Examining ‘cityness’ to inform an urban theory of the ‘global South’

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Examining ‘cityness’ to inform an urban theory of the ‘global south’

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Abstract

An urban theory of the 'global south' rejects the northern experience of urbanisation as the primary articulation of global urbanism and promotes the development of new paradigms and methodologies for the study of southern urbanism. Emerging theories on southern urbanism destabilise and decentre geographies of knowledge by 'provincializing' hegemonic urban theory. Cities across the 'global south' are developing in ways that challenge predominant theories and models of urban policy and planning. Therefore, the task we face is to develop a methodological repertoire to better understand the emergence of new place-making politics. To this end, the aims of this study are i) to challenge urban theory by identifying lacunas in analyses of southern urbanism; ii) to elaborate, trial and evaluate a research agenda built around 'cityness' to inform an urban theory of the 'global south.' The methodology is structured around an examination of the masterplans of the case study city (Dakar, Senegal) and a field-based analysis of (two) spaces in the city. By working with scale, the analysis arrives at a better understanding of 'cityness' and the various forces shaping the urban fabric of the city.
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Chapter One: Introduction

The issue, the problem, the controversy

The aim of this project is to harness theory as a ‘liberatory practice’ to challenge the metanarratives and hegemonic conventions of global urbanism (hooks, 1991, pg. 2). As it stands, cities of the ‘global south’ are evolving in ways that elude conventional theoretical frameworks and we have not yet developed the methodological repertoire to tap into their experiences. The corpus of urban theory is overwhelmingly focused on an exclusive group of northern cities framed as ‘successful locales of high finance and corporate city life’ while ‘poor’ cities are purveyors of a failed modernisation - ‘economically stagnant yet (perversely?) expanding in size’ (Robinson, 2002, pg. 540). This is not a new debate, but it is one that has ‘struggled to gain traction’ (Pieterse, 2010), as southern cities are continually measured against a ‘global/world cities’ model based on ‘northern’ urbanisation (Shatkin, 2007, pg. 1). This teleology relegates southern cities to the ‘waiting room of history’ (Chakrabarty, 2000, pg. 8) as the metropolitan ‘other’ - systematically vilified or ignored by urban theory (Said, 1978; Miraftab, 2009, pg. 45). The urbanisation narrative of southern cities is steeped in what Hart (2001, pg. 650) terms ‘Big D Development’ or the post-World War II invention of the ‘Third World’ and ‘underdevelopment’ in the aftermath of decolonisation. This rhetoric emphasises economic growth indicators and northern models of development as the benchmark of efficient urbanisation and overlooks the agency of local actors in the historically determinate urbanisation in other parts of the world (Malaquais, 2011; Pieterse, 2010). Consequently, theories of global urbanism based on northern research cannot account for the urbanisation of cities beyond the confines of a world ‘narrated by Lewis Mumford’ and his followers’ (Malaquais, 2011, pg. 7). Our epistemic vision remains myopic as only the narrowest ‘parameters of change are possible and allowable’ (Lorde, 1984).

The ‘parochial nature’ of urban theory and planning has been well documented by Yiftachel (2006), Watson (2002, 2009, 2013), and Roy (2009, 2011), as ‘travelling ideas’ from the north have often resulted in catastrophic results in the south. Policies directed at southern cities continue to rely on ‘unimaginative modernist templates’

1 Lewis Mumford was a prominent urban theorist of the 20th century whose work remains influential to modern urban planning.
repackaged as postcolonial, postmodern and, ‘post-racial (alternatively post-ethnic)’ (Malaquais, 2011, pg. 7-8). The restrictive boundaries of theory and planning create a dichotomy between the dynamic, informal cities of the ‘global south’ and the more static, formal cities of the ‘global north.’ Urbanity, however, is not a self-evident reality as cities are constantly evolving as complex systems (Brenner & Schmid, 2014, pg. 20). For example, city-building in much of the south is often an organic and ‘non-state affair,’ driven by elaborate systems of organisation, exchange, regulation, ‘reciprocity and continuous recalibration’ (Pieterse, 2017, pg. 220). Urban planning, however, is largely based on a singular notion of ‘proper’ communities and therefore remains poorly equipped to handle matters pertaining to southern urbanisation (Watson, 2013, pg. 102).

Within this paradigm, African cities, in particular, have been ignored or ‘banished’ to a category of ‘not-quite cities’ (Myers, 2011, pg. 4). This has resulted in the dissemination of narrow and simplistic ideas on conditions of African urbanism. Across the continent², cities are researched not in terms of ‘what they are, but in terms of what they might become’ given the appropriate policy reform and institutional infrastructure (Buckley & Kallergis, 2014, pg. 173). Mbembe and Nuttall (2004, pg. 348-9) argue that the African continent is ‘perpetually caught and imagined within a web of difference and absolute otherness’ (Said, 1978). Analyses of African urbanisation are often fraught with what Ferguson (2006, pg. 2-5) calls ‘Africa talk’ – the generalising and predominant way of thinking about ‘Africa and its cities' whereby Africa is a category based on which ‘a world is constructed…and a category within which and according to which people must live.' The monolith of the 'African city,' exemplified in mega-cities such as Lagos, Kinshasa or Accra, is analysed as the antithesis of western urbanisation and acts as an all-encompassing reference for failed modernisation or 'all that can go wrong with urbanism' (Myers, 2011, pg. 4).

To theorise and write 'across the whole continent,' focusing mainly on the 'less palatable particularities' of African urbanisation (Myers, 2011, pg. 3; Chabal, 2009)

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² The distinction between north and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is irrelevant within the scope of a research project on the ‘global south’ given the intermingled histories of cities across the continent. However, the dichotomy reflects the UN division of world regions and is utilised for statistical and demographic data on the subregions of Northern Africa and SSA.
suggests an implicit understanding of African urbanisation as a 'distinct lesser kind of urban geography' (Myers, 2011, pg. 4). The 'value' of published work on African urbanisation is diminished by the perceived limitations and usefulness of this research to the field of urban geography (Parnell & Pieterse, 2016, pg. 242). 'Things African' are considered 'residual entities, the study of which does not contribute anything to the knowledge of the world' (Mbembe in Goldstone & Obarrio, 2017, pg. 211). This betrays a normative understanding of urbanisation that frames the 'cityness' of African cities as 'alternative modernities' (McFarlane & Rutherford, 2008, pg. 341), evaluated in terms of the 'authenticity of the copy' (Ferguson, 2006, pg. 16). Consequently, research on African cities is limited by a 'relevance reflex' according to which the subject of urban inquiry is relevant only insofar as it addresses practical policy questions that 'solve' real-world problems (Pieterse & Parnell, 2014). The imperative of 'useful knowledge' leads to an overemphasis on institutional reform and capacity-building programmes. Thus, the challenge we face is to develop a research agenda that holds in tension a critical reading of power dynamics at both the macro and micro levels alongside a thorough engagement with 'relevant' research (Pieterse, 2009, pg. 8).

'Cityness'

To take on the challenge of studying southern urbanisation, this thesis proposes 'cityness' as a lens to impose 'conceptual order on a messy reality' and illuminate the blind spots in our theoretical vision (Creswell, 2014, pg. 5). Traditional understandings and 'essentialized visions' of 'cityness' are rooted in the moral values attached to urban life (e.g. the etymology of 'civility' is close to that of 'city') (Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 325). Based on this approach, southern cities are described as 'lacking in the qualities of cityness' because of their divergent development (Robinson, 2002, pg. 531). 'Cityness,' however, refutes the universalist grammar of global urbanism and expands the scope of urban studies to examine the place-making politics that transcend mimicry of the west. Sassen (2005) argues that 'cityness' captures 'something that might otherwise easily get lost: types of urbanity that are non-Western.' An urban theory of the 'global south' disrupts the universal narrative of urbanisation steeped in Eurocentric accounts of modernity and engages with layered, complex and emerging forms of southern urbanisation. This framework examines cities across the 'global south' as 'distinct but intertwined repositories of modernity' and 'harbingers of the capacity for extraordinariness and novelty' (Robinson, 2002, pg. 5). Cities of the south are at the heart of historical global
processes and ‘generators of urban stories worth telling and worth learning from’ (Myers, 2011, pg. 6). By framing the discussion in terms of ‘cityness,’ southern cities are recast as ‘works in progress, at the same time exceedingly creative and extremely stalled’ (Simone, 2004, pg. 1).

According to Mbembe (2010), there is no ‘better laboratory than Africa’ to gauge our ‘epistemological imagination’ or pose questions about ‘how we know what we know’ (in Shipley et al., 2010, pg. 654). Researchers and theorists, including Myers (2011), Simone (2004), Robinson (2011), De Boeck & Plissart (2004), Parnell (2014), and Pieterse (2010) seek to counter simplistic ideas about southern urbanisation and challenge conventional metanarratives through the analysis of African cities (Choplin, 2012, pg. 2). Their aim is to identify and document the ‘inventive responses to the contingencies of our times’ through a more nuanced examination of African cities (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012, pg. 125). To this end, this analysis uses ‘cityness’ to account for the ‘multiplicity of the pathways and trajectories of change’ in the case study city (Shipley et al., 2010, pg. 654).

In the field of urban theory, African cities are often one step ahead of the ‘knowledge produced about them’ (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004, pg. 349), as their spatial organisation has often escaped ‘conventional methods of analysing cities’ (Isichei, 2002, pg. 14). The challenge is therefore to hold in tension political and theoretical insights that make sense of the ‘elusive African city’ in the analysis of ‘cityness’ (Pieterse, 2017, pg. 218). This framework casts urban Africans as ‘active agents’ in the construction of meaningful lives, rather than the ‘passive victims of inexorable structural processes’ (Murray & Meyers, 2011, pg.3). For example, in times of sickness, the urban African ‘will consult, one after another,’ the doctor in an Abidjan hospital, the faith healer in the suburbs and the ‘witch doctor in his village’ because s/he ‘simultaneously inhabits these different worlds’ (Bayart, 1993, pg. 12). This example demonstrates how ‘cityness’ transcends fixed and opposing coordinates demarking places of modernity and tradition (Brooks & Herrick, 2019, pg. 12). African cities are places 'to be modern' and to 'keep tradition alive,' to be 'a kinsman' and to be cosmopolitan (Simone & Abouhani, 2005, pg. 12). Hanchard (1999, pg. 247) defines this social reality as ‘Afro-modernity’ or the ‘selective incorporation of technologies, discourses, and institutions of the modern West within cultural and political practices of African-derived people.’ Similarly, Ndi (2007) discusses the
ways in which urban dwellers find ways to integrate themselves into narrative of liberal capitalism while retaining ‘humanism and warmth that reflects pre-colonial standards’ (Aoyaji et al., 1998; Ndi, 2007, pg. 178-9). African societies have never been the 'passive objects' of processes of exploitation and dependency as neither colonisation nor economic decline has lessened their ability to 'pursue their own strategies to produce their own modernity' (Bayart, 1993, pg. 20). ‘Cityness’ is a tool to capture these coeval adaptations of the modern and generate a nuanced understanding of urban phenomena in Africa and across the 'global south.' The study of African cities does not necessitate ‘unique methodological requirements’ as the findings of this thesis do not have exclusive relevance to the African continent and lay out a methodology that captures urban processes unfolding across the 'global south.' (Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 2).

**Research aims and questions**

This thesis is predicated on 'cityness,' not cities. The title is deliberately kept open-ended to signal that the contributions of this research project extend beyond the case study city. While the thesis contributes to existing scholarship on the case city, the key contribution of this work is rooted in the task of arriving at a coherent understanding of 'cityness' by extending our knowledge of urbanisation in the 'global south.' To do so, the analysis posits the need for a deeper discussion on the emblematic characteristics of southern urbanisation that redress the oversights of mainstream urban theory. This is achieved via a retroductive analysis that 'speaks back' to mainstream urban theory and a methodology that is deployed and evaluated in the case study city (Dakar, Senegal). The retroductive study is neither wholly inductive (i.e. assuming the researcher enters 'unknown' territory to develop theory) or deductive (in the practice of relying on established scholarship to cast a gaze on the 'south'). Rather, the thesis speaks directly to existing scholarship and evaluates its relevance to southern cities while also engaging with emerging theories on urbanisation in the 'global south.'

The research questions of this analysis are outlined as follows:

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3 See Mourides example on pg. 258-259
4 The 'global south' is presented in lowercase and quotations to signal the problematic nature of the theoretical divisions and dichotomies within the field of urban planning and theory.
RQ1. How does an urban theory of the ‘global south’ address the gaps in urban theory and planning (in Africa)?

RQ2. How can we operationalise a research agenda structured around ‘cityness’ to inform an urban theory of the ‘global south’?

RQ3. How does the selected methodology contribute to our understanding of ‘cityness’ (in Africa)?

This research project is focused on the ‘global south’ rather than a regional theory of sub-Saharan African cities in order to challenge the common assumption within urban planning and policy that these cities are marginal examples that contribute little to the 'knowledge of the world' (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004, pg. 350). By harnessing the 'ex-centricity' of southern cities outside the traditional scope of urban theory and doing away with regional divisions through a relational approach, the thesis posits that African cities are valid empirical bases for the development of ‘mainstream’ urban theory (Bhaba, 1994, pg. 6). Furthermore, by speaking to the ‘global south’ (rather than ‘Africa’), the analysis avoids the trap of African exceptionalism and worsening the trend of ‘mosaic epistemologies’ (Connell, 2015). Southern theory based on the analysis of an African case study does not require a ‘distinct set of propositions’ or an ‘alternative paradigm’ to challenge hegemonic concepts (Connell, 2014, pg. 217). Rather, the thesis argues that there are ‘important propositions' that can be advanced from southern perspectives and African cities are valid empirical bases from which to develop urban theory (ibid).

The research questions of this analysis are applicable across the ‘global south’ but have been structured around the African continent and applied specifically to the city of Dakar, Senegal. The premise of this thesis, however, is the elaboration of a methodology based on ‘cityness' that is replicable across all southern cities. The analysis avoids gross generalisations that construct a metanarrative for southern urbanism and instead proposes ‘cityness’ as a way of understanding urban phenomena in the ‘global south.’ To this end, the methodology is designed to identify what Healey (2012) refers to as ‘contingent universals’ or the understanding of what is specific to a place and ‘what can be shared learning across different localities and contexts.’ The empirical work of this research project is conducted in...
the same vein as Chimurenga⁵ and Cityscapes⁶. These journals have expanded the methodological repertoire of urban studies by challenging traditional theorisations of African and southern cities within the disciplines of urban studies and planning.

Structure of the thesis

The thesis is structured as a retroductive analysis that speaks directly to existing urban scholarship and engages with emerging theories to develop and evaluate the methodology (Figure 1).

Identification

• The analysis begins by identifying the issues, problems or existing 'pain points' within urban theory. The gaps in our knowledge concerning southern urbanisation have limited our understanding of urban phenomena unfolding in southern cities (such as Dakar, Senegal).

Elaboration

• The research project proposes a methodology structured around 'cityness' as a means of testing the relevance of northern theory in southern contexts and evaluating emerging frameworks within the scope of an urban theory of the 'global south.'

Implementation

• The methodology is based on i) planning analysis based on archival research and ii) field-based analysis of designated spaces in the case study city.

Evaluation

• The contributions and effectiveness of the selected methodology are evaluated and assessed. Where/when the methodology has failed to produce relevant insights, the analysis proposes amendments and improvements for future study.

Figure 1: Elements of the retroductive study (Author’s own figure)

Identification:

The theoretical work of this thesis is based on the premise that something is amiss in urban theory with regards to the study of southern cities (African cities, in

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⁵ Chimurenga (‘Struggle for Freedom’) is a ‘Pan-African publication of culture, art, and politics based in Cape Town. It provides an innovative platform for free ideas and political reflection by Africans about Africa’ (chimurengachronic.co.za)

⁶ Cityscapes magazine is a ‘hybrid of forms, simultaneously invested in scholarly discourse around contemporary urbanism in Africa and the 'global south,' as much as individual everyday experiences and activities of the multitude of actors that are actively involved in shaping cities across the continent and the rest of the developing world’ (https://www.cityscapesdigital.net/about/).
Chapter Two engages with literature on African cities to expose the oversights of urban theory and identify instances in which theory based in/on the 'global north' is inappropriate or poorly suited to the study of African urbanism. Specifically, the study of African cities has been dominated by global political economy and policy fix approaches that examine urbanisation through the scope of development discourse and modernisation theory. This chapter discusses an emerging and evolving research tract, labelled 'socio-spatial infrastructures,' that examines new types of resistance, exchanges, networks, development and subsistence in African cities (Enwezor et al., 2003, pg. 19). These studies are often concerned with the 'nexus of multiple crossings that constitute urban spatiality' (Pieterse, 2010, pg. 3) and inform the methodology of this analysis in the examination of 'largely makeshift complexion of many cities in Africa and Asia' (Simone & Pieterse, 2017).

**Elaboration:**

Chapter Three addresses previous and ongoing work that, in its totality, constitutes an urban theory of the 'global south.' This section lays out the theoretical backbone of this thesis. By addressing definitions and categorisations, the false dichotomies underpinning urban theory are taken apart in order to situate northern theory within the geographical and intellectual prisms from which it originates. In so doing, the analysis identifies instances in which existing theory does not apply to southern contexts and examines new methods for studying urbanisation that dislodge the locus of knowledge production. Based on this discussion, the analysis proposes three 'corrective mainstreams' (Pieterse, 2017) which are the core tenets of this retroduction study. These are broadly defined as 'southern urbanism' (Corrective mainstream 1) rooted in postcolonial critique, 'vitalist ontologies' (Corrective mainstream 2) based on a deconstructive approach to the study of urban infrastructure, and 'everyday urbanism' (Corrective mainstream 3) focused on survival strategies and routine practices that define and shape urbanity.

Chapter Four is dedicated to methodology and addresses both the traditional methods for studying African cities and new avenues that expand the scope of urban theory. This chapter outlines the research design of the project, the various elements involved in the data collection process, and the details of the case study city. The case city, Dakar, is the largest city in Senegal, the former colonial capital of
the AOF (Afrique Occidentale Française), the commercial centre and main port, and accounts for over half of the urban population of the country. The city is a site for increasing real estate speculation and a ‘laboratory’ for international urban planning and governance, making it a strategic choice for the study of African urbanisation (Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 324). This research project works with scale to address the ‘heterogeneous forces, surfaces, and spaces’ that make up the urban fabric of a city (Simone in Enwezor Ed., 2003, pg. 25). The methodology involves i) planning analysis based on archival research and ii) a field-based analysis based on designated spaces in the city. The archival research is based on the study of masterplans as a means of identifying the narratives of urban development. The field-based analysis consists of first-hand observations supplemented by secondary resources to trace the evolution and transformation of the urban landscape. The methodology takes a step towards unravelling urban complexity through the analysis of built form, public services, transportation, housing and architecture in the 'staging of infrastructural modernity' (Fredericks, 2014, pg. 535). The chapter also discusses the limitations of the methodology and the strengths and weaknesses of a research agenda built around 'cityness.'

Implementation:

Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight document the empirical findings and contributions of this thesis. Specifically, Chapters Five, Six and Seven report the findings from the archival and planning research by recreating a timeline of Dakar, plan by plan, from 1857 to 2035. Chapter Five begins with the precolonial origins of Dakar prior to annexation by the French and examines the implementation of the first masterplan in the newly established city, covering the period between 1857-1920s. Chapter Six analyses masterplans of the 20th century and considers elements of continuity and change in the planning narratives of the city from the 1930s to 2000. Chapter Seven looks at the 21st century plans of Dakar, developed in tandem with JICA (Japanese International Cooperation Agency), and disentangles the technocratic and bureaucratic jargon of policy frameworks guiding the development of the city. Chapter Eight covers the field-based analysis of this research project and engages with on-the-ground configurations of the urban landscape. The research findings of this chapter are framed by the parameters of the paradigmatic and

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7 French West Africa (Mauritania, French Sudan (now Mali), Senegal, French Guinea, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Dahomey (Benin) and Niger
critical case in the analysis of emblematic processes and phenomena of southern urbanisation.

Evaluation:
The conclusion takes a critical look at the pitfalls and advantages of the proposed methodology and considers the benefits of building a research project based on 'cityness.' Additionally, interspersed throughout the monograph are entries that document the reflexive work of this analysis and can be read in or out of sequence. Throughout the research process, the researcher must consider an object ‘in relation to itself, bending that object back upon itself in a process which includes the self being able to consider itself as its own object’ (Archer, 2007, pg. 72). These nine 'Voices' reflect the theoretical evolution of this thesis and the evaluation of 'cityness' as a way of understanding urbanisation which inherently requires reflexive work and an implicit understanding of the researcher’s positionality in the research process.

The ‘Voices’ also speak to the fact that the city, as an object of study, constantly ‘remains out of focus’ and cannot be captured in one ‘master narrative’ (De Boeck & Plissart, 2004, pg. 8). Therefore, the research diaries also include works from novelists, musicians, photographers, artists, and poets to showcase different representations of the case study city beyond the confines of policy and planning. These resources contribute to a 'bottom-up re-sensitization' of top-down policy (Lawhon et al., 2014, pg. 507). They are situated within the retroductive approach by pluralising our perspective on southern and African cities beyond conventional depictions and characterisations of southern urbanism.
Voices: Decolonising the curriculum

This research project situates itself within a broader academic framework that calls for ‘decolonising the curriculum.’ Academic institutions both in the UK and abroad, have been called on to integrate subaltern voices – feminist, southern, postcolonial, ‘other’ (Said, 1978). The ‘so-called European intellectual tradition’ lies at the heart of most social science departments where ‘fundamental thinkers who are long dead and gone’ are referenced and discussed as though they were our ‘own contemporaries’ (Chakrabarty, 2000, pg. 5). Decolonising the curriculum does not advocate the complete rejection of masculinist, Eurocentric and hegemonic narratives but insists on situating these as a vernacular emanating from northern academia and embedded within certain disciplines. The retroductive analysis of this research project challenges the universality of northern urban theory in order to theoretically dismantle the master’s house with the master’s tools and engage with southern knowledge to ‘beat him at his own game’ (Lorde, 1984).

Throughout this research project, the discipline of urban geography is called into question, for how might anti-racist, anti-Eurocentric and grounded scholarship be developed by a ‘white discipline’? (Pulido, 2002). By acknowledging and addressing the ‘unbearable whiteness of geography’ (Derickson, 2017), this project embraces the possibility of the undercommons. The ‘undercommons’ – black, indigenous, queer, poor, feminist, subaltern voices – are not content with ‘being acknowledged by a system that denies a) that anything was ever broken and b) that we deserved to be the broken part’ (Harney & Moten, 2013, pg. 6). The challenge of the undercommons is therefore not to ‘displace the academy’ but rather to figure out how to ‘transform it’ and change the shape of the knowledge ‘produced within it’ (Jazeel, 2018, pg. 11).

By decolonising the curriculum, we broaden the theoretical standpoints of academic disciplines and address the oversights of hegemonic narratives. This provokes important questions regarding issues of representation and ‘voice.’ Specifically, this project asks ‘who gets to represent Africa’ within a discipline that has historically denied the continent representation as ‘a form of power’ due to legacies of

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8 Ebenzer Howard, Le Corbusier, Louis Wirth, Lewis Mumford
colonialism, racism, and economic decline (Briggs & Weathers, 2016, pg. 470). By tackling the issue of 'voice,' we must first question our role as researchers. The work of the 'subversive intellectual' in this project is to disappear into the 'undercommons of enlightenment, where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted' (Harney & Moten, 2013, pg. 26). In so doing, we may find that 'other' voices do not exist solely in response to the centre but in spite of it as we continue to decolonise and pluralise our knowledge of the 'global south.'
Chapter Two: Studying African urbanism

Academic literature on urban Africa has traditionally veered in two directions i) global political economy perspectives that paint a picture of 'utter devastation' and situate African cities within a dialectical totality of uneven development; ii) policy-focused literature that elaborates a 'comprehensive package' of governance, infrastructural, and institutional reforms to address development failures (Pieterse, 2010, pg. 2). Both approaches, however, fail to capture the paradoxical characteristics of modern African cities as carriers of a 'dysfunctional yet dynamic urban form' (Gandy, 2005, pg. 374). African cities represent an encounter with 'indeterminacy, provisionality, and the contingent' which, in the context of urban scholarship, assumes the magnitude of an 'epistemological abyss' (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004, pg. 349). Seekings (2013, pg. 169) argues that the knowledge at our disposal is ill-suited for theorising the urban 'south' due to the 'irreconcilably different lived experiences' of southern cities, rendering them analytically 'incommensurate' with their northern counterparts. An emerging research agenda, referred to here as 'socio-spatial infrastructures,' represents a more hopeful and nuanced approach to the study of African cities. Through interdisciplinary and grounded approaches, the study of socio-spatial infrastructures rebalances the 'intellectual work examining the nature of African urban life' and reframes the 'imperatives of developmentalism' (Pieterse, 2010, pg. 1).

The goal of this review is twofold: i) firstly, the chapter outlines critical approaches to the study of African urbanisation and identifies lacunas in urban theory concerning research on African cities; ii) secondly, the chapter examines an emerging research agenda based on a more nuanced conceptualisation of African urbanism. The literature review draws from both academic and policy-oriented literature including case studies, policy reports, newspaper articles, and comparative analyses, to document and analyse research on African cities. The chapter concludes with the examination of two key urban phenomena of African urbanism, informality and youth, to demonstrate how the research approaches outlined in this chapter (global political economy, policy fix, and socio-spatial infrastructures) frame the same phenomenon as the 'saving grace' or 'Achilles heel' of the continent. The review builds a case for rethinking the role of African cities as 'valid empirical bases' based on which to develop an urban theory of the 'global
sout' (Mbenbe & Nuttall, 2004; Robinson, 2006; Nuttall and Mbenbe, 2008; Pieterse, 2008; Watson, 2009; Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 3).

The history of history

Urban historiography has retained a 'myopic view' of changes in African metropolises and thus remains limited in scope (Salm & Falola, 2005, pg. xi). Despite Africa's long urban history, historical accounts of African urbanisation often begin with the era of colonisation. Coquery-Vidrovitch (2005) attempts to rectify this timeline by describing the *longue-durée* processes of African urbanism dating back to long before the 'Scramble for Africa' (1881-1914);

‘Islamization began in desert ports from the very beginning of the Middle Ages; Bantu capital cities of Central Africa were fitted with military and kinship social structures of local kingdoms and chiefdoms. Most of these elements progressively mingled and combined, giving birth to a complex and contrasted cumulative history’ (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2005, pg. xv-xvi).

The continent was not 'devoid of urban development' before colonialism and was home to several cities, such as Zanzibar and Ibadan, as well as major hubs along trade routes, including Timbuktu and Djenne which had similar characteristics to pre-industrial cities elsewhere in the world (Stewart, 1996, pg. 251-3). Gao (Mali), Thaba Bosiu (Lesotho), Umgungundlovu (South Africa), Kumasi (Ghana), Ife (Nigeria) and Kilwa (Tanzania) are other notable examples of pre-colonial African cities. According to Hopkins (1973), towns throughout West Africa performed important market and defence functions such as pre-industrial manufacturing in the form of metal-work and food processing. The populations of Gao, Timbuktu and Djenne, in Mali, amounted to 15,000-80,000 inhabitants, while Ibadan, in Nigeria, was home to about 70,000 people prior to colonialism (Hopkins, 1973; Stewart, 1996, pg. 253). These cities saw the birth of communities with distinct cultures and ways of life based, for the most part, on barter and commerce along old trade routes (Freund, 2007, pg. 65). Describing settlements dating back to 350 A.D. in South Africa, Muller (1993, pg. 9), for example, noted that villages were comprised of a 'complex of houses, each circular in form' which were a distinctive aspect of 'vernacular South African architecture.' In the central plazas of other precolonial

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9 The Scramble for Africa is also known as the 'Conquest of Africa' or the 'Partition of Africa' and refers to the Berlin conference (1884/5) when colonial European power agreed on the division and occupation of the continent.
formations, such as Kumasi (Ghana), capital of the Ashanti confederacy, people traded, celebrated public holidays, staged plays, carried out state affairs and proclaimed laws (Amankwah-Ayeh, 1996, pg. 68).

Formal colonial rule is considered a ‘turning point’ in the development of African cities by reorienting urbanisation, urban form, and urban functions to suit its needs (Myers, 2011, pg. 69). Following the Berlin Conference of 1884/85, European empires officialised their ‘spheres of influence’ and bolstered their position on the continent, marking an important shift in the social and spatial structures of African cities throughout the late 19th and into the 20th century. Colonialism was responsible for the dissolution of precolonial towns and cities as the latter ‘withered away’ when their commercial life was stifled by new colonial borders rendering traditional caravan trade routes useless and ‘old patterns’ of trade and commerce obsolete (Freund, 2007, pg. 67). Inter-African trade was discouraged, and the ‘skeletal infrastructure’ that was put in place by colonial regimes served primarily to facilitate trade with Europe (Khapoya, 2016, pg. 131). European colonial powers were unwilling to recognise or preserve the property rights of established African populations and, in some instances, even made plans to destroy local communities. In 1908, for example, the British colonial administration ‘toyed’ with the idea of wiping out old sections of Accra following a plague epidemic while the French in North and West Africa destroyed the native quarters of Dakar and Rabat under the pretext of ‘hygiene’ and ‘sanitation’ (Freund, 2007, pg. 75; Bigon, 2016; Betts, 1971). The key impact of colonialism was the radical alteration of the urban hierarchy of African cities from one aligned along historical trade patterns to one designed for the siphoning of resources towards European colonial powers (Stewart, 1996, pg. 251). As a result, the study of African urbanism has been defined by a perception of the ‘colonial terrain’ as a ‘passive receptor’ of imported ideas without precolonial forms of urbanisation10 (Bigon, 2016, pg. 1).

Despite its rich pre-colonial past, the earliest academic work on African urban history has been attributed to sociologist Georges Balandier who published Sociologie des Brazzavilles Noires in 1965. It was only 20 years after the publication of Balandier’s book that an Ivoirian historian, Pierre Kipré, published

10 See Faidherbe, 1853 on pg. 129
the first comprehensive historical study of African urbanisation, with a dissertation, in 1985, on Cote d’Ivoire’s urban history. Similarly, Assane Seck’s (1970) *Dakar, Metropole Ouest Africaine* is one of few monographs dedicated entirely to the urbanisation of a postcolonial African city. The study of African cities is an even more ‘recent trend in English’ with the ‘pioneering role’ of Akin Mabogunje’s 1968 study on Nigerian urbanisation (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2005, pg. xvi). In anglophone scholarly literature, Anthony D. King was one of the first scholars to conduct a systematic study of the colonial urban enterprise of the British empire in India, focusing on the city of Delhi. Beginning with the study of urban planning (*Colonial Urban Development*, 1976), and the examination of urban forms and their diffusion throughout the world (*The Bungalow*, 1995), King revealed the urban dimensions of colonial practices, specifically with regards to the housing sector (Sinou, 1993, pg. 6). In Francophone literature, the work of François Beguin (*Arabisances*, 1983) on colonial cities in North Africa, including Algiers, documented the ways in which the colonisers ‘borrowed’ from local architecture to produce hybridised colonial styles. Some American researchers have carried out significant work on French colonial planning including anthropologist Paul Rabinow, who studied urban planning in Morocco and chronicled its decisive role in defining French modernité (*French Modern*, 1989). Similarly, architectural historian Gwendolyn Wright outlined French colonial urban planning practices in 19th and 20th century Indochina, Morocco, and Madagascar, and their role in the production of an urban modernity (*The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism*, 1991). Janet Abu-Lughod also conducted a study on colonial planning practice in North Africa and cast a glaring look at the segregationist practices of French colonialism in the 20th century, focusing her enquiry on Rabat, Morocco (*Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco*, 1980). Recently, the work of Bigon (2015, 2016) and Beeckmans (2013) on Dakar has documented the effects of colonial planning on African urbanism.

Aside from these seminal pieces, French urban planning practices in sub-Saharan Africa have ‘remained almost unstudied’ (Abu-Lughod, 1966; Bigon, 2009, pg. 247). Njoh (2015, pg. 106) maintains that there is still a ‘dearth of knowledge on the raison d’être’ of French colonial urbanism in Africa in relevant Anglophone literature. France controlled the lion’s share of the continent during the era of European colonial rule, and colonialism was an important conduit for the diffusion and dissemination of Eurocentric urban planning principles. Yet, there is a dearth of research, particularly in Anglophone literature, that examines the extent to which
French colonialism influenced socio-spatial structures in colonial and postcolonial Africa (Njoh, 2015, pg. 95). For example, surprisingly few scholars have focused on the language of colonial urbanism, and there has seldom been any attempt to compile a ‘lexical dictionary of generic terms, commensurate imageries, and their meaning’ in (post)colonial urban settings in Africa (Bigon & Njoh, 2015, pg. 26). While several studies have examined the colonial practices of place-naming, they stop short of developing a semiotic roadmap that reveals embedded power relations. Similarly, many studies focused on African architecture have been based primarily on 'pre-colonial' and 'traditional' forms, often devoted to mud or mud brick buildings. While these investigations may provide a much-needed level of inquiry on numerous topics including building technique and style, symbolism and history, they do not investigate the ways in which traditional built form was (re)fabricated and appropriated to adhere to the colonial mindset (Shaw, 2006, pg. 3).

Key paradigms in the study of African Urbanism

The literature on African urbanism has revealed the emergence of key themes and approaches within the broader study of southern urbanism. Academic and policy literature on African cities may be divided into two broad categories while the third category focuses on the emerging research agenda on southern (African) urbanism (Figure 2). There is considerable overlap between these categories as researchers develop interdisciplinary means of studying cities. The analysis will discuss the central themes of each approach, notable examples, and the criticisms levied against them.

Global political economy

- The global political economy approach consists of perspectives based on the spatial workings of capitalism and state regulation. The bulk of this literature is focused on 'big structural factors' that drive Africa’s economic marginalisation in the world order and considers how these processes are ‘captured’ by political elites (Pieterse, 2017, pg. 224). This literature characterises cities across the continent as ‘incomplete or deteriorated examples of modernity’ in the global economy (Harrison, 2006, pg. 323).
- Davis, 2008; Kaplan, 1994; Cheru, 2005; Fay and Opal 1999
Global political economy

The global political economy approach focuses on the range and magnitude of urban problems on the African continent. It emphasizes the ubiquity of unsafe urban environments where disease, inadequate water and poor sanitation are rife, access to essential services including health and education is limited, policy frameworks are ad hoc, and employment is often insecure, informal, and poorly remunerated. Based on this approach, African cities are:

‘...threatened by chaos: parasitic on the economy and thus antidevelopmental; characterised by excessively rapid demographic growth, sucking the most active and qualified people from the rural areas; unplanned and sprawling; unhealthy because of the inability of infrastructure providers to keep pace with growth and the exacerbating effects of density on the transmission of infectious disease; and characterised by incompetent and corrupt government structures’ (Rakodi in Enwezor Ed., 2003, pg. 46).
The global political economy approach challenges previously held assumptions about the link between economic growth and demographic change. Contrary to the experience of Europe and North America in the 19th century, African cities exhibit a form of urban ‘involution’ that is marked by sprawl combined with economic decline (Gandy, 2005, pg. 372). The development of African cities is a paradox of urbanisation without growth (Fay & Opal, 1999). While urbanisation has generally led to sector transformation from agriculture to manufacturing, evidence suggests that much of Africa is urbanising without industrialisation (and, in some cases, has even experienced deindustrialisation) (Grabowski, 2015). Across the African continent, urbanisation has been ‘radically decoupled from industrialisation, even from development per se’ (Davis, 2008, pg. 9). As a result, countries are unable to tackle the challenges of rapid urbanisation, such as accommodating a large and growing population and coping with negative externalities. Rapid urbanisation without concomitant investments in physical infrastructure and human capital has meant that cities across the continent have not been able to reap the ‘benefits of agglomeration’ (Freire et al., 2014, pg. 6);

‘Urbanisation without development (or limited development) occurs when overall national economic growth and development are inadequate to meet the needs of a growing population [...] The key characteristics of urbanisation without development are: weak agricultural sector; poor national economic performance; lack of national policy that integrates economic and spatial planning; relative absence of intermediate cities and market towns; over migration leading to growth of mega-cities with poor economic bases and poor municipal capacity to provide minimum basic services’ (Cheru, 2005, pg. 2).

On the African continent, rapid urban population growth has surpassed economic development in the last 30 years, resulting in an ‘urbanisation of poverty.’ When combined with a laissez-faire approach to urban policy and planning, this has resulted in the proliferation of informal housing, urban poverty, inequality, informal work, and the deterioration of urban infrastructure. The UN Millennium Development Goals report (2015) estimates that approximately 59 per cent of the urban population of sub-Saharan Africa lives in slums, which suggests that informality has become a ‘generalised mode of urbanisation’ in this region. Aside from the precariousness of housing and insecurity of land tenure, slum dwellers also lack adequate access to water, electricity, sanitation, as overcrowding
in urban areas has led to the spread of diseases and deterioration of the environment. In light of these seemingly dystopian conditions, global political economy narratives highlight Africa's 'progressive marginalisation' from the world economy (van de Walle, 2001, pg. 5) as 'one can almost hear the sound of sub-Saharan Africa sliding off the world map' (George, 1993, pg. 66). The deviant trajectory of African development has framed the continent as a 'global ghetto' a region of 'wasted lives' abandoned by capitalism (Smith, 1997; Ferguson, 2006), and a 'continuing tragedy' (Leys, 1994, New Left Review). Davis (2008, pg. 17) describes African cities of the 21st century sitting in 'squalor, surrounded by pollution, excrement, and decay' and problematises the nature of their development;

How could cities in Cote d' Ivoire, Tanzania, Congo-Kinshasa, Gabon, Angola, and elsewhere - where economies were contracting by 2 to 5 per cent per year - still support annual population growth of 4 to 8 per cent? How could Lagos in the 1980s grow twice as fast as the Nigerian population, while its urban economy was in a deep recession? Indeed, how has Africa as a whole, currently in a dark age of stagnant urban employment and stalled agricultural productivity, been able to sustain an annual urbanisation rate (3.5 to 4.0 per cent) considerably higher than the average of most European cities (2.1 per cent) during peak Victorian growth years?’ (Davis, 2008, pg. 14-15).

Mega-cities11 on the continent have experienced a dramatic deterioration in the quality of life as they have neither the infrastructure nor the environmental capacity to accommodate a growing population. In Lagos, for example, unchecked population growth exacerbates crumbling infrastructure, as violence becomes a ‘determining feature of everyday life’ and symbols of civic culture (i.e. libraries, cinemas) have all but disappeared from the urban fabric (Gandy, 2005, pg. 372). Marginal communities living in temporary settlements within the city are obligated to meet their own needs, from housing to water, and are consistently under threat from ‘Area boys12,’ racketeers and criminals (Ismail, 2016). Kaplan (1994) offers a similar outlook on West African cities, characterising them as ‘some of the unsafest places in the world’ where ‘streets are unlit; the police often lack gasoline for their vehicles; and armed

11 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs defines mega cities as urban agglomerations with a population of over 10 million inhabitants
12 Primary and secondary school drop-outs, retrenched public sector workers, orphans, and citizens forcibly displaced from neighbourhoods and houses involved in income-generating illegal and informal activities (Momoh, 2000, pg. 100)
burglars, carjackers, and muggers proliferate.' Disease, crime, scarcity of resources, and drug trade are 'now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism.' Similarly, the notorious issue of The Economist from May 2000, featuring 'The Hopeless Continent' on the front cover adopts this trend of 'journalistic Malthusianism' and suggests that the 'worst off' in a globalized world are not the 'least developed' or those at the start of their journey to development, but rather those the 'farthest along a very different journey; a downward slide into degeneration, chaos, and violence' (Ferguson, 2006, pg. 191).

An important criticism levied against the global political economy approach is its failure to acknowledge *longue-durée* processes that explain the current state of affairs in African cities. Specifically, this approach does not adequately address the historical impacts of 'colonial plunder' and the intentional underdevelopment of countries and cities kept 'economically subservient' in a supplier relationship with former empires (Simone & Pieterse, 2017, pg. 50; Arrighi, 2010). In the process, we engage in sort of 'reverse orientalism' that examines urbanisation from the standpoint of southern cities and asks 'who in India or Algeria today can confidently separate out British or French components of the past from present actualities, and who in Britain or France can draw a clear circle around British London or French Paris that would exclude the impact of India and Algeria upon those two imperial cities?' (Said, 1993). The history of empire is a history of dispossession, the effect of which has affected both the cities of the coloniser and the colonised and allows for a better understanding of the state of African and southern cities in the 21st century.

In their attempt to recreate a 'quasi-metropolitan culture in every physical respect,' colonial regimes across the continent were responsible for the reordering of African urban spatiality both within the city and beyond (Lloyd, 2003, pg. 7). The colonial period influenced important dimensions of African urbanity including land administration, housing, and spatial organisation. The impact of colonial rule is evident in the predominant role of centralised governments, the 'strong orientation toward blueprint master planning for modernist visions' or the 'co-optation of traditional rulers into urban local government' (Myers, 2011, pg. 55). Whether through direct (French) or indirect (British) rule (Mamdani, 1996), the established power hierarchies failed to preserve African political institutions and strategically
barred the development of a 'national or colony-wide political consciousness' (Khapoya, 2016, pg. 119).

Policies of social and economic marginalisation imposed by colonial rule, including restrictions on education and paid employment, led African labourers to engage in profit-making activities within what is now 'imperialistically termed' the informal economy (Ndi, 2007, pg. 170). Informality is grossly condemned as a key reason explaining the trend of 'urbanisation without growth.' The history of colonisation, however, tells a different story. During colonial times, cities offered the prospect of higher living wages, but actual wages paid to African labourers could not offset increasing colonial taxation and inflation leading to growing urban poverty (Demissie, 2013, pg. 4). In turn, the growth of an African population in colonial cities prompted colonial authorities to reorient the spatial organisation of urban areas to lessen the perceived threat to Europeans created by unchecked population growth. Racial segregation became a defining characteristic of African cities under colonial rule but also a key reason for the development of informal settlements. Often, colonial medical practice blended with racist discourse would identify the 'African body' as the site of disease threatening the 'white settler population' and justified the segregation of populations (Vaughan, 1991). The colonial municipal officials in cities such as Johannesburg, Cape Town, Nairobi, Rabat, and Kinshasa used public health concerns\(^{13}\) of colonial medical discourse to relocate African populations to 'less desirable parts of the city' and segregate them by establishing cordons sanitaires (Demissie, 2013, pg. 4-5). Urban areas were considered the domain of Europeans and Africans were only tolerated in these areas for their labour. They were required to live temporarily in segregated indigenous areas or 'townships' built on the margins of the city. These zones were meant to host incoming migrants who were intentionally prevented from 'urbanising permanently'[emphasis added]' and benefitting from the rights of urban citizenship (Simon, 2015, pg. 219).

The infrastructure built during colonial regimes in the form of roads, railroads, telephones, electric power, and water and sanitation systems were the shaky

\(^{13}\) Today, medical practices re-branded as 'global health' programmes continue to focus on 'African diseases' (i.e. Ebola, HIV/AIDS), acknowledging the inequality between northern and southern healthcare access but nevertheless remaining reliant on the global unevenness of this discourse and practice (Crane, 2010).
foundations upon which new African states ‘built their new national institutions’ (Khapoya, 2016, pg. 136). The end of colonial rule brought a ‘moment of euphoria’ among postcolonial elites who hoped that cities would act as ‘engines of national development, not just for the individual countries but for the continent as a whole’ (Demissie, 2013, pg. 2). The lift of colonial restrictions on urban expansion and rural-to-urban movement meant that secondary cities experienced increasing urbanisation as urban growth today continues to occur ‘farther down the hierarchy’ (Myers, 2011, pg. 53). Indigenous elites of newly independent nations often stepped into the roles of ‘colonial predecessors’ and into their ‘urban spatial niches’ (Simon, 2015, pg. 220). Thus, the colour lines and cordon sanitaires of yore became the wealthy enclaves and ‘pockets’ of poverty of modern African cities, further exacerbated by detrimental structural adjustment programmes and deepening inequality (Fanon, 1961, pg. 122). Under the guise of modernisation projects, postcolonial states engaged in the construction and expansion of hospitals, airports, universities, highways, new civic buildings, residential buildings, banks, insurance companies, the ‘markers of modernity and modernisation’ according to the northern model disseminated by development banks (Demissie, 2013, pg. 2). Through multilateral organisations, former colonial powers continued to impose ‘historically informed political and economic values of the North on the South which satisfies the North’s ends’ (Sagoe, 2012). The ‘agents of neoliberalism’ – the IMF and the World Bank – are responsible for engineering development policy, notably the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and more recently the Poverty Reduction Programs (ibid). They impose their ‘institutional might’ through loan conditionalities while encouraging countries to open up to free trade and ‘corporate penetration’ (Conway, 2014, pg. 108). In the process of ‘developing’ poorer countries, rich countries are ‘locking them in positions of powerlessness and structural dependence,’ suggesting that poverty has ‘nothing to do with internal problems: it is the fault of global capitalism’ (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, pg. 20). Indeed, the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s and 1990s seem to ‘finish once and for all the task of fitting the colonies to the still-modern models of Western political economy’ as postcolonial nations were ‘unapologetically recolonised through the modernising strictures of multilateral lending agencies' (Sylvester, 2010, pg. 717).

In conclusion, the narrow-sighted outlook of the global political economy approach has failed to adequately address underlying historical factors explaining urban deprivation while also overlooking the diversity and heterogeneity of African cities.
The snapshot approach that dehistoricises African cities and focuses solely on dystopian conditions of urban apocalypse ignores the possibility of African urbanisation beyond the restrictive framework of northern developmental concepts. The 'presentism' of this approach results in the 'compression of supposedly relevant' events and processes into a few decades’ since the beginning of the 20th century and drives the scholarly output on African cities (Reid, 2011, pg. 136). As a result, much of the policy and academic literature on African cities is limited by a language 'prone to a level of abstraction' that fails to translate the issues of everyday life into plans and policies (Harrison, 2006, pg. 23). Furthermore, the dystopian inclinations of this approach have overlooked positive growth figures in a period of global economic downturn along with the improvement of a number of human development indicators. Rosling (2018) is joined by Deaton (2015) and Radelet (2016) in arguing against an 'overdramatic worldview' that ignores the fact that the majority of the world’s population lives 'somewhere in the middle of the income-scale - they are not what we think of as middle class, but they are not living in extreme poverty' (Rosling, 2018). The Economist captures the 'changing narrative' surrounding the African continent; while the May 2000 front cover was cynically titled 'Hopeless Africa'; by February 2001, this had shifted to ‘Africa’s elusive dawn’; in July 2005, ‘Helping Africa to help itself’; in December 2011, ‘Africa rising’ and by March 2013, the headline read ‘Aspiring Africa’ (Brooks, 2017, pg. 5). These more positive narratives are prominent in the 'policy fix' approach which also looks at urban development problems of African cities but seeks to capitalise on their advantages through policy reform.

**Policy fix**

The 'policy fix' approach, reflected in the work of international policymakers, identifies key urban problems of African cities including increasing informality, social and political exclusion, economic inequality, poor urban governance, overstretched infrastructural capacity, and limited service provision and proposes policy ‘fixes’ to address these issues. Examples of this approach can be found in reports such as State of African Cities (*Reimagining sustainable urban transitions, 2014; The Geography of African Investment, 2018*), African Development Bank Group Urban Strategy (2010), Cities Alliance, United Cities and Local Governments of Africa, World Bank: *Harnessing Urbanisation to End Poverty and Boost Prosperity in Africa* (2013). This approach is concerned with the consequences of rapid and uncontrolled population growth, youth bulges, dependency ratios, and GDP (gross
Policy fix reports express increasing anxiety regarding the spread and sprawl of Africa’s mega-cities including Lagos (18.9 million), Cairo (14.7 million) and Kinshasa (14.5 million), all of which feature the ‘herculean problems of underdevelopment’ (Roy, 2011, pg. 224). This fear is further exacerbated by the fact that Dar es Salaam, Khartoum and Abidjan will likely reach ‘mega-city status’ within 25 years if current growth rates persist (State of African Cities, 2018, pg. 23). Projections indicate that between 2010 and 2050, Africa’s urban population will increase from 400 million to 1.26 billion, while Africa-wide urbanisation is projected to rise to nearly 50 per cent by 2035, and 58 per cent by 2050 (State of African Cities, 2018). Although data trends indicate that smaller secondary cities absorb a portion of urban population growth, this trend is more likely to result in the spread of slums rather than relieve pressures from the largest urban agglomerations (State of African Cities, 2014, pg. 7). Conversely, informal economic activity across the continent is estimated at 60 per cent in SSA and 52 per cent in North Africa (ILO, 2015). Environmental externalities engendered by rapid urbanisation are also increasingly an area of focus in many reports, as the discourse has shifted to a discussion of sustainability, and resilience – the à la mode international development buzzwords. Hence, the policy fix approach utilises terms that are implicitly biased towards a western model of development in the emphasis on economic growth, normative planning policies, and the integration and normalisation of urban governance structures.

The World Bank report (2013) on African urbanisation frames the discussion in terms of ‘getting Africa’s urbanisation right.’ It posits that with the appropriate policy framework, there is an opportunity to rectify the ‘failures’ of African urbanisation since the continent is ‘only halfway through its urbanisation process’ (World Bank, 2013, pg. 3). Although the report discusses the heterogeneity and diversity of African cities and the need for tailor-made policy, there is a general statement about the ‘typical African city’ which is growing despite a lack of appropriate policy coordination (World Bank, 2013, pg. 3). The silver bullet of policy is expected to ‘solve’ the failures of African cities through i) secure policy and regulatory frameworks that allow for long-term, integrated development, ii) increased investment in strategic and ‘transformative’ infrastructure and improvement of basic service provision, and iii) sound institutional and financial systems at the national, regional, and local level (World Bank, 2013).

14 The growing concern with green urbanism is evident in the new satellite cities that are emerging on the continent that are touted as ‘green’ cities with an emphasis on renewable energy (see pg. 161).
The State of African Cities report (2014), titled ‘Reimagining Sustainable Urban Transitions,’ published by UN Habitat, identifies three areas of intervention i) improved social services, with a focus on bettering the working and living conditions of a growing youth population, ii) increased trade and investment flows within Africa, and between Africa and the world, including investments in rail, road, and energy networks as a way of boosting urban economies, and iii) institution building that promotes effective democratic institutions, less corruption in the management of public finances and other public interests. The latest edition of State of African Cities (2018) titled ‘The Geography of African Investment’ is focused entirely on determining ‘Africa’s current position in global FDI flows and uncovering why Africa is receiving low investment.’ In so doing, the report puts forth ‘strategies to enhance Africa’s global ranking in attracting investment’ (2018, pg. 11). This report concludes that an increased flow of FDI provides a ‘credible’ solution to urban poverty and unemployment but can, in some cases, result in deeper inequality. The report offers several ‘city-level recommendations’ that are primarily focused on the growth and expansion of FDI to situate African cities in ‘global development corridors.’

The African Development Bank Group Urban Strategy, published in 2010, is another example of the ‘policy fix’ approach. The strategy identifies ‘three pillars’ of urban development – i) infrastructure delivery, ii) good governance, and iii) private sector development. The report states that improving urban infrastructure, enhancing the effectiveness of urban governance systems, increasing revenue generation and financing modalities for municipalities and local governments will rectify the problematic trends of African urbanisation. The fundamental premise is that greater private sector participation in financing urban development will ‘reroute urbanisation trends and allow African cities to become engines of growth’ (AfDB, 2010, pg. 2). The urban strategy of the AfDB has not been updated since its publication in 2010 despite the rate/scale of African urbanisation and the challenge it poses to urban planners and practitioners.

As a normative approach, ‘policy fix’ is limited by its reliance on urban developmental concepts originating in the ‘global north.’ In many cases, policy frameworks and reforms have failed to deliver their intended and expected outcomes. The implications of policies underpinning the drive for more accountable modes of public administration have scarcely been addressed. African cities, in many cases, have developed independently of the work of city planners in a process
of ‘amorphous urbanism’ which complicates the task of implementing effective policies (Gandy, 2005, pg. 52). Many policy frameworks fail to account for the fact that cities across the continent are not built according to any particular design concept but are instead made up of the ‘ad hoc vernacular of local construction methods or the self-build of individual dwellings or shelters’ (ibid). This is further exacerbated by data deficiencies, since much of the economic activity in Africa remains ‘unrecorded’ (Simon, 1997). To ‘solve’ the problems of African cities, the latter must first be defined, typified, and categorised, leading to an unhelpful and misleading ‘African city’ archetype and an overemphasis on mega-cities.

Without a thorough engagement with the particularities of African urbanism, the assertion that there is a rational ‘policy fix’ in a neatly packaged three-pillar approach for a range of urban development ‘failures’ can be quite misleading (Pieterse, 2010, pg. 1). Many of these reports fail to acknowledge the fact that the investment required to achieve city-wide infrastructural improvements is currently near-impossible in sub-Saharan African countries. Africa’s position in the global infrastructure finance systems and the magnitude of the continent’s infrastructure ‘deficit’ presents a formidable challenge for the continent’s development (Brookings Institute, 2016). Simply put, Africans are ‘too poor to justify large-scale investments for rolling out infrastructure and basic services’ with countries across the continent considered ‘too high risk’15 for investment (Simone & Pieterse, 2017, pg. 32). This results in an overemphasis on profit-driven urbanisation that caters to an elite minority16. Mbembe and Nuttall (2004) denounce this ‘developmentalist’ approach as an ‘epistemic failure of imagination’ since it betrays a profound disconnect between policy intervention and the lived reality of African urbanism. Policy innovation is only possible through an engagement with ‘embedded practices and sensibilities at the heart of routine economic, social and cultural interactions in the urban context’ (Pieterse, 2010, pg. 4). Furthermore, the policy fix approach, much like global political economy, reveals a ‘lack of interest’ in the colonial and precolonial past which has remained ‘oddly irrelevant’ in developmental agendas since the 1970s and 1980s (Reid, 2011, pg. 153). Africa’s ‘deep past’ has therefore remained detached

15 This is despite worldwide approval of the United Nations SDGs in 2015 and stipulations of Habitat III in 2016 which require an infrastructural revolution to ensure access to basic services.
16 See ‘foreign direct investors’ on pg. 222
from 'challenges of the present' as the 'post-imperial age has given rise to solution-driven agendas that have no place for the deep past' (ibid).

**Socio-spatial infrastructures**

In recent years, there has been an attempt to pluralise the study of African cities through increasingly interdisciplinary and grounded approaches. The past decade has seen a resurgence of interest in African cities in the social sciences with historical surveys of urbanisation in Africa (Bigon, 2017; Beeckmans, 2013), multidisciplinary studies of individual cities (Simone, 2010) and comparative approaches (Watson, 2009, 2013). The socio-spatial infrastructures approach tries to understand how urbanites of the 'global south' cope with difficult living conditions and survive in circumstances of marginality. The focus on survival strategies and agency generates an understanding of cities as 'centres of generative, imaginative, or creative energies' in contrast to the 'wounded urbicides' of global political economy and policy fix (Myers, 2011, pg. 16). Despite adverse conditions, urban Africans have 'long made lives that have worked' and demonstrated a shrewd capacity to make city life liveable and viable' (Simone in Falola & Salm, 2004, pg. 13).

Many of these studies question whether African urbanism genuinely represents new forms of local knowledge that can be used and operationalised in urban planning policy. They ask, for example, how the 'global geographies of squatting – makeshift and experimental, precarious and informal' can help us to 'see like a city' (Amin & Thrift, 2017). These approaches experiment with how the ‘periphery’ may be brought back into our considerations of urban life (Simone, 2010, pg. 14; Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 3). Many cities of the ‘global south’ occupy a peripheral position in the global hierarchy of capital flows and are ‘relegated to the fringe of conventional urban analyses’ (Robinson, 2006). The study of these cities, however, can disrupt the theoretical 'centre' by broadening our understanding of 'possibility, innovation and adaptation' (Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 5). The focus moves away from the strict comparison of cities, towards the consolidation of themes that exist in the 'gaps between clearly designated and defined urban institutions, spaces, and actions' (Myers, 2011, pg. 11). African cities are framed as precursors to a 'new kind of urbanism' previously ignored by the discourses of western modernity but 'perfectly adapted' to the challenges of the 21st century (Gandy, 2005, pg. 39).
Specifically, this approach looks at new forms of urban sociality that recast the notion of the ‘right to the city’ as the ‘right to be messy and inconsistent or to look disordered’ (Simone in Myers, 2011, pg. 12). Alongside the images of hopelessness and desperation, there is evidence of efficiency and order in what the ‘untrained eye’ may see as ‘random and out of control’ (Beall et al., 2010, pg. 188). For example, ethnographic approaches have demonstrated how survival in African cities often requires improvisation, ingenuity, and finding ‘new ways of being together, of making the most out of crisis and disarray’ (Simone, 2010; Duminy et al., pg. 7). Bayat (2013) observes;

‘strolling through streets of Cairo, Tehran, Dakar or Jakarta in the midst of a working day, one is astonished by the presence of so many people operating in the streets – working, running around, standing, sitting, negotiating, driving or riding on buses or trams. These individuals represent the relatively new subaltern of the neoliberal city.’

Roy (2011, pg. 223-4) frames this as an ‘articulation of subaltern urbanism’ that explores squatter settlements and slums as purveyors of habitation politics that challenge the epistemologies and methods of urban studies. An overemphasis on the ‘triumphal ingenuity’ of the urban poor, however, runs the risk of conflating it with ‘creative survival behaviour’ which may have serious consequences for the urban future of cities of the ‘global south’ (Buckley & Kallergis, 2014, pg. 186).

**Case one: youth**

Across the continent, young people under the age of 15 account for 41 per cent of the total population, while persons aged 15 to 24 account for a further 19 per cent (UN DESA, 2015, pg. 7). By 2015, Africa’s youth population amounted to approximately 226 million and is projected to increase by 42 per cent to 321 million in 2030 (State of African Cities 2018, pg. 41). A large youth population is often considered a ‘demographic boon’ or ‘demographic dividend’ since it represents a potentially productive labour force and a competitive advantage in the global marketplace. However, the current generation of young Africans is confronted with the harsh reality that, despite unprecedented rates of educational attainment, their employment prospects and life opportunities are limited and differ little from those of their parents (Filmer et al., 2014, pg. 1). African youth may never attain the ‘social goods and status associated with adulthood’ including steady income, property and land titles (Marc et al., 2015, pg. 53).
Young people in Africa have been characterised as a 'lost generation' (O'Brien, 1996), or a generation of people unable to transition from 'youth' (Langevang, 2008, pg. 227). Vigh (2010), for example, speaks of young people in Guinea Bissau as 'imprisoned in a socio-spatial time of limitation and marginality' (Langevang, 2008, pg. 227). The prolongation, making and re-making of youth is set against a backdrop of a tiresome routine of 'incessant improvisation required to make ends meet' in a broader socioeconomic context typified by little opportunity for formal employment (Simone, 2005, pg. 518). As historically and socially constructed categories, age, identity and power are 'refracted, recombined and reproduced' through perspectives on African youth (Durham, 2000, pg. 114). Durham (2000, pg. 116) proposes a definition that captures the role of youth in the African context and, perhaps, the 'global south' more broadly:

'(1) those (either by their own claims, or by the impositions of others) who straddle kin-based, domestic space and broader public spheres; (2) those who have gained some level of recognized autonomy and take up public roles, but are still also dependent and not yet able to command the labour of others as superiors themselves; (3) those who can be expected to act upon their social world and not just be the recipients of action, but whose actions are often conceptualized as straddling (or linking) the social and a-social (biological, natural exotic domains).'

Youth is a contested term in the African context with age-based definitions including anyone between the ages of 15 and 35 (Christiansen, Utas & Vigh, 2006, pg. 11). While the Nigerian Youth Policy (2009) targets people between the ages of 18-35, Togo defines youth as 15-24 years, and Mali has no fixed definition for youth. Hence, 'youth' is a demographic cross-section of society shaped by the 'economic trials of postcoloniality,' 'geographically isolated (in urban areas),' and gendered, and 'classed (as economically marginal)' (Ralph, 2008, pg. 11). In a context of urban poverty, deprivation, and limited formal opportunities, youth becomes a position of 'social and political immaturity,' defined by exclusion, marginality, stagnation and a 'truncation of social being' (Vigh, 2010, pg. 37).

The global political economy approach constructs young people, who lack an economic and social purpose, as a threat. The 'reclassification' of young people as a 'threat' is manifested in the 'institutionalized hostility toward them' which renders their 'present difficult and their future unpredictable' (Diouf, 1996, pg. 4-5). Without education, employment and prospects of meaningful futures, youth
becomes synonymous with radicalisation, violence, and instability (Frederiksen & Muniver, 2010, pg. 250). On one hand, young men have played important roles in conflicts throughout the region. Young women, on the other hand, are usually seen as victims of violence who 'submit and have no real say in their own destiny' (Frederiksen & Muniver, 2010, pg. 249). Therefore, narratives surrounding young men and women have been reified as an archetype of ‘objects-who-defend-themselves’ (women) and ‘subjects-who-perpetrate-violence’ (men) (Mohanty, 2007, pg. 339). For example, young men have been actively involved in the Casamance insurgency in Senegal, Tuareg rebellions in Mali and Niger, and have joined the ranks of extremist groups in the Sahel (Marc et al., 2015, pg. 51). However, the link drawn between youth and violence needs to be re-examined within the scope of larger processes. Armed conflict and violence undermine young African’s education and employment prospects which leaves many of them unskilled and poorly prepared for the job market. These factors further exacerbate their already precarious position and perpetuates a cycle of conflict. In Liberia, for example, poverty was identified by ex-combatants as the most common reason for 'considering a return to violence, followed by lack of jobs and benefits or training' (Marc et al., 2015, pg. 55). Marginality and exclusion are identified as key triggers for criminality and violence, contrary to the narrative that assumes the latter are defining characteristics of African youth.

The eruption of youth violence in African cities is best understood as a response to crumbling states and 'crises of patronage politics' in the struggle for basic services and physical security (Meagher, pg. 112, 2007). Our understanding of urban violence must be recast as the product of deprivation, marginality, inequality and poverty (Winton, 2004). Deprivation, a cause of violence, becomes a form of violence (Galtung, 1991). Thus, the violence of youth should be understood through the scope of alienation and repression, income equality and lack of access to basic services as well as the lack of state protection, severe corruption and inefficiency (Winton, 2004, pg. 166). The eruption of ‘everyday reactionary violence’ (Winton, 2004, pg. 166) can escalate to larger conflict in societies that have endured the dissolution of social structures including family, school, police and justice (Vanderschueren, 1996, pg. 112).

