‘Cyprus is the Country of Heroes, Not of Homosexuals’
Sexuality, Gender and Nationhood in Cyprus

Kamenou, Nayia

Awarding institution:
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‘Cyprus is the Country of Heroes, Not of Homosexuals’: Sexuality, Gender and Nationhood in Cyprus

NAYIA KAMENOU

KING’S COLLEGE LONDON
2011
Acknowledgements

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I am indebted to Alecos Modinos for being an inspirer and living proof that no struggle for justice goes to vain, regardless of its cost. I am also grateful to Achilleas Demetriades for allowing me to use his rich, legal archive and to the employees at the Press Information Office in Cyprus for making me laugh, even while I was buried under piles of newspapers! Many thanks also to the activists Despina Michaelidou, Yoryis Regginos, Hüseyin Çavusoğlu, Stavros Giannakopoulos and Themis Katsagiannis for sharing with me their stories and for providing me with advice and assistance whenever I needed it. This project would not have been possible without the superb networking abilities of Petros Papadopoulos, a dear friend, who greatly assisted me with participant recruitment.

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Of course, all errors of fact and interpretation remain my own.
Abstract

Based on research conducted from September 2008 through June 2011, this thesis explores the construction of gender and sexuality identities in Cyprus vis-à-vis the socio-political, legal and cultural context within which it is enabled or inhibited. More specifically, it examines how predominant discourses of nationhood and national identity as well as the processes, norms, institutions and mechanisms of Europeanization, affect local approaches to the relationship between national identity, gender and sexuality.

Chronologically, the thesis covers the period between the early 1990s – when a Cypriot gay man brought a case before the European Court of Human Rights against the Republic of Cyprus – up to the present. However, it also makes references to the 1974 Turkish invasion and occupation of the island, as well as to the events that preceded and followed it, since these have been determinative of the importance assigned to Cypriot national identity narratives by local actors.

Part of the data examined includes fifty-five interviews with prelates of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus, Greek-Cypriot political elites, military officials, representatives of women’s groups, as well as Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans* and queer individuals and activists. Through the utilization of a research design that draws on Foucaultian analysis, queer theory, law and national identity studies, the thesis argues that the Cypriot discursive landscape both restricts and enables the negotiation and reconfiguration of identity-formation processes. Namely, although nationalistic, androcentric, patriarchal and heterocentric essentialisms continue to permeate the Cypriot socio-political milieu, nationalism is characterized both by inherent contradictions and by the ability to reinvent itself. When this is combined with the influence of external, supranational, European discourses of gender, sexuality and identity, then the possibilities of gender and sexual agency are augmented, as long as local actors manage to employ such discourses in ways that do not annihilate local modalities of gender and sexual existence.
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Introduction


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Conclusion

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List of Abbreviations

AKEL – Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού, Progressive Party for the Working People
AKOK – Απελευθερωτικό Κίνημα Ομοφυλοφίλων Κύπρου, Gay Liberation Movement
CJEU – Court of Justice of the European Union
CoE – Council of Europe
CyBC – Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation
DIKO – Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα, Democratic Party
DISY – Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός, Democratic Rally of Cyprus
EComHR – European Commission on Human Rights
EConvHR – European Convention on Human Rights
ECtHR – European Court of Human Rights
EDEK – Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Ένωση Κέντρου, Movement for Social Democracy
EOKA – Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών, National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
EU – European Union
GODIK – Γυναικεία Οργάνωση Δημοκρατικού Κόμματος, Democratic Party Women’s Organization
GODISY – Γυναικεία Οργάνωση του Δημοκρατικού Συναγερμού, Democratic Rally of Cyprus Women’s Organization
HAD – Hands Across the Divide
ILGA – International Lesbian and Gay Association
ILGA-Europe – European Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association
LGBT – Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans*
LGBTNCY – Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transgendered People of Cyprus
LGBTQ – Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans* and Queer
MEP(s) – Member(s) of European Parliament
MP(s) – Member(s) of Parliament
MWMF – Michigan Womyn’s Music Festival
NAMBLA – North American Man/Boy Love Association
NGO(s) – Non-governmental organization(s)
PACE – Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
ПАНХОК – Παγκύπρια Επιτροπή Αγώνα Ενάντια στην Αποποινικοποίηση της Ομοφυλοφιλίας, Pancyprian Committee for the Fight Against the Decriminalization of Homosexuality
PEO – Παγκύπρια Εργατική Ομοσπονδία, Pancyprian Federation of Labour
PIO – Cyprus Press Information Office
POGO – Παγκύπρια Ομοσπονδία Γυναικείων Οργανώσεων, Cyprus Federation of Women’s Organizations
RoC – Republic of Cyprus
TMT – Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, Turkish Resistance Organization
‘TRNC’ – ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’
UK – United Kingdom
UN – United Nations
US – United States of America
WWH – Women Walk Home
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INTRODUCTION
‘Cyprus is the country of heroes and saints, not of homosexuals’; ‘No to laws opposing our religion, morals and traditions’; ‘Yes to the moral armouring of Cyprus’.\(^1\) These are some of the slogans written on the banners of protesters against the decriminalization of homosexuality – shown in images 1.1 and 1.2 – who, headed by members of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus clergy,\(^2\) flocked outside the Parliament whenever legislation that pertained to same-sex sexual activities was under review by the Parliamentary Legal Committee, or by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Republic of Cyprus.\(^3\) In 1993, in the case of *Modinos v. Cyprus*,\(^4\) the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that sections 171, 172 and 173 of the Cypriot Criminal Code, which criminalized ‘carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature’, constituted a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (EConvHR).\(^5\) Therefore, in 1998, after years of procrastination and under pressures emanating from the Council of Europe (CoE), the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) Parliamentary Assembly was forced to vote on the issue of homosexuality’s decriminalization.

