From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’ II: The Challenges Posed by Women and Minors After the Fall of the Caliphate

By Joana Cook and Gina Vale

The Islamic State has lost its final territory in Syria, but the international community now faces an array of complex and difficult challenges, in particular those related to the up to 52,808 foreigners now recorded by the authors with the group including up to 6,902 foreign women and up to 6,577 foreign minors. Of unique concern are the minors born to parents in the ‘caliphate’ established by the Islamic State who represent up to 60 percent of total minors currently accounted for in countries with strong data on this issue. Returning home to varied state responses, up to eight percent of the up to 8,202 returnees are now recorded as women, and up to 20 percent minors. Thousands more remain in limbo in the region, however, and significant gaps in the data leave this picture incomplete.

In March 2019, the Islamic State lost the final territorial remnant of its ‘caliphate’ in Baghouz. Yet its demise has left the international community with a myriad of complex and difficult challenges, including how to deal with the many women and minors from across the globe recruited by, taken by, or born into the group. In July 2018, a dataset compiled by the authors revealed that of 80 countries beyond Syria and Iraq, women accounted for up to 13 percent (4,761) and minors 12 percent (4,640) of the total 41,490 foreign persons who were recorded to have traveled to, or were born inside, Islamic State territory. These figures were unprecedented and the direct result of the territorial and governance ambitions of the Islamic State, which drew ‘citizens’ from around the world. Yet, at that time (July 2018), only 26 states had published reliable information for both of these two interrelated, though distinct populations, raising the likelihood of significant underestimation.

Beyond the fall of the caliphate, three trends have prompted a reexamination of the status of Islamic State-affiliated women and minors. First, due to the group’s duration of occupation, an increasing number of Islamic State-affiliated women have borne children. Of the 10 countries with strong data on minors, 44-60 percent have been reported as infants born in theater, highlighting the potential scale and long-term implications of this matter. Second, a significant number of women remained with the Islamic State until its final stand in Baghouz and now require varied responses. Some are devout, battle-hardened members, while others may seek to leave this chapter of their life behind them. Third, due to the tens of thousands of adult males killed in counter-Islamic State and Islamic State operations, the proportion of women and minors present in the remaining Islamic State population in Syria and Iraq is higher than ever and therefore must be reflected in all responses to the group.

This article reexamines the status of Islamic State-affiliated women and minors, and the present challenges posed by these two distinct populations. Updating the authors’ dataset from July 2018, this article compiles the most recent figures for Islamic State-affiliated travelers, returnees, and detainees, and for the first time includes distinct figures for Islamic State-born infants. It considers how states have been responding to returnees and the long-term inter-generational concerns associated with these diverse populations, and it also provides considerations for international actors going forward.

Methodology

Obtaining precise figures for foreigners affiliated with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria remains a challenging task. The methodology for the original dataset in 2018 has been repeated. Figures

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a In this article, women are defined as adults aged 18 and above. See Joana Cook and Gina Vale, “From ‘Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State,” International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, July 2018, p. 13 for further discussion.

b In this article, minors are defined as those 17 and below. Minors are further distinguished as teenagers (15-17), children (5-14), and infants (0-4). See Ibid. for further discussion.

c These countries include Albania, Belgium, Bosnia, Canada, France, Kosovo, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden. All figures are in Table 1.

d The Islamic State actively recruited and utilized males under the age of 18. However, there are currently no clear figures of how many male minors were killed in battles against the Islamic State. Discussing the entire Islamic State foreign fighter population, Edmund Fittwon-Brown, the Coordinator for the ISIL (Daesh)/Al-Qaeda/Taliban Monitoring Team at the United Nations, estimated an attrition rate of “over a quarter,” but acknowledged “nobody knows the true figures.” Paul Cruickshank, “A View from the CT Foxhole: Edmund Fittwon-Brown, Coordinator, ISIL (Daesh)/Al-Qaeda/Taliban Monitoring Team, United Nations,” CTC Sentinel 12:4 (2019).

e Estimates that account for both foreign and local Islamic State followers killed have ranged from 25,000-70,000 and do not distinguish between men, women, and minors. A discussion on casualties on the battlefield is discussed at length in Cook and Vale, pp. 41-42.
have been updated based on information released between July 2018 and July 2019, cross-referenced with the previous dataset, and where possible verified by regional experts. Several challenges remain. Many countries continue to not publish figures; others have only acknowledged ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ (FTFs) or do not distinguish women and minors. Others may not have the means to track the movement of all their citizens. Some states have increasingly released figures, while others’ data proves contradictory and diverse, which is reflected in the dataset, particularly seen in the ranges included.

**Updated Global Figures**

Two developments impact the issue of returnees: more countries have clarified figures for women and minors who became affiliated with the Islamic State, and there is an increasing number of recorded foreign Islamic State-born infants. This has raised not only the authors’ global estimates of all foreign Islamic State affiliated persons (men, women, and minors), including those now deceased up to 44,279-52,808, but specifically women to 6,797-6,902 and minors to 6,173-6,577. Increasing numbers of women and minors have also returned to their countries of origin.

**Returns**

A number of observations emerge. First is the important distinction between state-managed repatriation initiatives and independent return. Where governments control the flow and return of persons back to their country, they are better able to manage them, while those who return independently may be unmonitored or unaccounted for. Second, the post-return realities of Islamic State affiliates vary by country. Some face immediate arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment. Others receive deradicalization and rehabilitation services or differing extents of physical, economic, or psycho-social support and return to normal life. Almost all, including women and minors, face social stigma for their time with the Islamic State.

