Identity Paradoxes
The Self and Others in the Literature of Aldous Huxley

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Identity Paradoxes:
The Self and Others in the Literature of Aldous Huxley

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Abstract

This dissertation is a study of the literature of Aldous Huxley, especially his fiction, with a particular focus on the issue of identity. By observing his representations of the self and Others, and by elucidating his attitude towards political and cultural problems pertaining to identity, I aim to reveal significant aspects of this topic, which have not been fully recognized in recent research on his work. Each chapter offers close readings of his texts biographically, historically and theoretically.

Chapter I, “Self,” sheds light on Huxley’s early writing on the Great War, particularly the “Farcical History of Richard Greenow,” disclosing his insights into the mind, which are then compared with psychoanalytic discourses on human aggression. Chapter II, “Woman,” focuses on Point Counter Point and analyses female characters while considering the actual women around the author as well as gender criticism of the maternal and the feminine. Chapter III, “Savage,” examines Brave New World by contextualizing the Savage Reservation and the hero Savage with their possible sources in anthropology in order to align the text with postcolonial concerns. Chapter IV, “Mass,” delves into how Huxley deepened his Utopian ideas in his later career, and investigates specifically Eyeless in Gaza and Island in relation to Marxist discussions of Utopia and totality.

With his sensitivity and imagination, the novelist Aldous Huxley consistently questioned the concept of identity in ways that might now seem postmodernist. However, his fear that loss of identity would lead to loss of meaning in life, history and
the world prompted him to seek a paradoxical form of identity that was not fixed or exclusive, and that was based on his scientific and religious belief in the changing and hybrid “unity,” existing behind all animate and inanimate beings.
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First, I offer my heartiest thanks to my supervisor, Professor Max Saunders, whose gentleness, gravity and Huxleyan encyclopaedic knowledge assisted me in studying and living in an unfamiliar place—unlike the World Controller in Brave New World, who brings misfortune upon a visitor to twenty-sixth-century London. I must also tender my gratitude to the International Aldous Huxley Society, particularly its president, Emeritus Professor Bernfried Nugel (University of Münster). It was indeed “an expected pleasure” (BNW, Chapter 3) in my sometimes-dystopian life that my original article for the latter part of Chapter III was awarded the Peter Edgerly Firchow Memorial Essay Prize. Moreover, I am deeply grateful to my former supervisors—Emeritus Professor Ai Tanji (University of Tokyo), Professor Yoshiki Tajiri (University of Tokyo) and Emeritus Professor Yoshio Inoue (Hitotsubashi University). They have effectively educated me by showing their own sincere attitudes towards literature rather than by instructing what/how I should do in/with literary studies. My research was financially supported by the Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO), without whose funding I would not have been able to study in the UK and my dissertation would appear in a totally different form, or perhaps even not at all.
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Introduction

And now at last it was clear, now by some kind of immediate experience he knew that the point was in the paradox, in the fact that unity was the beginning and unity the end, and that in the meantime the condition of life and all existences was separation, which was equivalent to evil.

—Aldous Huxley, *Eyeless in Gaza*

Before his successful career as a novelist, Gabriel García Márquez was engaged in journalism, writing many articles for newspapers, some of which are interesting albeit in a different sense from his original intention. A column titled “Nobel Prize Again” (8 April 1950, *El Herald*) is one such example. It is ironic that Márquez, who himself would win the prize thirty-two years later, made fun of the Swedish Academy, questioning very much their insight into the worth of literature. Márquez also made a mistake when he declared that William Faulkner was unlikely to be awarded the prize precisely because he was too a good writer—in fact, Faulkner did receive the 1949 prize retrospectively in 1950. A more unexpected remark is that Márquez counted Aldous Huxley as one of the great European writers, along with Virginia Woolf, James Joyce, André Gide and Marcel Proust: “Herman Hesse did not deserve the Nobel Prize for Literature. [. . .] And I am sure that the venerable members of the Swedish Academy would have a much more enjoyable time reading *Point Counter Point* and *Eyeless in Gaza*, the most interesting works by Huxley, than any by Hesse.”¹ Although Huxley was indeed nominated for this prestigious prize in seven different years,² it probably looks
natural, to most of us, that the academy awarded the prize to another candidate each
time, ignoring a writer who is now remembered nearly only as the author of the
controversial *Brave New World* (1932).

On the whole, we may, however, not have to deplore the demise of Huxley’s
reputation. In 1999, when the Modern Library announced the “100 Best English
Language Novels of the 20th Century,” the editorial board ranked *Brave New World*
fifth, only after *Ulysses, The Great Gatsby, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* and
*Lolita*; incidentally *Point Counter Point* (1928) was ranked forty-fourth. The board
consisted of authors and scholars from the humanities, but if the list had been drawn up
entirely by literary scholars, it would likely have been impossible for Huxley to have
gained a higher ranking than Woolf, E. M. Forster and D. H. Lawrence.

Why, then, has Huxley recently been less popular in the academic community? In
“Aldous Huxley and the Modernist Canon” (1995), Peter Edgerly Firchow, a leading
expert on the author, gives two distinct answers. Firstly, Huxley’s literature, which
sacrifices “complexity of expression” for his aim of “clarity,” is not suitable for “the
kind of close reading which [. . .] still remains the staple of literary instruction,
especially of modernist writers, in the universities.” The second reason appears to me
more relevant, essential and therefore persuasive:

Huxley lacks—in today’s English-speaking academic world anyway—a
clearly definable constituency. In this respect he differs from just about all
the other major modernist writers. He is not specifically supported by the
gay community, as are Forster and Auden; nor by the feminists, as are
Virginia Woolf and H.D.; nor by Irish-Americans and post-colonialists, as are Joyce and, to a lesser and more ambiguous extent, Yeats [. . .]. (RM, 173)

Firchow’s argument contains the suggestion that Huxley’s text is not closely related to the topics addressed by critical theories that have been ‘fashionable’ in the academic community since the late 1970s. Indeed, this point seems true not only of postcolonialism and gender, which Firchow clearly bears in mind, but also of other theories such as Marxism and psychoanalysis.

My Ph.D. dissertation ultimately aims to overturn these two images of Huxley, which have probably contributed to the unpopularity of this author and which have been widely shared and reproduced by many literary scholars, including some Huxley researchers. Throughout this dissertation, I aim to demonstrate that Huxley’s literature is indeed worth studying by close reading with a particular emphasis on the critical topics noted above. In a less abstract way, the subject of my dissertation is interpreting Huxley’s literature, particularly his fiction, with regard to the issue of identity, to reveal hidden significances of Huxley and his work to his time and ours. In my discussion, due attention will be given to his representations of the self and Others, as well as to his attitude towards contemporary political and cultural problems related to identity. Here, “Others” refers to women, non-Western people and the masses—i.e., those who are others in a political sense for Huxley, a British white male intellectual from the upper-middle class. It is probably because scholars have assumed Huxley had conventional/unquestioning relations to these Others that he has not received searching
theoretical explorations. The image of his life, far removed from the vulgarity of the world, has been stressed too often by many critics and biographers, although it could also be traced back to his avowed philosophy of “non-attachment” (see e.g., *The Perennial Philosophy* [1945], Chapter 6).

In terms of methodology, I observe how Huxley came to grip with the issue of identity by closely investigating his texts biographically, historically and theoretically. I am particularly interested in comparing his work with his contemporary and the present-day materials that have been slighted or are unknown in Huxley studies. My research will also be characterized by a stress on his fiction rather than his non-fiction. This is because I would like to highlight not so much an aspect of Huxley as an essayist or a thinker with intelligence and reasons—which has already been recognized in previous debates—but an aspect as a novelist with imagination and sensitivity—which has been unfairly underestimated. It can also be expected that Huxley’s fiction reflects more honestly and daringly his conscious or unconscious mind in response to problems pertaining to identity.

Before focussing on his fiction, I will summarize what Huxley in his non-fiction wrote about identity, especially about the concept of the self. In his early work, Huxley repeatedly emphasized the fluid and diverse nature of the self. According to “Spinoza” and “Pascal” in *Do What You Will* (1929), everyone tries to be “one person all the time” “of stiff consistency” (*AHCEII*, 371), encouraged or forced by Christianity and some aspects of modern civilization, but the fact is that “[w]herever life exists, there also is inconsistency, division, strife” (326) and that a human being is “a series of distinct
psychological states, a colony of diverse personalities” (402). Not disregarding “every element of human nature” (327), we should aim to achieve “self-harmony” (325) as the “life-worshipper.” Huxley himself avows: “I prefer to be dangerously free and alive to being safely mummified. Therefore I indulge my inconsistencies. [. . .] I try to be sincerely all the numerous people who live inside my skin and take their turn at being the master of my fate” (371). Logically, the diversity and fluidity of the self appear to allow one to live freely or irresponsibly in a certain sense. In “Personality and the Discontinuity of the Mind” in Proper Studies (1927), Huxley, after mentioning several “frameworks” of “personality” that human beings have been searching for since ancient times, goes on to attack Marcel Proust for his “strange moral poverty”; instead of “suggest[ing] what we ought to do,” he is “content to live the life of an intermittent being,” whose philosophy of life is intolerable “for those whose life is mainly passed out of the sickroom” (AHCEII, 267-68). On the other hand, Huxley in his later work consistently impressed on readers the importance of transcending the self and being aware of the Divine Ground: “man’s obsessive consciousness of, and insistence on being, a separate self is the final and most formidable obstacle to the unitive knowledge of God. To be a self is [. . .] the original sin, and to die to self, in feeling, will and intellect, is the final and all-inclusive virtue” (PP, 36).

Although it goes without saying that Huxley’s later perspectives were formed under the influence of his deepening concerns about religion and mysticism, his consistent refusal to see the self as something single or static can be attributed to his well-known familiarity with literature and philosophy. For example, one of his favourite
poets, William Blake, in his *Milton* (c. 1804-08), inserts a scene in which Milton talks with the “Seven Angels” about the essence of human beings: “We are not Individuals but States: Combinations of Individuals” (Plate 32). D. H. Lawrence, who greatly influenced the younger Huxley, associates his view of identity with his philosophy of life. In “Democracy” (written c. 1920 and published in *Phoenix* [1936]), Lawrence insists that “[c]reative life is characterized by spontaneous mutability: it brings forth unknown issues, impossible to preconceive” and that the notion of “personality” (the “ideal self”) is “just a machine,” “a fixed, static entity, an abstraction, an extraction from the living body of life” (711). In the area of philosophy, Huxley’s view of the self may remind one of the empiricist David Hume, who in *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1740) refers to the instability of the self, based on his concept of the mind as “a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement” (239). In *Appearance and Reality* (1893), one of Huxley’s favourite philosophers, F. H. Bradley, argues that the “self” is “made of inconsistencies” and “has no power to defend its own reality from mortal objections” (89). However, Huxley’s view of identity, as long as it is outlined thus, will never appear rare or unique in the period of modernism, which was characterized by an experimental way of representing the self with a narrative style of “stream of consciousness.”

From another angle, I will reconsider Huxley’s attitude towards identity to reveal the intertextuality of his text with discourses about culture and politics in his own time and beyond. We know that the period from the end of the nineteenth century up to the
present has been a turbulent age for notions of identity, which we may call the era of
identity crisis (not in a strict sense of psychology). A Western philosophy of the self as
sameness or continuity can be traced to René Descartes (*Cogito ergo sum*), but the
nineteenth-century psychologist William James challenged this dominant view by
highlighting a more mentally flexible nature of the self, and Sigmund Freud secured this
image of the self in Western thought, introducing a study of psychoanalysis to more
closely focus on hidden aspects of the mind, such as repressed desires. Of course, such
intellectual quests for redefining the self developed with public campaigns both in
politics and culture. Strictly speaking, the self and identity are different concepts;
identity is not always based on the self but can take various forms of collective identity,
subscribing to the same groups of nation, race, gender, sexuality and class. It may be
remarked that the age during which Huxley lived was the first time in history when such
categories of identity began to be shaken considerably and to be reinforced seriously.
Certainly, Huxley *himself* witnessed—if not literally—women ‘invading’ former male-
dominated spheres of culture and politics, the colonized resisting Western imperialism
and ‘civilization,’ and the working class promoting their positions in parallel with the
rise of socialist countries. Following his death, before *our* eyes—again, not literally—
these tendencies and streams became more radically accelerated, reflecting or being
reflected by a postmodern dismantling of the self which theoretically (as the sociologist
Anthony Elliott argues) has “promoted a suspicion of identity norms, given values,
established hierarchies, and traditional social practices” (17). How did Huxley react to,
or to what degree was he able to anticipate, such phenomena? Attempting to answer this
question may provide a new understanding of our seemingly antiquated theme, Aldous Huxley and identity.

Undoubtedly, in literary studies, the issue of identity has been energetically and repeatedly taken up, and even in only modernist literature in recent years, we have seen several important publications that are relevant to this subject. For example, in *Self Impression: Life-Writing, Autobiographiction, and the Forms of Modern Literature* (2010), Max Saunders carefully follows formalistic aspects of works on the self from the latter part of the nineteenth century to the present, finding ever-intensifying confusion between genres of auto/biography and fiction: “Where *fin de siècle* autobiografiction [such as John Ruskin and Proust] was tentative and anxious, and modernist engagements with life-writing [such as Joyce, Ezra Pound and Woolf] were formally more experimental, Postmodernist autobiographies like these [such as Vladimir Nabokov and Doris Lessing] are more ludic and performative in their explorations of the aesthetic life” (492). On the other hand, Meghan Marie Hammond contributes to an understanding of the self and the other by noting a shift from “sympathy” (feeling for; depending on some distance from others) to “empathy” (feeling with; instead attempting to obliterate this distance) in the literature and psychology of the modernist era (*Empathy and the Psychology of Literary Modernism* [2014]). Although my research does not necessarily concentrate on life-writing or psychological aspects of literature, it introduces a perspective on Huxley that may suggest a new approach to the issue of identity in literary studies.

For a re-evaluation of Huxley’s literature, I propose presenting my discussion and
arguments in four chapters, which are outlined below.

Chapter I, “Self,” primarily addresses Huxley’s first piece of published fiction, “Farcical History of Richard Greenow” (1920). During the Great War, Huxley, disqualified from military service, appears to have become wary of war, influenced by the tragedies of his many enrolled friends as well as the pacifist atmosphere of Garsington Manor; this ‘single-track’ understanding is reviewed in this chapter. By comparing his novella with contemporary anti-war fiction, the chapter points to his deeper insights into human aggression before moving to another comparison of his work with psychoanalysis by focussing on how Freud simultaneously dealt with human aggression and how Melanie Klein and recent critics of psychoanalysis have developed Freud’s views in more complicated and paradoxical ways. In addition to “Richard Greenow,” Huxley’s two other pieces published in the same year, “Happily Ever After” and the poem “Soles Occidere et Redire Possunt,” are together presented for consideration in a bid to gain some hints for approaching the author’s psychology in and after the wartime. This chapter’s discussion of the young Huxley’s view of the self leads to the following chapters’ discussions of his later views on Others.

Chapter II, “Woman,” provides an intensive reading of Huxley’s masterpiece *Point Counter Point* (1928), which has been regarded as a typical “novel of ideas” in which the plot appears to unfold with a focus on male characters. The collapse of a mother-child relationship frequently appears in his fiction and is particularly conspicuous in this novel, which sheds light on the ways in which less maternal or feminine women live, feel and suffer. This chapter looks at this issue firstly by
comparing contemporary discourses on gender and reproduction, as seen in the To-day and To-morrow series (1923-31), secondly by considering biographical information about the author’s wife Maria, friend Naomi Mitchison and lover Nancy Cunard, and finally by discussing the novel with reference to theoretical remarks on the maternal and the feminine, including those by Julia Kristeva and Judith Butler. This chapter, together with the following two chapters, challenges the generally accepted image of Huxley as a conservative elitist.

Chapter III, “Savage,” is also devoted to a close analysis of Huxley’s best-selling futuristic novel *Brave New World* (1932), observing particularly its representation of “savages” beginning with Chapter 6. To reconsider the author’s attitude towards imperialism, this chapter reads the novel not so much as a text categorized as either dystopia or eutopia but just as a story that is set in the twenty-sixth century. Having examined reports on American Indians by anthropologists, Huxley imagined the future of Indian society and the destiny of a “savage” hero with a complex identity. To what degree is this text free from or bound by contemporary ideology regarding Others? With reference to postcolonial criticism such as that of Edward W. Said, this chapter takes a closer look at how Huxley maintains or subverts concepts of race, nationality, civilization, savagery and primitivism.

Chapter IV, “Mass,” follows Huxley’s later work, mostly from his turning-point story *Eyeless in Gaza* (1936) to his final novel *Island* (1962). This chapter is particularly interested in his pilgrimage towards utopian ideas, which may be read as reflecting his experiences since the 1930s, such as his tours of industrial towns (“Alien
Englands”), engagement with pacifist campaigns and involvement in popular cultures, religions and drugs. Although he has been repeatedly defined simply as anti-Marxist or a satirist of socialist countries, how did Huxley truly view Marxism and Russia? His two utopian pieces, *Eyeless in Gaza* and *Island*, deserve special attention with regard to Marxist criticism, especially Fredric Jameson’s discussion of how to think of utopia and totality in the postmodern era. This final chapter also functions as a bridge between our understanding of Huxley in the previous chapters and the Conclusion, in which we can review his long struggle with the issue of identity historically, biographically and theoretically to acknowledge the significance of his literature in and beyond his time.

1 Márquez wrote this article, “Otra vez el Premio Nobel,” under the pen-name of Septimus. Gide received the Nobel Prize in 1947, Hesse in 1946.


3 Modern Library also announced Readers’ List, which ranked Ayn Rand’s *Atlas Shrugged* first and *Brave New World* eighteenth.


5 For example, Leonard Woolf, one of Huxley’s acquaintances, recollects: “His curiosity was so intense and his intellect so strong and subtle that his imagination never entirely broke loose from the reasoning part of his mind. That is why, I think, his novels, with all their merits, are never in the highest class. But his essays, where there is a perfect marriage of intellect and imagination, are masterpieces, works of art” (NT, 37-38). In his introduction to the volume of Huxley in the series “Bloom’s Modern Critical Views,” Harold Bloom mentions *Antic Hay* (1923) and *Point Counter Point* as “very literate Period Pieces” and
Brave New World as fiction that “scarcely sustains rereading,” and concludes: “Aldous Huxley was a superb essayist but not quite either a novelist or a sage” (1-2). David Bradshaw’s historicist studies on Huxley’s engagement with social and political activity and Huxley specialists’ focus on the mystic Huxley seem to eventually contribute to the perception of Huxley as a thinker and essayist. Of course, this can also be partly attributed to Huxley’s definition of himself as a novelist of ideas (see PCP, 353-86).

Another influential figure in literature is Proust, whom Huxley appears to have consistently disliked. In “The Intermittences of the Heart” from Sodom and Gomorrah (1923-24), the narrator, remembering his grandmother, expresses his mental state: “the self that I had just suddenly become once again had not existed since that evening long ago [. . .]. The self that I then was, that had disappeared for so long, was once again so close to me” (147). Although Proust’s image of the mind is certainly “intermittent,” the “Lost Time,” which he spent idly with such a state of mind, is sublimated together into the meaningful “Time Regained.” This structure appears similar to that of Eyeless in Gaza, in which Huxley again attacks Proust (6-7). As discussed in Chapter IV of this dissertation, the final chapter of this novel offers some meaning to the divided days which the hero has thus far defined as meaningless.

In 1934, Huxley also wrote another piece on personal identity, entitled “Personality,” which he developed as Anthony’s notebook in Chapter 11 of Eyeless in Gaza. For a detailed analysis of the impact of Romanticism on Huxley’s theory of “personality,” see Robert S. Baker, The Dark Historic Page: Social Satire and Historicism in the Novels of Aldous Huxley, 1921-1939, 126-35; for a discussion in philosophical contexts, see Lothar Fietz, “The Fragmentariness of the Self: Continuity and Discontinuity in the Works of Aldous Huxley” (1994). In her recent doctoral dissertation, “Reading the Self / the Other: Aldous Huxley and Ethical Criticism” (2012), Facultatea de Litere reads Huxley’s Point Counter Point, Eyeless in Gaza and The Genius and the Goddess, using a philosophical approach to his notions of the self and the other.

For the outline above, see Anthony Elliott, Concepts of the Self (3rd. 2014), 12-24.
Throughout my dissertation, I use ‘Chapter’ plus a Roman numeral for one of chapters included in *this* dissertation, and ‘Chapter’ plus an Arabic number for a chapter in any other book or dissertation by others.
Chapter I Self
—Early Writing—
War and Psychoanalysis

1. Introduction

As Sybille Bedford, a friend of Aldous Huxley and his first wife Maria, remarks in her 1974 biography, the Great War gave Huxley “the second isolation,” making him “a stranger to the world of contemporary experiences” (48). Unlike most of his Oxford friends, he could not enlist due to poor eyesight, from which he had suffered since three years previously, when he had developed keratitis punctata—this had been the cause of his first isolation, when he had dropped out of Eton. There can be no disagreement that the person “Aldous Huxley” must have been formed to a great extent by these two isolations, as well as by the death of his mother (when he was fourteen), and the suicide of his brother Trevenen (immediately after the beginning of the war). Moreover, few people would disagree with the view that his wartime life as a sort of outsider affected the writer “Aldous Huxley,” especially with regard to certain aspects of his literary career, e.g., his satirical spirits, by which he could see society from the isolated viewpoint of an intellectual. However, the present chapter, by analysing Huxley’s early post-war writings, particularly his literary pieces reflecting the unconscious, aims to reveal unknown sides of his relationship to the war (or war in general), reconsidering how Huxley consciously or unconsciously reacted to it and how it affected his subsequent views of the world and of human beings.
The chapter draws on psychoanalysis, especially psychoanalytical criticism of war and the destructiveness of the human mind. My intention here is not so much to interpret the author’s texts and psychology by applying psychoanalytic theory but to consider a hitherto undiscussed intertextuality between his work and psychoanalytic discourses of his time and beyond. Psychoanalysis definitely provides an important perspective for a general discussion of war (as suggested by the well-known contribution of the Great War to later Freudian psychoanalysis), and it is no less useful for a specific focus on Huxley, who referred to the subject repeatedly throughout his life. Surprisingly little attention has been paid to Huxley’s relationship to psychoanalysis, and the previous studies on this issue tend to centre on *Brave New World* (1932) and Sigmund Freud, especially his concept of the Oedipus complex. Revealing psychoanalytical significances of Huxley’s work, the present chapter will thus supplement existing studies to a certain degree by acknowledging some of his minor writing and the discourses of psychoanalysis provided by Freud and more recent critics.


Huxley’s Oxford days, beginning in October 1913, were supposed to be one of the happiest periods of his life. In the first year he was blessed with many friends, but the climate changed in August 1914, when England declared war against Germany. Within a few weeks, Trevenen killed himself at only twenty-four because of his failure in the civil-service examination and his unrequited love for a maid in his family. Many
Oxford students soon enlisted; Huxley himself applied a few times but naturally was rejected due to his damaged eyes. Leaving college, where remaining students were almost exclusively women and foreigners, Huxley lived with the Haldanes, and towards the end of 1915 he first visited Garsington Manor, home of Philip and Ottoline Morrell, where he became acquainted with the Bloomsbury intellectuals, his future wife Maria Nys and D. H. Lawrence. After the introduction of conscription in January 1916, Huxley was repeatedly called before medical boards only to be confirmed unfit for military service. In June, Huxley graduated from Oxford with a first in English—the honour was reported on page 12 of The Times, 3 July 1916, where much more space was devoted to “Roll of Honour” lists of military casualties. In September, his first book, The Burning Wheel, came out (his first published verse had already appeared in Oxford Poetry [1915]). As his civilian duty in wartime, he worked on Philip Morrell’s farm from September 1916 to April 1917, and was then engaged in a clerical job at the Air Board until July 1917. While teaching at Eton from September 1917 to February 1919, he published two poetry books, Jonah (1917) and The Defeat of Youth (1918). The armistice was announced in November 1918. Huxley’s life now seems like smooth sailing: he started an editorial job on the Athenaeum with Middleton Murry (April 1919 to October 1920), and married Maria in July 1919, who gave birth to their son Matthew in the following April.

Although the objective “facts” are as above, what did Huxley think and feel about the Great War? Certainly, his wartime letters were strongly coloured by his anxiety about the safety of his enlisted friends and his grief over the death of some of them (see
especially Smith 63-84; Sexton 18-19, 28-29). As David Bradshaw aptly expresses, Huxley’s “poor eyesight had preserved him from the carnage of the Front, but it had not prevented him witnessing the decimation of a generation” (“BSHM,” 219). It would be natural—especially considering the probable influence of Garsington pacifists—to expect that his sorrow over the war may have developed into a war-weary or anti-war feeling. Indeed, Huxley wrote to his family complaining about belligerent atmosphere without reason as well as the unfair treatment of conscientious objectors (see his letters to Leonard Huxley, 2 and 10 March 1916, Smith 69-71, 91-94), and confessing: “The longer this war goes on, the more one loathes and detests it. At the beginning I shd. have liked very much to fight: but now, if I could (having seen all the results), I think I’d be a conscientious objector, or nearly so” (letter to Julian Huxley, 31 March 1916, Smith 97). Critics thus tend to stress his pacifist mood in the later period of the war, and some of them further argue that from this time Huxley “never wavered in his opposition to war” (Birnbaum 105; see Dunaway HH, 15-19; see also Poller “TMHW”).

Of Huxley’s wartime works, the only poem that provides a direct narration of the war is “The Oxford Volunteers” (published in Jonah), in which he describes “the lamentable spectacle of them [a group of soldiers] marching along” (letter to Gielgud, 30 September 1917, Smith 135), suggesting his own disgust. His two poetry collections reflect the gloomy situations both of society and himself. The Burning Wheel, Huxley himself states, is “like going through my own private Morgue where every alcove is occupied by a corpse of myself” (letter to Julian, 7 September 1916, Smith 112). In The Defeat of Youth, the title poem, depicting the downfall of youthful idealism in love,
could be an echo of “the disillusionment of the men who fought in the trenches where they found not heroism but only futility” (Rosenhan “VBAH,” 236). Another poem, “Decameron,” might be partly a reflection of “guilt cloaked in satire against the pretentious escapism of his friends. They travel to a kind of rustic Bloomsbury to avoid reality and live the life of the mind” (Meckier AHPM, 71). These poems offer some insight into the possibility that Huxley’s attitude towards the war was more complex than what is clearly displayed by his letters.

To more deeply, or more daringly, consider Huxley’s relationship with the war, I will analyse his first piece of published fiction, “Farcical History of Richard Greenow” in Limbo (1920), which has hardly ever been discussed closely by critics, but which devotes more space to a narration of wartime than any other of Huxley’s works. True to the word “farcical” in its title, Huxley developed “Richard Greenow” with a fund of humour throughout the story, which certainly gave it a funny tone, but behind its farcical façade he actually dropped hints as to what he seriously thought and felt about his time and himself at the outset of his novelist career. This tale, written between around the time between the announcement of armistice and early in the new year, must reflect Huxley’s conscious or unconscious reactions to the war just after its end.

In his childhood, Dick (Richard Greenow), born in the same year as the author, secretly enjoys playing with dolls—in contrast to his sister Millicent, who prefers practical matters. In preparatory and public schools, Dick is “something of prodigy” (6), displaying his talents in mathematics and criticism of art and literature, and sometimes gets an inspiration for a poem from his love for a beautiful boy called Francis. Dick has
tended to repress his sentimental, imaginative characteristics in favour of his rational, logical characteristics, but finally, when he is at Oxford, the repressed aspects emerge as an independent and nocturnal personality—Pearl, a female writer. Thanks to this spiritually “hermaphrodite” nature (37)—specifically, thanks to the sales of Pearl’s sentimental novels—Dick can enjoy his life as an unproductive intellectual. However, after the declaration of war, he begins to suffer from neuroses, including his unspeakable fear of the crowd, and later realizes that Pearl is “invading” the sphere of his daytime life by writing pro-war propaganda (61-62), although he is engaged in an anti-conscription campaign, together with Hyman and other pacifists, believing in internationalism and socialism. Because Pearl, who apparently wants to be a land-girl, disturbs his application for the status of an absolutist conscientious objector, Dick is ordered at the local tribunal to work on a farm and is severely criticized for this by both Hyman and Millicent (now an exemplary patriotic civilian); their mutual attack on Dick ironically contributes to their getting married. After the war, Pearl goes to a public office to apply for suffrage, but because of her male appearance she is sent to a lunatic asylum where Dick, going on hunger strike, is killed as a result of force-feeding.

What made Huxley hit upon such a bizarre story? Biographically, the opposition between Dick and Pearl can be associated with the ambiguous wartime position of the author as the nephew of a belligerent propagandist, Mrs Humphry Ward, and as a member of an anti-war intellectual circle in Garsington Manor (see Svarny 56-57). In terms of historical contexts, what motivated the author to think up some aspects of this text might have been his masculine fear or hatred of a contemporary ‘invasion’ of
women into male-dominated spheres, including literature (see Gilbert 131; see also Huxley *Limbo*, 95-96), or his heterosexual anxiety that “authorship is a sign of inversion,” as suggested by Havelock Ellis (Sheets 208).

A perspective lacking in these explanations concerns non-combatant anti-war fiction. Certainly, a vast number of sentimental pieces of “home-front fiction” appreciated the war not just as an inevitable event but as something positive that would have a beneficial effect on a selfish, decadent society; many were written by women, including Mrs Humphry Ward, who, apart from her non-fictional contribution to the War Propaganda Bureau (as satirized by her nephew), wrote novels, such as *Missing*, which describes a tragic but strong-willed heroine who decides to work for the war after finding out about the death of her lover at the front. There was also some moderate war fiction, such as H. G. Wells’s *Mr Britling Sees It Through* (1916) and May Sinclair’s *The Tree of Heaven* (1917), both of which endorse the war but are critical of the anti-German racism or narrow patriotism sweeping the country. Though never popularized, anti-war fiction was also published, casting doubt upon the legitimacy of the war.9 It seems that Huxley’s “Richard Greenow,” centring on a conscientious objector’s life, owes something to anti-war fiction written by non-combatants in wartime.

For instance, Mary Agnes Hamilton presents in *Dead Yesterday* (1916) the horrible image of crowds in London streets in August 1914: “a mob of people and an indescribable inferno of sound”; “the whole wide street seemed to have become part of the seething, hideously shouting mass, all crying, as with one hungry bloodhound throat—‘War. War. War’” (231-32). The image is very similar to Huxley’s nightmarish
description of the Glasgow crowd around the same time, followed by the scenes in the train and on London streets (Limbo, 54-56). Rose Macaulay’s Non-Combatants and Others (1916), which is the most famous novel of this genre, narrates the experience of Alix, a young female artist with a disability who cannot contribute to the war. Curiously, the civilian heroine develops “the war disease”—not only because of her brother’s death but also due to the wartime atmosphere itself—in the same way as the civilian hero of Huxley: “you might quite truly look at the whole thing as a mental case; a case of nervous breakdown. The war’s playing the devil with your nerves” (138-39). In the end Alix joins an anti-war campaign because, in her words, “I can’t be fighting in the war, I’ve got to be fighting against it” (173); here, a pacifist campaign appears as a substitute to a military one, just as for Dick, as demonstrated below.

A text more likely to have directly influenced Huxley’s novella is the now almost-forgotten novel Despised and Rejected (1918) by Rose Allatini. This was published under the pseudonym A. T. Fitzroy, the name used by Huxley in the title of Dick (Pearl)’s novel, Heartsease Fitzroy (see Limbo, 33); Allatini’s book was regarded as a male writer’s just as Dick’s work is misrecognized as written by a woman. The novel soon became controversial for its advocacy of pacifist and homosexual rights, and under the Defence of the Realm Act the government destroyed unsold copies and prosecuted the author and publisher. Huxley, though not sure to have read the text, could have known the story before writing his own.

The musician Dennis in childhood did not like “manly” play, and has secretly felt in himself something like an unknown self, which he has turned into music (see 13, 66).
He recognizes himself as “[a]bnormal,” homosexual or hermaphrodite, “stand[ing] midway between the extremes of the two sexes” (90, 294), and suffering “the two conflicting strains of his nature”: “the continuous struggle between brain and body, the continuous struggle to suppress his instincts [including his homosexual love] and force them into ways not natural to them” (256). The role of war in the arts is ambiguous: the beastly atmosphere of wartime society makes Dennis neurotic, suggesting the incompatibility of arts with war (see 133, 203, 289), whereas the “nightmare” of the war also inspires his music as if it (and homosexual desire) were a trigger for creative activity (134-36; see 172, 202-03, 267-68). Believing in internationalism and socialism, Dennis and his friends are engaged in a pacifist campaign as conscientious objectors (see 169), with a desperate fate waiting for them in any case: either being sent to the front under compulsion, being ordered to do non-combatant service (followed by the criticism of their comrades as traitors [219, 228]), or being put into prison, where they will encounter “punishments that may injure them for life,” such as having food forced “through tubes up their noses if they won’t eat” (253). At the local tribunal, Dennis gets the second result, being made to do very hard labour, and the story ends with his friend’s expressing the expectation that hermaphrodites like Dennis are “a new humanity [. . .] in the process of evolution,” and making their sacrifice for those in the future (294-95). Despised and Rejected may have affected Huxley’s tale of Richard Greenow, especially the plot and the characterization of the hermaphrodite hero.

In his debut work of fiction Huxley, while employing the model of anti-war fiction cited above, delves more deeply into destructiveness or aggression in the human
mind. In short, by describing Dick, who promotes war through his alternate personality and who cannot accomplish his pacifism, Huxley tries to reveal that people out of the mainstream (such as COs, socialist artists and others who are judged unfit for service [including homosexuals and the disabled]—those whom Allatini and Macaulay expect to be pacifist) are inherently as aggressive or destructive as many people in the mainstream (such as the beastly crowd for which Hamilton shows intense hatred); by doing so, he also seems to satirize this genre. It is exactly this point, namely Huxley’s acute and pessimistic understanding of the human mind, which proves that the significance of this text cannot be reduced to the contexts of preceding (anti-) war fiction, and encourages us to compare it with the discourses of psychoanalysis, which was radically developing in those days, beginning to probe deeply into human aggression.


3.1. Aldous Huxley and Psychoanalysis

As is often pointed out, a vital relationship can be seen in modernism and psychoanalysis, both of which, for example, interdependently attempted the extension of reason (or language, science) into the sphere of emotion (or the mind, the unconscious). In Britain, psychoanalysis developed as a literary rather than a scientific discourse. Although, soon after the publication of Josef Breuer and Freud’s Studies on Hysteria (1895), psychoanalysis, or a new study that would become “psychoanalysis,” had received due attention from British sexologists such as Havelock Ellis as well as the
Society for Psychical Research, the strongest contributor to British psychoanalysis was of course the first English-speaking practitioner, Ernest Jones. As early as 1913, Jones established the London Psycho-Analytical Society, and in 1919, after dissolving this organization, formed the British Psycho-Analytical Society, incorporating two suffragist doctors, Jessie Murray and Julia Turner. Partly because of this, psychoanalysis developed uniquely in Britain in rapport with radical ideas such as feminism and socialism. In disseminating psychoanalysis in British culture, Bloomsbury played a key role, particularly by the publication in the 1920s of Freud’s *Collected Works*, although Bloomsbury characters, including Virginia Woolf, did not necessarily trust psychoanalytic treatment. In 1925, Jones invited Melanie Klein to London, but her arguments—especially on the nature of the infant and the centrality of destructiveness—stirred controversy with Freud and Ann Freud, who also came to London in 1938.

Under the growth of Nazism and Fascism, it can be said that psychoanalysis experienced a shift from Freud to Klein, paternal to maternal, the sexual impulse to that of death—the trajectory attuned to the concerns of some varieties of modernism.18

It is thus natural that, throughout his life, Huxley maintained an interest in psychoanalysis or psychology, recognizing its importance in understanding and improving the conditions of human beings and society. In his writing, the name “Freud” appears more frequently than that of any other psychologist (Freud is probably even the third most frequently referred to intellectual figure after D. H. Lawrence and William Shakespeare), sometimes accompanied by his mention of Freud’s works, such as *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1899), *The Schreber Case* (1911) and *Totem and Taboo*
Certainly, Huxley is well aware of the impact of Freud’s psychoanalysis upon the public, especially his interpretation of “sexual behavior” (*Do What You Will* [1929], *AHCEII*, 345) and “the Unconscious” (“Genius” [1956], *AHCEVI*, 327). Yet apparently Huxley is very critical about Freud’s analytical style and some parts of his arguments, in which he found “logical deficiencies,” “one-sidedness and an over-simplification of the problem”: “The basic Freudian hypothesis is an environmental determinism that ignores heredity, an almost naked psychology that comes very near to ignoring the physical correlates of mental activity” (*Literature and Science* [1963], *AHCEVI*, 140). From his late interest in mysticism and drugs, Huxley criticizes Freud’s apathy towards the “higher Not-Self within and beyond the self,” as well as the Freudians’ neglect of the positive aspects of “LSD or mescalin” (letters to an unknown recipient, c. 20 July 1952, Smith 647; to Mrs Ellen Huxley, 6 December 1956, Smith 813). As for Freud’s followers, Huxley appreciates to some extent C. G. Jung’s theory of psychological types, while attacking Alfred Adler and making no mention of Klein. Behind Huxley’s dissatisfaction, there was his belief that psychology can be effective only in cooperation with non-psychological studies, and that the human mind has often been analysed more accurately by non-psychological media such as fiction.

In fact, of Huxley’s published writing, the “Farcical History of Richard Greenow” is the first text that refers to psychology and Freud. After the beginning of the war, Dick, fearing Pearl, whom he can no longer control, visits Rogers—an amateur psychologist who is very familiar with “Freud, Jung, Morton Prince, and people like that” and who may “help him to lay the ghost Pearl.” Dick asks for his “professional advice,” saying:
“I believe I’m getting a bit neurasthenic”; “I want you to nose out my suppressed complexes, analyse me, dissect me” (63-64). Employing free association, Rogers asks Dick many questions, believing that “the majority of kinks and complexes date from childhood” and expecting that his replies reveal Rogers’s “favourite incest-theory,” “trace of those sinister moral censors, expurgators of impulse, suppressors of happiness” (66-67). Having “consulted a text-book,” Rogers declares that his friend’s present trouble is caused by “a great Freudian passion for his aunt,” just because he answered “Bosom” for the word “Aunt.”23 Probably disappointed at this, Dick never goes back to this amateur psychologist: “it wasn’t worth taking any more trouble” (66-68).

What can be deduced from this scene is Huxley’s thinking that Freud’s psychoanalysis, centring on his theories of sex such as the Oedipus complex, cannot understand, much less resolve, Dick’s problems—his neurotic condition as well as his alternate personality’s threat to him—the symptoms that began with the start of the war. Why did Huxley think so (which parts of Freud’s psychoanalysis dissatisfied him)? What sort of view of the mind did Huxley himself use to characterize Dick and make this story? The following sections consider these questions with reference to psychoanalytic discourses, especially on human destructiveness, provided by Freud, Klein and recent critics.

3.2. “Richard Greenow” and Psychoanalysis (1): Sigmund Freud

As early as the 1870s and 1880s, the French neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot worked on hysteria, hypnosis and dual personality, and it was one of his students, Pierre
Janet in *Psychological Automatism* (1889), who introduced the concept of “dissociation” as well as the distinction between conscious and subconscious. In Britain, Frederic W. H. Myers, one of the founders of the Society for Psychical Research, proposed the existence of the “subliminal self”—a concept similar to Jung’s “collective unconscious”—in the context of an attempt to explain paranormal events (see *Phantasms of the Living* [1886]). The most important psychologist in the late nineteenth century, however, was probably William James, the “Father of American Psychology,” whose *The Principles of Psychology* (1890) is particularly famous for the term “stream of consciousness,” a psychological metaphor for the transitory nature of the mind. In 1909, Morton Prince, whom Huxley mentions in “Richard Greenow,” published one of the most well-known studies of multiple personality, *The Dissociation of a Personality*. Of course, the theme of consciousness or the phenomenon of multiple personality became popularized by Robert Louis Stevenson’s *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* (1886), which is also mentioned in Huxley’s novella (see 37). It may certainly be argued that pre-Freudian psychology contributed to some formal aspects of Huxley’s debut piece of fiction; for instance, his description of Pearl as a “ghost” (63) or “devil” (71) appears to owe something to the then closeness between psychology and spiritualism (or psychic research).

However, the most important influence on Huxley in characterizing Dick was surely Sigmund Freud himself, especially his understanding of the conscious and the unconscious. Even before the publication of the authorized translation of Freud’s works—which certainly helped propagate Freudian psychoanalysis—some of his books,
including *The Interpretation of Dreams*, had already been available in English, and Huxley might have read them. It is at least likely that he came into contact with the basic tenets of Freud’s theory through his friendships with the Bloomsbury/Garsington intellectuals or the Haldanes. In the 1890s, Freud, through his clinical experiences with Breuer, became sure that neuroses (or hysteria) are physical expressions of emotional turmoil, and that the symptoms can disappear once unconscious memories of the past are narrated on the conscious level by the employment of hypnosis or free association (see *Studies on Hysteria* [1895], in which Breuer reports the famous case of Anna O., who had multiple personality, and Freud supplements this with eighteen cases of his). While recognizing the decisive role of sexuality in causing hysteria, Freud went on to argue that the mind is composed of three levels—the conscious, the preconscious and the unconscious—and that the ego is associated with the conscious, as opposed to the unconscious or the repressed. According to *The Interpretation of Dreams*, for example, repressed (e.g., incestuous) desire appears in dreams after having been distorted by a censor, and in this sense dreams are nothing less than an attempt at wish fulfilment. Freud also put forward the idea of the pleasure principle (the instinctual attempt to want pleasure and avoid pain), proposing two sorts of energy, namely the self-preservation drive and the sexual drive, both of which were later categorized under Eros, the life drive (see “Drives and their Fate” [1915]).

Formally or superficially, Huxley seems to employ some knowledge of Freud’s views of the mind. In a sense, Dick for example can be seen as the ego, while Pearl is a symbol of something that is repressed into the unconscious of his mind. Dick therefore
appears to pursue wish fulfilment, such as his repressed desires for romance, through his nocturnal personality. However, what is to be noted here is that Huxley critically supplements Freud’s sexuality-oriented model of the mind by incorporating unconscious instincts for aggression. Although or perhaps because the pacifist Dick has repressed his own destructiveness, it reappears in Pearl’s work for pro-war propaganda. She, or her “frightful” or “horrible” writing (62), is thus nothing less than the projection of his originally familiar elements. Rogers cannot make a correct diagnosis of Dick not simply because of his lack of clinical ability but due to the deficiencies of his favourite Freudian textbooks. It may be argued that through this work of ‘war fiction’ Huxley, in narrating the tragedy of Dick, is pointing to the destiny of the whole of humankind. Just as Dick, who has tried to control his aggressiveness in his endeavour to be rational and pacifist, remains a slave to it, human beings, despite having prohibited violence in the name of law and order, have never lost their violent disposition since ancient times, and this disposition has led them to engage in various kinds of atrocity, including the Great War.

Against his intention of satirizing Freud, Huxley curiously came to echo what Freud was thinking about the human mind during and after the war. Freud’s analysis of the war is seen in *Timely Reflections on War and Death* (1915), especially the first part.26 We may feel “disillusioned” by “the lack of morality shown outwardly by the states” and “brutality in the behaviour of individuals” (*MMM*, 174), but Freud astutely calls these disillusions groundless, “based upon an illusion” (179). Originally, individuals have “‘bad’ [egoistic] drives,” which usually do not become problematic
because of their “susceptibility to civilization,” the results of “the external factor” (e.g., “the compulsion of upbringing”) and “the internal factor” (i.e., being mixed with “drives of eroticism”) (176-77). However, once the wartime situation abolishes “moral restrictions,” individuals easily experience the “regression” of their mental life, just as we “cast aside our hard-earned morality” every night in “the sleeping state” (179-80). 27 Because such development and regression of the individual can apply equally to “the collective of individuals of humanity, nations” (182), it is still difficult to abolish war (182). 28

In 1919—while Huxley was writing the novella—Freud published “The Uncanny,” a text that is not directly relevant to the war but could not have been written without its influence on Freud’s thinking. 29 Freud’s argument here is paradoxical: an “uncanny element is actually nothing new or strange, but something that was long familiar to the psyche and was estranged from it only through being repressed” (U, 148). In other words, individuals have an “uncanny” feeling when they encounter “something familiar [‘homely,’ ‘homey’] that has been repressed and then reappears” (152). Apart from typical examples of the uncanny, such as “repressed childhood complexes” (154-55), Freud also remarks that an “uncanny” feeling emerges in facing an “evil” person like the “Devil” who has “special powers,” or by suffering “madness” which a person “can dimly perceive in remote corners of his own personality” (150). 30 Huxley in his novella seems to have fictionalized these arguments of Freud, bringing together his two essays despite never having read them. For Dick, Pearl is the “uncanny” self, 31 or the expression of the emotion and violence which he has repressed
through his reason and his pacifism. Something like Freud’s “uncanny” logic was crucial in Huxley’s response to the war between states and the brutality of individuals in the wartime.

Gradually Freud moved towards metapsychology, which was speculative rather than grounded upon his clinical experiences. In *The Ego and Id* (1923), Freud modified the opposition between the ego (the conscious) and the unconscious, arguing that the ego contains something unconscious. In the depths of the unconscious, “the life drive” and “the death drive” reside in conflict with one another in the element called the “id.” The death drive originally is a force of self-destruction, but it may be easily directed towards other objects (e.g., typically during war) for relief. As well as the ego and the id, there exists the “superego,” the element that has internalized social rules or morality, and which can be traced back to the Oedipal experience.

Here again, Freud’s model of the mind appears to help us understand, to a certain extent, what happens in Dick’s mind. On the one hand, Dick’s ego must heed his superego’s orders—‘do not love the same sex,’ ‘do not kill’ (both were illegal), and so on. On the other hand, his ego must be concerned with the opposing id, which tries to let him love—as the embodiment of Eros (the life drive)—or to engage in brutal behaviour—as the realization of Thanatos (the death drive). In short, his ego is torn between two conflicting drives. Dick therefore finds a compromise: under the pen-name of Pearl, he begins to fall in love with fictional boys and propagandistically urges others to work for the war (that is, mass murder/suicide). Although Huxley’s novella thus seems to correspond to Freud’s analyses of the mind and the war, going far beyond a
commonplace understanding of psychology, in my view it is crucial to look elsewhere—
namely, beyond Freud’s psychoanalysis—for a more appropriate evaluation of the work.

3.3. “Richard Greenow” and Psychoanalysis (2): Melanie Klein and Beyond

By applying dualisms (reason vs. emotion, peace vs. war), I have so far discussed
Dick’s mind under the assumption that his relationship with Pearl is essentially that of
contrasting personalities. This view appears to accord with Huxley’s calling the text
“my dual personality story,” and critics’ reading of it within a framework of “a dualistic
opposition.” But are Pearl and what she represents really in opposition to Dick? This
section will carefully analyse this “dual personality story,” attempting to challenge this
predominant view in search of a better understanding of the significance of the text.

First of all, the emergence of Pearl, an emotional and aggressive personality,
ever means that Dick ever loses the disposition symbolized by her. The two
personalities, Dick and Pearl, do not stand at opposite ends of a spectrum. For instance,
at a meeting of pacifists Dick still cannot deny the existence of his “senseless irritation”
with members of the lower classes and of his “pleasure” as incompatible with “reason”;
his lecture also depends mainly on his “inspiration” and “passion” rather than logic (78-
81). Moreover, it is very doubtful that Dick is really a pacifist, especially when he
regards other members as “queer” hypocrites interested only in “the salvation of their
own souls,” disregarding “the welfare of humanity at large” (72), and when he even
finds “a hot geyser of chauvinism bubbling up in his breast” (80).34

Our doubt turns to certainty through a close reading of the scene soon after the
beginning of the war—the most detailed description in the text, stretching over several pages. On hearing of the war while in Scotland, Dick cannot keep still because of an unusual “horror,” and sets out for London in order to “act, or at least create the illusion of action,” leaving his sister behind (53). Due to his “nervous agitation” he cannot “sleep” in the train. In Glasgow, before the next train comes, he spends a few hours wandering about the “streets,” but the inhabitants of the city speaking their “incomprehensible” words make him “shudder,” causing him to feel as if he were standing in “an alien place” or “hell” (54). In the “crammed” train for London, he is surrounded by Italian passengers sleeping like “carcasses,” whose “breath,” in his “nightmarish” imagination, is something like poison gas that may cause “suffocat[ion]” and “disease” (54-55). After suffering from visual and auditory hallucinations (e.g., hearing the wheels shouting “the War, the War, the War”), he reaches London but still cannot stop the “twittering and jumping” of his “nerves,” the “tic in his face” or the “twitching of the muscles” (56). Feeling “exhausted” and “faint,” he is conscious of feeling physically and mentally “divi[ded]” or “broken,” which prevents him from engaging in ordinary activities such as “walking” and “speak[ing]” (56-58).

In this scene, I would argue that Dick is simulatively undergoing the experience of a soldier heading for and standing on the front. For the military “action” in the “illusion,” he gets on a train, is sent off by his sister, and in the city “streets,” which can be identified as trenches, he encounters “hideous” “alien[s].” The train for London is also suggestive of a battlefield, or trenches in which soldiers are at times attacked by the enemy’s “suffocating” gas and also witness their “carcasses.” The disorders that Dick
undergoes as a virtual soldier are seen as the typical symptoms of “shell shock”: “fatigue, poor sleep, nightmares, jumpiness” and “a variety of somatic symptoms such as palpitations, chest pain, tremor, joint and muscle pains, loss of voice or hearing and functional paralysis” (Edgar Jones 23). Dick’s feeling of himself being divided or “broken” is also associated with the image of returned soldiers who were often called “Broken Soldiers,” as seen in, for example, articles since September 1916 in The Times (see also Cole 191-92). 36

Although he decides to join a pacifist movement, Dick, through this activity, is again fighting like a member of the army without being aware of it. Just as the army consists of young men grouped together beyond class distinctions under the name of (to use Siegfried Sassoon’s words) “Death’s Brotherhood,” this anti-war club is mainly based on male comradeship irrespective of class, especially in the friendship between the “leading spirits,” Dick and Hyman (72). Moreover, just as combatants on the front are forced to sacrifice themselves for the nation or the cause, Dick, at the tribunal for conscientious objectors, needs to prepare for being “killed” for his pacifist organization or because of his “belief” in “the solidarity of the human race” (83, 86). The similarity of Dick’s activity to military affairs is also suggested when the former is described using such words as “the cause worth fighting for,” “campaign,” “power[s],” “action,” “bold,” “strengthen” and “faith” (71-75; see also “army of vices” [74]), expressions clearly associated with the latter. After all, Dick, not being able to stick to “his principles,” is scurrilously denounced by Hyman and his sister as a “coward” who has “escaped” from his friends and beliefs, thus committing “treason” (88, 97-99); this scene is also
suggestive of the reaction of the army and the general public to deserters or shell-shocked soldiers.37

Towards the end of his life, Dick more straightforwardly undergoes simulated experience as a soldier. In a lunatic asylum, Dick attempts a hunger strike and is subjected to “forcible feeding,” a process in which he explicitly shares the sufferings of soldiers:

He thought of the millions who had been and were still being slaughtered in the war; he thought of their pain, all the countless separate pains of them; pain incommunicable, individual, beyond the reach of sympathy; infinities of pain pent within frail finite bodies; pain without sense or object, bringing with it no hope and no redemption, futile, unnecessary, stupid. In one supreme apocalyptic moment he saw, he felt the universe in all its horror.

(109)

After all, his resistance brings Dick the wound by which he soon dies, simulative experiencing the soldier’s end. What emerges in my reading is that Huxley’s text, despite appearing to be a simple story of opposing personalities (pacifist, cultural, rational vs. belligerent, violent, emotional), in fact carefully deconstructs this framework. In other words, Dick can never be fully analysed with a superficial understanding of Freud’s models (as shown in the previous section), i.e., in terms of mental dualism. This is a significant value of this text, I believe.

