Student Nationalism in Contemporary China: A Case Study of Learning and Expressing Nationalist Sentiment in Shanghai

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Abstract

This thesis is an examination of student nationalism in contemporary China. In addition to looking at student nationalism in China more generally, it analyses where and how nationalist sentiment is learned and how, when and why it is expressed.

The first part of the thesis engages with the literature on both past and present student nationalism and activism in China, as well as theoretical conceptions of nation and nationalism and their application to the Chinese context. The main chapters of the thesis present and analyse data from a five-point Likert Scale survey-questionnaire (N=246) as well as data from semi- and un-structured interviews (N=21) and unstructured observations, including a visit to a national heritage site in Shanghai.

These chapters analyse and explain where, how and why Chinese university students learn and express nationalist sentiment. To do this, I distinguish between ‘explicit learning’, which involves state education, media (including the internet) and family/friends, and ‘tacit learning’ in which I apply the concepts ‘Banal Nationalism’ and ‘Everyday Nationhood’ to the Chinese context. After having examined where nationalist thought and sentiment is learned, the thesis analyses how, why and where nationalism is explicitly expressed. Based on a factor analysis, it analyses forms and ways of both general expressions of nationalist sentiment and more advanced forms of expression. In addition to that, this thesis also examines students’ attitudes and sentiments towards other nations. Finally, it also briefly demonstrates and discusses how nationalist sentiment can be expressed tacitly.

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For Ute Szczepaniak

(* 29.08.1967; † 20.06.2016)

Thank you for always believing in me, when others did not. I miss you.
Declaration

I, Tobias Biedermann, declare that this PhD thesis entitled ‘Student Nationalism in Contemporary China: A Case Study of Learning and Expressing Nationalist Sentiment in Shanghai’ is no more than 100,000 words in length including quotes and exclusive of tables, figures, appendices, bibliography, references and footnotes. This thesis contains no material that has been submitted previously, in whole or in part, for the award of any other academic degree or diploma. This thesis was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the ‘Core Code of Practice for Postgraduate Research Degrees’ of King’s College London. Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is my own work.

Signature:

Date: 26.11.2019
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List of Abbreviations

BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation
CCP/CPC – Chinese Communist Party
CPD – Central Propaganda Department
ECUST – East China University of Science and Technology
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
GMD – Guomindang/Kuomintang
ICT – Information and Communication Technology
IT – Information Technology
MNORPG – Massively Multiplayer Online Role-playing Games
MOBA – Multiplayer Online Battle Arena
MoC – (Chinese) Ministry of Culture
MoE – (Chinese) Ministry of Education
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PEC – Patriotic Education Campaign
PLA – People’s Liberation Army
PLAN – People’s Liberation Army Navy
PRC – People’s Republic of China
QS – Quacquarelli Symonds
RMB – Renminbi
ROC – Republic of China/Taiwan
SCMP – South China Morning Post
SEZ – Special Economic Zones
TV – Television
UK – United Kingdom
US – United States (of America)
VPN – Virtual Private Network
WHO – World Health Organisation
WTO – World Trade Organisation
Chapter 1: Introduction

1. The Appeal of Nationalism and its Implications for Students in China

In the past few years, scholarly research on student nationalism in China has, more or less, taken a backseat. In the light of recent large-scale demonstrations in Hong Kong, student nationalism has resurfaced and scholarly research about it might already be in the making. Similar to the Umbrella Movement in 2014, which revolved around the demand for universal suffrage in Hong Kong, the protests since summer 2019 show that a large number of people in Hong Kong are not only dissatisfied with local leadership in Hong Kong, but also the central government in Beijing and its exertion of influence in the city. A recently conducted telephone survey by the University of Hong Kong found that 53 per cent of people in Hong Kong identified as ‘Hongkongers’, while only 11 per cent identified as solely Chinese. In addition to that, 71 per cent were not proud of being national citizens of China (HKU 2019). Although the crisis in Hong Kong is primarily about universal suffrage, an investigation into police violence and else, it also displays an identity crisis, in which a large number of people in Hong Kong do not identify as Chinese and in which mainland Chinese repeatedly admonish people in Hong Kong, that the city and its surrounding territories are part of China.

The recent deployment of military personnel in Shenzhen demonstrates that Beijing is not only taking Hong Kong’s case very seriously, but also that there is more at stake than merely economic considerations. Deuber (2019) argues that pictures of Chinese troops at the border between Hong Kong and Shenzhen are primarily taken for mainland Chinese citizens who, in large numbers, back Beijing’s position. In fact, recent (and sometimes violent) incidences at universities abroad between students from mainland China and students from Hong Kong demonstrate how strongly many students feel about the issue at hand (SCMP 2019). Outside observers may find it easy to understand why students in Hong Kong take their protest and anger to the streets, however it is arguably more difficult to grasp why students from the mainland also display their anger publicly. Where does this nationalist sentiment that flares out so strongly at moments of tension come from?
Students’ expressions of nationalist sentiment in regard to Hong Kong appear to be as intense as sentiment which was displayed about the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands earlier. Shortly after I finished my Bachelor’s thesis in summer 2012, which examined China’s foreign policy, I received a message from a friend in Shanghai who told me that Chinese protestors had destroyed the façade of a Japanese restaurant that we used to go when I lived in Shanghai. In the light of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute in 2012 nationalist protest had, once again, surfaced. Images and video footages instantly reminded me of protests which took place shortly before the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. At that time, I was a student at the University of Bonn and busy with preparations for my first year in China as a language student. News coverage in Germany on China was quite negative and calls for boycotting the Olympic Games were widely discussed (e.g. Zeit 2008). As I had never been to mainland China before 2008, I was worried that, if the German government decided to boycott the Olympic Games, my nationality could be a disadvantage during my year in Shanghai. However, after having arrived in Shanghai in August 2008, shortly before the Olympic Games ended, I did not witness any kind of resentment towards foreigners. Instead, Chinese students at Fudan University (where I was enrolled) were friendly and spoke highly of Germany. Nationalist protest against foreign criticism appeared to have disappeared. Similarly, nationalist protests during the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute also appeared to be of short duration. Depending on when/or whether the dispute about Hong Kong is resolved, it seems likely that student nationalism will, once again, disappear from the public eye. Popular reports and scholarly analyses sometimes overlook the fact that nationalism exists and persists not only during these moments of heightened tensions but also during uneventful periods of time and everyday life.

At the beginning of my research I wanted to understand where nationalist thought and sentiment come from, and which channels of influence are responsible for nationalist sentiment more broadly. In addition, how is nationalist thought and sentiment maintained during times in which domestic and/or international crises are absent? Early on, I learned that the idea of constructing political loyalty through nationalist sentiment appears to be particularly strong in contemporary China. In China, the government has
recently announced further strengthening of its focus on patriotic education (MoE 2016). However, at the same time, the government has also prevented past nationalist protests from escalating. According to Zhao (2005: 143) “[i]t is certainly not in the government's interest to allow the emotional, nationalistic rhetoric heard on the street to dictate Chinese foreign policy”. The Chinese government appears to be in a dilemma. On the one hand, it wants its students to be ‘patriotic’, but on the other hand, it fears that anti-foreign nationalist sentiment can threaten its diplomatic relations with other nations. Moreover, patriotic education has limits, as it does not necessarily affect students in their private lives outside of schools. Examining why extreme nationalist sentiment can emerge so suddenly thus requires an in-depth analysis of how students in contemporary China are socialised, in both obvious (e.g. through patriotic education) and unobvious ways (through banal and everyday representations of the nation).

2. Rationale and Research Questions

This thesis investigates student nationalism in contemporary China and examines how and why university students learn and express nationalist sentiment. To provide a comprehensive account of student nationalism in China, data of this research was conducted through survey-questionnaires, interviews and observations. By having used a mixed method analysis, this research presents valuable insights on some aspects of student nationalism in contemporary China, some of which have been largely ignored in past research. It contributes to our understanding of how young educated people in China feel about their nation and it demonstrates that students’ nationalist sentiment in contemporary China is multifaceted. It is interesting and original because it not only demonstrates how and where nationalist sentiment is learned and expressed in its explicit form, but also engages with learning and expression of nationalist sentiment on a subconscious, tacit level.

Historically, research about nationalism in China has often treated students as a key category of analysis, yet arguably since the 1990s, student nationalism has become more complex. University students in China are no longer a small elite social stratum and they no longer participate in large scale protests against the government. As of 2016,
when I started my field research, the number of undergraduate students in regular higher education institutions in China was more than 27 million (MoE 2018a). In other words, tertiary education has become a mass commodity in China. Visible student nationalism, it appears, has become part of something that Tilly (1994: 133) described as a ‘state-led nationalism’. Past research on student nationalism in China has not fully addressed these issues. The origin of nationalist sentiment among students is multifaceted and vague. Fairbrother (2003: 95-9) found that many students think secondary school education had the biggest impact on their national attitudes. However, Fairbrother’s data was collected in 1999-2000, before the internet played a key role in students’ lives. In addition, China is, according to Yan (2009: 287), undergoing an “individualisation transformation”, which could also imply that students perceive patriotic education as too obtrusive and instead merely view state education as means to an end, ideally culminating in good employment. Within the lifetime of students surveyed and interviewed for this study, ‘the individualisation of Chinese society’, as Yan (2009) calls it, has further progressed. For instance, today, almost every (urban) student possesses a mobile device and can connect to the internet and his friends’ devices anywhere he/she likes. Moreover, traveling and/or studying abroad has become commonplace for many students, and they are thus exposed to values, opinions and ideas from other countries.

Finding good employment later requires students to put a lot of effort in their own education. This, in turn, means that students also have to learn about nationalist content in school and university. However, it is not clear whether this exposure to nationalist content in state education automatically means that students adopt a nationalist mindset and agree with the content they have learned.

Historically, the rise of communism in China cannot be explained without the role nationalism played in regard to the social mobilisation of the peasantry. Today, the majority of the student body in tertiary education consists of young men and women who grew up in an urban area. According to Johnson (1962: 180), the “reinterpretation of Communist ideology for nationalist purposes” has been vital for social mobilisation in the past. The extensive revision and manipulation of Communist theory served the purpose to “bring it in line with various policies of a nationalist character” (ibid.). Zhao
(2004: 209) even argues that the very essence of CCP legitimacy was nationalism and not Marxism. Today, nationalism is not only presented as an altered and extended version of Communist ideology but also openly promoted in the form of ‘patriotism’ towards both party and state. However, in the light of a rising number of university students who struggle to find employment after graduating (Economist 2019), is this new form of nationalism convincing to all students?

By tackling these issues, we can attempt to determine the effectiveness of patriotic education and nationalism on students in general. By extension, this also gives us an indication of how many students are likely to support the government’s nationalist goals and visions of China in present and future. The government has repeatedly increased its focus on patriotic education. For example, the 2011 curriculum reform not only aimed to enhance “the quality of its human capital and its international competitiveness [but] China sought to use curriculum reform to realize its century-old dream of national revival, enhance its competitiveness in the face of intense global competition, and maintain its national cultural distinctiveness and socialist identity under the CPC’s leadership” (Law 2014: 352-4). In China, more state education could therefore lead to an increased level of nationalist sentiment. This would mean that that the negative relationship between nationalism and education, which was found in Western countries (see Hjerm 2001), could not be applied to the Chinese context. However, it is unlikely that all students are equally influenced by this state-led campaign to increase their levels of nationalism.

Even if Chinese university students in contemporary China learn nationalist sentiment from school and/or from elsewhere, it is unclear how university students express nationalist sentiment in their ordinary lives. The protests mentioned above are an explicit and unusual expression of nationalist sentiment, but it is unclear what role students played in it and whether these types of protests are a typical way for students to express their nationalist feelings. The discussions about street protests tend to overshadow other means and ways in which nationalist sentiment can be explicitly expressed by university students.

As nationalism is a multifaceted concept, expressing nationalist sentiment can take many forms and ways. For example, nationalist sentiment can be explicitly expressed in
the form of an opinion or argument. However, not every student chooses to express nationalist sentiment verbally. Students who are less communicative may choose to boycott a product of a different country which is perceived as negative due to its criticism of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This case study therefore also aims to capture and analyse different forms of expression of nationalist sentiment to provide a good understanding how university students in contemporary China express feelings related to their nation.

Finally, Chinese university students might not only learn and express nationalism explicitly, but also tacitly in their everyday lives. Gries (2004: 19) remarks that “Chinese, like all peoples, have deep-seated emotional attachments to their national identity”. It would be an oversimplification to assume that students in China only learn nationalist sentiment from state education, media or their families. Billig (1995: 37) reminds us that “[n]ational identity is not only something which is thought to be neutral to possess, but also something natural to remember”. Existing research has not yet investigated how people in China, who are less affected by formal and informal patriotic education, do not forget their national identity. Although there is a large body of case studies which examine banal and everyday ‘flaggings’ of nationhood in many other countries, China appears to have been largely overlooked.

As mentioned earlier, research on student nationalism in China almost exclusively deals with nationalism that is expressed explicitly (e.g. in the form of street protests). To investigate how nationalism is learned and how it affects those students who generally do not think highly of state education and/or express nationalist sentiment explicitly, this thesis also uncovers how students learn and express nationalism tacitly, on a “banal” everyday level (Billig 1995). My research thus addresses the following research questions:

How and where do Chinese University students learn nationalist sentiment?

How and why do Chinese university students express nationalist sentiment?

In a wider context, investigating student nationalism in contemporary China helps us to understand the fragility and stability of the current Chinese regime. China’s economic and political future largely rests on educated people, many of whom are university
Many of the goals Xi Jinping outlined at the 19th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) National Congress, such as “fostering stronger confidence in the path, theory, system, and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics” (China Daily 2017a), might only be achieved successfully if students today comply with his vision more generally. At the moment China’s growth rates of real gross domestic product (GDP) are between 6 and 7 per cent, which could make students more supportive of government policies. Moderately high growth rates might be perceived as evidence that the government’s general policy translates into good living standards for everyone. However, there is no guarantee that these growth rates will remain stable in the future. Brown (2016) believes that “[i]f the future when it happens proves disappointing, solemn lectures by political leaders on the need for even more sacrifice will no longer pay off”. If or when that time comes, will students’ positive nationalist sentiment towards nation and government be strong enough to prevent social unrest?

Regardless whether the CCP will continue to rule China over the next decades in its current form or whether other forms of governance emerge, some of the students today are likely to be part of the political elite tomorrow. This means that studying students’ views of their nation is necessary to predict how future political leaders rule the country, both in terms of domestic and foreign policies. Those who will not work in politics are nevertheless likely to become a part of China’s future middle class. McKinsey (2012) believes that most “large consumer-facing companies realize that they will need China to power their growth in the next decade”. Calls for boycotting foreign companies which have often derived from nationalist sentiment in the past, could thus have a large impact on foreign companies as many of them hugely depend on Chinese customers. For instance, Volkswagen, Germany’s largest car manufacturer, sold more than 3.2 million cars in China in 2017, making it the single most important key market in the world (Handelsblatt 2017). In other words, specific forms of nationalist sentiment among Chinese people who are students today could have both political and economic impacts on both China and the world.

Finally, Chinese students today travel and study abroad in large numbers. Views of people in other countries who have never been to China no longer only rest on what they see in the news or what they know about China from Chinese immigrants in their
own country, but also from impressions they have about Chinese students who study in their country. Depending on how much nationalist sentiment these students openly express, foreign opinions of China can become either more positive or negative. Having investigated what Americans think about China, Aldrich et al (2015: 219-20) found that those who have travelled to China were “more likely to hold a more positive general feeling toward China”. Several US (United States of America) citizens, however, have never been to China, and many of them probably never will. Their opinions on China largely rest on news coverage and random encounters with Chinese who travel to or, live in the US. A peaceful future between China and the US (or any other country) depends on mutual understanding and respect.

3. Structure

In order to provide a comprehensive picture of student nationalism in contemporary China, this thesis consists of 10 chapters. Having briefly introduced the topic of this research project here, the following paragraphs give a brief overview of the structure of this thesis.

Chapter 2 provides an extensive literature review covering both past and present student nationalism in China. It starts by discussing key theories of nation and nationalism and their applicability to the Chinese context, before focusing on student activism and nationalism as key categories of analysis and providing examples of past student activism in Asia. The largest part of Chapter 2 reviews both student nationalism in modern Chinese history - starting with brief overview of the downfall of the Qing Empire - and recent developments since the 1990s including nationalist protests against the United States (US) and Japan. After that, several channels of potential nationalist influence are analysed to demonstrate how nationalist sentiment in China can be explicitly learned. Finally, Chapter 2 concludes by briefly discussing research gaps.

Chapter 3 sets out the methodology and research design used for this research, explaining the mixed methods employed to answer the questions outlined above. This includes a 5-point Likert scale survey-questionnaire, interviews and several unstructured observations. It also outlines which sampling methods were used and provides a factor
analysis to show the internal validity of this study. Finally, chapter 3 also discusses
problems which came up during fieldwork and the limitations of this research.

Chapter 4 discusses several channels of potential nationalist influence which are
analysed to demonstrate how nationalist sentiment in China can be explicitly learned. It
includes a discussion of the Chinese concept *aiguo zhuyi* (爱国主义) and tackles the
question of whether the concept embeds nationalist or patriotic elements. The
remaining sections of this chapter presents channels in which nationalist content is
learned. It distinguishes between state education and channels which are found outside
the classroom.

Chapter 5 presents and analyses data which focus on the question of where students
explicitly learn nationalist sentiment. Based on different channels of influence, including
state schooling and visits to heritage sites as well as traditional media (radio, TV, print),
the internet, computer/video games and family as outlined in chapter 4, it demonstrates
that students perceive the influence of these different channels differently.

Chapter 6 uncovers banal and everyday representation of the nation through which
students tacitly learn nationalist sentiment, and is largely based on qualitative data
derived from interviews and unstructured observations. It distinguishes between state-
related representations of the nation, such as architecture and street-names, and
organic representations, such as Chinese food and language, and shows how each
representation of the nation cannot be avoided by students in their everyday life. It also
briefly discusses how nationalist sentiment can be expressed (as well as learned) tacitly.

Chapter 7 presents and analyses data related to how students explicitly express
nationalism more generally, focusing on aspects which relate to key theories of
nationalist thought, such as love for the nation and pride in one’s own national identity
as well as students’ willingness to serve and defend the nation.

Chapter 8 extends the analysis by demonstrating that nationalist sentiment can be
explicitly expressed in different ways, such as through consciously engaging with nation-
related activities (e.g. reading nationalist books), or through considering the nation as
equally important as one’s own family. It thus shows that student nationalism in
contemporary China is multifaceted and not limited to merely loving the Chinese nation.
It also presents data which highlight the limitations of expressing nationalist sentiment in contemporary China by, for example, showing that only few students are willing to sacrifice their life for the nation.

Chapter 9 analyses nationalist sentiment among Chinese university students towards Taiwan and other nations. It first looks at students’ opinions about Taiwan and the question of reunification, and will then (in section 3) demonstrate and discuss students’ opinions of the US, Japan and other nations. It also engages with the question of whether contemporary student nationalism in China is primarily inward- rather or outward-directed.

Chapter 10 concludes this research, summarising the most important findings in regard to student nationalism in contemporary China. It also demonstrates how this thesis has contributed to the scholarly research in the field and makes suggestion for further research on the topic.
Chapter 2: Theory of Nation and Nationalism and Evidence of Student Nationalism in Past and Present China

1. Introduction

This chapter explores the theory of nation and nationalism and its application to both past and present student nationalism in China. The objective is first to examine nationalism more generally and describe the context in which nations emerged in the past. The first part of this chapter therefore analyses key ideas of nation and nationalism while mostly relying on the modernist conception of how nations came to be. It also reviews Billig’s (1995) concept of ‘Banal Nationalism’ and subsequent theories and argues that the concept is helpful for the Chinese context. Section 3 engages with evidence of past and present student nationalism and activism in Asia and highlights the necessity of research on student nationalism and activism more generally. Section 4 forms the main part of this chapter, investigating student nationalism in both past and present China. To do so it chronologically analyses 20th century student nationalism (starting in the late Qing period) and, under consideration of economic and political changes, demonstrates how student nationalism since the 1990s has changed compared to earlier movements. The overall aim of this chapter and the thesis more generally is discussed in the final section of this chapter, by showing what the current literature on Chinese student nationalism covers, and what it does not.

2. Theory of Nation and Nationalism

The study of nations and nationalism is not only vast and complex, but also highly contested. We therefore need to take a close look at existing theories in order to extract plausible ideas which might help to explain nationalism in China. In order to explain how Chinese university students express nationalism, we first have to ask what nationalism is more broadly. This section aims to summarize and analyse the main debates and ideas only insofar as they are relevant to the Chinese context. I therefore focus mainly on the ‘modernist’ approach, including reviewing Anderson’s (1983) concept of ‘Imagined
Communities’. The second part of this section discusses Billig’s idea of ‘banal nationalism’ and subsequent theories to his concept and their application to contemporary China. Chapter 6 will highlight how crucial it is to include Billig’s unorthodox approach when investigating nationalism in China.

First, I should clarify why this section largely focuses on modernist conceptions of nations and nationalism and not on primordial schools of thought. A key theme of the primordial approach is descent. Attached to descent is blood, kinship and ancestry. Geertz (1993: 259-60) indicates that human beings, as part of collectivities, believe in the primordiality of their ethnies (i.e. ethnic groups - the precursor of the modern nation) and nations. Humans believe in their naturalness, longevity and power (Smith 2010:57). The primordial approach holds that “nations generally evolve rather organically out of a pre-existing substrate of ethnicity” (Hearn 2006: 20). According to Shils (1995: 100) “[a] nation is by its nature a transgenerational entity. It would be a contradiction in terms to conceive of a nation as a phenomenon of a single generation.” Shils believes that “the primordial” is pivotal to every man’s life and that it “has formed his or her present” (Shils 1995: 97). In short, primordialist thought holds that nations and nationalism have always existed and argues for an “essentially unchanging national identity consisting of certain ‘givens’ of social existence into which one is born” (Zhao S 2004:4).

This view is problematic, because it would mean that several assumed nations, including territories which are arguably inhabited by more than one nation, yet governed and administered by one single state, are in fact not nations at all. Indeed, we could consider China a multi-national state, which van den Berghe (1981: 61) describes as a state that is made up of two or more nations, and therefore argue that ‘each Chinese nation’ has always existed. However, while allowing a certain degree of political and cultural autonomy, the Chinese government actively promotes one single multi-ethnic nation (MoE 2011c: 13-15). The primordial approach would not help to explain a state-led nationalism which aims to form the national identity of all Chinese passport-holders. Even if we exclude ethnic minorities, it is implausible that a national Han identity has always existed, considering China’s vast territory and the inability of most Chinese in the past to read, communicate with or know of ‘others’. It is highly unlikely that an ‘early
national identity’ of the Han population has not been influenced/changed by ‘others’ (i.e. various dynasties, Mongols, Manchu, merchants and the Chinese Communist Party [CCP]) throughout Chinese history. For these reasons, I argue that primordialism does not help to explain Chinese nationalism, and instead suggest that the modernist school of thought is more valuable to the debate. However, this does not mean that Chinese nationalists themselves do not perceive their culture as ancient and, in fact, since the 2011 curriculum reform, the Chinese government has intensified its efforts to include more Chinese culture in the curriculum (Law 2014: 353). For this reason, I will refer back to primordial ideas when relevant and/or when these were expressed by students.

2.1 The Modernist Approach

The primordial and modernist approaches to the nation differ fundamentally. The primordial belief in the longevity and naturalness of a nation holds that nations and national consciousness have existed always, or at least since undefined ancient times. The modernist approach suggests the opposite, that nationalism is rooted in modernity.

Ernest Gellner (1997: 10-3) believes that nationalism only arises naturally when certain conditions are met, but that these conditions are not universal and natural themselves (e.g. a specific hostile foreign threat might engender nationalism). He insists that “[n]ations are not inscribed into the nature of things” and that the transition to industrialism marks the age of nationalism, so that nations can be defined only in terms of the age of nationalism, since according to Gellner (1983: 55), it is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way around. In short, nationalism arose in the age of nationalism (i.e. transitional period to industrialism in Europe) and created nations. The reason for the rise of nationalism and nations is different from case to case, but had deep roots in a particular nation’s “shared current condition” (ibid.). In the Chinese context, this “shared current condition” arguably came to be in the late 19th and early 20th century, as I argue in section 4.1.

Gellner (1983: 1) considers nationalism primarily a political principle (i.e. a moral rule or strong belief) in which the political and national unit should be congruent. A violation of this principle causes nationalist sentiment, which is usually expressed by a feeling of
anger, whereas the fulfilment of this principle causes satisfaction (ibid.). The rulers of the political unit (i.e. the state) cannot belong to a nation other than that of the majority of the ruled, as this would cause a violation of Gellner’s nationalist principle (ibid.). Another violation could be if the rulers of the political unit fail to include all the members of an appropriate nation, such as various minorities. As I will demonstrate, Gellner’s idea of nationalism is very useful for the Chinese context.

Eric Hobsbawm (1992: 9) agrees with Gellner’s definition but adds that nationalism as a political principle implies a political duty which “overrides all other public obligations, and in extreme cases (such as wars) all other obligations of whatever kind”. Both see nationalism as something negative, with Gellner (1998: 102) referring to nationalism as a problem and Hobsbawm (1992: 12-3) stating that “no serious historian of nations and nationalism can be a committed political nationalist [...] Nationalism requires too much belief in what is patently not so”. Both Hobsbawm and Gellner acknowledge the same historical process which gave rise to nationalism. But whereas Gellner speaks of industrialism, Hobsbawm uses the term capitalism to describe the same time period but highlight different processes. According to Hearn (2006: 69-70), Hobsbawm, a Marxist historian who views capitalism critically, “sees an [national] identity that is an ideological illusion, generated by the interests of those benefiting from the capitalist state, and the fears and uncertainties of those confronting the dissolution of more traditional ways of life in the face of capitalist ‘progress’”. Hobsbawm (1992: 12) therefore suggests that the masses (i.e. workers, servants and peasants) were the last to be affected by a national consciousness. Gellner (1983: 42), on the other hand, refers to industrialism because “[e]arly industrialism means population explosion, rapid urbanization, labour migration, and also the economic and political penetration of previously more or less inward-turned communities, by a global economy and a centralizing polity”. In other words, Hobsbawm (1992: 12) holds that a national consciousness develops unevenly among social groups. This is useful for explaining early-20th-century nationalism in China, considering the important role of students and intellectuals in nationalist uprisings. Both Gellner and Hobsbawm hold that mass education, a product of industrialism and/or capitalism, engendered literacy, which in turn gave rise to
nationalism insofar as people became aware of each other as well as the national other abroad (Gellner 1983: 89-90; Hobsbawm 1992: 91-6).

Gellner (1983: 3-5) asserts that mankind passed through three fundamental stages: pre-agrarian, agrarian and industrial. Pre-agrarian groups were too small to be state-endowed, whereas some agrarian ones were but by no means all of them. In the industrial age and in the transitional period between, the existence of a state became inevitable. Gellner (1983: 98-9) suggests that nations need a “political roof”; in other words, nations need political protection in the form of a state, to persist over time. Essentially, this political roof is there to protect the people’s culture, “the distinctive style of conduct and communication of a given community” (Gellner 1983: 92). Once this political and national congruency is achieved, we can not only speak of a nation, but of a nation that is likely to persist over time.

As I demonstrate in section 4.2, the current Chinese government actively promotes nationalism in order to unify the Chinese nation, maintain its stability and strengthen CCP legitimacy. However, the most significant nationalist movements in modern Chinese history were not instigated by the government, but oppositional. For this reason, it is also worth considering Breuilly’s definition of nationalism, with its emphasis on nationalism as opposition politics.

John Breuilly treats nationalism as a “form of political behaviour in the context of the modern state and the modern state system” (Breuilly 1993 (orig. publ. in 1982) :1). He considers the focus on culture, ideology, identity, class and/or modernisation as misleading and incomplete, as he believes that nationalism is “about politics and that politics is about power” (ibid.). He does not exclude the factors mentioned above but views them only as contributions which might be of relevance, unconditionally second to the factor of politics.

Drawing on his research on past nationalist movements in a variety of countries (including England, France and China), Breuilly sees nationalism primarily as a political movement that is “seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments” (Breuilly 1993: 2). He states that one typical nationalist argument is that the “interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and
values” (ibid.). This is very similar to Hobsbawm (1992: 9) on the political duty of nationalists. It also relates to Tilly’s (1994: 133) definition of state-led nationalism in which “[r]ulers who spoke in a nation's name successfully demanded that citizens identify themselves with that nation and subordinate other interests to those of the state”. Breuilly (1993 (1982) :8) acknowledges the existence of state-led or “governmental” nationalism but believes that it is not of value in regard to “the aim of arriving at a general understanding [of nationalism]” (ibid.). He believes that a government that came to power via an oppositional nationalist movement “belongs to the nation and continues the politics of earlier oppositional movements from which that government originated” (ibid.). This conception of nationalism as opposition politics is valuable when looking at nationalist movements in China’s past but defining nationalism in contemporary China requires a greater focus on state-led nationalism considering the CCP’s effort actively to promote nationalism.

Although Gellner and Hobsbawm slightly disagree on the origin of nationalism, their shared definitions of nationalism are most useful when looking at China today. If we consider the CCP as the “political unit” and the Chinese population and territory as the “national unit”, we could argue over whether or not they are congruent. What remains clear is the fact the CCP actively promotes this congruence under its leadership. The process of creating and/or maintaining this congruence is a form of state-led nationalism, mainly instigated by the CCP. In short, contemporary China offers a good case study for Gellner’s argument that “nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy” (Gellner 1983:1), as well as for Tilly’s “state-led nationalism” (Tilly 1994: 133). However, yet another scholar of the modern school of thought needs to be considered when explaining nationalism in contemporary China.

Anderson (2006 (orig. publ. in 1983) :5) defines a nation as an “imagined” political community, imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. What is significant about Anderson’s idea is that he treats nations as an imagined construct, instead of an actual real entity. There are four key aspects of his argument. First, although people might live in a community that shares values, traditions and territory, most of them never interact face-to-face, therefore they live in an ‘imagined’ community (Anderson 2006: 6). Second, the nation is imagined as limited because the boundaries in which it operates.
According to Anderson (2006: 7), no nationalist dreams of the day when all humans become part of his/her nation, whereas such a dream may exist in Christianity. Thirdly, a nation is imagined as sovereign because, in the period of Enlightenment and Revolution, nations/communities became free, due to the destruction of hierarchical structures (e.g. societal classes). Finally, they are communities, because of mutually-felt comradeship (Anderson 2006: 7). In other words, a nation is (just) an imagined community, since the members usually never meet or hear each other, which means the communal feeling exists only in their minds. In addition, he (ibid.) believes that despite exploitation and inequality that exist in some imagined communities, “the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship”.

There are two significant overlaps between Anderson’s imagined communities and Gellner’s point of view. Anderson (2006: 5) also believes that it would be a mistake to treat nationalism as an ideology. He (ibid.) argues it would “make things easier if one treated it as if it belonged to with ‘kinship’ and ‘religion’, rather than with ‘liberalism’ and ‘fascism’”. Another more significant overlap with Gellner is that Anderson (2006: 37-46) considers nations and nationalism a modern phenomenon. However, unlike Gellner who focuses on industrialism and mass education, Anderson believes that it was print-capitalism (which started in the industrial period) that caused the rise of nationalism. Both emphasise the same time period, but Anderson (2006: 37-46) focuses particularly on the technological change, arguing that print-capitalism led people, for the first time, to realise and imagine large communities with shared mutual feeling, values and culture.

2.2 Banal and Everyday Nationalism and their Application to the Chinese Context

Until 1995, scholars have largely focused on how nations and nationalism came into being (and still do today) yet have not addressed the question of how nations are maintained. A scholar whose concept is rather different from well-established modernist ideas on nationalism, and which is highly relevant to nationalism in contemporary China, is Michael Billig. Billig’s 1995 book “Banal Nationalism” introduced
a new concept to the well-worn topic of nationalism. Unlike Breuilly and other scholars, Billig’s (1995) work on nationalism focuses neither on the creation of a nation, nor on extreme forms of nationalism. Instead he concentrates on less visible forms of nationalism that are ingrained in human consciousness. Billig’s (1995: 6) concept of banal nationalism “cover[s] the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced”. He (ibid.) indicates that these habits are present in everyday life, arguing that “[d]aily, the nation is indicated, or ‘flagged’, in the lives of its citizenry”, and “[n]ationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition”. The basic idea behind Billig’s concept ‘Banal Nationalism’ is the notion that nationalism (in its ‘hot’ form) can only be located on the periphery of a nation. This, Billig believes, is misleading as when nationalism moves in from the periphery it would wrongly be regarded at as a temporary mood which passes after some time (Billig 1995: 5). Instead he puts forward the idea that for ‘hot’ nationalism to emerge, the nation requires already existing ideological foundations.

Billig’s concept attempts to explain how established nations of the West are reproduced. The term reproduction is at the centre of Billig’s argument. Billig does not theorise about a state-seeking or nation-building nationalism, but about a nationalism which attempts to explain how and why already-established nations (of the West) persist. A key question he (1995: 93) asks is “why do ‘we’, in established, democratic nations, not forget ‘our’ national identity?”. He argues that people (of Western nations) are constantly, consciously and unconsciously, reminded that they live in nations, because their national identity is continually being “flagged” (ibid.). Billig provides several everyday examples which he thinks are key to flagging the nation on a daily basis.

Besides obvious symbols like flags and the national anthem, one important element of banal nationalism is everyday language. Billig (1995: 94) points to specific words, such as ‘the’, ‘we’ or ‘here’, and common terms like ‘people’, saying that “[t]he ‘the’ of ‘the people’ is not mere decoration [...] the definite article is continually playing its quiet part in a routine ‘deixis’ [i.e. use of words like “me” or “here” which make sense only when put in context], which banally point out ‘the homeland’”. A different example is ‘the’ prime minister: when people use this phrase, they mean ‘our’ prime minister, otherwise they would state the name of the country, for example ‘the’ prime minister ‘of Japan’.
In another example of banal nationalism, Billig discusses the unbalanced coverage of domestic and international news, with domestic issues far more prominent in most newspapers (Billig 1995: 117-9). All of this seems normal to members of a particular nation, because they are used it. Yet at the same time, people constantly unconsciously learn where their nation is, and what their nation is about. Due to the daily ‘flagging’ of ‘our’ nation in the news and elsewhere, “we are habitually at home in a textual structure, which uses the homeland’s national boundaries, dividing the world into ‘homeland’ and ‘foreign’ [...] (Billig 1995: 119).

Billig’s concept refers only to democracies in the Western hemisphere, with a strong focus on the United Kingdom and the United States. When a British newspaper reports about the latest football match against France, one arguably can classify this as banal nationalism, due to the ‘we’ and ‘they’ narrative. Unless the article is written by a journalist with nationalist intentions, this specific banal nationalism is produced (by an editor) and consumed (by the readers) unconsciously. But what about non-democratic systems outside the Western hemisphere, like China? What does banal nationalism look like in a nation in which the government consciously and intentionally seeks to reproduce a perceived nation? I will return to this point when I discuss state-related representations of the nation in chapter 6.

Billig’s concept may be very useful in helping to explain why the vast majority of Chinese university students are proud of their national identity. No person is born being proud of his/her nation. National pride and identity have to be learned over the course of many years and continue to be learned on an almost daily basis. Billig points to the necessity to look at already existing ideological foundations on which a national identity and its resulting pride can be learned, remembered and loved. However, Calhoun believes that Billig should have relied less on the notion of ‘ideology’, because ideology belongs in the “realm of politics and actually obscures the banal forms of its reproduction” (Calhoun 2017: 22). In the Chinese context the phrase ‘existing ideological foundations’ may be too strong, but cannot be dismissed entirely, due to the ideological foundations (in the form of the 1994 implemented ‘Patriotic Education Campaign’ (see Zhao 1998) the Chinese government has created and still seeks to create. Indeed, formal state education in China, which students experience on an almost daily basis, may not fall into
Billig’s idea of banal nationalism because of its obtrusiveness. However, as I will show in chapter 6, there are other unobtrusive channels of remembering and loving the Chinese nation which are related to the government and its political realm.

Michael Skey argues that Billig’s work on banal nationalism is relevant because of its “emphasis towards the routine and ‘taken-for-granted’” (Skey 2009: 334). As stated above, it is difficult to imagine that all generations of Chinese people take their nation and its achievements for granted. However, university students in Shanghai may do so more than others. The vast majority of students in Shanghai are not only proud of their national identity (Law 2011: 143), but were born around or after 1990 and have therefore grown up in both a period of economic growth and prosperity, and under the influence of ‘Patriotic Education’. As formal patriotic education does not influence every student to the same extent, it is worth investigating what else may influence students’ national self-image. By demonstrating and analysing unobtrusive, routine channels in China, or ‘flaggings’ of nationhood, chapter 6 aims to show how students in Shanghai learn to remember and love their nation unconsciously from day to day.

Although Billig’s concept appears to be useful for the Chinese context, banal nationalism cannot be applied uncritically. For instance, Billig frequently refers to ‘established nations’ of the West (mostly UK and USA), yet he does not explain when a nation is ‘established’. Not only has there been research about banal nationalism outside the ‘Western’ hemisphere (e.g. Vidacs 2011; Pinchevski and Torgovnik 2002; Yumul and Özkirimli 2000), but theorising about whether China is an established nation or not, is not important here. So long as Chinese citizens/students imagine themselves as being part of a Chinese nation and, so long as the Chinese nation consists of ‘national reminders’, the nation can be remembered and potentially loved. Even if China is not a fully established nation, there are good reasons to assume that it is at least partly established in already developed cities and regions, and that these regions are already in a process of ‘reproduction’.

Another problem in applying banal nationalism to the Chinese context is Billig’s focus on everyday language. He (1995: 93) states that “banal nationalism operates with prosaic, routine words, which take nations for granted, and which, in doing so, inhabit them. Small words, rather than grand memorable phrases, offer constant, but barely
conscious, reminders of the homeland, making ‘our’ national identity unforgettable.” While some politicians, journalists and columnists in “established nations of the West” (Billig 1995: 6) also consciously use language as means for strengthening the nation and its unity, such uses appear to be far too obvious when reading Chinese news, for instance. Moreover, Skey believes that one of the weaknesses of banal nationalism is that it does not show us how “different constituencies” (e.g. students) respond to these ‘flaggings’ in routine media coverage or political speeches (Skey 2009: 337). Different ‘flaggings’ of the nation may influence different people to a different extent. Instead of merely applying Billig’s concept to the Chinese context, chapter 6 aims to uncover and explain those ‘flaggings’ which are very difficult to avoid.

To uncover ubiquitous channels in Shanghai in which national pride is unconsciously learned also requires us to look at Fox and Miller-Idriss’ (2008) idea of ‘Everyday Nationhood’. Although similar to banal nationalism, everyday nationhood puts its focus on “actual practices through which ordinary people engage and enact (and ignore and deflect) nationhood and nationalism in the varied contexts of their everyday lives” (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008: 537). In other words, everyday nationhood attempts to explain how ordinary citizens reproduce ‘flaggings’ of the nation themselves in an everyday context. Antonsich (2016) believes that there is a clear distinction to be made between everyday nationhood, which he views as a more bottom-up engagement with the nation, and banal nationalism, which he considers as state-centric.

In the Chinese context, this clear distinction is difficult to make, as ‘flaggings’ of nationhood often (but not exclusively) link to the state. There are channels which are linked to the state and which influence every student; however, there are also channels in which the Chinese nation can be remembered and loved (by all students) beyond the political realm. Chapter 6 will utilise both banal nationalism and everyday nationhood and distinguish between state-related (mostly banal) and organic (mostly everyday) representations of the nation. It will present everyday channels of remembering which can hardly be avoided and through which Chinese university students ‘tacitly’ learn to remember and love their nation. According to Sumartojo (2017: 198) “it is impossible not to experience the national as a spatial and temporal reality, because almost everywhere is somehow nationally defined”.

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2.3 Concluding Thoughts

I have discussed specific understandings and definitions of nation and nationalism, coming to the conclusion that it is impossible to agree with only one scholar. Instead, the Chinese case needs to be analysed through different concepts of nationalism. Breuilly’s ideas are most useful in examining the first half of the 20th century. Defining nationalism for contemporary China, though, is more difficult. As I demonstrate throughout this literature review, Gellner’s theoretical approach is very useful for explaining nationalism in China today, yet it needs to be augmented with both Tilly’s definition of a state-led nationalism, and Billig’s concept of banal nationalism. Anderson can also be applied to the Chinese case, but Anderson’s focus is mainly on the nation and not nationalism. I will refer to Anderson only when necessary.

3. Student Activism and Nationalism

Having argued that a modernist approach and banal and everyday nationalism are helpful in regard to defining nationalism in China, I now analyse student activism and nationalism in Asia. Following the modernist approach, the origin of nationalism lies within Europe and the Americas, and nationalism in Asia arose at a later stage. On a global scale it is difficult to argue that a specific group or social stratum is more prone to nationalism than others, because as people, societies and political or economic circumstances change over time, so does nationalism. According to Breuilly (1993: 19) “one cannot develop a general understanding of nationalism by means of class or any other kind of socio-economic analysis [because] [t]he enormous social diversity of modern nationalist movements rules out such approaches.” What can be said, however, is that nationalists are a group of people with a specific interest that strongly (and only) relates to their perceived nation and in order to achieve their goal, they have to engage in some form of political activism. In the Chinese context, a group that has been very active in this regard has been university students. Both past and, to a lesser degree, present, show that Chinese students can play a pivotal role in nationalist movements.
3.1 Student Activism and Student Nationalism as Key Categories of Analysis

Student activism and student nationalism are not the same. However, student nationalism, if defined as a movement, is also a form of activism. Since existing research on student nationalism, where students are treated as the key category of analysis, is scanty, I will look first more broadly at student activism. Surprisingly there is little research specifically on student activism in Asia. In one of the few studies on this topic, Weiss et al (2012) state that “[s]tudent activism is so commonplace that it seems to require no explanation” and that “[d]espite the continuing visibility of student protest, relatively little theoretical or comparative research has explored the determinants and impacts of student activism.” This does not mean that there is no literature on student activism in Asia, but much of the existing literature (Altbach 1989, 1984; Lipset 1964) focuses more broadly on the ‘Third World’. The editors of the 2012 book “Student Activism in Asia” find that questions such as why students protest and why students protest as students, as well as the question of commonalities across student bodies, have not been sufficiently answered (Weiss et al 2012: 1-2).

In historical perspective, Altbach (1989: 97) states that “[s]tudents have had a long-standing romance with nationalism, and some of the earliest important student movements were related to nationalism.” Evidence that nationalist elements have played a pivotal role in past student activism can be found in countries across the world, such as Germany, Italy, Indonesia and China (Altbach 1989: 97-9). However, in the 21st century, things might be rather different, if we consider Hjerm’s 2001 study of the relation of education and nationalist sentiment, which finds that an increased level of education leads to a decrease in nationalist attitudes (Hjerm 2001).

In the Asian context, Weiss et al (2012: 2) define student activism as “collective action by university students directed toward (and often against) the ruling regime.” This definition works well for explaining past student activism in the countries in their study, namely China, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, Burma, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, but works less well for China today. Furthermore, while Weiss et al have provided a general definition for student activism in the Asian context,
student nationalism in Asia, on the other hand, does not have one. There is research on both nationalism and students in Asian countries, but, except in the case of China before 1949 (historical China), student nationalism is not a key category of analysis. If we follow Gellner (1983: 89-90) that mass education gave rise to nationalism and Hobsbawm (1992: 12) that the popular masses were the last to be affected by a national consciousness, we could argue that students (and other intellectuals) might have been among the first to become nationalists. However, the existing literature tends to treat Asian students simply as a group which sometimes takes a vanguard role in nationalist movements and sometimes does not (see for example: Arenas 2006; Law 2002; Lee 2006; Sasada 2006).

The exception to this is China. When researching student nationalism in Asia, one comes across a vast body of literature which almost exclusively deals with historical student nationalism in China. The following section discusses student activism in Asia and explains why students are an interesting group to look at historically. I also briefly highlight the extent of nationalism found in historical student activism in Asia.

### 3.2 Student Nationalism and Activism in Asia

In order to understand student activism and nationalism in Asia more generally, I will highlight some key points of the book “Student Activism in Asia”, which treats students as a distinct group throughout most of the twentieth century. First, Asian students were usually concentrated geographically in a specific area in a large city, often the capital, in relative proximity to the state, or at least state institutions (Weiss et al 2012: 10-3). This allowed students not only to assemble relatively easily, but also to carry their protest to the state without travelling hundreds of miles.

Second, students typically enjoyed a disproportionate influence in society due to their (perceived) elite status (ibid.). The number of students in Asia was very low in the first half of the 20th century. Even by 1970, only Japan and the Philippines had a slightly larger student body (in comparison to the other Asian countries in the study), approximately 18% of the relevant age cohort. Today the number of students in most Asian countries is significantly higher, as tertiary education has become a mass-
commodity (Weiss et al 2012: 7). When students were a small educated group, often comprised of those who came from affluent families and/or government officials, they tended to enjoy more rights than other, less privileged citizens, because students were not only important for the development of a country as a whole, but also often occupied jobs in government after graduation. What this means is that students enjoyed privileges and immunities, because as “pre-professionals” they were (in the same way as professionals) vital for a government’s survival (Weiss et al 2012: 10-3).

Third, students were often integrated in multiple organisational structures. They were not simply enrolled in a university but were also members of various associations and organisations where they were able to meet like-minded others. This includes student councils and unions, which enabled students to form a wider network. If conditions and time were right, these networks could be used to mobilise protest on the streets (ibid.).

Finally, students in general had limited responsibilities and sufficient time to see and realise gaps between the ideal and reality in society. Due to their privileged student status and the transition from adolescent to adult, they did not have to earn money, take care of a family or have other responsibilities adults normally have. In addition, due to their high level of education, students were often able to analyse mistakes of their own governments (e.g. corruption, unequal treaties with other countries) (ibid.).

