In the name of society
the branding of Swedish civil security technologies and their exclusionary effects

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IN THE NAME OF SOCIETY
The branding of Swedish civil security technologies and their exclusionary effects

Sebastian Larsson
PhD Thesis
2019
ABSTRACT

This dissertation investigates the recent transformations of security practice and arms industries in post-Cold War societies. Specifically, I analyse emerging actors and technologies positioned in the sociohistorical context of Sweden in the 90s and 00s, and how new threats and risks as well as new ideas for how to secure society became constructed and imposed in structures of so-called total defence; that is, in the strong historical traditions in Sweden of war preparedness and domestic arms production. This transforming field is not only heterogeneous in how it mobilises both public spokespersons and private companies from both the civil- and military domains, but it is also distinctively situated in the larger context of Europe and its security industry that has emerged in similar ways in recent years in line with the ongoing militarisation of Europe and strengthening of the EU’s external borders and surveillance systems. Exploring these empirical issues, I draw on the works of Bourdieu and other critical thinkers and social theorists, and employ a perspective of field economies and symbolic power in order to offer a more profound reading of what is often imprecisely referred to as military-industrial complexes, and how these are changing in late modern societies.

In the dissertation, I aim to render visible some key effects of these recent transformations of security and defence fields. For example, I show how Swedish actors, including spokespersons coming from the state and its bureaucracies, have begun cooperating and competing in a more directly transnational context, and how their professional struggles and stakes are increasingly located in, framed as, or disguised by R&D in the security area. The legal arrangement interlinking the fields of Swedish and US security practitioners, for example, is designed as a science and technology agreement but may just as well include counterterrorism cooperation, information sharing, and political opportunities. Moreover, I demonstrate how the major arms industry in Sweden has come to expand increasingly into “civil”- or “societal” security technologies, including products and services for surveillance and border control. These technologies, I argue, are both associated with or feeding into military production, and tend to become wielded socio-politically in controversial arms export contexts. Here, industrialists and spokespersons continue to exploit and reconstruct the historical Swedish nation-brand of being “innovators”, “humanitarians”, and somehow “neutral”. The dissertation concludes that fields of security and defence, both in Sweden and elsewhere, are configured around resilient structures organised historically by the interests of military- and elite actors, but that they have indeed transformed to the effect that public-private security industries now follow dual logics and produce tools for controlling at once the frontiers and interiors of societies.
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Mamma Christin, pappa Jan, syster Josefin, mormor Yvonne. My beloved friends. Thanks for the endless love and support. Finally, thank you Jennifer Bergkvist, my dearest, for everything.
1943.

As the Second World War raged on the European continent, it became increasingly clear that major civilian casualties were to be expected in future wars. Air raids and enemy sabotage did not limit themselves to military targets, but had started affecting city centres, public infrastructures, and private industries. War had expanded beyond the battlefield and become “total”. In Sweden, the government reasoned that if the ongoing great war was indeed total, it needed to be countered with a total defence which in one way or another involved the entire population. To spread this message, the government produced a 16-page booklet entitled “If the war comes” which became distributed to every Swedish household in June 1943 (Figure I.1). This booklet made clear that the “modern war is not simply a power struggle between armed forces”, but “concerns everything and everybody”, and so the defence of Sweden required the preparedness of “all citizens, men and women, young and old, abled and disabled, soldiers and civilians, agencies and individuals” (Statens informationssstyrelse 1943, 2). The booklet then went on to describe in more detail how a full-scale mobilisation would play out, where enlisted soldiers should go, to whom “battle-ready volunteers” should report, how civilians and civil agencies should prepare themselves for invasion. Addressing enemy misinformation campaigns, the booklet also contains the now famous formulation “every message that resistance shall cease is false” (12). The back cover of the publication reads: “Study this booklet closely. It is your guidance in the event of war”.

Nine years later, in May 1952, this information campaign was repeated and the “If the war comes”-booklet became updated and redesigned – now containing several pedagogical illustrations – and circulated once again to every household (Kungliga Civilförsvarsstyrelsen 1952). Signed by the prime minister, the first page stated that every man and woman were obliged to “participate to the best of their ability in the military establishment, civil defence, arms production, national food supply, their homes, or any other way”. Now, the booklet had adopted a more sombre tone, more anticipatory of war: “We will never give up … Sweden wants to defend itself, can defend itself, and shall defend itself” (5). It also described how citizens in the event of invasion should remain calm, turn on the radio, cover up windows, refrain from using telephones, listen to any air raid signals, and prepare to evacuate. Parts of this booklet were also included in the back of the telephone directories which were also distributed throughout the country.
Studera denna broschyr grundligt

Den är din vägledning i händelse av krig. Försvara broschyren så, att du har dem till hand på behov.

Broschyren är avsedd för varje svensk man och kvinna. Den kan av var och en rekommenderas från.

STATENS INFORMATIONSTYRELSE
STOCKHOLM 2

Tjänste
Gregoriansmed

OM KRIGET KOMMER

VÄGLEDNING FÖR RIKETS MEDBORGARE I HÅNDELSE AV KRIG

Figure I.1 “If the war comes”, 1943

OM KRIGET KOMMER

Vad du bör veta

Innehåll
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   Invandrare: Information

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BEREDSKAPSNÄMNDEN FÖR PSYKOLOGISKT FÖRSVAR

Figure I.2 “If the war comes”, 1983
Another nine years later, in May 1961 and in the midst of what had become known as the Cold War, a third version of “If the war comes” was distributed to all households, now with a new front cover depicting ominous dark clouds gathering (Kungliga Civilförsvarsstyrelsen 1961). At the time, the government’s political strategies for war preparedness had crystallized, and so the booklet described how different branches of military-, civil-, economic-, and psychological defence together constituted the total defence-model, how soldiers and civilians fit into this structure and were expected to contribute in different ways. Two interesting additions were made in the 1961-version. First, a section on “vigilance” claimed that foreign agents and spies could be “in our midst”, and that citizens were prohibited from talking publicly about their role in the defence organisation. Here, another now famous saying can be found: “A Swede keeps quiet” (En svensk tiger) (14). Second, the threat of nuclear warfare and radioactive fallout became addressed at length for the first time (31-35), instructing citizens to identify their nearest bunker or shelter (which had now been built throughout the country) and to prepare an evacuation-kit with key necessities (including state-provided gas masks) (19-21, 26-27).

1983.

As the Cold War continued to unfold during the 80s, the military capabilities of many Western and Eastern societies were at their peak, as unprecedented amounts of money had gone into defence planning and armaments production during the mid-20th century. In Sweden, the armed forces was able to mobilise up to 850,000 soldiers, and was also about to start enlisting women for the first time. For all others aged 16-65, the law of “civil defence duty” made it mandatory for civilians to aid the civil defence organisation or the emergency services. The state-subsidised arms industry had grown to a near-autonomous size, and was now able to produce virtually all components of all categories of military supply at home. Its largest firms produced so expensive and technologically advanced weapon systems that the government had started to actively encourage arms export as a way to cover expenses for the industry in-between state orders.

Now, roughly 22 years since its previous rendition, the fourth version of “If the war comes” was ordered by the government and produced by the psychological defence board – this time with a markedly modernised design, and now with a front cover depicting different patterns representing the air raid alarm signals (Beredskapsnämnden för psykologiskt försvar 1983; Figure I.2). Audible throughout the country, in both rural and urban areas, these loud signals had different meanings

1 Cf. “careless talk costs lives”, as used in British world war propaganda.
depending on rhythm and length: “air raid, take cover”, “mobilise for invasion”, “important message on radio/TV”, or “all clear, danger has passed”. With its 39 pages, the 1983-version of the booklet was the most comprehensive one yet, as all stages of peacetime preparation and war mobilisation were explained in great detail. It also included descriptions of so-called ABC warfare, i.e. not only nuclear-, but also chemical- and biological attacks.

While previous booklets had been largely focused on how to personally plan and prepare for war, this version for the first time also addressed Swedish security- and defence policy. In other words, it thereby sought to spread throughout the population not only practical instructions, but also the political arguments, ideas, and justifications for why so much of their everyday civilian life revolved around the notion of defence:

The most important task for Swedish security policy is to try to keep our country outside of any future war – with preserved freedom and sovereignty. For this purpose, we pursue a politics of non-alignment in peace, with the goal of neutrality in war … Our total defence shall have such a strength and constitution that an attack on Sweden shall be deemed disadvantageous (39 [emphasis added]).

2018.

During a cold December day, fifteen Swedish-manufactured JAS fighter jets roar over Stockholm in a “Christmas tree”-formation as part of the armed forces’ annual season’s greetings. In recent years, the Swedish government has signalled its intent to “resume total defence planning”. The latest defence bill saw a not only the return of traditional threat discourses and geopolitical security narratives, but it also declared the need for an increased defence budget and a reinstated military conscription of 18-year-olds. The state has also recently decided to purchase new weapon systems and JAS airplanes in the coming decades, thereby propelling public spending on military technology to record-high levels in the post-Cold War era.

Apparently, state officers have also felt the need to, again, inform (or perhaps remind) the public about the general plans when it comes to domestic war preparedness. Not without some surprise, the government ordered a new booklet and tasked its now most central security agency,
MSB, to come up with an “If the war comes” suitable for the 21st century. Peculiarly, when published and distributed to the currently 4.8 million registered Swedish households, the central message was largely the same as it had been 30 years ago, and some key formulations (e.g. those relating to misinformation and resistance) had been literally copied and pasted in from previous versions (MSB 2018; see also Henley 2018). One striking difference could be immediately spotted, however. It was now entitled “If the crisis or war comes” (Figure I.3).

What’s in a word? In the three decades since the previous propaganda booklet, something has clearly happened. The general sense of unease that the booklets sought to spread during the 20th century has clearly changed, or grown, or somehow become dual: war and crisis. The word “crisis” per definition harbours a spectrum of threats, risks, and suspicions – some of them socially constructed, others environmentally induced – and relatedly, a spectrum of actors, institutions, and technologies that are supposed to deal with them. It includes the suggestion that security work should not merely be about defending sovereign territory, but also about protecting a cherished society and a civilian way of life. The little word “crisis” thus involves discourses, practices, and official strategies that are highly political, that have come to direct attention towards notions such as terrorism, migration management, and border control.
As I will try to show in this dissertation, what seems to be the mere addition of a little word is in fact the result of decades of social struggle and transformations of practice in the field of defence- and security – in Sweden and the Nordic region, across European and Western societies. To some extent, this dissertation will therefore be about what is called borderline cases in English, but which has the more elegant name gränsfall in Swedish. It will investigate tensions between not only wars and crises, but military and civil, external and internal, public and private, domestic and abroad, Sweden and the international. In short, across all these domains, I will study the practices that emerged after the Cold War “if crises or wars come”, and in extension, the many technologies invented, implemented, and exerting their effects on society even if the they never come.
The practice of security in Western societies has changed after the Cold War and more rapidly after the events of 9/11 to the effect that threats, risks, and suspicions have become reformulated, and the actors and technologies for dealing with them reconfigured. Alongside military actors and technologies optimised historically for defending the sovereign territory of societies against invasion in the event of war, civil actors and technologies have emerged with the aim of securing the continued functioning of peacetime societies from apparently “asymmetrical”, “internal”, or “transgressive” threats. These presumed threats are seen as undesirable, harmful, and dangerous to a similarly presupposed “way of life” which in turn is seen as cherished, shared, and harmonious. In short, the central threat to Society has become systematically constructed in recent decades as either the Terrorist, the Criminal, or the Migrant; certain signifiers behind which individuals are routinely targeted and apprehended at the expense of their fundamental rights and freedoms. This dissertation considers this development to be deeply problematic.

This trend has been observable in most Western societies. For example, in a process accelerated by the United States’ aggression towards international terrorism in the early 2000s, 22 different agencies and bureaus were mobilised to form the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002, becoming the world’s largest single organisation for internal security, surveillance, border control, and counterterrorism. Roughly one year later on the other side of the Atlantic, the European Union assembled a similar set of strategic objectives in its declaration *A Secure Europe in a Better World*. This was not necessarily an immediate reaction to the US “war on terror”, but more the result of a growing conviction since the early 1990s that “key threats” were no longer those of military invasion, but had become “diverse, less visible and less predictable” (EU 2003, 3). Since then, the EU as well as the US have systematically built up gigantic structures of agencies and technologies for both internal policing and external border controls. In fact, for many Western governments, the events around 9/11 merely justified and intensified several already existing, decade-long processes of reforming the structures for national defence and arms production, of rebranding security technologies, and of establishing new agencies for the management of migration, terrorism, and various “crises”.
These developments arguably ruptured and opened up the practice of security and defence in most Western societies, making it increasingly competitive, increasingly transnational, increasingly opportunistic, and potentially profitable. The arms industry, for example, have found new and more ways to profit from violence and control in this process. Companies and R&D institutes traditionally invested in supplying armed forces with military materiel are now able to redirect their attention and funds towards technologies for border surveillance, policing, infrastructure protection, and other “dual-use” or “civil” security products and services.

This is not to say that post-Cold War processes somehow reversed or inverted historical structures. Geopolitical claims continue to be recognised, military provocations and aggressions still occur, standing armies remain one the largest expenditure points for governments, nuclear strikes would certainly still be catastrophic. A military-oriented logic was not suddenly or entirely removed from practice. Rather, new policies, organisations, and technologies have emerged alongside with, and usually in subordination to, old ones. The central point here is that security and defence have not conflated into a “total” practice, but the practice has become heterogeneous – mobilising both military and civil, public and private, physical and digital, extraordinary and mundane elements. Indeed, external and internal security practices work along what can be called an (in)security continuum (Bigo 2001) of violence and suspicion, but have not coalesced into some monolithic “empire” (Hardt and Negri 2001), some catch-all “matrix of war” operating in the name of “humanity” (Jabri 2007), nor some ominous “risk society” where anyone is a potential suspect (Beck 2002).

Recent developments have nonetheless led practitioners to call for so-called “holistic”, “all-hazards”, “comprehensive”, “whole-of-society”-approaches to security and defence through which civil and military, public and private actors can be mobilised jointly under a single label. However, such approaches have the dangerous effect of lumping together “human-induced” threats with “environmental” threats and other “emergencies” or “accidents” under the same operational umbrella. In other words, these approaches make little to no practical, organisational, or strategic differentiation between how to deal with a forest fire, snow storm, or chemical spill on the one hand, and how to handle a terrorist event or migrant influx on the other. All “crises” or “security issues” – regardless of human involvement – are understood horizontally, thereby ignoring the fact that the handling of “human-induced threats” routinely includes the surveillance, profiling, tracking, detention, and coercion of individuals who de facto have fundamental civil- and human rights in liberal democracies. Indeed, there are several ethical and political issues that must be raised as soon as practices begin to target “society” holistically, when professionals start to make attempts at “securing” it.
The present introduction chapter can be understood not so much as a state of the art, as the “state of the question” (Bourdieu 2004, 4), meaning that I will outline my empirical research object, my modes of inquiry for constructing and studying it, and the relationality and position of my chosen question among other possible questions and answers. In the first section, I will introduce and briefly sketch out my empirical object, why I believe it “matters” in relation to similar objects, and how it can be delimited with some rough analytical definitions. In the second section, I will present a preliminary review of the literature concerning how this kind of object has, and has not, been studied previously in the fields of international studies, critical security studies, and beyond. In the third section, I demonstrate the strengths of a perspective of International Political Sociology for this kind of research, and then proceed towards a detailed account of my ontological and epistemological understanding inspired chiefly by the works of Pierre Bourdieu, and how this approach has enabled me to develop a specific methodology of “fields”. In the fourth section, I present in detail the sets of data generated for the construction of my object, the specific procedures and methods used for approaching and studying this material, as well as some notes on translation and language. Finally, in the fifth section, before outlining the remainder of the dissertation, I conclude with a brief reflexive discussion on the practice of critical research itself, as seen from a wider perspective of the social order.

SECURITY & DEFENCE IN A TRANSVERSAL WORLD: THE CASE OF SWEDEN

When post-Cold War transformations of security- and defence are discussed in International Relations (IR) and related fields of research, the doxa— that is, the commonly held belief among these scholars – seems to be that one should depart from “cases” like the European Union, or major countries like the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, or Western European states like France, or even Germany and Spain (e.g. Bigo and Tsoukala 2008; R. Jones and Johnson 2016; Salter 2010; Hoijtink 2014; Balzacq and Carrera 2006). I seek to move away from this overemphasis on the “great powers” of the Western world, as well as beyond the typically strong focus on the rules and bureaucracies at the EU “level”. How did this kind of history unfold in a smaller state in northern Europe, in a Nordic country? Indeed, to what effects did these transformations take place in a Scandinavian state with strong traditions of social welfare and social democratic policy, coupled

3 Although doxa should be understood as the assumed “common sense” in a given space of social relations, it is “never a consensus, nor a homogeneous ideology, rather it is an agreement on legitimate disagreements within the field” (Loughlan, Olsson, and Schouten 2014, 32). Doxa can moreover be seen as “the point of view of the dominant, when it presents and imposes itself as a universal point of view” (Bourdieu, Wacquant, and Farage 1994, 15). I will come back to this point later, and define doxa in more detail in relation to power struggles in social spaces.
with equally strong traditions of national defence and domestic arms manufacturing? In a state
which claimed itself “neutral” during and after the world wars, and which became a relatively late
addition to the EU community? What happens to the doxic narrative if we depart from actors
working in or emerging from Sweden?

Gradually in this dissertation, I will construct a research object which is somewhat different
from many other studies, but which is nonetheless situated in the same larger context of post-Cold
War transformations of security- and defence. This object is constituted not by “Sweden”, as
defined from a state-centric or nationalistic point of view, but by a relatively restricted social space
of actors coming predominantly from Sweden, operating both within these national borders as well
as beyond them; among their Nordic neighbours, transversally in Europe, across the Atlantic with
the USA, and elsewhere in the world. Both state- and industry actors come together in this space,
in both cooperation and competition, around questions of how the security of society should be
practiced.

As will be shown in subsequent chapters, the history of this space is firmly rooted in what
has been called “total defence” in the Nordic region, a tradition of organising national defence
which became particularly prominent in Sweden, Finland, and Norway. Established towards the
end of the Second World War and then gradually developed during the Cold War, total defence
became the prevalent ideal model in Sweden for mobilising the entire society around security and
defence. Ever since the 1940s, at the heart of the total defence-model laid the assumption that
security was not only about protecting sovereign territory, but that it also concerned the civilian
“homeland” beyond the frontiers, and how to protect its many vulnerable and interdependent
“functions”. Virtually all public, private, civil, and military institutions were assigned a role to play
in protecting society, as Swedish total defence became coordinated centrally and organised into
categories of military-, economic-, psychological-, and civil defence. Substantial parts of the
infrastructure and private sector as well as virtually all parts of the public welfare system – all the
way from the government to counties, municipalities, and individual households – followed a
specific form of preparedness and planning based on scenarios of foreign invasion. “War-thinking”
permeated society and everything from architectural designs, landscape planning, and the vast
network of bunkers and shelters, to the socio-political makeup of welfare institutions, markets,
laws, regulations, education, and defence propaganda.

The central idea and argument behind this was that in order to justify the foreign policy
stance of “neutrality” during the wars – and the principle of “non-alignment” after them – Swedish
defence had to be designed around a notion of self-perseverance. This not only required mass-
conscription and substantial war planning, but also a more or less autonomous domestic arms industry.
Instead of importing weapon systems and technological components from either of the two Cold War “blocs”, Swedish governments decided to continuously invest in the research, development, and manufacture of all forms of military supply; from aircraft to submarines, artillery cannons, and radar systems. Hence, a deeply rooted partnership and “alliance” was forged between the industry and the state, including its procurement agency, armed forces, and R&D institute. Awkwardly, the state not only subsidised the industry and provided long-term development contracts, but it also virtually served as the industry’s sole customer for most parts of the 20th century. In what emerged as a type of market monopsony, the state more or less controlled all of the different industrial sectors of military supply during the Cold War, sectors which usually became dominated by a single, major company (e.g. Saab in aircraft, Bofors in cannons, Kockums in submarines). What is more, these firms also tended to have one and the same owner – the Wallenberg family – who in turn had close relationships with top-level decisionmakers and bureaucrats in the defence sector. Gradually, towards the 70s and 80s the state started permitting more and more export of Swedish arms as a way to cover expenses and maintain production in-between the large government orders. As international arms export deals in effect became conflated politically with domestic “defence capabilities” during these decades, strong relations of interdependence were established between private arms companies and various government officials and state agencies; relations that are still very strong today.

However, towards the end of the 80s and in the beginning of the 90s, the intricate actor configuration and historical structure related to total defence and arms production faced dramatic changes, not only in Sweden but across the world. How did this transformation unfold? With what effects? What was at stake? Which actors were involved? The total defence model, and particularly its organisation for civil defence, entered a substantial reform process during the mid-90s which saw the gradual introduction of crisis management- and counterterrorism practices. Here, a small group of defence ministry officials, commission members, agency directors, and functionalist security scholars began formulating and introducing into public discourse new “asymmetrical” and “internal” threats, as well as ideas for how to counter them. They imposed these ideas in defence commissions, government propositions, state investigation groups, research environments, and eventually, in the new agencies KBM and MSB that were founded in the early 00s. This process unfolded in relatively close correspondence with the defence reforms running simultaneously in the other Nordic countries, and particularly in Norway. During these years, Swedish security practitioners also began working, collaborating, and competing increasingly in different inter- and transnational contexts, e.g. with EU bureaucracies and the then recently establish US Department of Homeland Security. Notably, as I will explore in later chapters, many of the emerging Swedish
security professionals who sought to “go global” and establish new transnational work relations at the time tended to do so not in e.g. political- or diplomatic settings, but usually via research and development initiatives in bureaucratic settings. The same cadre of practitioners that imposed new threats in civil defence organisations during the 90s became responsible in the 00s for setting up a bilateral security R&D partnership with the DHS, for example, and for advising the early working groups of what would become the European Security Research Programme (ESRP), steering its framing of practices and technologies towards what they preferred to call “societal security”. What came out of these transnational struggles and international partnerships? What distinguishes the relations between Swedish-, EU-, and US actors in the field of security and defence?

Moreover, during the years of the early 00s, the conditions for military R&D and arms export similarly changed. As military orders diminished worldwide during the 90s, the Swedish government decided to drastically alter its product development- and procurement policies in the defence- and security area. This opened up the arms industry for private- and international proprietorship, and forced major players like the company Saab and the research institute FOI to look for other sources of funding. Industrial partnerships were set up with companies like BAE Systems, and several actors entered into the newly established ESRP and the R&D projects aimed at dual-use-, “civil”-, or “societal security”-technologies. What exactly was the purpose of these technologies for the arms industry? How and where were they developed, sold, and implemented? As I will go on to explore, civil security technologies came to serve as a complement to regular military production, e.g. by enabling arms companies to expand into areas of border management and surveillance. Several attempts were also made at forging a new domestic “societal security market” in Sweden for emerging small- to medium companies in the technological areas of sensors, detectors, ICT, surveillance, and cybersecurity. More crucially, however, this transformation of the Swedish security- and defence industry unfolded together with a major surge in arms export in the 00s and 10s, a substantial portion of which went to authoritarian regimes and wealthy dictatorships in the global south. With the increasingly important role of arms export, the Swedish state found ways of indirectly subsidising or aiding its domestic industry, e.g. by simplifying procedures for granting export permits, inviting arms companies to trade delegations, participating in public-private lobby campaigns, and including military technology in various export promotion- and marketing activities. What was the role of “civil security” in these processes? Civil security products, scalable systems, and “smart” solutions actually came to play a central socio-political role for major arms firms since these technologies could be set up as a façade to disguise many of the grim realities associated with arms trade. Downplaying the actual effects of violent military products, Swedish arms dealers and state officials instead emphasise a discourse of engineering and innovation – even
clinging on to its historical nation-brand and notions like “neutrality” and “human rights” – and thereby frame arms export and security R&D as having to do more with societal progress rather than waging war.

The different actors and historical processes described thus far, and in particular, their trajectories since the end of the Cold War until present day make up the central components of the research object for this dissertation. As will be further explained below, this object can more specifically be seen as a “field”: a social space of struggle between different actors who are drawn together around a historically established stake which – in this particular case – concerns the practical logic of (in)security in Sweden, the know-how of protecting Swedish society in an increasingly transversal world, and the technologies that should be developed and implemented for this purpose. Illustrated by this field of actors, how have symbolic claims to “secure Swedish society” transformed? How have the justifications for these kinds of practices changed over time? Who introduced new threats and technologies among these actors, with what effects? How is the field intersecting, overlapping, and competing with other fields such as bureaucracy, politics, industry, and research? What are the implications of certain transnational and transatlantic professional relations in this context?

The central mobilising stake – i.e. the central logic of how the security of “society” should be practiced – is by no means an essential or universal stake, but something (re)constructed jointly by the agents surrounding it. In fact, with the help of Norbert Elias, it is even possible to argue that this field is constructed around a false claim, on a misconception of social reality. Are practitioners claiming to “secure society” not simply perceiving society as some larger referent object that must be secured, like a “supra-individual organic entity”, something existing before and independently of individuals? (Elias and Schröter 2001, 4) Is it not true that only when they have identified their “threat” – the terrorist or migrant “Other” – they reverse their view on society and choose to see only these individuals, and how they like small “atoms” and “particles” become manageable “security issues”? (18). Are they not so often failing to understand, or choosing to ignore, the fact that “while society, the relations between people, has a structure and regularity of a special kind that cannot be understood in terms of the single individual, it does not possess a body, a ‘substance’ outside individuals”? (61). Society does not exist “out there” as an object to be defended or secured, but it is a contingent set of relations at once shaping and reshaping society and its individuals; relations that are not in a fixed state, but constantly on the move. It is “in this way that human society moves forward as a whole; in this way the whole history of mankind has run its course” (63).
According to Elias, society is also “what every individual means when [they] say ‘we’” (61), and it is therefore at once a historical process of inclusion and exclusion. By referring to “society”, and not least when claiming to defend or secure it, actors are in other words partaking in an inevitable production of an “us” and a separation of a “them”. Drawing on Franz Neumann, Huysmans (2014) recreates this logic of exclusion specifically in the context of security and democracy. Neumann’s idea is that a democratic political system per definition originates in the idea of “maximising” notions of “freedom and justice” for people through the “execution of large-scale social change”. However, to deliver on such a moral promise, and in order to become integrated in society, politics must at once produce “fear of an enemy”. Neumann therefore invites us to understand the making itself of “enemies” and “fear” as the “integrative, energetic principle of politics displacing the democratic principles of freedom and justice”. To secure society is in other words “a practice not of responding to enemies and fear but of creating them. It enacts our world as if it is a dangerous world, a world saturated by insecurities” (3).

My object – this social space, or “field” – is by definition a heterogeneous one and involves a range of actors and practices: from public servants to private profiteers, from old defence heirs to the new cadres of crisis management- and counterterrorism professionals, from traditional military products to emerging civil security technologies. As put by Bigo, security “may be a field or many fields” (Bigo 2013, 127), and for this reason, I do not in beforehand make an analytical separation between e.g. “defence”- and “security”-actors, or “external” or “internal” practices. In fact, these kinds of fields are not, I contend, fully autonomous, coherent, generic or “pure” in any way, but include different crafts, skills, resources, and forms of employment. As can be exemplified by my selection of interviewees, for instance, a field of security may involve a diverse set of agents bringing in their know-how from an equally diverse set of backgrounds: foreign affairs ministries, defence commissions, arms companies, IT firms, business associations, government agencies, university teaching, think-tanks, embassies, etcetera. Many agents are also multi-positioned, e.g. with one foot in an arms firm and another in a public board for research and innovation, or e.g. working both as a professor and senior policy advisor. However, regardless of professional background, the agents are still drawn together in competition as “each profession is organised around struggles for excellence” regarding what should be the prevalent logic of, in this context, securing society (Bigo 2016b, 410). Among themselves, they may then construct “a certain common patrimony of dispositions, which exists despite differences of language, heterogeneities of national culture, and even of class positioning”. Indeed, “[t]heir practices are thus reminiscent of those of the city guilds of the late Middle Ages, which were themselves clusters of different crafts and professions, living together but with their specific ‘houses’” (ibid.). I shall momentarily
return to the conditions of a “field”-approach, and define in greater detail its logic and organising qualities. First, however, I will review previous studies dealing with the transformation of security and defence practice in Sweden, Europe, and beyond.

**PREVIOUS STUDIES OF SECURITY IN TRANSFORMATION**

From a strict viewpoint of IR scholarship, not that much has been said or written (at least in English) about the particular time period and field of actors that I am considering here. With a transdisciplinary outlook, however, one will immediately find several noteworthy studies that share both the empirical scope and critical attention of this dissertation. In the areas of economic history and science and technology studies (STS), for example, Lundin, Stenlås, and Gribbe (2010) have produced a central volume on the history of total defence and arms production in Sweden, including chapters on the fundamental entanglement of the Swedish social welfare system and the politics of rearmament during the Cold War (Lundin and Stenlås 2010) as well as the emergence of its “military-industrial complex” (Stenlås 2010, cf. 2008). Relatedly, historians have traced the evolution of Swedish arms manufacturing and export policy (Hagelin 1985), and the politics of “neutrality” (Hagelin 1990), and social scientists have carefully mapped the bureaucratic structure and legal framework of Swedish arms export today (Åkerström 2016). In the area of criminology, moreover, Flyghed has traced the post-Cold War emergence of anti-terrorism policy in Sweden (2005), and also, with others, published more widely on policing practices, criminal law, and surveillance technology in recent decades (Flyghed and Hörnqvist 2003; Flyghed 2016). In the area of gender and critical military studies (CMS), Sundevall and Persson (2016) have done important work on the Swedish armed forces during the 20th century from the perspective of sexuality and masculinity, Strand et al. (2018; S. Strand and Kehl 2018; S. Strand and Berndtsson 2015) have analysed the armed forces’ recent recruitment strategies and marketing campaigns, and Åse (2016) has situated Swedish narratives of armed neutrality in the gender-nation nexus.

This thesis is also both informed by, and analysing as part of its object, the debate among Nordic political scientists in the late 90s between dominant functionalist perspectives on security (e.g. Sundelius, Stern, and Bynder 2001) and emerging constructionist interpretations (e.g. Wæver et al. 1993). Illustrated by the so-called “Eriksson debate” in the journal *Cooperation and Conflict*, one of the central questions was whether academics and think-tanks should be “observers or advocates” when it came to security policy and legislation (Eriksson 1999; Goldmann 1999; Williams 1999; Wæver 1999), indeed, whether security scholars should focus on “moulding the minds of policymakers” and provide “roadmaps for the future” (Eriksson and Sundelius 2005), or
whether they from a distance should study the social construction of the defence- and security “agenda” and the role of “threat entrepreneurs” themselves (Eriksson 2004).

Swedish IR constructivists at the time were inspired by the simultaneously emerging so-called “Copenhagen School” of security studies. This “school” (which of course is not without its internal differences), tended to emphasise the role of identity, language, and speech acts (drawing on J. L. Austin) for the understanding of security policy and international relations (Buzan 1998; Buzan and Wæver 2009). Notably, this work led to the concept of so-called “securitisation” which refers to the speech act by which certain social phenomena like “migration” become discursively displaced from the reaches of democratic politics to the realm of security work in specialised institutions and agencies (Balzacq 2010). In the corridors of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen during the early 90s, a terminology significant for the empirical framing of this dissertation was coined: “societal security”, described as follows:

“… in the contemporary international system, societal security concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom” (Wæver 1993, 23).

Predicting a diminishing role of the nation state after the Cold War, Ole Wæver adopted “society” as a referent object of security and defined it on large-scale communities of “ethno-national and religious identities” (Wæver 1993, 18–19, 22). He thus saw societies as structured around arbitrary “we-identities” taken at face value, and positioned them as “units” separated from, but existing in parallel with, the state. Wæver wanted “to construct [the] concept of societal security ... as being at a wider level of collectivity” (Wæver 1993, 21), and so these units were said to be able to operate autonomously as players on the “international level”. This can be read as a reproduction of IR realism which mobilises units based on dangerous categorical assumptions about ethnicity, religion, language, custom, and culture, and situates them in an “international” struggle between different ways of life. As will be further discussed in Chapter 3, a leading functionalist scholar in Sweden, Bengt Sundelius (e.g. 2005), was later “handed” this concept by Wæver. Stripping societal security of its original, identity-oriented definition, Sundelius reframed it into a work label to be used in

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4 This Huntington-esque line of analysis is carried on elsewhere in the volume: Buzan sees ”societal and cultural threats” in the ”strong mutual reaction of Islamic and Christian communities to each other” (Wæver et al. 1993, 44), and there is a full chapter dedicated to the prediction that Europe and the Middle East are ”drifting towards societal cold war”.
practice, in policy-making, agency work, for applied research, and within the private industry. The Copenhagen School may have initially coined the theoretical concept which became recognised and occasionally cited in IR studies, but it were Swedish functionalists who appropriated the concept and forged it into the work label that would come to be associated with certain practices.

More importantly, the work in Copenhagen (and elsewhere) on securitisation signified a trend in IR studies in the end of the 90s and beginning of the 00s of increased attention towards post-positivist and “critical” perspectives on security in Europe, often with the aim of challenging mainstream IR realist narratives positioning security exclusively in the realm of sovereign nations in the “anarchical international system”, pertaining exclusively to a logic of territorial stakes and inter-state conflict (Huysmans 1998; C.A.S.E. Collective 2006). No longer reducible to certain “schools”, however, critical security studies (CSS) is now a broad and somewhat messy tradition which harbours a vast range of debates and viewpoints, and while many of these scholars may not share my empirical attention to Swedish actors, they most certainly share some of the theoretical insights that will be utilised. In CSS, important critique has been put forth regarding the shortcomings of securitisation studies, and its overemphasis on the role of exceptionality, speech acts, and its failure to address security as an everyday phenomenon and how multiple, insidious processes of (in)securitisation may unfold in contexts far beyond “moments with decisional gravity – sovereign moments” (Huysmans 2011, 375, 2002). Indeed, speech acts of security “enact a sharp distinction between the exceptional and the banal, the political and the everyday, the routine and creative” which inaccurately implies “an elitist vision of politics” (ibid.). What about securitisations that are not uttered by great political leaders and statesmen, securitisations that may not even be the result of active decisions taken in front of an audience? What about securitisations that similarly enact threats and rupture democratic life, but stem from a myriad of banal and unspectacular decisions, from implicit routines and habits, from mundane bureaucratic work?

Sociologically inspired work have exposed another weakness of the Copenhagen School’s approach by emphasising the practice of security, i.e. how it is not simply an “uttering”, but a systematic and often institutionalised form of doing (Balzacq et al. 2010). Who are the professionals practicing military defence, internal policing, border control, cybersurveillance and so on? What are the social conditions determining their everyday work? How did these spaces of actors come about historically? To resolve such questions, the work of Pierre Bourdieu have been a major asset in international studies (Leander 2011; Adler-Nissen 2013). Bourdieusian IR scholars insist that the state, society, politics, and security must all be theorised differently than in mainstream approaches. The locutor attempting to securitise, for instance, cannot be seen as in a monopolistic position – even if s/he is considered to be a “state leader” – but as a player in a larger social game involving
different professionals, all of them in competition over the appropriate categorisation of threats and how to counter them (Bigo 2013, 118). Among these agents, security does not become an “exceptional politics”, but a politics “as normal as other politics in liberal regimes” (121). From a Bourdieusian perspective, security – even if it is taking place in so-called “international relations” – thus becomes ontologically reformulated into a sociological question of “how agents playing locally are connected with rules of the games which are simultaneously national and transnational” (126 [emphasis added]). It certainly does not make sense, therefore, to “apply” Bourdieu on some arbitrary “international level” and propose that the struggle between socially situated actors with their specific positions and dispositions can be “translated” and “scaled up” to an analysis of relations between states; e.g. as in Adler and Pouliot’s (2011) narrative of security communities dressed up in Bourdieu’s terminology.

Some of the sociologically inspired, practice-oriented, and empirically driven work seeking to destabilise mainstream theorisations of security and the international have been referred to by others as the “Paris School”. This group of scholars in fact engages not only with Bourdieu, but draw inspiration from other critical thinkers, political theorists, and sociologists (even opponents to Bourdieu) like Michel Foucault (2003), Luc Boltanski (2011), Zygmunt Bauman (2007), Bernard Lahire (2011), and Bruno Latour (2005). In particular the work by and around Didier Bigo have enriched the literature on the politics, practices, and professionals of (in)security. He has insisted on its function of a “tipping edge” and the fact that security, mobility, freedom, and fundamental rights for some always entails insecurity, interception, coercion, and suspicion-making for others. Bigo has studied how actors come together around practices of fear and unease (2002), at once around both internal and external forms of security (2006), in different universes of border control (2014), and in transnational guilds of power (2016b; see also Bigo and Tsoukala 2008; Bigo et al. 2010). Alongside this vast body of work, Huysmans has concurred on the “dual”, paradoxical character of security phenomena: “security practice always securitises”, meaning that

security is a political practice that is defined through its tensions with the democratic organisation of political life. Democracy is a political stake in security practice, not simply

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5 Not all IR scholars drawing on Bourdieu are occupied exclusively with security practice, of course. Other works drawing on similar approaches and theoretical instruments have also explored e.g. lawyers and transnational justice (Dezalay and Sugarman 2005), or international civil servants and migration managers (Sending 2015).

6 However, researchers associated with the so-called “Paris school” in fact work not only in Paris but also in universities far away from France and Europe. If anything, this labelling of “schools” simply reinforces nationalistic sentiments and should either be rejected or entirely reworked, as done by Bigo and McCluskey (2018) who have playfully proposed the acronym PARIS (“Political Anthropological Research for International Sociology”) as a transdisciplinary approach for studying e.g. (im)mobility and (in)securitisation.
because of fundamental rights being violated in the name of security but because security practice inherently organises social and political relations around enemies, risks, fear, anxiety. When insecurities pervade how we relate to our neighbours, how we perceive international politics, how governments formulate politics, at stake is not our security but our democracy (Huysmans 2014, 4, see also 2006)

Associated with the “Paris” problematisation, other studies have shown e.g. how the EU field of internal security agencies is structured (Bigo et al. 2007); how the “war against terrorism” includes a politics of unease, suspicion, exception and radicalisation (Bigo and Guittet 2011); how militaries in a “state of exception” may be assigned counterterrorism responsibilities in which “the logics of war … could be considered to be ‘imported’ into the national territory” (Guittet 2006, 159); or how “international security” is increasingly made up of and determined by private military companies (Leander 2005).

As I will map out in detail in Chapter 2, there is a large body of more recent work drawing on the above critical and sociological approaches that addresses the role of technology in the transformation of security and defence (Guittet and Jeandesboz 2010a). Several studies have critiqued the emerging EU industry and R&D programmes (Hayes 2009; C. Jones 2017) which includes both “civil security” products (Hoijtink 2014) and military technologies (Karampekios, Oikonomou, and Carayannis 2018; Britz 2010). Here, certain EU technocrats have managed to construct a policy by which technology is posited as a “solution” and quick fix to various “security issues” (Bigo and Jeandesboz 2010; Bigo et al. 2014). Empirically, and with similar approaches, this issue has also been studied in the field of critical border studies. For example, Jones and Johnson (2016; see also R. Jones 2016) have studied how post-Cold War border management has become an increasingly militarised affair (not least in Europe) as both civil and military, physical and virtual technologies become tangled (see also Follis 2017; Suchman, Follis, and Weber 2017). The “market” for border surveillance- and control systems (Geiger 2014, 2016; Geiger and Pécout 2013) has therefore come to be largely dominated by producers of military technology and interests related not to freedom of movement, but to the arms industry (Akkerman 2018, 2016).

Another prominent area of research in CSS relevant to this study has explored the relation between the practice and knowledge of (in)security, or more precisely, the production and limits of these knowledge forms related to risk, resilience, and terrorism. Aradau and Van Munster have traced the governmentality of the “unknown” in recent history, and how societies have acted upon assumed threats, the yet-to-happen, or anticipated disasters or catastrophes. To plan for violent futures, they argue, is to produce “forms of knowledge that oscillate between the possible instead
of the probable and the plausible instead of the true” (Aradau and van Munster 2011, 19, see also 2012a, 2012b). In particular, the production of “worst case scenarios” have been a frequent activity among defence- and security practitioners, both before, during, and after the Cold War period of planning for nuclear holocaust (Collier 2008; Collier and Lakoff 2008; Ericson and Doyle 2004). This way of reasoning around future threats and risks, not least during the recent decades of the “war on terror”, have led practitioners to produce concrete strategies and policies for making the unknown “actionable”. Ideas like “precaution”, “prevention”, and “preparedness”, as Anderson (2010a) shows, all possess their own logic and historical trajectory. Preparedness in particular has been described as the “primary strategic logic through which threats to collective life are now being taken up” (Lakoff 2006, 265), and in Western counterterrorism- and policing operations, terms like “preemption” (de Goede, Simon, and Hoijtink 2014; de Goede 2008) and even “profiling” (Harcourt 2007) all describe the problematic “pre-crime logic” (Zedner 2009, 72) that currently permeates practice. These different “P-strategies” all conceptualise differently the identifiability and gravity of emerging threats, but all assume and work towards the inevitability of disasters; making the future attack or major incident a question of “when”, not “if”, it will occur (Anderson 2010b).

Relatedly, the concept of “resilience” not only works towards the future catastrophe, but also involves the idea of “bounce-back ability”, and how to return from “disruption” back to a state predetermined as “normal” (J. Walker and Cooper 2011; Coaffee and Fussey 2015; Cavelty, Kaufmann, and Kristensen 2015). In security studies, resilience is often utilised to conceptualise practices that seek to ensure “continuity” of key infrastructural- and architectural assets “whose continuous functioning is understood to be vital for economy and polity” (Lakoff 2007, 254).

Other recent studies have focused more directly on how different security knowledges tend to be produced and disseminated by some “expert”, often coming from academia or the private sector, often working for decisionmakers or state bureaucracies (Berling 2013, 63). Berling and Bueger (2015, 2) argue along this line that today, “governments are surrounded [by] experts” and authoritative voices who comment on events and advise on what kind of measures to deploy. In some examples, such as the early days of counterterrorism work, Bonditti and Olsson argue that particular kinds of expertise and theorisations even became developed from the outset “to the particular interests of security professionals” by scholars and academics made their “theories practical” for government (Bonditti and Olsson 2016, 244; see also Chapters 3 and 4, this volume).7

7 Beyond this review section, relevant literature will be continuously assessed in each chapter of the dissertation, as the focus moves more directly into narrower areas of research. Chapter 3 will e.g. more closely review and critique literature on security knowledge production, Chapter 4 will do so with literature on functionalist research and “expertise”, Chapter 5 will do so with literature on private security markets, and Chapter 6 will do so with literature on dual-use and military-civil technological boundaries.
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY & A METHODOLOGY OF FIELDS

In the early 00s, some of the scholars cited above came together around a shared discontent with the mainstream methodologies of IR, and particularly with the dogmatic narratives that for decades had been constraining serious analyses of “the international” and the multiple relations therein. Drawing significantly on Bourdieu, Foucault, and other thinkers who were unorthodox in IR at the time, these scholars posed questions like: how can we study international “problems” without reverting to state-centric ontologies? How may we understand international security phenomena without rewriting fables of “clashes between civilisations”? How can we think less of the international as constituted by order, boundaries, and entities, and more of the international as disrupted by transformation, transgressions, and processes? Emerging from these questions, the approach of international political sociology (IPS) has been an ongoing project ever since for rethinking the doxa of IR, for showing the detrimental effects of disciplinary gatekeeping, and for insisting that studies of the international per definition demands a transdisciplinary approach.

In line with Edward Said’s prediction of “the future of the critical function”, IPS scholars would agree that critique should be “exercised in the traffic between cultures, discourses and disciplines, rather than in the appropriation, systematization, management, and professionalization of any one domain” (Said 1984, 956). IPS scholars would also echo American political sociologist C. Wright Mills’ suggestion that one must “avoid the arbitrary specialisation of prevailing academic departments” and instead frame research projects “variously, according to topic, and above all according to significant problem”, and thereby “seek, continually and imaginatively, to draw upon the perspectives and materials, the ideas and methods, of any and all sensible studies of [individuals] and society” (Mills 2000, 225).

From the outset, an IPS approach wants to “think about process, change and flows through a continuous reflection on the assumptions enabling claims to knowledge, and provoke discussion with established disciplinary traditions” (Basaran et al. 2016, 2). It seeks intensify exchanges between disciplines such as (but not limited to) sociology, political theory, and international studies, and focus on phenomena that “seem to be simultaneously social, political and international, but not quite in ways that make sense to analysts committed to the academic disciplines specialising in

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8 I will make use of the term “trans”- rather than “inter”-disciplinary in this study, since the latter reinforces the idea of disciplines as enclosed territories that border each other, and not as more ruptured spaces of knowledge-production through which one may cross transversally (cf. international vs. transnational).

9 More recent studies have attempted to introduce a style of “companionship” in critique that seeks to “trace credibility” and “establish symmetries” instead of “denouncing positions we disagree with” (Austin, Bellanova, and Kaufmann 2019). Relatedly, Austin (2019) claims that critical IR employs a certain “suspicious hermeneutics” and suggest instead a “care-full” analysis moving “from suspicion to learning, exclusion to combination, and contradiction to composition”.

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the social, the political or the international” (R. B. J. Walker 2016, 16; see also Huysmans and Nogueira 2012). In doing so, the IPS tradition facilitates reflexive research on empirical issues that necessitate methodological and theoretical experimentation between disciplines, and precisely like this dissertation, it seeks to reassess power – particularly state power – and creatively rework assumed dichotomies of state and society, sovereignty and market, national and international.

A concrete way to “rethink the international” in the IPS tradition (Bigo and Walker 2007; R. B. J. Walker 2006), could be to, for instance, draw attention to the constructions of transnational elites in various fields, especially in Europe (Kauppi and Madsen 2013), and how they make use of what may be called “transnational capital”. Dezalay and Sugarman have analysed international legal professionals and shown how they manage to circumvent local power structures by reinvesting the capitals they have accumulated in transnational contexts, and how their “dual role gives them a strategic position in the construction of the regional ‘big markets’ which are gradually replacing national markets” (Dezalay and Sugarman 2005, 2). In the same vein, Bigo (2016a) has discussed how as bureaucrats and civil servants acquire this kind of transnational capital, power relations are fluctuating in more diverse directions today. Indeed, the traditional function of the state and its spokespersons has been to accumulate and monopolise power and authority in a “centre”, but as Bigo argues, this dynamic is shifting towards a centrifugal logic (circulation outwards from a centre) in how bureaucrats are increasingly able to “reinvest” their capital in the periphery of their relational chains, and not “at home”. While bureaucrats are still formally strung to a centre (e.g. their domestic institution), they may choose to continuously deploy most of their influence in transnational contexts (e.g. in communities abroad). As more and more bureaucrats operate through this form of centrifugal dynamic, distinct social spaces may begin to take shape in the form of “transnational guilds” constituted by actors who continue work for their respective state agencies, but who “share common professional dispositions and solidarity at distance” (Bigo 2016b, 406). This illustrates how “the national territory does not bind the state”, but rather, how “boundary-making depends on the chains of interdependences of its bureaucracies inside and outside the territory” (400). The heart of national bureaucracies, or the so-called “deep state”, may in other words itself work along a transnational logic.

Another prime example of how to problematise the international and, so to speak, “do IPS” can be illustrated by the work of Madsen (2011) and his construction of the notion of human rights law as an “international object”. The study illustrates how the relative ambiguity of the notion of human rights allows for practitioners to invest “different and often very well-camouflaged interests” into it (263; see also Chapter 6, this volume). Seemingly “universal” or “perpetual” ideas like human rights seek justification in claims “of the highest order and grandest kind” (268), and
hence, whatever is done under such labels become easily depoliticised and difficult to question. To circumvent arbitrary claims to universality, one should distance oneself from normative discourses, pre-existing and taken-for-granted narratives, and analyse human rights (for example) “in its own right” by constructing it into a scientifically autonomous object, as a space of actors. Who have an interest in making claims in the name\textsuperscript{10} of human rights? What are those interests? Instead of assuming human rights to be an “entity” in itself, one should make an in-depth, empirical investigation into the actors, relations, processes, claims, and struggles by which it is made up at a given time and place. Thereby, one may see how even “larger international phenomena” such as human rights, far from being untouchable, are in fact themselves constituted by several social microcosms containing quite specific and tangible interests (272).

As illustrated by Madsen and others, IPS approaches have benefited methodologically from the reflexive sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, whom has also been a major inspiration throughout this study. With regards to ontology, Bourdieu was unsatisfied with the seemingly firm division between objectivism and subjectivism in the social sciences. An understanding of any social phenomena, he argued, must attempt to make a “total” analysis of society and account for both the “physics” and the “phenomenology” of social life. Put differently, he insisted on the integration of both a structural analysis of an objective, relational environment and a constructivist analysis of subjective agency within it. On the one hand, he saw social reality as made up of a structure of agents and their relations in different spaces. Here, the social environment may be observed topologically, but when pushed to its limits, a structuralist view cannot alone do much more than portray agents as “passive supports of forces that mechanically work out their independent logic” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 8). Therefore, on the other hand, he saw social reality as simultaneously made up of subjects, their individual perceptions and struggles, and the specific knowledge they carry into their daily activities. Subjectivism is however similarly insufficient by itself since a narrow empiricism would make the world appear rational and immediately explainable, masking the structures that are embedded in social interactions: “the visible, that which is immediately given, hides the invisible which determines it” (Bourdieu 1989, 16). Indeed, to carry out a Bourdieusian analysis, one cannot adopt “an ‘idealist’ view of the world where ideas, norms, discourses, subjectivity, human freedom, and individuals are at the core”, nor can one adopt “an objectivist, ‘structuralist’ paradigm, one that essentialises history, trying to discover the law of history and reducing agents to the status of receptacles” (Bigo 2013, 125). In sum, people are neither fully rational agents that are able to act

\textsuperscript{10} Madsen’s approach is similar to this study since it, too, focuses on “gaps” between the said and the done, on practices that take place “in the name” of something else and thereby make use of what I in Chapter 2 will define in terms of symbolic power.
independently of social structures, nor are they simply passive cogs in a societal machinery. Bourdieu’s approach require both viewpoints simultaneously, or as Wacquant concludes: “[o]bjectivism and subjectivism, mechanicalism and finalism, structural necessity and individual agency are false antinomies” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 10). The structure and its agents, precisely like society and its individuals, are mutually co-constitutive.

This two-fold ontology resonates to a significant extent with the “sociological imagination” of C. Wright Mills, who argued that “[n]either the life of an individual nor the history of a society can be understood without understanding both” (Mills 2000, 3). In short, one needs to grasp “the interplay of man and society, of biography and history, of self and world” (4). He elaborated an approach which sought to connect “the personal troubles of milieu” with “the public issues of social structure”, and vice versa: “Troubles occur within the character of the individual and within the range of his immediate relations with others … Issues have to do with matters that transcend these local environments of the individual and the range of his inner life” (8).

Bringing this worldview into analysis, Bourdieu insists on an epistemological “break” with whatever requires study, and this break unfolds in two distinctive moments: It begins with an “objective moment” where researchers must try hard to distance themselves from any readily available historical preconceptions and construct an autonomous object of study. Instead of taking social phenomena for granted, one must seek to break with them, to reject received narratives and commonsensical representations of the world, “whether they be the mere commonplaces of ordinary existence or official representations, often inscribed in institutions” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 235). Here, the challenge concerns how “to think in a completely astonished and disconcerted way about things you thought you had always understood” (Bourdieu 1991, 207). As exemplified by Madsen’s work above, this analytical moment can be carried out by rejecting a grand narrative (e.g. human rights), setting up one’s “own” relational space, showing how it contains a number of available or potential positions, and how these are held by different agents (institutions, groups, individuals) together making up a structure. Next comes the “subjective moment” where the immediate, lived experiences of these agents, their individual narratives and struggles, their subjective understandings of the world are reintroduced in order to explicate the “categories of perception and appreciation … that structure their action from inside”, and their strategies for position-takings, or what is referred to as the dispositions of agents (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 11). These two moments weave together both structural realities (space of positions) and individual struggles (dispositions of agents) in the analysis, and seek to capture the “intrinsically double reality of the social world” (ibid.). The system of agents on the one hand, and the stances of agents on
the other, are in other words methodologically inseparable; indeed, I will analyse them together and treat them as “two translations of the same sentence” (105).

However, “although the two moments of analysis are equally necessary, they are not equal: epistemological priority is granted to objectivist rupture over subjectivist understanding” (11). The “objective moment” of systematically rejecting preconceptions must come before the analysis of subjective standpoints for the simple reason that a space of positions tends to command the logic of position-taking. This analytical sequence makes sense, too, since it grants the researcher a sense of reflexivity in how it enables you to see “the point from which you see what you see”. Indeed, all points of view “as the word itself suggests, are views taken from a certain point, that is, from a determinate position within social space” within which “we also know that there will be different or even antagonistic points of view” (Bourdieu 1989, 18–19). Epistemological reflexivity can thus be acquired by obliging social scientists to see how they are tasked to know an object of the social world of which they, in turn, are already the product (Bourdieu 1985, 12–13). The suggestion that the preconstructed is everywhere and that a detached “view from nowhere” is impossible is not to say, however, that the goal of reflexivity is to destroy truth claims. Rather, reflexivity is simply about mastering the subjective relation to the object, acknowledging that all claims are made “from somewhere”, that “constructors are themselves socially constructed”, and that whatever “escapes the gaze of science” tends to be “hidden in the very gaze of the scientists” (Bourdieu 2004c, 86, 93). Mills argues similarly that if social scientists and critical thinkers wish to work and act in a consciously chosen way, “they must first locate themselves within the intellectual life and the social-historical structure of their times. Within the social domains of intelligence, they must locate themselves; and they must relate these domains, in turn, to the structure of historical society” (Mills 2000, 179).

In order to perform the two analytical moments and capture the dynamic of positions and dispositions, Bourdieu developed the now widely recognised concept of “field”. Referring to the many social spaces in society organised around sets of historical relations between actors, fields are the arenas of play in which agents come together in collective struggle around a certain stake, a particular source of power, or what Bourdieu defines as “capital”. Fields are not defined by the ostensible characteristics or quantity of its actors, but precisely by the capital which attracts them, by their ongoing struggle around a given material property or immaterial resource which the players have mutually agreed is worth competing over (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 16). The efficacy of any form of capital is, in other words, field-specific; the organising qualities of e.g. economic, cultural, political, and scientific capital are not the same, but mobilise different players employing different tactics with different goals in mind. Moreover,
[w]ith its focus on actors’ positions relative to each other within in social space of ‘organised striving’ or ‘self-organised contestation’, the concept of field treats actors as strategic and interest-driven but in ways that are specific and heavily conditioned by the configuration and dynamics of each field (Sending 2015, 6).

The unequal distribution of capital in fields tends to structure the positions within it in such a way that some agents become the “dominants” or “heirs”, and others become the “challengers” or “pretenders”. Dominant agents are usually fewer but stronger, and are able to determine the overall logic and structure of the field to the effect that they also benefit from this logic and structure. In short, those who possess the most capital will have the most to say, the most at stake, and must therefore focus their strategies towards defending their positions and, so to speak, conserve the current configuration of the field. In contrast, challenger-agents benefit less from the current structure, have less to lose in their struggle, and will try hard to alter the game, shift its logic and structure, and overthrow the heirs. This field dynamic can be best understood by focusing, again, not on the actors as such – e.g. their “identity” – but on their points of contention. This can be done by going back to the initial differentiation between actors, to whatever first “sparked” the struggle, to the establishment of a gap between positions and dispositions – what Bourdieu calls the “sociogenesis” of fields – and from there analyse how heirs and challengers slowly emerged over time.

In so doing, “the question of which types of actors are authoritative … emerges from empirical analysis rather than being imposed as the analytical framework” (ibid.). For this reason, I argue that the notion of field must be understood less as a “theory” or “concept”, and more as an instrument and “thinking tool” for empirically driven research; a way of seeing the world and writing about it (Bourdieu 1985, 18; cf. Leander 2008). For example, fields are not to be understood as a concept for describing a “system of professions” (Abbott 1988), delimiting certain categories from which a complete social ecology can be produced. Rather, fields are key contributions to a methodology for situating relational struggle and the historical emergence of contingent social spaces, methodological tools which allow us to see how society works as an “ensemble of relatively autonomous spheres of ‘play’ that cannot be collapsed under an overall societal logic, be it that of capitalism, modernity, or postmodernity” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 17).

With this approach, we may see how some fields (not all) have gone through long processes of autonomisation. The fields of state bureaucracy, law, and education, for example, have been institutionalised for centuries, and all contain a certain practical sense among its agents, as well as a
certain commonsensical view (doxa) regarding how the game should be played (Bourdieu 1984, 1–4; Swartz 2013, 59). Other fields are comparatively new, emerging, unstable, contested, or still “in the making”. Certainly, no fields – regardless of level of autonomisation – have fixed boundaries or set limits but are always changing, and to focus on the contested limits of a field is therefore the same as focusing on its transformation. Who have an interest in rupturing it, who have an interest in conserving it, which other fields does it overlap and intersect with, and to what extent are its agents multi-positioned in other fields? To focus on the limits of fields further highlights whether these are tightly regulated or weak and permeable, in other words, how easily “new” players may enter into competition. It should be stressed not anyone can enter into struggle by their own free will, but field agents must be recognised as such by others, as legitimate “co-players” of the game (see also Chapter 2, this volume). As I focus on Swedish defence- and security after the Cold War, I attend to a period during which the practices and authoritative claims concerning how to secure society transformed, and therefore, I focus precisely on the limits of my field, how it overlapped with others, how new players entered into it and became recognised, and so on.

