Between Universalism and Particularism
Government and Civil Society Responses to Contemporary Antisemitism in Britain

Cardaun, Sarah

Awarding institution: King's College London

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Between Universalism and Particularism: Government and Civil Society Responses to Contemporary Antisemitism in Britain

Thesis submitted for the award of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) by

Sarah K. Cardaun

Student number: 0949094

(Revised version, 21 April 2014)

King’s College London
School of Arts & Humanities
Middle East & Mediterranean Studies Programme
Abstract

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, antisemitism still constitutes a significant problem in many parts of the world, including in Britain. Although many historical, social and political aspects of anti-Jewish prejudice have been studied extensively, something that has received only scant attention is whether and how key institutions and actors have attempted to counteract it. This thesis contributes towards filling this gap in the scholarly literature by examining governmental and non-governmental responses to contemporary antisemitism in Britain, which it conceptualises as a multi-dimensional and contested social problem. Analysing government documents, parliamentary records and other publications, the thesis compares how state and civil society actors have discursively framed antisemitism, and what practical measures – if any – they have adopted to counter it. This analysis shows that the state has traditionally tended to neglect anti-Jewish prejudice, or to address it only indirectly in the context of much larger categories of issues, such as racism or inequality. While this universalistic approach is not entirely dismissed, the thesis problematizes the underlying assumption that contemporary antisemitism should simply be subsumed under the larger umbrella of racism. The limitations of such an approach become especially apparent in the context of Holocaust remembrance and Holocaust education, to which the thesis devotes a separate chapter. On the other hand, while the thesis does not propose a simple dichotomy of universalistic state responses and particularistic civil society responses, it argues that the work of groups such as the All-Party Parliamentary Group against Antisemitism and the Community Security Trust highlights the potential of civil society to make significant contributions to the fight against contemporary antisemitism by engaging with it as a particular issue. However, an examination of British Israel advocacy organisations in the final chapter demonstrates that this inherent potential is not always realised in practice. Overall, the thesis argues that a multi-level framework for addressing anti-Jewish prejudice that includes different governmental as well as non-governmental actors is most likely to be effective in countering antisemitism in all its complexity.
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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAM</td>
<td>Anti-Apartheid Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADL</td>
<td>Anti-Defamation League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFI</td>
<td>Academic Friends of Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJC</td>
<td>American Jewish Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANL</td>
<td>Anti-Nazi League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPG</td>
<td>All-Party Parliamentary Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPIA</td>
<td>All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUT</td>
<td>Association of University Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDS</td>
<td>Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>British National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFI</td>
<td>Comment is Free (the Guardian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRE</td>
<td>Commission for Racial Equality</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Community Security Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CST</td>
<td>Community Security Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDL</td>
<td>English Defence League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EHRC</td>
<td>Equality and Human Rights Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOC</td>
<td>Equal Opportunities Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>Fundamental Rights Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HET</td>
<td>Holocaust Educational Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMD</td>
<td>Holocaust Memorial Day</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMDT</td>
<td>Holocaust Memorial Day Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HWG</td>
<td>History Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHRA</td>
<td>International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IoE</td>
<td>Institute of Education, University of London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRR</td>
<td>Institute of Race Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JACOB</td>
<td>Jewish Aid Committee of Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>JC</td>
<td>Jewish Chronicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>JLC</td>
<td>Jewish Leadership Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCB</td>
<td>Muslim Council of Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLG</td>
<td>Multi-Level Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATFHE</td>
<td>National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>NF</td>
<td>National Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUANGO</td>
<td>Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCAR</td>
<td>United Campaign against Racism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCU</td>
<td>University and College Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WZO</td>
<td>World Zionist Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZF</td>
<td>Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland</td>
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</table>
Introduction

The renowned British historian Eric Hobsbawm called the twentieth century the “age of extremes,”¹ highlighting in the process the failure of some of the century’s great ideological projects such as communism, nationalism and capitalism, that lived in the shadow of two world wars, the Holocaust and the Cold War. During the first half of the twentieth century, racism, xenophobia and anti-Jewish prejudice were widespread across continental Europe as well as on the British Isles, and they were not only a phenomenon encountered in society, but as is well known, often integral to state and government policies.

The exterminatory antisemitism of German National Socialism is one example of state-led prejudice. The British Colonial Empire – at its largest expanse in the 1920s – was a very different political entity than Nazi Germany, but arguably also underpinned and upheld by a conscious or at best subconscious justification that subjugating the inferior “Other” was the natural order of the world.²

It is true that there were also many positive developments, in particular in the second half of the century, which not only included great technological and scientific achievements and economic growth but also the establishment of democracy, liberal values and a universal human rights regime. Jewish communities, dramatically decimated and traumatised by the Holocaust, have been able to live and rebuild their communities all across Western Europe since the latter decades of the century.

But while openly racist policies have largely disappeared from Western European government policies and mainstream parties, and many countries have implemented far-reaching anti-discriminatory legislation, including the United Kingdom, the fact is that prejudice, racism and intolerance still exist.

² Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (New York; London: Routledge, 1995).
However, what is unquestionable is that racism and – especially after the Holocaust – antisemitism are now considered to be social problems that run counter the values of modern liberal democracy, and that they therefore need to be addressed at some level in order to ensure the health of wider society.

**Research question and overall conceptual framework**

Against this background, the dissertation investigates responses to contemporary\(^3\) antisemitism in Britain from a perspective that looks at manifestations of prejudice, for instance in the form of racism or antisemitism, as social problems. It does so by analysing how antisemitism has been viewed and discursively framed by different actors inside and outside the political system. In addition, it also looks at strategies and practical measures that have been adopted to counteract prejudice against Jews in the UK. In other words, this study asks – to put it in Lasswellian terms\(^4\) – “who does what against contemporary antisemitism in Britain, and how?”

This includes the British government, groups and individuals in other parts of the political system such as parliament, but crucially also individual and collective actors in civil society. A particular focus of analysis is the question of whether and in what ways the existence of the new antisemitism, a concept that posits the resurgence of anti-Jewish prejudice since the latter half of the twentieth century including a qualitative shift in the

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\(^{3}\) This is understood as covering the final decades of the twentieth and the first decade of the twenty-first centuries. In some respects, the study will, however, look further into the past, for example in dealing with the history of antisemitism in Britain, and beyond the 2010s by considering events or issues that have taken place up until and including 2013.

nature of antisemitism to include extreme forms of anti-Zionism and anti-Israel sentiments,\(^5\) is acknowledged in discourses on antisemitism and in governmental and non-governmental attempts to tackle anti-Jewish prejudice in the UK.

This short description of the research question comprises several different, but closely interrelated elements, which require some further comments.

Firstly, a key assertion of the overall approach to this research is that to examine responses to antisemitism in the UK, it is necessary to look at both the practical measures of social and political actors to counteract this issue, but crucially also the way anti-Jewish prejudice is perceived and interpreted in the first place, therefore paying close attention to the way antisemitism is discussed in the public and political spheres. As subsequent parts of this introduction and the first chapter will discuss in more detail, how political and social actors perceive and frame social phenomena is highly significant for several reasons.

At a fundamental level, this significance can be deduced theoretically from the insights provided by social constructivism.\(^6\) This puts great emphasis on the role of social actors in shaping individual and collective perceptions of reality, and therefore acknowledges that the recognition of a phenomenon as a social problem rests to a very great extent on how it is interpreted.

In a democratic, pluralistic context, there is a usually a great variety of publicly asserted viewpoints about which social issues require attention, and how any particular social problem should be interpreted, including different assumptions on the urgency, causes, sources and potential solutions to this problem. With some issues, the level of contestation and disagreement over these aspects is particularly pronounced, and it will be demonstrated later in this research that this is the case for contemporary antisemitism in the UK.

\(^5\) The new antisemitism thesis will be critically analysed in chapter three, which will also provide references to relevant literature on this subject.
\(^6\) See also below and chapter one.
Thus, the thesis argues that perceptions and discursive framing of contemporary antisemitism by different social and political actors are key starting points for analysing practical responses to it, while also being important in their own right.

A second aspect that constitutes a core theme in the overall framework of this research is the attention paid to both state and non-state actors. As this thesis aims to demonstrate, both are highly relevant to an analysis of responses to antisemitism in contemporary Britain.

The assumption that the state should concern itself with antisemitism can in the first instance be justified with reference to the very concept of the modern state. Even in minimal conceptions of the state, its function is to protect individuals living in its realm of authority against a breach of their basic rights and manifestations of aversive force, such as theft, fraud, breach of contract.7 Importantly for the discussion of antisemitism in this thesis, physical assault is also a state duty.

In addition, in the context of specific developments in Europe in the twentieth century already alluded to above, Western European governments, including in the United Kingdom, have effectively expanded the scope of state responsibility in fields like human rights, equality, anti-discrimination and anti-racism in dramatic ways since the end of the Second World War. This is especially the case in recent years, as evidenced in Britain by the far-reaching Equality Act 2010.8

On the other hand, theoretical considerations that will be discussed further in chapter one lead to the assumption that the non-governmental sector also has important contributions to make in the fight against antisemitism. Firstly, this is because of a general trend in state-society relations towards decentralised forms of governance, a trend also observable in

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Britain. Secondly, historically – and on a global level – civil society has been, and is, a key driving force in policy fields such as human rights, anti-racism and equality.

Therefore, this study seeks to ascertain whether the case of contemporary antisemitism demonstrates ways in which civil society can make vital contributions in shaping the debate over the definition of a contentious social problem, and whether it plays an important role in counter-acting it. In short, the question is whether the fight against antisemitism in the UK provides an example of the appropriateness of a general observation made by Pierre and Peters who have noted that: “Society performs complementary, and occasionally competitive, functions in the process of governance.”

The study’s contribution to existing knowledge

In asking these questions and examining the subject from the distinctive perspective outlined above, this study makes a number of significant contributions to existing knowledge in a variety of different ways, and in different fields of study.

First of all, it adds to a trend in recent scholarship on antisemitism that has taken steps to reducing an imbalance in the literature, which has long focused exclusively on what corresponds, to borrow the words of the Polish-Austrian historian Salo Wittmayer Baron, to a “lachrymose conception of Jewish history.”

Antisemitism has attracted an enormous amount of scholarly attention, resulting in extensive bibliographies and large library collections on the subject. As of September 2013, the Felix Posen bibliography of the Vidal Sassoon Center at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, one of the most comprehensive bibliographic projects on the topic, had counted

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around 50,000 entries.\footnote{See: http://sicsa.huji.ac.il/bib.html (last accessed 06 Sept. 2013).} While historical studies about antisemitism still predominate,\footnote{Reinhard Rürup, "Der Moderne Antisemitismus und die Entwicklung der Historischen Antisemitismusforschung," in \textit{Antisemitismusforschung in den Wissenschaften}, ed. Werner Bergmann and Mona Körte (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2004), 124.} social-scientific and other disciplinary perspectives have also made some contributions, in particular at theoretical and conceptual levels.\footnote{For an overview of social scientific approaches to antisemitism see Samuel Salzborn, \textit{Antisemitismus als Negative Leitidee der Moderne: Sozialwissenschaftliche Theorien im Vergleich} (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2010). Chapter two will provide more references to literature on antisemitism.}

However, while in recent years the wider field of Jewish/non-Jewish relations has benefited from an increased interest of especially English and German-speaking academics in dimensions other than hostility and discrimination against Jews, such as philosemitism,\footnote{Jonathan Karp and Adam Sutcliffe, \textit{Philosemitism in History} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Irene Diekmann, Elke-Vera Kottowski, and Julius H. Schoeps, eds., \textit{Geliebter Feind, Gehasster Freund: Antisemitismus und Philosemitismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart} (Berlin: VBB, Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 2009). With the exception of these and a handful of other collections of relatively wider-ranging collections of scholarly articles (for instance Nadia Valman and Tony Kushner, eds., \textit{Philosemitism, Antisemitism and 'the Jew': Perspectives from the Middle Ages to the Twentieth Century}, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004; Phyllis Lassner and Lara Trubowitz, eds., \textit{Antisemitism and Philosemitism in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: Representing Jews, Jewishness, and Modern Culture}, Newark, Del.: University of Delaware Press, 2008), the existing literature on philosemitism has been dominated by studies that focused on a specific historical period and do therefore not extend to the contemporary period, see for instance: Hans-Joachim Schoeps, \textit{Philosemitismus im Barock: Religions- und Geistesgeschichtliche Untersuchungen} (Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1952); Eliane Glaser, \textit{Judaism without Jews: Philosemitism and Christian Polemic in Early Modern England} (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Alan T. Levenson, \textit{Between Philosemitism and Antisemitism: Defenses of Jews and Judaism in Germany, 1871-1932} (Lincoln, Neb.; London: University of Nebraska Press, 2004); W. D. Rubinstein and Hilary L. Rubinstein, \textit{Philosemitism: Admiration and Support in the English-Speaking World for Jews, 1840-1939} (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); Alan Edelstein, \textit{An Unacknowledged Harmony: Philo-Semitism and the Survival of European Jewry} (Westport, Conn.; London: Greenwood, 1982); Frank Stern, \textit{The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge: Antisemitism and Philosemitism in Postwar Germany} (Oxford: Pergamon, 1992).} there is still a dearth of studies with an explicit focus on responses towards antisemitism and social and political attempts to confront it. Elisabeth Kübler has rightly observed that given the amount of historical and social scientific research that has been conducted into various aspects of antisemitism up to this point, “…the sheer absence of contributions dealing with measures against Jew-hatred is ever more astounding and disturbing.”\footnote{Elisabeth Kübler, "European Efforts to Combat Antisemitism and the Role of the Media," in \textit{Jewish Images in the Media}, ed. Martin Liepach (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences, 2007), 270.}

On the other hand, this “absence” does in fact not amount to a total lack of scholarship. There exists a limited but important body of research into reactions and
responses towards antisemitism in a number of historical periods, and from different parts of the social, cultural and political spectrum of specific societies.

In addition to a number of historical studies that concentrate on particular countries, such as Germany,16 the U.S.,17 Poland,18 and Canada,19 this literature includes a study by Stuart Svonkin on the history of prominent U.S. Jewish civil society organisations20 as well as Kenneth Marcus’ book on legal aspects of antisemitism on American university campuses.21 Attempts at tackling antisemitism undertaken at supra-national and inter-governmental levels by the European Union, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe have also been addressed to a limited extent.22

Another angle of looking at responses to antisemitism has focused on legislative measures against antisemitism, including legislation on Holocaust denial.23 The Yearbook for Antisemitism Research published by the Centre for Antisemitism Research at the Technical University of Munich offers a comprehensive survey of developments in antisemitism studies.

19 Janine Stingel, Social Discred: Anti-Semitism, Social Credit, and the Jewish Response (Montreal, London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000). Edited volumes containing a variety of historical case studies from different countries, are for instance: Jehuda Reinharz, ed. Living with Antisemitism: Modern Jewish Responses (Hanover; London: University Press of New England, 1987); Ulrich Wyrwa and Fritz Bauer Institut, eds., Einspruch und Abwehr: Die Reaktion des Europäischen Judentums auf die Entstehung des Antisemitismus (1879-1914) (Frankfurt; New York: Campus Verlag, 2010). This brief literature review covers in the main contributions in the English and German literature. Therefore, it cannot be entirely ascertained that no studies in for instance Hebrew, French or Italian have been overlooked, where these have not been translated. But see the introduction to Wyrwa, 2010 (ibid.) for some additional references.
University in Berlin devoted its 2011 edition to anti-antisemitism, whereas another German essay collection had a broader focus and dealt with more contemporary topics such as combating antisemitism in different educational contexts. Finally, some academics have examined reactions to antisemitism by important social theorists, and reactions of entire political traditions to specific events in the history of antisemitism such as the Holocaust.

Some of the edited volumes mentioned above contain studies with an explicit focus on responses to antisemitism in Britain by the Anglo-Jewish community. Responses to anti-Jewish agitation by British fascist groups have also been the object of study, some of which are in autobiographical form, and a biographical study on the clergyman and historian

27 See Philip Spencer, "European Marxism and the Question of Antisemitism: Reactions to the Holocaust before, during and after the Event," European Societies 14, no. 2 (2012), more precisely on the lack of responses. A case could be made that research on responses to the Nazi regime, such as resistance, or reactions to the Holocaust should also be included in a survey of literature on “response to antisemitism,” but to do this in a way that would do justice to the complexity of this issue would lead to a unnecessary thematic detour. But see chapter five for a brief discussion on the relation between the Holocaust and antisemitism. Likewise, it could be argued that literature on anti-racism should be included in this survey of existing research. But while there are indeed insights to be gained from this literature, there are limits to the applicability of anti-racism to antisemitism, as chapter four will discuss.
James Parkes has been written by Colin Richmond.\textsuperscript{31} In addition, some general works on Anglo-Jewish history contain sections about reactions towards antisemitism.\textsuperscript{32}

These studies provide valuable insights into responses to antisemitism in different historical, social and cultural contexts. Their number, however, has to be seen in comparison to the vast amount of publications on antisemitism, highlighting that the gap in the literature regarding responses and countermeasures is considerable. This is even more pronounced in regards to studies explicitly focused on Britain.

Moreover, with a heavy focus on historical studies, this literature leaves contemporary developments almost unaddressed. Although there are important continuities between traditional and new forms of antisemitism, it has already been mentioned that there have also been some changes in the character of anti-Jewish prejudice since the second half of the twentieth century, and that many observers speak of a new antisemitism.\textsuperscript{33} Thus, while historical studies are important in their own right and might even provide some valuable insights for the contemporary context, the present study’s explicit focus on today’s antisemitism constitutes a key element of its contribution to the existing literature.

Finally, many of the aforementioned studies, including those published by well-known authorities in the field of Anglo-Jewish history, set their investigations in the context of Jewish history. And while Gisela Lebzelter’s and Tony Kushner’s chapters on responses to antisemitism in 1918-1939 and during the Second World War, respectively, also deal with the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{32}] Gisela C. Lebzelter, \textit{Political Anti-Semitism in England, 1918-1939} (London: Macmillan, 1978) part three; Tony Kushner, \textit{The Persistence of Prejudice: Antisemitism in British Society during the Second World War} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), chapter 6. See also Raphael Langham, 250 Years of Convention and Contention: A History of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1760-2010 (Edgware: Vallentine Mitchell, 2010), dealing in some sections with the Board of Deputies’ responses to antisemitism, and Keith Kahn-Harris and Ben Gidley, \textit{Turbulent Times: The British Jewish Community Today} (London: Continuum, 2010), who argue that the spectre of the new antisemitism has been employed to form a new “discourse of insecurity” partly in order to add legitimacy to the need for a strong community leadership.
\item[\textsuperscript{33}] See chapter three for a more thorough discussion.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
responses non-Jewish actors and the state, in the great majority of cases, when civil society organisations are examined, the focus is exclusively on Jewish organisations.

Against this background, this study’s contributions to the existing literature are clearly evident. Firstly, the dissertation focuses on the contemporary period and takes into account how new forms of antisemitism in Britain have been interpreted in the public and political spheres, and how they have been addressed. To date, no critical examination with this particular focus exists in the academic literature.

Furthermore, this thesis considers a wide spectrum of actors: both successive British governments – the managing agents of the state – as well as non-state actors. In the latter category, the focus is not exclusively on Jewish organisations, but it also includes several other types of civil society actors.

Thirdly, while paying due attention to historical aspects, the overall disciplinary perspective of this study is political science. There are not many scholarly contributions to the study of contemporary antisemitism in the UK in this field,34 and certainly no studies that have taken the specific approach of this dissertation, by looking at anti-Jewish prejudice as a social problem, and analysing the response to it.

Thus, the primary aim of this research project is to make a substantial contribution to the literature on antisemitism – from a political science perspective, and thoroughly informed by the historical context. However, in addition, and as secondary objective, this study also aims to add to the burgeoning field of civil society research. In this context, the originality lies in the choice of antisemitism as a particular case, and in asking the question whether and in what ways approaches taken by the state, including the government and other institutions and organisations close to the centre of the political system, differ from those that non-

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34 Again, see Salzborn, Antisemitismus als Negative Leitidee der Moderne: Sozialwissenschaftliche Theorien im Vergleich for sociological contributions. Kahn-Harris and Gidley, Turbulent times: The British Jewish Community Today is to some extent also grounded in political (or general social) science, but as already mentioned, while it does incorporate a discussion of contemporary antisemitism and the way the Anglo-Jewish community has dealt with it, this is not the main focus.
governmental actors pursue. Therefore, for the sake of this secondary purpose, antisemitism serves as a case study that allows the comparison of state and civil society responses to a complex and contested social issue. Chapter three will demonstrate just how suitable contemporary antisemitism is for serving as an example of such an issue.

**Research design and methodological approach of this study**

This research encompasses a range of different social and political actors, and analyses a number of key issues relevant to an examination of approaches in the fight against antisemitism. These include government legislation and policy making, the All-Party Parliamentary Group against Antisemitism, Holocaust remembrance and education, Jewish communal self-defence and the activities of different groups in the realm of media and the wider public sphere.

Each of these are analysed in the different chapters and are indispensable for this study. For example, as chapter five will discuss, it would have been very hard to justify an omission of an analysis of Holocaust-related activities given the historical role hatred against Jews played in this event.

The relatively wide scope of this research is also appropriate because the present study breaks new ground by examining a heavily underexplored dimension of antisemitism research. It also introduces an original perspective on contemporary anti-Jewish prejudice in Britain by setting it in the wider context of policy studies and civil society theory, and more specifically the study of social problems. In this sense, it has to some degree an exploratory character, and like most such studies, casts a wide net.

This approach constitutes a particular strength of this research. However, it could also be argued that some of the topics examined in the course of this thesis merit separate studies of their own. One could, for example, delve into great depths in studying historical responses
to antisemitism in Britain, the role of government and legislation in countering prejudice or Holocaust and antisemitism.

However, in doing either of those things, this study would have constituted an entirely different research project – or rather a set of projects – requiring different historical and theoretical frameworks, and a much narrower research question in the first place. Given the dearth of existing research on responses to antisemitism, this dissertation deliberately addresses a wide the range of actors and issues – each of which is highly significant in the present context – in order to maximise its contribution to knowledge.

Turning from the general research design to more specific methodological issues, the following sections will outline the choices made in terms of sampling, data collection and data analysis. This study makes use of methodological techniques and analytical tools which are commonly used in both the discipline of contemporary history, as well as the social sciences. It examines published documents and other texts – a traditional historical approach – which are analysed by drawing on analytical concepts such as discourses, framing, and problem definition, which are widely used in social scientific disciplines.

The overall methodological approach of this study, in sampling, data collection as well as analysis, is a qualitative one. There is of course a long-standing scholarly debate about the extent to which the natural sciences with their exact, often large-scale, predominantly quantitative research designs, serve as the only or at least the best model for the social sciences. However, a consensus seems to have emerged that both quantitative as well as qualitative research methods have their place, and choices between them should be made according to their appropriateness for the respective research question.

Although there is great variety within qualitative methodology, there are a number of characteristics that differentiate it from quantitative research in general. According to Margrit

35 See for instance the first three chapters of Uwe Flick, An Introduction to Qualitative Research, 5th ed. (London; Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2014).
36 Ibid, 15.
Schreier, among the most important ones are that qualitative approaches are interpretative, naturalistic, situational, reflexive, allow for emergent flexibility, tend to use inductive rather than deductive reasoning, and are often case-oriented.

The latter point is particularly relevant for the methodological choices of the present study. Whereas quantitative research often focuses on variables across many cases, and treats concrete cases as means to an end – which is usually being able to make generalisations regarding the variables under study – qualitative approaches consider cases as important objects of research in their own rights. This thesis is interested in the concrete case of response antisemitism in the UK, and looks at specific actors such as British governments, the All-Party Parliamentary Group against Antisemitism, the Community Security Trust, and others. Because of this specific focus it is not a primary aim of this study to generalise these findings beyond the specific case of antisemitism, or draw direct conclusions from the British to other national contexts. The aim is to gather appropriate data on the responses to antisemitism of some of most relevant social and political actors, and – with due consideration to the context – to interpret this information as thoroughly as possible.

The selection of units of analysis

At a fundamental level, a decision had to be made which actors and organisations to examine in terms of their responses to antisemitism. This choice is clear in the case of the British government because there is only one unit of analysis. But a selection had to be made in regards to all other potentially relevant social or political actors, including non-governmental organisations.

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37 The context always considered.
38 This refers to the researcher’s self-awareness and awareness of his or her subjective influence on the research.
This study employs a non-probability strategy in its selection of units of analysis, more precisely what is commonly called purposive or theoretical sampling.\textsuperscript{40} The use of purposive sampling is not only advisable because of practical hurdles preventing randomisation,\textsuperscript{41} but using a purposive strategy has a number of clear benefits and advantages for achieving the research aims and answering the research questions.

There are a number of actors that have an obligation or an interest in countering antisemitism, thus warranting inclusion in this study, and most of them are relatively easy to identify.

The most obvious of these are the main political institutions, including government and parliament, which provide and maintain legal and political contexts with the aim of enabling citizens and communities to live lives free from discrimination or harassment. Some independent arms-length bodies or quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations, in particular the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), have responsibilities in areas that touch upon issues like racism, non-discrimination and similar fields. It could therefore be assumed that their work also has a bearing on antisemitism.

In addition, there are organisations that work for or represent those who are actually affected by antisemitism in the UK, first and foremost the Anglo-Jewish community. Even a cursory survey of contemporary Anglo-Jewish community structures leads to organisations that should be included in a study on countering antisemitism in the UK. The most important of these is the Community Security Trust (CST).\textsuperscript{42}


\textsuperscript{41} Drawing a random sample requires a sampling frame which includes all units of the statistical population, including all potential units of analysis. In practical terms, the sampling frame for this study would have been required to include all organisations which deal with antisemitism, Jewish community affairs, racism, or even community relations, and perhaps many more, but would have to exclude other organisations whose work does not have any bearing upon such issues. Such a list does not exist, and would have been impossible to collate from existing databases of associations in the UK.

\textsuperscript{42} Although the Board of Deputies of British Jews (henceforth the Board of Deputies), traditionally considered to be the main representative body of Anglo-Jewish, has also got a long history of responding to antisemitism in different ways, anti-Jewish prejudice is not the focus of its work, as is the case for the CST. On the history of the Board, including its responses to antisemitism and other challenges for the British Jewish community, see
In addition, there are also fields of inquiry for which the necessity to include them in this study requires some further elaboration. This applies especially to Holocaust remembrance and education, and chapter five will discuss just how relevant it is to the prevention of anti-Jewish prejudice in theory and practice.

The use of purposive sampling means that the results of the analysis do not allow generalisations in a strictly statistical sense. Representative samples make it possible to enumerate frequencies and to draw direct numerical inferences from empirical observations made on the sample to the wider population it represents.

However, even without the possibility of statistical generalisations, the results of the analyses are nevertheless significant. Firstly, this is because the focus is on key actors who are relevant in this context, as already mentioned above. Moreover, analytical generalisations can be made even without randomised sampling techniques, as Robert Yin has pointed out in the context of case study research. If only one organisation would be identified as making an important contribution to fighting antisemitism in Britain, this would be analytically relevant for the hypothesis that civil society plays a role in addressing antisemitism, even in the absence of a large, quantitative data set.

**Data collection**

Scott differentiates between four types of documents or records: closed, restricted, open-archival and finally open-published. In order to examine discourses on antisemitism, this study analyses a variety of open-published texts. These include reports, articles, official statements, press releases, websites and others.

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44 Ibid.

A large amount of very useful data was generated by the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism (APPIA), the outcomes of which were published in a report in 2006.\textsuperscript{46} The significance of this inquiry and the subsequent report for countering antisemitism in Britain and beyond will be explored further in the course of this study. At this point it can already be stated that even solely as a source of information, this inquiry has been highly valuable, not at least because it engendered a number of other highly significant documents containing a wealth of information relevant for the research question.

The Labour government issued two responses to the APPIA report in 2007 and in 2008 respectively\textsuperscript{47} and the coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats issued its detailed response to the overall findings and the 35 policy recommendations of the APPIA report in 2010.\textsuperscript{48} Moreover, there were written responses by the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats as opposition parties, as well as a Crown Prosecution Service response and others. As part of the inquiry itself, a call for papers was issued in November 2005, leading to more than one hundred responses by different governmental and non-governmental organisations and other interested parties and individuals.\textsuperscript{49} Not all of these responses have been published,\textsuperscript{50} but the majority of them have been obtained by the author of this study. In addition, four oral evidence sessions were held in February and March 2006 and they were fully transcribed.\textsuperscript{51}


\textsuperscript{49} For a full list of respondents see the Appendix of the APPIA report, 57.


\textsuperscript{51} Also available on the website, see http://www.antisemitism.org.uk.
The dissertation will also examine a variety of other published government documents, as well as various types of texts produced by civil society organisations, with particular emphasis on content made available to the general public on websites.

This document analysis is supplemented by a number of personal interviews conducted with representatives from groups and organisations connected to the issues raised in this study. These are Danny Stone, Director of the Parliamentary Committee Against Antisemitism Foundation (PCAAF), the charity which funds and provides administrative support to the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) against Antisemitism; Dave Rich, Deputy Director of Communications for the Community Security Trust (CST) and Stephen Hoffman, Campaigns Officer at the Zionist Federation (ZF) of Great Britain and Ireland. As will be explained later in this thesis, the APPG against Antisemitism had an important impact on political responses towards anti-Jewish prejudice in Britain, and the CST plays a crucial role in this context, too. The conversation with the ZF, the most established Zionist body in this country, was sought to confirm a hypothesis that emerged from analysing the ZF’s activities, namely that countering antisemitism was at best only a marginal organisational goal.

However, these interviews fulfill only a supplementary function, because the core analysis of the study consists of examining the methodologically more significant textual sources of information, including reports, government white papers, transcripts of parliamentary debates, and online publications by non-governmental organisations.

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52 On the interview as research method see Nigel King, *Interviews in Qualitative Research* (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2010).
53 Personal interview, 27 February 2013, London.
54 Personal interview, 24 June 2013, London.
55 Personal interview, 26 July 2013, London.
As Alan Bryman has correctly observed, documents “are simply ‘out there’ waiting to be assembled and analysed.”\textsuperscript{56} This is even truer nowadays with widespread availability and access brought about by the Internet and public archives.

However, availability and access are not the only or most important reasons why published documents are particularly suitable for this specific research. The very fact that a document is publicly available regardless of whether or not it is actively distributed, as in the case of newsletters, press releases or campaigning material, implies an intention to communicate the content to an audience or readership.

The production of texts intended for consumption involves deliberation about content and presentation. As a result, published documents are the result of the best possible effort within the limitations of given resources, on behalf of the producer of the texts to communicate the contents. This is especially relevant when it comes to complex and also controversial issues, which applies to contemporary antisemitism, as published statements on sensitive issues are considered carefully before being released.

Moreover, in an organisational context, documents such as reports, policy papers, mission statements or press releases usually aim to represent the views of the organisation as a whole, regardless of whether or not the texts have, in reality, been read and approved by members of the organisation other than the author. Finally, unlike research methods involving social interactions, examining documents benefits from the unobtrusiveness of texts.\textsuperscript{57}

Many of the texts which are analysed in this thesis are published on websites. The virtual character of online content poses potential methodological challenges because it can be altered easily. However, frequently occurring changes to websites usually include addition of texts to the existing ones, such as adding a most recent press release or annual report.

\textsuperscript{56} Bryman, \textit{Social Research Methods}, 370. However, open-archival documents dealing with the final decades of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century are not available due to the thirty-year convention which has only partly been undone by the Freedom of Information Act of 2005.

Substantial changes normally occur in the context of aesthetic considerations, such as rebranding, or modernisation of the layout, which often gives the opportunity to also reconsider textual content as part of the website re-launch project. Any substantial changes beyond that normally reflect changes in organisational strategy, or management. In this case, the changes to the website content do not pose a greater problem than the challenges of using offline publications. The latter may not be temporary in terms of their actual existence, but they also reflect the communicative intentions of the respective organisation at the point in time of the publication, and they may quickly become outdated. In this respect, online material can be much more advantageous as it provides immediate access to the most up-to-date communications of the organisation, and a website will be first to reflect any changes before these are circulated through printed publications.

Method of data analysis: The significance of language for political and social analysis

Paying attention to the ways in which political actors deal with issues at the discursive level yields important insights. Since the “argumentative turn,” the crucial role of language and discourse in the complex process of interpreting and prioritising different predicaments in society has been increasingly acknowledged in policy studies and other social scientific fields. This is because it can be argued that objective realities in themselves do not constitute problems. As Michael Hill put it, the “… social and then political – definition of a matter that needs attention always represents a collective construction directly linked to the perceptions,

58 To take an example from British party politics, employing language was key part of the modernisation process of the Labour Party during the time in opposition, and especially the rebranding process as “New Labour” under Tony Blair’s leadership from 1994, culminating in 1995 with the removal of Clause Four in the party constitution, transformed traditional Labour policy approaches but also image and rhetoric. As Bryson and Fisher point out, “the architects of New Labour deliberately used language to package their policies.” Valerie Bryson and Pamela Fisher, eds., Redefining Social Justice: New Labour, Rhetoric and Reality (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), 6. See also Norman Fairclough, New Labour, New Language? (London: Routledge, 2000).
representations, interests and values of the actors concerned.” Therefore, policy studies pay a great deal of attention to the definition of social problems in the broader context of agenda setting. Taking into account the ways a specific phenomenon is talked about or “framed” as a problem in the public sphere is important in analysing politics, especially in the era of “mediatisation.”

As stated above, the overall approach to data analysis in this study is a qualitative one, drawing on different concepts for textual data analysis. There are many different methods available to study textual data, such as content analysis, discourse analysis, framing analysis, conversation analysis, narrative analysis, socio-linguistic analysis, semiotics, general hermeneutic approaches and many others.

It is a common observation that one of the hallmarks of qualitative research in general and textual analysis in particular is the great degree of flexibility and diversity in approaches in the absence of one established methodological orthopraxis. At the same time, the rich diversity of available methods for data analysis in textual analysis presents an opportunity to draw on important concepts and insights from different methods. Maintaining a greater openness and methodological flexibility can yield rich results when, as is the case in this study, the material exhibits a greater variety of text types.

One of the most popular qualitative methods of data analysis is discourse analysis. This has its roots in linguistics but has also been employed in many other disciplines such as sociology, social psychology, media and cultural studies, and increasingly also in political

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63 In research practice, it is actually not uncommon to apply more than one qualitative methodological tool, even if this is not always made explicit. See for instance David A. Rochefort and Kevin P. Donnelly, "Agenda-Setting and Political Discourse: Major Analytical Frameworks and their Application," in *Routledge Handbook of Public Policy*, ed. Eduardo Araral, et al. (London; New York: Routledge, 2013), who mix methodological insights from the concepts of problem definition, framing and political narrative in their analysis of the 2011 London riots.
science. In the context of discourse analysis, texts are understood in the broadest possible sense, and include written texts, speech, visual products, events, artefacts or other objects that can be interpreted. Partly due to its interpretative nature, there is no single established method of doing discourse analysis, and so the term encompasses a great variety of approaches.64

Despite this great variety of approaches and the lack of an established methodological orthodoxy, a common denominator in all different types of discourse analysis is the epistemological outlook grounded in social constructivism, exploring “the relationship between discourse and reality.”65 While different varieties of discourse analyses vary for instance in the attention given to power structures in society, all focus on the prominent role of language in the social world. Discourses are taken as not only representing phenomena, but as producing and re-creating social reality.

The present study takes a middle ground by allowing for a notion of a pre-existing and accessible reality beyond discourse and acknowledging that to an extent, texts do represent the views, assumptions and attitudes of actors. At the same time, it is important to note that documents are not only containers of objective information but themselves constitute “social facts.”66 In short, while this study does not employ “discourse analysis” in the strictest methodological sense of the term, it utilises the concept of discourses and takes seriously the importance of language used by social actors that it highlights.

Another concept that the analysis in this dissertation will be drawing on is “framing,” defined by Robert Entman as selecting “some aspects of a perceived reality [in order to]
make them more salient in a communicating text."\textsuperscript{67} Originally developed in the context of media studies,\textsuperscript{68} it has been widely applied in other disciplines including political science,\textsuperscript{69} and its usefulness will become particularly evident in the fourth chapter of this thesis which deals with the way successive British governments have framed antisemitism.

The search for effective measures against prejudice and antisemitism

The primary approach of this study is empirical and analytical, not prescriptive. Instead of seeking to make recommendations about what should be done to address antisemitism, the main aims are to describe, analyse and compare different responses to it as “objectively” as possible.\textsuperscript{70} While it can be argued that the notion of value-free judgements in the social sciences is an aspiration rather than a reality, the philosophical problem of objectivity versus subjectivity\textsuperscript{71} does not preclude research from pursuing empirical and analytical objectives in the first place.

On the other hand, it would be incorrect to insist that normative considerations have not influenced this study at all. Antisemitism is a social phenomenon with hugely negative social consequences, as shown throughout history. For this reason, there is a moral mandate to fight it. Research could be expected to shed light on whether or not particular social or political actors do so in effective ways, or at the very least, to established whether there are

\textsuperscript{70} An alleged lack of objectivity is a common criticism levelled against institutions and individual scholars in the field of antisemitism research, often made in connection to criticising the politicisation of the field. Antony Lerman, \textit{The Making and Unmaking of a Zionist: A Personal and Political Journey} (London: Pluto, 2012). On the other hand, the criticism of a value-laden perspective can also be applied to some of those questioning the resurgence of antisemitism. See also chapter three on the wider critique against the new antisemitism thesis.
actually any proven methods to combat prejudice. The following section will discuss this issue.

Antisemitism can be conceptualised as a form of prejudice and in recent decades, prejudice research, an expanding field within the discipline of social psychology, has developed advanced concepts and theories about individual, social and cultural processes underlying the formation of different forms of social bias.

Therefore, although this thesis is not primarily located within the disciplinary context of social psychology, a brief examination of social-psychological research will help to illuminate the question of what is the “right” approach to fighting antisemitism. It will enable this dissertation to draw some conclusions that do not evade normative aspects, but allow for them to be scientifically grounded.

Historical analyses of conceptualisations of prejudice, first conducted by John Duckitt and later adapted by John Dovidio, show that against the backdrop of certain historical developments, especially in Europe and the United States, academic conceptualisations and explanations of prejudice, and at the same time also broad trends in social policy approaches to manifestations of prejudice in society, have undergone marked shifts since the beginning of the twentieth century.

Before the 1920s, widely-held attitudes of superiority towards ethnic minorities were generally not seen as a social problem but – in accordance with the widespread racial theories

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72 Chapter two will go into more detail on the conceptualisation of antisemitism as prejudice.
73 See John F. Dovidio et al., "Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination: Theoretical and Empirical Overview," in The SAGE Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination, ed. John F. Dovidio, et al. (London: SAGE, 2010), 4, who have quantified the relative percentage of articles about prejudice and stereotyping in relevant social psychology journals and found a steady growth in these figures since the 1960s.
76 The following historical account is largely based on Duckitt, "Historical Overview,; "Reducing Prejudice: An Historical and Multi-Level Approach," where further references on the different approaches to prejudice briefly outlined here can be found.
of the time – as normal and inevitable reactions towards inferior “races.” Accordingly, psychologists did not consider prejudice to be a concept requiring scholarly investigation.

It was only in the 1920s, when the legitimacy of European colonialism was increasingly questioned and the civil rights movement in the United States emerged, that prejudice came to be perceived as irrational and also morally wrong, and researchers started describing the extent and societal consequences of negative attitudes against ethnic minorities in more detail.

Subsequently, approaches that sought to explain negative prejudice through universal psychodynamic processes like repressed frustration and projection became popular, resulting in theories such as the “frustration-displacement theory.” Accordingly, assimilation became a prominent idea that shaped social policy thinking on the subject, assuming that once marginalised minorities adapt to their surrounding culture they would no longer be targets for “scapegoating.” On the other hand, however, the tragic historical legacies of governments that not only failed to see the merits of reducing racial discrimination but that, on the contrary, adopted policies of systematic discrimination and persecution are well-known.

In the 1950s, the experiences of the Second World War and the Holocaust brought perspectives to the fore that interpreted prejudice and racism as a result of particular, pathological personalities in individuals, combined with the effects of anti-liberal worldviews. The theory that was most famously elaborated by Theodor Adorno and his colleagues in *The Authoritarian Personality* assumed that authoritarian parenting in combination with anti-democratic ideologies prevalent in society produced disturbed personalities, prone to bias and prejudice. The long-term political answer to such views was the promotion of democratic and liberal political values, an approach embraced after the Second World War by the U.S. and its Western allies.

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Against the background of segregation in the American South in the 1960s and 1970s, a growing understanding emerged that explanations of patterns of prejudice needed to look beyond the level of the individual and consider not only psychological but also sociological and cultural factors, including the role that socialisation and racist social norms played in perpetuating hostile race relations.

Accordingly, policy interventions targeted institutionalised racism and discriminatory social norms. As it became apparent that more subtle forms of racism outlived desegregation, policy measures such as Affirmative Action and Minority Empowerment became new paradigms in social policy approaches to tackle intergroup conflict and discrimination.

By the 1980s, cognitive psychology had made significant progress in identifying psychological processes of categorisation as a key explanatory factor for the persistence of prejudice. The assumption that our natural cognitive tendency towards categorisation made it somewhat inevitable that there would be some level of categorisation of ethnic groups became pronounced in research. This opened the way for multiculturalism – the celebration of ethnic and cultural diversity in society – to come to the forefront of social scientific and political thinking about how to create tolerant societies.

One key insight arising from this historical analysis of socio-psychological prejudice research that makes it particularly relevant for understanding how intergroup bias can be addressed in any given larger social context is that, as highlighted by Duckitt, many of these conceptual changes cannot simply be interpreted as the result of progressive scientific developments whereby outdated theories are refuted by new findings.

Rather, many of the successive phases of conceptualising prejudice represent different levels of analysis, not always displacing previous insights but often simply illuminating...
different aspects in intergroup bias.\textsuperscript{79} Thus, individual predispositions, socialisation processes and other intergroup influences, as well as social and cultural factors \textit{all} play a part in the development and perpetuation of prejudice in a society.

As chapter two and three will demonstrate, the history of antisemitism provides a clear illustration that different factors need to be considered when seeking to explain the genesis and development of antisemitism in particular historical periods, and that contemporary antisemitism is characterised by the coexistence of multiple strands of anti-Jewish prejudice, each requiring a slightly different set of explanatory variables.

On the other hand, it is also important to highlight that despite this evolution in research, it would be wrong to assume that there is any single, established method to eliminate prejudice in society, or that there is any proven, universally applicable strategy to combat antisemitism in all its complexity.

Many measures and techniques aimed at fostering good intergroup relations at the intergroup level are based on the “contact hypothesis,” arguably the most influential concept in socio-psychological prejudice research to date. First developed in North America after the Second World War, in its original form it was based on the – now somewhat naïve – belief that any type of contact between people will foster better understanding and diminish racial tensions.

In 1954, Gordon Allport published his influential book \textit{On the Nature of Prejudice}, presenting a much more detailed and elaborate version of the contact hypothesis, the main ideas of which are still extremely influential today.\textsuperscript{80} In fact, a number of meta-analyses show

\textsuperscript{79} Duckitt, "Historical Overview," 30, and "Reducing Prejudice: An Historical and Multi-Level Approach".
that the core proposition of the hypothesis, namely that personal contact between members of
different social groups effectively reduces prejudice, is largely accurate.\(^81\)

However, an important qualification already raised by Allport himself was that the
intergroup contact only works if particular conditions are met, including equal status of
participants, a common goal or task, a cooperative instead of competitive setting and a
normative framework of mutual respect.\(^82\) The importance of conditional factors was
confirmed by subsequent research,\(^83\) and several other conditions were added by other
scholars.\(^84\)

The conditionality of programmes for prejudice reduction based on the concept of
interpersonal contact thus represents its inherent limitations, because outside of contexts that
are explicitly designed to foster positive intergroup relations, the positive effects of personal
contact are likely not to occur, although that is precisely where they would be most needed.

The same is arguably also true for prejudice reduction techniques operating at the
individual, cognitive level. Based on the insight that social categorisation, an inherent feature
of human cognition, is in principle malleable, a number of bias-reduction strategies have been
developed. The goal of both “decategorisation” and the “Common Ingroup Identity Model”\(^85\)
is to encourage individuals to alter their mental constructions of in- and-out-group categories.