All these factors might help to explain why students as a distinct group played a vanguard role in activist movements, like the ones in Japan in the late 1960s (Steinhoff 2012: 66-72), South Korea in the 1980s (Park 2012: 134-7) or Indonesia in the mid-1960s (Aspinall 2012: 156-64). If we follow Breuilly (1993: 8-9) and view nationalism as a form of opposition politics, we can conclude that all three student movements were essentially nationalist. In China, however, major anti-government as well as anti-foreign student protests happened at a different time as I demonstrate in section 4.3.

Student activism and nationalism in Asia is complicated to analyse and it is difficult to generalise patterns. I have explained why students possess a potential vanguard role in activism and nationalism; however, the reason why they protest, when they protest, as well as the outcome of this protest vary significantly. However, a few conclusions can be drawn. Altbach (1989: 108) states that “student movements, by themselves, are never
powerful enough to overturn a government.” Although a case like China shows that students often emphasised their purity (i.e. difference from other social groups), mass protests in China have never consisted only of students. Another point which interrelates with the previous one is the issue of students as an elite stratum, which holds fewer responsibilities, yet more freedom. In most Asian countries, students throughout most of the twentieth century were a very small group in society. Today, however, tertiary education is a mass-commodity, therefore this elite status has diminished (Aspinall and Weiss 2012: 289). Students today face much more competition than before, therefore finding suitable employment has become much more difficult. Aspinall and Weiss found that the expansion of higher education and the resulting competition for employment, impedes student activism in the ten countries they studied (Aspinall and Weiss 2012: 285-6). This does not mean that students do not protest, but again that students rarely protest alone. Instead students can be found alongside protestors from different social groups.

This brings me back to the definition of student activism, defined as a “collective action by university students directed toward (and often against) the ruling regime” (Weiss et al 2012: 2). Looking at China, this definition works well for past student activism in the country, but it might be not accurate for describing student activism and nationalism in China today. In addition, there is the problem of distinguishing student activism from its sub-type, student nationalism. Student activism can function without nationalist elements in the same way as student nationalism can function without activist elements. Student nationalism is often a form of student activism, if the protest is visible and students become active as a collective. However, students not always act as a collective and some forms of nationalist protest only feature specific groups of students. Regardless of differing motivations for protest, what can be said is that nationalism has often been expressed explicitly by students in Asia. This explicit expression has most frequently been directed at their own government. And finally, student nationalism as a form of activism has often been expressed explicitly (e.g. in form of street protests, hunger strike or else). In order to get a better understanding of student nationalism in China more broadly, the next chapter will focus on both student nationalism in the past and present and highlight changes that have occurred over time.
4. Nationalism in China and the Role of Students

Nationalism in China has been prevalent throughout the 20th and 21st century, but it has changed significantly over time. A group which often has taken a major role in nationalist (and other activist) movements is students. The previous section outlined why students had (and still have) the potential to take a vanguard role in student movements in Asia. China has seen several student movements over time, some of them arguably with a strong nationalist component, which have played a pivotal role in modern Chinese history. In the following sections I analyse student nationalism in China, highlighting when and why particular movements were nationalist and how nationalism changed over time, creating a distinct pattern of contemporary nationalism.

4.1 Student Nationalism in Modern Chinese History

According to Zhao (2004: 37-8), modern Chinese nationalism took form in the mid and late 19th century when China suffered defeats during the 1st Opium War (1840-42) and the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95). These defeats (amongst others) are a significant component in understanding the causes of early modern Chinese nationalism. Many Chinese feared that China “was about to be ‘carved up like a melon’” (Spence 1990: 230-31). Apart from other developments, Spence suggests that there were three particular events which made the existence of nationalism visible: The Boxer Uprising of 1900, the publication of ‘The Revolutionary Army’ (by Zou Rong) in 1903, and the anti-American boycott of 1905. These three events serve as evidence for the mobilisation of people (as a unit and for the first time) and can be seen as the harbingers of the downfall of the Qing (Spence 1990: 231).

4.1.1 Late Qing-Period

The Boxer Rebellion brought nationwide attention to the cause of anti-imperialism. More importantly it was sign of resistance to foreign powers (mainly Japan and the U.S.)
(Schmidt-Glintzer 2004: 36-7). During this particular rebellion, Sun Yatsen and Kang Youwei (both exiled) launched their own attacks against the Qing government, considered weak and corrupt. Though different in their ambitions, neither achieved a victory against the Qing troops (Spence 1990:236). A strong united resistance did not exist, and the troops of the Qing were still quite strong.

Arguably the increasing power of the written word was the defining moment where student nationalism became important (Spence 1990: 236). One of the key figures of early student nationalism was Zou Rong and his famous publication ‘The Revolutionary Army’, which spread anti-Manchu ideas and called for the Chinese Han race to unite against the Manchu rulers. Like Zou, many Chinese students at that time had gone to Japan to study and returned to China with a clear sense of how backward China was by comparison. Sun Yatsen distributed thousands of copies of Zou’s book to his followers (ibid.). Fairbank (1987: 141-2) states that “China after 1901 participated in the worldwide rise of the popular press, international news reporting, and mass publication of books and journals, [which] rapidly facilitated the spread of ideas in urban centres.” The rise of popular press in China very much coincides with Anderson’s argument that it was mainly print-capitalism that engendered a national consciousness (Anderson 2006 (1983): 45). In early 20th-century China, only a small fraction of the population was literate. Therefore, those who were able to read, like students, spread the ideas of publications like Zou’s. A popular term used by authors of that time was minzu, commonly translated as ‘nationality’; however, authors throughout the 20th century had different ideas on what minzu truly means. Dikötter (1994: 406) states that “[i]n nationalist narratives of the first decade of [the 20th century], minzu was thought to be based on a quantifiable number of people called "Chinese," a group with clear boundaries by virtue of imagined blood ties, kinship and descent.”

In 1905-1911, the Qing government had no clear military dominance over the country, and the lack of financial resources, which was met by an increase in various taxes, further delegitimized the Manchu rule (Spence 1990: 256-7). The weak stance of the Qing towards foreign powers, as well as the fact that Sun Yatsen’s ‘Revolutionary Alliance’ (precursor of the Guomindang) grew from 400 members in 1905 to 10,000 in 1911, helped overthrow the Qing in 1911. It is safe to argue that students played a
pivotal role in the overthrow of the Qing, considering that many of Sun’s ‘Revolutionary Alliance’ were students (Spence 1990: 261-2).

4.1.2 May 4th Movement

In the early post-Qing period, disagreements arose about how to balance traditional Chinese values and modern Western ideas (Zhao 2004: 38). According to Spence (1990: 310) Chinese intellectuals had not shown much interest in Marxism before 1917, yet “the rise of interest in Communist ideology was symptomatic of a cultural upheaval that was spreading throughout China.” Thus, it should not surprise us that “[t]he CCP was founded primarily on indigenous nationalist impulses in association with the May Fourth movement” (Zhao 2004: 87).

The May Fourth Movement epitomises the peak of student nationalism in the Republican period, if not the whole of 20th-century China. After World War I, China’s Shandong peninsula was ceded to Japan, sparking massive protests among Chinese students. On May 4th 1919, students marched to Tiananmen Gate to express their anger at both foreign powers and their own (warlord) government, which had signed agreements to Japan’s acquisition of Shandong (Wright 2012: 37).

Schmidt-Glintzer (2004: 48-50) highlights the dramatic increase in student numbers from 1915 to 1925 as a key cause of the May Fourth movement. The US Congress funded Chinese students studying in the US, leading to the opening of Tsinghua College (now University) in Beijing in 1908 as a preparatory school for students who wished to study in the US (Fairbank 1987: 187-8). The striking difference, however, is that “[e]ducation in Japan in the 1900s had produced the revolutionary generation active in 1911 [whereas] [e]ducation in the West now produced the academic leadership of the Nationalist era after World War I” (Fairbank 1987: 186). Students who studied in the US and Western Europe played a key role in regards to the May 4th Movement, because they brought new ideas into the country, including socialism, social Darwinism, democracy, science and communism. The import of these ideas equipped students with knowledge that was useful to “forge a coherent Chinese nation” (Zhao 2004: 84). According to Fairbank (1987: 310) “[b]oth the growing discussion of Social Darwinist
ideas and the rise of interest in the Communist ideology were symptomatic of a cultural upheaval that was spreading throughout China.” Like their counterparts who studied in Japan before, those students were able to see how far behind China was in terms of economic and political modernisation. According to Wu (2008: 468), the May Fourth events and circumstances “laid the foundation of China’s modern national identity, and of the Chinese nationalist and communist revolutions that followed.”

The ultimate goal of large parts of the student body was to build a strong new nation. Gellner (1983: 48) asserts that “nationalism is not the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, through that is how it does indeed present itself. It is in reality the consequence of a new form of social organization, based on internalized, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state.” It was not the goal of students in the May 4th Movement to preserve old traditions (e.g. Confucianism) and the old regime which were seen to be responsible for China’s underdevelopment, but to opt for something new.

According to Gellner (1983: 88-97), nations need a political roof (i.e. political institutions which safeguard the interests of a nation, ideally a state-government) in order to exist and persist, and this imaginary political roof did not exist in the eyes of Chinese students. The rule of the warlords therefore had to be overcome. Again, we see that nationalism in China can be best explained with a modernist approach which, according to Gellner (1983: 1), holds that the political and national unit should be congruent, which was not the case in China in 1919.

4.1.3 GMD, CCP and Student Nationalism

The aftermath of the May 4th Movement left a weak warlord regime, and opposition political organisations like the Guomindang (GMD) and the 1921-founded CCP were closely linked with students (Wright 2012: 38). In the early 1920s, students established schools to educate ordinary workers in topics like national consciousness (ibid.). At first nationalists and communists formed a united front; this, however, changed within a relatively short period of time.
After the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925, the alliance of GMD and CCP dissipated and Chiang Kai-shek took over the GMD. The GMD was popular among large parts of the student body, but now “many party leaders were having second thoughts about letting students play an active role in politics” (Israel 1966: 15). In addition, the GMD banned all communist elements from schools and put great effort in discouraging student activism (Israel 1966: 14-8). Of course, the communists themselves were also nationalists, insofar as their goal was also to build a unified nation, yet the CCP was also at first unwilling and unable to win over the majority of the student body. “Although the KMT [GMD] lost student leadership by default, the CCP was slow to step into the breach. It too harboured doubts about the young intellectuals” (Israel 1966: 192). Nonetheless, due to the emergence of a favourable public image of the Communists by the mid-1930s, the CCP became more attractive to wide parts of the student body and began to acknowledge the revolutionary energy of students.

Japanese pressure in 1935 sparked new waves of student protest across the whole country, forcing Chiang to cooperate once more with the CCP to defeat the Japanese (Wright 2012: 39). Wright (ibid.) states that “[f]rom the late 1930s until Japan’s surrender in 1945, activism on the part of students with a distinct identity as students, virtually disappeared.” Shortly after World War II, many students turned away from the GMD due to the overall bad living conditions. Due to the CCP’s oppositional role, its revolutionary character and sophisticated propaganda techniques as well as the diminishment of GMD-power, it won the allegiance of most students by 1945 (Israel 1966: 193-4). In addition, the CCP took credit for defeating the Japanese on Chinese soil.

4.1.4 The Era of Mao Zedong

In regard to student nationalism, a great shift took place shortly after the CCP came to power. While student nationalism before 1949 was usually directed toward or against the state, it became ‘regime-instigated’ under Mao (Wright 2012: 40). According to Weatherley (2014: 23), the victory of the CCP in 1949 was “as much a victory for nationalism as it was for communism”. We could even argue that it was a victory of state-led nationalism, as nationalism during Mao’s era, apart from the phenomena of
Red Guards (*Hong Weibing*, 红卫兵), was mainly top-down. Mao understood how to utilize nationalist feelings (e.g. the desire to forge a Chinese nation) of intellectuals and students, strongly anti-imperialist at that time, as was Mao. There had been intellectuals who did not follow Mao and even criticised him and the CCP, but they were often silenced, killed or deported to labour camps (Schmidt-Glintzer 2004: 80). By declaring that the working class would lead China, Mao destroyed the former elite-status of students and transformed all levels of education towards manual labour and ideological correctness (i.e. socialism, communism and the breakup of all forms of elitism) (Wright 2012: 40-1).

During the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) universities were shut down almost entirely and therefore the group of university students ceased to exist. It is therefore difficult to speak of student nationalism, since students as such did not exist. Former students were now simply adolescents, such as any other person in the same age cohort. The only evidence of a phenomenon similar to student nationalism was the Red Guards, which largely consisted of school students and former university students. With their new ‘authority’, their mission was, in the name of Mao, to “root out, criticize, and destroy manifestations of feudal and capitalist culture and thinking” (ibid.). However, it is difficult to call the actions of the Red Guards nationalist, because their actions often were spontaneous and random, and they were driven largely by Communist and Maoist zeal. Although they believed that they simply carried out Mao’s wishes, by 1969 Mao had become concerned with the actions of the Red Guards and ordered the army to halt their actions (Wright 2012: 41). Therefore, although there were traces of student nationalism during Mao’s era, a distinct nationalism in which students played a major role did not exist.

### 4.1.5 The Post-Mao Era

The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 initiated a further significant change: as universities reopened, students, once again, formed a distinct, elite social stratum (Wright 2012: 41).
In addition, this period in Chinese history also set the starting point of the so called four modernisations (set forth by Zhou Enlai in 1963, and enacted by Deng Xiaoping in 1978), in agriculture, industry, military, and science and technology. In 1978 Deng demanded a full rehabilitation of those intellectuals who were persecuted during the Cultural Revolution (Schmidt-Glintzer 2004: 97).

Deng and his followers believed they would need help from abroad in order to modernise the country successfully. The reopening of diplomatic relations with countries such as the US and Japan is significant as it epitomizes a major diminution of anti-imperialist thought. For three quarters of the 20th century, anti-imperialism had been inseparable from nationalism, whereas now this was about to change. However, it would be wrong to assume that therefore nationalism disappeared. Although the anti-imperialist component became less prevalent, Deng and the CCP nevertheless endeavoured to forge a strong Chinese nation, which is, de facto, a nationalist goal.

As reform did not bring immediate economic success, “many Chinese had arrived at a time of soul searching about their national identity and the meaning of modernization” (Pye 1993: 128-9). What followed were the so called ‘three belief crises’, which were the crisis of faith in socialism, the crisis of belief in Marxism, and the crisis of trust in the party (Wang 2008:788). Zhao (1998: 288) believes that these three crises led to the student protests in 1989. Zhao (2000: 1595) argues that “[u]nlike the eras of the earlier movements, the 1980s found China with a unitary state, […], and state legitimacy based on moral and economic performance.” While rhetorically the CCP still grounded its legitimacy in part on Maoist thought, de facto the CCP’s legitimacy became more and more based on economic progress.

Student numbers in China during the late 1970s and 1980s did not rise significantly and admission to university was extremely limited, therefore students remained a small elite group (Wright 2012: 41). Many became state sector employees after graduation, however, which meant that their salary was only marginally higher than that of their less-educated co-workers. Their elite educational status was not displayed in their salary after graduation, and poor living conditions as well as corrupt CCP officials further deepened students’ dissatisfaction (Wright 2012: 41-3). In the mid-late 1980s, students, like their counterparts in the late-Qing and early-Republican eras, increasingly believed
that China was still backward and inferior to the West. But unlike before, students did not demand a change in government. Wright (2012:44) holds that students always emphasized their loyalty to the regime and simply requested dialogue.

In other words, students generally agreed with the course of reform and opening of the government but wished to improve the government’s work and wanted to have a voice. In addition, influential cadres showed great sympathy for students’ demands. The death of Hu Yaobang (popular among and sympathetic to students) in April 1989 resulted in a large-scale funeral march which later culminated in the well-known pro-democracy movement on Tiananmen Square. The Tiananmen movement was not solely a student movement, as many workers joined the protest over urban inflation and harsh work conditions (Spence 1990: 735). Nevertheless, the movement was mainly carried by students and intellectuals. The reason for that was that “during the 1989 BSM [Beijing Student Movement], Beijing students tried to exclude Beijing workers from participating in the movement [at first], an action that, [...], was motivated by a traditional sense of elite status” (Zhao D 2000: 1594). Although this elite status also existed in the Republican period, students in the 1980s were more hesitant in regards to cooperating with the ordinary working class. This is because “the ruling regime’s solid control over the state [in the 1980s] heightened student concerns with repression” (Wright 2012: 49).

4.2 Economic and Political Shifts and Student Nationalism since the 1990s

Shortly after the government put an end to student protests on Tiananmen Square, student protests stopped. Throughout almost the whole of the 1990s, student activism, as defined before, took a backseat (Wright 2012: 46). Student nationalism did not disappear but underwent a significant change. Before examining students and nationalism since the 1990s, it is worth looking at broader political and economic shifts of the past 25 years, and how these have had an impact on students.
4.2.1 Economic Shifts

The establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) took place in the late 1970s, and were, according to Ge (1999: 1267) the “centerpiece of a gradualist approach toward reform and opening of the economy”. After a short economic decline after Tiananmen, China’s economic growth accelerated because of massive foreign direct investment (FDI) starting in 1992. China’s top universities are found in cities considered economically successful. According to Hong (2008: 593) “Beijing is still the most active municipality in technology transfer from university to industry”. Students in Beijing (and Shanghai, Shenzhen and other cities) therefore conduct their studies in an economically prosperous area.

China’s economic growth has also produced a rapidly growing urban middle class whose wages rose by 11.2% per annum over the period 1995-2007, whereas rural wages rose by only 6.3% per annum (Knight and Ding 2012: 188). While many Chinese benefitted from economic growth, some therefore benefitted more than others. Largely those who live (and are registered) in the SEZs and Beijing have benefitted the most. As of 2007, China has had the highest rate of income inequality in Asia (Knight 2013: 1). This is a very significant shift in comparison with the early post-Mao period, where income inequality barely existed (ibid.).

In conjunction with the rise of China’s new middle class, the number of students in higher education rose as well. Until 1998 enrolment remained below 0.3 percent of China’s population, whereas in 2006 it already amounted to 1.4 percent, due to a sharp change in higher education policy (Knight and Ding 2012: 121). Owing to “the challenges of the information technology revolution and the intense competition of economic globalization of the new century” (Li 2004: 14), the government implemented a new higher education policy in 1998. Besides reforming the administrative system and increasing expenditure for universities, the government planned to eliminate illiteracy among young and middle-aged adults and increase the number of students studying in higher education, in order to make China’s tertiary education more competitive (Li 2004: 16). By 2002, already 15 per cent of university-age youth were enrolled, and many chose to study a subject relevant to the development of the Chinese economy (ibid.).
The sharp increase in student numbers is to be seen in conjunction with the constant rise of wages of China’s new middle class. Tertiary education is not free of charge, therefore parents (and grandparents) must invest a lot of money in their child’s education, if the child is unable to get a scholarship. According to Wright (2012: 46) this constitutes a shift in regard to the student body, because “since the early 1990s, university students in China have been drawn less from the ranks of the most academically meritorious and more from the pool of financially privileged families”, i.e. China’s new middle class. This is not to say that admission to a good university is decided only by socio-economic status, since a student needs a high score on the *gaokao* (高考, National Higher Education Entrance Examination), but it suggests that the student body has changed, or at least consists of a greater variety of students today. Li remarks that although the number of students from poor families has risen, “students from higher income families have higher attendance rates than lower income families, especially at the higher quality universities” (Li 2007: 734). There are also quotas for specific group of students (e.g. ethnic minorities) who essentially can be admitted to a university with a lower *gaokao* score. Wright (2012: 46) argues that the elite status of students in the 1990s dramatically diminished. This is important, because students in pre-Tiananmen China were usually guaranteed a job, typically in government and administration. This changed in the 1990s, when Chinese tertiary education started to become a mass commodity for China’s emerging middle class.

Yet another shift constitutes China’s increasing global economic interdependence and changing relations with former imperialist powers. One large trading partner of China is Japan. Export to- and import from Japan have fluctuated over the years, Japan nevertheless remains vital for China’s economic prosperity (Alvstam et al 2009). Many students have visited (and sometimes even studied in) Japan. Although the proportion of Chinese students studying in Japan is higher than Japanese students studying in China, more and more Japanese students also come to study and live in China (Liu 2015). China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 constitutes another example of its global economic interdependence.

To sum up, economic shifts that have taken place within the last 25 years have in many ways changed students’ lives. As most students come from families that could be
considered China’s new middle class, they are part of those Chinese who benefitted from economic reforms. Moreover, all of China’s most influential universities are located in highly productive cities and regions. Essentially this means that students live at places which offer a vast array of resources, including leisure time activities, restaurants, shops and entertainment. Moreover, students in cities are also exposed to other cultures, be it expatriates working in those cities, foreign students or tourists. Finally, most potential future employers are located in cities as well, which means students get a glimpse where they might work after graduation.

The downside of China’s economic growth is that students now have to compete for employment. Although China’s economy is constantly growing, students today are no longer guaranteed a job in government or administration. The rise in student numbers also means that tertiary education is far less exclusive than before. With the exception of those who graduated from China’s elite universities such as Tsinghua, Peking or Fudan, many students struggle to find well-paid employment after graduation (Mok 2016: 60-7).

4.2.2 Political Shifts and Patriotic Education

The first and arguably most significant political shift that took place in post-Tiananmen China for students was the Patriotic Education Campaign (PEC), implemented in 1994 and constantly expanded until today. As the name suggests, the goal of the PEC was to implement patriotic education.

In the CCP’s eyes, the so called “three belief crises” of the 1980s significantly contributed to a loss of credibility in the CCP and their modernisation efforts (Zhao S 1998: 288). According to Callahan (2010: 32), Deng came to realise that China’s youth needed to be taught what it means to be patriotic, in order to foster loyalty and support for the CCP. Patriotic education was meant not only to establish trust in the CCP’s government, but also to create a unifying patriotic spirit particularly among the younger population. In order to achieve this goal, the CCP created a narrative which holds that the CCP is the guardian of China and therefore indistinguishable from the Chinese nation. Normally a
guardian protects something, and in the Chinese case it is the nation. But a nation only needs protection if there is a threat.

A key component of the PEC was therefore to shift the focus from domestic issues to foreign problems, or even invented foreign problems (Callahan 2010: 35). This is why the main component of the PEC was the notion of China as a victim of history. The emphasis of the PEC was not just on Chinese history in general, but particularly modern Chinese history, including China’s long period of suffering at the hands of foreign imperialists, the rise of the CCP and the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China. But patriotism was not only to be taught in history classes. According to Hughes, Jiang Zemin believed that patriotism had to permeate almost the entire curriculum, so it could foster and stimulate national pride, self-confidence and nation-building (Hughes 2006: 57). While the outside world perceived the Tiananmen protests as a pro-democracy movement where domestic problems such as official corruption and the lack of political reforms played a key-role, the CCP’s solution was “to shift the focus of youthful energies away from domestic issues to foreign problems [...] to redirect protest toward the foreigner as the primary enemy” (Callahan, 2010: 35). How this is implemented in the PEC I examine in detail in section 5. As for the “foreigner” as a primary enemy, state-led nationalism in the 1990s and the 2000s does not negatively address all foreign countries equally.

Another important political shift for students is the emergence of the internet and the CCP’s aim to censor specific content. According to Griffiths (2015), there are 668 million internet users in China. Today’s students belong to the first generation who grew up with the internet. Although all Chinese media are regulated by the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department (CPD), Hassid (2008: 415) finds that “it is hard to know the extent to which power is shared among the CPD and local or provincial propaganda departments”. It is therefore “often impossible for reporters to know ahead of time what will be a safe story”, so content on television and in print media is not always easy to control (Hassid, 2008: 423). The World-Wide-Web, however, constitutes a much bigger challenge for the CPD, as it offers a platform to the outside world that cannot fully be controlled. King et al (2013: 328) found that three types of censorship are used. First is “The Great Firewall of China”, which blocks specific websites. Secondly, “keyword
blocking” has the effect that certain words, such as ‘Tiananmen protest’, cannot be found on the web. Finally, there is “hand censoring”, used to erase content shortly after it appears (King et al 2013: 328-30). The ubiquity of the internet in a student’s life and the censorship that comes with it certainly has an impact. The question is how both the internet and the censorship influence students’ attitudes toward the nation. I return to this point when I examine the internet as potential nationalist influence on in section 5.

To summarise, the biggest political impact on students has arguably been the implementation of patriotic education. This is not only conveyed in the classroom, but also in students’ life more generally, as I demonstrate in section 5. The internet constitutes another important impact, because most students regularly use it and it still offers a grey area where students are able to access information or express views without fearing repression from the government (e.g. via the use of a VPN). Other economic and political shifts which have affected university students since 1990 may also have had an impact on nationalist feelings and behaviour, but the extent to which this has happened is unclear. These shifts might serve as an explanation to why (visible) student nationalism since 1990 has not played a dominant role. Nevertheless, students have participated in nationalist protests. In the following section I discuss the role of students in visible nationalist protest 1990-2016.

4.3 Students’ Role in Nationalist Protest since the 1990s

4.3.1 Anti-US Nationalism in 1999

The bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 was an incident that made explicitly expressed nationalism among students in China visible again, sparking massive protest against the US-led NATO. Although public demonstrations are officially forbidden in China, Chinese students participated in demonstrations, with the biggest one taking place at the US embassy in Beijing. According to Chen-Weiss (2014: 55) “[m]edia coverage of the protests served as a green light to those who had been apprehensive about participating”, thus the protest occurred unhindered. One could argue that the CCP faced a dilemma. On the one hand it wanted to maintain healthy
diplomatic relations with the US due to economic interdependence; on the other hand, the government had to show strength towards the US, in order for Chinese to not lose faith in the CCP.

Unlike nationalist protest in the first half of the 20th century, and protest more generally during the late 1980s, research has not focused on students in 1999 as a key group of the protest. Gries (2001) mentions protesting Chinese students in the US but looks at Chinese nationalist reactions more broadly. Chen-Weiss (2014:46-66) also mentions students, but often simply refers to “protesters”. Zhao Dingxin’s study (conducted at three elite Beijing universities) on the attitude of university students after Belgrade, found that “at least among China’s elite student population, a population that has always been at the forefront of Chinese politics in the 20th century, there is no domination of anti-US nationalism” (Zhao 2002b: 902). This claim, and the lack of research into the role of student protesters in the 1999 demonstrations, however, does not mean that anti-US nationalism among students is lacking, or that other forms of nationalism are dominant among China’s student population, but simply that reliable evidence is missing.

4.3.2 Students in Anti-Japanese Protests

Because of the PEC’s focus on modern Chinese history, Chinese students are very aware of the first and second Sino-Japanese War as well as the famous Nanjing Massacre of 1937. Based on the Japanese invasion, the Nanjing Massacre, and recent incidents in 2005 (textbook scandal) and 2012 (Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute), Sino-Japanese-Relations are tense, despite their closely-linked economies. A by-product that emerged during the 1990s, was a clear rise of anti-Japanese sentiments, as Chinese in general developed enormous grievances towards Japan (He 2007: 10). According to He (ibid.), this is because many Chinese have “been exposed to the history of Japanese atrocities”.

Again, existing research discusses nationalist protest and feelings in China as a reaction to both modern Chinese history and contemporary Japanese policies but does not focus on students as a key group in these protests (see Chen-Weiss 2014: 127-59; He 2007; Hughes 2006: 146-51; Downs and Saunders 1998). This is not to say that Chinese
students do not hold anti-Japanese feelings, as many of them do participate in nationalist protests against Japan, but there is no discussion of students as a key-group in these protests. He (2007:10) believes that “[w]hen there is a conflict of interest with Japan, the Chinese people always expect Japan to make concessions because it owed China so much throughout history”. But again, He speaks of Chinese people more broadly and not about students. Considering the PEC’s strong focus on China as the victim of modern history, it seems likely that students are also affected by anti-Japanese nationalist rhetoric, yet there is no evidence that students are particularly nationalist in regard to Japan.

It is worth noting that nationalist protest has not only occurred against either the United States or Japan since 1990, as a more general anti-Western nationalism came to the surface during the 2008 Olympics in reaction to Western criticism about China’s Tibet policies. But again, students were not mentioned as a key group in these protests, as “[m]any Chinese people took a defensive position toward foreign criticism of Beijing’s policies” (Zhao 2008: 48).

4.4 Conclusion

Student nationalism in China has changed quite significantly throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. Early student nationalism, which played an important role in the downfall of the Qing dynasty, was a form of nationalism very similar to - if not the same as - Breuilly’s understanding of nationalism as “not a response to simple oppression [but] an effective nationalism develops where it makes political sense for an opposition to the government to claim to represent the nation against the present state” (Breuilly 1993: 398).

The May Fourth Movement also fits with Breuilly’s framework and can even be considered as the peak of student nationalism in 20th century China. The Chinese government’s weak response to the Versailles Treaty and the fact that Japan was given Shandong territories can be seen as the main reasons for nationalist protest at that time.
The period after the May Fourth Movement is characterised by disagreements on how to build a strong Chinese nation, but the nation-building component of nationalism was constantly present. In addition to that, student nationalism remained characterised by a strong anti-imperial component. Student nationalism after 1949 was similarly characterised by anti-imperialism, considering that Mao was strongly anti-imperialist himself. But student nationalism became less important, since Mao (at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution) destroyed the former elite status of students.

In regard to student protests in 1976, 1978 and 1986 and in particular the events in 1989, students have been treated as a key category of analysis, but student nationalism has not. I argue that nationalism did play a role in 1989, considering the nation-building component of nationalism more generally and Gellner’s (1983: 1) theoretical consideration that “nationalist sentiment is [also] the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of this principle”, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent. In the light of general dissatisfaction among students, one could not say that both units were congruent at that time.

Arguably the Patriotic Education Campaign is the starting point of a state-led nationalism in reform-era China. According to Tilly (1994: 133) state-led nationalism is a nationalism where “[r]ulers who spoke in a nation's name successfully demanded that citizens identify themselves with that nation and subordinate other interests to those of the state”. Tilly (1996: 303-4) is more specific when he talks about top-down nationalism, which he does not clearly distinguish from state-led nationalism, asserting that this is “the insistence that the nation’s collective interest, as interpreted by the state's current rulers, should take priority over all particularisms”. This definition is more helpful in regard to defining nationalism in China more broadly, because ‘should’ does not automatically imply the final achievement, in regard to producing and reproducing China’s one nation. However, I suggest that the term “state-led” is more helpful than “top-down” here, because it distinguishes between the state/government and various others who might not be part of the state yet could be considered being at the top as well (e.g. intellectuals, entrepreneurs).

In the 1990s, the PEC and other factors established a considerably successful state-led nationalism in the 1990s. In addition to patriotic education in- and outside of the
classroom, China’s overall economic prosperity might have played a role. Due to the large amount of university graduates, competition has become fierce. Altbach (1989: 104) believes that “[s]tudents worry about future jobs and about their role in the upper strata of society after graduation”. This might make them focus more on their studies and less about societal and political problems. The internet also represents a relatively new source of influence in regard to both nationalism instigated by the state and instigated by non-CP actors, and so far it remains unclear whether students are a key category of analysis in regard to cyber nationalism (both as passive recipients and actors).

Wright (2012: 46-9) and Aspinall and Weiss (2012: 281-296) have argued that there are three key reasons for the absence of a large-scale student protest against the government, namely the loss of students’ elite status, the decline in students’ collective identity and, the shift in thought from being a vanguard of broader social interests towards career-oriented individuals who face fierce competition in order to find good employment. Even if we accept these three points, however, they are just a small part of the puzzle, since they do not include the role of the state in intentionally directing student nationalism, for example through the PEC. Both nationalist protest and protest more generally among students against the Chinese government might have sharply declined, nationalism and nationalist protest instigated by the government might very well exist.

The fact that students are barely mentioned as a key group in visible nationalist protest since 1990 does not imply that they do not hold nationalist views or feelings. The internet is a platform where nationalist thought and feelings are also explicitly expressed. However, so far research on cyber nationalism in China has also not yet dealt with students as a key group. Instead, existing research usually speaks of ‘internet users’ or ‘netizens’ more broadly (Cairns and Carlson 2016; Hyun and Kim 2015; Cheng 2011; Lei 2011; Leibold 2010). This is not to say that students do not express nationalism online, but it is unclear whether they constitute a key group. In addition to that, past research (e.g. Lei 2011) has suggested that ‘netizens’ occasionally oppose the official CCP-line and express their anger towards the government online. I will come back to this
point in chapter 4.4 where I discuss the internet as a potential channel of nationalist influence.

Visible nationalist expression since the 1990s has mostly been directed against foreign countries. Nationalist expression online has also targeted the Chinese government for not taking a tough stance in foreign policy matters, as in 2012 when Chinese netizens expressed their anger about the ‘weak’ response in the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands incident (Cairns and Carlson 2016). Nationalism itself, however, can also refer to nation building (and maintaining), an aspect that research on post-Tiananmen Chinese nationalism has not dealt with in detail. Instead, the scholarly debate on nationalism in post-Tiananmen China has almost exclusively talked about nationalism in its aggressive, anti-foreign form and it has not treated students as a key group, either on the streets or online.

5. Research Gaps

As I have demonstrated in this literature review, the study of student nationalism in China is very complex and has arguably become more complicated in recent times. There are many different factors which have to be considered in order to get a precise picture of contemporary student nationalism. There are also several aspects of student nationalism which the existing literature only covers poorly or not at all. In the following I point out a few of these gaps and problems.

5.1 Unclear Origin and Influence

Although there are many channels that contain nationalism - most significantly school education - it remains unclear which of these channels actually have had (and do have) a strong positive influence on the national attitudes of university students. Fairbrother (2003) has attempted to uncover students’ perceptions of channels that have influenced their national attitudes. However, his collected data is from the late 1990s and - given significant economic and educational changes – is outdated. Secondly, and relating to
the first point, Fairbrother’s study does not cover the internet as a potential source of influence.

Another attempt with a different overall research focus is Law’s (2011: 140-51) study from 2011. Law asked students about their perception of the amount of nationalist content in the school curriculum and showed that a vast majority thinks that flag-raising ceremonies play an important part in the state-provided curriculum. But his study did not tackle the question whether such ceremonies had a positive impact on students’ national attitudes. He (2011: 143) also found (for example) that a clear majority are proud of their national identity, but again the study did not ask where the pride comes from. Furthermore, Law conducted his research with students from grades seven to nine, not university students.

To sum up, there is no existing (up to date) research that deals with the question of where nationalist thought and influence really come from, and how and to what extent they find expression among university students – historically a key group of nationalist actors in China. Current scholarship addresses the question of where nationalist content can be found, but not to what degree it has influenced students and continues to do so as they progress through tertiary education. In addition to that, past research on where nationalist sentiment can be learned in China has not considered applying banal and everyday nationalism to the Chinese context. It could be that the influence of what students tacitly learn is much higher than what students explicitly learn (in, for instance, school). Either way, the question of where nationalist sentiment is learned is of vital importance, because it essentially uncovers whether the CCP’s educational efforts in regard to conveying nationalist thought work or not.

5.2 Expressing Nationalism Tacitly and Explicitly

The existing literature on nationalism in China since the 1990s has usually discussed the topic when nationalist thought and expression became visible. In other words, research focuses on nationalism when it has been expressed explicitly (e.g. in form of a street protest, or in an online forum), but not tacitly. Although there is some research on students’ national attitudes, it has seldomly asked how students express nationalist
sentiment. Indeed, nationalist expressions have been mentioned in conjunction with nationalist protest in the past (e.g. after the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy), but students have not been treated as a key category of analysis. In addition, it is also worth exploring how nationalism is produced and reproduced by Chinese students themselves. Billig (1995: 174) holds that “flaggings [i.e. for example the use of words like ‘motherland’, national flags on public buildings, China-centric news coverage, etc] of nationhood are quite different. Their unobtrusiveness arises, in part, from their familiarity”. This thesis therefore also aims to investigate how nationalism is “embedded in routines of [Chinese students’] social life” (Billig 1995: 175) and what part the government plays in it.

5.3 Research Questions

This thesis therefore investigates how and why Chinese University students learn and express nationalist sentiment, both explicitly and tacitly. In order to answer this main research question, I examine how and where Chinese university students learn nationalist sentiment, as well as how and why they express nationalist sentiment.
Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology

1. Methodological Approach

This study uses a mixed-method analysis to examine nationalist sentiment among Chinese university students in China. First, I examine the origin and influence of nationalist sentiment and thus demonstrate how students have learned nationalist sentiment, both tacitly and explicitly, from a variety of channels. Second, I investigate how and why Chinese students express nationalist sentiment explicitly, and I will also show how nationalist sentiment can be expressed tacitly. To answer these questions, I conducted original data in the form of a survey questionnaire and in-depth interviews, as well as unstructured observations.

2. Sampling and Universities

Field research was conducted between August 2016 and May 2017 in Shanghai while I was a visiting research student at Jiaotong University. I collected survey data from 246 undergraduate university students in Shanghai. In order to find suitable participants for my research, I used a purposive sampling method at first and switched to snowballing later as it proved to be more effective and was safer for students. At first, students were approached in class or the university’s cafeteria and asked to fill out my questionnaire, and later further respondents were recruited through snowballing. Interview participants were recruited from students who completed the questionnaire and indicated willingness to take part in an interview.

I used a maximum variation sampling, so that I was able to capture a wide range of perspectives relating to learning and expressing nationalist sentiment within China’s current student population (in higher education). In order to give consideration to China’s multifaceted and complex student body, students had to provide information about themselves prior to answering the questionnaire.
Data from a total of 160 female and 86 male students were collected for this research. This imbalance was mainly caused by male students’ lower willingness to participate in this research and by the fact that purposive sampling was replaced by snowballing in the second stage of field work.

Students of all disciplines in higher education took part in this research, ranging from subjects which largely fell into the theme of humanities and social sciences to economics and science-related subjects. The majority of students in this study could be considered ‘middle class’. As of 2015 the average monthly urban household income in China was RMB 8,572 (China Daily 2015b). I therefore set the middle-income household at between RMB 5,000 and RMB 25,000. Consequentially, students from families which earned less that RMB 5,000 a month were classified as ‘low-income’, and students from families who earned more than RMB 25,000 were classified as ‘high-income’. In this study, 44 students classified themselves as low, 173 as middle and 29 as high-income.

Students were also asked about by their place of origin. In the context of modernising the country, Murphy (2004: 19) found that the Chinese government has heavily invested in fostering a national consciousness in the countryside, thus students who grew up in rural China may have been exposed to more nationalist content in school than their urban counterparts. Prior to participation, students were asked whether they grew up in an urban (chengshi, 城市) or rural (nongcun, 农村) setting. 181 students reported that they grew up in the city, whereas 65 reported that they grew up in the countryside.

Finally, students also had to state whether they are a member of the CCP (gongchan dangyuan, 共产党员). According to Dickson and Rublee (2000: 108) the CCP “attracts the best educated into the party to re-legitimize its rule among key social sectors and to co-opt skills needed for new policy initiatives”. In this study, 23 students reported that they were members in the CCP.

Data was collected from 3 well-regarded universities: Tongji University (N=131), Donghua University (N=46) and the East China University of Science and Technology (ECUST) (N=69). Universities were selected based on their comprehensive number of different subjects and through informants who enabled me access to parts of their student body. All these universities require a relatively high gaokao-score for admission
and have more funding from the government than low tier universities in China. Due to the limited scope of a PhD thesis, this project only considered students who studied in Shanghai, as Shanghai has a history of student nationalism, is a representative of China’s rapid economic growth, and has some of China’s highest ranked universities, even on a global scale (QS 2015/16). Shanghai, like no other prominent Chinese city, is “China’s capitalist showpiece” (BBC 2008). Apart from Hong Kong, it is Shanghai where we might find the least nationalistic students in China, because of the city’s large variety of leisure time activities, its international and cosmopolitan character and because of its embrace of modernity and foreign culture (Yan 2009: 229). This, in turn, could tell us a lot about students’ nationalist sentiment in China more generally. For instance, if students in Shanghai were found to be very nationalistic, arguments could be made that students in other Chinese cities, which largely lack cosmopolitanism and foreign culture, are perhaps even more so.

3. Survey-Questionnaire

This study’s questionnaire is based on a five-point Likert Scale with choices ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. Following my survey questions (see appendix), I examined where students responded particularly strongly (or weakly) to specific themes and/or single statements. To ensure anonymity, students were instructed not to state their name on the questionnaire. After having read all relevant information and instructions, consent was given by ticking a box. Each completed questionnaire was treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the UK Data Protection Act 1998.

The survey questionnaire consisted of a total of 44 statements/items, sub-divided in different theme-clusters. Each theme-cluster presented specific nationalist ideas which relate to Chinese nationalism and nationalism more generally (see below). Some statements, such as ‘I love my nation’, ‘I put the interests of my country before my own’, or ‘university education increased my sense of aiguo zhuyi’, were inspired by previous research, such as Fairbrother (2003) and Kosterman and Feshbach (1989), and
sometimes altered to better fit this research project’s aim. Other statements were entirely developed for this project.

In order to test sampling adequacy of all 44 items, I applied a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Test, which is a measure to determine how suited data is for a factor analysis. KMO returns values between 0 and 1, in which values between 0.8 and 1 indicate that the sampling is adequate. This study’s KMO value was found to be .892, which means that the sampling is adequate. Based on a rotated component matrix (varimax with Kaiser normalisation), seven scales were created including a total of 34 items. 10 items were thus dropped as they did not correlate strongly with either one of the seven scales or with each other. To reduce measurement error, I also evaluated the reliability of all seven scales by using Cronbach’s Alpha (α), which ranges from 0 to 1. Higher scores indicate higher internal consistency. Each scale, its items and Cronbach’s Alpha will be further discussed in chapter 5, 7, 8 and 9.

All statements were positive and easy to understand in order to ensure that all participants could understand and complete the whole questionnaire in Chinese. The questionnaire intended to highlight which nationalist theme and/or statement was particularly ‘popular’ amongst all students. The first part of the questionnaire was designed to investigate both students’ feelings towards their nation and national identity and, their sense of duty to the nation. The topic of nationalism cannot be studied without examining people’s love for their nation and their willingness to make sacrifices in behalf of their nation. The second part consisted of statements in which students had to evaluate which channels (e.g. state education or family) have had a positive influence on their sense of aiguo zhuyi. This part was meant to help me answer the question of where nationalist sentiment might come from, at least in its explicit form. After that, statements revolved around issues of territorial unity and views on other countries. As discussed in chapter 2.4.3, student nationalism in China has often been discussed in conjunction with anti-foreign protests, therefore it was worth looking into students’ current views on the matter. In order to find out how students express (or have expressed) nationalist sentiment (in the past), part 4 and 5 of the questionnaire aimed to examine different forms and ways in which this can happen. For a more in-
depth insight, the second stage of my field research was based on semi-structured in-depth, face-to-face interviews.

4. Interviews

This aspect of my fieldwork particularly aimed to help answer my research question of ‘why Chinese students express nationalist behaviour/sentiment’. The interviews not only captured how nationalism is expressed, but also why students held a specific point of view on a nation-related issue. Between August 2016 and May 2017, I conducted a total of 21 semi-structured interviews. All interviewees were recruited from those who have already completed the questionnaire. After having completed the questionnaire, students were asked whether s/he would like to participate in an interview as well. All interviews were conducted on campus in empty classrooms or cafeterias during off-peak and on dates which both parties agreed upon. Before starting the interview, students were given an information sheet and a consent form, which they had to sign with their real name. For the purpose of protecting students’ privacy, each student cited in this study was given a pseudonym. Each interview was treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the UK Data Protection Act 1998. Interviews were not recorded thus data was collected through notetaking only. Considering the sensitivity of some of the questions asked (e.g. question on Taiwan), it was safer and less intimidating for students to know that their answers were not recorded.

The interview questions fell within the same themes like the questionnaire but allowed potential further enquiries after each question. All interviews were coded accordingly. Although I am capable of speaking and understanding Chinese to a certain degree, the complexity of the topic transcended my level of Chinese. Therefore, I conducted all interviews with the help of a student research assistant who was fully instructed through preliminary meetings. This not only gave me the possibility to focus on the topic instead of language issues, but it also allowed me to observe students while they answered which, in turn, helped to evaluate how strongly a student felt about a specific issue. My research assistant was a final year undergraduate student at Tongji University and possessed excellent English language skills which, in turn, enabled him to translate every
student’s answers without any problems. Occasionally participants were asked to repeat their answer when I deemed the answer being worthy of a direct quotation. Each interview lasted for about 30 to 45 minutes, depending on how much students were willing to tell me.

Generally, all interviews were able to give an in-depth and detailed view into people’s lives. This was particularly important not only to find out why nationalist sentiment is expressed explicitly, but also in regard to uncovering nationalist sentiment which indicates that national pride is also learned and expressed tacitly. In other words, in-depth interviews shed light on students’ expression of nationalism, while students were not aware that their particular behaviour/thought is nationalist. Billig (1995: 6-7) argues that nations are not just created, but also reproduced. In other words, daily, “the nation is indicated, or ‘flagged’, in the lives of its citizenry” (ibid.). The first interviews conducted in this study provided me with ideas on how nationalism can also be learned and expressed tacitly and on every day. Overall, semi-structured interviews were an ideal method to see how students express nationalist sentiment and why. They also helped uncovering behavioural patterns of which the student was not consciously aware and provided me with insights which, in turn, helped me understanding how nationalist sentiment is also tacitly learned and expressed. In other words, interviews helped to uncover how banal (and everyday) nationalism truly is reproduced among, and for, Chinese university students.

5. Observations

As some answers from the interviews gave me a good starting point, I conducted my observations from November 2016 until May 2018. The main aim of these observations was to learn how students in Shanghai might learn nationalist sentiment tacitly. As answers from the interviews highlighted, different students feel national pride about different things. For this reason, I started observing what role food plays in students’ everyday lives and how ubiquitous it is, as Chinese cuisine was mentioned by several students as a source of national pride. In addition to that, and also based on what some students told me, I started to focus my observations on aspects and things of everyday
life that cannot be avoided by any student. According to Sumartojo (2017: 198), “it is impossible not to experience the national as a spatial and temporal reality, because almost everywhere is somehow nationally defined”. To examine how the Chinese nation is represented in students’ everyday lives, I started to pay attention to things which might symbolise the Chinese nation in my own everyday routine life in Shanghai. I found that, methodologically, “autoethnography can surface the banal qualities of the nation [which] has become so commonplace that it effectively disappears, at least until it springs into notice” (Sumartojo 2017: 202).