17 Pieterse (2010) proposed a research agenda that examines African 'cityness' through the scope of youth, criminality and violence. This topic was the subject of a previous dissertation titled ‘Youth, Criminality and Violence in the African City’ but has been expanded in this analysis to adopt a more holistic approach to the examination of 'cityness.'
93). The socio-spatial infrastructures approach demonstrates how youth violence is a product of inequality and social exclusion resulting from a distortion of social structures – family, school, peer group, neighbourhood, police, justice – that can no longer fulfil their role. For example, the case of the vigilante group known as the Bakassi Boys in south-eastern Nigeria emerged as a 'spontaneous popular initiative' to enforce property rights and compensate for the lack of state security provision (Meagher, 2007, pg. 96). Similarly, the emergence of young, urban vigilante groups in Cameroon, Kenya, and South Africa suggests that the 'apparent links that Nigerians draw between vigilantism and inequality and power are far more widespread' (Smith, 2004, pg. 429-30). Yet, African states often regard youths as 'saboteurs' whose potential for social upheaval stems from their 'incomplete subjugation' and subversive political action (Durham, 2000, pg. 113).

Building off the global political economy approach, the policy fix approach broaches the topic of youth primarily through the scope of employment and poverty. High growth rates in Africa have not resulted in higher employment rates; between 2000 and 2008 employment grew at an annual average of 2.8 per cent, half the rate of economic growth with only five countries — Algeria, Burundi, Botswana, Cameroon, and Morocco — experiencing employment growth over 4 per cent (State of African Cities 2018, pg. 41). Women and youth are disproportionately engaged in the informal sector as formal employment is rare in most countries. South Africa is the only country in which formal employment accounts for most jobs. Formal employment in Botswana and Egypt represents 40 to 50 per cent of employment while neighbouring countries register less than 20 per cent of the working-age population in the formal employment sector (State of African Cities 2018, pg. 46). Policies that address unemployment seek to transform ‘youth’ into an engine of growth by tailoring education to job market demands, formalising informal economic activities, and pacifying criminal elements. For example, the Agenda 2063 of the African Union and the Common African Position have prioritised ‘youth development, science, technology and innovation’ as critical factors in the socio-economic development of the entire continent (African Union, 2017).

A 'monodisciplinary (economic) prism' of employment, income and labour markets has serious consequences for development interventions affecting African youth (Ismail, 2016, pg. 55). Youth employment strategies are often focused on how best to
make young people 'employable' in the formal economy, with a focus on vocational training. Training programs aimed at retrenched workers and new entrants to the job market are proposed and implemented as a means of increasing productivity. Youth-oriented programs are 'designed in close collaboration with private firms' and expected to yield positive results (State of African Cities 2018, pg. 54). Fox & Thomas (2016, pg. 33) have found that these projects do not help the majority of young people as paid jobs are in short supply relative to the number of working-age youth. Often, only educated youth from wealthier families have the educational level to gain access to wage jobs. This type of training in SSA, when publicly provided, does not produce cost-effective results (Fox & Thomas, 2016, pg. 33). Most youth employment policies tend to be 'elitist' and have 'formal sector biases' as they are aimed at educated urban youth or 'focused on skills training to prepare beneficiaries for formal, wage sector jobs' (Ismail, 2016, pg. 42). Furthermore, formalising pre-existing informal youth businesses may, in fact, stifle small and underfunded youth-led endeavours that are subjected to government scrutiny and taxation. The socio-spatial infrastructures approach demonstrates the ways in which policy dealing with 'youth unemployment' frames young people as an 'undifferentiated mass, overlooking the fact that very few young people are unemployed in the sense that they are doing nothing' (Fortune et al., 2014). African youth have demonstrated remarkable ingenuity, creativity, and resourcefulness in spite of limited opportunities by seeking income-generating activities in a variety of sectors. Artisanal mining, street trading, hairdressing and barbering can be characterised as 'survivalist entrepreneurial activities' that represent efficient coping mechanisms (Marc et al., 2015, pg. 57).

In some examples, young people pursue profitable agendas such as the 'marketing of violence,' demonstrating their aptitude for coercion, extortion, and violence by turning a capacity (for violence) into a resource (Ismail, 2009, pg. 483). In Lagos, for example, public discourse on youth has focused on the 'Area boys,' primary and secondary school drop-outs, retrenched public sector workers, orphans, and citizens forcibly displaced from neighbourhoods and houses (Momoh, 2000, pg. 100) who make a living by extorting money from drivers, demanding bribes from vendors in markets and threatening violence if and when resisted. There are two categories of 'Area boys': the first is considered 'harmless' and make a living by doing menial jobs in the streets of Lagos; the second group – the 'landlords' – holds more power and influence by extorting money from traders and holding shops mainly in Lagos.
Island (Momoh, 2000, pg. 186). The relevant literature explains the existence of ‘Area boys’ as the by-product of deep-set schisms in state-society relations in Nigeria which have resulted from political oppression under military rule and the harmful consequences of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). Ismail (2009) documents the daily lives of the ‘Area boys’ who use violence and criminality as ‘adaptive strategies’ to broaden their spaces of operation and ‘territories of habitation’ in ways that are economically practical (Ismail, 2009, pg. 465). Through the establishment of ‘junctions’ and ‘bases,’ ‘Area boys’ exercise their right to the city through a violent appropriation of public space. These ‘junctions’ and ‘bases’ are sites where norms, and ‘codes of belonging’ are created, defined, and processed as a way distinguishing, sustaining and reproducing youth identities within the public sphere (Simone, 1998, pg. 8; Ismail, 2009, pg. 471). The discourse surrounding ‘bases’ and ‘junctions’ highlights the fact that policy-oriented research often ignores how young Africans may resort to unconventional money-making opportunities to compensate for the ‘impossibility of their everyday lives’ (Ismail, 2009, pg. 485). In so doing, these ‘hoodlums,’ ‘hooligans’ and ‘miscreants’ have revealed themselves as a force to be reckoned with, prompting both the state and civil society to co-opt them and attempt to use them as a politically influential tool (Fourchard et al., 2005, pg. 183). In 2007, after the reconstruction of major streets around the central business district (CBD), the Lagos State government co-opted the ‘Area boys’ to police the CBD as legal enforcers of street trading laws and regulations. To justify this policy, the state claimed it was an effective means of reducing youth unemployment and handling the problem of ‘Area boys’ (Ismail, 2009, pg. 481). This state policy is remarkable for a number of reasons. The move constitutes an implicit acknowledgement, even legitimation, of the ‘regime of order’ imposed by these urban agents in ‘junctions’ and ‘bases’ and also suggests that the state has acknowledged its ‘deterritorialization’ in the spheres of influence controlled by the ‘Area boys’ (Ismail, 2009, pg. 481). Therefore, the political and power struggles of the ‘Area boys’ shed light on an emerging politics that sees ordinary urban dwellers move into spaces vacated by the state, necessitating a new way of understanding of the urban condition in African cities (Momoh, 2000, pg. 197).

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18 The term ‘base’ refers to a neighbourhood or meeting place where young people congregate, normally after working hours, to relax and discuss politics and sports. ‘Junctions’ are places where social hoodlums and ‘street marauders’ gather to devise and exploit money-making opportunities (Ismail, 2009, pg. 464).

19 See autogestion on pg. 92
The emergence of 'youth politics' across the continent demonstrates the political engagement of young people who embrace their modernity by using different mediums such as music, graffiti, fashion, and dancing to express agency (Herson, 2011; Niang, 2006). Youth music geographies provide arenas for negotiating political identities through rebellion and contestation, to 'claim a voice, group membership, or a place in the city' (Fredericks, 2014, pg. 133). Perullo (2005) looks at the ways young urban Tanzanians use the medium of music to deal with painful realities of difficult living conditions. Emerging in the 1980s, hip hop and rap evolved as a 'kind of lingua franca for disenfranchised youth' across the African continent (Saucier, 2011). His research focuses on the pressures encountered by young men and women in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, a city of approximately 3.5 million people where unemployment ranges from 13 to 40 per cent. In this context, young people work 'menial jobs, sit on street corners waiting to be hired, or search the city for employment' (Perullo, 2005, pg. 76). Pitted against a society that ignores their 'contributions in language, dress, and popular culture, and negates the ways they cope with economic and social pressures,' young people use rap to vent their frustration with unemployment, corruption, social stratification, AIDS, and gender relations (ibid). Therefore, through the medium of rap, young people are the representatives for 'those without power,' giving voice to the subaltern20 (Whiteley, 2004, pg. 9).

In a similar context, Senegalese rappers initially emulated the style of rap emerging from the USA and France, but their music soon began to develop its own 'distinct flavour,' combining local musical traditions, indigenous languages, and 'messages that resonated with Senegalese youth' (Fredericks, 2014, pg. 134). The decision to abandon French as the language of rap was conscious and deliberate. O'Brien (2008) differentiates between the use of Wolof and French, stating that French is the language of 'authority and instruction' while Wolof is the language of 'collusion and evasion, the language in which the orders are most effectively circumvented' (Gellar, 2016, pg. 13). Dakar is one of the most popular and influential hip-hop scenes on the continent (Charry, 2012). The trademark of the music is focus on with matters of social importance including political corruption, delinquency, legacies of

20 See Set/Setal on pg. 267-269
colonialism, economic hardship and the complacency of the country’s leaders. Fredericks (2014, pg. 136) suggests that the political critique in rap is ‘radical’ for two reasons;

‘First, it constitutes, a transgression of conventional delineations of who is allowed to speak for the community because it usurps gerontocratic traditions of public discourse. Second, this new discursive space constitutes a rupture with inherited conventions of propriety in indirect comment, through involving a direct and uncensored mode of public moral critique. In this way, rap—as a mode of speaking out of turn—embodies a rejection of the status quo that is at the core of a sort of generational revolt.’

The accessibility of rap, which requires no formal musical training, instruments, equipment, ‘or even literacy,’ has meant that it continues to be widely embraced as a medium of self-expression for young people everywhere (Fredericks, 2014, pg. 136). In Cote d’Ivoire, urban youth have harnessed popular music genres of zouglou and reggae as a means of democratic self-expression to vent their frustration with politicians and the lack of opportunities available to them. Through music, they have found a domain for articulating ideas and information on politicians, corruption, history and identity. Drawing from Lefebvre, Saldanha (2002, pg. 348), describes youth music geographies as the ‘embodied production of space’ existing ‘in’ space and referring ‘to’ space – ‘the space of music is produced and produces identity and politics through its corporealisation.’ Rap and hip-hop become a key element for reconstituting the democratic public sphere by producing ‘alternative representations of space’ (Saldanha, 2002, pg. 348). Thus, through rap and hip hop, young people forge a ‘radical politics’ in a reconfiguration of spaces that helps them assert their right to the city21 (Fredericks, 2014, pg. 138).

Through consumption, trade, violence and entrepreneurship, young people reinsert themselves into statist agendas and larger capitalist and global processes in the production of what Bhabha (1996) has termed a ‘vernacular cosmopolitan.’ These strategies point to the ‘hidden and subtle’ ways youth drive the economic and social life of the city and ‘keep it hooked into the global economy’ (Scheld, 2007, pg. 233). The urban knowledge of African youth, defined by Mbembe (1997) as the ‘ability to improvise, survive, and ultimately succeed in the city,’ can only be acquired through experimentation and improvisation. Urban knowledge enables

21 See Plebeian public sphere on pg. 263
young Africans to 'navigate successfully' through the hazards of urban life, using improvisational skills that demand knowledge of 'chaos, fractals, mobility and vectoral capacity' to navigate the 'complex dynamics of (social) transmission' (De Boeck, 2015, pg. 5).

**Case two: informality**

Informality is a poorly defined concept, particularly on the African continent where a false dichotomy between formal and informal is misleading and fails to grasp the nuances of the phenomenon. Official data detailing the size and range of informal activities in the 'global south' is approximative, but commands substantial authority. The International Labour Organization (ILO) (2018) estimates that, excluding agriculture, informal employment accounts for 78.8 per cent of employment in Central Africa, 76.6 per cent in East Africa, and 87 per cent in West Africa (ILO, 2018, pg. 29). Data suggests that only a third of 15- to 24-year-olds in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, and Nigeria are employed in the formal labour force (Fortune et al., 2014). The rest are categorised as 'unemployed' according to official data figures, although they are likely involved in the informal economy (Marc et al., 2015). The International Labour Organization (1972) defines informality as a ‘way of doing things characterized by (a) ease of entry; (b) reliance on indigenous resources; (c) family ownership; (d) small-scale operations; (e) labour intensive and adaptive technology; (e) skills acquired outside of the formal sector; (g) unregulated and competitive markets.’

The global political economy and policy fix approaches address informality through the lens of regulation and legality. However, the approaches differ on their standpoint regarding the effects of informality on urban development. While global political economy approaches refuse to acknowledge the informal sector as anything other than a ‘parasitic,’ and unproductive form of ‘disguised unemployment’ (Bromley, 1997), policy fix approaches have cast informality as a dynamic form of entrepreneurship, in which the self-employed opt out of the formal economy to benefit from its perceived advantages (Castells, 1989).

Both approaches ignore the history of informality in Africa which is arguably based on colonial rationale and neoliberal economic restructuring. It is important to note that ‘informality,’ as defined by the global political economy and policy fix
approaches, exist(s)ed in the pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial histories of Africa (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991, pg. 171-96; Abdoul, 2005, pg. 237). Following independence in many African countries, the informal sector was generally perceived as an 'inconvenient reality' that would eventually disappear as economies were modernised (Potts, 2007, pg. 10). State policies discouraged street traders and the informal sector was considered problematic, as newly independent governments wanted their cities to 'look like First World cities of the late 20th century'\textsuperscript{22} (Potts, 2007, pg. 10). However, the dearth of employment opportunities in urban areas and the absence of social safety nets meant that many urban dwellers were driven to the informal sector in search of income-generating activities. The case of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania demonstrates the tumultuous relationship between the state and the informal sphere. Both the colonial and postcolonial states made many attempts to remove the 'so-called unproductive elements' from Dar es Salaam and relocate them to the countryside. The targets of these policies were the self-employed, whose conflict with the state became one of determining 'not just how they would obtain a livelihood but also who would control their very means of survival'\textsuperscript{23} (Tripp, 1997, pg. 162). Resettlement schemes such as \textit{Nguvu Kazi} (1983) removed 'unproductive,' and 'idle' elements from the city and relocated them to the rural hinterland. Resettlement policies only antagonised the majority of the urban population whose work in the informal sector was a key means of survival but often disregarded as a legitimate form of employment. A similar set of policies implemented in Nigeria, called the war against indiscipline (1984), involved the arrest of street vendors and destruction of stalls along main roads in urban areas. In Zambia, similar policies arrested street vendors and destroyed their wares during a period of job shortages in 1982 (Hansen, 1999, pg. 148).

Structural adjustment in the late 1980s required the liberalisation of trade and cuts to public expenditure to attain macroeconomic stability and balance national budgets. The impact on urban livelihoods was felt throughout the continent; real income in urban areas declined as currencies were devalued and wages were

\textsuperscript{22} See 'vernacular western modernity' on pg. 241

\textsuperscript{23} These historical and ongoing processes of marginalisation and exclusion may be linked to Roy's current research based on the criminalization of poverty in American cities in which processes of dispossession are met with mobilization and protest by the urban poor who challenge housing exclusion (Institute of Inequality and Democracy, UCLA, 2019). This line of research casts the right to the city in terms of the right to be informal and the criminalization of informality as a means of survival.
Urban dwellers ‘bore the brunt of formal job losses’ and suffered the scaling back or removal of public subsidies (housing, schooling, and staple food). Real minimum wages fell 81 per cent in Abidjan between 1978 and 1988, and by 90 per cent in Nigeria between 1981 and 1990 while the population of Bissau experienced ‘persistent impoverishment’ (Lourenço-Lindell, 2002, pg. 71). Governments remained either unable or unwilling to fulfill the needs and demands of urban citizens or were still ‘obsessed with unrealistic modernising ideals for their cities’ (ibid). Retrenched public sector workers and new job seekers did not ‘passively watch their conditions deteriorate’ and devised alternative ways to access land, housing, and other basic services (Lourenço-Lindell, 2002, pg. 71, pg. 9). African urbanites created their own urban systems in the process of negotiating livelihoods with little concern for regulation and public policy, giving credence to the proverb ‘necessity is the mother of invention.’ By virtue of their small size, informal sector production units can evade taxation and regulation, which means they may benefit from public goods but do not contribute to public finance. In the context of Senegal, the informal sector is often the ‘only alternative to an acceptable life’ and ‘protection from the absolute lowest level of poverty’ following the devaluation of the Franc CFA (Granström, 2009, pg. 14). During times of economic crises, the informal sector has proven remarkably resilient to external shock since it does not have direct access to global financial markets. In recent years, the focus has shifted to an emphasis on gendered entrepreneurialism based on the assumption that ‘more women than men choose to become entrepreneurs’ across the African continent (Gaye, 2018). The informal sector creates opportunities for women to undertake income-generating activities and has improved the position of women through increased bargaining power and greater opportunities (Todaro & Smith, 2006). Policy discourse therefore focuses on solutions to support female entrepreneurs on the continent. In his pioneering analysis on the informal economy in Accra, Hart (1973) asked whether the ‘army of urban unemployed and underemployed really constitute a passive, exploited majority,’ or if they possess ‘some autonomous capacity for generating growth.’ Self-employment, redefined as micro-entrepreneurship, purportedly offers a host of potential benefits including flexible hours, opportunity for economic independence, better wages, and avoidance of taxes and inefficient government regulation. Thus, informality endures as a key means of employment, housing, services, and other functions in many under-serviced African cities. However, the neoliberal conceptualisation of ‘informality as self-employment’ represents a deceptively compelling and enticing narrative of opportunity and empowerment (Pieterse, 2010,
Although it provides income-generating activities for the poorest marginalised urban dwellers, employment in the informal sector remains precarious and poorly remunerated.

In recent years, the continent has experienced the spread and sprawl of informal settlements. Urban planning has been inefficient in light of the demographic and economic realities of rapid population growth, poorly defined property rights and limited provision of essential public services. Researchers explaining the increase of slums across the 'global south' have framed the process as 'disjointed modernisation,' the scale of which is 'symptomatic' of state failure to actively manage urbanisation (Fox, 2013, pg. 192). The 'modernist' view assumes that, as urban dwellers and rural-urban migrants find employment and increase their incomes, they will eventually gain access to the formal housing market or invest in upgrading their living conditions. It is more often the case, however, that slums become 'permanent' dwellings, entrenching the urban poor deeper into conditions of precariousness and informality. This makes their rise out of poverty increasingly unlikely in the long term. Overall, informality (in terms of forms of income generation, forms of settlement and housing) has become the dominant model; it is no longer the 'exception' in Africa and more broadly across the 'global south' (Roy, 2005; Al-Sayyad and Roy, 2003; Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2003; Watson, 2014, pg. 2263).

Increasingly, informal settlements are cast as 'islands of resistance and/or outcast territories,' but also increasingly as 'untapped markets and potential spaces for profit-driven development' and speculative urbanism (Vasudedan, 2015, pg. 346). Slums play a significant role in capital formation, demanding imports from the urban centre, and supplying unskilled and semiskilled labour (Frankenhoff, 1967, pg. 34). The attempts to formalise economic activities following deliberate attempts to suppress them reveal an 'ambition on the part of the state to tap this potential source of revenue' (Lourenço-Lindell, 2002, pg. 74). However, there is no concrete roadmap for what the formalisation of the informal would look like in the 'global south.' The desire to formalise the informal originates in the early emergence of modern

24 See ‘urbanisme evolutif’ on pg. 193
25 See Centre Felix Eboué on pg. 259
26 Examples of how formalisation attempts have been deployed in the case study will be discussed in Chapter Eight.
statecraft in the 'global north,' and its subsequent development into high-modernist ideology aimed at the 'rational design of social order' (Scott, 1998, pg. 4). Informal dwellers are expected to accept the long-term binding financial and legal obligations of home ownership, including the 'adherence to various regulations regarding the use of the land and the conduct of the occupants (e.g. respecting noise and health standards), and the payment of regular rates and service charges to the municipal authority' (Watson, 2003, pg. 396). This paradigm has driven government action in the 'global north,' and has dominated colonial and postcolonial policy in the south where development and modernisation have come to mean the same thing. In this context, slum evictions and the destruction of informal settlements is an ever-present threat for the working poor, while harassment and ostracism are legitimised by policies that seek to formalise the informal. The perceived 'illegality' of the informal sector makes it highly vulnerable to changes in government attitudes and policies, justifying 'draconian interventions' (Potts, 2007, pg. 6-7). Planning theory and policy in much of the 'global south' continues to categorise the 'informal' as 'illegal' which means that urban planning and policy has often intentionally sought to undermine or, in most cases, neglect the urban poor even though they constitute the majority across southern cities.

The socio-spatial infrastructures approach demonstrates that the formal/informal dichotomy is neither an accurate nor useful distinction in SSA and the 'global south' since informality is pervasive and exists throughout the city at a variety of scales. However, the dichotomy sheds 'light on what this condition implies for those living in it' (Marx & Kelling, 2019, pg. 10). Global political economy and policy fix approaches mostly ignore the fact that the informal economy is a fundamental component of the complex social life of cities across the sub-region, enabling the poor to access sources of incomes, and services that would not have been available to them if not through informal means. This approach reveals that informality is more than merely an encroachment of conventional infrastructures since it consists of a 'wholly alternative set of practices, indigenous in origin, which remained unrecognised in law for a long period during colonialism' (State of African Cities, 2014, pg. 132). The informal sector is arguably the 'real' economy in which social and economic linkages are formed, interrupted, reproduced and transformed through established cooperative practices. In recent years, the growth of informal work in African cities has been studied as a 'sign of resilience, partial autonomy and inventiveness' (Pieterse, 2010, pg. 5). Patterns of squatting in both the 'global north'
and ‘global south’ reflect the 'contingencies of precarious life in an unstable urban world' but also demonstrate practices of sociability and place-making relevant beyond conventional formulations of the ‘political’ (Vasuvedan, 2015, pg. 353). Informality arguably demonstrates the ambiguities of ‘non-compliant economic resistance’ and its ‘potential transformative power’ (Tripp, 1997, pg. 173). The ubiquity of informal urban processes and spaces forces us to recognize an ‘alternative right to the city’ and consider a more complicated link between ‘insurgency and informality’ (Roy, 2005, pg. 148).

An inverted look at the development of informality in the ‘global south’ suggests that it is not symptomatic of ‘failure’ but is arguably a ‘triumphant sign of their success in resisting the western models of planning and urban development’ (Miraftab, 2009, pg. 45). The failure of neoliberal economic reforms, once touted as the ‘key’ to ‘unlocking’ a country’s development potential, has given way to deepening and diversifying informality. Furthermore, the continued emphasis on policy based on the northern model of urbanisation undermines the ‘most basic right of the urban poor’ – the ‘right to control their means of subsistence’ (Tripp, 1997, pg. 173). Urbanites do not ‘sit by passively waiting for change,’ and instead seek ‘new niches within the informal economy’ (i.e. young women join men at traffic intersections to sell newspapers and in artisan mechanic shops to fix cars while young men join women in selling doughnuts on street corners, and tailoring in women-owned workshops) (Scheld, 2010, pg. 161). Yet, the informal sector continues to be discussed as an ‘individualistic, inchoate mass’ that expresses political interests only through political and economic disengagement rather than through organized and concerted political action (Meagher, 2007, pg. 46). Where the state has greatly and repeated failed the people, the informal sector has picked up the slack and become an inherently political reality of African cities. Informality as a mode of urbanisation is ‘insurmountable for states in poorer countries,’ as urban residents are the builders of the city, prompting a shift away from 'simply accounting for structural drivers of urban inequality' towards an understanding of how things get done amid ‘overlapping and dense social relations’ (Simone & Pieterse, 2017, pg. 39).

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27 See ‘exercise in placemaking’ on pg. 25292
28 See ‘battle against the hut’ on pg. 162
Grounded knowledge on informal processes reveal new ‘imaginaries’ and strategic opportunities with the ‘potential for wider applicability’ (Watson, 2014, pg. 2263). A deeper and more nuanced understanding of informality allows us to understand its role in the ‘city yet to come’ (Simone, 2004; (Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 252). As it stands, planning theory is poorly equipped to handle pressing urban issues and continues to advocate policies that destabilise the survival of large swaths of the urban population of the ‘global south.’ Consequently, new research will need to find ways of dealing with rapid and unpredictable growth in contexts where land and basic services rely to a greater extent on informal providers (Watson, 2014, pg. 2263).

Conclusion

By examining the main approaches to the study of African urbanism, this review has sought to make the origins of theory explicit in order to ‘provincialize’ our understanding of urban phenomena. While the global political economy and policy fix approaches represent the key paradigms guiding the bulk of research on African cities, the emerging research agenda (socio-spatial infrastructures) suggests that we can no longer dismiss African cities as failures of urbanisation, or decaying sites for ‘export-oriented neo-colonialism’ (Oldfield & Parnell, 2014, pg. 141). As the dichotomy between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ cities is slowly receding, the relations between cities in different parts of the world are recast and challenge ‘existing theoretical assumptions about the core and periphery’ (Hubbard, 2018).

The analysis has demonstrated that global political economy approaches are limited by an overreliance on northern models of growth that continue to rely on an understanding of southern, specifically African, urbanisation as merely an embryonic and distorted version of its northern referent. When identifying impediments (e.g. infrastructure deficits) and comparative advantages (e.g. large youth populations) to growth, policy fix approaches are primarily concerned with normative reform which has, in some cases, been inappropriate or detrimental to African cities. Socio-spatial approaches provide a corrective balance to the study of African urbanism by addressing the same harsh realities highlighted by the previous two approaches and broadening and pluralising the scope of research. The case studies on youth and informality are presented as examples identifying the tension between these three approaches. This research project is positioned firmly
within the socio-spatial infrastructures approach while simultaneously acknowledging the pitfalls and oversights of global political economy and policy fix. This analysis delves into the examination of processes shaping African urbanism in the case study city, including the 'patronage networks of dependency' and the 'new shared identities and social solidarities' (Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 329). The following chapter outlines the theoretical framework of this research project which is aligned with the aims and methodologies of the socio-spatial infrastructures approach. The goal of this framework is to harness the research potential of this emerging agenda by elaborating a research project based on ‘cityness.’
Voices: Psychogeographies and ‘cityness’

Psychogeography was developed by the Situationists in the 1950s and defined by Debord (1955) as the study of the ‘precise laws and specific effects of the geographical environment, consciously organized or not, on the emotions and behaviour of individuals.’ Psychogeographies map the ‘unrouted route’ designed by the ‘spatial intentionality’ articulated in the everyday currents of the city (Jenks & Neves, 2000, pg. 8). The psychogeographies of the city reveal the ‘amorphous urbanism’ (McFarlane, 2005) of southern cities that is shaped by ‘people’s intentions to do other things’ (Tonkiss, 2014). Within the scope of this research project, psychogeographies provide an interesting metaphor for understanding ‘cityness’.

Debord (1955) explains:

‘The sudden change of ambiance in a street within the space of a few meters; the evident division of a city into zones of distinct psychic atmospheres; the path of least resistance that is automatically followed in aimless strolls (and which has no relation to the physical contour of the terrain); the appealing or repelling character of certain places – these phenomena all seem to be neglected...People are quite aware that some neighbourhoods are gloomy and others pleasant. But they generally simply assume that elegant streets cause a feeling of satisfaction and that poor streets are depressing, and let it go at that. In fact, the variety of possible combinations of ambiances, analogous to the blending of pure chemicals in an infinite number of mixtures, gives rise to feelings as differentiated and complex as any other form of spectacle can evoke. The slightest demystified investigation reveals that the qualitatively or quantitatively different influences of diverse urban decors cannot be determined solely on the basis of the historical period or architectural style, much less on the basis of housing conditions.’

The psychogeographies of a city speak to the unspoken rules of urban life and allow for a better understanding of how these rules are broken, subverted or contested in the production of urban space. The empirical analysis reveals several instances when mechanisms of exclusion and marginalisation are integrated into urban planning as a way of manipulating the psychogeographies of the city. The archival analysis, for example, demonstrates how a city is planned and designed to impact and influence the psyche of urbanites. Specifically, the analysis documents the ways in which the colonial administration and postcolonial state harness architecture as an ‘ideological transmitter’ (Wright, 1991, pg. 1). The fieldwork analysis provides examples of the contest between the rationalities of urban
planning and the psychogeographies of urban life in the production of 'cityness.' The fieldwork analysis provides examples of the contest between the rationalities of urban planning and the psychogeographies of urban life. Fieldwork conducted in the case study city involves the experience of the psychogeographies of Dakar which integrates researcher’s own experience of the latter in the process of unravelling the complexity of urban space.
Chapter Three: Theory in the making

Until recently, research on Asian, African and Latin American urbanisation has largely been 'backward oriented,' concerned primarily with determining and exposing the causes of poverty and inequality (Parnell, 2014, pg. 74). The emerging counter-narrative, discussed in Chapter Two as the study of 'socio-spatial infrastructures,' has cast these cities as 'more aspirant, growth-oriented and ambitious' (ibid). New frameworks for theorising southern urbanisation include 'grey spacing' (Yiftachel, 2009), multiple modernities (Eisenstadt, 1999), ordinary cities (Robinson, 2006), alternative modernities (Gaonkar, 2000; Bhargava, 2010), hybrid modernities (Bhabha, 1994) and global modernity (Dirlik, 2007). Other examples include Watson's (2009) 'conflicting rationalities,' Roy's (2011) subaltern urbanisms and state informality, and Porto Alegre's participatory budgeting (Albrechts, 2012), all of which challenge conventional urban theory. An urban theory of the 'global south' is a theory-in-the-making as researchers explore new avenues for urban research that embrace the plurality and complexity of southern urbanisation. Trial and error²⁹ are therefore important parts of the research process and calls on the researcher to act as a 'bricoleur'³⁰ by experimenting with theories to determine whether they are useful tropes for expanding our understanding of southern cities.

The review begins by discussing and defining the key components of an urban theory of the 'global south.' The analysis then moves from the general ('global south') to the specific (African cities) to outline the theoretical framework of this research project and the guiding theories underpinning the fieldwork. Specifically, the project looks at postcolonial theory to provincialize urban studies, planetary urbanisation (Brenner & Schmid, 2015) and 'grey spaces' (Avni & Yiftachel, 2014) to recast urban development in southern cities, and 'people as infrastructure' (Simone, 2004) to examine more closely the survival strategies of the urban subaltern. For the purpose of clarity, much of what is presented here is outlined as neatly bound schools of thought, but an urban theory of the 'global south' can only come to the fore through the cross-pollination of various disciplines and theories.

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²⁹ Simone and Pieterse (2017) advocate for 'experimentation' as an integral part of theory-building for southern research (see pg. 297).
³⁰ See 'bricoleurs' on pg. 88
**Theorising the ‘global south’**

Drawing from the work of Sheppard et al. (2013), the analysis proposes a five-point manifesto that outlines the theoretical scope of this research project and its conceptual underpinnings.

**i. Defining the urban**

Research on cities of the ‘global south,’ is limited by definitions that circumscribe and frame our understanding. Conventional definitions of cities, urbanisation, and urban ‘thresholds’ are simply inadequate for defining and describing cities of the ‘global south.’ The ‘global south’ has replaced the ‘Third World’ as a term referencing all of Africa, Central and Latin America, the Caribbean, and most of Asia. The term originates in the Cold War era, denoting a ‘tripartite division’ in which two major ideological models for the political economy of modernity emerged, each with its ‘less developed others’ (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012, pg. 127). The Third ‘nonaligned world’ appeared after the Bandung conference (1955) and embraced an ‘empowering alternative’ to the ‘imperial plutocracy’ of the First World and the ‘imperial bureaucracy of the Second’ (Flusty, 2003, pg. 102). The more recently popularised term, ‘global south,’ is arguably a misnomer due to the multiplicity of locations it encompasses, becoming a blanket reference for a large part of the world. It is therefore best described as a ‘vernacular shorthand’ stemming from the ‘long-term parochialism’ in urban theory (Simone, 2018, pg. 23). It creates an artificial dichotomy between ‘north’ and ‘south’ and deepens the schism between the apparent ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of global capitalism. Throughout the thesis, ‘global south’ is intentionally written in lowercase and in quotations to problematise the term and signal its usage as a theoretical referent. In so doing, the analysis signals the need to ‘interrogate the coloniality’ of terms like ‘indigenous’ and ‘southern’ and question the parochialism of urban theory (Jazeel, 2018, pg. 10). In the realm of theory, the term references specific historical processes with their epicentre in the urban regions of the ‘south’ (Pieterse, 2013) and acts as a shorthand reference for ‘non-European, postcolonial peoples’ (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012, pg. 113). The ‘global south’ is therefore framed as an ‘epistemological location’ rather than a ‘geographical container’ which allows for the provincialization of hegemonic theory.
(Lawhon et al., 2014, pg. 505). The ‘monolithic West’ is arguably no more pertinent a term than ‘global south’ as a way of speaking ‘convincingly of the entire ex-colonial world in one sweeping generalisation after another’ (Said, 1987, pg. 47). However, the term ‘global south’ may also provide an opening for theory-building. In its ‘ex-centricity’ outside of Euro-America, the ‘global south’ signals an angle from which to ‘estrange our world’ in order to ‘make sense of its present and future’ (Bhabha, 1994, pg. 6). In this analysis, the term is harnessed as tool and point of contention to push back against urban theory and explore an urban world of southern cities beyond the focus on developmental factors.

The urban is widely understood as a ‘distinct kind of site’ (the city), distinguishable from the hinterland (the rural), and ‘taken to be a hallmark of modernism, progress, development and the metropole – the opposite of provincialism’ (Sheppard et al., 2013, pg. 894). Our understanding and definition of urbanism is steeped in Euro-American historicism – the opposite of which is not only ruralism, but a southern urbanism that deviates from the urban patterns of northern cities. As the ‘destination of societal development,’ urbanisation relies implicitly or explicitly on Northern American and Western European cities as ‘the norm’ (Sheppard et al., 2013, pg. 894). As they continue to evolve, cities of the ‘global south’ shed some of the elements that defined them ‘since antiquity’ including the ‘demarcation between urban and rural and functional and economic complementarity between its neighbourhoods’ (Jihad & Jacques, 2012, pg. 93). Wirth (1938, pg. 8), a key urban scholar of the early 20th century, defines a city as ‘a relatively large, dense, and permanent settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals.’ Size, density, and heterogeneity shape an ‘urban way of life’ and an ‘urban personality’ (ibid). Similarly, Mumford (1937, pg. 93-4) defines the city as;

’...the fixed site, the durable shelter, the permanent facilities for assembly, interchange, and storage; the essential social means and the social division of labour, which serves not merely the economic life but the cultural processes. The city in its complete sense, then, is a geographical plexus, an

31 The ‘west’ is displayed in lowercase (except in direct quotations from the literature) to signal that it makes the same blanket statements as the term ‘other’ or ‘oriental.’ Nevertheless, these terms are pertinent to the subject matter of this inquiry since they reference a long-standing tradition in academia that pits western knowledge against its subaltern/southern counterpart.
economic organisation, an institutional process, a theatre of social action, and an aesthetic symbol of collective unity.'

Wirth’s definition of cities applies largely to urban agglomerations across the ‘global south,’ owing to their dynamism, heterogeneity and diversity. The focus on ‘permanence,’ however, does not necessarily apply to the large and growing informal and temporary settlements in many southern cities. When cities across the south are weighed in the balance of Mumford’s definition, they are often found wanting in the characteristics of a city. The ‘fixed site,’ ‘durable shelter,’ and ‘permanent facilities’ do not lend themselves to an understanding of the mutable, flexible, and transient qualities of many southern cities, often defined by uncontrolled urban sprawl. In fact, the ‘question of temporariness’ demonstrates the ‘temporary quality’ of physical and spatial resources and ‘social, political, and moral relations and relations to the sources of power’ are produced by a continuity ‘in the face of the temporariness of things’ (Appadurai, 2003, pg. 47). The ‘theatre of social action’ is therefore devoted to producing, ‘if not the illusion, then the sense of permanence in the face of the temporary’ (Appadurai, 2003, pg. 47). When we broaden the definition of urbanity to explain the ‘concentration – or conggregation – of human energies and activities that bring space to life,’ then southern cities are prime examples of contemporary urbanism as evidenced by their dense social and economic networks and linkages32 (Beall & Fox, 2009, pg. 3). This analysis posits that southern cities fall within the scope of Gramsci’s *citta*, a ‘physical, densely inhabited and structured space (the roman urbs); [and] a social space of political engagement and active citizenship (the Greek polis)’ (Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 316). The city is therefore a socio-historically produced arena in which the subaltern become ‘actively involved in the making of their own society’ (ibid). Hence, there is a case for rethinking what constitutes a ‘city’ and the task of re-imagining the definitions of southern cities is only possible through new and nuanced approaches to the study of modern-day southern urbanism.

So, we arrive at ‘cityness’ – a prism through which to gain a deeper understanding of urbanisation in the ‘global south’ without relying on meta-narratives and development models of northern theory. The ‘developmentalist’ outlook that guides most studies of southern cities focuses on dimensions of poverty, economic marginalisation, dysfunctionality, and failures in establishing

32 See ‘people as infrastructure’ on pg. 87
viable systems of local governance. At times, this outlook has promoted policies that have been 'downright destructive' such as the Structural Adjustment Programmes in the 1980s and 1990s (Watson, 2002, pg. 46). While these factors are relevant to understanding the present-day realities of southern cities, they only tell one side of the story. Urban processes and practices in the 'global south' are not 'inadequate copies, or distortions' of northern developments but instead have 'their own logics' and represent unique and 'creative adaptations of the modern' (Harrison, 2006, pg. 324). This shift in focus opens a 'more hopeful' research agenda that focuses on the ability of southern urbanites to construct productive and meaningful lives at the 'micro-scale' and 'economies and societies at a macro-scale' (Harrison, 2006, pg. 323).

'Cityness' sheds light on coeval modes of contemporary urbanism and the 'diverse-yet-distinctive means' of city-making that shape the materiality of everyday life in cities (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012, pg. 118). To label southern urban modernity as 'alternative' presupposes its existence at the margins of a hegemonic (western) modernity, or worse, as a critique or 'merely an appendage of Western modernity and European modernism' (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012, pg. 118). Instead, it must be read as a 'vernacular—just as Euro modernity is a vernacular' since it constitutes an ongoing engagement with the 'unfolding history of the present' (ibid). Southern 'cityness' is the social and political meaning of 'being in and belonging to the city and refutes the narrative of 'urban incompleteness' and dysfunctionality (Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 325).

ii. Delimiting the urban

'Cityness' forces us to reconsider the spatiality of a city. Physical boundaries and delimitations are often rendered obsolete as soon as they are incorporated into the urban lexicon of many cities of the south owing to the rate of urban sprawl. Statistical definitions and demographic indicators are often used to establish a 'benchmark' based on which an area is defined as urban (or not). However, as the analysis will show, there are varying benchmarks often dealing with the same sets of data manipulated to fit within the scope of city agendas and municipal divisions.

The 'urban threshold' is arguably no longer a useful tool for understanding urban realities in the south, particularly on the African continent where growth projections
have been misleading and do little to explain the drivers of urbanisation. Varying definitions of the urban 'threshold' have meant that urban areas are defined as those encompassing anything from a 'few thousand inhabitants' in Cameroon to 10,000 urban dwellers according to Africapolis (2011) (Potts, 2012, pg. 2). Patterns of urbanisation across the African continent, and the 'global south' more broadly, have challenged demarcations between urban, peri-urban and rural\[33\] (Simon, 2008). Population estimates indicate that 70 per cent of the urban population in over 20 African countries resides in cities of less than 500,000 inhabitants (Simkins, 2013). Another important trend is the rise of mega-cities as these large urban agglomerations, including Lagos, Cairo and Kinshasa will continue growing at a 'maddening pace' (Koffi, 2012, pg. 188). By 2030, Dar es Salaam, Johannesburg, and Luanda will also have reached mega-city status (UN World Cities Report, 2018). The size and evolution of these cities defies definitions and challenges the capacity of traditional measuring tools for capturing the demographic phenomenon in all its complexity. Databases and measures of growth in African cities are 'weak' and available data is often produced based on a 'great deal of guessing' (Jerven, 2013, pg. 357).

Urban policymakers and practitioners rely on statistics, probability and risk modelling to dissect and study cities, but the toolbox developed from the northern model is unsuitable for an examination of cities in Africa and the 'global south.' These tools conceal the fact that 'no one knows quite what is going on' as everything that falls outside of the scope of traditional modelling techniques either 'does not matter or is subject to 'grubby governance' (Simone, 2014, pg. 323). Grubby practices refer to the pushback against narratives circulated by technocrats to preserve the 'domination of capital over labour' and reveal the disconnect between the strictly measured and defined categories of northern urbanisation and the flexible and mutable parameters of southern urbanisation (Harvey, 1978, pg. 231).

\[33\] See example of Pikine on pg. 184
indicators are especially inadequate in less developed countries' (Jerven, 2013, pg. 356).

Cities of the 'global south' have thwarted efforts for 'certainty inherent in modernist urban planning' (Chakrabarty 2002; Edensor and Jayne 2011). Yet, urban investigations in the 'global south' are often deployed with a 'prefabricated' set of theories and methodologies and urban plans are implemented despite important data deficiencies (McFarlane & Rutherford, 2008, pg. 343). Roy (2005, pg. 225) suggests we develop new 'vocabularies and epistemologies' for southern cities as we continue to 'decolonize [our] imagination about cityness.' Often, the only viable option for defining a city in the south is to ask, what isn't a city? There is no singular definition of the urban that captures the magnitude of this 'total phenomenon' (Lefebvre, 1970). However, in order to build a case for an urban theory of the 'global south,' this review concludes with a discussion on the definition of the urban that espouses the complexity of southern urbanity.

iii. Theorising the urban

The corpus of urban theory is centred on northern cities, borne of the industrial revolution, which no longer constitute the urban majority in terms of contemporary urbanisation trends of the 21st century (Oldfield & Parnell, 2014, pg. 2). Research on the 'urban phenomenon' in developing countries has been limited to case studies on large mega-cities cities such as Shanghai, Mumbai, São Paulo and Johannesburg (Choplin, 2012, pg. 1). This overemphasis on mega-cities is problematic since the latter are a hyperbolic example of southern urbanisation just as South African cities constitute extreme examples of racially segregated postcolonial urban environments. Nevertheless, these cities are often used as the 'African' examples in multi-regional comparative projects. The bulk of theory on southern urbanism is constrained by the 'notion of linearity' which assumes the reproduction of northern trends and patterns in southern cities in the manner of Rostow's (1960) stages of economic growth (Robinson, 2003; Patel, 2014, pg. 37). While an overreliance on statistical data in southern contexts is problematic, the numbers point to the sheer magnitude of the urban phenomenon unfolding in the south. In the 21st century, Africa and Asia account for 67% of the world's urban population (UNDESA, 2018). Yet, the 'canon of urban theory' fails to grasp the importance of cities of the south as 'worlding nodes' that foster planetary linkages within global regimes (Roy, 2014, pg. 17). Urban theory struggles to explain phenomena unfolding in cities of the south and is thus ill-suited to inform policy
intervention (Edensor & Jayne, 2012; Watson, 2009). For example, the World Bank (2009) maintains that ‘globalising capitalist and Western development models' will enable informal settlements in Mumbai to 'go the way of London's Victorian slums' (Sheppard et al., 2013, pg. 895). This reveals not only a 'failure of implementation' but also of theory which is based on ‘truth claims that are universal' rather than 'asserting those that are contextual' (Patel, 2014, pg. 45).

Theorising from the south means adopting a 'southern perspective' as a starting point from which to alter 'one's gaze on cities' (Oldfield & Parnell, 2014, pg. 1). An urban theory of the 'global south' counters the trend of ignoring the 'other' (Said, 1973) and engages with concepts and arguments dislocated from the western experience and rhetoric (Roy, 2014, pg. 23). Southern theory begins by contextualising the role and importance of northern cities to move beyond the ‘Eurocentric epistemic trap' of urban studies (Patel, 2014, pg. 38). The ‘unmarked Eurocentrism' of urban theory is challenged through an investigation of the existing urbanisms of the world’s ‘subordinated populations' (Gidwani, 2006, pg. 16). In so doing, urban scholars challenge the ‘colonizer's model of the world' (Blaut, 1993) and its ‘pervasive, taken-for-granted power’ (Sheppard et al., 2013, pg. 899). However, in the analysis of southern urbanism, there is always a risk of reproducing the epistemological pitfalls of northern theory. The continued emphasis on ‘Anglophone scientific output' as the hegemonic model of thought, means that theory still travels in one direction – north to south (Choplin, 2012, pg. 3). Theory travelling in the opposite direction has often been limited to 'sweeping generalisations usually about recent immigration populations' (Roy, 2014, pg. 29).

iv. ‘Provincializing' the urban

By ‘provincializing' (Chakrabarty, 2002, pg. xviii) northern theory, ideas that were once packaged as universal, are now tied to their specific intellectual and historical traditions and can no longer claim ‘universal validity' (Robinson, 2012, pg. 59). Dislodging urban theory from its western referents means fostering a dialogue between researchers from the south and north as well as between southern intellectual traditions. The goal is to destabilise ‘northern thinking' and ‘those who do it' (Roy, 2014, pg. 24). The central tenets of southern theory are outlined as follows:
1. 'northern theory fails or does not apply in the south; the north-south axis can be inverted

2. northern hegemonies intellectually may be challenged, Europe may be provincialized (Chakrabarty), Africa may be 'worlded' (Mbembe, 2001, 2010);

3. the future is outlined in the south, not the north

4. events and ideas in the south are powerful for understanding the world as a whole, not only the south' (Roy, 2014, pg. 24).

Operationalising these ideas in the process of constructing a research agenda for an urban theory of the 'global south' is a formidable challenge. It entails dislodging the long-held position of northern research in academic circles despite its continued supremacy in policymaking arenas and its status as the main recipient of grants and funding. The gaps in our knowledge are exacerbated by the uneven global distribution of scholars and scholarship focused in/on the north and dictating the 'politics of knowledge' that shape urban studies (Oldfield & Parnell, 2014, pg. 2). We must move beyond disciplinary 'controversies' to challenge the control of knowledge and assumptions that posit the universality of 'locus enunciations' (the places from which knowledge is produced and articulated) (Mignolo, 2009, pg. 4). Theorising from the south therefore proposes an 'other thinking' by changing the terms, not just the content of the discussion (Mignolo, 2000, pg. 70).

Thus, emerging theories pertaining to southern urbanisation 'speak back against those theories underwriting global urbanism' to destabilise and decentre geographies of knowledge and theory production (Sheppard et al., 2013, pg. 897). By 'provincializing' the history of Europe and universalising the experience of the urban south, we open new theoretical spaces for reimagining the history of southern cities in all their breadth and complexity. Therefore, 'we should write our [emphasis added] history as the history of our society in all its fullness'; a history during which 'contact with Europeans should only figure in it from the viewpoint of the African experience' (Nkrumah in Bayart, 1993, pg. 6). By 'subalternising' the urban in the practice of studying cities, we reject the western experience of urbanisation as the 'singular articulation' and focus on the development of knowledge that has relevance for urban theory more broadly (Patel, 2014, pg. 37-8).
v. ‘Subalternising’ the urban

Situating the production of urban knowledge in the (primarily) northern confines from which it originates allows us to ‘subalternise’ the urban by looking southward and ‘writing the world from the African metropolis’ (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004). Often, knowledge produced in the 'global south' is considered relevant only to other southern contexts and treated as 'primarily raw empirical data and information, to be made sense of by utilizing theories advanced by Western scholars' (Sheppard et al., 2013, pg. 898). Thus, where urban theory is produced ‘has consequences for whether it counts as ‘theory’ or ‘empirical evidence’ of theory (Robinson, 2006)’ (Marx & Kelling, 2019, pg. 6). The 'cultural colonialism' this engenders holds power in its 'internalisation by the host' (Rahnema, 1997). As countries of the ‘global south’ are relegated to the ‘waiting room of history,’ universally accepted narratives of ‘first in Europe, then elsewhere’ preclude the possibility of useful knowledge emerging from southern cities (Charkabarty, 2000, pg. 7). For example, theorisations of urban informality in cities in the ‘global north’ are rarely featured in the ‘formulation of broader urban theory emerging from cities in the west’ (Marx & Kelling, 2019, pg. 20). Yet, processes and phenomena unfolding across the ‘global south’ reveals key aspects of how the ‘global’ works, and ‘how it might work in the future’ (Ferguson, 2006, pg. 48). An urban theory of the ‘global south’ demonstrates how local problems at the micro-level ‘resonate with universal challenges’ such as environmental degradation, inequality, resilience and sustainable infrastructure34 (Oldfield & Parnell, 2014, pg. 3).

The processes taking place in the south may even foreshadow coming events in the ‘global north.’ Comaroff & Comaroff (2012, pg. 121) suggest that the urban south is first to feel the effects of world-historical processes and thus 'prefigure the future of the former metropole.' As countries in the ‘global north’ are suffering fiscal meltdowns, shrinking labour markets, disenfranchised lumpen youth, privatisation, corruption, increasing xenophobia and ethnic conflict, it appears as though they may be 'evolving southward' while the south itself is demonstrating new ways of addressing and coping with these trends (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012, pg. 113). In Lagos, for example, the trends of ‘canonical, modern, Western cities can be seen in hyperbolic guise’ (Comaroff & Shepard, 1999). Koolhaas (2007) therefore suggests

34 See Lefebvre on pg. 262
that Lagos is not catching up with 'us' but that 'we may be catching up with Lagos' since it is 'a paradigm for [the] future of cities everywhere and is at the forefront of globalising modernity' (Koolhaas & Cleijne, 2001, pg. 652–3). This echoes the comments by former U.S. Treasury advisor Roubini who saw the 'early warnings' of the 2008 recession by identifying a 'pattern of economic movement in the US that by 2005 made it look like 'an emerging market economy,' with the same 'irrational exuberance' (Roubini in Brockes, 2009, 25). Similarly, the increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) in sub-Saharan Africa by 16 per cent in 2008 against a 20 per cent decrease worldwide during the global recession seems to indicate that African countries are not 'immature forms of globalization' but 'advanced, sophisticated mutations of it' (Ferguson, 2006, pg. 41). However, we may take issue with the notion that developed nations are subjected to a 'Third Worldization' since it implies that these regions have been 'colonised by an external power, their native populations set to work on plantations and down mines and their indigenous culture despised' (Slater, 1994, pg. 237). Furthermore, when the 'global south' or 'Third World' is used as a metaphor for poverty, inequality, corruption and chaos, it denies the agency involved in the articulation of an 'empowering alternative' (Flusty, 2003, pg. 102). Overstating the relevance of southern urbanism as a metaphor explaining the (de)evolution of some northern cities undermines the entire premise of southern urbanism since it fails to consider how these cities are purveyors of 'cityness' we can learn from. To this end, developing a theoretical framework based on the 'global south' must identify the limits of existing theory and 'where it does not apply' (Connell, 2007, pg. 225), and look beyond a paradigm that frames southern urbanism as ‘backward or excluded vis-à-vis the newly emergent forms of global society’ (Ferguson, 2006, pg. 48).

Urban theory is only 'unsettled' through a comparative approach when all cities are used as models and foundations for theory building (Watson, 2014, pg. 105). In so doing, it is possible to draw ‘inspiration from all cities' (Robinson, 2002, pg. 2). Robinson (2014, pg. 58) suggests that, in order to proactively challenge hegemonic theory, a comparative approach requires the careful selection of 'comparators' moving away from an evaluation of cities towards the identification and exploration of common urban themes across regions. Themes such as the colonial legacies of

35 See satellite cities on pg. 219
poverty, 'underdevelopment' and inequality, the existence and growth of informal economies and settlements, matters of good governance, the impact of economic restructuring, globalization, and migration trends are important across the 'global south' (Myers, 2011, pg. 15). They represent the 'contingent universals' (Healey, 2012) of southern urbanism. The goal of this analysis is to find a way of understanding how they shape 'cityness' in a southern city.

**Theoretical framework**

The schema drawn by Pieterse (2017, pg. 40) outlines and explains the different research tracts of southern urbanism (Figure 3). This map is a useful guide for the construction of a theoretical framework since an urban theory of the 'global south,' much like subaltern urbanism, is not yet a coherent or full-fledged theory. The ongoing development of this theoretical premise opens up ‘new windows’ onto ways of inhabiting, appropriating or reapproriating the city that 'run counter to or disrupt global urbanism' (Sheppard et al., 2013, pg. 897).

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**Figure 3:** Critical urban theory landscapes (Pieterse, 2017)
Southern urbanism provides a 'corrective mainstream' to urban theory by emphasizing the demographic importance of the south and the necessity for a postcolonial 're-reading of history, state craft, political identities, hybrid cultural systems and multiplicity of bases of power, subjugation and empowerment' (Pieterse, 2017, pg. 226).

Vitalist ontologies is focused on a post-structural 'deconstruction' and neo-Marxist structuralist reading of the materialities of the city (Pieterse, 2017, pg. 227). This approach is concerned with how agency is enacted through particular configurations of both human and non-human actants (de Boeck, 2015; Larkin, 2013; Pieterse, 2017, pg. 228).

Everyday urbanism is modelled on Simone's (2004, 2010) work which meticulously documents everyday life in southern cities to develop a better picture of 'cityness.' The basis of this work is the careful documentation of the lives of the urban poor to 'give rise to a new moral universe, a sense of value, of potential, and of the unexpected' (Simone, 2010, pg. 38-9).

Ecological urbanism is concerned with the 'viability' of contemporary modes of urban development and planning and looks at 'alternative, more resilient and more liveable forms and modalities of inhabitation' (Pieterse, 2017, pg. 228).

The schema provides a useful guide for situating this research project within the broader discussion on southern urbanism but may potentially create theoretical limitations in the discursive work of this research project. Engaging with existing theory in this manner may limit the cross-pollination of theory that is necessary in the elaboration of a theoretical framework. For example, an investigation into informal means of subsistence situates itself firmly within 'southern urbanism' but also draws from methods of 'everyday urbanism' and 'vitalist ontologies' when discussing matters of 'ecological urbanism' (e.g. resilience and environmental degradation in slum settings and their effect on survival strategies). The components of the mind map will be analysed in the following sections and tailored to suit the research aims of this project. The analysis will discuss the theoretical applications of this framework in the African context, all the while acknowledging its pertinence to the 'global south' more broadly. Building on the work of Pieterse (2017), the theoretical framework expands the scope of the 'corrective mainstreams' outlined above to construct a retroductive approach that critiques existing theory and engages with emerging ideas on southern urbanism.
**Corrective Mainstream 1: Southern urbanism**

Southern urbanism is based largely on postcolonial theory which creates enormous potential for revisioning the history and the ‘present and potential futures’ of southern cities in the 21st century (Pieterse, 2017, pg. 226). Postcolonial theory is a key rhetoric for identifying and countering the ways in which colonialism and ‘Occidental rationality’ have subjugated ‘other’ ways of thinking to create an ‘image of the West in terms of modernity, progress, and rationality’ (Said, 1978; Harrison, 2006, pg. 324). Postcolonial critique remembers and recovers what Homi Bhabha calls the ‘painful, dismembered and traumatic’ and engages with the enduring sequelae of this history (Sylvester, 2010, pg. 712). The aim is not to produce ‘authentic alternatives’ to northern phenomena but instead to theorise from the ‘situatedness of specific places in the South’ and challenge the hegemony of northern rhetoric (Harrison, 2006, pg. 326).

Postcolonial analyses therefore aim to insert the ‘periphery, the marginal, the non-expert into their own destinies’ in the articulation of southern knowledge (Sylvester, 2010, pg. 172). While the aims of postcolonial theory may be explicit, the methods for conducting analyses in urban settings remain ambiguous since postcolonial urban theory is not a ‘fully fledged urban epistemology or a new research paradigm’ (Brenner & Schmid, 2015, pg. 160). While this allows for a degree of improvisation when casting a postcolonial gaze on the topic of inquiry, it also creates a great deal of uncertainty in the task of developing a research agenda. In this research project, postcolonial theory is harnessed as a corrective measure for the metanarrative of ‘northern’ urbanisation in the context of a retroductive analysis. The approach of this research project is to utilise postcolonial theory to destabilise the hegemonic discourse of the ‘metropolitan West’ by critiquing the discursive and material legacies of colonialism (Crush, 1994). Since postcolonial studies often pits itself against mainstream theory and is almost always antagonistic, the discussion rarely moves beyond oppositional terms in the dismantling of centre/periphery paradigms. As a result, it is necessary to draw from other corrective mainstreams to move beyond the epistemic trap of dichotomies and paradigmatic contest. To do so, the analysis considers the ways in which to analyse and interpret the built environment and the urban experience. By taking a step away from the traditional/fixed understandings of cities, the analysis of a modern southern metropolis is based on the analysis of the ‘heterogeneity and multiplicity of metropolitan modernities’ (Roy, 2016, pg.821). This analysis looks at both the material legacies of colonialism through
an examination of the built environment and the ‘discursive’ legacies of postcolonial rhetoric in the field of African urbanism.

**Materiality**

Colonial legacies are ‘etched’ on the urban landscape of many African cities (Home, 2014, pg. 75). The location of the continent’s major cities along the coasts or near sites of resource extraction is a colonial hangover resulting in the ‘functional retardation’ of African cities into roles as ‘entrepot/warehouse towns, bureaucratic capitals, or both at once’ (Myers, 2011, pg. 51). The primate cities of forty-six of the fifty-four independent nations of the continent were once the primary port or port capital cities established during the colonial era. The vestiges of colonial power remain in these cities in the form of parliamentary complexes, buildings, national symbols, artistic styles, language and cultural forms (King, 1995, pg. 90). Situating the material presence of colonial power in the physical structures of a city disrupts the ‘cultural hegemony of the West’ by revealing it as a destructive imposition of colonial logic onto the built environment rather than an unproblematic unilinear evolution towards modern urban forms (Ahluwalia, 2005, pg. 140). For example, the influence of Islamic culture and architecture in Dakar prior to annexation by the French colonial administration suggests continuity with existing community and household units. Spatial organization continued to be structured around the traditional *penc* (assembly area designated by a single tree), rather than the mosque, despite the centrality of Islam (Depret, 1983, pg. 62). Colonial architecture, however, brutally destroyed or replaced these elements – literally forcing circular forms of habitation into square plots – and demonstrating how the deployment of colonial built form in the physical landscapes of postcolonial cities was not a logical and rational evolution towards a western model of urban modernity but rather the result of domination, destruction and control.

Whether it was for the purpose of resource extraction, exploitation of labour or expropriation of land, the role of these cities was determined by the *metropole* which necessitated the destruction or disruption of pre-existing structures, cultures and rationales. Colonial governments implemented the production of timber, cocoa, rubber, and palm oil on a widespread scale in West Africa, while the settler regimes of Southern and Central Africa exploited mineral resources and agriculture using indigenous labour and indentured workers. The built environment of African cities
not only reveals the socioeconomic and political links between the *metropole* and the colony but also explains the development trajectory of cities. The archival chapters of this research project (Chapters Five, Six and Seven) document the ways in which colonialism determined the development of Dakar based on the motives and needs of the French colonial administration.

The material legacies of colonialism did not end with decolonisation. Although the term 'postcolonial' implies a break from the colonial past, newly independent nations only shifted from a 'position not so much of independence as of being independence' (Young, 2003, pg. 3). As colonialism withdrew its capital, it set up 'around the young state the apparatus of economic pressure' which turned the 'apotheosis of independence' into a 'curse of independence' (Fanon, 1961, pg. 77). Developmental policy has arguably served to 'keep the poor world poor;' rather than contributing to its development (Potter, 2004, pg. 18). The material legacy of (neo)colonialism is visible in the nefarious physical effects of the 1980s SAPs (structural adjustment programmes) in Africa and across the 'global south.' The 'roll out' of neoliberalism led to stagnant economic development which resulted in increasing urban poverty, decaying infrastructure, massive rural to urban exodus, the proliferation of slums, environmental degradation, deepening inequality and worsening violence (UN Population Division, 2002). The mutation of colonial doctrine into development discourse can be read in the built/crumbling environment of many African cities. The physical decay of cities in the wake of ill-fated development programmes was an urbicide\(^{36}\) of sorts and led to a new set of social relations based on the 'proliferation of survival strategies,' social immiserisation, marginalisation and exclusion in African cities (Demissie, 2013, pg. 222). Therefore, postcolonial urban studies document the ways urban inhabitants survive under conditions of 'duress and often state collapse' and traces these practices back to a history of colonialism and its modern-day configurations (Simon, 2015, pg. 218).

Despite the social failures of the SAPs, the mechanism was never completely abandoned and, instead, 'repackaged in a form and manner to make it attractive to stakeholders in development' by addressing the most 'fashionable' issues of the

\(^{36}\) Urbicide: ‘violence against the city’ (Moorcock, 1963)
development agenda of multilateral agencies (Heidhues & Obare, 2011, pg. 61). The enduring power of this discourse is evident in the fervent pursuit of large-scale infrastructural projects in many African cities that uphold the same modernising rhetoric (discussed in Chapter Seven). The 'lost decade of development' (1980s) failed to unlock the 'kingdom of abundance promised by theorists and politicians in the 1950s' (Escobar, 1995, pg. 4). The oft-repeated question ‘why is Africa so poor?’ is answered by international development banks who chalk it up to bad government, corruption, and civil disunity that failed to attract much-needed investment and financing (Ferguson, 2006, pg. 195). Dependency theorists and world system theorists have denounced development theory as a mechanism to 'subordinate, contain and assimilate the Third World as other' (Slater, 1993, pg. 421). Colonialism as development has historically subjugated the built environment of African cities to its needs as the ‘historically informed political and economic values' of the 'global north' on the south to satisfy the 'North’s ends' (Sagoe, 2012).

**Discursivity**

The ‘global north’ contributed to the ‘development of underdevelopment’ both in ways that can be measured and documented (i.e. growth figures, statistics) but also in terms of how the southern world comprehends its own evolution (Conway, 2014, pg. 111). For example, planning education on the African continent is steeped in the western city model and urban planning and policy discourse. Watson and Agbola (2013) have found that the history of planning in Africa is ‘firmly ensconced in the traditions and models of Europe – especially the UK – and the USA’ as the curricula of African planning schools is based largely on the colonial past and ‘promote ideas and policies transferred from the global North.’

Colonialism has contributed to the historical ‘othering’ of African societies which translates into a view of Africa as a ‘residual entity, the study of which does not contribute anything to the knowledge of the world or of the human condition in general’ (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004, pg. 350-1). Colonialism was based on the ‘systematic negation of the other person’ and a ‘furious determination to deny the other person all attributes of humanity’ (Fanon, 1961). The ‘privileged geopolitical identification’ between modernity and the west was circulated through the mechanism of colonialism and established a hegemonic western narrative of ‘modernity’ (Harootunian, 2000, pg. 41). The birth of European ‘modernity’ in the
19th-century afforded Europeans a sense of difference and superiority from other worlds (e.g. Africa), viewing the latter as caught in the ‘immature stages’ of human progress (Power, 2003, pg. 98). The ‘underdeveloped’ world was therefore an ‘incomplete’ or ‘embryonic’ form of western development based on a linear understanding of growth and modernisation (Rostow, 1960; Rist, 2002, pg. 74).