In the case of decategorisation this is achieved by breaking down boundaries between
them in focusing on individual outgroup members, and in the Common Ingroup Identity

\(^81\) Thomas F. Pettigrew and Linda R. Tropp, "Does Intergroup Contact Reduce Prejudice? Recent Meta-Analytic
Findings," in Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination, ed. Stuart Oskamp (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Earlbaum
\(^83\) For example: Jean-Claude Deschamps and Rupert Brown, "Superordinate Goals and Intergroup Conflict,"
\(^84\) Amir, for example, later added the condition intimacy: Y. Amir, "The Role of Intergroup Contact in Change
of Prejudice and Ethnic Relations," in Towards the Elimination of Racism, ed. P. A. Katz (New York:
Pergamon, 1976).
\(^85\) Also discussed under the term “re-categorisation.” Samuel Gaertner, L. and John F. Dovidio, Reducing
Model by utilising the positive effects of ingroup identification through the creation of more inclusive, larger social categories that encompass former outgroup members.\(^{86}\)

These insights have largely been gained in experimental settings, and are therefore difficult to implement in real life, let alone on a larger scale.\(^{87}\) Many of them require not only an awareness of prejudiced individuals of their biases but also the desire and opportunity to participate in attempts at prejudice reduction.\(^{88}\)

In short, even the most influential anti-bias theories, including the contact hypothesis and those based on concepts of social categorisation are inherently limited by conditionality, or the requirement for particular settings. Charles Stangor thus summarises the main weakness of socio-psychological research on prejudice to date: It “...has tended to ignore the playing out of intergroup attitudes in real life”, thus preventing the research findings from significantly contributing to social policy or “real social change.”\(^{89}\)

However, despite the absence of a simple, actionable formula, the aforementioned conclusion that Duckitt draws from his historical analysis is still valid. Given the complexity of prejudice, which includes the cognitive-perceptual, the individual and intergroup level, as well as social conditions at the societal level, a multilevel framework for prejudice reduction is arguably the best approach for effective social intervention in this area.\(^{90}\) Even if prejudice

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\(^{90}\) Duckitt, *The Social Psychology of Prejudice*, 251, first proposed a three-level model and later in "Reducing Prejudice: An Historical and Multi-Level Approach," 258-71, this four-level model outlined above. Authors subsequently building on Duckitt’s analysis also include multiple levels in their approaches. At the interpersonal level, Oskamp further distinguishes “mass influence processes” as occurring in media or educational settings from “group and interpersonal influence processes” at smaller-scale levels like in intergroup dialogue programme in college or community settings (Stuart Oskamp, "Multiple Paths to Reducing Prejudice and
cannot be stamped out entirely, the chances for success are increased if as many dimensions as possible are addressed at the same time.

But while Duckitt posits his multi-level framework as a suggestion for social policy, this study argues that it is not possible for one single actor alone to pursue the different methods of intervention, and it is certainly not possible or realistic for social policy makers to implement a policy that targets all these different levels simultaneously. In the course of this thesis, it will become clear that rather than assuming a central, planning agent in a concept of a multi-level framework for fighting antisemitism, it is much more realistic to envision a collective process, in which multiple political and social actors engage collaboratively or independently in pursuing various strategies for countering anti-Jewish prejudice at different levels.

The remainder of the thesis will examine whether the way in which contemporary antisemitism Britain is being addressed reflects the principle of a multi-level framework of tackling prejudice as a social problem, and if so, to what extent.

**Description of the thesis**

The first chapter will provide the theoretical framework of the thesis by introducing a neo-pluralist perspective on governance in the modern state. It will discuss different historical and theoretical developments that are relevant to different conceptualisations of both state and civil society. In order to highlight the role of civil society in identifying, defining, and addressing social problems, it will draw on some of the ideas and concepts already introduced such as the social construction of reality and the importance of discourse in problem discrimination,” in *Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination*, ed. Stuart Oskamp, Mahaway, N.J.: Lawrence Earlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers, 2000), 5.
definition, and elaborate them further to show their relevance to policy making and other, broader patterns of governance of society.

Before examining responses to contemporary antisemitism, and in order to do so in a conceptually and historically well-grounded context, the next chapter will look at the history of antisemitism in England and Britain from the Middle Ages to the post-Second World War era, and will also analyse how social and political actors have responded to it.

Chapter three contains a thorough discussion of the nature of contemporary antisemitism in Britain, and argues that antisemitism in Britain today can be characterised as a complex, multidimensional and contested social problem.

Chapter four focuses on political response to antisemitism, and shows that throughout the twentieth century, governmental approaches to the subject have mostly framed antisemitism in general, universalistic ways, for example as a subcategory of racism. It is argued that only in the wake of the landmark report on the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism in 2006, which also drew attention to the existence of the new antisemitism, has anti-Jewish prejudice received more political attention as a particular social problem.

That framing responses to antisemitism in larger, universalistic contexts is not confined to the state is highlighted in chapter five, which deals with Holocaust remembrance and education in the UK. It shows that British governmental initiatives, as well as civil society organisations in this field, derive universalistic lessons from the Holocaust, and that countering antisemitism is not a priority. It is argued that this, and in addition the politicisation of the Holocaust by some organisations, renders Holocaust remembrance in Britain largely ineffective as a direct means to combat the new antisemitism.

The final chapter, six, deals with the efforts of NGOs, most notably the Community Security Trust (CST) and some Israel advocacy organisations that confront a dimension of
contemporary British antisemitism not addressed by the government or state-sponsored civil society organisations in areas traditionally associated with fighting anti-Jewish prejudice. The case of the CST provides support for a key assumption developed in the theoretical chapter of this study, namely that civil society can fulfil important complementary functions in society by addressing aspects of social problems that cannot be fully tackled by governments for a variety of reasons.

The analysis of Israel advocacy in Britain, however, will also demonstrate some limits to the effectiveness of civil society groups. Their ability to specialise and attend to niche interests is potentially a great organisational strength, but overall, Israel advocacy remains rather marginal and lacks significant impact in the context of combating antisemitism.

Overall, the results of the analysis do not allow for a reductionist conclusion in the form of a simple dichotomy between state and civil society responses to antisemitism. But nevertheless, there are several examples of how non-state actors have made important contributions to the fight against anti-Jewish prejudice in contemporary Britain. The conclusion makes a case for recognising the potential role of civil society in addressing the new antisemitism in Britain without engaging in an uncritical glorification of civil society. However, this study also argues that while the elaborate legal frameworks that have been put into place by British governments in the past decades in areas such as anti-racism, equality, or hate-speech, suggest that the state has – literally – got everything under control when it comes to racism and prejudice, the case of contemporary antisemitism in the UK shows that the state might not be able to tackle this issue in all its complexity alone, and that the problem requires the attention of civil society, too.
Chapter 1: Governance in the modern British state and civil society’s role in addressing social problems

In order to analyse responses to contemporary antisemitism, it is first of all necessary to identify which political and social institutions and actors are, or ought to be, engaging in countering anti-Jewish prejudice and discrimination. Given the state’s mandate to protect its citizens’ basic rights, as mentioned in the introduction, the question is whether it should be expected that these are exclusively or mainly state institutions, or also non-state actors like civil society organisations.

Informed by theoretical debates in political science, this chapter will discuss important historical and political developments that have occurred in Britain and beyond since the final decades of the twentieth century, which some claim have amounted to a transformation in the way modern states are governed. Much has been made of the declining significance of the state and of strong, centralised governments on the one hand, and the increased importance of civil society actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in influencing and contributing to managing collective societal and political affairs at local, national, and even international levels, on the other hand.

After highlighting and discussing key aspects and arguments that are often raised in the context of these debates, part 1.3. of the chapter will conclude that claims about the complete retreat of the state, as well as uncritical eulogies on civil society and its relevance for governance, are slightly exaggerated. However, and this is the main point, there are a number of key areas in which the state is often not the sole agent in governance and in which civil society has particular contributions to make to governing today’s complex societies. This includes policy fields such as human rights, equality and anti-racism policies, and more generally speaking, the identification and definition of social problems. In short, the main conclusion of this chapter is that central government – the managing agent and most
important institution of the modern state – cannot identify and address all problems alone, but
civil society has vital contributions to make in governance. It will be argued that the input of
non-governmental actors is particularly important in the case of complex or contested social
problems.

The reason why all of this is relevant for the analysis of responses to antisemitism in
subsequent chapters is that, as chapter three will demonstrate, antisemitism is precisely that: a
complex, multidimensional and contested social issue. In principle, it therefore requires the
attention of both government, but also civil society. It will be the task of the rest of the thesis
to juxtapose the hypothesis about the relative significance of civil society and central
government in addressing contemporary antisemitism, as developed and presented in this
chapter, with the empirical reality.

1.1. The declining centrality of the state: The end of an era?

Since the Treaty of Westphalia enshrined state sovereignty as prime principle in international
relations and the French Revolution removed the last obstacles preventing the establishment
of the modern nation-state, the state has become the dominant form of political organisation
across the world.¹ According to a common definition, the state is a political organisation with
one government that maintains the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a certain
territory.² The executive, or government, is its managing agent.

Political theorists have been thinking about the relationship between state and society
for centuries.³ Conceptualising the state as separate from society is, historically speaking at
least, a recent development that is linked to the aforementioned rise of the modern state with

¹ Providing a good overview of the developments from the ancient state, the feudal and early modern state, to
the state in the twentieth century is Graeme J. Gill, The Nature and Development of the Modern State
² Adapted from Max Weber’s classic definition, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds., Weber, Max: Economy
³ For example John Locke (1632 – 1704), Charles de Montesquieu (1689 – 1755), Georg Friedrich Hegel (1770
– 1831) or Alexis de Tocqueville (1805 – 1859).
its clearly identifiable political institutions such as government, civil administration, and others. While the precise boundaries are not always easy to define, and while there are many points of interaction between state and society, it is nevertheless justified to analytically conceive them as distinct domains.

In the context of debates on modern state-society relations, one of the key issues is whether power is centralised or fragmented. This has important implications for the ways in which political communities make collectively binding decisions, allocate resources, develop structures and institutions, and solve their problems – in other words, for the ways in which societies are governed. Political scientists in the pluralist tradition⁴ identify multiple sites of power spread throughout society, government, and the state, and therefore tend to speak of “society-led states,” whereas elitists have traditionally conceptualised this relationship the other way round, seeing society as state-led and arguing for the primacy of the state.⁵

While the extent of government involvement has of course varied in different countries, until well into the twentieth century there was a clearly discernible overall trend towards a broader range of activities undertaken by governments in Western countries. In other words, the modern state had steadily expanded its scope of responsibility. The emergence of strong Keynesian welfare states in the decades after the Second World War peaked in the 1970s. This development extended the reach of the state to include the provision of social and economic rights and into fields including poverty reduction, social welfare, and healthcare provision. “These were,” it has been well argued, “the times when

⁴ Among the most prominent modern pluralists are Arthur Bentley, David Truman, Charles Lindblom and perhaps most importantly Robert Dahl. Neo-pluralism asserts that groups are vital political and social actors, but acknowledges that power might be dispersed unequally within society.

government was seen as the appropriate, legitimate and unchallenged vehicle for social
change, equality and economic development.\textsuperscript{6}

However, since the 1980s, much attention has been devoted to the multiple challenges
and changes to hierarchical, centralised and exclusively top-down forms of governance. In
the context of social and economic policy, neo-liberal approaches provided rationales for
governments all over the world to embark on public sector reforms that resulted in large-scale
privatisation programmes and a dramatic decrease in levels of state intervention.\textsuperscript{7}

In Britain, these changes were epitomised by the political project of “rolling back the
frontiers of the state” under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher during the 1980s. This
entailed the adoption of new public management, privatisation, public-private partnerships,
the introduction of internal markets where parts of the public sector compete with the private
sector, agencification and the rise of entities like non-departmental public bodies and quasi-
non-governmental organisations. The implementation of all these wide-ranging changes
resulted in a profound shift away from the post-war consensus and also away from the
principles of the Westminster Model.\textsuperscript{8} In fact, Britain is used by analysts as a prime example
of how the deliberate dismantling of state powers can transform a formerly strong state into a
weak state.\textsuperscript{9} New Labour, for its part, sought to rebalance many institutional changes
introduced under the previous Conservative governments, but reinforced the trend towards
decentralisation and fragmentation through increasing Europeanisation and the devolution of
powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland since 1999.

The pervasiveness of similar patterns and developments across the world has
prompted analysts to reassess traditional assumptions of state-centrality. The rising popularity

\textsuperscript{7} Although critics might argue that such neo-liberal projects themselves in fact exemplify top-down models of
governance, the key point is that they ultimately result in the retreat of direct state management of key areas of
social and economic life.
\textsuperscript{8} Dennis Kavanagh et al., \textit{British Politics}, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 252.
\textsuperscript{9} Pierre and Peters, \textit{Governance, Politics and the State}, 178-80.
of analytical frameworks like for instance Multi-level Governance (MLG),\textsuperscript{10} which incorporates different aspects of the rendering of state control to supra-national, sub-national as well as market forces, suggests that the idea of “retreat of the state” and the conceptual shift from government to \textit{governance} represent a new paradigm in the analysis of state-society relations.

In terms of relevance to and impact on the British political system, these developments prompted political scientists to develop alternatives to the traditional Westminster Model, the classic view of Britain as a unitary state with power firmly located at its centre and the core executive, underpinned by the principle of parliamentary sovereignty and a neutral civil service.\textsuperscript{11} One of the most prominent of the new explanatory models is the “Differentiated Polity Model” by Rod A. W. Rhodes.\textsuperscript{12} According to this organising perspective, the British polity is increasingly characterised by “functional and institutional specialization and the fragmentation of policies and politics.”\textsuperscript{13} The emphasis lies on governance instead of government, on power dependence, policy networks, a segmented executive and the claim that the British state is “hollowing out,”\textsuperscript{14} a phrase that has come into common usage since Rhodes’ ideas were initially published in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{15}

In addition to the diminution of state powers from within, developments like globalisation, increasing transnational economic activity and the growing influence of international law and international and supra-national organisations have led many to

\textsuperscript{11} Kavanagh et al., \textit{British Politics}, 44.
\textsuperscript{12} Rod A. W. Rhodes, \textit{Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability} (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997).
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 5.
question the traditional realist view that the state is the single most important unit in the international system.

In addition, and particularly relevant for the topic of this thesis, the rise of “global civil society”\(^{16}\) and the proliferation of non-state forces more generally speaking have allegedly contributed to the emergence of new forms of governance at both international as well as domestic levels. The following section will discuss the concept of civil society and provide an assessment regarding its potential to provide the lynchpins of pluralist forms of governance in an era of weak states.

1.2. Civil society: From high hopes to readjusted expectations

As ever so often with popular concepts, there is no consensus on the definition of civil society. The term is used in debates on a great variety of different subjects, from the activities of prominent transnational non-governmental actors such as human rights campaign groups or international development NGOs, to the emergence of democracy in the place of formerly illiberal political systems in the second half of the twentieth century, to initiatives for greater citizenship participation and local governance.

According to Michael Edwards, among the different perspectives on what constitutes civil society,\(^{17}\) the dominant view which stands in the Neo-Toquevillian tradition, sees civil society as that sphere of society where associational life takes place.\(^{18}\) In other words, and in line with much recent scholarship on non-governmental organisations (NGOs), transnational


and global civil society, at the most basic level civil society can be conceptualised as the societal realm of voluntary association. This realm of what has also aptly been called “organised civil society” is commonly understood to include different forms of associations such as charities, voluntary organisations, religious groups, but also pressure groups, political parties, mutual societies and co-operatives, trade unions, social enterprises and local community organisations.

Terms like charity, pressure group or voluntary organisation are not always used in the same way, and often carry specific meanings. Despite all these differences, one type of association that can be seen as exemplifying the commonalities of most kinds of civil society organisations is the non-governmental organisation (NGO). Matthew Hilton and colleagues refer to NGOs as the “players” of civil society, and even suggest that NGOs and terms like civil society, the voluntary sector or charities could be used interchangeably.

Due to the historical genesis of the term NGO in the context of the United Nations (UN), the label evokes connotations with development and humanitarian sectors. However, NGOs can be found in all fields, including areas relevant for this study such as Holocaust remembrance and education, provision of community security or Israel advocacy.

Apart from categorising NGOs according to issue areas like human rights, development or environmental issues, there are other ways of categorising NGOs. One differentiation is presented by Hildy Teegen, who distinguishes “club NGOs” which exist for the sake of their own members, like churches or trade unions, from “social purpose NGOs”

21 Ibid., 1.
22 A set of useful definitions and clarifications of these terms is offered in the first chapter of Matthew Hilton et al., A Historical Guide to NGOs in Britain: Charities, Civil Society and the Voluntary Sector since 1945 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). This is one of a number of publications on NGOs in Britain produced in the context of a Leverhulme Trust-funded project on NGOs in Britain since 1945.
24 Ibid., 2.
working for a cause beyond the narrow interest of their members, such as the poor, minorities or the environment.25

What unites all these different types of organisations is, as Thomas Davies phrases it in his history of transnational civil society, “non-governmental non-profit collective action”, that is social interaction that does not include governmental or profit-making aspects.26 In the case of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the very terminology already points to the key aspect of being independent from and not founded or substantially influenced by a government, and remaining unaccountable when receiving funds from the state.27

Within this general definitional framework, it should be clear that more loosely organised associations between individuals interested in a particular subject, such as social movements, “policy communities” and “issue networks,”28 or even prominent public figures that are engaged in activism or debates on issues of social concern in the public sphere, can also be included in this understanding of civil society, as long as they fulfil the criteria of voluntary, non-governmental and non-profit social interaction.

These aspects form the foundational, key elements of the working definition of civil society in this thesis. At the same time, it is also important to acknowledge that beyond the neutral and rather descriptive aspects contained in this definition, a proper understanding of

27 Anna-Karin Lindblom, *Non-Governmental Organisations in International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 46. In addition to that, it is also clear that in contrast to private businesses, gaining profit is not their raison d'être for NGOs. All NGOs are therefore also non-profit organisations (NPOs), a term particularly widespread in the US. This does not mean that NGOs are not allowed to make profit at all, but rather that this is not the explicit aim of their undertakings. “Non-profit” in this context means “not-for-profit”, not “no profit.” Thus, the term NGO clarifies the relation of an organisational form to state and government, whereas NPO refers to the role that profit-related goals play for the organisation.
civil society should also draw attention to its normative dimensions, for example by
acknowledging its relation to democracy. Without the existence of basic political and civil
rights such as freedom of speech and association, civil society cannot flourish. At the same
time, civil society has contributed to processes of democratisation throughout the twentieth
century.29

As Edwards highlights, the perspective of civil society as a “good society” is often
explicitly linked to, or implicitly integrated in, the dominant view of civil society as realm of
voluntary association. Highlighting that in fact, this normative view transcends a Western-
centric focus on liberal democracy, he states that according to this understanding civil society
represents the “institutionalization of ‘civility’ as a different way of living in the world, an
alternative kind of society in which all institutions operate in ways that reinforce these
positive social norms so that civil society becomes ‘a society that is civil’.”30

However, while it should be conceded that the concept has a normative dimension,
insisting on an overly narrow idea of this normativity can create a problem when drawing the
boundaries. It might not be difficult to exclude terrorist organisations from a narrowly
conceived realm of associations that pursue a good society, but it gets more complicated in
the case of non-governmental actors that hold controversial political views. In fact, as will
become clear throughout the rest of this thesis, there are many actors which should
legitimately be counted as forming part of civil society in accordance with the above
definition, but that espouse views and pursue activities that can be seen as fostering
stereotypes against Jews. The Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign is a good
example. Thus, it is also important to acknowledge that civil society can not only contribute

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29 Examples include the significance of the Solidarity trade union and the Catholic Church in Poland for the
democratic opposition since the 1970s, the role of religious actors, again especially the Catholic Church as
transnational civil society actor, in the so-called “third wave of democratization” (Samuel P. Huntington, The
Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1991) and the
role of civil society in the eventual collapse of the communist block at the end of the 1980s.
30 Edwards, Civil Society, 47
to addressing social issues, but can of course also be a source of contention and even for creating or exacerbating problems.

The promises of civil society

Those highlighting the strengths of civil society organisations can point to an impressive list of positive features and numerous examples where they have been successful in raising awareness for specific issues, formulating policy agendas and achieving notable results in influencing public and political discourses.

As noted above, NGOs are established actors in areas like development aid, human rights and environmental issues. NGOs, for example, played a vital role in the process that led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court.\(^{31}\) A long-term campaign against torture led primarily by Amnesty International and joined by other NGOs finally resulted in the 1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines was organised by a large network of different international NGOs in cooperation with government figures and international organisations. It was so successful that it was even awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997.\(^{32}\)

Moreover, compared to government agencies, NGOs are often ascribed greater efficiency, transparency and innovation, as well as democratic potential due to less-hierarchical structures, participatory management methods and grassroots connections. The commitment of NGO staff is arguably very high, not at least due to their humanitarian values and beliefs.\(^{33}\)


The significance of non-state actors is not only evident at the level of global politics and international issues, but also within the boundaries of the British state. The last three centuries of British history provide ample examples of a flourishing civil society. In fact, Britain, like the United States, has traditionally been seen as one of the heartlands of civil association. In particular Victorian Britain has been described as “golden age” for civic participation and philanthropy, an era when leisure-related associations and charitable organisations thrived at both local and national levels.

While the standard view of the preeminent role of civil society in British history has been scrutinized by historians, it is clear that voluntary associations of all shapes and sizes have long played a big part across British society, from social welfare and housing, to poverty relief and healthcare provision. According to James McKay and Matthew Hilton, who have been involved in a large-scale research project about NGOs in Britain since 1945, the role of non-governmental organisations has remained significant throughout the twentieth century and “contemporary Britain can only be properly understood with reference to the phenomenon of non-governmental organisations (NGOs).” They believe that virtually all important socio-political developments of the post-war period were profoundly influenced by NGOs, and that the major achievements in areas including environmentalism, consumerism, international aid, human rights, equality and various social policy issues like homelessness, education and child protection would not have been possible without the initiative of non-governmental organisations.

The enduringly vital role of civil society up to the present day has been acknowledged by successive British governments, under a variety of labels. The New Labour government

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34 Jose Harris, ed. *Civil Society in British History: Ideas, Identities, Institutions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 2-4.
36 Jose Harris, ed. *Civil Society in British History*, 3-5.
(1997–2010) prioritised “third sector” involvement in the delivery of public services and even established an Office of the Third Sector in Cabinet Office in 2006. More recently, the coalition government that took power in 2010 integrated the notion of the centrality of civil society in governance in their “Big Society” project, an ambitious programme for expanding voluntary action in all spheres of society based on community initiative that was introduced shortly after the 2010 general election. In the wider context of a global economic crisis, this project is an attempt to distribute the social and economic burdens of the welfare state more widely, and to include civil society in this endeavour. However, it has also been criticised, and of course, any expectation of civil society as the cure for all social and political ills is probably overly optimistic, as the following section will show.

Disenchanted civil society and the debate on the return of the state

While civil society has traditionally been predominantly viewed in an idealised way as morally superior agent of social change, in recent years this enthusiasm has cooled off considerably.

Critical voices have been raised by scholars as well as by politicians who have questioned the initial idealistic view of NGOs. In the case of development NGOs, it has been claimed they have failed to reduce poverty to any significant degree, that they oversimplify complex issues and preserve structural causes for inequality and deprivation by maintaining dependence on external aid. Critics also maintain that in spite of the alleged moral superiority and the claim that all NGOs serve the public good, in reality many NGOs do not operate differently from all other actors, pursuing their own self-interests and often

38 The three key elements are community empowerment, the opening up of public services and social action. Office for Civil Society (2011): Big Society – overview, available online at https://update.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/big-society-overview.
41 Haque, “Non-Governmental Organizations,” 336.
giving precedence to competing, instead of cooperating, modes of operation with other actors in the same issue area.\footnote{P. Wapner, "The State or Else! Statism's Resilience in NGO Studies," \textit{International Studies Review} 9, no. 1: 85-86.} Other criticism includes a lack of transparency, accountability and a lack of representation and legitimisation, the latter charge pointing to the fact that NGOs are not elected by democratic principles, are often run by their founders and have limited adequate member participation in decision-making processes.\footnote{Claire Mercer, "NGOs, Civil Society and Democratization: A Critical Review of the Literature," \textit{Progress in Development Studies} 2, no. 1 (2002): 13-14.} Finally, the ability of non-governmental organisations to have any notable impact on society at all, in particular to bring about social change, has been raised. NGOs are mostly dependent on funding and private donations which are often irregular and depend on the current situation and good-will of the donors. With such an unstable and insufficient financial basis an organisation is not able to consistently achieve all, or even some, of its objectives. Another argument is that existing power structures often hinder NGOs from achieving their desired change in the societies they work in.\footnote{Shany Payes, \textit{Palestinian NGOs in Israel: The Politics of Civil Society} (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2005). He deals with Palestinian NGOs in Israel and concludes that their success is limited because of existing structures in Israeli society.}

It has already been made clear that as exemplary form of non-governmental, non-profit, voluntary organisations in the pursuit of social or political causes, NGOs represent an “ideal type” of civil society organisation, and thus many of these points of criticism apply beyond NGOs as a specific organisational form to civil society more generally speaking.

Moreover, as already mentioned, not all causes pursued by civil society actors are equally laudable, and different positions held or interests advocated within can be met with divergent assessments. In short, civil society can be a force for good in society, but also has ambivalent and problematic dimensions.

Given all this, the question has to be posed whether the high expectations placed upon civil society in an age of retreating states might to some degree have been misplaced. In fact,
many scholars do not even agree with the proposition that the state is in retreat, arguing that
the notion is a myth or that accounts of such a decline are wildly exaggerated.45 Such critical
contributions that charge society-centred approaches with overlooking the enduring
significance of the state have become more numerous in recent years.

In the context of the British political system, Rhodes’ differentiated polity model has
been criticised and alternatives that claim the state still holds considerable power, notably the
“asymmetric power model of the British polity” have been presented.46 Marsh concludes that
“strong government, although increasingly challenged, is more realistic than a hollowed out
state,”47 and even this thesis has been challenged by those pointing towards a growing range
of powers of the core executive.48 As Colin Hay and Michael Lister have put it, “rumours of
the death of the state and of the demise of state theory would, thankfully, seem greatly
exaggerated.”49 Scholars such as Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol,
who made their often-cited case for “bringing the state back in” and reinserting the state-
factor into political analysis as early as in the 1980s, certainly see a return of the state at the
level of mainstream scholarship as justified.50

1.3. The transformation of the state and civil society’s role in the
governance of modern societies

In sum, there are numerous advocates for the thesis of the retreat of the state as well as for the
enduring significance of hierarchal modes of governance with the central government at the

45 For instance, looking at the expanding state revenue, see Colin Hay and Michael Lister, "Introduction:
Theories of the State," in The State: Theories and Issues, ed. Colin Hay, Michael Lister, and David Marsh
46 Marsh, Richards, and Smith, "Unequal Plurality: Towards an Asymmetric Power Model of British Politics".
& International Relations 10, no. 2 (2008): 255.
48 I. Holliday, "Is the British State Hollowing Out?," The Political Quarterly 71, no. 2: 59; Michael Marinetto,
49 Hay and Lister, "Introduction: Theories of the State," 15.
50 Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State back in (Cambridge:
core. Likewise, there are many examples supporting the claim that civil society provides effective solutions to social problems, but also arguments pointing towards the failure and inability of NGOs and other civil society actors to fill the vacuum left by retreating states. Thus, it seems that an all-encompassing, comprehensive assessment of the relationship between state and society at the beginning of the twenty-first century that aims to make broad generalisations is likely to fail.

It is, however, nevertheless possible to reach some more definitive conclusions regarding the relevance of civil society versus the state in spite of this apparently inconclusive and confusing picture. The remainder of the chapter will outline these conclusions.

**The transformation of the state**

Theoretical perspectives on the “transformation of the state” go beyond the dualism in the debate on the modern state, and avoid the extremes of retreat and state-centric scholars alike.\(^51\) Thinking about different ways in which states have been transformed captures the complexities of new forms of governance, and is more useful than an outright rejection of the hollowing out thesis or a blanket acceptance of the return of the state. This idea of the transformation of the nature of statehood has been used and adapted by many contributors in the governance literature.

One interesting approach has been put forward by Stephen Bell and Andrew Hindmoore.\(^52\) While their overall understanding emphasises the resilience of the state, they outline different modes of governance in all of which the state remains of central importance, but where non-state forces play a crucial role. For the topic of this study, their concept of

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“governing via associations”\textsuperscript{53} where governments collaborate with civil society actors to govern in particular areas, is of particular interest. As chapter six will show, the context of tackling antisemitism in Britain contains prime examples of this mode of governance, exemplified for instance in the successful collaboration of the government with the Community Security Trust (CST) in providing security and protection for Jewish facilities across Great Britain.

A main advantage of such middle-way approaches in state-society debates is that they do not place expectations upon civil society that cannot be fulfilled. They do, however, present an appropriate framework of a transformed state that comprises different modes of governance, and in which civil society does not replace the state entirely but in which it finds its niches. As the remainder of this chapter will outline, these niches in which civil society finds its vital roles may be particular policy areas, but beyond that and more generally speaking, processes of problem definition and discursive action in the public sphere which are not only important parts of political agenda setting, but of governance in complex modern societies in a wider sense.

\textit{Civil society and “low politics”}

The claim of the state’s unswerving power cannot be applied to all areas to the same extent. There are aspects of governance where the state still plays the dominant role and others where the balance within the particular arrangement of governance tilts more towards society than state. To assess the influence of civil society in the state it is advisable to take a look at distinct policy sectors instead of making broad generalisations.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 162-85.
Some of the literature on global civil society asserts that today, the impact of NGO varies across issues. While in “high politics” the state still dominates the field and civil society’s influence remains weak, in low politics, like for instance human rights and anti-racism, it tends to be the other way round on a global level, but also in individual countries.

Historically, there are numerous examples of how advances in these areas have been driven by associations, groups, individuals or private organisations. Examples include the founding of the human rights regime after the Second World War, the Civil Rights movement in the United States of America, the anti-Apartheid movement (AAM) that was at the centre of an international campaign against the Apartheid system in South Africa in the 1960s, and gay rights activism. Included in this category also are attempts by associations like the “Abwehrverein” in Germany in the nineteenth century or later in a different context Jewish organisations like the Anti-Defamation League to fight against antisemitism.

The same is true in the UK where NGOs have also played a major part in sectors such as equality rights and anti-discrimination. Organisations established by ethnic or religious minority groups in Britain have an important place in British social and political history, and many of them have led the fight against racism and inequality over the decades. Organisations like the League of Coloured Peoples worked against racism since 1931, and the movement against the threats of fascism in the 1930s and 1940s comprised a variety of groups, associations and political actors, including Jewish groups such as the Jewish People’s Council (JPC). More examples include the Institute of Race Relations (IRR) that became an

54 For an application of the distinction between high politics and low politics to Britain see Jim Bulpitt, Territory and Power in the United Kingdom: An Interpretation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983). High politics commonly refer to policy areas such as foreign relations, defence, and economic policy, i.e. matters that are crucial for the survival of a state, whereas a definition of low politics include areas like local politics and the delivery of service, but it is also justified to include policy areas related to immigration, equality and human rights in this category.

55 Charles W. Kegley, World Politics: Trend and Transformation (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009), 216.

56 The Anti-Defamation League is an international NGO founded in 1913 and based in the USA, whose primary objective was to stop anti-discrimination. Later, it expanded its scope and now considers itself as “civil rights/human relations agency”, see http://www.adl.org/about-adl.
independent charity after the Notting Hill riots in 1958, and the influential Runnymede Trust, established against the background of rising levels of anti-immigration sentiments in the UK in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{57} The rise of social regulation in Britain such as the Race Relations Acts or anti-discrimination acts can also partly be attributed to pressure groups like the Anti-Nazi League or the Fawcett Society.\textsuperscript{58}

**Civil society’s role in the identification and definition of social problems**

Political scientists\textsuperscript{59} have correctly pointed out that the idea of the generic policy cycle, in particular the division of the policy process into chronological stages such as agenda setting, policy formulation, decision making, legitimation, implementation and evaluation, which is commonly found in introductory textbooks on policy analysis\textsuperscript{60} is an over simplification of political and social reality. However, while acknowledging that policy cycle or stages models cannot – and mostly do not – claim to be an accurate representation of all details of policy-related processes and that these processes almost never occur in a strict linear fashion, these models are useful heuristic tools. In particular, they draw attention to the fact that a comprehensive analysis of how democratic societies perceive, negotiate and deal with social and political problems also has to consider aspects and developments that occur before issues reach the latter, practical stages of the policy-making process. This is because these stages – such as concrete policy formulation, legislation and implementation – are usually preceded or accompanied by debates on social issues in the public sphere, where different views and

\textsuperscript{57} Hilton et al., *A Historical Guide to NGOs in Britain: Charities, Civil Society and the Voluntary Sector since 1945*, 73.

\textsuperscript{58} Kavanagh et al., *British Politics*, 276.


interests regarding social and political issues are discussed, and importantly also, where new social problems are identified.

It should be evident from the discussion so far that many debates about state-society relations and the significance of non-governmental actors in relation to states and governments focus on later stages of the policy process. For example, a large amount of global civil society literature deals with is the development aid sector where, in some cases, NGOs even replace government functions in the provision of services.\(^6^1\) In other contexts, the role of charities and voluntary associations in health care and social services is often highlighted. Also, much of the criticism against the proliferation of arms-length agencies and quasi-non-governmental organisations centres on the concern that the ideal of a politically neutral civil service is being eroded, that the competencies of many agencies have grown, for instance related to budgeting, and that they are therefore explicitly or implicitly engaged in political decision making.

However, while it is certainly true that there much involvement of non-state actors in all these phases of governance, it could be argued that one of the areas where the pluralist notion of power dispersed across society becomes most apparent, and where the role of non-governmental actors in governance is most vital, is the process of identifying and framing social problems in the first place.

In general, a problem can be defined as “any situation in which the state of affairs varies, or may in the future vary, from the desired state, and where there is no obvious way to reach the desired state.”\(^6^2\) Of course, there are individual problems and then there are problems that concern a group of people or larger collectivities. Joseph Gusfield has

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\(^6^1\) K. A. Suresh, "Role of NGOs in Development," Kurukshetra 47, no. 1 (1998).

distinguished between social problems and public problems. According to the renowned sociologist James A. Beckford, social problems are “…features of social life that are widely identified as causing harmful but avoidable and possibly remediable difficulties to significantly large numbers of people – if not entire societies or the whole of humanity.”

However, the introduction has already elaborated on the relevance of social constructivism for understanding social problems and the processes of their identification, and highlighted that according to this perspective, objective facts do not automatically constitute problems. They become problems once they are collectively constructed by means of social and political definitions, and it is not only the government but also civil society that can play a part in this context.

While public debates about social issues in the wider public sphere are often particularly lively when an issue is already officially on the political agenda, it is important to note a basic insight, namely that only if and when an issue is actually perceived and articulated as a problem, is it even possible for it to ever reach the policy making process. As Fischer and Forester have put it, “… policy-making is a constant discursive struggle over the criteria of social classification, the boundaries of problem categories, the intersubjective interpretation of common experiences, the conceptual framing of problems, and the definitions of ideas that guide the ways people create the shared meanings which motivate

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them to act.” As Elmer Schattschneider saw it, the way that a concern is defined can determine whether it receives public and political attention and support and “the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power.”

Thus, it is not only the identification of a social fact as a problem, but also the way it is framed, or in other words, the problem definition, which matters. In an early contribution to the area of policy studies concerned with problem definition, Rochefort and Cobb identified nine different categories of claims that often recur in problem definitions. Among these is for example novelty, proximity, the perception of incidence frequency. Arguably, the most significant category is causality, which contains claims about the origins of a problem, usually including the question of culpability, and can constitute “the linchpin to a whole set of interdependent propositions that construct an edifice of understanding about a particular issue.” The suggested form of causality can also vary according to whether problems are defined in a simplistic manner, only identifying one or few causes, as opposed to more complex causal attributions including a variety of factors. In addition to the category causality, a second important dimension is the severity that is ascribed to a problem by different actors, by making claims about how serious a problem and its consequences are. Finally, many problem definitions also contain references to solutions. In a democratic context, civil society actors can contribute to shaping any of these aspects of problem definitions in the public sphere.

Robert Hoppe presents a typology of four kinds of problems, the main distinction being between what he calls “structured” and “unstructured” problems. In the case of

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70 Ibid., 16.

71 Ibid., 17.

structured problems, the appropriate solutions are known to policy-makers and it is only a matter of administrative implementation of those clearly identifiable means. On the other hand, with unstructured problems “there is dissent and conflict over which pieces belong to the ‘puzzle’, and over which arrangement of the pieces means ‘solving’ the puzzle.”73 There is a high degree of uncertainly and conflict involved, and there is not one single tried and tested solution that all actors would agree on as the measure that needs to be implemented in order to achieve a solution. The framework in which this typology of problems is anchored is a “problem-processing view of governance, or the governance of problems,”74 which is not dissimilar to the perspective on governance this study adopts, although it is quite abstract and at times presented in an overly complicated way. Nevertheless, Hoppe’s distinction between structured versus unstructured – or in other words “complex” – problems is useful for the purposes of this study.

From a pluralist point of view it can be argued that in the case of a complex problem, the participation of multiple actors across the public sphere and civil society contributes to a process of problem definition that is more likely to take into account the complexity and multidimensional nature of the issue, than if only a small elite in government or a closed circle of experts embark on the project of identifying the nature of the problem and developing adequate solutions. Simply speaking, especially in the case of complex and controversial social problems, the input from and participation of civil society forms an important contribution to the “governance of problems”. As this study will show, the case of contemporary antisemitism provides an example of civil society identifying patterns and aspects of this social problem that have been overlooked or neglected by the government, in particular the new antisemitism.

73 Ibid., 73.
74 Ibid., 29; emphasis in original.
Moreover, while problem definition and issue framing can play a significant part in the initiation of policy processes and are therefore often rightly conceived as part of the policy stage of agenda setting, it can also be argued that in order to fully account for the significance of civil society, it is also necessary to look beyond the narrow confines of the policy process and consider the much broader context of how societies govern themselves, with and without the state. Groups, individuals, parties and social movements and NGOs all play a part in a complex interplay of independent but also interdependent, competing and sometimes collaborative efforts to govern society and solve social problems, and often do so even before they become political problems or without them ever receiving the full attention of official policy makers. In other words, some issues – or at least aspects of it – are addressed within civil society without governmental, policy-making involvement.

For example, as the next chapter will demonstrate, throughout history and in the absence of policies targeting antisemitism, Jewish civil society groups – while not always internally united about the right approach – have always taken measures to address the problem of antisemitism, and to ensure the well-being of the Jewish community. In the latter decades of the twentieth century, as chapter six will show, the Community Security Trust was involved in providing physical security for the Anglo-Jewish community long before antisemitism started to receive increased political attention. And while later starting to receive material and moral assistance from the state, the biggest proportion of its activities and functions as a civil society organisation is still fulfilled independently of any such support.

1.4. Conclusion

This chapter discussed a number of profound changes in the nature of the modern state and the British political system. The classical Westminster Model has lost its unrivalled position
in contemporary political science and many experts find referring to governance instead of
government more appropriate in describing how political and social issues in Britain are
managed. Reflecting the wider debate on the increasing role of non-governmental
organisations in international politics and the emergence of a “global civil society,” it is
increasingly acknowledged that in addition to the core executive, the contributions of a broad
spectrum of actors, including civil society, have to be considered in analysing governance in
the United Kingdom. In the large-scale endeavour of governing modern British society in all
its complexity, the state cannot be the sole agent. Civil society can play vital roles in
cooperating with as well as complementing government efforts, especially so in low politics
areas like human rights, equality and anti-racism.

Moreover, it is particularly in the identification and definition of social problems in
the public sphere that the role of civil society becomes most evident. The complexity of
issues in modern societies makes it nearly impossible for governments to maintain a
monopoly of problem-solving agency. In the case of highly controversial issues, the
contribution of different civil society actors is crucial for articulating, highlighting and
advocating different perspectives and aspects.

Beyond that, a case for the significance of civil society can be further underscored if
one considers that the problem-solving capacity of modern societies does not solely rely on
feeding issues into the policy cycle. Many problems – or at least aspects of them – remain
outside the political sphere and are addressed by civil society itself.

The remainder of this thesis will apply these theoretical insights to the case of
antisemitism by analysing and comparing state and civil society responses to this particular
social problem. As chapter three will show, most observers agree that today, there are
multiple sources of anti-Jewish prejudice. However, it is also true that various aspects of
contemporary antisemitism are highly contested, such as the severity of the problem, and
what expressions and actions should be defined as antisemitic. In sum, contemporary antisemitism is a complex and controversial social problem. Throughout this chapter a number of aspects of civil society involvement in addressing it have already been briefly mentioned, and in the subsequent chapters the thesis will examine the role of government and civil society in this context in detail.
Chapter 2: Antisemitism in England and Great Britain and responses towards it in historical perspective

This chapter focuses on conceptual and historical aspects of anti-Jewish prejudice in order to provide essential context and background for the subsequent analysis of contemporary antisemitism. After briefly discussing some fundamental issues in regards to definitions and macro-level explanations of antisemitism as a social and historical phenomenon, it deals with the main trajectories in the history of anti-Jewish prejudice in England and Britain. Subsequently, it will be analysed what reactions and responses antisemitism has provoked in the past, with a particular focus on approaches adopted by the Anglo-Jewish community.

In covering all these points, this chapter will firstly contribute to a clearer understanding of antisemitism in its wider context, and therefore provide important background for the remainder of this thesis. As chapter three will show, contemporary antisemitism exhibits both continuities but also new and different characteristics compared to historical forms of antisemitism.

Secondly, the themes and issues examined in this chapter are also relevant for this research in their own right, because they add the historical dimension to the main aspects of inquiry that run through this thesis, namely reactions and response to antisemitism, and more specifically the role of the state and civil society in that context.

2.1. Defining and explaining antisemitism

Scholarly debates on antisemitism are marked by a lack of consensus at different levels. The disagreement begins at the very foundations of scholarly inquiry, manifesting in a great variety of definitions and different views regarding its historical continuity.

While there is agreement on the etymological background of the term itself, as most authors acknowledge the important role that the antisemitic German journalist Wilhelm Marr
played in publicising the expression in the late nineteenth century, attempts to establish a common definition for contemporary usage are more diverse. The fact that anti-Jewish hostility has such a long and varied history that can be traced back to Antiquity makes it difficult to isolate unchanging, essential characteristics that apply to all its different historical forms. Simply speaking, antisemitism is latent or manifest hostility towards Jews as Jews, collectively or individually, which can be expressed in words or actions.

Some insist that early forms of hostility towards Jews, particularly its religious forms in the Middle Ages, provided the blueprint for all subsequent forms of antisemitism, thus setting the scene for a continuity of antisemitism from the times of the Christian blood libel – or even from the teachings of the early Church fathers in the fourth century – to the genocidal racial antisemitism of the German National Socialists or even to the Jew-hatred of Islamic extremists in the twenty-first century.
On the other hand, proponents of the “transformation thesis” like David Nirenberg identify a major change in the history of antisemitism in the nineteenth century, when racial concepts replaced religious motivations as the principal foundation of antisemitism. Accordingly, some prefer to limit the usage of term antisemitism to this racial and political – or “modern” – antisemitism, while medieval Jew-hatred, which was primarily rooted in religious factors, is also called Judeophobia or anti-Judaism. However, probably the most common and also most pragmatic terminological convention uses the term antisemitism to refer to all different types of Jew-hatred without a particular distinction.

American scholar Helen Fein understands antisemitism as a “persisting latent structure of hostile beliefs towards Jews as a collectivity manifested in individuals as attitudes, and in culture as myth, ideology, folklore and imagery, and in actions – social or legal discrimination, political mobilization against the Jews, and collective or state violence – which results in and/or is designed to distance, displace, or destroy Jews as Jews.” While elaborate definitions such as this are more unwieldy than simple catchphrases, their advantage is the ability to capture more of the complexity and historical variability that characterises antisemitism. In addition, this particular definition introduces the concept of attitudes, which can be argued is crucial to a deeper understanding of the complexity of antisemitism.

From a socio-psychological perspective, antisemitism can be seen as a form of inter-group bias or prejudice, which is most generally defined as “a negative attitude toward a

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particular social group and its members."\textsuperscript{10} Like all attitudes, a prejudice consists of cognitive, affective and behavioural components.\textsuperscript{11} The cognitive element corresponds to the concept of stereotypes, the affective dimension refers to emotive involvement, and the behavioural element can for instance manifest itself as discrimination, which means to unfairly disadvantage a specific group or an individual on the basis of membership in a particular group.

Conceptualising antisemitism as prejudice does not necessarily imply an overemphasis on the psychological dimension at the expenses of socio-historical, political, ideological factors in explaining the genesis of different forms of antisemitism.\textsuperscript{12} In reality these are all intertwined and all play a part. It does, however, highlight that \textit{multidimensionality} is a fundamental characteristic of antisemitism even at the intra- and interpersonal levels. This complexity is augmented when a broader perspective is taken in attempts to understand and explain antisemitism as a social and historical phenomenon. There are many different psychoanalytical, sociological, political socio-economic or even theological explanatory factors that can aid our understanding of both nature and origins of hatred against Jews.

While antisemitism that is grounded in an individual’s attitude might be categorised as “first-order” antisemitism, it is important to recognise that like in the case of racism more generally, speech or actions can be antisemitic in the absence of intrinsic, antisemitic attitudes or sentiments. This kind of “second-order” antisemitism occurs, for example, when

\begin{itemize}
  \item But see also Lynne M. Jackson, \textit{The Psychology of Prejudice: From Attitudes to Social Action} (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2011), 13, who mentions “values” instead of behaviour as third component.
  \item Research conducted in the immediate post-war era like Adorno et al., \textit{The Authoritarian Personality} identified dysfunctional personality traits in individuals as main cause for the development of antisemitism, but has been criticised for this overemphasis by subsequent scholarship.
\end{itemize}
a classic antisemitic theme is used by somebody who does not harbour any kind of prejudice against Jews, and will be explored further in the next chapter.  

2.2. Historical trajectories of antisemitism in England and Great Britain

Traditional narratives of Anglo-Jewish history have maintained that in comparison to other parts of the world, during many historical periods antisemitism was less widespread and less severe on the British Isles.  

Britain was often considered a safe haven: In the late nineteenth century many Jews fled to Britain from pogroms in Russia and Eastern Europe, and during the 1930s and 1940s European Jews immigrated to Britain to escape the Nazis.  

It would, however, be inaccurate to deny or underestimate the existence of antisemitism in the countries that today constitute the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In fact, several chapters in the history of English antisemitism stand out for their fierceness of persecution of Jews, and several anti-Jewish themes that were to shape antisemitic thinking around the world for centuries had their origin in England. 

