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Riots and Rebellion
State, Society and the Geography of Conflict in India

[Final accepted version]

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Abstract: This article argues that different types of politically motivated violence in South Asia are associated with different forms of governance and relationships between society and the state. This variation in local governance in turn is the product of unevenness in state formation across the political geography of India. It classifies conflict events in India in 2015 and 2016 into conceptual categories of sovereignty-neutral and sovereignty-challenging, theoretically reflecting the commonsense distinction between riots and rebellion. It presents evidence that different categories of state-society regimes at the district level are associated with different patterns of sovereignty-neutral and -challenging violence. It finds that urban-adjacent *hegemonic* state-society regimes are associated with high levels of sovereignty-neutral violence, *revised* state-society regimes with of traditionally restrained state capacity are associated with high levels of sovereignty-challenging violence, with *fragmented* and *accommodative* regimes in the agrarian hinterland are associated with intermediary positions in both categories.

Political and social violence is rife in South Asia. Scholars have sought explanations for this violence in the competition over resources, ethnic and social grievances, the absence of social capital, electoral incentives and physical geographies that might make violent conflict feasible. But the study of internal violence in the Indian subcontinent is deeply bifurcated. Some scholars seek to explain the prevalence, intensity, character and duration of the multiple internal wars and insurgencies in India, Pakistan and, until recently, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Others attempt to understand violence among religious, ethnic or sectarian groups, in which the object of violence is usually not the state but other communities, and violent clashes and reprisals occur instead of armed conflict. Due to sub-disciplinary boundaries within the scholarship on political conflict, these two categories are rarely, if ever, incorporated within a single framework.

This article proposes such a framework, focusing on the spatial distribution of different forms of violence in India. To do so, I make a principal distinction in forms of violence based on the intentions, and related repertoires, of violent conflict, building theoretically on the commonsense difference between riots and rebellion. When state and non-state actors clash over the basic legitimacy of the state in a particular area, I term this *sovereignty-challenging violence*. When violence is deployed between and among communities to discretely influence policy, mobilize electoral support or settle scores within a fundamentally unchallenged structure of state power, I term this *sovereignty-neutral violence*.

The political geography of violent conflict in India reveals patterns that suggest that these two types of violence might be causally connected. With some notable exceptions, areas with high incidence of insurgency typically have low incidence of social violence, and vice-versa. In this article, I argue that the nature of

state capacity and the state's relationships with society provide a coherent conceptual framework that can explain the geographic dispersion of sovereignty-challenging and -neutral violence in India.

More broadly, I contend that the unevenness of the capacity of the Indian state across its national territory is a significant cause of the patterns of politically-motivated violent conflict. Such unevenness is a legacy of processes of state formation during the colonial era, in which the government privileged concrete strategic goals over the establishment of uniform standards of authority within its borders. Due to these processes, the Indian subcontinent under colonial rule became a patchwork of heterogeneous sovereignties, suzerainties and zones of administrative neglect (Naseemullah and Staniland 2016). As India achieved independence, the scope of state power over territory increased, as the government sought to knit together diverse territories into a coherent system of national authority. Yet the unevenness of the state's presence across its territory has persisted in practice. Some areas approach Weberian sovereignty, whereas in others, the state is all but absent. This leads to dramatically different relationships between the state and social actors across India's political geography, which in turn can shape discrete types of conflict.

In spaces where the state is omnipresent, the state's coercive and infrastructural powers are seen to overwhelm any rival governance actors, and the population looks exclusively to the government for the provision of key public and social goods. Control of the apparatus of government is thus essential for material progress, and groups compete to gain or retain state power to access its resources and rents, often through violent means. I argue that in these *hegemonic* regimes, associated with metropolitan governance or proximity to cities and towns, we see

higher incidence of sovereignty-neutral violence and little sovereignty-challenging violence.

In spaces where the state apparatus at the local level is traditionally weak or even wholly absent, government actors might not have everyday coercive capacities necessary to preempt or interdict rebellion. But further, the long-term weakness of the state's capacity to provide key social goods, including a monopoly of violence, undermines the authority of the state and encourages populations who feel underserved by the government to seek alternatives. Social groups seeking to fill this void are as likely to compete with or struggle against the state itself over political authority as to engage with it, particularly when the state or its capitalist clients choose to latterly reassert their authority coercively in response to economic opportunities or security mandates. In these *revised* regimes, we see high incidence of sovereignty-challenging violence.

Finally, in India's vast agricultural hinterland, intermediate *fragmented* and *accommodative* regimes present profiles of violence that are conditioned by whether commercialization has led to local contestation over the state's power and resources. The presence and authority of the state, and the relationship it has with society at the local level, can provide a more comprehensive explanation for the complex landscape of violence in India than forms of violence taken apart, and may be helpful for understanding the relationships between state capacity and violence in other post-colonial countries.

This article proceeds as follows. First, I outline the extant literature on the geography of violence in India, noting the bifurcation between studies of riots and of insurgencies; I then present a framework and associated evidence that aims to integrate the two. Second, I introduce a typology of governance regimes, based on

colonial state-building strategies, that explores the roots of variation in state-society relations and their impacts on violence. Third, I present empirical evidence for the relationship between state-society regimes and forms of violence in contemporary India. The article concludes with some reflections on the theoretical link between state capacity, sovereignty and conflict in India and beyond.

FORMS OF VIOLENCE IN INDIA

Since independence, India has had various, sustained episodes of internal violence. The roots of some of these episodes can be traced back to practices of colonial governance. Practices of primitive accumulation and repression gave rise to peasant insurgencies, and many argue that policies that created divisions among religious communities led to the violence that preceded and accompanied Partition (Guha, 1983; Aiyer, 1995; Kennedy and Purushotham, 2012). The context of Indian independence itself – widespread communal violence, the coercive integration of princely states and early interstate competition over the princely state of Kashmir – marred an otherwise relatively peaceful process of decolonization, with an orderly transition of administrative and representative institutions, achieved without an armed struggle.

Endemic violence has persisted well beyond independence, however. As the post-colonial state established itself, new challenges to its security and legitimacy emerged. Many of these were initially understood within the general rubric of political instability accompanying modernization (Huntington, 1968; Gurr, 1970). Rising disorder in India was associated with the decline of the Congress Party as a cohesive, programmatic institution capable of mediating the demands of an aspirant, restive and fragmented population (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987; Kohli, 1990).

Over time, two divergent perspectives of internal violence emerged. The first concerned challenges to the fundamental security of the Indian state by insurrections seeking to challenge it in particular national geographies. Analysts have sought to explain these challenges within a broader framework within security studies of the causes of civil war. The second has sought to understand contentious or violent inter-group relations in multiethnic democracies such as India, highlighting the importance of identity for political mobilization and intergroup competition. The two research programs unintentionally obscure one another's insights, however, because of disciplinary and sub-disciplinary divisions in the study of political conflict that separate insurgencies and riots into subjects of international relations and comparative politics, respectively. The result is two conceptually distinct geographies of political conflict that are rarely considered together.