Although having only spent one year in Shanghai during my field research, it has certainly also helped that I have lived in Shanghai for two years previously and was therefore already familiar with everyday life in the city. However, this time I had to make myself consciously aware of banal and everyday ‘flaggings’ in the city. For this reason, I wrote down as many observations as possible during my weekly routine. Most weekdays, after I woke up, I headed out to buy breakfast and started paying attention to what surrounds me that could potentially ‘flag’ the nation and is difficult to avoid. In the light of my research, I regularly went to the campuses of each university. I lived very close to both Jiaotong University and Donghua University; therefore, even on days where I did not collect data from students, I passed by (or went through) their campuses, which further enabled me to encounter what students encounter every day.

In addition to uncovering banal and everyday representations of the nation, I also visited Shanghai’s most famous national heritage site which deals with the foundation of the CCP. To get a better understanding of how national heritage sites in China work and what students encounter there, I wrote down several observations when I visited the site in May 2017. These observations are described in depth in chapter 5.2.2 and help to understand how these sites operate.

6. Problems & Limitations

A problem which lays at the bottom of my field research was the difficulty of conducting arguably sensitive research in mainland China, a country in which freedom of speech is limited. I had hoped that an introduction to a professor and head of department at
Jiaotong University would facilitate my access to the field. After having been accepted as a visiting research student at Jiaotong, and after having been issued a visa from the Chinese MoE, I met the professor in Shanghai to discuss my field research and was told that the topic is too sensitive for him to help (for instance, as my survey questions referred to Taiwan). He mentioned that he would not jeopardise my data collection but said that I have to conduct my research without his help. As mentioned above, students in the interviews were anonymised (and thus their identity was only known to me) and questionnaire sheets did not indicate the name of the student anywhere. Students’ safety was further ensured, as, after some initial purposive sampling in the beginning, I no longer approached students on campus in their classes or during lunch-breaks (where a foreigner disseminating questionnaires to students could have raised questions). Snowballing enabled students who already participated to only ask students (to also participate) they know and trust.

A second problem of this research, relating to the first one, was finding students to participate. Although the topic of nationalism (in the form of aiguo zhuyi) may not be as sensitive as certain other topics, such as direct questions about the CCP’s legitimacy, many students who were approached refused to take part in survey-questionnaire and interviews. The reasons for their refusal were manifold. Some students were indeed put off by the political nature of my research; however, others refused to take part because they assumed that this questionnaire is carried out on behalf of the government. The main reason for students not to take part, however, was lack of interest. As Chinese university students are frequently required to fill out questionnaires by both their universities and other researchers, many might therefore be less willing to fill out yet another one. Essentially, snowballing helped ensuring students’ safety even further, but also proved to be lengthy, especially in the beginning. Within the last three months of my field research, my supervisor at King’s College London helped me establishing contact with one professor at ECUST who helped me to find more students. Prior to that I had already evaluated a large sample of questionnaires which were collected from both Tongji and Donghua University students. The evaluation of the second data set (from Donghua) showed that Donghua students answered very similar to their Tongji
counterparts, thus my initial goal of 400 students was not necessary to reach data saturation.

Finally, it is worth noting that students (and people in general) are not always good and accurate judges of what has influenced them, especially when they are politically biased or when specific events date back too far. This applies particularly to data related to the influence from primary school as many students (in the interviews) found it difficult to recall (in detail) what they have learned there. However, data from those who recalled their time in primary school more clearly than others, indicated that students’ memories strongly related to what I discuss about ‘Morality and Life’ in chapter 4.3.1.
Chapter 4: Locating Channels of Explicit Nationalist Influence in China

1. Introduction

Nationalist content can be found in- and outside the classroom. Chinese students in the 21st century are exposed to a great many things that are not Chinese. Because of this, the “Chinese state worries about its students abandoning China’s traditions and socialist identity [and] about the loss of national distinctiveness and identity” (Law 2014: 347). A recently announced guideline by the Ministry of Education (MoE), once again, calls for an even stronger focus on patriotic education (MoE 2016). In this chapter I locate and highlight nationalist content that can already be found in Chinese formal and informal education and a student’s life more generally. I look at both channels of potential nationalist influence in the classroom and outside the classroom. Section three will discuss nationalist content in Chinese education with a particular focus on primary and secondary education. Section four analyses nationalist content which is encountered outside of school. In this section I will distinguish between nationalist content that is clearly state instigated and content which is more or less independent of the state.

Drawing on existing theories on nationalism, I define nationalist content as content that deals with nation-building, love and duty towards the nation, defence of the nation, distinction from other nations (distinctiveness), reproduction of the nation and, - significant for the Chinese case - loyalty to both nation and the government (see Anderson 1983; Billig 1995; Gellner 1998, 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Smith 1995).

Before locating potential channels of nationalist influence, it is also important to analyse and understand the concept of aiguo zhuyi which is central to an understanding of nationalism in contemporary China more broadly. Section two of this chapter will discuss the concept and argue why a clear distinction between nationalism and patriotism is not only problematic for the Chinese case, but also more generally.
2. The Problem of Defining Nationalism, Patriotism and Aiguo Zhuyi

In Chinese, there are two terms which describe nationalism and patriotism. The term *minzu zhuyi* (民族主义) is generally translated as nationalism, whereas *aiguo zhuyi* (爱国主义) refers to patriotism. However, *minzu* can be translated as both nation and ethnic group. *Minzu zhuyi* can therefore also be understood as an ethnic nationalism, which would destroy the idea of China as one nation, considering its 56 ethnic nationalities (Yahuda 2000: 33). Therefore, the preferred term of the CCP is *aiguo zhuyi*, often translated as patriotism or even love-stateism (ibid.). However, *guo* can be translated as country, state or nation, therefore the translation of love-stateism is too specific.

Loving one’s country or nation is a nationalist concept, whereas loving the state is rather different. However, in the Chinese context, it is worth noting that *aiguo zhuyi* embeds a political purpose which deliberately intertwines the government and the nation. Existing research on China has not much to offer in regard to defining the English term patriotism as a key concept in China and distinguishing it from nationalism; therefore, it is inevitable to first look at differences between patriotism and nationalism more broadly.

Billig (1995:55) believes that a distinction between nationalism and patriotism “would be convincing if there were clear, unambiguous criteria, beyond an ideological requirement to distinguish ‘us’ from ‘them’”. He believes that that patriotism is used due to its more positive rhetoric, insofar as one citizen might refer to ‘our’ patriotism and ‘their’ nationalism (ibid.).

Arguably the most prominent attempt to present evidence that patriotism and nationalism are distinct comes from Kosterman and Feshbach (1989). They (1989: 262) developed a questionnaire which was disseminated to 239 American students and was “specifically designed to assess various dimensions believed to contribute differentially to patriotism and nationalism (e.g. attachment to country versus superiority of country, etc.)”. Kosterman and Feshbach developed two scales, one of which was labelled ‘patriotism’, which included items such as ‘I love my country’ or ‘I feel a great pride in that land that is our America’. The nationalist scale, on the other hand, included an ‘America-first’ or ‘American- superiority’ view relative to other countries (Kosterman
and Feshbach 1989: 263-5). Although the mean scores of the patriotism scale were much higher as compared to those of the nationalism scale, their data also showed that the two scales significantly correlate (see Kosterman and Feshbach 1989: 268; Table VII). In their study on national identity in Germany, Blank and Schmidt (2003: 306) (also) come to the conclusion that a “nationalistic-positive valuation of one’s own group leads to the denigration of outgroups”, while a patriotic-positive valuation leads to the opposite. The idea that nationalism is related to superiority of the ingroup over outgroups and the exclusion (or even domination) of others, is a position which is not only prevalent among the broader public, but also held by scholars who did similar research to that of Kosterman and Feshbach (e.g. see de Figueiredo & Elkins 2003; Sidanius et al. 1997; Viroli 1995).

However, according to Billig, specific arguments made by scholars like Kosterman and Feshbach do not hold up. He (1995: 58) argues:

[Their] conclusion comes after evidence that those with higher nationalist scores tend to have higher patriotic scores. Thus, the sentiments, which supposedly reduce international belligerence, tend to accompany those which promote it, despite the protestation that the two should be sharply distinguished [...]. Underlying such arguments is the assumption that hatred of the outgroup (rather than love of the ingroup) provides the motivation for nationalist warfare. This is almost certainly an oversimplification.

Of course, one can love one’s nation without feeling superior to (or hating) other nations, but I argue that this does not mean that feelings related to both attitudes have a different origin. The origin of different sentiments toward one’s own nation as well as foreign nations, is an abstract form of attachment to one’s own nation which is consciously and unconsciously learned over a long period of time. I argue that sentiments which relate to love for one’s nation and national pride, and which are often understood as patriotism, should be viewed in the spectrum of liberal nationalism, which, according to Jones and Vernon (2018: 36), “recognises the equality of persons, the rights of individuals to join together with others on the basis of shared cultural identity, and the equal claims of all nations to self-determination”. Moral superiority, anti-foreign sentiment and denigration of outgroups, on the other hand, spring from “an
exclusivist, chauvinist nationalism that affirms the moral superiority of one’s own nation over all others and legitimises aggression against other nations” (Ibid.).

In their 2008 study, Kemmelmeier and Winter also investigated a potential distinction between patriotism and nationalism. In two experimental approaches, they asked American participants to fill out a 7-point scale questionnaire which contained items relating nationalism and patriotism, social dominance orientation, and authoritarianism. In contrast to studies like the one from Kosterman and Feshbach (1989), Kemmelmeier and Winter put participants (while filling out the questionnaire) in a room that was either decorated with an American flag or not. In their second experimental approach they did not display the American flag in the room, but had it printed on roughly half of all questionnaires. In result, they (2008: 871) found that the American flag did not arouse a sense of patriotism. Instead, “only nationalist views were increased in the presence of the flag, which cast the United States as superior and dominant to the remainder of the world” (Ibid.). To explain their results, they suggest:

[T]he flag is often used in a context in which the United States is defending itself against an aggressor—as was the case following the attacks of September 11, 2001, or in any other of the numerous military conflicts in which the United States has been involved. Because Americans expect the United States to prevail by demonstrating its superiority vis-à-vis its adversaries, it may be unsurprising that this sentiment is also associated with the flag (Kemmelmeier and Winter 2008: 872).

Although Kemmelmeier and Winter admit that their study might show very different results in different countries (Ibid.), their research demonstrates how a powerful national symbol like the flag, which is arguably loved by ‘patriots’ and ‘nationalists’ alike, can blur the line of what is perceived as unproblematic and thus patriotic and what is perceived as problematic and thus nationalist.

On this account, it is also worthwhile looking at Gellner’s definition of nationalism again, namely that nationalism is primarily a political principle which holds that the political unit and the national unit should be congruent and that “nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment” (Gellner 1983: 1). Regardless of whether the principle of congruence is fulfilled or violated, it, according to Gellner, engenders nationalist
sentiment. In other words, nationalist sentiment comprises a wide range of emotions and feelings (both positive and negative) which are linked to one’s nation. Negating a clear distinction between nationalism and patriotism does not mean that different forms of sentiments toward the nation do not exist, but I argue that creating and using the term patriotism for exclusively positive feelings for one’s nation and ingroup disguises the original role of nationalism in creating nations and national identities and intensifies the idea that nationalism is inherently negative, while patriotism is positive. China, perhaps, is an ideal example of the word patriotism being used because of its generally more acceptable image and sound. During my field research in Shanghai, both friends and students I interviewed corrected me when I told them that my research investigates nationalism while also mentioning aiguo zhuyi. Assuming that I do not know the difference, they told me that aiguo zhuyi represents patriotism which has a positive connotation, while minzu zhuyi means nationalism which has a negative one.

However, even if there was a clear and convincing distinction between patriotism and nationalism, it would still not mean that aiguo zhuyi consists solely of theoretical frameworks which can be attributed to patriotism alone. As demonstrated in chapter 2.4.3, Chinese nationalism cannot be studied without referring to its complicated relationship with countries like the US or Japan, and to its century of humiliation more broadly. Incidents like the ones discussed in chapter 2.4.3.1 and 2.4.3.2 are prime examples for showing how supposedly harmless sentiments like loving one’s nation and pride in one’s own national identity can quickly evolve into negative sentiments toward other nations. Thus, while acknowledging the contribution of Kosterman and Feshbach (1989), Blank and Schmidt (2003) and de Figueiredo & Elkins (2003) which distinguish nationalism from patriotism, I reject a clear distinction because explicit ‘patriotic’ and ‘nationalist’ expressions share the same origin, namely, for instance, positive feelings towards one’s nation.

Billig’s idea that it is mainly rhetoric which distinguishes patriotism and nationalism works well in the Chinese context, where the term nationalism (minzu zhuyi) is consciously not used by the government due to its ambiguous and potentially ethnically-divisive meaning, whereas aiguo zhuyi is used frequently. Zhao (1998: 290) believes that “Chinese patriotism can be understood as a state-centric conception of nationalism”,
which also suggests that Chinese patriotism is in fact embedded in nationalism. For these reasons, I suggest that in China patriotic education is essentially nationalist education. The following sections and chapters of this thesis will therefore refer to aiguo zhuyi as nationalist sentiment, which, in turn, is loosely defined as a variety of sentiments and feelings toward one’s own nation and national identity as well as other nations and thus incorporates what is often depicted as ‘patriotism’ as well as the broader term ‘nationalism’.

3. Evidence of Nationalism in the Chinese Syllabus

‘Patriotic’ education is not a subject in school. Instead nationalist elements are implemented in other subjects. The most obvious classes where nationalism is conveyed to students are the so called ‘Morality’ (or Moral Character) classes, which consist of three rather similar subjects: ‘Morality and Life’ (pinde yu shenghuo, 品德与生活), ‘Morality and Society’ (pinde yu shehui, 品德与社会) and ‘Ideology and Morality’ (sixiang pinde, 思想品德). Arguably the ‘Morality’-classes give the best understanding in regard to what the CCP wants the students to become more generally, as these classes’ overall goal is to make a good, compliant Chinese citizen (MoE 2011b, 2011c, 2011d). In addition, ‘moral education’ has become a top priority for CCP leadership (Law 2013: 612-3). In the following I therefore analyse the content of those classes in regard to nationalist elements, before demonstrating that nationalism can also be found in other school subjects.

3.1 ‘Morality’ Classes

The aim of all three morality classes is to form a good Chinese citizen. In the eyes of the CCP, or the Ministry of Education respectively, it is important to form the character of young students so that they can become responsible citizens in later life (MoE 2011b, 2011c, 2011d). Before discussing the actual content of all three classes it is worth noting that each class (taught consecutively) accounts for approximately 7-9 percent of the
curriculum (Lam 2010). Although this does not constitute for a lot, one should bear in mind that the content of the ‘Morality’-classes is also conveyed in other subjects. ‘Morality’-classes are taught throughout compulsory education (grade 1-9, age ranging from 6 to 15/16), starting with ‘Morality and Life’ in primary school (xiaoxue, 小学).

‘Morality and Life’ is usually taught in the first two to three years of primary school (varies). The MoE states that students at that age are in an important period of transition and must therefore be taught in how to adapt to school life. Moreover, they need to learn how to become good citizens, learn basics of the core socialist value system (shehui hexin jiazhi tixi, 社会核心价值体系) as well as ethical standards (MoE 2011d: 1). In addition, children need to be morally formed, learn how to behave, must develop a positive attitude to life and, most importantly, need to learn ‘correct values’ (zhengque jiazhi, 正确价值) (MoE 2011d: 2-4). The basic framework of ‘Morality and Life’ also holds that children must learn about themselves and society, as well as develop cognitive and practical abilities (MoE 2011d: 4-5).

Although ideas and concepts do only display a fraction of what young students need to learn, they are frequently repeated. In addition, the MoE barely explains its ideas and concepts, therefore one does not get a good idea of what the MoE means by, for example, ‘correct values’. Many of the MoE’s educational goals remain rather vague. This leaves room for a lot of interpretation, especially when we think of nationalism. ‘Morality and Life’ also consists of obvious nationalist content, although to a slightly lesser degree than ‘Morality and Society’ and ‘Ideology and Morality’. The MoE (2011d: 6) states that children have to love and respect parents and the elderly, the collective (jiti, 集体), and their home(town) (jiaxiang, 家乡) and the motherland (zuguo, 祖国). The curriculum also states that students in ‘Morality and Life’ need to acquire preliminary knowledge of the motherland (zuguo, 祖国) (MoE 2011d: 6-7). Love for the motherland is a clear nationalist theme and linking it with parents, gives a good idea on what nationalist content in Chinese education does. What is interesting about the statement is, that parents, elderly and the collective refer to actual people, whereas hometown and motherland refer to places. Having all of them in one sentence, leaves one with the impression that all terms belong together and are inseparable.
‘Responsibility and Caring’, as one of four sections, also contains nationalist content (MoE 2011d: 8-10). Besides respecting and helping the family and elders, students must also love and learn about revolutionary leaders (geming lingxiu, 革命领袖) and their glorious deeds. Students also have to gain knowledge about famous Chinese buildings. Furthermore, students are encouraged to honour the national flag (guoqi, 国旗) (via daily flag raising ceremonies), the national emblem (guohui, 国徽) and the national anthem (guoge, 国歌). Finally, students shall feel proud (zihao, 自豪) to be Chinese (MoE 2011d: 9). Once again, both love and caring for one’s family falls within the same topic area as love for one’s nation and everything that is related to it.

Teachers are instructed to carry out the curriculum creatively and include many activities. The MoE stresses the importance of students’ participation in class and many interactions of students with teachers, their peers and the environment (MoE 2011d: 11-2). Although teachers enjoy a great deal of autonomy in regard to what material/activities they use, they nevertheless have to stick to the four topics mentioned above and do everything in compliance with the law and the national conditions (guoqing, 国情) (MoE 2011d: 21-2).

‘Morality and Society’ is usually taught during grade three to six (Law 2013: 614). As ‘Morality and Life’, this class’s overall goal is to form students into good citizens and help them to participate in society. As the title of the course suggests, this class has a stronger focus on society. It integrates aiguo zhuyi as well as collectivism (jiti zhuyi, 集体主义), socialism (shehui zhuyi, 社会主义), history and culture (lishi yu wenhua, 历史与文化), national education (guoqing jiaoyu, 国情教育), geography and environment (dili he huanjing, 地里和环境) and national unity (minzu tuanjie, 民族团结) (MoE 2011c: 1-2).

The class has three sub-themes in which both sub-theme one (emotional attitudes and values) and three (knowledge) contain nationalist elements. Besides learning cultivating civility, tolerance and cooperation, students have to recognise the importance of loving and learning about home, the motherland and about the history and culture of China. Moreover, students are encouraged to develop a sense of belonging (guishu, 归属) and pride (MoE 2011c: 5). As before, all of these themes are mentioned in one single
sentence. However, for the first time, it is also emphasised to have respect for different cultures and different nations and learn about them (MoE 2011c: 5-6).

Another new theme in the class is understanding China’s geography. The sub-topic ‘Our Country/Nation’ (women de guojia, 我们的国家), which is by far the biggest one (in regard to content) teaches that Taiwan belongs to China and it speaks of China as a unified multi-ethnic nation (tongyi de duominzu guojia, 统一的多民族国家). In addition, the curriculum makes clear that China’s sacred (shensheng, 神圣) territory (lingtu, 领土) is inviolable (buke qinfan, 不可侵犯) (MoE 2011c: 13-5). In regard to nationalism, this section strongly relates to the idea of nation-building, as well as Gellner’s (1983: 1) definition of nationalism.

Different sections of ‘Morality and Society’ also highlight the importance of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its function in defending the nation and maintaining peace (MoE 2011c: 13-5). Moreover, the class goes more into depth in regard to China’s history. While stressing China’s (ancient) cultural heritage (wenhua yichan, 文化遗产), it also discusses China’s more recent history of (foreign) aggression (kangzheng shi, 抗争史) and the CCP’s historical efforts and deeds for China (ibid.). From this we can see that original content and focus of the 1994 implemented PEC, namely China’s century of humiliation, is still conveyed to students today. Also, linking the CCP to the defence of the nation in the past, as well as its overall efforts for the country, leaves one with the idea that China’s success story today has only been possible because of the CCP. In other words, the CCP (or the MoE respectively) links itself to the nation.

All of this content is conveyed to students in various ways. Activities and teaching methods include maps and puzzles of China, group work, use of different media and old photographs and interviews with time witnesses. In addition to that local forces of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) also come to schools, to carry out activities (MoE 2011c: 13-7).

‘Ideology and Morality’ is taught in the final 2-3 years of compulsory education (chuzhong, 初中) and does not differ significantly from ‘Morality and Society’. However, it puts a stronger focus on ideology, law and social stability (shehui wending, 社会稳定)
Again, the basic idea remains the same and nationalist content also remains the same, therefore I will only briefly highlight a few conspicuous features. As the name of the course suggests, there is a stronger focus on ideology. What this means is that students learn more about ideologies such as socialism (MoE 2011b: 1-2). Besides that nationalist content from ‘Morality and Society’ recurs, ‘Ideology and Morality’ also emphasises the importance of protecting social stability (MoE 2011b: 13), which can be linked to Billig’s (1995) idea that a nation does not only have to be produced, but also reproduced in order to persist.

Another theme in ‘Ideology and Morality’ is carried out in form of an extra lesson/activity. In this particular lesson/activity, students will learn that only when the motherland develops well, they themselves will grow/develop as well (zuguo fazhan wo chengzhang 祖国发展我成长) (MoE 2011b: 13-4). In the previous course, as I explained, the CCP links itself to the nation; now, this lesson links the student to the nation, conveying that helping China will result in helping him/herself. The course also gives students a more in-depth understanding of Chinese law, imparting that it is the duty of each student to protect national unity and to maintain national security (MoE 2011b: 16).

All of this suggests that the three ‘Morality’-classes do impart nationalist thought, and that although other topics, such as the respect for other countries, tolerance and world history are taught as well, nationalist content plays a significant role. Often nationalist content is mentioned alongside other themes such as caring for one’s family or own personal growth, but the overarching idea is that a student can only be a good citizen if s/he is also nationalist. Finally, nationalist content can also be found in other school subjects, which means that nationalism in compulsory education is not only conveyed in these classes, but more broadly throughout primary and secondary education.

3.2 Music, History and Other School Subjects

The content of all three ‘Morality’-classes is also applied interdisciplinary. Nationalist content can be found in almost any subject that is taught during compulsory education.
However, there are differences. Although nationalist content is especially evident in the classes discussed above, it is also taught in various other subjects to a more or lesser degree.

A good example of nationalist content in the Chinese curriculum is music education in elementary and junior middle/lower secondary school. School music education has two main aims: First, to enhance students’ interest in music, art and life and second, to encourage aiguo zhuyi (Law and Ho 2009: 503). However, apart from linking the fate of the nation with that of the CCP, aiguo zhuyi in China essentially promotes building and maintaining national autonomy, national unity and a national identity, all of which are generic nationalist goals (Smith 2010: 9), which once again supports my earlier argument in section two of this chapter that patriotic education in China is essentially nationalist education and that the term aiguo zhuyi does at least equally embed the term nationalism (with the exception of ethnic nationalism), depending on how patriotism is defined.

According to Law and Ho (2009: 505), the PRC’s national anthem, ‘March of the Volunteers’ is “always placed at the beginning of music textbooks and must be learned”. The current version refers to millions of Chinese people becoming one, which essentially can be also understood as become one nation. In addition to that the anthem also serves as a reminder of the past. Chinese students are taught about modern Chinese history in the context of China’s so called ‘Century of Humiliation’ (bainian guozhi, 百年国耻), a term frequently used in Chinese education. The lyrics were written in 1934 by Tian Han as a reaction to Japan’s invasion of Manchuria. The song calls for Chinese people to rise and to refuse be slaves and it asks to do so with flesh and blood (ba women de xierou, 把我们的血肉). In the context of nationalism, this includes the will to sacrifice oneself for the good (and/or survival) of the nation, which, according to Anderson (2006: 7), is at the root of nationalism. The routine of these events strongly relate to Billig’s (1995) idea of banal nationalism, as the national anthem is constantly present in students’ lives, and because of its daily repetitions in school, it might already have become an unnoticed ‘flag’.
Another song that is featured in school music textbooks is called ‘If There Was No Communist Party, There Would Be No New China’ (meiyou gongchandang jiu meiyou xin zhongguo, 没有共产党就没有新中国). This clearly relates to the idea that the Chinese nation and the CCP is one, thus loving either one, automatically implies loving the other as well (in theory). Songs in Chinese state education are often meant to promote nationalism. According to Law and How (2009: 506), “song lyrics exhort students to be involved in the life of their school, community, and family, and to be responsible for and aware of their duties in and beyond the classroom. National music is thought to be the ‘mother tongue’ of Chinese music culture”. Often, songs in Chinese music education deal with China’s recent history and relate to nation building and defending, which, as mentioned before, are nationalist goals.

However, students are not only encouraged to learn songs which have a clear nationalistic undertone, but also foreign songs as well as folk songs from China’s ethnic minorities. Although the lyrics of the latter are not necessarily nationalist, we should nevertheless keep in mind that the CCP (still) aims to build a united nation, thus the need to include ethnic minorities is pivotal, whereas at the same time not putting too much emphasis on cultural elements (such as music) of ethnic minorities (since China is meant to be a nation dominated by Han). This is why music from ethnic minorities only occupies a small space in the curriculum (Law and Ho 2009: 512).

In regard to foreign songs, Law and Ho (2011: 379) state that “[s]tudents are encouraged to learn diverse musical values as a means of developing their musical appreciation and aesthetic sensitivity, as well as for cultivating non-musical values, such as global peace and development”. In other words, music education, as the other three classes discussed above, is certainly nationalistic to some degree, but not entirely. In short, the CCP wants to encourage students to become global citizens with a good understanding of other cultures, while at the same time it wants to produce students, who feel deep love and loyalty for their nation (and the CCP) and are willing to contribute to make the Chinese nation great.

Another subject where nationalist content can be found is Chinese history. The History curriculum holds that students from grades seven to nine must be taught ancient
Chinese history (*gudai*, 古代), modern Chinese history (*jindai*, 近代 and *xiandai*, 现代) and world history (past to present) and clearly states that history aims to promote patriotism as the core national spirit (*hongyang aiguo zhuyi wei hexin de minzu jingshen*, 弘扬爱国主义为核心的民族精神) (MoE 2011a). Modern Chinese history (implies the period 1840-1949), features a lot of nationalist content in particular. The Nanjing Massacre plays quite a significant role, as students receive a large amount of related data, photos and statistics (MoE 2011a: 18-21). For this class the MoE also recommends the film ‘Lin Zexu’ (林则徐), a symbol of China’s resistance to European imperialism (ibid.).

In order to further foster a students’ national identity, the new curriculum standard (from 2011) requires all students in compulsory education to learn more Chinese poems and classical writings than before. The amount of translated foreign writings was slightly reduced. Students of all grades are now also expected to master calligraphy in Chinese language classes. In addition, “grades 7 to 9 students should emulate the styles of famous Chinese calligraphers and appreciate the aesthetics of Chinese calligraphy” (MoE 2013 in Law 2013: 615). While learning about the Chinese language is not necessarily nationalist, it is to be seen in an overall context of shaping a students’ national identity, which in turn is a nationalist theme.

Other examples can be found in the sciences and mathematics. For instance, in “[m]athematics students are expected to know the contributions of Jiuzhang suanshu 九章算术 (the Nine Chapters on Mathematics), one of China’s earliest mathematics texts”, as well as the historical importance of the abacus in ancient China (Law 2013: 615).

As for upper secondary education (*gaozhong*, 高中) which is required for students who wish to enter higher education, nationalist themes which have already occurred before are repeated. However, it seems that music education for upper secondary students contains fewer nationalist elements than before (MoE 2008b). Interestingly, the same applies for Geography, a subject that seems a likely choice for nationalist content (MoE 2008a). In upper secondary education, students have fewer compulsory courses and can choose a variety of electives, so that all students no longer have the same education.
This suggests that nationalist content is much more evident in primary and lower secondary education than it is in upper secondary.

4. Nationalism Outside the Classroom

_Aiguo zhuyi_ is most clearly conveyed in Chinese state education; however, there are also a variety of channels outside the classroom where nationalist thought and content can come from. In this section, I examine state channels in which explicit nationalist thought - instigated by the state - can be located, such as national heritage sites and media, and channels in which nationalist thought can be found, but not as an instrument of the state, like family and computer and video games.

A channel which clearly conveys nationalist thought, are national heritage sites and red tourism more generally. Visiting specific national heritage sites is actively promoted as an extra-curricular activity in Chinese secondary education. In 1995 the Ministry of Civil Affairs announced that “100 [memorial] sites were selected as the national level "demonstration bases" (Wang 2008: 795). Typically, each memorial site can be put in one of four overall themes, namely external conflicts (40 sites), civil wars (24 sites), myths (21 sites) and heroes (15 sites). Half of the 40 sites dedicated to external matters are about Japan (second most with 7 sites, is the Opium War). But these 100 sites are only the most important ones, since the overall number of memorial sites accounts more than 10000 (ibid.). As these memorial sites are “bases for patriotic education”, student classes frequently visit and – since 2004 - do not have to pay an entrance fee (Vickers 2007: 366).

According to Li and Hu (2008: 159-60) Red Tourism is most of all “a political project to consolidate CCP’s role as the sole ruling party in China. It serves as a popular means to recollect the history of the Chinese revolution, to show CCP’s historic contribution to Chinese national independence and to enhance people’s, especially the youth’s confidence with and loyalty to CCP’s leadership”. Indeed, Red Tourism is not meant to only influence the youth, or students in particular, but the Chinese public as a whole. Nevertheless, the concept of Red Tourism, and patriotic education more generally, aims to influence students as a key group (Li et al 2010: 105; Li and Hu 2008: 160). For this
reason, school classes which visit official memorial sites do not have to pay any entrance fee. Students who visit the like on their own get a discount of 50% (Li and Hu 2008: 161). In addition to that, the discount, which is also offered to few other groups (e.g. senior citizens and soldiers), complies with the overall idea that these sites are meant to be non-profit (Li et al 2010: 108).

Examples of Red Tourism sites include the birthplace of the CCP in Shanghai, the Mao Memorial Hall in Beijing, or the birthplace of Mao in Shao Shan. Although national heritage sites serve as a great example of where nationalist thought is conveyed to students, the actual influence is – as all potential channels - unclear. Shao Shan ranks among the most popular sites, however “74% of the tourists visiting Shao Shan admitted their principle motive had not been to commemorate Mao Zedong [but] because of its picturesque landscape and comfortable climate” (Li and Hu 2008: 162). This does not suggest that students necessarily think the same way but raises the question of how effective Red Tourism really is in regard to conveying nationalist thought.

Other channels of nationalist influence are traditional media (radio, TV, print) and, more recently and importantly, the internet. As the internet is a rapidly increasing theme in China and since the Chinese government even hires students to “civilize” the internet (Xu and Denyer 2015), I focus primarily on this particular source of potential influence.

Sometimes media more generally are used to advertise events or tourist destinations, most prominently represented by the fact that “a range of media channels including radio broadcast, TV, newspapers, magazines, textbooks, and internet are mobilized for red tourism promotion” (Li and Hu 2008: 160). In regard to news coverage, Shen and Guo (2013: 146) found that regular consumption of Chinese news (online and offline) has a positive influence on both national pride and political trust. It goes without saying that the CCP prefers content in media that coincides with its idea of aiguo zhuyi. However, control of media in China is complex, also because “the government does not impose the same set of regulations to all media outlets” (Shen and Guo 2013:146-7). In addition, Chinese journalists find it difficult to know themselves what to publish and what not, as “it is often impossible for reporters to know ahead of time what will be a safe story” (Hassid 2008: 423). Due to its massive reach and appeal, broadcasting media undergoes tighter control than print.
Control of the internet is more difficult as coded language and VPNs prevent the government from fully controlling the internet. If a student does not want to be exposed to nationalist content, he/she could avoid it. The same cannot be said for compulsory education. In other words, nationalist content cannot be conveyed equally in all media and loopholes for content that could be considered ‘unpatriotic’ are possible, especially online.

A more recent popular ‘meeting-point’ for young Chinese is social media. Here nationalism is also conveyed by ordinary Chinese citizens. The 2012 incident about the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands give a good impression of this phenomena, because various nationalist posts on Weibo, collected by Cairns and Carlson (2016: 7-8), display a wide array of nationalist thought, ranging from moderate opinions, “which cautioned against the potential negative consequences of direct action against Japan”, to rather extreme ones, which called for military action. However, as time passed, the amount of deeply nationalist posts decreased, while at the same time moderate opinions on the issue increased, which suggests that the more extreme positions on the issue were relatively volatile (Cairns and Carlson 2016: 12-3). Students online are confronted with a wide array of non-government opinions, which either can be nationalist or not. What this means is that students are also exposed to bottom-up nationalist content or are even actively creating non-state-led nationalist content. However, it also shows that popular nationalist (especially anti-government) positions have, so far, usually occurred in response to a specific incident and have been a relatively short phenomenon.

Another interesting finding is that, although anti-Chinese government opinions were expressed to a vast extent (though not for a long period of time), Weibo was hardly censored (Cairns and Carlson 2016: 16). Weibo could have been shut down, and it remains a mystery why this has not happened back in 2012. It seems that the internet in China has become a public space for ‘netizens’ to express their opinions, even those which do not go conform with the official CCP line. According to Tang and Sampson (2012: 458), some Chinese websites have become a “parallel information universe” which coexists next to traditional media. Hyun and Kim (2015: 774) found that “news consumption of both traditional and social media increased the level of online political expression [and that] [t]he more frequently they expressed their political opinions
online, the stronger [was] the likelihood that they would report nationalistic attitudes and support for the existing system”.

However, nationalistic attitudes do not necessarily imply that those netizens’ opinion is in line with the Chinese government. Having examined a cross-sectional nationally representative data set off the 2007 China World Value Survey (2007 WVS), Lei (2011: 300-6) found that those in China who responded using the internet to obtain information in the week prior to taking the survey, were more likely to evaluate the party state and political conditions as negative, compared to those who reported that they have only used traditional media as a source of information. More recently, Zhang et al (2018) investigated online comments (on Weibo) of 146 opinion leaders (measured by popularity and the number of retweets, likes, and comments the user receives) and found that “the dominant voice tends to be anti-regime, with as many as over 76 per cent of opinion leaders being clearly critical of the regime” (Zhang et al 2018: 780). However, citizens who occasionally express anti-regime views online are sometimes even more nationalistic than leaders in Beijing. Having analysed blog postings relating to the commemorative events marking the 150th anniversary of the Yuanmingyuan incident, Weatherley and Rosen (2013: 64-6) found that while some Chinese bloggers responded “in a way that the CCP would like”, others did not. According to Weatherley and Rosen (2013: 65) “not every blogger, [...] is supportive of the CCP over the legacy of the Yuanmingyuan”; some bloggers even think that CCP is/was too soft in its dealings with foreigners (Weatherley and Rosen 2013: 67). Nonetheless, in the light of this research, this data should be viewed with care, as we do not know whether university students are a key group of opinion leaders online. In addition to that, it is worth noting that more than 95 per cent of (Weibo) users rarely post original content themselves (Zhang et al 2018: 763). As the Chinese government also hires citizens to ‘post’ on their behalf, it is unclear who instigates nationalism online and to what degree. It also does not indicate whether nationalist content on- and offline has a strong influence on Chinese university students.

Having demonstrated that both Red Tourism and modern media more generally convey nationalist thought outside the classroom, I now briefly identify another potential source of nationalist influence which have not been widely researched. Many students
have played with toys and computer/video games throughout growing up, therefore it is worth looking at items that imbed nationalist thought. There is little research on this particular source of nationalist influence, although two recent studies have offered valuable insights. Naftali (2014: 15-6) found, for example, that that PLA toys – which are aimed to shape students’ national pride - do not have a significantly positive influence on students’ national attitudes, as most students prefer Japanese anime, Disney cartoons, and Hasbro toys over local ones. Another factor which has recently become significant is computer/video games. According to the Ministry of Culture (MoC), the number of online gamers reached 120,000,000 in 2010 (MoC, cited in: Nie 2013: 500). MNORPGs (Massive Multiplayer Online Role-playing Games) and MOBAs (Multiplayer Online Battle Arena) have become increasingly popular in China and the world over the past 10 years, arguably starting with the MNORPG ‘World of Warcraft’ from American video/computer game developer Blizzard Entertainment.

According to Nie (2013: 500) “the Party-state has begun to use the new medium of online games to propagate patriotic and nationalist values”. A popular theme for “China’s home-grown digital games” is the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), in reaction to a “perceived rising militarism in Japan” (ibid.). Over the past years the Chinese government has successfully integrated private game developers into its propaganda mechanism by offering financial support and partnership (Nie 2013: 501). Essentially this alliance epitomizes a win-win situation, as the CCP is able to embed its concept of aiguo zhuyi in gamers’ life and the gaming industry receives financial support which helps to compete with game producers from abroad. However, the existence of nationalist content in video/computer games since the 1990s, prior to the collaboration of government and gaming industry (which started in the mid-2000s), shows that nationalism has not always been instigated by the CCP, but also by parts of the Chinese gaming industry (Nie 2013: 503).

Family could also prove to be an important channel of nationalist influence, not least because of the time students spent around their family members. In fact, after having surveyed 708 Chinese students, Fuligni and Zhang (2004: 188) found that “both urban and rural adolescents continued to report a strong sense of obligation to support, assist, and respect the authority of their families”. According to Deutsch (2004: 412), “Chinese
students pay attention to what their parents want them to do as they embark upon their futures”.

However, past research has not investigated which roles Chinese parents play concerning the development of their son’s/daughter’s national identity and pride. It makes sense that many Chinese parents want to influence their children in regard to their academic and career success later, but even data on that is relatively scarce. By surveying 566 Hospitality, Tourism and Management students and their later career choice in major Chinese cities, Wong and Liu (2010: 98) found that parents influence their children in regard to their career choice, mainly because of “parental supports of H&T industry [and] parental career concerns about welfare and prestige”. Although there is evidence that many Chinese parents influence their children toward a specific career path, it is unknown what other aspect of students’ lives are also heavily influenced by their parents.

In section 3.1 I have demonstrated how invested the MoE is in forming students’ national identity. As, for instance, classes in ‘Morality’ also account for decent amount of credits, it would be logical to assume that parents want their children to succeed in these classes as well. This, in turn, could mean that parents have also become a channel of nationalist influence, regardless of whether parents’ influence in that matter derives from true belief (in aiguo zhuyi) or from the necessity to ensure that their children succeed in school overall.

5. Concluding Remarks

Despite past research which clearly distinguished patriotism and nationalism, I argued that sentiments which are considered as patriotism should also be looked at under the scope of nationalism. Nationalist sentiment can be expressed in many ways, one of which some scholars refer to as patriotism. However, using a different label for a sentiment that ultimately relates to one’s positive feelings for one’s nation and ingroup disguises the original role of nationalism in creating and maintaining nations and national identities and fosters the idea that nationalism is inherently negative, while
patriotism is positive. In the Chinese context, it is almost impossible to distinguish the two, considering how sentiment which merely relates to love for one’s nation can quickly change into sentiment which is characterised by hostility towards other nations (see chapter 7).

Nationalist influence in the form of aiguo zhuyi can, first and foremost, be found in Chinese primary and secondary education. Themes such as loving the motherland, unification, the link between people, party and nation and the importance of a national identity and belonging constantly recur throughout the overall curriculum. Although varying from subject to subject, nationalism is omnipresent in Chinese schools. Nationalism is not always conveyed in an obvious way. Sometimes love for the motherland is mentioned in the same sentence as loving the parents, as if it is the most natural thing in the world to love the Chinese motherland. Other themes such as the practice of calligraphy should also be seen in the context of bringing a student close to something that is uniquely Chinese and free of any other (e.g. Western) influences.

A recent document from the MoE stated that the CCP Central Committee (including Xi Jinping) attaches great importance to promoting patriotism and wants to further patriotic education, even for those students who live and study abroad (MoE 2016). The new guideline is intended to further strengthen ideas and concepts that can already be found in Chinese education. What is new, is the promotion of ‘to go with the party forever’ (yongyuan gen dang zou, 永远跟党走) which essentially means always to follow the party line (MoE 2016: Point 3). Point 4 of the document suggests that patriotic education should be increasingly implemented outside of school. Although this idea is not entirely new, it shows that state-led nationalism is also conveyed outside of school.

Channels of nationalist thought are also to be found outside the classroom. This does not imply that these channels influence students equally; however, due to their ubiquity, it is likely that some of them have positive effect on many students’ nationalist attitudes. Unlike other societal groups, students have to visit heritage sides as an extracurricular activity of school. Therefore, students are forced to engage with the nationalist thought conveyed at war museums, memorial halls and others. Media and the internet as well as online games could play a much larger role. However, one has to distinguish between
different types of media. Arguably the internet, which is widely used among most students, has a much bigger impact than for example radio or TV. Last year, the MoE announced that all primary and secondary schools will soon have internet access (China Daily 2015a). Online, nationalism is not always instigated by the government, thus all forms of nationalism can be found, ranging from moderate to extreme and from state-led to bottom-up.

Based on quantitative and qualitative data, chapter 5 will analyse to what degree students have actually been influenced by each of the channels discussed above. It will demonstrate that some channels are much more influential than others and attempt to explain the reasons behind students’ different perceptions of what has had a positive impact on their sense of aiguo zhuyi.
Chapter 5: Explicit Learning of Nationalist Sentiment and its Impact on Students

1. Introduction

This chapter discusses how Chinese university students in Shanghai learn nationalist sentiment explicitly. It also demonstrates how students perceive the influence of *aiguo zhuyi* from several channels that they are exposed to when growing up. The following sections thus analyse which channels of nationalist influence are particularly important. ‘Explicit learning’ is understood as follows:

[E]xplicit learning typically involves memorizing a series of successive facts and thus makes heavy demands on working memory. As a result, it takes place consciously and results in knowledge that is symbolic in nature (i.e. it is represented in explicit form) [...] In the case of explicit learning, learners are aware that they have learned something and can verbalize what they have learned. (Ellis 2009: 3)

As indicated in chapter 3.3 and based on a rotated component matrix, seven scales were created and Cronbach’s Alpha (α) was used to evaluate the reliability of each scale. In this chapter I first analyse content of the scale which is labelled ‘Formal Education’ (state education, as well as national heritage sites; consisting of the items 7, 8, 9, 10; see appendix). The alpha coefficient for the four items in the ‘Formal Education’ scale is .808, suggesting that the items have, according to UCLA (2019), a relatively high internal consistency. The second part of this chapter discusses and analyses items 11, 12, 13 and 14 which form the ‘Informal Education’ (education which is not directly received from the state, though sometimes indirectly) scale and which also have a relatively high internal consistency of α=.711. Although both scales help us understand how students in China are socialised in regard to *aiguo zhuyi*, there is a difference between mandatory schooling and extracurricular activities and explicit learning outside of school. I will come back to this point in the conclusion of this chapter.

Nationalist sentiment is explicitly learned in the form of *aiguo zhuyi* in school and elsewhere (see chapter 4). This study’s field data clearly shows that nationalism is explicitly learned by everyone, as all 21 interviewees reported that they have consciously learned *aiguo zhuyi* and were able to verbalize what they think of the
concept. Opinions on what aiguo zhuyi actually means varied slightly, but not a single student did not remember learning it. To determine the effectiveness of various channels, students were asked to evaluate which channels had had a positive impact on their national attitudes. The data presented in the following sections is based on students’ opinions and shows that some channels appear to be more effective than others. Being exposed to nationalism through various channels does not mean that students adopt nationalist thought equally. For instance, all students surveyed and interviewed completed compulsory state education, however, some students paid more attention in class than others. Some students may have only recited aiguo zhuyi-related content in class to get a good grade, while others took the concept to heart. In addition to that, teachers also have a certain amount of freedom when it comes to the curriculum and teaching of aiguo zhuyi. Because of this, my survey asked students about their own opinion as to whether they sympathise with the concept and chapter 7 demonstrates that the number of students who sympathise with aiguo zhuyi is generally high.

There are many channels of influence through which nationalist sentiment can be explicitly learned. Students were asked to evaluate to what extent a specific channel of explicit nationalist influence had had a positive impact on their sense of aiguo zhuyi. All students interviewed stated that they have learned about aiguo zhuyi. Although learning aiguo zhuyi does not automatically mean that the student agrees with the concept, it is evident that the concept is well known and plays a major role in the curriculum and outside of class. For this reason, students were asked to indicate which channel of influence had increased (zengjia, 增加) their sense of aiguo zhuyi. In this way, students were not only confronted with the idea of aiguo zhuyi, but they had also to critically reflect which factor had had a positive impact on their own sense of aiguo zhuyi.

The data from the following sections thus demonstrate and analyse the perceived impact of channels of explicit nationalist influence on students. Although students are also exposed to less obvious forms of influence, this chapter emphasises the importance which some channels of influence appear to have on students’ national attitudes. First, section two of this chapter examines the impact of state education, including primary, secondary and tertiary education. Generally, state education appears to have large impact on students, as many of them reported that (especially primary and secondary)
state education has increased their sense of *aiguo zhuyi*. However, students perceived an even greater influence from national heritage sites, which was surprising considering students only visit these sites infrequently (see section 2.2). Section 3.1 demonstrates that traditional media (radio, TV, print, video games) and the internet appeared to have a lesser impact on students’ sense of *aiguo zhuyi*, compared to state education and heritage sites. Finally, students also believed that they were greatly influenced by family (see section 3.2), yet not much by computer/video games (section 3.3).