Freud’s concept of “the death drive” was so problematic and controversial that even his daughter Anna was reluctant to use the term (though recognizing aggression in
general); it was Melanie Klein who, throughout her career, studied the death instinct most acutely and persistently. Despite Julia Kristeva’s remarks that Klein “did not focus on the political aspects of madness that tainted the twentieth century” (*MK*, 15), Klein’s thought—influential even now, especially in British psychoanalysis—has an aspect that indirectly addresses the question of war. As Michal Shapira clarifies, during the Second World War, Klein devoted much attention to the reactions of patients to war events (such as the Nazi invasion of Austria), and found a reciprocal connection between destructiveness in the outside world and destructiveness in the self, which one patient referred to as “the Hitler inside me.” Although Shapira appreciates Klein’s psychoanalysis as “unique” in that “it looked at the social and political issues of the time through a very personal perspective of the individual” (109), in his early writing around twenty years before Klein, Huxley had in fact made a similar attempt to draw a parallel between the actual war and the internal war of a civilian (see *Limbo*, 62, 70).

What is more important to us, however, is Klein’s inquiry into human destructiveness, which has the radical potential to disturb the opposition between morality and violence, or possibly even peace and war. This can typically be seen in her view of the superego. While positioning the superego as cultural agency opposed to the violent id, Freud himself recognized the ambiguity of the superego, seeing in its sometimes harsh nature “a pure form of the death drive” (“The Ego and the Id” [1923], *BPPOW*, 143; see also “The Economic Problem of Masochism” [1924]). Although in “The Psychological Principles of Early Analysis” (1926) she had already begun to view the introjected hostile mother as the basis for an early persecutory superego, in the early
1930s Klein adopted Freud’s concepts of the life and death instincts to argue that the superego originates in the death instinct, which is fused with the life instinct. Here, we can no longer rely on a rough map displaying the superego as opposed to the id, and the life instinct as separated from the death instinct.

This is one of the reasons that Klein’s thought has recently received much attention from critics interested in psychoanalysis. In The Culture of Redemption (1990), Leo Bersani, questioning a commonplace belief in culture’s ability to symbolize or repair sexuality and violence, through his reading of Klein, Freud and others, gives another perspective on culture, namely as a non-symbolizing or non-reparative result of sexual or violent energy (see Chapters 1 and 2). Lyndsey Stonebridge, in The Destructive Element: British Psychoanalysis and Modernism (1998), finds in both fields “the intractable complicity between the destructive element within and cultural and social violence without” (16); she also insists on the importance of Klein, who not only stresses Freud’s “image of a super-ego which does not simply repress murderous desires but draws from them and repeats their ferocity with all the violence that it at the same time prohibits” (7) but also comes to a paradoxical conclusion regarding the death instinct: “the culture of redemption [. . .] ultimately testifies to the omnipresence of aggression” (44). Influenced by their arguments, Fuhito Endo, in his essay “Radical Violence Inside Out: Woolf, Klein, and Interwar Politics” (2006), highlights the radical potential of Klein to psychoanalytically deconstruct “the conventional opposition of culture vs. violence”; in Klein’s theory, “the superego, far from being a cultural repression/sublimation of the id, is a form of the same primal sadism as the id. The
id/violence can be the radical core of the superego/culture, an ominous example of Freud’s paradox of the uncanny” (176).  

Unfortunately none of these critics takes Huxley into account. I would argue, however, that the Kleinian attempt at deconstruction was already being practised effectively in Huxley’s early literary text. Dick appears to be cultural, following morality (=the superego), while Pearl seems much more violent, controlled by instincts (=the id); however, Dick, who, as my reading shows, simulatively experiences war through a pacifist campaign, is no more cultural or peaceful than Pearl, and may in some way be more violent than her—after all, she only writes about her support for the war. By showing this confusion, the text can be read as suggesting that the cultural and moral elements of rational order in the individual could paradoxically be indistinguishable from their supposed opposite—instinctual and violent elements which allow the individual to be selfish.  

In Huxley’s story, culture’s redemptive aspect is diluted in two ways: culture—whether it is high (Dick’s philosophical work) or low (Pearl’s popular writing)—is never a peaceful, redemptive result of controlling violence but something rather more dangerous that recapitulates violence, or may be an act of violence itself.

In “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms” (1946), Klein compiled her previous theories, introducing new concepts such as “the paranoid-schizoid position” (as opposed to “the depressive position”) and “projective identification.” Very young infants feel that there exist a ‘good’ mother (loving them and being loved by them) and a ‘bad’ mother (hating them and being hated by them); this is the paranoid-schizoid position. Later,
realizing that these ‘good’ and ‘bad’ objects are the same mother as one object, infants come to feel guilt; this is the depressive position. The ego and the superego are formed through this process. Unlike Freud’s chronological notion of “stages,” Klein’s positions continue in relationships with others even after maturity, although the ratio of each position changes according to the time and depending on the person (generally, leaning towards the depressive side is a ‘normal’ state, while leaning the other way leads to mental illness). In the paranoid-schizoid position, individuals suffer persecutory anxiety: in an unconscious phantasy called “projective identification,” aspects of an internal object (such as aggression) are split off and attributed to an external object.

This perspective may be applied to proceed towards an explanation of the psychology of human beings that lies behind war. In peacetime, most people can manage to see the other in an ambiguous manner, as naturally having both good and bad sides, but in war, people enter into collective paranoia, entirely projecting an internal bad object onto the other and thus making the enemy a purely bad object to be destroyed.

In Huxley’s text, Dick is naturally cast into paranoia with a triple structure because he faces three sorts of war—namely, the war outside (against Germany; see 113), the war inside (against Pearl; see 62, 70) and what I have called the simulative war (against the imaginary enemy). Among them, the first type of war is clear and natural in wartime, but the second and third types of war are peculiar and worth examining. Of course they do deconstruct the relationship between the self and the other, or the friend and the enemy, but I would discuss another aspect—namely, the reasons for Dick’s paranoid horror of Pearl and his own compatriots—while also considering the author’s
biography.

In the third type of war, the enemy appears for Dick as a form of ‘the masses.’ His hostility towards the masses is repeatedly described, but the two most conspicuous examples are the scenes where Dick sees the crowds in the street and when he talks with working-class participants of a pacifist meeting. In the former scene, Dick is surprised by the sight of the masses “so numerous and so uniformly hideous”: “Small, deformed, sallow, they seemed malignantly ugly, as if on purpose” (53). In the latter, Dick reluctantly dines and talks with pacifists of “the middle classes, the lower middle classes, the lower classes” (77), feeling a “senseless irritation”: “They degraded what was noble; beauty became fly-blown at their touch. Their intellectual tradition was all wrong. [. . .] When they talked about war and the International, Dick felt a hot geyser of chauvinism bubbling up in his breast” (80). It should not be surprising to see such persecutory anxiety held by an upper-middle-class intellectual, considering that in wartime, as is often noted, class differences were to some extent relativized because of the stress placed on national identity; the periods before and after the war saw the masses ‘invading’ politics and culture—territories formerly occupied by the upper and upper-middle classes—e.g., through extended suffrage and the improved status of craftsmen (see 30, 79). The text takes care to show that hateful pictures of the masses are a result of something like paranoia, where an upper-middle-class intellectual projects his own hateful image onto them. For instance, Dick, although shocked by the monstrous image of the crowd, is himself later seen by others similarly as “a kind of monster” (56). Despite his hatred towards pacifists of the lower classes, Dick also feels
like “a bloodsucker” living parasitically off them, whose subject is thus composed of the object he hates.

Another of the objects of Dick’s persecutory anxiety is women. Of course, this may be explained in the same way as his anxiety about the masses; as Dick tells Millicent, both during and after the war there was a certain male horror of women, who were ‘invading’ areas formerly occupied by men, such as politics (95-96, see also 69, 100-02). I would adopt another perspective, however, to consider Pearl, who associates femininity with aggression. It will be helpful in this respect to refer to Freud’s *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood* (1910, trans. 1916). In some respects, Dick appears to resemble Freud’s da Vinci. For example, Freud describes him as an ambiguous genius who has talent in both the arts and science, and who is both a pacifist and an inventor of weapons; da Vinci is a rare case who “succeeded in saving the greater part of his libido from repression by sublimating it into a thirst for knowledge” (*U*, 104). More importantly, in Freud’s view, da Vinci was a homosexual or hermaphrodite with a “womanly” personality, internalizing his lost mother within himself (see 50, 73-74). It is probably interesting to look at Dick’s hermaphrodite or homosexual nature in the same way: Pearl can be identified as his lost mother, although he represses his memories of her (see 65). However, while da Vinci’s mother as depicted by Freud is a pacifist woman who loves her son, Pearl is a belligerent mother who sends her son to the battlefield. Certainly, Dick’s mother is dead. Yet if she were alive, she would drive her son to death like other mothers at the time, saying: “Go! It’s your duty lad. Join to-day.” This terrible nightmare can be seen in the context of Dick’s
paranoiac horror of women.  

It might be more than speculation to identify such paranoia as being shared by the author. The image of the mother here comprises two women—his real mother and his aunt, Mary Ward. Huxley certainly drops hints at his deep affection towards Ward: Dick has “a great Freudian passion for his aunt,” vividly remembering his “kneeling on Auntie’s lap,” pressed to her “[b]osom” (66, 68). Indeed, there even exists a photograph of Huxley and his aunt in the same pose (as printed in Bedford, after page 232). Ward was certainly similar to a mother in several ways: she was Aldous’s godmother, helped develop his literary talent, and took on the role of mother to the Huxley siblings after their real mother’s death. If we assume this identification to be operative, and consider the fact that this quasi-mother really was writing war propaganda, it would not be strange if Huxley, when characterizing Pearl, had in mind his real mother, who would have sent him to the front if she had been alive and he had not been disqualified from military service. Because of this secret paranoia, Huxley may have put the bellicose image of the mother into the hermaphrodite protagonist, instead of Freud’s basically peaceful one.

By deconstructing seemingly evident distinctions between reason and instincts, culture and violence, peace and war, and friends and the enemy, “Richard Greenow” links itself to psychoanalytic issues that are still current. However, this radical potential of the text cannot be necessarily attributed to the author’s original intention of writing a “dual personality story”; Huxley may have made such a complicated story, consciously or unconsciously reflecting his personal feelings about the war. Of course, we must be
careful about simply identifying a fictional character’s psychology with the author’s, but it may be possible to take from it a lead for approaching hidden aspects of the author’s attitude towards the war.

3.4. Huxley’s Unconscious Desires: Two Other Pieces of His War Writing

Let us turn our attention to Huxley’s other works on the war, written in the same time. “Happily Ever After,” included in *Limbo*, is a short story set during the war. The plot can be summarized as follows. In the fourth year of war, Jacobson, an old academic, calls on his friend Petherton, a philosopher in Wiltshire who has a daughter, Marjorie. When summer comes, the house becomes alive with three visitors, Rogers (Petherton’s brother), and two returned soldiers, Guy (Marjorie’s fiancé) and George (a friend of the family), who soon return to military service. The trio of three elderly men regard war as necessary, and Marjorie feels it is a matter of little relevance to her, but after a while they are made painfully aware of the distress (and perhaps irrationality) of war by finding out that George has lost a leg and Guy has been killed. The story ends describing Marjorie in a self-reproachful mood, being comforted by George, with the ironic suggestion that these two will be married.

The final scene between Marjorie and George appears to reflect the author’s guilt as a survivor. On hearing of Guy’s death, Marjorie, who was loved by him and who also liked him, criticizes herself as a “beast,” realizing that she has been “awful” and “hated him,” and that she can still “laugh” in this situation (188). Soon more positive feelings emerge in her and George, however: “We who knew him and loved him must make our
lives a memorial of him”; “our darling Guy is with us here even now” (191). This scene may remind us of Freud’s discussion of mourning. A survivor’s ambiguous attitude towards the dead (e.g., unconscious desire for the death of the loved) is mentioned in Totem and Taboo (1913, trans. 1918), later associated with the background of guilt and morality in Timely Reflections on War and Death. In Mourning and Melancholia (1917), Freud defines melancholia as the state of internalizing the love-object (identifying oneself with the dead), which is unlike the mourning in which the object can be relinquished; in both cases, however, the individual shows “self-reproach for having been oneself responsible for the loss of the love-object, of having wanted that loss” (MMM, 211). Freud’s arguments would be endorsed by Marjorie’s ambiguity and self-reproach concerning this tragedy, and more importantly by her and George’s feeling of identification with the dead, Guy. On the other hand, the story, by suggesting that these survivors will live “happily ever after,” hints at another function of mourning, that is, establishing identification also between survivors. This may put the text beyond Freud again. In The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (1997), Judith Butler, by referring to Klein’s concept of “guilt” as “a way of preserving the object of love from one’s own potentially obliterating violence,” mentions the possibility that “guilt emerges in the course of melancholia not only, as the Freudian view would have it, to keep the dead object alive, but to keep the living object from ‘death’” (25). Butler goes on to argue that the constitutive aspect of melancholia, i.e., (in Jacques Derrida’s words) “the affirmative incorporation of the other [into the ego],” has the subversive potential to question the ontological notion of “autonomy” (195).
Like Marjorie (this means, incidentally, that the author puts himself on the female side), Huxley probably felt guilt because of his ambiguous position with regard to the war: certainly it brought immeasurable misfortune on many people, and of course some of this was suffered by Huxley too, but at the same time it gave him moments of great happiness, such as his encounter with Maria, a Belgian refugee who stayed in Garsington for a time.\(^{55}\) Some of Huxley’s wartime letters seem to testify that such guilt—naturally shared by many civilians and returned soldiers—had a psychological function of forging or deepening a survivor’s ties not only with the dead but with other survivors. For instance, he writes to Jelly d’Aranyi: “one way that people survive after they are dead is in the society to which they belong and particularly in their friends” (c. 13 July 1916, Sexton 28); here, he appears to relativize the distinction between the war dead and the survivors. On the other hand, an example of relativizing the distinctions among survivors can be found in another of his wartime letters to d’Aranyi, in which he mentions the “long casualty lists,” including many names he knew, and insists on the importance of “friendship” and “love”; he then turns his thoughts to his memories of his mother and Trevenen, who had died of causes unrelated to the war (October 1915, Smith 83). Here Huxley, placing his mother and brother on the same level as war casualties, seems to identify himself with bereaved families.

If we are to understand that Huxley stands on the side of the war dead, “Happily Ever After” might be read as more radically disclosing some of his secret desires. Indeed, Huxley apparently empathizes with Guy, an introspective and shy poet who, having served for the Air Board, is “too clever” and “rather inhuman” (180). I would
argue that Huxley, through this character, tried to consciously or unconsciously experience the tragic but heroic destiny of a soldier that he in reality could not undergo—an alternative destiny in which Huxley, free from disability, goes to the front for the Cause, leaving behind a woman he loves. In “The Creative Writer and Daydreaming” (1908), Freud, regarding the “literary work” as “a continuation of, and a substitute for, the earlier play of childhood” (U, 32), contends: “Unsatisfied desires are the motive forces behind fantasies, every fantasy being a wish-fulfilment, correcting an unsatisfactory reality” (28). Huxley’s unsatisfied desire to be a soldier may be seen as being driven by something like the death instinct, but at the same time it was probably supported by something more similar to the life instinct, the search for a sense of belonging, originating not so much in patriotism but in the loneliness that, having been unable to join the army, he experienced in wartime and beyond. This secret desire may be the very thing that makes his “Richard Greenow” so complex, far beyond the simple story of a man with contrasting pacifist and militarist personalities that Huxley probably originally had in mind. In the novella, Dick, reflecting the author’s repressed desire, comes to simulatively experience war, wishing for a sense of togetherness, which he finally attains with soldiers on the front—though only for a “moment.”

Another example of his war writing is the long poem “Soles Occidere et Redire Possunt,” published in Leda (1920). In the foreword, Huxley declares that the poem is dedicated to his friend, John Ridley, who was killed in February 1918, and who, five weeks before his death, made a “request” to him in a letter: “if I should perish—and one isn’t exactly a ‘good life’ at the moment—I wish you’d write something about me”
The poem, setting up this dead friend as its “subject” (109), recounts a brief time in the life of a young man called John, who is staying at home because of a wound but will soon be sent back to the front. It begins with a youth’s dream before the dawn. Having risen from his bed, he goes to lunch at his aunt’s, and at night, stays with his lover, Jenny.58

Apparently Ridley, depicted both in the foreword and the main text, was very similar to Huxley. According to the foreword, he was “an adolescent, and suffered from that instability of mind” and was “so feebly sceptical, so inefficient, so profoundly unhappy” (110); the fictional Ridley is interested in writing (116), has an indecisive character (111, 122-23) and prefers being an individual to being in a crowd (113, 118-19)—just like most protagonists in Huxley’s early works, such as the poet Denis Stone in Crome Yellow (1921), Guy, and Dick, who has an aunt with the same nickname as Ridley’s. Here again, the poem may be seen as the fulfilment of Huxley’s hidden wish for a soldier’s tragic destiny. At the same time, this identification with the dead Ridley can also signify the author’s guilt as a survivor, or the work of mourning for this friend. From this angle, the title—“Suns May Set and Yet Rise Again,” borrowed from Catullus, where a boy tries to persuade a girl to seize the day and make love with him as, unlike the sun, they are mortals—would come to represent the author’s ambiguity towards the present situation: he is grateful to be privileged to be still able to see the sun, and yet feels guilt for this. However, considering that Ridley does not seem to have been an especially close friend of his,59 it is probable that the poem embodies another sort of wish fulfilment: by embellishing his relationship with Ridley so it seems closer
than it was, Huxley may be consciously or unconsciously seeking to simulatively undergo the serious mourning and guilt that are only allowed between men on the front, based on their sincere friendship.60

In contrast to his wartime tendency towards pacifism as avowed in his letters and confirmed by previous studies, a reading of these literary pieces, together with “Richard Greenow,” suggests hidden aspects of Huxley’s mind in and shortly after the war, such as his longing for a soldier’s fate.

4. Conclusion

Through a close reading of his early writing, I have so far addressed hitherto unanalysed sides of Huxley and his work in relation to psychoanalysis and the Great War. “Richard Greenow” narrates a man with two personalities as a pacifist and a militarist, by representing the human mind more pessimistically and complicatedly than other contemporary war fiction, such as anti-war novels that expect minority groups (e.g., homosexuals, the disabled, artists and intellectuals) to be pacifist. Although because of his acute interest in aggression Huxley was critical of Freud’s early theory focused on sexual matters, his text displayed curious parallels with, or even anticipated, some facets of Freud’s writing on the war or his metapsychology centred on the death drive. By reflecting his conscious or unconscious mind, Huxley’s novella also deviated from his probably originally-intended framework of a story of contrasting personalities. The protagonist simulatively experiences war when he behaves as Dick, a rational and cultural pacifist, as if to prove this personality to be no less aggressive than Pearl, an
instinctive and violent propagandist. This deconstruction of the apparently opposing relationship between the cultural and violent elements in the mind allows the text to be compared with some significant aspects of psychoanalysis—particularly the paradoxical arguments shared by Klein and more recent critics of psychoanalysis—such as the scepticism towards the position of the superego as opposed to the id, and towards the notion of culture as a redemptive product of controlling and repressing violence.

His personal situation during the war could have also prompted Huxley to write such a text, despite his limited knowledge of psychoanalysis. The radical potential of Freud’s and Klein’s work can be seen as attempts at questioning and subverting the distinctions or categories that have been established or acknowledged by many, including the analysts themselves. As has often been stated, psychoanalysis itself was born as a discipline that questioned the existing ones, and has developed through ‘outsiders’—e.g., Jews, women and foreigners—who may in themselves have subverted conventional concepts such as ‘home’ and ‘friends.’

Freud and Klein, though both civilians, built their theories under the influence of the two world wars, and lived under the shadow of death—not only their own but also that of family members. Curiously enough, having been unable to join the army, Huxley came to find himself during the Great War in a solitary position like that of a woman or a foreigner, consistently exposed to the thought of death, represented firstly by his suicidal brother and later by the many war casualties among his friends.

Two other pieces of Huxley’s war writing, “Happily Ever After” and “Soles Occidere et Redire Possunt,” may help us to conceive of some hidden aspects of the
author’s mental state in and after the war. It can be argued that Huxley, led not only by something like the death instinct but by something like the life instinct as well, held secret desires to become a soldier and have male friendships, i.e., a sense of togetherness on the battlefield. These hidden wishes of the author, which contributed to the complexity of “Richard Greenow,” may bring to light the other side of his mind, which is different from the anti-war tenor evoked by his wartime letters.

Why did Huxley call the story a “Farcical History” and recount it as a farce? Perhaps we should not seek out division but harmony or unity between his serious insights into the war and human psychology and his unserious style of narrating them. Precisely in his despair over what he had realized during wartime, Huxley likely had no choice but to laugh at it, or to treat it as ludicrously improbable, partly because of his reluctance to accept it as the truth. As a result of developing the tale under his funny touch, Huxley succeeded not only in stressing the desperation of the desperate all the more but also in making the story worth reading until the end. Already in this debut piece of fiction Huxley demonstrated one of his primary literary styles—writing about the miserable or the hopeless with a façade of farce—the method that would work most effectively in Brave New World.

Although the main interest of the present chapter is in his early writing, it is worth briefly discussing how Huxley subsequently faced his personal memories of the war and the theme of war in general, in order to reconsider his relationship with psychoanalysis. In the first three novels, Huxley seems to have repressed his memories of the war; only in Point Counter Point, published ten years after the armistice, did he begin to
represent his traumatic war. The novelist Philip Quarles appears to be “thankful” to have been unfit for military service due to his lame leg, but actually lives with a sense of guilt and inferiority. This is typically suggested in the scene where, after travelling from overseas, Philip hesitates to jump across the “chasm” between the ship and the launch (as if to display his own anxiety that he might not be accepted by his country), and is helped by a military man, but irrationally becomes disturbed when the man asks whether his leg was damaged in the war (297-99).

Later, Huxley consistently tried to find ways to prevent war in the future, but it is doubtful that he could ever completely escape from the image of war. *Brave New World* envisages the world state of the twentieth-sixth century, most of which is civilized and peaceful as a result of political and scientific methods, including Freudian theory, but some of which is preserved as “Savage Reservations,” where people still live with violence and pain. The main plot is the uncanny return of the Savage into civilized society, suggesting that aggression cannot be completely eliminated from humanity. Facing the danger of another world war, Huxley concerned himself with absolute pacifism (which can be seen as an attempt at the absolute repression of war and of his memories of the Great War), based on his scientific and religious belief in the “unity” of all creatures and existences—as described in *Eyeless in Gaza* (1936). After the Second World War, Huxley wrote *Ape and Essence* (1948), a nightmarish story of the future after a nuclear war, displaying his despair over human beings, who have been repeatedly brought back to war as a repetition-compulsion as if led by “the Devil” or the death instinct (see especially 37). In his last novel, *Island* (1962), Huxley dreams up an ideal
society of pacifists, using all his knowledge of Western and Eastern cultures, but destroys it himself through invasion by militaristic countries.\textsuperscript{71} 

Objectively and subjectively, Huxley thus suffered the uncanny return of war despite his consistent longing for peace; it looks as if he himself tried to prove—through his failure to solve the problem of war—what in his debut work of fiction he had argued and suggested about human aggression. This may remind us of what Jacqueline Rose, a critic of psychoanalysis, calls “the ethics of failure” (\textit{WW}, 36). If in the name of “absolute truth” we try to unify or master chaotic or diverse things into one theory, this can lead to repeating dictatorship, violence or war—the very object we criticize (see 23-24, 35-36). The ethical, anti-war value can thus be found—again, paradoxically—in the failure of Freud and other critics to theorize the death instinct and war, and their hesitation to instantly solve the problem (36-37).\textsuperscript{72} By this logic, “Richard Greenow” appears as a pacifist text, in that it critically identifies the violence of pacifism (Dick) with that of war itself (Pearl).\textsuperscript{73} Paradoxically, the repeated failures of pacifism in Huxley’s writing guarantee an anti-war ethic, and his own recognition of the difficulty of abolishing war also means the author’s maximum effort at being a pacifist.

To turn again to Huxley’s relationship with psychoanalysis, his persistent dissatisfaction with this discipline may be explained by his capacity to gain deep insights into human psychology without relying on it. In a certain sense, Huxley proved his own claim that literature could address the mind more accurately and essentially than so-called psychology or psychoanalysis.\textsuperscript{74} He gradually directed his interest towards mysticism and religion to see the mind from another angle, while severely
attacking psychoanalysis and most aspects of psychology for paying little attention to these fields. Yet, thanks to his reluctance to earnestly study psychoanalysis, his literature successfully anticipated some arguments of current psychoanalytic criticism.

Lastly, let us return to the overall theme of this dissertation, the issue of identity. In his early writing, as demonstrated above, Huxley had already consciously or unconsciously questioned the concept of self, suggesting that Otherness (the woman, the alien, the masses) is immanent in the self and that the image of Others can be forged through the projection of that of the self. Yet Huxley did not attempt to close the distance between himself and Others, instead showing his paranoid horror of belligerent women, monstrous masses and beastly aliens. Ideologically, could Huxley later grapple with political and social issues related to these Others? Personally, could he come to feel empathy for them? These are the questions that I will approach in the following three chapters.

1 Huxley’s wartime isolation is suggested by Randall Stevenson as a possible reason “why he went on to write fiction [such as Brave New World] in which enclaves of cultured individuals often flourish only through isolation—essential but precarious—from the vicissitudes of a wider society” (118; see also 115).

2 In 1915, Huxley met Lawrence, and from 1926, deepened his friendship with him. In 1927, Huxley recorded in his diary: “He is one of the few people I feel real respect and admiration for. Of most other eminent people I have met I feel that at any rate I belong to the same species as they do. But this man has something different and superior in kind, not degree” (“D. H. Lawrence,” published in Olive Tree [1936], AHCEIV, 88). Huxley stayed with Lawrence while he was on his deathbed in 1930, and after his death edited The Letters of D. H. Lawrence (1932).
3 See his letters to Leonard Huxley, 21 January 1916, Smith 89-90; to Lewis Gielgud, late May 1917, Smith 125.

4 For this paragraph, see Bedford 750-51; see also Ronald W. Clark, *The Huxleys*, Chapters 7, 8 and 10. For details on Huxley’s Oxford days, see David Bradshaw’s recent essay, where he cites many unpublished materials, including Huxley’s diary: “‘A Blind Stay-at-Home Mole’: Huxley at Oxford, 1913-1916” (2014).

5 Huxley also intimates the need for an immediate ceasefire: “the war becomes more ghastly day by day and every day it becomes most obvious that it is a folly and a crime to go on” (letter to Julian, May 1917, Smith 124).

6 Comparing the attitudes towards the war of two Oxford non-combatants, Huxley and Vera Brittain, Claudia Rosenhan demonstrates that, despite the differences of gender, character, background, etc., between these authors “exists a sympathetic connection rooted in their specific kind of indirect witnessing—an authentic act of testifying to the horrors of wanton death and destruction” (“Vera Brittain and Aldous Huxley: *A Testament / Defeat of Youth*—A Gendered Response to Education and War?” [2014], 239).

7 See his letters to Julian, 20 November 1918 and 5 January 1919, Smith 170, 174. See also Bedford 108.

8 Unlike Sandra M. Gilbert, Susan Gubar and Robin Ann Sheets, Erik Svarny finds in this text something like progressive significance: “[It] leads us to consider the construction of masculinity [i.e., the blurring of gender identity] within the larger context of combatant war writing and cultural practice [by Robert Graves, Siegfried Sassoon and those around them]” (68, see 65, 72). For the relationship of Ward with Huxley, see e.g., Helen Small, “Mrs Humphry Ward and the First Casualty of War” (1997), 18-20.


10 In 1919, Huxley contributed many articles to the *Athenaeum* and other journals; his subjects included
Macaulay (see Bedford 107). Macaulay also appreciated Huxley’s early novels (see A. Crawford 78).

11 Curiously, the last chapters of Non-Combatants and Others are reminiscent of Huxley’s Eyeless in Gaza (1936). For Alix, a guru equivalent to Anthony’s Miller is her mother, Daphne Sandomir, an international activist who, on meeting her daughter, can correctly guess the state of her health, giving medical instructions—just as Miller does for Anthony. Like Anthony’s, Alix’s pacifism is also based on her belief in unity. In the 1930s, both Huxley and Macaulay organized the Peace Pledge Union, and their literature and political activity may be worthy of comparison in the light of pacifism.

12 In February 1919, Ottoline Morrell had tea with Allatini. Virginia Woolf describes this in her diary (25 February 1919): “Allatini has had her novel burnt by the hangman. Allatini [. . .] had to be fed on bath buns, which Ottoline had by her—& confided, of course, the story of her unhappy love, which made it necessary for her to be fed on Bath Buns” (Diary I, 246). See also Woolf’s letter to Vanessa Bell, 26 April 1919, Nicolson II, 150. Meanwhile, in 1914, Allatini published Happy Ever After, a title similar to Huxley’s short story in Limbo, “Happily Ever After.”

13 As Dick secretly fights against Pearl, Dennis undergoes “the perpetual war against part of their [his] own selves [self]” (66).

14 In the tribunal scene, a suffragist appears as a person equivalent to Dennis, both suffering a cruel destiny due to their political beliefs (see 259). The same sort of allusion is adopted by Huxley, who sends Dick to an asylum because of his (her) application for suffrage and kills him by force-feeding, a technique often used on imprisoned suffragists (see Gilbert 133; see also Showalter FM, 162-64).

15 In fact, there is another main character, Antoinette (probably modelled after Allatini), who is lesbian or bisexual. This novel, especially this ending, inevitably reminds us of Edward Carpenter—an advocate of homosexual rights and an opponent of the war—whose book Towards Democracy Dennis reads in the story (see 239). In Lesbian Empire: Radical Crosswriting in the Twenties (2001), Gay Wachman argues that Carpenter’s works, particularly Love’s Coming-of-Age, The Intermediate Sex, and Intermediate Types.
among Primitive Folk, are “the sources for Allatini’s powerful representation of the link between compulsory heterosexuality and imperialist capitalism” (106). For a comparison of this novel with Hamilton’s and Macaulay’s work, see e.g., Claire M. Tylee, The Great War and Women’s Consciousness: Images of Militarism and Womanhood in Women’s Writings, 1914-64 (1990), Chapter 4.

16 Courtney Andree argues: “both novelists [Macaulay and Allatini] draw attention to what their disabled characters are capable of accomplishing with their anti-war activities. While both are shown to be outsiders on a number of levels, their mental fortitude and creativity are revealed to be more necessary than ever before in the midst of a society struggling with war” (“Non-Combatants and Other Peace Activists: ‘Everyday’ Disability in a Time of War” [2014], see the last paragraph of this unpaginated essay).

17 Of course, this satire could be directed at Huxley’s acquaintances. Bertrand Russell was energetically engaged in the anti-war movement, believing that under the “honour of human nature,” it was his “business to protest, however futile protest might be,” even though it is “hardly supposed that much good would come of opposing the War” (18). Yet Huxley mentions Russell coldly: “Not a thing I’d choose to be sentenced on—it is so curiously foolish. [...] He is appealing, but I dont suppose that will make any difference” (letter o Julian, 3 March 1918, Smith 146). Lytton Strachey, despite having the potential to be rejected for military service (and he really obtained this result), deliberately applied for the status of a conscientious objector and joined the pacifist campaign with Russell. Strachey was homosexual, like Dick, and some of his experiences at the tribunal—such as his statement that his application was not religious, and being questioned before his sister(s) about what he would do if he saw a German soldier attempting to rape his sister—are seen in Dick’s experiences (Holroyd 626, 628-29; Huxley Limbo, 85-87). Clifford Allen, Chairman of the No-Conscription Fellowship, who was imprisoned as a conscientious objector, was also a guest of Ottoline Morrell between June and September 1916 (see Miranda Seymour, Ottoline Morrell: Life on the Grand Scale [London, 1993], 357-58).
For the above outline of modernism and psychoanalysis, see Stephen Frosh, “Psychoanalysis in Britain: The Rituals of Destruction” (2003). As is well known, war neuroses prompted—through W. H. R. Rivers (a psychiatrist who treated neurotic soldiers, including Siegfried Sassoon)—the promulgation of Freud’s theories in British psychiatry (see e.g., Showalter FM, 189).

For The Interpretation of Dreams, see Antic Hay (1923), Chapter 4; Huxley’s letter to Julian, 17 May 1935, Smith 395; Brave New World Revisited (1958), Chapter 9. For The Schreiber Case, see his letter to Julian, 12 December 1957, Smith 837. For Totem and Taboo, see After Many a Summer (1939), Part 3, Chapter 1. For Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy, see “Two or Three Graces” (1926).

Huxley’s ultimate dislike of Freud remains “a vexing problem” (Baker DHP, 112). On the one hand, Huxley’s negative feelings can be explained from the difference of their opinions, as described above; in Jerome Meckier’s view, for Huxley, Freud was an “egocentric prisoner” of his “own reductive system,” based on the simplistic, “behaviorist” understanding of the mind (AHMSNI, 131; see also Thody 53-55). Yet some critics try to prove Huxley’s positive acceptance of Freud’s theories. According to Robert S. Baker, Freud’s concepts, including “the Freudian family romance,” play important roles in Huxley’s novels, from Point Counter Point to After Many a Summer (DHP, 142-43). Brad Buchanan also argues that in Brave New World Huxley’s “satirical attack” is grounded on the validity of the “Oedipus Complex” (118). If so, there must have been more personal, emotional aspects of Huxley’s dislike of Freud. Regarding this point, Philip Thody indicates the appropriateness of “Freudian” theories in relation to Huxley’s feelings towards his parents, such as his “adoration of his mother” and “intense jealousy for his father” (16). The possibility is also suggested by Charles M. Holmes that Huxley’s denial of Freud’s psychoanalysis is “unconscious rejection” because of “Freud’s emphasis on sex and Huxley’s near-obsession with it” (AHWR, 147). However, it is difficult to fully understand why Huxley had to attack Freud so severely throughout his writing career—as if obsessed. This is one of the questions that I would like to reconsider in the present chapter.
For Huxley’s interest in Jung’s theories, particularly his psychological types, see Proper Studies (1928), AHCEII, 150, 170; Adonis and the Alphabet [1956], AHCEV, 196, 342. In Mysterium Coniunctionis (1956), Jung also refers to Huxley’s Grey Eminence (1941) (376). In this book, Jung pays much attention to the medieval concept of the “unas mundus,” which is the “potential world, the eternal Ground of all empirical being” (534). Among pre-Freudian psychologists, Huxley appreciated F. W. H. Myers and William James for their deep (non-monolithic) understanding of the unconscious (see “Genius,” Esquire [1956], AHCEVI, 327; “The Oddest Science,” Esquire [1957], AHCEVI, 83; BNW, 204). In his essays and letters, Huxley mentions more recent studies on psychology or psychoanalysis, e.g., those written by Ira Progoff, Erich Fromm and William Sheldon (see “The Oddest Science,” AHCEVI, 77-81).

See Proper Studies, AHCEII, 150; The Art of Seeing (1942), preface; Perennial Philosophy (1945), Chapter 6; Literature and Science (1963), AHCEVI, 140-41; Island (1962), 141.

Since Dick replies “Wilkinson” (whose nick-name is “God”) to the question “God,” Rogers stupidly tells that a cause may be Dick’s “passion, almost religious in its fervour and intensity, for somebody called Wilkinson” (67-68).

The first English book of Freud’s writing, Studies on Hysteria (org. 1895), translated by A. A. Brill, appeared in 1909. The Bloomsbury intellectuals, James and Alix Strachey, were familiar with Freud as early as the mid-1910s (see Bloomsbury/Freud: The Letters of James and Alix Strachey, 1924-1925 [1986], ed. Perry Meisel and Walter Kendrick, 27). J. S. Haldane, a physiologist, investigated Germany’s use of poison gas and invented the gas mask. During the war, his son, J. B. S. Haldane, fought in the army, while his daughter, Naomi Haldane (Mitchison), served as a nurse.

In terms of gender or sexuality, too, there may be some intertextuality between Dick/Pearl and psychoanalysis. In a letter to Julian (5 September 1927), Huxley states: “according to Freud, [. . .] I have secret homosexual tastes” (Smith 290). Some of Freud’s writing on sexuality, such as Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905, trans. 1910), were available (see also Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His
Childhood, mentioned below). By using the concepts of Anima and animus, Jung describes the unconscious female image in men and the unconscious male image in women; the early version of this idea already appeared in his *Psychology of the Unconscious* (1912, trans. 1916).

The book was translated in 1918; it did not become particularly well known, however, so, Huxley probably did not read it.

In addition, Freud observes that even intellectuals experience the same “regression” because “our intelligence,” such as “reasons” and “logical” ability, is never “autonomous” and can be a slave to “strong emotional impulses” (see *MMM*, 181). This seems to fit well with the relationship between Dick and Pearl.

In his open letter to Albert Einstein (*Why War? [1932]*)}, Freud repeats, though more plainly, almost the same argument on war and peace.

In March 1919, when the borders of his home country were changed by foreigners as a part of the post-war settlement, it was realized by Freud how interchangeable the concepts of home and alien were: “we are not permitted to join Germany but must yield up South Tyrol. To be sure, I’m not a patriot, but it is painful to think that pretty much the whole world will be foreign territory” (qtd. in Gay 380).

The concept of the uncanny is important in terms of “the intersection of different generic affiliations in Freud’s oeuvre” (Masschelein 20), but strangely enough, Freud subsequently referred back to this essay only a few times—as if the text itself had been “uncanny” for him.

Furthermore, the images associated with Pearl, such as “nocturnal existence” (62), “ghost” (63), “devil” (71) and “double” (82), are typical images or examples of the concept of the uncanny mentioned by Freud or critics. For the “double” and “ghost,” see Freud *U*, 142-43, 148; for the “night,” see e.g., Bronfen 52.

In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), Freud introduces the notion of the death drive to explain the repeated nightmares of returned soldiers—a “repetition-compulsion” which is apparently incoherent with the pleasure principle.
See his letters to Julian, 20 November 1918 and 5 January 1919, Smith 170, 174. Critics have also regarded the text as a tale of two opposing values: “This story set out a dualistic opposition between mind and world, contemplation and action, and indeed between philosophy and the novel, which remained central to Huxley’s work of the 1920s” (David Ayers, English Literature of the 1920s [1999], 164); “the real fear that motivates the dualism of the text is [...] the fear that ‘creative’ literary activity, with its deployment of sensibility and emotion, might be intrinsically ‘female’” (Svarny, 68; but see also 72);

“Richard Greenow” is [...] presenting Richard’s pacifism as reasonable (as opposed to Pearl’s nationalism)” (Poller “TMHW,” 69).

My reading of the text throws doubt on the evaluation of it as “a saga of a pacifist” (Dunaway HHI, 16) or as being “consistent with Huxley’s [pacifist] attitude towards the war from late 1915 onwards” (Poller “TMHW,” 69).

During the war, images of city streets and of the trenches were often interchangeable—some of the battlefield trenches were given names such as “Bond Street” and “Park Lane.” Bertrand Russell also remembers his impressions at the start of the war: “After seeing troop trains departing from Waterloo, I used to have strange visions of London as a place of unreality. I used in imagination to see the bridges collapse and sink, and the whole great city vanish like a morning mist. Its inhabitants began to seem like hallucinations, and I would wonder whether the world in which I thought I had lived was a mere product of my own febrile nightmares” (Autobiography [1956], 18). Russell mentions the impact of his talk of the above experience upon T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land (1922), but this might be so for Huxley, too.

Dick’s symptoms can be diagnosed as civilian war neuroses. As early as 1915, The Lancet (October 23) reported on civilian patients with “mental disorders directly due to the war,” such as “a woman with seven sons serving at the front, five of whom had been wounded” or “the wives of soldiers and young recruits” who were put under stress (“Incidence of Mental Disease Directly due to the War,” 931).

Civilian war neuroses also appeared in literary texts during and after the war, and Trudi Tate in
Modernism, History and the First World War (1998) discusses this in minute detail, mentioning as examples Rudyard Kipling’s “Mary Postgate” (1915; a woman becomes neurotic after hearing of the accidental death during military training of her employer’s nephew, whom she raised), Rose Macaulay’s Non-Combatant and Others (1916; see above), Rebecca West’s The Return of the Soldier (1918; a woman has a nightmare about the trenches, influenced by her cousin, a neurotic returned soldier) and others (see Tate, Chapter 1). Compared to these examples, Dick’s case may be unique in that the patient is a man whose neuroses develop immediately after the beginning of the war and without any direct contact with the realities of the front.

Dick’s relationship with other members, especially with Hyman, sounds somewhat homosexual, as does the brotherhood of combatants. The members are described “queer” (72), a word already being used in the early twentieth century as slang for homosexuality (see Showalter S4, 112).

For general accounts of psychoanalysts’ engagement with the death instinct and war, see Richard Overy, The Morbid Age: Britain between the Wars (2009), Chapters 4 and 5; Jacqueline Rose, Why War? (1993), Part 1, Chapter 1; Daniel Pick, War Machine: The Rationalisation of Slaughter in the Modern Age (1993), Chapter 15.

“The] earliest measure of defence on the part of the ego constitutes, I think, the foundation-stone of the development of the super-ego, whose excessive violence in this early stage would thus be accounted for by the fact that it is an offshoot of very intense destructive instincts, and contains, along with a certain proportion of libidinal impulses [life instinct], very large quantities of aggressive ones” (Klein, “The Early Development of Conscience in the Child” [1933], LGROW, 250). For a more detailed development of her view of the superego, including a comparison with Freud, see Spillius 147-65.

The essay is also included in The Death Drive and Modernism: British Interwar Literature and Psychoanalysis (in Japanese, 2012), in which Endo sheds light upon substantial intertextuality between
psychoanalytic discourses, British modernist literature and even the political situation in modern-day Japan. While I was troubled by reorganizing my argument in this chapter, I encountered, and was greatly influenced by, Endo’s stimulating writing on psychoanalysis. In particular, my reading of Klein, Rose and Judith Butler in this chapter owes much to his discussions on their work.

41 This is symbolically shown by the impressive ending of the novella, in which Dick, who purports to be a pacifist, becomes eventually indistinguishable from his counterpart Pearl (see Limbo, 110-15). This ironical identification may be compared with Rose’s proposal of “the ethics of failure” (see below).

42 “I have often expressed my view that object-relations exist from the beginning of life, the first object being the mother’s breast which to the child becomes split into a good (gratifying) and bad (frustrating) breast; this splitting results in a severance of love and hate. I have further suggested that the relation to the first object implies its introjection and projection, and thus from the beginning object-relations are moulded by an interaction between introjection and projection, between internal and external objects and situations. These processes participate in the building up of the ego and super-ego and prepare the ground for the onset of the Oedipus complex in the second half of the first year” (Klein EGOW, 2).

43 “Much of the hatred against parts of the self is now directed towards the mother. This leads to a particular form of identification which establishes the prototype of an aggressive object-relation. I suggest for these processes the term ‘projective identification.’ When projection is mainly derived from the infant’s impulse to harm or to control the mother, he feels her to be a persecutor. In psychotic disorders this identification of an object with the hated parts of the self contributes to the intensity of the hatred directed against other people” (Klein EGOW, 8).

44 Hanna Segal, an important follower of Kleinian analysis, discusses wars in general and the present threat of total annihilation by nuclear weapons by applying Kleinian theory (including the ideas of “splitting” and “projection”) to group behaviour and psychology (see Psychoanalysis, Literature and War: Papers 1972-1995 [1997], Chapter 13). Across factional lines, the concept of war in much
psychoanalytic writing has been frequently associated with something paranoid (see Rose, *Why War?* [1993], 18-19).

45 In his dream Dick later recollects the “hideous” masses as a “hideous” flock of “camels” that consists of both “the familiar and the strange” (111-12). According to the 1911 *Britannica*, the camel is “too stupid to turn aside [. . .] [and] too dull to turn back [. . .]. In a word, he is first to last an undomesticated and savage animal rendered serviceable by stupidity alone.” This definition may fit intellectuals’ image of the masses. Like returned soldiers’ nightmares, Dick’s dream describe above would be deemed the result of the death instinct.

46 On this issue, it is helpful to consider Endo’s essay, in which, through a Kleinian reading of Woolf’s *To the Lighthouse* (1927), he argues: “high modernism [. . .] could be seen as a middle-class aesthetic reaction to the crises of political representation in the 1920s. As such, it projects its own ideological anxieties onto class/racial others, figuring them as ‘the masses’ through a series of cultural stereotypes. Klein’s theory can thus be seen as a radical critique of high modernism’s politics of representation, revealing ‘the masses’ to be an ideological projection” (“RVIO,” 185).

47 Huxley may have known Freud’s discussion of da Vinci because he was interested in this genius to such an extent that he wrote two essays specifically about him: “The Mind of Leonardo” (1919); “Leonardo, Then and Now” (1952, unpublished typescript).

48 The typical image of warlike mother appears, e.g., in *Good-Bye to All That* (1929) by Robert Graves, Chapter 21. With Pearl as his first attempt, Huxley, as if traumatized by such an image of mother, repeatedly described women who intentionally or unintentionally (try to) put their children to death (see Chapter II of this dissertation).

49 From this viewpoint, Dick’s simulative experience of war can be read as a result of Pearl’s sending her son to the imaginary battlefield.

50 Here Dick remembers his “kneeling on Auntie Loo’s lap and arranging a troop of lead soldiers on the
horizontal productive of her corsage” at the same time. This is interesting for us because it evokes the ambiguous image of the wartime mother who loves her son (and is loved by him) but who can send him to his death as a soldier.

As a tribute to Ward, Aldous was named after the hero of her novel *Marcella* (1894) (see John Sutherland, *Mrs Humphry Ward: Eminent Victorian Pre-Eminent Edwardian* [1990], 167). Huxley himself calls his aunt “a kind of literary godmother to me” (*Writers at Work: The Paris Review Interviews* [1963], ed. George Plimpton, 167). Ward’s *Robert Elsmere* is one of Dick’s favourite books (see Limbo, 3-4). Huxley’s novella was “one of the last books she read. She did not like it.” Yet she may “have recognized traits of kinship in its author” (Enid Huws Jones, *Mrs Humphry Ward* [1973], 164). When she died in March 1919, Aldous was “much affected” and in the funeral he, with “tears streaming down his face, wept openly” (Bedford 108). In *Eyeless in Gaza*, Huxley reproduced Ward in a more complex way as Mrs Foxe, who deeply loves her son Brian (partly modelled on Trevenen) but whose extravagant expectations consequently drive him to suicide.

Her son, Arnold Ward, volunteered for the army and survived; her three nephews, however, were killed (see E. H. Jones 161-62).

Strictly speaking, Freud finds not only affectionate but also cruel images in da Vinci’s mother, the strength of whose love made her son impotent (at least in a heterosexual relationship); for Freud, this ambiguity in da Vinci’s mother contributed to his painting “Gioconda” with its enigmatic smile. Huxley’s image of the mother, at least the image reflected in Pearl, is something more dangerous, and so is his interpretation of “Gioconda,” as seen in the title of his story of a woman bringing ruin upon her lover: “The Gioconda Smile” (published in *Mortal Coils* [1921]).

For Butler’s more recent analysis of Klein’s theory of melancholia, see Butler, *Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?* (2009), 173-77.

Maria Nys was the eldest child of Norbert Nys and Marguerite Baltus. In a letter to Julian (30 June...
Huxley mentioned Maria: “I have at last discovered a nice Belgian: wonders will never cease” (Smith 105). For Maria’s stay at Garsington, see Bedford, Part 3, Chapter 8.

56 For example, it is probably impossible that Huxley did not think of his alternate destiny when he made Guy talk to Marjorie as follows: “I know that when I am dead, I shall be dead; there isn’t any afterwards. If I’m killed, my immortality will be in your memory. Perhaps, too, somebody will read the things I’ve written, and in his mind I shall survive, feebly and partially. But in your mind I shall survive intact and whole” (162; a similar passage appears in Ridley’s letter to Huxley as cited in the foreword of the poem discussed below [see CPAH, 110]).

57 Analysing H.D.’s “Kola and Ka” (1934)—in which after the war a civilian man speaks as if he were an ex-soldier—Trudi Tate indicates a possibility that while “combatants often tried, unconsciously, to escape the war through illness,” “civilian men might flee into illness for the opposite reason—to enter the war and share its suffering” (23). For a sense of inferiority held by non-combatants (including Huxley himself), see Philip in Point Counter Point, mentioned in the next section. In my view, Huxley’s wish for a sense of togetherness or unity was developed later to be an essential concept that supported his pacifism (see Chapter IV of this dissertation).

58 It seems that this text has so far been closely analysed only by Meckier, who points out that “Ridley is a disillusioned idealist who anticipates the many youthful failures in Huxley’s early fiction,” and that Huxley’s portraying way of “the happenings of a single [ordinary] day” predicts the modernist technique or form adopted later by Woolf and James Joyce (see AHPM, 130-37, 140).

59 “Nobody,” according to Bedford, “remembers Huxley referring to the dead friend and his weird legacy” (111), and he never mentioned Ridley in his published letters. At least, Ridley was not a member of Balliol, as he is not listed on the Memorial Tablet (see Balliol College War Memorial Book, 1914-19 [1924] xiii, xv, xvii, xix). Of course Huxley may have changed the name of the model, or created Ridley as a plausible pretext for the poem. Meanwhile, Soldiers Died in the Great War, 1914-19 (originally
published in 1921, printed on CD-ROM in 1998) lists one soldier with the same name, who was born and enlisted in Newcastle, and died fighting in France and Florence on 20 February 1918 (see the soldier with No: RTS/2819).

60 Sarah Cole, using the term “friendship” as “individualized relations of amity or love between men” and the term “comradeship” as “corporate or group commitment, a relation particularly to war,” (144-45), finds in war writing some examples of the antagonism between these concepts. As well as some “comradeship” with contemporaries on the front, Huxley seems to be looking for a “friendship” when he stresses his personal bond with Ridley. This may also suggest that Huxley was in fact not necessarily satisfied with his seemingly intimate “friendship” with members of Garsington or with the Haldane family.

61 For example, Peter Gay’s detailed biography repeatedly reveals that in his private life and in psychoanalysis Freud frequently realized the unreliability of the distinction between home and alien, friends and enemy. During the war, because his enlisted sons and many of his followers left for the front, Freud in a letter confessed that he felt “alone” and “deserted” (qtd. in Gay 361); ironically, Freud exchanged a large number of letters with his intimate friend on the enemy side, Ernest Jones (see 350).

62 In a letter to Julian (1 February 1915), Huxley mentions the state of Oxford, calling it “the quiet life of Anglo Saxon lectures amid a crowd of painful young women” (Smith 66). T. S. Eliot supplements this, recollecting: “beyond the Rhodes scholars from America and the Commonwealth there were hardly any left except for those who, like Aldous, were wholly unfit for military service” (30). Objectively, only 12.5 % of the male population—approximately six million British men—served in the war (the number includes non-fighting members of the armed forces; see Tate 25); thus a position like Huxley’s was not unusual. Indeed, Leonard Woolf and Lawrence, though both senior to Huxley, do not seem to have cared so much about their own physical unfitness for military service (see Woolf’s autobiography, Beginning Again: An Autobiography of the Years 1911 to 1918 [1963], Part 3; see also Lawrence’s autobiographical
novel, *Kangaroo* [1923], Chapter 12). Keith Gandal argues that “the ‘quintessential’ male American modernist novelists [such as Ernest Hemingway, F. Scott Fitzgerald and William Faulkner] were motivated, in their celebrated postwar literary works, not so much, as the usual story goes, by their experiences of the horrors of World War I but rather by their inability in fact to have those experiences” (5). Although Gandal mentions this point as a difference between American and British war writers (see 31), Huxley’s work shows the diversity of British war writing.

Peter Edgerly Firchow also mentions the ambiguous nature of the work, pointing out its “marriage of opposites,” such as the “combin[ation of] the apparently disparate and certainly explosive elements of broad farce and profound satiric analysis” and the “miraculous amalgamation of grotesque [or ugly] and beautiful” (*AH*, 45-46).

As Deborah Parsons states, “the war and its aftermath remained a gap or absence in history that resisted representation. The early post-war years, dominated by psychological bewilderment and social and economic uncertainty, were a limbo period in which the intensity of horror and loss could not be integrated into normal understanding (“Trauma and War Memory” [2008], 177). It is interesting that she uses here the word “limbo” to describe the post-war years because it was also chosen by Huxley for the title of his collection of stories. An example of the author’s repression of the war is the emphasis on the war as being other people’s affair (see Scogan’s unsympathetic comments on war victims in *Crome Yellow* [84], which are shared by the poet Francis Chelifer in *Those Barren Leaves* [1925] [121-22]).