Insurgencies

From the 1980s onward, internal wars in developing countries have been established as a central object of enquiry for conflict and security studies through a belief that state failure presents a clear danger to international security. In India, serious challenges to the Weberian monopoly of coercion in its periphery coexist alongside a strong, powerful state apparatus that is in little danger of collapsing. Thus, scholars have applied case-specific and cross-national theories of civil war onset, intensity and duration to the continent-sized case of India not to predict total state breakdown, but rather for assessing where territorial insurgencies were likely to occur and why.

Two broad approaches have guided the study of major intrastate conflict, in India as elsewhere. The first, reflecting the notion that violent politics after the cold war would likely be conducted on ethnic lines (Chua, 2002), is that of the violent expression of political grievances among ethnic groups in plural societies, particularly

those with significant “horizontal inequalities” (Horowitz, 1985; Stewart, 2008; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). The second argues that internal conflict is more likely where insurgent conflict is more feasible: in places in which the coercive capacity of the state is too weak to forestall or interdict rebellion, features of physical geography enable guerrilla warfare against superior forces, and the presence of alienable resources fuel conflict against the state (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier; Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009).¹

These explanations go a long way to explaining the nature and spatial variation of insurgencies in India. Ethnic separatist rebellions in Punjab in the 1980s and in India’s northeast – and implicitly among tribal-majority regions of the “Red corridor” and the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley – arise out of a latent sense of group-based inequity, combined with ethnic outbidding by political entrepreneurs and the failure (or willful disruption) of ethnic management mechanisms in India’s constitutional structure (Kohli, 1997; Ganguly, 1999; Lacina, 2009). And securitization discourses themselves underplay the real and heartfelt grievances of those who find themselves trapped in conflicts between paramilitaries and insurgents (Peer, 2008; Pandita, 2011). Further, insurgencies throughout South Asia take advantage of mountains and forests in national peripheries and hinterlands from which to wage guerrilla warfare on the state (Gawande, Kapur and Satyanath, 2015; Johnson and Mason, 2008). In the case of Kashmir, material and logistic support that has been provided to rebels by a foreign power reflects the increased viability of rebellions with cross-border sanctuaries and sponsors (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Staniland, 2005).

Yet these explanations overlap in their predictions of where insurgent conflict is likely to occur, almost to the point of over-determination; forested and mountainous

regions are also places in which minority populations, with ethnic grievances, are estranged from the largesse of the state. But these explanations present a partial view of the geographies of violence in India, and the politics behind them, for three reasons. First, research on insurgencies necessarily select on the dependent variable by exploring the exceptional circumstance within which armed rebellions arise; theories that explain extreme outcomes are in general less effective at explaining variation across the universe of violent cases. Second, insurgent conflict in these exceptional geographies does not imply the absence of violence in other spaces, in India's heartland. Rather, these are prone to different forms of internal violence. Third, despite notable exceptions (Staniland, 2017), insurgencies are often studied through a security lens that regularly denudes armed struggles of their political meaning, which in turn naturalizes a false dichotomy between political violence and intrastate armed conflict, thus enforcing a conceptual separation between the exceptional and the quotidian in the geographies of violence.

Riots

In India, social violence – the violent contention by social groups against others or against government actors with such objectives such as policy change, electoral mobilization or the capture of rents – is often brought under the rubric of 'riots.'

Horowitz (2001: 1) defined ethnic riot as "an intense, sudden, though not necessarily wholly unplanned, lethal attack by civilian members of one ethnic group on civilian members of another ethnic group, the victims chosen because of their group membership." Riots have connotations of spontaneous outbursts of violence among crowds, whether against the police or other groups; these were originally thought to be expressions of criminality or reaction to popular frustrations (Gurr 1970). Brass (1997) has, however, argued that ethnic riots in India often involve a complex, latent

arrangement of violent actors and institutions that can be activated by political entrepreneurs when required, to achieve discrete objectives. A key actor in riot contexts – beyond instigators, rioters and victims – is the everyday state. Wilkinson (2004; 2009: 336) has argued that quotidian state actors such as police forces, if they have the right orders – and thus their political masters have the political incentives – usually have the capability to forestall or end riots; in other words, riots occur with the state's tacit permission (or active support).

Although there are several different targets of social violence in India, a deep, wide-ranging academic debate has existed on the causes of riot-based ethnic conflict between Hindus and Muslims, particularly after a wave of violence following the destruction of the Babri Masjid by Hindu nationalist groups in December 1992. Varshney (2003) argued that Indian cities with longstanding traditions of social capital that bridge communities experienced peace, whereas those lacking this form of social capital experienced interethnic violence. Wilkinson (2004) argued that while local political actors might wish to instigate riots to mobilize the electorate at the constituency level, state governments – when relying on minority support in electoral coalitions – deploy the state's coercive force to prevent riots from occurring or halt them in their early stages.

The success of this specific research agenda has, however, thrown a large shadow over other forms and targets of social violence. Importantly, it excludes riot-based violence against other ethnic communities, and thus other dynamics. Veena Das (1995) studied the microdynamics of the anti-Sikh riots in Delhi in 1984 following the assassination of Indira Gandhi, in which more than 2,500 were killed over four days; she argued that the targeting of a Sikh neighborhood was the result of local politics among community leaders. But the targeting of Christians by Hindu extremists in

Orissa, or Muslims by Buddhist gangs in Ladakh, is rarely reported, let alone studied. Social violence between caste-based groups in rural areas – particularly between Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Other Backward Classes (OBCs) over land and employment relations – is similarly obscured (Narula, 1999). More recently, Patidars in Gujarat and Jats in Haryana have clashed violently with the police over state governments' refusal to classify them as "backward" in relation to India's policies of affirmative action (Jaffrelot, 2015). Much recent social violence using the repertoires of riots is explicitly electoral, with the supporters of rival political parties or associated organizations, implicated in local mafias, clashing ahead of national and regional elections (Staniland, 2015).

Social violence, particularly executed through the repertoire of riots, is not unstudied in India, but the tools, data and concepts related to social violence are specific and tend to clash with those of insurgent violence, preventing any integrated geography of violence from being formulated. Part of this is because the data that could populate this landscape is politically fraught. Official government data on riots and other forms of social violence, aggregated from charge sheets, are subject to systematic underreporting (Wilkinson, 2009: 331). In insurgent-prone areas, by contrast, government actors and journalists face different incentives and challenging constraints.

The level of analysis for social violence is defined by the explanatory leverage of the theory in question, whether it involves wards within a city neighborhood, in a paired comparison of cities or at the state level. This spatial flexibility is enormously important for internal validity, but it does present some difficulty in mapping violence more systematically across India, particularly away from urban areas. Different forms of social violence occur in different geographies; as Varshney and Wilkinson have

demonstrated, Hindu-Muslim riots tend to occur in cities, but focusing on municipalities – and the specifically urban political geographies in which they are integrated (Gupte, 2017) – to the exclusion of rural areas tends to underemphasize caste-based violence, which is much more likely to occur in the countryside, let alone insurgent violence in peripheries and hinterlands.

Integrating Riots and Insurgencies

While the separation in social science research between internal war and social violence is explicable, it does limit our capacity to assess the causes and consequences of different modes of conflict within a common national territory, theoretically governed by the same state apparatus. How can one national politics – or even different regional politics with common institutional frameworks – create radically different sorts of violence? Why are the methods and objectives of violent actors so different across the geography of India? In integrating riot-like and insurgency-like conflict into one geography of political violence, we might start answering these questions.