2. Formal Education

2.1 State Education

As indicated by the data of table 5.1 below, most students identified primary school as having influenced their sense *aiguo zhuyi* (66.2 per cent; 163 students). Although students can be exposed to nationalist thought prior to formal state education, standardized nationalist content, for instance in the form of ‘Morality and Life’ classes, is explicitly learned from the age of six or seven, when students in Shanghai usually start their primary education (OECD 2016: 10). In theory, teaching nationalist content this early should prove to be effective as the character and development of young students is more easily influenced. According to Goswami, children start to learn and care about their pro-social obligations to the ingroup at a very young age (usually starting from the age of three). Suggesting that an implicit awareness of social attitudes to the ingroup is established by the age of five, Goswami remarks that “ingroups provide a way of organizing social interactions to promote ingroup ‘favouritism’” (Goswami 2014: 71-2). Considering the nation is also an ingroup, it appears conclusive that CCP-leadership hopes to shape students’ sense of *aiguo zhuyi* even before primary school, for instance, by story-telling sessions in kindergartens (Zhao S 1998: 296). However, it is primary school where *all* students are explicitly exposed to nationalist content in a standardized curriculum. As stated in chapter 2, the Chinese Ministry of Education wants primary-school students to learn ‘correct’ values in the designated class ‘Morality and Life’ (MoE 2011d: 2-4). At the time of my fieldwork in Shanghai 2016-17, university students were
usually around the age of 19 to 23 which means that most of them attended primary school prior to China’s major curriculum reform in 2011. Since the reform the CCP has further reinforced the focus on building a national identity by, for instance, giving Chinese culture a high profile in the new curriculum (Law 2014: 353-4). Therefore, future research on Chinese university students’ attitudes toward the nation will be needed to determine whether students who have been fully exposed to nationalist content in compulsory education after the reform display even more nationalist sentiment than students in this study.

Table 5.1 – Nationalist Influence in Primary School

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data

Teaching aiguo zhuyi in primary school proves to be effective for most, as two-thirds of all students (66.2 per cent) believed that primary school education increased their sense of aiguo zhuyi, while only 13.8 per cent (34 students) deny a positive impact. However, it is worth nothing that one in five students (19.9 per cent) was not sure about whether primary school had increased his/her sense of aiguo zhuyi.

Although some students perceive the influence of primary school as having been higher when reflecting upon their time in school, this does not mean that the actual influence of nationalist content in class was necessarily higher for them than for other students;
instead, some students might either evaluate nationalist influences in the past differently today or, and this seems more likely, have taken their primary education more seriously than other students. The reverse is also true, that some students might evaluate the same influence as less and/or have paid less attention in primary school than other students. I come back to this point later in this section when I discuss the importance of students’ gaokao-score (National Higher Education Entrance Examination, 高考) in relation to the subject they want to study.

Students who strongly agreed to the statement above may also perceive primary education as more influential than their peers, due to socialisation from family (see 5.3.2). Their mindset might stem from the desire to strengthen the nation more generally and/or from the desire to find good employment later (for which they have to study hard in school). Although every student I interviewed recalled learning aiguo zhuyi from primary school on, their answers differed slightly when I asked them about what aiguo zhuyi means to them (see chapter 7.2)

Students’ answers on what aiguo zhuyi means to them were not solely based on what they learned in primary school, but what they learned about it more generally. A few students were asked about what they can recall from aiguo zhuyi in primary school, but only two students were able remember how the concept was conveyed. Cuihua, who studied Fashion Design at Donghua University, told me that she did not like learning about aiguo zhuyi when she was young, because in her primary school the teacher was just merely reading from his book, and she sometimes felt asleep. She further added that she simply had to learn for her module ‘Morality and Life’ to get a good score in the test but did not particularly enjoy it (SHDUAD03, 10/04/17). Xiaoxiong, whom I met several times in the context of unstructured interviews, was able to recall that ‘Morality and Life’ did not have a lot of political components and mainly revolved around becoming a good citizen. He told me that filial piety (xiaoda, 孝道) was one of the key components of that module. But the module was not limited to the respect of parents and elderly only. According to Xiaoxiong, they also had to learn to respect authority. He could not recall whether he was also taught to have respect for the government, but he explained to me that this respect also involved being compliant to law and rules more
generally (zun ji shoufa, 遵纪守法). Like Cuihua, he also recalled that ‘Morality and Life’ was mostly conveyed through books which were read by the teachers (SHTUHSS04, 26/05/17).

As stated above, all students remembered learning *aiguo zhuyi* in primary school. However, all students attended primary school at an age where nationalist content is not necessarily perceived as such and where the actual influence may reside more in the unconsciousness instead of actual memories. In other words, remembering learning *aiguo zhuyi* in primary school may merely be related to having consciously heard about the concept in primary school for first time but not necessarily having adopted elements of it for the first time.

Chinese students in secondary school, however, are situated in a life period (age 12-18, adolescence) in which adolescents generally start to develop “stronger reasoning skills, logical and moral thinking, and become more capable of abstract thinking and making rational judgements.” (WHO 2014). This could mean that students are also more able to grasp ideas related to *aiguo zhuyi*, as compared to merely remembering learning about the concept. In addition to that, memories about lessons during that time are most likely more accurate than those of their time in primary school. The data of table 5.2 shows that slightly less than two-thirds (62.2%; 153 students) of all students felt that middle school had increased their sense of *aiguo zhuyi*. 
Table 5.2 – Nationalist Influence in Secondary School

Table 5.2 demonstrates that a clear majority of students thought that the influence of *aiguo zhuyi* in secondary school had a positive impact on their sense of *aiguo zhuyi*. Secondary school essentially prepares students for the *gaokao* which is decisive for attending a good university. Students might take secondary school more seriously, because they might start to realise that good grades pave the way to get into a good university later.

As secondary school is the precursor to university, students need to study hard in order to receive a high *gaokao* score. Scores required for admission largely depend on province/city (e.g. popular cities like Shanghai and Beijing tend to have higher admission requirements), discipline and the reputation of a university, and not only its general reputation, but also its reputation for specific subjects. Tongji University, for instance, is popular for both studying a Design and Science related subject (SHTUHSS04, 26/04/17). For this reason, subjects which relate to these disciplines, on average, require higher scores. For instance, a student who went to secondary school in Shanghai and who wanted to study car engineering (*cheliang gongcheng*, 车辆工程) at Tongji University in 2017, was required to have a minimum *gaokao*-score of 570 (the maximum *gaokao*
score which can be achieved in Shanghai is 600). In comparison, a student who wanted to study sociology (shehui xue, 社会学) at Tongji needed a gaokao-score of 559 (Tongji University 2017). This does not mean that every science-related subject at any Chinese university generally requires equally high gaokao-scores but studying an Science subject at a well-regarded university in a city like Shanghai, requires students to have worked hard in secondary school. More generally, all students surveyed for this project were studying in Shanghai, and thus must have had good grades in secondary school, as getting into one of Shanghai’s higher education institutions is very competitive.

Two modules which all students have to successfully pass in secondary school are ‘Morality and Society’ (already starts in the last years of primary school) and ‘Ideology and Morality’ (see chapter 4.3.1). Xiaoxiong told me that these two classes also largely involve textbook-study. However, according to him, the focus is less about becoming a good citizen, but more about economics (which mainly discusses the Chinese economic system and only basic economic theory), Chinese politics (including learning about China’s political system, the people’s representatives) and Chinese political belief which includes learning that the Chinese “nation is undividable” (bukefen, 不可分). As I will demonstrate in chapter 9.2, students’ strong attitude towards reunification (with Taiwan) might, in fact, largely stem from state education, as the message of an undividable China is constantly repeated in secondary school (especially in ‘Ideology and Morality’). Xiaoxiong also told me that his secondary school organised occasional trips to the cinema to watch Chinese movies like ‘The Founding of a Republic’ (Jianguo Daye, 建国大业) which plays between 1945 and 1949 and tells the story of the end of the Chinese civil war, culminating in the founding of the PRC. He also remembered that his secondary school organised a trip to see a fictional movie ‘Ip Man’ (Ye Wen, 叶问), in which a grandmaster of the martial arts resists Japanese invaders in 1937 (SHTUHSS04, 22/02/17). Students in secondary school, thus are not only exposed to textbook study, but also occasionally engage with nationalist content through, for instance, modern Chinese movies, which, due to their dramaturgy, action-scenes and effects, might also be appealing to a younger audience, like students.
Aiguo zhuyi is also taught at university level; however, fewer students (116 students) overall reported that the concept in university classes had had a positive impact on their national attitudes (see table 5.3).

Table 5.3 – Nationalist Influence in University

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data

The concept is brought into classes which are mandatory for students of all disciplines. According to one student at Tongji University, all Bachelor’s students in Shanghai must take classes in ‘Morality’ (sixiang pinde, 思想品德), ‘Modern Chinese History’ (zhongguo jindaishi, 中国近现代史), ‘Mao Zedong Theory’ (maozedong sixiang gaikuo, 毛泽东思想概括), and ‘Marxism Theory’ (makesi zhuyi sixiang gaikuo, 马克思主义思想概括). While students are required to take all modules, they can decide for themselves when they want to take each single module. At the end of each module, students need to pass a written examination.

Another point worth noting is the impact of these classes on a student’s grade. For instance, an English Language and Culture student from Tongji University receives six credits for the compulsory class ‘Mao Zedong Theory’, which is the highest amount of
credits that can be awarded for a single class, but only two or four credits for other compulsory classes, such 'Integrated English' (zhonghe yingyu, 综合英语). However, the core module ‘Integrated English’ - mainly consisting of understanding English literature and culture, as well as training in writing and translation - is taught in seven out of eight semesters and therefore contains more credits than the modules mentioned above. In total, an English Language and Culture student from Tongji University requires between 170 and 180 credits to graduate. Compulsory classes like ‘Mao Zedong Theory’ account for approximately 9 per cent of the entire curriculum which in turn is very similar to the ratio of ‘Morality’ classes in high school (see chapter 4.3.1), suggesting that even in higher education the government still places a similar emphasis on teaching aiguo zhuyi as in primary and secondary education. Shiru, an Accounting student from Tongji University, made a similar point in her interview, explaining that the intensity of aiguo zhuyi-related content in class stayed approximately the same from primary school until university (SHTUBFM02, 10/12/16). This emphasis does not stop at undergraduate education, as similar classes are also compulsory at postgraduate-level, such as the class ‘Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Thought’ (maozedong he dengxiaoping sixiang, 毛泽东和邓小平思想) for Master’s students.

Although the intensity of nationalist content in university classes varies depending on discipline and module, aiguo zhuyi continues to be a mandatory part of every student’s timetable. Yet, as demonstrated above, aiguo zhuyi does not seem to have the same impact on students as it does in high school, as only less than half of all students (47.2 per cent) believe that university has had a positive impact on their national attitudes. The data reflects that, although more students agreed compared to those who disagreed, a large number of students (N=83) took a neutral stance or were not sure (see table 5.3). Many students’ different perception about the influence of aiguo zhuyi in university is likely related to changes which take place when attending university. Entering higher education is a big step in the life of a Chinese student. For the first time many students do not live at home anymore and may be freer in their decision-making. In addition to that, moving to a global city like Shanghai may also lead to first face-to-face interactions and discussions with foreigners and people from different regions in China, including minorities.
Previous studies about how college affects (American) students, found that “authoritarian, dogmatic, and ethnocentric thinking and behaviour” generally declined while being enrolled at university (Pascarella and Terenzini 2005: 214-5). This may be different in a country like China, where freedom of speech and political discussion are limited, and where state education works differently. Students in this study reported less nationalist influence from university (compared to primary and secondary education) which basically fits to the global literature on the negative relationship between education and nationalism (e.g. Hjerm 2001: 56). It might be that university education in China (including university life) works against learning nationalism (at least compared to primary and secondary school) for a large number of students, while at the same time it might not substantially further increase the level of nationalism among those who already are quite nationalist.

This is not to say that the majority of students become apolitical when entering university, but it could be that many students want to focus more on their own interests and not on state-prescribed classes in which they are obliged to learn more about China. When asking Chinese students about their experience in university, Fairbrother (2003: 99) found that “[s]ome students denied that the university had much to do with their national attitudes, claiming that they learned nothing new about China in university or that they were too busy with their studies to be concerned with national affairs”. Others even stated that the university curriculum was “basically a repetition of what they had learned in secondary school” (ibid.). However, most students, Fairbrother (2003: 100.1) surveyed and interviewed, reported quite the opposite (63.3 per cent), saying that their attitudes to China had deepened and changed because of the general university experience (e.g. conversations with professors, classmates and greater variety of people and different opinions). However, Fairbrother (2003: 99-101) only discussed data related to how (and whether) students’ attitudes towards the nation during university has changed. His data does not imply that 63.3 per cent of students became more nationalist during their time on campus. In fact, most of those students’ attitudes changed because of the overall university experience, “rather than any conscious effort through the university curriculum or professors to influence students’ attitudes” (Fairbrother 2003: 99).
2.2 National Heritage Sites

As outlined in chapter 4.4, national heritage sites are meant to establish loyalty to CCP-leadership by historically linking the party to the nation’s salvation. According to a student interviewed, visiting a site as a school-organised extra-curricular activity takes place infrequently (usually in middle school). However, there is no reliable information as to how often students visit such sites. Aside from visiting a museum as an extra-curricular school activity, some students visit national heritage sites alone or with their friends and/or family, whereas others do not.

Table 5.4 – Nationalist Influence of National Heritage Sites

| National Heritage Sites increased my Aiguo Zhuyi |
|-------------------------------|------------------|
| Strongly Agree | 23.2 |
| Agree | 57.7 |
| Neutral/Not sure | 13.4 |
| Disagree | 4.9 |
| Strongly Disagree | 0.8 |

Source: Author’s survey data

Four in five students (80.9 per cent) thought that national heritage sites and museums have positively influenced their sense of aiguo zhuyi. Students are less frequently exposed to nationalism through heritage sites than in compulsory state education, and this may be part of the reason why so many believe that national heritage sites had a
positive influence on their national attitudes; visiting sites as an extracurricular activity may be perceived as more interesting than textbook study in formal state education. Before discussing why heritage sites and museums seem to have a big impact on most students, I will draw on my observations at Shanghai’s most famous national heritage site to develop a better understanding of what Red Tourism involves. Based on my field notes from spring 2017, I show how nationalism in the heritage site is conveyed and discuss how it aims to shape a single historical narrative and view of the Chinese nation.

On a weekday in spring 2017 I arrived at the ‘Memorial of the Site of the First National Congress of the CPC’ (zhongguo gongchandang di yi ci quanguo daibiao dahui hui zhi jinianguan, 中国共产党第一次全国代表大会会址纪念馆) which is located in a well-maintained historical shikumen (石库门) building in Shanghai’s Xintiandi (新天地) district. The site exhibits the birth place of the CCP in 1921 and tells the story of the thirteen members who held the first national congress there. Promoting ‘patriotism’ in China does not occur beneath the surface, as a sign next to the exit gate displays: “Shanghai Patriotic Promotion Site” (shanghaishi aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu jidi, 上海市爱国主义教育基地). According to Mitter (2005: 129) “[t]he inculcation of patriotism in China [...] is embedded in most of the activities and institutions set up in China as part of the educational regime”, and it is therefore quite common that heritage sites in China openly promote patriotism. Students and other visitors are therefore explicitly confronted with the site’s aims to promote patriotism. It is reasonable to assume that students’ minds are therefore focused on aiguo zhuyi and that they are conscious of the ‘message’ they are supposed to take away.

Shanghai’s most famous site – like many other heritage sites - does not require an entrance fee but to wait in a queue for a few minutes, as the site was well visited on the day I went. After passing a security check, visitors enter a large hall in which the CCP-flag is displayed on a large screen (figure 5.1). The hall contains a large copper art installation which shows all members of the first national congress (figure 5.2).
For the most part, the site is structured as a chronological “walk through” modern Chinese history starting with a preface in which “[...] Western Powers’ invasion brought huge disaster to the Chinese nation [...]”. It appears that the site is also meant to be visited by foreigners, as all information is displayed in English as well. The CCP is presented as the saviour of the Chinese nation and responsible for China’s prosperity and people’s happiness as it “[...] led the Chinese people to embark on the historical journey of striving for national independence [...]”. This is not only a key nationalist goal, but also typical for these kind of museums in China, as “the Chinese Communist Party [uses] history education as an instrument for the glorification of the party” (Wang 2012: 9). In other words, learning nationalism in the form of aiguo zhuyi at heritage sites is not
merely meant to build a national identity more generally, but one that is inseparable from the CCP.

Later in section one, ‘Western powers’ are, again, blamed and the Opium War of 1840 is discussed with reference to China’s suffering from Western powers’ “large-scale invasion and plunder”. While students may be used to this kind of narrative from school, at section one of the site, they are able to see real documents, certificates, photos and even a gun owned by the nineteenth-century reformer Liang Qichao. Section two of the site does not focus on ‘Western aggression’, but instead shows various formations of early CCP organisations in various places including Shanghai and Beijing, displayed on a large interactive map. The focus in section two is more on CCP revolutionary activities and the events leading to the foundation of the CCP. Section three is largely about the first national congress of the CCP, including “creating a new world” and the realisation of communism and socialism as central objectives. At the end of section three, visitors find life-sized statues of the members of the first national congress sitting at a table (figure 5.3).

*Figure 5.3: Iron installation, showing the founding of the CCP in 1921*

*Source: author’s photograph, taken: May 2017*

Both sections explain the events which lead to the formation of the CCP and the general conditions under which the first national congress took place. The impression in sections two and three is that the “journey of striving for national independence” is solely about the CCP, but the actual message conveys that struggle, effort and fate of people and party are aligned. Although the CCP only represented a small fraction of Chinese people in the early years of its foundation, the ‘Memorial of the Site of the First National
Congress of the CPC’ disseminates the idea that the CCP has always acted on behalf of all people in China. This inclusion-narrative appears to be common in heritage sites in China. Wang (2012: 227) suggests that a “state’s ‘official nationalism’ is often largely dependent on the degree of ‘social nationalism’ shared by all citizens. States must become social nations if they are to successfully mobilize nationalist behaviour among the population”. In other words, the events which lead to the foundation of the CCP are not only important for documenting CCP-history, but for documenting the history of the Chinese people more generally.

Section four features concluding remarks and gives an idea of China’s present and future. Unlike section two and three, which almost entirely deal with historical facts about the foundation of the CCP, section four, again, explicitly links the nation to the party. Having received an explicit nationalist introduction in section one, and merely historical facts about the CCP in section two and three, students are, again, confronted with a nationalist narrative, in which ‘the Chinese people’ were mistreated in the past but saved by the efforts of the CCP. As displayed at the bottom of figure 5.4, by reading ‘we believe...’ (women xiangxin, 我们相信), students and other Chinese visitors are explicitly invited to share a common dream which, in turn, is strongly related to a state-led nationalist vision of the future. In addition to that, the quotation of Xi Jinping highlights that the government reminds the Chinese people of this nationalist vision, and even claims that is has always been the dream of all Chinese people to realise this vision. Having visited several national heritage sites and urban planning exhibition halls, Denton believes that these sites and exhibition halls reflect the following:

[A] profound desire to once and for all extricate China from the burden of its modern history, a history of imperialist aggression, civil wars, and unending revolutions. These idealised visions of the future, moreover, are build on a nostalgic representation of the modern past, one that whitewashes Chinese history of its violence and trauma and that constructs a new historical trajectory that leads inevitably to the modernisation, development, and national greatness of the present (Denton 2014: 265-6)

Apart from the fact that Shanghai’s ‘Memorial of the Site of the First National Congress of the CPC’ covers an important chapter of modern Chinese history (and not the nation’s
future), it still gives visitors a taste of the future in the end which shows how close nationalist state narratives of past, present and future are aligned.

Figure 5.4: Installation set up at the End of Shanghai’s ‘Memorial of the Site of the First National Congress of the CPC’

After finishing the last section, visitors have to leave the building and enter another small room in which the actual first national congress of the CCP took place. Essentially,
there is nothing particularly interesting about the room (approximately 20sqm), as it only features a table with ordinary looking tea cups on it. While visitors are allowed to take photographs in all other four sections, they are not allowed to do so on the actual site, enforced by a security guard, and room was noticeably silent. Only a small number of people were allowed in the room at once and none talked. Everyone simply looked at the table and left after about 30 seconds. The unusualness of silence and the ban on photography could convey to the visitor that this room is sacred and to be respected. It reminded me of a brief ritual ceremony, not too different from visiting a church. Referring to museums in the Western hemisphere, like the Louvre, Duncan (1991: 90-101) notes that museums “work like temples, shrines, and other such monuments”, and that “museum space is carefully marked off and culturally designated as special, reserved for a particular kind of contemplation and learning experience and demanding a special quality of attention”. Despite or because of this simplicity on the surface, students are likely be very impressed, as this unexciting small room has had a significant impact on the nation and still does today. Without the first national congress of the CCP, the party may have never been formed and therefore may have never ‘saved’ the Chinese nation from peril. Finally, without the first national congress, Deng Xiaoping and the CCP may have never embarked on reforms which led to China’s remarkable economic growth. Section one and four explicitly remind students of that, while section two, three and the actual meeting room convey this message in a more implicit way.

To sum up, ‘Western Powers’ are blamed for China’s difficult times in the past, yet they are generalized as the site does not mention any country in particular. Generally, the site emphasises the inseparable fate and success of the Chinese nation and the CCP. The narrative is that only because of the CCP and its deeds were the Chinese people and the Chinese nation saved and led to glory and success. After examining Beijing’s ‘Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression’ (中国人民抗日战争纪念馆), Mitter (2000: 293) notes that “[t]he museum makes it clear that nationalism is being reconfigured in the PRC to reflect the Communist Party’s post-Mao identity and its representation of legitimacy in the face of a rapidly changing political environment”. In the context of nationalism and legitimacy, the meeting site of the first
national congress in Shanghai resembles a symbol of the nation which also indirectly legitimises CCP-rule, as this symbol aims to link the CCP to the nation by instilling an unambiguous national historical memory in students and other Chinese visitors. Although focusing on a different historical event, the Ge Le Shan Revolutionary Martyrs Memorial (歌乐山烈士陵园) near Chongqing also fulfils this function as it also indicates that “the CCP is the ‘savior’ of the Chinese nation” (Li et al 2010: 114). When compared to other channels of influence, heritage sites seem to have the biggest impact on students’ national attitudes, which in turn could mean that the frequency to which students are exposed to an explicit form of nationalism is not necessarily the decisive factor regarding forming a national identity.

The reason why a heritage site is particularly appealing to most students could be related to the fact that it is an extracurricular activity. Although Chinese high school teachers usually choose to organise a guided tour through a museum, it nevertheless gives students the opportunity to engage with an activity outside the school campus. In a Western context, Griffin found that students enjoy learning in a museum as long as they have some choice and control over what they are doing (Griffin 2004: 64). Even if Chinese teachers choose to book a guided tour, museum visits may be a stimulating and exciting change compared to textbook study in a classroom, and the rarity of visiting museums could mean that students try to make the most of it and recall such visits more clearly. Past research carried out by Marcus, Levine and Grenier on American teachers’ views on school-based museum visits, showed that several factors hinder teachers ability to use museums to promote historical understanding: “Cost and logistics limit the number of visits teachers make with students. Teachers’ own view of museums as authoritative and the rarity of asking students to analyze how museums present the past prevents students from fully capitalizing on museums’ potential to promote historical thinking” (Marcus et al 2012: 90). In China, however, the government subsidises visits and, unlike American students, Chinese students are not generally used to asking many questions in class, thus being a passive recipient of information in a heritage site does not mean students do not develop a historical understanding.

Finally, it is also worth noting that, despite promoting aiguo zhuyi nationwide, different heritage sites might have different impacts on students. Some heritage sites may be
more interesting to students than others. For instance, the heritage site which I visited in Shanghai does not only promote aiguo zhuyi as such, but makes the chic surrounding district Xintiandi, with its well-maintained buildings, a part of the experience. Xintiandi’s architecture and commercial infrastructure represent both old and new. Denton (2005: 586) notes that the heritage site is “sandwiched between architectural nostalgia for the Republican past and contemporary commercial modernity [and thus] a visitor who emerges from the exhibition and then strolls around the very attractive surroundings of the Xintiandi district might well think about the CCP’s role in making this urban transformation possible”. Similarly, the landscape surrounding the Shaoshan Mao Zedong Memorial Hall (Shaoshan Mao Zedong tongzhi jinianguanzhi, 韶山毛泽东同志纪念馆之) might also contribute to the overall experience of visiting the site. According to Hung (2018: 919) “74 per cent of those who had visited Shaoshan in the mid-2000s indicated that their primary motive was not to commemorate Mao Zedong but, rather, they regarded the site an ‘ideal ecotourism place because of its picturesque landscape and comfortable climate’”. This does not mean that the site does not have an impact on its visitors, but that successfully promoting aiguo zhuyi at a heritage site might also be dependent on the surrounding landscape/area.

To conclude, in contrast to state education in the classroom, national heritage sites offer a better visualisation of the nation’s past, therefore experiencing history in the form of a museum could be more interesting than learning from a textbook. There is no definite answer as to why national heritage sites in China prove to be particularly influential on students; students do not visit national heritage sites weekly or monthly and are therefore, in contrast to state education, not frequently exposed to nationalist thought in this area. As mentioned above, the frequency of explicit nationalist influence in a student’s life might not be the decisive factor regarding a student’s national identity. Instead, besides frequent tacit nationalist influence (see chapter 6), infrequent explicit nationalist influence could prove to be more effective. Special symbols or events, which are explicitly promoted by the state, but less frequently, may be better remembered than mundane formal state education.
3. Informal Education

3.1 Media/Internet

In contrast to Red Tourism, traditional media and the internet as channels of nationalist influence are much more ubiquitous in students’ life. But compared to formal state education, nationalist content in news media on- and off-line is not compulsory but voluntary. Students can choose which website they open, which newspaper they read and which TV show they watch. This may explain, why both table 5.5 and 5.6 do not indicate that either traditional media (by which I refer to television, radio and print) or internet are perceived as very strong channels of nationalist influence among most students. However, 51.2 per cent (126 students) students stated that traditional media have had a positive impact on their sense of aiguo zhuyi, while only 43.2 per cent (106 students) said the same about the internet.

Table 5.5 – Nationalist Influence of Traditional Media

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media (TV, radio, print) increased my Aiguo Zhuyi</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral/Not sure</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data
The reason why some students perceive the influence of the internet on their sense of *aiguo zhuyi* as lower as compared to the influence of traditional media might have something to do with the fact that 65 students of this study grew up in a rural setting and thus the accessibility of each media. According to Oreglia (2015: 1) the state is heavily investing in information and communication technologies (ICTs) in rural China, yet rural residents still lag behind. In this study, the lack of access of rural students could be the reason why some students do not perceive the internet as a more important channel of influence in regard to their national attitudes. Traditional media (see table 5.5), on the other hand, which is far more accessible in rural areas, is perceived as more influential by students overall. The accessibility of traditional media and the inaccessibility of internet in rural China may be related to this different perception. While urban students were and are able to access information through the internet, many rural students could largely rely on traditional media in the past which is more tightly controlled by the state. However, this is likely to change for future high school...
students in rural China, as internet connectivity becomes increasingly available in rural China (SCMP 2018).

On the whole, traditional media and the internet as channels of nationalist influence are not as important as primary and secondary education, or Red Tourism. In contrast to the internet which seems to be a factor of positive influence for only 43.1 per cent of all students, traditional media appears to have positive influence for about every second student (51.2 per cent). About every third student was not sure whether traditional media and/or the internet has/have had a positive impact on his/her national attitudes. To return to what I discussed in chapter 4.4 above, that ‘netizens’ are more likely to oppose the official CCP party state, it might be that those who denied and/or those who were not sure about the influence of the internet, are more likely to be active users and thus are, like every other student, exposed to state-led nationalist influence online, but disagree (or are not sure) that it has had a positive impact on their sense of aiguo zhuyi which, after all, is a state-led concept.

Unlike an official patriotic promotion site, some content in TV or online might be perceived as less explicit than other. Not every student perceives nationalist content in TV or online as content that can be related to aiguo zhuyi. This is not to say that media and the internet completely fall into Billig’s concept of ‘banal nationalism’, as many students are fully aware of nationalism in media and on the internet, but it once again highlights that students sometimes learn and perceive nationalism differently.

This issue is highlighted by students’ different interests and habits in regard to accessing news on- and offline. Some students may access a particular news-website every day, whereas others may not access any news-related website at all. Two online news websites which are popular among some students are Wangyi Xinwen (网易新闻) and Xinlang Xinwen (新浪新闻). Occasionally both display nationalist sentiment, for example by appealing to emotions by posting pictures which show sad veterans leaving the armed police force in the context of a farewell ceremony (Xinlang Xinwen 2018), yet at the same time they also feature articles about celebrity divorce and other content more reminiscent of tabloid-press. What this means is that these websites also appeal to students who are not interested in political matters, yet by scrolling down the website
those students might click on political articles if they find the headline interesting. The fact that the internet is not perceived as a strong channel of nationalist influence does not necessarily mean that it is not one. Instead, it could be that the internet has increased students’ sense of aiguo zhuyi without them consciously realising it. Wang (2017: 45) notes that Chinese “students are extensively exposed to horizontal communications among netizens via blogs or microblogs, BBS [bulletin board systems] forums, and Internet encyclopedias”. When examining which blogs are popular among users, she found that “life and relations” blogs are particularly popular (ibid.). Web-encyclopedias are also popular among students, and even “40 per cent of [Wang’s] respondents search on politics in some online encyclopedias” (Wang 2017: 46).

Referring back to table 5.6, it could be that that students perceive the internet as a channel of influence differently because they feel that they can choose what to access and what not, which in turn might give the impression that content online is less obtrusive.

In contrast, traditional media is less free, which could partly explain why it is not popular among Chinese university students. Wang (ibid.) found that only “one-fifth (of Chinese university students) listen to the radio, 51 per cent watch TV, and 75 per cent read print newspapers on a regular basis”, while at the same time 99 per cent use the internet. Traditional media may thus not have influenced students greatly, because many students are simply not interested in using it. In contrast to various microblogs or other content online, China’s biggest newspaper group in China, the state-owned and operated ‘Renmin Ribao’ (人民日报), appears to be more explicit and consistent regarding nationalist content, and therefore maybe more obtrusive. The online website of the People’s Daily is a classic news website which features a lot of political articles and less entertainment and red-top-related content. Occasionally even articles which are typically apolitical, contain strong nationalist elements, such as a top story from June 2017 about Anhui (Zhang, Wang, Wang 2017). Essentially the article praises the beauty of Anhui and discusses recent improvements (such as the installation of road lighting) as well as the people who live there and how their life has improved. But it also uses nationalist terminology in the introduction, such as Zuguo (motherland, 祖国), Weida Zuguo (great motherland, 伟大祖国), Weida de dang (great party, 伟大的党) and Weida
This article on Anhui province, which I came across when browsing the news, may be a good example to analyse why some students do not read these kind of news reports, and instead prefer to not read news at all or use less official sources online. Eleven of the 21 students interviewed told me that they do not use the term *zuguo* as they find the term either too political or too emotional. One student even said that using *zuguo* is weird (*qiguai*, 奇怪) (SHTUAD01, 06/12/16). Though few students use the term in informal speech, *zuguo* is more commonly used in formal writing (e.g. newspapers). As shown in table 5.5 and 5.6, students are quite divided on the question of whether media and the internet have had (or have) a positive influence on their national attitudes. There is no consistency regarding the influence of traditional media and the internet, as students access different kind of news in a different frequency and perceive nationalist content differently.

3.2 Family

According to Yan (2009: 287) “Chinese society is undergoing an individualisation transformation”, and for many years, observers have speculated whether social and economic changes will undermine “cultural traditions of filial piety, parental authority, and family closeness” in China (Zhang and Fuligni 2006: 527). Based on 84 interviews with undergraduate students at a university in Southeastern China, Deutsch (2004: 412-3) found that Chinese students generally pay attention to what their parents want them to do later in terms of employment. Similarly, Wong and Liu found that Chinese students perceive the influence of parents (in regard to career choice) as generally high (Wong and Liu 2010:92). While many parents in China might only want the best for their child in regard to employment later, others may even (consciously) want their children to develop a form of national pride.
Table 5.7 – Nationalist Influence from Family

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data

As table 5.7 demonstrates, the majority of students (63.4 per cent; 156 students) believe that family has had a positive impact on their sense of *aiguo zhuyi*. Compared with the data of both primary and secondary school, family is perceived as similarly influential when asked about *aiguo zhuyi*.

Although 65 students of this study have a rural family background, the origin of students might not say much about the influence of their families on their national attitudes. According to Fuligini and Zhang, both urban and rural adolescents “continued to report a strong sense of obligation to support, assist, and respect the authority of their families [despite recent social and economic changes]” (Fuligni and Zhang 2004: 188). It might be that the respect for the parents also translates into the willingness to learn from them (even in the case of nationalism) and that this willingness is similarly pronounced among most urban and rural students.

In 2010, 44 percent of all students in China studied a subject which is related to SE (Xie, Zhang and Lai 2014: 9438), which could also tell us something about the role of family in choosing a discipline before and/or after graduation. In this study only two out of 54 students who studied a subject related to science, said that family has not had any
positive influence on their sense of *aiguo zhuyi*. Although the sample is too small to make tangible claims, it is worth noting that studies on university/college students worldwide (see Pascarella and Terenzini 2005: 302-3) suggest that science students are generally more conservative, which in turn, could mean that SE students also hold more traditional views in terms of the authority of parents and therefore evaluate the influence of their parents in the past differently. Apart from parents who might influence their children towards studying an science subject later, there are surely also Chinese parents of children who later choose to study a science subject at university and who include (or have included) nationalist ideas in their education at home, but there is no data available to analyse this. It would be interesting if future research focused on questioning Chinese parents about their opinion of *aiguo zhuyi* and its importance in parenting.

Some students are exposed to explicit nationalist content in the family before they enter primary school. During my visit to ‘Memorial of the Site of the First National Congress of the CPC’, I observed a mother explaining Chinese history and the chronology of the formation of the CCP to her approximately four-year-old daughter. She might not have done this with a specific nationalistic intention but explaining the nation’s history this early might already create a sense of a shared national past. Xiaoli, a fashion design student from Donghua University, told me that she started to learn about *aiguo zhuyi* at a “very young age”. She stated: “When I was approximately two years old, I played a game of recognizing the national flags and it was then that my parents taught me the differences between ‘China’ and ‘foreign countries’” (SHDUAD01, 10/04/17). What might appear as an early-childhood geography lesson taught by the parents presents one of the key ideas of national identity, namely the narration of ‘we’ (or ‘us’) and ‘they’ (or ‘them’) (Wodak et al 2009: 45-7). According to Goswami (2014: 72) “[s]ocial learning of cultural ingroups appears to develop early in children [by the age of five] as part of general socio-moral development”, therefore family as a channel of nationalist influence could prove to be particularly effective when the student is still very young.

Similarly, Meifang had been exposed to nationalist influence in her family as well. She told me that she loves Japan and would like to move there at some point, but her father does not allow it, because he hates Japan. She said that throughout her childhood and
youth her father has always made negative remarks about Japan in her presence when, for instance, Japan-related issues were shown on the news (SHTUAD02, 06/12/16). Learning nationalism through a family member therefore does not necessarily lead to an application of the learned. Xiaofang’s story provides another good example, as she told me that her parents are very anti-Japanese, but she likes Japan and would never watch anti-Japanese films with her parents (SHDUAD02, 10/04/17). As I demonstrate in chapter 9, many students expressed similar views on Japan (despite high levels of self-proclaimed aiguo zhuyi).

Although many students did not mention their family when I asked them about where they learned aiguo zhuyi, the survey data indicates that family as a channel of influence should not be ruled out. Most students believe that family has increased their own sense of aiguo zhuyi, whereas only one in ten students (10.9 per cent) denied any positive influence. Coming back to what Meifang and Xiaofang told me about their fathers, it could be that a small percentage of students might find the obtrusive nationalist influence of their parents annoying and therefore state that family has not had a positive impact on their national attitudes. In other words, the influence parents try to have on their children might lead to the exact opposite outcome, that students review this influence as negative. By investigating various channels of nationalist influence, Fairbrother found that 50.2 per cent of all students stated that family has had a strong impact on their national attitudes, whereas only 27.6 per cent said the same about their friends (Fairbrother 2003: 95). Comparing this study’s data with what Fairbrother found in 2003, family and friends seem to be the only agent of influence that has positively increased over the years. While it is difficult to evaluate who presents what kind of influence (family or friends), my qualitative data from the interviews suggest that many students are confronted with discussions about political topics that contain nationalist content both by friends and family. How students react to political topics or even openly expressed nationalism, and how they express nationalism themselves is discussed in chapter 7 and 8.
3.3 Computer/Video Games

In chapter 4.4.2 I also discussed video/computer games as a potential channel of nationalist influence. Although there is evidence that the government also tries to shape students national views through online games (Nie 2013: 500), data from this study shows that only very few students believed that computer/video games have influenced their sense of aiguo zhuyi (see table 5.8).

Table 5.8 – Nationalist Influence of Computer/Video Games

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Computer/Video Games increased my Aiguo Zhuyi</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral/Not sure</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data

Table 5.8 indicates that only 39 students (15.9 per cent) believed that computer/video games have increased their aiguo zhuyi. This is not to say that computer/video games are not popular in China. According to Statista (2018a) the number of mobile gamers in China in 2018 was/is around 565 million, thus suggesting that video games are not just niche phenomena in China. However, young people in China appear to prefer games other other than those which promote nationalist thought. For instance, some of the most popular games in China, like ‘League of Legends’ or ‘Dota2’ are (Straits Times 2018), in fact, not Chinese and thus do not promote patriotic education. In addition, it is
not clear how heavily the government is truly invested in promoting games which contain nationalist content, as the Chinese government’s view on videogames is ambiguous. Despite efforts to promote games which contain nationalist content, the government is also concerned about growing problems with videogame-addiction and has thus started to restrict gaming. According to the Telegraph (2018) the Chinese government “will ‘implement regulations and controls’ on the number of games that can be played online, limit new releases, explore an age-restriction system for games, and take steps to reduce playing time by minors”. In short, nationalist content in computer/videogames do not appear to have large impact on current university students in China.

4. Concluding Remarks

This chapter has analysed and discussed where Chinese university students in Shanghai learn and have learned nationalist sentiment explicitly. It has also attempted to explain why particular channels of nationalist influence are perceived as generally more influential than others.

Although learning nationalist content can be learned explicitly from a great variety of channels, it is important to distinguish between formal (state education and national heritage sites) and informal (all media and family) education. With a mean of 3.67 (on a 5 point Likert scale where 1= strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree), formal education appears to be more influential than informal education (mean of 3.23), which might be related to the fact that the former is mandatory, while the latter is not.

Especially national heritage sites appear to have a large impact on students’ sense of aiguo zhuyi, which is surprising considering the infrequency of visits. Students overall positive perception of the influence of formal education on their national attitudes might also largely stem from their diligence in school. In chapter 7 I will demonstrate that the majority of students sympathise with the concept aiguo zhuyi which, in turn, might demonstrate that the conventional wisdom about the negative relationship between education and nationalism, does not seem to work in the Chinese context. It might be possible, that countries like China, in which the promotion of nationalist
thought is largely state-led, defy this conventional wisdom, and that in these countries more education might lead to a higher level of nationalist sentiment. Learning nationalist thought through textbook study might be perceived as dull by some students, but the constant repetition of nationalist content in school, accompanied by occasional school trips to heritage sites and movie theatres, in which previously learned nationalist content is presented in an arguably more interesting way, might have been very effective. Before analysing how and why university students in contemporary China express nationalist sentiment, I will argue that Chinese students not only learn nationalist sentiment from the channels discussed above, but also tacitly in their everyday life.
Chapter 6: The Nation as an Everyday Experience - Tacit Learning of Nationalist Sentiment

1. Introduction

Chapter 5 outlined and explained how students perceive nationalist influences from a variety of different channels. Although many students perceived a positive influence from channels such as compulsory education, heritage sites and family and friends, students overall were - in contrast to their apparent strong love for the nation and their great pride in their national identity (see chapter 7) - more hesitant to state that specific channels have positively influenced their national attitudes. Linking this apparent strong love for the nation among Chinese university students to the multifaceted mechanisms of state-led patriotic education (in- and outside of school) or family and friends only, may be an oversimplification.

By looking at the idea of national identity in England and Scotland, McCrone and Bechhofer come to the conclusion that nationalism does not derive from emotions based on historic memories, but “from day-to-day contemporary social associations of people” (McCrone and Bechhofer 2015: 191). Wodak et al. do not rule out the importance of a common past in regard to the construction of a national identity but suggest that the construction of a common culture (in Austria) is important as well (Wodak et al. 2009: 189). By attempting to construct common historical memories through patriotic education, the Chinese government hopes to shape students’ national sentiment (Wang 2014). However, little is known about whether patriotic education in China works (in the government’s favour) and how nationalist sentiment and its resulting pride are constructed. Having surveyed more than 3000 university students in Beijing, Pang and Thomas suggest that elite Chinese students are “generally disconnected from the state in their identity articulation” (Pang and Thomas 2017: 833-4). They found that nationalistic values are strongly held in areas such as economic development, culture and history, but less so in regard to political and social institutions (ibid.). But even if Chinese students’ national identity is disconnected from the state, we would have to ask whether it is consciously or unconsciously disconnected. Who, if not
the government, constructs students’ nationalist sentiment in China? Considering historical narratives are often constructed by the state, students might not always be aware of the political institution which shapes their idea of Chinese history. It is impossible to ignore the importance of historical memory in China when looking at the construction of students’ nationalist sentiment and the pride deriving for that sentiment (see Wang 2014). However, students’ nationalist sentiment and their idea of a Chinese nation and its history may also be influenced in more subtle ways beyond the scope of formal patriotic education.

This chapter argues that Chinese university students’ nationalist sentiment and pride are also learned through mechanisms other than explicit formal (e.g. school) and informal (e.g. TV, print) state education. For instance, one explicit channel which is meant to shape students’ nationalist sentiment, are national heritage sites; but visiting these sites and museums is not something that students do on a daily basis. Similarly, students do not continually learn nationalist thought at university; they do so only in designated classes and, depending on major, module and teacher, the intensity varies. In addition, news media do not affect every student equally, as some do not access news regularly. Based on 52 interviews with university students in Beijing and Shanghai, Li (2015: 323) suggests that “the notion of nation and nationalism hardly engages [students], at least not self-consciously”. Li acknowledges that many students took part in past nationalist demonstrations, but remarks that “there are many more who do not” (ibid.). This raises the issue of whether and how students, who neither follow news and/or nationalist content in class, nor participate in nationalist protests, learn and express nationalist sentiment. The aim of this chapter is to uncover and analyse channels through which Chinese university students learn nationalist sentiment and national pride tacitly. Section four of this chapter will also present theoretical considerations of how nationalist sentiment can be expressed tacitly. The term ‘tacit learning’ is introduced to signify that, in contrast to ‘explicit learning’, learning national pride happens on an almost daily basis through unobtrusive sources which are often unnoticed by the student. ‘Tacit learning’ is defined here as a form of quasi-daily learning, in which the respective person (here: student) does not receive knowledge and information through overtly obtrusive authorities and/or other channels, but through
more unobtrusive, routine ‘flaggings’ of the nation. As set out in chapter 2.2.2, Billig’s ‘flaggings’ of nationhood can be different in different nations, but their similarity lies in their unobtrusiveness, which arises in part “from their very familiarity” (Billig 1995: 174).

This chapter revisits Michael Billig’s concept of ‘Banal Nationalism’ and examines further research done on this topic. The aim of this chapter is also to demonstrate the applicability and limits of ‘Banal Nationalism’ in the Chinese context. As outlined in chapter 3.5, uncovering banal and everyday representations of nationhood in China as a foreigner requires in depth semi-structured interviews followed by observations and sensory experiences in everyday life. This chapter draws on such fieldwork to provide and analyse examples of both state- and organic representations of nationhood and argue how and why the Chinese nation is loved and remembered through these on a quasi-daily basis.

2. State Representations of the Nation

As mentioned in chapter 2.2.2, distinguishing banal nationalism and everyday nationhood in the Chinese context is not as clear as it may be in other nations. What may appear as banal nationalism in the UK or the USA may not be banal in the Chinese context, for instance, due to the Chinese government’s interference in public life. This section therefore uncovers and analyses channels in Shanghai through which the government intentionally promotes national pride and through which university students unconsciously learn to remember and love their nation on an almost daily basis. The channels discussed in this section often deliberately glorify China, but do so in an everyday and banal manner, such that their effects are (unlike news stories in China) unobtrusive and often not noticed by the students. In contrast to past research (e.g. Brunn 2011; Penrose 2011; Vidacs 2011), which focuses on engagement with nation-related things and/or practices that do not necessarily occur on a daily basis and do not affect everyone equally, this paper will only discuss channels which cannot be avoided by students in their daily life.
2.1 Shanghai’s Architecture

The importance of the link between science and nationalism was an idea that Deng Xiaoping developed during his so called ‘Southern Tour’ of 1992 (Hughes 2006: 69-70). He believed that science and technology have to be linked to both economic development and national power. Asking students to give examples for what has had a positive influence on their national attitudes and pride, roughly every second student interviewed told me that he/she is proud of China’s progress in science and technology. Although many did not explain what they mean by science and technology and simply continued to refer to China’s overall progress and achievements, one student from East China University of Science and Technology said specifically that she is proud of Shanghai’s architecture and that Shanghai’s financial district ‘Lujiazui’ reminds her of the nation in particular (SHEUHSSO2, 20/05/17). China’s slogan for the 2010 World Expo, hosted in Shanghai, was ‘Better City, Better Life’ (chengshi, rang shenghuo geng meihao, 城市，让生活更美好). Although not specifically promoted, by visiting the Expo both international and domestic Chinese visitors were able to see the pinnacle of China’s achievements and self-image through Shanghai’s architecture and skyline, which features some of the tallest buildings in the world. Although students in Shanghai may not necessarily see Shanghai as an explicit symbol for China’s achievements, but through repeated exposure may take the architecture and its skyline for granted.

