The compatibility of self-love concept and the message of the gospel Jesus proclaimed as recorded in the New Testament texts
A challenge for greater relevance

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The compatibility of self-love concept and the message of the gospel Jesus proclaimed as recorded in the New Testament texts: a challenge for greater relevance

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Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for PhD

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Abstract

The general perception that the Christian message of the gospel[s] is about disinterested love raises many difficulties. This is because disinterested love at its core is the assumption that self-love is synonymous with selfishness, but self-love is not the same as selfishness.

Contrary to this, the message of the Gospel embodied in the activities and the person of Jesus Christ focused on correct self-love. It is from this self-love that Jesus draws up the second command to love our neighbour as ourselves. To love one's neighbour self disinterestedly is an oxymoron. True neighbour love is conditioned by self-love. Aristotle contemplates self-love as legitimate and necessary for an individual and one is entitled to it. Augustine suggests that to love God who created is to love oneself, therefore self-love is loving God and it is common to all human beings. Kant subscribes to the idea of self-love by suggesting that we each have a duty to ourselves, such duty cannot be formed of our disinterestedness, but that duty to ourselves is the duty to love our selves. Adam Smith offers an everyday practice of self-love coached in the language of self-interest as dynamic economic law. Smith showed that in everyday life self-love is exercised by traders and customers each appealing to the self-love of the other in order to enter into exchange. Jesus in his activities and person demonstrates how God self-loves as Father who has the welfare of his children at heart. God has his interest in his children for his own sake and theirs. God cannot therefore be devoid of self-love, and Jesus is the dynamic equivalent of this God, relating to himself in self-love. Would be followers of Jesus each hear his messages appealing to their self-interest or self-love, calling for their attitudes in life to change.
1. INTRODUCTION

1.2 THE METHODOLOGY

1.3 THE POINT OF DEPARTURE: WORKING HYPOTHESIS

1.3.1 GOD’S SUFFERING NOT DEVOID OF SELF CONCERN

1.3.2 RADICALLY DISINTERESTED LOVE FOR GOD A MISTAKEN CONCEPTION

1.3.3 DIVINE LOVE CONSIDERED AS UN-TELEOLOGICAL IS FALSE

1.4 PROBLEMATIC AND SELF-REFERING SELF LOVE IN CHRISTIAN TRADITION

1.4.1 MORAL OR THEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF SELF-LOVE

1.5 THE CONCEPT AND THE CHANGING IDEAS OF THE SELF

1.5.1 SELF CONCEPT IN DISCUSSIONS OF SELF

1.5.2 SEIGEL ON THE QUESTION OF CONTEMPORARY SELF AND SELFHOOD

1.5.3 THE CONTINUITY OF BODILY AWARENESS OF THE SENSE SELF

1.5.4 THE RELATIONAL DIMENSION AS BASIS FOR A SENSE OF SELF

1.5.5 THE REFLECTIVE DIMENSION AS BASIS OF A SENSE OF SELF

1.5.6 CONCLUDING REMARK ON SEIGEL AND THE SELF

1.5.7 THE SELF IN MORAL SPACES – TAYLOR, CHARLES

1.5.8 THE SELF AND VALUE RELATIONSHIP

1.5.9 VALUES ON BEING MORE THAN EPIPHENOMENAL

1.5.10 SELF AS POSITING IDENTITY

1.5.11 CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE SELF IN TAYLOR

1.6 CONCLUSION

2 ARISTOTLE’S UNDERSTANDING OF SELF-LOVE IN NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

2.2 ARISTOTLE ON REALISED MORAL VIRTUES

2.3 ARISTOTLE ON SELF

2.4 FRIENDSHIP IN ARISTOTLE

2.5 ARISTOTLE’S FRIENDSHIP WITH A THEOLOGICAL COMPONENT

2.6 THE SELF IN FRIENDSHIP

2.7 SELF-LOVE IN ARISTOTLE

2.8 AQUINAS: TRANSLATING ARISTOTLE INTO A CHRISTIAN CONTEXT

2.9 CONCLUSION

3 AUGUSTINE’S CONCEPT OF THE SELF AND SELF-LOVE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

3.2 THE AUGUSTINIAN INTERIORITY

3.2.1 AUGUSTINE’S INWARDNESS ON REASON

3.3 AUGUSTINE AND A TRANSCENDING SELF

3.4 AUGUSTINE ON CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF SELF-LOVE

3.4.1 THE CASE FOR NYGREN’S AGAPE AGAINST AUGUSTINE

3.5 LOVING GOD FOR GOD FOUNDED ON SCRPTURES

3.5.1 FROM WHAT CRITERIA MAY AN AGENT LOVE ONE’S SELF?

3.5.2 HOW MAY AN AGENT PRACTICE SELF-LOVE?

3.6 OLIVER O’DONOVAN’S READING OF AUGUSTINE

3.6.1 AUGUSTINE’S EXPRESSION OF AMOR SUI OR ‘SELF-LOVE’

3.6.2 O’DONOVAN’S INTERPRETIVE BATTLEFIELD OF SELF LOVE

3.6.3 COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS BETWEEN SELF-LOVE AND LOVE OF GOD

3.7 AUGUSTINE AND PAULINE INFLUENCE

3.8 CONCLUSION
Chapter 1

Introduction


Posing the research question: Is the message of the gospel Jesus proclaimed recorded in the New Testament texts only about disinterestedness, which has nothing to do with self-love?

-following on I ask: are persons by virtue of the gospel message Jesus proclaimed ever morally permitted to act out of self-interest within specific constraints in spheres of creation order? 

-if the message of the gospel Jesus proclaimed is about disinterestedness how can we live and practice it in an economic order patterned on Adam Smith self-interest/self-love in our everyday economics?

1.2 The Methodology

In my attempts to respond to these questions, I begin by discussing the works of four important philosophers whose works remain pertinent to my examining self and self-love in relation to the message of the gospel that Jesus proclaimed and by which persons are expected to live. The first of the four is, Aristotle, whose philosophy of self, constructed in

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1 According to Brunner (1937) Divine Imperative, London, Lutterworth Press; God has ordained certain “orders of creation” that are part of God’s preserving grace for organizing human life. These orders include human communities in the “economic, technical, purely social, and intellectual spheres.” Brunner is very explicit, that community is not tantamount to the state; indeed, such creation orders exist apart from and prior to the state. For example, the family is the “primal community” whose “rights take absolute precedence” over any other institution. It is in these spheres of creation order that God’s act of love revealed in Christ is actualised. Here we find not merely particular sphere of life within which to act, but also orders in accordance with which to act where God’s will meets human beings.
terms of a hylomorphic understanding of self remains within the scope of his general epistemology that claims sensible things are the origin of all human cognition, including that of self. Self is therefore only known on the foundation of contemporaneous sentience in the discernment of sensible things. Such a self is relational and reflective, would be Aristotle’s dictum.

The second philosopher is St Augustine, for whom self implies freedom, that is, every self is immediately conscious of itself as willing and as possessed of the power of choice. God creates this freely willing self and foreknows (without willing) its evil choices; Augustine will concur. But the evil of these human purposes is simply to be regarded according to Augustine as a privation of being rather than as positive evil. Augustine will argue that away from the privation of being, the human self when it wills in conformity with God’s purposes is “free” in a second and higher sense; it is a good and obedient self. Such is a self that is relational.

Thirdly, I will discuss Immanuel Kant, who offers an array of understandings of what constitutes the self or the metaphysics of the self: these include the self as a substance or as a bundle of representations [à la Hume], as force or the self as a form or structure. Kant arrives successfully at a fragmented self that is depicted by these possibilities of the metaphysics of the self. The truism of self in Kant is that it assigns duties and respect.

Fourthly, I will discuss Adam Smith, who, in his discussion of the self’s development, expressed a basic tenet of [symbolic interactionism] the notion that the social self cannot emerge unless an individual is able to take account of others’ images of herself. Smith suggests that, when surveying one’s self and conducts as they appear to self, one enters into

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2 Hylomorphism—the theory that every physical object [but here we are thinking specifically of human beings] is composed of two principles, the first being an unchanging prime matter and the second a form deprived of actuality with every substantial change of the object.
emotions or judgments previously alien to herself, sentiments that could be entertained only through sympathy. Sympathy allows the image of self as the template on which to construct images of others although there is no restriction not to view others as identical to oneself all the time. Sympathy as the vicarious experience of others’ actions, emotions, tastes, and reasons allows Adam Smith to present a reflective self.

The discussions of these four philosophers set the foundation to demonstrate how important the understanding of the self is in providing the basis on which to build self-love. It is this self-love and its relation to the message of the gospel as proclaimed in biblical texts that is crucial in developing the important part of this research. Self–love understood from the various proclamations of Jesus’ message is legitimate and negates the too often peddled assumptions that Jesus and the New Testament texts proclaimed a disinterested message.

Jesus proclaimed the good news that through him the kingdom of God had come. The one who proclaimed, that is Jesus, became the subject of the proclamation. It was now his words and actions that constituted what, was proclaimed as the good news, the gospel. I will claim in this dissertation that Jesus proclaimed a single gospel, one by which he was to become a causa efficiens summoning into existence new love that would reflect back on himself. This new love anticipates the moral excellence of communion of giving and receiving love often lost sight of in Christian ethics.

I argue that, Jesus’ summation of the laws of Israel with his commandment to love God and to love neighbour as self (Matt. 22:37-40; Mark 12:29-31; Luke 10:27) is key to the gospel he proclaimed. This summation itself implies that Christian love is located in the triadic fellowship between God, self and other(s). All too often however, selfless love, a love utterly heedless of self and entirely one-way rather than circular in its movement, is thought to be ethically superior to communion and it alone worthy of the designation "Christian".
I argue that a "true" or proper self-love defined as the pursuit of one's own good found in the gospel Jesus proclaimed, within the context of triadic communion can be distinguished from both selfishness that is, the pursuit of one's own separate interests and self-infatuation. Consequently, not all self-love is to be caged although those who idealise selfless love generally albeit mistakenly start with this assumption. It is the case therefore, that the compatibility of the concept of self-love and the gospel message proclaimed by Jesus [in Christian tradition] remains a challenge for greater relevance. This then brings me to the determination of this dissertation, which is:

This dissertation is set to discuss the compatibility of the concept of self-love and the message of the gospel in Christian tradition in contemporary times. The methodology used for achieving the objectives of this dissertation is placed in four areas of discussions significant to responding to the question of compatibility of self-love and the message of the gospel. The four areas offer the possibility of examining the concept of self-love and its lived experience in the Christian message of the gospel from a variety of positions.

In the first of these four sections, the introductory chapter attempts to situate the concept of self-love in the Christian tradition, by providing a clarification of the concept of self-love that is specific in its understanding and application to this dissertation. This clarification begins with examining the problems faced in the application of the concept of self-love in Christian tradition. It will require paying attention to the challenges to normative accounts of the self. A particular attention to the social constructions of selves is in order as these constructions are responsible on how to be a coherent self.

The second section includes the three chapters on Aristotle, Augustine and Kant. The three demonstrate how the self and self-love concepts have been understood and applied in different traditions and times signifying the importance in diversity in these traditions.
Chapter two in this section addresses Aristotle’s understanding of the self and self-love, with a conclusion that shows in his treatment of the self and self-love the enduring motif is of an agent relating to herself. The self and self-love in Aristotle expresses the relational sense of self-reflection. Chapter three examines Augustine’s understanding and discussion of self and self-love. The sense of entering the inner self [interiority] is foundational for an Augustinian understanding self and self-love, a reflective [or perhaps an inner reflective] motif becomes overarching.

Chapter four in this section addresses a Kantian thinking and discussion of the self and self-love. This discussion quickly develops into a sense of respect and duties to one’s self. Kant’s understanding of the self is one of the most protracted discussions; perhaps it should be so, considering that he attempts to discuss the self in its perceived fragmented states. The question of the self and self-love eventually is brought into perspective via the agent’s recognition of her sense of respect and of being obligated to duties.

The third section examines philosophies of self and self-love and a theological commentary in the understanding of Adam Smith. The section asks whether Adam Smith can be discussed beyond stereotyping; as the father of all that is bad about market economics fronted by self-interest [self-love]. The discussion is intended to show self and self-love in application.

It is the relational, the reflective and the self-respect aspect of self and self-love as expressed in everyday life that remains key to the economic order as a sphere of creation obligated for the provision of material goods necessary for the preservation of life. This discussion allows the visualisation of the need to appeal to another’s self-interest or self-love to participate in any economic exchange. Smith could demonstrate that both the trader [the
butcher, baker and brewer] appeal to the self-love of the customer, just as the customer appeals to the self-love of the trader to facilitate an economic exchange.

The economic order is a means rather than an end providing an avenue through which the self and self-love may be expressed, albeit making the economic order easily suspect to ethical problems. Chapter five hence discusses Adam Smith’s philosophical understanding of the self and self-love and how these impacted on the notion of ‘homo oeconomicus’. Chapter six attempts to situate this ‘homo oeconomicus’ understanding in Adam Smith’s own theological thought that runs through his works, particularly, *Theory of Moral Sentiments* and *The Wealth of Nations*.

The *fourth section* comprising chapter seven and eight respectively first, chapter seven examines the use of the bible. At the forefront by first allowing the discussion of what the message of the gospel Jesus proclaimed constitutes. I then survey the Christian discourse of self-love focusing on two specific texts Leviticus 19: 17-18; Mathew 22: 39. This textual discussion is followed by discussing how Jesus related to himself and what is the gospel he proclaimed on relating to oneself.

In chapter eight I discuss self’s freedom from itself and other. That when this freedom is experienced on account of the gospel Jesus proclaimed, such is the highest freedom of the self, and yet still it remains compatible with the command to love ourselves.

In this section I argue that right or correct self-love consists in a self-determining response to God that is actualised in the not exhaustible love of the neighbour. I discuss further what I consider to be the idea of right self-love and its contribution to moral life, and what that idea lends to the relation between Christian faith and moral life.

The *fifth section* is a conclusion, the gathering of thought where drawing out key impressions of the whole dissertation. I will hope to have demonstrated the message of the
gospel Jesus proclaimed as recorded in the New Testament texts, is not about disinterested love. The gospel message is about communion between God, self, and other(s).

Such communion cannot be love that calls for self-abnegation or heedless selflessness, this understanding of selfless love misleadingly exaggerates the principle of unselfishness, while resting on an unsatisfactory concept of God. It is the case that true self-love and love for God are co-extensive, and that my interlocutors implied this understanding where they did not state it categorically.

I will hope to have made a successful case for the retrieval of the Augustinian assumption that the service of the most lasting significance for the other(s) is the restoration of the divine-human encounter that issues in true happiness. Indeed, the ontological fact remains that there is no lasting human happiness that is other than happiness in loving God. I will also attempt to show that while the concept of the self is plagued with innumerable controversies of interpretation, it is a useful concept designating identity between oneself and the other(s).

1.3 The point of departure: working hypothesis

The proclamation of the Gospel includes an invitation to recognize and accept in a personal decision “the saving lordship of Christ." The proclamation of the gospel is not a disinterested storytelling. Persons tell the story of the gospel hoping public decisions will follow. When such decisions are made they affect the human person’s life style. They affect how a person relates to herself and to others.

To open the word of God, to announce its meaning to the human community, is an exercise of hope in the action of the Holy Spirit that provokes the miracle of a response of faith (Morris 1989, p.115-116; Tyson 1984, p.577-78), even to our very limited testimony of Jesus Christ. Excluding possible misunderstandings, the need to affirm the Christian gospel is
an offer, an invitation, as a call to people to respond [interpellation\(^3\)] personally and socially to God is imperative.

The imperative draws out the importance of a process through which people come to understand their own predicament and recognize the forces that are at work in their lives and in the life of society. As a consequence, the need for persons to become protagonists both of their own destiny and the destiny of their community cannot be underestimated.

Since conversion is the moment of awareness of a personal relationship with God in Christ, an invitation is signalled to enter with Christ into the actual task of transforming oneself and the world according to God's will. This transforming presence is synonymous with Christ’s kenotic self-emptying as we shall see later on. The “the paradox of kenotic self-emptying arises because the self that is emptied must continue to exist as a self for itself to be emptied.” (Lippitt 2009, p. 131).

One cannot sacrifice one’s self to cease to exist, simply because one cannot care for another if it kills her in doing so. While sacrificing self may not necessarily be evil, ‘proper self-sacrifice must emphasise the worth of the self that is emptied out’ (Ibid. p. 132), this is what makes emptying self a sacrifice, because self is precious. In being precious the self relates to itself with a sense of value and worth that are both inherent. Such value is seemingly re-enforced by the suffering of the divine human in the person of Jesus.

1.3.1 God’s suffering not devoid of self-concern

There is a claim that the highest form of love is utterly heedless of self. This is a common depiction of the religious ethics aligned to Western Christianity that elevates the Saint who stands high above the province of ordinary human experience to be one completely devoid of self-love or concern. This is Nygren’s conception of agape central to it is emphasis

\(^3\) This is discussed below later on.
on human sinfulness (1982, p248-249), the necessity of grace, the transcendence of God, and
the distinctiveness of Pauline Christianity (Vacek 1996, p.29). Nygren gives classic
expression of a view of Christian love that is treated as the only valid view. One
misconception of selfless love is that in achieving complete self-abnegation in one’s love for
one’s fellow human, one certainly gains one faith. This idealisation of selfless love not only
misleadingly exaggerates a valid principle of unselfishness (Nygren 1982, p.644-651); it rests
on an unsatisfactory concept of God. Stephen Post (1988, 213) argues that,

‘Mutual love or reciprocity is the only appropriate fundamental
norm for human interrelations, and for the divine-human encounter as well.’

The divine love on which the neighbour love concept is founded or modelled cannot
The admonition of the neighbour love mirroring a Judaic understanding accepts that Judaism
is the awareness of the reciprocity of God and man, of man’s togetherness with divine. It is
therefore not surprising that the ideal of selfless love is not to be found in Judaism. Judaism
does not demonstrate a religion of self-satisfaction nor one of self-annihilation [except for
mystical path of Dov Ber of Mesritch] (Grozinger 2014, p. 17-20), rather it idealises love as
fellowship.

In Judaism and Christianity, scripture discloses a deity who experiences grief: ‘He
was sorry that he had made man on earth, and he was grieved at heart’ (Genesis 6:6). I argue
the divine love on which the teachings of neighbour love are founded is not bereft of self-
concern and that divine suffering results from limited human reciprocation. Divine self-
concern expressed in love for the mutual good of reciprocity cannot taint the purity of the
divine act. Recognising that the egocentric love of self that places "I" at the centre of the
universe is anathema, the abandonment of all self-concern confusing the valid prohibition
against selfishness with selflessness is equally abhorrent. Divine suffering is
incomprehensible unless a response from the beloved is sought after, if this were not the case there can be no reason for divine grief. When divine love is left unreciprocated humanity is charged with infidelity (Deuteronomy 1-11).

Forgiveness is then sought after as it represents the hope that a free response to the divine ultimately is imminent. If the divine had no interest in reciprocation then, forgiveness would be both unnecessary and pointless. It is therefore a mistake to misconstrue a steadfast and forgiving divine love as beyond self-concern, when divine love is indicative of such self-concern.

Divine love hence cannot be an overflowing plenitude as some theologians suggest (Spicq 1965, p.34). Debatably, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity contains the proposition that within the divine there exists a triadic mutuality that completely satisfies the condition of reciprocity (John 17). This triadic mutuality conceals the divine need for human response wherein insights can be gleaned from Judaism. Consequently, to misapprehend divine love as spontaneous, unmotivated and unconditional is to remove the basis for the urgent religious vocation of soothing divine agony. Divine love that so often is understood as the perfect example to which human love must conform, when claimed as selfless love, it is mistakenly interpreted as containing no element of self-concern. Unfortunately, this is a view based on the false assumption that the divine neither needs nor seeks the mutual good of fellowship with humanity.

1.3.2 **Radically disinterested love for God a mistaken conception**

It is disingenuous to claim legitimacy to a radically disinterested love for God that denies any place for self-concern in the divine-human relation. It may be true of the theological virtue of charity / agape to argue that such a pure love is both desirable and humanly possible as Sanderlin (1993, p.87), the claim however locks out a proper self-focus
of the kind necessary for ‘becoming a self’. On the understanding of Christ’s kenotic emptying, the message of the gospel cannot be argued to support disinterestedness. Disinterestedness stemmed into the Christian contemplative mysticism (Mennite 2014, p. 2), refers to detachment from selfish interest in sense-based, emotional, or temporal acquisitiveness synonymous with self-love in favour of seeking the welfare of others.

Disinterested love as a theological teaching of St John of the Cross claims charity / agape requires only an interior loss of desires for friendships and other temporal goods, not the literal sacrifice of these goods. But this statement is not true, because any action or no action regarding temporal goods or hypergoods (Taylor 1989, p.63-73) has strong bearing on the self. The proposition is false in appearing to support the idea that God is devoid of self-concern in the divine-human relation.

Proponents of disinterestedness argue that Christian neighbour–love must be seen as wholly self-denying, self-emptying (Nygren 1982 p.222-3); while this Christian ethical thought may remain intimately linked it is inadequate and misleading. Long (2000, p.27) observes the claim Christian moral action should be disinterested was an eighteenth-century innovation. For Stephen Post (1986, p.356), the problem of disinterested benevolence was a nineteenth-century issue.

In discussing the nature of Christian love, Post discovers that Christian ethicists like Samuel Hopkins and his adherents subscribed to a concept of radically self-denying love that undermined any place for self-concern in the divine-human relation. Sanderlin (1993, p.89) argues that Post does not ‘deal with arguments such as St. John’s of the Cross, that disinterestedness is necessary for a ‘pure gift-love for God and neighbour’. Expressing the thoughts of St. John of the Cross, Sanderlin (Ibid. p. 90) asserts one should desire God alone for one’s happiness, for God's own sake, and not for the sake of any lesser, created good,
such as a human friendship. I argue it may be true following Sanderlin’s argument and that of
_St. John of the Cross_ that; the complete formulation of this position is that for human
happiness one should love God solely for God's own sake. Accordingly, there is self-interest
for God and us, and rightly so, for God is the source of true happiness.

Notwithstanding, this critique carries a mistrust of the radical renunciation of the
natural inclination of the self towards personal happiness. The central message of the Bible is
the good news about the person and work of Jesus Christ. The love of an agent’s own
happiness is embedded in this good news and cannot be eradicated by Christianity. It is the
case that the natural man, replete with tendencies toward self-fulfilment and well-being is the
fundamental fact with which God works⁴.

Our relationships begin in God who lives in eternal triune relationship, the creator of
all that is very good. He is the one who is present and involved with His creation. He is not a
disinterested God distant and removed from His creation, nor should He be confused with His
creation. He is always the God of compassion and grace. So, the gospel begins (John 1) with
a God who has taken the initiative to be present in loving relationship. I argue therefore, that

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⁴ Jonathan Edwards, wrote critically regarding the debate over disinterested benevolence, and acknowledged in
his own theology that the influence of his maternal grandfather, Solomon Stoddard, an orthodox Puritan, in his
suspicion of the radical renunciation of the natural inclination of the self towards personal happiness. Jonathan
observed that "Mr. Stoddard of this town of Northampton" developed the "best philosophy that I have met with
of original sin" because "that natural and necessary inclination that man has to his own benefit" is not thrust
Harvey G. Townsend, Oregon.

Stephen Post writes of Jonathan Edwards that, “Edwards never allowed his notion of Christian love to ignore
the basic constitution of human persons, i.e., to go far beyond nature. This aspect of Edwards' thought can be
traced back to the influence of Samuel Willard (1640-1707) as well. Willard's lectures on the relation of love
and happiness were given in the 1680s and 1690s, simultaneous with the famous "Pure Love" controversy in
late seventeenth-century France involving François Fénelon and the Quietists.” (1986, p. 357).

Barbara Falgoust Mennite in her PhD dissertation (2014) discussed ‘The Philosophical and Theological
Foundations of François Fénelon’s Political Theory: Love, Free Will, and Disinterested Virtue.’ In her
discussions in chapters 2 & 3 she examine Fénélon’s thoughts on, ‘The Roots of Amour pur and
Disintéressement in Philosophical Theology, & Fénélonian Amour Pur and Disintéressement,’ respectively both
steeped in the renunciation of most if not all self-regard claims, makes little sense. Mennite does not seem to
carry any suspicion of exaggerated demands for self-denial in Fénélon’s thoughts that can be related to more
than a respect for Puritan orthodoxy. On reading the two chapters mentioned above in Mennite dissertation one
has the suspicion that even practical interests did not persuaded neither Fénélon nor Mennite that proper self-
regard must be included in the Christian ethic.
any Christian saint’s quest for happiness, is as necessary to her own nature as the faculty of her will is, and therefore it is impossible that such a love should be destroyed in any other way than by destroying her being.

Christian virtue ought not to soar too high above the range of human nature, it is the only way benevolence does not become so radically pure and disinterested as to demand that persons act "inconsistent with themselves". On the other hand, it is the cases that in the long-term interest of an agent, to develop, maintain, and act on other-regarding attitudes. Compliance with familiar other-regarding moral norms of restraint, cooperation, and aid is mutually advantageous (Brink 1997, p. 123).

Morality stems from the fact that experience is relational. Good will is what is most perfect in humans, and the will can experience its goodness only when it is creative and free of encumbrance, including limits to reason. The basis of the morally good will is ontological. The will always seeks the happiness of the agent such that the notion of selfless love is an abstraction divorced from concrete human experience. The idea of union as Infinite Goodness is the basis of the message of the gospel’s system of ethics, in which Scripture promises happiness and reward (Mathew 5), the cornerstone of the prudential aspect of Christianity. God who is the exemplar of perfect happiness shares this aspect of himself with the saints.

I consider that the message of the gospel taps into innate spiritual and aesthetic experiences that inform moral persons, and these voluntary experiences are not contrary to universal truths that can be reached through reason. It is my conviction that what can be empirically ascertained accords with scriptural warrant. Whilst love that "seeketh not its own," is acknowledged, it is worth recognising that "from one end of the Bible to the other" there are appeals to "the principle of self-love". It is arguable that whether seeking for personal salvation or simply responding to the teachings of the New Testament, scripture
‘counsels to seek our own good’ (Matthew 13: 44-46), to ignore this prudential aspect of New Testament ethics is to err. Christian love can be defined solely in terms of self-love, and this is without curtailing the importance of disinterested motives. The need to carefully balance disinterested motives within the framework of reciprocal love undermines the doctrine of the ‘willingness to be damned.’

My primary purpose is to survey how the message of the gospel is akin to the concept of self-love while distancing itself from the self-sacrificial morality purported by a sense of disinterested love. Against Stackhouse’s cosmopolitan social ethics (Long 2000, p. 27), I argue that it is not the case that the message of the gospel allows our actions and our gifts to others to be alienated, with no expectation of return. The consideration I presuppose is that communion in God carried through the message of the gospel, self, and other(s) is the highest ideal of Christian love.

1.3.3 Divine love Considered as Un-teleological is false

The assumption that God's love is "un-motivated," un-conditional, uncaused, and un-calculating is false. Joseph Haroutunian (1965, p.207) critically describes such an assumption as "negative" definitions of love:

"... the definition of love in negatives as unconditional, uncaused, unmotivated, groundless, uncalculating; as self-giving, self-denying, self-crucifying, simply outgoing; as unprudential unevaluating unteleological, etc., leaves us with a 'love' that is not only impossible for human beings, regenerate or unregenerate, but also of doubtful Biblical and theological validity."

From scripture God's love is motivated by a concern for the divine-human good. Biblical characters depict specific relations they associate with the divine; Jeremiah and Hosea both refer to God as the jealous husband of Israel. There are also narratives and language of love between father and son and between husband and wife that are central throughout the biblical materials. The divine is genuinely concerned for Israel for its own sake and grieves for
Israel’s sorrows. This biblical language indicates that mutuality is a moral excellence. Against Blum (1980, p.75), friendship should not be pictured negatively as a kind of extension of self, in the sense that “when one acts for the other one is simply extending what is in a sense one’s own good”. Also, the entire course of Old Testament the narrated history Jewish people must be understood in terms of a God who attempts to restore the communion lost due to the Fall.

Adams has pointed with reference to the Old Testament, "God's love for us is surely seen as involving a desire for certain relationships…’ These relationships are between God and humans not for God’s own sake and not merely as good for humans. For “..God seems at least as interested in divine-human relationships as in human happiness per se" (Adams 1980, p.96). For Haroutunian and Adams it is the intentions of the divine will, to be with humans, the ‘will to belong,’ and the symbol of the cross can be interpreted in the light of divine longing for communion.

I maintain that the idealisation of selfless love, both divine and human has an emotional appeal to it despite normative flaws. Claims of perfect self-forgetfulness or total dying to friendship violate the moral structures of both social and personal existence. Unfortunately, this perennial preoccupation with motivational selflessness is deeply embedded in Christian tradition and hence continues to obscure the actual giving and receiving that is the telos of love. Post (1988) suggests that the prevailing of idealising selfless love needs a ‘prophetic tradition,’ (p.22 citing Buber 1959, p. 82)

“You know always in your heart that you need God more than everything; but do you not know too that God needs you – in the fullness of His eternity needs you”?

One is inclined to think of the God of Buber as the kind of God who suffers due to divine exile from humanity. Although the will of God is to be established on earth, manifest and near; conversely, when the doors of this world are shut on him, his truth is then betrayed, and
his will defied, God withdraws leaving human beings to themselves (Romans 1: 17-32). God did not leave of his own accord, he was in a sense exiled, and while we are careful not to assign human-like features to the divine often the scriptural evidence of suffering is ignored hence the proliferation of the claim of the divine devoid of self-concern and self-suffering.

Classical Christian theology has argued that Jesus suffered only in his human aspect that is distinct from his divine nature. Accordingly, Jesus’ suffering was not as God and not even as a representation of the nature of God, since the divine nature is eliminated of all manner of suffering. This teaching fosters a selfless divinity above all need, and it is this that was considered the exemplar of the morally worthy love. McWilliams (1985, p.15) reasons out this presumed traditional idealisation of selfless love presently revisited, it still is increasingly untenable to accept this view, in the light of a God who exemplifies the persistent reciprocity of need.

I contend that, while there may be a limited strategic value to occasional considerations of what appear to be exaggerated claims against self-love, such considerations might act as a deterrent against selfishness. Nevertheless, any strategic value of these considerations must both be distinguished from normative importance and carefully scrutinized. This schema is being effectively carried out in feminist literature, the development of which constitutes a second line of criticism against selfless love that complements the theme of divine self-concern (Post 198, p.223).

1.4 Problematic and Self-Referring Self-love in Christian tradition

The self-referring disposition comprised in self-concept brings to the open the problem of the relation between egoism and altruism, of self-regarding and other regarding action, of self-love and benevolence. The central issues are the motivation of moral action with the failure to examine the underlying problem of the nature of all motivation. This
problem is most evident among those of the view that people are naturally moved only by self-love, or self-regard for their own interest. In the Christian tradition accounts of self-love and self-sacrifice are notorious problems, espousing apparently incompatible claims of self-love and self-sacrifice. Example, might be Kierkegaard “self-denial … is Christianity’s essential form” (Frankfurt 2004, p.68). Alasdair MacIntyre (1999, p.160) on the contrary, “self-sacrifice … is as much of vice, as much of a sign of inadequate moral development, as selfishness”.

To argue that love should be directed at others and that focusing it on oneself is vain and self-absorbed is erroneous. Furthermore, terms like true and false self-love complicate the more theological and philosophical discussions of self-love leaving them to struggle with what is proper self-love. In Christian tradition self-love is viewed by most as a necessary evil. The perennial traditional understanding being, Christians are called to love like Jesus, self sacrificially, on grounds that Jesus showed the ultimate act of love by dying on the cross. Christians are to imitate Christ’s love by sacrificing themselves for others (Nygren 1982. 218). Christian traditional thought and practice holds that self-love leads to selfishness and pride – both vices; claiming to be a true and good Christian one is called to imitate Jesus Christ, in whom are embedded acts of self-denial.

Considering certain texts of the Gospels and the Pauline Epistles, it is easy to see why Christian thinkers focus on service to others. For Martin Luther self-love is fairly similar to Augustine’s and Aquinas,’ except Luther’s more negative anthropology resembles Augustinian views more than Aquinas’. Luther did not believe self-love to be important or a just act. Brady citing the Institutes explains that Luther, “…. is deeply suspicious of the idea we ought to love ourselves. Because of sin we are inclined toward excessive self-love.” (2003, p.89). For Brady, Luther saw “true love for yourself is hatred of yourself” (Ibid.
Therefore, appreciating true self-love one must be so disgusted with one’s self to the point of actually hating oneself.

On account of the influence of the New Testament and the focus on loving and serving others in order to obtain eternal life, Luther perceived self-love as sinful and dangerous for Christians. I maintain contra Luther that there is a danger when one denies oneself self-love. In the Christian tradition the idea of self-sacrifice rather than self-love has been propagated to the extreme perhaps, without intention, but detrimental to self. Lippitt correctly observes that,

“The Christian tradition has perhaps tended to warn more forcefully of the dangers of improper self-love than of improper self-sacrifice. But either, taken to an extreme, can be both practically disastrous and incompatible with the Christian ideal.” (2009, p. 132).

I argue that self-love is the first and most important component for successfully completing the love command of Jesus. At the same time, each individual has a moral obligation not to relate to others in a way that is truly destructive of herself as a person.

1.4.1 Moral or theological considerations of Self-love

A correct theory of motivation shows that both self-love and altruism are acquired dispositions. Not being original ingredients in human psychological make-up, each of them may be either morally good or reprehensible. I maintain that human native impulses and acts are neither egoistic nor altruistic. They are not actuated by conscious regard for one’s own good or the good of others. They are simply responses to situations.

No suggestion is given implying that conscious regard for self is morally bad and regard for the other necessarily good. Acts are not necessarily selfish because they evince considerations for the future well being of the self. This is the context into which the gospel message of good news that Jesus proclaimed is presented, and where it is capable of changing personal dispositions. It is moral duty upon occasion to lookout for one’s self interest in
many respects. Jesus’ proclamations themselves are personally tailored, so the individual is invited to make a decision by herself. She responds to Jesus’ calls for the Kingdom addressed at her self-love.

Jesus appeals to the self–love [self-interest see Smith below] of each individual. It is also true that Jesus’ own interests are met in this appeal to an individual’s self-interest or self-love regarding the Kingdom of God. As a matter of fact, the relationship between Jesus’ call for a response, can be paralleled with economic relationships between the Smithian traders [butcher, brewer, and baker] and their customers.

Each appeal to the interests and the self-love of the other. Self-love is a phrase that shuttles between distinct experiences and different concepts, sometimes rival ones. This propensity affects how ethics arises in response to the demand to orient and guide one’s life (Weaver 2002, p.1). The problem of how to practically and morally love one’s self rightly surfaces. The answer must necessarily be that the right self-love designates a particular form of self-relation. We understand ourselves fully and truly and are prepared to embody this understanding in our actions and relations.

Self-love often explains self-related actions that reflect the negative, neutral and positive aspects of an action. The foundations of self-love are not narcissistic instincts or desires (Thomas 1997, p.3) but rather parental love. Aristotle, in *Nicomachean Ethics* (1155b18, 1156a5) speaks of self-love as capable of vicious and virtuous acts.

Loving oneself beyond the reasonable limit is censured and rejected. He speaks of virtuous people as being proper self-lovers who neither harm others nor themselves (NE 1168b29-1169a11). Not hurting others for the sake of gaining for oneself, one will not be blamed or charged as a self-lover. O’Donovan comments on Augustine’s three interpretations
of self-love as referring to negative, neutral and positive dimensions of human action (1979, p.90, 91, 137).

Joseph Butler, in his Sermons, equates self-love with the idea of selfishness that few define as ‘immoderate or excessive’ self-love, an excessive calculating concern for one’s own interest or advantage (Butler 1827, p.153). He also considers it a ‘reasonable’ or ‘cool’ self-love that takes care of the interests of others. For Butler the call of benevolence - acting for the sake of others - is not contrary to self-love since, “there is no peculiar contrariety between self-love and benevolence, no greater competition between these than between any other particular affections and self-love” (Butler 2006, p.54).

Kant implying self-love asserts that one must not give up her claims to her own happiness because under certain circumstances, it is a duty to her to be concerned with it. Kant observes further health, wealth, and the like may be necessary means for fulfilling one’s duty, the lack of happiness resulting from being too poor can prevent one from fulfilling her duty (Kant 2002, p.119).

For Nygren, self-love, is wholeheartedly pernicious and ‘a devilish perversion’ (Nygren 1969, p.740). Nygren’s opposition against self-love is based on the distinction between the natural and divine love and non-believer and believer love as well as on the fact that he believes self-love has no proper consideration of others. These suggestions display how easily self-love is widely employed to explain the act of selfishness and inconsiderate self-interest. My contention is that the notion of self-love must be disentangled from sounding the meanings of selfish and uncharitable self-interested actions.

To distinguish self-love from selfishness and discourteous self-interest one is faced with examining how self-love is conceived in moral theology. It is to redefine the notion of Christian love to some extent, and foster a sense of self-love that opens out to loving God and
neighbour. Such self-love is rooted in the Gospels, for example in Luke, where and when Jesus calls his disciples to love God and “your neighbour as yourself.” It is expected the disciples will discover personal self-love by focusing on one’s self and one’s happiness for the sake of others. Such self-love is different from selfishness because it never implies excessive love for one’s self to the exclusion and manipulation of others.

It inclusively embraces others identifying them as part of one’s self. This kind of self-love is distinguished from self-interest as its acts of self-love seek others’ advantage and attempts to motivate oneself to see the well-being of others for their own sake. A well-adjusted theological understanding of self-love would contribute to this interpretation. Stephen Post (1988, p. 346) writes that,

‘True self-love is justified by Augustine, for it is love fully coextensive with and supportive of love for God.’

I contend that, an Augustinian view of love for God with the ideal of communion insists that the last iota of self-concern must be renounced to achieve a perfectly "pure" motivation. The distinction is based on the distinctive nature of love that is essentially relational, that moves the person toward the good, uniting her with God who is the ultimate good and the source of all good.

Outka (1972, p.63) understands self-love to carry value judgements and views it as being wholly nefarious; as normal, reasonable, and prudent. Therefore, self-love is able to be justified derivatively from other regards; and as a definite obligation, independent of other-regards (Ibid, p.55-74). Outka advocates a relatively straightforward assumption, that persons do not in general need to be urged toward concern about their own welfare, since they already have plenty of attachment to their welfare of an immediate and unreflective kind. Self-love considered this way dispels Nygren’s unease and distrust that prudential self-regard totally passes over into acquisitiveness.
Augustine placed limits on the piety of self-denial by appropriating true self-love into the Christian framework, albeit remaining ambiguous. Christians, he argued, "do not strive to destroy themselves" (Augustine 1958, p.21). "All men," Augustine (1948, p.320) declared, "desire to live happily." Moreover, "Following after God is the desire for happiness; to reach God is happiness itself" (1948, p. 320). Notwithstanding that they remain theoretically distinct, love for God and true well being are in practice one and the same. Without love for God, there can be neither true self-love nor true happiness. God alone is the natural end or "chief Good" of the self. It will become obvious later on that Augustinian self-love is not a self-referring duty independent of God, yet it is still self-love.

The self, according to Augustine, is never free from desire or from love of self. The possibility of fulfilment comes when the self desires the one thing worth desiring, namely, God (O'Donovan 1980, p.37). A false self-love enters when communion with God is belittled, blighted or relegated to the background, such that one petitions or coaxes God for "external" goods, i.e., goods other than God himself. For Outka (1972, p. 63) a value judgment that may be placed on self-love is that it is normal, reasonable and prudent.

It may not be especially praiseworthy nor is it necessarily blameworthy. This self-love is taken to be a paradigm for equal regard of others per se, being basically independent of idiosyncratic attractiveness. This self-love is neither a precondition nor a remainder of neighbour love, as some have tended to behold it (Weaver 2002, p.45).
1.5 The concept and the changing ideas of the Self

“…I will try and convince you that there is no such thing as a self. Contrary to what most people believe, nobody has ever or had a self. But it is not just that the modern philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience together are about to shatter the myth of the self.” (Metzinger 2009, p. 1)

These are the opening lines in Thomas Metzinger’s book *The Ego Tunnel: the Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self*, 2009, (New York, Basic Books). If Metzinger is correct I do not need to write this section of this thesis, and yet there is something about self that defies the self illusion Metzinger advocates.

In the first section of his book, Metzinger appeals his claim to empirical studies on phenomena such as the well-known rubber hand illusion 5. In that section of the book one is confronted by the need to make a difference between saying that ‘there is no such thing as the self’ and saying that ‘the self is not quite what we supposed it to be.’

Therefore, whilst Metzinger remains justified in his scientific and philosophical pursuit of the question of the existence of consciousness in particular, he still has to contend with his further claims that, ‘say that the self is a widely distributed process in the brain. . . [or that] the system as a whole. . . can be called a ‘self’” (p. 208).

It seems Metzinger and other propagators of epistemological self cannot explain away the ontological self. Metzinger is simply faced with the same issues Hume faced regarding the existence of the self. In light of this we need to pay attention to Klein (2012, p. 255) that, ‘…we need a new, more inclusive metaphysic in which reality is not reduced to only that which can be manipulated by science.’ The self is a term that has remained inter-

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5 In this illusion, a subject’s real hand is covered from view, and a rubber hand is placed next to it on a table. The real and rubber hands are then stroked simultaneously with a probe; eventually, subjects come to experience the rubber hand as their own, even feeling the presence of a ‘phantom arm’ leading up to the hand. These experiments, it seems however, that they can be interpreted to imply only that our brains sometimes and, in some ways, misrepresent the nature of the self, rather than that our sense of self is always and nothing but an illusion (Buckner 2012, pp. 457-461)
disciplinary and more widely in its application, and yet it also remains less well understood. Not only is self a fundamental concept in psychology around which all else revolves, this is true of philosophy, anthropology, economics, theology, biology and so forth.

James Walkup (1987, p. 3) observed that the visibility of the term self in public and academic discussions is a sure sign that the self can no longer be taken for granted to mean the same thing for everybody. It may be the case that the difficulties encountered with so much contemporary commentary on the self is founded on a desperate, quite fundamental, uncertainty about the value judgments that are implicit in our attempts to contemplate its meaning.

A unitary sense of self that exists across time and place is a central feature of human experience, at least for most people. Consequently, most people intuitively understand what is meant by the term self; definitions have tended toward the philosophical and metaphysical. Efforts at creating more formal definitions have largely been unsuccessful, as many features of self are empirically murky, difficult to identify and assess using objective methods.

The phenomenological experience of self remains highly familiar to everyone (Heatherton et al 2004, 1-2). So, at issue is not whether the self exists, but how best to study it, seeing a lot of conceptual difficulties to the question of what the term “self” refers to persist. The self can be approached on two levels, the scientific inquiry or the epistemological self, and that of the personal experience or the ontological self (Klein 2012, p. 254)6.

Klein argues that it is the epistemological self that is causally accountable for the ontological self to be conceived as a subjective, singular self of everyday experience. That means, it is the neuropsychological self (epistemological self) that accounts for episodic

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457-461 The scientific inquiry of the self or the epistemological self has to do with the behavioral, affective, cognitive, and neural systems, that are assumed to be causally responsible at least in part for providing the personal experience or the ontological self (i.e., the conscious, phenomenological self of first-person experience) with knowledge of who and what it is to be a self.
memories of an agent’s life event, of her semantic trait summaries [personality traits], knowledge [facts about her life], her experience of continuity through time, personal agency or ownership, self-reflection, acknowledgment of physical self and finally the awareness of emotional self (Klein et al 2010, p. 2).

These are the components that result in the subjective, singular everyday experience of the self. Although these systems are functionally independent, as sources of knowledge in one’s self they work together as the epistemological self to help create a subjective unity. Taken independently, emotional self alone as a system becomes neither logically nor empirically necessary to maintain the experience of the self as a singular, subjective point of view.

Philosophical conceptions of the self equally do not yield a unified self as they lead to an account of the ‘minimal self’ a self devoid of temporal extension and the ‘narrative self’ that involves personal identity and continuity across time (Gallagher 2000, p.14). This philosophical understanding of the self is prevalent because it permits much allowance to the distinction between knowledge of the self by acquaintance and knowledge of the self by description. Knowledge by description subscribes to epistemological understanding of the self, while knowledge by acquaintance appears firmly locked on to the ontological understating of the self.

It is the ontological understanding of the self that shall be the focus of the discussion in this study. The ontological self permits us to have knowledge by acquaintance when we know something via direct personal contact (that may include sensory or introspective) and

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7 It continues to be demonstrated that sources of self-knowledge can be lost or partially impaired without a corresponding loss in the ability to experience the self as a singular, subjective point of everyday experience. Notably, in neuropsychological studies (Klein et al 2010), in the archives of the neurology are embedded cases of individuals who lack access to differing degrees to their self-constituting knowledge of episodic memories of one’s life events, or semantic summary representation of one’s personality traits or even of one’s semantic knowledge of facts about her life; and yet such a person still maintains sense of ontological identity and subjective unity.
manifest that knowledge by using terms referring to that knowledge to communicate with others. In this discussion self is a word familiarly used and easily recognised. A person certainly understands what is meant by the word both when she uses the word herself and when she hears it used by others. Considering the self\textsuperscript{8}, others can see this knowledge by acquaintance in the ease with which we talk about the self as well as we understand talk about self by them.

Ontological self or the self of personal experience is too poorly understood (scientifically) to satisfy the definitional adequacy required of terms referring to causal relations between the self and the brain. It is also a poor candidate for current scientific exploration. This is because scientific exploration is an enterprise predicated on understanding objects and their relations.

The self of my focus is derived from years of direct acquaintance that confers a sense of confidence that the readers know what it is the author refers to. This does not remove the problem of the self, for it remains unclear what the author refers to when she applies the label “self.” I advocate a tacit assumption that there is a substantive self-apprehending of this knowledge. That a self like any object (provided proper tools are available), can be treated as “other” and located, grasped, and studied scientifically (Klein 2012, p. 255).

This claim is made to accommodate the scientific focus on the self, whose investigating is the multiplicity of social and neural systems assumed to provide the

\textsuperscript{8} Despite centuries of thought committed to the problem of the self, it has proven notoriously difficult to provide a set of propositions capable of transforming our acquired knowledge into a satisfying description of what a self is. So that when we try to pin down what it is we refer to by the word “self”, problems immediately arise to try describing what the word “self” means. However, similar difficulties arise also when considering the word “time.” “What, then, is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I wish to explain it to one that asked, I know not . . .” (St. Augustine Confessions Book XI, 14, 15, p.263-266) Klein & Gangi (2010, p. 1-2) argue that questions pertaining to the ontology of the self include problems of synchronicity that is to ask what is it that accounts for the apparent phenomenal unity of self at a single moment? Self equally accounts for diachronicity that is to say the perceived continuity of self over time. Similarly, the notion of personal identity embodies the belief that the self, as presently experienced, is continuous with the self I experienced in the past and the self I will experience in the future.
ontological self with knowledge. This self may be construed as a reflexive arrangement of the subjective “I” and the constructed “Me,” that is evolving and expanding over the human life course.

This self begins life as a social actor, construed in terms of performance traits and social roles (Meads 1934, p. 140-141). At the end of childhood, the self has become a motivated agent, whose personal goals, motives, values, and envisioned projects for the future become central features of how the I conceives of the Me. Another layer of selfhood then inaugurates the self as the autobiographical author purposes to construct a story of the Me, to provide her adult life with broad purpose and a dynamic sense of temporal continuity.

Meads (1925, p.268) observes that ‘the self that is central to so-called mental experience has appeared only in the social conduct of human….’

Earlier on (p. 267) he had argued that exchange whether be of food or some other form is an act in which a person excites herself to give by making an offer. Exchange is therefore achieved by ‘putting one’s self in the attitude of the other party to the bargain.’ The individual’s action in the exchange process is the reason for the self [this understanding is covered late in Adam Smith]. The individual has become a self by virtue of organising her own response by the tendencies on the part of others to respond to her acts. The self it seems can exist for the individual only if she assumes the roles of others.

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9 McAdams (2013, p. 272) has argued that the progression of a psychological self ensue into an integrative theory that envisions the ‘self as a developing I-Me configuration of actor, agent, and author that helps to synthesize a wide range of conceptions and findings on the self from social, personality, cognitive, cultural, and developmental psychology and from sociology and other social sciences.’ McAdams is inevitably suggesting that the “I” may reflexively construe the “Me” as both a collection of abstract traits and an anthology of personal episodes or stories about my life.
1.5.1 **Self concept in discussions of self**

My focus remains the concept of the self, here I have an opportunity to examine how it relates to self-concept. The Self is not synonymous with self-concept. Self gives rise to self-concept that is built up by the responses of others to a given person, and these responses influence and shape one’s self-definitions (Reeder et al 1960, p. 153). Self-conception is related to the responses of others and to the individual's perception of those responses. These responses in themselves carry distinctions between the actual response of the other, and the subject’s perception of the response of the other.

In determining self-concept there is also the question of the self, taking on the role of the ‘generalised other’, that is, of ‘the individual’s conception of the organised process of which she is a part.’ Another key dimension of the self-concept discussion is the individual’s own conception of herself based upon the actual responses of the others; as well as other psychological determinants. Regarding the question of the self taking the role of the generalised other, Mead (1956, pp. 231-232) draws out three aspects of the generalised other. These include attitudes of other individuals toward the self, toward one another, and “toward the various phases or aspects of the common social activity or set of social undertakings that as members of an organized society or social group, individuals are all engaged.

It is obvious that the responses of others to an individual have an influence in shaping her self-definition. This self-definition is chiefly derived from the perception of the ‘generalised other.’ Walker et al (2013, p. 153) have argued that previous research on the self-concept has been mistaken by focusing only on those relationships specific to a given role without taking into account an individual’s overall fabric of multiple roles and relationships.
The general view espoused by identity theorists’ claims is that the self is composed of multiple identities attached to multiple roles through patterned ties to role based others. This role based others is not independent since it is embedded in the larger network of social ties that comprise one’s personal social network (Owen et al 2010, p. 479). Self-concept is conditioned it seems by the various identity theories focusing on internalisation of ‘social positions within a self-structure and those that focus on how consensual and or cultural identity meanings that evoke them’ (Ibid. p. 478). Mead (1934, p. 134) illustrated the self as a phenomenon of the human mind born out of reflexive action, stemming primarily from a person’s interactions with others.

He stressed the ability to imagine oneself from the standpoint of another person. The self consists, he argued, of two components: the “I” and the “me” (Ibid. p.173-178). The “I” (or subject) is the dynamic, novel, spontaneous aspect of the self that constitutes the individual as knower and actor. The “me” (or object) is all the learned perspectives a person takes toward herself and the attitudes that the “I” assumes toward one’s own person, especially when taking the role of the other. From Mead’s expression of the self-phenomenon it is the “me” aspect of the self that includes the self-concept and the identities incorporated into it.

Following Mead, once the self emerges in the human organism, a nascent self-concept soon follows. Rosenberg (1979, p.15-17) expressed self-concept as the entirety of a specific person’s thoughts and feelings toward herself as an object of reflection. The self-concept (or

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11 We will not here delve into details on the question of identity, but it suffices to suggest that identity concept finds its place in the broader concepts of the self and self-concept. Identity occupies a very unique place vis-à-vis these wider concepts (of self and self-concept). Identity is at the same time a nested component of the more general self-structures, yet also refers to social positions that exist outside the individual actor that are available to be ascertained, enacted, and potentially internalised. Owen et al (Three Faces of Identity 2010, in Annual Review of Sociology vol. 36, Pp. 377- 499) among others, provide an extensive review of literature accounting for the vast array of identity understandings. We can summarily suggest that for many theorists who emphasise the internalised nature of identity within the context of a stable self-structure, the concept of identity is nested within the more inclusive concepts of the self and the self-concept.
the “me”) can be thought to comprise of three broad classes of individual attributes; self-referring dispositions, physical characteristics, and identities\(^\text{12}\). These individual attributes are significant to the self-concept and affect the contemporary understanding of selfhood.

1.5.2 Seigel on the question of contemporary self and selfhood

Modern thought cannot dispense with the self and what it stands for. To proclaim the death of the author or the end of the human self or the individual as subject is to be mistaken (Seigel 2005, p. 39). It is this mistakenness that draws Seigel to the question of selfhood in contemporary “post-modern” notions of the demise of the human self or subject (ibid. p. 4).

Such notions he argues derive from the privileging of the reflective aspect of self, which purportedly enables the self to escape any or all of its concrete determinants “on behalf of a vision of transcendent freedom that overwhelms . . . more modest visions of personal integration and regulated autonomy” (Ibid, p. 4). Seigel challenges the idea that a naive, Cartesian concept of the self that has been hegemonic in the modern West, presumed responsible for a “demise of the human self or subject” ((Seigel 2005, p. 4). He wants to reject “one-dimensional” notion of the self, that illustrates the self as essentially rational or basically a function of the body, or as merely a function of social relations. He combines different dimensions of the self and has tried to get a more unified conception of the self. What he has

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\(^{12}\) Self-referring dispositions denote the abstract categories people develop over their life courses and then use to shape their response tendencies, including attitudes such as liberalism, traits such as altruism, values such as patriotism, and abilities such as athletic skill. It is notable that these traits represent ways to differentiate oneself from others (as opposed to representing communalities with others through roles or group membership). Physical characteristics include one’s external attributes such as being obese, deaf, or tall. Physical characteristics become sociologically interesting when they are also incorporated into a person’s self-image and thus have the potential to shape one’s behaviour or one’s social and psychological well-being. They also have an external character that influences how others respond to us, shaping their internalisation into the self-concept. A third component of self-concept is the identity. There are four key sources of identity characterizations (Owen et al 2010, p. 479) draws out of Rosenberg 1979 includes personal or individual identity, role-based identity, category-based identity, and group membership–based identity. Personal identity is the most elementary type of identity, defined as the social classification of an individual into a category of one. It denotes a unique individual with self-descriptions drawn from one’s own biography and singular constellation of experiences.
achieved is not a theory of the self, or at least he doesn’t set it out to be so; rather it is a theory about the history of thinking about the self.

Seigel advises of the importance of harbouring a lot of scepticism about the notion that the self is a thing or an object. For him, the self is an idea, and as an idea, it’s something human beings use as a vehicle for trying to make sense out of the different components of their lives, and they do that according to what sort of understanding of human existence they want to have.

The difficulties one encounters in this demarcation are that if there is only a bodily awareness of the sense of the self for example, what happens to the actual body? The emphasis on interconnections of the dimensions raises difficulties in definition; is Descartes’ reflection the same as Locke’s or Fichte’s or Heidegger’s? No not necessarily, since they were all trying to solve different problems, thereby defined the body, for example, in very different ways, even in some sense as different things (Izenberg 2005, p.398).

Seigel’s accounts of the scientific, commercial, political and intellectual revolutions within which the self’s bodily, relational and the reflective sense of awareness are figured during the self’s development stages to its modern idea of the self he has to accentuate the priority of each dimension. Seigel’s conception of the self is along one or more of these three dimensions, the bodily, the relational and the reflective (Smith 2006, p. 93).

He contends for the need of a “multi-dimensional” model of the self, in this case consisting of three dimensions: the “bodily or material”; the “relational,” which “arises from social and cultural interactions”; and the “reflective” or self-conscious aspect of the self (Seigel 2005, 5-6; Garrett 2006, p. 300).

The important question for Seigel in respect of these dimensions is, in what relationship are they put? How do people view or imagine the relations between these three dimensions of the self? The possibilities abound but within them a particular choice is significant for Seigel,
the multidimensional selves, and one-dimensional self (Seigel 2005. p. 10). A multidimensional self combines two or three dimensions of the self that is never wholly coherent because it experiences tensions between its constituents. If founded on a dimension of reflectivity it has some degree of independence, but its freedom will be limited by the material and social conditions of its being.

Thus, multidimensional selves experience both a degree of autonomy and a set of limitations to themselves. One-dimensional selves, on the contrary are permeated by the qualities of the single dimension that constitutes them. Seigel (2006, p. 340) refutes the views of Peter Gordon (2006, p. 324) who regards one-dimensional views of the self as “flat” and argues to their being notably bubbly and effervescent.

The self may be purely bodily, or may be dominated by its relational dimension, or the self may be wholly reflective and thus essentially independent of both the physical and the social worlds. It is to this tripartite model of the self we turn beginning with the bodily dimension providing awareness as a sense of the self.

1.5.3 The continuity of bodily awareness of the sense Self

The self for Seigel is not a free-floating consciousness, because the self is also defined by its corporeal existence. Such recognition of the self depends not simply on memory and consciousness but also on its peculiar physical characteristics. Seigel typically refers to this aspect of the discourse of the self as ‘the body’.

The idea of bodily selfhood has entailed a concept of self independent of time and place as a set, in essence, of universal biological needs. Seigel’s corporeal dimension of the self is highly compatible with the development of the sociology of the body as in part a critique of Descartes. Although the terminological apparatus is missing, Seigel works with a distinction between the Cartesian objective body and the phenomenology of embodiment. In short, while
the conscious self is a reflective agent, the body is not necessarily an object, but participates in an embodied subjectivity towards the world.

To emphasize the first dimension is to highlight the self’s quality as embodied, that is human beings are physical creatures, subject to passions and impulses and characterized by certain temperaments. The body dimension of the self suggests corporeal dimensions; a view that Aristotle and Plato recognised and subscribed to. Theories holding to a bodily awareness foundation of self account for the nervous feedback, emotions, awareness of controlled body movements and one’s mental image of her own body as proof of that. Aristotle (Ross 1942) accounted for the local body movement and nervous system as essential to the soul or the self notwithstanding, this constituted in the mind of Aristotle the irrational lower self.

The bodily awareness has two features recommending it; the first is that the human body is a continuous entity existing in physical space. A second feature of a bodily continuous awareness is having an immediate experience. Considering these two features one could hardly be or remain unaware of the continuities of awareness of one’s body.

Difficulties however, arise in identifying the self with continuities of bodily awareness when, the experienced body begins to change radically due to age, illness, transplantation, or loss of parts of the body, although these changes may not effect a change in the individual's sense of who she is.

Again, total identification of the sense of self with body awareness precludes any view of the self as including important elements of social roles or values. Seigel in addressing these difficulties treats the body like reflection, thus flattens the changing historical meaning of the body. The body surely has to be the body of material self-interest full of the passion - like aggression against which it has to be defined. Pre-Seigel (2005, 209) it seems the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’ morality was the springboard for an interest in the self of the material
body. For Izenberg (2005, 404) the idea of the body powered but also legitimately empowered by material self-seeking drives engendered much of Enlightenment reflection on ways of socializing and moralizing the self.

1.5.4 The relational dimension as basis for a sense of self

To stress the relational dimension of the self, is to insist that people belong to cultures or societies that give them certain characteristics that they share with other people around them (Prinz 2004, p. 14-15). The relational dimension marks selfhood with patterns of belief and behaviour derived from historically particular social or cultural matrices.

This self is determined by a lifetime of social and cultural relations allowing one to be oneself in relation with society and with others, while playing numerous social roles of interpersonal interaction. Roles organise behaviour and attitudes of individuals toward one another making social interaction predictable and efficient, and persons as continuous entities of the roles they play that accounts for self. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries spawned the principal ideas of contemporary social role theories of self.

Theories that suggest there exists a "self to be studied for each individual, and that this self is the basic determinant of her behaviour, a self developed through social interaction (Mead 1934, p. 200-9). Selves are also developed through legitimate processes out of the same materials, so that one can know oneself only to the extent that others know one. A relational dimension as a basis for sense of self suggests that individuals engage in a constant search for mutually good secure and intimate anxiety free relationships with others.

This promotes a positive development of a reliable self, acceptable to others as it remains consistent. An inconsistent self promotes a negative stimulus and removes from efficient ways for individuals to interact with each other through a commonly held definition
of reality that satisfy their individual needs. The self in a relational dimension comprises some
abstraction of the most important or most continuously played roles.

For example, Miller (1963, p. 672) suggests, "a person’s self may be defined in terms
of her unique manner of playing her roles", because there is no core personality underneath
one’s behaviour and feeling. There are those who argue that thinking about the self is shaped
by the subject-object predicate (Seigel 20005, 14). Subject-object ground signposts the
reflective dimension of the self with language as focus. Language then becomes key to a
relational foundation of the sense of self. Language encourages the location of selfhood in close
proximity in relation to others. It accommodates the subject as an agent of thoughts and
identified through its relations to others. This supports the claim that for the self to be most
useful must agree closely in form with the reciprocal definition maintained by others, thereby
stressing the importance of social definition to the sense of self.

The discourse between the self and the other, as envisioned by the self through “taking
the role of the other”, i.e. the process of role taking, is considered constitutive of the self as a
social object (Harnish 2010, p. 5). Descartes locates the essence of the self within the body and
mind of the actor, i.e. individually. Nonetheless the self cannot conceive itself as an object
without the other, i.e. socially., and the development of the self and mind arise from social
contexts.