Following decolonisation, colonial rhetoric morphed into the present-day configuration of development discourse. Development emerged as a new hegemony governing the way in which the postcolonial world and former imperial powers understood their position and role in the global hierarchy. The development framework emerged on the global scene in US President Truman’s post-war inaugural speech on January 20th, 1949 in which he proclaimed that it was the ‘responsibility of rich nations to develop poorer countries in their own image’ (Potter, 2014, pg. 18). On that very day, ‘two billion people became underdeveloped’ (Esteva in Sachs, 2001, pg. 7);

‘In a real sense, from that time on, they ceased being what they were, in all their diversity, and were transmogrified into an inverted mirror of others’ reality: a mirror that belittles them and sends them off to the end of queue, a mirror that defines their identity, which is really that of a heterogeneous and diverse majority, simply in the terms of homogenizing and narrow minority’ (Esteva quoted in Sachs, 2001, pg. 7).

The newly designated ‘underdeveloped’ world would unlock development by embracing the ‘mental models of the West (rationalisation), the institutions of the West (the market), the goals of the West (high mass consumption), and the culture of the West (worship of the commodity)’ (Peet & Hartwick, 2009, pg. 85). The modern/traditional binary was understood as a hierarchical relationship in which traditions were ‘destined to die out’ or be ‘bred out’ through policy interventions that would usher modernity (Schech and Haggis, 2000, pg. 18-9). The discursivity of this rhetoric, underpinned by an unassailable reasoning equating ‘western’ with ‘modern,’ has enduring consequences. Southern knowledge – broadly understood as any theory or insight emerging from/on the south (i.e. subaltern, indigenous, etc.), is often dismissed in favour of theory elaborated on/in the ‘global north.’ This trend is evident in the postcolonial masterplans of African cities which still rely on northern models of urban planning despite ample evidence of their profound disconnect from realities on the ground. The planning analysis of Dakar in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven closely examine how this ‘colonisation of minds, heart and
imagininations' has resulted in the continued (and inefficient) emphasis on northern planning models (Matthews, 2017, pg. 2654).

An urban theory of the 'global south' argues that postcolonial cities are rife with possibilities for destabilising 'imperial arrangements' (Jacobs, 1996, pg. 4) and allowing for the reinvention of urban practices, languages, and the (re)discovery of 'multiple memories' (Triulzi, 2006, pg. 79). A postcolonial reading of African cities requires a thorough engagement with the ways in which 'subaltern counter publics' reinvent and disseminate discourses that shape the 'oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs' (Fraser, 1990; Yeoh, 2001, pg. 459). Beyond closely attending to everyday life, subaltern urbanism 'self-consciously avoids' questions of state, capital, and collective action—all of which are 'contaminated already by elitism and grand theory' (Sheppard et al., 2013, pg. 897). The focus is, instead, on the 'encroachments and subversions' of the subaltern as a means of opening up new ways of inhabiting the city that disrupt global urbanism. Postcolonial urban studies fall squarely within Gramsci’s notion of 'subalternity' or the reimagining of the 'margins of society' through resistance, piracy, banditry, informality and 'everyday practices of contesting or by-passing relations of domination and state control' (Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 325).

As a corrective mainstream, southern urbanism can only exist in 'contestatory terms' in the examination of socio-spatial arrangements, and urban infrastructures (Fraser, 1990; Yeoh, 2001, pg. 459). Postcolonial studies have 'borrowed heavily' from western thought – 'Said from Foucault, Spivak from Derrida and Bhabha from Lacan' but has sought to maintain a degree of detachment from these intellectual traditions in order to deconstruct 'Occidental reason' (Mignolo, 2000; Harrison, 2006, pg. 320). The theoretical framework of this thesis does not shy away from harnessing northern theory developed by Eurocentric researchers in order to demonstrate its applicability in the 'global south' and thereby challenge the 'political economy of knowledge' that governs urban theory. The traditional 'political economy of knowledge' is based on a division of labour in which the periphery supplies data and later applies 'knowledge in the form of technology

37 These can be read as an articulation of Hanchard's (1999) concept of ‘afro modernity.’
38 See Plebeian public sphere on pg. 263
and method' while the role of the metropole, in addition to producing data is to 'collate and process data' and produce theory (including methodology) which are 'later exported to the periphery' (Connell, 2014, pg. 211). The thesis therefore proposes a methodology for 'writing the world from the African metropolis,' utilising the African metropole as the base for theory production, using both northern and southern theory in the process. This method of theorising takes it cue from 'intellectuals of colonized societies' who have adapted and critiqued existing work, 'combining this with critique of the conquest and sieving the culture of the colonizers' (Connell, 2014, pg. 212). The aim is not to replace northern theory with southern theory or 'set up artificial binaries between North and South' but to consider how urban ideas and theories originating in one city may inspire the study and analysis of other contexts (Watson, 2016, pg. 38). The task of building urban theory from the south is 'still in its infancy' and southern scholars have made several propositions on how best to tackle the enormity of this challenge (Watson, 2016, pg. 38). A core argument of southern theory isn't necessarily about 'different propositions, but about different knowledge practices' and 'to do, more than anything else, is start learning in new ways, and in new relationships' (Connell, 2014, pg. 219).

Nevertheless, the extent to which postcolonial theory can speak from the margins is undermined by its very 'fixation' on the centre (Sylvester, 2010, pg. 714). Postcolonial identity simultaneously identifies with and rejects the coloniser's culture (Yeoh, 2001, pg. 459) which often limits investigations to questions of how to be 'Western without depending on the West' (or how to use northern theory without positioning the west as the benchmark) (Shils in Vale, 1992, pg. 53). McClintock (1992, pg. 86) argues that postcolonialism is 'haunted by the very figure it seeks to displace' since it continues to 'privilege Europe as the central subject of history by reorienting the world around the single axis of the colonial/postcolonial.' As a result, the issue of 'voice' remains a weakness in postcolonial theory as the focus on refuting the claims of the centre often means that the periphery (subaltern) cannot speak or is 'rarely asked to do so' (Sylvester, 1999, pg. 717). The field is therefore left bereft of subaltern voices even as it pits them against Eurocentric academia.
B. Corrective Mainstream 2: Vitalist ontologies

Vitalist ontologies originate in a post-structural approach to the study of urbanisation which requires the theoretical deconstruction of urban infrastructure. Urbanisation, or the production of a built environment and its concomitant social developments, is a ‘total phenomenon’ (Lefebvre, 1970). Urban infrastructure is therefore comprised of:

‘socio-cultural’ infrastructures - social development investments that forge identity and urban communities and guarantee social reproduction (e.g. education, public spaces, healthcare, libraries, gardens, housings, arts and sports) (Simone & Pieterse, 2017, pg. 128).

‘biophysical’ network infrastructures – highways, roads, transportation networks, ICTs, energy, sanitation, water, food and ecological services are linked to landscape infrastructure and ‘make urban life and movement materially possible’ (Simone & Pieterse, 2017, pg. 128).

This disaggregation demonstrates that infrastructure is arguably always in a state of flux since it amounts to the ‘practice of connecting people and things in socio-material relations that sustain urban life’ and can therefore never be static\(^\text{39}\) (McFarlane & Silver, 2017). Silverman (2014, pg. 789) describes this as a theory of ‘incremental infrastructures’ whereby infrastructure is constantly under adjustment as ‘shifting technological and material configurations’ impact the formation of socio-cultural infrastructures. Infrastructure is ‘open ended’ (Wiig & Silver, 2019), which is why we must look at ‘life between buildings’ (Gehl) in order to gain a better understanding of the ‘contested process of ever-shifting in-the-making, socio-technical relations’ that produce urban form (Wiig & Silver, 2019).

i. Assemblage and fragmentation

McFarlane (2011) proposes a metaphor of ‘assemblage’ to understand the infrastructures of a city as composed of ‘relatively unpredictable but agentive combinations of objects, techniques, practices and human actions.’ A theory of urban assemblage questions how urban things are assembled and ‘how they might be disassembled or reassembled’ (Brenner et al., 2011, pg. 228). For example, in his work on informal settlements in Mumbai, McFarlane (2011)

\(^{39}\) This links back to Appadurai’s (2003) concept of the continuity of temporariness or the notion that the only constant in many cities is the temporary quality of physical and spatial resources (see pg. 59).
disassembles the 'everyday hardships faced by the poor' in order to pay attention to the 'eclectic collection of urban materialities' that constitute the everyday. He examines the tactile infrastructures of corrugated iron, sackcloth, and infrastructures of sanitation, drainage, water and electricity that constitute urban spatiality but also looks at the interactions between urban inhabitants and their physical environment to better understand existing infrastructures and how they constitute a city

Deconstructing infrastructure allows for a 'grounded excavation' of how 'the urban' is hardwired into the infrastructure (Pieterse, 2017, pg. 228). By disassembling what constitutes the urban, we may understand how 'actually existing urban situations' are constituted and begin imagining 'alternatives to those situations' (Brenner et al., 2011, pg. 228). In many cities, for example, the uneven distribution of utility services is best characterised as the presence of 'incomplete archipelagos' of access which become 'material emblems' or 'cultural signifiers' of social citizenship

Exclusion is, therefore, 'hardwired' into the network and inequality is embodied in the 'splintered' infrastructure that makes up urban spatiality (Bakker, 2003, pg. 64). McFarlane (2018, pg. 1008) and Roy (2015) proposes a narrative of 'fragments' to understand the infrastructural environment of the urban poor which is 'deeply fragmented' in a number of ways, from urban services, housing, to political, property and legal rights or employment opportunities. An investigation into the spatial organisation of cities is underpinned by a questioning of the mechanisms that produce spatial inequalities (Badcock, 1984, pg. 55). In sub-Saharan Africa, for example cities that were once spatially divided between African and European zones during colonialism today exist as 'parallel worlds (connected with secret passageways)' between those with access to modern infrastructure and those who continually 'hustle, pilfer and labour to re-secure a measurable access to energy, water and information' (Simone & Pieterse, 2017, pg. 44). The fragmentation of the urban fabric occurs everywhere but is mostly visible in the 'histories of capitalist and social exploitation, oppression and marginalization' of southern cities where urban fragments make up the 'texture and politics of the city' (McFarlane, 2018, pg. 1020). By taking apart infrastructure, right down to the building materials

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40 The tactile infrastructures of Dakar are examined as part of the archival analysis (see pg. 140).
41 See Dakar plateau on pg. 156
that make up the urban landscape, we are able to read power in the built environment and gain a better understanding of the driving forces that guide urbanisation. The concrete of Lagos, for example, defines the aspirations of modernity 'crafted by the ruling elite' of the postcolonial state (Omezi, 2011, pg. 112). Architects, engineers, and planners 'manipulate the city’s material reality' to concretise these dominant aspirations (Minuchin, 2011, pg. 107). As these aspirations are rendered in material form, they are encroached upon by marginal figures in the city who negotiate their 'material insertion into the modern metropolis' (ibid). The planning chapters of this thesis (Chapters Five, Six and Seven) will demonstrate how decrees on building materials, zoning laws, and building permits are mechanisms that explicitly govern the infrastructural development of the city while implicitly fragmenting the urban landscape as an instrument of domination and control.

The examination of infrastructures reveals urbanisation as a complicated process based on complex relationships between class, ethnicity, race, occupation, religion, and generation. Throughout the African continent, infrastructure and networks are consolidated through ‘people’s intentions to do other things’ - make a living; ‘find a space to sleep; get from A to B, and on to Z according to routes and along paths unanticipated by any transport planner’ (Tonkiss, 2014). Conscious and planned design objectives give way to 'innumerable more-or-less conscious designs' that are often improvised, incidental, temporary or permanent, which gives rise to the psychogeographies of cities discussed in Voices II (ibid). These studies reveal processes of 'creative destruction' (i.e. through abandonment, violence, war, etc.) that create both ‘wasteland’ and ‘wealthy enclaves’ as well as displacements and new networks (Mcfarlane & Rutherford, 2008, pg. 349). For example, traffic congestion itself becomes a 'slow-moving market space' as hawkers offer motorists plastic packets of water, roasted peanuts, fake designer watches and sunglasses, and mobile phone top-up cards (Gandy, 2005, pg. 41). Physical infrastructures – social and spatial – are conduits through which the urban poor exercise their agency. Issues of governance are located in the assemblages of both non-human and human actants and articulated through infrastructure, agency and social justice.
Deconstructing urban development reveals colonially inherited or borrowed frameworks which emphasize the inappropriateness of northern theories and policies in southern contexts. A hegemonic understanding of modernity has resulted in structural transformations based on a ‘global city’ narrative which, in many cases, has resulted in the disruption of ‘networks of survival and dependence’ (Harrison, 2006, pg. 330). The infrastructure of many African cities reveals a contest between two rationalities – the western and formal rhetoric from ‘above’ vs. the informal survival strategies from ‘below.’ An example from Kinshasa demonstrates what happens when these rationalities come head to head. The creation of the Cité du Fleuve, a new development planned by international design companies, led to serious consequences for the urban poor (Watson, 2013, pg. 222). The ‘promotional narratives’ display an ‘iconic’ landscape of skyscrapers and ‘ultra-modern’ airports, trade centres, office blocks and commercial centres (ibid). The reality, however, is that Kinshasa is a post-conflict city that bears the scars of war and is home to about nine million people, the majority of whom live in conditions of poverty and informality (De Boeck & Plissart, 2012). Under the guise of ‘modernising’ Kinshasa, the project converted boulevards to an eight-lane highway, ousting street children and small informal traders and destroying the rice-producing areas and their economic networks (Watson, 2013, pg. 228). In so doing, they undermined the socio-cultural infrastructures of the ‘unaccounted for’ – the unemployed, impoverished and marginalised (Simone, 2018, pg. 31). In its disruption of existing infrastructures and ‘segregationist model,’ the Cité du Fleuve redefines ‘what is centre and what is edge in Kinshasa’ which has profound consequences for those located in the margins42 (De Boeck, 2011, pg. 277).

Similarly, the masterplan of Abuja, elaborated with the help of American and Japanese architects and planners, is based on a ‘borrowed’ understanding of what a modern city should look like and a lifestyle based on the modernist Eurocentric ideal (Watson, 2014, pg. 100). The draconian manoeuvres of this plan resulted in the eviction of approximately 800,000 people by 2006 from areas that were ‘zoned’ in the masterplan to allow for the ‘beautification of the city, privatisation and cleaning up criminals’ (COHRE, 2006; Watson, pg. 100). Similarly, the ‘Chinese-built ghost towns’ of Luanda, comprised of tower blocks apartments selling at 150,000–200,000 USD,
fragment the infrastructural landscape of the city since they are implanted in a context where most Angolans survive on less than 2 USD a day. These examples illustrate the ways in which ‘biophysical infrastructures’ based on hegemonic state narratives dictate infrastructural transformation and undermine and destroy the ‘socio-cultural infrastructures’ of the urban fabric. The imperatives of speculation and capital flow unravel the ‘long-honed practices of inhabitation’ and force urban residents to ‘reassemble’ according to new ‘forms of obligation and control’\textsuperscript{43} (Simone, 2018, pg. 27). Put simply,

‘...architects and planners often do not recognize that the people whose concerns they are seeking to address have very complicated aspirational maps\textsuperscript{44}, in which spatial issues play a part. The issue is not to cut straight through to get the quickest road from the designer’s head or mandate or professional context to delivering the house, the road, the shopping mall, the train station, but to figure out where those elements actually might fit more fruitfully into strengthening what I call ‘the capacity to aspire’ (Appadurai, 2003, pg. 52).

Consequently, the analysis uses (dis)assemblage theory to correct the ‘silences of urban historiography’ (Roy, 2011, pg. 230) by recognizing infrastructures of survival and ‘spaces of poverty’ and putting them back on the map (Derickson, 2015, pg. 652). Assemblage theory is therefore harnessed as a tool to engage with ‘rationalities and practices’ that emerge as the subaltern finds ways to survive in ‘circumstances of marginality and domination’ (Harrison, 2006, pg. 325). Corrective mainstream 2 uses the metaphor of the ‘city as assemblage’ (Jacobs, 2012, pg. 416) but also adopts a relational mode of theorisation that moves beyond the understanding of ‘cities-as-territory’ or the concept of cities as bounded spatial entities in order to consider the circulation of urban mobilities. ‘Assemblage’ proposes an ‘alternative ontology for the city’ which emphasizes how ‘assemblages are being made and unmade at particular sites of practices’ (Farias, 2009; Jacobs, 2012, pg. 416). The jargon of assemblage and fragmentation emphasizes the notion that infrastructure is constantly in flux, not just a ‘context or a noun, but a verb’ and a ‘connective tissue, often unpredictable, anchoring urban life’ (McFarlane & Silver, 2017). The planning chapters of this analysis (Chapters Five, Six and Seven) involve the dissection of masterplans as a way of disassembling the built environment and analysing each

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item See example of SICAP housing in Dakar on pg. 187
\item See Voices: Psychogeographies and ‘cityness’ on pg. 49
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successive layer in the urban development of Dakar. In so doing, we identify when and where the biophysical and socio-cultural infrastructures come into contest.

ii. An African perspective on planetary urbanisation

African urbanisation is often framed in terms of the 'alarming,' 'relentless,' and 'unprecedented' rate of population growth. The assertion that Africa has crossed the urban threshold is the 'most quoted, but therefore also among the most banal, formulations in contemporary urban studies' (Brenner & Schmid, 2015, pg. 156). Urban growth projections and population estimates suggest that Africa and Asia are urbanising faster than any other region in the world, becoming 56 and 64 per cent urban by 2050 (World Urbanisation Prospects, 2018). Approximately 90 per cent of the increase anticipated in the urban population of the world (2.5 billion people by 2050) will take place in Asia and Africa. India, Nigeria and China are projected to account for 35% of the anticipated growth of the world's urban population between 2018 and 2050 (World Urbanisation Prospects, 2018).

Despite the 'colonial inclination' to restrict the growth of secondary cities, the most rapid urbanisation taking place on the African continent is driven by secondary and smaller cities while growth is slowing in primate cities (Myers, 2011, pg. 53). Urbanisation across the continent is most rapid in the urban-rural, 'peri urban' interface zones, which are a continuum of rural areas, villages, towns and cities of less than 500,000 inhabitants (McGregor et al., 2006). This trend has created an interesting dichotomy between a 'metropolisation from above' (i.e. urbanisation driven by major cities) and 'urbanisation from below' (Africapolis, 2011). Today's African cities are 'loose agglomerations of quasi-autonomous socio-spatial entities,' each evolving 'independently' of the other but connected through networks of exchange (Jihad & Jacques, 2012, pg. 93). This means that centre and periphery, city or village, urban or rural are 'states of mind' rather than objective designations of space in the 'postcolony,' which necessitates an imaginative retheorisation (De Boeck in Ed. Okwui, 2011, pg. 265). Consequently, the differences between 'formal and informal, autoconstructed and state sponsored, government-led or market-led suburbanisations are often pronounced' but are linked by a common denominator – they are part of 'extended urbanisation in the age of complete urbanisation' (Keil, 2018, pg. 501-2). Spivak (2003, pg. 72) suggests that a planetary outlook offers an alternative to 'reductive comparisons' by moving away from the
‘grip of algorithmic or computational logic’ of conventional urban theory (Jazeel, 2018, pg. 8).

Planetary urbanisation originates in the work of Lefebvre (1970) and proposes a new way of looking at how urbanisation occurs, arbitrates and transforms everyday life. Whether this happens in densely populated centres or more dispersed locations, urbanity is defined by the 'struggles' regarding the form and content of ‘the urban’ itself (Brenner & Schmid, 2015, pg. 171). Thus, the urban cannot be equated with 'any singular, bounded spatial unit (city, agglomeration, metropolitan region or otherwise)' or confined to any ‘territorial contours’45 (Brenner & Schmid, 2015, pg. 166), and mainstream urban theory must abandon the ‘fetishism of an ill-conceived notion of the city’ (Goonewardena, 2018, pg. 457). Planetary urbanisation proposes a 'new politics of the city,' as the urban becomes an arena for an ‘epic struggle (or many struggles over the future of human life on earth’ – a struggle of planetary proportions (Keil, 2018, pg. 10).

Planetary urbanisation is a trope that sees the whole 'rather than the differently sized illuminated dots on the dark background of the satellite-generated image,' as urban agglomerations and rural hinterlands are perceived as relational and 'co-constitutional' (Shaw, 2015, pg. 589). This framework illuminates the 'intimate, wide-ranging and dynamically evolving connections' of city-building processes and the transformations of non-urban landscapes (Brenner & Schmid, 2015, pg. 156). This is not to say that the 'rural' has disappeared, but rather to emphasize the fact that the use of ‘generic labels’ often presupposes patterns and pathways of development that limit the possibility of context specific and reflexive investigations (Brenner & Schmid, 2015, pg. 174-5). Geographical approaches to the study of urban life, for example, often limit their scope to the boundaries of neighbourhoods but acknowledge that activities and networks are 'not confined to this urban space' and extend to other parts of the city, rural areas, and even 'across the nation’s borders and even the global world"46 (Koning, Van Dijk & Foeken, 2001, pg. 4). Boundaries are often only necessary in the definition or delimitation of a case or field site when it is necessary to create artificial delimitations and dichotomies. However, these

45 Planetary urbanisation challenges Wirth’s (1938) and Mumford’s (1937) definitions of a city (see discussion on pg.81).
46 See example of Chinese supermarket on pg. 218-224, and Mourides on pg. 258-259
borders need not rely on a ‘simple counterposition to the outside’ and are formed by their link to the ‘outside’ which is consequently part of what ‘constitutes the place’ (Massey, 1994, pg. 8).

Schindler (2017, pg. 50) argues that planetary urbanisation will likely recreate the same theoretical marginalisation of southern cities as ‘ordinary cities’ in the south will never be the ‘primary reference points upon which its epistemological scaffolding will rest.’ However, planetary urbanisation does not presuppose the existence of ‘dense agglomerations everywhere’ but instead acknowledges that to a degree we haven’t seen before, ‘no one is outside the scope of the urban’ (Soja & Kanai, 2007, pg. 62). When Lefebvre describes the ‘urban problematique’ as global, he is not making a ‘claim about the totalisation of any particular urban form’ but instead saying that ‘what becomes planetary is the urban as a question, as a theoretical framework, as a conceptual object of struggle’ (Madden, 2011, pg. 781). The problems of the ‘modern city’ are therefore envisioned as ‘worldwide problems’ (Lefebvre, 2009, pg. 282). Furthermore, planetary urbanisation is particularly well suited for understanding ‘dispersion, not agglomeration’ which has typified urban growth in African cities (Parnell & Pieterse, 2016, pg. 236). The ‘boundaries’ of many African cities are constantly being pushed further out, suggesting that neatly drawn delimitations and city limits represented in maps and plans never exist(ed) in the imaginaries of those living within or beyond the perceived city limits (e.g. urbanites living 30 km out of Kinshasa still consider themselves Kinois). In the context of this research project, the contention that future inhabitants of Diamniadio, a satellite city located 37 km from Dakar will call themselves ‘Dakarois’ is not very far-fetched. Furthermore, the growth and expansion of the urban agglomeration of Dakar, which contains rural and non-urbanised zones, suggests that there is a pressing need to move beyond conventional dichotomies and definitions of what constitutes the ‘urban’ in the making of ‘endless cities’ (Burdett et al., 2011). The difference between urban and rural spaces seems ‘less relevant’ today to the extent that ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ are not useful distinctions for societies characterised by ‘high levels of geographic and social mobility’ (Hubbard, 2018, pg. 2). African urbanisation therefore defies boundaries and arguably falls squarely within the scope of a theory of planetary urbanisation.

47 See map of urban zones of Dakar on pg. 207
Planetary urbanisation is a polarising debate but provides an important framework because it reframes the urban question - 'do we really know, today, where the 'urban' begins and ends, or what its most essential features are, socially, spatially or otherwise?' (Brenner et al., 2011, pg. 226). Roy (2016) and Sheppard et al., (2013) argue that the urban 'should not be taken as an absolute' and instead defined through 'central and peripheral processes of interacting urbanisms' as a way of thinking beyond the city centre 'towards the periphery, from the core to the suburbs of urban society' (Keil, 2018, pg. 505). To respond to this criticism, it is perhaps helpful to speak of planetary urbanisation in terms of mondialisation. While the English word 'globalisation' implies that the 'distinctiveness of the world is drowned by something becoming ubiquitous,' mondialisation suggests the emergence of a world that is 'open-ended and creative' (Madden, 2011, pg. 775). Planetary urbanisation does not function as a teleology in which the centre takes precedence over the periphery in a totalising outcome, and instead sheds light on a 'discontinuous history rather than the growth of a stable and scalable object' with an end state (Madden, 2011, pg. 780). This is further emphasised by the point that, according to Lefebvre, the city as a ‘historical form (and concrete object of study) disappears as the urban evolves’ (Brenner, 2014; Brenner and Schmid, 2014; Keil, 2018, pg. 501).

The theoretical framework uses the language of ‘planetary urbanisation’ which has the explicit aim of dismantling space-based dichotomies and engaging with a mode of theorisation that is freed from a ‘topographical conceptualization of the city’ (Smith & Doel, 2011; Jacobs, 2012). Amin and Thrift (2002, page) argue that '[w]e can no longer even agree on what counts as a city' for ‘[t]he city is everywhere and in every thing,’ which casts urbanism as ‘something far more dissipated and emergent’ (Jacobs, 2012, pg. 413). For example, the common perception of Africa as a ‘rural continent’ has tinged development cooperation throughout the 21st century and been the basis of development aid and cooperation, largely ‘ignoring the urban realities of the continent’ (Forster and Ammann, 2018). Furthermore, this trend is perpetuated by postcolonial governments that previously and continue to support strategies to reduce rural-urban migration. This 'clear-cut binary distinction' between the rural and urban is ‘utterly impossible' as the latter are linked in 'manifold ways' (Forster and Ammann, 2018). Planetary urbanisation forces us to move beyond traditional definitions and dichotomies in urban theory in order to
engage with 'dynamic topologies and deep relationalities: the worlding of cities, the production and politics of space, and exurbanity and extraterritoriality' (Roy, 2016, pg.821).

iii. Grey spaces

Often, infrastructure in the ‘global south’ evolves in unforeseen ways as the city is reimagined by unplanned and ‘illegal’ neighbourhoods, incoming migrants and informal economies that are ‘forever contentious’ in the political struggle for societal transformation (Yiftachel, 2009, pg. 249-250). Across the African continent, urban spaces are characterised simultaneously by ‘regularity and provisionality’ (Simone, 2004, pg. 408). Often, much of what takes place in African cities is ‘fairly invisible’; for example, the number of people residing in a compound, the provenance of household incomes, or how electricity is available for more households than there are official connections (Simone, 2004, pg. 426). An African city exists ‘beyond its architecture,’ characterised as much by what is hidden as what is seen48 (De Boeck & Plissart, 2014, pg. 233).

Demographic trends on the African continent have intensified the pursuit of basic needs for housing, sanitation, or transport and are likely to govern city agendas in the near future. Southern contexts are often characterised by inequality, informality, and ‘grubby governance,’ which make the guiding imperatives of physical growth and transformation difficult to manage and comprehend (Parnell, 2014, pg. 431). The ‘informal’ does not conform to planning regulations and continues to grow, becoming an important part of the ‘new urban order’ (Avni & Yiftachel, 2014, pg. 487). The spread of informality, or ‘grey spacing,’ has blurred the dichotomies between formal and informal, legality and illegality, permanent and temporary and survival and entrepreneurship. This new ‘mode of urbanism’ (Al Sayyad, 2004) is located somewhere between the ‘lightness’ of legality/approval, and the ‘darkness’ of eviction/destruction/death (Avni & Yiftachel, 2014, pg. 488). Infrastructure in Africa and across the south can no longer be seen through the prism of false dichotomies as the reigning order has given rise to ‘new forms of resistance, creative self-planning and democratisation ‘from below’” (Avni & Yiftachel, 2014, pg. 501). The development of the continent has demonstrated how infrastructures that

48 See discussion on data deficiencies on pg. 35
are rationalised as ‘progressive, beneficial, and humane’ are revealed as ‘powerful, controlling, and often (if not always) detrimental’ (Peet & Hartwick, 2009, pg. 142). Grey spacing refers explicitly to what happens to infrastructure when the subaltern disengages from the state and creates an alternative vision of civil society through an ‘indigenisation’ of and ‘familiarisation’ with the ‘cracks’ in the workings of power (Yiftachel, 2009, pg. 249; Bayat, 2007; Perera, 2002, 2009; Yiftachel, 2009, pg. 249-250).

Informality poses a new and considerable challenge to city planning, but the preferred state response to this phenomenon is a lack of planning or policy or a policy of ‘ignore and neglect’ (Avni and Yiftachel, 2014, pg. 496). The stages of urban policy with regards to the informal are;

1. ‘ignore – turning a blind eye;
2. neglect – intentional denial and under-development;
3. limit – institutional and at times violent control and containment;

The prevalence of ‘grey spaces’ has meant that postcolonial African nations are viewed as the ‘shadowland of other societies,’ the late arrivals to Eurocentric modernity (Chakrabarty, 2000). The shadow metaphor reiterates the notion that the modernity and development of the ‘global north’ is only conceived in opposition to the ‘underdevelopment’ of the south because a ‘shadow, after all, is not a copy but an attached twin’ (Ferguson, 2006, pg. 17). Ferguson (2006) identifies the ‘presence of a variety of shadows’ in academic work pertaining to the ‘dark continent.’ Globalisation theorists have ‘shadowy metaphors of their own when it comes to Africa.’ The continent reveals the ‘dark side’ (Stiglitz, 2002) or ‘Satanic geographies’ (Smith, 1997) of globalisation, the ‘black hole of the informational economy’ (Castells, 1996) (Ferguson, 2006, pg. 15; McFarlane & Rutherford, 2008, pg. 341). Its ‘shadow economy’ is governed by a ‘shadow state’ (Reno, 1999) that develops ‘shadow networks’ (Duffield, 2002) across the continent (McFarlane & Rutherford, 2008, pg. 341). Africa is the ‘uncanny dark double’ of the west (Ferguson, 2006, pg. 16). As Mbembe (2006, pg. 1-3) puts it;

49 See autogestion on pg. 92
'Africa as an idea, a concept, has historically served, and continues to serve, as a polemical argument for the West's desperate desire to assert its difference from the rest of the world.' 'Africa' in this sense has served as a metaphor of absence—a 'dark continent' against which the lightness and whiteness of 'Western civilization' can be pictured.

Neither in the shadow nor in the light, African cities are thus made and remade as urban dwellers find their own vernaculars, not just as consumers or victims of modernity but as active agents in the advent of 'real collective change' (Simone, 2006, pg. 325). African urbanites have reaffirmed their right to the city by operating outside the scope of conventionally accepted forms of urbanity in the 'grey spaces' of liminality. In this analysis, 'cityness' is the tool that is used to capture these processes of systematic change that transform the urban fabric. Specifically, the empirical chapters will demonstrate how the process of 'grey spacing' in the case study city is a fundamental component of urban development despite its absence from the masterplans.

C. Corrective Mainstream 3: Everyday urbanism

'To be able to make something out of being a city resident, for many [Africans] today, means you have to find ways to NOT consolidate, to not defend, to not have your secure little niche, which you hold onto. It means taking the chances to move through the city, ... to deal with walks of life that are unfamiliar to you, because, within those kinds of unexpected or unanticipated chances, some new opportunity and possibility might ensue.'

Abdoumaliq Simone at Radio Netherlands Worldwide (2007)

People as infrastructure

Simone (2014, pg. 322) argues that urban politics and public policy neglect a key component of contemporary urban life in Africa and the south - the ability of the poorest urban residents to 'exceed sheer survival.' By deploying the 'little money that is left over after making ends meet,' they can engage in various experiments and opportunities to improve their lives (ibid). Urbanites embody 'hybridised' identities to move through the city and create 'complex combinations of objects, spaces, persons, and practices' in the making of socio-cultural infrastructures (Simone, 2004, pg. 407). The oft-cited example of children and youth who loiter at bus stations, traffic intersections, and markets to 'beg, shine shoes, sell cigarettes and food items, wash cars or steer customers to transport' is an example of how the intended use of
certain spaces is reconfigured to fit the needs of the 'users' (urban dwellers) (Falola & Salm, 2005, pg. 14).

Simone (2004, pg. 407–408) has documented the ways in which urban dwellers 'become [emphasis added] an infrastructure, a platform providing for and reproducing life in the city.' The work conducted by Simone reveals economies of 'piracy' in the conversion of underground parking garages into new mega-churches, hotel kitchens as day-care centres, living rooms as hair salons and 'even indoor swimming pools as butcheries' (Simone, 2006, pg. 362). Borrowing from Levi-Strauss (1962, pg. 17), the analysis argues that urbanites of African cities are the 'bricoleurs' of a 'new urban sociality' (Simone, 2010, pg. 314-16);

‘...adept at performing a large number of diverse tasks; but, unlike the engineer, he[sic] does not subordinate each of them to the availability of raw materials and tools conceived and procured for the purpose of the project. His universe of instruments is closed and the rules of his game are always to make do with 'whatever is at hand', that is to say with a set of tools and materials which is always finite and is also heterogeneous because what it contains bears no relation to the current project, or indeed to any particular project, but is the contingent result of all the occasions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with the remains of previous constructions or destructions.'

The 'bricoleur' is a metaphor explaining how survival in many African cities is based on the ability to improvise as urbanites ‘turn themselves into logistical instruments’ (Simone, 2018, pg. 24). For example, a transport depot in Abidjan is full of young men who simultaneously ‘function as steerers, baggage loaders, ticket salespersons, hawkers, drivers, petrol pumpers, and mechanics' (Simone, 2004, pg. 410). The ability to inhabit different roles, shift connections and collaborate to maximise efficiency despite the lack of 'explicit rules or formal means of payment' is based entirely on the capacity to improvise50 (Simone, 2004, pg. 410). While 'civil inattention' and the 'blasé outlook' dictates the politics of urban life51 in cities of the 'global north,' Simone's (2008) description of urban life suggests a state of hyper awareness in African cities as urban inhabitants are acutely attuned to one another

50 See ‘urban knowledge’ on pg. 45
51 The tendency for people to ‘rapidly scan each other to gain some categorical knowledge before turning their glance away for fear of invading their privacy' maintains 'civil order' and helps the citizen 'cope with the sheer number of strangers that are routinely encountered on the city's streets' (Lofland, 1998; Hubbard, 2017, pg. 20).
and people *become* infrastructure in the elaboration of networks, politics of mobility and the strategic positioning of bodies (Hubbard, 2017, pg. 19). This hyper awareness is evidenced in the fact that many urban dwellers base their livelihoods on the ‘tensions between the temporary and the permanent’ in the constant search for information regarding the ‘social forces at play in their environment’ (Appadurai, 2003, pg. 51). Everyone’s life is ‘so implicated in the lives of others that any gesture takes on an incalculable number of meanings as arrangements are momentarily put together by diverse residents trying to figure each other out and live together’ (Simone, 2008, pg. 80). By stitching ‘lacks and losses together,’ urban dwellers are generating ‘realignments and opening up alternatives’ through new kinds of ‘creativity with (spatial and temporal) beginnings, and therefore with new forms of interactivity’ (De Boeck, 2015, pg. 10). Thus, the bricoleurs may be framed as the ‘authentic builders of African cities, as part of a process of development from below’ (Freund, 2007, pg. 155). Rather than encroach upon and harm the development of the city and its economy, the urban poor, who often constitute the majority, are ‘actually building it up’ as they perform important activities and services in the city, generate employment opportunities, and carve out spaces for political representation (Freund, 2007, pg. 155).

An example emerging from Kenya, Ghana and South Africa, demonstrates how self-taught young people have independently engaged in ‘all manner of ICT-related services’ including hardware repair and maintenance, database management, mobile application development, call centres, business process outsourcing (BPO) (Ismail, 2016, pg. 44). These tech-savvy urban bricoleurs acquired the necessary skills outside of formal training and education, learning from peers and self-study on the Internet. Harnessing technological advancements and breakthroughs, these young people were able to meet their own needs for employment and income. The ‘preference’ for self-employment fits within a larger neoliberal framework in which workers opt out of formal employment to gain more independence and pursue versatile opportunities. Nollywood, another youth-owned industry in Nigeria, has arguably emerged from this ‘entrepreneurial will to overcome considerable obstacles,’ including inept governance, corruption, crime and lack of basic infrastructures such as electricity and roads (Foroohar, 2014). Without formal training, young Nollywood creatives have learned the trade of filmmaking through observation, ‘pre-existing talents and sheer adventure,’ enjoying continued success across the continent and the African diaspora (Ismail, 2016, pg. 46). Similarly, in
Sierra Leone as in much of West Africa, urban bricoleurs have joined the okada (motorcycle taxis) business which employs nearly 300,000 people as bike riders and 50,000 indirectly as mechanics, bike-owners, park attendants, food vendors, etc. Bike riders learn the trade 'on the streets' through observation and peer learning and meet an 'unmet demand' for transport in cities with few roads, too many cars and constant traffic congestion (ibid). In these examples, urban inhabitants become the infrastructure that is lacking in the urban context, compensating for state failure and legacies of poverty through improvisation, trial and risk-taking. Therefore, informality is often the key means by which urbanites are able to counter the 'erosion of urban public services,' affecting primarily those citizens who already struggle with fragile and temporary infrastructure in their neighbourhoods (Fredericks, 2014, pg. 536). Through the medium of music (e.g. Afrobeats), film (Nollywood), violence and gang affiliations (e.g. 'Area boys'), and loitering in public spaces, urban Africans are negotiating new spaces within the city for social and political assertion and shaping an emerging 'cityness.'

Simone & Pieterse (2017, pg. 63) argue that the 'inordinate skills of survival' demonstrated by urban inhabitants in light of the 'exigencies of urban remaking,' have opened up the possibility of radically new cities. In pursuing their own strategies, urbanites are 'responding to necessity' but also 'remodelling their own destinies' and finding new ways of making a living and reshaping the political and socioeconomic structures around them (Tripp, 1997, pg. 161). 'Cityness' demonstrates how 'micro infrastructures and minimal gestures' take on 'substantial powers' in the everyday (Simone & Pieterse, 2017, pg. 74). The intention is not to glorify the tenacity of the poor and ignore their struggle but to acknowledge the ways in which they 'recreate hope in places that have been written off by civic and government authorities' (Seabrook, 1996, pg. 10). A research agenda concerned with 'people as infrastructure' must investigate the ingenious survival strategies of the poor without depoliticising the debate on poverty by 'failing to question its causes' (Ferguson, 2006). In his analysis of Lagos, for example, Koolhaas (2007) focuses on the resourcefulness of the urban poor and slum dwellers but has come under fire for his overreliance on the neoliberal discourse of self-help and entrepreneurship that indirectly justifies the 'abandonment of these populations by public authorities' (Choplin, 2012, pg. 3). Emphasising the 'ingenuity' and 'resilience' of the poor may depoliticise the debate on poverty and inequality when it fails to question and understand its causes (Ferguson, 2006). There is a need for
studies that hold in tension micro processes of survival habits of urban dwellers with an understanding of *longue-durée* macro trends of economic growth and restructuring\(^{52}\).

**Conclusion**

The theoretical framework outlined in this chapter originates in a new research agenda on the 'global south' that embraces urban geography's spirit of 'radical openness as method' (Wolch, 2003). It relates directly to the rhetoric discussed in Voices I: Decolonising the curriculum, which calls for a theoretical decolonisation of urban theory and an emphasis on existing and emerging knowledge from the 'global south.' Often, the rhetoric of 'urban triumphalism' that prioritises the link between urbanisation and economic growth moves away from the central concern of urban studies - 'social justice and the city' (Goonewardena, 2018, pg. 458). Referring to the five-point manifesto outlined earlier, this chapter has engaged with definitions, thresholds and theories to recast 'the urban' in a manner relevant to the scope and aims of this research project. Southern cities, African in particular, are interpellated outside the scope of mainstream urban theory. In their perceived divergence, cities of the 'south' are recast as examples of Gramsci’s ‘future city’ and Simone’s (2004) 'city yet to come' in light of their ‘insurgent citizenships’ (Brown, 2015) and new forms of 'politically being-in-the-world' (Chatterjee, 2004; Choplin & Ciavolella, 2018, pg. 315). This analysis ponders how the subaltern of southern cities become *cittadini*, not solely in the sense of ‘becoming urban’ or 'belonging to the *citizenry (cives)*' with political and judicial rights but rather in the ways that they become political actors in transforming their society (Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 317).

With the goal of theory-building in mind, we move towards an understanding of ‘the urban’ as a shifting language of rights (Bayart, 1997). The 'right to the city' is invoked when urban inhabitants decide to 'reclaim space in the city, when they assert use value over exchange value, encounter over consumption, interaction over segregation, free activity and play over work' and appropriate spaces, as they develop the ability to 'manage the city for themselves' (Purcell, 2013, pg. 152). In the

\(^{52}\) The archival analysis of this thesis investigates the *longue-durée* processes and their impact on micro/survival strategies of local inhabitants (see chapters 5, 6, & 7).
absence of 'open political revolution,' the *citadini* shape their urban existence through everyday acts of resistance that circumvent power (Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 327). Each time a social group refuses to accept its conditions of 'existence, of life, of survival,' and endeavours to understand and master its own conditions, *autogestion* [self-management] is occurring (Lefebvre, 2009, pg. 135). *Autogestion*, understood here as 'people as infrastructure,' entails the appropriation of 'grey spaces,' abandoned by the state and reclaimed by the subaltern (Gramsci in Valentino Gerratana, 1975). The critical dimensions of this discussion turn the perceived stigma of marginality and informality into a 'claim, a right, or a call for justice' (Benit-Gbaffou, 2016, pg. 286). Therefore, being an urban citizen or 'citadini' is no longer dependent on the 'recognition of legal status' by the state but is manifested in the role of the subaltern who produce the 'future city' (Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 317). In the process, we begin to see glimpses of the urban – not yet in its 'mature form' but in a state of 'dispersed and alienated actuality' (Lefebvre, 1996, pg. 148). The task of the urban scholar of the 'global south' is to identify the emergence of the urban as it develops and materialises around us (Purcell, 2013, pg. 151).
Voices: Feminism and Flânerie

Historically, various forms of ‘white, bourgeois heterosexual masculinity’ have structured the ways in which the discipline of geography ‘claims to know space, place and landscape’ (Rose, 1993, pg. 137). The Chicago School has relegated urban ethnography almost exclusively to the realm of men as women are ‘either repressed’ or viewed as ‘disobedient marginal presences’ in the street (Parsons, 2000, pg. 2). Thus, the street has arguably ‘never belonged’ to women who shy away from the ‘dark, derelict urban environs’ that bear the dangers of sexual harassment and assault (Preston & Ustundag, 2007, pg. 221). The female flâneur—the ‘flaneuse’—can therefore never exist as her preoccupation with safety means she cannot ‘drift’ with male insouciance.

The early iterations of this research project proposed flânerie as a key research method for understanding the case study city. While the method was revised, the act of walking and observing remains a key methodological tool in this project (but has abandoned the ‘aimlessness’ of the traditional dérive). Walking is a research tool that is not just ‘parallel to thinking and writing’ but extends into ‘thinking and writing in terms of aesthetic engagement with its spatial, situational surroundings’ (Parsons, 2000, pg. 72). Therefore, in writing the story of the city, the reader becomes a ‘page of it himself [sic]’ (Sow, 1983, pg. 45). Walking through the city allows for the observation of people, interactions and contexts, as a ‘way of reading the city, its population, its spatial configurations whilst also a way of reading and producing texts’ (Jenks & Neves, 2000, pg. 1). It involves paying attention to detail, built form, and human interaction to reveal what lies beneath the surface and ‘beyond the particular’ (Frisby, 1985, pg. 221). Consequently, this analysis argues that flânerie is, in fact, perfectly aligned with the principles of feminist research in the reflexivity of walking that casts the flâneur(euse) as a ‘producer of a city’ through the ‘interplay of self/city identity’ (Parsons, 2000, pg. 1).

While this research project is not explicitly situated within the scope of feminist scholarship, it draws from the latter when examining relations of power and issues of reflexivity and voice. At one end of the spectrum, ‘masculinist geographers’ lay

53 Park addresses himself explicitly to ‘gentlemen’ when laying out his theory of urban ethnography.
claim to an 'omniscient view, a transparent city, total knowledge' while, at the other end, feminist geographers challenge this 'omniscient vision and its exclusions' (Rose, 1993). The broader framework of this analysis considers the ways in which scholarly practices and disciplines are inherently 'inscribed in relations of power' and questions the power relations that this monograph 'counter[s], resist[s] or even perhaps implicitly support[s]' (Mohanty, 2007, pg. 334). This gives rise to questions concerning who has the right to represent urban lives and how to do so without flattening out their complexity. Initially, the research design featured interviews as a key method for understanding the lived experience of cities. However, following preliminary fieldwork, it became apparent that there was a risk of replicating the shortcomings of subaltern and postcolonial urbanism on the issue of 'voice'54. Feminist, subaltern and postcolonial critique advise us to tread carefully when representing people's lives and experiences, particularly the lives of those who have historically been marginalised or maligned in academic disciplines. The decision to minimise the importance of interviews in this analysis was a strategic move to avoid the objectification of participants. Instead, the researcher is cast as a research subject and fieldnotes are treated as raw data as the city is (re)produced through her positionality as an African urbanite and a Francophone postcolonial subject. Through the act of walking and observing, these elements become an integral part of the data collection process in the task of addressing and redressing the failings of traditional urban theory.

54 See discussion on 'voice' on pg. 74-75
Chapter Four: Operationalising the research agenda

The methodology of this research project aims to i) destabilise the hegemonic narrative of urban theory; and ii) place ‘cityness’ at the heart of an urban investigation in the process of operationalising an urban theory of the ‘global south.’ The theoretical framework has directly influenced the development of the methodology to suit the aims of a retroductive analysis. The case study method allows for an engagement with the minutiae of data while providing a segue way into broader discussions on key themes pertaining to urban spatiality. In the context of the case study city, the methodology is divided between a planning analysis of Dakar based on the masterplans for urban development and a field-based analysis of spaces in the city.

To begin, the chapter re-examines the research questions in order to explain how the methodology was developed using a retroductive approach. To do this, the chapter discusses the elaboration of methodology in the context of highly mobile, versatile, and dynamic urban environments. The next section addresses the specific components of the case study, detailing the specific parameters of the research interventions. The case study city – Dakar, Senegal – is introduced in this section to lay the groundwork for the empirical chapters (Chapters Five, Six, Seven, and Eight). The following segment details the methodological tools employed during each phase of research including qualitative techniques, field sites, and data analysis techniques. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the trials and tribulations of fieldwork and the reflexive work that is required in the analysis of ‘cityness.’

Re: Research Questions

While this research project espouses elements of the inductive case, it is a retroductive case study that ‘speaks back’ to theory in the process of answering the research questions.

RQ1. How does an urban theory of the ‘global south’ address the gaps in urban theory and planning (in Africa)?

RQ2. How can we operationalise a research agenda structured around ‘cityness’ to inform an urban theory of the ‘global south’?

RQ3. How does the selected methodology contribute to our understanding of ‘cityness’ (in Africa)?
RQ1 is based on the premise that urban theory and planning are poorly equipped to study urbanism of southern cities. The analysis therefore speaks directly to existing theory in order to identify the gaps that are postulated by the research question. The case study method is the most strategic tool in the process of theory building, falsifying in the development of countering theoretical propositions. The case study method builds in-depth knowledge of a particular ‘case,’ while retaining a real-world perspective on the subject matter. According to Yin (2014, pg. 17), the case study method:

1. 'copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points;
2. relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion;
3. benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.'

The four main applications of the case study method are to i) explain links in 'real-world interventions that are too complex for survey or experimental methods,' ii) describe the real-world context of an intervention, iii) illuminate topics through descriptive evaluation, and iv) 'enlighten those situations in which the intervention being evaluated has no clear, single set of outcomes' (Yin, 2014, pg. 19).

The inductive case has the explicit goal of answering 'how' and 'why' questions in under-researched areas. Induction begins with the observation of empirical examples to make general statements and formulate hypotheses. The inductive case allows theories and generalizable statements to emerge throughout the research process. These cases are often ‘non-linear, with theoretical construction, data-gathering and analysis carried out simultaneously’ (Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 51). In the ‘global south,’ the inductive case is often used to enhance practical knowledge and address issues relating to urban governance such as concerns with the impact of structural adjustment in the urban domain, the links between formal and informal economies, land reform and tenure, or spatial planning and infrastructure. The deductive case usually begins with an ‘established theoretical premise’ in the form of a hypothesis supported by empirical examples to validate the existence of the

55 The retroductive case relies on a priori knowledge before undertaking the research process.
theory (Lauria and Wagner, 2006, pg. 365). Observations determine how variables contained within a theory ‘manifest (or not) in the case,’ and test the ‘predictive or explanatory power of the theory, substantiate or disprove a hypothesis, or assess whether the theory is or is not accurate in explaining the observed outcomes’ (e.g. urbanisation without growth) (Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 62).

The methodology of this research project proposes to answer RQ2 through a retroductive case study that challenges existing theory and develops concepts for evaluating and adapting theory to the subject matter under scrutiny. A retroductive case differs from an inductive case in its effort to ‘speak back’ to theory and assess the initial theoretical framework of the case. To do this, the methodology proposes an examination of macro-trends and policies through planning analysis and an understanding of micro-trends through field-based analysis that describes how statist agendas and blueprint planning are ‘received and negotiated by urban inhabitants’ (Duminy, 2014, pg. 9). Therefore, the retroductive case provides a much needed ‘reality check’ for urban theory by trying to understand ‘what is, rather than constantly striving for what should be’ (Odendaal, 2011, pg. 174). For example, Jenkins et al. (2002, pg. 116) conducted a retroductive case study on the impacts of globalisation in Luanda, as an ‘extreme case of peripheralization,’ noting how external forces have continually shaped the city. Their aim was to add to critical thinking and develop theories on alternative responses to globalisation leading to the conclusion that ‘what is developing on the ground in the face of global peripheralization can be the basis for more proactive agency rather than reactive acceptance of the dominant structural situation.’ Similarly, Harrison’s (2006, pg. 319) characterization of Johannesburg as a ‘prism through which to look at cities and at planning’ presents an ‘other way’ of thinking as the retroductive case takes on the task of critiquing and evaluating the relevance of urban theory from the north in a southern context. The goal of the retroductive case study then is to: i) cast a critical eye at ‘mainstream' theory and ii) to use the case as a vehicle for theory building.

Throughout the retroductive research process, the researcher moves between knowledge and ‘observable events,’ recognising that knowledge ‘cannot be reduced to observable events’ (Meyer & Lunnay, 2012, pg. 3). The retroductive case requires ‘a priori knowledge’ to begin questioning and clarifying the basic prerequisites or ‘conditions’ for a priori assumptions or theoretical frameworks (Meyer & Lunnay, 2012, pg. 3). Where the inductive approaches are concerned with moving from
the particular to the general, retroduction involves moving from a 'conception of some phenomenon of interest to a conception of a different kind of thing (power, mechanism) that could have generated the given phenomenon' (Lawson, 1997, pg. 236). Therefore, retroduction means 'moving backwards' and asking, 'what must be true in order to make this event possible?' (Easton, 2010, pg. 123).

The analysis addresses RQ3 by evaluating whether the methodology has succeeded in fulfilling the aims of the retroductive study. These are defined as i) 'conceptual or analytical modification (that is, improving how we understand an issue or approach its analysis)', and ii) enhancing knowledge and methodologies for project design and implementation (Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 57). The evaluation process of the methodology considers the strengths and weaknesses of the methods and the challenges of conducting this type of analysis in the 'global south.'

A key strength of the case study is that it is not limited by epistemological or theoretical orientations. Furthermore, case studies can be adapted to the dynamic, informal, and often transient nature of phenomena in cities of the south. The case study can be focused on what Flyvberg (2011) terms 'developmental factors' or changes over time that are interlinked and related. The malleability of case studies makes them a useful tool for developing southern theory. The use of qualitative case studies in the study of urban theory and planning allows for engaged and context-specific grounded research that is suited to 'promoting a collaborative and activist agenda amongst planning educators and students' (Peattie, 1994). Furthermore, a case study approach allows for the examination of the 'asymmetry between verifiability and falsifiability' in order to evaluate and assess universal statements (Popper, 2005, pg. 19). Case study research can be used to call into question the generalisability of northern theory while also generating contextualised knowledge. The analysis will consider whether the method operationalised in this research agenda succeeds in producing contextualised knowledge of power relations, daily practices and planning processes in the examination of 'cityness.'
Through the case study, the analysis will determine whether the methodology provides a vantage point for examining ‘phronetic insights’ and context-specific knowledge as a means of rectifying methodological and theoretical oversights (Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 11). The analysis will demonstrate how this method allows for a degree of manoeuvre that opens the possibility for tapping into knowledge that may be gleaned over conventional methods (i.e. statistics, surveys, etc.). Since planners and policymakers often rely largely on quantitative datasets to design and enact policy, they continually make assumptions on the beliefs, value systems, and rationalities of ‘those for (or with) whom they plan’ (Watson, 2003, pg. 404). This often results in a disconnect between the needs of the urban majority and the policy framework that guides the development planning of their cities in a ‘one size fits all’ approach to urbanisation. In the African context, the case study approach will demonstrate how the ‘periphery’ can be ‘productively brought back into our considerations of urban life’ (Simone, 2010, pg. 14). The premise is that theory and ‘conceptualisation’ can begin from any city but must also acknowledge the ‘locatedness of all theoretical endeavours’ (Robinson et al. 2006, pg. 25).

Increasingly, African cities are offered up as valid empirical examples based on which to develop theory since trends unfolding on the continent help inform changes taking place in other regions of the world (Mbembe and Nuttall, 2008; Pieterse, 2008; Watson, 2009; Robinson, 2006). The challenge for urban studies is no longer simply ‘paying more theoretical attention to the marginalized informal, invisible, spectral, necropolitan or ordinary settings’, but more so in dealing with issues of praxis in the articulation of how urbanisation processes might improve the lives of inhabitants of these cities (Myers, 2011, pg. 14).

Nevertheless, case study research is often subject to ‘methodological misunderstandings’ that undermine its credibility as a source of knowledge (Flyvberg, 2006). The viability of a case study as a research tool depends on the proper and thorough delineation of methods (i.e. interview, participant observation, etc.) and the honing of research aims and questions of the project. There are also many logistical considerations that can impede the research process such as access

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56 Phronetic insights are similar to Mignolo’s (2000) ‘locus of enunciation’ which is the concept of theorising from where one’s theoretical/geographical situatedness (e.g. casting a gaze from the ‘global south’/‘seeing from the south’)

57 See discussion on selection of Dakar on pg. 102-105

58 See tenets of an urban theory of the ‘global south’ on pg. 64
to research sites and respondents, language barriers, and financing of the project. Another common problem surrounding the case study method is centred on the topic of generalisability since the data collected cannot always be extended to larger or similar contexts. The case, however, is not always intended as a 'sample' for extrapolating statistical generalities representative of a wider population. Case studies may be used as a tool for testing the generalisability of theories rather than presupposing their relevance to the phenomena *a priori* (Lipset et al., 1956, pg. 419-20). Hence, the 'good case' produces knowledge about the 'causes, modalities or outcomes of a real-world problem' and theorises beyond the 'immediate boundaries of the case' (Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 27). The methodology of this research project is designed to arrive at an understanding of urban spatiality in the 'global south' through the prism of 'cityness.' While generalisability is not intended as a research outcome, the methodology has been designed in order to identify what Healey (2012) refers to as 'contingent universals.' The goal of this exercise is to identify the contexts in which theories originate and then to critically evaluate the 'extent to which these assumptions may hold elsewhere' (Watson, 2014, pg. 105).

**Designing the case**

The methodology of this research project consists of a case study and three research interventions (Figure 4). This project uses a qualitative approach to examine structural change through an examination of urban planning and fieldwork and observations. The methodology of this research project has been designed around two key aims;

1. an analysis of the urban evolution of the case study city based on planning documents and narratives; methodology includes archival research, analysis of master plans, renders and policy literature (Chapters Five, Six, and Seven)

2. a field-based analysis of (two) spaces and socio-spatial infrastructures to inform an understanding of 'cityness'; methodology will rely primarily on observation, photography and unstructured interviews (Chapter Eight).

The sequencing of the analysis was designed deliberately to tackle the field-based examination of the city with a priori knowledge obtained through archival work. The

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59 Chapter 8 relays the findings from fieldwork and observations and makes broader linkages to theorise beyond the case study.
groundwork conducted through the archival work was crucial for identifying the 'contingent universals' of the field sites. The research design uses two units of analysis (in Chapter Eight) adapted from critical and paradigmatic case studies. The critical case is selected for its particular or even unique 'strategic importance' regarding the 'general problem' it seeks to investigate (Flyvbjerg, 2001, pg. 78). For example, a hypothesis suggesting that informal urban settlements are characterised by 'social disorganisation' can be challenged by the observation that 'social organisation is indeed present in a particularly poor settlement that is generally recognised as a most likely site of disorganisation' (Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 30).

Paradigmatic cases are more representative and have 'metaphorical and prototypical value' and provide a generally accessible 'metaphor' for comprehending the complex 'intersection of discourse, action and context in society' (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 30). For example, Robert Park's 'laboratory method' metaphor for urban research views the city as a 'social laboratory,' or 'clinic in which human nature and social processes might be conveniently studied' (Bulmer, 1984, pg. 92). The critical and paradigmatic cases are utilised as entry points for researching the city but are not presumed to be the only spaces that define urban spatiality in the case study city.

The methodology of this research project has been designed to allow for an understanding of the various components that define and explain 'cityness' in a city.
of the 'global south' without falling into the epistemic trap of definitions and binaries that limit the scope of urban research. The selection of methods speaks directly to the fact that methodological choices ‘frame what it is possible to see’ and the multiplicity of actors and processes involved in the production of urban spatialities means that ‘methodological choices matter greatly’ (Robinson in Campkin & Duijzings, 2016, pg. 24). The methodology of this project was conceived within the limits of a doctoral dissertation, which has guided and constrained the selection of methods, cases and field sites resulting from a combination of scope, practicality and logistics. To focus the project without losing theoretical rigour, the parameters of this case have been repeatedly reviewed and revised.

The case study city: Dakar, Senegal

Based on their work in Kinshasa, De Boeck and Plissart (2004, pg. 8) concluded that cities of the ‘global south’ resist 'objectification, colonisation, synthesis and summary,' making it near impossible to elaborate a generalising or omniscient view of life in the city of Dakar. The primary aim of this project is figuring out how to arrive at an understanding of ‘cityness’ through the examination of planning documents and urban spaces. Thus, this project does not have ‘exclusive relevance to Africa or the global South' but can apply equally to the analysis and study of northern cities, given its emphasis on method and the study of processes deployed in space (rather than on the particularities of the spaces themselves) (Peattie, 1994; Duminy et al., pg. 2).

The selection of Dakar as the case study city was influenced by practical and theory-based considerations. In terms of the practicalities of undertaking fieldwork, Dakar was a strategic choice for a number of reasons. Visa-free travel, familiarity with the official local language (French) and the fact that city was the former capital of the Afrique Occidentale Francaise (French West Africa) and the locus and exemplar of

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60 Although French is the official language of Senegal, Wolof is the most widely spoken language in the city of Dakar. Referring to Senegal as a ‘French-speaking’ country is perhaps misrepresenting the language politics in the country since only a minority – ‘speaks French with any fluency’ (O’Brien, 2008, pg. 5). The Dakarois are a mixture of the Wolof, Peul, Diora, Mandinka, Soninke, Lebou and Serer ethnolinguistic groups. Senegal’s urban population accounts for 44 per cent of the total population (World Bank Databank, 2018).
urban development in West Africa, were all factors influencing the choice of Dakar. Additionally, a previous visit to the city in 2012 revealed the surprising similarities between Dakar and Rabat in terms of both the built environment, historical and contemporary spatial segregation and day-to-day activities unfolding in the city. Having been previously unaware of, and unfamiliar with, the strong links between the two cities, this was an opportunity to develop a deeper understanding of the mechanisms responsible for the parallel trajectories of these two cities. Additionally, Dakar is the locus of economic development, democratisation, innovation, and ethnic heterogeneity in Senegal. Economic analyses of Senegal suggest that the city plays a vital role in gauging the entire country's economic performance and the effectiveness of its poverty reduction programmes since it occupies a pivotal role in the country's trade sector, nationally and internationally (Mboup et al., 2015, pg. 4). Recently, the city has become a site for real estate speculation and a 'laboratory' for urban planning and governance which allows for an understanding of a 'new global assemblage of urban governance' (Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 324).

The theoretical framework of this thesis guided the selection of Dakar by responding to Robinson's (2002) proposition that African cities may be used as 'starting points' or prototypes for understanding 'an emerging, global form or urbanity' (Robinson, 2002, pg. 8). Mainstream urban theory has been developed based on the example of a few 'great cities' such as New York, Paris and Los Angeles, all of which are located in the 'global north' (Roy, 2016, pg. 820). This trend is replicated in the 'global south' with a similar set of 'great' cities that act as key sites for theoretical production. Cities such as Johannesburg, New Delhi and Jakarta are often focal points for urban research since they are aligned with a 'world economy of knowledge' shaped by colonialism and 'current north-south global inequalities' which often means that cities like Dakar are overlooked (Connell, 2014, pg. 210). Within the 'world economy of knowledge,' research conducted on African cities is often limited by the perception that it 'does not contribute anything to the knowledge of the world' (Mbembe in Goldstone & Obarrio, 2017, pg. 11). Analyses of African urbanisation

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61 It may also be argued that the political economy results in an emphasis on topics pertinent to the north that become focal points for southern research as well. For example, ecological urbanism constitutes an area that garners considerable attention and, from the standpoint of development work, is also used to label southern urban development as deviant.
often focus on deviant/extreme examples in comparative approaches that pit the southern examples against the model of the north. The value of published work on urban Africa is lessened by its perceived limitations relative to the broader field of urban theory and geography. Furthermore, the 'relevance reflex' that governs existing research limits the choice of field sites but also the range and scope of phenomena under scrutiny. The analysis therefore tests the effectiveness of African cities as 'worlding nodes' that foster planetary linkages within global regimes (Roy, 2014, pg. 17).

The choice of Dakar is a deliberate one for the purpose of producing a 'new set of concepts in the crucible of a new repertoire of cities' (Roy, 2016, pg. 820). Dakar is neither a mega city nor a post-apartheid city, both of which have been studied as glaring examples of the dysfunctional urbanisation of African cities. The choice of Dakar as the case study city for this research project is to demonstrate that an African city, which is neither a deviant nor extreme example of southern urbanisation, can act as a valid empirical prototype for the development of theory. By focusing on Dakar, the analysis investigates the ways in which a city may be connected to larger global networks that transcend the advanced business and producer services of the 'global cities' rhetoric. Yiftachel (2016), for example, engaged with a 'different epistemology of learning about South(east) cities' by focusing on Jerusalem which is not a 'universal model' for southern cities but acts as a 'window' to examine the relational nature of urban forces, the rise of new categories and concepts, and the transformations which they bring about over time' (Watson, 2016, pg. 37). The selection of cities like Dakar or Jerusalem falls within the scope of Robinson's 'ordinary cities' and 'cosmopolitan comparativism' that places 'all cities within the same analytical field' and interprets the differences between cities as 'diversity rather than exemplars of a hierarchical division' (Schuermans, 2006). The fundamental premise of this study is that the analysis may be undertaken in any city as the research questions and methodology

Nevertheless, it is important to note that although Dakar and Jerusalem are not megacities, they are capital and primate cities and therefore retain an important role in the global hierarchy of cities. A truly radical approach would be to examine small southern provincial cities and consider their relevance as starting points for theoretical elaboration. Within the context of this doctoral project, however, the selection of a smaller case study city was constrained by the lack of historical data and weak secondary sources on smaller African cities.