Shanghai’s ‘landscape’ has become familiar to students and the fast pace of Shanghai’s continuing transformation may have become familiar as well. While a new iconic addition to Shanghai’s landscape, like the 632 meter-high ‘Shanghai Tower’ finished in 2015, may be noted and admired, it is likely to pass into an unconscious notion that this building belongs inseparably to the nation. While the architecture of Shanghai Tower does not include elements which indicate Chinese design, it nevertheless is likely to become yet another symbol of the nation in the future and will always be associated with China. A building in Shanghai’s Lujiazui which has already accomplished this is the ‘Oriental Pearl Tower’, a renowned television broadcast tower with three public observation decks, restaurants and other amenities. It was one of the first recognisable high-rise buildings in Shanghai, and current university students who grew up in Shanghai
will have been born around the same time as the tower was completed in 1994. In other words, students in Shanghai do not know the city without the Oriental Pearl Tower. Lagerkvist, in his study of the relationship between memory and futurity in Shanghai, believes that iconic landmarks like the Oriental Pearl Tower “embody national and local symbols of modernity and arrival” (Lagerkvist 2010: 225). Indeed, other cities and areas in China may also have their symbols of ‘modernity and arrival’, but Shanghai, like no other city on the mainland, is a symbol of the nation’s desired future and its pride. According to Graham (2016: 395-6), a scholar of cities and society, “Blade Runner - and other retro-futurist verticalised sci-fi movies such as The Fifth Element (1997), the 2005-2008 Batman trilogy and numerous others — has surprising and important links to the retro-futurist architecture and infrastructure mushrooming to the skies in contemporary cities like Shanghai”. These comparisons are flattering and may lead to an increased sense of national pride among students. Although these kind of compliments are directed specifically at the city of Shanghai and not at the nation as a whole, Shanghai is perceived as an elemental part of this nation and thus indicates an idealised future for the whole nation. Having conducted a large-scale ethnographic study on Shanghai’s modernity, Greenspan (2014: 5) remarks that “[w]hen people want a symbol of Sinofuturism, [Shanghai] is were they come”.

Although “Shanghai is a place obsessed with tomorrow” (Lagerkvist 2010: 230), parts of Shanghai’s landscape are also banal reminders of the nation’s and the city’s past. While national heritage sites in Shanghai, like the ‘Memorial of the Site of the First National Congress of the CCP’, explicitly remind students of China’s and Shanghai’s past, the historical buildings of the ‘Bund’ on the west side of the Huangpu river may be seen differently. Although “the Bund was created by, and represented, a system of Victorian mercantile imperialism […] based on ideas of laissez-faire capitalism” (Taylor 2002: 141), today it also represents Shanghai’s and the nation’s modern face. When looking at the Bund’s historical art-deco buildings, students may tacitly learn about Shanghai’s and China’s colonial past, but at the same time, are likely to be unconsciously reminded of Shanghai’s prosperous past as a financial and trading hub. Moreover, while the buildings on Shanghai’s Bund connote historical events, at the same time they also fulfil Edensor’s criteria for iconic cultural sites by celebrating “the modernity of the nation” and acting
as “symbols of its progress” (Edensor, 2002: 45). This is highlighted by the fact that many of the Bund buildings host internationally operating Chinese banks, as well as luxury department stores and fancy restaurants and bars which are very popular among Shanghai’s ‘jeunesse dorée’. This, perhaps, shows how the Bund’s national atmosphere is treated. Instead of transforming the Bund into a place of commemorating Chinese history, its national atmosphere puts the “‘feel’ of the nation” (Sumartojo 2017: 209) in a context of everyday cosmopolitanism and pride.

It is irrelevant that most buildings on the Bund, or more recently constructed high-rise buildings in Lujiazui, have been designed by non-Chinese architect firms. What is important is how Chinese students relate to and understand them. On a general note, Sumartojo stresses the importance of “feelings, thoughts and bodily and sensory experiences that emerge in our encounters with [representations of nationhood]”, be it a particular building, food or something else (Sumartojo 2017: 211). These buildings in Shanghai, some of which students can see from far away on their campus, represent the modern Chinese nation and show it as strong, rich and successful. These significant unnoticed ‘flaggings’ of the nation in Shanghai must be seen in relation to the state. This is not to say that the primary intention behind constructing and maintaining these buildings is purely nationalist. However, at the same time it is difficult if not impossible to imagine that these sites are not also meant to instil national pride. Investigating form and function of major new architectural projects with reference to the Welsh Opera House in Cardiff Bay, McNeill and Tewdwr (2003: 739) remark that “major public building projects ignite a debate over the place of the nation in the world. This may not be explicitly stated, but rather may lurk in the subtexts of each story.” In contrast to actual national heritage sites, many Chinese buildings fulfil this kind of purpose in a much more subtle way, creating a nationalist image which is largely focused on the common present and future, and not necessarily on the common tragic colonial past. As Brunn writes of Finnish maps, postage stamps and else, through emphasising “the visual”, states “inform and educate their own populations and those beyond about where they are, who they are, and what they are about” (Brunn 2011: 19). I suggest here that this is exactly the effect of Shanghai’s architecture on much of its student body.
2.2 Nomenclature of Streets and Enterprises

Although many of Shanghai’s iconic buildings can be seen from far away, students do not visit these sites every day. To further uncover how the nation is ‘flagged’ in students’ life, this section focuses on state-instigated banal ‘flaggings’ that students literally encounter every day. Of course, Shanghai’s city landscape is not limited to well-designed high-rise buildings and iconic buildings of the past. Mainly referring to Western nations, Edensor argues:

The landscape is pervaded with familiarity by the distribution of numerous other elements: the style and materiality of suburban and working-class housing, the design of parks, the prevalence of leisure facilities such as football and rugby pitches, pubs and the mundane codes reinforced by street names. This regular pattern of spatial distribution means that little jars us out of our accustomed habituation of such landscapes (Edensor 2002: 51).

Shanghai’s landscape is not only pervaded with things that are familiar to students, but also with reminders of the nation. Today, it is not just maps which help people all over the world to “imagine and visualize the land beyond where they lived as being part of one country, one nation” (Palmer 1998: 192). There are many reminders through which students in Shanghai tacitly learn to love and know about their nation even if they have never left Shanghai (which is unlikely).

Sumartojo holds that “autoethnography can surface the banal qualities of the nation [namely] that it has become so common place that it effectively disappears, at least until it springs into notice” (Sumartojo 2017: 202). Having lived in close proximity to Donghua University during my field research in Shanghai, this section draws on autoethnographic findings that I made on an almost daily basis. It was important for me to find out which sensory experiences of everyday life could not be avoided by the students I was studying. Referring to pre-1948 Haifa and Jerusalem and post-1948 Umm el Fahm, Azaryahu and Kook (2002:195) argue that commemorative street names, due to their evident presence, are “instrumental in the symbolic construction of national identity, mainly in terms of historical heritage”. Students at Donghua University, for instance, cannot avoid looking at street signs which ‘flag’ the nation. For instance, the street I lived on during my field research in Shanghai, and which connects the west and east entrance
of the Donghua university campus, is called Xinhua Road (新华路). The term Xinhua translates as ‘New China’ and therefore unconsciously reminds one of the nation and, by extension, it also flags the CCP and the liberation of the Chinese people as the ‘new China’ began in 1949 with the foundation of the PRC. Students may also be reminded of China’s biggest state news networks which carries the same name. Entering or leaving the campus at its northern gate is only possible at Yan’an Road (延安路) which unconsciously points to far more than just a city in Shanxi province: Yan’an was the seat of operations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the Chinese Civil War, where party members and troops underwent intensive training and Mao Zedong successfully attracted large numbers of China’s peasantry to the communist model (Spence 1990: 424-64). Students cannot avoid reading the name Yan’an when leaving the campus through its northern gate and therefore tacitly learn nationalism through reminders of CCP history. Azaryahu and Kook (2002: 210) remark of Arab-Palestinian street names that “reading street names amounts to deciphering an officially constructed text of identity that reflects the interests and attitudes of local political elites”. Azaryahu and Kook’s analysis also applies to China. It cannot be a coincidence that a prominent street like Yan’an Road also happens to remind of an important event of the past. Having been taught about the importance of Yan’an in school, students of Donghua University are repeatedly reminded of it (albeit unconsciously) when they leave their campus through the exit in the north.

These political interests may also be reflected in Shanxi Road (陕西路), a street which stretches over approximately six kilometres of Shanghai’s Puxi. It is nearly impossible to avoid Shanxi Road, as students from (for instance) Donghua university will have to pass it if they want to go to popular areas like ‘People’s Square’ (人民广场). In addition to that, South Shanxi Road is a busy metro station due its proximity to the popular shopping centre ‘IAMP’. In contrast to other streets, Shanxi Road does not simply point to the Chinese province of the same name, but it also points to the destination of the ‘Long March’ which ended there in October 1935 (Spence 1990: 409). Partly because of the fact that only one in ten of Mao’s followers survived this journey, the ‘Long March’ is also considered to be a symbol of what the Chinese nation and its people can achieve in the light of great sacrifice. An excerpt of a 2016 statement by Xi Jinping highlights this:
Looking back at the vicissitudes of history, and looking back at the suffering and glory 80 years ago, we are more deeply aware that the Long March has a great significance in the history of the development of our Party, the nation, and the military, and has had a profound impact on the historical process of the Chinese nation (Xi 2016).

Although Xi comes to speak about the suffering during the ‘Long March’, he puts these sacrifices in the context of necessity in order to achieve something greater. Commemorating the ‘Long March’ publicly not only (explicitly) reminds Chinese students that sacrificing something (or oneself) for the nation is a noble thing to do, but also of the history of Shanxi province. Walking along or passing by Shanxi Road therefore may tacitly remind students of the events which took place in Shanxi province in 1935 and which are of great importance to the nation. I asked one student whether he knows what Shanxi in Shanxi Road stands for, and he instantly linked it to the ‘Long March’, adding that he learned about it in school. This shows how patriotic education (for instance in school) interrelates with banal nationalism. If students had never learned about the ‘Long March’, this street sign would probably not mean anything to them. In other words, Chinese history, taught in school, provides students with an understanding that is needed to unconsciously decode these banal ‘flaggings’.

On a similar note, Huaihai Road (淮海路), a shopping street popular with locals not far from Donghua University, also depicts the nation’s past. A student pointed out to me that Huaihai stands for the ‘Huaihai Campaign’, an important battle between the CCP and the Guomindang (GMD) culminating in the fall of the GMD state, the victory of the CCP and the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 (Spence 1990: 505-13). The fact that both Yan’an Road and Huaihai Road are long (and therefore have many street signs), makes it difficult for students not to unconsciously encounter important historical events ‘by accident’. Although Wang’s (2014: 223) assessment that “historical memory is the prime raw material for constructing China’s national identity”, may be too one-sided, students certainly may tacitly learn and be reminded of the nation’s history from many street signs. In this case, explicit and tacit learning correlate. In school and at national heritage sites, students explicitly learn about the importance of specific historical events. After this, students keep being reminded of what they have learned.
through, in this case, street signs, which (daily) depict events they have learned about before. Although not every street sign depicts a historical event, most streets are named after places in China - including cities, lakes and mountains, such as Huashan Road (华山路) which refers to the famous mountain in Shaanxi province - and students thus unconsciously learn what is part of the nation, even if they have never travelled to the place displayed in front of them on a street sign.

*Figure 6.1: Screenshot of Donghua University campus (grey/white pin, center-left) and surrounding area, displaying main streets and four ‘Lianhua Supermarkets’.\

Source: Google Maps (screenshot), taken: December 2018*

In a similar vein, the Chinese nation is also unconsciously ‘flagged’ by other channels which can hardly be avoided. While particular street names may be the prime example of how banal representations of nationhood in Shanghai are deployed by the state, Chinese state-owned enterprises often also unconsciously point to the nation. Just as it is impossible to avoid encountering street names, it is also highly unlikely that students
in Shanghai have not entered or at least passed by a ‘Lianhua’ (联华) supermarket (see figure 6.1). This state-owned supermarket chain competes with foreign supermarkets like Tesco and Carrefour and can be found everywhere in Shanghai. Its name literally means ‘united China’ or ‘united Chinese’ and therefore not only depicts the nation, but, by extension, also the nationalist goal of unification. In chapter 7, I will demonstrate that students see reunification with Taiwan as very important and the omnipresence of stores like ‘Lianhua’, probably tacitly contributes to students’ understanding of the importance of unification. The vast majority of state-owned Chinese banks also indicate the nation in their name, like the ‘China Construction Bank’ (zhongguo jianshe yinhang, 中国建设银行) or the ‘Agricultural Bank of China’ (zhongguo nongye yinhang, 中国农业银行). Regardless of where students have their bank account, passing by branches of Chinese banks is a part of everyday life, and the inclusion of ‘China’ (zhongguo, 中国) in their name always indicates that these banks belong to the nation.

On a similar note, it does not matter which telecommunication network students choose to subscribe to, as all three service providers flag the nation. When students switch on their phone, they either see ‘China Mobile’ (zhongguo yidong, 中国移动) or ‘China Unicom’ (zhongguo liantong, 中国联通) displayed on the top of their screen. Similarly, when they install, or restart their router, they will see ‘China Telecom’ (zhongguo dianxin, 中国电信). Having used ‘China Unicom’ myself during my fieldwork in Shanghai, I noticed that China Unicom is not just displaying the nation as such (as the two other providers do), but that ‘zhongguo liantong’ might be understood as ‘linking China together’ instead of ‘China connection/link’. Regardless of how students or other users interpret its name, Chinese telecommunication providers ‘flag’ the nation twofold. They represent the nation in their name, and they also enable communication and information access within the nation, which is vital for the survival of a contemporary nation, because in this way Chinese students (and other national citizens) are able to ‘imagine’ their nation (see Anderson 2006: 6-7).

Equally important to the survival of a nation are providers in the energy sector. In the Chinese context, once again, all three main providers represent the nation in their name. In addition to that, the ‘State Grid Corporation of China’ (guojia dianwang gongsi, 国
depict companies China, instance, street Although the students oppose, Despite, the government (People's Liberation Army officer) is splendid Chinese petroleum (Economist 2012), perhaps Chinese energy providers provide some of the resources modern nations require and therefore contribute to strengthening the nation as a whole. Although many students in Shanghai may not think about petroleum or electricity because they do not yet own a car or pay electricity bills, it is difficult to not pass by a Sinopec gasoline station or an office which belongs to the State Grid Corporation in everyday life.

Furthermore, enterprises can also be under private ownership and still ‘flag’ the nation. Perhaps the prime example of this would be the domestically and internationally successful Chinese company ‘Huawei’ (华为). Although the character of ‘hua’ can also mean splendid as well as China, its combination with ‘wei’ (an action or achievement), leads to the notion that China puts something into action or achieves something. Regardless of what this action or achievement may be, Huawei, founded by Ren Zhengfei (an ex-People's Liberation Army officer with allegedly good relationships with the Chinese government) (Economist 2012), also depicts the nation in its name and indicates that the company is as much a part of the nation as any other.

Despite, or perhaps because of, the prevalence of McDonalds, Tesco, Starbucks and other foreign brands in Shanghai, the daily depiction of the Chinese nation may remind students that, in Billig’s words, “the importance of a bounded homeland, together with the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘foreigners’, have not disappeared” (Billig 1995: 139). Although citizens of other nations can also be unconsciously reminded of the nation by street names and enterprises, I argue that this is particularly evident in China. For instance, nation-related street names and enterprises are much rarer in Germany. Like China, Germany has an export-oriented economy, yet many internationally renowned companies like ‘Adidas’, ‘Audi’, ‘Mercedes’ ‘Siemens’, ‘Telekom’ or ‘Schaeffler’, do not depict the German nation. Instead, they often depict the name (or an abbreviation of
the name) of the founder of the company. Likewise, main streets in many German cities do not depict the nation very clearly, either. For example, in my native Nuremberg, the famous street ‘Frauentorgraben’ (women’s gate-ditch) simply references the old city wall next to it. Similarly, the city’s most famous and central bridge is ‘Fischbruecke’, fish-bridge. Similar examples can be found in Berlin, Germany’s capital. For instance, every day thousands of commuters depart or arrive from/at Berlin’s central station. When entering or leaving the station, most enter or leave the station through ‘Europaplatz’ (Europe Square) or ‘Washingtonplatz’ (Washington Square), both of which do not ‘flag’ the German nation. While there are also some street names/squares and enterprises in Germany which do depict the nation, this is far less the case than in Shanghai/China. Having investigated street names in Berlin, Hanh (2015: 166-8) remarks that, apart from naming streets after historical, cultural or political figures or places in Germany, street names in Germany are often named after their location (e.g. ‘Universitätsstrasse’ (university street)), or specific attributes (e.g. ‘Hauptstrasse’ (main street)). After the Third Reich, every street named after prominent national socialists or institutions, was changed. In China, however, the new government (after 1949) “embarked on widespread construction and renaming of streets as one means of both commemorating a variety of events and personalities in history and proclaiming the agenda and ideology of the Communist state” (Huang 2018: 156).

Daily, then, students in Shanghai unconsciously encounter the nation in many ways. It is difficult to avoid depictions of the nation when walking through the streets of Shanghai. While sports events, exhibitions or museums can be avoided, students tacitly learn about their nation through state-related representations of the nation they inhabit. While some representations are intentionally put in place to promote the nation, it is difficult to determine whether the primary motive of a banal representation, for example an installation, is purely nationalist. A comparison with the Russian case is useful here. Like the CCP, the Russian government also officially promotes ‘patriotism’ through its ‘State Program for Patriotic Education’, started in 2001 (Goode 2017: 128-9). Having examined top-down nationalism in Russia, Goode notes that the “Kremlin’s push to make patriotism an essential part of education, media and politics represents a conscious effort to produce the nation in a way that resembles ‘banal nationalism’”
This happens by, for instance, continuous mentions of the exceptionality of Russian culture and traditions. However, after having conducted 60 interviews, Goode concludes that intentionally implementing national ‘flaggings’ in Russians’ daily lives and routines without them noticing does not work, as his respondents viewed the state’s patriotic practices “as relatively obvious” (Goode 2017: 129-30). Put differently, official patriotism in Russia has not really succeeded in “producing banality”, as respondents perceived it as “conspicuously ritualised or inauthentic” (Goode 2017: 140).

In the Chinese case, the common promotion of *aiguo zhuyi* (for instance in school) is similarly relatively obvious, but it is possible that perpetual exposure to some explicit (non-banal) representations of the nation, over some time, might have a similar effect as banal nationalism. Examining narratives of legitimacy, Aronczyk (2017: 250) suggests that seeking evidence of banal nationalism as the ‘endemic condition’, via ‘stages’ of legitimacy, might “allow us to see how repertoires of national power are made to appear banal through time and space”. In her analysis she refers to Suchman’s (1995) work on legitimacy and notes that the “most deeply embedded type of legitimacy is *cognitive*, or taken for granted” (Aronczyk 2017: 250). That means that a particular act (or action in form of a policy) needs to become “part of the intersubjective common sense world” to be successful (ibid.). In the context of this chapter, I suggest that political banners, which are regularly displayed on campus, fulfil this function (see figure 6.2). Students may notice them at first, but by passing them by every day, their message is absorbed in a more tacit way. As demonstrated in the example on Russia above, relatively obvious ‘flaggings’ of the nation can be noted, but it is not impossible that some ‘flaggings’ become banal when repeatedly being presented in specific ways and locations.
Figure 6.2: Banner at Tongji University, displaying: “The representatives of the People's Congress are chosen by the people, and the representatives of the People's Congress serve the people” (renda daibiao renmin xuan, renda daibiao wei renmin, 人大代表人民选, 人大代表为人民).

Source: author’s photograph, taken: November 2016

3. Organic Representations and Thoughts on Tacit Expression

The previous section highlighted how the nation is intentionally ‘flagged’ by the state to create and foster a nationalist sentiment among students. Although it is difficult to uncover which representation in China is clearly linked to the state and which is not, this section attempts to explore everyday representations of nationhood which are more-or-less independent of the state. Students’ answers as to what makes them proud and reminds them of China revealed that some mentions are indeed to be found in everyday life, and are neither tacitly nor explicitly promoted by contemporary Chinese leaders. Chinese food and China’s written language are ubiquitous in Shanghai and were reported by those I surveyed and interviewed to be causes of national pride. These two ‘flaggings’ appear to occur more organically. Yet, they also represent the nation and cannot be avoided, and thus nationalist sentiment and national pride are also tacitly learned through them. After having been exposed to nation-related organic representations through both explicit and tacit learning, this section argues that specific
aspects which give a nation its character can also be tacit expressions of nationalism by students. Tacit expression shall therefore be understood as the unconscious reproduction of the nation by students themselves.

3.1 Chinese Cuisine

After having asked students in the interviews whether they can think of anything that reminds them of China and/or makes them proud, eight students (N=21) mentioned Chinese food. According to Ichio and Ranta (2016: 1-3) “food is considered in many cases to be ‘national’ [and] the importance of food to national identity is neither a new phenomenon nor limited to particular geographic areas”. However, there might be differences as to what extent people of different nations value their national cuisine. China clearly belongs to those nations where food plays a very important role (Ma 2015, Chang et al 2010). This is highlighted by what Chinese people choose to eat when they live or travel abroad. Ma holds that “[m]any Chinese people in foreign countries, even after years of migration, still maintain the habit of eating Chinese food, which is very difficult to change” (Ma 2015: 196). Many students told me that what they miss the most, or what reminds them of home, when they are abroad, is Chinese food. While each region in China has its own regional food, Shanghai, despite having a specific Shanghai cuisine (also known as ‘Hu cuisine’), is home to restaurants which offer food from all of China’s regions, be it traditional food from Yunnan, Sichuan, or Xinjiang province. Specific ingredients also have their own rich cultural connotations, whose meanings are not immediately apparent to an outsider; for instance, “peanuts, also known as the longevity fruit, mean longevity; oranges and chestnuts mean good luck; rice cakes, promotion year; seaweed is a homonym of rich; noodle is long, which means health and longevity; and glutinous rice balls means the family stay together” (Ma 2015: 197). While most single ingredients do not depict the nation, the Chinese dish made from those specific ingredients may do. This is even more evident when the name of the dish depicts a place within the boundaries of the nation, such as ‘Beijing kaoya’ (Beijing duck, 北京烤鸭) which points to the national capital, or a story related to the nation. Other examples include ‘Xihu cuyu’ (West Lake vinegar fish, 西湖醋鱼), which points to
Hangzhou’s famous lake, and Jinling Meatballs (*jinling wanzi*, 金陵丸子), a dish which depicts the name of today’s Nanjing during the Tang Dynasty.

In this section, I focus on dishes which not only depict the nation or a place in it as such, but also display a sense of national history and saga. Further, I refer only to dishes eaten regularly, meaning that first, they are not reserved for special occasions, and second, that they are affordable, since dishes which are eaten only rarely or are too expensive for most students to afford (e.g. edible bird’s nest) do not display the everyday and taken-for-granted character of Chinese cuisine. Each dish presented in this section originates from a specific province, thus an argument could be made that these dishes primarily flag a region in China and not the nation as a whole. Indeed, when in China, Chinese students might think of each dish as a regional dish; however, when abroad, they more likely think of Chinese food more generally when they miss home. Every dish worldwide was invented in a particular region, yet, some dishes have become popular nationwide over time and thus have become dishes which are associated with their specific nation. I therefore briefly examine three dishes which are very common in students’ everyday life. Finally, I discuss how students tacitly express nationalist sentiment, through cooking, buying, ordering and eating these dishes.

One dish which is widely known and popular in China and which is also to be found on many menus of Chinese restaurants abroad, is ‘Mapo tofu’ (*mapo doufu*, 麻婆豆腐). Originating in Sichuan province, the dish consists mainly of mashed meat (usually beef), fermented bean paste, soy sauce, Sichuan pepper and tofu. The term ‘Mapo’ is an abbreviation of ‘Mazi Popo’ which refers to an old woman whose face is pockmarked. The name apparently refers to a couple surnamed Chen who owned a restaurant in north Chengdu during the Qing dynasty (1644-1911). Mrs Chen’s face was pockmarked, yet she became known for her unique way of cooking tofu (Sun 2015), a hearty common-man’s dish. Regardless of whether this story is true, it unconsciously reminds students (and other Chinese) of the nation through the development of a kind of myth of its origin. Although the dish originated in Sichuan’s capital, it has now gained the status of one of China’s most ubiquitous dishes, and the embedding of its origin myth into the nation’s common history may have helped the dish to become popular. Perhaps, this ‘myth’ in ‘Mapo doufu’ may also demonstrate particular kinds of modern Chinese virtues.
of entrepreneurialism, as Mrs Chen, who was not particularly rich or beautiful, created something which became popular and successful nationwide.

Similar to ‘Mapo tofu’, ‘Fuqi feipian’ (sliced beef, lit. ‘husband and wife's lung slices’, 夫妻废片) is also known as a common man’s dish which also has its origin in Sichuan province. Despite its peculiar name, ‘Fuqi feipian’ does not contain lung slices. In fact, the dish’s original name translated as ‘husband and wife’s offal slices’, but was changed to ‘lung slices’ due to its less repulsive sound (废 fei to 肺 fei) (China Daily 2012). The dish is usually made from beef brisket and, depending on the recipe, other parts like heart, tongue, tripe and/or skin. The dish goes back to a married couple in Chengdu in the 1930s, Guo Zhaohua and his wife Zhang Tianzheng, who appear to have been good at cooking beef slices, as its distinct taste was popular among their customers. It is said that children sometimes pulled a prank on the couple by secretly sticking a paper note on their back that said ‘husband and wife’s offal slices’. Guo and Zhang’s customers quickly picked up on the name and a merchant, who later visited their restaurant, gave the couple a gold-lettered plaque which read ‘Fuqi feipian’ (ibid.). It may not always be the grand narrative of Chinese history and its dynasties – which are an essential part of formal state education - through which students learn national pride, but instead, these little stories may also play their tacit part in regard to constructing a nationalist sentiment in China.

It does not matter whether the story behind a dish is true or false. What matters is the fact that it remains something national which is remembered. Pagel, who generally examined the longevity of fairy tales, remarks that “[f]airy tales, might even [...] exist at least in part because they exploit aspects of human cognition that improve the transmission of information. We remember stories better than strings of words” (Pagel 2016: 281). Pagel’s analysis is useful to help explain the popularity of Chinese dishes like ‘Mapo doufu’ and ‘Fuqi feipian’, yet I argue that even single words can be memorable and, in the context of this study, flag the nation. Quite a few dishes in China carry a name that neither needs a commonly-known story behind it, nor depicts the actual dish, yet are known and popular throughout China. For instance, ‘Ji zhua’ (chicken claws, 鸡爪) is also known as ‘Feng zhua’ (phoenix claws, 凤爪). Chicken feet are eaten in many
countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, but calling it ‘Feng zhua’ not only gives this ordinary dish a grand memorable name, but distinguishes it from its counterparts abroad and thus makes it uniquely national and memorable. The Chinese Phoenix is seen as a national symbol of China - hugely important in Chinese legend and highly symbolic. For instance, in Feng Shui (风水) the dragon and the phoenix represent the perfect couple. Having observed Chinese street food for many years, Southworth and Matza (2018: 41-2) note that the “Chinese have a knack for naming foods in two distinct ways: brutally descriptive or metaphorical. Whether the goal is to be ironic, clever, or funny, the memorable names of several street foods abound”. Referring back to the example above, chicken claws can be both brutally descriptive and metaphorical, and are in both cases a popular national food.

The nation is ‘flagged’ in an even more direct way when we look at the popular dish ‘Chairman Mao’s red-cooked pork’ (maoshi hongshao rou). The dish originated in Hunan province (where Mao was born) and is supposed to have been Chairman Mao’s favourite food. Moreover, it is “widely regarded as the ‘brain food’ which provided Mao with the wits to defeat his enemies” (Moore 2010). While students most likely do not choose to eat the dish as ‘brain food’ but merely for its taste, they are subconsciously reminded of Mao and, by extension, the Party. Although the local government in Hunan has sought to standardise the recipe (Moore 2010), and despite clear links to the Chinese Communist Party in origin, it is neither tacitly nor explicitly promoted by contemporary Chinese leaders. Restaurants and ordinary people can choose to adopt the supposed original recipe, but do not have to. Instead, it is more likely that people stick to the recipe that they consider the best. Palmer (1998: 188) remarks that “the choice of what to eat will, to a large extent, depend upon a combination of personal preference, cost, climate and environmental conditions”. In the case of Chinese restaurant owners, it probably largely depends on what sells the most. Both Chinese chefs and citizen unconsciously reproduce the nation by cooking Chinese food. For instance, food in Shanghai is generally sweeter than in Hunan, which means that ‘Chairman Mao’s red-cooked pork’ may taste a little different in a restaurant in Shanghai. Although main ingredients and names stay the same, adjusting the taste to each region also played its part in being able to cook and sell this dish nationwide.
Within the notion of Fox and Miller-Idriss’s (2008) concept of ‘everyday nationhood’, it appears that food in China highlights “the role human agency plays in reproducing nationalism” (Antonsich 2016: 40), namely in both producing and eating Chinese dishes. Food, as an organic representation of the nation, is not only tacitly learned, but also tacitly expressed, and the nation is thus also reproduced by those who choose to buy, cook or eat a national dish. Certainly, students in Shanghai do not usually eat a dish because it consciously reminds them of the nation. Instead, they have tacitly learned to appreciate national food, because it has surrounded them throughout their life. National food is familiar and, according to Ma (2015: 196), “[e]ating behavior, once formed, has continuity [...] it is hard to change”. Of course, students in Shanghai may occasionally go to a foreign restaurant or cook foreign food, and thus do not tacitly express their nationalist sentiment on that occasion, but, as mentioned in the beginning of this section, Chinese people generally prefer their national cuisine. It is not therefore only the government which intentionally and unintentionally ‘flags’ the Chinese nation, but also ordinary people themselves through daily, routine practices and behaviours. Likewise, students not only tacitly learn nationalist sentiment in the form of food, but are an essential part in the reproduction themselves, through tacitly expressing their food preferences to others (e.g. cooking for friends, ordering in restaurants, eating on the streets in front of other people). These organic representations of nationhood are by no means limited to food, but food is an essential part of everyday life and of great importance in China (Ma 2015: 196). Even Chinese dishes which do not have a famous story about their origin are perceived as national, because many have been repeatedly produced (by parents, restaurants, friends, and students themselves) and consumed by students. According to Ichijo and Ranta, food generally solidifies group identity and serves as a means for constructing and maintaining national identity (Ichijo and Ranta 2016: 60). In this process, students, like any other societal group, are both unconscious receivers and unconscious producers of nationalist sentiment and national pride.
3.2 Chinese Language

This section explores further organic representations of the nation which occur on a daily basis for students. As it is obvious that “people must eat in order to survive” (Palmer 1998: 188), it is also obvious that people encounter their language every day. 14 out of 21 students interviewed mentioned without prompting Chinese characters as something they are proud of. This pride is not only limited to specific highly symbolic characters like ‘fu’ (fortune, 福) written upside down¹, but also to Chinese characters in general. In contrast to many nations which rely on an alphabet through which they can write several languages, the orthography and image of the Chinese language are unique. Although Chinese characters (both in traditional and simplified form) can also be found in Japan (in the form of ‘Kanji’), Singapore, Malaysia and elsewhere, this does not change the fact that this language originated in, and is associated with, China. Students are well aware of this fact; one student at Tongji University specifically told me that it makes her proud that Chinese characters are also used in Japan. This kind of national pride is not necessarily felt every day, but surfaces typically when a student travels: the majority of students remarked that this pride and happiness come into consciousness when they are abroad. One Fashion Design student from Donghua University said that she does not feel happy or proud when she sees Chinese characters in China; however, when she travels abroad, she immediately notices them and is not only proud of their display outside China, but also reminded of her home.

Billig has stressed the importance of looking at small but crucial words of banal nationalism like ‘we’, ‘this’ and ‘here’ (Billig 1995: 94), but does not discuss how nation-specific (written) languages can also ‘flag’ the nation on their own. In other words, it may not only be important to the study of banal and everyday nationalism what specific words/characters Chinese citizens use, but the use of the Chinese language as a whole. Countries like the UK or USA, which Billig focused on in his analysis, use an alphabet such that their written language is by no means unique. This is not to say that other nations do not feel pride in their respective language, but I argue that even random Chinese

¹ When ‘fu’ (福) is written upside down, it implies that fortune/happiness is arriving as the character for ‘upside down’ is ‘dao’ (到), which, in turn, is a homonym for the character ‘dao’ (到), meaning ‘to arrive’.
characters can subconsciously represent the nation. Through overt nationalist education, Chinese students are not only aware of the antiquity of their language, but also learn how unique it is which, in turn, may be part of the reason why they are proud of it. Chinese characters date back 3500 years, and although there have been stylistic changes, the orthography has continued to this day (Wang 1973: 51). Having mentioned the relationship between national history and street signs earlier, it could be that a similar relationship exists between learning the Chinese language explicitly in school, and tacitly remembering it outside of school. Although students also explicitly and tacitly learn the language from their parents, it is state education which enables them to make sense of the characters which they see everywhere.

Regardless of how Chinese university students spend their day, it is unlikely that they do not encounter Chinese characters. Even if they choose to not leave their dormitory on one day, they cannot evade written Chinese language, as they see Chinese characters on food packaging, safety signs in the dormitory and other items. Although the government also promotes the Chinese language even on a global scale (see Ding and Saunders 2006), it appears that Chinese characters as unconscious and unnoticed reminders of the nation largely function within the notion of everyday nationhood, as the nation is also “the practical accomplishment of ordinary people engaging in routine activities” (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008: 537). Besides seeing characters every day, students also reproduce – and thus tacitly express - them. Students are therefore not only passive recipients of the Chinese language, but also an essential component in its continuity, by talking and writing to other people every day. One example for this may be the use of Chinese characters for (written/typed) communication in the popular social media application ‘Weixin’ (WeChat)\(^2\). This is not to say that the nation is not also reproduced through “the discursive construction of [...] routine talk in interaction” (Ibid.), but due to regional differences of Chinese vernacular languages, written language ‘flags’ the nation for every student, since Chinese characters can be written and read by everyone, regardless of which province he/she comes from.

\(^2\) ‘WeChat’ is the equivalent to ‘WhatsApp’ and has around one billion users (Statista 2018b)
Apart from hearing and/or reading the Chinese language in media, it is also people’s daily communications (both written and spoken) which keep the Chinese language alive. After having learned how to speak, read and write, students not only subconsciously notice their written and spoken language on the street, but also start to tacitly express it for others. Written and spoken language penetrates every aspect of students’ life in China. For this reason, students do not stop tacitly learning their language; instead, through its ubiquity in everyday life in both written and spoken form, they are constantly unconsciously reminded what their language is, and at the same time, they do the same for others, through what I call ‘tacit expression’. Theorising about nationalism and the modern sense of ‘nation’ more generally, Calhoun urges us not only to understand the phenomena of modern nations in terms of cultural distinctiveness, but points to the importance of looking at state formation as the single most important factor, including state education which helped to encourage standardization of national languages (Calhoun 1997: 10-5). One key aspect of the 2011 curriculum is to give Chinese culture a higher profile in the curriculum (Law 2014: 353-4). This includes an extended focus on Chinese language where students (grade 1-9) are, for instance, required “to take calligraphy lessons (in addition to learning how to write Chinese characters with an ordinary pen)” (Law 2014: 348). For this reason, it is difficult to ignore the importance of cultural distinctiveness when examining China as a nation, as language in China is seen and treated as a cultural artefact. Although, most students seldom express national pride and nationalist sentiment through calligraphy (and even if they did, it would be difficult to define this form of expression as either tacit or explicit), but tacitly learning and expressing Chinese characters every day contributes to the survival of the national language as a whole and thus also the awareness of where Chinese originally comes from.

4. Concluding Remarks

This chapter has investigated how Chinese university students in Shanghai tacitly learn national pride by being reminded of their nation every day. While it acknowledges that many of the unnoticed representations of nationhood are not limited to students alone,
students may think of their nation in a different way from other Chinese. This may stem in part from recent and continued participation in formal patriotic education which, in the case of street signs and language, enables students to subconsciously spot ‘flaggings’ of the nation. It may also be a result of Shanghai’s economic success in the past two decades and a process of tacit learning which is independent of the state. Students in Shanghai today are surrounded by multiple representations of the nation, many of which were not around when their parents and grandparents grew up. Even students who grew up in a rural environment, and moved to Shanghai for their studies, may think differently of their nation. According to Yan (2011: 117-8) “urban ideals and behaviour patterns do set contemporary rural youth apart from their elders, especially their pursuit of a more materialistic, individualistic, and modern life style”. This idea of lifestyle can be found in cities like Shanghai which, perhaps, is the ideal place for tacitly learning to remember and love the nation.

This chapter has presented and analysed banal and everyday representations of the nation which cannot be avoided by Chinese students. Taking into account Fox and Miller-ldriss’ (2008: 548) argument that “neither sporting competitions nor holiday commemorations can claim the loyalties of those who simply don’t show up or tune in to them”, this paper has presented both state-related and organic representations of the Chinese nation which arguably affect all students equally. Of course, just because all students tacitly learn to remember and love the nation, does not mean that all students love and remember their nation to the same extent. But this form of tacit learning most certainly has contributed to many students’ national pride.

Although this study cannot evaluate to what extent students’ nationalist sentiment and national pride consist of subconscious experiences of daily life, it stresses the importance of looking not only at explicit channels of learning, such as school education or media. Although state education and other forms of explicit learning, as well as various forms of tacit learning, may also play their part in reproducing and remembering the nation, it is also students who tacitly express nationalist sentiment every day. As I have shown in this chapter, everyday life in Shanghai is full of reminders of the nation. Sometimes these reminders relate to the state, but often they emerge organically and are absorbed and reproduced by ordinary people themselves. Uncovering these banal
and everyday ‘flaggings’ of nationhood in Shanghai and, by extension, China, may lead to a better understanding how a nationalist sentiment in China is constructed and continued. Billig argues that, by noticing ‘flaggings’ of nationhood, “we are noticing something about ourselves [namely] the depths and mechanisms of our identity, embedded in routines of social life” (Billig 1995: 175).
Chapter 7: Ardent Love and Basic Beliefs - General Nationalist Sentiment

1. Introduction

The last two chapters have demonstrated how university students in contemporary China learn nationalist sentiment explicitly and tacitly. In conjunction with learning Chinese history at school prior to a visit, national heritage sites appear to have an exceptionally strong impact on students’ national attitudes. Often labelled as patriotic promotion/education sites and only visited by students irregularly, these sites appear to be a significant channel of nationalist influence and surely contribute to forming students’ national identity and historical memory and, by extension, the nationalist sentiment deriving from that identity. But explicitly learning and perceiving nationalism does not necessarily translate into an expression of nationalist sentiments. According to Wang it is much easier merely to tell the story of what historical memory is, than to measure the effects it has on people. According to him (Wang 2012: 223), “it is also extremely difficult to measure how identities and perceptions influence decision-making behavior” (2012: 223). To put Wang’s observation into the context of this study, expressing nationalist sentiment in a certain way does not only stem from single or multiple channels. It is probably a result of both explicit and tacit learning which has brought forward a certain position or point of view.

The survey-questionnaire and the interviews presented students with general statements and questions related to nationalism to which they were asked to give an answer. In line with Ellis’ (2009: 3) definition of explicit learning (i.e. consciously learning and memorising facts which result in knowledge), explicit expression in both this chapter and following, is defined as conscious actions, behaviours or (expressed) opinions (through survey and interviews) of students which relates to nationalist thought and sentiment more broadly. Expression is explicit insofar as students were asked both about their opinion on key-topics closely associated with nationalism, and about ways in which they have expressed nationalism in the past or, occasionally do so through interests and hobbies.
Based on my rotated component matrix, ten items fell into a scale which I labelled ‘General Nationalist Sentiment’ (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q6, Q15, Q16, Q26, Q27, Q39, Q40; see appendix) which showed a very high internal consistency (α=.889). The ‘General Nationalist Sentiment’ scale includes not only includes items such as love for one’s nation, national pride and aiguo zhuyi, but also items such as the will to defend one’s nation. In contrast to the ‘Advanced Nationalist Sentiment’ scale which is discussed in chapter 8, the ‘General Nationalist Sentiment’ scale presents data on students’ general opinions and feelings related to their nation. This chapter will therefore examine students’ feelings and opinions of key-topics of nationalism. Based on the results from both survey and interviews, this chapter presents students’ views in which students explicitly expressed nationalist sentiment.

2. Love, Identity and Aiguo Zhuyi

Before analysing and discussing students’ manifold ways of expressing nationalist sentiment, this section demonstrates how university students in China feel about their nation and national identity. Smith (2010: 9-10) theorised that regardless of whether we define nationalism as “an ideology that places the nation at the centre of its concerns and seeks to promote its well-being”, or as a movement which seeks to attain national autonomy and/or independence, every nationalism pursues the goal of national identity to varying degrees. In the light of this research, it is thus essential to ask students whether or not they love their nation and why and whether they take pride in their national identity.

Both table 7.1 and 7.2 (below) demonstrate that almost every student loves his/her nation and is proud of his/her national identity. Only one student (0.4 per cent) disagreed when being asked whether he/she loves his/her nation and only two students (0.8 per cent) disavowed pride in their national identity. An almost identical number of students do both love their nation and are proud of their national identity. However, as discussed in chapter 6, this does not imply that all students’ love for their nation (and their national pride) solely stem from content which they have learned in school.
**Table 7.1 – Love for the Nation**

![Bar chart showing responses to the statement "I love my nation".قوس عمودي يظهر تفاعلات الأشخاص مع الاعتقاد "أنا أحب了我的 بلد".]

Source: Author’s survey data

**Table 7.2 – Pride in National Identity**

![Bar chart showing responses to the statement "I am proud of my national identity".قوس عمودي يظهر تفاعلات الأشخاص مع الاعتقاد "أنا فخور بالهوية الوطنية".]

Source: Author’s survey data
The first question students were asked in the interviews revolved around their love for the nation. Similar to the quantitative results of this study, almost all students said that they love their nation. Only one student from Tongji university, called Caixia in this study, told me that she does not feel any love for China. She added that this does not imply that she hates China, but explained that she does not concern herself with the idea of loving her nation. After further enquiries about her opinion, she admitted that there are some aspects of China (such as culture and history) which make her happy to be Chinese, but she insisted that this has nothing to do with pride or love. Instead, she said that she is impressed that some cultural (Chinese) elements have survived for that long (SHTUHSS02, 05/12/16).

All remaining 20 students said that they love their nation, albeit for different reasons. Although many students named various reasons as to why they love their nation, 15 primarily reasoned their love for the nation by referring to China as their place of birth. Design student Xiaoqin, for instance, was very explicit on why she loves her nation and mentioned aspects which many other students told me as well:

Yes, I love China. For me, this love is a sense of belonging. At the same time, it is also my identity which distinguishes me from other countries [...] Sometimes I express my love for China in my work. For example, in my first year at Tongji University I designed a modern building which contained elements of typical Chinese pagodas (SHTUAD01, 06/12/16).

Xiaoqin’s love and national pride is not limited to birth, a sense of belonging and identity only, but is also reflected in China’s overall achievements more generally. She told me that she often reads about China’s economic success and social progress in the news which makes her happy and proud. She said that she feels very hopeful and optimistic about her future which largely stems from China’s economic progress (SHTUAD01, 06/12/16).

Like Xiaoqin, many students also mentioned aspects which related to China’s current economic, political and social condition. Although most of those students linked their pride and love to China’s economic growth more broadly, three students also mentioned aspects relating to safety. When being asked about her love for her nation, Xiaofang also said that her love is related to the fact that she is born China. However, when I asked
her where her national pride stems from, she mentioned that she feels very safe in China. She said that she is very proud of China’s strict gun control and added that she would not like to live in a country like the US as she would not feel safe there (SHDUAD02, 10/04/17).

Most students consider loving one’s nation as something natural that comes with birth, however, when being asked about their national pride, almost everyone mentioned things and aspects which relate to China’s economy, culture and political system. On the one hand, students are thus proud of achievements which the Chinese government instigated (or is responsible for), on the other hand, no student mentioned the government when expressing national pride for something in particular. This is not to say that link between the CCP and China’s national achievements does not exist, but national pride can also be expressed without explicitly crediting the government for it. This is further highlighted when investigating students’ opinion about aiguo zhuyi. As discussed in chapter 4.2 aiguo zhuyi embeds a political purpose which deliberately intertwines the government and the nation, which means that a positive evaluation of the concept could also imply a positive evaluation of the nation based on a government-centric view of the nation.
Table 7.3 – Evaluation of Aiguo Zhuyi

As demonstrated in table 7.3, a much lower number of students (68 per cent; 168 students) sympathise with the concept *aiguo zhuyi*. When compared with students’ love for the nation and pride in their national identity (see table 7.1 and 7.2), *aiguo zhuyi* does not spark the same kind of positive emotion. Only very few students (8.1 per cent; 20 students) explicitly stated that they do not sympathise with the concept, whereas roughly a quarter of all students (23.6 per cent; 58 students) were simply not sure and/or remained neutral. Although slightly more than two thirds of all students generally sympathise with the concept, the undecidedness of some students is also reflected in the qualitative data of this study.

5 out of 21 students said that they do not sympathise with *aiguo zhuyi*. When I asked students to tell me what they think about *aiguo zhuyi*, Caixia, mentioned earlier in regard to her statement of not loving her nation, said that she does not really feel positive about the concept. She explained that she finds those Chinese, who constantly emphasise how much they love China, stupid. She went on and said that only because a Chinese person loves his/her nation, does not mean that this person is of benefit to the nation. In general, she finds the concept overrated and, to some degree, unnecessary.
Shiru even thought that *aiguo zhuyi* should not be taught in school at all. Although she admitted that she understands people who appreciate the moral aspect of *aiguo zhuyi*, she believed that it should have no place in the school curriculum “because it should be one’s own decision whether he/she embraces *aiguo zhuyi* or not” (SHTUBFM02, 10/12/16). Weizhong also said that he does not sympathise with *aiguo zhuyi* a lot, but for a different reason. After asking him why he does not sympathise with *aiguo zhuyi*, he replied:

> In most situations, I love China. However, it makes me uncomfortable when there is too much constraint and stress attached to this idea (SHTUSE02, 15/12/16)

Weizhong’s opinion on *aiguo zhuyi* perhaps illustrates best that some students do distinguish between merely loving one’s nation and the state-led narrative of loving the nation and its implications. As demonstrated above, most students generally hold the concept in high regard, however, even those who did (in the interviews) often could not explain why they sympathise with the concept. As discussed in chapter 4 and 5, *aiguo zhuyi* is an essential aspect in state education which all students remembered learning, yet most students are not able to sufficiently explain what it means to them. Instead, many consider it merely as something that every Chinese should possess and practice in his/her everyday life. Even Zhiwei, a CCP-member who told me that he loves China deeply, was not able to fully explain what *aiguo zhuyi* means to him, apart from saying that it is an essential part of his basic values which implies always serving the nation (SHTUBFM01, 20/12/16).