1.5.5 The Reflective dimension as basis of a sense of self

To conceive the self along the third dimension is to point to the independence humans
acquire reflecting on their being and establishing a distance from their bodily or social
existence. For Gordon (2006, p, 323) reflectivity must enjoy a distinctive, even primary role in
the composition of the self, but he fears Seigel does not explicitly address it.
Reflectivity suggests human beings’ ability as selves to think critically about their own positions and this is a constitutive, and pre-eminent, aspect or dimension of human selfhood (Surkis 2006, p. 315). Seigel sees the usefulness of the term reflectivity to include certain features of the wider vocabulary used when talking and thinking about the self. Seigel is referring to the vocabulary of disciplines such as human biology, psychology and other social relation whose contents he observes are complex and far exceeding the ability to be examined in his present work (Seigel 2005, 11-12).

The human capacity for reflection has been understood as enabling the self to become aware of its bodily and social characteristics. Through such self-awareness the self gets to know exactly how and to what degree there is an issue for self in reflection to detach itself and obtain independence from the bodily and relational. Reflectivity as the contribution made to self by the mind provides ingredients for intellectual self awareness in selfhood. A reflective dimension of the self permits the self to be an active agent of its own realisation as it establishes order among its own attitudes and beliefs therefore providing order to its actions (Gordon 2006, p. 323).

Reflectivity assumes self rationality and appears particularly mode of mental agency that bears on the self’s relations to itself and to the world outside. It is reflectivity’s self rationality that is responsible for the choice of means to achieve any given ends. A reflective relationship to the contents of experience suggests the apprehending of impressions and ideas as objects of concern in themselves. When modulated by reflection, the mental content of human attention focuses less on what is outside in the surrounding world, and more on what these mental contents seem to tell of things inside human beings\(^\text{13}\). The reflective dimension

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\(^\text{13}\)Seigel with a little digression highlights the difference between reflectivity and reflexivity, which are almost unwittingly assumed as synonyms. The two however carry opposed meanings where - reflex suggests an automatic or involuntary action or an uncontrolled response to stimulus this includes mirror images referred to reflections. The mental act of reflecting is an intentional and purposive act. It is not an unwilled response to
suggests goal-oriented behaviour as contributing to the sense of self. It suggests values, and activities which when they are engaged in become relatively persistent through the life of an individual hence giving the individual a sense of self. The sense of self in reflective dimension is based partly on the valuing process, therefore conceivably based on a continuing capacity to value, a point strongly made by Charles Taylor in *Sources of the Self* (1989).

The continuities of the reflective process act as potential contributors to the sense of self. In this valuing process one’s underlying values may or may not be known to oneself, although one is continually repeating behaviours that she labels good or bad. The labelling results from the immediate experience associated with one’s like of the good and dislike of the bad.

The capacity to reflect is consequently attractive as an experiential continuity potentially basic to the sense of self, since a sense of the self is based partly on the process of valuing. In the process of valuing, the self depends on feelings that one's actions and beliefs are in harmony - that she understands the world in a way consistent with her actions in it. Valuing or reflectivity is a feature self engages in precisely because selves are both corporeal and relational (Ibid. p. 17) and cannot be either corporeal or relational only.

By reflectivity or valuing selves address a bodily sense of being and what social and cultural existence imposes or permits. Korsgaard (1996, p. 369) observes that reflectivity allows some form of independent moral agency, a capacity to determine one’s own will reflectively. Reflectivity permits capacity for one to posit in a Kantian understanding the necessary ground of morality and freedom. Reflectivity however, requires reason to be able to

stimulus it is rather self-directed (2005, 13). The two terms therefore suggests two distinct forms of self-reference, a passive and an active response reflexive and reflection respectively. Reflectivity suggesting a more active attentiveness that establishes relationships is the term Seigel applies to the self as he argues reflectivity is always taking place below the level of unconsciousness. Reflection itself is set in motion by both inner and outer influences.
adjudicate between competing motives driven by corporeal (bodily) awareness sense as basis of self and relational or social awareness sense as basis of self.

A reflective dimension cannot be perceived to constitute selfhood independent of the corporeal and the relational (Gordon 2006, p. 322–323). This dismisses those who have made it to be the only true basis of self-existence, or that it provides access to the deep essential self or subject. Such a claim will find basic incoherence in the view that there is a self that comes first to know itself through conscious reflection.

The idea of reflective dimension of the self is attractive due to its continuity and availability to organise consistent and continuous corporeal and relational awareness of the self. But it faces its principle difficulties in attempting to integrate reflectivity with the corporeal and relational continuities. The self, as a reflective process, i.e. "it is an object to itself." It is the reflexivity of the self that "distinguishes it from other objects and from the body." The body and other objects are not objects to themselves in the way that the self is. It is, furthermore, this reflexivity of the self that distinguishes human from animal consciousness.

1.5.6 Concluding remark on Seigel and the Self

Seigel’s three-dimensional model of the self conceptually, presupposes the modern Western self, a complex rather than a simple entity, notwithstanding the supposedly nefarious influence of Descartes. A Western European self has taken on a normative status that prescribes how we should conceive the self. From this normative perspective, the bodily, relational, and reflective aspects of the self need to be properly balanced in order for culture to have a healthy notion of the self.

When the self model assumes normative status, it is no longer a “model” but the way the self “really” is or can be. For Seigel at different historical junctures and in different national cultures of West European, the dominant concept of the self may be quite differently balanced
internally. Whilst he does not dwell on the point, an accentuation of any one aspect can create certain “pathologies” in the self. Gratuitous emphasis on the social dimension leads to the view of the self as essentially passive and/or paranoid.

Underscore reflectivity too much and the self floats free of all specific connections and situations, while a purely bodily self has scarcely any human qualities at all. Altogether, the three-dimensional self is a thoroughly “situated” self, though neither a prisoner of its social-cultural environment nor a plaything of bodily impulses (King 2008, 428).

Additionally, while the three dimensions taken together are necessary to a full conception of the self, reflectivity—the capacity of the self to examine itself in all its manifestations including the act of self-awareness itself becomes first among equals and becomes a central characteristic of the most complex tradition of the self.

1.5.7 The Self in moral spaces – Taylor, Charles

Discussing Jerrold Seigel’s thoughts in ‘The idea of the self: Thought and experience in Western Europe since the Seventeenth Century’ (2005), his was a response to ‘postmodern’ challenges to the autonomy and integrity of the human subject. Sixteen years earlier Charles Taylor in ‘Sources of the self: The making of modern identity (1989)’, attempted responding to postmodern challenges to selfhood and subjectivity.

Taylor considered the philosophical questions; of who we are and how should we live…the response is an adventure of self-discovery for readers (Teske 1990, p. 159-60). In Taylor’s monumental work several areas enrich this discussion of the self.

Taylor traces the historical sources of the modern understanding of selfhood aiming to reconstruct this understanding. He investigates how the modern sense of selfhood came about through the influences of philosophy and popular thought. Taylor lays a philosophical foundation of a history of selfhood that is between straightforward intellectual history and a
history of mentalities. His fundamental argument is that the concept of the self is linked to morality (Schneewind 1991, p. 424).

Morality is not simply a set of claims about what one ought to or not do to be moral; rather what one ought to be or not be. Taylor concedes morality is related to the self by a framework (Taylor 1989, p. 17). That is to say, how one thinks about oneself depends first, on what one considers to be the Good, and how one relates to that Good (Taylor 1989, p. 20-23; Larmore 1991, p. 159). One can only think of oneself as one thinks of oneself in relation to what is most important.

Taylor’s insight that selfhood is dependent on the Good and on one’s relation to it permits him to ask how those conceptions of self have changed over time (Ibid. p. 21-22), as people hold and relate to different goods differently. Taylor describes a transition from an external sense of the self to an interior sense of the self, echoing Augustinian Confessions.

It is also a transition from finding meaning in extraordinary deeds to finding meaning in everyday actions, ‘affirmation of ordinary life’ (Ibid. p. 23; MacIntyre 1994, p. 187). Taylor raised questions about how people conceived who they are, and how religion has influenced that conception, similarly he provides ways of thinking about religion and the self.

Taylor argues the self is indefinable apart from the Good. But since religion is proficient in defining for many people the Good and how to relate to it, religion becomes a powerful key to understanding people’s sense of self. This is a way to use religion as a lens to view self, without treating religion as something merely epiphenomenal.

Taylor focuses on first-person, subjective, affirmed identity, category identity and the understanding of authenticity to address the self. His creates the intellectual space necessary for exploring alternatives to the traditional description of selfhood. For Taylor present
descriptions of the self should be radically revised to take seriously the independent claims of values having objective reality.

Objective reality support claims that moral sensibility is important in determining what it means to be a self. Contemporary attitudes of the self as modern constructs necessitate alternative formulations of naturalistic views of the self (Schneewind 1991, p. 422). Taylor perceives that experiencing structures of selfhood as given does not allow for freedom to seek remedies to difficulties and anomalies embedded in those structures therefore alternative formulations are needed.

Any narrative of the self should therefore acknowledge the extent to which the identity of a human being is deeply interwoven with the understanding of the good (Teske 1990, p. 160). The idea of the good implies being engaged in a form of judgement. For Taylor, human experience is without any doubt coloured by human being’s capacity or need to be engrossed in qualitative judgments (Taylor 1989, 27). Human beings therefore desire to be rightly related to what it is to be good, since this constitutes the human life (ibid. 44).

1.5.8 The self and value relationship

Taylor considers it reductionism to view the self from a perspective stripped of its moral and aesthetic framework. The framework provides values and norms to be understood and engaged, they are not mere projections of sentiments or ideas or Platonic ideas somewhere beyond the commonplace life-world. Rather, values and norms are aspects of the world of self (Laitinen 2008, p. 2) and individuals live by assessing the qualitative dimensions of things around them and their own selves in the world (MacIntyre 1981, p. 33).

The endless sifting and measuring of these assessments turn out to be a major component of each individual action subsequently supplying the rationale for every decision that is taken (ibid. p. 51-52). Taylor by this understanding claims the self actually emerges
from within the context of a moral/aesthetic framework. Taylor navigates away from the cognitive function and toward narrativity and metaphors such as the quest for the good or the question of being rather than doing (MacIntyre 1994, p.189).

Taylor’s self suggests a response to ethical questions about the meaning and value of life and of one’s life in particular. To define the self is to answer the question ‘Who am I? This is a question about one’s values, ideals and attachments. It is about what makes one’s life meaningful to oneself; it is intensely personal, subjective question distinct from questions of social category (Weir 2009, p. 536).

Taylor is concerned the language of contemporary moral philosophy guided by natural science unfortunately generalises all dimensions of human life (Taylor 1989, 58; Anderson 1996, p. 24). The fallacy of this natural science generalisation is that it is only possible when aspects central to making life humane are denied or ignored.

Contemporary moral philosophy correspondingly tends to narrow down the ethical, while distilling the moral self through few abstract principles to include for example, Kantian categorical imperative or Habermas’ universal justice (Taylor 1989, 64). Contemporary moral philosophy’s tendency to limit the range of human moral reflection runs as a counterpart to the augmentation of natural science. To its natural conclusion science has rendered society inarticulate regarding the basis of moral judgments (Taylor 1989, p. 53-91; Teske 1990, pp. 161-162), it has removed the foundation from which to explain or justify who a person is and why such a person responds in the world in the way she does.

Modern moral philosophy dependent on science portrays a picture where the self can be identified independent of values, however for Taylor identity is tied up with the values that give an agent structure and direction to her life. Natural science has inevitably argues Taylor, failed to discern the qualitative distinction that animate human life. Taylor is simply re-
enforcing the fact that one cannot just climb out of the framework of human reflection, as
natural science appears to suggest.

Framework is always in part structured by valuative thoughts, feelings, goals, and all
these cannot be accurately described without the qualitative dimension; for to do so is to
describe a world without human experience. Taylor cautions the readiness of modern
descriptions of the self that render incomprehensible the kind of activities that form the
substance of human experience. The caution is given from examining the complicated Western
European’s description of the self.

Science, Taylor argues, is a form of inquiry whose objective purpose has been to
describe things from a perspective freed of anthropocentric conceptions. It cannot leap and say
that notions of the good and right are not as real, objective, and non-relative as any other part
of the natural world (Taylor 1989, 56).

In his defence the language of values has no desire or interest to foster an attitude of
the sixteenth – and seventeenth century obscurantists who fought feverishly against the natural
sciences in aid of preserving the theological basis of human dignity. His starting point is that
human beings are essentially dialogical beings that define their identities through relationships
with (and struggles against) others and themselves.

Human beings define themselves always in linguistic and cultural contexts of meaning.
For Taylor, the self to whom one is related is, to its core, a dialogical self, dependent on
dialogue and on relations of recognition and misrecognition with others. It is a self with
background meanings and languages and always in a process of change through dialogue,
through relationship and interaction with others and with the world. No scientist can accurately
describe a humanly inhabited world without the qualitative dimension; any such a world is only
but an imaginary one. Summarily Taylor argues that the problem of defining the self as it is
understood in the West, stems from allowing a particularly powerful type of discourse (natural science) that extends its range beyond that task for which it was designed (ibid. 59).

1.5.9 **Values on being more than epiphenomenal**

Taylor is persuaded natural science’s construction of a value-neutral, mechanistic universe is an illusion (Schneewind 1991, p. 422-423). This is because the human value terms purport to give insight into what it means to live in the universe as a human being, which is something of a different matter from what physical science claims to reveal and explain (Taylor 1989, p. 59; Teske 1990, p. 162).

Taylor argues for a re-construction of the modern understanding of selfhood that points toward the possibility of a newer reconstructed discourse of self that eschews natural science’s interpretations. Such a reconstructed discourse must not give the idea of belonging or of identity, because to do so is to be left with a world in which nothing matters.

This reconstructed discourse must affirm the objective reality of qualitative distinctions and values, observes Bernard Williams (*The New York Review of Books November 8, 1990*). Blattberg (2007, pp. 802-832) on the other hand is critical of Taylor for providing a detailed account of the historical text of the life of the self, while his own reconstructed discourse of the self is limited.

Taylor suggests, that new approaches to the self ought to proceed from the background of values of hypergoods, that set the stage for human moral and aesthetic judgements. These hypergoods serve to orient persons to themselves and to the world around and provide persons with their human identities. Consequently, for one to be a self is to have the capacity to take an evaluative position with respect to the things she confronts in her world.

It means engaging into the pursuit of these hypergoods that are components of the moral/aesthetic framework one inherits and modifies. Without these hypergoods Taylor doubts
individuals might make meaning of human identity. This is because for Taylor, to be a self at all is to have the capacity to take an evaluative position with respect to the things one confronts in the world. Blattberg again is critical of Taylor who seemingly assumes that hypergood-driven conflicts can be solved rationally which is not the case (Ibid. p. 815).

In his quest to restore the self discourse of values and qualities as well as to engage in a constructive description of hypergoods, Taylor affirms the ontological status of value. A reconstructed discourse of selfhood constitutes a quest for authenticity. The ideal of authenticity does not presume a fixed, pre-given self, nor is the ideal of authenticity about the metaphysics of substance, or about metaphysics at all.

For Taylor, it is about ethics, and an ethical relation to self. The question ‘Who am I?’ when raised in Taylorent terms, is a question about an individual’s goods. It is about what matters to her and what constitutes a good life for her. Certainly, for Taylor, this question demands developing an authentic relationship to oneself to others and to ideals and values. The ideal of an authentic relation to oneself is that of being true to oneself, to one’s own particularity and uniqueness from which an individual call into account a truth and moral dimensions.

It is the case also that one’s inner voice and inner feelings are important because they tell her what is the right thing to do. That is to say, one has a moral responsibility to oneself comparable to one’s responsibility to others. In this particular circumstance the point of the truth dimension is for an individual to be true to oneself, calling into perspective self-love.

What is important is that one engages in and commits to a relationship of integrity with oneself. It is exercising the care of the self, in a specifically modern way (Weir 2009, p.537) where an individual must be attentive and receptive to herself. She listens to herself, respect and foster her own uniqueness and originality. When an individual fails to do so, she is missing the point of her life, and her life is missing what being human is for oneself” (Taylor, 1992: 30)
or, the meaning of her life. The modern ideal of authenticity pacts moral importance to a particular kind of relation to one’s self. It is also a relationship in, which one must struggle to discover or respect truth about oneself.

1.5.10 Self as positing identity

Authenticity for Taylor remains important as it aids an individual to discover the meaning and value of her life (Schneewind, 1991, p. 422; Anderson 1996, p. 17-18). It is up to the individual to find out and create meanings through dialogue and reflection carried out through a relationship of integrity with oneself. Authenticity re-enforces one’s identity that is made up of one’s commitments to her values and her attachment to a community that helps her to define these commitments to values (Taylor 1989, p.36).

Authenticity is important also for self-interpretation that constitutes Taylor’s understanding of the self. Taylor contends that the capacity to discover, create and affirm one’s own identity developed historically with liberation from fixed social positions. It entails one’s freedom and responsibility for the generation of meaning, for self-definition. Modern development of both individual and collective identities, Taylor argues, corresponds to liberation from fixed social positions, and works to undermine those fixed positions.

However, these modern identities remain socially constituted through background ontologies and relations of meaning (Turner 2008, pp. 33-34). Taylor is focusing on first-person, subjective, affirmed identity to demonstrate that authentic identity of the self requires a receptive relation to self and to the truth of the self or the pursuit of self-knowledge.

But identity also means one is constituted through webs of interlocutions, from whereby she is defined through her relation to the good, or goods, of her social world. One’s identity is her connections to others, to goods and to her own self. One is a self through her connections
to others, goods and to herself. Identities are in essence connections in which an individual is a participant in the construction of her own self through dialogue with others and with self.

Taylor’s valuation of community and an individual’s embeddedness in it, contra Meads (1934) is conservative. Taylor sees social influences as benign. So that the question “who am I?” central to establishing the place of the self, is for Taylor primarily a question about the values, goods, commitments and attachments that an individual affirms. He therefore pays no attention to the degree to which individuals are still very much fixed in hierarchic social positions defined by categories like race, class, gender and sexuality, and still are very much fixed by ascriptions of identity categories.

Antony Appiah (2005, p. 54) is concerned that developing the argument in this fashion allows Taylor’s thesis to rely upon an unresolved tension between a ‘subject-centred’ and a ‘social-centred’ model of interpretation. Taylor’s response is that assigning dignity to an individual solves this problem of hierarchical social positions. Dignity is important because it is an affirmation of an individual’s place in ordinary life. The absence of dignity can be catastrophic, can shatter an individual’s ‘sense of dignity by totally undermining her feelings of self-worth’ (Taylor 1989: 16). An example Taylor would observe, is how the affirmation of an individual’s ordinary life, as specifically a modern good becomes essential to the individual’s identity, and therefore to a meaningful life.

1.5.11 Concluding remarks on the Self in Taylor

Taylor’s central historical category in tracing the emergence of the idea of the self is the rise of modernity, a process he certainly sees as many-layered and complex but which he treats largely as the rise of individualism. He makes this conclusion by attempting to answer the question ‘Who am I?’ He answers by focusing on the idea of the Self, on two levels.
The first level is that of identity, and the second is that of values. His response is tailored to the fact the question ‘who’ a person is has to do with issue of the meaning of the person’s life. To know the meaning of life an individual has to respond to another question that of authenticity and that is not just about knowing the truth of the self but being true to oneself. One’s relation to self is an ethical relation, on account that it focuses on the question of the meaning of life.

For Taylor, what gives an individual meaning to her life is the central subject of identity and belonging. Lives have meaning only insofar as persons experience themselves importantly connected to their defining communities, to their background horizons, to their ideals and goods.

Meaningful life for Taylor involves connections, but it also means breaking away from something. A life without meaning is the kind lived without one being importantly connected to something, or someone. Being connected means identifying oneself with some past tradition, with defining communities, with values or ideals and with the future one can foresee or imagine. The relation to self and to one’s telos is one’s identity or an essential part of one’s identity. Taylor has argued that the beautiful life may be one telos among possible goods recognised by modern western individuals. He identifies several such goods, and many more can surely be identified, especially once the individual broadens her global horizons.

Taylor also acknowledges that presently individuals generally embrace several competing and conflicting goods. The remedy to reconcile the competing and conflicting goods is by developing capacities for articulating these goods, more carefully and clearly, so that there may be possibilities of reconciling some of these conflicts. For Taylor, however, the connection to an ideal self, without any account of connection to defining communities, or histories, is a rather dubious and unthinkable.
1.6 Conclusion

In negotiating everyday living the mystical language of self-abandonment, death to self, and allied terms forming a matrix for understanding disinterested love is hard to grapple with. It is true that disinterested love can be joined to Augustinian anthropology that gives primacy to the will. Such love entails radical adherence to the will of God, and replacement of self-will by the divine and the forgetfulness of self, of all that hinders becoming one with God.

A central issue however, arises as to what extend disinterested love could be said to be truly disinterested? It is difficult to concede the highest form of love of God as renouncing all desire for reward or purified of all self-interest. While there exists a radical antinomy between love of God and love of self there remains an impossibility of separation.

I argued that renouncing all hope of reward would be a deformation of the love of God, not its perfection. True love of God and true love of self include hope, acknowledging and affirming God as good in himself encompassing loving God as good for the self.

In the discussion above once it became obvious that the idea of a disinterested love was untenable, this opened the way for love of God and true self-love. Love of God includes any act, thought or impulse that is in concurrence with human beings’ created teleology. I concluded that love of God and self-love are possible and that the perfection of the one is the perfection of the other.

In discussing Augustinian self-love later, it will become obvious that, Augustine acknowledged as entirely coincidental and coextensive with the love of God the principle of right self-love. Any right kind of self-love necessarily imply the love of God, and there is no way in which God could be loved without the lover loving herself as well. But this is just what the problem is with self-love in Christian tradition.
The problem of self-abnegation in Christian tradition stands in the way of self-love, and challenges normative accounts of self and is suspicious of the self. Moral anthropological thinking has drifted from ontological to epistemological ones that are concerned largely with the limitations of human knowledge. Moral matters are now primarily of personal or communal choice and situation specific.

What is required, as I shall argue later, is a moral anthropology that illuminates the relation between moral beings and moral thinking, while orienting humans practically in a manner consonant with the insights of these present challenges. The prevailing accounts of the self, academic or cultural, show the need for a theological moral anthropology as the foundation for a norm of right self-love. An account of true self-love, I argue is imperative for orienting one’s life toward the hypergoods. In previous epochs the claim that God is the highest good and the good of human beings, weds personal flourishing to the self’s relation with God. So that proper self-relation and proper God-relation coincide. When the question of proper self-love is settled it contributes on how to be a coherent self. A self that is multidimensional and one that functions in moral spaces, that has value relationships capable of posting identity; that is exactly what Aristotle’s considerations on self and self-love attempts to do in the next chapter from the key motif of friendship.
Chapter 2

Aristotle’s understanding of self-love in “Nicomachean Ethics”

2.1 Introduction

Fundamental to Aristotle’s ethics is his concept of living well (eudaimonia). For Aristotle living well is living in accordance with the virtues, and friendship is one of the virtues necessary for living well. In fact, friendship is an essential ingredient for attaining the virtuous life.

Aristotle appears adamant that any discussion of virtues must include a discussion of friendship as a natural progression. Friendship is a virtue, or implies virtue and is most necessary with a view of living well. Friendship is an essential aspect of a life of happiness and morality. Friendship has this exceptionally close connection with moral virtue. Friendship is also a crucial link in a chain in which the treatment of the separate virtues is not yet completed.

In the lives of virtuous agents, friendship is far more involved and is more significant than just good will. Friendship aids agents’ progression towards fulfilling their ultimate end goals, for Aristotle that is human flourishing. Aristotle is committed to the unity of virtue and happiness and rejects the commonly held notion that what is really good for human beings is

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14 Virtues in Nicomachean Ethics VI (Aristotle [2000] Nicomachean Ethics, Eds. Terence Irwin, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company Inc, 2nd ed…) are accounts of the spheres of action or feelings of character. These states of character are the result of habituation, which is learning by practice to do the appropriate kinds of actions (NE 1103b21-5). This is contrary to teaching and learning of the intellectual virtues (NE 1103al4-17). However, the right state of action or feeling of character requires more than the just the right actions. It also requires the tendency to take pleasure in the actions or feelings themselves (NE 1104b3-16). We can infer by implication that someone whose desires and emotions have been trained to make him do the virtuous action and enjoy it, such a person has a virtue of character.

15 Aristotle writes that; “For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods” (1155a).

16 …“the friendship of good men is good, being augmented by their companionship; and they are thought to become better by their activities and by improving each other; for from each other they take the mold of the characteristics they approve” (1172a).
not what is most pleasant, and that what is right or noble is often neither good nor pleasant. Aristotle argues, to the contrary, that the activity of virtue is the very substance of human happiness and is best achieved within the context of serious friendship.

Serious friendship has love as an end and not love as a means, which makes the notion of self-love a primacy. Aristotle insisted that serious friendship by implication is dependent on both correct decisions and actions and these in turn depend on true practical thought and on right desire respectively; since "thought by itself moves nothing," and the thought which is practical depends on desire (EN 1139a35-b4). While my focus in this section of Aristotle is to understand how he treated the subject of self-love, a number of considerations become necessary for in order to arrive at Aristotle’s understanding of self-love. There is the unique way of understanding Aristotle’s account of the virtues or virtue.

In this unique way of understanding virtues or virtue, I discuss the way his treatment of virtues provides a foundation for his understanding of self-love. I will also discuss self that in Aristotle’s understanding is tied to his account of friendship and from friendship to self-love. We begin with the question of virtue or virtuous persons in Aristotle’s ethics.

2.2 Aristotle on realised moral virtues

Virtue can be argued a matter both of being knowledgeable and of having one's emotions and desires properly organized. This is an inclusive view of the virtuous internal condition adopted by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. For Aristotle at (EN 1106b36-7a2) "virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being determined by reason, the reason by which the practically wise person would determine it". So, it will seem virtue is a matter of developing the appropriate moral character key to the self and that involves both the acquisition of practical knowledge and some kind of emotional habituation. Annas (2014, p.1) perceives virtue as an ideal of character [in self
formation] that one aims to reach, rather than a tool one can use to work out what one ought to do.

She is convinced that Aristotle’s account of virtue is a dominant account that rests unchallenged in virtue ethics. Its core motif of ‘the doctrine of the mean', remains central to understanding virtue ethics. In Aristotle’s understanding of virtue ‘the doctrine of the mean,’ is important to his ethics, although now it is being left out by the neo-Aristotelians in discussions of virtue ethics (Ibid. p. 3).

Aristotle recognised that the exercise of moral virtue founded on what is fine as the dominant constituent of eudemonism [a life well lived]. He therefore easily endorsed eudemonism. Eudemonism for Aristotle is a product of habituation, a process of learning; an on-going process of learning that starts in childhood and continues all one’s life it is not mere routine habit.

It is this habituation that is responsible for the formation of the love for self or the self-lover. It needs experience and the ability to apply that experience in ways that intelligently appreciate what is worthwhile and what is not. This is why Aristotle’s account of friendship embraces virtue ethics. True friendship unlike political friendship based on utility of some kind, offers the proposition, and requires a friend to apply what was learnt in the past to the present relationship. It is applying deliberative, emotional, and social skills that enable one to put one’s general understanding of well being into practice in ways that are suitable to

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17 In his ethics Aristotle produces a table of virtues and vices, the table false between the excesses and deficiencies. Aristotle then argues that for an agent to be virtuous he will need to apply his principle of reason to be able to balance between his virtues and vices - there has to be found the mid-point. It is this midpoint, which demonstrates that the person is capable of rational planning. For example, a virtuous person who is capable of rational planning would consider the spheres of action or feeling between fear and confidence and decide that courage is the midpoint that for Aristotle calls the ‘mean’ between rashness into action and cowardice – staying away from entering the action or another example would be by applying reason an agent finds that temperance is the mean that lies between self-indulgence and insensibility. Aristotle expects this model of reason and acting to be applied to major and minor spheres of actions or feelings, and the ability to apply this principle renders an agent decent or morally astute. An agent who is unable to apply this principle has difficulties finding the ‘mean’, and therefore unable to control his appetites and desires, usually end up in the category of the morally base.
each occasion. A person should aim at eudaimonia not as an end, and the eudaimonia in question is one’s own. Thinking reflectively how one should live one realises that her fundamental concern is with making her own life realise eudaimonia.

The pursuit of eudaimonia becomes the process that should organize one’s other concerns and commitments, including the commitments that the agent would think of as moral. Eudaimonia involves the understanding that it is not only a matter of acting in a particular way that will best promote one’s own happiness, as we understand happiness, it’s more than that (Ackrill 12978, p.595-7).

Noticeably, Aristotelian eudaimonia includes virtue, or virtuous actions, and some virtues-especially justice and friendship remarkably are directed at the good of others. In acting to achieve one’s own eudaimonia [that is responding to self loving] one will in fact be acting in ways that benefit other people. A virtuous person must have practical wisdom. Her feelings must be such that she enjoys doing and wants to do what her good deliberations urge her to do. The rational and desiderative parts of her soul are in harmony so that she does not suffer from akrasia [the state of acting against one's better judgment] (Homiak 1981, p. 634).

Emotions play only a secondary role in the deliberations of a virtuous person, reason is the primary element that guides the soul of the virtuous person. The virtuous person is said to do the virtuous thing willingly or ungrudgingly making virtue enjoyable, therefore, contrasted with the vicious person who does the opposite, although Augustin would beg to differ with this conclusion. Of course, one may ask, but what is enjoyable about virtue? Aristotle’s interpretation of the virtues in terms of self-love helps us to see what Aristotle means. That is the virtuous person's pleasure derives from the fact that her actions are
expressive of who she is. Aristotle's annotations at (1 168a9-15) indicate that what is most noble is most pleasurable, and that depends on activity.

Such an activity is the kind which is expressive of a person's power to order and plan her own life. The virtuous person consequently loves rational planning above all else, and when she acts for the sake of the noble, she acts from this love. The mention of ends and goals here is out of question, for the point is that an agent’s enjoyment of planning causes her to act in the ways she does. This is the character of the virtuous person and as I shall comment below it is true of the self-lover in Aristotle’s understanding. Both the virtuous person and the self-lover whose behaviour is a natural causal consequence of her self-love, may actually be the same person acting from rational planning.

Aristotle declares that, applying reason, the practically wise person deliberates well about what sorts of things conduce to the good life in general (1140a25-8). Such a person’s practical wisdom is concerned with 'things just and noble and good for people' (1143b21-3). In these passages Aristotle suggests that the virtuous person deliberate well not merely about how to achieve the ends but more importantly about what ends to adopt.

Applying reasons, she deliberates well about what the good life consists in and makes clear that virtue does not lack direction and good judgment. Consequently, to be virtuous one must not only act; one must also understand why she acts the way she does (1105a31-2). Actions have to be seen in the context of one’s view of the nature of human good, that is, to

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18 Understanding Aristotle from this premise suggests that just as the presence of self-love will cause one to act virtuously, its absence will equally cause one to act in any number of morally deficient or vicious way, depending on the circumstances and the respect in which one’s self-love is actually deficient.
be able to explain actions in terms of conceptions of human good. These are the sentiments Aristotle carries into the relation of the self.

2.3 Aristotle on Self

Aristotle’s discussion of self can be contrasted with modern present day understandings of the self that have a bias towards *Cartesianism*. The Aristotelian self has substantial reality as an individual self, and his idea of the self stands in a marked contrast to the modern notion of selves derived from Descartes’s conception of the self.

Descartes’ idea of the self is something substantial; however his way of understanding this self leads too easily to the loss of substantiality (Seigel 2005, p. 59-61). Aristotle’s idea of the self has substantial reality as an individual self, whereas Descartes identifies substantiality with consciousness, which is an act or a series of acts and not a substance, and this consciousness is also passive and not active.

Aristotle would reject the notion of a Cartesian ego, which is supposed to be a unitary given even in absence of reference to the body. This Cartesian understanding expresses the self as disembodied, in its mode of experiencing itself and not in its mode of moving itself (Taylor1989, 146-147). The separating of the body from the self or the loss of the embodied animality of the self, viewed as the chief legacy of Cartesianism leads to the loss of substance and action.

The Cartesian concept communicates the self in its mode of experiencing itself and not in its mode of moving itself. The attempt to separate the body from the self is the chief legacy of Cartesianism leading to the loss of substance and action. It presupposes the Humean idea of the self as a bundle or a collection of different perceptions (Hume 1969, p. 299-301; Seigel 2005, p. 125-126). Although these are some distance from the Cartesian idea,
nevertheless they are a natural development from it. A bundle of feelings or impressions is what consciousness, understood as identical with conscious acts, must always threaten to become (Simpson 2001, p. 309-310).

Aristotle contrary to Descartes insists on the reality of the object of immediate perception (NE 9.91170a29-32), to include the reality of one’s own body. Aristotle's epistemology allows no direct self-knowledge to the human cognitive agent. An agent’s cognition is always directly of something else. Therefore, what Aristotle terms the self, is aware of itself only concomitantly.

That is in terms of the external sensible things that are its direct object. It is in this concomitant cognition that there arises an immediate and unshakable awareness of a single agent, namely oneself. This immediate awareness is not of a sense, or of a mind, or of a soul, rather it is of the person as cognitive agent (Taylor 1989, p. 27). It is an immediate awareness of a person who thinks and acts by means of those faculties of a sense, of a mind, or of a soul.

Ethically then, one is consequently and immediately aware of oneself as the moral agent, as the source of one's free conduct. And therefore, one draws the firm conclusion that she is responsible for her deliberate actions (NE 5.1113b3-21). In spite of the apparent difficulties in explaining the nature of a self of which an agent has no direct knowledge, there is no doubt that Aristotle’s text expresses the immediate factual awareness of an agent’s self as a unitary cognitive and moral agent.19

Aristotle provides a fully articulated account of substance as the ontological or metaphysical reality of each particular thing, or simply that, what makes the thing stand out from bare nothingness is its substantial being. This enables Aristotle to keep the substantial

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19 Difficulties arise from this claim, that is, from an epistemological setting that precludes any direct knowledge of the nature of the agent self, there is no knowledge of what the agent is. This is because the natures known are those of sensible external things, things other than the percipient. In this cognitive awareness knowledge of all else is modeled on those of sensible external things.
reality of the self as the abiding source and ultimate object of consciousness. The self cannot therefore be reduced to its properties; on the contrary it is its properties that are reducible to the self as substance. An Aristotelian understanding of self will then make the claim that one must always bear in mind that human cognition originates in sensible things.

Considering cognition, Aristotle gives an example with the sun’s rays; that sensations of sensible things are receptions of forms, as when the sun’s rays warm a thing, cognitional reception of forms takes place without matter. Since the cognitional or immaterial reception of the same form in sensation causes one to feel warm, it is just as authentically a reception of form and just as indisputably a cause of being. Owens (1988, p. 712) observes that form for Aristotle is always a cause of being, and the cause of a thing's being what it is’. Aristotle is perceived to claim that, received in matter, the form makes the thing what it is physically. A thing perceived can never be reducible to its sensations, since the substance of a thing is a real given of experience and its form or constituting principle. Simpson (2001, p.314) observes that,

‘The particular form or principle of a thing is sufficient, not only to individuate the thing as what it is, but also to make it the same individual thing throughout all changes. The doctrine of substantial form is what explains, for Aristotle, the identity over time of individual material things.’

This principle of substantial form is what Aristotle relies on to respond to the problem of personal identity. Aristotle maintains many tend to wonder whether such identity should be explained by references to either bodily or psychological continuity or both. Aristotle’s response inferred that personal identity can only be explained by identity of form or of the structuring code that keeps the body the same despite changes. Identity is derived from the enduring source of all the powers and acts of a person (NE 1.13.1102b16-28; Taylor 1989, p.27).
The structuring principle constituting personal identity over time is the soul according to Aristotle; it is the first actuality of the organic body. The soul sets the body in action as a body and as a living body. The soul becomes the source of being for the body and the foundation for all the acts of the body. Therefore, the principle of personal identity is not indistinguishable from acts of self-consciousness. It is a reality that becomes an object of self-consciousness, having a being independent of self-consciousness and acts of self-consciousness.

The idea of the primary self for Aristotle is the ontological reality of the composite of body and soul, but this biological or ontological self, is not all there is to Aristotle’s idea of the self. For Aristotle the biological self is the lowest level of selfhood. Beyond the unity of the animal’s substance, the immediate given, there is also the unity of the animal’s powers and acts. This unity of powers and acts is however, not an immediate given and does not automatically follow from the unity of the body. This is because the unity of the body’s substance can be affected without impacting the unity of powers and acts, and the unity of powers and acts can be affected without impacting the body’s substance.

A person may be oneself in her substance, but many and conflicting selves in her acts (NE 1.13.1102b16-28). This consideration leads to the moral self, that unlike the ontological or biological self, a given of nature; the moral is an achievement of practice and habituation and therefore a result of virtue. Without virtue an individual or even a community is torn and divided. An individual who is divided and torn is represented by the bad person of Aristotle’s texts (NE 9.4.1166b7-22). Who is not really a unity when contrasted with the good person of (NE 9.4.1166a13-29).

Concerning the moral self, Aristotle articulates the thought that virtue is what brings human souls to unity and makes human beings into single selves. No virtue opposes any
other, since all virtues are united in the virtue of prudence, right reason falls into the
definition of each of them (NE 6.1, 5, 13.). Because human virtues accord with reason and
nature, they integrate the human soul with itself and with its acts. They also integrate the acts
with each other.

Virtue is for the sake of acts and the good person is good in action, not simply in
having the power and disposition to act (NE 1.8.1098b31-9a7). It is in activity with the self
that the good person is come fully into being as a self, although the action is itself completed
in and through the body. In the ethical order Aristotle recognises in a person something
higher and dominating, as though it should be in control of a person's conduct.

Aristotle is accused of peddling fragmented selves akin to Kant when he claims that
the non-virtuous person has many selves because she is not unified. The difference between
Kantian selves and the selves of Aristotle is that each of the individual selves of Aristotle is a
real substance capable of communicating and sharing with others. Aristotle’s starting point in
relation to selves is that they are embodied rational animals with a capacity to share goods of
the soul over and above the goods of the body.

In the act of sharing the animal comes fully to itself thus becoming fully a self, this is
contra Kant whose view of self are founded on apperception – that conclusions of explaining
the self are founded on internal reasoning that cannot be experienced through the senses.
Aristotle's notion of self is not that of an impersonal, objective or transcendent mind; on the
contrary, the self is simply the individual who thinks, acts, has affections, wishes, and
chooses (Taylor 1989, p. 27). It is the whole human individual who is this self, one who
knows another and thereby recognizes herself as an individual self. For Aristotle, a person is
related to her friend as she is to herself because the friend is another self (NE 1166a3,
1166a15-17, 1166a30-32).
Another mirrors the friend as friend and so gives the ability to recognizes herself as the friend she is to herself. Therefore, a person is related to her friend as she is to herself as a second self. Aristotle also puts a marker on something else unique about the individual who embodies the self, that within that individual there is a divine element, perhaps represented by the self, "It may be even held that this is the true self of each, in as much as it is the dominant and better part" (NE 1178a2); "the intellect more than anything else is man" (NE 1178a7).

The true human self taking on divinity, and it is this true self’s divine feature that Aristotle urges persons to attend to as the supreme goal of their lives by suggesting, “It would be a strange thing if a person should choose to live not his own life [that is, be most truly his own self] but the life of some other than herself. (1177b3, 1178a4).” All human activity should be oriented as much as possible toward this life, but the express condition for possessing it is that the individual remain somehow her own self (NE 1159a8-12, 1178a2-3).

This self must have self-regard, and one most really feels integral in one’s own relationship with one’s self. Only with one’s own self is one of ‘one soul’ and therefore being one’s best friend. This conclusion allows one to be able to love one’s self most of all (1168b.9-12); this loving of oneself issues into self-love. The self of Aristotle denies the idea of self-abnegation, or radical self-denial. Aristotle’s self in friendship shows it’s neither solipsistic nor a social construct, rather it keeps the mean between these two contemporary extremes thereby achieving a higher degree of selfhood and community collectively.

2.4 Friendship in Aristotle

Philosophical and societal reflections on friendship have an extended history in Greek thought prior to Aristotle, but his discussion remains a watershed. It is a discussion that would later influence the Hellenistic world (Hume 2011, 48). Friendship demands presence
and activity, but these alone are not sufficient. It is not friendship until the attitude is reciprocated and mutually acknowledged’ (NE 8.1.1155b33f). Friendship subsequently, is reciprocal and explicit goodwill expressed in activity carried out in the presence of the friend. For Aristotle a friend, is a “second self,” although Valk (2004-2005, p. 50) is of the opinion that it is not clear what Aristotle meant by this phrase. Aristotle writes that friendship begins from an impulse of admiration and goodwill.

‘Good will may arise of a sudden, as it does toward competitors.’ (9.5.1166b35). ‘No one loves if he has not first been delighted by the form of the beloved.’ (9.5.1167a6)

Good will, admiration and delight are only but avenues to the beloved and are not love, until she who is admired and offered goodwill remains the focal point of delight, is longed for when absent and their presence craved (NE 9.5.1167a6). It is a sharing of life (NE 8.5.1157b18-20). Friendship is a partnership and as a person is to herself so is she to her friend. Aristotle maintains that this activity of a person being friends to herself is a conscious one and desirable to herself. But this too can be extended to a friend, where a person is able to produce the same activity of consciousness when together with her friend for the sake of the friend.

A person always perceives herself in her friend; the reason true friends want to spend time together (NE 9.12.1171b33-34). Real friendship, Aristotle would argue is difficult to find, because it requires time and familiarity for each to be found lovable and to be trusted. Therefore those who hurriedly exhibit signs of friendship to those they want to be friends with should know that they cannot be friends unless they are lovable and know that for a fact. It is easier for one to wish to be friends with somebody, the wish may arise quickly, but friendship does not. For Tessitore (1996, 75) treating friendship as ethical, virtue is afforded the possibilities of building a case for the classification of friendship. Tessitore is persuaded
that once we have established Aristotle’s main meaning of friendship it should be possible to work out the variants. Pakaluk argues that there are many sorts of relationships that people call “friendship,” but Aristotle thinks it is philosophically important to place these relationships in some order by selecting one form of friendship that qualifies as “friendship” in the proper sense (Pakaluk, 2005, p.258). Once the central form of friendship is correctly identified and described one can make sense of other forms and phenomena of friendship, in relation to this central case of friendship.

Pakaluk claims the central form of Aristotle’s friendship is a relationship of reciprocal affection between two equal and similar adults with affection for each other. These two equals each recognises and enjoys the virtues of the other (Ibid, p.258-9). Declaring friendship, a form of virtue Aristotle puts it to the test of a virtuous person who by reason and planning puts friendship through its paces to establish whether it subscribes to the foundational idea of living life well. After establishing this criterion Aristotle treats one species of friendship as superior to the others. True friendship is complete friendship with its concern for the good of the friend rather than the advantages gained through the friendship. This is presented as the paradigmatic case of friendship and remains the compass from which to work out other forms of friendships.

Aristotle differentiates between three species of friendship arguing that ‘not everything seems to be loved but only the lovable, that is good, pleasant, or useful.’ (NE 8.1.1155b17-18). This leads Aristotle to conclude that love of the good, pleasant, and useful, leads to different sorts of friendships to include virtue or complete friendship, pleasure friendship, and advantage friendship. Each form of friendship, although related to the other forms in a number of ways, remains distinct in that its enabling medium (goodness, pleasure, utility) is distinct. Valk identifies in Aristotle that; complete friendship is the friendship of
persons who are good, and alike in virtue. Such persons wish each other well *qua* good, and
they are good in themselves. Notwithstanding, complete friendship is however exceedingly
rare. Valk (2004-2005, p. 51) contends as the case is for its nature, it is natural that complete
friendships should be infrequent. Aristotle tells us, “...for such men are rare.” On account that
different classes of people value different things in life, they share lives of many different
kinds; the result is the three kinds of friendships based on utility, pleasure and goodness. But
Aristotle has already argued that usefulness cannot form a genuine basis for friendship (NE 8.3.1136b19-20) because useful implies valued as a means, but friendship needs to be valued as an end in itself, a good end which means valuable intrinsically.

Of the three types of friendships Aristotle concedes friendship based on goodness as the most important arguing that good people are useful as well as pleasant to one another. Noticeably, the third kind of friendship includes the other two (NE 8.3.1156b13-35) and transcends them in various ways. In the third kind of friendship each friend loves the other entirely for the other’s sake, contrary to the other two kinds of friendship where a person is loved not for whom they are but rather for providing some good and pleasure.

Aristotle writes of the later kind of friendship, that friendship founded on goodness is easily dissolved if the parties do not remain like themselves; for if the other party is no longer pleasant or useful the other ceases to love him’ (8.2.1156a15f). But friends who are good and not just exercising friendship based on utility and pleasure will always wish well to one another ‘*qua* good’, since they are good in ‘themselves.’ Their friendship is not incidental and it ‘lasts as long as they are good …and goodness is an enduring thing’ (NE 8.2.1156b5f).

I concede Aristotle is saying that friendship as virtue is more deeply and permanently embedded in a human being’s nature than other useful and pleasant qualities. Of course, friendship as a virtue is not identical with a person’s self, and so to love others for their
virtues is to love them incidentally and not for themselves. Nonetheless, it is also possible to love others for themselves even when they lack good qualities. Friendship can also break, and Aristotle contends that often when that happens it is because one person is in friendship for personal gain. Given such statuses, Aristotle observes, the need for remembrance of moments of former intimacy is necessary, and some allowance for former friendship is appropriate when the breach of friendship has not been due to excess of wickedness (NE 8.5.1165b35) although the friendship is ended. In this context it seems that a one-sided love may remain where one may love or continue to love another for herself although this person has lost or has never had good qualities that forge true friendship.

The evidence suggests that reciprocal friendship cannot be maintained unless both parties are more or less equally good, an attribute that cements friendships, which friends apply to themselves well before they extend it to the other. So far, I have been exploring Aristotle’s 'perfect' friendship (8.3.1156 b6-), friendship 'firstly and in the proper sense' (8.4.1157 a31). This friendship is 'perfect' in the sense that it is the goal. Any real friendship tends to become such if circumstances permit pleasant and useful exchanges gradually deepen into a sharing in the activities which give life its value. For the perfection of real friendship both parties must be virtuous, because the good life requires virtue. But Aristotle argues too that most persons are only 'in progress' to virtue, and the third kind of friendship can perhaps exist inchoately between people not yet perfectly virtuous.

'The friendship of good men is good, being augmented by their companionship; and they are thought to become better too by their activities and by improving each other; for each takes from the other the mould of the characteristics they approve' (IX.112.1172 a12-).

To live in the eye of a friend who values the good life is a support in living life well; such friends 'neither ask nor give base services, but (one may say) even prevent them' (8.8.1159
True friendship requires independence in order to recognise the needs of the other, it also need independence to recognise mutuality in the desire to participate in other people’s lives. Friendship may be practiced in the social settings of the polis, thus friendship guides the formation of the human good. This formation of the good is not only in individual persons but in life of the state also. Friendship is in essence a virtue practised over a lifetime and is by nature practised in human community together with one’s friends and others. Its moral contribution is what I now discuss in theology of friendship.

2.5 Aristotle’s Friendship with a theological Component

A connection exists between Aristotle’s understandings of ‘primary’ or perfect friendship and theology. Friendship emerges as a complex and protean dimension of human life. Its richness cannot be fully grasped without an understanding of its relationships towards other issues of high philosophical relevance: goodness, justice, happiness and self-identity. These are areas that Jesus addressed specifically in his ministry. Friendship is therefore an important theological concept. Both the Old Testament and New Testament model friendship in varying relationships. In the Hebrew texts Moses is called a friend of God. We find friendship modelled in the relationships of Naomi and Ruth and David and Jonathan. Most significantly Jesus, on the threshold of his passion and death, invited his followers to no longer think of themselves as his servants. The Gospel of John 15:15 is taken as the locus classicus of the biblical concept of friendship.

It is here that Jesus tells his disciples that they are no longer servants but are now equals a concept that runs through in Aristotle’s discussion of true friendship. Jesus’ invitation to his disciples to view themselves as his friends and therefore practice friendship echoes Aristotle’s thoughts in, “it will be appropriate to discuss friendship, since friendship is a kind of excellence, or goes along with excellence, and furthermore is very necessary for
living’ (NE VIII, 1155a3-5). Aristotle introduces the idea of friendship as a kind of excellence or something related to it that is necessary for human life. So, what did Jesus expect of his disciples’ new designations as friends?

Jesus speaks of a new relationship or an improved way of relating that went far beyond the psychological pleasure or participation in a shared activity. Friendship was to be central, or the central, organising principle of a disciple’s life. Jesus like Aristotle did not see friendship as an end in itself but as virtue, a way of being with fulfilment elsewhere. Jesus anticipated a [koinonia] community of followers, seeing from Aristotle’s theory friends form a community held together by pursuit of a common goal, a good though not necessarily the good. Aristotle, rather than presenting friendship as a kind of relation, seems to be keener on stressing its closeness to virtue as though he meant to emphasize the ethical aspect of friendship. It is not true however that Aristotle should be seen to argue— on this view — that one cannot be a friend to another without possessing a virtuous state of character contrary to Irrera’s (2005, p.567) observation. Friendship in Aristotle is described as a necessary thing for human life. Again, Irrera continues to question the idea of the necessity of friendship with a view to living, when it’s just mere living, but Aristotle has already argued that it is for living well and not just living (NE VIII, 1155a5-9).

Jesus’ demand of his disciples in John 15:15, hints at the fact that friendship is important in understanding the Trinity. Trinity holds the very heart of God where we find not solitude and isolation but intimacy and community. It is therefore rather difficult to understand why Nygren in the company of Kierkegaard regards friendship as having an essentially selfish nature and disregards friendship as being of any importance in theological thinking. It is in biblical [theological] thinking we find the highest friendships especially where friends do not act selfishly or based on egoistic calculation but rather seek the good for
their friends. They pursue the good on behalf of the friend, and for the friend’s own sake. This concern for the friend for his or her own sake is captured in the friendship with God, which is a friendship that certainly presupposes God’s initiative and choice.

It is God’s movement towards us in love and friendship that allows us to move towards God in friendship, nonetheless not everyone in the world can be called a friend of God. Only those who have entered into covenant with him are able to share friendship with him and with one another. This concept remains important for doing Christian theology in modern times. Jesus was offering the friendship of God to all humanity. The friendship-motif itself from the Biblical message and from the Christian tradition suggests that the Church is a community existing precisely in order to enjoy friendship with Christ, and consequently, friendship with one another. In Christ and through the Holy Spirit’s gift of friendship and love believers have become friends of God. In the community of the Church the friendship of the believers reflects none other than the friendship and the love of God Himself.

The relationship of friendship incessantly has served as a model for shaping spiritual and moral life (Van Asselt 2010, p. 2). For McEvoy (1999, 3-44) an Augustinian, Thomas Aquinas and other fathers had no problems in holding that friendship was a central virtue in Christian ethics. The Reformers [Luther and Calvin] on the contrary rejected the Aristotelian tradition of inquiry and adopted notions of ideal friendship as a disinterested bond cultivated among the virtuous. These Reformers on the other hand were strongly civic-minded in the

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20 In the texts of John 15:15 (‘I have called you friends’) Jesus seems to offer the blessing of friendship brought about by the operation of the Holy Spirit as first of all experienced in the personal faith of the individual believer. The blessing of friendship could then be enjoyed in prayer, in which God and the believer relate to each other ‘as a friend enjoys her friend and shares all good things with him. Following on the Great Commission of Mathew 28. 18 – 20, individual’s experience of friendship with God and others was most prominently present in the community of believers, notably in the liturgical practises of the Church. The sacraments are the means by which this intimate friendship with God could be primarily experienced. In the mystery of the Lord’s Supper we cannot help finding its meaning illuminated precisely in the experience of intimate friendship with God in the community of believers. It is the special characteristic of friendship to live together. We are not content with mere thoughts of our beloved friend: we want his presence.
tradition of other classical modes of friendship [Cicero], because such friendship was to serve a public good, which was for Cicero the preservation of social order of the administrative machinery of the (Roman) imperium (Heilke 2004, p. 11). Heilke quickly counters that Cicero actually formulated an account of friendship akin to an Augustinian one, who himself found Aristotelian philosophy informing his narrative ethical analysis.


‘The discussion of the friendship virtue – and the narrative depiction of friends in its literature- provide the Greco-Roman culture a medium to consider the dimension and directions of human moral agency when the individual came face to face with the needs of others (Ibid. 36)

Hume concedes that the understanding of friendship in Luke-Acts takes on the Aristotelian definition of the virtue. Whatever we might consider the Greco-Roman culture to be, it still made sense of friendship with the Aristotelian definition of friendship as a virtue. This understanding gives the concept the ability to lay down markers for the dimension and directions of human moral agency when persons come face to face with the needs of others.

In Aristotle’s thought, in good communities friendship was a kind of *sui generis* where the search for utility does not prevent people from displaying ‘other-regarding’ qualities like cooperation, trust and loyalty, that are typical of friendship of virtuous individuals. Jesus on his part insisted on the form of mutual and intimate love that should
subsist in a friendship based on ethical excellence, i.e. a kind of love that is not conceivable between citizens who do not know each other personally. The believers’ friendship is in accord with and is a result of God’s community shaping activity in their midst. Such friendship informed by covenant appears to dispense with Aristotelian categorisations of friendship as the believers’ friendship highlights themes of possessions, hospitality, and bold witness as found throughout Luke-Acts. Thinking about the divine covenant as friendship with God will not only mean reflecting on the bond that links Christian believers together in their journey toward God, but that it also enables the believer to relate to the tradition in his search for biblical truth. The uniqueness of the believers’ friendships is that it is entered into as community of believers without first having to engage a one to one friendship formation.

2.6 The Self in Friendship

Aristotle’s movement from disinterested love to loving a friend like oneself brings us to the connections between Aristotle's theory of friendship and the basic principles of his ethics (NE IX, chapter 8; Notopoulos 1953, p. 215 - 216). The connection is made through the idea that a friend is another self (EN 9.4.1166 a31, 9.9.1170 b7). The fundamental question Aristotle asked was whether a person should love herself most or someone else? In itself this is a graphic way of saying that disinterested love is possible, that we can 'identify' with another and make that person's good, one of our own goals, sought for, for its own sake. 'As a person is to herself, so is she to her friend' (NE 9.11.1171 b34). Now a person's happiness lies in living and being active in certain ways; more exactly it lies in conscious activity; and a person's happiness is

'to contemplate worthy actions and actions which are his own, and the actions of a good man who is her friend are both' (NE 1170 a3).

A good person takes pleasure in perceiving his own activity and it is this pleasure she
finds in herself that she looks for in the other. Aristotle observes that as the virtuous person is to herself that is how she is to her friend (for her friend is another self). Therefore, the good person takes pleasure in perceiving her friends' activity. Such a good person needs, consequently to be conscious of the existence of her friend. This generally will be realised by friends living together and sharing in discussion and thought. This living well is unique to humans and not, as in the case of cattle, feeding in the same place' (NE 1170 a15-b15).

'Discussion and thought', between friends generates happiness that is primary in their relationship, nonetheless friends also share secondary happiness of the life of practical virtue. There is an aspect characteristic of friendship that points to a key importance of friends that is happiness. Human beings always desire to spend time in the company of those whose presence pleases. It is only natural for persons to try to avoid what is painful and seek what is pleasant therefore the natural desire for pleasure plays a central role not only in pleasurable friendships, but also in those that are grounded in moral goodness. Aristotle claims that good human beings love that which is good and pleasurable simply as that, it is good and pleasurable for them.

‘..for that which is without qualification good or pleasant seems to be lovable and desirable, and for each person that which is good or pleasant to him;..’ (8.5.1157b25)

Aristotle by this argument prepares grounds for introducing the possibilities of a person being friends with herself. Having introduced the idea of a thing or person being lovable, he offers a comparison between love and friendship. He categorises love as a passion, and friendship as a state, observing that love may be felt just as much towards lifeless things, although mutual love involves choices and choice springs from a state of being. Persons wish well to those whom they love, ‘for their sake, not as a result of passion but as result of state.’ (8.5.1157b30). In loving a friend Aristotle conceives that a person in
essence loves what is good for herself. A concept of utility friendship is implied but argued as being in fact superseded by pleasure-based friendship (8.5.1158a18-26). From this understanding Aristotle develops the concept that a friend is actually an “other self,” on grounds that a good person is related to a friend as to herself. This notion of “other self,” for Aristotle constitutes the fundamental ideal of friendship. In so far as someone counts as a friend in any respect, that someone plays the role of an “other self.” (Pakaluk, 2005, 259) The notion of a friend as an “other self” easily prepares Aristotle to reach the claim of a person being friends with themselves and later on create grounds for examining self-love. The notion of one being friends with oneself seems at odd with the common idea that self-love is bad since its focus is a selfish self-centredness activity. But later on in 9.8 Aristotle rescues this notion of self-love from its negative connotations by arguing that there is actually a good kind of self-love as well as a bad kind of self-love, echoing Augustinian tripartite forms of self-love. Aristotle finds it self evident that a good person should love herself, but even more so love herself more than he loves anyone else21.

To understand friendship with self or oneself, there is raised a need to look at whether it is possible to wish the greatest goods for friends, given the all too well known fact of the tendency that persons wish good things most of all for themselves. Aristotle claims that if we are right in saying that a person wishes good to a friend for friend’s sake the friend must remain the sort of being she is, whatever that may be. It is for the friend only so long as she remains a human being that she will wish the greatest goods to her friend. Aristotle retracts this thought process to argue that a person does not necessarily wish the greatest good to her friend since it is for ‘herself most of all that each person wishes what is good.’ (NE

21 Many religious groups that put more emphasis on love of the neighbour always struggle with this admonition from Aristotle that reflects theology self-love. It is an issue for many religious groups to accommodate the idea of loving the self, let alone loving the self more than the neighbour.
Aristotle comes close to the thematic consideration of self-love by way of a second reflection, of the possibility of friendship with oneself. He remarks further that friendly relations with one’s neighbours, as the marks by which friendship are defined, is proceeded by a person’s ‘relations to herself.’ (9.4.1166a1-2). Friendship with others has its source from a prior friendship that rational or decent people have with themselves. For Tessitore, Aristotle was committed to the fact that decent persons are of one mind and desire the same things with every part of their soul. They wish for their own good for their own sake and seek it through action (1996, 83-84). These decent persons desire their own company with which they express agreeable memories of their past and good hopes for the future.

Aristotle suggests that such a person wishes to live with herself first. For she does so with pleasure, since the memories of her past acts as delightful and her hopes for the future are good and therefore pleasant (NE 9.4.1166a24-24). Such a rational person is keenly aware of her own joys and sorrows. This is because on account of her good character the same things always give rise to pleasure or pain. She rejoices and grieves more than any other, with herself. To the rational person the same thing is always painful and the same thing always pleasant and not one thing at one time and another at another; ‘he has, so to speak, no regret.’ (NE 9.4.1166a26-29)

Aristotle concedes this thinking has to do with the rational part of the soul of a person, since it would appear that the thinking part is what each person is, being more the self than anything else. At the same time, he observes that the attitudes of the rational person, that is of a decent person endowed with friendship as a virtue characterises “friendship” for another, but this leads also to the characterisation of friendship with self. A friend is in fact another self. The characteristics of a rational planner belong to the good person in relation to herself, and these make her related to her friend as to herself (for her friend is another self).
Friendship too is thought to be one of these attributes, and those who have these attributes to be friends...’ (NE 9.4.1166a31-33).

Tessitore concludes that although Aristotle never says whether the notion of friendship with oneself is, strictly speaking, meaningful he does maintain that it possesses a certain plausibility given the dual or composite nature of human being. (1996, p. 84). Aristotle seems to concede that friendship with self does have certain meaningfulness. Whereas previously on the same plausibility he ruled out any meaningfulness between oneself and justice, except only in a highly attenuated understanding. Aristotle’s more open-ended treatment of friendship with oneself permits friendship in this context to hold a somehow special status different from friendship and the city and political friendship.

While still examining friendship with oneself, there is depicted an interiority of the rational of the decent person contrasted with a corresponding description of the morally base. The morally base persons are characterised by certain deficiencies, the likes of lacking unity of soul since they are constantly at odds with themselves. The morally base desire one thing while choosing a different, they might wish for themselves the good but almost always they fail to do what is necessary to attain it because of cowardice or idleness.

Earlier on in (NE 9.4.1166a30-40) Aristotle argued that because friendship is also an attribute of the rational or decent person, it implied that the morally base person cannot attain it, and since they cannot attain friendship with the other it follows that they are unable to attain friendship with themselves. The morally base observes Tessitore, (1996, p. 84) are also unable to enter into their own joys and sorrows because there is a factional conflict in their souls. These morally base person is devoid of affection for herself for the simple reason that there is nothing truly lovable about her.
2.7 **Self-love in Aristotle**

Aristotle’s discussion of self-love is placed within the considerations of ethical or moral virtues. These moral virtues provide a peculiar character to ethical inquiry. In Nicomachean Ethics chapter IX.7, just prior to Aristotle’s claim in IX.8, that the good person is her own best friend and ought to love herself best, Aristotle explains why benefactors love those they have benefited more than those who have been well-treated love their benefactors. He explains that,

…..,'existence is to all people a thing to be chosen and loved, and that we exist by virtue of activity (i.e., by living and acting), and the handiwork is in a sense, the producer in activity; he loves his handiwork, therefore, because he loves existence. And this is rooted in the nature of things; for what he is in potentiality, his handiwork manifests in activity' (NE 1 1168a5-9).

