A Critically Comparative Kuyperian Analysis and a Trinitarian, ‘Perichoretic’ Reconstruction of the Reformational Philosophies of Dirk H.Th. Vollenhoven and Herman Dooyeweerd

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A Critically Comparative Kuyperian Analysis
and a Trinitarian, ‘Perichoretic’ Reconstruction of
the Reformational Philosophies of
Dirk H.Th. Vollenhoven and Herman Dooyeweerd

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Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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Abstract

This is a critically constructive study of the systematic thought of two ‘Reformational’ philosophers Dirk H.Th. Vollenhoven (1892-1978) and Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977) within the contours of the Reformational vision which they both inherited from the founder of the modern Reformational tradition, Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920). While exploratory work has been done in this area, a full systematic comparison is undertaken here for the first time. Elements in the thought of the two philosophers which may seem to be at variance will be shown to be complementary or at least capable of correction by the thought of the other. This will be done by returning to the trinitarian basis of the Kuyperian vision, and more specifically, the notion of ‘perichoresis’, which affirms at once the distinctiveness of the work of each of the triune Persons and the harmony of their joint achievement. It will be argued that this trinitarian grounding and ‘perichoretic’ reconstruction of the thought of the two philosophers provides a more fully-rounded Reformational account – one with a greater overall coherence than the work of either provides on its own – resulting in a philosophy true to the vision which they together inherited, offering a systematic framework serviceable alike for inter-disciplinary work in the contemporary academy, and for Christian engagement in the public square.

1 The term ‘Reformational’ will be used throughout this thesis to describe the movement initiated by Abraham Kuyper and developed primarily, but not exclusively, by Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. As will be explained in Chapter One, Reformational philosophy builds on the Reformed position – the latter largely associated with John Calvin – and Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd and their circle develop that position philosophically to apply to all areas of life.
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To Pamela, Edward and Robert
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The online discussion group, <Thinknet> has played a major role in the development of my thinking. Professor D.F.M. Strauss has been especially helpful and encouraging, as well as a very keen stimulus to the development of my own analysis. I have benefited immensely from his encyclopaedic knowledge of the Dooyeweerdian corpus. I have also benefited from interaction with Professor Roy Clouser and Dr J. Glenn Friesen, even though both, for different reasons, will almost certainly not agree with the position being set out here. Dr Friesen’s detailed concordance to Dooyeweerd’s *Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee* and *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought*, and other material and guides on his site have proved invaluable for my study. Dr Anthony Tol has been an invaluable assistance with the Vollenhoven material and the facilitation of my trip to the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam in the spring of 2008. He and Dr John Kok made available to me as yet unpublished material on Vollenhoven. Time spent with both of these two Vollenhoven scholars (in whose detailed discussions I was privileged to join in April-May 2008), and subsequent interaction, has provided me with an unparalleled opportunity to get to grips with the contours and complexities of Vollenhoven’s thought. Dr Tol’s now published critical edition of Vollenhoven’s *Isagôgè* which he

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kindly made available to me first in unpublished form, has proved to be crucial in my studies, as indeed have both his and Dr Kok’s published theses on Vollenhoven. During my visit to Amsterdam I had helpful discussions with Professors Hendrik Geertsema and Jacob Klapwijk, and Dr Govert Buijs. I have also valued the stimulus and support of the South East Reformational group meeting in London. I had the opportunity to present some of these findings in a preliminary way at a seminar. I have benefited greatly from being able to take into account the comments of my examiners, Professor Gerrit Glas and Professor Markus Vinzent. However, the responsibility for the positions advanced here remains my own.

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Green for their providing a congenial local context. Above all, I should like to thank my wife, Pamela, and my two sons, Edward and Robert, for their understanding and support over the years in which this thesis has been in preparation – I dedicate this thesis to them.
Preface

This thesis is a study of two thinkers with great potential significance for systematic Christian philosophy. Hitherto they have been largely neglected by the Christian mainstream on the grounds of their complexity and seeming inaccessibility. The project analyses the work of Dirk Vollenhoven and Herman Dooyeweerd in the context of the wider Reformational vision, especially as it is found in the voluminous writing and work of Abraham Kuyper, the founder both of the modern Reformational tradition and of the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam where Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd were on the professorial staff for almost all of their respective working lives.

Herman Dooyeweerd’s work is relatively well known in the English-speaking world, although his influence has largely been confined to the ‘Reformational’ circles because of the complexity of his systematic thinking. Much less well known is the thought of Dooyeweerd’s close collaborator and reluctant critic, Dirk H.Th. Vollenhoven. Until quite recently, most of Vollenhoven’s output has been unavailable in English. He has been better known for his complex work on what has been called the ‘consequential [or ‘consistent’] problem-historical method’. There has been much less focus on the systematic (or what he calls ‘thetical’) side of his systematic philosophical thinking.

The two philosophers together represent an accomplishment in systematic Christian thinking to match and, one might argue, exceed anything previously attempted in the Calvinian tradition, and in Christian systematic thinking generally. On the whole, throughout their long careers as professors of the Vrije Universiteit and co-leaders of what was then the Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte (V.C.W. – the

3 However, pioneering work has been done by Dr Anthony Tol, Dr John Kok and Dr Kornelis Bril, who are making Vollenhoven’s writings much more widely available.
4 In this regard both the Vollenhovian work of Dr Kok and Dr Tol (John H. Kok, ‘Vollenhoven and “Scriptural Philosophy”’, P.R. (1988); John H. Kok, Vollenhoven: his Early Development (1992); Anthony Tol, ‘Time and Change in Vollenhoven’, P.R. 60 (1995) and his thesis (Anthony Tol, Philosophy in the Making: D.H.Th. Vollenhoven and the Emergence of Reformed Philosophy (2010); and Anthony Tol, ‘Reformational Philosophy in the Making’, P.R. 76 (2011)); on the one hand; and, on the other, the Dooyeweerdian perspective of Professor Strauss (summed up in D.F.M. Strauss, Philosophy: Discipline of the Disciplines (2009)), have had a decisive influence upon me, as will appear in the footnotes, but far beyond what it is possible to convey in individual references. Eric Kamphof picks up the trinitarian basis of Vollenhoven’s systematic thinking (Eric J. Kamphof, ‘The triunity of life: on the unity of the Vollenhovian project’ (M.Phil., Institute for Christian Studies, Toronto, 1995)).
Association for Calvinistic Philosophy), they maintained a common front against their detractors, many of whom were colleagues on the staff of the Vrije Universiteit. These differences were largely aired privately, and in the circle of their closest common adherents, but later more openly. The question of the relationship of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s thought was raised programmatically by Professor Jacob Klapwijk; and ground-breaking work has also been done recently by D.F.M. Strauss, whose comparison of the thought of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven identifies certain complementarities between their philosophical positions.\(^5\)

Thus, while presenting an appreciation of both of their contributions in building the edifice of Reformational Philosophy upon the foundations laid in the previous generation by Abraham Kuyper,\(^6\) certain problematical features in their respective positions, and the clear differences between them in a number of respects, should not be ignored or glossed over. Indeed, it will in part be the aim of this thesis to uncover these divergences. However, far from undercutting their contribution, this will allow for a fuller appreciation of their respective positions, not least because, I shall argue, in many respects they are mutually complementary and corrective. It is the concern of this thesis that the respective insights of both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd need to be drawn upon in order to allow for reparative reconstruction of Reformational philosophy. This will be carried out in the light of the tradition of their predecessor, and the broader Reformational tradition of which he was the flag-bearer.

Chapter One outlines the Reformational vision, as it was handed on to Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd by the Kuyperian tradition. It identifies three themes: the integrity of the individual before God the Father; the plural diversity of the created order under the rule of the Son; and the unfolding purposiveness of the historical process through the work of the Holy Spirit. These three themes, arising from a consideration of the triune work

\(^5\) Jacob Klapwijk, ‘Over mogelijkheden van christelijk filosoferen’ in *M.V.C.W. 1971,3* (sept. 1971): 7-10; Klapwijk, ‘Reformational Philosophy on the Boundary between the Past and the Future’, *P.R. 52* (1987). D.F.M. Strauss, ‘Appropriating the Legacy of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven’ in *Journal for Christian Scholarship* (2006). This latter was part of a wider exercise hosted by the Institute for Christian Studies and Redeemer College, both in Toronto, in which a number of short papers were presented characterizing the differences.

\(^6\) With Abraham Kuyper, one also needs to mention his younger colleagues Herman Bavinck (1854-1921) and Jan Woltjer (1849-1917) whose theological and philosophical contributions respectively were also critical in the foundation-laying process. Woltjer is currently a subject of doctoral research at the Vrije Universiteit by Drs. Ir. R.A. Nijhoff.
of God, provided the thematic context for the philosophical work which Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd undertook both together and separately.

Chapter Two examines how this Kuyperian vision was developed by each of the two philosophers over the course of their long and parallel careers as close interlocutors, collaborators, professorial colleagues and fellow founders of the movement of Reformational philosophy. The pluralistic vision of the world, worked out together in the early 1920s in the theory of the modalities, provided a common framework which they continued to work on together despite their differences of emphasis. Their divergences and the possibility of a deeper complementarity will be looked at systematically in the remaining chapters of the thesis.

Accordingly, Chapter Three examines the ‘transcendental’ question of the different ways in which, over the course of their philosophical development, the structure of their respective accounts and the necessary conditions of experience diverge. While they both agree about the modalities – the irreducible ways of being and knowing governed by the appropriate laws and norms – they differ greatly in their systematic ontologies and epistemologies. I shall look at their respective presentations in this regard, noting their respective strengths and weaknesses in the light of the Kuyperian Reformational vision and the possibilities of their complementing one another.

Chapter Four addresses the ‘transcendent’ question of ‘religious’ grounding as a prerequisite for a Reformational philosophy. It reviews Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s respective positions in two stages: first it addresses the question of the revelation of God’s work in the world, and then its reception by humanity – how that revelation re-orient the total human response to God. In the former respect, I identify a certain sequential structure to Vollenhoven’s account, and a more hierarchical structure to Dooyeweerd’s account. In the latter respect, I note a possible convergence between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd about the question of Direction, although this is

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7 The term ‘ways of being’ (Vollenhoven, *Wijsgerig Woordenboek* (2005): 262 (‘bestaanswijze’)) needs to be qualified by Dooyeweerd’s ascription of ‘Being’ to God and ‘meaning’ to the created order (see 5.2.1). However, what is meant is simply that the ‘ways of being’ concerns ontology (what there is), while ‘ways of knowing’ concerns epistemology (how we know what there is). Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd resisted the reduction of ontology to epistemology characteristic of post-Enlightenment Western thought.
expressed sequentially for Vollenhoven in terms of an unfolding covenantal relationship under God’s Law, and hierarchically for Dooyeweerd with respect to the dependence of the ‘heart’ upon the Origin.

Chapter Five considers the presupposita that regulate the systematic consideration of the necessary conditions of experience\(^8\) in the light of basic religious orientation.\(^9\) Vollenhoven’s ‘consequential problem-historical method’ uncovers three ‘ground-types’ into which the basic shape of all thinking in Western philosophy (and indeed perhaps all human thought) can variously be discerned. Although Vollenhoven does not state it explicitly in this way, it is the argument of the chapter that these reflect three different presupposita, each of which is a necessary, but distinctive, basis for a systematic understanding of the world as a whole. Generally, one of these presupposita is overemphasised to the neglect or diminution of the others, leading to certain distortions. It is argued further that these presupposita are congruent with two of the three Ideas which, post 1930, Dooyeweerd identifies as the basis of the Christian ‘ground-Idea’, and a further Idea retrieved from his thinking in the 1920s. Overall, Vollenhoven’s ‘ground-types’, and the implicit presupposita that they express, tend to be described by him as mutually exclusive options, while Dooyeweerd’s ‘ground-Idea’ is burdened by an imbalance, with a concentration on the Idea of Origin and a subordination, or even eclipse, of the other Ideas. The need for greater systematic integration of the presupposita, in the case of Vollenhoven, and better balance of the ‘ground-Idea’ in the case of Dooyeweerd, points to the need for a convergence which is outlined in the last chapter.

Chapter Six draws on insights from more recent trinitarian thinking, more specifically by analogy with the notion of ‘perichoresis’ according to which equal but distinctive weight is accorded to the work of each of the Persons of the Trinity, while at the same time affirming their inter-dependence and harmonious interaction. In the light of this, it is argued that by analogy with the work of each of the Persons, the presupposita can be seen as distinct and yet also mutually complementary. Not only does a perichoretic view correct the sequential and hierarchical tendencies respectively of Vollenhoven’s and

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8 As dealt with Chapter Three.
9 As dealt with in Chapter Four.
Dooyeweerd’s accounts of the interaction of the Persons; but, drawing on both of their insights, it also opens up new possibilities of presenting a fully rounded methodology in the form of three complementary ‘descriptive views’, which can serve for both intra- and inter-disciplinary studies and for practical application.

Note on Style: In the footnotes and bibliography, I have followed an adapted version of Tyndale Short-Title. In the footnotes, the full name of authors, full title and date of publication is given on the first reference, and the surname with short title is used thereafter. The numbers immediately after the colon are pages, unless indicated otherwise. Where necessary, I have used ‘p.’ or ‘pp.’ to refer to the pagination of the published text. Following the practice for the Vollenhoven documents, the pagination of the original documents is indicated by ‘/’ or ‘//’ followed by ‘p.’ or ‘pp.’. For the numbering of Vollenhoven sources, I have followed the designations assigned by John Kok, which, for convenience of reference, I retain in the short-titles in the footnotes.10 In a number of cases the references are numbered as ‘volume.page’ with the references for each volume separated by semi-colons. Full publication details for all items cited are given in the Bibliography. While I italicise words from other foreign languages, I have tended not to italicise quotations from modern languages, especially Dutch. Square brackets are used to signal editorial emendations for the purpose of clarity to quoted extracts. All dates, unless specifically given as B.C., are A.D.

Throughout, the use of tense reflects the dual focus of this thesis. The historical background is indicated by the use of the the past tense, while the present tense is used to describe the structure of philosophical thought at each point.

10 Kok, Vollenhoven.
Chapter One: Historical and Thematic Background to Reformational Philosophy

In this chapter, I provide the wider background to what is called ‘Reformational’ philosophy, of which Dirk Vollenhoven (1892-1978) and Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977) were the leading exponents in the Twentieth Century.

The two philosophers’ thought needs to be set in the context of their common debt to Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920), the father of modern Reformational philosophy, and the founder of the Vrije Universiteit (V.U.) at Amsterdam at which both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven were professors. Kuyper himself was a leading figure in the tradition influenced by the thought of John Calvin (1509-1564), the founder of one of the main traditions in the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century which had resulted in a broad-scale break from the authority of the Roman papacy over questions of doctrine, especially over the issue of the nature of salvation. In particular, it was Calvin’s vision of the sovereignty of God over every area of life which influenced and provided the basis for Kuyper’s exposition of the character and place of a ‘Calvinistic’ or Reformational vision, not least in the face of the challenges to the Christian faith from the Western European enlightenment which came to prominence in the Eighteenth Century and which have shaped the Western mind-set subsequently.

Calvin provides a thoroughgoing re-orientation of Christian theology to take full account of God’s sovereign acts in creation, redemption and the bringing of creation to its final transformation. For Calvin, the world is the ‘theatrum dei gloriae’ (the ‘theatre of God’s glory’). He rejects any attempt to downplay the created order as somehow of secondary significance, or indeed somehow to be negated or transcended. Two distinguishing features of the Calvinian vision, to which Calvin’s theology gives rise, are: first, the recognition of the universal sovereignty of God over all things, over all areas of life and over history as a whole; and, second, the view of religion as a

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11 Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd followed Kuyper in the use of the term ‘Calvinistic’, although Dooyeweerd later preferred the term ‘Christian philosophy’. ‘Reformational’ is a usage coined specifically to indicate the distinctive philosophical tradition which Kuyper set in train.
covenant between God and humanity. In particular, the Calvinian view is that grace is the restoration by God of the created order in response to human sin and its consequences in the wider creation. The purpose of grace is not only as a remedy for sin, but also transformatively to realise God’s deeper purposes. The promise of grace does not stand ‘over against’ nature but is God’s provision with respect to sin (although not itself the opposite of sin: sin and grace are not ontologically equivalent or correlative – grace is the remedy for sin not its balance or corollary). While creation is fallen in every respect it is also redeemable in every respect through God’s grace – total human depravity calls for total redemption not only for humanity itself but also for the effects of human depravity on the wider creation.

Calvin’s all-encompassing vision was inherited and developed as a social and cultural programme in the late nineteenth century Netherlands by the towering figure of Abraham Kuyper (1837–1920), the father of Reformational philosophy. Kuyper sought to set out a Calvinian philosophy that responds to the challenges of the modern world. He does this by highlighting the need for a distinctively Christian ‘world and life view’ (or ‘worldview’ for short) that takes account of both the diversity and the unity of human experience in the light of God’s sovereignty over every area of life. This is a position that Kuyper came to through a series of decisive events in his life.

14 Vollenhoven, Het Calvinisme en de reformatie van de wijsbegeerte (33a) (1933): 21.
16 I shall not follow the tendency which has been dominant in Western thought to identify the ‘world’ with that which is external to ‘me’ or ‘us’ (whoever ‘I’ or ‘we’ might be). Rather the ‘world’ includes ‘me’ or ‘us’ as much as it does ‘my’ environment, and in relating to the world ‘I’ am relating to ‘myself’ as much as to my environment.
17 The term used by Kuyper in his seminal Lectures on Calvinism (Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism (1976): 11-12; Peter Somers Heslam, Creating a Christian worldview: Abraham Kuyper’s Lectures on Calvinism (1998): 88-96; David K. Naugle, Worldview: the history of a concept (2002): 16-25). The notion of a ‘world and life view’, or ‘worldview’ for short, seems to have been borrowed most immediately from James Orr who made it the theme of his Kerr Lectures in 1891 (James Orr, The Christian View of God and the World as Centering in the Incarnation (1899)). In its wider context, the term ‘Weltausenschauung’ was first used, albeit in passing, by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Judgement and taken up, amongst others, by G. W. F. Hegel, Wilhelm Dilthey and Friedrich Nietzsche (Naugle, Worldview: the history of a concept: 55, 58, 68-107; see also Albert M. Wolters, ‘On the idea of a Worldview and its Relation to Philosophy’: 14-25; Jacob Klapwijk, ‘On Worldviews and Philosophy’ (1989): 41-55; Anthony Tol, ‘Foreword’ (2005): viii). I am aware of the criticism that this implicitly uses a strongly visual metaphor, but the use of ‘view’ is not meant to privilege the faculty of sight over any of the other faculties. The visual is selected as representative of all the other faculties (hearing, touch etc.).
Kuyper’s father was a pastor of the state church, the Hervormde Kerk. He had resisted the ‘Afscheiding’ (‘secession’) of 1834, a breakaway element in the ‘Réveil’ (‘revival’ or ‘reawakening’), which had begun to have an influence in the Netherlands in the early part of the nineteenth century.\(^\text{18}\) The young Abraham Kuyper enrolled for theological studies at the University of Leiden in 1855. That university was dominated by figures from a liberal theological background such as J.N. Scholten (1811-85), the leader of the movement that Kuyper came later to believe sought to accommodate Christianity to the worldview of the Enlightenment.\(^\text{19}\) In contrast to this, in the exercise of his pastoral responsibilities in his first parish at Beesd in the province of Gelderland between 1863 and 1867, Kuyper came into contact with simple, heart-felt belief. His encounter with Pietje Baltus (1830-1914), a peasant woman in his congregation, led to his conversion and his adoption of orthodox Calvinism.\(^\text{20}\) Deeply influenced by this encounter, Kuyper came to stress the need for inner transformation through the work of the Holy Spirit in personal religious experience. This is inner rebirth, or ‘palingenesis’ which takes place in the ‘heart’, the religious centre of human existence. Indeed it was his discovery of the centrality of the ‘heart’ that was later to influence both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd so deeply in their joint enterprise.\(^\text{21}\) This inner transformation or rebirth is not merely an emotional experience but involves the adoption of an entirely new worldview. It is a religious re-orientation of humanity in a cosmic context.\(^\text{22}\) Kuyper’s own personal religious experience gave rise to his leadership of the ‘Doleantie’ (‘grieving’), which led

\(^{18}\)According to Praamsma, the more aristocratic members of the Réveil kept themselves distinct from the Afscheiding, while at the same time expressing sympathy with it (Louis Praamsma, Let Christ Be King: Reflections on the Life and Times of Abraham Kuyper (1985): 13-15).


\(^{21}\)See 2.1, 2.2, 4.1.1 and 4.2.1. The insight is not a new one; see for example, Blaise Pascal, Pensées: §423 (James Byrne, Glory, Jest and Riddle: Religious Thought in the Enlightenment (1996): 87-88).

to the break in 1886 with the national Hervormde Kerk and the subsequent founding of the Gereformeerde Kerken in 1892.23

This concern for inner spiritual transformation was matched by a vigorous engagement in the social and political issues of the day.

On the social and political front, Kuyper found himself in opposition to the ideals and consequences of the French Revolution. In this he followed, and was deeply influenced by, Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer (1801-1876) who, in his seminal work, Ongeloof en Revolutie (‘Unbelief and Revolution’, 1847), seeks to bring the concerns of the Réveil to wider social expression as an alternative social vision to the ideals of the French Revolution.24 In 1879 Kuyper was instrumental in founding the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (A.R.P.), in which he then took a leading role, serving as Prime Minister of the Netherlands from 1901 to 1905.25 He also founded the Vrije Universiteit at Amsterdam in 1880 to provide an academic environment within which the movement he influenced (‘neo-Calvinist’ or ‘Reformational’ as it came to be called26) could be nourished and elaborated.

The French Revolution, to which the A.R.P. was a response, was part of a broader cultural movement. The French Revolution had taken place in a social and cultural context characterised by a deepening scepticism about Christian belief, illustrated by Voltaire’s imprecation against Christ and Christianity: ‘Écrasez l’Infâme’ (‘crush the infamous one’).27 Even more profound was the scepticism of Jean-Jacques Rousseau

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25 Langley, Kuyper: 9-29; Praamsma, Kuyper: 54-56.
26 The term ‘neo-Calvinist’ was used by Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) in his The Social Teachings of the Christian Church (1912), to characterise, somewhat misleadingly, a more democratic and pietistic expression of traditional Calvinism (Praamsma, Kuyper: 116-118, 191); but it is more helpful to see Kuyper as ‘neo-Calvinist’ because of this concern for the extension of Calvinist principles to all areas of life. ‘Reformational’ signals its continuing philosophical character.
27 Francois-Marie Arouet (1694-1778), better known as ‘Voltaire’ (Byrne, Glory, Jest and Riddle: Religious Thought in the Enlightenment: 133; see Kuyper, Lectures: 10 (Kuyper has ‘Down with this scoundrel!’)).
(1712-1778) about revealed religion, combined with his radical political philosophy. In the eyes of Kuyper and fellow Reformational thinkers, the worldview of the Enlightenment was marked by an unstable, contradictory and unresolveable tension between the ideal of personal freedom and the science ideal characterised by mathematically quantifiable rationality. Following the ‘turn to the subject’ initiated by Descartes, the subjective human cogito was asserted to be the ultimate ground of certainty, and human personality was elevated as the ultimate source of authority.

Thus, the joint but competing commitments to personal freedom (seen in terms of the undermined human personality) and to scientific rationality (seen in terms of the ideal of a mechanistically determined physical process) shaped the Enlightenment worldview. Between them, they entirely displaced any belief in God. Doubts were expressed about belief in a transcendent deity, or at least in one who is active in the world and in human experience. In the nineteenth century, thinkers such as Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) questioned the idea that belief in God was anything but a projection of human yearnings for meaning. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) took this further, and enunciated the view that belief in God is antithetical to human freedom, since Christianity, in his view, is based on a falsehood. In place of the Christian faith that he rejected he set out the ideal of creating an ethic of human freedom unconstrained by the superimposition of moral requirements of (putatively) transcendent origin. In the Netherlands, similarly, E. Douwes Dekker (1820-1887), who wrote under the name of

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29 This is the ‘freedom/nature’ ground-motive (see 2.1).
33 Nietzsche is a deliberately slippery writer and uses a range of other voices. His most dramatic presentation of this thesis is in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, where ‘the Madman’ proclaims that God is dead – the corollary being that it is now up to each person, on one’s own, to work out one’s understanding of the world and create one’s own values. This theme is also taken up in Also Sprach Zarathustra (Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (1974): §125, pp. 181-182; Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra (1997): §2, pp. 4-5; Ronald Hayman, Nietzsche: Nietzsche’s Voices (1997): 3-4, 27-28). However, see also 5.1.1.
‘Multatuli’, set himself in opposition to all forms of organised religion.34

Alongside this ideal of unconstrained personal freedom, but in tension with it, is the rational-mathematical ideal. According to this latter ideal, the universe is to be understood entirely as a machine, fully determined by the process of cause and effect running along Newtonian lines.35 Newtonian mechanics were held by some, most notoriously Pierre-Simon, Marquis de Laplace (1749-1827), to dispense with any need for the ‘hypothesis’ of God.36 The idea of dispensing with God’s agency was extended to the biological sphere by the appearance of The Origin of Species by Charles Darwin in 1859.37

Kuyper sees the ‘dogma of Evolution’ or the ‘Evolution-theory’38 as a form of deterministic pantheism, in that it involves dissolution of the boundaries between God

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35 Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727), Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687); see Dooyeweerd, ‘Criteria’: 207. This was not a view of the world that Newton himself held, but his Principia Mathematica came to represent the mechanistic-science-ideal (Mike King, Secularism: The Hidden Origins of Disbelief (2007): 142, 258).
36 Colin E. Gunton, The Triune Creator: A Historical and Systematic Survey (1998): 133. It can perhaps be argued that this did not necessarily mean that Laplace does not believe in God, only that God is not a consideration in his astronomical calculations (see King, Secularism: The Hidden Origins of Disbelief: 127-128).
37 Full title: On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. Darwin himself was reluctant to draw these conclusions (King, Secularism: The Hidden Origins of Disbelief: 148), but the claims were made on his behalf, not least by Thomas Huxley (1825-1895) who coined the term ‘agnostic’ to describe his lack of belief (rather than any active disbelief) in God or any transcendent being.
38 I.e., not so much the scientific hypothesis itself, but the worldview associated with it (Kuyper, ‘Evolution (1899)’ (1998)). This needs to be carefully qualified in that although Kuyper did attempt (not very successfully) to critique Darwin’s theory, his fundamental concerns were the philosophical assumptions which he took to inform Darwin’s theory, and the worldview which Darwin’s ideas have inspired. Menninga suggests that the absence of mention of God in Darwin’s theory does not mean necessarily that it is incompatible with the Christian doctrine of creation, only that scientific theories are incomplete explanations of reality; and that Kuyper prematurely rejects theistic theories of evolution (Clarence Menninga, ‘Critical Reflections on Abraham Kuyper’s Evolutie Address’, Calvin Theological Journal 33 (1998): 439, 441-432; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.84 (n. 1, not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, ‘Schepping en evolutie (bespreking van J. Lever, Creatie en evolutie)’, P.R. 24 (1959); Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism Volume Three: Philosophy of Nature and Philosophical Anthropology (2011): 189-220; Dooyeweerd, ‘[Letter to Prof. J.J. Duyvené de Wit]’ in Dooyeweerd Archives (1963) quoted in J. Glenn Friesen, ‘Dooyeweerd versus Vollenhoven: The Religious Dialectic within Reformational Philosophy’, P.R. 70 (2005): 112; Vollenhoven, ‘De wijsbegeerte van het evolutionisme (57c)’, Mededelingen van de Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte (1957); Vollenhoven, ‘Getuigen in de wetenschap (59d)’ (1992): 140; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)’ (1992): 180-184; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd in onze kring (68b)’ (1992): 180-183. For a general bibliography of Reformational literature on this question, see Bruce C. Wearne, ‘Creation and Evolution Bibliography: Selected Reformational Contributions (1899-2011)’, P.R. 76 (2011): 163-168; with special reference to Jacob Klapwijk, Purpose in the Living World? Creation and Emergent Evolution (2008)).
and the world. Instead of a transcendent deity, the proponents of the ‘Evolution-theory’ now saw the world as containing within itself the seeds of its own origin and destiny without any need for, or reference to, a transcendent Creator. It was not so much the details of Darwin’s account that are a matter of concern to Kuyper (although he did address them, albeit with mixed success), but rather the pantheistic understanding of the world to which, he argues, it gives rise. He argues that Evolution-theory seeks to reduce the organic to the mechanistic, the aesthetic to the merely useful, ethics first to sociality or psychology and then to a mechanistic explanation, and finally, denies the possibility of a transcendent religious relationship altogether.39

‘Modernism’, the worldview of European Enlightenment which began in the late seventeenth century, was only one of a number of alternatives to the Christian worldview, of which, Kuyper argues, Calvinism is the most consistent expression. Kuyper himself identifies a number of worldviews: ‘Paganism’, ‘Islamism’, ‘Romanism’ and ‘Modernism’.40 These different worldviews reflect an underlying split or ‘antithesis’ that runs through humanity as the struggle between two dynamic principles: that of obedience to God, and that of disobedience to God and rebellion against him.41 The idea of this antithesis harks back to Augustine’s influential vision of the continuing tension, from the time of the fall until the return of Christ, between the Civitas Dei and the Civitas Terrena.42 For Kuyper, participation in the Civitas Dei requires a thorough re-orientation of one’s basic stance towards God. This orientation is reflected in, and underlies, a worldview. This underlying orientation cannot be arrived at by theorising, but is entirely the work of the Holy Spirit upon the human heart.

39 Kuyper, ‘Evolution’: 403-440; and Kuyper, ‘Blurring’: 375-380; Kuyper, Dictaten dogmatiek: College-dictaat van een der studenten (1910): 2 ‘Locus de Creatione’, §§4.5, 6, pp. 41,115-127; McGoldrick, Kuyper: 104-106; Praamsma, Kuyper: 18-19. This final part of his argument, in which he appeals to an incorporeal soul, is the least convincing part of Kuyper’s argument, but the basic point is not dependent on his still scholastic (dualistic) anthropology.

40 Kuyper, Lectures: 19-40. He does not deal with ‘Islamism’ in any detail, and he regards ‘Romanism’ as a compromise with ‘Paganism’.


42 Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans (1998). From a Reformational perspective, Augustine’s Civitas Dei is not to be identified with any institution (for example, the institutional church), but is a dynamic running through the whole of history.
Kuyper locates the key locus of the change in the human heart in the ‘sphere of special grace’ (‘de sfeer der bijzondere genade’) rather than in the exercise of reason.

In this respect, Kuyper breaks decisively with the rationalist side of the Enlightenment. However, this is not an irrationalist move, since, as we shall see below, following Calvin, he emphasises that God deals with the created order in a lawful rather than an arbitrary way. Indeed, by stressing the lawfulness of God in his dealing with the created order, Kuyper breaks with the unconstrained personality-ideal. For Kuyper, as for Calvin, the Persons of the Trinity bind themselves in a covenant for the existence and wellbeing of the world. The love among the three Persons of the Trinity and their common love for the world is the sole basis for the trustworthiness of their covenant to the world in its creation, redemption and transformation; since the covenant is an eternal promise made, in the first instance, by the Persons to one another. In this way two opposite positions are rejected: the intellectualist one, which sees the creation of the world as somehow a reflection of God’s mind (with God as subject to the laws of his own creation), and the voluntarist one, which sees the creation of the world as a sheer act of will (with God as utterly arbitrary). God is, as John Calvin puts it, both ‘legibus

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46 In terms of Vollenhovian-Dooyeweerdian modal analysis, love is ethically qualified. But the characterisation of the relations of the Trinity as loving involves all the modalities: the Persons proclaim divine status (pistical or faith modality), they give glory (aesthetic), they deal justly (juridical), effectively (economical), appropriately (social), truly (analytical), etc. with respect to one another. This is not to say that the triune Persons are bound by laws – only that in their self-revelation, they set out a basis for the life of the world expressed in each of the modalities. In Chapter Five, I shall argue that this basis is expressed in the Ideas of Origin, Coherence and Purpose.
47 Calvin’s own theology is often read in these voluntarist terms. It admittedly does have voluntarist elements. But this is to ignore the importance for Calvin of ‘union with Christ’ and the role of the Holy
solutus’ (‘free of law’) and equally ‘non exlex’ (‘non arbitrary’) because laws result from the mutual compact of the three Persons acting out of freedom and love, not out of submission to any external or impersonal law or principle; ‘non exlex’ because the mutual love of the Father, Son and Spirit gives the universe both stability and settled character. The acts of creation, redemption and transformation find their highest unity in the work of the Son. He participates in all these acts, not as a foreign element but as a full co-director of the ‘Eternal Counsel of Peace’ (‘eeuwigen Vrederaad’) and as mediator of both creation and redemption, and, indeed, transformation.

I shall now trace three themes common to the Reformational vision of the work of God in the world. In articulating this vision, Kuyper and those who followed him built on the

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*sources*:


Dooyeweerd mentions the divergence between the intellectualism of Thomas Aquinas and the notion of the ‘potestas Dei absoluta’ of William of Occam which the latter ranks above the ‘potestas Dei ordinata’. Dooyeweerd sees the ‘potestas Dei absoluta’ as rooted in the Greek matter principle whereby the divinity is seen as a lawless fluidum operating through blind anangkè, whereas in Thomas the rational form principle is absolutised (Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvinism and Natural Law’ (1997): 16-17; Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.147-150; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.186-187; Dooyeweerd, ‘Kuyper’s wetenschapsleer’: 216; Dooyeweerd, *Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy 2: An Introduction to the Anthropology of the Philosophy of the Law-Idea* (forthcoming): 215-217; Dooyeweerd, *The Christian idea of the state*: 14-17). As Dooyeweerd puts it: ‘not in a divinized reason, nor in a despotic, nominalistic “potestas absoluta” does the law find its Origin in the pluriform revelation in the temporal ordinances, but in God’s holy Creatorly will, that which agrees with the whole fully salvic of being God, in the unbroken unity and fullness of His love, justice, omnipotence, beauty and holiness’ (Dooyeweerd, ‘De wetsbeschouwing in Brunner’s boek Das Gebot und die Ordnungen’, *A.R.S.* 9 (1935): 370 (‘noch in een vergoddelijke “rede”, noch in een despotische nominalistische “potestas absoluta” vindt de wet, in haar pluriforme openbaring in de tijdelijke ordening, haar Oorsprong, maar in Gods heiligen Schepperswil, die met het geheel volzalig wezen Gods, in de onverbrekelijke eenheid en volheid van Zijn liefde, gerechtigheid, Wijsheid, almacht, schoonheid en heiligheid te zamen stemt’)). Dooyeweerd’s description of God’s will for creation locates it in the love at the heart of who God is, i.e., the love of the Persons for one another, not a metaphysical principle on the one hand, or an impersonal, unknowable deity on the other.

strongly trinitarian character of Calvin’s theology. We can see this trinitarian character reflected in three central themes of Kuyper’s exposition: first, the integrity of all individuals before God the Father – the Father uniquely creates and calls individuals, not least human individuals as integral beings; second, the plural diversity of the created order under the rule of the Son, through whom alone all things cohere – the Son is Lord over every area of life; and third, the unfolding purposiveness of the created order through the work of the Holy Spirit, who transforms all things and brings about the new heaven and the new earth – the Holy Spirit effects the acts of creation, redemption and the bringing of all things to their state of final glory.

I shall look at these themes as Kuyper expounded them in conjunction with some later reflections by Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd.

1.1 The Integrity of the Individual Subject before God the Father

The first overarching theme in Reformational thought which I shall address, then, is that of the integrity of the individual subject or ‘subjèct’ (to follow Vollenhoven’s later orthography). This emphasis on the integrity of the individual subjèct is in keeping with the broad vision of God’s sovereignty over the whole of life. Just as all areas of life are to be affirmed as created by God and therefore to be valued, so too should the material palpability and individual uniqueness of ordinary things be respected and celebrated. The sacred/secular split treats some elements of creation as ‘higher’ and others as ‘lower’. But for Kuyper, all created things are on one level coram Deo. We see this represented in the Golden Age of Dutch painting, where the value of the individual thing, no matter how commonplace, was expressed with care and attention to detail within the overall composition. As Kuyper puts it, the Dutch school, which

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50 See Tol, ‘Foreword’: xxi; Vollenhoven, Gastcolleges Wijsbegeerte. Erfenis voor het heden (2011): 32 for both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd of distinguishing between the ‘subjèct’ (i.e., that which is subjected to God’s law or norm – for which Dooyeweerd sometimes uses the French ‘sujet’), and ‘subject’ (i.e., the ‘active’ or ‘higher’ pole of a relation or ‘inter-relation’).

51 See Mt. 6.26.
flourished during the period of greatest Calvinist influence in that country, opened one’s eyes to ‘the small and insignificant’. 52

Each human being stands before God as a unique creature, and as such, is responsible to God for his or her actions and indeed for the basic underlying orientation which gives rise to those actions. The original relationship of human beings with God, other human beings and their environment has become distorted through sin and rebellion. Humanity is in a state of disobedience, and creation as a whole has been distorted as a consequence. However, in the midst of the all-pervasiveness of sin and its consequences in the rest of creation, each individual human being still has the responsibility to turn to God in total dependence and covenantal obedience. 53

The Reformational vision of the individual as subject to God and God’s law needs to be distinguished from the notion of ‘substance’ that informs the dualistic understanding of the individual. 54 This notion posits an underlying reality ‘beneath’ the appearance of things as we experience them. It was developed first in the context of Greek thought, applied in the medieval period, and taken up in a somewhat different way in Enlightenment thinking. 55

The Greek view is characterised by a tension between the eternal becoming of ‘matter’ and the eternal being of ‘form’. On the one hand, ‘matter’, in the Greek view, expresses dynamism and vitality; on the other, ‘form’ expresses the ideal of perfect order and unchangeability. The older Greek nature religions of Gaia (mother earth), Uranus (the god of the skies), Demeter (goddess of crops) and Dionysus (the god of wine) had

52 Kuyper, Lectures: 167.
53 Kuyper, ‘Blurring’: 391. Here, despite Dooyeweerd’s strictures about Von Stahl’s conservative influence upon Kuyper (already mentioned), Kuyper is himself critical of Von Stahl’s conservatism and his too ready identification of God’s providence with the status quo.
deified the matter principle as the eternal origin of all that exists; but this was contested by the culture religion of the gods of Mount Olympus, not least Apollo (the god of form). Dooyeweerd argues that culture religion represents the deification of the eternal, unchanging concepts of unity, truth, goodness and beauty. These involve the use of ‘theoria’, of abstract thought, which is a way of entering the realm of divine eternity. Aristotle’s notion of substance is an attempt to combine form and matter through the use of theoria in such a way as to recognise the underlying continuity of form (‘substance’) through the changes of matter (‘accidents’) to which an entity is subject. But here too, through reason (the ‘logos’) the human substance can realize its higher good through the contemplation of God as pure form.56

Related to the notion of substance, first in Greek and then medieval thought, is the notion of a ‘principium individuationis’, i.e., the process by which individuality is generated either by form from matter or vice-versa. The notion of the principium individuationis was developed by Aristotle and then taken up by Thomas Aquinas within the form/matter schema.57 Aristotle himself derives it from Hippocrates, according to whom form individualises matter. However, in his later thinking he reverses this, and for him,58 as for Thomas Aquinas who takes him up in this regard in the medieval period, it is matter which individualises form.59 In particular for Thomas,

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the ‘rational soul’ (‘anima rationalis’), the form of humanity, is individualised by the human body, the matter of human existence. However, according to Reformational philosophy, the *principium individuationis* cannot genuinely account for individuality, since both form and matter are universal in character – merely combining them cannot generate the ‘this-ness’ of individual persons and things.

In his development of the Reformational critique begun by Kuyper, Dooyeweerd argues that Thomas Aquinas takes up Aristotle’s notion of substance, albeit stripped of its original religious basis, and then replaces Aristotle’s view of God as supreme form with the biblical doctrine of God the creator. Following Plato and Aristotle as well as later Hellenistic philosophers, Thomas attempts to understand being in terms of the four eternal concepts, or ‘transcendental’, as he calls them: unity, truth, beauty and goodness. These transcendental, for Thomas, define the being of all things, but only by analogy with the Being of God, where they exist in perfect form. In this latter respect, it is argued that Thomas shows the influence of neo-Platonist philosophy (in which form and matter are organised into a hierarchy of being), rather than purely Aristotelian influence. Nevertheless, it demonstrates his dependence on a schema in

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61 Dooyeweerd, ‘Der Idee der Individualiteits-structuur 2’: 20-21; Dooyeweerd, *R. & S* 2: 317-319. We see a forerunner of this in Duns Scotus’s notion of the ‘haecceitas’. Duns Scotus rejected the Aristotelian-Thomist ‘*principium individuationis*’ in favour of his own position of individuality as *singularitas* (‘noninstantiability’); see Effrem Bettoni, *Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of his Philosophy* (1978): 58-65, 121-123; William A. Frank and Allan B. Wolter, *Duns Scotus, metaphysician* (1995): 184-187, 196-197; Timothy Noone, ‘Universals and Individuation’ (2003): 113-115, 118-121. Dooyeweerd is not entirely satisfied that Scotus himself escapes the constraints of the form/matter schema, since although ‘haecceitas’ is not a form as such, he depends, he argues, on the notion of an individual substance which is ‘added to’ to the form/matter schema, leaving the latter intact (Dooyeweerd, ‘De Idee der individualiteits-structuur’: 34-39; Dooyeweerd, *R. & S* 2: 355-362). However, it can be argued that although Scotus does not abandon the form/matter schema, yet his notion of individuality is *haecceitas* (‘noninstantiability’); see Effrem Bettoni, *Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of his Philosophy* (1978): 58-65, 121-123; William A. Frank and Allan B. Wolter, *Duns Scotus, metaphysician* (1995): 184-187, 196-197; Timothy Noone, ‘Universals and Individuation’ (2003): 113-115, 118-121. Dooyeweerd is not entirely satisfied that Scotus himself escapes the constraints of the form/matter schema, since although ‘haecceitas’ is not a form as such, he depends, he argues, on the notion of an individual substance which is ‘added to’ to the form/matter schema, leaving the latter intact (Dooyeweerd, ‘De Idee der individualiteits-structuur’: 34-39; Dooyeweerd, *R. & S* 2: 355-362). However, it can be argued that although Scotus does not abandon the form/matter schema, yet his notion of individuality is *haecceitas*, as that which is encountered concretely, does provide us with an insight which transcends the form/matter schema, as I shall argue (5.3.1). As Scotus puts it: ‘individuals as such are also willed by the first cause, not as ends – for God alone is the end – but as something ordered to the end. Hence God multiplied the individuals within the species in order to communicate His goodness and His beatitude’ (*Ordinatio* II, d. 3, q. 7, n. 10 (quoted in Bettoni, *Duns Scotus*: 64)).

which the diversity of material experience is understood in terms of an underlying
theoretical form – a form that gives it value and intelligibility. Dooyeweerd argues that
Thomas’s addition of the category of grace to this picture only intensifies the dualism
that runs through it. According to the ‘natural’ categories which Thomas derives from
the Greeks, individual things are seen, first, as unordered matter, then given form
through the process of causality (understood along Aristotelian lines63), and finally
made sacred as objects through the infusion of grace (the latter seen as a ‘donum
superadditum’: ‘an additional gift’, i.e., additional to its original created nature).
Understanding the world is left neutrally to the work of reason, supplemented by grace:
‘grace’ describes that which is directly revealed or provided by God, and ‘nature’ that
which pertains to the world as one finds it through the course of everyday human
investigation.64 This grace/nature combination epitomises what Reformational thinkers
tend to call ‘scholasticism’,65 a term which we shall meet repeatedly in the course of this
study.

More specifically, the notion of substance, as a key concept of the scholastic
inheritance, is not confined to ancient or medieval philosophy. It has also played an
important role in modern philosophy, not least in the thought of Descartes, for whom
the thinking self intuits an underlying substance belonging to the objects of cognition in
which properties inhere.66 By this method, he comes to intuit himself as a thinking
substance (‘res cogitans’) with a point of location in the physical world (‘res

63 I.e., according to their material, formal, efficient and final causes – especially the last, where God is the
final cause through the ‘lex aeterna’ (Dooyeweerd, ‘R.K. en A.R.S.’ 10).
64 Dooyeweerd, R. & S 2: 293-343; Dooyeweerd, ‘Der Idee der Individualiteits-structuur 2’: 1-40.
65 ‘Scholasticism’ for Reformational thinkers following Kuyper, refers not simply to the thinking of the
most developed exponents of the approach in the medieval period, but also to a deeply ingrained tendency
from before the earliest days of Christianity right up to the present day (see D.F.M. Strauss, ‘Skolastiek en Gereformeerde Skolastiek kontra Reformatories-Christlike denke’, Ned. Geref. Theol. Tydskrif
(1969)). To compound the difficulty in using the term, Reformational thinkers tend to use ‘scholasticism’
not simply as a term of historical description (i.e., referring to the thought of the universities in distinction
from medieval monastic thought), but also pervasively as a polemical term against one another, using it to
describe tendencies of thought inconsistent with the tenor of biblical revelation, and, most specifically,
the tendency to operate within the confines of a ‘grace/nature’ dualism (Roy A. Clouser, The Myth of
critical-polemical use of the term ‘scholastic’ by those in the Reformational tradition needs to be
distinguished from the strictly historical-sociological use to characterize the academic practice of the
medieval schools rather than the theological reflection of the monasteries (Muller, Post-Reformation
Reformed Dogmatics: 1.360-405; 4.391-403). That ‘scholasticism’ has a more ‘neutral’ historical-
sociological usage, does not necessarily exclude its critical-polemical use (For the ‘grace/nature’ ground-
motive see 2.2).
This move is a critical one in the shaping of modern philosophy. According to Dooyeweerd, it is taken up by Kant with his notion of the ‘homo noumenon’ (the ‘transcendental’ subject) i.e., the recipient of sensation and the agent of rational deduction which is the necessary condition of the unification of thought and experience. The notion, especially that of the self as substance, still plays a critical part in more recent Western epistemology, even when the ontology of an underlying metaphysical substance pertaining to all things has been rejected. The alternative philosophical traditions of empiricism (notably by David Hume) and logical positivism (notably by Bertrand Russell) replace the notion of a transcendental human subject with the posit of the self as a mere bundle of sensations. However, even in the case of the latter, the notion of a recipient to whom these bundles of diverse sensations are presented remains. Dooyeweerd argues, with respect to modern philosophy, that the individual is neither a ‘natural substance’, an inbuilt category of mental process, nor, pace Hume or Russell, a mere bundle of sense-data or a logical construct.

Both Vollenhoven (in his mature thought) and Dooyeweerd argue that the notion of ‘substance’ – be it in its ancient, medieval, or modern form – is a false ‘solution’ to the question about how the individual, encountered in naïve experience, is and can be

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69 It is a move paralleled by the critique of the notion of substance by Heidegger and his decisive break with Husserl (Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (1962): H. 114-117, pp. 149-153), who, influenced by the Marburg neo-Kantians, still clung on to the notion of the transcendental Ego (Russell Matheson, Husserl: A Guide for the Perplexed (2006): 146), although Husserl also recognises the ‘surplus’ which exceeds the psychological conception of the self (Ideas 2: 147 (quoted in Matheson, Husserl: 154)). However, as we shall see, Vollenhoven and, especially, Dooyeweerd followed this through in a very different way from Heidegger (see 5.2.1).
72 Philosophically (although not, per impossibile, in everyday life) Russell is working within the schema that all that there is are bundles of sense-data + logic (Dooyeweerd, N.C.(not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, ‘Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.’ 178-179; see O.K. Bouwsma, ‘Moore’s Theory of Sense-Data’ (1967)).
known. 73 Among Reformational philosophers, the notion of ‘substance’ was put forward by the South African philosopher, Hendrik Stoker, in order to safeguard individual continuity – a proposal which Dooyeweerd rejects as ‘neo-scholastic’. 74 The notion of substance (be it in its classical or modern form) is an attempt to make the individual the bearer of his, her or its own meaning, or to ground him, her or it in some sort of pre-existent combination of form and matter. For example, human beings are seen in dualistic terms as souls and bodies, and, in one account (that of Thomas), the soul is seen as the form of the body. Faith is then added onto this picture as a capacity of the soul brought into effect through grace. Further, the notion of substance involves, at least implicitly, recourse to a conception of a self-enclosed, self-subsistent entity. 75 Substances are interchangeable and capable of being defined conceptually, whereas, at bottom, genuine individuals are not. 76

From a Reformational perspective, then, the notion of substance – whether according to Aristotle, Thomas or in its more recent use in modern philosophy – cannot provide us with an account of individuality. Nor does it do justice to the integrity of the individual before God. All dualisms are to be rejected – whether they are the Greek division between form and matter, the medieval dualism between grace and nature, or the Enlightenment dualism between nature and freedom. 77

73 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §139, p. 104; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 3.2; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.4-3.
74 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 3.42-53; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.62-76. In fairness to Stoker, it might be argued that he might have envisaged substance neither in terms of the classical form/matter schema, nor its more recent permutations, but closer to the notion individuality which, I am arguing in this section, is an element of the Reformational vision. However, in retaining the terminology of ‘substance’ Stoker leaves that unclear.
76 As Roy Clouser points out, every kind of substance (be it the Aristotelian ideal of a changeless core, or a modern notion of a functional constant) involves identifying certain kinds of properties or laws as the essential nature of the creatures concerned (Roy A. Clouser, ‘The Uniqueness of Dooyeweerd’s Program for Philosophy and Science: Whence the Difference?’ (1995): 12 (n. 21)). This is not to dismiss Aristotle’s intuitive insights, which, despite the shortcomings of the schema in terms of which he is operating, show an awareness of the irreducible immediacy of the individual whether as ‘ἀτομον’ (‘undivided’) or ‘τὸ αὐτόν’ (‘this here’) in the Categories or the Metaphysics respectively (Michael Wedin, Aristotle’s Theory of Substance: The Categories and Metaphysics Zeta (2000): 130).
77 As we shall see (2.2), these dualisms are described by Dooyeweerd as ‘ground-motives’. Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought (1972): 27-60; Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning: 14-31, 111-180; Dooyeweerd, Roots: 9-31, 111-188; Dooyeweerd, R. & S. 1: 1-39. For an indication of Vollenhoven’s slightly different but complementary perspective see K.A. Bril, ‘A Comparison between Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven on the Historiography of Philosophy’, P.R. 60 (1995): 125-126.
To be consistent with this rejection of all forms of dualism, human beings are not to be understood as souls and bodies, but as integral entities. As will be argued, the ‘heart’ (as the Reformational reading of the Bible has it) is not a distinct entity or element within the human constitution. It is simply the human being seen most basically in terms of his or her relationship with God. While Kuyper’s account retains a somewhat dualistic character, his account of the heart provides what Dooyeweerd regards as the radical break with ‘scholasticism’ and it is this which lays the basis for a better integrated anthropology, one more in keeping with the biblical roots. From a Reformational perspective, an individual only receives meaning from beyond the horizon of temporal experience: i.e., in dependence on the Origin of all meaning and existence, whom Christians know as the Father of Jesus.

To sum up: from a Reformational perspective, all created things have equal ontic status in that the being of all created individuals is equally and directly dependent on the Father. This vision of the direct dependence of every creature upon God contrasts with the picture of the ‘great chain of being’ in which God’s relationship is mediated hierarchically down this chain of being from ‘higher’ creatures, or ‘higher’ created elements, to ‘lower’ ones. Further, all entities in the world are to be understood not as phenomenal representations of an underlying reality (such as a substance), but rather as creatures called into being, and subject, moment by moment, to God’s call and purpose. This does not exclude the functional differences one from another, nor that human beings and other sentient creatures have the capacity for true knowledge, and (as is the case for all creatures) can truly be known. But while it is only human beings who can come to know their dependence upon God, their dependence upon God, as with all creatures, is prior to that knowledge: the (noetic) direct or indirect awareness of God.  

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79 As we shall see this is true for both Vollenhoven (4.1.1) and Dooyeweerd (4.2.1).
80 Kuyper’s anthropology retains the traditional scholastic division between ‘soul’ and ‘body’, and remains somewhat rationalistic (with the emphasis on the rational element in the leading role) (Kuyper, Near: Ch. 28, p. 179; Ch. 39, p. 242; Ch. 85, pp. 519-522; Fernhout, ‘Man, faith and religion’ (46-50).  
81 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.69 (not in W.d.W.) = Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.12. As we shall see, Dooyeweerd tends to reserve Being (upper case) and meaning to the created order to indicate the latter’s radically dependent status. However, the distinction, heavily dependent upon Dooyeweerd’s own ‘linguistic turn’ in the late 1920s, is not altogether satisfactory (see 2.2 and 5.2.1).
82 See Mt. 6.26-30.
arises from the real (ontic) dependence of humanity, as of creation as a whole, upon God.

The theme of the integrity of individuals before God needs to be seen in the context of the subjugation of all relationships to the sovereign rule of Christ. This is the second Reformational theme, to which I shall now turn.

1.2 The Irreducible Plurality of Society and the World under the Son

The second Reformational theme, then, is the affirmation of the world’s irreducible plurality under the rule of the Son, in whom it is created, through whom it is redeemed, and by whom it will be judged. The Son is the Co-creator and the Saviour of the world – and is the latter only because he is already the former. There is therefore no grace/nature division. From a Reformational perspective, ‘grace’ and ‘nature’ should not be set against one another – the proper distinction is between creation and re-creation.\(^84\) ‘Re-creation’ means the transformation of the first creation after the entry of sin – it is a purging of its subsequent fallenness, and a healing of its wounds, not the nullification of its original goodness.

Kuyper sees human society neither as an undifferentiated whole, nor as a conglomerate of atomistic individuals. Both the collectivist and individualist tendencies are present in unstable combination in the ideas of the French Revolution and the developments to which it gave rise. Against both collectivism and individualism, he sets out a vision of society in which there are clearly differentiated social structures, arising from the order of creation but unfolded in history, each with its own appropriate sphere of responsibility and competence. For Kuyper, all spheres of the society (family, business, science, art as well as state and church) are directly under the Lordship of the Son.\(^85\) He calls this ‘sphere sovereignty’ (‘souvereiniteit in eigen kring’). However, he uses the

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\(^{85}\) Kuyper, ‘Common Grace’: 170; Kuyper, Lectures: 78-170.
notion of ‘sphere sovereignty’ in various and somewhat different ways. This creates difficulties, as his uses of the term are not entirely compatible with each other, certainly not in their initial exposition. There are at least three different ways in which he uses the notion.

The first sense is outlined in his inaugural address at the V.U., where he presents a theory of societal institutions. He elaborates this vision in greater detail in his 1898 Stone Lectures at Princeton, where he sets out a view of ‘sphere sovereignty’ in which state, church, and all institutions of society are envisaged as possessing distinctive areas of competence and appropriate operations according to their specific task or function. He draws on the well-developed pluralist tradition in Reformed thought from John Althusius (1557-1638) on. However, in working out what ‘sphere sovereignty’ actually means, Kuyper is still deeply influenced by nineteenth century currents of thought, namely, historicism and organicism.

With respect to historicism, like his predecessor in the Anti-Revolutionary movement, Groen, Kuyper was influenced by the view that legitimacy is rooted in the sheer fact of what is given in a specific situation and its particular cultural character. Linked with this is the notion of the corporate autonomy of societal ‘corporations’, including the church. Groen and Kuyper were also influenced by the historical-legal school of Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779-1861) and Georg Friedrich Puchta (1798-1846); or alternatively, the corporatist conservatism of Friedrich Julius Stahl (1802-1861). However, Kuyper is critical of Stahl because he confines legality within the boundaries of human knowledge and fails to see how it arises primordially from religion. He argues that all ethical right is rooted in God’s claim upon all creation. Sheer conservatism, even if based on one’s respect for God’s sovereign providence in specific situations, cannot

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89 For a discussion of ‘historicism’ see 2.2.
do justice to the call of God to humanity as a whole, and individual responsibility in the moment of decision, since merely appealing to the status quo does not properly take into account the depth of the human response.

With respect to organicism, one can see its influence in Kuyper’s description of relationships as the state of being joined together like ligaments of a body, and parts of a wider whole. He tends to express his conception of society in terms of what he describes as its ‘organic relations’, especially those of the family, local communities and their constituent elements. This is also behind his somewhat conservative – albeit deeply appreciative – attitude towards women, and explains his support of proposals such as household suffrage exercised by the male head of the household. More generally, he expresses a historicistic organicism in a way that idealizes the Gemeinschaft, the ideal of the natural community (of family or kinship group), as the normative characteristic of society.

The first sense of Kuyper’s ‘sphere sovereignty’ was developed later by both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. Both these latter contend that Kuyper is vague and inconsistent about how the spheres were actually defined, and suggest that this lack of clarity prevents him from developing a systematic social and political theory. Both give accounts of how the range of institutions in society act in accordance with universal principles, not simply as a conservative defence of existing corporate rights or practices. As we shall see, far from Dooyeweerd’s advocacy of pluralism being a reactionary stance, he sets out a normative basis on which ‘progressive’ and ‘reactionary’ tendencies in the development of society can be identified, so that the former could be promoted and the latter counteracted. This in turn provides the basis

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for a pluralistic vision of society, according to which not only the power of the state but also of any other overweening institution or element can be held in check. Only thus can there be genuine social flourishing.\textsuperscript{98} Dooyeweerd especially develops an account of social institutions, with particular attention to the philosophy of law. Further, the way in which Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd develop ‘sphere sovereignty’ provides more systematically for a philosophy encompassing the whole of creation rather than merely human society. In this regard, they were building on the second sense of ‘sphere sovereignty’ to which I now turn.

The second sense of ‘sphere sovereignty’, which is implicit rather than explicit in Kuyper’s thinking, is of diversity as a creational principle. Although he does not number or provide us with a systematic description of them, for Kuyper there are numerous and diverse domains which govern relations among individuals: religious, political, scientific, artistic, economic, and familial. Each is subject directly to the Son and obeys its own laws of life.\textsuperscript{99} For Kuyper, this plurality is expressed in the form of a diversity of ‘creation ordinances’ relevant to different kinds of relations (to be distinguished from the institutional plurality of the first sense of ‘sphere sovereignty’ described above).\textsuperscript{100} The diversity of the created order depends for its true character on the rule of Christ over every area of life. Kuyper’s best-known statement proclaims the need to make all aspects of life subject to Christ. As he puts it:

‘…there is not a square inch in the whole domain of one’s human existence over which Christ, who is Sovereign over all, does not cry: “Mine!”’\textsuperscript{101}

This is a striking vision of Christ as the ascended Lord, who rules with the authority of the Father by virtue of his status not only as the one in whom and through whom all

\begin{footnotes}
\item[99] Dooyeweerd, \textit{Vernieuwing en Bezinning}; 53-58; Dooyeweerd, \textit{Roots}; 48-54.
\item[100] Dooyeweerd, \textit{De beteekenis der wetsidee voor rechtswetenschap en rechtsfys losophie}; 63-64; W.J. Ouweneel, \textit{De leer van de mens: Proeve van een christelijk-wijsgerechte anthropology}; 262; Klapwijk, ‘Reformational Philosophy’; 110-115. There was a move away from the notion of ‘creation ordinances’ which Kuyper and others so powerfully enunciated. This was partly in reaction to the misuse of the idea by theologians during the Nazi period, but also partly to the association of the idea with notions of supra-temporality (A. Van Egmond and Cornelis Van der Kooi, ‘The appeal to creation ordinances: a changing tide’, \textit{Forum} 21 (1993)).
\item[101] ‘Sphere Sovereignty’ in Bratt, ed., \textit{Kuyper Reader}; 488.
\end{footnotes}
things were created, but also as Saviour and, further, as future Judge. For Kuyper, the general principle of Calvinism involves what he calls ‘the cosmological significance of Christ’. In speaking of Christ’s ‘cosmological significance’, he has Christ’s redemptive role in view, as well as his prior creative one. Christ is redeemer of all creation because he is creator of all. For this reason, Christ’s work includes the ‘restoration of the entire cosmos’, not simply the ‘redemption of individual sinners’.102

From a more consistently Reformational perspective, the way that Kuyper describes the Lordship of Christ over creation as a whole is not entirely satisfactory. There are residual ‘scholastic’ elements in his thought, not least in his distinction between ‘archetype’ and ‘ectype’: the archetype being located in its eternal origin in God, and the ectype being the temporal expression of the eternal truth. He emphasises the role of the Son as mediator of creation, possibly at the cost of attributing to ‘creation ordinances’ an absoluteness that subjects the work of God to quasi-divine structures (similar to Plato’s ‘laws’). The Logos as Kuyper conceives it tends to be understood as an impersonal principle of a logical character, and he tends to accord the creation ordinances eternal status as universals existing alongside God with a pre-ordained fixity. Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd were to critique Kuyper for this reason.103

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102 Kuyper, *Lectures*: 118-119 (Kuyper’s italics). As we shall see in the following section (1.3) this restoration is effected specifically by the Holy Spirit, but under the kingship of the Son.