To sum up, loving one’s nation and pride in one’s national identity are basic values which are shared by almost all students, yet sympathising with the state-led concept *aiguo zhuyi* is not always the same. Surely learning content in school which is related to *aiguo zhuyi* has contributed to students’ general love for the nation, but there are also some students who consider the emphasis which is put on the concept as too obtrusive.
3. The Interests of the Nation vs Individual Interests

To put students’ love for the nation to the test and to determine further how nationalistic Chinese students are, I asked them, in both survey and interviews, whether they generally put the nation’s interests before their own.

Table 7.4 – The Interests of the Nation vs Individual Interests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data

Table 7.4 demonstrates that a majority of students embrace the idea of putting the nation’s interests before one’s own (60.2 per cent; 148 students). The data thus shows that many students generally put the nation first, while also highlighting a large gap compared to the idea of simply loving the nation (see table 7.4). In other words, students’ willingness to put the nation first is not as developed as the idea of loving the nation. My interviews suggest a similar result, as nine students answered my question with yes, seven were either not sure or said that it dependent on the issue or the situation, and five students said that they would never put the nation’s interests before their own. In the following sections I attempt to explain why some students are more than others likely to put the nation’s interests before their own. As the nation’s interests
are primarily defined by the state (Zhao S 2004: 231-47), national cohesion depends on a certain level of compliance to these interests, (not only but) especially during times of war and/or economic hardship.

It is arguably less surprising to see that those students who answered this question in a very passionate way, also happen to be members of the CCP. All three students in the CCP were decisive in their answer and, unlike other students, did not need time to think about my question. While Zhiwei simply said that every Chinese citizen should put his/her nation’s interest before his/her own (SHTUBFM01, 20/12/16), Jianjun also answered my question with an instant yes, explaining that his nation made him what he is today and that he is very grateful (感谢, ganxie) for that (SHEUSE01, 20/05/17). Later in the interview, he told me that his family greatly benefited from China’s economic reforms in the past and that that, in turn, enabled him to study at well-regarded university. The nation’s interests are primarily defined by the state and Jianjun’s belief might be that these interests have benefitted him (and his family), thus, in his perception, he would not need to put the nation’s interest behind his own. Zhengyuan answered my question with yes as well; however, he made his point even more clear by explaining why he always puts the nation’s interests before his own. He said: “My nation’s interest and my own interest are always the same and do not contradict [each other]”. His answer left the impression that he really means it. Earlier in the interview, when I asked him about his opinion of aiguo zhuyi, he told me that for him the concept embeds an obligation to make the country a better place and protect it (when needed). He mentioned that China still needs to improve in regard to technology and the environment and hoped that Chinese people will become more civilised, but from his point of view, China will solve these issues as well. He admitted that the concept of aiguo zhuyi is a bit abstract to him, but emphasised that to him the concept is about obligations he has to fulfil for the nation (SHEUBFM01, 20/05/17). Jianjun and Zhengyuan did not make the impression that they merely answered what they (presumably) are expected to answer, and on this specific question, it might be that some students in the CCP answered according to what they truly think.

However, other students also reasoned why they would always put the interests of the nation first. Like Zhengyuan, Cuiping, a Sociology student from ECUST, thought that her
interests and those of the nation are the same. However, in contrast to Zhengyuan, she explained to me that she has never been put in a situation where she had to choose, therefore it is easy for her to make this claim. In general, she thought that everyone should put the nation’s interests first and even stated that it is important to do so, because in this way the nation could rely on every single citizen in the case of war (SHEUHSS01, 20/05/17). Zhaoqiang, another student from ECUST, took a more critical stance. He also thought that the nation should generally come first but added that this should not be the case in every situation as it depends on what that specific interest is about. He believed that “moral kidnapping” (道德绑架, daode bangjia) is not an option and one should not put the country’s interest first just because putting it first seems to be the morally right thing to do (看上去是道德的, kanshangqu shi daode de)”. Although holding the nation’s interests in high regard, Zhaoqiang appears to reject blind allegiance and considers everyone’s own moral conscience as the most important authority in a decision-making process and not the nation. He also told me that he is grateful that the government provided a scholarship for his studies, but in his opinion, this does not imply that the government has the right to dictate when he has to put the nation’s interests before his own (SHEUSE02, 20/05/17).

Although this study cannot make claims about differences between students who grew up in an urban environment and those who grew up in the countryside, it is worth noting that rural students are not socialised in the same way as urban students, and thus might be more likely to embrace the idea of always putting the nation first. The suzhi (素质, quality) discourse might be of help in explaining why rural students might be more willing to put the nation’s interests before their own. The concept emerged in the early 1980s and was put to work through rural schools to help state institutions implement policies in rural China. According to Murphy (2004: 19) the “suzhi discourse is used pervasively by the state to implicate every villager in the nation’s quest for modernization [and to foster] national consciousness in the countryside”. A key part of the suzhi policy is ‘quality education’ (素质教育, suzhi jiaoyu). Through state education, rural Chinese children shall learn to “identify themselves as citizens of the nation [and recognise] the nation’s unique character, mission and destiny” (Murphy 2004: 16). According to Murphy (2004: 17) “[t]he nation-building agenda of the Chinese education
system seeks to transcend these local group identifications and interests by appealing to rural children directly as individual members of the nation”. In other words, rural children should not only identify themselves in terms of their next of kin, but as national citizens. Although ‘quality education’ was meant to focus less on passing examinations and routine learning, parents, teachers and students adhere to educational discipline because examination-scores measure suzhi and therefore “higher suzhi students get university places, higher suzhi teachers keep their jobs and officials presiding over high suzhi schools obtain promotions” (Murphy 2004: 12-3). Having interviewed several final year primary students in rural Jiangxi province, Murphy (2004: 16) found that all students wanted to become “teachers, doctors, soldiers, scientists and other occupations encountered in textbooks”. In order to achieve these goals, rural students need to study harder for their examinations and are also encouraged to study harder by parents and teachers, who want to see their children/students to attend university.

Apart from textbook study, national ceremonies, rituals, symbols and systems of governing are replicated within schools as well, such as saluting the national flag every morning (Murphy 2004: 17). During the time when Beijing was bidding for the 2008 Olympics, rural teachers were encouraged to “use Olympic-based activities to foster a national consciousness” (Murphy 2004: 18). Actively participating in this kind of activities not only help rural students to improve their suzhi - and eventually gives them an edge over other rural students when applying to a university - but might also be more positively perceived by rural students. Murphy (2004: 14) notes that, many rural schools do not have “gymnasiums, computers and musical instruments needed for suzhi education, [thus] the best they can do for the school and the students is to concentrate on exams”.

Apart from these activities, which are meant to build a national consciousness, rural students might not have many other non-textbook activities and might therefore see them as a nice change. The perception that rural students have to study harder is also evident when considering the application process for tertiary education. Urban students have a small advantage compared to rural students because “most major city universities stipulate a higher entry requirement for applicants from outside their area” (ibid.), which disadvantages rural students, because most universities are located in
urban areas. This was confirmed by one of the students I interviewed (SHTUHSS04, 23/03/17), but he also said that universities in Shanghai are slowly declining their quota for local students which, in turn, led to online protests among parents in Shanghai who feared that their son/daughter would not be able to study in their city anymore.

Even if rural students were more likely to put the interests of the nation first, this does not mean that urban students are more likely to put their individual interests first. Although many students of urban families also said that they generally put the country’s interests before their own, there were some who either did not put the interests of the nation first or made it dependent on the issue at hand. Shiru, for instance, was very decisive in her answer when she told me that she would not put the nation’s interests before her own. In her view “the government is established by the people and it shall serve its people” as “the ultimate aim should be the wellbeing of the people and not the government”. Although I had not asked her whether she would put the government’s (zhengfu, 政府) interests before her own, she appeared automatically to link nation to government (SHTUBFM02, 10/12/16). This may be due to the efforts of the government to link itself to the nation. In chapter 5.2.2 I have explained how the CCP links itself to the nation in, for instance, national heritage sites by claiming to act on behalf of the whole nation and its people and to having saved both in the past.

Xiaoli, another student from an urban family, was more restrained in her answer, saying that most people ideally should put the nation’s interests first, but added that if the issue is not really important, one can also put his/her own interests first without causing much harm. But she herself would not even go that far. Asked to clarify, she said:

I don’t have a strong personality, so I can accept the nation’s requirements. But in many cases, when my nation needs me, I actually do not have the power to choose. Many times, at the national level, the question is not what you do, but how you do it. There is not a lot a single citizen can do when the issue is very complex (SHDUAD01, 10/04/17).

To me it seemed that Xiaoli does not mind putting the interests of the nation before her own, however, she also seemed to think that a single person does not have much choice other than complying with the nation’s interests (SHDUAD01, 10/04/17).
Other students (of urban families) appeared to take a stronger stance in this question and often told me that it would depend on the issue whether they would consider putting the nation first. Weizhong, for instance, said that he would only put his nation’s interest first if it does not hurt his own interests (SHTUSE02, 15/12/16). Other students like Cuihua and Caixia would only put the nation’s interests first in the case of a war (SHDUAD03, 10/04/17 & SHTUHSS02, 05/12/16). Xiaoqin was more careful about this statement, saying that she thought she would put the nation first in a war, but admitting that she is not entirely sure how she would really react if a war was imminent (SHTUAD, 06/12/16). Students in contemporary China have never experienced war, yet 9 out of 21 students link the idea of putting the nation first to the scenario of war. This may stem in part from how students learn about China’s century of humiliation and potentially also from compulsory military training. Although the state-syllabus does not include how specifically to act in the case of war, it contains many mentions of how the nation suffered in the past, for instance, during both Sino-Japanese wars. Putting the nation first in times of war can include sacrificing one’s life and accepting economic hardship, yet it remains abstract to Chinese students and what each of them would be willing to do remains unknown. I will come back to this point in chapter 8.2.

Anderson conceptualises the nation as a large imagined community, thus putting the nation’s interests before one’s own ultimately means putting the community’s interests first. To him, a nation “is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible […] for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings” (Anderson 2006: 7). As I will demonstrate in chapter 8.2, the majority of Chinese students hold that the nation is as important to them as family, which could help explain why some students may be even willing to sacrifice their life for the nation.

Overall, students from urban families appeared to take a more critical stance to the idea of always putting the nation first. According to Yan (2009: 287) “Chinese society is undergoing an individualisation transformation”, which implies that middle- and upper-class urban students become more individualistic and are more likely to focus on their own advancement than on their nation’s interests. An analysis of data from China in the
World Values Surveys (WVS) of 1990, 2001 and 2007 by Steele and Lynch demonstrated that adherence to national ideologies promoted by the CCP has declined over time and that the link between both national pride and support for collectivism and subjective well-being has diminished as well (Steele and Lynch 2013: 447-50). As Steele’s and Lynch’s sample only represents persons (aged 18-65 years) living in urban China, it is fair to assume that a high number of students from urban families are more likely to think of their own interests first and thus not of the interests of the nation necessarily. Having reviewed literature on the individualism-collectivism paradigm, Chen et al (1997: 47) argue that “for a collectivist, the collectivity is the whole and is superordinate, whereas the individual is a part and is subordinate. This means that when there is a conflict of interest, the collectivist should be willing to sacrifice self-interests for the sake of collective interests”.

This does not mean that students from urban (middle- and high-income) families are not nationalist, but a decline in support for collectivism might relate to a decline in the willingness to always put the nation’s interests before one’s own, as the nation can be seen as a collective unit. According to Steele and Lynch, a “key feature of the capitalist ideology is the promotion of individualism” characterised by the principle that “individual effort is rewarded and benefits the individual” (Steele and Lynch 2013: 442). China, however, which Steele and Lynch regard as a socialist nation, is characterised by a socialist ideology in which the promotion of the good of the collective dominates over the individual (ibid.). As the Chinese government promotes the good of the collective and thus the well-being of the nation, one needs to look beyond the realm of politics to understand why students from urban (middle- and high-income) families are more likely to be individualist and less likely to put the interests of the nation first in any situation.

In chapter 5.3.2, I have demonstrated that the majority of students believe that family and friends have had a positive impact on their national attitudes. On a general note, Triandis theorises that “[i]n collectivist cultures, child rearing emphasizes conformity, obedience, security, and reliability; in individualist cultures, child rearing emphasizes independence, exploration, creativity, and self-reliance” (Triandis 2001: 912). Applying Triandis’ theory to the Chinese context, conventional wisdom about child-rearing in China does not fit a notion that Chinese society has become individualist. Having
interviewed 328 urban Chinese parents, Lu and Chang’s (2013: 341) findings suggest that “[t]he parenting of only children in China was predominantly authoritative, child-centered, and egalitarian”. However, it is important to note Yan’s (2009: 287) wording, as he speaks of an ongoing “transformation” which is not finished. This transformation can also be found in Chinese peoples’ views on the concept of family. By analysing data from the 2006 China General Social Survey (CGSS), Hu and Scott (2016: 1286-7) found that although traditional family and gender values are still widespread in China, “attitudes toward patrilineal beliefs and gender roles prescribing a traditional gender division of labor had significantly less support”.

At the same time, however, most respondents in their data set strongly endorsed filial piety which, compared to other family-related values, has not changed over time. Even if Yan’s notion about the individualisation of Chinese society is correct, it appears that while some views change, others do not. Simply because students from urban (middle- and high-income) families are more likely to be individualist and less likely to put the nation’s interests before their own, does not mean they would always put their own interests first. Based on the interviews with those students, I assume that these groups of students are just more likely to evaluate when to put the nation first and when not. For instance, Caixia, who comes from an urban household, made it clear that she would only put the interests of the nation first if there was a war between China and another country (SHTUHSS02, 05/12/16). In other words, putting the nation first has become a conscious individual decision for them, depending on the issue at hand. This way of thinking about the nation and its interests could mean that those students consider whether a specific collective action or deed is truly in the interest of the nation or merely in the interest of the government. This notion was most reflected in what Shiru told me, whom I have mentioned above, as she decisively said no when I asked her whether she is willing to always put the nation’s interest before her own, referring to the government’s duty to serve its people and not the other way around (SHTUBFM02, 10/12/16).

As I will demonstrate in section 5 of this chapter, Chinese people’s idea of what the nation’s interests are, and how to respond to specific insults, are not always the same as what the government has in mind. Although the nation’s interests are often the same
as the government’s interests, they cannot be used synonymously. For instance, following the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute in 2012, Chinese protestors took their anger to the street and destroyed several Japanese cars and restaurants. Although the Chinese government also condemned Japan’s actions, “state media emphasised that citizens should express their patriotism ‘rationally’ and ‘say no’ to ‘beating, smashing, and looting’” (Chen-Weiss 2014: 208). Gries (2004: 19-9) is right in stating that “Chinese nationalism is not simply ‘party propaganda’, [...] an ‘instrument’ or [a] ‘tool’”, arguing that “Chinese, like all peoples, have deep-seated emotional attachments to their national identity”. As stressed in chapter 6, these attachments to national identity also stem from a process of tacit learning and not merely from state education and/or traditional media.

Although the majority of students stated that they would generally put their nation’s interests first, there appears to be a growing notion among some students that the nation only comes first if it really is necessary, like in war.

4. China in Comparison to Others

In section two of this chapter I showed that many Chinese university students attribute their love to the nation to their birth and a sense of belonging. Belonging to a nation also always implies, at least on an unconscious level, that there are some who do not belong to the same nation. Nations and forms of nationalism they embed, always need to be studied in conjunction with other nations. In chapter 6.3.1 I discussed how students in contemporary China tacitly learn to remember their national identity through the role of Chinese food. If China was a closed off entity in which its national members would not be aware of the outside world, Chinese food would not be Chinese food, but just food. Similarly, loving the nation also implies being aware that there are other nations. Indeed, many Chinese students may even express love for other nations, however, this would be a different form of love as it lacks the factors of birth, belonging and familiarity. This section analyses students’ opinions in regard to whether China is the best nation/country (guojia, 国家) and whether China is better than other nations.
Both table 7.5 and 7.6 demonstrate that less than half of all students think that China is the best nation in the world and/or better than other nations. 41.8 per cent (103 students) said that China is the best nation in the world and similarly, 43.1 per cent (106 students) said that China is better than other countries.
students) think that China is better than other nations. Although these numbers may signify that a relative high number of students hold opinions like the ones in table 7.5 and 7.6, a large number of students were not sure whether China is the best nation in the world (31.7 per cent, 78 students) or whether China is better than other nations (41.5 per cent, 102 students).

Interestingly, interview responses to the question of whether China is the best nation in the world deviated a lot from the quantitative dataset. Only five (out of 21) students believed that China is the best nation in the world, while 14 students did not hold this opinion and two students were not sure. Although this big difference in students’ answers may also be related to the fact that the interviewer is not Chinese, and students’ answers may have thus be more restrained when answering the question face to face, many of the answers were quite reflective and students did not make the impression that they feel uncomfortable answering the question.

Of the five students who told me that they think China is the best nation in the world, two admitted that they like to think that China is the best nation the world, yet acknowledge that they cannot be absolutely sure. Cuiping, for instance, said that she thinks China is the best nation in the world, but added that she does not really know a lot about other nations. If she did, she said that she would be willing to rethink her position in this regard (SHEUHSS01, 20/05/17). Weizhong also said that China is the best nation in the world, but emphasised that his opinion is only based on his current situation and that he can understand why different people think differently. After I asked him to further explain, he said:

For me, China is the best nation because it provides me with what I need in order to develop. But objectively it is not the best nation, because it has a long way to go as compared with other developed countries (SHTUSE02, 15/12/16).

Apart from three students who were absolutely sure that China is the best nation in the world, all other students either said that the do not think in absolutes or reasoned their opinion by referring to China’s shortcomings. References to China’s weaknesses were often made in conjunction to other nations’ progress and development. This even included references which were critical of the current political system (albeit in an
indirect way). When I asked Xiaoli whether China is the best nation in the world, she replied that especially Scandinavian countries are much better than China. Apart from mentioning positive aspects of Scandinavian countries such as their advanced social welfare system, she also pointed to China’s flawed judicial systems. According to her, there is not real rule of law in China and that is part of the reason why she thinks that China is, by far, not the best country in the world (SHDUAD01, 10/04/17). Jiaxuan also thought that China cannot be described as the best country in the world, by comparing aspects of contemporary China with that of other nations. He compared US strength in innovation to his own country and also pointed to flaws in China, albeit in a highly stereotyped way:

Although Chinese people are not as smart as the Jewish people, not as innovative as Americans and, we do not pay as much attention to details and craftsmanship as Germans, I still think that every country, including China, has its strengths and weaknesses and thus no country can be called the best. (SHDUAD05, 10/04/17)

As strange as his assessment may sound, many students made comparisons when being asked whether China is the best nation in the world. This, perhaps, also helps to explain the big difference between quantitative and qualitative data, especially when looking at the data in table 7.6. Many students may not generally think that China is better than all other countries, but only better than some countries. Zhiwei, for instance, thinks that China is the best country in the world. He asked me to look at India and argued that women in China are much safer than in India (SHTUBFM01, 20/12/16). While most students referred to examples from countries which are better off than China, few also drew comparisons to countries which are not. It is also worth noting that it might be easier for some students to express extremely nationalist sentiment towards foreign countries in an anonymous questionnaire rather than in an actual face-to-face interview with a foreign citizen.

Although many students may think that China is at least better than some countries, most answers (in the interviews) were quite reflective; yet at the same time sometimes based on reductive stereotypes (also see chapter 9.3.3). Although some students clearly think that China is not only the best country, but also better than any other country, loving one’s own nation does not necessarily imply feeling superior to other countries.
5. The Will to ‘Defend’ the Nation

The majority of Chinese university students in contemporary China may not generally feel superior to other nations, however negative sentiments toward other nations arise from time to time. Negative sentiments often surface after a specific incident with another country and students, like other societal groups in China, feel the need to defend the nation against, for example, criticism from abroad. Aside from street protests, there are many ways in which Chinese students can ‘defend’ their nation and students’ answers in the interviews about the way they defend their nation (in a particular situation) were diverse.

Table 7.7 – Defending the Nation

I often defend my nation against criticism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data
Table 7.8 – Unfair Treatment of the Nation

As table 7.7 indicates, most students (74.4 per cent, 183 students) often ‘defend’ their nation against criticism. On a similar note, table 7.8 shows that even more students would protest if their nation was bullied or treated unfairly (93.5 per cent, 230 students). Interview data showed that many students evaluate whether the critique from abroad is, in their minds, founded or unfounded, and thus also perceived as valid criticism or mere bullying. More than half of all students in the interviews told me that if the criticism is brought forward in a polite and objective manner, they are willing to accept it or try to reason with that person (politely). Except for two students who do not like to engage in discussions about China at all, most students told me that biased and aggressive criticism of China is not acceptable for them, regardless of from where (or from whom) the criticism comes. This was also the most common response when I asked students whether they could be friends with somebody who does not like China. Many students I interviewed explained to me that they would be willing to be friends with somebody who does not like China, as long as this person’s criticism of China was well-founded.
Xiaofang, a Fashion Design student at Donghua University, represented what most students told me, namely that “if the problems they point out are true, then we can be friends; because these deficiencies can be put right in time (referring to China’s shortcomings). But if the criticism is unfounded, I will not be friends with him/her” (SHDUAD02, 10/04/17). Three students, however, said that they would not, under any circumstances, accept a friend who criticises or dislikes China, yet each one had a different reason:

To be friends, two persons must share the same fundamental principles, and loving one’s country is a very fundamental principle. How can you be friends with someone like this? (Zhiwei, SHTUBFM01, 20/12/16)

If the criticism about China is true, it makes me feel uncomfortable. If the criticism is unfounded I think of the person as a negative person. And when the person criticises China repeatedly I think of him/her as a very stubborn and anti-social person. (Xiaoqin, SHTUAD01, 06/12/16)

I can't accept it when foreigners criticize China. But if a Chinese criticizes China, well... and sometimes I do it as well by complaining about China and its problems when chatting with my friends and that, I think, is perfectly okay. (Lili, SHTUSE02, 15/12/16)

Both students who distinguish between founded and unfounded criticism, as well as those who do not accept any form of criticism from abroad, have in common that specific forms of criticism from abroad hurt their national feelings. While for Zhiwei loving the nation was a fundamental principle, Xiaoqin appeared to take criticism from abroad personally and felt uncomfortable because she identified herself as Chinese. Lili criticised her own nation too, but did not accept someone who does not belong to the nation doing so. Although most other students told me that well-founded criticism is acceptable, there is no uniform belief as to what well-founded criticism is. Even if criticism is well-founded, it can be perceived as insulting or unfair. Since almost all Chinese students are proud of their national identity, it would not be surprising if many of them react harshly to well-founded criticism as well. According to Guibernau (2007: 12), “the internalisation of national identity [...] results in individuals charging it emotionally [...] sentiments of love of the nation and hatred of those threatening it are intensely felt by fellow nationals”. In other words, criticism of the nation or even insults are perceived as personal.
As displayed in table 7.7 and 7.8, the majority of students both ‘defend’ their nation as well as protest when they think China has been treated unfairly. Students choose different ways in expressing anger or showing solidarity online. Having surveyed 1280 university students in Beijing and Guangdong, Wang (2017: 102-3) found that “[o]nline collective actions are more efficient and less costly than those on the streets are”. Xiaoli told me that she joined boycotting Japanese products once after the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of APA Hotel denied the Nanjing Massacre which, in turn, could be seen as defending the nation’s interests. However, she emphasised that this only happened once and she did that because she was very angry and because many people joined the boycott. After asking her, whether there has been another incident before which made her angry, she replied that there was one (with a foreign exchange student) but she could not do anything because she sometimes feels that she does not have the expertise to defend China due to a lack of knowledge. Although she has not said it explicitly, it seemed that Xiaoli would only participate in collective actions even when they are not promulgated by the central government, as she believes those collective actions serve the interests of the whole nation. At the individual level, however, she seems to not be sure how (or whether it is worth) to defend the nation’s interests (SHDUAD01, 10/04/17).

After having analysed data from 1,458 university students in Beijing concerning anti-Japanese demonstrations, Zhou and Wang (2016: 408) remark that “[t]ypical thinking goes along the lines of ‘as only one individual it would not make a difference whether I participate or not.’ Participating as a lone individual in street demonstrations can be lonely, boring, and even intimidating”. Although Xiaolin emphasised that she has only participated in such a protest once, she generically believed in bottom-up collective actions online (SHEUHSS03, 23/03/17). According to Wang, university students use the internet (e.g. reading news) more frequently than other young internet users in China, and “tertiary school students are advanced users of online networking and communication instruments” (2017: 34-6).

This is also reflected in what Shiru told me. She said that when China is harshly criticised by citizens of another country in an online forum, she responded by pointing to flaws in the respective country (SHTUBFM02, 10/12/16). Jianguo also voices his concerns online,
mostly on social media like Weibo and Weixin, because he does not like it when China is permanently portrayed as negative in international media (SHDUAD04, 10/04/16). Defending China this way, however, is not limited to only those who engage in discussions or ‘post’ their opinion somewhere. Cuiping, for instance, told me that she hardly posts anything online, however, she expresses her solidarity by ‘liking’ posts from others who defend China online. After asking her for an example, she told me:

One time, Chinese national self-esteem was hurt by Japan [during the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute]. At that time, many people expressed their anger by smashing Japanese products like cars. I agreed with this approach in the beginning and ‘liked’ posts and videos, but then I found out that many Japanese cars were actually made by Chinese in China, so I opposed the action. (SHEUHSS01, 20/05/17)

Although she did not participate in destroying Japanese cars herself, she expressed her solidarity with those who did. Ironically, she changed her opinion later, not because of the extreme action itself, but because of another nationalist sentiment, switching her solidarity from those fellow nationals who destroy Japanese cars to those fellow nationals who produce them.

Generally, students who express nationalist sentiment online do so in a variety of more or less explicit ways. In fact, Wang (2017: 103-4) found that hardly any students actively participate in online petitions against a foreign country. From her sample of 1280 students, only 6 per cent stated that they have participated in such a petition before. In addition, only 19 per cent have participated in an online celebration of a national festival or event (ibid.). Expressing nationalist sentiment online might therefore not always be expressed in obvious ways (e.g. participation in boycotts, or postings on social media), but is also shown through, for instance, simply ‘liking’ nationalist postings of others on the issue at hand. Students who do not engage in discussions online are still willing to defend China offline. One student from ECUST told me that when Japan claimed the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, he held a public speech at school, although he was not willing to tell me the content of that speech. After asking why he was not willing to tell me, he merely responded that it is very private (SHEUBFM02, 20/05/17). Considering that he held a public speech in front of other students, it was likely that this speech contained nationalist content which he did not want to share with a foreigner. Nevertheless, some
students who are not very active online, prefer to express their opinion face-to-face even with foreigners. Shuyun, for instance, told me about a bad experience she had had with a British exchange student at Tongji University:

Once there was an English exchange student here in Shanghai and he always complained about everything in China. He always said that this in China is bad and that in China is bad and that generally everything in China is bad. And in England everything is better. Of course, I responded and defended China, but this guy was so stupid. (SHTUHSS03, 05/12/16)

It is worth noting that Shuyun belonged to those students who cannot be described as fervent nationalists. Shuyun did not even care about reunification with Taiwan and earlier in the interview also told me that she would never put the nation’s interests before her own. Unlike most of her peers, she would be even open to the idea of living in another country permanently. Yet even Shuyun got angry about a foreigner criticising China. Nationalism in state education may not have had as big of an impact on her as it had on other students, but Shuyun had tacitly learned to love her nation and therefore felt insulted when somebody spoke negatively about it. As argued in chapter 6, it is not only the grand explicit narrative which shapes one’s love for the nation. As long as Chinese students imagine themselves as being part of a Chinese nation and as long as the Chinese nation is ‘flagged’ by ‘national reminders’, such as Chinese cuisine or Shanghai’s architecture, the nation can be remembered and potentially loved, even by a student like Shuyun who did not hold the nation as dear as other students do.

When asked about how and why students defend their nation, female students gave more in-depth answers which could lead to an assumption that female students react more harshly to criticism or insult from abroad. However, past research on university students in the western hemisphere has shown that women and men feel equally angry and ashamed about an insult more generally (Mosquera et al 2008:1477). If Anderson (2006: 6) is right that “in the minds of each [national citizen] lives the image of their communion”, it would not be surprising if insults to one’s nation make people similarly angry as personal insults.

Although some Chinese students told me that they also discuss issues among each other, ‘defending’ the nation almost exclusively happens in an international context. Speaking
out against criticism and insult on- and off-line is usually directed against foreign governments, newspapers and/or individuals. As indicated above, this happens in different ways. Some students write comments on social media (mostly *Weixin* and/or *Weibo*), others express their nationalist sentiment in private conversations with their friends, and again others participate in boycotts. Students were aware that many foreigners hold negative views about China, and, to some extent students agreed with some of the criticism from abroad (e.g. environmental problems), but they nevertheless wished that China received more recognition for what it has achieved over the past few decades. Leo said that he gets a bit angry when criticism from abroad is only negative. He acknowledged China’s shortcomings, but found Western news coverage one-sided, which once encouraged him to write an article for a school newspaper on why Western countries should tone down their criticism (SHDUAD05, 10/04/17).

The request of more respect for the Chinese nation was a personal matter for most students. Several students linked the idea of loving China to a sense of belonging. Based on almost all students who were interviewed for this study, this sense of belonging often stems from the fact that they were born in China and that they have family and friends in China. Yet there may be even more attached to this form of national belonging. Skey (2011:137-9), who analysed qualitative data about the feeling of coming home (after a long time abroad), suggests that home is not only the place of family and friends. Instead, he (ibid.) argues that “[h]ome’ is a ‘thick’ (national) space that is predictable and hence stable, where a sense of continuity and hence familiarity comes from routine features of daily life [and that this national home] may be a critical element in allowing individuals to maintain a more secure sense of security and control”. This strong feeling toward an imagined national home might be abstract, but helps to explain why some students in China might feel so strongly about when their ‘national home’ is criticised or even insulted.

6. Pride in National Symbols

The final two items of the ‘General Nationalist Sentiment’ scale refer to pride in national symbols. According to Kolst (2006: 676) “national symbols - flags, coats of arms, national
anthems - play such a crucial role in nation-building and nation-maintenance”. Arguably two of the most explicit embodiments of a nation are its national flag and national anthem. However, this does not mean that these national symbols are valued equally across the world. As mentioned in chapter 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, flag raising ceremonies and learning China’s national anthem are a vital part of students’ education in contemporary China, however, this does not necessarily mean that students feel pride when they hear China’s national anthem or see China’s national flag. Having investigated national symbols in Bosnia, Russia and Norway, Kolst (2006: 696) concludes that “[t]here are no inherent qualities in state symbols that prevent them from being accepted, and likewise, no particular design and details will in and of themselves guarantee their success”. For this reason, students were asked whether they feel pride when they hear China’s national anthem and/or when they see China’s national flag.

**Table 7.9 – Pride in National Anthem**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I feel proud when I hear China's national anthem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data
As demonstrated in table 7.9 and 7.10, most students reported that they feel proud when they hear China’s national anthem (78.9 per cent, 194 students) and, feel proud when they see China’s national flag (81.3 per cent, 200 students). It thus appears that daily flag raising ceremonies and hearing the national anthem in school has proven to be very effective. The repetitive exposure to China’s national flag and anthem is vital in understanding why so many students feel pride in such symbols. According to Billig (1995: 40) a national symbol, like the flag or the anthem, “if it is to be effective, must pass into the conscious awareness of its recipients”. To return to what I discussed in chapter 6.2.2 on the effect of political banners on university campuses, the process of learning and appreciating China’s national anthem and flag might be perceived as obtrusive in the beginning, but later—after repetitive exposure—, both flag and anthem become what Billig (1995: 42) generally describes as “patterns of social life [in which] thoughts, reactions and symbols become turned in routine habits”.

Students in the interviews were not specifically asked whether they feel pride when they see a national flag or hear the national anthem, however one student mentioned pride
in China’s national anthem when being asked whether there is anything typical Chinese that he is proud of. He said:

I will feel proud when I see a Chinese map or hear the national anthem, for example especially when it is played when Chinese athletes won prizes in international sports games like the Olympics (SHEUSE01, 20/05/17).

Students most likely do not feel proud every time they hear the national anthem or see the national flag; however, when consciously engaged with it, for example in the form of a questionnaire or interview question, they will feel pride. I will come back to the importance of national symbols in students’ lives in chapter 8.3.1 when I discuss students’ responses as to whether they possess national symbols or items at home.

7. Concluding Remarks

This chapter demonstrated and analysed both quantitative and qualitative data on how Chinese university students in contemporary generally express nationalist sentiment. It focused on capturing and analysing strong beliefs, feelings and opinions related to the Chinese nation. Almost every student reported that he/she loves his/her nation and is proud of his/her national identity. Most students are also, for instance, willing to put the nation’s interests before their own, however, qualitative data has shown that a considerable number of students make their compliance dependent on the issue at hand. Not every student is willing to generally put the interests of the nation before his/her own. However, the Chinese government does not necessarily have to worry about that. Data from the interviews helped to explain why some students hold the interests of the nation in higher regard than other. Indeed, the interview data also showed that some students (5 of 21) are not willing to put the nation’s interests before their own under any circumstances. However, apart from those who always put the nation’s interests before their own (9 of 21), students who made their decision dependent on the issue at hand (7 of 21) usually argued that it is not necessary in everyday situations (whereas it would be in the case of a war), and they put their own interests first when it does not hurt main national interests.
Students who mentioned that they often defend their nation often do this in discussion with friends or foreigners, through joining a boycott, or online by, for instance, writing a post or ‘liking’ posts of other internet users. These forms of ‘defending’ the nation usually occur after an incident, often triggered by a specific action or policy of a foreign country (or individuals within a foreign country). Many students also explicitly expressed nationalist sentiment through the feeling of pride in China’s national anthem and flag. As the following chapter shall demonstrate, this does not imply that students necessarily possess a national flag or sing the anthem themselves on a regularly basis, but the feeling of pride in these two national symbols perhaps demonstrates best how something explicit like a flag raising ceremony, can transcend its obtrusiveness and turn into something habitual when repeated often enough.

Finally, only less than half of all students believed that China is the best nation in the world and better than others. However, a lot of students were unsure whether they support this kind of thinking. Interview data showed that most students do not believe that China is the best nation in the world. Most of those students not only pointed to China’s shortcomings, but also emphasised what other countries do better than the PRC. Chapter 9 will further engage with students’ views on other countries, and demonstrate that students generally show a lot of respect to countries like the US and Japan.
Chapter 8: Fervent Expressions - Advanced Nationalist Sentiment

1. Introduction

This chapter will continue to analyse different forms of expressing nationalist sentiment. The previous chapter has largely focused on general expressions of nationalist sentiment such as love for one’s nation, putting national interests before one’s own and the will to defend the nation. In contrast to chapter 7, this chapter analyses nationalist sentiments which could be considered as more advanced, if not extreme.

Nine items fell into a scale which I labelled ‘Advanced Nationalist Sentiment’ (Q4, Q5, Q30, Q31, Q32, Q33, Q35, Q36, Q37; see appendix) which, like the ‘General Nationalist Sentiment’ scale, also showed a very high internal consistency ($\alpha=.869$). The ‘Advanced Nationalist Sentiment’ scale not only includes items such as the will to sacrifice one’s life for the nation and the possession and purchase of national items, but also tackles the question of how often students use the term motherland when speaking about China. Most students may love their nation and are willing to commit in some kind of action if their nation was treated unfairly by other foreign powers, however, this does not tell us how far students would go for their nation and it does not provide us with insights of how nationalist sentiment is expressed explicitly in hobbies and other everyday activities.

This chapter thus provides and analyses both quantitative and qualitative data which not only show that nationalist sentiment can also be expressed in more extreme forms and ways, but also that there are limitations to nationalist sentiment. Nationalist protest on the streets might be the most obvious form to express nationalist feelings in an explicit way, but there are also other ways in which nationalist sentiment can be explicitly expressed, for instance, in the form of feeling a close connection with the nation which equals that one has with his/her family, or by consciously engaging in nation-related activities.
2. The Nation as Family, Sacrifice and Military Service

Chapter 5.3.2 has demonstrated that family appears to have a positive impact on students’ sense of aiguo zhuyi. Family, however, is not only an important channel of influence in students’ lives, but also something that is generally valued and respected (see Deutsch 2004; Fuligni and Zhang 2004). To further investigate how university students in China think of their nation, students were asked whether they consider their nation as important as their families.

Table 8.1 – Nation as Family

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>My nation is equally important to me as my family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data

Table 8.1 demonstrates that only slightly less than two thirds of all students think that their nation is as important to them as their families (62.6 per cent, 154 students). While about every fourth student was not sure whether he/she considers the nation as important as his/her family (24.4 percent, 60 students), only 32 students (13 per cent) did not agree with the statement in table 8.1. Considering the importance of family values in China, these results do not undermine the idea that family is generally
considered as something very important in China, but rather showcase how important
the nation appears to be to so many students.

To understand this apparent strong connection to the nation it is not enough to merely
point to students’ answers when I asked them why they love their nation. Although two
students told me that they think of the nation as a big family, most students just
explained their love to the nation by referring to their place of birth. Having examined
several countries on whether family metaphors can be found in national symbols,
Lauenstein et al (2015: 324) found that family terms are a relevant aspect of nationalistic
discourse in many countries. In China, this is most obvious when looking at the term
zuguo (motherland). However, family metaphors are also relevant in colloquial language
by, for example, referring to Xi Jinping as Xi Dada, a term which literally translates as
‘Big big Xi’ but actually means ‘Uncle Xi’ (in the dialect of Shanxi Province, where the
ancestral home of Xi is located) (Yin and Flew 2018: 96). Similarly, Xi’s wife Peng Liyuan
is often referred to as Peng Mama (Mother Peng, 彭妈妈). Terms like these embed
family imagery and, according to Lauenstein et al (2015: 321), “naturalise the social
relations or realities of a country”. Further research will have to investigate how family
metaphors in public speeches or everyday conversations in China have contributed to
peoples’ view of the nation as a big family.

Although many students might consider the nation as important as family, it is
questionable whether students would actually be willing to do as much for the nation,
as they would for their family. There are many ways in which a student can show how
he/she is committed to and feels about the nation. Chapter 7 clearly indicates that ideas
such as loving the nation and taking pride in one’s national identity are shared by the
majority of Chinese university students. However, loving the nation does not necessarily
indicate that students also feel a sense of duty to the nation (对国家的责任; dui guojia
de zeren) like, for instance, by putting the interests of the nation before one’s own. Not
every student in both questionnaire and interviews was willing to do that, yet still loved
his/her nation. What this tells us is that some students’ love for the nation might mainly
be attributed to the fact that they were born (and grew up) in China and that they have
family and friends there. If that is the case, it could pose a challenge to the legitimacy of
the current Chinese government because those students would probably also love their
nation regardless of who is ruling the country. In addition to that, students who consider their own interests more important as national interests could start expressing their anger when national interests (as defined by the government) increasingly overshadow individual rights and interests which, in turn, could lead to protests. To determine whether this love for the nation equals a sense of duty to the nation, students were asked whether they always put national interests over their own and whether they would be willing to sacrifice their life for the nation if need be.

Sacrificing one’s life for the nation is arguably one of the most extreme forms of commitment to the nation. Chapter 2 and 4 have explained how the Chinese government seeks to create a uniform national identity, permeated by both past humiliations caused by foreign powers and the idea of one nation with the CCP as its protector and leader. This rhetoric of nationalist mobilisation for all kinds of causes is not only common for governments with a nationalist agenda, but also crucial to implement the idea of sacrifice for the nation. The Chinese government often speaks of the nation as family (see, for instance, Xinhua 2015), and the idea that the nation is equally important as family, is a view which most students share (see table 8.1). If the nation is seen as an extended form of family, sacrificing one’s life for it appears more plausible. Stern theorises:

A national identity can also ‘win’ a contest of altruisms by tying itself symbolically to the groups to which people have the strongest and most primordial ties: family and community. These are the groups that have the deepest roots in human evolutionary history, arouse the strongest empathy, and exact the most stringent obligations from members—it is for these groups that people are most likely to sacrifice their lives (Stern 1995: 230).

Stern believes that equating nation with family and community generates emotions and elicits behaviour that is against self-interest. Indeed, some students were less likely to put the nation’s interest before their own, but that does not mean that they would not be willing to sacrifice their life for the nation, if the situation demands. This would largely depend on how these students feel about the nation. Depending on how they imagine the nation, they could see the nation as a big family, which is worth fighting for, or as a government-constructed entity too abstract to lay down their lives for. To combat a perceived alienation between students and the government-constructed nation, the
CCP has increased its nationalist rhetoric by, for instance, promoting to “go with the party forever” (yongyuan gen dang zou, 永远跟党走) (MoE 2016).

**Table 8.2 – Hypothetical Sacrifice**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data

Although most students mentioned that they would be willing to put the nation’s interests before their own in the case of war (see chapter 7), it is not evident that the same students would also be willing to sacrifice their life in a war. Only about one third of all students said that they would be willing to sacrifice their life for the nation (34.1 per cent, 84 students). A relative majority of students were not sure on whether they would sacrifice their life for the nation (41.1 per cent, 101 students) (see table 8.2).

Although this study cannot evaluate different groups of students, it is still surprising to see that female students are equally willing to lay down their lives for the nation, compared to men. 58 out of 160 female students (36.2 per cent) and 26 out of 86 male students (30.2 per cent) said that they would be willing for such a sacrifice. Conventional wisdom about war and self-sacrifice for the nation does not discuss women in the role...
of beings who willingly lay down their lives for the nation. According to Yuval-Davis (1997: 120), common wisdom about women and war holds that “[w]ars are seen to be fought for the sake of the ‘women-and-children’, and the fighting men are comforted and reassured by the knowledge that ‘their women’ are keeping the hearth fires going and are waiting for them to come home”. This common image, which depicts women staying home while their husbands are at war and sacrificing their life might not be entirely true for female university students in contemporary China. When being asked about his love for the nation, one student from Tongji University told me that every Chinese citizen, no matter whether male or female, should do his/her utmost to protect the nation even if that means that one has to die for the nation (SHTUBFM01, 20/12/16). Similarly, many students said that they would put the interests of the nation first in the case of a war. Putting the interests of the nation first and sacrificing one’s life for the nation are perceived as duties, however, the latter can only be seen as a hypothetical duty. Although about one third of all students would hypothetically being willing to sacrifice their life for the nation, it is unclear whether they would be really willing to do so when the situation arises.

Table 8.3 – Joining the Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I hope to join the army (later)</th>
<th>in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data
Table 8.3 illustrates that only about one fifth of all students are hoping to join the army later (20.8 per cent, 51 students), whereas the vast majority of students is either not sure or unwilling to do so. Despite being a minority, it is remarkable to see that every fifth student hopes to join the army later. This might be related to the fact that the PLA wants to raise the quality of the armed forces and thus increasingly recruits university students (Reuters 2009). Although we cannot be sure about the motivations, some students may honestly wish to serve in the army, but others may only want to join the PLA for career prospects. In contrast to the distribution of male and female students on the issue of sacrificing one’s life, fewer female students are hoping to join the army later compared to male students (female: 18, 8 per cent, 30 students; male: 24.4 per cent, 21 students). Although these results, based on a small sample, can only be treated tentatively, it is interesting to see that the difference between male and female students in this issue is not very large.

Traditional gender stereotypes in China still largely exist, but traditional gender roles in regard to labour are changing slowly (Hu and Scott 2016:1286-7). This also affects the perception of women working in the PLA, which has changed over the past decade. At the 60th anniversary parade of the founding of the PRC in October 2009, female soldiers, for the first time, participated in the parade. Images and video footage of these female soldiers not only attracted a lot of attention domestically, but also internationally. Prior to that, the PLA largely recruited its soldiers from unemployed men in rural China (Obradovic 2015: 7). According to Obradovic (ibid.) The Chinese government “is beginning to tap into the pool of talented and highly educated young women willing to join as the service offers privileges such as reimbursement for tuition fees, and [...] employment opportunities [and] [w]hile many female soldiers will be working in communications, health care and administration, China’s policies to correct the imbalance in the military despite six decades of women’s participation, are starting to deliver”.

Whether women in the PLA will truly be treated as equal in the future remains to be seen, but the message to current female students, which might be understood as that female soldiers are becoming equally well-regarded as their male counterparts, is nevertheless heralded. For instance, since 2011 the People’s Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN) has intensified its efforts to recruit, train and educate female personnel “in multiple career fields, including communications, nursing, maritime navigation, radar and sonar operation, and command-and-control functions on such platforms as destroyers, landing vessels, and the hospital ship Peace Ark” (Allen and Clemens 2014: 2). As of 2016 there were approximately 115,000 female enlisted personnel and officers in the PLA and although this number is still relatively low (1.3 million PLA personnel in total), “there are several examples of mixed-gender organizations that have been established in recent years [in which] men and women of the PLA are increasingly training together and to the same standards” (Kania and Allen 2016). Just as of 2018, the PLA has announced that it is training its first female captain (China Daily 2018b). Of course, this announcement might not change anything about the persisting inequality of men and women in the army, but it nevertheless delivers a positive message to female students who might want to join the PLA later. In line with the changing image of gender roles in contemporary China, many current female students might not think of self-sacrifice for the nation as a male-only domain anymore, but instead want to prove that they are no less prepared to do anything for the nation.

Sacrifice, however, does not only mean that one has to sacrifice his/her life for the nation. In the previous chapter I have discussed how students ‘defend’ the nation in different ways. Like ‘defending’ the nation contains a wide spectrum of actions, so does sacrifice. Xiaolin, for instance, made it very clear what Chinese people should do (and sacrifice) when the nation is in dispute with another nation:

> Whether in peace or war, the nation’s interest always comes first. For example, in face of the THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defence] issue with South Korea, we should put our nation’s interest first and stop buying Korean cosmetic products or go shopping at Korean-based stores like Lotte DFS, and instead, find alternatives from other countries (SHEUHSS03, 23/03/17).