Yet, many countries do not publicly acknowledge their citizens’ return. Women and minors may also be excluded or undistinguished in returnee figures or may return undetected. However, total confirmed returnees have increased in the authors’ updated dataset, albeit minimally since June 2018—from 7,145-7,366 to 7,712-8,202—with the greatest proportion found in the Southeast Asia region (up to 33 percent of those who traveled to, or were born within, the Islamic State) and Western Europe (28-29 percent).

**Women**

In 2018, only 256 women (five percent of total returnees) who had traveled to join the Islamic State had been recorded as returned to their country of departure. By July 2019, up to 609 women of those who traveled had been recorded as returned, comprising up to eight percent of all returnees, or nine percent of women who traveled. However, these figures may not accurately capture the true picture. Statements from the United Kingdom and European Union have suggested that women and minors have been returning more frequently than men over the past two years, even if these were not acknowledged or distinguished at the country level.

Media portrayals of Islamic State-affiliated women have generally oscillated between victims taken or duped by their husbands, naïve ‘jihadi brides,’ or active security concerns. Where framed in security terms, there appears to be less political will or public acceptance to return women. In contrast, where viewed more in terms of victimhood or naïveté, prospects for redemption and rehabilitation may appear more in public discourses.

Russia had been actively repatriating women up to November 2017, whereafter only minors were accepted due to women being perceived as security risks. Kazakhstan has taken a proactive approach, repatriating 137-139 women through its three-part ‘Operational Zhusan’ between January and May 2019. Upon arrival, women are isolated at a rehabilitation and reintegration center and face further vetting.

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f The Rescue Association of Tunisians Trapped Abroad acknowledged 970 “fighters” have returned from Syria and Iraq, Lindsey Snell, “The ISIS recruits that won’t be coming home,” Daily Beast, March 20, 2018.

g The United Kingdom has only acknowledged 40-50 percent have returned without distinguishing women and minors in these. Matthew Offord and Sajid Javid, “UK Nationals Returning from Syria – in the House of Commons,” theyworkforyou.com, February 18, 2019; Kim Sengupta, “War Against Isis: Security Services Bracing for Possible Return of Thousands of Jihadists as Group Loses Territory,” Independent, September 5, 2016.

h This article uses the word “affiliated” to account for the distinctions between both the roles of various persons within the group (not all of whom picked up arms), as well as the level of volition present in their joining the Islamic State. This is particularly true for minors who were forcibly taken by their parents, or infants born into the organization, who must now be addressed in comprehensive responses to the Islamic State.

i This figure of 44,279-52,808 comprises all foreign persons who between 2013 and June 2019 became affiliated with the Islamic State in its Levant territory. A significant number of these persons were killed in Syria and Iraq so it does not represent actual figures for populations being responded to today.

j The United States has offered its assistance to any country willing to repatriate its citizens and has facilitated a number of returns, while others such as Kazakhstan have been active in independently repatriating hundreds of its citizens (though reportedly with U.S. mediation). “5 ISIS militants, families returned to Kazakhstan with US mediation: SDF,” Rudaw, January 7, 2019.

k The reasons for this are varied and may include security or intelligence motivations; political motivations driven by fear of public backlash; and privacy and safeguarding issues (particularly in the case of minors).

l The word “recorded” acknowledges that even when greater numbers of women have returned, these are not publicly acknowledged or distinguished in some cases.

m In the United Kingdom, women and minors have generally been noted to be returning, even though the authors’ table records only two women and four minors have been publicly recorded as returned. The United Kingdom’s 2018 CONTEST counterterrorism strategy noted, “The majority of those who have returned did so in the earlier stages of the conflict, and were investigated on their return. Only a very small number of travellers have returned in the last two years, and most of those have been women with young children.” The reason for not distinguishing these women and minors within total U.K. returnee figures is unclear. “CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism,” HM Government, June 2018, p. 18.

n In a January 2017 interview, Wil van Gemert, Deputy Director of Europol and Head of Operations, noted that “those recently fleeing back to Europe have mostly been women and children,” though he did not spell out how this was manifested country by country in the European Union. Paul Cruickshank, “A View from the CT Foxhole: Peter Edge, ICE Acting Deputy Director, and Wil van Gemert. Europol Deputy Director,” CTC Sentinel 10:1 (2017).

o The concern of female militancy is particularly acute in Russia where women have been active in Islamist militancy, including in the Chechnya context as the so-called ‘black widows’ who acted as suicide bombers. Ilya Arkhipov, “Putin Shows Rare Soft Spot to Rescue Russia’s ISIS Children,” Bloomberg, February 1, 2019.
questioning by security services. While many return home and continue to be monitored, at least five women have been charged with terrorism-related offenses. Indonesia, with 54 confirmed female returnees, has also managed a large-scale rehabilitation and reintegration program. At least one woman went on to attempt an explosive attack and now faces the death penalty. Here, reintegration at the community level has been specifically tailored to women, including economic empowerment programs. With such programming, public safety must remain a paramount concern. Adequate planning, resources, and gendered considerations must be integrated at every step, together with the active participation and support of community organizations and families. Yet, such tailored programs remain rare.

Some women have been prosecuted upon return, including British woman Tareena Shakil. ‘Jennifer W.,’ a 27-year-old German returnee, was charged with the murder of an enslaved Yazidi child, war crimes, membership in a foreign terror organization, and weapons violations. Sabine S. also became the first woman convicted in Germany of belonging to a foreign terrorist organization. Yet, this route remains challenging as the type of evidence obtained against men, such as recordings of their direct involvement in Islamic State activities, is more limited for women who rarely appeared in propaganda. However, women within the Islamic State may also have been privy to information that may help facilitate the prosecution of other members.