Although metaphors of “game” and “players” may be occasionally useful for describing the dynamic of struggle (as did Bourdieu himself), they are still problematic. To speak of a “game”, first of all, is to suggest that someone invented it and came up with the rules, not that a particular practice has been moulded over long periods of time in a collective struggle. Second, game suggests that all of its rules are explicated, written down, generally known, etcetera, whereas in reality, things are more complex and our lives usually follow internalised norms and patterns of behaviour that are better described as regularities. We invest our trust in authorities, partake in voting, listen to educated teachers, get married, and so on, not according to some rule, but because the “social game is regulated [and] the locus of certain regularities” (Bourdieu 1990, 64). Third, game emphasises a certain willingness and freedom to play. In many cases, however, agents are in fact captured by fields, bound by them in their everyday struggles, and cannot simply choose to “quit the game”. Indeed, a field is simultaneously a space of magnetic forces which attracts agents, and a space of structural forces which constrains them.

Capitals may seem rather “strict” in the sense that they define and organise fields, but one may still use them playfully, I argue. Fields can have “two” capitals, or more accurately, two or more subdivisions of capitals that sometimes intersect and sometimes not. For example, Bourdieu saw how the field of science is mobilised, on the one hand, by a form of research-scientific capital, referring to conventional research practice and the related technical- and social skills. On the other, this field is also organised by a form of bureaucratic-scientific capital, referring to the ability to attract and distribute funding, administer and manage teams of analysts, represent faculty in high-level
university contexts, and so on – a subdivision of scientific capital drawing also on political skills (Bourdieu 2004c, 57). In the longue durée of security practice, are there not subdivisions of capital by which some agents in this field are organised around e.g. developing and providing technology, and others around implementing and using them? Are there not some actors who specialise in handling weaponry and setting up physical perimeters, and others who specialise in handling computers and setting up databases? Is there not a subdivision amongst security practitioners by which some pursue political ends and seek influence, and where some pursue economic ends and seek profit? Despite their differences, are they all not still strung to the core stake of securing society from various threats?

At the heart of Bourdieu’s approach lies the notion of habitus. Defined gradually throughout his work, habitus refers to the cognitive internalisation of social environments within agents. As people are born into, lead their lives in, and become constrained by multiple fields in society, the overall social order of fields starts to become “deposited” within individual bodies in the form of mental and corporeal schemata of perception, appreciation, and action. Effectively, the habitus is what provides people with a sense of one’s “place” in relation to others in society, and dictates personal taste and the way people classify themselves and others. However, although habitus is “a structuring mechanism that operates from within agents”, it is “neither strictly individual nor in itself fully determinative of conduct” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 18). Habitus is also, at the same time, “an operator of … a practical rationality immanent in a historical system of relations and therefore transcendent to the individual” (19). The concept therefore pertains simultaneously to individual and society, to both the individual self and one’s collective environment.

Sedimented in one’s habitus, the social order begins to appear “natural” and “necessary”. This allows certain structural behaviours to remain largely unquestioned, and certain rituals in social and political life to be repeated without reflection, and certain traditions to become customary. The “order of things” appears evident and not as “contingent fallouts of a given balance of power” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 14). The notion of habitus can thus explain in more detail what Murray Edelman discusses in terms of the “maintenance of a status quo”. He argues that politics, for instance, has been reduced to a spectator sport, a spectacle which “the mass public never quite touches, yet one its members come to fear or cheer” (1985, 5), and that political action has become mere reactions to abstract and self-sustaining “slogans” and “symbols” that are “essentially meaningless [and] mean different things at different times, in different situations, and to different people” (2001, 83). Perhaps, Edelman’s perceived “status quo” is not “maintained” by someone, but the effect of a deep collective internalisation of a given socio-historical order in habitus?
The focus in this study, however, lies not on the notion of habitus\(^\text{11}\) of security professionals, but on the multiplicity of fields, on the heterogeneous “ensemble” of society and its many “spheres of play” among security work is simply one element. Therefore, non-delimitation must be balanced against the delimitation of research, and seen as an equally intellectually viable principle. In the social sciences – not least in sociology – there is a tendency towards a high degree of specialisation, Bourdieu argues, since scholars want to “imitate the advanced sciences” and the positivist models “in which you have very precise and very narrow objects of research” (Bourdieu 1990, 39). Hence, there is an absurd “suspicion of all ambitions of a general kind”, but as he poignantly asks: “How can you carry out the sociology of literature or the sociology of science without reference to the sociology of the education system?”. Similarly, how can I make a sociology of “security” without relating it firmly to the social conditions for arms production, the field of applied research, and their historical inter-relations? Here, the researcher and its project must reject the image of being a “big fish in a little stream” in preference of a “little fish in a big stream” (ibid.). Contrary to what some believe, a field approach is in fact not the study of a field in the singular, but of fields in the multiple, and therefore of how they relate, intersect, and clash over time. Again, Mills seems to agree:

Do not study merely one small milieu after another; study the social structures in which milieux are organized. In terms of these studies of larger structures, select the milieux you need to study in detail, and study them in such a way as to understand the interplay of milieux with structure. Proceed in a similar way in so far as the span of time is concerned … do not merely report minute researches into static knife-edge moments or very short-term runs of time. Take as your time-span the course of human history, and locate within it the weeks, years, epochs you examine (Mills 2000, 224–25 [emphasis added]).

Bourdieu (1985, 11) had a restrained view on theory, and argued that it should organise research, not accommodate it, since it is merely “a temporary construct which takes shape for and by empirical work and which gains less by theoretical polemics than by confrontation with new objects”. Indeed, a methodology of fields necessitates the “construction of interpretations through direct interaction with the empirical world” (Adler-Nissen 2013, 7), and theorisations should stem from a reflexivity towards human practices and “not from an a priori dogmatic decision about the world done in an armchair” (Bigo 2013, 123). Accordingly, concepts should be seen as pertinent

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\(^{11}\) Some see habitus as Bourdieu’s “master concept” (Swartz 2013, 90), but I refuse this doxic idea that Bourdieusian research is obliged to follow a predestined, cascading motion through his various concepts and that it should culminate in a theorisation around habitus.
only if “put to work”: an over-emphasis on the “details of the research procedure … should have the effect of putting you on notice against the fetishism of concepts … born of the propensity to consider ‘theoretical’ instruments – habitus, field capital, etc. – in themselves and for themselves, rather than to put them in motion and to make them work” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 228 [emphasis added]). In my research exposition, I will therefore accentuate what Bourdieu (1996, 132) describes as paying “empirical attention to field effects”. Instead of being trapped in endless meta-theoretical debates concerning definitions (“is it a field or not?”) or topologies (“who exactly are in it?”), I consider it more vital to, in my writing, place an emphasis on what is at stake in social struggles, and on what the effects of these practices are on the social order, on the individuals therein, on their fundamental rights, and on the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in society.

Offering a similarly nuanced view, Mills (2000, 75) describes the problems of straying too far into “grand theory” or “abstracted empiricism” respectively; two poles of social science which if kept apart ensures “that we do not learn too much about man and society”. The former approach leads to “cloudy obscurantism”, he argues, and represents “a level of thinking so general that its practitioners cannot logically get down to observation” (33). The latter approach leads to “empty ingenuity” and represents a “fetishism of the method” by scholars who “seem more concerned with the philosophy of science than with social study itself”, who have embraced only “one philosophy of science which they now suppose to be The Scientific Method” (57).

A final emphasis must be placed on the role of history in and for this study. Up until now, I have outlined my methodological approach concerning, first of all, the “international” and how such phenomena must be studied in a transdisciplinary, empirical, and open-ended fashion. For such purposes, it was illustrated how the critical sociologies of Bourdieu and Mills are highly suitable. In particular, Bourdieu’s thinking tool of field (compared to the lesser defined term “milieu” in Mills) may enrich this methodology since it captures, at once and in equal measures, social structures and transformative processes; two elements of absolutely central importance for this study. Naturally, this also puts a historical perspective at the very heart of the approach. Indeed, the “analysis of the history of the field is, in itself, the only legitimate form of the analysis of essence” (Bourdieu 1985, 22, see also 1969, 95). In conclusion, let us one final time quote Bourdieu and Mills at length on this matter.

Suffice it to say that the separation of sociology and history is a disastrous division, and one totally devoid of epistemological justification: all sociology should be historical and all history

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12 See also the work of Christophe Charle (e.g. 2013) on how to think historically with Bourdieusian concepts without neglecting comparative insights or the importance of a transnational outlook.
sociological. In point of fact, one of the functions of the theory of fields that I propose is to make the opposition between reproduction and transformation, statics and dynamics, or structure and history, vanish (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 91).

Hence, this study cannot simply be prefaced by what Mills calls a “dull little padding known as ‘sketching in the historical background’” (Mills 2000, 154). Rather, to fulfil their tasks, or even to state them well, social scientists must use the materials of history. Unless one assumes some transhistorical theory of the nature of history, or that man in society is a non-historical entity, no social science can be assumed to transcend history. All sociology worthy of the name is ‘historical sociology’ (146).

**MATERIAL & METHODS OF INQUIRY**

Having introduced my research object in the first section, and established in detail in the second section how I go about approaching and constructing it methodologically, I will here outline the different steps in which the empirical data has been generated for this purpose.\(^\text{13}\) What are the modes of entry with which I may gain access into this space of actors? How do I evaluate what seems to be the most impactful relations therein? How can I trace these relations across and beyond social spaces, as well as through time? How are actor struggles observable in written texts, spoken narratives, non-participant observations, statistical graphs, and conceptual visualisations? How can the information generated from these inquiries be built into different types of qualitative data sets? What are the challenges of structuring, navigating between, playing around with, connecting and disconnecting these different data sets? Finally, how can this vast material be translated into my own language and writing?

Generating empirical material for this kind of research is by no means a simple or straightforward task, nor does it follow a template structure or strict schedule, nor does it obey some arbitrarily fixed research questions. As Stampnitzky (2013, 14) has reflected upon in her work, a Bourdieu-inspired analysis requires adaptive and empirical questions that do not in beforehand draw boundaries around a field and determine who or what constitutes it, but allow for an observation of the very construction of a field itself by those who are bound by it. This requires a multitude of research techniques and a triangulation of different types of material since not a single one of them can by itself capture the complexities of the social order (Adler-Nissen 2013, 7). While

\(^{13}\) Data is understood as "generated" here, in the sense that it is socially constructed, not e.g. “collected” in the sense that it is “out there” for the researcher to discover.
it may be true that “dispositions, positions and practices cannot be grasped through exactly the same analytical tools” (Pouliot and Mérand 2013, 46), the different methods and materials cannot in any directly transmittable way be categorised into the two epistemological “moments” outlined in the previous section – i.e. it does not make sense to say that a statistical model constitutes the “objective” moment and an interview transcript the “subjective” moment”, for example, even if this would appear logical. It would be imprudent to propose that the two moments can be operationalised in a perfectly ordered analytical sequence: the “double reality” is an understanding of the social world, in turn informing ways for how to acquire knowledge about it, but methodologically, this reality is too cluttered and illogical to be narrowed down to two neatly separated “methods” of analysis. It is therefore important to stress that methods and materials, far from being dichotomous or static, participate jointly yet unequally in a gradual construction of my object.

During the initial stages of the research, it was important to perform a preliminary mapping of actors and thereby identify the most visible entry points into the field of struggle. The empirics assessed at this stage did not in any way constitute the larger social space, but indicated how I could from there reject the most commonsensical narratives and proceed towards continuously setting up the different professional relations of interest. This preliminary mapping was done by assessing a set of state commission reports and government propositions from the late 90s and early 00s, as well as the actors surrounding the terminology of “societal security” during these years. I also made a preliminary topology of the industry field, including both security- and defence companies and their associated lobby groups and business associations, also noting the various R&D programmes and funding schemes in which they were involved. From this analysis, I built a preliminary map of spokespersons coming from both public bureaucracies and private organisations, and a preliminary timeline of the dates and time periods for some of the most central processes (see also Loughlan, Olsson, and Schouten 2014). Gradually proposing, rejecting, and reworking a series of empirical questions and conceptual frameworks based on this early mapping, the preliminary mapping stage was tremendously challenging but also valuable as an exercise in maintaining an open mindset and curiosity with regards to empirics and potential pathways of the dissertation.

I entered into a period of empirical field work which lasted between spring 2017 and summer 2018 while being based in Stockholm, Sweden. During this period, I was able to analyse a wide range of material in depth, employing a similarly wide range of methods. First, I built a historical archive based on extended periods of research in the National Library of Sweden and the Riksdag14 Library in Stockholm (e.g. Lobo-Guerrero 2012; Froese 2013; and Furay and Salevouris 2015, 103).

14 The Swedish parliament.
In these public archives, I compiled and consulted official- and primary documentation, the majority of which consists of texts written in the 90s and 00s by spokespersons from government, riksdag, and ministries. It includes but is not limited to government propositions and their preceding commissions and investigation reports (Statliga Offentliga Utredningar, SOU), the reports of the defence commission (försvarsberedningen), of parliamentary committees and working groups (riksdagsutskott), and of the ministries of justice and defence, as well as documents and minutes from government agencies working with civil- and military defence and crisis management. I examined some material from the “Nordic” context, e.g. Nordic Council member proposals, and inter-ministerial declarations related to Nordic security. The public archives also offered key empirics from secondary sources; e.g. edited volumes and monographs in Swedish academic press, NGO white papers, and different proceedings, reports, and speech transcripts from both academic- and civil society conferences. To a lesser extent, I also made use of the archives’ newspaper databases. All of this archival material was examined, photographed and/or cited, and then added and categorised digitally according to time period and type of source or author in the reference management software Zotero. Most of this material stems from different organisations and spokespersons in the bureaucratic field and “public sector”, and although this sector has a distinct hierarchy, this does not mean that e.g. a lengthy government bill – with its emblematic appearance of “weight” and “urgency” – is necessarily more “important” from an analytical point of view than e.g. a twelve-page, single-authored, internal guideline document from a civil defence agency. Contributing varyingly to my archive, these bureaucratic agents all produce texts that draw on the same form of symbolic authority – that of “official discourse” – and should thus be read, assessed, and objectified on similar terms (see also Chapter 2, this volume).

The bilateral arrangement between Sweden and the DHS consists of documentation that was partly or entirely classified. Gaining access thus required that I made an active request of information and submitted detailed descriptions to the DHS and MSB agency regarding my current research and professional background. Agency spokespersons then delayed this process for nearly a full year by refusing to reply directly to certain emails, and by transferring my request around internally to different representatives. When finally delivered by the MSB attorney as digital scans in PDF format, the documentation was “sanitised” and certain information regarding involved agents and organisations blacked out.

Second, I have compiled and studied an array of online sources for identifying key individuals, mapping their backgrounds, and tracing their work relations. For this purpose, I have triangulated findings by using a combination of search engines, making use both of webpages that collect personal data and structure searches based on algorithms and advertisements (Google), and those
that do not (DuckDuckGo, Startpage). This method has been particularly helpful for constructing an archive of individuals and their professional trajectories and collaborations, as well as for mapping actors and organisations beyond the public sector such as security- and defence companies, lobby groups, and business associations. The nature of these online sources are vastly different and can range from a personal CV to company press releases, from major defence blogs to PowerPoint slides from an industry seminar. Several of these online sources may appear highly trivial (e.g. a short news article on the installation of a new CCTV system in an Australian prison), but can still contain key information regarding individuals or companies (e.g. the involvement of a Swedish arms firm), which can then be cross-traced further in new searches, using new keywords. To be sure, this is an arduous, time-consuming form of research since one is obliged to scroll through mundane websites over multiple browser tabs, and assess texts that sometimes do not even have a clear author. Similar to the library-generated archive, the webpage sources were also recorded, categorised, and saved as offline templates in Zotero.

Combining the notes and citations of the historical- and online archives into one word processing document, I generated an original database combing these two sets of qualitative data. This word document of around 350 pages can be described as the unifile of raw empirical material for this study. Throughout the research process, this unifile continuously grew with new content – including both original citations and small personal notes and ideas – and was categorised and structured into different headlines, restructured, expanded, cleaned up, and so on. Certainly, the unifile can represent what is sometimes called “messy research” (Law 2004; Squire 2012), indeed, far from all of the material and notes have been used or cited in the final manuscripts, but the document proved immensely useful for experimenting, moving bits of empirical data around and trying to make new links and relations, for trying out preliminary arguments, for giving an overview of the combined historical- and online archives, and for searching for certain keywords and names within the unifile.

From the archives and unifile, I began noting individuals of interest; agents to be contacted and requested to participate in research interviews. Potential interviewees were listed in an Excel sheet, detailing their current employment, role, and main responsibilities or assignments; any additional employment at the time; previous affiliations and positions; and any publicly accessible contact information. The list was continuously updated and revised, and the interviewees categorised into different priority levels. Approached with a formal email or letter, informants were given background information about the project, shown a consent form,\(^\text{15}\) and asked to participate in a

\(^{15}\) In terms of research ethics, my interviews complied with all requirements of the Ethical Approval Committee at King’s College, London. All participants were provided with an information sheet detailing
1-hour interview at a time and location of their choosing. Interviewees were certainly not selected for this study in order to reflect or make up the “totality” of the practice and actor structure. Rather, of primary interest was the role these agents played in certain processes of field transformation, and how they could offer valuable narratives and reflections from their positions of representing, speaking for, and/or embodying the emerging “challenger”-actors in the field, or the “reformist” agents operating from within old and dominant structures like the defence department and major arms companies. A challenge from the researcher’s point of view is that the agents’ knowledge of their practice tends to be unsaid and tacit; indeed, it is like asking fish about the stream in which they swim (Rubin and Rubin 1995, 20). The key is to not take at face value what interviewees claim to “do” and “know”, but to focus more on the position from which they make such claims, how they describe other agents and their relations to them, the various assumptions and presumptions they express through their professional discourse, and how they make certain aspects about their everyday practice come across as commonsensical and “natural”. Accordingly, when preparing interview questions, some of them recurred in all interviews and concerned e.g. career history and professional background, previous positions held, their view on other individuals or organisations in the field, and their cooperation with other actors both abroad or domestically. Other questions were unique for the informant in question, and usually concerned their involvement or role in a particular reform process or organisational change. In sum, 29 semi-structured interviews16 were conducted (22 men, 7 women). All of them were done in Swedish and in the interviewees work environment or in their homes.

The interviewee material intends to cover a broad “mix” of different actors, sectors of employment, levels of responsibility, and types of skills and knowledge. From the public sector, I have interviewed staff from the civil security agency MSB, including its director and its senior analysts, chief attorney, and advisors working both at home, internationally, and in the transatlantic domain. Also in the public sector, I have met with directors of security research and R&D funding in agencies (KBM, MSB), as well as universities (IHT, CATS), applied research institutes (FOI), and innovation agencies (Vinnova). Further, I have interviewed spokespersons currently or previously working with promoting security- and defence export in ministries (Foreign Affairs, Defence) and agencies (FMV, FXM). Six interviews were conducted with retired civil servants previously working in civil defence agencies (ÖCB), the defence commission, or directly in the ministry of defence, and these were all key in contributing to the construction of my historical

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the nature of my research. In addition, participants who were interviewed (and in most cases, recorded) were required to sign a consent form permitting me to use this data.

16 See Annex II: Interviewees.
archive. From the private sector, I interviewed lobbyists and business association representatives from both the “civil” and “military” industry sectors (SACS, SOFF), as well as the key organisation for arms export promotion (Business Sweden). Five interviews were conducted with high- and mid-level representatives from Sweden’s largest security- and defence company (Saab), including its chief strategy officer, chief technology officer, and three heads of sales divisions. Finally, two interviews were held with leading activists from the Swedish civil society and peace movement. Interestingly, many of the security practitioners had a professional history of having worked at different times in both the bureaucratic- and industry fields. Some were currently multi-positioned, moving between different positions of responsibility, or serving simultaneously as e.g. university professor and agency R&D director, or as industry lobbyist and export promotor for the state. While some of these informants – e.g. agency directors and top lobbyists – fall under the general definition of an “elite interview” (Blakeley 2013), most informants were in fact mid- to high-level bureaucrats and company representatives. This made it somewhat easier to communicate and decide dates, and it also enabled informants to be more outspoken regarding their everyday work and professional relations. Following the completion of interviews, I transcribed audio recordings and added these texts along with my personal notes from the interviews in the qualitative data analysis (QDA) and text management software Nvivo. The Nvivo programme offers a coding-function by which texts can be structured into different “nodes”. If several informants explicitly mention or implicitly refer to certain key themes – like “US cooperation” or “total defence”, for instance – these passages in the transcript could be tagged and gathered into one and the same node, thereby providing an overview of how different informants describe, define, or recollect the same social phenomenon. This function was employed “lightly”, as I coded mainly the key themes emerging from the interviews for a general overview of certain elements of their discourse. The nodes as well as the non-coded material was then gradually cross-checked against relevant data in the unifile, looking for overlaps as well as discrepancies.

Particularly with regards to the research interview process, a few points on reflexivity must be added (e.g. Kunz 2012). When approaching individuals from arms companies or lobby groups in the private sector, I was surprised by the ease with which I managed to establish contact with

17 When it came to agents belonging to a particular organisation, like an agency or company, I usually began by contacting and interviewing mid- to high-level (not top-level) agents. A “head of sales” or a “strategic officer”, for example, tends to both work in the vicinity of company CEOs or agency directors and have staff responsibilities, and are thus suitable interviewees to begin with since they can “open doors” for future interviews, both upwards and downwards in their organisational hierarchies.
these agents, how willing they were to meet, and subsequently how generously they shared semi-sensitive information with me. The Swedish arms industry has been under close scrutiny from media and NGOs in recent years, not least during 2017-18 when a new and more restrictive arms export law was about to be tabled, and state-subsidised arms export promotion (done in the name of “Team Sweden”) is a highly controversial activity. Nonetheless, the agents working with these matters almost immediately and with little suspicion accepted my interview requests, shared detailed information, and put me in contact with future informants. Their attitude can likely be explained to a large extent by the fact that I am a young white male from Sweden – fitting the profile of what the industry would call a “young professional” – and come from the internationally renowned institution King’s College London. Certainly, a young woman or racialised person, an NGO researcher, a journalist, or for that matter a senior IR scholar, would not have had the same ability to access this field. Furthermore, another contributing factor for my interviewees’ generous attitude could be that I approached them with an empirical focus on “civil” or “societal” security, and focused my questions explicitly around these themes (rather than e.g. military production or arms export). As will be discussed in Chapter 6, companies and lobbyists tend to almost equate civil security with a form of “corporate social responsibility”, perceiving these technologies and solutions not as particularly controversial, but as having to do more with “societal benefit”, innovation, engineering, or even human rights.

Finally, the study has benefited from ethnographic observations in the field (e.g. Baird 2017b; Vrasti 2008; Wedeen 2010; Gusterson 2008). An essential part of conducting interviews in the everyday environment of practitioners is to simultaneously take in as much as possible of the social surroundings, the professional lingo and jargon, and the small interactions and exchanges taking place immediately before or after the sit-down interview officially starts. An environment like Saab’s office foyer was in fact highly interesting since it also served as a small exhibition area where large, bright LED-screens showcased some of the firm’s weapon systems and military technologies, its booming sales figures in recent years, and catchy company slogans related to e.g. “human rights” and “innovation”. Taken together these observations contributed to an understanding of how the arms firm seeks to “present itself”. I also conducted more prepared non-participant observations at three occasions. First, I attended a “networking forum” for public and private actors seeking to co-apply for R&D funding from the EU’s 8th framework programme. Here, applied security researchers mingled with practitioners, companies, lobbyists, and bureaucrats and made “elevator

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18 I received only one refusal from my 30 interview requests. While willing to participate in my research, this individual was legally unable to do so due to contractual obligations from their previous employer in the arms industry sector.
pitches” of their projects, and it was interesting to observe how agents interacted across sectors and exchanged know-how on certain threats and technological solutions. Second, I attended two exhibitions called the “Societal Security Forum” (Mötesplats Sambällssäkerhet) where representatives from most of the central actors in the field were represented and showcased their various services or products, and interacted on the exhibition floor. Ethnographic transcripts from these events were added into Nvivo and analysed alongside interview transcripts. These usually quite mundane observations can serve to enrich and flesh out an understanding of professional dispositions otherwise and typically acquired through interviews. Indeed, the “everyday” must be taken seriously in a sociological approach and analysed in a way which is on par with seemingly “exceptional” information. This can be done, Mills (2000, 215) suggests, by “deliberately inverting your sense of proportion”; for example, “[i]f something seems very minute, imagine it to be simply enormous, and … vice versa, for gigantic phenomena”.

For purposes of citation in the analyses and final manuscripts, I have translated selected passages from interview transcripts and archival material from Swedish to English. This has not been without its challenges, of course, as several terms end up in a translation zone and are difficult to make perfect sense of in English. The term “society”, for example, has a rather clear distinction from the term “state” in English, while in Swedish (and other Scandinavian languages), sambälle is arguably more vague and not as dichotomous with stat. Moreover, the Swedish word for “society” commonly prefixes other terms, as in the examples samhällssäkerhet (“societal security”) or sambällsanda (“societal spirit”) in ways that are perhaps not as common in English. Another translation issue concerns the Swedish word for “security”: while the English language contains both the words “security” and “safety”, these are conflated into one term in Swedish (säkerhet), making it difficult at times to describe practices with precision, e.g. to separate counterterrorism work from emergency services. To make things more complicated, although “societal security” exists in all of the Scandinavian languages (samhällssäkerhet, samfunnssikkerhet, and samfundssikkerhed), the term is certainly not “pan-Nordic” since it carries its own distinct connotations, definitions, and translations into practice in these different countries.

Partly for these reasons, I will pursue a style of writing which aims to be as “specific” as possible, a writing which recognises that vague language and sweeping definitions provide a “false clarity [which] is often part and parcel of the dominant discourse, the discourse of those who think everything goes without saying, because everything is fine as it is” (Bourdieu 1990, 52). In fact, it is precisely the ambiguity in language – the gap between the said and the done – that constitutes the core problem in several of the subsequent chapters. Bourdieu notes that an “oversimplified and over-simplifying discourse about the social world means inevitably that you are providing
weapons that can be used to manipulate this world in dangerous ways” (ibid.). This is not least the case with holistic discourses like society/samhälle or security/säkerhet, terms that are “overladen with passions, emotions and interests” and that “work like projective tests into which each person imports his or her prejudices, unreflective opinions and fantasies” (ibid.).

CONCLUDING NOTES: CRITICAL RESEARCH – ITSELF A FIELD OF PRACTICE

As a social phenomenon like any other in society, research should itself be seen as a field of struggle. Doing so, one rejects conceptions of the “research community” as somehow a “world of generous exchanges in which all scientists collaborate towards the same end” (Bourdieu 2004c, 45). Rather, the field of research is per definition conflictual, unevenly structured, and involves innumerable opposing viewpoints: “The ‘communitarian’ vision fails to grasp the very foundation of the scientific world as a universe of competition for the ‘monopoly of the legitimate handling’ of scientific goods” (ibid.). Viewing research as a field also explains the relatively narrow selection of “acceptable” concepts and methodologies available to scholars; indeed, the reason for why these are employed by a majority of scientific agents is not because they are somehow “best”, but because they are (mis)recognised as such according to the dominant logic of how research is “supposed” to be done.

Disagreements in scientific fields, like all others, tend to be “organised around the principal opposition between the dominant … and the dominated, the challengers” (35). Accordingly, international studies, like virtually all other areas of study, includes a division of newer, contentious, “revolutionary” approaches (e.g. “poststructuralism”, “new materialism”) who are subordinated to the older, mainstream, “conservative” approaches (e.g. “realism”, and other first mover-schools traceable all the way back to 1919 and the establishment of the so-called “first” IR department in Aberystwyth). Due to their position, the dominant approaches are themselves “bound up with the established state of the field” and thus “able, often effortlessly, to impose the representation of science most favourable to their interests”, becoming the “natural defenders of the ‘normal science’ of the day” (ibid.). Challenger-approaches cannot simply unbind themselves from these dominants, but must play the obligatory game of “position-taking” and make constant reference to mainstream perspectives.

A field perspective also rejects a view on social science as somehow extraneous to society; as if research is conducted in a position from which societal issues can be studied from “above”. Rather, the practice of research is immersed in society, inseparable from the many struggles that permeate the social order; indeed, it is merely one among several organised social practices, a field in competition with others. As such, the research field possesses a relative degree of “autonomy”,

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meaning that not all can enter it and make scientific claims recognised as legitimate, but that new agents need to meet certain “entry conditions” and a certain amount of specifically “scientific” capital. This capital is usually made up by a combination of material properties such as university diploma and doctoral theses, technical knowledge, an incorporated sensibility towards research in its practical state, and a propensity to take part in the scientific game (Bourdieu 2004c, 47, 50; see also Chapters 2 and 4, this volume).

Not science “as such”, but the position and disposition – the habitus – of the agent in the scientific field is what makes possible certain plausible directions of research for the individual scholar. Researchers’ personal and professional backgrounds – e.g. their class and gender just as much as their publication history and academic peers – all contribute towards (re)creating their practical understanding of research, functioning at once as their source of imagination and as “a system of censorship” (Bourdieu 2004c, 60). Their habitus leads them to consider some approaches normal and dull and others experimental and eccentric; making some theories readily available and others unthinkable; making them see certain empirical objects as “troubling” and others as “trivial”. The same goes for methods, of course. Methods are not so much about choosing and obeying explicit, written-down, “rules” of research, as they are about a practical sense emerging from prolonged exposure to the game of science and its regularities. Methods are not neutral links between reality and concept, nor ready-made tools for immediate application, but simply the words we use for what is actually ongoing research practice.

Put differently, this perspective has enabled some to consider how IR research is disciplined in various ways (Aradau and Huysmans 2013), for example, in how methods have been seen traditionally not as creative tools but as the “hygiene” of science (Aradau, Huysmans, et al. 2014, 4). If a certain field of research contains a dominant theoretical school and a narrow selection of acceptable methodologies, making reflexive choices or experimenting with methods become like tiny acts of resistance. This can be also done by adopting a playful attitude towards the research process, a general scepticism towards the current doxa in the field, and by bringing in “new loci” and “unorthodox” sites of critical attention (Brock 1999, 485). As argued in a recent volume on the practice of security research, critical scholars could also employ a methodological bricolage, that is, a research strategy which takes “complexity not as a challenge to knowledge that needs to be overcome by multiplying methods but as the recognition that the world consists of things that ‘relate but don’t add up’” (Aradau, Huysmans, et al. 2014, 7; see also Guittet 2016). Bricolage is a way of trying different methods out and continuously moving on to unfamiliar combinations of

19 Or as eloquently put by Bourdieu, “I would be tempted to say that only one rule applies: ‘it is forbidden to forbid’, or, watch out for methodological watchdogs!” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 227).
concepts and data “to bring out relations that otherwise remain largely invisible”, or to relate “what is usually kept apart” (Aradau, Huysmans, et al. 2014, 8). This playfulness goes hand in glove with an empirically driven field-approach and the overall methodological lens of IPS whose aim, we may remind ourselves, is to disconnect and reconnect the “international” in IR and emphasise not homogeneity and order, but difference and disorder. In line with a general theoretical critique towards the worldview generated by traditional IR realism, the goal of IPS and a methodological bricolage is not the “territorialisation” of disciplines, to draw “borders” between forms of argumentation, to “defend” claims at all costs, or to “secure” knowledge. This is not to say, of course, that the goal is to relativize the international, but simply to point out the “contingent epistemological terrain upon which IPS operates”, and to welcome rather than shun “themes of uncertainty, contingency and ambivalence” in critical research: “This is risky work”, the IPS editors point out, “but it is absolutely necessary in a political climate currently predisposed to closure, exclusion and territorialisation”.20

**Dissertation Outline**

In Chapter 2, I move from the question of research strategies to a state of the art. First, I will insist that my study of security and defence in Sweden needs to be situated in the larger geographical, economic, political, and socio-historical context of Europe, and in particular, in relation to the emerging European industry for civil security- and military technologies. Indeed, transformations of the Swedish field have occurred in interdependence with similar developments at the European Union level, in the European Commission, and among other EU member countries, and certain actors associated with the Swedish arms industry have benefited from the EU’s recent efforts to establish new R&D instruments in the area of security and defence. Second, this chapter will problematise how the historical case of Sweden as well as the present situation in Europe have tended to be conceptualised in terms of “military-industrial complex”. How can what is rather nostalgically referred to as “industrial complex” be theorised with more accuracy and nuance, and linked more decisively to my analytical object? What are some of the tools that can enable a richer theoretical understanding of the particularities of the social order, and its many struggles and power relations? Here, I will assess the works of certain influential thinkers before choosing to emphasise the theoretical work of Bourdieu, drawing out and critiquing his ideas of field economies, capital conversion, and symbolic power.

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The state of the art and theoretical discussion is followed by four chapters wherein I present the analysis of my empirical material. These are organised thematically and in pairs so that Chapters 3 and 4 focus broadly on the state and the role of statist- and bureaucratic agents for the transformation of the field of Swedish security and defence. The second pair of empirical chapters, Chapters 5 and 6, proceed towards analysing the industry (without neglecting the positions of statist agents) and the role of certain industrialists and arms companies for the transformation of the field.

In Chapter 3, I begin by describing in some detail the historical constitution as well as recent transformation of so-called “total defence” in Sweden, and how after the Cold War and in the early 00s, traditional organisational structures and strategies related to its civil defence-branch became challenged by a group of reformists. Gradually, these civil servants, commission members, agency officers, and security scholars began imposing new ways of doing security, and new threat constructions related not to military invasion, but to asymmetrical, transgressive threats and risks such as “terrorism”. As actors, practices, and research environments emerged in the areas of counterterrorism and crisis management, the general security discourse shifted and the work label of “societal security” started to spread. During these years, Swedish security practitioners began to work more actively in transnational relations, in the Nordic region and EU system, and often in contexts of applied- or functionalist research, industry collaborations, innovation, and R&D.

In Chapter 4, I take a closer look at precisely this latter point; that is, contemporary struggles of Swedish spokespersons regarding transnational security cooperation in the form of R&D. More specifically, I zoom in on the current partnership between Swedish actors and the United States Department of Homeland Security, and address the question of what is able to go on in the name of “security research”. Since the mid-00s, US-Swedish security cooperation has played out in the form of a bilateral agreement for purposes of “science and technology”. However, when assessed in more detail, this agreement has in fact been formulated so widely that in practice, it allows for far more extensive forms of cooperation beyond simply “research”. Having come to be referred to as an “S&T Plus”-agreement, it encourages everything from joint counterterrorism exercises to lab experiments and expert exchange, and even works as a “gateway” for connecting any security professional in Sweden with their counterpart in the US homeland security organisation. Moreover, in the agreement the notion of “information sharing” is defined so extensively that, legally speaking, it would enable the exchange of everything from personal data to top secret intelligence related to counterterrorism work. The chapter concludes with a sociological critique of the political function of science, and discusses theoretically the symbolic qualities of academic research and how the social scientific field, with its relatively weak autonomy, tends to attract multiple different interests.
In Chapter 5, I revisit history in order to carefully describe the social foundations of the Swedish security- and defence industry with regards to its political economy during the 20th century. Sweden’s Cold War foreign policy-stance – that of “non-alignment” in peacetime for the purpose of “neutrality” in war – blocked the armed forces from importing any military materiel, and so the government had to establish a more or less self-sufficient domestic arms industry which, in turn, became heavily reliant on state-subsidised industrial safeguards such as arms export. This historical reliance, I will show, can help explain the sociohistorical configuration of industry actors in the field and why certain industrialists and arms firms became so dominant, and why their partnerships with the Swedish public sector remain so close today. I then proceed towards analysing the industry’s post-Cold War transformations, its privatisation and internationalisation, and how a series of attempts were made in the early 00s at establishing a domestic “societal security market”, as a space in which the arms industry could “spin off”, diversify, and develop emerging civil security technologies. However, due to the lack of substantial state involvement and support structures, this “market” has remained weak and still in emergence, and arms companies focused instead on embedding civil security technologies in their military production, making it part and parcel of the manufacture and export of advanced weapons systems and security solutions.

In Chapter 6, I take a closer look at precisely this latter development; namely, contemporary struggles of Swedish industrialists regarding how to implement emerging technologies in arms production, and how to wield them socio-politically. I do this by analysing the case of Saab – the region’s largest security- and defence company – and its expansions into so-called civil security. First, I show how these “systems” or “solutions” possess a logic of scalability as they are able to move between civil- and military application. This discussion also considers how security R&D and modern engineering has become so advanced that these civil (not military) technologies now increasingly serve as the basis for new products and systems within arms firms – thereby disturbing the traditional function of the dual-use framework. Second, I discuss how the notion of “civil” becomes linked to discourses of innovation and human rights, and how it thereby serves a distinct socio-political function for industrialists and spokespersons since civil security can be wielded e.g. for recruiting staff or as a façade in arms export contexts.

Chapter 7, finally, offers some closing reflections on the sociohistorical structuration of the field, linking the present study to the role of civil society, how questions of “peace” and “freedom” relate to militarism in Sweden, and how these terms have tended to be trapped in a total defence-context. The chapter will then conclude the dissertation and draw out and discuss the most central findings before summarising the argument and linking it back to my theoretical discussion on
power, the state, the industry, and the economy of fields and capitals. I will end by presenting strategies for future studies and assess some of the avenues opened up by this research.
CHAPTER 2
SECURITY, INDUSTRY, SOCIETY
Theories and concepts for studying security practices and arms industries in Europe – a state of the art

The previous chapter discussed the methodological principles and tools, the empirical material, and the chosen mode of inquiry (“the state of the question”) for constructing the analytical object of a field of actors situated in Sweden and organised around post-Cold War transformations of security practice and arms production. The present chapter will situate this research object in a broader context, in the larger European public-private arms- and security industry, and more firmly in a theoretical context, in a critique of the ways in which these issues are often conceptualised. In recent NGO reports, for example, it is not uncommon to read that a security- or military-“industrial complex” has been spawned in Europe in recent decades. This concept is both unspecified and simplistic, and says little to nothing about how the “complex” in fact involves and attracts a multitude of related fields, actors, practices, and capitals, nor exactly what interests or issues these are strategically “aimed” towards, nor anything at all about how the many relations constituting this structure are recognised and regulated in certain ways according to their inter-relational value. This chapter will address these shortcomings.

In doing so, this chapter has two interconnected aims, and is structured into two larger sections. The first section will illustrate why the field of Swedish security and defence must be situated in the significantly larger geographical, economic, political, and socio-historical context of Europe. Indeed, the developments in Sweden have occurred not in a vacuum, but alongside and largely in interdependence with simultaneous developments at the European Union level, in the European Commission, and among other EU member countries. Here, a general shift of practice occurred from “second”- to “third pillar” activities; here, Swedish practitioners, researchers, and companies began expanding in the late 90s and early 00s; and here, the European arms industry, including major firms and research institutes from Sweden, found ways of ensuring public funding and support via new R&D programmes for civil security, surveillance, and border control.

In the second section, I will further develop the “state of the art”, continue the literature review, and develop a conceptual framework for how to better explore the intricate ways in which these processes in recent years relate to each other and make up a particular configuration of power. How can recent developments in Sweden and Europe related to emerging public-private, civil-military industries be properly theorised, beyond the unspecified notion of “complex”? What
theories and thinkers may aid us for this purpose? Here, I propose that the immensely important activist- and academic research cited and analysed in the first section should be reintroduced to early, profound, critical work on social hierarchies, struggles, and power; e.g. to Mills’ concepts of the institutional order and power elites, to Foucault’s ideas about governmentality and apparatuses, and – in more detail – to Bourdieu’s work on symbolic power and the economy of fields.

THE EMERGENCE OF A EUROPEAN INDUSTRY OF CONTROL & VIOLENCE

The end of the Cold War brought about a massive decrease in defence budgets not only in Sweden, but throughout Europe. In fact, global military expenditure began its decline already in the mid-80s, but it was not until the early 90s that significant effects were noticed in defence departments, government agencies, arms companies, and military research institutes around the world. With relative peace and stability, at least in the Western world, the procurement of new weapon systems became increasingly improbable for European governments. To the EU, consequences of the “peace dividend” were seen as a direct threat to hundreds of thousands of defence industry jobs, to technological capabilities, export figures, and the competitive position towards the US industry. Therefore, in two communications in 1996 and 1997, the European Commission began addressing new ways of aiding the “defence-related industry”, attempting to “frame armaments trade and production as economically vital and belonging to [the] internal market” (Hoijtink 2014, 464). To possess a “healthy and competitive European technological and industrial base” related to arms was understood as an absolutely necessity for the new common foreign and security policy to be credible (formally introduced as the European Security and Defence Policy with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997) (ibid; see also Mörth and Britz 2004; Mörth 1998).

Highly controversial, this move met major opposition from member-states. Further attempts towards the end of the 90s to unify the European market for defence were therefore stalled, and it was not until 2003, when the Commission tabled a communication entitled “European Defence – Industrial and Market Issues: Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy” that the attempts from 1996-97 were followed up. This report again attempted to connect security technologies with the single market, but now by making reference to crisis management operations (and other so-called Petersberg tasks from 1997), as well as a vague notion of “global security”. In

21 Military strategists and security professionals in late modern societies have managed to close down the notion of “violence” largely to their own benefit, associating it with political violence and a terrorist enemy and not their own activities. They impose themselves as the “protagonists” and their own violence as “pure” and “ethically’ justified and necessary against a ‘monster’”, while the enemy’s violence is seen as “nefarious”. (Bonditti and Olsson 2016, 235). I move away entirely from this, and consider violence and control as some of the literal and felt effects on the bodies and mobilities at which these technologies become targeted when harvested from the industry and implemented into practice.
contrast to the 90s, the Commission could now with the events of 9/11 skew industrial policy towards not traditional defence but security practice in its various emerging forms; “global”, “homeland”, “internal”, “civil”, “societal”. Indeed, the 2003 report as well as the Commission’s declaration “A secure Europe in a better world” from the same year (that would become adopted by the EU as the “European Security Strategy”) tied directly into the discourse of the United States’ “neo-cons”, the strategies related to the “global war on terror”, and the recent establishment of a US state department for “homeland security” (Hayes 2006, 11).

From this point onward, the strategy seemed clear: the Commission momentarily gave up its ambitions to create a common market purely for armaments and weapon systems, and sought instead to forge a market and R&D scheme for civil security in which the arms industry could still be facilitated. An important step in this process was the consecration of the so-called Group of Personalities (GoP) which worked until 2004 on setting up the general parameters and conditions for such an R&D programme, thereby laying the groundworks for future industrial policies. Constituted by 28 members, the arms lobby had a clear influence over the agenda and final report of the GoP; or, the “Group of Doctors Strangeloves” as they became nicknamed by the NGO Statewatch (14). In early 2004, the GoP final report was published virtually alongside a Commission communication announcing the launch of the so-called “Preparatory Action on Security Research” (PASR), “a funding scheme for pilot projects in the areas of explosives detection, aviation and maritime security, and emergency response” for “protecting against terrorism” and “enhancing crisis management” (Hoijtink 2014, 464). Between 2004 and 2006, the PASR programme funded 39 research projects, using EUR 44.5 of its 65 million budget. Jones (2017, 14) notes how

23 of the 39 projects were led by companies whose primary interests lay in selling arms and other military equipment. PASR also financed projects aimed at the long-term development of EU security policy and research. Between 2002 and 2006 the EU’s 6th Framework Programme on research and development … and the PASR funded over 200 projects concerned with the GoP’s priorities.

PASR was “preparatory” in the sense that it was supposed to act as a foundation for a more formal “European Security Research Programme” (ESRP) from 2007 and onwards, to become embedded in the 7th Framework Programme (FP7). Despite its pilot-function, PASR was still remarkable in how it served as an early market-construction instrument for the Commission, and moreover, in how it managed to convince the European Parliament to begin investing public funds into security technologies even though the key beneficiaries of such a project would end up being
arms firms. Karampekios and Oikonomou (2018, 194) argues that the results of PASR “justified the interest of the arms industrialists, not purely in quantitative terms – since the entire budget was relatively small – but primarily in qualitative terms, since PASR became the European arms industry’s early entry point to security research”.

Later in 2004, a follow-up Commission communication promised the establishment of a “European Security Research Advisory Board” (ESRAB) with the goals “to advise on the content and implementation of the ESRP, ‘paying due attention to the proposals of the Group of Personalities’ … and to ensure that the ESRP was closely linked with other EU policy areas, such as foreign affairs, internal security and defence” (C. Jones 2017, 14). After almost exactly two years in operation, the ESRAB delivers its final report in 2006 which sets the organisational structures and research priorities for the EUR 1.4 billion “security theme” in the upcoming EU FP7 which would run between 2007-13. It is here, in the ESRAB working groups and the early structurations of the ESRP, that the notion of “secure societies” becomes established as an FP7 theme, and that a discourse of societal security\(^{22}\) is introduced more widely in the EU context of security- and military R&D. Security in the name of “society” expanded the EU’s notion of internal security cooperation and policies in the area of freedom, security and justice, and mobilised practices of Petersberg-style crisis management as well as counterterrorism, border- and migration control, and surveillance under its umbrella. The emerging notion of societal security reflected the attempt to launch a Europeanised form of “homeland security”, to put a “label” on the tendency in the EU region – not least in northern Europe, including Germany and the Nordic countries (Hayes 2009, 72) – of policies calling for “all-encompassing”, “all-risk”, “holistic”, and “comprehensive” approaches to security work.

It seems that as traditional forms of social security have been deliberately eroded, enthusiasm for the doctrine of homeland security – sometimes referred to in Europe as ‘civil security’ or ‘societal security’ has continued almost unabated (C. Jones 2017, 28).

When the ESRP was about to be launched, it became clear that the long development between roughly 2003-2007 had led to “security” becoming defined in largely technocratic and entrepreneurial terms (Bigo et al. 2014), and that “research” concerned mostly different forms of

\(^{22}\) Chapter 3 will trace the societal security-label in the Nordic history of total defence, and analyse the link between Swedish civil defence practitioners and functionalist security researchers developing this label and the various EU processes leading up to “secure societies”-research in the ESRP. Moreover, as will also be discussed in subsequent chapters, societal security became a central strategic component in the effort to (re)frame military- and security technologies in Europe after the Cold War, not least among Swedish firms.
products and innovations to be developed by the private industry. For example, top-level discussions around how to develop instruments for security R&D did not conclude after the ESRAB report, but proceeded in the form of so-called “public-private dialogues” in the newly established European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF). Crucially, actor representation had not changed significantly between the GoP and ESRIF, but the security- and arms industry CEOs and lobbyists still dominated the agenda, and civil society organisations and social science researchers continued to be more or less absent in the different working groups (Bigo and Jeandesboz 2010). The design of the ESRP, in other words, made sure that it became outsourced to the very corporations that have the most to gain from its implementation, noticeable not least in through the fact that responsibility “was given not to the Commission Directorate-General for Research & Innovation – which oversaw the majority of the EU’s research programme – but instead to the Directorate-General for Enterprise & Industry (DG ENTR)” (C. Jones 2017, 41).

Lobby organisations such as the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) and the European Organisation for Security (EOS) played a key role for these developments in Brussels as they either became directly invited by EU officials to participate in “high-level expert groups” for shaping the early stages of its civil security R&D programme (Calvo Rufanges 2016), or themselves invited stakeholders to “High-Level Security Roundtables”, such as the ones in 2011-12 “organised by EOS under the ‘patronage’ of Cecilia Malmström, at that time EU Home Affairs Commissioner, and then-Commission Vice-President Antonio Tajani” (C. Jones 2017, 38). These various forums and roundtables, including the “Security Advisory Groups” in the FP7 and FP8, have been called “lobby fraternities” since the participants all seem to know each other and benefit from each other’s actions (Boros 2016).

It therefore hardly comes as a surprise, when looking back at the results of the ESRP,23 that the main beneficiaries of the research programme have been private companies:

In total, private companies took almost €552 million from the FP7 ESRP (2007-2013) budget, some 40% of the €1.4 billion total. Per project, private companies took almost 25% more

23 To illustrate the width of the FP7’s ESRP, it included technological development in areas such as maritime surveillance (e.g. projects like CLOSEYE, I2C, SEABILLA, and SUNNY); EU-wide, EUROSUR-styled border surveillance (PERSEUS), “smart” borders (ABC4EU, FASTPASS, FIDELITY, and XP-DITE); biometrics (INGRESS); autonomous land-border surveillance robots (TAILOS); anti-money laundering (HEMOLIA); data-mining and data fusion (ADVISE, CAPER, LASIE, and ePOOLICE); detection of “abnormal behavioural patterns” in urban environments (INDECT, ADABITS, TACTICS, SAMURAL, and ZONESEC); electromagnetic weapons for vehicle mitigation (SAVELEC and AEROCEPTOR); and “less-than-lethal” suicide bomber mitigation including “sound blasters” (SUBCOP) (C. Jones 2017, 21–26).
money on average from the … ESRP than they did from counterpart research programmes such as health, ICT, energy, environment and transport (C. Jones 2017, 3)

More precisely, a substantial portion of these private actors were in fact multinational arms firms\footnote{As Chapter 6 will discuss at length, arms companies entered into this technological area in the early 00s by establishing new civil security sales divisions, often with the implicit intention to enable the development and application of so-called dual-use technologies.} including companies such as Thales (France), Airbus (Netherlands/EU), BAE Systems (UK), SELEX/Leonardo-Finneccanica (Italy), Indra (Spain), and Saab (Sweden). In FP7, the top three arms firms participated in 165 different projects, receiving a total sum of EUR 78.2 million in R&D funds (ibid.). Beyond the arms industry, another major recipient category of ESRP funding were research institutes focused on introducing and applying new security technologies; e.g. Fraunhofer Institute (Germany; 51.5 million; 85 projects), TNO (Netherlands; 30 million; 54 projects), FOI (Sweden; 31.8 million; 53 projects), and CEAS (France; 15 million; 39 projects). Some of these actors, like FOI in Sweden, are defence research institutes with long historical traditions of delivering military solutions to the national armed forces (see Chapter 5, this volume).

NGO researchers have illuminated how several of the arms companies involved in EU R&D projects have profited substantially from the refugee crises in recent years, and how they are in fact currently dominating the booming market for border control in Europe. As the EU intends to harden its Schengen borders, arms firms have won substantial R&D contracts to supply agencies both with conventional border control products (walls, barriers, fences, cameras, radars) as well as digital solutions (ICT technology, database systems, software). “Most perverse of all”, Akkerman (2016, 1 [emphasis added]) argues, is that this “shows that some of the beneficiaries of border security contracts are some of the biggest arms sellers to the Middle-East and North-Africa, fuelling the conflicts in the region that have led refugees to flee their homes” (see also Benedicto and Brunet 2018; Andersson 2014; Akkerman 2018; Hayes and Vermeulen 2012; Baird 2017a; and Chapter 6, this volume).

Another central issue with the ESRP, as hinted above, was how the processes by which it emerged were largely undemocratic and lacked public transparency, and that it came to revolve around a logic of “security through profit and technology”; or, as succinctly put by Hayes (2009, 80), “[b]e it pandemics, political violence or protest, the ‘problem’ is seen as a grave danger and the ‘solution’ couched in terms that favour the transfer of social policy responses from civilian agencies to law enforcement and militarist proscriptions developed by securocrats and technocrats”. The European Parliament’s own civil liberties watchdog committee, for instance, saw the ESRP as a
“closed community in the making” which was immediately “put at the service of industry rather than society” (Bigo et al. 2014, 11, 27). NGOs have argued further that the entire project was a multi-billion “networking exercise” dominated from the outset “by profit-driven conglomerates with a particularly narrow view of how best to achieve security based primarily on the use of military force” (C. Jones 2017, 15; Hayes 2006, 40).

Moreover, throughout the programme it grew increasingly difficult to fit the R&D outcome within the parameters of the dual-use framework, to enforce technological regulation, and to define its application as either “security” or “defence” (see also Chapter 6, this volume). In fact, despite the legislation stating that “secure societies”-themed research should have an “exclusive focus on civil applications”, when the ESRP moved into the 8th framework programme (called Horizon 2020, to run between 2014-20), the Commission nonetheless intended to “evaluate how the results [of research projects] could benefit also defence … industrial capabilities” (C. Jones 2017, 3 [emphasis added]). Shortly thereafter, the Commission began moving towards (indeed, revisiting) questions regarding how to provide military researchers with a separate funding instrument, how to potentially set up a European defence research programme (EDRP) in the near future; thereby breaking the “long-held mantra” in the EU of exclusively civil R&D priorities (Karampekios, Oikonomou, and Carayannis 2018, 2).

These latest developments have led researchers to conclude that the ESRP served, if anything, as a way to “test the waters” for a potential full-fledged defence research programme, as a “stepping stone” for propelling research objectives from the civil to the military realm (Akkerman 2018, 351). Citing critical voices from within the EU system, Vranken (2017, 5 [emphasis added]) puts forth the argument that the aim with the ESRP was perhaps always about subsidising the arms industry:

In what one Green Member of the European Parliament (MEP) called a ‘salami-strategy’, this has led to a ‘slice-by-slice-approach’ whereby political red lines have progressively been transgressed. Defence research has always been officially excluded from all EU research programmes so the defence industry could only get funding through ‘the back door’: a security research programme.

Others reminisce the initial struggles during the 90s, when those who put the idea of an EU-funded defence research programme on the agenda were forced to settle with a “civil” programme, and how they perceived the entire situation as “unfinished business” (James 2018, 25). A key move was to frame the ESRP as ambiguously as possible during its establishment, with a strong focus on technological determinism, so that when a window of opportunity would open up a rough decade
later, opportunities related to military R&D could be more easily revisited (39; see also Langley, Parkinson, and Webber 2005).

The first concrete move towards a defence research programme was done in early 2015, when the Commissioner for Industry followed the blueprint from 2003 and initiated a High-Level Group of Personalities on Defence (GoPD), again comprising arms industry CEOs and big names from the defence lobby (Fotiadis 2017). According to Vranken (2017, 13), the GoPD was “very conscious of the contentiousness of its proposals”, and Commission representatives had made it clear that their report should seek to “overcome resistance towards a defence research programme”. A year later, its final report finally declared that the EU was about to take the unprecedented step of setting up a military research programme worth EUR 90 million; the so-called Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR). Only as a first step, however, PADR is to evolve into a significantly larger EDRP, planned to start in 2021 and last until 2027.

The EDRP does not come alone. The upcoming military R&D programme is in fact part and parcel of a larger so-called European Defence Fund (EDF) which in turn allocates a staggering EUR 40 billion not only on research and development, but also procurement of weapons (3). Regarding the latter, the Commission proposed in 2017 that a European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) should run alongside the EDRP with the aim of fostering “new cooperative weapon programmes and the procurement of these weapons by Member States” (6). The Commission has in other words made a historical move from the role of enabling and facilitating the manufacture of security- and defence commodities, to directly encouraging member states to purchase them as well. Notably, R&D and procurement in the defence area has also come to fast-track the militarisation of EU policy itself. For example, in 2017, the Commission tabled several proposals in addition to the EDF, including a new European Council of defence ministers, the development of the EU’s capacity to deploy armed forces in crisis zones, and “the revival of Permanent Structure Co-operation (PESCO) a mechanism known among EU officials as ‘the Sleeping Beauty of the Lisbon Treaty’”; proposals that were all rather swiftly integrated into the Commission’s new European Defence Action Plan (EDAP). The emergence of military-oriented research-, industry-, and procurement structures “in conjunction with opportunities for the EU to go to war”, Fotiadis (2017) argues, “will inevitably have a profound impact on the future of the EU”.

Here, some may say that the circle is “complete” from the Commission’s point of view: what began as a contentious policy experiment in the 1990s to consolidate post-Cold War arms

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25 For a longer discussion on today’s European Commission as an institution with “political roles” offering political leadership to the EU, see for example Nugent and Rhinard (2019).
industries in Europe has become picked up and resolved in the 2010s. In this process, the ESRP, or perhaps more specifically PASR, ruptured European research- and industrial policy traditions in how it presented “the first of a long – in retrospective – series of steps taken by the European institutions in accepting that security, security-related and defence research priorities are eligible for funding at the European level” (Karampekios and Oikonomou 2018, 201); or put differently, it signified

a transition from the ‘business-as-usual’ mode of tight interaction between national defence industries and national state agencies to a new paradigm of equally tight interaction between European internationalised defence firms and their political representation in Brussels and the European Commission (202).

Here, public officials must not be held unaccountable to the fact that they have transformed the EU institution from what was once, at least in theory, a regional “peace project” to an active subsidiser of an industry which exports war. When millions of euros are funnelled into new military R&D projects and armament procurement routines are streamlined at the EU level, “[t]he disastrous impact of European arms exports is not even considered. On the contrary, arms exports are seen as a sign of a thriving defence industrial base” (Vranken 2017, 24).

With the dual emergence of ESRP and EDRP, and with the two historically separate practices of civil security and military defence becoming increasingly institutionalised along a continuum in Western societies, Akkerman (2016, 2 [emphasis added]) concludes that today “we have an even more powerful military-security-industrial complex, using technologies that point outwards and inwards, that right now are targeted at some of the most vulnerable [and] desperate people on our planet”. It is precisely in this social, political, historical context that recent transformations of Swedish security and defence have unfolded; it is here that Swedish security professionals and arms companies are at work, labelling their practices and branding their technologies as “societal” or “civil” security.

The NGO-, activist-, and academic research cited here all bring invaluable empirical data to the table, and firmly connect these issues to their implications on democratic life, political accountability, democratic oversight and transparency, and fundamental human- and civil rights. However, in contrast to most of these accounts, I will not settle with a conceptualisation that routinely goes back – perhaps out of nostalgia, perhaps due to lack of a better term – to descriptions of a “military industrial complex”. Rather, in the following section of this chapter, I will sketch out a more refined theoretical- and conceptual framework for this study.
TOWARDS A THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE ECONOMY OF FIELDS

As far as I am concerned, I have very pragmatic relationships with authors: I turn to them as I would to fellows and craft-masters … people you can ask to give you a hand in difficult situations.