Some of the most infamous anti-Jewish tropes emerged during the Middle Ages, a time when the Jewish communities that had formed and grown since the arrival of Jews on the British Isles after the Norman Conquest in 1066 suffered from persistent discrimination and often violent persecution from the general Christian population. This contributed to a climate of hostility that gradually intensified towards the thirteenth century. Among the

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13 The next chapter will show that the case of the new antisemitism provides many examples of this “second-order” antisemitism, especially where traditional anti-Jewish tropes are unwittingly employed in some forms of criticism of the state of Israel.  


15 However, there were also heavy restrictions to immigration before and especially during the Second World War that have been discussed at length in the literature, see chapter five.  

The worst outbreaks of anti-Jewish violence during this period were the massacres in 1189-90 in London, York and other towns, the Baron’s War in 1263-7 and the coin-clipping massacres in 1278-9. The behaviour of the Church during those times ranged from being a “complicit bystander” to the active support of Judeophobia through antisemitic teachings, legislation and instigation of religious violence. Meanwhile, successive English kings created rulings detrimental to the well-being of Jewish communities, for example by appropriating a considerable share of profit through severe taxation.

A particular characteristic of medieval English antisemitism was its grounding in conspiracy theories and religiously inspired rumours, such as the infamous blood libel, the accusation that Jews would kill Christians, including children, to use their blood for ritual purposes. One of the first cases of blood libel-inspired antisemitism was the murder of William of Norwich in 1144, whose death was attributed to ritual murder by the local Jewish community. From then on, the blood libel was a frequently reoccurring motif in anti-Jewish slander that provided a blueprint for different forms of defamations far beyond medieval England. Elements of this theme, and other anti-Jewish canards originating in the Middle Ages such as the accusations of host desecrations or well poisoning continue to inspire antisemitism across the world until the present time.

The Expulsion in 1290 ultimately destroyed the Jewish communities that had developed in England by that time. It was the first in a series of expulsions in Europe, thus


18 Ibid., 129.

19 In particular during the time of the “Black Death” in the 1340s, across Europe Jews were accused of causing the pandemic through the poisoning of wells. Walter Laqueur, The Changing Face of Antisemitism: From Ancient Times to the Present Day (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2006), 62.


21 Although the Jews of France had been expelled several times 1182 and throughout the thirteenth century but were allowed back after each of those expulsions. They were finally expelled again in 1306 by King Philip IV. See: William C. Jordan, The French Monarchy and the Jews: From Philip Augustus to the last Capetians
providing another example for the – in a negative sense – pioneering role of English antisemitism.

While the absence of Jews made a continuation of physical anti-Jewish violence impossible in the centuries following the Expulsion, antisemitic imagery, stereotypes and themes were carried through into the centuries to follow, through “English literary anti-Semitism,” in visual art, sermons and the Elizabethan theatre which created infamous and enduring negative images of Jews in characters such as Shakespeare’s Shylock or Marlowe’s Jew of Malta, representing a persistent undercurrent of antisemitism in English culture.

The developments in the 1650s following the attempts by the Portuguese Rabbi Menasseh ben Israel to gain official readmission to England under Oliver Cromwell provided new impetus for strongly antisemitic attitudes to come to the fore. They found their forum of expression in lively public debates around readmission, with well-known figures like William Prynne, a lawyer, publicist and former Member of Parliament leading the way in anti-Jewish agitation.

Despite these antisemitic tendencies it would be overstated to view the post-readmission period of Anglo-Jewish history as completely dominated by antisemitism. The barriers to political participation, for example, were actually not directed at Jews but primarily at Catholics and Protestant Nonconformists. Also, there were other concerns that posed an equal or even greater, and certainly longer-term, threat to Anglo-Jewry’s survival as

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23 For more on antisemitism in English popular culture during the eighteenth century see Frank Felsenstein, Anti-Semitic Stereotypes: A Paradigm of Otherness in English Popular Culture, 1660-1830 (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

a cultural community, such as the pressure for assimilation. Nevertheless, the strongly hostile public reaction to the proposals in the 1750s for naturalisation of foreign-born Jews, the so-called “Jew bills,” demonstrated that antisemitic feelings and stereotypes always remained present to a certain extent in the British social and political landscape.

By the nineteenth century, however, the climate of opinion had changed and the admission of the Jewish Lionel Nathan de Rothschild to the House of Commons in 1858 did not provoke a very strong antisemitic backlash compared to the emancipatory process in countries like Germany. This has been attributed to a number of social and cultural factors such as the widespread acceptance of liberal principles including religious toleration in nineteenth century Britain, the rather favourable impression that the economic success of the Jewish minority made in Victorian Britain where many took pride in the achievements of British of industrial capitalism, and not least the notable philosemitic tradition that had developed in certain strands of English Protestantism since the sixteenth century. Indeed, the levels of antisemitism had decreased to such an extent during the period from late nineteenth century to the first decades of the twentieth century that Britain had the reputation of a “sweet exile” or “happy galut.”

This positive assessment might not have been entirely justified, as there was always a continuing undercurrent of antisemitism, manifesting for instance in antisemitic remarks against Benjamin Disraeli, the first Jewish Prime Minister who took office in 1874, by public

27 It should be noted, however, that the emphasis on this explanatory factor which can often be found in the traditional “Whig interpretation of history,” including Jewish historian Cecil Roth (Roth, A History of the Jews in England) has been challenged by scholars from a socio-cultural perspective such as David Feldman, *Englishmen and Jews: Social Relations and Political Culture 1840-1914* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1994).
figures and individual parliamentarians.\textsuperscript{31} A few decades later, many in Britain believed that Jews working behind the scenes were responsible for the Boer Wars (1880 – 1881 and 1899 – 1902), and the accusation that Jewish financial interests were a main driving force for the wars was put forward by both liberals as well as Marxist circles during this time.\textsuperscript{32}

Around the same period, the mass immigration to Britain of persecuted Jews from Eastern Europe since in the late nineteenth century led to the growth of anti-Jewish feelings among the wider population. From the 1880s to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, nearly 150,000\textsuperscript{33} mostly poor Ashkenazi Jews had come to Britain, and some of the ensuing social effects contributed to the rise of xenophobic antisemitism that would lead to hostilities in different forms in the decades to come. It is widely agreed that the Aliens Act of 1905, preceded by years of anti-alien agitation across different sectors of society, was aimed at stemming this tide of Jewish immigration although Jews were not explicitly mentioned in the text of the legislation.\textsuperscript{34} However, it would be incorrect to interpret this act as a governmental anti-Jewish measure; like in so many other instances throughout Anglo-Jewish history before and after 1905, Jews were affected indirectly by the acts of a government that was actually not particularly concerned with Jews, but had broader political aims such as maintaining social order.

Antisemitism, intertwined with anti-German sentiments due to the German lineage of many British Jews and often involving violence, reached new heights during the First World War and public opinion towards Jews turned increasingly hostile in the aftermath of the


\textsuperscript{32} Lindemann, \textit{Esau’s Tears: Modern Anti-Semitism and the Rise of the Jews}, 357, even compares this episode to the Dreyfus Affair in France.

\textsuperscript{33} Precise numbers on immigration are not available, but most estimates range from 120,000 to 150,000. See Endelman, \textit{The Jews of Britain, 1656 to 2000}, also Geoffrey Alderman, \textit{Modern British Jewry} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 118.

\textsuperscript{34} Vivian D. Lipman, \textit{A History of the Jews in Britain since 1858} (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990), 67-8; Alderman, \textit{Modern British Jewry}, 134-37.
Russian Revolution in 1917, as many Britons associated the Bolshevik movement with Jews.\(^{35}\) The theme of secret Jewish influence in world affairs that characterised much of the anti-Bolshevik agitation also underpinned the forged pamphlet *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, which was published and widely circulated in Britain in the early 1920s.\(^{36}\)

Particularly these latter episodes in the history of British antisemitism highlight the enduring potency of century-old erroneous assumptions that already fuelled the medieval libels; namely the belief that countless social ills, wars and tragedies can be traced back to Jewish influence or even a Jewish conspiracy.\(^{37}\) This does not only apply to the British case, but to the history of antisemitism more generally speaking. In fact, Jews have been – and still are – blamed for all kinds of problems, and have been ascribed mutually exclusive traits. Antisemites of different persuasions have accused Jews of being responsible for communism as well as capitalism, of being too rich or too poor, disfigured or too temptingly beautiful, too modern or stubbornly clinging to outdated customs and traditions, of being rootless wanderers but also of firmly controlling the places of power in the centres of the world. The common denominator in all of these accusations is the Jew as scapegoat, and this motif, as will be discussed later, frequently reoccurs in the contemporary context of demonising Israel, the modern Jewish state.

Nonetheless, it is also important to recognise that despite this clearly identifiable thematic and functional continuity, the main sources of antisemitism changed considerably over time, and new motivating factors emerged. By the 1930s, religious sources had


\(^{37}\) It has been claimed that irrationality has in fact been one of the most defining features of antisemitism. Gavin I. Langmuir, *Toward a Definition of Antisemitism* (Berkeley; Oxford: University of California Press, 1990). While this might be true historically, it could be argued that it does not wholly apply to all forms of contemporary antisemitism, especially those with strong bases in the most educated segments of society, see chapter three.
diminished in importance, as across Europe, political and ideological factors became the main influencing factor.

Political antisemitism in the sense of an official ideology of a mainstream party is not part of the history of British antisemitism.\textsuperscript{38} But political antisemitism did exist outside of the mainstream in right-wing extremist groups. The growth of British fascism in the 1930s caused considerable concern among British Jews, and although the British fascist movement, including the British Union of Fascists (BUF) did not include antisemitism as core element of their ideology from the outset, it became a more dominant feature in their campaigns in the mid-1930s.\textsuperscript{39}

Another key characteristic of the history of British antisemitism is that with the exception of medieval antisemitism, the state, and its laws and official institutions were usually not the main sources of active discrimination against Jews. The most enduring and most consequential threats to Anglo-Jewry emanated from various segments of society, at times from organised groups or extra-parliamentary political movements like the fascist groups mentioned above, at other times simply the wider public sphere, the media or the general public opinion.

This holds also true for the period from 1939, especially when contrasted with other European countries, Germany in particular, where it was the state, driven by antisemitic political ideology, which initiated, organised and carried out the extermination of European Jews. In Great Britain on the other hand, the government’s refugee and immigration policy

\textsuperscript{38} Lebzelter suggests a number of reasons why the German variant of mainstream political antisemitism did not gain a foothold in England, such as the incompatibility between the traditional class-based social structure and the idea of unified \textit{Volksgemeinschaft}, and the cultural preference for moral force, legality and compromise as opposed to brutal political violence which came to be associated with the antisemitic right-wing groups in the 1930s. Lebzelter, \textit{Political Anti-Semitism in England, 1918-1939}, 34-5. Also on antisemitism before the Second World War: Colin Holmes, \textit{Anti-semitism in British Society, 1876-1939} (London: Edward Arnold, 1979).

had – according to some – disastrous consequences for Jews attempting to flee persecution by the Nazi. The country’s Palestine policy, including the 1939 White Paper, prevented many from reaching the shores of Palestine. However, as Tony Kushner has aptly pointed out, these measures “are not in the same category as the Nazi government’s Final Solution or even Vichy France’s anti-emancipation enactments.”

Another strand of antisemitism had come into full bloom by the 1940s that was in fact linked to British government activities – if only in terms of consequences of, and opposition towards them – and this was anti-Zionism motivated by antisemitic tendencies.

Zionism had been a topic under discussion in Britain long before that, especially since the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the beginning of the British Mandate in Palestine in 1922. While Derek Penslar insists that European antisemites in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were mostly indifferent to Zionism, it does not mean that there was no relationship between anti-Zionism and antisemitism. According to David Cesarani, expressions of anti-Zionism in Britain in the 1920s – interestingly, at that time, especially widespread among the political right – were replete with anti-Jewish references to the extent that “…the ubiquity of anti-Jewish attitudes and discourses makes it hard to isolate an anti-Zionism that is rooted in antipathy towards Jews from an anti-Zionism that is principled but expressed in contemporary negative stereotypes of Jews.”


41 This was a British government policy paper issued in 1939 under Neville Chamberlain which abandoned the idea Peel Commission Report 1937 recommendation of partitioning the Mandate for Palestine and instead favoured the creation of an independent Palestine governed by Palestinian Arabs and Jews in proportion to their numbers in the population. It limited the number of Jewish immigrants to 75,000 for the following five years, and thus – as has been argued – prevented the emigration of a great number of Jews from Europe to Palestine at one of the most critical times in the unfolding events of the Second World War and the ensuing Holocaust.


Thus, anti-Zionism had existed in Britain since the beginning of the twentieth century, but there were periods when it emerged more forcefully, such as in the period of violent Zionist opposition to the British presence in Palestine in the 1940s. Rory Miller’s analysis of British anti-Zionism in the late 1940s shows that the motivations of key individuals such parliamentarian and diplomat Sir Edward Spears, who headed the most influential anti-Zionist organisation in Britain at that time, the Committee for Arab Affairs (CAA), were often ambiguous in their attitudes to Jews and Judaism.\(^45\) But while not all cases of active anti-Zionism in this period can be attributed to antisemitism, Miller also demonstrates that the anti-Zionist activities of some individuals were heavily influenced and fuelled by apparently deeply held antisemitic attitudes, as revealed for instance by analyses of private correspondence of central figures like the explorer and propagandist and writer Freya Stark.\(^46\)

There are numerous other historical examples of antisemitic anti-Zionism, for instance the fierce anti-Israel stance of the German Democratic Republic’s political elite and their foreign policy,\(^47\) the anti-Zionist campaign in Poland in the late 1960s,\(^48\) or the stance of the radical right in France.\(^49\) But what is of particular interest in the context of this thesis are the subsequent developments of anti-Zionism in Britain, and here in particular contemporary manifestations. Therefore, with a focus on the present period, the following chapter will continue discussing the nexus between antisemitism and anti-Zionism in more detail. A key feature that will emerge from this analysis is the popularity of anti-Zionist thought among the political left, partly inspired by and drawing on intellectual sources from the context of anti-colonialism and the wider concerns of the New Left.


\(^ {46} \) Ibid. and “British Anti-Zionism Then and Now,” \textit{Covenant Global Jewish Magazine} 1, no. 2 (2007).


To return to the situation in Britain after the Second World War and the Holocaust, another major source of antisemitism that would continue to exist was racist and right-wing antisemitism. This was undoubtedly the most consequential form of antisemitism in early twentieth century Europe, and also dominated the final phase in the history of British antisemitism before the great caesura of the 1940s. Like their unsuccessful predecessors in the 1930s, most British right-wing parties emerging in the mid-twentieth century never achieved the electoral successes of their co-ideologists elsewhere in Europe. Nevertheless, the political far-right milieu with its racist and antisemitic ideologies continued to exist, and in the 1950s and 1960s, various right-wing organisations and splinter-groups emerged. The National Front, founded in 1967 from a collection of Nazi sympathisers, enjoyed a significant level of support in 1970s Britain until its decline and fall in the 1980s. The 1960s also saw a series of antisemitic attacks in the UK perpetrated by far-right groups, including several synagogue burnings and serious incidences of vandalism at Jewish facilities.

2.3. Responses to antisemitism in historical perspective

Jews have never been entirely alone in their concerns about manifestations of anti-Jewish sentiments. There are numerous examples from different periods when individuals intervened on behalf of Jews. Richard of Cornwall, for instance, acted as a patron and protector of several Jewish communities and individuals throughout the 1230s up until 1260. On one occasion, a group of Lincoln Jews who were accused of child murder – a typical antisemitic accusations in medieval England as noted earlier – were spared execution due to Richard’s intervention.

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While difficult to ascertain Richard’s motivation to defend the Jews in this particular episode, it is important to acknowledge the existence of pro-Jewish attitudes – or philosemitism – through the centuries. Solomon Rappaport highlights that an exclusive focus on the negative aspects of Jewish-Gentile relations does not represent the full story: “In every age, it was not only anti-Jewish sentiment and conduct but, in one form or another, it was also pro-Jewish thought and action which characterised the relationship of Jews with a section of their neighbours in the Diaspora.”

Philosemitism should of course not simply be equated with anti-antisemitism. Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of allosematism highlights that at the heart of both philo- as well as antisemitism is the perception of Jews as being differently from all other peoples. Allosematism “does not unambiguously determine either hatred or love for Jews, but contains the seed of both, and assures that whichever of the two appears, is intense and extreme.”

Following on from this idea, it has even been argued that philosemitism is in essence antisemitism in disguise. Frank Stern, for instance, examined attitudes towards Jews in post-war Germany and concluded that not only did antisemitism continue to exist in German society beneath the surface after the Second World War, but in their ostensible display of philosemitism, many Germans simply rearticulated traditional antisemitic ideas such as Jewish financial power.

However, it is debatable whether Stern’s conclusions on the nature of philosemitism are also applicable beyond the specific cultural context of his study. Historically speaking, there has been a great variety of different forms of philosemitism. Moreover, the historical

55 Frank Stern, The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge: Antisemitism and Philosemitism in Postwar Germany.
record of pro-Jewish individuals, groups and organisations fighting to counter contemporaneous antisemitism and intervening on behalf of Jews shows that philosemitism can play a decisive, motivating role for opposition to antisemitism.57

On the other hand, despite the oftentimes keen interest that philosemites have taken in Jewish culture or the well-being of Jewish communities, it would also be incorrect to interpret philosemitism as a social movement primarily concerned with countering antisemitism.

In fact, there has never been any significant non-Jewish movement to counteract anti-Jewish discrimination, and there is no historical equivalent in the context of the history of European antisemitism to the popular struggles, for example, for Catholic emancipation in England, the abolition of slavery, universal suffrage or the rights of workers.

Likewise, in the British context, at least until the mid-twentieth century, antisemitism as a social problem was also not receiving any particular attention from the British state. While it would be wrong to entirely dismiss the significance of governmental policies for the status and well-being of Anglo-Jewry for the past centuries, there has never been, and arguably there is still no specific government policy on antisemitism. It was only in the twentieth century that attempts to tackle to racial tensions in post-war Britain emerged as a long-term consequence of immigration from the Commonwealth. These were, however, not primarily directed at reducing anti-Jewish prejudice, as chapter four will show. Also in the rest of Europe, racism and discrimination only started to be addressed in the second half of the twentieth century, and of course prior to that, in many countries Jews were not only lacking state protection as a minority, but on the contrary, they were victims of state antisemitism.

In the absence of forceful state intervention on behalf of minorities, or large-scale popular mobilisation against antisemitism, it was largely left to Jewish communities to formulate adequate responses to antisemitism. In this regard, Hannah Arendt’s often quoted assessment that “Jews stumbled from one role into another and accepted responsibility for none”\(^{58}\) which has been interpreted as partly blaming the vast scale of the murderous outcomes of Nazi antisemitism on a lack of Jewish resistance, should not too quickly be generalised beyond the specific historical context in which Arendt was writing.

In fact, Jews have always embraced a variety of ways to counteract antisemitism. Often these were simply \textit{ad hoc} responses or spontaneous reactions, lacking any longer-term counterstrategy or explanation for the existence of antisemitism. However, the rise of modern antisemitism in Europe in the late nineteenth century, and of course the anti-Jewish pogroms in Tsarist Russia in the 1880s, compelled Jewish communities everywhere to engage with this issue at a deeper level, and to respond to the growing threat.

Convinced that the “Jewish problem” would continue to exist as long as Jews were living among the nations, neither fully assimilated nor forming their own nation, early Zionists argued the only way to end antisemitism was to establish a Jewish state.\(^{59}\)

In many countries, the response entailed forming new organisations that took upon themselves the task of countering antisemitism in a more immediate and practical way. In France, the Alliance Israélite Universelle was founded in 1860 as a reaction to the Mortara affair, when a young Jewish boy was forcibly baptised by Catholic agents, which caused outrage across the social, religious and political spectrum.\(^{60}\) In Germany, two organisations in


\(^{59}\) For instance Leo Pinsker, \textit{Auto-Emancipation. A Call to his People by a Russian Jew} (London: Rita Searl, 1947) originally published in 1882.

particular became well-known during that period. The Verein zur Abwehr des
Antisemitismus,\textsuperscript{61} in short Abwehrverein, was founded in 1890 by mainly non-Jewish liberal
middle-class men. Their most famous means to counter antisemitism was the publication
Abwehrblaetter. Attempts to fight antisemitism also included education about Judaism and
Jewish culture to debunk antisemitic stereotypes. The Centralverein Deutscher Staatsbürger
Jüdischen Glaubens (Centralverein) employed a similar strategy.\textsuperscript{62} In 1913 in the United
States, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) came into existence.\textsuperscript{63}

In Britain, Jewish communal organisations were already well established, the main
one being the Board of Deputies of British Jews that had been founded in 1760, and until the
early twentieth century, no new organisations tasked with countering antisemitism emerged.
When they eventually did emerge, this happened as the result of internal struggles over the
assessment of the threat emanating from antisemitism, and over the appropriate responses to
it as discussed below.

Responses to antisemitism since late-Victorian Britain

The rise of antisemitic tendencies in late Victorian Britain, directed both at assimilated, well-
to-do Jews and, in particular, Jewish immigrants much lower down the social ladder, led to a
variety of different reactions. At the psychological level, it has been argued that the
proliferation of anti-Jewish tropes in Victorian society fed forms of “Jewish self-hatred,”
expressed for instance in the works of Jewish writers such as Julia Frankau, Amy Levy and
Leonard Merrick.\textsuperscript{64} Whether or not particular individuals indeed harboured such feelings is of

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{61} Engl. literally: “Society for the warding off of antisemitism”.
\textsuperscript{62} Avraham Barkai, ”Wehr dich!”: Der Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens (C.V.) 1893-
1938 (München: Beck, 2002).
\textsuperscript{63} Svonkin, Jews against Prejudice: American Jews and the Fight for Civil Liberties.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 170.}
course difficult to verify, but it is certainly not impossible given that the internalisation of negative stereotypes of social groups is a well-known phenomenon in prejudice research.65

At the practical level, the main theme that can be identified in the majority of Anglo-Jewish responses to antisemitism during this time was, as Endelman put it, a striving to “reassure their fellow citizens of their basic Englishness” and to “mute their distinctiveness.”66

The menace of antisemitism accelerated various processes of acculturation, including religious reforms in the 1880 and 1890s, at least some of which have been interpreted as intended to make Judaism more acceptable in an English religious and cultural context. This included, for instance, confirmation services for girls, organ music on special occasions, and public readings of the Ten Commandments to draw attention to commonalities between Judaism and Christianity.67

At the same time, many middle-class English Jews were convinced that the mass immigration of East European Jews with its real or perceived social effects in the housing and labour markets, in combination with their often unfamiliar cultural and social habits, would have negative repercussions for the general image of Anglo-Jewry. Therefore, a number of measures were put in place to reduce immigration levels and to help those already in England to leave, including repatriation and the provision of support for Jewish families to continue their journey onwards to the United States.

67 Ibid., 167.
There were also programmes aimed at improving Jewry’s public image by alleviating the immigrants’ visible poverty and aiding their anglicization through a network of charities and welfare schemes, leisure organisations, language teaching programmes and cultural events which simultaneously educated recipients in proper behaviour and lifestyles.\(^68\)

The underlying assumption was that antisemitism was provoked by Jewish behaviour and that by removing those factors that made Jews unpopular or simply different from their cultural environment it would be possible to fight antisemitism. The idea that Jewish behaviour was the key factor in provoking antisemitism was not only applied to East European newcomers. As noted briefly above, established and assimilated Jews were often criticised by other Jews for provoking antisemitism through for instance ostentatious presentation of wealth.\(^69\)

This self-critical “conformist” approach had long-time antecedents. It can even be found in the very early stages of modern Anglo-Jewish history, for instance in the ways in which the newly founded immigrant community set up their religious and communal practices in the 1660s. The congregational structures put in place were intended served the religious needs of the community, but some elements of it were also intended to avoid offending Christians or reducing the reasons for non-Jews to dislike the new community. This included bans on involvement in religious arguments or proselytising, and the requirement of permission by the governing committee (mahamad) for the publication of any books.\(^70\)

At a later stage, when Jews succeeded in ascending the social ladder in Edwardian England, many of the newly wealthy Jewish families deliberately imitated the culture, tastes and customs of their surrounding English culture. In Endelman’s assessment, this was to

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\(^{68}\) Ibid., 171-80; Terwey, ”Reaktionen Britischer Juden auf Anfeindungen und Antisemitismus vom Ausgehenden Viktorianischen Zeitalter bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges,” 76.

\(^{69}\) In ”Reaktionen Britischer Juden auf Anfeindungen und Antisemitismus vom Ausgehenden Viktorianischen Zeitalter bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges,” Susanne Terwey quotes articles in the Jewish Chronicle from the 1880s and 1890s with reference to David Cesarani, Reporting Anti-Semitism: the Jewish Chronicle 1879-1979 (Southampton: University of Southampton, 1993).

some extent, although not exclusively, “an effort to escape the association of the Jew with commercial chicanery and street ruffianism.”  

Even the programmes for social transformation that formed part of the public image campaign in Victorian England had historical precedents in the eighteenth century. As would occur in subsequent periods, the better-off strata of Anglo-Jewry started focusing on those within the wider Anglo-Jewish communities who supposedly provoked antisemitism and tarnished all of Anglo-Jewry with a negative image. Because of this, the Jewish elite started to cooperate with the authorities to identify and reprimand Jewish offenders, such as in the “Chelsea murder case” when they not only helped the authorities to apprehend the perpetrators, but also paid for advertisements in newspapers distancing themselves from them, in order to break the association between lower-class Jewish criminals and Jewry in general.  

In the 1780s, however, with a growing realisation that the problem would require a longer-term solution, they embarked on projects aimed at improving the “manners and morals of the children of the poor” such as reforms of religious Jewish schools to include more secular topics, in the hope that this would be a contribution towards tackling the roots of their misbehaviour.

This tendency towards a self-critical, inward-looking response surfaced repeatedly during the last decades of the nineteenth and the first years of the twentieth centuries. For example, in the defensive reaction to financial scandals in the 1912 and 1913, when the Jewish press suggested that certain Jewish politicians who were being accused of abusing

71 Ibid., 71.
72 Ibid., 72.
73 Ibid.
their position of authority for personal financial gains should have acted more carefully in public given their Jewish background.74

However, around the same time, another element in the Anglo-Jewish response towards antisemitic accusations started to emerge – or rather as we shall see, re-emerged – that was underpinned by the exact opposite assumption, namely that antisemitism was not rooted in Jewish behaviour but in a misperception, shifting the blame away from the Jews towards those holding the stereotype. Among the common stereotypes during the Boer Wars (1880 – 1881; 1899 – 1902) as mentioned above was that Jewish financiers had instigated the war, and that once the conflict began Jews were unwilling to fight. It was the Jewish press, especially the Jewish Chronicle, who defended Jews against these accusations by presenting facts refuting such claims.75

As in the case of the “conformist” approach, the strategy of rational public defence that does not attempt to modify Jewish behaviour but directly addresses the content of antisemitic stereotypes. This was used in various different historical contexts previously, including the seventeenth century Resettlement debate. Although antisemitism was only one of the various elements in the resistance against the readmission of Jews in the 1650s – English merchants’ fear of economic competition was a much more prominent factor – it frequently appeared in public debates.

Therefore, in many of Menasseh Ben Israel’s writings, such as the 1655 Humble Addresses to the Council of State, he aimed to tackle the popular anti-Jewish beliefs about Jewish usury, or the killing Christian children by way of refutation.76 Other publications, like

75 Ibid. 78.
his *Vindiciae Judaeorum* published the following year, dealt at greater length with the blood libel.\(^{77}\)

In an attempt to summarise this strategy of fighting antisemitism\(^ {78}\) in a single catchphrase, Arnold Paucker termed the practice of refuting antisemitic accusations through rational public defence, as used by the German Abwehrverein until its closure in 1933, as “apologetic.”\(^ {79}\) While in every-day use the adjective “apologetic” has a connotation of acquiescence, in a religious context, apologetics\(^ {80}\) is the discipline of defending a position through the systematic use of information. This is precisely what the above approach to countering antisemitic claims entails, and therefore this brief descriptor is quite suitable for this strategy, which has been used by Jews and non-Jews for centuries; and as will be discussed in chapter six, variations of it are particularly popular among contemporary defenders of Israel.

**Responses to antisemitism in the twentieth century**

The account has so far demonstrated the variety of responses to antisemitism, which entailed different kinds of actions. All had in common the fact that they were motivated by an, often unarticulated, interpretation on the nature and causes of antisemitism. While the “apologetic” approach focused on the cognitive dimension and assumed that all allegations against Jews were baseless and founded on erroneous or irrational thinking, the “conformist” approach instead sought to modify Jewish behaviour. Moreover, the “conformist” approach was also very defensive in style and was, in essence, an attempt to maintain a low profile.

However, the desire to keep a low profile did not always entail, or at least was not always limited to, self-criticism. In the years leading up to the Great War, the Board of

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\(^{78}\) This is not inherently limited to antisemitism but has been applied to countering stereotypes in general.


\(^{80}\) From Greek apologia which means speaking in defence.
Deputies, in its role as the representative body of Anglo-Jewry, also engaged in “behind-the-scenes politics” to petition the government and influence official figures on behalf of Jewish communal and religious interests. Such efforts, also a long-time aspect of Anglo-Jewish history, were underpinned by the belief that the government was able and willing to protect the Jewish community.

The rise of germanophobic antisemitism before and during the war, and also the founding of the Anti-Defamation-League (ADL) in the United States in 1913, provoked a renewed debated about the defensive, reactive nature of the Anglo-Jewish approach to dealing with antisemitism. Leopold Greenberg for instance, the editor of the *Jewish Chronicle* and the *Jewish World* demanded a more pro-active approach to counter the anti-Jewish defamation.

However, the default position of defensiveness continued against the background of rising levels of antisemitism in Britain during the First World War. Jewish families with German backgrounds anglicised their names, and the Board of Deputies’ refusal to intervene on behalf of German Jews interned in Britain as enemy aliens was one of many attempts to underline Jewish loyalty and patriotism. The enthusiasm of British Jews from all social ranks to join the army following the outbreak of war can also be interpreted as not only fervent patriotism, but also an eager attempt to counter the accusation of a lack of Jewish loyalty to the British nation, especially give the angry backlash against the 25-30,000 Russian Jewish men who escaped military service.

This does not mean, however, that no other strategies were pursued. For instance, the Jews’ Defence League was founded in Birmingham in the summer of 1914 to target the rising

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levels of anti-German antisemitism. The methods it employed combined physical defence against anti-Jewish threats and educational lectures about Jewish history.\textsuperscript{85} Another measure that began to be employed at this time was legal action against libel brought by Jewish company owners and individual Jews, often directed against the false identification of a company as German, but also against antisemitic accusations in general.\textsuperscript{86}

Parts of the Jewish press, especially the \textit{Jewish World}, also engaged in apologetics, using arguments to expose and counter false anti-Jewish claims circulating in the public arena, notably those charging British Jewry with a lack of loyalty and pro-German attitudes or even the erroneous identification of British Jews as Germans.

Beginning in the 1920s, new organisations tasked with combating antisemitism were founded, and existing ones shifted their focus. The Joint Press Committee, for instance, was founded in 1921, concentrating efforts by various prominent organisations including the Anglo-Jewish Association, B’nei B’rith, the Board of Deputies and the League of British Jews.\textsuperscript{87} This organisation dissolved after the Board of Deputies withdrew from it in 1925, but the Board continued its activities in countering antisemitism through its own Press Committee, which had been founded in 1918 to monitor and respond to anti-Jewish reporting in the printed press.\textsuperscript{88} This was renamed the Press and Information Committee after merging with a subgroup of the Joint Foreign Affairs Committee in 1933 and, together with the B’nai B’rith, created the Central Jewish Lecture Committee.

Up until this point, the strategy that the Board of Deputies employed in the framework of these different committees, groups and organisations was still rather limited and reactive.

\textsuperscript{85} Terwey, "Reaktionen Britischer Juden auf Anfeindungen und Antisemitismus vom Ausgehenden Viktorianischen Zeitalter bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges," 83.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid. Legal strategies were also employed by organisations in Germany, see Christoph Jahr, \textit{Antisemitismus vor Gericht: Debatten über die Juristische Ahndung Judenfeindlicher Agitation in Deutschland (1879-1960)}, Wissenschaftliche Reihe des Fritz Bauer Instituts (Frankfurt; New York: Campus, 2011).
\textsuperscript{87} For the following account and the examples, see Langham, \textit{250 Years of Convention and Contention: A History of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1760-2010}, 146-54.
\textsuperscript{88} Terwey, "Reaktionen Britischer Juden auf Anfeindungen und Antisemitismus vom Ausgehenden Viktorianischen Zeitalter bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges," 91.
It entailed producing pamphlets that targeted antisemitic content in the public sphere through factual counter-arguments, refutations of false allegations against Jewry, and educational efforts through the supply of selected speakers for non-Jewish events through the Central Jewish Lecture Committee.

For example, the Press Committee produced a pamphlet about Jewish leaders in allied countries as a reaction to common accusations that Jews did not sufficiently support the war efforts. It also sponsored publications in response to antisemitic material, such as *The Jewish Bogey, and the Forged Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* by Lucien Wolf, an influential Jewish historian and journalist.89

As far as the overall approach to antisemitism was concerned, the Board of Deputies’ general stance during this time was still one of understatement and quietism, motivated by the conviction that the state would be able to protect British Jews from attacks and major threats.

This attitude provided the backdrop for the Board’s initial reaction to the changing context of the 1930s which saw the rise of fascism and increasingly widespread safety concerns across Anglo-Jewry. The Board’s restrained posture was also evident when an international Jewish campaign to boycott German goods launched in March 1933 was supported by the Board only one and a half years later.90

One reason for this hesitant attitude might have been an underestimation of the strength of British antisemitism and the belief that had been prevalent in Anglo-Jewry since the turn of the century, and had been endorsed by the influential *Jewish Chronicle*, that the

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backlash against Jews that occurred in Germany, Austria and France during the Dreyfus affair could not happen in England.\textsuperscript{91}

More importantly, the Board of Deputies relied on the state to protect the Jewish minority, and it wanted to avoid causing trouble. As summarised by Lebzelter: “Still conscious of being a tolerated, rather than accepted, section of the population, it avoided questioning the image of an ostensibly harmonious symbiosis.”\textsuperscript{92}

However, as levels of antisemitism continued to rise, and especially as the threat emanating from the British Union of Fascists (BUF) increased, the tension between the Board of Deputies and those in the Jewish community who were discontent with the low-profile approach became more evident than ever before. As antisemitism began to feature more prominently in the rhetoric of the British Union of Fascists, in particular when Oswald Mosley initiated his “East End campaign,” many in the Jewish community felt prompted to respond in a more aggressive way. Thus, on 26 July 1936 a new defence organisation, the Jewish People’s Council (JPC), was formed to fight fascism following a meeting of delegates from 87 Jewish organisations.\textsuperscript{93}

At the same time – by coincidence actually on the same day – the Board of Deputies also stepped up its own efforts to counter antisemitism through the establishment of the Coordinating Committee, renamed the Jewish Defence Committee two years later. The friction that these simultaneous developments caused highlights the fact that there has always

\textsuperscript{91} Cesarani, Reporting Anti-Semitism: the Jewish Chronicle 1879-1979, 5-11.
\textsuperscript{92} Lebzelter, Political Anti-Semitism in England, 1918-1939, 139.
\textsuperscript{93} The response to the growth of British fascism in the 1930s is one of the few episodes in the history of reactions to antisemitism that has been dealt with at some length in a number of publications. See Rosenberg, Battle for the East End: Jewish Responses to Fascism in the 1930; Facing up to Antisemitism: How Jews in Britain Countered the Threats of the 1930s; Smith, "But what did they do? Contemporary Jewish responses to Cable Street,"; Tilles, “Some lesser known aspects”. The Anti-Fascist Campaign of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1936-40," and some chapters in Lebzelter, Political Anti-Semitism in England, 1918-1939; Langham, 250 Years of Convention and Contention: A History of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1760-2010 (however, largely based on Lebzelter); Kushner, The Persistence of Prejudice: Antisemitism in British Society during the Second World War, chapter 6), also Holmes, Anti-semitism in British Society, 1876-1939 chapter 12, 191-219.
been disagreement within the Jewish community on both the severity of the threat faced and the best tactics for responding to it.

The tactics of the Jewish Defence Committee were markedly different from those of the JPC. Its defence campaign included a continuation of the propaganda or “anti-defamation” campaign it had been engaged in before, but also unofficial pressure on the government, as well as the age-old “self-criticism.”

In addition to that, the Board of Deputies did not want Jews to get involved in more assertive forms of activism or to take matters into their own hands. It constantly appealed to Jews to stay away from anti-fascist demonstrations. Firstly because it feared that skirmishes on the streets of London would be counterproductive by attracting attention to clashes between Blackshirts and Jews, but also because, it wanted to remain politically neutral.

Critics of this approach accused the established leadership of the Board of downplaying the threat emanating from fascism, and of incorrectly identifying the nature of antisemitism. This tendency continued up to more recent times. Even decades later, in the 1980s, the chairman of the Jewish Cultural and Anti-Racist Project of the Jewish Socialists’ Group criticised the “lowprofilism” of the Board of Deputies which he believed continued to characterise its position in the fight against antisemitism to his time of writing.

The fear of being accused of championing Jewish over “English” interests also influenced the Jewish leadership’s stance during the Second World War. Not wanting to fuel the flames of antisemitism through public demonstrations or too much assertiveness, they did not protest when the British government interned Jewish refugees in 1940. In 1944 it did not join protests campaigns about the antisemitism of Polish soldiers on British soil as it did not

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95 Barry Smerin, Chairman of the JCAPR in the foreword to Rosenberg, *Facing up to Antisemitism: How Jews in Britain Countered the Threats of the 1930’s*, 1-4.
want to embarrass the government,” and chose to a behind-the-scenes approach instead to negotiate with the War Office.96

According to Endelman, this caution, exacerbated by domestic concerns such as the battle between Zionists and anti-Zionists during its meetings, was also to blame for the Board of Deputies’ restraint in attempting to lobby the government to intervene on behalf of Europe’s Jews by way of changing immigration policies.97

In the immediate post-war period, as occasional antisemitic attacks and outdoor propaganda by organisations like the British League of Ex-Servicemen and Women continued, the 43 Group formed in 1946 to counter lingering fascist anti-Jewish efforts.98 Like the JPC during the 1930s, the 43 Group resorted to radical and militant tactics. They openly challenged fascist speakers in public, interrupted their meetings and even engaged in vandalism against their bookshops.

This militancy was met with resentment from the Board of Deputies, which at this time continued to employ quiet means of reducing antisemitism. The 43 Group disbanded in 1950, convinced that it was due to its own efforts that the intensity of fascism dwindled in throughout the 1940s.99

Faced with a new outbreak of racist and antisemitic incidents in the 1960s, the response from the Jewish community initially came from the Board of Deputies’ Defence Committee and the AJEX, who made security arrangements for Jewish facilities.100 Continuously high levels of antisemitism throughout the 1960s led to the formation of other organisations such as the Jewish Aid Committee of Britain (JACOB) in 1966, who were calling for a more vigorous approach to defence than the Board of Deputies. The Board, in

97 Ibid.
98 Beckman, The 43 Group.
turn, did not consider their activist approach effective or suitable, and the group disbanded after a few years.\textsuperscript{101} The by now familiar tensions between low-key mainstream and radical approaches that had been characterised so many previous instances of Jewish defence was again visible in this episode in Anglo-Jewish history.

The pattern of disagreement over the right strategies and tactics to respond to antisemitism was to some extent continued – albeit in a slightly different vein, when the work of the anti-fascist Anti-Nazi League (ANL), established in 1977, provoked dissent from the Board and other segments of the wider Jewish community, as it was considered by many as taking an anti-Israel stance.\textsuperscript{102} Other anti-racist initiatives were welcomed by the Anglo-Jewish leadership, however, and the Board of Deputies even actively participated in the anti-racist movement through the establishment of the United Campaign against Racism (UCAR)\textsuperscript{103} and its supportive attitude towards race relation legislation of the new Labour government that had come into power in 1964.\textsuperscript{104}

One of the most significant organisational developments in the Anglo-Jewish community that was aimed at tackling anti-Jewish prejudice took place later in the twentieth century, when levels of antisemitism had become more severe. In 1986, the Community Security Organisation (CSO), closely affiliated with the Board of Deputies, was formed, and its successor, the Community Security Trust (CST) would later become the lynchpin of Anglo-Jewish activities in dealing with contemporary antisemitism in Britain, as chapter six will discuss in further detail.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{102} Geoffreya Alderman, "Fighters against the Front," \textit{The Jewish Chronicle}, 6 October 1978.
\textsuperscript{103} Langham, 250 \textit{Years of Convention and Contention: A History of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1760-2010}, 244.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 244-46.
2.4. Conclusion

The first part of this chapter has outlined some defining historical features of antisemitism – defined in its briefest form as prejudice against Jews as Jews – in England and Britain. Firstly, it has been pointed out that in the course of history, antisemitism has emerged from a variety of different types of sources, including religion, culture, social and political ideology, while in most eras one particular source can be identified to be of major significance. The historical survey also showed that in Britain, while state laws and policies of course profoundly affected Jews at all times, resulting for instance in barriers to their full civil and political participation for several centuries, for the post-Readmission Anglo-Jewish community, the state was not the main source of extreme persecution or violence against Jews. This stands in stark contrast to some of the most destructive turns that modern antisemitism took at particular times in other parts of Europe, such as in Germany.

On the other hand, however, the state has not been at the forefront of protecting the Jews against antisemitism either. Therefore, the second part of the chapter dealt mainly with civil society responses to tackling antisemitism, which manifested in a great variety, ranging from “conformist” to “confrontational” to “apologetic.”

As will become clear later in this thesis, some of the approaches that civil society actors adopt today in their fight against contemporary antisemitism are not dissimilar to ones that were employed in the past, including the area of traditional Jewish self-defence but also attempts to counter antisemitism through rational persuasion or “apologetics.” The considerable variety in response to antisemitism is another feature that will re-emerge in the discussion of contemporary reactions to anti-Jewish prejudice.
Chapter 3: Contemporary antisemitism as multi-dimensional and contested social problem

The preceding chapter highlighted the long history of anti-Jewish prejudice, and the great variety in which this hostility towards Jews has manifested over time. Waxing and waning throughout the centuries, but never disappearing completely, it has emanated from many different sources and parts of the political spectrum, and has assumed religious, cultural, political, racist and many other forms.

Against this background, this chapter examines the extent and nature of contemporary antisemitism, once again with a particular focus on Britain. The extensive and varied historical legacy of antisemitism in Europe – or more broadly speaking the “Western tradition” as David Nirenberg put it – forms part of the collective cultural consciousness that contemporary attitudes vis-à-vis Jews frequently draw on.

However, it will also be shown that while frequently rearticulating familiar tropes, contemporary antisemitism often finds novel ways of expressing itself. Perhaps most importantly, attitudes towards the state of Israel provide a new nexus that can link old and new forms of anti-Jewish prejudice. This new antisemitism, already mentioned in previous chapters, has captured the attention of scholars and observers from various disciplinary and ideological backgrounds, and has led to considerable disagreement inside and outside of academia over various aspects. The crux of the debate is the dividing line between anti-Zionism and anti-Israelism on the one hand and antisemitism on the other.

Although there is currently no conclusive assessment regarding this question among academics and experts, this chapter argues that some expressions of anti-Zionism can indeed be related to antisemitism in a number of ways, and that some of the concerns of proponents

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1 David Nirenberg, *Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013); note that the book was published in the UK by Head of Zeus Ltd with the subtitle *The History of a Way of Thinking* in the same year.
of the new antisemitism thesis should be taken seriously. While criticism of Israeli policies is legitimate, often justified, and not inherently antisemitic, it is also undeniable that Israel nowadays often represents the collective Jew, a convenient target for antisemitic sentiments.

Overall, this analysis of contemporary antisemitism in the UK concludes that despite all progress in the areas of human rights, equality, and anti-racist policies throughout the twentieth century, anti-Jewish prejudice has by no means disappeared and still represents a significant social problem. This problem is multidimensional, because old forms, such as far-right and openly racist antisemitism, coexist with new forms, such as radical Islamist hatred or extreme forms of anti-Zionism that are intertwined with anti-Jewish prejudice. At the same time, contemporary antisemitism as a social problem is also highly contested, as not all observers agree on its salience, or even on the very existence of one of its most problematic strands: the new antisemitism.

3.1. The persistence of antisemitism in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries

Empirical evidence for antisemitism across the world and in Britain

A number of governmental institutions, Jewish organisations, and anti-racist bodies across the world monitor antisemitism. While the scope and research designs of different studies and monitoring programmes vary, overall, the available data indicates the persistence of antisemitism in the late twentieth century across the world and the UK, and in some cases even a rise.