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are designed to investigate the emblematic characteristics of the case city and ponder how these inform a broader urban theory of the 'global south.'

The administrative region of Dakar is divided into four départements:

- Dakar (city)
- Guédiwaye
- Pikine
- Rufisque

The urban agglomeration of Dakar covers an area of 550 km² with a population of approximately 3.3 million inhabitants. Guédiwaye and Rufisque are the most recent peri-urban incorporations of Dakar region and are also made up of smaller administrative units (Diop, 2012, pg. 32). The region of Dakar includes two rural communities: Sangalkam and Yene. The commune of Dakar (city) is divided into four arrondissements which are subdivided into nineteen communes d’arrondissement (Figure 5 & 6).

Senegal is marked by a strong incidence of single-city dominance, or primacy, with the largest city (Dakar) accounting for approximately half of the total urban population. The rate of urbanisation in Senegal has previously been overestimated by UN population figures, owing perhaps to varying definitions of the urban threshold (Potts, 2012). According to Potts (2012, pg. 1), urbanisation rates were revised down from 48 to 43 per cent for the period of 2001 to 2010. Between 1960 and 1976, the population growth rate in Dakar was 5.1%, falling to 3.9% between 1976 and 1988. Within 20 years, the population of Dakar nearly doubled, from 1,609,820 in 1990 to over 2.5 million in 2007 (Diop, 2012). This rapid growth rate is partly due to rural-urban migration which continues as Dakar attract migrants from the country’s hinterlands and to the continued expansion of the city’s borders. Overall, the urban population appears to be increasing steadily year after year, with a 3.6 per cent urban

63 Sangalkam is made up of: Sangalkam, Tivaouane Peulh, Niaga, Niacoulrap, Ngalap, Kounoune, Keur Daouda SARR, Keur Ndiaye, LO, Ndiakhirate Digue, Bambilor, Deni Guedj, Ndiakhirate Ndiobène, Gorom 1, Deni Biram Ndao Nord, Deni biram Ndao Sud, Gorom 2, Gorom 3, Wayambame, Mbeuth, Kagnack, Keur Abidou, Niaga Peul, Nguindof, Ndiougouye.

64 Yene is made up of 10 villages: Yène, Yène Guedj, Kelle, Yène Kao, Nditakh, Niangal, Niaye Khaye, Ndoukhoura Ouolof, Yène Todd, Toubab Dialao.
growth rate in 2012, 3.7 per cent in 2014 and 3.6 per cent in 2016 (World Bank Databank, 2018).

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Figure 5: Administrative division of the département of Dakar
Methodology

i. the archives

• **Sources:** Archives National du Senegal; Gallica; Archives National d’Outre Mer; Bibliothèque Nationale de France (Pinet-Laprade (1862); Hoyez (1938); Lambert, Gutton & Lopez (1946); Ecochard (1967); PDU Horizon 2025 (2001); PDU Horizon 2035 (2015))

• **Field site(s):** Dakar Plateau, Dakar Ville, Medina, Village de Segregation

• **Conceptual framework:** Watson (2014); Melly (2013); Project for Urban Master Plan of Dakar and Neighbouring Area for 2035 (2016); DeBoeck & Plissart (2011); Ndiaye (2015)
Archival research involves reading archival documents in a ‘disciplined fashion’ to gain insights, ‘make discoveries and generate informed judgments about the character of historical events and processes’ (Ventresca & Mohr, 2001, pg. 16). This method involves rigorous note-taking and ‘coding’ using a software (Nvivo) to allow for the assessment of relevant variables that are ‘implicitly embedded’ within the source material (Ventresca & Mohr, 2001, pg. 16). Colonial archives, in particular, require a constant awareness of the power politics at work in historical records. The narratives examined through archival research are shaped primarily by the documentary history of the ‘powerful’ (colonisers) but also, to a lesser extent, by the ‘powerless’ (colonised) whose actions and/or transgressions were shaped by the laws and systems imposed by imperial forces (Shaw, 2006, pg. 32).

Archival research is subject to a number of limitations. Firstly, archives are fragmented, in terms of chronology and ‘coverage’ (Mills, 2013, pg. 703). The survival of some records in state repositories as opposed to others is a direct testament to their perceived ‘use value (like the records of land ownership)’ or suggests they are ‘too banal to threaten or incriminate’ (Stoler, 2007, pg. 317). Thus, even when complete, an archival account is only one version of the past as issues of power and representation are vital to the re-construction of archives (Mills, 2013, pg. 703).

Secondly, in the study of African colonial archives, Hobsbawm (1983, pg. 262) claims that the archival researcher is entrusted with ‘a double task’ of i) liberating themselves from the ‘illusion’ that the African ‘custom’ recorded by colonial officials and anthropologists is a sort of ‘guide to the African past’ and ii) acknowledging that ‘invented traditions of all kinds’ are important in the process of constructing ‘better-founded accounts’ of the colonial history of Africa. Thus, in the process of engaging with colonial archives, subaltern studies suggest that historical records must be read ‘against the grain’ according to or even ‘along’ it while also paying attention to the ‘unexplored fault lines, ragged edges, and unremarked disruptions to the seamless and smooth surface of colonialism’s archival genres’ (Stoler, 2007, pg. 314). The goal is not to arrive at an ‘authentic’ understanding of African urbanisation, devoid of colonial intrusion, but rather to engage with the ways in which colonialism, and its guiding narratives, influenced the development of cities.

65 See example of permis d’habiter on pg. 143
66 See example of neo-Sudanese architecture on pg. 240
The archival research of this study reads 'against the grain' to account for the blatantly racist overtones of the documents and uses them to trace the rationale guiding the elaboration of urban plans. The narratives constructed through archival research are indicative of the power hierarchy in a colonial society which ultimately shapes the socio-spatiality of the city.

As historical documents, archives 'wield power over the shape and direction of historical scholarship, collective memory, and national identity'\(^{67}\) (Schwartz & Cook, 2002, pg. 2). Archival records are neither 'innocent or transparent' and the very circumstances surrounding their production should 'give pause for reflection' (Ventresca & Mohr, 2001, 2001, pg. 4). In a very real way, archival records pertaining to the planning of Dakar still affect the direction of planning today. For example, the 2001 masterplan (Plan Directeur Urbain Horizon 2025) utilises the masterplan of 1946 (*Plan Directeur de la Presqu‘île du Cap Vert*) to design the current and future masterplans of Dakar. In turn, the 1946 masterplan is based on and updated from the 1938 Hoyez masterplan of Dakar which is itself based on the previous colonial masterplans from the 19\(^{th}\) century. Remembering (or re-creating) the past through historical research in archival records does not only require the 'retrieval of stored information' but also involves the 'putting together of a claim about past states of affairs' (Halbwachs, 1992, pg. 43).

The archival research for this empirical case was conducted over the course of six months and involved the consultation of archives from different sources. Archives of Francophone West Africa (*Afrique Occidentale Francaise*), and digital archives were accessed through the *Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer* (ANOM) (online), Gallica (online), *Bibliotheque Nationale de France* (online). Fieldwork in Dakar involved two trips and repeated visits to the *Archives National du Senegal* (ANS) during which archival documents relevant to this research project were consulted (daily visits limited to 5 record consultations a day). The project has also benefitted from the continued help of a contact in the ANS (Mohamadou Djiby Diallo, *archiviste à la Direction des Archives du Sénégal*) who assisted in accessing missing documentation. Where official translations do not exist, the archival work included in this analysis is translated by the author.

\(^{67}\) See Rahnema’s ‘internalisation’ of colonisation on pg. 65
The archival work was used to trace the lineage of urban development in Dakar, beginning with the establishment of French rule in Dakar, the colonial construction of the segregated ‘African’ spaces (e.g. Médina) and culminating in ongoing infrastructural projects such as Diamniadio (satellite city 30 km from Dakar). Data collection for this case is conducted primarily through archival and document analysis to yield an appropriate understanding of the evolution of urban planning and infrastructure. Melly (2013) provides an excellent example of how the trajectory of an urban space can be mapped out and situated within a historical perspective in such a way that sheds light on the narratives underpinning urban planning;

‘During colonialism, this section of the city was known as Dakar-ville or simply la ville and was home to the city’s European population and évoluté (evolved) Africans given the status of French citizens. As an experiment in assimilationist rule, Dakar-ville was strictly segregated from the so-called ‘African’ quarters, called Médina, on the city’s periphery, which supplied labour to the European district. In contrast to the unpaved roads and ostensibly impermanent housing of Médina (see Ndione and Soumaré 1982; Betts 1971), Dakar-ville was distinguished by its grand boulevards, cafés, government buildings, tidy shops and multi-storey residences (Whittlesey 1948). After independence, Dakar-ville was renamed Plateau, and, as the heart of the now post-colonial capital city, it was rapidly transformed by the construction of new government ministry buildings, monuments and museums, all of which were intended to make materially present President Léopold Sédar Senghor’s visions of Négritude and post-colonial nationalism. Plateau also contained some of the city’s liveliest commercial spaces, including Marché Sandaga, a thriving market known initially for its textiles and produce that grew quickly both in terms of the area it encompassed and the products it offered’ (Melly, 2013, pg. 392-3).

The archival and planning analysis is divided into three chapters that recreate a timeline of Dakar’s urban development (Figure 8). Chapter Five covers the period between 1857 through to the 1920s, during an era of colonial ‘assimilation,’ a cornerstone of French colonialism. Chapter Six covers the period between the 1930s through to the 1980s and 1990s, which includes post-independence urban planning following Senegal’s independence in 1960. In the build-up to decolonisation, the colonial administration rationalised the urban planning of the city according to the doctrine of ‘association’ (between native and European cultures). The analysis will demonstrate that planning was, in fact, more closely aligned to modernising ideals that reflect a hierarchical understanding of colonised and colonial societies. The
final planning chapter (Chapter Seven) looks at postcolonial planning and the emerging role of international players in the urban development of 21st century Dakar. It includes an in-depth analysis of the satellite city project currently underway in Dakar known as Diamniadio Lake City.
Timeline of masterplans (Author's own figure)

1857 Annexation of Ndakarou

1862: *Plan Directeur d'Urbanisme* (Pinet-Laprade)

1866: Port de Dakar inaugurated

1885: Dakar-Saint Louis Railway launched

1902: Dakar named capital of AOF

1902: *Plan Directeur d'Urbanisme* (Hoyez)

1914: Medina established

1946: *Plan Directeur de la presqu'île du Cap Vert* (Lambert, Gutton, etc.)

1960: Senegal gains independence

1967: *Plan Directeur du Cap Vert* (Ecochard)

1967: *Plan Directeur d'Urbanisme* de Dakar et ses environs Horizon 2035 (Republic of Senegal & JICA)

2001: *Plan Directeur d'Urbanisme Horizon 2025* (Republic of Senegal & JICA)

2013: Decentralization Act

2014: Plan Senegal Emergent

2015: *Plan Directeur d'Urbanisme de Dakar et ses environs Horizon 2035* (Republic of Senegal & JICA)


**ii. the field**

*Paradigmatic case analysis*

- **Unit of analysis**: Place Kermel
- **Conceptual framework**: Bigon, Beeckmans & Sinou (2016); Wright (1991); Bigon & Katz (2017); Betts (1961)

*Critical case analysis*

- **Unit of analysis**: Marché Sandaga
- **Conceptual framework**: Scheld (2007); Simone (2004, 2010); Ralph (2008); Ismail (2009)

Figure 9: Field research

The units of analysis for this research project are strategically selected urban spaces in the city that function as the loci for observation (Figure 9). The process involves an 'immersion' of the researcher into the everyday routines and rhythms of the spaces under observation in order to experience the ‘whole range of relationships and emotional states that such a process must inevitably involve’ (Cook & Crang, 2007, pg. 37). Documenting observations involves 'trying to describe things in breadth (e.g. to make sense of an event, and everything and everyone apparently involved in it, from beginning to end)' and trying to pay attention ‘what seems most important' based on the discursive work of the research project (Cook & Crang, 2007, pg. 55). Photographs and field notes are useful tools for documenting the infrastructural developments and 'comings and goings' in the urban spaces under observation.

The study of public spaces requires a certain degree of self-awareness since these places are guided by social norms or ‘assumptions of expected behaviour’ (Andranovich & Riposa, pg. 78). Structured interviews have taken a backseat in this research project since the extended analysis of archival work and observational research would curtail the analysis of multiple perspectives with an adequate level of detail, thereby perpetuating the trend of silencing the oft-ignored urban subaltern. Scoping interviews revealed that any attempt to give ‘voice’ to the research subjects within the framework of this monograph would likely undermine

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68 Fieldwork allows for a first-hand experience of the psychogeographies of the case study city.
the theoretical premise of the project itself (as discussed in Voices III: Feminism and Flânerie). Rather than perpetuate a scholarly trend of objectifying and essentialising the lives of people under scrutiny, interviews were given less prominence and the researcher’s own experience of ‘cityness’ was included in the data collection process. The research project, however, underlines the importance of interviews and life stories for understanding ‘cityness’ as a lived experience and opens up avenues for further research. As noted by Brenner et al. (1985, pg. 2): ‘if you want to know something about people’s activities, the best way of finding out is to ask them’ through the ‘everyday activity of talk’ which allows for ‘opinions, networks of relationships and ideas to be presented and qualified’ (Hoggart et al., 2002, pg. 203). Consequently, first-hand experiences of the city, recorded in daily field notes, were given more prominence as valid experiences of the city. The focus is shifted to an examination of the spaces in which people live but also the ways in which they live through the scope of Soja’s trialectic of space69 (based on Lefebvre, 1996). Observing everyday life as it unfolds in these spaces allows for the mapping of ‘socially significant patterns’ (Hoggart et al., 2002, pg. 282). Unplanned day-to-day interactions during fieldwork – documented in field notes - are incorporated in the analysis when relevant to the research topic. Whether in the form of formal interviews or unstructured interactions, it is important to bear in mind that there is always a ‘gap between lived experience and communication’ which Giddens (1987) has labelled the ‘double hermeneutic’ of social science based on which research is ‘visualised as an interpretation of interpretation of lived reality’70 (Hoggart et al., 2002, pg. 210).

Data collection in these carefully selected field sites enables the analysis of several interrelated themes and topics within the scope of the research project. This portion of the research was conducted in two stages. Each stage focuses on one of the urban spaces, utilising primary and secondary resources to arrive at the bigger picture of urbanisation on a city-wide scale. The research project looks at both the ‘skyline and the sidewalk’ –macro (i.e. monuments, highways, etc.) and micro (sidewalks, street corners, etc.) elements of the field sites are examined and

69 See example of vendors in Kermel on pg. 230
70 The author’s positionality and ‘urban knowledge’ (Mbembe, 1997) shape the interpretation of ‘cityness.'
situated within local, national, and global trends to form an understanding of urban spatiality (Gandy in Campkin & Duijzings, pg. 32).

Urban 'spatiality' refers to the 'assemblage, juxtaposition, mobility, separation' and the 'pure physicality' of the built environment that shapes urban processes and forms (Robinson, 2011, pg. 91). Researching spatiality therefore requires teasing out space/society linkages which involves:

1. an examination of the 'social practices of everyday life';
2. an analysis of how these spaces have been shaped by and shape urbanity (Castells, 1996).

The study and observation of these spaces is guided by Lefebvre's threefold conceptualisation of socio-spatial relations, as operationalised by Soja (1996) in a trialectic of space:71

1. *Espace percu* (perceived space) – Spatial practices are social processes which produce spatiality through individual routines (e.g. shopping) which culminate in the systematic creation of zones and regions that are 'concretised over time in the built environment and landscape' (Urry, 2006, pg. 25).

2. *Espace concu* (conceived space) – Representations of space are the spaces of imagination represented in the visions of designers, planners, artists and architects (for example, in maps, designs, paintings) and can become real geographies through spatial practices (such as commodification) (Mansvelt, 2005, pg. 57).

3. *Espace vecu* (lived space) – Spaces of representation exist at the intersection between spatial practices and representations of space. These include 'collective fantasies around space, the resistance to the dominant practices and resulting forms of individual and collective aggression' (Urry, 2006, pg. 25). They open up possibilities for resistance as an imagined space in which oppositional socio-spatial relations and space 'might be overcome and disrupted' (Mansvelt, 2005, pg. 57).

The analysis utilises larger themes drawn from the units of analysis to broaden the scope of urban spatiality as advocated by Robinson (2002) who views African cities

71 See example of Sandaga trialectic of space on pg. 266
as the 'starting points, prototype for an emerging, global form or urbanity' (Robinson, 2002, pg. 8). For example, *Marché Sandaga* provides a segue way into a discussion of informality since it acts as the ‘gateway to the country’s informal economy, a place where urban residents of various backgrounds barter for textiles, vegetables, or bootlegged DVDs’ (Melly, 2013, pg. 392). It represents an interesting ‘interaction between two logics of structuring space’: the ‘normative logic of the state’ that polices this popular tourist site and seeks to limit informal activity and the ‘so-called informal logic, which is animated by the customary authorities’ (Abdoul, 2002, pg. 357). *Place Kermel*, the paradigmatic case, has strong metaphorical value in the examination of the successive layers of urban planning narratives that shape urbanisation in Dakar. The field site is approached as a ‘microcosm’ depicting many themes including colonial rhetoric, postcolonial nationality, Chinese development intervention, and south-south pan Africanism. This analysis also demonstrates how spaces which are conceived with a specific purpose may be subverted and re-appropriated by urban dwellers.

The aim of arriving at an understanding of cityness as a ‘lived reality’ is fundamental to the project. The magnitude of this task means that this doctoral dissertation lays the groundwork for subsequent research. The thesis is presented as a standalone project, using archival and observational work as the bedrock of analysis. However, the research can also be elaborated to broaden the range of voices contributing to an understanding of ‘cityness.’ An extensive research project ‘à la Simone’ based on the longer-term ethnographic documentation of urban lives is a challenging endeavour given the practical considerations of a doctoral thesis and the routines of training, supervision and participation in a Geography Department in London. Thus, the project is intended as an example of a retroductive approach to the study of ‘cityness’ in the case study city.

### iii. data collection

The data collected for this research project is primarily qualitative, textual (archives, field notes, fieldwork diary, local newspapers, government reports) and visual data (photography). Where available, primary documents including policy reports, planning guides, interviews, and research conducted by local universities in London and Dakar is incorporated to supplement the data.
Visual data in the form of photography, maps and masterplans is an important element throughout this research project. Visual tools and imagery challenge the ‘fantasies of stable places and pure cultures in a world of global flows, dis-location and proliferating hybridity’ (Cook & Crang, 2007, pg. 108). For example, postcards, brochures, city maps, shed light on how urbanity is conveyed through imagery by individuals or organisations who seek to project a narrative on the city and create the ‘conceived space’ of the city\textsuperscript{72}. Urban images, in the form of maps, plans and pictures, are key data elements of this research project and powerful tools in the representation and development of cities. Images ‘depict and interpret urban change’ and have important impacts on-the-ground (Campkin et al., 2016, pg. 148). Maps, masterplans, photographs, ‘renders,’ street art and signage, ‘drive physical changes and are central to perceptions of place’ (ibid).

Maps and plans are not impartial records of the landscape but instead reveal power relations both in what they present and what they ‘subjugate/ignore/downplay’ (Crampton, 2008, pg. 699). Colonial masterplans are tools of ‘power, domination and control’ that enable the colonial administration to assert its dominance over the wild, exotic landscape of the colonial ‘other’ (Dovey, 1999; Njoh, 2016, pg. 4). The urban plans presented in this analysis are not ‘neutral or technical artefacts, but carriers of meaning’ (Beeckmans, 2013, pg. 2). They reveal the physical articulations of power and their imprint on the city. As a tool for development, the masterplan indicates how the growth and development of a city is envisaged and implemented. Masterplans reveal the technical practice of planning as a social practice, as every technical practice is ‘soaked in social determination’ (Baudrillard, 2006, pg. 51).

Maps and plans are therefore examined as a ‘compelling form of storytelling’ that expose the metanarratives embedded within them (Caquard, 2011, pg. 136), revealing the values, beliefs, discourse, attitudes, and institutional frameworks of the time and place in which they are produced (Silva, 2015, pg. 1). The prevailing discourse of the powerful can be understood by ‘reading’ the urban space planned and designed by maps. The subaltern response to this discourse is observed in the

\textsuperscript{72} See Soja’s trialectic of space on pg. 114

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visible in the encroachments that are not rendered in maps but play an equally pivotal role in the physical structure of the city (and the designated spaces of observation). Today, the masterplan is designed and 'legitimised' by planners, consultants, policymakers, international architecture design firms, and ICT consultants using 'standard assessment tools, glossy brochures and impressive presentations' to 'sell' the masterplan to the social and political elites (Datta, 2017, pg. 18). One of the most ‘prolific’ forms of representation in shaping contemporary cities along with masterplans is the ‘render.’ The term describes digital visualisations that have the authority and apparent ‘realism’ to dictate 'city imaging and branding’ by conveying what a city would ‘look and feel like in context'73 (Campkin et al., 2016, pg. 152). The renders of Dakar are analysed in this analysis to understand the future imaginaries of the city that drive the agendas of urban planning.

iv. data analysis

Data analysis of archival research, field notes, observations and primary resources is an integral part of the research process. Kumar (2014) breaks down the process of content analysis in the following stages: 1) identifying central themes; 2) assigning codes to central themes; 3) classifying responses and notes under central themes; 4) integrating themes into the report. As data is collected, transcribed, and coded, the elaboration of problems, hypotheses, and ‘appropriate research strategy’ continues to evolve, driven by the trials and tribulations of field research (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, pg. 151). The collection of data is therefore guided by the progressive analysis of data, which is in turn driven by the ‘clarification of topics for inquiry’ in a feedback process of ‘progressive focusing’ throughout the research process (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, pg. 151).

The data analysis stage requires the coding of raw data using the data analysis software Nvivo which allows for the extrapolation of important themes originating in field notes and observations. In the process of data analysis, the following factors allow for a coherent and navigable overview of the data: chronology aims of the research, research questions, and theoretical framework. The data analysis stage

73 See renders of Diamniadio on pg. 219
requires techniques of data ‘triangulation’ by compiling and comparing data relating to the same phenomenon during ‘different phases of the fieldwork, different points in the temporal cycles occurring in the setting, or the accounts of different participants (including the ethnographer) differentially located in the setting’ (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, pg. 183). The coded data identifies central themes from field notes and day-to-day observations and interactions. The goal of data analysis is to develop a narrative that describes a place, situation, or instance and, in the process, to zoom in on key themes that speak to the epistemic underpinnings of the project (Kuman, 2014, pg. 317).

Conclusion
The research questions and methodology are framed around ‘cityness’ as a means of engaging more thoroughly with southern urban spatiality. ‘Cityness’ is articulated in both the masterplans of a city and on-the-ground where ‘indigenous modernities’ resist, embrace, and reshape planning policy (Robinson, 2003, pg. 1). The methodology of this research project is designed to be applicable to most/any city of the ‘global south,’ since it is a way of studying ‘cityness’ and the urban evolution of southern cities like Dakar. The aim is not on a ‘strict, measured comparison’ of cities, but rather an engagement with themes that hold ‘somewhat constant as they manifest themselves in different ways in this diversity of cities’ (Myers, 2011, pg. 11). The retroductive case posits that African cities can become the theoretical starting points for more general analyses of southern urbanisation. This task is complicated by the fact that across the continent, ‘a new urban infrastructure is being built with the very bodies and life stories of city residents’ and the reality of ‘what kind of city is being put together is not clear’ (Simone, 2004, pg. 68).

When designing the methodology of a research project, one must always make allowances for the ‘messiness of fieldwork’ (Rabinow, 1974). This messiness stems from the need to critically engage with a number of competing positions on the nature of knowledge and its production and acquisition as well as the ‘epistemological positions, in the research sites’ (Naveed et al., 2017, pg. 773). As part of this ongoing process, the researcher must reflect on her presence in the field but also throughout the process of knowledge production. The researcher’s positionality is continually examined throughout the research process, both within
the context of a UK educational institution and during fieldwork in Dakar, Senegal. The task of the researcher is therefore to tackle the messiness of fieldwork rather than avoid it in order to reconcile the tension between local and universal pragmatics and realities. To do so, it was necessary to reconcile the fact that this southern project was conducted in a norther institution and drew from northern sources. The goal, however, was never to repudiate northern theory in favour of southern theory but, in many instances, to demonstrate how northern theory is not only applicable in the south but a worthwhile trope for events unfolding across the world. For example, the use of Lefebvre to gain a better understanding of events taking place in the ‘global south’ is perhaps an odd choice given that Lefebvre did not develop his theories with the ‘global south’ in mind but the analysis will reveals the ways in which his theories are instrumental in illuminating urban phenomena in the ‘global south.’
Voices: Ryszard Kapuscinski

Documenting his experiences as a journalist stationed in Africa during the era of independence and decolonisation, Kapuscinski captures the changing landscapes of newly independent countries. The passage below, from *The Shadow of the Sun: My African Life*, conveys Kapuscinski’s description of Dakar as he travels by train across Senegal. At first glance, Dakar appears as a facsimile of European ideals with architectural and design referents that recall a European city and way of life. However, as the train moves towards the outskirts of the ‘European’ city, the landscape changes dramatically and his description becomes more relational and critical. Kapuscinski captures many of the narratives and imperatives that have guided Dakar’s urbanisation. The description of Dakar as the ‘showcase city’ and the ‘dream city’ speaks to the intention of making Dakar a symbol of the triumph of French imperialism, reserved exclusively for the Europeans. As the train passes through the *bidonvilles*, the passage conveys the fact that the ‘beautiful coastal city’ of Dakar is surrounded by a ‘neighbourhood of squalor,’ pushed to the outskirts of the city, onto the train tracks. The empirical chapters examine the mechanisms that have led to the development of this bifurcated urban landscape and takes apart these narratives to understand the constituent elements of ‘cityness.’

‘At first, the train rolls along the edge of old, colonial Dakar. A beautiful coastal city, pastel-coloured, picturesque, laid out on a promontory amid beaches and terraces, slightly resembling Naples, the residential area of Marseilles, the posh suburbs of Barcelona. Palm trees, gardens, cypresses, bougainvillea. Stepped streets, hedges, lawns, fountains. French boutiques, Italian hotels, Greek restaurants. The train, gathering more and more speed, passes this showcase city, enclave city, dream city, then suddenly, in the space of a second, it grows dark in the compartment, there are loud thudding, crashing sounds outside, and we hear blood-curdling scream...

I can see that the lush, flowering gardens have disappeared, swallowed beneath the ground, and a desert has commenced, but a populated desert, full of shacks and lean-tos, sand upon which sprawls a neighbourhood of squalor, a chaotic and swarming district of slums, one of the typical, depressing bidonvilles that surround most African cities. And in this cramped bidonville, the shanties crowd one another, press together, even climb up one another; the only open space for a market is the train tracks and embankment’ (Kapuscinski, 1998, pg. 271),
Chapter Five: Layers I (1857-1920s)

The ‘Layers’ chapters (Chapters Five, Six, and Seven) lay the groundwork for the field-based analysis which examines spaces within the city in further detail. These chapters are titled ‘layers’ because the structural transformation of Dakar is taken apart and examined, plan by plan, to understand the gradual transformation of the urban fabric. Through the examination of masterplans, the analysis looks at the consecutive implementation of plans (layers), ‘while accepting that each is irreversible’ and can ‘never obliterate those which have preceded them, nor can they be cancelled by those which follow them’ (de Carlo, 1983, pg. 74).

The methodology of the planning chapters is based primarily on archival research conducted in Dakar and supplemented by secondary sources. The planning analysis is conducted in the same vein as the work of Dione (Dakar au fil des plans, 1992) who offers a brief overview of the contours of urban planning in Dakar and Beeckmans (Editing the African City, 2013) who utilises plans to understand the physical evolution of the city. The empirical work of Chapters Five, Six and Seven draws from both Anglophone and Francophone material to broaden the scope of the analysis. The structure of this chapter follows a chronological approach that traces the urban evolution of Dakar, beginning with its pre-colonial origins and culminating in the 21st century renders of the future metropolis. Bigon (2017, 2016), Njoh (2015), and Sinou (1993) have conducted extensive research on the urban development of Dakar and are instrumental to this analysis of masterplans. Additionally, the archival records collected by Jacques Charpy, archivist for the Afrique Occidentale Francaise from 1951 to 1958 and Claude Faure, archivist of the Afrique Occidentale Francaise from 1911-1920, are also crucial to piecing together the planning history of the city. These resources are utilised as tools for understanding the history of planning as well as the modern contours of planning in the city.

Throughout the planning chapters, the theoretical framework of this research project is applied to the empirical findings to identify the lacunas in urban theory and tease out elements of ‘cityness’ through the deconstruction (and reconstruction) of Dakar’s planning history. Specifically, in this chapter, southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) addresses the silences of the past by focusing
on the precolonial history of Dakar and exposing the history of colonial exploitation and expropriation that has guided the development of the city. Vitalist ontologies attends to the infrastructural development of Dakar, factoring in the architecture and building materials that constitute the urban fabric. Everyday urbanism engages with the human impact of colonial urban policies in the progressive socio-spatial segregation of the city and its enduring consequences. The chapter covers the evolution of Dakar from 1857 to the 1920s and begins with a map of the precolonial layer. The map reveals the presence of existing settlements on the Cap Vert peninsula prior to annexation by the French colonial empire. The following layer superimposed on the precolonial fabric is the masterplan designed by Emile Pinet-Laprade, head of the local Corps of Engineers, in 1862. The analysis of this plan demonstrates how French colonial doctrine was articulated through urban planning and the built environment. The following sections examine the extension of the city limits as the colonial administration sought to push the indigenous inhabitants further from the 'European' city designated by the masterplan. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the emerging duality of Dakar, marked by the spatial segregation of Africans and Europeans.
Figure 10: Carte de la presqu’île et du port de Dakar (Bry, 1800s; Gallica)
Ndakarou

The age of planned urbanisation in Dakar began with the official annexation of the Cap-Vert peninsula in 1857 by the French colonial empire. However, contact between the indigenous populations of Senegal, the Lebou and the Wolof, and the French colonial enterprise predates the establishment of Dakar to the mid-seventeenth century with the settlement of French merchants in the towns of Gorée, Saint Louis and Rufisque (Figure 10).

'The Senegalese coastal towns of Saint Louis, Gorée and Rufisque, provide exceptional examples for the long presence of European settlement in West Africa. Initiated by Portuguese and Dutch seamen and merchants (from the mid-fifteenth and the early seventeenth centuries, respectively), these fortified coastal settlements were not established as 'cities,' but rather as trading posts and depots, totally dependent for their existence on the extent and intensity of commercial exchanges, including the slave trade. Monopolised by the regime of the semi-official 'compagnies,' commerce was conducted by a tiny number of Europeans, a limited number of mulattos (métis), free Africans and domestic slaves, mostly women' (Guèye, 2013).

Treaties and agreements already in place between the French and local populations between 1679 and 1830, detailed the 'economic obligations' of European merchants to indigenous rulers (i.e. tolls paid in return for protection and the right to operate chambers of commerce) (Bigon, 2016, pg. 22-23). These treaties were designed to legitimise future seizure by European powers and paved the way for French occupation of the peninsula. For example, the ordinance of November 17, 1823 extended to Dakar a law applying to all of Senegal which allowed for the expropriation of land for public purposes and conferred a market value to any land that may or may not be part of the state property (Faye, 2001, pg. 60).

74 Treaties concluded with the Damel of Cayor in 1763 and 1765 by Poncet de la Riviere and in 1767 by Boufflers recognized France's property rights over the entire territory of the Cap Vert peninsula. However, the Lebou, formerly subject to the Damel, had made themselves independent and were the rulers of the region (Exposition coloniale internationale de 1931, 1933, pg. 6).

75 See 'accumulation by dispossession' on pg. 186
On the Cap-Vert peninsula, the pre-colonial settlement of Ndakarou was composed of eleven Lebou villages\textsuperscript{76}, the native inhabitants of the Cap-Vert peninsula. Lebou villages were made up of straw-hut complexes, organised by patriarchal households, situated around a central square with several large trees (Figure 11) (Bigon, 2016, pg. 24). Each Lebou village was arranged around a central public square (\textit{penc} in Wolof), a common feature observed in settlements across Senegambia (Ross, 2014, pg. 112). Lebou society was structured around fishing and inland farming and was governed by a 'Muslim religious lineage' known as the \textit{serignes} of Ndakarou (Shoup, 2011, pg. 163). The population of Ndakarou at the time of French occupation amounted to approximately 10,000 and was also composed of the \textit{Toucouleurs}, \textit{Peuhls}, \textit{Sarakholé}s from Bakel, \textit{Sereres} and \textit{Bambaras} from Baol, \textit{Kassoutrés}, and Moroccans from the North (Moraze, 1938, pg. 626). Ndakarou was the ‘generic name’ given to the Lebou villages, which, according to Lengyel (1941, pg. 25), was based on a ‘misunderstanding’;

> According to the traditional explanation, they [white travellers] pointed to the village and asked the natives its

\textsuperscript{76} The eleven Lebou villages were N’grave (Ngaraf), Kaye (Kaye), Kaye Toute, Sintia (Santiaba, Sinthiaba), M’bor (Mbor) and Tanne (Thann), Alonga, Sainba Dionni (Soumbedioune), Kamen, Thedern (Thieudeme), M’botte (Mbotte)
name. The black people, thinking the white travellers had asked the name of the tree, replied: 'Tamarind, tamarind - N'Dakar, N'Dakar'.

The map drawn by Louis Faidherbe in 1853 (Figure 12), the Governor General of Senegal from 1854-1861, indicates the location and names of the eleven Lebou villages on the Cap-Vert peninsula prior to the colonisation of Ndakarou. This map demonstrates that French occupation was not exercised over a *tabula rasa*, 'as many colonialists would have probably wanted to believe' since Ndakarou existed on the Cap-Vert peninsula as a set of villages with distinct arrangements and way of life (Bigon, 2016, pg. 23). Dakar – the imperial name of the indigenous Ndakarou – was therefore a kind of 'sketched colonial city' laid on top of the existing precolonial layer of as an 'improvised resting place for vessels on this western point of Africa we call Cap-Vert' (Loti; Letter from October 3, 1879). Urban planning under French colonial rule was therefore based on the 'destruction of indigenous cities and towns' and the construction of European built form (Wright, 1991, pg. 75). The physical changes to Dakar's precolonial layer recall the histories of other colonial cities following the advent of French imperialism;

'When the French captured Algiers in 1830, the destruction of the existing city – its streets, its monuments, and its population – seemed the primary goal. The French seized control of Saigon in 1859, when Napoleon III and his prefect, Baron Haussmann, were at the height of their imperial glory. Having burned the city, the French troops proceeded as if they had a tabula rasa. In an effort to encourage real estate speculation, an engineer's gridiron dominated the plan of the proposed new city, embellished with a few wide streets to evoke Haussmann's grand boulevards' (Wright, 1991, pg. 78).
In the fifteen years since the end of the slave trade in Senegal in April 1848, the political decision to colonise Dakar led to the construction of a deep-water port to support the deployment of French expansion in Africa and facilitate resource extraction from the region (Fall, 2005, pg. 150). In April 1856, Pinet-Laprade, adjoint du Gouverneur du Senegal (Deputy Governor of Senegal), wrote a letter addressed to the colonial administration on the annexation of Dakar;
The occupation of the peninsula is necessary for the protection of our increasingly important establishments in Dakar [sic], all the trading houses of the colony have a branch on the peninsula and in the space of ten years the commercial movement on the point rose to more than one Million (Rapport de Pinet-Laprade sur la defense de la presqu’île du cap vert; Gorée le 15 Avril 1856; Report from Pinet-Laprade on the defences of the Cap Vert peninsula; Charpy, 1958, pg. 96).

The exploitation of groundnut\(^{77}\) constitutes the economic foundation of the colony of Senegal and, along with military and strategic concerns, the primary motive for the annexation of Dakar\(^{78}\). Prior to the colonisation of Dakar, trade was conducted primarily in Saint-Louis following its establishment as a colonial outpost in 1659. However, the establishment of Dakar as a port of extraction would divert economic activity towards the Cap-Vert peninsula (Chenal et al., 2009). Consequently, colonisation made the ‘groundnut industry the essential vector of urban growth’ as the French power structure and city plans were designed based on exporting raw materials from the colony via Dakar (Sow, 1983, pg. 46).

On January 13, 1857, General Léopold Protet, Commandant de la Division Navale des Côtes Occidentales d’Afrique et Commandant supérieur de Gorée (Commander of the Naval Division of the Western Coasts of Africa and Commander of Gorée), disembarked his troops in Dakar and established a fortified post in the house of Jaubert, a groundnut merchant from nearby Gorée. On May 25th, as the local population celebrated the last day of Ramadan, Protet took possession of the Cap-Vert peninsula, distributing the tricolore to the local chiefs who ‘proudly hoisted them’ during religious festivities; it was ‘thus that the French took over Dakar’ (Lengyel, 1941, pg. 75). On the same day, in a communiqué addressed

\(^{77}\) Groundnut processing and export, between 1920-1970, was the driving force of manufacturing activities in Senegal. Between 1930 and 1938, half a dozen industries emerged around groundnut export including breweries, biscuiteries, soap, bags and packaging factories. The economy of the colony of Senegal was driven largely by the growing demand for peanuts (oil) from the metropole (Péllissier, 1951).

\(^{78}\) The colony of Senegal was largely dependent on the export of groundnut which took place through Dakar; therefore, the countryside cannot be dissociated from the city as the colony would not exist without the port city and vice versa. The analysis argues that this presents an interesting iteration of planetary urbanisation whereby the artificial dichotomies between urban and rural are largely irrelevant as the urban does not exist without the rural (and vice versa).
to the Goréens and the Minister of the Navy and the Colonies Admiral Hamelin, Protet wrote:

Gentleman, I am pleased to announce that today, 25 May 1857, I have taken possession in the name of France of the territory of Dakar, flying the French flag over the fortress that has just been built here, and I thereby release our commerce from the tolls that were imposed on it by our treaties with the previous chiefs of the land (Leopold Protet, Commander in Chief for Gorée and Dependencies; Charpy, 1958, pg. 130).

In the years following its annexation, Dakar remained 'in the shadow' of the three pre-existing communes, Gorée, Saint-Louis and Rufisque (Shaw, 2006, pg. 23). Residents of Gorée were concerned that the establishment of a new settlement in such close proximity, and the increasingly disadvantageous allocation of funds by the colonial administration following the occupation of Dakar, would compromise their primacy within the colony. Dakar remained in an 'embryonic state' (Bérenger-Féraud, 1883) for many years as evidenced by the reports of Colonel Canard, commandant de l’arrondissement de Gorée (commander of the Gorée district) from 1870-1880, who complained of the stifling silence of Dakar in the early years (Faure, 1914, pg. 158-60).

October 1875 - Nothing salient, perfect calm, still very few European inhabitants and mulatres [metis], and these few do not want to occupy themselves with industry; there is no shoemaker, tailor, or wigmaker, hardly can we find a laundress, but on the other hand we have a large quantity of merchants.

December 1875 - Everything is calm, too calm; trade is almost nil.

January 1878 - Dakar is still very calm, it is even sad, few houses, few inhabitants, little trade and no industry; one is obliged to be shaved by a disciple who was mason before his entry into service.

April 1880 - Always the same calm, too calm, trade almost nil; Always few houses to accommodate officers and officials; Little food, beef, always beef, little sheep, never a calf; In short life is very difficult, very expensive and not very pleasant.

Plan Directeur d'Urbanisme (E. Pinet-Laprade, 1862)
The first official masterplan of Dakar was designed by Emile Pinet-Laprade, head of the local Corps of Engineers, in 1862 (Figure 13). The plan features the deployment
of colonial and military rationale on what was then considered terra nullius. In a meeting of the Board of Directors of the Administration of Senegal, Pinet-Laprade detailed the plans for the new city:

Several public squares have been reserved and distributed in the principal districts; that of the market, the most important, is situated on the way to Cayor; That of the church, at the centre of which this edifice is to be built, is on the central plateau of the settlement; Finally, a third place of irregular form was reserved in the quarter of the East, at the meeting point of the streets of different directions, so as to destroy the disgraceful aspect which would have presented the houses raised in these directions.

Several fields have been reserved to receive the public establishments which will be necessary to create in Dakar, if, as can be supposed, this point becomes the main centre of our establishments of the West African coast. In the choice of these reserves we have been guided by a double consideration: 1) the question of salubriousness; 2) trade interests. (Proces-Verbal du Conseil d'Administration du Senegal; 1er Juillet 1862; Meeting of Board of Directors of the Administration of Senegal; Charpy, 1958, pg. 280-282).
Figure 13: Plan Directeur d'Urbanisme (Pinet-Laprade, 1862; Bigon, 2013)
The Pinet-Laprade masterplan, based on an orthogonal gridiron layout, was ‘brutally implemented’ on top of the indigenous tapestry of the Lebou villages which caused irreparable damage to the precolonial layer (Bigon, 2016). The land was conceived as a ‘terra incognita (an unknown land)’ but also as ‘terra nullius (an empty land)’ despite clear evidence from archival records and maps that the French colonial administration was familiar with the precolonial Lebou settlement of the Cap-Vert peninsula (Bigon, 2008, pg. 483). Imperialism was articulated as ‘an act of geographic violence’ whereby every place on earth was measured, mapped, exploited and brought under control79 (Said, 1978, pg. 180-2).

The design and layout of the masterplan and accompanying notes of Pinet-Laprade indicate a concern with sanitation and hygiene, a return to order in the land of ‘fever and barbarism’ (terre des fièvres et de la barbarie), and the clear intention to ensure that Dakar plays a strategic role in the region. Furthermore, the implicit denial of the existing settlement, referred to by Pinet-Laprade as a ‘disgraceful’ element that necessitated removal, suggests the birth of an urban culture predicated on destruction, segregation and ‘othering.’ The French colonial administration designated overseas territories as ‘experimental terrains’ or laboratories for testing urban planning policies and designs that were too risky or polemical in the metropole (Wright, 1991). Until the start of the nineteenth century, Guyana and the French West Indies, linked to Africa through trade, were France’s first location for colonial experimentation, and the subsequent experiments carried out in Saint Louis were often replicas of those implemented in Fort-de-France or Cayenne (Sinou, 1993, pg. 342). Dakar is prominent example of an ‘urban laboratory’ since low levels of urbanisation in 1857 meant that the French colonial administration treated the terrain as a tabula rasa – a blank canvas80. The first masterplan, however, was superimposed atop existing Lebou villages, destroying native burial sites, mosques and sacred lands. In the elaboration of planning decisions, African colonies –

79 See example of spatial organisation of Lebou settlements on pg. 127
80 The trend of tabula rasa urbanism is evident in the satellite cities of the African continent that bypass urban problems of existing metropoles in favour of the development of a wholly new cities and experimentation with new urban forms (see pg. 215).
'ahistorical in the then European mind' – were seen as having little to offer in the way of inspiration or design as local knowledge was dismissed as 'mostly irrelevant'\textsuperscript{81} (Bigon, 2016, pg. 166).

By presenting the masterplan of Ndakarou as the foundation upon which the French urban fabric was overlaid, the analysis is doing the work of southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) by exposing the silences of colonial history which ignores or neglects the precolonial history of Dakar. Furthermore, by beginning the urban history of Dakar with the precolonial layer, the analysis demonstrates that the deployment of colonial power in Ndakarou did not entail continuity of existing physical forms but involved the brutal implementation of urban change. Through the scope of vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2), the juxtaposition of the maps of Dakar demonstrates how the biophysical infrastructures of the newly established city were laid atop the pre-existing socio-cultural infrastructures of the Lebou settlement (Figure 14). As the analysis proceeds along the timeline of Dakar’s urban development, the examination of masterplans reveals instances when the socio-cultural infrastructures of the city survive or are adapted to the logics of urban planning. This provides an apt mechanism for understanding the narratives underpinning social change and their effects on the socio-spatial infrastructures of urban networks.

\textsuperscript{81} The perceived (a)historicity of African cities is perpetuated by urban theory in their image as 'residual entities' with little relevance to the establishment of theory.
Figure 14: Dakar en 1850 et 1880 (Faidherbe & Ancelle, 1889; Gallica)
i. Assimilation and civilising mission

French occupation of overseas territories was rationalised and justified by a doctrine of assimilation or *mission civilisatrice* (civilising mission). The policy of assimilation identified all indigenous inhabitants born in the four communes (Dakar, Saint Louis, Rufisque, Gorée), or having lived there over five years, as French citizens (*originaires*) with legal and political rights similar to those of French *citoyens* (citizens). Following French revolution in 1848, the government of the Second Republic extended the rights of citizenship to the French colonies. The rights were repealed in 1851 under the rule of Napoleon III but restored in 1870 under the Third Republic. The *originaires* benefited from certain rights that weren't extended to the rest of the Senegalese colony and West Africa (i.e. the right to vote, by universal adult male suffrage, the right to justice by courts, the right to elected municipal government, and the right to elect a deputy to the *Assemblée Nationale* in Paris). In 1889, Dakar was proclaimed by the Colonial Congress as a distant suburb of Paris, further reinforcing the tenets of assimilation (Betts, 1961, 13). The rest of the Senegalese colony was subjected to the colonial regime of the ‘*indigénat* – native justice’ or colonial officer’s justice which was ‘good enough for the subjects but definitely not good enough for the citizens of the coastal communes’ (O’Brien, 2008, pg. 8).

Rooted in Enlightenment rationale, the colonial policy of assimilation promoted ‘unilinear evolutionism and the unity of reason’ (Diouf, 1998, pg. 676). French colonialism sought to turn ‘backward’ and ‘primitive’ African societies into an Enlightenment project through education, sanitation, commerce and paid labour (Demissie, 2013, pg. 5). According to this policy, colonised African populations were expected to ‘love France and Africa simultaneously’ (Bignon, 2009, pg. 443). This necessitated a complete subordination to the ‘Metropolitan culture’ and the abandonment of an African identity (Diouf, 1998, pg. 676). Furthermore, the concept of assimilation was used to justify segregationist and repressive colonial manoeuvres, making the situation in the communes one of ‘false *fraternité*, a denied *égalité*, and an absence of *liberté*’ (Bignon, 2008, pg. 487). Ironically, the...

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82 The ‘civilising mission’ constitutes the ‘ideological bedrock’ of the European colonial enterprise and the modern development discourse (Omar, 2012, pg. 44)
83 See discussion on planetary urbanisation on pg. 81
'humanist' idea of man originating in the Enlightenment era was only achieved through 'dehumanizing the non-Western Other' (Fanon, 1961). The imagery of Moraze's (1936, pg. 627) description of Dakar reveals the emptiness of the assimilationist discourse in the racial classifications and power hierarchies it upholds;

'It is its population that gives Dakar the best of its picturesque. Under the brilliance of the sun, the variety of costumes with gaudy colours, the heavy jewels and golden threads worn by the rich, and the long floating robes of the poor make a curious assemblage. The costumes translate the manners: the fetishists wear the amulet, while a style of headdress distinguishes the Catholics. And when the Muslim prayer sounds in the evening, half of the population comes to a halt, then prostrate themselves in genuflexions. In the midst of this diverse and motley crowd, the European is the master. His title is managing to create a city in this peninsula which, less than a century ago, seemed prohibited to men.'

The colonial administration sought to subjugate the landscape and its people to assimilationist doctrine and the principles of urban planning and organisation. France's 'civilising ideas' in West Africa, and across its colonies, identifies colonialism with one key principle - mastery;

'Mastery not of other peoples – although ironically this would become one of civilisations prerogatives in the age of democracy; rather, mastery of nature, including the human body64, and mastery of what can be called 'social behaviour'. To put it another way, to be civilised was to be free from specific forms of tyranny: the tyranny of the laments over man, of disease over health, of instinct over reason, of ignorance over knowledge and of despotism over liberty' (Conklin, 1997, pg. 4-5).

Thus, mastery over nature – including the human settlement of precolonial Ndakarou- spelled the 'destruction of nature' (Lefebvre, 1995, pg. 149) and the first iterance of a fragmented landscape (McFarlane, 2018; Roy, 2015). Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) reveal how this this framework becomes increasingly relevant to the urban development of Dakar in the 'fragmentation and pulverisation' resulting from capitalist relations of production through the 'private ownership of

64 See discussion on 'biopolitics' on pg. 144

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the means of production and of the earth, that is, of space itself’ (Lefebvre, 1995, pg. 149).

Under the guise of ‘modernist’ urban planning, colonial regimes sought to bring order out of the ‘Dickensian urban disorder’ by improving public health and urban services (Simon, 2015, pg. 218-19). For the most part, however, urban policies were designed to serve the interests of the colonial settlers by separating them from the ‘tumult, alien cultures, poverty or real moral and health threats’ posed by the natives – an exercise in racialised modernisation (or the assimilation of black bodies into white landscapes) (Simon, 2015, pg. 219). The colonisation of the Cap-Vert was focused primarily on the material profit of France as the actual policies of the civilizing mission did not serve the needs of the native communities (Sinou, 1993; Conklin, 1997, 38-72). The cadastral plan of Dakar is the concrete rendering of assimilationist urban planning, a (literal) roadmap indicating how French colonial authorities inscribed assimilation and, ironically, segregation onto the built space of the city. Architecture and the built environment were used to design and organise the spaces of leisure, work, and cultural practices in order to (re?)orient an emerging urban identity. By imposing an ‘essentially occidental and rationalistic vision’ on the land and its native population, colonial urban planning fragmented existing relationships, political formations and family units (Bugnicourt, 1982, pg. 30).

**ii. Military rationale and security**

As an officer of the Navy and the Corps of Engineers, Pinet-Laprade was greatly influenced by the layout designs and models of the French military and naval engineers in the elaboration of the grid plan based on the ‘Roman camp type, in the tradition of Debelle Gallico’ (Bugnicourt, 1982, pg. 30). This planning model is associated to the ‘medieval bastide towns and the Renaissance tradition,’ which were characterised by two key principles: i) facilitating the organisation of a settlement in a faraway territory; and ii) engineering the modernisation of the indigenous practices (Bigon, 2009, pg. 435). Pinet-Laprade’s plan proposed to establish the barracks of soldiers on the upper part of the site to secure the land, while traders would be based on the edge of the sea in proximity to arriving ships (Sinou, 1993, pg. 232). The decision to position colonial buildings on an elevated plain was a strategic move to ‘dignify the power of the imperial government’ (Njoh,
Topography in colonial settlements played an important role, symbolizing the unequal distribution of wealth and power and effectively distinguishing the 'ruler from the ruled' (Winters, 1982). The salience of topography becomes increasingly apparent when European quarters are established on the 'plateau,' a geographically elevated area, during the 1910s both in Dakar and throughout French West Africa.

The military layout, exemplified in the 1862 masterplan, can also be found in the colonial settlements of Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and England. While these plans take into account local environmental conditions, they feature the same basic characteristics, namely:

1. an orthogonal design, featuring an 'internal hierarchy of morphological and infrastructure elements'
2. tree-lined streets, verandas in the caverns and the barracks (that is, the 'bungalow compound complex' or 'maison coloniale')
3. the influence of sanitary considerations on the layout of the built sphere
4. the segregation and isolation of the colonial population from the native inhabitants through land confiscations and forcible displacements (Bigon, 2016, pg. 71).

The analysis demonstrates that the 1862 plan of Dakar features these elements prominently and deploys them strategically to suit the needs of colonial doctrine. The similarities between the newly built towns of Dakar and Bathurst, founded by the British empire around 1820, illustrate the shared architectural design and practices based on military rationale that guided the early planning of colonial cities. The capital of the Gambia (Bathurst) is remarkable for its numerous military buildings, batteries, casernes, prisons, guardhouse, powder stores, and civilian buildings, including government hotel, hospital, church, school, prison, courthouse, cemetery, and coal depot (Sinou, 1993, pg. 237). Much as in Dakar, these elements were deemed necessary for the creation of a 'civilised' space suitable for European residents, as town planning was used specifically for 'articulating power in built space' (Njoh, 2015, pg. 101). Another key reason for the pervasiveness of this military style was the quest for 'visual unification' so that, Dakar to Hanoi, military officers in French colonies moving from one colonial outpost to another would encounter
familiar landscapes (Bignon, 2016, pg. 59). Where differences did exist, these were largely driven by health concerns, particularly with regards to prevailing winds and the orientation of streets that facilitated the circulation of air and ‘miasma’ (Sinou, 1993, pg. 232).

iii. Déguerpissements

The implementation of the Pinet-Laprade masterplan called for the displacement of Lebou villages beyond the new borders of the city. Driven by Vitruvian principles, Pinet-Laprade’s plan represents an attempt to ‘discipline’ the conquered territories through the design and imposition of legislative boundaries (Bignon, 2008, pg. 482). This required the displacement of ‘undisciplined’ elements that did not fit within the scope of the masterplan. In instances where Lebou villages and huts encumbered the streets, boulevards and avenues, the settlements were destroyed, and their inhabitants exiled to other parts of the city-to-be in a series of forced removals labelled ‘déguerpissements’ (displacements) (Figure 15).

85 On the topic of urban planning, Vitruvius proposed a city ‘founded on salubrity, to be achieved through the avoidance of the prevailing winds’ (Lagopoulos, 2009, pg. 194). Vitruvian principles in planning and architecture are based on arrangement, proportion, consistency, and uniformity, all of which continue to be important fundamentals of city planning.
In 1858, ninety-five huts from the Kaye village were destroyed for the construction of a boulevard while the rest of the village was 'incorporated' into the city's urban plans (Le Commandant de Gorée, d'Alteyrac, au Prince chargé du Ministre Gorée, le 21 Septembre 1858; Charpy, 1958, pg. 190). Racial segregation, while never overt in the French colonies, was used to enhance the power of the coloniser over the colonised by facilitating the ‘former’s surveillance of the latter’ (Njoh, 2015, pg. 106).

Surveillance was made possible through the internment of the colonized within delineated spaces. Everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) reveals that this practice set Dakar on a track of socio-spatial segregation and prompted the first iteration of informal settlements as the displaced communities sought to rebuild homes at the periphery of the newly established city. The strongest resistance to the 'déguerpissements' came from the Lebou who resented being dispossessed of their
ancestral lands (Sinou, 1993, pg. 280). The Lebou, however, did not fully comprehend the European land contracts and ownership rights, nor the ‘full implication of acts such as signatures on documents’ (Bigon, 2016, pg. 68). The colonial administration enforced the use of building permits (permis d’habiter; Figure 16) as a means of dispossessing the Lebou of their ancestral lands while legally enforcing a process of déguerpissements and segregation. In the European neighbourhoods, any permis d’habiter granted stability to inhabitants afforded them a sense of security while the permits bestowed to natives were often revocable and worsened their precarious foothold in the city (Ndiaye, 2015, pg. 52). The native population of Dakar were the ‘victims, recipients and participants’ of a colonial logic that substituted the ‘way of life of the villager for the civility of the city dweller’ (Faye, 2001, pg. 37).

![Figure 16: Permis d’Habiter (Gouvernement Générale de L’Afrique Occidentale Française, 1913; Archives Nationale du Senegal)](image)

During this time period, the first versions of the ‘sanitation’ narrative emerged in Dakar, recycling the rhetoric used to legitimise similar displacements in the development of Saint-Louis. The ‘Sanitation Syndrome’ (Swanson, 1977) dictated colonial urban policies and encouraged the segregation of Africans and Europeans as urban race relations were conceived and dealt with in an ‘imagery of infection and epidemic disease’ (Swanson, 1977, pg. 387). As in 19th century London, the urban
fabric was shaped by the goal of ‘producing a civilised, clean, respectable, productive and healthy city’ (McFarlane & Rutherford, 2008, pg. 349). Yellow fever outbreaks in the early days of the French occupation of Dakar as well as the perceived sanitation concerns generated by the lifestyle of the African population were used to justify the banishment of the latter to the outskirts of the newly developing city. During the colonial period, contamination was often underwritten by a ‘close association with disgust at the colonial Other’ as the ‘uncivilised, racialized polluting bodies’ of colonial subjects were arguably ‘less amenable to self-government’ (McFarlane & Rutherford, 2008, pg. 350). Infrastructural developments during the early colonial period and the displacement of local populations aimed to produce self-governing subjects. This provides an interesting restatement of Foucault’s (1997) concept of ‘biopolitics’ as colonial medical practice underpinned by racist discourse, became the rationality based on which the ‘African body’ was identified as the site of disease that threatened the white settler population and justified the segregation of bodies (and cities) (Vaughan, 1991). Infrastructure was therefore not only a means of regulating and allowing the circulation of water, waste, air and goods but also played a crucial role in producing a ‘self-governing hygienic, moral subject’ (Joyce, 2003).

A policy of segregation replaced the earlier arrangement of ‘coexistence’ in Senegal and was epitomised in the establishment of the Médina as a separate African quarter of Dakar in 1914. Similarly, the colonial municipal officials in cities such as Johannesburg, Cape Town, Nairobi, and Kinshasa used public health concerns derived from colonial medical discourse to relocate African populations to ‘less desirable parts of the city’ (Demissie, 2013, pg. 4-5). Urban areas were considered the ‘preserve of Europeans’ and Africans were merely tolerated in these spaces for the work and services they provided. They were required to live in segregated ‘indigenous centres’ or ‘townships’ built on the margins of the city to host ‘temporary’ urban dwellers who were intentionally prevented from ‘urbanising permanently’ and acquiring land rights of urban citizenship (Simon, 2015, pg. 219).

The pretext of sanitation was revealed as a political tool for subjugating the native population in colonized countries, as ‘medical’ rationality justified a mode of governance amenable to the aims of the French colonial project. This is evident in
the fact that the seemingly benevolent health concerns of the French for the living conditions of the African population all but disappeared once the latter were moved to the swampy interiors of the peninsula where topographic conditions and the incessant influx of people worsened living conditions in African settlements.

iv. Toponymic segregation

Bigon (2008) has conducted in-depth research on the toponymic practices of the French colonial administration in Dakar which constitute an important element for explaining how the civilising mission and segregation were simultaneously deployed through urban planning. Street-naming systems supported the ‘alienation’ of the native population from the colonial urban sphere (Bigon, 2008, pg. 497). The French colonial administration built a ‘linguistic superstructure which reduced the Senegambian dialects to unenviable rank of vernacular language’ (Faye, 2001, pg. 84). While racial segregation was never overt and consciously applied in the French colonies, the street naming system represented a ‘conceptual barrier’ in urban spaces that instilled an ‘informal racial segregation’ between the colonial and indigenous populations (Bigon, 2008, pg. 482). Faure, archivist of the Afrique Occidentale Francaise (1911-1920), categorized the thirty-eight street names of Dakar, approved by the Administrative Council in 1863;

1. Metropolitan street names (1): the first category includes only one street name, the Boulevard National (originally named by Pinet-Laprade the Rue Imperiale).

2. Military and Navy officer names (24): this second category lists street named after significant actors in the colonisation of Senegal and other regions, mostly military and navy officers, who died in battles against local powers (e.g. Descemet, Dagorne, Mage) or succumbed to malaria and other disease (e.g. Caille, Parent, Parchappe). Governors (Blanchot, Canard), military engineers (Vincens), surgeons (Theze) and explorers (Raffenel) are also included in this category.

3. French site-related names (5): this refers specifically to sites created by the new colonising powers such as Avenue du Barachois, Rue de l'Hopital, the newly established hospital in the Plateau; Rue du Cimetière, original location of the European cemetery, and Rue de la Gendarmerie and Rue de l'Administration.

4. African names (8): These names were carefully selected, featuring only references that supported the French
regional 'master narrative'; in the three instances where a local settlement name was used (Rue de Kaolak, Rue de Dialmath and Rue de Médine) it was, in fact, 'in praise of French military posts or fortresses that had heroically been established there' (Bigon, 2008, pg. 486). In later years, streets names such as Avenue El Hadji Malik Sy and Avenue Blaise Diagne drew from ‘Afrocentric lexical dictionaries’ to incorporate native culture and ‘win the hearts and minds of the colonised’ (Njoh, 2016, pg. 6). The choice of these names was deliberate as the political leaders they honour ‘never threatened the French colonial rule in Senegal’ (one was linked to Islamic life and the other was the first African mayor of Dakar) (Bigon, 2009, pg. 443).

Through the practice of street naming, the colonial state was both symbolically and materially exercising its power in the articulation of a ‘Eurocentric vernacular of spatiality in African built space’ (Njoh, 2016, pg. 12). The street names and ensuing toponymic segregation of Dakar depicts the encounter between two ‘spatial hierarchies, codifications and toponyms’ - that of the coloniser and that of the colonised (Bigon, 2008, pg. 480). Language policy was based on ‘presumptions of superiority’ and an ignorance and ‘denigration of indigenous languages’ (Gellar, 2016, pg. 6). French was best suited to ‘civilize’ the native populations; ‘excluding those who did not speak French from participating in public life and access to elite status; and conducting public affairs and administering justice exclusively in French’ (Gellar, 2016, pg. 6). This explains the privileged position of the evolués within the colonial hierarchy, as these African colonial subjects embraced a European way of life and abandoned indigenous languages in favour of French. As the socioeconomic divides in Dakar deepened, language became a determining factor for urban identity and an important constituent of ‘cityness.’ Language reflects the dichotomy between ‘appropriate urban and non-urban identities’ and everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) reveals the ways in which urbanites developed the ability to slip ‘out of one identity and into another as easily as if they were changing clothes’ in the process of negotiating their spaces in the city86 (McLaughlin, 2001, pg. 157). The duality of the city, as represented through language, is further compounded in the imperial age when the city is physically divided into European and native quarters, each structured differently and

86 See discussion on Wolof language on pg. 44
subjected to explicit codes of urban infrastructure and implicit codes of social behaviour.

**Imperial Dakar**

With the establishment of the Dakar - Saint Louis (DSL) railway in 1885, ongoing work on the deep-water port, and the increase in visiting sea crafts, Dakar entered its 'imperial age' which triggered a development momentum linked to the city's new administrative status. In 1902, the capital of French West Africa was transferred from Saint-Louis to Dakar. Dakar was designed and destined to become a new urban model for French colonies throughout Africa and was meant to play a strategic international role. A report presented to the President de la République following the decree in 1902 announced the new circonscription of Dakar;

The decree of October 1st, 1902 made of Dakar, city of Senegal whose capital remains Saint Louis, the capital of French West Africa. The General Government, as such, was gradually installed with all the departments of inspection, centralisation and control, the headquarters of the superior commander of the occupying troops, the court of appeal of the AOF, and treasury department. A large port has been built; a whole city has been built. In short, a considerable effort has been made to make Dakar a city worthy of the great role which it is called upon to fulfil, an effort made by the General Government, both on the ordinary resources of its budget and on the borrowing budgets for which it has repeatedly had to cover almost all costs. The results obtained, however, still do not meet all expectations. The urgent improvements in Dakar will necessitate very different expenditures. It is essential that the General Government should completely replace the Government of Senegal (Charpy, 1958, pg. 90-91).