— Pierre Bourdieu (1990, 28)

How can we theorise, and hence to an extent generalise, what is going on in Europe and beyond, with regards to emerging public-private, civil-military security industries? How can this meeting of actors, interests, and different forms of power be conceptualised? When critical scholars try to theorise around these issues, they often begin by recalling the US general-turned-president Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “Farewell Address to the Nation” in 1961:

… we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists, and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes (Eisenhower 1961).

“Military-industrial complex”, and variations of this term, has been used ever since to describe the unchecked powers and shared agendas of decisionmakers, the arms industry, the government, and other individuals and organisations in the uppermost segments of society (E. P. Thompson 1982, 5); both in small states such as Sweden (Stenlås 2010) and mega-countries such as the US (Porter 2018). Regarding the emerging European industry, it is not uncommon to read in recent reports that it, for instance, was “spawned by the military-industrial complex”, or that it has taken an entirely new shape of a “security-industrial complex” (Hayes 2006, 3). Relatedly, others frame the way Western governments outsource data gathering- and policing practices to private businesses and individuals as a “surveillance-industrial complex” (Stanley 2004).

However, in all of these cases, the notion of “complex” is more or less dogmatically “added on”, never sufficiently defined or elaborated. What is more, the industrial complex necessarily has to frame itself as “something” – as either military, security, or surveillance – thereby, in the moment of definition, making visible only certain types of actors and interests, and hiding or ignoring others. To argue that the EU has forged an industrial complex which is no longer primarily about military, but (internal/civil/societal) security, enables a form of reasoning which can end up nowhere than in a false “turn” (e.g. that we are witnessing “a new kind of arms race, one in which all the weapons
are pointing inwards”) (Hayes 2009, 5). This, of course, is not the case since arms companies neither abandoned their core of military manufacturing, nor were they oblivious towards the palpable technological and economic gains made available by emerging “smart” security solutions.

To couple two (or more) signifiers (e.g. “today we have an even more powerful military-security-industrial complex…”), while more accurate, is still bulky and unclear since the specific relation between the two remains unarticulated. To simply conflate different industrial complexes into one (e.g. “[t]aken together, a picture emerges of … an integrated, EU-wide interoperable, high-tech, surveillance system directed at combating a multiplicity of threats”) (C. Jones 2017, 3) is also risky from an intellectual point of view since it creates the image of a “mega-complex”; a monolith-structure which appears incredibly difficult, perhaps impossible, to scrutinise and hold accountable.

Other researchers move away entirely from the term “complex”, to e.g. “community”. Baird (2016, 34) writes that while many scholars, journalists, and activists have argued that we may be witnessing the development of a ‘security-industrial complex’ in Europe which resembles the earlier ‘military-industrial complex’ of the Cold War … I choose to focus on … the formation of what I call ‘surveillance design communities’ (SDCs), moving from the total ‘complex’ to the tangled ‘community’ in order to unravel the overlapping network structures involved in surveillance technology design.

Der Derian (2009) makes use of “network” in his mapping of the “military-industrial-media-entertainment network” in the US era of the “war on terror”, and the particular role played by drone strikes in modern warfare. As Der Derian argues, the so-called “revolution in military affairs” has challenged the traditional role of the military complexes since the battlefield is not necessarily staged at the borders, but e.g. in drone operating offices at home. This has effectively come to invite and involve more diverse actors into networks bringing together defence industries with professions related to video games, media, simulation, and virtual technology.

The notions of community and network, while accounting for the multiplicity and relationality of social spaces, are however too simplistic: community suggests the peaceful co-existence of agents in a space organised around shared interests rather than internal struggles; network says nothing about the specific characteristic of the relations of power constituting it, namely, that all relations are unequal relations, and therefore contentious. Nor am I contempt with complex since works through a strict logic of enalesce of actors and interests into some large epicentre-structure, and fails to specify its heterogeneity – its own internal components, contingency, contradictions –
and the way it is itself made up of smaller spaces that are not always moving in the same direction. Beyond its epistemological shortcomings, industrial complex also gives a certain nostalgic, almost ironic, tone to the (usually American) contexts wherein it is used; to talk of complex is often to reminisce about the Cold War, about senseless US spending on national defence, about corrupt civil servants and insidious lobbyists from a time seemingly far, far away. This, unfortunately, makes the tangible and very much present histories of these power structures hard to take seriously.

Rather, I intend to do away with reductionist, pacifistic, or structuralist models, abandon the notion of “complex” analytically, and gradually develop a conceptual framework which allows for empirical exploration of the diverse struggles, transformations, and movements of power, the daunting and glorious multiplicity and particularity of the social order, and the way in which security, industry, and society “hang together” today. This will be done by visiting, evaluating, borrowing from, and pointing out the strengths and flaws in the work of three “fellows and craftmasters” who have all offered important critique on these matters: C. Wright Mills, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Bourdieu.

MILLS, INSTITUTIONAL ORDERS, THE POWER ELITE

The precursor to Eisenhower’s national address in 1961 can in fact be found years earlier, already in 1956, in a book by Mills called *The Power Elite*. This is in fact not an entirely standalone piece, but part of a loose trilogy of works starting with a study on the reconciliation of labour movements and increased pliancy of unions in capitalist society (*The New Men of Power: America’s Labor Leaders*), followed by a study on the rise of the middle classes and bureaucratic forms of rule (*White Collar: The American Middle Classes*), and concluded with the aforementioned study on the interlinking of interests between the political, military, and economic elites since the end of the world wars. Throughout these works, indeed throughout his career, Mills asked: where is power, how is it changing, and what does it do to society? These questions are made perhaps especially explicit in *The Power Elite*:

If … we believe that war and peace and slump and prosperity are, precisely now, no longer matters of ‘fortune’ or ‘fate’, but that, precisely now more than ever, they are controllable, then we must ask – controllable by whom? The answer must be: By whom else but those who now command the enormously enlarged and decisively centralised means of decision and power? (1956, 26)

Mill’s concern with power can in fact be traced all the way to his first book, co-authored with
his mentor Hans Gerth in 1953, wherein they presented an early, less articulated version of what would eventually become Mills’ “power elite”. Strongly influenced by Weber, they introduce the notion of institutional order and discuss the “great increase in the power wielded by central decision-making units”, or more specifically, how the “planning and regulation and the enforcement of big decisions lead men of power to an increasing awareness of the interdependence, and accordingly of the need for co-ordination, of all major institutional orders [e.g. political, economic, military]” (Gerth and Mills 1953, 457; see also Chapter 3, this volume). From here, Mills took away the idea that the social order has nothing to do with spontaneity, harmony, chance, dynamic oscillations, or other arbitrary laissez-faire conditions, but that society and its institutions were structured and organised by someone, for some purpose (458).

In *The Power Elite*, he then goes on to specify these institutions, discussing at length how the economic order was getting dominated by a handful of giant companies “which together hold the keys to economic decisions”; how the political order had developed into a “centralised, executive establishment which has taken up into itself many powers previously scattered, and now enters into each and every cranny of the social structure”; and how the military order, once a slim establishment, had grown into “the largest and most expensive feature of government” (7). As each of these “orders” had become enlarged and centralised after the wars, the consequences of its activities are now greater, and crucially, “its traffic with the others increases” (ibid.). Any major changes in one of these domains caused inevitable ramifications in the others, and “key units of the private corporate economy” (such as major arms producers) were less and less likely “to break down in slump”. Mills therefore concludes that there was, and perhaps still is, “a political economy linked, in a thousand ways, with military institutions and decisions” which created fundamental interdependencies between “the warlords, the corporation chieftains, the political directorate” of the United States (8-9).

Mills further illustrated his core argument by asking: why is society de facto ruled by civilians, and not by those with a mastery in coercion by physical violence (military organisations)? Why is it led by civil servants, politicians, and lawyers instead of warlords, generals, and bandits? Indeed, “if the standing army, in the modern nation, has come to monopolise violence, to become strong enough to dominate society, why has it not done so? Why, instead, has it quite frequently tapered up to and accepted the civilian authority of the civilian head of the state?” (Mills 1956, 173). Following Weber, a central explanation to this was that for a particular form of rule to become stable over time, it needed to follow a process of “legitimation” based not merely on physical coercion and military violence, but on other socially reinforced forms of authority. Mills accepted, but extended, this Weberian argument. While rule is heterogeneous and includes different interests
(or orders), these have increasingly been embedded into each other. This is illustrated e.g. by what Mills called the “politicalisation” of the high military – how politics gets into the army, and the army gets into politics – or more specifically, how some military professionals “develop a vested interest – personal, institutional, ideological – in the enlargement of all things military” (200-01) and therefore have to obey to the civilian realms of decision-, law-, and budget-making.

By constitutional definition, the military is subordinated to political authority, and is generally considered, and has generally been, a servant as well as an adviser of civilian politicians; but the warlord is moving into these circles, and by his definitions of reality, influencing their decisions (222).

These developments are then coupled with a trend that was as persistent in 1950s America as it is today, namely the “increased personnel traffic … between the military and the corporate realms”, leading Mills to foresee a “great structural shift of modern American capitalism toward a permanent war economy” (215 [emphasis added]; see also Chapter 5, this volume) which, still today, is so deeply integrated into the societal fabric that it cannot simply disintegrate in peacetime.

This political economy eventually spilled over into the domain of scientific research as the military organisation became the largest single supporter (“as large, dollar-wise, as all other American research put together” and “twenty times the pre-war rate”) of applied research and product development for national security (216). Similar to how others viewed the rise of the ESRP and EDRP, science as such became a “means to the ends sought by the military” (223). Indeed, the great winners in the emergent permanent war economy in the US became the high military professionals and arms companies; those whose role and function in the public domain went from contentious to largely unquestioned, those who, increasingly at the expense of politicians, got to sit around the Pentagon tables and plan the war effort. The great losers in this process were democratic institutions like parliaments who became increasingly forced to listen to, speak for, and subordinate themselves under someone other than the “public”. Mills concludes that

[j]t is the professional politician that has lost the most, so much that in examining the events and decisions, one is tempted to speak of a political vacuum in which the corporate rich and the high warlord, in their coinciding interests, rule” (276-77).

In conclusion, the work of Mills is insightful since it gives a profound understanding of the historical interconnectedness of high-level agents involved in politics, industry, and military. He
illuminates how the “closed communities” in Europe responsible for the emergence of recent industrial policies were made up around shared interests and at the expense of democratic control in a way not too dissimilar from how the inner circles of the US elite were constituted during the Cold War. Indeed, *The Power Elite*, and related works, provided an early lesson on how the interests, ideas, and individuals in the upper segments of society have had a strong effect on the overall structuration of that society. When individuals with significant influence in their respective areas of practice move between different areas of practice, these areas become increasingly linked, interdependent, and aligned towards similar objectives (i.e. what Mills saw as culminating in the “permanent war economy”). Mills was also right in highlighting how the “institutional order” was (and continues to be) largely localised around the bureaucratic state, but how this order is increasingly permeated by an “elite” which is not exclusively made up by accountable actors and “public” forces. Much like in recent European developments, when power is increasingly centralised and aligned around an inter-sector, public-private “elite”, their objectives become further and further displaced from public grasp. Here, little seems to have changed, and the lessons of Mills are still strikingly relevant today.

On the other hand, there are certainly elements to Mills’ *Power Elite* that are markedly dated. For example, there is an emphasis on exceptional, high-consequence relations often centred around the role of the military. This is unsurprising due to the post-war reality in US society at the time, of course, but makes the work difficult to apply in non-US contexts, on emerging practices of e.g. border control and surveillance, and in examples where the many decisions of e.g. mid-level bureaucrats may be just as important in the longue durée as those of an “elite”. How would the notions of power elite and permanent war economy translate in other regions like Europe, in smaller countries like Sweden? What is the role not of top-level politicians and industrialists, but civils servants and agency officials for the transformation of security? Second, Mill’s frequent use of the term “order” suggest social spaces that are more or less fixed and lack internal dynamics. Are orders not also, at once, “disorders” if they contain relations of struggle? Third, regarding the relation between orders themselves, Mills lacks a stringent, developed conceptual terminology for precisely how these social spaces “hang together” (beyond the narrative of an “interdependent elite”). How exactly is power objectified, transferred, and converted between the orders of the elite? Fourth, and finally, Mills is arguably far too focused on the logic of centralisation in his work; indeed how interests and actors “align” themselves, and how different orders move, constantly it seems, towards a centre authority in society. This line of thinking around centralisation of elite power is what made it possible for Eisenhower to align himself with Mills and develop the historically resilient term of “military-industrial complex”, this idea of a “total” structure, an epicentre of
unchecked powers. However, how does Mills handle not constitution, but transformation of order? Power that does not move inwards towards a centre, but outwards, in e.g. transnational directions? (Bigo 2016a) These questions are left unanswered from the theoretical perspective of Mills.

**FOUCAULT, GOVERNMENTALITY, APPARATUS**

Michel Foucault is another thinker who had a lifelong concern with the locality and performativity of power. How would a Foucauldian perspective render the emergent public-private, civil-military industry structure in Europe? Rather late in his career, Foucault formulated what Mills would have called an “institutional order” in terms of dispositif (sometimes loosely translated to “apparatus” of security); a different and more open-ended conceptualisation signifying a particular system of ruling society and its individuals at a given time in history. A dispositif, as Foucault describes it, is

a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid … The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements … a particular discourse can figure at one time as the programme of an institution, and at another it can function as a means of justifying or masking a practice which itself remains silent (Foucault 1980, 194).

In other words, by encompassing “the said as much as the unsaid”, an apparatus organises the discursive as well as the material, the theoretical as well as the practical; everything from an explicit government declaration to a concrete bunker, from an implicit threat conception to the border wall. Importantly, at the heart of the apparatus lies its strategic function: its different elements shift and adjust over time into a “formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need” (195 [emphasis added]); it contains the “manipulation of relations of forces”, developed in a “particular direction” (196). “As responses to an ‘urgent need’, dispositifs are formed through the adoption, adaptation and bundling together of existing knowledges, practices and technologies” Bonditti et al. (2014, 173) explains, and hence a “dispositif is not a coherent episteme or paradigm built around clear principles or concepts; what defines a dispositif is not intellectual coherence but a strategic coherence”.

What is here sweepingly referred to as “urgent needs” can be more or less equated with what Foucault, elsewhere in his work, calls “problematisations”; intricate, historical objects targeted by practices of “governmentality”. For instance, in the lecture series where he first introduced
dispositif, he asks: how can the sovereign configure and structure its society in such a way that a “problem” like crime can be regulated in a given society and held within acceptable limits? How can a flow of “desirable” life be ensured in a particular city, while risks associated with “undesirable” life are restricted? To solve this urgent need, the apparatus strategically aligns both the immaterial (e.g. laws, norms, policies) as well as a number of “material givens” (e.g. land, water, architecture) (Foucault 2007, 19). The aim of the apparatus is therefore to systematically and strategically rearrange all of these elements, not in order “to arrive at a point of perfection” (i.e. cancel out crime entirely), but to “[maximise] the positive elements, for which one provides the best possible circulation, and of minimising what is risky and inconvenient” (i.e. regulating criminals to a given extent “while knowing that they will never be completely suppressed”) (ibid.).

Foucault’s notion of dispositif certainly resonates with how some societies, cities, and towns were “strategically” designed around war preparedness during the Cold War. In Sweden, for example, the urgent need was constructed as the threat of mass invasion, necessitating a bureaucratic structure involving every civil- and military organisation in so-called “total defence”, policies of mass-conscription of individual citizens, specific legislations for “war companies”, a foreign policy stance of “neutrality” and “non-alignment”, and so on. Here, the strategic apparatus also ensured that bunkers and shelters cluttered the land, built in both underground caverns and urban apartment houses, that road networks were designed based on attack scenarios, that subsidised armaments industries were set up across the country, that household property such as trucks and tractors were enlisted in military organisations. As Chapters 3 and 5 will discuss in more detail, total defence and the related arms production system truly constituted a kind of “system of relations”, a “heterogeneous ensemble” of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, moral propositions, and more. Indeed, Swedish Cold War defence was not only about worst-case scenarios, but like any dispositif, also about “constituting something like a milieu of life, existence, and work for a population” even in times of peace and stability (Foucault 2007, 30).

Despite its relative looseness, dispositif has gained some prominence in critical IR and IPS thanks to its methodological attention towards “the fragile and perhaps unique sets of relations established between discursive and material elements” brought together as a form of governmentality, not seldom in relation to notions like “terrorism” or “migration” (Aradau, Coward, et al. 2014, 68). In these types of studies, the different knowledges, actors, and technologies of the apparatus are often traced with a genealogical approach with the aim of rupturing the history of the present “problem”, and the taken-for-granted practices put in place to regulate it (65). Other Foucauldian IR scholars have approached various (in)securitisation
processes more directly as a form of “biopolitics”, aimed at separating unwanted bodies from a supposedly cherished way of life (cf. Dillon and Neal 2008; Aradau and Neal 2015; and Reid 2005).

However, this concept may be of limited to use in this study due to its somewhat deterministic character. The apparatus, Foucault frequently reminds us, has a strategic function aimed a specific problematisation and urgent need. It is not haphazard, does not follow some internalised logic or unconscious preference, but always seems to configure and arrange different elements in society with intent. The intent is then, in this line of reasoning, put in the hands of Foucault’s “sovereign” who apparently has a more or less clear idea about what needs to be done, who directs the multiple elements towards the “one” problem at a given period in time. Although countries like Sweden may have looked like a comprehensive apparatus of defensive societal elements during the Cold War, it becomes too simplistic to claim that this open-ended form of governmentality was directed at military invasion alone. Rather, as will be elaborated in Chapter 5, the “system of relations” constituting total defence and its associated arms industry was a paradoxical and somewhat contradictory apparatus, about establishing the conditions for both warfare and welfare, about inciting both fear and trust in the population (Lundin, Stenlås, and Gribbe 2010).

Moreover, and as akin to the work of Mills, Foucauldian dispositifs are similarly focused on a dynamic of concentration of power towards a “single” issue; a logic of centralisation not only of authority per se (as in Mills), but of strategy. How does Foucault’s apparatus handle the possibility of multiple problems, causing its different internal elements to intersect, clash, and compete amongst themselves? After the Cold War, the Swedish field of security transformed as some actors became focused on how to defend old defence organisations and industrial relations, and others on how to consecrate and promote new institutional structures, threat constructions, and technologies. Here, logics of defence, security, and surveillance became increasingly put in competition; elements that targeted different “urgent problems” but were nonetheless related and to an extent overlapping (especially with regards to technology); sometimes working towards the same objective, sometimes not. Did this particular social order constitute one apparatus, or multiple?

Indeed, Foucault himself preceded much of the extreme capitalist development that has taken place in the world since the 70s and 80s; a process which, according to Agamben (2009, 15), can itself be seen “as a massive accumulation and proliferation of apparatuses” since there is not a single instant today in which “the life of individuals is not modelled, contaminated, or controlled by some apparatus”. In the late-modern capitalist era, how does Foucault’s dispositif – or more

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26 Foucault has been criticised for being too sweeping in his analysis of the “sovereign” (overemphasising a Hobbesian-like ontology of violence) (e.g. Spiker 2011; Oksala 2012), as well as in his take on “human life” (often implicitly reducing it to white, male bodies) (e.g. Howell and Richter-Montpetit 2018).
precisely, his “sovereign” – deal with the unbundling and diffusion of problematisations? How is it transformed by the undeniably increasing capacity of multinational corporations, lobby groups, and technocrats to formulate problems and configure the overall strategic direction of practice?

Dissecting in great detail the 1977-78 lecture series where dispositif was first introduced, Bigo (2008, 93–94) concludes that it was in fact a concept “left fallow” in Foucault’s work. This course is said to be indicative of his “crisis of confidence” at the time, as he after only a few lectures gave up the attempts to make clear connections between the concept of security apparatus and his earlier concepts of discipline, the panopticon, and biopolitics. The dispositif was never applied beyond his brief example of crime in urban populations, and security as a problem of thought became reduced by Foucault to an idea of freedom of circulation (rather than e.g. coercive practices), and therefore became “a correlate of liberal economy and society” more than anything else. Indeed, security became “not a matter of establishing frontiers, isolating a space, marking the boundaries and closing it off as was done by sovereignty and discipline”, but a matter of “opening, integrating and enlarging” based on liberal principles (Bigo 2008, 97).

In conclusion, Foucault’s dispositif comes forth as a deceptively sophisticated, nuanced, and open-ended version of Eisenhower’s “complex”, or of Mills’ “institutional order”, but it in fact fails to clearly articulate and illuminate e.g. how power is at once in concentration and on the move, how it handles a multiplicity of “problems”, and whether (or to what extent) it is able to situate coercive and violent security practices and explain the role of the state vis-à-vis private industries. For these questions to be properly addressed, we shall proceed yet another step, towards a theoretical understanding based on Bourdieu’s work on symbolic power and the economy of fields in the social order.

BOURDIEU, SYMBOLIC CAPITAL, FIELDS OF POWER

How may we avoid the theoretical traps caused by the strong focus on coalescence of practices in the “complex”, centralisation of actors and interests in the “institutional order”, and concentration of power and problematisations in the “apparatus”? What are the concepts that pay attention also to the conversion of power between fields? Concepts that move from the most visible economies and policies upholding a public-private industry, to a more profound perspective on the economic logic of fields that upholds the entire social order? Locating such concepts in Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology, one should start, first of all, with a discussion around the conditions by which fields form and transform in the first place; i.e. with his three inter-related concepts of symbolic power, symbolic capital, and symbolic violence.
The concept of symbolic power is a central tenet Bourdieu’s work and deals fundamentally with the history of social order, with the structuration of societies over time, and with the mobilisation and movement of power in different societal domains. Symbolic power (the capacity to impose meaning) is closely linked to – indeed, dependent upon – symbolic capital (the authority to do so), and in combination, these concepts become powerful tools for gaining a deeper understanding of the sociogenesis and emergence of fields, the conditions for their autonomisation, and what it takes for them to change. Importantly, expressions of symbolic power and violence are not “symbolic” in the sense that they are “just” semiotic, abstract, fleeting, or somehow less tangible than “material” power. Bourdieu rejects dichotomies between idealism and materialism, arguing that the relationship between material and immaterial power, between physical and symbolic violence, is in fact intertwined and interdependent (Swartz 2013, 38, 45). I will here proceed to analyse in detail how the instruments of symbolic power and capital can be drawn upon in order to understand how fields are made, remade, possess a certain value, and “hang together” in the social order.

Symbolic power works through a practical force embedded in the contextuality and performativity of language. It is a force which does not merely tell people what to do in the form of suggestions, directives, orders, or warnings, but it is the fundamental power to tell people what they are in the social world. Bourdieu worked out a definition which can be located in the seminal volume Language & Symbolic Power:

Symbolic power - as a power of constituting the given through utterances, of making people see and believe, of confirming or transforming the vision of the world and, thereby, action on the world and thus the world itself, an almost magical power which enables one to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained through force (whether physical or economic), by virtue of the specific effect of mobilization - is a power that can be exercised only if it is recognized, that is, misrecognized as arbitrary (Bourdieu 1991, 170 [emphasis added]).

As emphasised in the above quote, what makes simple utterances, slogans, and labels into a fundamental power capable of (re)producing social reality is the legitimation of the authority of those words and of those who transmit them. As I will return to, “authority” lies in its (mis)recognition as such, making symbolic power largely “invisible” in the sense that it “can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it” (Bourdieu 1991, 164).

In Swartz’s (2013, 83) reading of Bourdieu’s work on symbolic power, he shows how this concept is profoundly political since it has to do with an ability to conserve or transform social
structures over time (usually through institutions of the state), and with the obedience among those who allow such power to operate more or less uncontested. Indeed, symbolic power is what makes a particular system or order appear somehow legitimate to the agents living in it. When institutionalised in a given society, it is the mysterious yet fundamentally powerful capacity to categorise, classify, and divide people (e.g. of citizenship, labour, gender). Understood in the context of (in)securitisation processes, symbolic power is what produces social order and disorder: it constructs a given “normality” and deviations from it, the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, of allowing and denying, of protecting some and combating others. The construction of threats, alongside the justification of responses to threats, becomes an extension of the exercise of symbolic power.

What makes this concept viable for studying intricate public-private, civil-military industries in contemporary societies is its appreciation for how relations of power are at work within and across several domains of the social order, not just exclusively in e.g. the fields of government, bureaucracy, or parliament. Rather power is a characteristic of the dynamic between dominators and dominated, that is, of the relational struggle of imposing one’s worldview over another’s as the most legitimate, whether it be within the political profession, within cultural production, within the educational system, or any other space. By highlighting its operations beyond the realm of elected politicians, symbolic power sensitises us to its subtle operations of classification spanning over high-level elite institutions as well as the more mundane and interpersonal activities of everyday life. It thus redirects focus from the most visible representatives of power to the more underlying logics of delegation, consecration, creation, formation of order, and how certain spokespersons manage to “make things with words” (Bourdieu 1989, 23; see also Swartz 2013, 77).

Again, symbolic power is dependent on its recognition as such: it is a given authority, it must be mobilised to exist. As exemplified by Thompson (1991, 8):

Not anyone can stand before a freshly completed ship, utter the words ‘I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth’ while flinging a bottle at its stem, and thereby succeed in naming the vessel: the person must be authorised to do so.

This kind of power is enabled by the acquisition of symbolic capital: i.e. the resource agents draw on in order to impose their claims, definitions, classifications, and systems of rule onto others. Here, symbolic capital becomes accumulated, almost like a credit, by being extracted from other types of capital. For example, powerful agents – i.e. charismatic politicians, trusted scientific experts, wealthy business leaders, military generals, etcetera – all have the possibility to exchange their wealth
(material as well as immaterial) which they have accumulated from the strong positions in their respective fields, into symbolic capital; the amount of which would determine the likeliness of their imposed worldview to become trusted also in other fields. In other words, symbolic capital (unlike other forms) does not have an organising quality but is a kind of metacapital, a dimension of other capitals. While cultural capital organises a field around e.g. educational credentials (Bildung), and the economic field around e.g. property or income, symbolic capital does not reside in its “own” field. Rather, it is a capital at work across fields, wielded specifically for attaining authority and for making such power appear natural and taken for granted, no longer in need of justification (Swartz 2013, 111).

Gerth and Mills’ (1953, 275) Weberian study of institutions in fact touches upon this element of Bourdieu’s work. Although largely underdeveloped, they present the notion of “symbol sphere” and its implications for the legitimacy of institutions of authority. Similarly concerned with modes of language, they show how certain vocabularies, pronunciations, moral symbols, sacred emblems, legal formulae, and types of conversation play a particular role for “the maintenance of certain institutions, to their chains of authority and to the authoritative distribution of their roles” (276). As with symbolic capital, these components serve as “master symbols” for the legitimation of an institutional order: “[b]y lending meaning to the enactment of given roles, these master symbols sanction the person in re-acting the roles. When internalised they form unquestioned categories which channel and delimit new experiences” (ibid.). In other words, they approach the paradox of the (mis)recognition of authority, but never sufficiently articulate – as Bourdieu did – the resource that claims based on e.g. the “votes of the majority”, “will of the people”, or “divine right of kings” all draw on in order to become legitimate (277).

Here, Bourdieu more precisely identifies the realm of the state as a major holder of symbolic capital; for instance, in how it has been able to seize the notions of “universal”, the “public”, and the “common good”. More specifically, through an “act of social magic”, symbolic capital becomes accumulated in the state when individual citizens give up their sovereign power and delegate it to nominated “spokespersons” (Bourdieu 2004b, 41–42). This enables what was merely a collection of several persons, a series of juxtaposed individuals, to exist in the form of a fictitious person, a corporatio, a body, a mystical body incarnated in a social body, which itself transcends the biological bodies which compose it. (Bourdieu 1991, 208).
The grandest example of this kind of process is arguably found in the sovereign state leader “who claims to be the President but who differs from the madman [only] by the fact that he is recognised as founded to do so” (Bourdieu, Wacquant, and Farage 1994, 12). The same mystical process of delegation can also explain the phenomenon of “commissions”. When the state (which is itself not a single actor but a conglomeration of fields, most notably the bureaucratic), in an attempt at crafting a microcosm of itself and thus of its citizens, appoints a commission, it organises a set of individuals around the notion of “general public interest”. Hence, it obliges its members to somehow transcend their individual illusion and produce a common good in the form of “official” propositions and reports. They do so

if not to sacrifice their particular point of view on behalf of the ‘point of view of society’, at least to constitute their point of view into a legitimate one, i.e., as universal, especially through use of the rhetoric of the official (Bourdieu, Wacquant, and Farage 1994, 17).

Of course, due to the constant constraints of habitus and field, “transcendence” and “neutrality” are impossible conditions in a social reality, but the arbitrary authority enabled by symbolic capital at least creates the appearance of universality and disinterestedness in activities claiming to address the “public interest”.

Precisely this latter issue became one of Bourdieu’s central concerns, and it is also a theme that runs through this dissertation; namely, to debunk practices that are based upon the refusal of interest, to show that, concealed by apparent “disinterest”, there are in fact often quite specific interests (such as political or economic) at work. This theme is explored in The State Nobility, a central cornerstone in Bourdieu’s work, wherein he traces the emergence of the bureaucratic state and how powerful men came to serve not a monarch, but the state and its laws and traditions, devoting themselves to service in the name of the “public”. Societies transitioned, as he later put it, from obeying the “king’s house” to the house of the cabinet (Bourdieu 2004a). For civil servants in the bureaucratic field, the denial of all own agendas, of all personal interest, itself becomes the organising quality and central means to power; here, paradoxically, “those who make themselves the disinterested defenders of universal causes might, without even being aware of it, have an interest in disinterestedness” (Bourdieu 1996, 382 [emphasis added]). In other words, the chances that an authoritative claim made in the name of some “common good” will be recognised as legitimate “are increased the less it appears to be determined by external physical, economic, political, or affective constraints (hence the more ‘authentic’, ‘sincere’, ‘disinterested’, etc. it appears)” (383). Or as Mills (1956, 17) concurs, “men of power tend, by convention, to deny that they are
powerful”; no one “runs for office in order to rule or even govern, but only to serve”. Although the inheritance of rule through dynastic bloodlines seem to belong to a time long gone, Bourdieu insists that the new “state nobility” still rests on a dimension of hereditary power. The university system, for example, plays a key role in moulding the new elite classes and civil servants of the state; that is, those who, more than most other groups, have accumulated an “insurance” from the state (often in the form of an academic title), and are therefore more than willing to give back, to reinvest their competences and their devotion back into the universal and into the division of labour it imposes (Bourdieu 1996, 382).

The (mis)recognition of power – as enabled by the accumulation of symbolic capital – has a distortive effect upon those whom it is being exercised which Bourdieu refers to, lastly, as symbolic violence. He sees this as a form violence through language and world-making, practiced in all instances when overt violence is impossible or undesirable. Even in its everyday form, symbolic violence is far from “soft” however; as explained by Swartz, it “suggests a bending under the weight of domination, a distortion, a deformation, an assault against the personhood of the individual” (Swartz 2013, 97). In short, symbolic violence is the violence of the norm, of the taken-for-granted and unspoken, the violence of not reflecting upon but finding oneself in the social order. This violence is maintained to a large extent by the relatively undisputed functions of modern states, indeed, “the question of the legitimacy of the state, and of the order it institutes, does not arise except in crisis situations” such as constitutional struggles or violent revolutions. As the site par excellence of symbolic domination, the state

does not necessarily have to give orders or to exercise physical coercion … as long as it is capable of producing embodied cognitive structures that accord with objective structures and thus of ensuring … doxic submission to the established order (Bourdieu, Wacquant, and Farage 1994, 15).

Law – or better, the imposed logic of legality – is an example of symbolic violence being exercised in more “formal” ways, e.g. in how it gives “an action or a discourse the form which is recognized as suitable, legitimate, approved” (Bourdieu 1990, 85). Parliamentary politics is another example, e.g. in how it has managed to seize control of the most widespread forms of political expression (ideology). Politicians are in fact not the will of the people embodied, operating in an arena of emancipation of the disenfranchised, but professional representatives of voters in a field of politics. Here, the symbolic violence lies in how a majority of citizens more or less unconditionally delegate their sovereignty to such professionals representatives, enabling what can be seen as a market of
consumers choosing between a rather narrow supply of recognised brands (e.g. parties and their nominees); making it perhaps “one of the least free markets that exist” (Bourdieu 1991, 173). In comparison, concerning the violence of the norm, Foucault saw politics not so much as a staging of professional struggles over voters, but linked it more directly to his wider understanding of governmentality. Famously, he reversed Clausewitz’ definition of war by stating that politics (or perhaps more accurately, biopolitics) is the “continuation of war by other means” (Foucault 2003), referring to its regulatory function of sorting out and separating the wanted from the unwanted, the normal from the abnormal, the healthy from the sick, and so on.

Here too, Mills had developed a theoretical view on violence that would come to resemble Bourdieu’s work, especially in how they both saw violence as inseparable from the legitimation of power. Mills (2000, 41) claims that violence in the form of coercion was merely a “final” form of power manifestations, preceded by authority (“power justified by the beliefs of the voluntarily obedient”), and before that, manipulation (“power wielded unbeknown to the powerless”).

In fact, the three types must constantly be sorted out when we think about the nature of power. In the modern world, I think we must bear in mind, power is often not so authoritative as it appeared to be in the medieval period; justifications of rulers no longer seem so necessary to their exercise of power (ibid.).

Foucault, Mills, and Bourdieu all developed peculiar approaches for studying power in how they departed not from its most visible representatives (e.g. presidents, governments), but in other, more mundane, and seemingly less exceptional contexts. Foucault began with the historical construction of “normalities” versus “abnormalities” (e.g. crime, madness) and how certain institutions (e.g. prisons, asylums) exercised their power on subjects in order to correct such deviations in society. Mills began in the labour movement, moved on to the middle classes, and then landed in his study on a centralised elite of which the state and parliament was only one of several components. Mills took an almost pre-Bourdieuian approach in the way he focused not only, or firstly, on state power per se, but on the configurations of the cultural and economic areas of production, and the accumulation and inheritance of wealth and influence in particular elite groups related to corporate or military activity. Like Bourdieu, Mills was also inspired by Weber and Marx, and had a persistent interest in the mysterious performativity of bureaucracies. Unlike most other American sociologists contemporary with Mills, he drew heavily on European schools of sociology, heavily influenced by his colleague, German sociology professor Hans Gerth. Bourdieu similarly did not begin in the

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27 For a contrasting argument, see Hanna Arendt’s (1970) work on violence and political power as opposites.
fields of politics or government in order to locate and study power (in fact, his studies of the political- and statist fields were done mostly in the 90s). Rather, his early interests laid in fields of culture and education, asking questions first about the specific power struggles that organised these respective fields, and then second, about the position of these fields in the larger societal hierarchy. Contrary to Foucault, Bourdieu and Mills both refused to single out the “sovereign” as an epicentre of power, but always related influential actors in one area of practice to those in other areas of practice, creating a society that worked a more like an ensemble of intricate power plays.

This brings us to the central question of the relationality, and therefore the difference and boundaries, of fields. More precisely, this question concerns how symbolic capital is put to work during the formative phases of fields, that is, during their *autonomisation*. Symbolic capital is precisely what needs to be concentrated for a phenomenon such as “art” to become autonomous, to acquire a certain degree of “artiness”; or for something like “security” to become (mis)perceived as bearing its own, internal logic of justification (e.g. “for the sake of security”) rather than as a convergence of actors with very specific and often material interests. When a certain organised activity is seemingly irreducible in this way, when it starts to become justified only with reference back to itself in a circular kind of motion, when some sort of “essence” is said to exist on principles other than the social, and so on, *symbolic capital has been successfully mobilised*, the central mobilising stake has been recognised by the players, and fields of practice may start to emerge (Swartz 2013, 102). As phrased by Bourdieu, the autonomy of a field “can be measured by its power to define its own criteria for the production and evaluation of its products”, i.e. the more its actors are able to enclose and restrict their field of speciality as containing a specific set of proficiencies and knowledges, “the more the internal demarcations appear irreducible to any external factors of economic, political or social differentiation” (Bourdieu 1984, 5). As these processes take place over time – through decades, sometimes centuries, of small interconnected social acts – certain fields (but not all) undergo autonomisation.

This explains why e.g. security and defence have become matters of specialists within relatively restricted social spaces – spaces with particular entry conditions — and not a matter of the public. Professional struggle create spaces of production and circulation based on a certain “know-how”, leading to a division of labour between those possessing the “right” to construct the systems of

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28 Bourdieu’s theoretical work on field autonomisation can be weighed against what Andrew Abbott calls the “system of professions”. Beyond occupations that are defined by a particular handicraft or technique, the birth of professions rely on the extent to which they are able to adopt skills through “abstractions”. As Abbott (1988, 9) argues, any occupation can obtain licensure or set up ethics codes, but only the control of abstract knowledge allows a profession to “redefine its problems and tasks, defend them from interlopers, and seize new problems”. As professions develop and evolve, they simultaneously strive for increased institutionalisation in order to survive as such. Disputes over boundaries of “jurisdiction”, that is, struggles
the social world, and the non-professionals who are designated to live in and by them. As Bourdieu (1991, 168) finds in the emergence of the religious field, the history of the transformation of myth into religion “cannot be separated from the history of the constitution of a body of specialized producers of religious rites and discourse, i.e. from the development of the division of religious labour”. Or as Hacking (2006) finds in the emergence of statistics, this phenomenon is inseparable from the early scholars of probability theory and the subsequent role of a specialised body of statisticians for the governance of populations. Simply put, depending on their capability to produce symbolic capital, only a few agents will be “allowed” into field struggle and recognised as e.g. fellow “security practitioners”. The interference of ordinary citizens in this process would merely obstruct their claims to professionalism, and so they must rather distance themselves from the public view in order to ensure that their “expertise” remains legitimate according to their collectively agreed upon rules for how the game is supposed to be played (the doxa). Again, field autonomisation depends on “the disjunction between its own principles of evaluation and those [of] the ‘general public’” (Bourdieu 1984, 6). Eventually, autonomisation therefore has to do with mustering a sense of orthodoxy, and as noted, the question of orthodoxy itself, of doxa, (indeed of all things pertaining to normality, order, and dominance) becomes a question of symbolic power. The degree of field autonomy can also be measured by the extent to which it is able to function as its own “market” and produce its own internal economy of symbolic and material goods, and whether it is able to generate its own sense of wealth and scarcity; for example, suggestions that societies can be measured on a scale from “secure” to “insecure”, or that societies possess or lack certain “means” (technologies and weapons) to secure itself.

This highlights the “economism” which is so salient in Bourdieu’s terminology. Turning economic language on its head, Bourdieu wants to avoid its typically narrow usages in mainstream theory which tends to reproduce a restricted understanding of e.g. “interest” and which assumes all agents to be perfectly rational homo economicus whose core drive is the maximisation of material and monetary profit (Bourdieu 1985, 20). With a Bourdieusian approach, one rejects such a reductionist view and adopts an understanding of economy which acknowledges that “all practices have an economic logic, though it is a social logic rather than a logic that stems from just individual choice” (Swartz 2013, 49). Capital, as we know, must be viewed theoretically, as a general property of all fields, not necessarily attached to currencies or commodities, but as something which can be both material and social and which may possess its own specific rules for accumulation and to claim or take over jurisdictional vacancies in society, are therefore the defining character of Abbott’s system of professions. This is also its analytical shortcoming since it limits any kind of understanding of interprofessional struggles to the notion of jurisdiction, and traps the discussion within narratives of law and state power.
exchange. Analysing power by measuring someone’s financial wealth, for example, can only by partially successful since capitals come in multiple forms. Power, it should be remembered, has no essence as such, no source outside of relational interaction, and is therefore distributive and zero-sum: if it becomes invested into one agent or object, it becomes withdrawn from somewhere else. As with principles of energy conservation, a concept like wastage has no bearing in a social context since “profits in one area are necessarily paid for by costs in another” (Bourdieu 1986, 253).

Bourdieu insists on this understanding of economism beyond traditional economic theory since he wants to highlight how even “priceless things have their price” (Bourdieu 1986, 242). By wielding symbolic capital, practices that are not directly convertible into money (e.g. those associated with law, academia, art, literature) can create the illusion of disinterestedness – and thereby conceal the power struggles that are always at their root – but with Bourdieu’s terminology, it becomes possible to articulate how all practices (including those of security) in fact contain social activities with economic logics, such as invention, manufacturing, branding, exchanging, transacting, leveraging, bartering, and so on.

Finally, we arrive at a central element of Bourdieu’s theoretical work which can be referred to as the economy of fields: the socially constituted economic logic of the specific inter-relation and inter-regulation of capital in society. As several different fields emerge and grow autonomous over time, their capitals obey specific rules determining their relative value and convertibility; in other words, they acquire an “exchange rate”. What is the “value” of cultural capital, for example, in relation to economic capital, and vice versa? How much is one actor’s financial wealth “worth” in relation to another’s political skills, in relation to a third’s military capacities? Moreover, to what “price” may agents transform their material and immaterial power into capital in its symbolic form, i.e. remake it into a force of authority? How are agents, possessing a certain amount of aggregated symbolic capital, able to enter into other fields by “converting” e.g. their powerful standing in the industry to an entry ticket to the bureaucratic field?

The struggle over this rate of conversion between capitals and fields of practice seems to take place in what Bourdieu calls fields of power. The field of power represents the upper reaches of the social hierarchy, the space where the “great spokespersons” from different fields bring in considerable amounts of capital into struggle to impose their particular form of power as the most legitimate and defining one for the totality of the social order (Swartz 2013, 61, 135). In Bourdieu’s (1996, 264) own words, the field of power is the

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29 Bourdieu’s persistent focus on social orders has occasionally been critiqued as “anthropocentric” in works inspired by Bruno Latour (2005) who insisted on the “agency” of the material, and that technology can itself “act”. He thereby reversed, or at least circumvented, one of the fundamental lessons of Science & Technology Studies (STS); namely, that scientific activities and products such as evidence, data, models, and
gaming space in which those agents and institutions possessing enough specific capital (economic or cultural capital in particular) to be able to occupy the dominant positions within their respective fields confront each other using strategies aimed at preserving or transforming these relations of power.

Here, the goal is no longer about accumulation and containment of capital, which is otherwise the case in individual fields, but about their “currency”. In short, struggles in fields of power concern overall recognition and the overall magnitude of different enactments of power (265). Imagine a meeting of forces in which the societal makeup itself is at stake – a meeting of presidents and prime ministers, corporate leaders, billionaire investors, supreme court judges, the great artists and writers, army generals, philanthropists, international diplomats, high-level activists, leading technological innovators, media moguls, and others who occupy a recognised position in the elite classes – who would chair it, who would prepare the agenda, who would speak loudly, who would remain silent? To ask questions about the field of power, about who or what controls the exchange rate between different species and spaces of power is, therefore, to ask the tremendously difficult questions regarding the conditions and transformations, the opportunities and the constraints, of the social order.

WHO DETERMINES THE CONVERSION RATE?

Here, the otherwise very detailed Pierre Bourdieu becomes unclear. How, more precisely, is the field of power staged? When and where can its struggles be observed? What is the general position of statist actors vis-à-vis other actors within it? What is the exact function of the state (remember, the site par excellence of symbolic domination) for the structuration of the economy of fields?

One the one hand, in some parts of his work, Bourdieu quite firmly states that in recent history the modern state has become the central authority in the field of power, indeed something of a “monopolist” when it comes to regulating the relation between fields and capitals. Through long historical process of accumulation and concentration of material and immaterial capital, it has acquired a specific and situated form of symbolic power which can be called statist power. This is expressed most tangibly in the forms of legislation, jurisdiction, taxation, government budgets, the welfare and punishment models, standing armies, public education, trade policy, market regulation, technological solutions are all socially constituted. Latourian studies therefore tend to altogether do away with what is the main analytical focus of this dissertation, that is, the fundamental impact of socio-historical struggles on society, and the initial socio-political enabling therein of certain technologies.
industrial subsidies, and so on – macro-instruments that to a significant extent constitute societal structures – as well as in smaller objects like the official emblem, the validation stamp, or the signed document. It can also be expressed in more intangible ways, e.g. in how the state by means of language is able to consecrate commissions and nominate spokespersons, how it is able to confer academic titles and diploma with its powers of certification, and how it therefore in a more general sense works like a “central bank of symbolic credit”. Statist power “guarantees … a certain state of affairs, a relationship of conformity between words and things, between discourse and reality” (Bourdieu 1996, 376). The state therefore exists in a “double” sense; both “in objective reality, in the form of a set of institutions such as rules, agencies, offices, etc., and also in people’s minds” (Bourdieu 1998, 33, cf. 2014). Wacquant elaborates this in the foreword to The State Nobility, pointing to the effects of statist power on habitus:

The state is not only ‘out there’ in the form of bureaucracies, authorities, and ceremonies. It is also ‘in here’, ineffaceably engraved within us, lodged in the intimacy of our being in the shared manners in which we feel, think, and judge. (Bourdieu 1996, xxviii)

On the other hand, in other parts of his work, Bourdieu presents a more nuanced view on how statist power plays its part in the overarching field of power. He writes, for instance, that statist institutions have if not a monopoly than at least “considerable scope” over capital conversion rates and the symbolic realm as such (Bourdieu 1998, 3). He further acknowledges that with the emergence of more and more specialised fields in today’s society, the so-called “circuits of legitimation” of symbolic authority are becoming longer and more complex:

No longer incarnated in persons or even in particular institutions, power becomes coextensive with the structure of the field of power, and it is only realized and manifested through an entire set of fields and forms of power (Bourdieu 1996, 386 [emphasis added]).

Indeed, as “autonomous fields multiply”, the field of power “diversifies” (ibid.), and the positions of statist institutions and spokespersons therein change. This can be read as a realisation that central authority over societal structures is becoming gradually displaced and deregulated from the restricted space of the state to a heterogeneity of actors represented in the field of power; or as Bourdieu ambiguously phrases it, relations in fields of power are changing from less “mechanical” to more “organic”.

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If a “monopoly” of symbolic and physical force is disassembled for one reason or another, power will certainly not float freely, but it will be reinvested in other fields. Bourdieu in fact notes how positions in fields of power in most late-20th century societies are experiencing a general shift towards a new dominant pole based around economic interests. More specifically, he understands civil servants and public administrators as typically occupying an “intermediate” position in-between cultural- and economic fields of practice, but acknowledges that these statist agents now increasingly obey the logic of economic capital in their everyday practice, and that the overall movement from public service to private sector employment has become increasingly “frequent among higher civil servants and military dignitaries, while movement in the opposite direction is nearly unheard of” (Bourdieu 1996, 270). Indeed, even in historically strong welfare states like Sweden, power has been progressively displaced to cultural and economic elites, to non-state agents who often “become significant players in the more decentralised and diversified realm of political life” (Swartz 2013, 110–11).

In sum, Bourdieu’s position on these matters remains somewhat two-fold, and he fails to make clear exactly how the state’s authority over capital currencies would be disturbed if fields of power have shifted increasingly towards the interests of great spokespersons from the private sector, or for instance, to what extent statist power could remain recognised and uncontested in contexts where governments have deep, interdependent relations with industry actors. What can be said, nonetheless, is that the function of the state (or rather, that of statist capital) is certainly an important factor – most likely still the most important one – for capital exchange rates, but that it is not viable to think of it as an unhindered or sole structuring force in field economies.

With the diversification of fields of power, has the state’s increasingly attacked position therein enabled more and other actors to now makes claims about the “public good”? Is it still possible to claim that the state controls the conversion rate and acts “in the manner of a bank of symbolic capital”, as if no external pressure has been successfully exerted? (Bourdieu, Wacquant, and Farage 1994, 12). While state institutions continue to hold an enormous amount of symbolic power over the conditions of the social order, are they not to an increasing extent intercepted and interfered with by other fields, by other agents like lobbyists, industrialists, technocrats, and policy experts? The bureaucratic field, Bigo (2016b, 412) argues, cannot be understood as constituted by only public actors, but in almost every country, bureaucracies have been reassembled and are now increasingly made up by “network[s] of intermingled actors of private and public origins, where the most powerful individuals are often the ones whose trajectories have been to constantly criss-cross between the boundaries of private and public”. Moreover, how is the capital conversion rate fluctuating when bureaucracies de facto have become increasingly inter- and transnational? Are we
not witnessing a “reconfiguration of loyalties worldwide, disaggregating the state as we have known it … with the primacy of nationalist frames and the normative acceptance that elected politicians are in charge of the state”? (ibid.).

While not fully equating them, Bourdieu may certainly have over-emphasised the proximity and similarities between the statist field and the field of power, and hence the state’s responsibility in upholding a particular order of domination.\(^{30}\) Any suggestions of a state monopoly over capital exchange rates in a given society must logically be rejected. Can it not be said, instead, that the statist field, alongside an expanding economic field (and any sub-fields overlapping with them, such as applied science) have more of an oligopoly in the field of fields? That they form of a set of related (not conflated) dominant fields; that they together, at once in competition and cooperation, strongly influence the overall capital exchange rate; that they, more than others, have witnessed an increased traffic of agents between themselves? Here, one could simply take a step back, note that the general relation between the statist field and the field of power was left ambiguous and uncertain by Bourdieu, focus less on trying to identify the main source and arbiter of power, abandon the question of who controls the “one” conversion rate between forms of capital, and instead show a more careful appreciation for how field economies as such can work as a concept for empirical exploration. Field economies are not automatically controlled by some statist field, nor do they necessarily concentrate into some field of power, but they will always remain contingent, more or less fluctuating and fluid,\(^{31}\) and their conversion rate will always be in some stage of transformation. Hence, the “problem” in Bourdieu noted here is not “solved”, but remains open for future theorisation, experimentation, and combination with other thinkers and writers.

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter began by sketching out in quite some detail the larger European developments in recent decades, and how the initial desire to foster the region’s arms industry after the Cold War led to the emergence of the ESRP and a prevalent discourse of “civil” (not military) security, indeed, of security practices in the name of “society”. This civil security R&D programme, in turn, not only introduced arms companies to the bureaucratic structures of EU, but some argue that it

\(^{30}\) This critique has also come from the so-called “pragmatic” turn in (French) sociology, and in particular from recent works around authors like Luc Boltanski (e.g. 2011; cf. Martin-Mazé 2017 for a Bourdieusian defence).

\(^{31}\) This conclusion can be weighed against what critical theorist Zygmunt Bauman has described in a series of volumes (2005, 2006, 2007) as “liquid life”, a late modern form of life by which societies have become increasingly precarious, unstable, on the move and accelerating, and how this has rendered a growing suspicion and distrust between people. This perspective has been useful in critical studies of contemporary security-, surveillance-, and policing practices, particularly for highlighting how these have created an entire industry for the commodification of different fears (cf. Zedner 2006; Bauman and Lyon 2013; Lyon 2010).
also paved the way for and enabled what would subsequently become the EDRP, the EU defence fund, and other related policies and programmes pointing towards an overall militarisation of Europe. European democracies now face a situation where a supranational structure spearheaded by the European Commission has formed and funded what are essentially two industries for producing violent technologies; one directed towards “societal” security, counterterrorism, surveillance, and policing practices; another directed towards military security, armaments, and territorial defence practices. These two sets of practices, technologies, industrial policies, and actors are different but closely related, hang together but are not the same, strongly overlap in terms of objects but do not always target the same subjects. Their relation is, so to speak, “anarchical yet structured, at once in competition and complementary” (Bourdieu 1996, 386).

With the largely undemocratic ways in which these industry structures have been established, NGOs, activists, and critical scholars have made a tremendous job at mapping out the key decisions and actors in this process, showing precisely what is at stake. The present study aims to contribute to this collective project, however, it will not reduce itself theoretically and claim that these developments have spawned some “military-industrial complex” that sounds, looks, and operates more or less the same as the complexes from the days of Eisenhower. Rather, I ask, what are the more profound concepts and theories with which one may describe the post-Cold War shifts in the relations between the public state and the private industry, between civil security and military arms, in Sweden and elsewhere in Europe? How can all of these elements be seen as not conflating into a centralised power-complex, but as fundamentally in competition and constitutive of a vast, contingent structure of fields?

Again, to address these theoretical issues, I have been inspired by Bourdieu’s (1990, 28) “pragmatic relationship with authors”, a premise which allows oneself to visit and borrow from them as “fellows and craft-masters … people you can ask to give you a hand in difficult situations”. In Mills, I accepted the idea that areas of security practice and arms manufacturing have long, strong historical connections with the political, bureaucratic, academic, and industrial elites, and that these “orders” are intimately connected and to some extent interdependent. In Mills, I rejected, however, the suggestion that these elites barrel and force the “institutional order” into an exclusively centralising direction, but that it also contains internal struggles and orders of play that sometime move in contradictory directions. From Foucault’s work, I appreciated the general

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32 Bourdieu works well for this study not only because of his methodological tools and theoretical insights, but also because of his reflexive scholarship and personal desire to be a democratic intellectual (Wacquant 2005, 11). Much like the activist literature dealing with recent EU developments, Bourdieu had a strong concern with what spokespersons are able to do in our name, in the name of society, and how practices become (mis)recognised as serving some “universal good” when they in fact may have directly contrary effects.
concept of governmentality and that different elements in society – ideational as well as material –
to an extent become assembled in ways that do not boil down to e.g. a mere policy declaration, but
that obey more fundamental regulatory and disciplinary forces. From Foucault’s work, I rejected,
however, the deterministic tendencies of the dispositif, including suggestions that an apparatus
concentrates society strategically towards a specific, single, urgent “need”. In Bourdieu, I became
influenced by the idea of symbolic power and the logics through which fields, and thus different
forms of capital, emerge and multiply in society. From here, we are provided a perspective which
appreciates not only the centralisation and concentration of capital, but also its movement and
conversion. From Bourdieu I chose to reconsider, however, his central positioning of the state in-
and-for fields of power – as if they may possess some “monopoly” over capital exchange rates –
and emphasised instead a more profane perspective on fields in the plural, their emergence and
relatedness, and their relative value and socially constituted “economy”. At this stage, a new model
or grand synthesis will not be constructed from these authors, but I will take away from this
discussion a framework rich with terminologies, concepts, and theoretical tools to be demonstrated
and put to work analytically for the remainder of this thesis.
CHAPTER 3
TOTAL DEFENCE AND THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIETAL SECURITY
The field of post-Cold War civil defence in Sweden, the symbolic production of new threats and risks, and the transnationalisation of practice

Whoever lives for the sake of combating an enemy has an interest in the enemy’s staying alive.

— Friedrich Nietzsche (2008)

Over the past decades, the notion of “societal security” has emerged, seemingly without a distinct origin, as an instrument for framing European security practice beyond traditional national defence. For example, this terminology has been utilised by Swedish and Norwegian security agencies as a way to describe their “all-hazards” approach towards crisis management and counterterrorism (MSB 2011a; DSB 2019; FOI 2013); it has been referred to in the context of high-level security cooperation in the Nordic region (Stoltenberg 2009; Sandö and Bailes 2014); it has become one of the main, overarching themes for security research and R&D funding in the European Union (Bigo and Martin-Mazé 2014; European Commission 2018); recently, it has even become subject to commercial and organisational standardisation by the International Standardisation Organisation (ISO/TC 223 2016; ISO/TC 292 2016). As discussed in the previous chapter, arms companies have also come to apply it interchangeably with “civil security” in recent attempts to expand into emerging technologies and new areas of R&D funding (C. Jones 2017). This emerging terminology makes bold insinuations: our society is under attack (SOURCE 2016). It is not the sovereign territory of states, but a fabric of functions and values that make up a certain way of life that is assumed to be the target. Antagonists are believed to be not an invading army, but asymmetrical or internal or transgressive threats such as terrorism. A sense of patriotism must be mobilised not under a flag, but around a seemingly permanent state of emergency. Security work must therefore be thought of holistically, it is assumed: actors must be coordinated, strategies coherent, infrastructures resilient, and so on. In short, societal security has been made available as an opportunistic work label in recent years for the post-Cold War generation of security professionals interested in making this general shift in practice.
However, most questions regarding the history of societal security have so far been left unanswered. This chapter will therefore try to explain not what societal security “is” or should be, but rather where it comes from, that is, the specific sociohistorical conditions for its emergence. Is the label indeed “new”? By which actors and from which ideational heritage was it initially forged? When and where did it become associated with specific practices? How was it promoted and spread internationally, in Europe and beyond? As indicated in a report from 2014 (Bigo and Martin-Mazé 2014, 8–14), societal security seems to have been developed by actors coming predominantly from the Nordic region. This chapter confirms this hypothesis in its analysis of the main transformative processes in the Swedish defence sector during recent decades. The analysis will illustrate how the notion of societal security, as it is commonly understood among practitioners today, is not the result of a wider democratic or intellectual debate on demilitarisation, or on how to fundamentally reframe societal issues. Nor is it the same product as the theoretical concept with the same name presented initially by the Copenhagen School (Wæver 1993), from which various identity-centric attempts at “broadening” the meaning of security in IR have departed (Saleh 2010; Theiler 2003; Ilgit and Klotz 2014; Roe 2005). Rather, this label is rooted in a field of actors organised since the end of the Cold War around transforming the historical model of “total defence” in Sweden.