According to the Moshe Kantor Database for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism at Tel Aviv University, there has been a worldwide rise in antisemitic incidents since the late 1980s. In 1989 the institute counted only 78 major incidents and until 2002 the annual figure remained under the 300 threshold with the
exception of 1994 when the number was 304. More recent figures are significantly higher: Numbers since 2006 have oscillated between 500 and 700 incidences while in the peak year 2009\(^2\) the institute recorded 1,118 incidences worldwide.\(^3\)

A report by the European Fundamental Rights Agency on antisemitism in the EU from 2001 to 2011 on the basis of data submitted by different EU countries found that although, due to a lack of sufficient data, there were difficulties in drawing comparative conclusions, “antisemitism remains a problem for Jewish populations in particular and for civil society as a whole across the EU.”\(^4\)

Regular telephone surveys commissioned since 2002 by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) to assess European attitudes towards Jews in general have revealed that many Europeans agree to statements that reflect classical antisemitic themes such as dual loyalty, Jewish control of the world of business and finance and others.\(^5\)

As far as the situation in Britain is concerned, in 1994, the Runnymede Commission on Antisemitism found that “antisemitism is alive and – literally – kicking in Britain today.”\(^6\) The Board of Deputies started monitoring antisemitic incidents in 1984 and reported an 85% increase from an annual total of 153 reported incidents in that year to 284 in 1991.\(^7\) The statistics collected by the Community Security Trust since 1994 also show that antisemitic incidences have increased, with a record number of 929 incidents in 2009.\(^8\)

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\(^2\) The Gaza War, or Operation Cast Lead, a three-week armed conflict in the Gaza Strip between Israel and Palestinian paramilitary forces from 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009, seems to have served as a trigger event for an outbreak of anti-Jewish violence around the world, also in the UK. The interrelation between anti-Israelism and antisemitism will be discussed further below in the chapter.


\(^5\) All reports are available online at http://www.adl.org/main_Anti_Semitism_International/Default.htm (last accessed 28/05/2012).


\(^7\) Quoted in ibid., 42.

\(^8\) All reports available online: http://www.thecst.org.uk.
The most common type of incidents involves verbal abuse randomly directed at visibly Jewish people in public everyday insults. Extreme violence, physical assaults and desecration of Jewish property also occur on a regular basis. Among the most widely reported among these extreme incidences were the synagogue desecrations in 2002 in Swansea and Finsbury Park, and a number of uncovered planned terrorist plots against Jews in London, Manchester and other cities in the UK.

Critics would be able to point out a number of methodological weaknesses in such quantitative studies on antisemitism. For example, longitudinal studies and the extrapolation of trends are difficult because of a lack of data for previous decades. Moreover, a rise in reported antisemitic incidents could also be explained by factors other than a real increase, for instance by general societal change, more sensitivity to the issue of antisemitism or less reluctance to report incidences due to an open discussion of antisemitism in public.

However, these effects are very likely to be balanced out by the general tendency towards underreporting, a well-known issue in criminology and anti-racist practice. Moreover, in opinion surveys, social conformity pressure needs to be considered, which means many respondents are likely not to disclose negative views about Jews. Finally, more subtle elements of antisemitic attitudes are not easily captured by statistical methods, in particular when it comes to the controversial forms of the new antisemitism.

All of this taken together means that there are good reasons to assume that the main problem with statistics and attitude surveys about antisemitism is not that their figures are exaggerated, but rather that these cannot accurately capture the full scope of contemporary antisemitism and therefore are actually too low.

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At the very least, even if quantitative inaccuracies cannot be completely ruled out and doubts about precise numbers remain, this data is empirical evidence that, contrary to what an overly optimistic perspective on the political and cultural developments in the twentieth century might suggest, antisemitism persists to varying degrees in Europe, even many decades after the Second World War and the Holocaust. The following sections will analyse its sources in more detail, and proceed to address the critical question of the relation between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes and activism.

**Strands of traditional antisemitism**

Chapter two briefly discussed a number of right-wing organisations that were politically active in Britain immediately after the war and as the century progressed. It was highlighted that antisemitism was a key component of the ideologies of prominent right-wing groups and parties from the 1930s through to the 1970s. Therefore, the fact that a number of different groups and parties on the extreme right still form part of the British political landscape in the first decade of the twenty-first century raises questions about the implications of their existence and their activism for contemporary antisemitism.

Similar to right-wing movements across Europe, the British right-wing milieu has traditionally been concerned with issues related to race, immigration and the alleged concerns and cultural fears of the white British majority population. Recently, especially in the last two decades, however, the British radical right has markedly shifted its attention to issues connected to religious diversity, the impact of immigration on white working-class

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communities and on the threats posed by radical political Islam, and arguably British Muslims more generally speaking.

The English Defence League (EDL) for example is a right-wing single-issue group that is mainly focused on Muslim extremism and a perceived threat to traditional English political and cultural values by Islam. But while their ideological views are certainly far from conducive for fostering a social climate that embraces all ethnic or religious minorities, Jews are not the EDL’s main targets. On the contrary, the group has made great efforts to show its solidarity with Israel on public occasions – against outspoken criticism by the Anglo-Jews community — and even expressed its concern about Muslim antisemitism.

The British National Party (BNP) emerged in 1982 after the split of the National Front (NF), and has an organisational background steeped in racist and antisemitic ideology. However, since in 1999 the party embarked on a process of modernisation under the leadership of Nick Griffin, and with a changed image it was able to become, in the words of Matthew Goodwin, the “most electorally successful extreme-right party in British history” that even “challenged the traditional interpretation of the British extreme right as a case of complete failure” through its success at local levels.

To some extent, its ideological focus has also shifted towards new issues in the ways mentioned above. The BNP’s General Elections Manifesto 2010 did not mention the words “Jew”, “Jews” or “Jewish” on any of its 90 pages, and only briefly mentions “Zionism” in the

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14 The (EDL) was founded on 27 June 2009 in reaction to a demonstration by Muslim extremists against homecoming British soldiers in Luton. All five points of their public mission statement are related to Islam in one way or another: http://englishdefenceleague.org/about-us/mission-statement/ (last accessed 30/05/2012). Their fixation on Islam has led them to be charged with Islamophobia. Chris Allen, ”Opposing Islamification or Promoting Islamophobia? Understanding the English Defence League,” Patterns of Prejudice 45, no. 4 (2011).
15 Leon Symons, ”UK Fascists to Wave Israeli Flag at Rally,” The Jewish Chronicle, 10 September 2009.
17 Ibid., 28.
context of attitudes of British Muslims. In contrast, the manifesto devoted an entire section to outlining the dangers of the “Islamic Colonisation of Britain”, claiming that Islam is incompatible with Western democracy. Banning the burqa and ritual slaughter as well as preventing the building of further mosques were among the key pledges.¹⁸

However, while the BNP – like other right-wing groups across Europe¹⁹ – has made efforts to limit overtly antisemitic statements in public, John Richardson draws attention to the great importance of understanding the communication strategies utilised by contemporary far-right groups. The “dual style” uses code phrases in public, such as “Zionism” as a substitute for Jews, the “Jewish question” for the myth of a Jewish world conspiracy, and “historical revisionism” for Holocaust denial,²⁰ while it speaks in an undisguised way to its members in non- or semi-public settings.²¹

Overall, Richardson is convinced of the “continued commitment of the BNP leadership to antisemitic conspiracy theories,” including Nick Griffin, who was a leading member of fascist parties since 1970s, has written and published antisemitic material and was prosecuted successfully in 1998 for Holocaust denial,²² and other key figures such as Andrew Brons.²³ He also believes that the BNP literature reveals that even beyond the core leadership, “significant portions of the BNP” are committed to antisemitic conspiracy theories and to Holocaust denial.²⁴

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²¹ Nick Griffin explicitly propagated this “dual style” in an article published in the BNP’s magazine, ibid., 106-
Whatever one makes of the analysis just presented, and even if other scholars in this field present a less condemning conclusion in regards to the salience of antisemitic ideology in the BNP, anti-Jewish views certainly permeate the political right-wing segment as a whole to some degree. It is in this political milieu that revisionist approaches to the history of National Socialism and Holocaust denial have flourished, promoted by protagonists such as the English author David Irving, although they are no longer confined to this political context.

Overall, the extreme right – the source of some of the most severe forms of anti-Jewish prejudice in Europe in the previous century – has not vanished and in some cases still espouses antisemitic views. On the other hand, David Art’s assessment that the BNP’s “organizational and recruitment problems will prevent the party from becoming anything more than a political irritant” highlights clearly that they are very far from the political success enjoyed by right-wing groups in Eastern Europe since the beginning of the twenty-first century; a status that the BNP arguably shares with most other extreme right groups in Britain. While still relevant to some extent, this part of the political spectrum is no longer the main source of antisemitism, as the rest of the chapter will show.

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28 Art, *Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe*, 104.
3.2. The new antisemitism: Beyond a “certain climate of opinion”?

The new antisemitism as a global concept

Most of the manifestations of antisemitism just discussed, for example in the form of disguised anti-Jewish ideology on the extreme right, incidents of antisemitic hate crime, clear statistical evidence of rises in traditional antisemitic attitudes, and of course extreme cases such as the torching of synagogues, are outside the realm of the socially acceptable in Britain and internationally. The fact that antisemitism continues to exist in these forms is not widely disputed and it is unanimously condemned. But this does not apply to all manifestations of contemporary antisemitism.

It is in particular the interface between antisemitism and criticism against Israel or the more profoundly ideologically driven anti-Israel views in the form of anti-Zionism that has been subject to fierce debate. The discussion has adopted the form of a polarised discourse between authors who are concerned about what they perceive as the emergence of a new antisemitism and those who believe that antisemitism is no longer relevant in Western societies and that talking about a new antisemitism is even exaggerated and misleading.

New antisemitism theorists have participated very actively in the public debate about the subject. Arnold Forster and Benjamin Epstein of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) were among the first to introduce the current use of the term in a publication in 1974. Since

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29 It could be argued that the term anti-Zionism should be used for sustained opposition to the creation of a Jewish state before it came into being, whereas today, “anti-Israelism” is a more suitable expression due to the fact that the target is no longer just the Jewish national movement, but the actions and policies of the state of Israel. In this study, however, the two terms are both used for contemporary phenomena.

30 Protagonists in these two camps have been called “alarmists” and “deniers”. Bunzl, Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in Europe, 1-3; "Between Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Some Thoughts on the New Europe," American Ethnologist 32, no. 4 (2005); Robert Fine, "Fighting with Phantoms: A Contribution to the Debate on Antisemitism in Europe," Patterns of Prejudice 43, no. 5 (2009), who analyses this polarised discursive formations in further detail. He also uses the more neutral expression “new antisemitism theorists and their critics.” This terminology is a bit fairer and more objective than “alarmist” and “deniers.” On the other hand, the downside is that it implies a stage in theory development which has not been reached. There is a scholarly exchange of hypotheses about the extent, nature and significance of antisemitism in the modern world, but it would be exaggerated to claim this amounts to social scientific theories.

31 Arnold Forster and Benjamin R. Epstein, The New Anti-Semitism (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974). It should be noted, however, that the expression “new antisemitism” itself was already used nearly one hundred years ago.
the late 1990s there has been a steady rise in the number of publications on the topic by scholars from various disciplinary backgrounds and by other experts and observers.32

While all these authors share a normative concern about contemporary antisemitism across the world, there are also some differences in their emphases and perspectives. Some place much weight on the quantitative rise of anti-Jewish incidents, others on Israel as the new object of antisemitic hostility, or the rise of anti-Zionist views in the left-liberal spectrum, academia or mainstream public opinion. Many authors also highlight the particular significance of Muslim anti-Zionism and antisemitism33 or the seemingly unifying function of radical opposition to Israel in forging alliances between different ideological or religious groups including radical Islamists, the extreme left or far-right in “red-green-brown alliances.”34

There are also differences in the degree of concern expressed by different authors and the level of complexity in their argument. Scholar Harrison, activist Foxman or ex-US ambassador to the EU Rockwell Schnabel who publicly stated that antisemitism in Europe

by the Board of Deputies to refer to the antisemitism of their times: Jewish Board of Deputies, "The New Anti-Semitism: The Official Protests of the British and American Jewish Communities," (London: Press Committee of the Jewish Board of Deputies, 1921). Brian Klug, a staunch opponent of the new antisemitism thesis, gives a number of other early examples where the “new antisemitism” has been employed to refer to emerging anti-Zionism, tracing it back to the 1960s. Brian Klug, "Interrogating the ‘New Anti-Semitism’," Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no. 3 (2013): 469.


33 Taguieff, Rising from the Muck: The New Anti-Semitism in Europe.

was “getting to a point where it is as bad as it was in the 1930s”\textsuperscript{35} represent the one end of the spectrum. Likewise, Manfred Gerstenfeld is forthright in drawing a direct connection between the delegitimisation of Israel in Europe and the spectre of a nuclear Holocaust against Israel.\textsuperscript{36} Anthony Julius on the other hand also identifies the main features usually attributed to the new antisemitism but uses a more differentiated terminology, and takes great care in discussing different varieties of contemporary anti-Zionism at length.\textsuperscript{37}

**Identifying the new antisemitism in Britain**

The patterns highlighted by proponents of the new antisemitism thesis can be identified in different parts of the world, particularly in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{38} In France, which has the largest Jewish community in Europe and very high levels of antisemitic incidents,\textsuperscript{39} the issue has attracted considerable attention from scholars and experts.\textsuperscript{40}

Also the UK exhibits most of the features attributed to the phenomenon. These include strongly critically attitudes towards Israeli policies on parts of the left and left-liberal segments of society, trade unions, churches as well as academia and the media. Moreover, Britain’s large Muslim community often expresses hostility towards Israel and ambivalent attitudes towards Jews, as further discussed below.

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\textsuperscript{35} See http://www.economist.com/node/2441205 (last accessed 28/05/2012).
\textsuperscript{36} Manfred Gerstenfeld, “De-Legitimization Currents in Europe,” Israel Affairs 18, no. 3 (2012).
\textsuperscript{37} Julius, Trials of the Diaspora: A History of Anti-Semitism in England, chapters 7 and 8.
\textsuperscript{38} Contemporary antisemitism in East Europe has very different characteristics compared to Western Europe. firstly, this is due to the prevalence and rise in more traditional forms of racism and right-wing antisemitism, Hungary is an example. At the same time, according to Wistrich, the Middle East conflict is not a central issue in countries like Russia, and as a result many of the features commonly associated with the ‘new antisemitism’ are largely absent. Wistrich, A Lethal Obsession: Anti-Semitism from Antiquity to the Global Jihad, 181.
\textsuperscript{39} “Rapport sur l’Antisémitisme en France en 2012,” Service de Protection de la Communauté Juive, SPCJ.
Some go as far as identifying London as the European hub of anti-Israel activism, especially with respect to anti-Israeli campus activities and the boycott movement. The call for a moratorium on all cultural and research links with Israel was initiated in 2002 by Steven and Hilary Rose, professors at the Open University and the University of Bradford, in an open letter to *The Guardian* which had gathered over 700 signatories in a few months. This initiative was followed by controversial actions taken against individual Israeli scholars by British academics.

Supported by famous public figures the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign continues to promote the selective or total cutting of ties with the state of Israel and Israelis, including calls for economic divestment, consumer boycotts of Israeli products or businesses that operate in Israel, and boycotts of Israeli cultural institutions, sport venues and Israeli participation in cultural events abroad.

Subject to considerable controversy and legal action have been various boycott motions by British trade unions, such as the University and College Union (UCU) between 2007 and 2011 and its predecessors the Association of University Teachers (AUT) in 2005 and the National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE) in 2006.

Since its inception by a small group of activists, the British boycott movement has garnered considerable support from different parts of society. For instance, while traditional

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41 “Building a Political Firewall against the Assault on Israel's Legitimacy: London as a Case Study,” The Reut Institute. In fact it refers to London as the “hub of hubs”.
42 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/apr/06/israel.guardianletters.
43 Dr. Miriam Shlesinger of Bar-Ilan University and Professor Gideon Toury of Tel Aviv University were removed from the editorial boards of two academic journals in the field of translation studies by an academic from Manchester University due to their affiliation to Israeli institutions, see Suzanne Goldenberg, "Israeli Boycott Divides Academics," *The Guardian Online*, 8 July 2002.
44 Archbishop Desmond Tutu is one of the best-known advocates of the Israel-boycott movement, in particular in the context of equations between Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians and South Africa Apartheid.
46 Mr R Fraser v University & College Union [2013] ET 2203290/2011.
religious antisemitism arguably plays a negligible role in Christian churches in Britain today, strong support for the BDS movement has emerged from Christian organisations and some denominations, such as the Methodist Church. What is notable in the church context is that – in addition to important theological differences such as the acceptance or rejection of what Christian Zionists call the “replacement theory” – the fault line falls clearly along the political spectrum. Rather than being purely denominational, church or congregational support of anti-Zionist stances or activities often correlates with the embrace of leftist political and social attitudes more generally speaking.

This reflects a much wider trend across society, and that is the strong appeal of anti-Zionism – and with it often antisemitism – across the political left, and the widespread hostility towards the Jewish state among the British left and liberal-left “intelligentsia.”

Different explanations have been suggested for the observable shift on the political left from being a source of firm support for the newly founded state Israel, to a situation where the left is home to some of the fiercest critics of Israel, including ones whose attitudes border on antisemitism.

According to Anthony Julius, the shifting ideological patterns on the left were a result of the historical “failure of the progressive cause itself”, ultimately sealed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In lieu of a comprehensive, all-encompassing socialist project, the left started to engage in small-scale “boutique movements” including anti-

47 See Christian Aid, “Christian Aid calls for UK legislation to end the trade in Israeli settlement products for the sake of peace and development,” Parliamentary Briefing, June 2012, also UK Methodist Conference report “Justice for Palestine and Israel,” 2010 available on the UK Methodist Church website.
49 It is of course important to highlight the diversity and heterogeneity of opinions on the left in order to avoid painting a simplistic picture. This diversity is also recognised by many proponents of the new antisemitism thesis. Anthony Julius for example, who devotes a great deal of attention to analysing the genesis and the character of contemporary anti-Zionism, mentions individuals and group on the left, such as the Euston Manifesto Group, that have balanced views on the Arab-Israeli conflict and acknowledge the possibility that antisemitism can play a role in forms of leftist anti-Zionism.
Zionism, and in the process it appropriated some classical liberal as well as reactionary positions which included anti-Jewish elements.\textsuperscript{50}

Colin Shindler has argued that this shift predated the Six-Day War in June 1967, from which Israel emerged as militarily superior party and which has often been understood as key turning point in regards to declining sympathies for Israel in the international public area.\textsuperscript{51} Instead, Shindler traces the origins of the New Left’s antagonism towards Israel to earlier influences such as the decolonisation movement in the 1960s, which led the left to favour nationalism in the Arab world.\textsuperscript{52}

But in fact, this latter aspect points to a much more fundamental source of left antagonism towards Israel: It is the general sympathy for the weak, the poor, the exploited and victims of perceived injustice – in short, the left’s natural identification with the underdog – that is also at the heart of many extremely critical leftist attitudes towards Israel since its victory in 1967. While the Jews used to be the weak and persecuted in the past, the Jewish state has – so it is believed – now become the persecutor, and in the context of an extremely polarised narrative of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinians are those that need to be defended against Israeli injustice and aggression.

Such perceptions might also play a part in shaping attitudes beyond the politically active spectrum of the political left. Anti-Zionist views are believed to have taken hold of mainstream public opinion. According to Shalom Lappin it is now common place in British public life “to regard Israel as a thoroughly demonic country of superpower proportions.”\textsuperscript{53} Bernard Harrison concedes that anti-Israel tendencies in the West do not prove a conscious

turn of educated people towards antisemitic views, but nevertheless amount to a “certain climate of opinion” which he classifies as potentially equally dangerous.  

British media associated with left or liberal political viewpoints have also been charged on more than a number of occasions with crossing the line from anti-Zionism to antisemitism. A widely cited example was the 2002 title story in the political magazine *The New Statesman* under the title “A Kosher Conspiracy?,” which was accompanied by an image of a golden Star of David piercing the British Union Jack, thus employing the classic antisemitic trope of secret and malicious Jewish power and conspiracy. Other media including the *BBC*, the *Independent*, the *Guardian* and its weblog *Comment is Free*, or the *London Review of Books*, have also been frequently criticised for being unfairly critical of Israel or for providing forums for antisemitic anti-Zionism.

Concerns about the media are compounded by anecdotal examples of high-profile public figures making disparaging remarks about Israel that sometimes cross the line to antisemitism. Even individual British politicians have on more than one occasion caused consternation with problematic statements, including Jennifer Tonge, a Liberal Democrat MP and later member of the House of Lords, David Ward, also a Liberal Democrat MP, and Tam Dalyell, a former Labour MP who in 2003 accused Tony Blair of being “unduly influenced by a cabal of Jewish advisers.”

What these examples highlight is the enduring power of age-old antisemitic motifs, themes and images. It is very likely that in many of the above cases, the reason for their frequent reappearance is simply their presence and availability in the collective cultural

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54 Harrison, *The Resurgence of Anti-Semitism: Jews, Israel, and Liberal Opinion*, 4
56 Like in the often-quoted example of the French ambassador to London, Daniel Bernard, who called Israel a “shitty little country” at a dinner party; see Ewen MacAskill, “Israel Seeks Head of French Envoy,” *The Guardian Online*, 20 December 2001.
memory and thus an individuals’ subconsciousness, rather than deeply-felt antisemitic sentiments. But as discussed in more detail below, the relationship between such expressions of anti-Israel attitudes and antisemitism is very complicated, and can operate at a number of levels.

British Muslims and the new antisemitism

Another strand of contemporary antisemitism that provides an equally clear – or even clearer – example of the complex interconnectedness of hostility towards Israel and anti-Jewish attitudes is Islamic antisemitism, a highly contested topic.58

Some insist that it can be traced back to the origins of Islam.59 Taking into account several antisemitic passages in the Quran60 and the Hadith61 it can indeed be argued that the traditional Islamic religious texts are a significant source of antisemitism that has inspired Islamic theology and thinking for centuries. Moreover, while historical analyses of Muslim-Jewish relations have traditionally pointed out that Jews fared better under Islamic than Christian rule,62 the traditional view of a “Golden Age” under Islam has also been questioned and the implications of the “dhimmi” status of protected religious minorities under Islamic law have been reconsidered.63

However, instead of focusing on the significance of the anti-Jewish legacy in Muslim religious sources and Islamic history, it is also possible to highlight the role of European

60 E.g. Sura 2:16, Sura 2:63, but see also Meccan passages such as Sura 29:45.
61 Tarek Fatah believes the teachings of the Hadith to be the actual source of antisemitic Islamic teachings while “in fact, the Quran, when read without being filtered through the prism of Hadith, is unlikely to trigger any of the virulent anti-Semitism that is so endemic in the Muslim world,” Tarek Fatah, The Jew is not my Enemy: Unveiling the Myths that Fuel Muslim Anti-Semitism (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2010), 110.
63 Bat Ye’or, The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam (Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1985), although it should be noted that the author is controversial. See also Bernard Lewis, Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986).
colonisation in the late nineteenth century in importing Western antisemitism into the Arab and Muslim world. Recent scholarship on the reception of Nazi-ideology in the wider Arab world, and the collaboration of key religious figures like the Grand Mufti Haj Amin el-Husseini with the Nazi regime also underscores the importance of foreign influences on the growth of Arab antisemitism, although on the other hand it is also possible to interpret it as evidence of inherent Muslim or Arab antisemitism.

Finally, a number of commentators highlight the role that Zionism, the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israel policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians in the historical genesis of Arab and Muslim anti-Jewish attitudes. From this rather simplistic perspective, Muslim antisemitism is a mere epiphenomenon, a reaction to injustice committed in the context of a regional conflict instead of an active force with its own historical, religious and cultural roots.

Taking into account these different factors in the genesis and development of Muslim antisemitism, Esther Webman has argued that with the success of Zionism and, in the context of the establishment of Israel and the conflictual dynamics that ensued, “resentment toward the Jews of the early Islamic period was translated into an emotional and intellectual Judeophobia, particularly in Islamist writing and exegesis, which used it to encourage religious and political activism.”

While scholarly debates about the relative significance of each of the different religious and historical factors in the genesis of Muslim and Arab antisemitism have not reached a conclusion, the outcome of this debate will not affect the social reality of the existing antagonism towards the State of Israel and Jews in the Muslim world today.

including in Britain. It could also be argued that the widespread antisemitic anti-Zionism has
given rise to an ingrained Muslim antisemitism which is no longer inextricably linked to
actual events in the Middle East, but has become part of Islamic culture, or to borrow a
concept introduced into the study of antisemitism by Shulamit Volkov, a cultural code.67

However, one important reason why this topic is so controversial, and why even many
serious scholars of racism and antisemitism have largely avoided it to date, is the concern that
several distinct categories are often conflated in the discussion, leading to generalisations
about Muslims and thus potentially fuelling anti-Muslim stereotypes.68

The most severe and consequential version of Islamic antisemitism is found in the
context of radical Islamism, which needs to be distinguished not only from Islam as a world
religion per se, but as many have correctly pointed out, even differs from more moderate
variants of Islamism or political Islam in its goals, strategies and worldviews.69

Extreme anti-Israel and also antisemitic attitudes of radical Islamist clerics based in
the UK such as Abu Hamza, Abdullah al-Faisal, Abu Qatada al-Filistani and Islamist
organisations like Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the now-banned Salafists Al-Muhajiroun, exemplify
this radical strand.70

However, it has also been claimed that Muslim antisemitism is no longer confined to
radical Islamist elements, but that it has become a firmly established in general Islamic
thinking and discourse in the Muslim world and Western European Muslim diasporas.71

While there is not much statistical data to support this assumption empirically, is nevertheless

67 Shulamit Volkov, Germans, Jews, and Antisemites: Trials in Emancipation (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), also "Readjusting Cultural Codes: Reflections on Anti-Semitism and Anti-Zionism,"
68 On Islamophobia, see also chapter four in this thesis.
69 See for instance Peter Mandaville, Global Political Islam (London: Routledge, 2007), 239.
70 In 2006, Hamza was convicted of terrorism and also inciting murder and race-hate against Jews. He has
reportedly made statements like: "...The day is fast approaching when Muslims will have to kill all the
Jews....All the Jews will be killed; the Jewish state will be destroyed....Palestine will be the biggest Jewish
greyyard. That is where they should be buried," quoted in Julius, Trials of the Diaspora, chapter 8.
71 Wistrich, A Lethal Obsession: Anti-Semitism from Antiquity to the Global Jihad, in particular chapters 9, 10,
11, 17, also From Blood Libel to Boycott: Changing Faces of British Antisemitism (Jerusalem: Vidal Sassoon
possible, not at least because of the existing media infrastructure that allows antisemitic content produced in the Muslim world to be broadcast and received in Britain.

A survey of British Muslims by the UK polling organisation Populus from 2005 indicates that views inspired by conspiracy theories are widespread: 53% believed the Jewish community had too much influence on UK foreign policy, 46% believed that Jewish community in Britain controlled the media and politics in cooperation with the Freemasons and 37% agreed that the British Jewish community was a legitimate target in the struggle over the Middle East conflict. The problem is further compounded by the enduring popularity of fictions accounts of alleged Jewish power such as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and Holocaust denial which is a fringe phenomenon in the Western world, but features in mainstream public opinion in many Islamic countries.

The case of Muslim antisemitism illuminates two central theses put forward in this chapter. First, in keeping with traditional patterns of British antisemitism, current antagonism towards Jews does not emanate from the state but from different strata of society – the diverse British Muslim community being one of them – where it is articulated in old and new forms of anti-Jewish discourses.

Secondly, patterns of antisemitism in twenty-first-century Britain have shifted from targeting individual Jews to targeting Israel, and antisemitic anti-Zionism plays a much greater role than any of the other forms of antisemitism that were dominant in previous times. Muslim antisemitism thus highlights the complexity and controversy surrounding the new antisemitism, but also the clearly existing link between anti-Israelism and antisemitism, and the fact that they are very difficult to disentangle.

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72 http://www.populus.co.uk/uploads/Muslim_Poll-Times.pdf, 28
73 Litvak and Webman, From Empathy to Denial: Arab Responses to the Holocaust.
Questioning the new antisemitism thesis

Whatever the historical origins of anti-Israel views on the left and in the wider public sphere, or the factors that created the hostility against Israel among Muslims, the important question in the context of this study is how significant these observations are for a rise in antisemitism in Britain.

Critics of the new antisemitism thesis argue that they are not, and that the extent of the problem has been exaggerated. While most acknowledge the need to remain vigilant against racist and openly antisemitic trends in society, they tend to see antisemitism as having largely been overcome in the West since the mid-twentieth century. Jews, it is claimed, live as securely and comfortably in Europe as never before. Moreover, it is argued that the debate about the new antisemitism diverts attention away from Islamophobia, which some believe has superseded antisemitism as most salient form of racism.

Many critics do not deny the existence of a link between events in the Middle East and antisemitism but instead they see a different kind of causality at work. Hostility against Israel, they argue, is not motivated by antisemitism in the first place, but it is rather the policies of successive Israeli governments that are causing antisemitism around the world.

These concrete objections aside, the critics’ main concern is the overall context of the debate and potential problems that arise from equating criticism against Israel and its policies with antisemitism. The well-known post-structuralist philosopher Judith Butler believes that if the charge is accepted that criticising Israeli violence, or calling for boycotts in order to change Israel’s policies “is to be ‘effectively anti-Semitic,’ we will fail to voice our

opposition for fear of being named as part of an anti-Semitic enterprise.” According to this view, the propagators of the new antisemitism theory effectively stifle open debate about Israeli politics by making antisemitism, in the words of Antony Lerman, “a device for delegitimizing any criticism of Israel and a political weapon in a global propaganda battle.”

Controversial critic Norman Finkelstein goes even further by accusing pro-Israeli protagonists of deliberately stirring up controversy about Israeli history in order to influence public opinion on behalf of the Jewish state. Finkelstein is convinced that a “stratagem of the Israel lobby is playing The Holocaust and ‘new anti-Semitism’ cards.”

Finkelstein’s belief in a pro-Jewish conspiracy of experts certainly represents an extreme opinion. Moreover, not all critics of the new antisemitism concept doubt the existence of the underlying problem itself. Taking a more realistic stance, more moderate observes have raised the objection that the actual expression “new antisemitism” is misleading not because anti-Jewish attitudes no longer pose a problem, but because in their view there is nothing particularly new about it.

This is a valid point, also because current antisemitic manifestations directed both at Jewish communities and at Israel, employ many traditional anti-Jewish themes such as conspiracy theories, the belief in malicious Jewish influence in world events, or the blood libel. It has already been highlighted that historically, motivations and sources of antisemitism have changed over time, but there have always been certain tropes and ideas that survived the transformation of anti-Jewish prejudice and were rearticulated in new

80 Ibid, 15.
81 Werner Bergman from the Center for Research on Antisemitism in Berlin is of this opinion, see his introduction to Frank, Neue Judenfeindschaft? Perspektiven für den Pädagogischen Umgang mit dem Globalisierten Antisemitismus. According to Rory Miller, contemporary anti-Zionists employ many of the themes their predecessors had already used before 1948, Miller, "British Anti-Zionism Then and Now".
contexts at later stages. While not specifically writing about the very latest expressions of anti-Jewish prejudice, David Nirenberg has aptly spoken of the enduring nature and reappearance of “habits of thought” based on “inherited cultural forms” in the history of antisemitism. He also highlighted the function of “Judaism” as a “moral and epistemological category” that has been as much an aid for explaining the big social and economic question of the world, as it has been about real existing Judaism and Jews; a trait of antisemitic thought that one might argue has also survived until the present time.

However, for most proponents of the new antisemitism thesis, the question whether or to what extent the motivations, sources or today’s antisemites’ concrete distorted ideas about Jews are really new is only of secondary interest; their key concern is the contemporary resurgence of anti-Jewish sentiments despite optimistic expectations that the twenty-first century might finally see this “oldest hatred” disappear for good. The fact that many manifestations of anti-Zionism and anti-Israelism even use traditional antisemitic ideas and tropes only lends support to the viewpoint that anxieties about the return of antisemitism, and the seriousness of the threat to Jews around the world, are far from hyperbolic.

Moreover, although many old tropes are rearticulated in the new antisemitism, the aspect that unites its different strands is the insertion of a particular political dimension through the focus on Israel. This is an aspect that could only emerge very recently in the long history of antisemitism, and thus deserves to be characterised as new.

**The contentious boundaries between anti-Israelism and antisemitism**

The most contentious aspect of the debate remains the drawing of boundaries between legitimate anti-Zionism and criticism of Israel on the one hand, and antisemitism on the other.

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83 Ibid., 436-7.
Nearly all participants in the debate acknowledge that not all criticism of Israel is antisemitic, and the existence of principled anti-Zionism that is not antisemitic is also not disputed.84

One attempt to delineate the boundaries is the “3-D-test” suggested by Israeli politician Natan Sharansky, which renders demonization of Israel, double standards and the delegitimisation of Israel’s existence antisemitic.85

In a similar vein, according to the working definition of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), the predecessor of the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), criticism of Israel can be antisemitic in cases where the Jewish people’s right to self-determination is denied, by claiming, for example that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavour; in applying double standards by expecting a behaviour of Israel not demanded of any other democratic nation; using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism to characterize Israel or Israelis; drawing comparisons between contemporary Israeli policy and the Nazis; or holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.86

Neither the 3-D test nor the EUMC criteria have been universally accepted as demarcations of legitimate discourse. They have been largely rejected by their very target audience, namely those participants in the debate who are most critical of Israel. In fact, the EUMC definition actually serves as a prime example for the contestation of the nature of antisemitism and its boundaries. It has attracted considerable criticism,87 as the decision in

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2011 of the Universities and Colleges Union to abandon it as a working definition demonstrates.  

Although the EUMC definition remains contentious, and while simple formulas like Sharanski’s may not be adequate in all cases, the truth is that the current level of hostility towards Israel and the fierce anti-Zionist activism across the world have some very problematic implications, and are linked to antisemitism in a number of ways.

The least controversial link is based on the fact that a statement, image or act can be antisemitic, even if the author or actor is not. The claim made in the Macpherson Report into the murder of black teenager Stephen Lawrence, namely that a racist incident is defined by the perception of the victim, and not the perpetrator, has often been misinterpreted. However, it points to an important shift in the way racism is conceptualised today, compared to earlier decades. This shift turns the focus away from the level of intent, and recognises that an act can be racist in outcome or content, even if in the genuine absence of a racist intent. David Hirsh has highlighted very clearly how this can add an important perspective to the current debate on the new antisemitism. It means that an act or discourse can be effectively antisemitic even in the absence of any conscious or subconscious anti-Jewish sentiments. Caricatures dealing with Israeli politics and politicians provide ample examples of the utilisation of classic antisemitic images or themes, and in many cases there is no reason to doubt the genuineness of the artist’s denial of anti-Jewish motivations.

89 “A racist incident is any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person.” William MacPherson, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (Stationery Office Limited, 1999) chapter 47, point 12. While such a wide definition is certainly effective for encouraging the reporting of racist incidents, the mere perception of an act or offense being racially aggravated is not sufficient for a successful prosecution, which requires further evidence in this regard. This is also recognised in the MacPherson report itself, see ibid. point 14.
Furthermore, while principled anti-Zionism surely exists, and many cases of extreme hostility towards Israel’s policy are not driven by antisemitism in any way, there are also clear cases where anti-Jewish prejudice does provide the main impetus or anti-Israel attitudes or activism. Even Brian Klug, already identified as staunch opponent of the new antisemitism thesis, acknowledges: “I know of no one who denies that antagonism towards Zionism or Israel can (and at times does) express an anti-Semitic animus.”

In their secondary analysis of ADL data for ten European countries, Edward Kaplan and Charles Small found a strong positive correlation between extreme anti-Israel views and antisemitism. Their study provides statistical evidence that individuals who hold not just moderately critical but extremely hostile views about the Jewish state are very likely to also be antisemitic. This is further supported by historical, anecdotal evidence that some active British anti-Zionists privately held antisemitic views even though in public they vehemently denied such charges.

Statistical correlations do not prove causality, a point that is explicitly acknowledged by Kaplan and Small. That means several causalities could be at work to produce this correlation. One of them, just mentioned, is that antisemitism constitutes the independent variable – the causing factor – and anti-Israel attitudes make up dependent variable – the result. In very simple term, this is the case if someone harbours negative prejudice against Jews, and therefore also hates Israel, because it is a Jewish state.

However, the causality can also work the other way round, as illustrated through countless cases of antisemitic hate crime incidences, recorded by monitoring bodies such as the CST, in which Jewish individuals and facilities are targeted because of anger over events in the Middle East. Examples of the simultaneous employment of different ideological

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92 Klug, "Interrogating the ‘New Anti-Semitism’," 470.
94 As mentioned in chapter two, see Miller, Divided against Zion: Anti-Zionist Opposition in Britain to a Jewish State in Palestine, 1945-194; "British Anti-Zionism Then and Now."
motives such as anti-Zionist and traditional antisemitic tropes in incident reports demonstrate how these strands can converge.95

Although the social psychological dynamics behind such incidences have not been explored in the literature in any detail, there are indeed valid reasons to consider the possibility that strongly held anti-Israel views or emotions can spill over into hostility towards Jews, who might consciously or subconsciously be associated with the object of hatred – that is, Israel.

In this context, it is worth considering both the power of prejudice, as well as the fact that in reality, all the different elements and processes that play a role in the formation and the development of attitudes are highly interrelated, and not always under conscious control. Stereotypes, for instance, are very persistent and as Gordon Allport has noted, even seemingly non-prejudiced people who reject a certain stereotypes as inaccurate can sometimes be influenced by them in the way they respond to others.96

Furthermore, while for analytical purposes it is useful to acknowledge the distinction between the cognitive, affective and behavioural components of attitudes, in reality these three components are highly interrelated. The strong link between emotional and cognitive elements of attitudes, for instance, is evident in the fact that according to research, prejudice can persist in affective responses to others, even if it is not supported at a cognitive level. In other words, “…prejudice that was ‘defeated intellectually’ can ‘linger emotionally’.97

This means that even if anti-Israel activists point out that they clearly distinguish between opposition to Israel and discrimination against Jewish individuals, in reality, it is

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95 One example taken from the CST incidents report 2011: A man phoned a Jewish organisation in London and said, “I am Hitler. He is not dead, coming to get you” and “We are Palestinians and we are not scared of you or the Jews”. The author of the report comments: “The perpetrator of this particular incident is typical of contemporary antisemitic incident perpetrators who will select from a range of Jewish-related discourses for language or imagery with which to abuse, insult or threaten their Jewish victims.” (CST incident report, 2011, 24).


hardly possible to neatly separate all the different emotional and cognitive elements that play a role in our perceptions and attitudes. It is therefore not impossible that in the context of strong emotional or intellectual engagement with an issue, such as anti-Israel activism, the boundaries between affect and intellect, and the distinctions between the Israel the state, and Jews, its citizens and possible diaspora supporters, can become blurred.

In addition to all of this, anti-Israeli discourse is also likely to have a long-term impact on public opinion on Israel, exacerbate existing hostility towards Jews in public opinion, or even contribute to the emergence of anti-Jewish prejudice. Negative media reporting, together with the influence of anti-Israeli academia and left-liberal intellectuals, the United Nations, renowned NGOs and parts of the church, all of them multipliers or “opinion leaders” are very likely to influence public opinion and cause a trickling down effect from the intellectual elite to the general public.

According to a review of several studies of media reporting on Israel, most authors agree that generally speaking Israel’s portrayal in international media has worsened since 1967.98 Other studies suggest that news coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict is biased at the expense of Israel.99 The present state of media effect research questions the view of a direct, unmitigated influence of mass media on their audience, because many factors have to be considered for assessing the effects of media.100 Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that for the great majority of the public, the mass media are the only source of information about Israel and therefore discourses on Israel in the media play an important role in the public perception of the Jewish state. While the role of Israel for Jewish religious, national or

99 See for example: Roland Schatz and Christian Kolmer, “The Portrayal of the War in the Middle East: Media Analysis of News Coverage by ADR and ZDF,” in: Liepach, Martin (ed.): Jewish Images in the Media, (Vienna: Austrian Acad. of Sciences Press, 2007), 139-150. However, see also publications by the Glasgow media group who claim there is actually a bias in favour of Israel in British television: Greg Philo and Mike Berry, Bad News from Israel (London: Pluto, 2004).
cultural identities, and the various relations between Israel and particular Jewish diaspora communities are very complex, it must be assumed that a great number of individuals from wider non-specialist audiences are not able to draw clear distinctions between Israel, the Jewish state and Jewish communities in their neighbourhood, or simply Jews in general.

In the long run, therefore, the combined effects of continuing activism seeking to draw public attention to Israel’s political failings, the public questions of Israel’s legitimacy by respected individuals or segments of society, compounded by – in so far as it really is – biased or simply extremely negative media reporting, will inevitably have some impact on the way Israelis are perceived, and possibly also Jews more generally.

All of this, it can be argued, is further exacerbated by a failure – especially by the political left – to acknowledge contemporary antisemitism and the potentially problematic implications of extreme anti-Zionism, including the threat posed by radical forms of anti-Zionism in the Islamic world. This neglect finds a precedent in the history of leftist underestimation of antisemitism as a factor in the Holocaust, as Philip Spencer has pointed out.101 Moreover, it will be argued in chapters four and five in this thesis that such a lack of recognition of antisemitism as a problem is not confined to the left, but is a much wider issue.

Leaving the thorny questions of antisemitic motivations or effects aside, it is certainly justified to point out that the promotion of hatred towards any state – including its political leadership but in most cases inevitably also its wider population – poses several moral and ethical questions, and history provides numerous examples showing that this tends to foster more conflict and hatred rather than peace and social harmony.

According to Sharanski’s “3-D test”, many views propagated in the context of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign and related movements cross the line to antisemitism. They often amount to a comprehensive, fundamental assault on the state of

Israel, and demonise the Jewish state by assigning sole responsibility for the long-standing and highly complex conflict with the Palestinians – or even the wider political instability in the Middle East and its worldwide fallout – to Israel.

The sustained campaign for various kinds of boycotts against Israel inevitably provokes memories of the antisemitic boycotts of Jewish businesses in Nazi-Germany in the 1930s, and therefore blurs the boundaries between legitimate and effective political activism, and antisemitism at the semantic level. In addition, these proposed and enacted boycotts have real, discriminatory consequences for Israelis – and Jews – around the world. Moreover, it would certainly not be too far-fetched to pose the question whether the exclusion of Israelis from the participation in academic conferences, or from membership in certain organisations, could lead to even more serious developments. Shalom Lappin has made an astute point in highlighting the possibility that a successful academic and cultural boycott of Israel could only be the first step, potentially to be followed by more drastic measures such as targeting of Jewish communal institutions, such as for example Jewish schools that have connections to Israel.102

Finally, taking a historical view, it is necessary to consider the potential unintended consequences of the sustained vilification and demonization of Israel – including and especially in the intellectual elite – at a time when Israel’s very existence is threatened by militant groups and regimes in the Middle East. If the only Jewish state in the world ever were to depend on its allies’ military intervention for survival, the long-term effects of its constant demonization and delegitimization might have a bearing on the degree of support across Western societies to intervene on its behalf. While general ethical and geopolitical aspects of foreign intervention cannot be discussed here, and although speculation about future events should always be framed very carefully in an academic context, it is

102 Lappin, “The Rise of a New Anti-Semitism in the UK”.

nevertheless appropriate to raise the concern that in the above scenario, latent but widespread antisemitism could once again play a role in failing to protect the Jews from persecution and destruction – this time it would be the Holocaust survivors’ descendants.

3.3. Conclusion: the multifaceted nature of antisemitism in Britain today

The examination of the nature of contemporary antisemitism in Britain has revealed a number of aspects. Firstly, while most periods in the history of British antisemitism were dominated by one particular form such as religious, political or racial antisemitism, today, various strands of antisemitism coexist. Not all traditional forms have disappeared, as highlighted in the case of right-wing antisemitism, but they now exist alongside new variants. Anthony Julius concurs that “....it is by reference to its heterogeneity – that is, in the diversity of its appeal and the plurality of its versions – that anti-Semitism is best conceptualized.”

Among the many varieties of antisemitism in Britain today, the new antisemitism has attracted the most attention and debate, and is alleged to be particularly widespread among the intellectual elite and in the public sphere. To a large extent, it is located at the level of ideas, beliefs, arguments and discourses, which makes providing unambiguous empirical evidence problematic. Partly for this reason, and because of diverging assessments regarding boundaries between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism, scope and nature of contemporary antisemitism in Britain are highly contested.

Though definitions and demarcations remain contentious, concerns about a new antisemitism in Britain are not unfounded, and the analysis of different kinds of evidence, observable trends and tendencies shows that antisemitism represents a complex and contested – but nonetheless real – social and political problem in Britain today.

Anti-Zionism, extremely critical views of the state of Israel and radical pro-Palestinian activism are all legitimate expressions of the freedom of speech, and they form part of critical public discourse which is vital for any liberal democracy. However, this does not mean that concerns about antisemitism should simply be dismissed.

There is solid empirical evidence for a positive correlation between turmoil in the Middle East and domestic levels of antisemitism. In some cases, expressions of opposition to Israel are motivated by antisemitism, openly or inadvertently. Furthermore, even in the absence of an anti-Jewish motivation, acts and discourses can be antisemitic if they use classic antisemitic themes. Finally, irrespective of the question whether or not a message or action is motivated by antisemitism, it can be antisemitic *in effect*. 


Chapter 4: Political responses to contemporary antisemitism in the context of universalistic equality and race relations policies in Britain

This chapter deals with political responses to antisemitism, including government policies that have addressed antisemitism in a direct or indirect way, and initiatives arising from Members of Parliament. In doing so, special attention will be paid to the way antisemitism has been framed in political discourse.

As the preceding chapter has outlined, contemporary antisemitism in Britain has been highlighted as a social problem by observers from within and outside the Jewish community for decades. In contrast, until the early twenty-first century, British governments have produced very few – if any – laws, policy programmes or political initiatives that had their origin in a governmental concern over levels of antisemitic incidences, or were in any other way specifically directed at countering antisemitism.