Meanwhile, the unproductivity of such suppression is also suggested by Huxley himself in *Antic Hay* (1923). While strolling in London streets, Theodore Gumbril, modelled after the author, has to glimpse in an uncanny manner miseries of post-war society, including the vestiges of the war such as “the legless soldiers” (73-75). Myra Viveash, who seems to possess Gumbril but may be otherwise, appears as something like a ghost or a living death (see Poller “AHAH”).

Philip’s bad leg, together with the author’s own poor eyesight, evokes the story of Oedipus and the
potential Oedipus complex experienced by both Philip and Huxley. In wartime, Huxley, who hurt one of his legs in a domestic accident, was also mistaken for a returned soldier: “We [Aldous and his cousin, Gervas Huxley] went round shopping together—and I was immensely tickled to see the huge respect and sympathy paid to my limp—while Ger—who was wearing a new uniform—was regarded merely as a specimen of K[itchener]’s nth Army! I am thinking, therefore, of keeping up my wounded hero limp for the duration of the war. It will always secure seats in buses!” (letter to Leonard Huxley, Mid-June 1915, Smith 72).

66 In Point Counter Point, two other characters may represent the feelings of the author. When the war came, Spandrell, an Oxford student, welcomed it as “a chance of getting out of the muck and doing something decent, for a change”; he even “wanted to get killed,” like Rupert Brooke (373). However, instead of fighting “in a trench” with “danger” and “courage,” he was assigned as “a spy catcher” in the intelligence service without “any of the nobler virtues” or anything “heroic” (374). Even after the war, Spandrell lives with his “dishonour,” and finally murders to be murdered (375). On the other hand, the destructive instinct that appears to lie behind the war and Spandrell’s madness is discussed by Rampion in a more complex way. While positively accepting the aggressive instinct as belonging to the essence of human beings, Rampion never identifies the war as the result of this instinct (see 121-22, 532), as if he (or the author) wished to diminish the heroism of soldiers, heroism of which he might previously have been envious.

67 This scene may remind one of a famous snapshot of the Battle of Ginchy in which two men are helping a wounded man across a trench who has escaped from capture. In the above scene, Huxley may indirectly express his own anxiety that, unlike the rescued soldier who responsibly fought for the nation, he might not be accepted by the nation.
Although the text only mentions the impact of “Our Freud” upon civilized society’s abolition of the family system (see BNW, 33; Huxley’s letter to Leonard Huxley, 24 August 1931, Smith 351), other facets of the depicted future, including pacifism (see 209), might be associated with Freudism. The world citizens are conditioned and controlled to be pacifist, having bonded to each other through collective ceremonies and freed from aggressive impulses by drugs. Some intertextuality can be found between this text and Freud’s writing of the same period: The Future of an Illusion (1927, trans. 1928), Civilization and Its Discontents (1930, trans. 1930; see also Buchanan 111-12; Higdon WBNW, 101-02) and Why War?

Huxley’s pacifism is endorsed by his scientific and mystical idea of “unity,” which in Eyeless in Gaza
he depicts using words related to water (see 502-03). The same sort of notion called “oceanic feeling,” a sense of belonging to the world outside oneself, is mentioned, though negatively, by Freud at the beginning of his Civilization and Its Discontents, where he responds to Roman Rolland’s question about it. In this idea Rolland’s thinking owed much to an Indian philosopher, Swami Vivekananda. In fact, Huxley wrote a foreword to the English translation of The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, a biography of Vivekananda’s teacher, published in 1942. Curiously, the feeling of unity that Huxley believed in and Freud denied might be (partly) traced back to the same source.

In After Many a Summer, Huxley portrays a multimillionaire in Hollywood—a world seemingly unrelated to images of death or war—who cannot free himself from the horror of his coming death or an element like the destructive instinct that eventually leads him to kill a young man. Time Must Have a Stop (1944), written during the Second World War, also clearly attacks the human tendency to justify war and any sort of violence in the name of time.

The journalist protagonist, who has been travelling around the world seeking incidents of the death—as if he were obsessed by the death instinct—arrives at Pala, a peaceful utopia where he develops as a person, discovering ways to love people under the influence of the pacifist inhabitants (see Chapter IV of this dissertation).

For the survival of psychoanalysis itself, this “failure” may be important, as Cathy Caruth remarks: “Freud suggests that psychoanalysis, if it lives on, will live on not as the straightforward life of a known and understood theory, but as the endless survival of what has not been fully understood. If psychoanalysis is to be continued in its tradition, it is paradoxically in what has not yet been fully grasped in its survival that its truest relation to its insight must be found” (Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History [1996], 72).

From a feminist perspective, such a violent aspect of psychoanalysis can be seen in Freud’s attitude towards Dora. By “constructing his own ‘intelligible, consistent, and unbroken’ account of her hysteria,”
Freud “asserts his intellectual superiority to this bright but rebellious young woman. He uses his text to demonstrate his power to bring a woman to reason, and to bring reason to the mysteries of woman” (Showalter FM, 160). However, in “Richard Greenow,” Dick (the believer in reason) and Rogers (the believer in psychoanalysis) cannot possibly compete with Pearl, a female patient; this may be an example of the text’s “ethic of failure” in a feminist sense.

For example, as well as Freud’s and Klein’s opinions about the death instinct and war, Huxley’s “Richard Greenow” echoes some facets of Edward Glover’s discussion of peace and war in the 1930s. In War, Sadism and Pacifism (1933), this Freudian analyst criticizes an optimistic view of human nature held by many pacifists, pointing out the “identity of impulses concerned in war and peace”: “a large part of the energy that drives a peace organization has precisely the same source as the energy that lets loose war” (13). To elucidate the psychology behind the waging of war, he also relies upon “projection,” which is “an attempt to convert an inner (psychic) stimulus into an outer (reality) stimulus, an inner enemy into an outer enemy” (27-28). Although Overy mentions the impact of Glover on Huxley in the mid-1930s, my reading has suggested, on the contrary, that Huxley was in advance of some aspects of Glover’s arguments on pacifism.

How can we explain Huxley’s persistent dislike of Freud? Paradoxically, it might be attributed to the similarity of their arguments on war and human aggression. Bearing in mind Huxley’s pacifism in and after the 1930s, which was based on his mystic and scientific visions, we can imagine that Huxley could not be tolerant towards Freud’s failure to see the significance of mysticism and to show any concrete way to achieve peace. In this sense, Freud was an uncanny being for Huxley, who also originally experienced a similar pessimism concerning the mind, but who subsequently tried to repress or overcome this by any means, including mystical ideas.

Huxley’s xenophobia or racism can be detected in “Richard Greenow” in his comments on Italians (54-55), Germans (113-14), Jews (see 6, 69) and Asians (see 10, 54). These are supplemented by the author’s
wartime comments on foreigners and different races (see e.g., his letters to Julian, 1 February 1915, Smith 65-66; to Leonard Huxley, Mid-October 1915, Smith 82); “Soles Occidere et Redire Possunt” also describes the hero’s dream of abusing “niggers” (CPAH, 123; see also Schneider 219-20). At the same time, the author implies that such feelings are the result of something paranoid; for example, in “Richard Greenow,” just before his death, Dick realizes that, whether “Engl. or Germ.,” all of human kind are equally “all beasts” (110; see also John’s wish “to eat the black sweat of niggers” [“SORP,” CPAH, 123], which could suggest a possible identification of himself or the author with “niggers”).
Chapter II Woman
—Point Counter Point—
Motherhood and Feminism

1. Introduction

A theme that repeatedly appears in Aldous Huxley’s fiction is the failure of the mother-child relationship. We can easily find this image in his descriptions of women afraid of motherhood (Crome Yellow, Point Counter Point, Brave New World and Eyeless in Gaza), women without maternal affection (Point Counter Point and Brave New World), and women who lose their children (Point Counter Point, Eyeless in Gaza and Ape and Essence), as well as, conversely, children who lose their beloved mothers (Brave New World and Eyeless in Gaza). Although this point appears to be an important perspective for considering Huxley’s work and life, there has not been enough discussion.

The issue of the mother-child relationship is essentially relevant to how to comprehend women. What kind of view of women did Huxley have? Biographically, the loss of his mother in his teens must have greatly influenced his subsequent life, and thus, through his frequent return to the collapse of the mother-child relationship, he may have attempted to overcome his own childhood trauma. As Chapter I suggested, this motif may have been evoked by persecutory anxiety about women, which the author formed during wartime when seeing, for example, mothers who sent their sons to the battlefield. In 1919, Huxley married Maria Nys, who died of cancer in February 1955,
and in 1956, he married Laura Archera, a musician and psychological counsellor; both women appear to have devotedly supported their husband’s work. These pieces of information might suggest Huxley as a man with a conservative view of women.

Certainly, some of his early writing seems to back up this image, which definitely fits well with D. H. Lawrence’s frank comment on “a fellow-writer”: “after all in your work women seem not to have an existence, save they are the projections of the men” (Huxley, “D. H. Lawrence,” published in The Olive Tree [1936], AHCEIV 74). A typical example is “Two or Three Graces” (the title piece of Huxley’s fourth collection of short stories, 1926), in which the main woman seems to rely on men, simply projecting their characters onto her own.

Such a reactionary aspect of Huxley has been, to some extent, shared and stressed by earlier studies. After analysing his utopian pieces, Brave New World, Ape and Essence and Island, and focusing on the female characters there, June Deery concludes that “the fate of women alone does not define these societies as eutopian or dystopian, and it is not something to which Huxley pays a great deal of attention” (115). That Huxley is “not clearly especially sympathetic to women” seems to be an assumption for Angus McLaren when he discusses Huxley’s writing in relation to the interwar contexts of sex and reproduction (14). However, it is also true that Huxley was almost always surrounded by unconventional or revolutionary types of women—such as his wife, Maria Huxley (an intelligent and bisexual woman; 1899-1955), his friend, Naomi Mitchison (a feminist and socialist writer; 1897-1999) and his shot-time lover, Nancy Cunard (a critic and political activist; 1895-1965). Is it not conceivable that his
associations with these women influenced his life and writing so that he viewed women more complexly or ambiguously than critics have recognized so far.  

To query again Huxley’s attitude towards women or issues related to them, due attention should be directed to his literary masterpiece, *Point Counter Point* (1928). Certainly, the novel may seem masculine in that the author composed it as a specimen of what he called “the novel of ideas” (*PCP*, 386), showing in a contrapuntal way ideological varieties of male characters mostly modelled after his acquaintances. At the same time, in *Point Counter Point* Huxley spares more space for women than in any other of his works, describing contrapuntally the lives of female characters, some of whom are based on actual women around him. It must be particularly noted that most of the women in the novel, especially the main female characters, do not conform well with the traditional ideal of womanhood—the feminine and the maternal.

Marjorie Carling, for example, is a spiritual and cultured woman of the middle-middle class who leaves her husband for her lover Walter, and who is now expecting a baby but cannot bear this fact. Elinor Bidlake Quarles is an intelligent and rational woman of the upper-middle class who has run out of patience with her husband Philip, and who cannot behave maternally towards her child Little Phil, losing him in the end. Lucy Tantamount is an upper-class lady with an independent spirit who is seen as a *femme fatale* and likened to a man by others. In the present chapter, I will analyse *Point Counter Point* by focussing on these three characters in order to demonstrate hidden significances of this text with regard to the maternal and the feminine, and to understand more deeply Huxley’s views of women and identity.
2. Women and Reproduction in the Interwar Period

The condition of women in the interwar period can be characterized by ambiguity. The upheaval of the Great War shook gender distinctions, bringing a reformist stream in which women obtained the rights to vote and stand for parliament, and in which the dissemination of contraceptive information reduced the average size of the family. On the other hand, great importance was certainly attached to the roles of women at home, including mothering, and this tendency was supported by the post-war atmosphere, which sought domestic peace, avoiding conflicts or competition between men and women.\(^1\)

These situations of women’s lives in transition are also reflected in To-day and To-morrow, a series of more than a hundred titles, published between 1923 and 1931.\(^2\) It is true that J. B. S. Haldane’s *Daedalus or Science and the Future* (1924) influenced the setting of the future in *Brave New World* (1932), in which every citizen is born through ectogenesis, but it is also conceivable that Huxley was familiar with some of the other volumes, judging from his intellectual curiosity about culture and society.\(^3\) Although the series contains many volumes discussing reproduction, they share in common the recognition that motherhood is in crisis. Symbolically, both the anti-feminist Anthony M. Ludovici—*Lysistrata or Woman’s Future and Future Woman* (1924)—and the feminist Dora Russell—*Hypatia or Woman and Knowledge* (1925)—criticize British society for underestimating the value of the body by using nearly the same phrase, respectively: “the greatest revolt against the old notions of Life,
Motherhood, and Domesticity” (30); “A revolt against motherhood” (42). In *Point Counter Point*, quite a few women, including the above three characters, have some sort of difficulty with motherhood.\textsuperscript{14}

However, and more importantly, there is also a difference between the series and Huxley’s text. Beyond the disparity of their political stances, the To-day and To-morrow contributors tend to idealize the maternal as a virtue. Some regarded motherhood or reproduction as a public/scientific issue of a nation, race or human beings—Ludovici, C. P. Blacker and Norman Haire\textsuperscript{15}—while others assumed that motherhood is not only vital to society or humankind but also essential to a woman’s personal life—Russell, Vera Brittain and Eden Paul.\textsuperscript{16} They seem to share the premise that two aspects of motherhood—the objective (i.e., the public, the scientific) and the subjective (i.e., the private, the mental)—can be reconciled, and this should be done to break through the crisis of motherhood.

In contrast, in *Point Counter Point*, the maternal is presented more negatively,\textsuperscript{17} and this negativity is often associated with irresistible feelings or senses of individuals. For example, Marjorie’s fear of childbirth, as well as her hatred of the baby, depends entirely upon her own sensibility, especially her anxiety about her possible death from a miscarriage or bloodpoisoning (see *PCP*, 4-5, 194-96). Elinor, too, has a very bad impression of childbirth, arguing for birth control, because she does not like suffering or the recollection of it (see 91). Here, the objective and subjective aspects of motherhood are shown as difficult to reconcile, and thus the situation of motherhood is viewed all the more seriously and pessimistically. Huxley’s representation of motherhood cannot
be fully reduced to the intellectual debate of his time and may be seen as a kind of deviation. Let us analyse this deviation by paying attention to the three major women in the novel.

3. Questioning the Maternal: Marjorie and Elinor

Since “Richard Greenow,” Huxley frequently displayed his scepticism towards the self as something single and consistent, as reflected in his remarks in *Antic Hay* (1923), *Proper Studies* (1927) and so forth. In *Point Counter Point*, this issue is addressed on the largest scale, and is chosen as the main subject, as clearly declared in its epigraph, the proverb of Fulke Greville in *Mustapha* (1609): “Oh, wearisome condition of humanity, / Born under one law, to another bound, / Vainly begot and yet forbidden vanity, / Created sick, commanded to be sound. / What meaneth nature by these diverse laws, / Passion and reason, self-division’s cause?” (Act V, Sc. 4.). Indeed, a variety of “self-division” can be found in the lives of the characters—e.g., in the form of reason/emotion, body/mind (Walter), past/present (John Bidlake), reality/ideal (Burlap) and theory/practice (Illidge). The diversity and fluidity of the self, the state in which different elements coexist in oneself at the same time or on different occasions, seems to be most strongly realized by the novelist Philip Quarles, who asks the “question of identity,” feeling as if his mind were an “amoeba” with “a power of assimilation” (253), and answers it by himself: “The essential character of the self consisted precisely in that liquid and undeformable ubiquity; in that capacity to espouse all contours and yet remain unfixed in any form, to take, and with an equal facility
efface, impressions” (254). In fact, the text also sheds light upon another sort of self-division—the issue of identity that women may undergo with regard to motherhood—by mainly describing Marjorie in pregnancy and Elinor with a young child.

Let us start with Marjorie. Pregnancy is evidently a self-division in that the other is being created within the self, but this division brings about another kind of division, that is, the ambiguity of pregnancy in terms of appreciation. On the scientific/public level of representation, pregnancy is admired as embodying the greatness of life and contributing to society, while it can be, on the mental/private level of experience, realized just as a source of anxiety or distress, as is depicted in the first scene of the novel:

Something that had been a single cell, a cluster of cells, a little sac of tissue, a kind of worm, a potential fish with gills, stirred in her womb and would one day become a man—a grown man, suffering and enjoying, loving and hating, thinking, remembering, imagining. And what had been a blob of jelly within her body would invent a god and worship [. . .]. [. . .] The astounding process of creation was going on within her; but Marjorie was conscious only of sickness and lassitude; the mystery for her meant nothing but fatigue and ugliness and a chronic anxiety about the future, pain of the mind as well as discomfort of the body. (2)

Subsequently, again, the text relies on the same contrast: “A cell had multiplied itself and become a worm, the worm had become a fish, the fish was turning into the foetus of a mammal. Marjorie felt sick and tired” (194). In fact, *Point Counter Point* has a
metafictional layer in which Philip develops his idea of the novel in his notebook, thinking of, for example, “biological” fiction that addresses characters in strictly scientific terms (see 114, 414, 433). Thus, *Point Counter Point* can be, at least partly, read as a work written by Philip, the quasi-scientist himself. In the cited scene, scientific discourse representing pregnancy (apparently based on Ernst Haeckel’s recapitulation theory) can be identified as Philip’s, which is then contrasted with the personal narrative of Marjorie, who is actually experiencing pregnancy. This division regarding the appreciation of pregnancy can also be seen as a reflection of a gender opposition or asymmetry.

Elinor embodies how this division may arise for women after giving birth. She cannot love her child in the same way that many mothers are generally assumed to do, and mainly entrusts the care to her mother and Miss Fulkes, a governess. After coming back from her overseas trip with Philip for ten months, Elinor unintentionally surprises her mother-in-law Rachel by confessing what she feels about Little Phil: “I don’t believe nature ever meant me to have children. Either I’m impatient with them, or else I spoil them”; “I didn’t imagine I *could* be so glad to see him again. But it was really a wild excitement” (339). Indeed, Elinor has complicated thoughts of Little Phil. When seeing him after a long absence, she feels as if her own child were a stranger, surprised by the wonder of life as suggested by this, and horrified by the weight of her social responsibility as a mother:

she was oppressed by a sudden realization of the mysteries and complexities of life, the terrible inscrutabilities of the future. Here was her
child—but he was also Philip, he was also herself, he was also Walter, her father, her mother; and now, with that upward tilting of the chin, he had suddenly revealed himself as the deplorable Mr. Quarles. And he might be hundreds of other people too. [. . .] A whole population of strangers inhabited and shaped that little body, lived in that mind and controlled its wishes, dictated its thoughts and would go on dictating and controlling. [. . .] She looked at the child with a kind of terror. What a responsibility!

(319-20)

Elinor finds an inerasable sense of distance or division between herself and her child. This division is associated with another sort of division, that is, a contrast between the gravity of mothering on the biological/social level and the difficulty of it on the emotional/personal level.

In *Point Counter Point*, there is a key link between the two divisions that mothers can face: the state of being physically and psychologically separated from the child, and the opposition between motherhood as privately and mentally experienced on the one hand and motherhood as publicly and scientifically represented on the other. Surely, the recognition of women’s interests being potentially confronted with science (e.g., its progress) was not so rare in those days, as seen in Brittain’s volume in the To-day and To-morrow series. However, the way of underscoring this division by dividing the narrative itself was not often adopted by contemporary authors, and thus might be considered as experimental or even unique.

Rather, these descriptions of Marjorie and Elinor can be compared with
subsequent criticism of the mother-child relationship. For instance, Julia Kristeva, a feminist and psychoanalytic theorist, basing her work on her own experience of motherhood, wrote an autobiographical and experimental essay, “Stabat Mater” (1977, rev. 1985). She characterizes the “maternal” as being “ambivalent,” and confesses her situation before and after childbirth by using the image of physical and psychological division of her identity:

A mother is a continuous separation, a division of the very flesh. And consequently a division of language—and it has always been so.

Then there is this other abyss that opens up between the mother and the child. What connection is there between myself, or even more unassumingly between my body and this internal graft and fold, which, once the umbilical cord has been severed, is an inaccessible other? My body and … him. No connection. Nothing to do with it. [. . .] The child, whether he or she is irremediably an other. [. . .] Trying to think through that abyss: staggering vertigo. No identity holds up. (KR, 178-79)

What is crucial is that, as seen in our reading of Point Counter Point, Kristeva not only associates the physical and psychological division undergone by a mother with the division of the objective and the subjective appreciation of motherhood but also adopts the contrasting narratives, i.e., the account of representation and that of experience, in order to express this division effectively. On the right side of the page, Kristeva addresses how the maternal, such as the Virgin Mary, has been admired by masculine
theology and science, while on the left side, she personally recollects her anxiety and agonies before and after childbirth by using bold letters.\textsuperscript{25}

While recognizing the difficulty with motherhood, Kristeva ultimately grasps it positively, believing that the maternal has the potential to free women from, and to assist them in opposing, patriarchal society or masculine discourse.\textsuperscript{26} However, it is doubtful whether such an expectation can be deduced from \textit{Point Counter Point}, as is suggested in Elinor’s subsequent story.

Unable to adapt herself to mothering and frustrated by her husband’s aloofness, Elinor begins to seek the “interest” of her “own independent happiness,” and decides to have an affair with Webley: “Taking a lover had seemed to Elinor, theoretically and in advance, a matter of no great difficulty. Morally wrong she did not think it. All the fuss that Christians and the heroines of novels managed to make about it!” (434). However, while waiting for Webley for a tryst, Elinor receives a telegram informing her of her boy’s illness, which turns out to be meningitis. She goes home in haste, “reproach[ing] herself for not having realized that he was working up for an illness”—“I ought to have taken more care” (481). At the same time, Webley is killed by Spandrell and Illidge, and the news naturally shocks her. Viewed objectively, all these things happen as a coincidence. However, losing her usual reason or calmness, Elinor intuitively realizes that (the telegram about) the outbreak of her boy’s illness was “a warning” or “prohibition” against her attempted affair (480) and, seeing his suffering before her eyes, finds herself caught by some sort of great power:

She felt as though she too were trapped. [. . .] Trapped by that obscure
sense of guilt, that irrational belief (but haunting in spite of its irrationality),
that ever more closely pressing and suffocating conviction that it was all, in
some inscrutable fashion, her fault, a punishment, malevolently vicarious,
for her offence. (540; see also 544)

What is this “fault” or “offence”? Elinor probably thinks not only of the affair itself but
also of her less maternal behaviour thus far. Her own “sense of guilt” suggests that
Elinor, despite seemingly being free from traditional morals, has actually internalized
the patriarchal value. The image of a mother’s division appears here again as a form of
a dilemma in which a woman is faced with a difficult choice, whether to perform a
social duty to be a good mother or to seek her individual happiness outside the home.

The scene leading to the death of Little Phil is probably the most realistic in Point
Counter Point. On the one hand, the text follows Elinor’s consciousness, especially her
wishes to nurse her child without rest, but on the other, it makes a scientific comment on
the situation in which she is a human being or living creature before being a mother, and
thus cannot deny her appetite or need for sleep, desire even in such a situation (see 545).

The division of the ideal and the real mother can be found in this comparison, too.

For his portrayals of Marjorie and Elinor, Huxley owes much to actual women. Of
course, one possible source is his intelligent wife, Maria. In a certain sense, Huxley’s
work was produced through cooperative efforts with her. From their marriage in 1919 to
her death in 1955, Maria was multiply engaged with his career by reading to her
husband because of his poor eyesight, typing his books, driving him around for research
and giving him insights for his creations (see Murray 73-74). As indicated by many of
her acquaintances, Maria was bisexual or lesbian, and throughout her life, had sexual relationships with women—including Ottoline Morrell and Sybille Bedford—of which Huxley must have been aware to some extent.\textsuperscript{28} It is suggested in \textit{Point Counter Point} that the three main female characters do not adjust to heteronormativity very well.\textsuperscript{29} Just as Marjorie and Elinor are terribly afraid of their coming or past childbirth, when Maria gave birth to her son Matthew on 19 April 1920, it was an extremely difficult delivery from which she nearly died of a haemorrhage and which convinced the couple of the impossibility of having another child (see Bedford 109).\textsuperscript{30} The division of appreciation of motherhood in \textit{Point Counter Point} could be traced back to Huxley’s letter of 1920 in which he unconsciously contrasts the suffering that his wife has undergone with his admiration of the greatness of life.\textsuperscript{31}

Huxley’s depiction of Elinor in the dilemma substantially depends on his long friendship with Naomi Mitchison, née Haldane. Just like the Huxleys, the Haldanes are a family of scientists: her father is the well-known physiologist John Scott Haldane, her elder brother is the equally famous biologist J. B. S. Haldane, and Naomi herself is renowned for her science fiction as well as her devotion to feminism and socialism. In the second volume of her autobiography, \textit{You May Well Ask: A Memoir, 1920-40} (1979), Mitchison recollects: “Aldous and I had been on affectionate terms over the between-war years. For me he was part of the family, a sort of brother” (95). Mitchison even confessed her love to Huxley, who, however, rejected it, marrying another intellectual woman a few years later (see Bedford 56).

Since her marriage with Gilbert Richard Mitchison (later a Labour Member of
Parliament) in 1916, Naomi Mitchison lived in line with her feminist belief that “intellectual” women should be allowed to have “both worlds” in their life, i.e., “to live as women, to have masses of children” and “to do their own work, whatever it may be” (*Comments on Birth Control* [1930], 25). From a realistic position, she affirmatively accepted birth control, writing a positive review on the “work of civilization” in birth control clinics (see “Motherhood” [1924], 249-50). Although having given birth to her first child Geoff in 1918, Mitchison could not adapt herself particularly well to motherhood, gradually feeling herself “trapped,” and there was a time when she went overseas with her husband, entrusting the care of Geoff to her mother, nurses and maids (Calder 50). In 1927—even as Huxley was writing *Point Counter Point*—Geoff developed meningitis and, despite her devoted nursing, quickly died at the young age of nine. The qualms of her conscience were acute, especially because for some of the period of his illness she was away (see Calder 80-81)—why she was absent is not described by any of her biographers, but she had an affair with another man, which might have been the reason. Even after more than fifty years, Mitchison could not “completely” set herself free from her “pain” and sense of being “guilty”: “I still wince away, inevitably blaming myself, thinking if I had taken more trouble at the beginning when he first got ear-ache. If only. If only” (Mitchison *YMWA*, 30). Jenni Calder, the biographer who interviewed Mitchison, sympathetically understands her situation, in which “she was living a complex professional and personal life” and “she gave time to people and causes in which she believed” (81). The “complex” life is, in Mitchison’s own words, to have “both worlds” inside and outside the home, and she found herself in
the patriarchal “trap,” which catches Elinor as well. However faithfully a mother usually tries to follow her beliefs, respecting her life outside the home, once something tragic happens at home, she has to (or is made to) drive herself into self-reproach, attributing it to the other aspect of her life.

To some extent, the dilemma in which Mitchison was placed reflects the confrontation of two kinds of ideology regarding a woman’s way of life—the discussion to which Mitchison herself contributed. In *Point Counter Point*, Elinor finds an “abyss” between herself and her mother-in-law Rachel, who is intelligent, religious and basically conservative on maternity. I suggest that this distance or conflict is also based on Mitchison’s case. Being “desperately unhappy after Geoff’s death,” Mitchison visited her brother Jack and his wife Charlotte in Cambridge, but she “not only got no sympathy or affection but painful accusations” (Mitchison *YMWA*, 77; see also Benton 54-55; Calder 81). Here, it is worthwhile to pay attention to Charlotte Haldane, another intellectual female writer. In *Motherhood and Its Enemies* (1928), published in the same year as *Point Counter Point*, Haldane—for whom childbirth and childrearing are not so much a problem of the individual woman but of the whole nation, and who is critical of birth control (117)—deplores the contemporary dislike for motherhood, which in her view should be the most important vocation for women. “Only the normal wife and mother,” according to her, “will consider her interests identical with those of her husband and her children,” whereas the “‘amateur’ prostitute [i.e., a group of “abnormal” women, including some feminists] will, after marriage, allow her own interests to compete with those of husband and children” (158). Naturally, there is
antagonism between “normal” and “abnormal” women (158-59), which appears, for example, as a generation gap between “wives of sixty” who are “obedient and abstaining and religious,” and “wives of thirty” who lack these characteristics (see 194). Regarding the “maternal instinct,” Haldane argues that “mothers are to some extent ‘born,’” even though the instinct is also put under the influence of civilization or education (174-75). Following Haldane’s standard, Mitchison, a feminist advocate of birth control who treated as equal the lives of herself, her husband and her children, and who lost her eldest child, would be classified as an “abnormal” woman lacking in “maternal instinct,” viz., the “enemy of motherhood.”

It is probable that Huxley, a close friend of the Haldanes, fictionalized the conflict between Mitchison and her sister-in-law as the conflict between Elinor and her mother-in-law. Indeed, the definition and criticism that Haldane offers in her book would apply to not only Mitchison but also Elinor, who, because of her apparent lack of “natural instincts,” is regarded as “strange” or “queer” by Rachel, and who sees a generation gap between herself and her mother-in-law (see 339). Mitchison was offended upon finding in Point Counter Point a description of the death of a child like her son, and Calder regards her reaction as natural (see 82; see also Mitchison YMWA, 30; Benton 54). However, what must not be overlooked is that Huxley fictionalized not only the death of Mitchison’s child but also her dilemma and agonies before and after this, as well as the ideological conflict regarding women’s lifestyles behind her tragedy. Through these scenes, Huxley tried to represent her feelings and the situation surrounding her on behalf of Mitchison, who during this period could not engage herself
in writing (see Benton 55) and who, after more than fifty years, still could not deeply recount the experience in her autobiography, which definitely traumatized her. Certainly, Mitchison must have been offended by *Point Counter Point*, but this is not because she felt betrayed by Huxley, whom she had privately told about her tragedy, but because she found in his writing some truths behind the matter which she never wanted to touch upon—or have anyone else do so.

What has come out through our reading is that any discourse stressing motherhood as the essence of women could put pressure on mothers, making their mothering even more difficult. This may remind one of more recent discussions of the mother-child relationship beyond the essentialist notion of mother. Jacqueline Rose, another critic of psychoanalysis and feminism, admits that “Kristeva [. . .] has been attractive to feminism,” but warns against a risk of her “image of femininity,” inveigling us into “that essentialism and primacy of the semiotic which is one of the most problematic of aspects of her work” (*Sexuality in the Field of Vision* [1986], 157). According to Rose’s article, “Mothers” (2014), what makes the mother-child relationship difficult, bringing ruin upon mothers and children, is before anything else the simplification of the relationship, i.e., the attitudes of idealizing motherhood and emphasizing the maternal instinct (this tendency, incidentally, is nowadays noticeably shared by neoliberalism and essentialist feminism). In fact, actual mother-child relationships can never be easily grasped because of their complexity, which Rose persuasively underscores, citing many examples of mothers and children, from Greek myth to recent critiques. On a mother’s affection towards her child, for instance, while
most of us (including Freudians) refuse to recognize any sexual impulse there—women being allowed to be the object of children’s sexual desire, but not vice versa—her breastfeeding is actually followed by her erotic pleasure. A mother’s love, despite our hope of its purity, is in fact something ambivalent, mixed with hate. It is thus vital to take account of such diversity or complexity and to construct an environment in which women can calmly experience being mothers. The need of understanding mothers more flexibly can be particularly deduced from Elinor’s ambivalent attitude towards Little Phil, finding fear and strangeness in him, as well as his unexpected death, which is no doubt the worst of all the possible endings for a mother and her child.\textsuperscript{36}

4. Questioning the Feminine: Lucy

While motherhood puts Marjorie and Elinor in the divided state, what happens to Lucy, who is not a mother? In fact, Lucy’s life, too, does not seem to be compatible with the general notion of identity; she is repeatedly emphasized in the text as a changeable being who cannot be easily grasped by anyone, especially in her temporary relationships with other people (in Molly’s words, she enjoys “float[ing] through life instead of trudging” like a butterfly that “flits from flower to flower” \textsuperscript{[115]} and in her incessant movement in search of a “new life” (as she herself says: “I find it’s really impossible to stay in one place more than a couple of months at a time” \textsuperscript{[294]}). This inevitably leads us to another question about women’s identity, that is, femininity.

Since the 1980s, feminist theory has displayed a strong tendency to reconsider and doubt the concept of the female subject, on which it had constructed itself. In
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990), Judith Butler declares that the feminist critique should “understand how the category of ‘women,’ the subject of feminism, is produced and restrained by the very structures of power [such as language, science and politics] through which emancipation is sought” (3-4). The most daring facet of her theory is to reveal the constructive nature of gender: “gender proves to be performative—that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be. In this sense, gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to preexist the deed” (34). Provided gender is only a discursive construct, it is naturally possible for us to act it in subversive ways, not the ways that reinforce existing structures of power—even though “those who fail to do their gender right” are “regularly punish[ed]” by society (190). Although by a dialectic approach she has deepened and corrected her argument in her subsequent writings, including Bodies That Matter (1993) and Undoing Gender (2003), her attention has been consistently directed to the issue of subjectivity and identity.38

Compared with other female characters in Point Counter Point, Lucy has lived free from the traditional way of female life to such an extent that other people feel as if she were “a man” (199, 378).39 In her relationships with men, Lucy always “want[s] to assert her will” and “pride,” trying to maintain her “independen[ce]” and “free[dom]” in various aspects of her life (200, 226, 262-63); even before Rampion, the most self-assertive man in the story, she cannot but feel it “insufferable that people should do things she didn’t want them to do” (172). What is remarkable is that Lucy appears to stir up gender trouble not only in individual relationships but also in the broader context of
culture, as symbolically depicted in a scene following her affair with Walter:

Aesthetically, with a connoisseur’s appreciation, she had really been admiring him as he lay there, pale, with closed eyes and as though dead, at her side.

[. . .]

[. . .] He had looked dead [. . .]. Herself alive, wakefully and consciously alive, she had studied his beautiful deadness. Admiringly, but with amused detachment, she had looked at this pale exquisite creature which she had used for her delight and which was now dead. “What a fool!” she had thought. (266)

From the perspective of a male “connoisseur,” Lucy observes Walter—ironically—in the same way as his father, the great painter John Bidlake, has so far observed many women, reducing each of them to just an object of his pictures that has “anything worth having beyond a pair of legs and a figure” (61). It is not difficult to find here the reverse of the traditional form of gender, or even a woman’s retaliation for what men have done to women. In another scene, Lucy harshly criticizes John as an artist, including his view of women: “Lucy [. . .] wondered why the old man’s painting had fallen off so much of late. This last exhibition—it was deplorable; “[Speaking as a woman,] I always find your bathers rather an insult”; “Do you really find us so profoundly silly as you paint us?” (59-60). In short, Lucy allows herself to be an observer of John, the observer of women.

What is noticeable is that Lucy has aspects of not only a male critic but also a
male scientist. This is significant given the structure of this story. As stated before, Philip’s scientific narrative frequently appears in the text, and the same sort of approach is shared by other male-scientific observers—such as Lord Edward, Illidge (professional biologists) and Rampion (an amateur zoologist like Philip [see 173]). Thus, by observing, analysing and even ridiculing them, Lucy plays a role in relativizing and challenging the male-scientific narrative (see 179, 200-01, 227, 410). When Lucy is identified as a kind of scientist, it is not only in the sense of “nineteenth-century naturalism,” which remains engaged in observation, but also of “twentieth-century experimental biology,” of which “intervention” is characteristic.\(^\text{42}\) Having inherited “scientific curiosity” from her father, Lucy calls her American mother’s party a “bear garden” and enjoys “experimenting, not with frogs and guinea-pigs, but with human beings” (107-08). Although her experiment is approached by “the method of Darwin and Pasteur” (“You did unexpected things to people, you put them in curious situations and waited to see what would happen” [107]), the difference between her and these forerunners of twentieth-century biology is that her objects are human beings: “I think I’ll take to science, like the Old Man [her father]. Isn’t there such a thing as human zoology? I’d get a bit tired of frogs” (200).\(^\text{43}\) Lucy thus distinguishes herself from her male rivals in the novel who content themselves with experimenting with animals (Edward and Illidge) or just observing people (Philip and Rampion). Considering that in those days women were often reduced by male scientists to the object of their observation and experiment (as typically seen in Haire’s volume in the To-day and To-morrow series; see also Squier, 77-78), Lucy definitely reverses this gender relationship.
as a kind of challenge to male science.  

Lucy’s disturbing influence on the notion of gender is stressed in the text by the contrasting attitudes of Marjorie and Elinor towards gender. Marjorie, despite her seemingly original lack of the maternal, tries to performatively adjust herself to gender norms and will become a maternal mother in the near future. For her, Lucy’s daring way of life is never “attractive” but just “a horror” (376-78). By deepening her religious belief under the guidance of Rachel, who puts a high value on the maternal (see 457), Marjorie accepts the fate of becoming a mother and seems to successfully obtain “peace” of mind which could provide her with a *stable* identity as a traditional type of a woman, although this might be an illusion (see 468-49). As for Elinor, her *ordinary* parody of gender results in a failure. She cannot devote herself to the home and secretly maintains her wish to live like Lucy, appreciating her as “very amusing and alive” and finding “an enviable talent” in her “masculine” way of life. To put it plainly, Elinor’s ambivalent attitude towards her affair—which is described thus: “The spirit was a libertine, but the flesh and its affections were chaste”—suggests that she is a compound of both Lucy-like and Marjorie-like elements. After all, her half-hearted position drives Elinor into an unhappier situation than both Marjorie, who properly enacts an *ordinary* woman, and Lucy, who consistently refuses to do so. Although Butler refers to the possibility of social punishment for people who deviate from gender norms, it might be insightful or realistic that Huxley prepares the tragic end not for Lucy, the most subversive character, but for Elinor, who has the ambiguous position. In a metaphorical sense of science, unlike Marjorie, Elinor certainly has an ability to observe people with
“the right sort of eye,” which her father and Webley appreciate (see 182, 485), but can never play the role of an experimenter like Lucy, as symbolically shown by her unsuccessful affair with Webley, which she calls an “experiment” on her husband (357).

On the whole, Lucy is modelled after Nancy Cunard, whom Huxley mentioned in a letter when they both had poems published in Wheels (to Julian, 3 August 1917, Smith 132), and with whom he was passionately in love, probably between the early autumn of 1922 and July 1923 (see Murray 141).\(^\text{46}\) Cunard was the daughter of an English baronet and a sociable American woman. Having acquired social skills and intelligence, she grew up to be an independent woman who loved freedom so deeply and lived so unconventionally that the “usual labels seem especially inappropriate to what she was” and even “people closest to Nancy [. . .] never began to understand her” (Chisholm 13-14). Concretely, her freewheeling character was reflected in her romances in disregard of chastity (thus, she was often represented as a \emph{femme fatale}),\(^\text{47}\) her repeated changes of dwellings, her preference for self-determination over dependency on others and her political activism for liberty from the 1930s onwards.\(^\text{48}\) Overall, Cunard’s life can be viewed as a performative challenge to the stable concept of identity.

Curiously enough, in fictionalizing Cunard into Lucy, Huxley made some alterations. The real Cunard lived with some traumatic or ‘unfortunate’ elements of her past: 1) her strange relationship with Lady Cunard (although in childhood she yearned for maternal love, Nancy later became estranged from her mother), 2) her unsuccessful marriage and the death of her boyfriend during the war, and 3) her hysterectomy, which she had in the winter of 1920 in Paris probably as a result of her unexpected pregnancy
and abortion (or miscarriage) followed by complications (see Chisholm 101; Gordon 99). Despite knowing about these matters, Huxley did not incorporate them into the character of Lucy. Not having any serious problem with Lady Edward (see 116), Lucy is not concerned about her husband, who died two years previously—on the contrary, she makes herself look good in mourning black (see 56)—never suffering from a women’s disease or hysterectomy. What kind of effect was brought about by this?

Before answering this question, let us direct ourselves to how Cunard was represented by another of her contemporaries. Michael Arlen, the popular novelist who was on close terms with Cunard before Huxley’s association with her, fictionalized her three times in his writing. In his autobiographical story, “Confessions of a Naturalised Englishman” (1929), Arlen recollects Cunard, through Pricilla (a married society woman), giving an accurate portrait of her in this heroine, who has grown up without her mother’s love and who takes a hostile attitude towards her: “Mrs Byrrh, preoccupied with the conquest of London, had entirely neglected Priscilla as a child and a young girl”; “Pricilla disapproved very strongly of the mother who had done so much for her” (SSMA, 17-18). In his earlier two novels, Arlen more daringly constructed characters based on Cunard. In his first novel, Piracy (1922), the protagonist Ivy stays with Virginia in Paris after the war. Virginia is a married woman of the upper class, who, despite appearing unrestrained and energetic, develops a gynaecological illness and is forced to undergo a major operation with serious complications: “‘There’s things inside me,’ she said, with a sob. ‘Steel things.... They’ve left them in there... holding things together.... Oh, it hurts, Ivor....’” (261). The story continues with her modest refusal of
his proposal and her sudden death because of a chill after going out in the rain. Arlen’s bestselling novel, *The Green Hat* (1924), develops almost the same sort of melodrama, in which an uninhibited heroine called Iris, having experienced syphilis and a miscarriage, kills herself in the end, realizing that she is not the right partner for the narrator: “Yes, I would die for purity. I wouldn’t mind dying anyhow, but it would be nice to die for purity” (47). What emerges from the above representation of Cunard is ambiguous: firstly, she formed her unusual character, including her preference for independence and liberty, (at least partly) prompted by her ‘unfortunate’ circumstances—thus her deviation might be allowed for such a ‘pitiable’ background; secondly, her freewheeling way of life eventually leads her to ruin—as if it were worthy of punishment.

In contrast, Huxley refused the causal relationship between her free-spirited character and traumatic past by avoiding representing the latter. An especially important point is the hysterectomy. Huxley did not adopt Arlen’s association of being unfeminine in gender with being unfeminine/barren in the body/sex—one of the targets of gender criticism.50 Regardless of the state of her body or other states peculiar to her, Lucy is free. The possibility is thus suggested that anyone can live like Lucy, performatively challenging gender identity. Especially given that Lucy, unlike Arlen’s heroine, remains energetic to the end of the story, Huxley himself was perhaps not negative about such a subversive form of gender, nor did he hope for it to be interpreted that way.

By showing in a contrapuntal way the three women—Marjorie, an expectant woman who is finally forced to accept an ordinary parody of gender, Lucy, an
independent lady who refuses it but is labelled a *femme fatale*, and Elinor, a mother who cannot do either and faces the most tragic end.\(^51\) — *Point Counter Point* exposes the harsh realities confronted by women, namely how compulsively and violently the stable notion of gender identity baffles or binds women, as well as how unfairly and irrationally male-oriented society will deal with them, even if they try to be subversive of it.

**5. Conclusion**

In *Point Counter Point*, Huxley contrapuntally describes how women with different characters and statuses search for their own happiness while resisting, obeying or struggling with the contemporary ideology of womanhood. His vivid portraits contain some elements questioning the concept of maternity, femininity or identity itself, interestingly echoing recent criticism of gender beyond the contemporary debate about reproduction and motherhood.\(^52\) This significance of the novel owes much to Huxley’s relationships with Maria Huxley, Naomi Mitchison and Nancy Cunard, as well as his imagination of, and perhaps empathy with, the circumstances and feelings of these women, who did not necessarily conform well with the gender norm. Here, we may also remember that, as Chapter I indicated, during wartime Huxley himself was actually put into a subtle position in terms of gender as a young male civilian. Although his attitude towards women has been, and will be, most probably associated with the image of the male scientist in *Brave New World*, a close reading of female characters in *Point Counter Point* leads us to other aspects of this author. In his creative activities,
Huxley was definitely influenced by the women around him, and he formed his own view of women in a more delicate and complicated manner than has been generally assumed.

Getting back to the failure of the mother-child relationship, this repetitive motif in Huxley’s oeuvre could be certainly discussed with his loss of a mother’s love as well as his attempts at overcoming this and another trauma, that is, of seeing wartime mothers sending their sons to the front. However, we also have to consider his associations with his female friends who struggled with gender ideology, by which he probably perceived the mother-child relationship as something more fragile, complicated and thus special in a certain sense. Huxley’s problematization of the mother-child relationship in *Point Counter Point* and his other writings still sounds a warning to our tendency to simplify, idealize and propagate it in various aspects of culture and politics.

It is natural to wonder how the author’s insight into the issues of women’s identity developed in his subsequent career. Although the theme of the collapse of the mother-child relationship repeatedly appeared in his fiction, his view of women never again had such depth as in *Point Counter Point*. By envisaging the future in which, albeit free from reproduction and the home, women still appear to be subordinated to men, never participating in political authority, *Brave New World* questions the impact of technological progress upon women’s status; this line of argument may fit that division in *Point Counter Point* between two discourses of male scientists and female individuals. On the other hand, there can be seen, in his later novels, memorable female characters, e.g., Katy in *Genius and the Goddess* (1955), a Nobel Prize-winning
physicist’s wife, who has the mysterious power to heal her husband’s illness, and Susila in *Island* (1962), a psychotherapist on an Asian island who helps the hero Will grow up as a human and who is probably partly based on his second wife, Laura. Certainly these women are influential in the overall plots of the stories, but they play key roles mainly in relation to men, rather than performing themselves. In light of gender criticism, this point, which more or less could be applied to women in *Point Counter Point*, may be regarded as the limits of his novels. In his non-fictional writing, Huxley directly addresses the theme of mother in “Mother” (*Adonis and the Alphabets* [1956]).

Although commercialization propagates the idealized mother, a purely maternal one (e.g., some greeting cards for Mother’s Day: “You put the sweet in Home Sweet Home”; “The happiness of fam’ly life / Depends so much on You” [*AHCEV*, 341]), the mother has actually and historically been more ambiguous, being “simultaneously the Creator and the Destroyer” of life (343), as duly described from the Book of Job through a Jungian book by Erich Neumann, *The Great Mother* (1955). It might be a pity that Huxley was not more actively involved with contemporary discussion on the issues related to women’s identity, of which he had been, to a certain degree, aware in writing *Point Counter Point*, but it must not be unfair either if we note a sort of development or progress from Pearl in his first piece of fiction (partly bolstered by his misogyny) to Susila in his final novel.

As Chapter I demonstrated, Huxley in “Richard Greenow” cast doubt upon personal identity from a psychological perspective with a focus on otherness in the self, especially the violent element of the mind; his scepticism was also directed against
gender identity, as seen in the hermaphrodite hero. His interest in this issue continued and made the author conceive of some aspects of *Point Counter Point* in which he suggested the inflexible concept of personal identity as not only unreliable but also harmful, by depicting female characters’ difficulty with the notion of femininity or maternity. With regard to the theme of identity, this novel, contrapuntally portraying characters on multiple levels, can also be viewed from other theoretical angles, such as those of class and race. The three main women are from different classes, and this point naturally influences the ways in which they live, as suggested by Marjorie’s references to Lucy: “He [Walter] likes her [Lucy] because she’s attractive. But if I had money.” It wasn’t fair” (194). Furthermore, the issue of class casts a shadow over other characters, including Walter, who theoretically sympathizes with the lower classes but emotionally dislikes them, as well as Illidge, a communist from a lower class in Russia who experiences despair after murdering Webley because of his strong passion for revolution. These descriptions—evidently affected by contemporary domestic and foreign situations, such as the rise of the Labour Party and the appearance of the Soviet Union—convey a hint of the author’s view of class, which is the main target of Chapter IV, a Marxist analysis of his work. At the same time, *Point Counter Point* has scenes which may reflect what Huxley at that time was thinking of races and cultures different from his. For example, he negatively depicted India and Indians, perhaps based on his actual stay there, hinting at his own feelings through Philip, who shows no interest in the justice or the future of this nation (see Chapter 6). On the other hand, Huxley’s pessimism concerning the future of his own nation or empire was also laid bare in his
negative treatment of *home*, a metaphor of country. The young Quarles’ “only child,” Little Phil, has already learnt—as a would-be supporter of the home—“social virtues and why the triangle of India is painted crimson [the same colour as England] on the map” (321, see also 238); nevertheless this boy, a ray of hope of the home, is not allowed to survive for long. This plot, together with female characters who are less maternal, may be deemed as a sign of the collapse of the British Empire, or England, showing a striking contrast with its colony, India, where many children are now in fact being born and raised (see 91). In the next chapter, let us review how in his next and most famous novel Huxley represented non-Western Others and approached matters of imperialism.

1 See Mary in *Crome Yellow* (1921), civilized women in *Brave New World* (1932) and Helen in *Eyeless in Gaza* (1936). For *Point Counter Point*, see below.

2 See Linda in *Brave New World*. For *Point Counter Point*, see below.

3 See Californian women in *Ape and Essence* (1948) and Mrs Foxe in *Eyeless in Gaza*. For *Point Counter Point*, see below.

4 See John in *Brave New World* and Anthony in *Eyeless in Gaza*.

5 Probably the study that most extensively discusses the roles of women in Huxley’s oeuvre is Guin A. Nance’s article, “Dragons and Dragomen: Huxley’s Heroines” (1995), in which she suggests that “the women of Huxley’s novels play a principal role both in the development of most of the central characters and in the reader’s perception of those characters” (146). Despite Nance’s important comment on the diversity of women in his work (see 156), not many critics have pursued this issue.

6 As early as 1916, “Huxley was attracted to such female spirits” as Lady Constance Stuart Richardson, Iris Tree, Nancy Cunard and Marie Beerbohm (Murray 86).
In fact, the possibility of another aspect of Huxley is suggested by Susan Merrill Squier, who finds in Huxley’s works, including *Brave New World*, a close association of VT (visualization technologies) with RT (reproductive technologies). According to her, an awareness of this point makes it possible for us to more flexibly “reinscribe the link between fetus and mother, and to remember that the embryo is [. . .] part of a complex mutual relationship [. . .] with birth” (167). Sally Minogue and Andrew Palmer, by turning their attention to Huxley’s representation of abortion in *Eyeless in Gaza*, which was illegal in Britain at that time but not described with “disapproval,” read this novel as “a powerful critique of current structures of oppression” (114).

To a certain degree, the artist Mark Rampion is based on Lawrence, the editor Denis Burlap is J. M. Murry, the fascist leader Everard Webley is Oswald Mosley, Walter Bidlake is the young Huxley, Philip Quarles is the present Huxley, etc. For Webley, however, David Bradshaw argues for the influence of John Gordon Hargrave, founder of the Kindred of the Kibbo Kift (see “Huxley’s ‘Tinpot Mussolini’ and the KKK’s ‘White Fox’: A New Source for Everard Webley and the Brotherhood of British Freemen in *Point Counter Point*” [2003]). Much attention has also been directed to the experimental features of this novel, such as applications of music and biology to fiction (see *PCP*, 384-85, 414). For this aspect of the novel, see Jerome Meckier, *Aldous Huxley: Satire and Structure* (1971), 41-52; Peter Edgerly Firchow, *Aldous Huxley: Satirist and Novelist* (1972), 93-117; Robert S. Baker, *The Dark Historic Page: Social Satire and Historicism in the Novels of Aldous Huxley, 1921-1939* (1982), 99-126.

There also appear other female characters of marked individuality some of whom are not categorized as conventional women. Janet, Elinor’s mother, married John Bidlake, a great but prodigal painter, despite her family’s objection, just because she liked his art, and she has indulged in reverie while also having an interest in Buddhism. Hilda, Lucy’s mother, is a sociable woman from “the New World” who married Lord Edward as she had wished, and who lives as she likes regardless of “traditional” values (50). Mary, albeit being of noble birth and despite her parents’ opposition, married Rampion, a talented working-class
man, calling him “simply an investment” (142). Their fifteen year-long marriage has been going better than that of any of the other couples described in the novel; Mary is a good example of “atavisms” for Mark (144) while he fascinates her with his artistic talent and radical ideas.

10 In an essay on Point Counter Point and feminism, Rupender Kaur evaluates the author’s depiction of “women who ultimately become the spokesmen of those issues that form the arguments of feminist writers who want the elevation of women from object to subject status” (46). This essay, however, refers only to Simone de Beauvoir as a feminist critic and does not take the author’s biographical facts and other writings into consideration.

11 For this paragraph, see Susan Kingsley Kent, Gender and Power in Britain, 1640-1990 (1999), Chapter 12.

12 The rationale for this series was “to combine the popularization of expert knowledge with futurology: as the title suggests, to lay out the current state of particular disciplines or subjects, and to consider their probable future developments” (Saunders “TTPS,” 3). As Aline Ferreira points out, the To-day and To-morrow series reflects contemporary interest in the situation of women, such as “the [present] plight of women” and “possible strategies and policies that would ameliorate women’s position” (33).