However, despite their critique of these residual scholastic elements, this second, wider sense of sphere sovereignty as creational diversity was rigorously developed by Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. As we shall see, their conception of ‘sphere sovereignty’ would later be set within the diversity of norms that govern all relationships. It is complementary to the first sense of ‘sphere sovereignty’, which affirms the diversity of the corporate structures of society, and the need for this diversity to be respected, nurtured and protected. However, there is a third sense of ‘sphere sovereignty’ which has sometimes come to eclipse the other two senses as the ‘the Kuyperian position’. This third sense, which I shall consider now, is of a different order to the first two, and arguably at variance with them.

This third sense of ‘sphere sovereignty’ can be seen in Kuyper’s rectorial address of 1892, ‘De Verflauwing der Grenzen’ (‘the blurring of the boundaries’). This sense of sphere sovereignty is what was subsequently called ‘verzuiling’ (‘columned society’), where the only remedy for the pervasive influence of pantheism (defined very broadly) was to form an independent ‘life-sphere’ (‘levenskring’) in which educational and other institutions for each group of believers, defined confessionally, are established. Here, as Heslam points out, he uses the term ‘sphere’ to indicate not a social institution or association, but, a ‘realm of human existence’ or, more specifically, a confessionally defined zone or complex of institutions and associations defined by the fundamental religious beliefs of their respective confessional communities.

It is this sense of ‘sphere sovereignty’ as ‘verzuiling’ that has had the most notable
impact on the social and political ordering of the Netherlands. But it is also the most problematical of the senses of ‘sphere sovereignty’. It is in danger of drawing a straight line from the fundamental religious belief of the members of a given community to the corporate expression of that belief. This can result in a form of separatism along confessional lines without fully taking into account the distinctly creational structure of each of the social entities concerned. It might lead to the dominance of one institution over another in a way that violates their sphere sovereignty in the first sense. For example, it might give undue dominance to the church as an institution over other institutions or associations, leading to an over-concentration on one aspect of creation at the expense of another (such as faith over justice). Also, as Heslam points out, it is unclear how it can be related to the original creation order, since the confessional diversity which arose out of doctrinal controversies (although perhaps not arising for cultural or other reasons) can only have arisen after the fall. In this regard, it seems to be in conflict also with the sense of ‘sphere sovereignty’ that stems from the diversity inherent in the created order itself.

Despite the different ways in which ‘sphere sovereignty’ has been understood (and also despite the problems of the historicistic influences upon the ‘sphere sovereignty’, especially in its social expression) we can still trace a common theme of a creation subject to God and harmoniously diverse to the extent that it is subject to God in the different aspects of the created order. As we shall see, despite differences in the way they were influenced, both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven sought to promote Kuyper’s vision of the Lordship of Christ over every area of life. Creation, although at present fallen and subject to the distortion of sin, needs to be seen in all of its harmonious diversity; and, moreover, needs to be seen in terms of the unfolding of God’s purposes in history. It is this last theme to which I shall now turn.

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107 Kuyper speaks of the separation of different kinds of people on the basis of *palingenesis* (Kuyper, *Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid* 2: §4; Kuyper, *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology*: §39. I owe this suggestion to Anthony Garood. For ‘*palingenesis*’ see Chapter One introduction).

1.3 The Purposiveness of the Historical Process through the Spirit

The third theme of the Reformational vision is the affirmation of the purposive nature of the historical process. As in the first theme we see the integrity of each individual subject coram Deo, and in the second the sovereignty of Christ over every area of life, so in the third we see the work of the Spirit in bringing about God’s purposes in and through the historical process.

The work of the Holy Spirit takes place within the context of the covenant between God and the whole of the created order generally, and with humanity in particular. Kuyper develops this first in terms of God’s original action of creation effected through the work of the Holy Spirit. Further, it is seen in the work of the Holy Spirit in ‘particular’ and ‘common’ grace. The former concerns the work of the Holy Spirit as revealed in the human heart – the specific work of God in the elect, those who are beneficiaries of God’s efficient grace. This is central to the account of election and saving grace in the theology of John Calvin. As we have seen, it is taken up in Kuyper’s account of palingenesis: God’s saving purposes are revealed at the centre of human experience, for each individual. Alongside this, the Holy Spirit restrains the effects of sin through his universal influence over all people. For Kuyper, this insight is expressed in his notion of ‘common grace’: the notion that the Spirit is not simply working in the hearts of individuals (‘particular grace’), but also in the cultural development of creation and human society as a whole. Special grace and common grace presuppose one another – it is through common grace that special grace is


112 See Ch. 1 Introduction.

possible and *vice versa*. Just as in particular grace the elect are brought to salvation through the work of the Holy Spirit with Christ as the mediator of salvation, a role for which he is fitted as mediator of creation, so the world at large is restored by the Holy Spirit on the basis of Christ as mediator of creation (common grace) and through the sideways implications of his work as redeemer of humanity (special grace). Thus, because special grace is centred on Christ, and because his Body shares in his honour, common grace is an ‘emanation’ of special grace and flows back into special grace, which has as its end and purpose the glorification of the Son. On the other hand, common grace can be seen as a preparation for the reception of special grace in that it holds open the sense of God, restrains entire human degeneracy and opens the way for the gospel to be received. Just as special or particular grace looks forward to the transformation of the elect through the particular work of the Holy Spirit, benefiting through the prior work of common grace in overcoming evil as an obstacle to the gospel, so common grace, through the sideways implications of special grace, looks forward towards the transformation of the entire universe. This transformation of the universe does not imply the destruction or supercession of its material character, but rather its re-orientation towards God and the restoration of its original goodness.

Heslam points out that for Kuyper the destiny of the creation is, in Kuyper’s words, ‘the restoration of the entire cosmos’. Thus, the account of God’s providence brings together God’s saving purposes for the elect, together with his intentions for creation as

114 Sytse U. Zuidema, ‘Common Grace and Christian Action in Abraham Kuyper’ (1972). D.F.M. Strauss argues that there is a problem in the way in which Kuyper sees Christ as Head of ‘particular’ grace and the ‘church’, but as such can only have a ‘sideways’ influence on civil life (Kuyper, *Gemeene Gratie*: 2,276 (‘zijdelingschen’ ... ‘burgersche leven’)). According to Kuyper, this influence is confined, firstly, to protecting the freedom and character of the institutional church; secondly, to preventing heathen concepts and ideas from replacing Christian ones in public opinion and institutions; and finally, through the behaviour of the members of the congregation, to the extension of nobler and purer concepts. In short, all that the congregation of Christ can aim is only a ‘moral triumph’ – a position that Strauss sees as close to Thomas Aquinas’s notion of grace perfecting nature. Strauss contends that Kuyper is working within a grace/nature dichotomy in that he accords the State a natural point of departure, while he accords the church a super-natural point of departure. Certainly, by allocating to the church institution the terrain of particular grace, and to civil society in general the terrain of common grace, Kuyper is tending towards a scholastic dualism that gives the institutional church a distinctive ontological and epistemological status within the wider social order (D.F.M. Strauss, ‘The Viability of Kuyper’s Idea of Christian Scholarship’: 125-126).


116 Kuyper, *Dictaten dogmatiek*: 3 Locus de Peccato, §4, p. 35.

117 Kuyper, *Lectures*: 119-120 (Kuyper’s italics); Heslam, *Christian worldview*: 175. Heslam points out that Kuyper sees the following passages (all alluded to in Kuyper, *Lectures*: 119-120) as teaching the cosmic significance of Christ’s salvation: Jn. 1.1-4; Mt. 19.28; Rom. 8.19-23; Col. 1.16-20; Rev. 4.11 (Heslam, *Christian worldview*: 175 (n. 121)).
Thus the purposes of God are worked out by the Holy Spirit in creation as a whole. Kuyper rejects the ‘Romanist’ teaching that there are two spheres: the earthly and the heavenly, with corresponding human capacities, ‘natural’ and ‘super-natural’; and the fall seen as involving the loss of the latter but not the former. In terms of the Reformational perspective, enunciated by Kuyper, there is no final distinction between the everyday and the sacred. The distinction is rather that between the principium of the work of the Spirit and the principium of the world at enmity with God. According to this understanding, miracles are marked out purely according to their revelatory power, not because they are more directly the work of God than any others.  

Sexual and other physical appetites are not in any sense deficiencies or elements of the created order that somehow need to be transcended. The issue is not the desires themselves, but the way in which they are directed and given expression. Unlike Plato’s view of reality, physicality is not seen as something from which we are to be healed or from which we are to escape, but as something that needs to be redeemed, restored, and transformed according to God’s purposes. Kuyper argues that this involves an appreciation of the ‘cosmological significance’ of Christ. This was something that had been lost sight of prior to the Reformation with the rupture between the life of nature and the life of grace. He argues, rather, from a Calvinist standpoint that the whole of humanity is fallen in every respect, but that the full implications of human sinfulness (which left to itself would lead to the degeneracy of human life) have been kept in check by common grace. This restraint of evil is the reverse side of the coin to the unfolding of created potential. Through common grace, sin is not permitted entirely to destroy the potential of the created order. Common grace makes history possible, not, in Kuyper’s words, as ‘an endless, unvarying repetition of the same things’, but as ‘constant change, modification, and transformation in human life’. God is constantly bringing about new

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119 See Plato, ‘Phaedo’ (1997): 114c, p. 197; Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 167-172. Catherine Pickstock attempts to salvage Plato’s account in this respect from a Christian perspective (Catherine Pickstock, ‘The Soul in Plato’ (2003)). However, despite Pickstock’s gloss, it can still be argued that the Platonic vision remains irreconcilable with the Christian expectation of the resurrection of the body, which excludes, on the one hand, any materialistic reductionism but also, on the other hand, any downplaying of present physicality or future embodiment.

120 Kuyper, Werk Heiligen Geest: 79-94; Kuyper, Holy Spirit: 1.3; Kuyper, Lectures: 118.
things by which life can be enriched; indeed, God brings to light hidden talents and develops human history by a ‘regular process’, securing humanity and its cultural milieu, and making possible all scientific endeavours.¹²¹

Redemption, then, from a Reformational perspective, is not the recovery of some lost constituent element of humanity or of the world, nor does it involve the abandonment of certain elements or features of the world. From this perspective sin is neither the loss of a property or substance, nor even a deficiency in being – it is a wrong orientation of one’s stance towards God, and how this works out in the way we live. Faith is not an additional element in the human constitution, something to be given or restored, but a re-orientation of one’s whole being to God through the redemption one has in Christ through the work of the Holy Spirit.¹²² Similarly, the Christian hope is not for a future disembodied state but for the resurrection, in Christ through the Spirit, of the whole human life, bodily restored, in a transformed universe.¹²³ The implication of this is that Christians are called, through God’s Spirit, to engage in all aspects of society, alongside their neighbours, and thus realise created potential, and more than that, become agents for its transformation, through common grace. The world at large is the objective of God’s final purposes and is to be subject in its wholeness to God’s rule.¹²⁴ In the light of this final purpose, the development of the world has value in itself, not simply as a means to an end.¹²⁵


¹²² In this sense, ‘faith’ is more than what Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd would call the ‘pistical’ modality, and is closer to what they both call ‘[D]irection’.


¹²⁵ Kuyper, ‘Common Grace’: 176.
Thus, through the working of the Holy Spirit in creation, the restraint of the effects of sin at large through common grace, and the restoration of humanity to full fellowship with God through special grace, Kuyper sees an overall purposiveness in the direction of history and the whole temporal process.

1.4 The Three Trinitarian Themes of the Reformational Vision

To sum up this chapter as a whole: the Reformational vision takes the affirmation of God’s sovereignty over every area of life. This is a vision inherited from John Calvin, and is central to Reformed theology. It was re-affirmed in a comprehensive way by Abraham Kuyper, in response to the Enlightenment’s scepticism about God’s agency in the world, to the reorganisation of society along secularist lines following the French Revolution, and more broadly to the dualisms which variously characterised Greek, medieval and modern thought. The vision which Kuyper enunciated is a symphony consisting of three themes. These three themes are: the integrity of the individual subject before God;\textsuperscript{126} the irreducible plurality of the world and of society under the rule of the Son;\textsuperscript{127} and God’s providence for the world, both for humanity and the wider cosmos, through the work of the Spirit.\textsuperscript{128} The three themes point to God’s threefold agency in the world: the will of the Father addresses all created beings as whole entities and expresses the Father’s care for each individual creature; the revelation of the Son models for us the many different ways in which the world is and should be; and the work of the Spirit transforms the world according to God’s purposes. While the work of God has this threefold character, it is a work carried out jointly by Father, Son and Holy Spirit in creation, redemption and the transformation of redeemed humanity and the world.

Kuyper’s lead was followed by a new generation of Reformational thinkers who continued his work. Chief among these were Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven. The two philosophers were guided by Kuyper’s vision of the sovereignty of God over every area

\textsuperscript{126} See 1.1.
\textsuperscript{127} See 1.2.
\textsuperscript{128} See 1.3.
of life, but sought to express this in a more consistent and comprehensive way than Kuyper himself had been able to achieve. This systematic approach encompassed all areas of knowledge, and sought to address universal human experience in a much less culturally specific way than that of Kuyper.\footnote{Dooyeweerd, ‘Introduction by the Editor in Chief’: 5-16; Dooyeweerd, ‘[Interview by Boeles]’.} Both were critical of elements in traditional Reformed theology which they felt compromised the integrity and global nature of this vision, and sought to set out a systematic philosophical structure which enshrined the Calvinian vision, but excluded those elements antithetical to it. As we shall see, neither Dooyeweerd’s nor Vollenhoven’s appropriations of the Kuyperian tradition were straightforward. Indeed, both came under strong criticism in the 1930s for departing from it in significant ways. However, both followed the trail blazed by Kuyper, and were inspired and shaped by the vision he enunciated.

In the chapters which follow, I shall look more closely at Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, as the two leading Reformational philosophers of the Twentieth Century. I shall explore how the three themes of Reformational thought illuminate the shape and working out of their philosophical systems and see how satisfactorily these themes are reflected in the structure of their thinking. To begin with, in the next chapter, I shall provide an overview of the development of their respective philosophies.
Chapter Two: Vollenhoven’s and Dooyeweerd’s Philosophical Development

Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, who are the major subjects of this study, drew on the pluralistic vision of their predecessor, Abraham Kuyper, which has been the subject of the previous chapter. The two figures were almost exact contemporaries (Vollenhoven just two years older than Dooyeweerd), and both were educated within the Gereformeerde Kerken tradition. From 1926, for a period of some forty years, they were Professors of Philosophy and of Philosophy of Law respectively at the Vrije Universiteit (V.U.) at Amsterdam. In this chapter, we shall see how the two philosophers worked out that vision in a systematic way to address not only social structures but also an understanding of created reality as a whole. Although they were collaborators in developing a comprehensive Christian philosophy, they differ in their accounts of how this vision is worked out. I shall present an overview of their philosophical development in order to see their mutual influence and divergences. That in turn will provide the background for a systematic comparison of the structure of their respective philosophical positions in the later chapters.

I shall look at the philosophical development of each in turn, starting with Vollenhoven.

2.1 An Overview of Vollenhoven’s Philosophical Development

The role of Dirk Vollenhoven in the development of Reformational thought is much less well known of than that of his brother-in-law. Even in his retrospective reflection on Vollenhoven’s philosophical contribution, Dooyeweerd largely focussed on the development of his own philosophical thinking. However, as his slightly older contemporary, Vollenhoven preceded Dooyeweerd in his own philosophical reflection, and arguably pioneered many of the key insights which Dooyeweerd later elaborated.

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130 As we have seen, the Gereformeerde Kerken were founded in 1892. The Doleantie, the breakaway of 1886 from the state Hervormde Kerk, joined the previous split, the Afscheiding, of 1834 (see Chapter One introduction).
131 Dooyeweerd, ‘Introduction by the Editor in Chief’.
As we shall see, by the time of their joint appointment as professors at the V.U. in 1926, their philosophical positions were very close. However, towards the end of that decade, their philosophical positions began to diverge. Nevertheless, in looking here at Vollenhoven’s distinctive development, as well as in the rest of this thesis, I shall endeavour to show that their insights, in important respects, remained complementary and indeed, exactly in their differences, are mutually corrective.

Dirk Hendrik Theodoor Vollenhoven was born on 1 November 1892 in Amsterdam. His family were members of the Gereformeerde Kerken, the denomination that had come into being under the leadership of Abraham Kuyper and others as a result of the ‘Doleantie’ of 1886. Accordingly, ‘Dik’ (as he was known in his family) was brought up within the Gereformeerde ‘pillar’. He attended the Eben Haëzer primary school and the Gereformeerde Gymnasium in Amsterdam, a class ahead of Dooyeweerd, and in the same class as Dooyeweerd’s sister, Hermina Maria (‘Mien’), his future wife. The Gereformeerde Gymnasium was presided over by the Reformed classical scholar, Jan Woltjer, from whom he derived a deep reverence for the Kuyperian vision of a Christian philosophy for the whole of life, which both then and later were to shape all his endeavours.

He enrolled at the V.U. in September 1911, where he studied literature and theology, and later, philosophy. During the years 1914-1918 he worked on his doctoral thesis at the Vrije Universiteit, entitled The Philosophy of Mathematics from a Theistic

132 See Chapter One introduction.
Woltjer’s approach can perhaps be characterised as a ‘Platonistic scholasticism’, in contrast to the ‘Aristotelian scholasticism’ which dominated the theology department of the Vrije Universiteit in the 1920s and 1930s (see J.H. Kok, ‘Woltjer’ (2007)).
134 While undergraduates, Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd shared an interest in philosophy and literature, which could take a somewhat mystical cast, a tendency from which Vollenhoven was dissuaded by Woltjer, his teacher and soon to be supervisor of his doctoral research. J. Glenn Friesen points to several student writings in the journal Opbouw, of which Vollenhoven was the founding editor from March 1914. These included a review of books by Frederik van Eeden (1860-1932), a psychiatrist and mystical thinker in whom Dooyeweerd was also interested (Vollenhoven, review of F. van Eeden and W. Versluys, Paulus ontwaken (14h), Opbouw 1 (1914); Vollenhoven, ‘Sirius en Siderius’, Opbouw 1 (1914). Both articles are quoted by J. Glenn Friesen, ‘Two Ways of Reformational Philosophy: Anthony Tol’s comparison of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’ (2011): 12-13). Vollenhoven also showed an interest in the writings of Pierre Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye (1848-1920) and A. H. de Hartog (1869-1938) (Vollenhoven, Gastcolleges: 208; George Puchinger, ‘Dr D.H.Th. Vollenhoven’ (1961): 88; Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 10; Friesen, ‘Two Ways’: 14-15). However, possibly influenced by Woltjer, Vollenhoven published an article in Opbouw in 1916 that was severely critical of de Hartog (Vollenhoven, ‘Gereformeerd blijven? ... Waarom niet?’ (16a), Opbouw 3 (1916); Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 21; Friesen, ‘Two Ways’: 12-13).
Standpoint. His position in his doctoral thesis, in which he sets out a view of what he called ‘theistic’ philosophy, centres on a view of the self as an active substance constructing its understanding of the world. After graduating with his doctorate, he served as a Gereformeerde Kerken pastor, first in Oostkapelle in Zeeland, and then, from May 1921, in The Hague. These were formative years philosophically for Vollenhoven, and were marked by two key shifts in his systematic thinking.

The first shift concerned the nature of the human person or self. It came about through his interaction with Antheunis Janse (1890-1960), a schoolmaster, who initially entered into correspondence with Vollenhoven over issues arising from their common interest in the philosophy of mathematics. Largely through the influence of Janse, Vollenhoven abandoned his previous view of the self as substance. In his later view, he rejects any schema of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ in the relationship between the heart or soul and the body as well as any notion of the intrinsic immortality of the soul. Instead, Vollenhoven came to see the human being as an integral unity with the soul seen not as a separate entity but, as Vollenhoven was later to put it, the ‘pre-functional’, ‘religious’ centre of the human being. Following biblical usage, like Kuyper, and, as we shall see, like Dooyeweerd as well, he calls this religious centre, the ‘heart’. As we shall see, for both philosophers, this was to prove critical in their account of the distinctive character of a Christian philosophy.

136 Vollenhoven, De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde van theïstisch standpunt (18a) (1918); Kok, Vollenhoven: 2-3, 9-231, 308-353.
The second, and parallel, shift in his position concerned the character of knowledge itself. In the period immediately following the completion of his thesis, his view shifted from one in which knowledge was seen as unfolding intra-mentally, to one where it was seen as being appropriated from a diversity of external givens unfolded over time.\(^{140}\)

While intuition is central for Vollenhoven in his early and later epistemology, there is a shift for him in its basic character. Initially, Vollenhoven (following Henri Bergson, 1859-1941) sees intuition as the constitution of experience into intelligible wholes (something approaching what he later calls ‘perception’). Accordingly, in his thesis of 1918, he describes the different levels of intuition. These levels relate to the process of perception whereby the concreteness of a particular percept is reflected upon with increasing levels of abstraction.\(^{141}\) Subsequent to writing his thesis, he came to see

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Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)’: 184-193; ‘Problemen rondom de tijd’ (1963); Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’: 206-207). ‘Immanence’ in Scripture properly belongs to God alone, and it is not correctly attributed to humanity or any part of the human constitution (e. g., the ‘soul’ seen as immaterial substance). For Vollenhoven, the whole person, including the body, is the image of God (Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 43-44; Bril and Boonstra, ed., S. Kaarten: 270, 279). That image is not some sort of possession, or an aspect of one’s being. All the functions that form the body are together an ‘entire cloak of functions’ (‘geheel de functiemantel’). This unity is located in the ‘heart’ or ‘soul’ (Vollenhoven, Gastcolleges: 246-247). Vollenhoven notes that in Scripture, ‘spirit’ means ‘[D]irectional principle’ (‘richtings-principe’) – it cannot be identified with any component or element of the human constitution (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §139, pp. 104-5). The division between ‘spirit’ and ‘flesh’ is not between two parts or functions of a human being, but between the human being as regenerated and animated by the Holy Spirit, and fallen human nature, the ‘body of death’. The heart is ‘pre-functional’, i.e., it has a unity prior to the exercise of the diversity of physical or mental functions (Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 43-44 (n. 39 – Vollenhoven quotes Rom. 47.24, 41 Cor. 15.44, 42 Cor. 45.41-48); Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§ 92, 93, 114, 121, pp. 61-62, 75-77, 80-83; Vollenhoven, ‘Historia Philosophiae (II – I) (41d)’: 8, 34-37; Vollenhoven, ‘Divergentierapport I (53)’: 115-117; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)’: 184-190; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’ /2, p. 201; Bril and Boonstra, ed., S. Kaarten: 293). It is the whole embodied human being who is raised immortal (Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 44-45 (n. 40)). Vollenhoven argues that God can subject the whole person, soul and body alike, to both temporal and eternal death (‘Verslag van de studieconferentie op 4 en 5 januari 1943 te Amsterdam’, C.V.C.W. (1945): 33-34). By the same token, it is the whole person, body and soul, that is redeemed, not merely a disembodied entity described variously as ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’. The Christian hope is located not in any notion of the intrinsic immortality of the soul, but only in the work of God in Christ, through whom alone is the triumph over death. Thus, much less equivocally than Dooyeweerd as we shall see (see 4.2.2), and even Kuyper (see Chapter One introduction footnote), he firmly distances his conception of basic religious commitment from any possible metaphysical anthropology located in a supra-temporal level of reality. Rather, religion, for him, is the stance of the whole human person in time, through Christ alone. I shall address the meaning of the terms ‘religion’/‘religious’ and ‘heart’ in 4.1.2. For a comparison with Dooyeweerd’s position, see 2.2 and 4.2.2.


\(^{141}\) He took over the categories of intuition as described by Höfding in his exposition of Bergson, namely that of concrete, analytical and metaphysical:

1. Concrete intuition – I am aware that this is something,
2. Practical intuition – I see some x persisting through the changes of phenomena,
3. Analytical intuition – there is a difference between x and y, and
intuition as having an architectonic role. This architectonic role involves a ‘metalogical’ function for intuition, a way of organizing the elements of experience in the light of an overall philosophical schema.\textsuperscript{142} During this period, Vollenhoven engaged in an intensive programme of reading, especially the Baden school of neo-Kantian philosophers. Through this reading, he shifted his focus from the process of knowing to the laws or norms appropriate to the different kinds of subject matter. Drawing on the notion of intuition (‘schouwen’) derived from the Baden neo-Kantians he came to the position that knowledge is not uniform or homogeneous, but diverse in kind, each field of human activity having norms appropriate to it.\textsuperscript{143} The norms are not to be thought of as the creation of the human mind, but of ‘holding’ (‘geldend’) extra-mentally,\textsuperscript{144} each field being governed by its own distinctive norms or laws. However, despite the epistemic diversity, there was nevertheless a ‘heteronomy’ (i.e., a mind-independent

\textsuperscript{142} Vollenhoven, ‘Hegel op onze lagere scholen? (21c)’, Paedagogisch tijdschrift voor het Christelijk onderwijs 14 (1921): 81 (n. 85); Vollenhoven, ‘[Letter to F.W. Grosheide, 16 November 1921]’ in Vollenhoven Archives (1921); I am grateful to Anthony Tol for this document; see Kok, Vollenhoven: 20-21 (nn. 34-37); Tol, Philosophy: 201-211; Vollenhoven, ‘Grondslagen en grensvragen der algemene kentheorie (25ms)’ (1925): 8 (I am grateful to John Kok for his transcription); Introduction: §§31, 48, pp. 25, 33. Vollenhoven identifies different organizing principles that shape the construction of a schema. In his Introduction, Vollenhoven gives, in passing, a number of examples of schemata which he rejects, namely: the schema of ‘means-end’ (Vollenhoven, Introduction:§60, p. 39); ‘partial aprioristic’, which takes a ‘higher’ function to be good and a ‘lower’ to be evil, and the ‘ascending’, which sees the ‘higher’ to be the goal through time of the ‘lower’ (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §88, p. 59; see Vollenhoven, Proeve eener ordening van wijsgeerige consepties (39k) (1939): 24); ‘nature-grace’ (Introduction, §130, p. 96); the ‘form-content’ (‘vorm-inhoud’) schema (Vollenhoven, ‘Enkele grondlijnen der kentheorie (26b)’, Stemmen des Tijds 15 (1926): 391-398; Vollenhoven, ‘Kentheorie en natuurwetenschap (26d)’, Orgaan der Christelijke Vereniging van Natuur- en Geneeskundigen in Nederland (1926): 57; Vollenhoven, ‘Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)’, P.R. 13 (1948): §1, pp. 59-60 (Hoofdlijnen: 13-14); Kok, Vollenhoven: 358-359), and that of ‘macrocosmos-microcosmos’ (Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 242, 259-260).

\textsuperscript{143} In 1919 Vollenhoven speaks of ‘the goals set by God for the areas of science, morals and art, in obedience to the norms that God has set’ (Vollenhoven, ‘Paedagogiek en paedagogie (19ms)’ (1919): 17 (‘het nastreven van de door God gestelde normen . . .’); Vollenhoven, ‘[Press release; lecture]: “Paedagogiek en paedagogie” (20b), De School met den Bijbel 27 (1920) cited by Kok, Vollenhoven: 16-17 (n. 23)). In 1921, Vollenhoven states: ‘logic is, together with ethics, aesthetics etc., in being a science of norms, thereby distinguished from the explicative [i.e., descriptive] sciences . . .’ (Vollenhoven, ‘Letter to Grosheide (1921)’; Tol, Philosophy: 93 (n. 34)).

\textsuperscript{144} Vollenhoven asserts: ‘But the norm as such differs from all that exists. Norms have their own mode of being. They hold [i.e., have validity]’ (Vollenhoven, ‘Iets over het stelsel van Bergson (21ms)’ (1921): 8 (‘Maar de norm als zodanig verschilt van al het zijnde: normen hebben een eigenaardige wijze van zijn: ze gelden’); cited in Kok, Vollenhoven: 21 (n. 36)).

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ordering) to the whole, which reflects an underlying ‘systasis’ (i.e., ontic\textsuperscript{145} coherence) that needs to be taken into account in the process of ‘synthesis’ (i.e., noetic coherence).\textsuperscript{146} In the summer of 1920, Vollenhoven spent a period of study under the psychologist, Felix Krüger (1874-1948) in Leipzig,\textsuperscript{147} looking at the relation of intuition and the intellect broadly within Bergson’s philosophical framework. Drawing on Bergson’s insights, he sharpened his sense of the importance of time, a view which would shape his philosophical investigations for the rest of his life.\textsuperscript{148}

The stimulus for this second, parallel, shift in his thinking was his lifelong intellectual partnership with Herman Dooyeweerd. While a student, Vollenhoven had re-established his friendship with Hermina Dooyeweerd, whom he married in October 1918. Herman Dooyeweerd, his brother-in-law, moved up to The Hague in 1919. The two brothers-in-law engaged in intensive philosophical discussion,\textsuperscript{149} which led, in mid-1922 to a

\textsuperscript{145} The ‘ontic’ in this sense is \textit{that which is apprehended}, as opposed to the ‘noetic’, which is \textit{one’s apprehension of} that which is apprehended. Dooyeweerd himself distinguishes the ‘intentional’ and the ‘ontic’ in this sense (Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 1.39).

\textsuperscript{146} Vollenhoven speaks of: ‘a certain autonomy for thinking in its own field … that is why in its method, in its working over material, thinking has to develop its own activity, and for that activity norms and ideals hold that do not hold elsewhere: heteronomy here too can easily be unity with autonomy “sovereignty (of ordering not creating) in its own sphere” ’ (Vollenhoven, ‘Hegel (21c)’: 80 (‘een zekere autonomie voor het denken op eigen gebied … daarom heeft toch het denken in zijn methode, in zijn verwerking van de stof zijn activiteit gelden normen en idealen die elders niet doorgaan: de heteronome laat zich ook hier zeer goed verenigen met de autonomie, de “souvereiniteit (van regeling, niet van schepping) in eigen kring” ’); Kok, \textit{Vollenhoven}: 21 (n. 37); Dooyeweerd, [‘Interview by Boeles’]: 53-54; Tol, \textit{Philosophy}: 205, 301-302, 501).

\textsuperscript{147} Felix Krüger was a disciple of Wilhelm Dilthey (Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 2.112 (not in \textit{W.d.W.}), and assistant and successor to Wilhelm Max Wundt (1832-1920), the founder of experimental psychology (Puchinger, ‘Dr D.H.Th. Vollenhoven’: 89).

\textsuperscript{148} Vollenhoven, ‘Iets over het stelsel van Bergson (21ms)’; Stellingwerff, \textit{Vollenhoven}: 42-43; Kok, \textit{Vollenhoven}: 3; Vollenhoven, ‘Iets over het stelsel van Bergson (21ms)’.

\textsuperscript{149} Dooyeweerd is inconsistent in his characterisation of Vollenhoven’s role in the development of Reformational philosophy. In 1935, he mentions Vollenhoven along with the South African philosopher, H. G. Stoker as a ‘colleague’ (Dooyeweerd, \textit{W.d.W.}: 1.viii (‘medestander’); Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 1.vii ), or ‘cofounder of the Reformational trend of thought’ (Dooyeweerd, ‘Introduction by the Editor in Chief’: 5). On the other hand, in 1964, in a taped conversation with his daughter and with his son-in-law, Magnus Verbrugge, he says that his conversations were limited to discussions about ‘neo-Kantianism etc.’ (Marcel E. Verburg, \textit{Herman Dooyeweerd: leven en werk van een Nederlands christen-wijze geer} (1989): 87 (‘… dat was eigenlijk een beetje gepraat in de ruimte, over het Neo-kantianisme enzovoort’).

However, in 1973, Dooyeweerd clarifies that their discussions centred on the necessity of a ‘Reformational epistemology and ontology’ (Dooyeweerd, ‘Introduction by the Editor in Chief’: 8), and that they had ‘close spiritual contact’ (Dooyeweerd, ‘Introduction by the Editor in Chief’: 5). This confirms Vollenhoven’s description that ‘both authors had very searching contact’ (article on ‘Calvinistic Philosophy’ in Vollenhoven, \textit{W. Woordenboek}: 78 (‘beide auteurs hadden een zeer diepgaand contact’)) and that this had taken place initially in 1919 with a letter from Dooyeweerd, and then more extensive contact in 1921 and in the early part of 1922 (Puchinger, ‘Dr D.H.Th. Vollenhoven’: 90 (‘in het voorjaar 1922’)). In notes made for this last interview, Vollenhoven states more fully that this was the period in
‘discovery’ or ‘find’ (as Vollenhoven later describes it). The evidence indicates that this ‘find’ crystallised in the thinking of the two philosophers the notion of what later became known as the ‘modalities’ (i.e., the irreducible plurality of the many different aspects of created reality). However, Vollenhoven was not to have the opportunity to develop this significant intellectual breakthrough jointly with Dooyeweerd straight which ‘Dooyeweerd’s doctrine of functions’ (i.e., modalities) arose (Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 52 (“Dooyeweerd’s functieleer”)).

150 Letter from Vollenhoven to Cornelius Van Til, 4 Feb., 1936 (Dooyeweerd–Van Til correspondence, Westminster Theological Seminary (quoted by Henderson, Illuminating Law: 33; and Tol, Philosophy: 367-368)). J.G. Friesen suggests that the ‘find’ might have been Okke Norel’s article published in 1920 in a journal to which Vollenhoven also contributed (Friesen, ‘Two Ways’: 19). However, there is no mention in Norel’s article of any modalities or equivalents such as is developed in a rudimentary way in ‘Kosmos en Logos’; although the article might have reinforced their common ‘Christian’, ‘critical’ or – for Dooyeweerd – ‘transcendental’ realism with its affirmation of the Logos as the ground (‘grond’) and purpose (‘doel’) of creation (Okke Norel, ‘Prof Gunning als wijsgeerig denker’, Stemmen des Tijds 9 (1920): 142-143; I am grateful to Dr Friesen for this article). A more certain background is Vollenhoven’s increasing emphasis on the ‘metalogical’ role of intuition. Henderson says that Vincent Brümmer reports that Dooyeweerd told him that Vollenhoven accompanied him on his walk in the dunes, which, as we shall see (2.2), is when Dooyeweerd described how he came to the discovery of the modalities (Henderson, Illuminating Law: 186; see also Stellingwerff, Geschiedenis van de Reformatorische Wijsbegeerte: 33). The chronology which Vollenhoven gave to Puchinger is especially important in the light of the key ‘discovery’ of 1922, as this seems to indicate that this latter was the product of their conversations. This also seems to chime with the ‘sub-spheres’ which Dooyeweerd pointed to in his debate with the neo-Kantian legal scholar, G. Scholten on 8 April 1922 (Dooyeweerd, ‘Staatsbemoeiing en Individueele Vrijheid (discussiebijdrage)’, Handelingen van de Vereeniging voor Wijsbegeerte des Rechts 7 (1922): 33; see Verburg, H.D. leven en werk: 29-31; Henderson, Illuminating Law: 29, 40-46; Tol, Philosophy: 281-290). Vollenhoven described later how they both ‘discovered’ (‘ontdekten’) the irreducibility of the diverse aspects as the biotic, the juridical, the pistical etc. (Puchinger, ‘Dr D.H.Th. Vollenhoven’: 90 (‘de onherleidbaarheid der diverse aspecten als het biotische, het juridische, het pistische enz.’)), and this was confirmed by Dooyeweerd who spoke of working out the Kuyperian vision of sphere sovereignty ‘as early as 1922’ (Dooyeweerd, ‘Introduction by the Editor in Chief’: 7). Dooyeweerd’s letter to Ridderbos (Dooyeweerd, [Letter of 16 January 1924 to Prof. [Jan] Ridderbos] in Kasuperstichting Archive, V.U. (1924) quoted in Henderson, Illuminating Law: 46-47) and Vollenhoven’s to Janse in early 1924, not long after his recovery from his severe mental collapse of the previous year, show a close common conception of the spheres over which the divine ordinances pertain (Vollenhoven, ‘[Letter of 24 February 1924 to A. Janse]’ in A. Janse Archive 157 (1924) – I am grateful to Anthony Tol for supplying me with his transcribed copy; Tol, Philosophy: 330; Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 51-57). Tol suggests that the ‘walk on the Dunes’ took place in 1923 and he identifies the ‘discovery’ with Dooyeweerd’s later articulation of the ‘law-Idea’ (‘wetsidee’; see 2.2), a term which Vollenhoven only himself used on a much later occasion, perhaps in deference to Dooyeweerd (Tol, Philosophy: 353 (n. 196)). However, while I agree that Dooyeweerd’s articulation of the term ‘law-Idea’ can be dated to 1923, the ‘find’ or ‘discovery’ was the crystallisation of the modalities, dated to mid-1922.

151 For a description of the modalities see Chapter Three introduction. Albert Wolters suggests that a key influence might have been Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950), the successor to Paul Natorp (1854–1924) at Marburg, who himself came to embrace an epistemological realism in his Metaphysic der Erkenntnis (1921), and later, suggested a theory of levels (‘Schichtentheorie’) which has some similarity to Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s modal scale (Wolters, ‘Dooyeweerd’: 1-15). However there is little direct evidence for the influence of Hartmann on Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s thinking and Dooyeweerd argues later that he came to his own view before Hartmann’s theory came to be published. Further, Hartman’s ‘levels’ are structured polarities, rather than modalities as in the case of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.51 (not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, ‘Van Peursen’s critische vragen bij A New Critique of Theoretical Thought’, P.R. 25 (1960): 122-124; Verburg, H.D. leven en werk: 80-82; Jan D. Dengerink, De Zin van de Werkelijkheid: Een Wijsgerige Benadering (1986): 195-210; Strauss, P.D.D.: 234).
away. In November, he experienced a severe nervous breakdown which rendered him incapacitated for much of the following year.\footnote{Doooyeweerd indicated later that on taking up his post at the Kuyper Foundation that he had already come to a conception of his philosophy, ‘although extremely rudimentary’ (Doooyeweerd, W.d.W.: v (‘nog zeer rudimentaire conceptie’); Verburg, H.D. leven en werk: 40-41(n. 48)), i.e., by October 1922 (see Doooyeweerd, ‘[Letter of Application to J.J.C. van Dijk, Minister of War, for Deputy-Directorship of the Kuyper Foundation, 15 May 1922]’ (1961): 47-49; Doooyeweerd, ‘[A letter to the board of the Kuyper Foundation, 16 Sept. 1925]’ (1925); Doooyeweerd, W.d.W.: I.vii. For a fuller discussion, see Henderson, Illuminating Law: 30-50). The document entitled ‘Kosmos en Logos’, still largely unpublished, which Doooyeweerd seems either to have brought with him to the Kuyper Foundation, or which he drafted soon afterwards, bears, with some reservations, Vollenhoven’s intellectual fingerprints and expresses the ‘critical realism’ of their common thinking at the time (Vollenhoven, ‘Letter to Grosheide (1921)’; Vollenhoven, ‘Iets over het stelsel van Bergson (21ms)’: 8; and Vollenhoven, ‘Hegel (21c)’: 80). Vollenhoven wrote to Janse in November, 1922 about the relation of one’s soul to the distinct terrains which bear a close resemblance to the variously named ‘all areas of life’ (‘alle terreinen des levens’), ‘region categories’ (‘gebiedskategorien’), ‘fields of vision’ (‘gezichtsvelden’) or ‘modalities’ (‘modaliteiten’) described in ‘Kosmos en Logos’ (Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 62; Tol, Philosophy: 369). This was to be the keystone of a radical new Calvinist epistemology which the two men seemed to have intended to work on together. Later, Doooyeweerd wrote (in September 1925) to the Directorate of a plan made ‘two years’ (in fact, three years) earlier which has to be temporally abandoned because of Vollenhoven’s illness (Doooyeweerd, ‘[A letter to the board of the Kuyper Foundation, 16 Sept. 1925]’; Henderson, Illuminating Law: 34-35; Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 63-65; Stellingwerff, V.U. na Kuyper: 118). Doooyeweerd incorporated this document wholesale early the following year into a document on Roman Catholic political theory, which he was obliged to prepare for the A.R.P., so that at least it would have some circulation (Doooyeweerd, ‘Kosmos en Logos’ in Rooms-katholiek en Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde (1923); Tol, Philosophy: 320-341, 361). The reservations about the extent of Vollenhoven’s influence largely concern Doooyeweerd’s references to the need to see the world ‘sub specie aeternitatis’ (Tol, Philosophy: 341, 367).} It may possibly have been related to the spiritual crisis that he was going through at the time – a crisis brought on by his correspondence with Janse (leading, as we have seen, to his rejection of the notion of the soul as a separate entity or substance). Nevertheless, his intellectual partnership with Dooyeweerd held firm, and it became clear that the two brothers-in-law had both been thinking and working along similar lines.\footnote{Stellingwerff, V.U. na Kuyper: 118-121.} Vollenhoven was given the post of Professor of Philosophy at the V.U. in 1926, while Dooyeweerd was appointed to the chair of Philosophy of Law. This made their continued co-operation possible.\footnote{Verburg, H.D. leven en werk: 86; Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 69-71, 73 (n. 66); Stellingwerff, V.U. na Kuyper: 121-122; Stellingwerff, Geschiedenis van de Reformatorische Wijsbegeerte: 40-41.} In his inaugural lecture, as well as other writings that year, Vollenhoven sets out a position, similar to that of Doooyeweerd, of a harmonious and irreducible multiplicity of fields of vision or modalities.\footnote{Vollenhoven, Logos en ratio; beider verhouding in de geschiedenis der westersche kentheorie (26a) (1926); Vollenhoven, ‘Enkele grondlijnen der kentheorie (26b)’; Vollenhoven, ‘Kentheorie en natuurwetenschap (26d)’.} His systematic thinking was soon further elaborated in his
'Isagôgè,' the ‘introductory’ syllabus to the study of philosophy which Vollenhoven continually revised between 1926 and 1945.\textsuperscript{156}

As we shall see in the following section, at this time, Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s thinking began to diverge in some significant respects. However, despite his growing philosophical differences with Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven publically maintained a common front with him. The two brothers-in-law set up the Association of Calvinistic Philosophy or Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte (V.C.W.) in December 1935, with Vollenhoven as Chairman (a post he was to hold until 1961), and Dooyeweerd as editor-in-chief of the main academic journal of the association, \textit{Philosophia Reformata}. The founding of the V.C.W. also represented a closing of ranks against the onslaught of ‘Reformed scholasticism’,\textsuperscript{157} which (as we shall see below) was increasingly vehement in its vociferous denunciation of the fledgling movement of Reformational philosophy which the association represented.\textsuperscript{158}

The onslaught by ‘Reformed scholasticism’ on the philosophical movement led by Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd had been building up close at hand. In the course of the 1930s, Vollenhoven’s colleagues in the theological faculty at the V.U. of Amsterdam confronted him aggressively. A central target of this attack were the views Vollenhoven expressed in his book of 1933, \textit{Het Calvinisme en de reformatie van de Wijsbegeerte},\textsuperscript{159} and indeed, amongst other things, an attack on Vollenhoven’s critique of the soul/body dualism and his account of the ‘heart’ as the religious centre of human existence. The


\textsuperscript{157} ‘Reformed scholasticism’ denotes the by now predominantly Aristotelian approach of the group of academics across the different disciplines which dominated the Vrije Universiteit in the 1920s and 1930s. As we have seen in 1.1, ‘scholasticism’ refers to an approach dominated by a grace/nature dualism.

\textsuperscript{158} Vollenhoven, ‘Vereeniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte’, \textit{Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte en Psychologie} 51 (1958); Stellingswerff, \textit{Vollenhoven}: 120-127; Puchinger, ‘Dr D.H.Th. Vollenhoven’: 94-97 (including Vollenhoven’s address as founding chairman); Dooyeweerd, ‘Na vijf en dertig jaren’, \textit{P.R.} (1971); Dooyeweerd, ‘Introduction by the Editor in Chief’: 14.

\textsuperscript{159} Vollenhoven, \textit{C.R.W.} (33a).
charges centred upon Vollenhoven’s denial of the ‘immortality of the soul’, which
suggests the conclusion that it was Vollenhoven (himself proxy, perhaps, for Janse) who
was the real target of the attack, rather than Dooyeweerd, since it was he who primarily
contested the immortality of the soul, and indeed its very existence as a substance or
entity.\textsuperscript{160} Between 1937 and 1939, the Curators of the V.U. examined both Vollenhoven
and Dooyeweerd, and charges were brought against them by Valentijn Hepp (1879-
1950), Professor of Theology at the V.U. in Amsterdam.\textsuperscript{161} This was accompanied by an
even fiercer attack on Vollenhoven by Hendrik Steen, a student of the son of Abraham
Kuyper, H.H. Kuyper (1864-1945), a leading figure at the Vrije Universiteit.\textsuperscript{162}

The public attack on Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd was accompanied by a quasi-
judicial investigation of the theological positions of the two philosophers by the
authorities of the Vrije Universiteit. Both professors were required to appear before the
Curators, with Hepp as the major accuser. The matter was delegated, eventually, to the
circle of the professors of the University for further consideration, and with the hope
that it might be resolved, but the matter remained in abeyance.\textsuperscript{163} Despite the somewhat

\textsuperscript{160} This will be discussed further in 4.1.2. Despite his criticism of the notion of the immortality of the
soul, Vollenhoven, still holds that there is some sense in which human existence survives death prior to
the resurrection (Vollenhoven, \textit{C.R.W. (33a)}: 43-45 (nn. 43-45); J. Glenn Friesen, ‘The Investigation of
Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven by the Curators of the Free University’, 2005, 2006,
\textless http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Curators.html\textgreater accessed 7 May 2007; Tol,
\textit{Philosophy}: 477-479 (nn. 164-169); Tol, \textit{Philosophy}: 242-243, 252, 257-263). As we shall see,
Dooyeweerd’s position, with his notion of the ‘supra-temporal heart’ is somewhat different, at least \textit{prima
facie} (2.2. and 4.2.2).

\textsuperscript{161} For background on Hepp see Stellingwerff, \textit{V.U. na Kuyper}: 145-158 and Harinck G., ‘‘Het zwarte
schaap van de gereformeerde theologie’’. Over V. Hepp, \textit{In de Marge} 3 (2004). Hepp had previously
attacked them in a series of brochures (V.H. Hepp, \textit{Dreigende deformatie} (1936-1937)).

\textsuperscript{162} Hendrik Steen, \textit{Philosophia deformata} (1937). Steen’s title mocks the title of the journal of the
Association of Calvinist Philosophy, begun in 1936 (Friesen, ‘Investigation’).

\textsuperscript{163} ‘Notulen (getypt) van 18 mei t/m 7 januari 1938’ in \textit{Archief College van Curatoren} (1937-1938);
‘Notulen (getypt) van 3 februari 1938 t/m 9 december 1950’ in \textit{Archief College van Curatoren} (1938-
1950); Friesen, ‘Investigation’; Stellingwerff, \textit{Vollenhoven} : 129-150; Stellingwerff, \textit{V.U. na Kuyper}:
185-251; A. Th. Van Deursen, \textit{Een hoeksteen in het verzuild bestel. De Vrije Universiteit 1885-2005}
(2005): 167-169; Verburg, \textit{H.D. leven en werk}: 208-228. With respect to the issue of the hypostasis of
Christ, Hepp claimed to be following Kuyper in asserting that in assuming humanity,
the Son assumes an impersonal nature, i.e., that it lacks any individual characteristics. This was in accord with his view of
human nature as a general substance. Against him, Vollenhoven affirmed, not that there is a separate
person belonging to the nature of Christ, but that Christ has an individuality enhypostatically in the reality
of the Word made flesh. Vollenhoven admitted to a possible ambiguity in the way he expressed it (in that
he might be seen to be affirming that the human nature of Christ has an individuality distinct from the
Person of the Son, i.e. that he be taking a ‘Nestorian’ position), and promised to reformulate it in a printed
revision (although there was no revised version published as it happened). In 1940, he published an article
in \textit{Philosophia Reformata} setting out his position on the matter. The Curators were not satisfied with the
re-formulation that he submitted to them, but the matter fell into abeyance with the German occupation of
the Netherlands during the Second World War, and then the split in the Gereformeerde Kerken in 1944

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inconclusive outcome of the whole affair, the intervention spearheaded by Hepp against both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven left a mark in the attitude of the two philosophers to theologians. Ironically, it was Dooyeweerd who evinced the strongest reaction in this regard, refusing to have any philosophical statement subjected to theological scrutiny. Vollenhoven at least attempted to enter into debate with the theologians, although he was not prepared to let historical statements of belief stand without careful scrutiny, in the light of wider scriptural affirmations, of the underlying philosophical assumptions.

These controversies did not seem directly to affect the development of Vollenhoven’s systematic philosophical thinking. In the course of the 1930s he shifted from seeing the relation between God and the cosmos as a dualism with the Law as a boundary between God and the cosmos, to one in which Law is seen as impinging in the created order, binding its elements together and implementing God’s rule over that order. A third shift in his thinking came in the 1950s with his view of God’s eternal Law as a process of successive unfolding, each stage in its unfolding representing the specific work of law.

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164 This is evidenced by the title of his article of 1958: ‘The Relationship between Philosophy and Theology and the Conflict of the Faculties’ (Dooyeweerd, ‘De verhouding tussen wijsbegeerte en theologie en de strijd der faculteiten’, P.R. (1958)).


166 The relationship between the Law and subject, on the one hand, and that between subject and object, on the other, lies behind Vollenhoven’s epistemological and ontological distinction between realism and nominalism and the related distinction between subjectivism and objectivism (Vollenhoven, ‘Objectief’ (38p), M.V.C.W. (1938); Vollenhoven, ‘Realisme en nominalisme (38u), M.V.C.W. 3 (1938); Vollenhoven, ‘Realisme en nominalisme (38v), P.R. 3 (1938); Vollenhoven, Proeve eener ordening van wijsgeerige concepties (39k); Vollenhoven, Richtlijnen ter orientatie in de gangbare Wijsbegeerte (41k) (1941); Vollenhoven, Hoofdlijnen der Logica (48f) (1948); Vollenhoven, Geschiedenis der wijsbegeerte: band 1: Inleiding en geschiedenis der Griekse wijsbegeerte voor Platoon en Aristoteles (50e) (1950); Tol, ‘Vollenhovens Sytematische Wijsbegeerte’: 34 (n. 22); Tol, ‘Foreword’: xxii-xxiv ). As we shall see, his shift in Vollenhoven’s thinking came at roughly the same time as Dooyeweerd was starting to develop his ‘transcendental critique’.

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one of the Persons of the Trinity. In general, Vollenhoven’s thought was increasing starting to emphasise God’s action in the world, and not just God’s sovereignty over the world, and doing so in explicitly trinitarian terms. He did not abandon his thinking of the early and later 1930s, but rather incorporated elements of his previous thinking as sub-features within the new overall categories he was starting to explore. This can be seen in his systematic analysis of the history of Western philosophy, which he called the ‘consequential [or consistent] problem-historical method’, to which I now turn.

Ever since his inaugural lecture of 1926, Vollenhoven had shown a strong interest in tracing the line of philosophical development from the ancient Greeks up to the present day. However, from around 1946, Vollenhoven began to approach this far more systematically. One early fruit of his work on the ‘consequential problem-historical method’ was the publication in 1950 of his volume on the Greek period. This was to have been the first of a series of volumes, but no further volumes appeared — possibly because he continued to refine his categories, as well as his placing of the different


168 The monism/dualism distinction of the early 1930s is incorporated, albeit now with an anthropological focus, as sub-divisions of the three basic ‘ground-types’, while the subjectivism/objectivism/realism distinction, developed most fully in the late 1930s and previously as sub-divisions of his early monism/dualism schema (see Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 51-67), is now used to characterise and mark out the periodisation of the time currents.

169 This term is used for the first time in Vollenhoven’s Geschiedenis I (50e): 6. He develops the use of the term explicitly in 1961 (Vollenhoven, ‘De consequent probleemhistorische methode’, P.R. (1961); Albert M. Wolters, ‘An essay on the idea of “Problemgeschichte”’ (Free University, Amsterdam: 21)). There are different views as to how it should be translated: whether ‘consequential’ to indicate that it is about the implications of the different ground-types, or ‘consistent’ to emphasize the systematic nature of the enterprise.

170 Vollenhoven, Logos en ratio.

171 In this, he found a kindred spirit in K.J. Popma (1903-1986). Popma was a member of Vollenhoven’s philosophical circle from the latter’s time in The Hague from 1921 on (Stellingwerff, V.U. na Kuyper: 111), certainly up to the mid-1950s. Together, Vollenhoven and Popma frequently contributed items along these lines to the Mededelingen (‘the announcements’) of the V.C.W.


philosophers in those categories (often to the bewilderment of even his closest colleagues). However, I shall argue that, despite the kaleidoscopic character of this task, there were critical systematic implications from the way his investigations yielded the delineation of what he calls ‘ground-types’ (which I shall return to in Chapter Five).

Even though he did not engage in any further revision of the Isagôgè after 1945, he provides hints of his continued systematic thinking in scattered addresses and publications. From the early 1950s, he started to articulate his divergence from Dooyeweerd’s systematic philosophical thinking, first in private, and then, after he stepped down in 1963 as Chairman of the Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte, on a number of occasions within the close circle of the V.C.W., or at its local meetings. However, he still did not feel fully free to publish his views, except towards the end of his life, when he attempted to put some thoughts together for an article in Philosophia Reformata, comparing his own position with those of Dooyeweerd and the South African Reformational philosopher, Hendrik Stoker. His

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174 It remained unfinished because it proved too difficult ‘even for his affinitive professional colleagues’ (Van Deursen, Free University: 172).
175 See 5.1. Anthony Tol has suggested that three themes can be discerned in each of the ground-types; namely, slightly changing his order:
   1. that of individuality v. universality;
   2. that of unity of being v. diversity; and
   3. that of genesis v. static structure
176 As we have seen, then, Vollenhoven’s explicit systematic thinking was largely put on hold after 1945, while he devoted his energies and attention to the consequential problem-historical method. After 1945, Vollenhoven did not revise his Isagôgè. The annotations on his own copy, made until 1945 on a 1941 version of the Isagôgè, were never included in later re-printings. The 1967 re-printing simply followed the version of 1943. The thorough-going re-writing and re-ordering of the Isagôgè that would have been necessary if the changes in Vollenhoven’s own systematic thinking had been incorporated, never took place (Anthony Tol, ‘[Introduction]’ (2010)).
177 These have been collected in Tol and Bril, ed., V.a.W. which is to be published in English translation (John H. Kok, ed., Vollenhoven Reader (forthcoming)).
178 Vollenhoven, ‘Divergentierapport’ (1953); Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)’; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’; see Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 222.
final years were overshadowed by his declining mental powers. He died on 6 June 1978.\textsuperscript{180}

We see then how Vollenhoven’s thought developed from an initial intra-mental focus on the self as thinking substance, to the diversity of the different fields of knowledge that there are in the world – and, in his ‘consequential problem-historical method’, to the presupposita which shaped how this diversity is apprehended systematically. I shall now provide an overview of the development of Dooyeweerd’s thinking similar to that which I have just provided for Vollenhoven.

\textbf{2.2 An Overview of Dooyeweerd’s Philosophical Development}

Vollenhoven’s slightly younger contemporary and brother-in-law, Herman Dooyeweerd, achieved much greater prominence than he did, and Dooyeweerd’s name tended to dominate the Reformational tradition of the twentieth century to the extent that ‘Reformational’ and ‘Dooyeweerdian’ came almost to be seen as interchangeable terms. However, as has been seen already, and as will be argued below, the relationship can be better understood as a complementary partnership, each bringing different insights to bear.

Dooyeweerd was born on 7 October 1894.\textsuperscript{181} His background through his father was Kuyperian, while his mother had been influenced strongly by the tradition represented by the famous preacher, Herman Frederik (or Hermann Friedrich) Kohlbrügge (1803-1875), who emphasised the grace of God to the sinful believer. This combination of a Christian vision of God’s universal sovereignty combined with an intense personal piety remained a continuing element in his upbringing. Like Vollenhoven, he went to the Eben Haëzer primary school in the Gereformeerde ‘pillar’, and then, for secondary school, to the Gereformeerde Gymnasium in Amsterdam. Again, like Vollenhoven, as the natural next step, Dooyeweerd enrolled in the V.U. in 1912. He was initially

\textsuperscript{180} Stellingwerff, \textit{Vollenhoven}: 251.

\textsuperscript{181} Henderson, \textit{Illuminating Law}: 15.
somewhat disappointed by the lack of a thoroughgoing working out of a full Calvinistic worldview by the teaching staff of that university. At the same time, his mystical tendency can be seen in the articles that he wrote for the student almanac of the V.U. in 1915 on his own religious orientation, and on the poet and thinker, Frederik van Eeden. His doctoral thesis, completed in 1917, is largely a technical examination of the constitutional role of the Dutch cabinet. This brought home to him the chaotic state of contemporary theory in the field of jurisprudence. After completing his thesis, Dooyeweerd found himself in critical dialogue with the Baden and Marburg schools of neo-Kantians, both greatly influential in the Netherlands at the time. This accentuated his desire to find a satisfactory philosophical approach, along Calvinist lines, for the study of law.

Dooyeweerd’s interest in the development of a fully-fledged Calvinistic philosophy was spurred on and advanced through his relationship with Vollenhoven, especially from the time when they were both living in The Hague, where (as we have seen) Vollenhoven was a Gereformeerde pastor, and where Dooyeweerd was employed, initially in government service and later in the service of the Anti-Revolutionary Party (A.R.P.).

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183 An interest he shared with Vollenhoven (see 2.1 footnotes; Dooyeweerd, ‘De neo-mystiek en Fr. van Eeden’, Almanak van het Studentencorps aan de Vrije Universiteit (1915); Dooyeweerd, ‘Wat ik op de laatste N.C.S.V. conferentie vond’ (1915); Marcel E. Verburg, Herman Dooyeweerd: Grenzen van het theoretisch denken (1986): 24; Henderson, Illuminating Law: 22; Friesen, ‘Two Ways’: 15). J. Glenn Friesen sees a link between Dooyeweerd’s mysticism and that of Kuyper to Franz von Baader (1765-1841), the German Roman Catholic philosopher and theologian (J. Glenn Friesen, ‘The Mystical Dooyeweerd Once Again: Kuyper’s Use of Franz von Baader’, Ars Disputandi 3 (2003)). He argues that Kuyper came to a knowledge of Baader via the Dutch theologians J.H. Gunning and De la Saussaye (see above), at least with respect to the notion of the supra-temporal heart which, as we shall see below, come to the fore in Dooyeweerd’s thought during the course of the 1920s (J. Glenn Friesen, ‘The Mystical Dooyeweerd Once Again: Kuyper’s Use of Franz von Baader’, Ars Disputandi 3 (2003)).

Contrary to Friesen’s contention, D.F.M. Strauss argues that the mysticism of Baader and the other thinkers mentioned by Friesen was of an organistic character, rather than one of ‘sphere sovereignty’ in the Reformational sense, and moreover, denies that Dooyeweerd can be characterised as a mystical thinker since he wants to deny both rationalism and irrationalism (D.F.M. Strauss, ‘Intellectual influences upon the Reformational thought of Dooyeweerd’, P.R. 69 (2004): 160-162, 172-173, 179; see reply by J. Glenn Friesen, ‘Dooyeweerd and Baader: A Response to D.F.M. Strauss’ (2005)).

December 1920, Dooyeweerd wrote to Vollenhoven expressing his interest in deepening his own philosophical understanding with Vollenhoven’s help. He mentioned his interest especially in the way in which Vollenhoven was starting to identify the diversity of forms of knowledge, reflecting the diversity of reality (an insight which, as we have seen, Vollenhoven was developing through his reading of the Baden school of neo-Kantians). The conversations between the two brothers-in-law rapidly bore fruit. As noted in the previous section, in mid-1922 (as the evidence seems to indicate), there was the discovery of the modalities – a breakthrough that Dooyeweerd then refined and developed. The task that they now undertook together involved working out Kuyper’s principle of ‘sphere sovereignty’ (‘souvereiniteit in eigen kring’) in a systematic way. Whereas for Kuyper this was a primarily a social vision, for Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven it extended to a philosophical account of the whole of created reality, and introduced an intensive philosophical rigour into Kuyper’s somewhat unsystematic conception.