Xiaolin told me that she had a hard time in following through with her boycott, but insisted that she has never been to a Lotte DFS at the airport again (ibid.). Boycotting foreign products as a form of sacrifice for the nation is not new. In April 2008, following Nicolas Sarkozy’s consideration to boycott the 2008 Beijing Olympics and after a disruption during the torch relay in Paris, a college graduate in Beijing staged a brief
protest outside the French supermarket chain Carrefour, calling for a boycott of French products. Although the boycott was not instigated by the Chinese government, the authorities allowed the protests to continue. By allowing the protests in front of Carrefour, the Chinese government essentially achieved two goals. By giving “domestic anger a relatively safe target to attack”, the Chinese government also prevented protests in front of French consulates or even the embassy and thus kept the issue out of the political sphere (Chen-Weiss 2014: 240-2). By handling it this way, the Chinese government could present itself as acting on behalf the nation’s interests and show that the people’s and government’s interests are congruent, which in Gellner’s (1983: 1) view is key to defining nationalism as a political principle. However, the government’s actual stance on the issue was not necessarily entirely congruent, as the government’s primary interest was to deflect attention away from a situation in which people would realise that the government’s actual interest was to safeguard French consulates and not necessarily the people’s national right to protest anywhere they like. Either way, boycotts might also be seen of a form of self-sacrifice in which Chinese people who are used to buy products from a specific brand for convenience or status reasons, stop to do so.

In attempting to answer why people more generally are willing to sacrifice their life for the nation, Stern argues that national problems are “simplified and reinterpreted in terms of emotional ties and moral obligations to family and community” (Stern 1995: 232). As discussed in chapter 5.2.2, the Chinese state tries to appeal to students’ emotions, by for instance telling the story of China as a victim of history. By this, the Chinese state creates an abstract bond between students and strangers who acted on behalf of the nation so that following generations can have a better life.

These nationalist appeals appear to be particularly effective among those who hold more conservative values as Graham, Haidt and Nosek (2009: 1034-6) found that conservatives are more concerned (than liberals) with issues related to the ingroup (by referring to the nation in the survey). Without emotional ties to the ingroup, which a national community in this context is, one would not be likely to sacrifice one’s life for the national community. Although one can love one’s nation without be willing to sacrifice one’s own life for it, conservative values among some students might explain
why some students are more willing to lay down their life for the nation than others. By investigating why there are many engineers among Islamic radicals, Gambetta and Hertog found that radical Islamists’ Weltanschauung (world-view) is largely characterised by “a corporatist and mechanistic view of the ideal society” in which Western pluralism is rejected and a unified and ordered society, ruled by strong leadership, is preached (Gambetta and Hertog 2009: 20-1). Although Gambetta and Hertog discuss this Weltanschauung in a right-wing extremism discourse – one which does not exist in China because Communism (left-wing) and order and authority (typically thought of as right-wing) exist simultaneously – it could be that conservatism in China is characterised by the belief in an absolute authority which is seen as a guarantor of national unity and an ordered society. If Gambetta and Hertog (2009: 21) are right to assume that “[e]ngineering is a subject in which individuals with a dislike for ambiguity [...] feel comfortable”, it would not be surprising if those students who study an engineering-related subject in China prefer a government which promulgates unambiguous narratives of how a unified and ordered society is created and maintained.

As mentioned above, many students view the nation as equally important as family, and some of them may already link the idea of the nation to a large family, which would help to explain why many of them are prepared for such a sacrifice. For instance, after having asked him what his love for the nation means to him, Zhoaqiang, who studied at ECUST, told me that he relies on his nation in the same way as he relies on his family. After asking him to clarify, he said that in the same way a family requires its members take care of each other, China requires that its citizens also take care of each other (SHEUSE02, 20/05/17). Indeed, taking care of each other does not necessarily imply that one is also willing to sacrifice his/her life for either his nation or family, but the government also promotes the narrative of viewing the nation as a family.

Apart from the narrative of viewing the nation as family, the state also embraces the narrative of sacrifice on behalf of the nation and the Chinese people and draws on comparisons to the past. This is arguably most prominently reflected in one of the latest annual New Year speech (2017/18) of Xi Jinping in which happiness can be achieved through hard work and in which “people have made sacrifices for the good of the nation without regrets or complaints” (Xi 2017). Although Xi did not mention what kind of
sacrifices were made specifically, he links the idea of sacrifice to deeds without complaints. In other words, complaining about one’s own sacrifice (of whatever kind) would mean that the person would be considered less honourable compared to those who did their deeds without any form of regret and/or complaint.

It is largely the rural population which has not benefitted from China’s economic prosperity to the same degree compared to those who live in urban China. Rural students and those from low income families might perceive their harder living conditions as a form of sacrifice, imagining that they cannot have the same living standard as others because China is still modernising, which in turn means, that some need to cut back and accept that. Because of Xi’s intensified efforts to modernise rural China (Xinhua 2018), his anti-corruption campaign (Manion 2016), and his “deep feelings for the village and the large number of peasants” (dui xiangcun, dui guangda nongmin baoshan shenhou qinggan, 对乡村、对广大农民饱含深厚情感) (CCTV 2018), he might be particularly popular among rural residents. Not complaining about their living conditions and understanding them as temporary may be perceived as honourable and as a great deed to the nation. As all rural students surveyed and interviewed in this study were enrolled at a university, shows that rural students’ self-perceived sacrifice has paid off and that the narrative of hard work and sacrifice are not merely empty promises by the government.

Although there is no existing empirical evidence, it could be that the narrative of family, hard work and sacrifice might therefore especially propel both rural students and those from low income families to put more effort in their education to improve their own living standard and, by extension, that of their family; and to achieve that, they automatically need to engage more with nationalist thought, as nationalism is part of the curriculum. Given the government’s effort to link the prosperity of the nation with the party, specific groups of students (e.g. rural) may link their own success (so far) with the new opportunities the nation has provided for them and which ultimately enabled them to attend a university. The increased willingness to sacrifice their life for the nation if need be, may therefore also be related to a sense of gratitude to the nation, whereas students from urban and middle- or high-income households might not feel the same, as studying at university is considered as something normal for them.
3. Nationalist Practice and Hobbies

Expressing nationalist sentiment is not limited to defending the nation from criticism abroad or the willingness to put the nation’s interests before one’s own. Nationalism can also be explicitly expressed by consciously engaging with nation-related leisure activities. These activities should not be confused with everyday practices relating to everyday nationhood and banal nationalism. The latter are practiced unconsciously, whereas the former are consciously chosen because of their relation to the nation (e.g. buying a national flag). Common leisure time activities in which the nation can play a role include reading nationalist books and watching nationalist movies. Students were asked whether they (consciously) like to read books or watch movies which praise China. This means that, for instance, reading a nationalist book is an explicit expression of nationalism, because the book is not just read by students because it provides content on China, but because it makes the nation look positive.

Table 8.4 – Nationalist Books and Movies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I like to read/watch books/movies which praise China</th>
<th>in % (Movies)</th>
<th>in % (Books)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data
Table 8.4 above demonstrates that slightly more students like to read books (106 students) or watch movies (116 students) which praise China, compared to those who do not (56 and 46 students), and that also slightly more students prefer nation-praising movies over nation-praising books which could be related to the fact that books are more time-consuming and require greater effort than movies. Seven of 21 students who were interviewed told me that they intentionally read/watch China-praising content. This is not to say that other students did not read/watch any content which praises China, but some students consciously enjoy engaging in such activities. Some of those who do not consciously read/watch books/movies which praise China, also told me that they intentionally read books or watch movies which praise China, but added that this happened in school (where they did not have a choice).

Those who also enjoyed reading/watching books/movies of that kind in their leisure time gave different answers as to what they enjoyed. Students’ answers ranged from reading/watching history books and movies (e.g. watching ‘The Founding of a Republic’, jianguo daye, 建国大业, in their leisure time; in contrast to having to watch it in school, see chapter 5.2.1) to science fiction novels or movies which deal with a fictional yet glorified future Chinese nation. One student even told me that one of his favourite movies which glorifies China is not even Chinese, but American, referring to ‘2012’, in which the ‘Arks’ which are supposed to save humanity in case of the end of the world are constructed in China. He added that as a future engineer he also hopes to invent something that benefits China and the world. In this case, nationalist sentiment and profession are intertwined. While having seen ‘2012’ was probably not the reason why he studied a science major, this kind of depiction of China’s role might have contributed to his choice of major (SHEUSE02, 20/05/17). Hollywood-movies are increasingly including China because of China’s huge potential as a movie market (Farr 2017). As the government only allows a certain number of foreign movies to be shown in Chinese cinemas a year, it is likely that only movies are picked which show China in a good light. This, in turn, presents Chinese viewers with movies in which China is portrayed as a good nation – and in the case of ‘2012’ a technologically advanced one - thus these (often American) movies might also engender national pride among those who are critical of
domestically-produced China-praising movies. By extension, they may even produce more pride as they show positive images of China abroad. While all students who intentionally read/watch books/movies which praise China may do so because they are generally more nationalist overall, some may choose to primarily read/watch those books/movies to which they can also relate personally.

Table 8.5 – National Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data
The nation can also be consciously engaged with in other ways, for example by buying and/or possessing things which remind the student of his/her nation. For this reason, students were asked whether they buy things which remind them of China and, in interview, what those things were. As table 8.5 above indicates, slightly more than one third of all students (90 students) bought things which remind them of their nation compared to those who did not (56 students). A relative majority of 40.7 per cent was not sure on the issue above (100 students). Although the national flag is arguably the most explicit symbol of the nation, only roughly a quarter of all students possesses a national flag at home (26 per cent, 64 students). In the interviews only five students mentioned that they have a flag at home. One of these students admitted that he has no idea where his flag is located in his apartment as he has not seen it in a long time (SHEUBFM02, 20/05/17). Instead, most students mentioned having bought items in the past which remind them of the nation but are not necessarily linked to the state/government. According to Fan (2006: 8), a nation has multiple images and Chinese products “conjure up the images of being the largest country with 1.3 billion people, the Great Wall, giant pandas, kung fu, Made in China, etc.”.

Table 8.6 – National Flag

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data
In the interviews, it was mostly female students who told me what they liked to buy or what they possessed at home which reminded them of China, while most male students could not think of anything. Although there is research on gender differences in regard to materialism and conspicuous consumption, Podoshen et al (2011: 23) have not found any gender differences in regard to levels of materialism among Chinese undergraduate students in Nanjing, thus it is not necessarily the case that female students generally buy more things compared to male students. In the following paragraphs I will briefly discuss what female students told me.

Caijuan and Shiru, for instance, liked to buy traditional Chinese clothes, such as a Qipao (旗袍) dress, whereas Cuihua liked traditional paintings of Chinese landscapes (SHTUHSS01, 10/04/17; SHTUBFM02, 10/12/16; SHDUAD03, 10/04/16). Calligraphy paintings, typical Chinese decorations and traditional Chinese furniture were amongst the mentions as well. Interestingly, male students did not mention any kind of hobby or interest which relates to Chinese culture more generally. All items named by female students related to Chinese culture more broadly and generally have a long history. It could be that specific nation-and culture-related items are more interesting to women, because they have been socialised in a different way and thus developed different interests from men. Analysing data related to knowledge acquisition from 617 boys and 852 girls in Taipei schools, Evans et al (2002: 165) found that “females tend to be more interested in areas of knowledge such as art, music, and literature, that traditionally define a culture, rather than in content areas such as science and math, that are more neutral and cross cultural barriers with relative ease. The converse is true for males”.

Yet, apart from female students’ interest in things related to Chinese culture and art, they were also proud and interested in aspects and events related to Chinese politics. For instance, Cuihua told me that she really likes (and also possesses) traditional paintings of Chinese landscapes, yet she also greatly enjoys watching Chinese military parades on TV (SHDUAD03, 10/04/17). Having surveyed junior high school students in China, the USA, Mexico and Japan, Mayer and Schmidt (2004: 397) suggest that “China takes great pains to indoctrinate its young people with the appropriate political and social views”. In fact, they (2004: 402-4) found that “Girls are, in reality, somewhat less interested in politics in three of four countries [including China], but despite the near
universal assumption that politics is ‘a boys’ thing’, girls value political participation at least as much as boys do, in all four nations”. Mayer and Schmidt (ibid.) suggest that the reason for this paradox is that because girls perceive politics as a male-dominated sphere, they would like to participate more than boys. In China, this may be a relatively recent phenomenon which might also have to do with a narrative that is produced by the government. As mentioned in the previous section, the PLA is currently training the first female captain which, in turn, might lead to a notion that women can also increasingly participate in politics which, in turn, could increase female students’ interest in politics. However, prior to this development, when female students were young they might have been interested (and engaged with) in other activities and interests which related more to culture and art.

Apart from being the most common mention among female students, calligraphy can also be seen as a national symbol of the nation and considering the MoE’s focus on Chinese culture in the 2011 curriculum reform, its importance in state education might even increase in the future. It is both ancient and perceived as something typical Chinese. Hamlish (2000: 234-5) remarks that “[t]he appropriation of calligraphy as an emblem of the Chinese nation suggests more about the ideologies of the nation than about the practice of calligraphy”. According to her, it is the rhetoric which portrays contemporary calligraphy as a “deep and enduring connection to a glorious ancient past” which, in turn, might not only connect those who are interested in it closer to the nation, but also strengthens the image of an ancient China. As argued in chapter 2.2, the primordial school of thought, which holds that nations have existed since ancient times, is not helpful for the contemporary Chinese context. However, the importance of calligraphy to some nationalists in China needs to be highlighted. According to Özkirimli (2010: 51) ”‘Primordialism’ is an umbrella term used to describe the belief that nationality is a natural part of human beings, as natural as speech, sight or smell, and that nations have existed from time immemorial”. Calligraphy in China also helps to construct Chinese national heritage (Hamlish 2000: 234-5). Unlike China’s “century of humiliation”, it does not seek to create a national identity based on the idea that China was bullied in the past and recovered owing to strength and sacrifice of party and people (as narrated in Shanghai’s most famous national heritage site), but instead is meant to
show that China has been a great nation long before that. While the aesthetics of calligraphy may be appealing to female students as well, this is not of importance here. Instead, it is the perception of calligraphy in the context of both past and present China which is relevant:

Yet the greatest significance of this history for the nation resides in the ways in which calligraphy signifies an imagined community spanning vast geographical spaces and centuries of historical time. The images of calligraphy embody a timelessness that transcends the particularities of any given historical moment, a sign of the persistence and endurance of the Chinese people. For a nation born out of nearly a century of humiliation and defeat at the hands of other nations, the historical transcendence symbolized in calligraphy holds tremendous appeal (Hamlish 2000: 234-5).

In this way, calligraphy tells a story that things which embody the nation have existed before the century of humiliation and are seen as proof that Chinese culture is able to survive under any circumstances. The imagery of calligraphy may be more appealing for female students - because of their general interest in arts and culture - and they may thus be more aware of the perceived importance of calligraphy in China as a national symbol.

However, it is unlikely that the curriculum of state education itself was the most important channel in which students were socialised in this regard. Students in this study went to primary school prior to the 2011 curriculum reform. Having asked Xiaoxiong whether calligraphy had a prominent spot during his years in secondary school, he said that he could only recall a few lessons in primary school, but not secondary school (SHTUHSS04, 26/05/17). This does not mean that calligraphy was entirely ignored in secondary school, but it could mean that girls’ socialisation towards art and culture before 2011 might mainly be engendered by parents and individual teachers. According to Law (2014: 353) “the official reinstatement of Chinese culture in the 2011 school curriculum represents a retreat from the state’s earlier denunciation of traditional Chinese culture as a barrier to development and signifies culture’s importance to China’s nation building and revival”. Perhaps the state has started to deliberately promote cultural representations of the Chinese nation through a focus on historical Chinese culture. It remains for future studies to find out whether the 2011 curriculum reform’s
increase in focusing on Chinese culture has impacted girls (as well as male students) who are in high school today in regard to their affinity towards nation-related arts and culture.

4. Promoting the Nation and the Use of Motherland

The previous section has demonstrated that (especially female) students appear to engage with calligraphy which is largely perceived as something uniquely Chinese. Calligraphy, as part of Chinese culture is also advertised abroad through, for example, Confucius Institutes. According to Pan (2013: 29), who investigated the role of these institutes abroad, they “function as agents of the state by relaying knowledge and information regarding China’s language, cultural traditions, way of life and foreign policies, in order to fostering international recognition of China as a civilized and harmonious society and to improve its economic and cultural connections in the global community”. The Chinese government not only wants to raise awareness of Chinese culture abroad, but also domestically. The MoE’s focus on Chinese culture in the 2011 curriculum reform intends to increase students’ awareness of Chinese culture, yet at the same time there is no data which suggests that Chinese students not only embrace aspects which are unique to Chinese culture, but also promote them to others domestically and internationally.
Table 8.7 – Promoting China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I often promote China’s uniqueness</th>
<th>in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data

As table 8.7 demonstrates, 43.9 per cent of all students (108 students) often promote China’s uniqueness whereas only 14.4 per cent said that they do not do that (38 students). 100 students were not sure if they promote China’s uniqueness often which might be related to a sense of uncertainty that they might do so occasionally and/or unconsciously. Although students were not asked whether they promote China’s uniqueness in the interviews, three students admitted that they sometimes promote or would like to promote elements or aspects which are unique to Chinese culture and do so because they are typical Chinese.

Meifang, for instance, said that she is proud of Chinese characters and the fact that they were adapted in Japanese language. She also mentioned that she once volunteered in a university programme which was aimed to teach the basics of calligraphy to foreign exchange students (SHTUAD02, 06/12/16). Xiaoqin, also expressed pride in Chinese characters and calligraphy, yet only said that she wished the Chinese language would be advertised more abroad (SHTUAD01, 06/12/16).
The aim of promoting distinct features of China (e.g. its long history and culture) might partially stem from students’ desire to present a better image of their nation abroad. Earlier in chapter 7.4 I explained that students are well aware of China’s perceived shortcomings and often draw comparisons to other countries. In conjunction to what I discussed in chapter 7.5, about defending one’s nation, it might be that the idea of promoting positive aspects or characteristics of China is indirectly related to previous experiences of defending the nation against criticism or insult from abroad. Xiaofang said, that she agrees with some of the criticism from other countries, however, often she has the feeling that the criticism is one-sided or disguised hatred of China. She went on and said that she wished other nations would think more positively of China (SHDUAD02, 10/04/17). Although Xiaofang did not mention anything about trying to promote a more positive picture of China abroad herself, students who often promote China’s uniqueness abroad, might be driven by the desire to create a more positive image of their nation in the world.

Promoting one’s nation abroad might imply a desire for recognition and respect, but it also means that students think that there are aspects or characteristics which are worth promoting. However, it is unclear whether (or to what degree) students were influenced by the government to promote specific (positive) characteristics of China abroad. It might also be that students learned to appreciate Chinese culture more or less independent of state-influence. This is different when we look at the promotion of nationalist language. Earlier I briefly discussed the importance of family imagery in nationalist language. While Xi dada and Peng mama might mostly be used colloquially, the use of official nationalist language is promoted as well in both state education and public life. Arguably the most prominent term is zuguo, which students already learn in ‘Morality and Life’ in elementary school (see chapter 4.3.1). For this reason, I asked students in both questionnaire and interviews whether they use the term themselves.
Table 8.8 – The Use of Motherland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data

Table 8.8 indicates that students were very divided on whether they often use the term *zuguo*. About one third of students stated that they often do so (34.2 per cent, 84 students), another third was not sure if they do and (32.1 per cent, 79 students), yet again, another third said that they do not use the term *zuguo* often (33.7 per cent, 83 students). Interviewees were also somewhat divided on the issue of using *zuguo*. Eleven students told me that they do not normally use the term, while 10 students said that they occasionally use it.

Even among those who told me that they occasionally use *zuguo*, more than half said that they only do so on either special occasions or under specific circumstances. Jiaxuan, for example, said that he only uses *zuguo* when taking vows or making promises, meaning that he swears on the motherland (SHDUAD05, 10/04/17). Xiaoli often uses *zuguo* on formal occasions just like the National Day of the PRC (*guoqing jie*, 国庆节) (SHDUAD01, 10/04/17), whereas Cuihua and Caijuan both told me that they occasionally uses *zuguo* in conjunction with foreign affairs, especially during a crisis with another
foreign country (SHDUAD03, 10/04/17; SHTUHSS01, 10/04/17). Xiaofang arguably came up with the most interesting explanation for when she uses the term zuguo:

> Normally I do not use zuguo because the term is too official. But when I speak to my friend in Taiwan I sometimes use zuguo. [...] By using zuguo I hope that my friend realises one day that we are one people and that China and Taiwan belong together (SHDUADO2, 10/04/17).

In addition to the desire of reuniting China and Taiwan (which I will further discuss in the next chapter), Xiaofang hopes to convince her friend by using the term motherland, which, perhaps, appeals to the idea of a united nation through family imagery. Although different students use zuguo on different occasions, it is worth noting that even most of those who occasionally use zuguo said that they do not use the term very often. Almost all students - including those who never use the term - said that they find the term too official and too emotional. Weizhong mentioned that he is fully aware that zuguo is often used in textbooks and the news, but it would make him feel uncomfortable if he used the term in his everyday life (SHTUSEO2, 15/12/16).

To sum up, slightly less than half of all students often promote China’s uniqueness. This almost exclusively occurs when talking to foreigners. It is unclear where this desire to promote China abroad originates from. It might derive from a government narrative, but it is equally likely that students developed a passion for, for instance, Chinese culture themselves and thus want to share and promote aspects of it when speaking to foreigners. Domestically it is hardly necessary for students to promote unique aspects and characteristics of China. Like mentioned before, promoting Chinese culture domestically (and internationally) is a project which is almost exclusively state-led. Domestically the government also promotes the use of nationalist terms like zuguo, however with limited success. Only few students appear to frequently use zuguo, a term which is largely disseminated through education and news. Although the term is occasionally used by some students on specific occasions, it is generally considered as too official. In other words, as zuguo is only used in specific situations and/or special occasion, nationalist sentiment is not expressed explicitly in the form of official, government-instigated nationalist terms.
5. Concluding Remarks

This chapter has provided and analysed further expressions of nationalist sentiment. This included questions about the nation as family, sacrificing one’s life for the nation, nationalist hobbies and promoting the nation. In contrast to the ‘General Nationalist Sentiment’ scale in chapter 7, the analysis of items in the ‘Advanced Nationalist Sentiment’ scale in this chapter has shown that expressing nationalist sentiment is not only limited to love for one’s nation, national interests and/or defending one’s nation, but also to arguably more extreme opinions, feelings and actions like the will to sacrifice one’s life for the nation or buying books which intentionally praise China. What is arguably even more important, is the fact that much fewer students agreed or strongly agreed with most of the items discussed in this chapter.

This becomes particularly evident when we compare the mean of the ‘Advanced Nationalist Sentiment’ scale with that of the ‘General Nationalist Sentiment’ one. As the questionnaire of this study is based on a five-point Likert scale, in which 1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree, we find that the mean of the ‘Advanced Nationalist Sentiment’ scale (M=3.15) is much lower compared to the one of the ‘General Nationalist Sentiment’ scale (M=3.97). In other words, most students explicitly express nationalist sentiment through opinions, feelings and actions which are related to general nationalist sentiment which is, apart from the will to defend the nation, mostly about nation-related love and pride. Based on all items discussed in this chapter, we can conclude that approximately one third of all students explicitly express nationalist sentiment that goes much further than merely nation-related love and pride.

Nevertheless, students’ expression of nationalist sentiment is very ambivalent. On the one hand, nationalist sentiment is reflected by students’ general love of and pride in their nation, but on the other hand it also includes an easily triggered impulse culminating in the will to defend the nation. Having discussed various incidents in which Chinese students felt the need to defend the nation in the past, the next chapter will demonstrate that, despite recent incidents, most students do not generally hold negative views about countries like the US or Japan.
Chapter 9: Attitudes and Sentiments towards Foreign Nations

1. Introduction

The previous two chapters have demonstrated how Chinese university students express nationalist sentiment both more generally and in specific situations. As demonstrated in chapter 2.4.3, nationalism in China is often discussed in conjunction with China’s foreign relations. For this reason, students in this study were also asked about their opinion about other nations. This included asking students about whether Taiwan should be a part of the PRC and whether China should use military force if Taiwan was to declare its independence. Popular opinion in China holds that the question about Taiwan is a domestic affair and not an international one. The factor analysis of this study indicates that students do not view the issue of Taiwan as an issue of foreign relations as the rotated component matrix of this study shows that the two Taiwan variables (in the survey-questionnaire) only relate to each other but not to the other variables which deal with foreign relations. The ‘Taiwan’ scale, which consisted of only two items (Q17, Q18) showed a relatively low internal consistency (α=.523), as favouring reunification does not necessarily mean using military means to do so. Although Chinese students view Taiwan as a domestic issue, this case study treats the island in the East China Sea as an issue of foreign relations. Taiwan might not be a sovereign state, but has become a nation distinct from the PRC. The Chinese government may consider Taiwan to be part of the PRC, but a large number of people in Taiwan maintain, what Guibernau (1999: 16) generally describes as, a “separate sense of national identity generally based upon a common culture, history, attachment to a particular territory and the explicit wish to rule themselves”.

This chapter will demonstrate both, how strongly Chinese students feel about Taiwan and why and, it will analyse students’ opinions about the USA, Japan and other nations. The second scale which is discussed in this chapter is called ‘Foreign Relations’ and consists of five items (Q21, Q22, Q23, Q24, Q25) which showed an internal consistency of α=.751. Although research on Chinese nationalism has often focused on protests directed against foreign countries such as the US and Japan, I found that students’ views
on foreign countries were generally quite positive. The following sections analyse both quantitative and qualitative data concerning how and why students feel or do not feel strongly about a specific nation, including Taiwan. The chapter also attempts to show how easily nationalist sentiment can arise and why, and at the same time, it also demonstrates how complicated it is to determine whether contemporary student nationalism is either more inward-directed or outward-directed.

2. The Importance of Territorial Unity in the Example of Taiwan

Although no students in contemporary China have experienced war or been put in the situation where they might have to sacrifice their life for the nation, they are nevertheless confronted with the idea of war and conflict, both in state education and media (traditional and new). Having already outlined the government’s nationalist narrative in formal and informal state education in chapter 4, this section examines a perennial topic in both state education and public discourse in China: territorial unity. This issue is not only a key theme in the study of nationalism but also prominent in contemporary China, as many nationalist protests in post-Tiananmen China have revolved around the issue of territorial unity, such as conflict in the South China Sea. Arguably the most prominent ongoing conflict concerning territorial unity is the question of whether or when Taiwan will become a part of the PRC again. The following sections will discuss students’ views on the issue more generally as well as the question of whether China should opt for a military solution to the conflict.

2.1 Consensus and Disparities

In China, Taiwan is considered a province which will sooner or later have to return to the fold of the PRC (Chu 2012). This conception is shared by almost all students surveyed and interviewed for this study.
Table 9.1 – Unification with Taiwan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>68.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data

Table 9.1 indicates that almost all students (94.3 per cent) think that Taiwan belongs to China. Only three (out of 246) students did not believe that Taiwan belongs to China. While these numbers might not be particularly interesting on their own, they gain importance when they are compared to students’ love for the nation (95.1 per cent). Although the difference is only marginal, the question of whether Taiwan belongs to China is as important as students’ love for the nation. This consensus highlights the fundamental role (territorial) nationalism plays among the Chinese student body. Data from the interviews on this question clearly show how important this issue is for many students. The following paragraph suggests why Chinese students more generally might feel so strongly about territorial unity from a theoretical perspective.

Aside from a single historical narrative, the importance of unity is also a key nationalist goal. Theorising about the creation and importance of territory more generally, Penrose argues that “it is the creation of territories that defines an ‘us’ and establishes boundaries between this ‘us’ and all others who become ‘them’ [and] the creation of territories has the capacity to bind people to specific places, and people value and protect these territories as long as they continue to fulfil fundamental emotional and
material needs” (Penrose 2002: 293). In 1683 Taiwan was annexed by the Qing empire and therefore became part of Chinese territory. After the First Sino-Japanese War in the late 19th century, a time in which a national consciousness slowly formed in China, Taiwan ceased to be part of this nation after China’s defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War which, in turn, is a violation of what Gellner describes as nationalism as a political principle (Gellner 1931: 1). As the majority of Chinese students believe that Taiwan belongs to China, Taiwan could be seen as part of Gellner’s “national unit” which, at the moment, is not congruent with the political unit in the form of the Chinese government. The Taiwan question in China is therefore also what Gellner calls a “theory of political legitimacy” [which] requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones” (ibid.). History education (which includes the topic of territorial unity) is aimed to strengthen the political legitimacy of the Chinese government and might be the reason why some students feel more strongly about the issue. Data from the interviews suggest that the reason behind students’ opinion is not very diverse. However, when asked about ways to reunite the PRC and Taiwan, some students showed that they are willing to use all means necessary.

Table 9.2 – The Use of Military for Reunification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data
As table 9.2 illustrates, the idea of using the military (if necessary) to reunite the PRC and Taiwan is an option which substantially fewer students support, compared to merely holding the belief that Taiwan belongs to China. However, almost one in three students even strongly favours the military option if Taiwan declared its independence. It is plausible that these students have a more conservative mindset when compared with some of their peers. To explain why more than half of all students are more willing to favour the military option requires one to look at the link between conservatism and the military. By reviewing past research from 1958 until 2002 including data from 22,818 participants (largely from the US), Jost et al found that conservatism is closely associated with fear and aggression as well as uncertainty avoidance (Jost et al 2003: 369). Based on past research from Jost and Thompson (2000), Altemeyer (1998) and Pratto et al. (1994), they also support the notion that there are correlations between conservatism and both military spending and nationalism (Jost et al 2003: 350). In the Chinese context, it appears that more than half of all students are more afraid to ‘lose’ Taiwan than others and answer this fear with an increased willingness to use all means necessary to avoid that. As I will show in the following section, one student even expressed a large degree of insecurity if Taiwan were to declare independence.

2.2 The History- and ‘We-are-the-same’-narrative

Almost all students interviewed for this study told me that they believe that Taiwan is a part of the PRC. Interviews showed no clear differences in students’ views on the matter and general arguments (on why Taiwan is a part of the PRC) always revolved around history, culture and a common identity. This section presents students’ views on why Taiwan should return to the PRC (or not) and analyses why the issue is so important for them by relating this to key theories of nationalism.

From the 21 students interviewed only three students did not see reunification as utterly important. Shiru, who studied at Tongji University, told me that she did not really care about the issue. She argued that it is “none of [her] business” and that “it is a matter for Taiwan residents [and] they should decide for themselves”. She further told me that the issue at hand had nothing to do with what Chinese people want, but instead it is about
what Taiwanese people want (SHTUBFM02, 10/12/16). Although students have learned that Taiwan is a part of PRC, Shiru disagreed with what she had learned in school and formed her own opinion, which includes a thorough consideration of what Taiwanese people might want. Similarly, Shuyun, who also studied at Tongji University, also expressed that she does not care about reunification, as for her, the status quo is fine. Unlike Shiru, she did not concern herself with the issue too much and thought that either reunification or a declaration of Taiwanese independence were acceptable for her (SHTUHSS03, 05/12/16). This point of view was also shared by Meifang (SHTUADO2, 06/12/16).

In contrast to the three students discussed above, Lili told me that reunification was very important to her and mentioned that she would “feel uneasy” (wo hui ganjue bu’an, 我会感觉不安) if Taiwan became independent from China. Her degree of unease might not necessarily only stem from a general conservative mindset as Lili’s answers in the interview were not generally very conservative and/or nationalistic. For instance, she also told me that she criticises China quite often (ranging from issues about China’s welfare system to the environment) and that she would be open to the idea of permanently living in another country. Lili only expressed obvious nationalist sentiment on two issues, Taiwan and her love for the nation more generally. Jost et al (2003: 369) suggest that “the avoidance of uncertainty [e.g. social and economic threats or political instability] may be particularly tied to one core dimension of conservative thought”, arguing that political conservatism “is significantly [...] related to motivational concerns having to do with the psychological management of uncertainty and fear”. In other words, a student like Lili might not be particularly conservative, yet occasionally develops a conservative (and, by extension, nationalistic) attitude, depending on whether the issue at hand (here: Taiwan) is important to her or not.

Like many other students, Lili feared the hypothetical declaration of Taiwanese independence (SHTUSE01, 15/12/16). According to Calhoun (1997: 97-9), “territory is [...] deeply ingrained in Chinese political thought”, because of the historical memory of colonialism (from both European powers and Japan). For this reason, “the idea of nation defined in terms of prepolitical cultural unity [in terms of pre-colonial times] ‘trumped’ the notion of democratic self-determination” (ibid.). Another factor, which might
explain some students’ fear of Taiwan’s independence, relates to fact that Taiwan’s official name is ‘Repulic of China’ (zhonghua minguo, 中华民国) and that the GMD ruling elite has “contended that there is a single Chinese nation” (ibid.). This, in turn, would jeopardise a key idea of the nation, because “[t]he ideas of nation, nationality and the like are ‘essentially contested’ because any particular definition of them will privilege some collectivities, interests and identities and damage the claim of others” (Calhoun 1997: 98). If Taiwan would declare its independence, it would damage the PRC’s claim of a single Chinese nation including its long history, unique culture and the like.

Weizhong also showed a certain degree of fear when I asked him the same question. As well as expressing anger about the fact that Donald Trump telephoned Tsai Ing-wen after the Taiwanese election in December 2016, he said that it is very important for him that Taiwan belongs to China. When I asked why, he told me his fear that Taiwan would set a bad example for others if it declared itself independent. In Weizhong’s mind a declaration of independence would cause a chain reaction in all over China as other regions, such as Hong Kong or Tibet, would strive for independence as well. His biggest fear is that China would fall apart (SHTUSE02, 15/12/16). This fear is not new, as many Chinese in the late 19th and early 20th century were also afraid that China “was about to be ‘carved up like a melon’” (Spence 1990: 230-31).

While the threat of foreign colonial powers is gone, the fear of not being a whole and unified nation continues to be present. It is likely that this is due to the historical narrative students have been exposed to in and outside of school for their whole life. One key element of the PEC was (and is) to present the “communist state as the defender of China’s national interests, pride, and territorial integrity [because] there is not peace on earth [and] every country works hard for its own national interests” (Zhao S 2004: 231). A recent poll by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation suggests that only every fourth Taiwanese citizen would prefer political integration with China (Taiwan News 2018), thus Chinese students’ fear that Taiwan might not be part of the PRC (again) is not ill-founded.

When asked why Taiwan should be a part of the PRC, many students used history, the principle of sovereignty and pointing out similarities between mainland Chinese and
Taiwanese people, to argue that Taiwan belongs to China. Some students left no room for argument, evading further questions about the issue. Zhiwei, for instance, was decisive in his answer and would not even let me finish the question, instantly saying “national sovereignty is indivisible (buke fenge, 不可分割). Taiwan must belong to China. There cannot be an argument about that” (SHTUBFM01, 20/12/16). Like him, Zhaoqiang also thought that Taiwan could not be separated as reunification is a “Chinese right which cannot be violated” (SHEUSE02, 20/05/17). Xiaoli believed that reunification would strengthen China and Taiwan, as together they would be more powerful, both politically and economically. In addition to that she stated that China and Taiwan belong together historically and added that she would be very concerned if Taiwan would declare its independence because it would mean that China looks weak internationally (SHDUAD01, 10/04/17). In a similar way, this concern was also shared by Jiaxuan, who studied Acting/Drama at Donghua University. He told me that Taiwan has a very important geographic and geopolitical position and if Taiwan were conquered by another country, it would also be very bad for China due to its proximity to the mainland. While some students were merely concerned with China’s national sovereignty or history, Jiaxuan also highlighted the importance of similarities between Chinese and Taiwanese people. Aside from security concerns, he also explained: “Taiwanese and Chinese are one people, we are the same. We only have different governments” (SHDUAD05, 10/04/17). This perception reflects a point of view which is also quite popular among the student body. Even a student like Caixia, who told me that she is not sympathetic about the concept of aiguo zhuyi, argued that it is important for Taiwan to return to China because of the similarities of both countries. Besides pointing to close business ties between the two countries, she also thinks that “Taiwan was, is and should be a part of China [because] China and Taiwan are the same”. After asking for further clarification she said that “we have the same language and the same culture” (SHTUHSS02, 05/12/16). The importance of the conception of having the same language and culture refers to what I discussed earlier. An independent ‘Republic of China’ would contest the uniqueness of Chinese language and culture. According to Calhoun (1997: 99), nations “are commonly forged in the struggle carried out by some members of the nation-in-the-making (here: PRC and ROC) to get others to recognise its genuine nation-ness”.

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Cuihua, a student at Donghua University, even called Taiwanese people ‘compatriots’ (\textit{tongbao}, 同胞), a term also used by Xi Jinping in his annual New Year speech when referring to Taiwanese citizens. She told me: “Our Taiwanese compatriots should return. Even though they have been colonized and have different values and thoughts, the roots are the same as mainland Chinese” (SHDUAD03, 10/04/17).

Referring to cultural similarities, if not sameness, a common history and language as well as imagining Taiwanese people as compatriots, strongly indicates a key feature of what Anderson described as an ‘imagined community’. In his view, the nation is “always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship [and] it is this fraternity that makes it possible [...] for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings” (Anderson 2006: 7). Again, under the scope of the narrative of a single Chinese nation, Chinese students’ nationalist fears are not unreasonable. People in Taiwan, however, fear reunification (Asia Times 2018). This fear also stems in part from nationalism, however, according to Cabestan (2005: 12), Taiwan’s nationalism “will remain a nationalism which is frustrated by the “sinitude” of its cultural and historical inheritance”. It recognises similarities to Chinese history and culture, while at the same time these similarities are part of the reason why Chinese students think that Taiwan is a part of China. Many Chinese students’ views on Taiwanese people and their culture may be limited, if not one-sided, but even those who acknowledge some differences see Taiwan as an inseparable part of the PRC. It is unlikely that students’ views on Taiwan only stem from history education alone, but it might also be this strong and abstract feeling of community that lets students believe that without Taiwan the PRC is incomplete. Cuiping, a student from ECUST, explained this feeling in a rather dramatic way, which sheds light on why reunification is so important to her: “Territory is part of the nation, just like some part of my body, and if you miss any part [of your body] you cannot live” (SHEUHSS01, 20/05/17). In short, most students feel very strongly about reunification with Taiwan which, in turn, demonstrates that nationalism among Chinese university students it not only limited to love of the nation and pride in one’s national identity alone.
3. Attitudes towards other Nations

The following three sections will demonstrate that students’ views on other countries are generally positive, and that past incidents between China and both the US and Japan have not led to nationalist sentiment against these countries. Apart from issues which affect China’s perception of territorial unity, such as Taiwan or the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, it could be that students’ nationalist expression is inward-directed (i.e. if Taiwan is seen as a part of China) rather than outward-directed. However, this shall not delude from the fact that nationalist sentiment surfaces very quickly when triggered by a specific event. Chapter 2 highlighted how China’s relationship with the USA and Japan has often suffered because of incidents in the past, such as the 1999 US-led NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade or the 2012 dispute about the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands with Japan. For this reason, the focus of the following sections will be students’ attitudes toward these two countries.

3.1 United States of America

Students in this study were surveyed between late summer 2016 and spring 2017, which meant that Donald Trump was elected as president of the US during my field work in Shanghai. Despite his negative rhetoric on China and his complaints about the US-China trade deficit (Guardian 2016), most students expressed great respect for the US.
Table 9.3 – Respect for the US

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I have a lot of respect for the US</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data

70.3 per cent of all students stated that they have a lot of respect for the US, whereas less than one in ten students declared that he/she does not have a lot of respect for the US (see table 9.3). This is not to say that Chinese university students would not take part in future protests against the US if another incident occurred, but it could be that specific earlier anti-US nationalist protests are not an indicator for anti-US nationalist sentiment among contemporary students. In an earlier study on anti-US nationalism among university students in Beijing, Zhao (2002b: 902) found that “the anti-US demonstrations triggered by the embassy bombing were unrelated to the anti-US discourses developed in China during the 1990s... [students] placed ‘to counteract US hegemony’ in the very last of the eight national goal statements that were provided”. According to her, this has to do with the decline of communism as a ruling ideology in conjunction with the “penetration of market forces” which gave rise to “a certain level of pluralism in many aspects of social life” (ibid.). During the interviews, after having asked which country or countries students particularly like and/or want to move to temporarily and why, six students (N=21) told me that they liked and/or wanted to move to the US. Reasons for admiring and/or wanting to move to the US were varied, but very similar to what Zhao
found in her 2002 study. Her students “thought very highly of American democracy, greatly admired America’s achievements, and wanted either to study in American universities or to work in American companies. A great admiration of the United States’ political system plus other personal interests had prevented the development of anti-American feelings among Chinese students” (Zhao 2002b: 903).

It is likely that students’ admiration of the US in this study is also related to their admiration for the country’s universities. Shiru, for instance, who studied at Tongji University, told me that although she wants to study for a Master’s degree in Australia (because she has family and friends there), she greatly admires the US as it has a very good overall system, both politically and economically. After asking her which aspects of the US system she especially likes, she responded that the US is not a totalitarian system, because US citizens have a lot of freedom and that the government is very efficient. She also mentioned that, because the US possesses the best technology, they can produce the best movies in regard to computer-generated imagery effects. She also added that she likes American movies because they are not censored. Although she did not explicitly compare American and Chinese censorship, it is very likely that she was contrasting with her own country considering the Chinese government’s tight control over movies shown in Chinese TV or cinemas (SHTUBFM02, 10/12/16).

As briefly discussed in chapter 7.4, most students’ admiration of other countries – and many students mentioned more than one country they admire (see section 3.3) – related to what other countries do better than China, ranging from social welfare, environment, education system to landscape. As indicated by their answers in the interviews, many students appear to have respect for the US more generally, albeit for different reasons.

However, unlike many other countries, the US is often perceived as a bully to China (e.g. BBC 2018). To understand how respect for the US on the one hand, and criticism towards it on the other, simultaneously exist, it is worth considering two points here. First, protesting against another country does not necessarily imply holding negative views about that country more generally and second, there are various forms of protests which are aimed to defend the nation, and not all students necessarily participate in street protests to express anger explicitly (see chapter 7.5).
For instance, female students, which account for approximately half of the student body today, might be less willing to express their anger on the streets. Having interviewed 62 individuals and surveyed 1,211 students shortly after the 1999 protests against the US, Yu and Zhao (2006:1773) found that “female students [were] generally less likely to participate in the protest”. Concerning the socio-demographic characteristics of students’ motivation to demonstrate in the Chinese context, Zhou and Wang (2016: 397) remark that “[i]t is often found that due to gendered socialization, men on average are more willing to take risks, whereas women are relatively more averse to risks. As all street demonstrations entail some degree of risk, men are more likely to protest than women”. The willingness to protest more generally (or to defend the nation) (see chapter 7.5), does not seem to affect students’ general opinion of the US. Even Trump’s election as US president and his criticism on China have not negatively affected students’ answers (two-thirds of all students were surveyed and interviewed after Trump became president).

Four students who were interviewed for this study, mentioned the US when being asked which countries they like in particular. All of them explained that they admire the US because of its lead in innovation and technology. Jianjun, for instance, who studied at ECUST, said that he thinks that the US has the best education system, referring to Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (SHEUSE01, 20/05/17). Indeed, some students might have a lot of respect for the US only because of their affinity to technology, but it also highlights that even a few aspects of a foreign country can positively shape a student’s view on that particular country. Recent estimates put the number of Chinese students studying for a university degree in the US at around 350000, making the US the most popular destination for Chinese students who study abroad (China Daily 2018a). Past student protests, such as the one in 1999, were nationalist in nature, but appear to not have led to general anti-US sentiments among students. I will come back to this point at the end of the next section, which shows a similar pattern in the case of Japan.
3.2 Japan

Arguably even more interesting than students’ views on the US is the finding that most students also expressed a lot of respect for Japan. Given the complicated relationship between China and Japan (set out in chapter 2), one would assume that Japan is much less popular than the data in this study suggests.

Table 9.4 – Respect for the Japan

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data

66.3 percent of all students said that they have a lot of respect for Japan (by either agreeing or strongly agreeing to the statement in table 9.4). The reasons for students’ overall favourable view of Japan are slightly different compared to those discussed in the previous section on the US. In the interviews, students did not admire aspects of Japan while at the same time acknowledging their own country’s shortcomings, but instead explained their admiration by mainly referring to Japanese art and culture as well as the Japanese way of life more generally. Six students mentioned that they especially admire Japan for these reasons, whereas three students expressed their aversion to Japan (for historical reasons). Although all students learn about past
Japanese atrocities in secondary school, only few students explicitly dislike Japan. Although results of this study on gender cannot be generalised, qualitative data of this study suggest that female students are more likely to have respect for and admire Japan.

Interview data showed that female students might have a greater affinity towards trends in Japanese fashion, culture and art. All female students’ answers revolved around Japanese art and culture, as no student mentioned anything related to politics, economy or even technology. This relates to the argument earlier in chapter 8.3 that female students are generally more interested in these areas of knowledge (Evans et al 2002: 165). Evan et al’s assessment of Taiwanese girls in high school might help to explain why female students in China might admire Japan. Meifang, for instance, told me that she really likes Japanese culture, food and architecture, and also mentioned that she finds that Japanese people are very civilised with good manners (SHTUAD02, 06/12/16). Similarly, Cuiping also admired aspects of Japanese culture. She said that she likes Japanese cartoons (Mangas) and movies (Anime), appreciated that Japan is very clean, and admired the etiquette of Japanese people more generally (SHEUHSS01, 20/05/17).

Considering the negative mentions of Japan in the state syllabus, this sounds like a contradiction at first. Incidents like the 2005 textbook scandal, which I have already mentioned in chapter 2, sparked massive protests which were difficult for the CCP to control. For this reason, government officials and scholars proposed a new thinking on Sino-Japanese foreign relations. According to Reilly, Ma Licheng, a member of the editorial board of the People’s Daily, and Shi Yinhong, a professor at Renmin university, suggested several ideas, many of which were adopted as policy later (Reilly 2011: 167-72). These included to stop demanding apologies from Japan, encouraging Japanese investment and trade and restraining anti-Japanese protests, and instead begin promoting positive images of Japan (Reilly 2011: 172). In other words, it might also be the Chinese government itself which promotes better relations with Japan and an overall more positive image of the country domestically. Reilly (2011: 174) acknowledges that “not all Chinese analysis was so self-reflecting [as] a good deal of public analysis still focused on criticizing Japan”, but today’s university students might have developed a more positive image of Japan, as negative rhetoric from the state has
declined. In fact, it is university students in particular who might benefit economically from healthy Sino-Japanese relations after graduation, considering Japan is China’s second largest trading partner. On this account, it is worth mentioning yet another female student who positively spoke about Japan. Her opinion of Japan has changed over the years, and she might not be the only student in this regard. She said that during high school she used to hate Japan, however, after having learned more and more about the country after high school, she changed her mind (SHTUAD01, 06/12/16).