More specifically, it can be located in a specific struggle which unfolded for over two decades among practitioners in the top segments of Swedish bureaucracy and politics who were trying to reform the “civil defence”-branch of the military organisation. From as early as 1986, a group of agency officers, state investigators, and policy advisors began to slowly but surely impose new threats and risks beyond traditional war-thinking – formulating strategies for managing an “asymmetrical” form of antagonism, introducing this as the new “security problem” in official discourse – while simultaneously seeking to transform practice by establishing new institutions, reforming agency structures, and setting up new research environments in the areas of crisis management and counterterrorism. The work label of societal security, it will be shown, emerged as a mere by-product of this far wider struggle around how to produce a new “enemy”, and alter the field’s practical logic from what in EU parlance would be referred to as “second pillar”-defence (foreign policy and interstate relations) to “third pillar”-security (policing and home affairs). Eventually, the label also managed to diffuse outside of Sweden, throughout the Nordic region, and soon thereafter, in different parts of the EU’s R&D structures and bureaucratic discourse.

In seeking to locate empirically the sociogenesis of the abovementioned struggle to renegotiate Swedish total defence, consecrate new threats, and formulate new work terminologies, I trace not the discourse of societal security itself, but the specific sociohistorical conditions for its production as determined by the transformation of a particular space of actors and the situatedness of that
space in the larger social order as well as in a transnational context. Again, I therefore draw attention to what Bourdieu calls the *autonomy* and *limits* of the field, and how its doxa became contested in the form of symbolic claims made by spokespersons drawing on the “magic of ministry” (Bourdieu 1991, 72–73).

The first section of this chapter discusses how the ideal model of total defence was conceived and constructed during the 20th century in Sweden, how its entire welfare system and population was mobilised in war preparedness, and how society thus became at once the asset to be protected and the resource from which to draw. The second sections traces, in three chronological steps, the key struggles in the bureaucratic-political transformation of total defence after the Cold War, the imposition of new discourses, practices, and research- and agency33 structures in this environment, and how the professionals centrally involved in this process began to more visibly and explicitly work in transnational contexts in the 2000s.

**SOCIETY & TOTAL DEFENCE IN COLD WAR SWEDEN**

Today’s more or less commonsensical argument in international studies that distinctions between external and internal dimensions of security have become blurred was in fact acknowledged already in the 1940s in Sweden. When a state commission was appointed to draft a new civil defence law in 1943, they concluded in their final report a year later that the “boundaries between the military and the civil, as well as between theatres of war and the previously preserved homeland, have to a large extent been erased. War has become total” (SOU 1944, 47). “Total warfare against the homeland, where civil life is the primary target”, it further declared, “needs to be countered with total defence, including both a military and civil side” (48). Here, in the midst of the Second World War, the idea of “total defence” began to emerge in the realms of decision making and bureaucratic work. Becoming gradually concretised over the following decades, it came to signify not a specific agency nor a fixed institutional structure, but an *ideal model* for the *security of society* wherein military defence became intertwined with the civil population, everyday life, and virtually all functions of the public welfare apparatus (Artéus and Fältström 2011, 9, 19–20).

Total defence came to be categorised and administered as four different branches, a) *military* defence, including the army, navy, air force, and reserves, mobilising up to 850,000 men b) *economic* defence, including supply of important provisions, storing of fuel and medicine, and more c) *psychological* defence, including public broadcasting media and information material, and d) *civil*

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33 The analysis focuses to a large extent on the restructuration of the Swedish agency system since the constitutional design in Sweden (as similar to Finland, but different from most other Nordic and European states) provides agencies with a strong and autonomous role, relatively independent from the government ministries/ministers under which they are sorted (Lundin and Stenlås 2010, 16).
defence, including air raid shelters, rescue services, evacuation planning, and more (Ministry of Defence Sweden 1995a; Von Konow 1961, 15; Figure 3.1). The “totality” of these elements was always stressed, in other words, the various forms of defence only worked if assembled together.

The branch with arguably largest implications on peacetime society was that of civil defence. During the Cold War, the government sought to mould a population-wide disposition and positive “collective mindset” regarding war preparedness, promoting a “culture” of voluntary participation among civilians (see also Preface, this volume). More tangibly, behind such propaganda efforts, the law of “civil defence duty” (tjänsteplikt) was at work, obliging each and every civilian between 16 and 70 years of age, every registered household, and even private property such as buses or trucks to fulfil a specific function in the fortification of Sweden. Complementing the civil defence, the military organisation was based on conscription of all abled bodied males between 18 and 47 years of age (Total Defence Information Committee 1980, 12; see also Kronsell and Svedberg 2006). Taken together, the defence organisation was to be conceived of as an “enterprise with 4.5 million shareholders in national security” (Interview: J Lundberg; Figure 3.2). Anthropologists have likened the widespread socio-psychological and infrastructural effect of total defence – and particularly of civil defence and the mass-construction of civil and military fortifications – to that of the christening of Sweden and the spreading of churches around the 12th century (Palmblad 2005, 10–11).

The total defence effort systemically securitised everything from Sweden’s “governance and administration structure [to] its businesses, factories, and industries, its mines, shipyards, and production facilities, its communications, its cities and countryside – in short, everything that constitutes the societal organism” (Von Konow 1961, 23). Just as it tends to be an “environmental” or “sustainability” dimension to most societal planning today, Sweden was designed to a large extent around a “war dimension” during the Cold War, making it into one of the most militarised societies in the world at the time. The central justification for this model was the government’s stance of so-called international “neutrality” and military “non-alignment” during most of the 20th century. Instead of joining alliances like NATO after the wars, the government and parliament chose the political line of “make do by yourself”, and maintained a strategy of self-preservation in terms of national security. This not only necessitated mass-conscription and a deeply embedded defence-culture, but also a more or less autonomous arms industry which, instead of importing

34 See also www.skymningslage.se/fakta-om-civilforsvaret/ (in Swedish) [accessed 12/03/19].
35 There are even examples of animals being enlisted for total defence service. In the Gålö archipelago, south-east of Stockholm, in a top secret project approved by leading generals in the 1940s, seals were trained to detect and mark enemy submarines. In similar experiments, doves, sea eagles, and owls were trained to spot submarine periscopes on the sea surface. See for example www.haninge.org/2016/03/27/salstationen-pa-galo/ (in Swedish) [accessed 12/03/19].
certain products or components, facilitated indigenous R&D in all categories of military supply (see also Chapter 5, this volume).

With the total defence model’s pan-sectoral logic, public administration had to be more or less centralised, coordinated, and comprehensive in scope. To be formulated later as the “BIS-model”, or the “preparedness model for societal planning” (Interview: Lagerblad), different invasion scenarios were present in the early stages of almost all forms of peacetime planning; in logistics, construction, commerce, telecommunications, healthcare, transport, roads, energy- and water supply, public and private housing, urban landscaping, and so on (see also Aradau and van Munster 2011). This extensive form of war preparedness was made possible at the time largely due to the fact that most infrastructures (e.g. the telecom and energy industries), as different from today, were owned and operated as state agencies. Indeed, at the time, “[p]lanning became the fashion of the day and the modus operandi of the state” (Lundin and Stenlås 2010, 15). Senior civil servants claim that what was referred to as robustness in the BIS-model of societal planning...
practically prefigured today’s notion of resilience and ideas of fostering of a “bounce-back ability” in the event of crises or attacks (Interview: Lundgren; Riddarström).

Certainly, politicians and bureaucrats realised that for extensive total defence planning to work, it could not be reduced only to actors in and around the state, but it necessarily had to include actors operating also in the private sector. This can be illustrated by the role of the Higher Institute for Total Defence Training (IHT) and the function of so-called “war companies” (K-företag). A training institution responsible for educating the societal elite in the organisation and operation of total defence, IHT was founded in 1952, later to be transferred to the Swedish Defence University. IHT was supposedly “more or less unique in the world” in how it managed to gather agency directors, senior state officials, military staff from across the country, high-level civilians from the corporate world, and even a few diplomats and archbishops during 10 weeks per year for wargames and networking in a secluded and heavily guarded location. The purpose was to “bind together a network across private businesses, public agencies, and the military organisation” and to create a “playhouse” for defence professionals in the early stages of the Cold War. In extension, it was also about forging new civil-military and public-private bonds that were to, somehow, “mirror society”, as well as ensure broader “impact and acceptance in the political field” from the 1950s and onwards.

Figure 3.2 Information pamphlet, “Why do we have a national defence?”, 1987
(Interview: Lundberg; Riddarström; Lundgren). Characteristic for the Swedish elite during the post-war decades was that it became led politically by the working class-oriented Social Democratic Party, and economically by the Wallenberg family empire who owned the largest companies in most industrial sectors, including arms production (Lundin and Stenlås 2010, 13). Despite their ideological differences, these actors collaborated tightly during what has been retrospectively dubbed as “the Boom Years” in Sweden, promoting “public-private cooperative ventures” in several infrastructural areas and effectively forging a strong “corporatist tradition” in Sweden (10, 15). In the same period, legislation was drafted that would come to classify a number of private infrastructure companies, banks, insurance firms, and arms producers, as “war companies” since these were deemed to be of special importance for the continued functioning and defence of Sweden. Over the decades, the amount of K-företag would increase exponentially, peaking at around 14,000 private companies in the late 1980s. These state-industry relationships became firmly rooted and long-lasting, not least in the area of arms manufacturing (see also Chapter 5, this volume).

Despite the Millsian (1956) elitism permeating the Swedish “war economy”, the structuration of total defence was nonetheless designed to embed defence practices “organically” in society, into everyday life, so that they would become part and parcel of the welfare system and the “milieu of life, existence, and work” itself (Foucault 2007, 30). For example, as put in the government’s national security declaration in 1976,

… future wars and crises may to an increasing extent and in other ways impact the entire society and its population. Total defence shall therefore be perceived as part of society and the societal development (Government of Sweden 1976 [emphasis added]).

In addition, a public investigation report directly preceding this government bill elaborated that in the 1970s, total defence was not be seen as an exceptional governmental practice, and national security issues were not be oriented exclusively around the protection of territory. Rather,

… relations within states are given far more consideration in security policy assessments. In a situation when people do not perceive the threat of war as impending as during what has been called the Cold War years, eyes are turned towards domestic issues. Citizens’ loyalty tends to change from a territorial orientation, with the own state as means to defend against external threats, towards a more functional orientation towards one’s work, environment, physical surroundings, etc. … It is obvious that even if physical security in the form of defence against invasion still plays an important role in the perception of security, it now also contains different elements of economic and social
security. … [F]aith in society … is a primary condition for the will to protect that society. It is important that fundamental values about societal concerns are shared (SOU 1976, 184–85 [emphasis added]; see also Ministry of Defence Sweden 1976).

Indeed, defence professionals at the time saw society as constituting at once “the ‘asset’ which total defence must be able to protect against external threats, and the ‘resource’ from which to draw in order to produce such a defence” (Pettersson 1977, 8, 21).

Despite giving such prominence to the societal “organism” in defence practice, public policy during the Cold War never de facto broadened its scope of threats and risks towards it, and never explicitly moved beyond the fixed peace-to-war scale and the overall capacity to respond to an “external attacker” (Ministry of Defence Sweden 1981). Even though official discourse had made occasional reference to the potentiality of “surprise acts of terror bombings” in the past (Von Konow 1961, 159; SOU 1944), this had been done strictly with reference to military air raids against civilians, and the military threat was typically classified as either a) mass attack, or multi-front invasion, b) limited attack, or single-front invasion, or c) surprise attack (Interview: Holmgren). However, defence analysts and advisors began to argue around the late 70s and early 80s that society’s increased accessibility, technological development, sensitivity to functional disruptions, and so on, had made infrastructures an increasingly attractive target for aggressors. Putting society at risk of being “wiped out by smaller attacks”, antagonists were increasingly prepared, it was argued, to “threaten or extort without needing to resort to military power instruments”, for instance, by means of “sabotage and terrorism” (Pettersson 1977, 70; see also Sondén 1984). From the mid 1980s and onwards, actors from the civil- and economic branches of the Swedish defence apparatus started coming together around claims such as these, around the perceived need to fundamentally alter the official threat- and risk spectrum and move focus from external invasion to various threats in our midst. Total defence, or more accurately, civil defence and its central scope and aim concerning what to counter, was about to become reconfigured during a period of significant bureaucratic and political reform.

TOTAL DEFENCE IN TRANSFORMATION

The following discussion will take a more detailed look at the post-Cold War period in Swedish politics and public bureaucracy, that is, when the first major attempts were made at trying to restructure the military organisation and impose other forms of threats and risks. It will offer a historical account of the most central political decisions and intra-agency and ministerial struggles aimed at challenging the established logic of total defence, and in particular the agency structure
for civil defence, between 1986 and the early 2010s. During this long period, the field saw a gradual turn towards crisis management- and counterterrorism practices and to the production of new conceptual knowledge in these areas. What was said to necessitate a rebranding of defence? Where, when, and by whom were theories and practices related to “crises” and “terror” officially (and non-officially) introduced for the first time? How did this social process unfold in Sweden as well as across and beyond the Nordic region? Three phases have been identified: one of rethinking (early 90s), followed by one of reform (mid 90s), leading to one of transnationalisation (early 00s).

1986-1994 – A CHALLENGER APPEARS

After a series of constitutional reforms between 1983-84, a government bill on civil defence was voted through with great majority in the parliament in 1985. This bill proposed the establishment of ÖCB (Swedish Emergency Management Agency) the following year which meant that, for the first time, Sweden would have a sole agency primarily responsible for coordinating the many non-military functions of the defence apparatus, with particular emphasis on aspects related to civil protection and economic planning (Government of Sweden 1985; Artéus and Fältström 2011, 64). ÖCB was supposed to serve total defence in a role of overseeing, planning, training, and evaluating relevant actors, and thereby, it was hoped, making the cooperation between its civil- and military parts more organised and cost-efficient. After extensive debate between bureaucrats, lawyers, and politicians (parts of which are still had), it was decided that, despite its role as central coordinating agency, ÖCB should not be led by a “civil supreme commander” equivalent to that of the armed forces. Rather, the so-called “responsibility principle” should continue to be in effect, meaning that whoever was operationally responsible for a certain societal function in peacetime should be prepared to be so also in times of war.

As a newcomer in the field, ÖCB and its first director Gunnar Nordbeck began to immediately ask far-reaching and, according to some, uncomfortable questions whether civil defence should be exclusively about “war rationing and misery” or if it should also include other forms of peacetime incidents (ÖCB 2002, 10). Ideas of interdependence and vulnerability of societal functions (which, as we now know, was not new but had been present for decades in one way or another in defence policy) were now brought to the fore as a way to put increased emphasis on issues other than invasion. An ÖCB “perspective study” from 1989 with the task to outline the near future of civil defence was the one of the earliest official texts to genuinely consider “non-military threats” such as “sabotage against vital nodes in society” (ÖCB 1989, 8–9). It claimed that the preparedness measures currently in place, in a period of international disarmament, were “far too schematic and in need of nuance”; indeed, “military and non-military threats were bound to become interlaced”
(11). ÖCB was a young and untested agency, and also lacked the legal mandate (or symbolic capital) to force a new practical logic upon other actors. As noted, paradoxically, it was supposed to be the central conductor and coordinating institution, but still, in line with the constitutional system in Sweden, remain hierarchically equal with all other government agencies. Therefore, in their everyday struggles with other civil defence actors, ÖCB’s director, leading officers, and so-called “BIS-ambassadors” were obliged to work through “intelligence and charm”, and with “social rather than coercive methods” when lobbying for increased attention to new threats and risks (Interview: J Lundberg; ÖCB 1989, 33). “We wanted the agency to be primus inter pares [“first among equals”] … so the difficult challenge was to simultaneously lead and not lead”, as put by a former ÖCB officer (Interview: Lagerblad). Sweden’s constitutional system of strong and autonomous agencies still exists, as all of ÖCB’s successors up until today have been obliged to similarly draw on social and political forms of capital, instead of explicit legal- or constitutional force, in their field struggle.

In 1992, the second ÖCB director Gunilla André began to gradually impose a more modern36 take on the “terrorism threat” in a string of newspaper debate pieces, as well as internally within the agency. “Everything suggests that the risk of direct warfare against Sweden should be minimal while the risks of crises are large”, she wrote, and so “[t]hreats such as nuclear accidents, large-scale migration, and acts of terrorism are part of the picture” (André 1992a, see also 1992b; and Eneberg 1992). She has commented retrospectively that:

Suggestions to widen the threat-scale did not resonate with the ministry of defence at the time, however. We were supposed to plan for a war situation, nothing else. Even if I, a loyal servant to the state, respected this policy stance, I could not help but bring up societal threats in a wider perspective during the politician meetings that ÖCB arranged. It just so happened that many members of parliament bore on thoughts similar to mine, which eventually resulted in several parliamentary motions on this theme (ÖCB 2002, 38).

36 A temporary “terrorism law” had been introduced in 1973 as a response to the attacks at the 1972 Munich Olympics. This law then became transferred between different legal statutes, gradually redefined and phased out, and eventually removed in the late 80s.
After a series of efforts by ÖCB to influence key decision makers – an unorthodox move for a state agency – a committee initiative in the parliament finally pushed the government to appoint the so-called “Threat and Risk Investigation” in 1992 which ran until 1995 (SOU 1995). The final report sketched out an image of society now under threat by new and emerging phenomena such as mass migration and asylum seekers, severe disruptions in power- and water supply, major urban accidents or attacks, and other threats they perceived to be in a “grey area” between war and crime.

Its head investigator Eric Krönmark, a former defence minister of the conservative party, had the explicit vision of merging the areas of internal policing and external defence which in his opinion were far too disjointed and should rather share resources and equipment. Controversially at the time, his investigation team “looked into options of designing a kind of ‘national guard’, which was not received favourably” (Interview: Holmgren). This was voted down since the domestic use of the army had been regarded a “politically untouchable” question in Sweden ever since the 1930s, when a clash between union protesters and the army left five civilians dead and caused major public protests, especially from the working classes.

“When [Krönmark’s] investigation report was handed over to the then recently appointed defence minister Thage G. Peterson, whom had held several cabinet positions for many years, he explained that this was the most important report he had ever received”, the former ÖCB director recalls (ÖCB 2002, 38). Peterson himself makes clear, however, that he “had no support” for politically implementing the ideas in the 90s, and “regrets not picking a fight”:

Time was not ripe for changing the view on what constituted threats and risks in society. When I began talking about the necessity of terrorism preparedness … these issues were not taken seriously. Many shook their heads and argued that national defence should not meddle with these issues … Developments in recent years seem to have proven me right, though, so perhaps I was ahead of my time (ÖCB 2002, 56).

Indeed, to propose changes of the Swedish national security strategy tends to be a slow and arduous process, and again, largely due to reasons of constitutional design. The five-year “defence resolutions” presented regularly by the government are supposed to dictate the overall defence priorities for the next half a decade, thereby virtually framing what should be at all thinkable and doable in the area of security. Based on a 10-15 year “planning horizon”, these resolutions are far from revolutionary, and draw on documentation from two strong public instances. First, the resolutions are required to draw on the recommendations presented by the respective government agencies. As already mentioned, the Swedish constitution provides agencies with a large amount of

bureaucratic capital, ensuring their operational autonomy and relative independence from the ministries under which they are sorted. Second, the resolutions must also draw on the reports of the defence commissions. Constituted by representatives from all political parties of the parliament, the defence commissions are able to formulate policy suggestions that are more or less ensured to gain broad and immediate political support, and its writings tend to harmonise rather well with what becomes eventually voted through parliament into legislation (Lundin and Stenlås 2010, 16). Thus, if one were to suggest an official redirection of security policy one would be obliged to convince, all at once, the government, the agency system, and the parliament (as represented by the current defence commission).

Partly for this reason, reformists during the early 90s were unsurprised that it took almost a decade for their thoughts and ideas to have an influence on practice. Although ÖCB had in fact observed and anticipated societal- and international developments for some time, they understood that “making changes is like altering the course of a steamer: it takes a long time, and the room for manoeuvre is limited”. The agency system is usually slow to react, a key reformist has noted: “the [Berlin] wall fell already in 1989, but ÖCB survived all the way until 2002” (Interview: Lundgren). However, the persistent struggles of civil servants, key politicians, and public investigators during these years seemed to come into fruition during the mid- to late 90s, as fundamental civil defence reforms were imminent. In conclusion, it is interesting to note that contentious reform ideas during this period emerged not from parliament, but stemmed to a significant extent from the everyday work and professional perspective of agency officers, and so the field struggle concerned, for the challengers, how to push bureaucratic knowledge into political processes and state commissions, and for the heirs, how to defend against such moves by insisting on the continued political relevancy of geopolitical threats.

1995-2001 – THE TRANSFORMATION ACCELERATES
From a long-term perspective, ÖCB’s peculiar lobby efforts and the Threat and Risk Investigation were arguably of central importance at the time since they effectively opened up avenues for the state, and particularly the ministry of defence, to think, talk, and write about new (in)securities. Indeed, parts of the arguments presented initially in the Threat and Risk Investigation became picked up and inserted into the subsequent defence resolutions and government bills around 1995; namely, the two interlinked propositions on “renewing total defence” (Government of Sweden 1995, 1996a; see also Ministry of Defence Sweden 1995c), and another one on the “readiness against severe strains on society in peacetime” (Government of Sweden 1996b; see also Ministry of Defence Sweden 1996b). When passed, these reforms led to the discontinuation of large parts
of the military organisation as well as a row of budget reallocations according to the new security policy organised around, not war, but “peacetime strains”. Again, although the scope and function of total defence was challenged by ÖCB as early as 1989, it is not until the 1995-96 propositions that we can see the so-called “widened security definition” become declared as official government policy. The defence commission’s assessments of the “international environment” in the mid 90s (Ministry of Defence Sweden 1996a, 1998), especially in the European context since Sweden had just become a full European Union member state in 1995 (Ministry of Defence Sweden 1995b, 1999), also had a “widening” effect on security discourse.

In practice, alongside the abovementioned government reforms, the ministry of defence was simultaneously occupied with carrying out the mandatory EU adaptations of domestic policy. In their area of practice, this meant interpreting and responding to the so-called Petersberg tasks and the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (later to become the EU Common Security and Defence Policy) which, among other things, broadened the practical military scope to also include crisis management in peacetime. Sweden had also recently joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme, and had focused initially not so much on military-to-military training, but rather on policy discussions on aspects of disaster planning and response. Reformists from the Swedish defence sector working with the PfP and EU adaptations in the 90s saw these engagements with international institutions as opportunities to further skew public institutions and mindsets at home toward a beyond-military disposition. Indeed, they saw the demand for a necessarily new form of security practice; one that was not fixed along a war-to-peace scale, one which recognised that whatever laid beyond territorial defence was not simply peacetime civil emergency planning or uniformed blue-light personnel, but something radically different concerning an evolved form of antagonism aimed directly at citizens, democracy, and rule of law (Interview: Riddarström; Lundgren; KKrVA 1998, 15). Overall, the acquisition of EU-level (or otherwise “international”) forms of bureaucratic capital by Swedish spokespersons thus became reinvested at home and had an accelerating effect on the field transformation.

With the gradual implementation of the 90s reforms, bureaucrats, legislators, as well as academic researchers became increasingly aware of the need for an updated conceptual-, and terminological toolbox. As new agency guidelines, policy proposals, and legal drafts had to be written, new explanation models were in demand among civil servants. Consequently, for the
remainder of the 90s, ÖCB distributed around SEK 25 million annually to emerging Swedish researchers in the area of defence- and security studies in order to fill the apparent knowledge gap caused by the end of the Cold War (ÖCB 2002, 35). ÖCB targeted scholars in their vicinity who they hoped could produce models “that would describe the new threats” (Interview: Riddarström).

At this stage, two persons outside of ÖCB played key roles. First, Christina Wegler, a former agency executive who had moved on to become head of department at the Swedish Defence University (FHS) was early to notice the demand for “new ways of thinking about the training and exercising of military personnel”. Looking to provide professionals with “a different perspective” from the intersection of the civil- and military knowledge domains, she strongly supported the facilitation of a brand new research crew at her department (ÖCB 2002, 58). Second, functionalist security- and crisis management scholar Bengt Sundelius – already a familiar face to many Nordic practitioners in the defence sector during the 90s – came to be the central figure around which new forms of research were mobilised. On the one hand dissatisfied with the general stagnancy and inflexibility of his former employer (Swedish Defence Research Institute, FOI), and on the other hand seeking closer proximity to practitioners than what could be offered by his current employer (Uppsala University), Sundelius looked for a different environment somewhere in-between research and practice where he could gather his network of young crisis management scholars. “Simply put, Bengt had the scientific bits, Christina had the facilities and administration, and I sat on the money”, as described by a former chief officer at ÖCB (Interview: Lundgren). Thus, the Centre for Crisis Management Studies, CRISMART, was founded in 1999 and quickly emerged as the leading research hub for crisis studies in Sweden. Their primary goal, according to Sundelius, was to “produce a cadre of competent co-workers” in this growing area of practice. Responding directly to ÖCB’s call for new applicable security models, they conducted “problem-oriented” and policy-friendly studies at the boundary between research and practice, and offered tailored exercises and training courses for government-, parliament-, and agency officials. Over the coming years, this team of self-proclaimed “pracademics” in and around CRISMART managed to forge tight bonds with the new generation of practitioners in the top segments of the state. Their positions enabled some of them to later take up key positions outside of academia, in both the public and private sectors, while others remained multi-positioned and moved frequently between various roles and responsibilities in and beyond universities.

This process is a prime example of how academic and political discourses of (in)security, in certain times and places in recent history, have been able to emerge in parallel and synergy, co-informing and reinforcing one another into a distinct category of knowledge. One may compare,
for instance, Swedish pracademics during the 90s with the early years of the RAND Corporation wherein a small group of researchers set out to explain the logics of nuclear war in the 50s and 60s:

With no empirical evidence to support their findings (no nuclear war had been fought!), the group developed a thought-provoking and immensely influential view of how nuclear strategy should be performed. From the models it developed, policy advice was deducted and policy formed. … The RAND people not only were good at producing scientific knowledge, but also had efficient channels for transmission of their ideas to practitioners – including politicians … Many in the US government felt that ‘it added scientific legitimacy’ … to listen (Berling 2011, 391).

ÖCB presumably had similar ideas about the research activities they funded, hoping that it would “close down controversies in the political realm” and that the scientific products, facts, models, data, etcetera, that became generated could be “mobilised strategically … as ‘weapons’ in political struggles in their efforts to secure for themselves the power to impose the legitimate version of the social world” (393). Not only can security research close down controversies for bureaucratic and political agents that have particular goals in mind, but at times, researchers may also themselves be opportunistic and tailor their theoretical work to make it “practical” for government. As Bonditti and Olsson (2016, 244) show, this was the case in the early days of terrorism research when some scholars linked their “theories on terrorism developed in the context of ‘scientific publications’ or other ‘academic settings’ to the particular interests of security professionals”. In Sweden, certain scholars similarly “reorganised security knowledge” around new threats or crises, thereby “opening up a space of indeterminacy” between defence and policing, between crime and war (242); a space in which they automatically became the new generation of “experts” (see also Stampnitzky 2013; Herman and O’Sullivan 1990).

In anticipation of further reforms in the new millennium, ÖCB officers and their academic expert allies began discussing along these lines how to relabel total defence and make their new theories “practical”. However, since a working definition of total defence was already in place in up to 150 different statutes and legislative acts at the time this was no easy task, and many practitioners were explicitly against a reformulation of official discourse (Interview: J Lundberg). Nevertheless, Sundelius was one of those who tried, e.g. by writing a policy paper for the defence commission and suggesting the notion of “societal defence” (Interview: Sundelius). However, what he described as “societal defence” still seemed more or less identical to the total defence model of the past, but now, with a stronger emphasis on the embeddedness of society in an international
and transboundary context, and more importantly, on the new threats and vulnerabilities stemming thereof (Sundelius 2001a, 8–9). Later that year, following violent protests during the EU Summit in Gothenburg in June of 2001, this policy paper was rewritten into a debate article for Sweden’s largest newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* in which it was phrased, more bluntly this time, that Sweden was in need a “societal defence against terrorists”. In passing, it was suggested – just as had been done by Krönmark a decade earlier – that for such a revamped non-territorial defence to work, the police and military organisations should be able to cooperate more closely and share equipment to counter non-state antagonists (Sundelius 2001b). “Societal defence” was received with mild indifference politically and never took off in official discourse. Instead, Sundelius and his colleagues continued to develop and further specify their idea of “functional” (as different from “territorial”) security by starting to call it “societal security”. Incidentally, their Danish colleagues of the Copenhagen School of security studies (or more precisely, Ole Wæver at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute), had already in 1993 written on the “concept of societal security” (see also Chapter 1, this volume). After some deliberation and debate between the two in the late 90s, Wæver had “handed over” his concept to Sundelius.37 During the late 90s and early 00s, Swedish scholars then came to quietly appropriate the notion of societal security, strip it of Wæver’s largely identity-centric definition, and promote it as an open-ended practical concept and work label to be used by agencies and policymakers. After the events of 9/11, advocates of societal security envisioned it to become the Nordic – perhaps eventually even the European38 – sibling-concept to “homeland security” which was being developed and put to work in the United States between 2001-03 in the form of a massive new state department.

While these kinds of discussions were held without any immediate results around the turn of the millennium, major reforms were again planned which would come to have a more substantial effect on the agency system. A carefully drafted ÖCB report in 1998 entitled “The new security” again enticed government officials to appoint a commission, this time the so-called “Vulnerability and Security Investigation” in 1999. Former Centre Party cabinet minister and Nordic Council secretary Åke Pettersson was selected as head investigator by the ministry of defence, and his team consisted of key figures from across the civil defence sector, among them Sundelius and leading reformists from within ÖCB. For two years, they conducted more than 50 case studies on critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, and in May of 2001, Pettersson presented their final report called

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37 “Arguably, Ole’s version … was about ‘identity security’ – not society, in my view … I remember in our last conversation regarding this during some dinner, Ole said ‘yeah, you’re right … you can have the term and keep working with it, because what you say fits better’” (Interview: Sundelius).

38 On the cross-over notion of “European homeland security”, see the works of e.g. Rhinard and Boin (2009), Cross (2007), and Kaunert et al. (2012).
“Security in a new era” (SOU 2001). In it, they effectively managed to incorporate the vast plethora of bureaucratic struggles and political decisions over the past 15 years, and turned them into the major proposal to discontinue ÖCB, along with the idea of civil defence altogether, and replace it with a new crisis management agency. More fundamentally, this investigation – together with the defence commission reports written alongside it which produced very similar conclusions (Ministry of Defence Sweden 2001b, 2001a) – meant that the threat of invasion was effectively written off in favour of, not simply “peacetime strains”, but crises such as asymmetrical attacks, major accidents, natural disasters, and other incidents to be captured by the proposed “all-hazards” approach. This, some declared, marked the “death” of traditional total defence, or as put by the military, the start of a “strategic timeout”. “This was a time when we did not experience that many threats, but we did however feel the need to guard ourselves against what has come to be called terror attacks”, Pettersson has elaborated, while his co-investigator from ÖCB has argued that they wanted to give asymmetrical antagonists just as much, if not more, attention as external threats: “Indeed, anyone with merely a hunting rifle, knowing where to go, could shut down Sweden’s power supply for at least three months” (Interview: Pettersson; Riddarström). This investigation report in other words signifies a key moment in the transformation of Swedish security work, as the logic of suspicion-making began shifting from extraterritorial enemies to internal antagonists.

The new crisis management agency was to continue in an overseeing and coordinative role, but should now focus even more on identifying and funding new forms of security research, as well as on bridging the gaps between different infrastructure operators. This required an update of the model for “exploiting society’s collective resources” for security purposes, it was argued, and so the traditional responsibility principle in total defence became complemented with the parity and proximity crisis management principles (SOU 2001, 18, 25). Disaster planning, operability, and recovery – just as per old defence ideals – was to be seen less as a government matter, and more as a concern for local and regional actors, reinstating the point that this too was an enterprise for the totality of society. In line with this, the SOU report further suggested that the armed forces should be able to aid all civil agencies dealing with disruptions in e.g. ICT-, water-, and power supply, flooding and dam failures, mass migration of refugees and asylum seekers, severe pandemics, and acts of terrorism (252). Despite being well received upon its publication in May of 2001, when the subsequent government bill for the “continued renewal of total defence” was to be drafted later that summer (Government of Sweden 2001), the SOU report was surprisingly

39 I.e. organisational routines and structures during crises should to the largest extent possible resemble those in a normal situation.
40 I.e. any attack, accident, or incident should be managed as close to its source as possible.
shelved by the defence minister. However, according to reviewers who saw the various drafts of the bill over the summer that year, when the final proposition was eventually finished and presented to the parliament on September 26th (that is, only a few weeks after the 9/11 attacks), it suddenly contained large chunks of text pasted in from the SOU report (Interview: Sundelius). In other words, although stemming from a long and careful process during the late 90s of preparing the discontinuation of civil defence in favour of crisis management, the first major decision in 2001 to reform the agency system was in fact more or less reactionary to the development in the US field and its transnational effects. “9/11 ‘saved’, if you will, Åke Pettersson’s vision”, according to Sundelius, as the attacks in New York and Washington D.C. convinced the heirs in government and parliament start shifting their positions, thereby intensifying the processes to restructure the Swedish agency field.

Another key detail in the 1999-01 reform period was the two study trips organised between the Swedish investigation team and a Norwegian team working in parallel on reforming practically the same policy area. The purpose of the trips between Stockholm and Oslo was to exchange and acquire ideas, specialist knowledge, and policy blueprints from both civil and military organisations concerning how to modernise, and eventually move away from, the total defence heritage they both shared (NOU 2000, 22, 242, 321). The final publication by the Norwegian investigation team – “A vulnerable society: Recommendations for the security and readiness of society”, published already in July of 2000 after only ten months in the pipeline – therefore had several similarities with the Swedish report, not least in how they both saw the increased openness and technological evolution of post-Cold War Nordic societies as producing a wider threat spectrum, ranging from natural hazards to terrorist attacks (6–7). The Norwegians also agreed roughly on how to organise against such threats, namely, by establishing a new coordinative crisis management agency (DSB), and by implementing the same organisational principles (responsibility, parity, and proximity). Notably, however, Norway decided to organise this area under the ministry of justice rather than defence, and also chose from the very outset to call this form of work as samfunnssikkerhet. In Sweden, the equivalent term of samhällssäkerhet in fact never cemented itself as the main umbrella term in the same way, and agencies remained under the ministry of defence instead of migrating to ministries of interior or justice.

Joint policy development and information exchange between Nordic ministries had been common throughout the 20th century in many other areas, including cross-border travel and emergency services, but never explicitly, until now, in the areas of “security” or “defence”. Rather, this area had been marked by a “taboo” both in the Nordic Council and between its ministers ever since the 1950s, much due their governments’ heterogeneous positions in IGOs like NATO and
the EU. However, regional cooperation came to be increasingly thinkable around the year 2000, not only due to the exchanges that occurred between the Swedish and Norwegian investigation teams, but also due to a recommendation by the Nordic Council (2001) on international civil crisis management. This signified developments to come in the mid 00s when Nordic practitioners began collaborating more closely and visibly in the areas of crisis management and counterterrorism, and increasingly under the label of societal security which began to spread both in the Nordic countries, and onwards in Europe.

2002-2010s – NORDIC & EU RELATIONS

In 2002, a second government proposition building on the previous year’s Vulnerability and Security Investigation was passed in parliament, leading to the discontinuation of ÖCB, and the establishment of the new and slimmer Swedish Crisis Management Agency (KBM) (Government of Sweden 2002, 43–44). Much like ÖCB, KBM was given a non-interfering role of planning, training, and coordinating other actors. Compared to its predecessor, however, it focused explicitly on new threats and risks such as terrorism, and also sought to also facilitate more so-called public-private partnerships (PPPs) in the area of critical infrastructure protection (which had become increasingly outsourced in the early 00s, not only in Sweden but in most Western societies). ICT in particular involved a plethora of public clients and private providers whose resilience was understood to be “of functional and economic importance for both sectors”, thus making state-industry cooperation in this area “highly valuable” and “mutually beneficial” (50). KBM even appointed a dedicated “PPP officer” in order to harmonise relations between crisis-relevant private companies and the public sector.41 The agency continued to administer its own research funding scheme (now with a more than doubled budget of SEK 60 million per annum), as the overall government policy in the early 00s was to begin reallocating R&D funds from the armed forces to the needs of the civil sector (see also, Chapter 5 this volume). Although KBM wanted to link up practitioners with emerging industries and technologies, it was (and still is) beyond the agency’s scope to directly fund private actors since recipients must be based at academic institutions. Instead, they maintained focus on setting up new research environments from which a supply of future security professionals could be generated, from which applied knowledge could eventually emerge into practice or onto the market. Leading this enterprise from within KBM was Sundelius, who had now acquired the position of agency research director, and who had continued to fund

41 Some years later, this position was removed from KBM, and the PPP officer moved on to become director of the largest lobby group for the Swedish arms industry (SOFF), and began encouraging companies to establish product segments for “civil” or “societal” security (see also Chapter 5, this volume).
research in line the CRISMART credo of linking together academia (and academics) with practice (and practitioners) (51, 65-66; KBM 2008, 36–37).

During these years, Sweden’s counterterrorism strategies also began to crystallise more clearly. Between 2004-06, the defence commission authored a long-term security strategy which not only oriented priorities around the new agency structure, but which also implicitly positioned Sweden as a Western ally in the “global war on terror”: “Shared vulnerabilities and transgressive threats means that Swedish and international interests coincide to an increasing extent … In today’s world, it is just as important to secure flows [of things and people] as it previously was to protect territorial borders (Ministry of Defence Sweden 2006, 11). Domestically, a state investigation sparked by the 9/11 events resulted in a report in 2003 on Sweden’s “preparedness against terrorism” (SOU 2003). The report proposed far-reaching policy ideas; e.g. new terrorism legislation, a radical hybridisation of military- and police organisations, as well as a substantially expanded mandate for the Secret Services (SÄPO) – the actor with central operational responsibility in the area of counterterrorism. Few of these suggestions became reality when government propositions and laws were to be subsequently drafted, however. Instead, since around 2005, SÄPO has been responsible for convening the Swedish Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Council (SÄPO 2019b) which gathers 15 different agencies, including the armed forces, coastguard, and migration agency. Within this council, moreover, the National Centre for Terrorist Threat Assessment (NCT) is a permanent working group staffed by personnel from SÄPO, the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA), and the Military Intelligence and Security Directorate (MUST). The NCT “produces long and short-term strategic assessments of the terrorist threat against Sweden and Swedish interests” and presents strategic reports to various government offices (SÄPO 2019a). Similar to the DHS, the NCT also produces an annual “threat level scale” with regards to terrorism, with an arbitrary range of “No threat (1), Low threat (2), Elevated threat (3), High threat (4) and Very high threat (5)” (SÄPO 2018).

Relatedly, around 2004, KBM funds went into establishing the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS) at the Defence University, making it Sweden’s first “government think-tank” dedicated to the field of terrorism studies. Similar to CRISMART, CATS produced classified policy papers for cabinet offices and arranged exercises with civil servants and the government (Interview:
Nicander). Their scholars also began frequenting mainstream and social media as self-proclaimed “experts”, with a tendency to express particularly opinionated views when it came to so-called “Islamic terrorism” (Flyghed 2005, 175–77). Originally, in 1998, a precursor to CATS had in fact been an analytical team working under the government with information warfare, named the Centre for Information Operational Studies (CIOS). However, after the events of 9/11, KBM’s research department viewed terrorism studies as a top priority and decided to reconfigure CIOS, transfer it to the Defence University, and provide it with an annual “research environment support grant” to ensure its permanence and its capacity to attract leading national and international terrorism scholars. “[KBM] had the mandate to fund research, but not the experience”, Sundelius has claimed, not denying that he was able to allocate funding rather freely to his colleagues and adepts in Sweden (Interview: Sundelius). Research directors of this kind can very well be compared to an impresario in the theatre world, i.e. a director-figure who finances, facilitates, and organises plays and concerts – those who “by their decisions [could] mould the taste of an age” (Bourdieu 1969, 91). Similarly, Mills saw this “new entrepreneur” as an increasingly common feature in the social sciences; those who are discontent with the old-fashioned professor roles and “ordinary” academic careers, those who instead “set up on the campus arespectably financed research and teaching institution, which brings the academic community into live contact with men of affairs”, those who “can get you the job, the trip, the research grant”, those who become “intellectual administrators and research promoters”, indeed the “executives of the mind” (Mills 2000, 98, 103).

The early- to mid 00s saw some signs of conjunction among Nordic security professionals, at least in terms of official discourse and agency practice. The abovementioned Norwegian report “A vulnerable society”, for instance, came to inform large parts of subsequent government proposals on e.g. “the road towards a less vulnerable society” (Ministry of Justice Norway 2002), “societal security and civil-military cooperation” (Ministry of Justice Norway 2004), and “the modernisation of defence” (Ministry of Defence Norway 2004). Furthermore, in Finland, a national strategy for “protecting the critical functions of society” became elaborated by the ministry of defence (2003, updated in 2006, and 2010) which included terminologies, guidelines, and organisational principles that were strikingly similar compared to its neighbours. These similarities could also be noted in the final report of the “Danish Vulnerability Investigation” published by Beredskapsstyrelsen the following year (2004), which in turn were following up on the Danish government’s anti-terrorism policy, “Antiterrorpakken” (2002).

Furthermore, in the Nordic Council, politicians started to come together for the first time around regional cooperation in the area of security. This was expressed e.g. in the form of a member proposal in 2005 calling for increased transnational collaboration in the area of societal
security. In the proposal, the council’s “Middle Group” (centre-and right party representatives from all five countries) acknowledged that while “[s]ecurity policy has traditionally been positioned beyond the spectrum of the Nordic Council”, they now sensed that with “new threats” supposedly facing the democratic state, rule of law, and individual citizens, it was time to implement societal security as a dedicated work area in the Council so that they could encourage the region’s governments to “re-evaluate the workload” between “internal and external security” as well as increase cooperation with “non-public actors” (Nordic Council 2005, see also 2010). The “Stoltenberg report” (2009) took further steps towards a “Nordic model”. Presented at an “extraordinary meeting of Nordic foreign ministers” in Oslo in February of 2009, it consisted of thirteen major proposals for strengthened security cooperation. Although the report consisted predominantly of high-policy proposals, three chapters concerned societal security specifically, and it concluded by introducing an informal Nordic declaration of solidarity in the event of a major disaster or attack in the region. In April the same year, the inter-ministerial “Haga Process” was initiated as a top-down effort to further orchestrate Nordic crisis management policies. This initiative led to two policy declarations by the Nordic Council of Ministers (2009, 2013; see also Sandö and Bailes 2014), in which the five countries’ ministers of defence, justice, and interior claimed to see a great advantage in developing the existing Nordic cooperation in the area of societal security and preparedness. Shared values and a cultural and geographical proximity make up an important foundation for this cooperation. It is our conviction that a deepened and more focused collaboration benefits the entire Nordic, as well as our capability to act in different international contexts (Nordic Council of Ministers 2009).

Here, “Nordic societal security” is used, on the one hand, as a way to frame a specifically “Nordic” way of life, and on the other, as an instrument for gaining leverage abroad. The declaration also included a surprisingly specific call to jointly develop technology and products for countering CBRN terrorism. The follow-up declaration, “Haga II”, suggested that the Nordic countries face shared threats due to their “similar societal structures”, “interconnected infrastructures”, and “openness”.

There are several ways to explain why security discourse and practice transformed in similar ways in the Nordic countries, ways that certainly do not suggest that it was down to some natural coalescence due to “similar societal structures”. Rather, this diffusion was very much a social and to a large extent conscious process of trying to impose a particular way of framing “Nordic security”. For example, there are long traditions of informal dialogue between civil servants in the various
Nordic cabinet offices, and of actively harmonising Nordic legislation to the furthest extent possible so that when work terminologies, organisational principles, and agencies are to be designed in one country, legislators are more or less obliged to account for and draw on what is already in place in the others. Policy exchange of this kind traditionally occurs outside of the Nordic Council, the Nordic Council of Ministers, or other supranational spaces; indeed, the Nordic Council – far from possessing the legal imperative of the EU – tends to act more like an influential pressure group on national parliaments. When Nordic defence – “taboo” as it was – became replaced by an apparently less controversial notion of Nordic crisis management in the early 00s, harmonisation started to occur in this area as well, and the semi-systematic policy dialogues concerning “best practice” intensified and spread also to the ministries of defence and justice. Professional exchanges were also frequently taking place at policy-oriented conferences and workshops where civil servants, policy advisors, and scholars met to discuss themes such as “shared Nordic security models” (KBM, CRN, and ETH 2004; Research Council of Norway 2008; Interview: Pettersson; Sundelius; Riddarström).

In Sweden, KBM was eventually merged in 2008 (after only six years in existence) with the Rescue Services Agency (SRV) and the Psychological Defence Board (SPF) into the currently operational Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). The agency continued to promote an “all-hazards” and “whole-of-society”-approach to security (Lindberg and Sundelius 2012), remained centrally responsible for all things security, including actor coordination, training, evaluation, and research funding (again with a doubled budget of SEK 120-140 million per year), and also started to work more actively abroad by appointing societal security “attachés” in both Brussels and Washington D.C. Notably, societal security never became established as the official terminology and discourse in the Swedish field, but came to be used interchangeably, depending on actor or context, with terminologies like civil contingencies, crisis management, emergency preparedness, or civil security. Similarly in the Nordic region, societal security became used in some inter-ministerial documents, but never fully cemented itself as some pan-Nordic label for security practice as it continued to be translated, interpreted, and applied in different ways in the five countries.

In the area of security R&D, however, the societal security label spread with some success both in Nordic region, and beyond it in the EU; particularly, it became clear, in contexts such as the ESRP where applied R&D overlapped with strategic policy development. The entrepreneurial research director Sundelius (who later acquired the position of senior advisor to the MSB director),

42 See also the recent Nordic societal security research programme (NordForsk 2013), co-funded by security agencies in the region and administered by the NordForsk council.

43 This, despite being proposed as the central work terminology in an investigation report from 2004 on “how to inform about security in society” (SOU 2004).
held the view that research could effectively function as a “door opener” for further practical cooperation, and more generally, that there is no clear line between the two (2008, 37). He therefore got personally engaged in the early stages of the European Commission’s ambitious plan around 2004 to forge a security research programme, and managed to become appointed “expert” for the European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB, 2005-06), as well as take a seat in one of the working groups of the subsequent European Security Research Innovation Forum (ESRIF, 2007-09). The strategy was explicitly dual: first, to impose the label of societal security by means of close professional partnerships as a way to frame European R&D in the future, and second, in doing so, to strengthen the overall position of Swedish and Nordic professionals in EU institutions. “The idea was always to try to shape the [EU] research agenda towards the notion of secure societies”, indeed, “to spread this message beyond Sweden, beyond the Nordic”, he has explained (Interview: Sundelius), and “since the Commission was rather unexperienced at the time, me and my colleagues [in the advisory groups] more or less authored the calls ourselves” Furthermore, “one thing I tried to implement was the element of international cooperation, that it should be possible to set up consortiums involving Canada and the United States”. However, his suggestions of linking together the EU’s framework programmes with the new US Department of Homeland Security, of building some kind of Euro-Atlantic security alliance via R&D and related activities, were generally disliked by the Commission and met with caution by most EU decisionmakers. This was perhaps understandable since the initial goal of the ESRP, as proposed by the Group of Personalities in 2004 and carried on through ESRAB and ESRIF, was oriented around the more protectionist notion of fostering the growth of their own “lucrative and globally competitive ‘homeland security’ industry in Europe” (Hayes 2006, 13; see also Chapter 4, this volume).

However, although Swedish security professionals and their preferred terminology of societal security entered into EU struggles related to the ESRP at an early stage and in key positions, this is not to say that these agents somehow by themselves transformed the practical logic in Europe towards “securing societies”. Rather, as shown in Chapter 2, the transformation of European security- and defence work and the emergence of the ESRP was a long process starting already in

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44 The attempt to spread societal security in the EU resonated with the Swedish approach for how acquire international influence, as outlined in a government report form 1995 (SOU 1995a, 81–83). This report urged civil servants working with foreign policy or security institutions abroad to draw inspiration from espionage literature and “penetrate” other states with “strategic ideas” and approach foreign bureaucrats on high, mid-, and low-policy levels in e.g. academic- or industrial settings.

45 In the next chapter, I will focus explicitly on the attempts by Swedish security professionals to establish a transatlantic work arrangement and R&D cooperation between their agencies and the DHS in the US, as well as the attempts by a US-Nordic research network to more conceptually synergise “societal” and “homeland” approaches to security practice (Sundelius 2005, 34; see also Sundelius, Grönvall, and Hamilton 2006; Hamilton and Burwell 2009; and Hamilton and Brattberg 2014).
the 90s (if not earlier) linked to the consolidation of the region’s arms industries after the Cold War. In this struggle, the label of societal security did not itself open any new doors, but more accurately would be to say that it became strategically associated with, or “added on”, to various R&D instruments, industrial policies, and bureaucratic processes that were already in place; as a way for EU decision makers to, largely in retrospect, justify certain position-takings related to its security research programme.

**CONCLUSION**

The *modus operandi* of total defence in Sweden was always about the security of society – perhaps even more so than about the defence of territory. With its emphasis on societal values and functions and on the interdependence of military- and other “civil” forms of practice, total defence laid the organisational and cultural groundworks for post-Cold War “holistic” approaches to security. Then just as now, central coordination and planning of security practice had to be balanced against a logic of mass-participation and responsibilisation. Then as now, “society” became acted upon and perceived as at once the “asset” to protect and “resource” from which to draw. What changed drastically after the Cold War was rather the socio-political and technological makeup of that society, as well as its general situatedness in the larger transnational social order.

In fact, field struggles at the time largely concerned what threatened the notion of a Swedish society, and how such threats should be countered. This chapter thus centred its analysis on how symbolic capital became aggregated from the bureaucratic- and political fields and put to work for the production of a new post-Cold War “enemy”; indeed, how, by whom, and with what effects certain emerging “asymmetrical”, “internal” and “transgressive” threats and risks became uttered, imposed, promoted, and negotiated into practice.

A key moment in this struggle was the mid- to late 90s. During these years, total defence traditionalists in parliament, government, and ministries became gradually defeated by contenders coming from agency circles and civil defence work. Reforms were passed, the total defence model was “renewed”, new legal and institutional structures took shape, EU- and international capital was mobilised, and a different (not entirely new) kind of professionalism with regards to security and defence emerged towards the turn of the millennium. The heirs, on their part, were more or less obliged to accept what became called the “strategic timeout” of total defence.

Drawing on key developments both at home and abroad, such as the EU entry and 9/11, this was a period of momentum for agency officers and their supporters in the statist field as they not only managed to convince key decisionmakers to shift the general focus of the agency system towards crisis management and counterterrorism, but also since they were granted the mandate to
establish and fund new research environments which came to produce research(ers) that, in turn, supported their worldview and closed down any major political controversies.

This new generation of “pracademics” emerged with increasingly transnational interests and agendas. It was shown in this chapter how the Swedish, and to some extent Nordic, experiment to mobilise practices, technologies, and applied research under the banner of societal security led to the diffusion of this work label abroad, to various EU institutions, bureaucrats, research funders, and private companies. Here, I argue that the entrepreneurs behind the societal security label, who moved it (and themselves) into an EU context, helped the Commission and its industry allies with “putting a name” on emerging R&D funding schemes, with retrospectively branding and justifying the many years of industrial policy development, thereby also aiding arms firms who could now more easily and swiftly move into “civil” or dual-use products. Together with the related notion of “civil security”, this label therefore coincided perfectly with the EU’s persistent attempts in recent decades to connect the European arms industry with a market for security, surveillance, and border control technologies.
CHAPTER 4
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, PLUS
Security research as transatlantic intelligence cooperation

As have been discussed and demonstrated in previous chapters, threat conceptions are not pre-existing, and security is not some fixed scale to which politics reacts. Rather, (in)security is itself a politics and practice including processes of constructing some ways of being, living, and moving as “desirable”, and other forms as “undesirable”; a symbolic exercise of creating freedoms and rights for some, but removing them from others. Being symbolic in character, this practice seeks to come forth as indispensable, universal, as a mere solution to a problem, rather than something highly political and controversial. It, in other words, seeks to conceal particular interests, and create the appearance of necessity – security simply “for the sake of security”. Like that of security, the practice of scientific research similarly tries to appear “neutral”, “objective”, and apparently free from political or ideological drives.

The research(ers) and profession(als) of security often seem to co-emerge and co-legitimise each other, validating each other’s objects of concern. For example, Herman and O’Sullivan (1990) and Stampnitzky (2013) showed how counterterrorism practice co-emerged with counterterrorism knowledge and a specific form of “terrorism studies”; indeed, how this entire area of research grew increasingly autonomous and began overlapping with the political and bureaucratic worlds, not least in the United States. Sending (2015), in turn, studied the social conditions for the twin emergence of a particular profession and expertise related to the UN and civil service in the “international” sphere. And as also mentioned in Chapter 3, Berling (2011) analysed the key role of certain security researchers after the Second World War and how they, without actual empirics, developed an immensely influential view of how nuclear strategy should be performed.

Theoretically, the role of research for the development of practice has also been discussed in terms of so-called “epistemic communities” at work in and around (inter)national policymaking circles (Haas 1992).46 A core argument that can be identified in all of these texts is that research – even the more theoretically focused work – certainly plays a key role for the emergence of practice, and vice versa, and that no definitive line of distinction can be drawn between them. Researchers and

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46 The tangling of the research and practice of security did not start in the 90s and with the observations made by Haas and others, of course, but as Langley et al. (2005, 11) discuss, this is a very long historical tradition exemplified not least by the tight interactions between scientists, engineers, and the military organisation during the world wars, leading to massive technological advances and the subsequent politicisation of certain types of technical and theoretical research.
practitioners indeed tend to contribute varyingly, from different positions, to a wider process of knowledge-production, to a struggle around a particular doxa.

If we more carefully consider the activity of research in this larger social structure, however, it should be noted that it itself includes many different “genres”; some of which contribute more than others when it comes to reproducing and defending the dominant practical sense in the specific area it studies. For instance, Robert Cox (1981, 130) argues that whereas “critical theory”\(^{47}\) can be a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order, “problem-solving” studies, on the other hand, work as “a guide to tactical actions which, intended or unintended, sustain the existing order”. Such problem-solving research can also be understood as “functionalist”: it involves actors who – instead of posing original questions, complicating things, drawing new lines – have become dogmatic; experts at delivering “solutions” (technical or methodological) to various “problems” that are usually constructed by someone else (a politician, bureaucrat, research funder, or any other prestigious public or private institution). They can be referred to as “functional” in the sense that they benefit from studying the general performance and improvability (rather than e.g. the effects) of the current configuration of practice. Functionalist security research, therefore, usually sees itself narrowly as a tool for “improving security”; for enhancing and maximising its function, trimming it like a motor. Burgess (2012, 3–4) claims, for instance, that security research can be categorised as either “beneficial” or “detrimental” with regards to its “impact on security”, and that it is often institutionally organised with an emphasis on “application” and “valorised according to a discourse of innovation”. Whether or not “impact on security” is even a relevant way of framing a research question is however never questioned; or as put by Kreissl (2017), “mission-oriented research in the field of security is confronted with a non-negotiable a priori: there is a security problem!”. Seeing their research as “fix” to this problem – and therefore, quite literally, a factor for survival, a matter of life and death – researchers belonging to functionalist traditions often like to talk about their work in sober terms as “policy-relevant”. As Mills (2000, 72) asks, however, “what is meant by the demand that our studies be concerned with important, or as it is more usually put, significant, problems? Significant for what?”. Or rather, relevant for whom?

This chapter will not repeat the exercise carried out in the previous chapter of tracing the knowledge-production of (in)security in Sweden and the co-emergence of functional research and practice. Rather, this chapter is concerned with convertibility of security research. One the one hand, when established as a practice in and of itself, how can security research be transformed into other forms of power? How can academics exchange their specific scientific capital into positions of

\(^{47}\) Latour pointed out, however, that even scholars claiming to do e.g. “critical” or “debunking” work may still, perhaps unintentionally, provide practitioners with discursive weapons (Latour 2004, 228).
influence, leverage, and authority in society? The multi-positioned role of scholars, scientists, advisors, and “experts” (as well as the institutions or organisations to which they belong or are affiliated) needs closer scrutiny. This is not to say, however, that the choice to foreground the researcher and the role of science in relation to other fields is the same as “perceiving scientists as ‘holding the strings’ in a ‘puppet society’”. I rather want to nuance the picture, and show how research and science is “embedded in social life and how [it] could (un)willingly be complicit in upholding patterns of domination” (Berling 2013, 70 [emphasis added]).

On the other hand, how and to what effect are social agents from other fields entering into “security research”, carrying with them different species of capital related to e.g. bureaucracy, politics, and industry? In the social sciences, not least around security- and foreign policy-related topics, more and more “experts” seem able to enter into competition and become recognised as “entitled to have their say” (Berling 2013, 66). This makes the chapter’s focus not only into one of the relative autonomy of the field of research – and its relative “weight” in relation to others – but also one of its conditions of entry. What can be done, so to speak, in the name of security research? What other kinds of interests does this practice hide or obscure, but nonetheless attract and involve? How might different professionals wield seemingly “neutral” academic capital related to “security research” for political or economic purposes, particularly in a transnational context?