In the absence of a distinct “antisemitism policy” in Britain, it is necessary to consider policy areas which, while not primarily targeting antisemitism, have been related to it in more indirect ways, for instance by having a bearing on the needs of British Jews a minority group in terms of protection from discrimination, harassment or other manifestations of prejudice.

This analysis shows not only that the most significant political initiatives and programmes concerning racism, discrimination and inequality were prompted by social or political issues other than antisemitism. Moreover, while British Jews have enjoyed increasing protection against discrimination on racial grounds, or from racially aggravated crimes due to policies and legislation originally developed for the sake of other groups, there have been limits to the applicability of these broad frameworks for countering all aspects of antisemitism, especially those of the new antisemitism.
However, since the early 2000s there has been significant progress in targeted governmental responses to antisemitism. The impetus for tackling antisemitism arose from within parliament, largely on the basis of initiatives from individual MPs, not the executive arm of the state, the government. The All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism (APPIA) in 2005 proved to be the crucial milestone in terms of political responses that followed the publication of its report in 2006, but also in terms of awareness and acceptance in mainstream politics of the discourse on, and condemnation of, the new antisemitism. Because of the significance of the APPIA, both in itself but even more so in light of the shortcomings of the universalistic approaches adopted by the state, it is important to look at it in detail, and this will be done in the third part of the chapter.

4.1. The needle of antisemitism in the haystack of British race relations, equality and integration policies

From Race Relations to Community Cohesion: The conceptual legacy of ‘Race’ in the context of expanding diversity agendas

British sociology and cultural studies have long had a strong interest in race and racism, with scholars such as Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy making influential contributions to the field of ethnic studies.1 This scholarly interest developed against the backdrop of many decades of British post-war history. In the post-1945 era British politics was to a considerable extent shaped by the salience of issues related to race and racism that emerged as Britain was dealing with the consequences of the unravelling empire and post-war immigration from the Commonwealth, mainly from the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent. Thus, Great

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Britain’s colonial past and a number of social, cultural and political developments in the decades following the Second World War contributed to a socio-historical setting in which there was a great and enduring political concern with race and ethnic diversity, and this has in reality for a long time meant Black minorities.

In the immediate post-war period, the changing social realities that immigration produced – there were no immigration controls in place even after the passage of the British Nationality Act 1948 – were dealt with under an assimilationist framework, placing the burden on the immigrants to adapt and shed their cultural distinctiveness against the background of a host society perceived as homogenous.2

As levels of immigration were met with increasing prejudice and racist sentiments, reaching a peak in the racially aggravated riots in Nottingham and Notting Hill in 1958,3 the government introduced increasingly restrictive immigration controls.4 However, according to John Solomos, public pressure was not the only motivating factor for the new immigration policies. Debates in the public sphere and the parliament but importantly also government debates from the 1950s onwards provide indications of “state racism,”5 with the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 representing “…the climax of the campaign within and outside government since the 1950s for the control of black immigration.”6

But the introduction and subsequent tightening of immigration controls presented only one strand of what was in fact a two-pronged strategy by successive governments. At the same time the Labour Government began to address racial disadvantage through

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5 Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, 56.
6 Ibid., 58.
progressively strengthened anti-discrimination legislation, laying the foundations of what has in Britain traditionally been termed “race relations” policies.7

The first Race Relation Acts of 1965 prohibited incitement to racial hatred, racial discrimination in public places such as hotels, and set up the Race Relations Board. The Race Relations Act 1968 expanded the prohibition of racial discrimination to other fields, for instance employment and housing, endowed the Race Relations Board with new powers and established the Community Relations Commission (CRC). The Race Relations Act 1976 prohibited indirect forms racial discrimination, and a new body, the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) replaced the Race Relations Board and the Community Relations Commission.

Thus, while several decades earlier the Aliens Act 1905 had its origins in Jewish immigration and anti-Jewish prejudice, the foundations of post-war British policy race relations and immigration policies had no basis in “the Jewish problem” so to speak, and was not aimed at the Jewish community or antisemitism but had to do with new social and political dynamics connected to more recent ethnic minorities.

While there is no quantitative data on antisemitic incidents in this period comparable to the data that exists today, it would be incorrect to claim that antisemitism did not exist as an objective problem in mid-twentieth century Britain. On the contrary, chapter two and three discussed several strands of antisemitism that continued to exist even after the Second World War. However, as the theoretical considerations outlined in the first chapter also made clear, in terms of public policy, it is not the objective existence of a social issue that matters most but whether, and in what ways social facts are identified, defined, and fed into the political agenda by social and political actors.

During these formative years in the emerging policy fields of race, ethnicity and equality, when successive British governments were preoccupied with anti-Black racism – both in efforts to promote racial harmony but also, as some claim, in pursuing racialised policies – and when immigrant ethnic minorities mobilised to advocate for their rights and against racism\(^8\) – it seems that antisemitism as a specific problem was not high on the political agenda.

It is true that the Jewish community leadership sought to make some contributions to public discussion of race relations policy\(^9\) and that organisations on the Jewish left had by that time long been actively involved in anti-fascist and anti-racist movements.\(^10\) But as far as antisemitism is concerned, as chapter two highlighted, until well into the second half of the twentieth century, the Anglo-Jewish leadership had traditionally adopted a quietist strategy that avoided drawing attention to problems, a strategy that Ben Gidley and Keith Kahn-Harris have in a more contemporary context called “a discourse of secure British citizenship and belonging.”\(^11\) Anti-racist activism on the Jewish left has to be seen in light of the fact that in the post-war period – and in many respects still today – racism was closely associated with class and economic inequality, as immigrant minorities were mostly socially disadvantaged. In sum, these strands of Jewish interventions were not articulating a particular interest in antisemitism, but were part of a larger movement for racial equality.

Nevertheless, in the 1980s it was made clear that race-related legislation did in fact also apply to Jews, which meant that Jews also benefited from the protection against racial

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\(^10\) Such as the JPC in the 1930s, the Jewish Socialists’ Group, the 43 Group and others, see chapter two in this thesis.
discrimination awarded by race relations legislation. Mandla v Lee,\(^{12}\) a 1982 law case lost in the Court of Appeal but won in the subsequent appeal to the House of Lords, confirmed the interpretation that Sikhs and Jews were to be seen not only as religious, but also racial groups. However, again, this legal clarification was not prompted by anti-Jewish discrimination, but in response to a case regarding the exclusion of a Sikh boy from a school that had failed to consider the religious needs of Sikhs in wearing specific religious attire.\(^{13}\)

In subsequent decades the policy area dealing with racial equality was consolidated and also significantly expanded in scope. Notably in this context is the Race Relations Amendment Act 2000 under the New Labour government, which covered among other things institutional racism.\(^{14}\)

In the face of changing social and demographic realities in Britain, there was also an expansion of the very concept of racism, which had traditionally been seen from the perspective of a “racial dualism” based on a Black-White dichotomy, but now came to pay more attention to ethnicity and cultural elements, thus giving rise to notions such as “cultural racism.”\(^{15}\)

But the important point to note is that while the Jewish community would benefit from progress in this area indirectly, neither the emergence of political awareness of racism as a social issue, nor the subsequent shifts and developments were primarily intended to combat antisemitism.

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\(^{12}\) Mandla (Sewa Singh) and another v Dowell Lee and others [1983] 2 AC 548.

\(^{13}\) "Turban or not turban — that is the question (Mandla v. Dowell Lee)," *Liverpool Law Review* 5, no. 1 (1983).

\(^{14}\) The issue of institutional racism was placed onto the public and political agenda through the Macpherson Report of the inquiry into the murder of black teenager Stephen Lawrence. MacPherson, *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry*. This was important in the overall context of equality and race relations, but it was not particularly relevant for the Jewish community, which has a good working relationship with the police, not at least due to the cooperation between police and the Community Security Trust.

The same is also true for other developments such as the emergence of hate speech legislation in the 1980s. While such legislation has a strong bearing on antisemitism, it was originally not specifically aimed at combating anti-Jewish prejudice. For example, the incorporation of the religious dimension into existing race relation, hate speech and equality law, arguably one of the most substantive changes in the history of British equality policy, had its origins in political and social issues arising from changing dynamics related to the British Muslim, not Jewish, communities.

The same applies to the introduction of broad policy agendas such as multiculturalism, which received its main impetus from urban unrest and the subsequent Scarman report (1981) neither of which were related to the Jewish community or antisemitism.

Similarly, the launch of “community cohesion” as a new, broad approach which incorporated various policy strands including race relations, was a governmental response to the urban disturbances in the summer of 2001 in Oldham, Burnley, Bradford and the subsequently commissioned Cantle report. Although introduced as a general policy on

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18 Equality Act 2006
19 Joly, "Race, Ethnicity and Religion: Emerging Policies in Britain."
20 Kymlicka, a respected authority on multiculturalism, defines it as “policies designed to provide some level of public recognition, support or accommodation to non-dominant ethnocultural groups”, Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 16. However, it must be noted that Kymlicka has written on this subject in a broader context relevant to counties like Canada or Australia where multiculturalism has a strong focus on the social status of indigenous minorities, not only immigrant minorities as it is the case in Western Europe. In Britain, the political ground for multiculturalism was prepared in the 1960s by Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, who famously defined it in a speech “not as a flattening process of assimilationism but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.” Jenkins, R., *Essays and speeches* (London: Collins, 1967), 267.
23 On the emergence of Community Cohesion and the question whether it has represented the demise of British multiculturalism see Thomas, "Multiculturalism and the Emergence of Community Cohesion," who argues that contrary to the majority opinion among commentators, it does not signify the “death of British multiculturalism” but only a transformation and adjustments to new social and political realities.
integration, in reality community cohesion has been overwhelmingly focused on British Muslim communities.\textsuperscript{25} It must be noted, however, that the relationship between these two policy frameworks and antisemitism are much more complex and difficult to assess than traditional race relations, hate speech or hate crime legislation, which are more directly applicable to antisemitism, especially the matter of antisemitic incidences.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{The equality of inequalities: Universalistic tendencies in the management of diversity in discourse and political practice}

As the above underscores, race relations had existed as a well-established political and legal concept many decades before the issue of antisemitism slowly came to receive more attention towards the end of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{27} All of this had developed in the context of Britain coming to terms with its colonial past. At the same time, while in Germany and France the memory of the Holocaust provided the backdrop for a deep political and cultural engagement with antisemitism which influenced efforts to combat it, modern Britain, as Robert Wistrich has aptly pointed out, did not have a comparable historical experience with anti-Jewish prejudice and therefore never underwent a similar kind of soul-searching.\textsuperscript{28}

Racism continued as a dominant paradigm in legislation and law enforcement, evidenced for instance in the fact that until the mid-2000s, all police forces in the United Kingdom were required to collect data on racist incidents and report them to the Home

\textsuperscript{25} Charles Husband and Yunis Alam, \textit{Social Cohesion and Counter-Terrorism: A Policy Contradiction?} (Bristol: Policy, 2011).

\textsuperscript{26} This can also be said about policy responses to the rise of terrorism since 2001. Terrorism being a major threat for Jewish communities worldwide and also in Britain, anti-terror legislation and attempts to tackle radicalisation such as the controversial PREVENT agenda do arguably have an impact on the Jewish communities, but it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the precise nature of this link. The main point here is again that anti-terrorism legislation was not initiated as a specific response to increasing levels of antisemitism.

\textsuperscript{27} Runnymede Trust, "A very Light Sleeper: the Persistence and Dangers of Antisemitism".

\textsuperscript{28} Wistrich, \textit{A Lethal Obsession: Anti-Semitism from Antiquity to the Global Jihad}, 363.
Office, but antisemitism was not assessed separately. It can be assumed that against this
background of race as a dominant framework, there was an inclination to simply subsume
antisemitism under this broader category. Indeed, though race relations expanded and
developed since the early period, the traces of the historical pre-eminence of the race
paradigm are still visible in twenty-first century language when governments continue to
subsume antisemitism under the category of racism.

The introduction and chapter one have drawn attention to the significance of language
and political discourse in the definition of societal problems, and the concept “framing” is
useful in the analysis of political talk about antisemitism. One striking feature of
governmental discourse on antisemitism across parties and across departments is a clear
tendency in official reports that where antisemitism is mentioned, it is framed in the
immediate context of racism, very often in the same sentence.

To provide only a few examples, in the 2005 white paper Improving Opportunity,
Strengthening Society, already noted as a relevant government publication in the context of
the community cohesion policy, antisemitism is mentioned only once in all 54 pages. It is
framed as “prejudice and hatred against people of different ethnic groups and religions,” for
which both antisemitism and Islamophobia are given as examples.

The 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth Office report on human rights and democracy
includes a part on antisemitism in a section entitled “promoting British values” under the
subheading equality and non-discrimination, which also deals with many other issues such as
freedom of religion, the rights of women, children, homo-and transsexuals, disability and
indigenous rights, racism, “Roma” and more. In regards to antisemitism it states that
“combating all forms of racism, including antisemitism, remains an important part of the UK

This was also highlighted in the APPIA report, which will be discussed in greater detail below.
30 "Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society: The Government's Strategy to Increase Race Equality and
Community Cohesion,” 21.
Government’s human rights policy.” It could be argued that such passages should not be over interpreted. However, the phrase “antisemitism and all other forms of racism” and similar expressions occur regularly in political discourse and seem to indicate a desire to avoid singling out antisemitism at the expense of other forms of prejudice or discrimination.

A final example that illustrates this latter point so clearly that it is worth being quoted in full is found in a government command paper issued in 2007 as first governmental response to the report on the 2006 All-Party-Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism, further discussed in part three of this chapter. It reads: “Our approach to tolerance and discrimination issues is a holistic one which tackles manifestations of intolerance and discrimination rather than the specific motivations behind them, e.g. antisemitic or racist beliefs. Any other approach risks the creation of a ‘hierarchy’ of discrimination.” In other words, it could be argued that this approach seeks to promote and preserve an equality of inequalities and to communicate the message that all racisms are equally deserving of political attention.

Universalising inequality

Taxonomically speaking, subsuming a specific issue under a larger category of issues – such as treating antisemitism as a subcategory of racism or ethnic or religious discrimination – is a form of “universalization,” a way of deductively classifying particular elements as subsets of larger, more universalistic categories.

33 There are several philosophical and theological traditions broadly related to a principle termed “universalism”. Moral Universalism for instance is a meta-philosophical position claiming that a particular system of ethics applies to different entities or individuals regardless of their concrete characteristics. This term is used here against the background of this main basic principle that is reflected in a number of ways in different universalistic philosophical traditions, but is not intended to imply a strict adherence to any concrete philosophical tradition.
In fact, for effective governance the creation of broader categories is advantageous because it reduces complexity. As Britain is a super-diverse\textsuperscript{34} society, there might understandably be an inclination for policy makers to reduce the social complexity by creating larger categories. The claim that British policies in areas related to prejudice and discrimination have displayed universalising and universalistic tendencies are illustrated through several concrete political projects.

Established since the 1970s, there have been separate agencies mandated to deal with the demands for equality and justice made by different social groups. The Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC), which was set up under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, was in charge of gender equality, the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) for race relations set up through the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Disability Rights Commission Act in 1999 created an agency specifically designed for the rights of disabled people. Thus, there were three different institutions and also three different sets of legislation.

In 2003, the government announced its intention to merge these three strands into one single organisation, and thus the Equalities and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) came into existence in 2007, covering not only the three strands mentioned above but in addition age, religion and belief, sexuality and human rights. Among the motivations for the creation of the EHRC was the need to comply with the EU Equalities Directive 2000, demanding a more coherent approach to diversity and also the observation that there were gaps in representation.\textsuperscript{35}

The EHRC’s scope of responsibility as “Britain’s statutory and independent body promoting equality and human rights in society” is to “…challenge discrimination, to protect and promote equality and respect for human rights, and to encourage respect between people

\textsuperscript{34} Steven Vertovec, "The Emergence of Super-Diversity in Britain," (University of Oxford. Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, 2006).

of different backgrounds."36 While socio-economic equality and human rights are two key priorities of the commission, antisemitism is in principle also included in this broad mandate of the EHRC, but it is only one of a bewildering array of issues in what is a very broad field of action.

The corresponding law, arguably one of the most important landmarks in the history of anti-discrimination legislation in Britain, was the Equality Act 2010. This was introduced by the Labour Party and replaced nine separate strands of anti-discrimination legislation, and beyond that, established positive duties for public bodies to take steps towards furthering equality.

According to Bob Hepple, one of the authors of the Cambridge Review,37 an influential report on equality policy that was produced under the auspices of the Cambridge Centre for Public Law and that formed part of a long-term campaign by equality and human rights experts which had preceded the shift in equality policy, both the establishment of the single commission as well as the Equalities Act 2010 represented “…a decisive shift away from the politics and law of single identities – such as race and religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability and age – towards the politics and law of fundamental human rights.”38

In other words, it represented a further move towards expanding the scope of anti-discrimination legislation and towards creating ever larger categories, reflecting the growing influence of universalistic human rights thinking, the legal aspects of which had of course been partly incorporated into the British system by the Human Rights Act 1998.

On a slightly more abstract level, a turn towards universalistic approaches in the governance of diversity can also be detected in the philosophy underpinning the community cohesion approach. Community cohesion was developed against the background of perceived

failings of preceding approaches, in particular the British model of multiculturalism dominant since the 1980s. In terms of race relations, this form of “anti-racist multiculturalism” was criticised for focusing on equality for each minority community separately, but neglecting the commonalities, common interests, and shared responsibilities of different communities. Consequently, the community cohesion concept represents a shift from ideological support for separateness, cultural relativism and particularism, to a commitment to fostering “universalistic” principles, with harmony and integration in “communities” – however ill-defined – at the core.

4.2. Advantages and limitations of addressing antisemitism through universalistic approaches

Advantages of universalistic approaches

In order to analyse and evaluate attempts to tackle contemporary antisemitism as a social and political problem in light of the above discussion, advantages and disadvantages of subsuming antisemitism under larger categories need to be addressed, including the appropriateness and the implications of framing antisemitism as racism. To this end, both conceptual but also political and practical aspects have to be considered.

First of all, it must be acknowledged that of course, the history of European antisemitism is inexorably linked with modern racism. The antisemitism that arose in Germany from the late-nineteenth century, a specific episode in the wider history of antisemitism but undoubtedly the paradigmatic form of modern antisemitism, was profoundly

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based on racial ideas first formulated during the Enlightenment and later reformulated in scientific racism.40

It was against the background of the Holocaust that Jewish groups like the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and individuals such as Raphael Lemkin and René Cassin made significant contributions to the emergence of the human rights regime after the Second War.41 They were well aware that the Jewish trauma provided invaluable lessons for the rights of other groups, but also that an association with broader moral issues would increase the effectiveness in the battle against anti-Jewish hatred.

In fact, such “bandwagon” strategies were by no means limited to that particular historical episode, but Jewish organisations have often sought to add legitimacy to the fight against antisemitism by linking it to wider issues.42 Writing in Britain in the 1980s, the chairman of the Jewish Cultural and Anti-Racist Project (JCARP) of the Jewish Socialists’ Group was convinced that the interests of Jews as an ethnic minority “…can be effectively defended only through combined anti-racist struggle alongside other ethnic minorities and threatened sectors of society.”43

Such calls are in accordance with more generally applicable insights based on analyses of public policy highlighting that generality is one important criterion that determines whether a particular issue reaches the policy agenda.44 In order to rise up on the political agenda, an issue needs to be sufficiently identifiable and specific to highlight the

41 The AJC was a leading part in a coalition at San Francisco in 1945 that pressed for making human rights a priority in the UN charter. Raphael Lemkin, a Jewish from Poland famously coined term “genocide” and worked towards the UN’s adoption of the Genocide Convention in 1948. René Cassin, then president of Alliance Israélite Universelle, was a major contributor in drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Michael Galchinsky, “Jewish Non-Governmental Organizations,” in Handbook of Human Rights, ed. Thomas Cushman, Routledge International handbooks (New York: Routledge, 2012).
42 Svonkin, Jews against Prejudice: American Jews and the Fight for Civil Liberties.
43 Rosenberg, Facing up to Antisemitism: How Jews in Britain Countered the Threats of the 1930's, foreword, 4.
44 William Solesbury, "The Environmental Agenda: An Illustration of how Situations may become Political Issues and Issues may demand Responses from Government: Or how they may Not," Public Administration 54, no. 4 (1976).
urgency to respond, and also needs to be general enough for a considerable number of people to be affected by it, at least potentially. In the case of antisemitism, it can therefore be a sensible strategy to frame it in the broader frame of racism, because it expands the scope of individuals affected by it – or at least concerned about it – compared to framing it as a singular issue.

Moreover, social psychological research suggests that if someone harbours high levels of prejudice against one group, there is a high likelihood that this individual will also be prejudiced against other groups. In this respect it does make sense to treat negative prejudice as one social-psychological phenomenon because if general tolerance is increased, it will have an effect on all types of prejudice. In the words of Gordon Allport, the doyen of prejudice research: “One of the facts of which we are most certain is that people who reject one out-group will tend to reject other out-groups. If a person is anti-Jewish, he is likely to be anti-Catholic, anti-Negro, anti any out-group.”

This would give support to a liberal assumption that what is really required to fight individual prejudice of all kinds is to building a tolerant, democratic society, and racism and other forms of bigotry would inadvertently disappear.

Finally, there are also political and administrative advantages to universalistic approaches to tackling racism and prejudice. Before the introduction of the Equality and Human Rights Commission in 2006, there was a debate over the advantages and disadvantages of having a single institution. The arguments in favour of a single body were that it would not only give higher status to equality as a principle, but also provide efficiency gains, and would result in administrative benefits by simplifying processes for employers and

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users. It was also hoped that one agency would be better able to deal with cases of multiple discrimination.

**Limits to the applicability of an universalistic anti-racist agenda to contemporary antisemitism**

The specificity of antisemitism

While there are overlaps between the history of antisemitism and the history of racism, and while it is certainly justifiable to see antisemitism at least as one variant, the two should not simply be conflated. There are many different forms of racism and antisemitism is at best a particular form of it. Also, while there are different racisms, contemporary antisemitism does not share all of the characteristics that are most commonly associated with traditional forms of racism, especially when taking a definition of racism as “prejudice plus power”\(^{48}\) as the starting point for analysis, as this section seeks to show.

Most types of prejudice and racism, especially those that have developed in the age of Western imperialism, have constructed out-group stereotypes of the Other in the context of clearly defined social and cultural categories. However, Jews were often not even categorised within such systems of prejudiced classifications, but as standing completely outside of the existing social, political or cultural order. For instance, it has been argued that in the context of the emerging nationalism of the nineteenth century, Jews in their alleged “rootlessness” represented the counter-image of the very concept of nationalism, an image that was of course influenced by antisemitic stereotypes.\(^{49}\) In Britain, the classic dualistic racial

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framework could long not precisely locate the Anglo-Jewish community, also because most British Jews have rarely been visibly different to the majority community.\textsuperscript{50}

However, if one does seek to locate the space that Jews have occupied in the socially constructed landscapes of ethnic cleavages and social hierarchies, and within the racist dichotomy of superiority and inferiority, it becomes clear that this space has sometimes been the one more closely associated with the oppressed, inferior Other, and at other times the one of power and success. The history of antisemitism provides many examples of the former dimension, for example in the way the National Socialists cast the Jews as inferior race, and as subhuman.

However, the image of the inferior Jew does not represent the full picture. Eric Goldstein has told the story of the complex process of negotiation through which American Jews, in the context of a prevailing dualistic Black-White racial framework, eventually became firmly associated with Whiteness by the end of the Second World War.\textsuperscript{51} While his study is about the Jewish community in the United States, the outcomes of the process of cultural negotiation he describes may be identified beyond that cultural context, for example in the well-integrated and relatively successful Jewish communities in parts of contemporary Europe, including Britain.

Where this association of Jews with Whiteness includes ideas of malicious “Jewish” financial or political power, it is of course imaginary. But at a basic, socio-economic level, it is to some extent based on social realities. While Anglo-Jewry is and always has been very diverse, and while many Jews immigrated to Britain from Eastern Europe had historically lived in poor conditions, nowadays, British Jews are profoundly well integrated and mostly socio-economically well-off compared to other minorities.

\textsuperscript{50} Even in the case of the strictly Orthodox Jewish community, the visual difference is not based on phenomenological features but religious attire.

In this sense, the Anglo-Jewish community does not fit well into the concept of classic nor cultural racism. While the focus of early race relations policies was discrimination of racial or ethnic minorities, later these categories were expanded to include religious or sexual minorities, for instance in employment, housing or the provision of goods and services. However, the incorporation of race relations into wider policy agendas under the umbrella of equality and participation retains a strong focus on issues of socio-economic exclusion. The problems of the Anglo-Jewish communities today might be manifold, but they are not primarily about exclusion from participation in society or institutionalised racism, as British Jews are rarely excluded from employment opportunities or public offices. Therefore, anti-discrimination measures can only, to a certain extent, successfully address antisemitism. In principle, providing protection for Jews against discrimination on racial grounds targets one dimension of antisemitism but not a particularly salient one.

There are not only limitations of the effectiveness of British race relations and equality policies for combating antisemitism, but more than that, an active tension. In an older but very insightful analysis of the underlying reasons for antiracist advocates’ neglect of pressing for the inclusion of teaching on antisemitism in a broader antiracist educational agenda, Geoffrey Short points to the inherent dilemma that arises for antiracism when confronted with antisemitism. According to his assessment, while the injustices faced by the Afro-Caribbean minority fit the classic definition of individual prejudice plus power structures perfectly, antiracists would be faced with a dilemma when “a minority suffers from prejudice but is not obviously disadvantaged in any other sense.”

This underlying tension between any approaches towards tackling prejudice based on an analysis that sees systemic inequality and power structures as the root of the problem,

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prevalent in Marxist thinking but also post-colonialism and left theorising more generally,\textsuperscript{53} and attempts to counter antisemitism applies not only to the antiracist movement in the 1980s and 1990s but has resonance in the current context.

Moreover, this inherent tension is further exacerbated by the fact that many expressions of antisemitism – both classic and contemporary – are based on a critique of alleged Jewish power and dominance. In this vein of thinking, Jews represent the exact opposite of the typical, socially deprived immigrant communities that anti-racism seeks to protect and elevate to an equal status. According to this perspective – which might operate at a conscious or subliminal level – not only does Jewry not require any protection from injustice and no saving from inequality, but it can even be seen as an integral part of capitalist power structures, or more unrealistically, but nevertheless widely believed, part of a web of conspiratorial world domination.

Overall, while historically Jews have been seen as both inferior and superior, the latter dimension has become more prominent since the latter half of the twentieth century. This becomes especially evident when considering that ideas of Jews – or “Jewish lobbies” – influencing world politics and finances have gained currency, and that Israel, the Jewish state, is nowadays seen as powerful threat to world peace by many. Although there are many different types of racisms, it can be argued that racism is predominantly about casting the Other as inferior, and in this respect, the nature of contemporary antisemitism might not be accurately captured by mainstream conceptualisations of racism.

Aycan Demirel, who has pioneered the Kreuzberg Initiative against Antisemitism, a successful non-governmental initiative in Berlin,\textsuperscript{54} highlighted that because of the uniqueness

\textsuperscript{53} But see also Spencer, "European Marxism and the Question of Antisemitism: Reactions to the Holocaust before, during and after the Event," 287, who points out that instead of interpreting Marxism as a purely class-oriented worldview, it can also be argue that the underlying concern that motivates the Marxist fight against class exploitation in the first place is “a more profound radical and egalitarian stance which rejects any effort to single out one group as inherently undeserving and inferior, let alone as objects of an exterminatory hatred.”

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of antisemitism, the pedagogical approach adopted by his organisation seeks to avoid subsuming antisemitism under the wider umbrella of racism. Drawing attention to another important difference to other forms of racism, he states that contemporary antisemitism is not just prejudice against Jews, but rather “an all-encompassing framework for understanding history and politics” which, unlike racism, offers a pattern for explaining the world.\(^55\)

In fact, this view is reminiscent of what Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno expressed in their chapter on antisemitism in one of the Frankfurt School’s key texts, *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*, namely that “…the blacks must be kept in their place, but the Jews are to be wiped from the face of the earth…”\(^56\) At their time of writing it was “true in the sense that fascism has made it true”\(^57\) that the Jews – which were “branded as absolute evil by absolute evil”\(^58\) – were “not a minority but the antirace, the negative principle as such.”\(^59\)

Perhaps it is no too far-fetched then to argue that today, it is true in the sense that antisemities have made it true that Jews – individually and especially collectively in form of the state of Israel – have once again come to represent a root cause of many of the world’s ills, including the lack of peace in the Middle East and the international reverberations of this ongoing conflict.

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\(^{54}\) His initiative received funding from the German government since April 2004 in the context of a Federal Programme for promoting tolerance (“Civitas”). Demirel was also one of ten experts on the commission that prepared the 2012 German Federal Government report on Antisemitism, “Antisemitismus in Deutschland: Erscheinungsformen, Bedingungen, Präventionsansätze. Bericht des unabhängigen Expertenkreises Antisemitismus,” ed. Deutsches Bundesministerium des Innern (Berlin 2012).


\(^{57}\) Ibid.

\(^{58}\) Ibid.

\(^{59}\) Ibid.
Limitations of an administrative one-size-fits-all approach – the example of the Equality and Human Rights Commission

Re-focusing again on the practical aspects of the limitations of approaches that fail to give sufficient attention to specific issues, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) provides a good example. It has already been mentioned that the EHRC’s remit as equality and human rights arms-length body is a very broad one. In fact, in the context of the debate over an inclusive body before the EHRC was eventually established, concerns were raised about subsuming the many different strands of inequality, previously represented by different organisations, under one umbrella. In particular, it was feared was that powerful groups would have an advantage over smaller groups by using their size and influence to push their own interests, a point that was stressed by disability groups that were keen to preserve the benefits of the still existing Disability Rights Commission (DRC).60

To gain insight into the EHRC’s actual focus and practice, it is helpful to examine the body’s publications, because these arguably reflect the organisation’s key areas of activity.61 In addition to reports that cover broad areas such as human rights or equality at the workplace, several publications deal with single issues, like prejudice against Gypsies and Travellers, homophobia, or discrimination on the basis of age. However, to date, no report on antisemitism has been produced by the commission. A research report on religious discrimination from the EHRC Research Report Series, carried out for the Commission by external researchers, contains a chapter on Islamophobia, but does not deal with antisemitism.62

60 Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework, 146.
The executive summary of the first triennial review published by the EHRC in 2013 entitled How Fair is Britain? omits any explicit mention of antisemitism.63 This is understandable given the enormous breadth of issues the report deals with, a coverage that necessarily demands a lack of detail. It also does not mention Islamophobia. However, while the omission is justifiable in sections dealing primarily with socio-economic issues, such as health and education – where there are references to Muslims – it is much less justifiable in the section on hate crime, the one area in the report that might be somewhat related to antisemitism. Moreover, the report has 21 references to issues related to experiences of LGB community, to be found in all sections of the report including the hate crime part. It is certainly warranted to suggest that the report provides an indication – at least to an extent – of the emphases and perceptions of problems in the area of inequality and racism, and antisemitism does not seem to be on the agenda.

Conflicting aims: opposing antisemitism and Islamophobia

Finally, it can also be argued that treating all instances of racism under a single umbrella has the potential to lead to a conflict of interests, especially where tensions exist between two minority communities, or where both communities suffer from prejudice.

This kind of tension is most obvious where there is a dual aim of combating antisemitism and anti-Muslim racism. Especially since the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York in September 2001 and subsequent events, experts have drawn attention to rising levels of extreme anti-Islamic attitudes and hostility directed against Muslims living in

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63 The only reference to Jews is found in section 5 on employment, where it reports the finding that “Jewish men are 13 times more likely to be in managerial or professional jobs than elementary ones,” 27. In fact, this gives a possible explanation for the fact that the Jewish community’s social status does not seem to be considered part of the broad equality and human rights agenda.
the West, including Britain. Against this background, opposing Islamophobia is an important task for the government and its anti-racism agencies.

However, chapter three addressed the fact that a considerable amount of anti-Israelism and anti-Jewish bigotry today emanates from Islamic contexts, and that Muslim antisemitism is a salient strand within the new antisemitism. What follows from this is a conflict of aims and interests between addressing antisemitism in all its facets, including Muslim antisemitism, while at the same time aiming to prevent the fostering of negative images and sweeping judgements of British Muslims.

An illustrative incident that highlights this tension occurred in the context of a report commissioned by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), the predecessor of the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA). Having tasked the Centre for Antisemitism Research at the Technical University in Berlin with the compilation of a report on manifestations of antisemitism in Europe, when the report was completed in 2002, the EUMC decided to withdraw it. In its place, a second study on the same topic was prepared, based on data submitted by a number of non-governmental partner organisations. The unsatisfactory quality of research was given as reason for the withdrawal of the Berlin study. However, critics claimed that the EUMC was reluctant to publish the report because it identified young immigrants of Muslim backgrounds as a main source of antisemitism across Europe. To this date, there is still open disagreement about the real reasons behind the decision to withdraw the report, but it is certainly possible that besides methodological weaknesses, a concern over stigmatising Muslims might have been a consideration, especially given the broad mandate of the EUMC – now FRA – to cover all forms of racism.

This is only one—albeit an important—example highlighting the fact that dilemmas can arise if the same organisation deals with different kinds of prejudice, and it is very likely that other examples of similar conflicts of interests can be found in other anti-racist contexts. Such dilemmas make the fight against the new antisemitism more difficult than it already seems to be, given the lack of effective counter-measures aimed specifically at this dimension of anti-Jewish prejudice.

4.3. The All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism (APPIA) and its significance for addressing antisemitism

Against the background of the general tendency to neglect antisemitism as a particular issue, the analysis now turns to political initiatives that have had a more specific focus on anti-Jewish prejudice. In doing so, it becomes evident that the most significant ones in this context can be traced back to the work of parliament, in specific to the initiatives of individual Members of Parliament (MPs) who formed groups, commissioned inquiries or engaged in other activities centred on antisemitism. The activities of one initiative in particular, the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) against Antisemitism, especially its 2005 Inquiry into Antisemitism and the subsequent report, have proven crucial in the development of governmental responses to address antisemitism.

There was at least one parliamentary initiative on antisemitism in previous decades, the Interparliamentary Council against Antisemitism set up in 1985 by Lord Janner, at the time Greville Janner MP, but it has left few traces in the parliamentary records or political history.67 This part of the chapter therefore focuses on the APPG against Antisemitism.

As the thesis seeks to draw comparative conclusions regarding the contributions of state and civil society in responding to antisemitism, it is important to approach this analysis

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67 Antony Lerman has commented critically on this initiative, see Antony Lerman, "An open letter on antisemitism," The Guardian Online: Comment is Free, 16 February 2009.
with an understanding of where the group, and the inquiry in particular, should be located conceptually within the state.

Historically speaking, legislatures across Europe – including in England – have emerged in processes of power-struggles between monarchies and their subjects. As Philip Norton points out, today parliaments have two kinds of relationships, one with the executive and another with citizenry. Therefore, most parliaments including the British one essentially serve as “buckle” between those who govern and their citizens. While the link with government, and in particular parliament’s contribution to the making and legitimation of public policy, has long been the scholarly focus, the second dimension including parliament’s role in representing and expressing citizens’ interests and demands – to a great extent but not exclusively channelled through political parties – is becoming increasingly important. The fact that the term parliament itself stems from the French word parler serves as a reminder that among the various functions of parliament are the articulation and debate of societal issues, interests and concerns.

Nevertheless, many political scientists would rightly argue that as an institution, the British parliament belongs to the state, not at least because parties form governments through majorities in parliament. As Norton put it, the British parliament has a “virtual monopoly as a recruiting agent for executive office.”

However, it is important to acknowledge that within parliament, or to be more precise, within the wider parliamentary context, there are some bodies for which the classification as

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70 Ibid., 11; 14.
72 Ibid., 165.
part of the state is much less convincing. It can be argued that this applies in particular to all-party parliamentary groups.

A 2012 report by the Speakers’ Working Group on All-Party Groups highlighted long-standing concerns that in the public eye, all-party groups are often confused with select committees.\(^74\) The reason why this poses a problem – and according to the report a concern serious enough for it to have been addressed repeatedly by successive Speakers – is that it gives an erroneous impression of holding a similar degree of parliamentary status and authority. Select committees are the most important official mechanism outside of the chamber to fulfil parliament’s function of administrative oversight of government.\(^75\) They are appointed by the House, form part of its official structure, and carry out functions on its behalf. Select committee reports are House of Commons or House of Lords papers, and are covered by parliamentary privilege.\(^76\)

However, unlike select committees, all-party groups have no formal place in the parliamentary legislature and also do not receive any funding from it. Based on the interests of individual MPs or peers, APPGs are formed through initiatives of members of the House of Commons or the House of Lords as cross-party interest groups. They are included in the Register of All-Party Groups\(^77\) and can use certain facilities in the Palace of Westminster. Nonetheless, their status is decidedly informal. In fact, the aforementioned Speakers’ report made the recommendation to discontinue allowing APPGs to use the official portcullis.

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\(^77\) The Register of All-Party Groups includes any group whose membership includes at least 20 Members, comprising at least 10 Members who are from the same political party as the government, and at least 10 who are not from the government party and includes at least one officer who is a Member of the House of Commons. See also “Guide on the rules of all-party groups”, House of Commons, March 2012, http://www.parliament.uk/documents/pcfs/all-party-groups/guide-to-the-rules-on-apgs.pdf.
symbol on their reports and websites, or the “House style” of select committee reports, in
order to clearly distinguish their roles and statuses the parliamentary system.\(^{78}\)

Moreover, as the next sections will demonstrate in the specific context of the APPG against Antisemitism, APPGs often have links to organisations outside the political system and are in dialogue with civil society more generally speaking. Therefore, while the British parliament taken as a whole can be classified as a state institution, there are strong arguments for the perspective that this does not necessarily apply to all-party groups, which do not represent the government or the state. Rather, they reflect interests of individual MPs, and as discussed below, in many cases even provide an opportunity for civil society to articulate and advocate its different interest and views.

**The All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism: context and analysis**

The All-Party Parliamentary Group against Antisemitism is registered as an all-party parliamentary subject group in the Parliamentary Register,\(^ {79}\) and is administratively supported and funded by the Parliamentary Committee against Antisemitism Foundation (PCAAF), a registered charity.\(^ {80}\) In 2009, Danny Stone joined the PCAA as director. The initiative for the APPG against Antisemitism can mainly be traced back to one particular MP without any direct affiliation with the Anglo-Jewish community, John Mann, a Labour MP for Bassetlaw since 2001.

Since its inception, the All-Party Group against Antisemitism has undertaken a number of different projects. In 2005, it commissioned an inquiry into the current state of antisemitism in the UK, chaired by the MP Denis MacShane, the outcome of which would turn into the most significant undertaking of the APPG to date. This All-Party Parliamentary

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\(^{80}\) Charity registration number 1089736.
Inquiry into Antisemitism (APPIA), in which 14 MPs81 from different parties were involved, set out to analyse evidence related to contemporary antisemitism, assess existing efforts against antisemitism as well as suggesting additional measures to confront it.

A public call for submissions was issued in November 2005, followed up by a number of personalised letters of invitations for submission to embassies, organisations and individuals, signed for by Rt Hon Dr Denis MacShane MP as the chairman of the inquiry. The call for submissions generated a significant number of written statements from various organisations and groups, including UK governmental departments, police agencies, faith groups, journalists and commentators, Jewish community organisations, academics, international organisations and foreign embassies, British trade unions, NGOs, and individuals. The inquiry also held four oral evidence sessions in London during February and March 2006, and carried out delegate visits to Paris, Manchester and Rome.

The general call for submission did not give specific instructions on expected content, apart from stating that “each submission should include the name and postal address of the individual or organisation and state whether it has been prepared specifically for the Inquiry.”82 As few framing elements were provided by the inquiry’s call for submissions, the decision what to include, what aspects to highlight, and how to frame the assessment of the nature of contemporary antisemitism reflect the views of the submitting parties.

The conclusions of the inquiry process were presented to the public in the Report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism, released in September 2006, which

81 From the Labour, the inquiry included Rt Hon Kevin Barron MP, Rt Hon Bruce George MP, Barbara Keeley MP, Khalid Mahmood MP, and Rt Hon John Spellar MP. Conservative MPs: Tim Boswell MP, Rt Hon David Curry MP, Rt Hon Iain Duncan Smith MP, Nigel Evans MP, Daniel Kawczynski MP and Theresa Villiers MP, and Chris Huhne MP from the Liberal Democrats and Lady Sylvia Hermon MP from the Ulster Unionists. See “Report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism.”
82 Call for submissions, APPIA, 2005.
elicited positive reactions from politicians,\textsuperscript{83} from some quarters of the Anglo-Jewish community,\textsuperscript{84} and academic experts.\textsuperscript{85}

The report deals with a variety of issues and themes related to antisemitism, including different sources of antisemitism, the situation at British universities – to which it devotes an entire chapter\textsuperscript{86} – and measures to address anti-Jewish prejudice. It draws attention to a rise in antisemitic incidences and discourse, and the effects this has had on the Jewish community, expressing the hope that “…this report will go some way to explaining how Jews may feel anxious about their place in an apparently welcoming society in which antisemitism appears not to exist.”\textsuperscript{87} Expressing a considerable degree of concern over antisemitism, the report finds that “…this phenomenon that has contributed to an atmosphere where Jews have become more anxious and more vulnerable to abuse and attack than at any other time for a generation or longer.”\textsuperscript{88}

One of the most significant aspects of the report in the context of this analysis is that it incorporates many of the elements that proponents of the new antisemitism thesis have pointed out. For instance, in addition to dealing with classic far right antisemitism, it also draws attention to the main sources of the new antisemitism, including Islamist and Islamic anti-Jewish attitudes and Holocaust denial,\textsuperscript{89} antisemitism on the political left,\textsuperscript{90} in the media and at universities. In the latter context, while it stops short of explicitly labelling academic boycotts of Israel as antisemitic, it provides a great number of examples of events and trends

\textsuperscript{83} Conservative Party chairman Francis Maude MP said the report was a “very valuable and challenging piece of work,” ("Tories laud Racism Report," \textit{The Jewish Chronicle}, 1 Dec 2006, 5).
\textsuperscript{84} The Jewish Chronicle called the report “ground-breaking” (Bernhard Josephs, “On the Rise and Becoming ‘Respectable’” 8 Sept 2006, 4) and Mark Gardner, the communications director of the Community Security Trust, said the report was “an important moment in the urgent struggle against the rising tide of antisemitic incidents and hatred.” (ibid., 4).
\textsuperscript{85} Robert Wistrich also believes the APPIA marked a decisive turning point in the way antisemitism is dealt with politically in Britain, and called the APPIA report “an important document in itself.” Wistrich, \textit{A Lethal Obsession: Anti-Semitism from Antiquity to the Global Jihad}, 363.
\textsuperscript{86} "Report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism,” 38.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid. summary page.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 24.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 32.
at British universities where anti-Israel sentiments have effectively created an environment of insecurity and intimidation for Jewish students.91

In other parts of the report, the link between the Middle East conflict and domestic antisemitism is pointed out equally clearly. On the one hand the intention is expressed to remain neutral, as “it is not the role of this inquiry to take sides in this major debate”92 and it is highlighted that “criticism of Israel is not to be regarded in itself as antisemitic.”93

However, it draws attention to a variety of ways in which anti-Zionism can be motivated by, or cause, antisemitism94 and even recommends the adoption of the EUMC working definition on antisemitism.95 This, as mentioned in chapter three, has been largely rejected by critics of the new antisemitism thesis who claim it conflates legitimate forms of criticism against Israel with antisemitism.

**Significance and impact of the APPIA: Government responses and subsequent developments**

It can be argued on a number of grounds that the work of the APPG against Antisemitism, in particularly the APPIA report, was highly relevant in the context of political responses to antisemitism in Britain, and even that it represents a key watershed in terms of addressing anti-Jewish prejudice in this country.

Firstly, the very existence of this group in itself is an important fact. As said, the work of the APPG against Antisemitism was initiated by individual MPs, in particular John Mann. With a negligible Jewish population of less than 50 individuals in a mainly Christian

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91 Ibid., 38.
92 Ibid., 17.
93 Ibid.
95 Ibid., 5.
constituency, it is highly unlikely that his motivation for engaging with antisemitism was rooted in electoral considerations. The willingness of him and other politicians in the group to invest time and energy on the subject of antisemitism can be taken as indication that it is perceived as important social issue by at least a number of British MPs from across the party-spectrum.

Moreover, even before the publication of the report, the process of evidence collection contributed to raising awareness of antisemitism as a social problem. Many organisations and institutions were explicitly invited to make a submission to the inquiry through individual letters. In some cases, this call for submissions may have provided a first-time or at least rare occasion for organisations with no specific focus on antisemitism to engage with this topic. Others, such as the Institute for Jewish Policy Research, carried out additional research in the process of preparing their APPIA submission.

Some individually addressed letters, sent for instance to embassies, added a tone of urgency to the rationale for the inquiry which, so the letters stated, had been launched “in response to evidence that British Jews are living in a state of fear and discomfort as a result of a perceptible rise in antisemitism.” In this sense, the process of evidence collection itself drew attention to the rise in antisemitism even before the publication of the report.