Aristotle explains existence in terms of activity. His remarks suggest that persons love the actions they perform because these actions are expressions of who they are. Activities are expressions of what persons can do. They actualise persons’ potentialities, which are expressions of who they are, of their existence. These are activities they love and find most pleasant (1153a12-5, 1153b9-17). The activities are not products of random action, but characteristic of human activities most expressive of human beings. They are activities born out of the rational choices of life planning. It is the activity of planning their lives [of the virtuous person] that is most pleasant and lovable. Persons who love planning the activities they perform in effect are true lovers of themselves and virtuous persons (NE 1168b35-69a3). These are people, who have performed activities on a rational principle and their actions are properly their own acts and voluntary acts for that matter.

Such persons must truly be lovers of self. The true lover of self therefore first of all is a rational planner having a conception of the good that she has rationally chosen. Such a person has a view of what is valuable in life and how to organise her life so as to obtain her goals and therefore satisfy her desires against one another. Rational planning is most truly what a person
does, when she loves that activity, she loves herself. For Homiak (1981, p. 639) the self-lover ‘must not simply be a planner or even someone who likes planning; she must love rational activity above all else.’ Strikingly, because of the rationality of activity the Aristotelian self-lover is engaged with she does not suffer from the kind of self-love normally condemned. She does not suffer from excessive self-concern or think herself better than others.

Since the virtuous person is most truly a lover of self, it follows that such a person loves rational activity above all else and her love for rational activity has important moral consequences. Following Aristotle’s thinking about self-love it becomes apparent that self-love is best seen as the cause of virtuous behaviour and not the end for which virtuous actions are performed. Homiak (1981, p. 640) argues that in being of a higher-order attitude towards planning, self-love ‘is not a part of one’s life-plan and hence not something one strives for qua part of one’s plan.’

For Homiak self-love belonging to the higher – order attitude does not constitute one’s reason or purpose for acting. Self-love cannot be the goal a person strives to achieve; nevertheless, a person with appropriate feelings of self-love will act virtuously. Fundamentally it seems self-love when thought through fully, provides a sufficient foundation for the other virtues. Virtues therefore form a unity implying that all other virtues can be grounded in the appropriate feelings of self-love. The true lover of self thus loves most what is rational activity; so for example, she will not be overly attracted by the pleasures of touch and taste. She will

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22 Seeing that Aristotle’s self-lover does not suffer from the kind of self-love generally condemned, what should we make of a person perhaps suffering from what we may term as Aristotelian self-hatred? It seems a person suffering from what may be termed Aristotelian self-hatred may not be conscious of these negative views about his life. He cannot engage rationally in planning his life. He simply does not take sufficient pleasure in planning his life. He is therefore likely to find herself living out the wishes of others – perhaps his parents – and this may be despite the fact that he activities actually realize many of his talents, but these activities actually do not realize him fully. This is because these activities have not sufficiently drawn on his life-planning abilities. Such a person has not taken sufficient pleasure in planning he simply finds it easier for others to plan for him. The activities he engages are then expressions of what others want him to be. We can conclude from this observation that Aristotelian self-hatred does not require that one explicitly denigrate oneself, just like Aristotelian self-love does not involve self-congratulation.
like them, but will not crave them. Nor will she shun these pleasures; for she does find them pleasant even though there is something she loves more. If we could extend Aristotle’s account of self-love to cover all the virtues, we could say that acting virtuously is feeling and behaving the way the true lover (i.e., the true lover of self) would feel and behave.

Aristotle addresses the question whether a person ought to love oneself or someone else most. The person that Aristotle is talking about inevitably is a rational person or a decent person. The question of loving oneself is on the contrary one that cannot be raised by a base person who always is unable to love herself objectively. Tessitore observes that, for Aristotle, the morally base do everything for their own sake while the decent are willing to act for the sake of their friends therefore putting their own concerns aside (1996, p. 91). For the rational love for her friend or others takes priority over self-love. If this is true how do, we account for Aristotle’s (9.4.1166a1-66b29) claim that actually love for others almost always designates feeling of friendship for oneself and his discription a primary relationship as that which one has with self. Aristotle has note of this difficult aspect of self-love and accepts that people will always find it difficult to accept all the aspects of self-love.

Some aspects of self-love rightly blamed, as it may seem so, are its most common forms in evidence. These aspects are those by which persons are led to indulge their appetites and passions; it is the irrational part of the soul. It is also true that to strive to secure the noble or a decent person practices virtues and is hardly blameworthy and yet it will seem she is practicing self-love to an exceptional degree. Aristotle adds further that those who use the term as one of reproach ascribe self-love to people who assign to themselves the greater share of wealth, honours, and bodily pleasures.

These are things most people desire and busy themselves about to have. Aristotle shows how it is easy for a decent person to be blamed for striving to achieve the highest
good, which includes being friends with herself. He notes the difficulties of differentiating
those who are grasping for regard to gratify their appetites, feelings and the irrational
elements of their souls, and those who act because it is noble to practice self-love.

The irrational and therefore morally base persons who self-love with intentions of
gratifying their appetites, feelings and the irrational elements of their souls are justly blamed
for being lovers of self. Such an irrational person is contrasted with a noble person who at all
times assigns herself the things that are noblest and best, doing so out of rational planning.
Her rational planning, at all events assigns to herself the things that are noblest and best, she
gratifies the most authoritative element in herself and in all things obeys these basic
requirements of decent person.

Aristotle makes a comparison a rational planner and a city or a well organised system
observing that, just as a city or any other systematic whole is most properly identified with
the most authoritative element in it, so is a decent person; ‘….this and gratifies it is most of
all a lover of self.’ (9.8.1169a30-334) The rational or decent person is one who loving and
gratifying the part of her soul, which is her true self, proves to be a true lover of self in the
truest sense. For Aristotle the good, decent or rational persons ought to be a lovers of
themselves because by doing noble acts they benefit both themselves and others including the
morally base persons.

2.8 Aquinas: Translating Aristotle into a Christian Context
Although Aquinas is sometimes described as an Aristotelian, he is not an uncritical
reader of Aristotle’s works. Having started as Neo-Platonist in tradition\textsuperscript{23}, in addressing the

\textsuperscript{23} Aquinas as one of the theologians of the early Church perceived value in the philosophical tradition of the
pagans, but why? It seems that these pagans responsible for ancient Greek philosophy as taught by Plato and
Aristotle and later on other Neo-Platonists were able to offer teachings of what these early theologians had
discerned as the fundamental importance of a transcendent ‘One’. While the Roman schools held on the
plurality of deities [gods], the Greek schools of Plate and Aristotle propagated besides a discipline of more
formal and critical philosophy, the doctrine of a single source of existence and, therefore, truth. For Plato the
truth was the good that lies beyond being. For Aristotle the truth lay in the divine first unmoved mover who is
theory of friendship he goes beyond Aristotle. Not only does he clarify the moral psychology behind the phenomenon of friendship he situates it with wider psychological views. He also makes efforts to connect Aristotle with a different philosophical tradition – the Christian tradition. Aquinas’ chief focus remained the expounding of the Church’s *sacra doctrina*, or holy teachings.

To translate Aristotle into a Christian context Aquinas needed to read Aristotle’s works, but Oliver (2015, p. 80) claims Aquinas was not privileged with the original Aristotelian texts instead he read translations of translations. Aquinas therefore faced the challenge of preserving the authenticity and integrity of these philosophical works. He read Aristotle’s philosophy as a handmaid for the clarification of the sacred teachings. In the case of friendship love the focus of this discussion, Aristotle provided three types of friendship that he distinguished according to reason that bring the friends into relationship: pleasure and utilitarian friendships; the third develop from a foundation of virtue and goodness (NE 8.2.1155b17-19).

These three forms of friendships sustain the pursuit of the friends’ well being and the excellence of life binding friends together. Aristotle’s treatment of friendship plays a significant role in Aquinas’ treatment of charity. For Aquinas, charity is a “friendship with God.” This kind of friendship corresponds most closely to Aristotle’s friendship of worth but transcends it in two important ways. Firstly, Aquinas’ idea of friendship with God requires a “participation” in God. This is an idea Aristotle could not fathom since for him God was entirely transcendent. Second, the idea of loving one’s enemies would be absurd from an

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fully actual. Secondly, these early theologians of the ancient Church valued Greek philosophical teaching because it provided an understanding of the relationship between faith and reason, hence theology’s relationship to philosophy.
Aristotelian perspective since Aristotle’s conception of love requires the good for oneself, one’s family and one’s country.

Aquinas was obviously convinced that the virtue of friendship in its various forms was one of the most important virtues in Aristotle’s ethics. He defended and depended on Aristotle’s explanation of these forms of friendship as foundation for his discussion ‘Is charity friendship with God?’ (Summa II-II.23.1 cited in Farell 1995, p, 214). Aristotle provides a fairly vigorous naturalistic explanation of friendship, and at times can account even for radical self-sacrifice on behalf of one’s family or country.

Conversely, Aristotle cannot provide an explanation for the kind of enemy love or friendship Aquinas discusses in which love is a participation in God, that enables Aquinas to claim that we can even love our enemies. Aquinas is always pushing Aristotle’s understanding of friendship and charity, and yet he still exonerates Aristotle and his philosophy using him to defend his [Aquinas’] own position. This is a key position in Aquinas where in the Summa Theologiae he turns to Aristotle in order to probe the nature of loving friendship. For Aquinas, Aristotelian philosophy was deployed to scrutinise religious teachings or doctrines from a neutral point. Aquinas was adamant the theological context underpins all authentic forms of friendliness; this is contra Aristotle (Quinn 1996, p, 270). For Aquinas the revealed Christian truth found in the sacred texts and teaching had the final word.

While Aquinas found Aristotle’s position defensible, the Church’s teaching was to be preferred as it was based on the witness of Scripture, the teachings of the tradition, and wider doctrinal concerns regarding the nature of God’s grace and freedom. Still, Aristotle’s thoughts were used even if negatively, to outline more exactly the distinctive meaning and implications of doctrines. Whilst Aquinas like Aristotle saw clearly values of friendship as a
supremely social virtue, he insisted that friendship ultimately be rooted in the special relationship that God has with human beings and with [God] himself. This later understanding informs and inspires the Christian formulation of friendship.

Aquinas intuitively turns to Aristotle’s treatise on *philia*\(^{24}\) as a text on Christian love. His reading of Aristotle seems to violate the spirit of Aristotle’s discussion of *philos* and henceforth the Christian understanding of caritas assuming *philos* is intended to be caritas. Undoubtedly, the two cannot replace each other directly thereby making difficult for Aquinas to let Aristotle interpret Christian teachings on love. Typical is the question of equality of the relationship that develops when people know and share similitude in virtue (NE 8.8.1158b 1-10). There are various degrees of inequality in human relationships as Aristotle illustrates from relationships between parent and child, husband and wife, rulers and their subordinates, etc. (NE 1161a 10-13).

Another difficulty is how human beings can be friends with God: Aquinas had no difficulties with this doctrine. Aristotle perceives an insurmountable degree of inequality between human beings and God (or gods). Aristotle cannot conceive of there being friendship with the deity (NE 1159a 5). Firstly, because the radical likeness shared by friends is their common human nature [God or gods who possess divine nature are excluded], the greatest

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\(^{24}\) I assume a fairly standard opinion of philia/philos that it implies-friend or dear – as in when one person likes or love another. Following Julian Anna: (1977) Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism, in Mind, New Series, Vol. 86, No. 344, pp. 532-554, I adopt the explanation of philos; suggesting that, “A can be philos to B not only when they both like each other and are friends in the full sense of ‘friend’, but also in two other cases: where A likes or is friendly to B whatever B thinks about it, and where A is liked by B whatever A thinks about it”. (Annas 1977, p.532-533)
good that humans wish for their friends is that they be more completely human (NE 1159a 7-15). Secondly, the experience of communion between friends (NE 1169b 4-8) is imperative for there being contact between them. Aristotle claims friends must be present for each other - even live together in order to participate in life-giving activity and the celebration of virtue (NE 1171b 31-1172a 8), this claim evidently eliminates the presence of the divine. Aquinas was aware of this difficult but still appealed to Aristotle to establish the nature of the relationship in which God, in Christ, has shared divine goodness with human beings in loving friendship (Farrell 1995, p. 214).

Annas considers an explanation of *philos* could be given that demonstrates how friendship between unequal persons can be achieved. The same can be applied to friendship between human beings and the divine. The explanation is as follows: A can be friendly to B not only when they both like each other and are friends [virtuous or decent, good persons] in the full sense of ‘friend’, but also in two other cases: where A likes or is friendly to B whatever B thinks about it [for political alliances], and where A is liked by B whatever A thinks about it [utility friendship] (1977, p.532 – 534).

This explanation exonerates Aristotle’s blanket application of friendship to cover domestic family type of relationships, or relationships between male and female who are physiologically different. The explanation also shows how Aquinas could apply Aristotle to support friendship between human beings and God who remain ontologically dissimilar.

Daniel Schwartz in his book *Aquinas on Friendship* (2007, p. 98.) suggests that Aquinas added something to Aristotle’s concept of friendship by introducing friendship that covers persons of unequal stations. This is not necessarily the case, we have observed above that various expressions of Aristotle’s friendship can cover friendship between persons of
unequal status; for example, a virtuous person goes out of her way to be friends with another person irrespective of what the person may think of the virtuous person herself.

This is similar with the Christian sense of loving one’s enemies as oneself. The Aristotelian doctrine of friendship focuses attention on the existence of a concrete, reciprocal and efficacious benevolence between friends (NE 8.2.1155b 27-31; 1162b 8-9). In perfect friendship a person will not only practise virtue for the sake of her friend but rather will sacrifice self-interest for the other (NE 9.4. 1168a 34-35). Perfect friendships are comparatively rare in life (NE 8.7.1156b 24; 1158a 10-14). Equality is a key motif of friendship relationship that develops when people know and share with each other a similitude in virtue (NE 1158b 1-10).

Aquinas wants to demonstrate that the love one loves herself with is not, strictly speaking, friendship (qua Aristotle) but something greater; that is, it is unity rather than union. Nonetheless, Aquinas is employing the supposition that the concept of charity, that is, Christian love for neighbours and self can be clarified with reference to Aristotelian friendship. Hence Christian love for neighbour and self are the same at least in the case of relationships directed not towards self but to others. Aquinas is committed to the identity of charity and friendship as well as to the identity of charity and what Aristotle’s terms *philia*. But then he has to react to whether love is friendship.

Aquinas contends that love is not useful or pleasurable friendship; love is not conjoined by the utility of the friend’s estate, nor by the presence of particular bodies, not by subtle and flattering adulation of other, but rather by the fear of God and the study of the Holy Scriptures.’ Love is not friendship; (NE 9.8.1157a18) the friendship of the good as implied in this Aristotelian text, because Christians as represented by Aquinas, love even sinners; whereas Aristotelian friendship of the good only extends to the virtuous.
Notwithstanding, all through these considerations the enduring fact is, we found Aquinas’ indebtedness to Aristotle. Considered from a contemporary time, it becomes apparent that Aristotle and Aquinas perceived that practical rationality presupposes some single end which completely calibrates the choice-worthiness of actions, and that that single end is one’s own happiness.

2.9 Conclusion

Aristotle’s thinking on self and self-love involves immediate knowledge of both self and something other than self. His understanding of the self is that of being aware of something else accordingly, as one is also concomitantly aware of oneself. Knowledge of self has to be represented in terms of sensible objects, the things upon which cognition has its basic bearing. Anything else is represented as concomitant to, and somehow involved in, the sensible things, as they exist in human cognition. Aristotle argued further that, sensible things that exist in themselves and are really other than our sensations and ourselves are what is prior in our perception. Therefore, the self that one is concomitantly aware of in every act of cognition is basically represented as a sensible thing.

One finds oneself spatially extended throughout one's own body, as existent in it outside the cognition. This is the self immediately recognized as something there in itself, independently of the cognitional act by which it is observed. Aristotle's principle is firm, on the unity of the agent in human activity. Human activity implies a concern for the cultivation of human character as it contributes to the flourishing of human life or living well.

Virtues are dispositions to act, desire, and feel that involve the exercise of judgment and lead to a recognizable human excellence, an instance of human flourishing becoming the foundation of living well. Aristotle’s conclusion was that virtues should be thought of as recognizable human excellences. Any inquiry into the nature and import of the virtues should
lead into the arena of human character and its contribution to the realization of what is of value in life.

Virtues involve values because they make possible prudent judgments about what constitutes a lasting good. Aristotle argued that such prudent judgment was dependent on an important element of virtues often to form the mean to balance out two vices, where the mean lies between extremes. Acting virtuously, we embody values and contribute to human flourishing as a sense of living well. Virtues in a sense are conceived the enduring elements of what constitute persons as specific individuals.

The virtue of friendship in its various forms in Aristotle’s ethics is one of the most important virtues. Similar to justice, friendship is one of the virtues that relate the acting person to another beside herself. Friendship is more basic than justice. Aristotle offered three general kinds of friendships, between the virtuous or good or decent persons; the second formed out of the quest pleasure and the third is utility friendship. While Aristotle has been criticised for laying emphasis on true friendship as that among equals, he has retracted at certain points to accept that even unequal friendships are based on some proportion between the unequal partners. Friendship in the domestic family relationship is a good example. All friendships equal or unequal must therefore be based on mutual benevolence. The question of similitude is important for Aristotle’s theory of friendship as it allows him to discuss the different forms of human interrelation as forms of friendship without forcing him to reduce the discussion to the perfect friendship or the virtue friendship only.

Aquinas's notion of friendship on his part is a reworking of Aristotle’s classical notions of friendship. By seeking to situate Aristotelian ideas in theological premises important in his times, Aquinas succeeds in producing a theory of friendship that is more flexible and more accommodating to real human differences and dis-agreements than that
proposed by Aristotle. Two areas that Aquinas has concerns with Aristotle’s theory of friendship include:

First: the question of the particularity of perfect friendship. I argued Aquinas broadened what was Aristotle’s aristocratic and exclusive conception of friendship. The broadening allowed Aquinas to apply Aristotle’s theory of perfect friendship into the theological virtue of love [Aquinas’ caritas] of neighbour. I argued also that Aquinas needed to reconcile Aristotle’s perfect friendship whose source is virtue, and the New Testament question of loving enemies, who neither correspond to friendship for pleasure nor friendship for utility; he needed this broadening to support a seemingly indefensible Aristotle on friendship of an enemy.

Secondly: regarding friendship with a god, Aquinas explicitly claimed that charitable love of God is friendship in the highest degree. Aquinas argued further that the primary and proper object of perfect friendship is God and not human beings. This is the most obvious transformation of Aristotle’s theory of friendship that Aquinas makes. He applies the Aristotelian category of friendship between unequals the perfect form of friendship – this is a combination impossible in Aristotle. Aquinas argued that God as the highest principle of human beatitude is the most lovable object human beings can charitably love.

God is the basis and principle of the complex order of charity; God is perfect friendship to the highest degree. God is the highest form of perfect friendship that also extends to others. God is to be loved as principle of beatitude. Aquinas concedes that an individual is to love herself insofar as she belongs to God and capable of achieving beatitude and only then does she love her neighbour. Because oneself is closer to God one is obligated to love God more than self or anyone else besides God [the principle of beatitude], one then loves herself more than her neighbour. Aquinas thus arrives at self-love. Self-love itself is a
noble thing and should be encouraged. The noble persons unlike the morally base and irrational, in self-loving or loving themselves most of all, by being morally serious persons they unknowingly benefit friends and fellow citizens often in extraordinary fashions. Adam Smith to demonstrates how self-love may be expressed in terms of self-interest and how such self-interest besides all else is actually a healthy conception of human beings.
Chapter 3

Augustine’s Concept of the Self and Self-love

3.1 Introduction

Augustine was not exempt to Aristotle’s claims that true friendships seek to build the other up and aid them in their journey to virtue, and bad friendships look only to destroy through evil and thoughtless acts. It is incredibly simple therefore, for one to ‘shape’ their friend and lead her either higher or lower, all in the name of friendship.

Perfect human friendships, Aquinas presenting Aristotle observed seeks the ultimate and highest good: God and looks to bring others to Him. Augustine spent his entire life searching for God, in essence searching the only way to be friends with himself: *Confessions* book 1, 1, “For our hearts are restless until they rest in you, O God”, and when Augustine finally found God his joy knew no bounds he had ultimately found himself.

For, it was in looking for the truth in human friendships that Augustine obtained the greatest friendship of all, friendship with God and also friendship with himself. It is a friendship that enabled Augustine to lead others to God and shape them through his holy example. Before and after arriving at friendship with God, Augustine worked his way through various ideas and concepts to satisfy himself that he had arrived at that, which is a good that he had always been looking for.

I start my discussion in this section with Augustine’s emphasis on the interiority of the subject. This interiority appears to undermine the importance of the external world. Augustine at the same time affirms the power to know the truth and therefore critiquing scepticism. Discussing Augustine’s treatment of a transcending self follows this section. It
remains the most rigorously of Augustinian themes that have influenced the existentialist’s tradition as the priority of the self for an understanding of being or existence.

I then discuss his concept and practice of self-love whose reflections have taken on a fresh cogency by, which Augustine still speaks to the condition of human breakdown even in 21st century. Next, I will discuss how from his *Confessions* Augustine argued that an agent only loves herself truly by loving God as her highest good.

A brief discuss Oliver O’Donovan will follow, as he remains a stalwart in all discussions of self-love in Augustine. He has raised the question of the un-reconciled and mutually incompatible assertions that Augustine made about self-love, that prevail today. Finally, I will discuss the Pauline influence on Augustine's basic epistemological understanding emphasising the interiority of the subject in a way that seems to undermine the importance of the external world.

By this action Augustine has played a central role in the development of the modern understanding of personal identity. In facilitating an inward turn, he is credited with inventing an inner space that has profound theological and philosophical implications. Pauline and Augustinian distinction between the "inner" and "outer," forged into a powerful tool of self-analysis.

### 3.2 The Augustinian Interiority

Augustine is perceived as an individualist in his orientation and discovery of the interiority (Hampson et al 2010, p. 550). His emphasis on interiority is therefore considered to be anti-body and anti-pleasure and repressive. How does Augustine arrive at this point of interiority? This is predicated by the question of self-knowledge, where, self-knowledge becomes a question of place or regionality (Smith 2001, p. 276). It is a question of *topos*; to which Augustine raise numerous questions to try to establish the whereabouts of God. These
questions included, where is God that I should call upon him? What place is there within me wherein God could enter and dwell? The very need to call God to ‘come’ implies a distance between God and Augustine’s self. It is not necessarily a departure by walking or moving through space (Confessions 1.18.p.38-39), but rather ‘spiritual spatiality’ alienation.

We notice this alienation from the Origin of the self is also a self-alienation. In *Confessions* (1.6.p.24-27) the question of origin is a question of place when Augustine writes, “I do not know whence I came to be in this mortal life or, as I may call it, this living death? I do not know where I came from.” Augustine is here expressive of a soul that has departed from God.

It is a soul that does not know itself [as *imago Dei*] and therefore does not understand itself within the horizon and definition of the creator. Augustine observes further that the wandering soul finds itself “dying by my alienation from you” (Ibid. 1.13. p.33-35) when it abandons its origin, its highest good, in order to “pursue the lowest things of your creation” (1.13.21).

The Augustinian self carries certain mysteriousness and ambiguity that appears grounded in the depth of the soul’s interiority. In the search for an answer to the question, ‘Who am I?’ A question that always already asks, who is my God? Augustine retrospectively is turning away from the outside world and into himself. This is an inward turn towards reflection on himself (Ibid. 10.6.p.211-213).

Smith (2001, p. 279) observes that in Confessions the ‘first half of Book 10 recounts this inward turn, couched in the Neoplatonic metaphor of interior ascent, ‘a journey from the outer world to the secret recesses of the soul.’ In this ascent Augustine starts by considering the external world then the movement goes on to the self as body, on to the self as soul, through the stages of vegetative and sentient soul, and finally to memory (Confessions 10.8.p. 214-216). Although portrayed as an ascent to a height, this Augustinian movement is actually
antithetical in that, it is in fact more of a descent into the abyss (Ibid. 10.2. p. 207-208),
penetrating deeper and further deeper into the soul until it reaches the ‘caves and mountains

It is in these interior caverns that the self becomes even more mysterious; that is by
penetrating to the heart of the soul, where one was to find at its centre a bottomless abyss that
could not be sounded. Consequently, Augustine reflecting on the powers of memory is struck
and overwhelmed by an infinity (Ibid. 10.8. p. 215). The power of memory is very great; it is
vast and infinite profundity. It is by the power of his mind, that he himself cannot grasp the
totality of who he is.

The self cannot grasp itself, neither can it conceptualise itself. That is not because it is
outside or external to or of itself, but simply because the self eludes itself on account of its
own depth that opens onto an infinity. The journey into the recesses of the soul brings the
self-face-to-face with its own mystery. It encounters the secret that cannot be made present
except to God, for whom “the abyss of human consciousness” is an open book. The self
further eludes conceptualisation precisely because it evades language.

The self as a radically private interiority is incommensurate with the public traffic of
language. Accordingly, the strategy of “confession” plays an important role in this
problematic ordering or conceptualisation of the self. Augustine has to return to himself, to
his interiority. The turn is a reflection, a return to consider exactly who he is (precisely what
Pascal on the other hand says we run from). By returning from the exterior world to the
interior life of the soul, Augustine runs up against its derivative nature, that it is created and
therefore must be inferior to that which made it. Subsequently, it is precisely in reflecting on
oneself that the self is confronted by its Origin [God], by its maker, and is awakened to its
being as imago Dei. Through this inward turn, by which the self is confronted simultaneously by its own nature and its Origin, what Augustine encounters is Being itself.

While Augustine finally engages in confession perhaps as the only way out of this abyss the self is continually descending into, he still has difficulties with understanding herself, “I at least, Lord, have difficulty at this point, and I find my own self hard to grasp. I have become for myself a soil which is a cause of difficulty and much sweat” (Ibid. 10.16. p.222-223; Foucault 1978, p. 57-59).

It is as if to say the more he works this soil, the harder he finds this exercise that is causing him much sweat. The ground is not yielding easily as he would have liked. This encounter with memory that is actually with himself is an encounter with infinity that causes amazement: “Great is the power of memory, an awe-inspiring mystery, my God, a power of profound and infinite multiplicity. And this is mind, this is myself” (Ibid. 10.17.p.223-224). But we are still left with the question: “What then am I, my God?’ (Ibid.) The mystery or ambiguity of the self, then, is grounded in its interiority, which signals an interior transcendence an infinity whose end I never reach.

3.2.1 Augustine’s inwardness on reason

Augustine recognises the limitations of words for describing the essential features of the self, which is the reflection of God's 'image and likeness' in each of us. However, his turn to the self was a turn to radical reflexivity that made the language of inwardness irresistible (Taylor 1989, p. 131). The inner light shines in our presence to ourselves exposing us to who truly we are. It is different from the outer light since it makes the image of inwardness compelling as it illuminates the space where ‘I am present to myself.’ It is from this one’s self, that one is drawn away from and becomes absorbed into the world, loving and enjoying the world rather than using it, and therefore acting prodigal (Confessions 1.18.p. 38-39).
But a return to the Origin is in Augustine’s thoughts synonymous with a return into himself his innermost citadel (Ibid.7.10. p146-147). It is by his returning from the exterior world to the interior life of the soul that he becomes an authentic self once again. Augustine thus introduced the concept of inwardness of radical reflexivity significant now for modern epistemological thought. The step to inwardness for Augustine was a step towards God.

The truth dwells within and God is the truth. This truth shows itself in our attempt to prove God’s existence. Augustine thus tried to show his interlocutors that there is something higher than reason: something that deserves to be called God. Reason in fact recognises that there is a truth that is critical to it [reason] that is a standard on which it [reason] regulates itself that is not its own making but rather beyond it and common to all.

His pursuit of the usefulness of reason brings him to the conclusion that there are base objects as well as higher common objects, applicable to all who apply reason. Truth available to all can be apprehended by reason. Augustine observes that, all can also enjoy truth and in fact this store of truth does not run out. So, Augustine’s proof of the existence of God is by experience of knowing and reasoning that is done by going inward where actually one gets drawn upward.

Augustine took this thought process to show that God is or may be found not just in the world but also importantly in the foundations of the person. God is or may be found in the intimacy of self-presence. Consequently, God as Truth gives human beings the standards, the principles of right judgment, not through the spectacle of a world that is organised by ideas but rather by that ‘incorporeal light.’ It is a light by which human minds are irradiated so that they judge rightly of all things (Taylor 1989, p.134). Augustine faced the question, what is it that one turns to inward that propels her to be drawn upward and unto God or the Truth? Augustine’s answer is that we turn to ‘memory’, but not memory as we commonly refer to
everyday the recovery of the past imprints. Memory for Augustine contained past experiences but included principles of intelligible higher order by which a person is capable of formulating them and making them explicit, even though they may have never been presented explicitly to us in the past.

Augustine implied that memory is capable of innate ideas, that deep within us there is an implicit understanding that we have to think hard and deep in order to bring it to explicit and conscious formulations. It is in one’s ‘memoria’ that one’s implicit grasp of who she is resides, that guiding her she moves from her original self-ignorance and grievous self misdescription to true self-knowledge.

Augustine perceived God to be the source of this implicit understanding. God was the source of the light that lights every person coming into this world. Augustine argued that the human soul, at the end of its search for itself, if it goes to the very end, the soul finds God. Augustine implied that it is in this, my paradigmatic activity where I strive to make myself more fully present to myself, to realise the full potential that resides in the fact that I, the knower and known are but one.

By this self-knowledge I come tellingly and convincingly to the awareness that God stands above me. It’s at the very root of memory that the soul finds God. In Augustinian understanding the way into memory leads above to God, hence going into memory takes one beyond. He inadvertently draws out the thought that the implicit grasp within memory suggests that training does not put knowledge of the ideas of principles and intelligible reason into us. The capacity is already there, teaching only but awakens what is already there.

The concept of the inwardness suggests an Augustinian path leading from the exterior to the interior and from the interior to the superior (Gilson 1961 cited in Taylor 1989, p.136). Augustine’s argument is that we come to God within. God’s is the power rather than reason,
sustaining and directing the human activity of striving to know. Human being grasp the intelligible not just on account of their soul’s eye being directed to it but primarily because the Master within directs them.

God is behind the eye, as well as the One whose Ideas the eye strives to discern clearly before it. This God is found in the intimacy of my oneself-presence, he is closer to her than she herself (Confessions III.vi.11). Augustine went on to claim that God can be thought of as the most fundamental ordering principle in a person. The soul animates the body, so God does the soul. He vivifies it. ‘As the soul is the life of the flesh, so God is the blessed life of the man.’ (Ibid. VII. 1. 2)

3.3 Augustine and a transcending self

The most rigorously Augustinian theme that has influenced the existentialist’ tradition is the priority of the self for an understanding of being or existence. This understanding of being (arguably to be described ontological) is integrally linked to self-knowledge and self-knowledge has relationship with knowledge of God and knowledge of self. In (Soliloquies 1.1.1; 1.2.7) Augustine engages in dialogue with oneself, where he raises the question of self-knowledge.

For Smith (2001, p. 275) Augustinian question of self-knowledge is actually a question of being, of one’s own being. It is simply that to know oneself is always already to raise the question of being as a question of one’s Origin. For Augustine his Origin is of course God who has made human beings in his own image and similitude, ‘which everyone acknowledges who knows himself’ (Sol. 1.1.4). The Augustinian question of being as origin is that which defines or gives meaning to the self. The origin determines what the self ought to be (anticipating the theme of “authenticity”). The same theme is found in
the opening of the Confessions and, indeed, determines the entire structure of the text. There in Confessions Augustine asserts that,

“…. you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you.”
(Confessions1.1. p.21).

The Augustinian self being made for and by God therefore remains restless if it departs from him [God]. But as the imago Dei, this same self finds its definition and meaning in its origin [God]. If the self is or was to lose this understanding of itself within this horizon of its definition as the image of God, it remains restless and anxious. Augustine therefore concludes that to be without self-knowledge is to be without the knowledge of God; and to be without the knowledge of God is to experience anxiety about one’s own identity.

Augustine describes his experience, “I had become to myself a vast problem” (Ibid. 4.4.p. 75): he was ‘not herself,’ not ‘at home’ with himself but rather constantly ‘restless.’ Augustinian self finds its “meaning” or its identity and definition in its relations, in its “love” as its intentional aim. This self is defined by what it loves, by what it directs itself toward, what it refers itself to. Although in Augustine, consciousness is intentional the priority is not on perception but love as an intentional mode of consciousness. The Augustinian self is, in a sense necessarily transcending and referring itself outside of itself and beyond itself in order to find meaning. In an existentialist reading of Augustine, it is important to appreciate the significance of one’s “love” in determining the meaning of the self.

For Augustine, the self is defined by the object of its love. What is at stake here is a certain ethics of self-constitutions: who I am is determined by what I love, how I relate myself to “the world”. Arendt (1996, p. 18) comments on this Augustine’s thoughts, “Since man is not self-sufficient,” “and therefore, always desires something outside of himself, the question of who he is can only be resolved by the object of his desire.” Augustine reminds himself that at one time he held the inauthentic self. This is a self that is “not itself”. It was the kind
of self that directs its love toward the “world,” departing from the relation where it is at home and finds its meaning. On account of this inauthentic self, Augustine recounts, “My sin, consisted in this, that I sought pleasure, sublimity, and truth not in God but in his creatures, in myself, and other created beings” (Confessions 1.20.p.40-41). The inauthentic self has its love misdirected and absorbed in the world, thereby dissipating and dissolving the meaning and identity of the self who is divided and anxious.

The self which departs from its Origin is a divided self, scattered and fragmented by its own absorption in the world of multiplicity: “As an adolescent I went astray from you, my God, far from your unmoved stability…” (Ibid.11.10. p.52-53). The inauthentic self\(^{25}\) is the prodigal self like the Lucan son in Luke 15: 13 who attempts to find meaning in the world that lacks transcendence. Augustine found out that the soul couldn’t be nourished in a “distant land” where it was experiencing famine. In contrast, the authentic self directs its love and finds, it’s meaning in its Creator and is thus defined as imago Dei. It has returned home for the feast. The abstruseness of the self, grounded in the interiority and depth of the self in Augustine, points to the transcendence of the self as always already referring beyond itself to its other, its Origin [God] (Smith 2001, p. 280). The Augustinian self therefore finds it’s meaning in relation to something other than itself. Its withdrawal into the cavernous depths of the self did not solve the question for Augustine, but rather made manifest a deeper mystery and a fundamental ambiguity that continued to point

\(^{25}\) The Augustinian inauthentic self finds itself travelling ‘into a distant country’ Luke 15: 13 far from home, restless and anxious, having “squandered his estate ‘with loose living’. Far from home, he is also far from herself, is not herself, and lacks a sense of selfhood or identity. The self is spent, dissolved, dissipated, scattered, pulled apart by an absorption in ‘the world.’ It has spent its fortune, its being. The prodigal self is less than a self, even less than human, not able to enjoy what unclean swine are fed. However, there is a sense in which this prodigal, inauthentic self is not aware of its condition; it thinks itself to be free, to be enjoying life. Not until a moment of crisis and reflection, does the self realize its destitution. That is, it is not until the prodigal “comes to herself” that he then reflects on his state and realizes that he was better off at home with his father (v. 17). This coming to oneself, then, is that experience or crisis which precipitates Augustine’s return, a conversion, a re-turning to oneself and finding meaning in relation to one’s origin/ being.
the self elsewhere to the Infinite. Consequently, the question, “Who am I?” becomes, for Augustine, a question concerning God, the Infinite.

The self will therefore find its authentic meaning only in relation to its Origin [God], its Father. The fundamental relation that determines this meaning is found in the intentional structure of love. The object of self’s love determines the meaning of the self. Accordingly, the question becomes, “What do I love when I love my God?” (Confessions X. 6. p. 211-212) “What is the object of my love?” (Ibid. X 7. p. 213-4). Further questions that Augustine needed answers to included, at what does my love aim? Where do I look for meaning? The world could not provide him with answers, as demonstrated in this response to self, “‘We are not your God,’ they responded; ‘look beyond us’” (Ibid. X.6 p. 212). He equally could not find any answers from or by himself as he goes on to show that the depths of the self, memoria, continues to refer him beyond himself (Ibid X.17. p. 218). The beyond himself pursuit finds its resting place in God, and yet there still remains a further quest, what is it that Augustine loves when he loves his God? Arendt comments, “What Augustine expects of God, is an answer to the question, ‘Who am I?’ - the certainty of which all previous philosophy had taken for granted. Or, to put it another way, it was because of this new quest for the self that he finally turned to God.” (Arendt 1996, p. 25).

Augustine’s self seeks and finds meaning outside of itself more probable in becoming aware of the Other or the Origin that is God. Smith (2001, p. 281) suggests the Augustinian self can be described as “ekstatic’ self. The self’s quest for meaning and the quest for God are inextricably tied to the quest for the happy life (Confessions X .20. p.226).

It is the mechanical characteristic of the self to seek its own happiness, the search that can go in different directions and find joy in the world instead of God (Ibid. X.23.p.229-230), or the authentic happy life finds its happiness in God, because God himself is the true source
of joy as he is himself that joy. Augustine’s *Confessions* continue to be approached consistently as documents of clinical relevance by psychoanalysis.

While it reads as an autobiography of some kind it also offers a study of personality processes for behaviours and responses fitting various psychoanalytic formulas. On a personal level Augustine, in *Confessions*, formulated this primal situation when he asked, “Who am I? What kind of man am I?” (Ibid. IX, 1, p.181). Notwithstanding the urgency, it took an enormous effort to articulate the answers; “I had placed myself behind my own back, refusing to see myself” (Ibid. VII, 7, p. 169). He needed, first of all, to return to his self, “Under your guidance I entered into the depth of my soul” (Ibid. VIII, 9, p. 145). He had formed the conviction that it is there, in the recesses of the inner self, that one finds the essential qualifying element: “It is in my heart that I am whatever I am” (Ibid. X, 3, p. 209).

Augustine became thoroughly involved in this task and visualising himself, as a field of his own labours is his own self. His sense of introspection could be compared to a land which a ‘farmer works only with difficulty and at the cost of much sweat’ (Ibid. X, 17, p. 223). His self-examining stance took a dialogical character. This is from the moment he began to analysing what was for him, a chronic situation of dispersion and internal divisiveness of an impoverished, crumbling self.

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26 Augustine’s personal story has been recognised as a pioneering self-analysis and a forerunner of modern psychology and existentialism, or as an exhaustive study of the self by one of the great minds in history (Nino 1990, p. 9). Urged by an internal dissatisfaction and a persistent desire to find the ultimate truth, Augustine also attempted to go beyond common aspirations of fortune and prestige. He was a person of peace and inwardness. The Confessions documents form a revision of his life at a critical juncture in the form of a dialogue between the self, God, and the other [reader]. In Confessions he wanted to explain his conversion, the major event of his adult life, at a time when he had a deeper understanding of its meaning and implications. In it he artfully presents self-conscious interpretations of his life and being, from the vantage point of a meaningful centre (Weintraub 1987, p. 26). Augustine’s inquiry about the nature of the self and God, structured in a highly personal, direct, and unashamed language, initiated a radical change in the ways others will later explore the vicissitudes of the human condition and the quest for an ultimate truth. He set the foundations for a new ideal of personality that includes individuality, introspection, and the capacity for transcendence.
The expression in (Ibid. II, 2, p. 44), engulfed in danger, misery, and bondage, full of fear and worries seem to confront any reader of his narrative and touch the heart of our own experience. Augustine is in fact describing a scene of a patient in today’s society in a psychoanalyst’s clinic. Augustine’s experience is of one wounded by an anticipatory despair of the crushing self and the final defeat of his aspirations (Nino 1990, p. 11).

He still was capable of that critical effort to search for what seemed to be missing in his life. He not only searches and explores the potential for enlightenment that may be available in other people, but also reads eagerly everything that may offer an answer, from the books of the Platonists to the letters of St. Paul (Confessions VIII, 20, p. 154-155). While focusing on God upon whom the Confessions themselves are focused, Augustine correspondingly entertained the contributions of others in the roles they played in the process of his restoration.

Although in the Confessions we see Augustine as one fumbling desperately in the darkness of his already long journey into a wasteland of futility, this particular predicament opened to Augustine another perspective that in turn, further clarified the nature of his search and the ultimate answer to his quest. In retrospect he found the answer that he was looking for, the realization that he had strayed from God, his Creator, and as a consequence had lost his inner equilibrium. He wrote in the Confessions:

‘You made us for yourself and our hearts find no peace until they rest in you. . . . You raised me up so that I could see that there was something to be seen. . . . I realized that I was far away from you.’ (Ibid. I, 1, p. 21; VII, 10, p. 147).

This is a phenomenon of one becoming aware of an Other within and beyond one’s self. He is here representative of a certain universal preoccupation with questions of ultimate meaning that many if not all people are confronted with. If these questions are adequately formulated and consistently pursued through the unfolding of the life narrative, individuals raise further questions that lead to the realm of the transcendent. Undoubtedly, Augustine’s
experience represents a particular experience qualified as religious, but he is representative of aspects that are visible in the problems many present in therapeutic settings.

3.4 **Augustine on concept and practice of Self-love**

Augustine remains a key contributor to the Western [Latin] Christian doctrine and ethics to the point that all medieval law, history, psychology, political theory and social thought stand in debt to him (Beach et al, 1973 ed., p. 100; Chadwick, 1986, p. 2). His reflections on self-love have taken on a fresh cogency by, which he still speaks to the condition of human breakdown even in 21st century, addressing the age-old debates of self-love and self-denial, which continue in the Christian community. (Schlabach, 2001, p. 3)

Many regard self-love as incompatible with the self-sacrifice of Christ. Others, especially feminists and liberation theologians (Ibid. 2001, p.143), contest the notion that self-sacrifice is the test of authentic Christian love. The resolution to this dilemma, lies with St. Augustine, argues Schlabach (Ibid. p.145, 146), eager to show how Augustine attempted to reconcile self-love and self-denial in a unified Christian love. Schlabach observes that, the crucial role continence played in Augustine’s teaching demonstrates continence is much more than just an attitude toward sexuality.

On the contrary it is the operative mode of Augustinian caritas, and Augustine conceded love a paradox that remained an agent’s personal quest for happiness, but which equally implied some self-renunciation and the pain of becoming what one is not. Schlabach observes further that putting Augustine side by side with historical theology, contemporary Christian ethics, feminism, and pastoral considerations, one affords tracing the role that self-denial played in Augustine's teaching. Sclabach is convinced that an integration of self-love and self-denial enabled Augustine to distinguish between true Christian self denial from mere self victimization. Another distinction is that the good an agent seeks when she loves -
whether directed toward neighbour, enemy, or self - is not self-serving but rather a participation in a mutual relationship with God and His creation.

Thus, Schlabach through his critical retrieval of Augustine's thought shows that self-denial is meaningful only when ordered to a higher good. Augustine’s example is that of Christ, he (Christ) endured the suffering of the cross. Christ’s example demonstrates practical applications of how charity working through continence can maintain right self-love and proper self-denial in an agent’s daily life. Augustine concedes and proposes that Christian self-sacrifice is the willing acceptance of a good derived from working on behalf of others.

3.4.1 The case for Nygren’s agape against Augustine

O’Donovan suggests Augustine’s discussion on self-love constitutes a problem, when Augustine claims that, “Self-love is loving God and it is also hating God. Self-love is common to all men; and it is restricted to those who love God.” (O’Donovan, 1980, p. 1). Nygren on the other hand sees Augustine’s concept of love from which derivatives of self-love may arise as an unsuccessful attempt to synthesis Platonist Eros and Christian Agape (Nygren 1982, p. 449-558). Nygren has argued agape is the uniquely Christian love fully expressed in the cross. It did not seek its immortal good. Agape becomes Christianity’s defining characteristic of fundamental motif. The content of Christian morality for Nygren, is determined by this self-giving love. Agape becomes value-creating principle (Nygren, 1982, p. 75 -81) while remaining un-attracted to the value.

Contra agape, Eros was the Platonic conception of love that even when in its noblest religious form and has nothing to do with eroticism or sensuality it remains for Nygren significantly acquisitive and egocentric. This is because the object of its desire remains the beauty of the divine. Eros is essentially and in principle self-love, and notwithstanding love for God and love for neighbour can be reduced to this self-love (Ibid. p. 212-217).
Nygren’s reading of Augustine’s caritas draws out the conclusion that it is primarily a love for or to God and not God’s love for an agent. Schlabach argues that Augustine was convinced God’s love poured into an agent’s heart by the Holy Spirit (Romans 5:5) is a love the agent receives from God, and such a love constitutes a gift (Schlabach 2001, p. 8). Nygren observes that Augustinian interpretation obscures the priority of God’s love for an agent (Nygren 1982, p. 452-55).

Augustinian caritas for Nygren although it continues to portray authentic Christian love it retains egocentricity, acquisitiveness and self-love. Augustinian doctrine of love for Nygren rests substantially on the foundation of Eros, which means it has very little to do with agape love. Even God’s love insists Nygren, seen through Augustinian eyes, it aims at evoking love back to God a character trait true of acquisitiveness. God’s love in Augustine becomes a self-seeking, that being the case it undermines neighbour love. Nygren is convinced that however Augustine’s love is interpreted all the time that love for God always starts in the self-love that conceives God as an agent’s good (Ibid.524-34).

Nygren’s key problem with Augustine’s concept of caritas is his (Nygren’s) attempt to remove Eros entirely from Christian love of God, as if God was never the desire of the human heart. Nygren’s loses sight of the fact that, Augustine sought to find in Goodness that, which is love’s source as well as its satisfaction. To do so he accommodates a measure of Eros, which strains ceaselessly inwards and upward into the creative and caring Agape that redeems. Harrison (1992, p. 253-4) on her part observes that Augustine did not perceive any differences in scripture as those that are attached to love. Augustine in De Doctrina Christiana 1:35 making a reference to the use of love in the Gospel according to St. John chapter 12:15 accepts scripture does not distinguish between love and fondness and charity as
Nygren tends to do. Significant is the fact that, all love according to Augustine has its origin in God’s gift of the Holy Spirit.

It follows even Eros that Nygren would like to extract from the Christian doctrine remains a product of God’s love. But how does Augustine differentiate when Eros has been applied as against agape, if both loves originate from God’s love? In *Confession* XIII. 9. 10, Augustine charges that love can be rightly or wrongly directed, depending on its object or goal. When an agent seeks to possess and enjoy lesser things than herself with no reference to God as her Creator her love for these things may be categorised as Eros.

When on the other hand she loves so as to refer all her love to God her creator, even with the love of lesser things than herself, she loves with agape. Disregarding, several of Nygren’s concerns could be justified from the point of view that Augustine himself at certain points eventually took greater stock for example, of the dangers of perverse self-love (Nygren, 1982, p.532-538). Augustinian self-love cannot be “acquisitive” in the egocentric way that Nygren alleges, because the only self worth loving is a gift of God’s grace. Augustine’s doctrine of Christian love (caritas), suggests that all loves find their unity in a *gestalt* vision of mutual love among all creatures in God, united in shared love of God as their highest good and participating in God’s own Trinitarian life.

### 3.5 Loving God for God founded on scriptures

Augustine herself claims that an agent only loves herself truly by loving God as her highest good. It is difficult to love God while in pursuit of love for self or love that is to satisfy self. Such an action will mean objectifying and using God to satisfy an agent’s own goals and desires determined independent of God. An agent who loves God does not desire God for her own private good. Conversely, if none other than God is the object of and reward of an agent’s love or even worship, then the nature of her desires changes. Augustine argues
that an agent does not love God for the sake of a reward apart from God; this argument
contradicts the notion of self-centredness. Burnaby (1991, p.160-161) suggests that when an
agent loves God, God will not allow such an agent’s will and desires to go unchanged.

Loving God must therefore transform the self. This is the self which an agent loves,
that is transformed to the point that the agent increasingly desires what God wills for self in
relation to the common good rather than the private good of the agent’s own choosing.

Augustine argued that love that enjoys fits well only with God. All other love of
created things including that of the other of an agent becomes love that uses such goods for
the enjoyment of God, but because an agent’s other is his neighbour such a neighbour cannot
be used to enjoy God. Against this preceding argument, Augustine favoured the notion of an
agent enjoying a neighbour in God.

Augustine perceived in Aristotelian rational love the agent as having an admiring
appreciation of the good of the object. In rational love the agent recognises that the object has
a purpose or telos, but it is not a telos that she herself the agent imposes. O’Donovan
surmises rational love to involve an observer’s disinterestedness and it may also encourage
her detachment. Rational love thus provides a more flexible and coherent statement of the
order of love unlike positive love (1980, p.29-32).

Of the four Augustinian loves the most satisfactory was benevolent love, which
rationally acknowledges an objective order of created good. It in essence adds something
more to rational love. From a creator’s point of view, each creation and hence every agent as
a creation has a destiny to fulfil in the order of things. A loving agent recognises the destiny
to fulfil the order of things and affirms, albeit he may not have devised that order, he adds
weight of his agency toward the complete realisation of the order. Benevolent love
accordingly while freely affirming the objective order of the created good seeks to realise it.
An agent in loving the other and self seeks after the good of the loved not in accordance with a teleological order that she imposes, but rather according to God’s will for herself and the other. She loves within the teleological ordered good of the whole, therefore not even Augustinian self-love can be egocentric on the contrary it becomes theocentric. Augustine’s speculative views were always influenced by the necessity of agreeing with scripture.

If he was going to say anything about love let alone self-love, scriptures became the source. Hence his conception of self-love takes its cue from that specific necessity, of agreeing with scripture. In scripture the agent is asked to love God with her whole heart, soul and mind and love her neighbour as herself (Luke 10: 27). In this command there is no expression on how an agent ought to love herself, or whether it is right for an agent to love herself or whether it is right for an agent to wish that others love her (Burnaby, 1991, p.116). What the agent is left with is a matter of approximation on how to love self.

Love God as God, your neighbour as yourself these are the standards for loving God and neighbour. There is no other equal to God, so that an agent may be asked to love God as that other. However, to the agent’s neighbour the agent is shown a rule by being given his neighbour as her equal. It is with this approximation Augustine perceived an agent as loving self to be the criterion from which such an agent loves. Augustine’s perspective is important because his considerations turnout to be companion for contemporary thinking on perennial issues of moral life. The complexion of human moral life appears multi-coloured by Augustine’s feelings that human beings long for God essentially for the sake of their own happiness (Meilaender, 2006, p.3-4). The question then is, whether seeking God to obtain a happy life is selfish or perhaps whether loving God with one’s whole heart, mind and soul is totalitarian? Evidently the wish to love God purely can develop a motive for trying to
ascertain pleasing God, in which case the focus shifts away from God to oneself. Yet, to attempt to seek happiness for oneself can equally lockout an agent off from the grace, which engenders happiness. This is because the focus will undoubtedly have shifted away from God to oneself.

Indeed, it is possible that the wish to love God with one’s whole heart, mind and soul in this earthly life can easily close off the love that God himself offers an agent through the presence of the neighbour. When this happens the focus again shifts from God to an agent herself. The question raised with this consideration of love for God and love for self is, what is the criterion from, which an agent may love self without the fear of turning away from God, and how does she love and enjoy God as an end in itself?

3.5.1 From what criteria may an agent love one’s self?

Augustine perceived the single essential to moral goodness to be the right direction of the will toward God. The love of God becomes the ultimate form of Christian decision into which contents of behaviour are to be placed. In *The City of God* Bk XIX chap., xiii, Augustine observes, ‘Love God, and do what you want.’

It is from the love of God Augustine concluded God alone is to be enjoyed for being eternal and unchanging (*De Doctrina Christiana*, Book 1. 22.20).

All other things are to be used in order that an agent may come at last to the enjoyment of God. Augustine grasped from the Neoplatonists the ontological divide between the transcendent immutable creator (God) and mutable temporal creatures (Harrison, 2006, p. 29-30). This understanding provided Augustine’s central belief in one transcendent God and the absolute dependence of creation upon him as Creator. He adopted this distinctively Christian doctrine of creation, from nothing, as a basis of reflection upon the central articles of faith and a thinking that involves a universal rational approach to Being (Anderson, 1965,
p.1). He understood God to be a Being who is the principle cause of all being, able to be perceived metaphysically. But, metaphysics for Augustine is not attained by natural reason it has its recourse to revelation. Revelation is achieved through the love of God who himself is wisdom.

In wisdom synonymous with God is found not only charity, which is the love of God, but also faith, which is the mind adherence to truth or God. Since the essence of love is to seek union with the beloved, love becomes personal, in the sense that it drives the agent towards a loving union with God himself. The love of God highlights an agent’s awareness of the ontological chasm between the omnipotent, transcendent God and a creation, which God has drawn from nothing and has made good, oriented and dependent on God. An agent as a creature loves correctly or rightly only because her will is oriented toward God. An agent cannot therefore act justly let alone love, through her own reason; hence reason for Augustine does not merit that place of virtue.

For Augustine perfect virtue and justice are only found in Christ and human virtue is always conditioned by humility since it is never entirely comprehended by reason. An agent who lacks faith ultimately lacks humility to accept the irrational notion of divine incarnation and mystery. Such lack immunises the agent to Christ’s justifying grace, the agent is then beyond the ability to stand in right relation to God. The enjoyment of God stands out as the criterion from which an agent is able to love herself. When an agent acknowledges the omnipotence and freedom of God, against her own subversive system that emphasises independent self-achievement she understands the nature and effects of human sinfulness and of evil, she is therefore able love correctly. This is because her love is firstly directed at her Creator God. The agent enters a right relation with God by obeying especially the commandment to love God and neighbour. Adopting a Christian stand Augustine argues an
agent who is not a believer deceives herself in a false piety, which offer but temporal security. She fails to come to love herself or her neighbours or the true God and in this she fails to seek the ethereal good (Dodaro, 2004)

A question is raised, should an agent be regarded as a thing to be enjoyed, or to be used or indeed both? I observed above sometimes love demands of an agent to use the other (neighbour for example, as a thing) as a means to enjoying God. Augustine argued against this understanding proposing the notion of an agent and neighbour enjoying one another in God (O’Donovan 1980, p.24-29)

For Augustine an agent is commanded, to love another; and so the question is whether an agent is to be loved by others for her own sake, or for the sake of something else. If an agent is loved for her own sake she becomes a thing to be enjoyed, but if she is loved for something else she becomes a thing to be used (a means) but a means to what? Most likely, a means to enjoying God.

When an agent loves a created thing rather than the Creator, the agent’s love becomes distorted, disordered and unsatisfying and insatiable on account that it is directed toward what is relative and contingent rather than the Creator [God]. It is also true that it is impossible for an agent to love God in order to satisfy love of self, since this is objectifying and using God to satisfy the agent’s own goals and whims that are determined independently of God (Burnaby 1938, p.121) Such is a love [cupiditas] turned downward from God to the temporal things. The love of God transforms all the respectable virtues of the civilised person. Whereas the Greek laid emphasis on the virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance and justice, Augustine swings radically and argues that these virtues’ worth is determined by the complete intention in, which they are cultivated. When these virtues are sought for the sake of self-love that is inward directed, they become self–defeating. Augustine is interested in the
conversion of the Greek moral ideal of justice, wisdom, courage and temperance by love. His belief was that the truth of Christianity should not be put alongside Greek wisdom, nor put above it as a superstructure but rather Christianity should convert, permeate and redeem Greek wisdom.

In Augustine’s understanding there are four things, which are to be loved, the first is God who is above human agents, then is the human agent herself, the third is another human agent and the fourth are those things below human agents (De Doctrina Christiana Book 1.23). Augustine argues that God did not see the need to issue a love commandment to an agent to love self nor such a commandment for an agent to love things below her human level. God’s only issued command is binary for an agent to love that one thing above human agent’s level [God] and that, which is on the same level with a human agent, that is another human being. Augustine’s advice is that an agent need not find enjoyment in herself and therefore love herself for her own sake but rather for the one whom the said agent is to enjoy [God]. Augustine offers this observation,

‘But if they love themselves for their own sakes, they are not relating themselves to God; rather, in turning to themselves, they are not turning to anything unchangeable.’ (De Doctrina Christiana, Book 1.21)

An agent’s enjoyment of herself in Augustine’s understanding is to some extent defective, this is because self is changeable and does not offer the security of the unchangeable good. Augustine also speaks of an agent loving herself for the sake of the one whom the agent’s love is most rightly directed to as its end, in the Confessions this is the Origin. An agent can therefore love herself but not for her own benefit, rather for the sake of God at whom her love is directed as its end. Loving God with one’s whole heart, and one’s whole soul and one’s whole mind implies an agent has his whole focus on God. That focus leaves no room for wanting to enjoy something else outside of God. In essence, the loving of neighbour as oneself becomes a conduit through which whatever else occurs to an agent as fit
to be loved must be carried along toward that point to, which an agent’s whole loving
impetus is hastening toward God.

3.5.2 How may an agent practice self-love?

The notion of self-love has always and continues to remain a paradox in Christian
theology. The two synoptic Gospel scriptural texts of Mark 8:35; 12: 31 have kept the
paradox in view. The bible however, also provides other texts that form a biblical foundation
that when applied somehow this foundation serves to uphold bewilderingly multifarious and
inconsistent ways of speaking. So that, whereas Calvin (Institutes III.7.4) describes self-love
as a ‘noxious pest’, Joseph Butler laments that persons have not enough regard for
themselves.

Unquestionably, it is impossible for an agent who loves God not to love herself. It is
only an agent who loves God that has proper love and is aware how to love best. With love
for God such an agent aims diligently at the attainment of the chief and the true good, the
enjoyment of God. What therefore, is to prevent such an agent from loving herself and since
she has firstly loved right by loving God and neighbour, should she not find it a mutual bond
of love to love another who is self? This certainly is true, by loving God right or in the
correct manner of soul, mind and whole heart an agent should find it possible to love self and
neighbour more easily; but she only loves self and neighbour with only part of her being.

Commenting on the texts of Mark 12: 30-31; Leviticus 19: 18; Deuteronomy 6: 5,
Augustine understands the rule of love God set for human beings to require an agent to love
her neighbour as herself. This loving of neighbour as self leaves room for an agent to want to
enjoy something else, and we have seen that other something to be God. It becomes apparent
that an agent loves self better and correctly or suitably when she loves God first. Therefore,
what an agent aims for in self-love must be what she aims for in her neighbour in order to
love the neighbour as herself. Augustine argues that what an agent desires in her love for self the enjoyment of God. God becomes her chief end, and the agent loves the neighbour as self with perfect affection as a conduit to God who remains the chief end. Indeed, an agent does not love her neighbour as self unless she wants to draw the neighbour to that good which she is in pursuit (God).

Only the pursuit of God offers room for an agent and her neighbour to pursue him concurrently, this means an agent must remain benevolent to her neighbour (Beach et al, 1973, p. 117). Augustine observes, things to be loved are those, which relate to God and to the human agent in a social companionship, and not all things that are used are to be loved. Augustine however concedes that an agent ought to be taught in what measure she may love herself so as to be of service to herself, for only then will she be loving herself for the sake of God (De Doctrina Christiana Book 1.25). Augustine somehow like Aristotle seems to postulate that an agent can be a neighbour to self, such an agent can see in herself a true friend since such a friend reminds the agent of self.

Augustine senses that to love the neighbour as self is at once and the same for how an agent ought to love herself, and inadvertently in doing so sees herself in the neighbour. Love of self is not overlooked in the commandment to love the neighbour as self. Self becomes the measuring ingot by how which a neighbour is to be loved. For an agent to love anything else other than her real self in the neighbour is to err. The case for an agent’s desire to love herself and desires to be good to self is an indisputable fact. But such an agent, ought also to be taught how to love self wisely and within due limits. The caution indicates the propensity of an agent to love self for her own sake, in which case she becomes an end in herself taking the place of God who is to be loved on his own account more than anything else. There is a contradiction somehow in Augustine when he suggests that other persons are to be loved
more than an agent’s own body. First because the agent is the measuring rode for love of the other; secondly, the others are not loved as an end in themselves but rather these are being loved for God’s sake. If all people are to be loved equally as Augustine observes in (De Doctrina Christiana Book 1.29) then the love of an agent of self is justified, for then an agent cannot love the neighbour or the other more than herself.

While it is true not all self-love has a legitimate place in Christian ethics, true self-love is consistent with a theocentric desire for the other to participate in the common good of God’s creation. God’s self-revelation as love becomes for an agent an appeal or a demand and a command or a standard as I have discussed, to love the neighbour as God loves. The neighbour is loved by an agent on account that the neighbour shares the same human nature as the agent, it is a command to love the other and that in the other God’s presence is exhibited.