Indeed, research programmes and scientific partnerships may work like a “trojan horse” for silently introducing other and potentially rights-infringing practices (Kreissl 2017). As will be elaborated in subsequent sections, this speaks to Bourdieu’s claim that science (like all social phenomena) is an interested practice, but which peculiarly, in order to function as such, constantly has to create the appearance of disinterest. Again, like with all forms of governmentality, scientific capital relies heavily on the logic of symbolic power, of being able to draw on the notion of the universal, the official; motivating acts and decisions not with reference to particular gains and profits, but merely with reference back to itself (Bourdieu 2004c; see also Berling 2013, 71). To depart from this assumption that there is interest in disinterest itself, that the particular can hide behind the universal, is certainly interesting from a theoretical point of view, but there is still a distinct deficit in previous Bourdieu-inspired works of empirically grounded arguments along these lines. In particular, there is a lack of empirical investigations concerning the nexus of security practice and scientific research and their links, in turn, to transnational (and/or transatlantic) power struggles. The chapter at hand seeks to provide this, as well as some theoretical nuance to the Bourdieusian sociology of science. The chapter also, to an extent, follows the path set out in the previous chapter, continuing the tracing of actors and their forging of transnational work relations in the early 2000s.
Drawing on primary- and legal documentation as well as interviewee statements, this chapter analyses the bilateral “science and technology”-agreement between the United States Department of Homeland Security and the Swedish government represented by MSB. In the first section, I study the strategies and negotiations leading up to its signing in 2007, its content in terms of legal text, how it is being described and interpreted by spokespersons, and the concrete practices that currently take place (or are allowed to take place) within the framework of the partnership. It will then be demonstrated, in the second section, how this relationship has been legally designed to be as wide as possible, as an explicit “S&T Plus”-form of professional cooperation encompassing activities far beyond simply science and technology, research and development. The “plus” has not only come to signify and/or allow certain multi-positioned “pracademics” to act as public spokespersons, but it also enables, inter alia, counterterrorism training, lab experiments, expert exchange, policy coordination, and a type of intelligence cooperation that becomes concealed as “information sharing”.

Security research, I argue in the final section of the chapter, has to do with power and can therefore be untied and enabling or representative of heterogeneous, political, and opportunistic professional relationships. R&D partnerships like the one analysed here may serve as a formidable channel or “vessel” for facilitating, at least legally, what is actually a profound form of security- and intelligence cooperation in practice. The Swedish partnership with what is de facto the world’s single largest organisation for counterterrorism and surveillance practices has remained largely unscrutinised, however, due to its “scientific” appearance.

**RESEARCH “FOR THE SAKE OF SECURITY”: ESTABLISHING A TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP**

The path towards Swedish-US security cooperation was paved initially via university collaborations and inter-personal professional connections between certain functionalist scholars in Stockholm and in Washington D.C. While multi-positioned “pracademics” in Sweden, most notably Sundelius, were trying to establish their label of “societal security” as the new work model at home, they also sought to diffuse it not only in the EU system (Chapter 3, this volume), but also in US practitioner-, policy-, and think tank circles. In the early 00s, and particularly around 2005, a series of articles and edited volumes were written by this group of scholars who claimed e.g. that the US had a “national security system designed generations ago for a world that no longer exists”, and that its recent reorganisation of state institutions around the idea of “homeland security” should involve increased transnational, and specifically, transatlantic partnerships (Dalgaard-Nielsen and Hamilton 2006, 159–60). These authors sought to conceptually marry “homeland” with “societal” security.
by pointing out not so much the gaps between the two “models”, but rather their perceived similarities and overlaps, supplementary roles, common goals, fundamental compatibility, etc.

With their apparently “shared political agenda”, it was believed that the US and EU should form a “secure Euro-Atlantic community” (Sundelius 2005, 3), and they proposed that societal security could become the “coherent EU policy” and base for helping the US government with their “outland vulnerabilities” in matters of homeland security (10). Implicitly, of course, what these researchers promoted was increased cooperation in counterterrorism and surveillance, and that Europe and the US should figuratively and literally stand “shoulder to shoulder” in their security efforts (Hamilton and Burwell 2009). The texts highlight the US-Nordic relation in particular:

The Nordic nations together with the USA could offer a lead in developing such a joint enterprise. Such a working agenda would serve to link together the rapidly evolving programs for embedded societal security in Europe and the primarily inward looking dynamics of the massive US investment in institutions and policies for Homeland Security (Sundelius 2005, 11).

This idea culminated in a book where both US and Nordic scholars proposed a model for “embedded societal security across the Atlantic” which was to work as “a concrete blueprint for enhanced, home-based societal security around the North Atlantic Basin” (Sundelius, Grönvall, and Hamilton 2006, 16). These texts are not insignificant, since the contributing scholars coming from Sweden were also directly involved with, working for, and/or advising leading government agencies in the security sector at the time.

Swedish spokespersons simultaneously started scoping out concrete possibilities for this kind of transatlantic cooperation. An investigation was ordered by the ministry of finance (not defence or justice, curiously enough), and the working group constituted by Vinnova, KBM, FMV, FOI, FHS, the armed forces, and an industry association called the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv) published its final report in early 2005. Strikingly entitled “Knowledge for the sake of security”, this report presented the official strategy that future security cooperation should be established as a first step not in the form of practical or legal arrangements, but by seeking out or creating collaborations in the area of research and development. In addition to the domestic R&D programme organised by KBM (later MSB) and the much larger EU funded programme European Security Research Programme (EESR) emerging from the Preparatory Action for Security Research (PASR), the report also urged the government to “facilitate participation” of Swedish state
agencies, research institutions, and companies “in US security research programmes,”, like the one of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) which had a budget roughly ten times larger than the EU’s security R&D programme at the time (Kleja 2007b). Entry into DHS-led R&D was to be achieved by creating specific “instruments” (bilateral agreements or MoUs) as well as by positioning specific “competences” (people) at the embassy in Washington D.C. (Vinnova et al. 2005, 3).

In line with this strategy, KBM ordered an internal report, tasking one of the leading functionalist scholars to conduct a field study on DHS’ research structures and their various “centres of excellence” (Grönvall 2005). In the final report, secretary of homeland security at the time, Tom Ridge, is cited:

Well, I mean, there is an enormous international dimension to securing the homeland, and … I wish we would have initiated the discussions on a bilateral basis or worked with the European Union … as we outlined domestic security priorities, it became clear that our efforts to secure America would not succeed without international cooperation. We realized that homeland security is more than just the integration of our nation. It’s about the integration of nations (30 [emphasis added]; cf. Morag 2011).

Swedish agency-, and private sector representatives “have worked actively” towards creating a close relationship with the DHS, the report further stated, recommending that the government “engages bilaterally with the DHS” in the area of R&D in coming years, not least since DHS had grown to be a major influence with regards to international standardisation, norm setting, and regulation of security practice and counterterrorism.

Subsequently, the Swedish government and defence minister Leni Björklund approached the US government in late 2005 and invited the DHS to enter into negotiations regarding a bilateral cooperative agreement for “science and technology”. Initially, negotiations were led by FOI and their CBRN expert Åke Sellström who had gathered a working group including Sundelius, who was KBM’s research director at the time, and who became deeply involved in the discussions with their counterpart; namely, the DHS’ so-called “Science and Technology Directorate” (S&T). DHS S&T had previously established similar bilateral agreements with only a handful of states, including the UK, Canada, Mexico, Australia, and Singapore. US negotiators showed a great interest in Swedish R&D due to their long history of military production and widespread reputation as a “strong innovator”, and according to Sellström, the DHS sought to particularly seek out Swedish technologies for CBRN(E) detection, underwater surveillance, border control, sensors, and ICT (Kleja 2007b). Negotiators said that a major reason for the US demand of new CBRN detection
technologies was the series of attacks in 2001 involving anthrax letters. These letters had been sent out over the course of several weeks after 9/11 to news media offices and senators, killing five individuals and infecting seventeen others (Kleja 2007a).

After a year and a half of bilateral discussions, on 13th of April 2007, the S&T agreement was signed by Swedish defence minister Mikael Odenberg and US secretary of homeland security Michael Chertoff. FOI handed over lead responsibility of the partnership to KBM (later MSB), which has since stayed in the coordinative role of “designated security authority”. The agreement includes several permanent roles, such as “executive agent”, which on the US side has been the different under-secretaries of the DHS S&T, and on the Swedish side, first the defence minister and then the MSB director. The executive agent is responsible for the general task of overseeing the work arrangement and approving specific research projects. The agreement also includes the role of “agreement director”, which in Sweden has been Sundelius since the start, and who is responsible for the general “agenda” of the agreement and for “filling it with content” by coming up with new projects and identifying partners such as FOI or specific research institutes or centres (Interview: Sundelius; Halldén).

The signed agreement document states as its objective: “… to establish a framework to encourage, develop and facilitate bilateral Cooperative Activity in science and technology that contributes to the homeland security capabilities of both Parties”. More specifically, projects should focus on “the prevention and detection of, response to, and forensics and attribution applied to, terrorist or other homeland security threats and/or indicators” as well as “crisis response and consequence management and mitigation for high-consequence events” (DHS S&T and KBM 2007, 6 [emphasis added]). The research activity covers both methodological studies on e.g. “threat and vulnerability assessments, interdependency analyses” or “testing and evaluation”, as well as technically oriented work on e.g. “prototype systems” or “integration of existing technologies for use in surveillance and detection”. Projects may take place “in both laboratory environments and real or simulated operational settings” (9; see also MSB 2011b).

In addition to Sweden, the DHS currently cooperates with 11 other countries in the area of science and technology. Allegedly, the DHS uses these agreements as an “international portfolio”, aiming to identify each country’s “strength” in terms of technological innovations (Interview: Sundström). Again, due to their strong initial focus on anthrax attacks, DHS agencies have most frequently collaborated with FOI amongst the Swedish participants, and in particular, FOI’s and Umeå University’s European CBRNE Center in order to develop technology for chemical detection (Interview: Frennberg). Secondly, they have worked with the police

organisation and Linköping University’s Swedish National Forensic Centre in order to develop technology for e.g. obtaining fingerprints from anthrax letters (Interview: Sundelius). Beyond FOI, several “centres of excellence” are involved in the S&T agreement, including Security Link at Linköping University, LUCRAM at Lund University, CATS and CRISMART at FHS, and Security Arena at Lindholmen Science Park.

Another core component of the S&T agreement is the possibility of joint commercialisation of the R&D results. For this purpose, a “focus group” linked to the agreement has been established in Sweden which consists of spokespersons from all relevant security- and defence agencies, as well as the business associations SOFF and SACS. In this way, private industry actors, including both arms firms and security SMEs, are represented in the annual bilateral meetings that are arranged by MSB and DHS in either Stockholm or Washington D.C. In connection to these meetings, industry workshops are arranged where lobby groups can showcase their member companies’ products and services not only to the executive agents and agreement directors from both countries, but also to representatives from DHS agencies like FEMA and FBI (MSB 2011b, 2013; SACS 2016b; Interview: Sundelius; see also Chapter 5, this volume). The commercialisation-aspect of the agreement has however been underutilised according to industry spokespersons, as most projects have focused on mobilising researchers and state agencies for developing “raw” technologies, rather than concrete products involving particular companies or buyers (Interview: Dahlberg; Limmergård).

In more detail, the S&T agreement consists of smaller legal components called “project arrangements” (PAs). These are drafted by the agreement director and the DHS’ and MSB’s agency attorneys on a regular basis, and are signed by the executives usually in connection to the annual meetings. The purpose of a PA, from a legal point of view, is to detail and define the general practical area wherein research cooperation may be initiated; either immediately after its signing or in the future, since PAs have no end-date.

The content of the PAs is regarded “controlled unclassified” information (e.g. must be reviewed before release), but the specific “points of contact”, participating researchers and organisations, and other identifying information in the PAs are censored out. Technical details regarding e.g. research budgets, lab equipment, and other logistics are put in classified “technical annexes” (TAs), and judicial details such as intellectual property rights are put in “technical assistance agreements” (TAAs). Supposedly, however, “there are some project arrangements that ‘don’t exist’, that are secret”, the agreement director has claimed (Interview: Sundelius).

Moreover, the highest level of classification for the “information or equipment and material” that may be exchanged between participating agents and organisations via this agreement is “top
secret” (i.e. the highest level of classification according to most definitions) (DHS S&T and KBM 2007, 15). Indeed, most of the PAs obtained for this study allow research up to the top secret-level; e.g. PAs no. 004-2008 and 014-2010 which concern “R&D efforts in biological and chemical forensics related areas” including “risk assessments”, “agriculture defence”, “response & restoration”, and “surveillance & detection” (DHS S&T and MSB 2008a, 004, 2010c). Another early PA allowing top secret research focuses specifically on “[e]stablishing a network” of US and Swedish research institutions, SMEs, “and other appropriate members” in the CBRN area (DHS S&T and MSB 2008b).

One PA for the area of “explosive detection” details how “joint research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E)” should be carried out on checkpoint and stand-off detection of explosive threats, including “person-borne” and “vehicle-borne” devices (DHS S&T and MSB 2009a). Another PA on critical infrastructure protection describes in great detail RDT&E “to protect against and mitigate the effects of terrorist … disasters”, in particular in the context of “complicated environments, and complex and major events” (DHS S&T and MSB 2009b). Another PA deals explicitly with interoperability in information sharing, or more specifically, research for improved “gathering, analysing, managing, sharing and protecting [of] information related to all hazards including terrorist threats” (DHS S&T and MSB 2010b).

While most PAs are authored in great detail and are said to include several ongoing projects, some are more or less “empty” and have been written and signed to ensure the existence of a legal foundation for future, anticipated, or planned projects. The PA for “maritime awareness” is one such example. Described as “resting”, this area has not yet seen any R&D projects, but is expected to become more active according to the MSB attorney since the current US administration intends to reinforce its southern border to Mexico and allocate more funds to border control and port management (Interview: Carlberg). This PA no. 010-2010 includes R&D on “techniques to detect behavioural anomalies”, “tools for increased situational awareness related to all sizes of vessels”, and a “more efficient capability to detect, track and identify the intentions or adverse activities in near-real time” (DHS S&T and MSB 2010a [emphasis added]).

A final49 PA concerns research that is less technical and product-oriented, and more focused on psychology and behavioural sciences. In line with the widespread campaigns in the US called “If you see something, say something” which aim to increase citizen vigilance and the reporting of “suspicious behaviour” (Petersen and Tjalve 2013, 2018; cf. Larsson 2017), PA no. 015-2010 seeks

49 Other project arrangements requested and obtained for this study, but not discussed at length, concern e.g. cybersecurity (DHS S&T and MSB 2011); emergency communication (DHS S&T and MSB 2012); nuclear forensics and detection (DHS S&T and MSB 2013); and first responder technologies (DHS S&T and MSB 2014).
to facilitate research for e.g. “enhancing community resilience”, “mitigating human factors impacts of catastrophic events”, and “increasing the involvement” of the public in security work “by equipping them with the necessary capabilities, confidence, knowledge and tools/instruments” to “improve screening”, and “to identify unknown threats as indicated by deceptive and suspicious behaviour” (DHS S&T and MSB 2010d).

As indicated, by simply discussing the most visible parts of the agreement – namely the content of the PAs – these R&D projects strongly overlap with security practice, and suggest that there are several openings for deepened cooperation disguised as e.g. “information exchange”. The following section will discuss in detail how and why this cooperative structure between the DHS and MSB has come to be described as “Science & Technology Plus”, analysing what exactly is being done in parallel with, and in the name of, security research.

**THE “PLUS” OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY**

Which other practices, that are in fact not objectively defined as “research”, are also included within the operational framework of this “science and technology”-agreement? Again, the legal definition of its aim – that it should foster “bilateral cooperative activity” for “homeland security capabilities” – immediately suggests several openings for other forms of cooperation. These will be accounted for here by showing how “research” can also be the name for, inter alia, international diplomacy, transatlantic policy coordination, joint training, exercises, and task forces, personnel exchange and lab cooperation, trans-sector information sharing, and even intelligence cooperation.

First of all, since the agreement involves frequent meetings and close communication between the DHS S&T and MSB, particularly between their directors and lawyers, it has a distinctively social function. Since the inception of the agreement, MSB has seconded agency officers in Washington D.C. to work full-time with activities linked to the DHS agreement, consecrating titles like “Liaison of Homeland Security Affairs at the Embassy of Sweden”. This job has been described as a “prestige position” to which MSB assign their up-and-coming, “young and energetic” civil servants so that they can acquire international experience and then return home on senior positions, or acquire high-profile jobs elsewhere (Interview: Sundelius). Previous DHS liaisons at the embassy have, for instance, moved to advisor- or middle management-positions at MSB, FOI, and other agencies, and some have taken up positions in government offices. Others have even been recruited by the arms company Saab – one as senior lobbyist, another as director
of sales of “civil security systems” in the US\textsuperscript{50} (Chapter 6, this volume). Building their reputation as “gifted” and “promising”, it is clear that the embassy position is a way for certain agents to acquire a \textit{transnational} form of capital (Dezalay and Sugarman 2005). They, in other words, become leading figures in their field by mobilising a form of influence based \textit{specifically} on doing “transatlantic security work” in D.C. This capital then becomes particularly valuable when brought back and reinvested “at home”, exchanged into top positions in either the statist or economic fields (see also Bigo 2016a).

Another DHS liaison moved from the embassy to a double role at MSB and the International Standardisation Organisation (ISO), working as a director of two committees for the technical and organisational standardisation of security practice (TC 223 on “Societal Security” and TC 292 on “Security & Resilience”). This particular civil servant suggests that the embassy is an important “springboard” for the US-Swedish security cooperation. Furthermore, she notes that “science and technology” in this case is just as much about “building networks” and “investing in personal relations”, and claims (rather unsurprisingly) that the Swedes and DHS “have had a tremendously personal relation with great trust thus far; a very good and healthy relationship” (Interview: Kyrk Gere). Accordingly, the annual meetings and signing of PAs tend to be treated, at least by Swedish spokespersons, as key “photo ops” where MSB can showcase for the government their “bonds” with the DHS (Figure 4.1). In sum, the research agreement is treated as a prestigious “diplomatic” partnership including nationalistic signifiers (embassies, flags), but in reality it works more as a kind of bureaucratic maintenance of key relations within the field, and as a way for agency staff and civil servants to facilitate transatlantic policy coordination.

Indeed, there is quite a noticeable sense of pride and prestige among Swedish spokespersons when the S&T agreement comes up in interviews, as all of them are quick to point out that Sweden apparently have a “top 3” status within the DHS. What this means in practice is never clearly explained, but interviewees suggest that among the DHS’ 12 bilateral S&T partnerships that exist worldwide, the ones with Sweden, UK, and Canada are said to have the most “substance” and “activity”. They then usually proceed to say that due to their comparatively small size, Sweden and MSB in particular have to work “extra hard” on their professional relationship with the DHS and highlight and “sell” their specific technological “edge” (presumably regarded as CBRN(E) and forensics) (Interview: Sundelius; Kyrk Gere; H Lindberg).

\textsuperscript{50} Some have combined the embassy position with taking up roles as advisors or analysts in the field of think tanks, a particularly rich social universe in Washington D.C. (see e.g. Medvetz 2012; Lipton and Williams 2016; Smith 1993).
One way in which the agreement has been “substantialised” is in the form of “reciprocal education and training”, “field exercises”, and “joint task forces to examine emergent homeland security challenges” (DHS S&T and KBM 2007). More concretely, this has meant collaborative anti-terror exercises with uniformed personnel in urban environments. For example, in connection to the 2007 annual meeting in Stockholm, where the FBI was present, Swedish first-responders and police trained together with special police forces from Capitol Hill, Washington D.C. in a staged terrorist bombing inside the Hornstull subway station (Kleja 2007a). In correspondence, the PA no. 005-2008 enables a US-Swedish joint task force for “on call” operations and “casework analysis” in the event of a chemical or biological terrorist attack in either of the countries (DHS S&T and MSB 2008b).

Furthermore, almost all PAs enable and invite “visits and exchanges” of scientists, engineers as well as “technical experts” and “other appropriate personnel” from the respective countries. These may also make “joint use of laboratory facilities and equipment and material for conducting … technological activities including research, development, testing and evaluation” (DHS S&T and KBM 2007). As an example of the latter, the DHS has moved much of its operations for preventing so-called bioterrorism to FOI’s security research facilities in Sweden. One reason for this is that Swedish authorities in recent years have reported several cases of myxomatosis – also called tularaemia, or simply “rabbit fever” – and thus possess the biological agent as well as the chemicals required for testing against it. Found in over 300 different species in the country, it is a highly infectious disease which can have a deadly effect also on humans. As a
biological agent, it is seen by the DHS as a potential weapon for terrorists, and they have thus
decided to fund and participate in lab experiments in Sweden. Second, nuclear and radiological
testing is now illegal in the United States, but allowed in certain caverns in northern Sweden, and
so the DHS have decided to move also some these testing activities to Swedish facilities. This form
of professional exchange between the US and Sweden (and FOI in particular) is an organised
practice right in-between research and counterterrorism, and is said to be a key component of the
S&T-agreement, and indeed one of the main reasons for why DHS prioritises Sweden on a similar
level to e.g. the UK (Interview: Carlberg; Kyrk Gere).

To facilitate these potentially controversial forms of cooperation within the framework of
the agreement, the PAs are written purposely vague. They are understood by MSB lawyers to work
as “open avenues for cooperation”, designed not to restrict or limit activities, but on the contrary,
with the intentional aim to facilitate and enable any current or future cooperation in both research
and practice. On the one hand, the agreement and supporting documentation allow the
participating agencies to call whatever they are doing “not illegal”. On the other, as evident above,
the texts are written so diffusely, with so many hypothetical openings, that the agreement is able to
harbour activities and exchanges that are highly political, and far from strictly “research”. Or as put
by the MSB director, the entire partnership is seen as “very wide-ranging”, as an “R&D plus”-
agreement including “that which is not exactly ‘science’ but perhaps more innovation” (Interview:
H Lindberg). Or, as formulated by the agreement director,

the idea was an R&D agreement, but we always had in the back of our minds that it was ‘R&D
plus’. The core and the foundation is research, which is harmless and nothing to worry about,
but ‘R&D plus’ means that we need to have other forms of cooperation … The ‘plus’-part
has been growing over the years (Interview: Sundelius).

MSB attorneys and spokespersons admit that phrasings like “cooperation”, “collaboration”,
“includes but is not limited to”, and so on, are used in the legal documentation precisely because
the PAs should not be delimited to “research projects”, but rather, again, understood as
professional work channels: “It is not ‘researcher-to-researcher’, but more expert[-exchange] … all
of this can be covered by the umbrella that is the agreement” (ibid.).

As noted above, the agreement de facto functions as a channel and gateway for cooperation
not only between DHS S&T and MSB, but in fact between all relevant agencies in the two countries
(Figure 4.2). The partnership is designed so that MSB serves as a mere point of entry on the Swedish
side (or, they “coordinate the Swedish participation”), allowing the US to partner up with any
interested Swedish agency or research organisation, e.g. FOI, SÄPO, or the coastguard. Similarly, on the US side, the DHS S&T also functions as a mere entry point through which Swedish actors can cooperate with any other DHS agencies such as the FBI, CIA, and FEMA. Private actors (researchers and/or companies) may also make use of this gateway for potential industry collaborations in R&D. MSB spokespersons make no secret of their intention to actively exploit this legal opening in the agreement: “We are trying to wipe out this label of the ‘DHS deal’ that people use, since DHS is merely a contact point in the same way as MSB is a contact point here”, an MSB officer states, while the agency director sees the S&T-agreement as a “way in” for e.g. accessing the FBI and its advanced policing methods, or the FEMA “master cell” and its “national level exercises” for disaster preparedness (Interview: Kyrk Gere; H Lindberg; Carlberg; Sundelius).

Bearing in mind the agreement’s gateway-function, it should be restated here that the highest level of classification for the “information or equipment and material” that may be exchanged in the partnership is “top secret”. Elsewhere in the agreement, the notion of “information exchange” is blown up to include all kinds of “practices, laws, regulations, standards, methods, and programs relevant to cooperation” (DHS S&T and KBM 2007, 10). The PA no. 009-2009 for “countering terrorism and natural disasters within the critical infrastructure protection domain”, for example, calls for “mutually beneficial sharing of information”, and makes a staggeringly wide definition of “information”:

knowledge that can be communicated by any means, regardless of form or type, including, but not limited to, that of a scientific, technical, business, or financial nature, and also including photographs, reports, manuals, threat data, experimental data, test data, computer software (which includes source code and object code), algorithms, designs, specifications, processes, techniques, inventions, drawings, technical writings, sound recordings, pictorial representations, and other
This is echoed in the more recent PA no. 021-2015 (quite straightforwardly entitled the “Master Information Sharing Arrangement”) which states that, in order to “expand homeland security technology capabilities … the parties [US and Swedish governments] acknowledge that successful collaboration is dependent on the fullest possible exchange of information” across the “entire range of potential areas of cooperation” (DHS S&T and MSB 2015, 3–4). Other PAs, like the one in the area of “cybersecurity” and “collaboration on control systems” further state that a participant may not “disseminate information it receives under this project arrangement to any third country, international organization or private entity”, thereby virtually brigading “information” with secret intelligence (DHS S&T and MSB 2012, 2). The main agreement text itself states that, in the “exchange” of information, equipment, material, and even people, the entry and exit in and out from the parties’ territories must be “prompt and efficient” and aided by “mutual logistic support” (DHS S&T and KBM 2007, 19).

Spokespersons state that “there’s not much money” in the agreement; indeed, MSB earmarks only around 20 MSEK (less than 15% of their total annual research budget) to be used as “stimulus funds” for projects covered by the S&T-agreement (Interview: Kyrk Gere). Thus, the main drive for S&T participants seems to have been not major research grants, not even a significant commercialisation of projects, but the “plus”-dimension; to be able to enter into prestigious professional relations right at the boundary between research and practice, or to be able to directly or indirectly share and receive different forms of intelligence, classified information, and work methods. Indeed, with this kind of work relationship – which, as is now clear, should rather be seen as a transatlantic political partnership – where does one draw the lines between “information”- and “intelligence” sharing, “harmless” and “sensitive” data, “research” and “practice”? The ensuing section will move some of these issues into a theoretical discussion on the question of scientific autonomy and the role of symbolic power.

**SCIENCE, SYMBOLIC POWER & THE QUESTION OF AUTONOMY**

In recent years, Swedish spokespersons have used the agreement for gaining influence elsewhere abroad, and for appearing to be on “good terms” with the US. For example, the agreement director have described how himself and his staff “helped” countries like Finland and the Netherlands to set up similar S&T deals with the DHS. They also took a seat alongside the European Commission
and assisted them in negotiating and signing a similar research agreement with the DHS around 2009-10. Although the EC-DHS agreement is underutilised by the two institutions and largely “empty” in terms of project arrangements, it may hold significant opportunities for practical cooperation in the future, were they to follow the MSB-DHS example (Government of United States of America and European Commission 2010; see also Government of United States of America and EU 2009). Precisely on this latter note, the Swedish executive agent and agreement director in fact co-authored a chapter in a homeland security handbook in which they encourage the EC to make use of the DHS S&T bilateral agreement to a larger extent, and that an “EU-US Transatlantic Cooperative Security Working Group or Task Force” should be formed (Lindberg and Sundelius 2012, 1316). Here, they also suggests that the “EU societal security policy area” that is apparently being “created and cultivated” needs to stretch across the “Euro-Atlantic basin” since “an attack on Baltimore is as much an attack on Berlin or Brussels” (1315). Another collaborative US-Swedish volume tries to merge the two notions of “homeland”- and “societal”- into a model for “global flow”-security, claiming that the two regions have become “hyper-interdependent” after the Cold War and that “new and innovative efforts to secure a society’s critical functions” are needed (Hamilton and Brattberg 2014, vi; see also Sundelius and Grönvall 2004). In other words, the same Swedish researchers who participated initially in establishing the MSB-DHS partnership continued to collaborate with US scholars in various policy-oriented publications during the 2010s, and continued to promote US-EU/Swedish security cooperation from a strictly mission-driven perspective. As discussed by Berling and Bueger (2015, 2), this political role of researchers, analysts, and advisors have become increasingly common recently, as more and more “experts” surround decisionmakers, impose quasi-scientific advice, and wield academic affiliations strategically when offering their services to governments, state ministries, agencies, and media outlets. While some may see this role of the expert-individual as “instrumental”, as some kind of “resource” of knowledge to be used in and for the contemporary political world, such a view is insufficient for understanding the state of the relation between security practice on the one hand, and security research and “expertise” on the other. How do they co-legitimate, or even co-produce, each other? What interests are embedded in science in general, and security research in particular? How might academic capital be converted into other forms of power? What if the actual, ongoing partnerships under banners like research and development are in fact themselves political? What if discourses of science and technology are put in place to cover up what should more accurately be called practical security cooperation? What if security research is not merely some “pool of experts” that statist actors may draw on, but a social space of actors which has been partly conquered by political and bureaucratic forces, and which is now itself an active co-producer of a dominant order?
Although I may only partially answer these kinds of questions in the present chapter, they remain pertinent as questions since they highlight the need for a reflexive perspective which acknowledges the researcher as a strategic agent (rather than a passive “expert resource”), as well as understands research and science as socially situated activities – a practice – that takes place in a particular social context – a field – which in turn occupies a particular position in relation to other fields in the social order (Berling 2013, 60). I will now expand theoretically on these issues.

Historically, the scientific practice has had the peculiar aim of creating products (facts, models, data) with an appearance of disinterestedness, of scientific “purity” in the forms of objectivity, validity, replicability, and so on. Functionalist scholar-advisors in particular tend to believe in the existence of a “view from nowhere”; that their views on e.g. security policy can emerge from a somehow apolitical place. By being fundamentally social however, science and research – like all other fields of profession – contain relations and thereby struggles and thereby interests, and suddenly “the philosophical ‘view from nowhere’ is … replaced by a ‘view from somewhere’” (63-64). Thus, the scientific products created in the field – far from being universal truths – have a social life. More crucially, they possess a relative political and economic value, and a logic of convertibility. Indeed, “something seems to happen”, Berling (2011, 393–94) notes, “when science leaves the scientific field: It seems that science – whatever type – has a tendency to perform a function in the political field”.

Not only do facts and statements move between scientific fields and other areas of practice, but so can of course researchers themselves. Aspiring “experts” situated in a research context may convert their academic standing and reputation into the symbolic capacity to enter into other fields of play, such as international diplomacy or security work. This view goes against that of Eyal and Pok (2015) who seem to misread Bourdieu’s understanding of social struggle as they claim that policy- and security experts operate “between fields”.

A security expert, they suggest, is “neither academic nor military, but must be seen as native to the interface between the two” (7). Just because the notion of expertise is messy and may contain a “hodge-podge of actors” (5) does not mean that it circumvents social logics. Fields are not something one can escape via some trapdoor; rather, social agents are always bound by them. Nor are they something one can enter at own will, but in order to do so, agents must have accumulated a sufficient amount of capital in order to be recognised as a legitimate co-players in the new field. Thus, more accurately would be to say that “experts” – like any human being – have multiple stakes and positions, and exist in, operate across, and are bound by

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51 To exist in a “space between fields” is to exist outside of them; i.e. this would be like living a life in a social vacuum without struggles and stakes, a space without relations, and therefore logically, without humans. To exist in such a state but still have an influence over particular fields from their in-between positions would be to perceive the expert like a suprahuman deity.
several fields at once. What is more, there are no “pure” forms of either research, industry, government, or security work, but these are all fields that transform, travel, blur, and overlap to a certain extent over time. For example, none of the actors involved in the Swedish-US partnership can be said to do “only research”, but their practice is convertible and has an inevitable effect on other fields as well.

This brings me to the core of the argument. The chapter has shown in previous sections not only the role of specific scholar-advisors in the establishment of a bilateral research agreement, and their process of entering into new playgrounds and thereby “becoming” e.g. bureaucratic and international agents. What the chapter has also done is to show the organised practices that are allowed to take place in the name of research and development, science and technology; how a work relation may be called one thing but practiced in another way; how specific interests may be covered by the “disinterested” front of science; how seemingly academic activities – carefully routinised, institutionalised, and framed as such – in fact are able to include far more extensive forms of cooperation. This fundamental argument has been explored before, not least by Bourdieu who in one of his last works departed from the hypothesis that, over the past century, “the autonomy that science had gradually won against the religious, political or even economic powers … has been greatly weakened" (Bourdieu 2004c, vii [emphasis added]). He claimed that the field of science is increasingly invaded by political, economic, and military interests, and that there are ideological uses of academia, especially in research areas where certain forms of leverage or profit can be gained (e.g. in security and defence, and also in medicine and biotechnology). Mills had in fact already noted this some 40 years earlier, in how bureaucratically oriented, applied research had been used to a large extent “in and for non-democratic areas of society” such as the “military establishment, a corporation, an advertising agency, an administrative division of government” (Mills 2000, 114).

What makes particular forms of research exploitable in other areas of society? First of all, because exactly as with political claims, “the struggle to know reality scientifically almost always has to begin with a struggle against words.” (Bourdieu 1990, 54). In other words, the practical sense of a researcher involves social qualities that overlap with those of the professional politician; they both have to become masters of persuasion, of bending, twisting, overcoming the meaning of words, and of finding ways to gain the symbolic recognition to make claims “true”. Like politicians, researchers draw on a capital which is not only symbolic, but also works like a credit in the sense that it presupposes an element of “trust” or “belief” from the general public in their long training, technical skills, and the various social rituals and traditions attached to the production and dissemination of knowledge (Bourdieu 2004c, 34).
Like so many other fields, not least that of art, academia is subject to external contestation because, of course, “the criteria for evaluating scientific works cannot be completely articulated”, but there is always an “implicit, tacit dimension, a conventional wisdom” and a form of cultural “connoisseurship” involved. Thus, recognising something as “scientific” or “proper research” is “not so different from the art of recognising a good picture … without necessarily being able to articulate the criteria that one is applying” (38). Furthermore, research is also comparable to a “sport” in the sense that scholastic practice itself is difficult to put into words: Without necessarily making conscious judgements, researchers just “do” with reference to intuition, a flair or “knack”, or previous experience (39). Research routines are of course occasionally explicated, written down, and disseminated in the forms of methods- and methodology-books, but these bodies of text in fact function less as criteria for external evaluation, and more as expressions of the doxa inherent to the field, and as disciplinary acts and devices that constrain just as much as guide the researcher (see also Aradau and Huysmans 2013; Chapter 1, this volume).

Obviously, mathematics was a historically significant stage in the autonomisation of the scientific field in how it not only became a central condition for field entry, but also enabled the emergence of concepts like probability, chance, explanation, quantification, and methods like statistics and econometrics (Bourdieu 2004c, 48-49; see also Hacking 1990, 2006). Therefore, the less reliant a particular subfield of research is on e.g. mathematic- or otherwise technical or heavily specialised skills, the more inclined it is to submit to external demands. In areas populated by predominantly hermeneutic approaches and qualitative readings of texts, for instance, the obstacles for field entry tend to be lower and its doxa appears more easily contestable. Put differently, if compared to e.g. the natural sciences, the social sciences are “particularly exposed to heteronomy, because external pressure is particularly strong there and because the internal conditions for autonomy … are very difficult to set up” (Bourdieu 2004c, 87). Concretely, for fields like policy analysis or security studies that are organised mainly around struggles of language (e.g. “threat assessments”), this means that more actors, opinions, and different interests are able to enter into play and have their positions recognised as more or less legitimate.

Nonetheless, despite the relative amount of external pressure exerted on a particular area of research, the overall quality shared by all fields organised around the mobilisation of scientific capital is that they allow for the production of an appearance of disinterestedness. Again, the scholastic practice is in many ways a competition over ostensible impartiality; to, from a position of “somewhere”, create the illusion of a “nowhere”-view. The practice seeks, more specifically, to produce what Bourdieu calls arbitrary “trans-historical truths”, or recognised representations of the “real” (69). Research is therefore intimately linked, both structurally and subjectively, to the
workings of symbolic capital. First, in the exchanges between competing researchers, the pursuit of recognition of one’s scientific production is, and to some extent must be, “based on the obligatory denial of interest”. Research, much like civil service, is therefore often falsely portrayed as an ascetic exercise, as “a generous act of oblation within nothing received in return, while masking, even from the person who performs it, the ambition of securing a power” (53). Second, from a structural point of view, academic titles and positions are symbolic not least through their ritualistic consecration, but more importantly, in how they can be converted into a capacity to make authoritative knowledge claims about the social order (Bourdieu 1996, e.g. 373). For these and many other reasons, therefore, the “disinterested” as such contains inherent interests, pursued by multiple actors, both inter-subjectively and structurally.

This may explain why spokespersons that sought to establish a highly controversial political and practical partnership across the Atlantic likely had the specific interest of making it appear void of interest. They struggled to achieve this by framing it as an apparently “scientific” agreement draped it in open-ended legal terms. Activities like the ones covered by the S&T agreement, described as taking place “between research and practice”, should therefore be seen as belonging to a quasi-scientific field which limits have been challenged, and which core stake has been transformed by political, bureaucratic, and economic agents. Among these agents, the notion of “research” is deployed not as such, but as a weapon to conquer positions in a transnational struggle. Thus, the agents involved in setting up and carrying out the work relation (which, again, is less about research and more about intelligence sharing and political relations) are not interested in themselves asking questions and finding problems, but in delivering solutions to problems constructed by someone else.

Mills also discussed this heteronomy of science and its harbouring of different interests, but called it the “bureaucratic ethos” of academia. In what he saw as a “new social science” emerging in close relation to government agencies, military institutions, and corporations, the researchers have “come to serve whatever ends its bureaucratic clients may have in view” and thereby “readily assume the political perspective of their ... chieftains”. They serve not to question, but to “increase the efficiency and the reputation — and to that extent, the prevalence — of bureaucratic forms of domination in modern society” (Mills 2000, 101). Much like scholars attempting to “increase the efficiency” of security mechanisms in society, Mills saw a class of “abstracted empiricists” emerging in the US who were concerned not with relations of power or democratic life, but “connected, in fact and in fantasy, with the top levels of society, in particular,

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52 Compare, for instance, with Bourdieu’s (1998, 8) pitting of critical intellectuals against “doxosophers”, or “technicians of opinion who think themselves wise”.

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with enlightened circles of business executives and with generals having sizable budgets” (95). Consequently:

Their positions change – from the academic to the bureaucratic; their publics change – from movements of reformers to circles of decision-makers; and their problems change – from those of their own choice to those of their new clients. The scholars themselves tend to become less intellectually insurgent and more administratively practical. Generally accepting the status quo, they tend to formulate problems out of the troubles and issues that administrators believe they face (96).

This, in turn, creates a new, entrepreneurial career path for social scientists, who are able to further their careers in academia by “securing prestige and even small-scale powers outside it”, e.g. in areas like policy advising or consultancy. Mills argues further that universities in the US often failed to make ambitious individuals contented with merely academic achievements, and thus pushed them out to seek recognition in other, adjacent fields:

The prestige of the profession has not been proportionate to the economic sacrifice often involved; the pay and hence the style of life have often been miserable, and the discontent of many scholars is heightened by their awareness that often they are far brighter than men who have attained power and prestige available in other fields. For such unhappy professors the new developments in the administrative uses of social science offer gratifying opportunities to become, so to speak, Executives without having to become Deans (98).

To sum up, then: Research is political but cannot, due to its relative autonomy and specific capital and doxa, simply be conflated with politics as such; scientific practice creates an illusion of purity and disinterestedness, but is in fact quite similar to how political capital is obtained via symbolic struggles; the academic field, like so many others, mobilises multi-positioned agents, and functionalist security research in particular contains multiple opportunities. To show that research contains struggles, different interests, and social games of prestige or power is not, however, to promote a “post-factual” reality and sweeping relativize all scientific activity (which is a common critique against ethnographic “lab studies”) (Latour and Woolgar 1986). Rather, by picking up the case of the specific US-Swedish S&T-partnership, I simply want to explore the questions raised here related to the relative autonomy of the academic field, the contingency of its boundaries, and offer a nuanced critique of the blurring of research and practice in the field of security.
CONCLUSION

Ever since the 2005 report proposing “knowledge for the sake of security” – if not earlier – a key Swedish strategy has been to extend transnational work relations between security professionals in the form of research and development across sectors. Both MSB and the other actors behind the report clearly understood from the very beginning that “security research” is not necessarily only research, but a heterogeneous practice involving several acts and processes that could just as well be called international politics, technical cooperation, lab experiments, joint police training, and more. Moreover, they understood that “research” therefore may function like a gateway for broader cooperation, and as an entry point from a legal perspective.

As will be elaborated in the following chapter, Swedish research institutions coming from the arms industry area were in dire need of new funding sources around 2005 due to severe government cutbacks. FOI therefore gladly took a central role in the agreement, as they were in a process of expanding towards emerging security technologies. KBM and MSB bureaucrats, moreover, needed to come to terms with their “image” and “role” both at home and abroad in the new millennium, and find ways to expand internationally via new professional relationships. They therefore, equally gladly, took on the role as “designated authority” so that they, on the one hand, could engage bilaterally with the world’s most influential actor in counterterrorism work and thereby acquire a specific form transatlantic capital that could be reinvested at home and in European contexts. On the other hand, they could also participate in designing the specific PAs as legally wide as possible and thereby facilitate much wider forms of cooperation than simply research. As shown, the “legal” is of course not given but always designed, or more accurately, designed in such a way that it becomes like an extension of the goals and objectives of statist institutions. This way, the PA texts have a regulatory function just as much as they had the function of opening up spaces of political and practical elbowroom.

Clearly, the DHS has made a similar, equally generous, interpretation of the legal arrangements for bilateral cooperation in the area of homeland security. If it is indeed true that they use their bilateral S&T-agreements to the effect of an “international portfolio”, they too perceive “research” as a general framework for acquiring restricted information and engaging in direct cooperation with other key partner countries that are, presumably, carefully chosen based on specific technological and/or methodological skills. It must be stressed that bilateral S&T partnerships of this kind of are quite far from the way consortiums work in e.g. the EU’s security research programme. EU projects are largely transparent in terms of budgets, participants, and results, and their end goal is usually the development, commercialisation, implementation of particular technologies. What has been analysed in this chapter, on the other hand, is a more
secretive arrangement set up in the name of research; a loophole or “empty vessel” for potentially extensive forms of policy coordination and intelligence cooperation – either now or in the future.

Again, in the specific MSB-DHS partnership, “knowledge that can be communicated by any means, regardless of form or type” may be legally exchanged between any Swedish or US societal/homeland security-, policing-, border control-, or surveillance agency – as long as they cooperate through the entry points of DHS S&T and MSB respectively. Arguably, the individuals and institutions responsible for carrying out this partnership would not want to appear as practitioners or as the ones in power, so they collectively played the card of “policy by research”. This “creeping” effect of research in the field of security needs to be further investigated as it may have serious implications on democratic oversight and transparency. When a set of relations is called “science”, it becomes inscribed with a form of societal acceptance and trust. However, if it then means something else in practice, it becomes difficult to question and pick apart, and even more difficult to counter with the appropriate political tools.

Finally, this chapter restated – with the help of Bourdieu, Mills, and others – the fundamental argument that there are distinct interests in seeming disinterest. Security professionals work hard in their everyday work to appear apolitical and free from ideological drives. To “securitise”, as we know, is the attempt to displace certain unwanted things or people from the reaches of democracy; to remake these “threats” via a series of speech acts into “matters of security” that must be handled by undemocratic means, while constantly seeking recognition and acceptance for these practices by making them appear necessary, proportionate, and somehow neutral. To do so by going down the path of “research cooperation” is an elusive strategy.

This illustrates, too, why functionalist scholars have been increasingly forced, or willing, or even happy to submit to external demands coming from e.g. government, politics, or the industry. This if course is alarming with regards to the relative autonomy of the field. Security research should rather stick to what Mills calls a “genuine intellectual puzzlement” regarding questions of power and democracy. Among the scholars who have become bureaucrats or technicians, it is rare to see “any passionate curiosity about a great problem, the sort of curiosity that compels the mind to travel anywhere and by any means, to re-make itself if necessary, in order to find out” (Mills 2000, 105).
CHAPTER 5
A WAR ECONOMY IN TRANSFORMATION
(Un)binding an industry of “armed neutrality” and the quasi-statist experiment to forge a market for societal security

*It is not just that we are preparing for war; we are preparing ourselves to be the kind of societies which go to war.*


In the 1980s, British historian and peace activist E.P. Thompson was deeply concerned with the rearmament of powerful regimes, noting how arms industries “have enlarged and consolidated their political influence; militarism has increased its retinue of civilian retainers; the security services and security-minded ideologies have been strengthened; [and] the Cold War has consolidated itself … as an indigenous *interest* in societies (E. P. Thompson 1982, 22). In Europe and the UK, he saw how incentives to purchase deadly technology “have come both from the regions of politics and ideology, and from the inertial thrust of research and development”, indeed, at once from “the ‘alchemists’ in the research laboratories, the arms lobbyists, the alarmist leader-writers and populist politicians, and … the military elites” (5).

More recently, Rosa Brooks’ aptly entitled book *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything*, discusses the fundamental inseparability of military institutions and everyday life in the United States. She shows how a war-dimension permeates everything from White House offices, Pentagon jargon, and State Department activities to the mundane worlds of shopping malls, schools, and soccer games, and how the long and deep historical tradition of militarism continues to determine the (not necessarily related) areas of technological development and international policy-making (Brooks 2016). Brooks’ “How Everything Became War…” thus offers a necessary rereading of Mills’ notion of the “permanent war economy” (1956; see also Gerth and Mills 1953, 192–229, 456–59), showing how the entanglements of political-, industrial-, and military actors are still at work today.

Striking as they are, however, these studies focus on the “great powers” of the Western world, and are unable to illustrate what a deep-rooted political economy of arms production and the notion of “everything became war” would implicate in a small and “peaceful”, social-democratic, Nordic country with a radically smaller state budget and population, no recent history of warfare,
and no active participation in military alliances. This chapter will depart precisely from this point, and first, discuss how arms production and military innovation seemingly “became everything” in the example of Sweden, and second, focus in more detail on how the public-private industry related to “total defence” became gradually reconfigured by the effects of post-Cold War field struggles, and how a notion of societal security emerged among these actors.

This chapter begins by exploring the following questions: how was the remarkable size and width of Sweden’s arms industry justified politically during the 20th century and linked to official arguments of peacetime non-alignment, of deterrence by means of technology and so-called “credible neutrality”? What political processes allowed this to grow into one of the largest arms industries in the world? How was export used as a state-subsidised method for preserving and protecting it? The chapter then proceeds to analyse in detail the following questions: How was this disproportionately large industry altered by the post-Cold War transformations of security practice as noted in Chapter 3? What were the effects of the policies introduced in the late 1990s and early 2000s, according to which most public support structures were scrapped in favour of increased private- and international elements? How and when were products and services related to, not defence, but “societal security” introduced by and among industry actors? What were the instruments and strategies used in the early 2000s by certain influential actors who sought to create a new security “market”?

Several recent studies in and around IR have paid attention to emerging markets and industries related to security, surveillance, and policing in late modern societies; for example, by analysing developments related to the increased outsourcing or marketisation of practice (Abrahamsen and Williams 2010; Berndtsson 2012; van Steden and Sarre 2007; Owens 2008; Verkuil 2007), or by examining “public-private partnerships” (Börzel and Risse 2007) or “triple helix”-configurations (Etzkowitz 2003) between public-, private-, and research institutions. Here, neo-Marxists and other critical scholars have tended to focus their critique on the “current fetishism surrounding security” (Neocleous 2007, 355), and how this has led to an increased commodification and diffusion of violent technologies (e.g. Loader 1999; Zedner 2006).

However, it must be emphasised here that any “economic processes” or “international trends” related to emerging markets of security, although they may appear autonomous, in fact continue to be inhabited by the state. Indeed, entire industries are in large part regulated by the distribution of statist- and bureaucratic capital. As a banal example, it is the state’s many regional, national, or supranational institutions – not a set of corporations or some capitalist spirit – that hold the central power to dictate the overall dynamic of trade and commerce within and across societies, e.g. by means of legislation, standardisation, government budgets, fiscal policy, taxation, subsidies and
This view is somewhat in tension with the traditional claim of Marx that governments are the mere “delegates of capital power”, as well as with more recent and elaborate claims that “states are ultimately just the local managers” of a vast capitalist structure that is becoming more “globalised” and less structured around states (Badiou 2016, 23).

Statist actors should more accurately be understood as arbiters of economic relations. Rather than accepting that some general “global” ideological shift is taking place, instead of focusing exclusively on the private forces behind such a trend, my argument demands that one puts the bureaucratic field front and centre, analysing the role of statist actors in and for the history of production. Thus, I align myself, at least initially, with the political economy of Robert Cox (1987, 1) who insists on approaching “the understanding of current historical change from the standpoint of a reciprocal relationship between power and production”. Importantly, he saw how “the principal structures of production have been, if not actually created by the state, at least encouraged and sustained by the state”; indeed, “in historical time, production has been more shaped by the state than shaping of it” (5). Cox therefore spent a lot of attention to the ways in which “different forms of state have devised and imposed specific patterns of production relations”, for instance, how “competitive capitalism required a liberal state in order to break through the shackles of mercantilism”, how “central planning was the creation of the Bolshevik state and state corporatism of the fascist state” (ibid.). In short, it has been actors coming predominantly from the statist field (not some ostensible “economy”) who have historically consecrated one form of production in a given society as “the dominant form, the most legitimate, the hegemonic form”, thereby regenerating domestic as well as international hierarchies of modes of production (ibid.).

However, in his political economy, Cox privileges the notion of “modes of production” as conditioning of the social forces of power. He thereby underemphasises the social processes that condition “production” in economic fields from the very outset, and should thus be confronted with the approach of Bourdieu. In some contrast, Bourdieu points towards the serious intellectual problem which is the “initial bracketing out of any social rootedness of economic practices”; or seen differently, how “economic action remains embedded in networks of social relations”

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53 Cox traced how capitalism became “a coherent expansive force on a world scale” around the mid 19th and entered its “monopolistic phase” towards the end of the 1800s (Cox 1987, 52). From here, he then suggested that the “complexes of production relations” that are interdependent with different kinds of “state orders” do not “exist in isolated national compartments”, but are “linked to a world order that bears directly on them” (6-7 [emphasis added]; see also Cox 1981).

54 Cox (1987, 4) starts “at the beginning with production so as to consider how the diversity of ways in which … the variety of social relationships generated in production processes condition the social forces that can become bases of power in state and world order”.

(Bourdieu 2005, 5, 198). For instance, a Bourdieusian approach towards the “economy” would understand it with reference first and foremost to its social logic – a logic included in, but irreducible to, the specific field of economic practices – and how in fact all forms of relations involve elements of conversion, transaction, bartering, and negotiation of different interests (see also Chapter 1, this volume). It would then consider “war economies”, more specifically, as something not inherently justified, but socially consecrated across various fields and then maintained and challenged over time. In effect, it would refuse to isolate the “arms industry” from the larger actor struggle in which its very constitution is at stake. An “emerging market” for security, finally, would be perceived not as an evolutionary process of such an industry, but as an object constructed through social struggle, often based on very specific and usually political interests.

More fundamentally, an analysis inspired by Bourdieu would then reflect on the symbolic rather than economic origins of notions such as “market value”, and insist that such things emerge from a twofold construction of habitus. In the first instance, the historical trajectories of fields structure society in a way which invests a given value in some forms of being, acting, thinking, and consuming, but which suppresses that of other forms. This enables state institutions to define a division of labour, and design e.g. trade laws and economic policies that generate “markets” and regulate what then becomes known as the “supply” of particular goods and services. In the second instance, specific agents, formed themselves by the constraints of this larger societal structure, invest a certain value in available objects and commodities through their individual cognitions, preferences, and “taste”, reflecting what is usually referred to as “demand” (Bourdieu 2005, 12, 16). The rise and fall of “demand” and “supply” leading to the eventual formations or failures of “markets” is therefore not the will of some invisible hand, but, if anything, an intricate process of symbolic exchange and material commodification taking place over long periods of time, in parallel with the formations of fields and habitus. The business of making and trading “security products” in particular is, much like with art commodities, to “trade in things that have no price” in the sense that their arbitrary worth is constructed, recognised, and made “real” only after following this kind of two-fold symbolic process (Bourdieu 1980, 261).

Assessing this general hypothesis, it will be argued here that the Swedish societal security market did not emerge organically in response to some new threats, but that it was politically proposed alongside them, in a social experiment initiated by someone, for some purpose. The “someone”, in this case, was a combination of actors, including on the one hand relatively young agencies like MSB, and on the other, the heirs of Swedish arms manufacturing and export possessing substantial amounts of economic and technocratic capital and situated in intricate and sometimes direct dependency relations with state institutions. By using different socio-political strategies (e.g.
establishing lobby groups and networking events, leading innovation consortiums, arranging industry fairs and exhibitions), their purpose was to enable and increase the commodification of societal security at home and thereby create a kind of marketplace which was to 1) mirror recent bureaucratic modifications domestically and become a place for arms firms, defence research institutes, and other technology-oriented actors to expand into as way to survive financially, and 2) replicate the wider initiatives taking place simultaneously at the EU level, as the European Commission was in a process of forging its R&D programme and market for civil security in the early 00s.

As will be concluded, however, in the case of Sweden, bureaucratic agents never invested sufficient statist capital for a new domestic market to be firmly established. Largely as a result of its history, the statist support structures rather continued to work mainly, but indirectly, around the manufacture and particularly the export of arms. Consequently, emerging technologies instead became picked up by major arms firms, and especially by actors who promoted the development of a “hybrid” area where new security innovations could be combined with and integrated into military products.

**SWEDISH REARMAMENT & THE MYTH OF NEUTRALITY**

The history of Swedish arms is long and murky. Some of the factories still in use today, like those of Bofors in Karlskoga, date back to the days of Alfred Nobel and the industrialisation of the late 19th century, and the multinational defence company Saab – now by far the largest arms firm in the Nordic region – was founded already in 1937. With that said, it is certainly not by accident that Sweden came to be one of the world’s largest arms producers during the Cold War, and one of the largest exporters per capita during the two decades following it.

The configuration of actors and interests that came to structure large parts of the arms industry in Sweden throughout the 20th century can be traced to the period immediately following the Second World War. An emerging idea in Swedish government and parliament at the time was that the unpreparedness exposed in 1939 had to be avoided at all costs in future wars by establishing a strong defence organisation, constituted by both public and private actors. This was initially a contentious argument, since it would mean massive investments into rearmament during a period when most of Europe was in a process of disarming itself. Swedish spokespersons were also struggling with how to explain its non-intervention in the war against Nazism (the horrors of which were becoming increasingly clear), as well as how to formulate its allegiances going forward (as a bipolar power structure began to emerge internationally). The answer to all of these questions, it seemed to decisionmakers, was “neutrality”, or more specifically, military non-alignment in times
of peace with the aim of neutrality in times of war. “Neutrality” became constructed at once as the explanation for why Sweden managed to stay out of the world wars, as well as the widely accepted strategy for how to position itself between the two emerging power blocs. The decision not to join NATO in 1949 has been viewed retrospectively as a confirmation of this political stance (Stenlås 2010, 83).\footnote{See also Åse (2016) for a gender reading of Swedish military non-alignment in relation to masculinity and the “ideal of the neutral soldier”.

For the notion of neutrality to be “credible” and free from foreign pressure, however, the Swedes reasoned that they could not be dependent on other countries when it came to the development and acquisition of arms. Instead of importing military technology, it was seen as necessary to construct a comprehensive and relatively self-sufficient arms production system (B. Karlsson 2015, 13; Stenlås 2010, 79). Other countries (Austria, Switzerland, Finland) also decided to follow (although to a varying extent) this post-war path towards “armed neutrality”, but Sweden was the only country among these willing and able to build a relatively autonomous industry including indigenous R&D and manufacture in all categories of military supply; including guided missiles, fighter aircrafts, surface ships, submarines, light and heavy tanks, small arms, and other “particularly important systems” for domestic defence (Hagelin 1990, 7, 37; B. Karlsson 2015, 16). Such relative independence would equal a “true deterrence”, it was said, rather than a “borrowed deterrence” which would be the case in neighbouring countries like Norway and Denmark who relied defensively on military alliances (Stenbäck 1977, 28–31).

The idea of neutrality in the realm of foreign policy emerged simultaneously and hand in hand with the idea of total defence in domestic policy making (Chapter 3, this volume). For defence to be “total” and neutrality to be “credible”, a militarist logic had to drive not only societal- and economic planning, but it also had to be placed at the very heart of industrial policies. A key factor in the struggles around rearmament versus disarmament was the gradual mutation of the Swedish Social Democratic Party – that is, the party that commanded Swedish politics with a parliamentary majority for most of the 20th century. Traditionally, Social Democrats had been anti-militarists, but after the war a more defence-friendly attitude emerged within the party, splitting it into camps of “doves” and “hawks” (Stenlås 2010, 65). Eventually, as the “hawks” succeeded to push the party line towards major investments in national defence, arms manufacturers from the private sector also managed to convince large parts of the parliament and government that such investments would lead to larger societal benefits beyond merely defensive capabilities, such as factory jobs in poor regions, civilian spill-over effects, and an overall high technological development.
In their study of militarism and welfare in Cold War Sweden, Lundin and Stenlås conclude that the two myths of modernity and neutrality were intimately connected in Sweden, having been intertwined in particular by leading Social Democrats and their allied “reform technocrats” from government agencies and private companies who were struggling to find political backing for their visions of a “new” Sweden during the so-called “Boom Years” (Lundin and Stenlås 2010, 7–8). These two myths worked as a highly efficient social cement with the ability to guide and justify public action during a period when it was especially important for the formation of a new, modern society. The myth of neutrality was constructed shortly after the Second World War, and, like the closely related myth of modernity, it was projected back on the … 130-year period of non-belligerence. As in many other countries, this … myth summed up the nation’s experiences during a severe crisis and served as a guiding principle for post-war political collective action (ibid.).