A useful starting point is to classify violence in relation to the closely associated concept of sovereignty. Max Weber's (1991 [1919]) definition of the state, and perforce its ultimate authority embodied in the concept of sovereignty, is that of an organization with a monopoly of legitimate use of force within a particular territory. Charles Tilly's (1985) framework of European state formation sees the deployment and legitimation of violence as integral to the building of strong capable sovereign states, to expand territories, extract resources and eliminate domestic competitors. But in the developing world in the postwar era, in which borders were defined by colonial powers and fixed by international norms, conflict both internal or external to the state has rarely led to the establishment of increased state power

(Philpot, 2001; Herbst, 2000; Centeno, 2003). Thus, *sovereignty-enhancing* violence is not particularly a feature of contemporary conflict in the developing world, except in instances where the state has collapsed and new organizational forms seek to replace it.

There is, however, variation in the relationship between sovereignty and the use of violence by non-state actors. Most instances of internal war are explicitly *sovereignty-challenging*: insurgent groups who explicitly aim to destroy the authority of the extant state over some or all of its territory. But there are instances of the deployment of violence by non-state actors that do not aim to contest the basic authority of the state but rather perpetrate violence while leaving the assumptions of the state's overall authority intact. When religious or ethnic groups target other groups for the purposes of political mobilization, or when party cadres clash ahead of polls, they are doing so without wishing the destruction of the state; indeed, as Wilkinson (2004) argues, they often do so with the state's implicit consent or active support. Similarly, if social groups air their grievances against certain officials or policies, and these demonstrations turn violent through confrontations with the police, these encounters are usually grounded on appeals to the authority of the state for policy change or group recognition within the rubric of state authority. Indeed, most social violence of this type has as its ultimate objective the control or influence of the levers of state power for their own objectives, rather than a revolutionary rejection of the state. For these reasons, I term this violence *sovereignty-neutral*.

This is not to suggest that social violence do not have any causal impact on the legitimacy of the (democratic) state more generally. Indeed, when the state remains a bystander or becomes a participant in perpetrating violence against minorities, its moral authority is diminished. Further, the deployment of coercion by the state or its

proxies is often embedded in larger and more complex landscapes of structural violence and victimization (Gupte, Justino and Tranchant, 2014; Gupte, 2017). For these reasons, sovereignty-neutral violence is at best a partial perspective on the complexity of social violence. Yet I maintain that the categorical distinction, at least based on a *Weberian* understanding of sovereignty, has some conceptual utility, because ordinary citizens and government officials alike do not perceive riot-based violence – unlike insurgencies – as a real challenge to the state’s monopoly of the legitimate use of force.

Sovereignty-challenging violence (SCV) and sovereignty-neutral violence (SNV) have specific repertoires of conflict that are helpful in coding instances of violence as belonging to one category or another. Guerrilla warfare and terrorism characterizes SCV: armed battles between rebels and security forces, targeted assassinations of government officials, remote bombings against government targets. SNV, by contrast, is largely characterized by riot-like engagements: clashes with other groups or police forces, including protests, rallies and marches that turn violent and brawling between political party cadres, as well as the more archetypical ethnic riots. This might also include targeted violence against civilians, forced displacement, assassinations of the leaders of rival groups, or even acts of terrorism aimed at targets other than the state.

To be sure, there are some grey areas. Take, for instance, the response of minority communities against pogroms and ethnic riots. Dawood Ibrahim’s mafia organization orchestrated high-profile terrorist attacks in Mumbai in retaliation for the attacks on Muslims by Hindu mobs in the city following the destruction of the Babri Masjid; the responses of minority ethnic communities to attacks by majoritarian groups are rarely symmetric. Further, the contexts of insurgent violence, interethnic

tension and popular unrest enables and masks local rivalries, criminal activities, and petty disputes (Kalyvas 2006). Riots in the context of regime collapse and violent state response can indeed end up challenging sovereignty, as with the Bengali nationalist uprising in Pakistan before Bangladesh's independence in 1971.

But in the proximate context of a state in no immediate danger of collapsing, like India, classification of violence based on sovereignty is feasible. While there are certain violent incidents that require difficult judgements as to the aims and objects of violence, the majority of incidents can be categorized because there is a strong elective affinity between the aims of violence and its methods: those who attempt to fundamentally challenge the state would be identified and arrested quickly if they chose open rioting over clandestine warfare, and those who aim to take democratic control of or express grievances to the state through popular mobilization are unlikely to do so effectively as guerrillas in remote areas.

To map these different kinds of violence, I utilize the Armed Conflicts and Events Database, or ACLED (Raleigh et al., 2010; appendix 1). The database tracks violent and contentious events within countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia through rigorously cross-referenced media reports. Unlike other geolocated databases that focus on particular forms of violence, such as terrorist attacks, battle-deaths or riots, it includes incidents of violence and contention without distinction. In charting a landscape of violence across Indian national territory, I locate 4,848 incidents, with 1,631 associated fatalities, across 630 administrative districts – county-level administrative units – across a two-year period (January 2015- December 2016).² SNV represented 83 percent of the total incidents, though accounts for 33 percent of the associated fatalities. The spatial distribution of each form of violence is represented in figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1: Incidents of Sovereignty-Challenging Violence in India by district, 2015-16

Source: ACLED Asia.

Figure 2: Incidents of Sovereignty-Neutral Violence in India by district, 2015-16

Source: ACLED Asia.

Figures 1 and 2 capture the essential differences in the geographic incidence of sovereignty-challenging and –neutral violence. The former is, as expected, very concentrated around the locations of contemporary insurgencies: in the Kashmir valley, in the “Red corridor” in eastern India, and in the Northeast. The latter is much more widespread, but located in areas of relative wealth in the south and along the

western coast and the northwest, as well as areas in Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, in addition to the Kashmir valley and the Northeast.

STATE CAPACITY, STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS AND VARIETIES OF VIOLENCE

To explain the spatial dispersion of these different forms of violence across India's territory, I turn to the nature of state power and the relationship between state and social actors at the local level. Variation in the bureaucratic capacity of the state has long been an important explanatory variable in explaining variations in cross-national social and political outcomes. In the study of conflict, low state capacity has long been considered a key indicator of political disorder, because weak states are not capable of successfully countering insurgencies, in addition to sowing the seeds of grievance by not meeting the needs of the population (Huntington, 1968; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Scholars have further specified causal linkages between (under)-investments in state capacity, civil conflict and violent contagion in developing countries (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009; Braithwaite, 2010; Hendrix, 2010; Besley and Persson, 2011).

Most of the research that links state power to social disorder is conducted at the cross-national level, however. In post-colonial countries, some of the most striking variation in the capacity of the state occurs within national borders rather than between country cases. This within-country variation can help us understand incidents of conflict, particularly when differences in the capacities of the state reflect regional economic inequality, which can, in turn, reproduce local state weakness (Buhaug et al., 2009). Some important work on urban political geography has recognized the importance of state response to challenges of social disorder, thus locating variations in violence in the differential capacity of the state to manage conflict locally (Urdal

and Hoelscher, 2012; Moncada, 2013; Fox and Hoelscher, 2015). Regime dynamics can additionally mediate this dynamic: under-institutionalized contexts such as hybrid regimes in which elite competition is not restrained by institutions can lead to both increased disorder and lower capacity of the state to mediate it (Hoelscher, 2015).