13 On the other hand, Ralph de Pomerai’s volume, Aphrodite or the Future of Sexual Relationships (1931), refers to Walter and Lucy in Point Counter Point as a young couple, who “have the misfortune of living in a transitional period in which the old standards have fallen into disrepute and new ones have not yet been evolved capable of winning approbation and acceptance” (69-70).

14 Apart from the main characters, the difficulty or failure of making or maintaining the mother-child relationship is embodied by several women. For instance, Mrs Knoyle unintentionally destroys her relationship with her son Spandrell (a character suggestive of Charles Baudelaire) by her second marriage, which finally brings about his suicide, by which he completes his “revenge” upon her (see 283). Gladys, a lower-class woman, extorts money from Sydney (Philip’s father) for her unwelcome pregnancy,
which is specifically “a humiliation” for his wife (489, see 457) as well as for himself. Miss Fulkes, a
governess, earnestly takes care of Little Phil, believing that she loves him more than his parents, and
feeling deeply sad that someday she will “have to leave him” (315). For Rachel, see note 51. On the other
hand, Mary, who in Rampion’s view “live[s] by instinct” (148), might be expected to have something like
a maternal instinct, but interestingly her life with her two children is not minutely described in the story.
15 Ludovici harshly criticizes feminism as a national and racial threat to “motherhood,” which shares the
recent “body-despising” tendency (33). Blacker advocates birth-control from racial and national
perspectives (see Birth Control and the State: A Plea and a Forecast [1926]). Haire eugenically attacks
“humanitarianism,” proposing “compulsory sterilization or contraception” to prevent the birth of
“unhealthy” people (Hymen or the Future of Marriage [1927], 76-77).
16 Russell argues for the need to train women to believe “that to create new human beings is worth the
discomfort and the suffering which she [they] must undergo” (46-47). Brittain tries to harmonize
women’s self-realization with the interest of the community (see Halcyon or the Future of Monogamy
[1929], especially 83-86), and predicts a future when motherhood will be well received again after having
been “identified with the four S’s—sentiment, suffering, sacrifice and stupidity” (67). Paul, sympathizing
with feminism and considering radically the state of “home,” believes that the maternal instinct is “real,”
something essential to women, unlike the paternal instinct, which is only “artificial” (Chronos or the
Future of the Family [1930], 28-30).
17 In terms of expression, too, this text appears to deal with the maternal negatively. The word
“maternal[ly]” appears six times, and four of these occasions are used for the description of the three
spiritual women surrounding Burlap, a lustful hypocrite (see 168 [Beatrice], 217 [Cobbett], 219 [Susan],
309 [Beatrice]). Burlap, because of his childlike behaviour, seems to arouse something maternal in these
women, but this (pseudo-) maternal love is grasped as something unusual that is suggestive of “incest”
(see 219, 221) and which is ultimately to be lost, as symbolized by the death of Susan. The word is also
used for Walter’s unrewarded love of Lucy; he treats her as a woman “whom one could maternally protect and be maternally protected by” (260), but this love eventually disappears along with his hope for something maternal.

18 A biological observation of the diversity of the self can be seen in the description of Webley’s dead body: “Thousands upon thousands of millions of minute and diverse individuals had come together and the product of their mutual dependence, their mutual hostility had been a human life. Their total colony, their living hive had been a man” (509). As mentioned in the Introduction, Huxley not only emphasized the fluid and diverse aspect of identity but also realized that such a view of identity might lead one to live freely or irresponsibly. In Antic Hay, for example, Theodore remarks: “when the future and the past are abolished, when it is only the present instant, whether enchanted or unenchanted, that counts, when there are no causes or motives, no future consequences to be considered, how can there be responsibility”? (184). In Point Counter Point, Philip sees the effect of his sense of identity in an ambiguous manner: “his liberty was in a strange paradoxical way a handicap and a confinement to his spirit” (255). As stated in Chapter IV of this dissertation, Eyeless in Gaza is an autobiographical work which follows his conversion into leading a responsible life based on another sort of identity.

19 This continues: “Fifteen years hence a boy would be confirmed. Enormous in his robes, like a full-rigged ship, the Bishop would say: ‘Do ye here in the presence of God, and of this congregation, renew the solemn promise and vow that was made in your name at your Baptism?’ And the ex-fish would answer with passionate conviction: ‘I do.’ For the thousandth time she wished she were not pregnant” (194).

20 In his notebook Philip writes: “Since reading Alverdes and Wheeler I have quite decided that my novelist must be an amateur zoologist. Or, better still, a professional zoologist who is writing a novel in his spare time. His approach will be strictly biological” (414). For the zoological feature of Point Counter Point, see Meckier, “Quarles among the Monkeys: Huxley’s Zoological Novels” (1973).
In *Anthropogenie* (1874) and others, Ernst Haeckel demonstrates that the embryonic growth of the foetus in the womb recapitulates the entire evolutionary history of the species. Although he supported his theory with illustrations showing the process, Haeckel was condemned for his modification of the original image. Assuming that Huxley knew of this fabrication (this is probable given his encyclopaedic knowledge), it may be that through the above scene the author not only exhibits the apparent contrast in two discourses (the objective and the subjective) on gestation but also deconstructs the opposition between them, both of which are, in fact, produced by a person’s subjectivity.

Fig. 2. Illustration of the Recapitulation: Tables IV and V in Haeckel’s *Anthropogenie: Entwickelungsgeschichte des Menschen* (1874).

As Squier remarks, unlike Russell, who sees ectogenesis very positively, “Brittain scrutinizes ectogenesis, as she does all of the other topics she addresses in *Halcyon*, in terms of its impact not on the species, nor on society in general, but on the specific experience of women in relation to their children” (81).
Being dissatisfied with an earlier feminism that, by “reject[ing] the image [of motherhood] and its misuse,” “circumvents the real experience that fantasy [of motherhood] overshadows,” Kristeva lays the notion of mother on the table for discussion, stressing the impact of pregnancy and mothering on women (see KR, 161). She also argues that subjectivity is always being formed, never completed. She receives a hint at this notion of “the subject-in-process” from a biological view that “a living being is not merely a structure but a structure open to its surroundings and other structures” (JK, 26). Such subjectivity thus occurs in an open system like an amoeba, consistently being transformed, depending on repeated incorporation and exclusion of others, particularly those who are loved.

At the beginning of the essay, Kristeva declares that in our “civilization” the “representation of femininity” tends to be “absorbed by motherhood,” and proposes a definition of “maternal” as “the ambivalent principle that is bound to the species, on the one hand, and on the other stems from an identity catastrophe that causes the Name to topple over into the unnameable, non-language or body” (KR, 161-63).

“Dividing the essay into two discourses, she writes on one side of the page of the mystical language of Christian theology and the rationality of science, while, on the other side, she develops a more private and autobiographical account of motherhood. In dividing the narrative of her essay in this way, Kristeva seeks to underscore the split or hiatus between the ideal and actuality of maternity” (Elliott 121-22).


In a string of incidents, Elinor is put under some obscure power, deprived of her own abilities of deciding, thinking and action, and is contrasted with Philip and other male characters who can decide, think and act by themselves (see especially 480, 540-44). Unlike the positive impact of motherhood as argued by Kristeva, this image of Elinor with “helplessness” (540) underscores another side of being a mother, which is partly suggestive of de Beauvoir’s well-known comment on women under the patriarchy
system: “The woman who gave birth, therefore, did not know the pride of creation; she felt herself the
plaything of obscure forces, and the painful ordeal of childbirth seemed a useless or even troublesome
accident. [...] she submitted passively to her biologic fate” (94). While Elinor, losing her reason,
becomes somewhat religious in the above scene, Marjorie is helped by religion to overcome her anxiety
about becoming a mother. It is thus suggested that thinking may need to be replaced by belief to become a
good mother (motherhood can make it difficult for women to remain rational and intelligent), and that the
maternal is something religious or illusory. See also note 51.

28 According to Bedford, “Maria was bisexual and she did have a series of short-term passionate
relationships with other people while she was married to Aldous” (qtd. in Murray 72, 140). In Garsington,
Maria had a lesbian relationship with Ottoline Morrell, which was well known among visitors, including
Aldous (see Murray 71-72; see also David King Dunaway’s interviews with Rose D’Haulleville [Maria’s
younger sister] and Francis Huxley [Julian’s second son], published in *Aldous Huxley Recollected: An
Oral History* [1995], 16-18). Although in a letter to Julian (5 September 1927) he himself admitted that
“according to Freud” he had “secret homosexual tastes” (290), it seems that Huxley was not plainly
engaged with homosexuality. Meanwhile, when he stayed at the Nottinghamshire coalfields to see
unemployment centres in 1936, the visit was called by Maria the exploration of the “homosexual
underworld of Nottingham” (Maria’s unpublished letter to her younger sister, Jeanne Neveux, c. March
1936, qtd. in Murray 292; Murray’s translation of “la basse homosexualité de Nottingham”). Other than
“Richard Greenow,” Huxley did not directly place the theme of sexuality into his work. However, in *After
Many a Summer* (1939), when Pete, a young scientist, asks, “what sort of sexual behaviour was normal,”
Propter, a philosopher who is mainly the author’s mouthpiece, mentions the relative, constructed nature of
this concept: “there was no one type of human sexuality that could be called ‘normal’ in the sense in
which one could say that there was a normality of vision or digestion. [...] Thus, if an individual wanted
to be well thought of in any given society, he or she could safely regard as ‘normal’ the type of sexual
behaviour currently tolerated by that local religion and approved by the ‘best people’” (260-62).

29 Although Marjorie is sure that she loves Walter “by [heterosexual] tradition,” her lover concludes that she “doesn’t really like men and is only naturally attuned to the company of women” (15). Elinor’s potential discord with heterosexism might be implied by Rachel’s impression of her as being “queer”—the word which had already been in use as slang for homosexuality at the end of the nineteenth century (see Showalter S.A., 112). For Lucy’s sexuality, see note 44.

30 That Huxley’s baby was named “Matthew” after Matthew Arnold (Huxley’s great uncle) definitely reminds us that Little Phil is named after his father Philip, and is composed of his many ancestors as realized by Elinor.

31 Huxley writes: “My wife has just had a son and has, I am thankful to say, weathered the tempest safely and auspiciously. These works of nature really do put works of art in the shade” (letter to Arnold Bennett, 23 April 1920, Smith 184; see also his letter to Leonard Huxley, 20 June 1920, Smith 187).

32 In her review of Brave New World, Charlotte Haldane expresses her dissatisfaction with Huxley’s satire on science technology (“Dr. Huxley and Mr. Arnold” [1932]). Six years earlier, she herself published Man’s World (1926), envisaging a twenty-first century in which women are divided by a caste system into sterilized and breeding groups, controlled by a male scientist. For a comparison of Man’s World and Brave New World, see e.g., Firchow EU, 42-43; Judith Adamson, Charlotte Haldane: Woman Writer in a Man’s World (1998), 55-56. Haldane’s attitude towards feminism and science appears complex and unable to be simplified. For a gender analysis of Haldane’s work, see e.g., Squier, Chapter 3.

33 As a matter of fact, many other women in Point Counter Point would be classified by Haldane as members of “abnormal” groups (see Haldane ME, 134, 157-58). Through these characters, Huxley, being probably familiar with Haldane’s tone of argument, which is also assumed to have influenced her husband, may satirize her view of women’s lifestyles. In a letter to Julian Huxley (signed with Aldous, 30 July 1920), Maria, soon after her childbirth, writes: “I hope Mrs Haldane will give me many hints and
advices [for mothering]” (Smith 189-90).

34 When writing *Point Counter Point*, Huxley wrote a letter to Mitchison in a gentle tone: “I have been hesitating to write for some time; for after all there is no consolation and the best-meant letters are intrusions. And where a child is concerned the horror is so specially unescapable and inexplicable. Child suffering brings the whole thing to a head, summarizes the whole enormous problem. And there is no visible solution. One can’t swallow original sin; and equally, I think, one can’t swallow mere chance, mere pointlessness, mere mechanisms. The only hope is that there may be a paradox, a living and functioning self-contradiction that admits the pointlessness and the wantonness and at the same time admits the point and the purposefulness, which one does feel certain of, at moments, as realities” (23 August 1927, Sexton 198).

35 One of the arguments against Kristeva is a suspicion that she is subscribing to, if not relying on, biological essentialism, although she views sexual differences mainly in psychoanalytic terms. For example, in “Stabat Mater,” Kristeva proposes an analysis that allows “an acknowledgement of what is irreducible, of the irreconcilable interest of both sexes in asserting their differences, in the quest of each one—and of women, after all—for an appropriate fulfilment” (*KR*, 184).

36 Considering the status of children, the text, especially the cited passage in which Elinor recognizes undeniable strangeness/otherness in Little Phil (*PCP*, 319-20), can be read as a warning against the narcissistic gratification that tempts parents to see their children as clones of themselves.

37 Butler also remarks: “Gender is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being” (45). For Butler’s criticism of Kristeva’s theory, including her view of lesbianism as “psychosis,” see *GT*, 107-27, 181-83.

38 In *Undoing Gender*, Butler argues that gender norms necessarily produce the repressed, those who cannot follow the norms, and that the norms always involve something latent to attack them: “Gender is
the mechanism by which notions of masculine and feminine are produced and naturalized, but gender might very well be the apparatus by which such terms are deconstructed and denaturalized. Indeed, it may be that the very apparatus that seeks to install the norm also works to undermine that very installation, that the installation is, as it were, definitionally incomplete” (42).

39 Lucy is very cautious of romance, which could collapse this power balance (see 226, 262-63). Her behaviour is compared by others to a man’s: “There was nothing of the victim about Lucy; not much even, he had often reflected, of the ordinary woman. She could pursue her pleasure as a man pursues his, remorselessly, single-mindedly, without allowing her thoughts and feelings to be in the least involved”—Spandrell (199); “She’s one of those women who have the temperament of a man. Men can get pleasure out of casual encounters. [… ] She has the masculine detachment”—Elinor (378).

40 The scene is ironic in another sense too, namely that Walter himself works as a ruthless critic (see 213-14). It can also be a woman’s revenge upon Walter, who has underestimated women’s intelligence (see 67).

41 See Hogara Matsumoto, “Three ‘Modern Girl Novels’: The Imperial Development/Revolution of the New Woman Fiction” (in Japanese, 2008), 271. In this essay, Matsumoto compares Point Counter Point, Michael Arlen’s The Green Hat (see below) and Virginia Woolf’s final novel, Between the Acts (1941).

42 See, e.g., Evelyn Fox Keller’s mention of this critical change: “One popular description of the distinctiveness of biological science since the end of the nineteenth century is cast in terms of the shift from an observational science to an experimental one. This shift might alternatively be expressed as a shift in aim from representation to intervention (or from description to control)” (96-97).

43 In another volume in the To-day and To-morrow series, J. D. Bernal, a controversial scientist, envisages a future state, as Huxley does in Brave New World, by using a similar expression: “The world might, in fact, be transformed into a human zoo, a zoo so intelligently managed that its inhabitants are not aware that they are there merely for the purposes of observation and experiment” (The World, the Flesh and the
Devil: An Enquiry into the Future of the Three Enemies of the Rational Soul [1929], 95). Although Bernal seems to think little of women (or simply does not seriously consider them), Lucy exactly practises such “observation and experiment[ation]” towards the people around her, or, in her words, “creatures” (109).

44 Naturally, Lucy becomes a threat to men—“gender trouble” must be the most troublesome for people who have vested interests in the regime of “masculine hegemony” (see Butler GT, 46)—and in this case they are male scientists in particular. Whether Illidge (“[Lucy is] Damned, destroyed, irrevocably corrupted” [70]; “A refined and perfumed imitation of a savage or an animal” [71]), Rampion (“These professional sirens!” [172]; “She gives me the creeps. That poor little Bidlake boy. Like a rabbit in front of a weasel” [173]) or Spandrell (“a born bad angel”; “good and faithful succubus” [199]), each of them tries to reduce her indefinability to the male-oriented category of femme fatale, bringing ruin upon men.

On the other hand, Lucy appears to have internalized the homosexual taboo. It is not difficult to detect in the text the signs that she has not adapted or satisfied herself by her heterosexual relationships with men, including Walter, whom she can never “love” (264). However, she continues to enact a parody of heterosexuality. Tired of London, she goes on a visit to Paris, where homosexuality (“les tapettes”/“les gousses”) is “fashionable,” but because of her “English respectability,” she soon begins to look again for “heterosexuals for a change” (409). Even though it brings to her “grave and attentive suffering” (470, see also 466-67), Lucy does not stop performatively acting as a heterosexual woman.

45 Another example of stable identity can be seen in Webley’s way of life: “He was always so definitely himself; he lived up to character” (358). In other writings, Huxley sees this sort of stability of identity very negatively as something unnatural for a living being, and refers to Christianity and Fascism as examples of that which requires one to live with a stable self (see the Introduction of this dissertation; see also EG, Chapter 11).

46 As for her appearance, Lucy really resembles Cunard, except for her “dark hair,” which contrasts with Cunard’s fair hair (56). Huxley’s association with Cunard influenced his characterization of important
women in his other novels, such as Myra in *Antic Hay*, Barbara in *Those Barren Leaves* and Helen in *Eyeless in Gaza*, each of whom is influential to the protagonist suggestive of Huxley. See also Firchow, “Nancy (Myra, Lucy); Carrington (Mary, Anne); and Aldous (Theodore, Walter): Fact and Fiction” (2006).

47 In terms of sexuality, Cunard was mysterious to men, many of whom realized that, instead of feeling pure satisfaction, she was undergoing “a kind of ordeal or torture” or “almost self-sacrifice” during sex (Chisholm 234-35). Although she had a lifelong tolerance towards, and friendship with homosexuals, she was not openly engaged in homosexuality (see Gordon 92).

48 Cunard is known for her enthusiastic involvement with the Black Rights Movement and the anti-Fascist campaign during the Spanish Civil War (see Chapter IV, Section 2.3).

49 Unlike in his earlier works on Cunard, Arlen does not kill the heroine but saps her of her vitality in the last scene: “She [Priscilla] was asleep, her mouth slightly open. Staring at her like one awaking from a trance, I felt that as she slept she had lost her superiority over me, that she was the younger and weaker, that she was no more than a child and needed protection” (55-56). In terms of gender, this scene presents a typical description of man as the observer/protector and woman as the observed/protected, contrasting strikingly with Huxley’s description of Lucy and Walter cited above.

50 For example, Butler rejects the generally accepted view of a necessary relationship between the body and gender, regarding sex as a “gendered category” in the sense that “‘sex’ is as culturally constructed as gender” (*GT*, 8-9).

51 On hearing Elinor’s frank comment about Little Phil (as mentioned earlier), Rachel realizes: “something seemed to be lacking in her, something without which no human being could be entirely sympathetic to Rachel Quarles. It was as though she had been born without certain natural instincts” (339). Of course, this “something” or “certain natural instincts” is so-called maternity or maternal instinct. A crucial point, however, emerges in the rest of Rachel’s consciousness. What makes her feel Elinor
“strange” or “queer” is not so much the fact that she is lacking in maternal instinct but “Elinor’s calm and casual admission of the fact. She herself would have blushed to make such an admission, even if it had been the truth” (339). In fact, Rachel herself has mixed feelings about her son Philip—she seems to love her lost second son Geoffrey more than Philip, dropping hints about her unconscious wish that Philip “had gone to the War” instead of his brother (see 300, 341-42)—and cannot be regarded only as an exemplary mother with a maternal affection. Yet at least she never expresses the less maternal side of herself on the performative level, so nothing seems to be lacking in her. The maternal is implied as something to be acted performatively rather than given inherently or existing objectively. So, what enables Rachel to successfully act performatively as a good mother or wife? It is, first of all, her piety.

The generation gap between Rachel and her daughter-in-law thus appears as whether or not a woman has faith in God. Rachel religiously leads Marjorie, who is originally more spiritual than Elinor, to accept her destiny to become a mother (see 458-59). For the association of the maternal with religion, see also note 27. On the other hand, Elinor’s mother, Janet, is also notable in the issue of identity. She appears to be just a typical wife and mother as Rachel does (although the former is attracted to Buddhism while the latter believes in Christianity), but at times questions herself on her identity and existence: “She [. . .] began to repeat her own name, ‘Janet Bidlake, Janet Bidlake, Janet Bidlake,’ again and again, until the syllables had lost all significance for her and had become as mysterious, meaningless and arbitrary as the words of a necromancer’s spell. Abracadabra, Janet Bidlake—was she really herself? did she even exist?” (549).

52 Point Counter Point is the longest novel with the most characters in Huxley’s fiction. Although this chapter has focused on the main three characters, other facets of the novel will be revealed by a close analysis of other women. The end of the novel, depicting Burlap and Beatrice playing happily in the bath, which is of course contrasted with the opening portrayal of the miserable couple Walter and Marjorie, may also be read as integrating a diversity of gender into something like heterosexism. However, Burlap and Beatrice are very ironically presented there (“Of such is the Kingdom of Heaven” [569]), so the scene
does not need to be construed as such.

53 The ideas of ectogenesis and of the abolition of the family first appeared in *Crome Yellow*, in which Scogan predicts these occurrences in a future world (see 23).

54 Marjorie’s unwelcome pregnancy may indicate that, unlike Elinor, she has little knowledge about birth control.

55 Philip’s racism appears elsewhere, placing Orang-utans equally with people of Chinese, Malays and North Borneo (see 251). With regard to his despising India, his father, Sydney, also uses the investigation of Indian history at the British Museum as a pretext for seeing Gladys in London; here, before an English man, the image of Indians emerges as the object of observation, as does that of women.
Chapter III Savage

—Brave New World—

Anthropology and Postcolonialism

1. Introduction

Unusually among modernist writers, there has been very little discussion of Aldous Huxley’s work in relation to postcolonialism. As the two previous chapters have indicated, Huxley, though not rare for people in those days, laid sporadic manifestations of racism about black people, Asians and Jews. Although his early writing tends to avoid describing colonies concretely or mentioning the problem of imperialism directly, there are a few exceptions, such as the travel sketch Jesting Pilate (1926) and the novel Point Counter Point (1928). After the Great War, before civil unrest developed in India, the British Empire was forced to select either conciliation or suppression in dealing with the Indian population. In Point Counter Point, upon hearing an Indian’s criticism of the injustice of British rule, Philip Quarles feels as if the issue were totally unrelated to himself: “what about old appalling India, what about justice and liberty, what about progress and the future? The fact is, I don’t care” (92). In Jesting Pilate, before the problem of “the capacity or incapacity of the Indians to govern themselves,” Huxley cannot show clearly his own position, only commenting: “it is easy for me to suspend judgment” (AHCEII, 471). According to Edward W. Said, “the fundamental historical problem of modernism” was that “Europe and the West, in short, were being asked to take the Other seriously,” but before the appearance of various
Others, modernist literature was “unable either to say yes, we should give up control, or no, we shall hold on regardless” (“Representing the Colonized: Anthropology’s Interlocutors” [1988], 223). This equivocal reaction to Others appears to be shared by Huxley, too. After all, his unpopularity with postcolonial criticism is probably due to the assumption that one could not really hope to deduce an unexpected or impressive result from his work even if interpreted in this context. Huxley looks like what one imagines of a typical English, white, upper-middle-class intellectual of those days—namely that he was indifferent to the problem of imperialism, or more judgmentally, that he stood on the ruler’s side of imperialism.3

Yet, even though such a conservative image agrees with Huxley’s early writing to a certain degree, it must be doubtful whether it can also fit the whole range of activity of his career, especially his later work. In light of the fact that Huxley, since the mid-1930s, appealed for world peace and deepened more and more his interest in Buddhism and other aspects of Oriental thought (as discussed in the next chapter), it would not be convincing to view him as indifferent to Others (in a racial or a national sense) or as being uncritical of the rule of the West over them. If there is a gap between his attitudes towards Others in his early and later writings, how should we understand the causes of this? Why did he experience such a development or conversion in the decade from the later 1920s to the later 1930s? Although it can be explained by the unstable political situation of his day or by his close association with pacifist intellectuals (see e.g., Murray 284-86; Dunaway HH, 17-32), Huxley was, first of all, a novelist, and it is probable that the acts of preparing and writing a novel gave him an opportunity to
reconsider and change his posture towards Others. To seriously examine this possibility, our attention needs to be directed to the text of *Brave New World* (1932), the novel published in the middle of the period concerned.

In the present chapter, I will adopt historical and critical approaches to Huxley’s most famous text, especially his descriptions of the Savage Reservation and the Savage, which have not often been discussed closely, in order to grasp carefully his attitude towards non-Western others and the issue of imperialism. My reading places emphasis upon the anthropology of those days as well as postcolonial theories of today.4

2. *Brave New World* and the Popularity of Anthropology

As is well known, anthropology was in fashion in modernist contexts. In Britain, influenced by the anti-slave movement, anthropology grew rapidly between the later nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. Although anthropology was first led by “armchair anthropologists” such as James Frazer (the author of *The Golden Bough* [1890-1915], an epoch-making comparative study of different customs and religions), it was reborn as that which based itself upon fieldwork or participation-observation by the achievements of Bronisław Malinowski, who, after living on an island off Papua New Guinea, returned to London to advocate social anthropology. This shift also contributed to some aspects of the British interwar avant-garde, including the literature of Joseph Conrad, D. H. Lawrence, T. S. Eliot, W. B. Yeats and Robert Graves.5 Anthropology, finding its origins in the encounters of Europeans with other races, developed in a close relationship with politics, and in the interwar period it came to scrutinize not only
foreigners but also domestic people, particularly the lower classes, in order to grasp and improve their realities or the nation itself. A typical example of this was Mass-Observation, the movement which started in 1937 by the anthropologist Tom Harrisson, the journalist Charles Madge and the filmmaker Humphrey Jennings, and which was endorsed by Julian Huxley, who wrote the introduction to their 1937 pamphlet: “it is urgent to obtain detailed and unbiased information as to the mode of thinking of the larger, more powerful and economically more important groups of human beings,” such as “our own group, the English people” (5). The necessity of employing anthropology to understand the natives of the British Isles was also recognized by some of the To-day and To-morrow contributors. For example, in It Isn’t Done or the Future of Taboo among the British Islanders (1930), Archibald Lyall attempts to foretell British customs in the future, arguing: “Anthropology, like charity, should begin at home a great deal more often than it does” (5). In Tantalus or the Future of Man (1924), F. C. S. Schiller never hesitates to point out the “savage” nature hidden by civilization, defining humanity as “Yahoo-manity” in “the clothes” called “civilization” (31-33); it would not surprise us if this statement had been uttered by Huxley or Sigmund Freud (see Chapter I). This volume cites Raymond B. Fosdick’s The Old Savage in the New Civilization (1929), which shows a contrast between the progress of science technology and the unchangeability of human nature.

Before writing Brave New World, Huxley himself was familiar with anthropology. In letters from 1929 to 1931, he not only appreciated Malinowski’s The Sexual Life of Savages in North-Western Melanesia (1929) and Margaret Mead’s Growing up in New
Guinea (1930) but also confessed that he wanted to write the *Sexual Life of Gentlemen and Ladies* by applying anthropological methods to ‘civilized’ society (see his letters to Julian, 13 July 1929 and 12 October 1929, Smith 314, 318; to Norman Douglas, 7 January 1930, Smith 326; to Kethevan Roberts, 28 November 1930, Smith 343). In fact, this really came to fruition in *Brave New World*, where the citizens of London are engaged in promiscuous sexual behaviour as well as the rituals of solidarity, which were probably, as Jerome Meckier remarks, borrowed from what anthropologists reported as a result of their research on ‘primitive’ cultures and peoples.

It is also presumed that anthropology influenced the descriptions of an American Indian society and the Savage, who comes from it, but this point has not been examined much in previous studies, despite the author’s own admission in his interview (published in 1963) of his depending upon the anthropology of American Indians:

> I had no trouble finding my way around the English part of *Brave New World*, but I had to do an enormous amount of reading up on New Mexico, because I’d never been there. I read all sorts of Smithsonian reports on the place and then did the best I could to imagine it. I didn’t actually go there until six years later, in 1937, when we visited Frieda Lawrence. (George Plimpton’s interview with Huxley, 165)

In fact, his memory here is not exact, and Huxley must have viewed the Arizona and New Mexico landscapes from a railway window when he travelled in America in May 1926 (Higdon “AHHSD,” 137-39; see Huxley *JP*, 548-49). However, the fact remains
that he never visited Indian societies in New Mexico or any other place. Although the “all sorts of Smithsonian reports” that he mentioned are Smithsonian Institution publications such as *Annual Reports*, it is also conceivable that Huxley, who did “an enormous amount of reading,” looked over many other books on American Indians. What should be noted here is Huxley’s recollection that he “did the best I could to imagine” an Indian society, and this suggests he depicted the “Savage Reservation” not only by borrowing descriptions of contemporary materials but also by using his own imagination. Thus, in order to grasp Huxley’s own views of Indians and the issue of imperialism, we need to carefully direct our attention to differences rather than similarities between *Brave New World*, a tale of a twenty-sixth-century world, and the contemporary anthropological studies that Huxley relied on.

3. A Hidden History of the Future World

3.1. The Vestiges of Imperialism

At first sight, *Brave New World* appears to be unrelated to the issue of imperialism and unsuitable for a postcolonial reading. This is simply because the novel narrates a story of a world after a ‘completion’ of imperial policies. In A.F. 632 (A.D. 2540), there is only one sovereign nation, the World State, which is governed by ten World Controllers, including Mustapha Mond in charge of Western Europe. If imperialism is defined as the imposition of our patterns of life and culture upon them in other regions, it cannot be seen there as an ongoing issue. By the State’s motto “COMMUNITY, IDENTITY, STABILITY,” the Controllers basically allow no regional
differences: in civilized society, all the people lead a civilized life, i.e., being controlled by developed technology, speaking English as the only official language and sharing the same sense of values among the same class. The unification of all the regions, or the establishment of the World State, means that the historical role of imperialism came to an end. Conversely, before the State was founded, imperial policies must have existed and progressed in order to achieve the unification of the world. According to Mond, it was during the period of the Nine Years’ War (A.F. 141-50 [A.D. 2049-58]) that world leaders constructed the general framework of the World State. Although before this period there were many sovereign nations, including imperial nations and their colonies, the leaders, facing difficult realities such as the ravages of war and an “Economic Collapse,” recognized the need for “World Control” to save the world from “destruction” (40-41). Because English was chosen as the official language, the World State must have been established, like the Wellsian World State, centring on the English-speaking world, such as the British Empire and the United States of America. In short, all sovereign nations were not equally engaged in the foundation of the World State, and they were substantially annexed by Britain and America into their empire.

Today, almost five hundred years after the establishment of the State, are there still any vestiges of imperialism in the Pre-World State Era? The answer is yes. They are described in Chapters 6 to 8, set in an American Indian society, to which we now turn our attention.

3.2. Vestige (1): The Existence of a Savage Reservation
Although most of the world in the twenty-sixth century consists of civilized society, there are a few exceptional regions called “Savage Reservations,” including the one situated in New Mexico. In fact, the existence of the New Mexican Reservation itself is the most conspicuous vestige of imperialism depicted in the text. In an Eton College teacher’s words, a “Savage Reservation” is an exceptional region that the Controllers have left uncivilized because “owing to unfavourable climatic or geological conditions, or poverty of natural resources, [it] has not been worth the expense of civilizing” (141). According to the Warden of the Reservation, “about sixty thousand Indians and half-breeds” or “absolute savages” live there, without “communication whatever with the civilized world”; they “still preserve their repulsive habits and customs,” including “marriage” and “families,” believe in “Christianity and totemism and ancestor worship,” and speak “extinct languages, such as Zuñi and Spanish and Athapaskan” (88-89).

No doubt the Reservation above is an image of the future of Indian reservations in North America. Historically, the purpose of the Indian reservations was to make the Indians abandon their ‘uncivilized’ cultures and lifestyles and instead give them ‘civilization’ by removing them from their ancestral lands to certain areas. By the late nineteenth century, virtually all the Indians were made to live in reservations, but there also appeared two signs of shifts in government policy from those days to the early twentieth century. Assimilation had already begun to be regarded as superior to removal in order to more effectively ‘civilize’ the Indians (see e.g., the Dawes Act of 1887 and the non-reservation boarding schools), whereas a contrasting movement was being born.
with the ‘humanitarian’ aim of changing the critical conditions of Indian life in reservations, especially after the Meriam Report of 1928.\textsuperscript{16} Through his investigation Huxley was familiar with the above history and situation of Indians,\textsuperscript{17} but curiously enough, he, as of 1931, envisaged in a very different manner the future of Indian society. In his twenty-sixth century, an Indian reservation in New Mexico still exists (the other reservations were possibly absorbed into this one), where the World Government does not carry out any imperial policies, including civilizing the inhabitants. Despite their enjoyment of self-government, Indians cannot leave the Reservation or mingle with others outside. Why did Huxley present such a bizarre vision?

This is the first mystery that we face regarding the Savage Reservation. The question could be replaced by asking: Why has the World Government left some regions uncivilized as “Savage Reservations,” instead of pursuing its civilizing policies everywhere? Apart from an official reason—which is economic—is there not a substantial one behind this? Before answering this question, however, we should see the second mystery, namely why civilized people visit a Reservation.

3.3. Vestige (2): Civilized People’s Visits to the Reservation

Bernard Marx (the protagonist of the early part of the story), an Alpha-Plus psychologist who is working for hypnopædia (sleep-teaching) at the Hatchery and Conditioning Centre, takes a week off to travel with his Beta co-worker, Lenina Crowne, to see the New Mexican Reservation. The permit for their entry is initialled by
the Director, who also went there more than twenty years earlier, when he would have been Bernard’s age: “I had the same idea as you”; “Wanted to have a look at the savages” (83). A journey involving a rocket and a helicopter brings the two Londoners, Bernard and Lenina, to Malpais near Santa Fé, while “crossing the frontier that separate[s] civilization from savagery” (90). Although the pilot recommends that they see the Indians’ “funny” snake dance (91), what they see in the pueblo of Malpais is, for Lenina, too shocking. No sooner do they enter the pueblo than she is overcome by a strong hatred towards everything there. Seeing the whipping performed as part of the ceremony, she shouts, “Oh, stop them, stop them!”; “Too awful! That blood!” (100). Her boyfriend Barnard expresses his candid opinion about Indian society: “[It was] [a]s though we were living on different planets, in different centuries” (106).

The civilized people’s visits to the Indian society are one of the vestiges of imperialism, namely “Indian tourism” in the Southwest, a kind of ethnic tourism which was popular when Huxley was working on this novel. Between the turn of the nineteenth century and the First World War, the Fred Harvey Company, together with the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway, was “the most powerful agent of tourism in the region” (Dilworth 78). This tie-up industry attracted tourists not only from North America but also from many other regions by turning Indians (their lives and rituals) into a cultural “spectacle” or the object of “touristic consumption.” For tourists, according to Leah Dilworth, the encounter with the real Indians was a kind of simulated experience of “the Columbian discovery” of America (79). Such Indian tourism has an imperialist aspect, not only because of the exploitation of Indians as commodities but
also because, through this system, Indians were made to change part of their original lives and cultures or be ‘civilized’ so that they could become English-speaking salesclerks at souvenir stores or act the role of so-called ‘Indians,’ which matched the tourists’ image of them.\(^{18}\)

Although many ethnographers, artists, photographers and writers reported on the Indian tourism, it was probably his friend Lawrence’s essays that had the greatest influence on Huxley’s description of civilized visitors to the Reservation. Lawrence not only reports about Indians from a non-professional yet non-amateur angle—which is shared by Bernard, who is also neither a lowbrow visitor nor a specialist in anthropology—but also observes carefully lowbrow sightseers’ impressions of Indians—which are shared by Lenina. Above all, Huxley’s setting of the Reservation in no other place but New Mexico shows the impact of Lawrence, who stayed there for two years.

After leaving Europe in 1922, Lawrence lived and mingled with Indians in New Mexico and later Mexico, inspired by them to conceive several pieces, all or some of which Huxley must have read.\(^ {19}\) Although the impact of Lawrence upon Huxley’s depiction of Indians is most earnestly analysed by Katherine Toy Miller, who mentions as possible sources Lawrence’s “Indians and an Englishman” (1923, included in Phoenix [1936]), “The Hopi Snake Dance” (1924, included in Mornings in Mexico [1927]), The Plumed Serpent (1926) and his letters (which Huxley was collecting and editing in parallel with writing Brave New World),\(^ {20}\) the first two pieces seem to me the most influential. In “The Hopi Snake Dance,” for example, Lawrence remembers the
ceremony he watched in Arizona, which was certainly positioned by Indians as “a
sacred religious ceremonia1,” but which was in fact just a “show” or “circus-
performance of men handling live rattlesnakes” for three thousand tourists from all over
the world (MM, 63). The same contrast appears in Brave New World as the difference in
the attitudes of savages and civilized visitors towards the snake dance. 21 When in New
Mexico he encounters the Savage, who can speak English, Bernard feels as though he
has come to a “different planet”; a similar phrase is used in advance by Lawrence to
express his impression of this place: “Supposing one fell onto the moon, and found
them talking English, it would be something the same as falling out of the open world
plump down here [New Mexico] in the middle of America” (P, 92). 22

Not having visited an American Indian society, Huxley attempted to make the
civilized people’s feelings about it realistic by echoing Lawrence’s essays. In Brave
New World, however, visits by civilized people to the Reservation do not represent the
imperial system itself but are vestiges of it. Unlike the early twentieth-century industry
of sightseeing Indians, which was connected with the imperialist system, Huxley
envisages Londoners’ visits in the future to the Reservation as not depending on such a
system. Except for “the Indian guide,” the inhabitants live as usual, in utter disregard of
travellers, and there seems to be no giving and receiving of money between them.
Bernard is “entitled to a permit” to enter the Reservation because he is a first-rate
psychologist with scientific interest, Lenina being allowed to accompany him as a sort
of assistant, while ordinary people, for whatever reason, cannot visit it only for the
purpose of sightseeing (see 76). 23

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3.4. The Backdrops and Meanings of the Savage Reservations

Now we can come back to the first mystery and consider a substantial reason why the World State has left several regions uncivilized as “Savage Reservations” instead of completing its policy of civilizing the world. In fact, compared with George Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949), Huxley’s *Brave New World* gives a fragmentary explanation to the process of founding the World State (see *BNW*, Chapter 3; Orwell *NEF*, Chapter 9). Viewed ideologically, this point may be a weakness, but it actually guarantees the strength of Huxley’s work as a literary text, affording us a wider freedom of interpretation.

Politically, one possible reason lies in the necessity for the Government to maintain its citizens’ identity as civilized people. As has often been indicated (and suggested in Huxley’s writing too24), “modern and primitive societies” tend to “derive a sense of their identities negatively.” By the “universal practice of designating in one’s mind a familiar space which is ‘ours’ and an unfamiliar space beyond ‘ours’ which is ‘theirs,’” fifth-century Athenians, for example, could feel they had an identity as “nonbarbarian” (Said, *Orientalism* [1978], 54). As far as the West is concerned,25 it is “the conquest of America that heralds and establishes our present identity.” In 1492, when Columbus encountered America, “our genealogy beg[an],” and since then “men have discovered the totality of which they are a part, whereas hitherto they formed a part without a whole” (Tzvetan Todorov, *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other* [1982], 5). Was this negative method of forming and maintaining identity not
adopted by the World Government in *Brave New World*? The hypothesis may be advanced here that, until a certain point in the Nine Years’ War (the period when a framework of the present World State was being created), the Controllers—such as the leaders of the British Empire and America—intended to complete their imperial policies to unify all regions into one civilization. However, the completion of imperialism or the unification of civilization would lead to a crisis in their identity, because the extinction of *them* is none other than the extinction of *ourseleves*. This fact, the paradox of imperialism, is what the Controllers were really afraid of. This is why the Controllers, switching their policies, decided to leave several regions uncivilized as “Savage Reservations” where savages could live in their own way, and this is also why the Controllers have purposefully and regularly dispatched “inspectors” to the Reservations in order to prevent these savages from being annihilated by any chance.²⁶

Why, then, are only a limited number of people permitted to enter the Reservations? In my view, this would owe to the Government’s fear that such contact could spoil the effect of conditioning (and hypnopædia) in the citizens’ minds. Originally, civilization-dwellers are not completely civilized; this is persistently suggested in their “unfordly” (anti-social/uncivilized) behaviour, which does not accord with their conditioning.²⁷ However, if nobody is allowed to enter the Reservations, it will become highly doubtful whether they really exist, and this may lead to an ‘identity crisis.’ As a compromise, permission for seeing the Reservations is given to only the elite (and their friends), who are socially expected to be such exemplary citizens that they have a low risk of being deconditioned (see 84, 128-29). In fact, this apparently
incomplete measure consequently succeeds in contributing to strengthening and spreading among civilized people the misrepresented images of Others—such as the mysterious, the exotic, the primitive and the inferior. This reminds us of Said’s disclosure of how Orientalism was being formed and confirmed by the West, including the intellectual elite, who were most earnest in irresponsibly repeating the misrepresentation of the Orient with no careful thought for what the real Orient is like.\textsuperscript{28}

It is also worth psychologically considering the meanings of the Savage Reservations’ existence and of civilized people’s wish to visit them. In fact, “Our Freud” is ranked alongside “Our Ford” as the theoretical founder of this World State (see 33). What remains in the Reservation is actually what existed in civilized society in the Pre-World State Era; uncivilized society—“the negative prefix \textit{un}- is the indicator of repression” (Freud \textit{Uncanny}, 151)—is thus a dump in which the Controllers confined the old customs, or a shelter in which the latter reached from the former.\textsuperscript{29} This is symbolically shown by Bernard’s and Lenina’s reactions to what they see in the Reservation, especially their ambiguous feelings (hatred and nostalgia) before “the spectacle of two young women giving the breast to their babies”:

“What a wonderfully intimate relationship,” he said, deliberately outrageous. “And what an intensity of feeling it must generate! I often think one may have missed something in not having had a mother. And perhaps you’ve missed something in not being a mother, Lenina. Imagine yourself sitting there with a little baby of your own. . . .” (96)

This is the uncanny encounter with the past self, especially for Bernard, who is not
conditioned well.\textsuperscript{30} What cannot be lost even by conditioning—something perhaps basic to humans and animals—may be a fundamental reason for inviting civilized people to a Reservation, and it may reveal some aspect of the Controllers’ wishes to maintain such a place like a living museum.\textsuperscript{31}

Huxley’s vision is unique in the anthropological context of his time. As stated later, mainly from a perspective of social evolution, professional and amateur anthropologists assumed that the Indians would either vanish sooner or later or else would be unable to live without the help of whites (see e.g., Strong 343, 347; Prins 508, 511, 519). Overturning these common views, Huxley freely envisaged that Indians would survive into the twenty-sixth century as a counterpart to civilized people, and that it is civilized people who would depend on their counterpart in terms of their identity.

3.5. Vestige (3): Christian Elements in the Snake Dance

Inside the Reservation, there also remain vestiges of imperialism. One of them can be seen in the Indians’ snake dance, which shocks Bernard and Lenina. Regarding the sources of the snake dance in \textit{Brave New World}, David Leon Higdon gives the minutest examination. The appearance and style of the snake dance, in his view, can be attributed to \textit{The Moki Snake Dance} (1898), a pamphlet for tourists written by the anthropologist Walter Hough, \textit{The Snake Dance of the Moquis of Arizona} (1884), written by the soldier-adventurer John Gregory Bourke, and three essays written by the anthropologist Jesse Walter Fewkes, “Tusayan Snake Ceremonies” (1897), “Tusayan Migration Traditions” and “Notes on Tusayan, Snake, and Flute Ceremonies,” (1900).\textsuperscript{32}
Among them, the most influential would be Fewkes’s writings, especially several illustrations and photographs that they contain, which were published in Volumes 16, 19-1 and 19-2 of the *Annual Report of the Bureau of (American) Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution*.

Although this is not analysed by Higdon, before the snake dance begins, Bernard and Lenina are passed by two Indians who are probably preparing for the ceremony and whose “dark brown bodies painted with white lines” remind Lenina of “asphalt tennis courts” (93). This image of Indians may be based on a photograph of an Indian whose body is painted with white lines like tennis courts, “Kakapti at Entrance to Walpi Antelope Kiva” (by F. H. Maude and G. W. James), which Fewkes cites as appearing in Volume 19-2, Plate LIV.33 Following the instructions of an Indian guide, Bernard and Lenina climb the ladder and, walking through the doorway and a room, find themselves on a terrace below which, “shut in by the tall houses, was the village square, crowded with Indians” (97). This composition appears to echo a reproduced illustration “Snake Dance at Mishongnovi” (Plate XLV in the same report), in which M. Wright Gill portrays Indians crowded in a square against the background of buildings and an audience who overlook them from the buildings, like Bernard and Lenina. Although Higdon comments that this illustration gave Huxley an “essential” hint about how a snake dance was performed by Indians (142), it also must have shown him how their snake dance was observed by sightseers. The text therefore seems to try to describe the snake dance as accurately as possible, but in fact it also includes an original scene which has not so far received due attention.
Up to the part of the performance involving sprinkling snakes with corn meal and water, the description of the snake dance basically follows the details of the real ceremonies (see e.g., Fewkes Vol. 16, 294-95), but after this, surprisingly enough, it presents the following unique scene, where Christian images suddenly appear:

And slowly, raised by invisible hands from below, there emerged from the one a painted image of an eagle, from the other that of a man, naked, and nailed to a cross. [. . .] Naked but for a white cotton breech-cloth, a boy of about eighteen stepped out of the crowd and stood before him [the old man], his hands crossed over his chest, his head bowed. The old man made the sign of the cross over him and turned away. Slowly, the boy began to walk round the writhing heap of snakes. He had completed the first circuit and was half-way through the second when, from among the dancers, a tall man wearing the mask of a coyote and holding in his hand a whip of plaited leather, advanced towards him. [. . .] The coyote-man raised his whip, there was a long moment of expectancy, then a swift movement, the whistle of the lash and its loud flat-sounding impact on the flesh. [. . .] Then all at once the boy staggered and, still without a sound, pitched forward on to his face. Bending over him, the old man touched his back with a long white feather, held it up for a moment, crimson, for the people to see then shook it thrice over the snakes. [. . .] A minute later the square was empty, only the boy remained, prone where he had fallen, quite still. Three old women came out of one of the houses, and with some difficulty lifted him and
carried him in. The eagle and the man on the cross kept guard for a little while over the empty pueblo; then, as though they had seen enough, sank slowly down through their hatchways, out of sight, into the nether world.

(98-99)

There is no need to dwell upon the fact that Jesus, alongside the image of a cross, appears in the Indians’ traditional performance. Why did Huxley hit upon such a strange vision of Christian elements mixing with Indian culture?

Of course, this prediction is not necessarily groundless, considering what is remarked about Indian snake dances by the anthropologists of the time—such as Fewkes’s fear that “the Snake dance will cease to be a religious ceremony” or will be “finally abandoned” under the influence of many visitors and traders (Vol. 19-2, 978; Vol. 16, 295, 311; Vol. 19-2, 978; see also Lawrence’s comments above). In 1913, Theodore Roosevelt, an ex-President who had an aspect of an amateur anthropologist, visited the Hopi village of Walpi, and forecast that in the near future their “snake-dance and antelope-dance will [would] disappear” because the people would give up their “religious” beliefs (82; see also Dilworth 62-68). Meanwhile, Fewkes and Lawrence refer to Indians’ tolerance towards Christian images of Jesus, Mary and the Cross (see Lawrence, “Indians and Entertainment,” MM, 52; Fewkes Vol. 16, 299).34

In my view, Huxley’s vision of an Indian snake dance mixed with Christianity was based upon his insight into the development of imperialism in the near future. The partly Christianized ritual is the vestige of a civilizing policy in the Pre-World State Era. Although since the seventeenth century European missionaries had travelled to convert
Indians to Christianity, the US government evangelized them more strongly by placing them in the Indian Territory. In the latter part of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries, boarding schools played a leading role in Christianizing Indian children. Huxley, bearing this situation in mind, imagined that this tendency would sooner or later bring Christian elements into an Indian dance.

By daringly envisaging the survival of Christianity in the snake dance in the twenty-sixth century (when Christianity was abandoned long previously in civilized society), the text suggests the violent impact of civilizing policy during the Pre-World State Era as well as the powerful vitality of Indian culture which is still alive.


Before the aftertaste of the snake dance disappears, Bernard and Lenina are suddenly greeted by a young savage called John. In fact, his mother is Linda, a Beta-Minus who was the Director’s co-worker and lover but was left in the Reservation by him about twenty years ago. (This means that the savage is the son of the Director.) Because she gave birth to John, Linda could not return to civilization and had to live thereafter in primitive society with him. As a civilized person, she speaks English and begins to teach it to her son. At twelve years old, John fatefully encounters Shakespeare:

“It was a thick book and looked very old. [...] He picked it up, looked at the title-page: the book was called The Complete Works of William Shakespeare.

Linda was lying on the bed, sipping that horrible stinking mescal out of
a cup. “Popé [Linda’s lover] brought it,” she said. [. . .] “It was lying in one of the chests of the Antelope Kiva. It’s supposed to have been there for hundreds of years. I expect it’s true, because I looked at it, and it seemed to be full of nonsense. Uncivilized. Still, it’ll be good enough for you to practise your reading on.” (113)

The question that has not been considered by critics is why the book of Shakespeare \textit{exists there}. In my view, however, it is necessary to address this question to understand the hidden history of the Reservation.

In civilized society, “almost nobody” knows Shakespeare because it is “prohibited” (192). Being made to believe in the progress of mankind (“History is bunk” [29], “progress \textit{is} lovely” [86]), the citizens “haven’t any use for old things” like Shakespeare (192) and, if they read it, “they couldn’t understand it” (193). In view of the fact that even in England, Shakespeare’s native land, almost nobody knows him, it must be a miracle of miracles that his book survived far away in New Mexico.\textsuperscript{35} The existence of Shakespeare’s book in the kiva’s chest in the twenty-sixth-century Reservation suggests the existence of someone who left it there “hundreds of years” ago, but when and who could do this? Since it would be impossible to bring the book from civilized society after A.F. 150 (A.D. 2058, the year when “all books published before” were subjected to “suppression”), it must have been brought to the Reservation before then. However, we can hardly imagine that the “civilized” visitors left it in the kiva because it seems to have been difficult for “any white man [. . .] to enter their [Antelope] kiva” (Fewkes Vol. 16, 290). Thus, logically, the most reasonable inference
would be that some Indian(s) obtained it from whites to read by themselves, and left it in that place before A.F. 150.

Here again, we come to see the author’s bizarre vision. Certainly, in the last decades of the nineteenth century, the US government began to recognize the necessity of assimilating Indians by cultural means in order to ‘civilize’ them, and one of the most effective methods was considered to be the education of their children (see Trennert 2), including teaching them the ‘civilized’ language, English. However, English education for Indians was regarded merely as a means to an end, i.e., to enable them to support themselves, by most politicians, educators and other people deeply interested in them (see the first official guideline, Reel 5).\(^\text{36}\) In short, political and academic authority never expected Indians to gain such high ability in English that they would be able to read Shakespeare, simply because of their prejudice about the inherent intelligence of Indians (see Lomawaima 427).

Unlike those professionals familiar with American Indians, Huxley saw no reason why the Indians would not be able to understand such a difficult text as Shakespeare, and thought that the influence of ‘civilization’ was so considerable that one of its symbols would intrude into even their very sacred space.\(^\text{37}\) After the Nine Years’ War, the Controllers have never followed the civilization policies of the US government, and thus no Indians with English proficiency have appeared. Consequently, the book was put away in the kiva and has not been read by anyone for several centuries until it is by chance taken up by John.
3.7. A Contrapuntal Reading of *Brave New World*

I have thus far focused my analysis on four mysterious points (what I call “the vestiges of imperialism”) which are related to the Savage Reservation, and while using these as a lead, I have reconstructed the unknown part of the history before and after the founding of the World State. My arguments are summarized in a timeline below (Table 1).