Therefore, according to the same study, the policy stances of neutrality and mass-participation in domestic defence in the 50s and 60s became seen as “non-issues” with a high degree of popular support, as “widely accepted political truths” that the “overwhelming majority could rally behind”. It was even “silently ‘forbidden’ even to discuss this … in critical terms” as it was considered to “weaken Sweden’s position [of non-alignment]” (ibid.). Certainly, these ideas were simultaneously maintained and reinforced by symbolic power moves since they were “needed to justify the … mobilisation of resources and the investments in the large technological systems that were needed in order to build the twin states of welfare and warfare” (9). Indeed, the political efforts and emerging doctrine of total defence- and mass-armament, as well as the steadily growing number of arms manufacturing factories across rural Sweden, “very much mirrored, or in some aspects even paved the way for, the new welfare state that simultaneously took shape” (Stenlås 2010, 62).

The fact that Sweden was never drawn into armed conflict in the 1940s – and thus “preserved its neutrality” – has been “interpreted as the result of ideological choice, i.e. a successful neutrality policy, rather than historical chance” (Lundin and Stenlås 2010, 8). As wartime neutrality moved into Cold War non-alignment, Swedish top diplomat Gunnar Hägglöf authored several novels under the pseudonym Frank Burns in which he argued that the Swedish defence model and neutrality-stance had a “paralysing” effect. In one of his novels, Hägglöf depicts Sweden as the boat Neutralia, sailing through the metaphorical storms of the world wars, only make it through and face the dangerous waves from the great powers in post-war Europe. The central point here was that the US and Soviet relations to Sweden determined the relative success or failure of a “non-
alignment policy”, not the Swedish defence at such. Neutrality was not some “magical recipe” or “legal formula”, he argued, but at best a factor in a far larger spectacle of power relations (Hagelin 1985, 167).

Approaching the 1970s, public spokespersons were nurturing the image of “Sweden the middle way” – a country not of communists, nor of capitalists, but of “reformists” somewhere in-between. With a defence organisation and industry now larger than ever before, military strategists also began portraying Sweden as the “leader” in the Nordic, as the key factor for “regional stability”, “status quo”, and “balance” between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (Total Defence Information Committee 1980; Stenbäck 1977). Their neutrality-claims, furthermore, “provided the Swedes with a sense of moral superiority”: indeed, whereas other states “based their decisions on nationalistic sentiments, ideological conflicts, and power struggles, the prevailing notion was that Sweden had left all that behind”. Again, non-participation in the Cold War “was thought of as an active choice rather than an outcome of events” (Lundin and Stenlås 2010, 8). Drawing on the widespread perception of nuclear war as the most dangerous global threat at the time, Sweden and other countries following the political line of “armed neutrality” (e.g. Switzerland) could proceed with conventional rearmament at home without attracting much attention, while urging their spokespersons in the UN and other international organisations to promote nuclear disarmament, and thereby construct the view of themselves as “the world’s leading peace proponents” (Hagelin 1985, 170).

The aim of a comprehensive industrial capability demanded unprecedented amounts of public spending on R&D during the Cold War. Almost every scientific discipline acquired warfare connotations and more than half of all government-funded research took place in the defence sector (Lundin and Stenlås 2010, 2). In 1945, various defence-related research bodies merged into the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOA; today called the Swedish Defence Research Institute, FOI) (21-22). FOA grew to be the by far largest research organisation in Sweden at the time, expanding from 130 employees in 1945 to over 1,000 in 1958, involving “many more researchers than any of the universities or private companies” (Stenlås 2010, 74). This has been viewed as a twin process of a “scientification” of the defence sector on the one hand, and a “military bureaucratisation” of science and higher education on the other (72; see also Mills 1956, 216; Langley, Parkinson, and Webber 2005). At the heart of the R&D efforts were the military aircraft projects; “the single most salient item in the defence budgets”, in which Saab produced the airframes, Volvo the engines, Saab and Bofors the weapons, and Saab and Ericsson the electronic equipment (80).

On this note, Thompson (1982, 5) argues that with the rapid growth of substantial arms industries like Sweden’s, technological development has often been the main driver, while the
various theories to justify it – such as “deterrence” or “credible neutrality” – have been brought in only afterwards, to excuse or justify all these things. The acceleration of military R&D is the main “operative force”: “Like an addictive drug, it induces euphoria, inhibits the perception of manifest consequences, and excuses the inexcusable” (16), and from it, e.g. deterrence theory emerges as little more than an “ideological lubricant of the arms race” (18).

Perhaps surprisingly, the Social Democratic governments during the Cold War were in fact never particularly interested in owning its arms industry by containing firms in the public sector. The government focused on funding and overseeing research, development, production, and procurement, and rather saw it as an advantage if most of the manufacturing took place within private companies (B. Karlsson 2015, 13; Hagelin 1990, 44–45). This, historians argue, created an environment where very little “real competition” existed amongst companies, as a single producer usually emerged in a monopoly-like position within each technical branch of the defence sector, serving a monopsonic customer (the government). These firms enjoyed financial stability, too, since orders were “almost guaranteed” and gave firms long-term public funding for major R&D projects (B. Karlsson 2015, 33–34; Stenlås 2010, 78).

The relations between the Swedish arms industry and statist field during the 20th century therefore strongly resembles how Cox describes the notion of “tripartism”. The capitalist mode of production in modern societies became consolidated in several stages. One of these were “bipartism”, which refers to the stable set of relations that emerged between employers on the one hand, and labour movements (and their associated unions and political parties) on the other. In some of the more industrially advanced countries, such as those in western Europe, bipartism later developed in the direction of tripartism, namely, the increased intervention of the state in bipartite relations as well as in national economic planning and industrial management. In tripartite societies, the government was not only concerned with providing a framework for labour management relations and for an “orderly settlement” of disputes between employers and workers, but it also sought to define its national economic policy so that it “conformed to the conceptions and interests of the dominant employer class while it encouraged concessions such as would retain the acquiescence of the articulate class of established workers” (Cox 1987, 74).

As a consequence, corporatist structures grew within the state, and the line between state and economy, state and civil society, became blurred. Ministries of industry encouraged the development of industry organisations and established regular links with them; ministries of labour did the same with trade unions. Regular contacts and the performance of functions
within an expanded state machinery bound employer and worker organisations more closely into the state. (ibid).

Overall, tripartism stems from a recognition by governments that public policy in certain important policy areas (such as arms production in Sweden) only works “with the compliance of the powerful corporate and union interests, and … only in a political culture that rules out direct government control over these interest groups and requires that compliance be secured by persuasion” (77). Tripartism was therefore particularly successful in north-western Europe, e.g. in Germany and Scandinavia, where it could thrive on a political tradition of strong working class parties (such as the Swedish social democrats) in combination with a culture of corporatism (such as the emerging industrial elite in Sweden after the world wars).

In fact, the actors comprising the corporate part of the Swedish arms industry were not only rather few and strong, but also had largely the same owner. In the 1970s, only a handful of companies accounted for 72% of all procurement expenditures, and most of these private arms manufacturers, including Saab, Saab-Scania, Volvo, Bofors, LM Ericsson, Asea, and Hägglunds, were all owned by the Wallenberg group (Stenlås 2010, 76–77). The “Wallenbergs” – a family of bankers, industrialists, politicians, bureaucrats, and diplomats, with an over 100 years old industrial empire – were in fact not only the major producers of armaments, but its family members also played a significant political role, had close ties to leading ministers and bureaucrats in the defence sector, and sometimes even themselves participated in decision-making as policy advisors in defence committees. As a result, the Wallenberg sphere, later represented by its corporate group “Investor”, became industry leaders not only in armaments, but also in many other Swedish industries by purchasing companies such as Electrolux, the SAS Group, and Atlas Copco. In the 70s, their firms together employed 40% of Sweden’s industrial workforce in and represented 40% of the total worth of the Stockholm stock market (The Economist 2016). As argued elsewhere, “even if the Social Democrats and [Wallenberg] industrialists … were found at the opposite ends of the political-ideological spectrum, they cooperated so smoothly and effectively that it is justified to speak of a state-industry alliance during the Social Democratic era” (Lundin and Stenlås 2010, 13–14).

In the words of Cox (1987, 78), these tripartite alliances “thus contradicts the conventional notion that public policy is to be defined by representatives of the people rather than by interaction

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56 In their quasi-political role as industry leaders, The Wallenbergs can be described as what Bourdieu (1996, 329) calls the “berobed” class: the “men of connections” that are socio-historically destined to occupy “eminent positions” in “the very locus of power”, usually at the intersection of public- and private sectors, e.g. in major companies deeply entangled with state operations.
of economic interest” and could rather be perceived as “a corporatist form of decision making within a polity that retains at least the potentiality of parliamentary control and accountability”. Hence, what Mills observed as a “permanent war economy” in the United States (Mills 1956) comes forth in the Swedish case as a smaller but even more tightly entangled public-private alliance organised around a specific form of “neutrality defence”.

A system of corporatism was formed where organised interests thoroughly penetrated official decision-making … Sweden’s corporate social structure must therefore be taken into account as an important component in the military-industrial complex. First, the corporative system gave legitimacy to the government’s defence policy. Second, armament issues were ‘kept off’ the political agenda (Stenlås 2010, 69).

The “alliance” was perhaps most visibly institutionalised during these years in the form of a partnership between the government agency for arms acquisition (i.e. the central customer, today called the Defence Materiel Administration, FMV), the armed forces (the central end-user), the R&D institute (FOA, later FOI), and the Wallenberg-owned arms companies (today dominated by Saab). This close configuration of actors and interests has also been called the Swedish “iron triangle” between the parliament, the bureaucratic system, and the industry (Tunberger 2008), or a “merry-go-round” in which state officials and parliamentarians frequently move from public service to the private sector (Svenska Freds- och Skiljedomsföreningen 2010).

SAFEGUARDING TECHNOLOGY BY MEANS OF EXPORT

The Swedish arms industry was in many ways tremendously disproportionate with regards to its population size and GDP. The significant width and overall high level of independence enjoyed by the Swedish arms industry during the 20th century could only be reasonably compared with mega-countries such as USA, China, and Russia. How can this remarkable gap between the relatively small size and net wealth of Sweden on the hand, and its massive industrial and technological capacities on the other be explained? To a large extent, by export:

[T]o develop military arms, and especially on the scale necessary to ensure relative self-sufficiency, is incredibly expensive. It would cost more than what could be justified politically. The solution to this dilemma became to permit arms export from Sweden, and thereby allow orders from other countries to fill the gap between the industry’s sales
requirements and the Swedish Armed Forces’ materiel needs. Arms export thus became a central building block for the neutrality politics (Åkerström 2016, 15).

Since a comprehensive arms industry was seen by the government as a fully necessary “national resource”, it actively promoted export as an instrument for safeguarding that resource, as a way to guarantee marginal profit and continuous growth, and enable long production series to lower costs (B. Karlsson 2015, 68–69). Both during and after the Cold War, the government’s official view was that “[i]n periods between orders from the Swedish armed forces, exports are essential for the survival of companies which depend entirely on defence orders, for example Bofors [missiles and artillery], Kockums [boats and submarines], and Hägglunds Vehicle [tanks and bandwagons]. The survival of the defence industry is an important Swedish national security interest” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sweden 1993, 8 [emphasis added]). It was, in other words, not citizens that were to be protected in the first hand by the state, but technological capabilities, or put differently, private companies.

Paradoxically, the government also believed that “there is no contradiction between this [arms export] policy and Sweden’s policy of disarmament” (35). Such statements worked, of course, because the doctrine of “total defence” and “credible neutrality” was so firmly rooted politically and socially that the means to uphold it rarely or never became seriously questioned. In particular during the 1950s and 60s, arms export was, as such, an almost apolitical topic viewed merely as an “important ingredient” in national security, and left largely unscrutinised “since it was assumed that there was nothing interesting to be found” (Hagelin 1985, 10). Consequently, export regulations were very liberal during the 50s, and sales were permitted to both Israel and Egypt, as well as to dictatorships like the Dominican Republic, countries with civil wars like Colombia and Indonesia, and to colonies and third world countries (Lindahl 2001, 22).

New arms trade regulations were introduced both in 1967 and in 1972, but these in fact had the unintended effect of further speeding up the procedures around export – thereby increasing it. At this time, Swedish companies were also encouraged for the first time by statist actors to initiate “industrial collaborations” and co-produce certain technologies with specific international partners as another way to cover revenue gaps in-between domestic orders. Unconditional bilateral deals were signed with several states in Western Europe and North America (never with Soviet states). This move has been interpreted as “an expression of where the government thought that Sweden ‘belonged’ in security policy terms – despite the politics of non-alignment” (Hagelin 1985, 11).

After failed contract negotiations with the US government in 1972 regarding the Saab 37 Viggen fighter aircraft, which included massive lobbying efforts by Swedish state officials, public opinion started swinging against arms export. Although this was followed by another update of
legal frameworks in the mid 70s (increased parliamentary control, bureaucratic transparency, and the introduction of so-called “end-user certificates” from customer countries), arms trade revenue continued to increase, and the instrumental role of export for domestic defence remained largely uncontested (B. Karlsson 2015, 66; Hagelin 1985, 123). The highly controversial “Bofors scandal” between 1984-87 involving Sweden, Singapore, and later India again saw several cases of lobbying as well as bribes, smuggling, and corruption, but admittedly only briefly affected public opinion on arms export. If anything, these scandals showed precisely how far the government was prepared to go in order to win prestigious contracts, and how deeply certain state officials were involved in international arms trade affairs.

It was arguably not popular opinion around arms export that steered the development of trade regulations and industrial policies during the Cold War. Rather, the entire policy area of arms export was – and still is – largely determined by a series of arbitrary arguments concerning jobs, growth, innovation, and of course, “neutrality” (Lindahl 2001, 24). Others have called this situation a case of trying to fit an “iceberg” into an “eggshell”; a situation by which an immensely large set of institutions and interests had to be protected by a rather fragile set of political explanations (Hagelin 1985). Indeed, what must be remembered here is that laws concerning arms trade (or any object of state interest, for that matter) are designed, written, and put to work by and for the will of the sovereign. As in a Foucauldian dispositif, arms export laws are put in place in order to control and rationalise trade, but never to block it altogether; or as put by Hagelin (1985, 150 [emphasis added]), “[c]ontrol does not automatically lead to less export … control exists to reduce exports, or to have oversight of an export which the government would like to see increase”. It could thus be argued that the more laws and symbolic statements that surround an object, the more cherished it is, and the less likely it is to be taken completely out of practice.

As demonstrated, a discussion on the trajectory of a particular private industry cannot start and end with the inner workings of that private industry. Such a discussion must rather depart from the effect of statist- and symbolic power on the relation between firms. The “market”, Bourdieu reminds us, structures actors less around the drive for economic profit, and more around the “competition for power over state power”, that is “for the advantages provided by the various state interventions: preferential tariffs, trade licences, research and development funds, public sector contracts, funding for job-creation, innovation, modernisation, exports”, and so on. Statist actors are not “supervisors” hovering above the market, “put there to maintain order and confidence” amongst firms. Rather the state “contributes quite decisively to the construction of both demand and supply” (Bourdieu 2005, 204). Correspondingly, the companies that managed to become most entangled with state power (like Saab in aerospace or Bofors in artillery) are thus likely to be the
major players not only on their respective markets, but in the overall field as they are able to alter or influence the overall struggle determining Swedish arms production and military sales.

In addition to industrial mergers and export, another state-supported industry safeguard was so-called “diversification”. Diversification refers to an overall increase of civilian production by firms otherwise focused on military manufacturing, and the related notion of “spin-off” refers to when military projects or product lines trickle down to civilian application, finding uses elsewhere in society. Emerging as a new corporate strategy in many countries already in the 70s, diversification tended to gain support both politically and from top managers in arms firms as they could “exploit their defence-subsidised technical advantages to gain market entry into niche markets” while simultaneously being able to maintain its core military production capabilities. In contrast to US arms firms, who were never urged by their government to expand into other application areas, civilian diversification in Sweden was “propelled by top decision-makers and government action”, again, as in the case of export, as a way to retain staff and stabilise profit (Feldman 1999, 9, 20–23).

Swedish arms industry leader, Saab, famously ventured into the automobile industry, but perhaps lesser known, they also initiated projects for wind turbines, civilian submarines, hovercrafts, commercial aircrafts, and even space aviation. By diffusing their technology – e.g. aerodynamic and ergonomic aircraft innovations into civilian cars, or military sensors into civilian factories for automation purposes – Saab wanted to convince decision makers about the wider “societal” or “commercial” benefits of their military projects, and “that military procurement is beneficial to larger economic objectives like growth and export capacity” (21; B. Karlsson 2015, 80).

However, as was concluded by both civil servants and several firms in the 80s, diversification and civil expansions would most likely never become a top priority for the Swedish industry since civilian production was deemed “too different”, and unable to satisfactorily replace arms export as a profit instrument for covering costs in-between domestic orders (B. Karlsson 2015, 80). As put by a peace organisation, “it is easier to convert7 people than industries to civil work” (Fred & Frihet 1998, 7). Diversification instead came to be superseded by so-called “focusing strategies”, meaning that arms firms returned to prioritising the profit-generating segments of the firm and sacrificing e.g. spin-off branches and experimental projects that were mainly costing money (B. 7 Peace movements tended to translate diversification into campaigns for “conversion” of the industry: from military- to purely civilian production. However, without a reflexive understanding of security, or more specifically, of what “civil” would come to mean for such an industry, the notion of conversion becomes problematic (see Chapter 6, this volume). A Swedish peace organisation wrote in the 90s, for instance, that conversion would be the optimal strategy for the arms industry to transition from war-products to “warding against” the “big threats to security today” which became defined as “environmental pollution, poverty, famine, refugee flows” (Fred & Frihet 1998, 10 [emphasis added]). Refugees, of course, became exactly what European arms firms controversially began “converting” to and “warding against” in the 00s (e.g. Akkerman 2016).
Diversification initiatives instead tended to be separated from military production, e.g. by creating offspring-firms for civil R&D projects. Exactly this happened at Saab, out of which the company Combitech emerged as a hub for civil- and dual-use projects, as an “additional (and more formalized) matrix and network system to promote diversification … operating in relation to a larger reservoir of technical talent [which] brought together the specialised know-how necessary to develop a wide range of new products” (Feldman 1999, vii). Today, Combitech has grown into what looks to be an independent service- and consultancy-based firm focusing on cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection, but which was in fact an early spin-off branch owned entirely by Saab who used it as a way to pool staff.

Importantly, as the literature from the 80s-90s fails to show, the idea behind diversification nonetheless paved the way for arms companies’ security-related “spin-offs” in the 2000s, perhaps not so much in terms of technological legacy, but as a way for arms companies to conceptualise a strategy for branching out to other and related areas of profit, and as an early exercise in how to associate some of their production lines with “softer” discourses such as “societal benefit”. The notion of diversification also shifts focus – momentarily, but importantly – from the overall field of firms to the field of the firm itself, as it illustrates how an individual company is certainly “not a homogeneous entity that can be treated as a rational subject”, and that it is “determined (or guided) in its ‘choices’ not only by its position in the structure of the field of production, but also by its internal structure which, as a product of all its earlier history, still orients its present” (Bourdieu 2005, 69). I.e. as a result of internal struggles at Saab and related firms, “focusing” meant turning production priorities back to their traditional core of military manufacturing and export.

After years of deliberation in parliament, the government decided in the late 80s to offer Saab the contract to develop and manufacture a new generation of high-technological fighter jets, called the JAS 39 Gripen. When finished in the 90s, the JAS Gripen would come to be not only the by far costliest R&D project in the history of Swedish arms, but also its most profitable export item. The development of Gripen also marks the “start of an era in which import is connected with larger military export”; that is, when import curiously started to serve and become embedded into, or blurred with, export. Gripen is constituted by several different components, some of which are now bought from abroad and assembled in Sweden (e.g. the US-made engine), and thus the Gripen project was an early example of “increased internationalisation in military acquisition”

Saab’s various spin-off attempts never actually moved beyond the areas of aerospace and automotive engineering, but as Chapter 6 will examine, Saab’s effort to expand directly into security-related technology areas (of perhaps more direct kinship to, and relevance for, military R&D) such as policing, surveillance, counterterrorism, and crisis management came around 2005 in the form of a specific product segment and business area dedicated exclusively to “civil security”.

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In the same period, an economic instrument called “compensatory deals” was introduced, meaning that Swedish imports of e.g. German-made helicopters would oblige the German government to purchase e.g. Swedish-made cannons. Today, compensatory deals are largely commonsensical in international arms trade, but per definition, it is a state-crafted economic instrument for domestic production subsidies which in fact contradicts the logic of a “free market”.

In conclusion, the industry and market dedicated since the mid-1900s to the manufacture and export of major weapon systems had in other words been built up from scratch and institutionalised by the government, making the involved public and private actors heavily dependent on this system. Quite illustratively, in 1988, when the production costs of armaments in Sweden amounted to over SEK 16.4 billion, “more than half of it was exported” and the arms industry was in general “more export-dependent than the aircraft- and shipping industries” (B. Karlsson 2015, 70). What is more, this also illustrates how the strong technological foundation for the current Swedish defence- and security industry – and therefore to a large extent the overall reputation emerging towards the end of the 80s of Sweden as a “strong innovator” – had in fact been based on a long historical tradition of arming other countries. To retain the perceived conditions for peace at home (by safeguarding technology), Sweden necessarily had to create unrest elsewhere by increasing geopolitical tensions or even fuelling conflicts abroad.

**POST-COLD WAR FIELD EFFECTS**

In the 90s, the “alliance” in the defence sector between state agents, researchers, and the industry was becoming increasingly fragile. Sweden’s security policy, like that in many other countries, had become recalibrated towards new threat discourses beyond those of war and invasion, and traditional defence models became gradually challenged by practices of crisis management, counterterrorism, and migration management (Chapter 3, this volume). Effectuated by a string of government decisions between 1995-96, the military organisation and the defence materiel acquisition agency (FMV) faced drastic cuts in budget and personnel. As the government began to let go of its industry, it explicitly encouraged companies to adapt and look for other R&D partners and income sources, claiming that the traditional idea of industrial self-sufficiency was “not economically or technologically possible, nor desirable” after the Cold War (Lindahl 2001, 25; see also Åkerström 2016, 21; and Mörth and Britz 2004). “We were forced to internationalise”, as put by Saab’s chief technology officer, “not simply peck on ‘mama-the-state’ like a hungry baby bird, which was the kind of behaviour we had adopted in the old environment” (Interview: De Laval).

The government did not “let go” entirely, of course, especially not in the area of arms export and export promotion since it claimed that, going forward, “it is important that the government...
and Swedish agencies, actively and in a structured manner, supports the arms industry’s export efforts’ (Lindahl 2001, 25). Along these lines, the government began reforming procedures for the assessment and granting of export permits; that is, the central legal condition for all arms deals. First, in 1993, permits became structured into two categories, “war munitions” (e.g. aircraft, artillery, tanks) and “other munitions” (e.g. radars, sensors) (Lindahl 2001:18, 27). Second, in 1996, the central responsibility for granting export permits was transferred from the government and its ministry of foreign affairs’ special office for “arms materiel inspection” (which had held this responsibility since 1935) to a new agency called the Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP) (Lindahl 2001, 30; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sweden 1993, 18–19). By mandating all these sensitive assessments to a separate agency, the government had effectively freed itself from direct accountability regarding the permits. Put differently, decisions of potentially tremendous gravity were displaced from professional politicians and government ministers to a bureaucratic structure of “neutral” and largely anonymous civil servants in an independent agency. Moreover, when granting export permits to arms firms, ISP is supposed to assess end-user countries’ respect for e.g. democratic principles and human rights. These aspects are however always arbitrarily weighed against the current “security policy” and whether the granting/denying of a permit would affect “domestic defence capabilities” (ISP 2019; see also Reuterskiöld 2018), thereby enabling a permanent loophole in the current procedure.

Simultaneously, when Sweden first joined the European Free Trade Association in 1994, and then the European Union in 1995, the law on public procurement was changed in line with the EU’s single market-logic. Between 1996-2001, both the amount and value of FMV’s arms procurements made “in competition” therefore increased (Britz 2010, 179). FMV also established an entire branch dedicated not to domestic arms acquisition, but to international “sales and exports” which was also responsible for export promotion activities (Interview: Küller). The years around the EU entry marks the end-point of the Swedish neutrality-myth, as traditional political arguments in favour of arms production – domestic defence capabilities, international non-alignment, rural factory jobs, etc. – became gradually replaced by arguments concerning domestic employment figures, international trade dependencies, and office jobs.

The government also decided to open up the industry to foreign proprietorship in the mid- to late 90s. When Alvis bought shares in the armoured vehicle producer Hägglunds in 1997, this was “unprecedented in Swedish history” (FOI 2007). In the years that followed, most arms firms acquired new owners and shareholders, as the artillery- and cannon manufacturer Bofors (at the time controlled by the public-private Celsius Group) became purchased first by the US firm United Defense, and then again in part by Saab, and in part by the UK multinational BAE Systems, who
also eventually purchased Hägglunds in its entirety. Submarine- and military ship manufacturer Kockums was bought first by German Howaldtswerke – GmbH, and then by Saab. Increased international proprietorship of the Swedish industry was of course not unique, but rather one of many effects of a widespread development towards “neoliberal” policies throughout Europe which affected many similar multinationals. The government claimed that in addition to a continuously high level of export, “the opening of the Swedish arms industry was necessary” for it to survive (ibid; see also Sandström and Törnqvist 1998). This rupturing effect not only transformed ownership structures of arms industries, but also the “norms” and “standards” for e.g. technology transfer, intellectual property rights, and R&D funding and cooperation. Eventually, when Celsius was purchased by Saab around the turn of the millennium, the Swedish arms industry had become entirely owned and operated by either private or foreign actors.

“Politically, this was not an easy battle”, Britz (2010, 180) notes, as the early 2000s saw a situation akin to the post-war divide between “doves” and “hawks” in the parliament. Now, though, the political struggle concerned whether or not the state should maintain funding and support for the industry structure institutionalised during the 20th century. After long debates, multiple cancelled military R&D contracts, and a resigned defence minister, the answer was “no”. Completing the first steps taken in 1995-96, the official strategy presented in 2006 was that “Swedish arms supply from now on should be provided primarily by buying equipment ‘off the shelf’, second by developing equipment in collaboration with other states, and only third by buying equipment ordered especially for Sweden” (ibid; see also Government of Sweden 2007, 2004).

In effect, during the early 00s, the Saab corporate group backed by their Wallenberg owners moved to purchase a row of other domestic defence- and security firms and thereby managed to cement their role as the largest arms company in the Nordic region. What had appeared previously as a monopoly-monopsony situation now changed into an oligopoly-like situation by which Saab came to both dominate Swedish military production, as well as reaffirm its place as the region’s largest exporter of arms and weapon systems (Åkerström 2016, 52). The company was now the “face” of Swedish arms trade, representing the “national pride” of being in the forefront in military innovation. What is more, Saab had grown into being much more than simply a fighter jet manufacturer in the new millennium. The company could now also be reckoned with as a political force due to its historical relation with, and substantial influence over, Swedish bureaucrats and decisionmakers in the defence sector, as well as its heavy presence in arms export promotion contexts, international trade delegations, and in national and European lobby organisations. More accurately, Saab had emerged as an heir in the overall field of security, and could from its strong position wield significant influence in several different areas beyond simply manufacturing,
including in “official” contexts. “The dominant”, Bourdieu reminds us, “is the one that occupies a position in the structure such that the structure acts on its behalf”. Hence, it is “through the weight they possess within this structure, more than through the direct interventions they may also make … that the dominant firms exert their pressure [and] define the regularities and sometimes the rules of the game, by imposing the definition of strengths most favourable to their interests and modifying the entire environment of the other firms and the system of constraints that bear on them” (Bourdieu 2005, 195). Understanding Saab as in an overall position of dominance since the early 00s could explain e.g. why this particular firm managed to acquire an oligopoly-like position, why it has been able to work closely with top-level statist spokespersons (especially with JAS Gripen negotiations), and why it has seen no direct interventions into its lobbying practices despite several suspected cases of bribes.

Furthermore, around this time, a new marketisation attempt was made by a heterogenous group of actors in the security- and defence area, including Saab, private lobby groups, emerging SME companies, certain state spokespersons and agency officials, and research institutes. This organised attempt aimed not so much at fundamentally changing the Swedish arms industry, but at forging a new and primarily domestic market for societal security which was to co-exist alongside, or perhaps within and for, the arms industry. New public mechanisms for R&D of technologies related to societal security were to be created as a way to complement (not replace) the defence industry, as a way to cover the “grey area” emerging – at least so these actors argued – in-between traditional marketspaces of public safety and policing on the one hand, and of military technology on the other. This idea was, of course, not unique for these actors but very much reflected the developments in Swedish bureaucratic-, agency-, and policy fields at the time, as well as the simultaneous developments at the EU level by which an R&D programme for “secure societies” was in its cradle (C. Jones 2017; Chapters 2 and 3, this volume).

ENVISIONING A MARKET FOR SOCIETAL SECURITY

Since the early 2000s, an entrepreneurial group of industrialists and public spokespersons have worked hard to forge a kind of domestic marketplace around not “defence”, but emerging notions of “societal” or “civil” security, and to make this market appear somehow new, novel, and relevant. This was not a grand attempt to overthrow the arms industry or to replace old firms with new risk consultancy-, counterterrorism-, or cybersecurity firms. If anything, I argue, it was an experiment to gain renewed government support and expand and strengthen the overall political economy of Swedish security- and defence technologies, to add a different kind of industrial safeguard, and
allow and even encourage emerging SMEs to take up complementary positions to arms companies as e.g. subcontractors, and potentially propel themselves into military- or dual-use markets.

Lobbyists saw this as a window of opportunity for introducing and emphasising so-called “hybrid threats”: “The grey area [between peace and war] has widened”, a lobbyist has claimed, and “we will never ‘reach the ceiling’ and enter into war, but neither will we have an entirely peaceful situation” (Interview: Limmergård). Portraying the threat as “complex”, in our midst, and laying in the future, their member companies (coming from both defence and policing) were encouraged to focus on developing “hybrid technologies”. “With technological development”, another lobbyist admits, comes “opportunities for increased control” (Interview: Dahlberg).

As will be detailed below, lobbyists from the organisations SOFF and SACS, individual companies like Saab and Ericsson, in partnership with public research institutes (most notably FOI), and specific government agencies (most notably MSB) began experimenting with how commercialise, commodify, package, and “sell” societal security at home, and how to replicate the simultaneously ongoing R&D initiatives at the EU level. This was typically done by social means, e.g. by pressuring decisionmakers, spreading new terms and explanatory models, building consortiums and formulating new national “innovation agendas”, linking up these consortiums with EU-funded projects by establishing networking forums, rolling out extensive marketing- and advertising campaigns, and finally, arranging recurring security fairs and exhibitions.

MOBILISING THE INDUSTRY

In light of the negotiations between Sweden and the DHS leading up to the bilateral agreement for “cooperation in science and technology for homeland security matters” in 2007 (Chapter 4, this volume), Saab and a group of other firms anticipated a boom in Swedish security commodities, and saw a need to mobilise the domestic industry and create new forms of representation in this area. Thus, they decided to establish a new lobby group called the Swedish Association of Civil Security (SACS) in 2006. Representing around 15 member companies59 covering a large spectrum from arms companies, to firms focused on border management, biometrics, CBRN(E) detection, risk consultancy, and cybersecurity, to traditional “blue-light” firms dealing with policing, surveillance, and “safety”, SACS defined as its mission to conduct “business supporting activity” for companies seeking to “provide and prepare society for threats of today and tomorrow” such as “antagonistic … threats with a significant impact on the functioning of society”.

59 In addition to Saab, who remained members until 2009, the lobby group has also represented e.g. 4C Strategies (risk consultancy), Advenica (cyber), Ericsson (telecom and radars), Firefly (public safety), FLIR Systems (infrared optics and border control), Securitas and Stanley (policing and surveillance), and ÅF and Volvo (civil engineering and dual-use).
With the added weight of having Saab onboard from the very beginning, SACS played a key role in the early attempts at consecrating a “new” security market in Sweden. The board members worked hard with making relevant and legitimising this expansion by framing themselves almost exactly in accordance with emerging EU- and domestic official discourse, by making frequent references to the ESRAB and ESRIF reports, and in particular, by replicating and diffusing a graph from an EU-commissioned report (ECORYS 2009) (Figure 5.1) which identifies the “civil security market” as the space in-between traditional “endogenous” and “exogenous” threats, including “terrorism, organised crime, cybercrime, etc. and … major catastrophic events”.

SACS also began convincing their bigger brother in the lobby world, the Swedish Defence Industry Association (FIF), to reframe their organisation in a similar way. This move was successful, as FIF not only changed their name in 2007 to the Swedish Security & Defence Industry Association (SOFF) (Mynewsdesk 2007), but also since they started to actively invite new companies in the areas of “sensor technology, interoperability, communications technology, and cybersecurity” in order to “take better advantage of … synergies between the defence and civil security areas” (SOFF 2014, 29). Thus, SOFF made a transition similar to many other EU-level and member state arms industry actors who, also out of both necessity and opportunism, had started to add “security” to their otherwise defence-focused repertoires. SOFF promised to closely “follow the development” of the European defence- and security market, and where possible, “work with the relevant authorities and the Swedish government offices to lobby for this market to open up” (21).

Strikingly, SOFF also published a folder detailing their new, beyond-military focus entitled “The role of the market for the security of society” (SOFF 2015a), in which they claim that the “growing” yet “relatively immature” societal security market with its “global reaching network of companies, suppliers, and customers” have transformed state officials into “clients” of security, rather than operators or owners. However, the hybridity and duality of this market area has caused inconsistency in the definition of societal security, they proceed to claim, leading to challenges, not from a legal or ethical point of view, but “from an analytical perspective and from a business perspective”.

Lobbyists claim that if SACS emerged predominantly from the “green bubble” (Figure 5.1), and SOFF from the “blue bubble”, the “purple bubble” supposedly forming a “new security market” became described as very much a joint project, as something not already in place, but in need of careful composition, negotiation, and refinement. In this effort, SOFF and SACS portrayed themselves (rather than state institutions) as the central architects, as two industry actors in synergy (rather than competition), with “synchronised agendas”, bringing in two “cultural perspectives” that were equally important (Interview: Limmergård; Dahlberg). To construct this image of heading
a “shared project” was of course a strategic move by the industry based on several different interests, such as (at least initially) gaining access to customers related to US homeland security by displaying a “united front” when representing Swedish companies at e.g. the industry seminars arranged in parallel with the annual DHS-MSB meetings. Via this channel, it was hoped that major arms firms like Saab who were prospecting a sharp sales increase in border management products could move closer to DHS agencies, a rapidly growing procurer of security technologies. Security SMEs, on the other hand, were hoping to expand further into CBRN(E) technologies, which was the principal focus initially in the DHS cooperation and also involved experienced FOI researchers. Another reason for “synchronising” themselves, at least visibly, was to strengthen their positions I relation to the defence commission and Swedish state agencies, including regulatory bodies like the ISP. In fact, one of the key objectives of both SACS and SOFF has been to hinder ISP from implementing export regulation on societal/civil security products, arguing that these technologies should be kept out of the dual-use framework (Interview: Dahlberg; see also SACS 2016a). Drawing together different companies and technologies with the outspoken goal of forging a societal security market “at home” was in other words, from the very beginning, a mobilisation based on specific interests of “going abroad”.

Figure 5.1 Emerging “new” security market
R&D AGENDAS & EU PROGRAMMES

With the “off-the-shelf” policy turn in 2006, which practically put an end to public R&D support in the defence area, several arms companies and research institutes that had been relying on military development projects were forced into a weakened position. A combination of public and private actors including Saab and FOI therefore linked up with SOFF and SACS in the early 2010s to apply for and establish a “strategic innovation programme” (SIP) on the theme of societal security, with particular focus on the areas of sensors, ICT, interoperability, and cyber security. Aiming to have this SIP funded by the state via its innovation agency Vinnova, the applicants sought to make the notion of societal security “well-established both within relevant Swedish higher education, and generally within the [private] sector and its organisations” (SOFF et al. 2013, 33). In an annex to the application, SOFF further writes that “civil research and military related research is to a large extent two sides of the same coin”, and since the funding mechanisms and military research environments that had been so strong traditionally in Sweden were at risk of disappearing, this general area needed a “boost” in the form of an SIP based primarily on “civil” research (Limmergård 2015). The SIP was envisioned both as a “forum” where “industry, academia, and owners⁶⁶ could come together” around the theme of societal security (Interview: Dahlberg), and as a way to bridge the so-called “valley of death”; that is, to fund the “stage between innovation and product” (Interview: Limmergård). The “agenda”-document on which the SIP application was based claims that the “demand for societal security” is determined not merely by “regulations and state initiatives”, but also by notions like “general economic activities in society”, “technological developments”, as well as “the general perception of current threats to security; when terrorists and organised criminals act in new ways, or when catastrophes/crises happen, temporary spikes in demand for security occur” (SOFF et al. 2013, 5).

Consisting of leading lobbyists, researchers, and civil servants, the SIP applicant group here tried to present itself as “neutral”, as commissioned servants of the industry, insisting that what is best for the industry is also best for society. They, in other words, tried to play a symbolic game and act as a legitimate pressure group, as a visible and “active minority” with a seemingly bureaucratic (not economic) interest (Bourdieu 2005, 118). Despite the pressure group’s thorough attempts to design their application as having to do with a genuinely new and “hybrid” area, as somehow striking a perfect balance between public safety- and military-R&D, it was ultimately refused in 2015 since Vinnova deemed it, technologically speaking, “too heavy on defence” (Interview:

⁶⁶ The actual word used by the interviewee was behovsägare, literally translated to “owner of need”. This kind of creative lingo is common in innovation contexts where terms like “need”, “solution”, “idea exchange”, “testbed”, and “end-user” are preferred over “contract”, “product”, “deal”, “company”, and “funder”.
Dahlberg). MSB’s own national security research programme may have worked as an optional funder, but was deemed irrelevant and too heavily focused on applied social- and behavioural sciences, and thus too “far from the market” and not “innovative, competitive, [or] technical” enough (Interview: J Lindberg; Halldén).

A central objective in the SIP agenda, too, had been to “go abroad”, or more specifically, to mobilise and revamp national R&D efforts as a way to create a “bridge” to strategic partner countries and gain an “entry ticket” to international collaborations (SOFF et al. 2013, 19). The SIP group thus decided to instead turn directly to the EU as a security R&D funder. This made sense, of course, since the comparatively small-scale and domestic attempt to establish an SIP strongly resembled, perhaps even imitated, the political and economic instrument that was the ESRP on the EU level. The Swedish pressure group had also similarly framed the SIP as a consortium-building project, very much in line with how the ESRP has been described as a multi-billion “networking exercise” (C. Jones 2017, 15).

Swedish participation in EU projects was initially high, and Saab and FOI became the largest and most frequent recipients of ESRP funding. These two heirs in their respective fields of industry and research were also granted positions in the “national reference group” for the “Secure Societies” theme, alongside spokespersons from the ministry of justice and the coastguard, police, and customs agencies (Interview: J Lindberg). FOI in particular saw the ESRP projects as an outright necessity for surviving in the 00s and 10s, and continued to be active in areas tied to the DHS agreement and domestic SIP agenda – namely CBRN(E), sensors, ICT, cyber. The new direction for this historically military-focused organisation meant that up to 30% of its staff started focusing exclusively on “security end-users”, rather than the armed forces. Sensors, specifically, became a key priority for FOI, including research on everything from camera lenses to lasers, radars, facial recognition, body scanners, crowd surveillance (Interview: Frennberg; FOI 2017; cf. Nishiyama 2018). In order to stay “relevant” (i.e. funded), they have in other words actively focused on technologies that to a large extent crosses boundaries between civil security, crisis management, counterterrorism, “total defence”, and military violence.

To further connect national agendas with EU funding programmes, FOI in cooperation with MSB and Vinnova also organised the so-called “H2020 Coordination Platform”. This works as a series of recurring meetings and networking opportunities, like local Horizon 2020 “brokerage

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61 See h2020viz.vinnova.se/#/country?countryNames=%5B%22Sweden%22%5D [accessed 12/03/19]. Vinnova’s visualisation tool shows the current allocation of EU R&D funds (in Sweden and elsewhere), including consortium participants, projects descriptions, budgets, and timeframes.

62 For example, FOI led the “SUBCOP” FP7 project which investigated “less-than-lethal” methods to mitigate suicide bombers, e.g. by means of a so-called a “sound blaster” that is now being marketed as a tool for “addressing the migrant crisis” (C. Jones 2017, 26).
events”, to which agencies invite all kinds of actors, private as well as public, to participate and identify co-applicants to the current FP8 calls. During these state-subsidised, full-day events, often arranged in science parks, one would see FOI researchers mingling with e.g. police officers, civil engineers, cybersecurity consultants, terrorism experts, border guards, SACS board members, MSB bureaucrats, and government representatives. The aim is to identify and matchmake companies and researchers with relevant public sector decisionmakers and “end-users”, connect them with open H2020 calls, and thereby “enhance application procedures” (FOI and MSB 2015, 2016).

SOCIETAL SECURITY ON DISPLAY

Societal security has been subject to extensive marketing and advertising campaigns in recent years. Since around 2009, magazines called simply Samhällssäkerhet (societal security) have been recurrently published as 15-page folders and included in the centre spread of some of the largest newspapers in Sweden, e.g. Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet. These seemingly journalistic magazines are in fact ordered ads, produced using the so-called “native advertising” method. Native advertising means writing and distributing text material, both in print and online, with the aim to create the appearance of it being a legitimate newspaper article or editorial piece, but which is in fact sponsored “informative pieces” or purely commercial advertisement. Content marketing firms such as “Mediaplanet” and “SmartMedia” are behind these campaigns, and claim that it is also themselves (not e.g. SOFF or SACS) who took the initial initiative to produce the campaigns. Mediaplanet, for instance, claims to be a “one-stop shop” for “nearly every industry” when it comes to creating and distributing “useful content that educates our audience and positions our clients as solution providers”.63 SmartMedia helps clients “reach their market and the key decision makers” by producing content that “contain information about well-known people and politicians … with the goal to increase sales”.64

The ad magazines include “editorials” from e.g. the MSB director who talks alarmingly about increased insecurities in society, “debate pieces” from lobby directors and Saab representatives about unlocking the potential of the industry, and company product offerings disguised as “news articles” (Media Planet 2013). Across the different issues, there is a relatively even distribution of content from private companies and public spokespersons. What these native ad magazines do, among other things, is to introduce a new way of framing security to the wider public, and to immediately put this label in a commercial context, creating the appearance of a new, smart, savvy

63 See www.mediaplanet.com/se/ [accessed 12/03/19].
64 See fokussamhällssäkerhet.se [accessed 12/03/19].
industry addressing the most recent technologies and "security threats". The ads also put the "faces" of the industry visibly on display; both new and old key figures, both company- and agency representatives, both producers and procurers of technology.

The newspapers through which they are distributed have a certain readership (urban, middle-to upper-class, liberal-conservative) which most likely corresponds with the intended target group for the advertised content. This is key, since "advertising is most successful when it plays on, stimulates or arouses pre-existing dispositions" (Bourdieu 2005, 55). Bourdieu may remind us that for one category of companies, ad campaigns like these "work to transform the socially constituted schemas of perception or appreciation (tastes) that potential buyers will apply to their product", and for another category of companies, they seek "to bridge the gap between the impression spontaneously inspired by the product and the image that is to be produced for it" (54). For the former group, usually challenger-SMEs, this means drawing attention to the "emerging market" with which they want to feel associated, and in which they identify key stakes. For the latter group,
usually major arms firms, this means transforming the general perception of their product portfolio, and giving them the image of being something else, not only arms. Actors like SOFF or Saab – who “have never truly chosen the path of subversion”, but for which the turn to societal security was more of a compromise – have been forced to pursue “symbolic campaigns of transfiguration” (ibid.); e.g. by doing these kinds of campaigns and investing heavily in rebranding themselves as also “civil” or “societal” security innovators.

Another tool for “selling” security in Sweden has been the industry fair called the “Societal Security Forum” (Mötesplats Samhällssäkerhet). Arranged biannually since 2011, the “forum” was initiated by the SIP group together with MSB, who also functions as a key partner and co-funder. These two-day fairs seem to want to replicate the larger international arms fairs, with long seminar programmes and large exhibition halls. The most frequent exhibitors with the biggest booths tend to be, yet again, SOFF, SACS, MSB, FOI, and Combitech (Saab’s service-based spin-off firm). Other exhibitors and seminar participants include the police and coastguard, politicians and government officials, municipality- and county board representatives, and a large shifting pool of specialised security SMEs, engineering-, and consultancy firms. Interestingly, over the years, the list of participants has shifted quite noticeably from a majority of public sector actors in the beginning to more private companies in 2017 (Mötesplats Samhällssäkerhet 2011, 2017). What is more, the actual exhibition floor is designed with social interactions in mind. Organisers have chosen to set up the booths with a “cross-shape” rather than the more common “cube-shape” (Figure 5.2), claiming that this provides a “better flow”, invites the visitors into meetings, and enables better exchange between exhibitors (i.e. increases sales discussions). The “foundational concept”, they argue, is to allow “actors who would not otherwise find each other to do so” (Stenvall 2015).

DEFICIT OF STATIST CAPITAL

Despite all of the different efforts discussed above, most of the industrialists and spokespersons interviewed for this study agree to some extent that the Swedish societal security market experiment was a failure, and that it continues to be “fragmented”, “immature”, or at best, still in emergence. Was this due to a lack of producers and consumers? Inefficient marketing? Stiff regulations? Weak “market pull”? As should be clear in all of the examples presented here, the involved actors were plenty, their species of capital rather varied, and there was certainly no lack of strategies and campaigns aiming at propelling this market into existence. Frankly, the reason for why a domestic market for the commodification of societal security remained “fragmented” was arguably the lack of direct government engagement and industrial policies, and weak to non-existent support
structures for R&D. In order to “reach the market”, practitioners tend to claim, technologically advanced systems related (or not) to security demand a strong procurer and long-term R&D contracts. Despite long traditions of a state-to-industry support in this area, not only in Sweden but across the Nordic, the area of “societal security” came to lack all of this; for example, MSB never took on (nor wanted to take on) the role of central procurer, similar to that of FMV in the defence sector (Interview: Dahlberg). Marketisation experiments may have seemed feasible initially due to the developments during the 90s and 00s that led to the establishment of new agencies, but the fact remains that statist actors never intervened in the industry field as it did in the agency field at the time; it did not impose economic instruments to the same extent it introduced new bureaucratic instruments related to security practice.

It should be restated that all “markets” to varying degree are the result of a “twofold social construction” of supply and demand “to which the state contributes crucially” (Bourdieu 2005, 16). Over time, the holder of statist (or symbolic) capital becomes the central arbiter of economic relations; of not only customer preferences (demand), but also of the structural conditions for the production of commodities (supply). And again, private actors positioned close to the statist field, like major firms or influential lobbyists, “have means far more powerful than mere advertising for shaping that demand; in particular, they can influence the political decisions that are likely to orient agents’ preferences” (89). Demand and supply, however, takes more than a few years to produce – despite involvement of seemingly very influential private actors. Compare the early 00s with the Cold War era when the government, not for some years but for over five decades, sought to mould society according to a model of mass-participation in defence and widespread acceptance of arms production; an era when it actively aided certain manufacturers and itself became the central customer. Defence-related production was always to be centred around the statist field, since “the production of a good or service is the more likely to be controlled by the state the more indispensable that good or service is” (Bourdieu 2005, 93). To the Swedish government, armaments were certainly deemed “indispensable” for the argument of “credible neutrality”. Consequently, companies had long and intricate, and sometimes even direct, dependency relations with state institutions at the time. Entire Swedish towns like Karlškoga, Linköping, and Karlskrona were built up to a large extent around the working class families employed in these weapons factories, and this industry in turn became a facet of the Swedish labour movement and welfare apparatus.

When situated in this context, the societal security marketisation experiment in the early 00s barely even makes a dent in history, as state engagement was negligible in comparison. While the arms industry was politically rooted and had an identifiable genesis in the rearmament struggles after the Second World War, and a bureaucratic structure of routines, rules, and regulations, the
The notion of a Swedish societal security industry, in contrast, has a much more vague sociogenesis, a more competitive configuration of firms and institutions, and no rigorous state-crafted support structures. Although the marketisation experiment saw some sporadic state involvement in the form of agency spokespersons, it was mostly a private initiative pushed by lobbyists and key companies trying to defend their overall positions in the field.

Rather, the societal security industrialists realised towards the 2010s that for this niche to work, they needed to continuously look abroad and try to connect themselves with international customers, partners, and R&D funding programmes. This is also precisely what the Swedish Trade Council (later to become the export organisation Business Sweden) concluded after conducting a market survey with 174 different Swedish companies associating themselves wholly or partly with segments like “societal” or “civil” security. The survey report argued that the Swedish industry – multinationals and SMEs alike – should focus less on the “fragmented” domestic market, and more on exports to the supposedly huge “world market” prospect ed to have a “steady growth … estimated at 7.5% per year”. “We have been studying the civil security sector for 10 years, but haven’t yet fully understood it” a Saab director states in the report, which then goes on to suggest that abroad there is “untapped potential” for Swedish companies who were deemed to have “many strengths in areas such as coastguard … and protection of infrastructure” (Swedish Trade Council 2012).

Already in 2005, the government had ordered a mapping of the Swedish security industry (Vinnova et al. 2005, 18–20) which suggested that in terms of concrete technologies and companies, such “strengths” included:

- IT security (200 companies, incl. Proact Datasystem, Technology Nexus).
- Sensor technology (e.g. identification, biometrics, screening, surveillance, tracking; 21 companies, incl. Ericsson Microwave Systems, Saab Bofors, Biacore, Exensor Technology, Precise Biometrics, Applied Sensor).
- Mobile solutions (56 companies, incl. Ericsson).
- Physical transportation (e.g. aeroplanes, ships, vehicles; 7 companies, incl. Kockums, Saab Aerosystems, BAE Systems Hägglunds).
- NBC technology (today referred to as CBRN(E), 4 companies).
- Weapon technology (7 companies, incl. Saab Bofors Dynamics and Bofors Defence, Dynasafe, Carl Bro, Aimpoint).
Despite being dated, this mapping rather unsurprisingly illustrates how the “strengths” – when taken together after half a century of arms production – was centred around dual-use or directly military technologies. Therefore, the tactic that emerged during the 00s and 10s, not least among lobbyists and industry leaders like Saab, was to focus not so much on market-construction, but on embedding and associating new and emerging technologies (related or not to societal security) with military exports, as this tradition continued to flourish with strong state backing. The 2012 survey suggests, for instance, that since Sweden has “a long tradition of exporting arms, with well-established sales channels for the large companies”, the “large companies should to a greater extent act as mentors for the SMEs” (Swedish Trade Council 2012; Interview: Dahlberg). Implicitly, this meant of course that emerging security firms should accept to find themselves in positions of e.g. subcontracted product developers for major firms. Contractual obligations for the import/export of large weapon systems have grown increasingly multi-faceted in recent years, however, and now involve not only compensatory deals, but often also an entire string of additional economic instruments and side-deals such as license sharing, technology transfer, buy-back, offset, factory construction, product installation and integration, technical training, and more; all of which open up new opportunities for security firms to be involved and included in major arms contracts.

The main concentration of statist capital, it became clear, was to be found not in some security market at home, but still in the arms trade system, visible not least in how the routines for export promotion gained increased state support between the 00s and 10s. Initially, the FMV’s “sales and export”-mandate had been shared with the armed forces and FOI, but in 2010, an entire agency dedicated explicitly to this purpose was established, called the Swedish Defence and Security Export Agency (FXM). At FXM, around 55 civil servants were tasked to promote Swedish arms to current and prospective customers abroad, serve as a “government-to-government” (G2G) and “business-to-government” (B2G) liaison, and to offer the industry financial support as well as “brain power” for certain marketing campaigns (Interview: Küller). Due to its highly controversial mandate, FXM was short-lived, discontinued in 2014, and its tasks spread out yet again to different actors. However, this time, most of the export promotion responsibilities were tasked to an organisation called “Business Sweden” which appointed a “director of defence and security”. Business Sweden, like Saab, has a strong international presence, but its regional directors enjoy diplomatic status (as “foreign trade secretaries”) as well as “arm-in-arm” relationships with the many Swedish embassies around the globe, with which they often share offices. From the very beginning of its operations, Business Sweden thus implemented a focus on both “security” and “cyber”, to run alongside “defence” in their arms export promotion activities. In recent years, the concept of “Team Sweden” has also been employed for marketing-, coordination-, and contract
negotiation purposes. Team Sweden has served as a marketing platform for promoting Swedish weapons systems at e.g. arms fairs, as a formal communication channel with which to handle direct business- or purchase requests from abroad, and as the “image” upheld against international customers. Team Sweden has also been used as a less formalised “coordination forum” at home (also called the “Defence- and Security Export Group”) in which an enclosed strategy group (consisting of the Business Sweden director, the SOFF director, and an “export promotor” from the ministry of foreign affairs) meet up in Stockholm, “usually on a weekly basis” for elite dialogue around arms export matters (Interview: Rudebark; see also Chapter 6, this volume).

These and other methods have been put to work apparently with major success, since Swedish arms export figures have been surging since the early 00s, reaching a historical spike in the

Figure 5.3 Swedish arms export 2001-2014
early 2010s (Figure 5.3). Since then, Sweden is usually found somewhere in the global top three when arms export is estimated in size per capita, ranking no. 1 in 2011. Estimated by net income alone, Sweden is still found in the global top fifteen, normally ahead of prosperous countries such as Canada, Switzerland, South Korea, Australia, and Brazil (Åkerström 2016, 101; SIPRI 2019). Having acquired parts or the entirety of companies like Kockums, Bofors, and Ericsson, Saab has grown into a multinational company with offices in over 100 countries, employing over 16,000 individuals (Saab 2018a). Offering over 600 different products, Saab now covers a broad spectrum of technologies related to not only defence, but since around 2005, also security and surveillance. Overall Swedish export booms, like the one around 2010, is now caused to a large extent by Saab themselves, and their sales of major systems like JAS Gripen to Brazil, or the radar plane GlobalEye to Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. In this long, persistent, and still immensely profitable tradition of arms trade, the Swedish societal security industry – if there ever was one – now finds itself increasingly embedded. Indeed, it is among major arms companies – like those involved in the EU’s security- and defence R&D programmes, like those exporting weapons to conflict regions while simultaneously being contracted to strengthen EU borders – that so-called civil security technologies are put to work and fulfil a particular socio-political function.

CONCLUSION

This chapter departed from a historical outlook on the Swedish political economy of “armed neutrality”, illustrating how the system of manufacture and export that became politically justified and institutionalised during the 1900s was not primarily about protecting society and its citizens, but more accurately, about protecting technology. It was designed to ensure a permanent stream of funding and support into violent products which, when taken together, were readily assumed to equal a “total” defence and “credible” foreign policy. More accurately than myths, perhaps, notions like neutrality could be seen as what Bourdieu calls “native theories”: concepts consecrated within the field, usually by and for its leading agents, as a way to aid them in their position-takings. As such, neutrality, non-alignment, credibility, self-sufficiency, totality, and so on, are all strategies “made explicit, avowed, declared, if not indeed cynically proclaimed … in the form of ‘native theories’ of strategic action … expressly produced to assist the agents, and particularly business leaders, in their decisions” (Bourdieu 2005, 200; see also Bonditti and Olsson 2016).

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65 This graph is produced by the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society, draws on data from Freedom House Index and government reports, and distinguishes between regimes that are “free” (democratic), “partly free” (semi-democratic/authoritarian), and “not free” (dictatorships).

The chapter then proceeded to show how, as this political economy became destabilised due a gradual reallocation of state funding after the Cold War, new strategies were introduced as a way to complement, expand, and, so to speak, “rescue” this industry. One of these was an attempt to forge and make relevant a market for the commodification of societal security in the early 00s. As noted in the previous section, this experiment included what may have seemed like “economic” instruments, but were in fact mostly social strategies for e.g. creating consortiums and networks between practitioners across the fields of state, industry, and research, for enabling new forms of commodification, often in transnational contexts. Both in Sweden and elsewhere in the West, this commodification experiment pushed the technologies – or more accurately, the developers and owners of this technology – even more front and centre. This was noticeable not least in how it were private companies and their business associations, not necessarily statist actors, that worked hardest when it came to promoting and framing “civil” or “societal” security as a new and novel “emerging market”. Unlike the European Commission, however, which strongly incentivised the growth of a European industry and have come to perceive technology as the general “solution” and quick-fix to various insecurities, the Swedish government never intervened to a similar extent among its domestic security- and defence firms. Rather, with its turn to an “off-the-shelf”-focused R&D policy, it had stepped down from its previous role as the central funder and procurer of security technologies. It was up to a public-private pressure groups, industrialists and specific agency spokespersons to play a symbolic game and seek recognition, but without the strong support structures of the state.

Instead of trying to make civil technologies into a wholly separate and autonomous market for security, more successful proved the idea to embed and integrate a lot of these already “dual” technologies into military production, and thereby closely associate “societal security” with arms export. Perhaps seeing the opportunities in blurring the civil-military areas further, it became a key point for lobby groups to insist that these technologies were to be defined by the ISP not as “war munitions”, nor “other munitions”, not even “dual-use”, but kept completely unregulated. Societal security commodities, in other words, emerged not as a market in its own right, but as a key stake in struggles between industrialists and regulators over how to negotiate the role of “emerging technologies” in the context of weapons manufacture and arms trade.