In October 1922, Dooyeweerd became deputy director of the Kuyper Foundation, the research institute of the A.R.P. During his time there, he came to a view of the place of the heart as the keystone of a reformed epistemology. He recounts an incident shortly after he began working at the Kuyper Foundation in 1922 when he picked up a collection of Christian reflections by Kuyper. He was gripped by Kuyper’s account of the ‘heart’ as the centre of human existence and the root of true knowledge flowing from one’s underlying relationship with God. He saw this as a radical break from the medieval ‘scholastic’ conception, in which the heart was regarded as being the seat of

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185 Dooyeweerd, ‘[Letter of 17 December 1920 to Vollenhoven]’ in Vollenhoven Archive (1920). This is printed by Stellingwerff (Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 47-48); Tol supplies two small corrections to Stellingwerff’s printed text in Tol, Philosophy: 277 (n. 298)). See also Dooyeweerd, ‘De Badensche Rechtsphilosopie’ (1922); Henderson, Illuminating Law: 27-28; Tol, Philosophy: 277-280.

186 Dooyeweerd’s story, related in the last interview Dooyeweerd gave before his death, is of a walk on the dunes near The Hague during which the inspiration about the modalities came to him (‘[Interview by Boeles]’: 38; quoted in Verburg, H.D. leven en werk: 40 (Verburg gives p. 37); Henderson, Illuminating Law: 37-38). See 2.1 footnotes.


the emotions, distinct from the intellect and the other human faculties, rather than central to the whole human person in his or her relation to God and the world.\textsuperscript{189}

As he settled down at his desk in the Kuyper Foundation,\textsuperscript{190} Dooyeweerd had two alternative conceptions of law and of the political order to respond to, namely those of the Christian Democrats (Roman Catholic) and the Christian Historical Party. Although these parties were political allies, Dooyeweerd had the task of ensuring that the A.R.P. developed its thinking along distinctively Calvinistic (or more specifically Kuyperian or what were later called ‘Reformational’) lines. Thus Dooyeweerd developed his account of a distinctive Calvinistic political philosophy (informed by its own comprehensive epistemology and ontology) in dialogue with two opposing but equally powerful intellectual traditions in Christian thought. The first was the tradition of Thomism (which informed the thinking of the Christian Democrats) as the classical representative of Roman Catholic political thought, a tradition which had been revived in the Roman Catholic Church at the end of the nineteenth century, encouraged by the publication of the papal encyclical \textit{Aeterni Patris} (1879). The second was that of historicism, informed by the writings of Lutheran political thinkers of the nineteenth century (characteristic of the Christian Historical Party).

In discussing the first tradition, Dooyeweerd argues, in broad terms, that Roman Catholic political theory is classically informed by the notion of natural law.\textsuperscript{191} Natural law is an amalgam of Stoic, Aristotelian, and neo-Platonist philosophies, combined with classical Roman law. The world is seen in self-contained terms and all events are the teleological realisation of potential intrinsic to the cosmos – more specifically, the realisation in form of previously unformed matter. For Aristotle, God is seen as the First Cause from which a chain of cause and effect proceeds. Thomism, taking further the synthesis of neo-Platonism and Christian doctrine developed by Augustine of Hippo, adds a Christian view of a transcendent God into this picture of a self-contained cosmos and then attempts to provide an account of God’s action in terms of the Aristotelian

\textsuperscript{189} Henderson, \textit{Illuminating Law}: 113-115 (Henderson refers to the 1973 interview by I.K.O.N. ‘1973 television interview’); see also Kuyper, \textit{Lectures}: 25; Stellingwerff, \textit{Geschiedenis van de Reformatorische Wijsbegeerte}: 37-38). Dooyeweerd’s account of the ‘heart’ will be discussed in 4.2.2.

\textsuperscript{190} Stellingwerff points out that it was in fact Kuyper’s former study and his desk (Stellingwerff, \textit{Geschiedenis van de Reformatorische Wijsbegeerte}: 37).

\textsuperscript{191} See 1.1.
framework. However, the Thomist claim that God is the First Cause gives rise to the antinomy of human freedom. On the one hand, human beings are held to have free will, and, by determining their own actions, limit God’s causality. On the other hand, human beings are, by implication, unfree, since all their actions are caused by God. The only way to resolve this antinomy is to adopt a dualism in which, on the one hand, there is the realm of natural law, within which state power is exercised; and on the other hand, the realm of grace, in which human beings are brought by divine assistance, through the mediation of the church, to eternal salvation. By extension, the church, as the instrument of grace, assists human free will, and is seen as superior to the state, which is the instrument of natural law as applied in the political realm. The ‘common good’ is seen as the supreme objective in the political realm, but it remains an inadequate guide for the exercise of state power: it neither provides limits for the role of the state, nor the basis for non-state institutions and social entities to be accorded recognition in their own right.192

With regard to the second tradition, Dooyeweerd notes that Christian historical political theory had been developed by powerful and influential nineteenth century Lutheran thinkers such as Von Savigny and Stahl; these thinkers saw the law and its authority much more in terms of the political status quo.193 The historical (or more properly the ‘historicist’) approach holds to the continual changefulness of the norms which govern political life at the cost of their constancy.194 Instead it absolutises the human capacity for cultural formation, characterised by what Dooyeweerd calls the ‘historical’ modality.195 All truth is seen in terms of cultural formation, and therefore, is made

193 See 1.2.
194 D. F. M Strauss, points out that cultural change has an analogy (retrocipation) to the physical (or energetic) modality, but this needs to be balanced harmoniously with cultural constancy, which has an analogy (retrocipation) with the kinematic modality. Cultural change requires cultural constancy: the latter cannot be reduced to the former or vice versa. Moreover, as Roy Clouser, another Dooyeweerdian thinker, argues, the cultural-formative (or ‘historical’) modality (see below) cannot be seen in isolation, but only properly in harmony with all the other modalities, including both the kinematic and the physical (Strauss, P.D.D.: 271-274; Roy A. Clouser, ‘A Critique of Historicism’ (2000): 110-116).
195 The ‘historical’ modality, according to Dooyeweerd, characterized by formative control, embraces past, present and future (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.193 (not in W.d.W.); M. D. Stafleu, ‘Time and History in
relative to a particular historical context. Against the historicist position, Dooyeweerd argues for the creational sovereignty of God over all cultures and historical circumstances. In his mature thought, Dooyeweerd’s view is that it is necessary for the norms which govern human behaviour and patterns of thought first to be grasped by the mind analytically (i.e., in a way appropriate to the logical or analytical modality), and then brought to formation or ‘positivised’ with a specific cultural context (i.e., in a way appropriate to the ‘historical’ or cultural-formative modality). However, the human role in analysis and the positivisation of norms does not mean that cultural and other norms – let alone the laws of number, space etc. – are culturally relative. In fact, all laws and norms have a universal scope.¹⁹⁶ Thus in contrast with historicism, Dooyeweerd does not abandon the notion of universality. He argues that principles can be positivised for a specific time and place, while at the same time recognizing that the principles themselves are universal.¹⁹⁷

Thus Dooyeweerd attempted to steer the A.R.P.’s philosophy between the Scylla of the unchanging complex of natural law and the Charybdis of historical relativism (or conversely, uncritical acceptance of the status quo) represented by historicism. Both these traditions would remain his discussion partners throughout his life. However, merely to state the problems he faced in these terms is misleading. He did not merely wish to navigate a middle course – much more than that, he wished to find a

¹⁹⁶ See Chapter Three introduction.
¹⁹⁷ While Dooyeweerd is not entirely consistent in his statement of his position (as has been pointed out by Strauss), this insight represents a critical intellectual breakthrough (Dooyeweerd, ‘De staatkundige tegenstelling tussen Christelijk-Historische en Antirevolutionaire partij (C.H. en A.R.P.) 1’ in Dooyeweerd Archive (1923); Dooyeweerd, ‘C.H. en A.R.P. 2’; Dooyeweerd, ‘C.H. en A.R.P. 3’; W.d.W.: 2.139-227; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.192-298; Dooyeweerd, De zin der geschiedenis: 3-5, 16-20; Dooyeweerd, Recht en historie (1938): 23-28; Dooyeweerd, ‘Criteria’: 215-219, 221-222; see also Strauss, P.D.D: 93-95, 290-293). Vollenhoven sees historicism not as a form of subordination of the other modalities to the ‘historical’ (i.e., cultural-formative) modality as Dooyeweerd does, but as a ‘levelling’ process: a reduction in the status of the law of God as holding sway over the cosmos, and its particularisation or relativisation in a multiplicity of concrete situations (Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’: 209-211; Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 184-185; Vollenhoven, ‘The Consequential Problem-Historical Method’: 104).
distinctively Calvinistic basis upon which to critique these two positions and provide a systematic alternative. While Dooyeweerd’s ostensible aim was to produce responses to the natural law and Christian historical positions of the parties in coalition with the A.R.P., his deepest concern was to address the issues with which he had been wrestling prior to his appointment at the Kuyper Foundation, and which had been the subject of intense and extensive discussion with Vollenhoven in the two years preceding his appointment.

In other words, Dooyeweerd’s concerns were wider than merely the dialogue with the A.R.P.’s Christian political partners. His overarching concern lay in the question of epistemology. Here, as we have seen above, his main discussion partners (figuratively speaking) were the Marburg and Baden neo-Kantians. It was this discussion which raised for him the deepest questions of epistemology. Accordingly, he produced a document entitled ‘Kosmos en Logos’ which substantively set out the basis of his epistemology. In this text we see a close alignment with the sort of position to which Vollenhoven was also moving. Against the Marburg neo-Kantian subsumption of all ontology and epistemology under the logical act of appropriation, Dooyeweerd affirms the pre-logical status of the world as ‘cosmos’. He argues against the neo-Kantians, those of the Marburg and Baden schools alike, that the ontic (the range of what is ‘out there’) is irreducible to the noetic (one’s intra-mental representations). Before one can make sense of the world logically (the point from where the Marburg neo-Kantians start), one is already presented with several other ‘fields of vision’ (‘gezichtsvelden’): numerical, spatial, temporal and physical. For Dooyeweerd, there is a diversity of different epistemic constructions (‘Gegenstände’), each formed by the knowing subject, appropriate to a particular ‘field of vision’ or ‘modality’. Each of those aspects is governed by its own laws or norms and so forms a distinctive and irreducible law-sphere. Therefore, considerations of logic can only be taken into account after these other (mind-independent) aspects of the world have first been accounted for.

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199 See 2.1.
During the course of 1923, Dooyeweerd came to characterise his philosophy as the ‘philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea’ or ‘… law-Idea’ (‘wijsbegeerte der wetsidee’).\footnote{201} For Dooyeweerd this ‘cosmonomic Idea’ plays an architectonic role similar to that which Vollenhoven, by 1921, had come to accord to the ‘met-alogical’ role of intuition.\footnote{202} With the help of this framework, Dooyeweerd embarked on an extensive programme, publishing a Calvinist overview of philosophical development through the centuries. This culminated in the enunciation of a Calvinist worldview in the Kuyperian

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tradition: that of the Lordship of Christ over every sphere of life, a position he developed further upon his appointment as Professor of the Philosophy of Law at the V.U. In his inaugural address he articulates a vision of God’s providential world plan combined with the affirmation of God’s sovereignty over every sphere of creation – a re-articulation of Kuyper’s vision of the unfolding of God’s sovereign purposes in the context of human history.

By the early 1930s, however, the foundational emphasis on God’s providential purposes (that of the divine world-plan) seems to have been relegated to the theological store-cupboard, rather than continuing to guide and shape his philosophical thinking. While in his personal piety Dooyeweerd continued to believe in God’s providence, it ceased to play the key systematic and foundational role it had done when he set out his

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204 In his inaugural lecture Dooyeweerd sets out the foundations of all Christian thought according to the principle of divine creation. This combines the confession of God’s sovereign providence and the coherence of the law-spheres under his sovereignty (Dooyeweerd, De Beteekenis: 61 (’belijdenis der goddelijke voorzienigheid [and ] der goddelijke scheppers-souvereiniteit’); see Kraay, ‘Successive 2’: 3). This position is developed in his article on juridical causality of 1928, where he sees the Logos as having an ordering role within the overall coherence (Dooyeweerd, ‘Openingscollege (1926)’ (1989): 423-425; Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvinisme contra Neo-Kantianisme’: 68; Dooyeweerd, De Beteekenis: 67-69).

205 Dooyeweerd had already pointed to the ‘root of this vitality’ (‘wortel van deze vitaliteit’) as the ‘the divine sovereignty … over the whole of creation’ (de goddelijke souvereiniteit … over de gehele schepping’) in his Calvinisme en Natuurrecht originally written in 1923 (Dooyeweerd, Calvinisme en Natuurrech: 3; see Verburg, H.D. leven en werk: 70; Henderson, Illuminating Law: 117 (n. 209); Tol, Philosophy: 361). In this article he sees the modalities as ordered by the ‘Logos’, which he identified with the logical modality (Dooyeweerd, ‘Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in ’t licht der wetsidee (A.R.S.)’, A.R.S.(3-m) 2 (1928): 17-21, 31-34, 36-41); Dooyeweerd, Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem: 17-21, 31-34, and 36-41. But by 1930, he sees the ‘logos’ (now lower case) as one sphere among many and no longer the basis on which the other law spheres cohere (Dooyeweerd, ‘De structuur der rechtsbeginselen en de methode der rechtswetenschap in het licht der wetsidee’, De Standaard Wetenschappelijke Bijdragen, aangeboden door Hoogleraren der Vrije Universiteit ter Gelegenheid van haar 50-jarig Bestaan 20 October, 1930 (1930): 231-222; Henderson, Illuminating Law: 149; Verburg, H.D. leven en werk: 96). Verburg comments (96 (n. 24)) that this two-fold characterisation of the Christian cosmonomic Idea (i.e., of modal order and providence) will be sought for in vain in Dooyeweerd’s later work. See also Peter J. Steen, The Structure of Herman Dooyeweerd’s Thought (1983): 207; Henderson, Illuminating Law: 130, 134, 149, 150, 154-156, 159-160, 177; Kraay, ‘Successive 2’: 2; Tol, Philosophy: 355-358. See 1.2 and 1.3 for Kuyper, and 5.2.3 for references in Dooyeweerd’s own writings.

206 Dooyeweerd speaks of the ‘religious ground-structure of the cosmonomic Idea’ (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.144-145, ‘de religieuze grondstructuur van de wetsidee’) of God’s providential world plan, but in this is superseded by his statement of the Christian ground-motive of creation, fall and redemption – which (as we shall see later) is more about what both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd call the ‘Direction’ of the ‘heart’ than about what actually happens in history (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.173-177; see 4.1.2. and 4.2.2). The Idea of Providence (5.2.2) never quite disappears but takes a much more structural form as the ‘opening-process’ (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.336-337; Dooyeweerd, ‘Criteria’ : 214, 219-226; Calvin G. Seerveld, ‘Dooyeweerd’s Idea of “Historical Development”: Christian Respect for Cultural Diversity’, W.T.J. 58 (1996): 41-61; C. T. McIntyre, ‘Dooyeweerd’s Philosophy of History’ (1985)).
philosophical vision in 1926. This shift, from the vision of God’s active providential role in the world towards an emphasis on supra-temporality, was precipitated by two key catalysts – although it also drew together a number of concerns which had occupied him for much longer.

One catalyst was his reading of Heidegger. Dooyeweerd made an intensive study of Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit* (*Being and Time*) after its publication in 1927. For Heidegger, ‘Being’ is not something which belongs to the ‘*Da*’ – the thatness of the world in which one finds oneself – it is not given. Rather, one is to understand *oneself* as ‘Being-in-the-world’ (*Da-sein*) as the constitutive basis of who and what one is; and it is thus (in the face of one’s death and finitude) that one is to take full account of oneself and that which is presented to one for one’s (self-determinately) appropriate attention and concern. Dooyeweerd’s position is exactly the reverse of Heidegger’s. While Heidegger denies being to God, Dooyeweerd asserts that only God has ‘Being’, and that it is from this ‘Being’ that the world has ‘meaning’ (i.e., creaturely dependence).²⁰⁶ Whereas Heidegger sees the human person bounded by temporal existence in their ‘thrownness’ (‘*Geworfenheit*’), Dooyeweerd seeks for a basis on which that temporal existence can be transcended, and the elements of the temporal order seen in true relation to one another. Dooyeweerd argues, *pace* Heidegger, that true authenticity can only be found in the sense of dependence upon the Origin.²⁰⁷

Another catalyst in the shift in Dooyeweerd’s thinking away from the Idea of Providence was the rise of Fascist and National Socialist ideology in Italy and

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²⁰⁶ Heidegger, *Being and Time*. For Dooyeweerd’s discussion of ‘Being’ and ‘meaning’ see 5.2.1.
²⁰⁷ Dooyeweerd, *De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer in het licht eener Calvinistische Kosmologie en Kennistheorie* (1931): 93-95; Dooyeweerd, *The Crisis in Humanist Political Theory as Seen from a Calvinist Cosmology and Epistemology* (2010): 78-81; Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W. I*: 78-799; Dooyeweerd, *N.C. II*: 53-59, 111. More generally, Dooyeweerd’s thinking in about the late 1920s from an organic analogy as the dominant organising feature (an analogy he inherited from Kuyper) to a *semantic* one (drawing on the symbolic modality). In this he was certainly influenced by Husserl and Heidegger. Dooyeweerd sees his own ‘linguistic turn’ as an alternative to historicism and relativism. In an article of 1928 on juridical causality, Dooyeweerd makes use of ‘meaning’ (‘*zin*’) in a number of contexts: ‘meaning-individuality’ (‘*zin-individualiteit*’), ‘meaning-consummation’ (‘*zin-voleinding*’), ‘meaning-analogies’ (‘*zin-analogieën*’), ‘meaning-substrate’ (‘*zin-substraat*’) and ‘meaning-constant’ (‘*zin-constant*’) (Dooyeweerd, ‘Juridisch causaliteitsprobleem (A.R.S.)’: 34-36 (I am indebted to D.F.M. Strauss in drawing my attention to this in an e-mail of 21 Feb. 2010). Strauss argues that this ‘linguistic turn’ is a form of what he calls ‘quasi-monism’ which excessively privileges the discourse of the kinematic modality with its meaning kernel of constancy providing the focus for the characterization of God, while the characterization of the world as ‘meaning’ focuses on the lingual symbolic modality (Strauss, *P.D.D.*: 6, 73, 251-252, 320-322, 375-379, 497, 531, 625).
Germany. In the early 1920s he had argued that the German romantics, notably Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854) and Johann Fichte (1762-1814), at the beginning of the nineteenth century, had influenced Stahl and other Christian thinkers, including the Christian Historical Party, to think of the historical process as intrinsically authoritative.\(^{208}\) In the later 1920s and 1930s, this concern was intensified and he saw historicism, with its organic conception of society, leading to the rise of Fascism and Nazism.\(^{209}\) The extreme emphasis on history as the self-attesting basis of norms and values, such as was held by the different forms of historicism, seems to have led Dooyeweerd in reaction to seek a non-historical, supra-temporal vantage point, free of the relativising tendencies of the historicistic approach.\(^{210}\)

In response to these considerations, Dooyeweerd came to seek a point of reference that is not located within time. As early as 1924, Dooyeweerd writes of the cosmonomic-Idea as a central lookout tower, but this thought is not yet developed systematically.\(^{211}\) By 1928, he raises the question of the need for an Archimedean point, which is not itself located in any of the modalities.\(^{212}\) Finding the Archimedean point involves the recognition that the ‘totality of meaning’ (‘zin-totaliteit’) of the world depends upon the ‘Being’ (‘Zijn’) of God. By 1931, this ‘totality-Idea’ (as Dooyeweerd called this recognition) had come to dominate and structure Dooyeweerd’s thinking.\(^{213}\) From this


\(^{209}\) Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning: 45-83; Dooyeweerd, Roots: 46-87; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.180-365; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W: 2.126-300; Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 61-112.

\(^{210}\) Steen, Structure: 262-265.

\(^{211}\) Dooyeweerd, ‘In den strijd om een Christelijke staatkunde 1’: 18 (see Kraay, ‘Successive 2’: 1). Tol points out that this goes back to his view in ‘Cosmos en Logos’ in 1923 about faith enabling a view ‘sub specie aeternitatis’ (Tol, Philosophy: 359).

\(^{212}\) An Archimedean point refers to the Greek scientist, Archimedes (287-c. 212 BC), who is said to have claimed that he could lift the Earth off its foundations if he were given a place to stand, a solid point and a long enough lever. It is also referred to by Descartes in his ‘Second Meditation’, although Descartes only mentions the need for a point which is fixed and sound (René Descartes, Discourse on Method and the Meditations (1968): 102; see 4.2.2). Dooyeweerd, ‘Beroepsmisdaad en strafvergelding in ‘t licht der wetsidee: Een bijdrage tot de dogmatiek van de beroepsmisdaad de lege ferenda (Met Nachschrift: Inzake het recht der Calvinistische wetenschapsbeschouwing en het misverstand eener “neutraal-wetenschappelijke kritiek”)’, Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde (3-m) 2 (1928).

supra-temporal creaturely root (‘boven-tijdelijke creatuurlijke wortel’) one can have a ‘view of totality’ (‘blick der totaliteit’), whereby the diversity of the temporal order can be unified with temporal diversity ‘below’ and supra-temporal unity ‘above’. Thus, despite certain modifications in the way he expresses his new conception, from the end of the 1920s on, there is a general shift in Dooyeweerd’s thought towards a somewhat hierarchical ontology and epistemology. This new emphasis on the Archimedean point and the view of totality eclipses the central role which God’s providence had played in Dooyeweerd’s thought in the mid 1920s. Instead, there is a universal ordering structure, which (from 1930 on), he confusingly came to call ‘cosmic time’. Setting aside the question of whether ‘cosmic time’ is properly time at all, we shall note that for Dooyeweerd, this a priori structure is, as he puts it, ‘the functional structure of reality’. He speaks of an ‘all-sided cosmic coherence of the different aspects of

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214 Dooyeweerd, *De zin der geschiedenis*: 6-8. J.G. Friesen argues that Dooyeweerd was influenced in this regard by Othmar Spann (1878-1950), the mystical corporatist thinker (J. Glenn Friesen, ‘Dooyeweerd, Spann and the Philosophy of Totality’, *P.R.* 70 (2005)). Dooyeweerd himself sees Spann as the ‘most consistent universalist’ (Dooyeweerd, ‘Grondproblemen der wijsgerige sociologie’ (1962): 105 (‘meest consequent universalist’); Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning*: 123, 226, 257-258; Dooyeweerd, *Roots*: 127-128). Friesen argues that Dooyeweerd draws on the totality theme in German Idealism – a theme which comes to the fore in the lectures by Max Wundt (see 2.1 footnote) in 1930 at Breslau including one entitled ‘Ganzheit und Form in der Geschichte der Philosophie’ (J. Glenn Friesen, ‘Individuality Structures and Enkapsis: Individuation from Totality in Dooyeweerd and German Idealism’, *P.R.* (2005): 1-9). In 1940 Vollenhoven speaks of the ‘personalist theme of Totality’ although he does not relate it to Dooyeweerd explicitly (Vollenhoven, ‘Anhypostatos? (40a)’: 73 (‘het personalistische thema der Ganzheit’)). See the critique of the notion of totality by Vollenhoven’s intellectual associate, Antheunis Janse (A. Janse, *Van Idolen en Schepselen* (1938): 20-21). The idea of totality bears a close relation to the linguistic turn, such as found, for example, in the thought of Karl Jaspers (1883-1969; see Strauss, *P.D.D.*: 321). Dooyeweerd might also have been influenced by developments in the philosophy of science, such as Hans Driesch (1867-1941) and the biological school of Holists, who substitute the concept of the whole for that of purposiveness. Driesch’s inaugural lecture of 1921 distinguishes totality from mere addition (Hans Driesch, *Das Ganze und die Summe* (1921) – a copy of which Dooyeweerd owned; cited by Friesen, ‘Individuality Structures and Enkapsis: Individuation from Totality in Dooyeweerd and German Idealism’: 5 (n. 15); and Hermann Weyl, *Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Sciences* (1963): 214). Dooyeweerd interacts extensively but critically with Driesch (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.509, 529, 3.54, 571, 573; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.546, 564-565; 3.730-771; Dooyeweerd, ‘Substantiebegrip ... enkaptisch structurgeheel’: 102-134). Previously, Dooyeweerd did not seem to have seen totality quite in this architectonic role but more as the universal functioning (‘sphere-universality’) of each of the modalities (Dooyeweerd, ‘De bronnen van het stellig recht in het licht der wetsidee: Een bijdrage tot opklaring van het probleem inzake de verhouding van rechtsbeginsel en positief recht’, *Anti-Revolutionaire Staatkunde* (3-m) 4 (1930): 229-233).

215 He briefly adopts the notion of an a*veum* between the eternity of God and the full diversity of temporal reality, although he quietly drops the use of this term later (Dooyeweerd, ‘Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën op het Immanentiestandpunt I’, *P.R.* 1 (1936): 69; ‘... 2’, *P.R.* 4 (1939): 1-2, 5; Dooyeweerd, ‘Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.’ 180-181). Peter Steen sees it as central to Dooyeweerd’s systematic stance, which he critiques as subject to the grace/nature dichotomy (Steen, *Structure*: 132-154). This ‘totality-Idea’ will be discussed further in 5.2.3. I shall look at the full systematic implications of this shift in later chapters. See 3.2, 4.2 and 5.2.

216 This will be dealt with in 3.2.3.

meaning … in a cosmic order of time’. As we shall see, this ‘cosmic order of time’ is not so much time (i.e., actual time) as the ordering of the modalities combined with the duration of individuals. It is the way in which the different modalities are harmonised without being reduced to one another. Accordingly, the coherence of all things is located in the concentration of the human consciousness, albeit the redeemed human consciousness, as the concentration point which unifies the diversity of human experience. Thus Dooyeweerd’s thought takes on an ahistorical character and a hierarchical structure, with totality being the supra-temporal mediating link between the eternal Origin and full-blown temporal diversity.

This hierarchical structure, with the Archimedean point situated between God and the rest of the created order, is reflected in his magnum opus, De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, published in 1935-6. Seeing the modalities from the standpoint of the supra-temporal heart as the Archimedean point represented what Dooyeweerd later called the ‘First Way’ – a forerunner of what he came to call his ‘transcendental critique’, as we shall see below. Critics suggested that the argument of De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee rests on a petitio principii in that it depends on the prior acceptance of a conception of the heart as the supra-temporal Archimedean point – a point from which the order and diversity of the modalities can be discerned. H. Robbers, S.J., from the Roman Catholic side, argued against Dooyeweerd’s rejection of the autonomy of philosophy. Another critic was J.C. Franken, who argued against what he considered the dogmatic basis of Dooyeweerd’s argument.

219 5.1.2 and 5.1.3.
220 See Kraay, ‘Successive 2’; 9-22.
To meet the criticisms levelled against the ‘First Way’, Dooyeweerd began to develop what he called his ‘Second Way’, where his aim is to start not with the fully-fledged outline of the modalities in relation to the Archimedean point, but with the character of theoretical thought itself. He argues that his ‘Second Way’ can properly be called a ‘transcendental critique’: it is ‘transcendental’ because it appeals to structures common to all human experience and reflection, not just specifically Christian ways of thinking; and it is a ‘critique’ because it suggests that the contradictions one encounters when one tries to understand the world cannot be resolved by theoretical thought alone, but are based on foundational principles or ‘Ideas’. The presupposita are those of ‘Origin’, ‘totality’ (or ‘unity’), and ‘coherence’. Dooyeweerd argues that these three presupposita or Ideas are revealed by critical self-reflection to be interdependent. These presupposita cannot themselves be theoretical, nor the conclusion of theoretically based argument, since they provide the basis upon which theoretical analysis is subsequently to be done.

Dooyeweerd’s concern in his ‘transcendental critique’ is to show that theoretical

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224 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.22-69; Dooyeweerd, ‘De Religieuze Basis der Wijsbegeerte’, Mededelingen van de Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte 5 (1940); Dooyeweerd, ‘De transcendentale critiek van het wijsgerig denken en de grondslagen van de wijsgerige denkgemeenschap van het Avondland’, P.R. 6 (1941); Dooyeweerd, ‘Introduction to a Transcendental Criticism of Philosophic Thought’, Evangelical Quarterly 19 (1947); Dooyeweerd, ‘Introduction à une critique transcendente de la pensée philosophique’ in Mélanges Philosophiques, Bibliothèque du Xme Congrès International de Philosophie (1948); Dooyeweerd, Transcendental Problems of Philosophical Thought. An Inquiry into the Transcendental Conditions of Philosophy (1948); Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 1-60; Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte’ (1962); Dooyeweerd, ‘Christian Philosophy: An Exploration’ (1996); see Brümmer, Transcendental criticism: 44-45 and Choi, ‘Dialogue and Antithesis’ (52-55). Brümmer argues that there are in fact three stages in the development of Dooyeweerd’s thinking in this regard: the first being a mere statement of the antithesis; the second, the ‘view of totality’ argued for in De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee; and the third, the transcendental critique proper as contained eventually in A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Dooyeweerd, ‘In den strijd om een Christelijke staatkunde (3-m)’, Anti-Revolutionaire Staatkunde (3-m) 1 (1927); Dooyeweerd, ‘Het oude probleem der Christelijke staatkunde’, A.R.S. 2 (1925); Brümmer, Transcendental criticism: 198-200).


thought cannot itself have a religiously neutral foundation.\textsuperscript{227} Theoretical thought needs to have pre-theoretical foundations of a religious character (be that a religious character grounded in dependence upon a transcendent Origin, or one grounded upon an apostate alternative constructed from one or other aspect of the world).\textsuperscript{228} He is deeply critical of the secular Western Enlightenment view of the thinking subject, to which the material of cognition (which he calls the ‘\textit{Gegenstand}’) is presented.\textsuperscript{229} Marking out the different

\textsuperscript{227} Dooyeweerd’s shift in the presentation of the starting point for his philosophy from that presented in \textit{De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee to A New Critique of Theoretical Thought} brought a sharp reaction from Cornelius Van Til (1895-1987), based at Westminster Seminary, Philadelphia, and a philosopher of apologetics in the Reformational tradition. There is a critique of Dooyeweerd by Van Til to the effect that Dooyeweerd is attempting to speak of religion, not in terms of God’s revelation, but in terms of a category of human experience, albeit a basic, universal, and definitive one. Van Til accuses Dooyeweerd of compromising the project of a philosophy worked out on a distinctively Christian basis. Van Til sees Dooyeweerd now engaged in the philosophical sphere in a project analogous to that of natural theology and criticizes him for drawing conclusions about the nature of a Christian philosophy from supposedly neutral premises (Van Til, ‘Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics (1974 G)’ in \textit{The Works of Cornelius Van Til}, 1895-1987 (1997); Van Til, ‘Response [to Herman Dooyeweerd]’ (1971); Van Til, ‘Christianity in Conflict (1962 I.)’ (1997); Dooyeweerd, ‘Cornelius van Til and the Transcendental Critique of Theoretical Thought’ (1971); Van Til, ‘Response [to Herman Dooyeweerd]’; Van Til, \textit{The Reformed Pastor and Modern Thought} (1970): 47); Verburg, \textit{H.D. leven en werk}: 396-398; Choi, ‘Dialogue and Antithesis’: 63-65; K. Scott Olijphi, ‘A Comparison and Evaluation of the Transcendental Methods of Cornelius Van Til and Herman Dooyeweerd’ (Westminster Theological Seminary, Philadelphia: 1995).

\textsuperscript{228} In the first volume of his \textit{W.d.W./N.C.}, he looks critically at what he calls ‘humanistic immanence philosophy’ and provides a cumulative case for this position. He argues that the ‘dogmatic exclusion’ of the need for presupposita and their religious foundation results in different kinds of reductionism, with one or other aspect of the world being made the presupposita of the system of thought, or alternatively, with the resort to different kinds of irrationalism (Dooyeweerd, \textit{W.d.W.}: 1.39, 467-471; Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 1.70-82, 501-506).

\textsuperscript{229} Dooyeweerd, \textit{De Beteekenis}: 64, 66; Dooyeweerd, ‘Juridisch causaliteitsprobleem (A.R.S.)’: 56-57; Dooyeweerd, \textit{Crisis der Humanistische Staatseer}: 102-104; Dooyeweerd, \textit{Crisis in Humanist Political Theory}: 88-89; Dooyeweerd, \textit{W.d.W.}: 2.306-365, 399-407; Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 2.367-369, 434b-435, 466-472; Dooyeweerd, [Interview by Boeles”]: 47. The ‘\textit{Gegenstand}’ is a theoretical construct focused on one modality, or combination of modalities, to the heuristic exclusion of considerations not germane to the specified description or explanation so arrived at. The \textit{Gegenstand} needs to be distinguished from the modal subject–subject and subject-object relations, which are not theoretical constructs but factual realities bound together in a concrete continuity in an already structured way, which Dooyeweerd calls the ‘ontic systasis’(Dooyeweerd, \textit{De Beteekenis}: 64, 66; Dooyeweerd, ‘Juridisch causaliteitsprobleem (A.R.S.)’): 56-57; Dooyeweerd, \textit{Crisis der Humanistische Staatseer}: 102-104; Dooyeweerd, \textit{Crisis in Humanist Political Theory}: 88-89; Dooyeweerd, \textit{W.d.W.}: 2.306-365, 399-407; Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 2.367-369, 434b-435, 466-472; Dooyeweerd, [Interview by Boeles’]: 47). However, problematically, Dooyeweerd also describes the \textit{Gegenstand} as the opposing of the logical modality to the other modalities of one’s experience and then the synthesising of the logical with that other modality (Dooyeweerd, \textit{W.d.W.}: 1.121; 2.399-403; Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 1.39-57, 153; 2.467-469; Dooyeweerd, \textit{Crisis der Humanistische Staatseer}: 103; Dooyeweerd, \textit{Crisis in Humanist Political Theory}: 88; Dooyeweerd, ‘De transcendentale critiek van het wijsgerig denken ... Avondland’; 6-18; Dooyeweerd, \textit{Transcendental Problems}: 29-55; Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte’: 19-48; Dooyeweerd, ‘Christian Philosophy’: 6-25; Dooyeweerd, ‘Het Oecumenisch-Reformatorisch Grondmotief van de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee en de Grondslag der Vrije Universiteit’, \textit{P.R.} 31 (1966): 11-12; Dooyeweerd, \textit{Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap 'Inleiding’} (1967): 10-24; Dooyeweerd, \textit{Encyclopedia of the Science of Law, Vol.1 Introduction} (2002): 26-48; Dooyeweerd, ‘De kentheoretische Gegenstandsrelatie en de logische subject-objectrelatie’, \textit{P.R.} (1975): 88; Dooyeweerd, ‘The Epistemo-logical Gegenstand-relation and the Logical Subject-Object Relation’, \textit{P.R.} 41 (1976)). This is a storm centre of fierce debate, initially
areas of analysis is unavoidable in theoretical thought. However, even there the divide between the thinking subject and the subject matter of analytical investigation is misleading and distorting. For Dooyeweerd (and indeed for Vollenhoven), the human ‘subject’ is not to be seen as divorced from his or her situation and the diversity of relationships of which he or she is part. Human beings are inescapably in the world and part of it. Any attempt to conceive of oneself as a thinking subject remote from the context in which one is engaged, is misconceived.

Thus, Dooyeweerd seeks to demonstrate that theoretical thought necessarily depends on prior religious beliefs – be they Christian or an alternative religious starting point – even if this does not seem ‘religious’. Basic religious belief (that is, the fundamental orientation of one’s world and life view) is expressed in what he calls ‘ground-motives’. He identifies four ground-motives which have shaped Western thought and

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230 As Polanyi has argued subsequently, one cannot engage with the world without prior, passionate expectations within what he calls a ‘fiduciary framework’ (Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy (1958): 267).

232 The term ‘ground-motive’ is used by Dooyeweerd to designate the basic ‘religious’ beliefs (i.e., basic to one’s personal life-stance) that shape a worldview and are foundational to any philosophical system.

culture. The Christian ground-motive, as Dooyeweerd states it, is that of creation, fall and redemption by Jesus Christ as the incarnate Word of God in the communion of the Holy Spirit. Dooyeweerd contrasts this Christian ground-motive with a number of ‘apostate’ ground-motives. First, there is the form/matter motive that he takes to characterise the religious foundation of Greek thought. Second, there is the grace/nature ground-motive characteristic of what Dooyeweerd calls ‘scholasticism’, produced by the synthesis of the Greek ground-motive with Christian revelation. (The grace/nature ground-motive differs from the form/matter ground-motive in that it allows


Dooyeweerd, ‘De vier religieuze grondthema’s’: 163-164; Dooyeweerd, Transcendental Problems: 59-77; Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte’: 46-63; Dooyeweerd, ‘Christian Philosophy’: 24-35; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 48-50. It has been pointed out that Dooyeweerd’s four ground-motives are similar to those identified by Abraham Kuyper in his Lectures on Calvinism, namely Paganism, Romanism, Modernism and Calvinism, leaving out Islamism (Kuyper, Lectures: 9-40; Dooyeweerd, R. & S. I: Dooyeweerd, R. & S. I; Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning: Dooyeweerd, Roots; see Klapwijk, ‘Reformational Philosophy’: 109). Dooyeweerd tends to write the ground-motives as ‘form-matter’ etc. However, I shall use the form ‘form/matter’ etc. in order to indicate that they involve two dialectically opposed principles, one set over the other (see 4.2.2). While the ‘ground-motives’ feature as such only from the late 1930s and are not in the W.d.W, yet they can be traced back to Dooyeweerd’s earliest thinking (see Dooyeweerd, ‘R.K. en A.R.S.’ 4-6, 48-49).


for the genuine sinfulness of humanity – this sinfulness is seen to work in a realm somehow over and above the original constitution of the world.)  

Finally, there is the Enlightenment freedom/nature ground-motive characterised by a dichotomy between the ‘personality ideal’ (‘freedom’), and that of the rational and empirical analysis of the physical order (‘nature’).

The relation of the ground-motives to the totality-Idea and the notion of the Archimedean point remains unclear, and indeed after the publication of A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, it has been observed that Dooyeweerd did not mention the

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237 In De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, there is an extensive discussion of the rise of the ‘the ground-antinomy in the humanistic cosmonomic Idea’ (‘grond-antinomie in de humanistische wetsidee’) (1.171 = Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.216) marked by the antinomic tension between the science ideal and the ideal of personality (1.151-471). However, while this is paralleled in A New Critique (1.187-506) there are subtle differences in presentation with specific mention of what is now a freedom/nature ‘ground-motive’ (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.36, 62-63, 187, 190, 193, 499, 501; Dooyeweerd, ‘De vier religieuze grondthema’s’: 170-171; Dooyeweerd, R. & S I: 17-19; Dooyeweerd, Transcendental Problems: 73-77; Dooyeweerd, The Secularization of Science: 16-24; Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 45-51; Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning: 143-180; Dooyeweerd, Roots: 148-188; Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte’: 56-63; Dooyeweerd, ‘Christian Philosophy’: 31-35; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 63-74).
Archimedean point again. There is some evidence that from the late 1950s he either modified or clarified the position that he had seemed to hold since 1930. In public, he expressed the view that he felt like ‘tearing out his hair’ at the way his statement of the ‘supra-temporal heart’ had been misunderstood. This remains an unresolved and controversial element in his philosophical system, although, as I shall argue in Chapter Four, it is possible to read Dooyeweerd in such a way that the difficulties raised by his notion of the ‘supra-temporal heart’ – and his divergence in this regard with Vollenhoven – can be resolved.

In his later systematic thinking, Dooyeweerd developed the notion of ‘enkapsis’: a specific coming together of diverse individuality-structures, not least in the case of the human person. In Chapters Three and Six I shall consider this notion and others, which together point to a more concretely situated systematics than his notion of ‘cosmic time’ and the ‘totality-Idea’ might seem to indicate.

Dooyeweerd retired in 1965, although he continued to be active until his death in 1977.

238 Kraay, ‘Successive 2’: 31. Kraay argues that A New Critique is an awkward hybrid between the Archimedean point conception found in Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, and the ground-motive conception, which was developed after the publication of the W.d.W. He points out that apart from the later, hybrid mention of it in A New Critique, Dooyeweerd’s last serious exposition of the Archimedean point conception was in 1948 (Dooyeweerd, Transcendental Problems). Dooyeweerd writes in the preface to A New Critique, that while he added in new conceptions, ‘I had to restrict any changes to what was absolutely necessary, if I did not want to write a new work’ (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.x; Kraay, ‘Successive 2’: 31, 39).

239 ‘[D]e religieuze concentratie juist een centrale relatie tussen het menselijk ik en de eeuwige God impliceert die nooit in de tijd kan opgaan’ (‘just because [the heart as] the religious concentration is the central relation between the human I and the eternal God does not mean that it rises above time’) (Dooyeweerd, ‘Van Peursen’s critische vragen bij A New Critique of Theoretical Thought’: 103).

240 The incident in question was after a lecture in 1964, but it has been variously interpreted (Strauss, ‘Legacy’: 4; J. Glenn Friesen, ‘Why did Dooyeweerd Want to Tear out his Hair?’ (2006): 12-21).

241 See 4.2.2.

242 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.696 (not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, R. & S 3: 1-2; Dooyeweerd, ‘Substantiebegrip ... enkaptisch structuurgeheel’: 68. Dooyeweerd describes the process of ‘enkapsis’ as that whereby individuals retain their structural individuality within the greater whole (or alternatively by assimilation, where they do not), and their going out of being (Dooyeweerd, R. & S 2: 1-2; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.696). Dooyeweerd took up the terminology developed by the anatomist Martin Heidenhain (1864-1949) and taken up by Theodor L. Häring in his book, Über Individualität in Natur und Geisteswelt (1926). Heidenhain used the term to describe the relation between the separate organs and the whole organism, whereas Häring gave it more general use to explain the whole and its parts. Dooyeweerd rejects both these applications and re-conceives the term ( Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 3.558-561; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.634-636, 696 (not in Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, R. & S 3: 3-4). Unlike Häring’s conception, as we shall see, for Dooyeweerd, ‘enkapsis’ is not a relation between a whole and its parts, but links two or more individuals, each bound with the other or others but retaining its own distinctive individuality (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 3.561-564; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.637-639; for Dooyeweerd’s enkaptic account of the human person see Dooyeweerd, R. & S 3: Part Two). See 3.2.4.

243 See 3.2.4 and 6.2.
The verdict on Dooyeweerd’s philosophical achievement, given on Dooyeweerd’s seventieth birthday by G.E. Langemeijer, then Chair of the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences, was that he was ‘the most original philosopher which the Netherlands has ever produced, not excluding Spinoza’. Through the whole of his time as Professor of Philosophy, as well as in the years preceding their joint appointments to the V.U., he worked in close co-operation with Vollenhoven, using this time and stability of tenure to elaborate a Christian philosophy of almost unrivalled comprehensiveness and rigour. Overall, the partnership between the two philosophers was long and fruitful, and over the course of their long joint tenure at the V.U., and before and after that, their combined achievement was both significant and remarkable. Nevertheless, the systematic divergences between the two philosophers remained unresolved in a number of critical respects during their respective lifetimes, for reasons which will be discussed in the following chapters.

2.3 A Reformational Vision for the Whole Created Order

In this chapter we have seen how Reformational philosophy as developed by Dirk Vollenhoven and Herman Dooyeweerd took the stage against the background of Reformational thought as seen in the work of Abraham Kuyper. Together they developed a systematic elaboration of Kuyper’s notion of sphere sovereignty. However, whereas Kuyper had largely developed his insights in a social context, Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd carried this basic insight through far more rigorously and comprehensively than had their pioneering predecessor. They built on the foundations laid by Kuyper and elaborated his social vision to develop a global philosophy of the created order as a whole. So far, I have presented a narrative account of their philosophical development. In the rest of this thesis, I shall attempt a systematic comparison of their respective philosophies.

244 Commemoration editorial in Trouw, 6 October, 1964, on the occasion of Dooyeweerd’s seventieth birthday.
As we have seen, Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd tried to devise a Christian philosophy that would take full account of the totality of human experience. From a Reformational perspective, the systematic philosophical task involves two basic questions together giving rise to a third. The first basic question is the ‘transcendental’ one: in what way is our experience of the world structured? This is itself a composite of two further questions: the question of what there is (the ontology of the world), and the question of how we know it (the epistemology of the world). The second basic question is the ‘transcendent’ one. It involves what is called in Reformational terms the ‘religious’ orientation of those engaged in the philosophical task. This second basic question is not one which secular philosophy asks, or even recognises as valid, committed as it is to the ideal of religious neutrality. But, from a Reformational perspective, the ideal of religious neutrality conceals a religious commitment of its own, so that the question of religious orientation can be suppressed but cannot be evaded.

Linking these two questions is the consideration of the presupposita that Vollenhoven (implicitly) and Dooyeweerd (explicitly) argue are the necessary foundations for any systematic philosophical thinking.

Therefore in the following chapters, I shall look first at how they systematically take account of the elements of the world (or what I call the necessary conditions of experience); second, at the way their respective philosophies have a Christian basis.

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246 In Chapter Six, I shall call these the ‘transcendentals’.


248 ‘Transcendental’ is a term with a long history. As indicated previously, I shall be using it in the Kantian sense of a condition of any possible experience or reflection (see Pereboom, ‘Kant on Justification in Transcendental Philosophy’), not the medieval scholastic sense (see 1.1). Further, it is necessary to distinguish ‘transcendental’, which refers to the conditions of our experience (indeed the necessary condition for any possible experience), and ‘transcendent’, which refers to the presupposita which shape and ground the interpretation of that experience. It is true that Vollenhoven expressed discomfort with the terminology of ‘transcendental (‘transcendental’) and ‘transcendent’ (Vollenhoven, ‘Enkele grondlijnen der kentheorie (26b)’: 386-391). However, he himself also states later that religion ‘points over and above the cosmos’ (‘boven den kosmos uitwijst’), i.e., is transcendent in character (Vollenhoven, *Isagôgè Philosophiae* (32) (1932): §72; see Tol, *Philosophy*: 483 whose translation of the phrase I follow) and speaks of the ‘point of orientation’ (Vollenhoven, *Introduction*: §17, p. 18). Similarly Dooyeweerd seems at times (not least in formulating his ‘Second Way’) to play off the ‘transcendent’ against the ‘transcendental’ (Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.37-38 (not in *W.d.W.*); Dooyeweerd, ‘Cornelius van Til and the Transcendental Critique of Theoretical Thought’: 75; see also 2.2), but he also affirms their interdependence (Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.88 (not in *W.d.W.*)). Dooyeweerd is not himself consistent in his use of the terms, and occasionally uses ‘transcendental’ when the term ‘transcendent’ might be appropriate instead (see for example Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 2.230-259; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 2.303-330).

249 Chapter Three.
(their religious orientation);\textsuperscript{250} and, third at the presupposita which link the Christian basis with one’s understanding of the world.\textsuperscript{251} Throughout, I shall analyse the extent to which their positions converge or are complementary, and explore how their respective insights can be drawn upon in a way which is true to the Reformational vision of the triune engagement with the world, as outlined by Kuyper.\textsuperscript{252}

\textsuperscript{250} Chapter Four.
\textsuperscript{251} Chapter Five.
\textsuperscript{252} Chapter Six.
Chapter Three: Transcendental Location – the Conditions of Experience

As indicated at the end of the previous chapter, I shall address the question of what I shall call ‘transcendental location’ of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s systematic philosophies, in other words, the necessary conditions which structure all human experience. In Chapter Six, I shall call these necessary conditions the ‘transcendentals’, but in this chapter I shall be engaging with the Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s presentation of their systematic responses to this question.

I shall approach this in two steps. In the first step I shall address the ‘modalities’ – the mutually irreducible ways of being and knowing. I shall present the list of these modalities upon which the two philosophers largely came to agree. The second step is to look at the conditions for experience (what in Chapter Six I shall call the ‘transcendentals’): the ontological and epistemological basic features (which as we shall see are called ‘determinations’ or ‘transcendental dimensions’ respectively by the two philosophers) within which modal diversity is ‘refracted’ (to use Dooyeweerd’s metaphor). Here as we shall see, the situation is somewhat more complex, since each of the two thinkers has a different point of entry and emphasis, giving rise to strengths and weakness in their respective presentations, but also offering seeming incommensurabilities with one another. But I shall look at each philosopher’s systematic account as far as possible in its own terms in order to make a critical comparison, so as later, in Chapter Six, to come to a constructive view of how their systematics are related within the wider context of their respective philosophies.

I shall begin, then, with the more straightforward matter of the modalities (‘straightforward’ in the sense that the two philosophers are largely agreed on their identification and ordering). As I have argued in the previous chapter, the ‘discovery’ of

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253 Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd use various terms for these aspects, but for the purpose of consistency, I shall use the word ‘modality’ to translate what Dooyeweerd calls ‘wetskring’ and which is variously translated ‘aspect’ or ‘modal aspect’. The strangeness of this word signals that it refers to something technically precise in Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven’s philosophy, which ‘aspect’ does not, and it is simpler than ‘modal aspect’ or ‘modal function’. It also indicates that what is being referred to is not a property, but a distinctive ‘way of being in the world’, or perhaps in terms of Dooyeweerd’s ‘Being’ of God v. ‘meaning’ of the created order (see 5.2.1) ‘way of meaning’.
the modalities came about as result of the intense examination by the brothers-in-law of the thought of the two neo-Kantian schools, the Marburg and the Baden, dominant at the time. Each of these neo-Kantian schools presented its own challenges and stimuli, but, in broad terms, they raised the question of reductionism in a hard and soft form respectively.

From a Reformational perspective, the neo-Kantian philosophers of the Marburg school, notably Herman Cohen (1842-1918) and Paul Gerhard Natorp (1854-1924), represent a hard form of reductionism. According to Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, Cohen and Natorp attempt to reduce even sensory perception (which Kant himself saw as graspable only by ‘intuition’) to logical analysis conducted by ‘pure thought alone’ (‘im reinen Denken allein’).\footnote{Cohen: Vollenhoven, \textit{W. Woordenboek} : 86, 279-280; Dooyeweerd, \textit{W.d.W}: 1.12, 40-42, 190, 376, 496, 2.110, 275, 317; Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 1.10 (n. 1), 17, 74-76, 91, 530; 2.167, 343; Hermann Cohen, \textit{Logik der reinen Erkenntnis} (1914): 126 (quoted by Strauss, \textit{Begrip en Idee}: 170 (n. 132)); Natorp: Vollenhoven, \textit{W. Woordenboek}: 279-280; Dooyeweerd, \textit{W.d.W}: 2.69-72, 114-116, 317; 2.25, 31; Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 1.204 (not in \textit{W.d.W}); 2.91-92, 95, 171-173, 387; 3.35, 46, 51-52. As will be seen (in Chapters Five and Six), ‘intuition’ will be used in a somewhat different way in this thesis from Kant’s usage (where it is the organising of sense experience), or indeed, as we have previously seen, that of Descartes (where it is axiomatic reasoning). Russell and Whitehead: See also attempts like those of Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) in the Anglo-American tradition, to reduce mathetics to logic (Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 2.78, 82-83, 436, 452 (not in \textit{W.d.W})).}

But attempts to reduce all other features of reality to thought, and, more specifically to analytical thought (which takes its character from considerations of logic) result in antinomies. Before embarking on logical analysis, it is necessary to experience that which is analysed; logic cannot itself provide the content for logical analysis. Moreover, logic cannot itself account for aspects of the world such as beauty and justice. These latter involve non-logical – but not illogical – considerations. As Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd both point out, a similar result awaits any project seeking to understand the world as a whole, which takes as its point of departure one aspect or a selection of aspects. Such projects include attempts to describe the world purely in physico-chemical terms or attempts to understand human relationships purely in biological terms. Any attempt to reduce the description of the world to one form of explanation cannot do justice to the many-sided diversity of everyday experience; any attempt to construct society on the basis of any one form of explanation risks
undermining that society. As in the story of Midas, if all things are turned to gold, they become lifeless.  

The Baden school of neo-Kantianism by contrast, represents a soft form of reductionism. Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd engage extensively with Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), Wilhelm Windelband (1846-1915), Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936), Maximilian (‘Max’) Carl Emil Weber (1864-1920) and Theodore Litt (1880-1962) – all of whom variously posit a duality between causal explanations, appropriate to the natural sciences, and ‘understanding’ (‘Verstehen’), appropriate to the ‘human sciences’. Broadly speaking, a soft reductionistic approach such as that of the Baden school marks out parallel forms of discourse, each of which is purported to be an adequate description of reality. For example, human relations are described primarily in physical or biological terms, while mental considerations are accorded a semi-autonomous status. Even modified forms of reductionism such as this run into the problem of the translation or mapping from one form of discourse to another. Moreover, the dualities between the different forms of discourse created raise new difficulties. These dualities give rise to the question: how can parallel forms of discourse provide

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255 Dooyeweerd mentions the dominance of ‘isms’ each of which absolutise one or other aspect of concrete experience (Dooyeweerd, De Betekenis: 67; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1:28-9 (not in N.C.); Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 146-49 (not in W.d.W.;) Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning: 37, 39-41; Dooyeweerd, Roots: 37-38, 40-43). Roy Clouser gives a number of examples of theories which attempt different form of reduction, which gain explanatory power at the cost of narrowing the number of aspects of concrete experience which are taken into account (Clouser, Myth 2nd edn.: 131-183; see also Strauss, P.D.D.: 5-8).

equally valid but mutually unrelated and incommensurable accounts of the same state of affairs?\textsuperscript{257}

Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd argue that while the more extreme forms of reductionism achieve their consistency at the cost of distortion, the less extreme forms collapse into incoherence.\textsuperscript{258} For example, one’s understanding of the world cannot fully be based on physical relation, that is, relations concerning the exchange and conversion of physical energy. Physical relations alone (or biological, psychological, cultural-formative relations etc.) cannot adequately exemplify for us relations of justice, beauty, love or faith to mention just a few. Any attempt to exclude these latter from the picture gives one an impoverished and distorted worldview. However, even any of the latter taken on their own cannot provide one with a full and balanced picture either.

As an alternative approach, both philosophers start with experience in its rich and irreducible diversity in this respect; Vollenhoven speaks of ‘non-scientific’ experience while Dooyeweerd speaks of ‘naïve’ experience. Non-scientific or naïve experience involves encounters with whole persons or things, engagement in specific relationships, and participation in actual events.\textsuperscript{259} When one drinks from a crafted crystal wineglass, one does not experience it separately as a container that holds liquid, as one that has economic value, and yet again as a beautiful object.\textsuperscript{260} Naïve experience involves the encounter with all reality at once in its irreducible diversity yet indissoluble ‘coherence’. It is ‘pre-theoretical’ in that it seeks no explicit analysis of reality’s norms

\textsuperscript{257} Indeed, it is the inadequacy of the Baden neo-Kantian school’s soft reductionistic dualism between causal factuality and ethical value (brought to the fore in Dooyeweerd’s debate with Scholten in April 1922 Henderson, \textit{Illuminating Law}: 40) which may well have served as the catalyst for the crystallisation (‘discovery’) of the modalities (probably) in the summer of that year, as I have argued (see Chapter Two).

\textsuperscript{258} Vollenhoven, \textit{Introduction}: §31, pp. 25-27; Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 1.46-49. For a more recent critiques of the reductionist approach from a Dooyeweerdian perspective in terms of a number of case studies in mathematics, physics and psychology, see Clouser, \textit{Myth}: 127-183; and Jonathan P. Chaplin, \textit{Herman Dooyeweerd: Christian Philosopher of State and Civil Society} (2011): 61.

\textsuperscript{259} Vollenhoven, \textit{Introduction}: §§148, 193, pp. 109,134; Dooyeweerd, \textit{W.d.W.}: 1.91-92; Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 1.127-128. Dooyeweerd takes the notion of the givenness of that which is presented to one from Husserl’s phenomenological approach (Dooyeweerd, \textit{W.d.W.}: 2.451-463; Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 2.529-532). Unlike Husserl, for Dooyeweerd, the palpability of one’s naïve experience is not dependent on the phenomenological self-interpretation of the transcendental ego. According to Dooyeweerd, Husserl supposes that one can logically formalise the totality concept in so doing pass beyond the modal diversity of the latter (Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 1.73 (not in \textit{W.d.W.}); see also 2.560-561 (n. 1; not in \textit{W.d.W.})).

\textsuperscript{260} My own example.
and laws.\textsuperscript{261} Naïve experience does not exclude analysis; but this must be
distinguished from ‘scientific’ or ‘theoretical’ analysis.\textsuperscript{262} In naïve
experience, analytical thought governed by the norms of logic is integrated
implicitly (Dooyeweerd calls it ‘enstatically’\textsuperscript{263}) in day-to-day engagement
with the world.

‘Scientific’ (Vollenhoven) or ‘theoretical’ (Dooyeweerd) thought, by
contrast, seeks the explicit differentiation of the different aspects of the
world through \textit{epochè} (the process of modal abstraction or theoretical
analysis).\textsuperscript{264} Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven came to identify fifteen
modalities, the mutually irreducible ways of being and knowing, from
‘higher’ to ‘lower’, or from ‘later’ to ‘earlier’,\textsuperscript{265} are:

\begin{itemize}
\item Naïve realism
\item Scientific (Vollenhoven)
\item Theoretical (Dooyeweerd)
\item Physical
\item Kinetic
\item Numerical
\item Temporal
\item Biological
\item Social
\item Psychological
\item Pistic
\item Epistemic
\item Historical
\item Cultural
\item Immanent
\item Transcendental
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{261} Dooyeweerd, \textit{W.d.W.}: 3.1 ff.; Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 3.3 ff. It is important to note here that Dooyeweerd
distinguishes one’s pre-theoretical appropriation of experience from the attempt of what he calls ‘ naïve
realism’ to treat naïve experience as a theoretical category.

Dooyeweerd is himself reacting against the Marburg neo-Kantians with their reduction of naïve
experience to the all-encompassing analytical activity of the knowing subject.

\textsuperscript{263} Dooyeweerd, \textit{W.d.W.}: 1.7-9: 2.402 (‘slechts-instellende denkhouding’ – ‘solely \textit{en}stic intellectual
attitude’), 410, 414; Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 1.5-7: 2.470, 474-475, 479. See 5.2.2 footnote.

\textsuperscript{264} Dooyeweerd points out that this term had a central function in Husserl’s thought, although he claims
he is using it not in the Husserlian sense of an isolated section of intentional consciousness for the
purpose of investigation, but rather, as he put it ‘an abstraction from the temporal continuity in the cosmic
coherence of meaning’ (Dooyeweerd, \textit{W.d.W.}: 2: 24-26, 402 (n. 1); Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 1.213 (not in
(Russell points out that it is necessary in this regard to distinguish ideitic, philosophical and
transcendental \textit{epochè} – the comparison here is with ‘transcendental \textit{epochè}’)). ‘Temporal continuity’ for
Dooyeweerd is the ordering of the modalities (see 3.2.3). Dooyeweerd argues that his procedure is exactly
the reverse of that of Husserl: while the latter requires the methodological elimination of the naïve
attitude and the transcendental-phenomenological ‘reduction’ of the world to an intentional-objective
correlate to the absolute transcendental ego, Dooyeweerd seeks to recognize the diversity of naïve
experience in the very irreducible diversity of the modalities (Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 2.73 (not in \textit{W.d.W.})).