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\(^1\) See images 1.1 and 1.2 in this chapter and image 3.1 in chapter 3. Image 1.1 shows an Orthodox Church of Cyprus clergyman marching outside the Parliament, holding a banner that reads: ‘Yes to the moral armouring of Cyprus.’ Image 1.2 shows a group of clergymen and elderly Cypriots. The man in the centre holds a banner that reads: ‘No to laws opposing our religion, morals and traditions.’

\(^2\) Please note that the word ‘Church’ is capitalized in this thesis when referring to the ‘Orthodox Church of Cyprus’. When the word appears lowercased, it denotes Christianity as an institution more generally.

\(^3\) In the RoC, legislation that pertains to same-sex sexual equality was passed or amended from 1998 to 2002. These legal amendments will be further discussed in chapter 3.

\(^4\) *Modinos v. Cyprus*, 1993 (Series A, No. 259).

\(^5\) Ibid., para. 8. Sections 171, 172 and 173 of the Cypriot Criminal Code (Cap 154) stated: ‘171. Any person who a) has carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature; or b) permits a male person to have carnal knowledge of him against the order of nature, is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for five years. 172. Any person who with violence commits either of the offences specified in the last preceding section is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for fourteen years. 173. Any person who attempts to commit either of the offences specified in section 171 is guilty of felony and is liable to imprisonment for three years, and if the attempt is accompanied with violence he is liable to imprisonment for seven years.’

Nayia Kamenou
THE CHURCH-ORCHESTRATED 1997 DEMONSTRATION AGAINST THE DECRIMINALIZATION OF HOMOSEXUALITY AND AGAINST THE AMENDMENT OF HOMOSEXUALITY-RELATED DISCRIMINATORY LEGAL PROVISIONS

The banner reads: ‘Yes to the moral armouring of Cyprus.’

Source: Alecos Modinos’s personal archive
THE CHURCH-ORCHESTRATED 1997 DEMONSTRATION AGAINST THE DECRIMINALIZATION OF HOMOSEXUALITY AND AGAINST THE AMENDMENT OF HOMOSEXUALITY-RELATED DISCRIMINATORY LEGAL PROVISIONS

The banner in the centre reads: ‘No to laws opposing our religion, morals and traditions.’

Source: Alecos Modinos’s personal archive
As a reaction to the prospect of the Parliamentary Assembly amending the criminal law, clergymen and Christian Orthodox movements and parishes organized under the name ‘Pancyprian Committee for the Fight Against the Decriminalization of Homosexuality’ (PAHOK). They fiercely opposed the legal amendments since, according to their 1997 and 1998 petitions – shown in images 1.3 and 1.4 – that were distributed to members of parliament (MPs) as well as in churches and in neighbourhoods, ‘the decriminalization of homosexuality [was] not a mere legal amendment’, since it would allow homosexuals ‘to display posters that read “become a homosexual”’ and ‘to demand the introduction of homosexual sexual education in schools’.6 The Church and its supporting religious groups became extremely alarmed at the ‘peril’ of the spread of this new ‘breed’, that is of the homosexual whom the law recognizes and protects, since, as they asked in their petitions, ‘how are we going to conduct our fight against [Turkish] occupation ... [and] how will marriage and the family be protected [if homosexuality is decriminalized]?’7 The petitions claimed that PAHOK summoned the ‘Orthodox Greeks of Cyprus’ to oppose the decriminalization not because they hated anyone, but because they were concerned about their ‘challenged nation’ and they wanted to help homosexuals return to God’s path. This is because, according to their reasoning, if homosexuality were decriminalized, ‘whose human rights [would be] violated, really? [The human rights] of those who have been drawn into the slimy sin of homosexuality, or [the human rights] of the decent and worthy people?’8

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6 See images 1.3 and 1.4. Image 1.3 is the May 1997 petition produced and distributed by PAHOK. The group constituted primarily by clergymen and elderly religious Greek-Cypriots. What is of special interest about the text of this petition is its portrayal of homosexuality as a disease and as a foreign trend – the reference to England is illustrative – that threatens the survival of the Greek-Cypriot national collectivity. It states: ‘If [homosexuality is] decriminalized, homosexuals will become able ... to display posters that read “become a homosexual ([as in] England).’ The text of PAHOK’s April 1998 petition, which is shown in image 1.4, is similar but it makes additional references to ‘Europe’. For example, the last sentence reads: ‘The government can have its obligations towards Europe. The Parliament, however, which represents us, cannot and should not be controlled by anybody and [in this manner] violate the will of the people that has elected it.’