Dakar was set up as an autonomous territory in an arrangement similar to the 'special status' of Washington, D.C. with a Governor of Colonies at the head of this autonomous territory known as the Circonscription de Dakar (Lengyel, 1914, pg. 53). The image of Washington, D.C. as a model for Dakar is particularly interesting given that Marshal Hubert Lyautey, the first Resident-General of Morocco from 1912 to 1925, labelled Rabat 'my little Washington' and Dakar's urban design was modelled after that of Rabat (Bigon, 2016, pg. 32-33). The parallels between Dakar and Rabat are useful for understanding the motives behind urban policies in French colonies. The foundations of the 'système Lyautey' (Lyautey system), as it was implemented in Morocco, were based on a 'peaceful penetration' – 'the coloniser is a civilizer, not a
conqueror' with the goal of global development (Brisson, 1934, pg. 72). Thus, in the 'land of anarchy' (Morocco) and the 'land of fever and barbarism' (Dakar/Senegal), 'modern civilisation' would be introduced to the landscape through 'construction and not with trenches; with picks and not with bayonets' (Brisson, 1934, page 16). Architecture and planning were viewed as 'effective ideological transmitters' fit for the purpose of subjugating, taming, and civilising the indigenous lands and societies of North and West Africa (Wright, 1991, pg. 1).

The new status of Dakar brought unprecedented growth to the city, with the construction of government buildings, European residences, recreation facilities and networked urban infrastructure. In 1877, it was necessary to expand the 1862 Pinet-Laprade plan south of the Rue Imperiale (Avenue Sarraut) and from the quartier des disciplinaries to the Rue de l'Hopital (rue Berenger-Feraud) (Exposition Coloniale, 1931). This also meant the enforcement of new regulations that prohibited African housing in the 'European' city. As a regional project, Dakar was based on the exploitation of peanut, underscoring its role as a port city with concomitant facilities as a means of strengthening the infrastructure of the region while reorganising the economy of the territory (Sinou, 1993, pg. 242). The population of Dakar grew considerably during this era, from 1,556 in 1878, to 8,737 in 1891 and then to 18,447 in 1904 (Lengyel, 1941, pg. 79-80). Ribot and Lafon (1908, pg. 18) report an even larger population with 19,775 in 1904 and over 25,000 in 1907 of which 2,700 Europeans. The population of Europeans in the capital, mostly French, was made up of civil servants and traders (35 per cent) or military men (15 per cent), sometimes accompanied by families (women, 17 per cent, children, 8 per cent). Alongside the French, there were foreigners engaged in trade (25 per cent) including Catholic Libano-Syrians, who, sought refuge from Muslim persecution and formed a colony of nearly 2,000 members in the city (Moraze, 1938, pg. 626). In 1901, Degouy, a captain of Engineering, designed an extension plan for Dakar to deal with the demographic growth of the city. As early as 1904, the first major avenues were laid out and intended to connect large facilities to each other (Dione, 1992; Chenal et al., 2009, pg. 71).

As the capital of French West Africa, Dakar was the 'living testimony' of the work accomplished in Dakar, 'at the cost of a thousand difficulties' to build the 'empire on solid foundations' (Ribot & Lafon, 1906, pg. 18). The increasing importance of Dakar
fostered a desire to give the city an 'air of distinction' as architecture and urban
design were meant to display France's imperial superiority (Bugnicourt, 1982, pg.
31). Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) reveals the ways in which
architecture and infrastructure were harnessed as fundamental elements of urban
planning not only to direct the 'flow of human traffic' but also to structure the 'way
people interact,' thereby acting as an effective mechanism of self-governance
(Shaw, 2006, pg. 10). The city centre was composed of the market, the church and
the administrative office - the 'three functional units' for the deployment of colonial
ideology and power (Faye, 2001, pg. 94). Architectural styles of colonial buildings
were influenced by the Beaux-Arts tradition in Parisian architecture, as well as
rococo and baroque styles. The construction projects undertaken during this time
period were meant to evoke the monumentality of Dakar's development, and display
the superiority of French colonial institutions and ideals and their mastery over the
land. Dakar was living proof that French colonialism allowed for the metamorphosis
of Ndakarou from a settlement of villages to a city of 'permanent edifices' (Bigon,
2016, pg. 135).

i. Built environment and building materials
A map of Dakar from 1906, taken
from *Essai de Geographie Medicale et d'Ethnographie* (Essay of Medical Geography and Ethnography) by Jojot (1907) (Figure 17), shows the
changing landscape of Dakar as Pinet-Laprade's gridiron plan was implemented
and expanded. The Jojot map clearly betrays the notion that the urban 'centre' of
the city (i.e. Dakar-Ville) was perceived as the 'real' city and populated by the
European population while the periphery, referred to only as 'quartier indigène
(indigenous village), rendered in the map as blank space, was not conceptually an
'integral part of the city' (Bigon & Njoh, 2015, pg. 32). The French social and cultural
projects in Dakar designated the African population as 'rural,' regardless of their
racial, cultural, social and historical 'otherness' constituted the paradigm that
'dominated all building activity' and spatial segregation only 'reinforced the
difference.' Hence, urbanity in Dakar comes to be defined by a process of 'othering'
whereby the urban European city was only conceived in opposition to a perceived
rural African hinterland.
The Lieutenant Governor of Senegal, Ernest Roume, issued a decree on June 21, 1902 forbidding the use of non-permanent building materials in the European residential quarters of Dakar. Non-permanent materials (i.e. anything designated by colonial authorities as contributing to an unhealthy urban environment) included cloth, straw, thatch, wattle, mud and tarred carton (Seck, 1970, pg. 133). This new legislation was unquestioningly directed towards the African population of the peninsula whose precolonial forms of habitation consisted mainly of the newly banned building materials. The Lieutenant Governor also required building permission for new structures in the city which were only bestowed to constructions using 'permanent' building materials (en dur). Existing habitations within the city limits made of perishable materials were destroyed while those made of durable materials were ‘thoroughly decontaminated’ (Betts, 1971, pg. 144). The owners of the
destroyed buildings were allowed to rebuild their homes ‘à l’européenne’ (the European way). If owners of destroyed houses did not build according to the new standards and regulations, they were assigned a plot near the city borders and granted the freedom to build as they saw fit. The native inhabitants remaining within the city limits often resorted to subversive means in the construction of their residences by replacing the walls of straw with walls of wooden planks and thatched roofs with mechanical ties in order to abide by the decree. These adaptations were generally considered sufficient to remain in place. Everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) reveals that these subversive measures are still utilised in
contemporary Dakar as those inhabiting or working in the informal sphere are constantly finding ways to subvert legislation that potentially undermines their way of life.

The style of residential buildings established during this period mirrored the nineteenth century 'Haussmannisation' of Paris with French and African populations sharing both adjacent buildings but segregated vertically with Europeans living on higher floors (to benefit from the ocean breeze) and Africans living on the ground floor (Nelson, 2007, pg. 229). This recalls the French concern with elevation and topography as a means of expressing power and domination. The first settlement houses built in Dakar emulated the style of Gorée and Saint-Louis, arranged side-by-side, barrack-like and surrounded by a garden. These 'colonial villas' were built with Hispanic and Mediterranean details and provide an 'ease of living' because of their 'adaptation to the climate' (Bugnicourt, 1982, pg. 30). Public space in Dakar was built by 'uprooting' the existing socio-spatial environment and replacing it with a 'modern' landscape. The penc was no longer the heart of community life as Place Protet (today's Place de l'Independence), became the central square of the city and exhibited an air of European flair with theatres and cafés that gave Dakar the 'impression of French city' (Bigon, 2016, pg. 136).

Public buildings, located in Place Protet, were 'neoclassical in inspiration' and signal the power of the coloniser with many Doric or Corinthian colonnades that evoke ancient Greek and Roman styles (Sinou, 1993, pg. 327). The Governor General's Palace and the Chamber of Commerce were constructed with neo-classical motifs to mark the power of the colonizer (ibid). Mosques were forced to follow rules of western architecture, 'characterized by a total rejection of African culture' with minarets disguised as bell towers as only the arches and cupola indicated the buildings' Islamic function (Barblan & Hernach, 2014, pg. 26). The 'instrumentalization of space' was therefore achieved through the 'successful application of French heritage' in the production of the city (Faye, 2001, pg. 65).

87 See discussion on topography on pg. 140
The built environment of Dakar reveals the role of architecture as an ideological transmitter in the city and throughout the French colonial empire. A comparison of the colonial architectures of Casablanca, Rabat and Dakar reveals the ways in which the French colonial administration manipulated architecture and planning to articulate its power in the built environment. In Morocco, for example, Lyautey (Resident-General of Morocco from 1912 to 1925) envisioned colonial society according to the following principles;

‘the French will always settle beside the Moroccan, the French city next to the Moroccan city, never in its place. And not only will the native retain integrally and always his character, his manners, his customs, his arts, but each of the two peoples that make up Morocco - Arabs and Berbers - will keep their institutions, their own customs and even their justice’ (Brisson, 1934, pg. 49).

In Morocco, the colonial administration sought to ‘conquer the native’s hearts and win their sympathy’ with ‘Moroccan-inspired design’ of colonial buildings such as Casablanca’s courthouse (Marrast in Mazrui et al., 2012). The policy served to pacify indigenous populations in order to facilitate resource extraction by securing the acquiescence of the exploited. In Dakar, however, the expulsion of indigenous populations to the periphery of the city suggested that the apparent ‘respect’ for and preservation of local culture in Lyautey’s doctrine was lacking in the French colony of Senegal. The 1862 masterplan reflects a colonial period during which the ‘modernisation’ (read: westernisation) of the territory of Dakar was achieved through the deployment of French colonial urban forms that were intended to ‘impress’ the indigenous population who, based on patriarchal logic, would unquestioningly imitate the European way of life (Bigon & Katz, 2017, pg. 58). However, the following chapters will demonstrate that, despite the efforts of the colonial administration, the ‘straw-hut landscape’ (the precolonial layer) never disappeared completely from colonial cities as the ‘organic’, ‘spontaneous’, ‘random’ and ‘improvised’ structures remained the ‘ultimate image of these towns’ (Bigon & Njoh, 2015, pg. 34).

**Dualistic Dakar - ‘Garden city’ and ‘ghetto’**

The deepening socio-spatial segregation of the European and African quarters lead to the establishment of an increasingly dualistic city. While the 1862 plan was rigorously implemented in the ‘European’ parts of the city, the margins of Dakar-ville were left to grow and expand unchecked, resulting in urban sprawl. Despite
numerous ‘déguerpissements’, the continued presence of the ‘indigenous’ inhabitants of the Cap-Vert in the ‘European’ city meant that French urban policy adopted different tactics to transform or exclude the indigenous residences from the emerging city. In 1914-15, several plans were drawn up for the new design of the Plateau (garden city) and the Médina which was hastily implemented after an outbreak of plague in 1914. The segregation of Dakar was progressive, but the establishment of the Médina marks a turning point when an entirely separate section of the city was officially nominated as ‘African’ and populated by native inhabitants forcibly removed from the city centre and separated by a cordon sanitaire (formed by the camps des tirailleurs Sénégalais – camp of the Senegalese sharpshooters) (Figure 18). At the same time, Dakar Plateau was established as the ‘European’ quarter with the implementation of the ‘garden city’ model in Dakar, and throughout much of West Africa. The choice of Dakar Plateau is a strategic one since it is topographically the highest point on the peninsula. Thus, to ‘assert their sociological superiority,’ the colonial administration built their urban habitat in areas of higher altitude, thereby initiating a ‘vertical flight’ (Faye, 2001, pg. 40). The development of these parallel cities ‘hardened into material spatialities of political connection, economic dependency, architectural imposition and landscape transformation’ (Jacobs, 2002, pg. 16-19).
i. ‘Garden city’ and cité-jardin

The ‘garden city’ originates in the work of Ebenezer Howard’s 1902 publication *Garden Cities of Tomorrow*. This book was translated into French soon
after its publication and was popularised by the first garden city experiments in England (e.g. Letchworth). The model soon entered Francophone urban planning circles. Howard presented the ‘garden city’ as an autonomous unit that provided an alternative to the growth of industrial cities which were associated with deteriorating sanitary and hygiene conditions, poverty, crime, and slums, and increased rural-urban migration. He stated that the ‘universally agreed’ principle in England, Europe, America and the colonies was that the continued ‘stream into the already over-crowded cities’ would further deplete the country districts and was a path best avoided (Howard, 1965, pg. 42). The garden city model proposed to counter this worrying trend through the following measures:

‘...the provision of a permanent belt of open land, to be used for agriculture as an integral part of the city; the use of this land to limit the physical spread of the city from within, or encroachments from urban development not under control at the perimeter; the permanent ownership and control of the entire urban tract by the municipality itself and its disposition by means of leases into private hands; the limitation of population to the number originally planned for the area’ (Mumford, 1965, pg. 34-35).

The monograph outlines the three ‘magnets’ that explain the attraction of the Town or Country and suggests that the ‘Town-Country,’ in the garden city configuration, is the strongest magnet (Figure 19). Howard (1902, pg. 47) argues that neither Town or Country represent the ‘full plan and purpose of nature’ and that ‘human society and the beauty of nature are meant to be enjoyed together.’ Town and Country must therefore be ‘married’ to form the Town-Country magnet. Howard maintained that his vision was ‘practicable’ and based on ‘principles which are the very soundest, whether viewed from the ethical or the economic standpoint’ (Howard, 1965, pg. 47-48).
Anglophone scholarly literature has seldom addressed the role of the ‘garden city’ model in urban planning in colonial Africa. Zeynep Celcik, Gwendolyn Wright and Paul Rabinow have only treated the subject en passant in the analysis of urban planning in French North Africa (Bigon, 2013, pg. 478-9). Bigon & Katz (2017, pg. 36) and Bigon (2012) trace the diffusion of the ‘garden city’ model and its adaptations and deviations in the French colonies across the African continent. Although the ‘garden city’ was envisioned as an alternative to industrialised urban environments, the colonial history of French West Africa did not involve an industrial revolution per se. Instead, the colonies were used as pools for the siphoning and exportation of raw materials and then as markets for manufactured goods.

The ‘garden city’ was disseminated as the cité-jardin model in West Africa and consisted of tree-lined streets, villas with verandas and gardens, and an abundance of vegetation, mainly for decoration (Bigon & Katz, 2017, pg. 59). This model, based on the ‘beaux quartiers’ in France, ‘haunts’ the settler who aspires to live in the manner of the bourgeoisie; ‘from his villa he [French expatriate in Dakar] dominates
his park, the garden boys, and can identify with the nobles or the bourgeois whose houses are enthroned in small urban parks88 (Sinou, 1993, pg. 308).

‘From Algeria to Madagascar, from Senegal to Congo Brazzaville and throughout the French dependencies and those of other nations, expatriate residential forms are often labelled ‘garden cities’ in these reports. The white residential area in Antananarivo (Madagascar) is described there as a ‘satellite garden-suburb’; in Thiès (east of Dakar) it is described as ‘a real garden city’; in Elisabethville (Belgian Congo) ‘a large garden city with greenery creates all the charms’ and even in Beira (Portuguese Mozambique) the white area is characterized as a desirable ‘garden city’. It is clear, however, that one should not look here for a direct application of the British Garden City movement but should understand this term as a successful inclusion of vegetation within the white residential quarters’ (Bigon, 2013, pg. 480).

The cité-jardin model was implemented in Dakar plateau and intended to imbue the area with an image of prestige. The Plateau has no function from an economic point of view other than bringing together employees of the colonial administration. As in Saint Louis, the streets of the Plateau were the first to be paved and outfitted with public lighting, effectively becoming the city centre of Dakar. Dakar Plateau is organised around several round public places and star-shaped avenues as urban planners adopted the same principles in most major colonial metropolises (Prost in Casablanca, Hebrard in Hanoi) or by other colonizers in sub-Saharan Africa, such as the Germans in Lomé (Sinou, 1993, pg. 301). The arrangement of the Plateau reflects the French colonial ‘pretensions’ in this part of the world. The main rond-point, a ‘simplified six-street version’ of the Rond-Point de l’Etoile in Paris exemplifies the ways in which mimicry of the metropole was inscribed in the narrative of Dakar’s development (Bigon & Katz, 2017, pg. 58) (Figure 20). In colonies across the African continent, the ‘garden city’ became the main type of settlement for the colonial administration. Lengyel (1941, pg. 30), a visitor to Dakar during this period wrote that ‘Dakar looks partly very French and partly very colonial’ and ‘if the visitor closed his eyes and forgot about the heat - which is, of course, out of the question - he might imagine himself in a corner of suburban Paris.’

88 See discussion on ‘hauntology’ on pg. 238
The 'garden city' model played a key role in deepening the racial polarisation of the urban landscape, a phenomenon described as 'dual cities' (Abu-Lughod, 1965; Bigon, 2013, pg. 477). While the plateau landscape featured buildings of 'international character, edged by trees and streetlamps,' the indigenous settlements appeared as a 'jumble of an African village, preserving a human texture despite the grid plan installed by the city administration' (Bugnicourt, 1982, pg. 28). Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) demonstrate how the city was divided between the 'modern, well-equipped, picturesque, white residential areas' and the 'ad-hoc African quarters' with limited and/or inexistent infrastructural developments, thereby relegating these areas to the 'waiting room of modern planning' (Bigon & Katz, 2017, pg. 69).

The emphasis on 'gardens' or 'jardins' in the cité-jardin model of Dakar Plateau meant that vegetation played a key role in the duality of the urban landscapes. On the plateau, the well-maintained garden represented the taming of 'savage' fauna – greenery conquering the desert and the mastery\(^8\) and 'domestication of a savage

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\(^8\) See discussion on 'mastery' on pg. 138
environment’ (Bigon & Katz, 2017, pg. 51-68). Historically, African flora ‘worried the White’ as humidity introduced by vegetation encouraged the presence of insects, snakes and disease (Sinou, 1993, pg. 307). The desert was ‘just as repulsive in the eyes of Westerners,’ reflecting the arduous journey of building an entire city from ‘sand’ (ibid). While the French, much like their European counterparts, considered any uninhabited or uncultivated parcel of land as ‘unoccupied,’ the Lebou, like many other colonised populations, saw these terrains as fulfilling various roles (Bigon, 2016, pg. 68). Vegetation played a key role in the pre-colonial settlement of Ndakarou. Prior to French occupation, vegetation such as the baobab or kapok were key to the layout of Lebou and Wolof settlements as they fulfilled an aesthetic as well as ‘spiritual, didactic, pragmatic and recreational’ function (Bigon, 2012, pg. 39). Bigon (2012, pg. 42) categorises the green spaces of Dakar-ville and Plateau as follows:

1. ‘Official’ gardens, designed according to French ‘formalistic tradition, such as those found in l’Hôtel de Ville and the Palais du Gouverneur General, and supervised by the Horticultural Service;

2. Public gardens and parks, such as those in Place Protet or the Jardin de Hann (Forestry Park of Hann, now known as Hann Botanical Gardens);

3. Tree-lined boulevards and avenues, which included imported species such as acacia and mimosa and native mango and banana. These served both an aesthetic purpose in their ‘resemblance to the urban arteries at ‘home’, a practical purpose in the ‘provision of shade in the tropical climate’, and a sanitary function through ‘swamp reclamation and other anti-malarial countermeasures, and the prevention of erosion on the sandy peninsula’; (Figure 15)

4. Corniche, a promenade along the eastern shore of the Plateau;

5. Decorative gardens of the European households located mainly on the Plateau and, to a lesser extent, in Dakar-ville.

The colonial administration imported trees such as the bougainvilliers and lauriers, and favoured vegetation such as the chestnut or platanus that calls to mind cities in France. Gardeners ‘trained on the French Riviera’ ‘simulated' the mood of the ‘old country’ in the vegetation of Senegal (Lengyel, 1941, pg. 31) (Figure 21).
Nature thus became ‘an object of consumption’ on the plateau and was subjected to the needs and aesthetics of bourgeois culture. The appropriation of native vegetation, once considered a factor of insalubrity, reflects the ways in which the French colonial administration subjected the native flora to its needs, turning it into a ‘symbol of civilisation’ and dispossessing it of its precolonial signification in order to embed it within the imported *cité-jardin* model (Bigon, 2016, pg. 52; Sinou, 1993, pg. 237). Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) reveals several instances throughout the empirical work when the natural landscape of the city is harnessed as tool of ‘modernisation.’ In modern-day masterplans, this approach is translated into matters of environmental preservation and ‘green cities’ agendas. The link that is drawn between the manipulation and preservation of nature that originated in colonial settlements such as Dakar Plateau is therefore recast in the neoliberal city agenda which links environmental conservation and ‘green’ policies to modern, wealthy enclaves\(^90\).

\[^90\text{See discussion on 'green cities' on pg. 161}\]
ii. Médina

Since the late nineteenth century, the French colonial administration sought to remove Africans from the economic and political centre of Dakar in order to establish their continued dominance and minimise growing concerns over increased immigration to the Cap-Vert (Nelson, 2007, pg. 231). The justifications for the physical and residential segregation of the European and African populations were based on colonial contentions around the inability of the French colonial administration to decontaminate poorly built African housing. The 'squalor which the African tolerated—particularly the co-habitation of people and domestic animals' and differences between African and French way of life, necessitated their segregation (Betts, 1971, pg. 143). Simply put, the 'barbaric collective' of native inhabitants, in the eyes of the colonisers, threatened the health of the European city which justified segregationist measures (Bigon, 2016, pg. 98-99). Ribot and Lafon (1908), medical practitioners in Dakar at the start of the twentieth century, called for the complete segregation of the natives, splitting Dakar into two districts: the European city and the indigenous city.

The 'Negroes [sic], even the most civilised, cannot submit to certain European habits, any more than the Europeans can adopt certain indigenous customs' which necessitated their segregation (Ribot & Lafon, 1908, pg.160).

The Médina was therefore conceived for the indigenous population who did not abide by hygiene rules and preferred to 'live as their fathers have always lived91.' The relocation of the indigenous population outside the city space was also justified by what Faye (2001) terms the 'battle against the hut.' This battle started in Saint-Louis where a decree of 1835 distinguishes between round huts (prohibited) and square huts (4 by 4 m and 3.4 m height) (permitted). This decree was based on the experience of the French administration in Fort de France when an outbreak of fire ravaged the city in 1800. A decree issued in 1902 on building materials and residence permits aimed to remove the African element from the city through direct purchase,

91 A.N.S, 3G2-160; from a 1916 report addressed to the Colonial Secretary from the Governor General.
expropriation or annexation (Moraze, 1938, pg. 611). By deconstructing the city’s infrastructure, down to the building materials, vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) reveals the inequality created and perpetuated by the components of the urban fabric itself. Building materials became an element based on which the segregation of the city was justified and enacted\textsuperscript{92}. French colonial authorities, however, were never able to advocate or enforce the complete residential segregation of Dakar on a legal basis since the local population was originaires, making segregation a tenuous issue.

The segregation of Dakar culminated in the creation of the Médina in 1914, following an outbreak of bubonic plague, which resulted in the expulsion of the African population from the ‘European’ city to the outskirts of the city. The initial response to the outbreak of plague was the establishment of two cordons sanitaires as a means of placing a large part of the country and the city into quarantine and prohibiting the free movement of Africans (Beeckmans & Bigon, 2016, pg. 420). These methods, however, were both inefficient and detrimental to the commercial life of the city. Throughout colonial French Africa, the cordon sanitaire also called zone interdite or zone non aedificandi appeared in a variety of forms, including a stadium (Dakar, Senegal), public parks (Rabat, Morocco), a dry creek (Niamey, Niger), and lagoons (in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire) (Bigo\textsuperscript{n} & Njoh, 2015, pg. 34).

In September and October of 1914, Gouverneur General William Ponty, following the example of urban centres in North Africa, issued an order for the relocation of the city’s African population to the outskirts of the city. The residences of the relocated people were destroyed and only European buildings (construction à l’européenne) were permitted within city limits. The colonial administration provided straw for the majority of residences in the Médina, and wooden beams and bricks, for those who ‘wished and could afford to build permanently\textsuperscript{[sic]}’ (Bigon, 2016, pg. 106). The French colonial administration justified the spatial segregation of the city by arguing that it allowed for the preservation of an indigenous way of life as African inhabitants of the Médina were ‘free to use local building materials, which were forbidden in the city’ (Njoh, 2016, pg. 7). This argument stands in direct opposition to the regulation

\textsuperscript{92} See discussion on ‘assemblage’ on pg. 76
on building materials within city limits (1902) which suggests that the Médina was not, in fact, considered part of the city of Dakar in the urban lexicon of the French colonial administration.

The African population was relocated to a disadvantageous bio-physical environment. The perishable building materials that were provided by the colonial administration for the African population to rebuild their destroyed homes resulted in...

Figure 22: Environs de Dakar, 1906 (Jojot, 1907)
in deteriorating living conditions that endure even today. The 1906 map of Dakar’s surroundings (Figure 22) reveals that prior to the establishment of the Médina, the north-western part of the peninsula, to which the African populations were relocated, was covered in ‘marigots,’ ‘brousse inculte’ (uncultivated bush) and ‘champs de mils’ (millet fields) (prohibited cultivations in the European city). This suggests that, up until the displacement of the native population, the area reserved for them was, in fact, considered uninhabited(able). The site selected for the relocation of the African population was sandy and topographically lower than the Plateau, and subject to flooding in the rainy season of *hivernage* (winter).

Originally named ‘*village de segregation*’ (village of segregation), the term Médina, the Arabic word for ‘fort town’ was borrowed from the French colonial experience in North Africa (Bigon, 2016, pg. 107). The term ‘Médina’ was adopted as a means of appeasing the local population in light of their relocation to unfavourable lands by appealing to their Islamic heritage. This name, however, is counterintuitive given the orthogonal layout of Dakar’s Médina which did not fit with the ‘intricate texture’ of the Islamic Medinas in North Africa (Bigon, 2008, pg. 491). The orthogonal grid layout of colonial urban planning was derived from Cartesian geometry that favoured parallel streets at right angles. The authoritarian top-down hierarchy imposed on precolonial settlements were ‘decidedly non-African and posed several challenges in terms of their ‘applicability and adaptability in Africa’ (Amankwah-Ayeh, 1996, pg. 64). The orthogonal layout also stood in contrast to the Plateau, which was arranged along roundabouts, star-like intersections with four to six wide avenues (Figure 23). Thus, the model of the Médina drawn from North Africa is no more relevant to Dakar than the plan for a ‘garden city’ as both logics were altered to suit colonial doctrine.

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93 Informal settlements throughout Dakar (Medina and Pikine) experience flooding during hivernage season and lack proper stormwater drainage infrastructure.
94 See discussion on ‘invented tradition’ on pg. 243
Bignon & Njoh (2015, pg. 28) note that while the streets of Dakar-ville and Plateau were christened and signposted, no ‘commensurate initiatives were undertaken in the native district’ as streets were only numbered to facilitate the government security apparatus\textsuperscript{95} (Bignon, 2008 pg. 491). The streets were indicated by numbers, from 1 to 71, and did not bear names until much later in the colonial period. The practice of toponymic ambiguity continued into the early 1940s and 1950s and was only rectified in postcolonial times when African names replaced numbers.

\textsuperscript{95} See discussion on ‘toponymic segregation’ on pg. 145
with *Avenue El Hadji Malik Sy*, connecting the Médina to the north towards the village of Hann and avenue *Blaise Diagne*, connecting the Médina to Dakarville (Bigon, 2016, pg. 89-90). Today, a visitor to the Médina may view this area as 'nondescript', 'chaotic' and 'disorderly,' lacking both street names and clear signage, but residents see names for streets and places in the 'shared mental imageries of their cities' which constitutes a defining element of 'cityness' (Bigon & Njoh, 2015, pg. 35).

Grid plans are never a spontaneous urban development and exist only through the conscious design objectives of agents shaping the policy and planning of the city. A key reason for the orthogonal design of the Médina was the surveillance of the African population. In the context of colonial Africa, well-aligned streets intersecting at right angles were designed for the organisation and beautification of the city but were also necessary to facilitate colonial surveillance of native populations (Njoh, 2015, pg. 103). A director of Public Works in the AOF stated that 'a single armoured car placed at an intersection [in the Médina] could control the entire length of two streets' (quoted in Bugnicourt, 1982, pg. 30). The layout of the Médina also facilitated the capture of deserters from forced labour and military service (Bigon, 2016, pg. 107). The first structure, southeast of the Médina were the barracks of the *Tirailleurs*, a 'rifle company of Senegalese soldiers loyal to the Empire, and who were, before 1911, recruited exclusively from rural colonial subjects' (Nelson, 2007, pg. 232-3). The strategic location of the *Tirailleurs* was intended to create a division in the urban space but also limit contact between Africans and Europeans, as a 'swathe of desert land and later a sizeable sporting arena bifurcated the Médina from downtown Dakar' (Nelson, 2007, pg. 233). The planning and design of the Médina reflects Haussmann's ideal in city planning which featured straight streets 'opening onto broad perspectives' (Benjamin, 1999, pg. 24). While contemporaries refer to this practice as 'strategic embellishment,' Benjamin (1999, pg. 23) points to the underlying goal of Haussmann's projects which was to secure the city against civil war by widening streets in order to make the 'erection of barricades in the streets of Paris impossible for all time' (ibid). The grand boulevards of the Paris and Dakar Plateau were meant to 'connect the barracks in straight lines with the workers’ districts' (ibid) and facilitate 'troop movement in the event of revolution' (Goonewardena, 2011, pg. 87).
The Médina grew rapidly, surpassing 25,000 inhabitants soon after it was established in 1914. While newly settled African populations were displaced from the city centre, the Lebou, the original inhabitants of the peninsula, resisted the transfer to the Médina. Having suffered numerous déguerpissements since 1862 and now subjected to the demolition of huts and the unwillingness of the Conseille d’Hygiène (Hygiene Council) to return the bodies of the infected for Muslim burial, the Lebou were brought to the brink of violent struggle. They rallied against the colonial administration whom they believed were collaborating with local French commerce to benefit from the sale of building materials imposed by the colonial decree (Bigon, 2015, pg. 210). In fact, the earliest anti-colonial resistance documented in the region was the boycott of Lebou and Wolof vendors in Marché Kermel (subject of Chapter Eight) who refused to conduct business with expatriate residents in response to the colonial government’s decision to force Dakar’s population to build ‘permanent’ housing in the city centre.

As a drastic and hasty response to an outbreak of plague, the Médina was both ‘ill-conceived and ill-received,’ and was only ever partially completed (Betts, 1971, pg. 148). Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) reveal that ‘in-between’ spaces (or ‘grey spaces; Yiftachel, 2014) originate in the duality of Dakar as native quarters were generally much larger than those of the Europeans, but were ‘disproportionately underserved,’ if at all, in terms of basic infrastructure (Bigon & Njoh, 2015, pg. 28). These in-between spaces constitute the grey spacing of the urban fabric that develop in between the rigid lines of orthogonal design. The area lacked proper drainage and access to sewage system, electricity, potable water and other amenities such as paved roads which were present early on in the European city. As Dakar continued to grow, other populated areas of ‘miserable housing’ surpassed the Médina but the latter still remains a ‘monument to hasty colonial decision’ in the making of a ‘planned ghetto’ (Betts, 1971, pg. 152).

Bugnicourt (1982, pg. 29) provides a telling, albeit crude, description of ‘dual’ Dakar which echoes the passage from Ryszard Kapuscinski (Voices IV), illustrating the ways in which the city looks very different ‘depending on whether it is viewed from the top or the bottom of the social system’;

‘The wealthy keep up with the films that are popular with the Parisians and in the French press. At parties, the young,
wearing rasta hairstyles, play Caribbean or Black American music and drink imported beverages. In poorer neighbourhoods, people flock to Hindu films which evoke, a little abusively, in the people's opinion, a certain Islamic culture, or else they go to see traditional wrestling or to hear tam-tam...The mimetic environment houses businessmen and civil servants, while the infra-urban areas contain the unemployed and those working part-time or temporarily. The former is home to some Europeans and to well-to-do Europeanised Africans, with overseas contacts; the latter houses a poorer population, with ties to the Sahel and to rural life' (Bugnicourt, 1982, pg. 28).

Conclusion

Beginning in 1914, Dakar was divided into three areas; the European city, the African village, and the economic centre where European traders conducted business alongside Lebanese, Syrians and Africans (Charpy, 2007, pg. 95) (Figure 24). The deepening segregation and inequality of Dakar is aptly described by Fanon’s (1961) description of the colonial world;

'a world divided into compartments, a motionless, Manicheistic world, a world of statues: the statue of the general who carried out the conquest, the statue of the engineer who built the bridge; a world which is sure of itself, which crushes with its stones the backs flayed by whips: this is the colonial world.'

As Dakar continued to grow as a commercial centre, rural migrants from all over French West Africa converged on the city, often ending up in in informal and squatter settlements at the outskirts of the European city. Despite deteriorating living conditions in these areas and the dire need for housing, the Office des Habitations Economiques, established by Governor General Jules Carde in 1926 only built twenty residential units for Africans by 1945 in contrast to the hundreds of villas built for French officials. By the 1920s, most of Dakar lived in housing that it 'conceived and partly built itself, without help from architects or officials' and without land titles96 (Bugnicourt, 1982, pg. 34). The following chapter demonstrates how the planning and actual growth of Dakar were continuously out of synch as masterplans that dictate the urban evolution of the city were baffled by the rate of urban growth in Dakar.

96 See ‘amorphous urbanism’ on pg. 35; Tonkiss on pg. 54; ‘aspirational maps’ on pg. 80
Figure 24: Plan de la Ville de Dakar, 1925 (Adapted from Gouvernement Général de l’Afrique Occidentale Française; Gallica)
Voices: Négritude

*Négritude* is an intellectual tradition founded by Aimé Césaire, Leon Gontran Damas and Leopold Sédar Senghor, based on valorising 'black' culture to counter the trend of continued European (colonial) denigration. Senghor, the first president of Senegal after independence in 1960, saw *Négritude* as a theory of ‘racial belonging’ and a ‘cultural rallying point’ for postcolonial affirmation (Harney, 2010, pg. 215). Poetry is a hallmark of the *Négritude* movement and is used as a vehicle to interpret, explain and come to terms with a history of colonisation and the ramifications of decolonisation. *Négritude* poetry is relevant to this monograph in its attempts to ‘give name to the nameless’ and voice to the subaltern (Lorde, 1984, pg. 37).

‘In the darkness of the great silence, a voice was rising up, with no interpreter, no alteration, and no complacency, a violent and staccato voice, and it said for the first time: ‘I, Nègre’

A voice of revolt
A voice of resentment
No doubt

But also of fidelity, a voice of freedom, and first and foremost, a voice for the retrieved identity’ (Thébia-Melsan, 2000, pg. 28).

The poem below is written by Césaire and expresses the profound disillusionment with narratives of modernisation and development as the latter failed to unlock the promises by western modernity. Furthermore, it conveys the effect of a newly established world order which forces the postcolonial, the southern, the subaltern to understand themselves as ‘inferior’ and ‘underdeveloped’ in a global hierarchy. The poem relates to Voices VII: Songs from Set/Setal and Sopi which echo the loss of hope in the wake of empty promises of modernisation in the postcolonial moment.

‘Prospero, you are the master of illusion.  
Lying is your trademark.  
And you have lied so much to me  
(Lied about the world, lied about me)  
That you have ended by imposing on me  
An image of myself.  
Underdeveloped, you brand me, inferior,  
That is the way you have forced me to see myself  
I detest that image! What's more, it's a lie  
But now I know you, you old cancer,  
And I know myself as well.’

Aimé Césaire, *A Tempest*
Throughout the planning history of Dakar, the phenomenon of urban sprawl has baffled the powers that be in their attempts to control and guide the growth of the city. As the analysis will demonstrate, the masterplans of Dakar are often playing 'catch up' to urban growth, unable to anticipate or accommodate the influx of people and the nascent forms of urbanity. Dakar is therefore characterised by a 'certain boundlessness' as the limits and borders delineated by maps and masterplans have never reflected the real contours of the city both in settlement patterns of new arrivals and the urban imaginaries of inhabitants (McLaughlin, 2001, pg. 155). Seck (1970, pg. 139) argues that it is 'inaccurate' to assume that Dakar has grown 'at random,' as authorities have never ceased in their efforts to organize the developing city (Seck, 1970, pg. 139). These efforts however were fruitless in light of 'spontaneous', 'deviant' and 'uncontrolled' growth that define the city's evolution. The development of Dakar has (never) been mastered despite repeated attempts by the central government (colonial or postcolonial) to bring it under control, resulting in a 'widening gap between the real city and the official city' (Tall, 2009, pg. 13-14).

During the 20th century, the colonial administration abandoned the policy of assimilation in favour of a doctrine of association that purported to embrace native culture and values. In the past, assimilation sought to overcome the obstacle of culture, religion and belief systems by teaching native populations the French way of life. The policy of association, however, called for greater respect for and preservation of 'distinctive local cultures, even cultural differences among indigenous people, including tribal councils and historic monuments' (Wright, 1991, pg. 73-74). The policy of association is best exemplified by the Exposition Coloniale (Colonial Expositions) which constitute an important exercise in placemaking politics by displaying the 'barbarity of colonised peoples' and the 'modernisation brought to them by France' (Morton, 2000, pg. 13). During the Exposition Coloniale of 1931 in Paris, the entire region of French West Africa, including Dahomey (Benin), Senegal, the Sudan (including Mali), Guinea, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Niger, and the Ivory Coast, was grouped in the Afrique Occidentale Francaise (French West Africa) pavilion while other French colonies were featured in their own pavilion (e.g. 97 Psychogeographies of the city vs. rationalities of planning
Morocco, Indochina). The entire region is put on display as an undifferentiated mass;

'The French West African section comprised a set of red stucco structures modelled after the *tata*, or fortified palace, and Muslim mosques of the Sudan. The work of Germaine Olivier and Jacques-Georges Lambert included a main pavilion with a tower, a mosque, a *rue Djenne* of shops, a village of huts along the lake, and a restaurant, all bristling with wood stakes, buttresses, and primitivist ornament. French West Africa was another invented political entity...As opposed to the Indochinese quadrant, however, this section did not express each colony with its own pavilion. Instead, the various countries were lumped into the main building, with individual exhibits on French colonial activity and indigenous culture for the eight colonies' (Morton, 2000, pg. 42).

The expositions revealed the social Darwinian hierarchies of the French empire in the amalgamation and juxtaposition of indigenous culture that differentiated between the 'higher' achievements of some regions (e.g. Indochina), and the 'primitive' productions of others. In this western laboratory, the colonial state sought to represent a 'human landscape of perfect visibility' through the classification of cultures presented in neatly bounded and coherent exposés (Anderson, 1991, pg. 185). The relevance of these expositions to the broader framework of planning in Dakar and Senegal is based on the shift in colonial doctrine which influences the transformation of the urban fabric. The goal of urban development was, and continued to be, to persuade the African population to ‘adopt our [French] civilisation, the highest and the best of all civilisations’ (Labouret, 1940, pg. 25). Associationist discourse was a calculated attempt to facilitate the exploitation of natural resources while appeasing the natives through the articulation of continuity between precolonial African societies and the colonial empire in the built environment. It is therefore an ironic turn of events that the practice of *déguerpissements* was further intensified during the 20th century, even becoming a necessary step in the implementation of masterplans.

The first masterplan of the 20th century was conceived by French architect H.L. Hoyez in 1938, followed by the 1946 masterplan designed by the French architectural firm Gutton, Lambert and Lopez. Michel Ecochard was the author of Dakar's first (post)colonial masterplan following the independence of Senegal in 1960. This masterplan, like its predecessors, tackled Dakar's main problem, 'a
problem of the greatest number,' brought on by the rapid and uncontrolled urban
growth and a worsening housing crisis (Beeckmans, 2014, pg. 852). Throughout this
chapter, the corrective mainstreams reveal the defining characteristics of Dakar’s
urban development that contribute to our understanding of 'cityness.' Specifically,
southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) exposes the implicitly racist
undertones of Dakar’s urban planning and looks at how they are translated in the
modern segregation of the urban landscape. Vitalist ontologies (Corrective
mainstream 2) attends to the infrastructural deficit in Dakar and the stark differences
between areas defined by uniform infrastructure and those with fragmented
infrastructure. Everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) focuses on the effects
of the masterplans on the urban majority and the creative adaptations of, or the push
back against, urban policy.

Plan Directeur d’Urbanisme (H. L. Hoyez, 1938)
In 1938, a federal council of the Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF) established
a Commission d’Urbanisme (Commission of Urbanism) to oversee the long-term
development of Dakar. The architect Hoyez, employed by the Ministry of Colonies
since 1936, was charged with designing a masterplan for the city. Hoyez presented
his masterplan (Plan Directeur d’Urbanisme) in 1938 which called for the extension
and expansion of Dakar. Much like Pinet-Laprade, Hoyez showcased the Beaux
Arts tradition in his plan which translated into an emphasis on the grandeur of the
city through monumental boulevards and squares. In an opus titled ‘Regards sur
Dakar’ (1938), Hoyez advocated rational spatial planning and the urban practice of
zoning to address uncontrolled urbanisation and provide a long-term outlook for the
development of the city. Although the masterplan was never implemented, it reveals
the core tenets of urban planning in 20th century Dakar. Among other things, the
need to restructure the ‘old’ city, Dakar-ville, the embellishment of the city through
total segregation (social and spatial segregation and functional specialization) and
the development of indigenous villages to the north of the peninsula, separated from
the rest of the city by zones of food crops (Chenal et al., 2009, pg. 72).

i. Zoning
In Hoyez’s masterplan, the practice of ‘zoning’ meant the division and development
of three distinct ‘zones,’ namely the indigenous, European, and industrial zones, in
such a way that they may grow without ‘colliding' or confronting natural obstacles (ANS 4P 48, *Un projet d’urbanisme en cours d’élaboration; note de Hoyez, Revue Nord Sud*, January 1939). Hoyez proposed the masterplan as a prospective look at the development and expansion of the suburban space and the enhanced circulation in and out of the 'old city.' In his accompanying notes, Hoyez was explicit about the need for delimiting the borders between the European and native city, and so-called neutral zones that would separate ethnic populations (A.N.S, 4P 64, Note de Hoyez sur la Circulation générale. Extensions suburbaines - Etablissements militaires - Etablissements hospitaliers - Abattoir).

Hoyez designated the eastern coastline as the industrial zone, the western and southern coastlines as the European zone, and the swampy central zone of the peninsula as the indigenous zone. Hoyez also introduced a ‘zone mixte’ (mixed zone) in his plan, located between the European and indigenous zones, which was intended for the ‘évolués’ as a transition zone for Africans who opted for a European lifestyle, as implied by the designation ‘zone mixte de transition’ (mixed transition zone). The ‘zone mixte’ was intended as a buffer, allowing a gradual transition from African to European zones and providing a space for Africans ‘transitioning' from an indigenous lifestyle towards an 'evolved' European way of life.

M. Hoyez intended this zone for the modest dwellings of Europeans and those of the natives who have the desire and the possibility of living in the European way to varying degrees. M. Hoyez believes that this zone will constitute a transition zone between the indigenous village which will remain in Médina and the European city (ANS 4P 46, report of the meeting of the Urbanism Commission, February 2, 1938).

This division was recreated in the ‘suburban' periphery of the city with an industrial zone in the north, European zone along the western coast, an African/indigenous zone in the new Médina, and between these, a zone for the évolués. Hoyez sought to mask the racial division created by ‘zoning' by changing the names and designations of the residential areas. Residential areas intended for Europeans were referred to as 'zone de résidence de première catégorie,' (zone of residences of first category). These zones represented the ‘neighbourhood par excellence,' typified by the ‘district of villas with gardens; the quiet neighbourhood where traffic is less intense, where the noise is excluded, where we rest and where life is good' (A.N.S, *extrait du Guide pratique de l'Urbaniste*).
extract from the practical guide of the urbanist). The zones located in the former 'cordon sanitaire' were designated for less wealthy Europeans and African évolués and made up the 'zone de résidence de deuxième catégorie' (zones of residence of second category), while the indigenous zones were referred to as 'zone de résidence de troisième catégorie' (zones of residence of third category). The racial segregation was also repeated in the 'zone mixte' with Europeans settled closer to the plateau and Africans closer to the Médina to allow for a 'smooth visual [racial] transition' (Beeckmans, 2013, pg. 123). Beeckmans (2013, pg. 123) notes that the 'zone mixte' located in the former cordon sanitaire was already occupied by Lebanese and Syrians which fell in line with the 'racially-honoured character that Hoyez had in mind' since it respected the 'colour line' imposed by zoning. By 1939, new building regulation meant that 'zoning' was now legally enforceable throughout the city. These regulations, based on previous French and Moroccan experiences, outlined specific and separate building and construction rules for each zone. Much like the regulations on building materials implemented in 1902, these rules further exacerbated the socioeconomic and racial segregation of the city. Despite having been purged the plan from racial terms, the reappearance of terms such as 'ville indigène' and 'zone mixte' are indicative of the underlying segregationist motives of urban planning.

The strong push towards actively controlling and planning Dakar's urban growth was met with little consensus at the government level as both the municipal and federal governments pushed forward with their own plans to no avail. Just as Hoyez was making headway in planning the urban development of the city, World War II erupted and plans fell into disarray as France and its colonies were swept up in the conflict. World War II diverted the aims of the French colonial administration towards the protecting French territory and colonies which 'reduced the efforts on progressive planning for the city of Dakar and caused a housing crisis in the city' (Mboup et al., 2015, pg. 8). The Hoyez plan has seldom been analysed in examinations of Dakar's urban evolution, primarily because it was never implemented. However, the masterplan is the foundation for the subsequent

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98 During World War II, Dakar, as the capital of French West Africa, was a strategic military post for warring nations as the allies sought to capture the port of Dakar in the Battle of Dakar (Diop, 2012, pg. 33).
masterplan designed by Lambert, Gutton and Lopez in 1946 and provides the
blueprint for urban policies on 'zoning' that determined the racialised urban
development of Dakar in the 20th century.

ii. Déguerpissements: Phase two

The Hoyez plan was founded on the displacement of native populations as an
integral part of the urban development of Dakar. The first phase of
déguerpissements dates to the initial annexation of Dakar with the implementation
of the Pinet-Laprade plan and the relocation of the native population to the outskirts
of the European city. The next phase took place during and after the establishment
of the Médina and is referred to, in official terms, as the 'voluntary exodus' of the
native population, continuing well into the 1930s (Faye, 2000, pg. 162). Everyday
urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) suggests that the 'voluntary' nature of these
displacements is highly debatable. The displacement of residents was engineered
by putting increasing pressure on urban inhabitants who did not possess the
financial means to build 'en dur' and therefore the capacity to comply with building
regulations99 (Faye, 2000, pg. 164). The Hoyez plan once again harnessed the
imperatives of sanitation in the eradication of the threat to the 'European city.' In
order to 'modernise' Dakar, the 'urgent evacuation of the demographic surplus of
natives' in the centre of the city was explicitly recommended by Hoyez at the
Commission of Urban Planning during a meeting on August 12, 1938. 'Old Dakar,'
however continued to 'defend itself; nestled in the shadow of massive constructions,
around even from the Government Palace, it survives sneakily in primitive huts
where is teeming with a brown undressed population'100 (Proust quoted in Goerg,
2006, pg. 15-45). Consequently, although the Hoyez plan was never implemented in
the city, it reveals the integration of segregation into the planning jargon and
mechanisms of modern urban planning deployed in subsequent masterplans of
Dakar.

99 See discussion on 'criminalization of survival' on pg. 47
100 See discussion on 'grey spacing' on pg. 85
Figure 25: Plan Directeur de la presqu’île du Cap Vert (Lambert, Gutton and Lopez, 1946; Seck, 1970)
Plan Directeur de la presqu'île du Cap Vert (Lambert, Gutton and Lopez, 1946)

In 1946, the architectural firm of Lambert, Gutton and Lopez was tasked with designing a masterplan for the Cap-Vert peninsula and its extension to Thiès, Popenguine and Mbour. This plan envisaged the extension of the city to the villages of Fann in the west and Hann in the east to create the subdivision of 'Grand Dakar' (Greater Dakar). The ‘Plan Directeur de la presqu’île du Cap Vert’ (masterplan of the Cap Vert peninsula) altered the city’s boundaries which were now determined by the entire Cap Vert Peninsula and projected a demographic growth of 1 million inhabitants by the end of the century (Figure 25). The population was, in fact, closer to 2.3 million by 2000. The city was divided into three zones (Dakar ville and annexes, Médina, and Grand Dakar – Figure 26). The city developed along three axes, each evolving according to the rationalities of its inhabitants.

‘The plateau and the Corniche Ouest were to get some high-class buildings and living facilities, actually assigned to the expatriate colonial community. Greater Dakar was equipped with some middle-class and lower-class buildings (SICAP and HLM). These buildings were for the use of a group of Africans whose purchasing power justified such property (civil servants, executives, etc.). Then those at the low end of the social spectrum, long-time city dwellers or recent immigrants, shunted aside by the urbanisation process, slipped into all of the temporarily vacant pockets. This explains the proliferation of poor districts and slums, amplified by the population growth of Cape Verde’ (Sow, 1983, pg. 48).

Grand Dakar experienced the fastest urbanisation, accounting for over half of the population of the city and included both modern areas with a ‘particularly successful urbanisation’ as well as the city’s ‘largest islands of slums’101 (Seck, 1970, pg. 167). The 1946 masterplan was funded by the large-scale investment program Fonds d’Investissement pour le Developpement Economique et Sociale (FIDES) (Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development) for nearly ten billion francs CFA and executed by the Service Temporaire d’Aménagement du Grand Dakar (STAGD), established in 1945 under the leadership of Roger Lantenois, directeur général des Travaux publics de l’Afrique Occidentale Française (Director General of Public Works of French West Africa).

101 See discussion on ‘splintered infrastructure’ on pg. 77
Lambert, Gutton and Lopez were also assigned the task of setting up a permanent urban planning service and drafting legislation that would facilitate the implementation of the plan. In 1957, the plan was amended by architects Cerruti and Marie-Appoline to integrate rural areas into the urban perimeter to account for the unanticipated speed of urban sprawl. Despite these amendments, the population projections on which both the initial and amended plans were elaborated were exceeded as the influx of migrants from rural areas continued to increase due to the industrial and commercial development of Dakar. Urban growth in the periphery of the city was so rapid, especially in the Médina, and later in Grand Dakar, that it was necessary to find an outlet in the east. It was under these conditions that the Dagoudane-Pikine (Pikine) district was created in 1952 to receive the ‘déguerpis’ of the Médina, Grand Dakar and outlying districts (Seck, 1970, pg. 146).

Figure 26: Three zones of Dakar (Adapted from Seck, 1970)
iii. Segregation

Once again, the western coastline was intended for Europeans, the eastern coast for the port, industry, and the swampy interior for the African population. The key difference with the Hoyez plan was the inclusion of a satellite district along the eastern highways near the cities of Thiès and Rufisque. The Lambert, Gutton and Lopez masterplan utilised the same zoning rationale as the Hoyez plan, further entrenching racial and socioeconomic classifications and divisions. Much like Hoyez, Lambert, Gutton and Lopez designated this segregation as ‘technical’ rather than racial. Their rationale for segregation, however, was based entirely on the perceived cultural hierarchies of African and European populations of the city.

Segregation is null, and we believe it is a mistake for both races who are in contact, the indigenous people who cannot develop their mode of existence, and the European who is constantly embarrassed by an embryonic mode of existence that is very different from that which he desires. [...] We have therefore imagined a segregation - but I insist immediately: a segregation that is not racial - a segregation that I will call technical (Raymond Lopez cited by Dulucq (1997); Dulucq quotes from the Committee on Urban Planning and Housing in the Colonies, Plan Director of the Peninsula of Cape Verde, Processional of the 3rd Sitting, 18 July 1946).

Southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) reveals that there was, once again, an effort to mask the racial categorisations of urban planning using ambiguous designations. Pseudo assimilationist motives were etched onto the design of the city, ensuring a legacy of socio-spatial segregation. The plan designated zones based on house ‘types’; linked houses (A), single houses (Small: B, medium size: C and large: D) and apartments (high-rise: E and low-rise: F). These labels were directly linked to the population living within the types of dwellings based on traditional family sizes and structures (i.e. housing for Africans (A), housing for évolutés (B) and housing for Europeans (C-F).

Areas A, reserved for closed habitat, respect the ancestral lifestyle of the majority of the indigenous population. Sectors B, located close to the previous ones, are open to the part of the indigenous population that seeks a habitat that conforms to desires for development Sectors C, D and E are intended for the European population. The sector F, unique in Dakar, [...], is reserved for the construction of collective buildings, isolated in the middle of gardens (Plan Directeur de la presqu’île du Cap Vert, 1946).
The terminology appears to uphold the motives of association of the colonial administration but only disguises the abandonment of assimilation in favour of segregation. Zones A, for Africans, were located in the interior of the peninsula while Zones B, for the évolués were once again a buffer between the African and European zones. Zones C and D were situated in prime locations including Ngor, Mermoz and Almadies, parts of the city which continue to house the elites even today. Zones E and F, denoting apartments, were located on the Plateau and intended for Europeans who required additional living space in the increasingly densely populated inner city. In a communiqué addressed to the AOF Public Works Agency regarding the urbanisation of Zone A, Lambert refers to this area as 'rural' and also indicates that this zone was not subject to the same building and planning regulations and policies as other parts of the city.

‘The 'A' zones of the Masterplan are rural areas, not urban areas. If the rural character of zone 'A' were to be abandoned, it would only be in violation of the Masterplan ... We would see these territories, primitively reserved for the detente of the African populations, invaded by heterogeneous constructions disseminated at random, and much more unfortunate than the simple indigenous huts, which are not prohibited in zone A of the Masterplan and which, in their simplicity, are aesthetically preferable to the proliferation of mediocre barracks.’ (ANS 4P 31; Letter from Lambert to the head of the AOF Public Works Office, Bigorgne, July 10, 1948).

The STAGD worked within the boundaries of the Lambert, Gutton and Lopez plan but made its own alterations. For example, the area designated as Zone A, reserved for Africans, and located in the Grand Dakar region was reduced in size while Zone B, intended for the évolués, was expanded in order to accommodate the AOF officers following the expansion of the federal parliament. Government officials of the highest rank (e.g. civil servants) were housed in the western part of Grand Dakar near the western coastline for Europeans. Lower ranking officials (e.g. police officers) were housed in the eastern part, indicating how the 'layered French society model was spatially translated' (Beeckmans, 2013, pg. 136). The STAGD was also responsible for developing the infrastructure of the Grand Dakar region including paved roads, sanitation, drinking water and electricity between 1951 and 1955. However, the STAGD was primarily concerned with developing the European zone, along the western coastline, and much less with the African/indigenous zone in the
inner part of the peninsula. As the city continued to grow, the colonial administration established Pikine-Dagoudane, 13 km from the city centre to control the overflow of population.

**iv. Pikine**

Unlike Dakar, Pikine was arguably created *ex nihilo*, and constitutes the first district of the suburban area of Dakar (Sow, 1983, pg. 48). The area, which was part of the public domain, was cleared and ‘equipped in very summary fashion... there was no road, no electricity, no market, no dispensary, no school’ (Sow, 1983, pg. 49). Pikine grew to be one of the most populous areas of Dakar – beginning with 20,000 inhabitants in 1959, 292,601 in 1976 and today counting more than 1,200,000 inhabitants (Zeliche, 2005, pg. 124). By 1960, 80,000 Africans were moved from the Médina and Grand Dakar and relocated to the periphery which no longer served as an outlet for Dakar residents but rather as an entry point for new migrants converging on Dakar. Pikine ‘*irregulier*,’ the part of Pikine that developed ‘spontaneously’ on the initiative of social actors, grew much faster than Pikine ‘*regulier*’, demonstrating the ‘pre-eminence of irregularity’ (informality) as a mechanism of spatial growth (Tall, 2009, pg. 15). The irregular city evolved ‘outside the reach of any government intervention’ (Sow, 1983, pg. 53).

The large investments that fuelled the growth of Dakar were not matched with equal investments in Pikine, thus preventing the periphery from developing into a fully-fledged district of Dakar. The area lacked nearly all basic infrastructure and was poorly connected to the city centre and the *déguerpis* who had already ‘broken ties’ with their rural lifestyles were relocated to an area where they were, once again, living in rural conditions (Seck, 1970). Furthermore, given that Pikine and Dakar were poorly connected, displaced Africans lost their homes as well as access to jobs, hospitals and schools. The problems afflicting Dakar were simply moved to Pikine. The already strained housing market was unable to accommodate new migrants from inland Senegal, forcing the latter to settle in *bidonvilles* (slums). The development of Pikine reveals the expansion of infrastructural archipelagos (Vitalist ontologies) as access to infrastructure (or lack thereof) was synonymous with the

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103 See disruption of socio-cultural infrastructures on pg. 76

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limits of social citizenship in Dakar. As Star (1999, pg. 379) remarked: 'study a city and neglect its sewers and power supplies (as many have), and you miss essential aspects of distributitional justice and planning power.' The presence and absence of infrastructure in Dakar and later in Pikine, are a testament to the inequality and spatial segregation of the city that stem directly from the urban plans of the city.

By 2001, three types of 'habitats' emerged in Pikine and represent the infrastructural archipelagos of uneven development;

1. The village-type habitat on the former sites of traditional villages such as Keur Massar and Yeumbeul. As old neighbourhoods became overpopulated, these villages were an extension of the city of Pikine. Agricultural activity is a primary means of subsistence in these types of areas with 80% of the active population in the district of Boune-village engaged in agriculture (Zeliche, 2005, pg. 128).

2. The 'irregular' habitat is defined primarily by the 'illegal' occupation of the land. Habitats are often installed in areas considered unfit for construction (lowlands, swamps, etc.) and afflicted by serious sanitation problems, particularly the evacuation of water during the rainy season (*hivernage*).

3. The last type of habitation is the planned and regular habitat. This type of habitation benefited from networks (roads, electricity, water) established by the state. These areas are subject to urban planning rules such as the formal prohibition to build with perishable materials and the strict enforcement of planning rules (Zeliche, 2005, page 129).

Article I of the Senegalese law on urban planning stipulates that the modernisation of Dakar must include all neighbourhoods including the 'semi-traditional' African neighbourhoods in the Médina and Pikine (Seck, 1970, pg. 147);

'The aim of the urban planning policy of Senegal is to integrate, in a general policy of economic development and social progress, the progressive and forecasting of the agglomerations. In particular, it aims at the rational use of land, the creation of a harmonious, physical, economic, cultural and social development for the population as a whole' [emphasis added] (*Loi n° 6460 portant code d'urbanisme du Senegal 15 août 1964; Law n° 6460 of the urban code of Senegal*).
The 1946 masterplan engineered the 'modernisation' of Dakar by simply removing impediments to development and deviant neighbourhoods from the city centre and relocating them to the suburbs. A law passed on June 17th, 1964 granted the state ownership of the 'vacant' lands of the Lebou, resulting in continued land conflicts and the legalization of the practice of 'accumulation by dispossession' (Harvey, 2003). The Lebou, the original inhabitants of the peninsula, fiercely protested the removals and expropriations and demanded compensation in the event of being moved from their ancestral homes. For many, leaving the 'heart of the city meant losing the slim chances for survival that had been acquired at great cost' (Sow, 1983, pg. 54). New arrivals to the city could not make similar claims, however, and were pushed to the periphery as Pikine today represents the largest département of Dakar region. The evolution of Pikine is therefore characterised by a 'vicious dialectic of dispossession' which draws people into the city 'while spitting others out of the gentrifying centre, forcing poor old-timers and vulnerable newcomers to embrace each other out on the periphery' (Merrifield, 2013, pg. 15).

Pikine provides an interesting restatement of the phenomenon of suburbanisation. Research on processes of suburbanisation have often focused on North American cities, but evidence suggests that the process must be evaluated and 'understood outside the conceptual boxes in which urban studies have conventionally filed the process' (Keil, 2018, pg. 497). Africa is witnessing the 'most pervasive forms of suburbanisation in the world at this conjuncture' (Bloch, 2015; De Boeck and Baloji, 2016; Mabin et al., 2013). The African context demonstrates the two drivers of suburbanisation; the 'wealthy' flight to enclaved spaces and the peripheralization of poor urban dwellers. The first driver of suburbanisation leads to the development of 'new economic activities, zones of middle- and upper-income residence (some of them 'gated')' (Keil, 2018, pg. 504). Chapter Seven examines this process in Dakar with the development of Diamniadio, a satellite city meant to decongest the city centre and offer the possibility of elite lifestyle. Pikine, however, is an example of the second driver of suburbanisation, as an outlet for poorer city dwellers. Pikine challenges notions of centre and periphery in the examination of African urbanisation. The debate is no longer about the 'intrusion of the countryside into the south'.

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104 See tenets of an urban theory of the 'global south' on pg. 64 (‘the future is outlined in the south’).
city, or of the city into the countryside' (Sow, 1983, pg. 59) but rather on the very definitions and understandings of what constitutes the urban;

'If ruralness today means walking along sandy streets, breeding chickens or a fetishist sheep that protects the line, consulting a healer to overcome sterility, sexual impotence, anxiety or insanity, or to get a promotion, then the Pikinois are still rural people. But this same ruralness is reflected in the fine residences of the top of the Plateau and of Fann, which house a certain bureaucratic and political elite of Senegal. Here, despite the barriers of money, the social splits and the possible alienation, the rites and the values are often identical. At this level, when it comes to Westernness, wrongfully synonymous with urbanity, people say 'never heard of it' (Sow, 1983, pg. 58).

Pikine is home to 1.6 million inhabitants in an area of 99.6 square km, compared to the 1.2 million of Dakar city (an area of 79.7 square km) (Mboup et al., 2015, pg. 8-9). The suburb reveals how definitions of density and urban sprawl are not only 'sterile or semantic, but also increasingly irrelevant, for the majority urban experience' (Keil, 2017; Tonkiss, 2013, pg. 43). An understanding of this urban phenomenon necessitates a shift from an 'unfounded duality' between the rural and urban, modern and tradition, western and non-western towards an understanding of the 'relationships of a dominant production system with a dominated production system' (Sow, 1983, pg. 55). The peripheral is therefore not understood as marginal to the centre as the relationship is recast in the 'exploded centralities' and 'reconfigured peripheries' that develop a 'life of their own in a world of complete urbanisation' (Keil, 2018, pg. 504).

v. Housing

Throughout the 20th century, the housing crisis in Dakar worsened as the colonial administration subjected the housing industry to colonial doctrine through spatial manipulations and population redistribution. The Société Immobilière du Cap Vert/Cap Vert real estate company (SICAP), founded by the Ministry of Overseas France in 1950, and funded by long-term loans from the Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre-Mer (CCFOM), was responsible for the construction of housing in the Grand Dakar region. Given the gravity of the housing crisis in Dakar, it was evident that the Office des Habitations Economique (OHE), founded in 1926 by the AOF was unable to cope with the increasing demand for housing in the city. Despite

105 See discussion on planetary urbanisation on pg. 81
the presence of private real estate organizations, including Crédit Foncier d’Afrique (CFA) and Crédit Foncier de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CFAO), and private real estate developers, particularly Lebanese, in the housing market, the city continued to suffer from a strong penury of housing. SICAP operated alongside STAGD within the limits of the Lambert, Gutton, Lopez plan - STAGD built the infrastructural framework while SICAP provided the housing. Between 1951 and 1960, SICAP built 3,602 homes for 30,000 inhabitants as well as open spaces, parks and public buildings. SICAP worked primarily with French companies including SOGRETA, COTRA and SODECO and obtained construction materials from France in order to keep the entire process under French control. During this time, OHLM and SICAP were interested in ‘experimenting’ with styles of community-making that broke with the French grid system, drawing on Scandinavian notions of the modern suburb106 (Melly, 2010, pg. 45).