To Augustine all love is acquisitive, a craving that rises from our lack of some good. An agent’s love proceeds from the status of her human being as a creature. Her insufficiency pushes her to seek the source of her being, consequently expressing her dependency on that source and not on her own self-sufficiency. This is the basis on which correct self-love consists, in loving God. The quest for good (bonum) is the most fundamental urge of human life. Humans are created as finite beings insufficient in themselves. They must desire in order to love, and love in order to complete their incompleteness. Every good desired by an agent satisfies the self, and consequently all love is by the same token self-love. In Augustinian understanding, love of neighbour and love of God are not free of self-love because the self rightly enjoys such a privilege. For Augustine even, God in the Trinity is a community of self-love. Therefore, self is not denied but fulfilled in Christian love. Instead of the lust (cupiditas) of selfish desire an agent is led to higher unselfish love” (caritas) in the Christian
way of loving. Christian tradition has followed Augustine in fulfilling rather than rejecting
the self in love.

There are rigid ascetics who prefer the negative path of Buddhism in cutting off desire
as the source of all evil. But desire is also the source of good, and to deny all desire is to ask
for unconscious Nirvana. To deny the self completely is to prefer death to life, a strange way
falling in love with annihilation. This is not the Christian way self-love is understood.
Augustine argues that revelation teaches an agent that her final well being lies in God, and to
love God is the greatest service she can render to herself (City of God 21.27). Augustine
recognises self-love as a natural phenomenon. Nature in itself is something good. No one
ever hates herself (De Doctina Christiana, 1.24.24), and there is evidently legitimate natural
love. For Augustine natural self-love is not always identical with the true search for
happiness, seen from a moral perspective self-love can be good or evil. Augustine observes;

‘Self-love despite God made the earthly city, love of God despite one-self made the
heavenly city.’ (City of God 14.28)

Augustine’s claim is that the city of this world loves itself so much that by
comparison it despises God whereas the eternal city loves God so much that by comparison it
despises itself. Yet, self-love is good. It is good when it is not contrary to the love of God. In
knowing how to love herself correctly agent ipso facto loves God. If she does not love God,
herself love occurs inappropriately, as she is in a manner hating herself (De Doctrina
Christiana, 4.4).

Human beings are full of weakness, this in itself demands that an agent must hate
herself as a being, or perhaps hate the evil in herself; if this did not happen she may not make
progress toward what is better (Soliloquies. 9.9-10; 169.15.18). An agent’s hatred of self
does not mean she despises herself, since this would mean a denial of the dignity she has
received from God. On the contrary an agent has need of enjoying herself because of God,
and here for support Augustine falls back to the New Testament text of St. John 12:25;
‘Whoever hates his soul (life) in this world will keep it for eternal life.’

The text suggests to an agent that if she hates in the correct way then she in essence loves. Augustine also repeats in (Soliloquies 96.2.2) ‘Learn to love yourself by not loving yourself.’ It is also possible that hatred of evil in self by an agent can be formulated in a positive way, suggesting an indication of the benevolent of self-love. An agent can therefore apply her will to serve her own advantage (De Dcotrina Christiana 1.25.26), on account that doing good is a duty she owes herself. This concurs with the Kantian understanding of the provision of duty to self.

Augustine would want to reiterate that an agent cares for her own well being in a full and deeper sense of the word when she has a genuine concern for the inmost meaning of life, which is to be found in the love of God. This is a gift an agent can give to herself. The self in Christianity is not rejected but purified of selfishness, lust, and pride. The Lord’s Prayer does not ask God to deliver us from self but to “deliver us from evil. It is the evil of false selfishness that cries out for deliverance, and from such temptation the prayer leads to the social values of God’s family— “for thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory, for ever.”

Such prayer strengthens rather than abnegating self by leading self to active participation in a larger cause of social love. In the family of universal love every self is strengthened by mutual respect and approval, human and divine. There is nothing an agent hungers for so much as approval, to be accepted by, others as a worthy member, not to be rejected or condemned, but affectionately treated with understanding and appreciation.

In the human family parental love strengthens the growing selves of the children to be good citizens taking their active part for the welfare of all. Parental rejection tends to make
neurotics and criminals who are unable to work or play constructively with others by reason of their self-rejection and emotional insecurity. There is a huge difference that family love makes in the ascendancy of good over evil in each self.

3.6 Oliver O’Donovan’s reading of Augustine

3.6.1 Augustine’s expression of amor sui or ‘self-love’

The Problem of Self love in Augustine as O’Donovan perceives it, arises from the unreconciled and mutually incompatible assertions that Augustine made about self-love; that in fact self-love is loving God, yet it is hating God; that self–love is common to all persons, yet at the same time it is restricted to those who love God. O’Donovan sets out to sort out what appears to be incompatibilities or perhaps ambiguities of self-love in Augustinian corpus. In doing so O’Donovan wants to shed light on the wider ethical and theological issues which are involved in an Augustinian application of self-love. In his introduction to Augustine’s thinking of self-love O’Donovan raises the question of ambiguity when Augustine says;

‘The primal destruction of man was self-love.’ ‘There is no one who does not love himself; but one must search for the right love and avoid the warped.’ ‘Indeed, you did not love yourself when you did not love the God who made you.’ (O’Donovan 1980, p.1)

On setting side by side these sentences, one encounters great difficulties determining what was Augustine’s baseline understanding and application of self-love. O’Donovan acknowledges that Augustine was the first Latin Father to give serious attention to the expression "amor sui." (Ibid. p. 2) Whilst he was also the first of all the Fathers to discuss its connection to Christ's commandment to love one's neighbour "as oneself," Augustine himself has given us no explicit "theory" of self-love and seldom tells us what he means by it (doing so misleadingly at times). The problem of self-love in Augustine as O’Donovan sees it, arises from the un-reconciled and mutually incompatible assertions that Augustine makes about
self-love is loving God, yet it is hating God; self-love is common to all men, yet it is restricted to those who love God; O'Donovan seeks to sort out as much as is possible and to shed light on the wider ethical and theological implications involved. O'Donovan concludes that many points are left unresolved and incoherent within the Augustinian corpus. Nonetheless, Augustine’s writings on self-love are not only the "product of Augustine's most important psychological and theological speculations," but play an important role in his "eudaemonist ethic": "self-love finds its only true expression in love of God"; "all moral obligation derives from an obligation to God which is at the same time a call to self-fulfilment."

3.6.2 O’Donovan’s interpretive battlefield of self love

Discussing self-love in Christian tradition on the back of Nygren’s publication of Agape and Eros was to set oneself or find one’s self at the centre of claims and counter claims for and against self-love. While Augustine’s claims of self-love may have been accepted during his time and the period that followed virtually without question, these views are not any longer met with universal approval. Nygren was convinced that Augustine had dealt a lethal blow to the self-denying agape of the Gospel by synthesizing it with the essentially self-regarding Eros of Platonic philosophy. Others have since rallied to Augustine's defence, but without always doing full justice to the complexity of his thought. O'Donovan himself is convinced that Augustinian concepts of both love and self are important (Ibid. p. 5-6) in any attempts to understand his application of the term self-love. Further still O'Donovan is persuaded that Augustinian nuances of love (Ibid. p.11) need to be brought into play to demonstrate how Augustine applied the word in different settings.

Although some of the nuances of love are backed by scriptural texts (1st John 4: 8, 16 for example), O’Donovan is surprised that at no point does Augustine attempt to show any
clear resolve to distinguish nuances that are scripturally backed from those that are not. It is in chapter one of the book that O’Donovan lays the groundwork for assessing the ambiguity generated by Augustine in the application of the concept of self-love. The groundwork for such an assessment starts by sorting out the various meanings of *amor* and its analogues and by sorting *dilectio* in Augustine's works. Four ‘aspects’ of love emerge as distinct but related. These are cosmic, the positive or subjective, the rational, and the benevolent love.

These loves, respectively, are appetition patterned on physical motivations, the pursuit of subjective and objective goals, the reasoned approval and appreciation of what is judged to be good, and finally the altruistic willing of the good of others. These four, form the foundations upon which the exploration of the manner in which, on the basis of the division, Augustine was able to reconcile self-love with the two commandments of the love of God and neighbour. Although this analysis made of the four loves is striking, O’Donovan does not seem to apply much of this analysis in the latter parts of his discussions. He simply makes a telling observation from this analysis, that is, that Augustine believed firmly in a teleological order (Ibid. pp. 35 -36). This belief allowed Augustine to pass smoothly ‘between the proposition and the purpose, between the expression of rational love and that of benevolence. ’O’Donovan suggests that as Augustine’s thought system matured these four nuances of love took on the subtler nature about ordered love. Subsequently, these four nuances of love formed a flexible and imprecise language that enabled Augustine to appeal to more than one aspect of love at once. O’Donovan sees a theological benefit that is served by this looseness of this concept of love in Augustine, that it enabled the unity of ‘every volitional impulse in the service of the love of God.’ This is the conclusion O’Donovan arrives at after his examination of the self-love and love of God and concluding the two as entirely coextensive.
By this conclusion O’Donovan is convinced the question of coextension helped Augustine explain that right self-love is benevolence towards oneself.

This means right self-love coincides with love of God; cosmic with benevolent love; and the useful with the right. The coincidence is learned under the guidance of Scripture: it is possible, even natural, not to know it (Campbell 1982, p. 413). Whilst Augustine remains ambiguous on whether it is possible not to love oneself, and this reflects a general ambiguity in his works: authority is continuous and discontinuous with reason the criteria for right self-love are objective and subjective.

### 3.6.3 Comparative evaluations between self-love and love of God

O’Donovan follows his conclusion and that of Augustine that right self-love coincides with love of God, by describing the distinction between correct and incorrect comparative evaluation of both self-love and love of God. The two distinctions are determined by the nature of the self, whereby on one hand this distinction is between the created self and the distortions that have marred it; and on the other hand a distinction between the self as it is now and that it is to become (Ibid. p. 61). These quantitative evaluations between self-love and love of God are next distinguished from qualitative evaluation of the soul, particularly as non-material. Importantly, the soul is described as first withdrawing from the lower, that is the material, and returning to itself, that is to correct quantitative evaluation. The soul then rises in faith to unity with eternal things in contemplation of God\(^{27}\). The continuity of the movement of the soul depends on the desire for happiness. Thus, psychological self-love on the other hand is occupied with the concept of the self, whether

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\(^{27}\) The soul wandering away from this contemplation finds itself “dying by my alienation from you” (I.13. p. 33-35) when it abandons its Origin (which is also its highest good) in order to “pursue the lowest things of your creation”. This is an interior ascent, a journey from the outer world to the secret recesses of the soul. The journey itself begins by considering the external world, then to the self as body, on to the self as soul, through the stages of vegetative and sentient soul, and finally to memory (Confessions10.8.p.214-216).
contemplative, that is converted and perfected, or unconverted and deformed. Perfected, benevolent self-love therefore involves both a 'horizontal' rational movement of the mind to its objective, and a 'vertical' movement based on faith in divine authority.

While raising new difficulties with this simplistic interpretation O'Donovan finds that after the year 400 Augustine began to stress the notion of a perverse self-love that is quite opposed to the love of God (1980, p.94). O'Donovan focuses on Augustinian comments on Psalm 44 (Ibid. p. 93, 96), and in the famous passage from the City of God on the two loves and the two Cities. It becomes clear from this analysis that the mature Augustine had not completely overcome his difficulties in reconciling love of self and love of God.

O'Donovan concludes that there is no 'finished' concept of self-love in Augustine, since Augustine does not have a coherent view on whether it is possible not to love oneself, or on how to love our neighbour 'as' ourselves. However, self-love nonetheless plays a significant part in the supporting structure of Augustine's eudaemonist ethic, his view is that moral obligations derive from obligation to God, which is at the same time a call to self-fulfilment. So far, O'Donovan has been useful leading into examining what Augustine’s thoughts were regarding self-love, the ambiguity we set out to dispel still lingers, demanding further examination, for now I turn attention to an Augustinian theological indebtedness to St. Paul.

3.7 Augustine and Pauline Influence

There is no doubt that Augustine’s theological propositions were doctrinally and hermeneutically shaped by his reading of Pauline materials in the New Testament. The Neoplatonic circle to which Augustine belonged was interested in parts of the New Testament texts. These parts included the prologue to St John, and numerous texts from the apostle Paul’s writings (Chadwick 1986, p. 24). Neo-Platonists Christians used Pauline
theology in an effort to counteract the Manichean’s determinism and dualism (Clark 1994, p. 2-3). Augustine as a Manichean was not exempted from reading and engaging with these New Testament texts. In Confession VIII. 12.29 he writes that ‘a light of certainty’ enveloped him and ‘all shadow of doubt disappeared.’

It will be wrong to think that this is when his conversion took place. He has previously in (Confession Bk VII.7) said he is a believer in Christ, ‘the faith of Your Christ, our Lord and Saviour, in the Catholic church stuck fast in my heart, though in many respects ill-formed and fluctuating outside the norm of doctrine.’ (Cary 2008, p. 63-4)

He found the transition from Platonism to Christianity was not simple, albeit platonic tradition had given him an effective foundation on which to work out his Christian tradition, and significantly so after his conversion (Clark 1994, p. 6-8) In reading Pauline texts Augustine began to see himself reflected and transposed in the life of the apostle, and particularly the manner of the apostle’s conversion. Reading through the Pauline epistles Augustine came to accept the certainty of God’s existence (The Confession VII.21) He also came to the conclusion that his turning to Christianity was not motivated by a desire to move away from the uncertainties of his philosophical scepticism, but rather dissatisfaction with himself. As with Paul, Augustine came to faith despite himself, solely through the grace of God. Augustine on his part was perhaps confronted with Paul’s texts in Romans chapter 7: 19-25, a chapter to which he took special interest (Clark 1994, p. 48-9). In these texts Paul explains how he (Paul) was miserable because of his inability to do what is right and correct, indeed each time he attempted to do good he failed. He always ended up doing that which he did not want to do. Augustine found that the conflict within himself intensify, on grounds that the good that his minds had accepted, he could not bring (or even command) his will to
perform. (Beach et al 1973 ed., p. 103) This practice made his life miserable, until he acknowledged the complete work Christ did on the cross.

Augustine saw Paul’s conversion as a compulsion from God, and he saw his own conversion equally in those violent terms. He felt his conversion experience incorporated elements both from above and here on earth. He saw God representing interaction from above where God was extending his right hand as it were in the abyss of human misery and corruption to snatch Augustine out (Confessions Bk. VIII.12-IX.1).

While God’s hand was extended from above, here on earth Augustine was expected to offer his hand in return and cling to God. Augustine saw his conversion therefore in the light of Paul’s conversion, where Paul was violently confronted by a force from above to which he Paul from below needed to respond by extending his whole self to cling to God.

Augustine echoes these Pauline thoughts as he exegetes Pauline texts, which give him the suitable external call in God’s bringing about an interior change of his will. Conversion for Augustine meant the will turning from the love of the temporal good to the love of the eternal goods. It is to Pauline texts that Augustine turned when disputing the positions taken by the Donatists in their protest of the Catholic Church’s use of state force.

Augustine referred to Acts 9, to show how Christ compelled Paul first before he taught him (Paul) of his mission to the gentiles. Therefore, the Donatists’ protest were not founded since the Catholic church first needed to apply state force to compel persons into the church and only then will the church begin to teach. Grace was only available in the Catholic Church, any agent outside though he may will and freely do so, that will was only free to sin. Nothing outside of an agent’s will compelled its evil choices; the agent’s will willed these choices itself. For an agent’s will to will rightly it needs to be touched by grace, only then does the will become free. Augustine again applied Pauline texts in his contest with Pelagius,
as he repeatedly invoked Romans 5:12 in support of his support of the idea of the seminal transmission of original sin.

In his other controversy with Pelagius on the will and humanity’s radical dependence on grace, he appears independent of Pauline nuances. Christianity since St Paul and other New Testament writers had began boldly to assert that the eternal Logos had been manifested in the personal history of Jesus Christ. This claim run counter to older ways of philosophising, which had continued characteristic of classical philosophy.

The Platonists, who applied reason in order to apprehend the divine, had accepted this classical philosophy (The Confession, Bk.VII, 9). Augustine argued that, although reason may approach the threshold of the Christian faith, it finds it impossible to enter. Reason refuses to acknowledge the grace of God through Jesus Christ and the disclosure of the divine to human kinds through incarnation. Whereas reason may accept the universal it is unable to accept the universal in particular; that is to say reason accepts the discarnate of the [Logos] but deny the Incarnate of the same {Word-Logos}. Augustine thus, strove to reconcile reason and faith as he accepted what he regarded as the overwhelming weight of the Platonic theistic tradition founded upon reason. He had no doubt that reason availed much for the apprehension of the existence of the divine, that is to say, natural theology could afford knowledge of the divine, however if natural knowledge is unguided by faith it err. Natural theology perceived by Augustine as synonymous with reason needed faith in order to apprehend the divine disclosure to humankind.

Paul and his New Testament compatriots had affirmed positively that God had drawn close to humankind, with God’s self-disclosure in history to the believers. Pauline theology and that of other New Testament writers held that, apart from reliance upon God’s own disclosure through faith, any other human efforts to apprehend the divine were inadequate,
perverse and futile. St. Paul whom Augustine admired considerably, had written earlier that this divine disclosure was to ‘confront the wisdom of the world’ with the ‘foolishness of the preaching.’ Paul had declared rightly that ‘the foolishness of God is wiser than men.’ As Augustine entered the scene in his efforts to reconcile faith and reason he attempted to make clear how and why the foolishness of God is wiser than men. (Cushman 1950, p. 271)

It becomes apparent that both Pauline thoughts and Paul’s figure as an apostle played a key role in the development of the theology and pastoral practice that Augustine exercised. In Confession Augustine expressed the prominent place of Paul in his conversion, the centrality of the grace of Christ in his theology and the polemical nuances that marked the Pauline and Augustinian ministries. These points although not exhaustive are some of the indications of the importance of Pauline influence on Augustine shaping his understanding of himself as a Christian, theologian and perhaps as a Bishop. No doubt the critical impact of Paul upon Augustine forms a part of a much wider arena of Pauline interest.

Augustine on his part undertook a systematic and perhaps comprehensive theological exposition of Paul and interpretation of Pauline works in which Augustine made attempts to bring the apostle’s authentic thought to light, thus superseding what others (Origen for example) had achieved earlier in their works on Pauline texts. In the Confession Bk 1.17.27 is Augustine recollecting his school days’ classical commentary tradition, which he found wanting at the time he himself took to the task of writing commentary to Pauline texts.

Augustine’s continued involvement in the theology of Paul stems from two points, that of doctrinal concern and secondly that of ethics or concerning the living of the Christian life and the search for holiness. These two areas for Augustine and other fathers earlier on suggest, an attraction to Paul as conversion model, ascetical guide and spiritual guru. Pauline accounts of conversion in Acts 9 have accentuated the attraction of those who want to pursue
his theology. Paul has equally in his works in the New Testament showed the spiritual crisis surrounding the collapse of the world he lived in, and the need for him to challenge the pagan world that was in decline.

The Manicheans to whom Augustine subscribed found Pauline theology and text useful and they gave the apostle a prominent role in support of their religious claims. Augustine must have come across other Manicheans who used Pauline texts; as he himself claims to have heard Ambrose preaching on Paul in Milan (Confessions Bk. 6.4.6). Augustine was aware of the various commentaries available in his time on Pauline works; however, it is argued that he appears not to have used any of these commentaries to rebut the controversies of his time. It is only during his disputation with Julian Eclanum that Augustine found himself making his own explicit theological defence for his Pauline interpretation; this afforded him the benefit of reaching his own Pauline conclusions.

Augustine’s familiarity with the numerous traditions of commentaries during his time on the Pauline texts served as a dialogue rather than foundational sources for his thought. These commentaries would therefore have suggested themes and highlighted motifs and problems that pushed Augustine back to reading Paul’s original New Testament texts. Armed with what others had already said in their commentary works on Pauline texts, with is own re-reading of Paul; Augustine was able to clarify his own understanding and articulate a unique Pauline synthesis.

The Confession Bk. 8 Augustine speaks hugely of his conversion; this conversion was one whereby he joined the church of Christ rather than the kind by which an agent decides to believe in Christ. The decision to believe in Christ appears in Augustine’s life to have taken place way back in The Confession Bk. 7. Cary (2008, p.65) is convinced that to read Confessions Bk 8 as the story where Augustine became a believer is to apply ‘Protestant
narrative of a much later era’, yet The Confession defies assimilation to Protestant conversion narratives.

Evidently, Augustine heeds Paul’s admonition to change his heart in respect of observing the law as expressed in Romans 7, which is a command to do something in reverence to changing life (Clark 1994, p.48). This command seems to fly against the message of the Gospel, which is the promise of grace in Christ. The binary understanding of the message of salvation appear to have suggested to Augustine the need for authority and reason, or grace and law respectively. Equally true is the fact that his platonic philosophical training was reacting to the texts of the Bible and Christian doctrine; it afforded him the same parallels of authority and reason as routes to the truth where authority represented Christ and reason represented by Plato. Chadwick observes that for Augustine, ‘Authority can give direction which reason subsequently understands.’(1986, p.27)

On account that authority is Christ himself, he is prior to reason in time, but reason remains prior in order of reality. Although a well-educated agent like Augustine would prefer to follow the philosophic paths of reason, reason by itself alone remains insufficient in providing all the required guidance. Reason and authority are both needed, since an exclusive reliance on authority is easily beset by great danger. Indeed, without reason it becomes increasingly difficult to discriminate between competing claims to authority. Augustine argues that, for an agent to distinguish between authentically divine authority and the authority of venerated inferior spirits of paganism of divination or soothsaying for example, she needs reason.

3.8 Conclusion

Augustine worked out his interpretation of love in relation to the metaphysics of Neo-Platonism that conceived God as being-itself (absolute). This Augustinian synthesis is
criticised because it is the critical point in the development of Christian doctrine or early Christianity. This synthesis has been the vision in many ways that informed most subsequent Christian thought.

Nygren attacks the synthesis by isolating agape from Eros as two utterly different concepts of love, an attack that seems to be misplaced. I argued that the difficulty with Augustine’s synthesis is its failure to develop a metaphysical thought that provides for a complete social relationship between God and human beings. Augustine espouses significantly the single mindedness of devotion to God. In this devotion he finds a synthesis of self-giving and mutuality in the being of the Trinity where all love agape and Eros participate directly in the structure of the divine being and has nothing to do with disinterestedness.

Nygren and other Augustinian critics must accept that, to complain about Augustine’s metaphysics by which he insisted there is an objective, final good for an agent, such a complaint cannot be appealed to, to contest the place of right self-love. This is because self-love would admit the kind of perverse self-interest critics claim it conceals. To reject Augustine’s use of a teleological ordering to relate the claims of self, neighbour and love of God is to fail to notice Augustine’s teleology or his notion of self-love could not have been egocentric. For Augustine his teleology and notion of self-love were theocentric. Where this understanding suggested conflict between reason and authority, Augustine’s response would be that an agent does not need to be taught to love self rather he needs to be taught how to love properly. When an agent loves God completely above all other loves and for God himself and not for his gifts, such an agent becomes capable of loving herself correctly.

She sees herself as God sees her, forgiven and beloved of God and able also to love the other compassionately and selflessly. Augustinian understanding of Christian doctrine
and ethics continues to influence and infiltrate much of our contemporary society and in some instances he is directly lifted from his mediaeval settings and applied to contemporary settings. His use of Pauline thought, and assimilation of Pauline writings offers him what appears a natural focus for a Platonist conception of key Christian concepts. Cary (2008, p.30) is convinced Augustine needed a Platonist transformation of the concept of free will in the direction of the Christian doctrine of grace to be able to fully understand what loving is like. Pauline writings provided a useful basis of grappling with the concept of love especially within Christian doctrine.

He perceived that an agent’s external works or actions are motivated by love of one form or another. Paul in the New Testament epistles had already referred to these works as good works, which can come only from love (Gal. 5: 6), love that is synonymous with love of God and neighbour. Augustine’s persuasion that good works in turn merit the promised reward of eternal life derives this conclusion from Paul’s writings in New Testament text.
Chapter 4

Kant’s Thinking on Self and Self-love

4.1 Introduction

According to Kant’s first formulation of categorical imperative (Ground work of the Metaphysic of Morals 1996), certain actions cannot be considered as moral on account their maxims cannot without contradiction even be thought as a universal law of nature. That said, other maxims although universally conceivable, could not be willed as a universal law because they would entail a contradiction within the agent’s will.

Therefore, for action to be considered morally permissible it must first pass what many of Kant’s commentators refers to as ‘contradiction in conception test and then the ‘contradiction in the will test’. Contemplating Kant’s thinking on self and self-love will obviously bring us into contact with some of these contradictions of conception and of will. With his voluminous literature we will simply look at what Kant said or perhaps thought about the areas of concern that are discussed below to include, Kant’s concept of self, self-respect, duty to oneself, Kant on self-love and Kant and contemporary philosophical discourse on selfhood.

4.2 Kant and the concept of the Self

Kant’s discussion of the self is always argued to be a response to David Hume’s (Kitcher 1982, p. 41-72; Wolff 1960, p. 117) denial that there can exist a self across time, the kind of self that is a unitary entity, and in some sense unchanging and persistent. Hume by denying any real or necessary connection among mental states is in fact denying any relation of existential dependence among mental states. Hume in essence is denying human beings’ ability to know that the self, presumably an independent system of mental states actually exists.
Notwithstanding, Mijuskovic (2010, p. 111) observes that Hume presents an empirical and phenomenalist paradigm of the self. Such a self is a construction of qualitatively simple impressions and complex ideas. These complex and simple ideas are classified under the generic title of perceptions, perception that are essentially mental in their nature. The constant motion of external material particles in space causes these perceptions. The result is that the self dissolves into a bundle of discrete atomistic impressions each pursuing the next with an inconceivable rapidity.

Hume offers an analysis of the disintegration of the self, besides his attack was on metaphysicians who attempt to establish personal identity based solely on the soul’s immaterial simplicity, unity, and identity (Hume 1955, p.248-252). Hume admits to an awareness of a temporal succession of perceptions of impressions and ideas, thus surrendering as it were all that is required for the establishment of personal identity (Ibid. p. 251). Seen from this perspective, a genuine presence of a singular self can be advocated; suggesting there is some self-conscious awareness of a passage of time. The awareness is of a succession of perceptions whose transitory thoughts can be recognised as personal by an agent. That is, I am self-aware of their passage without which otherwise, I could not be transitionally aware of their migration.

Nonetheless, Hume's scepticism concerning personal identity (Wolf 1960) was known and regarded as false but as worthy of philosophical refutation. In retrospect Kant appreciated the insights behind Hume’s sceptical conclusions. The discussions that follow take for granted that there could be made a case for a unitary self. Without having to pursue Hume28 any further, I

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28 Hume believed that the entire contents of the mind were drawn from experience alone. The stimulus could be external or internal. In this nexus, Hume describes what he calls impressions in contrast to ideas. Impressions are vivid perceptions and were strong and lively. “I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions as they make their first appearance in the soul. Ideas were images in thinking and reason.” (Flew 1962 p. 176). According to Hume there is no mind or self. That is to say the perceptions that an individual has are only active when one is conscious. “When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself,
will consider what must be true of the self that Kant discussed, how is it to be conceived, when Kant attempted to respond to Hume’s scepticism?

Kant demonstrated that experience necessarily involves knowledge of objects. He validated this necessity independently of, although in parallel with, the necessity of the representation of a unitary experiencing subject (Powell 1990, p. 11-12). But Kant’s discussion of the self is protracted and sometimes an opaque argumentation leaving one overwhelmed as to which self should be considered uppermost. Kitcher writes, ‘The problem with Kant's views about the self is that he has too many of them because the self has too many roles to play in his system.’ (1982, p.41), and yet Kitcher appears convinced that a single self can be deciphered out of these many.

Pursuing Kant’s self via his discussion of self-identity appears to lead to a plausible Kantian theory of the self as a continuing cognitive being that can complement theories that have tried to account for human beings continuity as moral beings. By this perception Kant is able to respond to the Humean argument. Kitcher (1982, p. 55) observes that whilst Kant’s theory of personal identity is supposed to be a response to Hume, at the same time Kant herself did not adequately define the relation of co-personality. Kant only but, ‘sketched a general kind of relation of which co-personality might be a species’. Kitcher is convinced that Hume also was never specific in his criticism of personal identity, never focused on a single criterion. One can then argue that it is because of the generalities that Hume engaged, in his criticism of personal

and may truly be said not to exist.” (Flew 1962, p.259). Hume is reducing personality and cognition to a machine-like existence that may be turned on and off. Death brings with it the annihilation of the perceptions one has. Hume argues passions as the determinants of behaviour. Hume also appears as a behaviourist believing that humans learn in the same manner as lower animals; that is through reward and punishment (Hergenhahn 2005). Hume’s starting point seems too be that experience in the form of impressions cannot rise to the constancy of a self in that would be constant to give rise to all future experiences. The concept of the self, Hume argued does not amount to a single impression, rather several ideas and impressions in itself. We cannot account for a constant impression that is enduring in an agent’s whole life. Different sensations as pleasure and pain, or heat and cold are in a constant continuum that is variable and never constant. “It cannot therefore be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is derived; and consequently, there is no such idea (Hume 1789).
identity that perhaps drew out the too many versions of selves in Kant’s response account of the self. Kant’s views of the self are dependent on his idealism or transcendental idealism. The self in Kant is bifurcated to include even the Humean views he is claimed to be refuting. Most discussions of the Kantian self (Brooks 2013, Marshall 2010; Kitcher 1982) agree on the point that there is no single description by Kant of the self. Brooks for example sees the consciousness and knowledge of self expressed in several ways. These include; two kinds of consciousness of self whose source is the inner sense; then there is the representational base of the consciousness of self that is dependent on the apperception that give rise to consciousness of oneself and one’s states. Brooks then discusses consciousness only of how one appears to oneself. He collates Kant’s views to suggest that neither consciousness of self by virtue of apperceptive acts nor empirical consciousness of self as the object of a particular representation yields knowledge of oneself as one is.

The fourthly, the referential machinery consciousness of the self, suggesting that to know that anything is true of an agent, the agent must first know that it is her of whom it is true. The fifthly, no manifold in consciousness of self, proposes it is not just identifying properties but any properties of oneself whatsoever that one need to know in order to refer to oneself as oneself. Sixthly, consciousness of self is not knowledge of self.

Kant put the idea of transcendental designation to work to explain how one can appear to oneself to be substantial, simple and persisting, but without these appearances reflecting how one actually is. In seventh and final discussion of self as garnered from Kant’s works, Brooks considers consciousness of self as single common subject of experience. In this last of Kant’s thesis about consciousness of self is the idea, that to think of oneself as plurality of things is to think of oneself being conscious of this same plurality, a factor that requires an undivided self.
Siegel argues that multiplicity of the self draws out first the self as a substance that made stable experience possible. In this case the self could provide both unity and continuity for the shifting data of the senses. The unity afforded this self is a product of its awareness of itself as the site and agent of all experience and by a consciousness that explicitly or implicitly accompanies each perception (2005. p. 305). Seigel observes that the first Kantian self is transcendental; easy to distinguish from his second version of self the empirical self discoverable in ordinary life. The empirical self is embodied and therefore subject to the laws and limits of material existence, and eventually a self codified in biology and physics. The third self that Seigel draws out is the practical or moral self encountered in certain kinds of behaviour.

Colin Marshall (2010) on his part arrives at four categorisations of possibilities that the metaphysics of the self may represent. For Marshall (p.9) Kant applies the same basic ontological categories as his predecessors when discussing the nature of the self. On this ontology, the world consists of substances and their accidents, and particularly the accidents of power or force by which substances influence each other’s accidents. Relations [of substances and their accidents] then become species of representations that are obvious candidates of an a priori metaphysics of the self. Marshall identifies the key desiderata for a plausible interpretation

29 This is a conclusion that is challenged Hume, who challenges the existence of the self and hence any selfhood. In Book 1 of the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume disagreed with the idea of the self as an agent capable of exercising radically free will. He went as far as to challenge the very existence of the self. Hume acknowledged that persons have experiences, memories, imagination, and an idea of personal identity. But Hume denied that human manifestations of any of these capabilities or human holding of this idea required the postulation of an entity lying behind them. Hume argued that through human experiences, memories and imaginations, persons create a sense of identity that does not exist in any of these impressions themselves. Therefore, human beings have experience, but no coherent idea of the experiencer of these experiences. Hume argued that, the self or person as experiencer is an illusion that is to be resisted if persons are to fashion a straightforward account of the world and the human place within it. Hume writes,

“It must be some one impression that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same through the whole course of our lives, since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable………It cannot, therefore, be from any impression…. that the idea of self is derive, and consequently there is no such idea.” (David Hume, A treatise of human nature, 1963, p. 173)
of Kant’s views on the self. At the outset is the interpretation of the self as a substance (mental substance), on the grounds that earlier on in his work Kant talks of the self’s being a substance, and that further on much of Kant’s talk about the self in the Critique suggests continuity with earlier rationalists’ views (Ibid. 10).

The second interpretation that Marshall deciphers from Kant’s works is that of the self as a bundle of representations. This interpretation puts Kant in Hume’s company who famously claimed as I discussed above, that the mind is nothing but a ‘bundle or collection of different perceptions.’ Marshall thinks Kant is simply offering a more sophisticated view of Hume’s famous claim that there can be no criterion of personal identity. Like Hume, Kant is rejecting the common-sense view that a mind is something distinct from the representations that it has.\(^\text{30}\)

Marshall third understanding of Kant’s self is that of self as a force or understanding of self as ‘existing in the act’ or seeing the self as an act or activity. Considering the self as an activity could have appealed to some section of society, but he is sceptical that Kant would have been drawn to this understanding of the self. This understanding would have sounded strange to Kant, that the act is the condition for the self’s existence, especially when in a section above Kant intonated the self in some sense to be a substance. It is difficult to see how a substance can then turn into an act or activity. The fourth interpretation of the self is the self as form or

\(^{30}\) Marshall envisions two problems of why a Humean reading of Kant is implausible, even with setting aside the metaphysical commitments of Kant’s moral philosophy. The first problem is that Kant certainly has the vocabulary to express a Humean bundle view but chooses on the contrary to typically express relation of the self to representations in terms that would be hard for a Humean reading to accommodate. Marshall textual evidence is found at Paralogisms (cf. A77/B103) Kant’s argument, of the self as the thing that combines representations in synthesis. Secondly, a Humean reading of Kant is implausible on account that Kant is emphatic that agents do not know themselves as they are in themselves. Agents are simply only aware of the appearances of themselves. Appearances are themselves representations, so if agents are bundles of representations, then there needs to be another level of representations that is the appearance of that bundle. This would certainly be held as a Humean reading of Kant, but Kant holds the view that agents can directly attach a ‘self’ or ‘I think’ to any representation (textual evidence for Marshall, Paralogisms cf. B131), and there is no indication on Kant’s part that this amounts to the appearances of a representation.
structure. Marshall does not delve much into this form of a self within Kant’s work; he rather calls upon mostly secondary works that consider the self being interpreted in this way. Kitcher (1982, p. 72) on her part has argued that from Kant’s discussions of *Transcendental Deductions* as a response to Hume’s challenge to the notion of personal identity, Kant described the self as ‘a continually interconnected system of mental states’.

Kitcher concludes her discussion that, the belief of the impossibility of acknowledging real or existential connection among mental states has its foundation in Hume’s claim that there can be no criterion for personal identity. Kant’s challenge to Hume’s claim is founded on this basis for regarding different mental states as states of a continuing being. Kant is therefore led to reflect on the necessary assumptions involved in regarding human beings as knowing agents. These are agents who must regard their state as standing in relations of continual causal interconnection.

Kant ascribes structures to human agents and their representations, but without any suggestion that a form could perform the kind of actions Kant ascribes to human minds. Discussing the Kantian self from the point of view of the metaphysics of the self, the self from our foregoing discussions is many things. The self is the mind, it is the thinking subject, and it is the soul, as Kant seems to have applied it. What has become very clear is that Kant never gives a precise statement of the relations between most of these terms as he applies them in his works. Marshall has argued in *Kant’s Metaphysics of the Self* (2010) that it is only under this topic that we can find Kant using all these terms effectively in the same way. Kant recognises a broad application of the term self, ‘I’ that refers to the ‘whole man’ therefore involving body and soul (*Anthropology Lectures 27:265*); elsewhere of course Kant describes the thinking self that exists outside of appearances as an agent’s ‘proper self’ (*Groundwork 4:457*). The self I am trying to
establish in this discussion is what will appear perhaps as the narrower understanding of the Kantian self applicable to human beings who possess the sort of mind that is more than mere representations that according to Kant even animals possess. It is the self that encompasses all the seven aspects Brook’s (2013) itemised and Seigel and Marshall’s four listed interpretations of the self. Apart, the self is all these different formats of understandings; it is still possible to depict a perceived unitary self in Kant as – ‘the whole man’. This is the self that I am working with in the whole of this discussion on Kant’s thinking on self and self-love, and my next step is to attempt to find out how does this self – ‘the whole man’ fair in self-respect.

4.3 Kant’s Concept of Self-respect

4.3.1 Self-respect as a conceptual “off-spring” of respect

Kant is acknowledged as the catalyst for much of the contemporary interest in respect for persons. But this claim is not without some contest that neither contemporary moral philosophers nor Kant himself should accept this traditional picture (Cureton 2013, p. 167). Others before Kant had an interest in the question of respect [Aristotle on Self–respect]. Respect is a feeling concerned with worth, esteem, dignity, or how others regard an agent. Kant offers different characterizations of respect, (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1785/1996, 4:429). First, it is a ‘feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept’, secondly, characterisation of respect, that is, ‘the immediate determination of the will by means of the law and consciousness of this [determination]’. And third, Kant calls it ‘the representation of a worth that infringes upon my self-love’.

Kant appears to generate with these characterisations a certain ambiguity that leaves readers to make up their own minds which particular characterisation does one consider to be primary. Reath (2006, p. 10-11) is of the opinion that the second characterisation is primary,
therefore for him conveying the primary notion of respect. But, did Kant intend these seemingly different characterisations to support each other in determining what exactly respect is? If we consider as Reath does that respect is the attitude appropriate to have towards a law [this is expressing the second characterisation], it follows that that attitude needs to bear on rational feelings [involving the first characterisation] and feelings are always personal and infringing on one’s self-love [this draws on the third characterisation]. Kantian agents having understood their uniqueness as rational agents and the dignity that such a status necessarily involves, they extend their respect for themselves to respect for other rational beings. They extend this respect to those belonging to the same kingdom of ends, where each being must be treated as an end in itself and never as a means to an end.

This extension is again purely cognitive; there are no emotions (such as compassion or kindness) involved, this is unlike Aristotle for whom respect and (other) moral virtues shape each other (Russell 2005, p.105; Hill 1993, p. 14-15). With this concept of respect Kant is able to articulate a special kind of metaphysical, agent-neutral and intrinsic value or status that all persons are thought to share in virtue of their rational nature (Cureton 2013, p.166). Accordingly, Kant in this claim offers value distinct to all and gives everyone sufficient reason to respect, and not just promote or maximise the dignity of all. Kant’s argument for the duties of respect toward others, relies on a substantive conception of what it takes to respect one’s self (discussed below).

Kant aims to argue from the self-regarding rational dispositions that persons have in virtue of their rational nature to other-regarding moral requirements about how to treat other persons who possess the same rational self-concern. Kant’s account of how and why we must respect others seems to lead to his account of the perfect duties to oneself. These perfect duties are characterised as the ‘highest duties of all’ (Ibid. p.175). The perfect duties to oneself are
most naturally a set of rational requirements about how to value oneself in a special way. That is to say, as having a dignity that is above any price, without equivalent and inalienable. Subsequently, when an agent mutilates herself, gives over to lust, or prostrates before others, for example; Kant thinks such a person values herself in a lesser and inferior way, as she values things with a price or equivalent.

4.3.2 Kant and Self -Respect

A person with a sense of self-respect identifies with a project, code, or status that provides a standard of worthy conduct and a line is always drawn past which one does not go. The person is committed to this standard, confident that by and large they are the right commitments, and tries to live accordingly.31 Many public discussions by contemporary philosophers about self-respect create impressions that all contribute to a unitary discursive tradition about a single concept. Roland and Foxx observe self-respect is a complex and elusive concept that requires to be placed in its ‘conceptual family’ in any attempt to understand it (2003, p.248). They perceive self-respect is professed a conceptual “off-spring” of respect that allows its logical placement into the same conceptual family as dignity, regard, esteem, and honour because all are concerned with worth. While Roland and Foxx acknowledge modern discussions of self-respect are grounded in different historical traditions, they make a reasonable attempt at grouping discussions about respect into their originators and their historical precedents (2003, p. 248-259). Kristjan Kristjansson (2007, p. 230) is unhappy with the divisions Roland

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31 Kant commonly is perceived the originator of these views expressed; whose summary could perhaps be stated that persons have a rational nature, so they should be respected like other objects of ‘awesome’ value. They should be cherished accordingly, treasured, protected, exhibited, honoured and so on. Kant is considered to have championed this deep inspiration, if not an outright adherent, of a view that emphasized this compelling and widely influential claims about the ‘objective’, ‘unconditional’, ‘incomparable’, and ‘absolute worth’ of persons, whose ‘dignity’ is ‘above all price’, ‘without equivalent’, and places severe constraints on how we may be treated; views expressed both in *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals* 4:434–6; *The Metaphysic of Morals* 6:435–6.
and Foxx compiled. He on the contrary suggests that any historical discussions of self-respect can only adequately be explored on two fronts, a Kantian and Aristotelian concept of self-respect. Generally, most if not all accounts of self-respect are born out of the idea or the concept of respect. Of itself the concept of respect for others usually assume that persons have a rational nature so they should be respected like other objects of ‘awesome’ value. Kant’s views about the ‘value’ of humanity that have inspired contemporary discussions of respect have been interpreted in this way.

That is to say persons owe each other the recognition of and respect for their status as agents capable of acting on the basis of reasons. This makes an agent an autonomous author of the moral law to which she is subject. An alternative interpretation has Kant proceeding from one’s own rational self-regard, through one’s willingness to reciprocate with others to duties of respect for others. Kant’s discussion of the concept of respect has huge implications for self-respect as its offspring. In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* 6.449, Kant introduced a topical perspective to the concept of self-respect, namely, that all persons deserve respect, regardless of their character.

His formulation,

“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end,” is considered to be the “preeminent statement of the principle of respect for persons” (Dillon, 1995, p. 14).

The idea, that everyone must be respected and that all persons should behave in ways that maintain that respect, is a major contribution to the understanding of self-respect. Kant proposed that human beings have the ability to rationalize, think, and choose; therefore, individuals have a
moral duty to respect others and themselves. This proposed activity requires individuals to act in certain ways and not others.

The foundation of Kant’s concept of self-respect was one’s dignity as a person, which was also the foundation of all morality. Self-respect carries the responsibility to only act in ways that reflect one’s status as a moral being. For Kant personhood and its inherent dignity form the core of his moral philosophy (Cureton 2013, p.168). Persons are ends in themselves, in virtue of their ability to rationalize, think and choose, and must respect themselves and others as such. The duty of self-respect is the supreme moral duty for it is a precondition of respecting others. In effect, there would be no moral duties if there were no duties to respect one’s self. Self-respect is thus understood holistically, as a global trait of one’s character as a whole (Russell 2005, p. 104).

Self-respect evidently forms one of the self-regarding duties in the moral sense by the law within a person that forces from her respect for her own being. It is a subjective feeling of a special kind (Kant, 1996, 162) and not a judgment toward an object it intends about. It is the humanity in a person that is the object of the respect a person demands of herself and other human beings.

She cannot forfeit this fact. It demands of her to value herself both as a sensible and intelligible being [the former as a mere animal and the later from a moral predisposition]. To have self-respect, is to have a sense of oneself as a person, morally responsible agent, or someone capable of participating in the deliberations of moral law.

It is in essence a relation to self (Honneth 1995, p. xiv-xvi). Kant argues that there is no obligation for one to have self-respect because self respect among other moral endowments lie at the basis of morality as a ‘subjective condition of receptiveness to the concept of duty (The Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 159).’ It is a natural predisposition of the mind affected by the
concept of duty, and it is by virtue of a person possessing it that she is held under obligation.

Kant writes in *The Metaphysics of Morals*,

‘Since he must regard herself not only as a person generally but also as a human being, that is, as a person who has duties his own reason lays upon him, his significance as a human animal may not infringe upon his consciousness of his dignity as a rational human being…’ (1996, 187)

A person cannot therefore of her own accord or by action of others disavow her moral self-esteem or desist from pursuing her own end. This is because this end is itself a duty not of one seeking favour for self and therefore disavowing one’s dignity, but rather it’s ones own consciousness of ‘sublime moral predisposition’ and this in essence is self-respect, which is a duty to self.

Kant cautions against arrogance, which he considers ‘a conviction of the greatness of one’s moral worth, but only from failure to compare it with the law’ this for Kant is wrong. (Ibid.187). There is also the activity of ‘waiving any claim of moral worth in one’s self, in the belief that…’ a person will then be perceived worth, this for Kant is morally-wrong and it is in fact false humility. Kant conceives that any effort directed at a diminished comparison of one’s self with other human beings does not count for duty. Such efforts deny self of self-respect, as it can sometimes be an attempt to equal or surpass others indirectly and therefore propagating a false sense of humility. From such an activity often, ensues a sense of believing that one will ultimately receive a greater inner worth but this is contrary to one’s duty to others and cannot be counted as humility.

True humility for Kant, ‘follows unavoidably from a sincere and exact comparison of ourselves with the moral law (its holiness and strictness) (1960, 126).’ There is an internal lawgiver within each individual compelling self to revere the moral human being within one’s own person. From within a person also arise self-esteem. Self-esteem as a result of moral law generates feelings of
inner worth in terms of a person standing above any price because such a person possesses an
alienable dignity that instills in her respect for herself. True humility does not encourage self-
abnegation nor claims of disinterestedness because this is likely to instil in others a negative verdict
on a person to the point of despising such a person, and that would be contrary to one’s duty to
self- that of self respect.

A low opinion of self in comparison to others does not imply humility and it can never be
a virtue. Kant reckons this to be ‘a monk’s virtue and not at all natural’ (1960, 127), and as already
observed above this form of humility is in a sense a kind of pride. Kant admits that every person
is permitted to consider herself equal in estimation to someone else and therefore allowed to pass
judgement upon one’s self. But, one would preferably be advised to draw a comparison between
self and the purity of the moral law. This is because one fails when she compares herself with
those she considers righteous who like herself attempt to model themselves on the moral law. It
is at this point that Kant makes this huge claim that ‘The Gospel does not teach humility, but it
makes us humble.’ Elsewhere Kant has observed that the ‘Gospel first presented morality in its purity,
and there is nothing in history to compare with it.’ (1960, 128)

The Gospel therefore lays before a person the indisputable fact that she is weak, but this
recognition in no uncertain terms has got to be by sacrifice of her good disposition. This is
because to receive God’s help one must be found worthy of it. When a person depreciates the
value of her human virtues she does harm to self in accordance to duty of self-respect. Kant
argues that self-respect is a pragmatic activity in accordance to rules of prudence and
reasonableness and these rules do not permit or demand a person to humiliate or even value herself less than others.

In fact moral rules ascertain the claim that human self-esteem may arise from self-love, self-love, which is favour and partiality towards one’s self requiring self-respect. At the same time moral self-esteem grounded in the worth of humanity cannot be derived from comparisons with others but rather from moral law. In this way one is able to curb self-conceit in face of moral law, and therefore pass judgement upon one’s self in accordance to moral law, she is in essence exercising duty to self; and it is the consideration of duties to oneself that we turn.

4.4 Kant on Duties to one’s self

The model of duty outlined by Kant primarily that of duties to others makes it clear that a duty to one’s self is one in which a single agent occupies both the subject and source positions. According to the *First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative*, an agent discovers her duties to herself in exactly the same manner she discovers what her duties to others. This is through universalization of her maxim (Paton, 1990, p. 223 – 224)\(^{32}\). Universalization however, fails for example, to establish that the duty of preservation of an agent’s life is a duty the agent has to herself [this is in the case of suicide]. The agent is both the subject of duty and the source of the claim on that subject's choices and so the same agent may (Schofield 2013, p. 1), but need not be the ‘beneficiary’ of such duties. For Kant it is not easy to ascertain what these duties to self are, and perhaps difficult to know how an agent should react to those who, in his judgment fail to fulfil these duties to self. Although, the problem can be addressed as long as there are reasonable

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\(^{32}\) The universalization maxim works by creating awareness in the agent that, he cannot consistently will that there be a law for example, permitting suicide each time the future seems to hold more pain in store for him than pleasure, to the extent he knows he has a duty to refrain from taking a suicidal act. From the same understanding when an agent finds out that he cannot will that everyone should make false promise that to duty him to resist the temptation to promise falsely becomes clear.
principles establishing certain facts about an agent’s self. Kant concedes that an agent needs to demonstrate her capacities for rational choice as the source of reasons for her to regard or treat herself in certain ways that establishes duties to self. It is this understanding of duties to self that tells us in some measure Kant’s general understanding of certain features of duty and obligation.

Duties towards one’s self suppose non-prudentially based reasons for adopting given attitudes towards one’s self. This includes an agent valuing certain of her powers or capacities, her interests or moral standing and so forth. Reath (2006, p. 231) observes that, ‘…absolute value of humanity provides a perfectly general basis for respecting …’ these capacities in others. This places human beings in a special position of either supporting, or neglecting or even undermining these relevant capacities and interests.

Not to respect self and others, one acts in ways that demonstrate failure to properly value these capacities and interests. This creates a situation that gives an agent an occasion not to apply to herself general reasons whose foundation is the absolute value of humanity that considers the self-regarding and the other regarding duties. Although the self and other-regarding duties seem to have a common basis there however does not seem to exist a precise correspondence between them. This is because the failure of self-respect to which an agent may be liable to does not seem often to parallel the characteristic failures to respect others that prompt duties to them. This supports the claim that to have a supposed share in the dignity due every human being because of their humanity does not always guarantee one will enjoy the benefit of other-regarding duties from an agent. In section 1-3 of the *Doctrine of the Elements of Ethics* (MdS 6: 417-20) Kant raises a foundational concern about the concept of duties to one’s self. The impression of a duty to one’s self at first seems contradictory. However, it is acceptable that there are duties to one’s self, since if there were not, there would be no duties whatsoever. Kant attempts to resolve this
by securing the possibility of duties to one’s self in two different appreciations of understanding the agent at the centre of these duties.

A more detailed account of this apparent absurdity is discussed below (Is duty to self a contradiction?). Kantian duties to oneself may therefore not be as problematic in the way that many have figured duties to one’s self to be. His treatment of self-regard [respect] in our discussion above demonstrated not only how one’s self-regard can be construed as a duty to one’s self, but also what Kant himself had to say about what constitutes self-regard as a duty. Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, especially the Doctrine of Virtue principally aims at presenting arrangement of persons’ duties as human beings. The duties are divided between juridical duties and ethical duties that determine the division of the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue respectively.

In considering the duties to one’s self the focus here is on the ethical duties rather than juridical duties. Ethical duties must not be externally enforced, since that violates the right of the person coerced. Instead, the subject herself through her own reason and the feelings and motives arising \textit{a priori} from her rational capacities that include, the feelings of respect, conscience, moral feeling and love of other human beings, must constrain herself to follow them (MS 6:399-404). Another notable division of duties under the ethical duties is that between the duties to self and others. Within the cluster of duties to self there is a further division between duties that are strictly owed, requiring specific actions or omissions and whose violation incurs moral blame, and duties that are wide or meritorious, the specific actions not strictly owed, but deserving of

\textsuperscript{33} Juridical duties are duties that may be coercively enforced from outside the agent, as by the civil or criminal laws, or other social pressures.
moral credit or merit. Regarding duties to one’s self, there is also a further division that is between ‘perfect’ and ‘imperfect’ duties that a person may exercise to themselves. Concerning duties that a person owes to others these tend to narrow down to ‘duties of respect’ with the wide or meritorious ones as ‘duties of love.’

Although Kant has these numerous divisions of duties, he does not appear to cover all the ethical duties raised. Kant confines the ‘metaphysics’ of morals only to those duties that are generated by applying the principle of morality to human nature in general. Kant holds that there are universal duties persons have both to themselves and to others simply as human beings. Kant regards these duties in some sense as the foundations of all our duties within which persons also acquire duties in consequence of social customs, institutions and relationships. Kant is convinced that moral philosophers err when they regard the idea of duties to self as an appendix to moral philosophy on grounds that a person should give thought to herself only after completing her duty toward others.

In the English-speaking tradition of moral philosophy, the concept of a duty to oneself is commonly attributed to alleged duties to promote one’s own welfare. This is a view that finds significant support from religious foundations upholding ‘the golden rule.’ It is in the application of this golden rule that voices are lifted against self [as an obstacle to Christian altruism, and Christian self-love]. Kant in the Metaphysics of Morals (1996) has no doubt that there must be a reason or a basis from, which to advocate a self-regarding duty, ‘the laws of pure reason of categorical imperative’. He observes that,

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34 Kant treats these latter as ‘duties’ because the actions in question are conceived as fit objects of self-constraint that is to say things persons can make themselves do through the exercise of reason and the moral feelings arising from the application of practical reason to their faculty of desire.

35 The biblical golden rule, which stats that we ought to act toward men as we would wish to be acted upon, was the prior to Kant the ‘the universal law’- of the pre-modern world. In the Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals, Kant gives a modern retelling of the ‘golden rule’ in the form of his categorical imperative. Therefore, every rational
‘It was taken for granted that a man’s duty towards himself consisted in promoting his own happiness.’ (Ibid. pp.117)

For Kant to achieve happiness, everything will depend on how an agent determined her own happiness. Therefore, an agent’s self-regarding duties would consist in the universal rule that demands her to satisfy all of her own desires in order to increase her happiness. But to take this cause of action, it is countered, is actually likely to have a great negative influence against executing one’s obligations toward others. There is no doubt in Kant’s mind, that duties towards one’s self are of immense importance and should take precedence, this is because not much can be expected from an agent who dishonours herself. Kant writes,

‘He who transgresses against himself loses his manliness and becomes incapable of doing his duty towards his fellows.’ (1996, p. 118)

Kant concedes that even a person, who performs her duties towards others badly, may nevertheless possess a certain inner worth on account of acting well to self. It follows that the prior condition of a person’s duty to others is duty to self. The former duty can only be fulfilled in so far as the latter duty to self is first fulfilled. An agent submitting to any kind of indignities for the sake of gain or profit or making one’s self the plaything of others is to cast away one’s worth (Cureton, 2013, p. 169). To transgress one’s duty to self is to do more harm than to transgress against another. Kant claims that (1996, p. 118) although a liar may not harm anyone with her lies she however becomes an object of contempt. She throws away her personality. Her

being must so act as if he were by his maxims in every case a legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends. Kant was keen it seems, to remove the biblical nuances of the golden rule which made the rule too situational, based on the assumption that someone else would by necessity wish what you wish, but this assumption relied on there being a law giver of the universal law—the divine being. Kant’s ethical concern is to establish a rational, universal ethic, which at the same time protects the individual’s autonomy.

36 This proposition adheres to Kant’s wishes of providing mankind with the realization that it is possible to live in a world where one can know what is right and good, by using the faculty of reason, rather than through external or situational obligation, and the essence of things is not altered by their external relations.
behaviour is found to be vile as she has transgressed her duty toward herself\textsuperscript{37}. Kant makes a further interesting claim that to receive favours and benefits is a breach of duty to self. In doing so an agent can never be on equal terms with the person who conferred the favours. Whoever confers the benefits evidently makes a huge demand from the recipient. This echoes in contemporary term the idea of being, debt free. It is the duty of the agent to herself to ensure she owes nothing in order to uphold her dignity [this is one way to uphold duty to self-]. Kant echoes Aristotle who writes,

‘…therefore as, in the case of loans, debtors wish their creditors did not exist, while creditors actually take care of the safety of their debtors, so it is thought that benefactors wish the objects of their action to exist since they will then get their gratitude, while the beneficiaries take no interest in making this return.’ (Nicomachean Ethics, 9.7.1167b 20-24)

To uphold duties to self, a person must be prepared to live in a way that does not degrade self. This is the only way to make a person worthy her personhood, and anything that make a person unworthy makes such a person unfit for anything and she ceases to be human. This means a person cannot abandon herself at the pleasure or even at the cost of saving another. To do so is to allow a person to be treated as a thing. To treat self as a thing is to fail to uphold one’s personhood and that fails to adhere to the fact that the first duty one has to observe is the duty to one’s self.

“Only if our worth as human beings is intact can we perform our other duties. A man who has destroyed and cast away his personality, has no intrinsic worth, and can no longer perform any manner of duty.’ (Kant, 1970, p.121)

Kant re-enforces the fact that duties to one’s self are not depended on the relation of the action to its outcome [happiness]. If this was the case it will imply dependences on human inclinations, which are often themselves governed by rules of prudence in \textit{The Metaphysics of Morals}, (1996, 

\textsuperscript{37} This point is also treated above under footnote number 2.
But such rules will be found wanting in moral terms, as they only indicate the necessity of means of an action to satisfying the respective inclinations (Korsgard 1998, pp. 52-53). This then brings us to the question of whether the concept of duty to one’s self, which allows freedom to act, is in essence a contradiction. Undoubtedly also love, which takes delight in others (considered as duty of love and not duty to love, Fahmy 2010, p. 327), will constitute duty to them since it is the judgment of delight in their perfection. It follows that love that takes delight in the other must equally take delight in self resulting in one being well content with one’s self.

To be well content with self (which should suggest loving self) in judging one’s own perfection, is an inclination that constitute duty [duty which implies moral freedom] and even more so duty to self (Korsgard 1998, pp. 49-52). Kant considers duties to one’s self to fall under the essential morality that is composed of duties towards everything in the world. Nevertheless, the first and foremost duty owed is that to one’s own self. Kant makes the claim that,

‘My duty to ward myself cannot be treated juridically; the law touches only our relations with other men: I have no legal obligations towards myself; and whatever I do to myself I do to a consenting party: I cannot commit an act of injustice to myself.’ (Kant, 1979, pp.117)

Kant’s statement is made from supposition that discusses the use of liberty in respect of one’s self. In the discussion of duties to one’s self he raises at least two issues. First, he warns of how in moral philosophy the question of duty to one’s self has continued to receive defective treatment on account of the absence of a proper concept of self-regarding duty. Secondly, Kant

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38 There are those who argue that one of Kant’s faults in his philosophy lies in the fact that there seems to be no important role for love to play in human life. Wennmann (2000), argue that Kant’s duty-centred ethic often contrast duty and self-love as a kind of inclination, and since moral law demand that an agent acts for the sake of duty and not inclination Kant cannot find love of humanly satisfying this condition, seeing an activity preceded by love is taken on as an inclination.
acknowledges from the outset that the concept of duties to one’s self contain a contradiction (Reath 2006, p. 232). This is because the concept of duty to self contains an element of being passively constrained. Any proposition that asserts a duty to one’s self involve being bound to one’s self as an active obligation, albeit this draws out an absurdity.

4.4.1 Is duty to self a contradiction?

It seems to be the case that purely social conceptions of morality in retrospect leave no room for duties to one’s self. To advocate for such conceptions of morality is to argue against the existence of duties to one’s self. On the other hand, proponents of duties to one’s self have argued against purely social conceptions of morality. However, if an agent assumes a conception of morality as social she will find herself attributing to Kant and even endorsing the idea that duties are generated by a kind of volitional activity between agents.

This may be characterized ‘as the reciprocal interaction and mutual influence of rational wills of agents who co-exist as members of a community of ends’. (Reath 2006, p. 246) From this assertion there is no reason to believe a social conception of morality excludes the possibility of duties to one’s self. How then can duties to one’s self be consistent with and fit into an essentially social conception of morality?

A conception of morality as ‘social’ hugely affects the concept of duties to self because of an agent’s belief that moral principles somehow arise out of relations between agents. This presupposes some kind of interaction between agents. An agent gets different conceptions of morality as social in nature depending on whether the interaction that the particular agent has in mind occurs at what Kant terms the ‘legislative level’ or at the ‘level of agency’.

Proponents of the conception of morality as social take moral principles or the need for moral principles to be generated by a kind of interaction between agents at the level of agency.
This is demonstrated by demands that agents make on each other as persons advancing their own interests in a social setting. The seemingly conflicting interests of hugely self-concerned agents create the need for morality. This view presupposes the need for morality to be that of regulating interaction between agents in some impartial manner that establishes limits on personal conduct. It means persons have to conceive of themselves and of other subjects as participants in a social world with pluralistic ends which they all share and mutually support. Morality, in Kant’s sense, is therefore not parasitic on the social world, but rather is its organising principle (Rosseler 2013, p. 15). The concept of morality as social necessitates a setting out of legitimate demands that an agent may advance against another person.

Therefore, the conclusion one draws from a conception of morality presumed as social is that, such a concept appear to leave no room for duties to one’s self. Kant is attributed with the view that the legislative capacities that an agent possesses as an individual are to be exercised by a guided regulative aim of arriving at general principles that all members of a community of ends can endorse. This in itself is a social conception of morality that takes moral principles to be generated by interaction between agents at the legislative level (Reath 2006, p.122). When this legislative process is gleaned over for moral principles concerning how individuals should treat themselves, sufficient room for duties to one’s self within a social conception of morality becomes apparent.