For all its utility in specifying the nature of state capacity and political disorder in subnational contexts, some limitations are evident. The first and most obvious is that focusing on urban violence occludes the violence in the countryside, where state structures look and act differently from those involved in urban governance. Second and relatedly, the use of the most readily available measures of violence at the local level, such as homicide rates, may not be capturing the underlying landscape of conflict across national territory. But third, there are serious difficulties with measuring state capacity, particularly at the subnational level, because it is hard to conceptually separate the state's often multiple, and conflicting, intentions, its ability to execute those intentions and resulting social and political outcomes (Naseemullah, 2016).

For this reason, I suggest that it may be prohibitively difficult to use the capacity of the state locally as an explanation for the various forms of conflict present in India today. Rather, the dynamics of governance that might produce different forms of violent action, response and resistance are to be found at the intersection of government and civil society. Variations in society's relationship to state structures at a local level can thus more meaningfully explain the forms of violence that are extant in contemporary India; the study of such variations are part of a larger "state-and-society" research tradition (Migdal, 1988; Migdal, 2001). Adopting an explanatory framework based on state-society relations rather than the power of the state in isolation has three advantages. First, it explores the interplay between coercive actors

representing the state and those in social groups seeking to either challenge or capture it; in this, it does not normalize or excuse violence perpetrated by the state, but rather seeks to characterize its variation.

Second, such relationships are in large part created by earlier investments in state capacity, or the lack thereof, which are often path-dependent (Pierson, 2003). Thus, we can see the present-day effects of previous investments in state capacity, even if these investments were made decades ago. Relatedly, the various regimes of state-society relations have concrete historical roots that are useful for understanding the origins of institutions that reproduce them. In India as with other post-colonial developing countries, many of these institutional investments were made in the period of establishing colonial states in the nineteenth century, building upon but also transforming early modern state structures. Boone (2003) developed a key framework for thinking about the engagements of colonial state actors with different constellations of social actors in sub-Saharan Africa, yielding different topographies of the state. Building on Mamdani's (1994) work on the institutional bifurcations evident in colonial rule, the book represented a watershed for research on the colonial origins of political order, even though much subsequent work involved cross-national rather than subnational research (Acemoglu, Robinson and Johnson, 2001; Lange, 2009; Gerring et al., 2011).

In the last decade, research on the colonial roots of conflict in South Asia has also mushroomed. Varghese (2016) argued that colonial governance forms may determine the latent potential for Hindu-Muslim violence; areas under direct British rule have tended to exhibit lower incidence of this type of violence than those under the rule of princely states, because the latter lacked institutional mechanisms to balance communal interests. Mukherjee's (2013) work on explaining patterns of left-

wing insurgent violence similarly situates indirect rule as an explaining the low levels of state capacity that enables rebellion. Naseemullah and Staniland (2016) provided a conceptual typology of various forms of colonial and post-colonial rule outside of Weberian sovereignty. Yet the challenge for using state formation or colonial practices to explain contemporary outcomes is in identifying the causal mechanisms that might lead to the persistence, or development along separate trajectories, of governance regimes at the local level, while being aware of when these relationships change through exogenous shocks or endogenous change.

To that end, I delineate different regimes of state-society relations in contemporary India by exploring the dynamics of the initial construction of local state institutions in the colonial period, the accommodations, influences and transformations with interlocutors in civil society, and their subsequent transformations after independence. While this cannot be a comprehensive causal mapping of state-society relations, it will focus on the causal roots of distinctions among types of state-society relations that form different regimes of governance today. Specifically, I will focus on the ways that a) commerce, trade and later, industrialization, helped build *hegemonic* state-society regimes around nodes of direct engagement with the international economy, b) different forms of agricultural production and institutions of land revenue and taxation led to *fragmented* and *accommodative* state-society regimes, and c) logics of administrative restraint and geo-political competition formed hybrid and later *revised* state-society relations.

Commerce and Hegemonic State-Society Relations

A key object of British territorial control in India was the enabling the trade of Indian commodities and the creation of markets for British goods. Networks of trade required protective governance arrangements; their nodes were the metropolitan ports

of colonial Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, where expatriate and indigenous commercial interests were located and the international economy engaged domestic production. Important too were cities along key routes of inland trade following roads, rivers and eventually the railways that could facilitate inland trade and link the hinterland to ports. Cities, then, provided key zones of commerce, in which the defense of property rights and the enforcement of contracts required much more durable state presence and power and, crucially, society incorporated into a state-directed and -enforced system of political order (North, 1990).

Due in part to the need for a legal and regulatory infrastructure to conduct commerce, as well as public investments in infrastructure, local governance institutions called municipal corporations emerged in all of colonial India's largest cities in the nineteenth century. Municipal corporations offered indigenous representation in governance – and thus electoral competition – several decades before the emergence of representative institutions elsewhere. Cities like Bombay, Calcutta, Surat, Ahmedabad, Kanpur and Coimbatore were also locations of indigenous industrialization from the late nineteenth century, and thus became sites of bourgeois associationalism and trade union mobilization (Chandavarkar, 1996). These formations reflected Mandani's (1996) 'citizens,' rather than 'subjects,' in the repertoire of colonial governance.

As India became independent, cities represented the leading edge of Nehru's vision for statist development – what Sunil Khilnani (1997: 63-107) has called 'temples of the future' – and thus became recipients of much of the state's resources in projects for state-directed development. Concomitantly, the wealth of urban areas, created by state expenditure and public and private investment, became an object of political and even violent competition, as new political forces – such as the sons-of-

the-soil Shiv Sena in Mumbai and the Communist Party of India-Marxist in Kolkata – engaged with bureaucrats, businessmen and mafia elements to maximize political power and resource mobilization. The notion that cities are governed differently than rural, agrarian India remains salient today. As social groups in South Asian cities are integrated into metropolitan governance, they increasingly demand rights and resources as citizens directly or through political entrepreneurs, rather than relying on kinship arrangements and other traditional structures that persist in the countryside (Heller and Evans, 2010; Chhibber and Varshney, 2013).

Further, urbanization and the proximity to towns and cities create transitional zones of governance in which those in rural areas can take advantage of urban opportunities while maintaining regular contact to agrarian livelihoods. Such zones of transition represent spillovers from the opportunities afforded by the city and the politics that correspond to these opportunities. Yet landed modes of power and authority still hold some sway. These zones of transition thus represent both dynamism and the potential for social conflict. But the nature of conflict in urban and urban-adjacent areas is usually over control over the capacities and actions of the local state: to whom does the government distribute resources, licenses, exemptions, for whom does it formulate helpful policies, whose rights does it enforce, whose criminality does it prosecute and whose does it ignore. Different social and economic groups intuit (quite correctly) that in the urban Indian context, these resources are zero-sum, due to chronic underinvestment in bureaucratic capacities and resources relative to population growth, and so groups compete with one another, at times violently, for the state's attention as well as electorally mobilize to gain power over the state, again at times violently. But the nature, targets and repertoires of this

violence reinforce the centrality of the state, and is thus overwhelmingly sovereignty-neutral, with high incidence of this form of violence relative to other regimes.