SICAP held a monopoly over public housing in Dakar (and the AOF), using it for the forcible redistribution of African populations across the peninsula. SICAP built villas and buildings in Grand Dakar but the cost of this housing was often prohibitive, as only a minority of civil servants benefited from a regular income. SICAP provided ‘permanent housing’ for a select group of Africans by controlling building regulation, the allocation of housing and the location of socioeconomic groups in the city. For example, Dakaros earning less than 15,000 CFA were excluded from SICAP rental which was destined for inhabitants with a monthly salary of approximately 28,000 CFA (location simple/simple rental) or 52,000 CFA (location vente/rent to buy) (Odinet, 1962, pg. 7). SICAP policies soon became the subject of public debate and discontentment;

'[SICAP] does not do anything for a whole mass of Africans whose monthly salary is between 6 and 12,000 francs (CFA): drivers, typists, small staff who do not have sufficient financial means to amortize the construction of a house at 4,000 francs. per month (ANS, Internal Note, Meeting of the Board of Directors, 1951)

'[SICAP] helps especially those who are already a little favoured: by their income or by the stability of their employment’ (Odinet, 1962, pg. 60).

106 See discussion on city laboratories on pg. 134
The Senegalese socialist party newspaper, *L’Action*, issued an editorial that captures the building practices of SICAP and the hollowness of the association doctrine that allegedly underpinned the urban development of Dakar during this time period;

'[...we note that everywhere buildings and squares are erected, it is for the use and the satisfaction of the European populations that grow rapidly and a minority of privileged Africans of the colonial system.]

The colonial administration used the housing industry as a strategic tactic for 'muzzling possible dismay' as the 'offer of a modern house' was alluring to an emerging group of privileged elites who saw settled dwelling as a symbol modernity (Beeckmans, 2018, pg. 11). By harnessing social initiatives as a political tool, the colonial administration ensured the compliance of the native population in a loosely knit 'social contract.' The effect of housing policies resulted in visible changes to the urban landscape of the city;

'...the living quarters of Dakar Plateau were taken over by the *nouveaux- riches* and prominent bureaucrats of the new regime; black officials and soldiers have taken the places of their white predecessors in the Médina administration buildings and barracks; in the areas once occupied by the retrained colonial agencies have sprung up the presumptuous offices of the neo-colonial economic powers; into the areas which had been left free, as poured an enormous mass of emigrants from villages, in search of an illusory wellbeing' (de Carlo, 1983, pg. 73).

In addition, the housing model prioritised by urban policy and codes corresponded to the western vision of a family dwelling which was poorly suited to the needs of African households which were typically larger than their European counterparts\(^{107}\) (Chenal et al., 2009, pg. 72). The houses built by SICAP during this time, much like those of the Belgian *Office de Cités Africaines* (OCA) in Congo, were based on the average middle-class European family composed of four members rather than the larger African family. Thus, as argued by Castells (1977, pg. 295), in the 'arrangement of space [housing, hospitals, schools, transportation, etc.], the state,

\(^{107}\) Households were based on the ideal neighbourhood envisioned by Hoyez (see pg. 176)
through SICAP and STAGD, becomes the ‘real manager of everyday life.’ Architects, planners and engineers script a simplified understanding of society in order to incorporate new built forms into the world\textsuperscript{108}. In turn, technocrats fabricate new social worlds, which cannot be inhabited by the majority of urban dwellers. The tendency of SICAP to prioritize class-based housing over ‘culture-specific’ or ‘context-specific’ housing meant that public facilities in SICAP neighbourhoods were often absent or poorly maintained. Everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) reveals the ways in which African inhabitants of poorly serviced neighbourhoods dealt with the intentional oversights of housing programmes;

‘…small traders, Moors or Foulahs [were] forced to infiltrate daily, like guerrillas, to supply consumers with tea, tomato paste, matches and the like. The lack of commercial facilities and the related influx of small-scale traders therefore resulted in new and unanticipated patterns of use of the public squares and parks in the SICAP neighbourhoods, as well as in the transformation of SICAP houses, public toilets, and garages into shops and stores’ (Bugnicourt, 1982, pg. 33; Beeckmans, 2018, pg. 19).

The implementation of housing programmes in Dakar once again necessitated the segregation of populations. Racial segregation morphed into socio-economic differentiation. The forcible removal of Africans enabled SICAP and the Office des Habitations a Loyer Modéré (OHLM) to implement their housing program destined for the slowly growing middle class rather than the rapidly expanding urban poor population.

‘To date, the policy of the Office des HLM has been, in general, the replacement of slums by modern housing intended not for the former inhabitants of displaced slums but for higher social categories, as modern housing is transforming rather quickly into this same middle class of employees already encountered in the SICAP neighbourhoods’ (Seck, 1970, pg. 109).

Indeed, the implementation of a real estate program was only possible through the destruction of precarious housing, highlighting the claim that the ‘history of cities is only a succession of phases of construction-destruction, interspersed with unfinished models’ (Haeringer, 1996, pg. 8). Through the scope of southern

\textsuperscript{108} See discussion on ‘perceived space’ on pg. 115
urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) and vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2), the analysis suggests that the superimposition of subsequent masterplans has resulted in a process of ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1942) in the realm of urban planning. Creative destruction is the ‘incessant product and process innovation mechanism by which new production units replace outdated ones’ (Caballero, 2010, pg. 24). In Paris, for example, Haussmann’s ‘urban improvements’ reflect an instance of creative destruction when the newly conceived urban boulevards were destined to break through the ‘medieval street plan’ and open the city further to capitalist spatiality through the increased ‘circulation of goods, people and money’ (Hubbard, 2017). While the theory is used to explain macroeconomic performances – growth, economic fluctuations and structural adjustments – it also explains the ways in which capital and profit-making increasingly shapes the city (ibid, pg. 24). Cities are increasingly moulded by the ‘workings of the market’ and property industry that align with ‘modernist visions’ but have ‘little to benefit’ from including the poor (Watson, 2009, pg. 2260). These early processes and continued transformation over the years reveal a shift in rhetoric from ‘land as commons or land as livelihoods’ into ‘land as commodity’ which disguises local struggles of ‘dispossession and fast city aspirations’ (Datta, 2017, pg. 20). Therefore, the profit-driven housing industry of Dakar prioritised a view of ‘land as commodity,’ explicitly and perhaps intentionally undermining the ‘land as livelihoods’ that enabled the poorer African population to maintain a foothold in the city. In the process, the driving rhetoric behind urban growth and expansion legitimised residential segregation which was ‘no longer traced exclusively along racial lines, but now also along socio-economic ones’ (Beeckmans, 2018, pg. 3).

vi. Independence and welfare colonialism

As African nations (allegedly) shed their colonial yoke, southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) traces the mutation of colonial policy and rhetoric into present-day development discourse. During General de Gaulle’s visit in 1958 a vote for independence saw Senegal opt to remain under French rule in the ‘context of a legal framework that granted the country a substantial measure of decision-making autonomy’ (Diop, 2012, pg. 33). However, soon after the dissolution of the short-lived Mali Federation (which sought to create a union of Mali and Senegal with Dakar as a capital), Senegal declared its independence from France in 1960.
Political leaders of newly independent countries viewed urban planning as a way of 'representing, consolidating and dominating their power in space' (Beeckmans, 2013, pg. 161). While this discourse signalled a move away from segregationist planning, it would do nothing to improve the living conditions of the majority of inhabitants of Dakar and only deepened the socioeconomic polarization of the city. Development discourse, as it appeared on the African continent shortly before and after independence, is denounced as 'welfare colonialism' (Young, 1994), 'development colonialism' (Cooper, 2002) and the 'second colonial occupation of Africa' (Low & Lonsdale, 1976). Cooper (2002, pg. 16) traces the development idea from 'colonial project to national project' and asks whether the national project 'reproduced certain aspects of the colonial one – such as the belief that 'experts' should make decisions for others.'

As in many other newly independent countries, the development of Senegal and Dakar, in particular, was characterized by both continuity and change as new multilateral development agencies emerged while other bilateral development agencies maintained their colonial functions (Beeckmans, 2014, pg. 849). This trend was also noted in Anglophone colonies where British colonial officials reappeared as development experts in the 1960s and 1970s (Craggs, 2014). Development organisations and donor countries offered their expertise to African nations and provided new opportunities for architects and urban planners to extend their professional practice throughout African countries as the latter once again became the 'experimental terrains' or laboratories of urban planning.

The French **Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Sociale** (Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development) (FIDES), renamed **Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation** (Aid and Cooperation Fund) (FAC) after independence was run by former colonial officers, the United Nations and the World Bank. Through the scope of southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1), the evolution of the former colonial finance structure into modern-day development agencies such as the **Agence Francaise de Developpement** reveals that the mechanisms and rationales guiding the urban development of Dakar are still at work and have simply been renamed and reconstituted (Figure 27). Governing bodies and financial institutions that guided the development of Dakar during colonial times merely changed names and adopted a new status but resumed their activities,
unfettered by the ramifications of the 'post'colonial moment. The instruments of development that govern the urban evolution of Dakar will be discussed in detail in the following section with the implementation of the first postcolonial masterplan.

**Plan Directeur du Cap Vert (M. Ecochard, 1967)**

*i. Urbanisme evolutif*

In 1960, Jean Dresch described Dakar as a ‘monstrous metropole whose accelerated growth brought despair to urbanists’ (quoted in Zeliche, 2005, pg. 124). After Senegal gained its independence in 1960, French architect Michel Ecochard was tasked with designing the first masterplan of the postcolonial era. In 1967, Ecochard presented a plan for the Cap Vert Peninsula and proposed a ‘two-pole’ development of Dakar and Pikine, which were projected to expand over a period of 15 years and eventually form a single urban agglomeration (Figure 28). During his time as head of the Urban Planning Department of Morocco (1946-1952), Ecochard elaborated the concept of ‘urbanisme evolutif’ (evolutionary urbanism) – known as *Trame Ecochard* – based on the assumption that urbanites who improved their living conditions could simultaneously improve the quality of their homes. This notion is underpinned by a development-as-modernisation discourse which suggests that ‘an improvement in infrastructure can create incentives for increased investment in housing construction’ (Gulyani et al., 2014, pg. 102). Ecochard drew a great deal from his experiences in North Africa. His plans for Dakar were much more aligned with the existing spatial and social conditions of the city than previous plans based entirely on *metropole* experience and expertise. However, in recycling plans designed for Casablanca and Rabat, he also revealed a fairly generalizing idea of African society,
assuming that planning concepts could be seamlessly carried over from one context to the other. This reiterates the colonial inclination to view northern African cities as a more valid examples of ‘modernisation’ and ‘urbanism,’ thereby justifying their replication in sub-Saharan Africa. Ecochard also subscribed to the modernist separation of functions such as inhabiting and working and emphasised the importance of including public facilities in new and existing neighbourhoods. He was inspired by the ‘neighbourhood unit,’ drawing inspiration from New York City. Ecochard quite literally called his neighbourhoods in Dakar ‘unités de voisinage’ (neighbourhood units) (Beeckmans, 2014, pg. 857).

Ecochard, a self-professed ‘urbaniste tiers mondiste’ (third world urbanist), began his work in Dakar in 1963, following his appointment as urban planning consultant by President Leopold Sédar Senghor and funded by the Secretariat des Missions d’Urbanisme et d’Habitat (SMUH) (depends on funding from

Figure 28: Plan Directeur de Dakar et du Cap Vert (Ecochard, 1967; Archnet)
FAC; Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation). Ecochard conducted extensive surveys of Dakar for three years following his appointment alongside the Senegalese authorities to collect socioeconomic, demographic and geographical data on the city. He was also tasked with developing plans for other Senegalese cities including Kaolak, Saint Louis, Diourbel, Louga and Thies as a means of slowing emigration towards the capital city. From the very beginning, Ecochard opposed the existing housing policy of the Senegalese government, which he viewed as biased in favour of higher classes of society while ignoring the urban majority. He also criticized the policy of déguerpissements, a colonial legacy repackaged and rebranded as 'recasement' in the 20th century (Beeckmans, 2014, pg. 853). 'Recasement' involved the removal of slum dwellers from the centre of Dakar to the periphery, Pikine, in order to develop modern neighbourhoods for public officials who could afford to live in the city centre. Between 1965 and 1975, nearly 130,000 déguerpis were displaced from 1,000 shanty towns and relocated to the periphery in Pikine and Guédiwaye. Governmental regulations that rendered these settlements 'unlawful' simultaneously produced 'specific images of modernity' that legitimised the displacement of those 'polluting' the landscape and deemed 'unfit to belong to the city' (Fredericks, 2014, pg. 535).

Ecochard was highly critical of the complacent attitude of the Senegalese government towards the development of Pikine, as Vernière (1977, pg. 229) warned against repeating the mistakes made in Dakar, in Pikine:

‘For independent Senegal, it might be desirable not to reproduce models and errors of European origin, not to continue an experiment inaugurated in 1952 by the colonial powers. Without going so far as to glorify the ‘irregular’ a certain policy of ‘laissez-faire’ towards them (actually in recent years).’

Ecochard also condemned the neglect of public facilities and open spaces in the SICAP and OHLM neighbourhoods in Dakar. In her analysis of Ecochard’s work, Beeckmans (2014, pg. 857) notes that his masterplan and its proposal often appeared more as a ‘political manifesto than an urban planning report’ with a ‘very moralistic’ tone. Ecochard proposed educative television programs that would teach the African population the ‘modalities of urban life’ and also suggested ‘cultivating a sense of public responsibility and civil awareness among the inhabitants of Dakar’ (ibid). He was increasingly frustrated by modifications to his plans, made without his consent, and incompatible with his
vision of urban development in sub-Saharan Africa. The continued lack of public facilities in Pikine indicate that the work of semi-public housing institutions was defined by the *Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique* (CCCE), making the cost-effectiveness of any housing programme a top priority over the pressing needs of urban inhabitants.

In order to cut costs in the implementation of the Ecochard plan, SICAP removed all ‘non-profitable’ elements from the plans and encouraged rented houses rather than private properties as the former were more lucrative. Ecochard denounced these practices as a colonial vestige that dictated a kind of urbanism based on profitability rather than social development;

‘Although on a previous occasion he had already accused OHLM of hijacking his proposal for public housing in the former *cordon sanitaire*, the problem escalated when SICAP decided, without informing Ecochard in advance, to omit a major core of public facilities in Quartier B, a zone roughly corresponding with the area of Grand Dakar in the centre of Dakar. In Quartier B SICAP built almost all its neighbourhoods, most of them organised around the central ‘*Rond Point de Libérté*’ and usually containing the prefix ‘SICAP’ in their name. Instead of a public centre aimed at servicing more than 50,000 inhabitants, SICAP’s ambitions were to develop the site as an (exclusive) residential neighbourhood, which would later be known under the name SICAP Libérté V’ (Beeckmans, 2014, pg. 860).

The French investment bank CCCE (*Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique*), central fund for economic cooperation, threatened to withdraw from SICAP if the SICAP-Libérté V neighbourhood was not built according to its plans. Thus, the postcolonial evolution of Dakar was increasingly determined by investment policy109. Despite numerous protests, Ecochard’s plans were repeatedly modified in order to fit the agenda of key players in the housing industry and urban planning which ultimately lead to his resignation as urban planning consultant in 1967 soon after the approval of his plan. Consequently, and perhaps inadvertently, Ecochard’s ‘*Plan Directeur du Cap-Vert*’ fuelled the tradition of exclusion and segregation perpetrated by its predecessors, rather than fostering the development and prosperity Ecochard intended. Furthermore, given that subsequent masterplans of

109 Increasingly, the urbanisation of Dakar is driven by investment policy as the agenda of market-driven competitive cities governs the spatial regime of urban growth.
Dakar continue to base themselves on Ecochard’s 1967 plan, this mechanism is still active today and determines the contours of Dakar’s ‘cityness.’

Conclusion

Despite gaining independence in 1960, the first masterplan of Senegal’s capital city was, once again, devised by French urban planners and entrusted to French expertise (Ecochard, 1967). Planning ideas therefore continued to travel in one direction and recycled colonial policies and plans that were ultimately imposed on the urban fabric of the city. This time period was marked by the ‘radical importation of techniques, of formal aesthetics’ and an ignorance or rejection of local traditions and ‘popular imagination’ (Depret, 1983, pg. 70).

An analysis of 21st century urban planning reveals that masterplans of Dakar did not capitalise on the seemingly egalitarian hopes brought by independence. In the early 1970s, rural-urban migration increased in response to the effects of environmental degradation in the Sahel (Zeliche, 2005, pg. 122). During the 1980s, under the pressure of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), the state struggled to provide basic urban services to a large portion of the city’s population and disengaged from the sectors of real estate and housing (ibid). Since then, nearly 90% of the demands for housing each year are fulfilled by promoters and real estate partners or through ‘self-help housing.’ The dynamics of the housing crisis in Dakar meant that the limited means of vulnerable groups precluded them from accessing housing due to the scarcity of long-term resources and the difficulties in mobilizing personal contributions for leasing programs. As a result, official sources estimate that between 25 and 45% of the urban area of Dakar has been occupied outside the legal norms as the built environment of the ‘official city’ lags behind the production of the city by popular initiative which continues to evolve outside of state supervision and control (Tall, 2009, pg. 82). In their efforts to address the problems of urbanisation, the implementation of plans and urban development reforms often resulted in worsening socio-economic segregation and the deepening polarization of cities. As the borders of the city were expanded to include Pikine, Thiès, and Rufisque, these towns were not developed with the same zeal as Dakar and only benefited from rudimentary design and infrastructure while remaining poorly connected to the city centre.
The masterplans of the 20th century reflect the extent to which development discourse has permeated the urban plans of cities, ‘charged with hopes for redress and self-affirmation’ (Sachs, 2001). Southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) reveals that despite the pitfalls of development, this discourse is firmly rooted at the heart of Dakar’s urban development. Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) demonstrates how this continued emphasis on the development narrative is epitomised in the ‘service delivery myth’ (Pithouse, 2011), which is an apt characterisation of the worsening infrastructural and service deficit in Dakar and the public responses to fragmented and/or absent urban infrastructure. As it took hold in Dakar and across the African cities more broadly, the articulations of the development discourse meant that service delivery was ‘assumed to be the natural metric for measuring the performance of the state’ (Pithouse, 2011). Masterplans delineate a future for urban inhabitants who are now viewed (and planned for) as ‘consumers or beneficiaries who just need to be plugged into the grid of serviced life by a benevolent state’ (ibid). The masterplans, however, do not only ignore the difficulties of access, but they also deny the ‘rebellion against service delivery’ and ongoing creative adaptations of existing infrastructure;

‘When delivery means an eviction from a shack in a community of which you are a valued member, and which is near to your work and your children’s schools to a transit camp filled with strangers in the middle of nowhere it can be a catastrophe. When delivery means the installation of a water or electricity meter to someone who previously, legally or illegally, had non-commodified access to water or electricity it can also be more of a curse than a blessing. Delivery, in the form that the state currently offers it to people, is fairly frequently refused and it’s not unusual for it to have to be implemented at gunpoint’ (Pithouse, 2011).

‘Cityness’ can therefore be translated into a language of delivery and access – the right to incorporate oneself as an active participant rather than passive consumer. As a result, urban spaces become more fragmented along socioeconomic lines, and planning is responsible for not only recasting ‘notions of citizenship in the terrain of racial difference’ but also for delineating different city spaces ‘separated by boundaries of class’ (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004, pg. 356).
Voices: Mon Super Kilomètre

Dakar is a city defined by its architecture and art. Bolstered by the Négritude movement, Dakar positions itself as the heart of Black African culture. The city hosts Dakar Biennale, or Dak’Art, a major exhibition of African art, since 1996. The photographs presented here are part of an art installation from Dak’Art Biennale 2018. The installation was located at a critical juncture in the city between Gueule Tapée and the Médina as a metaphor positioning art at the heart of the city and the city at the heart of art. The artwork does not only depict the urban fabric but becomes a part of it, simultaneously representing and becoming a part of Dakar’s ‘cityness.’
'Mon Super Kilomètre' is an open-air gallery which responds to the rhythm of the city. That city is Dakar and this gallery aims to break its social and aesthetic barriers. The painter appears alongside the fishmonger and the car mechanic. The photographer contends with the tea vendor and the tinker. The artist, whether recognized by academic institutions or not, takes up, on a daily basis, with both the handyman and the Fine Arts school alumnus. Opposites, or at least what we could have defined as such, get closer and discover each other and contradict themselves, in a wise and civilized atmosphere of the palaver tree. Here is the city. The omnipresence of the city that gives it its vitality. A simple pleasure to be together for a moment that hopefully could last forever, as is the case in any meeting' (Simone Njami, 2018).
Chapter Seven: Layers III (2001-2035)

The Plan Directeur d'Urbanisme de Dakar Horizon 2025 (PDU Horizon 2025) is the first masterplan of the city in the 21st century and was elaborated by the Ministère du Renouveau Urbain, de l'Habitat et du Cadre de Vie (Ministry of Urban Renewal, Habitat and Urban life) of Senegal with the help of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). PDU Horizon 2025 was never implemented due to a series of problems and shortcomings that rendered it ineffective as a planning tool. The masterplan was never developed with a clear understanding of local conditions and suffered from inefficient communication with grassroots actors. The lack of participation of local communities throughout the plan drafting process hindered the elaboration of grounded knowledge and limited its relevance and acceptability to the actors in charge of its implementation. The masterplan was disconnected from a reality in which the continued, and often necessary, encroachment on public infrastructure resulted in the transformation of railroads into garbage dumps, four-lane highways into two by the ‘invasion of informal activities,’ the destruction of natural reserves by the expansion and construction of real estate (niayes), and the sprawl of slums built on treacherous terrain regularly submerged by rain (Zeliche, 2005, pg. 125).

The involvement of Japan in the design of the masterplan for Dakar originates in the Tokyo International Conference of African Development (TICAD), first held in 1993. The conference laid out the terms of involvement between Japan, African nations and international organisations for the betterment of economic, social and environmental conditions of the African continent (Kato, Director General of the African Department, JICA). JICA positions itself as a strategic development partner in Senegal, and across Africa, by emphasising the fact that the most pressing problems plaguing African cities, namely rapid and uncontrolled population growth, are relevant to Asian cities as well. Despite the involvement of new development partners, the masterplans of 21st century Dakar reveal the unchanged modernist underpinnings of the city’s urban development. The ‘modernist persuasion’ of planners, architects and urbanists is evident in the recycling of traditional urban planning tools in the masterplans including the ‘zone’(zoning) that distinguishes areas with ‘ambiguous boundaries’; the ‘census' for calculations ‘on which to base
Throughout this chapter, southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) identifies the silences of the masterplans on the issues of poverty and informality. It also problematises the sanitised render of the satellite city as an extreme form of mimesis in the making of ‘hyper modern’ enclaves in the image of Dubai (which itself is arguably based on the Euro-American model). Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) addresses the continued fragmentation of the urban infrastructure as the infrastructural deficit of the city is increasingly determined along socioeconomic lines. Conversely, this corrective mainstream also addresses the making of Diamniadio, a fully equipped, serviced, and ‘green’ satellite city located on the outskirts of Dakar. Everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) engages with the disconnect between the masterplans and the reality on the ground as the definitions, descriptions, data and imagery incorporated in the masterplans are not only misleading but also irrelevant to the lived realities of the urban majority in Dakar.

110 See ‘defining the urban’ and ‘delimiting the urban’ on pg. 57-62
Figure 30: Plan Directeur d'Urbanisme de Dakar et ses Environs Horizon 2025 (Ministry of Urban Renewal, Housing and Living Environnement, 2001; Republic of Senegal and JICA)
Plan Directeur d’Urbanisme de Dakar Horizon 2025 (Republic of Senegal and Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2001)

PDU Horizon 2025 was never implemented but represents an important example of the power of a master narrative to dictate the direction of Dakar’s urbanisation in the 21st century (Figure 30). A number of projects currently underway in Dakar were developed on the basis of the 2025 masterplan. Among these projects are the Blaise Diagne International Airport, the extension of the Dakar-Diamniadio motorway, the extension of the VDN (Voie de dégagement Nord; northern clearance road), the development of the urban hub of Diamniadio, the development of a special economic zone (SEZ), and the construction of the new port of Sendou.

The fate of PDU Horizon 2025 was similar to that of previous masterplans of Dakar which were founded on ‘well-established colonial logic,’ but baffled by the reality of a city that has developed ‘anarchically’ in the years since its creation (Cities Alliance, 2010, pg. 7). The city is typified by an extreme spatial imbalance and incoherent territorial divisions worsened by a lack of strategic and concerted planning at the local, departmental and regional levels. PDU Horizon 2025 is the first masterplan for Dakar since the Ecochard plan of 1967 which was revised in the 1980s to account for urban growth and sprawl. Despite the deployment of longer-term planning mechanisms from previous plans, this gap in the timeline of Dakar’s growth suggests a growing disconnect between the narratives and imaginaries of the ‘dream city’ of masterplans and the actual development of the ‘real’ city. Masterplans are, to different extents, insufficiently applied to determine the spatial evolution of the region, leading to ‘une urbanisation sous-intégrée’ (under-integrated urbanisation). This expression, borrowed from the Moroccan geographer Mohamed Naciri, explains the uneven planning and organization of cities in the developing world. Under-integrated urbanisation has resulted in the development of areas that are located within the cartographic borders (delineated by the masterplan) of the city but are still poorly connected to ‘the city,’ due to derisory or non-existent basic services and economic and social marginalisation111 (Sané, 2013, pg. 315).

111 See urban fragmentation on pg. 77
The ‘dream’ city

PDU Horizon 2025, approved in 2009, sought to create a new urban structure for the city by increasing the size of the region to cover the full extent of the peninsula and form what is now called Dakar region. The anticipated annual population growth of the region was projected at 3.0% beginning in 2001 and amounting to 5,020,000 urban inhabitants by 2025 (Ministry of Urban Renewal, Habitat and Urban life, 2001). The PDU Horizon 2025 outlines the key goals for the urban development of Dakar as follows:

1. To develop a balanced spatial plan for the three départements of the region, Guédiwaye, Pikine and Rufisque, while maintaining the centrality of the département of Dakar;
2. To improve the transportation links between the different territorial entities (Dakar-Pikine-Diamniadio motorway, VDN (Northern Clearance Road), north-south road axes, and maritime transport network, etc.);
3. To meet communities’ expressed needs through planning by taking into consideration the socio-economic and spatial characteristics of various groups; specifically, to guarantee people access within 30 minutes (reasonable access time) to better basic urban services (water, electricity, education, health care, markets, etc.);
4. To manage population growth through effective and efficient decentralization, combined with intensified education and awareness;
5. To preserve and improve the urban environment and natural sites through stakeholder involvement (Ministry of Urban Renewal, Habitat and Urban life, 2001).

The emphasis on spatial balance throughout the urban agglomeration stems from the primacy of the département of Dakar over the territory which translates into the concentration of infrastructure in Dakar (département) and Dakar Plateau at the expense of the remaining départements of the region, and communes d’arrondissements in Dakar. Urban bias in Senegal has resulted in a ‘disproportionate allocation of resources’ to the capital city (O’Brien, 2008, pg. 8). The Plateau district contains, governmental, national, regional and administrative services, as well as commerce, higher education institutions, medical facilities, and
financial, cultural, manufacturing and logistics institutions. Urban services are concentrated in an area which makes up only 0.3 per cent of the map presented by PDU Horizon 2025. This imbalance is such that the region’s entire population is forced to travel to the southern tip of the peninsula for certain urban services (Chenal, 2014, pg. 104).

Originating in urban-industrial models (Lipton, 1977), the concept of urban bias points to a marked bias in favour of the urban sector, at the expense of the rural sector, leading to an inefficient allocation of resources, government expenditure, and development spending in favour of urban areas. In Dakar, however, this phenomenon appears as an 'overdeveloped town set against the impoverished countryside' as Dakar region contains non-urbanised areas that create a stark division within the urban 'built up' landscape (Figure 31) (O’Brien, 2008, pg. 8). Thus, while the colonial administration had to contend with remnants of the African settlement in the European city (in the battle against the hut); today, the administration must contend with this legacy of disjointed urbanisation as the landscape of Dakar, from one place to another, challenges definitions of ‘the urban’.

The situation in Senegal also points to 'dispositional urban bias' (Jones & Corbridge, 2007) as urban life, concentrated in the networked and serviced parts of the city, is likened with ‘modern’ and ‘developed’ visions of city living, despite a reality in which the majority of the city's population lives in informal settlements and shantytowns, 'scraping a living as best they can' (O’Brien, 2008, pg. 8). This explains both the continued allure of the city for rural-urban migrants but also provides a Senegalese example of Ferguson’s (1999) ‘expectations of modernity.’ People’s ‘desire for development’ appears to be caught up in their desire to be in and of the city (Matthews, 2017). Dakar, the ‘dream city’ of Kapuscinski’s description (Voices IV) and the ‘illusion’ of Césaire’s poem (Voices V) paid the price for its ‘astonishing attraction’ in the ‘extreme concentrations of people for whom it constituted the miracle’ (Vernière, 1977, pg. 8). The advantages of living in Dakar, even the periphery,

112 See discussion on planetary urbanisation on pg. 81
underpin the never-ending struggle of urban inhabitants to stake their claim in the city and their right to 'cityness.'

Figure 31: Spatial evolution of Dakar region (Adapted from N’diaye, 2011)

The 'real' city

The issue of access to basic urban services, particularly in Pikine, continues to be a key preoccupation of city plans. 'Auto-construction' (informal) is difficult to quantify, but estimates suggest it satisfies an estimated 84.75% of the demands for housing (PDU Horizon 2025, 2001, pg. 148). Since auto construction does not respect building regulations in the city, it is difficult to collect reliable statistics on the size of this phenomenon. To significantly increase the supply of housing and land purposed for building, the plan proposes to do the following: i) develop large extension areas; ii) facilitate access to credit; iii) provide adapted housing (based on family size and dwelling preferences) (PDU Horizon 2025, 2001, pg. 148). The PDU also aims to enable greater access to water and electricity as well as to education and health services. The issue is complicated by the massive population growth taking place in the city which the PDU proposes to address through a strengthening of population policy at the state level and through decentralization policy at the local level. By promoting poles of economic development at the national level, the PDU proposes to reverse rural-urban migration and ease the pressure of population growth on Dakar.
Previous studies conducted on the postcolonial development projects across sub-Saharan Africa ‘almost unanimously highlight their failure’ in the domain of architecture and urban planning but also in rural development, education, road and rail infrastructure (Beeckmans, 2014, pg. 865). PDU Horizon 2025 is one of these notable failures. Delays in the elaboration of the plan (initiated in 2001, approved in 2009) meant that many of the borders and guidelines drawn out by the map were exceeded by the spatial growth of the city by the time the plan was finally approved. This echoes Brenner & Schmid’s (2015) point on the falsity of urban borders and delimitations within the scope of ‘planetary urbanisation’ and the need to reimagine our understanding of the urban. Furthermore, the plan bases itself on the assumption that the city will densify rather than sprawl. However, urban sprawl has defined the spatial evolution of Dakar since the first masterplan in 1862. The PDU does not propose a plan or mechanism for dealing with urban sprawl and bases its population projections on calculations that validate the current situation for the next 25 years (surface required per family multiplied by the number of new residents). Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) reveals that the ‘detailed urban diagnostic’ of PDU Horizon 2025 for the appraisal of key urban issues, including infrastructure, environment, housing, and basic amenities, fails to understand and attend to the fundamental issue of land as ‘we ultimately learn very little about the market mechanisms of parcels in Dakar’ (Chenal, 2009, pg. 104). The PDU draws from multiple sources and does not use the same points of reference or administrative divisions (e.g. the divisions are either by département or by region) which makes it difficult to understand the situation on the ground.

Perhaps most importantly, southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) demonstrates that the PDU ignores or glosses over issues of poverty, presenting Dakar as a city like any other (Chenal, 2014, pg. 107). The masterplan falls in line with President Abdoulaye Wade’s vision of transforming Dakar into a ‘world-class city’ with ‘five-star hotels and modernized highways’ during his presidency (Melly, 2010). Through large scale and often controversial infrastructural projects, Wade positioned himself as the ‘builder of modern Senegal’ by attracting funding from a range of sources to finance projects that ‘sold the dream of a modern city […] to the Dakar people’ (Sarr, 2013, pg. 417-418). Similarly, Khalifa A. Sall, former mayor of Dakar (2009-2018) emphasized urban planning as priority for Senegalese
development, focusing on PDU Horizon 2025 as a tool for creating a ‘modern capital’ by influencing Dakar’s way of life and modernising employment and trade (Marfaing, 2019, pg.5). The reality of Dakar, however, is that;

‘Sections of the city where rents were more affordable grew crowded, and seven or eight young male migrants from rural Senegal might share a single room. Constant price increases in fuel, water, food staples, and imports wreaked havoc on household budgets...New arrivals and long-time residents alike worried aloud that their stay in Dakar was always provisional; if the cost of living continued to rise, they would be forced to return to their village or move in with family’ (Melly, 2010, pg. 54).

Much like its predecessors, PDU Horizon 2025 manipulates terms, definitions and housing classifications to create ambiguity surrounding the living standards of the urban population (i.e. ‘village’, and ‘spontaneous,’ correspond to the self-help housing of the poor). There is no examination of the living conditions of the ‘spontaneous’ or ‘village’ housing or an acknowledgement of the slums located in ‘formal’ areas. Throughout Dakar, slums may be characterised as ‘extremely diverse places characterized by great differences in housing quality, access to infrastructure and urban services, levels of crime, etc.’ (Gulyani et al., 2014, pg. 102). Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) and everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) reveals that PDU Horizon 2025 does not adequately address the fact that 74 per cent of Dakar’s ‘slum’ households ‘have access to piped water and electricity and live in houses with permanent walls’ (Gulyani et al., 2014, pg. 101).

PDU Horizon 2025 is nestled within a broader decentralisation initiative that was launched to better coordinate and control the growth of Dakar. The decentralization initiative launched in 1996 and supported by the Ministère de l’Urbanisme et de l’Amenagement du Territoire (Ministry of Urban Planning and Development), transferred some jurisdiction to local authorities, including urban planning (in the form urbanisation plans for administrative subregions). Act III of the decentralisation initiative approved in 2013 is an administrative reform that divided the country into 14 regions, 45 départements and over 500 municipalities (communes). Dakar is one of the 14 regions that was subdivided into four départements: Dakar, Pikine, Guédiwaye, Rufisque. Individual départements were then subdivided into municipalities with mayors who represent the local community and administer the properties and assets of the
municipality. With Act III of the decentralization act, the *département* was established as a local authority and borough communes and rural communities received the status of full-function municipalities. Article 193 of the Act III dictates guidelines for municipal finance, a key element in the implementation and deployment of urban programmes (Mboup et al., 2014, pg. 13). Article 170 of Act III also set up a framework for the decentralization of municipal services including waste management and hygiene, protection and conservation of historic sites and monuments, promotion of national and local cultures, preparation and implementation of various kinds of plans (including masterplans) and management of health and education programs. The new decentralised system is maintained by three supervisory authorities: the governor (region), the prefect (*département*) and the sub-prefect (district). However, the central government retained the power to supervise the activities of local authorities under the new decentralised system for the effective management of urban planning in light of the limited funding and capacity of these communities to implement urban development projects.

Under the decentralisation initiatives, a series of PUD (*Plan d'Urbanisme de Details*), detailed urban plans, were also approved and introduced into the planning framework of the city (Figure 32). The table below demonstrates that, rather than streamlining the urban planning process, the new administrative divisions resulted in conflicts over funding, precedence, competence and power as the coordination of various plans became increasingly difficult. The plans of different administrative bodies often lacked coherence and synchronisation in both their development and implementation (Mboup et al., 2015, pg. 14). Thus, the increasingly technocratic and bureaucratic jargon of planning tools of the 21st century plans only further reinforced their inaccessibility and incoherence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hierarchy</th>
<th>Main planning themes</th>
<th>Legal norms</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Spatial Plan</strong></td>
<td><em>(Framework for planning and urban planning)</em></td>
<td>Not mandatory but stipulates the guidelines for planning in accordance with national spatial plan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Schéma Directeur d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme</strong> (SDAU)</td>
<td>- Covers the planning period for the next 20 years &lt;br&gt; - Provides a planning guide for the formulation of a PDU to meet the requirements stipulated in the national spatial plan &lt;br&gt; - Covers urban and rural planning</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Plan Directeur d’Urbanisme (PDU)</strong></td>
<td>(Urban masterplan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Covers the planning period over the next 20 years</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Defines land-use plans including public spaces, public facilities, green spaces, the road network, environmental preservation areas and cultural conservation areas</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Part of the program for the Development of Public Facilities and Infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Designates planning areas for specific plans such as PUDs, urban renewal areas, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mandatory as a framework for the development and implementation of other plans (PUD, PL)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Plan d’Urbanisme de Détails (PUD)</strong></th>
<th>(département masterplan)</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Detailed urban plan for the development of départements</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Land Development Plan for the implementation of the Program for the Development of Public Facilities and Infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Determines regulation of regional planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Designates planning areas for specific plans (RU, R, RE, ZAC mentioned below, if necessary)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mandatory for the implementation of other plans (such as land reserve areas, and public lands and public services plans)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Plan de Lotissement (PL)</strong></th>
<th>(Lotissement (allotment) plan)</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Planning guidelines for spaces in preparation for and to meet the requirements of the PDU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning for allotments, whether residential, industrial or logistic with the necessary public services</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mandatory in terms of regulations for land occupation and construction</strong></td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Specific Plan in Designated Area</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Zone de Rénovation Urbaine (RU)</strong></td>
<td>(Urban renovation zone)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Plan for land acquisition, infrastructure development, land restructuring and regularization of irregular settlements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zone de Renforcement Urbain Structuel (R)</strong></td>
<td>(Structural reinforcement urban zone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Plan for restructuring and regrouping parcels in unoccupied and degraded urban areas, in order to meet the requirements of the PDU</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Framework for the development activities implemented under the PDU/PUD in association with the Public Services Declaration</strong></td>
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Despite the limitations and failings of PDU Horizon 2025, the following masterplan for Dakar (*Plan Directeur d'Urbanisme de Dakar et ses Environ Horizon 2035*) is essentially an adaptation of PDU Horizon 2025, recycling the same ideas and often the same shortcomings in planning Dakar’s urban future. A policy brief dated May 5th, 2014, titled ‘Project for Updating Dakar Urbanisation Masterplan by the Horizon 2025,’ published by the Ministry of Urbanisation and Housing of Senegal and Japan International Cooperation Agency, identifies the necessary revisions of PDU Horizon 2025 in the elaboration of PDU Horizon 2035. The policy document states that the PDU Horizon 2025 lacked in ‘vision’ for development, which should have been ‘formed in a participative way.’ The document stipulates that ‘spatial planning as well as demand forecast or integrity with social and economic policies, are not sufficient’ for the planning of Dakar. Regarding the PDU Horizon 2035, the policy brief states that the urban development of Dakar region should be based on the creation of a ‘favourable urban environment,’ based on social and economic development, environmental conservation, and disaster prevention (DUA & JICA, 2014). The following sections outlines and assesses the parameters of PDU Horizon 2035 to determine whether it succeeds in rectifying the failures of PDU Horizon 2025.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone de Remembrement (RE)</th>
<th>(Consolidation zone)</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Plan for the redistribution of isolated parcels including in a Special Management Zone Plan, applicable in the event of a restructuring of the zones for the construction of a subdivision, or a zone of re-development or development</td>
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<tr>
<th>Coopérative Development Zone (ZAC)</th>
<th>(Cooperative development zone)</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Provides incentives to promote private investment for mixed-use, residential, commercial and business urban centres</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Provides guidelines for the management of funds in the development of projects</td>
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Figure 32: Code of Urban Planning and Regulatory Framework of the Urban Planning Code (Republic of Senegal, 2009)
Figure 33: Plan Directeur d'Urbanisme de Dakar et ses environs Horizon 2035 (Ministry of Urban Renewal, Housing and Living Environment, 2015; Republic of Senegal and JICA)
Plan Directeur d'Urbanisme de Dakar et ses environs Horizon 2035 (Republic of Senegal and Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2015)

Based on the failures of the PDU Horizon 2025, the Senegalese government formally requested JICA to extend its technical cooperation and expertise in the revision of PDU Horizon 2025 and elaboration of PDU Horizon 2035. In 2015, JICA and the Ministry of Urban Renewal, Housing and Living Environment presented the ‘Urban Master Plan of Dakar and its Surroundings Horizon 2035’ (PDU Horizon 2035) within the framework of the National Plan for Territorial Development in order to control internal urban growth, reduce the spread of slums, encourage balanced urban development and respond to the needs for housing (Mboup et al., 2015, pg. 15) (Figure 33). The new plan was elaborated in line with the implementation of the Plan Senegal Emergent (PSE). Plan Senegal Emergent (Emerging Senegal Plan) (PSE), approved in 2014, provides a holistic framework for the sustainable development and economic growth of Senegal. Based on the PSE, the region of Dakar and surrounding areas are poised to play a leading role in the PSE as the national capital, international gateway and centre of economic activities in Senegal (Plan Directeur d'Urbanisme de Dakar et ses Environ Horizon 2035 Rapport Final: Volume I). In a traditional ‘policy fix’ approach, the PSE is structured around three main axes:

1. structural economic growth and transformation;
2. human capital, social protection and sustainable development; and
3. governance, institutions, peace and security (Mboup et al., 2015, pg. 13).

The ‘flagship projects’ developed under the PSE aim to position Dakar as a logistics hub in West Africa for the production and distribution of products and services; a touristic hub; a regional educational hub with world-class international schools; a business parks-hosting centre; and an ‘international medical city’ (Mboup et al., 2015, pg. 14). Guided by the framework of the PSE, the key aims of the revised PDU Horizon 2035 are: sustainable urban development, the development of a compact city connected by efficient transportation networks, environmental resilience, and coherent spatial planning. While the PSE addresses matters of national scale and importance, the discourse surrounding the role of Dakar as a locomotive for growth and the plans for Diamniadio, a new satellite city currently under construction in Dakar region, reveal a great deal about the forces guiding Dakar's development and the future envisioned for the city and region.
Published in 2015, the PDU Horizon 2035 presents Dakar as a ‘ville hospitalité’ (hospitality city), discussing the country's world-famous culture of ‘teranga’ (hospitality). The PDU lists the elements necessary for the transformation and growth of a hospitality city, namely;

1. A comfortable living environment; through the implementation of the masterplan, Dakar is poised to become a city where people will live comfortably 'without worrying about basic needs,' disaster risks, financial and security issues. The plan presents the image of a city characterised by a 'relaxing environment with lots of green space and parks' (PDU Horizon 2035, 2015, pg. 1).

2. Easy communication; Dakar will be a 'viable' city with improved communication and mobility. Urbanites will be able to 'move around the city and travel easily to other areas' and foreigners can enter Senegal via Dakar. Additionally, goods will be 'transported efficiently both inside and outside the city.' Communication with other regions and countries will be facilitated through 'advanced telecommunication technologies' (PDU Horizon 2035, 2015, pg. 1).

3. Innovative creation; Dakar will be 'an innovative city of creation' where people will benefit from 'local products manufactured and agro-food of quality.' The Senegalese people as well as foreigners will benefit from a 'unique touristic offer in the region and original artistic works' (PDU Horizon 2035, 2015, pg. 1).

The PDU Horizon 2035 states that people of 'all social classes' [emphasis added] can benefit from these (inclusive benefits) and generations to come will continue to profit from these (sustainable) benefits provided by the efficient organisation and planning of the city. Under the guidance of the PSE and through the implementation of the PDU Horizon 2035, Dakar and surrounding areas will play a 'leading role in West Africa (competitive) while supporting and stimulating the development of all the populations of Senegal and other countries across West Africa (solidarity)' (PDU Horizon 2035, pg. 2).

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113 See Article I of urban planning code on pg. 185
Firstly, the analysis of previous masterplans suggests that the aim of making Dakar, with its never-ending urban sprawl, a 'compact' city seems unrealistic given the patterns of human settlement. Secondly, the goal of 'inclusivity' has often been touted in masterplans as a key principle but has rarely seen any follow-through. The emphasis on 'inclusivity' and 'capacity building' in the postcolonial masterplans ring as hollow as the rhetoric of association during colonial times. Since its inception as a colonial project, Dakar has always been a profoundly segregated city, whether in the form of 'déguerpissements' or 'recasement,' the goal remains the same - to banish the African population (colonial) or the urban poor (postcolonial) to the periphery of the city in order to make the scenic and serviced parts of the city the exclusive playing field of the wealthier urbanites. Thus, the city is planned as an elite enclave with large 'pockets' of poverty or 'incomplete archipelagos' of urban infrastructure (Bakker, 2003, pg. 62).

Much like its predecessors, this PDU seeks to mollify the reality of poverty in Dakar and its physical manifestations. There is no mention of 'bidonvilles' (slums) despite the ubiquitous presence of informal settlements throughout the city. The term is, once again, replaced by the term 'spontaneous' in reference to patterns of urban growth and settlement. Once again, the PDU also fails to acknowledge the presence, let alone the disparity, of slums across the city. Slum conditions and informality in Dakar challenges the modernist notion that poor citizens must have 'education and employment before they can have access to decent living conditions and basic infrastructure'114 (Gulyani et al., 2014, pg. 101). The PDU Horizon 2035 is concerned with pursuing the 'modernist ideal' of the 'uniform, integrated, equally serviced city' which vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) has revealed as a mere spectre in light of the increased fragmentation of urban services caused by 'deindustrialisation, privatisation and reduced state spending' (McFarlane & Rutherford, 2008, pg. 354). Consequently, the plans of the 21st century perpetuate an image of urbanisation rooted in the modernist (western) ideal that 'subconsciously insists that all cities, wherever they are, be interpreted in that image' and 'systematically find wanting any urban form that does not conform' (Koolhaas in Enwezor Ed., 2003, pg. 175). Everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) reveals the disconnect between a state that continues to base its development on modernist

114 See ‘urbanisme evolutif’ on pg. 193
ideals and the survival strategies of the majority of urban dwellers in Dakar who 'remap the shape of the city, redesigning desires and aspirations outside the order of the colonial city and outside the nation-state, which given its colonial attachment is nothing but a 'hollow' pretence' (Okome in Enwezor Ed., 2003, pg. 319-200). Since colonial times, official masterplans of Dakar have rarely ever been in tune with the urbanisation articulated through the modifications of urban dwellers on-the-ground.

Diamniadio Lake City

A key element of the PDU Horizon 2035 is the plan for the development of Diamniadio Lake City, a satellite city located 30 km from Dakar city. The plans for Diamniadio are deployed under the PSE which seek to enhance the 'attractiveness and competitiveness of Dakar, and the Special Economic zone Diamniadio.' (Mboup et al., 2015, pg. 14). The PDU Horizon 2035 specifies the plans for Diamniadio within the broader framework of the urban development of Dakar;

1. ‘the creation of a secondary capital city (Diamniadio) with additional functions to that of the capital and a new economic centre at the crossroads of the regional corridor;

2. the formation of ‘Green Growth Centre' as an area with stronger potential for agricultural development and focal point of green tourism;

3. the formation of secondary cities to support the urban pole and its surroundings' (PDU Horizon 2035, pg.43).

The renders of this futuristic city (Figure 34) reflect the ‘familiar blend of programmatic ingredients, including securitised office parks, upscale shopping malls, exclusive residential accommodation, and a wide range of entertainment-leisure activities' (Murray, 2017, pg. 32). In terms of urban planning, Diamniadio is based on a 'holistic response' to the urban issues of Dakar, namely infrastructural deficit, housing crisis, restricted mobility, and environmental conservation. Furthermore, Diamniadio is intended as a 'smart city' with the installation of data centres, cloud servers, e-commerce, training and software development centres, business incubators, audio-visual and multimedia production units. The city is also touted as an environmentally responsible and eco-friendly development, drawing interest from Belgian, and Luxembourghian companies.
specialized in renewable energies, and from the German KFW for the installation of a solar plant near the city.

Across Africa, the construction of satellite cities is often 'deployed in tandem' with large-scale transportation projects and land use plans that aim to decongest the city centre (Lane, 2017, pg. 171). Indeed, Diamniadio is connected to Dakar via a new toll highway, opened in 2013, which is the first public-private partnership project in the road sector in Senegal. The project was financed in part by the Senegalese government (for nearly 35 per cent of the project), with private sources contributing 22 per cent of the funding, and the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the French Development Agency (Agence Francaise de Developpement, AFD) providing the remaining 43 per cent in the amount of 178.8m Euros (The Report, Senegal, 2011). The city is connected to the new Blaise Diagne airport completed in 2018 and serviced by the new Regional Express Train due to be completed in 2019.

The project has drawn interest from several investment consortia who have been allocated land by the Senegalese state to develop diverse urban projects at a variety
of different scales. In 2014, SénégIndia, a partnership between the Senegalese company Générale des Travaux Publics et de Négoce (Getran) and two Indian companies (Swaminarayan Vijay Carry Trade and Garasiya Farm), was the first consortium to launch work in Diamniadio Lake City. By the end of 2019, they aim to deliver 2,500 apartments and houses of low, middle and high standing as well as sports and health facilities, a five-star hotel and 10,000 sqm of green spaces and shopping centres that will form the ‘SD city’ within Diamniadio. Other companies involved in the urban project include Teyliom, Alliances (Morocco) and Médina Invest (Morocco), Doozy Gulf Group (UAE), and CGC Overseas Construction (China) which has been tasked with building an industrial park. Semer Investment, an Emirati firm, is responsible for the plans and development of the city while the design and architecture of the city were assigned to FSS Consult, another Emirati firm.

The Diamniadio project falls in line with a trend seen across the continent involving the construction of large-scale futuristic satellite cities;

'a massive shoreline reclamation project called Eko-Atlantic in Lagos; New Cairo City outside Cairo; high tech business incubators like the USD 14.5bn Konza City technopolis, south of Nairobi; Machakos City, a satellite city south of Nairobi; King City, an exclusive mixed-use development near the rebuilt port of Takoradi (Ghana); Luano City, a satellite city built on the outskirts of Lubumbashi in copper-rich Katanga Province (Democratic Republic of Congo); La Cité du Fleuve, a master-planned ‘oasis of tranquillity’ constructed on two islands reclaimed from sandbanks and swamp in the Congo River, adjacent to Kinshasa' (Murray, 2017, pg. 33).

These cities are often located outside the official boundaries of metropolises in the larger urban regions and aim to deliver high quality infrastructure and ‘first-world’ lifestyles in carefully planned and regulated environments. The renders of Diamniadio present a ‘hopeful future of a fully modernised and up-to-date metropolis’ (De Boeck, 2011). However, the long history of urban planning and socio-spatial segregation in Dakar is better characterised as a ‘future slow-motion apocalypse,’ in which the plans for the satellite city result in the abandonment of the

115 See suburbanisation on pg. 186
The urban majority ‘to make way for a partitioned city in which the elite retreat into fortified enclaves’ (Shatkin, 2014, pg. 11).

These satellite cities are revealed as templates rather than tailored solutions to urban problems since they are based on a singular notion of modern urbanism. While these projects lay claim to ‘novelty’ in their inception and planning, the analysis reveals that they often ‘borrow, mimic, or steal ideas about building typologies, design aesthetics, and regulatory regimes at work elsewhere in the world economy’ (Murray, 2017, pg. 35). The plans for Diamniadio fall neatly within the scope of the ‘neoliberal thrust of the creative-smart-sustainable triumvirate in urban discourse’ (Goonewardena, 2018, pg. 458). A closer examination of future plans of Diamniadio reveals the functional specialisations of these emerging satellite cities as outlined by Murray (2017, pg. 40);

‘The first type consists of large-scale mixed-use satellite cities that are typically constructed at the edge of existing urban landscapes and that operate under the mantra of ‘live, work, and play.’

The second type can be called ‘terminal cities’; that is, new urban landscapes constructed around major international transportation hubs like ports, railroad lines, and airports.

The third type can be labelled ‘leisure-entertainment cities’ which offer the amenities of a resort vacation in relaxed outdoor settings.

Finally, the fourth type consists of new ‘information technology’ hubs that function as business incubators.’

The plans for Diamniadio encapsulate all four functional specialisations, as the city is divided into three ‘zones’: financial, residential and entertainment districts. This division brings to mind Ecochard’s modernist separation of function, inspired by the ‘neighbourhood unit’ model of New York City and envisioned for SICAP neighbourhoods in the 1967 masterplan in the separation between ‘live, work, and play.’ Conversely, Diamniadio features three districts:

1. Financial district; stock market, office space with services, and business hotels
2. Residential district; private homes, retail and coffee shops on main streets
3. Entertainment district; shopping mall, national library, 5-star hotel, high-end residential area (Semer investment).
Plans for Diamniadio were unveiled during the *Salon International de l'Immobilier à Cannes* in 2017 (International property market salon in Cannes) which recalls the *Exposition Coloniale* (Colonial Expositions) that put the colonial world on display during expositions held in France. It is important to highlight the discourse around Diamniadio as it reveals much about who the city is intended for. Diene Marcel Diagne, the CEO of the Semer Investment group, describes Diamniadio Lake City as a project designed in accordance with the vision of the 'new aspirations of a Senegalese population that embraces its modernity, its high-class lifestyle and its pronounced taste for elegance' (Le Figaro, 2017). Thus, the discourse around Diamniadio is structured to leverage the geopolitical positioning of the country but to attract a 'new generation of foreign travellers' - foreign direct investors - in some ways despite rather than because of 'its African-ness' by offering the 'sort of generic comforts that they would expect to find at 'home'' (Melly, 2013, pg. 386). Diagne also highlights Senegal's favourable position within the international political economy;

'...some of the money comes in from France to pay for an important member of la francophonie...Senegal also attracts financial support from the US and the EU to support an African democracy with a commitment to the free market; from the Muslim world to support an African Muslim state; and then the funds from other sources to support a respectable African country which remains open and welcoming to the outside world' (O’Brien, 2008, pg. 10).

To model the 'meteoric rise of global cities like Dubai,' the discourse around Diamniadio is designed to 'lure international attention' and reposition Dakar as both 'the most beautiful city in Africa' but also a destination for foreign investment and tourism (Melly, 2013 pg. 386). Through Diamniadio, Dakar is sold as a 'modern' city in the image of Dubai, looking to position itself as a 'world city, reference, a crossroads city for a country, a region' (Chenal et al., 2009, pg. 80). The agenda of these mega-projects is justified through the promise of job creation, a sequestered and wealthy lifestyle, and eco-friendly sustainability. Indeed, Diamniadio promises to generate 35,000 direct jobs, as well as 105,000 indirect jobs by 2025, in an environment aimed at sustainability and upscale modern living.

The ‘futuristic fictions’ sold by these projects reveal the logics of ‘global capital accumulation, economic partnership and neo-liberal governance’ that shape the urban landscape of the southern city today (Melly, 2013, pg. 387). These projects are the 'mirror (and yet polar) opposites of existing urban landscapes in Africa,' aiming
to do away with the chaotic, congested and overcrowding of African metropolises (Murray, 2017, pg. 32). They represent a new geography of segregation. For many urban researchers, these cities are a drastic shift from the traditional approach aimed at rebuilding and regenerating the urban fabric. Satellite cities bypass the crumbling infrastructures, congested thoroughfares, and impractical regulatory regimes of existing metropolises. The sheer size and cost of Diamniadio Lake City, which requires a budget of 2bn USD to complete, provokes several important questions regarding the development goals of this satellite city;

‘where are the street traders, the informal transport operators, and the shack-dwellers in these new fantasy plans? Would traders ever be allowed to set up business on these pristine boulevards? Could the poor (or even the middle class) ever afford the glass box apartments, or even have the kinds of jobs that would get them access to the towering office blocks? How do people move around on foot, as most city dwellers do, through these wide-open spaces and care-oriented movement route?’ (Watson, 2017, pg. 63).

By doing away with overcrowding, chaos and congestion, satellite cities are an alternative to deviant urbanism of the continent; they represent the 21st century version of the tabula rasa approach to urban development as existing urban landscapes are abandoned in favour of ex nihilo urban projects. The ‘urban fantasies’ and narratives of ‘Africa rising’ are created and promoted by politicians and global investors who envision a city in sharp contrast to the reality in which the bulk of the population is ‘extremely poor and living in informal settlements’ (Watson, 2014, pg. 216). Within this discourse, however, hundreds of thousands of people who make up the urban fabric of Dakar are ignored and left to ‘live and die on sidewalks of development’ (Chenal et al., 2009, pg. 80).

**Conclusion**

The plans of the 21st century employ the familiar pillars of policy and reform to increase investment in the sectors of rail, road, and energy networks as the key development interventions based on which to unlock the benefits of urbanisation. Despite the involvement of new actors in the urban planning process and new tools of urban development, these plans are indicative of continuity rather than change in the emphasis on technocratic knowledge steeped in the modernisation as development rhetoric. The development argument, as articulated through these masterplans, emphasizes the need for African urban systems to ‘reform themselves
into new vectors of political and mercantile liberalism' just as the modernisation discourse underlines the importance of 'retooling outdated and neglected infrastructure and policy' to allow for more efficient urban economies (Enwezor et al., 2003, pg. 13).

PDU Horizon 2025 and 2035 and the plans for Diamniadio betray a concern with 'what ought to be' rather than 'what is' (Venturi et al. 1972, pg. 21). Everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) suggests that the 21st century aspirations for the 'modern' city means that the majority have been 'swept out of sight' in these futuristic visions as the latter will likely be 'chased out of town, removed to land on the city edge and out of sight, or perhaps - as the politicians so often wish - they have gone to smaller towns and rural areas' (Watson, 2017, pg. 63). Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) suggests that in satellite cities outside the metropolitan area, it is the wealthy that will flee beyond the city border, away from 'what is perceived as the crime, grime and chaos of the major cities', in what is increasingly a 'wealthy' flight to elite enclaves (Watson, 2017, pg. 63). Finally, southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) reveals that for all that has changed, everything is status quo in the urban development of Dakar as policies and plans originating in colonial times are given second life in the form of modernist and unilinear visions of growth that culminate in the satellite city.
Voices: Songs from Set/Setal and Sopi

Set/Setal (Clean-up/Make clean) was a youth movement launched in the 1980s to clean the streets of Dakar following state disinvestment from basic urban services such as waste management, security and sanitation. Sopi (Change) was the rallying cry of a politically engaged urban youth group who demanded changes to the country’s leadership, playing an important role in the election of Abdoulaye Wade to the presidency of Senegal.

These songs contribute to our understanding of 'cityness' as they shed light on the popular response to narratives underpinning the development of the city (e.g. development, modernisation, etc.). While ‘Set’ captures the dichotomy of First/Second world narratives and the ambivalent positioning of Africa (and postcolonial youth) within this global framework, 'The executioner is black' reflects the postcolonial disillusionment of young Africans, marginalised and maligned by enduring patronage networks upheld by President Wade despite his promises of change.

‘Set’
Have a clear mind
Be pure in your heart
Be sure in your actions
One day all the world's musicians will meet
Music has no frontiers
One day the Americans
Will find a new vision
And the Russians too
Will see life in a different way
For there are too many weapons
And war is terrible
I have a vision of all Africa
Being united one day
Give me your hand
Give me one chance to know
What do you think
For the future?
The young people are crying
Because the older ones are frightening them
That's what makes me sad

They are crying because
They have no hope ...

Youssou N'Dour, 1990

‘The executioner is black’
Some time ago you talked about illicit enrichment
It’s been years but tell me where the follow-through is
I was proud of you at that time, I saw justice
But unfortunately, we stopped everything and scrambled tracks
You are utopian but you stand by millions
Corruption, religion
Many people have understood this
But they avoid the solution
You see, it's unfortunate
Democracy, democracy what a nice bullshit
In Africa we always live in the hour of irony
The same dominant, the same dominated; the dominated, the sons of dominants dominate the dominated
The dominated being born is damned
The sons of the dominated have become damned
That we throw away
I just show you a youth condemned
In truth, in truth this bullshit is for the money and I'm bitter every time I talk about Africa
We are black sheep
That we head to the slaughterhouse and I am so ashamed
The executioner is black

Positive Black Soul (PBS), 1995
Chapter Eight: the paradigmatic and the critical case

This chapter focuses on the 'contingent universals' (Healey, 2012) of southern cities by investigating themes and topics that resonate across African cities and the 'global south' more broadly. In order to tease out these themes, the research project uses two units of analysis based on the parameters of the paradigmatic and critical case study. The paradigmatic case is an exemplar or prototype that acts a reference point and key paradigm for theoretical frameworks or schools of thought. The critical case has strategic importance relative to a general issue, problem or phenomenon. In this context, Sandaga is a strategic location within the urban fabric given its historical role and its continued importance as a battlefield between the state, the youth and informal vendors. Place Kermel (Kermel Plaza) is a microcosm of larger processes at work in Dakar and therefore provides a paradigm to understand the forces driving Dakar's urban transformation. The key difference between the critical and paradigmatic approach is in the literal and theoretical locatedness of the field sites under observation. In theoretical terms, Place Kermel is relevant as a paradigm for understanding urbanisation processes unfolding in Dakar. Geographically speaking, Marché Sandaga is a strategic location (and object of study) given its status as one of the most popular markets in Dakar located at the heart of the urban agglomeration of Dakar (in Dakar Plateau).

It is neither within the scope of this doctoral project nor the aim of this study to theorise southern urbanisation based on a single case study or make generalising statements concerning the large and 'boundless' expanse of the urban agglomeration of Dakar based on two urban spaces. Rather, the aim of this chapter is to finetune the picture of urbanity in the 'global south' that is slowly, but surely, coming into focus as a new research agenda comes to the fore. The narrative weaves between historical sources and first-hand observations, and continually engages with relevant literature to situate the findings of the research interventions within the broader context of an urban theory of the 'global south.' The chapter begins with an overview of Place Kermel and Marché Sandaga, reporting observations and identifying the salient elements of these spaces that are relevant to the study of urbanisation. The following sections look at the contingent universals of these sites and considers their broader implication for the urban development of
The analysis of the built environment of these two field-sites reveals the importance of architecture in situating the historical development and modern-day configurations of space. In the context of Kermel plaza, the contingent universals are established based on the presence of a Chinese supermarket, a Moroccan bank, a 5-star hotel and a newly established market in the field-site. In Sandaga, the 'contingent universals' are centred on processes unfolding in the city in which the market plays a pivotal role, including the informalisation of space and the development of a plebeian public sphere. Given the demographic structure of Dakar and the nature of income generating activities, youth and informality play important roles in the analysis.