The essential strategy of postcolonial criticism is a “contrapuntal reading,” which was first proposed by its key scholar, Edward W. Said, but which has been widely adopted and developed not only by postcolonial theorists, such as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Homi K. Bhabha, but also by many others engaged in textual studies in general. In this reading, one analyses a literary text, compares it with some seemingly unrelated phenomena of politics and culture in the same period, and attempts to disclose the role of a literary text in relation to imperialism, bringing to light a hidden reciprocal relationship between imperial society and colonized society. This method is supported by Said’s belief in the “worldliness” of the text—the political nature of the text, which necessarily exists in and reacts to the world (see e.g., *The World, the Text, and the Critic* [1983], 34-35). The most famous example of a contrapuntal reading is Said’s analysis of Jane Austen’s *Mansfield Park* (1814), in which he synchronizes a story of an upper-middle-class family with the situation of a British colony where the family has a plantation (see *Culture and Imperialism*, 95-116). Although the questioned history here is the present for Austen—and the past for Said—can we not apply this in the future too? In fact, partly with this idea in mind, I have attempted a contrapuntal reading of the
futuristic story of *Brave New World*, contrasting the written future of civilized society—such as London—with the unwritten future of Indian society, which was previously under the rule of the West and is now managed in a strange manner by civilized society. The potential of the text to be read like this suggests that Huxley, the very author who inserted such signs or vestiges of imperialism there, might have expected readers to perform such a reconstruction as I have done. At the very least, we can say that Huxley himself worked on the novel while bearing some of the above blueprint in mind—then, could we not call this a “contrapuntal imagination”?

While subscribing to some extent to a typical representation of Others (e.g., the primitive and the aggressive), Huxley was also resisting such an Orientalist image of Indians in his own way, by adding to his text images of Indians inconsistent with those shared by professional and amateur anthropologists of his time. The unique images, especially 1) Indians who will *never vanish*, 2) Western people who will have to *depend on Indians*, 3) the snake dance which will *survive with Christianity in it*, and 4) an Indian who will be able to *read Shakespeare*, are the essence of the very future that Huxley, not an anthropologist but a novelist, tried to (to use his own words) “imagine” by himself. What made these original visions possible is that, unlike the conventional image of Huxley as being indifferent to imperialism, Huxley in fact grasped the realities of imperialism, such as the destructiveness of ‘civilization’ policies and the contradictory psychology of ‘civilized’ people, more carefully and accurately (in a sense) than most of his contemporaries.

As seen in Said’s discussion, a contrapuntal reading is closely relevant to how to
think of history, identity and the role of intellectuals. Let us consider these issues through historical and theoretical approaches to the hero of *Brave New World*, who is white, intellectual but savage.
Table 1. Timeline of the World State in *Brave New World*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Real History</th>
<th>‘Civilized’ Societies (Centring on London)</th>
<th>American Indian Societies (Centring on New Mexico)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-A.F. 23 (-A.D. 1931)</td>
<td>0 (1908) Model-T Ford is produced.</td>
<td>1887 The Dawes Severalty Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23 (1931) Huxley writes <em>Brave New World</em>.</td>
<td>1901 The official guideline for the Indian schools is first published.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fictional History</td>
<td>Numerous sovereign nations exist as before.</td>
<td>1928 The Meriam Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I: The Pre-World State Era</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.F. 24-140 (A.D. 1932-2048)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fictional History</td>
<td>The Nine Years’ War causes devastating damage to various regions and the great Economic Collapse. As a measure to save the world from destruction, the leaders who are later to become the Controllers begin to recognize the need for World Control. In the interests of industry, they compel people to greatly increase their consumption, and massacre Simple Lifers and culture fans, who make conscientious objections to their policy. Realizing that force is no good, the Controllers begin to encourage scientists to develop the infinitely more certain methods of ectogenesis, conditioning and hypnopædia. A campaign against the Past is conducted, which includes the closing of museums, the blowing up of historical monuments and the suppression of all books published before A.F. 150. Science also begins to be controlled. The introduction of Ford’s first T-Model is chosen as the opening date of the new era.</td>
<td>&lt;The Continued Domination by the USA&gt; The policy for ‘civilizing’ American Indians and the reservation system are maintained almost in the same way as before. Because of education at boarding schools, the number of ‘civilized’ Indians who speak English and believe in Christianity increases. As a result, in New Mexico, images of Jesus and a cross are blended into their snake dance, and an Indian proficient in English obtains <em>The Complete Works of Shakespeare</em> and leaves it in a chest in a kiva.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II: The Nine Years’ War Period</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.F. 141-150 (A.D. 2049-2058)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fictional History</td>
<td>184 (2092) Soma is produced commercially.</td>
<td>&lt;The Transfer of Sovereignty&gt; Sovereignty over Indian societies is conceded to the Controllers. They designate certain lands, including New Mexico, as “Savage Reservations,” and decide not to develop them or civilize the residents, in order to maintain the citizens’ identity as civilized people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III: The World State Era</td>
<td>214 (2122) Hypnopædia is first used officially.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.F.151-Present (A.D.2059-Present)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>632 (2540) The two thousand million citizens enjoy their “happy” life. With the approval of the Controller for Western Europe, John and Linda enter London.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The shaded text is a history that has been restored by my reading of the vestiges of imperialism.
4. The Savage with a Complex Identity

4.1. Ishi, a Real ‘Savage’ in Two Worlds

John is a savage who lives in two worlds, Indian society and London, but it has not been clarified whether this unique hero is purely the product of the author’s imagination or if he is modelled on a real person. Judging from the biographical facts, the character of John seems to owe much to D. H. Lawrence. Despite living in a ‘civilized’ society, Lawrence was never satisfied with ‘civilization’ and tried to find an ideal in an American Indian society, and thus he might be called a ‘savage’ who lived in two worlds. Since the period in which Huxley wrote *Brave New World* (from May to August of 1931) overlaps with the time he edited *The Letters of D. H. Lawrence* (1932), it would not be surprising if Lawrence cast a shadow over the characterization of John.40

On the other hand, as a prototype for John, Margaret F. Sloan focuses on Frank Hamilton Cushing, an American anthropologist who “experienced a dual life, one among the native peoples and one in the polished and popular world of the day” (“F. H. Cushing: A Source for Huxley’s Brave Old World” [2003], 136). However, even if these actual people contributed to Huxley’s characterization of John, such an influence probably helped only with creating the general image of this hero, not with describing the concrete experiences in his life, especially in civilized society. After all, they entered Indian society from ‘civilization,’ unlike John, who does the opposite.

As a model for John, I will turn the spotlight on an American Indian known as “Ishi in Two Worlds.” Although having led a stone-age life in California, he suddenly entered white society in 1911, causing a sensation in San Francisco, and lived at the
Anthropology Museum of the University of California until 1916. When he mentioned “all sorts of Smithsonian reports,” Huxley may well also have been thinking of the *Bulletin*, published by the Smithsonian Institution. In fact, Volume 78 of the *Bulletin* (1925) is the *Handbook of the Indians of California* by Alfred Louis Kroeber, which mentions the “discovery” of Ishi, “the last wild Indian of the United States” (343-346). Huxley was somewhat familiar with studies by the anthropologist Franz Boas (see “Casino and Bourse” [1935], *AHCEIII*, 419) and may have known about the works of his student, Kroeber. While staying in London for a few months in 1930 and 1931 (see Bedford 250, 755), Huxley would have been able to refer to literary sources on Ishi, available in the British Museum, the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland (RAI), etc. When he visited California in May 1926, he may also have casually heard about Ishi from citizens who could remember this famous Indian. This section shows the interesting relationship between these fictional and real ‘savages’ by comparing their experiences in ‘civilized’ society, and argues that the character and story of the former could have been influenced by the image and life of the latter.

On 28 August 1911, an American Indian was discovered in a slaughterhouse near Oroville in California and driven by the sheriff to the county jail, where a thousand people crowded in to view him. He was called “the last wild Indian” or “aboriginal Indian” because in those days all the other Indians in North America lived under ‘civilized’ conditions in the Indian reservations. Having lived almost fifty years untouched by ‘civilization’ as the last surviving member of the Yahi (a group of the Yana Indians), he finally entered the white people’s world because of his terrible
hunger. This event was immediately reported in local papers, the Oroville Register and San Francisco Call, and piqued the curiosity of the citizens of San Francisco. The news also attracted academic interest from two anthropologists at the University of California, Kroeber and Thomas Talbot Waterman. On 4 September, with government permission, Waterman took the Indian to San Francisco and housed him in the museum at the University of California. The Indian spent his remaining years there as what one might call a living exhibition. Kroeber, who is said to have been his closest friend, named him “Ishi, an anglicization of his word for man” (A. L. Kroeber H, 343). It should be added that the Indian was first called “John,” which Kroeber rejected because it was “lacking in individuality” (Mary Ashe Miller, “Indian Enigma Is Study for Scientists” [1911], 97). The general public’s image of Ishi can be seen in a newspaper reporter’s description of him: “Of a verity, if any man in the world can be said to have qualified as the abysmal brute the caveman of the type that lived 50,000 years ago, the primordial savage of the stone age, with a mind unspoiled by civilization, Ishi is the man” (Grant Wallace, “Ishi, the Last Aboriginal Savage in America, Finds Enchantment in a Vaudeville Show” [1911], 108).

This event of Ishi’s entering ‘civilized’ society is similar to the story of Huxley’s John. Like Ishi, John visits civilization of his own will, being motivated by despair at the primitive life and his hope about civilized society. His visit is also made possible by an Alpha-Plus psychologist, Bernard, who intends to keep his social position by taking advantage of “this young savage” (120), and by the World Controller Mond, formerly a “pretty good physicist” who actually liked “real science” or “pure science” (198-200).
and even now displays “sufficient scientific interest” in the Savage (123). These are similarities with the anthropologists who cherished an academic interest in Ishi and took him to the white people’s world, with official approval. After arriving in civilized society, John, the “real savage” (133), becomes the focus of London’s attention. Having been deprived of his personal name, he is called simply “savage,” a common noun (or “Mr Savage”), and sometimes is treated like a gorilla or ape.  

This corresponds to the case of Ishi, the ‘wild man,’ who is also addressed by ‘civilized’ people using the general noun “Ishi” (or “Mr Ishi”) and sometimes is identified as a “brute” animal. Just because they lived as people had lived “hundreds of years” ago or “50,000 years ago,” ‘civilized’ people one-sidedly labelled them as such.

How do the two ‘savages’ live in the city and evaluate ‘civilization’? Although Ishi’s house was in the museum, he often strolled around the neighbourhood and was taken by white people on visits to all parts of the city. Anthropologists and reporters observed his reaction to it. In “The Yana Indians” (1918), Waterman remembers what Ishi felt about ‘civilized’ society:

To a primitive man, what ought to prove most astonishing in a modern city?

I would have said at once, the height of the buildings. For Ishi, the overwhelming thing about San Francisco was the number of people. That, he never got over. Until he came into civilization, the largest number of people he had ever seen together at any one time was five! […] The big buildings he was interested in. He found them edifying, but he was not greatly impressed. […] He mentally compared a towering twelve-story
Ishi reacted with horror to a city crowd, fearing that an individual could become lost in the faceless throng. On the other hand, against the ‘civilized’ guide’s expectations, Ishi did not show “astonishment” at a “big building,” a construction typical of ‘civilized’ society, because he thought things in his natural native world, especially the mountains, were much higher and more impressive. One day in October 1911, a newspaper reporter invited Ishi to visit one of the theatres featuring a vaudeville show. However, according to his attendant Kroeber, Ishi “did not appreciate” the “performance itself” or “the humor of any of the acts” (“It’s All Too Much for Ishi, Says the Scientist” [1911], 111).

As for the ‘civilized’ people living in such ‘civilization,’ Ishi did not judge them as good or bad, but according to his closest doctor, Saxton T. Pope, he regarded them only “as sophisticated children—smart, but not wise” (Hunting with the Bow and Arrow [1925], 13). While staying at home, Ishi met a large number of white guests and demonstrated his craftsmanship: “Ishi moreover was remarkably clever with his hands” and “made bows of perfect finish” (Waterman 67).

Compare John’s life in civilization. Although he has his own room, he can act freely and is taken by civilized people on visits to all parts of the civilized society. John’s reactions are also observed by Bernard and reported to Mond as follows:

“... the said Savage,” so ran Bernard’s instructions, “to be shown civilized life in all its aspects. ...”

He was being shown a bird’s-eye view of it at present, a bird’s-eye view from the platform of the Charing-T Tower. The Station Master and the
Resident Meteorologist were acting as guides. But it was Bernard who did most of the talking. […]

The Bombay Green Rocket dropped out of the sky. […]

“Twelve hundred and fifty kilometres an hour,” said the Station Master impressively. “What do you think of that, Mr Savage?”

John thought it very nice. “Still,” he said, “Ariel could put a girdle round the earth in forty minutes.”

“The Savage,” wrote Bernard in his report to Mustapha Mond, “shows surprisingly little astonishment at, or awe of, civilized inventions.” (137)

Contrary to the civilized people’s expectations, this savage does not show “astonishment” at a rocket, a device typical of the future civilized society, and instead comments that Ariel in *The Tempest* is much quicker and more impressive.  

This reaction is very similar to Ishi’s reaction to a high-rise building. Neither of them appreciates an invention of ‘civilized’ society, a symbol of modern ‘civilization,’ by comparing it with something familiar to them.

After that, John is taken to “a small factory of lighting-sets for helicopters, a branch of the Electrical Equipment Corporation,” and is greatly shocked by the figure of “a single Bokanovsky Group” working in “[e]ach process” (138). In the civilized society, members of the lower castes such as Gammas, Deltas and Epsilons are produced by “Bokanovsky’s Process,” a sort of “mass production” which makes at most “ninety-six [identical] human beings” from one egg (3-5). Seeing such people who cannot be recognized individually gives John a creepy feeling: “the Savage had
suddenly broken away from his companions and was violently retching, behind a clump of laurels” (139).

Hearing that his mother Linda is in a critical condition, John rushes to the Park Lane Hospital for the Dying, where “an interminable stream of identical eight-year-old male twins” is directed by a nurse to Linda’s bed in order to be “death-conditioned” (177-8). The children’s “repeated face— for there was only one between the lot of them” is nothing less than “a nightmare” for John. After attending his mother’s deathbed, John leaves the Hospital and begins to walk unconsciously, but suddenly finds himself being in “the crowd.” “Repeated indefinitely, as though by a train of mirrors, two faces” of the crowd make his blood run cold (183):

He woke once more to external reality, looked round him, knew what he saw—knew it, with a sinking sense of horror and disgust, for the recurrent delirium of his days and nights, the nightmare of swarming indistinguishable sameness. Twins, twins . . . Like maggots they had swarmed defilingly over the mystery of Linda’s death. Maggots again, but larger, full grown, they now crawled across his grief and his repentance. He halted and, with bewildered and horrified eyes, stared round him at the khaki mob, in the midst of which, overtopping it by a full head, he stood.

(183-84)

For John, the crowd, “the nightmare of swarming indistinguishable sameness,” is vile, like “maggots” gnawing at his mother’s memory. The “less than human monsters” (187)—labourers working in a factory, children receiving lessons and people walking in
the city—are the grotesque future (something like human clones) of the “crowd” that Ishi feared in the twentieth century because he could not recognize their individuality.

Paying close attention to detail, other resemblances can be discovered. Just as Ishi did not admire a vaudeville performance, John does not appreciate at all the film he sees with Lenina, Bernard’s friend. Like Ishi, John finds “infantility” in civilization and likens civilized people to “babies” who do not “understand what manhood and freedom are” (138, 187). In Surrey, John is “absorbed in the whittling of his bow” (218), something that Ishi also enjoyed.

The similarity of both ‘savages’ can also be seen in their last days in ‘civilized’ society. Surprisingly, in spite of his past ‘wild’ life, Ishi does not seem to have been attached to where he was born or where he later lived. According to Kroeber, although Ishi was told that he was free “to return to his old home or to settle on any Indian reservations,” he chose ‘civilized’ society (H, 343). Ishi was also “appointed Museum Helper; so that for the last years of his life he was self-supporting” (Waterman 68). His health was checked by Pope and other doctors (although Ishi himself seems to have preferred the tribe’s traditional medicine), but a plentiful diet in ‘civilized’ society did not necessarily have a good influence on him. Because of “over-feeding” Ishi sometimes injured his health, and on another occasion he asked Pope to “get him fresh spring water—‘sweet water’” because ‘civilized’ society’s “water did not taste good to him” (“The Medical History of Ishi” [1920], 179-81, 206). On 25 March in 1916, Ishi died of tuberculosis, a disease of ‘civilization,’ “as the result of an oversusceptibility to tuberculosis to which he never developed the slightest immunity” (Waterman 68).
John, too, does not intend to return to Indian society. However, this does not necessarily mean that he feels more at home in civilized society than in the Reservation. He is disgusted with the dehumanization of civilization, and his discussion on this point with Mond does not bring agreement any closer. When Bernard and Helmholtz call on John, he explains his condition in the following way:

Then, with a click, the bathroom door opened and, very pale, the Savage emerged.

“I say,” Helmholtz exclaimed solicitously, “you do look ill, John!”

“Did you eat something that didn’t agree with you?” asked Bernard.

The Savage nodded. “I ate civilization.”

“What?”

“It poisoned me; I was defiled. And then,” he added, in a lower tone, “I ate my own wickedness.”

“Yes, but what exactly . . .? I mean, just now you were . . .”

“Now I am purified,” said the Savage. “I drank some mustard and warm water.”

The others stared at him in astonishment. “Do you mean to say that you were doing it on purpose?” asked Bernard.

“That’s how the Indians always purify themselves.” He sat down and, sighing, passed his hand across his forehead. “I shall rest for a few minutes,” he said. “I’m rather tired.” (213-14)

Because “civilization” has “poisoned” and “defiled” him, John has to “purify” himself
by the traditional medicine of “the Indians.” In order “to escape further contamination by the filth of civilized life” and “to be purified and made good,” John leaves for Surrey heath, instead of returning to the Reservation, and begins to lead a self-supporting life free from “[l]oathsome civilized stuff” (217-18), but finally commits suicide in despair over being unable to elude the “crowd” (226), the tentacles of evil civilization. The story of John eating “civilization” and being necessarily “purified” reminds us of the facts that Ishi worsened his health by “overfeeding” on ‘civilized’ food, and that he craved “sweet water” that had not been contaminated by ‘civilized’ society. Above all, the plot of the story, where in spite of his choice to live in civilized society John the “Savage” does not adapt himself to civilization (or cannot acquire immunity to it) and dies of a disease of civilization as if betrayed by civilization, is highly suggestive of the last days of Ishi, the ‘wild man.’

Although these ‘savages’ who lived in two worlds have the above similarities, there are also differences between them. Most clearly, in regard to parentage, Ishi was an American Indian but John is not. Unlike Ishi, a survivor of the Yana, John was born to civilized parents, and he grew up only accidentally in Indian society.

Another difference in their characters lies in the amount of knowledge each of them has. After Ishi entered ‘civilized’ society, his ignorance was thoroughly stressed by ‘civilized’ people. By way of example, the San Francisco Call (17 December 1911) published Kroeber’s article entitled “The Only Man in America Who Knows No Christmas—Ishi,” at the beginning of which Ishi was introduced by an editor as follows:
He is the one man to whom the very name of Christmas carries no significance whatever. He is Ishi, a California Indian, the least civilized man in the world, who is being cared for by Dr. Kroeber at the Affiliated colleges. [...] He knows no Christ, no Christmas tree; the turkey dinner he will eat on the holiday will seem to him merely some special dispensation of his woodland gods.—Editor. (112)

As well as savagery (uncivilizedness) and primitivism, ignorance is recognized as a characteristic of Ishi. Although all of the above prejudices were not held in common by his friend and anthropologist Kroeber, he also comments in this article that Ishi “has been all his lifetime surrounded by civilization, yet never a part of it; in fact, absolutely unaware of its meaning” (“OMAWKNC,” 113), and in another, he compares Ishi to “a puppy” because “[n]ine-tenths of that which goes on around him he does not understand” (“IATMI,” 111-2). The ignorance of Ishi was also reflected in his attitude towards English. When entering ‘civilized’ society, he “knew no English and but a few words of Spanish,” and until his death he “never learned to speak English correctly or fluently” (H, 343; Waterman 68).

On the other hand, although John is also called “savage,” he is not ignorant. Rather, he is more intellectual than most civilized people. He has a sufficient education and sensitivity to love and recite the almost forgotten works of Shakespeare, and in spite of his unfamiliarity with the life of civilized people, he has a critical spirit and the logical ability to attack the irrationality of their civilization. Regarding language capacity, it is possible for John to speak “peculiar” but “faultless” English (100) and to
read closely the difficult text of Shakespeare, a skill shared by few others in the
civilized society.

As demonstrated above, Ishi and John have so many points of similarity that this
fact cannot be regarded merely as a coincidence, although these two ‘savages’ also show
some interesting differences. It is difficult to affirm how much of the characterization of
John depended on information about Ishi and how much of it can be attributed to the
author’s own imagination. However, there is a possibility that Huxley at least glanced
over, even if he did not read closely, books or theses which referred to Ishi, and that he
described John, whether consciously or unconsciously, based on his knowledge of
Ishi.
Grant Wallace’s article: “Ishi, the Last Aboriginal Savage in America, Finds Enchantment in a Vaudeville Show.”
Fig. 4. San Francisco Sunday Call, Vol. 110, No. 130 (8 October 1911), P. 5. This page contains A. L. Kroeber’s article: “It’s All Too Much for Ishi, Says the Scientist.”
4.2. Empathy with an Indefinable Individual

If Huxley knew about Ishi and chose him as a model for John, two questions arise as to why he was so drawn to Ishi, and what kind of attitude towards Others can be derived from his choice and fictionalization of Ishi.

As for the first question, would Huxley not have had a natural interest in—and empathized with—the destiny of Ishi, a person who, because of the diversity of his identity, could not be defined and had to live as an outsider to the community? In Ishi, there coexisted heterogeneous aspects, such as a ‘civilized’ person/a ‘savage’ and a white/an Indian. In spite of his former life as a ‘savage’ Indian, Ishi suddenly began to live with ‘civilized’ whites and refused to return to where he had lived before or to an Indian reservation, although he was not completely assimilated into white society and maintained his tribe’s traditional values until his death. Due to his complex identity, Ishi continued to be an incomprehensible person to those around him, whether whites or Indians. As we have so far seen, Huxley also realized that a human being, originally, is difficult to define because of a manifold and fluid identity, and that some people—particularly the minority who lived especially freely from the ideology of a simple identity (such as gender norms)—are often put into an isolated position, just as he was during wartime (see Chapters I and II of this dissertation). Considering this, it is not surprising that Huxley felt some attraction to and empathy with Ishi, and was inspired by him to create a character with a complex identity. John also has heterogeneous aspects as a civilized person/a savage and a white/an Indian, and thus cannot be fully understood by anyone, even by his friends, which forces him to live as a lonely outsider.
to both the Indian and civilized societies.\textsuperscript{51}

The answer to the second question depends on how we conceive the process of Huxley’s fictionalization of Ishi, especially his making Ishi similar to himself by attributing to him ‘civilized’ (English) parentage and knowledge. Assuming that he felt some empathy with Ishi, it would be most natural to consider that Huxley, precisely because of this empathy, reflected his own life and characteristics in his fictionalization of Ishi, perhaps without being entirely conscious of it. In this sense, John is a compound of both Ishi and Huxley. This autobiographical tendency would not be surprising, considering that before and after \textit{Brave New World} Huxley repeatedly portrayed himself in the main characters of his novels. Indeed, some aspects of John’s life, such as his relationship with his parents (his love for his [lost] mother and his hatred of his “bad, unkind” father [101]), are clearly a reflection of the author’s own.

If we imagine the process of his fictionalization of Ishi into John as above, i.e., if we imagine that Huxley consciously or unconsciously adopted Ishi as a model for John due to his empathy with him and made this model similar to himself by reflecting his own features in the characterization of the savage hero, the conventional view of Huxley as standing on the ruler’s side of imperialism will inevitably become less convincing.

\textbf{4.3. The Ambiguous Savage: Deconstruction of the Other}

How should we theoretically think about the effect of Huxley’s characterization of the Savage in an ambiguous manner? John was born and raised in a Savage Reservation, a vestige of imperialism, and he enters civilized society after having been
influenced by Christianity and Shakespeare, other vestiges of imperialism; this rare background makes him more complex than his model Ishi by incorporating into him another set of ambiguities, namely two aspects of the ruler and the ruled of imperialism. Unfortunately, little focus has been given to this ambiguity, although I believe it is the essential element to comprehending the significance of the hero and perhaps this text.

In a sense, John is a colonized person who has appeared several centuries too late. According to what this savage in “Indian” dress says to Bernard and Lenina, he has lived with Indians, learning their culture, loving an Indian girl (see 105, 111, 113, 116-17). Meanwhile, he has spontaneously attempted to civilize himself through reading Shakespeare and believing in Christianity (see 113-14, 119), just as Indians were by imperial policies made to be ‘civilized’ during the Pre-World State Era. Despite his endeavours, he fails to live as a civilized individual in civilized society, being regarded entirely as a “real savage.” His difficulty in becoming a civilized citizen is reflected in his use of language. His English sounds “faultless but peculiar” (100; see also 121)—typically for a non-native speaker who learns a language by reading—and his too frequent quoting from Shakespeare shows his unfamiliarity with practical English. When he is really excited, he can “adequately express” his anger “only in Zuñi,” his mother tongue (150-51, 221). In the climax of the story, where he engages in a bitter argument with Mond, John comes to find himself unable to speak anymore: “there were no words. Not even in Shakespeare” (203). After all, he escapes into the countryside to return to a primitive life-style, but finally puts an end to his life. Where imperialism was abandoned long ago, the Savage, in this way, replays the tragic fate of those ruled
by imperialism for the first time in five hundred years.

In another sense, John has an aspect of the colonizer from the British Empire, which no longer exists as such. John, whose “plaited hair was straw-coloured, his eyes a pale blue, and his skin a white skin, bronzed” (100), is the son of the civilized from London, who has grown up distanced from the savages around him (see 112, 117-18), and whose form of elitism appears when he likens himself to Jesus, God’s chosen person—“I did something that none of the others [Indians] did” (119)—and when he believes in his cultural superiority to them—“‘But I can read,’ he said to himself, ‘and they can’t. They don’t even know what reading is’” (112). When he reads or thinks of Shakespeare, he unconsciously identifies himself with civilized characters such as Miranda (120), Romeo (160) and Ferdinand (166), while refusing Othello, a “black man” who is associated with a deconditioned “negro” in the feely, *Three Weeks in a Helicopter* (see 149, 168). When for their unfordly behaviour Bernard and Helmholtz are exiled to the Falkland Islands (199-202), John asks Mond to join them instead of returning to his homeland (see 214), as if to suggest he has little or no attachment to it. The role of the ruler of imperialism is thus replayed by John in his identity.  

Theoretically, this multiple ambiguity of the hero is thought-provoking. While Ishi was from a tribe of American Indians, had its values of ‘primitive’ culture and contacted white culture, John is white but has been influenced by both primitive and white cultures, going on to live with over-developed and globalized culture; thus, the latter is put into a more complex cultural situation, being given two positions, of the ruler and the ruled, which were not shared by Ishi. In this respect, Huxley may be
criticized for his softening or weakening of Otherness (such as aspects of Indian and the ruled); this is so especially for some essentialist critics of postcolonialism who would place stress on race or the nation state. However, John’s complex identity can be somewhat positively evaluated when we realize it has the potential to question the very concept of “the Other” itself, deconstructing binary oppositions such as the civilized/the savage, the modern/the primitive, the ruler/the ruled and the West/the East. Such a deconstructive attempt is made by Huxley here and there in this text. In fact, Edward W. Said, while proposing a contrapuntal reading with a particular emphasis on the viewpoint of Others, is very wary of the identity politics of nativism based on essentialism: “Nativism, alas, reinforces the distinction [between ruler and ruled] even when reevaluating the weaker or subservient partner”; “to accept nativism is to accept the consequences of imperialism, the racial, religious, and political divisions imposed by imperialism itself” (CI, 275-76).

Furthermore, John may have a further radical potential, namely to be a defiant intellectual leader, in that he is an exile, always feeling outside of a community because of his complex identity, and resisting the hegemony of the World State (i.e., the ideology of universalism or globalization), based on a hybrid philosophy that he has formed under the influence of traditional Zuñi and English cultures. In this sense, John may agree with Said’s image of an intellectual with a spirit of resistance towards authority or hegemony—the image that is based on his own hybrid or complex backdrop of life: “the intellectual [is characterized] as exile and marginal, as amateur, and as the author of a language that tries to speak the truth to power”; “Exile for the
intellectual in this metaphysical sense is restlessness, movement, constantly being unsettled, and unsettling others. You cannot go back to some earlier and perhaps more stable condition of being at home; and, alas, you can never fully arrive, be at one with your new home or situation” (Representations of the Intellectual: The Reith Lectures [1994], xvi, 53). It could be argued, therefore, that Huxley brought forth Ishi’s hybrid and exiled natures more emphatically when he characterized the Savage.

4.4. A Reconsideration of ‘Humanitarian’ Anthropology

Given the above understanding, it makes sense that there was something Huxley wanted to intimate about anthropology, in which he was interested and on which he relied for his descriptions of New Mexico and the Savage. Our reading of the Savage Reservation has revealed not only the author’s conformity but also his resistance to the representation of Others provided by the anthropology of his time—but what kind of suggestion can we derive from his story of the Savage in relation to other issues of anthropology, particularly the relationships of anthropologists (the observer) with the colonized (the observed)?

From the beginning, anthropology seems to have developed with a kind of ambiguity, namely involving imperial and ‘humanitarian’ aspects. Anthropology, whilst being accompanied with European imperial contexts, has concerned itself with the movement of ‘humanitarianism,’ i.e., the idea and practice of building equal friendships regardless of race or culture. This ambivalence can be found in American anthropology of Indians as well. The first contribution of anthropology to the domin-
The assimilation of American Indians was seen in the second half of the nineteenth century, mainly attributed to Lewis Henry Morgan, a pioneering anthropologist known for his theory of social evolutionism. In this period, during which the government shifted its policy away from removal towards directed assimilation, ethnography was employed as a means to ease the task of ‘civilizing’ Indians. On the other hand, it was Franz Boas who, instead of measuring Indian cultures comparatively against the standard of Western ‘civilization,’ tried to evaluate them as they were, and by doing so, introduced cultural relativism into Western thought. However, Boasian or ‘humanitarian’ anthropologists were still not free from the prejudice held by the preceding ‘imperialist’ anthropologists, namely the social evolutionistic belief that Indian cultures would vanish in the not-too-distant future.

A theoretical problem of anthropology has been the asymmetric relationship between the observer and the observed. This is a mirror of the power relationship of Europeans and Americans, who can become the observers, to the colonized, who have to be the observed. Said focuses on “the unequal relationship of force between the outside Western ethnographer-observer and a primitive, or at least different but certainly weaker and less developed, non-Western society.” Although Western anthropologists are so deeply involved in “a political actuality based on force” that they cannot be “detached outside observers,” they conceive “a scientific and humane desire to understand the Other hermeneutically and sympathetically” (“RC,” 217).

While considering these issues in anthropology, let us compare Ishi’s relationship with anthropologists with John’s relationship with civilized scientists. As for the
Californian anthropologists, the most reliable standard for judging is Ishi’s own evaluation of this relationship. Waterman, an anthropologist who visited Ishi on his deathbed, claimed that Ishi ended his days with a great deal of satisfaction at his friendship with ‘civilized’ people:

A final word about Ishi himself would be in place, but I find it difficult to say the right thing. It was patent that he liked everybody, and everybody liked him. He never wished to go back to the wilds, naturally enough, for there was nothing to go back to. He had, however, to be reassured repeatedly that we had no intention of sending him back. As a matter of fact I think the closing years were far the happiest of his life. (68)

This kind of idealization of Ishi’s relationship with whites was more or less shared by Kroeber and Pope, and seems to have been carried on to this day. In *Ishi in Two Worlds* (1961), the first full-scale, best-selling biography of Ishi, Theodora Kroeber (Alfred’s wife) sums up their relationship in the epilogue: “He had walked quietly out of the Neolithic world into their [the whites’] world, and once he was settled in the museum, Ishi and the anthropologists took each other pretty much for granted, as one’s family is taken for granted, and one’s close friend” (238). When their relationship is defined like this, it sounds like an ideal comradeship between different races, or a symbolic reconciliation between the perpetrator and the victim of American history. In short, it was a friendship worthy of being called ‘humanitarian.’

But do we have to share this optimistic appraisal? It should be noted that all of the above comments were made by American white people. As Orin Starn suggests, the
whites’ idealization of their relationship with Ishi can be traced back to their self-contented desire to overcome their qualms of conscience regarding their oppression of American Indians: “Here was a vision of America healing itself from the wounds of genocide and slavery through the powers of goodwill, tolerance, and mutual respect and understanding” (93).

In order to relativize the above views, it is indispensable to refer to those of Native Americans too. Although Ishi left no account himself, other Natives commented on Ishi’s relationship with anthropologists. For example, Starn interviewed Art Angle, a Maidu Indian who denied the conventional image of Ishi as a “helpless, almost childlike victim in need of rescuing by Alfred Kroeber and other kind-hearted whites,” and instead believed that he was “a man of power, a healer, and always very much in control himself.” Angel’s view of Ishi has the personal endorsement of his cousin who “claimed to have come across Ishi” in his childhood (Starn 93). Angel also critically looked at anthropologists who made Ishi “a captive in the museum”: “Ishi would [not] have stayed in San Francisco if he had had any real choice”; “Kroeber had never viewed the wild man of Oroville as anything more than a specimen” (94). In his pertinent essay, Gerald Vizenor, a Native American writer, also remarks that concerning his treatment of Ishi “Kroeber was not sentimental enough, and anthropology was not ethical enough at the time” (“Mister Ishi: Analogies of Exile, Deliverance, and Liberty” [2003], 366).

This criticism of anthropologists cannot be dismissed as mere surmise. Because of their academic interest in Ishi, Californian anthropologists ‘brought’ him to the museum. According to a reporter for San Francisco Call, they regarded Ishi mainly “as
such an amazingly interesting human document” or “a unique specimen of the genus homo,” and Kroeber, in an interview by this reporter, expressed his joy at the encounter with Ishi as if he had miraculously discovered a species of animals which had been thought to be extinct: “It is almost unbelievable […]. Here is a man, the last remnant of a once proud and warlike tribe, who, through terror of the white man, has successfully hidden himself away from human sight for 40 years. Surrounded on all sides by white men and civilized Indians of other tribes, he has lived like a hunted beast” (Wallace 108).

Even if Ishi’s relationship with anthropologists was successfully maintained in the museum, it seems to have collapsed at the end of his life. Whilst Ishi was suffering from tuberculosis, Kroeber was staying overseas for his research and did not look after him. His absence made it possible for his colleagues to ignore Ishi’s last wish to be cremated without dissection. Kroeber’s friendship with Ishi might seem more doubtful from a letter which he wrote seven months after Ishi’s death to Aleš Hrdlička, anthropologist at the Smithsonian’s National Museum (27 October 1916): “There is no one here who can put it [Ishi’s brain] to scientific use. If you wish it, I shall be glad to deposit it in the National Museum collection” (qtd. in Starn 159). Considering these facts, it would appear difficult for us to recognize the anthropologists’ relationship with Ishi only as ‘humanitarian.’

In Brave New World, the above relationship between anthropologists and the subject of their research, i.e., between the ‘civilized’ observers and the ‘primitive’ observed, is reconstructed by the introduction of the viewpoint of the latter. By inviting
John to London from a selfish motive, Bernard achieves greater social “[s]uccess” than expected; thanks to John, he wins fame as “his accredited guardian” and becomes “a person of outstanding importance” (135-36). So as to please the Controller, Bernard also shows John civilized life in all its aspects, and with the intention of gaining public favour, he frequently takes John to parties where leading figures appear (see 150-51).

How does John feel about this? A hint is seen in the following scene, where John becomes angry at Bernard’s selfishness and refuses to attend a party he has announced on invitation cards to “meet the Arch-Community-Songster of Canterbury and Mr Savage” (153):

Bernard had to shout through the locked door; the Savage would not open.

“But everybody’s there, waiting for you.”

“Let them wait,” came back the muffled voice through the door.

“But you know quite well, John” […] “I asked them on purpose to meet you.”

“You ought to have asked me first whether I wanted to meet them.”

“But you always came before, John.”

“That’s precisely why I don’t want to come again.”

“Just to please me,” Bernard bellowingly wheedled. “Won’t you come to please me?”

“No.” (150)

Despite having obediently complied with Bernard’s requests on earlier occasions, John,
for the first time, expresses how he feels about such an imposition and resists it. Bernard’s emphasis on the phrase “[j]ust to please me” reveals not only his true feelings about John but also the hypocrisy of his friendship. Bernard has regarded John mainly as a means of raising his own position in society. However, after the quarrel, Bernard is reconciled with John by reverting to the modest behaviour he showed when they first met, and as a result they become “friends” worthy of the name (see 155-56, 214). It is difficult to see this kind of process in the relationship of Ishi and the anthropologists. The ‘wild man’ hardly asserted himself and could not speak English well, whereas his ‘civilized’ *friends* did not exactly remember his final word but optimistically believed in his gratitude to their society. Their relationship seems to have been far from a two-way friendship established after a collision of opinions and subsequent reconciliation.

Significantly, the World Controller is an ex-scientist who is not only familiar with the old life of “the savages of Samoa, in certain islands off the coast of New Guinea” (33) but also, out of “scientific interest,” orders Bernard to observe John and refuses John’s request to leave London so as to continue his “experiment” on the savage (214). His name, Mustapha Mond, which can be read as ‘must have a monde’ (i.e., ‘I must have the world’), is itself symbolically suggestive of the close relationship between anthropology and imperialism. In the end, John eludes the vigilance of Mond and goes to Surrey. This kind of event did not occur in the case of Ishi, who remained in ‘civilized’ society, although opinions have been divided as to whether he chose or was made to do so. John’s escape from the captive condition under the scientist’s surveillance may represent the true feelings of another ‘savage’ in California.
In Surrey, John is chased by civilized people, one of whom is a photographer called Darwin Bonaparte. As Carey Snyder suggests, his “name fuses the persona of naturalist with that of conqueror” (211), and he is associated with the image of an anthropologist who in a sense has played roles similar to those of a naturalist and a conqueror. Just as John’s character is distorted in Bonaparte’s feely, *The Savage of Surrey*, Ishi was one-sidedly represented by anthropologists as a ‘wild man’ in California and his story was avidly consumed by the public. However, in stark contrast to Ishi, who, according to his friends, did not avoid being reported on by the media and died as a person popular with the masses, John shakes off such attention and kills himself. Here again, we may see another example of the true feelings of the observed, namely the will to refuse to become either the subject of ‘civilized’ scientists’ research or a commodity consumed by the ‘civilized’ masses.

The above scenes contain not only a satire on the anthropologists’ optimistic belief that their relationship with Ishi was entirely ‘humanitarian,’ but also a suggestion that in their research anthropologists should make an effort to relativize the asymmetric relationship between the observers and the observed that reflects the power structure of the world.

According to Said, the practical measures for “the realignment” of anthropology are “the new and less formalistic understanding that we are acquiring of narrative procedures” and “a far more developed awareness of the need for ideas about alternative and emergent counterdominant practices” (“RC,” 221). Considering “the context provided by the history of imperialism,” anthropologists need to understand the
“articulation” of colonized people, through their “counternarrative” (such as Fanon’s or Césaire’s), which carefully shows the “contest between white and nonwhite” (223-24). As the counternarrative argues for the abandonment of “fixed ideas of settled identity and culturally authorized definition,” anthropologists have to “think of cultures as permeable and, on the whole, defensive boundaries between polities,” and “to see Others not as ontologically given but as historically constituted” (225).65

A similar vision of alternative anthropology is suggested in John’s life with civilized scientists. For instance, the Savage’s resistance to civilized people’s control and his criticism of the state of civilization can be construed to hint at the importance of Western anthropologists’ acceptance of the “articulation” of the observed-colonized, including their objections against Western imperialism. The necessity for flexibility in the ideas of “culture” and “Others,” on the other hand, is implied by Bernard’s friendship with John. Bernard can hear from John about his life and culture only in a scene shortly after their encounter (see 106-119) in which he recognizes John, not as a subject of his observation who has a settled identity or definition (such as a “savage” or an “Indian”), but as a flesh-and-blood person like himself who cannot be easily identified or defined.66

5. Conclusion

In searching for the hidden potential of Brave New World as well as Huxley’s attitude towards imperialism, we have thus far analysed the text historically and theoretically, by focusing on the descriptions of the Savage Reservation and the Savage,
which the author provided under the influence of anthropological discourses of those days. In his portrayal of the twenty-sixth-century society of Indians, while depending on the anthropological representation of American Indians to some extent, Huxley was also trying to resist this, by allowing his “contrapuntal imagination” to envisage unique images of Indians and their cultures as those which will never vanish even in the far future. His vision was also based on his insight into the violent and paradoxical nature of imperialism, including ‘civilization’ policies. By giving several vestiges of imperialism as a clue, Huxley enables readers to reconstruct a hidden side of future history, namely the West’s rule over Others.

What is key to appreciating the radical significance of this text is to explore the potential of the Savage, who has formed a complex identity through the influence of these vestiges of imperialism. Because of his hybrid cultural values and exiled way of life, this hero has powers latent within him to deconstruct the attributes underlying imperialism, such as race, nation, culture and ruler/ruled, and to be an intellectual leader who may resist authority by representing ‘subalterns.’ On the other hand, Huxley certainly set some limits to this potential of the Savage, by frustrating his counternarrative (relying on old Indian and European cultures) against the World State and by killing this character before he plays a significant role as the voice of Indians who were ruled by the West and who are now segregated by the State. This hopeless ending may leave us today with a pessimistic message that, with any sort of traditional cultures, we cannot possibly compete with globalization. As I minutely examined, Huxley could have characterized the Savage, inspired by and possibly in empathy with
Ishi, a real ‘savage’ who refused to be defined by others because of his ambiguous life and identity. Although contemporary anthropologists used Ishi to support a kind of Orientalism, idealizing their friendship with him, Huxley might have satirized this through his story of the Savage’s life with civilized scientists, fumbling after another form of anthropology.

I would also suggest, more positively, a potential value hidden in *Brave New World*. Said pins his hopes upon what he calls “the voyage in,” a paradoxical attempt in which the colonized do not oppose but resist empire by transforming the discourse of empire itself, while also subverting essentialist notions of culture and identity because of the hybridity of the attempt (*CI*, 260-61). This daring strategy of “writing back” to canonical texts has been adopted by postmodernist writers, including Aimé Césaire, a Francophone Caribbean writer who adapted a classic of Shakespeare from a postcolonial viewpoint, restoring Caliban’s counternarrative towards Prospero in *Une Tempête* (1969). It could thus be argued that *Brave New World* has the possibility of being reborn by the “voyage in” as such a postmodernist text, by either making the Savage represent more effectively the inhabitants of the Reservation or giving the ‘subalterns’ the right to speak, and by adding their challenges to the present and former rule of the World State, which can be traced back to Western imperialist powers.

Although, as stated before, there seems to be a large gap between Huxley’s indifference to Others in his early writings and his interest in Others in his later writings, my reading of *Brave New World* suggests the possibility that a feeling of tolerance towards non-Western Others emerged within him while he was preparing and
writing *Brave New World*, especially when he imagined the coming history of a non-Western region as well as the destiny of a savage with a complex identity who has grown up there. After all, for Huxley, who had written mainly about an intellectual circle modelled after actual people around him, it was, in a certain sense, his first encounter with Others, and this might have been precisely the secret trigger behind his ideological development or conversion.

In the mid-1930s, Huxley was engaged with a pacifist campaign seeking world peace, and wrote *Eyeless in Gaza*, where an intellectual like himself awakens to the “unity” of human beings, guided by an “anthropologist” who advocates and practises loving and treating the colonized equally with Europeans. In *Time Must Have a Stop* (1944), Huxley criticized a genealogy of violence justified by the worship of time, including the colonial rule of the West over the non-Western world. In parallel with these novels, Huxley increased his intellectual interest in Oriental thought to such a degree that he published *The Perennial Philosophy* (1945) in order to introduce Western readers to the doctrines of Eastern religions, especially Hinduism and Buddhism. Although this might sound like another example of Orientalism, Huxley, rather than idealizing Others, tried to grope for a meeting point of the West and the East, dreaming of a hybrid cultural community, which he fictionalized in his last novel, *Island* (1962).

In the next and last chapter, we will approach the above development of his later views of world, history and identity with a Marxist focus on his relationship with the masses, whom he appears to have mocked in his works up to *Brave New World*.
My evidence on this point is based on my online search in the MLA International Bibliography (as of 9 July 2015).

See note 76 of Chapter I; note 55 of Chapter II. For Huxley’s view of Jews, see Claudia Rosenhan, “Aldous Huxley and Anti-Semitism” (2003). “His anti-Semitic utterances are,” according to Rosenhan, “mostly abstracted from any actual attacks on Jews, are theoretical rather than prescriptive and thus lack the measurable impact that can lead to the unequivocal conclusion that Huxley is an anti-Semite” (232).

Huxley can be criticized for tacitly accepting British imperialism. Robert S. Baker remarks that “Huxley’s contempt for the British colonials is a leading theme in the Indian essays” which are “written from a self-consciously European perspective” (Baker I, AHCEII, xvi). While reading about Huxley’s trip to the Far East and Jesting Pilate, Charles M. Holmes states: “He himself might have been a Fascist, or a ‘full-blooded’ imperialist. Perhaps political talk, even political action, is a waste of time” (“SOW,” 189). In contrast, A. A. Mutalik-Desai views positively Huxley’s trip to India: “It was his first stepping out of his own class or set in Britain. It provided him with a look at how the other world, a vast chunk of humanity, lives, suffers, struggles without hope or resolution in sight” (35). Rosa Borgonovi has recently supported this view, arguing: “Huxley’s travel books [Jesting Pilate and Beyond the Mexique Bay (1934)], in fact, offer a realistic picture of the world, based on a supranational observation which permits him to give a description of European and non-European cultures that goes beyond stereotypes” (65).

When the author’s intention is concerned, it would appear that Brave New World has a special issue, differently from ordinary fiction. It is the question of whether Huxley tried to make a eutopia or dystopia. Although this is often regarded as a canonical text of the latter genre and Huxley himself called it a “negative” utopia (compared to his Island [see “Monitor,” John Lehmann’s interview in 1958 with Huxley]), David Bradshaw’s historicist and detailed analysis of the backdrops of Brave New World reveals that the world Huxley envisaged had an aspect of something like eutopia (as well as dystopia) to him at the time, when he was actually attracted to Wellsian ideas, feeling a necessity for the large-scale
planning of stability like the World Controllers (see “Huxley’s Slump: Planning, Eugenics, and the ‘Ultimate Need’ of Stability” [1995]). Though this is the question that arises in considering Thomas More’s Utopia as well, it would be unreasonable to categorize the text dualistically in either case; at best, the answer might be that the text has the ambiguity of both positive and negative utopias. Rather, what I want to do in the present chapter is to read Brave New World as just a literary text that is set in the future, and then to consider the author’s thinking or feelings about individual issues, such as imperialism.


6 I take up Mass-Observation again in Chapter IV, Section 2.1.


8 Huxley adopted a similar viewpoint in writing about what he called “Alien Englands,” such as the Durham coalfield, where he encountered the realities of mass unemployment (see Chapter IV). When working on Brave New World, Huxley also enjoyed reading Julian Huxley’s Africa View (1931) (see his letter to Julian, 17 May 1931, Sexton 256).

9 For a detailed analysis of this point, see Meckier, “Brave New World and the Anthropologists: Primitivism in A.F. 632” (1978). Meckier discloses the impact of the writings of Malinowski, Mead and Franz Boas upon Huxley’s idea of civilized society and people in Brave New World, and goes on to argue that Huxley, through this satire, demonstrates that even if “the theories of Ford, Freud, Wells and Pavlov are combined, the result would be Brave New World,” namely that even “such a federation of influential theories” could not bring “a significant improvement upon primitivism” (AHMSNI, 233-34).

10 Although this is a delicate issue, in the present chapter, as well as in other parts of this dissertation, I use “American Indians” or “Indians” instead of “Native Americans” outside of a few exceptions, following Huxley’s use of the former in the text. As is often indicated, what “(American) Indians” means is not strictly the same as what “Native Americans” means, and the latter can be problematic in that it
may conceal the history of the European colonization of the Americas—although the former has also received criticisms from other angles.

11 Exceptions are the later mentioned studies by Peter Edgerly Firchow and David Leon Higdon.

12 The anthropology mentioned here is anthropology of American Indians. In America, in the late nineteenth century, anthropology held a position as an “academic discipline,” thanks to the great achievements of John Wesley Powell (director of the Bureau of American Ethnology at the Smithsonian Institution) and Franz Boas (professor of anthropology at Columbia University). Boas is often ranked with Malinowski as the father of modern anthropology, and his “appointment at Columbia [in 1896] is heralded as marking the true beginning of anthropology as a university discipline.” Compared with contemporary Europeans, American anthropologists enjoyed the advantage of having “proximate access to indigenous peoples only recently affected by the West, who became its principal object of investigation, a ‘living laboratory,’ so-called.” For this outline, see Peter Whiteley, “Ethnography” (2004), 436.

13 See also the left side of the Timeline of the World State (Table 1), attached at the end of Section 3.7.

14 H. G. Wells repeatedly advocated the idea of the World State in his writing, such as Anticipations (non-fiction, 1905), The World Set Free (novel, 1914) and The Shape of Things to Come (novel, 1933), and was engaged in political activity to work towards the promotion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet his proposal of the World State has an aspect of the World “Empire,” which is established mainly by Westerners (especially English-speaking peoples), and where inhabitants of all the regions are civilized or Westernized, accepting Western cultural manners, including English as the only official language, as suggested in the second volume of his Experiment in Autobiography (1934): “The British Empire, I said, had to be the precursor of a world-state or nothing”; “I was still clinging to the dear belief that the English-speaking community might play the part of leader and mediator towards a world commonweal” (762; see also Patrick Parrinder, Shadows of the Future: H. G. Wells, Science Fiction and
Prophecy [1995], Chapter 5). According to his own comments, Huxley was conscious of the “Wellsian Utopia” at least in the early stage of his composing Brave New World (letter to Kethevan Roberts, 18 May 1931, Smith 348; see also Plimpton 165), and it has been suggested by critics that he had the intention of satirizing optimism regarding technology and equality, which repeatedly appeared in Wells’s later writings, such as The Sleeper Awakes (1910) and Men Who Like Gods (1923) (see Firchow EU, 57-66; for Huxley’s ambivalent attitude towards Wells, see Bradshaw, “Open Conspirators: Huxley and H. G. Wells 1927-35” [1994]). However, I am more interested in the possibility of reading Brave New World as a satire on the imperial aspect of the Wellsian Utopia.

With regard to imperialism, a racial discrimination system like slavery seems to exist in the future civilized society, if we turn our attention to the “black” or “negro” people who are mentioned as members of the lower castes, that is, Deltas and Epsilons (see 6, 55, 87, 138, 146-47). However, the lower castes do not consist of only “negro” people (see 6), and the descriptions do not necessarily mean the survival of the former institution of black slavery, even though we may get a glimpse of the State’s (or the author’s) racism here (see also Holmes “SOW,” 190-91).

After the Indian Removal Act was passed in 1830, about one hundred thousand American Indians were evicted from their homelands to the east of the Mississippi River to Indian Territory in the west. After the Civil War, the US government attempted to remove western tribes to reservations, which led to bitter wars. Ultimately, by the late nineteenth century, more than a hundred Indian tribes, exhausted from battle and struggling to live, had no choice but to move to reservations. However, the confinement of American Indians to reservations began to be suspected of not necessarily being effective for ‘civilizing’ them, and the government changed its policy from removal to assimilation. As a typical example, under the Dawes Act of 1887, reservation lands, which had been owned collectively by tribes, were forcibly redistributed in small portions into families and individuals. For the education of Indian children, the non-reservation boarding schools began to be regarded as superior to the reservation schools. However, the Meriam
Report of 1928 revealed the poverty in reservations and the injustice of the Indian policy, which subsequently led to the Indian New Deal from the mid-1930s, a movement for the improvement of Indians’ rights. For the above outline, see Arlen Hirschfelder, *Native Americans* (2000), 8-15.

Huxley could also have known about the severe situation of American Indians at the time, through his conversation with D. H. Lawrence, who, as stated later, spent some time in the 1920s in Taos and who was engaged with a campaign against the Bursum Bill, supporting Indians’ rights to their land (see Arthur J. Bachrach, *D. H. Lawrence in New Mexico: “The Time Is Different There”* [2006], 14-18).