7 See images 1.3 and 1.4.

8 Ibid.

Source: Alecos Modinos’s personal archive
THE PETITION OF THE PANCYPRIAN COMMITTEE FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST THE DECRIMINALIZATION OF HOMOSEXUALITY, DATED 8 April 1998

Source: Alecos Modinos’s personal archive
The rhetoric that the Church and its affiliated religious groups employed elucidates how discourses about ‘the nation’, nationhood and national identity are employed in order to render heterosexual sexual activity as the norm and as the only ‘appropriate’ and ‘decent’ modality of sexuality. In these discourses, non-heterosexual people and activities are portrayed as sinful, slimy and – above all – dangerous for the national collectivity. Furthermore, according to such discourses, rights and claims to rights, as well as the articulators and recipients of claims and rights, are not of equal value. Rather, they differ in importance: the human right of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans* and queer (LGBTQ) people not to be persecuted and prosecuted for their sexual choice is inferior to the claim of the ‘decent’ and ‘worthy’ ‘Orthodox Greeks of Cyprus’ that sexual inequality and heterocentrism’s monopoly be perpetuated.

For the Church and for its supporting religious groups, the idea of (European) human rights cannot exist, unless the rights afforded by the EConvHR do not challenge the national collectivity’s inclusion and exclusion boundaries and the predominant nationalistic discourses about what makes one a ‘decent and worthy Orthodox Greek of Cyprus’. As their claim went – according to their 1998 circular shown in image 1.5 – ‘this land [i.e., Cyprus] survived its numerous invaders because it remained premised on Greek-Orthodox and moral values’. Consequently, according to the Church and its affiliated religious groups, ‘the Council of Europe ... and all sorts of Modinoi’ should be warned that ‘we will not succumb to, and in the end we will reject [the CoE’s] political ... and especially [its] financial support, as if it were Judas’s pieces of silver’. In the ‘resolution’ that was included in their 1998 petition – shown in image 1.6 – these opponents of the legal amendment even warned MPs that ‘under no circumstances will we vote in the future for those MPs

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9 See image 1.5. Image 1.5 shows a circular distributed by a PAHOK subgroup, the ‘Fighters for Moral Values’. Please note the picture from the Book of Genesis and the reference to Saint Paul’s letter to the Romans. The circular reads: ‘According to Saint Paul, those men who have succumbed to the satisfaction of their unnatural appetites will face God’s wrath. They will face our dynamic resistance also ... Upon God’s order Lot and his family left Sodom and Gomorrah, since [God] would bury them [i.e., the cities] with fire and sulphur because of their inhabitants’ homosexuality.’

10 The then Archbishop of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus publically referred to homosexuals and to people who supported or did not oppose the decriminalization of homosexuality as ‘the Modinoi’. Namely, he used Alecos Modinos’s name as a derogatory term, in order to refer to people who engage in same-sex sexual activities or who do not discriminate against non-heterosexuals. In fact, even nowadays, and especially among elderly people, Modinos’s name stands for ‘(male) homosexual’. This demonstrates the intensity of the Church’s homophobic campaign and the degree to which it demonized Modinos.

11 See image 1.5.
who have voted [in favour of] this disgraceful law [i.e., the decriminalization legal amendments].

12 See image 1.6. Image 1.6 shows PAHOK’s ‘resolution’ that was included in its April 1998 petition. Interestingly, point 2 reads: ‘We warn that by the passing of this despicable law [i.e., the decriminalization legal amendments] our morals and our dignity are being violated, the family institution is being threatened, our society is being corrupted, our national strife is jeopardized and, lastly, our rights as citizens are being infringed.’
ΕΓΚΥΚΛΙΟΣ ΑΓΩΝΙΣΤΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΘΕΙΚΩΝ ΑΣΙΑΝ

Αυτός ο τόπος δεν διαλύθηκε κάτω από πολυάρθρος κατακτητές είναι γιατί οικογενειακά και εκκλησιαστικά ήταν στερεωμένος πάνω στις ορθόδοξες Ελληνικές και ηθικές αξίες.