Land Revenue and Fragmented State-Society Relations

For the vast rural hinterland of the Indian sub-continent during the colonial period, the state's abiding interest was to maximize land revenue while minimizing the costs of extraction. This led to different zones of rural governance, with different revenue extraction mechanisms, across India's territory. Wars in the south, west and northwest led British authorities to take control of conquered territories and incorporate them directly into the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras and the 'canal colonies' of the new province of Punjab, as previous rulers and their officials were deemed hostile to British interests and British investments created new client populations (Yong, 2005). By contrast, Bengal and the vast Mughal heartland in north India, eventually incorporated as the United Provinces and Bihar, acceded to British rule through agreements and compacts which left much local power intact.

As a result, much of northern India kept at least the form of local taxation structures and authority through intermediate landlords largely intact, while western and southern India saw dramatic changes, which included the direct taxation of peasants or *ryots* by the state. As Banerjee and Iyer (2005) noted, such a difference – between *ryotwari* and *zamindari* systems of taxation – had significant consequences in the presence of the state. The latter relies on notables to maintain order at the local level, whereas the former requires representatives of the state to extract resources, adjudicate disputes and enforce order at the local level.

In the third category of princely states, British authorities did not directly govern, but rather affirmed the notional independence of 'native states' in return for loyalty. In small statelets in India's interior, agricultural production was so marginal

that the British state may have decided that the benefits in terms of revenue might have not have outweighed the administrative costs of setting up local bureaucracies (Naseemullah and Staniland, 2016: 21). In some large and powerful states such as Kashmir, Hyderabad, Mysore and some states in contemporary Gujarat and Rajasthan, however, ryotwari and zamindari systems were established but with the revenues accruing to loyal 'native' rulers rather than the British. These different institutions of taxation, taken together, created a heterogeneous agrarian order with radically different legacies of state intervention in agricultural societies.

Soon after independence, the Indian state integrated princely states into the Indian union and passed laws abolishing the largest feudal landholdings. But the politics of the countryside in post-independence India were deeply bifurcated. In places where productivity was low and there were legacies of limited state intervention, traditional elites at the local level, especially those associated with dominant castes, used political power and social strength to reinforce traditional hierarchies, with the state largely *accommodating* the interests of a united elite at the local level.

In areas with agricultural wealth and traditions of deep state intervention, however, political mobilization emerged among cultivators for greater state engagement in defense of their own interests, in opposition to traditional elites and subaltern aspirants (Varshney, 1998). These politics were deeply implicated in the Green Revolution in northwestern, western and southern India, which enabled a market-based commercial revolution that vastly increased yields and enabled rich peasants to greatly expand their capacities, introduce mechanized cultivation and consolidate political power, but led to contention against those with customary rights to land use (Frankel, 1971). Structural agrarian transformation has given rise to

political conflict, as intermediate castes challenged traditionally dominant elites, and then lower castes asserted their rights against intermediate castes (Jaffrelot, 2002). State power in these contexts is thus *fragmented* by competitive political mobilization, with different communities capturing power at different levels based on varying waves of elections.

Thus in the agrarian heartland of India, two different types of state-society relations have arisen, with consequences for patterns of violence. Fragmented regimes would exhibit more sovereignty-neutral violence as different communities are struggling for power and influence over different elements of the state apparatus, though it's unlikely that this level of contention would approach that of the hegemonic regimes in metropolitan areas, where the presence of the state is more ubiquitous (Gupta, 2012). Accommodative regimes characterized by low production and the control of state power by dominant communities, by contrast, conflict is suppressed as traditional social relations are defended by unitary, quotidian state power.

'Standoff-ishness,' Geostrategic Balancing and Revised State-Society Relations

Administrative restraint was also a key feature of colonial governance practices, one that produced exceptional legal and governance arrangements, some of which have persisted to contemporary politics. There are several sources of this 'standoff-ishness' (Slater and Kim, 2014). State-builders recognized geographically delineated zones of *de facto* administrative exceptionalism in forested hinterlands and mountainous peripheries as homelands for 'indigenous' *adivasi* or tribal communities thought to be separate from normal caste-based agrarian society, often enforcing practices of separation that prevented the latter from dominating the former. Many of these communities were ruled under 'native' petty princes and chieftains rather than

directly under British administration. This is, in part, due to relative paucity of revenue potential relative to the costs of governance in these forested and mountainous areas (Naseemullah and Staniland, 2016). But these communities also practiced strategies of non-incorporation similar to Scott's "Zomia" highland communities in Southeast Asia, strategies that would continue after independence (Scott, 2014).

Light presence of the state was practiced even in contexts of geopolitical threat. From the middle of the nineteenth century, the British colonial state was obsessively concerned with foreign threats to their supremacy in the subcontinent. The greatest perceived threat was from Russian imperial expansion southward into Central Asia; British political efforts to ensure Afghanistan remained a buffer against Russian strategic designs led to three bloody wars (Barfield, 2010). French colonial expansion into Indochina and threats to trade routes into China proper involved similar if more muted strategic balancing to the far northeastern edges of British India (Phanjoubam, 2016).

British political strategies toward the borderlands of its Indian empire were guided by a principle of governance restraint, as colonial administrators were wary of getting dragged into internal and external conflicts. Along with the creation of notionally independent and neutral states such as Burma (until its annexation), Nepal, Sikkim, Tibet and Afghanistan, colonial agents established tribally delineated frontier agencies and specially administered regions to balance the requirements of state presence as strategic buffers with the prohibitive costs of establishing full state sovereignty in far peripheries. As a result, in areas such as the Tribal Agencies along the Afghan border, the 'non-regulated' district of Darjeeling and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), colonial authorities established 'hybrid' rule in which

political agents of the state shared coercive monopolies with tribal leaders (Naseemullah, 2014; Naseemullah and Staniland, 2016).³

After independence, traditions of administrative restraint at borders and hinterlands persisted in some areas, even as exceptional governance institutions were formally collapsed. Much forested land that constituted the livelihood of tribal communities received statutory and regulatory protections that precluded sale or development, though the use of forest resources was the subject of continual contestation (Guha, 2000). Further, the government recognized tribal autonomous areas concentrated in the Northeast as providing explicit exceptionalism for indigenous highland communities (Baruah, 2005). More generally, adivasi communities throughout India kept legacies of internal self-governance and limited engagement with the state well after India's independence.

Tribal self-governance was a norm that relied on the relative neglect of the state in these areas. But in the post-liberalization period, there were heightened incentives for penetration by an alliance of aspirant political actors and their capitalist clients in tribal-majority areas rich in natural resources, thus the state's often coercive attempts to revise older social compacts. Much of the conflict in eastern and central India involves the unilateral reversal of longstanding state policies of restraint, because corporations, often supported by the coercive force of state governments, seek to alienate land for extractive investment (Shah, 2006). These are what I consider *revised* regimes, where society actively disputes the state's new expanded roles in contexts when it was traditionally distant, and are associated with high incidence of sovereignty-challenging violence. As argued above, state capacity is sticky and not easily revised: Dasgupta, Gawande and Kapur (2017) have shown that government social distribution programs, such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee

Scheme, has been successful in restraining Maoist conflict only in areas with enough state capacity for programs to be implemented successfully.