97 In his own words, “I receive and will accept to no personal gain. I do my work because fortune has given me the opportunity.” Acceptance speech for Jan Karski Award, 07 May 2009, Annual Meeting American Jewish Committee, http://www.ajc.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=iJT12PHKoG&b=5154541&ct=6992437.
98 It requested additional data from all chief constables in the UK in November and December 2005 specifically for the purpose of the submission to the APPIA. Iganski, "Too Few Jews to Count? Police Monitoring of Hate Crime Against Jews in the United Kingdom."
99 Letters by Rt Hon Dr Denis MacShane MP to H.E. Thomas Matussek, German Ambassador to the United Kingdom, H.E. Akin Alptuna, Turkish Ambassador to the United Kingdom and H.E. Robery Holmes Tuttle, U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom, all dated 05 December 2005.
However, arguably the APPIA’s most significant, and most easily observable, impact lay in the impetus it gave to practical political responses to antisemitism.\textsuperscript{100} To date, there have been three written government responses to the report in the form of command papers; the Labour government’s first response, prepared under the chairmanship of then-Race and Faith Minister Phil Woolas was published in April 2007,\textsuperscript{101} followed by a second response in May 2008,\textsuperscript{102} and the new Coalition government published a response in December 2010.\textsuperscript{103}

The fact that there have been three command papers in response to the APPIA is notable, because the British government is not required, nor usually expected, to respond to unsolicited inquiries by parliamentary groups such as the APPIA.\textsuperscript{104} Moreover, at the level of practical measures, many of the policy recommendations contained in the APPIA report were implemented by the government or particular segments of society or responsible institutions.

Many of these measures were specifically targeted towards antisemitism, therefore running counter to the universalistic tendency of subsuming antisemitism under the broader framework of racism. For example, as a result of the APPIA, all police forces have adjusted their process of hate crime data collection and analysis to include a separate category for antisemitic incidents, instead of collecting all hate crimes under the heading of racism.

Also as a direct result of the APPIA, the Crown Prosecution Service conducted a review into the disparity between reported levels of antisemitic incidents and successful prosecutions and convictions of hate crime.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{101} “Report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism: Government Response.”
\textsuperscript{102} “All-Party Inquiry into Antisemitism: Government Response. One year on Progress Report.”
\textsuperscript{103} “All-Party Inquiry into Antisemitism: Government Response. Three Years on Progress Report.”
\textsuperscript{104} A number of factors could help explain why the APPIA report received such a positive response and considerable political attention. According to Danny Stone (interview), the inquiry panel represented a wide political spectrum and was thus perceived as non-partisan, the report itself was of good quality, and antisemitism as a topic is both relevant as well as easy to condemn without having to take a stance on contentious party-political debates.
In December 2010 the government released £2 million for additional security measures in Jewish faith schools in the state sector, a measure that has benefited all minority communities in the long run, but was nevertheless adopted in response to the APPIA.

However, one of the most pronounced examples for the contribution of the APPIA towards a more focused approach to dealing with antisemitism was the setting up of a cross-departmental government working group on antisemitism. The establishment of this group, in which representatives from different government departments and Jewish community organisations meet on a regular basis, was a specific recommendation in the APPIA report. However, initially, the government responded negatively to this suggestion by pointing to the existence of a Hate Crime Advisory Group, under which issues related to antisemitism were already dealt with.106 But according to Danny Stone, in further processes of engagement over this particular issue, the government could eventually be convinced of the advantages of an explicit focus on antisemitism instead of the much broader Hate Crime Advisory Group which had very broad policy objectives and, as Stone put it, treated antisemitism as a “side-show.”107

Thus, the setting-up of the cross-governmental working group on antisemitism is a prime example for the influence that the APPIA had on political responses to antisemitism, and how it led a more targeted approach to tackling antisemitism.

Accordingly, the two government response papers in 2008 and 2010 no longer contained the statement about a “holistic approach to tolerance” and the need to avoid the “creation of a ‘hierarchy’ of discrimination”108 from the 2007 command paper already mentioned. And while, as noted above, the 2005 white paper Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society only contained one reference to antisemitism, the three year progress report in 2009 that was published after the APPIA devoted an entire section to antisemitism.

107 Danny Stone, interview.
These could possibly be minor linguistic details or even coincidences. But what is clearly evident is that the APPIA report is now well-known in the political and public spheres, and has arguably made an impact in terms of practical response, and also in terms of public acknowledgement of antisemitism as a social issue. Regarding the wider impact on the debate on antisemitism in the public sphere, it is significant that an independent report by a parliamentary group explicitly draws attention to the new antisemitism. It highlights the urgency of the issue and overall, it can be argued, it adds discursive legitimacy to the new antisemitism thesis.

Thus, while antisemitism had long been neglected as a social problem, there are now a number of political initiatives that target anti-Jewish prejudice as a specific issue. There have arguably been several potential factors that prompted a heightened sensitivity towards antisemitism since the early 2000s. The rise in terrorism and radical Islamism, of which fierce antisemitism is a prominent element, have sensitised policy makers towards the insecurities of Jewish communities worldwide. But this chapter has demonstrated that the APPIA was also a significant factor in this process.

A final point to highlight is that since the shift towards a greater political acknowledgement of antisemitism as a specific issue, in many ways, the fight against antisemitism has begun to lead the way to tackling other forms of racism. Many of the various efforts in connection to the APPIA and the governmental responses against antisemitism have had pay-offs for other communities. As highlighted by Danny Stone, the funding which was primarily released for security at Jewish schools is also available to other communities. The cross-governmental working group on antisemitism has been replicated for Islamophobia. In a wider context, the expertise built through the CST and its cooperation with the police was subsequently implemented by other faith communities, and new organisations have formed that received guidance and expert assistance by the CST. What
this means is that the pattern of addressing antisemitism in an indirect manner through
policies, programmes and legislation that primarily targeted other problems, prevalent for
decades in the twentieth century, has now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, been
to some extent reversed.

4.4. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed political responses to antisemitism as a social problem. It has been
highlighted that since the mid-twentieth century, when the British government started to
tackle problems such as racism, discrimination and different kinds of inequality, antisemitism
was mostly addressed indirectly under broader frameworks.

It was also discussed that universalistic approaches have both advantages and
disadvantages, but that in the end, a failure to acknowledge the specificity of antisemitism
results in a number of tensions and difficulties that complicate efforts to address all strands of
contemporary antisemitism.

Against this background, the work of the All-Party Parliamentary Group against
Antisemitism was demonstrated to be very significant. The APPIA inquiry process and the
subsequent report led to a number of practical policy responses specifically directed at
ameliorating antisemitism. Perhaps even more importantly, the work of the APPG lent further
legitimacy to the new antisemitism thesis in British mainstream political discourse.

Thus, the most important political response to contemporary antisemitism in the UK
to date has not come from the government, but from a group informally associated with
parliament. Moreover, the APPIA is also an example of important civil society contribution
to the definition of a contested and complex social problem. This is demonstrated through the
analysis of the APPIA report, alongside the input of over one hundred written submissions
from governmental departments, Jewish and non-Jewish organisations and individuals, and
the expert testimony given in four sessions of oral evidence. It suggests that the way antisemitism as a social problem was framed by a number of Jewish organisations with particular expertise in antisemitism had some influence on the content of the report. This will be discussed further in the context of the analysis of the Community Security Trust in chapter six.
Chapter 5: Holocaust commemoration and education in Britain: Between the rhetoric of battling antisemitism and universalistic practice

This chapter deals with Holocaust commemoration and education in Britain, and examines to what extent countering antisemitism as a particular social problem plays a role in this context. As in previous chapters, special attention will be paid to the implications for addressing the new antisemitism, as well as the particular contributions to this of government, or state-led, initiatives on the one hand and civil society actors on the other hand.

The pivotal position of the Holocaust as the tragic historical climax of antisemitism is a main rationale for devoting an entire chapter of this thesis to Holocaust remembrance and education. Moreover, the results of this analysis will add an important, qualifying element to the overall argument developed in this study, especially in relation to the role of civil society in the fight against antisemitism.

The last chapter demonstrated that political, or “state”, responses to antisemitism in Britain have mostly been accidental by-products of other policy fields like anti-racism and equality. In comparison, the All-Party Parliamentary Group against Antisemitism, a political initiative with significant input from civil society, adopted a less universalistic approach to antisemitism and encouraged governmental actions that were more specifically targeted at antisemitism than most previous policy initiatives in this area.

A main argument put forward in this chapter is that British responses to confrontations with the Holocaust have historically been influenced by reluctance to engage with its specifically Jewish dimensions and by extension a failure to connect the Holocaust and Holocaust remembrance with antisemitism. This posture might still be an underlying cultural factor at work in Britain’s engagement with the topic today.
In the context of Holocaust remembrance and education, universalistic perspectives and tendencies to address the problem of antisemitism in a much larger set of issues are not confined to state or government initiatives – although they are clearly identifiable here – but they also extend to civil society actors.

Although in some respects Holocaust commemoration and Holocaust education are distinct practices, this chapter deals with both. There is a significant overlap between Holocaust commemoration and education, as many initiatives for Holocaust remembrance have some educational objectives, and Holocaust education utilises occasions provided by commemorative events.¹

In order to present this argument, the chapter addresses a number of issues that might at first seem to be of secondary importance. However, it will become clear that there are a number of historiographical, historical and comparative aspects that need to be dealt with because they add important information that places the concrete practices in Holocaust remembrance and education in contemporary Britain in their proper context.

For example, while international efforts are not the focus of this dissertation, it is important to show that there are many examples from around the world where countering and preventing antisemitism is an important aim of engaging with the Holocaust. To bypass this fact might give the impression that the virtual absence – despite a commitment to the contrary in political rhetoric – of this in Holocaust teaching and commemoration in the UK is because

¹ The perception that the Holocaust is a distinct and important subject in educational contexts could only develop against the backdrop of increasing knowledge and public awareness of the Holocaust, which led to the formation of and was furthered through cultural representation of the Holocaust in exhibitions, museums, memorials, and forms of popular culture. And at the same time, Holocaust education ensures that knowledge and awareness of the Holocaust is kept alive, which means more people today and future generations have a knowledge base that makes Holocaust commemoration meaningful to them. The Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research (ITF) (since December 2012 called International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)) even indicates the connection of these two elements in its very name. Organisations such as the Beth Shalom, also discussed in this chapter, have integrated both elements: space for memorialisation and commemoration, but also a strong emphasis on holding seminars for schools, lectures and other educational programmes. So does the Imperial War Museum, which has produced teaching packs on the Holocaust for its permanent Holocaust exhibition. The Holocaust Memorial Day, the main Holocaust commemorative event in Britain, also integrates educational elements.
Holocaust remembrance and education are not worth discussing in the context of countering antisemitism at all. It is the argument of this thesis that this is not the case.

5.1. The history of the Holocaust in the service of the present

The “uses” of history

The times are long gone when history as an academic undertaking was solely perceived as the “reconstruction of the past” in the pure sense of gathering objective facts, and the influence of the historian in the process of producing and constructing history is now widely recognised. Moreover, it can be argued that one of the most recent shifts in how societies deal with the past has relegated the role of the professional historian to a position of being only one among many different actors who are all interested in – and who shape – the way we see history, and also the way the past is used for public or other purposes in the present.

Noting a growing interest in history in the West since the late twentieth century, including an increase in using the past to orient ourselves in the present, Klas-Göran Karlsson has identified a set of different “public uses of history”, such as “scholarly-scientific”, “ideological”, “moral” or “political-pedagogical” uses. The purpose of the latter category is to “…summon history as an aid in attacking what are felt to be severe and concrete political and social problems in a later era.”

In other words, history is not always the focus of public attention solely for the sake of history, but can also be instrumentalised for political or public purposes, including addressing present-day social problems.

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2 On one of the most important figures in the development of historicism, or historical positivism, see Georg G. Iggers and James M. Powell, eds., Leopold von Ranke and the Shaping of the Historical Discipline (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1990).

This is especially evident in the social practice of memorialisation and public remembrance.\(^4\) Their purpose is not always primarily to ensure that particular historical events do not fade from collective memory but often they are related to social or political functions, and can also serve ideological purposes by artificially constructing and promoting a collective – often national – identity.

While instrumentalising the Holocaust certainly raises a number of moral concerns such as the need to maintain the dignity of victims and survivors,\(^5\) the Holocaust can be seen as a preeminent example of how history is employed in the service of the present in various different contexts. It is often asserted that the Holocaust carries vital lessons for future generations. Certainly, what Karlsson terms the “political-pedagogical use” seems an apt way to describe how the Holocaust is frequently employed in Western nations to impact on contemporary society.

\textit{The uniqueness debate, the origins of the “Final Solution” and antisemitism}

Of course, what potential meanings a concrete historical event, such as the Holocaust, can provide when employed for political or pedagogical purposes depends on the nature of the event itself.

Few subjects have provoked more historical research than the Holocaust, the “systematic, bureaucratic, state-sponsored persecution and murder of approximately six

\(^{4}\) As opposed to the individual-psychological function of recollection, memory in a sociological sense refers to the collective undertaking of collecting, creating and constructing a social memory. This sociological function of memory has famously been expounded in Maurice Halbwachs, \textit{La Mémoire Collective} (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1950). See also Pierre Nora, ed. \textit{Les Lieux de Mémoire}, 7 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1984).

million Jews by the Nazi regime and its collaborators,” as the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) defines it.\(^6\)

Historian Dan Michman has pointed out that since the 1990s, Yad Vashem’s collection of works on the Holocaust has grown by 4,000 items annually.\(^7\) Given this vibrancy in research and publications, it is not surprising that virtually no aspect of Germany under Nazi rule (1933-1945) and the Holocaust is uncontested among historians.

Much has been made of the question whether or not the Holocaust should be seen as a “unique” historical event without comparable reference point in modern history.\(^8\) Those arguing for the Holocaust’s uniqueness usually stress the scale of human suffering, the fact that it was mass murder on an “industrial” scale carried out by the government of a modern, bureaucratic state, and draw attention to the specific quality of Jewish suffering in the Holocaust.\(^9\) Other scholars look at it from a comparative perspective, insisting that it constituted only one among a number of genocides in the twentieth and previous centuries.\(^10\)

Closely related to the debate about uniqueness is the argument over the ethical implications of drawing particular lessons from the Holocaust – by locating it in the context of Jewish history and by extension the history of antisemitism – versus universal lessons, by interpreting the Holocaust as the manifestation of absolute, universal evil, and a tragedy for all mankind. In this latter interpretation, which has become a dominant perspective, the

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6 http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005143. While many definitions, including the one proposed by Yad Vashem, http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/holocaust/resource_center/the_holocaust.asp are centred on the Jewish victims of the Holocaust, other definitions include other victim groups like Roma, disabled people, political and ideological dissidents, or Slavs.


9 Yehuda Bauer has frequently spoken out against what he sees as inappropriate comparisons of the Holocaust with other atrocities that have occurred in the twentieth century. See for instance Yehuda Bauer, “Understanding the Holocaust: Some Problems for Educators,” Prospects 40, no. 2 (2010).

Holocaust has been seen as a “rupture of civilization.”\textsuperscript{11} It is thought to hold moral lessons that are relevant far beyond the context of Jewish-non-Jewish relations, and is seen as a primary, negative reference point against which Europe and indeed the world is to measure itself in terms of civil liberties, individual freedoms and respect for human life.\textsuperscript{12}

Another main area of debate, which cannot be discussed in too much detail here but must at least be briefly addressed because of its relevance to the issues explored in this chapter, is the longstanding discussion about the factors that ultimately led to the “Final Solution.”\textsuperscript{13}

Scholars in the so-called “intentionalist” tradition have emphasised the role of Adolf Hitler himself, his worldview and his virulent hatred against Jews in what they interpret as the pre-mediated mass-murder of Europe’s Jews. In this view, the annihilation of the Jews had been pursued as a chief objective from a very early stage in Hitler’s political career and the progressive radicalisation of the Third Reich.\textsuperscript{14} National Socialist ideology is accorded a central place in this explanatory perspective, and thus intentionalist interpretations place great emphasis on the role of racial antisemitism – a key element in this ideology – in the Holocaust.

Functionalists, or “structuralists”, on the other hand have questioned the preeminent significance of ideology – and thereby antisemitism – and highlight instead the role of contingent factors related to the structures of the Nazi regime, developments during the Second World War or bottom-up initiatives emanating from lower ranks in the bureaucracy.


\textsuperscript{12} David B. MacDonald, Identity Politics in the Age of Genocide: The Holocaust and Historical Representation (London: Routledge, 2008).

\textsuperscript{13} Ian Kershaw’s publications provide a most competent overview of the developments and current state of key scholarly debates. See for example; Ian Kershaw, Hitler, the Germans and the Final Solution, (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2008); The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems & Perspectives of Interpretation, 4th ed. (London; New York: Bloomsbury, 2000); Hitler (London; New York: Longman, 1991), and others.

\textsuperscript{14} For Lucy Dawidowicz, one of the earliest proponents of this perspective, the evidence is found in numerous antisemitic statements that Hitler made in writing and speech as early as 1919. Tom Lawson, Debates on the Holocaust (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010), chapter 4.
of the Third Reich and occupied countries.\textsuperscript{15} Research in this tradition has led to an understanding that is now shared by most experts, namely that looking at Hitler’s will and extreme antisemitism alone in order to explain the “Final Solution” is reductionist, and that “…the complexity of the processes involved cannot be captured by simple ‘intentionalist’ arguments.”\textsuperscript{16}

It is thus fallacious to insist that antisemitism was the only factor that led to the murder of two-thirds Europe’s Jewish population. One-sided views such as Daniel Goldhagen’s controversial thesis of the pervasiveness of an “eliminatory antisemitism”\textsuperscript{17} in Germany since the late nineteenth century as the main explanatory factor are not accepted by most mainstream scholars.\textsuperscript{18}

However, it is beyond doubt that antisemitism constituted a core element in Nazi ideology and at least by the mid-1930s, antisemitic views had gained ground in all parts of German society.\textsuperscript{19} Moreover, although for the majority of the German population, the “Jewish Question” was not a priority on their preoccupied minds during the war, Ian Kershaw has aptly summarised that latent antisemitism is nevertheless of great significance in an overall explanation of how the Holocaust was possible. It was the undeniably prevalent latent antisemitism across German society that “… conditioned the absence of any serious and organized opposition to antisemitism from non-Jewish institutions before the Nazi takeover of power, was quite sufficient to allow the anti-Jewish radical momentum of the Nazi regime

\textsuperscript{15} Famous exponents of the structuralist thesis are Hans Mommsen and Martin Broszat, see Michael Robert Marrus, \textit{The Holocaust in History} (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987), 40-42; also Kershaw, \textit{Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution}, 239-245.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 325.
\textsuperscript{18} For a critical discussion of the scholarly reception of Goldhagen’s book, see: Kershaw, \textit{Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution}, 314-323.
from 1933 onwards to gather pace until, given the existential conditions of the war years, it was as good as unstoppable.\textsuperscript{20}

Looking beyond Germany, perpetrator research has identified a great variety of motivating factors for the participation and collaboration in the mass murder of the Jews, such as economic gains and peer pressure.\textsuperscript{21} But although Dan Stone insists that “the complexities of real life mean we should not be satisfied with antisemitism as an explanation”\textsuperscript{22} in examining perpetrator motivation, he also concedes that at the very least one can accept that there must have been an unarticulated “antisemitic consensus”\textsuperscript{23} beyond the core of the Nazi regime and among the wider populations in countries where the atrocities took place.

Overall, it would be absurd to claim that antisemitism as a core ideological element of the Nazi Weltanschauung can be dismissed in any account of the Holocaust. As Kershaw has pointed out, even structuralists accept the “overwhelming evidence that Hitler maintained a personal, pathologically violent hatred of Jews” and acknowledge the significance of his “paranoid obsession in determining the climate within which the escalating radicalization of anti-Jewish policies took place.”\textsuperscript{24}

Attempting a definitive conclusion on historiographical discussions of such magnitude as the uniqueness debate or the role of antisemitism in the Holocaust cannot be achieved in the context of this chapter, if it is possible at all. However, although many factors have to be taken into account to explain the “twisted road to Auschwitz,”\textsuperscript{25} most Holocaust scholars nowadays agree that one cannot ignore antisemitism as a significant element in

\textsuperscript{20} Kershaw, \textit{Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution}, 148.
\textsuperscript{21} The end of the Cold War and the subsequent opening of archives in the former Soviet Union have enabled a new wave of scholarship with strong regional emphases. See also Dan Stone, "Beyond the 'Auschwitz Syndrome': Holocaust Historiography after the Cold War," \textit{Patterns of Prejudice} 44, no. 5 (2010): 460.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Kershaw, \textit{Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution}, 245.
explaining the Holocaust.26 While the Holocaust as an historical event does carry the potential for particularistic as well as universalistic lessons, it stands as the most extreme historical example of the destructive potential of antisemitism. As David Cesarani put it, the Holocaust was “ultimately, a Jewish catastrophe.”27

For this reason, it would be sensible to assume that among the lessons derived from the Holocaust for public uses, the prevention of antisemitism on the basis of an acknowledgement of the suffering of the Jewish people should have a prominent place.

**Employing Holocaust remembrance and education to counter antisemitism**

A number of examples from around the world show that countering and preventing antisemitism is indeed often an important aim of engaging with the Holocaust in different contexts.

One of the best examples is the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), one the first intergovernmental organisations to respond to the global rise in antisemitism since the 1990s, and arguably one of the most active in combating antisemitism at the intergovernmental level through its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR).28

Not only is the OSCE/ODHIR very engaged in Holocaust education and remembrance, it also makes an explicit connection between engagement with the Holocaust and countering antisemitism in its work. In the so called Berlin Declaration, which resulted

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26 Kershaw, *Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution*, 319.
28 Antisemitism, alongside other forms of intolerance and discrimination, has been highlighted as an issue through various OSCE ministerial decisions and conference statements, starting as early as the 1990 at the Copenhagen OSCE conference. (See: “Document of the Copenhagen meeting of the conference on the human dimension of the CSCE,” 29 June 1990, section IV, paragraph 40, p. 21). The Porto Ministerial Council Decision in 2002 (Porto Ministerial Council Decision on Tolerance and Non-Discrimination, Decision No. 6, paragraph 11) mandated the convening of separately designated human dimension events on issues in the area of tolerance and non-discrimination, including antisemitism. This was followed by conferences in Vienna on 19 and 20 June 2003 and Berlin on 28 and 29 April 2004, the latter of which was one the first high-level intergovernmental conferences specifically on antisemitism.
from the OSCE conference on antisemitism in 2004, participating states vowed to promote educational programmes for combating antisemitism and in the same context also to promote remembrance of and education about the Holocaust.\textsuperscript{29}

At the OSCE Conference on Anti-Semitism and Other Forms of Intolerance in Cordoba, Spain, in June 2005, a guideline for educators on preparing Holocaust Memorial Days was produced.\textsuperscript{30} The important point here is that Holocaust-related projects and initiatives were an important part of the agenda at these conferences which were explicitly dedicated to countering antisemitism, underlining the assumed connection between the two topics.

As far as its regular activities in the human dimension of security are concerned, ODHIR has divided its work in the area of “tolerance and non-discrimination” into different areas.\textsuperscript{31} These include “combating racism, xenophobia and discrimination”, “combating discrimination against Muslims” and “freedom of religion.” Antisemitism is addressed in its own subcategory, which is named “combating anti-Semitism and promoting Holocaust remembrance”, again underlining the explicit link between both in the work of the OSCE.

Another example is the European Parliament’s resolution on “Remembrance of the Holocaust, anti-Semitism and Racism” from 2005. This states that the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau provided not only a major occasion to remember and condemn the horrors of the Holocaust, but also “…for addressing the disturbing rise in antisemitism, and especially antisemitic incidents, in Europe.”\textsuperscript{32} Furthermore it makes an explicit connection between Holocaust education and the battle against antisemitism by urging Council, Commission and Member States “…to strengthen the fight against

\textsuperscript{29} The Berlin Declaration is published in a separate document at http://www.osce.org/cio/31432, last accessed 31 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{30} Yad Vashem and OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Right: “Preparing Holocaust Memorial Days: Suggestions for Educators”, January 2006.
\textsuperscript{31} See the ODHIR website: http://www.osce.org/odihr/44450, last accessed on 31 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{32} European Parliament resolution on remembrance of the Holocaust, anti-Semitism and racism, P6_TA(2005)0018, here point A.
antisemitism and racism through promoting awareness, especially among young people, of
the history and lessons of the Holocaust.”

In Israel, where the Holocaust has a special role in the national identity, 27 January, the international day for commemorating the Holocaust, was designated as “National Day for Countering Antisemitism” by then-Jerusalem and Diaspora Affairs Minister Natan Sharansky in 2004. This move was intended to encourage programmes in public and private institutions that focus on antisemitism worldwide and ways to counter it.

This has been taken up by Jewish organisations outside of Israel. The World Zionist Organisation, for instance, has held events such as the “Hate Stops Here” campaign on 27 January 2013, even adopting the identical terminology of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs by calling it the “International Day for Commemorating the Holocaust & Israel’s National Day for Countering Antisemitism.”

Yad Vashem, perhaps the most world’s most preeminent organisation in the field of Holocaust memorialisation since its inception in 1953, is also very active in the area of countering antisemitism. It provides educational resources on antisemitism and the Holocaust, addresses contemporary forms of antisemitism in its annual teacher-training seminars and organises scholarly conferences on manifestations of antisemitism.

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33 Ibid. point 5.
There are other examples such as the German post-war engagement with its history as an essential undertaking to develop “Geschichtsbewusstsein” or historical consciousness, a concept that developed in the context of the national process of dealing with the Holocaust. These will, however, not be explored in further detailed at this point because it should already have been sufficiently expounded that Holocaust remembrance, education and antisemitism are closely linked both historically as well as practically in various nations.

The rhetorical connection between the Holocaust and battling antisemitism in the UK

In British public and political discourse, the Holocaust is also linked to the need to address antisemitism, at least at the rhetorical level.

During parliamentary debates leading up to Holocaust Memorial Day that take place annually since 2008, antisemitism, past and present, is regularly a major topic. Equally, government publications also assume a link between countering antisemitism and engaging with the Holocaust.

The first government command paper in response to the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry report on Antisemitism provides a clear example that Holocaust remembrance and education are seemingly seen to form an integral part of dealing with antisemitism as a social issue. Before addressing the 35 recommendations from the APPIA report in its main section, the response paper commences with a summary of what are deemed the key components of the government’s response to antisemitism to date. Supporting Holocaust education and remembrance through funding the work of the Holocaust Educational Trust (HET) and the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust (HMDT) are mentioned prominently among these measures,

40 See for instance Hansard, 24 Jan 2013, Holocaust Memorial Day, Columns 531, 543, 548, 556.
because, as it states, “we recognise that in tackling antisemitism we need to learn from the past. To this end the Government is committed to honouring the victims of the Holocaust and reflecting on the lessons for today’s generation.”

It also worth noting that the appointment of Sir Andrew Burns as the UK’s Envoy for post-Holocaust issues has frequently been highlighted in the context of debates on antisemitism. Appointed in June 2010, the envoy’s main areas of responsibility are the development of the government’s policies on Holocaust-related issues, including resolving outstanding issues on Holocaust era assets, and representing the UK at the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research (ITF) and the International Tracing Service. While no further direct link to fighting antisemitism is explicitly mentioned in the official terms of reference for the role other than “raising awareness of the UK’s commitment to post-Holocaust issues,” politicians have drawn attention to the creation of this post in the context of addressing antisemitism in parliamentary debates, and it is also mentioned in the 2010 government responses to the APPIA.

The 1999 Government consultation paper for Holocaust Memorial Day listed as one of the suggested objectives of the proposed day the “continuing commitment to oppose racism, antisemitism, victimisation and genocide” – although it is notable that while antisemitism is mentioned here, it is but one of a number of other societal ills addressed.

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43 Andrew Stunell in the context of listing practical government actions against antisemitism, in response to a question on security provision at Jewish schools in the UK, Hansard, 20 Jan 2011, Column 366WH.
45 These were the commemoration of communities who suffered as a result of the Holocaust, ensuring that the historical events associated with the Holocaust continue to be regarded as being of fundamental importance and
On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Holocaust Educational Trust (HET), Prime Minister David Cameron raised the “national duty to fight antisemitism” in the context of efforts to keep the memories of the Holocaust alive, and to educate school children about the Holocaust as relevant historical event.46

Thus, the attempted annihilation of the Jewish people by the Nazis and their collaborators often provides the pretext for condemning anti-Jewish prejudice today. This begs the question of whether or not such utterances are simply a “reflex rhetoric” stemming from a vague, unspecified awareness that antisemitism and the Holocaust are in some way associated, or whether in Britain the memory and lessons of the Holocaust are really employed to fight antisemitism.

5.2. Commemorating the Holocaust in Britain

The long road to Holocaust remembrance in Britain

In a widely discussed contribution to the field of memory studies, Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider contend that post-Cold War Holocaust remembrance largely transcends national boundaries, and that it has become a prime example of today’s “cosmopolitan memory.”47 Indeed, there are broad developments and key events that gave impetus to the gradual rise in Holocaust awareness and commemoration all over the world, including in Britain.

While the post-war period was marked by a lack of interest in and understanding of the Holocaust, the 1960s are generally seen as a first major turning point in the development of Holocaust consciousness. Reports, biographies and studies published in response to the trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961 in Jerusalem, most famous of all Hannah Arendt’s *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, led to rising interest and dissemination of knowledge on previously neglected aspects of the Nazi rule far beyond Israel. Towards the end of the decade, the Six-Day-War of June 1967 brought fresh attention to a perceived Jewish vulnerability, and fears of a second Holocaust emerged.

Public interest in the Holocaust was greatly stimulated by popular cultural productions such as the NBC television series *Holocaust*, broadcast in the U.S. and Europe in 1978-79 and Claude Lanzmann’s film *Shoah*. The Pope’s visit to Auschwitz 1979 and the adoption of Auschwitz as world heritage by UNESCO were also landmark events in consolidating public awareness of the Holocaust.

Against the background of these initial developments, the decade of the 1990s, in the immediate wake of the end of the Cold War, is seen as the crucial period in the history of the spread of Holocaust consciousness, with mushrooming research, Holocaust themes in literature, art, and movies, the Holocaust-era assets debates and the opening of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in 1993.

But while all of these developments resulted in an increase in Holocaust awareness internationally, this process did not happen everywhere at the same pace, and the resulting

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48 On the other hand it is also increasingly being noted that the extent of ignorance and silence on the Holocaust should not be exaggerated. David Cesarani, ed. *After Eichmann: Collective Memory and the Holocaust since 1961* (London: Routledge, 2005), introduction, 1-17, and especially David Cesarani and Eric J. Sundquist, eds., *After the Holocaust: Challenging the Myth of Silence* (London; New York: Routledge, 2012).
cultures of remembrance are by no means uniform. In the UK, compared to other countries, Holocaust awareness as well as efforts for memorialisation set in with a great delay. Prior to the 1990s, there were only sporadic memory and memorial activities including a Coventry Cathedral exhibition in 1961, a Holocaust exhibition organised by the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial Committee in London, and a couple of television documentaries in the 1970s and 1980s, such as *Genocide* (1975) and the famous *World at War* series.

Despite these memory activities, for many decades British society as a whole – including Jewish leadership organisations such as the Board of Deputies and the Chief Rabbinate\(^54\) – showed little interest in engaging with the Holocaust on a national level. Even the Anne Frank story, immensely popular in other countries, did not lead to a notable public interest when it was initially introduced through a play in 1956.\(^55\) Nor did Eichmann trial provoke the same amount of discussion and engagement as it did in the U.S.\(^56\) Attempts by refugee and survivor organisations, as well as Jewish and Christian individuals to push for some form of memorial were unsuccessful. Eventually, a long controversy over a national Holocaust memorial in Britain finally yielded results in the form of a small memorial garden at the Dell in London’s Hyde Park in 1983.\(^57\)

Thus, throughout the twentieth century, Holocaust memory in Britain was largely confined to private activities organised by synagogues or refugee and Holocaust survivor organisations, mainly through an annual Warsaw Ghetto uprising memorial service and, after 1983, additionally through a “Yom haShoah” ceremony at the Holocaust Memorial Garden in Hyde Park.\(^58\)

\(^56\) Ibid., chapter 7.
\(^57\) Ibid., 256-61.
\(^58\) Berman, "Holocaust Commemorations in London and Anglo-Jewish (Dis-)Unity," 58.
After this decades-long neglect, the Holocaust started assuming a greater role in British commemorative life in the 1990s and the early 2000s. The Holocaust was included as mandatory subject in the new National Curriculum for schools in 1991. In 1993, the government confronted issues of war crime prosecution through the passing of the War Crimes Act, and Britain’s first private Holocaust museum was established in Nottinghamshire. The Imperial War Museum opened its permanent Holocaust exhibition in 2000 and 2001 saw the commemoration of the first national Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD), which has since become the focal point of British Holocaust commemoration.

Different explanations have been offered why the Holocaust was so long neglected in Britain. One of them is that while for those countries that had been under Nazi occupation or had collaborated with Germany there was a moral and in some respects also a political impetus to deal with this period of their national histories and their relation to the Holocaust, this was not the case in Britain where the dominant national war narrative had traditionally been focused on her role as liberator and defeater of the Nazi regime.

59 Stephen D. Smith, Making Memory: Creating Britain's First Holocaust Centre (Newark: Quill, 1999).
61 The establishment of Holocaust Memorial Day provoked many critical response and discussions. For contributions to this debate from academics see: Donald Bloxham, "Britain's Holocaust Memorial Days: Reshaping the Past in the Service of the Present," Immigrants & Minorities 21, no. 1-2 (2002); David Cesarani, "Seizing the Day: Why Britain Will Benefit from Holocaust Memorial Day," Patterns of Prejudice 34, no. 4 (2000); Tony Kushner, "Too Little, Too Late? Reflections on Britain's Holocaust Memorial Day," Journal of Israeli History 23, no. 1 (2004); D. Stone, "Day of Remembrance or Day of Forgetting? Or, Why Britain Does Not Need a Holocaust Memorial Day," Patterns of Prejudice 34, no. 4 (2000); Mark Levene, "Britain’s Holocaust Memorial Day: A Case of Post-Cold War Wish-Fulfillment, or Brazen Hypocrisy?" Human Rights Review 7, no. 3 (2006).
63 The question whether this self-congratulatory narrative is appropriate cannot be discussed here, but scholars have highlighted several problematic aspects of Britain’s role in the Holocaust as bystander, for instance in dealing with Jewish refugees before and during the war, the failure to engage in direct action to stop the Holocaust and the marginalisation of survivors in post-war years. A widely acclaimed and very balanced study is Louise London, Whitehall and the Jews, 1933-1948: British Immigration Policy, Jewish Refugees and the
A more complex but extremely insightful explanation which presents a key to understanding the argument put forward in this part of the chapter has been presented by Tony Kushner in his study *The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination*. According to this analysis, it was the liberal ideology prevalent in the U.S. and Great Britain that led to an inability and unwillingness to acknowledge the particularity of Jewish suffering from the 1930s onwards.

British liberalism in particular, with its strong emphasis on freedom, individual responsibility and its antipathy to Nazi racial thinking, was so far removed from the fascist worldview that as an overall framework for interpretation it failed to “come to terms with the specifically antisemitic aspects of the Nazis’ extermination programme.” As a result, it has been argued, Britain’s response to the unfolding anti-Jewish atrocities committed by the Nazis was a muted one.

Although antisemitism did in fact play a role in public debates during the war and subsequently in respect to demands for Holocaust commemoration, antisemitism was a topic in these discussions only in the context of concerns that a focus on Jewish particularity might provoke an antisemitic backlash both in Britain and elsewhere.

According to Kushner, this reluctance to acknowledge the particularity of the Jewish dimension of the Holocaust persisted far beyond the war and the immediate post-war period at least into the 1970s, as reactions to suggestions for commemorative initiatives during these

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65 Ibid., 207.  
66 Ibid., 249 and Berman, "Holocaust Commemorations in London and Anglo-Jewish (Dis-)Unity," 63, in the context of the debate on Holocaust Memorial Day.
decades highlight. Subsequently, so he and others have argued, the emergence of anti-racism and multiculturalism eventually led to a more pluralistic conception of the history of the Second World War and British history and culture more generally. As a result, there was also more openness for recognising the suffering of particular groups, including the Jewish fate in the Holocaust.

However, as the following part will demonstrate, Kushner’s analysis – insightful as it is – does in fact not go far enough in some respects. The refusal to acknowledge particularity might no longer be as prominent a feature of British culture per se, but in relation to the Holocaust, today Britain still avoids too much focus on Jews or antisemitism. This claim finds support in the fact that although Holocaust commemoration has been widely embraced in Britain and has become an integral part of Britain’s memory culture, its main messages are universal ones relating to good versus evil, tolerance and human rights, as demonstrated in the following part of this chapter.

Among the likely reasons might be the failure to recognise that antisemitism is still – or once again – a problem in Britain today, and the unwillingness on the part of the political and cultural elite to fully acknowledge the concerns of those highlighting the resurgence of contemporary antisemitism. As chapter four argued, in the UK, political awareness of antisemitism as a problem has only slowly started to emerge in the context of the APPIA report, and the political responses to it in the late 2000s. If antisemitism is not yet seen as a significant social issue – or only beginning to be seen as such – then using the memory of the Holocaust to further more important, long-standing general social and political goals such as tolerance and anti-racism is sensible from a typically British pragmatist perspective.

Overall, the way in which the Holocaust is presented in the context of national commemoration and education in this country seems to reflect a lack of understanding of the

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significance of antisemitism in this historical event, but also a lack of awareness of the potential of Holocaust commemoration as a vital and necessary tool for countering contemporary antisemitism in Britain today, as discussed in more detail in the following part.

**Holocaust remembrance in Britain today: Inclusiveness, politicisation and universalisation**

The institutionalisation of Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD) on 27 January, marking the date of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp, goes back to governmental initiatives. In 1999 Prime Minister Tony Blair suggested a memorial day for the victims of the Nazi regime. This decision was taken in the context of international developments in the field of Holocaust remembrance that were taking place at the time. Of particular significance were the establishment of the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research in 1998 and the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust in 2000, an international conference attended by heads of state and other high-profile politicians from 46 different governments.\(^{69}\) In January 2000, only a few days after the opening of the David Irving Trial in London,\(^{70}\) and a few days before the start of the Stockholm Holocaust forum, the decision to introduce this day in Britain was announced, and the first event was held in 2001.

From 2001 to 2005, the Home Office of the UK Government and the Scottish Executive were responsible for the annual commemoration of Holocaust Memorial Day. In 2005, this responsibility was given to the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust (HMDT) which is

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in charge of organising the national event on or around 27 January and setting the Holocaust Memorial Day theme for each year. There is close cooperation between the HMDT and the UK Government at Westminster, the Welsh Assembly and the Scottish Government.

When HMDT was established, the aims for Holocaust Memorial Day were officially set out in a statement of purpose. The statement lists a great number of different aims, starting with the recognition “that the Holocaust was a tragically defining episode of the 20th Century, a crisis for European civilisation and a universal catastrophe for humanity” – a clear commitment to a universalistic reading of the Holocaust. This is further underscored by the fact that although the title of the commemoration gives the Holocaust a prominent position, it has officially a broader scope including the genocides in Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Darfur.

As Philip Spencer and Sarah di Palma have also pointed out, the level of generality has in fact increased over the years, with earlier themes that were more directly related to the Holocaust such as “Britain and the Holocaust” (2002) or “Children and the Holocaust” (2003) replaced by universalistic themes such as “Dignity of Difference” (2007) “Imagine… remember, reflect, react” (2008), “The legacy of hope” (2010) and “Speak up, Speak out” (2012).

Other aims in the statement of purpose include providing “a national mark of respect for all victims of Nazi persecution and demonstrate understanding with all those who still suffer its consequences”, and general points such as to “provide a national focus for educating subsequent generations about the Holocaust and the continued relevance of the lessons that are learnt from it.” While racism, prejudice and “other forms of bigotry” are

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73 http://hmd.org.uk/resources/previous-years-themes.
part of the list, only in point twelve (of thirteen) does antisemitism receive explicit mention, when the statement of purpose asserts “a continuing commitment to oppose racism, anti-semitism, victimisation and genocide.” 75

Overall, Holocaust Memorial Day is officially framed in a wide, inclusive way that provides an occasion for commemoration of, learning about and social action against all kinds of evil. Antisemitism is only one of many social ills addressed by this event. Holocaust Memorial Day might fulfil many purposes, including, as some claim, the construction of a positive British national identity, 76 but it seems that fighting antisemitism as a specific problem is not an official priority.

Discourses on HMD by government, parliament and also key civil society organisations reveal a consensus that the HMD is officially intended to be a wholly apolitical event. An explanatory remark by Gavin Barwell, MP, at the beginning of the House of Commons debate on Holocaust Memorial Day 2012 demonstrates this point very clearly. The Croydon Central MP had secured the debate as a backbencher but by the time of the debate had been appointed Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Minister of State in the Department for Communities and Local Government. Because Andrew Stunell, a minister from the same department, had been chosen to respond to the Commons debate, there was a procedural issue with Barwell initiating the debate in the House. However, in this case the technicality was overlooked, because – and this is the important point – both the Backbench Business Committee as well as the Secretary of State agreed that “the subject is wholly apolitical.” 77

While “apolitical” in this particular context might primarily refer to an absence of particular divergences between government and opposition or political party interests, in a

75 Ibid.
77 Hansard, 19 Jan 2012, Column 335WH.
wider sense it is clear that the consensus on the apolitical nature of HMD goes beyond that. The parliamentary debates in preparation of HMD that have taken place annually since 2008 are usually held in a tone of unisonous condemnation of the evils of the Holocaust, with frequent references to the non-Jewish victims of the Holocaust and other genocides that have occurred since then. Such a discourse is in accordance with an idealistic perspective of HMD being an inclusive day of remembrance for all victims of the Holocaust and other genocides, sufficiently abstract in its references of human suffering to avoid mentions of controversial political issues, especially partisanship on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

While HMD goes back to a governmental initiative, and the HMDT was set up by government and is heavily funded by it, examples from civil society organisations show that the strong tendency towards a universalised framing of the Holocaust is not confined to state engagement with the issue.

Beth Shalom in Nottinghamshire opened on 17 September 1995 as Britain’s first dedicated Holocaust memorial and education centre. Stephen Smith’s autobiographical account of how he and his family came to transform their former Christian retreat centre into the Holocaust Centre, as it is called today, reveals that besides the general desire to “do something” about the ignorance of the British public on the Holocaust, another initial motivating factor for Stephen had been learning about the anti-Jewish tradition in church history.78

However, the current work of Beth Shalom is not specifically focused on antisemitism, but has much broader aims. The centre describes its mission as promoting understanding of discrimination and prejudice, and “…the development of ethical values,

78 Stephen D. Smith, Making Memory: Creating Britain’s First Holocaust Centre (Newark: Quill, 1999).
leading to a greater understanding within society.”

To this end, the centre says it “…uses the history of genocide as a model of how society can break down, and emphasises how current and future generations must carefully examine and learn from these tragedies.” The centre aims to promote “…respect for human rights, equal opportunities and good citizenship, which has greater resonance than ever in our culturally diverse society.”

Although this self-description contains many laudable objectives, and the different educational and commemorative activities that the centre provides might be immensely valuable, it appears that the organisational aims lack any specific focus on antisemitism, and the focus on the Holocaust is replaced by a broader concern with genocide.

The politicisation of HMD by anti-Zionist activists

It is not the case that British civil society in its entirety supports this official, inclusive and apolitical reading of the Holocaust which has few explicit links to the Jewish element of the tragedy, but which also rejects the use of Holocaust memory for partisan or anti-Israel purposes.

While the HMDT provides the nation-wide theme for HMD each year, and seeks to help with, and to a certain extent also influence, local commemorations that take place across the country, its official policy is not to “ordain what is a right or wrong HMD activity”, thus leaving local organisers the freedom to conduct the day as they wish. There are numerous examples of pro-Palestinian and other organisations using this freedom to stage events on HMD that contain political aspects, some of which could arguably be construed as antisemitic.

79 http://holocaustcentre.net, “about the Holocaust Centre”.
80 http://holocaustcentre.net/
81 Holocaust Memorial Day Trust, “Strategic Plan 2011-2013,” 5. It is noteworthy that the same paragraph quoted here recognised the potential for abusing the day for political purposes by stating: “We do not, however, support any activities which could be construed as offensive,” although no concrete examples are named.
In 2006, for example, the Scottish Palestinian Solidarity Committee staged a production of the controversial Perdition play,\(^8^2\) and in 2009 they invited a Hamas supporter to speak at an HMD event.\(^8^3\) Of course, the association between the suffering of the Palestinians and the genocide of European Jewry under the Nazis is not limited to the UK. Nor does it only occur in the context of Holocaust Memorial Day as examples from other countries such as Sweden demonstrate.\(^8^4\)

British Muslim organisations have also been at the forefront of politicising HMD, thereby inserting a political “counter-discourse” into the public sphere, which is exacerbated by the fact that British Muslim communal organisations, including the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), boycotted HMD between 2001 and 2007. After a brief reversal of the boycott decision in 2008, in the following year it again refused to participate due to the Gaza war, because it argued that it was not appropriate to commemorate Holocaust Memorial Day while Muslims were dying in the Palestinian territories through Israeli military actions.\(^8^5\) As Spencer and di Palma point out, in 2010 the MCB, Islamic Human Rights Coalition and other organisations even sought to establish Genocide Memorial Day as an alternative.\(^8^6\)

This political dimension is presently not actively countered to any significant extent by pro-Israel organisations, some of which also subscribe to the official consensus of HMD as inclusive event.\(^8^7\)

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\(^8^3\) Spencer and Valentina Di Palma, "Antisemitism and the Politics of Holocaust Memorial Day in the UK and Italy," 76.

\(^8^4\) Karlsson, "Public uses of history in contemporary Europe," 41.