Αυτό το συμβούλιο της Ευρώπης εκμεταλλευόμενο τις πολιτικές, πολιτιστικές και κυρίως οικονομικές προς εμάς συμπαραστάσεις του προσπαθεί να μας επιβάλει και ανοχές που διαρθρώνουν το δε-μέλος της πνευματικότητας και αξιοπρέπειας μας δηλώνουμε ότι μέχρι αυτοδυσίας δεν θα υποχωρήσουμε και στο τέλος θα απορρίψουμε και την αρωγή του σαν "αργύρια του Ιουδα".

Προειδοποιούμε δε τους κάθε είδους Μοδινός και υποστηρικτές τους, εντός και εκτός της Βουλής ότι όπως μέχρι σήμερα έκανε για τις εθνικοδομικές, έτοι θα αγωνιστούμε και για τις ηθικές αξίες μας.

Όσοι από τους άνδρες εκτράπηκαν, κατά τον Απόστολο Παύλο (Ρωμαίοι Α, 27) σε ικανοποίηση των αφύσικων μεταξύ τους ορέξεων, όχι μόνο έχουν την οργή του Θεού, αλλά θα αντικρύσουν και τη δι-κή μας δυναμική αντιμετώπιση.: Α.Μ. Α.Γ. ΓΕ. ΠΕ 8.5.1997

Υ.Γ.
ΓΕΝ. ΚΕΦ. 10:15-17:

Ο Λύτρο υπάρχει με την οικογένεια του αποκαρπώνονται από τα Σόδομα και Γόμορρα κατά εντολή του Θεού, όταν θα τα κατάκλυσε με φωτιά και θει-άφι λόγω της ομοφυλοφιλίας των κατοίκων τους.

CIRCULAR DISTRIBUTED BY THE FIGHTERS FOR MORAL VALUES,
1998

Source: Alecos Modinos’s personal archive
**THE RESOLUTION OF THE PANCYPRIAN COMMITTEE FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST THE DECRIMINALIZATION OF HOMOSEXUALITY,**

**DATED 8 April 1998**

Source: Alecos Modinos’s personal archive

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**IMAGE 1.6**

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Such approaches towards ‘Europe’ highlight another complexity in the already intricate national identity-gender-sexuality relationship, as this is manifested in Cyprus. This complexity relates to the double role with which external/‘European’ discourses are vested in places where numerous subjectivities overlap. The RoC’s European Union (EU) admission and claims about an organic relationship between ‘European’ and ‘Greek-Cypriot’ identity have been employed extensively by Greek-Cypriots, in order to portray Turkish and Turkish-Cypriots as ‘less European’ and consequently as less ‘civilized’ and inferior. Moreover, the Greek-Cypriot political elite has employed the European human rights discourse extensively, in order to represent the RoC as the victim of human rights violations and Turkey as the perpetrator of these violations. By doing so, it has tried to strengthen its negotiating position in attempts to find a solution to the ‘Cyprus problem’. Therefore, Greek-Cypriots have effectively employed European discourses, mechanisms and institutions in order to propel their politico-national objectives. After all, the RoC joined the EU and, therefore, received considerable financial assistance and support, while the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’) was excluded from this process.

Nonetheless, as the example of the decriminalization of sexuality in Cyprus illustrates, when some elements of European discourses came to be seen as dangerous for the preservation of the national collectivity, Greek-Cypriots were quick to reject them: Complying with the CoE’s demands that the RoC upholds the ECtHR Modinos ruling was perceived to involve much more than a ‘mere legal amendment’. The decriminalization of homosexuality was seen as a blow against the Greek-Cypriot collectivity’s premising pillars, that is, its ‘Greek- Orthodox and moral values’, which allegedly had assured its preservation, even under the threat of numerous enemies. ‘Europe’s’ institutions, mechanisms and political and financial assistance, which in the past had been lauded as a panacea for Cyprus’s politico-

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national problems, were relegated as part of Cyprus’s problems; they were described as ‘Judas’s pieces of silver’ to which the Greek-Cypriot national collectivity should not succumb. These and other interplays between the local and the supranational/transnational, tradition and ‘Europe’, the official and the ‘hidden’, are the focus of the chapters that follow.
This work focuses on the case of Cyprus for a number of reasons. Because Cyprus is a locale where multiple, overlapping and conflicting characteristics can be discerned, its study helps access the various power matrices within which, and the various discourses through which, understandings of gender and sexuality are formed, negotiated and reconstructed. It is a former British colony, whose history has been marked by ethnic conflict. Religion and religiosity, predominant narratives about nationhood and national identity, as well as traditional understandings of gender and sexuality, continue to have a great impact on Cypriots’ lives. Moreover, the Orthodox Church of Cyprus exerts a pivotal role in the country’s political affairs, even though the RoC is nominally a liberal democratic state. Although still divided into a ‘Greek-Cypriot south’ and a ‘Turkish-Cypriot north’ due to interethnic conflict and a Greek junta-supported coup which culminated in the 1974 Turkish invasion and continuing occupation of almost half of the island, as of 2004, the RoC is an EU member-state. Therefore, Cyprus is a particularly interesting case and paradigmatic of the ways in which local traditions and external/supranational trends interact, as well as of the consequences of such interactions on local actors, on their discourses and on their perceptions of self and others.