The following chapter will therefore analyse the specific role of emerging “societal” or “civil” security technologies for the arms industry today in a transnational context of R&D and export. Focusing more directly on the case of Saab, it will be discussed how arms companies not only expanded into the European border industry, the ESRP, and other international collaborations around emerging technologies, but also realised from the very beginning the complementary role
of these products for their “core” operations, namely arms trade. Having established civil security as a specific product segment in the mid 00s, Saab eventually saw how this area could function as a way to absorb new and even more advanced innovations, and how it could create the appearance of moving to “softer” areas of engineering; indeed, like a “humane” façade behind which to continue negotiating major military contracts together with the Swedish state. “The technological driving force is today much stronger outside the defence industry than within it”, SOFF now claims, referring to how the technological “landscape” is changing rapidly and how new military innovations increasingly stem not from internal R&D, but more and more from civil engineering, computer science, and areas like nanotechnology, robotics, big data, 3D modelling, and so on. The Swedish industry “needs better and more effective tools for implementing and realising new critical technology”, they argue (SOFF 2015c, 9). What this means in practice, and how it has been picked up not merely by Saab but by the plethora of organisations and individuals with a stake in Swedish arms export, will now be explored further.
CHAPTER 6
THE CIVIL PARADOX
Emerging security technologies and Swedish arms trade

What's that in the air? The Swedish guns
And what is that right there? That's Swedish guns
Let's have a second look; It's Swedish guns
Must be by the book; It's Swedish guns

— The Radio Dept., “Swedish Guns”.

The expansion into beyond-military technology has been one of the most fundamental changes to Western arms industries in recent decades (Guittet and Jeandesboz 2010b, 237; Hoijtink 2014, 466). Companies like Thales in France, BAE Systems in the UK, Leonardo in Italy, and Saab in Sweden have all, for their own various reasons, increasingly moved beyond their core of military products and services, towards emerging dual-use or civil technologies drawing on multi-sensors, radars, infrared optics, unmanned vehicles, artificial intelligence, algorithms, data interoperability, and more. Their technological expansions target not the battlefield, but the so-called “emerging market for civil security” introduced in the previous chapter; a “market” linked in turn to practices of crisis management, counterterrorism, surveillance, and border control. Again, in Europe, this industry was propelled into existence via a series of multi-billion research and development programmes, strategically crafted over several years on top EU-level by the European Commission, hand-in-hand with industry representatives and lobby organisations (C. Jones 2017; Hayes 2009; Bigo and Jeandesboz 2010; Chapter 2, this volume).

The determined effort to foster a “lucrative and globally competitive ‘homeland security’ industry in Europe” (Hayes 2006, 13) is not to say, however, that the field has undergone a strict “to-from” kind of transformation: from Cold War military practice aimed at defending sovereign territory to internal security practices aimed at preempting terrorist attacks or hindering mobility. Arms companies, as well as their clients, have not made a radical turn, a total reconfiguration, nor did new security SMEs suddenly replace the old military multinationals. Rather, these two different sets of actors and technologies seem to have been coupled, forming a space organised around a kind of double violence: Today there are, on the one hand, certain logics of scope, deterrence, coercion, the physical, the “military”; on the other, certain logics of speed, preemption, smartness, the virtual,
the “civil” – two logics that, while still different and distinctive, are now increasingly put to work together and simultaneously in Western societies. The transformation of defence- and security industries has in fact not been about a transition from one logic to another, but rather an entanglement of different technologies applicable interchangeably by both military and police, for both external and internal use. As persistently argued by Bigo (2014, 2016b), the field of security professionals today is a fundamentally heterogeneous one, constituted by both “heirs” and “challengers”, and embeds and intertwines different logics and techniques of violence and control that put fundamental freedoms and rights (not least those of mobility and citizenship) out of the equation.

Jones and Johnson (2016) acknowledge the coupling by which civil and military technologies become “two sides of the same coin”, and find evidence of this in the area of border management. They write that since borders are not simply lines on a map, but in reality constitute vast stretches of land and sea, their management have become an increasingly militarised affair in which radars, sensors, cameras, UAVs, barbed wires, and concrete walls are combined with interoperable digital databases for policing at a distance. This creates an environment which practitioners like to perceive as a model “for ‘total awareness’ and ‘effective control’ over the entire border zone” (194), but which is perhaps more an ongoing process of diffusing and displacing different forms of control and coercion across territory. Similarly, and again in the context of post-Cold War border governance, Follis (2017, 1003) argues that traditional techniques for monitoring frontier zones (e.g. watchtowers and remote tracking) in coalescence with new facets of border control (e.g. biometrics) have rendered a form of “transterritorial vision”, a surveillance-based “system-of-systems” involving security agencies, private manufacturers, and public decisionmakers.

Politically, behind all of these recent developments, what seems to be the principal idea – no, the ideological conviction – is that technology is the drive, the key and quick fix to all forms of “security issues”, be they refugees or invading armies (Karampekios and Oikonomou 2018, 200). A sense of security is, somehow, supposed to be mediated and enabled not by broad democratic participation, but by technical solutions, systems, innovations, indeed products made and sold by an industry. This can be read both as a technocratic attempt to neutralise controversial practices and move them away from debate and scrutiny, conflating “security” with a neoliberal understanding of freedom and progress, as well as a form of technological politics in itself, as an attempt to inscribe security- and surveillance artefacts with intentions “similar to legislative acts or political foundings that establish a framework for public order that will endure over many generations” (Dafoe 2015, 1053; citing Winner 1980, 29; see also McCarthy 2013)

In any case, the major beneficiaries of this political line of technologisation have been those who are typically at the forefront of state-of-the-art product development, namely, the arms
industry. To repeat a few key points from Chapter 2, the EU’s “emerging civil security market” is far from balanced or for that matter purely “civilian”, and has always leaned towards the specific interests of arms dealers. Not only have these actors profited substantially from refugee crises and the hardening of the Schengen borders in recent years (Akkerman 2016), but for several decades, they and their policy-allies have all had a consistent interest in making the European Union into a “Security Union”. Acknowledging this interest, company CEOs and lobbyists were invited by EU officials to participate in “high-level expert groups” for shaping the early stages of its civil security R&D programme (Calvo Rufanges 2016; C. Jones 2017; Vranken 2017), a programme presented “as a stepping stone, crossing the line between (civil) security and military research” (Akkerman 2018, 351). By moving into security R&D in the early 2000s, not only did arms firms explore spaces for “spinning off”, “diversifying”, “spilling over” into related technologies, but some argue that their involvement also strongly contributed politically to paving the way for EU’s forthcoming (and very similar, but even larger) defence R&D programme, an initiative which explicitly breaks the “long-held mantra” of “exclusively civilian” R&D priorities (Karampekios, Oikonomou, and Carayannis 2018, 2; see also James 2018).

Positioning itself right amongst the above issues, this chapter will investigate in detail the notion of “civil security” in arms industries, its trajectory of emergence, the multiple roles it is able to play for specific companies, and how it can be wielded strategically; in a technological sense as well as socio-politically. The chapter will, however, avoid the evolutionist tendencies in some of the work cited above, refusing the idea that different technologies for “security” and “defence” can simply synthesize into some grand practice. Rather than in harmony, it is more fruitful to view them as in competition and highlight how emerging technologies, while peripheral, are contesting the established ones. Furthermore, I reject a continuist view on this industry’s development, and suggestions that it (particularly in Europe) moved from defence to security and then back again. I stress, instead, how these different practices have been related throughout history; always with some proximity to each other and involved in a struggle over doxa. Finally, previous work has also tended to limit itself to “European level”-thinking, e.g. by departing from EU R&D programmes but not sufficiently analysing the position-takings of some of the actors involved therein. Indeed, there are still few empirically driven accounts that think transversally about how the notion of “civil” is at work within and for specific arms firms, both within and outside the European region. I will here address these gaps, and the following related questions: How did civil security emerge as a way to create the appearance of a transition from strictly military R&D, to seemingly “softer” and “less militarised” (and thus less contentious) areas of technological development? How is it mobilising technologies that creep between application areas, and thereby (perhaps unwittingly, perhaps
creatively) circumvent arms classifications and disturb dual-use regulations? What are the links between civil security, arms export, and human rights?

To explore these questions in depth, this chapter continues the analysis of the transforming Swedish defence- and security industry in the early 2000s, and the specific role of its largest security- and defence firm, Saab. As mentioned, Sweden is usually found somewhere in the global the global top three when arms export is estimated per capita, as its military sales saw a gradual yet substantial increase during the 00s and 10s. Notably, a large percentage of these exports is made up by Saab's sales to undemocratic regimes like Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates (UAE), or to governments with a general lack of respect for fundamental human rights such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brazil. Swedish arms trade regulation to these and other countries continues to lag behind, and emerging technologies further problematise the picture. As I will show below, instead of packaging their civil technologies for the Swedish security market, industry actors like Saab sought primarily to embed and integrate a lot of these already “dual” technologies into military manufacturing, thereby closely associating their “societal security”-products with arms trade. This chapter departs empirically from a series of interviews with high-level employees at Saab, as well as with Swedish civil servants and industry representatives involved in security R&D and arms export. Secondary sources have also been consulted, alongside journalistic accounts of recent military export affairs.

Saab’s first organised attempt at diversifying or “spinning off” into not commercial-, nor purely civilian-, but civil security technologies came around 2005. Having realised that they could not simply “repaint camouflaged products” and “call them civil” (Interview: Jernbäcker), but that they needed “clean sheets, new crayons” in order to be truly competitive (Interview: Dahlgaard), Saab established a dedicated sales unit, project leader, development budget, and product catalogue organised specifically around civil security. For Saab and many other European firms, however, the push towards civil security was less of a conscious spin-off strategy, and more of a compromise and reaction to wider trends like shrinking military orders, changing procurement standards and “off-the-shelf”-policies, and increasingly drained national R&D budgets. In Sweden, the 2006 government decision which essentially blocked indigenous R&D funding urged actors like Saab

67 While this segment is labelled “civil security” in the English versions of Saab's annual reports, online press releases, and product brochures, it is often referred to in Swedish as “societal security” (samhällssäkerhet), presumably in order to better align it with the prevalent domestic policy discourse (see e.g. Saab 2015a, iii). This product segment constitutes around 15-20% of the annual revenue, or up to GBP 500 million per year (Saab 2018a, 2015a; Interview: Adolfsson). A company representative notes that while multi-billion deals such as the JAS 39 Gripen fighter jets are difficult to predict, civil security sales, these so-called “bread and butter-deals that bring in from one up to about ten million [SEK]”, form the foundation of Saab’s turnover (Interview: Rylander).
and FOI to look elsewhere, towards transnational research consortiums and other industrial partnerships (Chapter 5, this volume). As noted, the Commission began facilitating and funding exactly such security-related R&D projects under the “Secure Societies”-thematic area of its framework programme. Echoing almost word for word the EU’s security agenda and “Group of Personalities”-report from the same period, Saab’s civil security project leader predicted in 2005 that

[it]he future is not only defence but also societal security. Previously, it was about protecting national borders, but now it is about securing flows of people, goods, and information from terrorists, organised crime, and natural disasters (Braconier 2005).

It is precisely to this suggestion the next section will turn, as I will position the case of Saab in the context of civil security R&D, and analyse how they interpreted and commodified notions of “societal” or “civil” security, how their central products in this area emerged, where they have been developed and sold, and finally, how they can be understood as scalable systems; as platforms adaptable in terms of scope and application, enabling multiple enactments of violence and control, in the prison and at the border. Here, I demonstrate how advanced civil engineering innovations are increasingly absorbed by military producers, causing a technological undertow and a reversed form of spin-off which cannot be sufficiently interpreted with the traditional dual-use framework, and which causes complications from an export regulation point of view. The second section will then expand this discussion and present examples of how industry- and state representatives have been able to wield the flexible label of “civil” both socially and politically. Here, I argue that the notion of “civil” serves as a façade with which arms firms can attract professionals and avoid controversies, a façade behind which they can continue to promote and sell other and far more profitable military products, especially in fragile regimes in the global south.

CIVIL SECURITY AS SCALABILITY: DETENTION, POLICING, BORDERS

Many arms companies, including Saab and other multinationals like Thales and BAE Systems, have worked hard to rebrand themselves into a defence and security firm in recent decades; as not only a fighter jet-, tank-, or cannon manufacturer, but also as key suppliers of various crisis management- and counterterrorism tools. Beyond arms-classified products, their civil security niche have come to be, perhaps naturally, products for “critical applications in society” including national borders and “ports of entry” (e.g. harbours, airports, container terminals), as well as prisons, detention centres, and police organisations (Interview: De Laval). By focusing on “system-critical” functions,
they could engage in publicly funded civil security R&D projects, and begin developing products that in fact were not too far from their core of technologies with military legacies. This is precisely what occurred when the Swedish industry entered into the European security R&D programme, as Saab and FOI came to be the country’s largest recipients of EU funding over the duration of the ESRP.

For example, Saab coordinated one of the most extensive consortiums of the 7th framework programme, IMSK (“integrated mobile security kit”), which ran between 2009-2013. Developing products for area surveillance, riot management, checkpoint control, CBRN(E) detection, and “VIP protection”, IMSK sought to produce “a mobile system for rapid deployment at venues and sites (hotels, sport/festival arenas, etc.)” (CORDIS 2013) and in “asymmetrical situations” such as “Olympic Games, EU summits and other medium- to large scale events requiring temporary enhanced security”. The project saw an arms company mobilising “police and counterterrorist operatives from several EU nations” for “field trials”, such as a large-scale simulation of an EU summit in Chelmsford, UK, during which 3D facial recognition and sniper scope detection sensors were introduced alongside a new radar that could see through walls (Saab 2012; Army Technology 2012). Another EU project where Saab was a key stakeholder developed technologies for remotely overtaking control of civil airplanes from an air traffic control tower in case of terrorist hijackings (Braconier 2005). Finally, Saab and several other European arms firms including Airbus, Boeing, and Indra also participated in the major project PERSEUS (“protection of European seas and borders through the intelligent use of surveillance”) which focused on “maritime surveillance system integrating existing national and communitarian technologies and enhancing them with innovative technologies”, or as Akkerman (2018, 350) notes, “basically what EUROSUR is about” (see also Suchman, Follis, and Weber 2017; Hayes and Vermeulen 2012; Heller and Jones 2014).

Due to a general lack of profit coming out of the EU’s consortium-led projects, many arms firms eventually started to invest their own funds into civil security R&D. Allocating a quite tangible 23% of their annual income to internal R&D, Saab for example set up a university collaboration in Australia involving around 400 engineers for the development of new camera-, sensor-, and network technologies, among other things. Assembled into a maximum surveillance system named “OneView”, this package was marketed and sold extensively to the booming Australian prison-

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68 As explained by Heller and Jones (2014, 9), EUROSUR, or the European Border Surveillance System, “is an information collection and exchange system intended to provide precise ‘situational awareness’ so that border guards can ‘detect, identify, track and intercept’ irregular migrants”. In practice, this means that it seeks to detect small boats used by migrants by “assembling data gathered through cutting-edge remote sensing technologies – such as drones, radars, and satellites – and combining the information generated by national authorities located on both sides of the Mediterranean” (ibid.).
and refugee detention industry. It was also offered to other “critical” or “high-risk” sites such as government agencies, embassies, power stations, casinos, and military bases. Used in on-site or remote control rooms, OneView is a “high security facility management” system for controlling any function of any building requiring visual awareness and strict perimeter control. The functions can include e.g. doors and gates, lighting and heating, intercoms and alarms, audio- and video streams from CCTV and body-worn cameras with facial recognition, searchable personal records, and virtually anything carrying a sensor. Indeed, like bringing the hardware concept of “plug-and-play” into the surveillance world, the OneView parent-hub integrates all of these subsystems into a single encrypted workstation and interface, giving the operator (near) real-time control of the site’s inhabitants (Saab 2017b; Security Electronics and Networks 2011; Saab 2017c; Interview: Adolfsson).

Since the early 2010s, this panopticon-esque system has been installed by Saab in around 30 government buildings and prison complexes in Australia and New Zealand, including the Grafton site which will become the largest prison in the region (Saab 2018b, see also 2014). Furthermore, Saab has also trained guards to operate the very same system at refugee camps such as the Northam Immigration Detention Centre, or “Yongah Hill”, which holds a mix of criminal convicts, asylum seekers, visa “overstayers”, and Hazara, Tamil, and Bangladeshi boat refugees transferred from the Christmas Island camps (Sontec 2012; DeRosa 2012). Yongah Hill has seen a series of violent protests by detainees (Young 2015; Echonetdaily 2015), and the Australian Refugee Rights Action Network has accused the government of deliberately turning “what is meant to be a non-punishment detention centre into a prison” (Perpitch 2017), e.g. by procuring not only maximum surveillance systems from Saab, but also electric fences, concrete walls, and “hardened beds” to reduce “criminal elements” (K. Diss 2017).

Redeveloped for the EU and UK markets, the OneView-system became scaled up and renamed “SAFE”, a closely related “incident control system” drawing on the same rationale of integrating subsystems into a centralised hub. SAFE works on a far wider scale than OneView, though, as its application area is not an isolated facility or campus, but an entire city or region. Correspondingly, the customer is not a single prison or security firm, but entire councils or boroughs. Sold to UK police organisations in Cheshire, Warwickshire, West Mercia, Cumbria, and London, the SAFE surveillance hub is complemented with detailed area maps and live traffic data, mobile applications for officers in the field, and the ability to link up with additional surveillance databases, including criminal records. Furthermore, a central function in the UK is that SAFE also integrates the country’s enormous CCTV network, transferring the electric eyes of the city to a single screen in the control room, giving the operator the ability to take over the live feed from any
CCTV post, guard vest, or car dashboard, from any square or street corner in the city, at any time (Interview Dahlgaard; see also Saab 2010, 2016). A version of SAFE was also installed in other countries ahead of various mega-events, like the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa where the platform was linked up with Saab-manufactured “Skeldar” UAVs, and became the central tool for synchronising over 16,000 police officers for scenarios like violent hooliganism or terrorist bombings (Saab 2015b; SecurityWorldMarket.com 2009). Peculiarly enough, in all these cases, it is of course not a state institution but a private actor and arms producer which seeks to commodify and streamline the policing of public space, in countries that already have some of the most extensive surveillance apparatuses in the world (see also T. Jones and Newburn 1998).

In terms of their “plug-and-play” setup, the site-specific or city-wide surveillance systems can be associated further with long-range radar systems for border surveillance. For example, Saab’s “Coastwatch” package (initially developed as “NetCentric” and strongly resembling the PERSEUS project and the logic of EUROSUR) works through the very same open architecture design of linking up and integrating different sensors and feeds into a common infrastructure, relaying not CCTV cameras but wireless data from e.g. watchtowers, ground- or naval-based radars, drones, and airplanes. Described as a scaled-up version of OneView and SAFE, and marketed specifically for border police and Mediterranean coastguards, this system operates in “high risk areas” and uses “dense surveillance systems, multi-sensors, watchtowers, and UAVs” like Skeldar. Furthermore, “solutions can be applied in the most difficult topographical areas especially in Southern and Eastern Europe” (SecurityWorldMarket.com 2008 [emphasis added]; Saab 2017a).

Unable to share specific contract details, Saab representatives claim to have “sold several systems” akin to Net Centric/Coastwatch, including “radars and optics”, to national coastguards as well as to EU agencies with the explicit purpose of surveillance of the “green” (land) and “blue” (maritime) Schengen borders (Interview: Jernbäcker). What is likely being included or considered in these deals are also Saab’s different “airborne early warning and control” (AEW&C) systems (usually Ericsson-built radars, mounted on-top of the turboprop plane Saab 340/2000). These have recently been updated with the capability to identify small sea vessels and “low-flying targets”. For example, at a Brussels seminar on EU’s external borders in 2013, Saab showcased this aircraft including its “high-resolution TV-camera and electro-optical sensors capable of detecting … people at sea”, and invited Frontex’ head of capacity building to explain how to combine these surveillance technologies with “remotely piloted aircraft” (drones) in order to create a so-called “common pre-frontier intelligence picture” including “[satellite] data collected as far away as Libya, Syria or Mali” (Nielsen 2013). Packaged as “Erieye” or “GlobalEye” depending on type of plane,
this AEW&C system is simultaneously sold to and used by regimes like Saudi Arabia and the UAE as an airborne military control station and missile guidance tool.

Asked about the future of civil-military technologies, both in terms of development and application, interviewees envision a convergence of exactly this kind; that is, an intermeshing of different technologies (radars, multi-sensors, optics, control hubs) for the policing of borders against refugees or “less advanced antagonists” (Interview: Adolfsson; Jernbäcker). This kind of “technology-creep” can be linked to the military term mission-creep, referring to battlefield operations that receive new objectives and take directions that were not originally intended. For example, this is how the DHS’ “fusion centres” have been described; intended originally as an information sharing centre across various levels government strictly for counterterrorism purposes, they have now mutated “into ‘all-crimes’ and ‘all-hazards’ organisations” and mass surveillance centres potentially violating the civil rights of US citizens (Monahan 2009).

In fact, Saab’s chief technology officer claims that after only a rough decade on the societal security market, their engineers already find it easier to depart from civil technologies and “add layers of security” to these products. Or, to reuse an analogy from earlier, rather than repainting military products, Saab increasingly prefers to develop something as a civil security solution to begin with, and then “paint it in camouflage” by adding higher levels of encryption and reliability. For Saab, the foundations for their current security- and defence systems have come increasingly from civil R&D projects which have been “more or less separated from military development”, e.g. via their cybersecurity consultancy firm Combitech (Interview: De Laval). Furthermore, they claim,

if you look at how we build our military control systems, we make use of more and more civil technology. We are forced to do this in order to keep up ... We see an amazing development linked to Amazon,69 Google, and others, and their investments into these large data centres ... so today, we build most of our cutting-edge control systems for military application based on such data centre technologies. We use more and more open-source code, and try to adopt exactly the work methods and technologies coming out of this strong development, with the logic that if not, we would be totally smoked ... Then you could say that we add layers of security on this foundation, as you are required to take that aspect up a

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69 A company until recently not recognised as “security-related”, Amazon “officially entered the surveillance business” in 2018: “Rekognition”, a facial recognition technology powered by artificial intelligence, which can “identify, track, and analyse people in real time and recognize up to 100 people in a single image [and] quickly scan information it collects against databases featuring tens of millions of faces”, is currently sold to law enforcers and state agencies, enabling them to monitor “persons of interest” (Cagle and Ozer 2018; see also Bures and Carrapico 2017).
notch when it comes to military application … What we will see in front of us, I believe, is a gradual migration, where we, if we succeed, may have a common platform for both our military and civil systems (ibid.).

SOFF’s chief lobbyist echoes, in turn, that arms companies now increasingly “try to pick up and absorb [technology] from universities and the civil market to see how to integrate it”, so as to not miss out on innovations that would otherwise go into the police or coastguard, or even the customs enforcement and emergency services (Interview: Limmergård). The same representative also predicted that the future arms manufacturer will most likely be seen as a “system integrator”, as someone contracting specialists of e.g. high-technological sensors who in turn could be largely indifferent to whether these are installed on driverless cars or combat vehicles. With the increased importance of system integration skills, a civil engineering company like ÅF in Sweden, with otherwise little to no involvement in the arms industry, “could very well be the next supplier of a fighter jet, since it is no longer about being able to manufacture, for instance, the landing gear … but about understanding how to integrate everything” (ibid.).

The surveillance-oriented command and control systems are poignant examples both of this integration-focus, and of the ambiguity of technologies which allows them to creep back and forth between applications and jurisdictions. The systems receive different names depending on context and customer, move between vastly different operational areas, and overlap with and combine both civil- and military technological legacies. Crucially, this opens up for a situation wherein public funds (which were never supposed to reach military production) are able to go into development of modular technologies, the “raw ingredients” of a system, such as sensors, detectors, or software, which can then in turn be absorbed and transferred around internally within a major arms company, scaled up, and added with “security layers” for military optimisation. The logics of diversification and spin-off have in other words been reversed, or given a new departure point. Where previously it may have been the intention to pacify military technology, to find uses for it elsewhere in society, it seems just as much the case today that arms firms rebrand themselves, consecrate so-called “civil security”-segments, and look towards these technologies partly because they form necessarily new sources of profit and R&D funding, but also because of their rapid development, increased sophistication, and fundamental relevance for military products. Arguably, the traditional role and application of the dual-use framework also becomes disturbed, as this is a case not of civilian...

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70 As part of the so-called Wassenaar Arrangement (see e.g. https://www.wassenaar.org), the current dual-use framework was designed and established in Europe around 1995. It consists of a detailed and ever-expanding list of technologies, usually developed in civil contexts for civilian application (e.g. infrared optics.
technology ending up with potentially destructive effects or trickling into violent contexts, but of military firms actively looking towards, absorbing, drawing out or replicating, adding layers to, and scaling up apparently non-destructive civil innovations (e.g. sensors) to a level of potentially violent application (e.g. border control).

Perhaps for this reason, “civil security” is rarely, if ever, delimited or defined by arms manufacturers, nor are their catalogues split into neat categories of “civil” and “military” offerings. Rather, they prefer to talk about “security issues”, “application areas”, or simply “client needs”. FOI’s head of civil security research, for example, claims that the they never define a project as either civil or military these days, but that they “view it as technological research towards a specific application”.

“We have nothing against the [civil] application. It is relevant for us as well … Research on a particular signal enhancer, a particular component, may certainly be a part of a radar system just as well as a civil communication radio. It becomes very basic” (Interview: Frennberg).

Depending on the type of business opportunity at hand, a drone like Saab’s Skeldar could be presented both as a military product for battlefield reconnaissance, as well as a “civil” or “hybrid” application for the monitoring of e.g. migrant routes, coastlines, power grids, pipelines, major events, or guerrilla groups (Wennberg 2006; Interview: Adolfsson). Thus, the line between what is military and what is civil cannot be drawn with a technical or even legal definition, but should be seen as always in flux, determined rather by how such notions become translated into technologies and used in practice. “It is never crystal clear how a particular product, service, or piece of knowledge will be used” Hagelin (1985, 152–53) notes, drawing attention to the example of the Swedish airplane MFI-9 which was exported to Nigeria during the Biafran War in the 1960s. The main purpose of these planes was to drop humanitarian supplies in conflict zones, but it turned out that the MFI-9 could very easily be modified for dropping bombs instead.

This section has studied the role of “civil security” in the development, framing, and assembling of certain technologies into concrete products for a company like Saab. I have made two central points. First, arms firms make no secret of their intentions of profiting from the late modern border- and surveillance society and the booming demand of policing- and surveillance tools, immigration detention systems, long-distance border patrolling as well as “port of entry” control. Rather, these have become as a central tenet for defence firms’ survival strategy in face of falling domestic orders and decreased public spending on military R&D in recent years. Second, a closer examination showed how Saab, in particular, are able to diffuse these technologies in integration-friendly “hubs” or “platforms” or “systems” that via a logic of scalability manage to for heat detection), but which may also be applied in military contexts (e.g. installed on a drone for target detection), and which should there be subject to national export controls.
creep rather indiscernibly between practical applications and normative and legal frames: from close inspection of detainees, to policing of urban environments, to surveillance of boat refugees, to military reconnaissance and missile guidance. Like most arms firms experimenting with civil technologies, Saab never moved beyond its military core, however, and civil security will most likely remain a peripheral “15%-segment” in terms of annual revenue. Socio-politically, however, it contains major opportunities, as it can serve as a façade behind which they continue to focus on arms trade. The next section will turn to these issues.

**ARMS EXPORT, HUMAN RIGHTS, & WIELDING THE “CIVIL”**

With regards to arms trade negotiations and export promotion campaigns, the notion of civil security has a central function. Arms export promotion in Sweden is currently undertaken by a coalition of actors meeting regularly under the loose label of “Team Sweden”, including spokespersons from the ministry of foreign affairs, the embassies, private defence- and security industry, and a public-private export organisation called Business Sweden (Interview: Rudebark; Bengtcén). Team Sweden works as the central marketing-, branding-, and communication platform for the industry, as well as the main channel through which to handle direct business requests from foreign customers. The Team Sweden group uses “civil security” mainly as a way to emphasise the “key selling point” of its industry abroad; namely, its technological width and comprehensiveness, and high level of innovation, claiming that

> from a size- and population perspective, [Sweden] is a midget [sic] globally, a nobody … If you look at innovation, on the other hand, we are an international giant … especially when it comes high-tech businesses such as defence and security, people tend to listen to Sweden … What [we] can do, business-wise, is to highlight the brand-name ‘Sweden’ … so that, if [companies] enter the market under our Team Sweden-flag, people go ‘oh, here come the Swedes’ (Interview: Rudebark).

In practice, this is often done by organising “pavilions” at trade fairs like Eurosatory in Paris, DSEi in London, LAAD in Rio de Janeiro, and MSPO in Kielce. These fairs, Vranken (2017, 9) notes, are “enormous meeting places which thousands of visitors attend, including tens of official delegations. These fairs not only function as markets for buying and selling military equipment, but also as ideal places for industry and policy makers to meet and discuss policies”. Ahead of the MSPO exhibition in Poland in 2016, Team Sweden sent out company invitations detailing how the fee of SEK 50,000 would include not only a dedicated booth around the pavilion, but also a pre-
mapping of “business opportunities and partners”, a tailored meeting schedule with prospective clients and customers, and access to a separate conference room in the middle of the 80 m² pavilion (Business Sweden 2016a, 2016b). Team Sweden invites a selection of up to 12 different SMEs to the pavilions, and with their predominantly civil security or dual-use focus, they showcase products such as police- and guard uniforms, red-dot scopes, and border fences, as well as services like risk consultancy, testing and evaluation, and more. Most arms fair organisers tend to separate national pavilions from major companies like Lockheed Martin and Airbus. Team Sweden, however, have insisted in recent years that their civil security-oriented pavilion is to be placed right next to Saab (and their strategic UK partner BAE Systems) (Figure 6.1). This way, they can emphasise the appearance of a “team” consisting of cutting-edge military and civil systems, and may more easily pass prospective customers between the two booths, and effectively, between the two pools of technologies (Army Recognition 2016; SOFF 2015b, 2017a, 2018; see also S. T. Jackson 2017).

Saab … appreciates and supports the Team Sweden-idea [and] our ambition is always to be as close to Saab as we can. We have also increasingly started to brief them about [our participants] so if someone approaches them, since they’re always a big attraction, they can say ‘sorry, we don’t have that product, but you can go over to [Team Sweden]” (Interview: Rudebark).

Notions of “width” and “comprehensiveness” have also been used for promotion purposes at Swedish embassies. In partnership with Team Sweden, embassies in fact play an essential role for incentivising arms trade, e.g. by scoping out local politicians and ministers, potential partners, and upcoming procurement deals, as well as for facilitating state visits, business seminars, and G2G/B2G negotiations (Interview: Bengtcéen). Gaining access to a significant source of symbolic authority, the Swedish industry here gets to do business, pitch weapons- and surveillance systems, network and mingle with key decision makers in an orderly and “official” context, in an embassy environment, surrounded by Swedish civil servants and national symbols. For example, the three Baltic countries are currently in the process of hardening their eastern Schengen borders with Russia and Belarus, investing around EUR 100 million in a range of commodities, from physical barriers to digital systems (Interview: Rudebark). Team Sweden was informed by the Estonian ambassador and local trade secretaries about the upcoming contracts, and began curating a “package” of Swedish companies, products, and services, putting together what they called a “one-
stop shop”, that is, an *entire infrastructure*, for border security.\(^{71}\) Presented to the Baltic border- and customs enforcement agencies, the package consisted of Saab, Ericsson, eight SMEs, and offered Net Centric-styled systems, scanning equipment for cars and bags, guard uniforms with bodycams, so-called “smart fences” with heat sensors distinguishing human- from animal movement, drones, and more. The one-stop shop strategy deployed by Swedish export promoters goes perfectly in line with how many private security companies (G4S, for instance) are trying to create the perception of an “all-rounder”, taking care of everything from armed missions to VIP-protection,

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\(^{71}\) Similar hand-picked infrastructure packages including the “whole palette” of civil-, military- and dual-use products have supposedly been showcased also at the embassies in Portugal and Spain, addressing the Gibraltar border (Interview: Rudebark).
maritime surveillance, UAV maintenance, and humanitarian assistance (Prem 2018, 66). For this to work for an arms industry, however, the notion of “civil” has to be carefully wielded.

Another selling point of the Swedish defence- and security industry is the country’s “good reputation”\(^\text{72}\) as not only technologically comprehensive, but also as a progressive, humanitarian, moral superpower which is supposedly still “neutral”: “not too close to the Americans, not a post-Soviet state” (Interview: Rudebark). The Swedish Trade Council’s (2012) survey on defence- and security exports claims that “[o]ur respect for human rights and our relative neutrality makes it easier to work in an international environment”, and the ministry of foreign affairs claims that as a security supplier Sweden signals “quality, transparency, long-term relations”, and that its “tradition of being a peace-building and multi-lateral actor” is an important tool for promoting arms

\(^{72}\) For example, the “Reputation Institute”, which claims to measure social- and economic policies as well as “ethics and perception of corruption, aesthetic-beauty, and ‘feel-good’ factor”, crowned Sweden as “the most reputable country in the world”. In line with Team Sweden’s marketing strategies, the institute claims that “the more you can integrate around a common theme, cultural values, around a common backstory on what your country stands for, the more effective the message, and ultimately the more powerfully that will be translated into your reputation” (Pitofsky 2018).
Along these lines, the draft design of the Team Sweden pavilion for MSPO curiously includes national symbols, a cheering crowd waving Swedish flags, as well as a picture of the famous Swedish children’s book character Pippi Longstocking (Figure 6.2). Arguably, it is precisely this sort of Pippi-image that the Swedish arms industry wants to convey; “small but strong”. These narratives function precisely like “strategic communication” in the corporate world: “coordinated use of activities designed to make the corporate entity ‘look good’, such as marketing, advertising, public relations, and community relations” (Brooks 2016, 84). Of course, “marketers needn’t care if their product is ‘good’ (or healthy, or durable, or safe, or whatever) – their goal is simply to make sure people buy it, regardless of its actual value” (ibid.).

In information folders, on their website, and all over the LED-screens in their office foyers, Saab’s corporate “vision” is presented as “IT IS A HUMAN RIGHT TO FEEL SAFE”. Ignoring the fact that “feeling safe” is not amongst the UN articles of human rights, and that security is in fact not an inexplicable feeling but a practice, the company frames itself discursively in the same way as the Team Sweden group, draws on the same nation-brand of being human rights advocates, and makes the same strategic links between security and technology. Indeed, technology is posed as key for achieving their goal of “keeping society and people safe”, as Saab’s “mission” becomes that of “pushing mental and technological boundaries” (Saab 2018c). As noted in the previous section, the latter is “pushed” by means of scalability, the overall ambiguity surrounding modern security products, and a creative approach towards legal and normative frameworks. The “mental” boundary is pushed with the perversion of words, by presenting themselves, a weapons dealer, as a supplier of safety and human rights. As Prem (2018, 52) notes, this kind of discursive framing – here exercised by both public and private actors – is a sign that arms industries are “actively seeking to influence public perceptions about what or who they ‘really’ are”, as an attempt to vindicate its reputation “by purveying a feel-good image as ‘new humanitarians’”.

One of the clearer ways in which the “civil” is wielded for arms export purposes is in trade delegations. Government-led delegations travel frequently from Sweden to countries such as India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and parts of Africa and the Middle East, as well as to other EU member states. Delegation participants consist not only of ministers, civil servants, and agency officials, but usually also of representatives from the Investor-sphere and some of its largest firms in the arms sector. To avoid controversy and critical media- and civil society scrutiny, however, when an arms company is travelling side-by-side with state representatives to countries in the global south, which can very well be unstable or undemocratic regimes, or outright dictatorships, it tends to masquerade as having purely “civil” intentions. Delegation representatives frequently stress that Saab, for instance, are there only to explore opportunities related to e.g. the tourism- and travel industry,
airport security, traffic management, or critical infrastructure more generally. Exactly this occurred in 2016, when a delegation including Saab travelled to the Philippines for trade talks in connection to the opening of a new embassy in Manila. The Philippines, it should be noted, is an increasingly brutal regime with numerous reports of human rights violations\textsuperscript{73} in recent years such as torture and extrajudicial killings in the infamous drug war, attacks on protestors and journalists, child labour, discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity, and is led by an autocratic leader in president Duterte who is frequently using violent and misogynistic rhetoric. Confronted by the media on why Sweden was apparently not only complicit in, but actively promoting, the arming of such as regime, the local ambassador downplayed the magnitude of the regime’s human rights abuses, and the press secretary of the Swedish minister for enterprise and energy\textsuperscript{74} stated that “this was a business trip with only civil elements” wherein Saab’s role was to “try to sell technology for the civil aircraft industry” (Forssblad and Mannheimer 2016 [emphasis added]). During the following two years, however, it became clear that the long-term aim of the trade talks was the upcoming Philippine procurement of 12 new fighter jets, as Saab admitted that their new Manila office (literally in the same corridor as the new embassy) had been set up exactly for this purpose, and that sales of “civil” security solutions, air traffic management, and surveillance systems were simply a step in this direction, a first move towards building a long-term business relation (ibid; Resare 2016; see also Government of Sweden 2017b). Eventually, in February of 2018, Sweden granted new arms export permits to the Philippines, including missile guidance and radar systems (i.e. Saab’s GlobalEye and Giraffe systems) (Holmqvist and Resare 2018). Here, the state acted in concert – if not secretly, than at least implicitly rather than explicitly – with the industry to obscure their true intentions. In response to these developments, the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society concluded that “fostering the Swedish defence industry’s sales requisites was, in practice, more important than human rights and democracy” (Lundström 2018). Furthermore, a former arms export officer admits that there is always a hierarchy at work in these cases, and regardless of how “civil security” is framed politically or bureaucratically, the “foundational question”, even today, is always about how to maintain Swedish defence capabilities by means of export (Interview: Küller). Sales of societal security or dual-use technologies are thus only relevant for the “bigger picture” if they can somehow contribute to larger deals.

\textsuperscript{73} See e.g. www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/philippines [accessed 12/03/19].

\textsuperscript{74} Shortly after the embassy opening, press secretary Ann Wolgers became recruited by Saab as head of their press centre.
This recent trip to India [in 2018], for example… It’s not always that you highlight a specific key business deal – usually you just talk about a ‘broad industrial cooperation’ – but in this case, it was definitely about the [JAS] Gripen affair, which could be a colossal breakthrough (ibid.).

Civil- and hybrid systems also serve a key role for maintaining the controversial business relation and export channel to the oppressive dictatorship of Saudi Arabia. As part of a weapons factory contract in 2011, Saab attempted to also sell the SAFE system; a policing tool which, in a state where political organisation and public protests are banned, could have been used for citizen surveillance and crowd control (Julander 2012; see also K.-J. Karlsson 2012). Despite these obvious issues, Saab and Swedish spokespersons downplayed SAFE as a mere “public safety”-system for “blue-light personnel”, and saw no problems in trying to include this in the larger deal which primarily concerned the GlobalEye package. GlobalEye, in turn, is classified by the Swedish regulatory system as belonging to the rather porous and flexible export permit category “other munitions”, which is supposed to include technologies of “non-destructive effects”, and which is therefore more freely exportable than outright weapon systems. As noted, GlobalEye is a radar- and sensor-based system which may be used both in warfare as well as for high-technological yet more “everyday” and “civil” contexts like border surveillance and counterterrorism. It is currently sold not only to Saudi, but also to the UAE whom together with Kuwait and Qatar form a Saudi-led coalition in their war with Yemen. In the Yemen war – “one of the largest humanitarian catastrophes today”, according to the Red Cross, with countless reports of civilian houses, schools, and hospitals being bombed – GlobalEye has been reported to be in use for missile guidance purposes (Tigerberg 2018; Wintour 2017; Al Jazeera 2018).75 “The most obvious tasking for [GlobalEye]”, a defence industry reporter commented at the time of contract signing, “is along Saudi Arabia's disputed border with Yemen. The system's ability to track low and slow-moving targets, along with its overland and maritime surveillance capabilities, is immensely valuable to the Kingdom” (Hewson 2010). Despite the so-called “democracy criteria” recently introduced into existing Swedish arms trade legislation as well as the general criteria of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), lobby campaigns and export permits to the Saudi coalition continue to be in place (Walan 2017).

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75 In April 2019, the NGO Disclose leaked several classified documents from the French ministry of defence. In a document which lists the weapon systems used in the Yemen conflict, Saab’s radar plane is included (Svahn 2019). See https://made-in-france.disclose.ngo/en/ [accessed 16/04/19].
The wielding of “civil” also enables a form of everyday militarisation, especially within the research- and higher education sector. Here, Saab representatives in fact admit that they use this product segment as a way to “soften” their military core, and for attracting and recruiting not only staff from policing firms like Securitas (Interview: Jernbäcker; see also K. Strand 2017), but also young and talented civil engineers.

I sense a new dawn when it comes to civil security. It feels new, fresh, it has a public benefit. It is something to attract new co-workers with … How are you thinking as a young person starting your employment at Saab? Is it ‘okay’ to work in arms manufacturing? … I therefore believe that when you have these [civil] products and offerings, you see much clearer that Saab actually works towards increasing societal security in general, making military products only one of our components … SAFE and these societal security-related products are rather pleasant to work with, and for luring in young people who may think that ‘Saab are only fighter jets’ (Interview: Rylander).

Again, in certain contexts, arms firms may necessarily want to downplay or even obscure some of their activities, for example by reframing their products not as weapons or arms, but as something far more ambiguous and multifaceted. Indeed, branding something “civil”- or “societal security” allows arms firms to stay undefinable and aloof towards their critics since “if nobody knows exactly what you do, then it’s hard to protest to or object to what you do” (Prem 2018, 68).

A contributing factor here, of course, is that with the increased focus on system integration and civil technologies, the arms industry has abandoned its old core of factory-based, blue collar workers and moved towards an office-based, white collar class of employees focusing on e.g. assembling modular technologies into “systems” or “platforms”. Here, what Bourdieu refers to as “technological capital” is at stake since dominant arms firms, in order to stay dominant, have been forced not only to diversify, but also recruit new and technically skilled staff, or merge with or acquire competitor firms (Bourdieu 2005, 203). Furthermore, in Mills’ work on the rise of white collar entities, he saw how these became made up by individuals with very specialised training, engaging in the provision of limited and circumscribed services, usually under strict supervision and within tightly defined project frames. Like other technically driven firms, arms companies thus acquire a bureaucratic logic by which everyday tasks are “parcelled out”, leaving its employees – a group of perhaps naïve civil engineers – with limited authority, understanding of, and influence over the overall organisation and interest of the company, even being discouraged of using their own independent judgement (Mills 1951, 141).
Arms firms can then masquerade as “technical experts”, “IT professionals”, “instructors”, or “educators” (Prem 2018, 68). In line with this, Saab established their own pre-college high school programme (gymnasium) in Arboga, Sweden in 2009. Here, company employees and consultants teach students aged 16-20 in engineering, mathematics, and business economics, and arrange a series of company visits and internship opportunities at Saab. A distinct career path is thereby carved out for teenagers who in turn are “expected to share the company’s values”. Nowhere in the curriculum are the words “military” or “defence” mentioned, rather, Saab is portrayed as a company working strictly with “security from a societal perspective”, focusing on e.g. “integrated systems”, “aerotechnics”, radar-, electrooptic-, microwave-, and communication technologies (Arboga Kommun and Saab 2015; see also Åkerström 2016, 51). From the very start of their higher education, students are thus enticed to associate security with technology; indeed, to equate something highly political with something seemingly apolitical and “neutral”.

CONCLUSION

Drawing on recent transformations of Western defence- and security industries, particularly with regards to the political context of Europe and specific actors from Sweden, this chapter has explored how arms manufacturers – forced to compromise and expand into related products in recent decades – have found a niche in “civil security”, and how this segment has not only proven to be an opportunistic new area of innovation and profit, but how it also has come to serve a significant socio-political function, often in the context of arms trade.

The first part of the analysis explored certain key examples of civil security products offered by the arms firm Saab. Their traits can be summarised in terms of scalability of scope of vision and control, referring to how the products – developed by Saab’s engineers not as weapons, but as “systems”, “platforms”, or “solutions” – are able to creep back and forth between defence- and security contexts. The surveillance-hubs of OneView, SAFE, and Net Centric, for instance, are all designed around a similar logic of modular integration of subsystems (“plug-and-play”), around a technical core which can be scaled up or down depending on customer needs or application area; be it a refugee camp or the entire Mediterranean Sea.

Out of this, questions emerged whether these systems are civil, military, dual-use, or neither? What exactly “is” a technological arrangement of different sensors, images, circuits, and signals, if it can be used interchangeably, with alterations, as tool for traffic management and perimeter control, as well as for aerial awareness and missile guidance? If it is indeed true that arms firms today increasingly and actively seek to absorb sophisticated solutions from the civil sector – or even from open-source software – how can a technology-creep be controlled? If arms companies
receive public funds to develop what they present as purely “civil” solutions, what stops them from transferring the raw technologies around internally within the firm or corporate group; rescaling, repackaging, and renaming it for military markets; adding camouflage patterns and robustness layers? These questions all require further study.

If a “civil” innovation developed in, say, an EU project becomes a component in a weapons system, should the development process then not be deemed illegal according to EU law, or at least regulated by the dual-use framework? According to Mörh (1998, 7, 14), when the EU was drafting its 5th framework programme for civil R&D funding in the late 90s, the Commission was in fact already prepared to tolerate that some such projects may result in products with “dual” functions. This was not seen as a risk at the time, but more as an opportunity for “synergy effects” and civil-to-military “spin-in” (as opposed to spin-off). During the 90s, of course, “spin-in” would have been more of an exception and side-effect, but with today’s rapid development in civil engineering, computer science, and related fields, it should rather be seen as an emerging trend. As military firms are now actively looking towards, drawing out, and scaling up civil innovations to a level of potentially violent application, this trend, what I have loosely called an undertow of civil ideas into military production, will be very challenging to predict and monitor. If these firms continue to “push mental and technological boundaries”, by “integrating into systems” rather than building weapons, the notion of dual-use may become too narrow and ineffective. Unsurprisingly, lobby groups see the dual-use framework as simply a list of prohibitions that “hinders innovation” at the civil-military intersection. If removed, defence and security could blend into a genuine “grey area”, they argue, in research, application, sales, as well as law (SOFF 2017b; SACS 2015; Interview: Limmergård).

The second part of the analysis extended these findings, exploring the notion of “civil” as something wieldable in socio-political contexts related to arms trade. In the example of Swedish export promotion campaigns, it was illustrated how civil security becomes a kind of “glue” for piecing together holistic packages and comprehensive “one-stop shop” offers where defence- and security products complement each other. Again, the industry has not undergone a strict to-from movement, from arms to counterterrorism, but rather these products are coupled and put on display side-by-side – precisely as is done in the literal sense at e.g. MSPO or Eurosatory. This way, the industry has acquired a chameleon-like character as they are able to deliver “total mission”, “holistic”, “end-to-end”, “seamless”, “integrated”, “full-spectrum”, and “self-sustaining” solutions (Prem 2018, 67). As holistic security suppliers, and by adding “civil” offerings alongside military ones, arms firms have increased opportunities to reframe themselves as “neutral”, as dealing mostly with various forms of technology, not violence. They arguably put up a façade: With it, they can
attract personnel and funders, masquerade as being interested simply in innovation and “human rights”, and thereby profit equally from talking peace and making war. Behind it, they can continue to negotiate major arms export contracts in the global south.

This chapter has shown how technology is inseparable from social struggles, from language, power, from the conversion of different capitals. Accordingly, manufacturers of arms are finding more and new ways to gain recognition, redefine themselves, exploit emerging technologies, and creatively work around regulations and norms. Arms export legislation in Sweden, as elsewhere in Europe, may have been rigorously investigated in recent decades, but despite certain improvements it continues to be weak and vaguely formulated; still unable to block trade with dictatorships, authoritarian states, and unstable or warring regimes. Emerging technologies and so-called “civil security”, I finally conclude, simply increases this ambiguity, hindering effective regulation and insight into what goes on in practice.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
(In)security, society, and the question of which peace, whose freedom

This research was driven by a longstanding unease with how some things are able to take place in our name. In the name of society – or the human, the civil, democracy, Sweden, and so on – certain practices work out their logic with implications that are often manifestly in contradiction to the ostensible “values” of that society or community. Legitimated by society’s active or passive support, funded by society’s shared resources, some processes and practices related to security rather tend to have a deteriorating effect on democratic life, societal cohesion, and social trust. This is because the types of practices targeting not e.g. environmental hazards, but individuals or groups of citizens or even entire populations are obliged to work through a logic of enacting an “us” and separating it from a “them”. In short, integral to practices of security are their exclusionary social effects. This is one of the major concerns of critical approaches to (in)security.

Again, to make such security practices seem justified, it is not uncommon for them to be framed or labelled in certain ways that seek to disguise or downplay their exclusionary effects; e.g. by referring to security as “societal” or “civil”. Ever since the 90s, it has been popular to talk about a “broadened meaning” of security, and to even try to demilitarise or pacify this practice by calling it e.g. “human security”. These kinds of framings are attempts to politically “upgrade” the notion of security, to make it look and sound more inclusive, or to displace it into an entirely different context. However, I believe that the broadening of security does not equal the solving of (in)security; i.e., reworking security as a discourse – to whichever extent this is done – will not necessarily remove the exclusionary effects of security as a practice. Rather, it is precisely this relative distance between the saying and doing of security that needs to be investigated empirically and with a critical lens.

“Society”, as it were, should arguably be reclaimed from security, from practitioners who claim or pretend to serve a common good, a universal interest, a public, but who in reality infringe, coerce, detain, and police that public. It should therefore be the task of critical security scholars to illuminate how certain policies, laws, techniques, and technologies related to security and defence are put to work at the expense of fundamental freedoms and rights; to make a reflexive intervention

76 Feminist- and queer theory has taught us, in a similar fashion, how the empowering of the ideal-type Woman and the re-evaluation of certain female-coded qualities up to the same “level” as the ideal-type Man is not the same as empowering these bodies and their lived lives. Rather, this simply recreates essentialist dichotomies between “natural” genders, and does not solve the problem of inequality (e.g. Butler 2006).
in (rather than instrumental contribution to) the field of security and highlight precisely what is at stake with regards to democratic processes; to study the paradoxes of power, the particular in the universal, the arbitrary in the official; and to relate all of these things to the tiniest domains of social life, to the grandest struggles of the international, and to the continuous unfolding of history. This is something I have aspired to do in this dissertation.

The final three sections of this dissertation will, first, offer some reflections on the notion of “peace” in the sociohistorical context of Sweden, and then summarise the central findings and arguments, link these back to the theoretical problem of the relations between fields, capitals, and the state, and finally, outline a set of strategies and potential avenues for future research.

“THE DEFENCE – SWEDEN’S LARGEST PEACE MOVEMENT”

The hijacking of discourses like “society” by security practitioners is far from a recent phenomenon in Sweden. Throughout the 20th century, symbolic games of language were at the heart of Sweden’s defence strategy, e.g. in how it was to be seen as “total” and thereby “universal” and “uncontested”. As we now know, it relied militarily on a politics of mass-conscription involving all male and able-bodied citizens, disciplining them through years of obligatory training, recruiting up to 850,000 of them as soldiers (more than a tenth of the total population at the time), and placing all others in reserves or in civil defence. This way, almost every family was given a relation to the defence organisation and “sense” of military life. For purposes of civil protection, the state sought to create a “culture” of voluntary participation, mobilising virtually every household in war preparedness, and assigning everything from public buildings to private property a specific role in civil defence. This generated an acceptance of the fact that a large portion of Sweden’s collective resources, either directly or indirectly, went into the defence mobilisation- and arms production apparatus, that almost all forms of planning, budgeting, and designing society became configured into strategies for how to defend it. Militarism was in other words deeply rooted in Swedish society – defence “was” society, society “was” defence – as means for welfare and warfare became tangled.

The Swedish state even sought to establish an imaginary of domestic defence as *itself a peace movement*. For example, in the 1980s, the armed forces’ supreme commander claimed that “we who in different ways work within Sweden’s total defence have to show that what we do also benefits peace” (SLK 1981, 4). The total defence information committee (1980, 31) stated that “a peaceful world is the goal” for Swedish war preparedness, that “Swedish total defence is purely defensive [as] clearly shown by the equipment and tactics of the military forces”. One of the voluntary defence organisations wrote that “defence is peacekeeping”, that “no one is [to be] threatened by Sweden”, and that “a real peace movement also has to include all of those who resolutely but in
other ways want to safeguard peace” (SLK 1983, 4). Voluntary organisations like SLK (Svenska Lottakåren, the Swedish Women’s Voluntary Defence Organisation) were core components in total defence, often assigned specialist positions in certain parts of the civil defence organisation. They contributed substantially towards militarising everyday life in Cold War Sweden since even personal pastimes and hobbies became sorted into the defence organisation. On the front cover of the government’s defence bill from 1982, several of these voluntary organisations are seen holding a large banner which states “THE DEFENCE – SWEDEN’S LARGEST PEACE MOVEMENT” (Figure 7.1). Rewriting the history of rearmament and mobilisation, the Swedish government here sought to disassociate defence with violence and conflict, emphasise its function as a “deterrent”, and construct a paradox by which defence practice and various militarised activities were to be conflated with maintaining “peace”.

Arguably as an outcome of this history, the Swedish civil society movement for rearmament and war preparedness has been traditionally stronger than the social movement against, and the actual peace organisations have tended to be in minority. For example, a central voice in the domestic security- and defence debate is Folk och Försvar (Society and Defence), a civil society organisation founded in 1940 – in part on the state’s initiative – by political youth leagues, labour unions, and voluntary defence organisations. Tasked to “build a bridge between the society and the armed forces”, Folk och Försvar wanted to increase the understanding of defence policy amongst Swedish citizens and increase their willingness to participate in national security. Today, the organisation arranges annual conferences in Sälen at which most relevant defence actors tend to be represented alongside key decisionmakers and government officials – like a more mediated and policy-oriented incarnation of the old IHT (Chapter 3, this volume). In the 80s, one such annual conference was similarly themed “peace and freedom” (SLK 1984), thereby repeating the government’s attempt to lock in these terms in a defence- and security context. This theme is, still today, part of the organisation’s “vision”.

This profound militarisation in Sweden and the historically supressed social movement for peace and fundamental freedoms may partly explain why the transformation of the field was so

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77 Other voluntary organisations sorted into total defence include the Swedish Red Cross, the Home Guard, the Voluntary Radio Organisation, and other associations interested in e.g. cars, motobiking, parachuting, animal caretaking, shooting sports, and more. See also www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/organisation/frivilliga-forsvarsorganisationer/ (in Swedish) [accessed 12/03/19].

78 E.g. the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society, the Swedish Women’s International League for Peace & Freedom, the Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation, Diakonia.

79 “… to create greater understanding of the issues and processes that influence peace and freedom in today’s world. It is our firm belief that a plurality of views contributes to the development of policy making. We aim to be an open arena in which people with different opinions can engage in the development of defence and security policy. See www.folkochforsvar.se/english.html [accessed 12/03/19].
slow after the Cold War, and why it eventually developed not in a demilitarised direction, but towards closely linked areas of security practice and technological development. Arms manufacturers and defence traditions remained in strong positions, and emerging challengers in the field tended to emerge out of these heirs (e.g. ÖCB’s reformists, Saab’s civil security branch), rather than enter from entirely different fields (e.g. peace organisations, civil engineering firms). In short, the field of securing society certainly shifted and became increasingly transnational in its makeup, but continued to be largely determined by a doxa and actor configuration historically rooted in a militarist defence-logic.

This thesis has presented new findings regarding the actor struggles and field effects of this transformation. Chapters 3 and 4 centred mainly on (but did not limit themselves to) the changing role of the state and its bureaucracies. First, I demonstrated how actor reconfigurations during the 90s and 00s effectuated an official reformulation of the post-Cold War “threat” to Sweden, in processes that were in fact initiated mainly by a group of high-level civil servants, agency officers, and functionalist scholars in the civil defence area. Wielding a combination of bureaucratic, political, and academic capital, they strived to generate the symbolic capital necessary to construct

Figure 7.1 Front page of 1982 defence declaration
and impose a new enemy that was to be seen as “asymmetrical”, “internal”, and “transgressive”. Largely as a by-product of this struggle, the label of societal security emerged out of the recently established academic environments. Swedish practitioners began associating this terminology with their preferred “holistic” approach to security which did not fully break with, but strongly resembled, the total defence-idea of organising “whole-of-society”. The notion of societal security also spread (along with the actors promoting it) to some extent in the Nordic region, and with greater effect, in European bureaucracies and the EU’s security R&D programmes that had come to emerge as spaces of opportunity and profit for arms firms, policy technocrats, and industrialists.

Second, I proceeded to analyse the specifically transatlantic work arrangement established by Swedish- and US security practitioners, and how this, at least visibly, took on the appearance of a bilateral agreement for R&D cooperation. Upon closer examination, however, this so-called “science and technology plus”-agreement with the DHS can in fact be said to work as a political partnership and vaguely phrased legal framework allowing for transatlantic information sharing, personnel exchange, and intelligence cooperation, widely defined. As a form of gateway, it also enables cooperation between any US and Swedish security organisation, including producers of military technology such as FOI. The S&T “plus”-agreement illuminated how Swedish security bureaucracies, in their attempt to “go global” in the 2000s, often chose to approach other actors and frame their interests as having to do with “research” rather than politics or straightforward practical cooperation. In sum, both in their relations to the EU and DHS, statist actors in Sweden have increasingly come to draw on new and other species of capital (e.g. scientific, technocratic) in order to gain legitimacy and influence in a transnational context.

Chapters 5 and 6 centred mainly on (but did not limit themselves to) the changing role of the industry related to security- and defence technologies. First, I traced the political arguments during the 20th century supporting the massive inpour of public funding and institutional support into Sweden’s wide-ranging private arms industry. Here, it was discussed how certain state-initiated, industrial policies and safeguards (most notably, arms export) have aimed throughout history to protect not Sweden and its population, but technology and its producers. Public-private elite solidarities and interdependencies effectively formed during the Cold War years. However, when central parts of the bureaucratic support structure were removed in the early 00s, forcing an internationalisation and privatisation of the industry, state officials had to establish ways of indirectly subsidising its arms industry. Here, certain spokespersons in cooperation with leading industrialists attempted to forge a domestic market for new “societal” security products and services. As this turned out to be largely unsuccessful, they instead urged the technologically
advanced, multinational arms firms to embed emerging technologies into military production and arms exports.