In this way, the misrepresentation of American Indians was reproduced, popularized and reinforced as a kind of Orientalism.

For the title list of the works Lawrence wrote during his stay in Taos, see Bachrach 107-10.

According to Miller, “Lawrence’s more lengthy experiences in America, particularly in New Mexico where he had hoped to be inspired by the Native Americans to find a new direction for western culture, had a much deeper and lasting impact on his worldview than Huxley’s brief experience in America had on him” (146). Meanwhile, another of Lawrence’s works on American Indians, the short novel *St Mawr* (1925), is mentioned in Snyder’s essay, below.

Lawrence also analyses why tourists were so drawn to the Hopi’s snake dance: since it was “uncouth in its touch of horror,” it attracted “the crowd” who were seeking “the thrill” (*MM*, 63-64). This may also explain the civilized persons’ seemingly inconsistent reaction to the savages’ snake dance in *Brave New World*, which is “funny” for the pilot but “awful” for Lenina. The fact is that their snake dance is so “awful” and gives civilized people such a “thrill” that they are attracted to it, feeling it is very “funny.”

While Bernard and Lenina are being guided by an Indian, they are surprised by a nasty smell coming from his body and the Indian society, and say their catch-phrases: “cleanliness is next to fordliness,” “civilization is sterilization” (94). Because of an unbearable smell of “long-work, long-unwashed clothes” and the “crowded” Indians with “dark skins shining with heat,” “Lenina put her handkerchief to her nose”
The shock of the Indians’ smell was mentioned by Lawrence, too: “they never wash flesh or rag. So never in my life have I smelt such an unbearable sulphur-human smell as comes from them when they cluster: a smell that takes the breath from the nostrils” (P, 95).

Carey Snyder discusses equally the works of Lawrence and Huxley, and argues that they were “a parallel project of satirizing” what she calls “ethnographic tourism,” which means “tourism that takes travellers to sites such as the tropics, reservations, and ethnographic exhibits, mimicking modern ethnology’s goal of observing traditional customs and ceremonies” (193). Although both writers’ works may include “satirizing” of the Indian tourism of their day, it is not very accurate to identify the twentieth-century Indian reservation tourism with the twenty-sixth-century visits to the Reservation. Whereas Lawrence in his essays reports contemporary tourism, Huxley in his novel envisages the vestige of it.

As Chapter I demonstrated, as early as in his debut work of fiction, Huxley questioned the distinction between the self and the other, and described an intellectual who tries to define himself as a pacifist by projecting aggression within himself onto the other.

I use the word “West” with reference to both Europe and America, following Edward W. Said.

It may be argued that, by making Savage Reservations outside, the Controllers have also tried to keep “COMMUNITY, IDENTITY, STABILITY” within civilized society. In a BBC radio lecture, “Causes of War” (1934), Huxley mentions the view that, for peace, we always need to make the enemy outside.

For instance, Bernard and Helmholtz Watson are too individualistic, Lenina loves her boyfriend for a long period of time, and the Director is sometimes overcome with the memory of his former girlfriend. Moreover, Linda, a civilized woman who gave birth to John, has formed, though awkwardly, a mother-child relationship to a certain extent (see 105, 110). In this sense, her body, as well as her mind, has not been “conditioned” enough as a civilized person (who would have never have a baby or such a relationship).

In Brave New World, civilized people show a strong interest in the Reservations, and later the Savage,
partly because they have usually filled the savage space, which they have not seen but heard of, with their fertile imagination. According to Said, the establishment of identity depends on “a very unrigorous idea of what is ‘out there,’ beyond one’s own territory,” and “[a]ll kinds of suppositions, associations and fictions appear to crowd the unfamiliar space outside one’s own” (O, 54).

29 Roughly speaking, it may be possible to identify civilized society as the conscious and the Reservation as the unconscious. As remarked in the conclusion of Chapter I, the visit of the Savage from the Reservation, where violence still exists, to civilized society, which is basically peaceful, can be viewed as the uncanny return of repressed aggression—on a personal level—and belligerence—on a political level.

30 Here, we might recall our discussion in Chapter II about Point Counter Point, where Huxley reveals the opposition of male-scientific discourse vs. female-personal discourse regarding motherhood. While the scientist Bernard applauds the mother-child relationship, Lenina displays some hesitation or dislike.

31 Interestingly, the Controllers connive at these primitive or savage elements to a certain extent in civilized society as well. For example, Londoners like an unfordly feely, Three Weeks in a Helicopter, something like a film in which a deconditioned hero lives “in a wildly anti-social tête-à-tête” with a girl (146-47). When John, a never-conditioned savage, comes to London, they enjoy “a fascinating horror” towards him, especially his unfordly behaviour of flagellation, which enables them to imagine “pain” they have never experienced (227).

32 Higdon also mentions as possible sources Erna Fergusson’s Dancing Gods (1931) and Edward S. Curtis’s The North America Indian (1907-1930) (Higdon “AHHSD,” 145-46).
In a religious sense, does the snake dance have something in common with Christianity? Fewkes explains that, although the “original meaning” of the snake dance lies in “clan worship,” its “main purposes” at the end of the nineteenth century are “the making of rain and the growth of corn” (Vol. 19, 1009; Vol. 16, 307). In the Indians’ religious view, a “sacrifice” is regarded as important (see Vol. 16, 297), and their snake dance includes a performance of whipping. Of course, the idea of requiring a
sacrifice for the prosperity of a group is similar to the Christian belief that Jesus was sacrificed for “our” sins. Moreover, the whipping in the snake dance apparently resembles the ascetic practices (including self-flagellation) of “Penitentes,” a Catholic sect in the Southwest. In Brave New World, the religious similarity between Indians and Penitentes is directly shown by the naked boy, who plays the two roles of a whipped sacrifice and Jesus. In the 1946 foreword, Huxley recognizes “Penitente ferocity” in the Indians’ religious view and explains that John’s behaviour is controlled by “native Penitente-ism” (xlii). According to Firchow, Huxley was dissatisfied with the idea shared by Indians and Penitentes that “death was merely another aspect of fertility” (EU, 74-75). Although in Brave New World the snake dance is conducted “[f]or the sake of the pueblo—to make the rain come and the corn grow” as in Fewkes’s report, another purpose is added: “to please Pookong and Jesus” (100-01; see also 111, 141). Interestingly, Jesus is placed on the same level as the traditional god of the Indians. According to P. E. Goddard’s Indians of the Southwest (1921), which Huxley could also have read, in the snake dance of the Hopi, “two wooden images” are brought into the kiva: “The larger represents Pookong, the elder of the war god twins; the smaller may be intended for his brother, or for some other divinity” (113). However, in Brave New World, this “smaller” god is replaced by Jesus (see Firchow EU, 74), and the painted images of Jesus and an eagle (a symbol of Pookong [see BNW, 141]) are equally shown in the snake dance. Considering the fact that both the Indians’ religion and Christianity emphasize the concept of a “sacrifice,” it is not necessarily impossible for Christian and Indian elements to coexist in the snake dance in Brave New World.

35 In fact, the “Antelope Kiva,” where the book was lying, is an underground chamber mentioned by Fewkes as being used for the snake ceremony. In the early part of the twentieth century, the kivas functioned mainly as “sacred rooms set apart for ceremonial purposes” (Goddard 76).

36 In reality, no American Indian who read Shakespeare seems to have been mentioned in the anthropologists’ and other people’s accounts of those times. As is well known, since 1925, the British writer Charles Kay Ogden advocated Basic English, the movement of proposing only basic vocabulary of
English as an international auxiliary language for non-native speakers. Considering this, Huxley’s imagination of the appearance of an Indian reader of Shakespeare looks daring.

37 As well as the snake dance (a traditional ritual), the kiva, a room closed to outsiders, can be seen as the most ‘Indian’ space.

38 “The point is that texts have ways of existing that even in their most rarefied form are always enmeshed in circumstance, time, place, and society—in short, they are in the world, and hence worldly” (Said WTC, 35)

39 I have published some of the following sections regarding Ishi and John; see Hisashi Ozawa, “John and Ishi, ‘Savage’ Visitors to ‘Civilization’: A Reconsideration of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, Imperialism and Anthropology” (2014). For this dissertation, I made revisions to this article, most of which are minor, excepting my discussion of John’s ambiguous identity and its potential to deconstruct the concept of the Other (Section 4.3).

40 For the influence of Lawrence on Brave New World, see K. T. Miller’s essay above, as well as Brad Buchanan, “Oedipus in Dystopia: Freud and Lawrence in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World” (2002).

41 Apart from Ishi, there were other American Indians who showed some similarities with John. Although since the sixteenth century Indians had written about their interactions with whites, it was only in the nineteenth century that three Indians recorded “their reactions to visiting England.” At the beginning of the twentieth century, E. Pauline Johnson used “Native terms to describe London and to compare Canadian Indian and British concepts of government, lifestyle, and worship” (A. LaVonne Ruoff, “Reversing the Gaze: Early Native American Images of Europeans and Euro-Americans” [2001], 208-11). These accounts may also have partly influenced the characterization of John or the motif of Brave New World, but Ishi was certainly a more recent and more famous Indian for Huxley, and thus the likelihood that he based John on Ishi must be greater.

42 It has often been indicated that his travels in America, especially his encounter with subcultures in
California, left Huxley with a bad impression and supported part of his negative descriptions of the civilized society in *Brave New World* (see e.g., Bradshaw I, *BNW*, xix-xx). If London(ers) in *Brave New World* can be partly identified with the real California(ns), is it to be doubted that the fictional savage who visits London, and the Londoners’ reaction to him, also depend partly on the real ‘savage’ who visited a city in California and the Californians’ reaction to him?

Although the discussion below focuses on Ishi’s life in ‘civilized’ society, his previous life may also be of interest. According to the generally accepted view, the Yana Indians, including the Yahi (Ishi’s group), had been in northern California for three to four thousand years and numbered two to three thousand before the conquest by white people. The Anglo-Saxons’ gold rush from 1848, followed by forced migration, bringing diseases and mass murder, dealt a crushing blow to California Indians, including the Yahi. Ishi was probably born in 1862, and lived with his mother and a small number of other survivors—their way of life is ethnologically regarded as the most ‘primitive’ of any on the continent—but after the death of the others, Ishi was without human companionship for almost three years before he entered white society (see Theodora Kroeber, *Ishi in Two Worlds* [1961], Chapters 1 and 3 to 6). However, the above description has been criticized for its stereotype of “white beastliness and Indian saintliness” and doubted because of the possibility that “Ishi was the child of a mixed union,” not only of the Yana (see Orin Starn, *Ishi’s Brain: In Search of America’s Last “Wild” Indian* [2004], 98-107). Ishi’s ‘primitive’ life is not similar to John’s, and in my view the descriptions of John’s concrete experiences before his visit to civilization are mainly based on Huxley’s imagination, although the Indian life of these ‘savages’ has a point in common—both of them are represented in a distorted way by ‘civilized’ scientists as being ‘primitive’ (see also Starn 25).

From Chapter 11, John begins to be called “savage” more often than John, and finally he calls himself “Mr Savage” when answering the phone (173). Subsequently, John is later reported by the media as the “MYSTERY SAVAGE,” “Benighted fool” (221), and is also compared to a “gorilla” by a photographer.
(223) or to an “ape” by the sightseers (225).

45 In fact, the cited line is spoken by Puck in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* (II, ii), which suggests that John (or the author) unconsciously feels a kind of similarity between himself and Ariel, both of whom have a submissive, colonized aspect.

46 There are other minor similarities between John and Ishi. Neither of them is good at forming close relationships with women, except their mothers (see Pope “MHI,” 19, 186). Ishi’s dislike of alcohol, especially whiskey, which he believed made men “crazy” (186), reminds us of John’s strong hatred towards soma, which in the future society functions like “alcohol” (*BNW*, 46). Ishi’s doctor was Pope, and a similar name is also given to a character called Popé in *Brave New World* who acts as an amateur doctor by providing John and his mother with mental support, in the form of Shakespeare’s works and a romantic attachment respectively (see also Sloan 141-42).

47 Conversely, knowledge often suggests power. Academic knowledge is accused of its complicity with politics in contributing to discourses of Orientalism (see e.g., Said *O*, 73-92). In anthropology, too, academics can be at times problematic in their sense of privilege of observing Others and propagating the image of Others (see Section 4.4).

48 However, part of the above ignorance was definitely fabricated, and Pope attempted to relativize it in the following way: Ishi’s “temperament was philosophical, analytical, reserved, and cheerful. […] While we knew many things, we had no knowledge of nature, no reserve” (“MHI,” 187).

49 All the academic books and essays cited in this section are presumed to have been accessible to Huxley. I checked copies of these sources that are now held by the British Library or the British Museum and investigated the seal marks of the copies to know which institutions originally owned them. According to the marks, copies of Kroeber’s *Handbook* were purchased by the British Museum (one copy shows 1926 as the year of purchase), Pope’s *Hunting with the Bow and Arrow* was also purchased by the British Museum, and the thirteenth volume of *University of California Publications*, which includes the essays
by Pope and Waterman, was purchased by the Royal Anthropological Institute (the marks of the latter two show no year of acquisition). Huxley might also have visited the Bodleian Library. Meanwhile, the possibility cannot be denied either that non-academic information as provided by the newspaper articles cited in this section was obtained by the author during his trip in America or later. It is uncertain whether there was a direct connection between Huxley and A. L. Kroeber, but there was one between Julian Huxley and Kroeber. In 1946, Kroeber was awarded the Huxley Memorial Medal (1945) by the Royal Anthropological Institute and first met Julian, who was engaged with the Institute. Their relationship continued until Kroeber’s later years (see T. Kroeber, Alfred Kroeber: A Personal Configuration [1970], 194-95, 198, 230-31, 238-41, 282). Incidentally, the well-known science fiction writer Ursula Le Guin, who wrote an introduction to Brave New World in the Folio Society edition (2013), is the child of Theodora and A. L. Kroeber (see also Clifford 175-89).

50 There have been many on-going controversies about how to interpret Ishi’s life before and after his entering white society, which also suggests that he is a person who cannot be fully understood by other people. The difficulty in defining Ishi is reflected particularly in the fact that his real name has remained unknown to this day. He never disclosed it to whites or Indians in ‘civilized’ society. Although in a narrow sense this silence can be interpreted as passive resistance against ‘civilized’ people by their victim, it might mean more broadly an adamant refusal to accept any definition by others. He was finally named “Ishi” by a white man, but even this means merely “man” in the Yana language and does not connote any personality. Regarding his name, the most symbolic explanation is offered in the butcher Adolph Kessler’s interview in 1973: “‘What is he?’ dozens of visitors to the jail house had inquired of the sheriff. […] Webber [the sheriff] began to call his captive ‘Is he’ and then just ‘Ishi’ for short” (Starn 40). Therefore “Ishi” is a name that by itself doubts (or rejects) a performance of naming.

51 Just as people who saw Ishi asked “What is he?” John is, symbolically enough, asked similar questions by Bernard, who is surprised to see him: “Who on earth . . . ?”; “Who? How? When? From where?” (100-
Huxley emphasizes his view of a human being as an indefinable existence by sending John, a human person with a complex identity, to the civilized society of the World State, which has produced machine-like citizens with a single, unchangeable identity by employing all sorts of conditioning and hypnopædia: “The mind that judges and desires” is “made up of these [the State’s] suggestions” (23); “characters remain constant throughout a whole lifetime” (47). Certainly, in the future civilized society, there are only a few citizens with human features, such as Bernard and Helmholtz, indefinable characters who have and realize their own complex identity and who build a relatively good relationship with John probably because of this. For instance, Bernard, whose “physique was hardly better than that of the average Gamma” (55), has a different image of himself: “what it would be like if I could, if I were free—not enslaved by my conditioning” (78). Helmholtz also regards himself as manifold and incomprehensible when he asks Bernard: “Did you ever feel […] as though you had something inside you that was only waiting for you to give it a chance to come out?” and when he mentions his “queer feeling” that “I’ve got something important to say and the power to say it” (59). However, according to the State’s criteria, they are only defective products that could not be conditioned well, and thus must be deported from society as illegal human persons who have “got too self-consciously individual to fit into the community-life” (200).

All these settings and the plot are based on the author’s belief that the complexity of identity is the essential condition for humanizing humans.

Sloan analyses Zuñi phrases which Huxley, in the text, cited from Cushing’s Zuñi Folk Tales (1931) (see 145).

This is not just a typical aspect of non-native speakers but one of the colonized who learn English outside England. In The World, the Text, and the Critic, Said divulges power structures embedded in language and texts, while citing James Joyce’s description of Stephen’s attitude towards English in Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916): “The language in which we are speaking is his before it is mine. How different are the words home, Christ, ale, master, on his lips and on mine! I cannot speak or
write these words without unrest of spirit. His language, so familiar and so foreign, will always be for me an acquired speech” (qtd. in Said WTC, 48). In fact, the discipline of English literature was established in India in the mid-nineteenth century for ‘civilizing’ the colonized, and was then imported into England in the early twentieth century (see Gauri Viswanathan, Masks of Conquest: Literature Study and British Rude in India (1988); for the institutionalization of English literature in Scotland in the eighteenth century, see Robert Crawford’s Devolving English Literature [1992]). The function of culture as “hegemony” can be traced back to Mathew Arnold (see Said WTC, 9-11). In Brave New World, a savage in the future brings English literature (Shakespeare) to England again, but unlike the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this fails to be established there. Although he was the great-nephew of Matthew Arnold, and one of the earliest graduates of English, Oxford (he got the best degree there in 1916), it would appear that Huxley in the novel set forth “culture” as rather changeable or unreliable than hegemonic or confirmed.

Ironically, in the Pre-World State Era, John would have succeeded as a civilized, submissive colonized or as a civilized, competent colonizer, because of his cultural accomplishments, such as his faith in Christianity and knowledge of Shakespeare. However, another fate awaits him in the twenty-sixth century, at a time when no imperial policies exist in non-Western regions and when former symbols of civilization like Shakespeare and Christianity are reversed as something primitive or savage in this new civilization.

Evidently, Huxley attempts to subvert or deconstruct a set of keywords “civilization” and “savage.” He envisages a future world where Shakespeare’s book is undoubtedly regarded by a new civilization as “uncivilized,” and civilized people make a habit of making some collective performances which are very similar to those performed by uncivilized people in the Savage Reservation (see 97)—indeed, Huxley described civilized people’s life, as mentioned earlier, by echoing the then reports on ‘primitives’ by anthropologists. Before and after Brave New World, Huxley often questioned the same sort of binary
opposition by remarking, for example: “being civilized [. . .] is keeping up the appearances of culture, prosperity, and good manners”; “freed from the necessity of keeping up the appearance of being civilized, the majority of human beings would rapidly become barbarous” (*Jesting Pilate, AHCEII*, 468); “The difficulty of measuring and comparing civilizations consists in the fact that we have no rulers and no scales in terms of which to make our measurements” (“The Fallacy of World Brotherhood” [1928], *AHCEII*, 102); “We say that the Quiché Indians are primitive. But what exactly do we mean by the word? [. . .] Primitiveness of mind is not necessarily associated with congenital inferiority of mind” (“Primitive Minds” [1933], *AHCEIII*, 360).

56 Said continues: “To leave the historical world for the metaphysics of essences like negritude, Irishness, Islam, or Catholicism is to abandon history for essentializations that have the power to turn human beings against each other” (*CI*, 276). A similar view is presented in cultural studies; for example, Paul Gilroy in *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (1993) questions the racial purity which has often been seen in black politics, believing: “The [hybrid cultural] history of the black Atlantic yields a course of lessons as to the instability and mutability of identities which are always unfinished, always being remade” (xi).

57 Throughout *Edward Said: The Paradox of Identity* (1999), Bill Ashcroft and Pal Ahluwalia place emphasis on Said’s own identity, which also appears inconsistent and paradoxical in various ways (e.g., being an exile from Palestine, sustained concern about his homeland while being a New York citizen with a Westernized persona), and which is what personally endorsed and supported his activity as a public intellectual as well as his postcolonial theory. Not fully, but to some degree, Said’s definition of an intellectual may be applied to Huxley, in whom Said was so little interested that he made no reference to Huxley in *Orientalism*, and only once in *Culture and Imperialism* (see 353). Despite his coming from a notable family of Western ‘civilization,’ Huxley was irresistibly attracted to Eastern cultures, by which in later years he cast a critical eye upon Western imperialism and a cultural and political tendency towards
globalization. His engagement with pacifism in the mid-1930s exposed him to severe censure for his “unpatriotic” behaviour, probably encouraging him to emigrate to America, which, however, did not give him citizenship for the natural reason that, based on his political beliefs, he refused all cooperation with the US Army in the case of an emergency (see Bedford 531-35). In 1959, Huxley declined an offer of knighthood by the British government as well (see Dunaway HH, 345).

58 For instance, in Britain an anthropology recognizable as such arose as a result of the anti-slavery movement, and its supporters entertained “liberal, humanitarian, and utilitarian ideals” and “the utopian belief that the sustained efforts of education and science would result in a better society” (MacClancy 76).

59 For the following outline of American anthropology, see George Pierre Castile, “Federal Indian Policy and Anthropology” (2004), 269-70; Whiteley 448-49.

60 This betrayal should not be attributed only to Kroeber, who actually urged the importance of observing Ishi’s dying wish in a letter to his colleague. However, this letter unfortunately arrived after the autopsy had been performed and the brain had been preserved.

61 Ishi’s brain, having been stored in the Smithsonian Institution, was finally buried together with the ashes in his native land in 2000.

62 The above criticism on Kroeber and his friends would be argued against by the anthropologist George M. Foster (see his “Assuming Responsibility for Ishi: An Alternative Interpretation” [2003]).

63 The Controller has often been compared with Alfred Mond, the founder of Imperial Chemical Industries (see e.g., James Sexton, “Brave New World and the Rationalization of Industry” [1986], 429-36).

64 As can be easily seen in Smithsonian publications, photographers were often indispensable for anthropologists’ field surveys.

65 Examples of results of such realigned anthropology can be seen in recent studies of Ishi, such as Ishi in Three Centuries (2003, ed. Karl Kroeber and Clifton Kroeber; a collection of essays from various
contributors from Californian anthropologists to Native Americans), Starn’s *Ishi’s Brain* (2004) and James Clifford’s *Returns: Becoming Indigenous in the Twenty-First Century* (2013), which devotes the second part to “Ishi’s Story.” These writings avoid a rash conclusion that overemphasizes either the side of whites or Indians. They appear to aim at something like an “impossible union” of human history which is made possible not by “the provincialism of one strand of history” but by “an apprehension of other histories” (see Said C1, 339-40).

66 My argument in the latter part of this chapter is based on the premise that Huxley had some information about Ishi, but even if he had not, the significance of Huxley’s work in regard to imperialism and anthropology would not be lost. On the contrary, if Huxley, without knowing anything about Ishi, had so correctly—in a sense—described how a ‘primitive’ person who grew up with American Indians felt and was treated in ‘civilized’ society, this description would imply that he had great imagination and sensitivity with respect to the destiny of Others. The fact also remains that Huxley had a keen awareness of the imperial aspect of anthropology, by which he could narrate John’s life with civilized scientists as a critical reflection of the ambiguity typically seen in the contemporary relationships between anthropologists and the colonized.

67 For privileged intellectuals’ risk of (mis) representing or silencing oppressed individuals (such as ‘Third World’ women), see e.g., Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s famous and controversial work, “Can the Subalterns Speak?” (1988).

68 In decolonizing cultural contexts, according to Said, “resistance” should be considered “an alternative way of conceiving human history”: “Certainly, [. . .] writing back to the metropolitan cultures, disrupting the European narratives of the Orient and Africa, replacing them with either a more playful or a more powerful new narrative style is a major component in the process. [. . .] The conscious effort to enter into the discourse of Europe and the West, to mix with it, transform it, to make it acknowledge marginalized or suppressed or forgotten histories is of particular interest in [Salman] Rushdie’s work, and in an earlier
generation of resistance writing” (*CI*, 259-61).
Chapter IV Mass
—Later Writing—
Utopia and Marxism

1. Introduction

The final chapter focuses on Aldous Huxley’s relationship with the masses and his view of them. The previous chapters have already provided some clues to this question, albeit in fragments. In the “Farcical History of Richard Greenow” (1920), Dick cannot repress his visceral hatred for a crowd on a street and in a train, as well as for lower class activists involved in a pacifist campaign with him.¹ Another of the author’s indirect confessions may be made through Walter in Point Counter Point (1928), who cannot “personally like the oppressed” despite his politically “advanced” stance. In this story, Rampion eloquently denies the validity of socialist ideas and movements, and even Illidge, a communist from the working class, has to finally question his belief of “revolution” after he murders Webley, whom he thought embodied the “plutocracy” (506, 511, 515). For most readers, however, the most memorable is probably the grotesque image of a crowd of lower castes like “maggots” in Brave New World (1932). These examples, more or less, might convince us of Huxley’s dislike of the masses or his contempt for them. Indeed, Huxley, especially because of his most famous novel, has been convicted by Marxists and other leftist critics as a reactionary engaged in, or standing up, for “bourgeois society,” “the authentic bourgeois spirit,” “the European leisured class” or “aristocratic critique[s].”² However, it must not be
overlooked that the aversions towards working classes in “Richard Greenow” and *Point Counter Point* are followed by the characters’ guilt as well as their desire to have empathy for them. In *Brave New World*, an uncomfortable feeling in a class-based society is also held by Bernard, who has an unstable identity because of his Alpha intelligence and Gamma physique, and who cannot “feel himself too secure in his superiority,” unlike many others of the same class who take “their position for granted,” moving “through the caste system as a fish through water” (55-56).

To reconsider Huxley and the masses, I reflect on his later work, examining the particular historical contexts of his time and Marxist theories of today. Although it is well known that after the 1930s Huxley increased his interest in religious thought and drugs, how can this be viewed in his relationship with the masses? A keyword in our discussion will be “utopia,” a theme that is problematic but significant for both the later Huxley and Marxism.

2. The Road to Eutopia: Huxley’s Encounters and Relationships with the Masses

2.1. Huxley’s Experiences “Abroad in England”

In *Typhoeus or the Future of Socialism* (1929, published in the To-day and Tomorrow series), Arthur Shadwell states: “Socialism was raised by the war [1914-1918] from a vague programme to a practical political question, and its future was thereby made a matter of primary interest” (9). The Fabian Society, established in 1884, provided a place for the energetic activity of intellectuals, including Sidney and Beatrice Webb, George Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells. In 1915, Huxley himself became a Full
Member of the Balliol Fabian Group to make “sincere but less than fanatic” commitments to socialism (Bradshaw I, HH, viii-ix)—this experience was later fictionalized in “Richard Greenow” (see Limbo, 29-30). In a letter to Sybille Bedford (28 May 1968), the leading figure of the Group, Rajani Palme Dutt, remembered that Huxley “supported socialism for the same reason as Oscar Wilde had done,” instead of being “an economic type of Socialist” (qtd. in Bradshaw I, HH, ix). In 1924, with Fabian ideas as a background, the Labour Party, having advocated “the common ownership of the means of production,” formed the first Labour Party government, together with the Liberal Party, which emphasized funding support for public housing, reforms for spreading education, and improving pension and unemployment insurance.

What kind of attitude did Huxley show towards these situations in his early essays? In “Varieties of Intelligence” in Proper Studies (1927), Huxley admits that in many cases “an individual’s thoughts and actions are undoubtedly conditioned by the class to which he belongs and the economic conditions in which he lives,” and that anyone “knows the difficulties which individuals of different classes experience in communicating with one another” (AHCEII, 192). However, Huxley carefully reminds readers that it is impossible to “interpret all social phenomena in terms of class warfare and the play of economic forces,” and that “[d]ifference in class no longer implies, as it once did, a radical difference in world-view,” especially now, when “education” is “made universally compulsory” (192). Of his essays in the 1920s, the longest discussion of Marxism is “Revolutions” in Do What You Will (1929). Huxley predicts a future in which “the doctrines of socialism lose most of their charm, and the communist
revolution becomes rather pointless” (133; see also 136). The image of the “Proletariat,” which Karl Marx characterized as being “exploited and victimized” as “slaves” by nineteenth-century industrialists, is now “ceasing to exist in America, and, to a less extent, industrialized Europe,” because “[i]n the depth of the human soul [including of a bourgeois] lies something which we rationalize as a demand for justice” (131-32). Marxists, or “historical materialists, who deal not with real human beings but with abstract ‘Economic Men,’” cannot realize this point (132), believing “equalization of income” as “happy consummation” in which “the real sources of present discontent” will be removed (133, 135). In Huxley’s opinion, “the real trouble with the present social and industrial system is [...] that it makes life fundamentally unlivable for all” because “mechaniz[ation]” “degrade[s]” the individual “from manhood towards the mere embodiment of a social function” (135-36). Of course, he recognizes the impact of Marx on the modern age (see e.g., “Print and the Man” [1928], AHCEII, 120), agreeing with some of its criticism of capitalism, but he was never satisfied with Marxism.

Unlike Huxley’s optimistic prediction, things were changing for the worse. Although in 1929 the second MacDonald cabinet was formed by just the Labour Party, October of the same year saw the beginning of the Great Depression. Unemployment grew tremendously, delivering an especially impactful blow to the staple trades—coal, cotton, shipbuilding, and iron and steel—particularly in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and Northern England (see J. Stevenson 270-71). For a breakthrough in the crisis, MacDonald was responsible for a National Government from 1931 to 1935, which, however, not only led to a splitting up of the Labour Party but also a weakening
of it, which had to wait until 1945 to take the helm again. It was during this depressed period that Huxley had a series of important experiences, namely encounters with the world and inhabitants “Abroad in England.” Though having toured the industrial Midlands of England in 1928, Huxley from 1930 to 1931 repeatedly—and rather surprisingly, considering what he had been before—explored “Alien Englands,” such as Durham colliery villages, St Katherine and Royal Albert docks in London, a Sheffield ironworks, the old and new industrial towns in Middlesbrough and Billingham respectively (Imperial Chemical Industries’ factory in the latter), and a car factory in Birmingham (see his articles “Abroad in England,” “Sight-Seeing in Alien England,” “The Victory of Art over Humanity” and “Greater and Lesser London” [1931]). In February 1931, during MacDonald’s second cabinet, Huxley even attended a parliamentary debate on financial matters (see “GLL”). He also delivered a speech titled “The Worth of a Gift” in support of the Cecil Houses Women’s Public Lodging House Fund in 1934, and visited drug and bicycle factories in Nottingham (see “How to Improve the World” [1936]) as well as a camp for unemployed people in the New Forest (see “The Man without a Job” and “Pioneers of Britain’s ‘New Deal’” [1936]).

In these tours, Huxley observed the state of labourers “stereoscopically” by using both the “standpoint of the bird’s-eye of sociological generalities” and “that of the wanderer among alien particulars” (“AE,” AHCEIII, 268; “SSAE,” AHCEIII, 277). The former looks at the negative aspects of what has supported, and will support, the British Empire—e.g., the highest class barriers, which have been accentuated by the English education system (“AE,” AHCEIII, 264-65); a slump in singing and the rising suicide
rate as a *quid pro quo* for industrial progress (268-69); aesthetically well-organized factories where the machine makes work monotonous or less creative (“SAAE,” *AHCEIII*, 277, 281; “VAH,” *AHCEIII*, 282-83); over-production that creates unemployment, which leaves poor people in the vacuum of leisure with boredom (“AE,” *AHCEIII*, 270-71; “VAH,” *AHCEIII*, 282-83; “MJ,” *AHCEIV*, 141-46). In a sense, these were all tragedies that were brought on by virtues such as “civilization,” “progress” and “humanitarian[ism]” (see “AE,” *AHCEIII*, 269; “SSAE,” *AHCEIII*, 274)––the paradox which Huxley vividly satirized in *Brave New World*. One may also find ideas similar to Marxism such as the theory of commodity fetishism.5

On the other hand, Huxley’s viewpoint of a wandering stranger allows him to think of those social issues as his own personal ones, too. He honestly confesses his difficulty in establishing contact with working-class people, despite the fact that he “like[s]” their “pleasant” and “intelligent” characters (“AE,” *AHCEIII*, 265). Before workers in a factory or mine, he “feel[s] ashamed” for his own “freedom,” “want[ing] to apologise to them for being a man whose labours are [. . .] much more profitable” (“SSAE,” *AHCEIII*, 278). Finally, he imagines himself in their places: “If I had been born and lived my life in this street of rags behind the Docks, should I be playing Bach, I wondered, should I even have heard of Schubert? [. . .] The conquest of poverty demands an extraordinary strength and vitality, a consuming passion for higher things. Most probably, I told myself, I should have succumbed” (“GLL,” *AHCEIII*, 301). These comments deviate considerably from his previous elitism.

Each time he witnesses such wretched circumstances, Huxley feels the need for
“the most careful and systematic national planning” (“AE,” AHCEIII, 212) and shows, though cautiously, interest in large-scale plans—whether from the political right or the left—such as the one proposed by Oswald Mosley in England and the Russian one in progress: “If her Five-Year Plan succeeds [. . .] Russia will be in a position to convert the whole world to her way of thinking. [. . .] [A] Time may come when communism will pay and pay better, for the majority of men and women, than capitalism” (“AE,” AHCEIII, 272-73). More importantly, his experiences “Abroad in England” seem to have given him a crucial insight into national reforms that would yield ideal communities. He appreciates the Cecil House organizers’ way of treating the homeless “as persons [like themselves], never as mere cases or things” (“WG,” AHCEIII, 418). In an Unemployment Centre—the Grith Fyrd camp for providing people with chances for working, learning and being entertained—Huxley draws significant lessons from their “co-operative, and in the fullest sense of the word, communistic” life—lessons that can “be applied to great many industries” or “the life of all civilised men” (“MJ,” AHCEIV, 145; “PBND,” AHCEIV, 150, 152-53). “Self-government,” in Huxley’s view, is the essence of the camp, which allows each group (the optimum size is around 20) “co-operation,” “the sense of solidarity” (and thus, “the highest social ethics”) and “human efficiency” based on “liberty” (“PBND,” AHCEIV, 150-53). 6

These essays can be located in broader contexts of those days, such as domestic anthropology. The idea of two nations in England, as symbolized by Huxley’s paradoxical phrases “Abroad in England” and “Alien Englands,” already appeared as early as 1855 in Benjamin Disraeli’s novel, Sybil, or the Two Nations (1855). The most
significant movement of the inter-war period was probably Mass-Observation, which started in 1937, as mentioned in Chapter III.\(^7\) Certainly, Huxley’s works about “Alien Englands” appear to be an early example of domestic anthropology, and in 1933 he went on to write the essay “Anthropology at Home,” insisting that “reformers” must be “anthropologists” to solve contemporary issues such as “slums” (AHCEIII, 369).\(^8\) While M-O put a particular focus on the working classes (who were equated with the primitive), Huxley was critical of the conventional treatment of the destitute as “a different and inferior species” or “African savages” (see “WG,” AHCEIII, 415), instead showing his awareness of the significance of applying an “anthropological approach” to both the poor and the rich (see “Casino and Bourse” [1935], AHCEIII, 421). This point will be well understood, given my argument in Chapter III that in Brave New World Huxley attempts to subvert or deconstruct the categories of the civilized, the primitive and the savage. In a sense, Huxley’s idea of ‘Anthropology at Home’ was something fairer than those proposed and performed by other intellectuals of his time.

2.2. Huxley’s Approach to Politics in the 1930s

How did Huxley’s encounter with “Alien Englands” influence his thinking and career? The main topic of the present chapter—Huxley and the masses—has never been discussed more earnestly than in relation to his most popular work of fiction, Brave New World. By using Marx and Lenin for the names of characters,\(^9\) Huxley appears to satirize Marxism, together with Freudism and Fordism, and the tale has been regarded as an anti-Marxist text that reflects the author’s contempt for the masses. For example,
in *The Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and Prejudice among the Literary Intelligentsia, 1880-1939* (1992), John Carey analyses representations of the masses in the writings of early twentieth-century intellectuals, and finds in *Brave New World* Huxley’s “cultural élitism, antagonism to the mass and mystic breakthrough to ‘ultimate reality’” as one body (86). According to Carey, *Brave New World* was written not only due to the author’s fear that “mass unemployment” would bring about something “awful” like “communism,” but also as a reflection of his desire to justify the status quo, rejecting “mass happiness” as “inherently inferior” (87-88). Thus, Huxley shares some notions or beliefs with Nietzsche, including “the ethic that was used to underwrite [. . .] the systems of exploitation that produced the European leisured class to which Huxley and Nietzsche belonged” (88).¹⁰

However, *Brave New World* can be read in a different way in view of the four pieces of non-fiction written by the author in the same period—from “Abroad in England” to “Greater and Lesser London.” Indeed, David Bradshaw argues that in the early 1930s Huxley’s contempt for the masses began to coexist with, and later even be surpassed by, his compassion for the masses. This ambiguity or development of Huxley’s mentality was reflected, for example, in his interest in drastic planning for stability (including “the state uses of eugenics, the legitimate use of force in society, and the desirability of hierarchical government”), accompanied by his joining several organizations,¹¹ as well as writing *Brave New World* (see Bradshaw, “Huxley’s Slump: Planning, Eugenics, and the ‘Ultimate Need’ of Stability” [1995], 168).¹²

In my opinion too, it looks a little unreasonable to trace the text back, as Carey
does, to Huxley’s elitist craving to protect vested interests occupied by the leisured class. First, as Chapter III demonstrated, Huxley’s attitude towards culture is more ambiguous, and not necessarily hegemonic or authoritarian. Second, is it not more probable and natural to see that Huxley satirizes or ridicules, rather than approving or appreciating, the (existing) class system? For instance, the conventional class system, which is mainly based on a family line, is suggested as groundless compared with the future caste system which is absolutely *rationally* managed by categorizing the citizens according to their mental and physical abilities. In another sense, by presenting such an extreme form of a hierarchical society, the text may hint at the futility of grading human beings who are objectively “physico-chemically equal,” for example, before death (63; see 65).13

A more reformist Huxley appears in his next novel, *Eyeless in Gaza*, which is not a so-called utopian text (about an imaginary or ideal community) but which, in a broad sense, falls under this category in that it is a story about a protagonist who finally reaches a utopian vision. In his childhood, Anthony Beavis, apparently modelled on the author, has a fear or dislike of the poor, especially their smell (Chapter 9). Although he becomes a member of the Fabian Society at Oxford (Chapter 10), he lives as a “sociologist,” an intellectual apart from others. However, through experiencing revelatory or fateful incidents—such as seeing a dog fall from the sky, which reminds him of his friend Brian, for whose death he was responsible, and his encounter with the “anthropologist” James Miller, who leads him to a pacifist movement—Anthony begins to have a “longing to know and love” a real person (see 128). In the end, this transforms
him into a new person who believes in the following “empirical facts”: “One: We are all capable of love for other human beings. Two. We impose limitations on that love [such as “classes and nations”]. Three. We can transcend all these limitations—if we choose to” (185; see 493). The story also suggests how to face and improve real politics. The “dilemma” explored in *Brave New World*—namely the choice between totalitarianism (because of large-scale plans) and societal breakdown (because of the lack of such plans)—is discussed again, but this time the author writes: “there is a hope of passing between the horns.” It is to always “begin by considering concrete people” instead of “States [. . .] and such-like abstractions,” in order to avoid the risk of those plans, such as the repression of individuals (364-65). By this novel, especially his belief of “moral evolution,” in which all people can improve themselves and thus society too, Huxley is counted by Stephen Ingle as one of “[e]thical socialists” (103-05). 14

The “love for other human beings” mentioned above is the essence of what Miller calls “anthropology,” which is to “study men,” “think of them as men” and “always treat them as men”; 15 this opposes “entomolog[y],” in which “you propose to treat him [a human being] as a bug” (468-72). The former contributes to the “good, whatever makes for unity with other lives and other things,” while the latter encourages the “evil” or “the accentuation of division” (see 499). In fact, as early as November 1934, Huxley had already used a similar expression in his speech for the Cecil Houses Women’s Public Lodging House Fund: “We do evil when we treat others as though they were not persons, like ourselves, but as though they were things. [. . .] And it [the evil] can be eliminated. Cecil Houses are there as a proof that it can. No person in a Cecil House is
ever treated as a thing” (“WG,” AHCEIII, 418). Huxley might have read some writings of the founder of the Houses, Ada Elizabeth Chesterton, who was the widow of Cecil Chesterton (the younger brother of G. K. Chesterton). In a sense, she was certainly a practical “anthropologist” who based her philanthropic work on her own journalism, and who brought light to the hidden lives of poor women after disguising herself as one of them. What she realized as a result of her investigation is that “the misery and starvation of the outcast” are not caused by “her own fault” but by “poverty” and “the shortage of housing,” and that “[h]umanity” of the outcast is as “decent” as others (In the Darkest London [1926], 34). Whilst reporting many types of women, including “thieves, prostitutes, blackmailers,” she consistently treats them on terms of equality with women of the aboveground by paying attention to the individuality of the subjects of her research, instead of lumping them together (see Women of the London Underworld [1931], 9). Although Miller has been thought to be modelled after the author’s male friends, such as the therapist F. M. Alexander (see EG, 13) and the philosopher Gerald Heard—none of whom was actually an anthropologist—another source for this character is possibly an almost forgotten female acquaintance of Huxley, Ada Chesterton.

What gave Huxley the major inspiration for Eyeless in Gaza must be his actually joining a pacifist movement, The Peace Pledge Union (PPU). Although it has often been indicated that Huxley was ideologically influenced by other intellectuals related to this campaign, such as Gerald Heard (a religious philosopher and one of Huxley’s lifelong friends), Dick Sheppard (an Anglican clergyman and the Canon of St Paul’s
Cathedral) and Richard Gregg (an American social philosopher whose *Power of Non-Violence* [1935] was a Bible for the PPU), and although Huxley’s joining the PPU can be said to be the result of his encounters with the masses “Abroad in England,” his activity for the PPU itself must have been another of his encounters with the masses. The origin of the PPU was a single letter signed by Sheppard which was published in newspapers on 16 October 1934, inviting men to send a postcard to him to publicly declare: “We renounce war, and never again, directly or indirectly, will we support or sanction another.” Immediately, 135,000 men responded and became members. Sheppard’s Peace Movement was sponsored by intellectuals, including Huxley, “the foremost thinker of the PPU,” and in May 1936 it was named the Peace Pledge Union. In contrast to his previous work, Huxley had to see the masses as the audience of his speeches and pamphlets, and found “more adherents [of the PPU] among the poor than among the rich” (*Ends and Means* [1937], *AHCEIV*, 270). This attitude was indeed an important aspect of the PPU’s campaign, reflected in its miscellaneous pamphlets, where plain catchphrases and illustrations were effectively used to gain popularity not limited by class and gender. In *Eyeless in Gaza*, Huxley articulates his reflection on his activity in Anthony’s notebook (see Chapters 13 and 28), in which, for example, he confesses to his “failure[s],” such as a feeling that his audience was “a collective noun, an abstraction” or the “imbecile or odious” masses (135-36). However, Anthony or Huxley finally overcomes them, resolving to act for “his friends,” who unite with him beyond class differences for the same purpose (see 493, 496).

One of the changes brought about by these points can be found in Huxley’s views
on social improvement. As we have already seen, Huxley once advocated top-down planning directed by the elite. Now, though still believing that “politicians” must be “intelligent,” he gives the highest priority to ordinary people’s “liberty” and “well-being” in politics, “education” and “physiological and mental” life (see 365). His idea is developed more theoretically and concretely in *Ends and Means* (1937). Finding the “goal” of social reforms in “freedom, justice, and peaceful co-operation between non-attached, yet active and responsible individuals” (*AHCEIV*, 191), Huxley goes on to argue that the “road to a better society” is none other than “the road of decentralization and responsible self-government” (191; see also Chapter 7). The volume also provides his consideration of general principles for making social plans (Chapter 5), as well as his discussion of the issues that appear when the plans are put into practice, including how to achieve both public and private benefits (Chapters 8 and 10). These arguments were supported by his recognition of the significance of self-government, which Huxley obtained firstly by his visit to the unemployment camp and secondly through working for the PPU, the essence of whose campaign was also “self-organisation,” by which members could freely and positively work through “local Groups” in their towns or villages (Hetherington 9).

Although I have not hitherto discussed how Huxley updated his view of Marxism and Russia after his tours of “Alien Englands,” this is a matter worth considering in some detail. “Like many of his contemporaries,” Bradshaw and James Sexton comment, “Huxley wrote fulsomely in praise of the Soviet Union in the early 1930s” (note 17 to *NMTE*, 88). Certainly, Huxley, probably as a result of his tours of “Alien Englands,”
took an interest in Russian-style propaganda or dictatorship (see “A Soviet School Book” [1931], _AHCEIII_, 308-10; “Forewarned Is Not Forearmed” [1931], _AHCEIII_, 310-11), beginning to feel that “the rest of the world” should adopt “something on the lines of the Five Year Plan” (letter to Leonard Huxley, 31 August 24, Smith 352; see also “AE,” _AHCEIII_, 272-73). However, this does not necessarily mean that he was always optimistic or positive towards Russia or Marxism. Theoretically, Huxley still repeats the same argument (as before in his “Revolutions” in _Do What You Will_), criticizing Marxism for its disproportionate emphasis on the economic aspects of human and history; he also shows his pessimism about Russia, the embodiment of Marxism: “whether they [the Bolsheviks] will go on being successful for long seems to me rather dubious. Man is more complex than the formulators of Soviet ideology care to admit (“In Whose Name?” [1931], _AHCEIII_, 314-15). To speak more concretely, for Huxley, a possibly problematic aspect of the Russian plan is the suppression of individualism or personal liberty in the interests of society, such as the abolition of private property. Rather he prefers, for example, “a limited right to private property”—as the French socialist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon proposed—in order to “enjoy the advantages of Liberalism and at the same time as the advantages of Socialism” (“The Problem of Property” [1932], _AHCEIII_, 347-38; see also his letter to Mitchison, below). His anti-Russian stance is more systematically developed in _Ends and Means_. Huxley, pointing out Marx’s failure in underrating nationalism (Chapter 7), relentlessly comments that Russia, due to defects in its plan, is almost the same as, or even worse than, capitalist countries in terms of suppression of individuals and militarism (Chapters 5 and 8 to 12).
His anti-communist or anti-Russian ideas have a personal aspect, too. While attending the International Authors Congress for the Defence of Culture in Paris (June 1935), Huxley, who “had hoped for serious, technical discussion,” was very disappointed “by the French Communist writers for their own glorification and by the Russians as a piece of Soviet propaganda,” and even got angry about their hypocrisy, namely “the cynical indifference of the Communist organizers to the wretched little delegates from the Balkans etc” (letter to Victoria Ocampo, June 1935, Smith 397).26

In his fiction, Huxley could more plainly but effectively express his strong mistrust of communists and Russia. When the main characters of Eyeless in Gaza, Anthony and Helen—both intellectuals who have lived in a self-indulgent way—search for a raison d’être to begin a new life, communism emerges as an attractive choice. Although Anthony follows Mark to join a revolutionary movement in Mexico and Helen approaches Ekki (a communist refugee), Mark’s attempt fails, revealing itself as just empty bravery, and Ekki is abducted and killed by the secret police or because of some factional dispute among the communists.27 A simple and emotional doubt about communists occurs to Helen when seeing Ekki with two other German communists: “She felt ashamed of herself, but at the same time couldn’t help thinking that life, if you were like Ekki, must be strangely narrow and limited, unimaginably without colour. [. . .] Whereas hers—hers was a vague bright Turner, a Monet, a savage Gauguin” (483, see also 491).28 The theoretical basis of this novel’s assaults against Russian communism is the author’s belief that “means determine ends.” As argued by Miller and Anthony after his awakening, violence such as “liquidating” achieves only the similarly
violent result, i.e., “a post-revolutionary society, not communistic but (like the Russian) hierarchical, ruled by an oligarchy using secret police methods” (335; see also 261-63, 491-92).

Not having visited Russia himself, Huxley formed the above view, depending somewhat on the reports of other people. For example, one of those around him who travelled to Russia was his brother Julian, who stayed with him and his family in 1932 in Sanary, France. In the late spring of the previous year, Julian visited Russia with his wife Juliette to “bring British scientists and medical men in contact with their Russian colleagues,” and on the whole, he was “favourably impressed by the development of Russia” (J. Huxley *MI*, 191, 200). Evidently, his attitude towards Russia was much less ambivalent than his younger brother’s.

Naomi Mitchison also may have contributed to Huxley’s view of Russia. Mitchison, a member of the Labour Party, stayed in Russia between June and August 1932 with her husband, a Labour MP, as well as other people of the Fabian Society. The aim of her journey was to investigate archaeology and abortion. Huxley’s reply to her (c. September 1932, Smith 361-63) suggests that Mitchison sent him her accounts of Russia, which no longer exist, like most of the other letters to him, due to the 1961 fire in his house in California. However, by using extant materials, we can surmise a rough idea of what she wrote to Huxley. Her Russian diary conveys the first impression that she got of the country: “I did like [Soviet Russia] so much. I felt it was in a way what I had wanted, what I have waited for” (her diary, qtd. in Lloyd 30). During her stay, she found lovable people who lived happily in the system of communism (see Mitchison
YMWA, 188-89; her diary, qtd. in Calder 115). On the whole, she was satisfied by Russian archaeology and the status of women, although shocked by witnessing an abortion, which was legalized in 1920 but which she saw performed without anaesthesia (see her diary, qtd. in Calder 113; Benton 84). At the same time, a more ambivalent aspect of her feelings towards Russia or communism appears in her diary, for example, in a passage in which, appreciating theoretically the rejection of possessions, she still has private doubts about life in Russia without a good bath, shampoo or clean linen (see her diary, qtd. in Calder 114). Her enthusiasm about “socialist thinking and planning” was not supported by a concrete vision of what it would be like “after the revolution” but by something “moral” that was formed “romantically” and “deeply influenced by William Morris.” Huxley—who originally did not like an economics-oriented view of humanity, calling Russian collective enthusiasm “the new romanticism” (MN, AHCEIII, 251-54)—agreed with Mitchison’s accounts of Russia, although he did so more calmly, saying: “I perfectly believe that a lot of people are happy in Russia—because [...] happiness is a by-product of something else and they’ve got a Cause” (Smith 361-62). Unlike Mitchison’s optimism about the future, Huxley showed acute anxiety about the period after the Five-Year Plan would be finished, while also questioning her about the economic facet of Russia: “without some private property, what is to become of individual liberty? Private property is the only guarantee possessed by individuals against the tyranny of the State” (362).

Though a minor person in Huxley studies, Cynthia Mosley (the MP and first wife of Oswald) may be a worthwhile figure to consider. As early as 24 August 1931,
Huxley wrote to his father: “The accounts of travelling in Russia which I received the other day from a Soviet enthusiast, Lady Cynthia Moseley [Mosley], were distinctly depressing. My own courage would quail before the dirt she described” (Smith 352; Cynthia’s letter to Huxley is also no longer in existence). In September 1930, when Oswald’s publicly known affairs made her feel insecure, Cynthia travelled to Russia, accompanied by her sister, Zita James. On their way, they visited Turkey, where they met the exile Leon Trotsky, to whom Cynthia enthusiastically conveyed “her sympathies towards Soviet Russia” as “an ardent Socialist” and as “a great admirer of yours [his]” (see Trotsky’s diary and her letter to him, qtd. in Nicholas Mosley 159-60). However, her expectations seem to have been too high about Russia, where she found only “that queer intangible new spirit, everyone equal, no classes,” as well as “all the nonsense talked about only wearing old clothes so as not to be conspicuous, typhoid, the frightful food shortages, no soap—bunk from beginning to end,” and wondering why Stalin had got rid of many intellectuals (see Cynthia’s letter to Tom [Oswald] and Zita’s diary, qtd. in Mosley 164).

I suggest that Huxley’s characterization of Helen in Eyeless in Gaza, especially with regard to communism, might have been inspired by these intellectual and political women who wrote to him about their own experiences in Russia and their views of it. A portrait of Cynthia Mosley, who visited Russia partly to gain her independence from her husband, excited by a charismatic revolutionist, but who finally found herself “stuck” because of the realities of Russia as well as her husband (see Mosley 165), seems to fit with the story of Helen after separating from Anthony. Other detailed aspects of
Helen—such as her reading about and experiencing abortion (see EG, 359-60, Chapter 39), later devoting herself to communism, but having a sense of discomfort when seeing actual revolutionists while in theory recognizing the importance of their arguments—might have been supplemented by Naomi Mitchison.