\(^8^5\) Spencer and Valentina Di Palma, "Antisemitism and the Politics of Holocaust Memorial Day in the UK and Italy," 75.

\(^8^6\) Ibid.

\(^8^7\) In the interview with the author, Stephen Hoffman from the Zionist Federation confirmed that the ZF does not organise special events for Holocaust Memorial Day but supports the activities organised by the wider community, and concurred with the idea of HMD as apolitical event.
It is, however, frequently condemned by many social and political actors. The HET submission to the APPIA, for example, made a disapproving reference to an advert by the MCB and Palestinian and Islamic organisations in the *Guardian* on the first Holocaust Memorial Day under the title, “Remembering Nuremberg”, showing a photograph of a Palestinian child standing on the remains of his house. The HET text continues to point out that "Holocaust Memorial Day is not a political day and certainly not a pro-Israeli day, yet to couch a protest in pro-Palestinian terms serves to politicise the event; to portray it as pro-Israeli and to undermine its objective as a nationwide reminder of an historical event that still has resonance today." By picking up on the recommendation of the HET in its submission, calling for “instant and robust responses to attempts to politicise and demote Holocaust Memorial Day”, the APPIA report itself confirms the same standard viewpoint.

This forthright condemnation across the board underscores that while the politicisation of the Holocaust by pro-Palestinian activists is regrettable, it is the apolitical approach that represents the official, most pervasive and widely accepted perspective on the Holocaust and its commemoration in Britain.

**Universalistic Holocaust remembrance and the fight against antisemitism**

There are a number of possible explanations for the pervasiveness of the universalistic – and essentially de-Judaized – understanding of the Holocaust across the political world and civil society.

First of all, one can question how deeply and thoroughly the pluralistic, multicultural ideals mentioned previously in the context of the discussion of Tony Kushner’s argument, have actually permeated contemporary British society, and whether these developments really outweigh the still enduring influence of the British liberal tradition and its distaste for

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88 HET submission to the APPIA, 7.
particularism. In some quarters of British social and intellectual life, historically, it has especially been Jewish particularism that has been taken issue with, and as preceding chapters have mentioned, such attitudes have been held by liberals, leftists and those of other ideological persuasions alike.

But on the other hand, it would go too far to maintain that those politicians and state agencies responsible for shaping the official approach to Holocaust commemoration in Britain are avoiding a special focus on Jewish history and suffering out of antisemitic motivation. More likely it is a disregard for, and lack of interest in, the great importance of the Holocaust as part of Jewish history and the history of antisemitism, and by extension a failure to see Holocaust remembrance as a potentially vital tool in combating contemporary anti-Jewish prejudice.

The universalistic approach has a number of implications for the fight against antisemitism. In the broad set of issues for which Holocaust remembrance seeks to raise awareness, ranging from human rights, to citizenship, to anti-racism or ethical behaviour in a very general sense, antisemitism is only one among multiple aspects. On the one hand, any possible effect Holocaust remembrance might have in terms of promoting tolerance, respect for minorities, or positive citizenship values could certainly also benefit the Jewish community.

However, in such a wide scope of themes and social issues, the history of antisemitism and the specificities of its contemporary manifestations are not at the centre of public attention. Chapter four has elaborated upon the general limitations of universalistic approaches to antisemitism and the same apply in this context. Such approaches limit the potential of Holocaust remembrance for creating awareness of anti-Jewish prejudice as a specific form of racism. Considering the fact that Holocaust remembrance represents an instance of the “political-pedagogical use” of history, the wider public is the main audience at
whom the messages disseminated in this context is directed. In Britain, on Holocaust Memorial Day the public mainly encounters general themes about human rights and the potential for evil and the good in humanity.

But at the same time, the public is confronted with the anti-Israeli message from those politicising HMD. The implications and likely long-term consequences of the politicised messages have already been discussed in chapter three: Even in the absence of antisemitic intent – in so far as it is really absent – messages about Israeli human rights abuses on Holocaust Memorial Day can still be antisemitic in themselves, for example if they use traditional antisemitic tropes and images. In the context of Holocaust remembrance, the use of such tropes is particularly offensive. In addition, they foster a public image of Israel as morally reprehensible, evil pariah state, and they perpetuate the presence of antisemitic themes in British cultural life. While it will always be debatable to what extent Israeli politics are morally reprehensible in the context of a protracted and highly complex regional conflict, such messages can contribute to the growth of antisemitic stereotypes at the very least among those segments of society who are not very familiar with Judaism or Israeli history and politics, and who are not sufficiently aware of the need to distinguish between the actions of particular Israeli governments, Israelis, and Jewish communities around the world. It is particularly regrettable if such dynamics occur in the context of Holocaust Memorial Day.

A stronger focus on the role of antisemitism in the historical events leading to the Holocaust would certainly create more public awareness of the tragic consequences of anti-Jewish attitudes, and also of the many different ways in which anti-Jewish prejudice has manifested in the past, and can manifest today. Such a historical awareness in itself might have an “immunising” effect on many individuals. It might also create a wider awareness of the inappropriateness of the publishing of cartoons comparing Israel to the Nazi regime, associating the situation in Gaza with the death camps of the Holocaust, or utilising images
reminiscent of the old blood libel on HMD – as already mentioned, often a result of sheer historical ignorance, and only one of many examples of the conscious or inadvertent perpetuation of antisemitism in the British public sphere.

The current universalistic approach of Holocaust remembrance in Britain is not suitable for effectively countering the demonization of Israel which frequently goes hand in hand with antisemitic themes, and thus – while it would of course be wrong to dismiss the overall cultural value and importance of Holocaust remembrance in Britain – it represents a missed opportunity in the battle against contemporary antisemitism.

5.3. **Holocaust education in Britain**

*Mandating Holocaust education England: aims and objectives*

Holocaust education in contemporary Britain takes place in a number of different institutional settings. Besides classical educational institutions such as primary and secondary schools and further education, a number of specialised organisations also make significant contributions, especially the Holocaust Educational Trust (HET), the Holocaust Centre, and the Holocaust Exhibition in the Imperial War Museum. The Centre for Holocaust Education at the Institute of Education (IOE), University of London, offers a research-led programme for professional teacher training in Holocaust education.

However, there has not always been as much activity in the field of Holocaust education as there is today. Engagement with the Holocaust in the classroom only gathered momentum in the 1980s and became widespread with the introduction of the National Curriculum in 1991, which included the Holocaust as a mandatory topic of study in England.

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While it is difficult to assess all the objectives behind placing the Holocaust on the National Curriculum, it is clear that a specific concern over antisemitism in Britain was not the motivating factor for either the government or those individuals responsible for drawing up the history curriculum. After in 1986 the government had announced plans to introduce a national curriculum, the Education Reform Act 1988 established working groups to set attainment targets and programmes of study for all subjects. It was therefore the History Working Group (HWG) that had the most profound influence on the content of the history curriculum, including the suggestion to include the Holocaust as a mandatory topic for Key Stage 3.

However, according to Lucy Russell’s relatively detailed examination of the behind-the-scenes workings of the HWG, the decision to include it was only taken under pressure following a considerable public outcry over the omission of the Second World War and the Holocaust in the group’s interim report. A member of the HWG interviewed by Russell mentioned that HWG meetings did not provide sufficient opportunity “…to discuss and theorize the teaching of the Holocaust in school history, or the purpose of school history more generally,”90 something that Russell claims also applies to subsequent groups tasked with reviewing the history curriculum in the following years, none of which have “…defined or given specific meaning to the Holocaust as a topic in school history.”91 On the other hand, there are also indications that ultimately “…the period of the Second World War and the Holocaust were included not on historical grounds, but for broader educational goals,”92 especially because of the topic’s relevance for anti-racist and citizenship education.

In short, whatever the reasons were, combating antisemitism was not a main objective for mandating teaching of the Holocaust in English schools; if anything, it would have been

90 Lucy Russell, Teaching the Holocaust in School History: Teachers or Preachers? (London: Continuum, 2006), 107.
91 Ibid., 192.
92 Ibid., 96.
an undefined element in a much broader interest in anti-racist education. Even so, while fighting antisemitism might not have been high on the agenda of politicians and influential individuals in charge of the National Curriculum, it might nevertheless be possible that Holocaust education is employed to address antisemitism in school practice. Therefore, it is also important to look at the perspectives and approaches of teachers on the one hand, and what pupils gain from Holocaust education on the other hand.

**Does Holocaust education counter antisemitism in practice?**

In the field of Holocaust education, there is a long-standing debate about whether the Holocaust should primarily be taught with the clear pedagogical objective to increase pupils’ historical knowledge, or with a more ambitious aim in mind, to teach a moral lesson in tolerance and humanity.93

In principle, it is a sensible assumption to believe that Holocaust education can – to some extent – immunise society against anti-Jewish prejudice. It is certainly possible that by creating awareness of the historical consequences of antisemitism, the potential consequences of antisemitism today will also become clear. According to the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research, “study of the Holocaust assists students in developing an understanding of the ramifications of prejudice, racism, antisemitism, and stereotyping in any society.”94

Although limited in scope, Russell’s study on English secondary school history teachers revealed a degree of insecurity regarding the right approach to teach the Holocaust,

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but there was a clear preference among teachers “…to teach the Holocaust from a social and moral perspective, and not as history.”

The most comprehensive study to date on the practice of Holocaust education in secondary schools in England, conducted by the Institute of Education (IoE) at the University of London, provides some insights into teacher’s understanding of the Holocaust and their pedagogical aims. Both the survey as well as the personal interviews in the institute’s study showed that teachers’ understanding of the Holocaust is in most cases influenced by general definitions of the Holocaust that contain no reference to the specificities of the Nazis’ targeting of Europe’s Jews. Only a quarter of respondents from the survey chose the definition provided in the questionnaire that contains a reference to the fact that Jews, unlike other victim groups, were targeted for complete annihilation, and very few teachers in the interviews raised this point. However, those teachers who appeared most knowledgeable about the history of the Holocaust were also the most likely to use the term to mean the specific targeting of European Jews. Interestingly, some teachers said that they purposefully emphasised the non-Jewish victims of Nazi persecution in order to make their teaching more relevant and accessible to students in their school.

As for the effects of Holocaust education on the learners, available empirical studies on school pupils suggest that Holocaust education can contribute to developing pupil awareness of human rights issues, genocides, stereotyping and discrimination, and have a positive impact on the general outlook of young people.

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95 Russell, Teaching the Holocaust in School History: Teachers or Preachers?, 44.
97 Ibid., 85.
98 Ibid.
Paula Cowan and Henry Maitles have conducted extensive research on Holocaust education in Scotland, and have found evidence that those pupils who had the opportunity to study the Holocaust “…had stronger positive values, were more tolerant and were more disposed to active citizenship by their understanding of individual responsibility towards racism.”

However, in a related study, the same team of researchers have also found that even the educational project “Lessons from Auschwitz”, a teaching unit provided by the Holocaust Educational Trust, does not increase pupils’ specific knowledge on antisemitism. By increasing young people’s knowledge on human rights and genocide, it could be argued that if anything, such projects have an indirect effect on countering antisemitism.

Besides the actual practice of Holocaust education, teachers’ aims and understandings of the subject, and pupil’s responses and learning experience, there are also a number of potential unintended consequences of dealing with the Holocaust in educational contexts that need to be considered when attempting an assessment regarding the effectiveness of Holocaust education in combating antisemitic attitudes.

The most problematic of these consequences is the possibility of reinforcing negative stereotypes in children and young people when they learn about racist perceptions of Jews, or of inadvertently encouraging the erroneous assumption that Jews are somehow deserving targets for persecution, leading students to assume that there is “no smoke without fire”, especially when they learn how cultured a nation Nazi Germany had been. A general point related to this is that studying the Holocaust without learning about other aspects of Jewish

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history, culture or religion can create a very negative view of the entire Jewish role in history and Jews.

Moreover, the Holocaust as an extreme historical event can serve to desensitise children instead of teaching them about challenges and opportunities in inter-group relations in less extreme social and political circumstances. The use of atrocity images can also be an issue, potentially leading to stress, embarrassment or nervous laughter and “inappropriate remarks in the classroom”, and can even have “a dehumanising effect and reinforce a view of ‘Jews as victims.’”

Not all cases and studies examined in this part of the chapter are related to the “state” in the strictest sense of the term. However, the absence of the specific goal to fight antisemitism in the process of establishing Holocaust education in England by the government, and the subordinate role that countering antisemitism plays in in state schools in practice can nevertheless be taken as another example for universalistic tendencies in areas that are closely related to the state and its sphere of influence.

**The Anne Frank Trust UK: A civil society organisation committed to universal lessons of the Holocaust**

In light of the above, the final section of this chapter will examine a civil society organisation to demonstrate that universalised frameworks are not confined to the realm of the state.

The Anne Frank Trust UK, founded in 1990, operates under a licence from the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam, but is separate from other Anne Frank organisations in terms of governance and organisation. The Trust’s work focuses on educational institutions and the criminal justice sector especially in deprived local communities and those with social tensions, in order to “advance public education in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in the

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103 Salmons, “Teaching or Preaching? The Holocaust and Intercultural Education in the UK,” 147.
principles of religious and racial tolerance and of democracy.”\textsuperscript{105} It uses Anne Frank’s life and diary “…to challenge prejudice and reduce hatred, encouraging people to embrace positive attitudes, responsibility and respect for others.”\textsuperscript{106}

The very broad and general wording of these statements, which does not mention antisemitism, is a good indication of the universalistic tendency of the Trust’s work that is further underlined by the type of activities that the Trust engages in. Most of its projects are designed to derive lessons from the Holocaust with very general aims such inspiring children “to confront contemporary issues” or “understanding the consequences of prejudice.”\textsuperscript{107}

The touring exhibition “Take a Stand” launched in 2011, for instance, looked at “inspirational people both past and present who have spoken out against social injustice.”\textsuperscript{108} It includes images of Mandela, Ghandi and Anne Frank and the aim of this anti-prejudice campaign is to “make people think about how they can combat prejudice in their everyday lives.”\textsuperscript{109}

“Anne Frank and You,” another major exhibition about Anne Frank’s life, created in conjunction with Anne Frank Museum Amsterdam and supported by an education pack on the theme “Stand Up, Speak Out, Make a Difference” explores human rights, prejudice and stereotypes.\textsuperscript{110} It is therefore fitting that Gillian Walnes, co-founder and executive director of Anne Frank Trust UK, described Anne Frank’s message as one of “compassion, respect, tolerance and understanding.”\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{105} Annual Report 2011, 6.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{107} A regional project officer at the Anne Frank Trust in the context of an Anne Frank Exhibition in Southport, see Georgina Stubbs, “Anne Frank exhibition opens at revamped Atkinson centre,” \textit{Daily Post, Liverpool}, June 13, 2013.
\textsuperscript{108} Annual report 2011, 8
\textsuperscript{109} Natalie O’Neill, “Exhibition takes Stand against Prejudice,” \textit{Hendon & Finchley Times}, Jan 18, 2012, by, on the exhibition in Brent Cross Shopping Centre
As valuable as these activities might be in themselves, as far as addressing antisemitism as a particular problem is concerned, neither the organisation’s mission statement, nor its activities, nor its website draw explicit attention to anti-Jewish prejudice.

A final example that illustrates the universalistic approach of the Anne Frank Trust UK in dealing with themes like tolerance and democracy is a high-profile project that began in 2013. It comprised of a letter-writing competition for 13-year olds that encouraged youngsters “to speak out about what was important to them.”112 Among the winning letters were calls for assisted suicide, the body shape of women in advertisement, examinations in the British school system and even poor food in school cafeterias.

While these are certainly legitimate concerns for children and young teenagers, the choice of winning letters and the very competition itself demonstrates how universalised the work of the Trust is and how far removed it is from the specific goal of countering antisemitism. Antisemitism is rarely highlighted in any of its projects, and there is very little reference to the fact that Anne Frank was Jewish, and was a victim of an ideology that centred on what was perceived by the Nazis as the “Jewish problem.”

This contrasts markedly with the work of the Anne Frank House elsewhere. The Anne Frank House Amsterdam, which is the main Anne Frank institution and has the responsibility for the original location of Anne Frank’s hiding place during the Second World War, sees the message of Anne Frank’s story as encouraging people to “…reflect on the dangers of anti-Semitism, racism and discrimination and the importance of freedom, equal rights and democracy.”113 In an outline of the organisation’s strategic aims for the period of 2012 to 2015, antisemitism is mentioned as the first of four categories, the other three being equal rights, identity/prejudice/perception and citizenship and it is even claimed that “the life story of Anne Frank cannot be understood without a knowledge of the history of anti-Semitism.”

Combating antisemitism is an explicit objective, which the organisation aims to achieve through information and education on antisemitism. In sum, it is evident that addressing antisemitism is a core concern for this organisation. Likewise, the Anne Frank Zentrum in Germany, established in 1994, has a strong focus on antisemitism in many of its activities, such as educational projects on the Holocaust and antisemitism for young people and educators.

Thus, compared to Anne Frank Organisations in other countries, the Anne Frank Trust UK adopts a more universalised, “anti-prejudice” discourse, and it would even be justified to conclude that this way of framing the topic amounts to a de-Judaization of the Holocaust.

5.4. Conclusion

To conclude, it has been shown that Holocaust remembrance and education in Britain, which both developed comparatively late in the twentieth century, deals with the Holocaust through universalised frameworks that relate to broad social issues such as human rights, tolerance and democracy. Fighting antisemitism as a specific problem is not high on the agenda in these contexts, and this applies to both government-led as well as civil society initiatives.

It is difficult to assess empirically what implications this universalistic framing of the Holocaust has for the fight against antisemitism, and it would be hard to claim that it renders it completely ineffective. However, bearing in mind the specific features of the new antisemitism, it can be argued that in its current, universalistic, inclusive and de-politicised form, Holocaust remembrance and education in the UK are neither intended, nor well-suited, for addressing contemporary antisemitism in all its dimensions. Moreover, in the case of

114 Ibid.
115 One example is the project “Antisemitismus im Klassenzimmer?!“ (engl. “antisemitism in the classroom?!“) which ran from 2007 to 2010 and was supported by a federal programme for diversity run by the German Ministry of Family, Pensioners, Women and Youth. See Siegele, Patrick and Judith Steinrückler, “Antisemitismus im Klassenzimmer?!“ Erfahrungen aus der bundesweiten Fortbildung für Pädagogen und Pädagoginnen, in Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung, Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung TU Berlin, 2011.
Holocaust Memorial Day, the politicisation of the commemorative event by some groups adds a further problematic aspect in the context of addressing the new antisemitism.

Overall, it can be concluded that Holocaust remembrance and education further the goal of dealing with antisemitism only indirectly by fostering general awareness of prejudice and attempts to build a more inclusive, tolerant society.
Chapter 6: Confronting the contentious: Particularistic approaches and the role of NGOs in fighting the new antisemitism

The preceding analyses of governmental approaches to antisemitism, and of Holocaust remembrance and education, have demonstrated that where antisemitism has been addressed in those contexts at all, it has to a great extent been confronted only indirectly as one of many issues under wider rubrics such as anti-racism or equality policies.

As chapter four discussed, since the beginning of the 2000s, there have been significantly more governmental initiatives tackling antisemitism as a distinct social issue. However, although the existence of the new antisemitism – where traditional modes of antisemitism are intertwined with anti-Zionism and anti-Israelism – is now widely acknowledged, it is not countered at the practical level by any of the political or civil society actors addressed in this thesis up to this point.

It is in this context that this final chapter of the dissertation examines particularistic approaches to dealing with antisemitism. This is understood to include efforts to address antisemitism as a particular problem, as well as attempts to tackle specifically the new antisemitism, or even narrower approaches that concentrate on particular dimensions or sources of the new antisemitism, such as academia or religious communities.

The chapter will commence with some considerations that highlight the significance of particularistic strategies in the wider context of multi-level approaches to countering social problems – in this case, antisemitism. Drawing on some of the theoretical discussions and analyses in preceding chapters, it will be explained why some of the distinct characteristics of non-governmental organisations make them particularly suitable for addressing antisemitism directly. Moreover, it will also be discussed whether, in principle, NGOs have a contribution to make in the battle against the new antisemitism in particular.
The remainder of the chapter will analyse some non-governmental organisations operating in the UK, notably the Community Security Trust (CST), an established Jewish community organisation whose work has a clear focus on antisemitism as a particular problem, as well as a number of Israel advocacy groups.

It will be demonstrated that the CST makes a significant contribution to combating and preventing antisemitism, including the new antisemitism. However, it will also be shown that this very success is to some extent predicated on working within certain self-imposed limits in regard to addressing some of the controversial aspects of the new antisemitism.

In its final section, the chapter looks at organisations engaged in various forms of Israel advocacy and other single-issue groups that participate in the battle of perspectives, narratives and discourses related to Israel in the public sphere. It will be assessed whether their engagement with the contentious dimensions of the new antisemitism that are avoided by other, more established actors, translates into an effective role in addressing antisemitism.

The main aim in examining this latter category of groups is to draw conclusions about the wider Israel advocacy scene in Britain and its stance towards the fight against antisemitism. Therefore, rather than presenting in-depth case studies of a small number of individual organisations, the chapter critically surveys a considerable range of Israel advocacy groups in order to gain insights into the potential role of British Israel advocacy as a whole in the context of the debate on the new antisemitism.

### 6.1. Locating the work of NGOs within a multi-level framework of addressing antisemitism

As the introduction pointed out, to date the question how antisemitism can or should be effectively countered has not been fully addressed by scholars or practitioners. Although there are actors that engage in different activities aimed at combating antisemitism, no
comprehensive, carefully considered framework that takes into account relevant theory or research exists. While social psychological research has yielded important insights into how prejudice can be reduced at the individual and inter-personal levels,¹ there is no readily applicable answer to the question how to combat prejudice comprehensively and effectively across all its different dimensions, including the societal level. Even less attention has been given to identify potential avenues to effectively address the new antisemitism, or to analyse approaches and strategies adopted by those actors intent on doing so.

However, the introduction also pointed out that some social psychologists² have come to a conclusion that is in accordance with a key point put forward in the theoretical chapter of this thesis; in order to address a complex, multi-faceted social problem such as prejudice against a minority in a society, multi-level approaches that include the activities of multiple political and civil society actors are most likely to be effective in tackling this problem across its different dimensions.

Taking the concept of a multi-level approach to combating contemporary antisemitism a step further, one can envision it as being illustrated through a concentric circle model, with activities particularly aimed at targeting antisemitism at the core, and other social or political efforts that are related to the fight against antisemitism, but target it only indirectly, represented by outer rings.

Some of the political measures implemented in the aftermath of the report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism in 2006, such as the separate recording of antisemitic hate crimes, governmental funding for the provision of security at Jewish schools or the cross-departmental working group on antisemitism, would be located close to the centre of the concentric circle model.

² Duckitt, "Reducing Prejudice: An Historical and Multi-Level Approach".
The universalistic approaches analysed in chapters four and five, however, would best be represented by the outer rings of such a model of a multi-level framework to address contemporary antisemitism. Detailed criticisms of concrete policies aside, the efforts of successive British governments since the post-war era with respect to political projects such as fostering good race relations, multiculturalism, anti-discrimination, equality policies or community cohesion can be seen as providing the legal, political and social frameworks in which minorities, including British Jews, are at the very least protected against extreme excesses of prejudice.

Similarly, even if the fight against antisemitism is not at the centre of Holocaust remembrance and education in the UK, it has the potential to foster democratic, moral values, such as tolerance, openness to cultural difference and awareness of the dangers of racism and antisemitism, and therefore to contribute to a cultural context in which anti-Jewish prejudice is widely condemned.

However, the broad scope that makes the efforts taking place in these areas effective in the ways just outlined is at the same time a drawback when it comes to targeting antisemitism more directly, because the breadth of any “one-size-fits-all” strategy\(^3\) comes at the expense of its depth.

In contrast to this, the potential role of single-issue organisations and particularistic approaches with a specific focus is clearly evident. Chapter one has highlighted that the capacity for specialisation and the acquisition of expertise has earned NGOs an important place in inter- and transnational politics and has firmly placed civil society in a central position in various policy domains, for instance humanitarian assistance, international aid or welfare distribution.\(^4\)

\(^3\) On the drawbacks of generalist approaches from a management perspective, see Aaron J. Shenhar, "One Size Does Not Fit All Projects: Exploring Classical Contingency Domains," *Management Science* 47, no. 3 (2001).

At the same time, NGOs are comparatively free to act in areas where politicians, governments and states are bound by political or diplomatic considerations or bureaucratic frameworks. For all the criticism that has been levelled against civil society organisations, as discussed in the first chapter, it remains true that they are more flexible and often better suited to act and manoeuvre in areas where political considerations or a lack of political interest limits governmental action and discursive interventions.

What is the case for non-governmental actors in those fields such as international aid also applies to organisations that deal with prejudice, inequality or racism; there is much to be gained from a particularistic approach, because while a broad engagement has certain strategic advantages as previously outlined, NGOs that focus solely on antisemitism are able to acquire a much deeper level of expertise, know-how and develop specialised networks.

The value that this kind of specialism can bring to the fight against antisemitism will be illustrated through the case of the Community Security Trust (CST) and other NGOs in subsequent sections of this chapter.

This insight that focused approaches have an important role to play in battling antisemitism as a specific problem still fails to shed sufficient light on the question of whether or not there are any potential strategies or measures that effectively address the new antisemitism in particular. Nevertheless, a careful consideration of the nature and main characteristics of the new antisemitism leads to some tentative conclusions about what such measures and approaches might look like. As the third chapter has outlined, although observers and experts draw the dividing lines between anti-Zionism and antisemitism in different ways, there are links between anti-Zionism and antisemitism that are largely beyond contention. Firstly, even if adopting the narrowest possible definition of antisemitic anti-

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6 For instance in the provision of humanitarian assistance in volatile areas of the world where governmental international aid can only be provided with delay, or might even be hindered by political considerations.
Zionism, cases in which expressions of anti-Zionism or anti-Israelism stem from an underlying antisemitic motivation do exist. Secondly, anti-Zionism can utilise antisemitic tropes or images even in the absence of any antisemitic motivation, in which case the content is antisemitic even if the source of the message is not. Thirdly, there are grounds to argue that extreme forms of anti-Zionist activism and continuous demonization of the Jewish state in the public sphere can encourage, provoke, or foster antisemitic stereotypes and attitudes in various different ways.7

In terms of the first and second links, efforts to expose, confront or directly counteract manifestations of antisemitic anti-Zionism are among possible responses to the new antisemitism. Moreover, in cases where anti-Israelism is only a symptom of racially based anti-Jewish prejudice, classical means of prejudice reduction to improve inter-group relations, as discussed in the context of social psychological prejudice research, might be effective.

Regarding the third link, it is entirely reasonable to assume that if anti-Israelism is a factor – or an independent variable to use social scientific terminology – that causes the deterioration of the perception of Jews, the logical conclusion is that addressing anti-Israelism – modifying the independent variable – will have an effect on antisemitism, the dependent variable. In simple terms, leaving aside the fact that it would be difficult, although not impossible, to gather empirical evidence for this, a case can be made that efforts to diminish anti-Israelism should be counted among the measures to address antisemitism.

For this kind of targeted, narrow approach, it is not only their capacity for specialisation that makes NGOs especially suitable, but also their flexibility and political independence, characteristics alluded to above. This means that in addition to the advantages that NGOs have owing to their ability to specialise, the other major advantage they arguably have over state actors in the battle against antisemitism – especially the Israel-dimension of

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7 See chapter three for further discussion and examples.
the new antisemitism – is their independence and freedom in contentious, political matters and the flexibility to participate in public debates that this affords.

In this respect, civil society has an advantage over the UK government, which cannot address all cases of demonization of Israel as in many instances this would amount to taking sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict. While the government can speak out against obvious cases of antisemitic hate crime or manifestations of anti-Zionism that have implications in terms of anti-discrimination laws, and has in fact frequently expressed its opposition to the BDS movement, it is not its job to address, never mind debunk, claims that Israel is a racist or illegitimate state.

6.2. The Community Security Trust’s security oriented-approach to antisemitism in the context of associative governance

One of the few organisations in the UK, and in fact worldwide, that has an exclusive, particular focus on combating antisemitism is the Community Security Trust (CST), already mentioned in previous chapters. Its formation as a charity in November 1994 was a historical outgrowth of organised Anglo-Jewish self-defence, and it took over the work of its organisational predecessor, the Community Security Organisation of the Board of Deputies of British Jews (CSO) in January 1995.

Although the CST lays great emphasis on a wider perspective on hate crime and prejudice, for instance through exchanging knowledge and best practice with other minority

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8 See footnote 64 in this chapter regarding restrictions on political activities of charities in the UK.
9 For example, Foreign Secretary William Hague said “this Government is firmly opposed to those who seek to delegitimise Israel, and … we are firmly opposed to boycotts,” in: “Sixty years of British-Israeli diplomatic relations,” speech delivered by Foreign Secretary Rt Hon William Hague MP for the Foreign & Commonwealth Office on 30 March 2011 at Chatham House, London.
10 Langham, 250 Years of Convention and Contention: A History of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1760-2010, 244. The CSO itself had been formed in 1986 as a merger of the 62 Committee, the Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen (AJEX) and the political branch of the Board of Deputies’ Defence Department. Michael Whine, “The Community Security Trust – Best Practice in Combating Antisemitic Hate,” Journal of Hate Studies 9, no. 1 (2011).
communities, its work has a clear focus on antisemitism, reflected in its charitable objectives and its actual activities. These include the recording and monitoring of antisemitic incidenes nationally, the results of which are published in bi-annual reports and the provision of physical security for Jewish facilities and events by approximately 3,000 trained CST volunteers, and via security advice and training for Jewish institutions and the wider Jewish community. In addition, it is also active in public affairs and media-related work and its senior staff regularly contribute to the public debate on antisemitism and hate crime-related issues both in the UK and internationally.

Through this work, in particular the provision of physical security and counter-terrorism support, the CST makes a significant civil society contribution to combating antisemitism in the UK. There are numerous examples of its cooperation with the police and

1. A reference to aiding other communities was incorporated in its founding document. Whine, "The Community Security Trust – Best Practice in Combating Antisemitic Hate," citing Community Security Trust, Declaration of Charitable Trust, 21 Nov 1994, London. The CST also works closely with British Sikh and Hindu communities, and has provided advice and training for setting up communal organisations such as National Churchwatch (ibid. p 119) and the organisation Tell MAMA (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks) which has been monitoring anti-Muslim incidenes since February 2012.

2. The main objectives, clearly highlighting the CST’s emphasis on antisemitism, are “to promote good race relations between the Jewish community and other members of society by working towards the elimination of racism in the form of anti-semitism, to promote the efficiency of the police within the community at large and the promotion of good citizenship and greater public participation in the prevention of crime with particular reference to the maintenance of public order and racially motivated especially anti-semitic crime, to relieve the victims of racial or religious harassment and especially anti-semitic harassment who are in need or who have suffered hardship or distress.” Emphasis added, source: Charity Commission.

3. All reports are available on the CST website: http://www.thecst.org.uk/.

4. Articles by Mark Gardner (Director of Communications), Michael Whine (Government and International Affairs Director) and Dave Rich (Deputy Director of Communications) appear regularly in the print and online media as well as journals, see a list of articles by senior CST staff at http://www.thecst.org.uk. CST representatives also speak at conferences and symposia.

5. The gathering of security-related information and counter-terrorism are an important focus of the CST’s security provision. See the CST report "Terrorist Incidents against Jewish Communities and Israeli Citizens Abroad 1968–2010," (London: The Community Security Trust). There are even grounds to assume that some of it amounts to professional intelligence work. See for instance CST chairman Gerald Ronson’s remarks in his autobiography that “we actively work with everyone we need to, from the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police – in fact, with police forces across the UK – to the various anti-terrorism units, Interpol and even the FBI.” Gerald M. Ronson, Leading from the Front: My Story (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 2009), 249. Geoffrey Alderman who is a senior figure in the Anglo-Jewish community believes the CST “operates in a third and inevitably murky dimension, namely that of a watching brief with regard to extremist organisations, possibly including the infiltration of such bodies.” Geoffrey Alderman, "Our Unrepresentative Security," The Jewish Chronicle, 18 April 2011.
judicial system in the area of hate crime and domestic terrorism. In fact, it could be argued that the contribution is so extensive that it even fulfils, albeit on a small scale, a core duty of the state – ensuring the security of its citizens against internal and external threats.

However, the fact that it does so in very close cooperation with state institutions, first and foremost the police, makes it more accurate to conclude that the CST operates in a relationship with the state that Bell and Hindemoore, whose work on governance was introduced in the first chapter of this thesis, have termed “associative governance.” The foundation of this close cooperation was laid after the bombing incidents at the Israeli Embassy in London and the headquarters of Jewish communal organisations at the Balfour House in 1994. Since then CST cooperation with local police forces across the UK has grown greatly. In 2001 it received third-party reporting status from the police, and in 2012 an incident data exchange programme between the CST and the Metropolitan Police Service was launched.

The CST’s close cooperation with the police is only one aspect of its central, and widely respected role that extends to the political and governmental spheres. Politicians

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16 For instance, it played a role in the prosecution of Mohammed Sajid Kahn and his wife Shasta who in July 2012 were convicted by Manchester Crown Court of planning a terror attack on the Jewish community in Manchester, see Jonny Paul, “Manchester Couple jailed for planning attack on Jewish community,” Jerusalem Post, July 22, 2012. Other examples include co-organised counter-terrorism seminars for the Jewish community together with the National Association of Orthodox Jewish Schools and the Metropolitan Police in June 2012, see Emma Innes, “Police hold counter-terrorism seminar for Jewish community,” Hendon & Finchley Times, June 15, 2012.

17 But also note that the core assumption of classical state theory that the sovereign state is capable of providing security, law and order within its territorial boundaries has also been called “one of the foundational myths of modern societies.” David Garland, "The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society," British Journal of Criminology 36, no. 4 (1996): 448.

18 “Associative governance occurs when governments or state agencies form governing partnerships with societal organisations or NGOs.” Bell and Hindmoor, Rethinking Governance: The Centrality of the State in Modern Society, 162.

19 On 26 July 1994 a car bomb exploded outside the Israeli Embassy in London, followed a few hours later by a bomb explosion outside Balfour House in North Finchley which was housing a number of Jewish charities. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/26/newsid_2499000/2499619.stm.

20 http://www.thecst.org.uk.

21 But of course there have also been fierce debates within the Jewish community over the CST. Geoffrey Alderman, for instance, has questioned the legitimacy of its claim to represent the Anglo-Jewish community in matters related to security and antisemitism. See Geoffrey Alderman, “Continually Spreading Trust,” The Jewish Chronicle, 10 June 2011; “Our Unrepresentative Security”, and the response of CST chairman Gerald M. Ronson, “CST Represents all Jews,” ibid., 29 April.
from all party-backgrounds frequently herald the CST as best practice example of community action. Together with the Board of Deputies and the Jewish Leadership Council, it represents Jewish civil society in the cross-departmental government working group on antisemitism that was set up in the aftermath of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism.

The CST’s expert reputation has, in the eyes of some observers, even led to an occasional over-reliance on its advice, as in the case of the Home Secretary Theresa May’s decision in April 2012 to ban a senior Palestinian leader from the UK solely on the grounds of confidential advice submitted by the CST.

Governmental recognition of the CST’s expert status in relation to hate crimes and antisemitism goes beyond mere rhetorical acknowledgement, as evident in the receipt of grants from the Ministry of Justice Victim and Witness General Fund for advertising campaigns, a grant in 2011 from the Ministry of Justice for a smart-phone application for incident reporting and the awarding in 2012 of a £2 million government grant which the CST administered for tightening security measures at Jewish schools.

In short, the CST is a prime example of a civil society organisation with a particular focus on antisemitism as a specific social issue, whose expertise has earned it an influential status in the political and public spheres, enabling it to carry out effectively its mandate to counter and prevent antisemitism in a collaborative, or “associative”, mode with the state.

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22 See David Cameron, Speech to the Community Security Trust on 4 March 2008 (http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches), also 3 March 2011; Nanci Frazer, "George Osborne Tells of his Warmth for CST and Israel," The Jewish Chronicle, 1 March 2012.
24 "Theresa May's Hast to Ban Raed Salah will be Repented as Leisure," Guardian Unlimited, 9 April 2012.
26 Governmental financial support was one of the 35 recommendations of the APPIA report, enacted by former Education Secretary Ed Balls and implemented by the Education Secretary of the Coalition Government, Michael Gove. On initial misunderstanding regarding the CST’s precise role in connection to this grant see the ensuing debate between the guardian and the CST: Jonny Paul, "Jewish Charity Slams 'Guardian' for Story Attacking State Funding of Security at Jewish Schools," The Jerusalem Post, 30 January 2012.
**The CST and the new antisemitism**

Its status as the Anglo-Jewish security organisation makes the CST’s views on contemporary antisemitism especially significant. While the CST avoids using the term “new antisemitism”\(^{27}\) it has actually been one of the main voices to raise awareness of not only the quantitative rise in antisemitic incidents stemming from traditional sources, but also the changing nature of anti-Jewish prejudice since the latter decades of the twentieth century, when antisemitism increasingly came from different parts of society, including the left and British Muslims.\(^{28}\) In fact, according to David Rich, the CST had attempted to draw the attention of politicians and journalists to potential threats emanating from radical Islamism long before this issue rocketed to the top of the political agenda after the terror attack in the United States on 11 September 2001 and the London bombings in July 2005.\(^{29}\)

The diversification of sources is a constant theme in CST publications.\(^{30}\) A second aspect of the new antisemitism that the CST’s publications consistently point out is the statistical correlation between domestic levels of antisemitism and political events in the Middle East – predominantly, but not exclusively, events linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict.\(^{31}\) In presenting their qualitative analysis of these statistical correlations, the CST annual incident reports and other publications tend to avoid the explicit terminology of causality, but by using the phrase “trigger events”,\(^{32}\) they leave little doubt that the underlying assumption is that events in the Middle East cause antisemitic incidences in the UK.\(^{33}\)

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\(^{27}\) Interview with Dave Rich.

\(^{28}\) See chapter three for a discussion of the different sources.

\(^{29}\) Interview with Dave Rich.


\(^{33}\) See also the CST APPIA submission which for instance states that the „focus on Israel, Zionism and the Middle East as a motor for attacks on British Jews is evidenced by the growing proportion of incidents that make explicit reference to these issues”, 2.
The endorsement of the new antisemitism thesis by the CST – noteworthy in itself in terms of analysing the perspective of a UK-based NGO on the issue – also had a particularly significant impact in the context of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism. An analysis of the many different written submissions and oral evidence sessions that formed the background information for the APPIA report, discussed in chapter four, leads to the conclusion that the views of those groups making a strong case for the existence of the new antisemitism, first and foremost the Board of Deputies and the CST,34 were an important contributing factor in convincing the MPs on the panel of the severity of this problem. This outlook was subsequently reflected in the endorsement of the new antisemitism thesis in the APPIA report.

A good example of this is found in a passage in the APPIA report that addresses the relationship between anti-Zionism and antisemitism. It contains a near verbatim quote from the CST written submission highlighting the view that a “narrative has developed that views Zionism as a global force of unlimited power and malevolence,” pointing out that Zionism has been redefined in a way that “bears no relation to the understanding that most Jews have of the concept.”35 This – so it is argued – results in the transferral of traditional antisemitic notions of Jewish conspiratorial power and malicious manipulation “from Jews (a religious or racial group) onto Zionism (a political movement)” which is described as the “core of the ‘New Antisemitism’ of which so much has been written.”36

34 Both organisations also gave oral evidence in the first oral evidence session in London on 6 February 2006, Henry Grunwald for the BoD and Mark Gardner for the CST. The questions of some MPs during the session suggest that not all members of the panel had in-depth knowledge about contemporary antisemitism or the work of the CST, making its evidence potentially even more relevant.
36 Ibid. A comparison to the CST’s written APPIA submission, p. 4, shows these paragraphs are virtually identical. However, it should be mentioned that the report contains a number of direct references to oral and written evidence, not only quotes from the CST submission.
However, although the CST clearly supports the new antisemitism thesis, and, according to Dave Rich, its written submission to the APPIA was deliberately “intended to make a very strong case,” Rich was also clear about the limits to the kind of work and discourse that the CST is comfortable engaging with. As Rich put it, the CST does not engage with “elements of the new antisemitism thesis that are purely about attitudes to Israel” because “we don’t do Israel advocacy.” In this context, he also pointed out the fact that there are other organisations in Britain whose work is specifically focused on defending Israel in public.

To some extent these self-imposed limitations are related to the preponderance of pragmatic approaches in the work of the CST. The organisation’s work remains clearly focused on antisemitic incidences and security, as the primary concern of all their activities is to concentrate on “what is it that is affecting British Jews, and how is it manifesting, and where is it coming from.”

However, it can also be argued that another important reason is the very success and influence that the CST has earned as a respected expert organisation, and its status as trusted partner of the government and the police, which as Rich pointed out, has taken the organisations many years to establish. Thus, the CST’s reluctance to engage in the most controversial parts of the debate is also likely to be influenced by a desire to avoid jeopardising its reputation as objective source on antisemitism in Britain. Although in 2008 the CST started publishing discourse reports in addition to the incidents reports because, as Rich explained, “it was clearly on our turf,” it aims to avoid “theoretical” as well as political

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38 Dave Rich, interview.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 CST, “Antisemitic Discourse in Britain in 2007”.

and controversial aspects of the new antisemitism, such as the question of whether or not the BDS movement is antisemitic.

In sum, the Community Security Trust makes an important contribution to an aspect of governance in Britain through the wide-ranging provision of security for the Anglo-Jewish community and other aspects of its work including raising awareness of contemporary antisemitism in the UK. While it does engage in the realm of discourse, its area of specialisation is the practical level with a main focus on recording, reporting, monitoring, responding to and preventing antisemitic incidents. Crucially for the analysis of countermeasures against the new antisemitism, it deliberately avoids getting into very controversial, politicised aspects of the debate. The next part of this chapter will analyse the work of organisations engaged in precisely those areas.

6.3. Speaking up for Israel in the battle against antisemitism

There are a large number of little known groups and high profile organisations in the world, including in Britain, that do engage with the contentious dimensions of debates on Israel and political action in the public sphere. These are Zionist and Israel advocacy organisations. In the following, a selection of groups and organisations of this kind that operate in the UK will be analysed to examine what role fighting antisemitism plays in their work and what contribution they make – collectively and individually – to addressing the new antisemitism.

Historically, a concern with the detriments and perils of Jewish existence in the galut, especially antisemitism, was a main driving force for the emergence of Zionist thought in the nineteenth century, the antecedent of today’s Zionist movement. The fact that

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43 As the introduction of this chapter mentioned, purposive sampling can have a number of advantages over random sampling, and it is a feasible sampling method to employ where representative samples are impossible to obtain. In this thesis, one of the main reasons for the difficulty ensuring randomised sampling is that a sampling frame – a list of the entire statistical population – does not exist, and this also applies to Israel advocacy organisations.

44 As opposed to the neutral term diaspora, the Hebrew word galut has a negative connotation.
Theodore Herzl’s dedication to the Zionist cause was to a great extent motivated by him witnessing the antisemitic Dreyfus affair in France is relatively well known. But even Zionist thinkers before him, from Perez Smolenskin (1842-1885) to Moshe Leib Lilienblum (1843-1910) to Leon Pinsker (1821-1891) were in one way or another concerned about the precarious situation of Jews living among gentiles and especially the rise of antisemitism in the Russian Empire.

Literature on contemporary Zionism and Israel advocacy often focuses on the foreign policy aspects of Israel-centred lobby groups. However, some of today’s most prominent Zionist organisations also have many other goals, and – true to their historical predecessors – fighting antisemitism is one of those other objectives. The World Zionist Organization, for example, has a separate Department for Activities in Israel and Countering Antisemitism which presents some of its activities on the website for the Communications Center for Diaspora Communications & Countering Antisemitism. Among those activities are the collation of articles on worldwide antisemitism and the “Hate Stops Here” campaign, already mentioned in chapter five.

Also in Britain, there are a number of Zionist organisations, groups and initiatives that see battling antisemitism as an important organisational goal. Like the CST, many of them have a very focused – and in most cases an even narrower – approach. Having set themselves the mandate to fight antisemitism by defending Israel, their activities range from opposing the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign, to confronting anti-Zionism on campus,

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48 http://izionist.org/eng/.

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to countering anti-Israel or antisemitic narratives in the church, to acting as so-called “watchdogs” for specific media outlets or non-governmental organisations.

CIF Watch, a website in blog format launched in August 2009, is an example of a group with a very narrow target. Its main aim, prominently stated on its home page, is “monitoring antisemitism and combating the assault on Israel’s legitimacy at the Guardian and its blog ‘Comment is Free.’” It seeks to expose and counter anti-Israel and anti-Jewish discourse on the Guardian’s website and weblog, which it perceives to be rife in both editorial articles and readers’ comments. In a press release announcing its launch, the founder explained his motivation to start the project, which was set up “…as a consequence of the complete and utter failure of Guardian management to adequately confront the problem of antisemitism on ‘Comment is Free.’”

In an attempt to find an acceptable definition that illuminates the boundaries between antisemitism and anti-Israelism, CIF Watch evokes the EUMC definition of antisemitism. It also makes implicit reference to Natan Sharanski’s “3-D test,” in particular the “delegitimization” aspect, by emphasising their support of “…open and honest debate about the Israel-Arab conflict including harsh criticism of Israel as long as the criticism of Israel is similar to that levelled against any other nation of the world.”