It is from the premise of a person’s humanity that considerations of duties to one’s self are perceived as fundamental, but also to be negative by virtue of restricting one’s freedom in respect of one’s inclinations aimed at one’s welfare. Reath (2006) is of the opinion that Kant in asserting the foregoing premise or arguing for it, did not take note of the contradiction in the idea that a being with personality or inner freedom can have obligations to herself. Kant however,
recognised this apparent problem of contradiction and examined it. Kant observed that if an agent that imposes obligation is one and the same agent who is put under obligation, a duty to one’s self in respect of this agent is in essence a self-contradictory. This is because the concept of duty to one’s self upholds the concept of an agent being bound and an agent who is capable of obligation has obligation to herself. This agent must also possess deliberative capacities of great value, capacities that make claims on her choices and attitudes towards self. In *Metaphysics of Morals* Kant observes that,

‘One can also bring this contradiction to light by pointing out that the one imposing obligation…. could always release the one put under obligation… from the obligation…, so that (if both are one and the same subject) he would not be bound at all to a duty he lays upon himself. This involves a contradiction.’ (1996, 173)

Kant taking note of this contradiction accepted nevertheless, that a human being has duties to herself. Kant acknowledged the contradiction in sufficiently general terms to the point of making it affect both moral and legal varieties of duty. Having acknowledged this contradiction it became difficult to exonerate himself argues Reath (2006, 236).

Notwithstanding, Reath is convinced that Kant is rescued from this dilemma by the acceptance that an agent acts on two levels, that of an animal nature and that of an agent’s own humanity. The first level Kant perceives an agent as a natural being [as phenomenon] for whom the concept of obligation does not come into play. The capacities that come into play are those, which make special claims on an agent’s choices attributed to self [as *noumenon*] or the personality. It is the legislative capacities of the *noumenal* self [an agent’s humanity or personality], which imposes the demands on her choices and attitudes as *noumenal* self.

Secondly, the foundation of duties to one’s self are the claims that an agent’s own humanity makes on her actions and attitudes. Therefore, the apparent contradiction in the concept of duties to one’s self is removed by accepting that an agent is vested with certain capacities whose values
she acknowledges that bind her by volition.

The basis for duties to her becomes perfectly general value of her humanity (the capacity of humanity in herself). Marcus Singer (1959) argues duty to one’s self will always entail a contradiction. He concedes the commonest division of duties as based on distinctions of those duties to one’s self and duties to others. These distinctions are founded both in traditional moral philosophy and in ordinary moral perception. But Singer does not accept that there is a duty that one owes to self. Kant has already observed that duties toward self are of primary importance and should therefore take precedence of duties to others. Indeed, the kind of self-constraint involved in laying down obligations on one’s self is the foundation of all duty.

I have discussed above, any difficulty in the idea of constraining one’s self that vitiated the concept of duties to self would in fact undermine duty generally. Singer argues that for there to be any duties to self in a literal sense, a person must be able to hold themselves obligated to a duty. The same person must be able to free themselves from such an obligation if need be, and it is this idea of freeing herself that spells out a contradiction. This is because the obligated person being the same one who can free herself from the obligation, will always almost inevitably free herself and never remain accountable. Singer disputes that ‘duties to one’s self’ are genuine moral duties to an individual. When duties are genuinely moral he observes, then they fail to remain duties to the individual.

He observes,

‘But a duty to one’s self, then, would be a duty from which one could release one’s self at will, and this is self-contradictory. A “duty” from which one could release one’s self at will is not, in any literal sense, a duty at all.’(Singer 1959, p.202-203)

Singer concedes that all duties entail accountability to some other person for the performance of these duties. If this is the case, then the idea of accountability to one’s self is preposterous. Wick
in *Ethics* (1960) responds to Singer by arguing that, ‘without duties to ourselves in a sense to be explained, the moral point of view makes no sense’ (1960, p.158). The key point of contention raised by Singer is that one cannot say she has a claim against self [for Singer this is absurd]. This is because the understanding of a duty from which one can release one’s self *at will* is self-contradictory. Wicks argues that Singer is mistaken in that the alleged contradiction is specious and springs from a failure to distinguish between moral duties from legal obligations (Wicks 1960, p.160), where the legal is essentially contractual binding duties from that one can be conclusively released or legally absolved.

Wicks argues that moral duties that often form the bulk of duties to one’s self are not similar to legal duties. Further still, that they are not the kind of duties from, which one can be absolved or released, a view echoed by Mothersill (1961, p. 205). Wicks speaking of moral duty has in mind the categorical imperative of Kant. Given that this is the premise from which Kant is addressing duty to self, to say one has moral duty to treat others [and herself] with respect, is to imply this activity is an end in itself and not a means. Wicks observes further that for Kant the concept of binding one’s self is already implied in that of duty.

The fact that a duty is obligated by necessity implies its binding one’s self and it is on this argument Kant perceived the contradiction (Wick 1960, p.162). In any duty there is an agent who is passively constrained and an agent who is actively responsible for constraining through an act of volition.

The later agent imposes the obligation on the subject (or the former agent) through her will and becomes the agent to whom duty is owed. It is in this respect duties to one’s self require a single agent occupying both roles. This is a feature of Meads’ understanding of *the self* that is
characteristic of being an object to itself (Mead 1934, p. 136-7)\textsuperscript{39}, the idea is also carried out in Adam Smith’s impartial spectator working in conjunction with Smith’s man in the breast (to be discussed in a later section).

The Kantian agent can therefore be said to experience herself, in the sense of an agent entering into the experience of her-self. The agent while being the subject of duty to herself [who exercises the duty] she also becomes the object up on whom the duty is performed. It is this absurdity of the concept of releasing one’s self from an obligation that Kant has to accept and deal with. Conversely, if there were no such duties as duties to self as already observed above, Kant is convinced and argues, then there would be no duties whatsoever and hence no external duties or duties to others.

A person recognises herself to be under an obligation to others at the same time she puts herself under obligation. The law by virtue of which such a person regards herself as under obligation proceeds in each case from her own practical reason and this later claim is key for Kant. To treat humanity as an end is to treat self as one treats others. A person is not to be valued merely as means to the ends of others or her own ends but as an end in herself.

On grounds that she possesses an absolute inner worth she exacts respect for herself from all other rational beings. She values herself on the same measuring scales with other rational beings because of this inner worth or self-regard, and it is to this self-regard I turn and briefly consider Kant’s presentation.

\textsuperscript{39} Mead writes that, ‘It is the characteristic of the self as an object to itself that I want to bring out. This characteristic is represented in the word “self” which is a reflective and indicates that which can be both subject and object. This type of object is essentially different from other objects, and in the past, it has been distinguished as conscious, a term which indicates an experience with, an experience of, one’s self’
4.5 Kant on Self-love

Self-regard or self-love refers to the rationally guided interest in the satisfaction of one's inclinations, perceived to be indifferent to the interests of others. In self-love persons are perceived to love themselves more than they others and being moved by self-love individuals have out of love for themselves the same standing, as it were, to treat each of their subjective concerns as though they were objective reasons for actions. Individuals act without regard to their subjective concerns as reasons that make claims on anyone else (Reath 2006, p26). Self-love thus treats subjective considerations as objective or justifying reasons for acting. This personal understanding of self-love, as objective reasons for acting does not preclude the agent recognising that others have the same self-concerns. That conclusion leads the agent to recognise that others likewise have to treat their subjective considerations as objective reasons.

Kant offers two kinds of motivational tendencies comprising of self-love and self-conceit. I focus on self-love the dominant of the two. Self-love is a predominant benevolence towards one’s self. In Kant’s understanding the moral law or pure practical reason responds to self-love in different ways. Kant’s Pure practical reason ‘merely infringes upon self-love it only restricts it as natural and active in an agent even prior to the moral law, placing it in agreement with this law.

For Kant, a well-regulated character is not simply a matter of the absence of counter-incentives. The goal is rather to transform our self-love so that it promotes and advances compliance with the moral law. Kant refers to it as ‘reasonable self-love’ (Critique of Practical Reason 1996, 5: 73), Aristotle’s rational self-love (NE 1168b35-69a3) and Joseph Butler cool

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40 Self–love falls under Kant’s consideration of an agent’s predisposition to animality- that concerns self-love expressed in human impulses for self-preservation, propagation of the species, and community with other human beings. This predisposition to humanity concerns self-love expressed in human cultural strivings and social dependence upon and rivalry with others.
self-love (Butler 1827, p.153). Self-love’s main objective is to ‘strike down’ and ‘humiliate’ self-conceit. Or as Kant later says, the moral law ‘excludes altogether the influence of self-love on the highest practical principle’, but ‘forever infringes upon self-conceit’ (Ibid. 5: 74).

Notwithstanding, the influence of self-love needs to be controlled (Ibid. 5: 75) so that an agent may act on self-interested inclinations when properly constrained. Self-love provides different concern that one can have or fail to have toward others. The object of self-love is an agent’s welfare or the satisfaction of an agent’s ends. An agent’s concern for another's well-being could be based either in feeling for or attachment to the agent’s (‘delight’) in the person or pleasure in the person's perfections, or in the duty of benevolence.

Self-love is feeling of respect directed at the self and an agent may have various formats how she interprets these feelings. She interprets self-love, as a love of one’s self manifesting itself as interest in one's own welfare and in the satisfaction of one's own desires. This love of one’s self may comprise inclinations directed at ends outside the self. It however tends toward a form of general egoism where an agent takes her inclinations as sufficient reasons for her actions and is prepared to view the inclinations of others as sufficient reasons for their actions. That being the case the agent and the other are therefore permitted to pursue their respective interest as they see fit.

From a Kantian perspective self-love may be perceived as a tendency to treat an agent’s inclinations as objectively good reasons for her actions, which are sufficient to justify them to others. Self-love can presume itself to be lawgiving, and moral law according to Kant only restricts self-love, which modifies an agent’s inclinations only when such inclinations conflict with one’s overall happiness. Kant is claimed to have argued that rational choice is guided by considerations that an agent regards as good and sufficient reasons for action.
This is a constitutive feature of free rational choice that an agent is guided by considerations that have a normative force for others as much as for herself, and that an incentive motivating through the judgments provides a sufficient reason for action. What motivates is the recognition of the authority of the moral law, or the feeling of respect and its effective dimension in a way in which the agent experiences the authority and motivating influence of moral considerations.

Morality, Kant would argue counteracts the influence of inclinations and non-moral interests (Hill Jr. 1993, p. 1-3). However, moral considerations can equally motivate through an agent’s recognition of their authority, to the extent that non-moral desires acquire their purchase on the will when an agent accommodates them to provide sufficient reason for action. Kant’s understanding of self-love is of a love, which takes delight in one’s self. A love, which has the inclination of being contended with one’s own self-judgment and perfection. True self-love is moral self-love devoid of arrogance or self-sufficiency.

For Kant there are two formats into which self-love may be described; the first is self-love compounded with arrogance, this may also be referred to as selfish self-love; which always only but pretends to be possessed of more moral perfection than it actually has, and it is this, which makes it morally defective. Such self-love has an inclination or a tendency to be satisfied with one’s perfection and therefore proud of its moral perfection and arrogance. True self-love (Aristotle’s sensible or rational self-love) makes no unwarranted claims ‘simply believing itself blameless and innocent’. (Kant 1996, p. 135).

The second format of self-love is that with an unwarranted claim to merit unlike false self-love. True self-love is not proud of its moral perfection and makes no claims for itself, rather is satisfied with itself and has no need to take itself to task to prove that point. The sensible or
rational self-love [Aristotle] in Kant’s judgment, ‘tests itself by the moral law’. Aristotle here argued that rational self-love first and foremost finds its example in a good friend, because a friend is an expression of another self.

Kant on his part argues that it is a risk to use other people’s moral experiences as a measuring standard. This is because often these examples from moral persons’ experiences lack the criterion of reason, a key component of moral law. This lack makes self-love suspect when it relies in its application to the experiences of other moral persons. Because such experiences are likely to provide a narrow and an indulgent view of moral law, and in the absence of reason it is more likely an agent will express a moral judgment that is impartial. Kant writes,

‘A man may compare herself with others and esteem only himself. This is moral egoism. We ought not to measure our worth by comparing ourselves with others, but with the standard of moral law.’ (Kant 1996, p.137)

Kant is convinced that for a person to measure her standard against the moral worth of others is to apply an inaccurate measuring standard, which ‘may lead to a very different estimate of our worth.’ (Ibid. p. 137). When an agent utilises another’s experience of moral law, they in essence apply a ‘fortuitous standard’. This standard almost always leads to a very different estimate of one’s own worth. From such a standard one may conclude that she is of a lesser value than others creating feelings of indifference or even hate for the other. Kant explains that parents often find themselves in awkward situations when they lose sight of principles of moral law by which to bring up children, but instead point to other children as examples. Kant writes,

‘The less strict our view of the moral law and the less strictly the judge within us judges us, the more arrogant we are apt to be.’ (1996, p.135)

In his explication of self-love Kant introduces self-esteem that for him connotes intrinsic worth. He elucidates that people esteem that which has intrinsic worth. Often, they do so by error because they do so irrespective of the purpose to which that which is esteemed is to be applied.
With self-love, we love that which in itself has worth and bears ‘on something else’.

For Kant, a person who does her duty and does not denigrate her personhood, such a person is esteemed, although she may not be sociable. Since she who is sociable is almost always loved and this foundation provides premise to judge on whether one is worthy of esteem or self-love. It seems that for Kant a combination of self-esteem and self-love provides a basis for a person to wish herself well, a natural thing to do. Kant quickly cautions that this natural thing to do is not the same with having a good opinion of self, which often generates a false sense of esteem, for that is the slippery slide into arrogance.

4.6 Kant and Contemporary philosophical discourse on Selfhood

The notion of autonomy is Kant’s organising idea of selfhood. Selfhood signified self-respecting autonomous agency realised when one is recognised as possessing the capacities of morally responsible agents. Kantian understanding will be that freedom consists in a person’s ability to determine her ends independently of domination by her own inclinations and desires; and such freedom consists in a person’s ability to select and pursue her own ends independently of domination by other persons.

Beate Rossler (2013, p.14-15) has argued that a Kantian discussion of autonomy is primarily concerned with the question: what should I do? Or perhaps, which of my actions – or maxims - could others reasonably reject? Rosseler feels that she is correctly interpreting Kant’s discussion of autonomy, pausing these questions. Kant has been misunderstood she contends, by other philosophers but particularly Honneth (2011), in her case.

Rosseler (Ibid. p. 15) explains that Honneth wanting to make his point as forcefully as he possibly can reacting to Kantian autonomy: what Honneth calls ‘moral freedom cannot, by necessity, take into account its own social preconditions and its own rootedness in the life-
world.’ She argues that Kant always understood ends, as always already adopted by subjects in their social contexts. Honneth at whom Rosseler is reacting argues that a Kantian impartial morality is only superficially related to its social conditions and cannot describe and interpret what it means, for example, to be a real friend and at the same time a morally responsible agent.

Moral freedom Honneth argues means that one frees oneself from personal relations and obligations and that one cannot, under the idea of moral freedom, act at the same time as a friend, or lover, mother, compatriot (Honneth 2011, 201 cited by Rosseler 2013, p. 16).

Rosseler’s response is simply that Kant’s ethics is an ethics for agents and their questions about how to act in their social relations with others. Kant’s ethics is not necessarily an ethics that is directed at finding moral faults in others.

Rosseler’s interpretation of Kant’s ethics suggests that as autonomous agents human beings have to make a judgment for mistake of moral fault committed, this is irrespective of whether the judgment is to solve a personal conflict or another’s conflict. There is no amount of moral freedom that can exonerate human beings, because as autonomous agents they have to decide. One cannot compromise her moral convictions and therefore fall short of her ethical obligations because of the freedom that accompanies her autonomy.

In Kantian ethics, it is still possible to properly articulate a genuine conflict between ethical obligations toward friends on the one hand and the claims of impartial morality on the other. Accordingly, it is the autonomous agents themselves who have to solve moral, ethical, social, and role-related problems. The foregoing discussion attempts to show how Kant’s
autonomy and the freedom it prescribes to selfhood still raises serious discussions in its application. But what does Kant himself say about autonomy?

For Kant autonomy was, “the property of the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition)” (*Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 4:440). For Kant any law must be universal it is the condition of an agent who is “subject only to laws given by herself but still universal” (Ibid. 4:432). This meant that the self would achieve its freedom by following the self-made laws of its own rational nature (Seigel 2005, p.298). Autonomy was hence, the ability to make not just free choices, but refers to the ability for self-determination.\(^{41}\)

The Kantian rational will therefore, is essentially autonomous or free in the sense that it is the original author of the law that binds it (the categorical imperative) and also the constant protector of that same law. It is not only negatively free (from external influence) but, more importantly, positively free as its own author, and freedom to choose its own law has inherent worth. Autonomy is, thus, nothing less than the lifeblood of Kantian categorical imperative and morality.

On account that all rational individuals in principle are equally capable of achieving selfhood and seeing that many indeed achieved it by pursuing the same rules, this makes selfhood universal.\(^{42}\) This conclusion also dispels the feminists’ claim of autonomy historically.

\(^{41}\) We should emphasize at this point that, autonomy cannot be taken merely in a negative sense, in the sense that the laws that we accept must be legislated by us, rather than by God, the government, the inclinations of nature, or some other way. Unless human beings are going to be turned into Kantian rational moral machines, Kant’s demand for autonomy must be combined with a cultivated ability for spontaneous thinking and action. There must also be autonomy in a positive sense. Autonomy taken in the positive sense is to understand the laws, to grasp the value they advocate and the binding power they assume. This conception of autonomy the challenging part in it, perhaps the part that Kant least comfortable with, is that one’s ability to choose laws for one’s self is intimately connected with his/her ability to see when such laws would be irrelevant, or superfluous, or misapplied (Cicovacki 2002, p.392-393).

\(^{42}\) Kantian autonomous selfhood was distinct from the expressivist selfhood that projected a self that was free in the sense of not being determined by external objects or relations (Taylor 1989, p.368-90). While Taylor attributes this
as a masculine (Slote 2004, p.294) ideal. While Taylor emphasises the distinction between Kantian autonomous selfhood and Leibniz expressivist selfhood (Taylor 368-9) it is the case that this distinction argues Seigel (Seigel 2005, p.299), remained uniquely German. These forms of selfhood depended on the isomorphism between individuals and the world. Kant’s idea of autonomy (Taylor 1989, p. 364) owed much to Rousseau, although Rousseau developed it only in the context of politics. Seigel reiterates the fact that these two forms of selfhood appear to have required the same kind of homology (Ibid. p. 299).

In essence these two forms of selfhood were internally related to each other. There should be no surprise that the two tend to feed new life into each other. Seigel observes further that the kinship of the two forms of selfhood continue to exhibit in each other radical and moderate forms, in their support of self-realisation, as they attempt to posit a world in harmony with the self. It is notable however, that each form of selfhood is capable also of setting limits to the self in the present, where the Kantian autonomous selfhood recognises that humans are expressivist selfhood to Leibniz, to which Seigel seems to concur, it is the opinion of Seigel that Taylor does not do Leibniz justice by attributing to him the credit due him in this respect. The expressivist selfhood itself did not legislate rules for itself or others rather it simply followed the innate principle of its own nature.

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expressivist selfhood to Leibniz, to which Seigel seems to concur, it is the opinion of Seigel that Taylor does not do Leibniz justice by attributing to him the credit due him in this respect. The expressivist selfhood itself did not legislate rules for itself or others rather it simply followed the innate principle of its own nature.

43 Many feminists’ protagonists to include the voices of Carol Gilligan are attempting to rehabilitate autonomy as masculine notion in order to accommodate an ethics of caring grounded in an ideal of connection with, rather than separateness from (suggested by autonomy); others would prefer perhaps to completely displace traditional masculine approaches and give us a total picture of what can be validly said about the ethical. [Carol Gilligan, _In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development_ (1982; reprint, with new preface, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); and Nel Noddings, _Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education_ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).]

44 Autonomy for Rousseau was an idea that described the freedom of the citizens who were at once sovereign and subject to in the politics they created. It is a freedom that did no seem to solve the problems of personal wholeness, since its social contract continued to divide citizens. Rousseau it seems did not invoke reason as a power able to integrate personality and ground personal moral autonomy in the manner Kant had done.
material creatures as well as rational, and the expressivism acknowledges that every self has to dwell in a world occupied at the same time with others.

4.6 Conclusion
I set out to look at Kant’s concept of the self and self-love. My discussion began with the self-concept in Kant’s works. I became aware firstly that Kant, with general opinion, was reacting at Hume’ objection to the idea of personal identity. Kant attempted to demonstrate that there actually can be made a claim for the self. The problem I found was that this Kantian self started to slip into various interpretations that appear to deny Kant a clear and concise description of a unitary self. These various interpretations of the self however, became key to how other Kantian ideas and concepts were to be discussed. Self-respect is one of the ideas that springs up in Kantian discussion of the self.

I argued that self-respect in a Kantian understanding accords an agent a real opportunity to exercise the universal capacities constitutive of personhood. I recognised that self-respect is a complex character state involving a disposition not to behave in a manner unworthy of oneself. That is to say it is a disposition to shun behaviour that one views as contemptible, degrading, or otherwise immoral. Such understanding was important therefore on how to interpret duty to self.

Kant’s claim that a person has certain duties to herself has greater importance for understanding his ethics and exonerates him from charges of abstraction. Kant provides a doctrine of duties to self, which is concealed in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* that has to do with how an agent esteems herself. This concealment is perhaps the reason for preoccupation in modern ethics with Kant’s universalization as the defining feature of duty.

The theory under which Kant propagates duties to oneself, grounds these duties in the notion that humanity deserves practical respect while embracing an impartiality that does not
exclude an agent’s own humanity from duties so grounded. Human autonomy seems to be central to this understanding of duties to oneself.

It is notable how Kant makes no use of universalization in the arguments for duties to oneself, yet this feature (universalizability) appears important recalling Kant’s ‘Law of Nature’ in the formulation of the *Categorical Imperative* that obligates an agent to act as if the maxim of her action were to become by her will a universal law of nature. In responding to the application of duties to oneself that involves self-respect, self-regard, conscience implying the inner court of moral judgment and self-love, Kant invites a sense of interpersonal and temporal universalization.

I discussed how Kant argued that under *Categorical Imperative* with self-love leading to self-preservation an agent cannot consistently will or even just once, to self-destruct from self-love. According to Kant there cannot be without contradiction of a universal law of nature that self-love lead to self-destruction when it must always lead to self-preservation.

Given Kant understands self-love as having a destination of self-preservation, it cannot be the case that agents’ self-love always in fact aims at dutiful self-preservation. This is because the same motive of self-love may lead to transgressions of duty, for example, to suicide perhaps.

It becomes apparent that universal temporal self-destruction from self-love runs contrary to the concept of self-love insofar as it is conceptually true that self-preservation is its destination. It seems that following Kant’s argument there is contradiction sometimes in letting natural purposes run their course and other times impeded by them. When an agent wills her
maxim to impede to become universal, she must always impede that natural purpose that contradicts the time when she lets it run its course.
Chapter  5

Philosophies of Self and Self-love – Adam Smith

5.1 Introduction

In the previous section a Kantian account of the self and of self-love, showed Kant begins with selves that are individuated by experience, with entities that are jointly responsible for unifying sensations into a single experience thereby constitute a single self. This understanding of the self has implications on self-love of an agent, and how she may have duties to herself or she may be obligated to her own self.

Kant called on conscience as the adjudicating faculty of an agent in order to resolve any cases of latitude that include how an agent can obligate duties to herself. This seemed to produce an irreconcilability of the agent’s action. Calling upon conscience, Kant somehow captured the dialogical quality of the Smithian impartial spectator who acts as the internal court in the human being, although of course, the Kantian description of conscience as incorporated in person’s being, as an original and (since it is the thought of duty) moral disposition clashes with the empirical basis of Smith’s conscience.

The self in Adam Smith’s understanding raises a different set of issues. The standard vision of the self in economics generally is attributed to Adam Smith, unfortunately with a misrepresentation that has more in common with egoistic notion of Thomas Hobbes (Dixon et al 2014, pp. 623-4). This Hobbesian version of the self is characterised with a set of interests, passions or preferences and the capacity to reflect on alternative courses of action with a view to best satisfying those ends. The ideal place of the self in Adam Smith is in “universal economic
liberty within the context of law and commutative justice” (Werhane 1991, 180), where Smith’s conception of self is quite different from that usually associated with orthodox economics.

In what follows in this section I will discuss the self of Smith in a number of contexts. First the self of Smith is of a deeper competence and a more complex form of selfhood than conventional economic analysis is able and/or willing to admit. In Smith’s account, the Hobbesian view that articulates that this is all we are, fundamentally miss-specifies the human self and how it comes to act and think.

I argue that the concept of the self in Adam Smith provided an explanation on the role of self-love in motivating parties to exchange, a view that has significantly and widely been misunderstood. A discussion of Adam Smith in the context of intellectual history will show while not exhaustively that Smith occupies a unique context.

I will discuss also how, Adam Smith has become better known for his political economy, less for his social and moral thought both that remain equally important and, arguably subtler. Smith’s *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (henceforth TMS) develops a sophisticated account of the social physics Smith saw emerging to accommodate the economic changes of his time.

It is this social physics discussed, that situates Adam Smith and contemporary notions of ‘*homo oeconomicus*’ in a context responsible for his reputation. I will attempt to draw a conclusion considering the apparent usefulness of Adam Smith to my research question.

### 5.2 Adam Smith and the Concept of Self

There is more to Smith than the founder of a tradition that works outwards from an un-explicated (simple) view of the self and its interests in order to demonstrate the possibility of a liberal-economic order or the need for ethical foundations. The self is commonly the factor differentiating self from others and from the rest of the universe. Self provides an agent with a
sense of ‘I-ness’ or ‘at-one-ness’ (Humphreys, 2010). Self allows an agent to become an individual. The awareness of self makes an agent to experience solitude, love and to be responsible for others. Self provides awareness of the past and the future, of life and death. Self also provides a sense of values and ability to plan ahead as well as being conscious of evolution and perhaps ability to influence its course. Self writes MacCannell (1977, p. 890),

‘…as a term implies more substance than it can convey, more unity and individual specificity than a reflexive pronoun available for any referent can provide.’

MacCannell suggests that each discipline in its own understanding treats self uniquely of its definitional opposites, for example; divisiveness and otherness, so we find frustration and alienation in the essence of self (psychoanalysis), and on the other hand in self is dependency upon the other for determination (sociology). The concept of self in Smith is a reflexive concept similar to Aristotle and Augustine. A self exists where there is self-reference (Buss 1965, p. 47).

In TMS Smith offers a theory of how the self and its acts are constituted – and of how individual and society are related. This function of the self is in stark contrast to the presuppositions of modern mainstream economic theory whose conception is more Hobbesian than Smith45. The self often associated with orthodox economics is characterised as a set of interests, passions, or preferences and the capacity to reflect on alternative courses of action with a view to best satisfying those ends.

Smith’s theory of the self on the contrary, is not solely built on an individual who relentlessly pursues her self-interest (however that interest may be conceived). This view misinterprets Smith’s social theory (Wilson et al 2009, p. 75-76). Smith’s social theory is rather

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45 Though Smith is claimed as a seminal figure in the development of the modern mainstream economics, its conceptions, based as they are on a strategically rational understanding of human behaviour, owe more to Hobbes than to Smith. Smith’s social theory is the culmination of a long and quite vehement reaction to Hobbesian action-theoretical presuppositions rather than a contribution to their development (Dixon et al 2104, p. 627 – 628).
concerned with appropriately constraining the self and the institutions. The logic of Smith’s account of the self drives Smith to view an individual’s action in terms of society rather than society via the actions of individual persons. A self caught up in this presupposition soon finds out that human interaction is not a straightforward matter. Smith reasoned that society is necessarily antecedent to self, and that self and mind develop through interaction with others, therefore, self control derives from social control and people are actors as well as reactors whose moral action is founded on epistemologies of the individual and social.

Smith divides the self into ‘examiner and judge’, on the one side, and the person ‘whom I properly call myself’, on the other. Mead’s consideration of the ‘me’ (1934, p.173) ‘taking the role of the other’ and discussion of the self appears paralleled. For Smith it is the position of spectator from which one assesses one’s own self conduct from the point of view of another. Smith’s ‘agent’ has the same function as Mead’s ‘I’, that is, it is the individual component of the self of which one is forming a specific opinion. Smith’s self consists of two components which unite the dual tensions of selfhood and society that is how he manages to account first for an individual epistemology followed by a social epistemology. Personhood consists in the resolution of this tension, the coexistence of individual spontaneity and the demands of the community.

Haig (2009) suggests that in reading Smith’s TMS a locus of moral responsibility, and a sense of self itself, emerges as one flips back and forth between one’s own self perspective and the perspectives of others, and as one attempts to reconcile and adjudicate among the different springs of internal action. To understand others the self avails itself via the imagination means taking an imaginative leap based, initially, upon one’s own person. The attitude that this produce what Smith refers to as ‘sympathy’. Sympathy, for Smith is ‘to denote our fellow feeling with
any passion whatever’ (I.i.1.5). It is not synonymous with compassion or empathy; it is not an attribute of personality. It is a faculty, possessed by all human beings. It is a mechanism employed in courses of social interaction and without which knowledge of others would be impossible.

By way of sympathy Smith showed that in every social situation there are persons acting and those acted upon, and this sympathy is a manner of explaining this activity. Sympathy allows the feelings of others to become accessible, since it involves imagination and allows individuals to conceive the experiences of others by way of representations. The process is necessary because others are separated from one’s self by time and space, therefore imagination provides the immediate best alternative for one to be able to conceive of what she herself should feel in the like situation.

5.3 Adam Smith and the idea of Self

Smith, in his discussion of the self’s development, expressed a basic tenet of [symbolic interactionism46] the notion that the social self cannot emerge unless an individual is able to take account of others’ images of her. Smith suggests that, surveying one’s self and conducts as they appear to self, one enters into emotions or judgments previously alien to herself, sentiments that could be entertained only through sympathy. At times, sympathy may even make one displeased with an act or quality advantageous to self, simply because the act affronts others, but sympathy

46 Symbolic interactionism is a theory attributed to American sociological society or community that argues of difficult to conceive” of a symbolic-Interactionist theory of society developing in Scotland and England, where monopolized power and restrictive social conventions prevailed until the twentieth century. An interesting observance has been that this theory has its origins among the American sociologists, although overwhelming evidence suggests the rooting of this symbolic interactionism to be in the eighteenth-century Scotland and England thinkers, but more specifically the Scottish eighteenth century moralists, again here Adam Smith has been singled out (Shott 1976, pp. 39-46; Cotello 1997, pp. 81-109). The theory itself claims that, human interaction and communication is facilitated by words, gesture, and other symbols that have acquired conventionalized meanings. George Herbert Mead 1863-1931, who was one of the key proponents of this theory.
remains central to Smith’s understanding of Self. Smith never espoused a specific form of the self, unlike his compatriot Hume and his predecessor Locke. It is Smith’s general reflections that provided for how the selves are formed (Shott 1976, p. 43). His discussion of this process observed that children learn how they are expected to act in a situation or what view of it they should take from others’ “definitions of the situation”. The attainment of a social self occurs, according to Smith, when the child has internalized an impartial spectator that monitors its behaviour. At this point an individual has fully acquired a reflexive self in the sense that her sentiments, acts, and physical appearance incite reflection and “role-taking” in order to ascertain their effects on others. That this social self carries a sense of self-evident whenever one’s “self-feeling” is determined by the imagination of how one appears to others.

Smith’s accounts of the selves suggest a relational self, where the virtuous behaviours are grounded in the individual’s capacity to govern the self (TMS VI, iii, 2; 241). Smith presupposes the idea that one might find empirical evidence for a unified self. From his opening lines of the TMS, we find the self of any given person having to align with the natural principles that interest one in the affairs of others.

The self becomes compelled to mind the welfare of others without anticipating recompense except for the pleasure of seeing the happiness of others. Smith develops his moral philosophy with sympathy as his corner stone. He portrayed the active character of self, as depicting people as actors as well as reactors (Shott 1976, p. 43). Seigel (2005, p.139) observes moral philosophy in Smith was no longer a discourse on the nature of virtue or goodness contra Aristotle; rather an inquiry into how self achieved the capacity to govern. Smith assumed a self that was irreducibly explained as social, moral and ethical. He identified any self-direction
human beings were capable of attaining as rooted in passions and feelings. These passions and feelings were at once governed by causal relationships making the self-relational.

Selves are formed by interaction with others, while at the same time selves achieved command over themselves by interactions with selves. Smith made the self depend on actions individuals carry out on themselves. Costello (1997, p.96) writes that Smith’s basis for the self to judge the conduct of others depended upon the ability to represent to oneself what one imagined the other is feeling. This dependency was not constituted of an activity carried out in isolation either from the bodily drives and urges or from social relations as was discussed here in chapter 1. Selfhood denotes a transformation of passions orchestrated when self’s concern was placed against the basic human need for society with others. The chief passion out of which virtuous behaviour originates is sympathy, Smith concluded this was in a way the extension of self-love to others.

The human need for society issues in a spontaneous impulse to put [imagine] self in the place of others, or fellow feeling, and out of this compulsion arise the stimulus to govern the self. Fellow feeling for Smith was the principle of ethics, presuming that through fellow feeling arose an ordering principle of the moral society. The total language of TMS thus, hinges on Smith’s fundamental investigation of the human self and its action (Wilson et al 2004, p. 121) as depicting “natural harmony” of the human capacity to act, rather than motives of the actor. A human being in essence is a self designed for harmony, acting in ways that involve the taking within itself present events and being in a pre-reflective anticipation mood of the attitudes of others, what Smith called sympathy.

Sympathy is the vicarious experience of others’ actions, emotions, tastes, and reasons. It is central to Smith’s account of the moral sentiments. Sympathy in Smith is a social practice
through which morality is inter-subjectively produced in shared physical spaces. This understanding counter frequent assumptions that sympathy is an emotion for Smith, or a virtue. Forman-Barzilai (2005, p.190-191) observes that the dramatic activities of surveillance and discipline, suggests that Smith’s description of sympathetic activity entails a rich moral psychology of culture formation.

Sympathy has practical as well as sociological dimensions. Sympathy for Smith is not just one of a number of attitudes that the self might strike in relation to others, on the contrary self and its interest are constituted in the imagining of the situation the other is experiencing. In applying sympathy as how the self and its interest are constituted, Smith draws a distinction between the nature of virtuous conduct and the way in which all forms of human conduct, virtuous or not, are constituted. Sympathy depends on watchful imagination, where self places itself in another person’s situation exciting itself to some degree of emotions the other is experiencing (TMS I, i.1.1-2. p.9). Sympathy is mindful imagination, by which the self places itself in another person’s situation (Seigel 2005, p. 142).

5.3.1 **Self’s sympathy not automatic**

The self’s capacity for sympathetic judgment although individualised, can be generalised to the point that any body within the society could and should provide or withhold sympathetic approbation. These sympathy judgments grounded in propriety become publicly motivated considering they occur in specific contexts. But Smith also wants to show that these sympathetic judgments carried out by selves in society and in specific contexts, provide a framework in which a more generalised point of view about morality may be internalised (Wilson et al 2004, p. 129). This means the actual external spectator relied on from whom selves learn as children in society, ultimately matures to become Smith’s man within the breast. That man allows each
individual self the ability to judge one’s own action in the same manner as the impartial spectator would judge these actions. This process of judging is the cultivation of conscience. Conscience may be viewed the *great demigod* within the breast that provokes self into austere self-judgment, becoming individuals’ secular imitation of the work of a divine artist (TMS VI.iii.25: 247-8).

The theistic residues implied speak of more than a focus on passionate contiguity. It means that natural desires for approbation become both the cause and results of sympathy and spectatorial judgments (Kelly 2013, p. 207). All sense of moral duty therefore stems from that which selves have become explicitly conscious of. A platform is provided from which the self becomes exceptionally conscious of the manner in which its own actions, and its judgments of the actions of others, is governed by the relationship between sympathy and propriety.

Through time and space persons have imagined themselves taking the places of others as if entering into their bodies and therefore sharing their feeling in their place in that particular situation. For Smith this process is the source of fellow feeling that remains a basic component of sympathy (TMS I, I, 1-2; 9). We observed that it is the relationship between sympathy and propriety that governs actions that reflect moral duty. Sympathy however, does not flow unchecked and is not automatic and along the way it experiences limitations.

5.3.2 Self’s sympathy as Calculative

Because sympathy is not always automatic it follows that selves do not always share every emotion that others display. Especially when such emotion is considered unrestrained or likely to make one feel distant from the person displaying it. Sympathy becomes calculative weighing out every emotion exhibited so as to arouse identification from the onlookers (Seigel 2005, p.143). Take an example; although grief and joy are feelings only shared to some degree,
humans very seldom share with the intensity of the person who displays any of these emotions to them.

Sympathy therefore is more than just a natural tendency to which the selves of persons respond in tune with others. There is always a calculative element or an element of judgment in sympathy before it is deployed. When one sympathises, she seeks the correspondence of sentiments between the other and self. Therefore, in sympathising with others, self in seeking their sympathy is more than just the amplification of one’s feelings it is the correspondence between their feeling or sentiment and self, and persons do not go about exercising this passion indiscriminately. This understanding is contrary to Halteman (2003, p. 458) who argues that ‘sympathy is not a rational transporting of one into another.’ Although involuntary the instinct of sympathy is calculative if calculative then more than possible rational.

In order to sympathise with the passions of the other, the self must deliberate that the passions of the other are appropriate or proper. Self must seek to be convinced in the suitableness or the unsuitableness, in the proportion or disproportion that the affection bears to the cause or object that is the reason for it (TMS I, I, 3-6; 18). To sympathise or not, is the judgment self makes on whether it would partake their feelings in their place.

It is the same process others undertake to sympathise or not with self and we care about whether they do. Because sympathy is not automatic selves can coexist with others with whom they do not concur on various opinions [literature, politics etc.], but they will find it hard or intolerable to one another when such people have no fellow feeling for each other’s deep concerns in their joys or misfortunes. It is this need for society with others that pushes people to not only to regulate their behaviour but to also moderate their feelings on which that behaviour is founded. A sense of self restraint is expressed and is two-sided and mutual, this restrain is
calculative not allowing for sympathy to be expressed automatically and rendering a sense of limitation to sympathy.

5.3.3  **Self’s sympathy is not limitless**

Another feature of self in exercising sympathy is that sympathy is not limitless. There comes a point where the self of a given person cannot continue sympathising indefinitely, because of spatial [constrains] limitation (Forman-Barzilai 2005). Although Seigel (2005, p.143) would want to argue that unlike Hume, Smith does not present sympathy in spatial limitation to those closest to an agent, there is a significant degree of difference in the sympathy imagined for those closest compared to those a far. Hume (1983 cited by Forman-Barzilai 2005, p. 190) observed that,

“sympathy . . . with persons remote from us [is] much fainter than that with persons near and contiguous” and that this effect on our sentiments necessitated a more impartial foundation for our moral judgments” which Hume located in general standards that are drawn from “social intercourse” and “general usefulness.”

Hume is representative of the discussion on sympathy during his time, giving a naturalistic account of a science of man that is grounded in passions but framed in the idea of natural history (Kelly 2013, p. 201). Smith through this mechanism of natural history was able to think through the relationship between passions, actions and political judgments (TMS VII.ii.1.38: p 289). Smith articulates that humankind is naturally biased by its self-love; besides, each individual naturally desires the approbation of others. Approbation is received when another individual reacts similarly or feels the same as one’s self does. The closer self to other, the easier it is to share the same feelings and the less effort self has to exert to develop command over its passions (Paganelli 2010, p.425-426). To gain the approbation of someone far away, an individual has to reach out and strongly control her passions. In spatial limitation of sympathy Smith adopted his orientation to the effects of proximity on sentiment, that is, human sympathy
tends to fade as the object becomes further removed. Smith drew substantially from Stoic moral psychology that physical proximity begets familiarity, which in turn makes affection stronger. Physical proximity further begets understanding that is more accurate, therefore making sympathy likelier, and other-concern more natural and appropriate (Ibid. p. 428).

Forman–Barzilia (2005, p.190) interprets Smith as appealing to the rich spatial texture of sympathetic responses and stimulations. Forman-Barzilai observes that the issue of physical proximity rouses more questions than it resolves. It seems to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for sympathetic response since the question of proximity seems also to demand cultural and affective considerations. (Ibid. p.198). Self’s sympathy also finds limitations through the medium of vision and its perceptual limits.

Although visual persuasion is a necessary judgment to activate sympathy it remains insufficient because selves assess the propriety of agency in a variety of ways. Two notable ways of assessment are language and the imagination and Smith was certainly aware of this, and in paying attention to imagination Smith was cautious of how self might be easily deluded about what it sees and hears, and therefore about what self perceives as appropriate in the first place.

Such delusion was not aberrant in the judgment of the actions of others, but that, selves are equally often deluded about what is truly in their own interest. The gaudy attraction of wealth rather than one’s own tranquillity is a pertinent example of this delusion. Despite the delusional possibilities any judgments on actions either of the self or others is dependent on the relationship between sympathy and propriety. This relationship is itself filtered through the medium of imagination, where this imagination for Smith is a concept constituting a compound of perception and moral judgement.
5.3.4 Self’s sympathy as imaginative

In Smith’s understanding, imaginative capacity of the self for sympathetic judgment [moral approbation] can be generalised but not underrated (Oslington 2010, p. 11-12). That is to say, the self’s ability to project into the sphere of another self, or see things their way, is an exercise undertaken individually in their thinking, acting and judging (Halteman 2003, p. 458). This self of an individual can only make the feelings of others accessible by making them available as if they were one’s own. It is through imagination that the self comes to sympathise with others, on the basis of the imperfect information provided by the filters (Marikoski 1999, p. 13-14).

Imagination endeavours to find out something which may fill up the gap by serving as a bridge; or at least unites those seemingly distant objects therefore rendering passage of thought between them smooth, and natural, and easy. Imagination introduces understanding into human experience. It has the ability to transport selves to the scenes of distant and forgotten adventures and to imagine oneself acting the part. Therefore, imagination makes past events part of the present.

When Smith talks about sympathy in terms of a natural desire for approbation, he has imagination in mind as the baseline from where he sees the demand of sympathy as intimately connected to one’s own natural sociability. This is re-enforced by the fact that most of what persons see is not everything that is visible. Persons are required to apply their own senses in combination with their imagination. The senses of self alone, ‘never did, and never can carry us beyond our own person ... it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are [the other’s] sensations’ (TMS I.i.1.2).

Imagination is not simply an aptitude of the self for reasoning. It is notable that, the self that is sometimes the spectator cannot physically experience the agent’s sensations or feel her
emotions, except when she sees the agent’s blood and tears, hears her cries and laughter, and is
drawn by imagination into the circumstances that gave rise to the process. The spectator of
another’s unhappiness therefore attempts [through imagination] to put herself in the situation of
another and to bring to self every infinitesimal circumstance of distress that can possibly occur to
the sufferer.

The self of the object of the imagination or the person being observed equally tries to
make her emotional condition sympathetic to others, by lowering her passion to that acceptable
pitch that the spectator is capable of going along with in the spectator’s imagination (Seigel
2005, p.143). She lowers her passion in order to reduce it to harmony and concord with the
emotions of those around her (TMS I., i. 1. I-2; 9), she inadvertently exercises self-love to
motivate others into sympathy with her.

5.4 Self-love in Adam Smith’s Works

The question of correctly interpreting what Adam Smith said about self-love in book 1,
chapter 2 of The Wealth of Nations 1776 (hereafter WN) is a continuing one. It appears founded
on an agent’s quest that the other must be deliberative, calculative and within limits as well as
imaginative in appropriating through sympathy the sentiments of her current state. It is this
appropriating of sentiments that remains central in Smith’s explanation of the role of self-love in
motivating parties to exchange, albeit this has been widely misunderstood (Black 2006, p. 7).

Noticeably, understanding the textual setting of Smith’s reference to self-love is crucial
to its correct interpretation. The first two chapters of WN must be read as a whole and in light of
Smith’s idea of “sympathy” from the Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS 1759) for a full meaning
of the appeal to self-love. A close orientation to TMS and WN about self-love returns no
necessary dichotomy in human behaviour. Criticisms of Smith for turning political economy into
the science of egoism or by founding such science on self-love are unfounded. Adam West (1969, p. 95) notes that Smith, in TMS, viewed self-love in the context of Christ’s admonition to “love your neighbour as yourself”. More precisely, Smith saw self-love as a Stoic virtue and one that could not have implied greed is good. This interpretation is false by a close examination of Smith’s reference to self-love in WN.

Self-love in WN, the word appears twice in the book. Both occurrences are in the same strategic place of the often-quoted passage in book 1 chapter 2, where Smith discusses the causes of the division of labour (WN, bk. 1, chap. 2, 13–14). This passage while it remains key to self-love interpretation, it offends many because it seems to prefer selfishness to benevolence. The passage also somehow appears to contradict the theme of sympathy as the foundation for moral judgments in Smith’s earlier text on moral philosophy (TMS).

Such apparent contradictions in Smith’s views on human nature comprise the “Adam Smith Problem.” But such casual readings of WN that attribute to Smith the worst possible meaning of the passage, that he advocated outright selfishness in commercial exchange are flawed. Notwithstanding, pure and immoral selfishness is not what Smith meant by self-love. Nor is his idea of sympathy purely other oriented or equivalent to benevolence (TMS, 10–11, editors’ note 1). Misunderstandings of Smith’s terms beget various misunderstandings of his ideas.

Smith’s use self-interest and self-love interchangeably at times, probably for variety of expression, means simply attending to one’s own interests but not necessarily at others’ expense. I argued above that attending to one’s own interests was important to Kant as he drew up his ethical demand of duty to oneself. Black (2006, p. 8–9) notes that Smith’s use self-love derived
its meaning from the Stoics application that every person is first and principally recommended to her own care.

Secondly, every person is certainly, in every respect, fitter and abler to take care of herself than any other person. This Stoic understanding of self-love is symptomatic, as I shall argue later, of the Christian virtue that is corresponding and equal love for one’s neighbour. The editors of TMS have raised this understanding in editors’ notes, ‘note 1 in TMS (1976, p. 23-24). Examining the passage on self-love in light of a closer investigation of the exact wording of the text itself, its immediate context, and the broader context of the first two chapters of WN shows how for example, the beggar in WN is crucial to Smith’s meaning regarding the role of self-love.

5.4.1 Adam Smith on Self-love [self-interest] in WN

In WN immediate context of paragraph 2 of book 1, chapter 2, and the broader context in book 1, chapter 1 and other parts of chapter 2, reveal more precisely what Smith meant about self-love. What is needed is a representation of these lesser known ideas in WN that precede the more popular passage about self-love. In the first two chapters of book 1 of WN, Smith examines the following five themes:

(1) the division of labour has led to increased productivity (the pin factory);
(2) the division of labour has also increased the complexity of production (the day labourer’s woollen coat);
(3) human activity tends toward exchange, unlike the animals (the “propensity to truck and barter” compared to the apparent cooperation of the racing greyhounds);
(4) specialization and complexity in production affect the way in which we are able to meet our needs (the spaniel and his master versus our relationship to the butcher, the brewer, and the baker); and
(5) the beggar is able to meet some needs but not all in a timely fashion. These ideas form a unit and harmonize with Smith’s idea in TMS that human behaviour is capable of self-love and benevolence, not one or the other. Many would be interpreters of Smith’s discussion on self-love leave alone these themes preferring to focus on the most popular texts. An approach that focuses on the popular texts does not show for example, how Smith discussed specialization and the division of labour, and consequent improvements in machinery multiply labour’s productive power, leading to increased exchange and improving living standards.

Another motif that is missed out by casual interpreters or readers of WN is, to what extent are humans and animals able to meet their needs through mutual exchange, individual activity, or begging? While domesticated animals are restricted to dependent effort or to begging, animals in the wild act independently. But humans cooperate, and their “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another” is a uniquely human tendency. Greyhounds running a rabbit may seem to work together, but they do not trade bones. Smith does allow that domesticated animals may obtain their needs from humans but not through trade (WN, bk. 1 chap 2, 118).

It is on the backdrop of such lesser-known texts that Smith offers his explanation of the concept of self-love. He perceives the role of self-love as that of motivating individuals and party groups in exchange. He explains that meeting one’s needs in a world tied to the economic means of production and exchange including division of labour, complex means of production, consumer needs and wants cannot be selfishness, and persons are capable both of self-love and benevolence. Nonetheless, Smith’s self-love gets bad press when its application is linked with transactions among the locals for whom it is argued benevolence should be the overriding motif (Black 2006, p. 15). The local brewer is supposed to trade with her local butcher who in turn is
dealing with the local baker; and it is assumed benevolence is the motif underpinning their trading relation. Smith’s discussion of self-love did not point to purely selfish behaviour but to the efficiency of appealing to the merchant’s self-love rather than to her charity.

While local tradespersons can appeal to each other’s benevolence for the provision of their needs, such appeals will only yield a few supplies at particular times. They cannot appeal to each other’s benevolence for the supply of all their needs and wants all of the time. The brewer cannot depend on the benevolence of the butcher to supply him the daily portion of meat all the time, nor can the butcher depend on the benevolence of the baker for his daily supply of bread all the time.

A point is reached in these exchanges where it becomes necessary for each of these tradespersons to acknowledge the limits of each other’s benevolence, whilst they are still interested in the product each trader is supplying. Each trader begins to understand that if she is to continue to receive her supply of meat, bread, or beer etc., she has to do something else than depend on a charitable spirit. None of them can remain charitable to each other at all the times by supplying their needs, unless their relationships change where they feel obligated to supply each other’s needs and wants.

However, as an everyday fact, the continual supply of the bread to the butcher by the baker, the butcher must create an understanding in the baker that it is in her interest (she the baker) to exchange her bread for the butcher’s meat. The exercise is appealing to others’ self-love, which is less egoistic than begging and generally more beneficial to society (WN, bk. 1, chap. 2, 13–14). Smith’s passage above from WN seems problematic to many, as it suggests preference to selfishness and not benevolence. Pure and immoral selfishness is not what Smith meant by self-love or self-interest. Self-interest and self-love that Smith uses interchangeably,
probably for variety of expression, imply attending to one’s own interests but not necessarily at others’ expense. West (1969, p. 95) notes that Smith, in TMS, viewed self-love in the context of Christ’s admonition to “love your neighbour as yourself”.

Smith’s analysis of self-love in chapter 2 of book 1 in WN (1976, p. 13-14) does not present a narrow psychology of the *homo economicus* person (West 1969, p. 82). Smith was aware that his butcher, brewer, and baker could be benevolent or self-interested. Nevertheless, society gains when they mutually meet one another’s needs rather than beg for their needs (Philips 1997, p. 51-66). Smith puts the emphasis here on mutual benefits of exchange. He criticises begging in the above texts and not poorly defined ideal of mutual benevolence.

Begging does not even fully suit the beggar herself because on a productive day of begging gifts are lumpy although consumption is smooth. Predictability of goods begged is not guaranteed, so that too few gifts of clothing one month and too little food another force the beggar to abandon complete dependence on benevolences and to appeal to the self-love of others (Black 2006, p. 16). Although occasionally an agent may gain the benevolence of those she knows, she cannot depend constantly on their benevolence. This problem is augmented by distance and space to exercise sympathy from those to be the agent’s [beggar’s] benefactors, and even more worse, when the agent is dependent on the benevolence of those she does not know and has never met.

Smith was concerned less with the shopkeeper but more with the customer, standing in need of supplies. Efforts to convince shopkeepers to be more benevolent and ethical in their dealings do not violate the sense of the passage above, for it is directed toward the customer: An agent will be more able to meet her needs and wants if she appeals to the self-interest, rather than to the benevolence, of others.
Notwithstanding Smith’s argument, the choice is not necessarily between benevolent or self-interested exchanges as many have come to presume. The choice Smith poses is between self-interested appeals to others’ self-love through exchange or self-interested appeals to others’ benevolence through begging. In begging an agent puts her needs first rather than the needs of her benefactor. Smith suggests that even if it means begging, a beggar is more likely to benefit the most when appealing to the self-interest of her patron.

Black (2006, p. 17) writes that ‘appealing to others’ self-interest ensures a steadier and more-balanced supply of necessities in a world of complex production.’ Smith should be interpreted as saying that a steady, balanced supply of necessities and not self-interest is actually the mainspring of mutual exchange. However, complex patterns of exchange in the production process make begging inefficient. The connection of self-interest to begging and the division of labour is apparent, to the extend that; division of labour causes begging to be a poor method of pursuing one’s self-interest. Myers (1983, p. 113) and Black (2006, p. 18) are of the opinion that Smith creates a sense in which he links moral philosophy and the division of labour. Myers writes,

‘Consequently, the division of labour arises from a desire to serve one’s self-interest but in such a way as to engage the self-interest of others’ (Ibid. p. 113).

Myers makes the division of labour depend on self-interest. Black is convinced Smith is suggesting a subtler context of the relationship between division of labour and self-interest (pp. 8-9). The propensity to enter into multiple transactions of production and exchange leads to a division of labour and complex patterns of production and trade. These patterns of production and exchange must be supported by reciprocating appeals to the self-interest of others in order for exchange to be conducted for the social good. These exchanges on their part are depended on
the ability of the consumer and the producer through sympathy to appeal to the self-love of the other.

5.4.2 Adam Smith’s Self-love in TMS

In the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, self-love is described as a morally neutral category, and the first sentence of the book alludes to what Hume ([1751] 1983, 90) once called the “selfish hypothesis” in order to refute it: “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others” (Smith [1759] 1976, I.i.1).

Smith develops in TMS a human behaviour system derived not from one, but two principles: self-love and sympathy. In TMS self-love is directly referred to or inferred. It is in a sense appealing to another’s self-love as the basis for socializing people while remaining indifferent of spatial proximity or even in different cultures.

From the opening of the book (Book I.i.1.i.1) Smith is convinced however selfish human beings may be, there is something that motivates these selfish beings to act unselfishly. If promoting cooperation among disparate groups of people is the goal, mutual exchange is a powerful tool. Human reason and sympathies tells an agent that, in a world of complex production and distribution, society gains when the agent chooses to motivate others to serve her by offering to serve them as well. Smith was promoting common courtesy, not unbridled selfishness as claimed as critics have alluded.

In moral theory in TMS an agent approves of the conduct and character of another person if, when they imagine themselves to be in that person’s situation, their ‘sympathetic’ feelings accord with those that they observe to motivate the person’s behaviour. Similarly, an agent disapproves of actions or attitudes that they cannot enter by this sort of imaginative change of
situation (Campbell 1975, p.70). In TMS Smith defends the idea that all sentiments depend on self-love. He reiterates the thoughts of the first sentence of the book in this, section;

“...whatever may be the cause of sympathy, or however it may be excited, nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast;” (1976, I.i.2.1, p. 13-4)

It is only because an agent has such love for self that by it she is able to associate or account for the pleasure or pain of others. Smith was equally aware how self-love could at other times arrogate itself (Ibid. II.ii.2.2. This means self-love needs to humble itself to the level others can associate with it, since if not properly guarded it can discolour, magnify or misrepresent an agent’s view of any given situation (Ibid. III.4.3).

An agent is not however abandoned entirely to the delusions of self-love (Ibid. III.4.7), since by considering the conduct of others the agent is insensibly led to arrive at certain general rules concerning what is appropriate and what is not, the former to be engaged in and the later to be avoided. When the exercise of considering the conducts of others is repeated again and again, the agent begins to form certain habits from which general rules, eventually, are derived.

These general rules of conduct become fixed in an agent’s mind by habitual reflection. They become of great use in correcting misrepresentation of self-love concerning what is appropriate and what is not fit to be done in a particular situation. Smith further introduces the question of how self-love ought to have regard for the will of the deity (Ibid. III.5.12). He singles out regard for the will of the deity to make good for those who believe God’s existence.

Religion therefore has the propensity to enforce the natural sense of duty to self and others in the format of Kantian ethics. This is the reason that an agent puts great confidence in the probity of those who are deeply committed to religious sentiments. They are presumed to act
under an additional tie, (besides those of the impartial spectator and the man in the breast particularly) which regulates the conduct of other people.

Therefore, natural principles of virtue do not abstract from the truths conveyed to humankinds by Divine Revelation. Human nature of itself is not capable of doing anything meritorious without the assistance of Divine and Supernatural grace. Unfortunately, today the divine has been left out and the selfish individual is upheld as the centrepiece of economics as a science and essential foundation stone of all theoretical achievements.

5.5 Adam Smith in the context of intellectual history

Smith is discussed more as an economist than the moral philosopher perhaps he was, a point from which economists have progressively adopted a more impoverished view of the individual. Economists applying economic theory in economics leave out an essential dimension of Smith’s moral philosophical vision (Wilson et al 2006, p. 252; Evensky 1987, p. 447-448).

Smith wrote considerably on matters of economics, jurisprudence, and astronomy but his starting viewpoint was always moral philosophy coached in natural philosophy with distinction between natural and moral philosophy. Smith never abandoned the notion that morality must ultimately be derived from the purpose or telos for which people were created (Haltmen 2003, p. 453).

He did not exclude human telos from his work and his moral system has enduring qualities that can sustain the market economy if followers of Smith are willing to integrate his moral theory with his economic system. On the contrary, MacIntyre (1984, p. 54) argues that the Enlightenment’s quest for unconditional scientific truth, of which Smith is a part of has contributed to the marginalization of questions about meaning and value in contemporary philosophy and social science. MacIntyre asserts further, the Enlightenment thinkers when
dealing with ethics and morality grounded behaviour in speculation about people as they happen to be given their nature as well as their social and cultural setting. MacIntyre observes the rejection of objective reason as a foundation for ethical and moral judgments cause such judgments to fail as meaningful guides in life (Ibid. p. 19).

MacIntyre is reacting to the fact that, if people are to make sense of moral precepts, they must understand their lives as having a telos that originates outside of their own nature and, toward which, these moral precepts give guidance. Inside such a teleological framework the moral precepts lead to socially constructive behaviour that when institutionalised provides an effective social glue. He concludes that Enlightenment thinking, diminished the essential importance of teleology faded and moral precepts were left hanging without an anchor (Ibid. p.25).

A side effect of the Enlightenment failure is a world that sees people operating as the economic person, homo economicus for which Adam Smith is responsible as one who contributed to the decline of a telos-based morality. But blaming Smith for this decline is debatable, since Smith appears to have gone to great pains to understand humans as they happen to be and as they ought to be to realize their true telos (Haltmen, 2004, p. 456).

5.5.1 Smith a moral philosopher that was an economist

Smith saw economics as a branch of moral philosophy and capitalism as an ethical project whose success required political commitment to justice and freedom, not merely an understanding of economic logistics (Wells 2014, p. 90). Appreciating the difference between natural and moral philosophy provided Smith with a vision of how institutions and individuals evolve. He figured how their evolution makes possible the development of the civic ethics necessary for the emergence of constructive liberal societies. Central to this understanding is the
recognition human condition is unique in nature. Subsequently, the nexus of human reason and human frailty puts humankind in an unusual and problematic position. Smith is therefore able to extend his economic reasoning to a variety of nonmarket exchange problems observes Anderson (1988, pp. 1068-1075), to include discussion of religious behaviour. Smith viewed participation in religion a rational device by which individuals enhanced the value of their human capital in economic perspectives.

Economists on the contrary, have not always readily applied their distinctive kinds of reasoning to problems other than those involving exchange across well-defined markets in which prices are clearly defined. A growing interest is developing where economists now extend models of rational maximisation behaviours to problem areas outside of economics. These new *homo economicus* assumptions imply a returning to Smith's conception of human nature as incorporating a multiplicity of motives including the capacity for ethical behaviour. Smith it is argued adopted language, and not the mechanics as the model of inquiry (Lindgren 1969, p. 899; Small 2001edit, p.7-9).

Smith drew a fundamental distinction between the methods of inquiry in the natural and the social sciences. His were narrow technical and mathematical elements that were indirectly supported by labelling his methodology Newtonian (Redman 1993, p. 226). These have become however, increasingly amplified in the twentieth century into economics theorems, as economics endeavours to dissociate itself from the social sciences and align itself with pure or natural sciences. WN is the reason Smith is cast as an economist rather than a moral philosopher.

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47 Smith provided a religious thought system similar to Max Weber: Weber in his studies in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, argued that the redefinition of the connection between work and piety in Protestantism and especially in ascetic Protestant denominations, particularly Calvinism, shifted human effort towards rational efforts aimed at achieving economic gain. In Protestant religion, Christian piety towards God was expressed through one's secular vocation (secularisation of calling). The rational roots of this doctrine, he argued, soon grew incompatible with and larger than the religious and so the latter were eventually discarded.
Readers who do not approach WN singularly from a production; distribution and exchange viewpoint will notice that Smith’s projects are rooted in moral philosophy. Economic thinking that interprets things in light of their origins and what influenced them has Adam Smith at the centre, and the germs of all subsequent economic theories are to be found in Smith’s many-sided work.