Although he did not lose interest in the Russian plan, Huxley always kept his eyes on the limits of this first state founded on Marxist socialism. What made him do this was, above all, the imaginative power typical of a writer, which was reinforced not only by the “dirt” revealed by writings about Russia or people who travelled there but also by the relationships with the masses that he firstly incidentally and later intentionally built up through his visits to their workplaces and unemployment facilities, as well as through his activity for the PPU. Particularly in the mid-1930s, Huxley was aggressive towards Russia, not because he rejected the ideals of communism or socialism—in a phrase, mass happiness—but because, in a certain sense, he had a genuine commitment to them. Although there were many intellectuals who, recognizing the effectiveness of the Russian plan, doubted that the same system would work in Britain (see Overy 288-89), Huxley, who as early as 1931 doubted that the effects of the plan would continue for a long time, even in Russia, drew a line between himself and many of the left wing—not to mention the right wing, who originally hated socialism or communism. The historical fact that Huxley never visited Russia due to being busy with writing suggests that Russia was, for him, not attractive enough to interrupt his work; otherwise he would have done so because he had a taste for travelling and he was particularly active in those days. With the benefit of hindsight, however, his choice was
wise because he could spend his time and energy producing his masterpiece, *Brave New World*, and because his critique of Russia, presented in his writings up to *Ends and Means*, was no less accurate than those of many of the actual visitors, and perhaps better than some of them.  

2.3. Huxley’s Retreat from Politics in the 1940s and 1950s

In 1937, while writing *Ends and Means*, Huxley went to America with his family and Gerald Heard to lecture on peace, and unexpectedly spent a quarter of a century there, mainly in southern California. There were several reasons behind this surprising decision, including a financial one. At that time, Hollywood film studios hired many literary authors for screenwriting and other roles, and Huxley was singled out, together with other European exiles such as Zoltan Korda and Christopher Isherwood. Huxley contributed to *Pride and Prejudice* (1940, a collaboration), *Madame Curie* (1943, a collaboration; not credited), *Jane Eyre* (1944, a collaboration with John Houseman) and *A Woman’s Vengeance* (1947, based on his short story, “Gioconda Smile”).  

Opinions differ about whether his engagement with Hollywood was successful, but it must have been a big event in his life, not only as another example of his encounters with the masses but also as his first participation in mass culture, which he had mocked. In his essays, Huxley rarely referred to concrete social issues, including those related to Marxism and Russia, and even when he did so, his arguments do not seem to have gone beyond what he had written before. Since his discussion of the issues more often appears in his fiction, this section traces the subject in his novels.
A conspicuous feature of his novels, from After Many a Summer (1939) to The Genius and the Goddess (1955), seems to be a retreat from politics. In his first American novel, After Many a Summer, the story centres on Jo Stoyte, a Hollywood multimillionaire who is obsessed by a fear of death. His old friend, Proper, puts his idea of something like Jeffersonian democracy into practice and lives as self-sufficiently as possible. This mouthpiece for the author, who is described by Stoyte as a “communist agitator” (147), gives one of his cabins to a poor family of transients whom Stoyte exploits, although Propter is also well aware of the self-responsibility of those economically disadvantaged people, and does not seems to have strong affection for them (Part 1, Chapter 8). The scene that is symbolic of the author’s denial of politics (or “social justice”) appears in a conversation between Propter and Pete, a young scientist (like Illidge in Point Counter Point) who joined the Republicans as a volunteer of the International Brigade for the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) (see Part 1, Chapters 6 and 9). Whereas Pete idealizes his and his friends’ activity for great causes—“fighting for liberty and democracy” (127)—by using such words as “friendship” and “self-sacrifice,” Propter argues that these values are also shared by those who are fighting for the opposite, Fascist side, and that Pete and his friends instead should do “something appropriate”: “Not war, anyhow. Nor violent revolution. Nor yet politics, to any considerable extent” (129-31). In Propter’s view, even if it appears evasive, the “realistic” strategy for a breakthrough in the crisis is to start by recognizing the existence of “good” beyond a “human level, the level of time and craving” (see 133-38).

The story may reflect the author’s state of mind. The Spanish Civil War had an
aspect of being a “dress rehearsal” for the Second World War as it drew in other nations; the Republicans (Popular Front) were supported by the Soviet Union, while Fascist rebels (led by General Francisco Franco) won with the help of Germany and Italy. As early as autumn 1936, Huxley revealed the PPU policy statement on this issue in a pamphlet called *Pacifism and Civil War*, appealing for non-violence: “the pacifist must concentrate above all on prevention”; “The pacifist will [have to] fight this battle for a better society by non-violent methods, by argument; [. . .] and, if necessary, by non-co-operation” (*Pacifism and Philosophy*, 36; see also *EM, AHCEIV*, 217). After all, about 500 renounced their peace pledge (Hetherington 11), and the war, as Huxley had feared, turned into a quagmire. In November 1937, the *Left Review* published a special booklet, *Authors Take Sides on the Spanish War*, in which Nancy Cunard openly asked famous British authors the following questions: “Are you for, or against, the legal Government and the People of Republican Spain? Are you for, or against, Franco and Fascism?"43 Although Huxley’s reply is categorized by Cunard into the Republic camp, it sounds closer to the neutral one: “My sympathies are, of course, with the Government side, especially the Anarchists; [. . .]. As for ‘taking sides’—the choice, it seems to me, is no longer between two users of violence, two systems of dictatorship. [. . .] The choice now is between militarism and pacifism. To me, the necessity of pacifism seems absolutely clear.”44 His comments probably did not please his ex-lover, who would have expected more enthusiastic support for the Republic, like her own: “It is unthinkable for any honest intellectual to be pro-Fascist as it is degenerate to be for Franco, the assassins of the Spanish and Arab people. [. . .] His place is within the people against Fascism; his
duty, to protest against the present degeneration of the democracies.” While writing the discussion between Propter and Peter, Huxley must have considered many of his contemporaries who, like Cunard, justified fighting for either side by using beautiful and brave words; Propter’s counterargument to Peter can thus be read as Huxley’s to those figures. However, there still appears to be a contrast between *Eyeless in Gaza*—the approach to real politics—and *After Many a Summer*—the retreat from real politics.45

One may get an impression that Huxley’s opinion of the Spanish Civil War is inhumanely dogmatic, voiced from (to use Cunard’s words in the pamphlet) “the Ivory Tower, the paradoxical, the ironic detachment.” Yet his seemingly unsympathetic attitude may have been supported by a humane feeling, too. Although not a close friend of his, the poet Julian Bell, the son of Clive and Vanessa Bell, was killed in July 1937, while serving as an ambulance driver for the Republican side in Spain. Moved by the news of his death, Huxley wrote a letter to Clive Bell: “There is no consolation; but at the risk of intruding I felt that I would like to tell you how deeply we both sympathize with Vanessa and yourself. It’s a horrible business and confirms me in my conviction that there’s no alternative to pacifism” (7 August 1937, Sexton 345). Although Julian Bell was basically a pacifist known as the editor of *We Did Not Fight: 1914-18 Experiences of War Resisters* (1935, a memoir of conscientious objectors from the Great War), the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War led him to feel the limits of political liberalism without any forces and to conclude: “to be anti-war means to submit to fascism, to anti-fascist means to be prepared for war” (Bell, “War and Peace: A Letter to
E. M. Forster, ”JB, 373). In fact, Bell, who had been a good reader of Huxley, came to criticize the absolute pacifist Huxley as “slightly mad” because he believed: “there’s no longer any real hope of peace, national or international, but only a choice between fighting and surrender” (letter to Jane Simone Bussy, 22 October 1936, Bell JB, 165; see also “WP,” JB 361). What made Bell ignore his parents’ oppositions and head for Spain was causes, again, such as “military virtues” and friendship (see Bell “WP,” JB, 380-87; see also Stansky 229, 248). Propter’s debate with Pete is, in a sense, Huxley’s posthumous debate with Bell, in which Huxley, while listening to the claim of a vigorous young man, persistently tries to impress upon him the significance of non-violence. Therefore Huxley’s dogmatic pacifism in After Many a Summer was not the result of an intellectual’s selfish escape into “the Ivory Tower” but of his anger at the war, which took the precious life of a man of great promise, and perhaps his anger at himself, who could not prevent it despite his campaign for peace.

As time passed, Huxley’s distance from practical politics, as well as his disappointment at the situation of the world, seems to have become more conspicuous. During the Second World War, Huxley wrote the next novel, Time Must Have a Stop (1944). The protagonist, Sebastian Barnack, is a poet mainly modelled on Huxley, though this character belongs to the generation of the author’s son. Sebastian is originally a sensitive boy who is, for example, moved by imagining mass unhappiness in the world (see 2-3) and who, having been born into the upper-middle class, feels “the shame and discomfort” on seeing “the poor” (156). At the same time, he leads a selfish life, prompted by his beauty and cleverness, bringing others into difficulty. In the end,
however, he decides to live according to the teaching of Bruno Rontini, a second hand bookseller who has been inconspicuously but consistently engaged with spreading his mystic and pacifist ideas by selling relevant books and teaching such ideas to his pupils. With the help of Bruno, Sebastian—now thirty-two years of age—perceives not only “the Ground,” which is “transcendent and immanent” and in which human beings can “love, know and, from virtually, to become actually identified with the Ground” itself, but also that “to achieve this unitive knowledge, to realize this supreme identity, is the final end and purpose of human existence” (248). Since the worship of time demands “human sacrifice”—as shown by the religions and politics that have justified violence by idealizing “either past time, in the form of a rigid tradition, or future time, in the form of Progress towards Utopia”—we should pay attention to “eternity,” where the Ground exists (250-51).

Although in these points Time Must Have a Stop is similar to another Bildungsroman Eyeless in Gaza, the former is much more pessimistic in terms of the effect of practical politics or the feasibility of social improvement. Bruno is equivalent to Miller in thinking that the first task is to improve ourselves (71), but unlike Miller, he is acutely aware of how difficult it is for everyone to do this, suggesting that it is almost impossible to improve this world in the end (see 87, 89, 92). Huxley’s previous self-portrait, Anthony, joins the pacifist campaign, prepared to die, by resisting the temptation of “going back to doing what nature meant you to do—to looking on from your private box and making comments” (see EG, 496). On the other hand, his new self-portrait, Sebastian, is now advised by his guru to concentrate upon the
improvement of himself, instead of wishing that “he could undertake some heroic
course of action” or of “try[ing] to act somebody else’s part” like Joan of Arc or
Florence Nightingale (242). Here, we cannot help imagining that the author tried to
justify himself, who no longer belonged to a political movement.49 His deep interest in
religion, as reflected in this novel, was also the subject of the book published in the
following year, The Perennial Philosophy (1945), in which he cites numerous examples
of what religious leaders have argued, and encourages readers to recognize the
significance of going out of the self and becoming one with other beings through
something like the eternal ground.

It seems that Huxley’s despair reached a peak in his next novel, Ape and Essence
(1948), which definitely mirrored his own psychology at the beginning of the Cold War.
Although he had already pointed out the danger of abusing science and technology in
Science, Liberty and Peace (1946), Huxley more dramatically fictionalized this fear in
the tale, which begins with two Americans who talk about the desperate situation of the
world as symbolized by the assassin of Gandhi, and who incidentally discover a rejected
script by Tallis, a minor writer who just died a few months previously. The script,
entitled Ape and Essence, is set in America in A.D. 2108, which is devastated by nuclear
war and where New Zealand explorers, including the main character Dr Alfred Poole, a
botanist, encounter the inhabitants who have degenerated like apes due to the effects of
radioactivity. The people of this “entirely new race” do not worship God but rather the
Devil, who they believe has hammered two absurd notions of “Progress and
Nationalism” into the human mind, directing them consistently “to courses of action
that are demonstrably fatal,” such as environmental destruction, the First World War, the Communist Revolution, Fascism and the Nazi holocaust (92-99). Tallis’s script or Huxley’s story ends with the escape of Poole and his new lover Loola from the dystopia, heading for another community beyond the desert. In contrast to Brave New World, Huxley gives signs of hope for his main characters, but in another sense this ending—namely, two characters escape from this society instead of improving it—suggests the author’s escapist attitude towards contemporary realities. The attempt to replace world issues with a private problem of lovers may be shared by his next novel, The Genius and the Goddess (1955), which mainly describes an assistant who lives with a Nobel Prize physicist and who has an affair with his wife, who has a healing power like a goddess. Inspired by Humphry Osmond, Huxley took mescaline from 1952, and recorded his psychedelic experience in The Doors of Perception (1954) and Heaven and Hell (1956), although his interest in the world of drugs has been repeatedly mentioned as a token of his “escapism.”

While his engagement with the mass culture in Hollywood was reflected in some styles or structures of his novels such as After Many a Summer and Ape and Essence, it seems to have had little influence on the core of Huxley, including his relationship with the masses—judging from his writing discussed above. It would not be unfair to note that the beginning of his period in America was soon followed by his setbacks in the pacifist campaign and later by his disappointment in practical politics in general, which became deeper and deeper, finally turning his face away from realities on the whole. In the 1920s, the elitist Huxley felt a gap in his relationship with the masses, while in the
1950s, the escapist Huxley finally appears to have lost the relationship itself. As a result, the significant questions are: did Huxley end his life without productive changes in his attitudes towards the masses, and are there any theoretical bases in common between Huxley and Marxism?

2.4. Huxley’s First and Last Eutopia

Huxley’s first attempt to write something like a positive utopia or eutopia can be found in a letter to Harold Raymond, dated as early as October 1940 (see Smith 460). Here, Huxley confesses that he has “abandoned the utopian plan for the time being—it didn’t work out satisfactory, for some reason,” and that he has turned instead to a biography of Father Joseph, who Huxley thinks was responsible for the contemporary dystopian world; the book appeared in the following year with the title of Grey Eminence. Although his desire to write an eutopian novel remained somewhere in the back of his mind, he postponed this project for as long as twenty years—while producing fictional works of the seemingly opposite type—until he finally embarked upon his last and only eutopian novel, Island (1962). Thus, this tale must have reflected those twenty years of his life, as well as of the world situation—from genocide during the Second World War, the appearances of Mao Zedong’s China and other communist countries, McCarthyism, independence movements in various regions of the world, the threat of atomic and hydrogen bombs, and the destruction of the environment on a global scale.

At first sight, Huxley’s eutopia, Pala in the Indian Ocean, appears to be anti-
Marxist. The people of this island are certainly said to want neither “the Communists” nor “the Capitalists,” rejecting “the wholesale industrialization that both parties are so anxious to impose on” them (109). However, there is some affinity between Pala and Marxism. Theoretically, the basis of Palanese systems was devised by two reformers’ skilful combination of “Buddhist ethics and primitive village communism” (see 89). Palanese people are thus not “capitalists or state socialists” but “co-operators” who have been working for “[human] decency, reason and liberty” (see 145-47). To solve economic issues, Pala has figured out several ways of avoiding “being over-populated” and “the temptation to over-consume,” and of adopting an “economic system” that “doesn’t permit anybody to become more than four or five times as rich as the average” (145-46). Unlike other “undeveloped countries,” Palanese people have “always chosen to adapt our [their] economy and technology to human beings,” only importing what is not inconsistent with their “wish to be happy” and their “ambition to become fully human” (140-41). They have welcomed, for example, some electric equipment but not “motor scooters” (141, 145, see also 130).

Huxley’s suspicion of economic liberalism and globalization is represented by the fact that he makes the faction of their supporters take the role of the villain in the story. For years, petroleum companies overseas have been trying to acquire oil resources in Pala (see 26, 45). Colonel Dipa, the military dictator of Rendang-Lobo—a neighbouring country that has industrialized itself by sacrificing the poor in slums (see 80-81)—plants the lure of “modern consumerism” in Murugan, the young Raja of Pala, by giving him “Sears, Roebuck and Co., Spring and Summer Catalog” (133). Just as “[Franklin D.]
Roosevelt is said to have advocated free distribution of S-R catalogues in Communist countries, to convert the inhabitants” to “Consumerism” (Huxley’s letter to Ian Parsons, 16 January 1962, Smith 928), Dipa plays the role of a serpent before Murugan in the Eden, directing his eyes to “the Tree of Consumer Goods” (I, 134). Murugan is now seriously planning to “get this place modernized” by using “oil royalties,” and this idea is also endorsed by his mother the Rani, who cunningly hopes to allot some of the proceeds to “the Crusade for the Spirit,” her own fanatic movement for “World Reconstruction” (44-46).56

In a different way from *Brave New World*, Huxley imagines Pala as a pure eutopia for the masses which is “so perfectly designed to make every man, woman and child on this enchanting island as perfectly free and happy as it’s possible to be” (I, 58; see also 185, 202). Unlike his previous work, the author tries to describe each character of ordinary people as an individual who has human appeal. The word “masses” may thus not necessarily be suitable for these characters, each of whom has a personal name, in contrast to the masses in his essays about “Alien Englands.” The visitor to this island, Will Farnaby—a solitary journalist who is an “ex-imperialist” from an “[u]pper class” (20) and who is suggestive of the author—comes to hope to live there as long as possible, profoundly attracted not so much to the system of Pala as to the individuals living there: “the more I see of you people the better I like you. I want to find out more about you. And in the process, […] I might find out some interesting things about myself” (111; see also 191). Especially with the guidance of Susila, a “dark little” woman (see 98), Will eventually grows into a full-blown human being. This clearly
opposes the author’s previous elitist view of human improvement, in which he tacitly assumed that it would be imposed by intellectuals, Europeans and men, upon ‘inferior’ groups of people, such as the masses, non-Europeans and women.

It is no longer difficult to associate Huxley’s empathic attitude with his encounters with the masses from the early 1930s. Certainly, Pala is composed of the elements necessary for ideal society—which probably came to Huxley during and after his visits to “Alien Englands”—such as the guarantee of worthwhile work (not drudgery), the abolition of disparities in income, the treatment of everyone as a human being and, last but not least, a communistic but self-governing system that develops human potentialities. The absolute pacifism was also a reflection of the author’s own experiences of a pacifist movement, in which he realized that war is none other than massive exploitation of the workers by their nations’ rulers (see EM, AHCEIV, 188).

Needless to say, this text, the final point of Huxley’s intellectual development, relates to all the texts that have been mentioned so far in this chapter. Regarding politics and economics, Huxley again owes much to Proudhon and Jefferson, while a religious facet of this utopia seems to be influenced by his interest in Oriental religious philosophy, especially the ideas of Vedanta, Jiddu Krishnamurti and Taoism, which are often cited in studies about Huxley’s later career. However, it is also worth considering D. T. Suzuki, a Japanese Buddhist scholar who contributed to the spread of Zen in the Western world but whose ideas have not received, in Huxley studies, as much deliberation as the ideas of Indian and Chinese philosophers.

In fact, Huxley referred to Suzuki more than ten times in his letters from 1940 to

Their personal relationship seems to have begun in May 1949, when Huxley received a letter from “Dr D. T. Suzuki, the well-known Japanese scholar who is the leading authority in the field of Mahayana Buddhism,” in which Suzuki told about “a friend who wd like to translate *The Perennial Philosophy*” (Huxley’s letter to Harold Raymond, 8 May 1949, Smith 597). This friend was actually Shosaku Fukazawa and his Japanese translation was successfully published in 1951 under the title of *Kuon no Shinri* (久遠の真理), which means “the eternal truth.”\(^{62}\) Suzuki himself wrote the preface to this book, confessing the feeling that there was a strange turn of fate because more than sixty years before he had read T. H. Huxley to learn English and now his grandchild, Aldous Huxley, was interested in Eastern ideas, paying close attention to Suzuki’s work (*SDZ35*, 47-48). Suzuki’s preface ends with the mention of a two-way exchange between the East and the West, as well as a strange combination of religion and science, both of which are embodied or symbolized by this newly translated book and the original author: “Because Mr. Aldous Huxley appeared in the same family [as T. H. Huxley and Julian Huxley], I firmly believe that even scientists are necessarily drawn into Eastern ideas because of something at the bottom of their heart. It would also be the trend of times that we in the East are given an opportunity to reflect on ourselves by the writing of a person in the West” (50). According to Suzuki’s diaries
and Huxley’s letters, they met together at least five times: 20 February 1950, 12
appreciated not only Suzuki’s knowledge but also his character, and his admiration for
Suzuki was more enthusiastic than the other way round.

Especially with regard to Island, Suzuki is important because he was a Buddhist
scholar, as well as a ‘socialist’ and pacifist. In a word, like Huxley, Suzuki was an
intellectual who dreamed of a new world where the Eastern religion could coexist with
Western political values. As early as the beginning of the twentieth century, in a letter
(14 January 1901), Suzuki expressed his sympathy with democratic socialism, which
was “not based on economics but religion” (SDZ36, 206). Furthermore, after the
Second World War, he also applauded the renunciation of war, stipulated in the new
Constitution of Japan, believing it represented a contribution to world peace.

Traditionally, Buddhism and socialism have not been considered compatible. Marx
himself was critical of religion in general even though he was culturally affected by
Christianity. Under the influence of Arthur Schopenhauer, Marx was not free from the
stereotyped view of Buddhism as an example of pessimism or escapism (see Lenoir
118). Overturning this, Suzuki joined Buddhist, socialist and pacifist ethics into one
philosophy. It is not so surprising that Huxley’s idea of a Buddhist, communist and
pacifist eutopia was partly inspired by his conversation with “dear old” Suzuki, whom
he consistently respected in the 1950s. Above all, Huxley’s encounter with Suzuki may
remind one of the fateful encounter between the two reformers of modern Pala, that is,
the British doctor Andrew MacPhail and its Raja, a Mahayana Buddhist: “what a
strangely assorted pair! But a pair, very soon, of firm friends” (128). In his characterization of them, Huxley might have viewed himself as Andrew, and the “little old Japanese” Suzuki as the Old Raja of another Asian island.67

Therefore, Island is actually not only a social, political text but also has an autobiographical aspect in that it reflects his later life, particularly his relationships with the masses and the intellectuals who have sympathy with the masses. This point cannot be fully understood until we realize the utmost important fact that, in his final novel, the author has returned to the issue that he presented in his first piece of fiction, “Farcical History of Richard Greenow.” In some aspects, Island is a rewrite of “Richard Greenow.”

As Chapter I discussed, Dick, a lonely intellectual with a split personality, dislikes the masses (see 77-80), and one day he is seized with a strong hatred and fear when he sees a crowd of people in city streets:

“There were three hours to wait [for a train] in Glasgow; he spent them in wandering about the streets. In the interminable summer twilight the inhabitants of Glasgow came forth into the open to amuse themselves; the sight almost made him sick. Was it possible that there should be human beings so numerous and so uniformly hideous? Small, deformed, sallow, they seemed malignantly ugly, as if on purpose. The words they spoke were incomprehensible. He shuddered; it was an alien place—it was hell”

(Limbo, 54).

In the end, Dick cannot fill the gap between himself and others, and dies with his
unrewarded hope to have something like a sense of togetherness (see 109). Dick is modeled after the young Huxley himself, but is also a reflection of human beings, especially of contemporaries who have faced the Great War as a result of the unsuccessful repression of their inherently violent dispositions.68

Forty years after this debut work of fiction, Huxley devised a similar character called Will, who also has a “schizoid” tendency (65) and no “compassion” for others, finding “pointlessness” in his life and the world (100, 103, see also 190). Dick’s traumatic scene above is reconstructed in Will’s recollection of his horrible feeling on seeing a crowd of people:

“[. . .] The first time it happened I was waiting for a bus to take me home from Fleet Street. Thousands upon thousands of people, all on the move, and each of them unique, each of them the centre of the universe. Then the sun came out from behind a cloud. Everything was extraordinarily bright and clear; and suddenly, with an almost audible click, they were all maggots.”

“Maggots?”

“You know, those little pale worms with black heads that one sees on rotten meat. Nothing had changed, of course; people’s faces were the same, their clothes were the same. And yet they were all maggots. Not even real maggots—just the ghosts of maggots, just the illusion of maggots. And I was the illusion of a spectator of maggots. I lived in that maggot-world for months. [. . .]” (99-100; see also 101)
However, this time Huxley prepares a destiny for Will that contrasts that of Dick. While living in Pala, Will experiences significant events—from learning the history of Pala to talking with the inhabitants to attending the deathbed of Lakshmi, Robert’s wife—all of which lead him to reflect on his past, understand the meanings of his life and the world, and “passionately” wish to join these “good” people (191). As a result of Susila’s counselling, his meditation and taking Moksha (a psychedelic drug), Will can see the real states of himself and of the world, where all creatures and things are one before “the divine unity” and for which he cannot find any other words to express than “love.” Will has “finally recognized” other people’s “existence,” no longer having visions of maggot ghosts, and even thanked himself for being now among other people and creatures (279-83). Here again, the story of Will, who has had little respect for others and been attracted to death like a hyena, is a metaphor of the history of human beings, who have left society intolerant towards each other, as exemplified by poverty and war (see 274-75). However, unlike “Richard Greenow,” the author now directs the readers’ “attention” to another message, namely that human beings can overcome terrible realities, as Will can do: [in Robert’s words] “We don’t despair [. . .] because things don’t necessarily have to be as bad as in fact they’ve always been” (117). 69

The above interpretation also suggests that the controversial facet of Huxley’s later career, i.e., his acute interest in religions and drugs, had a positive effect on his relationship with the masses. These two approaches were not so much for his escape from others but for his attempt to remove the distinction between himself and others. At first, Huxley tried to do so by following great figures of religions, through something
like emancipation, that is, freeing himself from the self (or personality) and attaining oneness with the divine and other beings, as he recommended in *The Perennial Philosophy* (see e.g., Chapter 3). Although studying or meditating on this was egalitarian in the sense that it did not depend on a person’s wealth or poverty, it was certainly not easy to achieve emancipation for many people, including Huxley. In due course, his eyes were directed towards drugs as another measure that could expand the human mind and that, unlike the first one, was not a technique limited to experienced sages. In fact, as a result of repeated experiments with LSD and psilocybin—which he often made with other people of various backgrounds—Huxley confessed in a letter: “I have known that sense of affectionate solidarity with the people around me and with the universe at large—also the sense of the world’s fundamental all-rightness, in spite of pain, death and bereavement” (“Notes on LSD and Mescaline,” qtd. in Borgonovi 73). Although this method has been attacked by many, it worked positively for Huxley. The effect can be seen, for example, in his warm descriptions of ordinary people in *Island* and many of his arguments in a series of lectures in 1959 at the University of California, Santa Barbara, in which he stresses the importance of universal education, criticizes power politics that has been responsible for the poverty of two-thirds of human beings, and advocates a sustainable society with no threat of technology or over-industrialization for the sake of the Earth’s future inhabitants (see *The Human Situation* [1977, posthumously published], especially Chapters 1 to 3 and 6).  

When it comes to Huxley’s impact on mass culture, the eutopian elements of *Island* have not received due attention, compared with the ambiguously utopian images
of the future in *Brave New World* (e.g., a regimented society, a test-tube baby, conditioning and hypnopedia) and the eschatological components of the post-nuclear-war world in *Ape and Essence.* As regards the counterculture centred in America from the 1960s, it is worthwhile to note what Huxley observed and made famous through his efforts to realize an eutopian unity with others—a Buddhist worldview, ecological arguments, the expansion of consciousness by use of psychedelics, etc. In recent Marxist theories, beyond Theodor W. Adorno’s theory of the “Culture Industry,” more attention has been directed to the political significance of popular cultures particularly as a reflection of contemporary people’s eutopian hopes for ties with others and for the improvement of unfair and unequal situations (see e.g., Fredric Jameson, “Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture” [1979]). Indeed, counterculture was political and eutopian in that it tried to reconsider and transcend the realities that earlier generations have established. This cultural phenomenon appeared internationally in various ways, from an individual experience of alternate experiences using drugs to student movements that sought both self-government and world peace—e.g., the campaign against the Vietnam War. One may see that Huxley’s spirit, bolstered by a compassion for the masses that he attained in the 1930s, was transmitted, even if it was incomplete and distorted, to this youth culture and to popular culture of our time.

3. A Marxist Analysis of Huxley’s Idea of Utopia

3.1. Marxism, Utopia and Totality

In contrast to the historical approach above, let us move on to a theoretical review
of Huxley’s later work, particularly his idea of utopia, which came to the front in his last fiction. To begin with, how should we think of a relationship between Marxist theories and utopia? In Marxism, utopia has been a problematic and controversial concept. As is well known, Marx and Friedrich Engels did not necessarily like the term “utopian,” attacking the plans of their forerunner socialists (such as Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier and Robert Owen) with the phrase “utopian socialism,” as opposed to their practical ones, namely “scientific socialism” (see e.g., Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific [1880]). However it can be said that, in terms of dreaming of social improvement, they were also “utopian,” and that utopian imagination played a key role behind their practical planning, too.\(^7\) There has been an unremitting controversy on utopia with regard to Marxism, and some critics, such as William Morris, Karl Mannheim and Ernst Bloch, were especially drawn to the notion.\(^7\) In Marxist criticism today, no one is more enthusiastic than Fredric Jameson in arguing for the importance of utopia.

According to his Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions (2005)—definitely one of the most influential in recent criticism of the present theme—utopia functions as a “disruption [Beunruhigung] of the present” to which we are bound (228), and “aims at imagining, and sometimes even at realizing, a system [in the future] radically different from this one” (xii). With this logic, one might argue that, paradoxically, the “increasing inability [of us today] to imagine a different future enhances rather than diminishes the appeal and also the function of Utopia” (232).\(^7\) Jameson’s own utopia is, of course, a Marxist one; his analysis in
Archaeologies of the Future is consistently underlined by his own search for an alternative society beyond capitalism (see e.g., xvi, 229-31). Furthermore, Jameson even indicates that utopias in general have to be Marxist, by drawing our attention to, for example, the fact that we cannot still imagine a future utopia without relying on such ideals as “the values of social and economic equality and the universal right to food, lodging, medicine, education and work” (196-97).

The unpopularity of utopia today is relevant to that of the notion of totality today. More concretely and plainly, the most perplexing question to us in forming a utopia is how to secure the inhabitants liberty there while also giving them a sense of togetherness. In general, totality has been used in two ways. The first is normative, in that it sets totality as a desirable goal that cannot be achieved under the present conditions. The second use is descriptive, based on a methodological belief that the concept of totality is effective in analysing a society whose constituent parts, as independent and unrelated as they appear, are inextricable elements of a larger whole (see Jay 23-24).

It is widely accepted that the idea of totality has occupied a special place in the discourses of Western culture, and this is especially true of the lexicon of all Western Marxists (see Jay 12, 21). It was G. W. F. Hegel who most greatly contributed to Marxism by presenting a profound and multi-dimensional version of holism. Identifying totality with “good infinity,” Hegel reinforced a longitudinal aspect of totality, grasping history with a circular image of time. On the other hand, his attention to a latitudinal aspect of totality led Hegel to subscribe to the idea that lesser or partial totalities exist
on all levels of the meta-totality. As all of the pieces of the meta-totality were united in their root (as something emanated from the “Absolute Spirit”), the individual cannot achieve personal totalization outside of the context of global totalization (see Jay 59). While confronting and assimilating some parts of Hegel’s vision, Marx moulded a holistic thinking—affirmatively using words such as “totality” and “the whole”—and associated totality with history, believing that history should be viewed descriptively as a totality and normatively as promising a totalization (see Jay 61-63).

Nevertheless, even on the left, there has recently been “a general move away from the totalistic emphasis that marked the earlier Anglo-American reception of continental Marxism” (Jay 513). Two factors are involved in this matter. The first one is political: though not so surprisingly, the association of totality with totalitarianism is shared even by some Marxist critics and those with some sympathy with Marxism. The second factor is theoretical but is related to the first one. In modernist to postmodernist contexts, Marxism has lost its popularity, charged by poststructuralist critiques with its tendency of reductionism, i.e., the eradication of difference and heterogeneity for some unifying system. In general, poststructuralism rejects every conceivable form of totality, such as textual, subjective, synchronic and diachronic. For instance, Marxism with totalizing thought regards reality as ultimately an intelligible whole, whilst poststructuralism, which not only describes but also celebrates discontinuity and difference, bases itself on the sceptical, relativist and nihilist view that all texts are constituted of fragments and particulars, which cannot be reduced into any larger whole. However, such a “rejection of totality is inevitably accompanied by a rejection
of ‘meaning’ itself. If meaning is context-bound, and there is no identifiable whole
which can serve as the context, then there can be no ‘meaning’ (a very under-theorized
term), only endless permutations of signifying chains which cannot be stabilized with
artificial totalizing schemes” (Best 338).84

Against these currencies, Jameson is a rare theorist today who attempts to revive
the concept of totality.85 In The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic
Act (1981), Jameson presents, by taking a hint from the Althusserian notion of History
or the Real as an “absent cause,” a paradoxical vision of totality as that which is the real
but is “not available for representation, any more than it is accessible in the form of
some ultimate truth” (55). According to him, history is an intelligible and meaningful
whole that can be grasped in its totality by a single “narrative” which functions in the
process of “transcoding” as the “mediation” between apparent separate phenomena and
the real totality underlying them (see 40). In other words, for Jameson, history is a route
towards emancipation, totality and utopia, and this “single great collective story,” which
reflects the “political unconscious,” can be well interpreted only by a particular
narrative (19). As well as diachronically, Jameson also employs narrative synchronically
so that “we can restore, at least methodologically, the lost unity of social life, and
demonstrate that widely distant elements of the social totality are ultimately part of the
same global historical process” (226). However, since totalizing thinking is never free
from the potential danger of overemphasizing systems or reducing complexity, the
problem here is whether it is possible to devise an open totality, which is contingent, in
process, and composed of differences, instead of a closed totality, which is
predetermined and finalized. By absorbing the poststructuralist critique of totality, Jameson has thus been paradoxically groping for a non-reductionist and non-essentialist version of totality that endures poststructuralist attack.\(^86\)

One of the reasons why Jameson defends totality so firmly is that, in his opinion, this concept plays a decisive role in relation to utopia, another object of his defence. Firstly, descriptive totality is the basis of “Utopian thinking” in that, once society is viewed from the perspective of totality, the necessity and content of an alternative plan come out spontaneously (see ST, 69-70).\(^87\) Secondly, and more importantly, normative totality is a necessary requirement for “the Utopian program” (see AF, 4-5). The question of what sort of utopia is to be realized is, after all, the question of what sort of totality is to be realized.\(^88\)

In his discussion of utopia, Jameson has addressed the issue of totality in a complex way, considering questions about how we should deal with anti-utopian fears, including those of totalitarianism and imperialism (AF, Part 1, Chapter 12), as well as how we can make a utopia with liberty, brushing away those fears, which can be traced back to “closure,” the formal condition of utopia (Chapter 13). While rejecting two contrasting tides typical of today—globalization (from commercialism to the Internet) and localism (political movements based on ethnicity)—Jameson shows a more positive interest in what can be called “federalism” (224), inspired by Robert Nozick’s pluralist notion of utopia as that which “consist[s] of utopias, of many different and divergent communities in which people lead different kinds of lives under different institutions” (217), as well as Yona Friedman’s proposal for a multiplicity of utopian communities, in
which “Utopias are not combined by way of the political [such as a world state] but related by the infrastructure, that is to say, by way of the globe itself and its materiality” (218-19). 89

The thinking of utopia can also be associated with his long-time theme of antinomies. In The Seeds of Time (1994), Jameson addresses the antinomies of the postmodern and deconstructs some of them in a postmodern way. For instance, he subverts the opposition of utopia and dystopia by insisting that “the most powerful arguments against Utopia are in reality Utopian ones, expressions of a Utopian impulse qui s’ignore” (54). In Archaeologies of the Future, Jameson also directs acute attention to antinomies incorporated in utopia (Chapter 10) 90 and proceeds with his discussion about how to deal with these dilemmas (Chapter 11). With reference to Louis Marin’s classic Utopiques (1973), he argues that “neutralization can be grasped as production, rather than as simple cancellation or effacement” (41), and that the antimonies must be “retained and sharpened, made more virulent, their incompatibility and indeed their incommensurability a scandal for the mind, but a scandal that remains vivid and alive, and that cannot be thought away, either by resolving it or eliminating it” (180).

3.2. Huxley’s Ideas of Utopia and Totality

Does the history of Marxist struggles with utopia and totality not offer any suggestions as to understanding Huxley’s road to presenting his eutopia? He himself was originally sceptical about utopian thinking, preferring satirical writing in despair at this world (see e.g., the last scene of Point Counter Point, which suggests the “Kingdom
of Heaven” is only allowed for hypocrites and fools), and later engaged in producing the ambiguously utopian *Brave New World* and the nightmarish *Ape and Essence*. Despite his utopian impulse, Huxley was so cautious in turning it into a utopian program that he waited about twenty years until *Island*. I would argue that the main theoretical reason for this difficulty was that he had to face the issue of utopia and totality.

Certainly, the concept of totality does not appear to fit well with the significant aspects of Huxley, which my study has thus far disclosed in the previous three chapters. His deconstruction of categories of identity, such as the psychological self (Chapter I), the feminine (Chapter II) and the savage/the civilized (Chapter III)—probably together with his empathy with solitary characters as well as his emphasis on the divided condition of this world or society (e.g., in *Point Counter Point*)—may seem to anticipate a postmodernist critique’s dislike of descriptive totality. On the other hand, his satire on imperialism and totalitarianism (particularly in *Brave New World*) must put the author on the same line with many critics wary of normative totality.

In fact, *Eyeless in Gaza* is a story of the author’s journey to not only utopian thinking but also a belief of totality. Anthony, or Huxley, has “live[d] irresponsibly” and enjoyed “liberty” (to “read his books,” “exercise his talents for sarcastic comment” and “sleep with any presentable woman”) by regarding himself, this world and history as “all nonsense or a joke” which is composed of fragmentary pieces without any form of totality (500-501; see also Chapters 11 and 26). Finally, his reflection of his life, as well as his activity with the masses, as mentioned before, brings him a conversion by which he becomes aware of “the totality of life and being,” which endorses “some
significance” to his life, the world and history: “And now at last it was clear, now by some kind of immediate experience he knew that the point was in the paradox, in the fact that unity was the beginning and unity the end, and that in the meantime the condition of life and all existence was separation” (501). In a descriptive sense, there is the “reality” of chronological and synchronic totality, in which everything is physically or mentally related to each other; but there is also a “reality of division” (497-99), which makes our “achievement” of totality in a normative sense “impossible” (see 501). For Huxley, pacifism is a utopian struggle for a normative totality, based on the reality of descriptive totality.

Huxley’s vision of totality is also reflected in the form of Eyeless in Gaza. For instance, the unchronological chapters seem incoherent at first glance, suggesting a fragmentary nature of the history of this world, but the above vision of totality leads to a discovery that the chapters are put in order, arranged by the author’s narrative. By making us reconstruct the story ourselves, Huxley uniquely lets us realize the fact that history is a meaningful story of phenomena, each of which is ultimately managed behind totality.

Although it seems that Huxley thereafter maintained the same sort of view of totality, the question remained unresolved as to how to achieve totality in a utopian program without anti-utopian fears such as that of totalitarianism. A result of his speculation on this issue can be found in his last novel, Island. As symbolized by the encounter of a British doctor and a Palanese Buddhist, as well as their and the citizens’ efforts to “make the best of all the worlds” to establish and keep a culturally hybrid
utopia (128-29; see also 220-21), this novel thematizes utopia, totality and antinomies.\textsuperscript{94}

It may be argued that Palanese totalizing thinking (a vision of descriptive totality) has contributed to their successful management of Pala as a place that is closest to a normative totality. Huxley’s utopia is a classless, pacifist and communitarian society where both economy and technology serve each person, unlike capitalist and state socialist countries outside (see 140-41). In Pala, totality is supported by the utopian attempt at neutralization or a rearrangement of antinomies: (in the Old Raja’s words) “All things, to all things / perfectly indifferent, / perfectly work together / in discord for a Good beyond” (30); “the reconciliation of yes and no lived out in total acceptance and the blessed experience of Not-Two” (38). The antinomies addressed in Pala contain those typical of utopia (as mentioned by Jameson) such as work and leisure (see I, 143-43), religion and science (see 178, 212, 220), and optimism and pessimism (see 117, 221); but it also questions or redefines many other antinomies, including those related to personal identity—e.g., self and other (see 34, 68, 76), man and woman (see 89, 96), and white and nonwhite (see 20).\textsuperscript{95} Only while taking Moksha or practising polished meditation, can all of these antinomies be perfectly neutralized or reconciled in a temporary utopia (see Chapter 15). In other words, even in the earthly paradise of Pala, the inhabitants usually need to make their own efforts to accomplish this paradoxically impossible mission, while trying to bring out the merit of each party of an antinomy, instead of eradicating one party (see 165).\textsuperscript{96}

Education has the important function of bringing the Palanese to the above way of thinking and lifestyle. Although originally “dualists” (88), children are trained at school
to view themselves, the world and history in an all-round manner through “the best-of-both worlds programme” (221), which covers various subjects from science to religion, but which always begins with “ecology” because of their educational policy: “Never give children a chance of imagining that anything exists in isolation. Make it plain from the very first that all living is relationship”; 97 “we always teach the science of relationship in conjunction with the ethics of relationship” (211).

Meanwhile, this utopia with totality also figures out several ways to save individual liberty and differences from the threat of totalitarianism or reductionism. Politically, Pala is “a federation of self-governing units, geographical units, professional units, economic units—so there’s plenty of scope for small-scale initiative and democratic leaders, but no place for any kind of dictator at the head of a centralized government” (146). In terms of the family system, Pala is a pluralist and changing utopia: everyone belongs to a Mutual Adoption Club (MAC) but is “allowed, is actively encouraged [. . .] to migrate to one of its other homes” and to bring “hybridization” to each club by repeated “adoption” (90-91). This can also serve as a measure against other anti-utopian fears, such as those of the repressiveness of the family system and the static or boring life of utopia (see Jameson AF, 184-188, 190-91, 206-10).98

How do we interpret the ending of Pala and Island? Pala is an enclave and has kept its totality or closure, partly thanks to geographical advantages, but it is eventually destroyed before spreading or totalizing its own virtues by the invasion of late capitalism or globalization, which may be called an evil form of totalization. Although the last scene may be read as implying “the sad fate of Huxley’s Island” (see Jameson
—as if to suggest the author’s eventual despair of utopian thinking and totality—I see it as the contrary. Huxley ends his narrative with the word “Attention,” after implicatively remarking: “The work of a hundred years destroyed in a single night. And yet the fact remained” (285-86). Yes, the fact remains that Pala really existed and Huxley narrated his utopia. By sacrificing itself, Pala tries to turn people’s “attention” to a normative totality, and this is the pacifist way of movement towards totalization, not an imperial way of it, as seen in many other utopias including those by Thomas More and H. G. Wells.99 By this ending, which is not the ending in a strict sense, Huxley closes his utopia not as a “closed” totality (not as “closure” in a spatial or textual sense) but rather as an “open” totality, by which he entrusts readers, namely us outside of Pala or the text, with the choice of whether to inherit, develop or simply reject his utopia.

Despite his avowed dislike of Marxism, Huxley, in the same way as Jameson, who appears to have little interest in Huxley either, evaluates utopian thinking and searches for a practicable version of totality, recognizing the realities of separation and the danger of totalization. This may offer a hint that we can understand the significance of Huxley’s utopia not so much as by comparing it with the theories of his Marxist contemporaries (let alone of Marx himself) but by putting it in Marxist discussion of our time, as presented by Jameson. What is more, Huxley, in terms of his utopian thinking, may go beyond Jameson, probably the most influential Marxist thinker of utopia, in that, compared with Jameson, Huxley conceives of utopia with his acute wariness of centralization, his positive employment of the religious and his perspectives of ecology and cultural hybridity, as well as his equal treatment of economy with other aspects of
this world.\textsuperscript{100}

It is impossible to overemphasize the impact of Huxley’s work on utopian literature and thought. Although a strong image of \textit{Brave New World} has never released the author from being compared with the “utopian” Wells or the “anti-utopian” Zamyatin and Orwell—indeed, Huxley has contributed to a genre of science fiction with this novel and \textit{Ape and Essence—Island} may be worthy of more attention in terms of recounting a positive utopia or eutopia. With the characteristics discussed above, not least the anti-imperial, ecological and culturally hybrid aspects, Huxley’s eutopia is probably one of the forerunners of today’s influential utopian works, including those of Ursula K. Le Guin.\textsuperscript{101} Huxley’s paradoxical presentation of eutopia—which he himself destroys, leaving its fate in \textit{our} hands—may be regarded as anticipating recent streams of utopian work, such as the “critical utopia,” through which authors—in instead of showing readers a self-sufficient or closed vision of utopia, conceived entirely by the authors themselves—aim to provide readers with an open debate or thinking itself in order to direct their realities towards utopia.\textsuperscript{102}

4. Conclusion

Stimulated by his hope for an empathy with the masses and his doubts about the class system, both of which had been suggested in his early work, Huxley in the 1930s more positively began to approach or relate himself to the masses under the influence of his encounters with them, through facing the severe realities of their lives “Abroad in England” as well as joining the PPU campaign as a mass movement. His wishes for a
peaceful world where everyone lives happily drove Huxley into his engagement with social and political activity, as reflected in his writings, such as *Brave New World*, which can be interpreted as unsparingly revealing the stupidity of the class system, *Eyeless in Gaza*, the story of an intellectual’s development into a utopian believer in the “unity” of human beings regardless of nationality or class, and *Ends and Means*, a more concrete proposal of what and how we should do to establish a society in accordance with this idealism. In an elitist manner, Huxley was certainly interested in large-scale, top-down planning, but as these writings show, he calmly maintained a certain distance from Russia or state socialism, unlike quite a few of his intellectual contemporaries.

Despite his work for Hollywood from the late 1930s—which was, in a sense, another series of his encounters with the masses—Huxley does not appear to have filled his emotional gap between himself and the masses, refraining from being directly involved in any political movement. This period, the 1940s and 1950s, may be regarded as that of his escape from reality, but actually it was a period of his preparation to take a different approach to it. Controversial aspects of the later Huxley, such as his interest in religions, meditation and drugs, can be better understood if re-positioned in the context of his search for bonds with the masses—i.e., a utopian impulse towards the “unity” of people in some utopian program. This view is endorsed by his last novel, *Island*, where Huxley—while showing how to achieve a practicable utopia with mass happiness—grasps a character modelled on himself as a member of the masses (though no one in this utopia can be categorized into the masses in a strict sense, inasmuch as they live with not just their sense of unity with each other but their each unique characteristics)
and leaves the future of this utopia in the hands of readers, namely the masses. The above development of Huxley’s attitude towards the masses cannot be explained by the image stressed in some studies of Huxley as the defender of the leisured class or aristocracy.

We have also reconsidered Huxley’s later idea of utopia in relation to current Marxist theories. One of the theoretical issues in producing utopia today is how to grasp totality, a concept that has been recently exposed to a postmodernist attack on its being (potentially) involved in reductionism and totalitarianism. However, some critics, such as Jameson, realize that the rejection of totality might lead to the rejection of meaning in the world, history or life, and thus are groping for an un-reductionist form of open totality. As the previous three chapters have already unveiled, Huxley anticipated a postmodernist way of questioning identity, while also directing his acute scepticism towards totality from his position of liberalism. However, the present chapter has demonstrated that Huxley, too, was aware of the probability that such an attitude would deprive meanings of the world, history and life, and this finally prompted him to conceive both practicable versions of utopia and totality to relieve anti-utopian fears of reductionism and totalitarianism. In this sense, it could be argued that Huxley, a less popular modernist writer, actually shared some significant aspects of (post-) postmodern discussion of utopia, presented by the Marxist Jameson and others. Undoubtedly, Huxley’s apparently personal wanderings through the concept of identity, which we have followed in the four chapters, may thus be compared with our own wanderings today.
About Limbo, Nicholas Murray states that “the working classes were not Huxley’s field” (118). Given Trevenen’s suicide, which could be traced back to his unrequited love for a housemaid, a class issue was probably somewhat traumatic for Aldous Huxley.


In the present chapter, I use the word “utopia” for nowhere of any sort and a text that describes it. Following the custom, I employ this term rather than “eutopia” and “dystopia,” unless I especially intend to indicate only positive or negative utopia. This can be said for their derivatives. In my theoretical debate mainly in the latter part of this chapter, I also adopt Fredric Jameson’s phrases such as “utopian thinking,” “utopian program,” “utopian impulse” and “anti-utopian fears,” in accordance with his usage; thus, “utopia[n]” refers to “eutopia[n].”

David Bradshaw is the first scholar who pays due attention to Huxley’s essays on “Abroad in England” to address hidden aspects of Huxley, particularly his compassion for the masses (see his introduction to The Hidden Huxley [1994]). However, it is worth having a look at a dissenting opinion presented by Jerome Meckier’s review (1996).

In February 1931, during those tours, Huxley and Maria met Virginia Woolf (see Woolf’s Diary IV, 11-12). Alice Wood mentions the influence of this meeting on Woolf’s late criticism, especially six journalistic articles for the British edition of Good Housekeeping magazine (1931-32). Comparing Huxley’s “The Victory of Art over Humanity” and Woolf’s “The Docks of London,” Wood finds in both essays Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism and indicates their differences: “Rather than looking outwards to discuss the global economies of trade [as Huxley does], Woolf’s essay instead turns inwards to provide an implicit commentary on the female consumer’s role in the sourcing and production of
With respect to adult education, the Grith Fyrd camp may be seen as a practical utopia, or an experiment of this: “Grith Fyrd was a utopian movement with a strong sense of practicability. Its members wished to construct an alternative world, not simply in order to criticise the present order, but in order that they might learn how to be a different kind of person, relating with one another in a different kind of way. Its demise was probably inscribed in this very demanding mission” (Field 163).

The series of Huxley’s essays on “Alien Englands” are reminiscent of the work of George Orwell, a contemporary writer whom Huxley taught at Eton and who also reported on the living and working conditions of labourers, discussing issues of the English class system. There are certainly several points shared by both authors. Just as Huxley declares that “in no country of the West are they [class barriers] so high as in England (“AE,” AHCEIII, 264), “England is,” Orwell states, “the most class-ridden country under the sun” (The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius [1941], E, 303). Whilst Huxley, watching people working in a coal mine, has to realize that “the marvels of our civilisation” are supported by “the body of man that has laboriously created the underworld of the coal-mine” (“SSAE,” AHCEIII, 278), a visit to a coal mine in Northern England gives Orwell a similar impression: “it is the miners who are driving your car forward. Their lamp-lit world down there is as necessary to the daylight world above as the root is to the flower” (The Road to Wigan Pier [1937], 30). In the same way that Huxley does not hide an upper-middle-class prejudice about the bad smell of the working class (see PCP, EG), referring to “a faint persistent smell” in a dock (“VAH,” AHCEIII, 288), so Orwell frankly confesses: “That was what we were taught—the lower classes smell” (RWP, 119). Furthermore, Huxley—who finds “benevolence” and “kindness” in the poor, something lost from the rich’s lives—directs our attention to the “[h]umanity and decency” as seen in a lodging house for destitute women (“WG,” AHCEIII, 415, 417) and to the true form of a “communistic” life in a camp for unemployed people. In “a working-class home,” Orwell also detects “a warm, decent, deeply human atmosphere” as shared by few
upper-middle-class homes (RWP, 107-08), and insists that “a working man” is “a truer Socialist than the orthodox Marxist, because he does remember, what the other so often forgets, that Socialism means justice and common decency” (164-64). In contrast to Huxley, Orwell originally had acute awareness concerning class issues, probably because of the ambiguity of his having been born into “the lower-upper-middle class” (RWP, 113). Orwell was also an avowed “democratic socialist” and such a journalistic writer that he, after writing about Northern England, reported the realities of the Spanish Civil War. Despite these differences, the influence of Huxley may be seen in Orwell’s non-fiction, such as The Road to Wigan Pier, where he mentions Huxley three times (see 100, 180, 188). Of course, compared to Orwell, who walked as a vagrant in slums and stayed under the same roof with families of the lower classes, Huxley in principle remained a passing “tourist” with “curiosity” (see “AE,” AHCEIII, 264; “SSAE,” AHCEIII, 278).

8 See also Huxley’s “Anthropology and Social Reform” (1935).

9 For a discussion on the names of Brave New World characters, see Meckier, “Onomastic Satire: Names and Naming in Brave New World” (2004), rpt. in AHMSNI, Chapter 12.