Throughout the chapter, southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) examines the continued influence of colonial history on the physical structure and social fabric of the city and the enduring effect of these longue-durée processes. Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) and everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) are used in tandem throughout this analysis to understand the socio-spatial evolution of the spaces under scrutiny. Specifically, they are used to analyse the 'unplanned' developments in the field sites that reflect the processes of 'grey spacing' and densifying social networks in the making of 'people as infrastructure.'

**Paradigmatic case: Place Kermel**

The paradigmatic case (unit of analysis) selected for this chapter reflects the multi-layeredness of urbanisation in Dakar and allows for the extrapolation of key themes and narratives revealed in the masterplans. The study of physical spaces reveals urbanisation as a complex transformative process that shapes multifaceted relationships between class, race, occupation, religion, and generation (Falola & Salm, 2005). The analysis of the paradigmatic case builds on the work by Bigon, Beeckmans, & Sinou (2016) on the façade of Marché Kermel which examines the architectural evolution of the market by dissecting the various narratives at work in the making of the market. The following study broadens the scope of the analysis not only in terms of the space but also the range of phenomenon under observation. The case covers the entirety of Place Kermel (Kermel plaza), using it as a model for understanding the urban transformation of Dakar and the continued hybridization of the city.
A snapshot of present-day Place Kermel reveals the successive waves of influence and infrastructural changes that shape the urbanisation of Dakar. The space is therefore used as a prototype for understanding urbanisation in Dakar and the dominant metanarratives that dictate the built environment of the city. Interestingly, Place Kermel reflects the fact that no city presents a ‘uniform aspect, even in the most developed countries,’ as these contradictions are nowhere more brutal than in Dakar, showcasing both ‘very modern ensembles and shanty towns’ (Seck, 1970, pg. 121). Kermel Plaza demonstrates a phenomenon observed throughout Dakar where the integration of some elements has remained incomplete and competing logics are played out in an urban setting. The urban fabric appears disjointed with the amalgamation of different waves of past and continuing influence, many of which are observed in Kermel (e.g. globalisation, informalisation, neoliberalisation, colonisation, etc.).

During an initial visit in April 2017, the area around Kermel was undergoing infrastructural change with the ongoing construction of Centre Felix Eboué, initiated by Mayor Khalifa Sall, and the Projet Lacoste, undertaken by a French architectural firm Lacaton & Vassal. Observations carried out during fieldwork in Place Kermel revealed the stark unevenness of the urban landscape. One can go so far as to stretch the metaphor to describe the state of the pavement and sidewalks which are an obstacle course of debris from nearby construction sites, piles of garbage and improvised stalls laid out on sidewalks. The initial visit to the renown Marché Kermel, a colonial artefact, revealed that the infrastructural changes taking place around the market were important to understanding the process of urban transformation in the city, prompting the decision to expand the zone of inquiry to include the entire plaza.

In the plaza, Marché Kermel operates as a market for fresh produce with an abundance of fruits, vegetables, fish, meat, grains, etc. The sheer amount of produce available in the market makes it hard to move around the windy passages arranged in concentric circles and mapped out by crates of fruits and vegetables.

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116 The ‘history of cities is only a succession of phases of construction-destruction, interspersed with unfinished models’ (Haeringer, 1996, pg. 8).
The fishmongers are located at the centre of the market, along with the butchers while the vegetable and fruit sellers stack their crates along the edges of the hexagonal market. The market is organised based on the type of produce on offer, with sellers standing in each section of the market waiting for customers to walk by their merchandise. Some of the sellers recline on makeshift chairs towards the back of the market, huddled in groups of 3-4 men and women sharing tea or coffee, delivering their sales pitch, offering deals and guiding customers to other vendors when necessary. These observations recall the study conducted by Ralph (2008, pg. 24) who documented the daily tea-making rituals of young Senegalese men in public spaces (depicted in Voices VIII: Dakar Arty). To the untrained eye, they appear to be loitering in the public sphere, but Ralph found they were actively involved in building solidarity networks by relaying information, tips and experiences while sharing a cup of tea. Furthermore, the patterns of buying and selling taking place within and beyond the market structure, particularly the tendency for several sellers to offer the same merchandise to one buyer, recalls the phenomenon of ‘collateral realities’ (Law, 2011). By pursuing their ‘own economic interests’ within a context of ‘collective entanglement,’ the sellers are ‘silently and incrementally’ creating the ‘official business’ of the market (Simone, 2018, pg. 33).
There are a number of cars and taxis parked right outside the marketplace making it difficult to manoeuvre in between stalls, people, cars and rubbish (Figure 35). Directly outside of Kermel, numerous stalls have been erected and offer the traditional ‘boubous’ (garment worn in West Africa), African masks, artisanal jewellery, art, and other such tourist-friendly knick-knacks (Figure 36). Others offer even more produce stacked on rickshaw stalls that are shifted around the market area for better visibility and out of direct sunlight throughout the day. The stalls outside of Kermel are propped up by wooden beams and covered in scrap metal or large parasols to extend the shade of the market. In between the stalls and the street, there are large piles of garbage from overflowing dumpsters and trashcans.

Figure 35: Façade of Marché Kermel (Author’s own photograph, 2017)
Critical case: Marché Sandaga

While the paradigmatic case is used as a prototype exemplifying a range of phenomena unfolding in the space relevant to the broader topic, the critical case broadens the scope of the theoretical work further given its strategic importance relative to the phenomena under observation. The analysis of Sandaga, as a strategic location in the city, allows for the appraisal of key themes that are relevant to ‘cityness’ including informality, resistance, and entrepreneurship which have arguably become defining features of the city in the ‘global south.’ Observations undertaken in Sandaga reveal the importance of the changing physical structure of the market, the presence of informal vendors in proximity to the market and the market activity itself. Unlike other markets of Dakar, Sandaga is one of the most
important meeting places for locals and toubabs\textsuperscript{117} given its location and allure as a colonial artefact. During the colonial era, Dakar-ville was home to the European population and *évolués*. Today, these buildings are occupied by African businesses – many of which pay tribute to the holy city of Touba\textsuperscript{118} – when once they were the exclusive playing field of the European and Libano-Syrian population of Dakar. The postcolonial era saw the area become the hub for new government buildings as well as museums and monuments in accordance with President Léopold Sédar Senghor’s *Négritude* movement of postcolonial nationalism. Today, Sandaga is surrounded by five-star hotels and shopping plazas which stand in stark contrast to the colonial style both in physical form but also in the types of consumerism taking place in these spaces.

The commercial activity of Sandaga has spilled over into the streets, making it difficult for cars to weave through pedestrians and vendors who now occupy the space. Although impressive in its distinctive stature and style, Sandaga is visibly crumbling with evidence of the fire that ravaged the market in 2013 and resulted in the closing of the central building. The story goes that the authorities closed the market due to the physical degradation of the building, and then a fire broke out a week later (Barblan & Hernach, 2014, pg. 100). While the origins of the flames remain unknown, many traders considered the possibility of arson sponsored by the public authorities. This stems from the strange coincidence between the timing of the forcible evacuation of the building during the week of the Tabaski festival (*Eid-el Adha* or the festival of sacrifice) when many Dakarois leave the city to join their families in the countryside, and the accidental fire that occurred a week later. According to some traders, this was a strategic move to relocate them permanently from Sandaga and compromise their foothold in the city. Sandaga is known as a ‘gateway’ to the country’s informal economy and economic activity unfolding in the market blurs the line between formal and informal (Melly, 2013, pg. 392). This is perhaps why governments often perceive markets as ‘dangerous places’ since they are unable to impose ‘one story about what the market is and should do’ (Simone, 2018, pg. 35)

\textsuperscript{117} Local term for people of European heritage  
\textsuperscript{118} See Mourides example on pg. 258-259
Yet, the strategic importance of Sandaga has meant that it continues to be one of the most popular markets of Dakar for locals, tourists, and informal traders who continue to flock to the market area. Today, the core of commercial activity takes place outside of the market structure itself. Despite repeated attempts to remove the vendors from the market and surrounding area due to the fire damage and risk of collapse, market activity has not slowed. Recently, the Minister of Commerce, Alioune Sarr, has announced the establishment of a steering committee will devise a plan for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Sandaga due to be inaugurated by the end of 2019 (Agence de Presse Sénégalaise, 2018). The decisions surrounding the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Sandaga are important. Colonial heritage is a 'socio-political construct' and the preservation and/or rehabilitation of built heritage, as with Kermel, is intrinsically linked to national identity. Southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) suggests that when the 'critical filter' between postcolonial memory and colonial past is removed, issues of 'whose heritage' (Hall, 2002) is destroyed/built/reconstructed are dehistoricised and depoliticised (Lagae, 2008, pg. 11).
Paradigmatic: Place *Kermel*

- Neoliberalisation of space (Projet Lacoste)
- Formalisation of space (Centre Felix Eboué)
- Globalising spaces (CBAO, Chinese supermarket)
- Hybridisation of space (Marché Kermel)
- Grey spacing

Figure 37: Place Kermel (Philippe Ruault, 2017)
Critical: Marché Sandaga

Figure 38: Marché Sandaga (Author's own photograph, 2018)
Contingent universals

An urban theory of the ‘global south’ emphasizes context-specific and embedded knowledge as a means of challenging universal theory. However, generalisation is a key means for developing theory and is required in research ‘if we are not to treat each city or place as entirely unique’ (Watson, 2016, pg. 38). The crucial nuance in the elaboration of southern theory is to understand and be explicit about the limits of theory to avoid repeating the mistakes of northern theory with regards to the ‘global south.’ To that end, the methodology proposes the analysis of ‘contingent universals’ (Healey, 2012) as a way of speaking ‘beyond the single case’ and elaborating a ‘criteria for comparisons and the terms of a diagnosis’ (Connell, 2007, pg. 225). Contingent universals allow for ‘meso-level theorising’ whereby the findings and ideas generated from this case are assessed in terms of their relevance and usefulness to other parts of the ‘global south,’ and the world. In so doing, it is possible to avoid the trap of what Connell (2015, pg. 59) calls ‘mosaic epistemologies’ in the elaboration of knowledge systems based on ‘specific culture or historical experience, and each having its own claims to validity.’ The contingent universals outlined in this chapter are specific to Dakar, but their relevance extends beyond the case study city. Firstly, the themes analysed in this chapter reveal the interconnectedness of cities which suggest that the urban development of a singular study is intrinsically linked to larger urban processes driven by globalisation, neoliberalisation, migration, etc. Secondly, the importance of these themes as starting points for theory-building is relevant to the broader agenda of informing an urban theory of the ‘global south.’

Consequently, southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) engages with architecture and the evolving physical structure of the field sites to demonstrate how power is inscribed on the built environment from the colonial era to modern times. Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) demonstrate that built form, public spaces and the ‘everyday’ are political – both static infrastructure and quotidian acts of subversion that transform the urban landscape. Everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) focuses on the everyday activities that unfold in the spaces under observation and engages with the ways in which people arrange themselves as ‘conduits’ and ‘connectors’ to create ‘unanticipated by-products and opportunities’ (Simone, 2008, pg. 88).
i. Hauntology

The 'spectre of colonialism' remains ever present and 'haunts' urban landscapes of the south in a 'psychology of fear that links the past into the present' (Derrida, 2006). Architecture and built form are strategic objects of study because they are not 'static embodiments of culture' and should be analysed as mediums through which 'identity, power and society are produced and reproduced' (Avrami & Mason, 2000, pg. 6). The city is not a 'neutral realm' as construction and infrastructure cannot be understood only in terms of 'concrete and stabilised earth' (Sow, 1983, pg. 45). Consequently, the analysis of the built environment reveals the complex relationships between 'built fabric, history and memory' and situates buildings within process of urban transformation and 'broader political-cultural contexts' (Lagae, 2018, pg. 19).

Marché Kermel was completed in 1910 and stands as a unique colonial structure in the city of Dakar. Located in the heart of the plaza, Marché Kermel evokes similarities to the 'great metal markets' in France and other European countries, featuring a prefabricated metal frame that was made in France and shipped to Dakar (Bigon & Sinou, 2013, pg. 714-718). The construction and reconstruction of Kermel market following an outbreak of fire in 1993, as well as the infrastructural changes taking place around the market area are indicators that built form and space are not static artefacts as infrastructural changes do not constitute neutral adaptations of the landscape. Chapter Six outlined the doctrine of assimilation in French colonial policy which was based on the apparent 'respect for and preservation of distinctive local cultures, even cultural differences among indigenous people, including tribal councils and historic monuments' (Wright, 1991, pg. 73-74). The 'visual language' of Marché Kermel reflects a period of 'stylistic hesitation' during which the French borrowed architectural motifs from North Africa in accordance with the doctrine of association (Bigon & Sinou, 2013, pg. 714-718). The architecture of Kermel consists of the appropriation of North African (Morocco, Algeria) vernacular elements in the making of the neo-Moorish architectural tradition. For the French, this region (Northern Africa) demonstrated a 'certain degree of civilisation' and became the subject of 'considerable anthropological and scientific interest' (Bigon & Sinou, 2013, pg. 714). The neo-

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119 Derrida, 2006
Moorish style (known as *Arabisances*) is visible on the façade of *Kermel* in the horse-shoe entrances adapted from Islamic architecture in a ‘decorative synthesis’ between two aesthetic traditions - that of the indigenous, colonised societies, and that of the modern metropole (Bigon & Sinou, 2013, pg. 714). In the colonial mindset, the prevalence of Islam in both regional colonies justified the use of North African design motifs in a sub-Saharan context. The apparent ‘respect for Islamic culture’ was evidenced in the use of indigenous Moroccan motifs in official buildings in Rabat as a ‘formal homage’ to Moroccan culture and a strategy for subduing hostility towards the colonial administration (Wright, 1991, pg. 1).

Another iteration of the colonial past that continues to haunt the landscape of Dakar is the development of the neo-Sudanese architectural style in the 1930s. In Dakar, the buildings designed in this style include *Marché Sandaga*, the Cathedral of African Memory, the Maternity Hospital, IFAN (Museum of the *Institut Français d’Afrique Noire*) and the Polyclinic in the Médina (Figure 39). Colonial administrators struggled to draw inspiration from the ‘vernacular mud (also called adobe or banco) straw structures’ of the Senegalese landscape that were dismissed as ‘primitive’ (Weithas, 1932, 114; Prussin, 1985).

![Figure 39: Musée de l’Institut Fondamental d’Afrique Noire (Author’s own photograph, 2017)](image)
The origins of the neo-Sudanic style are not from the local context and can be traced to the mud mosques in Mali (Western Sudan) and neighbouring countries. The mosque of Djenne, located in one of the oldest cities and major centres of commerce in SSA, provides the best example of the design motifs of this building style. Key elements of this architectural tradition include ‘monumentality, massing which conveys the sense of being solidly built,’ and the use of mud as the primary building material along with an infrastructure of wood (Shaw, 2006, pg. 64). Developed in the 1920s/30s, the neo-Sudanese/neo-Sudanic style reflects a brief period in history when colonial authorities sought to legitimise their presence by exhibiting, in a concrete manner, continuity between precolonial African societies and the colonial empire. Much like previous experiments with the neo-Moorish architectural style, the neo-Sudanese architectural tradition was invented to pay tribute to local culture under the new doctrine of association. Components of this architectural style were repackaged in order to suit the needs of the colonial administration. The neo-Sudanese architectural style never developed beyond an ‘embryonic and hesitant enterprise, sometimes vague in terms of stylistic coherence’ (Bigon & Sinou, 2013, pg. 721).

The resulting architectural hybrids of these stylistic experiments were not based on an accurate ‘historicism’ but instead represented an amalgamation of various visual sources subjected to western logics. This trend was seen throughout the colonial world and remains visible in many postcolonial countries. In British India, this took the form of Indo-Saracenic architecture (Davies, 1985), while in Mandate Palestine, the Moorish style was blended with ‘romantic Semitism’ by Jewish architects (Kalmar, 2001). Under the guise of conserving indigenous customs, the doctrine of association ‘mummified’ indigenous culture by shielding it from European influences that included ‘dangerous political ideas such as democratic representation and self-determination’ (Morton, 2000, pg. 190). Sandaga and Kermel therefore stand as self-congratulatory exercises for the French colonial administration in their clin d’oeil to indigenous culture, or as Hobsbawm calls this form of architecture - the ‘great new rituals of self-congratulation’. The use of architecture as an ‘ideological transmitter’ (Wright, 1991) recalls the underlying

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120 Engineering acquiescence through architecture is reminiscent of the ‘social contract’ of housing example on pg. 189
motives of the 1862 masterplan in which the grandeur and design of buildings imparted European 'models of command' and dictated 'modern' behaviour to an awestruck African population. Architecture thus becomes a form of governance to the African psyche and, in so doing, 'modernises' African 'thought and conduct' (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983, pg. 220).

The examination of these architectural styles and hybrids is relevant to the analysis of urban planning because it reveals that the 'studied neglect or denial of a discrete, variable architecture in Africa' permeates plans of the modern era (Prussin, 1974, pg. 183). Africa, south of the Sahara, was viewed as an architectural 'terre vierge' (virgin land) during colonial times as 'traditional' African built form could not be 'described, let alone valued' (Lagae, 2008, pg. 18). Today, the designers of the Diamniadio masterplan claim to draw inspiration from African culture, architecture and built form in the design of the futuristic satellite city. For example, the 'sharp curves and sloping lines' of the buildings in Diamniadio supposedly 'mimic the amorphous patterns of algae in a nearby lake, as well as the silhouettes of traditional female sculptures' (Bakri, Semer Group, 2018). The building materials include copper, 'an element found in the earth’s crust' as a way of recalling the natural landscape\(^{121}\) (ibid) (Figure 40). The majority of the structures, however, are made up of the materials of vernacular western modernity: steel, glass and concrete. Interestingly, Prussin (1974, pg. 192) argues that African built form is remarkable because of the 'absence [emphasis added] of any need for concrete permanence' (Prussin, 1974, pg. 192). Aside from stone ruins of some medieval cities, there is 'little evidence for architecture in permanent materials' as permanence exists 'perhaps only insofar as it marks the 'place' made sacred by ancestral habitation' (Prussin, 1974, pg. 204). Thus, the architectural styles observed in the city and in the renders of the future city only hint at African forms without being 'wholly African' (Shaw, 2006, pg. 87). So, 'whose 'Africa' was[is] this meant to be?' and 'what were[are] the political purposes of this synthesizing aesthetic?' (Roberts, 2004, pg. iii).

Today, African cities are, to an extent, defined by the absence of permanence, a prerequisite for Mumford who identified 'permanent settlement' as a defining

\(^{121}\) See discussion on assemblage and building materials on pg. 78
feature of the city. The lives of many city dwellers are built on impermanent settlements and their way of life is often characterised by the ‘temporariness’ of social arrangements (Appadurai, 2003). While this impermanence may have preceded the colonial moment, it was engineered by the colonial administration who prevented the African populations from settling permanently within the borders of the city. Today, the displacement of people and destruction of slums extends this practice of enforced impermanence. However, the analysis demonstrates that the ‘absence of a stable system of places’ does not prevent urbanisation but instead demonstrates that the processes of ‘renewal, rejuvenation, and rebirth’ are integral to ‘cityness’ (Prussin, 1974, pg. 205).

Figure 40: Diamniadio Lake City (BAD Consultants, 2018)

122 See Wirth and Mumford definition of a city on pg. 58
These architectural forms are a testimony to the history of experimentation and cultural appropriation which culminate in the hybridisation of urban form and function. These cultural hybrids, of which there are many in Dakar, represent what Hobsbawm (1983, pg. 1) calls 'invented tradition':

‘...a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.’

Hybridisation is an important metaphor for understanding the urban transformations underway in Dakar and Diamniadio. Observations during fieldwork suggest that the neo-Sudanese heritage of Dakar is not a thing of the past. Alongside historical buildings, recently built or rehabilitated buildings such as Hôpital Dantec, renovated in 2017/18, feature neo-Sudanese architectural motifs (Figure 41). Furthermore, present-day Sandaga market has also been further ‘hybridized’ both in terms of its physical appearance and the nature of the activities unfolding within and around this space. While the building retains its monumentality, small stalls set up around the structure accommodate the 'legions of shopkeepers who want or need to be located in such an important place' (Shaw, 2006, pg. 106). In many instances, the vendors who have installed themselves around the periphery of Sandaga have 'cemented' their presence – both figuratively and materially - through the construction of informal concrete shops that sell textiles, cassettes, DVDs, fresh produce, meat, and spices. A space that was once highly regulated as a rare meeting space between Africans and Europeans has arguably been re-appropriated and subjected to the needs of Africans – in a 'wholly African' way. Therefore, the colonial built legacy 'no longer belongs to those who built it, but rather to those who inhabit it' (Lagae, 2008, pg. 15).

The physical evolution of spaces therefore provides an interesting restatement of 'grey spacing' given the blend of ‘white’ (colonial) and ‘black’ (African) memories that ‘cannot be reduced to a simple juxtaposition, just as colonial history cannot be written simply in ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ terms’ (Lagae, 2008, pg. 14). Sandaga and Kermel arguably represent a space for competing modernities or an arena in which the historical allure of modernity is confronted with the realities of the city. The colonial layers are now arguably ‘subjected to the corrosive uniformity brought about by the neo-colonial one’ – a process that will be examined as we continue to
explore the evolution of *Place Kermel* and *Marché Sandaga* (de Carlo, 1983, pg. 74). These invented traditions represent strategic manipulations of the built environment, evoking at once both the monumentality of the colonial administration but also paying tribute to the ‘local’ indigenous cultures. The ongoing physical transformations of the landscape, including the rehabilitation of colonial structures and the future designs and renders of Diamniadio, demonstrate that these manipulations of the built environment are at work in present-day Dakar.

![Figure 41: Hôpital Dantec (Author’s own photograph, 2017)](image)

### ii. Global linkages

Any amount of time spent in Dakar, and in the spaces examined in this research project, reveals the continued involvement of foreign elements in the socio-spatial structures and infrastructures of the city. While colonialism represents a clear and easily identifiable example in which narratives of development and growth were imposed on the urban fabric of the city, recent trends in global linkages point to the influence of new global actors in shaping the urban development of the city.

*A Chinese supermarket*

Around *Place Kermel*, the ground floors of most buildings have small stores offering day-to-day necessities (i.e. milk, water, bread, etc.), a travel agency, and an Orange
tele-boutique which offers prepaid telephone cards and key cutting services. One of the storefronts located opposite Marché Kermel is displayed entirely in simplified Chinese which, upon consultation with native speakers, was translated to ‘China’ on the left, ‘market’ on the right and ‘supermarket’ across the top (Figure 42). The fact that the storefront is written entirely in simplified Chinese begs the question of who exactly the signage is meant for or if, perhaps, the presence of a Chinese supermarket in such a prime location is so common an occurrence that it doesn’t necessitate an explanation for anyone other than the researcher. The store offers a vast array of Chinese groceries and household goods (food and household products, many of which don’t have any French or English translation on the packaging) and appears to be managed by three attendants – one Senegalese and two Chinese.

![Figure 42: Chinese supermarket (Author’s own photograph, 2017)](image)

The presence of a Chinese business in this central location reflects the increasing importance of China as a development partner in Senegal but also demonstrates the effect of an influx of Chinese merchants as competitors to African businesses in
Dakar. Through the scope of southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) and everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 2), the analysis considers the implications of the Chinese supermarket in *Place Kermel* as a starting point for understanding the involvement of new actors in the development of Dakar.

At the local level, the advent of Chinese traders in Dakar has contributed to considerable changes in the city's informal economy in the development of new relationships of 'competition, complementarity and cooperation' (Haugen, 2011, pg. 173). The increased presence of Chinese merchants in Dakar markets has arguably changed the rules of the traditional 'bazaar' or 'souk' economy. In some instances, Chinese traders have all but replaced African merchants such as in Gare Petersen where they operate nearly 90 per cent of shops in a commercial centre arranged for Senegalese vendors relocated from the city centre (Scheld, 2010, pg. 153). The main base of operations for Chinese merchants is the *Boulevard de General de Gaulle (Allée des Centenaires)*; a central location connecting the city centre to the residential areas of Grand Dakar, including HLM and SICAP, and located close to Dakar's major markets and supplies Sandaga, Colobane and other markets with cheap goods. Interestingly, the patterns of occupation of urban space observed throughout Dakar and, particularly, in Kermel and Sandaga suggest that Chinese businesses are replicating existing patterns of 'secondary production'123 (DeCerteau, 1984). Secondary production is articulated through the use of space and objects in a manner different to their 'original intended use' (ibid). For example, the transformation of garages into Chinese-owned sewing workshops, hair salons, restaurants or shops that replicate the existing Senegalese 'economies of piracy' (Simone, 2006) by subverting urban space to the logics of informality.

The advent of the Chinese traders in Dakar has been a double-edged sword, particularly for young people who operate in increasingly competitive markets. On the one hand, goods and business from China are 'particularly appropriate for small-scale African entrepreneurs' including 'low-cost motorcycles and solar chargers, cheap and easily repairable tractors and other types of mechanised farming equipment, machinery for packaging, metalworking and woodworking' (Mbembe,

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123 See 'economies of piracy' on pg. 88
The low cost of Chinese commodities has enabled new urban actors to ‘take up trade with a decisively lower entry barrier’ by opening up new spaces for ‘emerging social actors,’ and by hiring local youth who gain access to commodities for ‘their own independent business endeavours’ (Marfaing & Thiel, 2013, pg. 655). Thus, the city has seen the growth of a new merchant class consisting of Chinese traders and merchants and their Senegalese employees (as observed during the fieldwork visit to the Chinese supermarket in Kermel).

On the other hand, the presence of cheap Chinese goods has meant that the local artisanal industry in Dakar has suffered. The National Union of Traders and Industrialists of Senegal (UNACOIS) denounces the negative effect of Chinese businesses and goods on the local economy and the environment. The prices charged by the Chinese traders are in direct competition with those of the Senegalese merchants of Sandaga, Tilène and HLM markets. Marfaing (2019, pg. 10) provides an interesting restatement of this phenomenon. While craftsmen have undoubtedly suffered the effects of increasing competition from cheap Chinese imports, she argues that competitiveness has encouraged Dakarois artisans to renew their artistic styles by modernising local know-how and adapting it to the needs of a ‘globalised population.’ This is evident in the ways Senegalese youth harness the consumption ideologies of modernity rooted in the imaginaries of the western middle class and subvert them to the needs of Senegalese identity – e.g. the purchase of boubous that follow the latest trends for cultural and religious occasions. The involvement of Chinese merchants in traditional markets has, therefore, allowed for the Dakarois to negotiate access to the materiality of a globalised modernity and enabled many whose incomes are limited to meet their household needs. Chinese involvement in African economies may therefore be thought of as a gateway to a globalised modernity.

On a national and regional scale, state-owned and private Chinese corporations constitute a ‘second form of Chinese presence in African cities’ which suggests an ‘expansion of the geography of transnational capitalism in Africa’ (Harrison & Yang, Cityscapes, 2015). However, the influence of Chinese involvement in African economies is made possible by the increasing involvement of Chinese actors in African economies.

124 The neoliberal rhetoric of self-entrepreneurship circulated by the World Bank (see pg. 89) is made possible by the increasing involvement of Chinese actors in African economies.
economies extends beyond the usual effects of bilateral trade and has, for example, enabled African countries to ‘foist tougher terms on Western firms’ (Wallis and Burgis, 2010; Haugen, 2011, pg. 163). The increased involvement of China in sub-Saharan African countries, like Senegal, falls within the scope of South-South Cooperation. The United Nations defines South-South cooperation (SSC) as

’a process whereby two or more developing countries pursue their individual and/or shared national capacity development objectives through exchanges of knowledge, skills, resources and technical know-how, and through regional and interregional collective actions, including partnerships involving governments, regional organizations, civil society, academia and the private sector, for their individual and/or mutual benefit within and across regions. South-South cooperation is not a substitute for, but rather a complement to, North-South cooperation’ (Nairobi Outcome Document, 2009).

Academic literature on SSC suggests that it is unique development in the geopolitics of ‘postcolonial solidarity’ between southern nations that leverage their difference from the north in the negotiation of economic treaties (Mawdsley, 2012, pg. 257). Chinese policy couches its involvement in African economies under the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. A key element of Chinese involvement with African countries is the emphasis on China’s status as a ‘developing’ and ‘emerging’ nation in which ‘domestic modernisation remains incomplete’ (Dehart, 2012, pg. 1366). Partnerships between China and African countries are based on shared histories and experiences, ‘structural positioning and values among developing nations, especially in terms of the desire for sovereignty and equality’ (ibid, pg. 1367). The ‘south’ of SSC is therefore harnessed not as a geographical designation but rather as a shared concept speaking to the global dichotomy between the developed and developing world.

125 (1) Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty (2) Mutual non-aggression. (3) Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. (4) Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit. (5) Peaceful co-existence (UN Treaty Series, 1958).

126 Strategic point of theorisation in its ‘ex-centricity’ outside of Euro-America (see discussion pg. 14)
On a national level, China explains the development cooperation between southern nations as a mutually beneficial arrangement that enables countries like Ghana, Senegal and Zambia to ‘redeem their honour and status by providing resources, investment opportunities and markets’ (Mawdsley, 2012, pg. 264). Some claim that China’s ‘scramble for unfettered access to Africa’s resources as well as her markets’ (Lee, 2006, pg. 303) is reminiscent of Europe’s mercantilist and exploitative patterns of expansion in its colonial relations with Africa. Others argue that China ‘with its impressive national development record, is more capable than any Western country of leading Africa out of poverty’ (Haugen, 2011, pg. 164). China and Africa’s shared experiences as developing countries lends China credibility as a development partner for African countries. For example, Chinese urbanisation has been marked by the trend of ‘urbanisation without citizenship,’ as newcomers to the city are ‘integrated into the city as workers but denied entry as political bodies’ (Short, 2017, pg. 3). This description recalls the experience of the déguerpis of Dakar and the establishment of Pikine which saw displaced or newly-settled urban inhabitants negotiate their insertion into ‘the city’ despite living within ‘city’ limits. A third camp argues that China’s aim is simply to maintain the status quo and therefore engage with the African continent in the way of western countries (i.e. exploitative and patronising) (Haugen, 2011, pg. 164). As the relationship between China and African continues to evolve, an undeniable effect of these emerging partnerships is the reinsertion of ‘Africa’ into the heart of discussions from which it has been historically excluded as the purveyor of discordant globalisation and divergent urbanism.

Whether the involvement of China in African development represents a shift from the status quo or simply a new form of the same exploitation is not yet clear. Historically, aid has been given ‘exclusively by the richer, industrialised countries of the North to the poor, needy, backward countries of the south’ (Mawdsley, 2012, pg. 261). Northern agents are therefore constructed as ‘carers who are active and generous’ while southern actors are ‘cared for, passive and grateful’ (Silk, 2004, pg. 230). Recently, however, non-DAC (Development Assistance Committee)

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127 China has set out its foreign policy principles in the Beijing Declaration of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum in 2000, and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) white paper on Foreign Aid
countries such as China, India, Taiwan, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Brazil have been supplying aid to other southern countries which appears to be changing the rules of the (development) game (Kharas, 2007, pg. 7). Edemariam (2008, pg. 31) suggests that when combined with the lasting effects of the 2008 economic recession, the emerging status quo undermines the development model set up in Truman’s 1948 speech;

'[Moreover] all that wealth that has accumulated in China, in the Middle East and Russia—that shifts the balance of financial power massively in their direction. ... If the Chinese got their act together, and they wanted to, they could, at this moment, buy the entire US banking system. ...Which is an extraordinary thing—it’s something that none of us could have predicted a few years ago.’

China’s increasing involvement in southern countries such as Senegal has arguably contributed to the narrative that ‘the west has lost power to shape the world in its own image’ (Mishra, 2014). China’s economic growth in the last few decades has ‘ostensibly validated’ the effectiveness of its development strategy as an example for other nations to follow; the model rejects the ‘standard package’ of policies promulgated by bilateral and multilateral development institutions, making it a ‘serious ideological threat to the West in particular’ (Dehart, 2012, pg. 1364). Thus, a new paradigm begins to emerge – one that suggests that southern countries, formerly dependent on and subject to the conditionalities of northern aid, are turning towards increased SSC as a cornerstone of their development.

Today, China is Senegal’s most important foreign investor, with nearly USD 1.6 bn invested in the country (Haque, 2018). Aside from the unmistakable presence of Chinese businesses throughout Dakar, Chinese investment is visible in their publicised involvement in the construction of large-scale projects such as the Léopold Sédar Senghor Stadium, the National Theatre and the Black Civilization Museum. Chinese influence in the transformation of the landscape of Dakar (evidenced in the example of Place Kermel) reflects China’s role in challenging the development binary that has hitherto determined the status quo; ‘just as globalisation is shrinking the world, China is shrinking the West. China is quietly helping to remake the landscape of international development’ (Halper, 2010, pg. 26).
Throughout different levels of society\textsuperscript{128}, we see the influence of China on the narratives and outcomes of development;

‘The young street vendor who gravitates around the urban markets, taking advantage of the presence of small Chinese merchants, the merchant who imports his containers of goods made in China, through the big entrepreneur who invests in solar energy or construction, or the States that entrust the construction of their infrastructure and the extraction of their raw materials to Chinese companies, all look increasingly (also) to China, which has become a benchmark or an alternative to Europe. Thus, these entrepreneurs allow another perception than that conveyed by the West’ (Marfaing, 2019, pg.6).

Consequently, the Chinese arguably position themselves as the purveyors of a ‘new’ modernity, made in China, which undermines the western model that has hitherto determined the evolution of southern cities (Bridet et al., 2018, pg. 8).

\textsuperscript{128} See example of global and local mediated by ‘the urban’ on pg. 285
The CBAO (Compagnie Bancaire de l’Afrique Occidentale) agency, located in Place Kermel, was rehabilitated in 2006 and retained much of its original colonial architecture, updated only to suit the needs of a modern bank (i.e. reinforced windows, gated entrance, etc.) (Figure 43). Founded by Napoleon III in 1853, before the official colonisation of Dakar, the CBAO was originally named Banque du Senegal (Bank of Senegal) and backed by Louis Faidherbe as the first local credit institution that lifted the dependence of Senegalese traders on French financiers. An agency was opened in Gorée in 1867, in Rufisque in 1899 and the headquarters were transferred from Saint-Louis to Dakar in 1884 as the latter gained increasing prominence. Following independence in the 1960s, the Bank continued to gain influence and merged with the First National City Bank of New York to create the International Bank of West Africa (Banque Internationale pour l’Afrique Occidentale) in 1965. Changing its name once again in 1993, the Bank
became the *Compagnie Bancaire de l’Afrique Occidentale*. In 2006, the Bank merged with the Moroccan Attijariwafa Bank to form ‘Attijari Bank Senegal.’ Attijariwafa Bank is a Moroccan bank, headquartered in Casablanca and one of the largest banks in Africa (Media24, 2016). The prominent presence of the CBAO Attijariwafa Bank in the heart of the city along with other Moroccan-funded infrastructural projects across the city (e.g. port de Soumbedioune) reflect the continued influence of Morocco in the urban development of Dakar and points to another instance of south-south cooperation in the city.

Previous chapters examined the ways in which the French colonial administration replicated much of their North African experience (in Rabat and Casablanca, specifically) in the development of Dakar. However, the intermingled histories of Morocco and Senegal predate colonial amalgamations of the regions. The historical presence of Moroccans/moors in Dakar prior to the arrival of the French, the parallels between Dakar and Rabat, and the increasing involvement of the Moroccan Kingdom in present-day Senegal suggests a continuity both in physical form and cultural and political ties in the postcolonial period. Southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) argues that the trade and investment relations between Morocco and Senegal are more pertinent examples of SSC to the Chinese model given their intermingled histories. Firstly, Mawdsley (2012) suggests that south-south development cooperation can be ‘discursively constructed and performatively embodied’ through shared experience of ‘colonial exploitation, postcolonial inequality and present vulnerability to uneven neoliberal globalisation.’ The colonial and postcolonial experiences of Morocco and Senegal are two sides of the same coin, as the history of one has directly impacted the history, present and future of the other. Morocco re-joined the African Union in 2017 after 33 years of absence and joined the Pan-African Parliament in South Africa in 2018. King Mohammed VI’s speech upon Morocco’s admission into the African Union in 2017 lays out the Kingdom’s approach towards increased cooperation between African countries;

‘Africa no longer needs ideological slogans. It needs concrete, resolute action in peacebuilding, security and human development.

Morocco has faith in Africa’s ability to reinvent itself and to unleash a momentum of its own. Given the obvious limitations of classic North-South co-operation in the bid to rise to the challenge of an emerging Africa, our continent
should make greater use of inter-African cooperation and of strategic, solidarity-based partnerships between sister nations' (King Mohammed VI's Speech to 29th AU Heads of State and Government Summit, 2017).

Morocco’s official policy towards increased African cooperation reflects the fundamentals of SSC which are partly based on the rejection of hierarchies and an ‘an insistence on win-win outcomes of South-South development cooperation and mutual opportunity’ (Mawdsley, 2012, pg. 263). As southern partners increasingly bring their own histories, identities and discourses to the table, the status quo is arguably shifting. Thus, the evolving patterns of foreign influence suggest that the ‘old spell of universal progress’ based on western ideologies has been ‘decisively broken’ (which recalls the poem by Césaire in Voices V);

...we have been living – in the east and south as well as west and north – with vanities and illusions: that Asian and African societies would become, like Europe, more secular and instrumentally rational as economic growth accelerated; that with socialism dead and buried, free markets would guarantee rapid economic growth and worldwide prosperity. What these fantasies of inverted Hegelianism always disguised was a sobering fact: that the dynamics and specific features of western ‘progress’ were not and could not be replicated or correctly sequenced in the non-west (Mishra, 2014).

It is important, however, not to overstate the scale of the phenomenon as the importance of north-south linkages will likely remain the global status quo. Whether these new south-south agreements are evidence of an evolving pan-Africanism or a strategic move for the Kingdom to gain allies in the stalemate over the perpetually contested Western Sahara territory is yet to be determined. These new and emerging insights from postcolonial geography are fundamental to developing an understanding of the ‘hybridised landscapes’ of economic and political power associated with emerging economies, including - and indeed ‘especially in terms of their implications for the rest of the global south’ (Mawdsley, 2012, pg. 269).

iii. The (in)formalisation of space

Whether in the shaky stalls temporarily set up along sidewalks or public parks, the bootleg DVDs and imitation designer clothes and accessories, or the freedom to haggle and bargain the cost of almost anything, informality dictates the comings and goings of the spaces under observation. On the ground, informality is an
'accessible' concept given its near ubiquity in physical form. As a thematic analysis, informality is a particularly challenging topic of inquiry as it is simultaneously economic, spatial, political and historical. It represents an interesting duality between 'two logics of structuring space': the 'normative logic of the state, symbolised by the municipal authorities,' and the 'so-called informal logic, which is animated by the customary authorities' (Abdoul, 2005, pg. 357).

The experience of informality in the city was an ordinary experience for an urbanite raised in a city where taxi fares are negotiable, fresh fruit and vegetables are sold on the side of the road, and where the rules for buying/selling are improvised. Sandaga market attracts urban residents from all backgrounds, as well as tourists who find any number of goods (e.g. second-hand clothes, artisanal crafts, bootleg DVDs, fresh produce, etc.). In this space, a familiarity with the way of life is not based on who is foreign to Dakar but rather who is foreign to the practices of informality in everyday life. Having previously visited Dakar, the city was not entirely foreign territory and proved easy enough to navigate for someone originating from its North African counterpart – Rabat, Morocco. Owing to the knowledge acquired from prior visits, the presence of other Moroccans in the city, and to the fact that the urban landscape had, on first impression, proved strikingly similar to that of Rabat, the mere exercise of walking through the city and the selected field sites resonated with my 'urban knowledge' (Mbembe, 1997). The intertwined histories of Morocco and Senegal meant that my presence was, for the most part, unnoticed by locals. In fact, many interactions involved a measure of incredulity on the part of locals who were surprised at my inability to speak Wolof. Most interactions were conducted in the conversational French which is spoken throughout the city. Furthermore, in line with the Senghonian ‘Négritudé’ vision of Dakar as the capital of Black Civilisation and the heart of African heritage, all Africans in Dakar are considered 'residents' (a designation which distinguishes us/them from the ‘toubab’ who, despite their historical presence in Dakar, are still generally referred to as ‘les Français’ – the French).

In the spaces under observation, the concept of ‘market,’ in the traditional sense as a designated area of trade and commerce (i.e. store, shop, mall), seems to be a restrictive definition as only one version of consumption practices. ‘Alternate’ markets such as sidewalk stalls, boot sales or traffic jam peddling are just as
common in Dakar and cities across the continent (Simone, 2010). Places of consumption in the ‘global south’ are not static but are formed by the ebb and flow of daily life (e.g. in Sandaga, some vendors set up shop in the same part of the market day after day while others move around or change the type of product they sell from one day to the next). Historically, markets have played a key role in African cities as the ‘centre of gravity’ of urban life (Simone, 2008, pg. 81). Consumption, both in the spaces in which it unfolds and the physical transactions it involves, grants insight into how people construct their identities, particularly with regards to the conception of ‘modernity’ and its link to consumption patterns. Scheld (2007, pg. 233), for example, argues that young people in Dakar are increasingly entrepreneurial individuals and base the ‘authenticity of their cosmopolitan identity on an ability to buy and sell (trade) in the urban/global informal economy.’ Consumption, according to Baudrillard (1970), dictates the ‘organisation totale de la quotidiénneté’ (total organization of daily life); so, what does it mean when consumption is, more often than not, an informal practice?

Sandaga is best described as a site of ‘incessant performance, for feigned connections and insider deals, for dissimulation of all kinds, for launching impressions and information, rumours and advice’ (Simone, 2010, pg. 81). A cursory glimpse down the side streets, away from the main avenues, tells a story about daily acts of subversion such as defying laws on loitering, and selling black market items out in the open. Everyday acts are neither innocent or innocuous, as they provide an opportunity for resisting conformity through ‘microbe-like strategies’ (DeCerteau, 1980, pg. 95). In fact, DeCerteau (1984) argues that an ‘urbanistic system’ that seeks to administer or suppress these ‘microbe-like’ tactics only reinforces their ‘proliferating illegitimacy,’ as they find ways to insinuate themselves within existing networks through ‘unreadable but stable tactics’ that constitute ‘everyday regulations and surreptitious creativities’ (DeCerteau, 1980, pg. 95). A notable example observed during fieldwork occurred at the traffic lights at the intersection leading to the Institut Français (French Institute) in the proximity to Sandaga market. With great ease and facility and under the watchful eye of a traffic police officer, the taxi driver purchased a plastic bag of water and a top-up for his cellular phone. Not (fully) breaking the laws on loitering or jay-walking, the informal trader was able to conduct his business with the taxi driver within the time it took for the light to go from red to green. These small examples of ‘secondary production’ (DeCerteau,
1984) demonstrate the ways in which subjects develop 'microbe-like' strategies and appropriate public spaces within the city to suit their needs. During the brief and seemingly mundane interaction, urban informality was revealed as an 'organising urban logic' and the urban actors were clearly privy to the rules of the game (AlSayyad & Roy, 2003, pg. 5).

At the masterplan level, these emerging geographies and 'velocities of circulation, shifting circuitries of cross-purposes, collision and complicity, oscillating vectors of the political' are not legible to 'hegemonic regimes of visibility' and often overlooked or ignored (Simone, 2018, pg. 31). Urban life, 'far from being dystopic' is typified by an 'apparent exuberance of the everyday,' where models of self-organising, produce new interpretations of urban cultures and 'modes of transmitting their efficacy to the city polity at large' (Enwezor, 2003, pg. 18). The local and international linkages of urban dwellers and their development of infrastructures beyond the frameworks of 'formality' and 'legality' are not captured by masterplans. In much of SSA, postcolonial governments view informality as 'synonymous with illegality, inefficiency or unproductive chaos' and aspire to the 'clean Western urban models' as 'the antidote' (Watson & Agbola, 2013, pg. 8). This definition, however, is reductive and fails to consider the role of informality which was 'discernible in precolonial African cities, perpetuated and consolidated during the colonial period, and have developed - and finally exploded - in the postcolonial period, notably within the residential, social, and professional dimensions' (Abdoul, 2005, pg. 339).

The informal, seen solely through an economic lens of regulation, contributes to a 'black box' view of informality which renders invisible the 'multiple power relations and the solidarity principles at work within it' (Lourenco-Lindell, 2002, pg. 5). Informality does not 'develop in a vacuum' and originates in the global and local forces that have shaped its development (Scheld, 2010, pg. 157). Furthermore, informal economies, often viewed on the surface as local or 'vernacular' are actually 'extensively internationalised' and embedded within global processes (Lindell, 2002, pg. 22). For example, the preponderance of signs mentioning or relating to Touba,
holy site of the Mourides brotherhood on a variety of storefronts in and around Sandaga, points to the ‘transnationalism’ of informal networks. The Mourides are important actors in Dakar whose spheres of influence extend beyond the city as local Sandaga-based activities are linked to broader global processes. Studies on the Mourides trading diaspora in the USA and France reveal that it is a ‘self-sustaining system of networks linking ties of belonging and trade’ that span over several continents. The vendors who display their link with or connection to the Mourides brotherhood in Sandaga are signalling their integration into a larger network in which Dakar is a hub (like Paris or New York City). In the process of developing expansive linkages, the Mourides are demonstrating the ‘plurality of cosmopolitanism’ (Werbner, 1999) of which informality is an integral part. On the Mourides, Diouf (2000, pg. 702) wrote;

‘In the Mourides case, there is neither a dissolution of the local in the global nor an annexation of the latter by the former. Rather, the Mourides experience involves constructing original texts and images that establish themselves at the heart of the world, and by so doing create new forms of cosmopolitanism whose manifestations no longer refer necessarily and obligatorily to the acquisition of an identity through assimilation but, rather, to the display of a unique identity added to global temporality and not simply informed by the Western trajectory of modernity alone. The Mourides diaspora in the world, precisely because it presents itself in the mode of a ritual community, participates in this plural representation of the world on the basis of unique achievements.’

By integrating the Mourides brotherhood, urban dwellers insinuate themselves into a ‘vast network of patronage and protection that the Mourides have woven into the Senegalese economy’ (Guibbert, 1983, pg. 83). Thus, far from ‘behaving in an anarchic fashion,’ this example demonstrates how urban agents base their behaviour on ‘widely understood and accepted, if informal, rules for social interaction’ (Rakodi in Enwezor Ed., 2003, pg. 46). Networks developed within the market are maintained through the ‘reproduction of the normative systems of the market, as it serves to uphold particular subject positions in relation to other networked actors, institutions and practices’ (Marfaing & Thiel, 2013, pg. 650). These

129 The Mourides order was founded in the 1880s by Cheick Amadou Bamba and has its capital at Touba, the site of his revelation, where Mourides have constructed the largest mosque in sub-Saharan Africa (Riccio, 2004, pg. 934).
'networks of accumulation' (Meagher, 2006) are distinguishable from 'networks of survival' (Marfaing & Thiel, 2013, pg. 660). In this example, the notion of 'informality as currency' reveals that informal activities are 'composed of relations that extend well beyond the 'local' and connect places together in ways that are not anticipated by urban theory' (Marx & Kelling, 2019, pg. 16).

Interestingly, the fieldwork conducted in Sandaga and Kermel reflects a drive towards a formalisation of informality. After nearly seven years of construction, Centre Felix Eboué, a complex dedicated to the street vendors of Dakar was inaugurated by the Mayor of Dakar in 2017. Colloquially referred to as 'Khadimou Rassoul,' the centre is designed to accommodate nearly 3,000 vendors. In addition, the centre also contains a bank agency, a cafeteria area, a mosque and a commercial plateau of 60 m². The site has modern conveniences, such as video surveillance, remote monitoring, and access control. Soham El Wardini, first municipal councillor of the city of Dakar, and representative of Mayor Khalifa Sall said in an interview in 2017; ‘since 2009, we have toured the markets of Dakar to converse with and explain to the traders the need to reorganise them. This [Centre Felix Eboué] is one of the achievements and among one of the three centres under construction. This modern shopping centre is divided into four three-storey blocks, taking into account the diversity of the merchants by making available to them canteens and boxes distributed in a manner perfectly aligned with the specialisation of activities and functional zoning.' Yet, despite the attempts of 'recasement' – to situate informal merchants in a designated space within the city, the continued presence and effervescence of marchands ambulants in the city is palpable. In the formalisation of space, the rationalities of the state, articulated through municipalities that impose ‘hierarchies of authority and specific rules and procedures about how those practices are going to work with each other,' ignore existing networks rendering them incompatible with socio-spatial infrastructures (Simone, 2018, pg. 35). Thus, the processes of formalisation in Dakar fall within the scope of Avni and Yiftachel’s (2014) stages of urban policy response discussed in the context of vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2). While the colonial and postcolonial state initially ignored, neglected and sought to contain or limit the spread of informality throughout the city, the modern-day state has made efforts towards selectively ‘whitening’ the grey spaces of informality through 'anesthetization, privatisation and gentrification' (Avni & Yiftachel, 2014, pg. 490).
iv. The neoliberalisation of space

The influence of global processes is palpable in the articulation of narratives of globalisation and development in the built environment and socio-spatial structures of the city. Like many cities across the continent, Dakar has become a hub for new modernisation projects and a site for continued and increased real estate speculation. The increased involvement of international and ‘economic non-state actors in the production of the city’ reaffirms the hegemony of the ‘politico-economic elite’ in a new assemblage of urban governance (Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 324). In the ‘global south,’ the neoliberalisation of urban space translates to the ‘financialization of everything’ as the ‘the planet as building site’ clashes with the ‘planet of slums’ (Keil, 2018, pg. 7).

Figure 44: Projet Lacoste, Dakar (Lacaton & Vassal, 2017)
The neoliberalisation of space in Dakar is evident in *Place Kermel* in which the significance of this space is reimagined through the scope of new and often contradictory paradigms. *Place Kermel* is home to the new *Projet Lacoste* which offers a ‘mixed program of retail, leisure facilities, a hotel (the first Hyatt in ‘black Africa’) and events centre superimposed on each other from the ground to the fourteenth floor, on top of two basement parking levels’ (Lacaton & Vassal, 2018). The project is presented as a ‘high class’ locale in an historical setting for the ‘discerning’ metropolitan (Figure 44). The glass building stands in stark contrast to the neo-Moorish market and even more so in comparison to the informal stalls littered around the hexagonal square. Even in its unfinished state, this building appears to be grafted on the landscape and does not reflect any of the architectural motifs of adjacent buildings.

The promotional pictures for this project feature a sanitised and idealised version of *Place Kermel* without informal stalls, overflowing dumpsters and crumbling colonial buildings. Instead, we see a picture of pristine glass and concrete modernity effortlessly blended with the ‘history’ of Dakar given its proximity to Kermel. The project uses space as an ‘object of cultural consumption for tourists, for aestheticism, avid for spectacles and the picturesque’ (Madden, 2011, pg. 782). Thus, even the historical importance of Kermel, as a remnant of history, is financialised in the process of imbuing the space with an artificial and imagined quality that is directly relevant to the monetisation of space. Space is thus taken apart, ‘exchanged (sold) in bits and pieces’ (Lefebvre, 1995; Keil, 2018, pg. 8). Modernity is manifested here at the intersection of the new and the residual ‘stemming from a different time, histories, and cultural conventions’ (Harootunian, 2000, pg. 62-3). The implantation of *Projet Lacoste* reveals that, at the centre of everyday life, lies the spectre of uneven development, engendered by capitalism as it ‘enters societies at different moments and different rates of intensity’ (ibid, pg. 57). Absent from these visions of modernity, for instance, are the thriving street stalls and shops whose local networks generate economic activity for urban residents on a daily basis. The renders equate modernity with what is commonly identified as ‘western’ urban aesthetics or the vernacular of western modernity. Therefore, to convey ‘modernity,’ the renders remove the informal elements from the visuals depicting the ‘modern’ space of *Place Kermel*. Urban informality in the ‘north’ is
discussed in terms of 'lack of scale of the phenomena' which is rooted in 'fixed
distinctions between what is aesthetically modern and pleasing and what is
aesthetically unappealing about urban informality' (Marx & Kelling, 2019, pg. 23).
Thus, the 'grey spaces' of Kermel are conveniently erased from the renders to
convey the sense of an 'aesthetically modern' space which suggests a planned
disruption to the psychogeographies of the city (as discussed in Voices II:
Psychogeographies and 'cityness') in the juxtaposition of seemingly contradictory
aesthetics (ibid).

Lefebvre argued that ‘wherever a dominated space is generated and mastered by a
dominant space – where there is periphery and centre – there is colonisation’
(Lefebvre, 1978, pg. 174). The infrastructural development of Place Kermel reveals
that the colonisation of space extends beyond the colonial history of the market area
as new forces (globalising and neoliberal) are entering in direct competition with
existing place-making politics in a new colonisation of space. The neoliberalisation of space results in the ‘gradual displacement of politics itself from state institutions to marginal, interstitial and informal sites’
(Choplin & Ciavolella, 2018, pg. 315). The postcolonial city, in the thickness and
complexity of its informal linkages in marginal spaces, becomes a 'laboratory of new
mobilizations, of informalities producing the 'city yet to come' (Simone, 2004)with
new kinds of ‘insurgent citizenships’ (Brown, 2015); or, to say it in a postcolonial
Gramscian fashion, of new forms of politically being-in-the-world (Chatterjee, 2004)'
(Choplin & Ciavolella, 2018, pg. 315).

v. Plebeian public sphere
Harnessing a rhetoric from the ‘global north’ and testing its veracity in the south,
this analysis questions whether we are witnessing the evolution of an ‘African
version' of Habermas's (1989) ‘plebeian public sphere' (Ndjio, 2005, pg. 267). Traditionally, public spaces are places of open access and interaction
unrestricted by the state or commercial forces, but subject to a ‘defined purpose and
behavioural norms that control those who are allowed to enter' (Mitchell, 1995, pg.
115). Throughout a city’s history, the nature and use of public space has been
disputed by groups who hold incompatible views on the purpose of spaces. Urban
space is understood here as a ‘meeting-place, of jostling, potentially conflicting,
trajectories, set within, and internally constituted through, complex geometries of
differential power’ (Massey, 2016, pg. 89). For example, market(places) and public
spaces are often one and the same in sub-Saharan Africa cities (e.g. street corners,
public parks and sidewalks have been turned into informal and ‘alternate’ markets),
which reflects a fundamentally different social reality than that of the traditional
‘public sphere' theorised in the 'global north' in the work of Habermas.

Studies conducted by Ralph (2008), Simone (2006), and Ismail (2009) have engaged
with the variable ways in which different groups appropriate public space by finding
ways to negotiate livelihoods and build social networks within the city. Case studies
documenting acts of subversive resistance in contemporary Africa demonstrate that
it takes on ‘highly different forms: pillaging, swindling or criminality (Bayart et al.
1993; Devisch, 1996; Ndjio, 2001); witchcraft practices (Geschiere, 1997); ethnic
withdrawal (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2001); religious awakening (Meyer, 2001); or
popular derision (Toulabor 1991).' The city therefore represented a ‘field of
contention' or an ‘arena of conflicts of power' (Sow, 1983, pg. 45). Informality as a
politics of subversion means that African public spaces may be read as places in
which ‘subversion took the place of revolution' (Trentmann, 2012, pg. 528);

‘From Filip De Boeck’s (2005) work on the appropriation of the
dead and funerals in Kinshasa as a way to challenge local
hierarchies, to studies of youth efforts to take over local
government councils in Nigeria in an attempt to run local
affairs in new ways (Adebanwi 2005; Watts 2004), scholars
have been documenting the intensity of the effort to break
with the past and the different forms devised for doing so' (Simone, 2008, pg. 83).

In some instances, informality morphs into a political outcry – the right to be informal
(particularly when the state has failed the people or undermined efforts at survival
despite being unable to provide basic urban services). Ndjio (2005) documents the
ways in which Cameroonian have developed different forms of ‘passive resistance,
including tampering with water and electricity meters, falsification of telephone
bills, taxes and other dues, slandering the authorities and rumour-mongering about
the men in power.’

Even in its deteriorated state, informal vendors still fight vehemently for their right
to be in or near Sandaga. The market is no longer important solely in terms of its
functions since the building itself is defunct, but it is important as a place of reckoning. In 2007, riots and protests broke out when Wade’s government ordered the eviction of thousands of street vendors who set up stalls in city streets, many of whom converge on Sandaga. The market was reimagined as a battlefield as the ‘spaces and objects of urban life are appropriated as a means of making highly particularistic claims and solidifying zones of disengagement’ (Simone, 2008, pg. 80). People have therefore taken what is ‘significant about a place (industry, history, buildings, literature, environment)’ and depleted it, ‘devoured’ or used it over time to suit their needs, as the market is in ruins but still holds critical value in the shared imaginaries of urban dwellers (Urry, 2006, pg. 1-2). As with Sandaga, public space comes to be occupied by ‘active participants in the drama of civilization versus barbarism’ (Jacobs, 2002, pg. 45). By its very nature, this requires users to be ‘actively engaged in the process of civility’ to contend with the ‘perverse consequence of the privatization of residential environments’ in the withdrawal of ‘many law-abiding participants from this role (Bentley, 1999, pg. 163)’ (Carmona, 2014, pg. 131).

Sandaga has metaphorical value as a battleground. In Sandaga, commercial and state forces have clashed with urban dwellers, making it a site of continued contest between oppositional groups throughout the years - informal vendors and the government, students and the state. The presence of young people and informal vendors en masse in the streets of Dakar, and Sandaga in particular, is indicative of deep socioeconomic woes. Young people’s integration into society, in terms of both civic responsibility and membership, has had enormous economic, cultural, political, and social consequences (Diouf, 2003, pg. 2). In demographic terms, ‘youth’ are not only the largest cohort in the city but also across the country and have become key players in politics and cultural industries. Young people have reimagined the traditional roles of music, language, clothing, and even tea-making, challenging prevailing approaches to and interpretations of topics such as democratisation, informality, and identity. Linguistic analyses of the language politics of the city reveal changing notions of urban identity originating in Dakar that move away from conventional identity tropes focused on ethnicity and religion towards a collective urban identity based on common language130 (Dakar Wolof). The

130 The emergence of a new cosmopolitan vernacular (see Bhabha on pg. 45).
topic of youth is important not only because it deals with the largest demographic in most African countries, including Senegal, but also because young people have come to symbolise the:

‘uneven trajectory of an Africa in search of its rhythm and its identity in their willingness to combine violence madness, and pleasure, sex and the temptations of religious chastity, the desire for autochthony and the impulse to rip themselves away from the continent and to erase all attachment to history and place’ (Diouf, 2003, pg. 10).

In Senegalese society, state rhetoric has generally recognized two classes of youth: *encombrements humains* (social obstructions) and students. *Encombrements humains* refers to a category of young people seen as marginal, whose lives are supposedly characterized by an ‘affinity for loitering, sexual deviance, panhandling, and criminal violence’ (Ralph, 2008, pg. 9). These young people migrate to Dakar in search of economic opportunities but end up on the streets or in prison because of the ‘often illicit strategies they used to secure a living’ (Ralph, 2008, pg. 9). The second class of young people, unemployed graduates, constitute a substantial cohort since education is no longer a guarantee of employment in a postcolonial context of economic crisis. Poverty and unemployment as well as worsening conditions in much of Africa due to economic crises and ill-fated SAPs resulted in the proliferation of more illegal peddlers on the street and illegal emigration towards Europe, as university diplomas and professional qualifications no longer guaranteed jobs.

With a median age of 23, Dakar’s population is, for the most part, young (Mboup et al., 2015, pg. 12). Student and youth-led protests are a common occurrence in Senegal since the 1980s. Everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) examines the ways in which young people strategically position themselves as visible reminders of the failure of the ‘neoliberal dream’ in Senegal. Hence, any discussion of contemporary urbanisation in Senegal is integrally tied to the role of youth as agents of change, particularly in focal places like Sandaga. The Set/Setal movement, a youth lead social endeavour focused on cleaning up the streets of Dakar, has been framed within the scope of Bourdieu’s theory of practice, whereby ‘power and its legitimation constitute the essence of social practice and social actors struggle to enhance their position and to dominate, oppose or transform their social world’ (Bourdieu, 1990; Swartz, 1997). Before 1988, waste management in Dakar was
regulated by the state. The system fell apart in the wake of the Structural Adjustment Programmes and the hollowing out of the state. Thus, the public version of the ‘disinvestment process’ resulted in the withdrawal of municipal services, including street cleaning, hospitals and police protection (Hartman, 2010, pg. 582). The accumulation of waste in public spaces became an indicator of state failure, corruption, financial insufficiencies, lack of technical capacity, and an inability to keep up with the pace of urbanisation (Fredericks, 2014, pg. 533). The state had arguably failed to keep up its end of the ‘social contract’ which incited a grassroots movement that sought to cleanse the city of its ‘evident corruption and evil’ (Ferguson, 2006, pg. 85). The Set/Setal (‘Be Clean/Makn Clean’ in Wolof) began in Dakar and saw ordinary citizens, youth in particular, take to the streets in order to clean the litter following the withdrawal of the state services 131 (O’Brien, 2008, pg. 7). These urbanites are the Gramscian ‘velites[foot soldiers] of the proletarian army’ that ‘take by storm the ancient citta, rotten and unsteady, in order to make rise, from its ruins, their own citta’ (1917, ‘il Grido del Popolo’).

As part of the movement, street names were reclaimed and renamed, walls were adorned with intricate frescos telling tales of national struggle. Graffiti painted on the walls as part of the Set/Setal campaign demonstrated an ‘appreciation of Senegal’s past’ and showed ‘solidarity with African heroes like Nelson Mandela and enthusiastically supported the values of democracy and freedom’ (Gellar, 2016, pg. 17). Other cultural icons included the Statue of Liberty, ‘anti-colonial heroes from Senegalese history and football players’ (Gellar, 2016, pg. 18). Diouf (1992, pg. 41) describes the movement as an ‘assault against the ruling class and its historicity’ which redefines public space as it fashions a ‘new historical memory, one which is quintessentially urban.’ In an interview conducted with Chimurenga scholar Maya Varichon at Raw Academy in Dakar (Interview April 24, 2017), she frames the artistic expressions during Set/Setal as a process of ‘appropriation by drawing.’ By combining elements of more ‘traditional’ cultural forms of art with the symbolic act of painting, the youth of Set/Setal were not only reclaiming their right to the city but

131 See discussion on ‘autogestion’ on pg. 92
carving out a space in which they could tell a story different to the dominant narratives of neoliberalisation and western modernity. In fact, Varichon (2017) suggests that Set/Setal was a moment in time when a rural mindset was 'reproduced' in the city, challenging dichotomies between the modern and traditional in the ways that people 'take care' of the public space. Village units and their concomitant mentalities were harnessed in the city-centre as well as in Ouakam, Fass and Fann to appropriate spaces and reject dominant paradigms.