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49 As of 2013, Adam Levick, whose professional background is at NGO monitor and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), works as its Managing Editor, supported by an Assistant Managing Editor Hadar Sela and volunteers.
51 The Guardian website is one of the most widely read online news sources, with an average daily traffic of 4.8 million daily unique browsers according to statistics recorded by the Audit Bureau of Circulations’ (ABC) digital audit in 2013, see “June digital ABCs confirm record web traffic for the Guardian,” Guardian Unlimited, 25 July 2013.
54 Sharanski, “3D Test of Anti-Semitism: Demonization, Double Standards, Delegitimization”.
55 http://cifwatch.com/about.
Modelled on established media watchdogs operating in the U.S. and internationally,\textsuperscript{56} CIF Watch is representative of a number of pro-Israel groups for whom countering antisemitism is an important part – or even the primary goal – of their organisational purposes. Christian Middle East Watch,\textsuperscript{57} a web-based project set up in 2012 is another example. While in some ways similar to CIF Watch, it is not exclusively focused on the media. However, it also conflates the goal of fighting antisemitism with Israel advocacy, including opposition to the “delegitimization of Israel”, and highlighting “Israel's achievements & values.” The equal importance of these goals are effectively visualised through the group’s colourful logo.\textsuperscript{58} In a brochure introducing its work, the organisation states that it wishes to “confront antisemitism in all its various forms,”\textsuperscript{59} and makes an explicit assumption regarding the causal link between not only unfavourable reporting on Israel and hostility towards it, but between anti-Israel bias and antisemitism: “In Britain today there has been an increase in antisemitism and unprecedented hostility against the nation of Israel, because of both bias and a lack of historical understanding of the current conflict in the Middle East.”\textsuperscript{60}

The reverse assumption seems to be that it is possible to address the new antisemitism through exposing, drawing attention to and countering content that deals with Israel in a biased, unfair or inaccurate way. In fact, this strategy is not dissimilar to the apologetic approach to countering anti-Jewish stereotypes through rational arguments, identified as one type of historical responses to antisemitism in chapter two.

\textsuperscript{56} Such as Honest Reporting, a U.S. based organisation that, although not primarily set up to combat antisemitism, mentions the EUMC definition of antisemitism among their guiding principles. (http://honestreporting.com/principles/) and the Committee for Accuracy Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA), which funds CIF Watch, according to CIF’s own website (http://cifwatch.com/about/).

\textsuperscript{57} http://www.cmew.org.uk/

\textsuperscript{58} The other goals, all of which are represented through varied coloured areas on a squared shape, are Incitement & Hate Education, The BDS Campaign. See http://www.cmew.org.uk/.

\textsuperscript{59} “Introducing Christian Middle East Watch” brochure, available on the organisation’s website

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., emphasis added.
Other Christian NGOs see the Christian world itself as their primary mission field, and are thus focused on one particular dimension, or source, of the new antisemitism. Hatikvah Film Trust UK,\(^61\) an evangelical Christian charity set up in 2004, produces documentary films, television programmes and books about British Middle East policy and Biblical prophecy such as “The Destiny of Britain or The Forsaken Promise”, which deals with the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate period in Palestine.

One of the main arguments that these books and films seek to get across is that Britain failed to fulfil its legal, political and, most importantly, spiritual obligations towards the Jewish people, with significant negative consequences not only for Jews but also for Britain itself. The stated objectives of these productions, in the Hatikvah Film Trust’s own words, is to “foster an understanding in the Church of the Hebraic roots of the Christian faith as well as the place of the nation of Israel and the Jewish people, from both a Biblical and historical perspective, in the purposes of God,” as stated on its website and “a related objective is to counter anti-Semitism.”\(^62\)

Anglican Friends of Israel, founded in 2005, seeks to “support the people of Israel and to secure defensible borders for the State of Israel” and, among a number of other goals also to “fight all libels against Israel and the Jewish people and their State.”\(^63\) In order to do so, this organisation considers the freedom to address political issues to be of crucial relevance, and for this reason deliberately avoided registering as a charity.\(^64\)

Since its inception this group has made use of this freedom, and has for instance published an open letter to Archbishop Justin Welby in response to his report about a trip to

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\(^61\) Charity registration number 1104887.  
\(^62\) http://www.hatikvah.co.uk/aboutus.php.  
\(^63\) http://www.anglicanfriendsofisrael.com/about.  
\(^64\) http://www.anglicanfriendsofisrael.com/about/faq: “We believe that it [the registration as a charity] might limit our ability to speak out on political issues. However, we are a non-profit organization.” It must be noted, however, that the restrictions placed on charities regarding political engagement are in fact narrowly defined. A charity must be established for charitable purposes with public benefit, but charities are nevertheless permitted campaigning and political activity if it furthers their organisational purpose. See the Charity Commission’s guide “Speaking out: Guidance on Campaigning and Political Activity by Charities (CC9)”, UK Charity Commission, 2008.
Israel organised by the Jewish Leadership Council (JLC). The group has also publicly condemned the boycott of Israel by the Methodist Church in Britain, and appealed to the Anglican Synod to reject a motion in support of the work of the Ecumenical Accompaniers Programme in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI), which has been criticised by supporters of Israel as portraying a one-sided version of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Another narrow target for organisations seeking to oppose the new antisemitism is the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign, discussed in chapter three, and anti-Zionism in the academic world more broadly speaking. The group Academic Friends of Israel, under the directorship of Ronny Fraser, a lecturer who in 2012 brought a case against the Universities and Colleges Union because of its campaign for academic boycott of Israel, is “concerned about the increasing number of anti-Israel and anti-Semitic incidents on British Campuses as well as the anti-Israel policies of the UK’s education unions.”

Assessing the relevance and effectiveness of British Israel advocacy in the battle against the new antisemitism

Potential and strengths of Israel advocacy in countering antisemitism

On the one hand, a number of arguments can be made as to why initiatives like those set out above, which operate mainly online and in the realm of discourse, and do not have a large

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68 On the wider debate about the EAPPI, see Ed Thornton, “Jewish Campaign Targets Synod Motion on Israel,” Church Times, 29 June 2012.
70 Mr R Fraser v University & College Union [2013] ET 2203290/2011.
organisational infrastructure, are nevertheless relevant in the context of the fight against the new antisemitism in Britain.

Firstly, regardless of their size, groups like these form part of civil society, the “realm of private associations” discussed in chapter one of this thesis. As a collective, it could be argued, Israel advocacy groups constitute what has been termed an “issue public,” the result of processes in which “various actors come together in defining an issue and establishing a configuration of actors connected to that issue.”\textsuperscript{72} The new antisemitism is to a large extent located at the level of discourse in the public sphere. Counter-efforts consisting primarily of discursive activities, online campaigning, media monitoring or advocacy, target precisely this dimension of contemporary antisemitism.

Moreover, these civil society groups directly engage with many concrete arguments regarding Israel and its policies in a way that would be rather difficult for most governments due to the political sensitivities involved. As already demonstrated in the case of CST – although it should already have become very evident that there are many significant differences between their approaches – it is the ability of these groups to specialise that makes NGOs and other civil society groups suited for this type of work.

Confronting sensitive and potentially controversial issues like these comes with a comparatively limited amount of risk for small, relatively marginal organisations such as Anglican Friends of Israel. It can be argued that such grassroots initiatives, which consist of individuals motivated to defend Israel in the church and wider public, do not have the type of reputation to lose that an established NGO like the CST has. As such, they are free to speak out on issues regarding which the government is not the most suitable actor to intervene, because of the contentious and potentially politically charged nature of the issue, but in all

likelihood also because the government would have limited interest in the minutiae of the public discourse around Israel and the new antisemitism.

Aristotle identified three means of persuasion: ethos, pathos and logos, which, when applied to communicative messages, correspond to the character of the speaker, emotional appeals, and the use of rational appeals in an attempt to persuade others. To counter the new antisemitism, it can be argued that methods of rational persuasion are particularly effective, because they can address concrete allegations made against Israel or expose antisemitic anti-Zionism. As chapter three outlined, intellectual and elite circles within society, from the academy and the arts to the higher echelons of the church, constitute a significant source of the new antisemitism. To engage with arguments brought forward from these quarters of society, actors with an equivalent educational background, or those familiar with the social context of a particular anti-Zionist initiative, can be in a good position to answer their claims.

Engage, for instance, an initiative co-founded by London sociologist David Hirsh, and mainly centred on the website engageonline, provides a good example for this. Concerned about antisemitism in the boycott movement, and about left-wing anti-Zionism that crosses over into antisemitism, the group publishes articles and engages in the public debate in a relatively nuanced and critical manner. Whether a deliberate strategy, or just a result of the particular professional background of their members, this group’s arguments are therefore more likely to be heard by academics and other highly educated proponents of anti-Zionism than those put forward by groups that are seen as lacking critical engagement with Israel’s policies.

75 Ibid.
The limitations of Israel advocacy for countering antisemitism in the UK

On the other hand, it goes almost without saying that the assumption underpinning the work of most of the groups mentioned so far, namely that strong public defence of Israel in public is an effective strategy to fight antisemitism, is not unanimously accepted across Anglo-Jewry, or by all groups who share their concern about a rise in antisemitism. In their founding declaration, Independent Jewish Voices, an Anglo-Jewish initiative launched in 2008 by British Jews dissatisfied with what they perceived as lack of open debate on Israel’s policies, makes it clear that they, too, are concerned about antisemitism: “There is no justification for any form of racism, including anti-Semitism, anti-Arab racism or Islamophobia, in any circumstance.” The difference, however, is that groups like these are critical of the effectiveness of strong Israel advocacy that neglects the reality of Palestinian suffering, and are convinced that “the battle against anti-Semitism is vital and is undermined whenever opposition to Israeli government policies is automatically branded as anti-Semitic.”

This line of argument is frequently raised in the polarised debate on the new antisemitism, as already mentioned in chapter three of this thesis. Another group with a strong concern for Palestinian Rights, Jews for Justice for Palestinians, champions the conviction that a just solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a prerequisite for tackling antisemitism, and that raising awareness of injustices inflicted on the Palestinians by Israel in Britain in itself is “…important in countering antisemitism, and the claim that opposition to Israel’s destructive policies is itself antisemitic.”

79 http://ijv.org.uk/declaration.
80 http://ijv.org.uk/declaration.
81 http://jfjfp.com/ under “Who we are”.

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battle against antisemitism. Beyond Images is a London-based project set up in 2005 by Andrew White. It employs a classic “Israel advocacy” method utilising rational persuasion. However, antisemitism is consciously bracketed out of this discussion, as explicitly stated in the context of their organisational goals: “We do not use the argument that the media is anti-Semitic. This accusation is serious but often backfires. We are interested in the impact of media coverage in demonising Israel, not the prejudices of the individual journalists or media organisations involved.”

In a talk at an even organised by the organisation Scholars For Peace in the Middle East (SPME) at the Embassy of Israel in London in 2010, White elaborated further on the rationale behind excluding antisemitism from the work of his organisation: “We need to reduce the focus on anti-semitism as an Israel advocacy tool: Pro-Israel advocacy needs to use positive messages about our beliefs and values, in a positive tone. Far too much Israel advocacy is built around the monitoring and fear of anti-semitism.” This strategy of avoiding antisemitism in pro-Israel activism is set in a larger context of a “values-based” approach that is centred on highlighting Israel’s positive achievements to divert attention away from the conflict and negative arguments, which is reminiscent of nation branding and marketing strategies. Furthermore, White maintains that asserting antisemitic motivation in discussions on Israel is counterproductive, not only because the claim is often inaccurate, but also because “…it conveys the impression that we are paranoid, and manipulate emotion to try to win arguments.”

The Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland is another example of an Israel advocacy organisation that, while not avoiding the topic entirely like Beyond Images, also does not attempt to counter antisemitism to any significant degree, albeit for slightly different reasons.

82 www.beyondimages.info, section “our goals”.
The Zionist Federation is the most important Zionist body in Britain, and is actively engaged in Israel-advocacy on multiple fronts in attempts to counter anti-Zionism and anti-Israelism. The organisation directly addresses substantial issues by mobilising its supporters to contact politicians and the media to challenge concrete claims such as the apartheid analogy. Its staff and members sometimes speak out against antisemitism publicly, utilising the ZF’s weblog to publish articles that relate to the issue. However, according to Stephen Hoffman, campaigns officer at the ZF, fighting antisemitism is in fact not a primary organisational goal for the Zionist Federation. The reason why it nevertheless occasionally engages with the topic is, as Hoffman put it, that “the problem seeks us.” In other words, because of its expertise in matters related to Israel and Zionism, and because its opinion is actively sought by the media, the ZF occasionally feels compelled to address certain contentious aspects of criticism against Israel.

At the same time, Hoffmann also offers a very insightful reason for the fact that at most, his organisation engages in countering antisemitism as an “unintended consequence.” Referring to the unique organisational structure of the Anglo-Jewish community, Hoffman explained “because the Board of Deputies and the Community Security Trust are there, and antisemitism is their field of expertise, we would just be crowding the market.” This means that in contrast to Zionist organisations operating at the international level such as the World Zionist Organisation (WZO), the Zionist Federation in Britain does not perceive the necessity to engage significantly in attempts to confront the new antisemitism, partly because of the effectiveness of other communal organisations like the CST.

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84 Examples of the kind of Israel-advocacy they engage in can be gleaned from their newsletters, for instance newsletter from 6. August 2013: “Thanks to all who contacted the BBC about the way Nigel Kennedy slandered Israel as an apartheid state whilst participating in a BBC Prom. As a result of pressure from yourselves, the ZF and other organization the slurs have been removed from the recorded broadcast and BBC iPlayer”.
85 http://zionistfederation.blogspot.co.uk.
86 Stephen Hoffman, personal interview.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
This indicates a division of labour in the Anglo-Jewish community with regards to the fight against the new antisemitism. This assumption is further supported David Rich’s remark mentioned above, who pointed out the existence of British Israel advocacy groups that engage in political discussions on Israel. Whether such a division of labour really exists, and if it is simply based on historical contingencies or on a tacit understanding in the Jewish community, are questions that cannot be explored further in this chapter, but they would certainly worth examining in a different research context.

The above examples show that there are some Israel advocacy organisations, including the Zionist Federation as the most significant one, that do not even seek any large-scale engagement in the battle against the new antisemitism. However, this absence of motivation to counter antisemitism does not apply to the entire British pro-Israel scene. Many of those organisations mentioned earlier in this chapter state fighting anti-Jewish prejudice as an important organisational aim. These organisations do not lack the will to engage in fighting antisemitism, but it can be argued what they do lack is actual effectiveness and influence in this endeavour.

The main disadvantage of small pro-Israel groups is the very feature that enables them to engage in all these activities in the first place – their marginality. They are, for the most part, niche organisations lacking extensive public exposure or influence and ultimately left to “preach to the converted,” the only audience they can effectively reach.

Certainly, most of the groups mentioned above as examples consist of only a handful of individuals. In the context of Fraser’s legal case, an employment tribunal judge described the Academic Friends of Israel (AFI) in the following terms: “Despite appearances … AFI consists of him, his wife and a computer.”91 And while CIF Watch draws attention to the fact that it is rated among the 100 most influential political blogs in the world by Technorati.com,

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a leading weblog directory, it is by no means clear that this kind of “influence”, calculated on a technical basis, does indeed indicate any social or even political relevance or impact that is actually responsible for changing the attitudes of those highly critical of Israel, let alone antisemites.

It was argued above that rational arguments and critical engagement with the concrete claims of anti-Israel activists are likely to appeal to an intellectual audience. However, it must also be considered that decades of social psychological research have led to the current understanding that for persuasive communication, defined by G. R. Miller as “any message that is intended to shape, reinforce, or change the response of another, or others” to be successful in changing attitudes, many factors are relevant. Among these is the motivation of the recipients to process the appeals made.

The crucial question is therefore how much motivation there is among certain segments of British society and among the wider public to engage in arguments presented by those defending Israel. As previous chapters, and indeed this thesis as a whole, have argued, anti-Zionism has always had a presence in the UK but has become increasingly widespread in many parts of political, cultural and intellectual life since the final decades of the twentieth century. Arguments about the injustice of Israeli policies – many of them objectively justified – have found strong appeal, but so have perspectives on Israel and Zionism that are problematic in terms of their potential links with antisemitic ideas, motivations or effects.

All of these developments point to a great receptiveness of anti-Zionist arguments in Britain. Currently, these arguments seem to find much stronger appeal than those put forward by defenders of Israel, or by those highlighting the dangers of the new antisemitism. The

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94 Stiff and Mongeau, Persuasive Communication, see for instance chapter 6 on the importance of audience motivation to engage with information offered for the effectiveness of rational appeals.
underlying reasons for this discrepancy need to be analysed carefully. But it is likely that among them, especially in regards to the latter aspect, is the long-standing failure to acknowledge antisemitism as a problem in Britain. This is not only because of the perception that other forms of racism represent bigger issues, but more importantly perhaps, because of the positive British self-image when it comes to the history of antisemitism – or rather its supposed absence – and the comparatively good integration of the Jewish community since its readmission in the 17th century.

In the absence of empirical studies on this topic, it is of course difficult to prove this positive self-image, but in so far as it can be assumed to exist, it does not correlate entirely with the historical reality as the second and third chapters of this thesis have shown. The long history of anti-Jewish stereotypes and discrimination in Britain have made antisemitic ideas part of the cultural and intellectual legacy, and therefore some observers might even wish to make the argument that anti-Zionism has such a strong appeal in this country because it resonates with a deeply embedded antisemitism.

Whatever one makes of this argument, at the very least, this might be a valid point in regards to those segments of the political spectrum that have indeed a strong foundation of not only antisemitism but also anti-Zionism intertwined with anti-Jewish thinking in their intellectual history. This applies in particular to the political left, as discussed in this thesis.

To a considerable degree, segments of the political left also form part of the intellectual elite, such as in academia, established churches, and the media, and thus influence wider society. But in addition to that, an explanation of the wider appeal of anti-Zionism in British society also needs to consider the “underdog dynamic” already discussed in chapter three. Coupled with a possible collective, subconscious element of national guilt over the memory of British imperial involvement in the Middle East and Palestine – a memory that has not seen any substantial process of “coming to terms with the past” – the anti-Zionist
narrative of a powerful, “land-grabbing” Jewish state that constantly violates the human and national rights of an Arab minority might play a role in creating a predisposition towards siding with the supposedly weak part of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In sum, while many pro-Israel groups, organisations and initiatives in the UK certainly intend to address antisemitism, whether they can also effectively counter it is much more questionable. This is because their very narrow specialisation, the very feature that enables them to engage in all these activities in the first place, is not combined with a wide recognition of their expertise of the kind the Community Security Trust possesses and benefits from. More importantly, these organisations contend with other parts of civil society that are eager to make a case against Israel, and their arguments currently have a much stronger appeal in the intellectual elite and to some extent also the wider British public.

6.4. Conclusion

This chapter has analysed different kinds of particularistic approaches in dealing with antisemitism adopted by civil society groups in the UK. It has been argued that because of their organisational format, NGOs are in principle well suited to contribute to solving contemporary antisemitism as a social problem because of their ability to specialise, to acquire expertise and to address controversial dimensions of the new antisemitism.

The Community Security Trust (CST) is a prime example of an organisation that has been able to translate an NGO’s potential into effective counter-action against antisemitism in collaboration with the state. Thus, to evoke the imaginary concentric circle model for illustrative purposes again, it is an organisation that can be seen as having an important, perhaps central, place in a multi-level framework addressing contemporary antisemitism.

However, the analysis of other civil society actors also showed that this should by no means lead to a generalisation about the significance of civil society in toto when it comes to
fighting antisemitism. Not all Zionist organisations in Britain are committed to fighting the new antisemitism and there are even those pro-Israel activists who wish to distance themselves from the topic entirely. But while a complete survey of the entire pro-Israel scene in Britain was not possible in the context of this chapter, the analysis of a selected sample was sufficient to demonstrate that there is nevertheless a great variety of such organisations intent on fighting antisemitism by defending Israel against biased or hostile discourses or political action. But although such pro-Israel might constitute a vital balancing element in the polarised public discourse on Israel and antisemitism, their efforts do not seem very effective in comparison to anti-Zionist activism. Thus, overall, must be concluded that Israel advocacy in the UK is presently not contributing to countering the new antisemitism to a very significant extent.
Conclusion

The thesis set out to examine governmental and civil society responses to contemporary antisemitism in Britain. In light of the fact that since the latter half of the twentieth century, racism and discrimination have increasingly become socially and politically unacceptable, and are now generally seen as incompatible with core values of liberal-democratic society, this thesis began by noting that antisemitism constitutes a social problem.

The study then sought to establish how exactly different social and political actors have responded to this social problem by analysing public discourses on antisemitism and practical measures adopted to address anti-Jewish prejudice in Britain by the state on the one hand, and by non-governmental actors on the other hand.

In doing so, this thesis aimed at making a contribution towards filling a large gap in the literature on antisemitism. This was identified as having a heavy emphasis on historical studies, but more importantly, has so far produced very little scholarship on aspects that diverge from a “lachrymose” version of Jewish-non-Jewish relations.

Moreover, through a comparative analysis of state and civil society actors in the context of the issues examined, the dissertation also intended to contribute to the wider field of the study of governance and civil society.

The research was underpinned by a theoretical understanding of changed patterns of governance in the modern state that are relevant to contemporary Great Britain. This theoretical perspective was outlined in chapter one. It showed that today the efforts of government as the managing agent of the state are complemented in many different ways by actors outside the central state institutions. This includes a large range of different voluntary associations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), or more generally speaking, civil society.
It was argued that while there are diverging scholarly assessments regarding the state’s continuing role in governance, and about the effectiveness and relevance of civil society, it is possible to identify some particular policy areas and generic aspects of governance in which non-governmental actors have important functions. This applies to human rights, equality, anti-racism and other areas of “low politics”, and more broadly speaking to processes of identifying and defining the nature of particular social problems.

These processes of problem definition take place in the public sphere across policy areas. Especially when it comes to very complex or contested social issues, it was argued, the discursive input of different civil society actors can ensure that specific views or particular dimensions of an issue that might not be at the centre of government attention are included in the public debate.

Finally, the argument was put forward that civil society organisations, such as NGOs, can contribute to addressing social problems at the practical level, either in collaboration with the state, or through complementing its efforts. All of these points taken together make civil society actors potentially important contributors to what can be termed a multi-level framework for prejudice reduction, a concept that has been suggested by scholars of social psychological prejudice research in other contexts.

By adopting this particular theoretical perspective in a study on antisemitism, this thesis makes an original contribution to the literature, and constitutes a step towards establishing the study of antisemitism within political science in general, and the study of governance and civil society in particular. As the introduction outlined, antisemitism research has mainly been conducted by historians and only to a limited extent by social scientists. While racism and ethnicity are important fields of study in political science, the discipline has produced very little on antisemitism as a specific phenomenon. Even within the limited scholarship on antisemitism that exists in the social sciences, the concept of social problems
and their discursive negotiation in the public sphere has hitherto not been applied to an analysis of anti-Jewish prejudice. Likewise, existing historical studies on responses to antisemitism have not utilised this insightful conceptual and theoretical dimension in their analyses.

Primarily grounded in political science, this thesis has applied a number of concepts and insights from different disciplines and fields of study. The concept of social problems, for instance, was in fact developed in the context of sociology.¹ This study has adapted it for a political scientific study and set it into the context of governance. Insights from social psychological research have also been applied where they aided analysis or helped to illuminate aspects of the argument.

The thesis has thus demonstrated that there are numerous concepts and ideas from different social science disciplines, such as the governance of social problems, the importance of problem definition in the public sphere, the role of civil society in certain aspects of governance, or the multi-level framework for prejudice reduction, that yield rich insights when applied to the study of contemporary antisemitism. In applying them where relevant, this study makes a valuable contribution to the existing literature on antisemitism, and demonstrates the advantages of a thorough theoretical grounding in analyses of today’s Jew-hatred.

Chapter two introduced some important conceptual aspects and outlined the history of antisemitism in England and Great Britain, as well as responses to it. In brief, antisemitism was defined as prejudice against Jews as Jews. It was highlighted that prejudice and hatred against Jews have a long history in this country, and many forms, such as the blood libel, even originated in England before they spread across the European continent and subsequently to other parts of the world.

¹ For example Beckford and Hjelm, "Religious Diversity and Social Problems: The Case of Britain".
Throughout this history, antisemitism has taken on a variety of different manifestations, including religious, literary, socio-economic, xenophobic and political antisemitism, thus providing a rich reservoir of anti-Jewish tropes and attitudes that subsequent manifestations of antisemitism were able to draw on.

The historical survey also showed that while the state was not the main source of extreme forms of persecution of Jews in the modern era, it was also not at the forefront of protecting Jews against antisemitism. Civil society, on the other hand, responded to it in a great variety of ways, notably, as outlined in the second part of the chapter, when the Jewish community embraced various approaches to self-defence.

As outlined in the introduction, there exists some limited historical scholarship on responses to antisemitism in Britain, especially with a focus on reactions of the Anglo-Jewish community. But such accounts are scattered throughout the literature. Monographs that deal with reactions to antisemitism, such as Rosenberg’s and Beckman’s autobiographical accounts, Susanne Terwey’s research on Jewish responses to antisemitism from the late Victorian era to World War One, and chapters in general histories on British antisemitism, like Kushner’s study on the Second World War or Gisela Lebzelter’s book on antisemitism in England in the inter-war years are all limited to certain historical periods. Other studies cover more than one period, but are not specifically about responses to antisemitism, or mainly deal with one organisation such as Langham’s research on the Board of Deputies. The second part of chapter two in this thesis has utilised existing secondary literature to bring

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2 Rosenberg, *Facing up to Antisemitism: How Jews in Britain Countered the Threats of the 1930s; Battle for the East End: Jewish Responses to Fascism in the 1930s; Beckman, The 43 Group.*

3 Terwey, “Reaktionen Britischer Juden auf Anfeindungen und Antisemitismus vom Ausgehenden Viktorianischen Zeitalter bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges”.


these dispersed strands of scholarship together into one narrative. In doing so it has identified patterns in responses towards antisemitism.

Against the historical background outlined in chapter two, the third chapter proceeded with an analysis of contemporary antisemitism, which was shown to be characterised by a multiplicity of sources, some traditional, others more recent. The new antisemitism was introduced as a main component of contemporary antisemitism. It refers to aspects of convergence between anti-Israelism and anti-Zionism on the one hand, and anti-Jewish prejudice on the other. In outlining the global debate that this concept has provoked within the scholarly world and beyond, it was highlighted that in addition to multidimensionality, contemporary antisemitism is chiefly characterised by a contested nature.

Identifying contemporary antisemitism as a multifaceted and contested social problem highlighted its suitability as a case study to apply the theoretical framework on governance, and to test the hypothesis that civil society has an important role in defining and addressing social problems. A particular focus of the subsequent analysis was to establish whether the new antisemitism has been acknowledged in the public and political spheres, and what countermeasures – if any – have been taken against it. By using the concept of social problems and setting it in the wider context of governance, the analysis of the new antisemitism in this chapter, and the responses to it in the subsequent chapters, constitute a contribution to the literature on the new antisemitism.

Chapter four examined how political actors, including the state, have responded to antisemitism in the UK. The analysis in this chapter added a substantive aspect to the analytical and comparative dimensions of this research: the distinction between universalistic approaches to tackling antisemitism on the one hand, and those with a more specific focus on antisemitism, accordingly labelled particularistic approaches, on the other hand.
The analysis showed that throughout much of the twentieth century, governmental approaches mostly framed antisemitism in general, universalistic ways. For historical reasons related to the unravelling of the British Empire, concepts of race and racism dominated policies on inter-group relations which emerged since the mid-twentieth century. It was demonstrated that at the level of political discourse, the influence of these concepts can still be detected today, and that governmental rhetoric seeks to emphasise that all forms of discrimination are equally important, in order to avoid a “hierarchy of racisms.”

A comprehensive approach to prejudice and discrimination that includes a great variety of different forms has some advantages, especially at the practical and administrative level. In addition, the promotion of tolerant norms and values which go hand in hand with such wide-ranging anti-discrimination policies are likely to have positive effects by diminishing the social acceptance of intolerance and prejudice in general, including antisemitism.

However, it was also pointed out that approaching antisemitism as a sub-category of racism has a series of problematic implications, and it is not necessarily the best, most appropriate or most effective approach. Firstly, it was questioned in how far the traditional concept of racism accurately captures the predominant themes found in contemporary forms of antisemitism. It was also highlighted that the socio-economic focus of equality and anti-discrimination approaches applies to the situation of contemporary British Jews only to a very limited extent.

In addition, a major disadvantage of broad “one-size-fits-all” approaches is that whilst positive synergy effects have to be considered, the focus on details and specificities of individual issues can get lost. Ultimately, universalistic approaches can result in particular problems, or at least specific strands within them, remaining unaddressed. Tackling different forms of prejudice under one roof can even create conflicts of interest, as exemplified in the
dilemma that arises from attempts to address Muslim antisemitism while at the same time trying to avoid inadvertently fostering Islamophobia.

In these terms, the results of the work of a parliamentary initiative, the All-Party Parliamentary Group against Antisemitism, was identified as major turning point in the fight against anti-Jewish prejudice in Britain. It was argued that in the wake of the landmark report on the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism in 2006, anti-Jewish prejudice received more political attention as a particular social problem than it had hitherto. A number of practical responses by the British government and other actors following the report, such as the creation of the cross-departmental government working group on antisemitism, improved reporting and analysis of police statistics, and government funding of security provision for Jewish schools, constituted important steps towards addressing antisemitism in the UK.

It was also argued that as a publicly recognised, reputable parliamentary initiative, the APPG’s specific focus on antisemitism, and the explicit recognition of some elements of the new antisemitism thesis in the APPIA report, contributed to creating more public and political awareness of the problem, and lent credibility to the new antisemitism thesis in the public and political spheres.

It was concluded that the APPG against Antisemitism constitutes a good example of a political initiative with civil society input that has successfully adopted a particularistic approach to tackling antisemitism in Britain today.

This analysis of the APPIA is another key element of this thesis’ contribution to the literature. Despite the importance of the APPIA, demonstrated in this chapter, it had not been the topic of any detailed, scholarly examination before. With no previous research available, the thesis drew on primary textual sources and an interview with the director of the APPG
against Antisemitism. In addition to the material that is publicly available on the APPIA website, the author was also able to obtain unpublished material for this analysis.

As already mentioned, the significance of the APPIA was highlighted against the background of governmental responses – or rather the lack thereof – to antisemitism as a specific issue over the course of the second half of the twentieth century. The implications of different governmental approaches to improving inter-group relations in society for the battle against antisemitism as a particular phenomenon with its own history and phenomenology have not been the subject of detailed scholarly inquiry. Their analysis in this chapter is thus another element of this thesis that adds to the literature.

A possible reason for the lack of scholarly attention in this area may be that the need to distinguish explicitly between different types of racism – a key argument of this thesis – is not widely acknowledged in the literature on anti-racism and equality policy, and is only addressed to a limited extent in the literature on antisemitism. The incorporation of the theme of particularism and universalism that runs through the dissertation therefore adds another important aspect to the study of contemporary antisemitism.

Chapter five examined whether and to what extent Holocaust remembrance and education in the UK have been employed to counter antisemitism, in light of the fact that the history of the Holocaust is inextricably linked to antisemitism as a main component of Nazi political ideology. Internationally there are numerous Holocaust-related programmes and projects aimed specifically at reducing or preventing hatred against Jews, and it was proposed here that this might also be the case in Britain.

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7 Where it is, it is mainly in relation to Holocaust scholarship, where it resonates with the broader debate on universalization of the Holocaust. Kushner, *The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination: A Social and Cultural History*.

However, the examination of important British governmental initiatives and civil society organisations came to the conclusion that Holocaust remembrance mainly seeks to derive universalistic lessons from the Holocaust which are applicable to wider social and cultural issues in Britain today. In other words, countering antisemitism is not a main priority in this context. This “de-Judaized” approach, compounded by the politicisation of the Holocaust by some non-governmental organisations, renders Holocaust remembrance in Britain largely ineffective as a direct means to combat contemporary antisemitism.

In the same vein, a number of empirical studies suggest that a main focus of teachers who are engaged in Holocaust education is the transmission of universalistic, moral values. At the receiving end, it seems that pedagogical engagement with the Holocaust increases pupils’ knowledge and understanding of human rights and related areas, but not necessarily the history of antisemitism.

Having mainly dealt with universalistic approaches to antisemitism up to this point in the thesis – with the important exception of the APPIA and resulting governmental responses – chapter six aimed to identify particularistic approaches to tackling anti-Jewish prejudice, with special attention devoted to attempts to counter the new antisemitism. This part of the analysis was especially relevant to the overarching theoretical interest of the thesis, because it might be expected to identify civil society contributions in addressing specific dimensions of antisemitism that the government might be unable – or unwilling – to tackle.

Indeed, it was argued that while condemning clear cases of antisemitic hate crime falls within the remit of government, addressing the complex and politically charged interface between antisemitism and anti-Israelism is a much more delicate issue for politicians, whether in government or not. Civil society actors such as NGOs, on the other hand, have the ability to focus on a single issue, to acquire special expertise in their fields of activity, and are much less constrained by politically sensitive problems than professional politicians.
The analysis of the Community Security Trust (CST) – to date not examined in any detail in the scholarly literature⁹ – found that it constitutes a good example to illustrate this capacity of NGOs. Having acquired a widely recognised level of expertise in recording, monitoring and preventing antisemitic incidences, it provides wide-ranging security services to the Anglo-Jewish community. It does so in close collaboration with the state, especially the police, and therefore represents a successful case of “associative governance.” Partly due to its established status as a community organisation that enjoys respect across government and society, the CST avoids engagement with some of the most politically controversial aspects of the new antisemitism. The CST is thus mainly concerned with those dimensions of antisemitism that pose the most immediate and obvious threat to the physical security of the Anglo-Jewish community.

What therefore remained to be examined is how Israel advocacy organisations approach the subject of antisemitism, and whether their activities could be seen as an effective way to counter the more controversial dimension of the new antisemitism. It was demonstrated that not all Zionist organisations in Britain are committed to fighting the new antisemitism and some pro-Israel activists distance themselves from the controversial discussion on anti-Jewish prejudice altogether. Moreover, although many pro-Israel groups do attempt to fight the new antisemitism, and might constitute a counter-weight in the polarised public discourse on Israel and antisemitism, it was argued that overall they are too marginal to be very effective, especially against the background of the relatively wide appeal of anti-Zionism in Britain.

⁹ One of the few exceptions is an article by Michael Whine, who is a member of staff at the CST. Whine, "The Community Security Trust – Best Practice in Combating Antisemitic Hate".
Civil society, the state, and the problem of antisemitism

Beyond the above conclusions of the analyses of different fields of action examined in this study, the question needs to be addressed whether it is possible to draw any general conclusions about the role of civil society and the state in the fight against antisemitism in Great Britain. In simple terms: Do the findings of this thesis demonstrate that civil society plays a significant role in the fight against antisemitism, and how should this role be assessed in comparison to the state?

The historical analysis in the second chapter showed that in most periods of English and British history, the state was not an effective actor in countering antisemitism. Although their approaches and strategies differed quite profoundly, it was mainly Jewish civil society organisations that took up the fight against anti-Jewish hatred. Therefore, it is fair to say that at the very least historically speaking, civil society has played a significant role in providing responses to anti-Jewish hostility.

In the twentieth century, the state started to address issues such as racism and discrimination, but antisemitism was mostly not a main political priority for governments. This is reflected in policies and legislation that can benefit Jews as a minority, but were not primarily intended to combat contemporary antisemitism. This highlights all the more the significance of the fact that as a result of the efforts of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism, this historical pattern changed towards an increased acknowledgement of antisemitism as a particular issue. Because of the important input from civil society organisations in the process of the inquiry, and because of the fact that the All-Party Parliamentary Group against Antisemitism itself is a type of group that is not part of the formal parliamentary system and thus occupies a space between civil society and the state, the APPIA report represents an example of an effective response to antisemitism based on an initiative from outside the core state institutions.
The fact that the APPIA, the CST and other organisations have emerged from this analysis as examples of social actors that have addressed antisemitism as a particular issue, and have done so with some success, are not pure coincidences but also based on some of their characteristics.

For example, it was noted that the APPIA panel consisted of a number of MPs from across the political spectrum who did not represent constituencies with major Jewish populations. Their non-partisan and politically independent character was most likely a factor that contributed to the fact that the APPIA report received wider attention. Moreover, APPGs are by their very nature intended to focus on specific issues, like their statutory parliamentary counterparts, the select committees.

In the case of the CST, it was argued that the expertise it has been able to acquire as a single-issue organisation constitutes a great organisational strength, on the basis of which it has succeeded in establishing itself as a respected civil society partner of both the police and government. The CST represents another example of an effective, particularistic response to antisemitism – from a civil society organisation.

Likewise, the underlying reason why successive British governments have long failed to pay attention to antisemitism as a particular problem are certainly related to specific developments in British history. But in addition to that, one needs to consider that the British government is a state actor, and thus affected by the general limits of the state in governing society in all its complexity, a structural feature of the modern state.

A number of reasons were mentioned throughout this thesis as to why it makes sense for the state to adopt universalistic approaches to solving problems in society. The increasing complexity of society and the expanding scope of government responsibility make it inevitable for the state to adopt broader solutions, and it is impossible for governments to deal with every single issue that deserves to be part of the political agenda. Moreover,
governments are not always aware of all problems, or might not be able to recognise and identify all the different dimensions that are relevant in the context of an issue.

On the other hand, and in contrast to the state, civil society actors are better able to focus on particular issues and in most cases they are also sufficiently politically independent to address controversial issues, which is especially important in the context of the new antisemitism.

However, it would be inaccurate to generalise these analyses too far and to construct a simple dichotomy between universalistic approaches to countering antisemitism adopted by state actors on the one hand, and particularistic non-state and civil society responses on the other hand. Such a simple dichotomy would of course not do justice to the complex social and political reality of a great variety of actors, many of whom have different aims, objectives and mandates.

The cases examined in this study provide examples for universalistic approaches to antisemitism adopted by the state as well as civil society. The analysis of Holocaust remembrance and education, for instance, demonstrated that universalistic approaches towards dealing with the Holocaust – a subject that is historically inextricably linked to Jewish suffering and anti-Jewish beliefs and attitudes – can be found both in government- and state-led initiatives as well as civil society.

At the same time, the study found examples for successful particularistic approaches adopted by civil society actors, but also seemingly less effective particularistic NGO approaches, such as Israel advocacy organisations.

However, it is critical to point out that the conclusion about the lack of effectiveness of some NGOs, in particular pro-Israel groups, does not automatically mean the thesis’ initial hypothesis about the potential of civil society to contribute to addressing social problems is
hereby disproven. It does not necessarily falsify the assumption that civil society has the potential to make important contributions to addressing antisemitism as a social problem, both at the level of problem-definition and awareness-raising, as well as the practical level.

However, what it does show first of all is that this potential is not always realised. There can be a great number of different reasons why civil society actors that work in areas potentially related to the fight against antisemitism do not focus on this issue, and why those that do still so continue to fail to realise their potential to make a significant contribution to countering anti-Jewish prejudice.

While generalisations in this respect should be made with caution, in the case of Holocaust remembrance and education, the underlying reasons why so many social and political actors seek universalistic applications of the Holocaust instead of focusing on antisemitism are probably influenced by much broader cultural processes of universalising the Holocaust. As discussed in chapter five, the tendency towards universalising the Holocaust and drawing widely applicable lessons from it is rooted in a long-standing debate on the moral and philosophical meaning of the Holocaust, and is thus not confined to Holocaust remembrance and education in Britain.

In the case of those Israel advocacy organisations that either do not see the fight against the new antisemitism as a priority, or do not even seek to engage in it at all, a number of possible explanations for their lack of engagement were discussed in chapter six. For example, the Zionist Federation sees the CST as effective actor in dealing with antisemitism. In other cases, a strategy was adopted that seeks to divert attention away from purely negative associations with Israel, or simply to avoid the controversial discussion on the new antisemitism.

But the analysis of those pro-Israel group that do wish to combat the new antisemitism but are largely marginalised and unsuccessful has pointed to a second crucial
aspect that is relevant in drawing an overall conclusion regarding civil society and addressing contested social problems: Rather than demonstrating that civil society is irrelevant in this respect, the exact opposite is the case. Civil society organisations do have a strong impact on public and political debates about Israel, Zionism and antisemitism in Britain, but it is especially anti-Zionist activists who have been successful at getting their points across – chapter six discussed a number of possible reasons for to the appeal of anti-Zionism in Britain.

In sum, it is not true that civil society is not important, but rather that in the case of the new antisemitism – and probably in other cases of highly contested social issues too – the effect of activities of actors from different, often opposing, parts of the spectrum in the debate, have to be taken into consideration.

Overall, while generalisations regarding the role of civil society actors in addressing antisemitism could only be drawn within certain limits, and do not indicate a clear-cut dichotomy between state and society, this thesis has nevertheless highlighted important patterns in the way social and political actors have responded to contemporary antisemitism. In short, at the theoretical level it was demonstrated that civil society has the potential to make a significant contribution to addressing antisemitism, a multi-dimensional, contested social issue. While this potential is not realised in all cases, the study has nevertheless found examples, especially the APPIA and the CST, in which civil society does make significant contributions to the fight against anti-Jewish prejudice.

But on the other hand, civil society should not be lionised. While those seeking to combat antisemitism are contributing their part to addressing the issue and can thus be seen as part of the solution – however significant or small that part may be – at the same time, in the particular case of the new antisemitism, civil society is also part of the problem.
Examples such as the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign, and many other strands of anti-Zionist activism may in some instances be motivated by antisemitism, and as discussed throughout the thesis, there are multiple other links between the delegitimisation and demonization of Israel in the public sphere and antisemitism. This new antisemitism does not emanate from the British state, but from civil society.

**Practical implications for the fight against antisemitism**

The contributions of pro-Israel organisations in Britain to the fight against the new antisemitism might currently be limited in their effectiveness. This is regrettable because it can be argued that an effective approach to directly address the new antisemitism requires the voluntary activities of groups, individuals and non-governmental organisations that defend Israel in the public sphere, because the state cannot – or will not – address this dimension of contemporary antisemitism effectively.

As chapter three demonstrated, the continuous propagation of extreme anti-Israel views is bound to have some effects at individual and societal levels by creating and consolidating an image of the Jewish state as illegitimate and morally evil. The acceptance of this perspective across different areas of society has implications for the way Jews with ties to Israel perceive their place in British society, as evident in the developments in the areas of boycott campaigns, and potentially creates or reinforces of anti-Jewish stereotypes and sentiments, as discussed.

However, in most cases, the propagation of Israel as an evil state or threat to world peace, and other forms of anti-Zionist activism do not cross the line towards hate speech, hate crime, or discrimination on the basis of someone’s political views or even against Jews on the basis of their ethnicity. Therefore, many expressions that some observers would identify as part of the new antisemitism are not covered by state legislation and do not lie within the
realms of governmental responsibility in any other way. Moreover, as has also been pointed out, the intricacies of the debates about Israel and Zionism are largely irrelevant for governmental actors who are disinclined to become embroiled with politically sensitive issues.

In these terms, as the new antisemitism is primarily a battle of ideas in the public sphere, a democratic government that wanted to take a clear stand on discussions on Zionism and the nature of the state of Israel, and get engaged in this battle in any substantive way, would risk interfering with issues related to freedom of speech, or invite the accusation of official censorship.

On the other hand, when civil society organisations speak out against the demonization of Israel in public, the accusation of attempting to stifle free debate might still be raised – and it frequently is – but none of the problematic implications in terms of free speech apply in this case. Therefore, civil society organisations are in principle well placed to engage in more substantive issues regarding to the controversial areas of the new antisemitism.

Depending on their level of expertise and knowledge, they are able to engage with concrete arguments against Israel at the level of content, and to present their views on issues such as the Apartheid analogy, the historical question of Israel’s legitimacy from the perspective of international law, or the ethical implications of Israel’s role as an occupying power in the Palestinian Territories. All of these and other issues are frequently raised by anti-Israel activists, and while concrete claims against Israel may or may not be true, they can be relevant in the context of the new antisemitism if presented in a way that demonises Israel or attacks individual Israelis or Jews.

It is unlikely that sharp and extreme criticism of Israel will abate as long as the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is not resolved. It might even continue after a
resolution of the conflict, in the event that this can be achieved at all. Therefore, the existence of anti-Israelism in the public sphere, and the implications this has in terms of the new antisemitism, can be taken as a given factor. In fact, those wanting to fight the new antisemitism might be better advised to engage in the debate and confront what they see as illegitimate and harmful criticism of Israel, rather than wishing that those voices that attack Israel through discourse and political activism be excluded from the public sphere through legal means or otherwise.

A curtailing of public debate for the sake of the battle against antisemitism, for instance through expanding legal definitions of hate speech to cover extreme criticism of Israel, would fail to address some very concrete, substantial issues that are raised by anti-Israel activists. A failure to address those substantive issues would constitute a missed opportunity to replace some extremely biased narratives about the nature and character of the Jewish state or the complexities of the Arab-Israeli conflict with alternative views.

By countering some of the excesses of anti-Israel discourse in the public sphere, civil society actors who have the expertise, the capacities and the social respectability to engage with them at a level of rational debate and discussion might at the same time also be able to make a contribution towards fighting the new antisemitism. Therefore, one might wish to conclude that the energies of those seeking to counter it should not primarily be directed at campaigning for even more legislation in the area of anti-racism and hate speech, nor lamenting the wide influence of anti-Zionists in Britain, but attempting to mobilise more supporters of Israel and those concerned about the new antisemitism to join the battle of ideas in the British public sphere.
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