\textsuperscript{265} The identification and ordering of the modalities is open-ended and subject to continual correction and
elaboration (see Strauss, \textit{P.D.D.}: 77-79). The principle behind it is that no one sort of relation is capable
of providing one with a fully adequate description of the world. The two philosophers largely agree on the
identification and ordering of the modalities, even though they jointly revised these over the years, and
their followers have attempted many revision – for example at different times, they came to distinguish
the kinetic from the physical (Strauss, \textit{P.D.D.}: 88). D.F.M. Strauss argues that the ‘numerical’ modality
should be called ‘quantitative’ because that is one of the ways the world is and which is then apprehended
by the human mind in numerical or arithmetic terms (Strauss, \textit{P.D.D.}: 82-87). Vollenhoven tends to speak
of the numerical (quantitative) modality as the ‘lowest’ modality with the pistical (faith) as the ‘highest’
modality, while Dooyeweerd tends to speak of these as ‘earlier’ and ‘later’.
Each modality has what Dooyeweerd calls a ‘cosmonomic’ side, which comprises the laws or norms specific to each of the modalities; and a ‘factual’ side, which comprises what Vollenhoven calls ‘subjèct’ or ‘subjècts’ – that who or which is governed by these laws or norms. For example, quantitative theoretical concepts are governed by quantitative ‘logic’, spatial concepts by spatial ‘logic’ and so on. ‘Laws’ (which have

267 ‘Cosmonomic’ indicates both laws proper – i.e., pertaining to what applies of necessity: quantity, space, kinesis, energy or biosis or analysis, and norms – i.e., pertaining to what ought to apply: analytical, cultural, symbolic, social, economic, aesthetic, ethical or certitudinal (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.175-180; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.237-24; Vollenhoven, ‘Getuigen (59d)’: /2, p. 138; see Strauss, P.D.D.: 41, 82-102, 258-259, 298). How this applies in the two thinkers’ respective philosophical positions is far less clear and somewhat controversial. Vollenhoven explicitly rejects the distinction between the cosmonomic and factual side and instead he sees the law as mediating between God and cosmos (Vollenhoven, ‘Divergentierapport I (53)’: 113-115; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)’: 184; see 4.1). Strauss argues that the differences between the accounts presented by the two philosophers are more terminological than substantive, since while Vollenhoven speaks of the law as ‘above’ the temporal order and the Dooyeweerd of the cosmonomic ‘side’, both share the notion of being ‘subjèct’, i.e., ‘under’ the law (Strauss, P.D.D.: 76-77, 447-449; see also 4.1). Moreover, while Dooyeweerd makes this distinction, there are questions about Dooyeweerd’s consistency in applying it (Strauss, P.D.D.: 446-449). However, although Vollenhoven rejects the distinction as stated, and although there are ambiguities in the way Dooyeweerd sets it out, it is still a useful and necessary distinction for the purposes of exposition. Not only it is helpful in a straightforward account of the modalities (holding in tension the distinction between ‘potential’ and ‘actual’ with respect to the laws, ‘is’ and ‘ought’ with respect to the norms), it also illuminates Dooyeweerd’s and Vollenhoven’s differing presentations. Moreover, as we shall see, while formally Vollenhoven rejects Dooyeweerd’s distinction between the cosmonomic side and the factual side, there is a way in which that distinction is crucial to his (Vollenhoven’s) own systematics. As I shall argue (3.1.1 and 3.1.2), Vollenhoven implicitly incorporates the distinction systematically by the correlation of the thus-so and this-that connections or ‘determinations’ (see Appendix One). Dooyeweerd’s distinction between the cosmonomic and the factual sides of created reality should not be confused with that between naive experience and theoretical thought. Naive experience is equally subject to laws or norms, even if these are not explicitly differentiated according to the modalities; while theoretical thought investigates both the laws and norms and the law and norm-conformity according to those different modalities.
their force independent of human implementation) pertain only from the numerical modality up to the logical modality. From there, they require human mediation; they are no longer laws which apply independently of being grasped by human subjectivity. They are now ‘norms’, requiring human mediation to be ‘positivised’, i.e., brought into actual operation. For norms to apply in the analytical modality they must be grasped by human beings functioning as the analytical subject. From the cultural-formative modality onwards they need human formative activity in order to come into force. For each modality, therefore, there is a specific type of law-or norm-conformity. The first modality is governed by arithmetical laws, the second by spatial laws, and so on. Further, each modality has a characteristic nucleus of meaning which makes it irreducible to other modalities: the laws of number and space and their distinctive subject matter are mutually irreducible. Those of a kinetic kind are distinct from the numerical and spatial, and their ‘meaning kernels’ are quantity, space, movement and so forth. So the key factors subsumed under a modal law can be rigorously isolated.

Each kind of theoretical concept is governed by the ‘logic’ appropriate to its modality, and the full, rich totality of experience cannot be reduced to the explanations or descriptions of any one modality. Each modality refers to every other modality ‘analogously’. This is the specifically Reformational sense of ‘analogy’, namely the way in which a concept specific to one modality refers to ‘has an analogy

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269 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.5, 36-37; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1: 3-4; Dooyeweerd, ‘De vier religieuze grondthema’s’: 7. These modalities are identified according to what D.F.M. Strauss calls ‘a transcendental-empirical approach’, which takes full account of the multi-faceted character of human experience (D.F.M. Strauss, Reintegrating Social Theory: Reflecting upon Human Society and the Discipline of Sociology (2006): 111-119; Strauss, P.D.D.: 231, 234, 291, 319, 435). The term seems to have originated from Dooyeweerd’s successor, the philosopher of law, H.J. Hommes and the philosopher of science, M.D. Stafleu (H.J. van Eikema Hommes, Encyclopedie der rechtswetenschap: Hoofdlijnen der rechtssociologie en de materiële indeling van publiek- en privaatrecht (1975/1983): 41-42; Strauss, Begrip en Idee: 86. I am grateful to R.A. Nijhoff for this point). The identification of these modalities is an empirical task governed by the appropriate theoretical rigour. And yet, while the identification of the modalities is an empirical and theoretical task, that there are such pluralities is a pre-cognitive insight grounded on a presupposition of an over-arching Coherence (which, as we shall see in 5.2.2, I argue, pace Dooyeweerd, should be capitalised in order to indicate that it is a transcendent Idea).

270 I am using ‘logic’ here not in the strict sense (i.e., as an analytical concept) but analogically (see Vollenhoven, ‘Philosophia systematica II (27ms)’: §40; Tol, Philosophy: 403-444).

271 Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvinisme contra Neo-Kantianisme’: 68-70; Dooyeweerd, De Bespeckenis: 64, 109 (n. 102); Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.5-6; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.3-4; Kraay, ‘Successive 2’. This the point of Roy Clouser’s ‘thought experiment’ whereby he shows the impossibility of descriptions in terms of any one modality alone (Clouser, Myth 2nd edn.: 189-190).
Analogies indicate the coherence of that modality with all the other modalities (this is the ‘sphere universality’ of each modality). Analogies can be either ‘antecipations’ (referring ‘forward’ to), or ‘retrocipations’ (referring ‘back’ to) the other modalities. For example, a number series (in the numerical modality) antecipates points on a line (in the spatial modality) while the points on the line retrocipate the numerical series. In a similar way, the spatial antecipates the kinetic, the kinetic the physical (energetic), the physical the biotic, the biotic the psychic (sensory), the psychic the analytical, and so on until the pistic (the modality of faith or certitude).

Every kind of concept abstracted from the expressions of the different kinds of relation needs to be enunciated with an awareness not only of the specific ‘logic’ appropriate to the modality in question, but also with a sense of the analogies (antecipations and retrocipations) which that concept has with the other modalities. For example, the concept of ‘development’ retrocipates the biotic concept of growth, and antecipates the social concept of complexity. Because it involves the tracing of analogies across the modalities, theoretical thought cannot find its foundation within any one modality alone and so the exponents of any ‘special science’ (i.e., any modally-specific discipline) must recognise that it cannot provide the sole basis for itself and need to recognise its dependence on all the other modalities as the one which is the primary focus for that ‘special science’.

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272 For both philosophers, ‘analogy’ is not a bridging of the temporal and the eternal (or a bridge between the created order and God) but a bridging of the different sorts of discourse within the temporal or created order (i.e., with respect to the modalities). Dooyeweerd first set this out in his inaugural lecture of 1926 (Dooyeweerd, De Beteekenis: 69, 109 (n. 102)). Kraay points that only a few months earlier, Dooyeweerd had dismissed analogy as ‘conflicting with the postulate of critical purity (Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvinisme contra Neo-Kantianisme’: 56; Kraay, ‘Successive 2’: 8). However, in this it is important to see the difference between the ‘scholastic’ (eternal/temporal) and Reformational (trans-modal) uses of analogy.

273 ‘Ante’ (Latin for ‘before’) signifies that a conceptual element clustered around the ‘meaning nucleus’ of a modality ‘goes before’ the modality to which it points, while ‘retrocipation’ (‘retro’ being Latin for ‘backwards’) indicates the same in reverse. Here, in order to signal the distinctively technical sense of the ‘antecipation’, I shall follow Vollenhoven’s (largely) preferred spelling (Vollenhoven, ‘Plato’s realisme (63a), P.R. 18 (1963): 128, p. 137; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)’; 173,181,193; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’; 203), taken up by Strauss (Strauss, P.D.D.; passim), including, for the sake of consistency, for both philosophers (even though Dooyeweerd, and sometimes Vollenhoven, uses the spelling ‘anticipation’).


275 As we shall see, Vollenhoven tends to characterise the expressions of the modalities as functions of individuals (3.1.1), while, I shall argue, the characteristic expression of the modalities for Dooyeweerd, are the kinds of relation (3.2.1).
Thus Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd ‘discovered’ their modal theory in response to the hard and soft reductionism they found in the Marburg and Baden neo-Kantian schools respectively – the hard and soft reductionism of these two schools respectively representative of Western philosophy as a whole. Positively stated, modal theory is both a pluralistic yet coherent account of the world – a working out of Kuyper’s vision of ‘sovereignty in every sphere’ across the whole created order. There is a considerable degree of agreement between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd about the modalities and their ordering and what differences there are in that respect pertain mainly to nomenclature.\footnote{The main one being, as we have seen, to do with what Dooyeweerd calls the ‘historical modality’ and what Vollenhoven prefers to call the ‘formative’ modality (see 2.2).}

But there is much less agreement between the two philosophers about the other crucial feature of their philosophical systematics, which Vollenhoven calls the ‘determinations’,\footnote{Vollenhoven, \textit{Introduction}: §§28-45, pp. 24-32 (‘bepaaldheden’ is translated variously as ‘determinant’ and ‘determination’).} and which Dooyeweerd calls the ‘transcendental dimensions in the experiential horizon’ (or ‘transcendental dimensions’ for short).\footnote{Dooyeweerd, \textit{W.d.W.}: 3.53 (‘transcendental dimensies in den apriorischen horizon der ervaringswerkelijkheid’); Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 3.77.} While the modalities are ways of being and knowing, the transcendentals are the basic ontological and epistemological framework in terms of which the modalities are identified.\footnote{See 6.1.} There is no direct match between Vollenhoven’s and Dooyeweerd’s account of this basic framework, and the proposed resolution of the discrepancies that arise will have to wait until the final chapter, when I shall attempt to take account of these divergences and build on them in a constructive and mutually corrective way.

In the meantime, except as specifically indicated, I shall follow the structure of their own presentations, noting as we go the internal difficulties of each, and comparing their systematic approaches to illuminate their strengths and weaknesses so as to view both in the light of the Kuyperian vision.
3.1 Vollenhoven: the ‘Determinations’ of Created Reality

In his *Isagôgê*, his basic philosophical teaching syllabus, Vollenhoven calls the first two ‘determinations’ the ‘thus-so’ and the ‘this-that’. The thus-so determination refers to the functions of individuals, while the this-that deals with individuals in relationship with one another. Alongside these, there is also implicitly a third determination. Vollenhoven calls this the ‘genetic connection’; but for the purpose of this presentation, since I consider it alongside the ‘thus-so’ and the ‘this-that’ ‘determinations’, I shall call it the ‘genetic determination’. This denotes the flow of time. I shall examine the question: to what extent do these three determinations provide a satisfactory ontological and epistemological framework in terms of the Kuyperian vision described in Chapter One?  

3.1.1 The Thus-So (‘Modal’) Determination

The first determination, then, in Vollenhoven’s systematic account in the *Isagôgê* is the ‘thus-so determination’: a ‘vertical’ ordering of laws and norms, with later functions building on lower ones. These modal laws and norms govern what Vollenhoven calls...
'unities of subjèction' or 'subjèct units' ('subjèctseenheden'); to avoid this somewhat cumbersome terminology, I shall call them ‘individuals’ – a term which Vollenhoven uses himself, albeit less frequently. These individuals may be numbers, spatial figures, atoms or any other unique entities.

An individual is given a unique identity by the creative fiat of God. For Vollenhoven, the diversity of individuals cannot be seen purely in terms of either the provision of a list of characteristics, *qua* Hobbes, nor, as in Leibniz’s principle of ‘identity of indiscernibles’, can the possession of a ‘property’ uniquely distinguish one individual from all others. So what finally makes an individual unique is not a list of properties or characteristics. Vollenhoven holds, rather, that each individual is constituted by an ‘idea’, known only to God. In everyday, ‘non-scientific’ experience one encounters individuals as wholes. All things have an internal unity; they are not collections of random matter. They are ‘structured through and through’ by the creative decree of God the Father.

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283 Vollenhoven does speak of number ‘3’ as an individual, but strictly the individual is *this* number ‘3’ as it is counted or written physically on the page (*Introduction*: §36, pp. 27-8; §45, p. 32).

284 Vollenhoven, *Introduction*: §182, p. 128. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Vollenhoven sees Hobbes as a nominalist who holds that there are no universals only individuals, so that concept and name are identified (Vollenhoven, *W. Woordenboek*: 186).


286 Vollenhoven, *Introduction*. The early Vollenhoven had a conception of an individual as a substance to which properties attach (Kok, Vollenhoven: 67-68, 225), a notion that he was to reject in his later thinking (see 2.1).

287 Vollenhoven, ‘Levens-eenheid (55ms)’: 122-124; Vollenhoven, ‘Getuigen (59d)’: /3, p. 138. In his thesis of 1918, Vollenhoven states that the ‘essence’ of things is ideational (‘ideëel’), and he emphasises that this ideationality is extra-mental i.e., it is not purely a mental construct even though it is a noetic appropriation of an ontic given (Vollenhoven, *W.W.Th.S. (18a)*: 229, 411, 429, 440; Vollenhoven, ‘Hegel (21c)’: 79, 81 (n. 71), 85, 86 (n. 74); Tol, *Philosophy*: 112, 144-146, 181, 205-206). According to Tol, Vollenhoven did not use the term ‘idea’ after 1923 because of its association with Greek [*ante rem – J.G.A.I.*] thought (Tol, *Philosophy*: 452; see Vollenhoven, ‘De visie op den Middelaar bij Kuyper en bij ons (1952k)’: 86). The faculty according to which individuals are known by a human being is that of perception, which is for him not merely a psychic (i.e., sensory) act, but also an analytic grasping of an individual (and indeed an act involving all the other modalities). Perception (‘waarneming’) is always synchronous with that which is perceived. It is exercised in tandem with recollection and expectation (Vollenhoven, *Introduction*: §§164-169, pp. 116-120). Here a way may be found for making sense of Vollenhoven’s account of concept forming, which for him, as we have seen, is focused on individuals rather than the relations or the modalities governing those relations. If one reads Vollenhoven’s account of ‘concept forming’ as equivalent to what Dooyeweerd calls ‘naïve concept forming’ (i.e., focused on individuals and events) rather than as being equivalent to Dooyeweerd’s *theoretical* concept forming, the two accounts can be reconciled.

288 Vollenhoven, ‘Levens-eenheid (55ms)’: 123-124 (‘doorgestrukteerde’); Tol, ‘Time’: 102. For Vollenhoven, the created structure of an individual is not ‘modal’ – it is ‘pre-modal’ or ‘pre-functional’.
From a ‘scientific’ attitude (to use Vollenhoven’s term), analysing an individual means distinguishing that individual’s functions according to the modalities. An individual functions arithmetically as a single entity bound by arithmetical laws; it is located spatially and bound by spatial laws, and so on. With respect to each modality, the individual functions either actively or passively (i.e., as subject or object). Some functions are presupposed by others (‘retrocipations’), or are themselves the ‘presuppositions’ (‘antecipations’) for others. The modalities on which other modalities depend are called ‘substrates’ for those which they antecipate; those which stand on them are called ‘superstrates’. Thus, the modality of number is the substrate of spatiality (and the spatial modality the superstrate of number) – the concept of spatial size requires the prior concept of numerical quantity.

This complex of laws and norms constituted by the thus-so determination can only come into force when individuals actually function in relationship with one another. Laws and norms can only apply if there are entities to which they can apply. This actual functioning of one individual in relationship with one another is the ‘this-that’ determination, to which I now turn.
3.1.2 The This-That (‘Individual’) Determination

While the thus-so determination describes how an individual functions with respect to modal aspects, the ‘this-that’ determination concerns the relationships which individuals form with one another in specific contexts. The this-that determination is about the actuality of individuals in relationship, while the thus-so determination is about the laws and norms which govern that factuality. As Vollenhoven says, there is a ‘determination of law’ (the thus-so determination) which correlates with a ‘determination of being subject’ (the this-that determination).294 The two determinations are correlative with one another, but are not reducible to one another.

It is in the context of the factuality of individuals as ‘subjects’ that relations come into being. Vollenhoven sees relations as being constructed by God out of the combinations of the functions of the individuals concerned. Relations for Vollenhoven are first known in pre-theoretical experience as the ‘horizontal’ connections between actual individuals. If the relata function at the same modal level, e.g., two human beings in relationship, the complex is called a ‘subject-subject relation’. If on the other hand one relatum functions at a higher modal level than another this is called a ‘subject-object relation’. An example of the latter is a relationship of a human being and a plant, with the plant functioning as subject up to the biotic modality, and variously as sensory, social, economic, legal, ethical and pistical (faith) object to human subject.295 Individuals are

295 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§52, 65-66, pp. 35, 45-47; Vollenhoven, ‘Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)’: §§2, 45 pp. 62, 98-99 (Hoofdlijnen: 16, 59-60); ‘Problemen rondom de tijd’ (63b): 177-178). For Vollenhoven, ‘subject-object relations’ correlate to the active and passive polarities of the different law-spheres – as marked out in terms of the thus-so connection (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§51-84, 100-107, pp. 34-56, 64-68). In order to determine whether these individuals are subjects or objects as they are brought into contact with one another, it is necessary to see what ‘realm’ they belong to (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§22, 23, 84, 94, 96-99, 104-107, 109, 122, 180, 185, pp. 21-22, 56, 62-64, 67-69, 83-8, 127-128; Vollenhoven, ‘Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)’: §45, p. 59 (Hoofdlijnen: 16, 59-60)). Vollenhoven sees a number of realms (‘rijken’) each identified by the highest modality or ‘leading function’ (‘leidende functie’) according to which the members of those realms function (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§97-98, 104-109, pp. 63-64). For Vollenhoven there are the physical, plant, animal and human realms (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§95-98, 104-109, pp. 62-64, 67-69). Accordingly, for Vollenhoven, ‘subjects’ are those which belong to the same realm, while ‘objects’ are those which belong to a lower realm from that of the subject or subjects to which they have been brought into relation. For this reason, Vollenhoven did not accept Dooyeweerd’s contention that there can be numerical, spatial or kinematic objects, since none of those modalities define distinct kingdoms, even though (in C.R.W: 31-32) he had himself briefly seemed to accept that these constitute kingdoms (a point I owe to Dr Christopher Gousmett). In his later thinking he holds that only the modalities from the physical-energetic modality on can provide objectsto the higher modalities in this way, since the physical-energetic modality defines a
‘directed’ (from one individual to another). Vollenhoven uses the illustration of travelling from Amsterdam to Haarlem and back again. Here there is one inter-relation, but two (relational) directions: one direction is from Amsterdam to Haarlem, the other from Haarlem to Amsterdam. These directions can either be those towards another individual (‘inter-individual’) or those towards elements in the make-up of a specific individual (‘intra-individual’). In the former case, one individual builds up a relationship with another (e.g., two people carrying a burden together); in the latter case two parts of a whole build up a relationship with one another, e.g., the relationship between a cat’s tongue and its fur, as it licks its fur; or between a person’s head and their hands, as they put their head in their hands. In general, one can only know relations, says Vollenhoven, by identifying the individuals that they connect, and, implicitly, the context within which this takes place. Relations, for Vollenhoven, only exist as divinely determined constructions bringing together the respective directions of the constituent individuals, and they do not have an ontic status independent on those relata.

Here some wider philosophical background is necessary if one is to understand and evaluate Vollenhoven’s position on relations. Vollenhoven himself cites Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), who identifies three different ways in which relations can be seen:

distinctive kingdom (the ‘mineral’), as does the biotic (the ‘vegetable’), and so on (Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de tijd’ (63b): 177-178; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd’ (68b): 204-205).

I adopt the convention of (relational) ‘direction’ this with a lower-case ‘d’ to distinguish it from (religious) ‘Direction’ (see footnote in 3.1).


However, he does allow that universal relations can exist independently of one’s thinking of them, but only as they relate to individuals. This is true even of animals. He gives an example of a dog which burns its paw on the fire, and therefore is afraid not only of the particular fire which burned its paw, but of all fires (Vollenhoven, ‘Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)’: §45, p. 98 (Hoofdlijnen: 60)). Individuals ‘possess’ relations (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§80, pp. 54-55), although at the same time, he also states that an individual without relations (a ‘Ding an Sich’) does not exist (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §71, p. 51). As we shall see, these constructions accrue over the course of time. Dooyeweerd’s position will be discussed later in this chapter (3.2.1).
The first is the ‘monist’ view such as was held by Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) and later by ‘neo-Idealist’ thinkers such as Bernard Bosanquet (1843-1923), and Francis Herbert Bradley (1846-1924). In the case of monism, the problem of the independence or universality of relations does not arise, as all individuals are simply parts of a greater whole and relations are merely elements in the constitution of that greater whole.\textsuperscript{303}

The second view identified by Russell is the ‘internalist’ or ‘monadistic’ view, in which relations are seen merely as properties of the constituent relata rather than having a universal and common status not bound to the specific individuals concerned. This is the view associated most notably with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and was later expounded by Rudolph Hermann Lotze (1871-1881). Those who hold a monadistic view resort to different devices in order to account for the apparent ‘universality’ of relations. Notable amongst these is Leibniz’s notion of ‘\textit{harmonia prestabilita}’ (‘pre-established harmony’), whereby God is held to ensure the universal harmonisation of the separate internal arrangements of the ‘monads’ giving the appearance that they are related and can affect one another. But what appears to be shared is the result of complex divine engineering – there is nothing ‘external’ (having an ontic status distinct from the relata themselves). Relations from a pure monadistic view are thus complexes of the properties pertaining to the constituent relata in combination.\textsuperscript{304}

The third view is the ‘externalist’ view such as held by Russell himself. In this view, relations have a status independent of the relata that they connect – in other words, relations are not merely composites of the functioning of the constituent relata, but have a universal ontic and epistemic status regardless of the specific individuals concerned.\textsuperscript{305}

Of these positions, as we have seen, Vollenhoven, in the writing of his doctoral thesis, holds to a fully-fledged monadistic position. However, while he modified this position, as we have seen, he never entirely abandoned it. Vollenhoven moved from the intra-individual conception of classical monadism in which relations are seen as pre-determined within each monad to what I shall call a ‘modified monadism’ in which relations are seen as inter-individual constructions over time. In his mature thought, Vollenhoven does not envisage the possibility of there being monadic individuals existing in isolation from one another. Individuals are, for Vollenhoven, always located in a temporally-defined context, and that for him means individuals-in-relation. But at the same time, he has a shortfall in his account of the universality of relations since for him they do not have distinct ontic status – in Russell’s sense, they are not fully ‘external’. Not only does this undermine the notion of relationships, since these can be seen merely as tailored to (and reflective of) the concerns and interests of the individuals involved. It is also corrosive of universal values such as truth, justice, beauty and goodness, as well as the intelligibility of the created order. If what is true for one person is not, or at best only seemingly true, for another person, or is merely constructed or the product of local custom, then the universality which gives force to lawfulness or normativity is undermined.

The fragility of Vollenhoven’s account of relations contrasts with the robustness of his account of the individuals out of whom or out of which those relations are constructed. In order to account for the construction of these relations, there needs to be a conception time as the process, in terms of which these relations come into being or are constructed. Interrelations only come into existence when positivised between individuals as subjects or objects in relationship over time. He calls this conception of time as process the ‘genetic’ determination – to which I now turn.

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307 Leibniz himself turns this problem on its head by arguing from ‘eternal truths’ to the necessity for a divine mind, the supreme monad, in which they exist. As Eric Voeglin points out, the only way that the monadic position can hold to universal truth is to assert the universal imperium of each monad (Eric Voeglin, The New Science of Politics (1952): 59).
3.1.3 The Genetic Determination

Vollenhoven calls the third element in his account of the necessary conditions of experience the ‘genetic connection’. For the purpose of this presentation, I shall call it the ‘genetic determination’, meaning the process of time from the past to the present to the future. It is purely to do with ‘becoming’: things come into existence, continue in existence, change, and go out of existence. Although he does not accord the genetic determination a formal place in the Isagôgê, implicitly it structures his entire philosophical system.

Just as individuals come into being and go out of being (the genetic determination), so relationships between them are created and destroyed. The genetic determination draws the thus-so and this-that determinations together, and the correlation between the two determinations is expressed over time. This correlation needs to be seen in both ontic (extra-mental) and noetic (intra-mental) terms.

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309 Already in his 1918 dissertation, Vollenhoven speaks of the ‘characteristic existence of successive self-development’ (‘een eigen, successief zich ontwikkelend bestaan’) which belongs to the essence of things, which, for Vollenhoven’s then still somewhat scholastic conception, sufficiently distinguishes them from the modification of God’s mind. It is also part of his wider contention in his thesis that time needs to be understood as succession, over against the Kantian view of time as a form of intuition, correlative with space (Vollenhoven, W.W.Th.S. (18a): 345 (cited by Kok, Vollenhoven: 13)). In 1938, he speaks of three schemas of differences, which includes earlier and later (‘vroeger en later’ = ‘genetic’) alongside the ‘here and there’ and the ‘higher and lower’ determinations – the latter two corresponding in effect to the ‘this-that’ and the ‘thus-so’ determinations (Vollenhoven, ‘Realisme en nominalisme (38v)’: 72 (hier en ginds’; and ‘hooger en lager’ – I am indebted to a personal communication from Anthony Tol, 21 Apr. 2006, alerting me to this reference)). In his later thought, he sees creation, including the human self, as temporal and subject to change. Indeed the lifeline of the human self should not be accorded an elevated, supra-temporal status as if human beings can somehow escape their historical location and identity (see 2.1 and 4.1.2). Rather, the purpose for one’s lives is unfolded through events (Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’: 185; Tol, ‘Time’: 117). Time has a key systematic importance in the Isagôgê. The highly internalised way in which time is understood in the strongly monadistic epistemology of his thesis is externalised in the Isagôgê: one knows things in a temporally successive way because that is how individuals develop in relation to one another, independently of one’s knowing. It was because of this externalist view of temporality that he was unhappy with Dooyeweerd’s account of ‘cosmic time’, the supra-temporal heart, and his designation of the ‘cultural-formative’ modality as ‘historical’. While it is true that, for example in the Isagôgê, he followed Dooyeweerd’s usage (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§ 48, 55, 66, 171, 208, 209, 210, pp. 33, 36-37, 49, 121, 139-140), he was not happy with this and retrospectively expressed his reservations to this effect (Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’: 207, 209).
In ontic terms, the genetic determination concerns the unfolding of individuals in actual time, the inter-relations between them (‘inter-individual connections’), and the inter-relations within them (‘intra-individual connections’). New individuals, and new inter-relations between or among them, come into being, develop their individual character over time, and cease to exist. Vollenhoven speaks of ‘life lines’ which express the change and development of each individual over time. Individuals are not only related to one another at a specific time or moment (‘contemporaneous inter-individual’); inter-individual, intra-individual, subject-subject, or subject-object interrelations (‘samenhangen’) are formed through time. The ‘successive intra-individual’ connections describes the case when an individual at one moment is related to itself or to an aspect of itself at another moment – an example would be one’s genetic connection to one’s younger or older self. ‘Successive inter-individual’ connection concerns a causal link between one individual at one moment and another individual at another moment – for example, the genetic connection to one’s ancestors or descendants.

The ontic reality of the genetic determination (i.e., temporal unfolding) is mirrored noetically (i.e., in the unfolding of human knowing). One remembers the past and

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311 Vollenhoven, ‘Getuigen (59d)’: /2, 138 (‘levenslijnen’); Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)’: 185. A ‘younger thing’ evolves out of one or more previously existing things, so that whereas the constituents were previously interrelated in an inter-individual manner, now they take on an intra-individual interrelation (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§102-103, pp. 65-66, my examples).

312 I prefer to translate ‘contemporeel’ or ‘contemporèle’ as ‘contemporaneous’ to avoid the ambiguity of the English ‘contemporary’ which John Kok uses in his translation (Vollenhoven, Introduction: 78-80, 82, 88, 157-159, 163, 165, pp. 54-56, 59, 111-112, 116-117).

313 Introduction: §§29, 34-49, 65-66, 71, 79-80 pp. 24, 27-34, 45-49, 54-55. My examples. In his Isagôgé of 1930, Vollenhoven speaks of the way in which subjects can either make objects patent (for example if an animal makes an edible object into food by eating it), or by actualising it as an object in a certain respect (for example if gold, or other suitable material, is minted and so made into money) (§§ 64-67). This was dropped in the 1932 Isagôgé, but the notion that different interrelations (be it subject to subject, or subject to object) are actualised over time remain – even though Vollenhoven seems to have dropped the notion of rendering latent features patent (for example see Introduction: §210, pp. 139-140).

314 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §48, p. 33; Vollenhoven, ‘Het geloof, zijn aard, zijn structuur en zijn waarde voor de wetenschap (50d)’, Levensbeschouwing en levenshouding van de academicus, 1950,
anticipates the future, and both are not collapsible into the present perception of what is the case.\textsuperscript{315} For Vollenhoven, time is an irreducibly successive flow of ‘moments’\textsuperscript{316} The ‘contemporaneous’, the inter-relation of individuals at a given time, is not reducible to the ‘successive’, the succession of temporal moments.\textsuperscript{317} There is an actual past, present and future which cannot adequately be accounted for except in terms of a succession of actual events.\textsuperscript{318} Thus for Vollenhoven the flow of time is ‘much more’ than the constituent individuals in relationship at a given time – although this view is not at first apparent from the formal presentation of the \textit{Isagôgê}.

This ‘much more’ is the sheer eventful actuality of time. To use a metaphor from drama: the play is not merely the sum of the individual actors and their roles – it has a plot as well. This plot is accounted for by the genetic determination as a necessary condition of experience.

\textsuperscript{315} Perception can be stretched into the past as recollection (Vollenhoven, \textit{Introduction}: §§164, pp. 117-118), and into the future as expectation (Vollenhoven, \textit{Introduction}: §168, pp. 119-120). Vollenhoven argues that there are significant differences between perception and recollection which prevents them from being mutually interchangeable or mutually reducible, since recollection is not necessarily the bringing to mind a previous perception (although it can be); but is rather a recollection of a previous action. A perception in a past event concerns relations with other individuals, whereas the recollection of that perception is the bringing to mind of past memories within the consciousness of the individual concerned (Vollenhoven, \textit{Introduction}: §§164-165, pp. 116-117). Similarly, expectation depends on recollection and, directly or indirectly, on perception, but it too cannot be reduced to perception or recollection, since it is possible to expect someone or something of which one has no recollection, or of whom or which there is no history of past perception (Vollenhoven, \textit{Introduction}: §§168, pp. 119-120).

\textsuperscript{316} In this respect, Vollenhoven may have been influenced by Bergson (see 2.1).


\textsuperscript{318} Here Vollenhoven is, in effect, affirming the ‘A series’, the existence of which was specifically denied by the British Idealist philosopher, J.M.E. McTaggart (1866-1923), who argues that the determination of time in any sense of past-present and future, which he called the ‘A-series’, is not possible in any absolute sense, since all A-series statements can be re-formulated in terms of earlier and later, which he called the ‘B-series’ (J.M.E. McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’ (1993)). McTaggart’s error in this influential article is to treat events as ‘substances’ – or ‘compound substances’ (McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’: 26), and to treat ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ as ‘properties’ of those ‘substances’ (McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’: 31-33). This is pointed out by Arthur N. Prior (Arthur N. Prior, ‘Changes in Events and Changes in Things’ (1993): 36, 43. See also Arnold B. Levison, ‘Events and Time’s Flow’, \textit{Mind} N.S. 96 (1987): 348-350) and obliquely recognised by D. H. Mellor when he points out that events and things need to be distinguished (D.H. Mellor, \textit{Real Time} (1981): 127-132. See also D.H. Mellor, \textit{Real Time II} (1998) (quoted in L. Nathan Oaklander, \textit{The Ontology of Time} (2004): 178-181).

\textsuperscript{319} Vollenhoven, \textit{Introduction}: §§47-48, p. 33; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’: 209 (‘veel meer’).
The genetic determination, or time as eventfulness (i.e., as opposed to order, or pure duration), is crucial for Vollenhoven’s ontology and epistemology. As we have seen, it is through the view of relationships over time that Vollenhoven modifies his earlier (classical) monadism. In this modified monadistic account, he holds that relationships are externalised, even if they are not finally fully accounted for as ‘external’ in Russell’s sense. The genetic determination also allows Vollenhoven to account for the unfolding of individual ‘lifelines’. Indeed, in the overall character of his thought Vollenhoven is a genetic (or in terms of his own basic ground-types, ‘cosmological-cosmogonic’) thinker. In this respect, Vollenhoven presents a contrast with Dooyeweerd, as we shall see in the following section.

3.1.4 Review of Vollenhoven’s Account of the Determinations

Like Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven inherits the Kuyperian vision of the sovereignty of the triune God in and through the work of creation. I shall look at the framework which Vollenhoven sets out in the light of this vision, looking in turn at individuality, relationality and time.

With respect to individuality Vollenhoven systematically describes two determinations: the thus-so is about the way in which the functions which govern an individual are arranged up the modal scale; the ‘this-that’ accounts for specific individuals in relation and the context in which they are related. In this way, the two determinations are correlative with one another, or mutually dependent. In the distinction between the thus-so and the this-that, he provides an account of individuality which is both law- or norm-governed (with respect to the thus-so) and has factual existence in the context of subject-subject and subject-object relationships (with respect to the this-that). Further, Vollenhoven provides us with a robust account of individuals in relation, and, indeed, for Vollenhoven, individuals are always to be considered in relation and never in

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320 See above in this section.
321 See 3.2.3. In the notes he made in 1973, for his final, but uncompleted, article, he identifies himself in his way, in the line of a ‘cosmogonic-cosmological’, ‘pneumatistic interactionist’ line of, amongst others, of Gregory of Nazianzus (330-389 or 390; Bril and Boonstra, ed., S. Kaarten: 104, 231(krt#33c); Bril, ed., Laatste: 112; see Klapwijk, ‘Calvin and Neo-Calvinism on Non-Christian Philosophy’: 60-61), and Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995; Stellingwerff, V.U. na Kuyper: 246-250; Bril, ed., Laatste: 118-120). See 5.1.3.
isolation from one another. It is these individuals in relation who are the subjects marked out by the this-that determination.\textsuperscript{322}

With respect to relationality, Vollenhoven has a problem in accounting for the universality of relations, since relations for him do not have their own ontic status, but arise from the composite of the directions of the individuals themselves. The relations which link these individuals are, as we have seen, constructed over time from the ‘directions’ of those individuals.\textsuperscript{323} This ‘modified monadism’ (as I have called it) is dependent on his account of the third element, which I have argued functions as his third determination – that of time.

With respect to time, Vollenhoven, with his account of the genetic determination, provides an account of the temporal process that has a robust narrativity and eventfulness (both of the temporal process itself with the coming into being of new individuals and their inter-relations, as well the consciousness of that process).\textsuperscript{324}

Having examined Vollenhoven’s account of the transcendental location of a Christian philosophy. I shall now turn to Dooyeweerd’s ontological and epistemological framework with the same questions.

3.2 Dooyeweerd: the ‘Transcendental Dimensions’ of Created Reality

In this section I shall aim to show that, despite certain problems and lacunae that I shall identify, Dooyeweerd’s account of the necessary conditions of experience breaks important new ground in philosophical thinking in the light of the Kuyperian Reformational vision; moreover, his systematic philosophical account is complementary to Vollenhoven’s.

\textsuperscript{322} 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.
\textsuperscript{323} 3.1.2.
\textsuperscript{324} 3.1.3.
For Dooyeweerd there are three ‘transcendental dimensions’ in what he calls the ‘experiential horizon’. Each of these ‘transcendental dimensions’ provides a different point of entry for our experience of and reflection upon the world. I shall look at each of these transcendental dimensions in turn.

3.2.1 The Relational (‘Modal’) Dimension

The first transcendental dimension for Dooyeweerd is what he calls the ‘modal horizon’. For Dooyeweerd, the modalities are distinguished first of all by a consideration of the different kinds of relation (where Vollenhoven distinguishes the modalities first of all as the functions of individuals). In the first instance these concern the irreducible kinds of relation that there are. I shall therefore call it the ‘relational’ dimension. This transcendental dimension concerns the different kinds of relation. Dooyeweerd’s discussion of this transcendental dimension is complex, but the critical consideration to bear in mind is the distinction between naïve experience and theoretical reflection.

In the case of naïve experience, the modalities are not explicitly differentiated from one another: there is no explicit identification of the laws/norms governing quantity, space … faith and the relations appropriate to each. The process of naïve concept-forming takes tacit cognisance of all the modalities intuitively, without distinguishing them explicitly. In the naïve concept-forming process, attention is focused on individuals and

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325 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 3.53-54; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.76-77.
326 Here I follow Dooyeweerd’s own intended order of presentation in W.d.W./N.C., i.e. the second volume (i.e., the first after the introductory volume) is about the modalities (which for Dooyeweerd are, I argue, relations in the first instance), while the third is about ‘individuality structures’. Dooyeweerd was intending to write a fourth volume about time, but instead wrote a series of articles in Philosophia Reformata in the later 1930s. Nevertheless, despite the lack of the fourth volume of the W.d.W., Dooyeweerd’s order of presentation is, therefore: (1) ‘modalities’ (for Dooyeweerd this concerns relationality in the first instance), (2) ‘individuality structures’ and (3) ‘cosmic time’ – an order I endeavour to follow in Chapter Three in my presentation of Dooyeweerd’s account. Thus, if we bear in mind this intention, Dooyeweerd’s order of presentation is (1) ‘modalities’ (which for Dooyeweerd are concerned, in the first instance, with the different kinds of relations and the laws and norms governing them); (2) ‘individuality structures’ and (3) ‘cosmic time’.
328 As we have seen (at the beginning of this chapter), an explicit focus on the modalities is characteristic of the theoretical attitude in general and not just about relations (as we shall see, modal analysis can be applied to individuals, through the modal identification of the diversity of functions, as well as events, through the modal analysis of the different aspects of time).
329 See Chapter Three introduction.
events and not on relations themselves – although, on analysis, relations provide the implicit framework within which such concepts are formed. One’s experience of relations in naïve concept forming is tacit: one’s attention is not focused on the relations per se, but only the individuals and events that are presented to one. 330 This does not mean that in the naïve attitude one is necessarily ignorant, or even unaware, of modally defined relations and classifications; it implies only that this is not the focus. The use of an abacus depends on the existence and tacit knowledge of numerical/quantitative relations and the laws of number or quantity that govern them. But the attention of the person using the abacus, engaged in that way in naïve concept forming, is not focused on these, but rather, on the action of counting the beads and on the beads themselves. 331 Or again, if a person goes into a shop to buy a cigar, he or she is interested in the cigar and what the act of purchasing it involves, not in disentangling all the different relations involved in that transaction. In this naïve process of concept forming, one’s attention is directed to the thing (the cigar) and the event (the act of purchasing it). 332 Thus, in the naïve attitude, thus, one assigns ‘properties’ to ‘things’ (i.e. individuals) or events. However, Dooyeweerd denies that it is appropriate to carry over the procedures appropriate to the naïve process of concept-forming to those of theoretical concept-forming. Before proceeding to Dooyeweerd’s account of what he considers the appropriate approach to theoretical concept-forming, we need to look at what he calls the ‘scholastic’ approach to concept forming, and why he considers that approach problematical.

The scholastic approach uses the procedures of ‘genus proximum’ and ‘differentia specifica’ to form concepts by a process of abstraction. This process of abstraction allows a kind of entity to be identified by its properties – properties common to all entities of that kind. 333 Through this process, the entity can be described with ever greater exactitude. In this way, one finds concepts which correspond to the reality of the thing so designated (the process of ‘adequatio intellectus et rei’). 334 This procedure results in three possible positions: ‘ante rem’, in which the properties are held to exist

330 Dooyeweerd says ‘individual things’ (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.41 (not in W.d.W.)).
331 Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning: 43; Dooyeweerd, Roots: 44; Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 14.
332 Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 15.
eternally prior to experience; ‘in re’, according to which the properties of a thing are held exist in that thing itself; and ‘post rem’, according to which the properties of a thing are held to be purely creations of the mind which are then attached to the things which are experienced by convention.\textsuperscript{335} All three positions give the ‘properties’, which arise in the discourse of the naïve process of concept forming, a theoretical status – indeed a quasi-ontic status – even if, as in nominalism, those properties only exist in the mind.\textsuperscript{336} Dooyeweerd argues that all three positions arise from the attempt to establish an adequate relation between the conceptual form in the understanding with the essential form of being (‘ousia’), and it is on this basis that the attempt is then made to isolate what those ‘properties’ might be (be they ante rem, in re or post rem). But this procedure is misconceived.\textsuperscript{337} While naïvely, one may observe that ‘the rose is red’, it is wrong to reify a ‘property’ of ‘redness’ as a quasi thing – be it a pre-existent thing (ante rem), something which individuals posses (in re), or a mental object (post rem).\textsuperscript{338} All three ‘scholastic’ approaches involve the illegitimate transfer of procedures from the naïve attitude to the process of theoretical concept-forming. The procedures appropriate to naïve and theoretical concept-forming must be clearly differentiated if erroneous procedures of theoretical concept-forming are to be avoided.


\textsuperscript{336} Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.42-43.

\textsuperscript{337} Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.303, 319-321, 348, 499-500, 500-501; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.367-369, 389, 419, 559, 566, 571; Strauss, P.D.D.: 176-178, 370-379, 4421-442). Dooyeweerd describes how the different forms of metaphysical realism are founded on the notion of a lex aeterna located in Divine reason. This lex aeterna, he argues, is the absolutisation of the analytical modality (see Dooyeweerd, ‘R.K. en A.R.S.’; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.317-321, 491; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.386-389, 559; Dooyeweerd, R. & S 2: 293-297; Dooyeweerd, ‘Der Idee der Individualiteits-structuur 2’: 1-4; Strauss, Reintegrating: 92). The rejection of either ante rem or in re realism must not be construed as the rejection of any extra-mental reality. On the contrary, Dooyeweerd affirms that we can indeed truly know and have direct experience of individuals, relations and events (Strauss, P.D.D.: 25, 347). Further, this procedure needs to be distinguished from another sense in which ‘properties’ can be used, namely, in the sense of specified or unspecified functions of individuals as they governed by modal norms or laws. Here the functions are seen in terms of the relations that govern a specific type of individuals. The ‘properties’ in this case are not to be seen as ‘things’ or ‘universals’ which attach or do not attach to an individual bearer of those ‘properties’, as in ‘naïve realism’ (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.43 (not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 17), but as the more specific application of a framework of relations to a limited class of entities (see Strauss, P.D.D.: 143, 517). I am grateful to D.F.M. Strauss for drawing this to my attention (Strauss, personal communication, 24 Jan, 2010).

\textsuperscript{338} Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.41-42 (not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, ‘Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.’ 211; Dooyeweerd, ‘De transcendentale critiek van het wijsgerig denken ... Avondland’; 9; Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 16; Dooyeweerd, R. & S 2: 293-297; Dooyeweerd, ‘Der Idee der Individualiteits-structuur 2’: 1-4; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 40.
So, Dooyeweerd distinguishes the ‘naïve concept forming process’ from the ‘theoretical concept forming process’. Theoretical concept forming is not properly about the abstraction of properties. It involves identifying and understanding the different kinds of relation explicitly in the light of the modalities rather than having them remain implicit, as in the naïve attitude. ‘Redness’, properly considered from a theoretical attitude, is a sensory relation that links the rose with a normal human observer. This relation and other relations are subject to certain sensory laws (in this case) or norms (in the case of the analytical and later modalities). These relations are universal – not ‘universals’. They are links between or among individuals (albeit links with an ‘external’ status – unlike the case with Vollenhoven), but are not to be thought of as ‘things’ (they are not ‘properties’ in the scholastic sense). The relation between observer ‘O1’ and rose ‘R1’, within the appropriately defined set of conditions (for example to a normally sighted observer in normal daylight), pertains to all possible or imaginary human or quasi-human observers ‘x’ for all possible or imaginary roses ‘y’. If one is going to make theoretical claims, one needs to pay explicit attention to the modal distinguishing of the different kinds of relation, so that each kind of relation can be analysed appropriately and rigorously in heuristic isolation from the others (as has been described in the introduction to this chapter). For Dooyeweerd, the relations between individuals (or as he puts it, ‘individuality structures’) are ‘indifferent’ to the particularity of the respective relata. It is universal relations abstracted from each of the modalities that are being considered in theoretical concept forming, not the whole gamut of individual characteristics of the relata. The relation can either be that of subjects to subjects, or

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339 Dooyeweerd begins the passage by asking the first transcendental question concerning theoretical thought, (‘what do we abstract in the antithetic attitude of theoretic thought from the structures of empirical reality as these structures are given in naïve experience? And how is abstraction possible?’). In order to illuminate his answer, he immediately contrasts it with what happens in ‘naïve concept forming’ (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.41; 2.434 (Dooyeweerd’s italics; neither in W.d.W.)).

340 Theoretical concepts are specific to a modality (albeit referring to all the other modalities analogically according to the principle of modal universality). By contrast, naïve concepts are the intuitive recognition of certain relations by taking into account the individuals they link together at certain times.

341 As explained above, for the purpose of clarity, I shall use Vollenhoven’s orthographic distinction between ‘súbject’ (as that which is the active relatum in a given relationship) and ‘subjèct’ (as that which is subjected to God’s law).

342 See 3.1.3.


344 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.307; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.371; Dooyeweerd, ‘Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.’ 211; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 195. For Dooyeweerd (unlike Vollenhoven), the relata (be they subject–subject or subject-object) are placeholders in all instances for all individuals similarly qualified in the relevant way. This is the concept of a legal object, couched in universal terms,
of subjects to objects. Subjects (as relata) are bound universally to their objects, or to other subjects, in terms of the appropriate law or norm. For example, if R1 appears red to O1, and if all the relevant considerations apply in the case of O2 as of O1, then the same relation should pertain between R1 and O2, or for R2 and O2, or R2 and O1. This then is also true for observers O3 and O4, etc., and roses R3 and R4 etc. The concept ‘red’ describes these universal relations. In general, concepts are a description of the universal relation defined in terms of the norms or norms which govern a specific modality – in this case, the laws which govern the psychic (or sensory) modality and the specific kind of relation governed by those laws.345

as opposed to the idea of this legal object which refers to the trans-modal description of a specific individual (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.337-339; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.405-406). 345 Dooyeweerd, De Beteekenis: 64. There is a problem in Dooyeweerd, in that he tends to stress the laws or norms which govern a modality (the ‘cosmonomic side’) at the expense of the relations so governed (the ‘factual’ side). Strauss points to the way Dooyeweerd, in A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, tends to overstress the cosmonomic side rather than the ‘law-conformity’ of that which pertains to each modality. Indeed, Dooyeweerd explicitly conflates the universal with the cosmonomic side and the individual with the factual side (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.418 (not in W.d.W.)). Strauss calls this conflation of law and law-conformity a form of ‘nominalism’, i.e., the process of reducing knowledge of the world to legislation about how the world should be conceptualised – be that legislation divine or human (Strauss, P.D.D.: 446-447, 449-453). While Dooyeweerd in A New Critique seems to imply that subject-object (or subject-subject) relations hold on both the cosmonomic and factual sides (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.366), Strauss argues that the translation in Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.366 is in error, and the Dutch original reads: ‘een eigenaardig verband tusschen subjectiviteit en objectiviteit aan de subjectzijde zelve’ (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.301 (my emphasis in bold); Strauss, personal communication, 24 Jan. 2010). This is contested by Hendrik Geertsema, who argues that in the text cited by Strauss, Dooyeweerd continues to develop the account of the subject object relation with respect to both the cosmonomic and factual sides (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.306 ff.; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.370. Geertsema, verbal comments, 6 Feb. 2010). However, Strauss argues that in later versions of Dooyeweerd’s Encyclopedia of the Science of Law modal subject-object (or subject-subject) relations are factual albeit bound by the appropriate norm or law (Strauss, P.D.D.: 76-77). Indeed, as Strauss points out, the use of the phrase ‘factual side’ is already found in A New Critique (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.96 (see also N.C.: 1.28, 174)). In particular, in what he calls ‘s[subjective right’, Dooyeweerd identifies a juridical factual relation between a specified juridical subject and a specific juridical object – and this factual subject-object relation is distinct from the relevant juridical norm (expressed in terms of a competence or obligation) by which that relation is governed or in terms of which that subjective right is exercised (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.333-342; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.402-413; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap 3 (1961): 169-234; Paul Marshall, ‘Dooyeweerd’s Empirical Theory of Rights’ (1985): 130-137; Strauss, P.D.D.: 388 -389). Already in A New Critique, Dooyeweerd heuristically isolates factual juridical subject-object relations as legal universals which pertain independently of the individuals which happen to occupy the respective poles. In the context of the juridical (law) modality, a specific subjective right is does not depend upon the whole individuality structure of the bearer of that subjective right, but only in the fact that that individual occupies the subject-pole in a specific juridical relation. Similarly, the juridical object-pole of the relation can be occupied by a bearer in a way which is ‘blind’ to the non-juridical characteristics of any possible bearer of the role of juridical object (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.405). In other words, the factual subject and object (or subject and subject) relata should not be seen as specific factual individuals but rather as bearers of universal roles. In this way, factual juridical relations can be seen truly universal. Moreover, the juridical modality has multiple analogies with those modalities which precede and follow it, so that juridical subject-object relations need to be seen within a larger trans-modal coherence, not in isolation from the other modalities (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.57-58; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.75-76; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap ‘Inleiding’, 109-145; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap 3: 1-30).
Dooyeweerd’s way of accounting for relations in universal terms is thus an important corrective to the residual (or what I have called ‘modified’) monadism of Vollenhoven. In recognising the universality of relations as the basis for theoretical concept-forming he avoids having to posit universal properties (be these *ante rem, in re or post rem*). At the same time he avoids the danger of a relativistic historicism, which sees these truth and value in terms of a specific place and time, a problem unresolved in Vollenhoven’s systematics.

It was only after he has considered the modalities in terms of relations that Dooyeweerd addresses the second of his transcendental dimensions, that of individuality, or, as he puts it, ‘individuality-structures’.

### 3.2.2 The Transcendental Dimension of ‘Individuality Structures’

As with relations, individuals can be considered as they are encountered naïvely (seen in terms of naïve experience), or analysed theoretically in terms of their modal structure (seen in terms of the theoretical attitude). As with relationality, errors arise if these two attitudes are confused.

Considered according to the naïve attitude, individuals are known wholes, not merely the sum of their perceived characteristics. Dooyeweerd makes it clear that one must recognise the individual *per se* (its ‘thingness’) as something that cannot be enclosed within a single modality. He gives examples of the linden tree outside his study window and the book he might throw into the fire – in both cases, it is *this* linden tree and *this* book, each can only finally be pointed to, not described exhaustively.346 In naïve experience, it is thus *whole individuals*, not mere sense-data, with whom one is acquainted. In the first instance, one perceives individuals through encounters and interaction with them.347 In the naïve attitude one does not analyse the constitution of an

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347 Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 3.1-3; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 3.1-5. As Dooyeweerd points out, perception is a concrete act, it cannot be characterised, for example, merely as the reception of sense-data. Dooyeweerd speaks of the ‘naïve concept of a thing’ (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 2.404 (‘naïve ding-begrip’); Dooyeweerd,
individual, but looks to the context of relations and events within which that individual is encountered.\textsuperscript{348} An individual’s ‘temporal unity’, its character, can only be grasped by an appeal to the naïve experience of time; it is not possible to account for it purely theoretically or in terms of modal analysis.\textsuperscript{349} Here individuality is taken as given, and attention is focussed on the relations between and among individuals over time. A dog, says Dooyeweerd, does not really perceive the concept of the chair as a theoretical idea or as an individuality structure. For the dog, the chair is merely something to lie on, not an individual whole, functioning either as a subject or object across the whole gamut of the modalities.\textsuperscript{350}

Problems arise when this naïve experience of an individual is treated as a theoretical construct, theorising about it as a ‘substance’ or making it a metaphysical principle such as the principium individuationis. The ‘type-concept’ cannot truly represent a specific individual. All it can do is generalise about individuals as typical of a certain kind of law-conformity. We know individuals not by concepts in terms of any one modality, but by what Dooyeweerd calls ‘ideas’ (trans-conceptual knowledge). The idea of a chair as an individual thing groups all these aspects together and allows us to speak of this or that chair. The idea of a thing is irreducibly ostensive rather than descriptive, and merely regulates theoretical claims which one might seek to make about an individual.\textsuperscript{351}

\textit{N.C.:} 2.470), although strictly this should be the ‘naïve idea of a thing’ (see Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.:} 3.76, and below), since, as has been argued above, an individual can only be grasped epistemically only finally as a (concept-transcending) idea, and can never fully be reduced to any conceptual formulation. To use Bertrand Russell’s distinction (albeit not in the way he himself uses it), individuals are only finally capable of being known by acquaintance (i.e., ostensively), rather than by description (see Bertrand Russell, \textit{The Problems of Philosophy} (1964): 44-59, 108-109).

\textsuperscript{348} Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.:} 1.41-42 (not in \textit{W.d.W.}).


\textsuperscript{351} For Dooyeweerd’s rejection of the notion of ‘substance’ and the \textit{principium individuationis} see 1.1. Dooyeweerd, \textit{W.d.W.:} 1.354 (n. 1); 3.105-107; Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.:} 1.387 (n. 1); 3.135-136; Dooyeweerd, \textit{R. \\& S 2:} 243-246; Strauss, \textit{Begrip en Idee:} 177-178, 203. Here I distinguish between an ‘idea’ (lower-case), the representation of an individual, and an ‘Idea’ as an overarching, organising principle (Strauss, \textit{Begrip en Idee:} 6-19,196-197; see 5.2). Unlike Plato, Aristotle recognises that the individual is not susceptible to conceptual grasp in terms of ‘universal formula’ (‘λόγος τοῦ καθόλου’– Aristotle, ‘Metaphysica’ (2001): 7.9, 1035 b-1036 a 1031, p. 1797). However, as Strauss points for Aristotle, knowledge is exclusively identified with \textit{conceptual} knowledge – as Aristotle puts it, knowledge of ‘form’ rather than ‘matter’ (Aristotle, ‘Metaphysica’: Bk. 3, Chs. 4 & 5, // 999a-1003a, pp. 723-731) and matter can at most be known in negative terms. Aristotle then falls back on the notions of substance (defined in conceptual terms) to characterise individuals, even though Aristotle wrestles with the notion of a substance as a ‘concrete thing’ as opposed to a ‘universal formula’ (Aristotle, ‘Metaphysica’: Bk. 7,
In the theoretical attitude, in contrast to the naïve attitude, one pays attention to the functional structure of the individual. Here an individual is seen in terms of its ‘individuality-structure’: the structure of modal laws and norms expressed in the diversity of that individual’s functions. Unlike Vollenhoven, as we shall see, Dooyeweerd does not start with concrete individuals and their functions; instead he begins with modal relations, and then sees these as being individualised. As he puts it, ‘an individuality-structure individualises the modal functions and groups them together in a typical way within the cadre of an individual whole’. Further, Dooyeweerd tends rather to characterise individuals in terms of the laws and norms that govern their functioning rather in terms of their actual functioning. This is a somewhat conceptual approach that focuses more on what individuals must or should be rather than what they are. Accordingly, he identifies different kinds of ‘typical’ structures: ‘radical types’ which delimit the mineral, vegetable and animal realms; ‘geno-types’ which mark out general types of individuals; and ‘pheno-types’ for specific instantiations of these. More generally, Dooyeweerd speaks of ‘individuality

Ch. 3.// 1030a1020-1028, p. 1797). Strauss himself argues for a duality of ‘concept’ and ‘idea’, and concludes: ‘The temporal identity of individual entities expresses itself in the modal diversity of aspects and can only be approximated in a regulative sense in a transcendental idea referring to the meaning-coherence in which every individual entity is embedded’ (Strauss, Begrip en Idee: 202-203). Moreover, as Strauss describes, ideas about individuals can be ‘stretched’ to different contexts through the use of metaphor, and so one’s perception of individuals is part of a much wider web of meaning and significance (Strauss, Reintegrating: 9, 14-15; Strauss, P.D.D.: 152-157).


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353 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.423-424 (not in W.d.W.). J. Glenn Friesen in his interpretation of Dooyeweerd denies the existence of individuals as such, only structured combinations of the modalities (J. Glenn Friesen, ‘95 Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd’, P.R. 74 (2009): 82, 84-86). To identify an individual solely in terms of one or more of their modal functions is what Strauss, following Dooyeweerd, calls ‘functionalism’ (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.488; 3.9-12, 174, 176; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.559:3.24-28, 197, 239; Dooyeweerd, Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer: 101-112; Dooyeweerd, Crisis in Humanist Political Theory: 89-97; Dooyeweerd, ‘Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.’ 215; see Strauss, P.D.D.: 409 (n. 1); 460 (n. 4)).


355 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 3.39, 53-64 et passim; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.76-98 et passim; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 205-206; for two different views see Friesen, ‘95 Theses’: 85; and Strauss, P.D.D.: 449-453). Jonathan Chaplin has drawn attention to the question of the status of ‘societal forms’ which Dooyeweerd holds to be both on the ‘law-side of human societal life’ and ‘products of human formation’ – a confusion in his thought. Chaplin concludes (pace Dooyeweerd) that societal forms should be seen as exclusively the latter: they should be seen as a response to divine law-making, not a participation in divine law-making – otherwise the societal forms are collapsed into the principles themselves with no room for the exercise of human responsibility (Jonathan P. Chaplin, ‘Pluralism, society and the state: the neo-Calvinist political theory of Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977)’ (Ph.D. thesis, University of London,1993): 198-199; Chaplin, Herman Dooyeweerd: 94-95; see Dooyeweerd,
structures’ as functioning as ‘typical structures’, but it remains unclear whether Dooyeweerd’s account of ‘typical structures’ is prescriptive or descriptive. The confusion caused by Dooyeweerd’s tendency to describe individuals as ‘individuality structures’ can be seen in Dooyeweerd’s original term ‘individual structures’ which conflates ‘structures’ (the complex of functions each of which is conceptually describable) and individuals (which are irreducible to conceptual description). But even in his later account, there is a lack of clarity in Dooyeweerd as to whether ‘individuality structures’ belong to the cosmonomic (‘structures for’) or to the factual side (‘structures of’) of the created order. On the whole, however, Dooyeweerd tends to see individuality structures as ‘structures for’, i.e., as complexes of law and norms governing the functioning of individuals. So we see that while Dooyeweerd questions whether it is possible in principle to approach individuality conceptually, yet he himself has a tendency to view individuals in such terms.

The somewhat over-conceptual character of Dooyeweerd’s account should not hide its possibilities, especially when combined with the complementary insights of Vollenhoven, as we shall see. Dooyeweerd recognises that the individual is finally unknowable in purely conceptual terms. There is a double tendency in Dooyeweerd to overconceptualise individuals: firstly to see the individuals in terms of their component functions, and then to see those functions in terms of the laws and norms which govern those functions – hence Dooyeweerd’s tendency to speak of ‘individuality-structures’ rather than individuals. This problem haunts the third of his transcendental dimensions to which I now turn.

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356 Dooyeweerd, *Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer*: 111-185; Dooyeweerd, *Crisis in Humanist Political Theory*: 96-162. This can also be seen in the early version of his teaching syllabus in the philosophy of law (Dooyeweerd, *Dictaat encyclopaedie der rechtswetenschap* (undated), from the mid 1930s).

357 Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 2.418 (not in *W.d.W.*). As D.F.M. Strauss points out, they should not be conflated because this does not properly allow for factual universality as well as for factual individuality (Strauss, *P.D.D.*: 446-458). However, Dooyeweerd’s position, with its ambiguity with respect to the cosmonomic and factual sides, is defended by Hendrik Geertsema (Hendrik G. Geertsema, ‘Emergent Evolution? Klapwijk and Dooyeweerd’, *P.R.* 76 (2011): 63).