There has also been increased focus on the gender dimensions of criminal justice responses to counterterrorism and evidence that women may be arrested, charged, and sentenced differently (often more leniently) than men. Countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States have opted to strip or deny citizenship, as demonstrated in the cases of Shamima Begum or Hoda Muthana, raising broader questions about rights and identity of first- and second-generation immigrants in these countries. Though many trajectories remain possible for Islamic State-affiliated women, repatriation, prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration (as appropriate) remain the most feasible for their successful long-term monitoring.

Minors

By July 2018, 411-1,180 minors were recorded as confirmed and in-process returnees. A constant trend from 2018 is the international community’s prioritization of repatriation of minors. In total, 1,460-1,525 minors (22-25 percent) have now returned to their country of departure (or the country of their parents), representing up to 20 percent of total returnees. For some states, such as Tajikistan and Saudi Arabia, this is the result of proactive collaboration with local authorities to identify and return their underage nationals. Yet, these efforts are predominantly framed as ‘rescue’ missions to recover young children whose Islamic State affiliation was not through their own volition. This was epitomized by the reunion of a Trinidadian mother and her two sons, which was facilitated by Pink Floyd’s Roger Waters. This framing of the issue has put mounting pressure on hitherto unresponsive governments. For some, repatriation of the most vulnerable Islamic State-affiliated population can be presented as a politically acceptable concession. A salient example is Norway’s repatriation of five orphans, out of 40 minors in the conflict zone. This arguably creates a ‘hierarchy of victimhood,’ in which those seen to be most helpless and unthreatening are prioritized.

Despite increasing awareness and efforts to repatriate minors, national initiatives remain limited and ad-hoc. In February 2017, a French official stated approximately 700 French minors were in the conflict zone. It was boldly announced, “they will return to France, it is just a question of time.” France later tapered this, pledging to return only 150 minors, stipulating “the mothers of any repatriated children would be left in Syria.” Yet, by June 2019, only 107 minors had been confirmed as returned. In contrast, Kazakhstan has repatriated 357 minors in quick succession.

The repatriation of minors, particularly infants, also raises the issue of separation from their Islamic State-affiliated parent(s). Although Islamic State-affiliated parents have endangered their children through their travel to Islamic State territory, separation could also exacerbate trauma experienced by minors. Furthermore, blanket separation policies may prove harmful if custody is granted to other family members also holding extremist views. This reinforces the need to assess the parameters of repatriation and rehabilitative needs for minors on a case-by-case basis.

Despite momentum shifting toward repatriation and rehabilitation, some countries have adopted a security-first approach, adding additional barriers to minors’ return. In Australia, Islamic State-affiliated minors from age 14 can have their citizenship revoked under recent legislation. This also applies to children of ‘suspected terrorists.’ Denmark introduced legislation that refuses the automatic assignment of citizenship to infants born to Islamic State-affiliated parents—the result of increasing public fears of the security threat that minors may pose upon return. Some officials have also (unhelpfully) referred to these children as a “ticking time bomb.” It is important that countries acknowledge and address minors’ indoctrination through the Islamic State’s education and training programs. However, approaches that generalize, securitize, and further victimize minors—instead of addressing their developmental needs—will compromise the effectiveness and sustainability of rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives.

Detainees

Another critical issue is the predicament of thousands of foreign Islamic State affiliates imprisoned in Iraq and detained by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria of which foreign women account—

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p As women’s roles were primarily prescribed in the domestic sphere, offenses were more likely to have occurred in the home with local or enslaved women, making such evidence even harder to attain.
ed for up to 5,350 and foreign minors 8,580.1 Iraq has tried thou-
sands of persons in controversial court proceedings,36 and indefinite
SDF-detention in Syria is unlikely. Several considerations pertinent to
women and minors detained in the region have become visible.31

Women
In Iraq in 2018 alone, 616 foreigners were tried and convicted of
Islamic State membership, receiving varied sentences of up to life
in prison, or even the death penalty. A staggering 466 of these were
women, 108 of these minors, and only 42 of these men, and it was
noted that “most of the women sentenced for ISIS links were from
Turkey and republics of the former Soviet Union.”32 For those who
did receive the death sentence, these have not yet been carried out.
For countries that oppose capital punishment, there are reports
that Iraq has been willing to commute these sentences, for a price.1
However, serious concerns over flawed and swift trials and human
rights violations in detention remain.33 If paid, Iraq has also offered
to receive, try, and hold thousands of foreigners currently in SDF
custody, including women, only compounding these concerns.34

Women currently in SDF custody face similar potential trajec-
tories as men. These were well outlined recently by Brian Michael
Jenkins in this publication, who identified eight local and multilat-
eral options for dealing with these detainees.35 Yet, the proportion
of women makes these options more complex and demands gen-
dered considerations at every step. Of the three major SDF-admin-
istered refugee and internment camps in northeast Syria out of its
total population, al-Hol alone hosts 12,000 Islamic State-affiliated
foreigners—4,000 are women and 8,000 are minors. In contrast,
SDF forces are holding only 1,000 men deemed ‘fighters’ across its
prisons.36 These persons do not have access to fair trial and cannot
be held indefinitely—an important pillar of international law and
another reason to repatriate citizens.37

For women currently detained in the region, there is a challenge
of identifying persons in custody. Upon arrival in Iraq and Syria,
many foreigners destroyed or surrendered their identification and
may seek to conceal their identity: “There is also a lack of deradical-
ization and rehabilitative services available while detained or upon
release, highlighting long-term hurdles for reintegration. While
many detention facilities, particularly in Europe, have segregated
areas for those convicted of terrorism offenses, such units do not
(as far as the authors are aware) exist in Iraq for women, meaning
that women who still adhere to the Islamic State’s ideology may
radicalize others or their children.” While SDF camps have segre-
gated annexes for foreign women and minors suspected of being
associated with the Islamic State, the same concern related to their
children remains.3 The potential for inter-generational radicaliza-
tion has already been highlighted as a long-term strategic concern
by senior officials.3

Minors
Despite more promising rates of repatriation and return for Islamic
State-affiliated minors, thousands languish in limbo within prisons,
camps, and detention centers in Iraq and Syria. According to a Re-
uters report in March 2019, an estimated “1,100 children of Islamic
State are caught in the wheels of Iraqi justice.” For the youngest,
detention in Iraqi government facilities is the direct result of their
parents’ Islamic State affiliation and conviction for terrorism offens-
es.38 Foreign infants and toddlers are now being raised in crowded
and unsanitary cells.39 Two hundred foreign infants have reportedly
been born inside one Baghdad prison alone.40 Before the decision
was taken to separate and repatriate only the children,41 seven
minors have perished in the poor conditions.42 Recently, mothers from
countries such as Tajikistan have refused permission for their chil-
dren to be repatriated without them, resulting in 17 Tajik minors
remaining in Iraqi prisons.43

In line with the national minimum age of criminal responsi-
bility, Iraqi authorities deem children from the age of nine to be
legally accountable for their involvement in the Islamic State.44 This
craves international standards, which stipulate that children
recruited to non-state armed groups are “primarily victims who
should be provided with assistance for their rehabilitation and re-
integration.”45 Charges and prosecutions range from illegal entrance
into Iraq to fighting for the Islamic State, and 108 foreign boys and
77 foreign girls have received sentences from a few months to up to
15 years in juvenile detention.46 Of even greater concern are reports
of arbitrary arrest, forced confessions, and torture of juvenile Islam-
ic State suspects in Iraqi and Kurdish custody.47 Such actions can
be harmful and counterproductive, and may create further barriers
for minors to reintegrate into society upon release, psychologically
and physically alienating individuals branded as ‘Islamic State-sup-

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s It should be noted here that there is a disconnect between this figure
and the authors’ dataset, which only shows a number of foreign minors
affiliated with the Islamic State up to 6,577. The significant number of
countries that still do not publicly record disaggregated data for minors
reinforces that the figure in the authors’ dataset continues to be an
underestimation. Iraq: 1,350 women and 580 minors. Syria: 4,000 women
and 8,000 minors. Margaret Coker and Falih Hassan, “A 10-Minute T
rial, a Death Sentence: Iraqi Justice for ISIS Suspects,” New York Times,
April 17, 2018; Ben Hubbard, “In a Crowded Syria Tent Camp, the Women
and Children of ISIS Wait in Limbo,” New York Times, March 29, 2019; Quentin
Sommerville, “There are 12,000 foreigners in Kurdish custody. 4000
women- 8000 kids. Men, 1000+ From more than 50 countries. That’s not
including Iraqis and Syrians,” Twitter, April 12, 2019.

t In the case of 11 French citizens, the Iraqi government reportedly requested
$1 million per person to commute their death sentences to life in prison.
It is not clear if these citizens included women or if women will be treated
differently in such cases. David Chazan, “Iraq offers to commute death
sentences of French Isil members for ‘millions of euros,’” Telegraph, June 2,
2019.

u Reasons for concealment of identity may include avoiding authorities if
the individual has committed a crime or if they do not wish to return home and
hope to stay in the region. Thanks to Petra Ramssauer for highlighting this
last point.

v Such a scenario is reminiscent of Camp Bucca, where the forging of
relationships and the hardening of ideological convictions preceded the
rise of the Islamic State.

w In contrast to Iraq, women or minors have not been charged or tried in
SDF-held territory. OCHA, “Syria: Humanitarian response in al-Hol camp,”

x Major General Alexus Grynkewich, deputy commander of Operation
Inherent Resolve who oversees joint and coalition operations, recently
stated the potential for radicalization in these camps is “the biggest
long-term strategic risk” outside of active military operations in efforts
to counter the Islamic State. Richard Hall, “Hardcore’ Isis ideologues
held in Syrian camps represent long-term risk, warns US-led coalition,”

y These comprise both foreign and local minors. Raya Jalabi, “Special Report:
Minors in this dataset demonstrate the need to act in accordance with international attention. The disaggregated figures for women and most tripled, and the plight of minors and infants has captured responses to other groups who pursue state-building. The need to recognize, record, and assess the status of women and address issues resulting from the Islamic State’s territorial collapse. Over the last year, modest but important progress has been made to build a future. Justice and recovery for the victims of the Islamic State, as well as prevention of future instability and conflict in the region, is paramount, but it is jeopardized by states’ inaction or hesitancy to manage their citizens. This is an inter-generational challenge, one that requires a nuanced and long-term approach. A transparent and rights-based process will provide justice for both Islamic State members and their victims, as well as demonstrate the values of the international community in contrast with the Islamic State. This, however, is the long game. It requires courage to overcome the temptation of vengeance; flexibility and collaboration to work across national jurisdictions; and patience to implement tailored and sustainable solutions. 

The authors’ 2018 dataset records less than 8,000 minors, excluding those already returned. This demonstrates that not adequately and publicly acknowledging women and minors can produce consequences such as underestimations, which may limit preparation and response for such significant populations.

For women, it is critical to assess the varying levels of individual agency based on their unique circumstances of joining, the plurality of their roles in the group, and possible continued support for, or disavowment of, the group. Assessments should take into account the risk that some women may pose, both in security terms and the possibility of radicalizing others. Action must also be taken in accordance with legal norms and with respect of human rights, including access to fair trials and gender-conscious rehabilitation and reintegration programs. Stripping citizenship of adults has potentially adverse implications. Such policies foster societal tensions and alienation born from a ‘hierarchy’ of citizenship and risk pushing these individuals to countries who may not be willing or adequately equipped to manage them.

For minors, stripping or denying citizenship is even more problematic. This creates barriers to access benefits, rights, and services that are needed to facilitate true reintegration into society. Fortunately, repatriation and rehabilitation of minors is a more common point of agreement and concession, yet still appears to prioritize specific groups, such as infants or orphans. Minors should have their rights and development put first, and initiatives that address healthcare, education, and psychosocial support should be prioritized. A rehabilitation-first approach responds to individual needs, provides an effective counterpoint to the Islamic State’s indoctrination, and offers a new ‘non-Islamic State’ identity on which to build a future.

Returnee figures recorded for women since July 2018 have almost tripled, and the plight of minors and infants has captured international attention. The disaggregated figures for women and minors in this dataset demonstrate the need to act in accordance with their status as interrelated, though distinct populations, with the flexibility and nuance to respond to each case in turn.

This is exemplified by some states’ public acknowledgment of “losing track” of their Islamic State-affiliated citizens. “Germany loses track of 160 ‘Islamic State’ supporters,” Deutsche Welle, June 23, 2019.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Minor Affiliates (includes traveled and born in theater)</th>
<th>Infants (confirmed born in theater)</th>
<th>Female Affiliates</th>
<th>Total Affiliates</th>
<th>Minor Returnees</th>
<th>Female Returnees</th>
<th>Total Returnees</th>
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<td><strong>Middle East and North Africa (MENA)</strong></td>
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<td>8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
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<p>| Eastern Europe                |                                                          |                                    |                  |                 |                |                 |                 |
| Albania                       | 38ICR-41ICR                                              | 13ICR                             | 29ICR-35ICR      | 157ICR-163ICR   | 44ICR          | 45ICR           |
| Azerbaijan                    | 19ICR-22ICR                                              |                                    | 200ICR           | 900ICR          | 2ICR           | 7ICR            |
| Belarus                       | 3 ICR                                                   | 3 ICR                             | 3 ICR           | 3 ICR           | 3 ICR          | 3 ICR           |
| Bosnia                        | 230ICR                                                   | 150ICR                            | 70ICR           | 500ICR          | 7ICR           | 6ICR            |
| Bulgaria                      |                                                        10ICR                                                 |                                    |                  |                 |                |                 |
| Croatia                       |                                                        4-5ICR                                                |                                       | 7ICR            |                |                 |
| Georgia                       |                                                        1 ICR                                                 |                                    |                  |                 |                |                 |
| Kosovo                        | 98ICR                                                    | 40ICR                             | 55ICR           | 44ICR-51ICR     | 7ICR           | 39ICR           |
| Latvia                        |                                                        2ICR                                                 |                                    |                  |                 |                |                 |
| Macedonia                     |                                                        6 ICR                                                 |                                    |                  |                 |                |                 |
| Moldova                       |                                                        1ICR                                                 |                                    |                  |                 |                |                 |
| Montenegro                    | 4ICR                                                    | 1ICR                             | 5ICR           | 2ICR           | 1ICR           | 1ICR            |
| Poland                        |                                                        20-40ICR                                              |                                    |                  |                 |                |                 |
| Romania                       |                                                        1ICR                                                 |                                    |                  |                 |                |                 |
| Russia                        | 1,600ICR                                                 | 57 ICR                            | 1,000ICR        | 4,000-5,000ICR  | 145ICR-200ICR  | 24ICR           |
| Serbia                        | 15ICR                                                    | 20ICR                             | 59ICR           | 59ICR           | 2ICR           | 2ICR            |
| Slovakia                      |                                                        6ICR                                                 |                                    |                  |                 |                |                 |</p>
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### Central Asia

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### Western Europe

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<td>2 ICR296</td>
<td>4 ICR295</td>
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<td>900318</td>
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### South-Eastern Asia

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<tr>
<td><strong>Malaysia</strong></td>
<td>17(^{211})</td>
<td>14(^{332})</td>
<td>102(^{233},154^{234})</td>
<td>2 ICR(^{335})</td>
<td>1 ICR(^{336})</td>
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<td>1 ICR(^{339})</td>
<td>100(^{340})</td>
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<td><strong>Singapore</strong></td>
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<td>2 ICR(^{342})</td>
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**Eastern Asia**

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<td>~350(^{345})</td>
<td>1,000(^{346})</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5(^{348},9^{349})</td>
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<td><strong>Women and minors as % of total</strong></td>
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**Americas, Australia, and New Zealand**

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<tbody>
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<td><strong>Argentina</strong></td>
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<td>23(^{351})</td>
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<td><strong>Australia</strong></td>
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<td>2 ICR(^{354})</td>
<td>30-40(^{355})</td>
<td>232(^{356})</td>
<td>9(^{357})</td>
<td>13(^{358})</td>
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<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
<td>26(^{360})</td>
<td>18(^{361})</td>
<td>18(^{362})</td>
<td>110-120(^{363})</td>
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<td>1 ICR(^{366})</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1(^{367})</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>New Zealand</strong></td>
<td>11(^{368})</td>
<td>12(^{369})</td>
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<td><strong>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</strong></td>
<td>60(^{370})</td>
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<td>1 ICR(^{374})</td>
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<td>14-17%</td>
<td>22%</td>
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**Southern Asia**

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<td>6(^{387},8) ICR(^{388})</td>
<td>67-87(^{389})</td>
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<td>61-200(^{396})</td>
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<td>15 ICR(^{398})</td>
<td>100(^{399})</td>
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<td><strong>Sri Lanka</strong></td>
<td>7 ICR(^{400})</td>
<td>1 ICR(^{401})</td>
<td>1 ICR(^{402})</td>
<td>32(^{403},60)^{404}</td>
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**Sub-Saharan Africa**

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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>2 ICR(^{405})</td>
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<td>100(^{406})</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Madagascar</strong></td>
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<td>3(^{407})</td>
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**Note:** All data is approximate and subject to fluctuation.
Citations

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. For an expansive methodology, see ibid., pp. 11-13.
5. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. This gendered dimension of rehabilitation and reintegration has been examined at length in Sanam Naraghi Anderlini and Melinda Holmes, “Invisible Women: Gendered Dimensions of Return, Rehabilitation and Reintegration from Violent Extremism,” International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN) and UNDP, 2019.
23. “[A film about Kazakhstanis returning from Syria published by the National Security Committee],” Tengrinews, June 8, 2019.
26. Ibid.
While both 600 persons who traveled and returned are reliable figures, that's not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syrians, and that’s not including Iraqis and Syria.


This figure includes travel to all theatres. “Those who joined the organisation, ‘Daash,’ outside the country does not exceed 340 people. The Minister of Interior complains about the growing foreign presence in the country,” As-Sayha, July 14, 2016.


Ibid.

100 ibid.; “70 Sudanese Joined IS: Interior Minister.”

101 “456 children who previously lived with Turkish parents accused of being members of IS”: Ayse Karabat, “Hundreds of children of IS members jailed in Iraq set to return to Turkey,” Middle East Eye, December 14, 2018. This is in addition to a further 20 ‘Turkish children of IS fighters’ previously returned. See Ece Doksedef, “Lost youth: Scarred children of Turkish Islamic State fighters return home,” Middle East Eye, November 30, 2018.


103 These figures only comprise minors currently detained in Iraq and are believed to be a significant underestimation. Ahmet S. Yaya, “Turkish ISIS and Foreign Fighters: Reconciling the Numbers and Perception of the Terrorism Threat,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (2019); p. 4.

104 5,000 – 7,000 men, and 2,000 women. (See Yaya, p. 6). 456 minors. (See Karabat.) Further reports have suggested in addition to men, family members (women and minors) comprise an additional 40% of total figures. See Yaya, p. 4.

105 This figure is calculated from 20 minors having returned by November 2018. (See Ibid.) This is in addition to 188 and 35 minor returnees. “[The Judge Decides the Fate of More than 1,000 Foreign ‘Daesh’ Children],” Republic of Iraq, June 2, 2019.

106 The figure of 900 returnees was published in error in the authors’ previous Daesh to Diaspora report; the only publicly acknowledged Turkish returnees are the minors listed in the above endnote.

107 Two hundred Tunisian minors “detained abroad as ISIS family members”—this does not disaggregate those in Iraq and Syria. “Tunisia: Scant returnees are the minors listed in the above endnote.


112 El-Ghobashy.


116 ibid.


120: 150: Xharra. 13 born there: Mejdini.

121: Azinovic, Between Salvation and Terror, p. 10.


124: “The Judge Decides the Fate.”

125: This figure only accounts for women captured by Iraqi forces. Vian Dakhil, “512 #Russian and 200 #Azerbaijani women as #ISIS members were captured and incarcerated by #Iraqi forces,” Twitter, November 8, 2017.


127: “The Judge Decides the Fate.”


129: “The Judge Decides the Fate.”

130: Ibid.

131: Ibid.

132: Ibid.


134: Ibid.


137: Sito-Sucic.


139: Azinovic, Between Salvation and Terror, p. 10.


142: Ibid. Though these seven have Croatian citizenship, none of them has lived in Croatia.

143: “Women from Georgia’s Azeri community travelling to join Syria jihad,” experts say,” Rezonansi, May 19, 2015, accessed on BBC Monitoring.


147: 12-17: “Experts divided on danger of Jihadists’ return to Georgia,” Rezonansi, February 26, 2018, accessed via BBC Monitoring. This article disputed claims that as many as 50 Georgians had returned. 3: Hasaya, “Why do women of Georgia go to ISIS?”


149: Fifty-five have “travelled or been caught en route.” “UN Urges Kosovo to Stop Citizens from Joining Terror Groups,” U.S. News, December 5, 2017.


152: Ibid.

153: 32: Zivnicov. 7: Hasaya, “Kosovo Women that Joined ISIS.”


155: “Pair of Latvian Muslims may have Joined ISIS in Syria,” Latvijas Sabiedrība, March 7, 2017.

156: Hasaya, “Kosovo Women that Joined ISIS.”


158: Ibid.

159: 32: Zivnicov. 7: Hasaya, “Kosovo Women that Joined ISIS.”


161: Azinovic and Becirevic, p. 22.

162: Ibid., p. 41.

163: Ibid.

164: Ibid.