Areas where the state was traditionally weak or absent and where India feels its greatest threat from external powers constitute a special case. The creation of the independent Indian state through Partition established several strategic standoffs. The first and most significant has been over the former princely state of Kashmir, which has been subject to contestation since 1948 that included four interstate wars. A disastrous war with China in 1962 led to strategic standoffs to the northeast from the early 1960s. Unlike the colonial state, however, strategic threats have been not with modulated restraint but by overwhelming military presence in borderlands, where relationships to the state were previously tenuous, such as in the North East Frontier Area or the princely states of Manipur and Kashmir. In these kinds of revised regimes, we should naturally expect high incidence of sovereignty-challenging violence but also high incidence of sovereignty-neutral violence, as military presence and involvement in governance, even a special kind of ‘subnational authoritarianism,’ is likely to provoke rights-based resistance, often violently suppressed by government authorities under exceptional legislation.

We would thus expect different forms of state-society relations to be associated with different patterns of conflict. In hegemonic regimes, we would expect the highest incidence of SNV and the lowest incidence of SNV. In revised regimes, we should see the highest incidence of SCV, and additionally high SNV where the military or paramilitary forces are regularly deployed. In agrarian regimes, we should see lower incidence of violence, but in accommodative regimes, we should see lower SNV and perhaps higher SCV relative to fragmented regimes.

ANALYSIS

These regimes are conceptual types, of course, and would need to be operationalized before their explanatory power can be evaluated. To do this, I measure 628 Indian districts by the proportion of their urban population, the proportion of their tribal population, their district-level ‘GDP per capita’ and their government classification as ‘disturbed.’⁴

Hegemonic Regimes: These are associated with metropolitan governance or adjacent to urban centers. I use the variable *urban* to classify roughly the top quintile of most urban districts by population, with 40 percent or more of the population living in urban areas by the 2011 census. These 103 districts include all the major metropolitan centers in India, as well as adjacent districts, such as Thane in Maharashtra and Kanchipuram in Tamil Nadu, and districts containing other ‘second tier’ cities such as Bhopal, Rajkot, Chandigarh, Surat, Vishakapatnam, Tiruppur, Lucknow, Amritsar and Pondicherry.

Revised Regimes: I use two measures here. First, I categorize as *AFSPA* districts in the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Manipur, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh – 105 districts in total – have been classified as ‘disturbed’ and thus are subject to the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act.⁵ These are areas with traditions of state distance, but in which the military has been deployed because of geopolitical threat. Other districts that I associate with revised regimes are those with a high population of Scheduled Tribes, which are facing the most jarring transition between a traditionally restrained state and contemporary interventions of state governments and allied corporations eager to alienate previously protected land. I classify as *tribal* those districts with the tribal proportion of the population greater than 40 percent, and are not either under *AFSPA* or *urban*, to a total of 50 districts.

Fragmented and Accommodative Regimes: These regimes are associated with the agrarian hinterland, but differ in their amount of wealth and productivity. I classify as *rich agrarian* – associated with fragmented regimes – those districts with urban and tribal populations lower than 40 percent and with district ‘GDP’ per capita higher than Rs. 18,000 in 2004-5, to a total of 195 districts. I classify as *poor agrarian* – associated with accommodative regimes – those districts with urban and tribal populations lower than 40 percent and with district ‘GDP’ per capita lower than Rs. 18,000 in 2004-5, to a total of 180 districts.

The profile of these districts by category for incidents of violence is represented in figure 3.

Figure 3: District-wise Mean Incidents of SCV and SNV, by category

Source: ACLED

Figure 3 generally demonstrates an association between the closeness or distance between the different forms of state-society relations and forms of conflict. In urban, rich agrarian and poor agrarian districts, sovereignty-neutral violence is higher than sovereignty-challenging violence. The mean number of incidents are higher as we move from poor to rich agrarian to urban districts, as the resources to contest over grows. By contrast, tribal and AFSPA districts have a different profile. The districts in

the tribal category have on average more incidents of sovereignty-challenging violence than sovereignty-neutral violence. AFSPA districts have high SCV but even higher SNV, due in large part to the presence of (often violent) protests against military and paramilitary activities in a hyper-securitized context.

To further test local governance and state-society relationships in relation to other common explanations for violence at the district level, I fit models for incidents of sovereignty-challenging and sovereignty-neutral violence per district. For this analysis, I employ *Urban*, *Poor Agrarian*, *AFSPA* and *Tribal*, with Rich Agrarian as the excluded category.

For control variables, each at the district level, I include *Princely State*, *Log Density*, *Scheduled Caste* and *Literacy*. Princely State indicates whether a district consisted of a princely state before independence; Mukherjee (2013) argues that such legacies are associated with higher insurgent violence and Varghese (2016) sees princely states as associated with higher levels of ethnic riots. Low population density is a rough proxy for challenging terrain such as mountains, deserts and forests, which are associated with the feasibility of conflict. Scheduled Caste, the proportion of the population in the district that are members of Scheduled Castes, reflects the communities that have faced the most significant caste-based discrimination, and thus can be used as a proxy for the salience of group-based grievances. Literacy, as the proportion of the district population that is literate, represents human development in the district; we would expect that higher human development would be associated with lower conflict.

To analyze results, I use OLS regressions in the article for ease of interpretation. However, as negative binomial regressions are more resilient to the overdispersion that is characteristic of count data, I also fit negative binomial models

using variables specified above, as an additional check on robustness; these yield broadly the same results, and they are presented in Appendix 2. I estimate OLS models with Huber-White standard errors, clustered by Indian states (table 1).

Table 1: Mean District Incidents of Sovereignty-Challenging and Sovereignty-Neutral Violence

	(1) SCV incidents	S.E.	(2) SNV incidents	S.E.
Urban	-0.25	0.64	7.28**	2.25
Poor Agrarian	-0.10	0.25	-3.88***	0.98
Tribal	2.20	1.22	-0.01	1.95
AFSPA	4.90**	1.68	8.03*	3.66
Log Density	0.69	0.52	4.92**	1.40
Princely State	1.71	0.97	3.47	1.71
Scheduled Caste	-4.49	4.16	1.32	10.70
Literacy	-3.05	1.97	-0.12	6.03
Constant	-1.40	3.30	-25.44*	9.61
R ²	0.17		0.23	
N	630		630	

Significance: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

For incidents of SCV, only AFSPA districts are statistically significant, associated with an increase of nearly five incidents in comparison to the reference category. Both tribal and princely state are weakly significant (p<0.1). For SNV incidents, however, a number of variables were significant. Urban is associated with more than seven more incidents and Poor Agrarian districts are associated with nearly four fewer incidents, compared to the reference category. Richer and more urban regions will tend to have more state resources to fight over, and groups with rising social status through urbanization are more likely to come into conflict with previously entrenched elites, providing a context for electoral polarization and conflict, as with the Muzaffarnagar riots in 2013 (Berenschot, 2014). AFSPA has high substantive and statistical significance here as well, which is expected given that the overwhelming presence of military and paramilitary forces will generate social resistance and violent

state response. In addition, log density has a positive effect; more densely populated districts are associated higher incidence of SNV.