358 This despite his conflation of individuality and factuality (see 3.2.2).
3.2.3 The Transcendental Dimension of Time and the Question of ‘Cosmic Time’

The third transcendental dimension for Dooyeweerd is that of time. Presenting and assessing Dooyeweerd’s account presents considerable difficulties, because, as we shall see, there are systematic problems with his account of ‘cosmic time’, which, I shall argue, is a hybrid notion conflating, in effect, the dimensions of relationality and individuality. However I shall also contend that Dooyeweerd’s account of time does not begin or end with the more problematical notion of ‘cosmic time’, and that there is considerable potential in his (more limited and undeveloped) account of time as it is naïvely experienced and analysed theoretically – an account, which, I shall argue, can stand on its own feet without recourse to the notion of ‘cosmic time’ and the systematic difficulties which the latter involves. I shall begin therefore, as I have done in the case of the transcendental dimensions of relationality and individuality, with Dooyeweerd’s account of time: first from within the naïve attitude, and then from within the theoretical attitude.\(^{359}\)

With respect to the naïve attitude, Dooyeweerd is clear that the naïve grasp of time is necessary for the theoretical reflection upon time – but not reducible to it. In the naïve experience of time, one implicitly grasps events as wholes.\(^{360}\) In doing so, one’s consciousness is primarily directed to individuals and relations, and only indirectly to the events themselves: ‘I hasten to my work and look at my watch’.\(^{361}\) One sees in this example that one’s attention is directed to one’s watch and one’s workplace as well as one’s relation to each. Within the naïve attitude, for Dooyeweerd, time is experienced as a whole (i.e., without making modal distinctions) in the form of ‘concrete events’, which together make up concrete history’, which he describes as ‘the great process of

\(^{359}\) For an explanation of the naïve and theoretical attitudes, see 3.2 Introduction.

\(^{360}\) However, he does not give us any systematic account of events, even though, in passing, he does distinguish between ‘things’ and events. For example in Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.41-42 (not in W.d.W.). Dooyeweerd points out that Whitehead distinguishes between permanent ‘objects’ and events – the latter are the ‘dynamical element of the universe’ (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.21 (not in W.d.W.); see A.N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (1929)).

becoming which must continue in all the aspects of temporal reality'.

One example of this is a tree that germinates, grows and perishes in time. He also gives an account of human feeling – and indeed human action in general – in ways that traverse all the modalities.

Within the theoretical attitude, by contrast, the different aspects of time are revealed in their diverse modal forms; for each of the different modalities there is a specific kind of time. Physical time measures physico-chemical reactions or clock time; biotic time measures biological growth; psychic time is about one’s sense of time or ‘durée’. The same goes for each of the modalities. Dooyeweerd develops his most rigorous theoretical account of time in relation to the juridical or legal modality, his own special sphere of study. Here, he develops what he describes as the relation between ‘coming into being and going out of being’. This juridical causality includes not only the coming into being or going out of existence of specific legal facts (for example someone’s ownership of a piece of property); it also includes the distinctive and irreducible linking of two events on the basis of legal considerations. The railway signalman who neglects to operate a switch to move an approaching train from one track to another has not done anything physically. But on the basis of the juridical causality between his inaction and the crash he is legally responsible for it (de causa omissionis).

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362 Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap ‘Inleiding’: 8; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 140; Dooyeweerd, ‘Criteria’: 214; Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Beginning: 60 (‘concrete gebeurtenissen’, ‘concrete geschiedenis’), 76 (‘het grote wordingsproces dat zich in alle aspecten der tijdelijke werkelijkheid moest doorzetten’); Dooyeweerd, Roots: 63, 79. Dooyeweerd uses two different words for ‘history’ in Dutch: ‘historie’ (which refers to that which is specific to the ‘historical’ or cultural-formative modality) and ‘geschiedenis’ (which is about actual events).


367 Dooyeweerd, Dictaat encyclopaedie: 54; Dooyeweerd, ‘De modale structuur van het juridisch oorzaakelijkheidsverband’, Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde Nieuwe reeks, deel 13 (1950): 37; Dooyeweerd, ‘The Modal Structure of the Juridical Causal Nexus’ (1997): 61; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap ‘Inleiding’: 67; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 117; Strauss, P.D.D.: 24, 281). While Dooyeweerd develops his account of juridical causality, it is possible to apply the same procedure in other modalities. For example, it is possible to speak of moral facts (i.e., the relation between a moral subject and a moral object) coming into being and of moral causality. For example one has a certain duty of care for one’s neighbour, and one’s neglect of his or her welfare in some relevant way, even if one does not physically assault him or her, can be seen as a form of moral causality.
Dooyeweerd attempts to draw the naïve and the theoretical accounts of time together in a wide-ranging account of temporal unfolding, which he calls ‘the opening process’. He describes how the different modalities are successively revealed and distinguished from one another, as society becomes more complex. This can take different forms. First, there is a process of ‘differentiation’ across the modalities, with the different sorts of relations being distinguished from one another over time. He calls this ‘the external opening process’. This is complemented by the internal opening process or ‘individualisation’: an individual, whether human or non-human, endures through time; its individuality-structure – the structured diversity of diverse functions which that individual exercises – is opened up over the course of that duration.  

For an example of the opening process, we can return to the linden tree in front of Dooyeweerd’s study-window. Dooyeweerd says that the internal opening process of this specific tree cannot be guaranteed by its leading biotical function, since that function relates to the individual whole and its typical internal structure. In particular, the ‘intrinsic destination’ (‘bestemmingsfunctie’) of a thing must be distinguished from its ‘external teleology’ (‘doel-begrip’); the external teleology has to do with the tree’s external function and lies outside the tree’s internal structure. The external purpose of the tree, and specifically its biotical leading function, cannot exhaust what the tree is and how we encounter it in naïve experience; but it is an important guide to the unfolding of the internal opening process. As a living thing, one can expect it to grow. If one learns more about the specific characteristics of linden trees, one can anticipate in greater detail what is likely to happen to this particular individual. This ‘intrinsic destination’ (‘bestemming’) is the basis for the ‘internal thing causality’, and applies to social structures as well. The supreme example of the opening process is the case

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369 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 3.34–44; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.54-63; Dooyeweerd is careful once again to distinguish this notion of an internal unfolding process from the Aristotelian notion of entelechy, which arises from the Aristotelian notion of substance, which, as we have seen, Dooyeweerd rejects (1.1)  
370 Jonathan P. Chaplin, ‘Dooyeweerd’s Notion of Societal Structural Principles’, P.R. 60 (1995): 17; Chaplin, Herman Dooyeweerd: 86-89. For example, Dooyeweerd states: ‘In the genetical order historically founded communities (i.e., communities with a cultural-formative founding function) are always preceded by natural ones (i.e., communities with a biotic founding function), irrespective of the typical individuality structures of the latter [my italics]’; and the same thing applies to the genetic order of institutional organized communities, founded in the cultural-formative modality, and voluntary associations, founded in the social modality (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.568). It has been objected that
of human character. Human character is opened up in the diversity of different relationships and in the elaboration of a person’s internal structure. Dooyeweerd provides the example of the development of a child: feeling precedes logical distinction, which in turn precedes language, just as the psychic modality precedes the analytical, and the analytical the lingual. The opening process, opening up the diversity of social forms, seems to proceed according to modally defined order, where organically-founded relations give rise to culture, language, social forms, economics, law, morality and faith.

So, in Dooyeweerd’s account of the opening process, we see a systematic opening up of the modalities. But does Dooyeweerd claim that events or historical development must necessarily unfold accordingly to the order of the modalities? In order to answer this question we need to go to Dooyeweerd’s account of what he calls ‘cosmic time’. As we have seen in the description of the development of his thought, ‘cosmic time’ indicates a ‘supra-temporal’ view of the ordering of the world. This discerning of ‘supra-temporal’ ordering involves, on the one hand, identifying and placing in sequence the laws and norms which govern the different kinds of relation, and, on the other, providing a characterisation in modally structured terms of the individuals which perdure. To put this in ontic terms (i.e., in terms of the way things are), for Dooyeweerd, ‘cosmic time’ is, on the one hand, a systematic opening up of the modalities (the ‘cosmic temporal order of the modal aspects’ which, as we have seen, Dooyeweerd traces out primarily in terms of the different kind of relations – the ‘cosmonomic side’ of ‘cosmic time’), and, on the other, the perdurance of individuality structures (the ‘factual’ side of ‘cosmic time’). Thus, for Dooyeweerd there is something of an a priori necessity of cosmic time, unfolding according the order of the modalities from number or quantity on. This seems to surrender the messiness of the factual process to a somewhat over-neat conception of what must or should happen.

supposed primitive societies are in fact highly complex, so that the process of differentiation does not easily fit with the empirical evidence, and, on the other hand that Dooyeweerd unduly enshrined the pattern of Western social diversity as the normative pattern for all human social development (Sander Griffioen, ‘De Betekenis van Dooyeweerd’s Ontwikkelingsidee’, P.R. 51 (1986): 84-94; McIntyre, ‘Dooyeweerd’s Philosophy of History’: 99-108).


While Dooyeweerd’s account of time or ‘cosmic time’ does have a certain conceptual neatness in that the modal ordering does provide us with a clear roadmap about how time unfolds (as indeed as we have seen above in Dooyeweerd’s account of the growth of a tree, the process of human life, and, on a larger scale in the diversification of society), the very conceptual neatness of his account poses a certain problem. In setting up the problem in this way, Dooyeweerd conflates cosmic order (the ordering of the modalities as the ‘cosmonomic side’ of ‘cosmic time’) with the open-endedness of the future, or indeed the eventfulness of past and present in the passage of time towards the future. He seems to present a somewhat closed and pre-determined account of time, seeing it as a systematic opening up of one kind of relation or individuality function after another in strict modal order. 373 Nevertheless, as we have seen Dooyeweerd himself implicitly recognises the ‘process of becoming’ which cannot simply be reduced to the ordering of the modalities; and here, as we shall see, there is a stronger resonance with Vollenhoven’s account of time. But first it is necessary to review briefly Dooyeweerd’s account of the transcendental determinations overall.

373 Vollenhoven later explicitly rejects the notion of the ‘modalisation’ (‘modaliseering’) of time that Dooyeweerd’s notion of ‘cosmic time’ represents, i.e., the conflation of narrative, or a sequence of events, with (or, one might say, the reduction of narrative to) the order of the modalities (Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)’: 173, 175-179; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’: 175-177; Tol, ‘Time’: 112 (n. 125)). This problem is identified by Hendrik Geertsema. As Geertsema himself points out, sin is much more than merely unrealized potentiality (Geertsema, ‘Transcendentale Openheid’: 135, 142-146). The problem is also identified by Atie Brüggeman-Kruyff (A. Th. Brüggeman-Kruyff, ‘Tijd als onsleuting, tijd als ontsluiting: Een ondersoek naar de tijd in de kosmologie, de epistemologie, de anthropologie, en de geskiedenis van Herman Dooyeweerd ’, P.R. 46 (1981): 119, 129-137; and ‘... 2’, P.R. 47 (1982): 41-53, 66-68) following Mekkes (J.P.A. Mekkes, Radix, tijd en kennen (1970): 172-180), and by J. D. Dengerink (Dengerink, De Zin van de Werkelijkheid: Een Wijsgerige Benadering: 214), and more recently Dirk Stafleu has pointed out the ambiguity in Dooyeweerd’s treatment of time (Stafleu, ‘Time and History’: 154-163,166-167). The solution Geertsema proposes is that the full potential of every modal unfolding is always there, even if unrealized (Geertsema, ‘Transcendentale Openheid’: 135, 142-146). Similar solutions are proposed by Dengerink who sees the emergence of new structural laws as disclosures of pre-existing possibilities (Dengerink, De Zin van de Werkelijkheid: Een Wijsgerige Benadering: 179-183) and also Hart (Hendrik Hart, Understanding Our World: An Integral Ontology (1984): 105-107). These ‘solutions’ merely raise the further question of the ontic status of these unrealized modal unfoldings. They merely introduce complications which can be avoided provided that modal ordering is distinguished clearly from actual time (see footnote above). There is the further problem (see below) that the progressive unfolding of one modality after another seems to be presented as the normative pattern for all development according to the strict order of ‘cosmic time’ (and indeed this is how Dooyeweerd presents it). However the difficulties introduced by his notion of ‘cosmic time’ can be avoided by abandoning that notion altogether and by distinguishing systematically between modal ordering on the one hand, and actual historical development on the other, so as not to pre-judge the issue in this somewhat deterministic way. This will involve the consideration of Direction (i.e., the basic orientation of human beings worked out through the positivisation of norms appropriate to a specific historical context (Griffioen, ‘De Betekenis van Dooyeweerd’s Ontwikkelingsidee’: 102-106).
3.2.4 The Transcendental Dimensions and the Kinds of Enkapsis

Before leaving the considerations of Dooyeweerd’s account of the ‘transcendental dimensions’ of created reality, there is a complex notion which he presents to us, which as yet I have not yet addressed in this systematic analysis, and which, I shall argue, cannot adequately be accounted for in terms of the transcendental dimensions as they have been described in the preceding sections. This notion, which we have already encountered in the description of Dooyeweerd’s philosophical development, is what he calls ‘enkapsis’: specific relationships in terms of which one individual is linked to another, and indeed may need the other for its very existence, but in such a way that the distinctive individuality structure of each is preserved. This results in a new ‘enkaptic structural whole’, i.e., an entity with its own individuality and identity distinct from that of the constituent entities without the constituent entities losing their own integrity and individuality.\(^{374}\)

The first of the kinds of enkapsis is ‘external’ or ‘symbiotic’ enkapsis: a higher component structure avails itself of the modal functions of the lower structure so that a new individual comes into being leaving intact the individuality-structures of the individuals whose interaction brings it into being. An example of this is the bird and a nest: the bird and the nest each has its own distinctive individuality structure – the bird has the ‘psychic’ or sensory modality as its highest subject function, while the nest has as its highest subject function the biotic modality because of the organic material out of which it is made, although it also functions as ‘psychic’ or sensory object to the bird.

\(^{374}\) Dooyeweerd, ‘Substantiebegrip ... enkaptisch structuurgeheel’: 78-86; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.13-21,704-713; R & S 3: 10-15. Here Dooyeweerd refers to experiments by Walther Kossel (1888-1956) which demonstrated that the structure of a crystal lattice is influenced by the internal structures of the constituent atoms, and yet can be recognized as a distinct identity. Dooyeweerd argues that this insight is in conflict with classical mechanistic physics, which denies entiary status to the lattice and only recognizes the entiary status of the constituent atoms. It is also in conflict with the neo-Thomist account, such as set out by Hoenen (Philosophie der organische Natuur (1940): 408 ff.) which attempts to accord the lattice the status of ‘composite form’ and regards the atoms as having merely ‘virtual form’ since the coming into being of the lattice renders their properties dormant. See 2.2.
However, despite these differences in their respective individuality structures, the bird and the nest form a new enkaptic structural whole.

The second kind of enkapsis is ‘internal’ or ‘foundational’ enkapsis: an individuality structure is dependent on another for its existence, e.g., a sculpture and the marble from which that sculpture is made, or a cell and a molecule, or the different individuality structures (chemical, biotic and psychic) which govern the functioning of a human being, and the ‘act’ (normatively functioning) individuality structure according to which the human being functions with freedom and responsibility.

The third kind of enkapsis is ‘correlative’ or ‘environmental’ enkapsis: the relationship between an individual and its environment, e.g., the relationship between a living organism and the atmosphere or the water in which it exists, or a state and the system of international relations.\(^{375}\)

In considering the different kinds of enkapsis it needs to be noted that the enkaptic structural wholes cannot be treated as universal relations, since enkaptic relationships are specific to certain states of affairs; they are only the mutual arrangements of the relata themselves; nor can they be treated as individuality structures, since they encompass two or more individuality structures; nor, by the same token, can they be accounted for in terms of ‘cosmic time’ either on its ‘cosmonomic’ side, which as we have seen is not modal ordering, nor on its ‘factual’ side, which, as we have seen, is the duration of individuality structures. Modal ordering cannot account for the coming into being or interlinkage of individuality structures in specific instances, since, as we have seen, the modalities (which for Dooyeweerd are in the first instance kinds of relations) are universal features which cannot account for specific circumstances; while the duration of individuality structures cannot account for the specific functioning of different individuality structures with respect to the same state of affairs. In short, enkapsis – a notion which Dooyeweerd himself develops, and which is crucial for his account of the specific states of affairs, not least concerning the constitution and development of the human person – reveals the systematic incapacity of ‘cosmic time’

\(^{375}\) Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.92, 638-790 (all not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, R. & S. 3: passim; Dooyeweerd, ‘Substantiebegrip ... enkaptisch structuurgeheel’: 66-139).
to account for the specific historicity which a satisfactory account of enkapsis
requires. \footnote{In Chapter Six, I shall suggest a systematic approach that can account for enkaptic relationships and enkaptic structural wholes. Even though ‘enkapsis’ is Dooyeweerd’s term, which ironically, as we shall see, systematically accords better with Vollenhoven’s systematic framework than Dooyeweerd’s own.}

All in all, ‘enkapsis’ calls for an entirely different systematics than that which can be accommodated in Dooyeweerd’s account of the transcendental dimensions in terms of the framework provided by ‘cosmic time’. \footnote{In Chapter Six I shall address ways in which the insights of Dooyeweerd’s account of ‘enkapsis’ can be developed on a more satisfactory systematic basis in the light of the Kuyperian vision, both drawing on insights from Vollenhoven, and developing them ‘perichoretically’ through a series of what I shall call ‘descriptive views’.} How the different kinds of enkapsis can be accommodated will be addressed in Chapter Six. Meanwhile, in the following section, I shall briefly review Dooyeweerd’s account of what he calls the ‘transcendental dimensions’.

3.2.5 Review of Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Dimensions

In the light of the Kuyperian vision of the integrity of the individual, the plurality of relations and the purposiveness of events, certain features of Dooyeweerd’s account can be seen to add new and strong insights, but a number of problems remain.

Regarding individuality, while recognising concrete individuals, Dooyeweerd tends to treat them primarily in terms of their cosmonomic side, i.e. in terms of ‘individuality structures’ (as ‘structures for’): but in doing so, he leaves little room for the recognition of individuals as factual entities, even if he begins his discussion with that recognition. So his account of individuality structures is somewhat ambiguous, with a tendency to over-conceptualisation.

With respect to relationality, his view of the universality of relations supplies a corrective to the residual monadism of Vollenhoven, although in his treatment of individuality, he tends to over-emphasise the cosmonomic side (laws and norms) at the expense of the factual side (conformity to laws and norms).
When it comes to time, there are systematic difficulties in Dooyeweerd’s position; these arise from his notion of ‘cosmic time’. While Dooyeweerd’s account of the time aspects and the opening process provides a non-reductionistic account of time, his account of ‘cosmic time’ amounts to a hybrid notion combining, in effect, relationality (on the ‘cosmonomic’ side) and individuality (on the ‘factual’) resulting in an a priori tidying up of the messiness of genuine eventfulness. For the time being, we simply need to note the internal possibilities in Dooyeweerd’s position.

But, having looked ahead, it is now necessary to recapitulate where we have got to now with respect to the transcendental location of the two philosophers’ systematic thought by an initial comparison of both philosophers together in the light of the Kuyperian vision.

3.3 An Initial Comparison of Dooyeweerd’s and Vollenhoven’s Accounts

As we compare both philosophers in the light of the Kuyperian vision of the integrity of the individual, the plurality of relations and the purposiveness of time, some of their respective strengths and weaknesses emerge.

Vollenhoven’s account of individuality is much stronger than Dooyeweerd’s, seeing individuals as unique, concrete entities and identifying how they are governed by laws and norms. Vollenhoven focuses on individuals, seen both from the standpoint of the diversity of functions (the ‘thus-so’ determination), and from that of relationships between linking concrete individuals to one another (the ‘this-that’ determination). Vollenhoven complements Dooyeweerd’s account of individuals as individuality structures, whether seen as complexes of functional laws and norms (‘structures for’), or complexes of individuals’ factual functions (‘structures of’).
There are, however, problems in Vollenhoven’s account of the externality and universality of relations. For him, relations do not have their own ontic status, but derive from the linking together of the constituent individuals over time – they apply only to a specific context or chain of events. Relations cannot therefore be seen as having universal ontic status beyond the specific coming together of the constituent individuals. Dooyeweerd, by contrast, opens the way for a much stronger conception of relations in ‘external’, i.e., ontically independent, terms, which is important because otherwise values are reduced merely to tendencies specific to the individuals concerned, or the product of purely local arrangements – in short, they are reduced to historistic relativism.

With respect to time, Vollenhoven’s account supplies a systematic corrective to Dooyeweerd’s account. With his conception of the genetic determination Vollenhoven provides a way to account for time in a narrative way, detailing the coming into being and development of new individuals. This corrects and complements Dooyeweerd’s account of ‘cosmic time’, consisting as it does of modal ordering on the one hand, and the perdurance of individuals on the other – without the story of what actually happens. This allows for the insights of Dooyeweerd’s account of the ‘opening process’ to be appreciated without falling into a form of modal determinism, where the process of history ‘must’ or ‘ought’ to proceed purely in a pre-ordained modal order. How these insights can be brought together in this way will be addressed in Chapter Six.

So far, we have seen how Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd address the necessary conditions of experience (what Vollenhoven calls the ‘determinations’ and Dooyeweerd the ‘transcendental dimensions’ of the horizon of human experience). The question remains: how is it possible to hold the diversity of experience and reflection together in a unified view? For both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, holding the diversity of experience and reflection together in a unified way is what constitutes the philosophical task. Both philosophers hold that this is not a task that can be carried out in isolation.

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380 As previously indicated (2.2), his tendency to focus unduly on the cosmonomic side is corrected in his later thinking, not least in the last versions of his Encyclopaedia of the Science of Law, where he provides a robust account of factual juridical subject-object relations. This is an approach which can be extended to all the modalities (see also 3.2.1).
from the basic ‘religious’ commitments, i.e., in terms of the worldview of the person concerned. Both hold, like Kuyper, that it can only happen as the response of a whole, human person to God’s triune action in the world. The question will be addressed in the following chapter.
Chapter Four: Transcendent Orientation – the Religious Basis

In the previous chapter I examined Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s different but complementary ontologies and epistemologies – their account of what there is in the world and how it is known. However, both philosophers agree with Kuyper that ontology and epistemology must be underpinned by basic religious commitment. In the course of this chapter I shall examine Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s basic religious commitments. In further chapters we shall see how these basic religious commitments orient their respective philosophical systems, and how both reflect the vision enunciated by Kuyper.

As we have seen in Chapter One, Kuyper argued for a Calvinian ‘world and life view’ distinct from the alternative ‘world and life views’ (‘worldviews’) of the Greeks and the Enlightenment, and indeed from the ‘scholastic’ attempt at a synthesis. According to Kuyper, the distinctively Christian worldview is best expressed in the Calvinian tradition. Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven take up Kuyper’s stance, and develop it in a systematic and thorough way. Vollenhoven also identifies the ways in which different religious foundations shape and structure all thought – and indeed action.

382 See Chapter Two. Dooyeweerd’s position is somewhat ambivalent. In the 1920s and at times in the 1930s he stated unequivocally that the ‘philosophy of the law-Idea’ (‘De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee’) is the elaboration of a Calvinistic worldview (Dooyeweerd, ‘In den strijd om een Christelijke staatkunde 1’; Dooyeweerd, ‘In den strijd om een Christelijke staatkunde 2’; Dooyeweerd, ‘In den strijd om een Christelijke staatkunde (3-m)’; Dooyeweerd, ‘De plight der jongere generatie tegenover Kuyper’s geestelijke nalatenschap’, Volhart (1937); see Albert M. Wolters, ‘On the Idea of Worldview and its Relation to Philosophy’ (1989): 22, 25 (nn. 28, 29)). However, later, Dooyeweerd rejects the view that philosophy is merely the elaboration of a ‘Christian life- and world view’ (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.127; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.158) although crucially, Dooyeweerd indicates that both a ‘life-and-world view’ and a philosophy both proceed from the ‘[D]irection’ (‘richting en instelling’) given by the Divine Word-Revelation (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.92; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.128; Wolters, ‘On the Idea of Worldview and its Relation to Philosophy’: 22, 25 (n. 10). I shall return the meaning and importance of Direction, for both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, in the course of this chapter.

383 In the early 1930s, Vollenhoven explicitly distinguishes between scriptural and un-scriptural ground-motives, although not in the form later taken by Dooyeweerd (Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 49-67). However, it is important to note that the apostate ground-motives which Vollenhoven describes then are different from those which Dooyeweerd was later to set out (see 2.2). For Vollenhoven, they are the monistic – subdivided into pantheism and pan-cosmism; and the dualistic – subdivided into the partial cosmism and partial theism (Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 51-52). This understanding of monism and dualism in cosmic terms prevailed until the early 1940s. Anthony Tol comments: ‘It is only in the last revision of the Isagôgé, in 1941, that Vollenhoven’s later [more anthropologically-focused rather than cosmological – J.G.A.I.] understanding of monism and dualism becomes definitive’ (Tol, Philosophy: 80, also. 98-102, 393-396; and Sytse U. Zuidema, ‘Vollenhoven en de Reformatie der Wijsbegeerte’, P.R. 28

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Dooyeweerd’s position in this regard is not essentially different from Kuyper’s or Vollenhoven’s, except that he locates it in the universal conditions of human experience rather than in the expression of a specific communal belief, as Kuyper does.\(^{384}\) Closely following categories developed by Kuyper, Dooyeweerd identifies a series of what he calls ‘religious ground-motives’, including the Christian one, which have shaped the development of Christian thought.\(^{385}\)

However, the question of how philosophy relates to theology and religion is a fraught and painful one in Reformational philosophical circles. Both philosophers distinguish between religion, philosophy, and theology. They use ‘religion’ to refer to the basic orientation of the whole person to God or to any putative alternative which may be substituted for God, while ‘theology’ refers to the analysis of creedal statements, and ‘philosophy’ to the comprehensive analytical study of all the modalities (and indeed all matters of epistemology and ontology).\(^{386}\)

As we saw in Chapter Two, doubts were raised about the value of theological insight in the development of Christian philosophy, following attacks on Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven by their theological colleagues. It may be suspected that the theological roots of the two men’s thought were obscured deliberately – partly to avoid the polemical assaults to which both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven were subjected and partly because of a systematic attempt (especially by Dooyeweerd) to question in principle any theological scrutiny of the stated basis of their philosophy. It was also a matter of deep debate among the following generation of Reformational philosophers, (1963): 138). However, as we shall see in the following chapter (5.1) this was subsumed into his analysis of the ‘ground-types’ which emerge from his ‘consequential problem-historical’ consideration of the history of Western philosophy.

\(^{384}\) Jacob Klapwijk points out that Dooyeweerd was working in a different philosophical milieu from that of Abraham Kuyper. Kuyper had a Romantic ‘expressivist’ vision of life, according to which ‘worldview’ reflects the spirit of a community (i.e., the Calvinist community). Klapwijk argues that Dooyeweerd moved away from Kuyper’s expressivism towards a more Kantian (or neo-Kantian) one, which focuses more at the general conditions of human experience rather than the spirit of specific community. However, Klapwijk points out that Dooyeweerd is not consistent in this, and that he ‘surreptitiously brings the notion of worldview into his idea of “religious ground-motive” ’ (Klapwijk, ‘On Worldviews and Philosophy’: 50-52).

\(^{385}\) This can be seen in the way Dooyeweerd’s four ground-motives correspond to the four worldviews which Kuyper identified: Paganism, Romanism, Modernism and Calvinism ( Kuyper, Lectures : 20-34; Klapwijk, ‘On Worldviews and Philosophy’: 52). As pointed out previously (2.2), this is not accidental, since Dooyeweerd developed his account of the ground-motives in the late 1930s, at the same time as he was studying Kuyper in preparation for the celebrations at the V.U. of centenary of the latter’s birth.

\(^{386}\) 4.1.2 and 4.2.2.
although there is no final consensus.\(^{387}\) Vollenhoven was willing and able to defend his position against theological opponents (see Chapter Two), while Dooyeweerd rejected any theological examination of the expression of religious belief.\(^{388}\) The difficulty is

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\(^{387}\) See Klaas J. Popma, *De Plaats der Theologie* (1946); Klaas J. Popma, ‘Enkele Opmerkingen over het Systematisch Karakter van der Theologische Dogmatiek’, *P.R.* 25 (1960): 64-76; J.P.A. Mekkes, *Creation, Revelation and Philosophy* (2010): 33-39; and Troost, ‘The Relation between the Revelation of Creation and Word-revelation’: 27-40. In particular, he denies that the content of religious belief can be identified with the subject matter of theological investigation, which he identifies as ‘special science’, i.e., a purely theoretical discipline (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 2.497; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 2.562-563; Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 42, 136; see Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘Dooyeweerd: An Appreciation’ (1960s)). Dooyeweerd points out difference in this regard with his close colleague, Klaas Popma, who maintains that theology is not purely theoretical (Dooyeweerd, ‘Verhouding tussen wijsbegeerte en theologie’: 67-68 (n. 64)).

\(^{388}\) Here Dooyeweerd rejects all ‘scholastic’ claims about theology as the ‘queen of the sciences’. Dooyeweerd identifies three ‘scholastic’ models according to which the ‘scholastic’ understanding of the relation between theology and philosophy is expressed. The first is the model of Augustine, who identifies Christian doctrine itself as ‘Philosophia Christiana’. Dooyeweerd argues that Augustine’s conception represents the synthesis of the contemplation of the eternal forms (as described by Plato) and biblical revelation: in the ‘scholastic’ vision, the categories of unchangeability and impassibility are imported into the picture of God. This is conflated with the biblical deity, engaged with the world in and through time and incarnate in the person of the Son, who suffers and dies before his resurrection and ascension. For Augustine, the two pictures of Greek philosophy and of biblical revelation are, in Dooyeweerd’s view, held together by sheer assertion (Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.177-179 (not in *W.d.W.*); Dooyeweerd, ‘Verhouding tussen wijsbegeerte en theologie’: 2-3, 5-6; Dooyeweerd, *R. & S* 2: Ch. 8; Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 43, 114-115; Dooyeweerd, ‘Philosophie et théologie’, *Revue Reformée* 9 (1958): 48-49, 55; Yasunori Ichikawa, ‘Herman Dooyeweerd’s view of theology as science’ (Calvin Theological Seminary, Grand Rapids, Mich: 33-35)). The second model is that exemplified by the approach of Thomas Aquinas, which sees theology, as derived from biblical revelation, crowning the understanding of the world provided by Greek philosophy. In the case of Thomas Aquinas and the medieval ‘scholastics’, Augustine’s conception is schematised into a two-tier view of the world. In the lower sphere, the world is understood by reason, God-being but otherwise unaided. In the higher sphere, content is provided by revelation, including biblical revelation, in a manner complementary to an understanding of the world achieved by reason alone. This latter approach is called the *analogia entis*, the extrapolation of the existence of God from a consideration of the nature of the world. Revelation then, according to this account of Thomas, supplements what can be known by natural means. Thomas, like Augustine, subordinates nature to grace in his schema (Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.179-185 (not in *W.d.W.*); Dooyeweerd, ‘Verhouding tussen wijsbegeerte en theologie’: 7-10; *R. & S* 2: Ch. 8; Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 44-45,116-118; Dooyeweerd, ‘Philosophie et théologie’: 49; Ichikawa, ‘Herman Dooyeweerd’s view of theology as science’ (36-39; see also 1.2). The third model is that of Karl Barth (1886-1968) whom Dooyeweerd sees theology as displacing philosophy as the only true basis for knowledge about God and the world. It might seem strange that Dooyeweerd treats Barth as a ‘scholastic’. However, for Dooyeweerd, since Barth operates within the grace/nature ground-motive which characterises the scholastic position, he can be so classified – although one might, perhaps, call Barth a ‘contradictory’ or ‘dialectical’ scholastic in that Barth’s model, as set out in the first volume of his *Church Dogmatics*, distinguished nature and grace, but sets the two in sharp antithesis. Revelation is the unmerited act of God’s grace while natural reason is an apostate human project. In practice (and contrary to his own claims), Barth follows an eclectic path, within a certain, largely implicit, philosophical framework. Further, Dooyeweerd argues, he does not distinguish properly between theology as the knowledge of God in Jesus Christ, and the dogmatic science that seeks to systematize Christian revelation. Barth argues that God can be known solely by revelation and rejects the *analogia entis*. In its place he puts forward the *analogia fidei*, which, in effect, mediates one’s direct relationship to God through the theoretical categories of dogmatic analysis. In contradiction of his own claim that Christian belief has no point of contact with human experience, he effectively absolutises one aspect of human experience: the faith modality (Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.66; 2.34, 300-302 (not in *W.d.W.*); Dooyeweerd, ‘De wetsbeschouwing in Brunner’: 336-340; Dooyeweerd, ‘Verhouding tussen wijsbegeerte en theologie’: 10-11, 16-17, 21, 50; Dooyeweerd, ‘De
that the problems of various ‘scholastic’ approaches, dependent as they are on a dualism between grace and nature, are imported into Christian philosophy. Nevertheless, both philosophers clearly describe the triune work of God as the necessary basic religious orientation for a Christian philosophy; they describe the human response from the ‘heart’ to this triune work as the pre-requisite for a systematically Christian approach to philosophy. In this they are following Kuyper.

In this chapter, I shall ask two related questions. First, how are Vollenhoven’s and Dooyeweerd’s accounts respectively grounded in the Christian vision of God’s triune engagement with the world, as we have found it enunciated by Kuyper? Second, how does this account shape their respective accounts of the human response? With respect to the first question, the two philosophers give somewhat different accounts of God’s triune narrative. With respect to the second, they account somewhat differently for how this impinges on, and orients, the centre of human life and action, which, following Kuyper, both call the ‘heart’: Vollenhoven tends to stress the eternal ‘Law’ in this regard, while Dooyeweerd tends to stress the ‘supra-temporality’ of the heart. I shall outline and compare their respective accounts of the religious basis for a Christian philosophy (both the triune grounding and the human response) with suggested resolutions for the problems and divergences in their accounts.

In the next two sections, then, I shall look at how Vollenhoven and then Dooyeweerd describe both the transcendent vision (which *qua* Kuyper should inform a Christian philosophy), and its reception by human beings. This will all be seen in the light of the main question: whether they remain faithful to the Reformational vision inherited from Kuyper.

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389 See Chapter One.

390 See 4.1.1 and 4.2.1.

4.1 Vollenhoven: the Trinitarian Covenant with Humanity

So, in examining Vollenhoven’s account of the religious orientation of a Christian philosophy, I shall consider, first, the unfolding of the great narrative of the triune work in the world and second, what that means to human beings at the centre of their life and consciousness.

4.1.1 The Trinitarian Grounding of the Law – the ‘States of Affairs’

Vollenhoven grounds his philosophical thought in explicitly trinitarian terms. I shall look at how he portrays the work of the three Persons in the unfolding of the great narrative of God’s dealings with the world in general and, more specifically, humanity.

As a trained theologian, Vollenhoven is far less reticent than Dooyeweerd, a legal scholar, about expressing himself in explicitly theological ways – although, as we shall see, some of the positions he takes are not without difficulties.

The characterization of the roles of the three Persons was affected by the shift, noted earlier, from an intra-mental to a cosmic focus. Early on, Vollenhoven sees the work of the Father as the initiator of ‘ideas’ within the structure of thought, with the Son as Logos underlying how these ‘ideas’ are assimilated in the process of human knowing, and the Spirit applying them in concrete situations. In his later thinking, the focus shifts from the work of the three Persons in the intra-mental process, to the work of God in the world as a whole. He speaks of God ‘Creating, Word-revealing and Spirit-guiding’ (‘Schepping, Logosopenbaring en Geesteleiding’), and he links these concepts to the work of the three Persons of the Trinity respectively. Later, he calls these three

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392 See introduction to this chapter and 4.2.
393 See 2.1.
394 At this stage in the thinking of Vollenhoven, an ‘idea’ is characterised as what Tol describes as a ‘extra-mental archetype’ or ‘thing-law’ of a given object (Tol, Philosophy: 112; see also pp. 180-211).
successive stages, ‘[S]tates of [A]ffairs’.\(^{396}\) States of Affairs are the stages in which God’s Law is expressed in the created order. Each of these States of Affairs is linked to the work of one of the three Persons of the Trinity. This takes the form of a three-stage unfolding of the Law by each of the Persons in turn:

First we see the act of creation by the Father: this is God’s secret will, or creation command.\(^{397}\) The Father takes the leading role in the act of creation. Within that act the Father is the Archè of all things and the giver of the initial ‘creation command’ (‘scheppingsbevel’) according to which the created order comes into being.\(^{398}\) Once the primordial act of creation has been carried out, the diversity of all creatures unfolds through the address of God.\(^{399}\) The Father names each individual uniquely, so constituting the ‘idea’ or ‘structure’ that gives each created thing its unique identity.\(^{400}\)

Second, there is the giving of the love command by the Son applicable to humanity in general: the work of the Son is to provide the revelation of God’s Law by whose light humanity can uncover the structures of creation, including the norms and laws which govern human life. This work is focused on revelation and redemption, in his offices as Logos and Christ respectively (the two offices are intertwined but distinct). In his

\(^{396}\) This is a special sense of ‘[S]tates of [A]ffairs’ which I shall capitalise accordingly. Vollenhoven, ‘Historia Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)’: 11; Vollenhoven, ‘Levens-eenheid (55ms)’: 122-133; Vollenhoven, ‘Kort overzicht van de geschiedenis der wijsbegeerte voor de cursus paedagogiek (56b)’ (1956): 2; Vollenhoven, ‘Getuigen (59d)’; Vollenhoven, ‘Levens-eenheid (55ms)’; Vollenhoven, ‘Norm en natuurwet (51h)’.

\(^{397}\) There is an echo here with Kuyper’s notion of ‘archetype’ – that which is known to God alone but is only revealed indirectly in the form of an ‘ectype’ (Kuyper, Sacred Theology (n.d.): 3.1.59, 60, pp. 96-117).


\(^{399}\) Vollenhoven, \textit{Isagôgè Philosophiae (31f)}: §74A = Vollenhoven, \textit{Isagôgè Philosophiae (32)}: §76A ; Wolters, ‘Vollenhoven on the “Word of God”’: 6. Wolters points out that here Vollenhoven is following the traditional reformed distinction between \textit{creatio prima} and \textit{creatio secunda} such as in found in the writings of Vollenhoven’s theological teacher, Herman Bavinck (Wolters, ‘Vollenhoven on the “Word of God”’: 9 (n. 2); for Bavinck see 6.1). For God’s speaking, Vollenhoven uses the term ‘Logos-revelation’ (‘Logos-openbaring’) not in the specific sense of the second Person of the Trinity, but in the joint speaking of all the Persons (see Vollenhoven, ‘Historia Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)’: 5-6; see also Vollenhoven, ‘Levens-eenheid (55ms)’: 124).

earliest thinking, Vollenhoven sees the Son, as Logos, providing the basis on which the subject and object of knowledge can come into synthesis.\footnote{1} From the 1920s on Vollenhoven came to see the Logos as having a cosmic role as the basis for the harmony and coherence of all the modalities, rather than an intra-mental role, bringing experience and reasoning together.\footnote{2} The Logos is the revelation of the eternally begotten Son in the creative act while, at the same time, the representative expression of the common creative work of all three Persons.\footnote{3} It is the Son then, as ‘the Christ’ (‘the anointed one’), who calls humanity through grace back to the Father.\footnote{4} As the Christ, he replaces the old office-bearer, Adam, and bears the consequences of the judgement incurred by Adam’s failure. He does so both as the eternal Son and as a human being. Only as God can he reverse the consequences of the failure of Adam as the first office-

\footnote{1} Here he shifts his view from that which he set out in his doctoral thesis to that which he held from the 1920s on. In his earliest thinking, the Logos is that which brings norms together with judgement. In this sense, the Logos mediates epistemically between the norms called into being by Father, and the judgements made through the influence and work of the Holy Spirit (Kok, \textit{Vollenhoven: 24}; Tol, \textit{Philosophy}: 180-126). Looked at another way, the Logos is the one who norms the working over of experience (\textit{empirie}) by systematic reflection (\textit{ratio}). This connection should not be seen as a question of the Logos setting one’s thinking and the order of the world in parallel (which he sees as naïve realism). On the other hand, the Logos should not be seen as an unknown third to which \textit{ratio} and \textit{empirie} stand in one-to-one relation. Rather the Logos has a regulative role in that it provides the framework which makes both \textit{empirie} and \textit{ratio} possible (Vollenhoven, \textit{W.W.Th.S.} (18a): 409-410; cited in Kok, \textit{Vollenhoven: 24}, 314-315; and Tol, \textit{Philosophy}: 185-201). This is not a claim that the Logos provides the content of thought (which for Vollenhoven would be too close to the ‘scholastic’ notion of ‘thinking God’s thoughts after him’). Vollenhoven rejects ‘logos speculation’, the view that postulates a special connection between human thought and the divine Logos (Vollenhoven, \textit{De noodzakelijkheid eener christelijke logica} (32b): 1-2; Vollenhoven, ‘Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)’: §15, p. 70 (\textit{Hoofdlijnen: 27}); see Tol, \textit{Philosophy}: 197-201, 299 (n. 125)). Vollenhoven’s point seems to be that while sober exegesis \textit{does} identify the Logos in the N.T. with the Word of the Lord in the O.T., to single out a special link between this and one’s \textit{ratio} \textit{faculty} (or analytical function) is to absolutise the latter at the expense of all the other faculties and aspects of one’s life. It is wrong to link the Logos purely with the logical. For him it is the divine Logos who creates both the created logos (i.e., that which is of a logical nature), and the a-logical (Vollenhoven, ‘Enkele grondlijnen der kentheorie (26b)’: 388 (‘alogische’)). It important to note that ‘non-logical’ is not illogical, only subject-matter to which the distinction logical/illogical does not apply as an appropriate designation.

\footnote{2} It combines both those elements of a logical, i.e., specific to the logical or analytical modality, and non-logical character, i.e., those of other modalities (Vollenhoven, ‘Enkele grondlijnen der kentheorie (26b)’: 388-399).

\footnote{3} Vollenhoven argues that the names ‘Son’ and ‘Logos’ need to be distinguished. The first refers to the second Person of the Trinity as eternally-begotten, the second to the name of the Son in joint participant with the Father and the Holy Spirit in the creative act (Vollenhoven, ‘De logos’ (38m), \textit{C.V.C.W.} 3 (1938): 39-41; Vollenhoven, \textit{Isagogè Philosophiae} (30d); Vollenhoven, \textit{Isagogè Philosophiae} (32): 74-76; Vollenhoven, \textit{Introduction}: §§ 117, 136, pp. 78-102). However, he is not consistent in this regard.

\footnote{4} ‘Levens-enheid’, pp. 124-5; Tol, ‘Time and Change’, p. 102. Strictly-speaking the term ‘Christ’ should be ‘the Christ’ (the anglicised Greek rendering of its Hebrew equivalent, ‘the Messiah’ both meaning ‘the anointed one’) the office assumed by the eternal Son in the act of redemption. In general, apart from where this needs to emphasised, I shall use the more generally used term ‘Christ’ without the definite article. ‘Christians’ are by extension, members of the anointed community as well as followers of ‘the Christ’.

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bearer, and yet it needs to be as fully human that he does so. The human nature the Son assumes is not an abstraction: Jesus of Nazareth is a genuine human individual. Vollenhoven argues that the incarnation needs to be understood in terms of the ‘enhypostatic’ identity of the Son as an individual human being – not in terms of his assumption of an ‘anhypostatic’ (‘impersonal’), pre-given or general human nature. It is only through this enhypostatic human being, Jesus of Nazareth as the new office-bearer, head of the angels as well as the earth, that redemption is possible in that it is only through him, as its new federal (i.e., covenantal) head, that humanity truly finds its unity with God. The incarnate Son is not only the bringer of redemption but also reveals the law of love, the characteristic of redeemed humanity. This has implications for the laws or norms appropriate to each modality, including the modality of faith. The Son who is the Logos, the basis of the created order, is present in the church as the Christ, the basis for the words and sacraments that shape the church’s faith. Thus, Vollenhoven sees the incarnation of the Son not only as making possible the salvation of ‘souls’ or separate individuals, but also as the revelation of God’s Law for humanity in general.

Third, the Holy Spirit puts the decree of the Father as revealed by the Son into effect.

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409 Vollenhoven, ‘Getuigen (59d)’: 138. In the first instance, this is worked out with respect to the subject-pole in the post logical-modalities, but there is the wider norm of flourishing which works out in all the modalities (see Chapter Four).
411 See 2.1.2
412 Vollenhoven, ‘Plato’s realisme (slotgedeelte)’: 159.
This is God’s effective will that realises the creative potential in specific situations. In creation, the Holy Spirit first broods over the waters, leading to the unfolding of the still concealed diversity of the initial creation. Then, and in conjunction with the effecting of creation, he brings the revelation of the Logos to human consciousness, believers and unbelievers alike. This ‘double work’ (‘dubbele werkzaamheid’) is the ‘genetic deployment’ (‘genetische ontplooiing’) of the Holy Spirit. Alongside this ‘double work’ of the Holy Spirit in supporting and carrying through the work of the Father and the Son, there is the distinctive work of ‘positivisation’: the application and particularisation of God’s Law in specific situations. The work of the Holy Spirit causes human life to flourish – including the process of biological reproduction and the development of culture and civilisation. For Vollenhoven, the eschatological hope is not a move to a supra-temporal realm, as we shall see is the case for Dooyeweerd. For him, rather, the eschaton is unfolded in time and does not involve a transcendence of time. He sees a temporal continuity between the present reality and the transformed heavens and earth achieved by a combination of the direct action of God in the historical process, through the resurrection of Jesus, and humanity’s participation in that reality through the work of the Holy Spirit.

So we see the sequential character of Vollenhoven’s account: the work of the Father is succeeded by that of the Son, and that in turn by the work of the Holy Spirit. He sees the work of the Persons as a successive unfolding, with first the Father as creator, then

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415 Vollenhoven, ‘[Press release; lecture]: “Bergson” (21d)’, De School met den Bijbel 28 (1921); Vollenhoven, ‘Iets over het stelsel van Bergson’, Zeeuwsche Kerkbode 33 (1919): 15 (I am grateful to Dr John Kok for providing me with his transcription of this manuscript); Tol, Philosophy: 184-185. In the versions of the Isagôgè between 1932 and 1939, there is a section entitled, ‘The leading of the Spirit and the result of this activity’ (Vollenhoven, Isagôgè Philosophiae (32): §78 ‘Het leiding van de Geest en het resultaat van deze activiteit’).


417 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §121, p. 82 (Vollenhoven refers to Pss. 127 and 128, and also to Dt. 7.13); Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’: 207-209.

418 See 4.1.2.

419 Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 6 (Vollenhoven quotes 1 Tim. 3.16, Rom. 6.9 and 1 Cor. 15.33-34).

420 Here he closely follows Kuyper, E Voto Dordraceno: 1.193-194, although, as Anthony Tol points out, there important differences of emphasis, in that Kuyper tends to see God’s activity as inherent in nature and he tends to formulate this in teleological terms (Anthony Tol, personal communication, 13 Jan. 2008).
the Son as revealer and redeemer, and, finally, the Spirit as the agent of change and the realisation of new possibilities. This sequence is not a straightforward identification of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit – in each act led by one of the Persons the other two Persons have subordinate roles. However, while it is not straightforwardly sequential, it is sequential nevertheless, in that the identification of each of the Persons takes place primarily, albeit complexly, in the unfolding economy of creation, redemption and ‘positivisation’.

The way that Vollenhoven presents the work of the three Persons in sequence – albeit a complex sequence – raises the question about how the Persons can act jointly without losing their distinctions from one another. This is a matter I shall return to in Chapter Six. But, for the moment, it is clear that Vollenhoven sees God’s engagement with the world in trinitarian terms. It is thus, in trinitarian terms, that we must consider God’s Law and humanity’s religious, (i.e., basic covenantal) response.

4.1.2 The Law of God and the ‘Heart’

For Vollenhoven, God’s complexly sequential threefold action in the world, which constitutes his Law, calls for appropriate reception by humanity. He describes the Law as the ‘boundary’ between God and the cosmos. This was a theme for the duration of his professorship from his inaugural lecture in 1926 to his valedictory lecture in 1963.421

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421 As will be argued in 6.2 Introduction, Vollenhoven’s identification each of the Persons with successive manifestations the work of God is in danger of portraying the Trinity in modalistic terms, where the Persons are understood as different expressions of an underlying divine essence. Although the sequence is complex in this way, it remains true for Vollenhoven that the engagement of the Persons is sequential (Vollenhoven, ‘Levens-eenheid (55ms)’: 122-128). It is noteworthy that Vollenhoven argues that the early church considered the Sabellian heresy less dangerous than the Arian one, since the Sabellians at least considered the Logos to be divine, whereas the Arians did not (Vollenhoven, ‘Norm en natuurwet (51b)’/5, p. 61).

Here I shall argue that this should not be understood either in ontic or noetic terms, but rather as ‘religious’ – to use both his and Dooyeweerd’s terminology.

First then, the Law might be seen in noetic terms, providing some sort of supra-modal knowledge. The principal instrument which Vollenhoven offers in this regard is the principle of the exclusion of antinomies (the ‘principium exclusae antinomiae’), according to which the diversity of the law-spheres can be discerned and delineated according to a supramodal ‘metalogic’. If one modality can entirely be explained in terms of another, it raises the question of the explanatory basis for that other modality; for example, if morality can entirely be explained by psychological principles, it leaves the question of how psychological principles can be explained. This process leads to an infinite regress with each level of explanation requiring a higher, meta-level, and so on. And further, the force of such principles specific to a certain modality cannot themselves be derived from those principles; for example, psychological principles cannot appeal merely to other psychological principles for their basis and justification. According to such a procedure, different forms of discourse are shown to be modally distinct, each irreducible to one another, but all subject to a higher, supra-modal Law, because of the antinomies that would otherwise arise. However, privileging the logical principle of the exclusion of antinomies elevates the analytical modality (in which the logical principle of non-contradiction is located) over all the others in a reductionistic and rationalistic way. Moreover, such a noetic, God’s eye view, rendering of Vollenhoven’s account of the Law gives rise to the objection that if the Law is supramodal or metalogical, how can it be known, and what meaningful role can it play in human life? It seems to posit some special knowledge (i.e., knowledge not subject to the laws and norms of number, space etc.), to which humanity can somehow have access. This raises the question about how the Law can be spoken of at all. We can only know the Law in terms of the different laws and norms appropriate to each of the modalities, and it is not clear at all how any kind of supra-modal knowledge of the Law

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424 See Chapter Three introduction.
425 Whether ‘rationalism’ is read as the overemphasis on the analytical modality, or on laws at the expense of factuality – or both.
can be attained.\textsuperscript{426}

Second, Vollenhoven’s conception of the Law might be read in ontic terms.\textsuperscript{427} The problem is that to describe the Law in these terms, where the Law is seen as ‘above’ the world, makes the Law an intermediary between God and the world. Such a rendering of Vollenhoven’s position compromises the directness of God’s engagement with the world.\textsuperscript{428} It displaces the role of the Son as mediator of creation, and the role of the Holy Spirit as the direct agent of God’s involvement in the day to day unfolding of his purposes. Moreover, the Law then becomes a ‘third thing’, neither sovereign nor subject, neither finite nor infinite – and, indeed, neither creator nor created.\textsuperscript{429} Up until 1932, Vollenhoven himself seems to suggest that the God’s sovereignty in willing the Law gives the latter an ontic status, and speaks indirectly of God’s relation to the cosmos as ‘firm ground’ (‘vaste grond’) or ‘substance’ (‘substantie’).\textsuperscript{430} But this was omitted from his syllabus of 1932, possibly because it could be seen as what he called ‘partial theism’, according an element of the created order divine or quasi-divine status.\textsuperscript{431}

\textsuperscript{426} This tendency is what Strauss calls Vollenhoven’s ‘quasi-monism’, concentrated as it is on the validity of the law, and creation’s subjection to it (Strauss, \textit{P. D. D}: 204-205; 448-449).

\textsuperscript{427} Vollenhoven, \textit{Logos en ratio; beider verhouding in de geschiedenis der westersche kentheorie} (26a): 31.

\textsuperscript{428} J. Glenn Friesen holds Vollenhoven to be claiming that God and the Law are somehow ‘outside’ the cosmos (Friesen, ‘Dooyeweerd versus Vollenhoven’: 110; see reply by Tol, \textit{Philosophy}: 407 (n. 446)). However, Vollenhoven is careful to point out that he is not claiming that God is outside the cosmos – if indeed it is possible to speak of God and the world in that way at all – only that all things are subject to God (Vollenhoven, ‘Significance, 1 (31g1)’: 392; Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 24-25).

\textsuperscript{429} Michael Morbey has argued that this is the situation with Vollenhoven or those influenced by Vollenhoven in this respect (Michael M. Morbey, ‘Vollenhoven, Dooyeweerd and Law – A Rejoinder’, \textit{Anakainosis} 4 (1981): 8-9). Nicholas Wolterstorff argues an analogous position with respect to uncreated universals, for which he is critiqued by Hendrik Hart (Nicholas Wolterstorff, \textit{On Universals} (1970); Hendrik Hart, ‘On the Distinction between Creator and Creature: Discussion of a Central Theme in N. Wolterstorff’s \textit{On Universals}’, \textit{P. R. 44} (1979)).

\textsuperscript{430} Vollenhoven, ‘Isagôgè Philosophiae Textkritische uitgave’: §§151-152 (1932), pp. 1369-1371; Vollenhoven, \textit{Isagôgè Philosophiae} (32); Tol, \textit{Philosophy}: 400 (n. 433). The relevant sections (§§151-152) were among those omitted (from §147 on) from the \textit{Isagôgè} of September 1932 (Vollenhoven, \textit{Isagôgè Philosophiae} (32) ), and the parallel sections in \textit{C. R. W.} (Vollenhoven, \textit{C.R.W.} (33a): 49-67).

\textsuperscript{431} See Vollenhoven, ‘The Significance of Calvinism for the Reformation of Philosophy, 2 & 3 (31g2)’, \textit{The Evangelical Quarterly} 4 (1932): 129-160, 398-427; Vollenhoven, \textit{C.R.W.} (33a): 73-199. After 1932 Vollenhoven quietly drops any description of the Law in terms of substance or firm ground, and thus implicitly ceases to accord the Law what might be regarded as a distinctive ontic status. The decisive turn in this regard is his deliberate omission of §§151 (latter section), 152 and 153 (beginning) from what he called ‘The provisional negative result’ (‘Het voorlopige negatieve resultaat’). The latter comprised §§147-164 excised from his \textit{Isagôgè} of 1932 and replaced by Part 1, Ch. 3 in the \textit{C. R. W.} (Vollenhoven, ‘Isagôgè Philosophiae Textkritische uitgave’: 370-371; Vollenhoven, \textit{Isagôgè Philosophiae} (32): 90 (published September 1932, which refers readers to C.R.W.). Vollenhoven, \textit{C.R.W.} (33a): 49-67; Tol, \textit{Philosophy}: 400 (n. 433)).
These two renderings thus cannot provide a satisfactory account of the place or nature of the Law and each gives rise to intractable theological and philosophical difficulties. However, a third rendering, distinct from both of these (although sometimes seemingly held in tandem with them), is possible. Rather than seeing the Law either as a supramodal form of knowledge (according to the noetic reading above) or as a supratemporal entity (according to the ontic reading), the Law needs to be seen in religious terms. ‘Religion’ for Vollenhoven in the orientation of the whole person towards God – this is what both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, following Kuyper, called the ‘heart’ in biblical terms. The heart can be God-directed or apostate, according to what Vollenhoven calls ‘[D]irection’. Vollenhoven sees Direction not as a feature of the created order itself, but rather, in the first instance, as humanity’s integral response to God’s sovereignty; more broadly, it is the relation of the created order as a whole towards, or away from, God. The Direction of the heart is expressed in terms of a worldview. The Christian worldview is an expression, in broad outline, of Christian religion.

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432 See 2.2.
433 Tol states that from 1939, Vollenhoven tends to drop the terminology of ‘biblical dualism’ of God and the world and emphasises instead God’s engagement with the world, impinging in and through the constitution of the world, summoning the appropriate human response in the choice between good and evil (Tol, ‘Foreword’: xxiii; see Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 40; Vollenhoven, ‘Historia Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)’: 4; Vollenhoven, ‘De waarheid in de godsdiens-wijzebegeerte (42l)’, Vox Theologica 13 (1942): 414; Vollenhoven, ‘Het geloof (50d)’; also see Kok, ‘Vollenhoven and “Scriptural Philosophy”’: 107, 110; and John H. Kok, ‘Vollenhoven and Thinking in the Light of Scripture’, Pro Rege 21 (1992): 12).
434 As mentioned in the last chapter (3.1 introduction), I shall spell distinguish between ‘Direction’, i.e., the basic religious orientation of human being, which I shall spell with a capital ‘D’; and ‘direction’ with ‘d’ in lower-case which, as we have seen (3.1.2) is a component of an ‘interrelation’ between or among two or more individuals (Vollenhoven, Isagôgè Philosophiae (32): §94***; Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§85-91, 139, pp. 56-61, 104-105; see Tol, ‘Time’: 107). Tol calls Direction a ‘holistic determination of a religious nature, affecting a human being’s concrete redemptive living’ (Tol, ‘Foreword’: xxix). Vollenhoven seems to have initially taken his notion of ‘[D]irection’ from Driesch’s notion of entelechy, although relating it to the ultimate relationship with God and although he is critical of the teleological (Aristotelian) character of Driesch’s conception. This was expressed in a lecture of 1929 published in 1930 (Vollenhoven, De Eerste vragen der psychologie. (30b) (1930): 20). In the 1931 Isagôgè, Vollenhoven says (§77) that this guidance (i.e., of the Holy Spirit) is not something of the creature. The determination of Direction is something other than the continuing in existence (‘bestaansverloop’) of that which is led. The following year he writes of the sharp opposition between good and evil which both resort under the ‘[D]irection of human life’ Isagôgè (1932-1939): §63 = Vollenhoven, Introduction: §92.
435 I.e., is not about the component make-up (‘Structure’; see 3.1 footnote).
436 Vollenhoven speaks in terms of a ‘world and life view’ (Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 78; Vollenhoven, ‘Kort overzicht (65b)’: 1; Wolters, ‘On the Idea of Worldview and its Relation to Philosophy’: 22, 25 (nn. 26, 27)). For ‘world and life view’ or ‘worldview’ see Chapter One introduction.
Christian religion is a response to God’s revelation of himself in Scripture in and through the person of Jesus Christ. Faith refers back to the other modalities and they in turn anticipate faith as its respective substrata. But even though faith (as we have seen, the ‘highest’ of the modalities for Vollenhoven) has a leading role with respect to the other modalities, the integrity and distinctiveness of each of the latter should be respected, and the faith modality opens up the other modalities analogically rather than prescriptively.

Moreover, a formal statement of faith, however correct, is not sufficient. As with Kuyper and Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven sees the process of regeneration (palingenesis) as the crucial one. It involves a turning around of the heart – it is effected directly by the Word of God as an effectual call (‘vocatio efficax’). Regeneration, or palingenesis, has the effect of redirecting the faith (‘pistical’) function to the Word of God as expressed in the preached Word, the prediction of Christ’s coming and the two-edged covenantal promise of grace and judgement.

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438 Faith (as governed by the norms appropriate to the ‘pistic’ or certitudinal modality) is not to be confused with underlying religious belief and involves the formulation of concepts which express certainty, typically theological or dogmatic statements (by ‘dogmatic’ is meant merely statements of one or other kind of certainty or conviction without any pejorative – or indeed approving, connotation). Religious belief, unlike faith concepts, cannot be subjected to theoretical scrutiny; and Scripture does not provide us with a ready-made theological system (Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 39-40; Vollenhoven, ‘Het biblicisme, special van Bengel e Oettinger (36c)’, C.V.C.W. 1 (1936): 12; Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§11-15, 125-136, pp. 112-113, 188-198; Vollenhoven, ‘Het geloof (50d)’: Vollenhoven, ‘Historia Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)’: 4; Vollenhoven, ‘Schriftegebruik en wijsbegeerte (53I)’ (1992); Vollenhoven, Gastscolleges: 215-222; Dooyeweerd, ‘Biblicisme en Schriuurlijke Wijsbegeerte’, C.V.C.W. 2 (1937) – Dooyeweerd quotes an extract from Vollenhoven’s article in Calvin Forum, 2, 7 (Feb. 1937), 148-149; see also Kok, ‘Vollenhoven and “Scriptural Philosophy”’: 110-111 and Kok, ‘Vollenhoven and Thinking in the Light of Scripture’: 14).

439 Vollenhoven, ‘Vollenhoven’s Laatste Werk’ (1973): 121. Vollenhoven affirms that the faith function is not lost with the fall, but is distorted and obscured like all other functions including reason (Vollenhoven, Logos en ratio: 32; Vollenhoven, ‘De waarheid in de godsdienst-wijsbegeerte (42I)’): 115; Vollenhoven, ‘Het geloof (50d)’; Vollenhoven, ‘Norm en natuurwet (51b)’: /5, pp. 62-63; see Kok, ‘Vollenhoven and “Scriptural Philosophy”’: 108-110; and Kok, ‘Vollenhoven and Thinking in the Light of Scripture’: 12-14).