Evensky (2005, p.109-110) re-creates Smith’s vision of moral philosophy showing its relevance for today and that Smith sought to do for moral philosophy what Isaac Newton had done for natural philosophy. Which is to imagine and represent invisible connecting principles that determine the course of nature, hence, Smith's moral philosophical realm was humankind.

What Smith wanted to portray was not so much the invisible hand of the market, but rather the invisible hand of the deity who is responsible for the world in which people live. This deity, according to Smith’s natural religion was and is responsible for the principles according to which the world has evolved and will evolve in the future. Human beings on their part can learn to sense these principles, but they can never acquire full knowledge of them. In TMS Smith conceded all kinds of societies are held together by ethical beliefs. The same is true of commercial societies that need to be held together by ethical beliefs as well as laws and institutions. When commercial societies take into account ethical requirements their economies function properly, they flourish. It is increasingly obvious now that, Smith’s formulation of the new moral economy of the commercial age was always intended to complement his political economy. Fundamentally, pragmatic in its construction Smith’s approach was conceived to support markets and developing an increasingly differentiated society. Was Smith therefore more of a social scientist than an economist? Economists will answer in the negative because he is heralded as the father of modern economic practice and perceived less as a social scientist. Smith
and his equals are generally seen as sociological precursors, or figures of historical interest and not genuine resources upon which to draw for undertaking sociological investigation (Comim 2002, p. 93-96). Although there is a general assumption among students of contemporary social science, that the content of Scottish thought and providers has nothing substantive to offer, it is actually economics in light of Smith that has subsumed his sociological standing. Smith is therefore never perceived as a sociologist, just as he rarely is counted on as a moral philosopher, this is because his economic reputation has run away with him.

Unwittingly however, the TMS (originally published in 1759) has fallen outside of social science proper. There may be some worth to reading it as a work of sociology alongside the Wealth of Nations, seeing the latter book is widely read in social sciences without being strongly integrated into histories of sociological thought (Dow 1987, p. 344-48). Given that Smith discussed the need for morality in TMS and a legal system in Lectures on Jurisprudence and explored the economic dimension of society in WN, the jury is still out even after all these decades regarding his writings on the question of unanimity; that these writings contain a system that links them all together. The jury is still deliberating on the argument that it is hard to reconcile the ideas of TMS (1759) with those of WN (1776). Hence, the so-called Das Adam Smith Problem to which we now turn.

5.6 Adam Smith and contemporary notions of homo economicus

Smith is best known as an economist. Specifically, the defender of the “invisible hand” of free-market economics, wherein the self-interested actions of private individuals, mediated through free markets are argued to generate results that are good for society as a whole. A great deal of contemporary (neo-classical) economics is founded in translating Smith’s invisible hand metaphor into a systematic theoretical form, with a particular emphasis on the economic
efficiency of perfectly competitive markets. This economic view attributed to Smith has resulted into a double erroneous emphasis.

First, it is based on the narrow foundations of a few selected texts from Smith’s WN taken in isolation as summing up Smith’s economic theory. Secondly, these texts have been analysed in a particularly narrow way. Together these selections and interpretations are driven by contemporary mainstream economists’ interest in justifying orthodox economic methodology and their peculiar Mandevillian rather than Smithian assumption of the selfish utility-maximising homo economicus.

Stigler aptly sums up the WN upon which this economic view is founded and writes; “The Wealth of Nations is a stupendous palace erected upon the granite of self-interest” (Stigler 1975, p.237). Homo economicus has become a cornerstone on which economic theories are built. It is the prevalent model of human behaviour among economists and has also permeated other social sciences through rational choice theory.

In the standard view of economic theory human beings are integrated, consistent, maximizing, utility-seeking, calculating creatures (Roberts 2014, p.227-228). Homo economicus is fundamentally self-interested, while not denying that the consumption of others might enter one’s utility function. It is the characterization of persons in some economic theories as rational beings that pursue wealth for their own self-interest. The economic person is described as avoiding unnecessary work by using rational judgment.

The assumption that all humans behave in this manner has been a fundamental premise for many economic theories. Persky observes that the economic person is “solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end” (1995, p. 321), that is to say, obtain wealth, as well as seek to maximize
pleasure. The economic person is usually assumed to be perfectly rational and able to predict every possible outcome for all her choices, making her decision be the one that will maximize her utility. Exclusive of complications such as personality, value, belief, and emotions, economic person’s behaviour can be explained by her own self-interested orientation; so, it is assumed. But the economic order is not as simple as that.

Peach (2002, p. 29) observes that the economic order is a complex process with its highly developed intensity of division of labour, specialisation combinations and its numberless convoluted relationships that make persons dependent on one another to an unprecedented degree unlike in the past. On this premise the homo economicus person characterised in economic theories as a rational being pursuing wealth for her own self interest (O’Boyle 2007, p.321-2) is unsustainable.

Smith is notable for claiming that, merely acting on her own self-interest, the economic person unintentionally promotes public interests. Ng et al (2008, p. 267) argues freedom of the economic person pursuing self-interested gains is not unbounded, because a free market can work well only when the divisions of labour and unfettered competition are built on a civilised society. It clearly emerges that in real life people do not always make rational decisions based on established preferences and complete information.

In many ways their behaviour contradicts the homo economicus model. The behaviour people exhibit trying to cope with the complexity of the world around them is by approximating. Because collating and evaluating all the factors of relevance to a decision overtaxes people’s mental processing capacities. Subsequently, economic approximation methods may deliver serviceable results, but also lead to distorted perceptions and systematic flaws (Schneider 2010, p. 3-5). In the light of the financial market crisis, people are more than justified in questioning
whether the theory of rational expectations, even in its weak version, describes economic reality adequately. Some economists are beginning to question the *homo economicus* model underlying the current economic theories that claim economic persons are driven by self-interest; exercise rational behaviour in maximising personal utility and react to constraints and fixed preferences from the complete information they have.

It is argued that as the economic person travelled into neoclassical economics, she became an analytical tool for the prediction of outcomes and a model for the self-interested utility maximizer operating with finite resources within a society. The neoclassical period presented spinoffs of the economic person to behavioural, contractual, and social dimensions as criticisms were mounted upon its original concept. The economic person of *homo economicus* became perceived as an abstraction that typifies social behaviour in the market place. Adam Smith is credited with the creation of such a figure and of giving it a place in economic science. But Smith’s economic person is not such a free flowing person without constraint in exercising her economic expertise.

In the TMS the economic person is governed by natural law and the passion of sympathy. Smith embraced not only the analysis of simple acts of exchange, but also issues of opportunism, strategic actions and changes in tastes, norms, and sentiments, collusions among agents and a reciprocity and altruism as much (Bowles et al 1993, p. 84). Smith therefore accounted for much more than what is embedded in the *homo economicus* theory. Therefore, the contemporary self of the *homo economicus* is definitely alien to the thought of Adam Smith. Such a self is a misconstrued caricature of the true idea of the economic person Adam Smith presented.

*Homo Economicus* is an idea very useful just as the idea of a biologic person or physical person is accepted as a product of one’s culture. It is not about explaining individuals. It is
behaviour about enabling authoritative forecasts of economic variables such as consumption that constitutes the aggregation of individual decisions (Schneider 2010, p. 6).

A sense of abandoning a hedonistic view of *homo economicus* now prevails after Great Crash of 2008, but this does not mean an equally naïve belief that people are wholly-self-disregarding and virtuous (Hodgeson 2012, p. 4). Human motivation is complex involving more than self-interest, is more complex than the theory of *homo economicus* suggests. Also, an appeal solely to self-interest is ultimately self-defeating. Because of the place of moral judgments in human activity, economics desperately needs invigorating by the critical study of investigative approaches from other social sciences to include theology.

Although *homo economicus* theory has fashioned itself as an exact science like physics, the moral tradition reflected in Adam smith and Aristotle’s understanding of economics requires highlighting and strengthening. Contrary to claims, morality is more than matters of preference, convenience, or convention since its claims apply both to the claimant and to others.

Mackie (1977 cited in Hodgeson 2012, p. 4) observes that moral claims are outcomes of deliberations and conversations yet remaining however inescapably emotionally empowered. While hailed as the patron saint of homo economicus, Smith has continued to be misinterpreted, albeit in TMS he perceived self-regard as foremost in human motivation, but he too had undoubtedly a more complex view of human nature than generally attributed to him. He countered strongly that ethical principles spring entirely from self-serving motives.
5.7 Conclusion

Smith views human self and the characteristically human way or process of acting or sympathy as involving the taking within, hence the pre-reflective anticipation of the attitudes of others. Sympathy is the only attitude self strikes in relation to others. It is how the human self and its interest are constituted. Smith’s sympathy is not the same as Hume’s sympathy that assumes association with considerations of utility.

While Smith’s description of sympathy as the “communication” of sentiments goes along the way with Hume’s subsequent shift in which sympathy was associated more conventionally with benevolence, Smith eventually rejected Hume’s claim that sympathy was grounded in utility. Sympathy in Smith’s work returns the reader to the metaphor of reflecting mirrors, where one sees oneself through others’ eyes, who see themselves through her eyes.

Sympathy therefore is in keeping with the theme of reflection, and reflections upon reflections, (Haig 201, 4). Smith assumed the reflections of a self on the passions, reason, and morality. He centred his account of the moral sentiments on the concept of sympathy from where the self understood others by putting itself in their situations while judging its own conduct by viewing itself from the perspective of an impartial spectator.

Human faculties of sympathy are therefore both reflexive, that is, reasoned contemplation of others and one’s own relations to them. Smith summarily may be perceived to claim human moral choices as emerging from a nexus of conflicting agendas of different entities with different ends. That suggests a locus of moral responsibility, and a sense of self itself emerging as human beings move back and forth between their personal perspectives and the perspectives of others, in their attempt to reconcile and adjudicate among the different springs of internal action.
The whole movement of the self entering into the passions of others and being able to see one’s self with their eyes is depended on imagination (Costello 1997, 93-94). Sympathy for Smith depends on imagination by which the self of a person places itself in some other person’s situation. Sympathy however, does not flow unchecked and is not automatic and along the way it experiences limitations and is always calculative in nature.

The process is where nature teaches the self of the spectator to assume the circumstances of the self principally concerned; it is teaching the later to assume in some measure the circumstances of the self of the spectator. It is a position in which they are continually assuming and placing themselves each in the position of the other. For the moment each spectator appears devoid of self-regard of preferably self-love and is more concerned with the well being of the other.

Beyond Das Adam Smith Problem, Smith seeks to harness the dominant passion of self-love for the good of society. Self-love is not necessarily antisocial or a socially destructive passion. Self-love can be an extremely potent tool for achieving sociality. Nevertheless, critics and proponents of self-love in Adam Smith share the basic conviction that self-love is a problem because of its inherent antisocial proper tie.

I argued that in Adam Smith, reason, law, custom, benevolence, markets, or some combination of these regulatory devices could check self-love. Unfortunately, in the evolution of economics the theory is stripped of Smith’s intended meaning turning individuals into self-seeking persons with their own utility as the only standard of morality. Smith's discussion of self-love did not have purely selfish behaviour in mind. It is selfish instead to depend always on charity.
Chapter  6

Adam Smith and Theology

6.1 Introduction

In this section I discuss the theological dimensions of Smith’s work, and it’s bearing on moral life. I begin by asking where was the source that influenced Smith’s theological outlook? The familiarity with these influences provides guidance into Smith’s theological content and supports efforts in examining neutral concepts like invisible hand, self-interest and self-love in Adam Smith’s work. Following after this I will look at Adam Smith’s own interpretation (reworking out) of these various theological influences; lastly how he has tried to apply the theological content.

6.2 Adam Smith’s Theological Influences

Smith’s moral philosophy is exceptionally relevant today because, in the aftermath of the economic crisis many economists and policy makers are again reflecting on the moral basis of the free market. There has been a revived interest in Adam Smith not only because he is known for being the father of economics, but also for his ability to embed economics in a broader framework of moral philosophy (Adam Smith on the Financial Crisis, in The Economists, January 27th, 2015; Bholat 2009, p.60-78; Sen 2009).

Adam Smith developed important theories about how commercial society could develop while maintaining and simultaneously developing a moral framework that could assure harmony. I discuss here how Adam Smith’s economic analysis and moral philosophy is embedded in his theological worldview. From the outset, it is notable that there are complicated issues raised
regarding Smith’s theological stance. I want to argue that to steer away from them is to risk serious damage to understanding Smith’s thought in ignoring this theological dimension. Issues raised deepen the understanding of Smith’s theories and well known concepts he employs like the invisible hand and impartial spectator that remain complex and subtle.

Nonetheless, the understanding of Smith’s moral philosophy is especially relevant today because, many economists and policy makers are again reflecting on the moral basis of the free market. Adam Smith developed important theories about how commercial society could develop while maintaining and simultaneously developing a moral framework that could assure harmony. No doubt his moral framework was informed by the various theologies he was exposed to, and these form our next discussions.

6.2.1 Stoic Influence on Smith

Adam Smith’s theology should be firmly placed in the context of the eighteenth century within the period of Scottish Enlightenment. To propose and adopt a Smith’s Weltanschauung, one will do so with minor or perhaps no modifications from the Stoics, since the points where Smith does not agree with the Stoics, are few and far in between. Smith represents the universe, or Nature, as an enormous, sophisticated and subtle machine.

A machine supervised by an omnipotent, omniscient and beneficent indeed, utilitarian deity. The sole aim of the machine and, probably, of the deity himself (TMS VII.ii.3.18), is the maximisation of happiness. So, for Smith the world is perfect: one truly lives in a Panglossian ‘best of all possible worlds’ (Denis 1999, p.73). Since the world is perfect, any appearances to the contrary are a result of a human finite partial view of it. It is human failure to grasp ‘all the

48 While Weltanschauung remains a concept fundamental to Germany philosophy and epistemology, it none the less offers us the ability to refer to Adam Smith’s comprehensive conception or image of the world he inhabited and his relations to it.
connexions and dependencies of things’. The purpose of philosophy in Smith’s understanding, therefore, is to cultivate a fine indifference to whatever occurs (TMS VI.ii.3.3).

From a theological point of view, Smith espoused a Hutchesonian theology that has resonance with Stoicism. It is the case that Smith disparaged Christian enthusiasm and asceticism but was attracted to the natural theology of Stoicism. Stoic philosophy remains the primary influence on Smith’s ethical thought. It also fundamentally affects his economic theory.... Stoicism never lost its hold over Smith’s mind.’ (Raphael and Macfie 1976, p.5-6).

Smith was attracted to the ‘scientific religion’ of Stoicism on account of its organic interpretation of the universe as a designed and integrated system. Such a vision was, Smith claims, entirely unknown to the early Greeks. Science proper did not commence until ‘the Universe was regarded as a complete machine’, as a coherent system governed by general laws and directed to general ends, for ‘Its own preservation and prosperity’, (Smith 1980, p.113, 116–17). Consequently, Stoicism’s scientific religion is marked by a shift in preoccupation from ‘irregular’, catastrophic events that Smith purported governed the Christian revealed theology, to ‘regular events governed by predictable laws’ (Oslington 2007, p. 5). Smith submits that in the Greek and Christian religion is where, ‘…. ignorance begot superstition, science gave birth to the first theism’ (Smith 1980, p.112–17). Clarke (2000, p.50) considers the main theological influence on Smith to have come from Stoic philosophy. Smith rejected the unworldly tradition that the soul should be cultivated at the expense of the body and mind.

Smith also thought that society would be lasting only if it conformed to the laws of divine Nature. The proper approach to God was not through the transcendence of the world the wisdom of Greek and Christian, but via the world through respect for the rules of Nature. Smith called this rule of nature the wisdom of God (Oslington 2007, p.3-4). In eighteenth century Britain the
Stoic doctrine that appealed to God and country had become fashionable espousing Stoicism naturally.

Stoicism was seen as a means of taking morals out of revealed religion and putting them into philosophy, or in other words as a way to oppose Christian morality. Smith while practicing Christian faith did not revert to Stoicism to promote the utilitarian ethic that he rejected. He described Stoicism as the most religious of all the ancient sects of philosophers and accepted the Stoic notions of Providence, God, and Nature. He however, modified Stoic philosophy to make it more compatible with liberalism, but critical that Stoic fatalism had excluded any notion of science. The Stoics had never gone beyond declaring that everything was supposed to follow its own nature a point Smith strongly supported. Smith argued that Greek and Christian philosophy had built on an unscientific notion of a transcendent God.

Such a God was wholly beyond the world. Smith’s account of theology was also equally influenced by the Christian theology of the Scottish’s church that he was brought up with and that for which he studied at Oxford. Russell (1961, p.311) claims that the Christian religion handed down by the late Roman Empire was in any case constituted of certain philosophical beliefs that had been derived from the Stoics. This philosophy included the importance of self-command as a virtue signalling an Aristotelian teaching.

The Christian religion that Adam Smith subscribed to would not have been unique to espousing the Design argument a central tenet in Stoic’s philosophy. Much of Christianity prior to Smith’s time promoted the argument that maintained nature to be the Design of the Deity. This thinking increasingly influenced Smith’s form of Christianity and commitment to a harmonious natural order and universalism. It had its foundations in the Stoicism of Zeno and Marcus Aurelius’ writings, but particularly the latter (Clarke 2000, p. 57). The Stoic influence
on Smith is also brought to light through Raphael and Macfie’s introduction to the standard edition of the TMS (1975).

“Stoic philosophy is the primary influence on Smith's ethical thought. It also fundamentally affects his economic theory” (1975 p.5) “Adam Smith's ethics and natural theology are predominantly Stoic” (Ibid. p10).

Stoics’ significantly influenced Smith, and he admired Stoics’ ideas that were popular during the Scottish Enlightenment. Smith did not however uncritically embrace all the doctrines found in Stoicism. Notwithstanding the Stoic influence on Smith, one cannot be too ready to accept as indicated above that Stoicism fully disposed of Christian theological influence on Smith. Stoicism and Christianity are not mutually exclusive categories, this is the reason Enlightenment Scots were attracted to Christianised Stoicism (Sher 1985, p.325).

6.2.2 Scottish Church’s Influence

Besides the Stoics influence on Smith the Church of Scotland had a significant impress upon him especially with its Calvinistic theology. It cultivated Smith’s personal convictions by locating him in the context of his Scottish Calvinist milieu and the theological ideas at work in dogmatic theology as well as the natural theology and moral philosophy of his time (Singh 2013, p. 253).

Calvinistic theology seems to have dominated Scottish life from the 16th century and well into the 19th century (Stewart 2003). Calvinism is argued to have been the dominant strand of theology of moderate intellectuals in the era of the Scottish Enlightenment. It was a theology that emphasised the role of God as creator and sustainer of the world. Its focus on the signs of the divine presence as evident in the natural world put the design argument widely assumed to be valid at the time, at the centre of its theology and therefore in line with Stoicism.
Smith whose work reflects a significant bent towards social sciences must have found Calvinism inviting as it addressed the beneficial role of religion in society. Religion was seen to contribute to social harmony and order. Smith wrote at a time of change in religious thought and this puts into perspective some of his criticisms of religion that appear in TMS. Flanders (2013, p.762) concedes that Smith was a child of the secular Enlightenment as well as a friend of the atheist David Hume.

The bulk of recent commentators have concluded that the Scottish Enlightenment was not hostile to certain (rational) types of theologies. Smith’s work can therefore be read, and should be read, ‘as a transition out of a God-centred universe to one where humans alone make the rules and find their own happiness.’\(^49\) The ‘new view’\(^50\) of Smith’s theology places Smith in the mainstream of his time. It is no surprise therefore that Smith argued religion was useful to social order and harmony when purged of religious irrational fanaticism and intolerance. Only then does faith exercise a cohesive function through the moral direction and its focus on human life.

Smith carries further a specific criticism of Catholicism in part VII of TMS. Here he refers to casuistry, as he locates its cultivation in,

\(^49\) Considering Flanders’ point, it becomes logical to argue that, although Smith might have repeatedly employed such terms as providence, the Author of nature, or the “invisible hand,” and talked of treating moral commands as divine laws, such phrases are at best rhetorical flourishes, mere metaphors, or at worst concessions to a less enlightened, even benighted, audience. This kind of religious language that Smith employed would not have been unique to him. It was a language pervasive in the era in which he wrote and lived. Paul Oslington contributing in *Adam Smith as Theologian*, New York, Routledge, 2011, p. 2 writes in his introduction to the collection, it would have “been unusual if [Smith’s] work did not have substantial theological dimensions.”

\(^50\) A new trend of economic historian or historians of economic thought has arisen and is now attempting to re-dress the previously held views about Smith and his works. The focus has been to return to Smith’s own intellectual context with a particular focus on his works relating to theology. Kleer (1995, p. 275-279) as a strong supporter of the new view of Smith’s theology argues that, Smith cannot just be dismissed as having abandoned theology nor that his theology was only founded in TMS on ‘the concept of a benevolent divine author of nature’ (1995, p.275). This ‘original view’ was maintained ‘for a long time thereafter. However, Kleer argues that ‘the principle of a benevolent divine author of nature must be considered as one of the cornerstones of Smith’s system of moral philosophy’ (1995, p.279). The ‘new view’ (Hill 2001; Alvey 2004 etc.) asserts that Smith held the view that a benevolent deity created the universe and that teleological design underpinned Smith’s work. The growing popularity of this ‘new view’ reflects dissatisfaction with both versions of the modern view mentioned above. While the evidence for the ‘new view’ interpretation is scattered throughout Smith’s works, it is primarily located in the TMS.
‘….the custom of auricular confession introduced by the Roman Catholic superstition, in times of barbarism and ignorance’ (TMS: 333).

Criticisms by the church of the pre-Galileo view while in Smith’s time were declining (Clarke, 2000, p.53), they still held sway and were yet to disappear. Smith’s works therefore reflect the religious beliefs of his day, a period basically in transition. From a religious point of view this was a time linked particularly to the Christian Stoicism of the Scottish Enlightenment. In this Christian Stoicism Smith found himself subscribing to a benevolent and wise God who has ordered the world so that its moral and scientific laws contribute to human welfare.

What about Christian faith? Smith leaves no doubt that he finds little attraction in Christian doctrine except where it coincides with an enlightened and ‘rational’ (i.e. deist) theology. He seems to obliquely identify himself as a theist in designating theism as a belief and devotion to a single, universal ‘God of all’. This is the starting point for him for the natural science he admires and seeks to promulgate (Smith 1980, p.112–13 cited by Hill 2001, p.4). Such an attempt of promulgation of the natural sciences as the starting point of belief, distances him from conventional Christianity whilst at the same time committing him to a belief in one God standing in some unique relationship with human beings. Rothschild (1994, p. 321) is of the opinion that Smith’s natural religion is never pious for the mere benefit of a religious readership, nor in any way profanely ‘ironical’ as has been suggested.

Faith for Smith is not in conflict with reason, and he shares with Hume’s interest in the rational explanation of religion and religious institutions, documented in Book V chapter I

51 Hume who was friends with Smith and the fact that Hume wrote so freely in their private correspondence suggests that Smith understood Hume’s skepticism (Ross 1995, 178-80. Hume espoused his philosophical views on religion in terms of the skepticism and naturalism that features significantly in his works the Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40). Hume is argued to have removed almost all-earlier material in the Treatise that concerned with religion on account that he was anxious to avoid causing any “offence” among the orthodox. In the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), Hume presented his views on religion in a more substantial and direct manner. In Natural History of Religion (1757) and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) both are entirely taken up
part III article II of the *Wealth of Nations*. Smith argued that whatever was taught in universities concerning the nature of human mind or of the Deity, such teachings made part of the system of physics, and Smith does not seem concerned. He adds that philosophy was taught only as subservient to theology. An appreciation of the Calvinist theological elements in Smith shows that neither Calvin nor the main strands of subsequent Calvinist theology were opposed to scientific investigation.

There is no suggestion that Smith’s position on religion is undermined by his treatment of the relationship between faith and reason. The problem in Christian faith Smith contends, is that Christian religion enjoyed a state protected monopoly whereas the ‘pure and rational religion with philosophical issues in religion. The linkage between these various works is that the later writings on religion are simply an extension and application of the skeptical and naturalistic principles that Hume developed in his earlier writings. There is an intimate connection between Hume's skepticism and naturalism and his irreligious objectives and orientation, but this relationship cannot be understood in terms of Hume drawing irreligious consequences in his later work from the skeptical and naturalistic principles that he laid down in his earlier work. Paul Russell (2013), argues that the traditional account of Hume’s skepticism and naturalism and his irreligious [irreligious denotes that Hume aimed at discrediting a vast array of the Christian religion – doctrines of miracles, a future life etc., the institution – church, clergy etc.,] …objectives and orientation seriously underestimates the irreligious content and aims of Hume's earlier work - particularly in the *Treatise*. Such a view is liable to overlook the way in which 17th and 18th century theological controversies and debates structure and shape Hume's entire philosophy — not just his philosophy of religion. Hume's philosophy of religion is integral to his entire philosophical system and cannot therefore be viewed as an extraneous outgrowth or extension of earlier concerns and commitments that lack any specific irreligious motivation or orientation.

Hume's views on the subject of religion are not the empiricist/rationalist controversy, but a more fundamental dispute between philosophical defenders of Christian theology and their “atheistic” opponents. Hume's philosophical writings are particularly concerned with and seek to discredit two proofs for the existence of God — i.e., the arguments *a priori* (cosmological argument) and *a posteriori* (teleological argument). There are several points from, which to starting understanding Hume’s views on the philosophy of religion. I will only name rather than discuss, the first empiricism, that is potential for empiricism to produce skeptical conclusions concerning our knowledge of God and similar empiricist principles concerning the foundations of human knowledge. The second is the cosmological argument and God’s necessary existence. Third, the argument from design, fourth, the problem of evil, fifth, the question of miracles as an essential and fundamental element of the monotheistic religions, sixth is the place of immortality and a future state.

Smith was not always agreed with Hume in spite of their close friendships and private communications. It is claimed that a major point of disagreement centres on the question of cause. Hume associated herself with the Godless and ‘materialist’ system of Epicureanism via his denial of Final Causes and the possibility of evincing a Divine purpose (Kettler 1965: 123). He believed instead that order is achieved endogenously via inner self-regulation and growth. Smith on the other hand, posits a monistic, externally generated teleology with the universe portrayed as a single interdependent and designed unit and not as a collection of autonomous mini-systems that seems to be the case with Hume. Alvey (2007, p. 41) on the other hand, is convinced that Hume’s influence on Smith life and activities was significant.
the example of Stoicism did not have that benefit, thus they had to compete between independent sects.\textsuperscript{52} Smith in (TMS 1975, p.105) accepts a Calvinistic view of the fall writing of the irregularity in the human heart or the great disorder in human moral sentiments.

This apparent disorder however, in the greater scheme of God has a utility in which human beings can admire the wisdom of God even in the follies of people. This is a necessary part of the plan of the deity or nature (Viner 1927, pp. 205-206). Smith understands that human beings’ limited, and distorted capacities actually works out prolifically in tandem with divine providence and humans can be comforted by the fact God the benevolent and all wise Being can admit into the system of his government nothing (this to includes evil) that is not necessary for the greater good. Viner observes that

\begin{quote}
‘What we have, therefore, in the Theory of Moral Sentiments is an unqualified doctrine of a harmonious order of nature, under divine guidance, which promotes the welfare of man through the operation of his individual propensities. (Ibid. 206)\end{quote}

Smith’s account of the role of sentiments in the moral life develops with little to no theology, apart from pointing out that God implants these sentiments in human beings. Smith sees the moral principles that emerge from his account of the moral life as divinely sanctioned. Nature, which Smith is analysing, is the product of divine creation and providence to the point that Smith considers even flaws in human nature as part of the divine plan (Waterman 2002).

\textsuperscript{52} Taking the cue from the economic system Smith would argue that, it would be the case that perfect competition between diversity of denominations would have produced a culture of tolerance. Such competition would also have been responsible for mutual respect whereby over time the teachings of the greater part of each individual sect would have been reduced to that of pure and rational religion that is free from every mixture of absurdity, imposture, or fanaticism.
6.3 Teleology in Adam Smith

The beginning of the design argument goes back to the Socratics, who argued for a mechanical or chance foundation of nature (Hurlbutt 1985, p.97-8). Stoics arose and developed a philosophical religion of nature based on the teleological\(^{53}\) foundation. Stoicism became virtually the official ideology of the Roman Empire exercising an early peak in the teleological doctrine; subsequently, the popularity and orthodoxy of the teleological argument followed a cyclical pattern (Alvey 2004, p.3, 7-11).

I argued above of the Stoics and Scottish church circles from where Smith may have been influenced theologically. Whether he continued to make claim to these theologies remains debatable. If Adam Smith propagated a theology (let alone a theology of economics), that theology significantly hinged upon his application of the metaphor of the invisible hand (Hill 2001, p.3). It was once widely accepted that the metaphor of the invisible hand\(^ {54}\) signalled his belief in the existence of a benevolent deity. Hill observes it is important ‘to remember that teleology and the argument from design were still intellectual staples in Smith’s time.’ Therefore

\(^53\) ‘Teleology’ is a term that had just come into usage in Smith’s time coined in 1728 in eighteenth-century philosophical Latin by Christian Wolff in his book Logic (Fulton 1914, p.215; Owens 1968, p.159 cited in Alvey 2004, p.4). The term implied final causes in nature and has been readily accepted in modern philosophic vocabulary. ‘Final cause,’ the term, itself in turn, extends back to the Scholastic treatment of Aristotle’s theory of causation (Fulton 1914, pp.215-232). In the Physics of Aristotle there were four ‘causes’: the material cause, that is the material out of which something is formed; the formal cause, is the form or defining characteristics of the thing; the efficient cause, is the agent immediately producing the change in the thing changed; and fourthly, the final cause being the end or purpose of the thing changed or produced. Aristotle’s typology of causes was widely used in Smith’s time, assumed as background knowledge and used by Smith herself (TMS II.i.3.5; II.iii.3 title).

\(^{54}\) Smith is not the first to use the phrase invisible hand, although most economists immediately associate this idea with Adam Smith. The last few decades there have been intensive debates among historians of economics as to whether Smith used the invisible hand idea in a rhetorical sense or with a theological or providential connotation. However interesting these debates are, it was certainly not Smith who coined the term. Smith’s ‘invisible hand,’ remains however, one of the very many phrases that have attracted attention albeit there still is no consensus to what meaning should be assigned to the phrase, in spite the large body of secondary literature devoted to it. In spite of this there is no consensus on what Smith he herself might have intended when he used this expression, or on what role it played in Smith’s thought. Estimates of its significance range from the laudatory—“one of the great ideas of history,” to the dismissive—“an ironic joke.” (Peter Harrison 2011, footnote number 1) Commentators are also divided on whether Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ has teleological or providential connotations, or whether it is simply a rhetorical device.
it will appear any reading of Smith, as an essentially secular mind ought to be approached with caution and suspicions of ahistoricity. The design principle was the unit idea of the eighteenth century. Arthur Lovejoy (1964, p.10–15 cited in Hill 2001, p.27) defines ‘Unit ideas’ as ‘endemic assumptions’ that control ‘the course of (our) reflections on almost any subject’ (Love Joy 1964 is cited in Myers 1983, p.3).

A starting point for investigating Smith’s views on teleology is his understanding of nature, primarily presented in the TMS. Smith argued that, “In every part of the universe we observe *means* adjusted with the nicest artifice to the *ends* which they are intended to produce”; Smith refers specifically to “the two great purposes of nature, the support of the individual [self-preservation] and the propagation of the species” (TMS II.ii.3.5).

He certainly exemplifies the teleological argument to design. Smith shows that throughout “every part of the universe” means are nicely adjusted to produce the ends of nature. The purposive relations amongst the parts imply a contriver-designer (Hurlbutt 1985, p.8-13). For Smith it will seem that, if nature has any ends, it is only for the sake of preservation. At this stage in the TMS Smith can infer that God’s wisdom is demonstrated throughout the universe, by being adjusted to produce the ends of preservation and precreation.

Human constitution also follows the design pattern. The uniformity of the design seen here, and in the natural theology of Smith’s contemporaries, suggests that there was a single designer who drew up a grand blueprint of the universe before creating it in accordance with the plan. Not only has Nature determined the human ends but it has endowed humans “with an appetite for the means” by which these ends can be realized (TMS II.i.5.10). Smith stresses the providential role of nature in the provision of instincts for human beings; the *efficient cause* of
human action is instinct (Cropsey 2001, p.124). Secondly, as a counterpart to this, reason is downplayed, and thirdly, Smith links his teleological views to the “Director of nature”, teleology is one foundation of his theology.

Teleology argument was strongly offered by the Stoics and Newton. It seems in Smith’s time teleology was conventional. Scholars have supposed that Smith’s entire “system of natural liberty” rested on this teleological foundation and could not be sustained without it (Kleer 2000, Alvey 2004, p.337-339). However, early in the twentieth century a more secular view arose that began to question the place of teleology in Adam Smith’s work. A view strongly endorsed after the Second World War. Teleology or final causes, and divine design views initially seen as central to understanding Smith’s writings, over time fell out of favour and that trend held its place in economics and other social sciences in which Smith is invoked.

A new wave of commentators is on the rise and is beginning to undermine the current secular orthodoxy that removed teleology from Smith’s work (Alvey, 2004, p. 350-351). A teleological view in Smith’s work implies references to a design argument drawn from nature as the basis for inferring to an intelligent contriver. Evidence of design drawn from nature becomes the foundation for theorizing about God. Smith varied this application of specific arguments and analogies over time; however, key features of the design argument and teleology were its link to monotheistic religion.

Smith also relied on unalterable laws of nature, a general optimistic outlook, and the promotion of religious belief in his teleological considerations. For Smith, the all-encompassing

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55 Notable here is the fact that reason does not drive human action. The ends of preservation and procreation are eminently rational. According to Smith, sub-rational desires lead the means that deliver these ends. As the instinctual means are nicely adjusted in us to produce rational to ends and humans could not have constructed these instincts, since the means were wisely created by the “Director of nature,” God, in order to achieve the ends, this means there is teleology immanent in the human constitution.
understanding and application of teleology was aligned on the work of Isaac Newton, who from the design argument secured the unity of science and religion—at least in Britain. Smith continued to view teleology as implying the arrangement of the human passions as the *efficient causes* that spontaneously bring about benevolent final causes.

Alvey suggests this teleology to be immanent in the human constitution or a providential path through history (Alvey 2003, p.1). In a teleological account, the operations of nature are designed with one or more purpose in mind; the ends of an individual or that of the whole species (Dennis 1999, pp. 71-86).

In cases where the ends of nature were not mutually compatible and therefore clashed, Kleer suggest that all apparent imperfections turn out to serve some benevolent purpose; and the ‘author of nature’ only strives to achieve his ‘main ends’ (Kleer 2000, p. 25). Alvey does not think that this would be Smith’s view, and that this view does not fit the nature of Smith’s texts (Alvey 2003, p.5). This is because a significant role for human reasoning exists in the WN, suggesting that Smith allows a significant role for human reasoning within his teleological account.

Kleer (2003 is perfectly clear that Smith’s teleology has instincts as the efficient causes that mechanically bring about the providential final cause(s). This conclusion would seem to deny the fact that through his lifetime Smith appears to have shifted from one type of teleology to another (Alvey 2003, p. 7). During Smith’s time teleology remained the core of natural theology, until Darwinian propositions of evolution as an alternative explanation to the Divine design argument. So successful has been the Darwinian argument that in contemporary times little is heard of teleology or the design argument. When mentioned, causation is almost always
in terms of efficient causation. Teleology has therefore fallen out of fashion after the popularization of the Darwinian thesis.

Teleology has become a victim of secularisation of the natural and social sciences. However, if Alvey (2004, p. 2-3) is correct, then the re-examination of the place of teleology in Smith’s works is coming back into play, not only that, recent economic crisis has raised questions for moral reflection in light of economic policy making and adjudication. Smith’s references to a benevolently designed divine order, final causes, and so on, are thoughtful and his discussions of teleology are not irrelevant but rather integral components of his argument. Smith’s views on theology, however, did develop over time and in some sense, perhaps developed away from Christianity. Nevertheless, his fundamental commitment to natural theology remained.

6.4 Theological content in Smith's work

*Theory of Moral Sentiments* is the main source for Smith’s alleged religiosity, varying from his alleged adherence to the doctrines of the Presbyterian version of Christianity, through to Providence (God’s plan) and to Deism (belief in an unknowable, all-mighty creator). There is a wide range of views concerning the character of Smith’s theology. Haakonssen (2006, p.13-14) discusses Smith with certain scepticism,

“…. whatever (Adam Smith’s) personal religious sentiments may have been of which we have no real evidence – he dramatically underplayed all traditional religious ideas of conscience as either an inspiration by God or a response to human fear of the might of the deity.”

Evidence demonstrating Smith’s religiosity, is variously presented as Christianity, Deism, Stoicism, Providential beliefs, or combinations thereof (Evansky 1993, p.205; Denis, 2005, p.1-32; Wight, 2007, p. 341-58). Markikosi on the other hand observes,
“The prevailing scholarly conclusion has been that Smith rejected the Calvinist Presbyterianism of his childhood in favour of a natural theology that adopted Stoic features found in Smith’s descriptions and understandings of Providence.” (2002, p. 75).

Kennedy (2009b, p. 1) observes that scholars ignore where available Smith’s biography, and do not consider how it affected the way Smith wrote about religious matters. While Smith may not have been a theologian he had very strong theological viewpoints early in his life particularly those of a revealed theology as expressed in the TMS. Neither the TMS nor the WN was designed a theological textbook.

Hence Smith’s theology will tend to be implicit in his work particularly the TMS that presents his system of moral philosophy more ardently of the two books. Smith refrained, it is argued, from making explicit his views on religion in his public writings. It is further claimed that reference to controversies over religion, especially accusations of atheism, true or false, would have upset Smith’s mother who always indulged him (Ibid. pp. 4-5). This is expressed to support how Smith was able to re-edit the TMS from the 1st to the 6th edition between 1784 when his mother died and until the year on his own deathbed. Smith made numerous dilutions to his theological statements in the final 6th edition of his TMS. But there is no evidence he categorically renounced his Christian ethos or religious position.

56 Although Kennedy (Ibid. p. 2) suggests that Smith’s time at Oxford diluted the solidity of beliefs, it is difficult to account for this. This is because after Oxford he returned to Glasgow where he engaged in devotions at the start of his lectures. While the teaching regime at Oxford, Smith does not seem concerned with the content. Smith’s willingness to make a ‘solemn promise’ on graduation from Oxford (Scott 1937, p. 42) to be ordained into the Church of England and then to become a Minister in the Episcopalian Church in Scotland must have meant something significant. Adam Smith published Moral Sentiments while at Glasgow University where he conformed in all public respects as required from professors at the time. It is believed in 1751 he publicly committed to his being a Christian Protestant by reading his dissertation, De Origine Idearum (origins of the idea of God), his signing of the Calvinist Confession of Faith before the Presbytery of Glasgow, and by his taking the Oath de Fideli (Scott 1937, pp. 138-9; Ross 1995, p. 109). The Kirk Elders rigidly managed public opinion in Glasgow at the time (whose motto was: ‘Let Glasgow flourish by the preaching of the Word’- the revealed God). Without assurances from his sponsors that he would complete these formalities, Smith would not have been appointed (Scott 1937, p. 79).
Kennedy (2009b, pp.7-16) has provided a detail examination on how Smith appears systematically to have reduced down the emphasis of his Christian or religious statements. Kennedy’s slide rule suggests that we know sufficient of Smith’s biography to consider how it affected the way he wrote about religious matters. The rule concludes that Smith in his later years abandoned Christian faith or any form of deism for that matter, although Hill (2001) and Alvey (2004) would disagree.

Although Coase (1976, p.536) disputed the claim that Adam Smith was a Deist, there are numerous instances of where Smith dropped or toned down his original religious statements between the 1st and the 6th edition of TMS. This is the period Smith found himself leaning toward what was increasingly becoming scientific world, in its reasoning. Smith wanted his work to be perceived as scientific in line with the Scottish traditional scholarly thought between 1730 – 1870, rather than theological (Macfie 2009, p.389-91).

Smith was aligning himself with the characteristic Scottish attitude and method ubiquitous in the history of economic thought at this time, the philosophical or the social approach. It is this method that Smith was attempting to pattern his work to that compromised his assumed religious affiliations. The analytic methods of the WN Book 1 eclipsed the philosophic and historical methods of the TMS in which Smith so revelled and showed his Scots tradition in philosophic thought.

The TMS remains pivotal to Smith’s development, the reason for his continuous editing of its earlier materials to provide seamless bedding for the WN. Macfie (2009, pp. 91-392) suggests that between Edinburgh and Glasgow universities this method had its foundations in Natural Theology (including some Natural Philosophy), and on to Moral Philosophy (thence to Justice and Law). It was resulting from this prescription that Smith under the law of contract and
private property with its social aspects he developed the broad descriptive collated into WN. Smith ably offered critical comments on political economy the kind of discursive comment that the philosophic method naturally and richly inspires, and on this foundation Smith’s specialized treatment of economics inevitably begins.

Such specialisation however, was not unique to him because from the same foundational method other Scots gave their own works a special slant toward their own special interest: Hutcheson towards morals, Hume towards metaphysical scepticism and history and Ferguson towards sociology. Macfie aptly observes that Smith cannot be understood especially from what are considered his weaknesses when we disregard the fact that the Scottish method he embraced was concerned with giving a broader balanced comprehensive picture from different points of view and not a logical meticulousness (Ibid. 392, 399).

Smith was a preacher–philosopher of some kind who did not adhere to the law of non-contradiction as we might read him in contemporary times. He does not follow his analysis into its logical components and falls victim of inconsistencies. That is true of his theology which does not appear anywhere as a collected body of works, but rather can only be inferred implicitly in his surviving corpus. The same thought pattern is applied to his use of the working of the spontaneous generation or otherwise the invisible hand arrangement central in his natural theology.

6.5 The Invisible hand embodying hidden theology of Adam Smith

Smith’s idea of the invisible hand continues to attract much attention, while there remains no consensus on what he intended in applying the expression. The seeming ambiguity around the expression has resulted in it being seen either “one of the great ideas of history,” or as “an ironic joke.” (Harrison 2011, p.29).
Whether Smith’s ‘‘invisible hand’’ has teleological or providential connotations, or whether it is simply a rhetorical device is equally a continuing debate. Smith did not coin the phrase, and he did not make it common currency, but the invisible hand remains the most famous image in economics attributed to Adam Smith and that has puzzled interpreters. The invisible hand is significant as focus for disputes over capacities of markets. Smith’s invisible hand summarizes the case for a market economy. Mark Blaug writes:

“Under certain social arrangements, which we would nowadays describe as workable competition, private interests are reconciled with public interests as if by an invisible hand” (Blaug 1997, p. 60).

Deirdre McCloskey (2006 p456-8) is of the opinion that the hand reconciles private virtuous actions with the common good. Critics of the invisible hand see this image to be Adam Smith’s mistake that has cursed subsequent economic analysis (Oslington 2007, p. 1). There is a fertile ground of those who conceive the invisible hand only as a metaphor and nothing more, or as a rhetorical use of language while others have suggested it is only incidental to Smith’s scheme considering the metaphor was only used at most thrice. To others Smith used the expression ironically (Hill 2001, p. 2), and it is the late readings of Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ that has turned it into an essentially secular rather than remains Providentialist.

Hill is persuaded that Adam Smith’s social and economic philosophy is inherently theological and that its Providentialist underpinnings cannot be removed without impairing his theory of social order. Hill sees an ally in Martin (1990, p. 273) who perceives Smith’s notion of a Providential invisible hand not only the centrepiece, but also the unifying principle or ‘metaphysical core’ of Smith’s entire oeuvre without which much of his thought makes little sense. Harrison (2011, p. 45) argues that Smith’s first readers encountering the phrase in his writings would naturally have read it in a way that was in keeping with the predominant usage of
tis time, as invoking divine providence.

Kennedy (2009b, p. 4-5) is not impressed with this conclusion. He suggests that whatever evidence is provided for this conclusion is not watertight, seeing that Smith drifted away from Christianity as early as 1744 when he deserted his obligation to be ordained and to serve as a minister in the Episcopal Church in Scotland. As a matter of fact, the claim of a hidden or ‘secret’ theology of Smith revealed by examining and disclosing the workings of the invisible hand and by exploring its most important constituent elements of faculty psychology and natural theology begs the question of wholesomeness. Whatever positions are attributed to the metaphor of the invisible hand, they all are but conjectures, since Smith did not elaborate what he implied by it.

Harrison (2001, p. 46) would reply to Kennedy that, Smith casually adopted the invisible hand expression on the very few occasions, and introduced it without comment, is to imply his acquiescence in its contemporary meaning. Most probable is the fact that if Smith did not intend the expression to carry its traditional theological implications, he would have sought for a different form of word or words. Actually, the invisible hand expression or idea was relatively common in Smith’s time and became increasingly frequent from the seventeenth century onward (Hengstmengel 2011, p. 52).

There is no doubt that the invisible hand metaphor far from it being presently considered a purely secular, materialist approach; Smith assigned it its functions from the argument from design to construct a model that is manifestly teleological. This ‘teleological arguments central to Smith’s work could be expunged without impairing the cogency of his analysis’ observes (Kleer 1995, p.275), this makes Glen Morrow’s (1923, p.71) argument that Smith’s moral world is
totally secular in arrangement ‘not the order of a divine law-giver’ in my understanding misplaced.

Anthony Flew Morrow (1987, p. 200-1) argues that it is a mistaken gesture to construe Smith’s invisible hand as an instrument of divine direction whether this is in the sense of special interventions or by reference to design argument. But others (Hill 2001, p. 2; Harrison 2001, p.45; Martin 1990, p.272-274) will differ from these claims and argue firstly, that Smith usage of the expression that have reference in TMS, first speak of the idea of unintended, yet beneficial, consequences. Secondly, the notion is explicit in the excerpt from Moral Sentiments that provision for the Deity orchestrated attaining those consequences. It is not only on these specific references alone that Smith’s thesis of commitment to a providential understanding of the hand is based.

There are numerous other places particularly in the TMS where Smith seems to be affirming providentialist conceptions. He writes that in the economy of human nature, human beings are motivated by passions and instincts that are acted upon ‘‘without any consideration of their tendency to those beneficent ends which the great Director of nature intended to produce by them.’ (TMS II.i.5.10) Subsequently, an individual should direct her attention to the care of her own happiness first (implying self-love), that of her family and her friends etc.

That is because, ‘‘the care of the universal happiness of all rational and sensible beings, is the business of God and not of man.’ (TMS VI.ii.3.6). Harrison has observed that following Smith’s train of thought, his use of the invisible hand differed from its use by the Church fathers such as Calvin. While Smith’s use implied the providential matching of proximate human goals

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57 Calvin tended to the view that God’s providential activity is visible only to the eye of faith. Recognition of God’s special providence expressed in revealed theology in particular, required the adoption of a particular attitude to events that in other interpretations would be regarded as owing to chance [or what seems to us contingency, faith will recognise and accept as the secret impulse of God]. The workings of the secret or invisible hand, in this view,
to a general social benefit seems to be attributed to general providence according to Calvin these benefits were attributed to actions of a secret special providence. Smith argued that God was understood to have instituted general laws that matched human self-love with beneficial social ends. Therefore, like all other natural laws of motions, human moral faculties also followed general rules that more justly could be referred to as laws of nature. Just like the laws of nature in the physical exemplified beneficial design so too are the laws of morality. Smith is perceived to imply that the general laws of the moral, as well as of the material world, are wisely and beneficently ordered for the welfare of our human species (Harrison 2011, p. 47)

Although the discussion of Adam Smith’s expression of ‘‘invisible hand’’ does not offer much in arbitrating between these two interpretations whether it's a secular or providentialist expression, perhaps they are not as far apart as they may initially appear. Certainly, on either reading, the contention that the invisible hand was ‘‘an ironic joke’’ or ‘‘a rhetorical device’’ becomes unsustainable. Even the incredulous hypothesis places providential deism and Newtonianism on the same footing, and yet few commentators regard Smith’s references to

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58 Smith draws on the strong tradition of the principle of unintended consequences common to the use of the expression invisible hand but understands the operation of the invisible hand in the realm of moral economy as directly analogous to its regular operations in the natural world. In short, there were certain elements of the revealed theology of the contemporary conception of the invisible hand—specifically, those that relied upon a Calvinistic conception of special providence—that Smith appears not to have invoked. He however, retained an appeal to general providence in a manner consistent with applications of the invisible hand to the natural order. Smith’s ability to link up of perceived regularities in the moral and physical realms and his apparent attribution of these to providence, provided a clear warrant for reading him as endorsing a general natural theology [as discussed above] and of using the invisible hand as another way of speaking about divine providence. Such a stance did not necessarily entail an endorsement of Christianity per se, of course, for it was equally consistent with deism or a Stoic providentialism (Hill 2001).
Newtonian physics as ironic or rhetorical, contrary to what they write of the invisible hand. A genuine difficulty with the sceptical hypothesis lies in its potential for self-reference. It seems fatally to undermine the validity of Smith’s own efforts to secure an orderly foundation for moral economy. If, for Smith, all accounts of the intelligibility of the phenomena of the world, both physical and moral, serve only to highlight features of human psychology, it is difficult to see how his own moral and economic philosophies could be anything more than impressive products of the imagination (Harrison 2011, p. 49).

But the same observation could be said of Newton and the law of gravity. That said, Smith’s ultimate agnosticism on these questions cannot be definitively ruled out. We could still claim that Smith was as committed to providential explanations of the functioning of the moral economy as he was to Newtonian explanations of celestial mechanics. That he was conscious of being psychologically committed to the validity of both natural science and natural theology.

In the specific case, it seems likely, that like the rest of his contemporaries, he believed the invisible hand to be the hand of God. It is just that in places he seemed to treat all of such beliefs as data for further speculation about general features of human psychology, but this then, was the nature of inquiry of his times and contemporaries.
6.6 Conclusion

Smith’s work is an attempt to form a descriptive account of the primary processes by which communities develop and functions. Smith’s belief system appears to involve commitments in a first and final cause of human social behaviour and the institution that support it. Smith’s religious thought is complicated because there is no record of his work on natural or revealed theology. Evidently, he was more of a Christian philosopher than a theologian proper. He most certainly saw himself more as a writer moving in a broad Christian tradition than as a theologian.

He believed in the existence of a benevolent ‘Providence’, and in a limited extent of human control over events. He demonstrated an imitation of Stoic theodicy in his elaborate rationalization of apparently vicious human tendencies as indirectly beneficial. Smith would in no doubt subscribe to the fact that God exists. He would argue that the world is the product of design and the observable order of regularity in human affairs is a direct result of this design and purpose in Nature.

Teleology, final causes, and divine design were initially seen as central to understanding Smith’s writings. But over time, this view fell out of fashion. With the rise of positivism, the idea of teleology has tended to be overlooked or downplayed in its interpretation. A new theistic view of Smith’s work is emerging in various interpretations to include teleology that is attempting to restore it to its previous position as an essential element in understanding Adam Smith. The consensus of this new theistic view is that it presents a new understanding that there is a theological viewpoint in Smith’s work, and this theological viewpoint underpins Smith’s moral and economic theories. Smith presented the teleological argument, combined with the substitution of a utilitarian emphasis on worldly prosperity for conventional definitions of the
divine purpose. I concede in this thesis that for Smith, the world was so designed that a natural order would result from individual actions and need not be imposed by the State. This argument makes Smith’s belief in a benevolent God, natural order, and natural laws very important, since God has established natural laws that regulate individual behaviour to produce social order.

Smith’s eighteenth-century religious background and upbringing endowed him with the opportunity to use the expression invisible hand a term that has religious connotations to describe an economic phenomenon. If the ideal economic order, governed by the invisible hand, reflects closely the natural order, an order in some way or other commanded by God, Smith’s use of the term invisible hand to refer to economic activities is consistent with the metaphysical speculation.
Chapter 7

The message of the Gospel

7.1 Introduction

This section begins with a discussion on what constitutes the message of the Gospel. The Gospel is appropriated here as a model of the type of personal knowing and witness that gives its peculiar status to knowledge in the sympathies. The Gospel according to Matthew, Mark, Luke and John constitute a gospel genre, and may each be viewed in comparison with the other canonical Gospels in order to bring out its own peculiar slant, particularly the way it reads Jesus’s life with hindsight in the light of Easter.

Unlike the Greek idea of a Bioi gospels are revelatory statements about who Jesus is and what his death means. The Gospels are in fact historical, but they are also theological and aretological [virtue-forming] (Long 2013, p. 113). Clusters of discourses associated consistently with the gospel message focus on the basic narrative of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. These clusters include claims that God has brought about salvation through the work of Jesus Christ, in an effort consistent with the work of God expressed in the Hebrew Scriptures in Old Testament (Campbell 2009. p. 111).

The dissertation discussion initiated a claim that the proclamation of the Gospel includes an invitation to recognise and accept in a personal decision “the saving Lordship of Christ.” The proclamation of the good news of gospel is not a disinterested storytelling. Whilst the concept of disinterestedness still harbours intonations of actions that satisfy self-propelled achievements, I argued that self-love is a legitimate attitude tied to one’s relationship that begins in God who lives in eternal triune relationship, the creator of all that is very good. I will argue later that the gospel message of good news that Jesus proclaimed when presented, is capable of changing
personal dispositions, and it appeals to the personal interest of the hearer. The individual is invited to make a decision by herself. She responds to Jesus’ call for the Kingdom addressed to her self-love. It is to the self-love [self-interest] of each individual Jesus appeals.

Philosophically I discussed earlier beginning with Aristotle who showed self-loving is one of the virtues of a good life, people are self-loving and more importantly people are self-loving through as a means of loving others. This explains that when people love others it is because they are close to the point that they see themselves in their friends, and by loving their friends, they are self-loving.

Following Aristotle, Augustine on his part attempted to reconcile self-love and self-denial in a unified Christian love and arrived at the conclusion that in loving God an agent [a person] is able to love others and self. In discussing Kant, it became apparent that self-love is in essence a duty to oneself that one cannot deny herself that duty, for to do so is to err. In the preceding section on Adam Smith, I discussed how self-love is a formative of practical rationality in an agent that is appealed to by others.

This is because self-love is part of the structure of a properly formed character that comes about via receiving the right kind of love. This practical rational individual becomes a self-lover, and the message of the gospel Jesus proclaimed from its reservoir in the gospels appeals to her as a self-lover. This claim is especially apt for bringing out the way that the Gospel story serves as a narrative illustration of what is known theologically through faith in Jesus Christ and experienced in worship and liturgy. Gospels are theological documents based on historical events, contributing to theology and practice but remain sui generis in character. In the sections to follow I will discuss although not exhaustively; first in an appraisal manner the content of the gospel as a message of beliefs received and professed by Christian communities focused on the
“gospel” as basic narrative work of God in Jesus Christ and the claims he consistently made about this narrative.

Secondly, I will then discuss the language of the Gospel which remain unique and does not permit the genre to ‘flow into history nor ebb out totally into a biography’. This is the language used by the early Christian communities through which they expressed Jesus’ significance in the lives of the people whom he met and who believed in him. Thirdly, I will discuss how the Gospels are considered consummate work of interpretations of how Jesus was experienced.

Lastly, I will follow this discussion with the gospel’s ability to interpellate individuals as subjects and how Jesus’ interpellation carried out in the message of the gospel demands a response. My focus now is the Gospels wherein is embedded the claim of self-love. Gospels provide texts of discussions featuring the use of the bible in Christian discourse on self-love in New Testament text of Mathew 22:39 an adaptation of the Old Testament Leviticus 19: 18 text’s rendering of self-love.

7.1.1 The message of the Gospel

Gospel reads as a kind of biography, the life-story of Jesus of Nazareth and purports to be a true story about events among a certain people in a particular time and place. It might correspondingly be assimilated superficially to history. Gospel is in crucial respects sui generis and while considered as a literary genre, is not to be confounded with history or biography. It is not about facts of Jesus, but what he meant to these disciples.

It shows Jesus revealed God to them in himself becoming their saviour. Central to the Gospel is the witness to the power of Jesus to transform human lives and give a fresh meaning. The Gospel proclaims a message of salvation rather than simply telling Jesus’ story for its own
sake. The shared meaning of the gospel revolves around the simple narrative that is told by it, of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection (Campbell 2009, p. 112). It is the death and resurrection of Christ that is the consistent core of the message.

The Gospel is a prototypical category of subjective knowing and witness that gives its peculiar status to knowledge in the humankinds (Franke 2012, p. 413-414). The core message of the gospel is the particular way it reads the Jesus’ life retrospectively in the light of Easter. It is this revelation of the salvation of the world through Jesus that is core to the message of the Gospel.

At stake in this revelation is the claim that Jesus is the embodiment of God’s presence in the world. Jesus is the Son from the Father who uniquely reveals the way to the Father and imparts life and light. In imparting life and light, he gives identity to the people who share it. The Gospels represent a consummate work of interpretation, and it is not necessarily about disinterested love or disinterestedness. It is about redemptive love that remains consistent with Christian faith and self-love.

This is the interpretation the present gospels in the form of scriptural witness to God’s love revealed in Christ to the world present. This interpretation has its emphasis on the facts of Jesus’ life recounted not for their own sake, but as a testimonial of faith and in order to reveal an overarching order of significance, a providential plan for history and redemption (Ibid. p. 415). Hooker (2001, p.33) suggests that the gospel as good news is good news of Jesus the person and the message he proclaims. She suggests that Mark’s introduction, “Mark’s purpose is clearly to set out not just the beginning of the good news, but the good news itself.” The good news is therefore about Jesus and the good news is Jesus herself. He satisfies the understanding of good news subjectively as well as objectively. Subjectively the good news is from Jesus and
objectively the good news is about Jesus and it is not necessary to choose between the two. Consequently, the good news demonstrates the relation between a fixed essence so-called love and the analysis of need and value.

This relation results in a constant interweaving of Christian experience and non-Christian experience in the perpetual attempt to discover the actions called for by the redemptive love. Three areas of focus will be of help to our understanding of the message of the gospel. These three are, the language of the message of the gospel, the place of interpretation and the subject who interprets the texts. The primary quest is how the meaning of a gospel text can be discerned and displayed in very profound ways by those who respond to scripture as it makes a direct and, existential call on their lives.

7.1.2 The Language of the Gospel

The language of the gospel is that of the early Christian community, by which these communities’ recounted facts of Jesus’ life as a testimonial of faith that revealed an overarching providential plan for history and redemption of human kind. The gospels are more than historical sources or literary artefacts, not only in their embodiments in the lives of believers but also in their formative role in the practices if Christian faith (Burton 2006, p. 8).

Stanton (1989, p. 3) observes that Christians acknowledge Jesus as the Son of God for which there must be historical evidence support such a claim. The claim forms the basic gospel message embedded in New Testament texts and transmitted first through an oral tradition that formed the foundation of early Christian creeds (Campbell 2009, p. 13), and aided structure the canon of Christian scripture as it developed in the first through the fourth centuries CE.

Christians accept that in Jesus’ teaching and actions, in his death and resurrection, God disclosed himself to mankind in new ways. The need to reconstruct the life and character of
Jesus with a sufficient degree of confidence to make such claims meaningful becomes an obvious requirement. Stanton (2004, p.13-20) has made important and helpful strides toward understanding the origins and development of ‘gospel’ language in earliest Christianity. Stanton sees the ‘gospel’ language of the early Christians as having its roots in the post-exilic hopes of Deutero-Isaiah.

Hooker (2001, p.34) makes similar Isaiah reference where the good news proclaimed is the imminent salvation that God is going to work out for his people (Isaiah 40: 9; 52:7; 60:6; 61:1). This concept describes the ‘good news’ of God’s kingship and his sovereign deliverance of his exiled people. Stanton considers this motif an important part of Jesus’ own self-understanding and his ministry. The good news of Jesus Christ therefore is God’s good news expressed in Old Testament first but becomes a continuation with the new gospel an extension of God’s emancipation and sovereignty on earth.

This message is first uniquely expressed in and through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. Snodgrass (2005, p. 31) speaks of dissimilarity between ‘the gospel of Jesus’ and the ‘gospel about Jesus’. He perceives the ‘gospel of Jesus’ as the distinct message and ministry of Jesus. Whereas, the ‘gospel about Jesus’ is the ‘good news’ preached by the early Christian church. The ‘gospel’ message preached by Jesus on earth is however, the basis for and the backbone of the ‘gospel’ message that was expounded by the church after his death and resurrection. The concept of conceiving the Christian message as ‘good news’ stem from Jesus’ own appropriation of the motif. Pahl (2006, p. 212) suggests that the motif of Jesus, as the embodiment of these ‘good news’ was present in the late Second Temple Jewish eschatological expectation. This understanding therefore must be what motivated the early Christian community’s use of noun euangelion. Hooker (2001, p.33) is of the opinion that this Greek word
euangelion translated as ‘gospel’ but now understood, as the ‘good news’ was not yet a technical term implying a document of any kind. Hooker suggests that nobody before Mark had written a ‘gospel.’ Albeit Mark’s first readers would have understood Mark in this ‘gospel’ document to be referring to a message (Diehl 2011, p. 173) and that message to be that, which was proclaimed by early Christian preachers, but not necessarily to a particular literary arrangement.