There are some outstanding issues with the causal import of revised regimes in this model, however. Specifically, the AFSPA variable may be picking up the influence of tribal governance, because many of the AFSPA districts, particularly in the Northeast, also have large tribal populations. To see if this is the case, I fit an alternatively specified model which counts only districts in Jammu and Kashmir – ‘disturbed’ districts under AFSPA, but with mostly negligible tribal populations – and distribute the rest of the AFSPA districts to tribal (which grows from 50 to 98), poor agrarian (N=210) and rich agrarian (N=194). The other aspects of the model stay the same, and results are reported in table 2.

Table 2: Mean District Incidents of Sovereignty-Challenging and Sovereignty-Neutral Violence

	(3) SCV incidents	S.E.	(4) SNV incidents	S.E.
Urban	0.10	0.73	7.57**	2.28
Poor Agrarian	-0.14	0.30	-3.74**	1.03
Tribal	1.56*	0.73	1.76	1.83
Kashmir	9.44***	1.06	18.27***	1.59
Log Density	0.30	0.36	4.27**	1.39
Princely State	0.67	0.81	1.06	1.10
Scheduled	-8.54	4.89	-4.08	10.80
Caste				
Literacy	-2.22	2.46	2.82	5.76
Constant	1.59	2.45	-21.76*	10.20
R ²	0.20		0.26	
N	630		630	

Significance: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

In this specification, the correlation between districts with large tribal populations and sovereignty-challenging violence is significant, consistent with the argument of this article; tribal societies maintain significant distance from state actors and thus are

more likely to challenge the state's authority directly rather than compete with other groups over state power or resources. The statistical and large substantive significance of Kashmir is also not surprising. Other results remain the same. It is noteworthy that princely state, literacy or the SC percentage variables are not significant, suggesting that horizontal inequality, development or colonial institutions are not significantly correlated with incidents of violence.

India in Comparative Perspective

The patterns of association between forms of violence and of state-society relations have the potential to travel, but not without some modification. The analysis on India above confirms that incident numbers are concentrated on more urban and transitional governance, even though the intensity of violence remains with revised regimes. This seems to confirm a more general trend – pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa – that has seen a movement in the balance of violent incidents from internal insurgency based in rural areas toward urban violence (Raleigh, 2015).

Other countries in South Asia have comparable but distinct profiles. In Pakistan, for example, a decade of insurgent violence has ravaged territories along its western and northwestern peripheries, regions that maintained an administratively exceptional relationship between state and society, which was then disrupted by the military (Naseemullah, 2014). Such distance mirrors *in extremis* the revised patterns of state-society relations in India. But unlike India, Pakistani cities have been subject to high incidence of both sovereignty-neutral and sovereignty-challenging violence. Karachi has since the 1990s been host to intense violence associated with ethnic and sectarian warfare, and has additionally been the site of Taliban support and mobilization in the 2000s. Also during the late 2000s, the Pakistani Taliban waged a terrorist campaign that effectively targeted sites of state power in cities throughout the

country. Since the early 2010s, the balance of violence has shifted as sectarian groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba have dominating recruitment and resources; this has pushed violent incidents and fatalities to the south of the country, and to both rural and urban areas (Zahab, 2009).

In Bangladesh, however, violence is concentrated in urban areas. Due to the violent origins of the Bangladeshi state and as-yet-unresolved accusations of collaboration with occupying Pakistani forces between political groups, conflict has been centered around political party mobilization and illiberal, winner-take-all electoral competition (Lewis, 2011). But this is partly because Bangladesh was formed out of the Muslim-majority agricultural areas in eastern Bengal under British rule, and thus – with the exception of the Chittagong Hill Tracts – largely lacked the exceptional frontier regions of Pakistan or the tribal majority areas of India. In fact, contemporary Bangladesh has much the same general profile of violence as the Indian state of West Bengal; in 2015 and 2016, nearly three-quarters of violent incidents involved political parties. This deep similarity of electoral violence may be a historical coincidence, but the underlying political economy of West Bengal and Bangladesh, which is increasingly urban and urban-implicated in nature, leads to conflict over the control of the state rather than the authority of the state.

In developing countries more generally, we see a bifurcation of sources for conflict. The first is the reality that the state has not established a uniform sense of legitimacy; there are areas – gaps, rips and jagged edges in sovereignty – in which political entrepreneurs can succeed in challenging the state's coercive authority. The second involves the goods that come with control over the state, and thus the use of both electoral and extra-political means to achieve that control or maintain that

dominance. Given increasing inequality and the deep embeddedness of social elites in state structures, it is perhaps not surprising that we see such divergence.

CONCLUSION

The study of conflict suffers from a problem of myopia when it confronts political geography. Those following the motivations, structures and practices of particular violent groups tend to concentrate on their habitus to the exclusion of areas which are peaceful or in which the character of violence is fundamentally different. Those who seek structural factors that enable violence do not concentrate on the networks and the social context that are vitally important for understanding the reasons behind conflict. A focus on the state, not as an abstract ideal but rather as a set of concrete and geographically specific organizational structures, has the ability to combine these two perspectives. And yet, state capacity is notoriously difficult to measure and narratives of state formation are at great temporal remove from the lived experience of politics today. We need a set of conceptual mechanisms to link the internally varied state at the local level and diverse modes of contemporary political violence. This article attempts such a framework by placing the focus not on the state itself, but rather the ways in which it relates to society at the local level. Variation in state-society relations combines historical influences and more recent transformations in the state to characterize the ways in which the state relates to society. Different state-society relations, in turn, are associated with different forms and patterns of violence.

This article also highlights the insights and limitations of explanations for conflict when rescaling from cross-national to subnational research, or when shifting the focus from explaining particular kinds of violence to a broader universe, understood spatially. Conventional cross-national explanations of insurgent feasibility or horizontal inequality, for example, are not as powerful in explaining incidence of

conflict *within* India, without the mediating causal influence of state structures and state-society relations. And the deep and insightful explanations on Hindu-Muslim riots require some modification when the object is to understand the incidence of other forms of social violence as well. Rescaling and expanding the universe of conflict within national boundaries throws up exciting new possibilities for research into the spatial dynamics of violence in integrated geographies.

NOTES

¹ A third, less spatially predictive, approach focuses on the internal organization and external linkages of insurgent groups as a means for understanding the intensity of insurgencies and the cohesion or fragmentation of rebel groups (Weinstein 2007; Mampilly 2011; Staniland 2014).

² The nature of the data necessitates a cross-sectional research design; a major limitation includes an inability to see the dynamics of conflict over time. However, it does enable us to identify spatial variation in forms of conflict during a particular period when certain factors at the national level – the makeup of the national government, its broad security policies and economic conditions – are held relatively constant.

³ Naseemullah and Chhibber (forthcoming) have recently examined the impact of these institutions, as well as their legacies in delimited state presence, in relation to democratic representation; they find greater constituency-level electoral fragmentation, even despite common electoral rules and party organization under areas with legacies of hybrid rule.