What also makes Cyprus an interesting case-study is the extent to which gender and sexuality have been the subject of concern, scrutiny, anxiety and surveillance, even though these issues did not have a place in public dialogue and political life until very recently. The management of gender and sexuality as a means for preserving social order and political stability is not exclusive to Cyprus, although the stakes in this stability are perhaps especially high in postcolonial and ethnically divided places, like Cyprus. This is so because in such places the preservation of a ‘pure’ national identity and of the ‘authentic’ ways of the organization of the national collectivity – like the heterocentric and androcentric organization of social relations – are perceived as vital for avoiding penetration or ‘contamination’ by the ethnic ‘other’. What makes Cyprus distinct, yet representative

14 A brief discussion of the history of Cyprus as well as of the events and the – admittedly debated – reasons that led to the island’s ethnic division will be presented in chapter one. Please also note: the occupied north and Turkish-Cypriots were excluded from EU admission.
of other milieux where a multitude of subjectivities and discourses intersect, are the ways through which Cypriots – both elites and LGBTQ individuals – negotiate and amalgamate otherwise conflicting discourses, ideas and languages – for example, the language of ‘the nation’ and the language of ‘Europe and human rights’ – in order to define themselves (in the case of LGBTQ individuals) and to justify their politico-national objectives (in the case of elites).

In fact, the analysis of the case of Cyprus brings into view research on locales that have been marginalized or that have not been sufficiently addressed in Western European and Anglo-American scholarship. For example, Cyprus has been the focus of both foreign and native political and social science research. However, this research centres on the ‘national problem’, its causes and effects. The issue of sexuality and the numerous social, political, legal and cultural questions that emanate from it remain almost completely unaddressed by both Cypriot and foreign scholarship. This continues to be the case even though since the early 1990s the study of sexual, gender, class, racial, colonial, postcolonial, ethnic and national overlapping subjectivities has gained a prominent place, especially in the American and English scholarly production. Therefore, this study helps to better understand the applicability of Euro-American theoretical models of national identity, gender and sexuality to different venues, and to test the limits of these models in describing and historicizing what are often assumed to be shared universal realities.

Consequently, such an analysis throws light on the often-ignored complexities of gender and sexuality. By doing so, it allows for their better understanding and appreciation of elements that are central in the formation and preservation of ideas about national identities and nationhood. The example of the decriminalization of homosexuality in Cyprus, which will be extensively discussed in the next chapters, is indicative of this perplexed national identity-gender-sexuality relationship. The time-frame of the study extends from the early 1990s, when the Modinos case was adjudicated by the ECtHR, until June 2011 when the research for this study was completed. Nonetheless, references will also be made to the 1974 events, as well as to the events that preceded and followed the 1974 coup and Turkish invasion and occupation, since these are pertinent towards understanding predominant perceptions of nationhood and national identity and – by extension –

16 That is, the Turkish invasion and ongoing occupation of the north part of Cyprus.
the impact of official/public and ‘everyday’/symbolic nationalist narratives on the construction and permissible demonstration of gender and sexuality identities in Cyprus.

The invocation of ideas pertaining to nationhood and the employment of nationalist, and often nationalistic, rhetoric was central in nation-state building processes throughout Europe and beyond. Whether elite-orchestrated or rooted in shared ideas, cultural customs and traditions, whether dynamically or symbolically demonstrated, the importance of conceptions of nationhood and of a coherent national identity that is shared among a population cannot easily be disputed, especially with regard to ethnically divided locales or postcolonial milieux. Furthermore, discourses about nationhood and national identity have been employed in order to both construct and preserve androcentric and heteronormative perceptions


of ‘acceptable’ gender and sexuality performances and identifications. Moreover, in our so-called ‘global’ era, local constructions of national identity, gender and sexuality are continuously and intensely exposed to transnational and supranational discourses, which impact them in various ways, both positive and negative.

Therefore, discerning the interconnections between local/national official and grassroots/personal subaltern discourses of national identity, gender and sexuality, as well as the dynamics between national narratives and transnational/supranational discourses is intrinsic. This is so because these interconnections and dynamics are at the heart of how individual subjectivities and modes of collective life are constituted, sanctioned or legitimized.