440 The faith modality is the highest in that it directly anticipates the transcendent, and so leads all the other modalities. See the list of the modalities in Chapter Three introduction.

441 See Chapter One introduction, 2.2 and 4.2.2.

442 Introduction: §125, pp. 88-90. Vollenhoven clearly differentiates faith from regeneration (Kuyper’s palingenesis (see Chapter One introduction) in that following the Canons of Dordt (III-IV) there is a distinction between conversion (a matter of faith) and regeneration (a matter of the heart). The faith function plays a role in articulating this promise, although purely theoretical assent in terms appropriate to
This covenantal or religious commitment shapes one’s worldview, and provides the framework and context for one’s whole experience. Vollenhoven speaks of the covenantal relationship (‘unio foederalis’) between humanity and God. This covenantal relationship concerns the submission of the human creature to God as sovereign Creator and Lawgiver. Each human individual has a lifeline (‘levenslijn’) through time that he or she follows coram Deo, conversant with God’s Word and guided by the Holy Spirit. As we shall see, this sequential picture of the human response contrasts somewhat with that of Dooyeweerd. However, before turning to Dooyeweerd’s account, I shall briefly sum up Vollenhoven’s position.

4.1.3 The Sequential Character of Vollenhoven’s Account

We have seen how Vollenhoven portrays the triune work of God in the world as unfolding successively in three ‘States of Affairs’: first, the Father’s secret decrees; second, the Son’s revelation of those decrees; and, third, the Holy Spirit’s application of those decrees not only in turning the hearts of believers towards the Father, but also in working this out in every function of creaturely existence. Bringing this together with the discussion in this section, we see that this triune action needs to be received appropriately in human consciousness in ‘religious’ terms, and responded to in every area of life. We need, then, to read Vollenhoven in such a way as to see the Law not as a special kind of supra-modal knowledge, nor as an entity between God and creation, but as God’s covenantal relationship with us in the work of the three Persons. The Law (the triune action) appropriately elicits the response of the heart, its Direction, which is then expressed in the integrality of everyday experience as well as its ‘scientific’ expression as modally-specific analysis.

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the faith function is not a sufficient response to God’s covenantal call, nor yet an adequate expression of a covenantal relationship with God.

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See 4.2.
His account takes a complexly sequential form: through his identification of the three Persons in turn with each of the great acts of creation, redemption and transformation he sees the work of each of the Persons as successive and cumulative, rather than their acting together as Persons-in-relation. This reflects his emphasis of time as process, rather than order, and especially his notion of ‘lifelines’: individuals over time. I shall return to examine their full systematic implications of this in the final chapter.

Meanwhile, I now turn to the ways in which Dooyeweerd’s account is similar to, or differs from, that of Vollenhoven. We shall see to what extent they reflect the vision of Kuyper, as set out in Chapter One, and how that vision affects their general philosophical systematics. As we shall find, this is a question about which there is great contention – not least to do with Dooyeweerd’s notion of the ‘supra-temporal heart’.

4.2 Dooyeweerd: the Christian Ground-motive and the ‘Supra-Temporal Heart’

*Prima facie*, Dooyeweerd’s account of the religious orientation of a Christian philosophy differs sharply from that of Vollenhoven in certain crucial respects, not least concerning the question of the ‘supra-temporal heart’. Whilst accepting this, I shall argue that despite these divergences, there is an underlying convergence both about the centrality of the triune work of God and the need for this to be received, and worked out in every area of life by the person as a whole and undivided subject. This will make it possible to trace ways in which their respective positions are complementary with one another.

As I have done with Vollenhoven, so in the case of Dooyeweerd I shall look first at the religious basis itself (which Dooyeweerd couches in terms of ‘ground-motives’ – here the Christian ground-motive), and then at the human response, focussed on his account of the ‘supra-temporal’ heart.
4.2.1 The Trinitarian Basis of the Christian Religious Ground-motive

As with Vollenhoven, the transcendent orientation of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy arises from his vision of God’s work in the world. For Dooyeweerd this involves the articulation of what he came to call the Christian religious ‘ground-motive’. For Dooyeweerd a religious ground-motive is a basic driver of thought and action. The Christian religious ground-motive is contrasted with a number of other ground-motives such as the Greek ground-motive of form and matter, the medieval synthesis of nature and grace and the Western enlightenment ground-motive of nature and freedom. He formulates the Christian ground-motive in its most succinct form as ‘creation, fall, and redemption by Jesus Christ in the communion of the Holy Ghost’. Dooyeweerd’s formulation of the Christian ground-motive thus has a trinitarian structure, even though he does not draw attention to this as Vollenhoven does. In this section I shall examine this trinitarian structure in greater detail to see how adequate it is, in order in later chapters to see what the philosophical implications of the adequacy of this structure may be. I shall look at how it is unfolded through his account of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

First, with respect to the Father, Dooyeweerd tends to speak of ‘the Origin’ or ‘the Archè’, although he also refers to the ‘Father’ by name as well. The Father as Origin is the source of all meaning – ‘meaning’ for Dooyeweerd comes to be his way of

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448 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.472; Dooyeweerd, N.C: 1.61 (not in W.d.W.), 507; Dooyeweerd, ‘Philosophie et théologie’: 56; Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 134, 136; see Geertsema, ‘Transcendentale Openheid’: 50-54; with a response: Strauss, ‘Herbesinning oor die Sin-Karakter van die Werklikheid by H. Dooyeweerd’: 169-170. As we see, Dooyeweerd’s formulation of the Christian ground-motive makes use of theological terminology and concepts (the persons of the Trinity, creation, sin and Christian ground-motive redemption), and indeed is creedal in form (Dooyeweerd, ‘De vier religieuze grondthema’s’: 169; Dooyeweerd, N.C: 1.507). In the parallel place in W.d.W. (written prior to his elaboration of his notion of the ground-motives), under ‘grundmotief’, Dooyeweerd merely speaks of the struggle between the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of Darkness (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.472 (‘Duisternis’)). Although Dooyeweerd distinguishes between religion and faith, he still accords the faith aspect a special role in the articulation of a Christian worldview (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.227-259; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.298-330), as does Vollenhoven (see 4.1.2).

expressing creaturely dependence upon the Origin.450 Humanity is the high point of God’s creation, created as ‘image-bearer of his divine Origin’.451 All God’s work of creation is concentrated in humanity as the *imago Dei* – the image of God.452 Dooyeweerd thus pictures redeemed humanity’s loving dependence on the Father of Jesus, just as children in a family experience their dependence on their parents.453

Second, with respect to the Son: just as the Father is the Origin and the Archè of creation, so Dooyeweerd sees the Son as its Redeemer. It remains unclear, however, to what extent the Son can be seen as co-creator (as in the Kuyperian vision). Unlike Kuyper, Dooyeweerd does not clearly articulate the role of the Son as the mediator of creation *per se*, that is, prior to the fall and redemption. He tends to portray Christ’s involvement in creation as redemptive and revelatory, as a *post facto* and subordinate one, rather than one exercised jointly from the beginning with the Father.454 Through

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450 Dooyeweerd, *Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer*; 99-100 (n. 101); Dooyeweerd, *Crisis in Humanist Political Theory*: 84-85; Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.6, 12; 2.19-22; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.4, 10, 73 (n. 1, not in W.d.W.); 2: 22-25.
452 Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvijn als Bouwer 2’.
454 See 1.2. On occasion, Dooyeweerd does speak of the Son as the ‘creating Word, through which all things were made’ (Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning*: 36 (‘scheppend Woord, waardoor alle dingen geschapen zijn’)); Dooyeweerd, *Roots*: 37) but then he seems to overlook the role of Christ as the creating Word (which he has just himself mentioned) when he states: ‘if one tried to conceive of common grace apart from Christ by attributing it to exclusively to God (i.e., the Father) as creator, then one drives a wedge in the Christian ground-motive between *creation* and *redemption*’ (Dooyeweerd, *Roots*: 37; Dooyeweerd, *Vernieuwing en Bezinning*: 37 (‘Want zodra ge de gemene gratie los van de Christus poogt te vatten en haar uitsluitend op God als Schepper terugvoert, drijft ge een wig in het grondmotief der christelijke religie tussen schepping en verlossing . . .’)). Elsewhere, the Son is called the ‘new religious root of the temporal cosmos’ (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1:471 (‘den tijd transcendeerende religieuse wortel der schepping’); Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1:506). However, once again, is not clear whether Dooyeweerd conceives of Christ in this respect as the mediator of creation (as the wording of the *W.d.W.* would indicate) or as the redeemer of humanity (as the ‘new’ in *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought* would seem to indicate), although the location of both creation and redemption in supra-temporality tends in Dooyeweerd to a conflation of these two roles (see D.F.M. Strauss, ‘The Central Religious Community of Mankind in the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea’, *P.R.* 37 (1972): 58-67). On the whole he tends to see the Son in purely redemptive terms as distinct from ‘God’ as creator (Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1:32-33 (not in N.C.), 54 (not in N.C.), 64-67, 70-72, 86-87; 2:420-421, 424, 471, 482-484, 491-497, 503-508, 527; 2:30, 493; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1:99-102, 105-106, 123-124, 2:32, 485-486, 489-490, 552-554, 560-565, 571-575, 593; Dooyeweerd, ‘De wetsbeschouwing in Brunner’: 370, 372; Dooyeweerd, *Criteria*: 227). There is some force to David VanDrunen’s contention that Dooyeweerd grounds common grace not (as with Kuyper), in the Son’s mediatorship over creation (see 1.2) but in his role as redeemer (David VanDrunen, *Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms*: 360-362; see also Jacob Klapwijk, ‘Antithesis and Common Grace’ (1991): 183). However, in warning about the conflation of creation with redemption, VanDrunen falls into the opposite error of dividing the Person of the Son and by ignoring the continuity of the latter’s role as the creating
Christ we are directed to the true Origin of all things, the Creator of heaven and earth. In Christ, the root of life is renewed, not just with respect to the individual human being, but also the whole of creation, which Dooyeweerd sees as concentrated in humanity.

By belonging to Christ, the Christian becomes engaged in a struggle with those tendencies which absolutise one or other aspect of the temporal order and which redirect it away from God, the Father as Origin. Following Kuyper, Dooyeweerd suggests that through common grace the distortion of sin can be sufficiently corrected not only to make everyday life possible, but also to allow for the development of science, culture and general prosperity. The opening-process under the influence of apostate ground-motives has an ‘inter-modal disharmony’ resulting from the absolutisation of one law-sphere at the expense of others. He states that the opening-process needs to be guided by faith in Christ, in Whom alone is the ‘consummation of meaning’. The opening process is set against the struggle between the Civitas Dei, that is to say, God’s rule in the hearts of redeemed humanity, and the Civitas Terrena, the dominance of apostate human tendencies which culminates in the ‘definitive victory’ of Christ’s Kingdom.

Thus for Dooyeweerd the Son tends to play an intermediate role: in the first instance between the Father as Origin and fallen humanity, and then as head of redeemed humanity, bringing humanity – and with humanity the whole of the cosmos – back to the Father.

Third, there is the role of the Holy Spirit. For Dooyeweerd, the Holy Spirit transforms the hearts of redeemed humanity it to the pattern of the Son, as they are directed to the Logos with that as the redeeming Christ, and indeed, in the triune work of the transformation of all creation.

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456 Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvijn als Bouwer 2’.
460 Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap ‘Inleiding’; 108 (‘definitieve overwinning’). As mentioned earlier (1.1) these are terms employed by Augustine of Hippo (354-430) in his great work describing God’s work through history especially with respect to the Roman Empire. Dooyeweerd is critical of Augustine for not adequately, in his view, distinguishing ‘the kingdom of Christ in the hearts of men’ (which is how Dooyeweerd understands the Civitas Terrena) from the temporal Church institution (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 3.452; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.510).
Father in inner rebirth. As distinct from Kuyper and Vollenhoven, he sees the work of
the Holy Spirit as an almost entirely interior one, rather than in the cosmos at large,
although he recognises that the effects of the work of the Holy Spirit, through its effect
on human action, can have wider significance than merely for the human heart. It is
through the power of the Holy Spirit and through the dynamic of prayer that the battle
needs to be waged against the spirit of apostasy in human culture as a whole and in
modern Western culture in particular. The biblical ground-motive can be embraced and
worked through in every area of life by building up a community which gives this
corporate expression. Nevertheless, because it is largely confined to the hearts of
redeemed humanity, Dooyeweerd tends to portray the work of the Holy Spirit in the
world as indirect and posterior to both the work of original creation and that of
redemption. As the work of Christ is portrayed as subsidiary to that of the Father, so the
work of the Holy Spirit is portrayed as subsidiary to that of the Son.

So, for Dooyeweerd there is a vision of the unfolding of God’s purposes for humanity,
descending from the Father as Origin, via the Son as Word or Christ to the hearts of
redeemed humanity, in communion with the work of the Holy Spirit.

4.2.2 The ‘Supra-Temporal Heart’

For Dooyeweerd, like Vollenhoven, the response to the triune work of God is
concentrated in the ‘heart’. Like Vollenhoven, he holds the heart to be the centre of
human existence as seen from a biblical perspective. Unlike Vollenhoven, however, he
presents an account of the heart in ‘supra-temporal’ terms. This matter is not
straightforward, and in his overall thinking it is far from clear what he means by it. I
shall consider three possible renderings of his position. At times he seems to argue for
each of these three renderings, and indeed at times seems to want to hold them all
together. I shall show that while he tends to conflate these three renderings, it is possible
to distinguish them – though not in such a way that one rendering can be hermetically

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462 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.61, 175, 507 (none in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, ‘Van Peursen’s critische vragen bij A New Critique of Theoretical Thought’: 103; Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 186-189; Geertsema, ‘Transcendentale Openheid’: 51.
463 Dooyeweerd, R. & S 2: 5; Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning: 11; Dooyeweerd, Roots: 12; Dooyeweerd, The Secularization of Science: 4.
sealed from another. Furthermore, it is impossible to state the question of the nature of the ‘heart’ neutrally, since each rendering of the question involves a commitment to one or other interpretation of what he means by the ‘heart’ or ‘supra-temporal heart’, and implies a judgement on the adequacy of that rendering. What all these renderings of his position have in common, however, is that the ‘heart’ is central to humanity’s reception of God’s engagement with the world, and the consequent transcendent orientation of humanity’s stance vis-à-vis the world.464

The first rendering of Dooyeweerd’s position sees his understanding of the ‘heart’ in noetic terms. According to this view, the heart is a ‘supra-theoretical’ (‘boven-theoretisch’) viewpoint: an ‘Archimedean’ point ‘above’ the diversity of the modalities from which the inter-relations between the different modalities (their anticipations and retrocipations) can be viewed. He approaches this position with the argument that by its nature philosophical thought attempts to grasp the totality of human experience as refracted according to the different, mutually irreducible, modalities. But, as we have seen,465 this cannot be done in terms of any one of the modalities without falling into one form of reductive distortion or another. The notion of a knowing subject to which all knowledge can be presented is a chimera: such a subject cannot find its own unity and is relationally bound with the very subject matter (the Gegenstand) which it seeks to grasp.466 What is needed, therefore, is an ‘Archimedean point’467 which is not itself defined or definable in terms of any of the modalities, but can be found ‘above’ the diversity of the modalities from which the inter-relations between the different modalities (their anticipations and retrocipations) can be viewed.468 From this

464 In my presentation of the three renderings, as with my presentation of the renderings of Vollenhoven’s account of the Law in the previous section, I am not claiming that Dooyeweerd moved consciously from one to the other. There is a rough correlation between the first rendering and Dooyeweerd’s ‘First Way’ of his transcendent critique, and between the second and the ‘Second Way’ (see 2.2). However, Dooyeweerd never fully discards any of the renderings, and seems to hold them, and articulate them, in tandem (see 2.2; and also Kraay, ‘Successive 1’ and ‘… 2’).
465 Chapter Three introduction.
466 See 2.2.
467 See 2.2.
468 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.59 (not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, ‘Der Idee der Individualiteits-structuur 3’: 34 (not in R. & S. 3). Roy Clouser suggests that the supra-temporal heart is a standpoint required in order to grasp the diversity of the world in a non-reductive way through ‘belief’, i.e., non-reductive assent (Clouser, Myth 2nd ed.: 180-182, 271, 283, 356-357). This is also a position which has also been argued for in the past by D.F.M. Strauss (Strauss, ‘Central religious community’: 61), although in his more recent thinking Strauss has indicated implicitly that he now holds definitively to the third rendering (which I shall set out below).
Archimedean point, the temporal diversity of the created order can be surveyed.\(^{469}\) So runs Dooyeweerd’s argument. But it runs into serious problems. If the heart is seen as rising above modal diversity (for example, the modalities of faith, morality, or law), then, at least noetically, it is free of the laws and norms of the modal order.\(^{470}\) This contravenes Calvin’s dictum: ‘Deus solus legibus solutus est’.\(^{471}\) In defence of this position it might be argued that while the heart is free of the norms and laws appropriate to the modalities, it is still subject to the central religious law of love.\(^{472}\) But Dooyeweerd then creates further difficulties by maintaining that the underlying religious beliefs are beyond description and not subject to analysis. For him, the heart, and the religious belief located in the heart, are ‘above’ all modally-differentiated expression.\(^{473}\) But this leaves unanswered the objection that since this law of love, and the heart as Archimedean point, cannot be known or expressed, all that remains is an inexpressible mystical aspiration. By claiming that this reflects a divine perspective, this is at best untestable, and, at worst, in danger of being seen as making quasi-divine claims for the human consciousness (albeit the human consciousness redeemed in Christ).\(^{474}\) The problems with seeing the ‘heart’ in purely noetic terms leads one to the second rendering, that of seeing the heart in terms which are not a matter merely of making claims about the possibilities of human knowledge, but about the nature of the ‘heart’ itself.

The second rendering of Dooyeweerd’s position, then, is the claim that the heart is a


\(^{470}\) There is a certain similarity to the ‘Oration on the Dignity of Man’ by Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494): ‘… the Supreme Maker … spoke to [humanity]: “… I have placed you at the very centre of the world, so that from that vantage point you may with greater ease glance round about you on all that the world contains.” ’ (J.B. Ross and M.M. McLaughlin, eds., *The Portable Renaissance Reader* (1977) quoted in King, *Secularism: The Hidden Origins of Disbelief*: 238).

\(^{471}\) See 1.2. Indeed, Vollenhoven rejects an anthropology which places part of the human being above God’s Law (Vollenhoven, *Introduction*: §182, p. 129).

\(^{472}\) Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*, 2.98-100; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*, 2.141-144 (not in *W.d.W.*); 3: 71. This can be argued that it a question of freeing humanity truly to the *imago Dei* (C.P. Cronjé, ‘Eerste gedagtes rondom Dooyeweerd se etiek (liefdesleer)’, *Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap* 16 (1980): 73-74).

\(^{473}\) Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*, 1.69-70; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*, 1.57-8,104; Dooyeweerd, ‘De taak ener wisgerige anthropologie en de doorlopende vegen to wisgerige zelfkennis’, *P.R.* 26 (1961): 43; Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*: 181; see Fernhout, ‘Man, faith and religion’: 76.

supra-temporal entity. Both Peter Steen (critically) and J. Glen Friesen (in advocacy) argue that Dooyeweerd conceives of the supra-temporal heart in ontic terms.⁴⁷⁵ According to this rendering, Dooyeweerd sees humanity as bearing the image of God in an intermediary role between God and the rest of the created order.⁴⁷⁶ In order to have this intermediary role, the ‘heart’ has somehow to be ‘above’ the temporal order, i.e., have a time-transcending status.⁴⁷⁷ Moreover, unlike Vollenhoven, Dooyeweerd views the Christian hope, the eschaton, not as something anticipated in the future, but as the eternal destiny revealed in the present. It is the intensification, indeed the transcending, of temporal experience.⁴⁷⁸ However, his use of the term ‘eternity’ with the sense of ‘supra-temporality’ is contestable, as are the claims he makes about the


⁴⁷⁶ Dooyeweerd’s reply to Cornelius Van Til in Jerusalem and Athens (pp. 87-89) quoted in Clouser, Myth 2nd edn.: 363-364 (n. 334)).


⁴⁷⁸ Dooyeweerd rejects the tendency of those theologians who ‘identify the eschatological aspect of time with the historical and reject the supra-temporal sphere of human existence and of divine revelation’ (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.33 (not in W.d.W.).)
‘supra-temporal’ heart on the basis of this interpretation. In particular, it can be argued that the Hebrew term ‘olam’, the Greek term ‘αἰών’, and the Latin term ‘aevum’ should be read not as eternity in the sense of ‘a-temporality’ or ‘supra-temporality’, but in the sense of ‘age’. There is a danger of falling back into that dualism in which the heart occupies a position ‘above’ the diversity of the temporal order. In locating the heart at a ‘supra-temporal’ remove from human experience, Dooyeweerd presents us with a conception of a de-historicised human person, bearing none of the characteristics that makes each individual uniquely him or herself. Most significantly of all, the

479 ‘God has put eternity [ha olam] in the hearts [of humanity]’ (Eccl. 3: 11), and ‘out of the heart are all the issues of life’ (Prov. 4: 23) are favourites of Dooyeweerd’s (see Dooyeweerd, W.d.W: 1.80; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.298; Dooyeweerd, ‘Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.’ 181; Dooyeweerd, ‘De leer van de mensch in de W.d.W.’ 182; Dooyeweerd, Theory of man: 22; Dooyeweerd, ‘Schepping en evolutie (bespreking van J. Lever, Creatie en evolutie)’: 34, 116-117 (nn. 112-113); Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap ‘Inleiding’: 102; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 174). However, these biblical texts can be read in religious, i.e., in terms of the heart’s Direction, rather than in ontic or noetic terms. Indeed, Dooyeweerd himself makes it clear that what he is referring to is not ‘an invisible, substantial form or an abstract complex of functions’ (Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning: 35 (‘een “onzichtbare” vorm-substantie met een abstract complex van gevoels- en denkfuncties’); Dooyeweerd, Roots: 35).


482 Steen indicates that the notion of supra-temporality was rejected by C. A. van Peursen, J. M. Spier, Hendrik van Riessen, S. U. Zuidema and K. J. Popma (Steen, Structure: 7, 13, 24, 30, 126, 154). The notion of the supra-temporal heart has also been rejected by James Olthuis as dualistic (James Olthuis, ‘Dooyeweerd on Religion and Faith’ (1985); 21, 33, 34), as also by C. T. McIntire (John Bolt, ‘The Legacy of Herman Dooyeweerd’ in Calvin Theological Journal (1986): 88), and Hendrik Hart (Hendrik Hart, ‘Problems of Time: An Essay’, P.R. 38 (1973)) and by Hendrik Geertsena on the grounds that it is ‘anthropocentric’ (Geertsena, ‘Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique’: 93, 97; see also Hendrik G. Geertsena, Comments on Friesen’s 95 theses on Herman Dooyeweerd’, P.R. 74 (2009); Gerrit Glas, ‘Ego, Self and the Body. An Assessment of Dooyeweerd’s Philosophical Anthropology’ (1995); Gerrit Glas, ‘Is Dooyeweerd a Panentheist? – Comments on Friesen’s “95 Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd”’, P.R. 74 (2009)). Hendrik Hart speaks of a threatening dualism here – or rather a new dualism, since no sooner is one dualism (that between those things qualified by the faith modality and the rest) ejected from the front door that another (that between the modal and the supra-modal) comes in through the back door (Hart, ‘Time’; Fernhout, ‘Man, faith and religion’ (74). As Gerrit Glas points out, further, there is a danger of this religious unity being considered as one between centre and periphery (Glas, ‘Ego, Self and the Body’: 74-76; see also Steen, Structure: 130-230; and James W. Skillen and Rockne McCarthy, ed., Political order and the plural structure of society (1991): 328).

483 Glas, ‘Ego, Self and the Body’: 75-76. Vollenhoven sees Dooyeweerd as still operating within a dualistic anthropological framework in which, as Vollenhoven describes it, the heart is ‘higher’ than the ‘lower’ mantle of diverse modal functions of which it is the concentration point (Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de tijd (63b): 184; Vollenhoven, ‘The Consequential Problem-Historical Method’: 9, p. 104; Bril and Boonstra, ed., S. Kaarten: 279). Vollenhoven rejects what he takes to be Dooyeweerd’s conception of the heart as the ‘supra-temporal concentration point’ (‘Studieconferentie 1943’: 32-34; Vollenhoven, Divergentierapport I (53): 115-117; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de tijd (63b): 187; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’: 203-205; see Bril, ed., Laatste: 105-106;
directness of the relationship of creation as a whole with the Son as Logos, and with the primally nurturing Spirit, tends to be obscured in the face of his strong emphasis on the supra-temporal heart, even the redeemed human heart as it is found in Christ. 483 Humanity is not to be detached from its creational context, otherwise the directness of God’s dealings with human being as whole persons, as well as with the rest of creation, is attenuated. It is more helpful, therefore, to see the heart not as an entity between God and wider creation, but rather as the orientation of humanity, fully located in the temporality of the created order, towards God. This is the third rendering to which I now turn.

The third rendering of Dooyeweerd’s position is one which he himself enunciates as a clarification if not a revision of his previous positions. The heart is not supra-temporal knowledge, nor an entity, but rather the orientation of the whole person towards or away from God. It is ‘supra-temporal’ not by virtue of special knowledge, or because it exists somehow above time. The ‘hearts’ of humanity – that is, each member of humanity considered as a whole person – are created to be relationship with God; God alone is above all time. 484 In this sense the heart needs to be seen in religious rather than


484 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.88 (not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, ‘Schepping en evolutie (bespreking van J. Lever, Creatie en evolutie)’: 116. Dooyeweerd describes how the Origin or Archè is encountered and how the heart comes to rest in it (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.61, 63 (neither in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 172 (Dooyeweerd refers to Calvin, Institutes: 1.1.1); Dooyeweerd, ‘Het Oecumenisch-Reformatorisch Grondmotief van de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee en de Grondslag der Vrije Universiteit’: 8). Dooyeweerd’s account here resonates with Augustine’s famous declaration: ‘… Thou madest us for Thyself, and our heart is restless, until it repose in Thee’ (Augustine, The Confessions of St Augustine (1907): 1.1.1, p. 1; see Steen, Structure: 60). Strauss argues that Dooyeweerd in 1960 should be read as claiming not that it is the central human consciousness which transcends time, only the Direction of that consciousness (Dooyeweerd, ‘Van Peursen’s critische vragen bij A New Critique of Theoretical Thought’): 137; Strauss, P.D.D.: 207-208). Jacob Klapwijk argues for a reconciling formula in the Dooyeweerd-Vollenhoven controversy in the notion of a ‘ek-centric’ religious anthropology (Klapwijk, ‘Reformational Philosophy’: 118-122). Hendrik Geertsema has suggested that the Reformational stance should not be focused on the heart as a supra-temporal centre, but on the response by humanity to God’s call (Hendrik G. Geertsema, ‘Homo Respondens. On the Historical Nature of Human Reason’, P.R. 58 (1993); Hendrik G. Geertsema, ‘The Inner Reformation of Philosophy and Science and the Dialogue of Christian Faith with a Secular Culture: A Critical Assessment of Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique of Theoretical
in noetic or ontic terms. It is in the heart that humanity receives its basic religious orientation or Direction. Direction for Dooyeweerd, as for Vollenhoven, is that which underlies the expression of belief in human life and thought, in and through time. This can be seen in the way this Direction works out in human life.

There are two ‘main springs’ that operate in human hearts, which orientate the whole person religiously. The first is the dynamic of the Holy Spirit re-directing creation, through Christ, to the Father as true Origin. The second is the spirit of apostasy in the human heart from the true God. The apostate main spring cannot itself provide anything new but only distort creational reality according to the ‘law of sin’: the religious misdirection of the human heart towards a pretended rather than the true Origin. This involves the idolising absolutisation of an aspect, or combinations of aspects, of the created order. Since for Dooyeweerd, the whole of created reality is refracted through the human heart, for him the fall of humanity thus involves the diremption of the cosmos as a whole. These two main springs are located in the ‘central sphere of occurrence’ – the unfolding of humanity’s response to God in the struggle between the

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485 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.65. (‘uitgewischt’); Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.100; Dooyeweerd, ‘Van Peursen’s critische vragen bij A New Critique of Theoretical Thought’: 103; Steen, Structure: 80-81. Steen argues that sin for Dooyeweerd involves a loss of meaning, and since meaning is basis of the existence of the cosmos for Dooyeweerd (in contrast to the Being of God) this involves a privation of its very existence (Dooyeweerd, ‘Van Peursen’s critische vragen bij A New Critique of Theoretical Thought’: 103; Steen, Structure: 80-81). See the discussion about ‘Being’ and ‘meaning’ in 2.2 and 5.2.1.

486 In Der Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (but not in A New Critique) he states: ‘Our cosmos fell in Adam; all the additional creatures in one’s world order were cursed in Adam. According to Scripture!’ (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.65 (‘Onze kosmos viel in Adam: al het in onezen wereldsamenhang gevoegde schepsel werd in Adam vervloekt. Naar de Schriften!’); see also Dooyeweerd, ‘Juridisch causaliteitsprobleem (A.R.S.)’: 26; Dooyeweerd, ‘De transcendentale critic van het wijsgerig denken ... Avondland’: 11; Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvijn als Bouwer 2’).


488 Dooyeweerd, Encyclopaedia Introduction: 45; Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning: 29; Dooyeweerd, Roots: 29. Whether Dooyeweerd moved to hold this third (religious) position and abandoned the first two has been contested (Friesen, ‘Why did Dooyeweerd Want to Tear out his Hair?’).

489 Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap ‘Inleiding’: 21 (n. 22); Dooyeweerd, Encyclopaedia Introduction: 44 (n. 41).


486 Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 45; Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning: 29; Dooyeweerd, Roots: 29. Whether Dooyeweerd moved to hold this third (religious) position and abandoned the first two has been contested (Friesen, ‘Why did Dooyeweerd Want to Tear out his Hair?’).

487 Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap ‘Inleiding’: 21 (n. 22); Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 44 (n. 41).

488 Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 137. There is a certain ambiguity in Dooyeweerd’s position because he also states the fall means that the image of God was ‘wiped out’ (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.64-65; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.100; Dooyeweerd, ‘Van Peursen’s critische vragen bij A New Critique of Theoretical Thought’: 103; Steen, Structure: 80-81). Steen argues that sin for Dooyeweerd involves a loss of meaning, and since meaning is basis of the existence of the cosmos for Dooyeweerd (in contrast to the Being of God) this involves a privation of its very existence (Dooyeweerd, ‘Van Peursen’s critische vragen bij A New Critique of Theoretical Thought’: 103; Steen, Structure: 80-81). See the discussion about ‘Being’ and ‘meaning’ in 2.2 and 5.2.1.

489 In Der Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (but not in A New Critique) he states: ‘Our cosmos fell in Adam; all the additional creatures in one’s world order were cursed in Adam. According to Scripture!’ (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.65 (‘Onze kosmos viel in Adam: al het in onezen wereldsamenhang gevoegde schepsel werd in Adam vervloekt. Naar de Schriften!’); see also Dooyeweerd, ‘Juridisch causaliteitsprobleem (A.R.S.)’: 26; Dooyeweerd, ‘De transcendentale critic van het wijsgerig denken ... Avondland’: 11; Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvijn als Bouwer 2’).
'civitas Dei' and the 'civitas terrena', which as Dooyeweerd puts it: ‘takes its issue in the history of the world’.\(^{490}\)

There is then, for Dooyeweerd, a need for the redemption of human consciousness within the temporal process of human experience, as a concentration point which unifies the diversity of that experience.\(^{491}\) Because it is only in Christ that the true connection with the Origin is possible, it is only through ‘religious self-reflection on one’s part with Christ’ that one can discern the true and irreducible diversity of the created order, refracted into the diverse modalities.\(^{492}\) This diversity of meaning relates to the central unity of divine law revealed by Christ: to love God and one’s neighbour.\(^{493}\) This is not an escape from temporality, but a call to bring about a ‘concrete community of love’ through right relationships with one’s neighbour.\(^{494}\) So for the human being to be considered in religious terms, he or she cannot be removed from their context, because that would make the community necessary for the human being to be considered in those religious terms, impossible. But not only is temporality necessary for the community which makes religion possible, it is also necessary for human beings themselves to be considered as whole persons. This requires an account of human character.

\(^{490}\) Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.32 (Dooyeweerd’s italics), 57 (neither in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 172. Accordingly, the Structure (see 3.1 footnote) of creation is itself unaffected by the fall (i.e., no aspect of it is lost—the fall is not metaphysical but religious, i.e., not a change in the elements of the created order, only in their orientation), even though the different elements are now comprehensively subject to the misdirection brought about by sin and evil though the distortion and marring of the relationship with the absolute Origin (see Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 44 (n. 41)). Religion does not add any new aspect to reality but is the relationship with the absolute Origin (Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 44 (n. 41); see Calvin, Institutes: 1.1.1). As Strauss points out, the religious sphere is the central concentration of those structures, and is not to be confused with any of those structures themselves. It is also what both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven call ‘[D]irection’ (Strauss, P.D.D.: 196-197, 640; see 4.1.2).

\(^{491}\) Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.175; 2.52-53 (both not in W.d.W.); Fernhout, ‘Man, faith and religion’: 75.

\(^{492}\) Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.421 (‘de religieuze zelfbezinning op ons deelhebben aan Christus’); Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.487. In the latter, Dooyeweerd refers to John 13.8, presumably comparing true knowledge in this respect with the participation of Peter and the other disciples in Christ. See also Dooyeweerd, ‘De leer van de mensch in de W.d.W.’: VI; Dooyeweerd, Theory of man: VI; Fernhout, ‘Man, faith and religion’: 77.


\(^{494}\) Dooyeweerd, ‘De wetsbeschouwing in Brunner’: 341-342 (‘concrete liefdesgemeenschap’). Here Dooyeweerd contrasts this with Brunner’s antithesis of the eternal command of God and the ordinances of law as they are found in the pluriformity of one’s temporal experience.
For Dooyeweerd, human character is the expression of human individuality over time through concrete acts. These acts integrally involve the whole gamut of the modalities, from quantity through the physical, biotic and sensory modalities to that of faith – this bottom up order should not obscure that it is faith which is the leading modality in this process.  

Dooyeweerd speaks of the ‘genetic process of human life’, where genetic, as with Vollenhoven, means the sheer process of becoming. This involves the process of the actualization of ‘potentialities already present in the structural principle of human bodily existence’. In order to account for this ‘structural principle of human existence’, we need to draw on the notion of ‘enkapsis’ which as we have seen, Dooyeweerd came to enunciate in his later thought. For Dooyeweerd, the ‘structural principle of human existence’ is what he calls an ‘enkaptic interlacement’ of a series of individuality structures, with each providing the foundation for the next. First, there is the structure comprising the chemicals which make up the human body; second, the biotic structure of the body; third the interlacement of the psychic structure with these other structures; and finally, what Dooyeweerd calls the ‘act structure’. This last, the exercise of normative intentionality, is bound together with all the others. Each structure is successively bound, ‘morphologically’, by the higher one; thus human bodiliness, although it has no one modally qualified feature, can be bound by the act structure. 

This view of the human person leaves no room for the human person to have a viewpoint separate from that of the interlaced physical, biological, psychic and ‘act’ (normative) structures which constitute the human being as an ‘enkaptic structural whole’, nor indeed for the positing of an entity somehow linked to but separate from that whole – but is consonant with a conception of the human being seen as a religiously oriented individual. In other words, the integrated anthropology so described is better consonant with the third rendering of the heart described above than the other two

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495 Dooyeweerd, ‘De leer van de mensch in de W.d.W.’ XXVI; Dooyeweerd, Theory of man: XX. Dooyeweerd rejects any notion of incorporeal acts. He states that outside of the body, no acts are possible (Dooyeweerd, ‘De leer van de mensch in de W.d.W.’ XX; Dooyeweerd, Theory of man: XX).
496 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.78 (not in W.d.W.).
497 See 2.2.
498 See 3.2.4 – the type of enkapsis here is ‘foundational’ or ‘internal’ enkapsis, which I shall later argue can only be accommodated by what I shall call the ‘descriptive view’ of individuals over time (see 6.2.1)
renderings. Moreover, the religious character of the human being can only be worked out temporally: *palingenesis*, implies, if not a sudden conversion experience, at least the unfolding of the effects of the Spirit’s work in the life of the person concerned and the transformation of his or her character.\(^{500}\) Noetic or ontic supra-temporality cannot do justice to this sense of the transformation of human character in and through time, but supra-temporality considered as the Direction of the heart makes perfect sense in this regard.

Thus, Dooyeweerd’s account of the heart is not to be seen as the exercise of supra-temporal knowledge, or as an entity over and above human temporality. Rather, it is the locus of the Direction of the whole human person towards or away from God. The heart’s Direction, in other words, is the deepest and basic orientation of humanity: God calls each human being in the depth of who they are, in the midst of life, and in the living community of faith. Instead of seeking to provide a God’s eye view, or claiming a supra-temporal status, as a finite human creature all one can do is to encounter the Triune God through the transcendent revelation of Scripture and the inner working of the Holy Spirit as these are accommodated to the conditions of experience, including that of time. Understood in this way, Dooyeweerd’s account of the heart is not necessarily incompatible with that of Vollenhoven. The main difference is that of emphasis: rather than Vollenhoven’s account of the sequential unfolding of God’s Law and the covenantal response to which humanity is called in response, Dooyeweerd’s account of God’s self-revelation and humanity’s response is structured in a more hierarchical way.

I shall now sum up Dooyeweerd’s account of the religious basis or transcendent orientation for a Christian philosophy.

4.2.3 The Hierarchical Structure of Dooyeweerd’s Account

In his account of the Christian ground-Idea Dooyeweerd emphasises the role of the Father as Origin, mediated by the Son (seen as redeemer more than co-creator), with the

\(^{500}\) See Chapter One introduction.
work of the Holy Spirit largely confined to human hearts.\textsuperscript{501} Combined with his
tendency to portray the ‘heart’ as ‘supra-temporal’, this gives his account a strongly
hierarchical structure, with temporal diversity at the base. However, there may be more
common ground with Vollenhoven’s account of the heart than is often asserted; as I
have argued above, the heart should not be understood in noetic or ontic terms, but like
Vollenhoven, in religious terms, in terms of Direction. I shall review both in the light of
the trinitarian vision of Kuyper.

4.3 The Triune Economy and the Direction of the Heart

In this chapter we have seen how Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd each set out a Christian
vision of the world, providing an account both of God’s triune work in the world and of
human receptivity to that work. In this respect they follow Kuyper and reflect his vision.
However, at least \textit{prima facie}, their accounts differ structurally, both from one another
and from Kuyper.

Kuyper’s vision is that of the covenant among the three Persons as the basis for the
creation, redemption and transformation of the world. Unlike Vollenhoven, this does
not view the unfolding of the role of the three Persons as sequential, or even complexly
sequential; nor is it to be understood primarily in hierarchal terms, as Dooyeweerd does
with the Father as Origin at the top, via the Son through to the work of the Holy Spirit.
In Kuyper’s view, although there is a certain sequence and hierarchy in the work of the
three Persons, they are \textit{primarily} joint, but distinct, agents in the work of creation,
redemption and transformation, bound by love among the Persons which is the sole
ground for their common work. Thus, the world needs to be seen, to use John Calvin’s
expression, as the ‘\textit{theatrum dei gloriae}’ (the theatre of God’s glory).\textsuperscript{502} The world is
not the extension of God’s being, but it reflects and bears the impress of God’s Triune
action, in its creation, redemption and transformation and indeed, God’s presence in and
through his incarnate Son. Thus human beings, as the Triune image-bearers, are

\textsuperscript{501} See 2.2.1.
\textsuperscript{502} To take Calvin’s phrase (Calvin, \textit{Institutes}: 1.6.2, 1.14.12, 12.16.11, 13.19.12; see
Schreiner, \textit{Theatre}).
dramatis personae in this great task as they are called to present the whole of who they are, and to have their minds transformed in their world-and-life-view and philosophy, not as an optional extra, but as their appropriate service to their Lord. This does not reflect or argue for the explicit knowledge of God as Trinity as revealed in Scripture, although it can do; it rather suggests the response to the work of God as Trinity – a response which is common to all humanity, albeit suppressed and inchoate, an implicit 'sensus trinitatis'. Both philosophers implicitly recognise this sensus trinitatis in the way they both structure their respective accounts of the God’s self-revelation and the human response. Neither Vollenhoven nor Dooyeweerd (despite his disclaimers) avoid speaking of God in trinitarian terms as the basis of a Christian philosophy. The question is not whether reformational philosophy should have a trinitarian basis, but whether the specific account of that trinitarian basis is adequate both with respect to scriptural revelation and reflection, and to the shape of the philosophical reflection which ensues.

The alternative to a trinitarian approach would be a default via negativa, i.e. a view of God as essentially unknowable. However, this does not solve any of the problems about speaking of God – it essentially smuggles in a monadic deity through the back door, for example in talk of God as ‘originating essence’ or the like. This is to fall back into a substantialist conception of God. Moreover, there is no final via negativa. For example, to say that God is ‘above conceptualization’, is not to make no claims about God, but, rather, to fall back into a spatial analogy as dominant in one’s faith discourse.

Meanwhile, the link between this trinitarian vision and the contours of a philosophical system needs to be shown more clearly and systematically. In the following chapter, I shall show how the presupposita that arise from such a vision are revealed implicitly through Vollenhoven’s ‘consequential problem-historical method’ on the one hand, and through Dooyeweerd’s Christian ‘ground-Idea’ on the other.


504 See Chapter Six.

Chapter Five: The Link – the Philosophical Presupposita

In Chapter Three, I looked at the ‘transcendental’ question of the necessary conditions for experience and how the laws and norms appropriate to the different modalities govern them; this is the account of the world which both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd provide. In Chapter Four we then examined the ‘transcendent’ question, examining their respective accounts of the religious orientation, which constitutes the Direction of the heart, in covenantal obedience to God through the joint work of the three Persons in creation, redemption and in the process of transformation. Where in the two previous chapters I have treated the necessary conditions and religious orientation separately, in this chapter I shall seek to show how they are linked as the basis for a comprehensive Christian worldview with distinctive implications for systematic philosophy.

Despite their differences in presentation, I shall argue that Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd are both concerned to identify the basic presupposita of philosophical thought in general, and those required for a Christian philosophy in particular. I shall look at how they did this, and discover how and why they diverge. I shall argue further that there is a close fit between the presupposita which they respectively uncover – with one exception, which I shall account for. Moreover, I shall point forward to a way of developing their common insights; this will be developed in Chapter Six to show how their respective accounts, and indeed their systematic divergences, complement one another. I shall first look, then, at the presupposita that illuminate Vollenhoven’s ‘consequential problem-historical method’ and then at the presupposita of Dooyeweerd’s ‘Christian ground-Idea’. I shall compare them, noting the respective strengths of their insights, but also their lacunae and imbalances, and will attempt to show how these two seemingly disparate and incommensurable positions are potentially congruent with one another.
5.1 Presupposita Illuminating Vollenhoven’s Ground-Types

After 1945, Vollenhoven developed the ‘consequential problem-historical method’ which absorbed the greater part of his attention from that time on. The complexities of his presentation, and the continual corrections to his analysis that from time to time he brought to the attention of his colleagues, can easily obscure the underlying rationale. Indeed, this is a rationale that Vollenhoven followed largely implicitly rather than explicitly, absorbed as he was by the minutiae of his task. Nevertheless, I shall argue that the way his analysis developed has considerable systematic implications, which I shall attempt to outline.

Vollenhoven’s emphasis on the historical development of philosophical thought led him to introduce the notion of ‘time currents’ (‘tijdstromingen’), which situate thinkers in specific time periods. Within each time current, Vollenhoven came to identify three ‘ground-types’: the main types of philosophical thought. These are the ‘theogonic-cosmogonic’ (the view of God, or the gods, as the origin of the universe); the ‘pure cosmological’ (the view the universe in terms of timeless order); and the ‘cosmogono-cosmological’ (the view of the universe as unfolding process). Each of the ground-types is in turn broken down into numerous sub-categories, the shape and character of any philosophy being determined according to which of these is dominant and how the others are combined. Further, Vollenhoven presents the findings and continual refinement of his analysis and categorisation of the different thinkers in descriptive terms, rather than as the working out of dominant presuppositions – which, I shall argue below, is implicitly what he is doing.\(^{506}\) There are three caveats which I need to make.

\(^{506}\) See 2.2. In this regard, I am following in the footsteps of other Vollenhoven scholars, namely Seerveld, ‘Biblical Wisdom Underneath Vollenhoven’s Categories for Philosophical Historiography’; Anthony Tol, ‘Vollenhoven’s probleemhistorische methode tegen de achtergrond van zijn systematisch denken’, P.R. 58 (1993); Anthony Tol, ‘Vollenhoven and Philosophy in Early Antiquity: A Critical Review’ (2007); Bril, ‘Historiography’. However, while I have drawn on the insights of all these scholars, not least Anthony Tol, the suggested outline of the presupposita uncovered by Vollenhoven is my own. Vollenhoven initially did not think of these as three ground-types, but as a basic division between the ‘mythologising’ on the one hand, and ‘non-mythologising’ on the other – the former comprising the ‘theogonic-cosmogonic’ and the latter divided in turn into the pure cosmological and the cosmogono-cosmological (Vollenhoven, Geschiedenis I (50e): 175, 229 et passim; Vollenhoven, ‘The Consequential
The first caveat is that the Vollenhoven’s procedure is not, and cannot be, a deductive one. To provide a deductive account of what Vollenhoven is doing through the process of this ‘consequential problem-historical method’ would be inappropriate, since such a deductive account could only be provided in terms of one form of discourse, be it mathematics, logic, semantics or any other specific discipline. The subject matter of Vollenhoven’s study encompasses a whole plurality of different disciplines, although it has systematic implications for them all in the way that it circles around and delineates the premises at the root of all thought and experience. The character of the analysis itself is architectonic, inductive and cumulative, rather than linear, deductive and explicit.

The second caveat is that Vollenhoven’s procedure largely remains a somewhat methodologically taciturn exercise. While it categorises thinkers, under the ground-types and sub-types, and situates them in their appropriate time-current, it remains largely silent about the assumptions that underlie the method itself. This has to be teased out implicitly rather than explicitly. Nevertheless, he does provide characterisations of the ‘ground-types’. It will be those characterisations, however briefly stated, and the way those characterisations inform its categorisations of the myriad thinkers and the periodic development of their thought, which will be at the heart of the ‘presuppositional’ account of Vollenhoven’s method which will be offered here.

The third caveat is, as we shall see, that Vollenhoven has greatest affinities with the ‘cosmological-cosmogonic’ and least with the ‘mythological’ character of the ‘theogonic-cosmogonic’. However, he deals with all the thinkers of his comprehensive study on an even-handed basis, and with what has been called, in a general context, ‘critical solidarity’. Despite himself, he recognises the value and, indeed, the genuineness of the quest undertaken by each of the myriad thinkers which he examines in the process of his studies, from the time of the earliest Greek thinkers to the present day.

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507 This last is the expression used by D.F.M Strauss (Strauss, P.D.D.: 184-185, 286-287).
These caveats suggest a certain caution in the reading of Vollenhoven’s ‘consequential problem-historical method’. What is being presented is indirect and cumulative rather than explicit and deductive. However, the indirect and cumulative character of the argument is appropriate to the subject matter. It is as if we have stumbled by night on a lost city in the jungle. The contours of that city cannot be visible from the ground since the mass of debris and jungle covering obscures the foundations, and the patterns which remain of the ruined architecture, are too close to the observer to be identified. Nor can they be visible from above – because that would imply that there is a God’s eye view from which they can be contemplated (something I have argued against in the previous chapter). The contours can only be outlined in the light of strategically placed beacons which each and together provide the correct orientation. Gradually, through this orientation, the ruined foundations of the city can be uncovered and their contours can be identified. I shall argue that the three beacons in this regard are the presupposita of a transcendent Origin, of a transcendent Coherence and a transcendent Providence respectively – each of which illuminates and orientates one of Vollenhoven’s ‘ground-types’. Whether these presupposita are the right ones can only be determined by whether they adequately illuminate and orientate the ground-types. I shall look, then, in turn at each of Vollenhoven’s ‘ground-types’ and the presupposita which, I argue, illuminate them.

5.1.1 The Theogonic-Cosmogonic Ground-Type – Origin

Vollenhoven’s first ground-type, the first in the history of Western philosophy, is the ‘theogonic-cosmogonic’ (‘theogonisch-kosmogonisch’). Vollenhoven has least sympathy for this stance and is highly critical of its ‘mythologising’ character. This ground-type focuses on the role of the divine (or ‘the gods’) in bringing the universe into being. I shall argue that ‘theogonic-cosmogonic’ ground-type is illuminated, however murkily, by the presuppositum that there is a transcendent Origin upon which – or Whom – all existence depends.  

An early representative of this position is Museaus, the legendary disciple of the mythical Orpheus, who attempts to describe the divine origins of the world. Hesiod, working in the sixth century B.C., is another early representative of this ground-type; several different strands of the theogonic-cosmogonic ground-type are represented in the Orphic tradition. Later, the ground-type can be seen in Gnosticism, which portrays the dependence upon God in a hierarchical way via a chain of intermediate deities. Gnosticism, with its vision of the ascent of the human soul from the ‘lower’ material realm to the ‘higher’ spiritual one, emphasises the transcendence and unknowability of God beyond the horizon of any possible experience.509

Vollenhoven continues to trace the theogonic-cosmogonic ground-type through the course of Western philosophy; through the medieval Jewish Cabbala and, in the Christian context, through Jacob Böhme (1575-1624); and then in the modern period, somewhat surprisingly, through Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). The inclusion of Nietzsche as ‘theogonic-cosmogonic’ is surprising, especially given Nietzsche's notorious, albeit ironic, remark that ‘God is dead’. Vollenhoven himself does not explain his categorisation of Nietzsche in this regard, but especially in his later, irrationalist, phases, one can see the expression of Nietzsche’s theogonic-cosmogonic tendency in the way he rejects all attempts to discern order in terms of any cosmic scheme. Nietzsche seeks to overcome change and affirm the sheer triumph of human individuality, first in his assertion of the ‘Übermensch’, free of any external ordering or subjection to universal categories, and, second, in the notion of the eternal return, staking a claim for the persistence of personality (or at least its conceived persistence) in the face of change. In raising the possibility that there might be no ‘God’ (in the sense of one given by tradition), or that the god of tradition had died, Nietzsche clears the way

for the sheer and naked encounter of the individual with the Origin – sheer in that it is
direct and unmediated, naked in that it is stripped of tradition. It should be noted,
though, that through his ‘will to power’ he advocates attempting to find this source in
oneself. In this he is followed in this quest for self-discovery by Martin Heidegger
(1889-1976), in the latter’s ‘Nietzschean’ phase from 1933 on. In this latter phase,
Heidegger embraces Nietzsche’s notion of the ‘eternal return’: God (as ground of Being
or Beings) and self can only be known and engaged apophatically – there can be no
final resolution.510 Here the theogonic-cosmogonic ground-type differs both from the
pure cosmological ground-type, which finds resolution in structure, and from the
cosmogonic-cosmological ground-type, which finds resolution in narrative.511

The theogonic-cosmogonic ground-type implicitly presupposes an unknowable Other or
Others that constitutes the Origin of the experienced world and lies beyond the horizon
of human experience. But this presupposittum of Origin, held to the exclusion of all
other considerations, remains an irrational leap in the dark, having no consideration
either of the order of the universe, or indeed of its future. The two latter points are
uncovered in the working out of the two other ground-types, to which I shall now turn.

510 Note here Paul Tillich’s theological appropriation of Heidegger, when he states that ‘‘God’’ is the
answer to the question implied in man’s finitude …whatever concerns a man ultimately becomes god for
him’ (Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology 1 (1951): 211).
511 Cabbala: Bril and Boonstra, ed., S. Kaarten: 117, 222 (krt #27), 312-313, 318. Böhme: Bril and
Bril and Boonstra, ed., S. Kaarten: 82, 242 (krt #1), 296; Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 290-293;
Vollenhoven, ‘Hoofd trekking der wijsgerige problematiek in de hedendaagse mens-beschouwing (64a)’
Wijsbegeerte : 112-113; Nietzsche, The Gay Science: 3.25, pp. 181-182; Nietzsche, Thus Spake
Zarathustra: 1, Prologue, p. 5. The remark that ‘God is dead’ marks the boundary, before and after,
according to Vollenhoven, of Nietzsche’s irrationalist turn (Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 290-291).
However, as we have seen Nietzsche in both these cases puts the remark into the mouths of others (the
madman and Zarathustra respectively) and can be read ironically (see Chapter One introduction).
Heidegger: Vollenhoven, ‘Hoofd trekking (64a)’: 342-343. Hemming describes Heidegger’s resopne
to Nietzsche in this phase of his thinking as ‘a renewed openness toward who God might be, that yields no
answer, only a question which endlessly sharpens itself, because it throws everything that went before
into relief’ (Laurence Paul Hemming, Heidegger’s Atheism: The Refusal of a Theological Voice (2002):
225).
5.1.2 The Pure Cosmological Ground-Type – Coherence

Vollenhoven’s second ground-type, then, concerns ‘pure’ structure – structure abstracted from time, as distinct from genetic structure, or process over time. This second ground-type is called ‘pure cosmological’ (‘louter kosmologisch’). We see it arising implicitly, if not explicitly, from the quest for the basis on which all of created reality coheres. The pure cosmological ground-type emphasizes the a-temporal structural ordering of all things.\footnote{Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 238-240; Bril and Boonstra, ed., S. Kaarten: 41, 330-332; Bril, Vollenhoven’s P.-H.M: Introduction: 43.} I shall argue that it is illuminated by the presuppositum of a transcendent Coherence that provides the basis for the structured ordering of all kinds of relation.

For Vollenhoven, the earliest representatives of the pure cosmological ground-type are Thales (c. 624-546 B.C.), and Xenophanes (c. 580-c. 478 B.C.). For both these philosophers, the basic question is a cosmological one: ‘what is it that constitutes and orders the universe?’ For Thales, the answer is one of a single ordering substance. In this he is followed by the atomists, Leucippus (450 B.C.) and Democritus (c. 460-371 B.C.), who ‘suppressed’ the genetic theme of change and brought everything under a single qualifying term, eternally persistent ‘atoms’. For Xenophanes, what constitutes and orders the universe is a dualism between an eternal reality and the non-transcendent and changing permutations of the temporal order. In this he is later followed by Parmenides (c. 540-475 B.C.), who sees a dualism between the unitary, unchangeable ‘being’ known purely by the intellect, and the ‘indicateable’, sensorially observable, diversity of experienced phenomena. For all these philosophers, the emphasis is on an a-temporal structure of the universe.\footnote{Thales: Vollenhoven, Geschiedenis I (50e): 56-59; Vollenhoven, ‘Short Survey (56b)’: //4-5, 8, pp. 34-35, 39; Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers: A critical history with a selection of texts: 74-98, 163-181. Atomists: Vollenhoven, Geschiedenis I (50e): 375-398; Vollenhoven, ‘The Consequential Problem-Historical Method’: /19, p. 115; Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers: A critical history with a selection of texts. Xenophanes: Vollenhoven, Geschiedenis I (50e): 59-66; Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 448-449. Parmenides: Vollenhoven, Geschiedenis I (50e): 258-272; Vollenhoven, ‘Short Survey (56b)’: /10, p. 43, notes by K. Bril; Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 312-313; Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers: A critical history with a selection of texts: 263-285.}
This a-temporal focus can be seen supremely in the ‘monarchian’ schema. The monarchian schema sees all reality as a structured ordering of the lower changing physical diversity, an ordering conducted by a higher metaphysical unchanging unity. There is a dualism (or as Vollenhoven later held, a *duality*) between the ruler and the ruled, with a ruled diversity ontically dependent on a higher unity. Later, Vollenhoven sees this as characterising the later Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) at the definitive stage of his thought. According to Vollenhoven, the monarchian schema is developed, not least by Speusippus (410-339 B.C.), Plato’s nephew and successor at the Academy.

Speusippus’s work reveals a vertical divergence of time and eternity, with eternity being the transcendent, unchanging realm inhabited by the divine and by human souls, and time being the cause of diversity in the lower realm.\(^{314}\)

The monarchian strand was continued by the neo-Platonist Plotinus (205-270), and was to prove highly influential on medieval thinkers. Amongst these are the Muslims Averroës (1126-1198) and Avicenna (980-1037), the Jewish Moses Maimonides (1135-1204), and the Christian Thomas Aquinas (c. 1224-1274). Vollenhoven sees the pure

\(^{314}\) Vollenhoven, *W. Woordenboek*: 264-268; Vollenhoven, ‘Short Survey (56b)’: 24, pp. 63-65. ** Aristotle**: In the stage immediately prior to his ‘definitive stage’, Aristotle was a semi-mystic according to which the boundary between the transcendent and the non-transcendent is lower than in monarchianism, with a material body and lower and higher soul, the latter of which is capable of returning to god of which it is an extension (Vollenhoven, *W. Woordenboek*: 239; Bril, ed., *Laatste*: 66-73; Bril, ed., *Problem-Historical Method and the History of Philosophy*.: 54-55 notes; Aristotle, ‘Metaphysica’: Bk. 12, 1069a-1076a, pp. 1872-1888.). According to Vollenhoven, Aristotle was originally a cosmological-cosmogonic thinker (Bril and Boonstra, ed., S. *Kaarten*: 72, 186-196 (kts#3-8)). Vollenhoven, ‘The Consequential Problem-Historical Method’: 27, pp. 123-124; Vollenhoven, ‘Short Survey (56b)’: //16-18, pp. 51-55; Bril, ed., *Laatste*: 65-70, 79-81; Bril and Boonstra, ed., S. *Kaarten*: 72-73, 187-189 (kts ###3-11), 275-277; Aristotle, ‘Metaphysica’: Bk 7, //1028a-1041b, pp. 1783-1813 This reading of Aristotle is contested by one of Vollenhoven’s students and successors, Professor A. P. Bos, who argues that Aristotle retained a semi-mystical conception throughout his intellectual career and that the monarchian conception was not held by Aristotle personally but was a later interpretation by Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. ca. 200), the commentator on Aristotle (Abraham. P. Bos, *The Soul and Its Instrumental Body. A Reinterpretation of Aristotle’s Philosophy of Living Nature* (2003); Bril editorial note in Vollenhoven, ‘Short Survey (56b)’: 55; for Alexander of Aphrodisias see Vollenhoven, ‘Short Survey (56b)’: //21, 27, pp. 59, 67; Bril, ed., *Laatste*: 72; Bril and Boonstra, ed., S. *Kaarten*: 67, 237 (#37); Bril, ed., *Laatste*: 96, 107-108 119). Vollenhoven slightly changed his characterisation of Aristotle’s final stage as that of ‘entelechism’ (Bril, ed., *Laatste*: 67-70, 79-81; Bril and Boonstra, ed., S. *Kaarten*: 22-24). **Speusippus**: Bril, ed., *Laatste*: 63, Speusippus was an important late discovery of Vollenhoven’s, not least because Vollenhoven sees Speusippus as an intellectual forbear of Dooyeweerd via Plotinus (Vollenhoven, ‘Concepten voor het laatste artikel 1973;’ Vollenhoven, *Privatissimum 1969-1970* (1969-1970); 21-26; Stellingwerff, *Vollenhoven*: 246-250. In entelechism, the higher unity moves the lower diversity to its goal, whereas in ‘new monarchianism’ (as represented by Speusippus), the lower gives expression to the higher unity, and confirms the latter as the transcendental pre-condition for the former (Vollenhoven, *Privatissimum 1969-1970*: 25-26; Bril, ed., *Laatste*: 64, 88-89, 94-97, 100, 108). Vollenhoven initially identifies Speusippus as a dualist (Bril and Boonstra, ed., S. *Kaarten*: 145, 224, 237, 247).
cosmological ground-type in general and the monarchian monist strand in particular as being influential through later periods in the thought of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) and, in the contemporary period, in the thought of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). He also links Dooyeweerd with this strand of thinking.\textsuperscript{515}

So the pure cosmological ground-type is illuminated by the presuppositum of a timeless Coherence which structures the diversity and range of human experience as well as the order of the world. It reflects a basic presuppositum of an ordering structure, a basis for the coherence of the experienced world which itself overarches and is not reducible to any aspect, or set of aspects, of that world. This presuppositum relativises any one description of the world or explanation of its operation, and so counteracts the different forms of reductionism.\textsuperscript{516} Each reductionistic attempt to delineate the structure of the whole on the basis of this or that kind of relation reveals its shortcomings as a satisfactory account of the diversity of the whole.

The pure-cosmological ground-type focuses on the structure of the world-order in terms of unchanging, eternal principles. In other words, its focus is contemporaneous or synchronic, giving weight to structural rather than narrative considerations. It presents the view of the universe as a timeless, unchanging, block. By contrast, the third ground-type, to which I now turn, focuses on the successive or diachronic feature of the world – the moment to moment progression of time.


\textsuperscript{516} For ‘reductionism’ see Chapter Three introduction. I shall call this presupposition, ‘Coherence’ (upper-case) below (see 5.2.2 and 6.2).
5.1.3 The Cosmogono-Cosmological Ground-Type – Providence

So, the third of Vollenhoven’s ground-types is the ‘cosmogonic-cosmological’; he also characterises this ground-type as ‘genetic structural’. I shall argue that it reflects a basic presupposition of a transcendent Providence in all things found in and through their coming into being, unfolding and even eventual demise.\textsuperscript{517}

Cosmogonic-cosmological thought for Vollenhoven is exemplified first in the work of Heraclitus (c. 535-c. 480 B.C.), who sees all things as governed by a single principle of change. Slightly later, Empedocles (c. 492-432 B.C.), posits a division between on one hand a body composed of four basic elements, dominated by the forces of love and strife, and an eternal soul on the other. Empedocles is a link to the greatest representative of the cosmogono-cosmological ground-type, Plato (427-347 B.C.), who in the different phases of his thought, sees the eternal forms as being worked out and exemplified in the material chaos of the cosmos.\textsuperscript{518} Plato’s strand of cosmogonic-cosmological thought is continued in the medieval period by Bernard of Clairveaux (1090-1135), whose dichotomous anthropology is followed in the modern period by René Descartes (1596-1650).

A somewhat different strand of cosmogonic-cosmological thinking is represented by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who seeks to reconcile the antinomy between ‘scientism’ (which gives supremacy to mathematical or logical analysis) and ‘practicalism’ (which


\textsuperscript{518} \textbf{Heraclitus}: Vollenhoven, \textit{Geschiedenis I (50e)}: 67-82; Vollenhoven, ‘Short Survey (56b)’: /7, p. 38; Vollenhoven, W. \textit{Woordenboek}: 175-176. \textbf{Empedocles}: Vollenhoven, \textit{Geschiedenis I (50e)}: 83-96; Vollenhoven, W. \textit{Woordenboek}: 127-128; Kirk and Raven, \textit{The Presocratic Philosophers: A critical history with a selection of texts}: 320-361. \textbf{Plato}: According to Vollenhoven, Plato moves to ‘realism’, i.e., the view that laws should not be located either in the subject nor the object but should bridge them both, whether in a higher realm of eternal ideal ‘forms’, or as in his last thinking, as norms adopted in an instrumental way (Vollenhoven, ‘Short Survey (56b)’: 48-51; Vollenhoven, ‘Het begin van Platoon’s realistische jaren (56a)’, \textit{P.R.} 21 (1956); Vollenhoven, ‘The Consequential Problem-Historical Method’: /25-26, pp. 121-122; Vollenhoven, ‘Plato’s realise (63a)’; Vollenhoven, W. \textit{Woordenboek}: 324-330; Bril and Boonstra, ed., \textit{S. Kaarten}: 144; Bril, ed., \textit{Laatste}: 42-58, 122-123).
gives supremacy to experience). Kant draws the two together in what Vollenhoven calls an ‘ennoëtist’ anthropology: this is one in which a lower self within the causal nexus is observed by a higher self from a universal vantage point – a point which Kant defines in ethical terms. G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) transfers this vision of greater self-realization from the forum of epistemology to an account of the unfolding of human history. This is painted on a cosmic canvas in the process theology of A.N. Whitehead (1861-1947), where God is seen as a mind coming to self-understanding within an unfolding universe.\(^{519}\)

Vollenhoven places himself within the characteristic outline of this ground-type, but in the tradition of ‘pneumatistic interactionism’ (‘pneumatische wisselwerkingstheorie’). By this he means a continual inter-flow between human consciousness and human physicality. He rejects the characterisation of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ as in the ennoëtist anthropology represented by Kant. Rather, he sees things in terms of the unfolding of God’s covenantal Providence in and through history, not in any notion of transcending history through a metaphysical ascent to a supra-temporal reality. Vollenhoven sees himself in this respect in the intellectual line of Gregory of Nazianzus (c. 330-390), middle-period Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), the early (pre-critical) Kant, and Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995).\(^{520}\)

In Vollenhoven’s account, cosmogonic-cosmological thought emphasises process or narrative sequence, rather than hierarchical order. This process is not mere flux: unlike


the theogonic-cosmogonic ground-type, it is not a leap into the unknown. But equally, it is not merely the unfolding of an existing, protological potential within a basically a-temporal framework; unlike the ‘pure cosmological’ ground-type it features a genuinely future-orientated transformation, i.e. a view seen in the light of a divine Providence, or more generally, a view in the the notion of divine Providence has been secularised (as Progress or Evolution), but which, nevertheless, sees the world as a purposive unfolding of events.\(^{521}\)

5.1.4 The Presupposita Illuminating Vollenhoven’s Ground-Types

In setting out the three ground-types in this later development of the ‘consequential problem-historical method’ Vollenhoven reveals the contours of three basic and distinctive presupposita which have shaped Western philosophy. To a certain extent his ‘cosmological-cosmogonic’ preferences come into play in his sensitivity to the time-current in which each thinker is situated. But his careful categorisation of the thinkers is done largely dispassionately and without bias towards one or other ground-type. My contention is that in this very taciturnity and self-restraint, Vollenhoven evinces a self-critical sensitivity to the presupposita which necessarily underlie all thought (even if, from his own standpoint, he has preferences for the cosmogonic-cosmological ground-type, and has least personal affinity to the ‘theogonic-cosmogonic’). Implicitly and cumulatively, then, Vollenhoven’s ground-types provide a comprehensive survey of the philosophical ground and uncover the way in which three basic outlines can be discerned within each period of Western thought through the periodically changing expressions of thought. These three basic outlines, or ‘ground-types’, are each illuminated implicitly by a presuppositum from which each takes it character.

\(^{521}\) Note that this needs to be distinguished from any conception of Providence as a pre-given order. The conception of a pre-given world order would pertain to what Vollenhoven would categorise as the ‘pure cosmological’ rather than the ‘cosmogonic cosmological’. This is a view largely shaped in the medieval period by Aristotelian philosophy (according to the potentiality-actuality schema). This shapes Thomist philosophy, although Thomas’s own account is much deeper and richer than this, not least because of his dependence on Augustine, and the latter’s seminal Christian account of Providence in his De Civitate Dei. The other, later tradition, which sees the world-order as pre-given is the Deism which came to the fore in the Eighteenth Century. However in the Reformed tradition, while there was the residual influence of Aristotle to a certain extent, the medieval conception was replaced by a more future-orientated and dynamic understanding of Providence (see Abraham Kyper, Van de Voleinding (1929); Herman Bavinck, The Last Things: Hope for This World and the Next (1996); Benjamin W. Farley, ‘The Providence of God in Reformed Perspective’ (1992): 87-93).
The first presupposition involves a reaching out towards a transcendent Origin (or putative Origin) of the cosmos. From a Christian perspective, in the presupposition of a transcendent Origin, one can see an implicit reflection of the work of the Father. For Vollenhoven, individuals are first named by their ‘structure’ (i.e., the blueprint of who or what they are); the norms are realised concretely in individuals. Through the Father’s secret creatorly command, all creatures are ‘thoroughly-structured’ as individuals.522 This links together this presupposition of a transcendent Origin with Vollenhoven’s insight (which we have noted in Chapter Four) about the irreducible character of individuality endowed by the Father.523

The second presupposition involves a vision of the coherence (or putative coherence) according to which all the diversity of relations in the world fit together in an overarching and harmonious architectonic, i.e., the presupposition of a transcendent Coherence. Viewing the presupposition of a transcendent Order524 from the Kuyperian Reformational perspective, one can see the work of the Son (in whom all things hold together), his cosmic creational role as the Logos, and equal in divinity with the Father and the Holy Spirit. For Vollenhoven, the Son reveals the law of love as the grounding of all human relationships, not least in the uncovering of the many different kinds of norm appropriate for human society.525

The third presupposition involves a basic confidence that all things happen for an overarching purpose (or a putative purpose), i.e., that there is a transcendent Providence (even if that ‘Providence’ is stated in secular terms – be it Progress, Development or Evolution). Viewing the presupposition of a transcendent Providence in and through events526 from a Christian perspective, one can see reflected the work of the Holy Spirit.527 For Vollenhoven, this sovereign Purpose reflects the work of the Holy Spirit in the world, following through the secret ‘idea’ of each individual given by the Father and the law of love revealed in the Son. In the context of human society, the Holy Spirit

522 4.1.1
523 3.1.1 and 3.1.2
524 3.1.2
525 4.1.2.
526 3.1.3
527 4.1.3.
positivises (i.e., realises the existing potential and application of) new institutional arrangements and states of affairs. ⁵²⁸

The three presupposita which illuminate Vollenhoven’s three ground-types thus provide one with a link to the work of the three Persons of the Trinity in the world, on the one hand, ⁵²⁹ and with each of the necessary conditions for experience, on the other. The presupposita are transcendent in the sense that each is a prior commitment not itself deducible from the evidence at hand. Each presuppositum held in isolation from one another lead to different emphases in philosophical thought, on origin, order and purpose respectively.

Vollenhoven does not provide any account which draws the three ground-types together, and indeed sees them as alternatives rather than elements in an overall conception, or what Dooyeweerd calls a ‘ground-Idea’. Moreover he tends to favour the third ground-type. This lack of integration and imbalance will be seen in better chiaroscuro in comparison with Dooyeweerd. To do that, I shall now look at Dooyeweerd’s account of the presupposita or Ideas, which together for him constitute the Christian ground-Idea.

5.2 Dooyeweerd’s Account of the Christian Ground-Idea

Dooyeweerd’s account of the Christian ground-Idea and the elements that comprise it provides a comparison and, I shall argue, congruence, with the presupposita which illuminate the ground-types identified by Vollenhoven.

Dooyeweerd defines and describes what he calls the ‘presupposita’ of philosophical thought, ⁵³⁰ or ‘Ideas’. ⁵³¹ In general terms, presupposita are those pre-theoretical beliefs...

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⁵²⁸ 4.1.1.
⁵²⁹ Dealt with in Chapter Four.
⁵³⁰ As we have seen in 2.2, these presupposita played an important role in the construction of the ‘Second Way’ of his transcendental critique, which eventually appeared in the English language edition of this magnum opus, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, in the mid-1950s.
which are the foundation for any system of thought. Dooyeweerd conceives of these as the ‘hypothesis’ (my emphasis – that which lies under or provides the basis) of theoretical thought, rather than arising out of theoretical thought itself. The presupposita cannot themselves be theoretical, or the conclusion of a theoretically based argument, since they provide the basis upon which theoretical analysis is subsequently to be done – he states that the presupposita ‘cannot be evaded by any philosopher who wishes, indeed, to think critically.

As we have seen in Chapter Two, from the 1930s on, Dooyeweerd holds that the three presupposita of philosophical thought are the Ideas of Origin, coherence and totality (the last two for him in lower case because they are subordinate to the former). He argues that these three presupposita are revealed by critical self-reflection to be interdependent. Dooyeweerd links these presupposita to the three steps of his ‘transcendental critique’ corresponding to three ontic levels: coherence, totality and

531 Augustine of Hippo, and later Thomas Aquinas, both see the Ideas as the thoughts eternally in God’s mind, as distinct from God’s unknowable being (Strauss, Begrip en Idee: 38-45,197). In modern Western thought, Immanuel Kant took up the duality of concept and Idea, with concepts (as thought-categories) bound up with sensible phenomena, and Ideas as purely regulative ‘limiting concepts’, a notion going back to Plato (Plato, ‘Parmenides’ (1997): 137-166, pp. 371-397; see Strauss, Begrip en Idee: 16 -19, 196-197). Ideas are thus principles for ‘regulating’ (as Kant calls it) the content provided by sensibility, without, properly, any positive content. Attempts to give the Ideas of God, the human soul and the world positive content result logically in different forms of self-contradiction. Only by treating these Ideas as purely regulative notions, can these contradictions be avoided (Kant, C.P.R.: A642-668/B671-696, pp. 590-604; Strauss, Begrip en Idee: 48-59, 92-96,197-198; Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense: 423-425). Ideas for Dooyeweerd are regulative, organising presupposita necessary for any philosophical reflection, but (pace the Marburg or Baden neo-Kantian schools, and, depending on interpretation, Kant himself), this does not mean that they are neutral or self-sufficient. For Dooyeweerd they are necessarily grounded either in a vision of the triune God’s engagement with the world, or in an apostate religious alternative (see 4.2). Dooyeweerd is rejecting the logicism of the Marburgers, as also the phenomenological position of Husserl (see Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.73ff.). In particular he is rejecting the ‘postulate of self-sufficiency’ (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.53 (‘postulaat van zijn zelfgenoegzaamheid’). As explained above in this discussion I distinguish orthographically between ‘ideas’ (lower-case), the referent of individuals, and ‘Ideas’ (upper-case), the necessary presupposita of theoretical thought. While ‘ideas’ have epistemic content and ontic reference (see 3.2.2.), ‘Ideas’ do not – although the ‘use’ of the totality-Idea with respect to the intuition of individuals complicates this (see 5.2.4).

532 2.2.

533 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.52; 2.491-2; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.37 (not in W.d.W.), 88; 2.552.

534 Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 55.


536 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.40. Hendrik Geertsema suggests that the three presupposita should be considered as a triangle, each directed linked to the others (Geertsema, ‘Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique’: 99).
I shall argue that while Dooyeweerd presents his argument in steps, deductively one from another, it is better understood as a way of coming to an overall understanding of the world on the basis of ‘presupposita’ which cannot be argued for deductively, but are all equally and distinctively necessary for a true understanding of the world.

In this section, I shall, therefore, look at each of the Ideas in turn in order to assess their adequacy together as the basis for a systematic philosophy, while matching them with the presupposita corresponding to Vollenhoven’s ground-types. In the ‘First Way’ of his transcendental critique set out in the *Wisbegeerte der Wetsidee* (the first, Dutch version of his *magnum opus*), Dooyeweerd starts with the Idea of Origin, and then moves through the view of totality, that is, of the cosmos as a whole, to an appreciation of the coherent diversity of the created order. Dooyeweerd later reverses this order for the purpose of constructing the ‘Second Way’ (or his transcendental critique proper) in the *New Critique of Theoretical Thought* (the revised, English version of his *magnum opus*), starting with the problems arising from the theoretical apprehension of the coherent diversity of the created order, moving to the Idea of totality located in the human heart, in order to rest finally in the Idea of the Origin. (In both cases, as we shall see, ‘coherence’ and ‘totality’ are in lower-case, for reasons which will emerge.) My argument will be that there is an alternative way of looking at the presupposita as neither a top-down hierarchy, as in the First Way, or a bottom-up hierarchy, as in the Second Way. I shall seek to show the parallel between the Vollenhoven’s ‘ground-types’ and Dooyeweerd’s ‘presupposita’ (retrieving as well the Idea of Providence central to his thinking of the 1920s). In order to make this clear I shall slightly change the order of presentation of Dooyeweerd’s Ideas or presupposita. I turn now to the first of Dooyeweerd’s Ideas to be considered here – that of a transcendent Origin.

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537 Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.*: 1.6, 22-33, 36-40, 64, 2.395-410; *Dooyeweerd, N.C.*: 1.4, 24-25, 28-34, 38-70; 2.468-473, *Dooyeweerd, Dictaat encyclopaedie*: 3-50; *Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap 'Inleiding'*: 10-69; *Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction*: 26-122; *Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight*: 52. For some of these references, I am grateful to J. Glenn Friesen (Friesen, ‘95 Theses’: 87; see 2.2). Dooyeweerd identifies each of the Ideas of the Christian ground-Idea (which for him form the three steps of the ‘transcendental critique’) with the three ‘Ideas’ of Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic: world, selfhood and Origin (Dooyeweerd, *N.C.*: 1.89 (not in W.d.W)). As we have seen in a previous footnote, Kant criticizes these in his ‘transcendental dialectic’ (Kant, *C.P.R.*: Transcendental Dialectic, pp. 208-333).


539 *N.C.*: 1.34-70.
5.2.1 The Idea of a Transcendent Origin

Dooyeweerd’s conception of the Origin as an Idea changed less in the course of his thinking than his conception of the other two presupposita. However, his elaboration of it changed as the systematic context of his thought developed. For Dooyeweerd, dependence on the Origin is the true ground for human individuality as it is concentrated on the heart, which as we have seen is the religious centre of the human person. More generally, but less clearly for Dooyeweerd, the relation to the Origin is the root of all individuality, not just of human persons (and of the human person as a whole, not just of the ‘supra-temporal heart’), but of all things.

With respect to the human person, Dooyeweerd takes as his point of departure Calvin’s dictum at the beginning of his *Institutes of the Christian Religion*: all knowledge begins with the knowledge of oneself in the light of one’s relation to God. God the Origin is the source of all things and the ultimate point of reference for the ‘I’. The ‘I’ has its ex-istence (i.e., its self-transcending point of reference) solely by virtue of its relation to the Origin. Only through ‘my’ relation to the Origin am ‘I’ truly myself ex-istently; by the same token, ‘I’ recognize that others have wholeness and integrity through their distinctive creaturely calling by the Origin. Dooyeweerd argues that the human ego derives its identity and Direction from the Origin (or putative origin) upon which it places its ultimate dependence. But this ultimate dependence needs to be seen not just as applicable to the human ego, but to all individuals. While this dependence can be expressed in Christian terms, it need not necessarily be expressed in terms of dependence on the Christian God (or, more precisely, the Father of Jesus Christ), or even on any god at all. This dependence is above all of a religious nature, that is, it is constituted by that which gives every person and thing its ultimate meaning and purpose. For Dooyeweerd, echoing Augustine’s Confessions, ‘I’ can find no rest (unity and integrity) except as in relation to the Origin, the Creator.

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540 4.2.2.
the problem of infinite regress of the ‘I’, since there are no further ‘I’s in the face of the Origin.\textsuperscript{544} Further, it is in face of the Origin that religious unity of the ‘I’ is constituted.\textsuperscript{545} Carefully distancing himself from the notion of the self merely as the ‘transcendental-logical subject’, which no longer has anything individual in itself,\textsuperscript{546} as well as from the existentialist position, which attempts to find authenticity within the temporal order. Dooyeweerd argues further for a notion of ‘self-surrender’ or for the inexhaustible ‘existent’ (self-transcending) character of the religious centre, the true and finally unknowable ‘I’. This self-surrender should not be seen as an individualistic act (according to ‘individualism’ all entities, and above all, the human person are regarded as self-creating and self-contained).\textsuperscript{547} It represents, rather, the true ground for human individuality (i.e. that each person or entity has a unique identity) – the dependence of each individual on the Origin.

It is not just human individuality which arises from the dependence upon the Origin of the human heart. What Dooyeweerd calls the ‘meaning-particularity’ (‘zin-bijzonderheid’) of all individual creatures arises from their dependence upon the Origin.\textsuperscript{548} Naïve experience leads one to an implicit sense of the dependence of all things, human and non-human alike, upon the Origin, and contains implicitly within it

\begin{itemize}
\item <http://members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Definitions/Arche.html> accessed 24 July 2006; see Augustine, The Confessions of St Augustine: 1.1, p. 1.
\item Glaas, ‘Ego, Self and the Body’: 71-72.
\item Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.30-32; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.73-74.
\item Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 8-9; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.6-7.
\item Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.58 (Dooyeweerd’s italics, not in W.d.W.). Dooyeweerd is critical of the irrationalism in Heidegger’s conception of the human subject (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.78-79; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.111-112; Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte’: 41-42). Unlike Heidegger, Dooyeweerd believes that the reality in which one find ourselves is a created one, it is not simply one in which we are one’s own reference point and create one’s own meaning in and through the existential discovery of one’s own finitude. He speaks of ‘the temporal reality considered in the light of God’s Word principally through its creaturly relationship to God, …’ (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.48 (‘de tijdelijke werkelijkheid bij het licht van Gods Woord principieel vanuit haar scheppingsverhouding tot God beziet, …’ – not in N.C.)).
\item Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.268; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.337; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 3.555; N.C.: 3.632. In De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, Dooyeweerd asks three questions: (1) What is the Origin? (2) What is the meaning-totality of one’s cosmos? and (3) How is the underlying nature and coherence of the meaning-diversity constituted? (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.39 (the three questions are put in specially emphasized type)). On the next page, Dooyeweerd lists the three elements as (1) ‘meaning-particularity’; (2) ‘meaning-coherence’; and (3) ‘meaning-totality’ (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.40-6 (zin-bijzonderheid’, ‘zin-samenhang’ and ‘zin-totaliteit’). In other words, we see ‘meaning-particularity’ worked out in relation to the Idea of the Origin; alongside the Ideas of coherence and totality (see 5.2.2). As Stafleu points out, being created means that the individual points to the Creator, i.e., the Origin (Stafleu, ‘Problems of time’: 72-73).
\end{itemize}
the recognition of its created and ontically dependent status. The dependence of human and non-human individuals upon the Origin answers the claim that any feature in creation can itself be seen as the basis upon which all things fundamentally relate to one another.

The Idea of the Origin points to a second Idea or presuppositum, that of a transcendent coherence (or as I shall argue ‘Coherence’): there is a transcendent basis upon which all things relate to one another, and in relation to which all the different kinds of relation cohere, without themselves being reducible to one another. I turn now to this second Idea or presuppositum.

5.2.2 The Idea of a Transcendent Coherence

The second of Dooyeweerd’s presupposita which I shall look at is the Idea of ‘coherence’ (lower case for Dooyeweerd), which I shall argue should be treated not as subordinate to the Idea of Origin (upper case for Dooyeweerd), but alongside that Idea and of equal weight to it (hence it will, I argue, be appropriate to spell it upper case). As has been argued in Chapter Three, relations need to be understood as having an ontic basis in their own right which is not simply a function of the individuals to which they refer and which they connect. There is an irreducible yet coherent diversity of relations which both govern and norm (the cosmonomic side) and describe (the factual side) all the sorts of relations which there are.

Dooyeweerd’s Idea of ‘coherence’ refers to a basic harmony across the modalities without their being reducible to another. He calls this the ‘ontic systasis’: ‘an indissoluble inner coherence’ binding all the modalities together. The identification of the ontic systasis is based on the prior presuppositum of coherence – that law-like

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549 Dooyeweerd says: ‘so far as it is rooted in the ground-motive of the Christian religion, naïve experience also has the religious and integral view of temporal reality by which the latter is concentrically conceived in its true religious root and in its relation to the Origin’ (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.84. See Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.48).

550 See 3.2.2.

regularities can be identified and described, and that they together cohere – even if this coherence cannot be (and arguably, should not be) defined and described in terms of a single logical structure. In other words that coherence or ‘ontic systasis’ links the kinds of relation in their (mutually irreducible) modal diversity. It is not, and cannot be, a theoretical construct, since, as we have seen above, any attempted theoretical construction of a harmony between the different kinds of relation will result in a form of reductionism.\textsuperscript{552} It is only when the diversity of different kinds of relations is seen in terms of a coherence which transcends any one kind of analysable relation, that a vision can be sustained of a harmony between them: the different kinds of relations antecipate and retrocipate one another without any kind of relation being reduced to another.

There is a problem in treating ‘coherence’, however, merely as a feature of the way the world is, without a transcendent reference point. It was this problem which drove Dooyeweerd to attempt to find this transcendent reference point in and around 1930 in the ‘supra-temporal heart’, albeit the supra-temporal heart as it is redeemed in Christ. However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, this ‘solution’, based on an account of the heart as an entity supra-temporally removed from temporal diversity creates its own problems – not least that of according the heart semi-divine status. As I have argued in the previous chapter, a more satisfactory rendering of the account of the human heart is to see it rather in ‘religious’ terms, i.e., in terms of its orientation towards or away from God who alone is to be accorded that divine status and ‘supra-temporality’.

If the philosophical and theological problems arising from any attempt to elevate the heart as a supra-modal viewpoint, or a putative entity with supra-temporal status, are to be avoided, the question remains: what, or better ‘Who’, is the transcendent point of reference for the ontic systasis? The harmony among the different modalities can only be achieved in the ordering of the creation by the Logos (the Divine Word).\textsuperscript{553} Just as with respect to the work of the Father, there is the Idea of Origin (upper case) as we

\textsuperscript{552} See introduction to Chapter Three.
\textsuperscript{553} Dooyeweerd, \textit{W.d.W.}: 2.233-236; Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 2. 307-309. Dooyeweerd speaks here of the harmony of the Word-revelation and the ‘\textit{revelatio naturalis}’. However, he indicates that this Word-revelation is God himself and appeared in the flesh, i.e., he implicitly identifies the Word-revelation with the eternal and incarnate Son.
have seen in the previous section, so with respect to the work of the Son, there is the Idea of Coherence alongside and of equal weight with the Idea of Origin (and for this reason, it needs also to be in upper case along with the Idea of Origin to indicate its equal status in this regard). The Idea of Coherence is thus the presuppositum linking the work of the Son and the irreducible yet harmonious diversity of the created order. This Idea is thus grounded, as is the Idea of Origin ‘religiously’, i.e., in the basic orientation of the human heart and needs to be worked out through the whole-hearted love and service of God and one’s fellow creatures, as it has grounded in the new religious root of the human race in Christ.

However, the Ideas of Origin and Coherence need also to be considered alongside a third Idea or presuppositum, missing from those set out in De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, but which was an important element in Dooyeweerd’s thinking in the 1920s. I shall consider this Idea at this point, because I shall argue that it needs to be considered as co-ordinate with the Ideas of Origin and Coherence and, further, that in this respect it has a distinctive weight similar to the Ideas of Origin and Coherence. Like the Ideas of Origin and Coherence (but, as I shall argue in the following section, unlike the Idea of ‘totality’), it illuminates a basic feature of the world.

5.2.3 The Idea of Providence and its Eclipse by the Totality-Idea

The third Idea which I shall consider, then, is the Idea of Providence. The feature of the world which it illuminates is that the world has a transcendent destination, just as it has a transcendent origin: it is purposive and not merely governed by chance.

As we have seen, in the 1920s, Dooyeweerd saw Providence as having a determinative role in the created order. Through God’s sovereign purposes for the world, its unity-in-diversity is unfolded and upheld. These purposes are built into God’s plan for creation, and at every stage in world history exist both formally, through the

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554 Specifically in this regard, his Ideas of coherence and totality need to be drawn together as the Idea of Coherence (upper-case), and that it needs to be given equal weight with the Idea of the Origin (see 5.2.2).
556 See 2.2.
governance of the world, and materially and practically through the predestination of God. This predestination is not merely in the election to salvation of individual human beings, but also involves a plan for the whole universe according to God’s goodness and wisdom. This goodness and wisdom is evidenced by God’s common grace until God’s final word, as Judge, will be spoken. However, even when it plays a foundational role in his thinking in the 1920s, Providence is still seen more in structural terms rather than as the purposive ordering of events.

In the following decade, Dooyeweerd expressed reservations about the centrality of the Idea of Providence in any philosophical account (without denying its importance in personal piety). He retreated from seeing God’s work in the world to a view of the unfolding grasp of the coherence-in-diversity of the world in and through the redeemed human heart; there is a shift here from an ontic to a noetic focus as we have seen, for a number of reasons set out in Chapter Two. The Idea of Providence is replaced by the Idea of ‘totality’ (lower-case for Dooyeweerd), which he links with notion of a supra-temporal vantage point from which the diversity of the temporal order can be surveyed in a unified way. Post-1930, he re-defines time as ‘cosmic time’. Accordingly, he tends to see time as cosmic order and so does not address the actual work of God in the world. Indeed he specifically removes the consideration of God’s providence from the proper purview of Christian philosophy, or for that matter, any philosophy.

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558 See 2.2.

559 See 2.2. Brümmer speaks of a shift from the ontic to the noetic in Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique (Brümmer, Transcendental criticism: 213-218).

560 See 2.2 and 4.2.1.

561 Doooyeweerd, De zin der geschiedenis: 4-8, 13-20; Doooyeweerd, ‘De zin der geschiedenis vanuit de openbaring’, Vox Theologica 5 (1934): 118-122; Doooyeweerd, N.C. 2.233 (not in W.d.W.). However, in W.d.W., Dooyeweerd still speaks ‘een goddelijke wereldplan in de “ providentia” ’, although in N.C. he
then, his account tends to be dominated by the totality-Idea which leads to a much more static view of the temporal process. Actual time (the narratable unfolding of events) is replaced by the opening process (the unfolding of the modalities as the realisation of existing potential in a way already built into the original created order). History is largely seen protologically, i.e., with reference to the beginning; there is little room for the breaking in of the future into the present, not least in the resurrection of Jesus. As has been pointed out earlier, eschatology for Dooyeweerd is verticalised with little sense of genuine futurity.

Thus the totality-Idea tends to eclipse the Idea of Providence in his thinking. He is prepared to acknowledge God’s secret providence as foundational to the world order in a purely formal sense of setting up the law-structures according to which the world is governed; but he is not prepared to see the factual unfolding of God’s engagement with the created order, either in general or with humanity in particular, as having any significance accessible to a Christian philosophy. The replacement of the Idea of Providence by the totality-Idea after 1930 represents a sharp point of divergence between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, particularly in that Vollenhoven later implicitly uncovers the Idea of Providence in his ‘consequential problem-historical method’. It is also a departure from the Calvinian Reformational vision, which includes the vision of the purposiveness of the work of the Holy Spirit in all of creation; as we have seen in the previous chapter, Dooyeweerd seems largely to see the work of the Holy Spirit as located within the human heart. There are, however, hints of a wider perspective in his discussion of the working out in history of the struggle between the Civitas Dei and the Civitas Terrena and also in his discussion of Kuyper’s notion of common grace.

states that this is ‘hidden from human knowledge and, and therefore not accessible to a Christian philosophy’ (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.145; Dooyeweerd, N.C: 1.173).

As we have seen (5.1.2 footnote), Peter Steen sees Dooyeweerd as a cosmogonic-cosmological rather than a pure cosmological thinker. However, Steen himself says: ‘the human race as a totality represented in Adam and Eve (‘stamvader en stammoeder’) was created by God in the beginning. All that will unfold and be subject to the temporal process of becoming is present here as finished creation’ (Steen, Structure: 65; see Dooyeweerd, ‘Schepping en evolutie (bespreking van J. Lever, Creatie en evolutie)’: 115-117).

Human history for Dooyeweerd is thus portrayed here as the unfolding of already existing potential. In the following section, we shall see how Vollenhoven complements Dooyeweerd in this respect especially.

4.1.1.

4.1.3.

4.2.1.

4.2.1.
But there is nothing comparable with Vollenhoven’s account of the ‘positivising’ role of the Holy Spirit in bringing about and making concrete the intention of the Father and the revelation of the Son in new situations in the world at large.

We see then that while Providence is a central Idea in Dooyeweerd’s earlier thinking, it is largely missing after 1930; but it is none the less necessary if events are not to be seen merely as the realisation of existing potential. I shall return to this further in the following chapter.\textsuperscript{568}

Having touched on the ‘totality-Idea’ in this section to the extent that it displaces Providence, I shall now consider whether the ‘Idea of totality’ is properly an Idea, or something else.

5.2.4 The ‘Kinds of Use’ of the Totality-Idea as Forms of Intuition

The third of Dooyeweerd’s Ideas or ‘presupposita’ as he set it out in his \textit{magnum opus} of the mid 1930s, \textit{De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee}, is that of ‘totality’ (as with the Idea of ‘coherence’, Dooyeweerd spells it lower-case).\textsuperscript{569} While the Ideas Origin, Coherence and Providence illuminate the basic features of the world (origin, order and destiny), the Idea of totality brings home to us that we are to grasp those features in a holistic way. This holistic grasp of the basic features of the world is what Dooyeweerd calls ‘intuition’.

For both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, intuition lies at the centre of their respective epistemologies. Intuition for both philosophers in their mature thinking is neither merely an extension of rational analysis on the one hand, nor, on the other hand, is it irrational. Rather, as we shall see, it is a bridge notion. According to both philosophers’ mature insights, intuition is trans-modal knowledge. It is the grasp of the many-sided diversity of relations, individuals and events worked through in the light of the vision of the whole or ‘totality’. Dooyeweerd describes ‘totality’ as the process of seeing the created order as a whole, or as Dooyeweerd he puts it: ‘the totality of meaning of the

\textsuperscript{568} 6.1.3.
\textsuperscript{569} 6.1.3.

See 2.2.
cosmos’.\textsuperscript{570} The metaphor which he uses is that of the prism, where the beam of undivided ‘white’ light is experienced before it is refracted into the many different ‘colours’ (i.e., the modalities) as they are found in the harmony yet irreducible diversity of temporal experience.\textsuperscript{571} But merely to say this does not yet tell one what form intuition takes: is it intuition of individuality functions, kinds of relation or aspects of time? Nor does it tell us what the ‘totality’ is: is it the intuitive grasp of whole individuals, or of the coherence of different kinds of relations, or whole events? It requires greater transcendental specification in the light of the Ideas of Origin, Coherence and Providence if it is to have any systematic purchase.\textsuperscript{572}

Dooyeweerd himself opens up the possibility to a wider conception of ‘totality’ as intuition in the list of ‘different kinds of correct and fruitful use of the Idea of totality’ he makes in \textit{A New Critique}.\textsuperscript{573} As we have seen, the Idea of ‘totality’ in itself lacks a point of reference and, considered in isolation, tells us nothing about the ontology or epistemology of the world. However, the ‘kinds of use’ provide it with a noetic character, or rather with a set of noetic characters, and indeed as we shall see below, each kind of use can be seen as a form of intuition, illuminated in turn by each of the

\textsuperscript{570}As Dooyeweerd states it: ‘Philosophical thought is theoretic thought directed towards the totality of meaning’ (Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.} 1.7; see Dooyeweerd, \textit{W.d.W.}: 1.7, 10; 3.381; Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.} 1.5, 7-8; 3.424-425). As has been mentioned elsewhere, ‘meaning’ for Dooyeweerd indicates the ontological dependence of creation on the Origin (see 2.2, 4.2, and 5.2.1).


\textsuperscript{572}Dooyeweerd, \textit{W.d.W.}: 2.407-420; Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 2.472-485. See 2.1. (see Dooyeweerd, \textit{Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer}; 97-100; Dooyeweerd, \textit{Crisis in Humanist Political Theory}; 82-86; Dooyeweerd, \textit{W.d.W.}: 1.306-318, 2.11-12, 379-380; Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 1.27 (not in \textit{W.d.W.}), 342-352, 2.12-13, 448-449. It needs to be noted that I am using ‘intuition’, following the later usage of both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, in a different sense from that used by Kant. For Kant, ‘intuition’ is the ordering of the products of sense as those are given us in space and time (Allison, \textit{Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense}; 82-82; Richard A. Smyth, \textit{Forms of Intuition: An Historical Introduction to the Transcendental Aesthetic} (1978): 40, 139-150, 170-223 and Jay F. Rosenberg, \textit{Accessing Kant: A Relaxed Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason} (2005): 61-87). Putting aside Kant’s reduction of experience to the ‘sensory’ (one of the modalities from a Reformational perspective), from a Reformational perspective space is the second of the modalities, after number, and is not itself a pre-condition for experience, sensory or otherwise. Kant’s ‘space’ can be taken to expresses, in effect, two prior conditions for any possible experience: firstly, that there are potential objects of experience, and, secondly, that these objects are related to the experiencing subject and to one another (see Dooyeweerd, \textit{Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer}; 97-100; Dooyeweerd, \textit{Crisis in Humanist Political Theory}; 82-86; Dooyeweerd, \textit{W.d.W.}: 1.306-318, 2.11-12, 379-380; Dooyeweerd, \textit{N.C.}: 1.27 (not in \textit{W.d.W.}), 342-352, 2.12-13, 448-449).

Ideas of Origin, Coherence and Providence.  

The first kind of use of the totality-Idea involves the intuitive grasp of individual wholes as they are seen as directly dependent upon the Origin (taking together the full sweep of all their modally-specific functions into a whole). It is the ‘idea of the whole of a thing …’ i.e., the encounter of an individual, not the conceptual description of that individual.  

The second kind of use of the totality-Idea involves the grasp of the ontic systasis (i.e., the irreducible but harmonious diversity of the different kinds of relation holding together in the modally-differentiated and theoretically irreducible diversity of relations): ‘irreducible’ because each kind of relation is marked out by a distinctive ‘nuclear moment’, i.e., a basic feature which distinguishes those kinds of relation from all others; ‘harmonious’ because each kind of relation has analogies with every other kind of relation, linked analogously (i.e., by retrocipations or antecipations) with every other kind of relation (Dooyeweerd calls ‘modal universality’). According to one rendering of his position, post-1930, which was considered in the previous chapter, he argues for an ‘Archimedean point’ from which one can rightly apprehend the ontic systasis that binds the modalities together. One can do this without reducing that systasis to any one modality according to which one seeks to apprehend the world.  

This intuitive grasp can be exercised both in the context of the naïve apprehension of the different kinds of relation as well as in the theoretical attitude where they are distinguished from one another. With respect to naïve experience, Dooyeweerd speaks of the way ‘intuitively’ one takes account of the different modalities without

574 These are not set out in the order which Dooyeweerd himself does. His account of the second form of intuition (which Dooyeweerd tends to come to first, since as we have seen, relationality tends to be primary for him) is well developed, that of the first form (which Dooyeweerd tends to come to second as he only addresses individuality after relationality) less so, and that of the third (concerning events, undeveloped in Dooyeweerd’s ontology and epistemology), merely consists of fragmentary clues and possibilities.  
575 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 3.381 (‘de idee van een ding-totaliteit’); Dooyeweerd, N.C: 3.424; also Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.40 (‘doch deze idee is niet zonder een inhoud’), Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.74, 83. See 3.2.2.  
576 In 4.2.2.  
577 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.421; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.487 (here Dooyeweerd refers to John 13.8, comparing true knowledge in this respect with the participation of Peter and the other disciples in Christ).
theoretically distinguishing them. Through naïve intuition the ontic systasis is experienced ‘ensitically’, i.e., implicitly rather than explicitly. With respect to theoretical analysis, through the intuition of the ontic systasis across the modalities one forms a meaning-synthesis. This is the process whereby one grasps the ‘meaning nuclei’ (the irreducible cores) of each of the modalities and their mutual harmony and order (the ‘Idea of the totality of meaning moments in the meaning-modus’). Dooyeweerd also refers to the ‘Idea [i.e., the intuition – J.G.A.I.] of the integration of human societal relations’ (his italics). As we shall see below, this harmonious ordering of the different kinds of relation calls for an active human response. Dooyeweerd holds that it is only as we live out the reality of what it means to be created in the image of God that one can experience the coherence of the different forms of meaning – one is drawn into the deeper totality which is the grasp of the harmonious interweaving in life and thought of all the modalities in obedience to the laws and norms which govern them.

The third kind of use of the totality-Idea involves the grasp of events as wholes: It is ‘the grasp of … an occurrence’. This hints at the notion of time in the form of the ‘opening process’ of which ‘integration’ is a feature. This is least well developed of the three uses. However, if the Idea of Providence is restored, this provides a similar basis on which events as wholes might be grasped intuitively, and their time-aspects analysed through the process of modal differentiation.

‘Totality’ needs to be considered as the way that individuals, the ontic systasis of relation, and events as wholes – respectively – are grasped intuitively (i.e., in trans-modally holistic way) both naïvely and theoretically. This makes sense of the somewhat protean character of ‘totality’ in experience and reflection giving rise to the three different forms of intuition described above. I now turn to review where this retrieval and revision of Dooyeweerd’s Christian ground-Idea takes us.

578 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.33 (not in W.d.W.); see also Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap ‘Inleiding’: 10; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 27.
5.2.5 Dooyeweerd’s Christian Ground-Idea – Retrieval and Revision

As I have done with Vollenhoven, I shall review Dooyeweerd’s Christian ground-Idea in the light of the Reformational vision enunciated by Kuyper.

First, the Idea of Origin in itself provides a basis for both human and non-human created individuality. Here Dooyeweerd is close to Kuyper’s vision of God the Father as the one from whom all things take their distinctive uniqueness as individuals, not least with his stress on the dependence of all individuals on the Father as the ground of who or what they are.

Second, the Idea of Coherence similarly provides a necessary ontic basis for the harmony of the different kinds of relation, provided that it is linked with ‘totality’ insofar as the latter is seen to function, in effect, as the noetic counterpart (the noetic ‘synthesis’) of the ontic systasis; both are drawn together in the overarching Idea of Coherence (which I have capitalised to indicate that is an Idea of equal weight and status alongside that of the Origin). Here again, we see echoes of Kuyper’s affirmation of the lordship of the Son over every area of life – and it is the great achievement of Dooyeweerd, together with Vollenhoven, to extend the working out of that vision in every aspect of the created order.

Third, the Idea of Providence, a key organising principle for Dooyeweerd’s thought in the 1920s, is largely displaced from around 1930 on. Here Dooyeweerd shifts significantly away from Kuyper’s vision of the purposive work of the Holy Spirit in and through the historical process. This needs to be retrieved and placed alongside the Ideas of Origin and Coherence if the third element of the Kuyperian Reformational vision is to be taken into account.

I shall now briefly compare Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s accounts of the presuppositions of a Christian philosophy in the light of Kuyper’s Reformational vision in order to conclude this chapter.
5.3 The Presuppositions or Ideas in the Light of the Kuyperian Vision

Kuyper’s vision of the work of the triune God provides an integrated and balanced account of work of the Father as Origin, of the Son as the basis of the Coherence of the diversity of relations, and of the Holy Spirit as the sovereign executant of divine Providence. These three elements comprise the Kuyperian vision.

We have seen that, in the case of Vollenhoven, the three ground-types of which his ‘consequential problem-historical method’ traces out the outline (the theogonic-cosmogonic, the pure cosmological, and the cosmogonic-cosmological) are illuminated by the presuppositions of a transcendent Origin, Coherence and Providence. While Vollenhoven does not explicitly enunciate these as presupposita, he shows that emphasis on these in turn provides three alternative bases for a systematic view of the world. There is a close match between these presuppositions and the elements of the Kuyperian Reformational vision, but these presuppositions are not developed as an integrated system, only indirectly, and in isolation from one another. Vollenhoven, despite his preference for the cosmogonic-cosmological ground-type, and his distaste for the theogonic-cosmogonic, provides, in effect, his own ‘transcendental critique’, comparable to that of Dooyeweerd.584 But, unlike Dooyeweerd’s ‘Second Way’ which treats each of the Ideas as steps in a deductive ascent, it is not hierarchical – rather, it has an implicit recognition of the distinct and equal basis of the Ideas of Origin, Coherence and Providence.585 However, Vollenhoven does not capitalise on the systematic potential of these insights and does not give us an account of how they are structured into a single Christian ground-Idea.

On the other hand, Dooyeweerd does gives us an explicit account of presupposita and also provides an argument for the way that they are structured as Christian ground-Ideas of Origin, totality and coherence. He does so, however, in strongly hierarchical terms, not least in his subordination of the Idea of coherence to that of Origin. Further in his

584 See 2.2.
585 See 5.2.
account, the Idea of Providence, central to his appropriation of the Kuyperian vision in the 1920s, is eclipsed from around 1930 by the Idea of totality – not itself an Idea, but the intuitive grasping of the ontic features of reality in the light of the Ideas. So while Dooyeweerd, unlike Vollenhoven, presents an explicit and systematic account of the presupposita, I shall argue that he does so at the cost of a certain imbalance and distortion of the Ideas.

This leaves the question of how the disparate and seemingly contradictory strands in the thinking of the two philosophers can be systematically reconciled. I shall argue that their positions are in fact complementary; and in their complementarity, they systematically realise Kuyper’s vision for Reformational philosophy. In order to do this, I look again at each of the necessary conditions of experience (the transcendentals), as they are linked by the Ideas or presupposita in the light of the trinitarian vision enunciated by Kuyper; and will then draw them together with the aid of ‘perichoretic’ insights which have been rediscovered in late Twentieth Century trinitarian theology.
Chapter Six: Conclusion – a Trinitarian and ‘Perichoretic’ Reconstruction

In the course of this thesis I have located the thought of the two philosophers central to this study, Dirk Vollenhoven and Herman Dooyeweerd, in the modern Reformational tradition founded by Abraham Kuyper. In this chapter, by way of conclusion, I shall critically draw the insights of the two philosophers together in the light of the Kuyperian vision, and will also provide an indication of the way in which a revised philosophical framework is possible, which draws on their strongest insights.

In Chapter One, we have seen how Kuyper sees the work of the three Persons as founded on an eternal covenant among them, with the three Persons pictured as working together in creation, redemption and in bringing the universe to final glory. This joint action is grounded in the distinctive work of each of the three Persons: the work of the Father in the call of each creature to distinctive individuality; the work of the Son as Lord over every area of life and in whom all relations hold together; and the work of the Holy Spirit in working transformatively to bring creation to its final purpose.

In Chapter Two, I looked at the development of the two philosophers’ respective philosophical systems. Both worked within the brief of Kuyper’s wide-ranging vision of God’s triune engagement with the world and his call to work out the implications of this vision philosophically and to realise it practically in every area of life. Together, in 1922, they made a crucial breakthrough in the ‘discovery’ of the modalities – the irreducible ways of being and knowing of the world. Over the course of their joint tenure as professors at the V.U. in Amsterdam, they developed this insight in distinctive ways, each with their own approach and emphasis.

In Chapter Three, I noted how, with respect to the conditions of experience, Dooyeweerd tends to make relationality (for him, the ‘modal’ transcendentai dimension) his starting point. Then, in turn, relationality (which is what modal ordering is primarily about for Dooyeweerd) and individuality (‘individuality-structures’) are combined to form the hybrid notion of ‘cosmic time’. This displaces the potentially more fruitful accounts of the temporal process and the ‘time-aspects’ which are present,
albeit systematically orphaned, in the writing of Dooyeweerd. On the other hand, Vollenhoven starts with individuals, both in terms of the individuality functions (the ‘thus-so’, which for him is the ‘modal’ determination), and individual factuality (the ‘this-that’ determination as individuals are found in specific subject-subject and subject-object relationships); he provides an account of how relations between and among individuals are constructed over time as well as how individuals themselves change and develop over time. So while he starts with individuality, it is the implicit third determination (the ‘genetic’) which is systematically central to his ontology and epistemology, since it both gives actuality to individuals, and provides a basis on which relations are constructed. However, this creates problems in accounting for the universality of relations, and opens the door to a historicistic relativism.

In Chapter Four, I dealt with the question of religious orientation. Here I noted the sequential character of Vollenhoven’s account of the triune economy and Dooyeweerd’s hierarchical account, and the way these are reflected respectively in their accounts of human receptivity. Vollenhoven’s covenantal account of the human response over time contrasts with Dooyeweerd’s somehow verticalised account of the dependence of ‘supra-temporal heart’ on the Origin – however the term ‘supra-temporal’ may be interpreted. Nevertheless by reading both these accounts in ‘religious’ terms, a much closer convergence between their respective positions can be arrived at than might appear prima facie.

In Chapter Five, we saw that for both philosophers there is a link between the necessary conditions of experience and the religious orientation of the heart: the presupposita or Ideas which shape and direct their own systematic philosophies. Indeed, according to them, this applies to all systematic philosophical thinking. Identifying this link is not a straightforward matter – for different reasons in the case of each philosopher. In the case of Vollenhoven, while, as I have argued, the presupposita are central to his systematic analysis of the Western philosophy and his ‘consequential problem-historical method’ and for the tracing of his ‘ground-types’, they remain largely implicit. Moreover, the systematic implications of these insights remain largely unexplored, and, unlike Dooyeweerd, the presuppositions are not integrated or structured into an overall

Christian ground-Idea. A further problem is Vollenhoven’s emphasis on the third of the presupposita – that which stresses process to the detriment of those pertaining to origin and order. In the case of Dooyeweerd, the problem is the reverse: origin and order are emphasised to the detriment of process (as informed by the Idea of Origin and the ‘Ideas’ of ‘totality’ and ‘coherence’). The Idea of Providence, systematically central in his thinking in the 1920s, is largely eclipsed, from the 1930s on, by his stress on an a-temporal ‘totality’ – effectively the noetic correlative to the ‘ontic systasis’ according to which the different kinds of relation cohere.

Overall, in their accounts of the religious basis, the Ideas and the transcendentals, Vollenhoven tends to have sequential structure to his account, while Dooyeweerd tends to a hierarchical one. These divergent patterns to their systematic thinking result in a certain incommensurability between their respective philosophical insights – this despite their common inheritance of the Kuyperian Reformational vision, and their initial joint ‘discovery’ and continuing basic agreement about the number, identification and ordering of the modalities. However, there are possibilities for the philosophical positions of the two thinkers to be brought together in such a way that their divergences are seen to be complementary rather than mutually irreconcilable. I shall approach this in two steps in the two main sections of this chapter, respectively.

In the first section, I shall argue that while indeed there are problems in each of their accounts that need to be addressed and corrected, nevertheless, their accounts can be shown to be complementary. In order to do this, I shall look at the elements of the Kuyperian vision, bringing together their accounts of the necessary conditions of experience (i.e., their ontologies and epistemologies, or what I shall call the ‘transcendentals’), their respective religious orientations and their accounts of the philosophical presupposita. As we have seen, the problems and the incommensurabilities of their respective positions arise from differences of emphasis – indeed, as I argue, over-emphasis – on one or more elements of the Kuyperian vision to the detriment of others.

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587 As we have seen, this is recognized by Vollenhoven himself in 1973, with his characterization of himself as a ‘cosmogonic-cosmological’ thinker, and of Dooyeweerd as a monarchian thinker within the ‘pure cosmological’ ground type (see 5.1.2 and 5.1.3).

588 See Preface and Appendices One, Two and Three.
In the second section, I shall draw on further trinitarian resources to show the inter-linkage and to correct the balance of how the elements are considered. In this regard, I shall make use of the notion of ‘perichoresis’, as rediscovered by twentieth-century theologians, and the methodological insights it contributes, especially the possibility of coming to what I shall call ‘descriptive views’: three combinations of the basic elements which together allow one to come to a rounded view of the inter-dependence of individuality, relationality and time – at once seeing their inter-dependence, but avoiding the danger of over-emphasis on one element, or neglect of another.

I shall now proceed accordingly.

6.1 A Comparative Evaluation of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd in the Light of the Kuyperian Vision

So, in this section, the first of these steps, I shall compare the two philosophers in terms of the elements of the Reformational vision enunciated by Kuyper: that of the integrity of the individual before God, that of the Lordship of the Son over every area of life, and that of the working out of Spirit of God’s purposes for the world. Kuyper’s vision has been reinforced by developments in trinitarian thinking during latter half of the twentieth century.

In certain ways, these developments followed the clarion call of Karl Barth earlier in the century. As we have seen, the Reformed tradition at the V.U. in the early twentieth century placed strong emphasis on the Trinity; this is seen in the work of figures such as Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck (1854-1921), as well as the leading opponent of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, Valentijn Hepp (1879-1950). Across the Atlantic, this was matched by the trinitarian thinking of Cornelius van Til (1895-1957), a close but critical associate of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. Hepp was succeeded at the V.U.

in 1945 until 1973 by Gerrit Berkouwer (1903-1996), who attempted to steer an irenic course with respect to Barthianism, on the one hand, and Reformational philosophy, on the other.

Berkouwer’s successor at the V.U., Harry M. Kuitert (1924-), Professor of Theology (1967-1989), began directly to oppose the doctrine of the Trinity. This was part of what has been called ‘the eclipse of trinitarian theology’. However, even as Kuitert, and others, were voicing their strongest opposition to trinitarian thinking, there was a notable revival in trinitarian thinking elsewhere. Jürgen Moltmann (1926-), Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928-) and Robert Jenson (1930-), Colin Gunton (1941-2003) and T.F. Torrance (1913-2007) are Protestant thinkers who have restored the doctrine of the Trinity to a central place in the theological map, together with Roman Catholic theologian such as Karl Rahner (1904-1984), Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905-1988), and members of the Greek and Russian Orthodox churches, such as Metropolitan John Zizioulas (1931).

Calvin argues that God’s triune nature is:

….a special work to distinguish himself more precisely from idols. For he so proclaims himself the sole God as to offer himself to be contemplated clearly in three persons. Unless we grasp these, the bare and empty name of God flits about in our brains, to the exclusion of the true God.

Considerations of the Trinity arise firstly out of the encounter with Jesus Christ, as we find him witnessed to in Scripture, and through our personal experience. If Jesus is truly God, as is claimed in Scripture, most graphically in the Fourth Gospel, but throughout the New Testament, there must be a sense in which he is both the same, and yet different from the Father who sent him to us, and to whom he teaches us to pray. Then


593 Calvin, Institutes: 1.13.12.
there is the Spirit, whom Jesus promises, who again, is identified with Jesus and yet is distinct from him. This is against the background of the extensive use, throughout the Old Testament, of terms such as ‘Word’, ‘Spirit’ and ‘Wisdom’.\footnote{Arthur W. Wainwright, \textit{The Trinity in the New Testament} (1962): 30-234; Ben Witherington and Laura M. Ice., \textit{The Shadow of the Almighty: Father, Son and Spirit in Biblical Perspective} (2002): 1-147; Gerald O’Collins, \textit{The Tripersonal God: Understanding and Interpreting the Trinity} (1999): 11-83.}

As we have seen in Chapter Five, the triune narrative of the creation, redemption and transformation of the world by the Father, Son and Holy Spirit acting jointly in each of the great acts yields the three Ideas (or presupposita) that together constitute the ground-Idea of a Christian philosophy. The three presupposita that I have identified serve as links between the transcendental elements and transcendent orientation of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s philosophical positions; each Idea implicitly reflects the distinctive work of one of the three Persons.\footnote{It is important to note that the position being outlined here is that the world bears the impress of the work of the three Persons – not their being. The analogy being explored is that between the doctrine (i.e., specifically formulated in ‘pistical’ or faith terms) of the revealed perichoretic economy (joint work) of the three Persons and the wider philosophical possibilities which this insight opens up.}

Each of the Ideas thus corresponds to one of the three necessary conditions or ‘transcendentals’: individuality, relationality and time.\footnote{For an explanation of the ‘transcendentals’ used in this way see footnote in 1.1.}

I shall look at each of the transcendentals in turn in the light respectively of the work of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and at the Ideas or ‘presupposita’ yielded by the response to each: Origin, Coherence and Providence.

6.1.1 Individuality, the Idea of Origin and the Work of the Father

I begin by looking at the two philosophers’ respective positions vis-a-vis the Kuyperian Reformational emphasis on the integrity of the individual subject before God the Father. Here I shall draw together their accounts of individuality in the light of the work of the Father, and the Idea of Origin that that consideration uncovers as a presupposition of philosophical thinking.
Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd bring different insights to the question of individuality. In their mature thinking, both reject attempts to define individuality in terms of any metaphysical notion (e.g., ‘substance’) or metaphysical principle (e.g., in terms of the *principium individuationis*).\(^{597}\) Both philosophers see the uniqueness and distinctiveness of the individual as a subject, i.e., as a whole entity subject to the laws and norms of the created order.\(^{598}\) Vollenhoven brings together the this-that and the thus-so determinations as distinct but correlative (with respect to individuality, equivalent in effect to what Dooyeweerd calls the ‘cosmonomic’ and ‘factual’ sides of created reality). This provides a systematic philosophical framework to account for the way in which the laws or norms governing the functioning of individuals correlate with factual individuals in their specific contexts. In this respect he complements Dooyeweerd’s account of ‘individuality structures’: without the ambiguity of Dooyeweerd’s account and its tendency to over-conceptualism.

Drawing, then, on the insights of both thinkers, we see that an individual is given his, her or its unique identity by the creative fiat of the Father (following Vollenhoven), as Origin (following Dooyeweerd) which, properly acknowledged, prevents that person or thing from being seen as interchangeable with any other. Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd acknowledge that an individual cannot finally be known in terms of the sum of the different modalities – important as that multi-modal grasp of the individual is. This means that an individual needs to be met or encountered and accorded the appropriate respect. While it is only human beings who can be conscious of that dependence (and indeed, it is in the possibility of that consciousness that one’s humanity consists), *all* individuals as creatures have a dependence upon the Origin that constitutes the uniqueness of each individual. Who or what they are is grounded finally in their dependence upon the Origin. The transcendent orientation to the Origin thus opens us both to the naïve experience of individuals, and it also makes possible the

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\(^{597}\) See 1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1.1, and 3.2.1.

\(^{598}\) A ‘subject’ (as we have seen) is an entity which does not take its identity and constitution from itself, but only from the transcendent Other, on whom it is utterly dependent and by whose call it receives its being and distinctive constitution – compare the insights of the Roman Catholic *nouvelle théologie*, which Dooyeweerd mentions with approval, according to which the very act of bringing things into being is an act of sheer gift (see Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte’: 15; Dooyeweerd, ‘Centrum en Omtrek: De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee in een veranderende wereld’, *P.R.* 72 (2007): i/9-10, pp. 11-12, 12; De Lubac, *Mystery of the Supernatural*).
theoretical apprehension of individuals in a non-reductive way. Let us explore this somewhat further.

With both philosophers, we need to affirm that for any experience to be possible there need to be persons or things to experience; otherwise experience is entirely devoid of content. The world cannot be reduced to purely universal descriptions on the one hand, or fragmented into sheer particularity on the other. As Vollenhoven points out, individuals are not to be regarded merely as a list of functions or the possessors of a certain set of ‘properties’. There needs to be an implicit or explicit sense that the individuals of one’s experience need independently to take their uniqueness from their total dependence on the Origin, as Dooyeweerd argues; their otherness is not merely a function of one’s consciousness of them or the product of one’s conceptual analysis of them. It is a question of taking seriously the ‘thisness’ of persons and things – their irreducible uniqueness. How can an individual’s identity, irreducible uniqueness, and, indeed, final incomprehensibility, be accounted for in a philosophically satisfactory way? Individuality is the sheer, finally indescribable and unconceptualisable who-ness or this-ness of persons or things as we encounter them in ‘arms-length’ experience. As we are ourselves individuals, true self-knowledge needs to accord that same status to other human individuals, and indeed, albeit less directly, to non-human individuals as well.

Thus, for both philosophers we see that in ‘pre-scientific’ (Vollenhoven) or ‘naïve’ (Dooyeweerd) experience, the Idea of the dependence of individuals upon the Origin

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599 Husserl denies that it was possible to make sense of individuality in terms of universal principles of knowledge (Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy: Philosophy as Rigorous Science and Philosophy as the Crisis of European Man (1965): 116, cited in Tol, ‘Time’: 108 (n. 116)).

600 This is a question to which Duns Scotus’ notion of the haecceitas of individual persons and things offers insight (see 1.1).