⁴ The sequence of classification for districts is as follows: first, AFSPA; if no, then Urban; if no, then tribal; if no; then either rich or poor agrarian based on district GDP. District GDP was unavailable for districts in Gujarat; human development figures were used for agrarian classification instead.

⁵ The AFSPA variable might lead to concerns of endogeneity, as this piece of legislation, which allows military personnel to act coercively without legal oversight in ‘disturbed’ areas, is associated with the presence of insurgent violence. However, AFSPA was deployed in parts of the Northeast from the 1950s and in Kashmir from

the 1980s, thus is causally prior to contemporary constellations of insurgent violence there, and indeed, might represent part of the reason for the persistence of violence, as this exceptionalism gets calcified into the nature of authoritarian governance.

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Appendix 1: Dependent Variable Classification

For the main dependent variables in this article – sovereignty-challenging and sovereignty-neutral violence – I rely on data from the Armed Conflicts Location and Events Database (ACLED), Asia running files for 2015 and 2016.⁵ For all its manifold virtues, this data has a limitation that are inherent in its construction and data collection: it relies on media reports from multiple sources, which are then subject to rigorous cross-checking. Because of this, the data arise from events that are reported in the media. As a result, violence that is unreported or underreported by the media will not be captured by ACLED data. Further, the broader structural contexts and the events that lead up to episodes of violence cannot be captured; riots are often preceded and accompanied by heightened tensions and spatial segregation, arguments, rivalries, jealousies, stone-pelting and bottle-throwing, and a battle between insurgents and security forces is located within a broader web of informants, intelligence-gathering, the forced displacement of affected communities. But this data can be crucially important for understanding the *spatial distribution* of different forms of violent events; this is the object of analysis in this article.

In the following, I will explicate the coding principles used to exclude irrelevant data and to categorize the remaining violent events into sovereignty-challenging (SCV) and sovereignty-neutral (SNV).

Exclusion

To begin, I excluded all violent events that involved cross-border fire or shelling between Indian and Pakistani armies or security forces, even when soldiers or civilians are hurt or killed in the process. Such events, which included several dozen events, represent international rather than internal conflict. Next, from the category of “Riots and Protests,” I excluded all events that represented non-violent forms of

demonstration and protest through the interaction code of 60, which signifies protestors (as opposed to “rioters”) on one side and no actor on the other. Such acts are simply contentious; they can become *potentially* violent only if the police are deployed (thus are classified under interaction codes 16 or 61).

Classification

Classification was executed through two variables in the ACLED database: event type, and then interaction code. I go through each to explain classification.

Battle-No Change in Territory: These events – usually between insurgent groups like CPI (Maoist) and the police or military (interaction 12 or 13), were classified as CSV, except in instances where the interaction codes indicate battles between rival communal militia (44), or between communal militia and police forces (14). When an unidentified armed group was mentioned, as with gangs of criminals engaging in shootouts with the police, I classify it as SNV unless the Notes refer to an insurgent group.

Remote Violence: I coded these events based on the interaction: whether a non-state insurgent armed group was identified as perpetrating the violence, I would code SCV. Otherwise, SNV.

Riots / Protests: After the exclusions, these were coded as SNV.

Strategic Developments: I coded these based on the interaction: whether a non-state insurgent armed group was identified as perpetrating the violence, I would code SCV. Otherwise, SNV.

Violence against Civilians: I coded these events based on the interaction: whether a non-state insurgent armed group was identified as perpetrating the violence, I would code SCV. Otherwise, SNV.

Appendix 2: Negative Binomial Regressions

While in the main article, I have retained OLS models for ease and clarity of interpretation, negative binomial regressions are considered more appropriate for use with count data that are subject to over-dispersion. In the following tables, I fit negative binomial regression models with the same variables as Tables 1 and 2, with robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by Indian state.

Table A1: Mean District Incidents of Sovereignty-Challenging and Sovereignty-Neutral Violence

	(1) SCV coefficient	SCV Incident rate ratios	(2) SNV coefficient	SNV Incident rate ratios
Urban	1.01 (0.52)	2.74 (1.44)	0.65*** (0.17)	1.92*** (0.33)
Poor Agrarian	0.685 (0.535)	1.98 (1.06)	-1.06*** (0.15)	0.34*** (.05)
Tribal	2.49*** (5.74)	12.08*** (6.94)	-0.46 (0.26)	0.63 (0.17)
AFSPA	3.20*** (0.68)	24.77*** (16.90)	0.81 (0.39)	2.24 (0.87)
Log Density	0.323 (.203)	1.38 (0.28)	0.86*** (.10)	2.37*** (0.23)
Princely State	-0.01 (0.50)	0.99 (0.49)	0.53** (0.19)	1.69** (0.32)
Scheduled Caste	-3.42 (2.05)	0.03 (0.07)	1.38 (1.14)	3.97 (4.53)
Literacy	-3.75* (1.68)	0.02* (0.04)	-1.10 (0.66)	0.33 (0.21)
Constant	-0.60 (1.82)	0.55 (1.00)	-3.31*** (0.482)	0.04*** (0.02)
Pseudo-R ²	0.10		0.10	
N	630		630	

Significance: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

The first model yields results that are broadly consistent with those of Table 1; key differences are that Tribal, with a positive effect, and Literacy, with a negative (but substantively minor) effect, are significant in SCV_incidents, while Princely State has a new positive effect for SNV_incidents. Incident rate ratios present relatively clear interpretations of significant effects. For SCV, tribal districts represent 12.1 and

AFSPA districts 24.8 times the incident rate as the reference category, rich agrarian, respectively. For SNV, urban districts and AFSPA districts have 1.92 and 2.37 times the incident rate as the reference category respectively, while poor agrarian has 0.34 times the incident rate. Princely state is associated with 1.69 the incident rate relative to others.

Moving to the alternative specification represented in Table 2, we see roughly the same parallels between the OLS and negative binomial models, with signs and significances remaining largely the same.

Table A2: Mean District Incidents of Sovereignty-Challenging and Sovereignty-Neutral Violence

	(3) SCV coefficient	SCV Incident rate ratios	(4) SNV coefficient	SNV Incident rate ratios
Urban	0.73 (0.55)	2.08 (1.14)	0.67*** (0.17)	1.96*** (0.33)
Poor Agrarian	0.33 (0.46)	1.39 (0.64)	-0.95*** (0.14)	0.39*** (0.05)
Tribal	1.50** (0.48)	4.50** (2.16)	-0.21 (0.30)	0.81 (0.24)
Kashmir	2.69*** (0.60)	14.76*** (8.87)	1.50*** (0.31)	4.50*** (1.40)
Log Density	0.26 (0.21)	1.29 (0.27)	0.73*** (0.09)	2.08*** (0.179)
Princely State	-0.13 (0.60)	0.88 (0.52)	0.28 (0.20)	1.32 (0.27)
Scheduled Caste	-8.36** (2.65)	0.0002** (0.0006)	0.70 (1.17)	2.02 (2.26)
Literacy	-3.51 (1.87)	.03 (0.06)	-0.49 (0.63)	0.61 (0.39)
Constant	1.12 (1.96)	3.05 (5.99)	-2.75*** (-0.51)	0.06*** (0.03)
Pseudo-R ²	0.08		0.10	
N	630		630	

Significance: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001