Stanton detects that the ‘gospel’ language of the early Christians mirrored that of the Roman imperial propaganda (Stanton 2004, p.22-35). He provides evidence of recent epigraphic research into this broader historical and textual study showing that although imperial propaganda focused on to the imperial cult, it was not limited to the cult. It was rather widespread in the northeast quadrant of the Roman Empire throughout the first century (Ibid. p. 28-32). Therefore, evangel language as such was not unique to what we presently accept as the biblical text of the gospel but was language relatively common and widely accessible in promoting the imperial agenda in this region.

Pahl (2006, p.212) infers from the grammar in Stanton’s work, that the plural ‘good news’ – euangelia – tended to focus on those occasions of accession of emperors and their subsequent benefaction to the Empire, to the throne. These were accessions reciprocated by civic celebrations and religious sacrifices on behalf of the emperor. Contrary to the world of emperors however, the early Christians employed the singular - euangelion as the ultimate message of ‘good news’ for the world. One would obviously assume that, if this language of the gospel as ‘good news’ was widespread as such, it could have been applicable to all strata of society within the empire a feature from which the Christian community was bound to benefit. This inevitably seems to be case in point for these Christian communities. The communities must have used the term with full knowledge of its association with the imperial ‘good tidings.’ Stanton (2004, p.52-
59) sees development in early Christianity in the use of – *euangelion* from its civic use–appearing in the Pauline works in reference to the orally proclaimed salvific message about Jesus centred on his death and resurrection. Whilst there is no written gospel in Pauline writings\(^59\), there is also no evidence of pre-Easter Jesus tradition as an integral part of Paul’s – *euangelion* – good news. Paul however, acknowledges that all the apostles can be described to have proclaimed the good news in traditional terms (1 Cor. 15:1-11). But this post-Easter apostolic tradition is not a tradition believed to have originated with the pre-resurrection life and ministry of Jesus of Nazareth. Notwithstanding, Paul believed the Jesus tradition included comment on the proclamation of the gospel. For Paul the proclamation of the gospel did not of necessity include the Jesus tradition of pre-Easter events.

Retrospectively however, for Paul – *euangelion* - the orally proclaimed salvific message about Jesus centred on his death and resurrection. This message, Hengel (2000, p. 61) describes as ‘the living “message of salvation”, preached orally and with a Christological stamp’, suggesting perhaps the message is also the person. Here is provided the opportunity to understand the good news to be either objective news about Jesus Christ or the subjective news from Jesus, the two stands undivided.

**7.1.3 Gospels as consummate work of interpretation**

The gospels’ texts resemblances to other literary genres are deceptive, for the Gospel is in crucial respects *sui generis*. Gospel, considered as a literary genre, is not to be confounded with history or biography (Diehl 2011, p. 171-2; Blomberg 1997, p. 107). Its purpose is not to narrate the facts of Jesus’ life *per se*, but rather to show what Jesus meant to his disciples. It is the

\(^59\) It is agreed widely that Pauline writings were produced much earlier than the Gospels, and yet this technical term of ‘gospel’ is missing in record of application in Paul’s works or those works produced any time earlier than Mark’s wittings (Hooker 2001, 33-34).
kerygma, or the proclaimed message given by God for the benefit of his people (Hortbury 2005, p. 12). Unambiguously, the Gospel shows Jesus revealed God to the disciples [and ultimately to all his followers] in himself and thereby became their Saviour. The Gospel witnesses to the power of Jesus to transform human lives and give them a new meaning. Gospel as ‘good news’ is meant to change people’s lives. It declares a salvific message and not simply telling a Jesus’ story. If the Gospels only presented the objective facts of Jesus’ historical existence, they could not say what is most important about him that is revealed only by his significance in the lives of the people whom he meets and those who believe in him.

It is this life-transforming power experienced by the individuals who were changed by their belief in him that is supremely important, indeed miraculous. Gospels accurately seen even just as literature, should not be read as transparent to the historical Jesus, but as testimonies of faith (Diehl 2011, p.192-3). But even if they were to be read as transparent to the historical Jesus, there is a particular manner that Christian usage of the Gospel narratives has assumed.

The Christian usage has tended to see the Gospel narratives as the fit enactment of their authors’ intentions. The primary kind of usage that Christians have made of these particular texts (for example the passion – resurrection sequences in the Gospels) is not one where the reader looks for a hidden intention ‘that will open up an esoteric meaning behind the façade of their apparent meaning’ (Higton 2004, p. 204).

Although readers may make observation regarding the intentions of the authors over a certain text, such intentions are never meant to run counter to the surface meaning of the texts.

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The four canonical gospels have recorded fundamentally how Jesus was experienced. On considering the texts and the massage of the gospels; what is of crucial importance is what meaning does that which is recounted as gospel have for those who experienced and perhaps still experience it? It is this meaning that can be interpreted and re-experienced as true by readers in all ages and today’s readers.

Excluding, that the Gospel is witness to purportedly historical happenings, it is fully unveiled certainly not as naked history but rather always only for those who have made the commitment and decision of faith. It is not a surprise that gospel texts therefore have Jesus as the narrative subject of the action and where he is not the subject he is its chief object. This claim presents a problem that is; where to place or how to interpret Jesus’ own utterances as they are presented in the New Testament text.

These utterances for example, have been seen as allegories, or classical parable with a single central lesson. Then there is the question of whether the parables of Jesus should be treated as human parables rather than sacred texts, a process useful perhaps if one was in search for the original words of Jesus, although the process may not yield a trustworthy accounts of God’s special revelation. The difficulty of this claim is augmented by the fact that there is literally no language and no parables of Jesus except insofar as such can be retrieved and reconstructed from within the language of the earliest interpreters (Davis 1988, p.193). Alexander (2006, p.17) observes that gospel narrative structures work as folktale, since the accounts are told for the sake of the events.

The narrators and audience are principally interested in the events, with Jesus as the hero. His followers were given new hope and were empowered to love in previously unattainable ways for which they could not possibly have accounted otherwise. The written gospels hence had a
dynamic twofaced interface with oral performances, by being viewed as deposits of oral teachings and preaching of Jesus (Ibid. 22).

These texts were used as the foundation for on going oral instructions in the early church. Therefore, behind what we have today as the written texts of the gospels is a structured teaching tradition of oral materials. From the point of view of the four gospels, these materials were shaped by repetitious delivery and in accordance Hence, each manuscript of the four gospels appear aimed at a specific audience.

An important point to emphasise is the continuity observed between the oral tradition and text. Alexander observes that, ‘the gospels were little more than compilations of pre-existent units of material, arranged and selected like pearls on a string.’ (Ibid. p.24). Each pearl in its interdependency to the others adds something of its own uniqueness to the string. Subsequently, when we look at each narrative stringed in each respective canonical gospel of the four gospels, it brings its own uniqueness in its interdependency to other narratives.

The same can be claimed of the four canonical gospels, which can also be stringed as pearls on a string with each exhibiting the qualities and uniqueness of the narratives within it. In all these understandings the centre of this oral tradition is ‘all that Jesus began to do and teach’ (Acts 1: 1). The centre of Christianity in fact remains the person of Jesus, and the existence of the gospels is in itself a testimony this fact. It is this person of Jesus that is hailing any who will stop and answer, to be transformed from mere individuals into subjects (Davis 2012, p. 882; Althusser 1971, p. 174). The Gospel in embodying the message of Jesus calls out, and the one so called turns around in response (religious wording, repents)
7.1.4 The Gospel interpellates individuals as subjects

The Gospel message hails and interpellates individuals, calling all who hear it to conversion of life in the light of the truth it discloses. Persons become subjects of the gospel message to the extent that they respond to such hails. They are constituted or interpellated as individuals through the process of responding to hails by the gospel.

Louis Althusser popularized interpellation as a word in his seminal essay “Althusser, Louis, 1971, Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (Notes towards an investigation), In Lenin and philosophy and other essays, Trans. B. Brewster, New York: Monthly Review Press.) Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” is argued at two key points:

First, that ideology is disseminated by the ruling class, he argues that state institutions, such as public schools, are designed to circulate ideology that in turn supports the state itself; secondly, he redefines ideology as something that is constitutive of the social order rather than something that merely props up the dominant social order. Althusser explored the relationship between the state, modes of (re) producing power and ideology from a Marxist perspective, defining ideology as “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (Althusser 1971: p.162).

Althusser, on closer examination in the manner in which he talks about ideology in; Althusser, Loui, 2008. On Ideology, Trans. by Ben Brewster, London: Verso; and in 1971. Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, Monthly Review Press; Althusser appears to contradict himself in insisting on ideology as ‘imaginary’ and on being ‘constituted’. He claims ideology is “imaginary” and not real and that in fact, ideology masks reality, but then concedes that ideology as a matter of fact is constitutive of reality; that is to say, ideology creates what is real in the sense of the set of the identities that interpellate human beings as subjects. Martin (2013, p. 408) asks, ‘How can ideology be
constitutive of reality and be imaginary at the same time?’ Martin’s own response is that, it is not possible for one ‘to be interpellated as a citizen—and thereby really constituted as a citizen and simultaneously for’ her citizenship to be imaginary. Foucault on his part, while accepting Althusser’s idea that subjects are constituted through hailing or Interpellation, nonetheless does not apply these two terms; he is persuaded this makes nonsense of the opposition between ideology (as something imaginary) and truth. Foucault writes,

‘The notion of ideology . . . always stands in virtual opposition to something else that is supposed to count as truth. Now, I believe that the problem does not consist in drawing the line between that which, in a discourse, falls under the category of scientificity or truth, and that which comes under some other category; rather, it consists in seeing historically how effects of truth are produced within discourses that, in themselves, are neither true nor false. (Foucault 2000, p. 119)

Foucault implies that a concept like “citizen” central to Althusser’s theory of *Ideological State Apparatus* is neither true nor false. Furthermore, the use of the discourse of “citizenship” is not “imaginary” but rather, produces citizens about which persons can make true and false statements. One can truly be a citizen or make statements about them only when a discourse on citizenship is regnant such that interpellation makes the truth possible rather than obscures or masks it. Martin following Foucault has observed that, ‘… it has been extremely difficult to maintain an epistemology according to which we can clearly establish something as definitively “true.” I perceive Martin suggesting without something that is definitively “true,” how can we contrast truth with ideology? (2013, p. 409). Martin reiterates, Foucault is right to point out that what Althusser calls ideology is constitutive of truth rather than merely imaginary; but Martin quickly adds that this claim does not rule out the ‘possibility of “imaginary” ideologies that obscure or mystify social relations.’

I concede the two features firstly, of ideology as representing the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real condition of existence (Althusser 2008, p. 36) and secondly, that all
ideology has the function of constituting individuals as subject (p. 45), to remain as a creative way he redefines ideology. Althusser saw ideology functioning as a mediator between systems of power [religious, ethical, economic, political, as examples] and individuals. Althusser attempted to show the relationship between domination and subjugation by introducing the interpellation process, where individuals recognize themselves as subjects through ideology, thus illustrating how subjects can be complicit in their own domination. Ideology was not a passive relation between the economic base and superstructure. Ideology is a pervasive set of dynamic conditions suffusing the institutional apparatus of the state and shaping not just the idea of the person as subject, but more importantly for theorists to follow clarifying in structural terms the idea of a subject position. It is in this concord political and psychological forces converged to define possibilities of action and forces of constraint and repression.

More importantly it seems, Althusser wanted to demonstrate as a good Marxist, how Marx’s understanding of ideology could prove that, “The ultimate condition of production is in essence the reproduction of production.” Althusser analysed Marx’s social concepts from two perspectives; from the point of view of practice and production . . . and from that of reproduction on the other” (1971, p.136). Althusser acknowledges that all institutions in a given state proclaim their specific ideology, whether that institution is a state run institution or private. For Hirst (2007, p. 398) ideology is a representation of people's 'lived relation' to their conditions of existence and that this relation is ‘imaginary’. Althusser claims that ideology for him ‘represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence’ (1971, p.162), whereas for Hirst all ideology entails the Subject as a pole of the 'imaginary' relation whereby all such ideologies have common characteristics at all times regardless of the specific socio-historical circumstances in question (2007, p.393-4).
For Althusser, ideology is constituted in what he terms *ideological state apparatuses* in which he discusses how ideology interpellates or hails persons as subjects. By interpellation Althusser sees ideology as calling out or singling out individuals. All ideology [ethical, religious, political, or legal] hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects (1971, p. 173).

For Althusser, ideology is the lived relation between human beings and their worlds and universals because there will never be a totality in which the human subjects who lives in social relations can understand them through experience (El Hassan 1986, p. 53). This is because social totalities do not exist in a form accessible to experience. Hence, relationship between human beings and their lived conditions of existence is, and will ever be, imaginary as indicated above. Full knowledge of social relations can never be attained since human beings are, ‘as if’, they are living these conditions.

### 7.1.5 Judith Butler on Althusser’s Interpellations posing an impossible scene

Althusser is quick to observe that “individuals are always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects”, which implies that “individuals are always-already subjects”, “even before she is born” (Ibid. p. 176). Judith Butler (1997b, p. 10-11) concurs with Althusser that the interpellative naming is, the individual’s entry into intelligibility and its guarantee of existence and legibility. She contends that accounts of interpellation present “an impossible scene,” that of a body or individual “that is, strictly speaking, not accessible to us, but that nevertheless becomes accessible on the occasion of…an interpellation that does not ‘discover’ this body, but constitutes it fundamentally” (Butler 1997a, p.5). Furthermore, the “Individual” for Butler, is not a term one can really make sense of as “individuals… acquire their intelligibility by becoming subjects” (Butler 1997b, 11). On account of this, Davis (2012, p. 883) concedes that any mention
of individuals presents the impossible situation, where one must implicitly presume, in advance, the subjects they will become. Althusser has no problem with the term individual even though he does not define who or what the ‘individual’ is. He makes it clear that this is not an individual that pre-exists the subject (Althusser 1971, p. 175) because the existence of ideology and the interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing”.

Althusser’s (1971, 175) claim is contrary to Butler (1997b, p. 11) for whom individuals must first be subjected through interpellative process. “Individual” for Althusser is a term that was necessary to enable him to express the processes of interpellation in a manner that one could grasp, and because of its use, one may have thought that there was an individual before the subject, an individual that became a subject in the turn.

Althusser particularises on the workings of interpellation in his essay, “with a religious example: The Christian Religious Ideology” (Althusser 1971, 177–83). He explains that, as the structures of all ideologies are the same, the religious, as it is “accessible to everyone” (p. 177) provides an ideal ideology where interpellation is exercised. Butler grants this claim but is nonetheless critical of Althusser’s choice of example. For her the choice suggests all ideology is necessarily theological. Consequently, for Butler the divine power of naming, structures the theory of interpellation. Althusser is therefore claiming that social ideology “assimilates social interpellation to the divine performative” and so institutes a regime of sovereign authorization for all subjectivity (Butler 1997b, 110).

Butler challenges the divine naming that makes the hailing compelling and authoritative, because as divine, it is a “voice almost impossible to refuse” in its command that one must submit. A point I have sympathy with Butler. The significance of this, for Butler is that this divine authorizing power manifests through each and every interpellative apparatus. State
authorities and ISAs (Ideological State Apparatuses) such as the law and its representative the policeman, become conduits for the divine voice. The hailing of the passer-by becomes a divine imperative made secular, working through the same, non-refusable command as the voice of God (Butler 1997b, 110). Again, this makes it impossible to interrogate the authority of this divine voice.

7.1.6 The Gospel message as religious ideology

Judith Butler has argued that it is difficult for a person to hear the hailing of a divine command even if it proceeds from a non-religious state apparatus and ignore. That is it is impossible for one to cross-examine the voice of the divine. How then does the gospel message as religious ideology get to interpellate individuals as subject? Religious ideology always functions as a mediator between the gospel and individuals. The gospel message proclaimed by Jesus is addressed to specific human individuals that can be referred to by a specific name.

This message of the gospel as proclaimed by Jesus tells them of God who exists and to whom the hearers are answerable. Jesus proclaiming the message of the Kingdom of God, he is the voice of God. Although Jesus in his time addressed the crowds, still the hearers were expected to respond individually.

……a police officer shouting out “Hey, you there!” in public. Upon hearing this exclamation, an individual turns around, and “by this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes a subject” (Althusser, 1971: 174).

The gospel message interpellates individuals because its aim is to transform them into what Althusser calls ‘subjects’. The gospel message by interpellating the individual it makes the subject free to obey or disobey the appeal (Ibid. 178). I observed that Jesus proclaims the good news and at the same time he is the good news. If his message calls the individual by name the hearer, is as if addressed by name, thus recognising that she is always –already interpellated as a
subject with personal identity, she is expected to respond.

If the message of the gospel was to interpellate the individuals in such a specific way that she responds, ‘It is I’; if it obtains from that recognition that the ‘I’ really occupies the place of the person interpellated, then the message of the gospel that interpellated becomes the main Subject. It is this Subject which hails the individual as subject. The Gospel message [Subject] interpellates individuals as subjects while presupposing the existence of a Unique and central Other Subject in whose Name the religious ideology interpellates all individuals as subjects.

The Gospel message defines itself as the Subject through itself and for itself, and it is itself the message that interpellates its subject, the named individual. The individual called recognises that she is the subject, a subject of the Subject and subjected to the Subject. God in the message of the gospel is the Subject and we are the subjects interpellated, the Subject’s interlocutors-interpellates (Ibid. 179). The message of the gospel thus suggests that, God needs us; the Subject needs subjects, just as subjects need Subject. The great Subject needs subjects and subjects respond to the Subject by interpellation. The good news message given by Jesus “hails,” each individual to fulfil the role of the Christian disciple. Jesus in proclaiming the good news language functioned to enlist individuals in a belief system in which they fulfilled specific subject roles. Hooker (2001, p.15) observes that the gospel was to be read aloud in a congregation and not privately. This reading aloud is synonymous with the police hailing in the street ‘Hey you”, and for the reading Hooker (Ibid. 16) argues was done in toto, or at least in large sections, in essence interpellating. If Hooker’s conclusions are correct, then reading aloud the gospel texts in public, accords with Althusser’s theory where ‘hailing’ is made in the public to draw the attention of a given individual. For Althusser as subjects –in – ideology, Jesus’ hearers, each is the subject of language or ideology having to obey its rules and the laws and
therefore behaves as that ideology dictates (Klages 2006, p.134-135). The enhancement of language skills by listening to Jesus’ claims in his messages should serve to create listeners as subjects of the ideology [Judaism of Jesus] communicated through Jesus’ oral speech.

It is clear that language skills are also required for written text, the acquisition of language is the process of becoming subject and enhanced understanding of language re-enforces how the reader or listener become subject of and to the ideology of the Gospel which is Christianity. According to Althusser ideology interpellates individual subjects as subjects.

Persons are all always caught up in the process in which they voluntarily acknowledge the validity or relevance of the dominant ideology in which they live for themselves and therefore subject themselves to it. In the act of acknowledging that it is indeed she who is addressed, [when the policeman shout ‘Hey, you there’] the individual thus recognizes her subjecthood. One may observe that the individual really has no choice in this matter, but to yield to the hail, “Hey you there!” a point of contention between Althusser and Butler.

If the individual hailed however, was to ignore the call she would sooner or later be forced to adhere to it. It is of particular interest that for Althusser (perhaps as a practicing Roman Catholic), the most telling examples of the operation of ideology are religious, including his vivid term for how the subject is “called” or “hailed”, interpellation, transferred to the political domain. In Althusser’s account, ideology as such has no history since it is carried in the material, institutional forms of social life, and is always submerged back into them (Martin 2013, p. 407-8; Davis 2012, p.888-889). Althusser implies that the analytical problem is to preserve a critical focus on the

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61 Althusser must have had in mind the religious significance of calling, where God calls with respect to men/women when he designates them to some special office [Exodus 31: 2; Isaiah 22: 20; Acts 13: 2] and when God invites men/women to accept his offered grace. This is evidence in the message of the gospel where God’s call is addressed to all people – Jews and gentiles alike [Matthew 28: 19; Mark 16:15; Romans 9: 24, 25; ]
moment of “calling,” as it is at this point the interpellated subject is both created as a subject by being called, and subsumed by the very acknowledgement that, “It is I” who is being called (Hirst 1976, p. 405). In this sense, one is always dealing with ideologies, not a monolithic doctrine, that may show up in any arena of social life, in the family, the school, the church, political parties, government, and so on.

Althusser’s theory is however plagued with difficulties and many have taken Althusser to task (Butler 1997a, 1997b, 2002; Choi 2012). The theory however gives a premise from which to consider how the oral message of the gospel as good news functioned in Jesus’ time, and how the written text creates subjects of those who read or hear it read in contemporary times.

Jesus’ proclamations while on earth interpellated his hearers to a role of discipleship. Just like the policeman shouting ‘Hey you there!” in public (according to Althusser), so too Jesus’ utterances compel the listener to recognise who she herself is, and the need to respond and commit to following Jesus’ teachings.

In contemporary times when the text is read, the text interpellates its readers to this same role of Christian discipleship. One point of contention in this theory is that the hearer or reader of the text can refuse to assume the position of subject in the ideology, in which case she cannot be

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62 Judith Butler’s work presents a continuing challenge to the notion of the subject as a given and self-contained, bounded entity that somehow internalizes an external social system synonymous with Althusserian theory of ideology. Proposing a subject as a performative (re) materialization of its social environment, she offers the possibility for re-envisioning subjects as intimately entangled within their contexts as performative materializations of social values and norms. Butler’s performative materialization of the subject and its entry into intelligibility, is founded on her examining Louis Althusser’s notion of interpellation as, she notes, it still underlies much contemporary theorization of subject-formation (Althusser 1971; Butler 1997b, 106). Althusser’s theory of interpellation forms the basis for Butler’s own work on performativity and subjectivity. Butler’s narrative however, conceptualises subjectivity in Althusser’s work that is negative and restrictive in vision and by it she has identified constitutive paradoxes of subjection in Althusser. While Althusser is plagued with ambiguities in his text, it seems these ambiguities are paramount in support to an alternative view of subjectivity to that of Butler. To which Davis (2012, p. 882-886), suggests that Althusser’s ambiguities allows one to theorize a materialization of subjectivity that does not depend on the notions of subjugation, guilt, and submission that are attendant on Butler’s rendition, but rather one that offers a more open, welcoming view of what it is to be a subject. Butler thus, attempts to invert Althusser’s theory of interpellation while using it to conceptualise the subject as a performative materialisation of its social environment.
controlled by it. To refuse to be controlled, in fact in a culture where the policeman is not vested with authority the hailing is of no significance.

Equally true the individual being hailed by the gospel message may avoid subjection without realising or acknowledging the ideology they reject. The Gospel proclaimed by Jesus was able to interpellate the hearers because Jesus was founding his proclamation on beliefs his hearers had already acquired; this is because the Judaic ideology already sustained control over their actions. It influenced their beliefs and actions. They could not claim ignorance of the ideological system in which they lived and in which Jesus proclaimed the message, neither could they claim to have misunderstood the basis of its ideas.

It is also true that one’s ideologies may not always be the result of interpellation. Such ideologies could develop independently or even in spite of hailing, and that is how perhaps those who have never heard about the message of the good news nor have Christian tradition influence come to be hailed (Romans 1: 20-21) by the good news of the gospel of Jesus.

7.1.7 Jesus’ interpellation demands response

The message of the Gospel shows how Jesus revealed God to the disciples in himself and thereby becoming their Saviour (Healey 1988, p.305). Jesus’ proclamation of the Good News of the Reign of God looked for reciprocation as a social good. This is because without it one can form no reliable expectations regarding the conduct of others and life would become utterly unpredictable as "social intercourse” approaches chaos.

The message of the Gospel is a witness to the power of Jesus to transform human lives and therefore giving them a new meaning (Johnson 2006, p.643, 647) of love of God and self-love. It is good news that is meant to change people, acting from a sense of disinterestedness to self-valuing. Good news proclaims a message of salvation. When the Gospels are objective and
present facts of Jesus’ historical existence, they cannot say on their own what is most important about him. Because what is important about Jesus is revealed only by his significance in the lives of the people interpellated and who believe in him and are therefore changed. It is this life-transforming power of Jesus that remains indispensable about him for the individuals who are changed by their belief in him (Wilson 2013, *The Telegraph 26th December 2013*). Jesus in essence demonstrated a steadfast and forgiving divine love that should not be misconstrued as beyond self-concern, on the contrary as indicative of such. That love is supremely important if not indeed miraculous.

Followers of Jesus are therefore given hope and empowered to love in previously unattainable ways for which they cannot account for otherwise. Jesus message tied to the Jewish people in the first instance practiced Judaism that idealises love as a fellowship. Later on it will become apparent that Jesus embraced the hope of becoming in his lifetime, a *causa efficiens* summoning fresh love into existence that would reflect back to himself. We can argue that Jesus was disappointed due to the moral failures of those surrounding him and therefore not effecting the transformation he anticipated.

There is no doubt that through the cross Jesus became the exemplar of forgiveness, a transforming power exemplified by him and the salvation Christians associate with his sacrifice (Wawrykow 2012, p. 21-22). It is this transforming power that defies what historians may truly say about Jesus, since they write about a man, but cannot do anything beyond that to say in the least what it is that transforms those who put their belief in Jesus. Indeed, the idea of Jesus being divine, the Son of God that defies what historians make as observable and recorded facts.

It is important to record that Jesus spent his public life preaching the Good News of the Reign of God, and it can be assumed that the deepest desire of his heart was that people would
respond to his proclamation and have a change of heart. Such a conviction was only meaningful only in the context of personal relationship. Therefore, the message of the Gospel makes sense when appropriated as testimonies of faith, rather than transparent literature to the historical Jesus (Schroter 2008, p. 195-197). The New Testament texts serve as the Gospel message to demonstrate how Jesus was experienced.

The message of the Gospel is always directed towards an actualisation of God’s saving grace through Jesus. As I have already indicated, intrinsic to the Gospel message, as a genre is purpose beyond just recording what happened, it is a testimony of how Jesus was experienced. The gospel is the particular way of reading Jesus’ life retrospectively in the light of Easter.

It is apparent that Orthodox Christological interpretation of this Easter message has centred on the claimed disinterested love that Jesus demonstrated in his dying on the cross. This Selfless love records that agape as self-sacrifice is rooted in a Christology that concentrates upon Jesus’ self-immolation upon the cross (Andolsen 1981, p. 69). On her part Harrison (1985, p.17-18) observes that the Orthodox Christological interpretations somehow implying that the meaning of Jesus’ life and work was to be found in Jesus’ impetuous sprint toward Golgotha and on toward crucifixion is false. She argues that Jesus did not seek suffering as an end in itself so as to complete the resolution of the divine human drama once and for all.

Her response to Jesus’ Easter action is that, rather than Jesus being motivated by a lust for sacrifice, Jesus was actually motivated by his power of mutuality. I concur with Harrison’s conclusion, self-abnegation is not the central feature of love let alone divine love for the world, and by making it so we have "deeply confused the Christian moral tradition" (Ibid. p.18).

One standard text of the agape tradition declares that, like the rain and sunshine, God's love falls on all persons therefore human love should imitate God's (Mt 5:43-48). Because God's
agape extends universally, it includes one’s own self. Altruistic agapists hold that Christian love excludes self-love; they imply that as a Christian one ought not love what God loves. That one must exclude from her love precisely that object of God's love that is most available to her and that is herself.

It means one must exclude that self whom she is most able to help. If she excludes any loving involvement with her own-self then she will most surely fail in some of love’s most central tasks (Vacek 1994, p.262-63). Within a Catholic framework, on the other hand, grace is believed to enable Christians to cooperate with or participate in God's own love, and that includes love of self. A new understanding of certain New Testament passages that have traditionally been read as challenges "to transcend reciprocal love” is needed in order to recover the prophetic tradition capable of addressing the accepted Christian teaching of a selfless divinity interpellating all.

7.1.8 Conclusion

The gospel is the central element in a fairly small cluster of interrelated beliefs and practices that have consistently characterized Christian communities that have persisted through a sequence of larger host cultures. The starting point to describe the gospel in Christian traditions, as attested to requires exploring some consistently related beliefs and practices, including the proclamation of the gospel itself, the professing of the Christian faith and identification with the Christian community through the sacraments.

Also included is the worship of the triune God, and the study and explication of the Christian scriptures normed by the gospel narrative. I have only examined in an appraisal way the content of the message of the gospel of and about Jesus, language of communication and the gospel as consummate works of interpretations. I discussed how the gospel interpellates
individuals as subjects and how Jesus’s interpellations demand a response. The composition of the Gospel materials allowed a discussion showing how early Christians who believed that Jesus had lived and died in a real historical setting, were able to describe these events in objective terms, as we see in the canonical Gospels.

Pursuant to the discussion on the use of the bible in Christian discourses of self-love, in contemporary discussions of Jesus I argued the gospel [message] could actually be obscured by gospels [the text]. That is to say the gospel message that preceded the writing of the New Testament texts can be obscured by analysis of these texts and other early Christian literature abstracted from the earlier Christian traditions that the gospel literature transmitted. The gospel as the central message of Christian churches in contemporary times can also be obscured by claims that there is not or cannot be such a central message and by focusing almost exclusively on the claims of theologians rather than the claims of churches.
7.2 The use of the bible in Christian discourse on self-love

7.2.1 Introduction

While the Biblical injunction to love one's neighbour as oneself is a 'central pillar of morality', logical difficulties prevent its functioning as a genuine moral principle. Its importance to morality must lie elsewhere in uses other than as a straightforwardly choice-directing imperative. The general and obvious interpretation of the love commandment is not integral to morality, not even as 'an ideal which gives direction to one’s moral aspirations. However, once one acknowledges how the injunction generally is interpreted in the moral traditions in which the commandment ordinarily functions, the logical problems disappear (Radelife 1994, p. 497).

Notwithstanding its incoherence as a moral imperative, this second greatest commandment remains the foundation from which many appeal for biblical morality, and arguments for self-love are derived (Leviticus 19:18; Mathew 22:39). In the Hebraic tradition the injunctions of Leviticus 19: 17-18 provided foundations for other works like the Jubilees and Josephus’s writings on loving your fellow as yourself (Livneh 2011, p.173-174). The interlacing of Leviticus 19:17–18 into stories concerning different generations of Israel’s ancestors also serves as a means of illustrating the right relations to be practiced between the Israelites and/or between Israel and the Gentiles. Jacob, the prototype of Israel, is portrayed as fulfilling the commandment to “Love your fellow as yourself,” while his sons, representing the Israelites as a whole, ultimately come to constitute the model of brotherly love (Ibid. p. 198). Classical Judaism upholds that the biblical commandment, “You shall love your neighbour as yourself” (Lev. 19:18), expresses the heart of the Torah as the essence of Judaism: its ethics and its theology (Neusner 2008, p. 294).

The Mathew 22; 39 text injunction to love your neighbour as yourself in the New Testament, functions canonically as the central law or moral principle par excellence (Reinhard
Neighbour love is a central problem to Christian thinkers of the New Testament, where the neighbour has acted as a doctrinal shibboleth for the separation and opposition of Jewish and Christian ethics.

One could be justified in arguing that the neighbour in modern-day time is responsible for the emergence of the secular world from the Christian line of interpretation. Neighbour love nevertheless, remains significantly important for any considerations of self-love. Many in Christian psychology as well as evangelical teachers employ Mathew 22:39 texts as the biblical underpinnings for self-love concept. The primacy of these texts provides two familiar divisions of psychological interpretation. The first interpretation audaciously asserts that this second greatest commandment among other things, is a command to love one’s self (Fisher 1992, 9; Trobisch 1976, p.8).

The second division embraces a greater number of self-esteem advocates. It maintains that self-love in these passages is a desirable and necessary part of the emotional well being of every individual, but not necessarily a command (Stafford 1992, p.38). While the core of this argument lie in its definition of the word "love," proponents take it that love coincides with the accepted Christian understanding of self-regard. It is to deliberately love, value, and honour one’s self, established on one’s possession of the imago Dei and Christ’s sacrifice for that individual. In some cases proponents have viewed accompanying interpretation as proof that "love" in this context is equivalent to self-esteem (Young 1983, p.265-272; Narramore 1978, p.37). But, Matthew chapter 22:39 reads simply, “A second [command] is like it: ‘You shall love your neighbour as yourself.” I argue from the outset that the use of the bible in the Christian discourse on self-love does not suggest self-esteem at all in any form or shape. Self-esteem is a judgment of oneself as well as an attitude toward the self. Self-love is not a person's overall subjective emotional evaluation of her own worth. The Mathew and Leviticus texts are the platform from which I discuss the use of the bible in the discourse on self-love.
7.2.2 Old Testament’s Leviticus Text’s Rendering of Self-love (Leviticus 19: 18)

The book of Leviticus’ central focus is holiness. Leviticus conceptualizes holiness as a unity of proper ethical and ritual conduct and also affirms that religion is not a private matter between the individual and God. Leviticus recognizes that one regularly moves between states of purity and impurity hence, its legislation is designed for a community that resides in God's eternal presence while living in the everyday terrestrial world. Holiness is a theme so highly methodical in this document of laws issued to govern the civil and religious life of Israel. It is more than ritual cleanliness, proper sacrifices, clean and unclean foods (Wright 1983, p.26); it encompasses God’s own holiness that is thoroughly practical.

In Old Testament terms holiness is the very essence of God (Ibid. p.27). It demanded that Israel’s quality of life reflect the very heart of God’s character. Leviticus continues the legislation begun in Exodus that forms a self-contained unit that divides at chapter 16 (the Day of Atonement). The theology of the Holiness Code (Leviticus chapters 17-26) required that resident aliens [a very specific group of people who, according to the Priestly tradition consisting of non-Israelites who dwelled in the land of Israel], together with the people of Israel to obey certain cultic regulations (Kaminsky 2008, p. 124).

Because Leviticus consists mainly of the Priestly Code (Exodus 25, Leviticus 16) and the Holiness Code (Leviticus 17-26) that are considered to be corrective measures for specific instances of religious failure (Sailhamer 1992, 344), it does not constitute a complete and systematic set of instructions of Israelites’ religious system. The regulations are paradigmatic and representative, serving as principles for cases and incidents not mentioned in the inspired scroll (Childs 1985, p.159). The regulations in Leviticus 19 are not exhaustive but illustrative; they required the Israelite to do more than comply with these injunctions alone. She was expected to respond similarly in situations for which there are no specific guidelines.

Additionally, because the list consists mostly of prohibitions, the self-love implied
seems to refers to how one would wish to be treated by another since one can hardly rob, slander, or financially defraud one’s self. This self-love first entails caring for the physical and material well being of another. Secondly, it concerns the emotional welfare of others by instructing the Israelite to care for her neighbour’s reputation, honour, dignity, and happiness.

Subsequently, the self-love mentioned in 19:18 refers to the innate preoccupation of human beings in pursuing procedures that promote their physical and emotional well being, whether they can achieve the outcome themselves or are desirous of that treatment from others. Leviticus 19: 33-34, the comparative clause "as yourself" reveals the meaning of self-love to be the inborn desire for fair treatment and charity. In no way does this understanding suggest that, when the OT commands to love one’s neighbour as herself, an overall understanding of what it means must include the vital ingredient of suppressing self love to execute brotherly love. Brotherly love cannot be the same as neighbourly love.

Makujina (1997, p.217-218) parallels Leviticus 19 with 1st Samuel 18 and 20 and concludes that self-love implied in these texts and particularly the Samuel texts where Jonathan is claimed to have loved David as himself is a form of forfeiture. The context texts surrounding Jonathan’s actions suggest David had been declared King in waiting, in hindsight he had assumed Jonathan’s position of succession to Saul. Whatever brotherly love of 1st Samuel 18: 1, 3 may have replaced Jonathan’s self-love; there is no suggestion Jonathan divested himself of his own love. All things considered he simply was operating with self-love as the inborn desire for fair treatment and charity. Jonathan and any one extending love to the neighbour is in all intents responding to the fact that the individual desires the overall well being of the neighbour as one desired the good for oneself.

7.2.3 Self-love a view from New Testament Text Mathew 22: 39

I argued above that the commandment love your neighbour as yourself canonically is the ethical essence of Christianity functioning in tandem with the commandment to love ‘God.’
While self-love is implied in love of neighbour, neighbour love itself seems far from rational and appears deeply enigmatic demanding a rethink to the nature of subjectivity, responsibility and even community. To sceptical readers religious or secular, neighbour love is an obstacle to its own theorisation than a roadmap to ethical living. Reinhard argues that neighbour love is not a law to be obeyed literally, nor a theory definitively exemplified, it can only be proved by its exception (2013, p.5). Neighbour love does not seem to subscribe to the general thinking, that all ethical imperatives involve some ambiguity and therefore requires some form of interpretation. Neighbour love serves as a test for affective bond of some sort between the other and the self.

In popular circles this Mathew 22: 39 is often paraded as a text that teaches that we are commanded to love ourselves; although R. T. France (1985, p.320), considers ‘As yourself’ to imply rather than command, a basically self-centred orientation that Jesus requires disciples to overcome. If the texts should be seen as a command to love ourselves, then the implied meaning is, “You shall love your neighbour just as you are to love yourself.” But such a view appears spurious, stemming from the need to place self-actualization at the top of the pecking order of one’s goals.

It is a secular psychologists’ understanding that made its way into Christian psychological treatises (Tjeltveit 2006, p. 9-11; Schmid 2008; Roberts 2007, p.301-303). Nonetheless, the statement naturally assumes that persons have a certain desire for their own wellbeing. It is therefore assumed that if this text presupposes a command, then the command assigns an equal concern for the wellbeing of others as one’s self. Self-love is not a virtue that Scripture commends, but as one of the facts of our humanity is that it recognises and tells us to use as a standard (Wilson et al 1998, p. 411-12). Therefore, interpreting self-love as a command to love self is fallacious. The Mathean verse 39 appears to yield the following expanded
translation: “You shall love your neighbour as you already do love yourself.” Thus, self-love is assumed in this text, not commanded.

The argument for this claim firstly, rests on the fact that in the New Testament Greek grammar a comparison normally sets up a standard or norm against which some position is put forth. The Greek particle ὡς suggesting even as, like as (Wallace 2004) is the primary means used to suggest such a comparison in the New Testament (and is used in Matt 22:39 of the text above).

When applied the comparison reads for example, in Matt 12:13, Jesus healed a woman’s hand, “making it whole, like the other one.” The whole hand was the standard against which the now healed hand was measured. In Matt 17:2, Jesus’ face “shone like the sun,” the sun is the standard by which the comparison is to be made. In Matt 28:4, the soldiers guarding the tomb of Jesus “became like dead men” when they saw the angel. In Pauline writings, Rom 9:27, the number of the sons of Israel is to be “like (ὡς) the sands of the sea.” In 2 Tim 2:9 Paul says that he is wearing chains “like (ὡς) a criminal,” and the Petrine text of 1st Peter 1:24 says, “all flesh is like (ὡς) grass.”

In all these texts a comparison is made wherein each comparison starts with a standard or norm. But if Matt 22:39 implies two commands as some suggest, then there is no standard of comparison. To argue that we should love our neighbour as much as we should love ourselves sets up no standard, no norm. Secondly, there is particular application of this particle, ὡς sometimes found subsequent to a command. When applied, what verb is to be implied in the ὡς clause? At all times, the indicative should be read\textsuperscript{63}. That is, the comparison is not of a command to a command, but of a command to a standard that is already being followed.

\textsuperscript{63} Not infrequently, the verb is actually stated. The indicative is the mood found. Cf. Matt 5:48 (“be perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect”); 6:12 (“forgive us our debts, as we have forgiven our debtors”); 8:13; 15:28; 18:33; 27:65; Col 3:18; Rev 18:6; etc. (Wallace, 2004, Is Self-Love Biblical? Mathew 22: 39 - https://bible.org/article/self-love-biblical-matthew-2239)
This argument suggests examples like, Matt 6:5—”When you pray, do not be like the hypocrites [are]”; Luke 15:19—”treat me as [you would] one of your hired servants” or 2 Thess 3:15—”Do not look on him as [you would] an enemy, but regard him as a brother”. This understanding presupposes self-love as biblical but hardly commanded. It is biblical in that it is assumed to be true (cf. Eph 5:29). The primary proof-text for such is Matt 22:39⁶⁴ that demonstrates the text to mean that self-love is assumed, not commanded. Further, there are numerous texts that suggest that our lives need to be other-directed. Phil 2:3 “regard one another as more important than yourselves”, suggests we ought to counter-balance any notion that our focus in life ought to be on self.

7.2.4 Conclusion
Lev 19:18 is central texts in Judaism and Christianity, but one surrounded with potential difficulties when placing too much weight upon this single verse in its interpretation. One may observe that there might be a problem if one loves one's neighbour only as much as one loves oneself. What happens when one does not love oneself enough and thereby wrongs and degrades herself? Should she treat others as she does herself? Love of God and love of neighbour as self belong together expressing metaphysical as well as ethical concreteness, and while they be distinguished they must not be separated. To love God demands openness to God’s creative undertakings where one’s self is drawn into that project following God’s divinity and accepting God’s otherness. It is the desire to know God and a longing for an intensified closeness with God. Jesus’ restatement of the double love commandment (Mathew 22: 37-39) denotes an appreciation of it for the proclamation of the reign of God in the Synoptic Gospels The biblical commandment in Leviticus and the Gospels to love the neighbour grounds that love of the other in a more original, basic, or given love of the self. For Rudolf Bultmann

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⁶⁴ Ephesians 5:33 has a similar construction and should be interpreted similarly. "Husbands, love your wives as yourselves” does not mean, “love your wives as you should love yourselves,” but “as you already do love yourselves.”
(1958, p.117) love is a 'definite attitude of the will' and 'not an affection of peculiar strength among the feelings and affections that fill the human soul'. In Christian ethics, the commandment is applied universally, suggesting 'the life of the neighbour to be affirmed beyond the bounds set by natural human sympathy' (Niebuhr 1963, p.30). This neighbour love consists in 'active goodwill toward the other' (Furnish 1972, 195). Neighbour love also suggests volitional and practical regard for her as a human being and assumes that one naturally has (or should have) the same sort of regard for oneself. Loving the neighbour as yourself, while the first part of the neighbour suggests a command, the second part ‘yourself’, self-love is only but implied. This is contrary to those who argue it is commanded in both parts (Radcliffe 1994, p.501). Given that love cannot be commanded, the injunction might be expressing a hope, an ideal, rather than telling one directly what to do. Presenting an ideal life in which one is motivated by feelings of affection for everyone, by thinking well of others. It is more a statement of fact than a commandment, it could be argued.

7.3 How did Jesus relate to himself?

7.3.1 Introduction

The injunction of Mathew 22: 39 stems from Jesus teaching that reflects how he wanted those listening to him to act. Proclaiming this double commandment was to illustrate the truths of the Kingdom of God he had come to set in place. This was a principle to be lived by in this new Kingdom, and he himself was practicing it. How did Jesus relate to himself? Did he from a Kantian understanding consider that he was obligated to duty to himself, or did he see himself from an Aristotelian point of view subscribing to the subject object understanding of the self? Or, how did Jesus view the place of the impartial spectator (Adam Smith) or the generalised other of Mead?

One place to look for a view of how Jesus must have related to himself is in the Gospels. Although the gospels are perceived kerygmatic, they also sketch out the life and
character of Jesus (Broadhead 1994, p.25). The gospels assume the validity of a historical Jesus who raised the question, ‘Who do people say that I am.’ (Mark 8:27-33) The question produced a variety of answers to include one volunteered by Peter, ‘You are the Christ’ (vs. 29). This response somehow alerts how Jesus related and thought of himself as the true God and true man.

The lives of many people have been influenced by the belief that Jesus was the Messiah of God. Jesus himself must have had some form of self-awareness from which he drew the conclusion to accept Peter’s answer, ‘You are the Christ’. His followers would have reflected on him in this guise growing in their understandings of who he was and what he embodied. It is this self-awareness that we seek to explore in this section to aid determine how Jesus must have related to himself. There are many evaluations of Jesus used in the bible: Rabbi, Prophet Saviour, Lord, Son of Man, Son of God and God not to leave out Christos- Messiah. The evaluation of the Messiah-Christos has been responsible for the expression of Christology designating who he was and the role he played in the divine plan.

Some believers have stopped at this point of recognising Jesus as the Christ of faith responsible particularly for the Christian community, others have insisted on both the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith, in this discussion I accept Jesus both of faith and history. Looking for the historical Jesus has aimed first at establishing how Jewish Jesus was, and secondly, using the same premises others have attempted to show that Jesus was not Jewish (Casey 1998, p.96). Proponents of the quest for the Jewishness of Jesus have been responsible for the argument that Jesus the Christ of Christian faith was in fact a creation of the early church. The historical Jesus never claimed to be the Son of God, the Lord, or even the Messiah (Craig 1994, p.242-243). I concede of the Jewishness of the historical Jesus pre-resurrection. For Evans ‘..the only Jesus who operates in history, is the preached Christ of the
apostles (1994 ed. p.56-57). For a response to how Jesus must have related to himself will draw attention to his intentions and his relationship to his contemporaries in Judaism.

The first is to ask whether Jesus had a self-awareness of being a person that related to the times and the peoples of Galilee specifically (Riches 2010, p.351), although his travels took him as far as Jerusalem and other areas of the region. The second question asks whether that self-awareness was synonymous with Peter’s reply, ‘You are the Christ?’ These two questions could be asked differently; did God became human in order that human beings might share in a divine reality, what is the point for stressing the Jewishness of Jesus’ humanity? Yet, it is as a human being that the enigma of Jesus is presented to those he interacted with. The authors of the gospel story show a deepened awareness of how interrelated are the events, words, and the works in the life of Jesus with the person he is.

7.3.2 The enigma Jesus presented

It is ostensible that whatever else may be involved in the Christological belief, it must include a reference to the specific historical person of Jesus (Wiles 1994, p.45). This is the Christ who is the son of Mary but who is also the incarnate Son of God. Concerning this Christ, a reference is therefore made of a particular person at a given moment in history being the embodiment of the divine. This embodiment designates a concept of incarnation a term in which Jesus’ followers came to sum up their belief.

The cogent subject of incarnation is God or the second person of the Trinity. Incarnation presents us with the ‘from above,’ that is to say it begins with being of God and then moves to consider his becoming a man (Ibid. p.11). In this incarnational work is built the uncertainty and curiosity over Jesus’ identity. To all those Jesus encounters, speaks and ministers to, his identity seems to change each times (Green 2003, p.4). John the Baptist questions Jesus’ authenticity, ‘Are you he who is to come, or shall we look for another?’
(Mat. 11: 3). John’s question expresses the conundrum with which the person of Jesus and his ministry presented itself to his contemporaries.

There continued to be expressed the uncertainty of whether Jesus was actually the promised Messiah. To some Jesus presented himself as simply another itinerant preacher, cynic, or a charismatic, prophet or indeed an agent of Beelzebub the prince of the devils as postulated (Mt. 10; 25). The same enigmatic stance occurs on his triumphal entry into Jerusalem as “the whole city was stirred and asked, “Who is this?” (Mt. 21:10). Harrington (1972, p.154) observes that the documents of the New Testament are about a person whose role in history is remembered.

To this person is attributed an event still close at hand. The body of sayings in the gospels even while making allowances for limiting factors in their formation remain coherent and consistently distinct and must be seen to represent the thoughts of a single inimitable teacher. These gospels independently contain genuine evidence of the perplexity Jesus presented to those who were around him (Young 2005, p.206). Jesus did not seem to fit with the previous patterns and expectations of what constituted a messenger of God, a prophet or even a teacher of religion (Sanders 1985 cited by Flusser 1986, p.247). He was not a priest; and unlike his cousin John the Baptist Jesus did not come from a priestly family. He wasn’t even a bona fide prophet in the Old Testament sense. His preaching was not couched in the idiom of a reiteration of the word of God.

Jesus was also not simply an apocalyptic seer or visionary with intend to interpret the signs of the times and proclaiming God’s judgement on his community. He could not fit in the group of teachers of the law in the Pharisaical sense of the word. He was opposed to the casuistry that typified the Pharisees profession. Speaking in parables, aphorisms and proverbs, he fitted into the group of teachers of wisdom. He was politically indifferent at many points and least motivated by schools of Zealots, nor was he simply another itinerant
exorcist, wonder working or charismatic miracle man. In all respects Jesus broke apart previous categories and expectations, he simply was “the man who fits no one formula.’ (Schweizer 1989, p.86)

7.3.3 Jesus’ human self-awareness

While Jesus created this aura of enigma around himself, he also expressed in very intimate terms the arrival of the Kingdom of God. In fact, his own intimate address of God as Abba, his message that the future domain of God had already broken through in his own being and ministry, gave him identity. Jesus’ predictions regarding his own suffering and fate, his table fellowship with women and publicans considered social outcasts of his contemporary society put him in a league of his own.

The question of his identity, role or relationship of Jesus to the divine forced itself to those who came in contact with him (Green 2003, p.5). Either Jesus was whom he said he was, the kind of person who spoke with divine authority, or he was a blasphemer and a fool. The gospels entertain several possibilities (Mk. 1:22, 27; 2:7; 3:21). Marsh (1998) concurs with Wright (1996, 131) that in the New Testament ’Jesus is reconstituting Israel around himself’ (p.78). Jesus’ self–awareness consisted in him calling those around him to a new way of being Israel, and therefore making a claim for the crucial role of his own person in Israel’s reconstitution in this new way. Jesus was consequently retelling the story of Israel as his own story.

Marsh (1998, p.78-79) citing Wright’s (1996) observes that every activity Jesus engaged in had a deeper meaning that encompassed the whole of Israel. In the parable of the sower ’Jesus implies that his own career and kingdom-announcement is the moment towards which all Israel’s history has been leading’. Jesus’ own ministry is to be seen as ’the encapsulation, not merely the climax’ of the story of Israel. Jesus fully intended his stories to generate a new form of community. He was not, then, speaking of Israel as an abstract
concept, but very concretely of the way that people inter-related. Jesus created around himself a ‘fictive kinship’ that undermined contemporary assumptions about family ties. There is hence a personal language and style unique to Jesus showing clearly his personal characteristics in his sayings. In their simplicity [sayings], closeness to life and evident of the Semitic usage they all point to the person of Jesus. Jeremias argues that in the synoptic tradition, ‘it is the inauthenticity and not the authenticity of the sayings of Jesus that must be demonstrated’ (1971, p.37).

It is however, the uncertainty and speculation regarding Jesus’ true identity and status that brings into play the encounter and quality of the first Christological reflections (Green 2003, p.5). The issue of Jesus’ identity did not surface in its beginning as a theoretical problem. Green observes further that it seems the question was how this person of Jesus could be said ‘to express and unite both the essence of humanity and divinity in a way unique and unparalleled in the history of religion.’ Jesus somehow brought this question of identity upon himself by how he acted or interacted in his everyday life. His compassion for the poor, the sick and all those marginalised members of the society appear to have created difficulties for him.

Further still, his proclamation of the coming kingdom of God and his demonstration of the saving and healing reality of that impending kingdom forced his interlocutors to stop and notice (Mk 7: 31 - 37). It must be such a reflection as this; on what he was doing that produced the first examples of Christological reflection and confession. We come to know Jesus in many ways including how we can imaginatively reconstruct the way he lived out his Jewish heritage and sought to transform the life of his people. We also come to know Jesus through the eyes of his early disciples in the Gospels (Riches 2010, p.355).

A central feature in understanding how Jesus related to himself has been the place of his humanity. The question of recovering Jesus’ full humanity remains central to Christology,
it is the question that sent the communities of Jesus followers into centuries-long process of trial and error whose final conclusion were the dogmas of Nicea and Chalcedon. The exercise is never completed, this is because Jesus’ impact and significance are to be communicated in every place and time, and the Christological quest is a continuing quest. Therefore, the quest for the historical Jesus cannot be avoided in our present cultural setting. This is re-enforced by the fact that Jesus was this historical figure who proclaimed the Kingdom in his parables, healings, exorcism and to the company he chose to keep, he acted out the nearness of this Kingdom of God.

7.3.4 Jesus’ divine self-awareness

There is the dominant ethical norm in Christian history and tradition that of Christ as exemplar tied in our opinion to a false view that he exercised a powerful pure love that was free from self-interest and self-love. Thomas a Kempis (1952, p. 83-84) suggests that for love to be worthy of the Christian ideal a complete denial of self is required, ‘no trace of self-love.’ Kempis’ sentiments have been applied capturing the typical ideal of saintliness which then bequeathed on the wider historical tradition of Christianity and ultimately based on the assumption that Jesus transcended all self-concern.

Unfortunately, this claim does not account for the fact that Jesus like the God of Israel, yearned for the requital of love (Post 1988, p.217). It is apparent from New Testament texts that Jesus’ love is more complicated perhaps than the image of an overflowing plenitude appear to suggest. While I agree with Post (Ibid. p.218) that Jesus hoped to become a causa efficiens calling new love into existence, the love that would reflect back on himself, Post would be hard pressed to prove that Jesus was disappointed because of the moral failures of those surrounding him65. Jesus clearly may not have wanted his love to be rejected and

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65 Later on considering the question of how ‘God’s suffering cannot be devoid of self-concern’; we notice that suffering has something to do with the divine’s own self-love; a love, which the divine expects, should be an example to humanity. In the divine human love, the divine loves in a manner that cannot preclude human
unreciprocated. He may not have willed that the recipients of his love would reject his generosity.

But he had to accept the fact that the divine act of loving like the human act of loving included freedom of choice. In love is freedom certainly expressed and this freedom of choice of wanting or not wanting to love back is very much what Jesus expected. Albeit if he was not requited this love he would not have failed in his mission either. Jesus hence did not demonstrate a pure love free from self-interest and self-love and we are not surprised when Jesus cried out in wrath tempered by forgiveness,

O Jerusalem, Jerusalem the city that murders the prophets and stones the messengers sent to her! How often have I longed to gather your children as a hen gathers her brood under her wings, but you would not have me. (Matt. 23:37)

Jesus’ concern for both himself and his Father is evident: "I have come accredited by my Father, and you have no welcome for me" (John 5:43). There is no question here that Jesus supposedly exercised a higher standard of selfless love, was this to be the case he would not have been agonising over this rejection

It is obvious that through the cross Jesus became the exemplar of forgiveness and patience the two virtues equated with selflessness, but this is contestable. Since it is equally obvious that the virtues of patience and forgiveness would be nonsensical and superfluous in the absence of blame attached to non-requital. It seems to me that crucifixion is not necessarily the only way to tell the story of salvation as enacted by Jesus. Westerly (1981, p.116) observes that ‘mutuality will be devalued as sub-Christian’ when the cross is focused

freedom of choice. Love is demonstrated by this freedom. Post (1988, p. 218) suggests that Jesus was disappointed in his mission. If Jesus hoped to become a causa efficiens summoning this new love into existence, while he would have wanted everyone to embrace it, compelled by the same new love he would have had to give room for the freedom of those surrounding him. The difficulties that Post suggest existing between John the Baptist and Jesus Christ in how they related to one another in doing each his own ministry is therefore not founded, and it cannot be the case that the equilibrium and moral excellence of mutuality was left unrealised, but rather to reiterate that divine suffering is not devoid of self-concern although this may appear to be the case. Indeed, many tend to or would celebrate the fact that Jesus would have been happy to be conceived to empty herself of all self-interest and self-love.
on singularly as the way of salvation. To this point Post (1988, p.219) would add that considering the action of Jesus on the cross, the penchant for the pain of one-way love rests on a mistaken view of Jesus and his mission.

But this mistaken view is what Nygren’s identification between selfless love and the cross (Nygren 1982, p.115) amounts to, suggesting a simplistic orthodox understanding of Jesus death on the cross. It is a simplistic understanding of Jesus’ actions because of the assumption that these actions were none-requital but desired, necessary and good. It seems when love is given such simplistic dogmatic assumptions it can only be understood as self-abnegation wholly disinterested in response, rather than as personal communion.

Something that appears to have eluded the orthodox Christian tradition is the fact that the life that Jesus Christ lived presents no normative model of love that violates the principle of reciprocity. Rather, Jesus’ life teaches the tragedy of non-requital and the necessary role of freedom in the divine-human encounter. Jesus must have understood that it is human freedom that thwarts the divine intention of effecting mutuality, and yet at the same time, any efforts to eliminate human freedom by some divine determinism would preclude the realisation of mutual love.

Jesus must have been clear in his undertakings that the divine desires a free response from humanity, for that matter the Kingdom of heaven could not be imposed on anyone. John Hick (1977, p. 517) remarks that the life of Jesus was, ‘a hazardous adventure in individual freedom.’ Hick appears to imply that Jesus must have known that love that is forced, or even manipulated out of the lover is not the kind of love that God wants as the foundation for fellowship. God on account of that, will not, and must not destroy the responsible personhood of humanity however much he finds human actions as frantic and cruel distortions of right relationship as something that grieves him. It is the only way the divine can remain true to his own ultimate purpose. Post has argued that divine ‘mutual love is
inextricably linked with freedom, risk, and patience, but never with selflessness.’ (1988, p. 220) Jesus in his actions never intended the absence of requital nor did he seek after this absence. Although a case can be made for an individual’s personal preoccupation with motivational purity that may result into disinterestedness and a feeling of sanctity, this benefit easily disrupts the movement of love through give-and-take action that defines the Jesus ethical ideal founded on mutual love⁶⁶.

7.3.5 Conclusion

It is the case that Jesus did not empty himself of self-concern and that his message constantly was that the people would respond to his proclamation and have a change of heart. It is this desire of people’s change of heart that solidly establishes mutuality as the highest ideal of love when we turn to Jesus and attribute self-concern to him. Without taking up the life of Jesus and considering his actions, the traditional orthodox claim of Christus Exemplar as a norm of radical self-abnegation remains both uncorrected and a potential obstacle to mutuality or reciprocity. To understand Christian ethics through mutuality is to come into consistency with the Jewish prophetic tradition. The tradition permits us to think about the ideal of love without necessarily making references to the cross. This is because in modern times the cross is bestowed with such a high status than perhaps is necessary and therefore

⁶⁶ I argued above that the life of Jesus presents no normative model of love that would violate the principle of reciprocity that is summed up in mutual love. Mutual love is redemptive intimacy highlighting the moral good of reciprocity and fellowship between the divine and humanity. Jesus’ actions on the cross stand out and the cross has been used as the symbol of disinterestedness and of pure utterly selfless love. Distancing from this orthodox claim of the cross as the symbol of pure and an unadulterated selfless love we hold on the place of mutual love. Considering crucifixion, it seems obvious that Jesus’ enemies exclusively and fully willed his murder on the cross, it cannot have been willed by the Father or Jesus himself. Jesus spent his public life preaching the Good News of the Reign of God, and it can be assumed that the deepest desire of his heart was that People would respond to his proclamation and have a change of heart. If this had happened, then salvation through immolation would not have been necessary. While salvation through immolation is one way of considering the nature of love and that this is the way through which we are presented salvation, it is surely not the best way nor the only way. Westerly (1981, 115) asks, ‘Suppose the Jews had heard his call and the nation converted,’ would they perhaps have still gone ahead and kill him? If everyone had responded to Jesus message of conversion there would have been nobody to administer his death, on the other hand if Jesus had known that he would have to die on the cross in order for salvation to come, then he could not want everyone to be transformed by his message. We concede that it is more likely that Jesus hoped and prayed that “everyone” would respond to his call and that the significance of his death to be otherwise.
undermines the theory of mutuality. I have argued that the cross is never the goal of love, its more the expression of the distance to which God is willing to go in order to restore broken community and therefore symbolises the violation of love than it symbolise love itself. The love therefore that we need is not the disinterested and utterly selfless love but rather the deeply mutual love that has both the quality of a gift received and the quality of a gift given.

If this is true, then it cannot be the case as presented by the Orthodox Christological interpretation of Jesus’ actions that he simply and somehow his entire meaning of life and work was to be found in his headlong race toward Golgotha. It is not true that in his journey toward crucifixion Jesus sought suffering as an end in itself to complete the resolution of the divine human drama once and for all. Self-abnegation is not the focal point of love especially the love Jesus expressed, since Jesus' act appear motivated not in his lust for sacrifice but in his power of mutuality.
7.4. What did Jesus teach on relating to oneself?

7.4.1 Introduction

Nothing is more characteristic of the teaching of Jesus than his insistence upon the duty of self-sacrifice for his followers and would be followers. Again and again he goes back to the same thought, that a person must lose her life in order to gain it; that no one can be his disciple unless she deny herself and take up her cross and follow him; that no person can serve two masters. These sayings of Jesus made a great impression upon his hearers, and there have been no sayings that have given modern Christians more difficulty. Jesus is advocating self-denial that takes many forms, moral or otherwise and he [Jesus] asks too much of us morally. The sayings fit well in an age of martyrs, but they seem entirely out of place in an age of conventional Christianity. The precept of Jesus seems to be to treat others as you would be treated by them, and not as they have treated you or would be likely to treat you in future. Jesus goes beyond the doctrine of human rights as presently presented. While the doctrine of human rights\(^67\) sets morally acceptable limits to moral self-sacrifice, moral conduct remains demanding.