Second, I discussed in more detail not only the technological and economic, but also the social and political roles of emerging “societal” or “civil” security products for arms companies. Taking stock of Sweden’s largest arms producer, Saab, it was shown how a lot of these products follow a logic of “scalability” from civil to military contexts, are open-ended and adaptable in terms of application, and thereby challenge the traditional application of export regulations. European arms firms like Saab make no secret of their intentions to profit from the recent years’ booming border- and surveillance industries, from the monitoring and detention of individuals. They are thus responding to a “market demand” which the industry and their allies in the statist field themselves have contributed towards creating in the first place; that is, via their exports of weapon systems to conflict regions, forcing victims of war to flee to Europe. From a technological point of view, it was discussed how civil security products have disturbed, perhaps even reversed, the logic of military-to-civil diversification and spin-off since emerging technologies (increasingly absorbed from engineering and computer science) have proved to be so advanced that they are now seen as “better” foundations for new military R&D projects. From a socio-political point of view, it was shown how emerging security technologies contributes to the rebranding of arms firms, enabling them to downplay their traditionally military core, and to remake violent applications as somehow having to do mostly with “innovation”, “civil” activities, or even “human rights”. Finally, civil security, it was shown, also works as a façade with which to conceal (or at least propose as more acceptable) certain controversial arms trade negotiations with countries like the Philippines, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. In sum, in Sweden and elsewhere, the private arms industry not only permeates the statist field to a large extent, but it has also come to be historically interdependent with it. Public and private actors even reinforce each other and give each other legitimacy due to the currently strong technocratic drive of security policies; a drive which, in turn, disguises the true effects of these technologies, as they are branded as smart and harmless, as “solutions to problems” rather than violent.

**DUALITIES IN AND OF THE FIELD OF SECURITY**

In the early 00s, certain spokespersons and industrialists struggled to draw what can be called a “false boundary” around Swedish security work, to give it the appearance of being an autonomous practice and market. Societal security, for instance, became portrayed as a sibling-concept to US homeland security, as somehow the new paradigm and doctrine for Sweden’s security practice in the new millennium. My thesis has, among other things, debunked this narrative. At least in
practice, the homeland security “boom” never caught on in Sweden, or for that matter in the Nordic region which remains fundamentally diverse in terms of how security work developed after the Cold War and the events of 9/11. Despite efforts to solidify it, the practice of counterterrorism, for example, remained politically contested in the region, and rather unstructured institutionally if compared to countries like the UK or USA. As I have demonstrated, in Sweden the emerging practices, actors, and technologies labelled societal security (or similar) remained closely connected to, and somewhat overlapping with, total defence and militarist logics. Old institutions and relations of power had such an intricate history in this sociohistorical context that they could not simply be recrafted or removed after the Cold War.

Understood in the longue durée, it would be accurate to conclude that the field of securing Swedish society did not transform according to a movement of reversal or inversion – from a Cold War military doxa to something entirely new and seemingly “civil”. Rather, during a brief but important period of time, structures of the field became challenged and destabilised, different players emerged within it, and the arsenal of technologies for various forms of violence and control expanded and was complemented with new deceptive “solutions”. Without conflating and becoming one and the same, mechanisms for targeting, apprehending, and detaining individuals have been put to work alongside with, and often in competition with, mechanisms for defending territory and going to war. As I have demonstrated, the “civil” and “military” are not preconfigured signifiers, explicit technical definitions, perfected legal categories, but ambiguous terms that must be studied empirically and in relation to a continuum of security- and defence practices.80

From a theoretical point of view, it can be said that the field of securing society in Sweden has been de-autotomised to the effect that it is (or perhaps always was) rather incoherent and “impure” (in terms of its defining capital), and that it involves a seemingly ever-expanding range of actors, crafts, skills, professions, and sub-capitals. The latter refers to, for example, how some practitioners seek excellency in armed violence, and others in controlling mobility; how some pursue a career in doing security physically, and others in doing security virtually; how some supply the means to do so, and others focus on applying those technologies in society. Despite their varying strategies and interests, however, they all still share an illusio and come together in competition around the core stake of securing society – a stake which, as such, remains undisputed. Regardless of how their practice becomes shaped and reshaped around this stake, whether it comes to be seen as either militaristic or societal at a given moment in time, it will nonetheless exert significant effects on the

80 Overall, with regards to conceptual debates, this dissertation has highlighted the specific intersection of critical security studies and critical military studies. Currently largely separated, there are certainly a vast amount of lessons to be learned by increasing the intellectual traffic between these two traditions of research (Stavrianakis and Stern 2018). See also https://journals.sagepub.com/toc/sdi/49/1-2 [accessed 12/03/19].
larger social order due to the simple fact that security is an exclusionary practice situated in a field usually involving very powerful agents.

To capture the power plays and many dualities of this practice, I employed a theoretical perspective inspired by Pierre Bourdieu. Moving from sweeping terms such as industrial complex, institutional order, and apparatus of governmentality, I turned to the notion of fields (in the plural), or more precisely, their relationality, relative value, and socially constituted “economy”. This way, it became possible to reflect on the different fields intersecting with security work, the movements of actors across these social spaces, their multiple positionalities, the convertibility of capital and resources (both material and immaterial), and the overall structurations of power in the social order (without a priori privileging some actors over others). It thus became possible to, with some nuance, discuss to the role of the modern state in relation to non-statist actors. With my outlook on Swedish actors, I have paid attention to the many tensions between traditionally “public” and “private” actors engaged in security work, and the convertibility of industrialist- and statist capital. Despite their claims to serve a common good, statist actors may in fact be deeply invested in the survival and prosperity of particular private companies. In the tradition of so-called tripartism, the state might even go as far as conflating public and private interests into a mirage of “national security capabilities”, or permitting fundamentally different forces to appear in harmony behind a banner such as “Team Sweden”. Importantly, the historical case of Sweden as well as the more recent case of EU R&D both illustrate that for an industry to even emerge in the first place, it needs to mobilise a certain amount of symbolic capital usually granted by statist institutions. For example, societal security-related commodities became deemed desirable, worthwhile, or necessary only (or mainly) when associated with the interests of heirs and supported by the historically strong bureaucratic structures behind such actors.

The perspective of field economies allows for analysis of several transversal issues, beyond those of the public-private “divide”. Arms manufacturing and export in late modern societies – a recurring case in point – crosses not only public and private boundaries or civil and military categories, but also the logics of local and international. It concerns at once local realities, explicit national laws, and parliamentary compromises, as well as international delegates, implicit socio-

81 The public-private relation in Sweden has in fact played out quite differently to many other Western societies. For example, the US has long traditions of outsourcing surveillance work to a plethora of private actors (Stanley 2004; Brown 2017; Hay and Andrejevic 2006; Collier and Lakoff 2008), and in the UK, the private policing of public space is more or less the norm and firms like G4S are major players (Shearing and Stenning 1983; Shearing and Wood 2003; Crawford and Lister 2004). In Sweden and most other Nordic countries, however, private security firms have historically been more regulated, security- and surveillance work has remained largely within the state and its local counties and municipalities, and public-private relations have tended to centre on open-ended forms of “cooperation” and PPPs concerning critical infrastructure provision.
political opportunities, and the historical nation-brand of the state. Indeed, the state is itself a transversal object: the many fields making up a “state” are not necessarily restricted by national boundaries, nor interested in domestic stakes alone, but have become increasingly border-crossing. This was illustrated by, for instance, how certain Swedish bureaucrats have become less interested in internal agency struggles at home, and far more interested in what goes on in e.g. Brussels or Washington D.C. Particularly in the new millennium, Swedish civil servants and statist agents have struggled to extend their transnational chains of interdependence, to cultivate their “solidarities at a distance”, not least those in the transatlantic domain (Bigo 2016b).

Finally, what can be said about the “problem” in Bourdieu’s notion of field economy, that of the “conversion rate” of capitals and of who “determines” it in late modern societies? While this is a problem subject to further study, theoretical critique, and empirical evaluation, it can be argued here that the value of statist capital in the field of power has indeed shifted. Statist capital seems less and less able to alone convert itself into symbolic capital, into raw authority and recognised power. Arguably, statist capital, in order to defend its symbolic qualities, has to be increasingly combined with other sources of capital, e.g. economic, political, social, scientific. Must not European spokespersons admit that the security- and arms industry contributed heavily to its own creation, as well as to the EU’s subsequent formulation of “solutionist” and technocratic security policies? Is not professional relations around security increasingly framed by statist actors as research and development, science and technology? Is not the image and reputation of “Sweden” upheld abroad by certain statist agents largely dependent on Sweden’s technological innovations and privately manufactured weapons? To be a “spokesperson” has taken on an increasingly ambiguous meaning, too, it seems; the spokesperson rarely relies exclusively on statist power, but its symbolic power draws on more and other forms of authority. Is the multi-positioning by public spokespersons, their apparent intentions to pursue and serve several interests at once, becoming more of a regularity and less of an anomaly? Is the civil servant becoming what Lahire (2011) has referred to as a “plural actor”, an agent with multiple and sometimes contradictory dispositions?

If anything, this dissertation has illustrated how theoretical questions such as these on the tensions between statist- and symbolic power, both in and beyond fields of security, need to be explored empirically. Fields “need not be anchored or held together by the institutional form of the state” and “the claim to represent the state is but one (significant) dimension of a larger set of classificatory schemes within which … authority is determined” Sending (2015, 126–27) notes, and so the question of e.g. “conversions” of influence and power is an analytical question pertaining to social struggles, and therefore, one with a shifting answer depending on when and where it is asked.
STRATEGIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Certainly, several aspects have been overlooked in this dissertation, or consciously excluded due to its scope and timeframe. These latter aspects must be addressed, as they may present promising areas for future empirical research. For instance, this thesis could have taken a more comparative approach towards the other Nordic countries, and in particular Norway. As noted, there were important inter-professional relations and policy exchanges between the two countries in the early 00s, leading to a similar formulation and framing of practice, as well as to the diffusion of the societal security-label in both agency systems. What other struggles and exchanges between these and other countries in the region has this dissertation neglected? Also, Finland has had a relatively similar history of war planning, mass-mobilisation, and total defence-thinking, whereas the Danish field transformed rather differently. How were defence policies reformed and new security practices shaped by actor struggles in these countries, and to what effects? What lessons can be learnt from more closely comparing and relating these different fields of actors? More attention could have also been paid to the specifically “Nordic” context and policy level, analysing in greater detail e.g. the role of the Nordic Council, the Nordic Council of Ministers, as well as the research council NordForsk. How did these institutions contribute towards shaping the narrative and imaginary of a shared “Nordic model” of not only social welfare, but also post-Cold War security work?

Second, I have chosen not to request interviews with current members of the Riksdag or of the parliamentary committees and working groups. This has been somewhat of a strategy. In the spirit of Mills and Bourdieu, I strongly believe that power struggles can, and to an extent should, be captured not only in the theatres of decision-making, but in less visible and more everyday contexts; e.g. in bureaucratic settings where parliamentary decisions become (re)interpreted, put to work, and routinised, or in company settings where politics often enters as a form of restriction or obstacle that needs to be scrutinised, negotiated, or sometimes sidestepped. In short, deprioritising the narratives from politicians has been an attempt to focus less on the most visible signposts of power, and more on its practical workings and relational effects.

However, the political could as such still be reintroduced in future studies; perhaps not from the professional politician’s point of view, but from the focal point of political resistance. What are the forces – from both within and outside of the corridors of the state – that seek to challenge and disturb, for example, the Swedish arms export system and the various power relations constituting

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82 See also the suggestions by Charle (2013) on how to do comparative transnational history.
83 Initially, the aim of this PhD project was in fact to try to analyse the emergence of security practice in all Nordic countries, and to assess the possibility of a potential “Nordic field” of security.
it? How could the struggles of NGOs, activists, party dissidents, or journalists be placed not in the analytical periphery, but front and centre?

Third, regarding the notion of arms export, I have chosen to focus on the socio-political strategies and state-industry relations underlying arms trade deals, rather than e.g. the violent effects of these technologies when applied in various customer countries. The current events in Yemen, for example, in many ways represent the catastrophe of our time, and the great paradox of peace-promoting liberal democracies. Virtually all exporting countries – including Sweden – have certain regulations in place which should hinder or significantly restrict arms trade with warring countries. Despite this, countries like the US, UK, France, and Spain continue to arm the Saudi-led coalition (Dewan 2018). Neighbouring countries like Denmark and Finland (as well as Germany and the Netherlands) have stopped weapon sales to the conflict region (Stone 2018), but Swedish authorities continue to permit export of Saab’s aerial surveillance- and missile guidance system GlobalEye to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and have even signed a new deal in 2019 for future deliveries (Svenska Freds- och Skiljedomsföreningen 2019). At the moment, these states and their security- and defence industries are complicit in the violence exerted on Yemeni civilians and in a conflict that has caused a famine starving as many as 85,000 children, and leaving up to 15 million Yemenis without access to clean water (Trew 2018). This conflict demands continued scrutiny, not only from the media but also from academics, since it so clearly and with such acute relevance highlights how Western democracies simultaneously talk peace and fuel war.

Fourth, perhaps one of the more obvious avenues for future research is the ongoing (re)militarisation of Sweden and Europe. Since 2015 (indeed, since around the start of this PhD project), the message from the Swedish government and parliament has been rather univocal: total defence-planning must be resumed! As visible in for example the latest defence bill from 2015 (Government of Sweden 2015), as well as in the two defence commission reports preceding it (Ministry of Defence Sweden 2013, 2014), Swedish security policy has seen a return to geopolitical discourse, and claims that the “security environment” has “deteriorated”. These official documents all make direct or implicit reference to a returning “Russia-scare” and mention e.g. Russia’s annexation of Crimea by means of both conventional and unconventional military strategies, recent airspace violations in and around Sweden, and information operations in several Western countries. As a result of this new policy direction, defence budgets have increased, and military conscription became reinstated for all 18-year-olds in 2017 (Government of Sweden 2017a). Moreover, as the

84 In August 2018, an air strike was carried out, hitting a school bus and killing 40 children and injuring 56 more (Almasmari, El Sirgany, and Qiblawi 2018). At the time, civilian deaths in the Yemeni conflict had increased by 164% over four months (Beaumont 2018).
armed forces have expressed a “greatly increased need” for new defence material and armaments (Augustsson 2017), FMV were given green light in 2018 to purchase new weapon systems like the US arms firm Raytheon’s missile defence system “Patriot” – a contract worth up to SEK 28 billion (Olsson 2018). The government had already in 2014 decided to purchase 60 new JAS planes from Saab that are to be delivered over the coming 30 years for a value of up to SEK 90 billion (Kleja 2014). What will be the implications of these recent developments? How will the supposedly new “hybrid threat” referred to in the abovementioned defence bills be formulated in more detail? What will the future configuration of actors look like, as agencies for managing crises and terrorism will have to operate alongside revamped institutions for total defence? Will the concept of civil defence re-emerge in practice? To what extent have statist actors managed to recreate historical partnerships and elite relations in the industry field? How will the post-2015 rearmament process affect Sweden’s so-called “feminist foreign policy” (Reuterskiöld 2018) and arms export figures?

Of course, Sweden’s revisit to war planning and arms procurement corresponds with recent developments in Europe and the EU system. The Group of Personalities on Defence (GoPD) established in early 2015 by the Commission did indeed set in motion a series decisions and events accelerating the current militarisation of Europe. What are the outcomes of the 2017-19 projects under the EUR 90 million Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) implemented by the European Defence Agency? How will it shape the upcoming and significantly larger defence research programme which will run between 2021-27? What will be the involvement and role of Swedish actors and companies such as Saab in these R&D programmes? Saab has already indicated a strong interest in these upcoming funds and industrial partnerships such as the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), as their CEO Håkan Buskhe in fact took a seat in the GoPD (Vranken 2017, 11). In this group was also former Swedish Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carl Bildt, who also sat in the original security-related GoP in 2003.

More important, perhaps, is the question of how the staggeringly large European Defence Fund will distribute its EUR 40 billion, and with what effects. Again, the EDF intends to fund not only research and development, but also the procurement of weapons. Here, future research must address the (albeit largely rhetorical) question: what happened with the EU “peace project”? What happened with the institution that in 2012 won the Nobel Peace Prize for “the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights”, but which only around five years later took the unprecedented step of not only enabling the production of military technologies, but also actively encouraging its member states to purchase them?

85 See www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2012/summary/ [accessed 12/03/19].
As starkly illustrated by the long process of decisions and moves associated with the ESRP in the beginning of the 00s, a technocratic and solutionist approach to (in)security through the constant promotion of certain industrial policies will have an inevitable effect also on practice. The introduction of new violent technologies becomes, in itself, an incentive for putting them to use. Consider this in the context of the EDRP and the EDF: how will these military technologies be put to use? By whom, against what? What will the Commission’s new European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) be the first step towards? Europe may or may not be preparing for war, but it is certainly consolidating itself as “the kind of society which goes to war” (E. P. Thompson 1982, 23).
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APPENDIXES

ANNEX I: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

- AEW&C: Airborne early warning and control
- ASD: AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe
- ATT: The Arms Trade Treaty
- B2G: Business-to-government
- CATS: (FHS) Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies
- CBRN(E): Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, (explosive)
- CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
- CRISMALE: (FHS) Centre for Crisis Management Studies
- DHS: Department of Homeland Security
- DHS S&T: DHS Science & Technology Directorate
- DSB: Direktoratet for Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap; Norwegian Directorate for Societal Security & Civil Defence
- EDA: European Defence Agency
- EDAP: European Defence Action Plan
- EDF: European Defence Fund
- EDIDP: European Defence Industrial Development Programme
- EDRP: European Defence Research Programme
- EKN: Exportkreditnämnden; Swedish Export Credit Agency
- EOS: European Organisation for Security
- ESRAB: European Security Research Advisory Board
- ESRIF: European Security Research and Innovation Forum
- ESRP: European Security Research Programme
- EU: European Union
- FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation
- FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency
- FHS: Försvarshögskolan; Swedish Defence University
- FIF: Försvarsföretagen; Swedish Defence Industry Association
- FMV: Försvarsmaterielverket; Swedish Defence Materiel Administration
- FOA: Totalförsvarets Forskningsanstalt; Swedish Defence Research Agency
- FOI: Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut; Swedish Defence Research Institute
- FP: EU Framework Programme
- FRA: Försvarsmaterialeden; National Defence Radio Establishment
- FXM: Försvarsexportmyndigheten; Swedish Defence & Security Export Agency
- G2G: Government-to-government
- GoP: Group of Personalities
- GoPD: High-Level Group of Personalities on Defence
- ICT: Information and communications technology
- IHT: Institutet för Högre Totalförsvarsutbildning; Higher Institute for Total Defence Training
- ISO: International Standardisation Organisation
- ISO/TC: ISO Technical Committee
- ISP: Inspektionen för Strategiska Produkter; Swedish Inspectorate of Strategic Products
- KBM: Krisberedskapsmyndigheten; Swedish Crisis Management Agency
- LUCRAM: Lund University Centre for Risk Assessment and Management
- MoU: Memorandum of Understanding
- MUST: Militära Underrättelse- och Säkerhetstjänsten; Military Intelligence and Security Directorate
- NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
- NOU: Norges Offentlige Utredningar; Norwegian Government Reports
- PADR: Preparatory Action on Defence Research
- PASR: Preparatory Action on Security Research
- PESCO: Permanent Structure Co-operation
- PPP: Public-private partnership
- R&D: Research and development
- SACS: Swedish Association of Civil Security
- SEK: AB Svensk Exportkredit; Swedish Export Credit Corporation
- SLK: Svenska Lottakåren; Swedish Women’s Voluntary Defence Organization
- SME: Small and medium-sized enterprises
- SOFF: Säkerhets- och Försvarsföretagen; Swedish Security & Defence Industry Association
- SOU: Statens Offentliga Utredningar; Swedish Government Reports
- SPF: Styrelsen för Psykologiskt Försvar; Swedish Psychological Defence Board
- SRV: Statens Räddningsverk; Swedish Rescue Services Agency
- SÄPO: Säkerhetspolisen; Security Services
- UAV: Unmanned aerial vehicle
- UN: United Nations
- ÖCB: Överstyrelsen för Central Beredskap; Swedish Emergency Management Agency
## ANNEX II: INTERVIEWEES

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<th>Date</th>
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<td>Adolfsson, Ann-Kristin</td>
<td>Chief strategy officer, <em>Saab</em></td>
<td>07/12/17</td>
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<td>Bengtcéń, Anders</td>
<td>Head of security &amp; defence export promotion, <em>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</em></td>
<td>14/11/17</td>
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<td>Carlberg, Ella</td>
<td>Agency attorney of DHS agreement, <em>MSB</em></td>
<td>19/07/17</td>
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<td>Dahlberg, Ulf</td>
<td>Director, <em>SACS</em></td>
<td>16/05/17</td>
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<td>Dahlgaard, Klaus</td>
<td>Director of marketing &amp; sales, <em>Saab UK</em></td>
<td>14/03/18</td>
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<td>De Laval, Pontus</td>
<td>Chief technology officer, <em>Saab</em></td>
<td>23/04/18</td>
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<td>Frennberg, Hans</td>
<td>Business area manager, <em>FOI</em></td>
<td>17/10/17</td>
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<td>Halldén, Anna</td>
<td>H2020 primary national contact point, <em>VINNOVA</em></td>
<td>05/04/17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Holmgren, Gunnar</td>
<td>Former agency officer, <em>ÖCB</em>; co-investigator, <em>SOU 1995:19</em></td>
<td>15/05/17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jernbäcker, Lars</td>
<td>Strategy &amp; portfolio manager and former project leader of civil security, <em>Saab</em></td>
<td>26/04/18</td>
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* Telephone interview.
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<tr>
<td>Küller, Leif</td>
<td>Former head of sales &amp; export, FMV; former head of market relations, FXM</td>
<td>23/04/18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kyrk Gere, Åsa</td>
<td>Senior international affairs specialist, MSB; chair ISO/TC 292 &amp; ISO/TC 223</td>
<td>21/06/17</td>
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<td>Lagerblad, Peter</td>
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<td>Head of Disarmament, <em>Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society</em></td>
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ANNEX III: US-SWEDEN S&T AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN ON COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY MATTERS

Preamble

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN (hereinafter referred to as the “Parties”):

HAVING a mutual interest in research and development relating to homeland security matters;

SEEKING to make the best use of their respective research and technology development capacities, eliminate unnecessary duplication of work and obtain the most efficient and cost effective results through cooperative activities;

DESIRING to increase the exchanges of information and personnel in areas pertinent to the identification of homeland security threats and countermeasures and consequence management and the development of technical standards, operational procedures, and supporting methodologies that govern the use of relevant technologies;

STRESSING that physical and cyber-based critical infrastructures and other homeland security capabilities, both governmental and private, are essential to the operation and security of the Parties’ respective economies and governments;

NOTING that the Parties’ economies are increasingly interdependent, and that infrastructure protection and homeland security are of paramount concern to the Parties’ respective governments;

BEING AWARE of research, development, testing, evaluation, development of technical standards and operations in both countries in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive countermeasures and consequences management, in other areas that could enhance homeland security;

NOTING the important work accomplished under arrangements such as the Agreement on Science and Technology Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden, dated June 29, 2006;

RECOGNISING a common desire to:

- expand the homeland security technology capabilities of each Party;
- minimise unnecessary duplication of work;
- obtain more efficient and cost-effective results; and
- adapt more flexibly to the dynamic threat environment

through cooperative activities that are mutually beneficial and that relate to the application of state-of-the-art and emerging security technologies, making best use of the Parties’ respective research, development, and testing and evaluation capacities;
AFFIRMING a common interest in enhancing the longstanding collaborative efforts of the Parties’ respective agencies, private sector and governmental organisations, and academic institutions in generating scientific and technological solutions to counter threats, reduce vulnerabilities, and respond to and recover from incidents and emergencies in those areas having the potential for causing significant security, economic, and/or social impacts;

DESIRING to set forth a vehicle for the conduct of cooperative scientific and technological research, development, testing and evaluation in the field of homeland security;

HAVE AGREED as follows:

**ARTICLE 1**  
Definitions

For purposes of this Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden on Cooperation in Science and Technology for Homeland Security Matters (the “Agreement”), the Parties have adopted the following definitions:

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<th>Term</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agreement Director</td>
<td>Has the meaning given to it in Article 5 (Management) of this Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Confidential Information</td>
<td>Has the meaning given to it in Section IV of Annex I to this Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classified Contract</td>
<td>A Contract that requires, or will require, access to Classified Information by a Contractor or by its employees in the performance of a Contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classified Information</td>
<td>Official information that requires protection for national security, law enforcement, domestic security, or other reasons and is so designated by the application of the appropriate security classification markings in accordance with the national laws, regulations, policies, or directives of either Party. It may be in oral, visual, magnetic, electronic, or documentary form, or in the form of Equipment and Material or technology. Classified Information under this Agreement shall be deemed to have the same meaning as &quot;Classified Military Information&quot; in the General Security of Military Information Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden, dated December 4 and 23, 1981.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>A legally enforceable agreement to provide goods or services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting Agency</td>
<td>Any entity within the government organisation of a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Contractor
An individual or a commercial entity that agrees to provide goods or services.

Controlled Unclassified Information
Information that is not deemed to be Classified Information in the United States, but to which access or distribution limitations have been applied in accordance with national laws, regulations, policies, or directives of either Party. Whether the information is provided or generated under this Agreement, it will be marked to identify its sensitive character. This definition includes, but is not limited to, information marked “Sensitive Homeland Security Information,” “Sensitive Security Information,” “For Official Use Only,” “Law Enforcement Sensitive Information,” “Protected Critical Infrastructure Information,” “Restricted,” and “Trusted Information Sharing Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (TISN) In Confidence.” Controlled Unclassified Information may include Business Confidential Information.

Cooperative Activity
Any form of activity described in Article 7 (Forms of Cooperative Activity) of this Agreement on which the Parties agree to cooperate to achieve the objectives of this Agreement. Such activity will normally take the form of a Project.

Critical Infrastructure/Kritisk Infrastruktur
Governmental and/or private activities or sectors that are identified by each Party in its laws, executive orders, directives or policies as “Critical Infrastructure” or “Kritisk Infrastruktur”.

Designated Security Authority (DSA)
The government authority responsible for the development of policies and procedures governing security of Classified or Controlled Unclassified Information covered by this Agreement.

Equipment and Material
Any document, product or substance on or in which information may be recorded or embodied. Material shall encompass everything regardless of its physical character for makeup including documents, writing, hardware, equipment, machinery, apparatus, devices, models, photographs, recordings, reproductions, notes, sketches, plans, prototypes, designs, configurations, maps and letters, as well as all other products, substances or material from which information can be derived.

Government-to-Government Transfer
The principle that Classified Information and classified Material will be transferred through official government-to-government channels or through other
channels as may be mutually agreed, in writing, by the Parties in accordance with the requirements laid down by both Parties.

**Intellectual Property**

Has the meaning given in Article 2 of the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, done at Stockholm July 14, 1967 and may include other subject matter as agreed by the Parties.

**Need-to-Know**

A determination made by an authorized holder of Classified Information that a prospective recipient requires access to specific Classified Information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function.

**Participant**

Any non-federal or non-central government person or entity, including but not limited to a private sector organisation, academic institution, or laboratory (or subsidiary thereof) engaged in accordance with Article 9 (Participants).

**Personnel Security Clearance Assurance (PSCA)**

a. A certification provided by one of the Parties concerning the level of personnel security clearance held by an individual who is employed by a government agency, or Contractor facility under the jurisdiction of one of the Parties.

b. A statement provided by the DSA of the individual's country of citizenship concerning the individual's eligibility for a personnel security clearance at a level specified by the requesting Party for individuals who are a citizen of one Party but is to be employed by the other Party or its Contractors.

**Project**

A specific form of Cooperative Activity described in Article 8 (Projects).

**Project Arrangement**

The instrument setting out the scope of any Project to be carried out by the Parties described in Article 8 (Projects).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Background Information</td>
<td>Any information furnished to a Project regardless of form or type, including that of a scientific, technical, business, or financial nature, and including photographs, reports, manuals, threat data, experimental data, test data, designs, specifications, processes, techniques, inventions, software, source code, drawings, technical writings, sound recordings, pictorial representations, and other graphical presentations; whether in magnetic tape, electronic media, computer memory, or any other form and whether or not subject to intellectual property protections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Development</td>
<td>That stage of a Project during which Project Foreground Information arises through the development of technologies, prototype equipment and other activities included in a Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Foreground Information</td>
<td>Any information created in a Project, regardless of form or type, including that of a scientific, technical, business, or financial nature, and including photographs, reports, manuals, threat data, experimental data, test data, designs, specifications, processes, techniques, inventions, software, source code, drawings, technical writings, sound recordings, pictorial representations, and other graphical presentations; whether in magnetic tape, electronic media, computer memory, or any other form and whether or not subject to intellectual property protections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving Party</td>
<td>The Party to which Classified Information is transferred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&amp;E)</td>
<td>Programs and activities, including basic research, applied research, advanced technology development, proof of principle, verification, validation, and development of technical standards of the Parties and/or Participants that seek to identify, develop, and implement technological and analytical solutions, tools and techniques to address the homeland security capability needs of each Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending Party</td>
<td>The Party that originates and/or transfers Classified Information to the Receiving Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsorship Arrangement</td>
<td>A written agreement between a Participant and a Party where the Party engages the Participant to carry out work on its behalf relating to Cooperative Activity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Technology Management Plan

A specific component of the Project Arrangement jointly developed by the Parties in which they agree on how Project Background and Foreground Information will be handled, and which will discuss among other things, the rights of the Parties and their Contractors and Participants concerning Intellectual Property created under this Agreement, including how any royalties shall be shared, where such Intellectual Property shall be protected, and who shall be responsible for obtaining that protection and granting licenses.

Third Party

Any entity or person who is neither a Party to this Agreement nor a Participant in any of its Cooperative Activities.

ARTICLE 2

Objective

The objective of this Agreement is to establish a framework to encourage, develop and facilitate bilateral Cooperative Activity in science and technology that contributes to the homeland security capabilities of both Parties in:

a) the prevention and detection of, response to, and forensics and attribution applied to, terrorist or other homeland security threats and/or indicators;

b) the protection of Critical Infrastructure; and

c) crisis response and consequence management and mitigation for high-consequence events.

ARTICLE 3

Means of Achieving Objectives

The Parties shall seek to achieve the objectives set out in Article 2 (Objective) by means which may include, but are not limited to:

a) facilitating a systematic exchange of technologies, personnel, and information derived from or applied to similar and complementary operational Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation;

b) collaborating to develop technologies and prototype systems that assist in countering present and anticipated terrorist actions in their respective territories and other homeland threats that satisfy their common strategic interests and requirements;

c) integrating or adapting the homeland security technologies of each Party to save development costs;

d) conducting evaluation and testing of prototype homeland security technologies;
e) developing an approach to identify shared priorities, including areas of research for Cooperative Activity;

f) ensuring consistent and appropriate measures of effectiveness by development and implementation of appropriate standards and supporting test protocols and methodologies;

g) involving, as appropriate, a wide range of public and private sector research and development organisations in Cooperative Activity developed pursuant to this Agreement;

h) providing reciprocal opportunities to engage in Cooperative Activity, with shared responsibilities and contributions, which are commensurate with the Parties’ or the Participants’ respective resources;

i) providing comparable access to government-sponsored or government-supported programs and facilities for visiting researchers and experts, and comparable access to and exchange of information and Equipment and Material;

j) facilitating prompt exchange of information and Equipment and Material, which may affect Cooperative Activity, and facilitating the dissemination of information and Equipment and Material, consistent with applicable national laws, regulations, policies and directives; and

k) utilising and applying Project Foreground Information derived from Cooperative Activity to benefit both Parties. The right to ownership and exploitation of Project Foreground Information are to be governed by the Articles of this Agreement and established in a Technology Management Plan, taking into account, among other things, the Parties’ respective contributions to the Project.

ARTICLE 4

Executive Agents

1. The Under Secretary of Science and Technology of the United States Department of Homeland Security is the primary official within the Government of the United States with responsibility for executive oversight of Cooperative Activity, as defined in this Agreement, within the United States and is hereby designated as the “U.S. Executive Agent” responsible for the administration of this Agreement. The duties of the U.S. Executive Agent may be delegated to other officials within the Department of Homeland Security.

2. The Minister of Defence of the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden is the primary official within the Government of Sweden with responsibility for executive oversight of Cooperative Activity within Sweden and is hereby designated as the “Swedish Executive Agent” responsible for the administration of this Agreement. The duties of the Swedish Executive Agent may be delegated to other officials in the Swedish Ministry of Defence.

3. Prior to undertaking Cooperative Activity (including any Project) under this Agreement, the Parties shall agree in writing upon the nature, scope, and duration of the Cooperative Activity.

4. Where, because of changes in the administrative arrangements for either Party, responsibility for the oversight of this Agreement is no longer held by those currently designated as “U.S. Executive Agent” or “Swedish Executive Agent”, the relevant Party shall provide the other Party
in writing with the details of its new Executive Agent without requiring amendment to this Agreement.

**ARTICLE 5**

Management

1. The Executive Agents shall appoint Agreement Directors who shall be responsible for the day-to-day management of this Agreement and its Cooperative Activities. In addition the Agreement Directors shall be responsible for:

a) promoting Cooperative Activity under this Agreement;

b) managing activities carried out under this Agreement and its Projects and exercising technical and financial oversight;

c) serving as a repository for any and all documentation which is generated pursuant to this Agreement including Project Arrangements and any annexes thereto;

d) monitoring the overall use and effectiveness of this Agreement;

e) recommending amendments to this Agreement to the Parties;

f) resolving issues arising under this Agreement;

g) authorising involvement by Participants in Cooperative Activities pursuant to this Agreement;

h) establishing and maintaining security guidelines, including but not limited to procedures related to exchange, storage, and transmission of information and equivalent security markings to be applied to exchanged information in accordance with Article 12 (Information Security);

i) ensuring that any requirements to exchange Classified Information in connection with any Project are fully identified in advance and specifically agreed to prior to the conclusion of any Project Arrangement;

j) developing and maintaining an outline of the Cooperative Activities and their associated costs. This outline will be known as the annual work plan and will document the work to be carried out under each Project Arrangement; and

k) developing and maintaining a strategic plan setting out the objectives of the Cooperative Activities being carried out at any given time and the Parties’ intentions for future cooperation.

The Agreement Directors shall meet at least annually to review implementation of the Agreement and at such other times as they consider necessary to implement this Agreement. The Agreement Directors shall be responsible for coordinating with other coordination bodies established by the Parties.
ARTICLE 6
Areas of Cooperative Activity

The Parties shall facilitate Cooperative Activity in broad areas related to homeland security. Areas of Cooperative Activity include, but are not limited to:

a) development and implementation of threat and vulnerability assessments, interdependency analyses, and methodologies related to potential threats to homeland security scenarios;

b) assessment of prior operational experiences and evaluation for the purposes of articulating operational deficiencies into definable technical requirements and appropriate standards and supporting methodologies;

c) integration of existing technologies for use in surveillance and detection in support of permissible homeland security activities, or in defence against terrorism and other homeland security threats;

d) research and development of technologies and systems to meet user requirements or capability gaps and national needs;

e) testing and evaluation of specific prototype systems for homeland security applications in both laboratory environments and real or simulated operational settings. This includes technologies associated with enhanced detection and monitoring of potential terrorist activities and those associated with recovery and reconstitution of damaged or compromised systems;

f) preparation of detailed final test reports to allow either Party or their Participants to evaluate follow-on efforts individually or to allow the transition of successful prototypes into operational deployments;

g) system protection (including protection of automated infrastructure control systems) and information assurance (including protecting the integrity of data and information in control systems);

h) reciprocal education, training, and exchange of scientific and technical personnel, and exchange of Equipment and Material in science and technology areas including Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation;

i) development and exchange of best practices, standards, and guidelines; and

j) commercialization and other exploitation of Project Foreground Information and any resulting Equipment and Material developed through Cooperative Activity to achieve the effective transition of technology from the research and development (R&D) environment to the operational environment.
ARTICLE 7
Forms of Cooperative Activity

1. Cooperation under this Agreement may include, but is not limited to, any of the following:
   a) coordinated research Projects and joint research Projects;
   b) joint task forces to examine emergent homeland security challenges;
   c) joint studies and scientific or technical demonstrations;
   d) joint organisation of field exercises, scientific seminars, conferences, symposia, and workshops;
   e) training of scientists and technical experts;
   f) visits and exchanges of scientists, engineers, or other appropriate personnel;
   g) exchanges or sharing of information and Equipment and Material;
   h) exchange of information on practices, laws, regulations, standards, methods, and programs relevant to cooperation under this Agreement;
   i) joint use of laboratory facilities and Equipment and Material, for conducting scientific and technological activities including Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation; and
   j) joint management of the commercialisation and exploitation of Equipment and Material and Project Foreground Information developed through Cooperative Activity.

2. Nothing in paragraph 1 shall preclude the Parties from facilitating other forms of Cooperative Activity that they may agree upon.

ARTICLE 8
Projects

1. Cooperative Activity under this Agreement shall normally be implemented in the form of Projects to be conducted pursuant to Project Arrangements.

2. Project Arrangements shall ordinarily contain the following terms and conditions for each Project:
   a) its nature;
   b) its scope;
   c) its duration;
d) the manner in which it will be funded;

e) specific details of any transfer of Equipment and Material and the identity of personnel and/or organisations, if any, to be committed to the Project;

f) Project Background Information to be used in the Project;

g) any specific provisions for terminating Participant involvement;

h) the dispute resolution process;

i) whether the use of Classified Information will be required;

j) any safety measures to be followed, including, where appropriate, specific procedures for dealing with hazardous or dangerous material;

k) any applicable cost sharing provisions;

l) any applicable cost ceiling;

m) currency variation arrangements;

n) any necessary technical annexes;

o) the allocation of responsibility for any taxes, duties or other government charges which may arise;

p) provisions addressing the national law which shall apply to Contracts made in relation to the Project Arrangement;

q) a Technology Management Plan containing details concerning the sharing, allocation and protection and/or benefits derived from the creation, use or exploitation of Intellectual Property under the Project;

r) any other consistent terms and conditions necessary to ensure the required development of the Project.

3. The Parties shall ensure that Project Arrangements incorporate the terms of this Agreement. In the case of any inconsistency, the terms of this Agreement shall prevail.

**ARTICLE 9**

**Participants**

1. Subject to the provisions of this Article, a Party may engage a Participant to carry out work relating to Cooperative Activity on its behalf. The engagement of any Participant in the implementation of any Cooperative Activity shall require the non-sponsoring Party’s prior review and written approval.
Before engaging a Participant to carry out work, a Party must enter into a Sponsorship Arrangement unless such an agreement already exists that can support Cooperative Activities pursuant to this Agreement.

The Party engaging a Participant shall ensure that the Participant agrees to:

a) carry out any work relating to Cooperative Activity in accordance with the terms of this Agreement; and

b) report to that Party’s Agreement Director on a periodic basis.

4. The Parties’ Agreement Directors shall jointly determine the frequency and scope of the reporting requirement referred to in paragraph 3b) of this Article.

5. In the event that a question arises with respect to a Participant and/or its activities under this Agreement, the Parties shall consult to consider the Participant’s role in Cooperative Activity. If either Party objects to a Participant’s continued participation and requests its termination, the Party that sponsored the Participant shall give the request sympathetic consideration, including as to the consequences of terminating the Participant’s participation.

6. Nothing in this Agreement or any Project Arrangement precludes a Party who has sponsored a Participant from suspending a Participant’s activities or replacing the Participant in accordance with Paragraph 1 of this Article in one or more of its Project Arrangements.

ARTICLE 10

Contracting

The Parties shall ensure that Project Arrangements are supported by Contracts wherever possible. The Contracts may be formed between the Parties, their agents or Third Parties where appropriate.

All Contracts made pursuant to Project Arrangements shall include terms and conditions equivalent to the provisions of this Agreement, the relevant Project Arrangements, and their associated Technology Management Plans. Without limiting the foregoing each Party or its Contracting Agency shall negotiate to obtain the rights for both Parties to use and disclose Project Foreground Information as specified in Article 13 (Intellectual Property Management and Use of Information) and to obtain the rights contained in Article 14 (Publication of Research Results) unless the other Party agrees in writing that they are unnecessary in a particular case, and each Party's Contracting Agency shall insert into its Contracts, and require its subcontractors to insert in subcontracts, suitable provisions to satisfy the requirements of Article 12 (Information Security), Article 13 (Intellectual Property Management and Use of Information), Article 14 (Publication of Research Results) and Article 17 (Third Party Sales and Transfers).

The Parties recognise that their respective legislation and regulations may apply to activities undertaken in respect of Project Arrangements and supporting Contracts made under this Agreement.
ARTICLE 11

Finance

1. Subject to the availability of funds for Cooperative Activity and to the provisions of this Article, each Party shall bear its own costs of discharging its responsibilities under this Agreement and its associated Project Arrangements.

2. Except as provided in paragraph 1 of this Article, this Agreement creates no standing financial commitments.

3. The Parties may agree to share costs for Cooperative Activity. Detailed descriptions of the financial provisions for Cooperative Activity, including the total cost of the activity and each Party's cost share, shall be agreed between the Parties in Project Arrangements in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article.

4. At the commencement of each Project, the Parties shall establish the equitable share of the total costs, including overhead costs and administrative costs. They shall also establish a cost target, a cost ceiling, and the apportionment of potential liability to be borne by each Party in the Project. In determining each Party's equitable share of total costs, the Parties may take into account:
   a) funds provided by one Party to the other for work under this Agreement ("financial contributions");
   b) material, personnel, use of Equipment and Material and facilities provided for the performance of work under this Agreement ("non-financial contributions") to directly support Agreement efforts. The Parties also recognize that prior work can constitute a non-financial contribution, and
   c) the ownership of Project Background Information utilised in the Project.

5. The following costs shall be borne entirely by the Party incurring the costs and are not included in the cost target, cost ceiling, or Project costs:
   a) costs associated with any unique national requirements identified by a Party; and/or
   b) any costs not expressly stated as shared costs or any costs that are outside the scope of this Agreement.

6. A Party shall promptly notify the other if available funds are not adequate to undertake activities arising as a result of this Agreement. If a Party notifies the other that it is terminating or reducing its funding for a Project, both Parties shall immediately consult with a view toward continuation on a changed or reduced basis. If this is not acceptable to both Parties, the respective rights and responsibilities of the Parties under Article 12 (Information Security), Article 13 (Intellectual Property Management and Use of Information) and Article 14 (Publication of Research Results) shall continue notwithstanding the termination or expiration of the Project. A Party sponsoring a Participant shall ensure that the Participant agrees to comply with the terms of Article 12 (Information Security), Article 13 (Intellectual Property Management and Use of Information) and Article 14 (Publication of Research Results) notwithstanding the termination or expiration of the Project.
7. At the commencement of each Project, the Parties shall jointly develop a Technology Management Plan.

8. Each Party shall be responsible for any audit of its activities in support of Cooperative Activity, including the activities of any of its Participants. Each Party’s audits shall be in accordance with its own national practices. For Project Arrangements where funds are transferred from one Party to the other Party, the receiving Party shall be responsible for the internal audit regarding administration of the other Party’s funds in accordance with national practices. Audit reports of such funds shall be promptly made available by the receiving Party to the other.

9. The U.S. dollar shall be the reference currency for this Agreement, and the fiscal year for any Project shall be the U.S. fiscal year.

**ARTICLE 12**

**Information Security**

1. All exchanges of information and Equipment and Material, including Classified Information, between the Parties and between Parties and Participants, shall be carried out in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations of the Parties, including those relating to the unauthorised transfer or re-transfer of such information and Equipment and Material.

The transfer of technical data for the purpose of discharging the Parties' obligations with regard to interface, integration, and safety shall normally be made without restriction, except as required by national laws and regulations relating to export control or the control of classified data. If design, manufacturing, and processing data, and associated software, which is business confidential but not export controlled, is necessary for interface, integration, or safety purposes, the transfer shall be made and the data and associated software shall be appropriately marked. All activities of the Parties pursuant to this Agreement shall be carried out in accordance with their national laws and regulations, including their export control laws and regulations and those pertaining to the control of classified information.

All information, Equipment and Material subject to export controls shall not be transferred pursuant to this Agreement unless such transfers are compliant with the originating Party's export control laws, policies and regulations.

2. **Classified Information:**

a) All Classified Information provided or generated pursuant to this Agreement and any of its Project Arrangements shall be stored, handled, transmitted, and safeguarded in accordance with the principles established between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of the United States of America in the General Security of Military Information Agreement dated December 4 and 23, 1981. The Parties specifically agree that the policies and safeguards established in the aforesaid Agreement will apply with equal force and effect to exchanges of Classified Information under this Agreement. The Parties shall agree on any implementing security arrangements that are deemed necessary. Prior to the sharing of Classified Information, the providing Party will ensure that the information is properly marked and the receiving Party is aware of the pending transfer.

b) The Parties shall appoint a DSA to establish implementing security arrangements and procedures consistent with this Agreement.
c) Each Party shall ensure that access to Classified Information is limited to those persons who possess requisite security clearances and have a specific need for access to the Classified Information in order to participate in Cooperative Activity established pursuant to this Agreement.

d) Each Party shall ensure that it incorporates the provisions of this Article into Project Arrangements. In addition, if either Party deems it necessary, Project Arrangements shall include:

i) detailed provisions dealing with the prevention of unauthorised transfer or re-transfer of information and Equipment and Material; and/or

ii) detailed distribution and access restrictions on information and Equipment and Material.

e) Each Party shall take all necessary lawful steps available to it to ensure that Classified Information provided or generated pursuant to this Agreement is protected from further disclosure, unless the other Party consents to such disclosure.

f) Classified Information shall be transferred only through official government-to-government channels or through channels approved by both Parties. Such Classified Information shall be given the equivalent degree of protection in the country of receipt as it was given in the country of origin and shall be marked with a legend containing the country of origin, the conditions of release, and the fact that the information relates to this Agreement.

g) The Parties shall according to their national laws investigate all cases in which it is known or where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that Classified Information provided or generated pursuant to this Agreement has been lost or disclosed to unauthorised persons. Each Party shall promptly and fully inform the other of the details of any such occurrences, and of the final results of the investigation and of the corrective action taken to preclude recurrences.

h) Unless both Parties agree in writing that it is unnecessary in a particular case, Contractors, prospective Contractors, subcontractors, or private sector Participants that are determined by either Party to be under financial, administrative, policy or management control of nationals or entities of any country which is not a Party to this Agreement may only participate in a Contract or subcontract requiring access to Classified Information that has been classified on grounds of national security if enforceable measures are in effect to ensure that the nationals or entities of that country do not have access to such Classified Information.

i) Information or Equipment and Material provided or generated pursuant to this Agreement may not be classified any higher than the "TOP SECRET/KVALIFICERAT HEMLIG" level.

3. Controlled Unclassified Information: The nature and amount of the Controlled Unclassified Information to be acquired and disseminated pursuant to this Agreement shall be consistent with the objectives of this Agreement and the following guidelines and procedures:

a) Controlled Unclassified Information shall be used by the receiving Party only for the purposes directly related to Cooperative Activity conducted pursuant to this Agreement;
b) access to Controlled Unclassified Information shall be limited to those personnel of the receiving Party whose access is necessary for the permitted use under this Agreement;

c) all necessary lawful steps shall be taken, which may include national classification where appropriate, to keep Controlled Unclassified Information free from unauthorised disclosure, including requests under any public access provisions;

d) Controlled Unclassified Information provided under this Agreement is to be marked by the Party providing it with a legend containing the country of origin, the conditions of release, the fact that it relates to this Agreement and a statement to the effect that access to the information is controlled; and

c) Controlled Unclassified Information provided or generated pursuant to this Agreement shall be stored, handled, and transmitted in a manner that ensures proper control. Prior to authorising the release of Controlled Unclassified Information to any Participant, the authorising Party shall ensure the Participant is legally required to control such information in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

4. Business Confidential Information:

a) Each Party shall safeguard and protect identified Business Confidential Information that is furnished or is created pursuant to this Agreement in accordance with Annex I to this Agreement. The receiving Party shall maintain security over such items.

b) The Parties shall ensure that any Participants are legally required to control and safeguard Business Confidential Information in accordance with this Agreement.

ARTICLE 13

Intellectual Property Management and Use of Information

1. General: Both Parties recognise that successful collaboration depends on full and prompt exchange of information necessary for carrying out Cooperative Activities. The Parties intend to acquire sufficient Project Background Information and/or rights to use such information to enable the development of technologies, prototype equipment, and other activities included in a Project. The nature and amount of information to be acquired and disclosed shall be consistent with this Agreement and the terms of individual Project Arrangements.

2. Exploitation: Issues related to the management of Project Background Information and Project Foreground Information, including the allocation of any benefits (including royalties) derived from the creation and exploitation of Intellectual Property in Project Foreground Information in respect of Cooperative Activities under this Agreement shall be governed by the Articles of this Agreement, including the provisions of Annex I, and any Technology Management Plans associated with a Project.

3. Government Furnished Project Background Information:

a) Disclosure: Unless a Project Arrangement provides otherwise, each Party shall disclose to the other Project Background Information in its possession or control, provided that:
(i) the Project Background Information is necessary to or useful in the implementation of a proposed or existing Project established pursuant to this Agreement. The Party in possession or control of the information shall determine whether it is "necessary to" or "useful in" establishing new Projects or implementing existing ones;

(ii) the Project Background Information shall be made available without adversely affecting the rights of holders of Intellectual Property or Business Confidential Information; and

(iii) disclosure is consistent with national disclosure policies, laws, and regulations of the furnishing Party.

b) Use: Unless a Project Arrangement provides otherwise, Government Furnished Project Background Information disclosed by one Party to the other may be used without charge by the other Party for Project Development purposes only; and the furnishing Party shall retain all its rights with respect to such Government Furnished Project Background Information. Where the use of Government Furnished Project Background Information is necessary to enable the use of Project Foreground Information, such Government Furnished Project Background Information may be used by the receiving Party for homeland security purposes, upon agreement of the Parties and in accordance with applicable laws.

4. Participant Furnished Project Background Information:

a) Disclosure: Unless a Project Arrangement provides otherwise, Project Background Information furnished by a Participant sponsored by one Party shall be made available to the other Party provided the following conditions are met:

(i) the Project Background Information is necessary to or useful in the Arrangement. The Party in possession or having control of the information shall determine whether it is "necessary to" or "useful in" a Project;

(ii) the Project Background Information may be made available without adversely affecting the rights of holders of Business Confidential Information or Intellectual Property; and

(iii) disclosure is consistent with national disclosure policies, laws, and regulations of the furnishing Party.

b) Use: Project Background Information furnished by Participants may be subject to restrictions by holders of Intellectual Property. In the event that it is not subject to restrictions preventing its use, it may only be used by the Parties for Project Development purposes. If a Party wants to use Participant Furnished Project Background Information for purposes other than Project Development, (which other purposes shall include, without limitation, sales and licences to Third Parties), then the requesting Party must obtain any required licenses from the owner or owners of the rights to that information.

5. Project Foreground Information:

Project Foreground Information may be commercialised where appropriate, in which case benefits derived from the utilisation and application of such information shall be distributed according to the relative contributions of the Parties to the Project, the cost of commercialisation,
and the degree of commitment of the Parties to obtaining legal protection of Intellectual Property, as determined in a Technology Management Plan.

Each of the Parties may own its Intellectual Property in Project Foreground Information in its own jurisdiction and in the jurisdiction of the other Party and may derive benefits from its exploitation and commercialisation in those jurisdictions, with a mechanism for their establishment in a Technology Management Plan.

**ARTICLE 14**

**Publication of Research Results**

1. The Parties agree that the provisions of paragraph A of Section III of Annex I to this Agreement shall apply to the publication of any research results created under this Agreement.

2. **Publication Review:** The Parties agree that publication of the results may be one of the goals of this Agreement, to stimulate further research in the public or private sector. In order to protect the rights of the Parties, including to avoid prejudice to the holders of Intellectual Property and Business Confidential Information, each Party shall transmit to the other for its review any material containing such results and intended for publication, or other disclosure, at least sixty (60) working days before such material is submitted to any editor, publisher, referee or meeting organiser, or is otherwise disclosed. In the absence of an objection by the other Party within that sixty-day period the publication or other disclosure may proceed. If either Party raises an objection to the public release of publications arising from this Agreement, public release will not occur unless and until there is agreement between the Parties as to the conditions for public release. It is the responsibility of each Party to coordinate with its sponsored Participants who work under a Project Arrangement to determine whether all potential Intellectual Property or Business Confidential Information interests have been properly considered.

3. **Affiliation:** The sponsorship and financial support of the Parties for Cooperative Activity shall not be used in any public statement of a promotional nature or used for commercial purposes without the express written permission of both Parties.

4. **Publicity and Acknowledgements:** All publications relating to the results of the Projects established pursuant to this Agreement shall include as applicable a notice indicating that the underlying investigation received financial support from the Government of the United States and/or the Government of Sweden. Two copies of such publications shall be sent to the Agreement Directors by the individual or entity that is the author of the publications.

**ARTICLE 15**

**Entry of Personnel and Equipment and Material**

1. With respect to Cooperative Activity under this Agreement, each Party, in accordance with its national laws and regulations, and as appropriate, shall facilitate:
a) prompt and efficient entry into and exit from its territory of appropriate Equipment and Material, to especially include instrumentation, test equipment and Project Background and Foreground Information;

b) prompt and efficient entry into and exit from its territory, and domestic travel and work of, persons participating on behalf of the Parties or Participants in the implementation of this Agreement;

c) prompt and efficient access, as appropriate, to relevant geographical areas, information, Equipment and Material and institutions, for persons participating on behalf of the Parties, or Participants, in the implementation of this Agreement; and

d) mutual logistic support.

2. Customs duties, import and export taxes, and similar charges shall be administered in accordance with each Party’s respective laws and regulations. Insofar as existing laws and regulations permit, each Party shall use its best efforts to ensure that readily identifiable duties, taxes and similar charges, as well as quantitative or other restrictions on imports and exports, are not imposed in connection with Projects carried out under this Agreement.

ARTICLE 16
Research Safety

1. The Parties shall establish and implement policies and practices to ensure and provide for the safety of their employees, the public, and the environment during the conduct of Cooperative Activities subject to applicable national laws and regulations. If any Cooperative Activity involves the use of dangerous or hazardous materials, the Parties shall establish and implement an appropriate safety plan.

2. Without prejudice to any existing arrangements under the Parties' national laws, the Parties shall take appropriate steps to protect the welfare of any subjects involved in Cooperative Activities. Such steps may include the provision of medical treatment and, where appropriate, financial relief.

ARTICLE 17
Third Party Sales and Transfers

Neither Party shall:

a) sell, transfer title to, disclose, or transfer possession of Project Foreground Information, or equipment incorporating Foreground Information, to a Third Party without the prior written consent of the other Party; or

b) permit any such sale, disclosure, or transfer by others, including by the owner of the item, without the prior written consent of the other Party. Such sales and transfers shall be consistent with Article 13 (Intellectual Property Management and Use of Information).
2. For the purposes of this Article States, Territories, Protectorates and other domestic government entities are not considered to be Third Parties.

**ARTICLE 18**

Dispute Resolution

1. Except for disputes concerning Intellectual Property and those procedures set forth in Article 14 (Publication of Research Results), all questions or disputes between the Parties that cannot be resolved by the Agreement Directors arising under or relating to this Agreement shall be submitted to the Executive Agents. Such questions and disputes shall be resolved only by consultation between the Parties and shall not be referred to a national court, an international tribunal, or to any other person or entity for resolution.

2. Resolution of disputes concerning Intellectual Property, shall be resolved as provided for in Annex 1.

3. Each Party shall ensure that any Sponsorship Arrangement that it enters into with a Participant includes provisions for dispute resolution consistent with paragraphs 1 and 2.

**ARTICLE 19**

Status of Annex

Annex I forms an integral part of this Agreement and, unless expressly provided otherwise, a reference to this Agreement includes a reference to Annex I.

**ARTICLE 20**

Entry into Force, Duration, Amendment, and Termination

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature by both Parties

2. The Agreement may be amended in writing by the mutual consent of the Parties. This Agreement shall remain in force until terminated in writing by either Party, with such termination taking effect six months from the date of the written notice of termination.

3. This Agreement may also be terminated by the mutual written agreement of the Parties.

4. Unless otherwise agreed, termination of this Agreement shall not affect the validity or duration of any Cooperative Activity previously undertaken pursuant to it.

5. The respective rights and responsibilities of the Parties under Article 12 (Information Security), Article 13 (Intellectual Property Management and Use and Information), Article 14 (Publication of Research Results), Article 17 (Third Party Sales and Transfers), Article 18 (Dispute Resolution) and Annex I shall continue notwithstanding the termination or expiry of this Agreement. A Party sponsoring a Participant shall ensure that the Participant agrees to comply
with the terms of Article 12 (Information Security), Article 13 (Intellectual Property Management and Use of Information), Article 14 (Publication of Research Results), Article 17 (Third Party Sales and Transfers), Article 18 (Dispute Resolution) and Annex I notwithstanding the termination or expiration of this Agreement.

6. In particular, all Classified Information exchanged or generated under this Agreement shall continue to be protected in the event of the termination or expiration of the Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Washington, D.C., in duplicate, on this 13th day of April 2007.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN: