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Shared Experience: Organizational Culture and Ethos at the United States Marine Corps’ Basic School 1924-1941

By

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Abstract

A significant gap exists in historical study of the United States Marine Corps, centered on the conduct and curriculum of its “Basic Officers’ Course.” There is no extant history of basic officer education in the Marine Corps. The current official history is broad, lacks detail, and focuses primarily on the last thirty years. A “History of The Basic School” was written in 1945, covering the early decades in slightly more detail. It is, unfortunately, almost entirely devoid of citations and does not approach the subject in a scholarly way. Other existing publications about the history of the Marine Corps Schools fail to make a detailed survey of the content of basic officer instruction courses, though there are a handful of detailed works on field officer education. Finally, no previous project has attempted to place the instruction of Marine officers within the broader political, social, and demographic environment of the United States in the interwar period. This paper will help fill that gap.

The history of the Marine Corps, like any other long-lived and large institution, has been written from a variety of perspectives, many times over. Before the American Civil War, Marine Corps history was so closely tied to that of the Navy that a unified maritime history tradition was sufficient for both institutions. Then, beginning in 1875, every generation of Marines has produced their own single-volume “History” of the Marine Corps, distinguishing the Corps’ identity from that of the Navy. Accompanying most of these are specialized monographs which consider more narrowly the conduct, composition, missions, and personalities. Only in more narrowly focused scholarly works are disputes or controversies really worked out in detail. To date, none of those inquiries attempted to explain the influence that education had on the unit cohesion or individual camaraderie which were evidenced during the Second World War. Single-mindedness in both tactical and operational environments were a hallmark of USMC operations in the Pacific Theatre, yet no analysis has been made of the one educational experience the vast majority of those combat commanders had in common.

The purpose of this paper is not to settle a dispute, but rather to explain the nature of education for junior officers during a specific time period. Between 1920 and 1940 the true “professional” schools consisted of: the US Army War College, the US Army Command and Staff School, the US Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, the US Naval War College, the Marine Corps Field Officers’ Course, the Marine Corps Company Officers’ Course, and the Marine Corps Basic Officers’ Course. This last named, the particular subject of this paper, was the only professional school being conducted at the “basic” level. It was the single point of entry for commissioned officers into the Marine Corps during the interwar period, and its operations were consistent during that same interval.
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

TBS – The Basic School
SOA – School of Application
MCS – Marine Corps Schools
USMC – United States Marine Corps
HQMC – Headquarters, Marine Corps
CMC – Commandant of the Marine Corps

USN – United States Navy
USA – United States Army
USNI – United States Naval Institute
NWC – Naval War College
AWC – Army War College
CGSS – Command and General Staff School
USNA – United States Naval Academy
USMC – United States Military Academy
ROTC – Reserve Officers Training Corps
NROTC – Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps

PME – Professional Military Education
ABF – Advanced Base Force
AEF – American Expeditionary Force
NCO – Non-commissioned Officer
CO – Commanding Officer
FMF – Fleet Marine Force
MOS – Military Occupational Specialty
BAR – Browning Automatic Rifle

POW – Prisoner of War
KIA – Killed in Action
MIA – Missing in Action

2ndLt – Second Lieutenant, Marine Corps
1stLt – First Lieutenant, Marine Corps
Capt – Captain, Marine Corps
Maj – Major, Marine Corps
LtCol – Lieutenant Colonel, Marine Corps
Col – Colonel, Marine Corps
BGen – Brigadier General, Marine Corps
MGen – Major General, Marine Corps
LtGen – Lieutenant General, Marine Corps
Gen – General, Marine Corps
2LT – Second Lieutenant, U.S. Army
1LT – First Lieutenant, U.S. Army
CAPT – Captain, U.S. Army
MAJ – Major, U.S. Army
LCOL – Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
COL – Colonel, U.S. Army
BGEN – Brigadier General, U.S. Army
MGEN – Major General, U.S. Army
LTGEN – Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
GEN – General, U.S. Army
ENS – Ensign, Navy
LTJG – Lieutenant Junior Grade, Navy
LT – Lieutenant, Navy
LCDR – Lieutenant Commander, Navy
CDR – Commander, Navy
CAPT – Captain, Navy
RADM – Rear Admiral, Navy
VADM – Vice Admiral, Navy
ADM – Admiral, Navy
Introduction

At five minutes until ten o’clock on a Wednesday morning, the passageways of Heywood Hall are silent. The somber faces of past commanders, Medal of Honor recipients, and other notable Marines hung on the concrete walls regard one another impassively. Somewhere near the quarterdeck, Colonel Commandant Charles Heywood himself occupies a wall. Heywood’s hall is the only building on the campus not named after a Lieutenant of Marines. At 1000 exactly, two hundred fifty Second Lieutenants come piling out of Classroom 1, headed north toward the barracks buildings. They have managed to stay awake for all 90 minutes of “Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force Operations II.” At the same time, 250 more Second Lieutenants leave Classroom 3’s map problem on “Patrolling” and head south, dispersing toward small group discussion rooms and the mess hall. Caught in the middle, a group of visiting members of the Class of 1969 recall how they, too, once sat in classrooms in this same corner of Camp Barrett. They sagely observe how much has changed, and yet stayed the same. At 1010, the halls are silent again. This is “The Basic School,” a unique institution among military schools and one which holds a central place in the Marine Corps’ system of training and education.

Every year, the United States Marine Corps educates about one thousand newly-commissioned Second Lieutenants at its Basic Officers Course. Each class of 200-250 students, organized as a company with a Major in command, completes a six month course, at the end of
which each participant is considered qualified to serve in the Fleet Marine Force as a rifle platoon commander. Many go on to do exactly that, or one of a host of other things. The Basic School (TBS) is unique among the military schools operated by the United States Armed Forces. It is the only post-commissioning school categorically required for all officers of a given service to attend before joining an operational unit. There are no substitutions for TBS. The Marine Corps does not differentiate among the various sources of commissions for officers: United States Naval Academy graduates, four-year Naval Reserve Officer Training Course graduates, and “other” university graduates who attend a 10-week Officer Candidates’ School are all mixed together at TBS and no group receives individual or specialized treatment.

The uniqueness of TBS comes from two primary features: its structure, and what it allegedly provides to its graduates. It is the only “basic” level post-commissioning school in the United States which imparts a “generalist” education, rather than one directed at a particular military operational specialty or community of experts. Lawyers, pilots, comptrollers, and infantry officers all attend the same course. To date, no academic study of what they actually do or teach has been completed. Without that groundwork, it would be difficult or impossible to analyze the second primary feature. There is today a strongly held belief among Marine officers that the school contributes something fundamental to the identity of a Marine officer, and thus to the Corps itself, and without TBS unity of purpose among Marine officers might cease to exist. I suggest that the commonality among officers created by attending the Basic School is equivalent to the bond enlisted Marines share having passed through the recruit depots at Parris Island or San Diego. Colonel George M. Van Sant, a graduate of Parris Island in 1945 and TBS in 1951, gave the two institutions equal billing in his memoir: “the lessons of Parris Island and Basic School [were] deeply emblazoned on my soul.”

By beginning with a study of the “what” of

TBS, scholarship can be developed which digs into the questions of “how,” “why,” and “to what end?”

Is TBS really so central to the identity of Marine officers that their ethos would fade away without it? Why do other services not seem to need a similar school to accomplish unity of purpose among their officers? Unfortunately, the history of TBS spans over 120 years. Rather than give superficial treatment to the entire history of the school, this paper undertakes a study of one pivotal moment in Marine Corps organizational development, and looks at TBS specifically as it existed in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania between the World Wars. The research question I submitted at the beginning of the project was: *What was the nature of the curriculum and conduct of the United States Marine Corps’ “Basic Officer Course” during the interwar era?* By showing how TBS was conducted during the interwar period, we can shed light on the background and experience of the officers who were most responsible for carrying out the Pacific campaigns of World War II. The TBS students discussed in this paper are the mid-grade officers described by General Alexander Vandegrift on Guadalcanal as “the men on whom so much depended.”

“The best teacher of war,” wrote Martin van Creveld, “is war.” In the modern era, admirals and generals have searched far and wide for a means to circumvent this ancient truth. How to learn war before fighting one? How to train for an event whose terrible realities cannot be replicated? To answer this question, the science of “Professional Military Education” has developed. We now understand Professional Military Education (PME) to mean some combination of classroom exercises, field exercises, reading assignments, expert lectures, and mentor-mentee interaction with men and women who have experienced war firsthand. If a professional military education (PME) program “succeeds,” the students will be better prepared to fight a war than will be their enemy. Guaranteeing students can defeat the enemy, when the

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enemy’s program of training and education is unknown, creates a burden on instructors to somehow cover an infinite number of potential combat lessons in a very finite amount of time. That is the central problem in any military school.

Since the publication of Clausewitz’ On War, most modern militaries have attempted to (or claim to have attempted to) teach “principles of combat,” in lieu of preprogrammed technical behaviors. They strive to cultivate philosophical and logical mental models in their officers; *coup d’oeil* is the gold standard of battlefield prowess.\(^4\) Depending on the year and the location, attempts to turn combat leaders into military geniuses began earlier or later in the officers’ careers. In the Marine Corps, principles of leadership, “strategic intuition,” creative decision making, and innovation are taught from the very beginning. Thus TBS forms a foundational component of their PME program for officers. As a parallel example, enlisted Marines are taught teamwork, small unit leadership, and creativity beginning at boot camp, not later at specialty schools.\(^5\) TBS establishes an institutional vocabulary, shared knowledge of basic combat principles, a “baseline” expertise, and a common experience for all Marine officers. There is a confidence among TBS graduates that their experience there is a replication of a proven, consistent educational model, and that as graduates they share an identical knowledge base with every other Marine officer. TBS creates a bond of culture, identity, camaraderie, community, tradition, and most importantly, trust. In 2004, the Commanding Officer (CO) of The Basic School, Colonel John R. Allen, wrote: “today, our Corps is defined by it and America depends on it.”\(^6\)

This bond may in fact be identical with the “ethos” scholars attempt to locate and analyze. What makes ethos exist changes from generation to generation, and what makes a given


\(^6\) Allen, J.R., forward to “Official History: The Basic School” [Coll/3706; Box 1, Folder 10], USMC Historical Division, Archives Branch, Quantico, Virginia.
military organization different from its peers and near-peers shifts over time. In the United States in particular, the overriding influence of an ideological civilian government prevents military services from behaving in an entirely self-determining manner. However, in spite of all those barriers to building a consistent organizational culture, the Marine Corps undeniably has a very strong one. As mentioned before, Marine officers feel that TBS is central to their identity despite its short length and relatively limited scope of content. It is after all only a “basic” course. In order to make up for what the rational outsider sees as a lack of justification for idolizing TBS, a number of myths have grown up around the school over the years. Their very existence says something about why the school matters so much to the Marines. For example, many Marine officers believe that every one of their number has endured the trial known as the Basic School, from themselves all the way back to some vague point in the past, maybe as far as Pressley O’Bannon. They are incorrect. In fact, there were times in the school’s past when an officer could be excused from attending TBS, or when a correspondence-based equivalent was acceptable. Moreover, the school only came into existence in 1891, precluding attendance for the many Marine officers who served between the Corps’ first and 114th birthdays. Myths notwithstanding, Marines correctly understand that TBS is a critical element of their professional military education system; they simply are uneducated as to how TBS has perpetuated elements of the Marine Corps ethos over the years, and have no scholarly account of the details of its history.

There is no single comprehensive history of Professional Military Education in the United States Military, much less one for the Marine Corps in particular. Omnibus volumes considering battle histories are plentiful, as are biographies of luminaries like John Basilone and Dan Daly. Introspective studies on administration, organizational culture, and even technical training did not appear until the Cold War era. As a result, the formative early twentieth century years must be pieced together from scant sources, and at the same time laboriously separated from the hagiography which sprouted up in the absence of serious histories. In this study, we will primarily examine two things: the composition of the curriculum at the Basic School between the
World Wars, and the experience and qualifications of the instructors assigned to TBS between the World Wars. The primary sources available answer these two questions satisfactorily, and the data could serve as a springboard to future research into the role of the Basic School within the Marine Corps over its institutional lifetime.

*United States Marines: Historical Context*

The Marines take great pride in their familiarity with their own past. Casual conversational references to long-dead Marines are everyday fare among Marines today, and their scripted traditions (such as a Birthday Ball or Mess Night) work to maintain those connections. The available literature for students of Marine Corps history reflects this fact: the shelves are heavy on the biographies and battle accounts, light on the analyses and data sets. However, the myths’ longevity speaks to there being some underlying truth. Else, how would the legends live so long? In the context of education and TBS, there are a few particular facts about the Marine Corps and Marine Corps Schools which help frame, if not completely explain, why the legends persist unchanged. Factors of size, mission, origin, legal structure, organizational culture, and geography all contribute to the Marines’ ability to possess, disseminate, oversee, and manage their corporate heritage.

Prior to the American Civil War, the Marine Corps was a small, tightly integrated force aboard ships of the United States Navy, or serving as guards on Navy Yards. The senior officer of the Marine Corps prior to 1820 was a major or lieutenant colonel. Between 1820 and 1860 Archibald Henderson alone ruled the Corps, retiring as a brevet Brigadier General more by virtue of his extremely long service than because of any fundamental structural change to the Marine Corps. The Corps was a small service with a unique and limited mission. Occasional overseas service in Korea, South America, the Philippines, China, and the Mediterranean during those decades provided many “high adventure” heroes. It did not create a large Marine Corps nor give rise to a radical new mission. Neither did the Civil War itself transform the Marines: the Corps never grew significantly (despite Congressional authorizations to do so) and after the war they
returned to the ship-and-yard guard duties which had occupied them previously. Sailing to far off destinations to protect “American lives and property” also continued as before.

The civilian governments of 1865-1885 made very little political use of the Navy and it fell into disrepair. The Marine Corps continued to keep to its old mission and shared in the Navy’s state of neglect, while the other service armed with rifles (the Army) was growing by leaps and bounds and drawing all kinds of new tasks under its tent. The westward growth of the country itself gave rise to a pressing need for Army schools and Army development and Army recruitment above any other national defense priority. American newspapers were full of “Indian Wars” and the rush of industrialization, not foreign policy or maritime strategy. In particular, salacious tales of massacres and murders proved extremely palatable for the reading public.7 The U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) and its journal, Proceedings, were founded in order to draw attention to, and attempt to remedy at the ideological level, the plight of the neglected sea services. It would be unfair to characterize the officers of the late-nineteenth century Navy and Marine Corps as desperate. But they were certainly correct to sense it was a serious fight they faced.

In particular, the minor crisis of a temporarily unused Navy threatened to mean the permanent end of the Marine Corps. What would become of the Marines? What actually became of them was a renaissance, as the era of small wars truly came into its own and the “high adventure heroics” of the occasional trip overseas during the early 1800s turned into the everyday life of the rank and file Marine from 1890 until the First World War. Beginning in 1891 officers received education at the basic level and enlisted Marines gradually were shifted to training at centralized recruit depots. Beginning in 1910 distance education for Marines of all ranks was introduced. After 1920 a full three-tier officer education system was in place and technical specialists of all ranks were being sent to a broad range of schools around the country for further professional education. The Marines had managed, through careful observation of sister services

and through some trial and error, to create a strong corporate culture which was being effectively
communicated through permanent PME institutions. When existential questions were raised
about the Marine Corps’ role after World War II, it was clear the Leathernecks had spent the
previous 50 years well: Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal allegedly remarked that the
Marines had guaranteed their existence “for the next 500 years” with their prowess in battle and
their creative lobbying on Capitol Hill.\(^8\)

The current operational culture of the Marine Corps (official since 1989) is called
“Maneuver Warfare.” In the theoretical work which defines their ideology at length, professional
military education is given a pivotal role:

Military Education is basic to the definition of maneuver warfare and is an integral
component of tactics and the operational art. Without military education, tactics and
operations become little more than applied checklists. True education removes the need
for checklists and “school solutions,” enabling commanders to approach each problem
equipped with a large array of possible solutions, placing the problem in a larger context
and evolving innovative answers. The common thought process developed in officers
through military education binds techniques, tactics and the operational art. As noted
earlier, it is also a basis of command and control in maneuver warfare.\(^9\)

The modern maneuverists looked back for inspiration at educational models which preceded the
Second World War. After 1941, American military education shifted into a kind of “emergency”
mode in which education, even of officers, was optimized for speed and efficiency but not depth.
The reformers of the 1980s wanted to return to a model more like that of the German
Kriegsakademie, where the focus was on active learning, creativity, and placing more
responsibility on an in-training officer than would be given to him in the operational forces.
According to the author of the Maneuver Warfare Handbook, the interwar Marine Corps Schools
were also such places.\(^10\)

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8. General Holland M. Smith related Forrestal’s comment in an account he gave of their
conversation at Iwo Jima at the time of the famous “flag raising.” (Coral and Brass, 1949) It has been
repeated many times since.


10. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 44.
Unfortunately, modern Marines claim a connection with the schools of the 1920s and 1930s but know virtually nothing about them. The product of the interwar schools was Amphibious Warfare Doctrine and the officers who executed it. But the process is shrouded in mystery. This study, by shedding light on the content of the Basic School in the interwar era, helps fill in a gap in the history of professional military education. It is arranged in three parts: first, the introduction and first two chapters set the stage, providing context for the history of Professional Military Education in the Marine Corps, as well as covering the early years of TBS. Since few records are available for the 1920s and 1930s some extrapolation from 1890-1918 helps fill in the gaps. In particular, the explicit discussions of TBS in the Annual Reports of the Commandant of the Marine Corps provide insight into the Marine Corps’ corporate viewpoint on the purpose of the school.

The curriculum at the school has been under continuous development, but from its founding until at least World War II, it was clearly divided into three main areas. These areas align with Chapters 3 and 4 of this study: sea service and small wars, and conventional land warfare, respectively. Each chapter will examine the missions undertaken by the Marine Corps, in particular the experience various TBS instructors had in each of the three primary areas of study. Since the curriculum was developed by the instructors themselves, it was heavily influenced by their own careers and combat experience. Chapter 5 forms the keystone of the project, giving a chronological picture of how TBS functioned during the interwar years. Records from personal papers collections, memoirs, official histories, the Marine Corps archives, Annual Reports of the Commandant, and the holdings of the National Archives were all used extensively for this chapter. Finally, Chapters 6 and 7 study the existing examples of TBS curriculum from the interwar era. Chapter 6 surveys the items preserved in the Marine Corps Archives in Quantico, Virginia. Chapter 7 surveys the complete collection of student papers which was preserved by Brigadier General Ronald R. Van Stockum, who attended TBS at League Island in 1937-38. A large data set was compiled and analyzed using available biographical data for the 1,182 Marines who either attended TBS at League Island as a student,
worked on staff as an instructor, or both. That data set was the starting point for every aspect of this project. A variety of demographic facts from it are included here, particularly in chapter 5.

In his 1921 report to the senior leadership of the Marine Corps, popularly-styled “Father of Amphibious Warfare” Major Earl H. Ellis wrote:

To affect a landing under sea and shore conditions obtaining and in the face of enemy resistance requires careful training and preparation, to say the least; and this along Marine Corps lines. It is not enough that the troop be skilled infantry men or artillery men of high morale; they must be skilled water men and jungle men who know it can be done--Marines with Marine training.\textsuperscript{11}

Ellis was confident that the Marines were training their officers and men to do something unique, even unprecedented. Six years later, the \textit{Landing Force Manual} presumed a similar level of unique ability on the part of Marines:

Marines will be employed as landing forces whenever the numbers present are adequate. In a mixed force the special training of marine officers and men will be used to the greatest practicable extent to increase the efficacy of the entire force.\textsuperscript{12}

When the 1927 \textit{Landing Force Manual} was released, company and senior level Marine schools had been in operation for six and five years, respectively. Clearly some source of specialization and continuity within the Marine Corps was producing confidence in the competence of Marines to carry out specific missions. That source was the Basic School.

In the summer of 1941, there were fewer than 1800 officers on active duty in the Marine Corps.\textsuperscript{13} By 1945, over 35,000 officers would have been brought into active service via the USMC Reserve, the United States Naval Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps commissions, and the draft.\textsuperscript{14} Only the former group had had the benefit of a professional school


experience, at TBS. The remaining Marine officers completed abbreviated training courses at Quantico, Virginia, some of which were as short as ten weeks’ duration. The data gathered showed not only that a large percentage of senior Marines attended TBS specifically while it was located at League Island, but showed that those officers progressed at a high rate through the leadership positions of the Marine Divisions. Those who served as junior staffers or company commanders at Guadalcanal were chiefs of staff and regimental commanders at Iwo Jima. The prevalence of League Island officers in tables of organization for the Pacific campaign strongly supports presuppositions that the school and its curriculum had a profound effect on the Marine Corps as a whole. It is true that League Island graduates were raised to these positions by default. However, it does not lessen the necessary impact that the TBS education had on the Fleet Marine Force, when all but a handful of its most senior leadership had attended TBS at the same location and within a span of only sixteen years.

Methodology: Primary Sources and Collections

There are a variety of sources available for proving this thesis’ central proposals. Most are related to the personal careers of Marine officers. Some come from official records. All of the primary source records used for this study have shortcomings. When organizing this paper, preference was given to grouping like sources, rather than presenting the evidence in a strictly chronological manner. This choice was made in order to avoid some of the errors made by previous studies of TBS. For example, Anthony Frances’ *History of the Marine Corps Schools* is a chronological record, and often presumes that class schedules from one year carried into the next. The limited records which do exist actually disprove that presumption. So, rather than extrapolate multiple years’ programs of instruction from incomplete records, this paper presents only the solid evidence available.

The first source consulted was the *Muster Rolls of the United States Marine Corps, 1893-1940*. The original muster rolls no longer exist, so all modern research is done in reference to a series of microfilm records held by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)
in Washington, DC. The rolls have been digitized and can be searched from a number of third-party research databases. They are organized in sheets by date and location; each “roll” contains the complete personnel listing for a single Marine Corps unit for a single month. In some cases the original record was damaged before being transferred to microfilm. For example, the records for the School of Application while it was located in Annapolis, Maryland, during the 1900s are virtually indecipherable. In other cases, errors of spelling (common) or complete omission of individuals (one instance) caused problems with creating a complete record. A spreadsheet of 1,182 Marine officers was created for this project, using data from the *Muster Rolls*. That group of officers, all assigned as students at the Basic School between 1924 and 1941, form the core of the project.

Using the listing of names, three additional primary sources were consulted in order to verify, substantiate, and correct information gathered on the *Muster Rolls*. First, the “personal papers” collections of the USMC Historical Division, Archives Branch, were checked. Personal papers are original documents, including official records, which were donated to the archives by the servicemember or a family member. One hundred sixty four officers on the spreadsheet have personal papers in the USMC Archive. Of those 164 collections, fewer than two dozen contained any documents related to TBS.¹⁵ The relevant documents found included transcripts, graduation certificates, partial copies of assignments or exams, official orders to or from the Basic School, and a few photographs. Perhaps by coincidence, the most helpful collections were those of officers who had been both students and instructors at the Basic School during the interwar period. It was very surprising to find that the personal collections of Marine Corps history “notables” such as Victor Krulak and Robert Heinl contained no documents pertaining to TBS.

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¹⁵ Most collections contain photographs, official biographies, newspaper clippings of obituaries, World War records, copies of awards and medals, and correspondence from late-career assignments at the regimental level and above.
The USMC History Division is divided into three branches. The Archives Branch maintains only original documents; the Reference Branch retains photocopies and secondary source material. Out of 1,182 Marines on the spreadsheet, 886 have a “personnel file” in the Reference Branch. The content of each personnel file varies, but all items are photocopies: speeches, newspaper clippings, awards and citations, official orders, official biographies (produced by History Division), special event programs, and correspondence. For this project, only the personnel files for TBS instructors were examined in detail. The Reference Branch files provided confirmation of assignment dates, rank at retirement, and supplementary biographical information which helped to corroborate or correct the *Muster Rolls*. The Reference Branch collection is the largest and most “complete” at History Division, but since the items retained are not originals, they tend to “self-select” for items which are either late career or which pertain to newsworthy events such as major battles or promotions to command.

The third branch of the History Division is the Histories Branch. It maintains a collection of “oral histories,” mostly recorded during the 1970s. Thirteen officers who served as instructors at TBS between the World Wars also recorded oral histories. The transcripts were studied and references made to TBS were included in this thesis. The oral histories contained the best material for showing what Marines thought about TBS and how they felt about being assigned there as a student or instructor. However, they are prone to minor errors of memory on the part of the interviewee. For example, General Graves Erskine asserted in his interview that no civilian college graduates attending TBS while he was an instructor. The General was mistaken, so care must be taken to corroborate or correct these records as well.

The *Muster Rolls* and three USMC History Division collections established the identities of the officers who attended or taught at TBS between the wars, and together create reasonable certainty that no individuals have been overlooked in creating a database for recording demographics, career statistics, combat assignments, awards and citations, and military specialties. In order to populate the database with further information, additional sources were used. For the TBS students who were also graduates of the United States Naval Academy,
copies of the *Lucky Bag* (annual yearbook) and a digitized listing of deceased midshipmen called the “Memorial Hall” provided information about college years, extracurricular activities, and place of origin.\textsuperscript{16} For all students, copies of the *Register of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the United States Navy and United States Marine Corps* for the years 1935-1975 provided date of commissioning, duty station listings, retirement dates, and retirement rank for all students except a select few who died or left the Marine Corps soon after commissioning. For those students whose full biographical information was not available in any of the above collections, United States Social Security Administration Death Indices, Veterans’ Administration BIRLS (Beneficiary Identification Records Locator Subsystem) files, newspaper obituaries, and cemetery records were variously employed to determine dates of death and terminal rank. For the first two sources, “ancestry.com” has a digitized collection available. For cemetery records, “National” cemeteries (maintained by the United States government) have searchable grave indices. Others I searched using Google and similar engines, visiting in person any location within reasonable travel distance.

Establishing the names, career information, and biographical details for the full list of TBS students and staff created reasonable certainty that, once information related to each name had been exhaustively searched for within each database, no further information on the topic would come to light. It was a by-name search which led to the discovery of the Brigadier General Ron van Stockum collection, for example. Likewise, the personal memoirs of various TBS students who wrote books after retirement were discovered by searching for their name. Once a complete search for individual records was complete, a smaller collection of official records and primary sources was considered.

First, the USMC History Division, Archives Branch, holds two non-personal collections of documents which relate to Marine Corps Schools. TBS has its own collection of over 250 boxes, the vast majority of which pertain to student records and programs of instruction from

\textsuperscript{16} A real “Memorial Hall” exists on the property at the Naval Academy as well.
1960 to the present. One box contains original records for the League Island period. The “Marine Corps Archives Material” chapter on this thesis discusses all of the League Island TBS records kept in the official collection from the Archives Branch. Additional official collections for the Marine Corps Schools were considered, as well as the personal papers of a select group of Marines who had an impact on PME in the Marine Corps during the early twentieth century, but who did not attend or teach at TBS during the interwar period. The thoroughness of MCS records (including ones for TBS) improves dramatically after 1950. The change coincides with the final relocation of all schools to Quantico, Virginia, and the establishment of the History and Museums Branch as a permanent fixture at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC). The lack of a fixed location helps explain the extreme paucity of records for the years 1891-1924 when the school frequently was closed and moved.

Second, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in Washington, DC, maintains a small collection of papers relevant to the officer of the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC). For the interwar period, records at NARA are confined to the Series 127 record group with correspondence between the CMC and his staff, the CMC and outside parties, and some staff correspondence with outside parties. The items relevant to TBS included copies of TBS commanders’ reports to the CMC, intra-staff discussions at Headquarters Marine Corps about the program of instruction at TBS, and a limited number of daily schedules from TBS for the 1924-1926 time period. A search of the Marine Corps collection at NARA under subject headings for “education,” “training,” facilities - Philadelphia,” and “schools” did not result in additional items relevant to TBS. Pressures of limited space explain the small size of the Marine Corps collection at NARA.17

Third, the archives collection of the Donovan Research Library at Fort Benning, Georgia, provided insight into the education received by TBS instructors who attended the Infantry School

17. Anecdotally, when asking NARA archivists about Marine Corps records, the invariable first response was, “Have you looked at Quantico?” The Quantico archivists always ask, “What did you find at NARA?”
at Benning between 1920-1935. The Donovan Library maintains indices for curriculum taught at the Infantry School, as well as a card catalog of student papers, beginning in 1930. The indices were analyzed for similarities to the program of instruction at TBS, since Marine officers who served at League Island as instructors (and wrote the teaching notes and exams for their courses) brought educational concepts with them from the Army school. The card catalog yielded no records for any of the 83 instructors covered by this study, meaning they did not write a capstone or “thesis” research paper while at the Infantry School. That proved the officers (mostly First Lieutenants and Captains) were enrolled in the Company Officers Course. Unfortunately, it also meant that no individual-specific records were available. The Army did not maintain any comprehensive record sets, such as lists of students organized by class year, and none of their existing collections at Fort Benning are digitized. Significant research potential exists at Fort Benning, where little to no work has been done to analyze the junior officer education courses or to survey the demographic makeup of the schools’ students and staff prior to World War II.

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**Literature Review: The Marines’ Compromise between Land and Sea**

Before the American Civil War, Marine Corps history was so closely tied to that of the Navy that a unified maritime history tradition was sufficient for both institutions. Then, beginning in 1875, every generation of Marines has produced their own single-volume “History” of the Marine Corps, distinguishing the Corps’ identity from that of the Navy. Accompanying most of these are specialized monographs which consider more narrowly the conduct, composition, missions, and personalities. In general, these works were written by active duty, or former, Marines and were not of a strictly scholarly nature prior to World War II. After 1945, professional historians, who also usually happened to have served in the Marine Corps, wrote the histories. These latter works contain the bibliographical references and citations expected from a scholarly effort. The former do not.

However, the “unsubstantiated” works of the nineteenth and early twentieth century are still useful. They contain personal accounts, and often refer to at least a body of sources (if not a
specific chapter and verse) which give the researcher an idea of their methodology. These books help establish the array of primary sources which have been available to scholars of Marine Corps history since 1775. They also establish a tradition of “laudatory” books on the Marine Corps. The early histories set out to demonstrate what made the Marine Corps interesting and exciting. Gradually, more scholarly historical work was done by chroniclers, while the unequivocally flag-waving works continued as a separate genre. Marines today continue to write elegies and valedictions, with varying degrees of scholarly discipline. These works, such as Lieutenant General Victor “Brute” Krulak’s modern *First to Fight*, were written for the express purpose of elevating *esprit de corps* and relating the legends, customs, and traditions of the institution: while they are historical in nature, they lack consistent rigor of scholarship. They are not considered in this literature review or in this paper, except where any relevant legends related by them can be reconsidered, corrected, or occasionally confirmed by the historical record.

The grand, single-volume histories are expository in nature. They typically follow the highlights of Marine Corps history, which means describing battles and memorializing participants. There are few controversies, and the major points of transition (i.e. amphibious warfare doctrine development in the 1930s) are glossed over in order to return to battle chronologies as quickly as possible. None of these works appear to take a philosophical position about how or why the Marine Corps *should* have developed a certain way. Facts are presented simply and the genre tends to lack commentary or analysis. There are few identifiable “themes” present in the single-volume histories. There are errors of fact, which unfortunately tend to be repeated in successive single-volume histories, each of which uses the previous work as a source. Insofar as any internal history or scholarship about the Marine Corps exists, the bulk of it is found in these types of books.

In order to find analytical work relevant to the Marine Corps, one must expand the literature to include studies done on peer institutions. Many of these works are comparative studies and sometimes mention the Marine Corps in passing. It is entirely reasonable to expect comparisons to arise between the United States Marine Corps and its sister service, the United
States Navy, as well as with the United States Army. The Marine Corps, which did not belong wholly in either world, “cherry-picked” the portions of each larger service’s doctrine to meet their needs. Primary sources, such as the Commandant of the Marine Corps’ *Annual Report* and the curriculum of the schools themselves, suggest that the Marines observed and imitated the Army and Navy closely. However, since much of the development of Marine Corps education was on an ad hoc basis, a very small amount of archival material is left as evidence. If we infer that ideology was also being imitated as well as practical application, then the letters, memoirs, orders, articles, personal papers, and published works of the men who founded and ran the Army and Navy institutions become highly relevant to this study. Those writings by Army and Navy officers form the bulk of the primary sources on professional military education: those are the sources made use of in the few analytic works available on the subject of PME in the United States prior to World War II. This is the relevant literature for review.

Published in 1977, Dr. Ronald Spector’s monograph *Professors of War* on the U.S. Naval War College describes an “evolutionary” institution’s “beleaguered” founding. Dr. Spector spends no time on the United States Marine Corps nor on basic-level instruction in the Navy (confined solely at the time to the U.S. Naval Academy). Moreover, his study begins and ends in the late 1800s, more than two decades before the interwar period at TBS which is the subject of this paper. The tangential relationship of his work to our topic revolves around the central philosophical ideas behind the education of military officers, for any reason and at any level of experience. In addition, Spector provides letters and papers from the War College founders which describe funding problems. Similar problems were experienced by the Marine Corps when they founded their schools. Finally, Spector’s work considers an institution, the Naval War College (NWC), which was familiar to all Marines and which helped shaped the educational background of several senior USMC commanders who influenced the Basic School.

Dr. Spector begins by describing the development of American society and professional educational thought between the Civil War and the year 1900. Harvard established a business school during that era, and the American College of Medicine was established. The
military attempted to do the same. In particular the Navy wanted a “War College” which could train officers in operational and strategic thinking. The increasing technical complexity of maritime equipment (from individual guns all the way up to ships) and the resulting larger personnel structures created new roles for officers. The pioneers of the War College, especially Admiral Stephen B. Luce, felt that “on the job training” was no longer sufficient, and they pressed for an academic institution purpose-built to supply much needed knowledge. Dr. Spector quotes at length from the papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Luce, Emory Upton, Stephen B. Chandler, John G. Walker, and even William T. Sherman. These names read as a “who’s who” of American innovators in military education at the end of the nineteenth century. Their letters, along with the extensive collection of articles written by Luce in the USNI’s Proceedings journal, are the primary source of material for Dr. Spector. They show what the founders of the schools were thinking, what they intended to accomplish, and what difficulties they saw going forward. Proceedings became a lyceum at which the officers of the Navy could come together, at least intellectually, and work through the existential questions of the day.

One key misconception about the War College was that it would function as a “second Naval Academy.” It was common, says Spector, for both friends and foes alike to view the War College as a type of post-graduate school which merely continued the work begun by the Naval Academy at Annapolis. Instead, Luce and the other founders wanted the War College to be seen as a school of philosophy, strategy, and creativity: the students would not merely memorize history, but build new lessons by studying its patterns. By 1893, the means of exercising creativity was well-established and took the form of “war gaming.”

“applicatory” type of active analysis and engagement with problems would be directly imitated by the Marine Corps Schools (MCS). Spector credits the idea to German military education methods, which came into vogue in the United States during this general time period. He does not examine the effectiveness of those methods over time. The second half of Spector’s book deals with the role the NWC played as a planning cell and is not relevant to this study.

Alongside Spector’s well-known book, a new work by historian Scott Mobley fills in more of the Navy’s professional education history. *Progressives in Navy Blue* outlines the sweep of modernization which characterized the late 1800s, but goes deeper than Spector in analyzing the cultural changes within the Navy which were occasioned by the end of the age of sail. In particular, Mobley challenges the notion that the Navy was slow to react to the professionalism movement: he provides evidence that the United States Navy was in fact almost 20 years ahead of peer institutions. The creation of the U.S. Naval Institute, the founding of the War College, and the integration of engineer and line officer communities were all pioneering moves on the part of the Navy. According to Ronald Spector, the Navy saw the purpose of professional military education in terms of the conflict between the armed forces and the civilian government: “to insure for the officer a place in the public esteem and a voice in the conduct of national affairs by demonstrating that his profession was necessary, and indeed, vital to the general welfare.” Mobley puts that purpose in context, showing how the Navy’s effort to adapt to the modern world provided it with both an administrative structure as well as a strategic vision.

The Army, on the other hand, felt that their seat at the strategic table was always guaranteed, so few efforts to justify their existence were needed in the late nineteenth century. In the practical realm, the Army also had no need to adapt to radical equipment or organizational changes in the late nineteenth century; land warfare’s technological revolution had occurred

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22. Nenninger makes this point as well in reference to Army schools; that the broad concept of “mental field exercises” and applicatory learning came from Germany.

some generations before. So the Army schools aimed to “rationalize military administration, develop a regular officer selection process, and cultivate an intellectual, scientific approach to solving military problems.”

Published in 1978, Dr. Timothy Nenninger’s *The Leavenworth Schools* remains a key source on the founding phase of professional military education in the United States Army. Drawing on the records of the National Archives, Nenninger creates a systematic understanding of how the post-Civil War Army transitioned into the twentieth century. Memoirs, published and unpublished, help fill out the details of the lives and motivations of the men who made that transition a reality. Every military service has its professional journal, and the Army’s *Cavalry Journal*, *Infantry Journal*, and *Journal of the Military Service Institution* all three printed various discussions on topics relevant to military service. Nenninger makes use of these journals as well. The service journals are especially helpful since they preserve a chronological record of ideas, responses, adjustments, and implementations. For more general background, Nenninger cites a number of well-known biographies of general officers of the Army (e.g. Forrest Pogues’ *Education of a General* on the early career of George C. Marshall), single-volume histories of the Army (e.g. Russell Weigley’s *History of the United States Army*), and thematic works on civil-military affairs (e.g. Samuel Huntingdon’s *The Soldier and the State*) to establish context for the Leavenworth experiment.

Also on the subject of Army schools, T.R. Brereton’s *Educating the Army: Arthur L. Wagner and Reform, 1875-1905* (2000) examines the progress of education in the Army through the biography of one of its chief reformers. Born in 1853, Arthur Wagner was the son of a Civil War veteran and a graduate of West Point. His highly intellectual approach to military science made him unpopular among some of the career officers of his day, but eventually found


support among the influential soldiers who founded and presided over the Leavenworth schools in their early years. Wagner served as an instructor at the Infantry and Cavalry School beginning in 1886 and composed materials ranging from exams and lectures to full-length textbooks. His reach was long: the *Organization and Tactics* manual used at TBS in the 1920s was authored by Wagner. Brereton’s biographical study makes use of Army records, collections at the National Archives, unit records from Wagner’s years as a line officer, and personal journals and diaries. He chronicles the difficulty posed by “old school” veterans like Nelson Miles, who believed that leadership was a mysterious, mythical talent which only manifested on the battlefield and which could not be taught or even cultivated. He includes a clear and detailed outline of the context of the Army’s Leavenworth courses and a record of changes over time. This work provides detail which complements Nenninger’s *Leavenworth Schools* and provides much-needed evidence of Army officers’ reflections on the value of education.

The Marines began their professional military education system more in line with that of the Army than the Navy, as the adoption of “promotion by examination” in 1889 created a need for standardized officer instruction. The founding of the Basic School in 1891 was the first step. Organizational reforms ensued, but they were largely confined to administrative and practical measures to increase the efficiency of the Marine Corps in general. By the 1920s, the Marines had passed through phases of focus on administrative efficiency, standardization of technical knowledge, “operational” or even “strategic” mission, and back to standardization of technical knowledge. The interwar era has always been considered a period of “mission development” for the Marine Corps as a whole, due to the advent of amphibious warfare doctrine and any accompanying operational and tactical procedures. A variety of historical and technical studies have already examined the amphibious warfare doctrine development. Because that doctrine was developed within the context of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, the Company Officers’ and Field Officers’ courses received excellent attention as well.

*Curriculum Evolution of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College 1920-1988* was written by Lieutenant Colonel Donald Bittner in 1988. LtCol Bittner had at that time been
serving as the military historian on staff at the College for 13 years. LtCol Bittner’s (also Doctor Bittner, PhD) project was produced by the Marine Corps in response to an investigation by a Congressional subcommittee “on the historical content of the senior service schools’ curricula.”

Dr. Donald Bittner, graduate of the University of Missouri, was breaking new ground when he produced his monograph in 1988. He explicitly stated: “no real history of the professional military education system of the Marine Corps has been written.”26 He also helpfully explains why such a history was lacking: the divorced relationship between the Marine Corps Schools (most of which have changed locations multiple times since their founding) and the military installation(s) they call home resulted in local histories leaving out the Schools’ full lineage, or else in the Schools’ histories being fragmented by multiple relocations. In attempting to create such a history from nothing, Dr. Bittner utilized the Quantico Sentry (local military base newspaper), the Marine Corps Gazette (professional journal of the Marine Corps), and any archived materials from past academic years. He found the archive collections from the 1920s and 1930s were the most complete.27

One of Bittner’s key sources is the self-styled “Professional Journal of the Marine Corps,” the Marine Corps Gazette. Similar to Proceedings, the Gazette has functioned as a forum for professional discussion since its inception in 1916. In its earliest days, the Gazette was a more informal publication, with news items (both factual and “scuttlebutt”) and essays sharing print space. Some issues of the Gazette reprinted speeches and portions of monographs on a given topic.28 It was a smaller, more narrowly focused cousin, but still certainly a close relative of the more familiar Infantry Journal or Proceedings. Its official publisher was the Marine


28. Eventually, Leatherneck magazine was established and the less-academic content gradually migrated to Leatherneck. Today, the Gazette is still largely a professional opinion journal, where Leatherneck is an informal magazine targeting enlisted Marines.
Corps Institute, and those who read or contributed to the *Gazette* were also usually those who were active in developing the Marine Corps organization. Especially in the early twentieth century, the staff and students at the Marine Corps Schools were heavily represented among the authors featured in the *Gazette*.

Early staff, commandants, and “boosters” of the Field Officers’ Course were enthusiastic about its founding. This course was to be a stepping stone to the Naval War College, which these sea soldiers considered their pedagogical homeland in the world of military philosophy.\(^{29}\) In order to maintain discussion about the role of the Marine Corps Schools, faculty and staff submitted articles to the *Marine Corps Gazette*. Essays and commentary served to keep the active Marines interested in debate over what should be taught, to whom, at what level of seniority. Most important of all, the proponents of military education at all levels continuously explained how classroom education was relevant for men who fight wars.\(^{30}\) The *Gazette* is a major source for all books on the Marine Corps which have been published since 1916, but for those who study professional military education in the Marine Corps, occasionally it is the sole source.

Dr. Bittner’s study outlines internal discussions at the Field Officers’ Course as to which subjects should be taught and the best way to teach them. That is helpful here since it can be presumed that similar debates went on at the Company Officers’ Course and at TBS.\(^{31}\) The next portion of Dr. Bittner’s study is taken up by an essential question for the interwar Marine Corps: “Where was the Institution Heading?” The answer to the question is “amphibious


\(^{31}\) Bittner does not cite them in his study, but letters and speeches from the Marines in command at the various schools confirm this supposition. See Dyer, “Military Schooling in the Marine Corps,” *Marine Corps Gazette* 7;1 (March 1922); Anon. “Marine Corps War Planning Course,” *Marine Corps Gazette* 14;1 (April 1929); Breckinridge, “Some Thoughts on Service Schools,” *Marine Corps Gazette* 14;4 (December 1929); Breckinridge, “Why Quantico?” *The Leatherneck Magazine* 14;5 (May 1931); Williams, “The Education of a Marine Officer,” *Marine Corps Gazette* 18;1 (May 1933).
warfare” but more than a decade of debate, development, refinement, progress, failure, and contention would have to pass before that became clear. During the interwar period, both the Field Officers’ Course and Company Officers’ Course became heavily involved, not just in academic discussion of the future role of the Marine Corps, but in developing the doctrine itself. Bittner says the result of this process was a set of Marine Corps Schools which departed sharply from their old Army-inspired focus. Greater flexibility was one trait especially desired in the new, improved courses.32

This study relies on Dr. Bittner’s scholarship for insight into the conduct of the Marine Corps Schools organization as a whole. The director of the Basic School reported to the Marine Corps Schools (MCS) during the interwar period, with the MCS staff located in Quantico, Virginia, and TBS slightly distant in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. However, Bittner’s study does not describe or explain the content of the Marines’ basic level course. In contrast to the doctrine-developing schools in Quantico, TBS was focused on proficiency and consistency in already-established tactical skills. This study will show that the fundamental mission of the Marine Corps did not change between 1900 and 1945; moreover, the basic skills taught to lieutenants were the same no matter whether the Marines were deploying in the Caribbean as an Advanced Base Force or in division-sized elements across the South Pacific.

Thus, the final relevant literature is concerned with “lower level” military education. Studies of near-peer institutions shed much more light on the conduct of the Basic School than do studies of career, staff, and command level schools. In particular, the U.S. Army’s Infantry School had critically important influence on the interwar Basic School, as many of the interwar Marine officer instructors at TBS went to the Infantry School first. Jorg Muth’s Command Culture (2011) compares and contrasts the officer education systems of the United States Army and German Army. The most important new material Muth covers is not in his general

discussion of German-American interaction. That has previously been written about by other scholars. In terms of unique contribution, Muth takes the time to examine the conduct of the Infantry School at Fort Benning. This key element in the Army education system has been wholly overlooked by other scholars and Command Culture is the only published book to place it in the larger context of American professional military education. Since interwar era Marine officers who intended to become instructors were required to attend the School of Infantry, this portion of Muth’s study is particularly relevant.

Muth boldly asserts that the Infantry School was “more important…than any other institution” for American officers. It was the place young Army lieutenants were sent to get hands-on instruction on the weapons and tactics of infantry units from the company to regimental level. Fort Benning’s Infantry School suffered from many of the problems Muth identifies elsewhere in the Army (excessive paperwork, “canned” exercises, memorization and recitation, etc.) but during the time period he writes about, it also experienced a “renaissance” at the hands of George C. Marshall. The Marines who went to Benning all attended during or immediately after the years of Marshall’s command. Continued use of Army materials at TBS up until 1941 points to the ongoing influence these schools had on the Marines’ educational institutions. The ongoing use of Army schools, and for an even longer period of time the use of Army publications, was the primary link between the Marine Corps PME system and European (especially German) ideas about military education.

In conclusion, the literature considered here provides context for the interwar Basic School, but the conclusions reached by previous scholars do not touch on the specific topic of this study. When I proposed this study of the Basic School, I expected to find archival evidence that would show TBS following along with the patterns of the Army and Navy schools which changed dramatically in response to the larger, faster, more complex conflicts of the early

twentieth century. It was reasonable to expect that the preponderance of the literature on the turn-of-the-century Marine Corps was correct, and that the institution was locked in a struggle for survival which stemmed from a complete lack of direction. Instead, it will be shown that while the Marines did imitate the technical content of peer Army schools, and while the Marines did imbue their schools with a cultural element which echoed that of the Navy, their institutional approach to education was truly unique. The Marines were not engaged in a desperate search for meaning at the corporate level, but they were working out how to update their traditional mission. They did not reinvent themselves, but instead continued to convey foundational, fundamental, elementary skills to their most junior officers in a manner ideologically unchanged since the 1890s. A soldier of the sea, the Marine Lieutenant departing the Basic School was a judge, a rifleman, a jungle warrior, a diplomat, a logistician, and a drillmaster. That picture, despite significant changes in the world around them, was not fundamentally different when Lieutenants departed that same school in 1940.
Chapter 1 - Professional Military Education in Context

Military Education: History and Context

In October, 1929, Lieutenant Colonel Elias R. Beadle submitted a report to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, detailing the routine inspection he had just completed at the Basic School. Beadle, a career Marine with 30 years’ service, was serving in the Adjutant and Inspector General’s Office at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC). Like most Marines of his day, Beadle’s career had taken him to a variety of foreign duty stations; while stateside, he had commanded the recruit depot at Parris Island.

After completing his inspection of TBS, Beadle wrote to the Commandant of the Marine Corps with his findings as to the class schedule, fitness of the instructors, and competence of the students. In addition, he commented:

A serious consideration of the mission of the Basic School bring us to the conclusion that it is a work of the utmost importance. The old adage, “As a twig is bent so the tree is inclined” is most apt. Habits are made here which will probably be carried throughout the lives of the individuals under instruction. Here is our opportunity to lay a foundation for officers of true Marine Corps caliber, and it is incumbent upon us to leave nothing undone to give them every opportunity and every advantage to get from this service in the school the very utmost.1

Beadle’s high regard for TBS in 1929 helped establish its importance within the Marine Corps organization. At the same time Beadle made his report, other highly-placed Marines were writing about the role of the Basic School. Perhaps most significantly, Brigadier General James Breckinridge, commander of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, sent lectures and essays to his friend Lieutenant Colonel Julian C. Smith, then commanding officer of the Basic School, with the intent that “they may serve to stimulate discussion in the Basic School.” For Breckinridge and other pioneers of professional military education, TBS was not mindless technical training, but rather the place where “difference of opinion that will reason rather than

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Professional Military Education: Definitions

The phrase “professional military education” can be found in the Encyclopedia Britannica as early as 1889, and appears in niche educational journals in the United States in the late 1860s. In these early instances, the grouping of the word “professional” with “military” and “education” was more accidental than a deliberate term of art. “Military education,” in one essay written by the President Asa D. Smith of Dartmouth College in 1868, was a descriptor for whatever courses of study had military subject matter and were taught in a school. When Smith added “professional” to the definition, it was merely to distinguish general knowledge of military subjects from the particular study of those military subjects by persons who had embarked on a military career.2

This circular definition was over time replaced with a technical one, which in the American military today varies slightly from service branch to branch. This definition, from the 1990s, is a good representative of current definitions of PME:

...[E]ducation that provides individuals with the skills, knowledge, and understanding that enable them to make sound decisions in progressively more demanding command and staff positions within the national security environment. It addresses the military, political, economic, social, and psychological dimensions of national security with varying degrees of emphasis. These include planning and conducting war, organization of the services, joint and combined operations, force employment and deployment concepts, and military leadership.3

Between this elaborate paragraph and the 1868 tautology came a century of debate, discussion, development, and refinement of the term “professional military education.” In his mid-twentieth century work on “Civil-Military” affairs, Samuel Huntingdon wrote: “the peculiar skill of the

2. Asa D. Smith, “New Scheme of National Military Education,” The Dartmouth 2, no. 2 (February 1868): 68. Smith was a Protestant minister and himself a graduate of Dartmouth College. A known abolitionist, he was named president of the college during the American Civil War. His legacy there was to expand the number of departments to include agriculture, mechanic arts, and engineering. Dartmouth doubled in size while Smith was president. Today he would probably be considered a sociologist.

officer is the management of violence not the act of violence itself.”

Huntington was writing on the role of military officers from a political or strategic perspective; he took it for granted that every officer, no matter his rank or responsibility, must be something more than a mere technician. He went on to explain that, merely because one generation of soldiers established a successful formula for waging war, does not mean that the next generation has nothing to contribute. Like all professions, that of the military officer develops over time and must adapt to changing circumstances.

American military organizations did not develop in sync with their older European counterparts, and for that reason a discussion of PME in the context of the United States has multiple distinct parts. First, the European development of military education as a concept must be understood. The United States Army closely imitated many European education systems. It was also European technology that Americans adopted or copied. European wars drew the attention of the American military leadership. Second, a discussion of professionalization in American thought must take place. The push for practitioners of certain crafts, trades, and vocations to create standards of performance (and schools to teach those standards) originated outside of and reached far beyond the military. Third, the impact of technology on military organizations must be considered. The United States Navy (USN) underwent a seismic technological shift at nearly the same time professionalism and military education began to merge. Thus, their journey toward establishing a PME system was much more complex, and dramatic, than was that of the U.S. Army. Between the Army’s deliberate path and the Navy’s dramatic revolution, the Marine Corps developed their own sort of compromise, educating their officers and men where the shore met the sea.

For centuries, the conduct of armies and navies stood or fell on the strength of the man in charge. Genius and authority combined to make a general successful, or incompetence and authority combined to make him a failure. During the dynastic era and before, the identity of an army was bound up entirely with that of the monarch. Apathy and amateurism during peacetime operated as a kind of safety mechanism, meant to ensure that no upstart general was inclined or equipped to challenge the military authority of the king. The coming of national armies in the 1790s changed that security to a liability. The shift in identity prompted an explosion of military education and academies to furnish it, because a central national authority was now available to shape and promulgate military ideals: ideals that needed to be shaped and improved over generations, not jealously guarded by hegemonic monarchs.\(^5\) Put another way, the newfound freedom for a nation to create an identity \textit{in bello} carried with it an imperative that some guiding force present itself and channel that identity into something that would be constructive and beneficial to the nation. Unbounded military enthusiasm was a recipe for barbarism, not progress. In the Age of Enlightenment, it was natural that education be identified as the means to military success.

However, it would be inaccurate to say that the period of “national warfare” was the beginning of all military education in the west. The centuries-old apprenticeship programs which turned the page into a squire and the squire into a knight were certainly education. This one-on-one method was costly, time consuming, and largely social: it produced effective feudal knights but was not suitable for creating professional soldiers on a large scale. At the opposite end of the spectrum, technical schools for military practitioners also existed for centuries prior to the advent of national armies. Those schools educated many, but did not provide them with more than the basic means of employing battlefield technology. National armies and the wars they brought about far outmatched both the feudal leadership system and the technical schools which operated

in parallel. Students were suddenly in need of a more intellectual and comprehensive education in the art of war, and the development of institutions to meet that need was one of the single greatest accomplishments of the great powers during the nineteenth century.

What did these schools teach? In essence, the PME schools codified a new way of commanding in battle. Beginning during the Napoleonic wars, large armies with complex technical and logistic demands became the norm across Europe. A staff and corps system allowed Napoleon to effectively command and control a field army of over 200,000 for the first time in history. Without some kind of mechanism to teach his generals to all think alike, Napoleon would have been unable to wield the massive weapon that was the French national army. It is evident from his preserved correspondence that Napoleon did not keep his methods of war a secret from his subordinates. The individual Marshal was not treated as an automaton, ordered to march his army from one point to another without getting a glimpse of the master plan. Rather, the entire concept of operations was revealed from supreme commander to army commanders.6

A particularly clear example of Napoleon’s rudimentary strategic education of his generals is found in the Franco-Austrian War of 1809. In January 1809, Napoleon sent a series of “notes” to Eugene; these were operational plans of campaign for the Army of Italy in the event of war with Austria. Eugene’s general approach to war and the conduct of his army illustrates a “broad understanding of Napoleonic methods and practices.” Napoleon’s manœuvre sur les derrières, masse primaire, masse de manœuvre and masse de rupture were employed by Eugene just as Bonaparte himself would have done. The divisions of the Army of Italy into a left, center, right and reserve mirrors Napoleonic organization of his own army. Epstein observed that Eugene was no Napoleon, but

...these similarities show that there was commonality in approach to organization, operations and tactics. This commonality cannot guarantee victory, but it does provide the basis that makes victory possible.7

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It was precisely that commonality which gave the French an edge over their enemies for nearly two decades. France’s contribution to the battlefield was a completely new relationship of commander to army--one in which the contested field was so large that no single man could manage it. Instead, great generals had to convey their strategy to intellectual men who could bring it to life using column and line. There is no doubt that Napoleon’s crushing victory over the old-style Prussian army at Jena (and Auerstadt) provided the catalyst for major changes in European armies. Military reformers among the vanquished helped to bring about innovations that turned European armies into national forces, with the stellar accomplishments of Prussia being the brightest example. Nenninger calls these catalysts “national military calamities,” events which led to the establishment of all three of the first European staff schools.

The Prussian military establishment was the first to create a real “war academy,” in which subjects like strategy and military theory were studied. Although military academies existed before this, their programs of study were almost exclusively technical and/or historical. Everything that was new about the Napoleonic battlefield demanded a more nuanced education for officers, and demanded an especially homogenous concept of strategy among the army’s leaders. Beginning in 1770, “regimental” schools were established by some forward-thinking commanding officers. Mathematics, tactics, engineering sciences, field sketching, gunnery, fortifications, history, and geography were featured in the curriculum. These schools were for already-commissioned men, but more closely served the equivalent function of a modern “undergraduate” or pre-commissioning military academy. In 1772, a young man named Gerhard Scharnhorst entered the military academy of Count Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst zu


Schaumburg-Lippe-Buckeburg. Count Wilhelm was a significant thinker and educator, and his private academy filled an otherwise very broad gap in available military learning in Hanover. It supplemented the technical education of “regimental” schools with philosophical and strategic courses.\textsuperscript{11} Count Wilhem taught his pupils that the profession of arms demanded a continuous process of development that could not be mastered by simply learning existing techniques.

In 1801 the primitive level of education in the officer corps was the most serious shortcoming of the Prussian army. The lack of professional study had caused the army to become hopelessly anachronistic in its tactical and operational concepts. Combat experience in France and Poland had especially demonstrated the poor quality of Prussian military leadership. Without further education, Scharnhorst believed that officers would be of very little use during war.\textsuperscript{12} In 1801 Scharnhorst took charge of the small and moribund Berlin Institute in the Military Sciences for Young Infantry and Cavalry Officers. Under his leadership the Institute became the Prussian army’s central institution for professional education. The new course of instruction would extend over three consecutive winters and would emphasize both theoretical and practical knowledge that would benefit the officer in his profession. No longer did “mental drill” comprise the entire education:

Scharnhorst identified three key elements in the program: training, education, and leadership...Skillful synthesis of training and education would develop leadership and promote realism and intellectual independence, avoiding the tendency of most earlier military schools of solely conveying facts and drilling officers in a particular theory of war.\textsuperscript{13}

The Berlin Institute provided a “real” experience of higher education. Reading, writing and discussion at an advanced level were part of the daily routine. Any junior officer of good character, having “studied the basic elements of mathematics and military knowledge, and

\textsuperscript{11} White, \textit{The Enlightened Soldier}, 3.
\textsuperscript{12} White, \textit{The Enlightened Soldier}, 31.
\textsuperscript{13} White, \textit{The Enlightened Soldier}, 90–91.
seeking to educate himself further in the higher and applied components of the same,” could apply for admission to the Institute. 

To strengthen the commander’s control in battle, Scharnhorst advocated the development of a general staff corps of considerable talent and ability. Only intelligent, well-educated, and trained staff officers could bring “flexibility to size, agility to might.” Flexibility and agility were applied as descriptors not just to military organizations themselves, but to the minds of those officers who wielded armies in operational and strategic contexts. In the strict context of schools curriculum, “German” military thinkers of the eighteenth century used applicatory methods to create that mental agility. Active problem solving was the key elements of those educational methods. Scharnhorst’s ideas were imported to the US a century after he began to advocate for them, and the salient features of his educational ideology survived the transition: map problems, terrain studies, and live field exercises.

Developing curriculum was an ongoing process and continued well after the departure of the Kriegsakademie’s brilliant founder. Questions about how much general education was necessary, issues with how to train instructors, and difficulty obtaining troops for use in training were perennial problems. Sometimes mistakes were made. For example, graduates of the Prussian school were often criticized as “competent operations officers who sometimes had a far too narrow focus and far too limited concept of the conduct of war.” The British Staff College at Camberley suffered for many years from an over-reliance on an “unsophisticated lecture and recitation course” which created knowledgeable officers who lacked the ability to make firm decisions. Both schools grew, changed and improved over time. These activities were

16. All of these are present throughout the curriculum of the War Colleges, Staff Colleges, and the Infantry School at Fort Benning. At TBS there were no troops available for live training, but map problems and terrain exercises were a consistent part of the curriculum from the earliest years.
observed by the United States Army and Navy throughout the nineteenth century, but the observations would not be converted into courses of action until after 1865.

**United States Military: Approach to PME**

On the western side of the Atlantic, American military theorists failed to make any significant headway with regard to grand strategy, military ideology, or professional education until the American Civil War was behind them. Though two service academies existed, little else in terms of education, staff development, or even professional performance standards was put in place. When journals and school began to appear, however, they gave credit to the long process of military professionalization that had been taking place in Europe. The Army officers who helped establish the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth explicitly pointed to German models for “justification of advanced military education, for methods of instruction, and for books to use in the curriculum.”

By following the well-trod path of the European armies, the Americans were able to avoid some mistakes.

However, military schools in the United States still developed relatively haphazardly. The Army and Navy each started with a military academy, but during the great age of professionalization the Navy skipped all the “next” intermediary steps and created a senior-level War College. The Army eventually settled on the Command and General Staff School as their principal vehicle for education of officers. Later, intermediate institutions were established which filled in the gaps in both the Army and Navy systems. At all times, the American military and political corporate cultures pushed back against educational development for a variety of


19. Nenninger, *The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881–1918*, 13  Before the “German” model achieved dominance, the “French model” was the most popular source of inspiration for doctrine and tactics. Henri de Jomini, for example, was widely translated and ready by American officers throughout the nineteenth century. The Austro-Franco-Prussian War’s outcome put an end to the dominance of French thought.
reasons. Some reasons, such as fears in the Navy that ships’ captains would cease to be good sailors if they spent all their time in a classroom, had some fair basis in reality and were worked out carefully in professional journals and personal correspondence over a period of decades. Other pushback, such as petty political squabbles or unwillingness to alter departmental budgets, was less rational and has yet to be eradicated even today.

Only the Marine Corps started their system of professional development from the “bottom,” creating a Basic Course in 1891, long years before a Field Officer Course (1920) and Company Officer Course (1921) came into being. The stark difference between the Marine’s apparently orderly method and piecemeal efforts of the Army and Navy is explained by chronology: just as the Army observed the European process and evaded some pitfalls, so the Marines waited and observed, eventually imitating proven systems which had been painfully evolved by the efforts of their counterparts in the larger services. Though much imitation was going on during this time period, it is important to note that only educational methodology was copied from the other institutes. German tactical doctrine, as Timothy Nenninger points out, was not adopted by the U.S. Army, and the Marines in turn did not create an exact copy of the Army’s tactics, techniques, or procedures.\textsuperscript{20} Put another way, methods of leading a classroom made their way from institution to institution, but the content of the courses did not automatically follow.

The flagship institutions for the establishment and development of American “professional military education” were the United States Army’s Command and Staff School in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the United States Navy’s Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Both were established at the close of the nineteenth century. The founding of the military schools was squarely in the middle of the broader national movement to give structure to professional education. Though many “medical schools” had existed in the United States since

\textsuperscript{20} Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881–1918, 15.
the late 1700s, in 1876 the American Association of Medical Colleges was formed in order to systematize the methods for instructing new doctors, especially to create a “minimum standard requirement” for medical schools, one which “must be attainable by the average medical school and meeting the requirements of the average medical student.”\textsuperscript{21} Towards the end of this same time period, Harvard formally gathered its extant courses and professors of business into a School of Business in 1910.

In particular, the Navy wanted a “War College” which could train officers in operational and strategic thinking. The founders of the War College, especially Admiral Stephen B. Luce, felt that “on the job training” was no longer sufficient, and they pressed for an academic institution purpose-built to supply much needed knowledge.\textsuperscript{22} War College proponents worked tirelessly to distinguish their institution from merely a post-graduate school which continued the work begun by the Naval Academy at Annapolis. Instead, Luce and the other founders wanted the War College to be seen as a school of philosophy, strategy and creativity: the students would not merely memorize history, but build new lessons by studying its patterns.\textsuperscript{23} This is yet another manifestation of applicatory learning methods which seeped into American PME programs via the German military schools.\textsuperscript{24}

On the plains of Kansas, a different group of visionaries attempted to define “professional military education” for officers of the United States Army. The United States Military Academy (USMA) had been sufficient for creating and maintaining a competent officer corps, up until the


\textsuperscript{24} French officers occasionally published articles or books advocating for active problem-solving in schools, but their efforts have not received much attention from scholars. This author’s French is too unsophisticated to analyze their contributions in much detail. See “Kriegspiel d’armée” in \textit{Journal des Sciences Militaires} (Paris, 1905) and Captain Paul Simon’s \textit{De L’Entrainement Intellectuel Necessaire A L’Officer} (1907).
American Civil War. The American Civil was a demographic fluke in terms of the Army’s size: 1862’s 350,000 man Army of the Potomac was twenty three times larger than the organization which had existed prior to the secession of South Carolina a year earlier. The million-man Grand Army of the Republic in 1865 was even more out of proportion to the peacetime force of the 1850s. The post-Civil War Army dwindled to fewer than 10,000 men in the late 1860s, and only slowly balanced by Congressional action. By 1877 there were about 24,000 troops in the Regular Army, most of whom were scattered in detachments across the “Indian Territory” of the midwest and Texas. Even after a postwar recalibration of size and disposition, the scattered Army of the 1870s was still a larger and more complex organization than its peacetime predecessor. By 1880, General William T. Sherman and Colonel Emory Upton could discern that something additional was needed to elevate the officers’ experience and education. Their efforts to create a “career” level course were significant, and the model that grew out of the first school at Fort Leavenworth is admirable. Upton was a visionary who foresaw the role that education could play in professionalizing the officer corps of the Army, shifting away from a crypto-aristocracy and creating a standards-based culture. Upton and Sherman were the thinkers “on deck” when the U.S. military finally grew large enough to need the staff, corps, and army-level structures that had been developing in Europe. Scholars identify three “permanent characteristics” which helped the American military emerge as a true professional entity: journals, professional associations and graduate schools. All three characteristics were in place for both the Army and the Navy by 1895.

The Army School for Infantry and Cavalry officers was founded by Sherman in 1882, but no action was taken to provide a set program of instruction and permanent regulations until 1887.

The result of the new regulation was, for the first time in history, an American Army school which taught practical field instruction in minor tactics--officers left the lecture hall and tested their abilities in the 1880s version of a “tactical decision game.” This was a direct copy of the German educational style, which emphasized active learning and applicatory problem solving. This system provided the Americans with a crop of much-improved officers, but they left the colleges to go to war with Spain. The war with Spain not only closed the Army schools but caused a suspension of all systematic theoretical instruction in the Army.\textsuperscript{28}

Army officers had been thinking and debating educational concepts for a number of years prior to the Spanish American War. Professional journals proliferated and advocates of institutional reform often included expansion of the schools as a key improvement.\textsuperscript{29} However, the war threatened to severely hinder or perhaps even halt plans for such reforms. With officers leaving school to join the operational forces, educators feared that the Army leadership would be unwilling to remove students from the Army in the field after hostilities subsided. Such fears were unfounded: immediately after the close of the Spanish American War, the single most significant effort of an administration to expand and standardize the PME system in the American armed forces began. Elihu Root, Secretary of War, decided to reopen the Infantry and Cavalry School and to greatly enlarge its influence. Where Upton had been a progressive theorist and enthusiastic promoter of modernization, Root was the man with the power to put reforms in place:

I cannot speak too highly of the work done in our service schools for a number of years before the war with Spain. It was intelligent, devoted and effective, and produced a high standard of individual excellence, which has been demonstrated by many officers in the active service of the past four years. There was, however, no general system of education. The number of officers who could avail themselves of the very limited accommodations afforded was small.\textsuperscript{30}

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In 1901 the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, was enlarged and developed into a General Service and Staff College. It became a school of instruction for all arms of the service, and by official order its design became a post graduate school rather than an institution for imparting knowledge of elementary nature. This marked a revolution in the whole plan and scheme of military education within the Army. The General Service and Staff College was opened in September 1902 and twenty-nine cavalry officers and sixty-five infantry officers formed the inaugural class.

Emory Upton’s far-reaching interpretive study, *The Military Policy of the United States*, written in the 1880s, was resurrected in 1902 and began to influence military thinking again.\(^{31}\) The Staff College had Upton in mind when they outlined their “military art” segment to include staff duties, tactics, military history, strategic and tactical cooperation of the Army and Navy, and care of troops.\(^{32}\) Root’s work as Secretary of War also resulted in the creation of the Joint Army Navy Board. His “think tank” board was the predecessor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and was made up of officers who had completed the education provided by the war or staff colleges, or both. For the better part of two decades, the Joint Army Navy Board coordinated the development of United States national strategy in conjunction with the Secretary of War and the president. By way of a vastly improved educational apparatus, the United States was entering the twentieth century with a new, functioning command system at the highest level.\(^{33}\)

For their part, naval thinkers were working hard to develop a professional education system. However, unlike the Army, the U.S. Navy was at the same time undergoing a pivotal restructuring which impacted their educational efforts. The Army officer of 1860 was the commander of an infantry unit. The Army officer of 1920 was both an infantry commander and a

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strategist. The Marine officer of 1860 was an infantry commander who arrived at the scene of battle via ship. In 1920, the Marine officer was still fundamentally the same. The Navy officer of 1860, however, was a fundamentally different kind of military professional than his descendent of 1920. The sailing Navy, built on an ancient apprenticeship system and a strategic mindset which began and ended on the vessel’s quarterdeck, was ontologically different from the steel Navy of the twentieth century. The “warrior-sailor” and the “warrior-engineer” were different and the growth of the Navy’s educational institutions was impacted by that transition in a way that the Army and Marine Corps schools were not.

**Professionalism and Professionalization: Navy Developments**

In his recent book *Progressives in Navy Blue*, naval officer and historian Scott Mobley provides a useful framework for defining and analyzing the concept of professionalism. Dictionaries, he writes, use isolable phrases like “specialized knowledge” and “formal qualification” to distinguish the professions from other types of vocations. However, those phrases are then developed by historians and sociologists who introduce additional concepts, such as authority, prestige, service and identity. From these more nuanced ideas, Mobley identifies seven “cardinal characteristics” that give meaning to the term “profession:”

1. Expertise: the application of specialized occupational knowledge and techniques, built upon a coherent body of theory.
2. Service-oriented mission: motivates the members of the occupation to meet the needs of a wide community and to place client benefit over personal benefit.
3. Well-defined standards.
5. Autonomy: the right to exercise control over itself as a community of professionals.
7. Singular identity.

This useful list is easily applicable to a military organization. The fourth characteristic, a “formal regime of education” is the most relevant to this study. To examine professionalism in the

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United States Navy in particular, the effort to create the Naval War College provides a concise case study.

Naval Professionalism: Social Context

During the nineteenth century, the United States experienced a steady and consistent population growth. A nation of ten million in 1820 was a nation of fifty million in 1880, and 106 million in 1920. At the same time, the centers of population shifted from rural to urban areas, with a fourfold increase in the number of city dwellers between 1830 and 1870. From 1790 through 1849 the U.S. Patent Office awarded nearly 17,000 patents to inventors; during the second half of the nineteenth century, patent officers issued more than 21,000 patents for inventions per year.

None of those social changes brought about any abrupt alteration to citizens’ daily life. Similarly, developments in naval technology and complexity proceeded at a brisk pace, but none of the innovations forced sudden or abrupt change. Instead, Navy leaders awoke one day to realize their dominant naval culture was no up to the task of using the new technology effectively. As a result, many in positions of leadership initially stood in opposition to much of the technological development that was taking place. Like many who are surprised by change, they refused to believe things could really be so different as to require a serious reexamination. However, the dominant naval culture of this same time period initially stood in opposition to much of the technological development that was taking place. “Quarterdeck culture”


emphasized “mariner and warrior proficiency” over academic subjects such as mathematics and history. Seamanship was still largely considered more art than science.\textsuperscript{38} The Navy did not change on its own, but instead outside forces made the status quo impossible to maintain.

First, events like the American Civil War helped change the viewpoints of some Navy leaders, particularly toward strategy and intelligence. The tactical and operational facts of naval warfare during the American Civil War led many officers to believe that the age of sail, if not drawing to an actual close, was at least being asked to share the stage with steam power and armor. Second, even the most intractable traditionalist had trouble denying how complex the industrial age had become, and by extension how much more complicated even “basic” education or training had to be. Third, decisions of the United States government forced the Navy to alter its structure and style to meet the demands of a crypto-imperialist foreign policy. A fourth factor technically came from within the Navy: the establishment of a professional journal, \textit{Proceedings}, created a semi-official place for naval officers to discuss professional issues and develop a \textit{corporate} identity. Before this, the individual ships’ commanders had operated largely in an ideological vacuum.\textsuperscript{39}

Relative to the Army, and even to civilian communities such as law and medicine, the Navy’s professional infrastructure matured early. Mobley asserts that a “full battery” of educational, associational and regulatory elements were in place within the Navy by the mid-1880s.\textsuperscript{40} In the spirit of the day, naval innovators embraced “Progressivism” and a confidence that science and technology were the means to improve not only their professional ability, but society in general.\textsuperscript{41} Similar developments in youth education, social welfare programs, and corporate structure surrounded the average American at the time. Between the American Civil

\textsuperscript{38} Mobley, \textit{Progressives in Navy Blue}, 24, 76.
\textsuperscript{39} Mobley, \textit{Progressives in Navy Blue}, 139.
\textsuperscript{40} Mobley, \textit{Progressives in Navy Blue}, 7.
\textsuperscript{41} Mobley, \textit{Progressives in Navy Blue}, 66.
War and World War II, the American industrial labor market underwent a kind of homogenization. Scientific management theory, Fordism, and increased production speed reduced formerly skilled jobs to unskilled or semi-skilled levels. Control of the labor process was wrested from those skilled workers (artisans). Methods of mass production and automation created an ever-growing supervisory corps of foremen and managers. In every context, there was a shift in society with which the military had to keep pace, or risk disaster.

Finally, to cap the “professionalization” of the American military, a key strategist emerged for both the Army and the Navy. In 1953, Richard Brown made an extended comparison of the Army and Navy’s respective godfathers of military theory and educational practice: Alfred T. Mahan and Emory Upton. Brown’s study primarily focused on giving Upton the same philosophical adulation in land warfare circles that Mahan enjoyed in the maritime world. At the time, students of those men were still living, and students of the students were in powerful leadership positions within the United States military. Two World Wars had tested each thinker in a variety of ways, and confidence in the Mahanian/Uptonian systems was strong. Shared aspects of methodology, such as the use of a “historical approach,” tied the two together. Their approaches to the philosophy of military theory created complimentarity: Mahan spoke of what great things could be accomplished with a strong Navy, while Upton warned of the dire consequences which followed from having a weak Army.

Theorists and practitioners of military science struggled with the proper balance to strike: when to educate, for how long, in what manner, focusing on what subjects. Moving in to the twentieth century, an increasingly complex global community created an additional education need, for officers to learn concepts of

international law, trade, and cooperative agreements regarding the use of force.\textsuperscript{44} For analysts like Mobley, it was the project of naval professionalization itself which gave rise to the new strategic consciousness of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{45}

In the Marine Corps, only one school was in operation at this pivotal time, the “School of Application” (later the Basic School) which opened its doors in 1891. The name of the school itself points to a perceived connection between German PME concepts, such as active problem solving, and the Marine Corps plan for officer education. From the beginning, map problems or “hands on” training were part of the curriculum as far as was possible with limited staff and resources. Its focus on entry-level military concepts shielded it from the ongoing, sometimes esoteric, discussions which populated the pages of \textit{Proceedings} and the \textit{Infantry Journal}. Instead, the Marines used their school primarily to prepare officers for commissioning examinations. A secondary effect, that of equalizing the knowledge base of new officers arriving from a variety of previous locations and occupations (Naval Academy midshipmen, enlisted Marines, graduates of private military colleges), could not have been lost on Headquarters Marine Corps. In fact, the leveling effect of requiring all new officers to attend the School of Application later became a source of cohesion and camaraderie.

The School of Application (SOA) remained true to its basic mission of providing basic education to new officers, but it struggled to achieve the continuity already enjoyed by the Naval War College and the Command and General Staff School. The much smaller Marine Corps could not keep their school staffed: wars, constabulary missions and even fleet maneuvers frequently shuttered the institution in the years before World War I. It was not until the period between the World Wars that the Marines managed to keep the school open on a regular basis.

\textsuperscript{45} Mobley, \textit{Progressives in Navy Blue}, 89.
The Gilded Age theorists had several chances to test a variety of concepts in combat between 1890 and 1910. Besides the “major” conflict of the Spanish-American War, there were several smaller engagements. After 1900, the work already begun became more sophisticated as the first generation of “professional students” matured and became the first generation of “professional instructors.” For the first time, the Army and Navy had a majority of officers with at least some experience in a professional education program. In that environment, PME programs’ stability allowed them to become the subject of critical assessment and adjustment. In other words, school staffs no longer fighting for survival could focus on honing their curriculum and developing their pedagogical methods.

In the United States and Britain, concerns about the need for a well-educated officer corps were not confined to the highest echelons or the strategic realm. Though training programs for cadets and midshipmen had existed for decades, beginning in the twentieth century programs for officer education at all levels became more sophisticated. In the United States, this had the appearance of a “trickle down” effect, due to the fact that higher-level schools had been established first. Concepts like the “art of command” came into vogue, and the use of military history to provide context for strategic analysis received increasing emphasis at all levels. The U.S. Army began to put time and energy into their career-level courses for infantry officers. Two closely related factors began to influence PME systems in the twentieth century, as the initial impulses of professionalization faded and technological advances stabilized: these were the twin problems of expanding foreign policy and limited government budgets.

Questions of foreign policy were not new to military theorists in the twentieth century. What had changed was the impact that foreign policy had on military education in particular. The ongoing spread of classical liberal thought gave rise to a range of international agreements and globalization policies; each of these placed some type of restraint on war, or limited armed conflict in specific ways. Military professionals at continuously-lower levels of command needed to receive education on these topics.\(^47\) This was merely a practical effect of over a century of trade, colonization, war and reconciliation. In order to provide military officers with the necessary context, many schools turned to military history for insight. Naval and land strategy could be informed, some believed, by simple study of past military exploits.

One of the earliest projects undertaken by Navy visionaries with regard to thinking about creating and analyzing strategy was Foxhall Parker’s *Fleets of the World*, an assessment of historic naval battles and the ships that fought them. Parker was a naval officer of the old breed, getting his initial seamanship training as a midshipman before attending the Philadelphia Naval School (similar to Annapolis) in his 20s. He served throughout the Civil War and exhibited a lifelong interest in educational material and training manuals. He published a new signals code for steamships in 1872, and his *Fleets of the World* in 1876.\(^48\) His final assignment was as superintendent of the Naval Academy, from which he participated in the founding of the United States Naval Institute.\(^49\) Parker provided case studies and lessons for his readers which they were meant to use in their own careers. A growing effort to incorporate historical study in PME programs was a continuation of that concept.

Modern analysts note a difference between PME systems which focused on purely technical or mechanistic military concepts, and those which attempted to incorporate a more


holistic range of topics. “Competent knowledge of such sciences as mathematics, physics, geography, astronomy, navigation” was considered necessary, but occasionally that was confused for the end of education rather than the means. Those who did the worst at providing context for their technique ended up in the service of the highly proficient, yet socially destructive, German armies of the two World Wars.

It would be incorrect to propose that any early-century American program correctly identified all of the potential PME pitfalls and studiously avoided them. On the contrary, not only is such serendipity unlikely, the evidence does not support it. Americans were, in fact, not very good at developing PME systems. The overriding control of a civilian government (a government which switched parties every 4-8 years and which was always at the mercy of a variety of partisan political issues) prevented any branch of the military from turning too far in on itself and its technical tactical needs. Instead, the Army and Navy spent a great deal of time navigating the political climate, and in spare hours pieced together systems which created a mediocre tactical proficiency. In wartime, industrial largesse could be counted upon to make up for what was lacking. These practical barriers to development within the military services were not, and are still not, unique to any time and place. The days of Samuel Adams and Thomas Jefferson saw their fair share of inter-service rivalry and lobbyist machinations. Today is no different.

Further, scholars identify problems with the “transfer of culture” as another reason why institutions fail to efficiently observe and adopt certain types of systems. In his 1962 study, educational historian Jurgen Herbst asserted:

Culture may be said to consist of the interaction of an institution and its ideas. Thus the American who went to German universities to acquire the tools of scholarship brought home not only tools but ideas as well. When the ideas proved difficult to assimilate to American conditions, the scholars sought to modify or discard them, only to realize that their scholarly equipment, torn from its ideological setting, would no longer serve until a new context of ideas could be adapted.51

50. Lambert, “History as Process and Record: The Royal Navy and Officer Education,” 89.

Herbst was interested in the transfer of systems from one nation to another, where the differences were significant. In the case of the various branches of the American military, cultural differences were less dramatic, but still created confusion or incompatibility. It took time and effort for each group of military educators to work out which aspects of a peer institution should be kept and which discarded in favor of some in-house concept. For example, most U.S. Army commanders were of the “Jominian” school and clung to French-inspired tactics long after the implications of mass-produced firearms and skirmish lines should have led them to abandon or modify them. More importantly, hot wars often interrupted or slowed the development of educational institutions in the United States.

During World War I itself, professional military education at the senior level ground to a halt, and attention switched to the mass production of junior officers and enlisted men for both the Army and the Navy. Training overtook education in a real way, and although the participation of the United States forces in the Great War was brief, it had a significant effect on many aspects of American life. Contrary to the impression given by patriotic songs, artwork and literature, the postwar United States was outwardly anti-war. That public, isolationist attitude carried over into the ability of the military branches to capitalize on the combat lessons learned. The American public, influenced by the major arguments of the Wilsonian peace movement, was attracted to the concept of disarmament. The extent of this interest was, wrote political scientist Robert Hoover, “far greater in the United States in the early 1920s than anywhere else among the former Allied forces.”

The overriding foreign policy feature of the interwar era was tailored toward stifling military development. For example, the “Open Door” policy the United States adopted toward Asia in the 1920s was not allowed to be supported by overt military action. Additionally, American trade in the Far East was actively damaged by the Nine Power Treaty.

52. Addington, Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century, 70–71.
54. Hoover, Arms Control: The Interwar Naval Limitation Agreements, 21, 40.
Whatever effort was going to be made to forward American interests overseas, it had to be done out of the public eye so that peacetime pacifists did not notice the military and express their displeasure at the ballot box.

However, Navy and Army thinkers continued their planning and discussions, shielded from voters’ displeasure by a series of talented Secretaries of War and of the Navy. Since it was easier for the Navy to do this than the Army, much of the interwar development was maritime in nature. Fleet maneuvers and ship construction continued, as well as modernization of existing assets in order to meet threats which had emerged during the war: the torpedo, the airplane bomb and the alarmingly effective submarine. On land, the Army mechanized as a means of improving combat readiness; behind the scenes they worked diligently to ensure better integration between the Regular Army and National Guard, especially when it came to the level of education provided for the “part-time” officers of the various state militias.

Nevertheless, as mentioned before, peacetime restrictions and unfriendly political environments seem historically to energize development within the American military community. Though they innovate “with considerable uncertainty and ambiguity about the nature and context of the next major conflict,” they still innovate. In fact, the interwar developments which came out of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps were all the more effective because of their inherent flexibility. Not knowing what kind of war they would fight, each service developed concepts of operations which could be adapted to a variety of strategic situations. The famous “War Plan Orange,” developed in 1926 at the Naval War College, may have identified Japan as a likely enemy, but it did not fixate on a tactical or operational solution

55. Hoover, Arms Control: The Interwar Naval Limitation Agreements, 71.

56. Daniel Fullerton, “Bright Prospects, Bleak Realities: The United States Army’s Interwar Modernization Program for the Coming of the Second World War” (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas, 2006), ProQuest Dissertations Publishing. George C. Marshall was sent on multiple circuits by the War Department, touring militia camps or meeting with National Guard leaders, in order to build a plan for improving the training and education prospects of those organizations.

to the Pacific problem. It merely provided the setting in which some solution would be brought to bear. At all times, this development of concepts and solutions was happening at the schools.  

Finally, during the interwar period itself, military education in the United States was governed by one factor perhaps more even than foreign policy: finances. In an oft-quoted 1997 essay for Military Review magazine, then-Senator Ike Skelton wrote at length regarding the accomplishments of the interwar military:

During the Great Depression of the 1930s, in a far harsher budgetary climate than that of today, all of the services found themselves reduced to “pauperdom.” The sizes of the forces were drastically cut, and modernization programs were, at first, postponed and then canceled. The Army, which during the Great War had numbered more than 2.3 million, was reduced to less than 128,000 by 1934...the United States had the 16th largest army in the world, with Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Spain, Romania, and Poland possessing larger armies.

Too poor to train and equip their forces, the Army, the Navy and Marine Corps took advantage of a difficult situation by sending their best officers to various schools—to study, to teach and to prepare for the future.

In what Skelton described as a “renaissance,” the primary institutions of all the services put considerable effort into their schools’ curriculum and conduct. Renowned future leaders such as George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, Chester W. Nimitz, and Raymond Spruance attended or taught at (or both) the Army or Navy War Colleges. Nimitz was later reputed to remark: “We won the victories of the 1940s in the command and staff and war college classrooms of the 1920s and 1930s.” Skelton’s opinion was not particularly ground breaking, either: half a century earlier Samuel Huntingdon had spoken in similar terms about the ability of the Gilded Age military to overcome post-Civil War retrenchment and demonstrate creativity.

Throughout these periods the applicatory style of learning was kept in place, maintaining a


60. Skelton, “JPME: Are We There Yet?” 99.

connection to the PME ideologies which had first inspired American military educators a
generation before.

The Basic School: A Different Kind of PME

When considering the Basic School in the context of professional military education, it is
important to remember that the concept of PME is often understood in a limited sense, a sense
which does not capture the ethos, culture, or content of TBS at all. As a basic course at the
tactical level, many did not (and still do not) consider what happened at TBS to be “education” at
all. It was and remains merely “training.” However, when examining the records of the school
itself, it is clear that foundational principles for self-improvement and auto-didacticism, for
decision making skills, and for leadership and management skills were all imparted at TBS from
its earliest days. Those are critical educational concepts, not training procedures. Later in this
paper a detailed analysis of the military history course helps prove the particularly educational
tenor of a TBS education. Furthermore, it is anachronistic to presume that the officers who
founded the School of Application in 1891 or who commanded the Basic School between the
World Wars would have put a great deal of thought into whether there was a difference between
“training” and “education.” The distinction had not entered the lexicon during that time period,
even among those military officers who were well known for their interest in PME.

The interwar Marines failed to leave behind much helpful, reflective commentary on their
schools. Instead the writing of their peers and contemporaries can be analyzed. The obvious,
and perennial, comparison made by scholars is between the United States Marine Corps and the
United States Army. The USMC has often been considered merely a small amphibious army.
That is accurate, since the Marine Corps is in fact a small amphibious army. The Basic School
has always focused on concepts which overlap with those taught at Army schools. It has enough
in common with Army schools, in fact, that the available literature on Army PME provides good
commentary on the Marine Corps as well. For that reason, the work of several scholars is
considered in this paper, as they variously discuss the US Army War College, the US Army
Command and Staff School, the US Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, the US Naval War College, the Marine Corps Field Officers’ Course, and the Marine Corps Company Officers’ Course.

All of these schools were designed to serve officers with at least four or five years in military service. In its most complete form, this tiered structure had War Colleges at the top, Staff schools below, and a “career” course at the bottom. Below that, a service academy provided pre-professional training and education. The U.S. Army sent lieutenants at the earliest opportunity to artillery, infantry, transportation, or air schools, sometimes before their first tour of duty but often immediately following it, after the officer had acquired 1-2 years’ experience. At 2-3 and 3-5 years in service, the Army officer had a variety of opportunities for more advanced education depending on his area of expertise. The U.S. Navy, by contrast, operated no intermediate schools for a graduate of the United States Naval Academy (USNA): each was qualified upon graduation day to serve as a line officer in the Navy and that was that. If they survived the sea and the promotion boards, eventually they could attend the War College.

It has been mentioned that the Marine Corps created a hybrid or “compromise” system of PME. More accurately, the Marines created an Army structure with a Navy culture. Like the Army, the Marines created “career” and “senior” courses for officers. Like the Army, these schools attempted to teach officers the mechanics of command both via classroom recitation as well as tactical games and field exercises. Like the Navy, the Marines operated “generalist schools” for the officers to learn and absorb the naval culture which transcended any technical speciality and united all mariners. Like the Navy, the Marines imbued their officers with a sense of independence and self-reliance; the ship’s officer was as likely as not to be deprived of a senior colleague’s advice and support when encountering an enemy far from home. However, there were still many differences. The Marines were the only ones with a “basic” course. They insisted on all officers completing it, no matter the source of their previous education (military academy, civilian college, etc). They operated no war college level school due to their lack of corps- or army-sized units. The differences made the Marine Corps unique as an institution, and
consequently the current scholarship, which covers the Army and Navy well, is inadequate to completely explain how and why the Marine Corps’ PME system was created.

This study will demonstrate that what happens at TBS, and what has happened since its inception, is correctly understood as education. As Lieutenant Colonel Beadle observed at the beginning of this chapter: “Here is our opportunity to lay a foundation for officers of true Marine Corps caliber.”

Beadle observed something more significant than Marine officers learning to clean a rifle or march in close order. The entire structure of the school adhered to the model set out by visionaries of military education, men like Stephen B. Luce and Alfred T. Mahan. The basic concepts which formed the course content at TBS did not preclude the students’ developing advanced learning skills: collaborative learning and “individual inquiry” were always part of the program. In short, the Marine Corps’ basic officers course was and is an essential element of its professional military education system. How and when it originally developed will be considered in the next chapter. The balance of this study will show how the content and conduct of TBS place it squarely in the real of education, and that it was and is the foundation and heart of the entire professional system which builds upon it.


63. Mobley, Progressives in Navy Blue, 191.
Chapter 2 - Early History of The Basic School

In 1890, an act of Congress ordered officer promotion in the United States Army to be based on examination rather than a mere assessment of seniority.¹ This ground breaking measure was the first of many such legal acts during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century which cemented the transformation of the United States Army into a “modern” military force. Within six months the United States Marine Corps followed suit. In an order by Colonel Commandant Charles Heywood, the Marines not only instituted “promotion by examination” but also authorized the foundation of a school which would teach the subjects necessary for officers who would be taking promotion examinations. This was the birth of the “School of Application,” which opened its doors to seven students in the autumn of 1891. By the time the United States emerged from the First World War, the “School of Application” had become a fully developed educational institution serving several dozen students each year and covering every basic topic of military knowledge deemed necessary by Headquarters Marine Corps.

History of the Marine Corps Schools - Primary Source

There are few original records on the history of the Basic School. The nearest “contemporary” source exclusively focused on the topic of the Marine Corps Schools was produced in 1945. Prior to that, no purpose-written history of any Marine Corps school had been created. The *History of the Marine Corps Schools* was authored by First Lieutenant Anthony Frances, at the direction of Commandant of the Marine Corps Oliver P. Smith. There are two extant copies of this source. One is held by the Marine Corps research library in Quantico, Virginia, and one by the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The “Quantico

copy” is the original. It is a library-bound typewritten manuscript, bound on oversize paper. A
processing stamp indicates the work was cataloged by library staff in 1960.

The History of the Marine Corps Schools lacks citations, notes, or a bibliography. The
short disclaimer Frances included at the beginning of the book is the sole explanation of his
methodology:

Source material for this history includes files of the Marine Corps Schools and all its
branches; the Schools Library and files of the old newspapers and magazines; the annual
reports of the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Commandant of the Marine Corps
Schools; general files at Marine Corps Headquarters, Navy Annex, Washington, DC; and
the reference division of the National Archives, Washington, DC. Additional information
was obtained by personal interviews with officers who held responsible positions at the
Schools at the time of writing or who had served there in previous years. The writer was
a candidate in the Marine Corps Schools, having been commissioned with the Sixteenth
Candidates’ Class. He is indebted to First Lieutenant E.D. Lejeune, Officer-in-Charge of
the Library and Record Section, Miss C.M. Waster, Libraries, and their staffs’ [sic] for
their pleasant cooperation and valuable assistance in compiling this history.

Anthony A. Frances

We are left to infer from the text itself which of these sources the author used for which portions
of his work.

The History of the Marine Corps Schools is divided into eight sections, with an appendix
at the end. The first three sections are the most relevant to this paper: they discuss the foundation
of TBS (as the “School of Application”) in 1891 and continue through 1935. Understanding the
“founding era” is helpful because that period had the most detailed and explicit record of
ideological discussions about professional military education in the Marine Corps. Frances
included a great deal of this background material in his analysis of the first decade of the school’s
existence. Unfortunately, once he reached the time period most relevant to this study, Frances
included far less background explanation about why the school was structured a certain way,
merely relating what was being taught. Frances’ History was a key source for this chapter;
setting out timelines, creating a picture of the first school staff, and developing leads on better or
more carefully considered works.

2. Anthony Frances, History of the Marine Corps Schools, United States Marine Corps Printing
Given the “official” status of the writing project, it is hardly surprising that the introduction to the *History of the Marine Corps Schools* emphasizes industry, activity, and solidarity among the Marines engaged in academic pursuits. At the time Frances wrote, the Marine Corps Schools were all located together in Quantico, Virginia. His introduction provides a clear view of what Marines at the time thought was important about their professional schools:

On the shores of the wide Potomac and across the rugged terrain on the 60,000 acre military reservation in Prince William County, Virginia, thousands of America’s finest young men have labored long and hard for commissions in the United States Marine Corps. At the same time, thousands of other officers, generals, and lieutenants and majors, have studied and experimented there in order to better themselves, their Corps, and to contribute to a stronger and better first line of defense for their country...

...Quantico has grown into one of the Corps’ largest and most developed bases, largely because Quantico today is the center for Marine officers’ training and education. The Marine Corps Schools are the Marines’ Annapolis and Naval War College all rolled into one.³

In this passage Frances stressed that the schools were meant to cover every level of education, from the most basic (“Annapolis”) to the most advanced (“Naval War College”). He also reflected on the work of previous generations:

Quantico, however, was not the first Marine Base that provided officers’ training. Since the history of the Corps itself is a subtle study of world geography, the story of the Marine Corps Schools has its share of moving about...It is a story of how the school grew from a teaching staff of two officers to an institution in which 400 officers served during World War II as administrators and instructors. It is a story of the struggle for classrooms, buildings, training areas, rifle ranges and impact areas. Likewise it was a continuous struggle to develop a better and more thorough curriculum.⁴

Frances’ insight into the founding of the Basic School is important because he had access to sources no longer available. For that reason his book is typically treated as a primary source by a variety of secondary works, including the official history of The Basic School and this thesis. The personal interviews he conducted cannot be replicated; the records and papers of the Marine Corps Schools which he seems to have consulted have largely vanished; the book lists and syllabi cannot be fully corroborated by any extant source. Yet, Frances’ book had the strongest

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endorsement of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and was read and forwarded by at least one senior officer who would have experienced The Basic School for himself between 1920 and 1950. The latter fact, could with Frances’ identity as an educated Marine officer interested in the development of his own institution’s educational heritage, combine to demand the History be treated with some deference as a source in its own right. Where it can be corrected by other records, it has been in this paper.

School of Application: Establishment Under Heywood and Mannix

On 1 October 1890, an Act of Congress declared that all officers below the rank of brigadier general in the Army were required to pass a formal examination prior to promotion. Once officers were required to pass such examinations, the creation of schools to prepare officers for the exams was a logical next step. Colonel Commandant of the Marine Corps Charles Heywood moved immediately to establish some type of officers’ school. Heywood did not personally record his motivations for creating an officers’ school. According to some authors, Heywood acted quickly to preempt the Navy Department from “setting standards” for Marine officers. Marine officers at sea were often at risk of having their authority undermined or reduced by the action of a nearby Navy officer. Perhaps awareness of that truth led Heywood to act. Perhaps it was just common sense that schools were needed.

Whatever the motivations, the end result was the establishment of the “School of Application” on 1 May 1891. General Order No.1, as published in the Secretary of the Navy’s Annual Report for that year, outlined the purpose and structure of the school Heywood


envisioned. Examining this document in detail will reveal much of his thinking. His “precedent making document” provided an outline of the Marines’ first professional school, one which not only justified its existence to the United States Congress, but helped the school’s first staff understand their mission:

DESIGNATION:
The school is officially designated the “School of Application of the United States Marine Corps” and it will be under the direct care and supervision of the Colonel Commandant.

ORGANIZATION:
The School of Application shall consist of a Director of Instruction, who shall have the immediate command of the school and post, instructors and assistant instructors, and such officers and enlisted men as may be assigned to it for duty or instruction.

ADMINISTRATION
Instructors and assistant instructors shall, as far as practicable in the judgment of the commanding officer of the school, be exempt from all duties that will in any way interfere with the preparation for and proper performance of duty as instructors and assistant instructors. The instruction as prescribed shall be obligatory for all commissioned officers.

This new school would assist the Marines in moving away from a system of officer education which was wholly dependent on “on the job” training. By using a school-based system, the officers of the Corps would impart a more consistent and predictable knowledge set, while their leadership style could be formed from a central model. The available evidence does not indicate that the school’s foundation catalyzed a change in organizational culture. Instead, the use of experienced Marine officers as instructors meant that the schools reproduced and perpetuated the existing culture of the Corps in a centralizing environment. This conclusion is consistent with the analysis of interwar education, where the experience of the instructor staff had a bigger impact on the school than any other single factor. It was the same in the 1890s as well.


Marine Corps Schools, beginning with the School of Application, codified and systematized an ethos and ideology which already animated the organization.

The History of the Marine Corps Schools helps to make this point, by focusing on the persona of the School of Application’s first commanding officer, Captain Daniel Pratt Mannix, Jr. Frances saw Mannix as the Marine who set the cycle of influence in motion:

When benign-looking Captain Mannix took over his new post his career in the Marine Corps had nearly run its course. Evidence by his white goatee, he was an old hand, and his years of service, rich in experience, and typical of the old Marine Corps, were highlighted by a decoration from the Chinese Emperor. During the Civil War he served aboard the Ohio, the steamer Cricket, and the ironclad steamer Chillicothe. He was commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1865. His assignments included a tour aboard the Saugus, the usual round of guard duty ashore, three years of duty with the Quartermaster’s Department, artillery school at Fort Monroe, Virginia, Navy Torpedo School at Newport, Rhode Island, two cruises aboard the steamer Ticonderoga, finally a torpedo instructor for the Chinese Army for which the Emperor made him a member of the Order of the Imperial Dragon for distinguished services. In 1886 he returned to Washington, took a last cruise to the Far East aboard the flagship Brooklyn and returned to headquarters in 1887 where he was again detailed to the Quartermaster Department. His last tour of duty was as commanding officer of the School of Application, which post he held at the time of his death in February 1894.

Frances carefully projects the image of a long-experienced, widely traveled Marine. Mannix, like Heywood, served in all the various posts common for Marines to hold in the nineteenth century, and in addition had served lengthy periods ashore overseas. Both the Commandant and the school commander had no formal professional education. They had life experience. Once a professional military education system for the Marine Corps had been initiated, the ongoing, informal, “on the job” master-apprentice mentorship experience of their lifetimes had to be converted into something new. It would become part of the fabric of the school-based framework. Those who were shaped by the school as students would return later as instructors to influence the next generation, but their fleet experience in the meantime was what made them effective, interesting mentors.

Next Frances reported that a group of seven second lieutenants arrived for “duty” at the School of Application on 1 July 1891. All were members of the United States Naval Academy’s class of 1889 and had just completed two years at sea as “naval cadets.” One of those seven, Benjamin H. Fuller, would go on to serve as Commandant of the Marine Corps. After they completed the course of instruction, they took a proficiency exam before being allowed to graduate. Frances reported that Mannix decided what was on the exam:

Captain Mannix developed a nine-month course of study which was followed, with minor changes, for many years afterward. Undoubtedly, his long years of experience in the Corps, his specialized training in artillery and torpedoes served him well in conducting the affairs of the school. For his first class, he prepared 214 questions which comprised the final examination. The questions were purely academic. There were no practical exercises or problems. All seven students passed the course, and continued with their Marine Corps careers.\(^{11}\)

The course as set up by Mannix always lasted nine months and it was located at the Marine Barracks, Washington, DC.

The Annual Reports of the Commandant for 1892, 1894, and 1895 demonstrate that the School of Application was an important piece of Heywood’s vision for the Marine Corps. Multiple pages were dedicated to a lengthy report from the officer in charge of the school (Mannix), No other officer of the Marine Corps was allotted so much space, with the exception of the paymaster general. Generally, items which received the most attention in an Annual Report were those that needed the most explanation or justification. Heywood knew that his new school continued only at the pleasure of the Secretary of the Navy and he repeatedly sought to make its value clear.

In October 1892, three new officers passed exams for promotion. Continuing the pattern of highlighting the School of Application, Colonel Heywood wrote:

Most excellent results have been obtained in the course of instruction to both officers and enlisted men, and show in a very gratifying manner the advisability of its establishment, and the benefit that will result to the corps...Owing to the limited number of officers and men, and the duty that is required of them, it has been impossible to order as many here for instruction as I would like. Many officers and enlisted men have applied to be detailed, and I hope, if this corps is increased, to see large classes here in the future, and

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gradually to have everyone in the corps instructed at this school.¹²

Heywood’s strident praise included not only a glowing report, but the unheard of suggestion that all Marines would eventually be attending school. To propose that all Marine Corps personnel be instructed at a formal institution demonstrated that Heywood was “on board” with the professionalization movement in a serious way.

The 1892 Annual Report included the long report of Captain Mannix on the progress made at the new school during its first year. “With the view of supplying a want long felt by the corps for a school of practice,” Mannix confidently relayed how the school’s location was ideally suited to the task of educating new officers and was already contributing to improving the Marine Corps:

The headquarters of the corps has special advantages not possessed by any other place for a school of practice. Here student officers and men are comparatively free from the care of guard duty, except so much as may be necessary for instruction, and in consequence display more interest in their drills and studies and have more time to devote to them. The naval experimental ground for ordnance at Indian Head is of easy access, as is the naval magazine with its excellent range for target practice, and a few miles back of the Potomac’s eastern branch the country is well adapted for field training. The navy-yard and gun foundry are conveniently at hand, combining a water front admirably suited for instruction in boat pulling and sailing, with the advantages afforded by the gun shops of acquiring a practical knowledge of the manufacture of guns, carriages, etc., not to be obtained elsewhere.¹³

Next, he detailed the courses he oversaw, dividing the program into sections for officers and enlisted men. For officers Mannix provided a description for each course:

The course of infantry is divided into four parts, embracing the drill instructions, guard duty, small-arms firing regulations, and infantry fire discipline, and consists of recitations, drills, problems, and field exercises.

The course of artillery is divided into two parts, embracing artillery drill instruction and naval gunnery, and consists of recitations, drills, and practical exercises.

The course in administration and sea service is divided into two parts, military administration and sea service, and consists of lessons and exercises in application.


For the present the course of law is limited to one part, military law and courts-martial, and consists of lessons supplemented by lectures.

The course of torpedoes is divided into four parts, torpedoes offensive and defensive, torpedo fuses, electricity, and explosives, and consists of lessons and exercises in application.

The course of engineering is divided into four parts: topography, field engineering, signaling and telegraphy, military hygiene, and consists of lessons, lectures, and exercises in application.

The course of military art is divided into three parts: minor tactics, grand tactics, and strategy, and consists of lessons and exercises in application.14

Mannix’s inclusion of “grand tactics and strategy” in the course on military art is critical. Instructing newly commissioned officers is an educational undertaking, one which goes beyond mere technical training. In the list of courses for enlisted men, only military law and military art are missing. Since enlisted men did not serve any role in courts martial, they did not need a law course. In place of the “military art” course, enlisted men received abbreviated instruction only in minor tactics. This structure emphasizes the aspects of officer education which relied on creativity, analysis, and a philosophical understanding of warfare. In his own commentary, Anthony Frances also noted the inclusion of grand strategy, then highlighted the mention of “combined action of the three arms of battle” under the military art subheading:

Certainly Colonel Heywood and his colleagues had no way of knowing that “combined action” would come to mean, in later years, a gargantuan force on the land, sea and in the air...The progenitors of the School of Application were not visionaries, but they knew that any battle would be determined by the close coordination of all arms and units.15

Frances also recognized that advanced concepts were being taught to the Lieutenants at this school from the first day it opened.

Next, Mannix summarized the operation of the School of Application. He explained how he and his staff of three First Lieutenants had to prepare their own notes and circulars for use in class, in lieu of having actual textbooks on hand. Mannix’s staff consisted of First Lieutenants


15. Frances, History of the Marine Corps Schools, 11.
“White, Prince, and Long.” Harry K. White would spend almost forty years serving the Marine Corps, recalled to active duty during World War I in order to manage courts martial (health problems precluded him from combat duty) and again after the war to manage naval records for the Marine Corps.¹⁶ Thomas C. Prince graduated from the Naval Academy in 1875 and retired from the Marine Corps sometime before 1915. He served in the Adjutant and Inspector’s Office for several years.¹⁷ Charles G. Long remained in the Marine Corps until 1921 and was the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps during World War I. His career included combat engagements at Guantanamo Bay, Tientsin (China), Nicaragua, and Vera Cruz.¹⁸ None of the three Marines published articles in the *Marine Corps Gazette* or *Proceedings*. For the first semester, only Prince was actually present at the SOA. Whatever writing these instructors completed, it was anonymous or was otherwise forgotten as newer materials replaced their original notes and lectures.

However, not everything was an unqualified success. A lack of sufficient quarters in the early part of the year meant that classes were delayed in starting. In contrast to his glowing introduction on the suitability of the Washington Marine Barracks, in the “operations” section Mannix complained that while many facilities were nearby, it was time consuming and complicated to arrange use of those facilities for the SOA students. Surveying and drawing equipment were in short supply. However, the assistance of several Navy officers in Washington, serving essentially as volunteers, helped ease the teaching burden with lectures and lessons on naval ordnance, military hygiene, and first aid. According to the 1892 report, each subject was taken “in turn” and the course work completed before the class moved on to the next

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¹⁶. *The Danville Bee*, November 7, 1924 (Danville, Virginia), 1. See also *Muster Rolls of the United States Marine Corps 1893-1943*.


¹⁸. Charles G. Long Official Biography, Reference Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.
subject. The written portion of the final examination was included in the Annual Report, filling close to eight pages and giving a very clear idea of what topics had been covered during the course of instruction.19 At the end of the year, the students were given their oral examinations by the Commandant himself, with the aid of Major H.B. Lowry, Quartermaster of the Corps.20

The Frances manuscript described the first decade as a “long struggle for existence,” since the School of Application was in competition with hot wars, expeditionary activities, training needs, and the perennial fight over funding. This was in contrast to the “struggle for existence” experienced by the Army’s school at Leavenworth and the Navy’s War College, both of which faced all of those basic challenges plus the active opposition of some senior officers within their respective organizations.21 It is significant that Heywood did not mention any lack of cooperation on the part of other Marines. In fact, he specifically stated that more officers and enlisted men applied to the school than could be spared from the fleet. The primary dangers to the School of Application, at least in the Commandant’s eyes, were the challenges of manpower availability and limited funding.

By contrast, Frances’ account, written in 1945, suggested that not many Marines’ attitude toward professional education conflicted with that of Heywood and Mannix. Paralleling some of the lack of cooperation seen in the Army and Navy at their more senior schools, Frances described officer students sometimes being the biggest problem:

The attitude of the officers toward the “schooling” did not enhance the growth of the school at first. Most of the officers in the Corps in the early days were drawn from the Naval Academy where they spent four years under Navy tutelage. Following this, all graduates of the Academy were immediately sent on a two-year tour of sea duty with the Fleet. Returning from their cruises, they were far from anxious to sit for more schooling. Later, some of the older officers were assigned to the school as students. Their protest was the loudest. Some of these salty old characters were in no mood to hold down a school desk after years at sea and several more years of duty in the Far East or Central America. Most of them did not join the Marine Corps to go to school, and some of them

were far from hesitating about saying so.\textsuperscript{22}

The inclusion of Central America in this passage indicates that Frances was referring to Marines as late as 1912, when the first expeditions to Nicaragua were dispatched. When Frances wrote his manuscript he was stationed at Quantico, Virginia, and would have interacted with a variety of senior Marines there. Men like Oliver P. Smith (commissioned 1917), James Devereux (enlisted 1923), Edward Dyer (commissioned 1929), Francis Fenton (enlisted 1917) and Merrill Twining (commissioned 1923) were familiar with the “Old Corps” and officers from that era who might have had less than a positive attitude about schooling. All were at Quantico or Headquarters Marine Corps in 1945. While Frances was stationed in Washington, DC, several interwar era TBS instructors passed through Headquarters Company “C” and he could have interviewed them as well: William Purple, George Hollett, Graves Erskine, Harold Harris, and Emmett Skinner. Frances listed personal interviews as one of his sources, and these are the type of officers he had the chance to engage at that time.

Regardless of individual anecdotes about anti-education Marines, the official opinion of the Commandant in the early years of the School of Application was positive and supportive. Scholars such as Jack Schulimson assert that the debates within the Marine Corps during the late 1800s did not focus on the attitude of Marines toward education at all. Instead, broad and existential questions about the role of the Marine Corps in a modernizing Navy, or its “jurisdictional area,” occupied the forward thinkers of the day.\textsuperscript{23} If true, the internal debate described by Frances was relegated to informal media such as letters and personal discussion. Furthermore, Frances interviewed officers about those discussions forty and fifty years after the fact. Much of that testimony would have consisted of unreliable second or third hand recollection.

\textsuperscript{22} Frances, \textit{History of the Marine Corps Schools}, 13.

The Commandant’s *Annual Report* for 1893 contains much of the same information as Mannix provided for the inaugural year at the School of Application. The same courses in infantry, artillery, administration and sea service, law, torpedoes, engineering and military art were offered. In 1893, the final examinations were presumably also conducted by the Commandant and Quartermasters of the Marine Corps, but in addition a Board of Visitors was convened to attend the closing exercises and make a report on the school. The Board included one Navy officer, one U.S. Army infantry officer, and a Lieutenant Colonel of Marines. Their “unanimous opinion” was that the school deserved “highest praise.”

In a separate paragraph, the Board praised the instructors for their work in creating and distributing new written works on the subjects taught at the school. This commentary from the Board sheds some light on the production and dissemination of professional materials, something the reports of Mannix and Heywood fails to explain. The *Annual Reports* give the impression that an immense amount of writing was done by the school staff. More than three decades before any formal school would be established for the purpose, Mannix foresaw the usefulness of a “correspondence course” or similar program of professional development. In his 1892 report he suggested that if someone could procure a “hand press” for the school staff, they could reprint their notes and distribute them to the entire Marine Corps. The request was not repeated in his 1893 report, but neither did Mannix mention having acquired a printing press. Instead, only the Board’s report confirms the role that School of Application instructors had in developing not just their school but the Marine Corps itself. If the instructors were composing their own textbooks, they were exerting direct influence on the thought processes of future Marine officers.

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End of Century Developments

Captain Mannix died on 6 February 1894. Captain Paul St. Clair Murphy took command of the School of Application and completed the course with the class then in session, which included six officers and twenty-three enlisted men.27 He continued the initiatives begun by Mannix, and reemphasized the use of practical teaching methods. Murphy was especially proud of the employment of local terrain to teach topography:

While work in all departments of study was exceptionally good, the practical exercises in topography are deserving of special mention. In this department parties were organized and sent out from time to time to make reconnaissance of the neighboring country, the conformation of which is sufficiently diversified to offer a good test to the knowledge of the students in field work. These reconnoitering parties made very creditable reports and sketches and showed a thorough comprehension of the principles that govern the making of hasty surveys and the collecting and recording of data necessary for military operations. The plotting of campaigns in connection with the study of the Operations of War (Hamley), in which much original work was done, showed an intelligent understanding of the subject and a high degree of merit in the art of map drawing.28

During the 1894-95 academic year, Captain Murphy extended the course from nine months to twelve. He brought in guest lecturers to present on “Modern Small Arms” and “Naval Law and Procedure.” Seven officers and eighteen enlisted men undertook instruction that year. Two of them did not graduate--one officer resigned his place in order to join the Navy, and one private was dismissed.29

Between 1895 and 1901, further minor alterations were made to the course of study. A new commanding officer arrived in 1896, Captain Francis H. Harrington. Harrington was known in the Marine Corps for his interest in the naval expeditionary brigade and was among the Marines who pioneered the Advanced Base Force concept around the turn of the century. His


presence at SOA preceded his most famous assignment, as commanding officer of the First Marine Battalion during the landing at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In the Annual Report of 1895 the Commandant noted that topography, terrain comprehension, and the ability to make hasty sketches had been added to the final exams. The Frances manuscript dates the shift to 1897, unequivocally stating that 1897 was the year terrain sketches were added to the exams. The 1897 Annual Report includes Harrington’s full report on the SOA, but does not make any special mention of additional courses in topography. On the contrary, Harrington described a course in sketching and reconnaissance very similar to that conducted by Mannix in 1892 and 1894. He also requested that newer and more “modern” topography textbooks be provided for the school, which perhaps led Frances to date the shift to Harrington’s tenure. Certainly practical exercises on real terrain had been part of the curriculum since before 1895 and the reason for such confusion in the record is unclear. Words such as “more,” “significant,” and “increased” are relative and do not provide an overly clear idea of the scope of change. Whenever it happened, making terrain-related work a key element of the SOA curriculum brought it in line with the emphasis on terrain and sketching that was already well established in the U.S. Army schools.

According to Frances, Wagner’s Organization of Tactics was added to the list of textbooks in the late 1890s. The use of Wagner’s textbook was recommended by the Board of Visitors during their spring visit to the SOA in 1897, as it was “up to date and [being] used at all the military schools of the country.” Wagner was an officer of the United States Army, heralded across the military services as the new Emory Upton. Wagner was the officer who put Upton’s ideas into practice, transforming the Leavenworth schools into premier institutions of professional military education. In 1898 he was “universally regarded as the army’s chief

spokesman on matters of tactics and doctrine.”34 Organization and Tactics premiered in 1894 as a companion to Wagner’s first book, The Service of Security and Information. Both were designed to fill a lacuna in the existing literature which lacked references to American campaigns and battles.35

A central feature of Wagner’s military philosophy was that leadership, command, and strategy could be taught to officers, primarily through the use of military history. He spent most of his career battling officers who believed the opposite: that no amount of teaching could give an officer an idea of how to lead or how to create and employ strategy. Instead, many Army leaders subscribed to a caricature of the Clausewitzian “genius.” According to one of Wagner’s chief detractors, Major James Chester, USA, a real leader “controls the spirits of his men silently, mysteriously, magnetically.”36 Such was the prevailing view among many of those men who had led the Army during and immediately after the Civil War. By implementing a schools system, the Marine Corps had clearly aligned itself with the Uptonian, Mahanian, and Wagnerian ideology which advocated the education of officers not only in tactics or drill, but in the art of command itself. Including Wagner’s textbooks in the curriculum at the SOA was the logical next step in the improvement of their infant PME system.

Unfortunately, the explosion of the USS Maine in Havana harbor and the beginning of the Spanish-American War resulted in the 1898 Annual Report on the SOA being truncated: no full-length report from the school’s director was included for the school year which had just ended. Likewise, the 1899 and 1900 reports contained no information on the school, since it had closed in mid-1898 and all the students and staff reported for duty. In 1900, Headquarters Marine Corps

34. Brereton, Educating the Army: Arthur L. Wagner and Reform, 1875–1905, xii.
relocated the School of Application to the newly constructed Marine Barracks Annapolis, Maryland, where it reopened.

The Muster Rolls for Annapolis from 1899-1903 are damaged and a complete record of students and staff is difficult to create. The *History of the Marine Corps Schools* indicates that the director of the School of Application in 1900-1901 was Major John H. Russell. In Commandant Heywood’s words, Russell was “the instructor of the year,” implying that he was the only instructor present. Overseeing Captain Russell was Colonel E.B. Russell, commanding officer of the nearby Washington Marine Barracks. (Captain J.H. Russell would serve as Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1934-1936.) Another officer present during that time was Captain Louis J. Magill, a veteran of the 1898 landings at Guantanamo and one of the early participants in the Advanced Base Force (as a member of the staff of Captain Francis Harrington). Magill was the officer in charge of the Marine Barracks at Annapolis. He later published articles in the *Marine Corps Gazette* on the topic of administration and paperwork, in which he detailed his long career and the variety of posts he had held. According to the combat accounts from the 1896-1900 Annual Reports, Magill and Russell both served alongside or in close relationship to former SOA instructors including Thomas Prince and Charles Long, as well as former school director Harrington. There was ample opportunity for all of these officers to discuss the school, its curriculum, and means for improving it.

The officers under instruction in the 1900-1901 year were all “appointed from civilian life,” meaning they were not graduates of the Naval Academy. Their course of instruction did not begin until November, 1900, due to ongoing difficulties preparing the facilities at Annapolis to receive students. The eight officer students were Harold Snyder, Thomas Brown, Rupert Dewey, Hamilton South, James Tracy, Berton Sibley, William Brackett, and William Redles.


“Practical exercises” took the form of company and battalion drills, practice marches, scouting, operating 3-inch field guns, and signaling. “Theoretical exercises” included recitations or lectures three times per day, six days per week, and two recitations or lectures on Sunday. At the end of the 1900-1901 school year, Heywood ordered the honor graduate, Second Lieutenant Dewey, to remain at SOA as an instructor.

Some Departures from the Established Narrative: 1900

No enlisted men were instructed during the 1900-1901 year. According to the Annual Report, this was because not enough noncommissioned officers were available to justify running a course of instruction for them. The careful division of SOA reports into “officer” and “enlisted” divisions shows that although there was a single School of Application with a unified staff, students who came from a service academy or civilian college completed a different course of instruction than did the enlisted Marine students. Prior to the school’s closure in 1898, the enlisted division was a simplified version of the officer’s program, leaving out some more “advanced” skills such as mapmaking and the sections of military art which dealt with grand strategy. No one in the 1890s used the terms, but the differences between the two programs are essentially the difference between “training” (enlisted), and “education” (officers). All of the additional topics covered by officers but not enlisted men required creativity, innovation, and assumption of decision making responsibility on the battlefield.

The program changed slightly in 1900. According to Brigadier General Heywood (then in his tenth year as Commandant), after the Spanish-American War came to an end it was his intent to “reestablish at the School of Application” with a new course specifically designed to instruct men who would be promoted to Gunnery Sergeant. In 1901, “Gunnery Sergeant of

Office, 1901), 1234.


Marines” was a relatively new rank, equivalent to the rank of First Sergeant in the United States Army. According to the *Annual Report*, an extensive list of qualifications was necessary for promotion to this rank:

Candidates for appointment as gunnery-sergeant are subjected to a thorough examination as to their competency. They are required to demonstrate their proficiency in the drill regulations, their ability to thoroughly drill recruits, and to drill the squad and company. They must be thoroughly conversant with the nomenclature of the rapid-fire and machine guns used in the naval service, and be sufficiently acquainted with their drill to be able to act as gun captain and to instruct the enlisted men in their duties at such guns. They are required to have knowledge of the kinds and quantities of ammunition used in those guns, and they must have a thorough knowledge of the instructions pertaining to target practice. They must also have a sufficient knowledge of the system of accountability of the United States Marine Corps to take change of and properly render the accounts of a guard aboard ship, and be competent in all respects to perform the duties of a first sergeant in charge of a guard on a ship to which no marine officer is attached, as well as a knowledge of the duties of an officer in command of a part of a landing party on shore.41

Heywood’s detailed explanation of the Gunnery Sergeant role helps explain the presence of enlisted men at what was traditionally viewed as an officers’ school. These senior noncommissioned officers of the Marine Corps enjoyed parity with the junior officers in terms of their level of technical knowledge. In fact, the newly-commissioned second lieutenant often relied on experienced Marines to guide him in technical matters, and trusted that they would take command of the unit should the officers become incapacitated. This insight helps correct one of the Basic School myths: that it has been the place where all officers, and only officers, of the United States Marine Corps have received instruction. This clearly is not the case. Enlisted men were instructed at the School of Application from its first day, while some Marine officers did not attend the school at all, as it periodically opened and closed in response to manpower challenges.

Heywood’s design in sending enlisted men to school was a key element in ensuring that, as the duties and responsibilities of the junior officer became simultaneously better defined and more complex, the noncommissioned officer was educated to a similar level of subject matter

expertise. The gradual increase in the size of the Marine Corps eventually led to there being sufficient numbers of enlisted men to establish schools for their exclusive use. By World War II, officer education and enlisted education tracks were well-defined and clearly separated.\textsuperscript{42}

An additional departure from the popular myths deserves attention at this point. Not only do many Marines believe that all officers (and only officers) have attended TBS, it is commonly believed that no other school for new officers ever existed. In the 1901 \textit{Annual Report}, that myth was dealt a serious blow by the “Officers Class at Boston, Mass.” According to Commandant Heywood’s report, nine officers of the Marine Corps received “theoretical and practical” instruction at the Marine Barracks in Boston, their duty station. The program closely followed the School of Application’s model, and the officers who completed the Boston school were not required to also attend the school in Annapolis. The Boston course lasted eight months and covered standard topics: “drill regulations for infantry and artillery, the guard manual, firing regulations for small arms, naval ordnance and gunnery and explosives, security and information, military and naval signals, military field engineering, infantry fire, military topography, and sketching.”\textsuperscript{43} Heywood set the Boston school apart from other, less formal courses which other Marine Barracks conducted on an ad hoc basis. Typical courses, common across the fleet, only covered drill, formations, and the duties of advance and rear guards. Boston’s robust curriculum was clearly aligned with the more professional program at the School of Application, and Heywood gave credit to the Commanding Officer of Marine Barracks Boston, Colonel Percival Pope, for his direction.\textsuperscript{44} The small school only trained perhaps 15-18 Marines over the years it

\textsuperscript{42} E.W. Sturdevant, “A System of Instructions for Officers of the Marine Corps,” \textit{Marine Corps Gazette} 4, no. 3 (September 1919): 232–38; John H. Gleason, “School for Combat: The Camp Elliot Training Center,” \textit{Marine Corps Gazette} 27, no. 6 (October 1943): 22. Neither of these Marines appear in the various muster rolls or \textit{Annual Reports} detailing the names of school staff. Lieutenant Gleason in particular was likely a “journalist” or reporter assigned to author articles for the \textit{Gazette} in order to educate Marines and raise morale. His writing style is very similar to that of 1stLt Anthony Frances.

\textsuperscript{43} Heywood, \textit{Report of the Commandant of United States Marine Corps}, 1236.

\textsuperscript{44} Heywood, \textit{Report of the Commandant of United States Marine Corps}, 1237.
existed, but the correction to the myth should be noted.

*School of Application: Early 1900s Lack of Stability*

Six months of studies had been completed at the new location in Annapolis when Major Charles A. Doyen, commanding officer, had to close the School of Application due to high demand for officers in the Philippines. It would not reopen until 1904. When it did, the students returned to the Maryland location. It is not clear, however, why Annapolis was chosen in 1900 nor why the school returned there: the conditions did not seem to merit it. According to Colonel Clyde Metcalf, as quoted by Frances in *History of the Marine Corps Schools*:

> The school was housing in unsuitable quarters and barracks which proved to be quite a shock to some of the newly appointed officers from civil life. Before this class had completed its study, another section joined it, making a total of sixty-five, making the crowded conditions still more uncomfortable, and necessitating the erection of tents for added living space.

Frances did not provide a citation for Colonel Metcalf’s statement, and Metcalf’s own work *A History of the United States Marine Corps* (1940) does not contain any similar passage.

This is another example of a statement which was certainly based on an eyewitness account. Metcalf himself was a student at the School of Application in 1913 when it was located in Norfolk, Virginia. Metcalf’s staff had attended the School of Application in 1909, and so on. Metcalf was working at Headquarters Marine Corps during the period Anthony Frances was stationed in Quantico, Virginia, and made trips to Headquarters “relating to the Marine Corps Schools.” Whatever anyone thought of the conditions, classes continued despite the lack of space and, except for a continued lack of ammunition and the facilities on which to train with it, the school prospered. “European ideas” about infantry were introduced during the 1905 class year, said Frances, and terms such as “fire power,” “mass,” and “economy of force” made their way into the institutional vocabulary.


Future Major General Logan Feland (in 1904 still Captain Feland) served as an instructor at the School of Application while it was in Annapolis. Feland had not attended the school as a lieutenant, since he was commissioned during one of the many times school operations were suspended. However, he was serious about his career and took advantage of the professional journals and books which abounded at the time. Keeping up with the latest in professional thinking meant reading the *Infantry Journal* produced at Fort Leavenworth, and he did so. While an instructor, he taught classes in tactics, field engineering, ordnance and gunnery, military law, hygiene, and signaling. Before and after classes, the instructors also ran drill, conducted physical exercise sessions, and guided students through the various processes of garrison duty. Some of Feland’s fellow instructors would go on to become luminaries in the Marine Corps’ PME system: James C. Breckinridge, Robert Dunlap, and John Russell in particular.\textsuperscript{47}

In his *History*, Frances spent time editorializing on the School of Application as it operated in the 1900s and 1910s. His perspective as a World War II Marine must be kept in mind. For example, he relates the story of “one field officer” who refused to adopt new theories about infantry: there was no proof they worked, said the officer. Frances had little patience for the reluctant innovator:

“’We have always done it that way,’ has stymied improvements more than once. It cannot be said truthfully that the school was always progressive and always decadent. Rather the school is the arena in which the diehards and the radicals argue their points, and the amount of progress made is in direct proportion to the caliber of thinking involved.”\textsuperscript{48}

There is no citation or indication as to the identity of this field officer, or how Frances came to know his story. The *History* was written by a junior officer who had just spent nearly two years in the Pacific. He had many opportunities to solicit the opinions of the more experienced officers around him. No doubt, in a tense combat environment, a fair share of critical or blame-placing comments were made. Failure, large or small, had to be examined and some reason had to be


\textsuperscript{48} Frances, *History of the Marine Corps Schools*, 18.
found for the failure. It was easy for a combat commander to blame a distant school or backward colleague for failures which led to death and defeat, and the assignment of blame at the school level had the added benefit of seeming easy to fix. A school curriculum could be amended much more easily than a complicated operational doctrine. Although tasked with writing a “history,” Frances had been trained as a journalist and his method appears to have been based on the “interview,” making notes of others’ thoughts. When he included those thoughts in his History, he failed to provide information on who offered the thoughts or in what context. It is also probably that the Corps itself had little desire to include too many names, as those interviewed were still serving within the organization.

Relocation in 1907: Port Royal, South Carolina

In 1907 the school moved to Port Royal, South Carolina, making use of recently-vacated spaces at the former Parris Island Navy Yard. The move to South Carolina was notable primarily because it gave students the opportunity to conduct live training with troops from the Marine Barracks at Port Royal. It is unclear how much of the training was done using Marine Barracks personnel, and how much was done using the students themselves. (As a point of reference, in interwar Philadelphia none of the local Marines were used in training exercises for TBS students.) However, the Port Royal move was specifically praised because of the availability of troops so it is reasonable to conclude that the troops were used for training with the lieutenants. The billeting spaces were also larger than previous school environments, allowing for more officer students to attend, and enjoy better living conditions. In years past, the commencement of the school year had varied according to when enough officers were available to form a class, when instructors were able to report for duty, and when school facilities were

constructed or repairs. The Port Royal School of Application stabilized the pattern, operating on a calendar-year schedule which began in January and ended in December.\(^{50}\)

A key account of the Port Royal era was the autobiography *Once a Marine* by General Archer Alexander Vandegrift. Vandegrift graduated from the School of Application in 1910. In 1963, Vandegrift recalled:

The School of Application...was located at Parris Island, a short distance by boat from Port Royal, South Carolina. From the deck on an ancient mail boat, *Summer Girl*, the island appeared about as inviting as the arctic and the first look ashore did not change matters.\(^{51}\)

Quartered on the upper floor of a machine shop, Vandegrift and his classmates slept three to a room and the entire class shared a single lavatory. But, he goes on, those physical hardships were only the “first shock”:

All of us being college men, we had expected to be treated as commissioned officers. Instead we learned we were to resemble inmates of some sort of penal institution. Organized into a company of sections, we began a routine that did not greatly vary in the next eleven months. Revellie sounded at six. We fell out to setting-up exercises followed by a doubletime run around the station. We then washed, made up bunks, breakfasted and marched to class. Class was forty-five minutes, then a short break followed by another class, and so on all day.\(^{52}\)

Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Eli K. Cole, the “Marine Officers’ School” became the name of the institution during the year in which Vandegrift attended. The change in name was not accompanied by any sharp departure from the existing course content. Vandegrift listed the curriculum in his autobiography: drill regulations, guard duty, small arms regulations, the rifle, signals, security and information, organization and tactics, military law, administration, engineering, hygiene and naval gunnery.\(^{53}\) Classes involving “live firing” weapons were

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conducted during summer months at a range near Sea Girt, New Jersey. The trip to Sea Girt would have been a welcome change from the oppressive humidity and insect-infested swamps of Parris Island. Vandegrift, who would go on to command the 1st Marine Division during the invasion of Guadalcanal, summed up his basic education: “The school proved interesting in a number of ways and I certainly learned a considerable amount, including discipline...But I cannot say I regretted graduation day.”  

In 1909, the Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps was George F. Elliot, a veteran of the Spanish American War and popular hero of the battle at Cuzco Well. Elliot’s Annual Report did not contain a section on education. In one passage there was a request that officers being examined for promotion have their “moral examination” before they had a physical examination. To Elliot, it was a waste of time and manpower to provide a medical exam to a man who would soon afterward be disqualified due to educational, behavioral, or legal shortcomings. Elliot did not appear to be hostile to educational pursuits, but his priorities were clearly not the same as those of Charles Heywood. His longest single report was on the state of target practice ranges and the need for more space to train the Marines in marksmanship. Elliot did not include any full-length reports from school directors or any detailed lists of textbooks or curricula.

When he did mention the Marine Corps’ various schools (i.e. the Advanced Base School in Rhode Island and the Marine Officers School), Elliot did so in the context of reporting on the Marine Barracks at which each was located. Elliot used the same standard compliments for the course of instruction and the students as had his predecessors, such as “very thorough” and “very satisfactory.” He requested that the Navy Department consider retaining Port Royal for the Marines for at least two additional years (beyond the existing lease), in order that a new two-


month course on “the sea service” be added to the curriculum. However, in the 1910 report, Elliot also described the poor living conditions at Port Royal, and requested that serious repairs be made to the facility in order that instruction may be better carried out.

The Navy and Marine Corps had allowed the Port Royal facilities to fall into disrepair as early as 1903, in preparation for a relocation to nearby Charleston, South Carolina. The use of the Parris Island location for officer education had not been foreseen at that time. Perhaps one explanation is that another, larger, more convenient, less disease-prone location was high on the Commandant’s list. In the same 1910 report, Elliot revealed his personal hope that Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, might in the future be the home of the Corps’ educational institutions. Though he desired a permanent Marine detachment at Port Royal, the Philadelphia station was better suited to long term use for educational purposes. He asserted:

> Philadelphia is rapidly becoming the most important post of the Marine Corps. It is at this station that nearly all expeditionary forces are mobilized and equipped and from there transferred to their destination, especially so in view of the fact that the depot of supplies of the Marine Corps is located in that city. It is hoped that in the near future Philadelphia can be made a depot for the institution of all recruits enlisted in the East, as well as the location of the Marine Officers’ School and the Advanced base School, which are now located at Port Royal, S.C., and New London, Conn., respectively.

Elliot’s vision did not come to pass. The Marine Officers School and Advanced Base School did relocate to Philadelphia, and the Depot of Supplies at Philadelphia hosted Marines, soldiers, and sailors on their way to Europe in 1917-1918, but the “great hub” of Elliot’s imagination faded in the late 1930s as the Quantico base in northern Virginia proved more spacious.

In a striking indicator of relative priorities, in 1911 the Marine Officers School was moved to Norfolk, Virginia, in order to make room for a military prison at Port Royal. Norfolk was even more crowded and ill-suited to be a school than Annapolis had been. In his *Annual Report of the Navy Department* (Washington, DD: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1903), 1216.

Report for 1911, Major General William P. Biddle, the new Commandant, highlighted the plight of the Marine Officers School:

There are no quarters for the student officers nor for the instructing officers; the former are living in tents in a camp which has been erected on the parade ground, and the latter are living outside the station.\(^{58}\)

The continual placement of the school in inadequate buildings and poor locations highlighted the lack of priority given to education, at least from a facilities perspective. The Naval War College experienced similar problems finding and keeping a location, detailed in Ronald Spector’s *Professors of War*. The *Annual Report* of 1912 reemphasized the poor conditions in Norfolk, but the Marine Officers School remained in place for the time being.

**Final Years Prewar: Officer Quality and School Stability**

In 1914, a problem with officer quality was highlighted which, though not necessarily a reflection on the Marine Officers School, still had an impact on it. In 1911 Major General Biddle had written that he was facing a twofold problem with regard to officer procurement: he was not getting enough officers, and he was not getting good ones. In particular, Biddle discovered that the new second lieutenants who were commissioned “from civilian life” (meaning those who attended a public college, private college, or military preparatory college such as the Virginia Military Institute) were often physically unfit to perform their duties.\(^{59}\) He proceeded to “earnestly recommend” that priority be given to United States Naval Academy graduates for commissioning in the Marine Corps. More interesting, he proposed an alteration to the officer rank structure, creating a “provisional” or “acting” rank of second lieutenant so that non-Academy graduates would only be given a provisional second lieutenant’s commission. This


would allow the Marine Corps to “weed out” any substandard officers over the period of one or two years. However, Biddle’s suggestion was not taken up by the Navy Department before he relinquished control of the Marine Corps to George R. Barnett. When the question of officer quality was taken back up later, it was not in the context of source of new commissions. A permanent system for balancing the number of commissions from the various undergraduate sources would only be finalized after World War II. In the meantime, the establishment of Reserve Officer Training Corps programs at civilian colleges had remedied many deficiencies in the civilian candidates.

In his brief discussion of the Marine Officers’ School itself, Barnett spent more time emphasizing the lack of satisfactory accommodations at Norfolk than discussing the content of the course. It seems that, by this time, the curriculum and conduct of the Marine Officers’ School was more or less taken for granted. This should be understood in a positive sense: the Commandant’s assumption that the school was going along as usual demonstrated that it had achieved a stable existence. There was no longer a need to justify the educational project to Congress by means of lengthy, detailed reports. The school existed, it was performing an essential task, it was flourishing, and the instructors were qualified and competent. These are the assertions implicit in Barnett’s lack of commentary. Elsewhere his reports critiqued at length any program which was underperforming, so it is reasonable to expect that any problem with the school would have made its way into his report. Instead, he merely wrote:

> The policy of sending the student officers to camp for a period of approximately six weeks for practical exercises in military topography, field engineering, and minor tactics has been of great advantage and without question increased the efficiency of all officers completing the course.

60. Bernard Nalty, *A Brief History of U.S. Marine Corps Officer Procurement 1775–1969* (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1970) Military services used to distinguish between officer “procurement” and enlisted “recruitment.” This is probably an accident of the word “recruit” referring to an enlisted man specifically. Studies on officer procurement do not examine any part of the officer’s career after the moment he accepts a commission or accepts an appointment to a service academy. Studies on recruitment typically ignore the process of officer procurement altogether. Today officers are said to be “selected” rather than “recruited.”
Barnett believed he was presiding over a mature educational establishment. The six-week encampment, an innovation introduced some time after 1909, was a capstone element, proving the Marine Officers School was a stable and essential part of the Corps.

In his manuscript, Anthony Frances suggested that, interruptions for temporary expeditionary duty in Central American notwithstanding, the 1910s were the real pinnacle of school development prior to World War I. He described the program at the time:

The curriculum now contained a great deal of practical work, and the theory of learning by doing was having a new vital influence on most courses. Standard Army textbooks were used in tactics and field engineering. The law course was augmented by the study of elementary law, criminal law, and the law of evidence, supplementing the prescribed course in naval law and procedure. In addition a course in bookkeeping was available to all officers for the first time.  

But the heyday was not without its drawbacks. Frances complained that the general state of education, coupled with the lack of professional training for instructors, rendered the staff less than ideal and the students less than dedicated:

Few of the instructors were “educators” in the sense that they had studied the psychology of learning and perfected the art of teaching. At the same time universal higher learning was still something comparatively new--even in civilian life...There was still the tendency to regard schooling only as a delay in getting a job. This same attitude was reflected to some extent in the Marine Corps. The young officers were invariably eager to get on with the more serious business of duty...  

It was somewhat anachronistic for Frances to suppose any instructor in a professional school was likely to also be a professional educator; even today very few uniformed staff members of a given PME institution answer that description. Furthermore, memoirs written by students placed much higher value on an officer’s career experience than his teaching credentials. The focus on expeditionary duties and the coming whirlwind of World War I eclipsed any interest in prewar professional military education from either biographers, memoirists, or historians. No official Marine Corps position on the credentialing of instructors has survived, either.


Frances, proving this point, disposes with the remaining years prior to World War I in one
deft paragraph, describing a tempo which must have been very familiar to him from his experiences in 1941:

On August 29, 1916, Congress passed the National Defense Act, providing for a substantial increase in Marine Corps personnel, fixing the total strength at 600 officers, 40 warrant officers, and 14,891 enlisted men. A month after the Defense Act was passed, 23 officers were commissioned from the ranks and were given a brief course at the Norfolk school. Forty-two were given commissions in February 1917, followed by a brief period of instruction. Several more contingents followed, but many officers, including those holding temporary commissions made during the war, were hurried off to their new stations without any study at the Marine Officers School, which was then virtually eclipsed by the urgent need for basic training. The school all but closed, and what remained of it moved to Marine Barracks Quantico, Virginia.63

The 1915 and 1916 Annual Reports each dedicated one paragraph to the Marine Officers School, reporting that the conduct of the institution continued as it had before.64 An encampment at Gettysburg had been added to the program of instruction, to give students additional field training. Unfortunately Barnett’s terse reporting style did not include details of the encampment. An extended period at the rifle range at Winthrop, Maryland, was also added for more strenuous marksmanship practice and examinations. In 1917, the Marine Officers School was effectively discontinued in favor of a three month course held at Quantico.65 As soon as one course ended, a new course began. The Marine Corps was putting itself on a war footing.

63. Frances, History of the Marine Corps Schools, 22.


Chapter 3 - Sea Service Heritage

The Basic School was located at the Philadelphia Navy Yard from 1924 until 1941. During that time, just over eighty Marines served as instructors. There was always one officer serving as “Commanding Officer” or “Director” or “Officer in Charge.” The rest of the staff were Captains or First Lieutenants with the simple title “Instructor, Basic School,” until the late 1930s when the size of the school demanded the introduction of a Major’s billet for an “Executive Officer.” A small auxiliary staff of enlisted Marines were also present at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. The program of instruction was informed by the career experiences and educational background of the instructors. In later chapters we will examine the explicit or “formal” doctrine contained in the curriculum of the Basic School. In this chapter and the next, implied or “informal” doctrine, made up of the instructors’ aggregated experience and ideological backgrounds, will be examined.

The instructors were born between 1890 and 1916. Their childhoods were colored by the Spanish-American War, the ebullient American President Theodore Roosevelt and his “Steel Navy” and the birth of a new technological age. The typewriter, the diesel engine and safety razors had recently made their debut. Indoor plumbing was no longer an urban luxury, but had made its way across the plains and was a literal fixture in all but the poorest homes. Electric lighting was commonplace. Almost all of these men could remember what life was like before the Titanic sank, and before the world had become engulfed in the Great War. Nearly all of them would live to see a second world war of even greater scale, and see the Marine Corps grow rapidly from a peacetime strength of 17,000 in 1938 to over 475,000 in 1944.1

The experience of these men as career military officers was filled with change, innovation, development, adjustment and the need for flexibility. However, the early days of their professional lives were primarily occupied with the theme of naval expeditionary warfare.

This played out at sea, in the form of naval maneuvers, or on land as the Marines formed the extremity of early twentieth century American efforts at carrying out the Monroe Doctrine. I do not agree with the more strongly worded analyses of the Marine Corps during this period, which insist that the Marines were apathetic and their mission ill defined, or that the Marines were aimless or purposeless in the post-sail-Navy world prior to the publication of the Landing Operations manual in the late 1930s. On the contrary, the limited and well-defined task of serving with the “Naval Expeditionary Brigade” (later the “Advanced Base Force”) was carried out by the Marine Corps with regularity and effectiveness, continuously from its introduction in the late 1880s until the adoption of the Fleet Marine Force concept in 1934. That was their mission, and it was conveyed to the newest officers at the Basic School throughout the interwar period as a matter of course.

I also do not agree with the common theme that the Marine Corps was merely a resting ground for “Useless Sons Made Comfortable:” the derisive name for a group of politicians’ younger sons or rebellious nephews whose commissioning in the Marine Corps supposedly marked only the moment when they ceased to be a social liability for their family. Still other authors emphasize that the Marine Corps “had new responsibilities” beginning in 1900 or “began” engaging in peacekeeping operations around the world. On the contrary, the Marines did not ever cease doing those things from the end of the American Civil War until World War I. The pre-1900 Marine Corps was small, administratively backward, and suffering from the same

2. Schulimson, The Marine Corps’ Search for a Mission, 1880–1898; Leo III Daughtery, Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare, 1898–1945: Profiles of Fourteen American Military Strategists (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland, 2009). Both authors describe the industrious activity of the Marine Corps at the turn of the century and just beyond, but do not connect that activity with any underlying purpose. They omit and study of Marine Corps schools during the time period and thus miss key evidence that the Marines did, in fact, have a mission in mind for themselves. I believe overemphasis of outspoken Marine reformers like Henry Clay Cochrane also contributes to this skewed perspective.

stagnation in its officer corps as were the Army and Navy. However, they were not lacking in things to do, and when called upon they performed satisfactorily.

The United States Naval Academy

Though it is a consensus among both memoirists and scholars that career shapes an officer more than college, it is appropriate to take a moment to consider the United States Naval Academy and its influence on the Marine Corps. It is a maritime service academy and, in varying percentages over the years, has typically provided a large number of new Marine officers on an annual basis. Many Commandants of the Marine Corps were graduates of the Naval Academy; during the interwar period there was consistently a 10-25% portion of each Basic School class coming into the Marines directly from Annapolis.

In a preface to the Annual Register of the United States Naval Academy (1923), Superintendent Henry B. Wilson wrote:

The broad mission of the Naval Academy has been defined as follows: to mold the material received into educated gentlemen, thoroughly indoctrinated with honor, uprightness and truth, with practical rather than academic minds, with thorough loyalty to country, with a groundwork of educational fundamentals upon which may build the finished naval officer, capable of upholding, whenever and wherever may be necessary, the honor of the United States.4

Wilson served as head of the Academy from 1921-1925 and had as good a grasp as any what the purpose of his institution was. The United States Naval Academy, founded in 1845, predates the American Civil War. Its biographers typically consider the “real” beginning of its history as a serious educational institution to be 1851, when the four-year academic cycle was initiated.5 Prior to that, the state of naval education was probably best described as “primitive,” and it reflected poorly on the Naval establishment in comparison to the United States Army and its

4. Henry Wilson, Annual Register of the United States Naval Academy (Annapolis, Maryland: USNA, 1923).

highly regarded military academy at West Point. The education and training of future naval officers was always the goal, but post-Civil War improvements in recruitment, applicant screening and instructor qualification meant the goal was much more consistently achieved in the second half of the nineteenth century than it had been in the years between the Mexican War and the southern rebellion.

Beginning in the 1880s, the national political mood of the United States allowed the Navy to enjoy a resurgence of important. Popular writers have pointed out the American habit of failing to prepare adequately for crisis, trusting that “grit” or “determination” can make up the difference when needed. The will to compete with major European power, particularly Britain, was not enough: grit was going to have to be backed up with something substantial. In this case, the Americans began to work toward a position of maritime strength which could put force behind the desire. Midshipmen were put through programs of navigation, geography, advanced mathematics, foreign language, gunnery and ordnance, marine engineering, law, naval construction, physics, seamanship and English. Increasingly complex technology led to alterations in the content of courses like naval construction and engineering, but in general the list of topics considered important to a Navy officer’s education remained constant. The struggle for acceptance faced by advocates of the Naval War College during the late 1880s showed very clearly the nature of the Naval Academy curriculum: the postgraduate school was criticized for being merely “a continuation of the scientific and engineering curriculum” taught to midshipmen. That perception was in error, of course, but those who failed to see the strategic


8. Hoover, Arms Control: The Interwar Naval Limitation Agreements, 12.

and operational development made possible at the War College naturally saw any further technical education of naval officers as redundant.

Students at the Naval Academy from its founding until well into the 1900s completed a “generalist” curriculum. They were offered no electives or customization, other than a limited “branching” opportunity to choose a specialty field during their final year. For example, engineer officers and line officers would take slightly different tracks based on the relative needs of their chosen specialities. The detailed, mechanistic nature of the education at the Academy during this time period was in keeping with the ideas of progressivism and progressive education which were in vogue at the time. The supreme importance of having a scientific mind, for example, was a hallmark of the era. Data, studies, comparative analyses and experimentation framed the educational environment in many professions, not just the military. Those ideas were still part of the Naval Academy environment into the 1920s and 1930s, though the emphasis on wrote memorization of facts—the “purely academic mind” Superintendent Wilson warned against—had faded somewhat in favor of a more active learning style.

During the interwar period, the average class of midshipmen at the Naval Academy was between 700-800 young men. From each class, anywhere from 5-30 would join the Marine Corps. Graduates were intimately familiar with the rank structure, social mores, daily life, customs and courtesies and physical discipline involved in military life. They had a better chance of making good political connections than the average “civilian” did, since they had a preexisting relationship with their elected representatives who appointed them to the Academy in the first place. But they were not guaranteed to be better officers or more successful leaders. The only real reason Naval Academy graduates tend to be examined and commented upon in the context of military education in the Navy and Marine Corps is simply that they are an easy group to identify. Their status as a midshipman is easy to trace in Navy lists and public records, as opposed to the widely varied and unpredictable records of a Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) cadet. However, they did not make up a majority of Marine officers. Rarely did they comprise more than 50% of a class of new officers in a given year, and by the late 1930s they
represented fewer than 20% of all Marine second lieutenants. The number of Marines commissioned from the ranks, as well as the number of Marines who attended a military college or an ROTC program, was just as significant as the midshipmen demographic: they are merely harder to group together.

One genuine aspect of the midshipmen’s presence at the Basic School is the amount and type of maritime knowledge they brought with them. The explicit consensus among senior Marines was that commissioning a Naval Academy midshipmen was preferable to commissioning a cadet from West Point. That clearly indicates that the Marine Corps was a naval service and that new officers who already understood something about sea service would be at an advantage. Looking beyond Annapolis at the experience of Marine officers with the Fleet, we will see that the maritime heritage of the Marine Corps continued to shape its identity throughout the interwar period.

*Sea Service: The Advanced Base and Naval Expeditionary Brigade*

The strategic options for American sea power after the age of sail were understood as either “secure permanent overseas colonies” or “be capable of seizing temporary overseas bases for the home fleet.” The latter option was more palatable to the American Congress. So Navy planners set about making their infant fleet into an oceangoing flying column. First, the type of fleet had to be decided upon. Despite sharp opposition, the “battleship faction” won out in the 1890s and the United States Navy began building a fleet based on capital ships. The resulting “top heavy” fleet was located on the eastern seaboard and as a result was called the “Atlantic Fleet.”

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directed the Marine Corps to develop some procedure for established advanced bases around the world, to protect the Navy’s resupply positions.\textsuperscript{12} Almost immediately, the Board’s instruction was validated by events in the Pacific: fatal damage done to the Russian fleet at the battle of Tsushima in 1905 clearly showed what could happen to a capital fleet whose journey toward the battle space had been long and arduous.

In addition, the famous cruise of the “Great White Fleet” in 1907 shone a light on the fleet’s inherent problems of supply and self-defence. Intended as a training mission, field test, and “flag showing” all in one, the cruise consumed 430,000 tons of coal, all of which was supplied by foreign entities (primarily the British).\textsuperscript{13} The United States was unwilling openly to become a global empire, but the need to support and supply their mobile fleet was undeniable. Something similar to the British infrastructure was needed for the American plan of “national defense via seapower” to be realized. Logistic support for the Atlantic Fleet was made a priority. This was a welcome relief for the officers who had been personally serving on coal-boiler ships for the previous 20 years, and who knew all too well the perils of traveling around an ocean where fuel supplies and trouble spots were rarely located near one another.\textsuperscript{14} It would be a matter of years, though, and not months before the Navy, Congress and the Army settled on exactly how the fleet was going to be supplied and from what locations.

At the end of that long development process was a decision to use the Marines, in battalion-sized formations, to secure or defend bases needed for coal-powered ships.\textsuperscript{15} This was the “Advanced Base Force,” first established as a detachment of give officers and forty enlisted

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Bettez, \textit{Kentucky Marine: Major General Logan Feland and the Making of the Modern USMC}, 59.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Baer, \textit{One Hundred Years of Sea Power}, 47.
\item \textsuperscript{14} A.T. Mahan to Ashe, 12 March 1885. Alfred Thayer Mahan, \textit{Letters and Papers of Alfred T. Mahan} (Annapolis, Maryland: US Naval Institute Press, 1975), 594.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Daughtery, \textit{Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare, 1898–1945: Profiles of Fourteen American Military Strategists}.
\end{itemize}
Marines at the Marine Barracks in Newport, Rhode Island.\textsuperscript{16} According to the Commandant, the Advanced Base School was a “post-graduate” type of school, and proficiency at the basics of military science was presumed. Brigadier General Commandant Elliot wrote a memorandum detailing his expectations, that the school be “theoretical and practical, systematic and progressive.”(elliot memo clifford pg 13) Elliot’s message has been quoted by scholars since as the first heralding of the Marines’ use of combined arms.

In the first decade, the Marine Corps could ill afford so many men dedicated to the Advanced Base mission, and fleet exercises suffered from a lack of manpower. Even those commanding officers who strongly believed in the Advanced Base mission were often hesitant to give up any men from their already undermanned ship’s detachments or sparse Marine Barracks complements. But the emphasis on base seizure and defense grew rapidly within the Navy. A bigger Marine Corps was called for in every Annual Report from the Commandant to the Secretary of the Navy. By 1912, over fifteen percent of the entire Marine Corps had passed through the tiny Advanced Base School in Rhode Island.\textsuperscript{17} Soon, discussions about the use of Marines in base-seizure operations occupied many pages of the Marine Corps Gazette during its initial years in print.\textsuperscript{18} One anonymous author even informed readers of the Gazette that the Advanced Base Force mission was not only familiar to all Marines, it formed “the rock whence we are hewn.”\textsuperscript{19} All signs were pointing toward the Advanced Base Force being the future of the

\textsuperscript{16} Philbin, “The Roots of the S-2: The Role of the Naval Brigades and the Advance Base Force in the Development of the Marine Corps Tactical Intelligence Officer,” 142.

\textsuperscript{17} Bettez, Kentucky Marine: Major General Logan Feland and the Making of the Modern USMC, 63.


\textsuperscript{19} “The Marine Corps and the General Board of the Navy,” Marine Corps Gazette 16, no. 2
Marine Corps, the size of the Corps just needed to catch up to the vision.

The Advanced Base Force was the direct predecessor of the Landing Operations and Amphibious Landing Doctrine concepts which emerged from the Marine Corps Schools in the 1930s. It is true that other adventures occupied the Marines in the early twentieth century (i.e. Legation Guard duty in China), but the starting point for most mission from 1900-1930 was some kind of naval expeditionary action. The Advanced Base Force was the pre-World War I Marine Corps’ solution to their ongoing need to remain relevant as means of waging war changed. It was not a new problem. As one Marine Corps Gazette article opined,

...Harnessing complex logistics to produce functionally simple tactical units, so flexible that they can fight either sea or land forces, has been our root problem ever since technology invaded war.\textsuperscript{20}

Put more simply, the Marines had to marry their naval heritage to the land warfare environment. Because these naval expeditions formed the majority of the Marines’ activities during this time period, they were necessarily familiar to the instructors at the Basic School. The men who served as instructors at TBS were the direct contemporaries, and sometimes the classmates, and occasionally the combat-seasoned peers of those who developed Amphibious Landing Doctrine. While they were unable to be part of the Quantico-based research and revolution in doctrine development because they were assigned to instructor duty in Philadelphia, they shared an intellectual heritage with those planners. We know a little about what they knew and what they thought, because we see the doctrinal products of their generation brought into use during World War II. The evidence for naval-type missions’ influence on the Marine Corps is found in the pages of the Marine Corps Gazette, as well as in the actual missions carried out by the Marines during the first half of the twentieth century.

Using the *Instructions for Infantry and Artillery, United States Navy* (until 1904) and *The Landing Force and Small Arms Instructions, United States Navy* (1905 onward), Marines of the Advanced Base Force developed a system for approaching, securing, and defending land bases.\(^\text{21}\)

Training for the mission was, at least by modern standards, “rudimentary” at best, but the Marines were still training and were doing so in a systematic fashion. The level of detail and specialization provided was comparable to that of other militaries at the time, and compatible with the small size of the Marine Corps. In later years, specialists in intelligence, logistics, supporting arms, engineering and communication would be given exhaustive training comparable to that already inflicted upon Marines in areas like marksmanship and drill. That training extended to education of officers as well.\(^\text{22}\)

Classroom training was the least important part of the system. Whenever possible, hands-on training in the form of practice maneuvers was conducted. Exercises such as at Culebra in 1902-1903, Grande Island in 1904 and Subic Bay in 1907 formed the bulk of Advanced Base Force operations during the first decade. The lack of manpower, as well as political questions over whether the Army should be responsible for commanding any land-based operations, kept the Marines from developing the concept beyond the basics outlined in manuals such as the *Landing Force and Small Arms Instructions*.\(^\text{23}\) In 1910, the Secretary of the Navy ordered the Commandant to take responsibility for the Advance Base Force equipment being


\[\text{22. Awareness of a distinction between “training” and “education” is not something that happens in the pages of contemporary journals for the time period. In the case of specialized training for logistics, etc, it simply was not considered necessary to provide extra schooling. In the early 1900s, it was enough that “someone” was asked to collect intelligence and “someone” was in charge of supply. Any competent junior officer was capable of fulfilling those tasks. There was no table of organization or other mechanism to ensure that someone with the correct knowledge, skills, and abilities was placed in a given role. No parameters were laid out. This strikes the modern eye strangely, but helps shed light on exactly the type of “generalist” education schools such as TBS were trying to achieve.}\]

stored at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. He did so, but it was another year before the Marine Corps decided to locate the Advance Base Force itself in Philadelphia. With equipment, storage space and berthing now co-located, the Marine Corps began developing the Advanced Base Force concept in earnest. In 1913, “a brigade of two understrength regiments embarked for the Caribbean. In January 1914, the brigade landed on Culebra in the first large-scale test of the Advanced Base concept.”

By the time the Marine Corps Gazette began publishing in 1916, there was enough interest in the Advanced Base mission to guarantee an article on the topic in almost every issue.

One future commanding officer of the Basic School, Major Julian C. Smith, attended the Advanced Base School in Philadelphia in the 1910s. At that time, Marine Corps visionary Logan Feland was in command. Feland’s approach to education was “on the job” and students held a variety of garrison duty positions in addition to completing coursework. Smith learned to lay mines, build fortifications, operated land-based defense artillery and practice field living, all on the same property which would house the Basic School 15 years later. The Advanced Base School at that time was already beginning to develop and teach concepts of amphibious landings, but Smith noted that the danger of enemy fortifications had not yet been foreseen, so the Marines did not practice any techniques for landing under fire.

The Marines were clearly emerging as specialists in the field of landing operations. In the archives of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, a number of lectures delivered by Marines focused on the Advanced Base Force. Major Dion Williams was an especially enthusiastic speak on the topic, contributing student papers, lecture and pamphlets to the War College library shelves. Major R.H. Dunlap and Major John H. Russell (former commander of the School of Application and future Commandant of the Marine Corps) also wrote papers on the


subject. These lectures by Marines are the only items in the War College archive which pertain to the Advanced Base Force--Navy officers of the same era do not appear to have written or lectured on the topic at all. In 1909 Russell lectured on “Construction of Advanced Bases,” and wrote papers entitled “An Outline Study of the Defense of Advanced Naval Bases” and “Notes on Field Construction Work and Guns for Advance Naval Bases.” In 1910 Russell lectured on “The Preparation of War Plans for the Establishment and Defense of a Naval Defense Base.” Dunlap gave a lecture entitled “The Naval Advanced Base” in 1911, and “The Temporary Naval Advanced Base” in 1912. Williams attended the War College in 1912-1913 and lectured on “The Naval Advanced Base.” All three held leadership positions at Headquarters Marine Corps during the interwar period, and all three wrote articles or made policy decisions related to Marine Corps Schools in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

Most importantly, the establishment of the Marine Corps as the designated Advanced Base Force, and by extension as the resident experts on landing operations, continued after World War I and continued seamlessly into the era of Amphibious Warfare Doctrine. In 1924, Captain Dudley Knox, USN, published “Bases Mean Ships” in the February issue of the *Marine Corps Gazette*. In that article he described the “major mission” of the Marine Corps as directly related to naval strategy: to multiply “the number and power of naval ships through ensuring the availability of naval bases.” Know hearkened back to the battle of Jutland, when British ships were forced to make a long journey home to refit, while the German Navy’s forward bases, with prepositioned supplies, gave them operational flexibility. Knox, already retired by the mid-1930s, used his influence and connections to urge military planners to draw on lessons of history: his calls for bases would be heeded in World War II, though (somewhat ironically) for the benefit of heavy bombers more than for battleships.

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Other articles appeared in the *Gazette* in the 1930s which perpetuated the Advanced Base Force concept. In 1932, Colonel E.B. Miller took the time to define the mission of the Marine Corps in three parts:

1. To assist the fleet in establishing and maintaining American sea-power in the theatre of war by land operations in the seizure, defense and holding of temporary advanced bases until relieved by the Army, and by such other land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of the naval campaign.
2. To support the Navy by the prompt mobilization and dispatch to designated areas of such expeditionary forces as may be required by the Navy in protecting the interests of the United States in foreign countries, and in carrying out government policies in emergencies not involving war.
3. To assist the Navy in the maintenance and defense of certain naval establishments within and without the continental limits of the United States, furnish detachments for service on board certain vessels of the fleet, and perform and maintain duties and agencies throughout the Marine Corps.²⁸

Those three areas were the current, up to date, modern mission of the Marine Corps circa 1932. That was prior to the introduction of the Fleet Marine Force and before the promulgation of the Amphibious Operations Manual. Yet one would be hard pressed to find any essential difference between Colonel Miller’s definition and one for 1940 or 1945.

*Small Wars: Battle Beyond the Sea*

The “other” primary Marine Corps mission between 1900 and 1940 was the “small wars” mission, which played out in Central America, the Caribbean and (in a more limited sense) in China. This was a different kind of fusion of naval expeditionary warfare and land warfare. An Advanced Base Force exercise took only days or weeks to complete, and was focused on employing quick action tactics to seize a stronghold or defend a supply area. In contrast, “small wars” usually ended up being years-long conflicts that may have begun with Marines disembarking from a ship, but otherwise were more traditional land warefare engagements. They came complete with garrison life, lengthy occupations and civil peace keeping. The interwar

students at TBS received instruction in “small wars” and “anti-guerilla” warfare from old campaigners like Lewis B. Puller. But the interwar instructor themselves had received no such training. The formulae for jungle battles and impromptu street fighting in tiny villages were developed on the job. This situation recalled the founding days of the School of Application, in which Captain Mannix and his fellow instructors relied on their own experience to create a curriculum. The small wars Marines of the twentieth century did the same, and the schools were dependent on those individuals.

The official United States Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual* was written in the mid-1930s and published multiple times, with a “finalized” version released in 1940. However, several decades of experience went into the composition of that work, beginning long before 1930. All during the time the *Manual* was being written, an oral version was being taught at the Basic School. The *Manual* was comprehensive, covering many topics: general characteristics of small wars, the strategy of small wars, psychology in small wars, concentration, transportation, ports of embarkation, training management for small wars, operations orders and instructions (Navy), debarkation, supply plans, neutral zones and movement inland, disarming populations, collection and custody of arms, armed native organizations, relations: military-naval-civil, military territorial organization and methods of pacification, principles and functions of the Marine staff, signal communication, infantry weapons and equipment, light artillery in small wars, defense-attack-occupation of small towns, animal transportation and mounted detachments, convoys and convoy escorts, organizing the infantry patrol, infantry patrols in the field, use and employment of aviation, river operations, chemical agents, medical topics, withdrawal from foreign territory, military government and supervision of elections.

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exhaustive table of contents, the *Manual* was not accompanied by training plans or curriculum through which its lessons could be communicated to young Marines.

Like the Advanced Base Force, small wars fighting was a concept with which all Marines of the era were familiar, even if they did not personally fill a billet involved in that mission. Based on the number of articles in the *Marine Corps Gazette* from this time period, the small wars missions were considered “romantic” and garnered much attention in the way of published anecdotes, updates from the field and glowing reports of decorations awarded. It was not treated with the same academic analysis and scientific inquiry that the Advanced Base mission received. It is unfortunate that the finalization of Marine Corps doctrine on small wars coincided with the beginning of World War II, an event which marginalized the importance of small wars fighting and guaranteed that only minimal study of non-amphibious operations in the Marine Corps would be carried out over the immediately following decades. Only a few campaign studies and some excellent doctoral studies attempted to examine the development of small wars doctrine. It was completely overshadowed by the landing operations and amphibious warfare doctrine which rocketed the Marine Corps to fame beginning in 1943.

This remained true until the 1980s, when fear over proxy wars in the Caribbean fueled interest in small wars once again, and the original 1940 *Smalls Wars Manual* was reintroduced in Marine Corps Schools. Unfortunately, that interest came too late for many of the “banana wars” campaigners, who had long since died and taken many of their recollections with them. Reconstructing the memory of small wars fighting from memoirs and oral histories is only a partial substitute. The *Manual* has since been replaced by post-9/11 doctrinal works on counterinsurgency operations and today many books and papers have been written on the subject, with the assistance of a new generation’s memories and experiences.

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In addition to their own experience in the Caribbean, the Marine Corps capitalized on the limited amount of small wars experience the United States Army gathered during the Spanish American War. The Army struggled to convert its long experience in the American West, where conflict with some Native American tribes went on for decades, to the jungle terrain of the Philippines. Even more difficult was the new concept of “nation building” which the Army had not previously encountered: attempting to create a functioning civil structure in the midst of civil war was beyond their expertise. There was also an extensive amount of experience to be gained from the British Army, especially in the Indian subcontinent where a great deal of “insurgent” activity took place. The British understood the need for cultural awareness and devoted much training time in learning how to track, identify, subdue and communicate with enemy combatants. The Marines’ challenge was to convert those various experiences, both the Army’s culturally familiar ones and the Brit’s actually successful ones, to the mission at hand.

Between 1915 and 1933, Marine Corps historians identify three “small wars” in which personnel deployed in an active role: Haiti, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. About one third of all Marine officer were deployed to one or more of those theaters during their career, and the distribution of those officers was evenly balanced across all ranks. Informally, the lessons learned in those three wars were instilled in junior officers—and in peer officers who did not personally participate in the conflicts—through journal articles, personal correspondence and shared follow-on assignments. Formally, the Marine Corps developed official manuals and “training materials” to instruct Marines on how to properly prosecute small wars.

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One of the pioneers of small wars tactics was Major Samuel Harrington. In 1921, he composed a report entitled *The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars*. Portions of his report were printed in the *Marine Corps Gazette* during 1921 and 1922. He believed that small wars fighting was a central part of the Marine Corps mission:

United States Marines have engaged in numerous small wars as of late in Nicaragua, Mexico, Haiti and Santo Domingo. It is not improbable that Marines will continue to perform duty of this nature so that the subject is peculiarly fitting for study.\(^{35}\)

After classifying types of small wars, Harrington immediately began outlining what type of preparation an officer must make for fighting a small war, and emphasized that much of the preparation was mental. Understanding the culture and habits of the people living in the target territory, for example, was key to overcoming opposition. All of his examples were drawn from the three recent wars fought by Marines in the Caribbean, or from China.

Harrington would later serve as an umpire and official observer of Navy, Marine Corps and Army training maneuvers conducted in 1941 as U.S. forces made their first attempts at planning and executing a “real” wartime amphibious landing.\(^{36}\) He was especially critical of mock landings which were poorly supported logistically, or which failed to take into account geographic and hydrologic conditions on the target terrain. He was considered an expert in the field of landings, logistics and operations. His knowledge of military history was detailed and extensive. Harrington’s articles in the *Marine Corps Gazette* made many appeals to strategy, strategic thought, high level planning and thorough staff work. Throughout the 1920s, his essays were a major source authority on the subject of small wars. When we compare proposed topics for TBS students’ papers with the concepts put forward in Harrington’s articles, there is a clear connection. Though Harrington did not serve as an instructor at TBS himself, he clearly had influence on small wars theory in the Marine Corps as a whole. The instructors who did serve at

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TBS had personally taken part in the operations Harrington described, and carried out operations exactly like the ones he recommended.

So, the *Small Wars Manual* of 1935 was a doctrinal publication written to codify decades of experience, rather than a formative document meant to dictate behavior. It was to be used during:

...operations undertaken under executive authority wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another State whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory, for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our nation.\(^{37}\)

It is important to note that the *Small Wars Operations* manual was published after the Fleet Marine Corps concept was revealed. Even though the “new” mission (amphibious landings, which were really just a restatement of the an old mission) had been identified, the small wars knowledge base was understood not to be obsolete. It was not until the landing operations development was validated by the World War II experience that small wars fighting was definitively relegated to second-class status. In the meantime, the Marines continued to be actively interested in its various incarnations throughout the 1920s and 1930s.

*Officers and Gentlemen: Diplomatic Skill and the Marines*

Finally, the Marines’ mission in China should be considered. The employment of Marines on “Legation Guard” duty in practice around the globe during the early twentieth century, but was particularly important in China. In a delicate international environment, the Marines were required to inspire confidence and comfort in the American citizens living abroad, but without sending inappropriate signals of interference or imperialistic intent. The number of American forces stationed in China varied widely during those years. In general, permanent duties were assigned for the protection of the “Foreign Concession” districts in Peking and later also in Shanghāi, areas which had been amicably set apart by the Chinese government as early as

\(^{37}\) *Small Wars Operations*, 1.
the 1880s for the use of foreign residents. The existence of the concession at Peking was formalized in 1901, at the end of the Boxer Rebellion, and the right to permanent military guard was granted by China to each resident nation. The Marines who manned these outposts were armed with rifle and bayonet, and were fully trained and prepared to engage in active defense of American lives and property. It is a testament to the hard work of both the United States Military and the foreign service that they were called upon very infrequently. In the 1920s, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson would praise the first decades of the century as a truly remarkable era, which he considered a “rare instance where a nation recognized that farsighted self-interest was dependent on justice and fair play towards a neighbor.” Specifically, Stimson and thinkers like him were proud of the lack of aggression shown by the United States, despite the fact that up to two thousand armed Marines at a time had been present in China between 1905 and 1920.

Beginning in the 1920s, the relationship with China became much more complicated. This was due less to bilateral relations between the two countries, and much more to the significant changes which took place in the region as a whole, changes which impacted not only the countries of the Far East but all the nations whose long presence there gave them a commercial interest in the region. It was the stance of the American government, for example, to avoid any direct intervention in Chinese affairs, while at the same time the Americans were vocal supporters of Chinese autonomy. By 1925 that policy had been outlined in writing and promulgated as guidance for both State Department entities and the military. This placed some


41. Carlson, “Marines in China as an Aid to Diplomacy,” 27.

restraints on the Marines and required all military leadership, including junior officers, to understand and be able to properly represent the diplomatic position of the United States. These types of missions, which were far more sophisticated than the average infantry patrol or machine gun deployment, were considered everyday duty by early twentieth century Marines. Over one quarter of the interwar staff at the Basic School had served in China, some for multiple tours. It was part of the Corps’ mission at the time and, like small wars and sea service, would have been at the forefront of the instructors’ career experience.

Rifle Marksmanship: A Corps-wide Requirement

The next chapter will consider the role of traditional land warfare concepts and training on the development of the Marine Corps and its schools in the early twentieth century. A critical component of that training was rifle marksmanship. However, emphasis on small arms proficiency in the Marine Corps predated the organization’s first real encounter with traditional land warfare. Rifle marksmanship was a critical component of the Marine Corps’ identity as early as the 1880s and will be considered here in this chapter, alongside the three primary missions which had occupied the Marines during the Gilded Age and the early twentieth century.

At the turn of the century, the Marine Corps numbered fewer than 6,000 enlisted men. Stationed in small groups around the globe, never more than a few hundred together in one place at one time, it was imperative that there be no “wasted” effort when it came to firepower in combat. Commandant Charles Heywood recognized that “target practice” needed to be part of the training of every Marine. There was an urgent need to provide gainful occupation for the enlisted men, who were far too often overworked and denied adequate recreation time. Heywood did not bring anything into existence during his time as Commandant, but he frequently wrote that the living conditions of the enlisted Marines, both physical and moral, were unacceptable and needed improvement. He had barracks rebuilt, mess facilities and food improved, and attempted to reduce fraud and corruption in the quartermaster department. Following in his footsteps, Commandant George Elliot put the finishing touches on the improvements: in 1906 a
system of pay incentives and competitive marksmanship programs were initiated. Enlisted
Marines who qualified at increasing levels of proficiency with the rifle (and later, the pistol for
noncommissioned officers), would receive financial compensation. Competitive shooting
competitions were developed as a further means to incentivize weapons proficiency.\textsuperscript{43} The
symbolic structure of competitive teams--whose chance at an award rested on the collective
proficiency of the entire team, and where weak members’ poor performance could not be
balanced or “saved” by one exceptionally proficient shooter--recalled the life and death reliance
on other members of the unit when Marines found themselves in combat situations.

All of this marksmanship training eventually extended to officers as well. Along with
close order drill, marksmanship was a skill taught to officers as a means of instilling discipline,
creating good habits of communication and understanding among members of a unit, and
(judging from the enthusiastic reports included in the bulletins and Marine Barracks journals of
the era) providing a significant source of community morale. Officers whose personal
marksmanship abilities ranked very high were often excused from typical duties and from foreign
 postings so that they could focus their energies on training and coaching competitive
marksmanship teams. In 1910, the Marines obtained property south of Washington, DC, and
constructed a rifle range, using enlisted Marines’ labor to save costs. From then until the
beginning of World War I, any Marine who received extended range training with a weapon did
it there at “Marine Detachment Winthrop,” Maryland.\textsuperscript{44}

The Marines relied on efficient marksmanship much more than did the United States
Army or other large organizations. The \textit{Field Service Regulations} and \textit{Infantry Drill
Regulations}, even into the 1920s, were still emphatic about the principle of “massing firepower”
as the primary objective of infantry units. Achieving superiority of firepower in an Army unit

\textsuperscript{43} Robert Barde, \textit{The History of Marine Corps Competitive Marksmanship} (Washington, DC:

\textsuperscript{44} Barde, \textit{The History of Marine Corps Competitive Marksmanship}, 36.
was done with numbers, and the Army had them. In Army doctrine manuals, the need for individual proficiency with small arms was never discussed, and the existence of supporting arms rarely mentioned. Instead, they relied on “mass.” It is clear that the Marines did not attempt to make use of massing techniques in any of their primary missions of the early twentieth century. It was highly inadvisable in the jungles of Cuba to presume traditional infantry company tactics would be effective (much less safe). It was completely impossible to employ such tactics in most of the mountainous terrain of Haiti or Santo Domingo. More to the point, there were never enough Marines in a given location for traditional use of mass to even be attempted: a full strength infantry company (150 men) using the Army doctrine of the day could cover a frontage just less than 200 yards.\footnote{In Panama in 1922 there were only 358 Marines present in the entire country: how could they possibly “mass” against anything?\footnote{John Lejeune, \textit{Report of the Major General Commandant of the United States Marine Corps}, Annual Reports of the Navy Department. Report of the Secretary of the Navy (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1922), 822.} They did not even attempt it.}

After World War I, it was desirable that officers maintain proficiency on a variety of additional weapons, including machine guns, even though it was not typical for an officer to actually fire a crew-served weapon in a combat environment. Thus, throughout the League Island period, the students at TBS not only spent time on the range with the automatic rifle and pistol, but also with several different types of machine guns. Officers could qualify as marksman, sharpshooter or expert on the rifle, pistol, and Browning M1917 (and later M1919) .30 calibre machine gun. The organization-wide emphasis on individual marksmanship was a critical part of the Marine Corps culture throughout the interwar period (and before and after) and played an important role in the structure of the Basic School.

Naval Heritage and Marine Corps Culture: Conclusions

There were eighty six Marines detailed as instructors at TBS over the entire interwar period. Thirty-five of them served at least one tour in Haiti, Nicaragua, Cuba, or Santo Domingo; most served two or more of those places and on multiple tours. Some, such as Captain Nels Nelson or Lewis Puller, served over five years on those missions. Twelve of the instructors served in China. Every single instructor at TBS between 1924 and 1941 also completed at least one tour of sea duty. Their experience, both in terms of “type” of billet and “years” spent, was overwhelmingly that of a naval service officer. By contrast, only eight of the instructors went to France in 1918 and of those, only four served with a unit that saw combat. So, the majority of TBS staff in the interwar period were far more experienced with small wars and the Advanced Base Force mission than with traditional field army operations such as those encountered during World War I.

The material for this chapter was primarily taken from an examination of the Marine Corps Gazette, alongside the personal records of the instructors. A few preserved copies of their military records, indicating when they arrived and departed from each duty station. One kept telegrams and notes pertinent to his service in the Caribbean and Central American. None kept a journal, but it is interesting to note that for those officers who did keep mementos and then ensured they were donated to an archive: each kept just as many photos and papers from their early career as they did from the World Wars. It is clear, when examining the body of documentation left behind, that these missions resonated with the Marines and were an important part of their heritage.
Chapter 4 - Land Warfare Doctrine and Fort Benning

Traditional land warfare went through a series of now well-known developments during the modern era. The American Civil War has been called the last of the Napoleonic wars, and it was certainly the last to make large-scale use of traditional line tactics. Advances in technology quickly sent the maneuverable armies of the late nineteenth century into increasingly elaborate systems of self-defense. Trench warfare was born outside Petersburg in 1865, and perfected itself to an extremity by 1917. Within a generation it was overtaken by mechanized warfare and a new type of maneuverable army. During this period, the United States Army put great effort into modernization in the technical, tactical, administrative, and educational sense. Their development process was painstaking, producing a multitude of volumes to analyze the historical, organizational, educational, professional, and political implications of the various changes made in the U.S. Army between the American Civil War and World War I.

Because the Army had a clear claim to national expertise in land warfare, it was natural that the early century Marine Corps turned to the Army for insight into the more traditional aspects of land warfare. American military officers had already fought during the previous generation to produce professional reading material in their own language and which analyzed the exploits of their own Army.1 It was also out of keeping with the Marine Corps’ general culture to overemphasize European armies’ influence, as doing so meant absorbing principles of war which deemphasized the individual autonomy of the fighting man which was prized highly in America.2 The premier army of the time was German and it was the ultimate source of influence, but schools in the United States filtered that influence through their own writers and thinkers, so that at the basic level only American sources were referenced.


World War I: Impact on the USMC

In August, 1918, the Marine Corps total strength stood at just over 60,000 officers and men. Officer training for the war in France took place primarily at a newly-acquired base near Quantico, Virginia.\(^3\) Prior to the arrival of the Marines, Quantico was a narrow, muddy field between a riverboat pier and the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad’s tracks.\(^4\) There was a little general store and a lot of forest. After the Marines came, space for 7,000 men to live and drill was speedily erected, soon “ablaze” with activity day and night. Some of the exercises undertaken by the Marines at Quantico included: “perfecting themselves in close-order drill, learning new tricks of trench warfare, practicing new bayonet strokes on dummies in the company streets, and acquiring skill in the art of hand-grenade throwing.”\(^5\)

Enlisted Marines trained at Parris Island, on an installation increased dramatically in order to accommodate the almost 30,000 new Marines who would be sent with the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). Their program of study also included drill and bayonet tactics, with the addition of swimming, rope climbing, camp equipment use, and other basic skills.\(^6\) Unfortunately for these adventure seekers, only about 10,000 Marines ever made it to Europe.\(^7\) American involvement in the war simply came too late for many to participate. Those present at the Parris Island training depot recalled later that when armistice was declared there were no

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cheers--those present knew that they had missed their chance to go to war. For many, it was a moment of bitter disappointment rather than relief. Alexander “Archer” Vandegrift, later to take the 1st Marine Division to Guadalcanal, was a Captain in China and Haiti during the 1910s and tried several ways to get himself recalled to the United States. He believed that returning to one of the Expeditionary Brigades and going to France was critically important for an officer who wanted combat experience (and thus improved chances at promotion). Finally brought back from the Far East in 1918, the war ended before he received orders. He wrote: “the big one, the war to end wars, had come and gone and I had missed it. This was a personal calamity of tremendous proportions.”

Personal calamities aside, the Marine Corps as an institution quickly returned to business as usual. The majority of enlisted Marines in World War I were on a “duration of the war” basis and were rapidly discharged during 1919. In March 1920, the enlisted ranks had fallen far below authorized strength (27,400) and stood at 15,249. The Gazette and local periodicals such as the Recruiters’ Bulletin discussed the need to bring in new Marines. Newspaper ads abounded. Soon, an influx of regular (four-year) enlistees balanced the precipitous drop in numbers, and by 1922 the Marine Corps had returned to a total enlisted strength of 22,000. During that same period, the number of officers remained between 800 and 2000. The “surplus” of officers postwar was dealt with by returning many officers to the Marine Corps Reserve, which had been the original vehicle for offering them commissions during 1917-1918. The Marines had intended to use TBS to train many of these reserve officers for future wars, but instead the school was temporarily shut down and the remaining active officers detailed to other duties, primarily in China and the Caribbean. The Reserve officers were left merely with the training they received

8. Vandegrift and Asprey, Once a Marine, 53.


prior to embarking for France. Many simply disappeared back into the civilian world by resigning their commissions.\footnote{11}

30,000 Marines joined the American Expeditionary Force and traveled to Europe, with just over one third of them participating in active combat. Battle streamers and popular histories speak to the combat exploits of those men, and their contribution to the war effort is not in question. However, at the same time, another 20,000 Marines were in “combat” zones elsewhere in the world, mostly in locations which had been the scene of Marine Corps action for several decades already. Participation in the American Expeditionary Force did not radically change the Marines’ overall mission. It did not fundamentally alter the direction in which the Corps was moving as an organization. On the contrary, within a year of Armistice, the Marines had settled back into their “naval expeditionary unit” role, developing it into “amphibious warfare doctrine” through a process of experimentation and research which consumed the energies of the Marine Corps’ two senior schools for a decade. The *Marine Corps Gazette* only published technical or tactical articles related to trench warfare between 1916 and 1919.\footnote{12} After that, articles that mentioned the Great War focused on the exploits of the “great heroes” or were retrospective battle studies.\footnote{13}

However, the Great War did have an impact: it brought the Marine Corps onto the land warfare *stage* in a serious way, for the first time. It was the first chance for the Marines to fight

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in a “real” war against a peer nation. In that sense, World War I catalyzed the nascent professionalization of the Marine Corps. The “retrenchment” environment of the postwar years forced the entire American military to focus closely on existential questions of mission, education, and equipment.\textsuperscript{14} The financial and ideological realities of that environment enabled the Marines to develop themselves into a modern fighting force. World War I came not at the beginning, but rather the end of a decades-long process that formalized the structure of the Marine Corps, created and maintained a system of education for both officers and men, and solidified the primary mission of the organization.\textsuperscript{15}

It is clear that intense study of trench warfare tactics did not become part of the Marine Corps’ long-term education plan. In fact, in the broader context of the whole twentieth century, any focus on World War I lessons looks like a fluke.\textsuperscript{16} What need did an amphibious assault force have for large numbers of machine guns, or for extensive knowledge of how to combat-load a railway train? The Marine Corps quickly abandoned close study of those traditional land service topics in favor of the amphibious doctrine which was developed between the wars. However, in the process of learning and then discarding the “big Army” way of doing things, the Marines learned something about their place in the military establishment of the United States. By sending its officers to Army schools, the Marine Corps was able to develop a baseline expertise in the standard topics a land-based military leader understood.

There was a correct formula for many of the usual activities undertaken by a land forces commander, and it was cheerfully acknowledged by the Marine Corps in the first two decades of the twentieth century that the United States Army had that formula. In addition, students who

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\footnote{15. Sayen, “World War I and the USMC.”}
\end{footnotes}
attended Army schools and then returned to the Marine Corps gained some prestige amongst their peers. Receiving an assignment to Fort Benning was considered an honor, and the Marines tended to do well in the course. In 1936, when First Lieutenant Russell Jordahl attended the Company Officer Course at Fort Benning, he reported that all of the Marine students did very well with the entire curriculum, including “many hours spent riding” despite most of them having little prior equestrian experience. The year he spent as a student “was by far the best professional year I had experienced up to that time,” recalled Jordahl.\textsuperscript{17} By the mid-1930s, the leaders at Headquarters Marine Corps became aware that their officers, while benefiting from most of the Army instruction, needed schools that catered to their own particular needs (especially regarding the equipment and techniques being developed for amphibious operations), and began shifting away from the Army institutions and making use of their own, new schools.\textsuperscript{18}

\textit{Fort Benning: Origins and Development}

Located almost one hundred kilometers south of Atlanta, Georgia, Fort Benning is one of several large training areas east of the Mississippi River that were acquired by the United States Army in the early twentieth century. The wide open area was excellent for training troops and the small nearby town of Columbus posed little in the way of distractions or “dissipated” entertainment. Other installations, such as Fort Sill, Oklahoma (artillery) and Fort Knox, Kentucky (armor) were established to focus on other combat arms—Fort Benning was dedicated to the study and rehearsal of infantry troop tactics. General John J. Pershing himself took personal interest in the infantry institution: those who chose the site at Fort Benning claimed to have his personal endorsement—Pershing was obsessed with obtaining a suitable training area for soldiers to learn to fire machine guns.\textsuperscript{19} When justifying the opening of another school,

\textsuperscript{17} Russel N. Jordahl, interviewed by Benis M. Frank (June 1970), Transcription of Oral History. USMC History Division, Oral Histories Branch, Quantico, Virginia, 44.

\textsuperscript{18} Frances, \textit{History of the Marine Corps Schools}. 
Army Colonel Henry Eames explained to a Senate committee that basic education was not enough for the modern professional soldier:

> West Point is the foundation school which has nothing to do with the teaching of the technical use of arms. Every officer who comes into the service must go through these [Fort Benning] schools.\(^{20}\)

Congressional budgeters were soon convinced that the “peacetime Valley Forge” project was justified.\(^{21}\) The older schools, including the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, were “watching with interest” how the new infantry school would develop. It was initially a “combination” and “amplification” of the old Infantry School and Machine Gun School (which in turn descended from the “Musketry School” first operated at the Old Presidio in Monterey, California).\(^{22}\) In 1920, it settled on the name “The Infantry School” for itself.

Virtually no one paid any attention to the Infantry School in Fort Benning, Georgia.\(^{23}\) Perhaps this was because the American students at Benning, in terms of their being a “Captain” with “field experience,” were four or six years behind their German peers. U.S. Army second lieutenants went straight from West Point to command their platoons—or even companies—“without deeper knowledge of tactics and the efficiency of the weapons in the inventory of the U.S. Army.”\(^{24}\) They relied heavily on the seasoned Non-Commissioned Officers in their units and were not given the opportunity to fill that knowledge gap until years later at the Infantry

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23. Muth, *Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and German Armed Forces, 1901–1940, and the Consequences for World War II*.

School. This meant the Infantry School content was likely far below the ability level of the average German officer, who had been commanding battalion-level units since his days as a cadet at military college. However, for American Army officers it was a watershed event to attend the Benning institution and, for the first time, get hands-on experience of infantry weapons and tactics at the company, battalion, and regimental level.25

Influence of George C. Marshall

Even before George C. Marshall took over as assistant commandant with full responsibility for the curriculum, the school was highly regarded. After Marshall arrived in 1927 began a series of reforms, during what was called the “Benning Renaissance,” it was even more exemplary.26 This is perhaps a little ironic, since George C. Marshall is reflexively known in the Marine Corps even today as an “enemy” because of his career-long conviction that the Marines simply were not capable of operating a unit larger than a brigade. Marshall was among those who felt that landing operations were relatively simple, and as such were either well within the ability of a small Marine Corps, or else could and should be handled by the Army.27 However, during the interwar years such disagreements were not yet being aired

It is unclear exactly when the Marines began sending officers to Fort Benning, but it is certain many of the interwar TBS staff attended the Infantry School during or immediately after Marshall’s tenure there. Marshall was known for his American Expeditionary Force service, his


role as confidant to General John J. Pershing, and (within the Army itself) for his campaign to
revitalize and revolutionize the Army education system. His lifelong interest in professional
development at all levels is evidenced throughout his letters and personal papers. Marshall is a
prime example of a well-educated military officer of this time period who had long experience
with military life, with training, with professional education, and with the administration of a
school; and yet he continuously conflated “training” and “education” in his papers. Perhaps
highlighting the difference between the two was not then seen as critical, like it would be today.
“Everyone” knew the difference between training which was scientific and formulaic, and
education which was creative, and no one disagreed so no scholar ever took the time to point out
the difference. Educational manuals and essays of this time period use the two words
interchangeably, or sometimes use “education” as a kind of genus to describe any process in
which learning has taken place, whether via technical “training” or some more esoteric species.

Once put in a position to effect real change in an academic setting, he did so energetically. The school which Marshall influenced the most was the School of Infantry at Fort
Benning and, by extension, Marshall’s influence on the Marine Corps Schools would be difficult
to deny. When he was appointed director of the Academic Department at Fort Benning,
Marshall’s voice had particular weight due to his involvement in the American Expeditionary
Force during World War I. As a result, many of his suggestions for reform were adopted without
argument. According to General Omar N. Bradley, interviewed a number of years later, it was
Marshall’s style to simply “recruit a superior staff” and leave them to execute assignments as

Affairs, Boston (1 January 1912), comments on the variety of schools available to Massachusetts national
guardsmen; Marshall lecture at the Army War College (10 September 1923), “The Development of the
National Army,” comments on the superiority of a years-long gradual training system for national
guardsmen over the old system of a six-week intensive course immediately before combat deployment;
Marshall to Pershing, Washington DC (23 January 1924), comments on the need to include a course on
leadership and command at West Point.

29. Larry Bland, ed., The Soldierly Spirit - December 1880 to June 1939, The Papers of George
they saw fit. This “mission command” or “mission analysis” method was inspired by German principles of leadership. While on the Infantry School staff, Bradley recalled being summoned to speak with Marshall only once to discuss course matters.  

Marshall was also determined to improve the facilities, reduce class size, standardize the course material, and prevent field exercises from becoming “stale” or “scripted” and thus lose the students’ interest. The War Department accepted all of Marshall’s recommendations for the 1929-1930 school year.

Marshall’s presence and ideology created a school heavily influenced by the “applicatory method.” The centerpiece of this method was the use of actual “war-strength” units for field exercises, conducted on real terrain rather than around a map board with game pieces. Marshall added an additional layer to the concept by surprising students at the end of a tactical exercise with a task: for example, to sketch terrain recently ridden over--terrain they had not been studying in a “mapmaking sense” up to that point. His initiatives combined to create a system of education which was active, dynamic, and required the students’ continuous input. The “element of surprise” was a key part of German officer education and was not commonly implemented in American military schools before Marshall introduced the idea at Fort Benning.

Marshall’s vision for professional military education was geared toward creating something thorough, but also standardized. His letters and lectures were preoccupied with the problem of creating a corps of officers which could easily be expanded in wartime, via institutions such as the Reserve Officers Training Corps, but still remained small enough to


34. Muth, *Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and German Armed Forces, 1901–1940, and the Consequences for World War II*, 145.
satisfy the American political taste for a cheap military. On his own time and with his own funds, Marshall invited officers to his home for discussions and encouraged professional reading on the part of students during their leisure hours. He explained that four things were necessary for men who would lead others into battle: discipline, grasp of technique, an appreciation for simplicity, and correct methods for maintaining control. His efforts to reform the curriculum at Fort Benning were always directed toward one of those ideas. When he felt that an impasse had been reached or there was a lack of imagination at Fort Benning, Marshall would travel to other Army schools and observe the methods in use there, returning to Georgia with new ideas.

Fort Benning: Better than Homemade

But why did the Marines send their officers to Fort Benning in the first place? 1920 had seen the establishment of a Company Officers’ Course for Marines at Quantico and, though that course did have a few bumps before being truly stable, it existed. The Marines could have sent their Captains to the Quantico course instead of to an Army equivalent. By the late 1930s, Marine Captains were being sent to Quantico rather than Fort Benning. However, a variety of factors probably influenced the decision to utilize the Army school as long as they did. First, it was already established. More Marines attending Fort Benning meant the Quantico school, and its staff, could remain small. It was a savings in cost and in manpower. The Army schools had good reputations, and even Marines who attended them tended to be complimentary: Graves Erskine declared the Infantry School at Benning was “the most practical school I’ve ever been to,


or that I know of.” 39 Second, the Army was a highly respected military organization and had recently “won” a major war. It was entirely reasonable that their formula for success in land warfare would be of interest to Marines.

Third, inter-service education is an old practice and the decision of the Marines to send their Captains to an Army school could have derived some motivation from the fact that “we have always done this.” Many senior Marines already attended senior Army and Navy schools. Finally, the Marines were not ready to begin teaching land warfare tactics at the company level—they had next to no experience doing so in the traditional sense and were not likely to gain that experience any time soon. Their manuals, maps, exercises, techniques, and equipment all came from the Army or were very closely based on Army materials. Though their own school was in the making, and would eventually come to be a respected institution in its own right, it was not equal in quality to the Infantry School during the early interwar era.

Fort Benning: Structure of the Infantry School

The Fort Benning curriculum was built around a modular system of multi-format courses. Each course was taught in at least one, and usually three or four, different ways over the length of the program of instruction. The exercises were cumulative, beginning with simple problems at a low tactical level and proceeding through the levels of organization beginning with a company and ending with a regiment. The Company Officers’ Course at the Infantry School was the course attended by most members of the TBS staff. (Captain Lewis Puller, an exception, attended the Advanced Course.)40 The “Marshall influence” was evident in the emphasis on


40. Evidence for Puller’s presence at the Advanced Course was found in the form of his “capstone” paper being listed in the Donovan Research Library’s card catalog. Puller and Gilder Jackson (who did not serve on the TBS staff) were the only Marines with papers in the catalog for the 1924-1936 timeframe. Puller’s personal papers collection does not include any documentation from his time at the Infantry School.
active learning, though an honest assessment shows that some courses were less “active” than others. The logistics and motor transport courses were especially heavy with paper-based problems with predetermined solutions, controlling the students’ answers at the minute level. Tactical exercises such as the terrain walk and the official “field exercise” at the end of the course had school solutions included in the teaching notes. (It is not clear how closely the student solution was supposed to align with the school solution.) However, most topics were covered with a combination of field exercise or map problem, combined with a lecture or conference. The available format options listed in the 1937-1938 academic year curriculum index are (alphabetically): conference, conference and illustrative problem, conference and map problem, demonstration, exercise, field exercise, fire problem, illustrative problem, illustrative map problem, illustrative terrain exercise, lecture, map exercise, map problem, terrain exercise, tactical ride, and tactical walk.41 These formats appear in indexed curricula as far back at 1930.

Only a few Marines who became instructors at the Basic School kept records from their pre-WWII career. One of them, Graves B. Erskine, preserved a variety of course materials from Fort Benning, as well as his graduation certificate. Erskine was commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1917 and saw combat with the AEF at S. Mihiel. He served in all three “small wars” theatres and was an instructor at the Marine Corps Schools in 1926-27.42 He was an instructor at TBS from 1930-1932. According to the graduation certificate, Erskine completed the Company Officers Course in May 1928, and was considered proficient in the following subjects:

- History of the Army of the United States
- Military Policy of the United States
- Military History
- Applied Psychology
- Military Courtesy
- Administration
- Organization and Equipment
- Mass Athletics
- Equitation
- Transportation
- Management of Animals
- Close-order Drill
- Military Sketching and Map Reading
- Instructional Methods
- Training Principles
- Mechanics and Marksmanship of the Rifle
- The Pistol
- The Automatic Rifle
- The Machine Gun
- The 37-mm Gun
- The 3-inch Trench Mortar
- Grenades
- Bayonet Practice
- Musketry
- Combat Practice
- Communications and Command Posts
- Field

41. United States Army, Index to Instruction Matter Volume 1 (Fort Benning, Georgia: Infantry School, 1938).

42. Graves B. Erskine Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
Messages and Orders; Staff and Logistics to include the Regiment; Combat Intelligence; Organization of the Ground; Field Engineering; Tactics to include the Company.

This list does not correspond exactly to the listing of courses preserved in the Fort Benning archive. Some courses (i.e. “Military History” and “Military Sketching and Map Reading”) existed as stand-alone classes dealing exclusively with that subject. Other as some subjects from the graduation certificate are “covered” in multiple formats. For example, there is no “Field Messages and Orders” class listed in the curriculum index, but sections on writing a field message or delivering an order are present in the course materials for all the classes for “company in the defense,” “battalion in the attack,” and so forth. Erskine’s graduation certificate thus gives a complete picture of the subject areas covered, and what kind of experience the Army believed it was giving its students at the Infantry School.

By comparison, the graduation certificate for TBS in 1930 listed the following subjects: administration; boats; drill regulations; first aid and military hygiene; interior guard duty; signal communications; aviation ground course; military field engineering; marksmanship; musketry; naval and military law; tactics; topography; naval ordnance; individual combat. Nearly forty percent of the topics on the Infantry School certificate were covered at TBS. Of the remainder, some were only marginally relevant to the Marine Corps (i.e. “history of the Army” and “management of animals”); those were the same courses that would be used in support of sending Marine officers only to Marine schools, instead of the Army schools where so much irrelevant material was taught.

43. Graves B. Erskine, “Graduation Certificate - The Infantry School,” Personal Papers Collection [Collection #3065, Box 27, Folder 14], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico Virginia.

44. Joseph H. Berry, “Graduation Certificate - Basic Course,” (1930) Personal Papers Collections [Collection 3A11, Box 2, Folder 6], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, VA.

45. Frances, History of the Marine Corps Schools, 29.
Technical Courses

The courses at Benning fell into one of several broad categories. “Technical” courses were neither historical or informational, nor concerned with troop leading skills. Technical topics include administration, skill-based classes such as drawing, or the mechanics and use of weaponry. These courses took place in a classroom, and presumably a lecture was given by an expert in the field as an introduction to the material. Sometimes textbooks were provided, or an Army manual which functioned as a textbook.46 The Infantry School curriculum indices currently preserved do not include descriptive material on how the courses were structured so the exact format is unclear. However, by looking at the examination material from each index, we can at least know what the Army considered “proficiency” in the subject matter.47

The courses on map reading and map making are easiest to reconstruct. The textbook in use at the Infantry School in the 1920s was *Military Map Reading and Sketching*, by Captain Frank J. Pearson, USA. Pearson was an instructor at Fort Benning during the 1920s and his textbook included a preface which explicitly stated that his book was written for, and in use at, the Infantry School at Fort Benning. The book on map reading covers topic areas including scale, orientation, elevation, coordinated, aerial photography and the tools used to read a map. In the “sketching” portion students learn to sketch a landscape while observing it, as well as to create notes from which a sketch can be drawn later.48 In the early 1930s, the material being tested still aligned with Pearson’s text. An exam from the “Topography: Map Reading” course


47. Curriculum indices (arranged by year) at held at the Donovan Research Library at Fort Benning, Georgia. At the time of this writing, the Donovan library has been without a research librarian for almost three years and the records are thus difficult to access or interpret in detail.

begins with basic questions such as “What do you find at the following coordinates?” etc.

However, it soon progresses to more complex problems:

After an attack on this (Fort Benning) reservation, you find an enemy map. The section showing SCALES has been torn off. You compare this map with your 1:20,000 Fire Control Map, Fort Benning, and find that a line drawn from the Water Tank on RIGHT HILL (near intersection of 17-21 grid) to the junction of the MARNE and SANTA FE ROADS (19.21-21.40) measures 8 inches. State the REPRESENTATIVE FRACTION of the enemy map.  

In an associated course, “Military Mapmaking and Map Reading,” the class on sketching from notes was delivered as a classroom exercise headed by these guidelines:

**GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS.**

a. On a card or piece of paper, construct a graphical scale of yards for use on a map with a representative fraction of 1:10,000. Show 900 yards on the primary portion; show 100 yards on the secondary portion and make it read to the nearest 10 yards. The length of a 100-yard division on the scale will be 0.36 inch.

b. On the opposite edge of the card, construct an angle of differences of elevation for use on this map...show 10 feet on the secondary portion and make it read to the nearest foot. The length of a 10-foot division on the scale will be 0.69 inch.

c. Place a sheet of sketching paper before you with the long axis parallel to your front. Lay off three vertical grid lines 1000 yards apart, the first one being 1,000 yards from and parallel to the left edge of the paper.

d. Station A (elevation 608 feet) will be located on the first vertical grid line at a point three inches from the bottom edge of the paper. Magnetic North is 6 degrees west of grid north.

e. First: plot the boundary traverse and if it is not close, adjust it. Second: plot the buildings along the boundary. Third: plot the interior of the traverse. Fourth: put in the contours and other topography.

Students then used the guide to design a map according to a description furnished by the instructor, including a variety of terrain features and military symbols. When instructors arrived at TBS after completing the Infantry School course, they used the same maps for their students’ classroom work as had been used at Fort Benning. For example, map problems solved during an exam used Fort Benning maps and associated problems. When the Marines went to the field,

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however, they used maps made for the terrain at hand (either Mount Gretna, Pennsylvania, or Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania).  

The “Browning Machine Gun” was the subject of a separate course. Students were tested on knowledge of the function of the gun, how to disassemble and assemble it, how to prepare it for immediate action, and how to conduct an “elementary” gun drill. For gun drill, each portion of the drill was timed. Major errors counted against the student’s grade more than lesser errors (for example, failing to “level” the gun when mounting was a greater error than was using the incorrect hand to clamp the tripod legs into place). Other weapons courses in the curriculum index vary in their exact content, but cover a basic range of technical background about the weapon itself, ways to train or increase proficiency with the weapon, and finally outlines for tactical use of the weapon in a given combat scenario. The “Grenades” course includes diagrams explaining the construction of common types of grenades, and detailed drawings as to proper form for throwing them.

It is possible that the use of a particular technical course was up to the discretion of course leaders at the time. While the tactical or “command” courses are indexed in full in each volume of Fort Benning curriculum (archived by year), the courses on weapons, fortifications, and other ancillary subjects are not part of the index. Occasionally one course may be included, such as “Military History” but the record is not complete. This may simply be because there would be too much material to include in the index for each academic year. It may also be because the technical courses changed more quickly (to adapt to alterations in weaponry for example) than did the “troop leading skills” or “command” courses. In general, the Company Officers Course had more technical courses, especially on weapons. The Advanced Course was mostly tactical courses, with field fortification and motor transport being significant exceptions.


Field or "Command" Courses

Each series of “field” courses began with a map problem. They were cumulative courses, beginning with platoon or company problems and moving up to battalion or regiment (Advanced Course only) level problems. For example, to teach concepts associated with an “advance guard,” students worked through a map problem at the battalion level, then a field exercise at the regiment level and a field exercise at the brigade level. For “attack,” students completed 21 map problems, 17 terrain exercises (on a “sand table” or similar in a classroom) and five field exercises.\(^{53}\) In every instance, the field exercise follows multiple other formats. It is not the first event presented to students on a given topic. The students were all given chances to “command” their classmates, and in the field their assignment to a given staff or command billet. As then-retired Marine General Russell Jordahl (TBS staff 1938-1939) recalled in an interview:

> We never knew what assignment we were going to have, and relative rank for students from major to 1st lieutenant meant absolutely nothing...So you might be send out in command of a platoon one day, a battalion the next day, a regiment the next day...\(^{54}\)

For the Marines who attended the school, the freely given opportunities to demonstrate competence in the field were a precious opportunity.

For the field exercise “regiment in the attack,” students were assigned to billets: battalion commanding officer, executive officer, S-1 (adjutant), S-2 (intelligence), S-3 (operations), S-4 (logistics), surgeon, and platoon commanders (two, for the battalion headquarters troops). Below each battalion the companies were assigned one commanding officer, one executive officer, and three platoon commanders. Twenty seven of the students were assigned as umpires/observers.


\(^{54}\) Russel Jordahl, interviewed by Benis M. Frank (June 1970), Transcription of Oral History, Oral Histories Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, Virginia, 44.
The umpire students were required to develop a solution to the exercise’s problem ahead of time, which would be compared to the billeted students’ performance during the exercise itself. The curriculum summary does not indicate how the exercise was graded. The field exercise problem was written by school staff and included firing of blank ammunition, flags and smoke signals to indicate success or failure of a movement.  

The central element of the field exercise, that which made it such a valuable experience for students, was the ability to lead live troops. Each battalion, company, and platoon was supplied with a full complement of Army soldiers, armed with rifles and bayonets. The Marine Corps lacked the ability to supply such a large number of troops for a training exercise, so this experience was perhaps the single most important opportunity for Marine officers who attended the Benning school. Until they deployed to a foreign post, they would have no experience leading real men (in training or in combat) other than that they gained at Fort Benning.

Other Classroom Formats

The “lecture” was used rarely. Only one lecture, entitled “Organization of the British Army,” is listed in the course of instruction for 1931-32. Notes for the “Organization of the British Army” lecture were not preserved so we cannot compare the lecture format to the

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55. For fans of American war films, a scene from “The Dirty Dozen” (1967) depicts this type of exercise, in which opposing teams wear colored arm bands and execute a carefully choreographed series of maneuvers. The “blue” team was the pre-planned “winner” of the exercise. Students in the movie version were graded on their ability to adhere to the plan, and organizers became enraged when the protagonist “cheated” by obtaining some enemy arm bands and sneaking through the line. Students at Fort Benning were expected to adhere to the plan, but (because of the influence of Marshall) would also to encounter unexpected developments to which they must react, drawing on principles they learned during previous exercises or classroom events.

56. Another “lecture” appears in the archived curriculum, but not the index to the volume, on the topic “Medical Care of Students” and intends to “inform the student as to what measures have been taken by the authorities at this post to keep his family and himself in good health, and what he himself can do to aid the authorities in this good work.” It goes on to explain the location and quality of the post hospital and give phone numbers for a civilian doctor in the nearby town of Columbus. Today this lecture would be considered part of in-processing and not part of the course of instruction. There are other portions of the curriculum which pertain to medical subjects and which are clearly part of the course of instruction, such as a conference on “Organization of the Medical Service.”
“conference” format, though they appear to be closely related. The latter was used for conveying general principles in a variety of subjects, such as security, tank employment, river crossings, use of motor transportation in reconnaissance, night operations, pursuit, field artillery organization, employment of troops for domestic disturbances, combat orders, characteristics of cavalry, and the air corps. Each of these conferences was followed by at least one applicatory exercise, so presumably the conference was “keyed” to follow-on exercises in particular, where the lecture was delivered for the general edification of the students. This idea is supported by the fact that student memoirs and reports by school staff indicate that visiting experts on military subjects frequently gave evening lectures which students were expected to attend.

Within the “tactics” section of the 1931-32 course, “pursuit” was taught with a conference as the first element. It begins:

Pursuit, as considered in this conference, will be used in its broader sense—that is, as aggressive (i.e. offensive) action against an enemy withdrawal... Obviously the earlier a commander learns of his opponent’s withdrawal, or better still, his intention to withdraw, the better able he is to combat it.\(^{57}\)

The instructor goes on to give students a framework for deciding to pursue, for choosing a precise aspect of the enemy to pursue, how to estimate a dynamic enemy situation, for how to organize and deploy an encircling force, how to use supporting arms in the context of pursuit, and finally some special considerations when pursuing an enemy at night. The conference closes with a summary of “variations” on the idea of pursuit and some exceptions to the rules.

The “illustrative problem” appears in several subject areas and is often listed immediately before an equivalent field exercise. The “IP” served as a classroom-based rehearsal for a field exercise, having the multi-stage aspect of a field exercise, as well as the requirement to formulate and issue orders to a large unit, but without the student actually being in the field. Problems and solutions for “Battalion in the Attack,” for example, are divided into three parts and each solution must be evaluated and graded against a school-designed standard before the student moves on to

the next portion of the exercise. Some classroom problems list an amount of time allowed for the student to complete the exercise (three hours, one hour, etc) and others are open-ended. It is not clear from the composition of the archived course materials whether the students ever worked in groups, or if assignments were ever completed as “homework” during off hours.

Classes to “Teach the Teacher”

Many of the courses at the Infantry School were specifically designed to serve officers’ future roles as instructors. For example, the “Rifle Marksmanship” class in the Company Officers Course included a written exam. The questions were not about the officers’ own ability as a marksman, but rather were all in relation to the officer’s need to instruct his men on principles of marksmanship:

**SITUATION**: You are inspecting the rifles of your organization, preparatory to engaging in target practice.
**REQUIREMENT**: Indicate hereon the particular points of your inspection and the common defects that should be corrected.

**SITUATION**: You are coaching an individual who yanks the trigger and flinches on every shot. He admits these errors but states that he is unable to control himself.
**REQUIREMENT**: Indicate hereon the procedure that you would take on the firing line to correct this deficiency.

**SITUATION**: The soldier in this exhibit [illustration] firing instruction practice at 300 yards rapid fire.
**REQUIREMENT**: A list of all errors of commission or omission made by the soldier.

And so on. By contrast, the “Pistol Marksmanship” does not emphasize instruction skills. Instead, that course’s exam asks the officer to strip and then assemble a pistol, explain safety requirements on a pistol range, and calculate firing scores from sample targets.

The course on “The Automatic Rifle” itself includes sections on instruction skills. For example, students learn to compose a marksmanship training schedule for their unit. The


suggested schedule in 1931-1932 included 16 hours of “mechanical” (stripping and assembling) training, 5 hours of preparatory range training, 7 hours of training at the “1000 inch range,” and 70 hours at the “known-distance” range. On exams, students were given varying amounts of time intended to be insufficient for training, and then were asked to modify the “ideal schedule” to meet the reduced time availability. These skills are all management or staff skills, necessary for an officer who commanded at the company or battalion level and who needed to plan and execute his unit’s training schedule. They are incorporated into classes which appear to be technical or tactical in nature, showing that the Army school at least partially subscribed to the idea that officer education should include skills “above” his current level (for example, a future company commander learned to compose a training schedule for an entire battalion or regiment).

Students also learned how to create classroom exercises, such as a “map maneuver.” An event titled “Preparation and Conduct of Map Maneuvers” told students the purpose of such an exercise, how to write one, and how to conduct one:

A map maneuver is an exercise in which a military operation, having at least two successive situations with opposing sides, is conducted on a map under the supervision of a director; solutions of the players for the preceding situations constituting the basis for the one following. When both sides are represented the map maneuver is called “two sided”. When one side is represented by the table director it is called “one sided.”

Students who graduated from the Advanced Course at Fort Benning were “qualified” as composers and conductors of map maneuvers. The introduction of map maneuvers at Fort Benning, according to the 1931-1932 course materials, was in 1916. They had fallen out of use in the early 1920s, but were reintroduced in 1927 and formed a significant part of the curriculum by 1931.

The value of the map maneuver as a flexible, simple tool was significant. While the success of the tool was dependent on the “ability, initiative, and versatility of the table director,” it was still highly regarded. Future instructors were taught to compose map maneuvers by

considering the maps available to him, the number of troops he wished his students to
“command,” the general principles of warfare he wished to convey, the amount of time in which
he had to conduct the problem, and the previous experience of his students. Those familiar with
the concept of “war gaming” will recognize in this list the elements typically needed for any
indoor tactical work, whether imaginary (as the map maneuver is designed to be) or based on a
historical scenario (called a “historical terrain exercise” or “historical problem” in the indices). 61
In the austere budget environment of the American military schools, any learning mechanism
which was affordable was bound to be popular:

The officer in charge of the exercise is responsible for the arrangements and equipment of
the place where the map maneuver is to be conducted. Some few years ago it was
thought that elaborate facilities and equipment was necessary...[But] It has been found
that the arrangements and equipment can be extremely simple. For the two-sided
maneuver maps and tables for each side and for the table director are desirable. For the
one-sided maneuver only two sets are necessary. All the equipment that is needed is
paper and pencils. Troops may be represented on the maps by markers, charcoal, or
colored pencils. 62

The composer of the school’s notes on the map maneuver believed that any “good officer” who
graduated from the Infantry School would be able to create good map maneuvers and execute
them successfully with students.

Finally, detailed prescriptive courses on creating a program of training were part of the
courses at Fort Benning. Questions of how to schedule training, or to what technical standard
troops should be expected to perform, were included alongside more existential questions about
what and why training was conducted. These are especially pertinent, since the Marine students
who went on to become instructors would be responsible for composing and conducting their
own courses at TBS, and would be partly responsible for deciding the overall educational

61. Unfortunately, there are no examples of “historical terrain exercises” or “historical problems”
in the archived Benning curriculum. A “historical map problem” on the battle of Vicksburg is included in
the course materials for TBS during this time period, presumably copied from the same or similar taught
to one of the TBS instructors while he was at the Infantry School.

62. Notes for “Preparation and Conduct of Map Manuevers, Section 1-81 of Materials for
Instruction 1931-1932 Volume 5, The Infantry School, Fort Benning.
ideology of that institution. In the course materials for “Training: Programs and Schedules,”
students were admonished:

There is no prescribed form for a training program, nor is there to be found in regulations
anything that lays down what its contents shall be. However, it is believed that there are
three essential elements which should appear in a program: first, the training objective or
objectives; second, the time available in which to accomplish the mission or missions;
and finally, such instructions relative to the conduct of training as are necessary.63

Students who went on to become instructors were expected to give their future staffs clear
instructions and their own students reasonable standards. An understanding of how wartime
training would look different than peacetime training was apparently presumed. No mention of
that contrast is present in the extant Benning materials.

The last type of instructional material included in the Fort Benning curriculum,
particularly aimed at those students who would go on to become instructors, were “reference
texts” and manuals located in the back of the Materials for Instruction volumes. These included
subjects like “A Text for Self-Instruction in Morse Code,” “Training of Radio Operators” (with a
section on how to select good radiomen from one’s unit), “Logistics Problems,” “Military
Policy” (a primer on American history and political behavior as pertains to the military), and a
table organizing subject matters alongside relevant Army handbooks. Like the Marine Corps, the
Army recognized that it did not have time to give officers all the information they were likely to
need in the course of carrying out their duties. Consequently they prioritized topics which
required expert instruction for the classroom, and utilized a self-study model (as well as a
correspondence school) to fill in the gaps.

Fort Benning: Conclusions

Nearly twenty percent (15 of 80) of the interwar TBS instructors attended a course at Fort
Benning. Their presence at the Infantry School creates a close connection between the two

63. United States Army, “Training: Programs and Schedules,” Materials for Instruction 1931-
1932 Volume 5 (Fort Benning, Georgia: Infantry School, 1931), 3-11.
institutions. Unfortunately, the records at the Benning library today are limited. Much like the existing Marine Corps archives, the Army collections are sparse before 1945. There are no rosters or lists of students present. While the Marine Corps Muster Rolls can provide a list of personnel at a given time and place across the entire Corps, the Army did not create or maintain a centralized collection of muster rolls. The National Archives, for example, does not retain custody of unit records for the Army, except in cases where the individual record was preserved as part of a larger collection (i.e. unit diaries or muster rolls for a battle or campaign). These limitations severely restrict the amount of demographic data that can be produced about the number of Marines who attended the Infantry School between the World Wars.

The Army pioneers who developed the Infantry School at Benning, especially between 1920 and 1935, were firm believers in the importance of education for military officers. Led by George C. Marshall, the school that they created influenced the Army perhaps more than any other single institution. Over 5,000 graduates left Georgia and carried their knowledge to “every corner of the United States and its possessions” while Marshall was in charge, and the changes he made formed a central part of each student’s experience. The “Spirit of Benning” which encouraged creativity, individuality and courage was meant to inspire everyone who attended. The Marines already possessed a brash confidence; for those who attended the Benning schools between the World Wars, they found a place where their natural approach to combat leadership was fine-tuned and given context.

64. See https://www.archives.gov/research/military. A large portion of “crowd-source” military history research on the internet today consists of individuals finding unit muster rolls or lists and sharing their isolated finds with one another. It is slow work trying to piece together the larger record since no official or centralized collection exists.

Chapter 5 - League Island

The Marine Corps has a long and legendary connection to the city of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, stretching back to the days of the American Revolution. It was near the waterfront in Philadelphia that the famed “Tun Tavern” was located, where the first Marines are said to have signed up for service with the nascent colonial armed forces. For most of the nineteenth century, the powerful influence of a few leading Philadelphia families ensured the continuation of that connection. Butlers and Biddles—names that would still be recognized by Marines today—used their good will, vast fortunes, and political influence regularly to bring new construction and expanded operations to the Philadelphia Navy Yard and its tenant, the League Island Marine Barracks. At the turn of the twentieth century, this became especially apparent. While the new “Steel Navy” was built and the Marine Corps cemented the Advance Base Force concept, Philadelphia was home to a regular contingent of Marines who deployed to China, the Caribbean, and Central America. During the First World War, all of the Marines who joined the American Expeditionary Force departed from Philadelphia. After the war, the relocation of the Basic School to Philadelphia introduced yet another new group of Marines to that venerable installation.

The Navy Yard at Philadelphia was closed in 1996, after the “Commission on Base Realignment and Closure” recommended it no longer be maintained as an active naval base.¹ Today the riverfront area once known for shipbuilding and festive launch ceremonies is home to a variety of corporate offices, a commercial bakery, and a few U.S. Navy administrative offices. Walking paths edge the waterfront, and information technology companies are building a series of glossy, modern buildings along the border between the old Yard and the city. The only military ships remaining on site are decommissioned warships which await their final disposition: sunk, scrapped, or sold.² Some civilian ships are refitted in the still-operational dry

docks, but the work is being done by private companies. The Marines’ parade deck survives as a public park. The barracks and warehouse buildings which felt the presence of so many famous Marines are now occupied by a host of government contractors, or sadly stand vacant. In a vague gesture of recognition, the Navy Yard site is designated a “historic area” but no plaques or signs indicate which buildings hosted what important group, no markers inform the visitor that Chesty Puller once stood under this very archway, drawling his way through a lecture on the proper means of polishing brass buttons. One would never imagine that the massive receiving barracks across the avenue, now in extreme disrepair, was the place many Marines and sailors stayed their “last night on shore” before shipping off to the Pacific—and never returned. The sense of history that such a place should have is lost amidst the bustle of the modern military-industrial complex.

Also lost is the base archive. The Navy History and Heritage Command lists collections for “naval bases and facilities” among its holdings, but the Philadelphia Navy Yard is not among them.\(^3\) (Digitized photographs from League Island are part of the NHHC collections.) Fortunately, prior to the shipment of the Philadelphia Yard’s records to permanent storage (and the likely loss of many irreplaceable documents), historian Jeffrey Dorwart produced a history of the installation, from the “earliest colonial roots to final deactivation.”\(^4\) His excellent book, including many photographs, maps, and diagrams, was an invaluable source for this chapter.

\section*{History of the Navy Yard}

Philadelphia and the surrounding Delaware Valley were an unlikely place for the first military shipyard to be established in the Colonies—the city had been founded by the pacifist Quakers. However, the relentless press of commerce overcame the religious fervor of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{The Philadelphia Navy Yard.}
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
\item 2. The NAVSEA Inactive Fleet Inventory provides a summary of ships in mothballs at League Island. In September 2016 there were thirty one fleet assets held there.
\item 4. Dorwart and Wolf, \textit{The Philadelphia Navy Yard.}
\end{itemize}
original Philadelphians, and a healthy arms business was in place by the mid-eighteenth century. The first complete warship to be built in the Philadelphia inlet was laid down in 1762. That ship, Hero, would later serve as the model vessel for the Continental Marine Committee’s infant Navy. Though the great Alfred Thayer Mahan had once disparaged Philadelphia’s harbor, the presence of the Continental Congress in that city, and its designation as the first capital city of the United States, guaranteed a naval presence. By 1801, the Marines had settled into the Yard at “Southwark” with their own barracks—a brick building once owned by the commercial shipbuilders of pre-Revolution days—and they were soon a fixture. In fact, during the early part of the nineteenth century, while Federalists and Anti-Federalists were still trying to work out whose ideas of government would shape the new nation, the Marines were the only ones who had continuous residence at Philadelphia. The Navy came and went according to the shifting political winds of the day. Proper shipbuilding works, repair facilities, and permanent berthing for sailors failed to materialize until after the War of 1812, and the largely unsuitable channel leading into Philadelphia was continuously criticized before, during, and even after the establishment of permanent Yard features. As the “Southwark Yard” grew, the Marines were detailed to stand guard over the government’s property at night. Until the time of the American Civil War, the Navy property at Southwark was slowly expanded and improved. After the war, need for additional space—especially dry docks with river approaches that could accommodate increasingly larger ships—prompted the relocation of the Yard to nearby League Island.

When the initial transfer to League Island was complete in 1876, a Marine Corps guard of fifteen men and two officers formed the organized security force aboard the Navy Yard. One of the officers, Lieutenant William P. Biddle, was from a high society Philadelphia family. His Marines initially resided on a leaky ship and in a temporary barracks near the gate house, waiting


for better accommodations. They waited for an entire generation, while development of the Navy Yard itself took first priority.\textsuperscript{8} It was not until 1901 that political forces in Philadelphia began to influence the growth of the Navy Yard, and finally provide some direct support to the Marines. Their patrons included the Biddle family, Senator Boise Penrose (Republican party boss and close friend of future President William H. Taft), Pennsylvania Representatives to the U.S. Congress Michael Donohoe and J.H. Moore, and Representative Thomas S. Butler, whose son Smedley Darlington had joined the Marine Corps in 1898. Under the influence of these men, a series of Federal administrations put increasingly large amounts of money into developing the Marines’ infrastructure aboard League Island. By 1912, a “new Marine Corps barracks, officers’ quarters, parade ground, drill field, rifle range, and bandstand” had been installed.\textsuperscript{9} The Advanced Base School had been brought to Philadelphia the previous year, and this broad range of facilities completed the Marine Corps complement at League Island.

Philadelphia was the “biggest post” in the Marine Corps for a number of years. Marines whose careers carried into the 1960s would later describe it as “something like Quantico,” now known as the “crossroads of the Marine Corps:” a hub, warehouse, schoolhouse, and meeting ground for Marines of all ranks and specialties. The 1\textsuperscript{st} and 2\textsuperscript{nd} Marine Regiments were headquartered at Philadelphia, as well as the 5\textsuperscript{th} and 6\textsuperscript{th} Expeditionary Brigades. Every expedition to the tropics between 1900 and 1940 was chartered out of Philadelphia.\textsuperscript{10} In 1919, the Philadelphia War History Committee released a commemorative book in which they declared, “Philadelphia is probably the foremost Marine Corps city of the United States.”\textsuperscript{11} It

\begin{itemize}
\item[8.] Dorwart and Wolf, \textit{The Philadelphia Navy Yard}, 100.
\item[9.] Dorwart and Wolf, \textit{The Philadelphia Navy Yard}, 117.
\item[10.] Julian C. Smith, interviewed by Benis M. Frank (November 1967), Transcription of Oral History, Oral Histories Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, Virginia, 57.
\end{itemize}
was this environment to which newly commissioned Second Lieutenants reported for instruction at the Basic School during the interwar period.

**Quantico Prelude**

There was no basic officers’ course in operation during World War I. Instead, an officers’ training camp at Quantico, Virginia, provided new Second Lieutenants with the rudiments of infantry platoon leadership. After the war’s end, no basic classes of any kind were held until 1922. Beginning in 1922, a series of “basic” classes met at Quantico, but their precise structure is difficult to pinpoint. The usually-helpful muster rolls provide few clues, as the “Schools Detachment” at Quantico did not separate the student-officers by class, but rather by rank. There are no surviving records about who served as instructors for the basic classes at Quantico, nor examples of curriculum. However, official histories and oral interviews both confirm that something was done at Quantico from 1922 to 1924 that approximated a basic class. It was that class which overburdened the facilities at Quantico, forcing the relocation of The Basic School to Philadelphia in 1924.

Throughout the 1920s, officers at Headquarters Marine Corps and at Quantico objected to this move. Major General James C. Breckinridge, commanding officer of the Marine Corps Schools, felt that TBS should remain at Quantico and be more closely modeled on the curriculum taught at the Company Officers’ School. Breckinridge saw the Basic School as an element of the larger Schools organization and, when he was unable to relocate TBS he instead occupied himself with sending letters and essays to the commanding officers in Philadelphia. Whenever possible, he attempted to mentor and guide other senior Marines engaged in the business of

12. NARA box 115 etc; memorandum “The Basic School,” from Commanding Officer Marine Corps Schools, to the Major General Commandant, 16 August 1928. Breckinridge objected so strongly to the Basic School’s being in Philadelphia, that he effectively refused to comment on the curriculum in use there. He wanted the school moved back to Quantico; but if Headquarters insisted on leaving it in Philadelphia, then he felt “it should be allowed to proceed unmolested, as the Commanding Officer of the Marine Corps Schools is not in a position to judge as to its facilities and the conditions under which it operates.”
educating young officers. Multiple reports and inspections written during the interwar era echoed Breckinridge’s concerns about the Marine Corps Schools being ill-served by having the Basic School so far away. The consistent reply from General Lejeune and his successors was simply that the move to Philadelphia had been made for good reason, and when billeting and classroom shortfalls were corrected, the Basic School would return to Quantico.

1924-1926 “Split Cycle” Years

On July 22, 1924, Major John R. Henley arrived at the League Island Navy Yard. A recent graduate of the Army Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, he was to be the new officer-in-charge of the Basic School. Along with Major William Smith (post quartermaster) and Colonel Charles S. Hill (barracks commanding officer), Henley was one of only three field grade Marine officers in Philadelphia. He commanded a small staff of instructors, with the title “Officer in Charge, Basic Class,” the others were “Instructor, Basic Class.” Captains Franklin A. Hart, Stephen F. Drew, and Julius T. Wright all joined from Quantico. Drew had been serving as an instructor at the Company Officers Course there, and Wright had been attending as a student. Hart was a recent graduate of the Infantry School at Fort Benning. All four Marines had long careers behind them, with combined experience that spanned Marine Corps missions in Nicaragua, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and France. The Commandant of the Marine Corps was Major General John A. Lejeune. In his annual reports, Lejeune seldom mentioned the Basic School in any detail. Only his ongoing concern about officer procurement had some bearing on the League Island institution.

By contrast, the intra-staff workings of Headquarters Marine Corps showed a great deal of active interest and influence on the conduct of the Basic School. Major Henley was the officer in charge, but he was being closely watched. From 1924-26, he submitted a weekly schedule to Headquarters Marine Corps for endorsement. Each schedule included the daily class periods, subjects taught in each, and a copy of any exams being administered that week. Though largely a
formality, the exercise of submitting the weekly schedule for “approval” demonstrated the active role Headquarters intended to play in how the Basic School would be run.

A total of twenty-eight students joined the Basic School in the summer of 1924. Fourteen were 1924 graduates of the United States Naval Academy. The “fall 1924” class graduated in December 1924, having completed a five month course. In the Marine Corps Archives at Quantico, the personal papers collection of Lieutenant General Robert O. Bare includes an academic transcript for this “fall 1924” basic course. The individual subjects were each assigned a weight (indicated in parentheses): topography (150), infantry drill regulations (150), law (150), weapons and tactics (270), ordnance and gunnery (70), administration (80), marksmanship (20), musketry (20), signaling (25), boats (25) and field engineering (50).

Bare’s graduation certificate from TBS listed the course content in detail:

1. Tactics
   - Automatic Rifle
   - Combat Orders
   - Combat Principles
   - Grenades, Hand and Rifle
   - Light Mortars
   - Machine Guns
   - Marches
   - Military Field Engineering
   - Musketery
   - Scouting and Patrolling
   - Security and Information
   - Terrain Exercises
   - 37 M.M. Guns

2. Topography

13. John L. Allen (USNA), Robert O. Bare (USNA), Kenneth B. Chappell (USNA), James H. Hudnall (USNA), Charles C. Maints (USNA), Ralph D. McAfee (USNA), Charles L. Pike (USNA), William C. Purple (USNA), Charles F. Replinger (USNA), John R. Rhamstine (USNA), Prentice A. Shiedler (USNA), Gerald H. Steenberg (USNA), Walter J. Stuart (USNA), William W. Conway (from ranks), Arthur W. Ellis (University of California), Leonard B. Cresswell (Mississippi Agricultural and Military College), Samuel K. Bird (University of Oklahoma), Richard Fagan, William A. Hamilton, James E. Jones, Walter I. Jordan, Otto Lessing, William G. Manley, St. Julien R. Marshall, James B. MuHugh, Thomas C. Perrin, and Ernest E. Shaughnessy. A combination of Muster Rolls data, official biographies, and obituaries were used to provide undergraduate college information for all of the TBS students in this study. Many did not leave behind enough identifying information to find such sources.

14. Robert O. Bare, “Academic Transcript: Basic Course” (1924), Robert O. Bare Personal Papers Collection [Coll/150, Box 1, Folder 13], USMC History Division Archives Branch, Quantico, Virginia.
Conventional Signs  
Map Reading  
Military Sketching, Theoretical and Practical  

3. General Subjects  
   Administration  
   Bayonet Fighting  
   Boats  
   Infantry Drill Regulations and Training Educations (U.S.A., ‘24)  
   Landing Force Manual  
   Naval Ordnance and Gunnery  
   Rifle and Pistol Marksmanship  
   Signalling  

4. Law  
   Naval Courts and Boards  

This formulation for the courses seems to establish general areas of study (tactics, topography, etc.) and provide particular examines of the subsets taught in each area. The subsets listed on Bare’s transcripts do not exactly correspond with the number of exams given in each area (for example, “topography” was covered over 17 separate graded events but was divided into three topic areas on the certificate). Typically, a small portion of the graduates would proceed immediately from TBS to naval aviation flight training. Only one member of the “fall 1924” class did so; William W. Conway was subsequently killed in a plane crash in 1931. Four of the other graduates (L.B. Cresswell, C.F. Cresswell, Kenneth Chappell, and Walter Stuart) would return to TBS later in the interwar period, when they served as instructors.

In January of 1925, a spring short-cycle class commenced. First Lieutenant George Hollett joined the staff of TBS at this time, but departed in the summer along with the “spring 1925” graduates. Hollett’s was one of the shortest stays recorded among the instructors, who typically averaged an 18-month tour of duty. Also in January 1925, Major Henley became the “Commanding Officer, Basic Class” rather than the previous “Officer in Charge.” The change was the result of conversations had at Headquarters Marine Corps, in which senior Marines felt it was an injustice to Henley’s excellent performance to continue referring to him as a mere “officer in charge.” Though Henley’s role and daily life did not change, the alteration to his title was a significant moment in the history of the Basic School, as the Marine Corps culture valued command and leadership roles highly.
With twenty-seven members, the “Spring ‘25” class met from January until April, completing a four month course. Ten students were graduates of the United States Naval Academy, and only one (Lewis Puller) left behind conclusive evidence that he had prior enlisted service. Unfortunately, no member of that class left their transcripts or graduation certificates for posterity. At least five went on to achieve flag rank, notably Albert D. Cooley who was awarded a Navy Cross for his participation in the “Cactus Air Force” on the island of Guadalcanal in 1942-43. Colonel John Groves, another notable, remained on active duty until the early 1950s and was instrumental in the creation of the Republic of Korea Marine Corps.

In July 1925, a new group of twenty students arrived. This group was under instruction from August until November, completing a five month course. Ten members of this class were graduates of the United States Naval Academy. Brigadier General Wilburt S. Brown, a member of the “Fall ‘25” class, preserved his academic transcript and graduation certificate from the Basic School. They are part of his collection of personal papers held in the Marine Corps Archives. The courses were listed on the certificate as well as the transcript cover page, and on the transcript a “weight” or value was assigned to each course (indicated in parentheses): administration (80), boats (30), drill regulations (130), first aid and military hygiene (20), interior guard duty (30), military field engineering (30), marksmanship (30), musketry (20), naval and military law (170), tactics (195), and topography (180). Even though only one year had passed, the staff of the Basic School had already begun altering or adjusting their curriculum. For example, the “signaling” course noted on Robert O. Bare’s 1924 transcript was now absent. Brown’s grades placed him eleventh out of twenty, and he performed especially badly in topography and field engineering. However, he had already served as an enlisted Marine from 1918-1920 and 1922-1925, receiving a Purple Heart. His collection of personal papers included a letter from Major General John A. Lejeune personally congratulating him on receiving a

15. Wilburt S. Brown, “Certificate, Basic Class” (1925), Wilburt S. Brown Personal Papers Collection [Coll/702, Box 1, Folder 1], USMC History Division Archives Branch, Quantico, Virginia.
commission. He would go on to receive a Legion of Merit during World War II, and a Silver Star in Korea. Today, performance at TBS is said to be a strong indicator as to how successful an officer’s career will be. In the 1920s, that was not the case for Wilburt Brown.

From January until May 1926, a group of twenty-four students arrived and completed a five-month course. Only five were former USNA midshipmen. Each of these short classes (fall ‘24, spring ‘25, fall ‘25, spring ‘26) undertook marksmanship training during a two-week period. The importance of marksmanship was emphasized in the communications between the Headquarters Marine Corps staff and the commanding officer of the Basic School. While James C. Breckinridge was concerned primarily that TBS curriculum was going to stray from that of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, most of his peers in the Marine Corps organization were more concerned with the lack of shooting ranges in Philadelphia. Thus, great effort was expended to transport the students to suitable marksmanship training areas. The “spring” classes also traveled to Mount Gretna, Pennsylvania, for field exercises which lasted for one month. At Mount Gretna (and later at Indiantown Gap, when the classes began to grow in size), the students probably completed map reading exercises, land navigation tests, and learned to fire larger weapons. That was the case in the late 1930s. Unfortunately, no official record of the “field exercises” during the 1920s was preserved.

In June 1926, Major Alley D. Rorex arrived at League Island to take command of the Basic School, continuing the use of the “Commanding Officer, Basic School” title. Henley departed at around the same time. Rorex was an old Marine with a career going back to at least 1905. Also arriving at the school during the summer of 1926 was Captain Robert M. Montague. Montague received the Silver Star for actions during World War I, and was the first member of the TBS staff to have served in France with a combat unit. Captains Hart and Wright departed around this same time. Students for the “fall 1926” course began to arrive in August, along with another new instructor: Captain Robert C. Kilmartin. Kilmartin was a graduate of George Washington University and was trained as a lawyer. This brought the staff back to a total of four: Major Rorex, Captain Drew, Captain Montague, and Captain Kilmartin. All four were
veterans of World War I. The authorized size of the TBS staff was controlled by Headquarters Marine Corps. On at least one occasion, a vacancy on the staff could not be filled because no officer of the correct rank was able to take the place of the departing instructor. The small interwar Marine Corps was extremely flexible, however, and simply rewrote the “table of organization” so that the vacancy matched the rank of an available officer.16

That summer, a memorandum was issued on July 2 by Headquarters Marine Corps, informing newly commissioned officers from civilian life what items they would need to purchase (or “acquire within a reasonable time”) after arriving at the Basic School:

1 belt, officers, Sam Browne pattern
1 belt, trousers, woven
2 blankets, wool
3 pairs breeches, service summer
1 pair breeches, service winter
1 pair buttons, cuff
1 cap, service, summer (Khaki cap cover may be substituted)
1 cap, service, winter
6 collars
1 pair gloves, gray
1 hat, field (with cord)
Insignia, bronze, as required:
1 pair insignia of rank for shoulder straps
1 pair insignia of rank for collar of flannel shirt
1 knot sword, undress, commissioned officers
1 pair leggings, russet
1 ornament, cap and hat, bronze
1 pair ornaments, collar, bronze
1 overcoat
1 scabbard, sword
1 scarf, field
3 coats, service, summer
1 coat, service, winter
2 shirts, flannel
4 shirts, white
2 pairs shoes, russet
1 sling, sword, undress
1 watch, wrist, with illuminated dial

The iconic blue dress uniform was not required, but was recommended for use at social

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16. Director, Division of Operations and Training, to Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps, Washington, DC March 27, 1928; “Authorized complement of Basic Class (Staff)”; Correspondence of the Office of the Major General Commandant Series 18, Record Group 127, Box 115; National Archives Building, Washington, DC.
functions. The Depot of Supplies, conveniently located on the Philadelphia Navy Yard property, was recommended as a good place to find all of the items on the list, and for reasonable prices.\(^\text{17}\)

Students from civilian life (ROTC) were the least common sources of commissions during the 1920s. Most students came from the Naval Academy, with some from the ranks. The Marine Corps established a sort of “priority list” for ROTC programs in 1926-27, creating a list of “distinguished” military colleges based on a similar list developed by the Army at the same time. Thirty six military colleges, including famous names such as the Virginia Military Institute and the Citadel, were placed on the list and ROTC commissions from those schools were preferred to those from other sources.\(^\text{18}\) Some debate later arose between the Navy and War Departments, over whether it was fair to prefer students from a particular group of colleges, but no record remains of any official directive revoking the system.\(^\text{19}\)

There were twenty nine “Fall ‘26” students who completed a course of instruction from September to December. The total number of instruction hours was 675, a schedule which

\(^{17}\) Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps, Washington, DC July 2, 1928; “Memorandum for 2ndLts”; Correspondence of the Office of the Major General Commandant Series 18, Record Group 127, Box 115; National Archives Building, Washington, DC.

\(^{18}\) Major General Commandant to Presidents of Distinguished Military Colleges; “Letter, in ref. Bulletin of July 28, 1927”, Washington DC, July 28, 1929; Correspondence of the Office of the Major General Commandant Series 18, Record Group 127, Box 229; National Archives Building, Washington, DC.

\(^{19}\) Secretary of War to Secretary of the Navy, Washington DC, February 8, 1923; “Cooperation with the Navy Department in selecting Second Lieutenants, United States Marine Corps, from graduates of Reserve Officers’ Training Corps units”; Correspondence of the Office of the Major General Commandant Series 18, Record Group 127, Box 229; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. Secretary of War to Secretary of the Navy, Washington, DC, December 16, 1924; “Appointment of Graduates of Distinguished Military Colleges as Second Lieutenants in the United States Marine Corps”; Correspondence of the Office of the Major General Commandant Series 18, Record Group 127, Box 229; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. Secretary of War to Secretary of the Navy, Washington, DC, March 11, 1926; “Procurement of 2\textsuperscript{nd} Lieutenants for U.S. Marine Corps from Distinguished Colleges and other institutions maintaining Senior ROTC Units, US Army”; Correspondence of the Office of the Major General Commandant Series 18, Record Group 127, Box 229; National Archives Building, Washington, DC. Secretary of War to Secretary of the Navy, Washington, DC, January 14, 1929; “Vacancies in the Grade of Second Lieutenant (probationary) in the U.S. Marine Corps to be filled by the appointment of civilians”; Correspondence of the Office of the Major General Commandant Series 18, Record Group 127, Box 229; National Archives Building, Washington, DC.
closely copied the one previous in use by Major Henley. Sixteen of the students were graduates of the Naval Academy, and one had a commission as a graduate of the University of Oklahoma. Ten additional second lieutenants arrived in Philadelphia at the same time, but did not participate in the fall course. They instead participated in the activities of the Marine Corps football team, a source of great pride for the interwar Corps. Notable among the “Fall ’26” graduates was Lieutenant General Edward Snedeker, a decorated veteran of Nicaragua, World War II, and the Korean War. Snedeker’s final assignment before retirement was as commanding officer of the Marine Corps Schools, including the Basic School (then located at Quantico, Virginia, alongside the Officer Candidates School, Amphibious Warfare School, and Command and Staff College).

Snedeker’s Naval Academy classmate and friend, Robert Hogaboom, also achieved a flag rank before his retirement from the Marine Corps in 1959. Hogaboom served on the staff of the Quantico schools in the mid-1930s and again in 1941-1942. After the war he attended the Naval War College before serving in policy roles at HQMC, ending with the Chief of Staff (Plans) in 1957.\textsuperscript{20} In his personal account of being a student at TBS, Hogaboom outlined the “equalizing” effect of the Basic School’s structure, one of the positive qualities which Marines still emphasize today:

> We were made up of those who came from the Academy, we were made up of those who came from the civilian colleges and we were made up of those who came from the enlisted Officer Candidate School. And we almost immediately stratified by interests and characteristics and friendships across the board. There was no stratification by source from which we came, none whatsoever. And this has been true and this was a very great appeal to me about the Marine Corps, the people were judged not for where they came from, people were judged not from any particular background, but you judged a man on what he was good for…and I noticed that this was not just in my basic school class. It soon became apparent to me that this was characteristic of the entire Corps.\textsuperscript{21}

At the same time, Hogaboom did not feel that “real professionalism” was quite achieved by the curriculum at the Basic School, because the course was too simple. While students did learn

\textsuperscript{20} Robert E. Hogaboom Biographical Reference File, Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

\textsuperscript{21} Robert Hogaboom, interviewed by Benis M. Frank (April 1970), Transcription of Oral History, Oral Histories Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, Virginia, 32.
how to be good officers and carry out garrison duties, the very small amount of field work was severely limiting in his estimation.

By contrast, another member of the “Fall ‘26” Basic School class, also a Naval Academy graduate, had a slightly different viewpoint in his own interview. Brigadier General Russell Jordahl, speaking in the early 1970s, recalled:

We young men were subjected to rules and regulations suitable for high school boys...The manner of operation and the daily associations of that year did not in any way encourage any of us to believe that we were being welcomed into the officer corps.

However, when asked about the quality of instructors at TBS, Jordahl related fond memories of “one fine old ranker” named Captain Drew, who was affectionately known as the keeper of a cocktail shaker and alcohol—during Prohibition and at the height of the rule of Smedley Darlington Butler as enforcer of tee totaling, no less. He also corroborated Hogaboom’s description that all students were equally motivated, equally treated, and equally well equipped to succeed, regardless of the source of their commission. Elsewhere in his account of the interwar military scene, Jordahl sharply criticized his Naval Academy instructors for being, in a word, totally unqualified to teach. At TBS, however, he recalled “when you have a Marine officer teaching weapons, map reading and sketching, things of that sort, they live with this all the time...While they were pretty impersonal with all of us, they did a pretty good job with the teaching.”

22. Robert Hogaboom’s account of TBS life helps show what an exciting time it was for a young officer to be entering the Marines. The great World War I heroes were still young (captains), serving in close mentor relationships with the students (lieutenants), and the previous generation which had served in China and the Philippines, in Panama and Haiti and Nicaragua, was very much alive and well. Hogaboom wrote: "I would like to recall the first Marine Corps birthday party that I ever attended, which was of course November of 1925 in Philadelphia. Smedley Butler was at that time the Director of Public Safety. We all went up and got in our best dress, finest, with our cloaks and all on and we went up to the Bellevue Stratford, which I believe is the principal hotel there and we occupied the great ballroom. And we went through the birthday ceremony and in the midst of the ceremony Smedley got the spotlight and walked out in the middle of the floor and made a great speech about the Corps and said as I recall, among other things, he said he was having his difficulty with the local politicians in his job as Director of Public Safety. I think his concluding words were, "to hell with the politicians, God bless the United States Marine Corps."

interview is taken up with strident, though thoughtful, criticism of some old Marine Corps practices) the quality of instructors was considered to be adequate and even superior to what the students had found at the Naval Academy.\textsuperscript{25}

In January, the football team returned to League Island to begin their studies. One of them, David M. Shoup, spent a considerable amount of his time as a young lieutenant trying to leave the Marine Corps, in order to join the U.S. Army’s new air corps.\textsuperscript{26} The permission was never granted and he never served as a pilot. Instead he became famous as commander of the 2nd Marine Regiment at Tarawa where he was awarded the Medal of Honor, then he served as the 22nd Commandant of the Marine Corps in the early part of the Vietnam War.\textsuperscript{27} Another 22 other lieutenants also began instruction alongside the football players. Sixteen of the 32 members of the “Spring ‘27” class were USNA midshipmen. Two received ROTC commissions from the universities of North Dakota and Maryland.\textsuperscript{28} An additional instructor, First Lieutenant Edward Fellows, also joined the staff at this time. The class had the pleasure of “passing in review” for the Governor of Pennsylvania, John Stuchell Fisher, while completing their field exercise at Mount Gretna in June.\textsuperscript{29}

The 1927-1928 academic year was the final “split” cycle year. The “Fall ‘27” class had 27 members, of which 19 were USNA graduates. Fourteen of the students went on to achieve

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Jordahl Oral History, 15.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Jordahl returned to TBS as an instructor in 1937, and his recollections of that time period are included later in this chapter.
\item \textsuperscript{26} David M. Shoup Personal Papers Collection, Marine Corps History Division, Archives Branch (Quantico, Virginia).
\item \textsuperscript{27} David M. Shoup Biographical Reference File, Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Besides the built-in diversity which comes from having the USNA as a source of students, TBS represented the American population in a generally balanced way via ROTC commissions as well. Many universities from all part of the country were represented during the interwar period.
\item \textsuperscript{29} “Fisher to See Marines,” \textit{The Philadelphia Inquirer}, 22 June 1927, 14.
\end{itemize}
flag rank, a very high percentage of the overall class size. They completed the same curriculum as the classes had in years before, including a trip to Mount Gretna, Pennsylvania, for practice on the rifle and pistol ranges there.30 During that year, the staff grew considerably. Major Rorex continued as the commanding officer, but promotions, departures, and arrivals among the captains resulted in a very different roster than before: Captain Kilmartin, Captain Montague, Captain Fellowes, Captain William Riley, Captain Clarence Ruffner, First Lieutenant Bayard Bell, and Major Anthony Biddle (USMCR) formed the staff.

Major Anthony Biddle formed a unique part of the League Island history. His biography is shrouded in some mystery due to legends which grew up around his personality, his eccentricities, and his contributions to the art of hand-to-hand fighting. Born in Philadelphia in 1874, Anthony Joseph Drexel Biddle was a member of the famous Biddle family—the same family as that of Marine Corps Commandant William P. Biddle (1911-1914) and the businessman Clement Biddle who donated the League Island property to the United States Navy in the early 1800s. Their political influence on the region was significant, but Anthony mostly stood apart from his family’s political ways, except where ensuring profitable marriages of his children was concerned. He was a “gregarious individualist” and became known around Philadelphia for his dedication to an interdenominational “Bible Class” movement he founded, which combined memorization of scripture with physical activity such as calisthenics.31 During World War I, his imagination was captured by the idea of military service and he procured a captain’s commission in the Marine Corps. He financed the setup of a training camp near Philadelphia and oversaw physical fitness training for over 1000 AEF-bound men at that

30. The thirty-day stay at Mount Gretna cost $295.00. Director, Division of Operations and Training to the Major General Commandant, 16 March 1928; “Basic School: Practical Work at Mount Gretna”; Correspondence of the Officer of the Major General Commandant Series 18, Record Group 127, Box 115; National Archives Building, Washington, DC.

Discharged from the Army after the war, Biddle sought and received a position in the Marine Corps Reserve.

Biddle’s lifelong interest in physical fitness and boxing had by that time transformed into a focused set of “training exercises” he developed for the use of the bayonet. During the League Island period, he participated in the training of most TBS classes by delivering those training exercises to the new lieutenants. Several popular legends were repeated throughout this time, in particular a story in which Biddle would challenge a new student to “come at me, kill me,” and give them a rifle with unsheathed, fixed bayonet. Once the youngster overcame his shock and fear and charged at Biddle, the old man never failed to disarm the opponent. Another story, popular among the Marines, was that Biddle would have his students greet visitors to the Marine Barracks with a bayonet demonstration which ended in knocking the guest’s hat to the ground with the thrust of a bare bayonet. While they might not relate facts, the legends speak to the personality of Biddle and his lasting impression on a whole generation of Marines. Biddle drew no pay from the Marine Corps for his service at TBS, but also participated on a somewhat lassez-faire schedule and was sometimes absent from the muster rolls for multiple months.

The sizable collection of correspondence preserved for the 1927-1928 years reflects the close interest Headquarters Marine Corps took in TBS. However, the files preserved are just that, correspondence, and do not rise to the level of orders or administrative directives. They do indicate both awareness and activity. The inspections conducted by representatives from HQMC were very detailed, and recommendations made sometimes went down to minute issues. For example, in September 1927, Colonel Dunlap (Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Schools) visited Philadelphia and recommended to the Commandant that instruction in general courts

32. The challenge portion of this legend is likely true, though the assertion that Biddle never “lost” is almost certainly not. In the book written by his daughter, Cordelia Drexel Biddle Duke, Biddle was said to have borne at least 23 separate bayonet scars on his “chest, forearms, and abdomen.” See Cordelia Biddle Duke, My Philadelphia Father (New York: Pocket Books, 1955). A newspaper article from the League Island period also described Biddle being injured in an “exhibition engagement” with First Sergeant E.J. Snell. Snell was the First Sergeant of TBS at the time. See The Courier-News (Bridgewater, New Jersey), 29 July 1919, page 1.
martial be eliminated from the program of instruction entirely, and that no study of company or battalion tactics be attempted at the basic course. Full records of student grades and class performance were also periodically transmitted to Headquarters at least through 1929.

In December, 1927, at the midpoint of the academic year, the HQMC Aviation Section weighed in on the subject of an “extension course” for the Basic School. Dismayed at the lack of aviation training possessed by officers commissioned from civilian life or ROTC programs, the Aviation Section recommended the addition of several classes at TBS which would mimic the aviation courses then being taught at the Naval Academy. In their eyes, lengthening the overall program of study “so that it will include preliminary ground instruction in aviation” was a worthwhile alteration to the program. Major Rorex acquiesced to the proposal, and MCS Commanding Officer Colonel Robert Dunlap also endorsed it. However, Major General Commandant John A. Lejeune declined, writing “I do not believe it advisable at this time to make changes.”

This was only the beginning of a long series of proposals for curriculum change.

Finally, at the close of the “split cycle” phase at League Island, the “Spring ‘28” class convened in January 1928 and would remain until April. There were twenty members, of which only five were Naval Academy commissions—an unusually low percentage. Future TBS instructors Karl Louther and Jamie Sabater were among the “Spring ‘28” students. Sabater was

33. Director, Division of Operations and Training to the Major General Commandant, September 1927; “Inspection Basic Course, MB, NYd, Philadelphia, Penna., by Colonel R. H. Dunlap, USMC., CO., Marine Corps Schools”; Correspondence of the Office of the Major General Commandant Series 18, Record Group 172, 115; National Archives Building, Washington, DC.

34. Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Schools, to the Major General Commandant, Washington DC, December 1929; Handwritten note in reply to “Subject: Basic School – Length of Course”; Correspondence of the Office of the Major General Commandant Series 18, Record Group 127, Box 115; National Archives Building, Washington DC. The following year, the Aviation Section made another attempt to add a basic aviation ground course to the Basic School, proposing a six week morning-only schedule covering “aviation history and organization, theory of flight, aerial photographic interpretation, aerology, aviation engines, radio, aerial navigation, structure and rigging, and gunnery and bombing.” No responses were preserved, but the extension of the school year did not occur as they had proposed.
one of the first Puerto Rican officers in the Marine Corps, and had a very unusual early career. Sabater completed two years of study at the Agricultural and Technical University in Puerto Rico, before receiving and appointment to the United States Naval Academy. After graduating from Annapolis, he received his commission in the Marine Corps and went to League Island, but he did not complete the Basic School course at all. Instead, he remained for one month then left to attend a signals communications school run by the U.S. Army, then returned in 1931 to serve as an instructor at League Island until May 1933. He was the only Second Lieutenant to serve as an instructor during the interwar period. When the “Spring ‘28” class departed, it signaled the end of the split cycle system and the beginning of a period of transition for the Basic School.

These small, half-year classes had a significant impact on the Marine Corps during World War II. Table 5.1 shows the terminal (career-end) rank for each member. A total of 203 officers completed the Basic School between August 1924 and June 1928. In 1942 they were the most senior officers in the Marine Corps who had completed the Basic School, and were well positioned to lead units whose entire “down” chain of command shared that same school experience. One hundred eighty six survived the war, of whom seventy two (39%) achieved general officer rank.36

35. Colonel Jamie Sabater historical reference file, USMC History Division, Reference Branch, Quantico Virginia; USMC Muster Rolls.

36. For all data tables, “unknown” quantities represent those officers for whom conclusive evidence of terminal rank could not be found. In most cases, these were officers who resigned or were dismissed from service. They typically disappeared from the lineal list within ten years of completing the Basic School. Any officer at the rank of Brigadier General or above has an official biography maintained by the Marine Corps Historical Division; for that reason, I am sure that none of the “unknowns” are general officers.
Curriculum Adjustments: Shift to the “Long Course”

The shift from a “half year” course to a “full year” course at the Basic School was the culmination of lengthy debate and discussion, which took place via three-way memorandums between Headquarters Marine Corps, the Commanding Officer of the Basic School, and (less often) the Commanding Officer of the Marine Corps School at Quantico. A decision to make TBS a nine month school, rather than a four or five month school, had been made in January 1928, but a firm concept of how that would change the curriculum was not in place. The ultimate disposition of the curriculum was eventually agreed upon by some unknown group of officers, the final word resting as always with General Lejeune. We cannot discover whose recommendations created the curriculum, but many who took part in the discussion left their signatures behind as evidence. During 1927 and 1928, a host of senior Marines contributed to the debate, among them Louis McCarty Little\textsuperscript{37}, Dion Williams\textsuperscript{38}, James Breckinridge
Records of explicit discussion (held during the summer months of 1928) about the “long course” were not preserved.

However, there was immense struggle on the part of the “spring 1928” staff to fit in all the necessary classes and subjects. They were fighting a battle which had been foreseen at Headquarters, and the solution to their problems (the long course) had already been decided. However, the ongoing debate that continued during the first half of the year is well documented, and shines a light on how the lengthening of the course fit the Marine Corps’ plan. The consistent advice coming from the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico was to make the focus of TBS more tactical; the response from the Commanding Officer of TBS was that he lacked the space and the time to do so. In the middle, the office of the Commandant served as referee, seldom giving lengthy commentary or participating actively in the debate.

In January 1928, Major Rorex submitted a draft schedule for the Spring 1928 cycle, comprising a total 717 hours of instruction. He had been the first Commanding Officer to

37. Louis McCarty Little was commissioned into the Marine Corps in 1899 and did the “usual” things for a Marine officer of the early twentieth century: China, Panama, Cuba, and Haiti, and sea duty. During World War I he held a staff billet with the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces. He attended both the Naval War College and Army War College, then began a tour on the faculty of the NWC. From 1927-1931 Little was the Director of Operations and Training at HQMC. (Louis McCarty Little Official Biography, Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, Virginia.)

38. Dion Williams joined the Marine Corps from Annapolis in 1893 and attended the School of Application under Daniel Pratt Mannix. Williams participated in the first Advanced Base Force fleet exercises on Culebra in 1902. In 1905 he reported to the Naval War College for the first time, where he wrote what most consider a “doctrinal study” about the importance of amphibious concepts. Williams next served at the Office of Naval Intelligence, in China, on the General Board of the Navy, with the 10th Marine Regiment in France, and then in the Dominican Republic. Throughout the 1920s he participated in fleet exercises and published articles in the Marine Corps Gazette about amphibious landing concepts. From 1928-1934 he was the assistant to the Commandant of the Marine Corps; after retirement he wrote articles about professional education. (Dion Williams Official Biography, Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, Virginia.)

39. William Upshur was commissioned in 1904 and attended the School of Application at Annapolis. He served sea duty tours, in Cuba, in Panama, in the Philippines, in China, and in Haiti. He was awarded the Medal of Honor in 1915 for action in Haiti. During World War I he commanded the American Military Prison. Upshur attended both the Naval War College and Army War College. He was in command of the Marine Corps Schools in the 1930s and the current site of The Basic School is named after him.
operative relatively freely (compared to Major Henley, who submitted weekly reports and schedules) and he was wary of too much interference from the distant Quantico schools command. The subjects (and hours) proposed by Rorex were: Administration (46), Law (35), Hygiene (6), Topography (108), Engineering (15), Interior Guard Duty (8), Boats (4), Musketry (12), Infantry Drill (51), Marksmanship (68), Tactics (65), Infantry Weapons (192), and Individual Combat (55). Individual Combat was the title Rorex proposed for Major Biddle’s classes on boxing, fencing, martial arts, and bayonet tactics. His total of 717 hours included the field exercises and rifle range time he hoped to spend at Mount Gretna as well.\textsuperscript{40} Colonel Little, at Headquarters Marine Corps, singled out the “Individual Combat” course right away, noting the length of time devoted to such a class was “excessive and inconsistent with its relative importance.”\textsuperscript{41}

Colonel Upshur, the Commanding Officer of the Marine Corps Schools, responded with a three-page commentary. Like McCarty Little, he did not see the utility of a 55-hour course in “individual combat,” but suggested that the time spent on boxing might still be beneficial if done after class hours and considered “athletic exercise.” Upshur went on to provide his own proposed schedule, with changes both minor and major. The two most significant alterations were an increase of 100 hours in the “tactics” course, which he broke down into sections (and hours): combat orders (19), marches and shelter (2), military organization (3), scouting and patrolling (16), and combat principles (125). Upshur also increased the “infantry drill” portion by 25 hours. Elsewhere, he cut between 4-20 hours from several courses to make up the difference. In his comments, he provided rationale for several of his changes, such as for

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{40} Commanding Officer Basic School to the Major General Commandant, Washington, DC, 19 January 1928; “Schedule for spring class, Basic School”; Correspondence of the Office of the Major General Commandant Series 18, Record Group 127, Box 115; National Archives Building, Washington DC.
  \item \textsuperscript{41} Major General Commandant to Commanding Officer Marine Corps Schools, 21 January 1928; “Schedule for spring class, Basic School (2\textsuperscript{nd} Endorsement)”; Correspondence of the Office of the Major General Commandant Series 18, Record Group 127, Box 115; National Archives Building, Washington, DC.
\end{itemize}
“infantry drill”: “It is believed students should drill during approximately 50 school days...The drill should include the school of the company, as platoon leaders must know company drill in order properly to command platoons in the company.” Each of Upshur’s comments was based upon his own experience as a career officer and as an educator, but most were minor adjustments meant to eke out the maximum benefit from a tight schedule.

However, the really significant alterations that Upshur recommended, those for the tactics course, were changes that would have a fundamental impact on the course going forward. They were not minor shifts, but represented a total revamp of the heart of the Basic School’s curriculum. The course in “Tactics” is still the centerpiece of the Basic School education, and the importance of each student being proficient in a broad variety of tactical command situations cannot be overstated. It is not clear exactly what was taught during the short cycle years in terms of tactics. It is clear that the pattern suggested by Upshur in his 1928 memo is nearly identical to that which was adopted in the fall of that year and continued in use at TBS throughout the entire interwar period. In his explanatory notes, he explained that his five “sub topics” were meant to convey the scope of instruction, of which all but the last part were considered self-explanatory.

For “combat principles,” however, Upshur explained:

> Combat principles include the tactics and technique of all infantry, machine gun and howitzer weapons, in attack and defense, and security from the squad to the company, inclusive. It is basic and most important. The schedules here are entirely suitable for use by basic course students.

Unfortunately, the attached schedules Upshur referenced were not included. However, he later made reference to schedules for “infantry weapons” and those he specified were taken from the curriculum at the Company Officers’ School in Quantico.42 The Basic School students stood to benefit from this change. But there was also a secondary motive: Upshur’s efforts to have Rorex

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42. Commanding Officer Marine Corps Schools to the Major General Commandant, Quantico, Virginia, 2 February 1928; “Schedule for spring class, Basic School”; Correspondence of the Office of the Major General Commandant Series 18, Record Group 127, Box 115; National Archives Building, Washington, DC.
teach principles of tactics at the basic level would better prepare those officers to more quickly engage complex material at the Company Officers’ Course, where Upshur was in charge. In effect, Upshur was improving the quality of his own school by making the prerequisite basic course more sophisticated.

Upshur’s second major alteration was to lengthen the portion of the course dedicated to “infantry weapons.” In this case, it is less clear what changes he was advocating. In his paragraph on tactics, quoted above, he specifically indicated that the use of infantry weapons was a central part of the tactics course itself. How the additional 125 hours of “infantry weapons” as a separate course fit into his plan is unclear, other than both additions were meant to expand the amount of knowledge TBS students graduated with, and better prepare them for the Company Officers’ Course. The office of the Commandant endorsed Upshur’s recommendations, and requested Major Rorex to submit a revised schedule proposal, taking into account the suggestions.

On February 14, Rorex replied with his own defenses, explanations, and partial acquiescence. His overriding objection to the suggestions was that there already was not enough time in the short cycle to cover all the topics needing to be covered. Put another way, he accepted the need for additions to courses like tactics, but did not want to draw away hours from any of the existing curriculum. The primary reason, explained Rorex, that some classes needed to be lengthy was that the students had had no previous exposure to the content whatsoever. It was unfair, he wrote, to expect a newly commissioned officer to comprehend topography or administration so quickly as an officer who had been in service for four or five years. He also pointed out that while the Quantico standard was admirable, it was not possible for his staff of five officers at TBS to imitate what Upshur had been accomplishing with a staff of at least 11. As was often the case in the small Marine Corps, it was a logistics problem which prevented TBS from covering more ground.

Finally, Rorex responded at length to the alterations suggested for the tactics course. It is apparent from his memo that he was feeling pressure to alter the “short cycle” course right away.
(in January and February 1928) rather than wait for the already-approved “long cycle” to commence in the fall of 1928. His explanation is worth reproducing in full:

Regarding Tactics, it may be stated that heretofore the course at this school has not included the tactical use of other than infantry rifle units, squad, section, platoon and company. This because of the fact that comparatively few, if any, graduates go immediate to howitzer or machine gun units. Because of the limited time under the present scheme, it has been found necessary to devote the time to rifle units only. In this connection, I cannot see the necessity of devoting 19 hours to combat orders for second lieutenants. The reason for, and details of construction of combat orders, followed by some practice is all a junior second lieutenant must have. They are not being trained as staff officers. In my opinion, until the Basic Course is lengthened, the time available is needed on other subjects more in line with the students’ immediate requirements. The same remarks apply generally to the idea of increasing the tactics by 100 hours. It is true that practically all subjects taught here should have more time allotted…It is not fair to the officer not the unit he joins to deny him sufficient instruction in the subjects that will, in all probability, be required of him immediately after leaving this school. Such subjects will be in most cases Administration, Law, Marksmanship, Topography, Drill and Infantry Weapons, and I believe that these subjects should by no means be reduced in the time allotted. As has been stated, all subjects should have more time and will have when the longer course begins next fall.43

Rorex was determined to stand his ground. As a result, General Lejeune responded with a one-page endorsement of the Major’s plan, except that “individual combat” was to be removed from the daily schedule and taught only in off-hours. The alterations suggested by Upshur would come in time.

1928-1931 Transition to Long Course and Large Classes

In August 1928, fourteen graduates from the United States Naval Academy arrived at League Island for instruction at the Basic school. They undertook rifle range training during September of that year before returning to Philadelphia to begin classes. One non-Academy student, Louis C. Plain, joined the group in November. (Plain had begun the course in January of 1928 with the last split-cycle class, but spent most of the spring in the Naval Hospital at Philadelphia.) These fifteen formed the smallest group to attend TBS during the entire League

43. Commanding Officer Basic School to Major General Commandant, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 14 February 1928; “Schedule for spring class 1928, Basic School”; Correspondence of the Office of the Major General Commandant Series 18, Record Group 127, Box 115; National Archives Building, Washington, DC.
Island period. Four would go on to become pilots; two were captured in the Philippines while serving with the 4th Marines. At the same time this small class arrived, the staff continued a pattern of slow growth. Serving under Major Rorex for the 1928-1929 academic year were Captains Ashurst, Ruffner, Snyder, Walker, and Wright.

Unlike the previous six classes to pass through TBS, this group would remain until May 1929, marking the first time in the interwar period the course of instruction lasted longer than six months. Though the process of lengthening the course, documented above, was deliberate and thorough, when juxtaposed with the broader condition of the Marine Corps in late 1928, it is somewhat surprising. Due to the increased need for troops in Nicaragua, the Marines had actually suspended the Company Officers’ Course altogether, and a significant number of students and staff from the Quantico schools were detached for foreign duty. In contrast, during those same years the TBS staff was increased and the course of instruction lengthened. This approach demonstrated the value HQMC attached to a basic course: it maintained the school during a severe manpower crunch. Lieutenants’ knowledge of the topics covered at TBS was critical if they were going to perform well in the fast-paced, complex Nicaraguan theatre.

Also in 1929, an additional layer was added to the Marine Corps’ PME system, one which was tied directly to the Basic School. Beginning in the spring, a “School for Candidates for Commission from the Ranks” was established at the Marine Barracks in Washington, DC. This school was created for those enlisted Marines who intended to apply for a commission, but were too old to simply attend the Naval Academy as midshipmen. The school, more of a self-study program was intended:

...to provide an opportunity free from distraction for selected men...to REFRESH their knowledge of the more difficult subjects in which they will be examined for appointment as second lieutenants in the Marine Corps.\(^44\)

\(^44\) Major General Commandant to All Marine Officers, Washington DC, 20 April 1919; “Selection of Candidates for Commission from the ranks of the Marine Corps”; Correspondence of the Office of the Major General Commandant Series 18, Record Group 127, Box 115; National Archives Building, Washington, DC.
A staff was assigned, though General Fuller assured them they would not be required to instruct the students, merely aid them in their individual study. It is not clear whether every prior-enlisted Marine destined for TBS was able to complete this short course at Washington first.

The small 1928-29 class remained on active duty for full careers with only one exception. All but five achieved a rank of Colonel or higher, as shown in Table 5.2.

In August 1929, another “long cycle” class reported for instruction at the Basic School. The class marked another significant change in the way TBS did business: the class of 1929-1930 had fifty three students. Among the students were notables such as future author Samuel B. Griffith, and four future TBS instructors. Roughly the size of two “split” classes, the 1929-1930 class size set the pattern for the size and schedule of TBS classes until the late 1930s. Of the 53 members of the class, 17 were USNA graduates and one, future instructor Randall M. Victory, had attended the University of Washington. Another non-academy student, Alva B. Lasswell, would later be immortalized in the film “Midway” for his role as a cryptologist in breaking Japanese communication codes. Another, Chandler W. Johnson, commanded the battalion at Iwo Jima that raised the flag on Mount Suribachi. A general pattern emerges around 1930, in which future billets for TBS students from a given class year can be reasonably predicted. For example, the members of the classes of 1928-1930 were typically Majors at the beginning of World War II, and served as Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels throughout the war. Members of classes slightly
before or slightly after show a corresponding pattern of more and less senior rank and position. There are exceptions to this rule, especially for those officers who attended flight training or a specialist school (such as artillery or signals communication) after entering the fleet. But in general, beginning around 1930 it is possible to predict the future operational billets and combat leadership roles of TBS students with a fair amount of certainty.

In 1947, the 1929-30 class had forty six living members, with thirty four still on active duty. Twenty eight (82%) were Colonels or above when they retired. (See Table 5.3)

Arriving with the students were two new instructors, Captains Merritt B. Edson and Roger W. Peard, bringing the total number of instructors to eight. Edson would become famous during World War II for his role in founding the Marine Raiders. Peard served as the de facto commanding officer of TBS during transitions and periods of leave. Though only listed as “instructor, basic school” on the muster rolls, Peard clearly had an advanced administrative role at the school, as evidenced by his signature on diplomas, rosters, orders, and other intra-school communications. (In the late 1930s, his de facto role was formalized and a Major from the staff was specifically designated to serve as the executive officer.)

The next class repeated the new “long cycle” pattern, with forty one students admitted. Twenty seven of them were USNA graduates, and fourteen were “candidates” who came from the enlisted ranks. Three future TBS instructors were among the 1930-1931 class, as well as
future commandant Wallace M. Greene. Perhaps the bravest soul of all, class member John Wehle would later marry the daughter of USMC legend Smedley Butler. Lawrence C. Brunton, one of the Annapolis graduates, would be killed in Nicaragua in 1931, a rare casualty as a result of enemy fire. In his reminisces, student (and future TBS instructor) William Battell recalled that the course at TBS was a challenge. However, the students found time to enjoy themselves as well. One student, Michael Mahoney, found an antique French textbook on engineering and brought it with him to Captain Julius Wright’s field fortifications class. Mahoney’s oddball answers to test questions—taken from the outdated textbook—did not amuse the instructor. Instead, Captain Wright declared: “Now the whole class will sit here until Lieutenant Mahoney has memorized the entire chapter in the training manual.”45 Two more “new joins” were also on the staff: Captain Graves B. Erskine arrived from the Infantry School at Fort Benning, and Lieutenant Colonel William D. Smith took over command from Major Rorex.

William Dulty Smith was the first Lieutenant Colonel to command the Basic School. He was a member of one of Philadelphia’s famous socialite families, and some Marines considered his hometown assignment to TBS as a kind of “reward” for many years of foreign duty.46 When he arrived his family included four small children, so it was likely a pleasant change of pace. Regardless of pedigree, Smith was a soft spoken, uncontroversial pick, and was universally liked by his students and staff. Smith did not write a memoir nor preserve any of his personal papers. Graves Erskine was a well-known veteran of the First World War, recipient of the Silver Star for actions at S. Mihiel. His strong opinions on the Marine Corps Schools were often negative: late in his career, he said that Marine Corps schools of the interwar era were very poor compared to those of the Army. Primarily, Erskine referred to the lack of field exercises conducted at Marine Corps Schools. His own experience at the Army’s Infantry School at Fort Benning, where field


work formed a large percentage of the work, had shaped Erskine’s opinion of military education. When he held command at the Marine Corps Schools after World War II, Erskine continued to call for increased amounts of wargaming, field exercises, and practical application.

However, the Silver Star recipient from Louisiana had a much more positive view of the Basic School. He felt it was “quite a thrilling thing” to influence young officers, and especially appreciated the challenge of mentoring those students who were disinclined to work hard. In his eyes, the students who had risen from the ranks were better students and were more diligent than the Academy students. Erskine taught scouting and patrolling, machine guns, and “customs of the service,” which was a lecture rather than a full-length class.47 Erskine also stepped into the “executive officer” role, replacing Captain Peard. Captain Louis Whaley joined the staff halfway through the academic year, replacing Captain Skinner, and the staff strength remained at eight. Around this time, the instructors at the Basic School began to receive some recognition for their ability as experts in education. In February 1931, the Commandant requested that a member of the Basic School staff deliver a series of 14 lectures on field artillery, to be used for “preliminary” instruction of the officers of the First Battalion, 21st Marines (a reserve unit). The lectures were written by the staff of the 10th Marine Regiment (artillery), but a qualified instructor was wanted to deliver them to students, so a TBS staff member was chosen.48

The 1931-1932 class consisted of only thirty five students, 24 of whom came from the Naval Academy. Three would return to League Island to serve as instructors before the decade ended. Future pilot Henry T. Elrod was one of the non-Academy students; he would posthumously

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47. Erskine Oral History, 111-112. Erskine’s testimony was recorded in 1969, when the General was seventy years old. Some of Erskine’s memories, such as that there were “no civilian college men” at the Basic School during his tenure, are in error. However, generally his sentiments on TBS are useful, and he was able to accurately recall the names (and details of future careers) of more than a dozen students from 1930-1932.

48. Major General Commandant to Commanding Officer Basic School (9 February 1931) “Instructor for First Battalion, 21st Marines (Reserve),” R.G. 127, series 18, box 109, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC.
receive the Medal of Honor for his actions in the defense of Wake Island in December 1941.
Another student, John H. Cook, had an unusual future as the commander of USMC tank units
which were assigned to Iceland in July 1941.49 The staff had undergone significant change
during the summer of 1931: Lieutenant Colonel W.D. Smith remained as commanding officer.
Major Biddle reappeared on the muster roll for most of the academic year. Captains Curtis,
Erskine, Joseph T. Smith, and John Thaddeus Walker were joined by First Lieutenant Walter
Wachtler and Second Lieutenant Jamie Sabater.

The following year, another small class of thirty students convened, this time in June (two
months earlier than usual). Twenty four were Naval Academy graduates. Despite arriving early,
they remained through May of 1933 to complete the usual one-month field exercise at Mount
Gretna, Pennsylvania, as had the classes before them. No record has survived to explain how the
students occupied themselves during the extra two months. Among the 1932-1933 students was
Samuel D. Puller, younger brother of Lewis B. Puller (and future instructor at TBS). A total of
nine instructors were now present, including Gerald C. Thomas. “Jerry” Thomas was a favorite
among the students, admired for his World War experience and respected for his impressive
command of the course material. Thomas himself remembered the assignment as particularly
fulfilling, and felt he had a great deal of talent as a teacher.50

When off duty, Thomas was an avid reader and committed himself to a program of self-
guided education in history and military subjects. He was well aware of the ongoing
developments in Marine Corps thought and the creation of new landing doctrine—all taking
place back in Quantico, Virginia. Just as Alexander Vandegrift felt that missing the fight in
France was a personal loss, Jerry Thomas chafed as his “rewarding” assignment as an instructor

49. William K. Jones, A Brief History of the 6th Marines (Washington, DC: History and
Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 2001); Clifton La Bree, The Gentle Warrior: General
Oliver Prince Smith, USMC (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2001), 18.

prevented him from taking part in the amphibious doctrine development. He resolved to leave the Basic School as soon as possible and join the cadre of officers in Quantico who were in the process of reshaping the Corps. An appeal to his Congressman, Augustus Keyser, won him the desired billet in Quantico, but only after he promised to finish his tour in Philadelphia. Thomas’ account of his desire to be in Quantico is the only source which corroborates 1stLt Anthony Frances’ *History of the Marine Corps Schools* account that some officers did not want to serve as instructors or otherwise be involved with schools. However, not only did Thomas complete his entire tour at TBS, his reason for requesting an early transfer had nothing to do with any opposition to education.

With a staff of eight, the 1933-1934 class of 21 students also completed an extra long cycle, arriving in June and departing in May. Only two members of this class were not USNA commissions: one, Frederick S. Bronson, was almost certainly commissioned from the ranks, as he retired some time before 1940 as a Second Lieutenant, indicating he already had many years of service before he attended TBS. Though the overall class size at TBS would continue to change, the 1933-34 cycle marked the end of fluctuation regarding the number of students sent to TBS from the Naval Academy. For the rest of the interwar period, between 20 and 25 midshipmen would be given Marine Corps commissions, no matter the overall size of the TBS class they were destined to join. Such equilibrium suggests that Congressional committees and the Department of the Navy had settled on a quota.

In June 1934, Lieutenant Colonel William D. Smith departed, and Major Julian C. Smith took command of the Basic School. Smith’s long career had given him extensive familiarity with both military education and the Philadelphia Navy Yard. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in September, soon after the start of the academic year. James Breckinridge, in


command at the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico, was a close friend and the two often corresponded about PME and the schools. Under Smith’s command, the students stood “officer of the day” duty and served on real courts martial. He believed they should complete as many tasks at school as possible, as they would find in the fleet. For the balance of the year, J.C. Smith, four Captains, and three First Lieutenants formed the staff of TBS. Captain Lee Hoxie Brown had the implicit role of executive officer, taking command of the school whenever Smith was temporarily absent.

Thirty one students arrived in July, all but five coming directly from the Naval Academy. Two future TBS instructors were among them. One, Harold Deakin, later remarked that his experience as a student at TBS was that “individual weapons” were the primary focus, and cited the extensive amount of marksmanship both at Cape May and Indiantown Gap. One of the former midshipmen was a short, thin young man named Victor Krulak. After the departure of the class of 1934-35, the TBS staff had a two month break—the first time there had been no students present at the school since mid-1931. The incoming class for 1935-36 was going to be very large and have a unique structure. It seems certain that a great deal of planning and preparation was being done by the staff during the short summer break.

1935-1939: The Building Years

In mid-July 1935, newly commissioned Second Lieutenants began to arrive at the League Island Marine Barracks’ schools detachment. The beginning of a period of rapid growth had begun, and large classes were the “new normal” at TBS for the rest of the 1930s. The Fleet Marine Force (FMF) had been formally established the previous spring and the way forward for


the Marine Corps was clear. Congressional funding was finally catching up to the oft-sounded alarms of past Commandants, who insisted that the very small “old Corps” was no match for the expansive missions of the postwar era. The officer corps of the Marine Corps was increased, leading inevitably to enhanced promotion for all preceding entries. At the same time President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized other prewar increases in military spending, such as establishing the Naval Construction Battalions (Sea Bees). The majority of the new Lieutenants arriving at Philadelphia in 1935 were graduates of ROTC programs at civilian universities.\(^\text{55}\) For over a decade, ROTC programs at a select group of military colleges had been designated “distinguished” programs by the War Department. Those schools were producing ROTC graduates who were not only welcome but sought after.\(^\text{56}\) Besides the parity in competence, it was of course a welcome savings to admit an ROTC officer vs the expensive four-year education of a midshipman.

The “class of 1935” stayed in touch throughout their careers, and some documentation of their reunions has been preserved. Their records provide evidence of a confusing tradition revolving around class years and names at TBS. Sometime during this era (perhaps the entire time), the members of the Basic School classes began the convention of referring to themselves not by the year in which they graduated from TBS, but instead by the year in which the Naval Academy graduates had graduated from that school and been commissioned. Thus, the “class of 1935” graduated from the USNA in 1935, and attended TBS from 1935-36.\(^\text{57}\) At their 50th class

\[\text{55. See } \textit{Muster Rolls of the USMC}, \text{ etc.}\]

\[\text{56. Oliver P. Smith, “You Are Hereby Detached,” } \textit{Marine Corps Gazette} 11, no. 1 (March 1926): 2.\]

\[\text{57. This convention was in place for additional class years in the late 1930s (see Van Stockum, } \textit{Remembrances of World Wars})\text{, and I presume it had been for some time. After World War II, the format of the Basic School was retooled once more, and a 6-month course of instruction was created that continues to the present day. The much larger postwar TBS started between 3 and 8 groups of Second Lieutenants in a given academic year between 1950 and 2015. During the 1950s, the 6-month classes began adopting “names” taken from the company name, for example “Fox 6-08” is the class name for Fox Company, which arrived at TBS in June of 2008. “Golf 8-08” arrived in August of 2008. And so forth.}\]
year reunion in 1985, they celebrated not only the lives of their classmates who had passed away, but also their distinction as the “most promoted” class of the era: two commandants came from this class, as well as a large number of two- and three-star generals.

The very large 1935-36 group was so large, a staggered arrival pattern was created. The “staged” reporting, which was not repeated by later TBS classes, attempted to balance the different degrees of military experience which the various groups of incoming students already had. In early July 1935, twenty six graduates of the United States Naval Academy arrived at League Island. The USNA graduates remained at the Basic School for only three months, and were known as “the June group.” At the same time, fifty ROTC graduates and three meritorious noncommissioned officers also arrived. These students would remain until March 1936, and complete their month of training at Mount Gretna in April 1936. These were known as “the July group.” Finally, in August and September 1935 another forty-four ROTC graduates and one meritorious noncommissioned officer arrived to complete the class of 124 members of the TBS class of 1935-1936. The “September group” remained at League Island until April 1936 and completed their field training at Mount Gretna in May 1936. Each group retained a distinct identity, evident in their memorial books and reunion programs, but all referred to themselves throughout their careers as members of the “class of ’35.” Marines from the surrounding generations usually had high praise for the “class of ’35,” crediting a variety of factors for their collective successes. One possible explanation for their consistently excellent performance, for example, was the fact that the US Army declined to accept any ROTC officers during 1935, so the Marine Corps “caught the cream” of the lot.58

Due to its very large size, the 1935-36 class had many notable officers. Seven had become pilots (five of whom died in aircraft mishaps). Three died as Prisoners of War (POW); a

58. Russel N. Jordahl, Oral History Interview, 57.
fourth survived captivity to retire as a Brigadier General. Eight were killed in action. Of the 101 members of the class who survived the war, ninety one retired at the rank of Colonel or above.

To meet the demands of the larger classes a larger staff was gathered. Lieutenant Colonel Allen H. Turnage took command of the Basic School in July 1935. Turnage was a graduate of the University of North Carolina and served three tours in Haiti. He also served with the AEF in France as the commanding officer of the 5th Marine Brigade’s Machine Gun Battalion. Turnage had been an instructor at both the Company Officers School and Field Officers School in the 1920s. He also completed an unusual sea duty tour, on the staff of an Atlantic battleship division.\(^{59}\) Turnage was assisted by the first official “executive officer” of the Basic School,

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59. Allen H. Turnage, Biographical Reference File, Reference Branch, Marine Corps Historical
Major William P. Richards. Richards was an old “China Marine” and had served as the captain of the USMC competitive marksmanship team during the late 1920s. Captains Lee Hoxie Brown, John Muncie, William Orr, Amor Sims, and Merrill Twining were an even mix of “old hands” and “new joins.” Twining would become famous for his vocal participation in the political development of the Marine Corps in the late 1940s during the “defense unification” crisis. He taught Naval Law when he first arrived at TBS, but recalled that he “volunteered my head off” in other subjects, such as machine gunnery, in order to escape the law classroom. In addition, seven First Lieutenants joined the staff. All seven of the First Lieutenants had attended TBS as students while it was located in Philadelphia. All seven would also be promoted to Captain at the end of the academic year.

Large classes continued to arrive at League Island until the entrance of the United States into World War II. Each had about 23 midshipmen, and a varying number of ROTC and “from the ranks” commissions. The 1936-1937 class consisted of ninety-nine total students. Thirteen future general officers, including Vietnam-era Commandant Lewis W. Walt, were among them. Seven would be killed in action during World War II. Unfortunately, the lineal lists for 1936 are missing the listing of midshipmen who graduated from the Naval Academy during that year—as a result, official records for USNA numbers in 1936 cannot be obtained. The only member of the USNA class of 1936 listed as a Marine Corps officer in the Academy’s Memorial Hall is Captain Ralph Haas, who graduated from the Academy in 1936 but did not join the Marine Corps until after the start of World War II. (Haas did not attend the Basic School at League Island, but may have done so after 1941. He attended Naval Aviation training immediately after graduation from the Academy, presumably as a Navy Ensign.)


61. Merrill Twining, Oral History Interview (transcribed), 59-60.
Also in 1936, Captain Russell Jordahl joined the staff of the Basic School. Jordahl’s recollection from his days as a student at TBS was very negative, due to perceived coldness of the relationship between the instructors and students. Though he agreed that the instructors were competent, it was Jordahl’s sense that when he was a student the instructors completely failed to welcome him (and his classmates) into the officer community and camaraderie. So, when he arrived as an instructor himself, the memory “prompted [me] to take some positive actions,” and he went to great effort to entertain every student in his home, at least once during the program of instruction. Jordahl’s wife included the fiancées and wives of students as well, imparting knowledge of service life from a spouse’s perspective. In the classroom, Jordahl was the chief instructor for Military History during his entire time at League Island. He also assisted with classes on the machine gun, defense tactics, and administration. By Jordahl’s account, the younger members of the staff served as “instructor assistants,” while the most senior members had final say over the class schedule, grades, etc. 62 Those instructors who had been to Fort Benning had an advantage, he opined, because some part of the curriculum there had been instruction on how to teach, not merely instruction in the military subject matter itself. 63

The 1937-38 class consisted of eighty three students. Twenty two were members of the United States Naval Academy class of 1937. Fourteen achieved flag rank, and many were decorated for heroism during World War II. Three died in early 1945, among the many Marines captured by the Japanese in the fall of the Philippines. At least fifteen became pilots. One member of that class preserved his student papers from the entire program of instruction, giving a detailed look at the full scope of the curriculum from the student’s perspective. Another member wrote a detailed memoir, including some passages about the social and extracurricular opportunities available to TBS students in the late 1930s. The two accounts of the 1937-38 class


63. Jordahl Oral History Interview, 60.
year provide an interesting range of perspective, as one student had an ROTC commission and the other was a graduate of the Naval Academy.

In 1938-1939 only seventy-four students were “on deck,” but the staff continued to grow. Eleven Captains, three Majors, and a new commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Gilder D. Jackson, formed the staff. Acting as executive officer was Major Frank Goettge. He was already famous in the Marine Corps for his football exploits from former days; he would later be famous for being killed in action on an ill-fated reconnaissance patrol on Guadalcanal in the opening weeks of the battle there. The already-famous Lewis B. Puller was also among the staff. Nine of the fifteen staff members had attended TBS while it was located at League Island, creating a close community of common knowledge. As mentioned earlier, Captain Russell Jordahl worked hard to be sure that his own negative experiences as a student were not perpetuated during his time as an instructor. Others, such as Captain Howard Kenyon, were more austere. Kenyon taught naval law and was a very serious mentor with a very dim opinion of anyone who exaggerated or invented tales for the sake of the audience’s enjoyment.64 Telling sea stories in his class was ill-advised.

The students in 1938-39 included the usual 23 Academy graduates. Among them were two recipients of the Medal of Honor, 1stLt George C. Cannon (killed on December 7th, 1941, at Midway) and General Raymond G. Davis, who received the Medal of Honor as a Lieutenant Colonel in Korea, where he force-marched his unit at night in order to reopen a blocked pass and prevent the isolation of two stranded Marine regiments.65 Eleven members of the class would go on to complete flight training.


65. George C. Cannon Biographical Reference File, Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, Virginia; Raymond G. Davis Official Biography, Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, Virginia.
The 1939-1940 class marked the final transition year, with one hundred thirty two students attending. Twenty three were former midshipmen, and from that group nine were captured together in the Philippines in late 1944. One, Lieutenant Colonel William F. Harris, survived his ordeal in World War II, and was also captured during the Korean War, last seen in December of 1950 and never officially recovered. Harris was featured as a character in the recent film “Unbroken.” Another prisoner of war, Captain William Hogaboom, recorded a detailed operational report of the fall of Corregidor, which he buried in a tin can immediately prior to his position being overrun by the Japanese. He did not survive. A total of seventeen members of the TBS class of 1939-1940 were captured as prisoners of war. Ten died in captivity.

The few pieces of curriculum left in archives suggest that the program of instruction did not change dramatically during this time period. Some instructors even suggested that the “old school” emphasis on some increasingly outdated topics, such as close order drill, detracted from the overall usefulness of the course, providing clear evidence that the “old” material was still in the program as late as 1939. However, the pace of operations at TBS left little time for reworking the course in any significant fashion. Additionally, the commanding officers were still “old corps” officers whose attachment to early-century ways of instruction were likely much stronger than those of their young staff members. In the meantime, class sizes were growing and the introduction of the FMF concept had a focusing effect on the Marine Corps Schools as a whole. While the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico worked through their process of transformation and developed the landing manuals to be used “in the next war,” TBS continued without interruption.

In a time period where many aspects of the military professional’s life were changing, the Basic School may have been the only source of real continuity for the officer corps. With the

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66. Hogaboom Oral History Interview, 53.

67. Jordahl Oral History Interview.
shared experience of having attended TBS, combat commanders in 1941-45 had a common knowledge base to work from at all levels of the fleet organization. In December 1941 there were just over 1600 Marine officers on active duty. All but 400 of them had attended the Basic School while it was located at League Island. Approximately 150 of those “old Corps” officers had attended the Marine Officers School (Port Royal and Norfolk) or School of Application (Washington, DC, and Annapolis) where the program of instruction had also bee very similar.  

1940-1942: End of the League Island Era

The final change to occur at the Basic School during the League Island period, the change which truly signaled the transformation of the school into a permanent fixture in Marine Corps professional military education, was the appointment of a full Colonel to command the institution. In July 1940, Colonel Clifton B. Cates arrived to take command. Cates was a decorated veteran of World War I and had served extensively overseas. He came to TBS from the Army War College. Cates was one of the few commanding officers who mentioned the Basic School in any personal notes or histories: he described it as “about only 140 young college boys…that course lasted approximately eight month and then during the summer we trained.”

In one interview, he was questioned about rumors that the League Island school had “inbred problems” due to a lack of land for field training. Cates replied:

I don’t think that’s quite true. There wasn’t an area right by the school where you could fire but there was plenty of vacant territory where we’d hold maneuvers and things and then every summer we would go to Indian Town Gap. We had something like 30,000 acres up there with no one there. We were the only ones there. The Army, you see, had closed up the camps and we had wonderful accommodations, wonderful ranges, and you couldn’t ask for better. We’d be there for – as I remember we stayed there for eight weeks. So we got in a world of firing up there.

68. Lineal lists, muster rolls, and the Annual Reports were used to develop these statistics.


70. Cates Oral History Interview, 111.
When Cates went on to command a regiment on Guadalcanal in late 1942, fifty percent of his regimental staff were members of the TBS classes he had overseen.

Serving under Cates was Lieutenant Colonel Frank Goettge, who had been at TBS since June 1938 (as a Major), in the position of executive officer. Majors on the staff were Kenneth Chappell, Louis Marie, Andrew Mathiesen, Dwight Muncie, and William Scheyer. Captains Joseph Berry, Melvin Brown, Raymond Crist, Walfried Fromhold, John Lanigan, Clifton Moss, Ellsworth Murray, Marcellus Howard, Charles Miller, Samuel Puller, and Randall Victory were joined by First Lieutenant Harry Schmitz. The outbreak of war in December 1941 did not materially alter the program of instruction at TBS right away. Rather, the curriculum and course length remained steady. In fact, it is almost surprising how unruffled the TBS organization was by the outbreak of war: more than one student remarked that everyone “dashed around” and expected some immediate excitement. Instead, they were disappointed to find that business would continue as usual until the end of the school year. Cates remained in command at TBS until the school was closed and relocated to Quantico in May 1942, marking the end of the League Island period.

The 1940-41 class was also a large one, with a total of one hundred fifty four members. Only twenty three were graduates of the United States Naval Academy, continuing the downward trend of midshipmen as a percentage of the total number of new Marine officers. However it was in line with the increasing interwar numbers of the Navy, which had more need of the specially-trained midshipmen. At least three members of the 1940-1941 TBS class would remain on active duty for a long enough period that they were credited with combat service in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Twelve were killed in action between 1942 and 1945.
In Brief: The Basic School in Wartime

During World War II, TBS was a highly abbreviated program which produced over 30,000 Second Lieutenants in a three year period. The school was relocated to Quantico, Virginia. In February, 1942, the Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools had recommended to Headquarters, Marine Corps (and by extension the Navy Department and the Congress), that the Quantico reservation be expanded by 50,000 acres. It took until October to finalize the purchase of the additional property, but by the end of the year ample training space had been made available in the swampy Virginia woods. The Basic School’s relocation brought it into the same

physical location as the already-established Reserve Officers’ Course, the Platoon Leaders’ Course, and the two-part Marine Corps Schools establishment itself.  

Since 1938, the Marines had been operating the Reserve Officers’ Course as a way to create “trained but unpaid” officers, ready to be activated at a moment’s notice. In 1942, the reserve officers were immediately being activated and sent to operational units: an “assembly line” program of ten-week courses turned out over 300 new officers each cycle. Whatever was left of the Basic School was absorbed into this mass-production officer factory. No mention of a separate course for ROTC- or USNA-trained officers is present in the Anthony Frances History of the Marine Corps Schools, and the Quantico muster rolls for the Schools Detachment do not delineate. Recruiting efforts focused on ensuring that the quality of all officer candidates was high, and great pride was taken in the ability of the Quantico schools to turn “civilian into Marine” in such a short time. By 1944, explicit elimination of TBS as a separate program came in the form of a memo by General Clifton Cates, now the commanding officer of all Marine Corps schools at Quantico, in which he listed the education operations under his watch: Officer Candidates’ School, Reserve Officers’ School, Field Artillery School, Ordnance School, Correspondence School, Command and Staff School, Aviation Ground Officers’ School. The Basic School would not return until the war was over.

72. Frances, History of the Marine Corps Schools, 70.
73. Frances, History of the Marine Corps Schools, 71.
74. Frances, History of the Marine Corps Schools, 78.
75. Frances, History of the Marine Corps Schools, 82.
Chapter 6 - United States Marine Corps Historical Division: Archives Material

In an average year, students at the Basic School during the interwar era completed between 80-100 individual classroom-based “instructional events.” This was augmented by daily drill, one month of marksmanship training, one month of field training, and guest lectures. The students were employed in a variety of garrison duty tasks in order to prepare them for similar duties in the fleet: these included standing watch, cleaning and inspecting barracks, and maintaining personnel records. The Marine Corps Archives preserved a broad variety of original materials related to the Marine Corps, but curriculum from schools was not considered a historical preservation priority until after World War II. As a result, the “official” archives file on TBS contains only twenty one items from the entire League Island period. The personal collections of instructors who served at TBS while it was in Philadelphia provide an additional eight items. These are the only examples of curriculum available from an “official” source for the time period. In this study, they are set apart from the items preserved by students, since their preservation in the “official” archives file says something about the Marine Corps Schools and professional military education, not merely something about any one individual. The items preserved do not provide a clear picture of any one class year or any one topic. They merely provide some insight into what was deemed important by the instructors and staff who chose to preserve them.

In this chapter, the materials from instructors’ personal collections will be considered, along with the “Military History” course materials preserved in the Marine Corps Archives, a “Tactics” exercise from the Marine Corps Archives, and a technical class on extended-order machine gun tactics also from the Marine Corps Archives. These items best demonstrate the purpose of TBS, which was to train infantry platoon commanders, as well as show the educational input made at TBS to mold Marine officers ideologically. In particular, the scope and content of the “Military History” course will be assessed in detail. This course provides key evidence as to the educational nature of the instruction at TBS during the time period considered.
Students were asked not merely to memorize historical facts, but instead to create something new based on their reading of a historical source, and to interpret the lessons of history for a modern audience of military professionals. Such an aim, whether it was realized in the classroom or not, is clearly beyond “training” and shows the intent of TBS instructors (and the Marine Corps which created or endorsed the curriculum) to truly educate new Marine officers. The preservation in the Marine Corps Archives of a nearly-complete set of “Military History” class notes, for more than one instructional year, amplifies the impression that the course was of great importance.

**Course of Instruction: Records from the 1920s**

Between 1918 and 1924 the Basic School lacked a consistent format and was relocated more than once. The “emergency” officer training during World War I was conducted at Quantico, Virginia, in a training camp that was disbanded after the war. In his *History of the Marine Corps Schools*, Anthony Frances stated:

> The first basic class began training in 1922 with 17 newly-appointed second lieutenants and 11 Marine Gunners. The general organization initiated by this first class was followed until the Basic School was disbanded during the Second World War.¹

The summer 1922 edition of the Marine Corps Gazette almost corroborates Frances’ account, listing 16 second lieutenants and 4 noncommissioned officers graduating from a “Basic Class.”² Unfortunately, no records from the schools detachment have survived to create any record of the content of that course. Whether it was comparable to the Basic School itself, and how many students actually attended, is unknown. Accounts like Frances’ *History* which collapse the entire interwar period into a single sentence mischaracterize the amount of development and growth which took place during that time period. More troubling, the “official history” of TBS glibly repeats Frances’ account (without citing his book), saying “a more modern curriculum was

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introduced in 1922” and implying that the move to Philadelphia in 1924 effected only a change in location and no other alteration to the school structure.³ The truth is much more complex and contains the story of an institution which, while remaining steady in its mission and overall structure, grew and adapted to the increasing needs of the Marine Corps.

The only items in the Marine Corps Archives that provide information about the TBS program of instruction in the 1920s are the academic transcripts from General Wilburt Brown and General Robert O. Bare’s personal collections. Those transcripts, mentioned in the previous chapter of this thesis, listed eleven individual subjects: topography, infantry drill regulations, law, weapons and tactics, ordnance and gunnery, administration, marksmanship, musketry, signaling, boats, and field engineering.⁴ Neither the official TBS collection at the archives nor any of the personal papers include more detailed information. No individual exams or lecture notes were found.

_Course of Instruction: Archives Material for the 1930s_

For the rest of this chapter, we will consider the preserved pieces of lecture notes and teaching materials from the Basic School of the 1930s. Some of the documents discovered were in the official archive file for TBS. Others were preserved due to the foresight of interwar-era instructors who saved copies of papers for their own reference and then donated their files to the Marine Corps Archives. This paper will examine each, then attempt to relate this small group of records to the broader scope of education. In addition to these original records, there are accounts from students and instructors of the era, both official and unofficial, which provide more insight.

³ “Official History - The Basic School” (2001), The Basic School Collection [Coll/3706, Box 1, folder 10] Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, Virginia; 7.

⁴ Robert O. Bare, “Academic Transcript: Basic Course” (1924), Robert O. Bare Personal Papers Collection [Coll/150, Box 1, Folder 13], Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, Virginia.
Some of the preserved documents were kept by officers who served as instructors at both TBS and the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico. The influence of the parent command was a positive one that lent continuity to the activities at TBS. It was still true that the commanding officer of TBS had great independence, but the administrative task of developing a curriculum or keeping a program of instruction up to date was no longer wholly on the shoulders of the commander and his staff. Though it is not true that “all courses copied from Fort Benning and Leavenworth were discarded,” it was true that the course material was updated and altered. A gradual shift was made in which the Marines created their own, new material, but the influence of the Army schools remained significant and visible.

It is interesting that both instructors and students at the Basic School during the 1930s preserved portions of curriculum in their personal papers. In contrast, none of the instructors in the 1920s did so. The contrast is not confined to records about schools, but extends into the general makeup of official files across the Archives. It is reasonable to assume that Marines who clearly saw another great war on the horizon might think their early career mementos of 1935 or 1939 would be of potential importance. The most complete records available belong to officers whose careers began on the eve of World War II and ended after Vietnam. On the other hand, those who were commissioned earlier in the interwar period felt they had missed “the big war” completely and were resigned to peacetime service in support of the Navy: honorable, but probably not exciting. Certainly none of them had an idea that they were destined to become flag officers during the largest single conflict embarked upon in recorded history.

The preserved portions of curriculum are from 1930-31 and 1933-37. These items, a total of nine full-length sets of teaching notes, will be examined in chronological order by the date they were used in the curriculum. In addition to these “from the classroom” pieces of evidence, there are notes, orders, schedules, graduation certificates, and other miscellany which help fill in the picture of academic life at TBS in the 1930s.

5. Frances, History of the Marine Corps Schools, 36.
Examples of Interwar Curriculum: 1930s

The courses taught at the Basic School in 1930 were: “administration, boats, drill regulations, first aid and military hygiene, interior guard duty, signal communications, military field engineering, marksmanship, musketry, naval and military law, tactics, topography, naval ordnance, individual combat, and aviation (ground course).” The Marine Corps Archives holds twenty one items from 1933-1941, mostly from the 1933-34 class year. In this chapter, we will examine only the papers for “military history” (three documents), “tactics” (one document on the 75mm Mortar, one on the machine gun, and one for “squad in the defense”), and a historical case study on the siege of Vicksburg (one document). Preserved in the personal papers collections of TBS instructors were materials for machine guns (four documents), and “military customs and courtesies” (one document), both of which will be examined in this chapter. An additional complete set of curriculum was preserved by a student in the 1937-38 class, and will be examined in a separate chapter.

One example of curriculum for the 1931-1932 academic year is very different from all the rest, and will be discussed first. The document, from Graves Blanchard Erskine’s personal collection, is a 10-page lecture entitled “Military Courtesy and Customs of the Service.” The final page references “Marine Corps Manual, 1926; IS Pamphlet, 1927; general experience,” indicating two published documents were consulted as well as the author’s own knowledge of the subject. The paper used the same format as was used at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, from which Captain Erskine had recently graduated. The customs and courtesies lecture did not cover items in detail, such as how to wear uniforms or what types of greetings are appropriate in which situations. Instead it was an ideological admonishment, detailing the underlying principles which should motivate military officers to be courteous:

6. “Graduation Certificate” (1930), Personal Papers Collection of Joseph H. Berry (COLL/3A11, box 2, folder 6), Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.
The officer who comes into the service to make it his life work, may be unfamiliar at first with many military matters but he must be a gentleman--he must have character. By this is not meant the passive character to live decently, pay his bills promptly, and to show kindness to the weak and unfortunate, but the vital character to know right from wrong, to stand for what is right against all odds, to be true to his men and brother officers, to fight his men’s battles, and really to live and act in such a way that his men and the people who come in contact with him, be they civilian or military, will have someone to admire and emulate. His title and uniform single him out from the crowd: they make him conspicuous, and in so doing they impose not only distinction but also an added responsibility.7

This paragraph encapsulates what continues to be true about the Basic School even today: that it is meant to form a mentality about leadership and what it means to be a military officer, in addition to teaching technical and tactical skill. Ethos is not created out of thin air; conscious efforts, like this lecture, must be made to develop a unified mentality among the officers.

The lecture contained illustrations and anecdotes on general courtesy, personal courtesy, common “discourtesies,” and then “customs.” Presumably, this lecture was written and delivered by Erskine himself. In the second half on “customs,” he stated:

The Statutes, Navy Regulations, Marine Corps Manual and Orders are written: consequently anyone can obtain a knowledge of them quite easily by study. Customs of the service, however, are another matter. To acquire a knowledge of them it requires a long association with the military and naval establishments. During this association one achieves more or less a liberal education, usually experiencing his share of embarrassments and chagrin.8

He then continued to discuss what types of things are “customs” and how a practice can grow to be a custom rather than just an ordinary behavior. The six qualities of a custom, for Erskine, were: “habitual or long established practice, continuance without interruption, acceptance without dispute, exactitude, compulsory compliance, and consistency with other customs.”

Some of the particular examples of customs in the lecture are now out of date, such as a detailed list of how to leave a calling card and what time of day it would be appropriate to visit a senior officer’s quarters. But the general sense of the document is more timeless. The

7. “Military Customs and Courtesies” lecture (1931), Graves B. Erskine Personal Papers Collection [Coll/3065, Box 24, Folder 7], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.
8. “Military Customs and Courtesies” lecture (1931), Graves B. Erskine Personal Papers Collection [Coll/3065, Box 24, Folder 7], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.
importance of the material, too, is indicated by Erskine’s having kept it. His collection of personal papers was quite large, and included many items with notes or covers. He was organized and carried on correspondence long after retirement. This short lecture, though, is one of only two items he kept from his time at TBS (the other was his set of “Machine Gun Drill” notes). It is a prime example of professional military education in the Marine Corps, encompassing not only technical training but also the “intangibles” that shape officers’ careers.

1930-1931 and 1931-1932: Machine Gun Drill Documents

Graves Esrkine served as an instructor at TBS from June 1930 until August 1932. He preserved many papers pertaining to his time as an instructor at the Marine Corps Schools later in his career, and remained interested in professional military education throughout his lifetime. He even maintained a connection with education and training after his retirement, corresponding with Marines who were engaged in writing tactical problems for the various schools. From his time at TBS, in addition to the “customs and courtesies” lecture, he kept copies of four full-length sets of study questions relating to “Machine Gun Drills.” There are two sets of study questions, one for 1930-31 and one for 1931-32. Each set was divided into three parts, but Erskine only kept two out of three parts from each set. For 1930-31, part two and part three are in the archive.

The machine gun used for training at TBS in 1930-32 was the Browning .30 caliber M1917 machine gun. This was a water-cooled, belt-fed weapon popular in the American, British, and French armies of the day. In operational units it had already been replaced by the M1919 (air cooled) model, but for training the M1917 was in active use. “Machine Gun Drills: Study Questions Part II” contains sixty-two questions. All of the questions in “Part II” are under the subheading “Elementary and Advanced Gun Drills.” Some examples of questions asked of the students included:

- How should the gun squad be trained to work?
- What is the primary purpose of elementary gun drill?
- When are close order drills executed by machine gun units?
Are movements during gun and battery drills at attention or at ease?9

Students were also expected to be able to list and describe all of the equipment needed to execute an elementary or advanced gun drill. Then, in questions 15-30, the student was asked to explain a series of commands. These commands were the “drill” part of “machine gun drill:”

FORM THE SQUAD; SECURE EQUIPMENT FOR ELEMENTARY DRILL; LAY OUT EQUIPMENT FOR ELEMENTARY DRILL; POST; STAND CLEAR; FALL OUT ONE (TWO); EXAMINE EQUIPMENT; MOUNT TRIPOD; DISMOUNT TRIPOD; MOUNT GUN; DISMOUNT GUN; LOAD; HALF LOAD; UNLOAD; CLEAR GUN.10

For several key commands, students were instructed to explain the command itself, then describe (and correct) some common errors. The additional sub-questions for each of those commands create an additional fifty-two pieces of information the student needed to memorize.

For example, the command “MOUNT GUN” had nineteen additional errors the student should watch for and be able to correct:

- Failure to complete the test in the prescribed time.
- Failure to grasp right side of cradle with right hand.
- Failure to straddle the trail.
- Wrong movements of hands in unclamping the legs.
- Failure to grasp the tripod correctly when mounting it.
- Failure to glance at the target when mounting the tripod.
- Failure to steady tripod correctly when clamping both legs.
- Failure to clamp both legs of the tripod with the right hand.
- Trail not pointing to the rear and aligned with target.
- Leg clamps not tight.
- Traversing dial not level.
- Elevating screw threads not exposed about one inch when tripod was brought forward.
- Tripod and gun not at suitable height for the gunner.
- Traversing clamp not properly adjusted.
- Long axis of the gun not approximately horizontal.
- No.1 not in proper position at the gun.
- Elevating pin not inserted properly by No.1.
- Command not repeated by No.1.
- Movement made after signal is given that test has been completed.11

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9. “Machine Gun Drills: Study Questions Part II” (1930), *Graves B. Erskine Personal Papers Collection* [Coll/3065, Box 24, Folder 5], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.

10. “Machine Gun Drills: Study Questions Part II” (1930), *Graves B. Erskine Personal Papers Collection* [Coll/3065, Box 24, Folder 5], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.

11. “Machine Gun Drills: Study Questions Part II” (1930), *Graves B. Erskine Personal Papers Collection* [Coll/3065, Box 24, Folder 5], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico,
The commands DISMOUNT GUN, LOAD, and UNLOAD also had multiple sub-questions dealing with common errors. It was expected that a Second Lieutenant graduating from TBS would immediately enter the operating forces and be able to command a rifle or machine gun platoon. Drilling the unit was part of the job. The lieutenant needed to be as proficient with drill as were the Marines who would be operating the machine gun: parity of skill with the Marine Gunners who had multiple years of enlisted service was a good marker. Before the 1950s, American infantrymen did not receive any specialized combat training beyond what they experienced at recruit depots, so time “in the field” and during drill was the sum total of their experience with weapons. Drill was thus not just a critical component of preparation for combat, but the only component.\textsuperscript{12}

Part II continued with questions related to which tasks were carried out by the various members of the machine gun crew, and asks students to account for variations in terrain when laying the gun. Question 44 was expanded into a multi-part answer, detailing common errors the students were expected to spot: “Explain the manner of going into action at the command: 1. \textit{Range eight fifty}, 2. \textit{paste No.3}, 3. \textit{ACTION}.”\textsuperscript{13} In addition to the usual errors outlined in the “mount gun” section prior, students were also looking for errors related to aiming for the target identified. (Doubtless, tables were provided to students and they would have known at what height “paste No.3” was placed. Those helpful supplements were not preserved in the archives.)

\textsuperscript{12} C.A. Willoughby, “Aiming and Sighting Drills—Machine-Gun Known-Distance Practice,” \textit{The Infantry Journal} 28, no. 6 (June 1921 1921).

\textsuperscript{13} Aiming “paste” are paper circles which could be affixed to a larger board or cardboard target, indicating either upper/lower and left/right limits or to mark a bullseye. “Machine Gun Drills: Study Questions Part II” (1930), \textit{Graves B. Erskine Personal Papers Collection} [Coll/3065, Box 24, Folder 5], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.
Part II then wrapped up with questions about rates of fire, instructions for “two man load”, a variety of specialized or target-specific commands, and re-sighting the gun after use.\footnote{14 “Machine Gun Drills: Study Questions Part II” (1930), \textit{Graves B. Erskine Personal Papers Collection} [Coll/3065, Box 24, Folder 5], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.}

Part III of the machine gun study questions from 1930-1931 deals with a particular technique of fire called “direct laying.” There were 137 questions asked of students in the “direct laying” section of the study questions. Unlike the drill questions in Part II, the Part III questions were all short answer questions or calculations. Some examples include:

- What is the relation of DIRECT LAYING to MARKSMANSHIP?
- What are the advantages of indirect laying over direct laying?
- When, if ever, should indirect laying supplement direct laying?
- What is meant by the term “cone of fire”?
- At what rate does the width of the cone of fire increase for every 1000 yards?
- What is meant by the term “effective beaten zone”?
- How are ranges usually determined when direct laying is used?\footnote{15 “Machine Gun Drills: Study Questions Part III” (1930), \textit{Graves B. Erskine Personal Papers Collection} [Coll/3065, Box 24, Folder 5], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.}

For the last question, there are handwritten notes on Erskine’s copy of the study questions. A light red pencil has marked on the page in multiple places, and here someone has written “estimates---range finders--adjustment.” Only a few questions have pencil markings, and some have an “x” rather than a written note. Part III continued with a 57-question review section on machine guns, which asked general questions about the use of guns in various situations. The total number of questions in “Machine Guns, Part III” for 1930-31 was one hundred ninety four.

Erskine remained on the TBS staff the next academic year, and his papers include Part I and Part III of the machine gun study questions for that year. Part I has many penciled answers included. It is subtitled “MECHANICS” and asks 156 questions. Some examples (with pencil answers):

- What type of machine gun does the Browning Machine Gun, calibre .30, model 1917, represent? recoil operated, belt fed, and water cooled machine gun.
- What is the function of the tripod? To gain the gun a firm mount.
- What is the weight of the model 1917 tripod? 48lbs.
- Into what unit of measurement is the rear sight windage arc graduated? Mils.
How may the lubricant for the machine gun be thinned in cold weather? *By adding a small quantity of kerosene or gasoline.*

Later questions required longer answers, such as descriptions of parts of the weapon or explanations of multi-step operations for using it. As in the 1930-31 materials, several types of common errors or common malfunctions are included in the study material. For some problems, students are asked to provide the solution to the malfunction, for other problems they are asked to explain the cause of the malfunction. The section on maintenance and repair, including keeping records for each weapon, is very detailed.

Part III of the 1931-32 study questions has many of the same questions as the 1930-31 version. However, there are 5 new questions, and many of the questions have a penciled answer written on the page. Some additional material at the end of the study questions asks the student about the utility of drilling machine gun operators using direct laying problems, and about methods for conducting direct laying problems. Some questions from 1930-31 were eliminated, all either sub-questions for a question that was kept in the new version, or which were closely related to another question. Many of the penciled answers on the 1931-32 set of questions for Part III have diagrams, equations, and lengthy notes included. In more than one instance, the back of the paper was used to draw out a complex series of calculations. I believe that all four sets of machine gun materials kept by Erskine were his own sets of teaching notes, with his own penciled answers.

Erskine’s materials bear a strong resemblance to the machine gun instruction materials used at Fort Benning. For example, the Benning exams were written in order to test the officer student on his ability to conduct drills with his men. Lists of common errors were also included on the Benning exams as on Erskine’s notes:

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16. “Machine Gun Drills: Study Questions Part I” (1931), *Graves B. Erskine Personal Papers Collection* [Coll/3065, Box 24, Folder 5], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.

17. “Machine Gun Drills: Study Questions Part III” (1931), *Graves B. Erskine Personal Papers Collection* [Coll/3065, Box 24, Folder 5], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.
MAJOR ERRORS
1. Traversing dial not level.
2. (___) axis of the gun not approximately horizontal.
3. (Leg) clamps not tight.
4. Tripod and gun not at suitable height for the gunner.
5. Elevating screw threads not exposed about one inch when tripod was brought forward.
6. No 1 not in proper position at the gun.

LESS IMPORTANT ERRORS
7. Command not repeated by No 1.
8. Failure to grasp right side of cradle with right hand.
9. Failure to straddle the trail.
10. Wrong movements of hands in unclamping the legs.
11. Failure to grasp the tripod correctly when mounting it.
12. Failure to glance at the target when mounting tripod.
13. Trail not pointing to the rear and aligned on the target.
14. Failure to steady tripod correctly when clamping both legs.
15. Failure to clamp both legs of the tripod with the right hand.
16. Traversing clamp not tight.
17. Elevating pin not inserted properly by No 1. 18

Erskine would have been proficient with the machine gun himself, having used it since 1917 and his own entrance into the Marine Corps. He did not necessarily learn the mechanics of machine guns from the Infantry School, but the evidence shows he made use of the Army’s organization and teaching style.

1933-1934 Academic Year: Military History Course Materials

The most complete set of interwar curriculum in the archive is related to the “Military History” course. This course is the central piece of evidence showing that activities at TBS rose

to the level of “education” and were not confined to simple technical “training.” In addition to being a near-complete set (three out of five parts of the entire course are preserved), the Military History course taught to TBS instructors who attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning was also preserved by the Fort Benning archive, so a direct comparison can be made between the materials instructors were given at Benning and the materials they gave their students in Philadelphia. There are many close parallels between the two sets. For the TBS materials, there are: “MH-2, Preparation of Military History Monographs, Military Theses, and Oral Presentations;” “MH-3, Military History Notes on Lecture;” and “MH-5, Books Recommended for reading on Military History.”¹⁹ Like the lecture on military customs and courtesies mentioned earlier, these are not technical/tactical materials, but lectures on a “soft” subject of professional interest to military officers. As a window to the broader interests of Marines during the interwar period, the list of recommended books (“MH-5”) is fascinating in its own right.

“MH-2: Preparation of Military History Monographs, Military Theses, and Oral Presentations” is a seventeen-page explanation of the central assignment in the military history course. The entire course centered on the students’ development of a “military thesis,” which they would then present to the class for peer critique. The initial writing portion was due to the instructor in January of the academic year, so presumably the entire second half of the course was taken up by student presentations. The “theses” had the following stated purpose:

(a) They are intended to afford the student an opportunity to continue his study along lines which he is already interested, and to offer his ideas for the benefit of the class.
(b) They afford experience in the presentation of the results of the student’s study and thought.
(c) They give each student an opportunity to collect material for his prepared talk.²⁰

Students were then given instruction as to what type of subjects each could consider in their

¹⁹ In the archives there is also an “MH-1” from the 1935-36 school year, which covers identical material to the 1933-34 “MH-2”. In that document, “MH-2” is described as a “mimeograph” which the students will fill out with their personal information and proposed topic for writing the military history thesis. There are no other portions of the 1935-36 Military History curriculum preserved.

²⁰ “MH-2, Preparation of Military History Monographs, Military Theses and Oral Presentations” (1933), The Basic School Collection [Coll/3706, Box 3, Folder 7], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.
thesis, and some examples were provided. While Navy or Marine Corps topics were preferred, other subjects “which deal with the important problems of leadership, organization, and technique” were also permitted.

Students were instructed to express immediately to the instructor their preferred subject. The instructor would assign their topics “no later than” 10 November 1933. The class convened in August of that year, but it is not clear whether the Military History class began immediately or if there was some delay. (Based on records from other class years, the first two months of the academic year were taken up with marksmanship training. If that schedule was the same in 1933-34, the students’ first days in the classroom at League Island were in late September.) Once topics were assigned, the students would be held to a strict length requirement (1500-2500 words), and no paper outside the requirement would be accepted. Further format details were then outlined for cover pages, typing or longhand standards, use of quotations, and so on. Finally, the instructor noted that students would be giving an oral presentation later in the year, and that the school presumed the written thesis of the fall semester (turned in on 24 January) would form the basis of the oral presentation given in the spring:

It is contemplated that the subjects of the prepared talks which members of the Basic Class are scheduled to deliver in the school year will be the same as the subjects of the students’ monographs or theses. At the time of submission of the written work, each student should retain either a copy of his paper or adequate notes with which to prepare his oral presentation.21

This means that students did have the option to write a thesis on one topic and give an oral presentation on a different topic. There is no record of any student having done so.

The next section of MH-2 was on the oral presentation itself. The oral presentation was meant to serve a dual purpose. First, students gained practice in “the presentation of instructional matter to others,” which was critical for young officers who would immediately enter the operational forces and be responsible for training a unit. Second, the general art of public

21. “MH-2, Preparation of Military History Monographs, Military Theses and Oral Presentations” (1933), The Basic School Collection [Coll/3706, Box 3, Folder 7], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.
speaking was served by the exercise. During the 1930s, it was commonplace for military officers to be invited to speak to civic groups, at colleges or universities, and at other public gatherings. The staff at TBS was interested in making sure that the students would show the Marine Corps in a positive light when they did so. There are many examples of these informal speeches preserved in the Marine Corps Historical Division’s Reference Branch records, especially for any officer who rose to fame during World War II.

All of the instructions on the military thesis, up to this point, took four typed pages. The remaining 13 pages of the document were devoted to a lengthy list of suggested topics. Despite its length, though, the teaching notes emphasized that the list was “merely a guide and a suggestion and...is not intended to be all-inclusive in any sense.” The topics suggested give a fascinating look at the aspects of war which were of interest to the interwar Marine Corps leadership who set the curriculum. The first topic series was centered on land battles and campaigns, including:

- The development of Frederick the Great as a soldier, up to and including the battle of Leuthen (5 Dec., 1756).
- Burgoyne and the campaign of Saratoga, from the inception to the surrender, October 17, 1777.
- Wellington’s Peninsular campaign, with special reference to the development of linear tactics and the battle of Talleyera (sic).
- The first battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861.
- The battle of Chancellorsville, May 1-3, 1863.
- The battle of Vionville-Mars-la-Tours from immediately after the battle of Colombey to 10:00AM the 16th of August, 1870.
- The Philippine insurrection, February 1899 to include the advance on Malalos.
- The battle of the Mazurian Lakes, September 1-14, in the East Prussian campaign of 1914.
- British operations at Etruex, August 27, 1914.
- British operations at Nery, September 1, 1914.
- The mission of Captain Wachenfeld of the staff of the German V Corps on August 21, 1914.
- Gustavus Adolphus’ crossing of the Lech.
- Incidents of the German anti-tank defense near Cambrai on November 21 and 23, 1917.
- The methods by which the Germans attained surprise on May 27, 1918.
- Machine gun support for the attack of the 29th U.S. Division on Etrayes Ridge.²²

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²² “MH-2, Preparation of Military History Monographs, Military Theses and Oral Presentations” (1933), *The Basic School Collection* [Coll/3706, Box 3, Folder 7], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.
Note that on this list only one operation involved the Marine Corps, and very few had any relation to amphibious or “from the sea” operations.

The next section of recommended topics were “technical” topics: education, training, athletics, discipline, character building, organization, close order drill, communications, field engineering, rifles and bayonets, and the sub-machine gun. Suggestions for each technical topic centered on means of training Marines in that area or developing ways to improve the unit. No matter which topic the student chose, it would be up to the individual to research and compose his essay according to the parameters outlined in pages 1-4. Examples of student papers from later class years indicate that sometimes students consulted only one or two sources for their paper, and that the level of analysis was somewhat simplistic.

The next portion of the curriculum in the Archives file is “MH-3, Military History - Notes on Lecture.” This document was an overview on the purpose of studying military history, and the structure of the course at the Basic School. Like the “customs and courtesies” lecture, this piece of curriculum said as much about the ideology of the school as it did about the course content itself. Not only did students learn history via the military history course, they were encouraged in “originality, thoroughness, veracity and logical presentation.” The “Notes on Lecture” document clearly defines the structure of the course in a way that MH-2 did not. This strongly suggests that the MH-2 paper was presented to students right away, perhaps even handed out without comment, at the beginning of the course. In academic parlance, the MH-2 document might even be considered a “syllabus.” MH-3 was probably the first set of material actually lectured on by the course instructor. As stated in the “Notes on Lecture,” the three parts of the military history course were:

- A series of lectures and demonstrations enunciating the general principles the school desires to emphasize.
- The preparation by the student of a thesis or a short, historical monograph.
- The oral presentation of the thesis or monograph before the class.²³

²³ “MH-3, Military History - Notes on Lecture” (1933), The Basic School Collection [Coll/3706, Box 3, Folder 6], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.
The instructor then drew a sharp contrast between “ordinary” means of teaching history (such as lectures and recitations) and the means employed at TBS. To use those traditional methods alone, wrote the instructor, would be “inconsistent with the policy of this school to avoid, as far as possible, the employment of ‘school-boy’ methods.” Instead, they sought to give students opportunities to practice applicatory or active methods of learning, such as demonstration and public presentations. Besides the field exercises conducted at the beginning and end of the program of instruction, this military history “thesis and presentation” and the “role play” court martial in the naval law class are the most obvious evidence of applicatory methods of learning at TBS.  

The next section in this document gives a clue about why these few papers survived when so little else from TBS was kept from this time period. The military history class, unlike a technical course on maps or weapons, was formative of the student as a leader and as a thinker, not merely a practitioner of tactics. The following paragraph from MH-3 provided a better explanation of what military officers were meant to gain from PME, and thus what they were meant to learn at TBS, than any other account available:

The study and mastery of technical subjects taught in the Marine Corps Schools and acquired by individuals study, work and experience are valuable items in the education of an officer but they are far short of constituting such a military education as fits and officer for the responsible duties of a high command in time of war or for the important staff duties. These should be the ultimate aim of every young officer. The seemingly important questions of post administration dwindle to the proportions of triviality when compared with the military and naval policy of a nation, the organization and mobilization of its forces, the strategy of a war, the tactics of a modern battle and the organization of the lines of supply. No officer should neglect his technical education, for he will find himself greatly handicapped if he does, and in these days of educational competition in the service, a lack of proper attention to these matters will inevitably result in leaving the officer far behind his fellow-officers. But he should supplement this study of the technical aspects of his profession by the careful reading and study of military history. He must in this way lay a foundation for building to greater capacity. This is one of the surest ways of acquiring that power, confidence and satisfaction which knowledge gives and is one of the best means of acquiring a knowledge of leadership.

24. The court martial exercise is discussed in the next chapter, where class of 1939 student Ronald Van Stockum’s notes on the naval law course are analyzed.

25. “MH-3: Military History - Notes on Lecture” (1933), The Basic School Collection [Coll/3706, Box 3, Folder 6], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.
TBS was the place where the Marine Corps intended to instill lifelong habits of self-discipline and auto-didacticism. The instructors were career officers who lived the habits described above—many had already spent time and effort to attend advanced schools or take correspondence courses. Several would go on to great fame as commanders during World War II. This was a place where the individual’s motivation to excel was supposed to be ignited, not a place where reliance on external compulsion was born.

There is no clearer documentation describing the ideology of the Marine Corps’ officer education programs for this time period. One student described the purpose of the school to “take newly commissioned officers...and train them as “Soldiers of the Sea,” in the process instilling in each the spirit and morale associated with the Marine Corps.” In particular, during the 1920s and 1930s the spirit and morale of the Marine Corps was closely associated with the social concept of the “gentleman.” As expressed by Rear Admiral William Rodgers at the commencement ceremonies at the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico, synonyms for “gentlemansliness” can be found in the words “loyalty, justice, sympathy, judgement, and above all, courage. It takes much courage to behave as a gentleman at all times.” Rodgers’ audience included Marine Gunners who were completing a commissioning course. In the address, he emphasized the duty of officers to their men, and the critical importance of respect owed by leaders to their subordinates: without using the phrase, Rodgers strongly referenced the concept of “consent of the governed.” As the author of multiple books on naval warfare, he was certainly a supporter of the use of history in professional education as well.

27. William L. Rodgers, “Address to the Graduating Class of Marine Officers at Quantico on June 9, 1923,” Marine Corps Gazette 8, no. 2 (June 1923): 89.
character as a central goal for Marine Corps Schools was a very strong one during this time period.

Returning to the Military History curriculum, the “MH-3” document continued with instructions on how the student should continue the study of history throughout his career. Emphasis was placed throughout on the inadequacy of mere technical education. Instead, officers should study history on their own: “this is one of the best means of acquiring that power, confidence and satisfaction which knowledge gives and is one of the best means of acquiring knowledge of leadership.”

Next, the document outlined some principles for ensuring the student was accurate in his historical research. Proper vetting of sources was the principle means of ensuring accuracy, and various types of sources were listed and commentary provided on how to select each, and what pitfalls were associated with the various types.

Often, military professionals prefer to read memoirs and firsthand accounts of battles. They are engaging and help provide a sense of connection between the modern practitioner of war and their forebears; this seems to be the case regardless of the accuracy of the narrative or the credentials of the author. However, the “MH-3” lecture took a somewhat dim view of memoirs:

MEMOIRS: Search carefully for the interest of the writer. He may have been exploiting himself for the Presidency or other public office. He may have been following a policy dictated by the Government or by his family. He may be emphasizing certain facts to the exclusion of others so that the proportion of the book may suffer. He is not likely to place himself in a bad light. Memory is faulty and one forgets, especially if a book is written long after the occurrences.

Likewise, magazine articles, newspapers, official reports, combat orders, personal letters, general histories, diaries, political documents and proclamations, speeches, and oral testimony were described and evaluated each in a separate paragraph. In general, the military history lecturer

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29. “MH-3: Military History - Notes on Lecture” (1933), The Basic School Collection [Coll/3706, Box 3, Folder 6], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.

30. “MH-3: Military History - Notes on Lecture” (1933), The Basic School Collection [Coll/3706, Box 3, Folder 6], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.
was highly suspicious of all sources, and pressed the students to use many types in conjunction
with one another in order to develop a truthful account of a battle or campaign.

Finally, the lecture covered some mechanics of essay writing. Students were instructed to
keep note cards for both quotes and sources. An example was provided showing what
information should be included on each card, along with suggested means of organizing them.
The Navy Yard recreation center library and Philadelphia Free Library were immediately
available to students. Students could access the Marine Corps Schools’ infant library (located in
Quantico, Virginia) via a type of “library loan” program, as well as the Navy Department Library
in Washington, DC. Assistance from the recreation center librarian was promised. Finally, the
instructor gave a stern order to begin research immediately, not at the last minute.

Once the student gathered his material and composed his written essay, the final step was
to prepare for the oral presentation. Like the written essay, the oral presentation was subject to
length requirements. Also like the written essay, some suggestions were provided on how to
organize the presentation, and some example “cue cards” were provided. The students were
encouraged not to memorize their entire speech, “but to depend on the outline, greatly
skeletonized, as notes to assist his memory if required; he will then talk more naturally; can give
greater attention to the effect of his discourse upon his audience; and can spend more time on
points which are likely to cause the class some difficulty.”31 Then, in all bold letters: “NO
STUDENT WILL BE PERMITTED TO READ HIS PRESENTATION FROM
MANUSCRIPT.” Students were encouraged to form groups and practice delivering their
presentations to one another ahead of time. Going without practice, the lecturer warned, was
“fatal.” And finally, page eight of the lecture explained in detail how students were to seek out
criticism and accept it when offered:

In the criticism of this practical work it is the adverse criticism that is of the greatest
value. It does not serve any useful purpose if we bring out only the good points...Look
carefully for the defects and call them to the attention of the speaker. He may not be

31. “MH-3: Military History - Notes on Lecture” (1933), The Basic School Collection [Coll/3706, Box 3, Folder 6], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.
aware of some little defect or peculiarity and your criticism may be instrumental in correcting this fault and making a better speaker of him. It is requested that you be free, specific, and absolutely impersonal in your discussions of these exercises, and above all, candid.\textsuperscript{32}

Unfortunately, no “MH-4” document was preserved in the Marine Corps archives. Perhaps the missing piece of curriculum contained the lecturer’s notes for the first half of the academic year. Perhaps there were additional periods spent discussing the ideal way to study military history.

The final document preserved from the 1933-34 academic year is “MH-5,” a list of recommended reading materials for the military history subject.\textsuperscript{33} This twenty page typewritten list was organized into six topic categories: general history, military history, the art of war, tactics and technique of the separate arms, international law, and small wars.\textsuperscript{34} Under the “general history” heading, books on both the United States and foreign countries’ histories were recommended, organized by period (for the U.S.) and by region (for foreign countries). For “military history,” American books were listed first including Emory Upton (\textit{Military Policy of the United States}) as a general reference; books for chronological periods of American military history included Roosevelt (\textit{The Naval War of 1812}), Grant (\textit{Personal Memoirs}), and Mahan (\textit{Lessons of the War with Spain}). Books on foreign wars were arranged chronologically: early wars (ancient and classical era), Seven Year’s War, Napoleonic wars, the Crimean War, the Austro-Prussian War, Franco-German War, Russo-Turkish War, the Sudan, China-Japanese War, Boer War, Russo-Japanese War, and “minor wars.” While American military schools expressed a preference for textbooks which focused on their own military history, clearly the extracurricular reading suggestions were much broader. The next three pages of the reading list focused exclusively on books related to World War I. Next came a section of biographies. The “art of war” section began with philosophical works (Clausewitz, von der Goltz, Brandes), then

\textsuperscript{32} “MH-3: Military History - Notes on Lecture” (1933), \textit{The Basic School Collection} [Coll/3706, Box 3, Folder 6], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.

\textsuperscript{33} “MH-5” is reproduced in full as a “Appendix E” at the end of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{34} “MH-5: Books Recommended for reading on Military History” (1933), \textit{The Basic School Collection} [Coll/3706, Box 3, Folder 6], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.
listed “strategy and combined tactics” works (Du Picq, Foch, Mahan, Corbett). “Tactics and Technique of the Separate Arms” was a brief section, with subheadings for infantry, cavalry, artillery, air service, chemical warfare, and medical topics. Even more brief was the “Law” section: International Relations (Bryce), International Law (Oppenheim), War Rights on Land (Spaight), and War Powers Under the Constitution (Whiting) comprised the entire list for that subject. Finally, the “Small Wars” section included five books (including Calwell’s Small Wars) and two full pages of journal articles written by U.S. Army and Marine Corps officers about their experiences in the Indian and jungle wars.35

At the end of the document, particular books were arranged into a “reading list for officers,” in which the works were aligned with various stages in the officer’s career. The lecturer’s forward indicates from what lists the books had been assembled into this collection:

The following bibliography of standard books and other available publications has been taken, for the most part, from the following sources: 1) the list of books recommended by the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for a course of reading on military history; 2) a partial bibliography of small wars prepared by the Marine Corps Schools, Field Officers’ Course, Quantico, Virginia; 3) a bibliography of selected literature relating to historical, political, economic, and military subjects, prepared by the Army War College. The publications selected are, in most instances, of recognized value and cover in a general way the subject named, no claim being made for absolute completeness.36

There follows a detailed explanation of how to obtain copies of the books from a variety of military libraries. The lecturer was careful to explain the process of borrowing a book from a distant library, and students were responsible for paying the fees associated with sending the materials via registered mail. Finally, it was suggested that students keep a copy of the list for their reference, and attach any additions or changes to that copy, as needed, throughout their career. This was a tool meant to be used for many years, not a list the instructors expected students to complete while they were engaged in study at the Basic School. As General William

35. “MH-5: Books Recommended for reading on Military History” (1933), The Basic School Collection [Coll/3706, Box 3, Folder 6], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.

36. “MH-5: Books Recommended for Reading on Military History” (1933), The Basic School Collection [Coll/3706, Box 3, Folder 4], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.
Upshur wrote in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, “it requires a lifetime of conscientious study and attention” to become a quality, efficient officer.\(^\text{37}\)

This “Military History” class shows the breadth of personal development TBS hoped to achieve in its officer-students. MH-5 covers a lifetime of study, not only with regard to strictly military topics, but also to the social and political history of the United States itself. Many books on the list are not studies related to war, but instead cover the early history of exploration and colonization in North America, as well as highly detailed examinations of the “founding” period in the late eighteenth century. Unfortunately, there is no preserved documentation to tell which senior Marines worked to compile the MH-5 list. Lists of recommended reading were often published by the Army’s schools at Fort Leavenworth, and those likely served as an inspiration.\(^\text{38}\) British military journals and periodicals also published lists of recommended reading. It is certainly true that no Second Lieutenant read all of the books on these lists, and likely very few of them even read “most” of the books. However, an expectation is set using these documents. By communicating the list to students within the confines of a graded class, the importance of professional reading is clear.

**1935-1936 Academic Year: Tactics and the Machine Gun**

Some changes were made to the texts used at TBS between 1934 and 1935. Minor alterations to the military history course are apparent from the differences in the “MH” series curriculum in 1933-34 and then 1935-36. Other alterations were likely occasioned by the Marine Corps’ 1935 revisions to the *Manual for Small Wars*, which was used as a text at the Basic

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\(^\text{38}\) While a copy of contemporary Leavenworth reading lists did not appear in searches, the lists of student papers written at the Command and General Staff School in 1933 shows a strong correlation between the TBS reading lists and the CGSS ones: liaison, river ferrying for light infantry, Mont Blanc Ridge, motorization, signals communication at Soissons, use of the light machine gun, Amiens, the Russo-Japanese War, tactical use of smoke, Gallipoli, and many others. *CGSS Student Papers Collections*, Combined Arms Research Library, Carlisle, Pennsylvania (www.usacac.army.mil).
School throughout the 1930s.\(^{39}\) Besides the military history pieces preserved in the archive, the “MHG-2” document for the tactics course was also preserved in the Archives: “Summary of Extended Order Machine Gun Squad Section, and Platoon.” This is an eleven-page set of teaching notes divided into four sections. The format for this document is very similar to that used at Fort Benning, and the type of class is a “conference,” another term used at Fort Benning. The exact difference between a “conference” and a “lecture” is not clear. Based on the fact that the conference materials usually have a diagram or opportunity for the instructor to make a demonstration of the principle being explained, it is likely that the conference is a more interactive version of a lecture. There is not a “problem” presented to the students in any of the conference materials.

Part One of “Summary of Extended Order Machine Gun Squad Section, and Platoon” is a general explanation of the use of the machine gun in a particular setting. Under “scope:”

This conference deals with the factors governing the formations of extended order of machine-gun units. It furnishes a guide for instruction in the use of ground and other cover, the selection of gun emplacements, and the employment of combat formations in various tactical situations.\(^{40}\)

The use of extended order formations is a more advanced tactic than that of close order formations, so this is probably a later portion of the tactics course. Students were already familiar with deploying the weapons from columns or files, and with the technical operations of the weapons themselves. A review of the use of the machine gun squad in close order takes up the first page of MHG-2.

Part Two contains the material on extended order formations at the squad level. First, the materials outlined the duties of the squad leader. Though the Marine officer would not serve as a squad leader himself, he was responsible for training Marines who might fulfill that role, and (perhaps more important) selecting those leaders from within his unit. The squad leader was


\(^{40}\) “MHG-2: Tactics - Machine Gun Part I - Summary of Extended Order Machine Gun Squad Section and Platoon” (1935), *The Basic School Collection* [Coll/3706, Box 3, Folder 13], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.
responsible for properly utilizing cover, preventing the squad from “bunching” during gun placement, and for ensuring the entire squad received and understood instructions on movement before actually moving.

Next, Part Two discussed formations for extended order. The utilization of carefully-counted paces and separations between men in the squad was paramount. The MHG-2 material required students to maintain a five-pace separation between each man, and gave instructions for leading the squad both with and without “carts.” Gun carts, designed by the U.S. Army to aid in transporting the machine gun equipment to and from static positions, were still in use during the 1930s. Each squad had a cart, pulled by a mule. Carts were used as a guide in formation and their presence had an impact on how the individual members of the squad were combat loaded.41 When the cart was present, the ammunition, tripod, pioneer tools, and seven cans of ammunition were loaded onto it. With no cart, the men carried all of the equipment themselves. There is no evidence of the Basic School retaining pack animals in order to train with them, so it is likely that the students at TBS never actually used the gun carts while they learned tactics.42 However, the existence of the cart is acknowledged in the training material so it was presumed the students at least needed to be familiar with the concept.

Part Three of the document discussed the section leader and proper formations for a machine gun section. Like the machine gun squad leader, the section leader was responsible for gun placement and movement. The squad leaders reported to the section leader, and he was required to remain in constant contact with the platoon commander (lieutenant). Formations for sections were based on the formation in use by the squad: squad columns (line or echelon) were


42. It is also possible that the Marines used hand-drawn carts. I did not find any evidence of tactical problems making use of carts, nor mention of them in any accounts of TBS during the time period.
the default formation. Again, much of the material in this document was formulaic, based on the by-unit attacks employed during the First World War. It was still “current” in the 1930s but it would not be employed by the Marines during the upcoming Pacific campaigns. The careful delineation of pacing and the provision for use of carts are two good examples of training given to students at TBS that would be defunct when they saw combat in a major conflict. On the other hand, use of machine guns in static positions was still a reasonable employment of the weapons in the small wars settings in the Caribbean, as well as during brief conflicts in China in the late 1930s.

Part Four of the “Summary of Extended Order Machine Gun Squad Section, and Platoon” described duties which would be carried out by the lieutenant himself, in his capacity as platoon leader. This section contained:

Duties of a platoon leader.
Duties of a platoon sergeant.
Duties of ammunition corporal.
Duties of corporal agent.
Formations of platoon.
Advancing over rough ground and through woods in various formations, with and without carts.
Selection, occupation, and concealment of gun positions.
Supply.

All of these aspects of guiding the platoon were presumed to be the sole responsibility of the platoon commander. The text explained that a “present” company commander may provide direction, but then presumed that the student would act independently (no company commander available) and expected decisions to be made at the platoon level. This included combat environment decisions as well as pre-combat decisions such as selection of the platoon sergeant, corporal, etc.

43. “MHG-2: Tactics - Machine Gun Part I - Summary of Extended Order Machine Gun Squad Section and Platoon” (1935), The Basic School Collection [Coll/3706, Box 3, Folder 13], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.

44. “MHG-2: Tactics - Machine Gun Part I - Summary of Extended Order Machine Gun Squad Section and Platoon” (1935), The Basic School Collection [Coll/3706, Box 3, Folder 13], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.
The platoon commander acting alone was usually operating in support of a rifle company. The commander in that case would do the following:

...[D]etermine both the time and method of deployment, assign the general direction of march, reconnoiter the route of approach, and select firing positions for his unit. In addition, he provides for the supply of ammunition, water, and oil; he disposes of the carts when the company commander relinquishes control of them, he issues the necessary orders, controls the fire of the platoon, determines the time and method of advance to successive firing positions, maintains communication with the company commander and with the rifle unit which the platoon may be supporting, and (when ordered or when necessary) places his section for the defense of the ground gained. The platoon commander does not remain in a fixed position with respect to his unit, but goes wherever his presence is required.45

Duties of the platoon sergeant were those of a second-in-command figure. The ammunition corporal marched in the rear and ensured the platoon moved along smoothly. When machine gun carts were in use, he was responsible for moving them to cover and retrieving them when needed. The corporal was also responsible for intra-platoon communication and supervised a team of runners. (This corporal role would become obsolete as field radios became more reliable and available, and actual Marine Corporals would be given a leadership role at the squad level.) Each of these positions was critical to the operation of the platoon, and the students needed to be able to train Marines to fill each position competently.

Putting the platoon into position was considered the most difficult part of commanding a machine gun unit. Instructions on marching included methods for remaining in defilade and ensuring that progress of the unit was undetected. However, “the last part of the approach and the actual mounting of the gun” was especially susceptible to enemy fire. Preventing excessive noise or movement on the part of the men was critical. The lesson material suggests the platoon commander adapt the “advance gun” drills already learned, particularly in cases where the ground was rough or the guns were to be placed in a low area. Extra practice for the gun crews in crawling with the weapon and ammunition is recommended:

45. “MHG-2: Tactics - Machine Gun Part I - Summary of Extended Order Machine Gun Squad Section and Platoon” (1935), The Basic School Collection [Col\l/3706, Box 3, Folder 13], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.
Number 1 must crawl forward with the tripod. The gunner folds the legs of the tripod back against the trail and drags the tripod with him by hooking his arm under the cradle. Number 2 must crawl forward with the gun, exercising great care so that it will not be damaged.\footnote{MHG-2: Tactics - Machine Gun Part I - Summary of Extended Order Machine Gun Squad Section and Platoon (1935), \textit{The Basic School Collection} [Coll/3706, Box 3, Folder 13], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.}

The attention to detail in these instructions is surprising. The Marine Corps prided itself then, and still does, on the ability of “small unit leaders” to act independently. The individual Marine was taught to seize the initiative, and Clausewitz’ concept of the military “genius” was familiar to the professionals of the 1930s.\footnote{Charles Lauchheimer, et al., “Discussion on Marine Corps War College,” \textit{Marine Corps Gazette} 1, no. 4 (December 1916); George Van Orden, “Leadership,” \textit{Marine Corps Gazette} 2, no. 2 (June 1917); E. Broadbent, “The Estimate of the Situation and Order Form,” \textit{Marine Corps Gazette} 14, no. 4 (December 1929) Also note the presence of \textit{On War} in the “MH-5” list of recommended books for new officers to read.} Here there is a strong sense of micromanagement. Is a particular technique for crawling with a machine gun so specialized that drills were required to perfect the practice? Perhaps the value of the equipment drove instructors to train gunners in such detail, lest an inexperienced Marine damage the gun by carrying it in a dangerous fashion. Otherwise, the use of such detailed technical instruction is out of keeping with the broader ideology about individuals learning to think for themselves and not merely memorize and parrot the behavior of those who have gone before.\footnote{The question of how much detail is too much detail is far from settled. Americans analyzing the German Army after World War II concluded that there is a difference between “technique” and “tactics,” and that generally small units in the German Army had extremely rigid “technical” training, but the “tactical” instruction was more reliant on individual initiative. The on-scene commander was given great leeway. I do not believe that the Americans ever made such a clean distinction between the two things in their training. Whatever combat proficiency developed in separating the two was the result of common sense and battlefield expediency. In other words, what appears in retrospect to be a clever mental distinction was in fact, at the time, merely accidental.}

The next section in Part Four is a set of diagrams explaining the layout of the machine gun platoon in “line of section columns,” “line of section columns, echeloned,” “line of squad
columns,” and “line of squad columns, echeloned.” Use of consistent marching and deployment formations was important if the sections became unable to see or hear one another in a combat situation: predictable patterns of movement were the best way to prevent instances of “friendly fire.” The section concluded with instructions on placing the guns quickly. In this section, the squad leaders were to be given extreme freedom in moving their gun crews into position. For example, if the gun was to be placed on relatively exposed terrain, the platoon commander should allow the squads to proceed individually, and the squad leaders could give each Marine the opportunity to rush forward at their own pace, rather than bunched in a single group.

Paragraph 16 of the document (near the end of Part Four), reads a little differently than the rest. In discussing the movement of the platoon over rough ground or through woods, some explicit direction on how much freedom to provide subordinates is given:

The leaders of machine-gun units must exercise a great deal of resourcefulness. The weight and awkwardness of the loads...must be considered by all commanders; and section and squad leaders, particularly, must be prepared, on their own initiative, to alter the distances of intervals between their own and neighboring units, and at times even to change temporarily the formation or direction of march if this will render the crossing of difficult ground unnecessary or less dangerous...This does not mean that subordinate leaders should be allowed to change formations at will. The tactical requirements, especially as governed by the available maneuver space and the hostile fire, may render desirable changes impossible. Exercise in which subordinate leaders are faced with these problems are the only real methods of teaching the need for and limits on individual decision.

The final two sections explained types of positions the machine gun platoon might utilize, and supply. Like previous sections, detailed formations and procedures were laid out for a variety of situations. Then, the instructor explained how the platoon commander should relax control or leave decision making at the squad or section level in certain combat environments.

49. “MHG-2: Tactics - Machine Gun Part I - Summary of Extended Order Machine Gun Squad Section and Platoon” (1935), The Basic School Collection [Coll/3706, Box 3, Folder 13], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.

50. “MHG-2: Tactics - Machine Gun Part I - Summary of Extended Order Machine Gun Squad Section and Platoon” (1935), The Basic School Collection [Coll/3706, Box 3, Folder 13], Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.
Lecture: The Bayonet

According to accounts by both students and instructors, occasionally a lecture would be presented in the evening hours. Members of the staff typically presented these lectures, which focused on some current issue being discussed in the Marine Corps. A copy of one such lecture, entitled “The Bayonet,” was included in the Marine Corps Archives collection for the 1936-37 academic year. It was a reprint from a conference given by Major Oliver P. Smith to students at the Company Officers’ Course in 1932. Presumably, a member of the TBS staff felt Smith’s gung ho lecture would benefit the lieutenants. In the lecture, Smith first provided a highly stylized account of warfare from the seventeenth century to the present. Over the course of only a few paragraphs, he established the utility of bayonet fighting as an extension of the musket and rifle, but immediately admonished listeners to cease presuming the bayonet was “tactically a defensive weapon.” In the American Civil War, he scoffed, the Army provided only two ways to use the bayonet: in “defense against cavalry” and “defense against infantry.” This was not the way Oliver P. Smith wanted his Marines to think of the bayonet. From page three until the end of the lecture, he used the bayonet not as a technical example of hand to hand fighting technique, but instead as a symbol of initiative.

Beginning with an example taken from the Boer Wars, the Bayonet lecture proceeded to build a kind of theatrical pattern. First, the lecturer told a story of historical combat. Then, he abruptly called on a member of the audience: “Lieutenant ________, what is your deduction as to the effect the absence of bayonets in the ranks of the Boers and their presence in the beleaguered garrison had on the operations of the Boers?” Next, he explained in ostentatious detail how the use of the bayonet, an emblem of course and decisiveness, was really what made the victor victorious. Giving examples from China, South Africa, the Russo-Japanese War, and even World War I, Smith’s lecture was not a scholarly exposition on the technical use of the bayonet. He even admitted in the text that he had not studied many battles in which the bayonet figured prominently. But what really mattered, he mentioned in the closing pages: “bayonet training
develops alertness and quickness and, above all, the spirit of combat. Men do not get the spirit of combat on the rifle range.”

This lecture was a means of conveying ethos and the Marine Corps mentality toward fighting.

**Historical Map Problem: Vicksburg**

Also from the 1936-1937 class year, the Archives collection contains a historical map problem simply entitled “Vicksburg.” The two-page document begins with a “brief outline of the operations leading up to the crossing of the Mississippi and the investment of the fortified garrison.” Taken directly from the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, the background material explains to students which troops, supplies, lines of communication, and march routes were available to the United States Army commanders who were approaching Vicksburg, Mississippi, in the spring of 1863. Next, a summary of the actions which had been taken by senior commanders in the previous few months was provided, so that students had a clear picture of how the campaign had been progressing up to that point. However, the material did not provide a complete picture of the siege of Vicksburg. Instead, the encyclopedia article was abruptly cut off and students were given a problem:

State briefly your plan to effect the river crossing for the investment of Vicksburg, to be executed on the 20th of April and during the days immediately following. State this plan in your own words and make plans for the supply. State your immediate alternative in case your initial landing may be unsuccessful.

This apparently simple problem combined several elements of the TBS experience: military history, map reading, and on-the-spot development of solutions to problems. However, it added an element of *strategic thought* which proves TBS was not merely a technical school, but an educational experience. Like the Military History course, the Vicksburg map problem shows that much more than a simple technical education was being imparted to the students at League Island.52

51. Oliver Prince Smith, “The Bayonet,” Lecture Delivered to the Company Officers Course, USMC Historical Division, Archives Branch (Quantico, Virginia, 1932).
Tactics: Rifle Squad in the Defense

From the 1939-1940 class year, only one item was preserved in the Archives. “Tactics: The Squad in Defense” is a lecture from the early part of the academic year. The Tactics course was meant to train lieutenants how to command an infantry platoon, as well as give them an understanding of how their company commander (a Captain) approached his role. The Lieutenant would need to be able to understand a combat situation, choose the correct tactical response, and give orders appropriately in case the Captain was disabled. First, the document explained the organization of the squad when in a defensive position:

[the platoon leader] will divide the squad sector into sub-sectors and assign a firing position…squad leaders [will] seek those places that afford the best fields of fire, cover, and concealment.

Again, the Tactics course was set up in imitation of the courses at Fort Benning and at Quantico, in which unit tactics were taught in order from smallest to largest. This section on the squad, then, was taught before the students would be allowed to engage material on the subject of the platoon or company.

For the rest of the lecture, the material described the actions necessary for each squad leader in order to maintain the safety of the squad while it was in the defense (and presumably under attack). As with most TBS instructional material, it was assumed that the students would proceed to an operational unit where their first duty was training the squad leaders under his command. Understanding the squad leaders’ role was thus the most important function of the platoon leader’s overall training.

In Section II, diagrams were provided to demonstrate good and bad methods for positioning the squad. Shortcomings in a given arrangement, such as difficulty in control, lack of firing effectiveness, or overexposure of one section of the platoon, were all highlighted.

52. “Vicksburg” Historical Map Problem (1936), Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, Virginia.
Accommodation for different types of terrain, such as hills or woods, was also made. In all, seven diagrams for the squad in defense were covered in the lecture. Unlike most of the Tactics lectures available from this time period, no map reference is included in the materials. The instructor may have used a blackboard to draw the diagrams instead. These items highlight the collection of Basic School materials preserved by the Marine Corps Archives. They show a pattern of format and the very close relationship between the instructional materials from Fort Benning and those used at the Basic School. The items preserved by individual instructors support the conclusion that TBS staff members often wrote their own class materials, borrowing from courses they had attended themselves at either Fort Benning or Quantico. Finally, they give a picture of the “non-technical” courses which attempted to teach the Marine Corps’ ideology as it related to leadership, custom, and the “spirit of battle.”

Tactics: Rifle Squad in the Attack

The final item from the Marine Corps Archives considered in this chapter is the 1941-1942 “Tactics: Rifle Squad in Attack” map problem. Unlike the defense lecture just discussed, the map problem included a map reference and a specific problem for students to solve. In this case, as with most of the TBS map problems, the map reference used was a map of the Fort Benning training areas. This indicates that the problem itself was probably directly copied from the instructor’s own materials he used while at the Infantry School. On the map, students were to identify several key terrain features, as well as understand the location of “Red” (enemy) and “Blue” (friendly) forces.

Next, the problem is presented, in several sections. The first requirement:

You are Corporal, 3d squad. What route do you select to move your squad from the vicinity of BM 418 to a firing position in the edge of the woods on the northwestern slopes of COOK RIDGE?

Next, students had to select the correct formation for moving their squad to the designated location. A solution to the first requirement was provided next, and students were presented with the subsequent problems for a total of five requirements. This format was an exact copy of the other tactical problems seen in previous years’ curriculum examples, as well as being identical to the map problems taught at Fort Benning.

*Archives Material: Conclusions*

These items highlight the collection of Basic School materials preserved by the Marine Corps Archives. They show a pattern of format and the very close relationship between the instructional materials from Fort Benning and those used at the Basic School. The items preserved by individual instructors support the conclusion that TBS staff members often wrote their own class materials, borrowing from courses they had attended themselves at either Fort Benning or Quantico. Finally, they give a picture of the “non-technical” courses which attempted to teach the Marine Corps’ ideology as it related to leadership, custom, and the “spirit of battle.”

Unfortunately, they do not give a complete picture, or even a clear picture, of what was taught to newly commissioned officers during the interwar era. Instead, they give a picture of two possible things: which items were considered important to the instructors who saved them in personal collections, or which items were “lucky” enough to be transferred into the archive by an anonymous clerk or administrator. Since the Basic School moved to Quantico during wartime and did not return to Philadelphia, it is likely that many of the records were destroyed at that time. If not, items would have been stored either at the Marine Corps Schools (Quantico, Virginia) or Headquarters Marine Corps (Arlington, Virginia). Their transfer to the Archives would not have been effected in the late 1950s or early 1960s. During the intervening decade, the “antiquated” pre-World War II material was likely not considered important and was discarded.
In July 1937, Ronald Reginald Van Stockum arrived at the League Island Navy Yard, reporting for duty as a student at the Basic School. He was a recent graduate of the University of Washington, where he had participated in the university ROTC program. His mother was an English woman, widow of a British Army soldier killed in 1916, and his step father was a World War I veteran of the U.S. Army. Van Stockum spent over thirty years in the Marine Corps, retiring in 1969 as a Brigadier General. Throughout his career he kept a journal, notes, copies of documents, incidental papers, mementoes, and even items of historical interest which had belonged to other Marines. Among his carefully organized collection of personal papers is a complete set of graded student materials for the 1937-1938 Basic School class year. Arranged by course (not by date), the materials provide detailed insight into the content and scope of the program of instruction, as well as a limited view of the daily schedule and assignment of staff to various courses. The collection has exams, map problems, and some handouts. When he donated his collection to the Filson Historical Society in Louisville, Kentucky, he included a detailed inventory with “commentary” on some of the more interesting items. Van Stockum also published a memoir entitled Reminiscées of World Wars which sheds additional light on the collection of TBS papers. It is important to note that Van Stockum’s collection shows only the graded material from exams, not the lecture notes used by instructors.

Using the Van Stockum collection, we can reconstruct a letter and number classification system used for organizing the program of instruction. Courses were given letter codes, and items within the course have a multi-number item code. For example, “Drill and Command” has the letter code A. “Field Engineering” has the letter code D. And so on. The numbering system within each course is unclear because many items are missing from each series. The “Field Engineering” course is a good example since some course handouts were preserved along with the exams themselves. Exam #1 from Van Stockum’s collection of graded papers is item D-6, and a handout on “Hasty Trenches and Emplacements” is item D-7. The next item is a handout
numbered D-9, “Trench Drainage.” Exam #2 is item D-12. Some additional handouts, exercises, or practical demonstrations probably fill in the gaps in the numbering. “Field Engineering” is a relatively simple course. Large courses, especially the enormous “Tactics” course, have three and four sets of numerical codes identifying individual items. Without the entire set, it is very difficult to determine how many items formed the program of instruction for a given course. Instead, the dates on numbered exams provide only a relatively clear picture of which topics were taught and in what sequence.

**Commissioning and Arrival at Philadelphia**

Ronald R. Van Stockum graduated from the University of Washington in June, 1937. He was living at home with his mother near Kelso, Washington, at that time. He received his commission from the United States Marine Corps via mail on August 4, 1927, and was sworn in by the local police commissioner, Bert Van Moss. According to his journal, Van Stockum chose to travel via coach from Washington to Philadelphia, in order to save the expensive sleeping car fare, even though he had been notified that all his travel expenses would be paid. At Kansas City, Missouri, he left a lunch counter in shock that a meal of waffles and bacon was priced at an exorbitant seventy cents.

He arrived at League Island late on August 10, 1937. It was a Tuesday. The next morning he reported: “it’s a wonderful thing that I have stepped in to. The fellows who have been at the school a few weeks drill wonderfully--it’s beautiful to see their manual of arms.”\(^1\) Van Stockum was referring to the graduates of the Naval Academy, forty-nine of whom had arrived about three weeks prior. It was presumed that the former midshipmen, having lived at a military college with daily drill for four years, were proficient in that art. However, at least one Academy graduate was willing to admit that the Marines’ standards for drilling troops were a

\(^1\) Ronald R. Van Stockum, transcription of Personal Journal 1 of 3 (1937-38), 1.
step above what they had been used to at Annapolis. All of the students would endure a lengthy “Drill and Command” course no matter the source of their undergraduate education.

The first week of instruction was at a very brisk pace for the R.O.T.C. officers. The TBS staff remaining in Philadelphia focused on the “new joins,” while the USNA officers and a small staff detachment were away at Cape May, New Jersey, on the rifle range. Topics covered in the first week were Hygiene and Sanitation, Drill and Command, rifle marksmanship, and a technical course on how to assemble and disassemble the automatic rifle. Van Stockum felt he was working “every minute of every day, doing in three weeks, four weeks’ work.” At the end of the first month, though, he was “still very enthusiastic over the Marines.”

During the interwar period, rifle and pistol marksmanship had become a central feature of training for all Marines. Undated exams for “Rifle Marksmanship” and “Pistol Marksmanship” are part of the Van Stockum collection, and presumably were administered before the students fired weapons on a live range. The Philadelphia Navy Yard itself lacked facilities for firing weapons, so small arms shooting was done at Cape May, New Jersey. The Marines were quartered over a mile from the ranges, so the Lieutenants included over three miles of hiking on each “qualifying” day in addition to firing over 150 rounds daily. Mosquitoes made the use of netting a priority at night, but Van Stockum felt the insects were at their worst during inspection or “other times when we are at attention.” After completing exercises on the rifle range, the

2. Woodrow W. Kessler, To Wake Island and Beyond: Reminisces (Quantico, Virginia: USMC History and Museums Division, 1988), 12–15.

3. The 1937-38 class year appears to be the only one in which the fall rifle qualification trip to Cape May was split between the USNA officers and the ROTC officers. Travel orders for 1938-39 show the entire student body and staff traveling to Cape May together.


students returned to League Island to resume classes. A number of the TBS staff members throughout the interwar period were well-known marksman, and several interrupted their instructor tour to join (or train) the USMC competitive shooting teams for international and inter-service matches. Though the phrase “every Marine a rifleman” did not come into use until 1953, the idea of universal marksmanship training and a high standard of proficiency with small arms was taken for granted long before.

Back in the classroom, Machine Gun subjects were the focus in preparation for October’s field exercises at Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. Each student would “qualify” on the .37mm machine gun on the extended ranges at Indiantown Gap, so proficiency in the use, assembly, cleaning, and tactics of the weapon was prerequisite. Machine gun “mechanics,” “direct laying,” and “technique of fire,” the first three tests in the “Course U” and “Course X” materials, were all administered during September and early October prior to the field exercises. Being able to disassemble and reassemble the Browning machine gun “blindfolded” was the goal.

However, students did not simply study machine guns during the opening weeks of the course of instruction. “Hygiene and First Aid” was administered in mid-August, along with the first of ten “Drill and Command” exams. The 26 August “Drill and Command” exam covered formations of the platoon while in line and column. Using a combination of “fill in the blank” and “true or false” questions, the exam covered: positions of the platoon commander, positions of the platoon sergeant, role of the guide, use of the whistle, and some basic commands. The exam was weighted five points. According to Van Stockum’s memoir, close order drill on the parade deck was taught by Captain Lewis B. Puller. Finally, four exams from “Course C” in


Military Sketching and Mapmaking were administered before the students departed for Indiantown Gap: “Topography,” “Logical Contouring,” Topography Part II,” and “Military Sketching.”

Indiantown Gap: Marksmanship and Field Exercises

In early October, the entire Basic School traveled approximately one hundred miles into the Blue Ridge Mountains west of Philadelphia. The military reservation at Indiantown Gap served as a replacement for the Mount Gretna, Pennsylvania installation which had served the Pennsylvania National Guard (and the Basic School) throughout the 1910s and 1920s. The Mount Gretna training areas had been outgrown by the National Guard units who used it for their annual maneuvers. Van Stockum reported that the weather was “rather cold,” and blamed the namesake gap in the mountains as the source of a sharp wind. The TBS students were housed in “squad and a half” rooms which were heated. Woodrow Kessler recalled that the students made “hard” cider by leaving jugs of apple cider near the stoves in each sleeping area.

The staff and students remained at Indiantown Gap for three weeks. The .37mm machine gun was the primary weapon fired while on the ranges there. During the interwar era Marine officers not only fired but “qualified” on the machine gun and could receive a marksman, sharpshooter, or expert badge for increasingly high levels of proficiency. The students spent the first full week of camp on the 1000-yard range with the .37mm. Additional time on the ranges to practice direct and indirect laying was included later in October. These range exercises coordinated with the exams students had taken in Philadelphia immediately prior to traveling to Indiantown Gap.

10. Van Stockum, Remembrances of World Wars, 49.
In addition to firing on the machine gun ranges, the students also completed map making and sketching exercises. All of these exercises were part of the Military Sketching and Mapmaking “Course C.” For example, three road sketch exercises were completed by students on October 14, 19, and 26. Each sketch was graded, with a weight of 5 or 10 points. In his journal, Van Stockum noted that the first road sketch exam had been administered by Captain Howard Kenyon, who required students to use conventional signs and map symbols, and include contour lines. Van Stockum received a satisfactory grade, which he thought was “lucky ... because I had a large error of closure in both traverse and elevation and didn’t have time to complete the landscape.” Captain Kenyon was not so forgiving later in the course, so some room for error was clearly being allowed the new lieutenants. In early November, an “area sketch” was also completed, with a weight of 15 points. The area sketch is graded item C-9 in the “Course C” (Military Sketching and Mapmaking). Item C-6 is missing from among the Van Stockum papers, but it chronologically would have fallen during the time at Indiantown so it was probably administered there.

Finally, in addition to range work and exams, the students did practical application exercises in the field. The use of field marches, terrain studies, and “hip pocket” training was a natural continuation of the original Basic School’s design and mission. “School of Application,” the 1891 name of the institution, was meant to indicate a type of education in which students practiced and applied the lessons learned in class, rather than merely memorize and repeat already determined solutions. At Indiantown Gap, that meant combining the drill, command, sketching, and marksmanship skills from the classroom into an immersive mission:


14. The term “hip pocket” seems to have originated in the 1980s, with the idea that a training exercise or tactical game which could be completed with minimal preparation, no equipment, and a short amount of time, was one that fit in the instructor’s “hip pocket”. Today the Marines’ use of the idiom also implies the “hip pocket” training is like a weapon, holstered but ready to be drawn at a second’s notice so the user can train his Marines at an opportune moment.
We had a real day’s work last Friday. We spent all morning on scouting work including advancing the attack with scouts out. In the afternoon we marched seven miles along a dirt road as a patrol to relieve a “marine detachment”... At night we had the compass problem of following a course of 144 degrees across the hill to the east of the Gap. An undated exam for “Course T: Scouting and Patrolling” was probably administered immediately before this field exercise. At the completion of the patrol and scouting exercises, the students returned to the machine gun ranges once more. Van Stockum qualified as a “second class gunner”, blaming the difficult 1000 yard range portion for not making “expert”. Only five of the eighty-two students received that highest qualification, a point of pride as it meant that “the Marines’ course [of firing is] tough.”

Return to League Island - November and December

Upon returning to League Island, students completed the Military Sketching and Mapmaking course with two additional exams, on “Aerial Photography” and again “Topography.” The final exam (“Exam 11”) was not cumulative, but only tested material pertaining to aerial photography. It consisted of a single question, asking students to analyze an overlay and then: “Describe one method of restitution,” and “explain how to put direction lines on an aerial photograph.” Restitution is a branch of topography, in which the location of features from a photograph is indicated on a map. The “photograph” used for the exam was not included, but an overlay of a nearby rural area was part of the material. In his journal, Van Stockum recalled embarking in buses and trucks for Broomall, Pennsylvania, where Captain Kenyon supervised the students making overlays of the terrain. Presumably the overlay included

with Van Stockum’s exam is his own overlay which he composed while at Broomall. Exam #11 had the item code C-75-76, so many items were included in the course that did not form part of Van Stockum’s collection of student papers: only ten exams were preserved, no handouts and no notes on practical demonstrations or lectures.

After completing “Military Mapmaking and Sketching,” the students began the “Fielding Engineering” course. “Course D” had only two exams. The exams covered topics introduced in handouts entitled, chronologically, “Balanced Defense,” “Hasty Trenches and Emplacements,” and “Trench Drainage.” Without the ability to practice engineering skills in the classroom, this course appears to be less instructor-intensive than others. Students were given handouts then simply took exams on them. Practical demonstrations or further effort on the part of the instructor was not included. “Drill and Command” exam #2 was administered on November 12, covering march speeds, commands for executing the salute while passing in review, and rules for carrying the rifle. As an indication that TBS students were not learning for their own edification, but for their eventual need to train Marines, question #9 was: “When is the recruit taught the use, care, and nomenclature of the rifle?” Van Stockum’s answer, marked correct by the instructor: “Whenever practicable, as soon as possible after his enlistment. He will not fire on the range until he has been taught these subjects.” A separate sheet of “possible solutions” was provided along with the marked exam, giving page numbers in the drill manual, to which students could refer when checking their answer.

Rounding out the late fall were some short courses, as well as the first events in the long springtime courses which were to begin in January. A brief administration course (two exams)


began in late November, after the completion of “Field Engineering.” Ability to create and manage payroll was the central feature of both exams, as well as that of a “practical exercise” included with the course materials.\textsuperscript{21} At the same time, the very brief “Interior Guard Duty” (one exam) course was completed during the week of November 20th. “Drill and Command” exam #3 was administered on December 17th, one of the very last assignments to be completed before the Christmas holiday. Students must have completed many intervening assignments and practical work for this course between exam #2 and exam #3: the item codes jump from A-56 (exam #2) to A-102-103 (exam #3). The “Drill and Command” exam #3 contained the following questions:

- The platoon is in line, describe the movements of the right and left guides at the preparatory command “take interval”.
- A platoon has opened ranks, the platoon leader has verified the alignment, and commanded “front”. What is his position now?
- Describe the position of the platoon leader, while verifying the alignment of the front rank of his platoon. The platoon is in line; give the proper commands to form column of squads and march to the front.
- The platoon is in column of squads: give the proper commands to form line to the front.
- What formation of the platoon is the habitual column of route?
- The platoon is in column of squads; give the proper commands to diminish the front to a column of twos.
- The platoon has been marching in route step. The command to resume attention has been given. What is the prescribed way of carrying the automatic rifle?\textsuperscript{22}

And so on. A total of fifty questions were included on exam #3, which had a weight of 20.\textsuperscript{23}

In December, the labor-intensive “Naval Law” course began. The law course, “Course F,” had few exams but each was lengthy and complex. Van Stockum recorded in his journal that the school was “becoming a bit more difficult,” and mentioned the law course in addition to Signal Communications, Tactics, and Administration. At the same time, he expressed frustration

\begin{itemize}
\item 23. Only two items from Van Stockum’s collection had a weight higher than 20: the “Small Wars” exam, and the tactics exam for a rifle platoon “In the Attack”.
\end{itemize}
that no overall “class standing” was published at TBS, so he had no sense of how his
performance compared to that of his fellow student officers. On December 10th, he related:

We have certainly not been given much encouragement as to our future in the Marine
Corps. Capt. Kenyon...and his “your days are numbered”, and “red lights ahead”, and
“you’ll get the ax”... However, most of the Marine Officers seem to laugh at their
troubles and take things as they come. I understand that this class has been doing
remarkably well. No one has yet failed a course. 24

However, his hopes for class standings to be released before Christmas seem to have been
unfounded. No mention of class standing appears in the journal at that time, and no graded exam
or paper indicates an overall class standing. The students left Philadelphia on December 16th
and 17th, traveling home to visit with friends and family. They returned just after January 1st
(Van Stockum, coming from the West Coast, was on a train through the overnight of New Year’s
Eve) and resumed classes.

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Midwinter at League Island: Work Begins in Earnest

Just as the August-September classroom work prepared students for their October field
exercises at Indiantown Gap, the post-Christmas months were also spent preparing for a field
event. In April, the TBS students and staff would travel back to Indiantown for a month long
field exercise, and much of the course work in January, February, and March directly pertained to
subjects that would be covered at that event. A cumulative “exam” in the form of a field exercise
was the standard for military schools around the world at the time, and remains so in the Marine
Corps today. In particular, the progression of tactics, engineering, and weaponry classes at TBS
mirror the curriculum at the Infantry School at Fort Benning. The influence of that school’s
structure on the Marine officer instructors at League Island is very clear. Since preparation for a
field exercise was the primary goal of the spring term, the “Tactics” course formed the largest
portion of the work. Unfortunately, almost all of the “Tactics” materials preserved by Van
Stockum lack dates. Thus, they are discussed later in a separate section in this chapter.

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On January 2nd, the “Administration” exam #2 was administered, followed the next day by the “Naval Law” exam #2. The Naval Law exams are unique. There is no exam paper with questions or prompts. Instead, it appears that the students took notes on either a “performed” dummy court martial, or on a transcript of a court martial which was read aloud. Facts of the case are included in the student answers, along with an outline of how courts martial typically proceed. Unfortunately, Van Stockum did not mention in his journal anything about the Naval Law course, and no instructor notes have survived. These mysterious Naval Law exams are all very large, some running to 10-15 pages of handwritten “answers” in the form of trial transcription. Some have a cover sheet for court martial included, and others are only the student notes themselves. By volume, Naval Law contains more graded material than any other course except Tactics. Classmate Woodrow Kessler noted that the instruction in Naval Law at TBS was much more extensive, and “far better,” than had been the legal instruction at the Naval Academy.

In early January, Van Stockum noted that work days were six hours long, all spent in the classroom. He lamented that there was “no drill to break the monotony.” Instead, students found ways to be active on weekends including ice skating, hiking, and traveling to Wilmington, Delaware, or Washington, DC, to sightsee. Van Stockum often took time to attend plays or concerts with his friends, Lieutenants Edmond Glick, Arthur Fisher, and Golland Clark. Art museums or botanical gardens rounded out extracurricular opportunities. For those students who


27. Van Stockum, transcription of Personal Journal 1 of 3, 12.

28. In one of the most enjoyable passages in the Philadelphia portion of his journals, Van Stockum recounts in detail his visits to the Smithsonian museums in Washington, DC. He notes the appearance and interesting features of a number of exhibits which are still enjoyed by visitors today. The connection between generations via these monuments to human endeavor is powerful.
had made local friends, dinner with Philadelphia families (often the families of another student’s “best girl”) was a regular event as well.

For the rest of January, students finished some short courses and began longer ones. The second “Signals Communications” exam was administered on January 11th, with questions such as:

- What information does the communication officer plot on his own map when accompanying his unit commander during the issuance of the attack order?
- What four main agencies are normally employed by a communication platoon in a battalion or a regiment in either attack or defense?
- Who is responsible for the proper functioning and coordination of the above agencies within his own unit and with that of adjacent and superior units?
- In time of war, how is worn out, lost or expended communication material replaced?
- Where may material required by all communication units for garrison, maneuvers and war-time operations be found listed?
- Sketch a field “pick-up” set as you would erect one for plane pick-up in the field.  

The Signals Communication exam #2 was weighted 15. At the same time, students were studying for an “Administration” exam administered on January 14th, which covered payroll. The following week, only “Naval Law” exam #4 (January 19th) appears in the Van Stockum collection. “Naval Law” #3 is missing, but presumably it was administered sometime between January 2nd and January 19th. These were busy weeks for the students.

Around this time, Van Stockum’s journal shifted in focus, mentioning fewer items related to TBS and more about his social and personal life.

February at TBS was similar to January. New courses included “Service Afloat,” “Chemical Warfare,” and “Military History.” The “Signals Communications” and “Naval Law” courses were completed. For “Service Afloat,” two lengthy manuals were included in the Van Stockum collection along with four exams. It was critical for a Marine officer to seamlessly work alongside the officers and sailors of a battleship. The course on “Service Afloat” focused


30. The “Tactics” course began some time during the last weeks of January, as one dated event (“Tactics - Field Orders”) appears in the collection on January 31st. Since most of the “Tactics” items are undated, they are treated as a whole, in a later section of this chapter.
on familiarizing the students with naval terminology and the ships environment, and on the operation of the battleships’ secondary gun batteries. Exam #1 covered “boats:” classes of small boats organic to vessels of the U.S. Navy, emergency equipment to be carried aboard small boats at all times, some terminology for small boats, procedure for entering and exiting a small boat, rudimentary procedures for landing a small boat on a beach (not in combat situations), and a variety of hails for communication among small boats or between the boats and the ship.31

The “Military History” course materials from Van Stockum’s collection align with those preserved in the Marine Corps Archives from 1933-1934. A lecture or series of lectures was delivered, but the primary means of instruction for military history was the students’ writing assignment. Van Stockum was given the topic “Battle of Cowpens” on February 1st.32 No exams for Military History were given. Instead, the composition of the history paper, and the delivery of the same or similar in class, were the graded events. A reading list was included as well, similar to that given to students in 1933. Van Stockum’s monograph was seven pages long, typewritten, and referenced three sources.33 He also included two hand-drawn maps of the battlefield, one for general location and one indicating tactical events which took place during the engagement. There is no grade on the monograph.

In March, students completed the second and final “Chemical Warfare” exam. “Chemical Warfare” materials in the Van Stockum collection include two exams, one lecture, and one tactical exercise (on paper). The lecture appears to have been handed out to students, but reads as if it were being delivered by an instructor. Due to the very fast pace of the program,


it is possible that the “Chemical Warfare” class was primarily completed by students as “homework” rather than use valuable classroom time. The lecture begins:

Gentlemen: During this lecture I am going to follow the origin and development of chemical warfare by dividing it into three phases. The first phase deals with chemical warfare prior to the World’s War. The second phase deals with the subject during the World War and the third phase deals with the subject matter subsequent to the World War.\(^{34}\)

Exams on “Chemical Warfare” included types of chemical weapons, tactics for employment, emergency and protective measures when made the target of a chemical attack, and applicable rules of engagement governing the use of chemical weapons. At the same time, the “Drill and Command” course also resumed, presumably with the return of good weather. Exam #5 for “Drill and Command” was administered on March 17th. Exam #2 for “Service Afloat”, on ship and gunnery drills, was administered on March 18th.

Also in March, the brief “Small Wars” course began. It was taught by Captain Puller.

Van Stockum recorded in his journal:

[March 1] “Capt. Puller...is starting his course in Small Wars. His tales of Haiti are most interesting especially since they are true...Tales told as only “El Tigre” can tell them assure wide awake classes during Small Wars lectures.”\(^{35}\)

The “Small Wars” tests were less romantic. Exam #1 began with discussing the Monroe Doctrine, and asked students to outline what characteristics of a foreign country the officers should familiarize themselves with before being assigned there. The proper channels of civilian and military authority were also discussed. Exam #1 was made up of twenty short answer questions.\(^{36}\) The influence of early century missions for the Marine Corps is evident in these exams. While manuals from this era focused on jungle fighting, the dangers of disease in warm 


\(^{35}\) Van Stockum, transcription of Personal Journal 1 of 3, 17.

climate, and rudimentary (and often erroneous) studies of native population’s habits and practices, these exams focused on administrative and governmental aspects of small wars.

Captain Puller had been an officer in the Haitian Gendarmerie, so his interest in the use of American military officers as a proxy authority for the tenuous civil government was unsurprising. Exam #2 had the same format, as exam #1, but shifted topic. The second exam discussed the mechanics of patrolling in a small wars environment. For the purposes of Puller’s class, a “small wars environment” meant one where the hostile troops in the vicinity were difficult or impossible to identify. Some questions included:

- Discuss the factors that govern the size, composition, and armament of the infantry patrol in a small war.
- Discuss the advisability of including friendly native troops in Marine patrols.
- Why should not canned fruits and vegetables be carried on patrol?
- In general, the infantry patrol in a small war differs from one in a major war in what respects?  

The problem of protecting a local population from insurgents who look and dress identically to the population was not a new one for the Marines. It continues to be a factor today. Other students recalled Puller’s interest in protecting his Marines, and noted disregard for any modern conventions about the civilian populations’ right to protection: “one day in a class on Small War[s] ...Louis intoned in a deep guttural, ‘When you occupy a native village, you provide security; the first things to do is put a machine gun in the church steeple.’”

April was the final month of classroom work before students departed for Indiantown Gap. During April, the final “Drill and Command” exam was administered and the “Service Afloat” course was completed. The 81mm Mortar was introduced at this time, and an exam administered on the use of the weapon. (It would be fired on the ranges at Indiantown Gap the next month.) Students had to name the parts of the gun and projectile, and state the purpose of each. Knowledge of the mechanical and chemical processes of firing the weapon was also

38. Kessler, To Wake Island and Beyond: Reminisces, 12.
tested. Significantly, students also had to describe a misfire and give five reasons a misfire might occur. Demonstration of targeting calculations, and of the correct command sequence for loading and firing the mortar, were the final components of the exam.\textsuperscript{39} Along with the tactics course, which will be examined next, these events formed the program of instruction for Second Lieutenants at the Basic School.

\textit{Tactics: The Main Event}

When the Basic School was operating in Philadelphia between the wars, the focus on a Marine officer as a rifle platoon commander was still in its early stages. The Marine Corps had identified, via decades of small wars and then eighteen months of trench warfare, what type of education an officer would need in order to command units ashore. Despite the fact that nearly every Marine to graduate from TBS would immediately serve a tour of sea duty (unless he remained in school to complete aviation training), the central event in the program of instruction was a series of classes and exams on land warfare tactics.\textsuperscript{40} The various influences of Army schools, World War I, emerging military technologies, and an increasingly independent Navy, led the Marines to dedicate their schools’ energy to land warfare tactics. The Fleet Marine Force concept demanded that the Marines pass over water to reach the battlefield, but once ashore the fighting was done according to standardized techniques familiar to any conventional soldier of the time period.

The Tactics “course” at TBS is better understood not as a single course, but as a framework. Like the structure of a building, the elements taught in the Tactics course serve as pegs on which the various other knowledge and skills acquired at TBS are hung. Marine officers do not use machine guns absent tactics, nor are Small Wars fought in a setting without a platoon

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\textsuperscript{39} Ronald R. Van Stockum, "81mm Gun" (1938), Ronald Reginald Van Stockum Papers [Mss. A V217, folder #4], (Louisville, KY: Filson Historical Society).
\textsuperscript{40} “Basic School Graduates Leave Studies for Sea Duty,” \textit{Leatherneck} 18, no. 6 (June 1935 1935): 33.
\end{flushright}
or company engaging in either defense or attack. Everything learned at the school finds context in a tactical setting. The “three levels of war,” a popular means of discussing warfare since the late 1800s, are tactical, operational, and strategic. This formulation considers small military units, those below battalion size, to be “tactical” units. The Marine lieutenant is a “tactical” commander, and the skills taught at TBS are “tactical” in nature.

The interwar Tactics course was always lengthy, roughly double the size of any other single course, maintaining that proportion even as the overall scope and size of the program of instruction shifted. In 1937-38, there were forty two separate graded items for the student to complete, in a variety of formats: exam, map problem, map exercise, lecture, quiz, “estimate of the situation”, combat order, diagram, pamphlet, historical map problem, terrain walk, and terrain exercise. The Van Stockum collection, again, contains only the items a student brought home with him. The final numbered item in the course materials is #107, so many more items were included that students did not keep. The early problems use small units (rifle sections) and teach isolated elements of a tactical situation, such as “covering forces” or “security,” then the rifle section is examined in the attack and in the defense. The rifle platoon and rifle company are introduced in sequence, each with separate “attack” and “defense” exams. A second Indiantown Gap exercise, a kind of “final exam” for the Tactics course and for the overall TBS program of instruction, was focused on firing all the weapons previously practiced with in the fall, in addition to larger weapons such as the 81mm mortar.

Major Amor L. Sims introduced the Tactics course to students in a lecture. His five page overview began:

The course consists of 122 hours embracing studies in organization, technique, and the infantry tactics of units up to and including a reinforced battalion. Some time will be devoted to supporting arms, the service of supply of infantry units in combat, marches and shelter, and combat intelligence. As separate courses there will be given by the school; Landing Operations, and Small Wars. These courses will tie in so far as possible with the tactics course. The school hopes that through the efforts of the Director of the school and his staff, and through the constructive cooperation of the students, a well grounded foundation for this study will be gained by the students.41

41. Ronald R. Van Stockum, "Tactics Lecture" (1937), Ronald Reginald Van Stockum Papers
Sims further explained that the course was divided into many parts, which generally fell into either “offensive,” “defensive,” or “special operations.” Finally, students were instructed to seek clarification from the Field Service Regulations, US Marine Corps, and “such training regulations and manuals as have been designated and approved by the Major General Commandant. There is no other source for authoritative doctrine or policy in this course.”

Tactics item H-17, “Combat Orders,” laid out the basic principles for composing a combat order. Combat orders are “orders of any type that contain directives for subordinate units pertaining to any phase of operations in the field.” Fundamental characteristics of a combat order included a concise description of the situation, a definite decision and plan, tactical instructions for each element of the command, instructions for administration and supply, and arrangements for communication. An example order for an attack and for a defense were included with item H-17. Since many combat orders included diagrams or maps, a sample map with operational unit notations was also included. Students would be required to replicate some parts of a combat order in their first tactics exam.

To further cement the lessons on combat orders, H-18 and H-21 used map problems to demonstrate actions taken by a rifle section in the attack and defense, respectively. The combat orders for each situation were sketched loosely in the course materials. In classrooms, map problems were demonstrated using transparent films and projectors or using chalkboards, and relied heavily on the instructors’ ability to describe the lesson in detail. As he walked students through the problem, attendant tasks for the section commander (in these examples, a Sergeant)
were considered and completed under the instructor’s guidance. Use of cold calls and student input was probably used extensively.

The only “tactical walk” in the Tactics course is item H-23,25: “Rifle Squad and Section - Security on the March and Offensive Combat.” This exercise took students out of the classroom and onto the parade ground of the League Island Navy Yard. Beginning in the southeast corner of the property, students walked through the property and discussed correct formations for patrolling, conditions needed to be met or considered for security, and the like. The “situation” was provided in order to give the exercise some realism:

Company A is the advance guard of the 1st Battalion 1st Marines, which is marching west from the Delaware River via this road, with the mission of seizing the line of that railroad embankment in the vicinity of that tall building, in order to cover the crossing of a larger force over the Delaware. Small enemy patrols have been reported in the territory to our front but no actual contact has been made with them so far.44

The “tactical walk” was immediately followed by a “terrain exercise,” also conducted on the Navy Yard grounds. The terrain exercise was for a platoon-sized element, rather than a squad (security) and section (offensive combat). Students were asked to sketch the terrain as informally described by their company commander, and prepare to issue orders to their platoon according to those given by the company commander. After thirty minutes, they put their sketch to use deploying the men of their platoon around the Navy Yard grounds according to principles of tactics they had learned.

Next, item H-26 returned students to the classroom. In this map problem, students were presented with a historical problem centered on British operations against local tribes located in the Northwest Territory (modern Afghanistan/Pakistan) in 1919. The problem was divided into two sections: posting a flank guard, and advancing across open country. The use of this historical case study provided the students a different learning experience than the previous exercises had. In this case, the historical protagonist (a British Sergeant) made an error in his

estimate of the situation which caused some of his force to be lost. The materials provided to TBS students included the erroneous historical solution, along with a discussion of the Sergeant’s mistake and how he should have acted differently. In materials created for the students elsewhere in the program of instruction, solutions provided were always correct. In this case, students examined a poor solution and discussed its consequences.

The last item in the first “section” of the tactics course is a conference on the map problem itself. First, different types of tactical exercises were listed and defined. Most of the exercises described in this list were used by the TBS students themselves. Students were cautioned to only answer the question asked, and not indulge in overly complex solutions or solutions which solve a problem not presented by the exercise. At the same time, it emphasized paying careful attention that all of the elements of the problem were solved. Some of the provided answer keys for tactics tests had pre-written criticisms typed on a sheet, and the instructor merely circled the relevant criticism: on all of these, an option for “did not complete all elements of the solution” was included, so this was a common error.

After this groundwork was laid, the course developed quickly. A map problem on the rifle platoon in the defense was quickly followed by terrain exercises for platoon in the attack and in the defense. A “check list” for combat orders served as a kind of review for the material already covered. On February 1st, 1938, the first tactics exam was administered. Exam #1 began with a map problem, on which students were to indicate positions or movement of troops. On Van Stockum’s copy of the map, his pencil markings are visible but there is no accompanying problem set. This portion of the exam must have been related to the class orally by the instructor. The next section posed some questions for the rifle platoon commander in the defense, beginning with how he would respond to one of his Marines being injured by enemy

45. The types of exercises in this list are the same as those used at the Infantry School at Fort Benning.

fire. Finally, the platoon commander’s established defenses were overrun, and he was asked to react to the presence and action of new enemy troops. In exam #1, section three, students were required to label a diagram of outposts. Pickets, lines of observation, lines of resistance, support posts, detached posts, and outguard posts were all featured on the diagram. Finally, a set of solutions to the exam questions was included with the student’s graded papers.

Tactics exam #2 was given on February 3rd, 1938. “Rifle Platoon in the Attack” relied more heavily on the concepts of combat orders than the defense-oriented exam #1. Given a situation, students were to issue a combat order to their platoon, based on the remarks given by the company commander. The time allowed for this part of the exam was forty minutes: the answers were given in five-paragraph form. In the next part, the “current” position of troops (i.e. after the movement described in part one was complete) was indicated for students on an overlay, and one section of the platoon (2nd Section) was singled out. Students were asked to detail the combat orders given by the Sergeant, 2nd Section, in response to the updated situation. Next, a short answer section, lasting twenty minutes, covered additional concepts:

- What general considerations govern the distance at which a support platoon follows the assault section?
- What is the position of the platoon leader of a support platoon in the attack? Why?
- Give 5 of the most usual missions which may be given the support platoon exclusive of that of furnishing protection during the reorganization of the assault echelon?47

Finally, students had ten minutes to answer ten true or false questions about the correct positions occupied by various members of the platoon when marching, patrolling, in a fixed position, and when withdrawing. The final lesson: “It is pardonable to be defeated, but never to be surprised.”48 None of the other graded items in Van Stockum’s collection included time limits on individuals sections.


Throughout February and March, this pattern was repeated with increasingly large combat units. The rifle company and machine gun platoon were introduced together, first with a pamphlet, then a quiz, then a map exercise, then an “estimate of the situation” exercise, then a combat orders exercise, then an illustrative map problem (solution provided during class rather than later), and finally a map exercise. Supply, ammunition, and combat first aid were also introduced at this time. Items H-54 through H-70 all contributed to the development of students’ knowledge of the rifle company and the machine gun platoon in direct support. Item H-73/74/75, “Tactics Exam 3#” was administered on March 3rd, 1938, and used a combat orders exercise to test the students’ knowledge of the rifle company. Unlike the first two tactics exams, however, exam #3 was weighted only 10 points. The principles being taught in this portion of the course would be tested in the field at Indiantown Gap: there would be another chance to grade students’ knowledge.

Exam #4 (item H-79/80/81) was given March 8th. Two map problems on the howitzer platoon, one in the attack and one in the defense, were the only items taught between exam #3 and exam #4. Exam #4 continued the same format, however, and asked students to provide a combat order or give instructions to their unit in response to a tactical situation. For this exam, the student played the part of a machine gun platoon commander. Unfortunately, the first typewritten pages of Exam #4 are missing from the Van Stockum copy, and his handwritten answers have faded with time. Section Four is thus the beginning of the document, which finds the rifle platoon commander “in the north corner of the woods,” planning to continue the attack according to plans established earlier in the exam. The introduction of new information creates the next exam problem:

At this time a messenger from the 1st Section on WELLS HILL reports to Lieutenant 1st Platoon, that one machine gun was destroyed and two of the gun crew killed by enemy 37mm shells. The other gun has moved to an alternate position and it still firing. Captain Company A heard the report and made no change to his orders.

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FOURTH REQUIREMENT: The actions and orders of Lieutenant 1st Platoon from this time until the 2nd Section is in position.

The solution to this problem formed the final part of exam #4.

As promised in the introductory lecture, combat intelligence was included in the Tactics course. Item H-82/83 “Combat Intelligence” was a map exercise. The role of the intelligence officer in the late 1930s was still being defined. Though several scholars have pointed out the provenance of the role stretches back into the late 1890s and the Advanced Base Force, it was still the case in 1938 that there were no Military Occupational Specialties. Thus the precise role of intelligence, and detailed procedures for gathering it, were not established. For TBS students, the combat intelligence class was in two parts. First, the students were required to fill out an overlay according to written “notes” provided to them from a “scout”. The overlay was completed ahead of time and brought into class. During the class, a series of “enemy prisoners” were encountered. Students had to demonstrate proper information gathering techniques, the procedure for reporting intelligence to higher headquarters, and what deductions they would draw from each enemy prisoner encounter. Late in the exercise, a “friendly civilian” was also encountered, and the students were cautioned that even a friendly source of information may have innocent errors in their report. Finally, all of the intelligence gathered during the various encounters was to be summed up in an official report to the “battalion commander,” using a standardized format and including a reference map filled out by the students. This lengthy exercise was the only dedicated piece of curriculum for “combat intelligence” included in the program of instruction.


Tactics exam #5 was the final classroom event for “rifle company” problems. Administered on March 25th, it covered the rifle company and machine gun platoon in the defense. In a format that was by then very familiar to the students, it began:

1st Battalion, 1st Marines, as part of a larger force, has been ordered to defend the sector shown on the situation overlay. An attack is not expected before daylight tomorrow (0630). An outpost is covering the occupation of the position. By 0800 today, Lieutenant Colonel 1st Battalion has completed his reconnaissance of the assigned area and is on SMITH HILL conferring with Captain Company D. The position of the machine gun sections as shown on the overlay has been definitely decided by the battalion commander, and he now asks Captain Company D to recommend two sections of machine guns in B company’s sector. You are Captain Company D. 

Students were expected to include sectors of fire for each section, as well as final protective lines for each section. Next, they shifted to play the part of Captain Company B, issuing a complete set of orders to their company according to the notes given by the “battalion commander.” Finally, students were to plot the situation overlay for Company B, including strength and location for each combat group in the sector, fields of fire, and location of the command post.

In Van Stockum’s collection, tactics exam #5 included a complete set of very clear instructor comments on the student solution. Though Van Stockum received a “satisfactory” on the exam (and a good grade on the course overall), all but one of his answers to the requirements received some criticism or correction. For example:

- It would be better to first take out the enemy 37mm gun at (2), which is endangering your machine guns and 37mm guns.
- This is not a suitable target for this weapon.
- A position on COOK RIDGE would provide better observation and a better field of fire in the battalion zone for both 37mm guns.
- There is a lack of mutual support between the various machine gun sections in the battalion sector.

This rigorous exam was followed by only four more classroom events and the Tactics course would draw to a close. Map problems for the machine gun company and howitzer platoon were completed on March 23rd, and students were issued a lecture handout on supplying infantry


units. Finally, tactics exam #6, “Machine Gun Company and Howitzer Platoon Map Problem” completed the course.

Without a complete set of dates, it is impossible to say when the tactics course began, but certainly exams were first administered on February 1st, meaning the bulk of the material had been covered in less than two months. This was a major accomplishment: students were now considered equipped to lead a rifle platoon with ease, to understand the workings of a rifle company, and to be able to utilize machine guns, artillery, mortars, engineers, intelligence, signal communications, and air reconnaissance in support of their missions as ground combat elements. Added to the courses already completed on drill and topography, the TBS student was now in possession of a really comprehensive military education. Given the lack of equivalent “basic” schools in any other part of the United States military at the time, they would have been justified in claiming they had the “best” professional military education, for their grade and experience, in the country. To complete the experience, the students and staff of the Basic School returned to Indiantown Gap for additional qualification using small arms, as well as the opportunity to fire larger weapons that had been introduced during the tactics course.

_Spring Exercises at Indiantown Gap_

Van Stockum traveled back to Indiantown Gap with classmates in their personal car. Unlike “going to the field” today, students on the field exercise at Indiantown Gap were free to leave on weekends or long afternoons. However, during the day they were very busy. First, they fired both .22 caliber and .30 caliber rifles again. A .45 caliber pistol course was also included, and it was the goal of every student to qualify as “expert.” No one wanted to join the Fleet Marine Force without the “expert” badge on his uniform.55 It was a pleasant time of year to be in the field, and Van Stockum listed the reasons all of the students said the final field exercise felt less grueling than it otherwise might have seemed:

55. No one does today, either.
1. Hot weather
2. Good wholesome chow and lots of it
3. No more book work and its accompanying cut-throating
4. Only three more weeks til end of Basic School

Firing the 81mm mortar was completed the following week. After that, qualification with the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) finished on May 12th. Students were given two rounds of firing with the Thompson Submachine Gun as well--once for practice, the first time they ever shot the weapon, and once “for record.” Van Stockum managed to qualify as expert on all of these but the “Tommy” gun.

The firing of weapons did not fill three weeks of field time. In between, students had classes covering some of the “big” weapons and their employment in combat. Course “Z” provided “combat practice” for machine gun and howitzer units. Entitled a “demonstration and field exercise,” item Z2 asked students to survey the terrain and place the weapons from an 81mm mortar platoon, and a .37mm machine gun section, in the correct positions to stop an oncoming enemy force. At the end of the class, one student’s answer was selected and live weapons were emplaced and fired according to that solution.

Another day, “Machine Gun Barrages and Concentrations” were taught, also in a field demonstration format. With map in hand, students received oral instructions as to the situation and were asked to assess the terrain given the enemy units described by the instructor. The use of machine gun barrage relied on complex communication mechanisms for the infantry battalion, so for this exercise a “staff officer” was provided to the student to provide support when “interacting” with the battalion. The tasks were:

- Task A: a portion of the enemy front line will be interdicted from H-4 to H.
- Task B: a portion of the enemy front line will be interdicted from H-3 to H+1.
- Task C: an area suspected of containing enemy reserves will be neutralized from H+2 to H+4.
- Selection of positions for the emplacement of your guns is restricted to the area northeast of a line running 800yds northwest from CR 666 (near ST JOSEPH SPRINGS). HILL 727 is at your disposal.
- R-4 will deliver 8000 rounds of ammunition, loaded in belts, to your assembly position as soon as notified of its location. You will expend this ammunition on these missions.

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Students would then explain which type of machine-gun laying was to be employed in such a
mission, and indicate locations for two battery positions.

Finally, a terrain exercise was conducted at Indiantown Gap which placed the students in
the shoes of a rifle company commander. This exercise fulfilled another of Major Sims’
promises, that students would consider problems up to the level of a reinforced battalion. The
exam was divided into three sections. First, given a situation which included an infantry
battalion supported by a battery of 75mm pack howitzers, the students were to “give the
formation” for an advance guard which was required for the battalion to cross the battle area.
Once the “advance party” began to move, it was fired upon at the crest of a hill by a group of
enemy troops in the vicinity of a nearby house. (Because this was a terrain exercise, it was
written to match the actual terrain; the features identified in the exercise material would have
been physically present for the students to act on as references.) Students had to react to the
attack, deploying the advance party to protect itself and the howitzer battery. Their decisions
during the exercise were controlled by the instructor: at some point, no matter what the students
had proposed, the “correct” solution would be offered so that the next stage of the exercise could
begin. In this case, the “enemy troops” were driven away by the correct solution, and students
were asked to turn their attention to a new group of enemy machine guns which had crept up on
the flank during the initial attack. Having done so “correctly,” the exercise concluded and the
battalion was considered safe.

Van Stockum: Conclusions

Van Stockum’s unique collection provides the most complete picture of the Basic
School’s curriculum during the interwar era. It is clear from his records that the courses were

57. Ronald R. Van Stockum, "Machine Gun Barrages" (1938), Ronald Reginald Van Stockum
organized systematically, gradually building toward higher skill levels of leadership, tactical command, and proficiency in ancillary skills such as mapmaking or administration. The obvious emphasis on “old fashioned” topics such as sea service and small wars helps solidify the claim that TBS was still teaching Lieutenants traditional topics, and had not fully shifted to the “amphibious warfare doctrine” model which would come to define the 1940s. At the same time, seeing the curriculum in full supports the argument that the subjects which aligned with the Advanced Base Force concept were natural and direct predecessors to amphibious warfare, which in turn developed into the modern “Air-Ground Task Force” system for quick reaction, mobile forces that the Marine Corps has espoused since the 1980s.

The personal journal which accompanied his personal papers helped give a broader picture of student life at TBS as well. Van Stockum shared weekend activities, impressions of instructors, and anecdotes from training. All of these clarify how much work was expected of the students, how they viewed the school experience, and whether the learning environment was rigid, relaxed, or something in between. Van Stockum was a good student, graduating near the top of his class and going on to enjoy a long career. His command of the material was solid, so no opportunity to assess instructors’ methods for grading is available. The notable exception is the map sketch which was featured prominently in his journal, his memoir, and even in his notes that accompanied the personal papers collection. The episode of Captain Kenyon awarding an unsatisfactory grade merely because Van Stockum had turned in his sketch before time was called made a deep impression on the student. That and similar lessons were the ones which lasted longest, and which were the most important to be conveyed at the Basic School.

Technology and time caused rapid changes in the techniques of war, but lessons of leadership were taught with the belief that they were unchanging.
Conclusion

It remains only partially clear how the Basic School operated between the World Wars, the official record is incomplete, and eyewitness accounts fail to fill in all of the gaps. By combining several disparate sets of evidence, this study provides a fuller picture of the officers’ course than has previously been available. Evidence pertaining to the League Island era was analyzed in four main areas: historical background, instructor expertise, records of school conduct, and archived curriculum. All of this informs modern Marine officers’ understanding of the professional military education system that they encounter, how it has developed, and (perhaps more importantly) how it has stayed the same. The Marine Corps prizes its heritage above all else, and those traditions which are old, which are unbroken, and which most closely connect the current Corps to its forbears receive great respect. When Marines gather to celebrate their Birthday or remember a fallen comrade, the formulaic recitation of Marine Corps history is part of their ritual. Places like the Basic School or the Recruit Depot at Parris Island, provide structure for those chronologies.

In the final chapter, the extensive personal collection of Brigadier General Ronald R. Van Stockum provided the most detailed overview of the program. The structure of the course, start to finish, is clear. Van Stockum’s collection of exams and the notes which accompany them show that the Tactics course was the centerpiece of the school: it was the most lengthy and most detailed “event,” and all of the other classes either directly referenced it or naturally filled ancillary roles. His collection makes the connection between the Marine Corps school system and the larger U.S. Army education system explicit, by showing that the structure of the course as well as the course materials themselves bears a strong resemblance to materials found in the Fort Benning archives. The size and scope of the Naval Law and Service Afloat courses speak to the importance of those officer roles in the interwar Marine Corps. Van Stockum’s classmate, Woodrow Kessler, went so far as to say “the Marines were expected to provide” judge advocates for the entire Naval service. Whether that impression was correct or not does not change the fact
that the Marines were training their officers extensively, even at the most basic educational level, for courts martial. Van Stockum’s carefully preserved collection of students papers serves as a springboard for “reverse engineering” TBS while it was located at League Island. His near-complete, chronological record allows the fragmented records from other archives to be cross-referenced and contextualized.

In the preceding chapter, isolated elements of the curriculum which had been preserved in the Marine Corps archives were examined. Only a few examples are still available, showing small portions of the course for the years 1930, 1931, 1933, 1934, 1936, 1940, and 1941. They corroborate the complete set of materials from Van Stockum’s personal collection, showing that the program of instruction did not vary significantly from 1930 to 1940. No curriculum samples for the 1920s exist, but two academic transcripts from 1924 and 1925 show at least a similar array of course topics as those present in the 1930s curriculum; examples that corroborate the Van Stockum collection. For example, the presence of a “Customs and Courtesies” lecture in both 1931 and 1937-38 shows that the material was important. It outlasted multiples changes of instructor and two changes of school director, as well as the dramatic restructure of classes in 1935 which heralded the USMC’s shift from “small postwar force” to “large prewar force.” Likewise, the Oliver P. Smith lecture on “The Bayonet” also survived the 1934 advent of the Fleet Marine Force and the 1935 restructure of the Basic School, indicating that the topic covered by that speech remained relevant.

Chapter five outlined the administrative conduct of the Basic School. The primary source of data for that chapter were the Muster Rolls of the United States Marine Corps themselves. The raw numbers showing how many students were present, when they arrived and departed, how many instructors served on the staff at a given moment, and the source of commissions, had not been analyzed prior to this study. It is true that raw class size information was recorded by First Lieutenant Anthony A Frances in his History of the Marine Corps Schools, but he offered no analysis. More importantly, the critical question of the size and composition of the staff was not recorded by Frances in his manuscript. While at League Island, TBS grew from
a four-man staff and 25 students to a powerhouse educational institution commanded by a full Colonel with a staff of seventeen, producing over 100 graduates per academic year. The Marine Corps’ transformation into the Fleet Marine Force was not sudden or accidental. On the contrary, the growth of the Marine Corps was steady and controlled. The Commandants throughout the interwar period took an active interest in Congressional proceedings and the strategic environment within the United States military as a whole. They had attended the War Colleges, where student exercises focused on future operations. In response, the Marines slowly increased class sizes at their schools and cultivated additional means of procuring both officers and enlisted men. The only “dramatic leap” in size came in 1935, when a “double class” passed through TBS, allowing less-experienced ROTC officers and well-seasoned USNA graduates to complete customized courses which deposited them on the far side of graduation day with comparable levels of ability.

In chapters three and four, the “sea service” and “land warfare” backgrounds of the interwar instructors were examined. Lacking a complete archival record of TBS curriculum, and knowing that the school instructors had a critical role in creating the course materials, it was helpful to outline what kinds of missions and schools had influenced the instructors themselves. A significant number of the early TBS instructors attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning. The quality and availability of the Army’s professional schools made them an easy choice for early interwar period Marine officers. They not only attended Army schools, but modeled their Marine Corps Schools curriculum on the Army systems. Eventually, the Marines shifted to training their officers at their own career and senior level courses as each became better developed and was able to accommodate more students. The influence of Army education on Marine officers between the wars is undeniable. However, six to nine month of schooling, no matter the venue, is seldom the most influential experience in a military officers’ life. Their missions, billets, and operational activities were significantly more important.

This brings us to chapter three, on the maritime heritage of the Marine Corps and its schools. The creation of amphibious warfare doctrine during the 1930s has cast a long shadow,
obsuring many of the significant missions undertaken by Marines in the first two decades of the twentieth century. The “naval service” material analyzed showed how the use of Marines aboard ships and on foreign shores was never seriously the Marines absolutely had a unifying and consistent mission in the Advanced Base Force from the time of its inception in the 1890s. Marines remained aboard ship (despite the efforts of some Navy officers and Theodore Roosevelt), in order to operate the secondary gun batteries aboard ship as well as be prepared to leave the ship and establish bases ashore from which the fleet could be supplied or protected.

It is a mistake to believe that the “power from the sea” mantra originated with Amphibious Warfare Doctrine. It goes back the Advanced Base Force. The transition from the latter to the former was seamless, a logical progression from the dreadnaught era to the age of the aircraft carrier and super battleship. The interwar era Basic School absorbed the impact of transition and shows, perhaps more clearly than any other aspect of Marine Corps life, how closely related the two missions really were: they began the 1920s teaching “tactics,” “service afloat,” and “small wars,” and they ended the 1930s the same way. Moreover, there was never a sharp break from that same tradition after World War II. All of the aspects of the Advanced Base Force mission can be described using modern terms with which the current operating forces would be familiar. Naval expeditionary warfare was and is the lifeblood of the Marine

In chapter two, this study outlined the early history of the Basic School, from 1891 until the start of World War I. Since TBS, as the “School of Application,” was the first of the Marine Corps Schools to be established, it is helpful to understand why it was founded. Colonel Commandant Charles Heywood foresaw how promotion examinations would create a need for officers schools. What some have called the “Age of Professionalism” was ushering in a new desire for codification and consistency of knowledge within a variety of communities, such as medicine and law. The military was no exception. Though it took longer for American military services to implement the ideas espoused by “professionalism,” this was due to the inability of the political leadership of the country to achieve unity of purpose, and not because military thinkers failed to see the importance of professional education. Beginning with the Army’s
Command and General Staff School, between 1880 and 1900 schools at every level were established and began a long process of systematizing professional military education in the United States. The Marines were the only service that established a school for junior officers at a *basic* level. They are still the only service with a dedicated basic course, required for all newly commissioned lieutenants. By understanding the purpose of the institution dating to the 1890s, we can then properly analyze whether the interwar school was living up to the founders’ ideals.

Finally, chapter one attempted to place the Basic School in context among the broad array of PME institutions in the United States, and then in the history of PME itself. Not only is TBS part of the Marine Corps’ professional military education system, that larger organization itself does not exist in a vacuum. Understanding the origins of PME, going as far back at the Napoleonic era, is key to understanding why military schools exist and what factors influence their development. In the case of the Marine Corps, this study had argued that the land-sea combination which has always defined the organization led the Marines to “watch and see” with regard to education. They carefully observed and imitated the Army and Navy efforts, rather than striking out on their own.

The question was asked, “Does the Basic School teach ethos?” It does not. The existence of the school itself is the ethos. The ability of a Marine today to reach back across more than 100 years and assert “Ben Fuller completed this course,” “this is how Chesty Puller learned tactics,” or “this is where Wesley Fox practiced patrolling” is powerful. Some errors or myths have been mentioned during the course of this study. None of them were existential. Correcting the record does not lessen the impact of TBS as an institution. Indeed this study has shown that during the interwar period, which was formative for the entire officer corps of World War II, the Basic School perpetuated and enhanced a preexisting tradition of professional education. That same tradition would be recalled and renewed after World War II.
Appendix A: Biographical Notes on Instructors

William Wallace Ashurst served as an instructor at The Basic School from June 1928 until December 1929. He was born in 1893 at Green Ridge, Missouri and attended the Wentworth Military Academy. He also attended Northwestern University at Evanston, Illinois, for two years. He joined the Marine Corps Reserve in 1917 and received an appointment as a Second Lieutenant on September 24th of that year. He did not attend The Basic School as a student. Ashurst was awarded a Silver Star and the French Croix de Guerre for “bravery, coolness and ability in leading his men into combat during the enemy attack” at the battle in Belleau Wood. He did not serve any tours in South America or the Caribbean, making him nearly unique among the interwar staff at TBS. However, he was heavily involved in the inception, development, and training of USMC competitive shooting teams, first competing as an individual marksman before joining the Marine team. He eventually coached the USMC National Rifle Team. From 1920-1927 he served at various stateside Marine Barracks. Ashurst left competitive shooting to attend the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, and completed the Company Officers Course in May, 1928. He then proceeded to The Basic School. Ashurst served in China from 1930-1933 before returning to the United States and resuming an advisory role over marksmanship training. He was the commanding officer of the Marine detachment in China when Pearl Harbor was attacked, and he spent four years as a prisoner of war in China. Ashurst was advanced to the rank of Brigadier General upon retirement and died in 1952. He did not preserve any of his personal papers, though the Marine Corps archive does maintain a file with clippings related to his time as a prisoner of war.

Merton J. Batchelder served as an instructor at The Basic School from 1932-1935. Batchelder was born in Massachusetts in 1896 and attended public schools but did not go to college. His career began as an enlisted Marine, and he served in the Virgin Islands from 1917-1918 before going to France with the 13th Regiment. While in France he was appointed a Second Lieutenant, in August 1918, and served in France as an officer for one additional year. He did not attend The Basic School as a student. His first experience with “small wars” was in Santo Domingo, from December 1919 until April 1922. While a First Lieutenant, Batchelder attended the new “Company Officers’ Course” during the Marine Corps Schools’ first year of operation at Quantico, Virginia. Batchelder did not attend the Infantry School at Fort Benning. Instead, he completed tours at Quantico, Parris Island, Hawaii, Guantanamo Bay, Marine

1. William W. Ashurst Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
Barracks Washington, and China. After all of these assignments was Batchelder’s tour as an instructor at The Basic School, while he was a Captain (O-3). He served sea duty after finishing at The Basic School and would later become famous for valor at Tinian during World War II. Merton J. Batchelder retired as a Brigadier General in 1949. Batchelder did not preserve any of his personal papers.²

William Putnam Battell served as an instructor at The Basic School from 1936-1937. He was born in 1906 in Iowa and attended Iowa State University. He did not graduate, but instead enlisted in the Marines in 1927. He worked as a radioman and then served as an instructor at the Naval Radio Materiel School in Maryland. He was selected from the ranks and attended Officer Candidate School. He attended The Basic School as a student in 1930-1931. His only overseas duty was to China (1932) and aboard the USS Saratoga (1933). Battell completed the Army Signal School course in 1936 and went immediately to Philadelphia to serve on the instructor staff at The Basic School. He left TBS in 1937 and did two sea duty tours before returning to Philadelphia and working as the Signal Supply Officer at the Depot of Supplies (then the primary East Coast logistics base). He served as the pacific fleet supply services director during World War II, and retired as a Major General. Battell preserved a large number of photographs pertaining to Nicaragua and the Pacific War, but unfortunately none of his personal records were kept.³

Bayard L. Bell served as an instructor at the Basic School from February 1927 until February 1928. His name appears among the students at Quantico in 1922 for the “special course” in preparation for examination. Unfortunately, no record of his Marine Corps service exists other than the muster rolls for his presence at Philadelphia and Quantico during those years.

Joseph Howard Berry served as an instructor at The Basic School from June 1939 until July 1942. He was born in Los Angeles, California, in 1906 and attended the United States Naval Academy, graduating in 1929. He received his commission in July, 1929, and attended The Basic School as a student in 1929-1930. He was designated an aviation cadet while at The

². Merton J. Batchelder Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

Basic School and received some flight training after completing the course in Philadelphia before reporting to his first duty station in Nicaragua. He returned to the United States in early 1933 and completed flight training. He also served a tour of sea duty. Berry attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning in 1938-1939 and then reported to The Basic School as an instructor. He served as aide to the Commandant during most of the war, then as G-4 (logistics) for the Fourth Marine Division during the Iwo Jima assault. He was advanced to the rank of Brigadier General upon retirement, in recognition of his combat service during World War II. Berry retained a very large collection of personal papers for his entire career, including certificates, photographs, orders, handouts, correspondence, and decorations.  

Dudley Brown served as an instructor at The Basic School from 1932-1934. He was born in 1895 and attended the University of Arizona. Brown received a commission as a Second Lieutenant in 1917, at the beginning of the Marine Corps’ efforts to grow the officer corps in preparation for war. Brown served as a member of the 11th Regiment from 1918-1919. His “small wars” experience included Santo Domingo and Nicaragua. He also served a tour of sea duty. Brown did attend the Infantry School at Fort Benning (1931-1932) and reported directly from Fort Benning to his instructor’s billet at The Basic School. His official biography specifically states that he attended the “Company Officers’ Course” while at Fort Benning. After TBS, he went on to attend the Army’s Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, and was an instructor at the Marine Corps Schools in the “operations” department. He served as an operations officer for a variety of units during World War II, and served on the staff of the National War College after the war. His final active duty billet was as Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico. Brown retired as a Major General in 1950. Brown kept no personal papers.  

Lee Hoxie Brown graduated from George Washington University in Washington, DC in 1916 as a Bachelor of Laws. He received a reserve commission in 1917, and moved to active status in September of that year. Brown served in Haiti and Nicaragua during the 1920s and completed a tour of sea duty aboard the USS Pennsylvania. In 1919 he joined the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe where he held the temporary rank of Captain. Brown was a

4. Joseph Howard Berry Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA. Also the Joseph Berry Personal Papers (COLL/3A11) at Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

5. Dudley S. Brown Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
Major when he served on the staff of TBS, from June 1933 until August 1936. Brown was the second-in-command for most of his tour at TBS, and often served as “acting director” while the commanding officer was absent. He attended the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico after completing his instructor billet at TBS, and served as Commanding Officer of the Transient Center, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, an administrative command responsible for both deploying replacement troops and rotating combat veterans back home. Brown retired in 1949. He kept no personal papers.  

Melvin G. Brown served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1939-1941. He was born in Ohio in December 1905. He graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1929 and proceeded immediately to the Basic School at Philadelphia. After completing TBS he was stationed in Guam, Haiti, and China. He attended both the Army Signal School and the Company Officers’ Course at Quantico before returning to TBS as an instructor. Brown held a variety of senior staff billets during World War II and completed advanced schools for logistics and supply after the war. He was serving as the commanding officer of the 3rd Service Regiment, 3rd Marine Division in Japan when he suffered a heart attack and died in 1955. He was promoted to Brigadier General posthumously, having been selected for that rank a few months prior to his death. Brown kept no personal papers.

Daniel Earle Campbell served as an instructor at The Basic School from 1926-1927. He attended St. John’s College in Annapolis, Maryland in 1908. He was commissioned in December, 1916. His foreign service included Haiti, Nicaragua, the Virgin Islands, Panama, and France. He served at The Basic School from 1926-1927. He retired in September, 1946, as a Colonel. There are no extant records of Campbell’s World War II service, but a Maryland register of “military men” lists the Order of St. Sava among his decorations. The award was given for military excellence or valor by the Yugoslavian government between 1910-1948, so Campbell might have been among the few Marines who served alongside the OSS in eastern

6. Lee Hoxie Brown Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

7. Melvin G. Brown Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

8. At the time St. John’s was a military school and actually pioneered the concept of a Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps on their campus. In the 1920s interest in the program waned and it was dropped. Today Johnnies are known for being not of the same ideological mind as their Midshipmen neighbors.
Europe. He kept no personal papers, and no entity at the Marine Corps Historical Division has a record with further detail on his service.⁹

Kenneth B. Chappell served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1938-1941. He attended TBS as a student in 1924. Chappell had several sea duty tours, as well as service in Cuba, China, and Nicaragua. Before serving as an instructor at TBS he was on the staff of the Signal Battalion (school) at Quantico. He also attended the Company Officers’ Course in 1935-36. During World War II he commanded the 1st Regiment, 1st Marine Division on Okinawa. Chappell died in 1985. He kept no personal papers.¹⁰

David K. Claude was an instructor at The Basic School from January 1936 until June 1937. He was born at Annapolis, Maryland, in 1903 and attended the United States Naval Academy but did not graduate. Instead, he enlisted in the Marines after three years at the Academy, spending time in Santo Domingo. He completed the candidates class at Marine Barracks, Washington, DC in order to receive his commission as a Second Lieutenant in 1925. He attended The Basic School from June-December 1925. He served in Cuba, Nicaragua, and on sea duty before his billet as an instructor at The Basic School. Claude was promoted to Captain halfway through his time on the TBS staff, and attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning immediately after serving as an instructor at TBS. Then-Major Claude was killed in action in 1943. No personal papers were preserved by his family or the Marine Corps.

Lenard Baker Cresswell served as an instructor at The Basic School from July 1936 until April 1939. He was born in Mississippi in 1901. He attended public schools and graduated from the Tupelo Military Institute (preparatory school) in 1919. His undergraduate degree was from Mississippi Agricultural and Military (A&M) College. Cresswell attended The Basic School in 1924, immediately after receiving his commission as a Second Lieutenant. He was assigned an instructor’s billet at the Infantry Weapons School in Quantico after completing TBS. He served in China and on sea duty, but did not participate in the “small wars” mission in the Caribbean, other than the 1935 fleet maneuvers. He did attend and complete the “Senior Course” (Field


¹⁰. Kenneth Baldwin Chappell Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
Officers Course) at Quantico in 1933. Cresswell received the Navy Cross for actions on Guadalcanal, and retired as a Major General in 1956. He kept no personal papers.

Charles F. Cresswell served as an instructor at The Basic School from June 1936 until April 1939. Cresswell was born in Wisconsin in April, 1900. In his high school yearbook, he was listed as “deserving a medal” for “cramming.” He graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1924 and attended the Basic School as a student that same year. He attended the Army Signal School at Fort Monmouth in 1928. His other operational experience prior to becoming an instructor was in Nicaragua, Guam, aboard the USS California, and at various Marine Barracks. Cresswell was the only TBS instructor during the interwar period to serve on a department-level staff prior to his instructor billet, working in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations in 1928-1929. Cresswell retired as a Colonel in 1946, and died in 1948. He kept no personal papers.

Raymond F. Crist, Jr. served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1939-1941. He was born in Maryland in 1908 and graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1929. He attended TBS as a student from 1929-1930. Crist served two tours in China and multiple tours of sea duty during his early career. His shore duty included service with the 10th Marine Regiment (artillery) at Quantico, and he attended the US Army’s field artillery school at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in 1936. After his instructor assignment at TBS, Crist returned to Oklahoma to complete the artillery Field Officers’ Course. He served as executive officer of the 12th Marine Regiment (artillery) during the campaigns for Bougainville and Guam. He commanded the regiment from January 1945 until the end of the Iwo Jima campaign. After the war he held a variety of staff billets, retiring in 1955 at the rank of Brigadier General. He kept no personal papers.

Merritt B. Curtis served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1931 until 1934. He was born in California in August 1892, and attended the University of California. He attended TBS as a student from 1929-1930. Curtis served two tours in China and multiple tours of sea duty during his early career. His shore duty included service with the 10th Marine Regiment (artillery) at Quantico, and he attended the US Army’s field artillery school at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in 1936. After his instructor assignment at TBS, Curtis returned to Oklahoma to complete the artillery Field Officers’ Course. He served as executive officer of the 12th Marine Regiment (artillery) during the campaigns for Bougainville and Guam. He commanded the regiment from January 1945 until the end of the Iwo Jima campaign. After the war he held a variety of staff billets, retiring in 1955 at the rank of Brigadier General. He kept no personal papers.


13. Raymond F. Crist, Jr., Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
James E. Davis served as an instructor at the Basic School for only two months, August-September 1928. Davis was born in Virginia in 1894 and received his commission as a Second Lieutenant in 1916. Davis received temporary promotions to First Lieutenant and Captain in 1918 and 1919, but did not serve in France during the “emergency” wartime period which created the need for his promotions. Instead, he remained in the Dominican Republic throughout the Great War, serving as detachment commander at multiple locations. He was given a permanent commission as a Captain in October, 1919. Davis was among the earliest pilots training by the Marine Corps, attending flight training for naval cadets in the summer of 1920. He served in Nicaragua after flight school. Before his time at the Basic School he also attended the Air Corps Tactical School at Langley Field, Virginia. His first assignment after TBS was as squadron commander in Haiti. David, then a Lieutenant Colonel, was killed in a plane crash in New Mexico in October, 1935. No personal papers were kept by his family or the Marine Corps.  

Harold O. Deakin served as an instructor at the Basic School from June 1940 until the beginning of World War II. He was present as a student in 1934-1935. Deakin was born in Salt Lake City, Utah, in 1913 and attended the United States Naval Academy. After graduating from the Academy in 1935 he immediately attended TBS. Deakin completed sea duty and a tour at the Marine Barracks Newport, Rhode Island, before attending the Company Officers’ Course at Quantico in 1939. June 1940 was the beginning of a two-year assignment to Philadelphia as an instructor. He would serve in Europe as an observer of the Italian and North African campaigns for one year, before going to the Pacific in command of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines. He retired in 1957 and was promoted to Brigadier General. Deakin kept no personal papers but did sit for an interview with the oral historian at Marine Corps Historical Division.  

14. James E. Davis Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

15. Harold O. Deakin Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
Louis DeHaven served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1931 until 1935. He was born in Delaware in May, 1894. He attended public schools and received his commission as a Second Lieutenant in 1917. He served in France, as well as China, Guam, and Santo Domingo. He was commended for his service with the National Rifle Team in 1923 and 1936. Dehaven kept no personal papers. Dehaven commanded the 14th Marine Regiment (Artillery) during the Iwo Jima campaign. He kept no personal papers.\(^\text{16}\)

Stephen Francis Drew served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1924 until 1927. During much of his time there he was one of only four or five staff members. He was born in 1886 in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Drew enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1907 and served for a decade before taking the examination for Second Lieutenant. He accepted temporary appointments to Second Lieutenant, First Lieutenant, and Captain during July 1917 but did not retain those ranks. In 1919, he accepted an appointment as Marine Gunner instead. There is no record of why he returned to the ranks, but in 1921 he accepted a permanent appointment to the rank of Captain. In 1924 he joined the staff of the Basic School. Drew attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning immediately after his instructor billet. Drew retired in 1936 but was reactivated during World War II. He kept no personal papers.\(^\text{17}\)

Merritt B. Edson was an instructor from September 1929 until May 1931. He was born in Vermont in 1897 and attended the University of Vermont for two years. In 1916, Edson enlisted in the Vermont National Guard and was sent to the Texas/Mexico border for duty. He served in Texas for only three months before returning to University, but joined the Marine Corps Reserve as an enlisted man in June 1917. He was given a regular commission as a Second Lieutenant in October 1917. The Basic School was closed during these years and Edson did not attend. Instead, he went to France with the 11th Marine Regiment but did not see combat. He returned to the United States and served on the staff of the new Marine Corps Institute, on mail guard duty, at military flight school, and on sea duty. He also served in Guam and Nicaragua. Edson attended the Company Officers’ Course at Quantico before being promoted to Captain. When he began his staff billet at TBS he was assigned as “tactics instructor”. Throughout his career he

\(^{16}\) Louis Glass DeHaven Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

\(^{17}\) Stephen F. Drew Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
was famous for coaching the Marine Corps marksmanship team and was credited with making marksmanship a central part of training for all Marines. He would become famous for his raider unit during World War II, receiving the Medal of Honor at Guadalcanal in 1942. Edson retired in 1947 as a Major General. Edson’s collection of personal papers only pertained to his World War I and II service, and his connection to the “Marine Raiders” which he helped develop.

Graves Blanchard Erskine served as an instructor at the Basic School from June 1930 until August 1932. He did not attend TBS as a student. Erskine was born in Louisiana in 1897. He attended the Louisiana State University and graduated in 1916. He received a commission as Second Lieutenant in 1917 and went to France with the American Expeditionary Force. He was awarded a Silver Star for action at S. Mihiel. After the First World War he served in Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua. He attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning in 1925-26 and served on the staff of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico in 1926-27. After his tour at TBS he returned to serve on the staff of the Marine Corps Schools again. Erskine preserved many papers about the various schools, including several sets of teaching notes from the Basic School. The papers he kept do not correspond to the years during which he taught at TBS, but with his second tour at MCS as an instructor there. This suggests that the two schools maintained close contact, and that the parent command at MCS had some input into the course content at the Basic School. During World War II Erskine commanded the 5th Amphibious Corps and 3rd Marine Division. His interest in education led him to organize “vocational schools” on Guam, his final duty station during the war, so that Marines preparing to return to civilian life could develop useful trades and skills. Erskine retired in 1953 and was advanced to the rank of General. His personal collection of documents was key in the development of this paper.

Edward E. Fellowes served as an instructor at the Basic School from August 1927 until July 1928. He was a graduate of Yale University (1918). Fellowes’ personnel file is missing, but he published two articles in the Marine Corps Gazette about USMC involvement in Santo Domingo, so his presence there as a subordinate officer to Lieutenant Colonel Presley Rixey is

18. Merritt B. Edson Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

19. Graves B. Erskine Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA; Graves B. Erskine Personal Papers, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA.
known. Fellowes retired as a Major and died in California in 1946. He kept no personal papers.\textsuperscript{20}

Walfried H. Fromhold served as an instructor at the Basic School from May 1938 until January 1941. He was born in New York in 1907 and graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1930. Prior to his appointment to the Academy, he served on active duty as an apprentice seaman for one year. He attended TBS as a student in 1930-31. Fromhold began flight training early in his career, spending 1932 in Hampton Roads, Virginia, and Pensacola, Florida, at navy pilot schools. He then served a tour in China and the Philippines. Fromhold attended the Company Officers’ Course at Quantico in 1937-38, immediately before reporting to the Basic School. During World War II he served in staff and support billets in 1942-43 before being promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. After promotion he received command of the 22nd Marine Regiment and led that unit through the Marshall Islands and Guam campaigns. He retired in 1948 and was advanced to the rank of Brigadier General. Fromhold died in 1996 in California. He kept no personal papers.\textsuperscript{21}

Frank Goettge served as an instructor at the Basic School from June 1938 until January 1941. He was born in Canton, Ohio, in 1895 and attended Ohio University in 1916-1917. In 1917 he left the University and enlisted as a private in the Marine Corps. He was appointed a provisional Second Lieutenant one year later. Goettge went to France with the 5th Marine Regiment and served for one year there. He also served in Haiti and China. Goettge was a senior Major while at TBS, so he had completed both the Company Officers’ and Field Officers’ Courses at Quantico prior to his arrival at Philadelphia. He also attended the Army’s motor transport school. He had served as a White House aide and on the Headquarters, Marine Corps, staff. He also coached the USMC football team for a number of years. Goettge is well known for his role in leading a combat patrol on Guadalcanal which was ambushed and all but three members were killed—the patrol became famous due to postwar controversy about the failure of the Marine Corps to recover the bodies of the fallen, including Goettge. Personal papers preserved by the Marine Corps pertaining to Goettge are all in relation to his Guadalcanal patrol, and to his great fame in the 1920s and early 1930s as a star football player.\textsuperscript{22}


\textsuperscript{21} Walfried Fromhold Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

\textsuperscript{22} Frank B. Goettge Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps
Chester B. Graham served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1935-1938. He was born in New York in 1904 and attended the United States Naval Academy. After graduation from the Academy in 1926 he was commissioned a Second Lieutenant and immediately proceeded to the Basic School in Philadelphia. He served in China and Nicaragua during his early career. Graham attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning immediately prior to his tour as an instructor at TBS. During World War II he was an observer in the European theatre. He was advanced to the rank of Brigadier General upon retirement, and died in 1961. He kept no personal papers.23

Roy M. Gulick served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1937-1940. He was born in Pennsylvania in 1904 and attended the United States Naval Academy. After graduation from the Academy in 1926 he immediately proceeded to TBS as a student. He served in Nicaragua and China as well as on sea duty during his early career. He completed the Company Officers’ Course at Quantico immediately prior to joining the staff at TBS. Gulick may have had special training in finance, as he served as paymaster to several Marine Corps installations during World War II and immediately afterward. He did not hold a combat command during the war. He was promoted to Brigadier General in 1954, and Major General in 1958 at which time he was named Quartermaster General of the Marine Corps. He retired from that billet in 1960 after 34 years of active service. He kept no personal papers.24

Harold Harris served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1935-37. He was born in Wyoming in 1903 and attended the United States Naval Academy. After graduating from the Academy in 1925 he attended TBS as a student during one of the “short courses” soon after the school moved to Philadelphia. His early career tours included sea duty, China, and Nicaragua. Harris attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning immediately prior to his tour as instructor at the Basic School. When he left Philadelphia, it was to report to the École Superieure de Guerre in Paris as a student. He was still on duty in Europe when hostilities began in 1939, and he

History Division, Quantico, VA.

23. Chester B. Graham Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

24. Roy Gulick Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
received a commendation from the American ambassador in Paris for his help evacuating the American nationals in France at the time. He served as an instructor at the Army and Navy Staff College (Washington, DC) after World War II. Harris was advanced to the rank of Brigadier General upon retirement in 1949. He kept no personal papers.\textsuperscript{25}

Harold Hayder served as an instructor at the Basic School in 1926-27. Though his name appears consistently in the muster rolls for all twelve months of his stay there, no additional record of his service could be found. His name does not appear in the Register of Commissioned and Warrant Officers for 1926 or any other year.

John R. Henley served as the commanding officer of the Basic School from 1924-26, during the first years at Philadelphia. While an instructor at Quantico in 1922, Henley was listed among the staff of the “department of law”. When he arrived at Philadelphia, he checked in directly from the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Henley first appeared on the Register of Commissioned and Warrant Officers in 1906, and had retired by 1936. He kept personal papers pertaining to service in Haiti in 1927, after his time at the Basic School, and a photograph of the Marine Barracks at Bremerton, Washington, from 1909 indicating he may have been stationed there. No other records about his service have been preserved.\textsuperscript{26}

George L. Hollett served as an instructor at the Basic School in 1924-25. He was born in Illinois in 1885 and enlisted in the Marine Corps in June, 1918. He received a commission as a Second Lieutenant in December, 1918, indicating that he had some higher education, though where and when is not chronicled in his personnel file. Hollett served in Santo Domingo during World War I, and did two tours of sea duty. In 1922 he reported to Quantico for the Company Officers’ Course, and records indicate that he took the class two times. Records for the Marine Corps Schools suggest that the course was briefly structured like the courses held by the Army at Fort Leavenworth, which were split into two years, with less experienced officers completing both years and more experienced officers only taking the “second half” of the course. Hollett may have been one of those who did the course under the two-part plan. He died in 1948 as a Lieutenant Colonel. Orders and information on his duty assignments were donated to the Marine

\textsuperscript{25} Harold Harris Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

\textsuperscript{26} John R. Henley Personal Papers, Archives Branch, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, VA; Muster Rolls of the USMC.
Corps Archives, helping create a picture of the typical career arc and training assignments of a Marine officer of this era.\(^{27}\)

Marcellus J. Howard served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1938 until 1940. He would go on to become known for helping establish and train the first Airborne units in the Marine Corps. His personnel file is missing and he kept no personal papers.\(^{28}\)

Norman Hussa served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1937 until 1938. Along with fellow TBS instructor Harold Deakin, Hussa served as an observer in Europe during the Salerno campaign. When stationed in the Pacific, he served as executive officer for the 7th Marine Regiment at Peleliu. His personal papers collection included only a copy of his observer’s report from Salerno.\(^{29}\)

Gilder Jackson served as the commanding officer of the Basic School from 1937-1940. He was born in Delaware in 1893 and attended the Wenonah Military Academy. He joined the Marine Corps in 1917 and was decorated multiple times for action in France. He remained in Germany with the Army of Occupation until 1919. He served sea duty, recruiting duty, and in China and Haiti during his early career. He was in command of the Marine Barracks at Pearl Harbor in 1941, and fought on Guadalcanal after the initial invasion there. Because of combat service he was advanced to the rank of Brigadier General upon retirement in 1946. He died in California in 1966.\(^{30}\)

Blythe Gold Jones served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1932-35. He was born in Pennsylvania in 1891 and received a degree in mechanical engineering from the Drexel Institute, also in Pennsylvania. He enlisted in the National Guard in 1916 and served for a year before being given a Reserve commission in the Marine Corps, as a second lieutenant. He was honorably discharged in 1919 but received a permanent commission in 1921. He served in Santo

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27. George Lyon Hollett Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA,


29. Norman J. Hussa Personal Papers Collection, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

30. Gilder Jackson Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
Domingo in 1919 and 1922; and in China in 1927 and 1932. He also completed several sea duty tours. Jones, then a Colonel, was stationed at Pearl Harbor at the beginning of World War II, and was reported missing in action in May, 1943. There are no personnel records relating to him other than a biographical statement released with his MIA announcement.31

Russell Jordahl served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1936-39. He was born in Minnesota in 1903. He attended the Iowa State University before joining the United States Naval Academy’s class of 1926. Upon graduation from the Academy he attended TBS as a student in 1926-27. Jordahl served in Haiti, Nicaragua, and China in his early career. He attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning in 1935-36, immediately before joining the staff at the Basic School. Jordahl was highly decorated during both World War II and the Korean War, retiring as a brigadier general in 1957.32

Howard N. Kenyon served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1936-38. He was born in Oklahoma in 1898. He attended the Oklahoma Agricultural and Military College briefly before attending the United States Naval Academy. He graduated from the Academy in 1921 and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant. Kenyon was the only TBS instructor to serve on the “mail guard duty” during the early 1920s, when the Marines were used to discourage thefts from U.S. Mail trains crossing the continent. Also stateside, he served as a drill instructor at the recruit depot at Parris Island. He was a company commander in both Haiti and Nicaragua. He completed three tours of sea duty. Kenyon was responsible for courses in topography and mapmaking while an instructor at the Basic School. His students referred to him as “Quack Quack” due to his distinctive, gravelly voice. During World War II he held staff billets until September 1944, and he commanded the 9th Marine Regiment at Iwo Jima. Kenyon was apparently interested in history and continuing education. He wrote a “family history” of the Kenyons in which a stern preface admonished anyone who included “hagiographic” accounts in their family histories, instead of sticking to the facts. From 1946-1949 he served as the “Officer in Charge” of the Historical Division. Kenyon retired as a Brigadier General in 1951, and died in 1958. He kept no personal papers, but his name appears in several sets of archived papers from his time as the director of Historical Division. His career record does not indicate when, but

31. Blythe Gold Jones Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

32. Russell N. Jordahl Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA; Coronado Eagle and Journal, No.30 (July 25, 1957), Coronado, California.
before retirement he completed law school and was admitted to the Bar in Virginia and Oklahoma, as well as the Maryland Court of Appeals, the U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone (Panama), and U.S. Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{33}

Robert C. Kilmartin, Jr. served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1925-27. He was born in Virginia in 1896. Kilmartin began service in the Marine Corps while still a college student, receiving a temporary commission as Second Lieutenant in 1917. He received temporary advancements to First Lieutenant and Captain in 1918-19 and was assigned to the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy. He attended George Washington University in Washington, DC. He completed a law degree at George Washington and began postgraduate work in international law in 1920-21. During that era, typical study for a bachelor of law was 3-4 years so Kilmartin likely undertook studies during most of the time he was stationed in and around Washington, DC. In 1921 he was detached to Santo Domingo and remained on duty there for two years. He worked as aide to Brigadier General Dion Williams from 1924-25, in Quantico. General Williams was a well-known lecturer who played a significant role in the development of the “Advanced Base Force” concept in the Marine Corps. Kilmartin completed the Company Officers’ Course while he was stationed at Quantico. He went directly from Quantico to his assignment at TBS. Between then and World War II, he served in Nicaragua, Cuba, on sea duty, completed the Field Officers’ Course at Quantico, and returned to the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy. He served in a combat role at Guadalcanal and the Solomon Islands. His remaining wartime billets were on Division and Fleet Marine Force staffs. Kilmartin retired in 1949 and was advanced to the rank of Brigadier General in recognition of wartime service. He kept no personal papers, but the Marine Corps Schools collection retained two lectures he delivered while at Quantico.\textsuperscript{34}

John R. Lanigan served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1939-1941. He was born in Washington, DC, in 1902. He attended the University of Maryland and graduated in 1926. He immediately proceeded to Philadelphia and attended TBS as a student from 1926-27. He was a member of the “all-Marine” football team and was briefly stationed at Quantico in order to participate in the team’s activities. His nickname while on the football team was “the fighting Irishman.” During his early career he also served in Nicaragua and China. He was

\textsuperscript{33} Howar\textsuperscript{D} N. Keyon, Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

\textsuperscript{34} Robert C. Kilmartin, Jr., Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
selected for aviation training but was not able to complete the assignment due to illness. He served a sea duty tour aboard the USS California. Lanigan completed the Company Officers’ Course at Quantico immediately prior to joining the staff at TBS. During World War II he was decorated for heroism as the commanding officer of the 25th Marine Regiment at Iwo Jima. After the war he served as commanding officer of the Marine Barracks at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and as Chief of Staff at Parris Island. Lanigan was advanced to the rank of Brigadier General at his retirement in 1957. He kept personal papers pertaining to the Iwo Jima campaign, and two photographs. One photograph showed him along with other combat commanders at Saipan in 1944. The other is a photograph of the Basic School class of 1926-27, with members of the class identified in pen. Lanigan’s classmates included future Commandant of the Marine Corps David M. Shoup, and two members of the TBS staff from the late 1930s.  

Harry B. Liversedge served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1936-38. He was born in 1894 in California. He attended the University of California at Berkeley and participated in track and field events. He enlisted as a private in Marine Corps in 1917 and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in 1918. He went to France with the Fifth Brigade and was promoted to First Lieutenant while overseas. After returning to the United States in 1919, he was assigned to Quantico, Santo Domingo, and Quantico again in quick succession. He was well-known as a football player during his early career. He also participated in the 1920 Olympic Games at Antwerp, earning a bronze medal in track and field events. He then served in Haiti. He participated in the 1924 Olympic Games, and later that year went to Quantico to complete the Company Officers’ Course. After completing it, Liversedge was stationed in China where he coached the boxing team and participated in international sports competitions. He served a tour of sea duty before returning to Quantico to complete the Field Officers’ Course. He began his time on the TBS staff in June, 1936, and was promoted to Major in July. He fought with the Marine Raider battalion at New Georgia during World War II, receiving a Navy Cross. He commanded the 28th Marine Regiment at Iwo Jima and was awarded his second Navy Cross for action there. He was promoted to Brigadier General in 1948 and died on active duty in 1951. He kept no personal papers but is featured prominently in Marine Corps historical collections related to military sports teams and competitive athletics in the early twentieth century.  

35. Jon R. Lanigan Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA; John R. Lanigan Personal Paper Collection, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.  

36. Harry Bluett Liversedge Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
Karl K. Louther served on the staff at TBS in 1936-37. He was born in Missouri in 1901 and attended the University of Michigan. He enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1925, and served two years before accepting a commission as Second Lieutenant in 1928. He attended TBS as a student in 1928-29. Louther then attended the aviation course at Hampton Roads, Virginia. He served at Parris Island, on sea duty, Mare Island (California), and was a distinguished marksman on the Marine Corps pistol team. Immediately after his tour on the Basic School staff, he proceeded to China. He was present in China during a brief combat exchange between local Chinese and American forces, and Japanese troops who had entered the area. Louther returned to the United States to take the Company Officers’ Course, and stayed at Quantico as a member of the schools staff after completing the course. During World War II he served as a courier pilot for special confidential documents. He later worked on the planning staff for the Sixth Marine Division. After the war he attended the National War College. Louther kept no personal papers and a complete record of his career is missing. Death records indicate Louther was a Brigadier General at the time of his death, which may have been a promotion granted at retirement in recognition of combat service.37

Louis E. Marie, Jr., served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1938-40. He was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in 1897. He graduated from the United States Naval Academy and received a commission as Second Lieutenant in the Marines in 1920. He served in China and the Philippines, as well as multiple tours of sea duty. From 1936-38 he studied at the *Ecole Superieure de Guerre* in Paris, France. His service record is missing, but his personal papers collection contains a biographical statement from November, 1942, and an official photo of him at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.38

Andrew J. Matheisen served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1938-40. He was born in 1903 in California and graduated from the University of California in 1925. He attended TBS as a student in 1925-26. His early career included tours of sea duty, service in China, and time coaching and participating with the Marine Corps marksmanship team. He attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning immediate prior to his tour on the TBS staff. While on the staff at the Basic School he completed the Naval War College’s correspondence course in international law. Mathiesen left the Basic School to take a billet with the 4th Marine Regiment

37. Karl K. Louther Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

38. Louis Marie, Jr., Personal Papers Collection, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
in the Philippines, where he was promoted to Major in 1941. He was captured by the Japanese and died while a prisoner of war, sometime in 1943. Mathiesen’s name is prominent in several memoirs of prisoners of war, but no additional official record of his service was kept.  

Charles A. Miller served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1940-41. His service record is missing and he kept no personal papers.

Robert M. Montague served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1926-28. He was born in Virginia in 1892 and graduated from the University of Virginia. He enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserves in 1917 and received an appointment as a Second Lieutenant in October of that year. Montague was decorated for valor during the Meuse-Argonne offensive, receiving the Navy Cross and Distinguished Service Cross. He was discharged in 1919 and left the Marine Corps. In 1921 he accepted a reappointment and served on the staff at Headquarters, Marine Corps, for one year. He then completed a tour of sea duty aboard the USS Pittsburgh. Montague returned to France briefly in 1923 to command the Marine Detachment participating in dedicated ceremonies for memorial at Belleau Woods. He then attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning from 1925-26. After completing his tour at the Basic School he went to China, Haiti, and back to France. He attended advanced schools in Paris and served as an exchange officer with several French army units. During World War II he served on the staff of the Naval War College and on planning staffs for the Fifth Amphibious Corps and First Marine Division. Montague wrote a memoir for his children, which was preserved among his personal papers. Other items in his collection included documents describing his World War training, which took place at Quantico. Montague retired as a Brigadier General in 1946. He maintained an interest in historical artefacts and preservation, serving as superintendent of Gunston Hall, home of George Mason, during the 1950s and 60s. He died in 1972.

Clifton R. Moss served as an instructor at the Basic School from June 1939 until January 1941. He attended TBS as a student in 1931-32. His service record is missing and he kept no personal papers.


40. Robert Latane Montague Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA; Robert L. Montague Personal Papers Collection, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
John Dwight Muncie served as an instructor at the Basic School in 1935 and 1936. He was born in Illinois in 1900 and attended the University of Illinois. He received his commission as a second lieutenant in 1923. He reported to Quantico immediately, but his name does not appear among students for the “basic course” which was held there that year. He participated in exercises with the East Coast Expeditionary Force in late 1923. He attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning after his tour as an instructor at TBS. He was serving as executive officer for the 5th Marine Regiment at Okinawa when his service record ends. He kept no personal papers.

Ellsworth Murray served as an instructor at the Basic School from June 1939 until the school closed in 1942. He served with the 4th Marine Division Staff during World War II. He kept no personnel papers.

Leslie F. Narum served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1937-40. He was born in 1903 in Iowa. He attended the Agricultural College of North Dakota and participated in that institution’s R.O.T.C. program. Narum received a second lieutenant’s commission in 1925. He attended TBS as a student in 1925-26 alongside fellow instructors Andrew Mathiesen and David Claude. Narum’s service record is missing and no personal papers were preserved. In 1948 he was court-martialed and ejected from the Marine Corps on charges of misuse of U.S. government funds. The conviction was upheld by the U.S. Court of Claims in Washington, DC, in 1960. Narum was a Colonel at the time of his dismissal.41

Nels H. Nelson served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1934-36. He was born in South Dakota in 1903 and attended both Dakota Wesleyan University and the United States Naval Academy. Upon graduation from the Academy he accepted a commission as a second lieutenant in 1926. He attended TBS as a student in 1927-28 for only a half year. He served in China and Nicaragua in the late 1920s. In 1931 he attended the Army Signal School at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. He then served in Haiti as the “officer in charge” of the Haitian government’s radio, telephone, and international communications systems. He then joined the staff of the Basic School. After his tour at TBS he completed the Company Officers’ Course at Quantico. He then returned to China, where he was present for the active hostilities between Chinese and Japanese forces during 1938. From 1940-43 he was the officer in charge of the Signal Supply Division at Headquarters Marine Corps. From 1943 until the end of World War II he was the Signal Officer for the 1st Amphibious Corps. He commanded Marine detachments,

41. Leslie Narum Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
the 12th Marine Corps Reserve District, and the Landing Force Training Unit, Pacific. He also attended the National War College, and sat on the General Board of the Navy from 1949-1950. He was advanced to the rank of Major General upon retirement, in recognition of his combat service. He kept no personal papers.42

William Orr served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1934-37. He was born in Nevada in 1901 and attended the United States Naval Academy. After graduation from the Academy in 1922, his service record indicated he completed the “basic course” at Quantico. His name does not appear on the muster rolls for the schools detachment at Quantico during 1922 or 23. He then served in Haiti once and Nicaragua three times before 1928. He served two tours of sea duty. Orr attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning in 1933-34 immediately before joining the staff at TBS. After leaving Philadelphia he served in China. He served as an instructor at the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico until early 1941.

Roger W. Peard served as an instructor at the Basic School from June 1929 until June 1930. He was born in Iowa in 1891. His personnel record is incomplete and his educational record is missing. Peard enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1915 and served for one year before accepting a commission as Second Lieutenant. He went to France and remained there until 1919, for some time he was detached to the U.S. Army, probably participating in occupation duties. He took some courses at the Sorbonne during that time. He served in Haiti, Nicaragua, and Cuba. The final entry in his personnel file indicates that he was “missing in action” in 1943. However, his death index record indicates he died in California in 1948 and is buried at the veterans’ cemetery in San Diego. He kept no personal papers.43

Lewis B. Puller served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1936-39. One of the most famous Marines to ever live, he is one of the few instructors mentioned in histories and memoirs about the League Island era of the Basic School. Puller was born in Virginia in 1898 and attended the Virginia Military Institute. He enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1918 and was frustrated by his inability to get attached to a unit which was going overseas. He was given a commission as Second Lieutenant in 1919 but the drawdown of the Marine Corps at the same time meant he was shifted to inactive status after only ten days. Puller wanted to serve actively

42. Nels H. Nelson Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

43. Roger W. Peard Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA. See also US Social Security Death Indices.
and so he resigned the commission and reenlisted. He served in Haiti for several years. His official biography states that he attended the Basic Course at Philadelphia in 1924 but his name is not among the student lists for that year. He attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning prior to serving as an instructor at TBS. While at TBS, Puller taught courses on drill and marksmanship. He served in China between his time as an instructor at the Basic School and World War II. He held a variety of combat commands during World War II, as well as during the Korean War. He amassed a record five Navy Crosses during the course of his career. Puller’s personnel records and personal papers collections are extensive. Most of the memorabilia relates to his early career in Haiti, and to his combat commands during World War II and Korea. Puller’s own memoir does not mention his time at TBS, but many of his students from League Island mention him at length in their works.  

Samuel D. Puller served at an instructor at the Basic School from 1939-1942. He was born in Virginia in 1905 and attended St. John’s College in Annapolis, Maryland. He enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1929 and served three years before accepting a commission as Second Lieutenant. He attended TBS as a student from 1932-33. Puller served tours of sea duty and a variety of garrison billets in the continental US. He attended the Company Officers’ Course at Quantico immediately before joining the staff of the Basic School. After leaving Philadelphia he served in a variety of combat commands. He was killed in action on Guam in 1944. Puller kept no personal papers. He was the younger brother of Lewis B. Puller, but testimony from some students at the Basic School 1939-42 indicated that “their” Captain Puller figured very significantly in their experience as students, and some were even unaware that the older Puller existed.

William C. Purple served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1935-37. He was born in 1901 in Pennsylvania and attended the United States Naval Academy. He graduated from the Academy in 1924 and attended TBS as a student from 1924-25. He retired from the Marine Corps as a Colonel. He attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning in 1934-35. His personnel record is missing and no additional information about his military service could be found. He kept no personal papers.

44. Lewis B. Puller Biographical Reference Page, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA.  (https://usmcu.edu/historydivision)

45. Samuel Duncan Puller Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA.

46. See USMC Muster Rolls; Pennsylvania World War II compensation records.
William E. Riley served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1927-28. He was born in 1897 in Minnesota. He attended the College of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota, and graduated in 1917. He accepted a commission as Second Lieutenant that year and departed for France in September. Riley was decorated for action at Verdun and Aisne-Marne. After returning to the United States he served in Haiti, Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, and Cuba. During World War II he served on senior staffs before commanding the Third Marine Division. During his late career he held key billets related to the State Department and diplomatic missions, especially related to the formation of Israel. Riley retired as a Lieutenant General in 1951 and died in 1970. He kept no personal papers, but his personnel file has extensive documentation for his late career.47

Alley David Rorex served as the commanding officer of the Basic School from 1926-1930. He was the longest-serving officer at TBS during the League Island period. Rorex was born in Alabama on February 13, 1882. He joined the Marine Corps in 1909 when he accepted a commission as Second Lieutenant. Unfortunately, no official personnel records exist to document his military service. The Register of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Navy and Marine Corps indicate that he served in Haiti (1915) and Santo Domingo (1923), and he was in Quantico from 1920-1922. Rorex was a Major at the time he commanded the Basic School. In 1938 he retired from the Marine Corps as a Colonel and died in 1946. He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery. He kept no personal papers.48

Clarence Monroe Ruffner served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1927-29. He was born in Pennsylvania in 1892. His personnel file is missing and he kept no personal papers. However, census and draft records indicate that he joined the Marine Corps in 1916 or 1917, and he retired as a Major in the late 1930s. Muster Rolls for the USMC place him in Haiti prior to his TBS service, and in China afterward. Ruffner registered for the draft in 1941 (at age 50) and indicated he was “awaiting reactivation”. There is no record to indicate that he was recalled to active duty at that time. He died in 1945.49

47. William E. Riley Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA.

48. See USMC Muster Rolls, Social Security Death Indices.

49. Clarence Ruffner Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA.
Jamie Sabater served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1931-1933. He was born in Puerto Rico in 1904 and attended the College of Agriculture there, for three years. He then entered the United States Naval Academy. While at the Naval Academy he received aviation training. After graduating in 1927, he attended TBS in 1927-28. He was stationed in Nicaragua right away, then traveled to Quantico to serve as the Officer in Charge of the radio school there. Sabater served as an instructor at the Company Officers’ Course in Quantico for three months in 1930. Still a Second Lieutenant, he next returned to Philadelphia, serving as an instructor at the Basic School beginning in June 1931. Sabater is the only Second Lieutenant to serve on the staff at TBS. During World War II he was the commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment. After the war he served in China and at Headquarters Marine Corps. He was stationed in Argentina as a military advisor when he was killed in a jeep accident at 1955. He was a Colonel. Sabater kept no personal papers.\(^{50}\)

Morris L. Shively served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1936-38. He was born in 1896 and enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1917. His personnel record is missing, but the Register of Commissioned and Warrant Officers indicates that he served in Haiti and China before his time on the staff at TBS. He was known as a competitive marksman. Shively kept no personal papers.

Amor LeRoy Sims served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1935-38. He was born in 1896 in Ohio. He completed two years of college before enlisting the Marine Corps. He served during the First World War and in Nicaragua. His personnel record is missing and he kept no personal papers.\(^{51}\)

Emmett W. Skinner served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1929-30. He was born in 1894 and accepted a commission as Second Lieutenant in 1917. He had World War I service but his personnel record is missing so no further information about his military service is available. He retired in 1946 and died in 1954. He kept no personal papers.

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\(^{50}\) Jamie Sabater Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA.

\(^{51}\) See USMC Muster Rolls; Register of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the United States Navy and United States Marine Corps.
Joseph Thomas Smith served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1930-31. He was born in Livermore, California in 1895. He attended the University of California, graduating in 1917, and accepted as commission as Second Lieutenant at that time. He did not serve in France but instead went to Haiti and Guam. He completed the Company Officers’ Course at Quantico in 1922, graduating first in his class. He held a combat command at Guadalcanal and was the Chief of Staff for the Fleet Marine Force for operations at Tinian, Saipan, and Guam. He retired in 1946 as a Major General. He kept no personal papers.  

William Dulty Smith served as the commanding officer of the Basic School from 1930-34. He was born in 1883. He attended Swarthmore College until 1904 and his name appears in the records of the Phi Kappa Psi fraternity for many years as a “well known marksman” and crack pistol shot. Smith participated in the USMC marksmanship teams for a number of years. His personnel service record is missing and no additional information about his military service could be found. He retired as a Colonel, and died in 1965. He kept no personal papers.

Clate Charles Snyder served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1928-31. He was born in 1893. His personnel record is missing, but the Register of Commissioned and Warrant Officers indicates that he served in Santo Domingo at Quantico before his tour at TBS. He kept no personal papers.

Walter James Stuart served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1935-36. There is no official personnel record available for Stuart and he kept no personal papers. He was born in New Jersey in 1900 and attended the United States Naval Academy, graduating in 1924. He was among the students of the first TBS class to convene at Philadelphia (1924) but the muster roll record is incomplete. Stuart likely completed only a partial basic course, since he was an Academy graduate. Before his time as an instructor he went to Nicaragua. During World War II he was the commanding officer of the 2nd Marine Regiment and was decorated for heroism in connection with the assault on Saipan. He retired in 1949 and died in 1969.

52. Joseph Thomas Smith Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.


54. See USMC Muster Rolls; Citation for Legion of Merit Award; US Social Security Death Indices.
Gerald C. Thomas served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1932-34. He was born in Missouri in 1894 and was attending college at the start of World War I. He enlisted in the Marine Corps and fought in France in 1917-18. He was awarded the Silver Star for actions at Belleau Wood. In September, 1918, he accepted a commission as Second Lieutenant and continued to serve in France until July 1919. He served in Haiti in late 1919-1920, then was stationed at Quantico where he completed the Company Officers’ Course. He served sea duty, attended the U.S. Army Motor Transport School, commanded the transportation company at Parris Island, and then returned to Haiti all during the 1920s. In 1931 he returned to the United States and attended the Army Infantry School at Fort Benning. Thomas is the only TBS instructor to attend both the USMC Company Officers’ Course and the course at Fort Benning. Immediately after completing the Fort Benning course he joined the staff at TBS. In his memoir, Thomas expressed misgivings about serving as an instructor at the Basic School, since the assignment did not have a command component and he was “losing time” that could have been spent on active service with the Fleet. Regardless, he remained for a full two-year tour at Philadelphia before being assigned to take the Field Officers’ Course at Quantico. He then sailed for China. Thomas was a staff planner for the initial invasions of Guadalcanal and Tulagi, and was present on the islands as Chief of Staff for the 1st Marine Division. He received several decorations in conjunction with those campaigns. After World War II, Thomas commanded the Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific, until that unit was disbanded in 1949. He then commanded the 1st Marine Division during the Korean War, where he was decorated by the United States Army. He was promoted to Lieutenant General in 1952 and named Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. He retired in 1956 after a two-year tour commanding the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico. He died in 1984. General Thomas left a large collection of personal papers, most of which relate to his service in World War II and as Assistant Commandant.55

Allen H. Turnage served as the commanding officer of the Basic School from 1935-36. He was born in 1891 in North Carolina and attended the United States Naval Academy. He graduated from the Academy in 1913 and then attended the “Marine Officers’ School” (TBS) while it was located in Norfolk, Virginia. At that time, the course was 17 months long. He served in Haiti prior to World War I. In France he served as the commanding officer of the 5th Marine Regiment’s Machine Gun Battalion. After the war, he served as an instructor at the Quantico Marine Corps Schools, then returned to Haiti from 1922-25. He then returned to Quantico to complete the Field Officers’ Course. He had one tour of sea duty before being

55. Gerald Catharae Thomas Personal Papers, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA.
assigned to the Basic School as commanding officer. After his tour at TBS Turnage served in China. He commanded the new Marine Corps Base at New River (later renamed Camp Lejeune) before traveling to the Pacific to take command of the 3d Marine Division in September 1943. He was Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1944-46. His final assignment was Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. He retired in January, 1948, and was promoted to General in recognition of his combat service. He kept no personal papers.56

Merrill B. Twining served as an instructor from 1936-37. He was born in Wisconsin in 1902 and attended the United States Naval Academy. He graduated from the Academy in 1923. His official record indicates that he attended TBS at Quantico in 1923, but no record of his name appears on the muster rolls during that time period. He participated in fleet maneuvers and in China during the 1930s. From 1929-1932 he was with the Officer of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and he completed a Bachelor of Laws degree at George Washington University at that time. He participated in competitive marksmanship events throughout his early career. In July, 1935, he began a course at the Infantry School at Fort Benning. Twining likely took the “Senior Course” at Benning, unlike many of his instructor peers who attended the junior course. This is evidenced by a lengthy term paper included in the Benning archive, submitted by Twining while a student there. He joined the staff of TBS immediately after completing the course at Fort Benning. After leaving Philadelphia, he served as a company commander at Quantico and also worked on the staff of the Marine Corps Schools. He participated in fleet maneuvers in the late 1930s as well. Twining was on the staff of General Archer Vandegrift in 1941-42 and was the Assistant Operations Officer and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (operations), during the Guadalcanal campaign. Twining was one of the two officers who flew initial reconnaissance flights over the Solomons Islands. He remained on Vandegrift’s staff when the General took command of the 1st Marine Amphibious Corps. From November 1943 until 1947 Twining was back at Quantico, again on the staff of the Marine Corps Schools. He was promoted to Colonel during that time. Twining held staff billets throughout the late 1940s and served as Assistant Division Commander for the 1st Marine Division during the Korean War. In 1956 he was promoted to Lieutenant General and returned to Quantico a final time, serving as Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, until his retirement in 1959. Twining kept an extensive personal papers collection with significant portions dedicated to the Marine Corps Schools.

56. Allen Turnage Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA.
Many of his papers related to the Basic School, though not for the years during which he was a member of its staff.  

Randall M. Victory served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1939-41. He was born in Wisconsin in 1904 and attended the University of Washington from 1925-29. He participated in the University’s R.O.T.C. program while a student, and completed the Officer Candidates School. After graduation he accepted a commission as Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps. He attended TBS as a student in 1929-1930. After completing the Basic School he served in China and on sea duty. When he returned to the United States, he attended the U.S. Army Field Artillery School in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, the first TBS instructor to undertake special instruction in field artillery. He did not attend the Company Officers’ Course or the Infantry School at Fort Benning. Victory’s combat assignments during World War II were all related to the 10th and 14th Marine (Artillery) Regiments. After the war he served in staff and command billets related to Marine Corps logistics and installations in several locations. He retired in 1959 with the rank of Major General. He kept no personal papers.

Walter Aloysius Wachtler served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1931-34. He was born in 1896 and attended the United States Naval Academy, graduating in 1919. His official biography indicates that he attended a basic course at Quantico in 1920, but no record for his name appears on muster rolls for that time and place. He also attended the “Officers School for Service Afloat” in Norfolk, Virginia. He then departed the United States for service in Santo Domingo. He returned to the US to attend the Army Signal School, then departed again in 1925 for Nicaragua. He left Nicaragua for China, where he served as the detachment communications officer until 1930. Wachtler completed the Company Officers Course at Quantico in 1930-31 and then reported to TBS. After his time on the Basic School staff, he held staff billets as communications officer in Quantico and at Headquarters Marine Corps. He traveled to Europe as an observer for most of 1942. During the rest of World War II he served in a variety of commands throughout the Pacific, always in some specialty related to communications or personnel. He retired in 1947 and was advanced to the rank of Brigadier General in recognition of his combat service. He kept no personal papers.

57. Merrill Twining Personal Papers, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA.
58. Randall M. Victory Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA.
59. Walter Wachtler Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps
John Thaddeus Walker served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1928-32. He was born in Texas in 1893 and attended the Texas A&M University. He graduated in 1917 and accepted a commission as Second Lieutenant immediately. He went to France with the 5th Marine Regiment in June, 1917. He saw active combat but was soon ordered back to the United States to serve as an instructor at the Bayonet School at Quantico, Virginia. He remained there until 1920 when he left for Santo Domingo. He spent two years in the Caribbean before returning to serve as an aide to the Commandant of the Norfolk Navy Yard. He then attended the Company Officers’ Course at Quantico from 1925-26. Walker then completed a tour of sea duty, as detachment commander aboard the USS West Virginia. His tour at TBS was the longest of any other officer serving during the League Island period. In 1932 he left Philadelphia and went to Haiti, then Headquarters Marine Corps. He observed the fighting in Egypt prior to the United States’ entry into World War II in 1941. Newly promoted to Colonel, he took command of the 22nd Marine Regiment in June, 1942. He participated in hand-to-hand fighting on Eniwetok, for which he was awarded a Navy Cross. He then held staff billets before joining the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade as Chief of Staff. He received a Legion of Merit for participation in the recapture of Guam in 1944. After the war he commanded training centers, the 3rd Marine Brigade, and the department of Personnel at Headquarters Marine Corps. His final billet was as commanding officer of Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego. He retired in 1954 and was advanced to the rank of Lieutenant General in recognition of combat service. He died in 1955. He kept no personal papers.60

Louis J. Whaley served as an instructor at the Basic School for only seven months, from December 1930 until June 1931. He was born in New York in 1892 and attended the Citadel military academy, graduating in 1914. His specialty was civil engineering. He accepted a commission as Second Lieutenant in 1917 and went to Haiti, where he participated in the regular activities of the First Provisional Brigade in addition to helping install a new water supply system at Cape Haitien. In 1929 he worked as aide to the Commandant of Marines before attending the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. After his tour at TBS he worked as an intelligence

History Division, Quantico VA.

60. General Walkers’ biography is maintained on a variety of public websites, including a crowd-sourced military decorations database. His official biography published on the USMC History Division website at Quantico corroborates those outlets.
officer, security officer, instructor at the Naval Medical School, and provost marshal at different installations on the Atlantic coast. The final entry in his personnel records indicates he was “Missing in Action” in April 1943. However, both a retirement and death record are entered in the U.S. Department of Veterans’ Affairs database. These indicate the Whaley retired in 1946 as a Colonel, and died in 1979. He kept no personal papers.  

Julius Wright served as an instructor at the Basic School from 1924-26. He was born in Indiana in 1896 and attended the United States Naval Academy. After graduating from the Academy in 1917 he accepted a commission as Second Lieutenant. He did not go to France, but traveled to Quantico, for Fort Sill (possibly for artillery training but only for two months), and China. He also served tours of sea duty. Wright also participated in mail guard duty in the early 1920s, before his assignment to TBS. His official personnel record ends in 1930 and he kept no personal papers. Death record indices suggest that he died in 1931.

61. Louis Whaley Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA.

62. Julius Wright Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA. See also US Social Security Death Indices.
Appendix B: Biographical Note for First Lieutenant Anthony A. Frances

According to the author’s preface, Anthony Frances was in the Marine Corps Reserve when he wrote the *History of the Marine Corps Schools*. Born in Ohio to Italian immigrant parents, Anthony Frances attended Bowling Green Community College in the late 1930s and continued on to journalism school before being drafted into the Marines in 1942. He served with multiple infantry divisions in the Pacific campaign before being wounded at Iwo Jima in 1944.

No explicit description of Frances’ career after his injury exists. The Muster Rolls of the Marine Corps provide his location from summer 1944 until summer 1945, as he passes through a series of “reserve” (meaning “holding”) battalions moving first to San Diego, California, and eventually to the East Coast. First Lieutenant Frances was present in Quantico, Virginia, for only six months in 1945. His official billet was as a member of an “awards board,” an entity responsible for reviewing the documentation provided by combat commands on behalf of Marines nominated for decoration. On two days in October, 1945, he traveled to Headquarters Marine Corps, about 45 miles from Quantico in Arlington, Virginia, for “business relating to the Marine Corps Schools.” Next, we find his name on the title page of the *History of the Marine Corps Schools*, printed in 1945. His discharge paper is not accessible to the public, due to the recentness of his death (in 2014), but the next official public record pertaining to his life is a marriage, which took place in Ohio, in 1948. Presumably he left the Marine Corps soon after the writing assignment was complete.

Returning to the *History of the Marine Corps Schools*, we see a good example of a document which has happily ended up in the right place, though its path to the library shelves is


3. “United States, Muster Rolls of the Marine Corps’ Database with Images,” NARA microfilm publication T1118, National Archives and Records Administration (Washington, DC); 21st Marine Division records of April-October 1944 (Fleet Marine Force), 21st Marine Division October 1944-July 1945 (Rear Echelon), 1st Headquarters Battalion July 1945-January 1946 (Quantico, Virginia).
somewhat mysterious. Two sets of handwritten corrections run throughout the document, one in pen and the other in pencil. Corrections to spelling, additions to information, adjustments to the grammar and punctuation, and whole sections in the appendix are all part of these handwritten edits. The appendix section amendments appear to be additions of information from late 1945, referring to events that occurred after the initial manuscript was completed. Given these handwritten notes, one would expect to find Frances’ manuscript in an archive of original documents. Instead, it is hardbound on a library shelf alongside mass-produced monographs, mimeographs of Army tactics manuals, bound periodicals, and official reports. (The “Carlisle copy” of the manuscript is a typed and bound manuscript as well, but both the ink and pencil corrections from the “Quantico copy” have been implemented. The page numbers do not exactly align, due to the manuscript being on legal-sized (8.5 inches by 14 inches) paper and the Carlisle copy on standard American (8.5 inches by 11 inches) paper. This paper will refer only to the “Quantico copy” since it is the original source.)

Frances’ work was never published in the traditional sense, nor was it “routed” to various Marine Corps institutions for their edification. The fact that no “real” hard copy monograph exists is unsurprising. The fact that the document did not make it through the typical process of publication and promulgation throughout the Marine Corps is surprising. Mimeographed papers were often circulated in this fashion and copies of such papers (Dr. Donald Bittner’s “occasional paper” on the Command and Staff school is a modern example) are easy to find on the library shelves. Frances’ book is alone. Besides the lack of extant copies in other formats, we can also assume that the document did not make it into the publishing queue based on a quarter-sheet piece of blue office memo paper, cello-taped to the front matter of the “Quantico copy”:

17 Nov 1953
To: Capt Amos
From: MSgt D.E. Sullivan, USMC
Subject: History of the Marine Corps Schools
General Wensinger feels that the attached folder may be of interest to the Historical Branch.
Respectfully,
In 1953, “Historical Branch” was the current name for the modern “History Division,” then an entity under the direct authority of Headquarters Marine Corps, located within its complex of buildings in Arlington, Virginia.

Major General Walter Wensinger was, at the time, the recently-assigned commander of the Plans and Policies Division of Headquarters Marine Corps. Wensinger was a veteran of both World Wars and had served multiple tours of sea duty, command of Marine Barracks and detachments at Navy Yards, and commanded the 23rd Marine Division during the Pacific Campaigns of 1942-1944. He was a graduate of the University of Michigan and a lawyer. There is no indication on the memo as to where the monograph was “found”. General Wensinger’s office had no hierarchical connection with the Historical Branch. None of his assignments between 1945 (when General O.P. Smith wrote his endorsement of the History) and 1953 (when the manuscript was sent to Captain Amos) suggest that General Wensinger was in personal contact with any historical or archival functions of the Marine Corps on an official basis. However, upon his death in 1972 the General’s papers would be donated to the Marine Corps Archives, perhaps indicating that during his lifetime he had expressed an interest in the preservation of historical documents and Marine Corps memorabilia.

“Captain Amos” is presumably Raymond Lee Amos, commissioned a second lieutenant in 1949 with a relatively unusual status: authorized for “limited duty only.” Part of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, the Limited Duty Officer program was “established to provide officers in fields requiring considerable technical skill and training.” The typical limited duty officer was a technical specialist, analogous to the Warrant Officers of the modern Marine Corps, who


populate fields dealing with specialized weaponry or other “niche” military occupations such as bio-chemical warfare. In the 1950s, this program was much larger and included administration, intelligence, infantry, logistics, artillery, engineers, tanks and amphibian tractors, ordnance, communications, supply, food, motor transport, and aviation.\(^7\) It is not a foregone conclusion that Amos was a historian, writer, or journalist and thus was assigned to headquarters in that capacity, but it seems likely given the connection General Wensinger made between him and the manuscript. Unfortunately, the Muster Rolls for Headquarters Marine Corps in 1953 are incomplete and Raymond Lee Amos does not appear on any of the extant papers. As a result, it cannot be independently confirmed that “Captain Amos the limited duty officer” is the same gentleman as addressed in the blue memo from the Frances manuscript.

So, the genesis of the book itself is mysterious and unusual. For the purposes of this paper, Frances serves as a primary source. It has been adopted as such by a number of well-known secondary works on the history of the Marine Corps, notably Williamson Murray and Allen Millet’s *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, William Parker’s *Concise History of the United States Marine Corps*, and Donald Bittner’s monograph on *Curriculum Evolution at the Command and Staff College*, as well as all of the “official histories,” that quote Frances or refer to his book.

Appendix C: The Marine Corps “Historical Division”

Today, the “Library of the Marine Corps” is located in a dedicated facility aboard Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia. A research library and family-use library share one wing of the Gray Research Center building, constructed in 1991, and a conference center occupies the other wing. In October 2016, a new building opened adjacent to the Research Center, triggering a shift in resources as well as an official reorganization. Prior to October 2016, the “Marine Corps Archives” was located within the Gray Research Center and was considered part of the library itself. Today, the archives are located next door (in a new, purpose-built facility), and are known as “Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division.” Scholars wishing to do research on the Marine Corps have three Quantico-based options for source material: the Gray Research Center’s library of published works, the Archives Branch’s collection of original unpublished documents, and the Marine Corps History Division’s more varied collection of photocopied papers, photographs, transcripts and recordings of speeches, unit histories, and some original records (such as 1950s-era casualty cards for killed or wounded Marines). The Frances manuscript, as an example, is currently shelved in the research library, but was given to the library by History Division during the 1950s, and apparently before that was stored in the Headquarters Marine Corps “informal archive” (anecdotes from current archivists indicate this was a closet in an out-of-the-way hallway) which was the predecessor to today’s Quantico-based archive.

The Marine Corps History Division was originally located in Arlington, Virginia, as a subordinate command of Headquarters Marine Corps. The Marine Corps Order forming a “historical branch” was signed by Commandant George R. Barnett in May, 1919.¹ That entity fell under the authority of the Adjutant General’s office and consisted of civilian clerks and historians: their first project was obtaining copies of National Archives documents relative to the Marine Corps. Their second, more pressing, project was to locate any records pertaining to the American Expeditionary Force, which were largely still in the possession of units who

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participated in the Great War and which were in constant danger of accidentally being lost or
damaged amongst the files of a still-active combat unit. The “Marine Corps Archives” was
nonexistent. Files compiled by the civilians at “historical branch” formed the heart of a slowly
growing collection of archival material, but the majority of papers were still held by units,
installations, and individuals. Multiple reorganizations and location changes have resulted in the
archive collection being dramatically increased, but it remains incomplete and, in some areas,
unorganized. The permanent establishment of most Marine Corps educational activities at
Quantico solidified the future of the “historical branch,” and an academic library was established
at Quantico during the interwar years. The stories of “History Division” (so renamed in 1942)
and of the Marine Corps Schools are thus closely related.
Appendix D: Full-Format Sample of Fort Benning Infantry School Curriculum

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL
Fort Benning, Georgia
1931-32

TACTICS

BATTALION IN ATTACK

ILLUSTRATIVE PROBLEM

SECTION I

SITUATION AND FIRST REQUIREMENT


   b. A Blue force, moving southeast on an offensive mission, having encountered a Red force late this afternoon (25 April), is deploying preparatory to an attack.

   c. At 5:30 PM, Colonel “1st Infantry” in the vicinity of RJ 636-C (364.9-730.7) issues oral orders, excerpts of which follow:

      “For enemy information, see overlay.

      “Line now held by our advance guard - Big Pipe Creek.

      “The 2d Infantry on our left will make the envelopment. The 3d Infantry will be on our right.

      “The 1st Battalion 1st Field Artillery will support this regiment. It will fire a preparation along the hostile front line commencing at H-20.

      “This regiment will attack, capture the high ground between RJ 706-A and RJ 691 and continue the attack in its zone of action.


      “Line of departure - Big Pipe Creek.

      “Formation: 1st and 2d Battalions in assault. 1st Battalion on the right.

      “Boundaries: see overlay.

      “The 1st Battalion will capture that part of the regimental objective in its zone of action and continue the attack to the south.”

   d. The 1st Battalion 1st Infantry has not been engaged. It is to be assembled in the woods 700 yards east of Green Valley School by 6:15 PM. The 1st Platoon Howitzer Company is attached to and with the battalion.
2. FIRST REQUIREMENT - Orders as actually issued by Lieutenant Colonel “1st Battalion 1st Infantry” for the attack.

ILLUSTRATIVE PROBLEM
SECTION II
SECOND SITUATION

3. A SOLUTION OF FIRST REQUIREMENT - At 6:30 PM, Lieutenant Colonel “1st Battalion 1st Infantry” on hill 647, issued the following oral orders to his assembled unit commanders and staff:

“For information of the enemy known at this time, see overlay.

“Our advance guard holds the line of Big Pipe Creek.

“For disposition of our force, see overlay.

“The 1st Infantry will attack, capture the high ground between RJ 706-A and RJ 691 and continue the attack in its zone of action. The 1st Battalion 1st Field Artillery will support our regiment. It will fire a preparation along the hostile front line commencing at 3:55 AM.

“This battalion with at least the 1st Platoon Howitzer Company attached will attack at 4:15 AM tomorrow, capture the hill at RJ 691 and continue the attack to the south.

“formation: Companies A and B in assault, Company A on the right.

“Boundary between companies: stream to our front (pointing) to junction with Big Pipe Creek -- RJ 517-H (pointing) -- unimproved road to house at road bend -- RH 691 (all to Company A).

“Line of departure: Big Pipe Creek.

“Company A will capture the small hill in its zone of action and then continue the attack.

“Company B will assist the advance of Company A until that hill in the zone of Company A has been captured.

“Company D will support the attack; one platoon from the vicinity of RJ 621-B will support the attack of Company B, paying particular attention to the open ground on the eastern portion of this company’s zone; the company (less one platoon) from positions in the vicinity of CR 539-G will initially support each assault rifle company with one platoon; thereafter, one platoon will be sent forward in the zone of each assault rifle company for the close support of that company.

“The 1st Platoon Howitzer Company from positions in the vicinity of RH 553-D, will support the attack. Initially it will pay particular attention to the zone of Company B.

“Company C will await orders near RJ 520-E (364.1-730.5) (pointing) in reserve.

“The battalion will form at 2:25 AM with head of column at RJ 515-H in the order Companies A, B, D, Howitzer Platoon, Company C. On reaching RJ 590-K (363.6-730.5)
(pointing), organization commanders will lead their units into attack positions. Every precaution will be taken to keep this movement secret.

“Administrative details later.

“Command post: RJ 515-H until 3:30 AM; thereafter RJ 520-E.”

4. SITUATION, CONTINUED. -  a. The attack jumped off as ordered and has progressed slowly. At 5:30 AM, Lieutenant Colonel “1st Battalion” has just arrived on hill in Company A’s zone and has the following information:
Appendix E: Books Written by League Island Students or Staff

-----. *Aloha Class of 1926.* Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Academy Press, 1982. A collection of memories from the USNA class of 1926. A section in the book features submissions from the class members who were commissioned in the Marine Corps.


McKean, William, *Ribbon Creek: The Marine Corps on Trial.* New York: Dial Press, 1958. McKean attended TBS in 1930-31. At the time of the Ribbon Creek incident he was the commanding officer of the Weapons Training Battalion at Parris Island.


Appendix E: MH-5 “Books for Recommended Reading” (1933-1934)

BASIC SCHOOL
MARINE BARRACKS, NAVY YARD
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA
1933-1934

BOOKS RECOMMENDED
for reading on
MILITARY HISTORY

FOREWORD

The following bibliography of standard books and other available publications has been taken, for the most part, from the following sources: 1) the list of books recommended by the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for a course of reading on military history; 2) a partial bibliography of small wars prepared by the Marine Corps Schools, Field Officers’ Course, Quantico, Virginia; and 3) a bibliography of selected literature relating to historical, political, economic, and military subjects, prepared by the Army War College. The publications selected are, in most instances, of recognized value and cover in a general way the subject named, no claim being made for absolute completeness. A number of the texts quoted are out of print; however, students can generally obtain a considerable part of them from public and private libraries and from second-hand dealers.

It is anticipated that the instructor in Military History will have on hand, when subjects for the students work in that course are to be selected, complete list of books and other publications which may be available for loan to the individual officer in the loan collection of the Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, and in the library of the Marine Corps Schools, Marine Barracks Quantico, Virginia. Further instructions will be issued at a later date as to the conditions under which books from these sources may be obtained.

Upon direct application to the librarian of the War Department, officers may obtain such books in the War Department Library as are not necessary for reference purposes in the library rooms. Books so obtained may be retained 30 days from the date of their receipt, at the end of which they must be returned by registered mail to the librarian of the war department. The officer must pay the registration fees.

Under the same conditions books may be obtained from the Military Information Division Library (War College Division, General Staff).

It is suggested that this list be retained by each student for use in connection with the course in Military History and that subsequent additions to the list in the form of changes or instruction memoranda, be affixed to this publication.

CONTENTS

I. GENERAL HISTORY
   1. General History of the World
   2. General History of the United States
   3. General History of Foreign Countries
II. MILITARY HISTORY
   1. General Works
   2. American Wars
   3. Foreign Wars
   4. World War
   5. Biographies

III. THE ART OF WAR
   1. General Works
   2. Strategy and Combined Tactics
   3. Logistics
   4. Military Intelligence
   5. Psychology and Leadership

IV. TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE OF THE SEPARATE ARMS
   1. Infantry, including Tanks
   2. Cavalry
   3. Artillery
   4. Air Service
   5. Chemical Warfare Service
   6. Medical Department

V. INTERNATIONAL LAW

VI. SMALL WARS

VII. A READING COURSE FOR OFFICERS
   1. First Period (Average Four Years)
   2. Second Period (Average Four Years)
   3. Third Period (Average Four Years)
   4. Fourth Period (Average Four Years)
   5. Fifth Period (Average Seven Years)

BIBLIOGRAPHY - RECOMMENDED READING FOR OFFICERS

I. GENERAL HISTORY - THEORY
   Writing of History - Fling
   Historical Criticism of Documents - R.L. Marshall

   1. GENERAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD
      Ancient Times. History of the Early World - Breasted
      The Story of Mankind - Van Loon

   2. GENERAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

      a. GENERAL WORKS
         History of the United States, 8 Vols - McMaster
         History of the United States - Channing
         American Commonwealth - Bryce
         The Riverside History of the United States, 4 Vols
         The Development of the United States from Colonies
to a World Power - Farrand
         The Discovery of American, 2 Vols - Fiske
b. COLONIAL PERIOD
   The Beginning of New England - Fiske
   New France and New England - Fiske
   The Dutch and Quaker Colonies of America, 2 Vols - Fiske

c. REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD
   The American Revolution, 2 Vols - Fiske
   The Critical Period of American History - Fiske
   Lossing’s Field Book of the Revolution, 2 Vols - Lossing
   True History of the American Revolution - Fisher

3. GENERAL HISTORY OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES

a. MEXICO
   Monograph on Mexico - U.S. War Department

b. SOUTH AMERICA
   History of Latin America - Webster, H.
   South American - Koebel
   History of South American - Alers

c. BRITISH EMPIRE
   A Short History of England - Cheney (1914)
   Short History of England and the British Empire - Larson (1915)
   Leading Facts of English History - Montgomery (1912)

d. FRANCE
   A Short History of France, 2 Vols - Duruy
   History of France, 3 Vols - McDonald (1915)
   The French People - Hassall

e. GERMANY
   A Short History of Germany, 2 Vols - Henderson
   History of Germany - Marshall

f. ITALY
   History of Italy - Abbott
   Greater Italy - Wallace

g. SPAIN
   The Spanish People - Hume
   Isabelle of Castille and the Making of the Spanish Nation - Plunkett (1915)

h. RUSSIA
   Autocracy and Revolution in Russia - Korff (1923)
   Russia Today and Tomorrow - Miliukov (1922)
   Revolt against Civilization - Stoddard (1922)

i. JAPAN
   The Far Eastern Question - Millard
   Japan-The Rise of a Modern Power - Porter
Japan and Japanese-American Relations - Blakeslee

k. CHINA
   The Problem of China - Russell (1922)
   The Middle Kingdom, 2 Vols - Williams

I. MOHAMMEDAN COUNTRIES
   The Turkish Empire - Lord Eversley (1917)
   Foundations of the Ottoman Empire - Gibbons (1916)
   New World of Islam - Stoddard
   Rising Tide of Color - Stoddard

II. MILITARY HISTORY

1. GENERAL WORKS
   The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World (From Marathon to Waterloo) - Creasy
   The Decisive Battles of Modern Times - Whitton
   Battlefields of the World War - Johnson
   The Influence of Sea Power upon History - Mahan
   War and the World's Life - Wilkinson

2. AMERICAN WARS

a. GENERAL WORKS
   Military Policy of the United States - Upton
   American Campaigns, 2 Vols - Steele
   The Military Unpreparedness of the United States - Huidekoper
   History of the United States Army - Ganoe
   History of Our Navy, 3 Vols - MacClay
   History of Our Navy - Spear

b. REVOLUTIONARY WAR
   American Revolution, 4 Vols - Trevelyan, G.O.
   History of the American Revolution, 2 Vols - Fiske
   Naval History of the Revolution, 2 Vols - Allen
   Navy of the American Revolution - Paullin
   Story of the Revolution - Lodge

c. WAR OF 1812
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