By maintaining negative mentions of Japan and other countries in the state syllabus while at the same time restraining anti-foreign public opinion, the CCP can both keep a national historical memory alive and do business with its trading partners as well as publicly promote closer ties to other countries (SBS 2017). According to Yan (2014: 510-1), autocratic rulers like the Chinese government “need to ‘generate the active mobilisation of youth and their creative participation in the regime’ while maintaining rigid control to prevent them from transforming into anti-systemic forces. Hence, in different stages in their evolution, autocratic states often emphasize one value above another to cope with particular domestic and international situations”. This interplay of promoting both nationalism and cosmopolitanism might be also a main reason, why many students generally do not dislike Japan.

This does not mean that nationalist sentiment toward Japan does not exist at all. It appears that nationalist protest in the form of anti-Japanese sentiment only surfaces when triggered by a particular incident. During the time data of this study were conducted, no incident between China and Japan occurred. To understand why most Chinese university students hold generally positive views about Japan, it is also worth mentioning that no student (in the interviews) mentioned Japanese politics, and instead focused on specific aspects of Japanese culture and art only. As the following section further demonstrates, students’ views on foreign nations are generally limited to specific aspects of the nation which not seldomly display stereotypical thinking as well as single personal experiences.
3.3 Generalising and Stereotyping Foreign Nations

Although the expression of nationalist sentiment in China is often discussed in conjunction with the country’s relationship to the USA and Japan, students also had to state whether they have respect for other countries more generally. As table 9.5 shows, 93.1 per cent of all students stated that they have a lot of respect for other nations. Only two out of 246 students said that they do not have a lot of respect for other nations, while 15 students were not sure. In the previous section I mentioned that it is also the CCP itself which promotes better relations with Japan. This certainly also applies to shaping students’ views on other nations, not least because China’s economic development largely depends on healthy foreign relations.

Table 9.5 – Respect for other Nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data

However, asking students whether they generally have a lot of respect for other nations does not tell us about how students think of individual countries. In addition to asking students about the US and Japan, interviewees were also asked which nations they like or dislike in particular and why. Eleven students mentioned that there are no nations
which they generally dislike. Out of the remaining ten students, four told me that they dislike South Korea.

Meifang, for instance, did not even take a second to think and told me that she really dislikes South Korea. After asking for her reasons, she told me that she regularly plays computer/video games which fall into the category of either MNORPG (massively multiplayer online role-playing games) or MOBA (multiplayer online battle arena). There, she said, she often encounters very rude South Korean players. After enquiring about the behaviour of those players, she mentioned that South Korean players often look down on her because she is neither as skilled as they are nor South Korean (SHTUADO2, 06/12/16). Caixia also mentioned that she dislikes South Korea, albeit for different reasons. In her view South Koreans are very arrogant and too proud of themselves. She added that South Koreans claim that chopsticks were invented in Korea and not in China (SHTUHSS02, 05/12/16). Shiru told me something similar. She also thinks that South Koreans are arrogant because of their belief that everything associated with East Asian culture was invented in Korea. In addition to that Shiru’s sentiments toward South Korea are also founded in some form of competition between China and South Korea. She explained that she is very concerned about the increasing monopoly of South Korea’s music, television and entertainment industries and suggested that Chinese youth should support China’s equivalent (SHTUBFM02, 10/12/16).

Generalising and stereotyping different nationalities are not limited to negative sentiment only. Students were also asked which nation they like in particular and for what reasons. Apart of positive mentions of Japan which I have already discussed in the previous section, German-speaking nations were also quite popular among some students. Although this might also be related to the interviewer’s German nationality, five students mentioned that they especially like Germany and/or Switzerland. While Japan was popular among some students because of its art, design and culture, Germany and Switzerland received praise for different reasons. All five students liked Germany and/or Switzerland for the same reasons, which revolved around technological and economic aspects as well as ethics and traditions. Zhengyuan, for instance, told me that he admires both countries not only because of their overall economic strength, but also because of their strong focus on discipline. After having asked him to further explicate
his point of view, he said that Germans and Swiss are always on time and work hard. Although he had never been to Germany or Switzerland nor known any Germans or Swiss privately, he was convinced that these two nationalities embody attributes related to discipline (SHEUBFM01, 20/05/17).

Chinese students’ responses as to why they have respect for or like specific countries in particular is often based on stereotypical thinking, personal experiences and on a country’s soft power abilities. All nations which received positive mentions from students, were nations which generally have strong soft power abilities. This also extends to another question students were asked in the interviews. Interviewees were asked in which country they would like to live temporarily and why. 20 students said they wanted to study a Master’s programme abroad. Students’ most desired study destinations included the USA, UK, Japan, Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland and a few Scandinavian countries, all of which have strong soft power abilities. In addition to mentioning those countries’ higher education institutions, students also explained their choice by referring to stereotypical attributes of these countries which they found particularly attractive (and which were very similar to what students answered earlier in regard to the question which countries they like in particular).

It is important to note that “[s]oft power is not merely the same as influence [...] persuasion or the ability to move people by argument” (Nye 2004: 6). Nye (ibid.) argues that while influence and persuasion are important, soft power is also the “ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence”. Nye (2004: 33-4) remarks that the US has many resources for providing soft power, such as by exporting movies, the reputation of its educational institutions, popular music and its cutting-edge information technology. It is likely that soft power abilities of different nations have also contributed to Chinese students’ views of other countries.
Table 9.6 – Curiosity

I want to learn more about other nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data

Table 9.7 – Respect from other Nations

Other countries should show China more respect

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Not sure</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey data
Both table 9.6 and 9.7 further illustrate the ambivalence of student nationalism in contemporary China. Almost every student wants to learn more about other nations (92.7 per cent, 228 students), yet at the same time thinks that other countries should show China more respect (92.3 per cent, 227 students). On the one hand there is both a clear will to learn more about other nations and showing respect for those countries, but on the other hand there also appears to be a feeling of dissatisfaction among students originating from the perceived lack of respect of other countries. As I argued in chapter 8.5, explicitly expressing nationalist sentiment largely occurs on a very general level, including items like love for one’s country and pride in one’s national identity. However, this does not tell the whole story, as – in this case – respect for other nations and the will to learn more about them, can quickly change into hostility when triggered.

When analysing students’ manifold expressions of nationalist sentiment (see chapter 7 and 8) as well as their general views on other countries, one could argue that contemporary student nationalism in China is more inward-directed and less outward-directed. It is surprising to see that most students do not generally hold negative sentiments toward Japan, especially when taking into account what students learn about Japan in the school syllabus. According to Comaroff and Stern (1994: 38) inward-directed sentiments “hold a nation together” whereas outward-directed emotions “heap hostility upon others”. The reason why student nationalism appears to be inward-directed and not outward-directed, at least in regard to some nations, might have two main reasons. First, many students today are able to travel and can therefore get to know other countries first hand and thus potentially reshape their views which, prior to their visit, were only based on what they learned in state education and from media. Second, and relating to the first point, specific countries have strong soft power abilities, which eventually attract many Chinese students in the first place and contribute to students’ stereotypical thinking. However, as mentioned above, negative personal experiences with national citizens of different nations as well as incidents such as the 2008 boycott of Carrefour, demonstrate how quickly positive sentiment can turn into negative sentiment.
4. Concluding Remarks

This chapter has explored students’ nationalist sentiment toward Taiwan, the US, Japan and other nations. Chinese students generally expressed very strong nationalist sentiment when being asked about Taiwan. Students’ answers on why Taiwan is an inseparable part of the PRC were largely based on what students learned in state education and on their perception that Taiwanese and Chinese culture and identity are identical. The final sections of this chapter demonstrated and discussed the limits of nationalist expression, arguing that although students expressed a high degree of nationalist sentiment in regard to Taiwan, nationalist sentiment is only seldom expressed by students when looking at foreign relations more broadly. Students’ respect and admiration for the US and Japan and some other nations predominate anti-foreign nationalist sentiment. This is not to say that contemporary student nationalism in China is only inward directed – especially when the conflict with Taiwan is seen as an international matter, but nationalist protests against foreign countries in the past have usually been of short duration and appear not to have led to general negative nationalist sentiment among students.

To return to Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) – discussed in chapter 4.2 – who distinguish patriotism and nationalism, an argument could be made that what I have referred to here a Chinese nationalism is, in fact, not nationalism but patriotism. I agree that what I am characterising as nationalism is the same as Kosterman and Feshbach’s idea of patriotism (see 1989: 263-5) where nationalism comprises a feeling of superiority towards other nations, whereas patriotism does not. However, although contemporary student nationalism in China appears to be more inward-directed rather than outward-directed (at least when matters like Taiwan or territorial disputes in the East China and Southeast China Sea are excluded), I argue that we can ignore neither negative mentions of foreign powers in the school curriculum, nor outward-directed nationalist protests in recent years. In short, a clear distinction between patriotism and nationalism does not work well in the Chinese context.
Chapter 10: Conclusion

1. Introduction

This study has explored student nationalism in contemporary China and has sought to answer questions which were overlooked by past scholarly research. It has also provided an up-to-date analysis of the ‘state of nationalism’ in China with regard to university students. It has contributed to the existing body of research on student nationalism in China and nationalism in China more generally. This conclusion briefly summarises the most interesting findings of all students and show which contributions to knowledge were made and which questions need to be answered by future research.

2. Summary of Findings

This thesis has examined and critically assessed student nationalism in contemporary China more generally. It has utilised original data collection through both quantitative and qualitative research methods, as well as analysis of existing research, to find out how students learn and express nationalist sentiment. Nationalism as a key category of analysis is not reduced to a single definition, but instead, several theories of nationalism which help to explain the phenomena in the Chinese context are applied in this research. To investigate how university students in contemporary China learn and express nationalist sentiment, this thesis has distinguished between explicit and tacit learning, as well explicit and tacit expression. It has argued that students’ nationalist sentiment stems not only from channels in which nationalism is explicitly learned, but also from unobtrusive representations of the nation in their everyday lives. In addition, this thesis has also presented quantitative and qualitative data to demonstrate how nationalist sentiment is expressed explicitly. Finally, it also presented examples of how nationalist sentiment is expressed tacitly.
Chapter 4 presented both an attempt to define aiguo zhuyi as well as several channels through which nationalist sentiment can be learned in contemporary China. Despite aiguo zhuyi’s official translation, the concept embeds many aspects which fall into the category of nationalism. This includes different kinds of sentiment which some scholars would label as ‘patriotism’, but it also consists of characteristics which the same kind of scholars would label as ‘nationalism’. This thesis has brought forward an argument that nationalism and patriotism should not be treated as distinct concepts. Instead, I suggested that sentiments like love for one’s nation or national pride belong into the field of liberal nationalism and are thus to be discussed in the context of nationalism more broadly. Chapter 4 showed that a lot of nationalist content can be found in state education. Arguably the embodiment of nationalism in mandatory state education are the so called ‘Morality’ classes. These classes are designed to not only turn students into upright citizens of the PRC, but also to instil nationalist thought that is in line with CCP leadership. Another channel of explicit nationalist influence are national heritage sites which have often been studied under the term ‘Red Tourism’. Similar to ‘Morality Classes’, these sites also intend to educate students in nationalist thought, often focusing on events in modern Chinese history and the heroic role of the CCP in it. Apart from few mandatory extra-curricular activities, students are free to choose whether the visit a site in their free time or not.

Similarly, students are also free to choose which media they access. Both traditional media (e.g. radio, TV, print) and the internet are explicit channels of nationalist influence. That is not to say that every article or TV show contains nationalist elements, but some do. In contrast to state education and national heritage sites, the internet is also a platform through which students can learn nationalist sentiment from individuals who are not affiliated with the government, for instance, by having an account on a social media platform. At the same time, through using a VPN (or travelling), some students are also able to access content which is entirely independent of the state. Due to the increasing popularity of video games for console, PC and mobile devices, the government has also started to use this relatively new medium of online games to disseminate nationalist thought. Although the CCP is not directly invested in programming and producing games, it offers financial incentives to game-developers
who include nationalist content in their games. Students, however, may also be influenced by their families, a channel which is more or less entirely independent of the state. Many parents may not influence their children to learn nationalist content as such, however, extensive research shows that Chinese parents are very invested in their children’s success in school which, in turn, means that receiving good grades also implies investing a lot of time in learning nationalist content.

Chapter 5 demonstrated that the perceived (explicit) nationalist influence from different channels varies. Most students stated that both primary and secondary education have increased their sense of *aiguo zhuyi*, whereas university appeared to have had a lesser impact. Although most nationalist content in state education is based on textbook study, its constant repetition and occasional extracurricular activities might have contributed to students’ nationalist sentiment. In fact, national heritage sites (occasionally visited by school classes) appear to have a particularly large impact on students’ sense of *aiguo zhuyi*, with data showing no other explicit channel of nationalist influence having had a larger impact. An in-depth account of how national heritage sites in China operate is based on both existing research and observations from one such site, Shanghai’s ‘Memorial of the Site of the First National Congress of the CPC’. In 5.2.2 I have also suggested why these sites might have such a large impact on students, arguing that heritage sites’ more interesting visualisation of nationalist content (in contrast to textbook study) and the area which surrounds a heritage site might contribute to the overall experience which is positively remembered.

Traditional media did not appear to have a large impact on most students’ sense of *aiguo zhuyi*. Past research (see Wang 2017) has found that students are not keen on using traditional media and instead prefer to use the internet. However, data in this study has shown that most students do not perceive the influence of the internet on their sense of *aiguo zhuyi* as very large. I argued that this has likely something to with students’ different preference regarding reading blogs and news webpages, but I also suggested that some nationalist content online does not appear very obtrusive as it is being found in between other news which often relate to popular culture, celebrity news and so forth. Computer/video games are even less likely to have a positive impact on students’ sense of *aiguo zhuyi*, as most students denied any kind of positive influence. This may largely
have something to do with students’ personal preferences and the question of how much the government is really trying to influence gamers. Finally, family also appeared to have large impact on many students’ aiguo zhuyi. Past research has shown that many Chinese parents invest a lot of time and effort in their children’s education and thus also contribute to students’ progress in school which, in turn, also implies learning nationalism in the form of aiguo zhuyi. However, interview data has also shown that parents influence their offspring in different ways. For instance, Xiaoli, whom I mentioned in chapter 5.3.2, told me that her parents taught her to distinguish her nation from other nations at a very young age. In short, state education, national heritage sites and Chinese families appear to have the greatest impact on students’ sense of aiguo zhuyi. Nationalism in the form of aiguo zhuyi is explicitly learned from these channels and has contributed to students’ overall nationalist sentiment, both generally and in regard to how students express nationalist sentiment (see below).

In chapter 6, I argued that students not only learn nationalist sentiment explicitly, but also tacitly. Although most students believed that, for instance, secondary school has had a positive impact on their sense of aiguo zhuyi, there were also a few students who denied any kind of impact. Of all students interviewed, Meifang, whom I mentioned in 5.3.2, appeared to be the student with the least nationalistic opinions and beliefs. For instance, she did not care about reunification with Taiwan, she would not protest in any way if China was being insulted and she also mentioned that she is open to idea of living in another country permanently. However, even she told me that she loves her nation, explaining that her love derives from familiarity with the nation. Chapter 6 thus argued that there are also other ways, beyond explicit channels of nationalist influence, in which even students who generally are not very nationalistic learn nationalist sentiment. The chapter utilised theories of banal and everyday nationalism as well as unstructured observations to uncover unobtrusive representations of the nation which remind students of their nation on an everyday basis.

The chapter distinguished between state-related and organic representations of the nation and argued that due to their unobtrusiveness and ubiquity in students’ daily lives, they positively contribute to how students feel about their nation. In addition to tacitly learning nationalist sentiment from both state-related and organic representations, the
Chapter also discussed how students tacitly express nationalist sentiment themselves, through unconsciously reproducing organic ‘flaggings’ of the nation. For instance, once having learned the Chinese language explicitly and tacitly, students also unconsciously flag the nation for others, through daily conversations, both written (e.g. in messenger applications) and spoken. Although it is not possible to quantify the process of tacit learning and expression, the chapter has argued that, in contrast to ‘flaggings’ which do not occur on a daily basis such as annual traditions like Chinese New Year celebrations or culture-specific items which are only popular among some students, specific ‘flaggings’ like street signs or food, cannot be avoided and affect almost every student almost every day.

Chapter 7 examined how and why nationalist sentiment is expressed explicitly. It focused on general expressions of nationalist sentiment. Students were asked to express their opinion on issues related to love for their nation, pride in their national identity and their opinion of aiguo zhuyi. Almost every student said that he/she loves his/her nation and is proud of his/her identity, however, fewer students said that they sympathise with the concept aiguo zhuyi, which is partly related to the fact that many students are unable to define what aiguo zhuyi really is, apart from the principle of loving one’s nation. Pride was also expressed by most students when being asked about their national flag and anthem.

Most students said that they would generally put their nation’s interests before their own. In the interviews nearly half of all students mentioned that this would be particularly the case if there was war, however, linking the idea of putting the nation’s interests before one’s own, did not mean that students were also generally more willing to sacrifice their life for the nation (see chapter 8).

Both quantitative and qualitative data showed that most students generally defend their nation or would be willing to defend their nation in the future. Often students’ willingness to defend their nation derived from foreign criticism and insult. However, less than half of all students mentioned that they actively defend their nation online by, for instance, writing an article or commenting on specific issues on news web pages or social media. As demonstrated in 7.5, nationalist sentiment can also be expressed explicitly by merely ‘liking’ nationalist statement of others, thus defending the nation.
online can also be expressed in ways other than explicitly writing something. Some students I interviewed also stated that they have defended the nation in the past by, for instance, joining a boycott or through heated discussions with foreigners on campus.

The high willingness to defend the nation is not clearly reflected in students’ opinions of China when compared to other countries. Although a large number of students stated that they think China is the best nation in the world and is better than others, qualitative data found that most students were very reflective when answering this question. Often students compared China to other countries, saying that depending on the issue at hand (e.g. public safety or innovative capabilities), China is better than others or worse.

Chapter 8 focused on advanced forms of nationalist expression. In contrast to basic sentiments like love for one’s nation or pride in the national flag, it examined how and why students express nationalist sentiment on levels that could be deemed (slightly) more extreme. Surprisingly, the majority of all students surveyed stated that they think that their nation is as important as their family. In sharp contrast to that, only about one third of all students would also be willing to sacrifice their life for the nation if necessary.

Expressing nationalist sentiment is not only limited to merely defending the nation in various ways, but also through conscious engagement with nation-related activities, such as consciously reading a book or watching a movie which praises China. Although only slightly less than half of all students reported doing that, many students whom I interviewed mentioned that they have consciously engaged with these activities in school. Similarly, less than half of all students reported that they (consciously) like to buy things which remind them of their nation. In all three cases, the largest number of students was found to take a neutral point of view which, in conjunction with data from the interviews, leaves room for speculation that students sometimes engage with nation-related activities on a tacit level. As these engagements might often occur on an unconscious level, they would also fall in the category of banal and everyday nationalism, but not necessarily every day.

Finally, students’ love for their nation does not necessarily imply that a majority of them also seek to promote it often. Similarly, although students take great pride in their national flag and anthem, does not imply that most of them also regularly use nationalist
terms like *zuguo*. On the whole, students more generally were much more restrained in expressing advanced forms of nationalist sentiment when compared to general expressions of nationalist sentiment.

Chapter 9 sought to examine expressions of nationalist sentiment in conjunction with foreign countries and/or issues. When asked about the issue of reunification with Taiwan, almost all students agreed that Taiwan belongs to China. Along with loving their nation more generally, the issue of territorial unity sparked the greatest consent among students, highlighting that one of the key concepts of nationalism is held in very high regard by Chinese students.

Chapter 9 also discussed limitations of nationalist expression, demonstrating that, despite strong nationalist sentiment towards criticism and insult from abroad, students do not generally hold negative views about other countries and have a lot of respect for both the US and Japan. Attitudes towards other countries more generally were, overall, more positive than negative, but often based on stereotypes and personal experiences. However, almost every student held the opinion that other countries should show China more respect. Although past atrocities of foreign powers are omnipresent in both state education and national heritage sites, the Chinese government also promotes good relationships to other countries and wants students to study abroad. In addition to that, other nations’ soft power abilities might also have contributed to students’ overall positive views of other nations.

3. Contributions to Knowledge and Suggestions for Future Research

This thesis has contributed to the existing body of scholarly research in several ways. Existing research on contemporary student nationalism has been conducted in (especially) the last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century: for example, Chen-Weiss 2014 (whose data was collected 2006-07); Sinkkonen 2013 (data collected 2007); Fairbrother 2003; and Zhao 2002a &2002b. However, revisiting the topic more generally is highly relevant because of constant changes which take place in China. As indicated in the introduction and in the context of this study, some of the biggest changes have arguably been the 2011 curriculum reform (including nationalist
content to which students in this study were exposed to from secondary school onwards), the commercial availability of internet, Xi’s presidency along with his strong focus on promoting (hongyang, 弘扬) aiguo zhuyi, and the increasing number of Chinese students who are able to travel the world. However, it is not entirely clear as to what degree each change has increased or decreased nationalist sentiments among students.

For instance, the answer as to whether the increased focus on teaching aiguo zhuyi (here: in secondary school) has contributed to students’ nationalist sentiment can neither be answered with a simple yes, nor with a simple no. On the one hand the majority of students (62.2 percent) stated that secondary school (in which all students were studying when the 2011 curriculum reform was implemented) has had a positive impact on their national attitudes, which could give reason to believe that teaching aiguo zhuyi in that stage of a student’s life proves effective. On the other hand, similar research carried out by Fairbrother (2003: 95-6) before the reform found that an even higher proportion of students (72 per cent) who believed the same about secondary school which, compared to this study, indicates a decline of 10 percent. Similarly, Fairbrother (2003: 85-6) found that 75 per cent of Chinese students held the view that the welfare of the individual is not more important than the welfare of the nation. Having posed a similar statement in this study, I showed that today only 60 percent of all students were willing to generally put the nation’s interests before their own. Similar declines between Fairbrother’s results and this study were also found in regard to sacrificing one’s life for the nation.

If there is a negative relationship between individualisation and nationalism, then perhaps Yan (2009: 276) is right about an ongoing individualisation of Chinese society in which, “due to the increased opportunities for mobility in both physical and social terms, the individual can now break away from the constraints of social groups and find her or his own ways of self-development in a new social setting”. However, the results of this thesis do not suggest at all that nationalism has disappeared. This is not to say that nationalism has increased either, but I suggest that student nationalism in China has changed within the last two decades. Traditional media does not seem to have a big influence on students’ nationalist sentiment, however, compulsory state education and especially national heritage sites still have a great impact on students’ sense of aiguo
zhuyi and, by extension, might be the only channels of explicit influence left in which the state is able to successfully promote aiguo zhuyi to all students. Opinions and feelings related to, for example, loving one’s nation, being proud of one’s national identity and believing that Taiwan belongs to China were shared by almost all Chinese students (90 per cent upwards).

All students surveyed and interviewed for this research have studied at well-regarded universities in Shanghai, which means that they most likely have studied harder in school than many of their peers in compulsory state education. For this reason, they have been exposed to more nationalist thought than others. Considering uniform consent on issues like love for the nation or Taiwan, we could hypothesise that students who studied harder are far more likely to express nationalist sentiment (at least on a general level).

The negative relationship between education and nationalism in Western countries, shown for example in the work of Coenders and Scheepers 2003 and Hjerm 2001, cannot be applied in the Chinese context. We could theorise that education only reduces nationalist sentiment when it is not explicitly state-directed. However, I believe that the relationship between nationalism and education in contemporary China is more complicated. This is most reflected by the state’s educational goals, some of which appear to stand in opposition to each other. For instance, history education in China is full of anti-Japanese sentiment, yet at the same time the government wants to maintain healthy diplomatic relations to Japan. Anti-Japanese nationalist sentiment in formal and informal state education may thus engender anti-Japanese nationalist sentiments among students and help to explain why, for instance, anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2012 became violent. At the same time the Chinese government also tries to prevent nationalist protests (e.g. Chen Weiss 2014: 208), and even encourages students to study abroad (and to return after). Recent data suggests that China “remains the top source of Japan’s international students, accounting for 40.2% of the total” (Nippon 2018). Essentially, we would assume that ‘you can't have your cake and eat it (too)’, but it appears that the Chinese government is still successful in directing nationalist sentiment. China’s leaders may not prevent (or want to prevent) short-term nationalist protests, as doing so could provoke anger against themselves, but by toning down their rhetoric
against Japan (Reilly 2011: 172), they may have contributed to students’ general positive views about Japan.

Why are students, who generally denied positive influence from (for example) state education, also proud of their national identity and almost equally love their nation? I suggest that the answer to this lies in how banal and everyday representations of the nation influence all students almost equally. Chapter 6 has significantly contributed to our understanding of how nationalism in China works. First, it has applied banal and everyday nationalism to the Chinese context and showed that, in contrast to many other nations, rhetoric in China’s media is too obtrusive and thus does not fall in the category of banal nationalism. Second, in contrast to previous research (e.g. Brunn 2011, Penrose 2011, Skey 2011, Vidacs 2011, Azaryahu and Kook 2002, Edensor 2002), it has not merely discussed how the nation is remembered and reproduced, but it has uncovered unobtrusive representations of the Chinese nation which cannot be avoided in daily life in Shanghai. For instance, Shanghai’s architecture and street signs are put in place by the government and permanently remind students of the nation. Intentionally producing ‘banality’ might not work in every country (see Goode 2017), but in China, it might.

I would like to get back to what I asked in chapter 2.2.2: ‘How does banal nationalism look like in a nation in which the government consciously and intentionally seeks to reproduce a perceived nation?’ I argue that, through putting state-related representations of the nation in place, the Chinese government possesses a useful tool for augmenting nationalist content in state education. Teaching nationalism in the form of aiguo zhuyi might be perceived as dull and repetitive, but once students leave their school after a long day, they continue to tacitly learn nationalist sentiment through unconsciously experiencing the nation. For instance, at eye level, historical street names unconsciously remind them of the nation’s struggles in the past, however, when looking up and seeing modern skyscrapers, they are unconsciously reminded of the nation’s (bright) present and future. While British citizens may also (unconsciously) consider London’s highest skyscraper ‘The Shard’ as a symbol of their nation, they do not unconsciously link the building to the government. In China, however, students might, as the government is not changing and is therefore credible when linking national
success-stories to its efforts. Even if Pang and Thomas (2017: 833-4) are right and Chinese (elite) students are generally disconnected from the state in their identity articulation, state-related representations of the Chinese nation connect students with the state, but on a subconscious level.

Similarly, Chinese food and language also ‘flag’ the nation and are therefore tacitly learned. However, in contrast to state-related representations of the nation, organic ‘flags’ are also tacitly expressed. Although organic representations of the Chinese nation work in a similar way as they do in other countries, it worth noting that Chinese food and language are of special significance. Both are perceived as ancient. Put differently, food and language in China do not only ‘flag’ the Chinese nation, but also ‘flag’ antiquity and uniqueness. This antiquity and uniqueness are also unconsciously reproduced, and thus tacitly expressed by students themselves in their everyday lives. Chapter 6 has therefore distinguished between representations of the nations that exist organically, and those which are consciously and unconsciously instigated by the state. Future research should focus on investigating representations of the Chinese nation which are not encountered every day, yet also ‘flag’ the nation and discuss whether state-related representations of the nation contribute more effectively than state education to every student’s love of his/her nation.

Providing a comprehensive and well-rounded picture of student nationalism in contemporary China is complicated. As this thesis has repeatedly demonstrated, student nationalism today is multifaceted and complex. Like any other human being, no Chinese citizen is born with a national identity. As a nation is also a community of people, “it must be personified before it can be seen, symbolized before it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived” (Walzer 1967: 194). As in any other nation, or territory where a nation is in the making, Chinese students both explicitly and tacitly learn their national identity and sentiments attached to their nation and national identity, over the course of many years.

Not all students express nationalist sentiment in the same way. Not only has this thesis demonstrated a wide array of how nationalist sentiment can be expressed, but it has also shown to what degree and why these specific nationalist sentiments are expressed. Having analysed different ways and forms of nationalist sentiment (e.g. items from the
‘General Nationalist Sentiment’ scale and ‘Advanced Nationalist Sentiment’ scale), I come to the conclusion that the majority of students are expressing nationalist sentiment on a very basic and general level. What this means is that ideas such as loving one’s nation or pride of the national anthem are very prevalent among the student body, whereas more extreme forms of nationalist sentiment, such as sacrificing one’s life for the nation or consciously buying a book for its nationalist content are not. In addition, it is safe to say that most students generally hold positive views about many other nations.

Zhao believes that as long as the Chinese government continues to maintain its strategy of pragmatic nationalism, which prevents nationalism turning “from a tool into a threat” (Zhao 2004: 29), Chinese nationalism will continue to emphasise ‘inward-directed sentiments’” (Zhao 2004: 290). On a more general note Gries (2004:141) notes that “[w]hile all individuals, to varying degrees, assimilate into national groups and favour fellow nationals over foreigners, they do not invariably pit their nations against other nations”. Although my research suggests that Gries is correct in saying that favouring national fellows over foreigners does not imply hatred for those who are not part of the nation, assuming that student nationalism in contemporary China is therefore solely inward- and not outward-directed would be an oversimplification. Although student nationalism and, by extension, Chinese nationalism more generally, often appear to be inward-directed, we should not forget how easily outward-directed nationalist sentiments can arise in China.

Students may generally hold positive views about other countries, but past incidents have demonstrated how quickly that can change. In addition to that, the idea of student nationalism as entirely inward-directed is complicated by the issue of Taiwan (as well as the South China Sea and other territorial disputes), which is difficult to define as solely a domestic issue. Considering what students told me in chapter 9.2.2, about their fear of Taiwanese independence and why Taiwan should be a part of the PRC, it appears that specific aspects of contemporary student nationalism in China are very much outward-directed. If most students surveyed in this study had direct relatives in Taiwan (who identify as solely Taiwanese), it would be understandable for them to want that their relatives belong to the same nation as they do. However, since this is most likely not the case, students could thus simply not care about whether Taiwan is an independent
country in the East China Sea (and, in fact, one student did not care about Taiwan at all). As most students arguably consider Taiwan a domestic issue, Taiwan, perhaps, not only illustrates best how extreme nationalist sentiment can be, but also how defining inward- and outward-directed nationalist sentiment is complicated and very much depends on the point of view.

Regardless of how China’s rise may change the world, it is important to understand how students learn and express nationalist sentiment in China today. Considering that future Chinese politicians, entrepreneurs and other people of influence are likely to consist of those who are studying at a university today, it is vital to understand how they think of their nation and others. Although student nationalism in contemporary China may be more inward-directed, outward-directed nationalist sentiment has not disappeared. Having shown how sensitive some students react to criticism or insult from abroad, there is no guarantee that outward-directed sentiment will not become stronger in the future. The status quo may largely depend on foreign politicians’, scholars’ and journalists’ rhetoric towards China. It will also depend on foreign nations’ stance toward the question of China’s territorial unity, especially in the case of Taiwan. If Taiwan were to declare its own independence, China would most likely declare war and it would lead the US in a dilemma as they are bound by contract to defend Taiwan. According to Brown (2018) it is also the Chinese government which keeps outward-directed Chinese nationalism at bay. He suggests that it should stay this way as the outcomes of a chaotic (bottom-up) nationalism could be horrifying. Even some forms of inward-directed nationalism, such as students’ love for their nation or their support of the Chinese national team in sport competitions, appear harmless and normal, but Billig (1995: 139) reminds us that nationalism “never spoke with a straightforwardly simple voice”. This is not to say that every form of nationalism is inherently problematic, but even small sentiments towards the nation essentially distinguish ‘us’ from ‘them’. Because of China’s increasing economic and geopolitical power and its history of student nationalism we should take Billig’s (1995:177) general advice to heart:

If the future remains uncertain, we know the past history of nationalism. And that should be sufficient to encourage a habit of watchful suspicion.
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Appendices

1. Survey-Questionnaire

Information from the participant:
参与调查者信息:

**Mandatory 必填项:**

1. Name of university 大学名称:_____________
2. Major 专业:_________________
3. Gender 性别:  male  female  other
4. Estimated household income 家庭收入估计:
   
   [ ] RMB 5000/month 小于5000人民币/月
   
   [ ] RMB5000-25000/month 5000 ~ 25000人民币/月
   
   [ ] more than RMB25000/month 高于25000人民币/月

1. Membership of CCP 共产党党员:  yes 是  no 否
2. Place of origin 出生地:  urban 城市  rural 农村
Theme 1: Love and Duty for the Nation

部分1 对国家的爱和责任

<table>
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<th>Strongly agree/非常同意</th>
<th>Agree/同意</th>
<th>Uncertain, neutral/不确定,中立</th>
<th>Disagree,不同意</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree/非常不同意</th>
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<td>(tick)</td>
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1. I love my country/nation
1. 我爱我的国家

2. I am proud of my national identity
2. 我为我的国家认同感到自豪

3. I put the interests of my country before my own
3. 国家利益先于我的利益

4. My country is equally important to me as my family
4. 我的国家和我的家庭一样重要

5. For my country, I would be willing to sacrifice my life
5. 对我的国家我愿意牺牲我的生命

6. I sympathise with the concept aiguo zhuyi (with Chinese characteristics)
6. 我对于爱国主义(中国特色)有认同感

Theme 2: Origin and Influence

部分2 起源和影响

7. Primary School education increased my aiguo zhuyi
7. 小学教育增加我的爱国主义

8. Secondary School education increased my aiguo zhuyi
8. 中学教育增加我的爱国主义
9. University education increased my *aiguo zhuyi*

9. 大学教育增加我的爱国主义

10. National heritage sites and museums increased my *aiguo zhuyi*

10. 国家遗产保护点和博物馆增加我的爱国主义

11. Chinese media (TV, Radio, Print) increased my *aiguo zhuyi*

11. 中国的媒体(电视，无线电，纸质媒体) 增加我的爱国主义

12. The internet increased my *aiguo zhuyi*

12. 网络增加我的爱国主义

13. Computer/Video games increased my *aiguo zhuyi*

13. 电子游戏增加我的爱国主义

14. Family increased my *aiguo zhuyi*

14. 家庭增加我的爱国主义

**Theme 3: China and Other Countries**

部分 3 中国和其他国家

15. China is the best country in the world

15. 中国是世界上最好的国家

16. China is better than any other country

16. 中国比其他国家好

17. Taiwan belongs to China

17. 台湾属于中国

18. China should if necessary use military force to reunite China and Taiwan

18. 如果必要，中国应通过武力手段统一台湾

19. I would like to live in another country temporarily

19. 我愿意暂时住在海外

20. I would like to live in another country permanently

20. 我愿意永久住在海外

21. I have a lot of respect for other countries

21. 我对其他国家非常尊重
22. I have a lot of respect for the US
   我对美国非常尊重
23. I have a lot of respect for Japan
   我对日本非常尊重
24. I want to learn more about other countries
   我希望更了解别的国家
25. Other countries should show more respect for China
   其他国家应该更尊重中国

Theme 4: Explicit Expression
部分 4 外在表达
26. I often defend my country against criticism
   对于批评，我时常会为我的祖国内辩护
27. If my country is bullied or treated unfairly, I would protest
   如果我的祖国受到欺凌或不公的对待，我会提出抗议
28. I often defend my country online
   我时常在网上为我的祖国辩护
29. Somebody who does not like China, cannot be my friend
   如果某人不喜欢中国，他就不能作我的朋友
30. I often promote China’s uniqueness
   我时常宣传中国的特色
31. I would like to actively serve my country
   我希望参军

Theme 5: Other Expressions
部分 5 其他表达
32. I like to read books which praise China
   我喜欢看表扬中国的书
33. I like to watch movies which praise China
   我喜欢看赞美中国的电影
33. I like to watch movies that praise China.
34. I have memorized China’s national anthem.
35. I possess a Chinese national flag at home.
36. I like to buy items that remind me of my country.
37. I often use the term ‘motherland’ (祖国) when I speak about China.
38. I often use ‘we’ when I speak about Chinese people in general.
39. I feel proud when I hear the national anthem.
40. I feel proud when I see the Chinese national flag.
41. I often think of ‘home’ when I think of China.
42. I think ‘only’ China’s future is important.
43. I mostly read/watch news that deal with China.
44. I always support the Chinese team in sport.
2. Interviews

Information from the participant:
受访者信息：

**Mandatory: 必填项:**

1. Name of university 就读大学：____________
2. Major 专业：__________________
3. Gender 性别：_______________
4. Estimated household income, as either in “low” (up to RMB 5000/month), “middle” (RMB5000-25000/month) or “high” (more than 25000/month)
家庭收入估计：低（低于 RMB5000/月）、中（RMB5000 ~ 25000/月）、高（高于 RMB25000/月）

**Optional: 选填项:**

1. Membership of CCP, yes/no
是否为中国共产党党员：是 / 否
2. Place of origin, urban/rural
户籍类型：城市 / 农村

**Theme 1 部分 1**

1. Do you love your country? What does this mean to you?
你爱你的国家吗？这对你来说意味着什么？
2. Do you think every Chinese citizen should put the country’s interests before his own? Why? In what way?
你是否认为每个中国公民都应当把国家利益放在自己的利益之前？为什么？在哪些方面？怎么讲？

**Theme 2 部分 2**

3. Where have you learned about 爱国主义？What does it mean to you?
你在哪里学到过“爱国主义”？这个概念对你来说意味着什么？
4. What has had a positive influence on your national attitudes and pride? Could you give some examples?

对于你对国家的态度和自豪之情来说，有哪些因素对它们有过正面的、促进的影响？是否能列举一些例子？

Theme 3 部分 3

5. Do you think China is the best country in the world? Why/not?

你是否认为中国是世界上最好的国家？为什么？

6. Do you think it is very important that Taiwan will be part of China again? Why/not?

你觉得台湾是否应当回归为中国的一部分？这点重要吗？为什么？

7. Are there any countries you really dislike? Can you give me some examples? Why?

有没有你特别不喜欢的国家？是否能列举一些例子？为什么？

8. Do you have respect for other countries and their cultures? Any in particular? Why?

对于其他国家，你是否尊重？有没有特别尊重的？为什么？

9. Would you like to live in another country temporarily or permanently? Where and why/not?

你是否想在国外暂时居住，或者永久定居？哪个国家？为什么？

Theme 4 部分 4

10. Do you often defend China against criticism? In what ways? Where?

对于对中国的质疑和批评，你会不会为中国辩护？以什么方式？在哪里？

11. Would (have you) you voice(d) your concern (on- and/or offline) if (when) China’s national pride is (was) hurt?

当中国的民族自尊心受到伤害，你是否会表达你的担忧（线上或线下）？在以前，你是否曾做过这样的事？

12. If somebody criticises China, could he still be your friend? Why/not?

如果某个人批评中国？他是否还能成为你的朋友？为什么？
13. Do you often spend time with things (e.g. movies or books) that praise China? Could you give some examples?

你是否常常接触正面表扬中国的事情（比如电影或者书籍）？

14. Do you have a national flag at home and/or other items that remind you of China? Examples?

在你的家里是否有中国国旗？或者是别的什么能够让你想起中国的东西？

15. Do you feel proud/happy when you see something typical Chinese in- and outside China?

无论身在中国抑或他乡，当你看见某样独具中国特色的东西时，你会不会感到自豪？

16. Do you often use terms like 'motherland' or 'we Chinese…'? In what context? Can you give some examples?

你会不会用“祖国”或者“我们中国人”这样的词句？在哪些情况下？是否能列举一些例子？
3. Consent Forms
3.1 Survey-Questionnaire

SURVEY-QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PARTICIPANTS

Student Nationalism in Contemporary China:
当代中国的爱国主义

A Comparative Study on Nationalist Thought and Expression among Chinese
University Students
中国大学生爱国主义思想和表达的一个比较研究

King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref: LRS-15/16-2845

Thank you for considering taking part in this survey of Chinese students’ nationalist
tought and expression. You should only participate if you want to; choosing not to
take part will not disadvantage you in any way.

感谢您参与“中国大学生爱国主义思想和表达的一个比较研究”的调查。这场调查完全自愿参与；拒绝参与调查对您没有任何影响。

Please read the information sheet (Version No.1; 01/06/16) thoroughly before
completing the questionnaire. If you have any questions, please ask the researcher
before you decide whether to join in.

请先认真阅读信息页（版本 1 号 01/06/16）如果您有任何问题，请在参与调查之前
先询问研究员。

Please tick the box below to show that you have read and consent to the following
information:

请在框内打勾以确认您已经阅读并同意下列内容：

- Submission of a completed questionnaire implies consent to participate,
  and for all data collected to be used.
- 提交填写完整的调查问卷代表着您已同意参加调查，并认可所有内容被调查
  使用。
- Submission of a partially completed questionnaire implies consent to
  participate, and for data entered up to this point to be included in the study.
- As participation is anonymous it will not be possible to withdraw your data once you have submitted your questionnaire.

- I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the UK Data Protection Act 1998.

- 我同意将我的信息提供给本次调查研究。我了解这些信息将会是高度保密的，并基于 1998 年英国信息保护法案执行保护。

Please tick the box below to show that you have read and consent to the following information:  

Please tick or initial  

请在框内打勾以表示您已经阅读并同意其下的内容：
3.2 Interviews

CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES

Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened to an explanation about the research.

Title of Study: Student Nationalism in Contemporary China: A Comparative Study on Nationalist Thought and Expression among Chinese University Students

King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref: LRS-15/16-2845

Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any time.

I confirm that I understand that by ticking/initialling each box I am consenting to this element of the study. I understand that it will be assumed that unticked/initialled boxes mean that I DO NOT consent to that part of the study. I understand that by not giving consent for any one element I may be deemed ineligible for the study.

1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated [01.06.16, Version Number 2] for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information and asked questions which have been answered satisfactorily.

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time during the interview without giving any reason and I am able to withdraw until 2 weeks after the interview.

3. I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained to me. I understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the terms of the UK Data Protection Act 1998.

4. I understand that my information may be subject to review by responsible individuals from the College for monitoring and audit purposes.

5. I understand that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and it will not be possible to identify me in any publications.

6. I understand that I can withdraw at any time and ask for the deletion of my data.

Name of Participant

Date

Signature
研究受访者同意书

在阅读完信息页／听完相关陈述之后，请完成这张表格。
研究题目：（当代中国学生的爱国主义：中国大学生爱国主义思想和表达的一个比较研究）

King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref: ________________________

感谢您参与本次调研。组织调研的人员必须在您同意参与前向您阐述项目的概要。如果您有任何相关问题，请在同意参与前询问研究员。您将获得此份同意书的复印件，以备日后参考需要。

当我在框内打勾，即表示我同意并愿意执行这项陈述。
如果我没有打勾，即表示我不同意并不执行该项陈述。
如果我有在一项未打勾，即可能无法参与调查。

1. 我确认我已经通读完信息页的内容[01.06.16, Version Number 2]版。我以考虑过相关问题，如曾有疑问，也已获得满意的答复。

2. 我的参与纯属自愿，在采访的任何时段中，我都可以无理由地中断拒绝继续。在采访完结 2 周之内，我都可以撤回任何内容。

3. 我提供的信息可以被研究使用。我知道我所提供的信息都会受到 1998 年英国信息保护法案的保护。

4. 出于审查检查缘由，我理解我所提供的信息被大学的相关负责人员过目。

5. 我理解该研究严格执行信息保密原则和匿名原则。在任何的出版物中，都不可能有人从人选出我来。

6. 在任何时刻，我都可以要求撤回我提供的信息数据。

受受访者姓名 日期 签名

研究员姓名 日期 签名
4. Ethics Clearance

Tobias Biedermann

5 August 2016

Dear Tobias

LRS-15/16-2845 - Student Nationalism in Contemporary China: A Comparative Study on Nationalist Thought and Expression among Chinese University Students

Thank you for submitting your application for the above project. I am pleased to inform you that your application has now been approved with the provision indicated at the end of this letter. All changes must be made before data collection commences. The Committee does not need to see evidence of these changes, however supervisors are responsible for ensuring that students implement any requested changes before data collection commences.

Please ensure that you follow all relevant guidance as laid out in the King's College London Guidelines on Good Practice in Academic Research:
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/college/policyzone/assets/files/research/goodpractice%20Sept%2009%20FINAL.pdf

Ethical approval has been granted for a period of three years from 5 August 2016. You will not be sent a reminder when your approval has lapsed and if you require an extension you should complete a modification request, details of which can be found here:
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/applications/modifications.aspx

Any unforeseen ethical problems arising during the course of the project should be reported to the panel Chair, via the Research Ethics Office.

Please note that we may, for the purposes of audit, contact you to ascertain the status of your research.

We wish you every success with your research.

Yours sincerely,

GOS Research Ethics Panel REP Reviewer

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**Major Issues (will require substantial consideration by the applicant before approval can be granted)**

Thank you for your thorough responses - especially confirmation you will not be covertly observing students while undertaking your observations.

It is common practice during observations to put up posters alerting other students that an observation is taking place, wear a name badge alerting others to your status as a researcher or ask gatekeepers to email students who might be involved in your observations. Personal introductions (and taking consent) may suffice, obviously depending on the number of students involved in the classes you attend.

Students should have the option in advance (so they have time to consider) of either you discontinuing your observation if they do not wish to be observed, or you could agree not to take notes about a specific student.

You may well be asked about your approach when writing up your PhD so it is good to have thought about the issues in advance.

**Minor Issues related to application (the reviewer should identify the relevant section number before each comment)**

Also - Your consent forms allow participants to withdraw from your study at any time. It might be advisable to give participants 2 weeks. You do not want someone withdrawing their key data just before you are about to submit.

**Minor Issues related to recruitment documents**

**Advice and Comments** (do not have to be adhered to, but may help to improve the research)