Diouf (2003) describes youth movements in Senegal as a process whereby the ‘total disillusionment of politics among youth’ led them to ‘claim their own form of democracy rather than accepting what is available through party politics’ (Selboe, 2010, pg. 370). By transforming their social world, cleaning and inscribing the streets of Dakar, young people, once dismissed as troublesome elements within society, were able to display their power for change and, in the process, expose the powerlessness of the state to make good on its promises in their ‘symbolic transformation of the city’ (McLaughlin, 2001, pg. 54). In their willingness to embrace their power for ‘autogestion’ (Lefebvre, 1970) urban citizens compensated for state ineptitude, appropriating both physical spaces and societal roles previously monitored and controlled by the state. Thus, the appropriation of space forces us to rethink the idea of ‘rightful ownership’ and transform the way we ponder who ‘rightfully owns the city’ – particularly in contexts where the use and control of space is so contested (Purcell, 2013, pg. 149). Autogestion is only possible in a historical moment when the state withers away (Lefebvre, 1966/2009:150) since ‘autogestion cannot avoid a collision with that stato-political system’ (ibid., pg.147). In The Urban Revolution, Lefebvre (1970/2003, pg. 180) argues that the ‘state and the urban’ are ‘incompatible.’ The example of Set/Setal demonstrates how the urban only comes to be defined in opposition to the state and in the spaces and roles abandoned by the state. Thus, Brenner and Elden (2009, pg. 38) suggest that Lefebvre’s concept of autogestion provides an ‘important normative reference point for the rejuvenation of political struggle’ and allows us to reframe our understanding of youth movements in the city, especially when considering how they shape ‘cityness’ and ‘the urban.’ Butler (2012, pg. 158) argues that Lefebvre’s right to the city has the potential for ‘destabilizing and challenging the dominance of capitalist social relations’ if

132 See discussion of ‘ruralness’ in Pikine on pg. 187
pursued simultaneously with ‘the right to difference as part of a generalized spatial politics of autogestion.’ Set/Setal is an example of the ‘urban' produced through social struggle (Kipfer et al., 2013, pg. 128-9). In Dakar, ‘the urban' provides a glimpse of a future based on autogestion, civic engagement and participation – quite possibly in a setting that Lefebvre never foresaw or imagined.

In Dakar, the practices of young people have encouraged ‘democratic, transparent and accountable politics and management' through street manifestations, calls for accountability, and sharp criticism of the ‘fraudulent and clientelist practices' of politicians and older generations who ‘agreed to and reproduced these’ (Selboe, 2010, pg. 380). The spirit of reform and optimism of the Set/Setal devolved into a more aggressive social movement in the Bul Faale (Don’t Care) ethos, which was strongly represented in Senegalese rap as a rallying cry for disillusioned youth (Figure 45). Bul Faale is an urban movement that has a cultural dimension through ‘artistic modes of expression’ (i.e. rap) and sports (Senegalese wrestling) and social dimension in its conveyance of distinct generational values (Havard, 2001). It represents both a desire to break with tradition and convention, as well as a capacity for innovation in the rewriting of identities (Havard, 2001). Young people demonstrated their power for creation and destruction, as ‘idealism, nihilism, and sometimes even pure, childish naughtiness’ were articulated through the positionality of youth in the African city (Diouf, 2003, pg. 9). Diouf (2003) states:

In the most dangerous neighbourhoods of Dakar, for instance, young people have seized control of local space by setting up militias for self-defence and the protection of property and the tranquillity of peaceable citizens. In 1989, the youth of the Médina, seeking to make up for the deficiencies of the police, organized raids on thieves and drug addicts who hung out in the grottos of the Corniche along the seafront. In 1990, in the same neighbourhood, groups of young Islamic fundamentalists launched a series of reprisals following an early morning attack on a muezzin. Several bars and nightclubs selling alcoholic beverages were burned down. In September and October 1993, in order to fight the noise and accidents caused by express buses, young people living in the rues Valmy and Petersen in the centre of Dakar blocked the area and forced the governor of the region to order the vehicles off the streets (Diouf, 2003, pg. 8).
These examples demonstrate how young people strategically position themselves in the city, leveraging their role within the urban fabric to build the socio-spatial infrastructures of the city. Youth opposition to Senegal’s political establishment eventually led to the demise of the Diouf regime, helping Abdoulaye Wade and his promises for Sopi (change) to power (Gellar, 2016, pg. 17). In Dakar, the new regime’s interest in ‘modernising’ the capital through infrastructural transformations was often at the expense of the needs of urban residents and failed to address the shortage of jobs, affordable housing, poor transportation services, traffic congestion, and ‘flooding, erratic waste management, broken sewage pipes and frequent power cuts’ that typified the ‘other Dakar’ (Paice, 2016, pg. 1). As popular support for Wade and his large-scale and costly infrastructural projects waned, young Dakarois who once headed his call for Sopi (change) in his ascension to the presidency, were now venting their frustration and demanding a change of regime (Gellar, 2016, pg. 16). Wade’s popularity declined due to economic stagnation, repeated political scandals, and limits on democratic practice, as young people denounced his presidency as ‘increasingly patrimonial, autocratic, and even authoritarian’ (Bingol and Vengroff, 2012; Kelly, 2012; Mbow, 2008; Fredericks, 2014, pg. 131).

In the span of a decade, the challenging socioeconomic context of Dakar, and Senegal more broadly, spurred the development of a highly organized, exciting, and dreadful social movement, known as Y’en a marre (fed up) – a ‘rallying cry that hoarsely shouts the youths’ unprecedented, widespread discontent’ (Ngom, 2016, pg. 11). A new identity was formed, the – NTS (New Type Senegalese);

’a citizen fully aware of his[sic] rights but who doesn’t shun from his duties. This ideal citizen is demanding toward their rulers but doesn’t expect everything from the latter. Y’en a marre valued entrepreneurship and civic
attitude, which earns the movement growing popularity among a population disillusioned by politicians’ (Ngom, 2016, pg. 13).

On election day, youth positioned themselves at polling booths ‘to ensure against any foul play in what was turning out to be one of the country’s most dramatic electoral test’ (Fredericks, 2014, pg. 131). Abdoulaye Wade lost the election to Macky Sall, an outcome which was hailed as a ‘solidification of Senegal’s reputation as one of Africa’s strongest democracies’ but also signalled young people’s ability to place themselves ‘at the centre of the political stage’ and inspire deeper public reflection on citizenship and democratic practice (Fredericks, 2014, pg. 131). To an extent, the events unfolding in Dakar mirrored those of the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011. While political structures vary greatly between Senegal and countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the similitude arises from the ‘dissenting voice of the Arab public’ which echoes in the African public sphere in the airing of grievances demonstrated by the youth movements in the country (Bayat, 2013, pg. 588). The events of the ‘Arab Spring’ therefore resonate with the revolutionary potential of African cities in the culmination of ‘non-movements’ –

‘the non-deliberate and dispersed but contentious practices of individuals and families to enhance their life chances. The urban poor made sure to secure shelter, consolidate their communities, and earn a living by devising work in the vast subsistent and street economy...And youths took every opportunity to affirm their autonomy, challenge social control and plan for their future, even though many remained atomized and dreamed of migrating to the West’ (Bayat, 2013, pg. 588-9). In their ability to work within the confines of dominated spaces and subvert everyday routines and practices that make up all spheres of life: work, politics, leisure, language, etc., the ‘contentious’ practices of non-movements are actively involved in the making of ‘cityness.’

**Conclusion**

*Place Kermel and Marché Sandaga* reveal how power is inscribed in the built environment of Dakar and how urbanisation is an amalgamation of historical processes and evolving metanarratives manifested in built form. The territorial relations unfolding in Dakar represent the encounter between a ‘dominated space’ that is ‘generated and mastered by a dominant space’ and where the implicit and explicit narratives of periphery and centre are at odds in the ongoing ‘colonisation’ of space (Lefebvre, 1978, pg. 174). Power is therefore understood as ‘diffuse, residing
nowhere but enacted everywhere' (Lawhon et al., 2014, pg. 508). Urban planning and architecture cover up the 'social antagonisms' arising from processes of urbanisation while informal and grassroots transformations of space are committed to the 'revolutionary vocation' of radically changing both 'space and society' (Goonewardena, 2011, pg. 88).

The examination of the structural transformations of the case study city through the analysis of field sites allows for a better understanding of the manipulations of space and infrastructure and the fundamental redrawing and shaping of the contours of 'cityness.' In Sandaga, we see the transformation of public spaces into political arenas – both as contested territories and sites for political protest. Sandaga is a site for 'exegesis, rumour, speculation, conviviality, entertainment, mobilization and networking,' all of which visibly extend beyond the physical (perceived) borders and the conceived importance of the market that continues to be a 'powerful attractor' (Simone & Pieterse, 2017, pg. 93). This example demonstrates that the transformation of space occurs through a politicised contest between the imaginaries of the state and those of the people. Place Kermel, as a microcosm for urban change, demonstrates the various processes and actors at work in the development of the city. The redevelopment of Marché Kermel and the construction of Projet Lacoste and Centre Felix Eboué suggest the presence of competing ideologies that fragment urban space. 'Cityness' is therefore understood in 'contestatory terms' (Fraser, 1990) since it is always negotiated in the process of defining what it means to be (and to look) urban.
Voices: Dakar Arty

African cities are ‘generators of urban stories worth telling and worth learning from’ (Myers, 2011, pg. 6). The photograph presented here is emblematic of the African ‘bricoleur’ discussed in Chapter Three. The salesman conducting his own business in the backdrop of a fish market in Dakar is demonstrating the ‘collateral realities’ that produce urban spatialities of the city (Law, 2011).

Figure 46: ‘Salesman on the sly in front of Soumbedioune fish market’ (Stefan Gladieu, 2017)
African cities are places 'to be modern' and to 'keep tradition alive,' to be 'a kinsman' and to be cosmopolitan (Simone & Abouhani, 2005, pg. 12). This photograph is representative of the networks established through tea-making rituals, the presence *en masse* of young men and the inklings of an Afro-modernity represented in the effortless blend of vernacular elements with globalised symbols of modernity.

Figure 47: ‘Shop on the coastal road between Dakar and Saint Louis’ (Stefan Gladieu, 2017)
Urban dwellers ‘become an infrastructure, a platform providing for and reproducing life in the city’ (Simone, 2004, pg. 407–408). The photo below presents an example of the economies of piracy (Simone, 2006) and the increasing presence of women as entrepreneurial economic agents in the African city.

Figure 48: ‘Hair salon in the old city’ (Stefan Gladieu, 2017)
Chapter Nine: Conclusion

The thesis situates itself within the discipline of human geography but speaks to broader themes across development studies, urban planning and African studies. While these disciplines have called for decolonising urban knowledge, the ways in which scholars and students undertake this task still remains a matter of debate. Within the framework of human geography, this analysis has utilised a variety of lenses and research approaches to analyse key urban processes (e.g. colonialism, modernisation, neoliberalism and globalisation) to arrive at a better understanding of ‘cityness’ in the case study city. As a geographical contribution, this analysis has drawn from and challenged the fields of Development Studies, History, and Planning. Furthermore, the importance of reflexivity and positionality throughout the research process has leveraged the researcher’s identity and experience of the city as part of the discursive work of understanding placemaking politics in Dakar.

This analysis is a retroductive study of an urban theory of the ‘global south’ that has two key aims: 1) identify and address the gaps in our knowledge concerning cities of the ‘global south’; 2) engage with emerging theories on the urban ‘global south’ in order to arrive at a better conceptualisation of ‘cityness’ in the case study city. Archival research and fieldwork were conducted in tandem in/on the case study city to arrive at a better understanding of the ‘contingent universals’ (Healey, 2012) of urbanisation in the ‘global south’ through the analysis of the case study city. Nevertheless, the study remains conscious of the fact that shared histories of colonisation, exploitation, ‘brutal sovereignty and unbridled economic liberalisation,’ give rise to ‘specific urban formations and original urban residues’ in the making of ‘cityness’ (De Boeck, 2015, pg. 2).

This chapter begins by touching base with urban theory to reassert the position of this research project within the broader framework of human geography. The following section dissects and evaluates the methodology of this research project. The evaluation considers the benefits of a retroductive analysis in the study of southern urbanisation against those of traditional urban inquiries (i.e. comparative urbanism). This section also looks at the use of masterplans as the primary focus of
the archival analysis of the methodology. The use of layers/scale to structure research interventions is also discussed and assessed. The next section considers the benefits of structuring a research project on the 'global south' around the concept of 'cityness' and the opportunities for broadening the scope of the methodology. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the role and importance of reflexivity and positionality throughout the research process and argues in favour of putting African cities at the heart of theory-building in the development of an urban theory of the 'global south.'

Taking stock

Roy's (2009, pg. 820) call to 'blast open theoretical geographies' and produce new concepts in the 'crucible of a new repertoire of cities' has incited creativity in theorising southern cities. However, this has not been matched by the 'development of rigorous empirical methods to actually research them' (Schindler, 2017, pg. 48). Urban geography continues to 'tread water' by recycling old ideas and 'failing to develop new theories to explain the production of urban space' (Hubbard, 2017, pg. 3). Thus, the scope of conventional urban theory continues to be limited by its theoretical underpinnings and orientations, especially when applied to southern contexts. In order to study cities of the south – not as cases of failed modernisation or urbanisation gone awry – it is necessary to commit to a 'mental decolonisation' and recognise that the 'ideal of the Western city' was deployed in the colonial era, and is now 'deployed in the neoliberal era to advance a certain paradigm of development and capital accumulation' (Perera, 1999; Miraftab, 2009, pg. 44). By restating the terms and not only the content of this conversation, we are able to reframe events unfolding in the urban south to give them their rightful place in history and in the framework of global processes underway. At the heart of this endeavour is the need to understand 'what ultimately shapes the city' in the 'global south' and 'what can be done' to effect urban change (Parnell & Pieterse, 2016, pg. 237). This requires a 'parallax view' of the city that looks beyond conventional theorisations that have limited our knowledge of southern urbanism (Simone, 2018).

Oswin (2018, pg. 544) contends that we should 'keep thinking rather than settling on an epistemology' that tries to capture 'that which is bound to always elude us' - the 'truth of the urban.' The 'global south' is arguably at the forefront of an 'urban
revolution’ – the scope and ramifications of which we have only started to understand. An urban theory of the ‘global south’ is a theory in the making which allows for a great deal of improvisation, and trial and error in the elaboration of methodology. The title of this thesis signals that an urban theory of the ‘global south’ is not a totalising discourse on southern urbanisation. Much of what we know about southern cities continues to evolve as urban phenomena become ever more complex and defy the boundaries within urban theory. Within this framework, African urbanity remains an ‘elusive mirage clouded by limited data and inadequate theoretical approaches’ (Pieterse, 2011, pg. 20). Through the analysis of African urbanisation, this project has proposed that the examination of southern cities should be shifted from an appraisal of the city in a 'state of being' to a 'state of becoming.' Thus, African cities should not be seen in terms of ‘what they lack’ but rather based on ‘what they are and how they arrived at their contemporary configurations’ (Fourchard, 2011, pg. 224). Moving beyond stark binaries of what a ‘modern’ city should be or look like necessitates the examination of space as a chronology which develops and changes ‘as it comes into existence’ (Carmona, 2014, pg. 171). Places are not static, they are processes that are always in flux (Massey, 1994). The analysis of ‘layered’ urbanisation based on the dissection of masterplans moves away from the dehistoricising approach to the understanding of southern cities towards the examination of longue-durée historical, social and economic processes shaping the urban fabric. By identifying patterns of continuity and change and the factors ‘driving both,’ the analysis reconstructs the ‘socioeconomic and the political past’ of cities over an ‘extended timeframe’ (Reid, 2011, pg. 141). On the ground fieldwork is a way to see these processes in action in the physical articulations of dominant narratives, whether originating in the statist agenda, from above, or the logics of hustling and survival, from below. The empirical and theoretical work of this research project supports the idea that urbanity is contested, appropriated and reappropriated – both the physical urban landscape and the very meaning of what it means to be ‘urban.’

Trial and error
The tools of urban research in their current configuration are generally ill-suited for the study of southern urbanisation. The theoretical framework and literature review have underlined the need for a new theoretical and methodological repertoire that
can broaden and deepen our understanding of southern urbanisation. To answer the research questions, this research project proposes and evaluates a method centred on the topic of 'cityness' in the study of southern urbanisation. The following section examines and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed methodology. In order to take on this challenge, the analysis has presented a research proposal based on scale to tackle the enormity of the urban phenomenon. The methodology begins with the examination of masterplans, followed by observational work throughout the city within designated spaces to engage with themes that are relevant to the socio-spatial infrastructures of the city. The methodology is designed to allow for a more grounded image of 'cityness' by examining the articulation of power politics in built form and the transformation of biophysical and sociocultural infrastructures.

**Retroduction**

The methodology is based on a retroductive approach to the theoretical and empirical work on cities of the 'global south.' In the field of urban planning and theory, comparative studies have traditionally underpinned the process of theory-building and allowed for 'a wealth of empirical findings' but have been less successful in pondering what this means for 'existing methods and theories' (Ward, 2010, pg. 482). More often than not, the comparative approach culminates in the development of 'new ideal-types' rather than an examination of the differences and complexity of cities in the elaboration of theory (Robinson, 2002, pg. 549). Comparative approaches are often based on establishing the similarities (and/or differences) between places as a means of arriving at a theoretical proposition. As a result, comparative approaches run the risk of 'lumping' together the unrelated and the inessential' (Ward, 2010, pg. 476). The methodological choice of working with one case study city rather than a comparative approach is arguably both a strength and weakness of the proposed methodology. Using only one case study does not prevent the analysis of several themes pertinent to southern urbanisation – i.e. colonisation, decolonisation, nationalism, structural adjustment, neoliberalisation, and globalisation. Furthermore, the methodology was designed to be replicable across cities of the 'south' by making space for their unique histories and processes of change while holding in tension the need for generalisability. Additionally, urban planning and masterplans as blueprints for urbanisation is a global practice that
extends beyond 'global south' and is therefore also relevant to the study of urbanism in the north as well. As a result, the methodology is not constrained by the criteria of a comparative approach and the uniqueness of place works in tandem with the examination of urban transformation to develop a methodology that captures 'cityness' in any city (Massey, 1997).

For the sake of clarity, comparative urban studies often rely on methodological territorialism which assumes that 'all social relations are organized with self-enclosed, discretely bounded territorial containers' (Brenner, 2004, pg. 38). This premise ignores more open-ended and relational conceptualizations of cities (Massey, 2016) that examine the city as 'both a place (a site or territory) and as a series of unbounded, relatively disconnected and dispersed, perhaps sprawling activities, made in and through many different kinds of networks stretching far beyond the physical extent of the city' (Ward, 2010, pg. 479-80). The methodology of this research project is based on the premise that 'boundlessness' is an important feature of southern urbanisation based on the African perspective to planetary urbanisation. Furthermore, the analysis highlights the ways in which phenomena observed in the selected spaces of fieldwork shed light on larger processes unfolding on a city-wide scale with global linkages. By highlighting 'interconnected trajectories - how different cities are implicated in each other’s past, present and future' (e.g. Dakar, Paris, Rabat and Casablanca), the analysis takes a step back from looking for similarities and differences between ‘two mutually exclusive contexts’ and focuses on 'relational comparisons that use different cities to pose questions of one another' (Ward, 2010, pg. 480).

This thesis does not engage in the traditional city-to-city comparative approach, instead focusing on the analysis of comparators in a relational mode of theorisation. For example, the thesis examines ‘urban policy mobilities’ and considers the ways in which ‘knowledges, expertise and techniques routinely and quickly move from one city to another’ (Jacobs, 2012, pg. 413). Understanding the flow of urban models and the often-implicit relational links between the spatialities of cities are important components of this research project. The empirical work demonstrates how colonial logics of planning and modern-day rationalities of sustainability are circulated across time and place and recycled in the context of Dakar. For example, the analysis
investigates how the garden city model was exported and implanted across West Africa as the 'cité-jardin' and how the Medina, a north African urban configuration, was transplanted onto the urban fabric of Dakar. Other examples include the use of military rationale in urban planning in two colonial regimes (i.e. Bathurst (British) and Dakar (French)). This trend is also visible with the sanitation syndrome originating in London and Paris which is then recycled in Rabat and Dakar and used to justify socio-spatial segregation in these cities. The city of Rabat, in particular, reappears throughout the thesis as the prototype for Dakar but Rabat itself was modelled after Paris and demonstrates how planning ideas travel through space and time and are adopted/imposed in different contexts. More recently, the mobilities of urban planning are evident in the model of Diamniadio which is based on new planning ideals that fall in line with urbanisation as a profit-driven enterprise.

The analysis also compares different masterplans across space and time alongside the comparison of different spaces within the city to explore different themes (e.g. Place Kermel, Marché Sandaga, Diamniadio). This type of relational work is important for arriving at theoretical propositions that can be shared across contexts. Amin (2004, pg. 34) noted that '[cities] come with no automatic promise of territorial or systemic integrity, since they are made through the spatiality of flow, juxtaposition, porosity and relational connectivity.' These types of ‘connective practices’ (Jacobs, 2012, pg. 415) become what Robinson (2004, 2011) calls ‘actually existing comparative urbanism.’ This speaks to Healey’s (2012) proposition of planning case studies to determine 'origin narratives' and how these are carried over to other contexts. In so doing, it is possible to determine how planning strategies become attached to political projects involving 'domination of one group by another' (Watson, 2016, pg. 39). Therefore, in this relational approach, a key area of interest is to determine how the spatial workings of one city are transplanted onto the other, with varying degrees of success, and how this determines the ways in which cities speak to each other.
Masterplanning

The first part of the methodology focuses on masterplans as a way of gaining insight into the narratives that shape(d) the urbanisation and urban spatiality of Dakar. The task of this research project was to engage with the embedded politics and ideological inclinations of masterplans to better understand the rationales driving the production of urban space. This study has found that, generally, urban planning and design in Dakar consists of a 'superficial exercise of cut-and-paste graphics along with copied text' that only feigns concern with 'more than just profit' (Watson, 2015, Cityscapes No. 05). This is evident in the plans of Hoyez (1938), Lambert, Gutton and Lopez (1946) and Ecochard (1967) in which racist motives and an imperative of profit-making and cost-effectiveness led to distortions of the plans and entrenched societal stratification and precarity, a hallmark of Dakar's 'cityness.'

The effects of increasingly unequal and segregated cities such as Dakar where the poor are marginalised, in spatial and functional terms, will be felt more acutely as resources continue to be diverted away from meeting basic needs towards supporting the demands of the 'new enclaves of the elite' (Watson, 2015). The masterplans of 21st century Dakar are highly problematic in the profound disconnect between the reality of city life and the implausible development and planning goals envisioned as the urban future of the city. The absence of slums, poverty, and informality in these masterplans combined with the fact that their implementation entails the displacement of thousands, indicates their complete inadequacy in guiding the urban development of the city. Planning theory is rarely implemented in a way that is pro-poor or inclusive, which points directly to the need for abandoning inherited planning systems in favour of context-specific policies. As the masterplans of Dakar have indicated, traditional planning often relies on regulatory systems of zoning that outline rights, uses, and management of land in order to produce a hegemonic idea of the 'good city,' developed by urban modernists like Le Corbusier (Watson, 2014, pg. 2261). Symbols of the 'good urban life' are captured by urban forms such as the 'apartment and single-family dwelling, for example,' and are deployed in the masterplans and infrastructural modifications of Dakar133 (e.g.

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133 See masterplans of Hoyez (pg. 175) and Ecochard (pg. 193)
SICAP housing under the Lambert, Gutton and Lopez masterplan and Diamniadio that prioritise this type of dwelling). Urban inhabitants are interpellated and called upon to ‘identify their dreams and desires with regressive, myth-like utopias’ that structure urban modernity within the bounds of the ‘nuclear family, private property, and segregated community’ (Kipfer, 2018, pg. 201). Thus, the masterplan as it is deployed in the case study city and elsewhere is challenged as a worthwhile tool in determining urban futures of southern cities, particularly in the context of southern cities where the urban majority (i.e. informal, youth, poor) play a fundamental role in reimagining and restructuring the urban fabric of the city. Neuwirth (2015, Cityscapes No. 07) asks;

‘Are master plans even relevant, given that so many people in African cities don’t have access to basic infrastructure, like potable water or decent roads or electricity. Given this, should Africa be importing fancy development models from the rest of the world? Or should African cities instead be focusing on providing infrastructure and, as they improve themselves neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood, defining their own home-grown sense of what it means to be urban?’

The most recent masterplan for Dakar (PDU Horizon 2035) projects the city into the future to 2035 and dictates the rules for planning for the next two decades. The plan presents a sanitised version of the city in which fundamental factors such as informality and temporary settlements are expected to be formalised and fall in line with the modernist aims of the plan. The reality, however, is that any given amount of time on the ground reveals that the hidden/ignored/rebranded inconveniences of urbanisation in Dakar are alive and well and cannot simply be ignored by a plan that currently only exists in the realm of fantasy. The consortium of planners, developers and architects that have established these ‘neocapitalist dreamscapes’ therefore invalidate the appropriations of everyday spaces ‘by reducing them to industrialized, neo-colonial, and patriarchal spaces’ (Kipfer, 2018, pg. 203). Devas (2001) found that in a study of nine cities across Asia, Latin America, and Africa, most relied on planning standards that were unsuited and perhaps even detrimental to the poor. Fernandes (2003) makes a similar point as the urban poor are often forced to ‘step outside the law’ to secure housing and basic services due to the outdated and ‘elitist’ urban policies in place. Governments of the postcolonial state continue to opt for

134 See 'aspirational maps' on pg. 80
the 'northern' way which Fanon explains as the plight of the 'mentally colonized African' who internalises self-hatred only to have it 'manifested in a perverse attraction for the culture of the colonial master' (Ferguson, 2006, pg. 157). This perverse attraction is evident in the recycling of old planning tools and narratives that become more and more removed from the reality on-the-ground. Even as the models of southern urbanisation appear to have shifted from New York, Paris, and Washington to Hong Kong, Dubai, and Singapore, the aspirations about somewhere else that is supposedly more 'modern' and 'more desirable' remain the same (Watson, 2014, pg. 101). Thus, the liberation of the colonies only signalled a new period of a different type of colonisation where the vernaculars of the 'global south' are still dismissed and subjugated to the rationalities of western modernity.

The masterplans of colonial and postcolonial cities such as Dakar, Kigali, Nairobi and Addis Ababa have always (and continue) to 'remake the city in the image of somewhere else considered world-class,' (Watson, 2016, pg. 61). The diffusion of hegemonic planning ideas continues to travel north to south, but the increased involvement of foreign actors in the development of Dakar has defied the north/south binary. Firstly, the dichotomies that segregate the world are increasingly irrelevant in the emerging patterns of development of the 'global south' with the involvement of development actors such as Japan, China and Morocco who do not fit neatly within a First/Second/Third World framework or the recently hyped 'global north/south' binary. Secondly, the analysis suggests that the increased involvement of non-western, non-state foreign agents in the development of Dakar is evidence of a distorted triangular cooperation. The distortion arises from the fact that despite the partnership between 'developing' countries, the involvement of the

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135 ‘The curricula of African planning schools draw largely on the colonial past and promote ideas and policies transferred from the global North. Most planning text books used in Africa are produced for students in the USA, the UK or other developed economies. The Association of African Planning Schools (AAPS) was formed to mitigate the dominance of unsuitable and irrelevant archetypes in planning education’ (Watson & Agbola, 2013, pg. 6).

136 The UN’s working definition for triangular cooperation. (TrC) is ‘Southern-driven partnerships between two or. more developing countries supported by a developed. country(ies) or multilateral organization(s), to implement. development cooperation programmes and projects’ (Note by the Secretary-General, High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation Seventeenth session New York, May 2012)
'developed' country means that the cooperation is implicitly guided by the development narratives of the latter, thereby maintaining the status quo. For example, while JICA is responsible for Dakar’s masterplan and China and Morocco are playing increasingly important roles in the infrastructural transformation of the city, the narrative of the masterplans is still very much in line with the demands of ‘Big D development’ (Hart, 2001). This suggests that even in the presence of new global players, the urban planning bodies of Dakar continue to be ‘occupied with the master’s concerns’ (Lorde, 1984). Thus, the advent of satellite cities in Dakar and across the continent signals a worrying shift in the same direction. By doing away with the congestion, informality and chaos, the ‘parallel’ satellite cities represent ‘everything existing metropolises in urban African are not’ (Murray, 2017, pg. 32). Urban development in the 'south' requires 'incremental development, militant social activism, smart city management, entrepreneurialism or state-based redistribution' which means that theory and praxis must be linked to the everyday and makeshift practices that allow the majority of residents in Africa to 'come to grips with urban life' (Simone & Pieterse, 2017).

Overall, masterplans are useful tools for identifying competing narratives of urbanisation and the elements of continuity and change in urban planning and development. The findings reported here shed light on how urban space is caught between the ‘workings of the market and the property industry in cities’ and the informal incursions and ‘push back’ from the urban (poor) majority who shape spaces within the city (Watson, 2009, pg. 2260). History appears to be repeating itself in the urban development of African cities. Modern-day masterplans, inspired from their colonial predecessors, once again construct these areas as ‘terra nullis’ (Lindqvist, 2015) and the transformation of ‘land as commons or land as livelihoods into land as commodity’ is simply a new iteration of a historic cycle (Datta, 2017, pg. 20). The push back against masterplans, however, is an equally important part of the masterplanning process since it documents how planning imaginaries are reconciled (or not) with urban transformations on the ground.

Layering
Throughout the research process, Lefebvre’s (1970) ‘theory of levels (global, urban and quotidian) and their forms of mediation' have guided the examination of
racialised, and stratified socio-spatial processes that form the urban fabric of the city (Goonewardena & Kipfer, 2006, pg. 10). For Lefebvre, the urban is a level of analysis between the 'general level of the social order' and the private level of everyday life; in this configuration, the urban 'mediates totality' (Kipfer, 2008, pg. 200). The urban is therefore a 'crucial arena,' strategically located between 'global flows and national surfaces' (Short, 2017, pg. 6). Thus, the level of the urban 'mediates between the global and the everyday' (Goonewardena, 2011; Kipfer, 2009; Goonewardena, 2018, pg. 468).

By working with scale, the methodology begins by looking at masterplans – elaborated and implemented on a city-wide scale – and then focuses on zones of interest based on the findings from the masterplans. Masterplans are examined as 'layers' of urbanisation, each guided by their own goals, theories and underlying objectives. By structuring the analysis in this manner, it becomes possible to distinguish where the layers 'collide' in a battlefield of competing politics. For example, informality is often absent from masterplans and addressed as an exogenous phenomenon in the development of a city rather than an integral part of the process. The city centre, designed to exclude young informal traders from conducting the income-generating activities on which their livelihoods depend, have engaged in the 'illegal' occupation of land and widespread 'non-compliance with urban regulations regarding the use of public roads and setting up commercial businesses' (Diop, 2012, pg. 41). Street trading was banned despite 'frequent consultations with trader associations' resulting in opposing relations between the city authorities and marchands ambulants (street vendors) (Paice, 2016, pg. 2).

'Layers' also structured research interventions in the fieldwork portion of the analysis. Lefebvre’s contention that 'produced space' has 'perceived, conceived, and lived dimensions' is key to this analysis (Kipfer, 2008, pg. 200). The examination of spaces requires the analysis of perceived (representational) conceived (symbolic) and lived aspects (Figure 49). This tripartite approach is helpful for understanding the competing narratives on the ground. For example, the table below presents a trialectic (Soja, 1996) analysis of Sandaga which can be replicated for any space in the city. The example below shows how the perceived space of Sandaga as a marketplace can only be understood based on its conceived aspects as a
battleground for the continued struggle of vendors operating within and around the market as a lived space.

Figure 49: The Sandaga trialectic (Author’s own figure)

The analysis argues that architects, planners, urban designers are responsible for constructing the material aspects of the city such as monuments and renders and therefore generate the perceived and conceived spaces of the urban fabric. For
example, President Léopold Senghor (1960-1980), first president of the Republic of Senegal, encouraged the standardisation of urban planning and architectural designs to reflect African sculpture (Diop, 2012, pg. 38). Through Négritude, Senghor used the development of the built environment as a ‘tool to exhibit the various aspects of the Senegalese way of life' with the construction of Obélisque Square, a 30-metre memorial, the central mosque in 1963, the Demba Diop Stadium, and the Daniel Sorano Theatre which hosted important cultural events such as the World Black People’s Arts festival in 1966 (Diop, 2012, pg. 38). Similarly, President Abdoulaye Wade harnessed the perceived and conceived aspects of space to establish Dakar as a strategic investment destination and ‘world-class city' through large construction programmes, roads, malls, hotels, a new international airport, the Monument de la Renaissance Africaine (Paice, 2016, pg. 1), the Millennium Gate and a ‘bronze statue of a young football player, which immortalises the country’s various victories during the African Cup of Nations and the 2002 FIFA World Cup’ (Diop, 2012, pg. 38). Therefore, the ‘specialized, state-dependent knowledge’ of architects, planners, and urban designers is channelled in the reification of space as a ‘thing-like object that imposes itself on the urban inhabitants from the outside, as it were’ (Kipfer, 2008, pg. 201). However, the reality of places as lived spaces has meant that they are transformed in accordance with the 'cityness' articulated by urban inhabitants.

Lived space is shaped by the daily interactions of urban dwellers with the infrastructural environment (and with each other within the space) which imbues the space with its conceived and perceived materialities. Plans and maps represent an abstract representation of the city. They give life to the imaginaries of planners and development practitioners and fall in line with the growth agendas and discourses elaborated at national and international levels. They represent the 'aspirational maps' of planning bodies137. On the ground, however, observations have revealed that urbanites are designing their own city in the visible and constant

137 See Appadurai 'aspirational maps' on pg. 80
changes to the landscape\textsuperscript{138}. Therefore, by working with layers and scale, the analysis of masterplans allows for a better understanding of the more abstract renders of cities and the ‘aspirational maps’ of planners, developers and the state, while fieldwork observation is an opportunity to examine whether these aspirations are articulated in the development of the city or remain in the realm of fantasy (Watson, 2012). While the analysis engages with socio-spatial infrastructures of space in a manner that allows for the development of themes, the understanding of \textit{lived} aspects is somewhat limited by the methodology of this research project. While the objectives and methods of key agents such as architects, academic, planners and developers are taken apart and studied through the masterplans and policy literature, the agency of urban dwellers also needs to be considered in all its breadth and complexity. Aside from the insight gained from first-hand observations and experiences of the space based on the researcher’s positionality, the proposed methodology is limited by the absence of ‘voice’ (interviews). This limitation originates in the parameters of the doctoral research project and the theoretical imperatives of southern theory that limit or advise against documenting the ‘manifold narratives of the minority’ (Jazeel, 2018, pg. 17). Rather than draw conclusions from fleeting interactions and unstructured interviews, the study has opted to focus on the study of plans, structures, landscapes and observations but emphasizes the need for in-depth interviews with urban residents who occupy the spaces under scrutiny. A key issue in postcolonial and subaltern studies is the issue of voice and any attempt to situate the views of the subaltern within the confines of a doctoral thesis focused primarily on the evolution of planning and urban forms through in-depth archival work that enables an extensive analysis of historical and contemporary master plans within the scope of a single thesis. Life stories collected through interviews would add a degree of depth to the analysis of urban experience in a more humanist analysis to the nature of everyday urbanism. However, the current methodology still allows for an understanding of how people operate within the confines of planned spaces, often reimagining and redesigning their use and purpose. Interviews add a layer of complexity to the analysis of urban lives that have

\textsuperscript{138} An important example of this trend is in Pikine and the three forms of habitation that demonstrate the contest between the aspirational maps of different groups. The ‘official’ housing stands in stark contrast to the ‘irregular’ housing and demonstrates how the aspirations of the state are out of touch with those of the people (See pg. 185)
hitherto either been essentialized or ignored. The analysis answers the question of how people live within the spaces and their methods of habitation and occupation of space. Further research which features interviews and life stories more prominently may look more closely at why ordinary urbanites interact with the city in the way they do. This research project therefore maintains that in order to expand the scope of our understanding of ‘cityness’ further, future research should delve further into the lives of those who occupy the spaces under examination. This necessitates for the subject to be examined in all its breadth and complexity, as geographers must learn to ‘tell the stories that our work yields in non-reductive ways’ (Jazeel, 2018, pg. 17).

**Scale**

This analysis uses scale as a methodological tool to engage in ‘meso-level’ theorising based on which the findings are assessed in terms of their relevance to other (southern and northern) contexts (Connell, 2007, pg. 225). For example, in order to understand the real-life consequences of a macro project such as PDU Horizon 2035 or the Plan Senegal Emergent, it is necessary to engage with field-sites at the micro level such as Sandaga and Kermel. In the scalar analysis of the case study city, the different phases of fieldwork have different aims:

An archival analysis of masterplans is necessary to arrive at a better understanding of the metanarratives guiding urban development and explaining the broad contours of infrastructural development

Fieldwork analysis allows for the observation of metanarratives ‘at work’ on-the-ground while also accounting for the fact that there are elements beyond the purview of masterplans that are integral to urban trends (i.e. informality)

On a practical note, the task of studying a ‘city’ in all its breadth and complexity is a challenging one for the doctoral researcher, so it was necessary to find a way to get a birds-eye view of the city without straying too far from the goal of developing a methodology that was replicable in other cities. To do this, the analysis of masterplans became an important foundation for understanding the broad contours

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139 See 'contingent universals' on pg. 227
of planning and physical development as well as the development of ‘cityness’; through the analysis of masterplans, it is possible to discuss the metanarratives driving the development of the entire city and to hone in on specific topics/ideas/buildings (e.g. architecture as an ideological transmitter). By working with scale, it is possible to engage with the constituent elements\textsuperscript{140} of ‘cityness’ without losing analytical rigor and depth of analysis for the purpose of theory building. The importance of scale as an analytical tool is demonstrated in the work of previous researchers who have conducted their own examination of the case study city:

- Beeckmans (2013) looks at masterplans to trace the historical development of three African cities (Dakar, Dar es Salaam, Kinshasa) between 1920 and 1980. The paper focuses on the development of specific neighbourhoods within the case study cities to assess the success (in terms of implementation) of the masterplans.

- Bigon (2017) focuses on the historical development of French colonial Dakar and looks at a city-wide scale but also focuses on specific planning mechanisms as well as architectural analyses of specific buildings and neighbourhoods.

- Dione (1992) examines the evolution of Dakar, plan by plan, focusing on the bigger picture and broad contours of urban development in the city.

- Seck (1970) examines the 20\textsuperscript{th} century plans of Dakar in great detail, including topographical and meteorological analyses of Dakar.

The analysis works across both scale and time to account for the fact that infrastructure is always in flux and that space is a chronology. In so doing, the thesis takes a 'more sanguine approach' to the understanding of ‘underlying conditions’ that shape African urbanisation (Berrisford, 2013). The examination of longue-durée processes allows for a better understanding of the mechanisms that obstruct change and the continuity of ‘deep-seated attitudes’ such as the preponderance of the interests of a ‘small minority over those of the majority’ (Berrisford, 2013).

\textsuperscript{140} See redrawn Pieterse schema on pg. 295
Questioning 'cityness'

Another key aim of this research project is centred on determining whether 'cityness' is a useful trope for the study of southern urbanism. The research has shown that 'cityness' is a prism based on which urban research may be broadened to develop a better understanding and appreciation of southern urbanisation beyond the traditional developmentalist outlook. 'Cityness' is located in the everyday which is structured by the trivial and repeated occurrences in which a single experience acts as a 'metonym of larger and unarticulated wholes' (Harootunian, 2000, pg. 71). Wierling (1989, pg. 171), a gender historian, described the everyday as the 'sphere in which people through their actions exercise direct influence on their condition.' Japanese scholars, observing life from banal spaces such as street corners, imagined a new discipline called 'modernologio' (kokengaku) centred on the everyday and the articulations of modernity (ibid). As the metanarrative of modernisation was discredited in the failures of development policy to unlock growth, new types of exchanges and networks of solidarity and resistance were explored (Enwezor et al., 2003, pg. 19). Modernity once held Europe as a 'silent referent' (Chakrabarty, 2000, pg. 28). Today, the analysis suggests that this paradigm was abandoned in favour of 'revitalised versions of non-modern, usually non-Western, philosophies and cultures' (Peet & Hartwick, 2009, pg. 153). In everydayness, we look for 'the watermark of a history concealed under the smooth surface of routine and sameness' (Harootunian, 2000, pg. 72).

The observational work conducted in Kermel Plaza, for example, reveals the tension between the etchings of history and the routines of modernity that culminate in the 'cityness' of Dakar. 'Cityness' is therefore posited as the meeting point between the diverse processes of city making – the 'dystonic impositions of planning infrastructure, policy and local vernacular practices' (Simone, 2018, pg. 23).

The academic concern with the everyday arose from a deepening suspicion of 'big structures' which rejects the idea that politics is a battle over the 'control of state and institutions' and instead a battle centred on the ways that people 'appropriate their world' (Trentmann, 2012, pg.525). As the tensions between structure and agency are called into question, the everyday and its small acts of resistance become an important topic of inquiry. In the study of the everyday, we make note of the 'linear-repetitive rhythms of state, commodity, and technocratic
knowledge' and how they are deployed on the ground (Kipfer, 2018, pg. 205). Lefebvre makes a distinction between his definition of daily life (*la vie quotidienne*), the everyday (*le quotidien*), and everydayness (*la quotidiénneté*). Everyday life is where 'dominated, accumulative sectors (everyday, everydayness) meet undominated, non-accumulative sectors (daily life)' (Kipfer, 2008, pg. 199) (Figure 50). Therefore, daily life opens up the possibility of radical politics, the 'locus of which is increasingly the city' (Goonewardena, 2011, pg. 97).

Dakar, alongside other cities of the ‘global south’ showcases examples of the ‘meeting’ between everyday/ness and daily life, a reality captured by ‘cityness’ as the ‘locus where revolutionary breakthrough is achieved’ (Bayat, 2013, pg. 594). Through the daily practices of 'street politics' of 'non-movements' (such as street vendors selling their merchandise on the sidewalk or poor households 'incorporating public spaces into their private lives'), the urban subaltern wages a quiet revolution in a disruption of routines and the appropriation of public space which is a ‘gain itself, rather than a means to achieve a political goal’ (Bayat, 2013, pg. 595). As an 'exercise in placemaking,' these patterns extend our understanding of 'cityness' (Vasuvedan, 2015, pg. 349);

1. as an act or process of 'collective world-making through which an alternative; informal sense of 'cityness' is continuously made and re-made' (Simone, 2010; Vasudevan, 2011);

2. as an 'improvised materialism that focuses on the everyday materialities' within informal settlements and spaces and the tactics and strategies of residents and activists to use and adapt different materials in contexts of 'daily survival, experience, inequality and possibility' (McFarlane, 2011, pg. 163);

3. as a 'specific political imaginary characterized by a provisional and precarious openness to the possibilities of assembling and developing other
alternative urbanisms out of the very matter and stuff of inequality, displacement and dispossession' (Vasuvedan, 2015, pg. 349).

Drawing from the idea of 'people as infrastructure', this analysis has identified the social architectures created by urbanites who use their 'time, bodies, inclinations, tools, and all the material stuff that exists around and within them' to deliver and benefit from public services such as water, waste management, income-generating opportunities or 'even to disappear, fade away, fan out into a larger world of operations' (Simone, 2008, pg. 88). In the daily acts of subversion, a Gramscian counterhegemonic narrative emerges in the articulation of autogestion (self-management) that amounts to a transformation of the urban fabric (Kipfer, 2008, pg. 197). 'Cityness' can therefore be used as the masterplan metaphor for this change. A map of cityness, in its physical articulations and transformations of the urban landscape, placed atop an official masterplan will reconcile the gap between planning imaginaries and lived realities.

The everyday therefore becomes a central concern for any radical urban theory that isn't content with simply offering 'vivid descriptions of cities and capital' but with producing new concepts beyond the 'exhausted attachments to party, state, and parliament, not to mention 'social capital', 'civil society', or 'citizenship,' none of which capture the continued battle for the right to the city' (Goonewardena, 2011, pg. 97). The narratives surrounding the everyday in cities of the south are overly cautious or blind to their potential to 'change the world without taking power' (Holloway, 2003). The tendency within some academic work to romanticize resistance and read 'all forms of resistance as signs of ineffectiveness of systems of power and of the resilience and creativity of the human spirit in its refusal to be dominated' has, at times, collapsed distinctions between resistance and coping strategies (Abu-Lughod, 1990, 42). Studies that elucidate how poor urban dwellers survive in 'uninhabitable' urban environments are in line with the 'in-vogue parlance of social resilience' (Simone & Pieterse, 2017, pg. 63). Acknowledging the state of poverty, inequality and marginalization of the urban majority in southern cities does not preclude us from recognizing the 'energies and ingenuity' that the urban poor marshal to retain a foothold in the city, despite the odds against them' (Pieterse in Pinther et al. ed., 2012, pg. 35). Prevented from 'fulfilling their
aspirations,’ Africans are arguably developing new forms of social capital and political expression with the potential for creating new societies and ‘running into the ground inherited images of what a city should be’ (Simone, 2008, pg. 86);

‘The notion of capturing positions of power, whether it be governmental power or more dispersed positions of power in society, misses the point that the aim of the revolution is to dissolve relations of power, to create a society based on the mutual recognition of people’s dignity. What has failed is the notion that revolution means capturing power in order to abolish power. What is now on the agenda is the much more demanding notion of a direct attack on power relations. The only way in which revolution can now be imagined is not as the conquest of power but as the dissolution [emphasis added] of power’ (Holloway, 2003, pg. 9).

The examination of these survival strategies – the ability to transform people into infrastructure, for example - sheds light on events taking place in the north. For example, Jaleel (2012) discusses the neighbourhood distribution centres arising from the ‘Occupy Sandy’ movement which established a ‘base for identifying acute housing needs’ and enabled the Occupy movement to create and maintain spaces for ‘people to care for each other’s needs while challenging the scarcity logics of capitalism.’ This phenomenon was arguably happening two decades earlier in Dakar during the Set/Setal movement and continues today as residents of informal settlements find ways to survive in precarious conditions. Set/Setal was a direct response to the effects of capitalism and responded to the needs of urban citizens through the mobilisation of people during a time when the state was simply unable to fulfil its role. These social movements do not necessarily have revolution as an ‘explicit aim’ but often rely on gradual transformation (Kipfer et al., 2008, pg. 15). The urban poor are arguably the new proletarian class. Zizek (2005) asks: ‘What if the new proletarian position is that of the inhabitants of the slums of the new megapolises?’ His answer: ‘While we should of course resist the easy temptation to elevate and idealize the slum-dwellers into a new revolutionary class, we should nonetheless, in Badiou’s terms, perceive slums as one of the few authentic ‘evental sites’ in today’s society’.

This type of work therefore has the explicit aim of locating ‘agency, possibility and resistance in the habitus of slum dwellers’ (Derickson, 2015, pg. 652). Informal spaces are arguably constructed through a process of placemaking – whether by
consumption or habitation. Neuwirth (2004, pg. 311), for example, argues that the 'world's squatters give some reality to Henri Lefebvre's concept of 'the right to the city';

‘they are excluded so they take,’ he writes, 'but they are not seizing an abstract right, they are taking an actual place: a place to lay their heads. This act – to challenge society's denial of place by taking one of your own – is an assertion of being in a world that routinely denies people the dignity and the validity inherent in a home.'

Thus, 'cityness,' through the language of rights can be understood as the 'renewed right to urban life' (Lefebvre, 1996, pg. 158).

Situating 'cityness'

![Figure 51: Situating 'cityness' (Author's own schema adapted from Pieterse, 2017)](image)

Pieterse's map of the conceptual landscape of urban theories (2017) is a useful guide for understanding the core approaches to the study of African urbanism. However,

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141 In a 2010 paper titled 'Cityness and African Urban Development,' Pieterse outlines a research agenda based on 'cityness' for the analysis of African cities. The agenda is based largely on the examination of violence as a defining characteristic of the African city (in particular, deprivation as violence). In a previous dissertation titled 'Youth, Criminality and Violence' completed in 2014, I engaged with this theoretical proposition and research agenda as a way of broadening the scope of urban analyses of African cities by focusing on the
in order to develop and evaluate a research agenda based on 'cityness,' the analysis has 'tried on for size' several theories and frameworks in order to 'see what sticks' in the process of theory building. The schema (Figure 51) develops a language to speak back to urban theory and discuss emerging urban phenomena by operationalising a research agenda based on 'cityness.' The redrawn schema demonstrates how 'cityness' is disaggregated into its constituent elements and proposes existing or emerging theories as mechanisms to redress the oversights of mainstream theory. The first disaggregation (urban experience, urban spaces and infrastructures, urban experience) breaks down 'cityness' into its constituent elements. The schema indicates that 'urban experience' represents the most concrete engagement with the city which requires first-hand observation while the 'urban plans' is the most abstract representation of the city in the aspirational maps of planning bodies. The second disaggregation uses Pieterse's designations for theoretical landscapes in the African urbanism but reimagines their role in the elaboration of theory through the selection of several theoretical frameworks.

Urban plans – The lasting effects of colonial control are evident in planning which is why postcolonial theory is used as the corrective mechanism to 'decolonise' the field of urban theory. This thesis does the work of decolonising the curriculum and engaging with emerging imperatives. The analysis offers a method that can be applied across southern contexts and inform both northern and southern theory in a postcolonial approach to the study of urbanism.

Urban spaces and infrastructures – When theorising infrastructure, the overly pessimistic outlook ('journalistic Malthusianism') has meant that African cities are studied in terms of what they lack relative to their northern counterparts and the focus is on the infrastructure 'deficit' and 'depicting African cities as not working—while claiming at the same time that urbanisation is a prerequisite for development' (Forster & Ammann, 2018). To move beyond this mischaracterisation and acknowledge the various forms of urbanity, the analysis proposes to use the language of planetary urbanisation which argues that nothing falls outside the scope of the urban. Furthermore, 'grey spacing' largest demographic - youth. While the violence agenda opens up the framework of analyses, the Pieterse (2017) schema and proposed research agenda expands the scope, allows for more manoeuvre and takes a more holistic approach to the study of African urbanisation.
allows for an engagement with ‘life between buildings’ and the importance of socio-cultural infrastructures in shaping the case study city.

Urban experiences - The approach cuts across disciplines to avoid ‘normative, preconceived categories’ and better understand urbanity as a ‘social practice of urban dwellers who, through their interactions, create encounters and distanciation in urban social spaces’ (Forster and Ammann, 2018). Politicians, planners, local entrepreneurs, development experts as well as ordinary urbanites have different and often contesting visions for their city. By engaging with planning documents followed by on-the-ground observational work, it is possible to observe and analyse how the aspirations of planners and development experts are articulated and how they are accepted/subverted/altered by ordinary urbanites.

The methodology of this analysis, reflected in the schema, was designed according to Simone & Pieterse’s (2017) propositions for a research agenda for the study of African cities:

1. Research on southern urbanisation should involve a 'commitment to walking the street and finding compelling ways to re-describe the affective dynamics of everyday urbanism';

2. Theorising the urban south requires a certain degree of experimentation to develop new concepts and imaginaries that can ‘anchor and accelerate new practices, at diverse scales and in numerous institutional settings’ – learning through experimentation, trial and error;

3. The study of southern cities must come to grips with the ‘changing and creaking institutional formats of the state (hierarchy and market), market and civil society organisations (networks and hierarchy) with an eye toward figuring alternative formats to curate organisational designs that are fit for purpose.’

In order to attend to these core principles, the theoretical framework works in tandem with the methodology to critically incorporate the propositions throughout the research process. Firstly, walking is a key method in this research project as it allows for an understanding of the psychogeographies of the city and how they interact with the rationalities of planning. The principles of flânerie are adopted as part of the research process but the aimlessness of the drift was abandoned in order focus on spaces that allow for critical engagement with broader theories. Secondly,
much like Simone’s bricoleurs who engage in ‘trial balloons,’ the analysis demonstrates how theory building involves a great deal of trial and error. Experimentation is at the heart of this methodology which challenges conventional models and engage with emerging theory. Finally, to make space for the ‘creaking institutional formats of the state,’ the analysis has offered a historical and critical analysis of the longue-durée practices that account for the development of the case study city. Urban plans and mechanisms are traced back to their colonial and precolonial origins and their evolution is analyzed relative to the development of the rest of the urban development of the city.

Southern urbanism: Further research

New methodologies and theoretical propositions for the study of southern urbanism will need to find ways of addressing the rapid and ‘unpredictable’ growth of these cities, especially in contexts where land and service delivery rely to a much greater extent on informal providers than they do on the state (Watson, 2014, pg. 2263). An important question with regards to the study of southern urbanity is - how do we grasp as an ‘object of analysis’ something that is fleeting and transient? (Simmel). Analyses of the urban south should embed themselves within a larger research framework that looks at the bigger picture of planning but also privileges the study of everyday ‘lived’ urban life. In so doing, this type of research may ‘explicitly or implicitly’ disrupt mainstream global urbanism by privileging southern knowledge and giving credit to the ‘tactics of survival and subversion resorted to by subaltern or subordinated populations’ (Sheppard et al., 2013, pg. 897).

The contribution of this thesis is to consider how ‘cityness’ may be set in motion as a research tool to theorise cities of the ‘global south.’ To do so, the thesis engages with emerging and longstanding debates in urban geography concerning how African cities have been studied and conceptualized and integrating these into a theoretical framework that considers how the examination of cities like Dakar informs urban theory. By calling on ‘cityness,’ the analysis rejects the northern constructs of urbanity and its ruling dichotomies and engages in a longue-durée analysis of urbanisation in a southern city, utilising both historical/archival material and fieldwork observation to inform an understanding of the process. ‘Cityness’ is not a fixed definition but a tool for capturing emerging urban forms and multiple
pathways and trajectories of change and to consider their interlinkages through a relational approach. The analysis suggests that 'cityness' may be understood and studied as the intersection between the psychogeographies of the city and the rationalities of planning.

The case study demonstrates that from the very first masterplan, the contours, goals and methods of planning have been contested and are embedded within a process of othering that turns the city into a battleground for the right to the city. As the rationalities of planning and the psychogeographies of the city continue to diverge, the 'cityness' of Dakar is steeped in contestatory terms as the plans, infrastructures and spaces, and (lived) experience are constantly in contest. The 'cityness' of Dakar, along with that of many southern cities, is arguably 'off kilter' as urban plans are focused on urbanisation as a profit driven enterprise which compromises the viability of urban infrastructure and the lives of the majority of city dwellers. As a result, the urban experience becomes one steeped in contest and struggle as urbanites are forced to compete with plans and infrastructures in order to maintain their foothold in the city. Discordant 'cityness' is visible in the fact that the ways a city operates is often 'wholly divorced from the realities of urban life and governance,' particularly with regards to the emphasis on 'compact, contained city' such as with Diamniadio when the reality of urban sprawl typifies Dakar's urbanisation (Berrisford, 2013). This is also evident in the prominence of large infrastructure projects that increasingly use planning law to 'criminalize informal land development' to clear the way for 'mega-infrastructure,' resulting in the destruction of 'homes and businesses of people who are unlucky enough to reside on land allocated to a new bypass' (ibid).

To use the terminology of the colonial administration, the effectiveness of the urban experiments (plans) that are deployed in the laboratory of the city (Parks) may be measured by 'cityness.' 'Cityness' is an effective methodological tool because it contributes to an understanding of how to harness the strengths of its constituent elements (experience, infrastructure and plans) in order to promote efficient and equitable development. Therefore, in response to Simmel’s question on how we capture something as fleeting as urban development and change, this thesis proposes 'cityness.' Much like Lefebvre's 'eruptions' of 'the urban,' 'cityness' is
revealed in the moments of contest/symbiosis between the rationalities of planning and psychogeographies of the city.
Voices: Epilogue

In the opening lines of this thesis, the aim was to harness the 'liberatory' potential of theory in the development of an urban theory of the 'global south.' The academy has long come under fire for being dissociated from praxis and too far removed from the 'real' needs of people, constantly shackled by the parameters of the 'relevance reflex.' However, as the analysis has demonstrated, technical practice is never very far removed from social practice which, in turn, is only a step away from the musings of urban theorists, flaneurs, and researchers (Baudrillard). Theory informs planning but in order for planning to reconcile with the needs of cities of the south, theory must liberate itself from dichotomies, conventions and traditional representations.

The premise of this emerging research agenda is to treat the subject matter with dignity. Not only the people whose lives are being scrutinised, documented and reported, but also the theory which has long been an afterthought in urban studies and research. On the topic of southern urbanisation, to speak of an 'impasse' (Amin, 2007) in urban theory is to assume that research has simply reached a cul-de-sac on a theoretical road less travelled. Yet, one may argue that this road has seldom been travelled at all as there is much left to learn from southern urbanisation. Particularly with regards to African urbanisation, this research project has argued that not only is it possible, but it is crucial that we 'move away from the fascination with the horrors of a seemingly static world' in order to better understand its 'virtue as a necessary hallmark of a truly global academic project' (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004, pg. 352).

In the concluding chapter of The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon makes a heartfelt and impassioned appeal to newly independent nations to find 'something different.' We [the postcolonial people] 'can do everything' as long as we do not 'imitate Europe' or become 'obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe' (Fanon, 1961, pg. 250). In the new geographies of the postcolonial world, we need blueprints, models, and masterplans that guide urbanisation; the European model – today's 'northern' city - is 'the most inspiring,' but has also led to 'mortifying setbacks' in the 'global south' (ibid). Therefore, in finding 'something different' for our cities, we must harness the
lessons of history and the revolutionary potential of 'the urban' to tackle the challenges of the present and reimagine the future of cities in the 'global south.'
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Wallis, W. and T. Burgis, 2010, 'Continent drives a harder bargain', Financial Times, 14 June,


Appendix I: Research Ethics Minimal Risk

Research Ethics Office
King's College London
Rm 5.11 FWB (Waterloo Bridge Wing)
London
SE1 9NH

TO: Sabrine Hakam

SUBJECT: Confirmation of Registration

Dear Sabrine,

Thank you for submitting your Research Ethics Minimal Risk Registration Form. This letter acknowledges the receipt of your registration; your Research Ethics Number is MR/16/17-90. You may begin collecting data immediately.

Be sure to keep a record your registration number and include it in any materials associated with this research. Registration is valid for one year from today's date. Please note it is the responsibility of the researcher to ensure that any other permissions or approvals (i.e. R&D, gatekeepers, etc.) relevant to their research are in place, prior to conducting the research.

Record Keeping:
In addition, you are expected to keep records of your process of informed consent and the dates and relevant details of research covered by this application. For example, depending on the type of research that you are doing, you might keep:

- A record of the relevant details for public talks that you attend, the websites that you visit, the interviews that you conduct
- The 'script' that you use to inform possible participants about what your research involves. This may include written information sheets, or the generic information you include in the emails you write to possible participants, or what you say to people when you approach them on the street for a survey, or the introductory material stated at the top of your on-line survey.
- Where appropriate, records of consent, e.g. copies of signed consent forms or emails where participants agree to be interviewed.

Audit:
You may be selected for an audit, to see how researchers are implementing this process. If audited, you will be expected to
explain how your research abides by the general principles of ethical research. In particular, you will be expected to provide a general summary of your review of the possible risks involved in your research, as well as to provide basic research records (as above in Record Keeping) and to describe the process by which participants agreed to participate in your research.

Remember that if you have any questions about the ethical conduct of your research at any point, you should contact your supervisor, the Research Ethics office, or a member of your Department’s Research Ethics Panel for advice.

We wish you every success with this work.

Research Ethics Office
Appendix II: Risk assessment

Dear Sabrine Hakam,

Your countersignatory, Andrew.brooks@kcl.ac.uk (copied) has now countersigned your application. Since you have indicated your research is of ‘significant risk’ type, your assessment will now be reviewed by the Safety Committee (copied).

Your assessor is: helen.j.adams@kcl.ac.uk (copied).

Safety Committee comments at this stage: Dear Sabrine, Thanks for this. I wondered if you could think about risks relating to the experience you are likely to have in Senegal, not just the FCO's recommendations. Also, would be good to have the local contact's details here too. If you have experience in the region, make that known as well. Best, Helen

If you are a student and if your project requires ethical approval you must add your approval number to the form when available.

Your assessment is accessed, edited, countersigned or reviewed using this link. Each time you submit changes, the form will email you and your countersignatory, who will need to review them.

This assessment is for work carried out by: PhD student
Student number: K1471873

I confirm that I will/have applied for research ethics approval: Yes

If required, when you have ethical approval log the approval number here:

Provisional project title: Examining 'cityness' to inform an urban theory of the global south

Location of the research: Dakar, Senegal
Estimated date you arrive in this area: 2017-04-18
Estimated date you leave this area: 2017-04-30
I/we have pre-existing medical conditions or disabilities that are likely to prevent me from undertaking the proposed project safely: No
Have the FCO advised against travel to this area?: No
Insignificant or significant risk?: Significant
My project is: Social science

Are you planning to work alone? If you are inexperienced in the location or techniques, how will your work be supported/supervised in the field.: I will be working alone but will have a local contact.

What type of environment(s) are you working in? This initial visit is solely for the purpose of visiting the national archives in Dakar, Senegal.
What are the key techniques you will use? I will be visiting the national archives which are open to the public in order to collect data.

Permissions: Although the archives are open to public access, the work may require permission to duplicate/scan the files relevant to this research.

Next of kin (full name and email address or telephone number): Soukaina Hakam soukainamiyahakam@gmail.com +212 661343384

Identified hazards and precautions that will be taken to minimise risk to you and others: Potential hazards (listed on FCO website) There is a high threat from terrorism; you should be vigilant after recent attacks in Cote d'Ivoire, Mali and Burkina Faso. Attacks could be indiscriminate, including in places visited by foreigners. Mitigating actions: Avoid any demonstrations or large gatherings of people. Unrest in Casamance regions; you should be vigilant when travelling in the Casamance region to the west of Kolda, and where possible you should avoid travelling at night, and stick to the main road from Ziguinchor to Cap Skirring and the main road north of the Guinea-Bissau/Senegal border from Sao Domingos to Ziguinchor. See Local travel Mitigating actions: I am not travelling to the Casamance region. Pickpocketing and street crime are common in parts of Dakar, particularly around Place de l’Independence, the central area of the Plateau, the Western Corniche, and at the airport. Mitigating actions: I will not carry anything valuable and avoid public transit.

Are you working far from a hospital?: No

Home country support: who in your home country will you or colleagues contact should emergency medical repatriation be required? My family is aware of all my insurance details which covers any emergencies that may arise during travel. They must be contacted immediately in case of emergency.

Your full name: Sabrine Hakam
Your KCL email address: Sabrine.hakam@kcl.ac.uk
Your signature: Sabrine Hakam
Date of signature: 2017-04-07
The KCL email address of your countersignatory: Andrew.brooks@kcl.ac.uk
Countersignature (completed after you submit): Andrew Brooks
Date of countersignature: 2017-04-11
KCL email address for safety committee reviewer:
Safety committee approval:
Date of Safety Committee approval:
Comments from safety committee and/or approval conditions: Dear Sabrine, Thanks for this. I wondered if you could think about risks relating to the experience you are likely to have in Senegal, not just the FCO’s recommendations. Also, would be good to have the local contact’s details here too. If you have experience in the region, make that known as well.