War and city-making in Somalia: Property, power and disposable lives

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\begin{abstract}
Rapid urbanisation in Somalia, as in many other war-torn countries, is driven by in-migration of displaced people who are often amassed in camps. Although such camps become institutionalised sites of exclusion where 'bare life' is generated and disposed, they are also characterised by socially messy and continuously evolving relations of space, power, violence and displacement. The article draws on fieldwork with displaced people in Somali cities to analyse claims to property and (often violent) competition to uphold them in contestation for sovereignty. Comparing two cities, Mogadishu and Bosasso, we show how a broad range of international and local actors, including displaced people themselves, negotiate (urban) property and establish relations that guide and foster political authority, while rendering the lives and livelihoods of displaced people precarious and insecure. In property, politics and the economy intersect, and property relations are therefore subject to struggles for both power and profit. We underscore how sovereign power produces spaces of indistinction, but emphasise that property as an analytical category contributes to understandings of sovereignty. Furthermore, propertying as social practice draws attention to the way sovereignty emerges and is connected to the market. This enables the differentiations of forms of sovereignty and draws attention to how it is negotiated, openly challenged or silently undermined.
\end{abstract}

Similar to other war-torn countries, rapid growth of cities is evident in Somalia. Although no reliable statistics on cities are available, it is apparent that urbanisation is to a large extent driven by in-migration of people displaced from other parts of the region. Many cities are surrounded by camps in which the displaced are amassed. Evidence from Somalia's long history of conflict (Cassanelli, 2015; Hoehne, 2016) as well as examples from other countries (Buescher, 2018) suggest that the majority of displaced people will likely stay in the city. This article examines how enforced migration contributes to urbanisation and the making of cities. The focus is on urban camps, as they have evolved into a prevailing mode of conflict-induced urbanisation.

This exploration of camp urbanisation builds theoretically on Agamben's (1998) conceptualisation of the camp as spatial enclosure characterised by a permanent 'state of exception' and used to dispose of 'bare life' - that is, life reduced to its mere biological functions. The camp, according to Agamben, exists outside normal legal frameworks, and this exceptionality allows for the continued reproduction of bare life that Agamben identifies as a core of biopolitics and insignia of modernity. Agamben developed a distinct 'spatial theory of power, sovereignty and displacement' (Ek, 2006, p. 364), which we outline in more detail below. Somalia provides an exemplary case for the empirical exploration of this theory. Against the backdrop of war, state-collapse and internationalised rule, Somalia can easily be interpreted as the 'coming to light of the state of exception as permanent structure' and as an example of how entire populations are transformed into bare life (Agamben, 1998, p. 28; 101). Three decades of violent conflicts across different parts of the country have wreaked havoc on rural and urban environments and people's lives. The state stopped functioning, formal law was suspended,\textsuperscript{1} hundreds of thousands lost their lives, and many more have been displaced and lost their means of survival. In the global (and sometimes local) imaginary, the entire country has acquired a particular status as a deviant space or 'Badland'. This perception is shaped by multiple forms of violence that threaten the national, regional and international order, among them clan-based violence, Islamist militancy, or piracy. Different forms of violence have caused mass-migrations, and have precipitated a large number of international interventions, many of which are ongoing (Al-Bulushi, 2014).

In spite of this convergence with Agamben's theory, we find his...
concepts of sovereignty and displacement too static for the processual character of space and power, displacement and sovereignty, not least in how they have evolved in the midst of the prolonged ‘state of exception’ that has characterised Somalia in the last decades. While we retain Agamben's politically powerful frame of camps as spaces of exception, we empirically ‘re-fill’ it by investigating living conditions in camps, focusing in particular on the ways these camps are managed and governed. We use the example of two cities, Mogadishu in the war-torn south and Bosaaso in the more stable north of Somalia to explore lives in the midst of normalized exception. This empirical analysis builds on 82 interviews, mostly with people who were forced to flee from violence and drought. At the time of the interviews in 2017 and 2018, interviewees lived in eight camps across Mogadishu and five camps in Bosaaso. Bosaaso interviewees had settled in the city between 10 and 19 years, while interviewees in Mogadishu had lived there between 3 months and 8 years.²

Our study shows that displacement produces bare life in Agamben's sense. However, it also shows that camps circumscribe quite different places, and that they are sites where agency exists. We suggest using property as an additional analytical category to capture the socially messy and processual relations of space, power, and violence. Property relations are based on inclusion and exclusion, and link sovereignty - as an attempt to perpetuate authority over a given territory and its people - to practices of displacement. Unlike Agamben, we do not conceptualize sovereignty as a juridical-institutional status (linked to a state), but as social practice in which actors (among them state actors) have to establish and maintain their authority in competition with other actors (Hansen and Stepputat, 2005, p. 3). In support of the processual approach and empirical analysis, we differentiate empirical or de-facto sovereignty from legal sovereignty: the former identified in the ‘right over life’ and thus ‘the ability to kill, punish and discipline with impunity wherever it is found and practiced’; the latter a formalized ‘legitimate right to govern’. Our focus on empirical sovereignty allows us to study sovereignty as a ‘tentative and always emergent form of authority grounded in violence’ (Hansen and Stepputat, 2006, pp. 296–7; also Lund, 2016).

The Somali city examples show that this competition for sovereignty may be executed through claims to property: land, real-estate, territory or, in some cases, people. The violence of these claims and the accompanying production of disposable lives, are striking in the context of Somalia. Nonetheless, the country is neither unique nor exceptional. Processes that are currently unfolding in Somalia are indicative of the (often violent) ways in which political authority is established, and for the global-local entanglements that shape forms of government in conflict-prone regions. In Somalia, cities are assembled through practices in which a broad range of international and local actors, including displaced people, are engaging in the definition, demarcation and contestation of (urban) property and in developing regimes to regulate and control it - albeit from quite different positions of power.

In order to develop this argument, we first outline Agamben’s spatial theory of sovereignty, exception and bare life, but complement it with property. Property, we argue, is well suited to capturing the messy social practices and nuances of sovereignty (in the making) and how these are linked to displacement. After a section that introduces the Somali conflicts and patterns of displacement and urbanisation, the third section comparatively analyses the ways in which displaced people have experienced and act upon existing modes of urban government. We identify propertying ³ as important social practice that structures camp life and determines the ways camps are assembled within the wider city. We also show that actors use property to establish their authority over places and thereby further contribute to violence and displacement.

1. Expanding and propertising ‘spaces of exception’

Agamben’s (1998, p. 12) self-declared correction/completion of Foucault's works on biopolitics is often applied in research on displacement and camps (Bauman, 2004; Giroux, 2006; Martin, 2015; Minca, 2015; Turner, 2005). Biopolitics, according to Agamben, is the process by which exception becomes the rule and by which ‘bare life’, that is ‘life that is irremediably exposed to death’ (1998, p. 2), is indistinctly aligned to politics and moves from the margins to the centre of the political order. Agamben's early identification of the camp as a prototypical ‘space of exception’ and as ‘hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity’ (Agamben, 1998, p. 73) is confirmed in the existence of Guantanamo Bay, or by international regimes governing mobility. Policies to regulate in-migration to Europe are, for example, characterised by their indifferent acceptance of the death of thousands of migrants in the Mediterranean, and by the establishment of militarized camps where people - whose crime seems simply to be their search for better lives - are incarcerated. Sovereign power no longer establishes itself merely as border between law and exception, but develops into a ‘zone of irreducible indistinction’ (Agamben, 1998, p. 9) allowing or even promoting the expansion of camps as sites for the disposal of bare life.

The global zone of indistinction is filled with bodies of migrants. Their government-through-containment attests to the rise of new forms of internationalised rule, a ‘global governmentality’ that transcends the state-centred focus on national populations and instead targets the human population at a global scale (Larner and Walters, 2004; Lui, 2004; Agier, 2010). The global government of migration is cooperatively executed by international humanitarians and national sovereigns. In spite of their benevolent intention, humanitarians display a ‘secret solidarity’ (Agamben, 1998, p. 133) with sovereigns by emphasizing humanitarian needs of the displaced and by making the ‘management of the basic functions of life’ their main business (Hoffman, 2008, p. 405). Humanitarians thereby separate political life from life reduced to its biological functions. While they are treating the displaced as incarnations of bare life, they are reducing them to their need for humanitarian support in order to be kept alive. In this way, humanitarian regimes are inadvertently contributing to the expansion of bare life (Agamben, 1998, p. 78; Turner, 2005, p. 314).

Although Agamben's version of biopolitics seems to have become a sad reality, his work also been critiqued. His ‘eclectic collection of empirical evidence’ (Mills, 2004, p. 47) and undifferentiated treatment of camps neglects variety and renders camps and their inhabitants indistinguishable (Turner, 2005, p. 313). His homological understanding of biopolitics contrasts with Foucault's genealogical and empirical exploration of how modern institutions emerge as part of knowledge practices that establish truth claims and constitute normality through procedures of exclusion. That is, by separating the rational from the mad, the normal from the abnormal, the truth from the false (Foucault, 1996, pp. 10-11) and, we would add, the productive from the disposable. Agamben also ignores camps’ embeddedness in wider economic and political processes (Lemke, 2005, pp 4-5), thus de-historicizing and depoliticizing them. The Somali examples show that camp life is shaped by (political) negotiations, contentions and struggles, and confirm the need to delve deeper into the ways camps are embedded in the political economy of the city and beyond. Camps in Somalia are subjected to struggles for both profit and authority, and this has drawn our attention to the relevance of property in these struggles.

Devenney (2011) has recently elaborated the political character of property, inherent in any form of deliberation and decision-making. Accordingly, property establishes enclosures by activating boundaries that demarcate inclusion and exclusion, and differentiate those who

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2 The interviews were conducted by teams of researchers led by Abdirahman Edle Ali. Among the researchers were Ahmed Abdulahi Dualeh (Hargeisa), Mohamed Abdiqadir Botan (Bosaso), Ahmed Takow Hassan (Mogadishu) and Ismail Abdullahi Moalim (Baidoa). Our thanks for their exceptional work.

3 Term borrowed from Elliott, 2016: Footnote 22.
access or appropriate property from those who don’t or can’t. This characterisation of property can be traced back to Max Weber (1980: pp. 23-24, 203ff.), who conceptualised property as ‘organised social closure’ constituted through rights and obligations that provide some people with access to (tangible or intangible) objects while excluding others. Property is thus enacted by mobilising and assembling specific relations between people and objects, relations that are then, as property, normalized and often also naturalised. Blomley additionally emphasizes how property practices violently enact and shape space (2003, p. 122). Focusing on private land, he demonstrates how violence has been used to claim, enforce and defend property while displacing others (Blomley, 2003, p. 121, 128). We label as propertying, both the practices of assembling material and immaterial relations that enact space, and their simultaneous generation of (layered) rights and obligations that guide those relations themselves.

According to Devenney (2011, p. 152), property is mostly regulated by a sovereign who builds on legal and violent means to define and delineate (rightful) owners from criminals. Sovereignty is therefore executed, in part, through the definition, enforcement and enactment of property. However, sovereignty itself is not external to, but deeply intertwined within, property as it lays claim to ownership of land, which is then transformed into and produced as territory (Bahia, 1971; Lund, 2016). Territory is the form in which space is produced by a ruling authority or a state in a specific historical period (Elden, 2013, p. 6; Agnew, 1994). This production of territory is rooted in and simultaneously perpetuates particular relations of property in which the ruling authority claims ownership and control over land and people in ways that enhance knowledge of that territory. Using measurements, surveys, statistics and maps, territorial property establishes boundaries that constitute an ‘inside’ order of politics based on shared norms, and separates this from an ‘outside’, delineated as a potential threat to the former. These technologies also produce land in particular ways and eventually naturalise this process. Although land merely circumscribes a politicized, potentially enforced, and always policed ‘relation between owners and others (including non-owners)’, it is increasingly perceived as essential relation between an ‘owner and inert space’ (Blomley, 2003, pp. 131–32). Property thereby evolves into an important disciplinary mechanism that shapes people’s behaviours and reifies relations of power. Foucault (1994, p. 99) additionally outlined that the increase and moral upgrading of property required adjustments of norms of legality and illegality, continuous surveillance, and new technologies of inquiry able to capture those who transgress property regulations. Such governmental practices and technologies of propertying produce effects like the ‘isomorphism of space, place and culture’ (Gupta and Fergusson, 1992, p. 7). This fosters a sense of belonging whereby a sovereign is aligned with a territory, and both are naturalised as national (Painter, 2010).

However, as Agnew (1994) reminds us - and as Somalia exemplifies - territory is only one kind of spatiality, and political power can inscribe itself in spaces in many different ways. It is therefore helpful to draw again on Weber (1980, pp. 203ff.) who discussed the relationship between property and political authority in more detail. He outlined how types of authority assemble relations of property in various ways, ranging from patriarchal, patrimonial, hierarchical and personal, to more impersonal, bureaucratic, commercialized-private, collective or sacralised relations characterising different forms of ownership. According to Weber (1980, pp. 209ff.), the organisation of enclosure of a valued object, also implies that owners start to develop an order that ensures the persistence of rights and obligations vis-à-vis things and each other. Propertying is thus executed simultaneously with others and towards others, as it implies and generates rules that govern and order social life. Weber also outlined that property depends on the availability of mechanisms to enforce this order. The need to reiterate and if necessary defend, or enforce, principles and relations of property rationalises the formation of political authority. Sovereignty, in our understanding, emanates from, and goes beyond, political authority as it entails the recognition of the right to define property. As the highest form of political authority in a territory that sovereignty itself constitutes, sovereignty is itself an expression of established relations of property, but is simultaneously constituted as power to define and demarcate these relations. Sovereignty makes property relations legal and (violently) protects both the relations and borders that property constitutes and reproduces. The decision of who is entitled to hold property (and in which form) is, as Lund (2016) reminds us and the empirical analysis below shows, deeply interwoven with questions of belonging, and thus with questions of citizenship.

The following sections explore practices, relations, technologies and (emergent) regimes of property in Somali cities through the experiences of displaced people. This approach reveals how actors enforce claims towards sovereignty, how these claims are intrinsically linked to displacement and contribute to the creation of disposable life. It also shows that bare life exists with many nuances and variations, and that it is, at least in these Somali cases, not without agency.

2. Conflict-driven urbanisation: Mogadishu and Bosaaso

Cities in contemporary Somalia have been profoundly shaped by political and economic instability, violent conflict and war. Mogadishu and Bosaaso are located under different political authorities tenuously embedded in attempts to rebuild a central state and to re-establish state sovereignty. Mogadishu is the capital of the Federal Republic of Somalia, internationally recognised as sovereign since 2012. The city hosts a parliament and a government which exercises limited empirical sovereignty beyond the city’s limits. This government’s authority depends to a large extent on the military support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the political support of the UN and other donors’ and to ‘security partners’ linked to the Global War against Terror. The port city of Bosaaso is the economic hub of the Puntland State of Somalia. Puntland was established 1998 as an autonomous region. Although Puntland has been described as the most fully consolidated member of the newly founded Somali Republic (Mosley, 2015), formal relations between Puntland and the Federal government remain unstable and ill-defined.

Many of the violent conflicts that shattered south-central Somalia found their most pronounced expression in Mogadishu. The city was at the centre of power-struggles immediately following the collapse of the state in 1991, when violence was driven by competition between the clan-based militias that had ousted President Siyaad Barre (in power since 1969). This period was also characterised by indiscriminate persecution and mass-killing of people affiliated with Darood (sub)clans associated with the former government (Bakonyi, 2010; Kapteijns, 2013). With their leaders unable to agree on a power-sharing formula, militias started to fight in changing alliances against each other. The intertwining of (claims to) sovereignty with (claims to) property, and both justified through claims of belonging, was clearly visible when clashes between the two main contenders for the Presidency led to the division of Mogadishu, each party (more or less) controlled by one of the self-proclaimed Presidents and their militias (Marchal, 2002, p. 2). Since the presidential contenders hailed from the Hawiye ‘clan-family’, these two areas were increasingly associated as ‘belonging to’ one or the other sub-clans of the respective self-declared Presidents.

The claim to political authority was translated into a right to
property, as militias took over previously state-owned buildings, among them schools and hospitals, but also state-owned export farms and land in regions neighbouring Mogadishu. Some militias even claimed property of bodies, forcing people from racially stigmatised groups to work on their newly acquired farms (Bestemann and Cassanelli, 2003). Claims to ownership rapidly expanded from public and government sites to more mundane buildings, such as houses, shops or restaurants of people considered loyal to the former dictator. While expanding their power from Mogadishu to other regions, militias targeted members of weaker or unarmed clan groups, committed numerous atrocities, expropriated land and farm products, and even looted food stocks in the regions in which they tried to establish control (Bakonyi, 2010). The right to rule was translated into the right to take ownership, to transgress and reshuffle existing property relations. This extortional warfare in combination with a drought precipitated a large-scale humanitarian crisis and drew in the first military humanitarian intervention (1992–95), led by the United States and the United Nations.

UN forces left Somalia in 1995. Mogadishu, like the rest of south-central Somalia was divided into a patchwork of smaller enclaves, each controlled by a militia from a Hawiye (sub-)clan and their leaders, so-called warlords. The intensity of violence decreased under the authority of the warlords (1995–2005), partly because the fragmentation of clan-militias resulted in the loss of violent man power, and partly because of a rising business class. Commercial activities were initially conducted through profitable alliances with warlords, but over time many business people mobilised their own militias to defend their newly acquired properties, and their interests increasingly deviated from those of the warlords (Marchal, 2002). Business people also supported the establishment of Islamic courts in the early 2000s, as they provided mechanisms to protect property and helped to regulate trade across the territories controlled by clan militias (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Ahmad, 2015). Multiple actors, among them militias, warlords and religious organisations, simultaneously claimed and exercised sovereignty in Mogadishu and beyond, at times in contestation, at other times in cooperation with each other.

When a rising Union of Islamic Courts appeared to have prevailed in the sovereignty contest, the Ethiopian military intervened on the side of an internationally-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG), an institution that included many warlords. The defeat of the Courts Union in 2006 instated the TFG as the ruling authority in Mogadishu. Ethiopian forces were later joined by troops from the African Union (AMISOM), and the TFG-AMISOM alliance was soon engaged in renewed fighting with a revived Islamist movement, spearheaded by Al-Shabaab. By 2010, Al-Shabaab controlled most of south-central Somalia, while the authority of the TFG and their international supporters was limited to certain districts in Mogadishu.

From 2007, violence between Islamist militias and TFG/AMISOM forces escalated dramatically, especially in Mogadishu. Both sides were engaged in massive human rights violations and used indiscriminate violence (HRW, 2007) leading once more to large-scale displacements out of Mogadishu. Combined with Al-Shabaab’s aggressive stand against humanitarian organisations, the war aggravated the effects of a drought, leading to a famine roughly coinciding with the withdrawal of Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu in 2011. Both initiated large-scale migration into the city, where humanitarian aid was available and security slowly improved. The transition period of the government ended in 2012, and the Somali Federal Government (SFG) established itself as rightful sovereign in Mogadishu. By then approximately 300,000 displaced people were living in Mogadishu, mostly in deplorable conditions (Hammond, 2013, p. 70). Three years later, a UNHCR-led profiling survey identified 400,000 internally displaced (UNHCR, 2016, p. 3), a number that would amount to nearly one third of Mogadishu’s estimated 1.5 Million inhabitants. Many newcomers squat in ruins of collapsed buildings, construct huts or tents (Somali: bital) in ‘empty’ city places, or join overcrowded camps at Mogadishu’s outskirts (see photo 1).

Camp settlements in Mogadishu became entangled in a rising number of land disputes that are often articulated in clan terms (RVI and HIPS, 2017). Although Mogadishu is populated by people from all clans, most districts and neighbourhoods continue to be politically dominated by (and associated with) particular Hawiye sub-clans that used to control them during the ‘warlord’ period.

Compared to south-central Somalia, the north-east has remained relatively peaceful. The port city of Bossaso, largely spared from mass violence, became a major destination for people displaced from other regions. In-migration was also stimulated by economic growth and employment opportunities, as well as by Bossaso’s proximity to Yemen, providing an option for dangerous migration to the Arabian Peninsula or further (Ali, 2016). The foundations for Bossaso’s economic growth and its development into an international trade-hub were laid in the 1980s when the city started operating a duty-free port and when the road that linked the city to the south was rehabilitated (Marchal, 2010, p. 19). With state collapse and the intensification of violence in Mogadishu many people from the former dictator’s extended Darood lineage group, among them also former government officials, moved to the northeast where they sought sanctuary from clan-targeted mass violence. Some of these in-migrants used their savings (including money previously embezzled from state coffers) to transition into private enterprise. The creation and relative stability of the Puntland administration since 1998 attracted investment from the Somali diaspora and facilitated the rise of a new business class (Marchal, 2010, p. 20).

Different phases of conflict in south-central Somalia also prompted those from other regions to move north. For example, many people from the Bay, Bakool, and Lower Shabelle regions fled to Bossaso after 2006 in an attempt to escape the war between the government/AMISOM and Al-Shabaab. In 2001, UNDP (2001, p. 58) estimated Bossaso’s population at around 60,000, while nine years later UN Habitat estimated already 150,000 people, among them 35,000 internally displaced people (Decorte and Tempra, 2010, p. 16). The city’s municipal government even reported a total population of 500–700,000 in 2015 (IDMC, 2015, p. 5). While these statistics are likely inaccurate, available satellite imagery of the city since 2003 demonstrates the rapid expansion and urban sprawl of the city.

Compared to Mogadishu, relative stability in Bossaso has allowed for a rather uninterrupted process of displacement-linked urban growth. This has played out over a longer period, and allowed for urban planning. This has included the development of an urban transformation plan entailing the resettlement of displaced people. UN agencies, in collaboration with the Puntland state, the local municipal government, and private landowners, have relocated a large number of displaced people from the city centre to its outskirts (see photo 2). The resettlement was undertaken alongside other infrastructural developments and has had a lasting impact on the character of property relations and interactions between displaced people from clan groups different to those claimed to be original inhabitants of the city, even if those original ‘local’ inhabitants arrived as recently as many other displaced people.

The following section compares settlement practices of the (seemingly) spontaneously formed camps in Mogadishu with the planned re-settlement areas in Bossaso, and explores mechanisms and norms governing camp life. The analysis shows that even without formal land-

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6 Prolonged insecurity has made Somalia particularly resistant to surveying practices that accompany (biopolitical) forms of statebuilding (Bakonyi, 2018). The few numbers in this article are rough estimates and provide merely an indication of trends.
use policies or legislation, property relations are enacted, and guide and foster claims of authority.

3. Property and precarity in Mogadishu

The following is an extract from an interview with Wiilo (Mogadishu, 09/01/2018), a 38-year old woman who fled to Mogadishu during the famine of 2011:

The rivers dried, there was no water and there was a bad drought – through Jilaal, Gu and Deyr [seasons] the water did not come back.

At no time did water come back. We were without water. It was hard when my children died. So, we came [to Mogadishu]. Two of my brothers and I were living in a place owned by the government […] that I now forgot the name of. After some time, we were told to vacate the camp because the land was the government’s. We then moved to Maslah camp and lived there for one or two years. We then moved and settled at Shabelle University [another camp] and that is where we stayed for some time, and worked for ourselves. We woke up early in the morning to go into Xamar [Mogadishu] to look for work, like laundry, when it was available […].

So, the government kicked you off the land you were on?

Someone came in the camp and wrote something on a red painted area. I didn’t understand it, because I cannot read. I can just write my name. Some of the elders came and read it for us and said that it was a notice for us to vacate the camp. We had a month before we would be kicked out. The man who warns you is not killing you [proverb]. My father told us before the notice time ends, he will go and look for a place for us to move. My brothers were living in Maslah camp and we then moved there […] and lived there for about year […]. Then [we came] here in my current camp where I lived for three years. I came to Mogadishu five years ago.

How was the life in your previous camps?

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7 Beyond narrative interviews, the research also drew on photo-voice and equipped displaced people with cameras to document their daily lives. This article does not draw on the photo-voice analysis, but uses two of the photos to illustrate camp spaces. For details of the research design and outcomes: securityonthemove.co.uk.

8 We cannot show if and how these patterns were affected by al-Shabaab. The Islamist militants continue to exert considerable influence in both cities, e.g. through shadow taxation systems and Shariah courts, and therefore likely affect property. However, interviewees did not talk in great detail about al-Shabaab. This might be because of fear or because their everyday was not (much) affected by them.
I speak the truth clearly, and don’t lie: we never even got a bar of soap to wash in those camps. The first year after I came from Dhoohey [rural area], I didn’t know the place or anyone around and didn’t have any family nearby [...] But luckily my sister-in-law and her children knew the place better than me. They helped me look for work - laundry and cleaning houses. That camp had many thieves. They steal from you. There was no security and no one did anything about it. It was dangerous, you could be hit or killed!

You’ve been in the Shabelle University Camp for three years. Who helped you to settle in your current camp?

It was people who came from Dhoohey, and we used to know each other. When they heard that we got displaced from Maslah camp, a girl who is married to my cousin came to my rescue. She asked me where we were moving and I told her that I didn’t have anywhere. We came with some of our belongings – but they destroyed most of our other things.

So, soldiers were there?

Yes! We came out and sat under the tree with our blankets. Most other things were just destroyed. She told me to wait outside while she looks for a car. She took us to her place, and that is how we came here. So, the girl brought us, we came from where we were living before to [the camp] here. Thank God for her, we thank God that we are doing good. We settled here. Even though we fear bloodshed, fire and fighting on the street, apart from that, it is peaceful here.

All those camps that you were displaced from in the first or second place belonged to the government. What about this place, who owns it?

It belongs to some guys from the Abgal clan, but the owner’s name is [first name]. He owns it. One cannot just settle here. The land belongs to [him], but some guys rented it from him. If you want to move in, you ask first the guys who rented it, and they will ask you if you want them here and build a life here or if you want a temporary stay. Because, there are those who don’t want to live here [...] but just to build tents and move to other camps when there is food-rationing going on. So, you say you want to live here, and if you say permanently, then he will give you a place on the land and allow you to build your tent. If the space isn’t enough, like mine – I have my children with me, my son who is here with his wife, my daughter who is with her husband and my other daughter […] – they add more space to build. So, you cannot just move in freely. [...] They don’t charge rent, but when assistance comes and if you get something, they will ask for something small. Those who want to give to the owners will give, and if you don’t want, no one will force you. [...] There are people in Xamar [Mogadishu] who have huts in this or that camp. There are some places around that are known as ‘buush baris’ [rice huts]. People who live in other neighbourhoods establish a hut (in a camp) so they can come in the mornings when food is distributed and get their ration. They are there until the afternoon, then they just go back home. Then, you don’t see them. They don’t spend the night here.9

Wiilo’s story epitomises the permanent emergency and ‘state of exception’ that have characterised large parts of south-central Somalia since 1991, and the ways ‘bare life’ is generated and maintained. It indicates the centrality of property as a spatial technology through which authority materialises in space, and shows how property is socially selective and often violently enacted. Even once property relations are established, they continue to enact violence on people who are dispossessed or excluded from access, forcing them to continue a living at the “edge of catastrophe” and thus rendering their lives precarious, insecure or bare.10

Wiilo (and many other interviewees) show how displaced people relied on information from relatives and neighbours who migrated before them and who either directed them to camps where they themselves lived or where some assistance was available. Displaced people without social networks and prior knowledge of the city often ended-up on the city’s streets where they turned to begging for their survival. However, it usually did not take too long until newcomers would be directed to one of the camps, to erect make-shift huts (buush) on land which the interviewees referred to as goof – meaning uninhabited, unused land. Although uninhabited, these lands were not owned, as interviewees also referred to the Goof-leh, the owners of unused land, usually a group of people or, as in Wiilo’s case, an individual railing from a locally dominant lineage group.11

Land owners often rent land to entrepreneurs who initiate camp settlements. Referred to by displaced people as camp leaders, these entrepreneurs establish themselves as middlemen between land owners and the displaced, and, between the displaced and international organisations. Leaders actively direct displaced people to ‘their’ camps, trying to gather a large enough number of settlers to be recognised as camp by international organisations. Several interviewees even received initial support to settle from the leaders. See for example Kheyrta’s arrival in Mogadishu:

When I came [to Mogadishu] I didn’t come directly to the camp. We were brought to the main highway. We stayed there for two days under a big tree. Then a lady came for us and took us to a big field. Then we built small makeshift houses, and were given a kilo of sugar, mattresses, food and clothes by the people. The good lady also distributed 100[$] to each family to build houses. We bought plastic bags and shaded the house with it (Kheyrta, Mogadishu, 9/01/2018).

As Wiilo, Kheyrta and others explained, the leaders decide who is allowed to settle in the camp, register newcomers and identify the spots where they can set-up huts. Access to the camp can only be gained through him/her, and resources channeled into camps have to pass the leader. Leaders often work with a committee of displaced people who support the daily management of the camp. When asked about the main activities of leaders, interviewees emphasized their search for international support. In case international aid is obtained, the leaders will take their share.

Many displaced base their decision on which camp to settle in on the availability of international aid. Particularly those who have settled longer in Mogadishu actively look for camps with aid connections. Once a camp regularly receives aid, the inhabitants may have to pay rent:

There are camps in the city that get aid, but the leader needs to accept you to join. I would have wanted [to move there], but I cannot [afford]. [...] Some of these camps are expensive. You have to pay monthly to settle and stay there [...] like 50,000 SoSh, up to 108. You also have to pay money before you are given a plot to settle. You pay to build [huts] there (Aliya, Mogadishu, 09/01/2018).

International organisations refer to the leaders as ‘gatekeepers’ and criticize the ‘layers of gatekeeping’ around such camps as they impede

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9 Interviews were conducted in Somali, translated and transcribed into English, then language edited and anonymized.

10 We build here on Duffield’s (2019: 115) elaboration of precarity as condition where ‘casualization, informalization or unpredictability of work coexist with economic vulnerability, environmental uncertainty, and an openness to surprise and shock.’ Precarity in its extreme form constitutes living conditions characterised by daily struggles for survival.

11 The Abgal clan she refers to is a Hawiye sub-clan, associated with one of the self-declared Presidents of 1991, and a clan that inserts considerable influence in many Mogadishu districts.
information-management and cause the aid diversion (Saferworld, 2012, p. 16). Interviewees confirmed these challenges, and especially emphasized the practice of setting up *buush barsi* (rice huts). Rice huts are established by Mogadishu residents who, in arrangement with camp leaders, try to receive their share of international aid. Interviewees didn’t usually criticize this ostensibly deceptive practice. Although they acknowledged that not only the displaced are in need of support, their acceptance may also relate to a deeply engrained view of international aid in Somalia as a public good belonging to everybody who manages to access it.

Most interviewees were rather positive about the role of gatekeepers/leaders and referred to their continuous efforts, their responsibilities, and the high costs of daily camp management. Leaders advocate for hygiene and cleanliness, support people in distress, mediate disputes, and provide rules for behaviour. They also provide (rudimentary) security as the protection of the leader’s clan extends to his/her property (including businesses) and therefore to the camp. While leaders’ daily engagement is visible to the camp inhabitants, aid organisations were regularly criticized for their failure to provide support:

In fact, they [the leaders/gatekeepers] help us by building us pit latrines, they were cooking food for us in the beginning, and because we were new, they welcomed us very nicely. I’ve never seen an organisation in Mogadishu help us (Sokorey, Mogadishu, 08/01/2018).

Gatekeeping was not viewed as overly problematic, but some interviewees felt that land owners rather than gatekeepers/leaders were taking advantage of them. Interviewees described how they added value to the land, made it habitable, cleared bushes and rubble, or dug pit latrines. Their settlement stimulated economic and social development: boreholes and water points were established, electricity brought to the camp, (private) schools or madrassas started to cater for students, pharmacies, kiosks and small shops opened. International aid supports the establishment of schools, mother-child clinics and other services that attract more displaced people, but also other residents, to settle in the neighbourhood. However, once a camp is integrated into the city’s commercial, aid, infrastructural and trade networks, the value of the land rises, and land owners often wish to develop the land or sell it to private investors, with the consequence that the camp inhabitants are once again forced to move. Wiilo’s experience with evictions are therefore common in Mogadishu. Shoooba outlined similar dynamics of propertying, land development and evictions:

[The land] becomes valuable because it was a forest and we made it liveable land by cutting unwanted trees and cleaning it. And then, when so many people demand to buy it, they make us move, claiming that it does not belong to us but that it belongs to them [...]. After some time, they come with a taxi and they look at the land all around, and they say this land is wanted, you must move (Shoooba, Mogadishu, 09/01/2018).

Evictions are part of wider land and property dynamics in post-conflict environments. Modest improvements in security initiated attempts to reconstruct the city. Investments in building, real-estate, social and physical infrastructures were driven by the Somali business class, the diaspora, and international donors. This building boom led to spiking land and real-estate prices, drawing the attention of government and private investors to the large numbers of displaced people squatting in private or previously state-owned land and (ruined) buildings. The consequences have been cycles of often violent mass evictions of people from the increasingly valuable camp estates. In December 2017, for example, almost 35,000 people were evicted from the two Mogadishu districts Kahda and Deynille (NRC, 2018). Many evictees had resided for several years in these settlements, which were ironically named ‘Protect Rights’ (*Xaq Dhawr*). These and other evictions destroy the built infrastructure, interrupt social networks and livelihoods, and therefore underscore the extreme precarity of camp life.

People living in these camps again lost their few belongings, and were forced to search for new places and means to rebuild their lives. The significant increase of such evictions since the Federal Government of Somalia established its rule in Mogadishu and the increased competition between actors from the government and those in the ‘regional’ administration governing the city (RVI and HIPS, 2017, pp. 80–88) exemplify how, in struggles over property, attempts to establish sovereignty intersect with attempts to make profit.12

Taken together, investments in the city’s built environment, the gentrification of the centre, and sprawling peri-urbanisation, are continuously changing the cityscape and living conditions in Mogadishu. The articulation of property rights, however, renders the most vulnerable inhabitants in a continuous state of precarity, enforcing them to continue moving and precluding their settlement on a secure basis.

## 4. Property, precarity, and urban planning in Bosaaso

The experiences recounted below by Himilo, a chair-lady and camp leader in Bosaaso, provide a snapshot of a life that has long been lived on the move. Her story traces her migration from Ethiopia to Mogadishu in the wake of the 1977 Somali-Ethiopian war, and then flight again from conflict and state collapse in the early 1990s. Her attempts to settle and survive in Bosaaso are characteristic of many interviewees who continue to live in situations of long-term displacement and precarity.

I was born in Ethiopia. My parents migrated with me during 1977 when there was war between Somalia and Ethiopia. We went to Jalaalga [town] as refugees and then came to Mogadishu [...]. I grew up in Mogadishu, I married there and had children there too [...]. At the time of the destruction [of the state] my husband’s hand was injured and we left for Baidoa and Baraaawe [southern cities]. Then we entered Ethiopia and eventually reached Addis Ababa. Our living conditions were hard and crowded and we didn’t find a peaceful place after the destruction, so eventually I came to Bosaaso. In between, I went to Djibouti, and was in Jigjiga [Ethiopia] [...].

Since I came to Bosaaso 18 years ago I have passed through three places. We were in Tuurjaale, and we moved from there to a place by the mosque Tawakal. We moved from another place to Raf łyo Raahó. There was land owned by the people of the community, an elder I knew had a big plot [...] which we were to be transferred to. We went to the old man to give us a place to live. [We said] you can see we have been told by the owners of the land that we were staying on to leave within three days or otherwise the soldiers will kick us off. It was written on paper that they brought to me [...]. This was four years ago. I read it and so I went to the government and told them that we didn’t have money to migrate, and the number of people in the camp was 800. I went to an old man who was from the town and who was rich and he gave us land, 400m², for free. So, we settled there and I went to the humanitarian agencies called CARE and DRC. They built toilets and they brought two water tanks for us. We are staying there now, and there is no money that is being charged for rent [...].

We only built makeshift tents [buush] and [once] they [international organisations] gave us tents with iron poles [...]. My house is a tent and what we built with worn-out cloth is prone to fire. Thieves and rapists can get in. They are vulnerable to winds and also the heat during the summer time. So, we are living this type of life (Himilo, Bosaaso, 30/07/2018).

Himilo has lived for 18 years in Bosaaso, but her everyday continues to be characterised by precarity. Here too, displaced people have

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12 Lund (2016) and Elliott (2016) outlined how colonialists used property to establish sovereignty while making profit.
experienced cycles of forced evictions.

The relation between precarity, property and insecurity is increasingly acknowledged by international actors. By 2009, a framework to provide ‘Durable Solutions’ to displaced populations had been adopted by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (itself established in 1992 to coordinate global humanitarian assistance). This framework partly guided projects to improve housing conditions and provide tenure security for displaced people in Bosaaso. Implemented between 2005 and 2014 and supported by the Puntland government, Bosaaso’s municipality cooperated with international actors, prominent among them UN Habitat, to resettle 1,700 displaced households to land east of the city. This rocky and sandy land was privately held, but landowners donated some of their plots to the municipality. In exchange, their remaining land was connected to urban services and the value for it increased (IDMC, 2015, p. 4). The new plots were surveyed, measured and mapped, and eventually endowed with corrugated metal huts (jingad) or stone houses. These were distributed among displaced people through a lottery in which households that met certain eligibility criteria could participate. Noor, one of the people who received a plot of land and a corrugated steel house described the process:

I was among the displaced people who was lucky to get a house here in the camp which was built by the local government for the IDPs. I got this one room, toilet and kitchen [...] it was a lottery and pieces of paper were put in a box and everybody picked up one piece of paper [...]. I was lucky and we were satisfied. God gave it to us. We were [previously] in tents that were vulnerable to thieves, and there was rape. I fled my house one night after an attempted rape. Because of this, I took my children elsewhere. I also fell then and injured my arm that night. There is a scar (Noor, Bosaaso 23/12/2017).

The lottery system reflects the arbitrariness of property regimes, which always only benefit certain ‘lucky’ families. The less lucky, those unable to benefit from the distribution of houses, remained vulnerable to evictions from private owners who rent or sell their property as the city grows and property prices increase. The distribution of houses was connected to an incremental tenure model, aimed at a processual increase of housing security. Recipients receive full property rights only after they have lived in their houses for consecutive fifteen years (IDMC, 2015). In this way, a new set of neighbourhoods for previously displaced people has emerged on the far south-eastern outskirts of the city.

The proximity of the settlement to the city attests to attempts to support the displaced settlers in retaining their social and economic networks (IDMC, 2015). Being placed east of a newly built bypass road also facilitated transport and enabled easy access to the city. The bypass, however, also demarcated the separation of the settlements from the city and transformed them into a kind of satellite neighbourhood. The image of a separate town, populated by people with different clan affiliations to those of the majority of Bosaaso’s inhabitants, was enhanced by the infrastructural developments that followed, among them the establishment, shops, health centres, a police station, and mosque. Khalid, another ‘winner’ of the lottery described:

Now you have visited us in the day time, but if you visited us at night, you would say this camp is the town, the big town of Bosaaso. Now you are in the centre of the IDP camps and all sides are other IDP camps. At night, the lights are on and the businesses are open till the morning (Khalid, Bosaaso, 25/12/2017).

The geometrical arrangement of the settlement with its straight-lined roads and adjacent rectangle houses, render the settlements near ideal-typical examples of a Foucauldian disciplinary space (Foucault, 1978, p. 11, pp. 34-35). Hospitals, asylums or prisons are regularly used as examples of how space is disciplined to enhance surveillance and control. However, 19th century European working-class housing estates provide a more suitable comparison. Such working-class estates were designed to tackle the ‘urban problem’ associated with industrialisation and the emergent labour class (Driver, 1988, p. 277), while camp settlements in Bosaaso show a modern attempt to tackle ‘urban problems’ associated with conflict, droughts and displacement. However, urban planning here is part of global forms of governance in which, as Agamben outlined, international actors cooperate with (weak) sovereigns. While this cooperation provided shelter and enhanced the tenure and physical security of some of the displaced, it simultaneously excludes others from the same prerogatives and contributes to their spatial segregation. Property, as outlined above, is an organised social enclosure and it is linked to the formation of authority and sovereignty. In Bosaaso (as in other conflict prone environments), international organisations take over important government roles, including the generation of knowledge (maps, surveys etc.) that accompany the definition, demarcation and distribution of property. Aid actors thereby transmit disciplinary characteristics to the settlements as they contribute to the partitioning (and segregation) of urban space, and to the placing of bodies in spatial arrangements that permit classification and enhance control, especially when compared with the messy spatial arrangements that characterise camps in Mogadishu. The ease with which these arrangements can be sécuritised was demonstrated when people hailing from southern Somalia were suspected of harbouring Al-Shabaab operatives. Reacting to attacks in the city, Puntland officials defined the re-settlement areas as ‘danger zones’ (Haji, 2012, p. 44) and in 2010 authorised round-ups and deportations of people to southern Somalia. Deportations to what were seen as their rightful ‘home’ regions, show that even people who receive re-settlement provision are not necessarily perceived as belonging to the city. The subsequent amassing of ‘outsiders’ in a spatially segregated cluster may allow for their further othering and association with militants.

The disciplining of space and bodies described above does not follow some grand, evil plan of ‘western’ or other aid actors aiming to take control of southern, post-colonial (or otherwise defined) states and people. Instead, international actors cooperate with sovereigns - the Puntland state and municipality authorities - and together execute power in a way that ostensibly promotes the interests of the ruled. After all, the programmes are improving tenure security, housing conditions, health and wellbeing for the re-settled, and interviews with the lucky ones attest to the positive effects of this form of government. Power, in Foucault’s reading, is not a top-down activity, but needs to be deciphered within networks of continuously developing and changing social relations. Above all, power does not merely subdue and suppress, but also enables, generates and improves (Foucault, 1994, p. 38).

Conversely, although space is disciplined in Somalia, it is not monitored consistently, and multiple forms of authority continue to co-exist. The utilisation of space therefore deviated swiftly from its originally planned schematic. The Bosaaso settlements have become a preferred destination for new (unregistered) arrivals, among them often relatives of those who had already received a plot and who often erect own dwellings close to their family members. Others who were less lucky did not simply wait until they moved upwards on the waiting lists of the municipality, but started to acquire plots in the wider settlement area. The prior practice in which displaced people enter into agreements with landowners to erect temporary shelters on un-used land, has continued in close vicinity to the new settlements. Ruptures to linear, rectangular architectural designs attest to the dynamic (re)use of the resettlement areas and the land that surrounds them. The permanent stone and semi-permanent corrugated steel huts built through the resettlement scheme, along with the make-shift tents that now intermingle with them, signify the ambiguities of property, ownership and land rights and alternative forms of propertying that subvert original plans.
Additionally, some of the lucky new owners started to rent their houses or even sell their titles, often to people who were anticipating a rise in the land’s value. Beyond such speculations, the high rate of divorce and family breakup further contributed to such sales and demonstrates the gendered nature of property. A Somali NGO-worker explained that women who were provided with tenure or ownership documents, often had them over to their husbands who, after divorce, sell them to a local buyer. While these men may move to other places, their ex-wives often return to the settlement. However, as the woman is already registered as a beneficiary of the housing scheme, she can’t get another plot (NGO-worker, Bosaaso, 02/10/2018).