Some of the relevant literature demonstrated that although prevailing ideas and discourses about nationhood and national identity are formed and employed differently at different levels, their ramifications are no less important or perilous regardless of whether they are explicitly/actively or subliminally/symbolically invoked. For example, Brubaker’s blow against the usefulness of national identity as an analytical category and his interpretation of ‘everyday ethnicity’ as a mode of making sense of one’s lived reality and social world, does not make Billig’s argument about the precariousness of ‘banal’/subliminal/symbolic nationalism less convincing. Moreover, analyses of nationhood and national identity do not, for the most part, sufficiently explore the intra-national and intra-ethnic problematics that a study of the relationship between ‘everyday’/‘banal’/symbolic nationalism and


gender and sexuality highlights. Furthermore, the nationhood-gender-sexuality relationship is further complicated when external, supranational narratives are also taken into account. Namely, deciphering whether and how such external discourses emasculate local exclusionary ones or actually reinforce symbolic and discursive violence against intra-national and extra-national ‘others’ is pertinent in attempts to understand identity construction processes.

This is why this thesis will focus on the role of internal and external discourses and officially articulated and ‘hidden transcripts’, on their agents, recipients, supporters and resisters, as well as on the interaction of such discourses and actors at the national, transnational and supranational level. It will analyze these issues by raising and addressing a number of questions: What are the effects of local, traditional and transnational/supranational approaches towards national identity and gender and sexuality subjectivities on Cypriot LGBTQ individuals? What are the main actors/forces behind both internal and external discourses, and where does the impact of national and supranational/transnational official discourses leave grassroots/subaltern agency? Namely, do the supranational/transnational human rights and Europeanization discourses expand the boundaries of traditional gender and sexual identities (thus facilitating the self-determination and emancipation of Cypriot LGBTQ individuals) or are these external discourses just nuances or replicas of the norms that already prevail at the national level? Addressing these questions is pertinent. This is so because although the mechanisms, institutions and the language of ‘Europe’ have been instrumental in rectifying state injustices against individual citizens and groups, elite and non-elite actors at the local and national level sometimes assume a passive and indifferent, or reactive and hostile position towards ‘Europe’-induced changes in domestic legal, institutional and societal structures.

The past two decades have witnessed a large increase in scholarly production on sexual subjectivities and sexual politics. Queer theorists have focused on the

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26 For example, recourse to the ECtHR constitutes one of the ways in which European mechanisms and institutions contribute to the rectification of injustices at the national level. LGBTQ-relevant ECtHR litigation will be discussed in chapter three. The negative reaction of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus, of the majority of the Greek-Cypriot political elite and of numerous Greek-Cypriots towards the decision of the ECtHR in Modinos, as well as the CoE’s demand that homosexuality be decriminalized by the RoC illustrate that external/regional influences and decision-making are not always welcomed at the local level. These issues will be further discussed in this chapter and in chapter three.
complex and often indiscernible matrices of power within which attempts to articulate and politically situate our sexual selves are circumscribed, while postcolonial queer theorists have attempted to recover the experiences of sexual and other ‘others’. Nonetheless, this research has not always discerned the multiple ways in which seemingly opposing discourses – for example, identity and rights politics vis-à-vis radical and anti-normalizing politics, or indigenous modalities of sexuality vis-à-vis ‘European/Western’ paradigms – often complement each other. As it will be discussed in more detail in the chapters that follow, this is more so the case in milieux outside the ‘European/Western’ centre, where years of oppression have not permitted the development of discourses that would destabilize locally predominant, oppressive ones.

Unfortunately, the relevant existing literature pays, for the most part, little attention to this fact. The reason is that most proponents of identity and rights-based politics are primarily interested in pointing to the practicability and to the on-the-ground effectiveness of rights and identities, while they often ignore the power structures and perils embedded in such politics. In a similar way, by remaining primarily focused on a radical project, some strands of (mostly early) queer theory underemphasize the importance of local particularities and distinctions, questions about disruptive politics’ practicability and applicability at different geographical contexts and the positive change brought about by identity and rights-based politics. Moreover, even recent mainstream scholarship on national identities

27 Judith Butler and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s pioneering work on these issues will be referred to and discussed throughout the thesis.
29 See, for example: Diane Richardson, “Locating Sexualities: From Here to Normality,” Sexualities, vol. 7, no. 4 (2004): 391-411; Michael Warner, “Introduction: Fear of a Queer Planet,” in Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social Theory, ed. Michael Warner (Minneapolis and London: Minneapolis University Press, 1993), 3-17; Michael Warner. The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics and the Ethics of Queer Life. New York: The Free Press, 1999. Jeffrey Weeks describes these approaches as the approach of ‘progressivism’ and the approach of ‘continuity’. He argues that both approaches fall into ‘traps’: the former is overly optimistic and assumes that transformation is inevitable, while the latter is overly pessimistic and insists that beyond some minor (legal) changes, the oppressive power structures remain intact. See: Jeffrey Weeks, “The Remaking of the Erotic and
completely ignores questions of gender and sexuality. This is especially regrettable since such omissions overshadow, or merely gloss over, the importance and need to approach subjectivities and experiences in ways that do not relegate matrices of power and the possibility of exercise of agency.