165: Ibid.
168 The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon, p. 46.
169 Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment, p. 9.
172 This figure of 1,000 is supported by two sources. The source notes 2,000 women and children are individually recorded as missing in Syria and Iraq by their family members from Russia. As the bulk number of 2,000 women and children is undifferentiated, this report divides them equally between both categories. Tim Whewell, “The Mystery of Russia’s Lost Jihadi Brides,” BBC World Service. April 22, 2018; “Russia receives 1,000 requests from Daesh widows for return: Official;” PressTV, December 4, 2019.
174 40 expected: “27 Russian children repatriated from Iraq,” Rudaw, February 10, 2019.105: Ilya Arkhipov, “Putin Shows Rare Soft Spot to Rescue Russia’s ISIS Children,” Bloomberg, February 1, 2019. As this was going to publication in Russia, Russia had 200 children born to ISIS parents repatriated from Iraq, while 30 more were scheduled to be returned in August. Mohammed Rwanduzy, “473 children born to ISIS parents repatriated from Iraq: ministry,” Rudaw, July 15, 2019.
175 Brown, As this was going to publication, Russia had confirmed an additional 30 minors had returned from Iraq, while 30 more were scheduled to be returned in August. Ibid.
177 This article, which references Russian ‘militants,’ is assumed to be in reference to men only. The figure of 283 returnees is therefore added together with 24 women and 145-200 children, 283 ‘militants’: “In the Kramlin, 3,000 Participants in the Fighting in Syria and Iraq Counted from the North Caucasus,” Interfax Russia, May 16, 2018. 24 women: See “Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Moscow, April 19, 2018: 145-200 minors: See: “27 Russian children repatriated from Iraq;” Arkhipov, and Brown.
179 Zivanovic.
180 Azinovic and Becirevic, p. 22.
181 Balkan Jihadists, p. 43.
182 The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon, p. 48.
183 Azinovic and Jusic, p. 30.
184 Azinovic, Between Salvation and Terror, p. 144.
186 1: Ibid. 2: Ali Younes, “ISIL Bomber’s Father: My Son was Radicalised in Ukraine,” Al Jazeera, October 5, 2015.
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189 Ibid.
190 Sixty-three Kazakh minors were repatriated in December 2017. See Alexander Bogatik, “Children of killed militants in Syria set to return to Kazakhstan,” Caravanserai, December 27, 2017. This was followed by a further 30 minor returnees in Phase I of Operation Zhusan in January 2019. See “5 ISIS militants, families returned to Kazakhstan with US mediation.” This brings the total additional 30 minors had returned from Iraq, while 30 more were scheduled to be returned in August. Ibid.
192 The figure of 1,136-1,236 is a compilation of the 649-749 minors calculated in endnote 190 and 487 adults. Fifteen Kazakh adults already returned in 2015. See “[National Security Committee told how many Kazakhstani militants are fighting abroad;” Forbes Kazakhstan, March 20, 2015. In Phase I of Operation Zhusan, 17 adults were repatriated in January 2019. See “5 ISIS militants, families returned to Kazakhstan with US mediation.” In Phase II of the operation, a further 75 adults returned. See “Kazakhstan continues operation to repatriate citizens.” After these repatriations, 380 Kazakh adults remained in theater. See Ibid.
193 Sixty-three Kazakh minors were repatriated in December 2017. See Alexander Bogatik, “Children of killed militants in Syria set to return to Kazakhstan.” This was followed by a further 30 minor returnees in Phase I of Operation Zhusan in January 2019. See “5 ISIS militants, families returned to Kazakhstan with US mediation.” A further 156 minors were repatriated on May 7-9, 2019, in Phase II of the operation. See “Kazakhstan continues operation to repatriate citizens.” A further 171 minors were repatriated in Phase III of the operation on May 27-31, 2019. See Eran Karin, “[Operation Zhusan-3];” YouTube, May 31, 2019.
194 “[A film about Kazakhstanis returning from Syria published by the National Security Committee].” Tengrinews, June 8, 2019.
195 Eleven women returned in Phase I of Operation Zhusan in January 2019. See “5 ISIS militants, families returned to Kazakhstan with US mediation.” A further 61 women were repatriated on May 7-9, 2019, in Phase II of the operation. See “Kazakhstan receives 231 citizens from The Administration of northeast Syria,” North Press Agency Syria, May 9, 2019. A further 67 women were repatriated in Phase III of the operation on May 27-31, 2019. See Karin.
196 This figure is compiled from the 420 minor returnees calculated in endnote 193, in addition to 174 adults. Fifteen Kazakh adults already returned in 2015. See “National Security Committee told how many Kazakhstani militants are fighting abroad.” Seventeen adults returned in Phase I of Operation Zhusan in January 2019. See “5 ISIS militants, families returned to Kazakhstan with US mediation.” A further 75 adults were repatriated on May 7-9, 2019, in Phase II of the operation. “Kazakhstan continues operation to repatriate citizens.” A further 67 women (no men) were repatriated in Phase III of the operation on May 27-31, 2019. See Karin.
199 Ibid. This figure references travelers between 2010-2016, suggesting that some of these individuals may not have traveled to join extremist groups, though the specific proportion is unclear.
202 Ibid. This figure may not account for the additional 19 families that were stated to have already returned. However, specific figures for women in this figure for families were not available, suggesting more women were present than 279.
205 “The Judge Decides the Fate.;” “Iraqi Authorities Reportedly Holding Wives and Children.”
206 “About 100 Children to Return from Iraq to Tajikistan,” Qazaq Times, Janaury 10, 2019; “Iraqi Authorities Reportedly Holding Wives and Children.”
207 “Iraqi Authorities Reportedly Holding Wives and Children.”
208 147 returnees 2016: Urut Botobekov, “Is Central Asia Ready to Face ISIS?” Diplomat; July 8, 2016. This is in addition to 90-100 minors reported in 2019. See “About 100 Children to Return from Iraq to Tajikistan;” “The Judge Decides the Fate;” NB: The figure of 163 returning Tajik “members of banned groups” is not used as it does not stipulate Islamic State-only returnees. See “Over 160 Tajik ‘extremists’ returned home in nine months.”