10 Other examples of Marxist criticism of Brave New World follow. In The English Utopia (1952), the Marxist historian A. L. Morton, tracing utopia in English literature, positions Brave New World and Ape and Essence as representing “the lowest depths to which the new genre of anti-utopias could fall” (273). In his view, Huxley fails to see “the false politics of capitalism,” and instead attacks the idea of Humanism, believing “in human wickedness, in original sin” (258, 272). After all, “Huxley is unable to understand that a socialist society is a form of movement in which each individual is able to reach his highest potentialities in his relation to other individuals” (259). Theoretical criticism appears in Adorno’s essay, “Aldous Huxley and Utopia” (1951, included in Prisms). In his opinion, the serious problem with this novel is the “crude alternative of objective meaning and subjective happiness [or a choice between individualism and a totalitarian world-state], conceived as mutually exclusive” (111, 116), by which
Huxley “provides a pretext for the strengthening of domination” (113), instead of showing “a praxis which could explode the infamous continuum” (116). Huxley’s arguments that human beings are “not yet ready for socialism” and that “if they no longer had to work, they wouldn’t know what to do with their time” remind Adorno of “the member of the upper middle class who solemnly insists that it is not in his own interest but in that of all mankind that he advocates the continuance of a profit economy” (115). It is a bunch of nonsense to have too much “concern for the calamity that a realized utopia could inflict on mankind,” taking no note of “the real and far more urgent calamity” such as “hunger and distress” (115-16).

11 Since the early 1930s Huxley was involved in the Political and Economic Planning (PEP), the Federation of Progressive Societies and Individuals (FPSI), and the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL), though his dedication to them is far less than that to the Peace Pledge Union, stated later (see Bradshaw, “The Flight from Gaza: Aldous Huxley’s Involvement with the Peace Pledge Union in the Context of His Overall Intellectual Development” [1994], 11).

12 Something like a eutopian nature of Brave New World emerges in Bradshaw’s reading, where the World Controller Mond, John’s opponent in the climax of the story, plays a role “as Huxley’s ideological spokesman” (“HS,” 161).

13 Furthermore, as Chapter III indicated, from an anthropological viewpoint, both the upper and lower castes have similar customs (see BNW, 97). Considering that during his wandering into “Abroad in England” he held uncomfortable feelings about the class “barriers” exaggerated by “education,” Huxley in Brave New World appears to satirize it, especially when he envisages that children not only receive educations of different qualities according to the castes to which they belong (see 140) but also are, in advance, “conditioned” into having “Class Consciousness” through hypnopædia, which repeatedly exposes them to such a voice: “Delta Children wear khaki. Oh no, I don’t want to play with Delta children. And Epsilons are still worse. They’re too stupid to be able to read or write. Besides they wear
black, which is such a beastly colour. I’m so glad I’m a Beta” (22; see also 64). One might level other objections at some of the above-cited criticisms (see note 10). Contrary to Morton’s rash judgment, Huxley, as his “Alien Englands” essays suggest, does not deny the essence of socialism. Instead, he shares with Morton the ideal image of a socialist society where people can exert their “potentialities” (see note 57); the brunt of Huxley’s attack in Brave New World is actually directed at capitalist and socialist countries, equally. On the other hand, Adorno—who is actually a good reader of Huxley’s works, including Eyeless in Gaza (see Adorno’s letters to Walter Benjamin, 15 October 1936 and 15 April 1937, Lonitz 57, 174)—provides a finer analysis. His complaints about Brave New World (regarding the simple binary opposition and lack of an alternative plan) are more to the point and more relevant to Huxley’s more mature ideas.

14 Although Huxley “cannot provide a plan of action for us,” it is “nonetheless important. [. . .] Ethical socialists advance a very different view of evolutionary change to those of the scientific socialists. Huxley’s theory puts him in direct opposition to Shaw, who argues that only the natural leaders in society are capable of achieving progress, and to Wells, who emphasises communality at the expense of individuality” (Ingle, Narratives of British Socialism [2002], 105).

15 Miller’s “anthropology” is not the same as anthropology in general but rather develops a ‘humanitarian’ aspect of anthropology that Huxley satirizes in Brave New World, as discussed in Chapter III. Miller’s anthropology is also different from Helen’s husband Hugh Ledwidge’s purely academic “ethnology” (see EG, Chapter 45): “To Hugh Ledwidge’s museum-bound ethnography, which liberates him from actuality to become the author of a nauseating novel of spiritualized love, is opposed Miller’s arduous field anthropology, a true science of man rooted in human experience, not in abstractions”(Woodcock 168).

See also MacClancy 75-76.

16 In January 1932, Ada Chesterton asked Huxley to join the council of the Community Theatre, and Huxley replied that he would do so with pleasure (see his letter to Chesterton, 31 January 1932, Smith
In August 1939, Chesterton also reported from Moscow for *The Spectator*: “The Soviet has a keen appreciation of foreign writers of all schools and creeds. The most popular at the moment is Aldous Huxley, not only among authors. He is also appreciated by students and the intelligentsia” (“The Author and the Soviet” [1939], 175).

As possible sources for Miller, the following candidates have been listed: Gerald Heard, Dick Sheppard (both are mentioned later), F. M. Alexander (a therapist whose technique is well known and cited in *Eyeless in Gaza*), J. E. R. McDonagh (a surgeon who recommended to Huxley colonic irrigation and a vegetarian diet) and Theodore Pennell (a doctor who in the 1890s used non-violent techniques in his dealings with American Indians) (see Bedford 320; Woodcock 166; Eros 103-05; Poller DFAD, 136).

“After remarkable sea change in Huxley’s outlook occurs after he dedicates himself to pacifism in the autumn of 1935. [. . .] Huxley’s decision to join Sheppard’s Peace Movement was to prove the pivotal event of his life” (Bradshaw “FG,” 11). For a recent study on *Eyeless in Gaza* in pacifist movement contexts, see e.g., Charles Andrews, “Pledging Peace in Aldous Huxley’s *Eyeless in Gaza*” (2012). While Huxley was preparing *An Encyclopaedia of Pacifism* (1937, a revised and enlarged version appeared in Chapter 9 of *Ends and Means*), Maria was “busy with a thousand errands, helping to set up some of the practical work that members were undertaking such as looking after destitute local families or released prisoners or guaranteeing maintenance to Jewish refugees” (Bedford 328-29).

For Huxley’s relationships with these three pacifists, see Bradshaw “FG.” For Heard’s pacifism, including his involvement with the PPU, see Alison Falby, *Between the Pigeonholes: Gerald Heard, 1889-1971* (2008), Chapter 4. For Heard’s influence of Huxley’s pacifism, see e.g., Paul Eros, “‘A Sort of Mutt and Jeff’: Gerald Heard, Aldous Huxley, and the New Pacifism” (2001). For Sheppard’s pacifist work with Huxley, see Carolyn Scott, *Dick Sheppard: A Biography* (1977), Chapters 16 and 17. Another influential pacifist for Huxley was the Dutch anarcho-pacifist Bart de Light, whose *The Conquest of Violence* (1937) contributed to the spread in Europe of Gandhian pacifism, together with Gregg’s book
(see Goodway 226-27).


21 Huxley realizes that, because of “education,” especially “the kind of discipline that produces a militaristic mentality, at once obedient and domineering,” “the members of the middle and upper classes are still, on the whole, more bellicose than the members of the working class” (*AHCEIV*, 270).

22 Many interesting pamphlets are preserved in the British Library (title: Miscellaneous pamphlets and leaflets, author: Peace Pledge Union). For example, *You Coward! Dialogue Between Stuart Gelder and His Wife* (1936) deconstructs the word “cowardice” through a readable dialogue between an imaginary couple. *From War To Peace: A Story of Some Very Stupid People Who Came to Their Senses* (1936) preaches pacifism in a once-upon-a-time story. In *To Mothers Especially* (1937), Vera Brittain, as a mother of two children, calls out to other mothers to support pacifism. *1066 and All That* (1937) has a strange title but this is the answer to the question “WHEN did we last fight for a War on British soil?,” and discloses people’s paranoid mentality regarding war.

23 Bradshaw also states: “Huxley praised the Soviet Five Year Plan as ‘the most significant example of a social experiment’ [cited from “Science of Politics?” (1933)] and lauded a gung-ho account of it [M. Ilin’s *New Russia’s Primer* (1930)] as ‘not merely interesting; it is exciting’ [cited from “A Soviet School Book?”] (Bradshaw “HS,” 159). However, in the former essay, Huxley carefully adds: “At least a century will have to pass before anyone can decide how far experiment has confirmed the soundness of Lenin’s or Mussolini’s theories” (*AHCEIII*, 161-62); in the latter essay, he, identifying communism with religion, curtly predicts that its “spirit” will not continue for very long (309).

24 Indeed, Huxley repeatedly exhibits the same dissatisfaction with Marxism or Russia, insisting that
human beings and history cannot be fully explained only by economics, which needs to be supplemented by other perspectives such as psychology (see, chronologically, “Ideals and the Machine Tool” [1931], AHCEIII, 294; “The Problem of Pleasure” [1932], AHCEIII, 338-39; “Psychological Dividends” [1933], AHCEIII, 357; “The Interpretation of History” [1936], AHCEIV, 127-30).

25 See also “Babies—State Property” (1930), AHCEIII, 231; “The New Romanticism,” Music at Night (1931), AHCEIII, 251-52. As stated in the next section, Proudhon’s ideas are adopted in Huxley’s Island.

26 As late as 2005, the proceedings of the conference were published as Pour la défense de la culture: Les textes du Congrès international des écrivains, Paris, juin 1935 (ed. Sandra Teroni and Wolfgang Klein). Although the congress “has often been presented as a sorry example of the relations between Communism and the intellectuals” (it is said that Moscow is behind an initiative “which seeks to consolidate control over Communist intellectuals”), the proceedings show that the congress “happened in many ways despite Moscow” and that “the many speeches and discussions at the Mutualite display diversity of opinion” (Bowd 119).

27 Eyeless in Gaza has several characters with socialist or communist ideas, but all of them appear to experience some setbacks or despair. Anthony, Brian and Mark are all members of the Oxford Fabian Society. When visiting his girlfriend Joan’s home, which is a working family, Brian can only hesitate for the atmosphere, getting a “feeling of moral discomfort,” instead of anything like empathy with them (203). Beppo, a homosexual communist, seems to eventually become just an egoist who exploits young men of the working class as the object of his sexual desire (see 382-83).

28 As early as 1931, Huxley might have held a similar impression when he saw and talked with a butchery worker: “My young Jewish friend was a communist, and did not forget the fact even when he was discussing books. For example, he judged D. H. Lawrence by the standards of Marxism and found him wanting” (“GLL,” AHCEIII, 300-01).

29 Although Huxley planned to join Julian’s Russian trip, his re-writing of Brave New World, which took
longer than expected, made it impossible (see his letters to Julian, 17 May 1931 and 27 May 1931, Smith 256, 348-49). Of course, many published materials on Russia were available to Huxley. For example, he agreed with Yevgeny Zamyatin’s article about the future of literature in *Le Mois* (“New World Drama” [1932], *AHCEIII*, 336-37) and appreciated P. S. Romanov’s *Three Pairs of Silk Stockings* (also referring to his *Without Cherry Blossom*) as “the most real and convincing account of life in Russia” (letter to Leonard Huxley, 24 August 1931, Smith 352). Huxley was also probably influenced by unidentified people engaged with the organizations that he joined, such as Political Economic Planning (PEP) and the Society for Cultural Relations Between the Peoples of the British Commonwealth and the USSR (see Bradshaw “FG,” 155-160).

30 On his return, Julian recorded his vivid admiration: “The technique and the very idea of large-scale planning [. . .]—in these and many other ways the new Russia, even in its present embryo stage of development, is in advance of other countries: and if the rest of the world refuses to learn from the object-lesson provided by Russia, as well as profiting by her mistakes, so much the worst for the rest of the world.” In 1970, however, Julian corrected this by mentioning the deficiencies dissatisfying him, such as “the absence of free speech,” and by stating that, on his second visit in 1945, all of his “fears proved justified” (*MI*, 201; see also Chapter 19 of the same volume).

31 Mitchison only published some extracts from this diary under the title of “Pages from a Russian Diary” in *Modern Scot*, 3 (October 1932). Pages 246-52 of the diary are also printed as an appendix (209-15) in Helen Lloyd’s doctoral dissertation, *Witness to a Century: The Autobiographical Writings of Naomi Mitchison* (2005).

32 “I feel they have solved, or nearly solved, the sex question which has preoccupied us for so many years, simply giving women complete economic freedom and equality” (Mitchison’s diary, 251, rpt. in Lloyd 214). As Jenni Calder remarks, Mitchison was encouraged in Russia by the fact that there seemed to be “no conflict between socialism and feminism” (112).
For Mitchison’s ideological and personal relationship with the feminine and the maternal, see Chapter II, Section 3.

Here, Mitchison has *News from Nowhere* (1890) in mind. This sounds a little strange because, in that work, Morris idealizes maternal instinct and motherhood (including contractions), while flatly rejecting feminist arguments for women’s liberation (see Chapter 9), to which Mitchison subscribed. Not theoretically but rather intuitively, she may have been attracted to a socialist revolution: “Above all I felt that in a fairer world people would become automatically nicer, all social intercourse would be happier and easier” (*YMWA*, 191-92).

In March 1931, Cynthia left the Labour Party for the New Party, which Oswald formed. According to a letter from the poet Robert Nichols to the neurologist Henry Head (qtd. in Bradshaw “HS,” 154), Huxley saw Cynthia at least once before or in February 1931.

What Huxley wrote in his reply to Cynthia Mosley’s accounts of Russia is not known. There remains, however, an unpublished letter from Huxley to her (26 September 1931) in which he states that he “should very much like to know your [her] views on the situation & your [her] plans,” while attacking “a few of the old politicians who have landed us [them] in this mess by their criminal negligence” (Birmingham University Special Collections, OMD/1/1/2/2). This letter suggests that Huxley paid some attention to Cynthia’s political opinions, and that he was also interested in her husband’s political potential and planning, prompted by his disappointment in parliamentary democracy (see Bradshaw “HS,” 154-55; his introduction to *HH*, xvii-xviii).

In 1936, for example, Huxley positively associated pacifism with socialism: “The pacifist must aim at getting rid of militarism everywhere. This means, that in the economic sphere, his goal must be socialism” (“100,000 Say No!,” 79; see also *EG*, 335).

Huxley’s writing is contrasted not only with these works by Mitchison and Julian but also with many other positive accounts of Russia by contemporary intellectuals, such as *Stalin-Wells Talk: The Verbatim*.
Record and a Discussion (1934)—an interview with Joseph Stalin by H. G. Wells, George Bernard Shaw, J. M. Keynes and so on—and Soviet Communism: A New Civilization (1937) by Sydney and Beatrice Webb. In his negative view of Russia, Huxley synchronized with (and thus may have been influenced by) Heard, who made his anti-Russian attitude clear (see Falby 58-59).

39 It is well known that his screenplay for Disney’s animation, Alice in Wonderland, was rejected in 1951.

40 In Tom Dardis’s view, Huxley “left a small legacy of two absolutely first-rate screenplays [Pride and Prejudice and Jane Eyre]”: “Despite his chronic bad health, near-blindness, and own avowed lack of dramatic sense, his high degree of success as a screenwriter was astonishing” (215). A more positive view of Huxley’s involvement with Hollywood can be seen in Aldous Huxley and Film (1987) by Virginia M. Clark (see also Meckier’s dissenting review [1988]). In terms of biographical interest, the minutest account of Huxley’s relationship with films is still David King Dunaway’s Huxley in Hollywood, where Huxley never seems to be satisfied with the film industry and vice versa.

41 However, during this period Huxley certainly deepened his understanding of ecology, which he would further explore in his last novel. Dana Sawyer remarks that in Science, Liberty and Peace (1946) and Themes and Variations (1950) Huxley was “prescient in assessing the impact of environmental catastrophes on the human population—anticipating the interrelationship between environmental crises and economic globalization” (“BNWV,” 222).

42 In Brave New World Revisited (1958), Huxley states: “We are far indeed from Jefferson’s ideal of a genuinely free society composed of a hierarchy of self-governing units—‘the elementary republics of the wards, the country republics, the State republics and the Republics of the Union, forming a gradation of authorities’” (AHCEVI, 233). Discussing Huxley’s major writings including After Many a Summer, Brian Smith highlights several points of similarity between Huxley and Thomas Jefferson, though the former is more pessimistic than the latter in terms of the future of the world and of human beings (see “Jeffersonian Reminders: Aldous Huxley on Property, Happiness, and Freedom” [2011]).
The booklet is unpaginated. The questions were based on Cunard’s firm belief: “It is clear to many of us throughout the whole world that now, as certainly never before, we are determined or compelled, to take sides.” Of the 148 answers, she classified 126 as the support for the Republic (e.g., W. H. Auden, Samuel Beckett, C. Day Lewis, Havelock Ellis, Ford Madox Ford, Naomi Mitchison, John Middleton Murry, Rebecca West, Leonard Woolf), 16 as neutral (e.g., Vera Brittain, T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, H. G. Wells) and 5 for Franco (e.g., Evelyn Waugh).

In a similar way, Brittain, another sponsor of PPU, answers: “As an uncompromising pacifist, I hold war to be a crime against humanity, whoever fights it and against whoever it is fought.” As a consequence of Huxley’s seemingly positive mention of the anarchists, Emma Goldman, an American anarchist and feminist, contacted Huxley to sponsor the SIA (Solidaridad Internacional Antifascista [International Anti-Fascist Solidarity]), only to find his reluctance to join her activities (see Goodway 227-30).

Just when he was writing After Many a Summer, Huxley refused his friend’s proposal for a statement deploring the treatment of Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe, because he thought: “Expressions of generalized opinions, outbursts of indignation and the like don’t seem to me to fulfil any very useful purpose” (letter to Jacob. I. Zeitlin, 19 November 1938, Smith 439). Yet he wrote an introduction to They Still Draw Pictures (1938) to raise a little extra money, and also sent his limited funds to Germany to help two political exiles emigrate (see the same letter; see also Dunaway HHI, 110).

See Bell, “Notes for a Memoir,” JB 19; see also his letter to Vanessa Bell, 1 October 1936, JB, 159; “On Roger Fry—A Letter to A.,” JB 260-62. See also Peter Stansky and William Abrahams, Julian Bell: From Bloomsbury to the Spanish Civil War (2012), 64, 105.

For details on Bell’s decision to go to Spain, his death and the responses of his family and others, see Stansky 226-53, Chapter 5. Virginia Woolf’s Three Guineas (1938) is also “in many ways a posthumous discussion with Julian” (Stansky 258).
48 In the company of Eustace, an individualist who adheres to his “self,” Bruno feels despair: “Out of ten thousand only one would ever break out of his carapace completely [i.e., improve oneself]” (87); “One doesn’t have to catch the infection of goodness, if one doesn’t want to. The will is always free” (89); “resurrection is optional” (92).

49 In *Time Must Have a Stop*, Huxley repeatedly attacks the past and present states of actual politics, especially its violence—such as imperialism, religious wars, totalitarianism and the Second World War (see 112, and Chapters 20 and 30)—and makes Sebastian realize his indirect responsibility for mass unhappiness (244), while rejecting Eustace’s individualistic position. However, Huxley insistently shows no expectation of a direct political approach to the world situation; John, Sebastian’s father, for example, turns out to be a dogmatic, inhuman socialist who finally arrives at “the conviction that political principles [. . .] were almost irrelevant to the real problem,” i.e., “the present miseries of India—the Bengal famine, the pandemic of malaria, the prisons crowded with the men and women at whose side a few years before, he himself had fought for swaraj” (259). Meanwhile, the unhappiness that is later brought upon members of the family who have benefited through imperial exploitation, can be read as a criticism of rampant capitalism.

50 This sense of despair was shared by his non-fictional writing, *The Devils of Loudun* (1952), where Huxley focuses on the collective madness of human beings through narrating a real case of sexual hysteria in seventeenth-century France—the case in which a young priest was burned at the stake on a charge of his league with the devil. Huxley clearly considered the contemporary totalitarian atmosphere not only of communist countries but also of America with McCarthyism.

51 See e.g., Thomas Mann’s letter to Ida Herz, 21 March 1954, rpt. in Watt 394-95.

52 In February 1940, Huxley collected material for a utopian novel but this was not completed (Smith 16). Meanwhile, he worked on *Grey Eminence*, a biography of Father Joseph (François Leclerc du Tremblay), the French monk and advisor to Cardinal Richelieu. Huxley traces the tragedy of contemporary politics
back to Father Joseph’s mistake in committing himself to power politics and encouraging others to fight
for the unity of his nation (which in his view was God’s will), although Huxley admits that this monk
succeeded to some extent in mystic experience.

53 For Huxley’s confession of his difficulties writing about a positive utopia, see “Monitor” (1958).

54 See also Palanese people’s criticism of contemporary communist states such as China and Russia (91,
96, 201).

55 Among Marx’s writings, Palanese life may particularly evoke the famous image of human life after the
abolition of the division of labour as presented in German Ideology (1932, written with Engels c. 1846,
trans. 1938): “in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can
become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it
possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon,
rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter,
fisherman, shepherd or critic” (KMFE CW5, 47). Such a way of life is experienced by Robert, who is
engaged with not only “intellectual work” (such as medical treatment and politics) but also “muscle
work” (such as “digging and delving”) not as “part of his duties” but “part of his pleasure.” This lifestyle
effectively keeps Palanese people both physically and mentally healthy (142-43).

56 Jake Poller remarks that Huxley was probably “thinking of [Madame] Blavatsky when, in Island, he
created the character of the Rani, a corpulent theosophist who receives astral communications from the
Master Koot Hoomi” (“GI,” 130). A deeper analysis of this point can be found in Meckier, “Enemies of
Utopia: Young Krishnamurti and Madame Blavatsky” (2012).

57 “Human potentialities” is one of Huxley’s favourite phrases in his later work and is relevant to his
vision of eutopian society (see note 71). In “Human Potentialities” (1961), he writes: “Ancient and
modern, the two babies are indistinguishable. Each of them contains all the potentialities of the particular
breed of human being to which he or she happens to belong. But the adults into whom the babies will
grow are profoundly dissimilar; and they are dissimilar because in one of them very few, and in the other a good many, of the baby’s inborn potentialities have been actualized” (417). Huxley then discusses the ways of actualizing these potentialities. For more details on this notion, see e.g., Bernfried Nugel, “Aldous Huxley’s Plea for Desirable Human Potentialities: Some Unknown Late Comments (1961-63)” (2012).

58 Proudhon, too, expected the working class to behave as people with subjectivity and responsibility, idealizing a form of self-government rather than centralization (see e.g., On the Political Capacity of the Working Class [1865]). He argued for a limited right to private property (see What is Property? [1840]) and was one of the forerunners of anarcho-pacifism (see War and Peace [1861]). Like his rival, Marx, Proudhon is very critical of belief or religion (see e.g., General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century [1851]).

59 For a classic study of Huxley’s interest in Eastern religions, see B. L. Chakoo, Aldous Huxley and Eastern Wisdom (1981); for a more recent one, including an analysis of the influence of Western mysticism on Huxley, see Poller’s doctoral dissertation, especially Chapters 4 and 5.

60 As a possible jacket for Island, Huxley proposed “some Chinese or Japanese rendering of rocks in water, suggestive of an island,” as well as Van Gogh’s “Fields under Storm-clouds” (letter to Ian Parsons, 19 January 1962, Smith 928). Though apparently far less interested in Japanese than Indian cultures, and despite his negative descriptions of Japan (see Jesting Pilate, AHCEII, 540-45), Huxley in one of his early essays wrote about the Japanese Buddhist monk Ekai Kawaguchi (see “Tibet” [1923], AHCEI, 419-21; the name “Kawaguchi” is given to a scientist in Brave New World). In the 1950s, Huxley mentioned not just Suzuki’s books but Zen in English Literature and Oriental Thought (1942) by R. H. Blyth (see Huxley’s letters to Mrs Elise Murrell, 4 November 1951, Smith 638-39; to Dr Roger Godel, 23 December 1951, Smith 639). Blyth was an English scholar who lived the latter part of his life in Japan, becoming one of Suzuki’s dear friends, and who discussed Huxley in A Survey of English Literature (1957) (see
362-63). Huxley also appreciated the image of nature in Chinese and Japanese art, including Bashō’s haiku, which in his view anticipated Wordsworth’s attitude towards nature, i.e., the idea that a “bridge of living substance links man with the material world” (HS, 44-45).

61 See Huxley’s letters to Hubert Benoit, 3 February 1950, Smith 618; to Philippe Dumaine, 3 September 1950, Smith 533-34; to Dr Humphry Osmond, 1 June 1957, Smith 825; to Mrs Lucille Kahn, 8 August 1961, Smith 918; see also the bibliography of *The Perennial Philosophy*, 306. On the other hand, Suzuki mentioned the following works by Huxley: *Brave New World*, *The Perennial Philosophy*, *The Devils of Loudun*, *The Doors of Perception*, *Heaven and Hell* and the dramatized *Gioconda Smile* (see “Toyo wa Sekaibunka ni Nani wo Kouken Shiuru ka” [1948], *SDZ33*, 234; *Toyoteki na Mikata* [1953], *SDZ20*, 222; “Yomigaeru Toyo” [1954], *SDZ21*, 331; “Amerika no Sakkon” [1955], *SDZ34*, 97; *Daisetsu Tsurezure Gusa* [1966], *SDZ20*, 337; letters to an unknown recipient, March 1949, *SDZ37*, 210; to Lunsford P. Yandell, 30 September 1959, *SDZ38*, 171; “English Diaries IV. 1950 to 1951,” 36; “English Diaries IX. 1952 to 1953,” 48. Suzuki also enjoyed a friendship and corresponded with the philosopher Alan Watts, a friend of Huxley.

62 See also Suzuki’s letter to Fukuzawa (sic), 7 December 1955, *SDZ38*, 284.

63 See Suzuki, “EDIV,” 6-7, 78; “EDIX,” 3; “English Diaries X. 1954 to 1955,” 31; see also *SDZ40*, 196, 211, 245. In letters, Huxley recollected his meetings with Suzuki as follows: “I saw dear old Dr. Suzuki the other day and had a very pleasant and instructive talk with him” (to Dr Roger Godel, cited above, Smith 639; see the letter to Murrell, cited above, Smith 638); “I also saw dear old Suzuki in New York. What a really wonderful old man!” (letter to Dr Humphry Osmond, cited above, Smith 825).

64 For example, in the above-mentioned letter to Murrell, Huxley devoted more space to Suzuki than the news of his first grandchild: “He is a little old Japanese of more than eighty, [. . .] with an extraordinary charm and gentleness. I saw him once a year ago, and was greatly taken by him, would like very much to talk with him again” (Smith 638).
In an article, Suzuki makes the same sort of comment, believing that social progress, both in the East and the West, largely depends on the activity of socialism (see “Shakaiminshuto no Ketto Kinshi ni Tsukite: Shakai-shugi no Shukyoteki Kiban” [1901, “On the Prohibition of the Formation of the Social Democratic Party: The Religious Foundations of Socialism”], SDZ30, 266).

See the introduction and the seventh lecture of his Nihon no Reiseika (1947, The Spiritualization of Japan, included in SDZ8). Suzuki was especially interested in the “RENUNCIATION OF WAR,” Article 9: (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. The same sort of pacifism is declared in the preamble, too. These fit with Pala’s renunciation of the war and army. Suzuki wrote several essays on war and peace, which are mostly gathered in volume 33 of Suzuki Daisetsu Zenshu. For a detailed analysis of Suzuki’s attitude towards war, see Kemmyō Taira Satō, “D. T. Suzuki and the Question of War” (2008).

Like the two founders of modern Pala and Huxley, Suzuki, discussing what post-war Japan should be like, argued for the Buddhist ethical control over science technology and other aspects of American culture (see his Nihon no Reiseika, especially the seventh lecture). On the other hand, Suzuki was sceptical that drugs, such as LSD, can provide a similar result to that of Zen (see e.g., Daisetsu Tsurezure Gusa, SDZ20, 337; letter to Yandell, 30 September 1959, SDZ39, 171).

In Antic Hay (1923) too, the old gentleman who happened to be in the same train talks to Gumbril in a similar way: “What disgusts me is the people inside the architecture, the number of them, sir. And the way they breed. Like maggots, sir, like maggots. Millions of them, creeping about the face of the country, spreading blight and dirt wherever they go; ruining everything” (219).

As well as “Richard Greenow,” Huxley in Island returns to another of his early pieces, the poem “Soles...
Occidere et Redire Possunt.” Catullus’s original lines are cited in Island with Huxley’s comments:

“Sunsets and death; death and therefore kisses: kisses and consequently birth and then death for yet another generation of sunset-watchers” (238-39). Here, we cannot help imagining that Huxley had his coming death in mind, dedicating this novel to “another generation.”

70 Huxley also became acquainted with Timothy Francis Leary, the psychologist who, unlike Huxley, argued for almost unrestrained use of LSD and who later became influential in the counter-culture of the Sixties and the Seventies (see Huxley’s letter to Leary, 20 July 1963, Smith 955; see also Sawyer AH, 174-78).

71 In Brave New World Revisited, Huxley presents a relevant vision: “societies are composed of individuals and are good only in so far as they help individuals to realize their potentialities and to lead a happy and creative life” (AHCEVI, 233).

72 Dunaway states that “Ape and Essence is an unrecognized predecessor of science fiction films on the environmental destruction of Los Angeles and human devolution” and mentions as such examples Planet of the Apes (1968), Them! (1954), Blade Runner (1982) and The Omega Man (1971) (HH, 222-23).

73 In The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition (1969), Theodore Roszak remarks that Island is “cluttered with brilliant communitarian ideas and insights, and which [it] has had great influence among its young readers” (300). More recently, in Atomised (1998), Michel Houellebecq describes two brothers mentioning Island, as well as Brave New World, in their discussion of utopia: “Aldous would become a major influence on hippie culture. He had always been in favour of sexual liberation, and he was a pioneer in the use of psychedelic drugs. The founding members of Esalen met him and were very influenced by his ideas. Then the New Age came along and recycled all the ideas of Esalen. Aldous Huxley is probably one of the most influential thinkers of the century”; Island was “widely read and it had a big influence on hippies and through them on New Agers” (189-90).

Alice Reeve-Tucker and Nathan Waddell point out the “pluralism” of recent studies on utopia, which can be traced back to Bloch’s multi-modal philosophy of utopianism, functioning to counter a reductionist identification of utopianism with authoritarianism, fascism and totalitarianism. Reeve-Tucker and Waddell also see the twentieth century as “a century of utopianism” because of 1) the production of famous literary utopias, 2) re-theorization of utopianism by critics, and 3) (though problematically) the rise of authoritarian utopias advocated by Adolf Hitler, Pol Pot, Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong (2-5).

“Utopia thus now better expresses our relationship to a genuinely political future than any current program of action, where we are for the moment only at the stage of massive protests and demonstrations, without any conception of how a globalized transformation might then proceed. But at this same time, Utopia also serves a vital political function today which goes well beyond mere ideological expression or replication. The formal flaw—how to articulate the Utopian break in such a way that it is transformed into a practical-political transition—now becomes a rhetorical and political strength—in that it forces us precisely to concentrate on the break itself: a meditation on the impossible, on the unrealizable in its own right” (Jameson *AF*, 232).

Jameson continues: “The proof is that even the neo-conservative fundamentalisms of the day continue to promise eventual satisfaction in all these areas, in that rising tide of universal prosperity and development to which they claim to add the elusive thing called freedom, as well as the imaginary thing called modernity” (*AF*, 196-97).

For the history of “totality” in Western culture, from ancient Greece to Hegel (including Plato, Aristoteles and Spinoza), see Martin Jay’s great book, *Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a
With regard to real evils, such as the violence of Communists, Fascists and Nazis, Huxley emphasizes the danger of abuse of the Hegelian word “historical”: “The appeal to history is one which the dictators find particularly convenient; for the assumption which underlies it is that, in Hegelian language, the real is the rational—that what happens is ultimately the same as what ought to happen”; “In consequence, those who have seized absolute power are prepared, as a rule, to make use of any means, however disgraceful, in order to retain it. Spying, delation, torture, arbitrary imprisonment, and execution—in every dictatorial country these are the ordinary instruments of domestic policy. They occur; they are therefore ‘historical.’ Being historical they are, in some tief, Hegelian way, reasonable and right” (EM, AHCEIV, 194). In terms of the nature of history, Peter Edgerly Firchow reveals some points in which Huxley’s thought is similar, and perhaps superior to, that of Herbert Marcuse and Francis Fukuyama—the Hegelians of the left and the right (see Modern Utopian Fictions from H. G. Wells to Iris Murdoch [2007], Chapter 3).

For the outline of Marxism, totality and poststructuralism in this section, see Best 333-38; Homer 152-54.

For instance, the poststructuralist Michele Foucault argues: “We readily believe that the least we can expect of experiences, actions, and strategies is that they take into account the ‘whole of society.’ [. . .] But I believe that this is asking a great deal, that it means imposing impossible conditions on our actions because this notion functions in a manner that prohibits the actualization, success, and perpetuation of these projects. The ‘whole of society’ is precisely that which should not be considered except as something to be destroyed” (Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews [1977], 233).

In The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969), Foucault employs the notion of discontinuity to deconstruct historical forms of totality, such as “epoch” and “history.” In Anti-Oedipus (1972), considering the
Oedipus complex to be socially constructed (not primitively possessed, as Freud argues), Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari level severe criticism at the conventional understanding of desire in psychoanalysis, instead seeking radical potential in the politics of desire.

Although he “acknowledges all of these [poststructuralist] reasons why the discourse of totality is now so much in disfavor,” Jay paradoxically advocates maintaining the notion of totality in order to address current global issues: “The search for a viable concept of totality […] should not therefore be written off as no more than a benighted exercise in nostalgia for a past plenitude or the ideology of intellectuals bent on legitimating their domination of the rest of mankind. For if the human race is to avoid the negative totality of nuclear catastrophe, we may well need to find some positive alternative”; “If the Western Marxist discourse on totality can be said, Habermas aside, to have undergone such a decline, is it too much to hope that amidst the debris there lurks, silent but still potent, the germ of a truly defensible concept of totality—and even more important, the potential for a liberating totalization that will not turn into its opposite” (536-37). This conclusion is interesting because Jay associates totality with utopia (an alternative world) and even appears to suggest these two concepts support each other—in the same way as Jameson, to whom Jay, however, does not pay much attention.

Another philosopher who views positively the notion of totality is Jürgen Habermas, who influenced Jameson. Habermas daringly attempts to reconstruct Marxist holism in a non-Marxist way, that is, by “drawing on a wide variety of non-Marxist sources” (such as Max Weber) while “[s]purning a class-specific concept of reification, calling once again into question Marx’s value theory, explicitly rejecting the philosophy of history that was still potent in the Frankfurt School” (Jay 504).

For this paragraph, see Best 339-351. If Jameson’s thought above is historicized, the impact of particularly three Marxist critics can be revealed: 1) Louis Althusser, who advocates a “structural totality”—the “decentered whole” governed by overdetermination and comprised of multiple, autonomous, complexly interrelating levels; 2) György Lukács, who develops the concept of “mediation,”
which is useful for grasping interconnections among social levels; 3) Jean-Paul Sartre, who proposes a syncretic theory which mediates objectivist accounts of Marxism and subjectivistic accounts of existentialism and psychoanalysis (see Best 345-51).

87 “[T]he thinking of totality—the urgent feeling of the presence all around us of some overarching system that we can at least name—has the palpable benefit of forcing us to conceive of at least the possibility of other alternate systems, something we can now identify as our old friend Utopian thinking” (ST, 70).

88 “Totality is then precisely this combination of closure and system, in the name of autonomy and self-sufficiency and which is ultimately the source of that otherness or radical, even alien, difference [. . .]. Yet it is precisely this category of totality that presides over the forms of Utopian realization: the Utopian city, the Utopian revolution, the Utopian commune or village, and of course the Utopian text itself” (AF, 5).


90 The antinomies mentioned here by Jameson are: “work and leisure, laws and behavior, uniformity and individual difference, sexuality and the family”; “the ascetic/abundant (indulgent), aesthetic/functional, scientific/primitivist, sensual/spiritual and religious/secular”; “egalitarian/inegalitarian (or elitist), ‘open’/totalitarian, libertarian/coercive, democratic/undemocratic and optimistic (with regard to human nature)/pessimistic”; “industrialism versus anti-industrialism; private property versus common ownership; religion versus secularization; revolution versus gradualism; statism versus communitarianism; and democratic versus authoritarian organization” (AF, 145-46). As shown later, Huxley in Island also addresses some of these antinomies and deconstructs them.

91 In fact, Huxley first wrote the chapters chronologically and later rearranged their order; for a detailed analysis of the structure of this novel, see S. Krishnamoorthy Aithal, “Huxley’s Eyeless in Gaza” (1984).

92 In Ends and Means, Huxley states that, although science has begun to deepen an understanding of
“total experience,” the “masses” still believe that “the world is without meaning or value. But nobody likes living in such a world. To satisfy their hunger for meaning and value, they turn to such doctrines as Nationalism, Fascism, and revolutionary Communism” (AHCEIV, 366). Huxley goes on to confess to his previous subscription to “the philosophy of meaningless,” which was, for him and most of his contemporaries, “an instrument of liberation” from “a certain political and economic system” and “a certain system of morality” (369). He also adds: “I had motives [non-intellectual reasons] for not wanting the world to have a meaning” (366-67). This comment should remind us, as Dunaway points out, of Huxley’s own past sorrows: “any rational world would have had to account for his mother’s and Trev’s deaths and his own blinding” (HH, 48).

93 Huxley’s view of descriptive totality can also be found in his works after Eyeless in Gaza, although he gradually began to emphasize spiritual rather than material aspects. See e.g., Propter’s analysis of the world as being composed of not only the levels of humanity and of animality but also “the level of eternity,” which we cannot reach in reality but which exists above individual differences (see AMS, Part 1, Chapter 9), and his view of history as a series of incidents that may appear pointless or irrelevant but actually happen in accordance with certain laws behind the reality (see 327-28). See also The Perennial Philosophy, Chapter 12, “Time and Eternity.”

94 Before finally arriving at Pala, Andrew travelled in many places as a naturalist and worked for a hospital in Madras in South India. One characteristic of Pala is the coexistence of people with animals, which may be traced back to his life in northern New Guinea (189). Here, we see Andrew’s, or the author’s, hope of making use of the wisdom of non-Western cultures. Ideologically, this is in a sense reconciliation between the rulers and the ruled of Western imperialism, which is symbolized by the British doctor and the Old Raja, who is deeply influenced by Indian thought. The culturally hybrid attitude appears in how languages are employed in Pala. For example, introducing English into some academic contexts never prevents the maintenance of the native language there. The Palanese have
developed their hybrid culture not by rejecting but by subverting Western culture, e.g., by rewriting Greek literature to reflect Palanese values.

95 Other examples contain human and God (see 116), human and nature (see 189, 210-12), life and death (see 107, 166, 239), the body and the mind (see 75-79), the present and the past (see 189), time and eternity (see 166-67).

96 In this respect, this utopia is different from the World State of Brave New World, where anything inconvenient, such as pain, is totally eradicated by the Controllers (see John’s discussion with Mond, Chapter 17). However, in Island, Huxley still appears to maintain dualistic thinking when he makes Palanese people practise the improvement of human quality, which must be based on the distinction between superior and inferior.

97 This part might sound Lawrentian. Certainly, in Eyeless in Gaza, Anthony shows his dissatisfaction with Lawrence for his overemphasis on animal aspects of life (see 288-90), finally arriving at a multifarious philosophy of life. Yet this does not mean Huxley’s unequivocal refusal of Lawrence but that he supplements it in his own way by incorporating his encyclopaedic knowledge and his experience of pacifist activity. The presence of Lawrence in Huxley’s later thought can be confirmed by, for example, John Rivers’s view of life in The Genius and the Goddess (see 118-31) as well as some aspects of the Palanese life, cited above. For a literary analysis of Huxley’s views of Lawrence, including his misunderstanding of Lawrence, see e.g., Meckier, Aldous Huxley: Satire and Structure, Chapter 4.

98 Island is a text in which three different genres of utopia, Bildungsroman and autobiography are inseparably combined. It can thus be read as a response to a criticism of the utopian text as that in which an individual perspective tends to be lost (see e.g., Jameson ST, 55-56). It can also be remarked that Huxley actively takes advantage of the traverse nature of utopian text, which has traditionally been formed by connecting exiting genres (see Jameson AF, 35). An example of “neutralization” can especially be found in Huxley’s combination of two genres of autobiography and utopia, in which the real/factual
autobiography paradoxically coexists with the possible/imaginary story without killing each other.

99 In *Utopia* (1516), Thomas More argues for pacifism in the first volume, and the inhabitants of Utopia are described in the second volume as pacifists; but this country has colonies abroad and even appears to be attempting an imperial enlargement (see Vol. 2, “Social Relations,” “Slavery” and “Military Affairs”), as if to foretell the appearance of the British Empire thereafter.

100 Although both Jameson and Huxley see history as a meaningful process towards emancipation, Jameson has in mind a descriptive totality based on the Marxist preference for economy, whereas Huxley is not particular about the notion of class struggle. Regarding normative totality (or utopia), the comparison between these two utopians is more interesting. As I have argued, Huxley’s 1962 utopia is characterized by the ecological, the religious and the culturally hybrid. In contrast, Jameson appears to be cautious of the popularity of ecology in postmodernism, pointing out the essentialist danger of “nature” (see ST, 45-52). Despite his definite interest in religious elements, such as magic in science fiction (see *AF*, Chapters 5 and 6), Jameson overlooks the potential of religions or mysticism (for a detailed discussion on Jameson’s ambiguous view of religions, see Roland Boer, “Religion and Utopia in Fredric Jameson” [2008]). Culturally, Jameson may have a tendency to be somewhat Eurocentric. It is not just that his interest basically centres on American and European writing, but that his view of the Third World (see e.g., “Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism” [1986], rpt. in *JR*, Chapter 18) appears relatively simplistic and exclusive, which has been indicated by several postcolonial critics. For an overview of postcolonial critique of Jameson, see Avram Alpert, “We are Cannibals, All: Fredric Jameson on Colonialism and Experience” (2010).

101 “Though respectfully received,” *Island* was “perhaps in any case too early to contribute in a serious way to the ecological culture, which developed only towards the end of the decade” (Kumar 409; see also Houellebecq 189-90). For a detailed analysis of *Island* as an ecological utopia, see e.g., Marius de Geus, *Ecological Utopias: Envisioning the Sustainable Society* (1999), Chapter 9.
The idea of “critical utopia” was originally proposed by Tom Moylan (*Demand the Impossible: Science Fiction and the Utopian Imagination* [1987]), but it seems that this notion has been recently employed in a wider or more general sense (see e.g., Barnhill 214-15). Because of the differences of views regarding several points of *Island*, including its narrative and ending, opinions are divided about whether to count this novel as an example of the critical utopia (see Moylan 216-22). Meanwhile, in order for us to think about the problematic ending of *Island*, Jameson’s mention of the failure of utopias is worth taking into account: “at best Utopia can serve the negative purpose of making us more aware of our mental and ideological imprisonment”; “therefore the best Utopias are those that fail the most comprehensively” (*AF*, xiii).
Conclusion

Although previous studies on Aldous Huxley have tended to discuss the issue of identity, particularly the self, in the contexts of philosophy and literature, my research has so far demonstrated that throughout his career Huxley pursued the theme of identity in various ways, struggling with numerous facets of the political and cultural climate of his time.

Immediately after the Great War, Huxley embarked on his debut piece of fiction, “Farcical History of Richard Greenow,” in which he already drew close attention to the divided nature of the self, perceiving human aggression more pessimistically and complicatedly than most of his contemporaries. It can be argued that this novella synchronizes with or anticipates some varieties of psychoanalysis, especially Sigmund Freud’s, Melanie Klein’s and more recent critics’ discourses on human destructiveness, which potentially or actually deconstruct the generally assumed opposition between the rational/the cultural and the instinctive/the violent. Huxley’s prescient insight could be partly traced back to his exceptional or lonely position during the war due to his failure to join the army, as well as his discovery of something like the destructive instinct in human mentality, including his own. Although he was certainly aware of the unclear, unstable relationship between the self and the other, Huxley at this point did not try to bridge the gap between himself and different types of others.

His wartime solitude in terms of gender, as well as the childhood loss of his mother, may have allowed Huxley to stand a certain distance from the ideology of
womanhood. Inspired by his relationships with Maria Huxley, Naomi Mitchison and Nancy Cunard, who did not necessarily conform to the traditional ways of women’s life, Huxley in *Point Counter Point* portrayed Marjorie and Elinor, less maternal women who undergo the division of identity with regard to motherhood, as well as Lucy, a less feminine woman who performatively lives in a masculine way without caring about the *femme fatale* label. Beyond the contemporary debate over reproduction, his descriptions of these women can be compared with recent discussions of gender which have resisted the essentialist notions of the maternal and the feminine.

A similar and less-known radical side of Huxley can be seen in *Brave New World*, especially its representation of savages. While relying on anthropology, Huxley envisages, with his “contrapuntal imagination,” the future of American Indian society more freely than anthropologists, showing his acute awareness of the violent and paradoxical natures of imperialism. Huxley could have modelled the savage hero with a complex, hybrid identity upon himself and Ishi—the real ‘savage’ with an ambiguous identity, with whom the author would have secretly empathized. Huxley’s scepticism is directed towards not only the imperialism and anthropology of his time but also the conventional markers behind them, such as race, nation, the civilized/the savage and the modern/the primitive. The tale contains some elements that are insightful and thought-provoking in respect of postcolonial concerns. This was the first time that Huxley imagined the future and destiny of non-Western Others, and it may have triggered his ideological and emotional shift from his racist and Eurocentric stance to a more tolerant attitude towards Others, including his pacifism and deep interest in Eastern cultures.
Through visiting mining villages and camps for unemployed people, organizing a pacifist campaign, writing screenplays for Hollywood, and deepening his interest in religions and drugs, the later Huxley gradually wished more earnestly for ties with the masses, whom he had previously despised. He also began to visualize a utopia where ordinary people live happily, developing each of the human potentialities, unlike any of the existing socialist or capitalist countries. Due to the difficulty in making a utopia compatible with liberty, it was not until his last novel, Island, that Huxley could fictionalize his own utopian program in detail. His struggles with utopia can be compared with the Marxist Fredric Jameson’s arguments on utopia and totality, but in a sense Huxley’s utopia may be beyond them, because of its attempt to neutralize all sorts of antinomies, its ecological vision and its culturally hybrid or syncretic nature.

A recapitulation like this convinces us that Huxley’s literary oeuvre, from “Richard Greenow” to Island, constitutes a story of his own wanderings through the issue of identity. From his younger days Huxley expressed scepticism about the notion of identity but paradoxically, in doing so, he was consistently searching for a certain type of identity. Through writing his series of fictional works, Huxley used his imagination and sensitivity to question or deconstruct the conventional forms of identity, such as the psychological self, gender, race and class, and to satirize or criticize the cultural and political ideology associated with these concepts. In the end, scientifically, religiously and experientially, Huxley came to assume a certain “unity” behind all fragments of the world and history, and to argue that anyone can freely and equally gain a non-exclusive and non-fixed form of identity by positioning themselves
within this open and changing order of unity. The pilgrimage to this utopian vision was also his long journey in search of ties with others, which could be partly traced back to his unrewarded wishes to restore severed friendships with enlisted (and dead) friends. Huxley, who had started writing fiction with his contempt for others—as reflected in “Richard Greenow”—now closed his career with his hopes for others—as suggested by the ending of Island, where he left the destiny of his utopia in the hands of readers.

Theoretically, we can acknowledge that Huxley’s way of addressing the issue of identity transcended his time and may now appear postmodernist or even beyond. Huxley anticipated not only the positive effects of the deconstructive view of identity, e.g., emancipation and respect for diversity, but also the downsides, such as the danger of depriving people of meanings of or reasons for their life, which could be followed by some people seeking salvation in extreme versions of traditional patterns of identity (e.g., exclusive nationalism) and others spending their lives in vain without any purpose or value. An example of the latter case was the author himself in his youth. The hero of his final novel, Will, is a “schizoid” intellectual who sees everything with fragmentary images, just as Huxley did. However, having seen a utopian unity in a moment, Will tries to start his new and meaningful life, which is no longer only his but involves others, too. In fact, postmodern ways of welcoming and appraisals of fragmentary, disconnected and empty images of identity (a typical example is Deleuze and Guattari’s eulogy of the schizophrenic in a political sense) have been not only questioned for the limits of their political effectiveness but also rejected for their lack of recognition of the actual situation of schizophrenic people suffering and fighting such fragmentation,
disconnection and emptiness (see e.g., James M. Glass’s *Shattered Selves: Multiple Personalities in a Postmodern World* [1993], a critique of postmodernism grounded on the narratives of women with multiple personality disorder).¹ There are also some critics among postmodernists (or those influenced by postmodernism) who have themselves been searching for a means of coping with the ‘identity crisis.’ As Chapter IV indicated, Jameson, while having been inspired by postmodernism, proposes a meaningful life, based on the un-reductionist and open form of totality, where differences are not erased but rather paradoxically enhance each other. Furthermore, Edward W. Said is not entirely satisfied with his advocacy of a contrapuntal reading of histories, and paradoxically expresses his hope for an “impossible union” of the history of the humanity (*CI*, 339-40), by which he is exploring the possibility of life with another form of identity not involved in identity politics. Here again, Huxley’s apparently strange proposal of a new sort of identity, which rests on the paradoxical basis of the impossible (thus utopian) demand for “unity,” may look far ahead into the future.

It is worth noting that these understandings can surface through a close reading, which, according to Peter Edgerly Firchow, has often been assumed by academics to be unsuitable for Huxley’s text. In fact, my intensive analysis of his literature has proved the extraordinary characteristics of Huxley as a novelist (rather than an essayist) who has not only intelligence but powers of imagination, empathy and expression.²

My research also has some suggestions towards literary studies with little interest in Huxley. If the critics have belittled Huxley despite the above facets of his literature, especially its suitability for close reading and theoretical discussion, would it not imply
that they may have been ridden by prejudices, including the image of Huxley as a conservative elitist, partly because of his “identity” in the traditional sense of this word? The unpopularity of Huxley, then, could be attributed to the ‘conservatism’ of literary scholars, rather than their radicalism as indicated by Firchow. Of course, this situation is also ascribed to Huxley himself, who in principle maintained a distance from the radical ideology of politics and culture, sometimes due to his misunderstanding of it, which has resulted in a vicious circle, arousing theorists’ misunderstandings of him, instead of penetrating into the radicalism hidden under the surface of his text. But were such images of Huxley—part of the reason for his unpopularity—not formed, copied and even spread by Huxley researchers themselves? If so, this might mean that, without being aware of it, they have so far limited the potential of Huxley and his literature, which are worth interpreting more freely, diversely and paradoxically.

In 1916, exactly a hundred years ago, Aldous Huxley took an undergraduate degree in English literature but gave up the idea of entering academia because Oxford could not afford to hire a new lecturer during wartime. In “Literature and Examinations” in The Olive Tree (1936), Huxley, as if to avenge this misfortune, mercilessly declared that “[v]ery many of the scores of theses produced each year in the various universities of the world are totally pointless.” At the same time, he also confessed his “extremely mixed” feelings when he received letters from students who were writing about him, and mercifully showed some sympathy for them: “The candidate for academic honours has no choice but to study the insignificant aspects of a good writer’s work or else the work, not yet explored, because universally deemed not worth exploring, of a bad
writer” (*AHCEIV*, 59). Even though it is not for me to judge whether my thesis is pointless or not, I optimistically believe that I have studied the significant aspects of a good writer’s work.

1 As a possible answer to how we characterize the general connections between postmodernism and identity, Anthony Elliott proposes: “[we] must be careful to avoid a naive celebration of the multiplicity of selves, fragmented identities, narcissistic personality disorders and schizophrenia as possible subjective sources for alternative social arrangements” (148).

2 It is interesting and probably significant that Huxley could effectively delve into the issue of identity in his fiction rather than his non-fiction. Compared with most non-fiction, the writing of fiction, which usually involves the process of pretending to be other people, is itself an act of consciously causing an ‘identity crisis’ within authors, in that it necessarily shakes their subjectivity, subverting the rigid distinction between the self and the other. By way of example, as Chapter III argued, his characterization of the Savage in *Brave New World* gave Huxley an opportunity to reconsider his own identity in terms of race, nation and culture. In addition to deepening his insight into the issue of identity, Huxley, through writing fiction, developed and reconstructed his own identity, and this point may be more or less applied to fiction writers in general.


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