Because of its focus on the constructed nature of identities, and since it has convincingly argued that the language of rights and identities partakes in those discourses that set inflexible limits on gender and sexuality self-understandings, queer theory allows us to disaggregate and scrutinize the diverse, and often concealed, forces and agents behind predominant, exclusionary discourses which demarcate individuals’ possibility for self-formation. On the contrary, analyses of the impact of identity and litigation-based sexual politics, and specifically analyses of the impact of European/regional legal language, mechanisms and judicial narratives on member-states’ subordinated LGBTQ groups, suggest that they have


been beneficial. Studying these two approaches together is interesting, since it reveals how discourses that were once assumed to be unrelated are not only interconnected, but they also impact each other. Yet, it also highlights the distinct interconnections between discourses at different locales. Namely, addressing the issue of gender and sexuality subjectivities in postcolonial and/or ethnically divided places – where ideas about nationhood and national identity and traditional and religious conceptions are not only still prevalent, but they are also exposed to external influences – through the lens of both queer theory and national identity theory, underscores the limits of understanding national, gender and sexuality identity formation solely as a nationally-based phenomenon.

Moreover, an attempt to bridge academic discourses about gender and sexuality subjectivities and about identity-formation and politics which is based on all positions’ shared support for gender and sexual equality, is in a better position to discern and avoid the perils of both identity and rights-based approaches and of a radical project that could be impractical or unrealizable in specific locales. In this way it helps cover some gaps in the existing literature, while it also generates new ideas about how external transnational/supranational discourses of sexuality and modes of sexual politics could be appropriated by activists at the national level, in ways that are compatible with local particularities and historical distinctions.

In sum, this thesis attempts to approach the national identity-gender-sexuality relationship in a manner that the relevant scholarship to date has avoided. We can reach a richer and more thorough understanding of the operations of discourses of identity, gender and sexuality by examining the articulations of competing, yet not necessarily incompatible, visions. This thesis focuses on local and transnational/supranational, official and unofficial discourses of nationhood, gender and sexuality, on their relationship to power and culture, as well as on their interconnections and effects on individuals. By doing so it attempts to highlight daily life conditions and experiences that are otherwise obscured. It aims to expand the ways in which gender and sexuality subjectivities can be imagined, articulated and

studied and, in this manner, to represent a new, complimentary focused scholarly approach to theories and ideas, whose real currency is measured by their impact on people’s lives.

Before embarking into an analysis of these power dynamics and of the questions that they generate, a few caveats are in order. The first one relates to the way in which I employ some contested terminology and terms with more than one meaning. In this thesis, I use the terms ‘subjectivity’, ‘identification’ and ‘identity’ to denote what I understand to be the three stages/products of a process. In part, this is so because of the ways in which the interviewees described this process. By ‘subjectivity’ I mean the portrayal and construction of certain people and classes of people by others. For example, ‘LGBTQ subjectivity’ refers to the way in which LGBTQ individuals are perceived and constructed by the predominant forces of the social and political milieu in which they are located, without this meaning that they have no control over this procedure. By ‘identification’ I mean individuals’ own self-perceptions, while ‘identity’ signifies the assignment of various identifications with political meaning. For example, a person who identifies as a man who has sex with other men does not necessarily understand himself as a ‘gay’ man. This is because, within the context that I examine (that is, Cyprus) ‘imported’ terms like ‘gay’ or ‘lesbian’ denote a specific political sexual identity. The Cypriot man who has sex with other men identifies as ‘gay’ once he perceives his sexual choice not only as part of his personal identity, but also as a political identity.

I use the term ‘Europeanization’ quite loosely, intending it to refer to the involvement with, and participation in, European bodies, institutions and mechanisms, to the abidance with the laws and policies of such bodies and to the embracing of the ideas and values that these bodies represent – for example, human rights. Although I recognize the binaries embedded in concepts like ‘Europe/West

34 This will be the focus of chapter four.
35 Michel Foucault (1978). The History of Sexuality Volume 1: The Will to Knowledge, trans. Robert Hurley (London and New York: Penguin Books, 1998), 60. My understanding of the formation of subjectivities is in agreement with the Foucaultian concept of ‘subjectivization’: the different subject positions in discourse. The fact that subjects are being positioned in discourse does not necessarily render subjects passive since subjects are not only products of power, but they are also producers of themselves. Such understanding of ‘subject’ and ‘subjectivization’ precludes discourse determinism and the essentialization of power. See: Kevin Kendall and Gary Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods (London: Sage, 1999), 54.
36 As Weeks explains, ‘homosexual behaviour is widespread; but distinctive roles, categories and ways of life have developed only in some cultures, and do not necessarily encompass all forms of homosexual activity’. See: Jeffrey Weeks, “Sexual Orientation,” in The Languages of Sexuality (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 191.
versus the Rest and/or the non-European/non-West/ the Periphery’,\(^{37}\) in this thesis I use these concepts extensively, in order to denote the hierarchies – some of them discursive – and the unequal dynamics between the Western European and Anglo-American ‘centre’, on the one hand, and the rest of the world, on the other hand.\(^{38}\) Undeniably, these hierarchies and the unequal power and cultural influence balance are, to a great extent, the result of discourses of ‘modernity’.\(^ {39}\) Such discourses have formed the nucleus of colonial projects that have divided the world into ‘civilized/advanced’ and ‘uncivilized/backward’.\(^ {40}\) As the discussion of the case of Cyprus will amply demonstrate, the effects of such discourses continue to haunt former colonial peoples, thus rendering the idea of the possibility of ‘postcoloniality’ – or even, ‘postmodernity’ – questionable.\(^ {41}\)