215 The estimate of 1,500 only references Uzbek nationals, but includes their travel to Afghanistan. The figure of 2,500 accounts for both national and ethnic Uzbeks, particularly from Kyrgyzstan, in Iraq and Syria. Dierdre Tyan, “Thousands from Central Asia joining ‘Islamic State,’” Internationa l Crisis Group, January 21, 2015.

216 This figure is of those who have links to radical jihadis. It is not clear if these have actually traveled to Syria or Iraq, “Is Austria-underestimating the threat of radicalization?” Local Austria, January 29, 2016.

217 “30 children of ISIS leave Iraq on flight to Moscow;” “Syria Kurds say repatriating 148 Uzbek ISIS women, children.”

218 Ibid.

219 “Syria Kurds say repatriating 148 Uzbek ISIS women, children.”


223 “Austrian Ministry Says Women Fifth of Jihadists Watched.”


225 “Mother of IS girl wants to bring grandchildren.”

226 “Austrian Ministry Says Women Fifth of Jihadists Watched.”

227 “Constitutional Protection Report 2017.”

228 Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment (CUTA) figures as of July 10, 2019, received via email to author. The authors thank Thomas Renard for his assistance with these. Thomas Renard and Rik Coolsaet eds., Returnees: Who Are They, Why Are They (Not) Coming Back and How Should We Deal with Them? Assessing Policies on Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands (Brussels: Egmont Institute, 2018), p. 22.

229 Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment (CUTA) figures as of July 10, 2019, received via email to author. The authors thank Thomas Renard for his assistance with these.

230 Ibid.

231 Ibid.

232 Ibid.

233 Returnees, p. 22. In 2019, an appeals court in Brussels determined the Belgian government was not obligated to repatriate two Belgian women who joined Islamic State. The initial court decision noted the women should be brought back with their children. Michael Birnbbaum, “Their parents joined ISIS. They were raised in the caliphate. Can they come home?” Washington Post, February 17, 2019.

234 Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment (CUTA) figures as of July 10, 2019, received via email to author. The authors thank Thomas Renard for his assistance with these.

235 Politietets Etterretningstjeneste (PET), Assessment of the Terror Threat to Denmark (Copenhagen: Center for Terroranalyse, 2017), p. 5.

236 “Factbox – Europeans who joined Islamic State,” Reuters, February 19, 2019. “Just below half” of 435 have returned. Ibid.


238 Ibid.

239 Ibid.

240 Ibid.

241 Assessment of the Terror Threat.

242 “The Judge Decides the Fate.”

243 Tim Meko, “Now that the Islamic State has fallen in Iraq and Syria, where are all its fighters going?” Washington Post, February 22, 2018.

244 Linus Gustafsson and Magnus Ranstorp, Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: An Analysis of Open-Source Intelligence and Statistical Data (Stockholm, Swedish Defense University, 2017), p. 59.

245 Half of these are younger than five and a third were born in theater. “700 French Minors Will Return From Syria,” Figaro, February 2, 2017.

246 Gustafsson and Ranstorp, p. 59.

247 “700 French Minors Will Return.”

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257 BKA, BV, and HKE, Analysis of the background and process of radicalization among persons who left Germany to travel to Syria or Iraq based on Islamist motivations (Wiesbaden: Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BV) and Hesse Information and Competence Centre Against Extremism (HKE), October 2016), p. 11.

258 One thousand and fifty traveled to Iraq and Syria. See Herr Haldenwang, “Verfassungsschutz- Chef: ‘Wir leben in einem der sichersten Länder der Welt’ [Head of the office for the protection of the constitution: We live in one of the safest countries in the world],” Bundesamt für Verfassungs- schutz [Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution], March 19, 2019. 218 born in Iraq and Syria: [Several toddlers of German jihadists still in war zones].”

259 13 children: “Two Islamic State Wives Return to Germany With Their Children,” Deutsche Welle, April 27, 2018. 3 children: Florian Flade, “Network of radical sisters,” Die Welt, July 20, 2018, accessed via BBC Monitoring. 3 children: “[Germany returns the first batch of ‘Daesh’ children from Iraq],” Deutsche Welle, April 5, 2019. In the authors’ 2018 dataset, they cited an article that noted “the Federal Government expects more than 100 underage dependents of ISIS members to return to Germany from the war zones.” However, this has not appeared since 2018, and the authors have adjusted their figures accordingly. Manuel Bewarder and Florian Flade, “Fear of the children of Jihad,” Die Welt, January 8, 2018, accessed via BBC Monitoring.


261 347: 1,050 travelled to the Middle East to join ‘terrorist groups’ after 2013. About one-third have returned. “Germany loses track of 160 ‘Islamic State’ supporters,” Deutsche Welle. June 23, 2019. 10: “Germany returns the first batch.”

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311: Twenty minors are in addition to 77 adults. Ibid. 312: “The Judge Decides the Fate. " 313: "Chiffres des voyageurs du djihad – Février 2019."

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315: Noman Benotman and Nikita Malik, The Children of Islamic State (London: Quilliam, 2016), p. 8. Unverified sources have stated up to 100 British children have been born there. See Martin Evans, “One hundred British children born to Islamic State brides remain in Syria, experts warn," Telegraph, February 24, 2019. 316: Unverified sources have stated up to 100 British children have been born there. See Evans.

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