602 See Martin Heidegger’s insight that art, for example, is both a reaching out to, and a recognition of the irreducibility of the thing depicted to any metaphysical or theoretical formulation (Martin Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ (1964)). A similar insight can be seen in the notion of ‘instress’, the poetic response to the this-ness of which informs the poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins (1844-1889), deeply influenced by the philosophy of Duns Scotus (for the latter see 1.1): ‘I kiss my hand to the stars, lovely asunder starlight, wafting him out of it . . . since tho’ he is under the world’s splendour and wonder, his mystery must be instressed . . . ‘ (‘The Wreck of the Deutschland’: 1.4). P.F. Strawson (1919-2006) argues that the identification of individuals finally depends on the ‘presupposition’ that there are persons and things so to be identified (P.F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (1959): 87-116, 190-213). This corresponds to Kant’s First Analogy of Experience (Kant, C.P.R.: A. 182-188/B224-232, pp. 299-304) provided that Kant’s account can be purged of its substantialist terminology.
illuminates the appreciation and acknowledgement of individuals as finally irreducible to any conceptual description of them. In such experience, individuals are known as continuous wholes, i.e., for naïve experience to make sense, there needs to be the naïve idea of an individual, or, as Vollenhoven puts it: an individual is ‘this’ or ‘that’. The perception of a hand, for example, is more than the specification of a given bundle of sense data. To pick out this or that sense-datum as relevant to one’s perception of a hand requires that one knows first what a hand is and how it is constituted, not necessarily ‘scientifically’ or ‘theoretically’, but certainly implicitly in a ‘pre-scientific’ or ‘naïve’, i.e., in an everyday, way.\footnote{As O.K. Bouwsma points out, \textit{pace} G. E. Moore – and, one might add, Russell (Bouwsma, ‘Moore’s Theory of Sense-Data’: 8-24).} A normally functioning human being knows the world not as a disordered mass, but as discrete and concrete entities. Even one’s encounter with enormous individuals, such as the Sun, or galaxies – or microscopic individuals, such as atoms or quarks – needs to be put into middle-sized terms in one’s mind for the purpose of apprehending them – for example models of galaxies on the one hand, or of atomic and sub-atomic particles on the other. These individuals or putative individuals need somehow to be represented to us in middle-sized terms in order for us to have an idea of them.\footnote{It is important to distinguish between ‘ideas’ (lower-case), the noetic grasp of individuals, as opposed to ‘Ideas’, the presupposita of philosophical thought (see 3.2.2 footnote and 5.2 introduction footnote). This is a systematic extrapolation of the thinking of D.F.M. Strauss in his revision of Dooyeweerd (Strauss, \textit{P.D.D.}: 176-188, 195, 369, 430, 469). In his doctoral dissertation Strauss, traces the notion of ‘concept’ (arising from the forms of knowledge specific one or other modality) and ‘idea’ (the bringing together of many concepts with reference to a concept-transcending whole, i.e., with reference to a specific individual). Concepts are abstracted from the universal relations which bind individuals, but they cannot themselves fully characterise the individuals to which they refer. For example, to have a concept of a chair would be to reduce it purely to one function, namely, an abstract notion of something upon which one can sit (Strauss, \textit{P.D.D.}: 12, 151). A concept cannot encompass all the other modal aspects of this or that chair (that is heuristically isolates the chair as a cultural-formative object from all its other characteristics). Strauss concludes: ‘The temporal identity of individual entities expresses itself in the modal diversity of aspects and can only be approximate in a regulative sense in a transcendental idea referring to the meaning-coherence in which every individual entity is embedded’ (Strauss, \textit{Begrip en Idee}: 202-203; Strauss, \textit{P.D.D.}: 176).} But, according to Dooyeweerd, one’s account of individuals also needs to be regulated by the sense that each individual is directly dependent upon the Origin, and as such has, as Vollenhoven points out, a secret identity (or ‘idea’ as Vollenhoven calls it) which cannot finally be conceptualised, only received from the Father.\footnote{Confusingly, in the context of Vollenhoven’s account of the threefold acts of God, the ‘idea’ of the individual in God’s mind is also called a ‘structure’, so that it has ontic force for Vollenhoven in that context (see 4.1.1.). As we have seen, for Dooyeweerd, the ‘Ideas’ (upper case) are religious properties of God’s mind, whereas the ‘ideas’ (lower case) are the individual’s properties as objects of knowledge.}
the ‘this-ness’ of the individual concerned cannot ever be fully comprehended, since each individual finally derives its unique identity and calling solely from its dependence upon the transcendent Origin. Thus in everyday or naïve experience, one encounters individuals as wholes and one must accord them the respect due to them as beings, like us, directly dependent upon God.

In addition to its constituting role in naïve experience, the Idea of the dependence of individuals upon the Origin also explicitly provides one with a transcendent basis for ‘scientific’ or ‘theoretical’ reflection upon individuals. Scientific or theoretical ideas (lower case) draw together concepts from a diversity of modalities to provide a composite description of the individual concerned. One can approximate the idea of an individual ‘scientifically’ (Vollenhoven) or ‘theoretically’ (Dooyeweerd), i.e., through systematic analysis. Individuals can be identified as falling under different typical descriptions, or what Dooyeweerd calls ‘individuality structures’ – as Vollenhoven puts it, ‘scientific’ descriptions in terms of the ‘thus-so’ determination. Individuals can be people or things, and individuality can also be seen in institutions, organic communities or voluntary associations. The theoretical idea of an individual is a description of the structure comprising the ordered functions of the individual.

presupposita. For the purpose of clarity, I have distinguished these from ‘ideas’ (lower case), which are about the epistemic grasp of individual wholes.

607 What has been called ‘type laws’, a term coined by Roy Clouser.
608 Each of these functions corresponds to the list of the modalities, which we saw listed at the beginning of Chapter Three. As explained there, these and the lists for relationality and time, are not necessarily final in their number and order; but are subject continually to revision in the light of the identification of the nuclear feature of each and their analogies (antecipations and retrocipations).
### Individuality Functions (listed below as ‘subject/object’)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pistical (faith)</td>
<td>believer/belief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethical</td>
<td>ethical agent/good deed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>juridical/legal</td>
<td>legal subject/legal object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aesthetic</td>
<td>admirer/aesthetic object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic</td>
<td>trader/commodity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social</td>
<td>social actor/custom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>symbolic/lingual</td>
<td>communicator/symbol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cultural-formative</td>
<td>shaper/utensil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logical/analytical</td>
<td>analyser/proposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>psychic/sensory</td>
<td>sensor/sensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>biotic</td>
<td>organism/cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>physical</td>
<td>particle/energy-packet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kinetic</td>
<td>body in motion/trajectory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spatial</td>
<td>extended figure/point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quantitative</td>
<td>cardinal numeral</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This theoretical ordering of functions, described by both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, involves the identification of the ‘founding’ and ‘leading’ function of that individual. For example, the theoretical idea of a plant will take into account how that plant is guided by the biotic function, or what it means to be subject to the laws governing biology. For the purpose of analysis, the individual being contemplated is isolated from that individual’s context and seen in terms of the laws and norms that govern it, i.e., in terms of its individuality-structure. This individuality-structure needs to be seen as a generalised approximation of one’s perception of the individual at a given time. However, it cannot finally capture fully who or what an individual is – only provide a modally-ordered description. While individuals can be described, or approximated to in conceptual terms, this needs continually to be revised in the light of the encounter with concrete (and not fully conceptualisable) individuals over time.

To extend Dooyeweerd’s insights: the Idea of Origin, grounded in the work of the Father, yields the recognition of the fact that there are things and persons which are not simply the product of my own

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mind; indeed, I myself cannot be the product of my own mind since I do not relate to the world as a disembodied epiphenomenon, but as one who is a full participant in the world. Even if I am dreaming, it is ‘I’ who am the participant. This confirms Vollenhoven’s account of the joint rooting of the individual in both their functionality and actuality in the calling of the Father, and corrects Dooyeweerd’s tendency (with a few exceptions) to see the individual merely in terms of structures ‘individualised’ through combinations of (‘modal’) relations.

Apart from being at best only provisionally grasped in naïve experience or theoretically through ideas, individuals should not be seen in isolation. The subjection of individuals to the Father as Origin can only be exercised in the context of the diversity of their relations with other individuals. This leads me to a consideration of the second element of the Kuyperian vision: the irreducible diversity of the different kinds of relation under the Lordship of the Son, and the presuppositum of Coherence which is uncovered as a result of this reflection.

6.1.2 Relationality, the Idea of Coherence, and the Work of the Son

The second element of the Kuyperian vision, then, concerns the irreducible plurality of society and the world under the Son. Both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven take up Kuyper’s rallying cry of the sovereignty of Christ (i.e., the Son) over every sphere, and more generally, the vision of the irreducible plurality of society and the world under Christ. Indeed, as I have described, they both extended Kuyper’s vision beyond its social application to the whole of the created order.619

However, neither Vollenhoven’s view of the Son as primarily fulfillment of the role as the revealer of the Law and the leading actor in redemption, nor Dooyeweerd’s view of the Son as occupying a subordinate role between the diversity of the temporal order and the eternity of the Origin, fully does justice to the joint divinity of the Son along with the Father and the Spirit. He is not only to be seen as the revealer of the love command and the covenantal office-bearer on behalf of humanity, or as with Dooyeweerd, as the

619 See Chapter Two.
stepping stone to the Origin – although he is both of those. Prior to his role as redeemer, he is the co-creator of the world with the Father and the Holy Spirit. The Son, as Calvin states it, is ‘autotheos’ and ‘aseitas’. As Vollenhoven emphasises in his rejection of the Son as ‘anhypostatos’, the Son in his incarnation is not a generic abstraction but the historically identifiable human being, Jesus Christ – born of Mary in Bethlehem, raised in Nazareth, died in Jerusalem under Pontius Pilate, buried in Joseph of Arimathea’s tomb, rose again, ascended on the Mount of Olives, and whose return in power and glory is expected as he promised. Through his incarnation, the Son shows us what it is to be in relation to our fellow human beings, and indeed how to be in proper relation with the world. This means that the work of the Son in redemption needs to be seen against the much wider backdrop of the work of creation – not just the Son as the root of the new creation, as Dooyeweerd has it, but the Son as co-creator with the Father and the Holy Spirit, looking forward to the bringing of creation to the state of its final transformation.

The Idea of Coherence is thus grounded in the work of the Son – the basis for the trustworthiness and regularity of the irreducible harmony-in-diversity of the many different kinds of relation. It is the work of the Son, in whom all things hold together, which illuminates both the naïve grasp of the transmodal harmony of the different irreducible kinds of the relation and provides the basis on which the analogies (antecipations and retrocipations) can be traced out. The theoretical distinction and analysis of those relations in specifically modal terms shapes the appreciation that others are interrelated at least in some way; when one calls a rose ‘red’, one can generally – at least within the bounds of certain implicitly acknowledged circumstances – expect one’s neighbour to do the same. In other words, there are universal connections that can implicitly be taken for granted. While confirming Dooyeweerd’s insight regarding the universal nature of relations, this corrects Vollenhoven’s tendency to see relations as constructed from the ‘directions’ of the respective relata (what I have called his ‘modified monadism’).

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620 See 4.1.1 and 4.2.1.
624 See 3.1.2 and 3.2.2.
As have we noted, the modified monadism of Vollenhoven’s account in which relations are treated, effectively, as combinations of the functions of the individuals concerned restricts relations to what pertains in a specific context. If relations are merely what pertain in a specific context, there is a danger of historicism, where the values of truth, goodness and beauty are relativised. Here Dooyeweerd’s account of relationality (or what he tends to call the ‘modal’ transcendental dimension) offers a corrective to Vollenhoven’s account. For Dooyeweerd, relations are universal in that they are ‘blind’ to the specific individuality of the subjects and objects which they link; in this he differs from Vollenhoven, where the subjects and objects pertain for him solely in the this-that determination, not in the thus-so determination. This has implications for both naïve experience and theoretical reflection, which once again I shall look at in turn.

With respect to the naïve experience of relations (or what Dooyeweerd calls the process of ‘naïve concept forming’), as we have seen, Vollenhoven does not address relations directly, but involves attention to them in the context of the individuals and events which they connect. Naïvely we truly experience the reality of relations. One does not have to wonder if a ball thrown into the air will fall down again. This does not mean that modal differentiation is absent; rather, it is implicit. As we have seen, it is ‘enstatic’: bound up in the ‘plastic’ continuity of the harmonious inter-relation of the modalities which Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd call the ‘ontic systasis’.

In order to come to a theoretical understanding of relations, it is necessary to distinguish the different irreducible kinds of relations for which rigorous descriptions can be formulated. The modalities should not be thought of as being refracted supra-temporally, as Dooyeweerd suggests. Rather, the modalities, in this instance seen in terms of the irreducibly different kinds of relations, need to be distinguished (or, to use Dooyeweerd’s favourite image of the prism, ‘refracted’) empirically in the light of the Idea of Coherence. In the light of the Idea of Coherence, the diversity of relations is open to being seen as holding together with one another by a web of analogies – not

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625 See 3.1.2 and 3.2.2.
626 See Chapter Three introduction and 5.2.2 and 5.2.4.
through the elevation of any sort of relation as itself the organizing principle (as in the case of the many ‘isms’, each of which seeks to reduce the diversity of relations to one sort of relation); rather all the different sorts of relation are viewed together in the light of a transcendent Coherence, not reducible to any one sort of relation, but to which they all refer. Then only can we think of all the relations holding together without any being reduced to one another. The Idea of Coherence thus provides a non-reductive, regulative grounding for the process of theoretical reflection. Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven together provide a list of the irreducible kinds of relation:

Kinds of Relation

- **pistical (faith):** trust
- **ethical:** benevolence, *truth*
- **juridical/legal:** fairness, *retribution*
- **aesthetic:** harmony
- **economic:** optimal exchange, stewardship, thrift
- **social:** courtesy, *social intercourse*
- **symbolic/lingual:** meaning, significance
- **cultural-formative:** formative control
- **logical /analytical:** on-contradiction
- **psychic/sensory:** feeling, sensitivity
- **biotic:** cellular composition
- **physical:** dynamic system
- **kinetic:** approaching or receding, speed
- **spatial:** contiguity, comparisons of size or shape
- **quantitative:** more or less than, equal to etc.

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627 As pointed out previously, what is important is not the precise description of each of these different relations, or indeed the precise identification, number and order of them. Their identification and ordering is open-ended and subject to continual and rigorous correction and elaboration. This does not mean that they are purely noetic constructions – quite the reverse, their elaboration is corrigeble precisely because of their openness to the grain of ontic.


631 Jonathan Chaplin argues for ‘tribution’ rather than ‘retribution’ as the core of the juridical modality, which makes sense if one sees the characterization of the modalities in creational, i.e., pre-lapsarian rather than post-lapsarian terms (Jonathan P. Chaplin, *Dooyeweerd’s Theory of Public Justice: A Critical Exposition* (1983)).


635 Dooyeweerd, *W.d.W.* 2.96; Dooyeweerd, *N.C.* 2.140-141 (n. 1), 379 (not in *W.d.W.*).


639 Dooyeweerd, *N.C.* 2.118-132 (not in *W.d.W.*).


642 Dooyeweerd, *N.C.* 2.99-102 (not in *W.d.W.*).


The principle behind the process of distinguishing of the different kinds of relation (or as they have been called ‘relation frames’\textsuperscript{646}) is that no one kind of relation is capable of providing a fully adequate description of the world and is irreducible to any other kind of relation. Only by taking into account the full range of these mutually irreducible kinds of relation, and giving them their proper consideration, can we truly live and think in a way that expresses the richness of the way that God created the world, and, in particular, how he provides for the true flourishing of human relations. The diversity of relations needs to be seen in turn in the context of other relations held together by a great web of analogies (antecipations and retrocipations); by these, the different kinds of relation are linked together harmoniously.\textsuperscript{647}

The work of the Son, the work of the Father, and the response of the human person to both, as grounded in the Ideas of Origin and Coherence, need to be seen in conjunction with the work of the Holy Spirit, which grounds the third Idea for which I have argued in the light of the Kuyperian vision, Vollenhoven’s account of the Trinity, and a critical retrieval of Dooyeweerd’s position from the 1920s: transcendent Providence.

\textsuperscript{646} M. D. Stafleu speaks of ‘relation frames’ (M. D. Stafleu, ‘Relations and Characters in Protestant Philosophy’, 2006, <http://www.freewebs.com/relationsandcharacters/>). However, unlike Stafleu, I do not see the modalities as such as the ‘relation frames’; rather, ‘relation frames’ are one way the modalities are refracted – in this case via the transcendental of relationality.

\textsuperscript{647} This corresponds to Kant’s Third Analogy of Experience (Kant, \textit{C.P.R.}: A. 211-215/B.256-262, pp. 316-319).
6.1.3 Time, the Idea of Providence, and the Work of the Holy Spirit

So, the third element of Kuyper’s Reformational vision is the purposiveness of the historical process through the work of the Holy Spirit, expressed in the Idea of Providence. This brings us to the question of time, which is perhaps the point of greatest systematic divergence between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. One way to characterise this divergence is between Vollenhoven’s narrative approach (such as with his notion of ‘lifelines’), and the more structural approach of Dooyeweerd (not least his notion of the ‘opening process’). To help put this divergence in context, I shall situate it in terms of the perennial question that is basic to the writing of history.

Historians attempt to account for the unfolding of time either by narrative chronicle, or by an analysis of the structures that underlie historical development – or even, some claim, determine it. The first option, that of chronicle, can be opened out artistically to a certain extent by extending it into the form of a narrative. This form of historical writing has been highly developed in the hands of skilled exponents; but it tends to consider the succession of events at the expense of systematic analysis of the deep structure of the underlying historical process. The second option has received its most developed exposition in the hands of the Annales School constituted by ‘l’histoire sociale’ (‘social history’) or ‘histoire des structures’ (‘structural history’). Here historical accounts take the form of building up layer on layer of structural elements, moving, as it were, in a series of geological strata, from the deeper and longest-term modalities to the shallowest and transient. The effect of this, as the reformational philosopher of history, M.C. Smit points out, is that ‘man has been surrendered to and made dependent upon the stream of history … the individual person has become subservient to the historical process’.

The tension within the practice of historical writing reflects an underlying tension in principle between the recognition of diachronicity (the narrative through time) and synchronicity (the structures at a given time). As Smit points out, it also tends

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649 The most notable exponent of the Annales school was Fernand Braudel (1902-1985) (Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age of Philip II* (1972)).
to deny a full recognition of the individual by prioritising either the narrative (in which the individual becomes merely a ‘role player’) or the structure (in which the individual becomes a point in the configuration of a particular set of structures within a given state of affairs). \(^{651}\)

What is needed is recognition that there is a narrative that is coherent, but irreducible to structural description; there must be room for both the diachronic and the synchronic, as well as for the mutual enrichment of both approaches or points of entry. However any narrative which is simply a chronicle of the succession of events cannot do this, since, as Smit argues above, it will either undercut a genuine recognition of the individuality of the participants, or reduce to incomprehensibility the temporal procession from one state of affairs to another. Genuine narrativity needs to be consonant with the structural connections between the individuals whose story is being presented – but is not reducible to those connections. How can a philosophical account of genuine narrative be provided in such a way that it is not mere chronicle on the one hand, or a mere reduction to the unfolding of a set of structural considerations on the other? This is the basic question that confronts all historians: how to resolve the tension between the diachronic and the synchronic? Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd both address this question, but from opposite points of view.

As we have seen, Vollenhoven has an extensive understanding of the work of the Holy Spirit in human society in general and not merely in the human heart – unlike Dooyeweerd. More specifically, he sees the work of the Holy Spirit bringing into effect what has been decreed by the Father and revealed by the Son, ‘positivising’ the law in concrete situations. \(^{652}\) The work of the Holy Spirit provides the expectation of the eschaton, but it should not be confined to the future; it must also be seen in terms of the expression of God’s Providence over history as a whole. \(^{653}\) The Holy Spirit effects creation jointly with the Father and, in redemption, makes possible the incarnation, work, death, and resurrection of Christ; it brings about both palingenesis (inner

\(^{651}\) This can be seen in Vollenhoven’s ground-types in the tension between the ‘cosmogonic-cosmological’ and the ‘pure cosmological’ (see 5.1.2 and 5.1.3).

\(^{652}\) See 4.1.1.

\(^{653}\) See 1.4.
religious change and redirection of heart) and the effectual call of all believers. The work of the Holy Spirit establishes a basis for holding that there is a transcendent Providence – that there is genuine movement forward. In concrete situations we see the leading role of the Holy Spirit, orienting all things to the transcendence of the Father, and directing them towards the greater realisation of the Kingdom of the Son. Vollenhoven calls this the ‘genetic’ determination: the process of moving from the past to the present to the future.

Reflection on the work of Holy Spirit thus yields the Idea of a Providence which transcends any specific narrative. The Idea of Providence holds open the possibility of genuine eventfulness, and so provides the grounding for time as a distinct transcendental, a necessary condition for experience. This involves the diverse ways in which states of affairs (i.e., combinations of individuals in connection with one another) lead to one another – or to put it another way, how states of affairs succeed one another. There is the need to make sense of events in the light of a larger story. Here I will argue that Dooyeweerd’s account of the ‘totality’ as a ground-Idea needs to be corrected and replaced by the retrieved Idea or presuppositum of God’s providence or of divine Providence or Purposiveness.

Moreover, the Idea of Providence provides a basis to consider and conceive of the passing of time or diachronicity. Jürgen Moltmann distinguishes between two

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654 See 1 introduction, 4.1.2 and 4.2.2. See also Colin E. Gunton, ‘The Holy Spirit who with the Father and the Son together is Worshipped and Glorified’ (2003): 88-90.


656 Here I am indebted to the seminal paper, Tol, ‘Time’. See also Tol’s introductory remarks in Vollenhoven, ‘Plato’s realisme (slotgedeelte)’: 153-154.

657 Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience, which Kant himself characterises by ‘causality’. In a most basis sense this means that there is a succession of events (Kant, C.P.R.: A. 188-211/B. 232-211, pp. 304-316).

658 See 4.2.3, One is presented with ‘the finality of non-resolution’: the narrative of the world cannot be resolved in terms of one narrative which one may attempt, and, in the words of Paul Janz, it ‘utterly forbids any ultimate resolution into explanatory mechanisms of any kind’, not least in the face of suffering or evil (Paul D. Janz, ‘Revelation as Divine Causality’ (2007): 78).
conceptions of the future: ‘futurum’ and ‘adventus’. According to Moltmann, the future in the sense of futurum is that which is mere extrapolation from the past via the present, whereas adventus refers to that which is a genuinely new development, opened up by a the hope in the future coming of Jesus, and the promise of cosmic transformation by the Holy Spirit which that brings.\(^659\) In this way, the idea of Providence gives weight to time as a transcendental in its own right, in such as way as to that the passing of time is not seen merely as more of the same – be that ‘same’ the universal continuity of relations or the duration of individuals – but, rather, a genuine openness to the transformativity of time. This is Vollenhoven’s ‘much more’. This ‘much more’ grounds both the naïve intuition of events, as well as the ‘scientific’ or ‘theoretical’ distinction of the different aspects of time, in terms of which events can be analysed, according to each of the modalities.

With respect to naïve experience, Vollenhoven describes how individuals come into existence and go out of existence. Individuals divide, join up, and bring about new individuals. In all of this, the genetic determination involves the individual, either as a whole or in part, in a variety of ways.\(^660\) This is the nature of actual time which we can only experience. Events bring individuals together; but events are not to be confused with either relations or individuals – events are not the individuals or relations themselves but the changes in the permutations of those relations as they link the individuals concerned. If events are no more than individuals and relations, nothing actually happens; eventfulness is reduced to inclusion in an ever widening hierarchical complex of individuals and relations, resulting in an infinite regress to an all-encompassing totum simul constructed in terms of a dominant, overarching explanatory principle.\(^661\) Pace Dooyeweerd, the unfolding of events cannot be treated merely as the unfolding of the order of the modalities, nor as the perdurance of individuals.\(^662\)

With respect to the theoretical attitude, both philosophers provide lists of time aspects which correspond to each of the modalities.\(^663\) Each time aspect describes an irreducibly different kind of time, as follows:


\(^{660}\) 3.1.3.

\(^{661}\) Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative (1990): 158-161.

\(^{662}\) 3.2.3.

\(^{663}\) The situation is confused in the case of Dooyeweerd (albeit not for Vollenhoven), in that according to him the time aspects are the modalities – the cosmonomic side of ‘cosmic time’. Nevertheless, inconsistently, he himself provides comprehensive lists of the time aspects which are distinct from the individuality functions, and are not merely kinds of relation.
Time Aspects

faith (pistical): liturgical time, ‘time of belief’, revelation
ethical: ‘right’ time, priority of moral obligation
juridical/legal: length of validity, retribution
aesthetic: aesthetic moment, dramatic order, rhythm
economic: interest, rent, profit, wage, economic cycle
social: conventional time, social priority
symbolic/lingual: word order, tense, symbolic moment

cultural-formative: cultural order, periodicity

logical/analytical: prius et posterius
psychic/sensory: tension, durée
biotic: growth time, organic development
physical: causal irreversibility, physical time
kinetic: constancy, duration
spatial: simultaneity
quantitative: succession, ordinality

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665 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.33 (not in W.d.W.); Popma, Inleiding: 75-76.
666 Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 32.
668 Vollenhoven, Encyclopedia Introduction: 32.
673 ‘Staying too long’ (Dooyeweerd, Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer: 105-106; Dooyeweerd, Crisis in Humanist Political Theory: 91); Popma, Inleiding: 70-71.
675 Popma, Inleiding: 68-70.
677 Dooyeweerd, Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer: 105; Dooyeweerd, Crisis in Humanist Political Theory: 90; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 30.
678 Vollenhoven, Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer: 105; Dooyeweerd, Crisis in Humanist Political Theory: 90; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 30.
683 Dooyeweerd, Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer: 105; Dooyeweerd, Crisis in Humanist Political Theory: 90; Vollenhoven, Introduction: 48, p. 33; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 30; ‘Groeitijd’ (Popma, Inleiding: 71-72); Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.28.
684 ‘Physische tijd’ (Popma, Inleiding: 63-64).
687 Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 29.
Once again, as with individuality functions and kinds of relation, the identification of the modally distinct kinds of time is provisional upon the identification, number and ordering of the modalities. The modalities provide the laws and norms which govern each aspect of an event.

Thus we see how the Idea of Providence, resting as it does upon the mystery of the work of the Holy Spirit, forbids any attempt to elevate any specific kind of explanation, or causal hypothesis, to a position of special privilege in this way. It also prevents the reduction of time either to relationality or individuality: the actuality of specific events cannot fully be captured by the description of all the relations involved, while events cannot be seen purely within the world-lens of any individual, or indeed in the mere perdurance of individuals over time. As we have seen, Vollenhoven argues, there is an actuality of events which is ‘much more’ than just the sum total of the individuals and relations concerned. This appreciation of the actuality of events complements the tendency in Dooyeweerd to present a somewhat over-conceptual account of the temporal process, not least in his account of ‘cosmic time’, and reinforces resources in his own account that can be developed to correct this.
6.1.4 The Mutual Correction of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd in the Light of the Kuyperian Vision

In the preceding sections, I have been looking at what I shall call, the ‘transcendentals’, i.e., the necessary conditions for being and knowing (I shall use this term for both thinkers, even though Vollehoven tends to avoid this term and Dooyeweerd tends to use the term, ‘transcendental dimensions’) in the light of the work of the three Persons and the basic presupposita or Ideas grounded in that threefold work. The transcendentals shape their respective accounts of what they call the ‘modalities’, i.e. the different kinds of laws and norms (what Dooyeweerd calls the ‘cosmonomic side’ of created reality), and what it means for individuals, relations and events (what Dooyeweerd calls the ‘factual side’ of created reality) to conform to these laws and norms. Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd approach these necessary conditions in different ways.

For Vollenhoven, the point of entry is the transcendental of individuality, i.e. that there are individuals and the question to which this recognition gives rise, namely ‘what are individuals’. For him the modalities are discerned in the first instance as functions of individuals, and, in a reverse procedure to that of Dooyeweerd, sees relations as constructed over time from the functions of concrete individuals. The diversity of the ways that individuals function exhibits law-conformity and the correlative diversity of laws to which they conform. It is that diversity of laws and norms, which Vollenhoven designates as the ‘thus-so’ determination. In correlation with this, Vollenhoven’s account of law conformity is about concrete individuals-in-relations (i.e. ‘this-that’). The difficulty in Vollenhoven’s account arises when he attempts a systematic account of the relations between or among individuals. For him, these tend to remain the combined functioning of the individuals involved, rather than these relations having a status in their own right.

For Dooyeweerd, the point of entry is relationality, i.e., that there are (universal) relations that link individuals and comprise all the connections in the structuring of the

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688 3.1.1
689 3.1.2.
world. For him, the modalities are discerned in the first instance by examining the different, irreducible kinds of relation. These (relational) modalities are ‘individualised’ by being seen as functions of individuals, and then grouped in an ordered way as ‘individuality structures’. Combined with his tendency to see the modalities as the appropriate laws or norms, this results in a somewhat over-conceptual account of individuals. It is often unclear whether Dooyeweerd is speaking of the laws or norms governing individuals, or those individuals themselves.

When their accounts of time are compared, once again Vollenhoven, with his more robust account of time as eventfulness, makes it possible to provide an account of individuals coming into being, growing and developing, and then going out of being. Vollenhoven avoids Dooyeweerd’s conflation of time with modal ordering on the one hand, and with individuality structures on the other (Vollenhoven insists that time is ‘much more’ than this combination) – but ironically, it is Dooyeweerd who supplies the missing piece in the puzzle: Dooyeweerd’s account of real relations which make it possible to read the modal distinction so uncovered across to the time aspects (just as is the case with the individuality functions described above).

This mutual correction of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, which I have traced out in the three preceding sub-sections, takes account of the three elements of the Kuyperian vision: that of individuality grounded on the Idea of Origin in the light of the work of the Father; that of relationality grounded on the Idea of Coherence in the light of the work of the Son; and that of time grounded on the Idea of Providence in the light of the work of the Holy Spirit. We have seen this being worked out for both philosophers with respect to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, as follows:

Firstly, for Vollenhoven, the Father is the one among the Persons of the Trinity who calls or names each person or thing as this or that. According to this alternative correlation, one’s individuality (marked out by this-that determination) is the direct outcome of God’s creational command for each structure – the secret constitution of

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690 3.2.1.
691 3.2.2.
692 3.1.3 and 3.2.3.
each creature known only to God.\textsuperscript{693} Similarly, for Dooyeweerd, each individual is unique and non-interchangeable in dependence upon the Origin.\textsuperscript{694}

Secondly, with respect to the Son, Vollenhoven describes how, in the call to loving obedience, it is the Son who takes the leading role; he models the character of true relationships and provides the normative basis for them.\textsuperscript{695} This yields the Idea of Coherence according to which, to draw on Dooyeweerd’s insights, the diversity of relations, each universal in scope, hold together.\textsuperscript{696}

Thirdly, for Vollenhoven the Holy Spirit is linked to the ‘positivisation’ of new states of affairs, which Vollenhoven sees as the distinctive work of the Holy Spirit. As we have seen, positivisation as temporal unfolding is grounded in the Idea of Providence.\textsuperscript{697} It is at this point that we notice a lacuna in Dooyeweerd’s account, since his account of the Holy Spirit is largely confined to the latter’s work in human heart, and from 1930 on, the Idea of Providence is largely removed from his systematic thinking by his notion of ‘cosmic time’. Nevertheless, by the retrieval of the Idea of Providence central to his thinking in the 1920s one the one hand, and with reference to the ‘great process of becoming’ and other indications in his thinking that time is not merely order and duration but also eventfulness.\textsuperscript{698}

Thus in the light of the Kuyperian vision of the work of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit and the Ideas of Origin, Coherence and Providence which each yields, a basis can be found to ensure the distinction of each of the transcendentalis of individuality, relationality and time, and to accord each of these elements their appropriate weight and distinctiveness in their systematic consideration, both of ‘pre-scientific’ (Vollenhoven) or ‘naïve’ (Dooyeweerd), or ‘scientific’ (Vollenhoven) or ‘theoretical’ (Dooyeweerd) reflection in the light of the Ideas of Origin, Coherence and Providence respectively. However, having considered each separately, it is necessary to draw them together in such a way as not to lose this distinctive recognition of each of the elements (i.e., each

\textsuperscript{693} 4.1.1 and 5.1.1.
\textsuperscript{694} 4.2.1 and 5.2.1.
\textsuperscript{695} 4.1.1 and 5.1.2.
\textsuperscript{696} 4.2.1 and 5.2.2.
\textsuperscript{697} 4.1.1 and 5.1.3.
\textsuperscript{698} 4.2.1 and 5.2.3.
transcendental and the corresponding Idea), but also to draw them together in order to put together the whole picture again. In order to do this, I shall draw on the trinitarian notion of ‘perichoresis’.

6.2 A ‘Perichoretic’ Way to see Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd as Complementary

As I have just indicated, in this section I shall argue that this interdependence and distinctiveness of the different elements can be suggested by analogy with the trinitarian notion of ‘perichoresis’, and that in the light of this analogy, combinations of the transcendentals and the corresponding Ideas which illuminate them, can be discerned. These combinations provide a way to draw the transcendentals and the corresponding Ideas together into a larger picture; they also further provide insights into the way in which the systematic divergences between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd can be reconciled.

*Perichoresis* is not being offered as a solution in any deductive sense, rather as a suggestive characterisation of an approach which can provide an alternative to the sequential character of Vollenhoven’s, and the hierarchical character of Dooyeweerd’s presentation respectively. The perichoretic model is not a simple one, and needs to be approached in a thorough and critical way. It needs to show how the triune communion can operate in concert *at any one time* without confusion about the operation of each distinct Person, grounding the diversity in the unity and *vice versa*. There needs to be recognition of the equal ultimacy of the unity of the Godhead and the diversity of the Persons.

The perichoretic model is by no means foreign to the Calvinian tradition. Calvin argues that the Son and the Spirit are equally active in creation, and that each Person is

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699 See Calvin, *Institutes*: 1.13.12 (also 14.12.16, 16.17). Torrance points out that Calvin uses Cyprian’s notion of *in solidum* from Cyprian, *De Unitate Ecclesiae*: 3 and 5 ff. He also quotes from Augustine *De Trinitate* 6.8.8 also 6.10.12: ‘In the supreme Trinity one [Person] is as much as three together, nor are two anything more than one. And they are infinite in themselves, so both each are in each, and all are in each,
God in his own right, not successive manifestations of God.\textsuperscript{700} Calvin quotes Gregory of Nazianzus with approval:

\begin{quote}
I cannot think of the One without immediately being surrounded by the radiance of the Three; nor can I discern the Three without at once being carried back to the One.\textsuperscript{701}
\end{quote}

The term ‘\textit{perichoresis}’ describes the indwelling of the Persons of the Trinity one with another: each retains its own distinctiveness in their joint ‘economy’ or work in the world. ‘\textit{Perichoresis}’ (‘\περιχώρησις’) derives from ‘\textit{chora}’ (‘\χώρα’), Greek for ‘space’, or ‘\textit{chorein}’ (‘\χωρεῖν’) which means ‘to contain’, ‘make room for’ or ‘to go forward’. It was originally a christological notion in which the two natures of Christ are seen in relation to one another. The use of the term ‘\textit{perichoresis}’ with respect to the Trinity seems to have originated with Pseudo-Cyril and was later used in the dogmatics of Maximus Confessor and John of Damascus.\textsuperscript{702} The perichoretic approach is based on

\textsuperscript{700} Calvin, \textit{Institutes}: 1.13.22.
\textsuperscript{701} Calvin, \textit{Institutes}: 1.13.16, 11.13.17; John Calvin, \textit{Commentary on the Gospel according to John}, vol. The John Calvin Collection (1998) on 1: 1; Calvin, Epistle 607; Torrance, \textit{Christian Doctrine of God}: 112, 201; Butin, \textit{Revelation, Redemption, and Response}: 42-43, 124, 161 (n. 133), 206 (n. 125). The notion of ‘\textit{perichoresis}’ is associated with the Eastern (Greek) rather than the Western (Latin) theological tradition. The contrast between the Eastern (Greek) and the Western (Latin) views of the Trinity is associated with the ‘paradigm’ associated with the name of Théodore de Régnon (1831-1893; see Théodore De Régnon, \textit{Études de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité} (1892-1898)). De Régnon has, however been subjected to close critique by Michael Barnes (Michael René Barnes, ‘De Régnon Reconsidered’, \textit{Augustine Studies} 26 (1995)), and Lewis Ayres (Lewis Ayres, \textit{Augustine and the Trinity} (2010)). Whether or not the contrast suggested by the ‘de Régnon thesis’ and asserted more recently by Colin Gunton (Colin E. Gunton, ‘Augustine, the Trinity and the Theological Crisis of the West’, \textit{Scottish Journal of Theology} 43 (1990)) is correct, the insights of the Cappadocian Fathers, Basil of Caesarea (330-379), Gregory of Nazianzus (329-c. 389) and Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335-394) complement the position of Augustine (354-430), whose theology has been dominant in the Western theological tradition, both Roman Catholic and Protestant. The issue of the precise patristic provenance of the insights drawn on here (whether they are exclusive to the Eastern tradition, or whether shared between East and West) is secondary to the value of the insights themselves as they are rooted in a biblical vision of God and taken up, as here, by John Calvin within the Reformed tradition.

the notion of communion and the interplay of distinct Persons in mutual interdependence, working lovingly and harmoniously within a common field of action.\(^{703}\) Thus, this approach gives the work of each of the Persons equal and conjoint weight, correcting the distortions that result from over-emphasising the one or the other.

A perichoretic understanding of the Trinity grounds the diversity of the whole in the unity and vice-versa. In terms of this picture, each of the Persons is dependent on the two others in the divine economy. We see first the Father as he is known as the Origin of all things in and through the Son and through the agency and execution of the Holy Spirit. All persons and things have their distinctive individuality through the calling of the Father, and are named by the Father. This is made known to us in and through the Son and is effected by the Holy Spirit. Second, we see the Son, whose unbroken relationship with the Father and the Spirit assures us of his continuing transcendence, becoming a fully human individual; and through the anointing of the Spirit and declaration of the Father becoming ‘the Christ’ (‘the Messiah’ – the anointed one).\(^{704}\) The many different aspects of the world are bound together harmoniously in the relationships made possible in and through the Son. As the Son is the one in whom all things hold together, so this allows us to comprehend the diversity of all things without reducing them to one another. He is the focus of all things, and yet he frees all things fully to fulfil the calling they have from the Father, as they are empowered by the Holy Spirit. Third, we see the Spirit sent by the Father and witnessing to the Son – indeed, bearing the latter’s identity as the ‘Spirit of Christ’. The Holy Spirit makes all things possible according to the will of the Father, as they are transformed according to the eschatological measure of the risen Son. This is true not just for each element considered separately, but also for the elements seen in combination. In all these dynamic interactions, dependence does not constitute a deficit but enables each of their distinctive work. Thus perichoresis affirms the joint yet distinctive work of the Persons at every point, and the way that this distinctiveness is grounded in their mutuality and common divinity.

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\(^{703}\) See Gunton, *The One, The Three and the Many*: 152 ff.

The insights gained with respect to our consideration of the distinctiveness and mutuality of the perichoretic work of the three Persons can provide an analogical guide to the systematic consideration of the transcendentals. I argue that what I am putting forward is not a return to the *analogia entis* for the following reasons:

First, the notion of analogy being used is the reformational one which pertains between different modally-defined kinds of discourse – in this case, the concept of *perichoresis* specific to faith discourse opens up other forms of discourse by analogy.705

Second, the concept of *perichoresis* in this context refers to the work of the triune Persons, not their being. The three Persons work together and so together realise the plural and irreducible diversity of the world.706

Third, the basis of God’s relationship with the world is a covenantal not an analogical one. In Chapter One, I argue that the Kuperian view presents an alternative to a view of God framed in essentially monadic terms as either supreme intellect (in which creation is seen as a reflection of God’s mind), or supreme will (in which God is seen as an arbitrary *potestas absoluta*). The perichoretic trinitarian position provides a clear alternative to both these positions. The conception of the love among the Persons, and the covenant which flows from that avoids both the conception of God as a monadic intellect, as well as the alternative (voluntarist) conception of God’s *work* as sheer *potestas absoluta*.707

Using the perichoretic analogy, we can see that all three transcendentals are complementary, and each is necessary for the full description of a specific state of affairs. An individual is only known as the developing character of that individual as expressed over time, and in terms of the different kinds of relation that come to light. Relations are only known through looking at a concrete individual in actual relationships and the way relationships develop over time. Events are known through the unfolding of relationships over time, and the development of the character of the

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705 See Chapter Three introduction.
706 See above.
707 See Chapter One introduction.
individuals concerned. Just as the work of the three Persons needs to be seen as both distinctive to each Person, yet mutually dependent between each pair of Persons in turn (e.g., the Father sending the Son and the Son revealing the Father, or the Son giving the Spirit and the Spirit witnessing to the Son), so each pair of the transcendentals (as I have addressed them one by one in the previous section), and the corresponding Ideas which open them up, needs to be seen as inter-dependent.

I shall call each of these pairs of epistemically inter-dependent basic features of reality, ‘descriptive views’. Three combinations are possible: individuals over time, relations over time, and, and individuals in relation. Together these three ‘descriptive views’ provide a rounded picture of relationships seen from different viewpoints. I shall look at each combination of these transcendentals in turn. Each of the ‘descriptive views’ is regulated and opened up by the Ideas which ground the respective transcendentals: that of individuals over time is regulated jointly by the Ideas of Origin and Providence; that of relations over time by the Ideas of Coherence and Providence; and that of individuals in relation at a given time by the Ideas of Coherence and Origin. Each of the descriptive views provides an axis of analysis and presentation that needs to be complemented by both of the other two descriptive views. As we shall see, the axes of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s thought each tends to lie within one of these descriptive views, albeit different ones, just as they emphasise the respective transcendentals somewhat differently; although they do not do so straightforwardly or exclusively, since the matter is complicated by, e.g., Dooyeweerd’s tendency to emphasise the cosmonomic rather than the factual side of created reality. Their gravitating to different descriptive views in this way helps to explain some of their divergences, and also provides a way to show how they can systematically complement one another.

6.2.1 Individuals over Time as Illuminated by the Ideas of Origin and Providence

The first descriptive view, regulated jointly by the Ideas of Origin and Providence, involves the coming into being, reconstitution and going out of being of individuals (including social wholes) over time; it also embodies the joining and separation of individuals as they enter and leave social wholes. An individual can be contemplated
over time by tracing how the concreteness of that individual presents itself; ensuring that all the features of that individual form a continuous whole.

Vollenhoven tends to gravitate to this descriptive view in that, as we have noted, he tends systematically to proceed from consideration of individuality to the states of affairs which are built up with respect to, or among, individuals, over time. In this regard we can note his account of ‘successive intra-individual connections’ that trace out that individual’s ‘life line’ (‘levenslijn’). This ‘successive intra-individual’ connection provides a narrative for that individual. Through his recognition of the ‘genetic’ determination as ‘much more’ than relationality and individuality, Vollenhoven provides a systematic basis for this.

Dooyeweerd lacks the narrative thread provided by Vollenhoven’s account of ‘successive intra-individual connections’ and by ‘life lines’, and in the isolated instances where he does this (as in the case of the linden tree outside his study window) it rapidly becomes a structural account. In the latter regard, he provides an extensive account of ‘individuality-structures’, which are both elaborate and highly focussed conceptually, with, as we have noted, a tendency to over-emphasise the cosmonomic side of individuality at the expense of the factual side. For Dooyeweerd, an individual’s development is governed by the internal destination (‘bestemming’) appropriate to its individuality structure, e.g., the linden outside his study window has a destination to grow from seed to fully-grown tree. Dooyeweerd’s account of the unfolding of the internal destination of individuals over time (the ‘internal opening process) is complemented by account of ‘internal’ or ‘foundational’ enkapsis. In this latter, we see the development of individuals over time through the process of ‘enkaptic interlacement’ (e.g., changes in the composition of molecules providing the foundation at the level of the physical modality for the growth of cells at the level of the biotic modality): without losing their own integrity, existing individuals facilitate the coming into being of new ones. However, since time, at least in his account of ‘cosmic time’, is effectively a hybrid of relationality and individuality, it lacks the systematic resources to account for the coming into being, or unfolding of individuals over time. What remains

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708 See 3.1.3.
709 See 3.2.4.
is the cosmonomic description of what individual development must or should be, rather than the narrative of their actual development.

For Vollenhoven, as we have seen, all individuals have a unique identity, given by the Father, which is unfolded providentially over the course of that individual’s life. Here the Idea of Providence forbids any deterministic account of the individual’s life line, since it calls a halt to attempting any explanation in terms of any one modality. The Idea of Origin, on the other hand, forbids any attempt to reduce one’s account of an individual to the sum of the different ways of its functioning, to attempt to explain any outcome in terms of the sum of the different ways (distinguished modally) of that individual’s functioning at any given time. This together the Ideas of Origin and Providence exclude functionalism (the notion that any individual can be explained by the sum total of its functions) and determinism (the notion that any set of modally refined laws or principles can entirely explain the process from one state of affairs at a given time to another at a later time).

Dooyeweerd, on the other hand, has a danger of tending to both functionalism, with his emphasis on ‘individuality structures’, and what Vollenhoven calls the ‘modalisation’ of time (and I have called ‘modal determinism’), with his tendency to describe his ‘opening process’ (in this case – the ‘internal’ opening process) in terms of the cosmonomic side, i.e., in terms of what must or should happen rather than, as Vollenhoven does, provide a narrative of the individual concerned. As we have noted also, the Idea of Providence tends to be eclipsed systematically in his philosophical thinking after the end of the 1920s, so that he does not provide a strong account of the individual’s ‘life line’ in a narrative way as Vollenhoven does, and his account tends to be frozen deterministically.

Overall in this descriptive view, then, Vollenhoven’s more robust account of the narrative of individuals over time provides a more satisfactory systematic basis for the descriptive view regulated by these two Ideas, than does Dooyeweerd’s more conceptual account, with its tendency to both functionalism and determinism.710

710 The ‘opening process’ as such need not be seen as being deterministic. The point I am trying to make is the narrower one about the systematic problem which the reduction of time to modal ordering (the
Nevertheless, by bringing together their respective insights, a fuller picture of both the narrative of individuals and their structural unfolding can be gained.

As we turn to the second descriptive view, by contrast, we shall see that it more closely reflects Dooyeweerd’s account of both ‘cosmic time’ and the ‘opening process’ which concerns individuals in relation at a given time, as regulated by the Ideas of Origin and Coherence.

6.2.2 Individuals in Relation at a Given Time as Illuminated by the Ideas of Origin and Coherence

The second descriptive view involves looking at a network of relationships at a given time. Each relation between two individuals has implication for third-parties, and these yield further relationships (where a relationship is a relation or set of relations between specific individuals). Relationships between or among individuals are also multi-textured in that they comprise layers of different kinds of relation which form complexes of links between or among the individuals involved. As we have seen, this descriptive view can be seen in Dooyeweerd’s account of what he calls a ‘correlative’ or ‘environmental’ enkaptic relationship and which the background network of relationships undergirding any specific relationship is traced out.\(^7\)

In general, this is the axis to which Dooyeweerd’s thought tends, shaped as it is by the Idea of Origin on the one hand, and the Idea of Coherence on the other.\(^7\) This is the view enshrined by Dooyeweerd’s notion of ‘cosmic time’, which has relationality in the form of the diversity of the modalities on its ‘cosmonomic side’, and individuality in the

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\(^7\) For both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, pace the different schools of neo-Kantians, it is critical that the ontic systasis is mind-independent (hence ‘ontic’). The noetic synthesis is the intuitive grasp of the ontic systasis – as we have seen this is a position first developed by Vollenhoven (see 2.1). There is only one act, not two: the ontic systasis is not an act – it is the mind-independent object of the noetic synthesis. Further we have seen, totality is more than the noetic synthesis. It can also be the intuitive grasp of individuals as wholes/unities or the grasp of events as wholes/unities (see 5.2.4).
form of the enduring individuality structures on its ‘factual side’. It is also in keeping with Vollenhoven’s characterisation of Dooyeweerd as a ‘pure cosmonomic’ thinker, i.e., one who emphasises enduring structure over changing process.

By contrast, the axis of Vollenhoven’s thought does not sit as easily within this descriptive view, because while he stresses individuals as called into being by the Father as creator (i.e., as we have seen, in the light of the Origin), for him, the focus is on process rather than structure (i.e., he tends to emphasise Providence rather than Coherence). Nevertheless, what Vollenhoven calls ‘contemporaneous inter-individual connections’ does capture something of this descriptive view, although, unlike Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven’s account is not primarily a synchronic but a diachronic one – for him, the contemporaneous is a moment abstracted from a succession of moments (whereas for Dooyeweerd, the opening process is a conceptual projection from the synchronic).

In addition to the descriptive views first of individuals over time, and of individuals in relation at a given time, illuminated by the Ideas of Origin and Providence, and Origin and Coherence respectively, there is a third combination possible which completes the full perichoresis, namely that of relations over time as illuminated by the Ideas of Coherence and Providence.

6.2.3 Relations over Time as Illuminated by the Ideas of Coherence and Providence

The third descriptive view involves not only the widening and deepening of existing relations, but also the discernment of new ones; it correspondingly involves the expression of new forms of relations in new combinations, while new structural formations express themselves and are recognized in relation to others. This descriptive view is only partially realised in the thought of both philosophers, and for neither is it centrally axial.

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713 3.2.3.
714 5.1.2.
715 3.1.3 and 3.2.3.
716 One philosopher in the Reformational tradition whose thinking comes closest to this descriptive view is Lambert Zuidervaart who proposes an account of truth as ‘a dynamic correlation between (1) human
Vollenhoven can partially provide a systematic account of this descriptive view through his account of ‘successive inter-individual’ relations, although what he accounts for in his way is not so much the relations themselves and the way they are differentiated as the construction over time of different arrangements of the (relational) ‘directions’ of the individuals concerned.\(^{717}\) However, there is a similarity between Vollenhoven’s account of ‘successive inter-individual’ relations and Dooyeweerd’s account of ‘external enkapsis’.\(^{718}\)

Dooyeweerd’s notion of the ‘opening process’ can to a certain extent be seen as a working out of this descriptive view. One aspect of this involves a process of ‘differentiation’ across the modalities: the different kinds of relation are distinguished from one another over time.\(^{719}\) However we have noted Dooyeweerd’s tendency to a certain over-conceptuality and tendency to a certain determinism based on the order of the modalities, which prescribes how relations must or should unfold (with perhaps also a European or Western bias) rather than how they actually do in concretely observed processes or indeed in all situations and across all cultures. We have also noted, nevertheless, that he partially corrects this tendency with respect to the juridical modality in his account of juridical causality in which he accounts for the coming into existence and going out of existence of modally specific subject-subject and subject-object relations.\(^{720}\)

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1. Societal principles implicitly illuminated by the Idea of Coherence;
2. Life-giving disclosure implicitly illuminated by the Idea of Providence.

In both respects, Zuidervaart further stresses the factual side rather than the cosmonomic side – in this regard his position is the opposite of that of Dooyeweerd, who tends to do the reverse. However, this does not place Zuidervaart outside the Reformational tradition – he is merely stressing elements of the larger picture which Dooyeweerd, especially, has neglected or under-emphasised. Nevertheless, in doing so, he tends himself to neglect the Idea of Origin, which explicitly informs and regulates Dooyeweerd’s position, and implicitly, Vollenhoven’s as well. This is a matter that will require a more sustained engagement with Zuidervaarts’s thought than is possible here.

\(^{717}\) See 3.1.2.
\(^{718}\) See 3.2.4.
\(^{719}\) See 3.2.3.
\(^{720}\) See 3.2.4.
Both philosophers therefore provide approximations to this descriptive view, even though neither is fully at home with its centre of gravity in the unfolding of relations over time. They approach this descriptive view from different positions: Vollenhoven comes to it on the basis on his account of individuals and their unfolding arrangements as ‘successive inter-individual’ relations. Dooyeweerd approaches this variously from his account of ‘differentiation’ in the opening process (according to which the ‘external aims’ (‘doeleindes’) of individuality-structures are opened up successively along the modal scale), or, alternatively ‘external enkapsis’ (when two distinct ‘individuality structures’ together form a larger complex without either losing their individual distinctiveness). Both ‘differentiation’ and ‘external enkapsis’ variously amount to a description of the cumulative elaboration and ever increasing complexity of a network of relations be it in the physical or biological worlds, or in human society.

Vollenhoven’s and Dooyeweerd’s approaches reflect their respective emphases on the Ideas of Providence and Coherence; Vollenhoven approaches this descriptive view with his thinking illuminated by the Idea of Providence, whereas Dooyeweerd approaches this descriptive view with this thinking illuminated by the Idea of Coherence. What neither succeeds in doing is systematically to hold the two Ideas together, so that the account of the descriptive view by each of the philosophers is partial but complementary.

We see then, even though this descriptive view is not one in which either of the two philosophers of this study are fully at home, that, nevertheless, it fills in a necessary gap in their joint coverage of the whole picture, and draws at least partially on certain, albeit different, elements in their respective accounts.

6.2.4 The Philosophical Benefits of the Perichoretic Approach

These descriptive views (of relations over time, and individuals over time, and individuals in relation – each regulated by the corresponding pairs of Ideas of Origin, Coherence and Providence) are complementary, and each is necessary for the full description of a specific state of affairs. The descriptive views help us to see the perichoretic interaction and balance among the Ideas considered in all their paired combinations, together with the corresponding transcendentals.
Together the three descriptive views provide a rounded picture in which the systematic insights of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd can be integrated and applied in a more systematic way without the problems that beset the thought of each on its own. While, broadly Vollenhoven’s analysis and presentation tends to have its locus in the first descriptive view (that of individuals over time), and Dooyeweerd’s in that of the second descriptive view (that of individuals in relation at a given time), yet their thought is not exclusively located in either of those two descriptive views. Both philosophers have elements that cross over into the descriptive views primarily reflected in the thought of the other, as well as in the third descriptive view (that of relations over time). For Dooyeweerd, this can be seen in his account of the different forms of enkapsis, which bring him closer systematically to Vollenhoven, than, in some ways, to his own attempted systematics.721

6.3 Conclusion

Thus we see how the original vision of the Lordship of Christ over every area of life enunciated by Abraham Kuyper can more fully be realised by drawing together the insights of Vollenhoven, on the one hand, and Dooyeweerd, on the other. We have looked at both in the light of Kuyper’s vision of the integrity of every individual before the Father, of the rule of the Son over ever kind of relation, and the providential working out of the Holy Spirit in bringing about new states of affairs in and through the temporal process.

We have seen this, first, with respect to individuality drawing on Vollenhoven’s more robust account of factual individuality to complement Dooyeweerd’s more conceptual

721 This seems to be an odd and somewhat ironic conclusion. One might see an analogy in the work of Albert Einstein, who, among the papers of his annus mirabilis of 1905, produced one which laid the foundations for relativity theory (first special and later general relativity), and another which opened the way for quantum mechanics – each approach systematically is incompatible with the other in that they into account different physical forces (gravity on the one hand; and electro-magnetism, and the strong and weak nuclear forces on the other), in a way which tormented Einstein for the rest of his life, almost forcing him to disown his contribution to quantum mechanics and its view of physical reality (Brian R. Greene, The Fabric of the Cosmos: Space, Time and the Texture of Reality (2004): 39-123).
account of ‘individuality-structures’ – however these latter may be interpreted. For both philosophers, individuality needs to be seen in the light of the Idea of the Origin, reflecting the work of the Father calling all things and persons into being. In the light of this Idea, both the naïve intuitive grasp of whole individuals as well as the ‘scientific’ or ‘theoretical’ differentiation of the diverse and irreducible individuality-functions is made possible.

Second, we have seen this with respect to relationality, allowing Dooyeweerd’s account of universal relations to correct what I have described as Vollenhoven’s ‘modified monadism’. Relationality needs to be seen in the light of the Idea of Coherence, bringing together both Dooyeweerd’s Idea of ‘totality’ (effectively the noetic synthesis of the different kinds of relation) and the Idea of ‘coherence’ (effectively the ontic systasis of the different kinds of relation), which reflects the work of the Son in whom all things hold together. The Idea of Coherence illuminates the naïve intuitive ‘enstatic’ grasp of the way that the different kind of relations hold together, as well as a basis for ‘scientifically’ or ‘theoretically’ distinguishing and ordering those relations.

Third, we have seen that with respect to time, in that Vollenhoven’s ‘genetic’ determination provides a corrective to Dooyeweerd’s problematical notion of ‘cosmic time’. Here the retrieved Idea of Providence, eclipsed in Dooyeweerd’s thought since around 1930 by the Idea of ‘totality’, can help to provide the necessary illumination. This Idea of Providence is opened up by Vollenhoven’s account of the work of the Holy Spirit in the ‘positivisation’ of new situations. This makes possible the naïve grasp of entire events on the one hand, and the ‘scientific’ or ‘theoretical’ distinguishing of the different aspects of time.

These three loci (individuality, relationality and time seen in the light respectively of the Ideas of Origin, Coherence and Providence) need to be seen as distinct, yet dynamically inter-dependent. Here the trinitarian notion of ‘perichoresis’ has been drawn on to trace out three ‘descriptive views’ showing the inter-relation in turn of the transcendentals considered pair by pair, in the light of the corresponding pairs of Ideas. Together these descriptive views provide a comprehensive and fully rounded basis on which to approach and make sense of any state of affairs to which systematic consideration needs to be given. Together, the three ‘descriptive views’ provide a way in which all the
transcendentals, as the necessary condition for experience, can be taken appropriately into account. In particular, it puts the Dooyeweerdian notion of ‘enkapsis’, which cannot satisfactorily be accounted for in terms of his ‘transcendental dimensions’ and ‘cosmic time’, on a much sounder systematic footing, as the descriptive views each provide the framework for ‘internal’ or ‘foundational’, ‘correlative’ or ‘environmental’, and ‘external’ or ‘symbiotic’ forms of enkapsis, respectively.\(^{722}\)

For a fully-rounded Reformational philosophy, it is necessary to see how conceptual knowledge, which arises from the distinguishing or ‘refraction’ of the modalities is made possible and complemented by the three forms of intuitive knowledge, which are regulated by the transcendentals of individuality, relationality and time. This is necessary for both ‘pre-scientific’ or naïve (i.e., modally undifferentiated) experience, as well as for ‘scientific’ or ‘theoretical’ (i.e., modally differentiated) reflection. In the case of ‘pre-scientific’ or ‘naïve’ experience, this intuition makes possible the grasp, respectively, of whole individuals, the ‘ontic systasis’ of the different kinds of relations and the entirety of events. In the case of ‘scientific’ or ‘theoretical’ reflection, the transcendentals seen in the light of the Ideas of Origin, Coherence and Providence constitute the three lenses through which the modalities are refracted to yield individuality functions, kinds of relations, and time aspects.\(^{723}\)

In conclusion, on the basis of Kuyper’s trinitarian vision, I have systematically compared the thought of Dirk Vollenhoven and Herman Dooyeweerd, and have put forward a way to reconcile their thought, without minimising their divergences but building on their complementarities. Further, in the light of a perichoretic analogy, I have sought to show how one can draw on their insights in a fully-rounded way through three ‘descriptive views’ – two of which lie across the respective axes of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s thought, together with a third axis, largely unaddressed by the two philosophers. While the major focus of this thesis is a systematic comparison of the two thinkers in the light of the historical location and development of their thought, the conclusions of this study have practical implications for Christians globally, today as in the twentieth century. The systematic insights that this study yields can provide a

\(^{722}\) See 3.2.4 and Appendix Four.
\(^{723}\) See Appendix Five.
philosophical framework to address the perennial questions which affect everyday human life and experience, as well as a methodology for corporate human projects in the academy and the public square. Building on the systematic work of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, the task is now further to develop a Reformational ontology and epistemology, ever illuminated by the Ideas of Origin, Coherence and Providence which characterise the trustworthy commitment of the triune Persons to one another in the creation, redemption and transformation of the world.
### Appendix One: The Structure of Vollenhoven’s Philosophy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>COSMONOMIC SIDE</th>
<th>FACTUAL SIDE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDIVIDUALITY</strong></td>
<td>thus-so (‘modal’) subjects (active-passive functions)</td>
<td>this-that (individual) realms (subject-object relations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RELATIONALITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>(inter-relations: composite of the directions of the component individuals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TIME</strong></td>
<td>gene time aspects</td>
<td>tic lifelines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix Two: The Structure of Dooyeweerd’s Philosophy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>COSMONOMIC SIDE</th>
<th>FACTUAL SIDE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUALITY</td>
<td>typical-structures (functions)</td>
<td>individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELATIONALITY</td>
<td>modal laws and norms</td>
<td>subject-object relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME</td>
<td>(modal ordering)</td>
<td>(duration of individuality-structures)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix Three: A Perichoretic Reading of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd

This links the emphases of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven: For Dooyeweerd, ‘cosmic time’ links relationality and individuality. Vollenhoven starts with individuality over time and sees relations constructed on that basis. Dooyeweerd is in blue, while Vollenhoven is in red.
## Appendix Four: A Combined Reformational Ontology and Epistemology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRANSCENDENTAL (with ground-Idea)</th>
<th>COSMONOMIC SIDE (totality/modality)</th>
<th>FACTUAL ontic (totality/modality)</th>
<th>SIDE noetic (totality/modality)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUALITY (grounded in the Idea of Origin)</td>
<td>typonomic structure/functional law or norm</td>
<td>individual/individuality functions</td>
<td>idea/property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELATIONALITY (grounded in the Idea of Coherence)</td>
<td>analogical ordering/relational laws or norms</td>
<td>systasis/relations (subject-subject and subject-object)</td>
<td>synthesis/concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME (grounded in the Idea of Providence)</td>
<td>event-structure/time law or norm</td>
<td>event/factual genesis</td>
<td>narrative/temporal hypothesis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix Five: The Three Descriptive Views

Diagram:

- **Inter-individual relations at a given time**
  - **INDIVIDUALITY**
    - Individuals
  - **RELATIONALITY**
    - Relations

- **Individuals over time**
- **Relations over time**
- **Events**
- **TIME**
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