The arrangements in Bosaaso have also given rise to new forms of intermediation and gatekeeping. Chairpersons and organising committees emerged in the new settlements, and they too serve as point of access mediating between settlers, the municipality, private landowners (who still threaten some residents in the vicinity with eviction) and humanitarian organisations. Unlike in Mogadishu, the camps’ chairpersons were registered and thus acknowledged as settlement representatives by the municipal government. The chairpersons’ role in the local government has become similar to the leaders of other town neighbourhoods, albeit with important differences remaining:

The chairman of an IDP camp and the sixteen chairmen of the Bosaaso neighbourhoods do not get equal rights. The neighbour- hood chairman has a salary, he can participate in elections, the education fee of his family is covered by the government, he is part of the government, he has a budget, he is a known person and he is a member of the host community so, what he suggests will come into action, but my suggestion will not work. These are my specific challenges and I have the same responsibilities, or even more responsibilities than him (Chairman, Bosaaso 25/12/2017).

The entrepreneurial strategies of gate-keeping that characterise Mogadishu camps are less evident in Bosaaso’s new settlements, where short-term emergency assistance is decreasing. However, as resettlement areas continue to evolve, and many displaced people continue to settle on privately-owned land (where tenure insecurity persists), gatekeeping continues, as does the practice of establishing rice huts (NGO worker, Bosaaso 02/01/2018). The close cooperation with state actors has nonetheless affected opportunities for gate-keeping and is likely to contribute to the development of state-centred forms of intermediation that characterise other aid dependent states (Bayart, 2000).

The cooperative planning of satellite cities for displaced people amount to a particular form of ‘inclusive exclusion’ (Agamben, 1998, p. 9; Minca, 2015, p. 82). The exclusionary logics of property persist in the ambiguities of land ownership at the city’s periphery. The planned resettlement scheme has created a new centre of gravity which draws in new arrivals, and within which mechanisms for ‘incremental tenure’ are translated, adapted and transferred through circuits of local power between humanitarian agencies, the municipal government, private landowners and ‘community’ representatives. Ultimately, however, economic precarity hinders the ability of the displaced to fully capitalise on opportunities brought by external settlement initiatives. Economic disparities are prevalent and livelihoods of displaced remain extremely insecure. This was repeatedly cited as main factor preventing displaced people from formalising ownership of land. The logic of resettlement has itself set the trajectory for the articulation of local property rights, with displaced people now being forced to stake and negotiate their claims in a designated area outside of the city proper. The extent to which this will constitute a ‘durable solution’ may be contingent on the economic viability of these settlements in relation to Bosaaso town, the interaction of layers of authority, and differential access to the benefits of international aid regimes.

5. Conclusion

This article has compared war-induced urbanisation in Mogadishu and Bosaaso. Both cities have over the years experienced large scale immigration of displaced people, many of them moving to camps where they hope to improve their security, find employment and receive some kind of aid. Comparative analysis of the erection, maintenance and government of camps contrasted the seemingly spontaneously established settlements in Mogadishu with the planned ‘durable solution’ settlements in Bosaaso. Building on Agamben’s spatial theory of sovereignty and displacement, the paper identified property as analytical category used to empirically differentiate forms of sovereignty and to further nuance the layered ‘sites of exception’ that emerge in the midst of a generalised state of exception. Sovereignty remains connected to the right to claim lives, but this right is executed, among others, through (often quite violent) competitions over property, which are in turn connected to and reconfigure forms of belonging.

The article has explored the ways in which property is practiced. It has looked into actors, relations and activities performed to designate land for urban settlements, to make this land habitable, and to manage the relations between the inhabitants and the outside world. The struggles to define and categorize rights of ownership, and the attempts to couple them with questions of belonging in both cities became part of ongoing contests for sovereignty. These contests are particularly dynamic in Mogadishu and carried out at the expense of displaced people, many of whom experience cycles of forced evictions. Although reduced to bare life and made disposable, displaced people have not simply been passive victims. They have remained on the lookout for options to act and retain agency, however limited. Displaced people in both cities actively navigate existing property regimes, try to get access to property and to improve their positions vis-à-vis dominant agents in these contexts.

The emphasis on social practices of property not only helps to unravel the makings of sovereignty, but simultaneously exemplifies how sovereignty is embedded in the (global) political economy. In propertying, struggles for sovereignty intersect with struggles for profit. The gentrification of camp neighbourhoods in Mogadishu attest to this, as does the resettlement of displaced people to less valuable land at Bosaaso’s outskirts. Whilst the durable solutions initiative increased the locational security of resettled people it continued to demonstrate the arbitrary and exclusionary character of property. The resettlement improved the tenure security of some lucky few among those who had managed to survive years of violent ‘disposal’, and who will in the next fifteen years be able to call themselves owners of a small piece of urban land and, by then, a likely-deteriorated steel hut. Property in the new settlements of Bosaaso has become the material expression of the “interrogation of the worth and eligibility of the living across a terrain of value” (Dillon, 2005, p. 41). This interrogation is shaped by globally circulating knowledge which makes truth claims about values of life, for example by defining, identifying and registering those who qualify as displaced, and those who do not, or by organising lotteries that select winners of land.

Both city examples also show that urban camps in Somalia are places that are acted upon and that are jointly, but not necessarily cooperatively, governed by local, national, regional and international institutions. These negotiate with each other and, to a limited extent, with the displaced. Although the formation of political authority in and after violent conflict is always locally specific, the examples also demonstrate that formations of authority are embedded in global structures – whether the global regime of (militarized) humanitarianism or the equally global property market. However, global structures always materialize in particular places where spaces, bodies, objects, subjects, knowledge and violence are assembled into concrete material and social figurations. In empirically examining the emergence and evolution of formations of political authority in the midst of a normalized crisis, and by emphasizing the experiences of the displaced themselves, this analysis has shown that agency is exercised even by people who embody ‘bare lives’. Urban camps in Somalia are globally governed formations of precarity. They may be located at the ‘edge of the world’
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