And for self-denial\(^68\) that Jesus espoused, no formula captures its fate. Below I consider some of the texts Jesus called upon as he laid out his injunctions for moral commands. I also discuss briefly how Jesus illustrates self-sacrifice and the moral injunctions he sets out for his followers. These injunctions championed self-sacrifice as a process by which the follower of Christ seeks for the supreme moral good. The Sermon on the Mount remains paramount to achieving the moral good.

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67 Rights-based ethical theories carry the idea that advocating equal rights for everyone enhances the preservation of each individual's life and freedom. Modern accounts of rights, therefore, focus more on respecting the rights of others or on playing our own 'trump cards' than on showing how respecting others' rights and asserting our own contribute to our personal happiness.

68 While Jesus appears to have implied self-sacrifice and self-denial in his conversations, we subscribe to view that at the limit of self-sacrifice is the willingness to die of the sake of acting morally, while at the limit of self-denial is the willingness to die for the sake of acting on principle, even when there is no apparent moral issue at stake.
7.4.2 **Jesus illustrates ethical self-sacrifice**

Jesus’ precepts are beyond the capacity or even the will of most people, who can only but moderate them; that is to say we must force them into a compromise (Kateb 2008, p.371). A compromise that looks more like a betrayal. Jesus’ own life is a striking illustration of this ethical sacrifice. From the first consciousness of his great mission, he schooled himself to follow his ideals. His experience of the wilderness Temptation was not a bit of histrionics. He actually chose the narrow path in preference to the broad way to immediate success.

Life meant much to him, and he was ambitious as few men are; pushing some lesser good aside that he might find his meat and drink in doing his Father's will. The people wished to make him king, he who was without a place to lay his head. His friends urged him to avoid the suffering and death he foresaw awaiting him. While his own nature cried out in Gethsemane his choice was steady. He would give his life for others; he would seal the new covenant with his blood.

Although Jesus drew men to himself by the cross, it was not that he wished martyrdom, but that he saw his mission was too great to be abandoned at any price. Here Jesus language of self-sacrifice is completely contrary to Derrida’s understanding of self-sacrifice as an act of violence against oneself in order not to subject others to violence (Dalferth 2010, p. 78-79). Jesus equally refused to give his soul to gain the world. And therefore, God hath highly exalted him and given him a name that is above all other names. He was the totality of a lived Sermon on the Mount.

Jesus expects his followers to be able to emulate or make the efforts to emulate him in living out the Sermon on the Mount, in itself a hard act to follow. Jesus shows us what being human means because he defines how to live the good life in this world (Alexis-Baker 2011, p. 427). Jesus illustrates simply that, when morally good, our acts of self-sacrifice never fail to benefit us because they necessarily advance our deeper desires. This could be said of a
father who sacrifices his desire to watch a football game to be present with his son at an important moment. The father is not only benefitting his son, he is also advancing his own true self-interest because his relationship with his son is more essential to his own happiness that of staying home and watching the game.

Subsequently, when self-sacrifice is ethical it involves sacrificing material or social goods. It can be said to sacrifice personal goods only in a very narrow sense. Humans are inclined toward communion with others, so that the ethical self-sacrifice they practice advances this inclination and consequently personal flourishing. Although ethical self-sacrifice necessarily forfeits goods of one sort or another it always gains others in their place. Otherwise, it might be self-sacrifice, but it would not be ethical.

7.4.3 The supreme good as expressed in the Sermon on the Mount

If one clears her mind of the fanciful and over-zealous interpretation of Jesus' call to sacrifice, there at once appears the great principle upon which it is based that one must choose the supreme good rather than a secondary good. Jesus considered the supreme good to be membership in the kingdom of God. Jesus pursues an agent centred ethics, the kind that modern authors eschew emphasising impartiality and objectivity (Devettere 1993, p.76).

Jesus ethical framework suggests acting for the sake of personal happiness, which many consider to be self-centred and out of place ethics. It is, however, necessary to call to mind some of the things which Jesus regards as secondary goods: wealth, whether much or little, physical comfort, reputation for piety, even life itself. The language of the supreme good that supersedes the secondary goods is central in the Sermon on the Mount, where

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69 Obviously, Jesus’ ethics does not advocate selfishness. Paradoxical as it may seem, his goal of personal happiness is compatible both with seeking virtue for its own sake and with seeking the good of others for their sake.

70 It is not surprising that when Jesus finished the Sermon on the Mount, all of its teachings radical in varying degrees, "the people were astounded" (Matthew 7:28). Presently although we have grown as familiar with the Sermon on the Mount, the words retain the power to astound and to disconcert, when they are thought about as a contribution to moral philosophy rather than as articles of inherited religious doctrine.
Jesus declares all these secondary goods to be sacrificed when they come into opposition with the supreme good. They are to be sacrificed because the supreme good is worth more than they.

The man who sold all he had to buy the field with a treasure in it (Mat. 13: 44), the merchant who sold all his pearls that he might buy the one extraordinary pearl (Ibid. verse 45-46), these men did not count themselves as suffering loss in the exchange. The thing obtained was worth more than the things given. This is Jesus' very simple philosophy of sacrifice. A person surrenders an inferior good for a greater good. She gives for what she gets, but she gets something more valuable than that which she gives. She makes a good bargain by giving for instance; physical life to gain eternal life. Jesus’ language of the Sermon on the Mount is unique. But in recent literature one often comes across remarks implying that from a comparative perspective Jesus’ ethical teaching appears to be banal. Reynolds Price (1997, p.49) argues that the Marcan Jesus' ethical teaching, “virtually no single injunction or opinion is without its parallel in earlier religious lore—whether Jewish, Greco-Roman, Hindu, Confucian, or Buddhist.”

Wierzbicka (2001, p.442) counters Price’s argument that numerous parallels to Jesus’ sayings may have been cited in recent scholarly literature but “these reported parallels are superficial and depend largely on an inadequate language analysis.” It is on this understanding of uniqueness that Jesus teaches the great message of the Sermon on the Mount that could ‘virtually amount to an introduction to the entire development of Christian theology and ethics’ (Davies et al 1991, p. 283). The teachings concentrated in the Sermon on the Mount in Mathew chapters 5-7 and scattered elsewhere in the gospels constitute a radical

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71 Wierzbicka’s point holds on grounds that not many scholars would maintain that humankind's religious beliefs can be meaningfully compared through culture-bound concepts like predestination, karma, nirvana, or purgatory. (For example, what does Judaism teach about karma? What does Confucianism teach about purgatory? What does Buddhism teach about predestination?). It is simply imagined, that only concepts like kindness, tolerance, nonviolence, or anger that are of an entirely different nature can be safely relied on as analytical tools in comparing ethical teaching across languages, cultures, and religions.
view of human conduct (Kateb 2008, p.372). Acting on some of them would require either moral heroism or martyrdom, and one is inclined preponderantly that martyrdom rather than heroism is called for.

The teaching of the Sermon on the Mount requires an interpretation that takes into account the literary context of the whole book. Davies et al (1991, p. 285) suggest the Sermon on the Mount functions in its larger literary context as ‘a general summary of Jesus’ moral demand ‘ on anybody, but more so Jesus’ own followers particularly. This moral demands call for moral virtues and qualities that always involve injunctions to do what has not yet been known done. It calls for moral perfection that cannot seem to be achieved (Lundbom 2009, p.441 citing Luther 1530).

The injunctions build up one’s character as one earnestly struggles with no relaxation, to reach the unreachable. It is in these higher echelons of the moral demands that the supreme good of the domain of God is sought for. A condition of attaining this supreme good Jesus demands everything, up to and including the impossible. This is because anything less than that, anything less than the eschatological will of God would put a limit on goodness (Ibid. p.286). Jesus’ moral commands portrayed in the Sermon on the Mount call for change in such a way that one is constantly evolving towards what is better, being transformed from glory to glory, and thus always improving and ever becoming perfect by daily growth, and never arriving at any limit of perfection.

Perfection consists in one never stopping in her growth in good, never circumscribing her perfection by any limitation. This forms a bigger picture of what Jesus teaches about relating to oneself. In Matt. 28: 16 – 20 he commands that disciples be made of all people by being taught, ‘all that I have commanded you’. Noticeably, the injunctions of the Sermon on the Mount appear unrealistic, impractical, impossible of fulfilling and unjust. The evangelist who wrote the gospel of Mathew does not seem to directly address these issues. While this
remains the case, it seems Jesus had in mind a sense of progressive pursuit of the supreme good. The injunctions commanded in the Sermon of the Mount cannot in any straightforward sense be fully possessed or mastered, exhausted, perfected, either by the community or the individual (Davies et al 1991, p. 290). Goodenough (1967, p. 254) observes “Jesus would fulfil the Law by looking to impossible ideals rather than practicalities”. The point Jesus seems to be making was to teach the necessity of grace. When one sincerely undertakes to obey the commandments, one inevitably fails. But this can only be a boon for it leads one to confess inadequacy that in turn should throw one back upon God’s grace.

Jesus teaches his hearers that they could not, in their own strength, fulfil the will of God. The point being made is to teach the necessity of grace. Elsewhere, Jesus seems to imply these injunctions can be reached by love, of God, neighbour and of self. Jesus claimed God to be perfect or complete in that his [God’s] love is not confined within himself but extends to all the created order, so too must the disciple be perfect, it is to be humbly and passionately concerned with what is not the self.

7.4.4 Conclusion

Modern authors eschew agent-centred considerations in ethics and emphasize impartiality and objectivity. They advocate respect for natural rights held equally by all, or action for the sake of duty and the moral law regardless of personal consequences, or action guided by rules designed to achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest number. In Jesus’ ethical frameworks acting for the sake of personal happiness appears self-centred and out of

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72 The apostles Paul [11 Cori.3: 18; Philip. 3] reminds us, that we ought not to be distressed when considering the commands of the Sermon on the Mount with their tendency [toward mutability] in our nature. ON the contrary we need to place ourselves in a state to change in such a way that we constantly are evolving towards what is better. It is being transformed from glory to glory, and thus always improving and increasingly becoming perfect by daily growth. We never arrive at any limit of perfection, since perfection consists in our never stopping in our growth in good, or circumscribing our perfection by any limitation.
place. The teachings of Jesus are radical, but they feature a formulation of moral guidance that need not be radically interpreted.

When revised, it is the most succinctly useful of all: "Always treat others as you would like them to treat you" (Matthew 7:12; Luke 6:31). Jesus’ teachings about relating to oneself appears to lay emphasis on an ethic of self-denial, that today some are uncomfortable with. The Sermon on the Mount links Christian ethics with personal happiness: the meek will possess the earth, the mourners will be comforted, the seekers of justice will be satisfied, the merciful will obtain mercy, the clean of heart will see God, the peacemakers will be called children of God, the persecuted will have a great reward in heaven (Mt 5:1-12).

Many people will admit that this is a self-centred ethic whose goal is personal happiness and appears to make ethics ultimately narcissistic. If the goal of ethics is always my personal good then other people seem to become no more than something I use to achieve my goal. The other person becomes what proponents of natural rights, the Kantian moral law and the utilitarian principle all condemn; merely a means to my personal end. Jesus teaches that self-sacrifice for others actually provides the greatest measure of personal happiness for the hero or martyr. Jesus appears to advocate double paradox that is, acting both for the sake of virtue and for personal happiness, and doing good for others for their sake and for my sake as well, that is to say, loving others and loving myself.
Chapter 8

Theology of Self and Self-love

8.1 Introduction

For many Christians ideas of the self represent one of the areas of greatest confusion. On the one hand we are exhorted from wayside pulpits to make the order 'God first, others second, self last'. On the other we are urged by Christian counsellors 'Be yourself', 'fulfil yourself'. Neither injunction seems generally made with any depth of consideration as to why the self should be renounced. Or, whether there is a possibility of distinguishing between 'self' in its popular usage and 'the self', and to what the Christian understanding of the nature of the self might be. Others like Alice Keefe (1997, p. 61-76) have written, "belief in the self as independent and self-existent is our fundamental delusion and root poison."

Reading Keefe one has the impression that it is somewhat paradoxical to speak about the self as a form of identity in a Christian religious tradition, which ultimately deny that reality that we might claim for ourselves. Keenan (2004, p. 94), suggests ‘a philosophic world accustomed to thinking in terms of interconnectedness and complexity theory,’ cannot claim there are real substances anywhere.’ This is echoing the post-modernist who claim the death of the subject and therefore in our case the death of the self.

I subscribe to that reality of the self, convinced that day-by-day most if not all of persons experience their identities, including our religious, cultural, and social identities, as neither empty nor erased (Bidwell 2008, p.3). I also discuss the fact that modernity now offers a number of different cultural possibilities for the self suggesting why identity confusion and fragmentation is claimed {in regard to the self-}. A Christian theology of the self is therefore affected by the two injunctions raised above, of acknowledging the self as key to personhood or debasing the
self-altogether. The “self” with these two injunctions implies a commitment to a particular theological anthropology. It is obvious therefore that contemporary Christian thought about the self is at pains to stress that; it is only in relation to God and other people that we become fully human (Woodhead 1999, p. 67-68). In what follows I discuss the merits and de-merits of the two injunctions and from which I will attempt to determine the theology of self and self-love. I begin by discussing how determining and presenting the case about the self from theological resources is justifiable. It means a Christian religious commitment of some kind in defence of a self or Christian theology of the self.

8.2 Christian theology and self

Christianity provides a distinctive technique of the self, of the practices of confession and examination of conscience. The requisite of disclosing oneself that makes Christianity a confessing religion is fulfilled in different ways at different times. In its beginnings this requirement was carried out by a ritual recognizing of oneself as a sinner and penitent, a practice that later on turned into self-examination.

The continuing practice of confessing and the introduction of the sacrament of penance in the church made the self a concealed reality. Its truths had to be uncovered by a process of self-interpretation. This Christian understanding of the self has significantly influenced the Western culture. The self was no longer something to be made but something to be renounced and decrypted. The Christian experience of the self is inevitably negative, or at least ambiguous (Ward 1982, 178;), because the self is the arena for an endless struggle with evil (Wood 2010 p. 417-418).

In an age of increasing secular humanism there is a preoccupation with questions about the self. Questions ranging from who am I, how can I improve my life, and how can I know who
I am? Regrettably, there subsists today little agreement among philosophers, psychologists, sociologists and even theologians regarding the nature of human nature. The situation is made complicated by an assortment of post-modern theories among those claiming the death or disappearance of the self altogether (Davis 1990, p.160; Marsh 2002).

Aside, earlier theories without neglecting the social factors, laid great stress upon the instincts as representing reservoirs of specific energy. Christian theology need to provide authentic answers to many questions of the self, that is to say, Christians need to postulate a method by which to develop a theological concept of self. A concept capable to support claims that confessional theology has resources for shaping a powerful and innovative re-description of the tradition of transcendental subjectivity. This is a tradition that does not require the self’s disappearance (Marsh 2002, p.254).

If the self constitutes a person willed by God into being, such a person then possesses certain completeness constitutive of a being created in the image of God. The self is therefore is a portrait of authentic subjectivity that derives from one’s first and foremost independent membership in the body of Christ. This account of the self is a portrait of authentic subjectivity that is explicitly Christological and Trinitarian (Wood 2010, p.419).

This is contra Keenan (2004, p.94) who claims there is no self, that there are ‘no substances since all things are empty specifically of substance.’ Furthermore, Keenan observes in the mystical body of Christ individuals clearly do retain their physical bodies, with their obvious functions and dysfunctions. However, one cannot attribute the definition of self as
bounded in these individuals by the skins of their bodies as they have been emptied of any final being, because the self has no abiding essence\(^{73}\).

I argue that in the mystical body of Christ physical body identities are retained, and Christ relates to more than just these physical bodies but rather to some supposed core of being persons possess uniquely. It cannot therefore be a misunderstanding that Christ’s reality stands opposed to human cultures and lives, ready to break in with supernal force exploding into human pride and arrogant lives construed upon sin. I discuss below that whether sinful or saved, human subjectivity is performative and imitative and whether under sin or under grace, to be a self is to imitate God, and this cannot mean to be empty of substance.

As sinners, humans have duplicitous subjectivity which is a dreadful parody of God’s loving act of creation. Conversely, as saved subjects, persons imitate Christ the only fully real human being. Persons imitate him by turning away from the self and loving God above all things. At the core of human subjectivity, one cannot help but imitate God. But before I discuss imitation I will examine first the argument of the disappearing self that is proposed by the theologian Stanley Hauerwas among other theologians like Rowan Williams\(^{74}\), since a self

\(^{73}\) Keenan wants to demonstrate that, that “the self exists essence-free independence” based upon a host of historical, genetic, and cosmic causes and conditions: human families, parents, individuals paths through this life, their genes, the very being of the universe and-most especially-human memories, which lead persons back to the time of Jesus and incorporate their self-identities within his identity.

‘There is no final need to carve up the real into units of self and not-self,’ argues Keenan (Ibid. 96) Rather, individuals live by passing through “the great doubt”—that they have no firm hold on being, that they do not control the flux and change that swirls through their veins-and into an assured and confident identification with Christ, mixing their memories and sharing his experience.

While Keenan wants to use all these collections of experiences to claim that none can stand out to demonstrate the abiding essence of the self, we want to argue here that the reverse is actually true; it is only because these experiences can be attributed to personhood that they allow us to conceive an active and abiding essence of some kind common to all of these experiences. That essence has to be the self.

\(^{74}\) While Hauerwas (1998, p. 78,79) subscribes to the disappearing self, Williams has great distrust of interiority and depth, and rejects all notions of an authentic self as a therapeutic self and therefore questions the self’s integrity as a full formed unity created in the image of God. He perceives the self to exist without interiority, with no deep psyche, no buried emotional truths longing to achieve authentic expression. Williams seeks to re-describe the self within the framework of a non-competitive ethic. This task of re-description Williams argues is the recognition that
capable of imitation cannot at the same time be a self that is disappearing unless the
disappearance is itself a form of imitation. I argue that to be a self is to be a proper object of
love loving God above all things through imitating Christ and therefore being an enduring self.

8.3 Modern theology and dignity of human personhood

Above I discussed how post-modernity continues to speak in the language of the self’s
disappearance or perhaps in the concomitant annihilation of interiority. This kind of language
denies that the person willed by God into being possesses certain formfulness [being], which
does not only suggest pure intentionality or interiority, but rather calls also for a kind of being
unity constitutive of being created in the image of God. This post-modern claim of the
disappearing of the self affects Christian theology of the dignity of human personhood. Stanley
Hauerwas suggests and defends this conundrum.

8.3.1 Stanley Hauerwas and human selfhood

In his book, The Peaceable Kingdom (1983), at the dawn of the pot-modernism’s
ascendance into higher echelons of academic institutions, Stanley Hauerwas was a formidable
advocate of human selfhood. He argued that, not only is knowledge of self tied to knowledge of
God,

inwardness, hiddenness and interiority of self remain false constructions to the extent that they are presumed to be
outside the unscripted and unpredictable networks of negotiations and exchanges.
Williams (1988, 42) observes that the notion of an essential private self is a socio-historical construct, since human
beings are not in the world as selves contained inside other sort of thing the shell of husk. There is no depth that
exists in subject until it is created. There is no a priori identity awaiting human beings, seeing that inwardness is a
processing of becoming. ‘The self is not a substance one unearths by peeling away layers until one gets to the core,
but an integrity one struggles to bring into existence (Williams 2000, p. 239-40).’ Therefore, for Williams, the idea
of a hidden self is then a fiction created as protection against the unpredictable and unscripted conversations and
negotiations with other that is life. The idea of a hidden self is a fiction created for the purpose of asserting a
fundamental script, a transparent narrative of eh way things are there is no truthful perception awaiting the self
through a process of uncovering and un-layering – no ‘swaddling clothes of hidden and given reality... ..........’ (Ibid.
p. 241). Williams is of the opinion that the self is something like a temporal boundary of our distinctive
conversational self-questionings.
‘but we know ourselves truthfully only when we know ourselves in relation to God. We know who we are only when we can place our selves, locate our stories within God's story.’ (1983, p.27)

Hauerwas provided an exposition marked by an unwavering affirmation of God who lovingly includes everybody within his own life, and by this inclusion affirms the overabounding grace of God for each self. Hauerwas understood grace to be ‘not an eternal moment above history rendering history irrelevant’. It is God's choice to be a Lord whose kingdom is furthered by human concrete obedience through which humans acquire a history befitting their nature as God's creatures (1983. p.27).

Hauerwas lays the foundation for a theological conception of the self (Marsh 2002, p. 258) that claims true self-knowledge requires knowledge of God. This is because in God’s story individuals become, the who, that they are. This re-enforces the fact that truthful knowledge of self is possible only on the basis of the God who has revealed himself in Jesus Christ and the church. Hauerwas later on jettisoned or perhaps side-lined these The Peaceable Kingdom 1983 thoughts on a Christian understanding of human selfhood in his later works, Wilderness Wanderings: Probing Twentieth-Century Theology and Philosophy 1997; and Sanctify Them in the Truth: Holiness Exemplified (1998). Marsh (2002, p.255) perceives Hauerwas as not being interested in the philosophical or theoretical justification for the correspondence between Christian claims and truth. It is in the absence of Hauerwas not being able to offer the justification for the correspondence between Christian claims and truth that he is able to ask,

‘How can theologians make sense of the world, given the way we Christians are taught to speak in and through our worship of God? (Hauerwas 1997, p. 3).

Hauerwas’ question and the further development of his thoughts suggest he is attempting to free Christian theology from prefixing conversations about God with apologies, prolegomena and
polemics with other discourses. Nonetheless, there is plenty polemical and prolegomena in his work. In his 1997 work where I focus his assessment of the self, Hauerwas writes that ‘Theology is best done without apology’, (1997, p.1). Hauerwas suggests that Christians’ knowledge about God, the world and the self, can be discovered by attending to the practices of the church as the 'primary set of language games' and to those distinctive practices the church keeps. Hauerwas however, is not alone in this consideration as Keenan (2004, p.97) echoing this argument writes,

‘…our identities are defined now, not by the conventions of deluded primal ignorance, but by the conventions and practices of pilgrimage into Christ. All identities are conventional; all selfhood exists only dependent on clusters of causes and conditions.’

Clusters of causes and conditions’ is a significant phrase here, as it eliminates any question of personal selfhood, suggesting any such selfhood is discovered in the collective practices of the church (Eucharist for example]. This collective discovery of the self in Hauerwas applauds the postmodern notion of the disappeared self for its capacity to recover an understanding of holiness. He sees .holiness, ‘…not as an individual achievement but as the work of the Holy Spirit building up the body of Christ'. (1998, p.78).

Hauerwas suggests that, it is in the collective thinking of physical bodies in the framework of a spirituality that makes God alone the agent of sanctification [the framework is peasant Catholicism]. For Hauerwas…‘. Christianity', `is not a set of beliefs or doctrines one believes in order to be a Christian, rather . . . to have one's body shaped, one's habits determined, in a manner that the worship of God is unavoidable.' (Ibid. p79). Hauerwas suggests for loss of individuality in the body of Christ or the community of the church. This is a view subscribed to by Haker,‘….the self participates in a socially and psychically mediated discourse that displaces
its individuality and its particularity' (2004, p. 360). The process makes any recourse to a “core” of subjectivity of the self or of the subject to be a myth of subject philosophy.

Notwithstanding, it cannot be true that these peasant Catholics do not have personal considerations of a goal to holiness, and that they are rather content with embodied practices. Each person is called into Christ first as an individual with a personal identity then, into the community of the church. It is argued from neuroscience’s intriguing findings that the anatomical structures of the brain responsible for the sense of self are also the ones involved in religious experience (Newsom 2012, p.6), implying a sense of personal autonomy and not of fused individualities.

It cannot therefore be true that in ecclesial practices persons cease to have boundaries nor are these boundaries fluid to the point the particularities of these individual’s bodies are lost. Conversely, even in liturgy or sacramental life these peasant Catholics do not lose their identities. Individual bodies belong to particular selves and not wholly to the other; holiness is therefore a matter of individual will.

The Peasant Catholics of Hauerwas can only but be selves who follow Jesus with a sense of self-reflection. Consequently, in their self-reflection they will uncover the existential subject. That is, the subject not merely as a knower but also as a doer; more than that, a doer engaged in a self-making. This is the subject who freely and responsibly makes the self to be as a particular self (Davis 1990, p.159).

Although Hauerwas argues otherwise, it is the case that human identity is a matter of a self that is seeking to control the body, a matter of perduring, continuous or predictable identity

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75 These practices to include prayer, celebration of the eucharis, obedience to ecclesial authority and tithing practices which show holiness to be primarily related to the matter of bodily gestures and movements. Knowledge of God is ‘habituated’ to bodies, in their distinctive practices ± ‘it is enough that they pray, obey and pay’.
Foucault has argued considering his third axis of ethics [the other two being knowledge and power] that, human beings have a propensity to the kind of relationship that makes one a moral subject. The genealogy of ethics according to Foucault examines how an individual forms that self-relationship that makes one a moral subject. He analyses the various practices by which persons attempt to become moral agents (Davis 1990, p167).

An action is ethical if it contributes to the formation of our subjectivity and he gives as an example, human sexual practices. Foucault (1983, p.208-9) writes contrary to Hauerwas. Hauerwas seems to see ethical relationships that one ought to have with oneself as displaced by the community. Individual identities of particular person become fused with Christ’s body; implied in Hauerwas suggestion is that human bodies belong wholly to others, not to selves.

Selfhood, in Hauerwas understanding is bestowed by participation in a story-shaped church for example (Woodhead 1999, p.68). Hauerwas describes the body of Christ as the annihilation of the self. He emphasises the transcendence of God at the expense of God's humanity. There is obviously in every individual a formal identity that is presupposed in the habits, practices, and crafts of the church. Without which any foregrounding of sanctified bodies, catechumenates, contrite hearts and character falls into incoherence. This supports the theory sometimes referred to as "symbolic interactionism" (Blumer 1969) that posits the origin and growth of the self-system in a community of selves, the distinctive process and basis of its formation involving the symbolic mechanisms of speech, dialogue, and role taking.

It is however this individuation or the self that is both subject and object at the same time; the knower and known, transcendent and empirical that postmodernists and Hauerwas are denying. Notwithstanding, it is difficult to justify Hauerwas (1998, p.78) claim that, `… loss of the self . . . can help us rediscover holiness not as an individual achievement but as the work of
the Holy Spirit building up the body of Christ'. Hauerwas seems oblivious to his previous claims in (1983 p.27), in the Peaceable Kingdom when he wrote, ‘To learn to be God's creature, to accept the gift [of salvation], is to learn to be at home in God's world'. We learn to be at home in God first as individual selves and then as a body of Christ or the community of the peasant Catholics.

There is no doubt that in each of Hauerwas’ peasant Catholics is an inner richness and mystery in creation's diversity that always and everywhere witnesses to the divine mystery within which it is concealed. Simply stated, the transformation of the self in Christ - being crucified with Christ - does not destroy the I for the sake of the Father but reconstitutes it in a new life to accommodate the Pauline claim, ‘the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me'. (Galatians 2: 20)

Moreover, in order to improve one’s self-image one must, value one’s self as an individual and not to judge one’s self by achievements. Each person has the duty to know who he/she is, that is, to try to know what is happening inside oneself, to acknowledge faults, to recognize temptations, to locate desires, and to be obliged to disclose these things either to God or to others in the community and hence to bear public or private witness against oneself (Martin et al 1998, p.40). The truth obligations of faith and the self are linked together. This link permits a purification of the soul impossible without self-knowledge, and self-knowledge presupposes a self to which it relates.

8.4 Theology of the supposedly fragmented self/selfhood

I have argued that self-knowledge presupposes a self to which it relates. It is this self-knowledge that commonly accepted provides individual selves with an identity that persons carry throughout lives despite the various changes experienced. Furthermore, persons know that they
have sets of abilities, great or small, that are their own and can used for good or for ill. Many people naturally resent being moulded in the image of other people and prevented from expressing their own true nature (Thiselton 1995, p.74).

Christians locate their identity ultimately in the God who created them in His image. Christians claim to be God’s creation made for His purposes and glory and must therefore be important as individuals before God. They are not just a small part of the mass of humanity, since each Christian is a unique individual self, albeit with some characteristics shared by all people but also with a set of characteristics unique to oneself. The fragmented selfhood has become synonymous with postmodernism, where one isn’t really a self at all. One has no unique identity that is identifiable from birth to death; and therefore there is no real "you" that remains constant throughout all of life’s changes. Anderson (1997, p.38) observes that

‘In the postmodern world you just don’t get to be a single and consistent somebody.’ Consequently, the resulting "loss of stability, loss of stable identity, and loss of confidence in global norms or goals breed deep uncertainty, insecurity, and anxiety. A self in such environments, is argued to live daily with fragmentation, indeterminacy, and intense distrust" of all claims to ultimate truth or universal moral standards. One reason for this is that modernity is not seen as a single and homogeneous entity but rather as internally diverse interweaving of various strands (Woodhead 1999, p.53).

Woodhead has identified what she terms as the four influential strands of the modern self; and adds that Christianity is implicated in all these strands. This idea of the fragmented selfhood appears spurious just like that of the disappearing self. Woodhead argues that the cause of fragmentation of modern self does not rest ‘in the actions of monolithic and universal processes of modernity’ (Ibid. p. 66), rather fragmentation is a product of the ever-increasing cultural
possibilities competing for the self in the contemporary context and cannot, it seems, come to a halt since as societies change their cultural possibilities change also\textsuperscript{76}. There is a sense in which Christianity acknowledges the fragmentary character of human life itself, a sense that leads to the question of what constitutes our personal humanness?

Christian faith is still the ’good news’ persons in contemporary times must find for themselves, and Christianity must not alienate persons from their authentic selfhood. Sin however does alienate from true essence, from true humanity. In God’s economy sin is the reason for a fragmented selfhood and therefore false subjectivity.

8.5 Theology of the self as sinful and hence false subjectivity

In many disciplines the conception of the self is always tied up or traced to Descartes’ understanding (Woodhead 1999, p. 61; Taylor 1989, p. 143-159; Seigel 2005, p. 56-74). It is the Cartesian self, which is fully autonomous, disembodied and self-transparent thinker; that essentially is unrelated to the other, whether human, divine or even itself. Many theologians have tended to distance themselves from this Cartesian conception of the self by the pursuit of other understandings of the self (Woodhead, 1999, p. 55-57; Daly 1973 p. 13-15)

Away from this Cartesian conception of the self, there is the perennial thought of the self as being simultaneously great and wretched; where the plausible explanation of this paradoxical dialectic can only be that persons have fallen from some previously ideal state, a teaching central to Christian theology. The wretchedness and greatness of the self ensue from two marked

\textsuperscript{76} The change can be reckoned from a single group like a church congregation to a whole people group. Woodhead (1999, p. 56) has pointed out that fragmentation is no longer just a historical unilinear view as it is evidenced in different cultures. While cultures may not necessarily be characterised by stable, embedded identities, it seems individuals in that culture retain certain enduring personhood. Woodhead’s observation appears to imply that there is going to be intensified fragmentation of the self in this postmodernity period. If Anderson is correct that persons lives are decentered, and that these are persons who are drawn in many directions and are constantly changing and being defined externally by the various relations they have with others, there is going to be a proliferation of the selves in the postmodern understanding.
positions that of the sinful self and therefore false subjectivity synonymous with wretchedness, and that of the greatness that is synonymous with redeemed self that is true subjectivity.

Under the conditions of the fall, the self that is constituted therein is false\textsuperscript{77} or for Pascal it is imaginary self (Wood 2010, p.421-426) that is called into being by an improper self-love. Improper self-love as an activity of human subjectivity constantly falls victim of false self and has restrictions when only God is worthy of unrestricted love. A false self depicts fallen subjects that actively construct their imaginary selves in concert of tacit cooperation with other duplicitous subjects. That is to say a false self has the tendency of preforming its subjectivity in a dark parody of divine goodness.

A false self acts with a sense of loss of due subordination of reason to God and of the other faculties to reason. The fall, from which according to biblical claims the false self may have arisen, has thus destructed the human personality. The project of enacting the false self certainly displays the performative incoherence of sin. Therefore, in the full light of a robust theology of sin\textsuperscript{78}, the false self is not just logically incoherent but also morally dreadful. Wood (2010, p.427) observes that a false self depicts a duplicitous subject that turns away from God in her duplicity. The duplicitous subject derides and misrepresents God’s own good activity.

\textsuperscript{77} This is false self not necessarily in the sense of Pascal – of a selfhood that is a fantasy – for whom the selves that people manifest to the world are only polite fictions. To be a self is for Pascal to be a false, imaginary self existing for the sake of imagined esteem; Blaise Pascal, Pensées. Trans. A. J. Krailsheimer [New York, NY: Penguin, 1966; L978/S743]

\textsuperscript{78} The doctrine or theology of original sin is important in providing the context in which the false self rises, as it shows that false self is a matter of deficiency since its essence is the falling away of self from being that good in which, rather than in itself, it ought to have found its satisfaction. Self is fallible on account it is created; it is God’s creation and because of self’s creaturely nature it is being that is capable of becoming less that it is. It is simply the self abandoning God and to exist in itself, that is to please itself; this act does not however mean it immediately lose all being, but rather it comes to nearer to nothingness [Fitzpatrick 2009, pp.459-460; Heans 2013, pp. 55-57, Kelly 2014, pp.13-14]. Another point to make is that, a great deal has been written on the subject of Original sin or on the biblical texts of Genesis chapters 1-3, and there is virtual unanimity that the account of the fall found there is mythology interpreted aetiologically, that is, in a manner to imply a cause for man’s present situation in the world (Daly, 1973, pp.14-15)
Consequently, the false self refuses to recognise in Jesus Christ the limit and condition of all authentic self-relation that includes other-relation. The performances of the false self are at root in a sinful performance depicting the self that does not imitate Jesus Christ [God] and is therefore devoid of its true subjectivity. Such is the false self of Augustine’s *Confessions*, depicted with the analysis of the self in its relations with God (Drever 2007, p. 237). It is an analysis that identifies a fundamental potential instability or mutability in human existence, exacerbated by sin\(^79\).

False self becomes a concrete self that through its various relations is broadly construed to include material and spiritual relations. Although spiritual reality most intimately and truly pertains to the self, it is incorrect to refuse to accept that material reality has substantive value for the self. The teachings of incarnation and bodily resurrection advocate the irreducible value of material reality [of the body] to the self. Another notable feature of the inward space that characterises the concrete, historical self in an Augustinian understanding is that it is a morally charged space of dynamic relation, a self that need redemption. It is a self that is malleable and unstable and fundamentally corrupted through sin.

In light of a theology of sin the false self appears not just logically incoherent but also morally dreadful. The false self becomes nothing but the product of a frustrated attempt to imitate the creator. It is when the false self (double-dealing self) of a subject turns away from God in its fraudulence, that it mocks and parodies God’s own good activity. This false self is a matter of deficiency because its essence is the falling away of human being from ‘that Good in which, rather than in herself, she ought to have found her satisfaction (Heans 2013, p. 55).

\(^{79}\) In Augustine’s case, the ramifications of this characterization of the self permeate the Confessions; the anxious grasping of the infant; the conforming effect, for good or evil, of friendship; turning to God during conversion and continual struggle with temptations.
It is to abandon God and to exist in oneself, that is to say, to please oneself, which is not immediately to lose all being; but it is to come nearer to nothingness. It is the loss of all being as its ultimate consequence. Human sin has left this inward space opaque and treacherous and likely to deceive and corrupt those who enter it [this inward space]. Should a Christian want to enter this inward space to arrive at a deeper relation with God, it is important to seek its soteriological purification. Following bellow, I discuss the true self as the self that ceases to be a self independent of Christ, so that precisely insofar as it imitates Christ by loving God above all else it is restored to its original self.

Christ is an exception to the anthropological rule that ‘all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God’ (Rom. 3:23; cf. v. 10; cf. Ps.14: 2–3). For the false self to be brought into genuine communion with God, it is necessary for God to have entered into the most possible intimate solidarity with the self (McFarland 2008, p.399-400). Christ’s communion with impermanence achieves that solidarity as it includes the most profound sharing of being vulnerability. However, this experience of vulnerability does not lead Christ to share in human sin and this in itself is the hope for the self as redeemed and therefore an expression of true subjectivity.

8.6 The self as redeemed and true subjectivity

I am now in a position to claim that every false self begins life in a state of alienation from God. In so far as without grace false self is unable to rise to the level of existence God has designed. God loves and creates the world and thereby holds it in being. Creation is good because God makes it so. I discussed above that the duplicitous subject does not love God and the grace God offers, neither the world as it is nor even herself as she is.

Apart, the duplicitous subject is capable of exercising freedom to true subjectivity, albeit the false self is bound [will constantly] to fail because if it does not accept God’s grace its
freedom counts for nothing since grace respects this freedom (Dalzell 2006, p.93) and will not interfere with it. Human freedom is made in the image and likeness of God’s freedom, that although the image can lose its likeness to divine freedom, it cannot lose its image character. When one acknowledges the primacy of the soteriological dimension within the inward space of the self, wherein God’s action is always the prior condition of truth and goodness within the self, this counts for redemption.

As a result of the fall, we noted above, the fallen self demonstrates the effects of original sin\textsuperscript{80}, as loss of due subordination to God, but all is not lost. St. Aquinas and St. Augustine stress to varying degrees the residual elements of human original nature (Moriaty 2007, p.111). This elucidates the fact that if every self is a false self until redemption sets in, it is the case that such a condition is not an accident, but an actively created condition (Wood, 2010, p.426)

The natural inclination to virtue may be diminished by sin but it is not totally suppressed. This is because this natural inclination to virtue pertains to the self as rational beings and to act virtuously is to act according to reason. This natural inclination to virtue also orients self to see a deeper directionality that is established between the self’s action and God action. It is a sequence that accommodates sinful humanity, which must move from the material to the spiritual or from

\textsuperscript{80} Although there is much to be said about the negative impact of the doctrine of original sin, theology still needs a doctrine of original sin to describe the common observation that each human being is greatly diminished by what has happened prior to her own decisions and actions; and that her striving for perfection does not liberate from existential anxiety. The doctrine gives foundation to faith, meaning trust in God’s forgiveness, as a gift from God enabling justification. Justification itself is necessary because human beings are born sinners, and victims of other persons’ sin and sinful structures and therefore affected by sin lose the trust needed to be able to live in loving relationships with others, however God’s new creation can enable them to relate to others and God. In contemporary times the concerns of human perfection make the doctrine necessary since human beings are creatures seeking happiness, a condition hard to reconcile with human imperfection. It is now no longer sufficient to strive only for inner perfection, because human beings are striving also for perfect physical bodies as well as perfect social life, in itself a view that places unreasonable demands on human beings to control their own lives. [Granten, Eva-Lotta 2009, lays much blame on Luther and Augustine for the contemporary understanding of original sin, but does not seem to have considered the Pauline text of Romans 5: 12; Dalzell 2006, p. 93, concurs that whatever original sin constitutes can be communicated from one generation to another therefore satisfying Augustinian claim by a psychoanalysis process.
the temporal to the eternal.

St Augustine acknowledges that human beings retain some traces of the image of God in which they were created. The self of human beings retains a residual rationality by which they can know something of the divine law (De spiritu et littera, XXVIII.48, PL 44, 230). This claim is contrary to Pascal’s view in the Pensees that the self is false through and through, if this were to be true then there is no chance of a trigger to this false self to turn into true self. Logic would demand that any conception of a false self must depend on some prior conception of a true self that is the norm from which one deviates.

Although redemption advances a positive soteriological relation between the divine and the self, it does not follow that the redeemed self experiences total or full disclosure of God. In redemption God’s creating and saving act that clearly has a triune structure establishes and restores the self into the image of God that allows human beings access to God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. While human salvation restores the image of the Godhead within the self, the soteriological transformation does not erase the limitations of human creatureliness, and therefore preserving a healthy respect of divine mystery (Drever 2007, p.240).

The self therefore will always remain creatio ex nihilo and subject to the limitations of human creatureliness (Williams, ‘Sapientia and Trinity,’ 321). Most importantly, however, the recast of the sinful and so false self and the redeemed and therefore true self thesis is able to explain why modern crises of identity take the many different forms they do. Sinful and redeemed understandings of the selfhood cease to be blanket explanations but rather become more nuanced tools of analysis that help interpret contemporary crises of identity.
8.7 Self-Love as Being Proper Self-focused

All self-focused actions irrespective of whether they conform to proper self focus or not are almost always categorised as selfishness or self-interested actions. These actions are considered not disinterested or selfless actions. To better comprehend proper self focused love’s distinction from selfishness and self-interest one needs to examine how self-love is conceived in moral theology. Self-love is judged different from selfishness because it never implies excessive love for oneself to the extent of excluding and manipulating others.

On the contrary, it inclusively embraces others and identifies them as part of oneself. It is also possible to distinguish self-love from self-interest because an act of self-love seeks others’ advantage and motivates also oneself to see the well being of others for their own sake. Therefore, a strict theological understanding of self-love would contribute to this interpretation. The distinction is based on the distinctive nature of love that is essentially relational, always moves the person toward the good and unites the person with God who is the ultimate good and the source of all goods (Taylor 1989, p.13).

A distinction needs to be drawn between 'proper' and 'selfish' forms of self-love or perhaps, proper self-focus of the kind necessary for 'becoming a self that helps one find in herself a disposition to attend to Self (Lippitt 2009, p.125-126). There is probably nothing more natural than this proper self-focus to attend to self. Frankfurt (2004, p. 68) observes that for any human being the deepest and most essential achievement of a life lived well and successful is true self-love. This claim falls victim of those espousing the concept of self-sacrifice or self-denial, but as we have seen above self-sacrifice is itself a concept plagued with difficulties to sustaining it.

We accept that self-love and self-sacrifice are notorious concepts in Christian thought that leave orthodox Christian tradition littered with incompatible claims and counter claims about
them. So that for example, in the thoughts of MacIntyre, 'self-sacrifice ... is as much of vice, as much of a sign of inadequate moral development, as selfishness’ (1999, p. 160), whereas for Kierkegaard, 'self-denial ... is Christianity's essential form’ (1995, p. 56). Proper self focused love or self-love is, in its distinctive nature first and foremost, in and of itself, relational. Proper self focused love requires others to constitute its sense and qualify its rightness or appropriateness. Claudia Welz (2008) notes,

“The only convincing mark of love is ‘love itself’, the love becomes known and recognized by the love in another”. (p. 114)

This suggests that love is essentially selfless and other-centred. In talking about love, one is always talking about an affective relationship between two or more human beings. Where the relationship is more than an encounter as it is an exchange of meaning in the world of one with the other. Andreas Schuele has asserted that,

“the semantics of love become crucial above all in those contexts [Torah] where one opens one’s ‘own world’ to the other in order to create an environment that meets with his or her requirements for life” (2004, p. 55).

Love possesses the power of moving oneself toward others in search of the reality and meaning of life in human interactions. It designates a fastidious form of self-relation in which we understand ourselves truly and rightly in our relations with one another (Weaver 2002, p.1). To understand love as essentially relational, then self-love in the double love command, then self-love must be conceived either as a pre-condition for loving others in which one must love oneself first in order to love others insofar as love for others entails some affirmation of the self as worthy of giving to another.

Alternatively, it must be understood as by-product or a fruit of rightly loving others in which some goods (e.g., satisfaction, moral habituation, and discipline) may accrue to the self organically and indirectly. For Niebhur,
“whatever spiritual wealth the self has within itself is the by-product of its relations, affections and responsibilities, of its concern for life beyond itself” (1949, p. 117).

Self-love on the other hand if not understood in light of the two alternatives observed above, must be viewed as a paradigm for neighbour love in which one loves others as she loves oneself. Outka observes that self-love can serve as a model for what neighbour-love involves. In self-love persons transfer “prudential reasoning into moral reasoning by invoking some variant of the Golden Rule”. (1999, p.485) Father Pinto echoes Meads (1934) stating, “for humans ‘to be’ is essentially ‘to be with others’, to exist is to co-exist, to live is to live in relation to others (Pinto 2006, p. 106).

Consequently, all human beings desire warm, loving, stable and fruitful relationships. It is by relating ourselves to others that we satisfy our personal, interpersonal and social needs. Love is the only way to enter into such relationships. It is the case, the independent claim of self-love as an immoral and a neutral position by itself is evacuated leaving what is the essential substance or the basic element that moves the self toward others. That is what makes love a relational reality.

It is also the distinctive nature of love that it tends toward the good. In the act of loving one is being united with a kind of ontological good existing either in the self or others. Thomas Aquinas defines love in its broadest meaning as, “an aptitude for, or inclination toward, the good” (Summa Theologica, Vol. II (Part II, First Section). Aquinas appears to explain that at its deepest human level of meaning, ‘love’ refers to the agent’s ‘complacency in good’, a response of affective thankfulness of an apprehended goodness.

This appreciation of an apprehended goodness could mean either the acceptance of, or conformity to the apprehended good, or a desire for union with the unattained good or perhaps delight in the presence of the attained good. The central moral meaning of love therefore is a
willingness of the person to identify herself with the good in the reality. Self-love consequently perceives the reality of being whether one’s own or others as good in itself. Loving oneself means identifying oneself with the being of good. Hyman stresses “love of self has no justification and no intelligibility outside of a larger framework that connects the goodness of the self to the goodness of the whole (2004, p.48)”.

Love of self is both made possible by and is a necessary precondition for love of the whole, which is to say, a love of the good. The claim is, if being is good, it follows that the being of others and mine is good too. Since the good is that which one naturally desires and can be known only as good for oneself, one loves oneself and others. This loving of others is only possible because the good in the self is identical with the good in others and it has love as the common ground for all goods in the whole reality.

More importantly, the good to which the self tends to love is to be originally found in God who is love himself. God seeing the creation as good (Genesis 1: 31) proves God’s goodness. God himself is the one who brought into existence the whole creation. If the goodness of creation proves God’s goodness, and love always seeks for the good, love is to derive from God and to be realised in self and others. Aquinas affirms God as the source of this good seeing in God as to its cause, “in ourselves as to its effect, in our neighbour as in a similitude” (Aquinas 2006, p. 234).

The good that ontologically exists in God is in the first instance accessible in oneself. Carmichael avers, “right self-love opens us to God and hence, in God’s love, to others” (2004, p. 120). This affords a theological justification for self-affirmation that is inextricably bound up with others for our genuine love for them. This claim also satisfies Johnson’s assertion that, “self-love can only properly be understood within the three personal dimensions of human life.
(God – others – self), and in terms of the redemptive-historical meta-narrative (creation, fall and redemption)” (2007, p. 559). The theological sense of self-love is in essence received from the divine being and practically given to others. Self-love is basically constructed on viewing and accepting the ontological relational reality of the self with God and others. It originates internally from God and is supposed to be externally shared with others. Self-love is, thus, a responding love that turns back to the self, after the self loves God with all its heart, soul and strength, and prepares itself to extend that divine love to others (Mt 22:36-40). Schweiker’s fittingly emphasises that,

“one is to love [others] as one has first been loved by God, a love manifest in creation, in Christ, and in the reign of God. Christian self-love is grounded not in the self but in God. One’s being a Christian is in Christ. There is an ‘otherness’ at the very core of any Christian conception of consciousness and the self” (2004, p.103).

Our being in love with God enables us to love others, hence the one who loves God, also loves her brother (1 John 4:16-21). Self-love ultimately is grounded in God and not in the self, but loving God means realizing the love God shows us. Instead of saying that one loves God and others as if love essentially originates from the self and is to be extended to others, one says that she responds to the love of God by giving this love to others. That means unless one first defines her identity with the divine being who is the cause of her existence, one never views the full sense of love.

To fail to view self-love as originating from divine beings, then love of self indeed becomes doubtful and even sinful. In which case self-love would easily degrade to either selfishness or pure self-interest. In other words, self-love gets out of the moral realm and takes the form of either immorality or amorality. Importantly loving God, others and self are interdependent, reciprocal and irreducible to each other, so that from a Christian standpoint, one cannot have one without some degree of the others. The theological sense of self-love reveals
that an individual exists being ontologically related with God and others. This understanding guarantees that self-love will not degrade to self focused love that is entirely centred on the entity of the self, nor to pure self-interest that only approaches others in terms of their significance to promote one’s own advantage.

8.7 Conclusion

In Christian theology, the concept of self, or human self-image, is usually described in relationship to God as otherness, specifically in the framework of soteriology. These references include motifs such as the human condition in the world, relations between humanity and God, the way of reconciliation with God, and the realisation of God’s Kingdom. Minimally self implies perceiving experiences as one's own. The various self prefixes [for example self-consciousness] therefore imply that the experiencer has some notion of a self, in that she can distinguish between herself and her experiences.

Reflecting on the self enables one to gain important insights into the basis of morality and thus to broaden one’s reflections about the subject of morality, or perhaps the “moral self.” Christian theology does not need to become so complicated that it finds itself unable to talk about the value and mystery of persons. To be a self entails the remarkable capacity for being an object to oneself as subject. Such human self-awareness rises only in the context of "knowing-with" another [God]. This appears to be the root meaning of "conscience" and "consciousness."

We know ourselves, then, only in the presence of another [first God and then other human beings]. We become or acquire selves when we know ourselves to be known, when we are apprehended and valued by a self-disclosing other. This knowing therefore dispels any notions of the disappearing self, or the decentred self. The only two selves that endure in Christian theology then become the sinful self or false subjectivity and the redeemed self or the
true subjectivity. The finite individual self [true subjectivity] is mutually dependent upon and mutually determinative of other selves in a network of mutually supporting, interpersonal relations. Christian theology constantly reinterprets, re-uses, and uses its own past in seeking answers to problems of the present situation and the Christian understanding of the self is not exempt to these reinterpretations.

For the Christians the conscious centre that is the self is somehow founded between subjective experience and the Bible. The Spirit of God renders the Christians’ sense of selves deliquesced; furthermore, the kind-heartedness of the worshiping community softens and shapes how they understand their lives.

These lives are shaped in a way that they accept themselves as valued, by God and others and selves. Such acceptance generates a sense of good feelings for oneself, that first defines one’s identity with the divine being who is the cause of one’s existence, forcing one to view the full sense of love from divine being. Not just love for God but for the other and self. Self-love is then only properly understood within the three personal dimensions of human life (God – others – self), and in terms of the redemptive-historical meta-narrative. Self-love is basically constructed on viewing and accepting the ontological relational reality of the self with God and others.
Chapter  9

Conclusion

The study was set in motion by the concern that many contemporary adherents to Christian faith have embraced the understanding that the message that Jesus Christ proclaimed as recorded in the gospel narratives is about disinterested love. It is argued that the message of the gospel that is the good news of love of God for his people proclaimed through Jesus is a about a radically disinterested love of God for the people.

But I find the message that Jesus proclaimed cannot refer to detachment from selfish interest in sense-based, emotional, or temporal acquisitiveness synonymous with self-love in favour of seeking the welfare of others. This dissertation carries a mistrust of the radical renunciation of the natural inclination of the self towards personal happiness and that the central message of the Bible is the good news about the person and work of Jesus Christ.

I argued that Christian virtue ought not to soar too high above the range of human nature, it is the only way benevolence does not become so radically pure and disinterested as to demand that persons act "inconsistent with themselves". The consideration in this thesis presupposed that the communion between God carried through the message of the gospel, self, and other(s) is the highest ideal of Christian love.

Fundamental to the communion is the giving and receiving love that is too often lost sight of in Christian ethics. It is a moral duty upon occasion to lookout for one’s self interest in many respects. Kant asserts that one must not give up her claims to her own happiness because under certain circumstances, it is a duty to her to be concerned with it. I consider Kant was simply referring to self-love. This kind of self-love is distinguished from self-interest on account that it’s
an act of self-love that seeks others’ advantage and attempts to motivate oneself to see the well-being of others for their own sake.

This is love fully coextensive with and supportive of love for God. This self-love is taken to be a paradigm for equal regard of others per se because it is basically independent of idiosyncratic attractiveness. This self-love needs to be able to stand-alone rather than be correlated to neighbour love as expressed in the gospel narratives; it is the only way to morally evaluate religious accounts of self love and the divine-human-relation.

This self-love is however, beleaguered by the complex theoretical accounts of the self widely thought to be philosophically untenable and morally suspect. It is thus a platitude of modern-day theological anthropology that the Enlightenment has bestowed to us a penurious conception of the self. A conception often traced objectively or not back to René Descartes.

This Cartesian self is a fully autonomous, disembodied and self-transparent thinker. It is not essentially related to other persons, whether human or divine. Indeed, this self is not even essentially related to its own body. Nonetheless, even as theologians distance themselves from the Cartesian subject, the need to present a robust account of subjectivity that is not only anti-Cartesian but also theologically rich becomes apparent.

Given an earlier account of the self in the beginnings of this dissertation that was followed by the philosophical discourses and ethics, the challenge of delineating some general term to denote what the self is, remains. It was necessary to look for an overarching term that can empty of content as much as possible, nevertheless one that hopefully still had enough meaning or reference to guide a descriptive and comparative study.

Taylor was helpful in this regard I argued, by providing an understanding of a self that is constituted through its own self-interpretation and therefore moral or ethical. The constitutive
source of Taylor’s self was Aristotle who argued that human beings are self-interpreting animals. By it was implied that a human being is a being with a certain moral status, or a bearer of rights. But underlying the moral status, as its condition, are certain capacities. A human being is a being who has a sense of self, has a notion of the future and the past, can hold values, make choices; in short, can adopt life-plans. At least a human being must be the kind of being who is in principle capable of all this, however damaged these capacities may be in practice.

I argued that the question of what the self from a theological anthropology is could be settled somehow with two accounts following the premise provided by Taylor. Both accounts encompass the self as the totality of what an organism is physically, biologically, socially, psychologically and culturally . . .. It includes what one would like to be as well as what one hopes she never become. The first account is a portrait of fallen subjectivity, selfhood under the reign of sin. On this account, the self is imaginary, in a special sense. It is one’s own imaginative construal of oneself. That is to say, what I call my “self” is therefore, just the story that I tell to myself about myself, my subjective narrative identity.

Aristotle has already told us that the "Self" uniformly describes the human agent responsible for her choices, the originating source of her own conduct. The term remains central to Aristotle's analysis of friendship. From Aristotle’s inferences I discussed the self as underlying the notion of what one is when being a friend of the genuine kind culminating in self-loving.

The self thus, is the unique, irreplaceable individual who thinks, acts, has affections, wishes, and chooses. Adam Smith on the other hand gave us the self the examiner and judge as the same person that is engaged in self-interest (self-love) consistent with self’s ability to feel for others, where self and others together are the building blocks of the ideal society. Smith claimed the chief passion out of which virtuous behaviour originates is sympathy, which Smith concluded
was in a way the extension of self-love to others. Even in the much-derided text of the butcher, the baker and the brewer as seeking after their own interests, Smith demonstrated that these trades persons and their clients each seek to activate self love in the other in order to enter into any exchange. The customer has to appeal to the self-love of the trader in order for the trader to engage in exchange; in the same breath the trader has to appeal to the self-interest of the customer, to show it is to the benefit of the customer to enter into exchange.

Augustine was equally very helpful in demonstrating this kind of self through the story he tells in the *Confessions*. This subjective self as an imaginary construct that typically does not correspond to the way I really am, Augustine argued. Augustine needed to go deep within himself to find the divine and therefore to find himself. This first account of the self is in fact doubly imaginary because one always sees oneself through the eyes of other people. Aristotle already told us that the other already settles the question of the self. It is the other through whom the self is validated.

My subjective narrative identity is therefore the story that I imagine that other people would tell about me. This subjective narrative identity leads me to me and assigns me duty to myself that includes self-love. The second account of the self is a portrait of authentic subjectivity. This account is explicitly Christological and perhaps Trinitarian.

I argued that authentic subjectivity derives from one’s membership in the body of Christ. The way of living Christian faith has the capacity to transform the self by illuminining its thoughts, redirecting its desires, and recasting its goals. Therefore, for someone influenced by Jesus Christ all her activities are differently determined and all impressions differently received. That understanding, I argued is central to the message of the Kingdom of God embedded in the gospel.
that Jesus proclaimed and recorded in the New Testament texts. This is the message an agent is expected to live by daily. It influences every aspect of her life style.

For Kant, empirical views of redemption as the resources for human transformation are already inherent within the self through reason and nature. But, I want though, to emphasize the causal efficacy of an actual historical person for transforming the self. Perfected human nature is that which expresses the divine. Jesus mediates the divine causality to others through the power of his God-consciousness. The efficacy of transformation or redemption is thus communicated through historical and social influence. An important aspect of these two accounts of the self is that, whether sinful or saved, our subjectivity is performative and imitative. That is, whether under sin or under grace, to be a self is to imitate God.

As sinners, our duplicitous subjectivity is a dreadful parody of God’s loving act of creation. Equally true, as authentic Trinitarian subjects, we imitate Christ, the only fully real human being, by turning away from some aspect of the self and loving God above all things. Either way, at the deepest core of our subjectivity we cannot help but imitate God, this imitation resonates with duty to self.

Transformation of the self thus becomes synonymous with the Christian faith of the person-forming activity of Christ on an individual such that, all her activities are differently determined ‘… and even all impressions are differently received, meaning that the personal self-consciousness too, becomes different.’ Kant’s view of the moral self and of the relation of religion to morality is here contrasted. Contrary to Kant, religion is not only consisted of schemata of the good principle and the moral life, religion also does transformative work. But what kind of causality is at work in the transformation of the self?
In response, I argued how the transformation of the self is specifically tied to how the gospel message interpellates persons as subjects and how Jesus’ interpellations demands a response. This makes the message of gospel that Jesus proclaimed, which message at the same time is the person of Jesus central to Christian faith. The gospel is the central element in a fairly small cluster of interrelated beliefs and practices that have consistently characterized Christian communities and that have persisted through a sequence of larger host cultures.

In its proclamation Jesus gave the summation of the laws in the Torah and commandments; into a single command – the double love commandment. Jesus himself as the embodiment of this double love command has the ability to transform all those whom he ‘hails’ –Hey you there… In this hailing Jesus extends the love of God of neighbour and of self.

In this way he empties the cross of its wonder. In any case, the cross is never the goal of love as many in the Christian tradition have claimed, it is more the expression of the distance to which God is willing to go in order to restore a broken community and therefore symbolises the violation of love more than it symbolises love itself. The love therefore that we need is not the disinterested and utterly selfless love, rather the deeply mutual love that has both the quality of a gift received and of a gift given.

It is not true that in his journey toward crucifixion Jesus sought suffering as an end in itself to complete the resolution of the divine human drama once and for all. Self-abnegation is not the focal point of love especially the love Jesus expressed, because Jesus' acts are not motivated in his lust for sacrifice but in his power of mutuality. In the power of mutuality Christian theology cannot become complicated that it finds itself unable to talk about the value and mystery of persons. To be a self entails the remarkable capacity for being an object of value to oneself as subject. Such human self-awareness rises only in the context of "knowing-with"
another [God]. This knowing therefore dispels any notions of the disappearing self, or the decentred self. The only two selves that endure in Christian theology then become the sinful self or false subjectivity and the redeemed self or the true subjectivity.

But as this dissertation has demonstrated, there endures a claim particularly in the Western church tradition that makes huge theological and ethical claims for a disinterested gospel. These claims continue to be found and subsequent claims to include, that Jesus calls for a total self-denial and self-sacrifice and even a sense of self-abnegation. Jesus’ death on the cross is taken as the cornerstone. His followers must therefore sacrifice for the sake of the other. Perhaps such claims are justified in a Western individualistic economic society; however, I do not see Christian social ethics demonstrating such a clear-cut dichotomy, or a narrow dualism between self-esteem and the common good, self-acceptance and compassion for others, self-love and altruism or introspection and community.

It behoves the church community therefore, in proclaiming the traditional moral teaching that selfishness is wrong, and unselfishness is right, to make it clear that ‘selfishness is only a vice perceived undue regard for the self, unselfishness is only a virtue if it is countered by self-respect.’ This exercise is however conditioned by the understanding of the self. I am reminded of Metzinger’s difficulties whether to make the claim that, “there is no such a thing as a self,” or that “the self is not quite what we supposed it to be.”

From this dissertation, the need for a new more inclusive metaphysics in which reality is not reduced to only that which can be manipulated by science is urgent. A continued re-casting of the unity of the self is crucial. Self-love I identified works well for a unified self. If this unified self was to be replaced by a multiplicity of divergent self-images, who or what exactly bears the image of God is the enduring question. If identities are diminishing or transitory or
fragmented who or what subjectivity is burdened by sin and what subjectivity is finally redeemed by Christ’s interpellations?

I contend that at any given moment a person who self-loves has a unified sense of self and over the course of a life, although such an individual may construct a variety of relatively autonomous sub-personalities; in the end she is able to claim her in a way she tells a single coherent story of her life. In spite of presumed multiplicity of the self, such an individual retains a sense of singularity capable of God’s ‘self-disclosure’ in the ‘personal encounters’ with Jesus of Nazareth. Hence, an interdisciplinary understanding of the self remains an enduring pursuit to appropriating Jesus’ message proclaimed in the gospels, but that is a discussion for another time.
Chapter 10

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