The second caveat relates to my position as a researcher in relation to my topic and to the people I interviewed as part of this project. Like many others who conduct research on sexual identities, I was asked by interviewees, fellow researchers and friends about my motives for choosing to undertake such a project. To answer, I adopt Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s comments about her positionality in relation to her project, and about the attacks she received from some gay scholars for

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\(^{37}\) I criticize these binarisms in chapter five.


\(^{39}\) ‘Modernity’ is an ambiguous term with regard to what it denotes and with regard to the way it has been employed over different historical periods and about different milieux. The term becomes even more ambiguous when applied to the case of formerly colonial Cyprus where ‘multiple modernities’ intersect. See: Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1987). Translated by Frederick G. Lawrence. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005. For the purposes of this thesis, the terms ‘modern’, ‘modernity’ and ‘modernization’ are understood in their conventional sense, i.e., they refer to the nineteenth-century European societies’ social transformations, which were later transmitted into other contexts.


Sedgwick writes:

It is as if one couldn’t say [or be] “heterosexual” in the first person without invoking, fatuously, the mendacious pretense of the two terms’ symmetry – as well as of their empirical transparency. That was part of what my performative insistence was about: a refusal to pretend to make sense within a bifurcated discourse that did not make any sense of me.43

To explicate, an understanding of gender and sexuality as bifurcated – whether this understanding is propelled through heterocentric discourses, or it is articulated by some scholars who see it necessary to police gender, sexuality and disciplinary borders – fails to account for the way I perceive myself and for the way I position myself in relation to my project.

However, my – or any other researcher’s – motives for studying a topic, is of secondary relevance. What is relevant – and what really affects both the process and the results of projects like mine – is not the researcher’s standpoint, voice or sexuality. Rather, it is the fact that any standpoint or voice – regardless of the motives behind it – is always thought of as being related to some kind of vested interest. This tendency to look for motives and vested interests in projects about sexual identities confirms that sexuality is tangled in webs of power. It also confirms that sexuality and sexual identities are not merely the effects of the forces that produce them. Engaging with them through research, unearthing the processes of their formation and voicing them is unavoidably a political act, since doing so unveils the ways in which they could function as weapons against those webs of power that attempt to eradicate them, via keeping them invisible.

An imperative question remains, though: How can ‘research as praxis’ actualize in the postmodern/post-positivist era?44 How could one create an empowering research design and conduct empirical research in an era characterized

by ‘a crucial disparity between the world and the knowledge we might have of it’? 

Rather than inhibiting scientific inquiry from reaching ‘the truth’, the postmodern/post-positivist turn has pointed out the limitations of science and has highlighted the importance of realizing that there is no such thing as ‘reality’ for scientific inquiry to grasp and explain. Therefore, what makes good scientific inquiry is being attentive to the different ways available of knowing and of making sense of human life and experience. The fact that the production and legitimization of knowledge has been exposed as being historically and culturally situated does not annihilate scientific inquiry. Rather, it prompts scholarship to make its biases part of its argument and of its study. Consequently, the question of legitimization is rephrased from establishing ‘the truth’ to deciphering how and why certain truths are established, while keeping in mind that the researcher cannot stand above this reflexive process.

This idea of reflexivity guided my project throughout. Following Bourdieu’s recommendations, I attempted to remain constantly aware of my own biases and of my social relation to the topic of my study. As Foucault phrased it, ‘the object was to learn to what extent the effort to think one’s own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently’. My aim is to promote understanding regarding the processes that lead to self-identification and to subjectivization by others, as well as regarding the power nexus amidst which these processes become possible. My objective is to coordinate theory and praxis and thus enhance action that leads to a change of the current status quo, which currently alienates certain gender and sexuality identifications.

In the process of doing so, I have been constantly reflecting on how my value commitments insert themselves into my work, and with what consequences. I have also remained constantly aware of the ethical dilemmas raised when one interviews people on a sensitive topic such as sexuality, and of the analytic difficulties and

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46 Lather, “Feminist Perspectives,” 570.
50 Lather, “Feminist Perspectives”, 576.
shortcomings associated with doing discourse analysis. One of these shortcomings, to which discourse analysis is most vulnerable is the circular identification of discourses and mental constructs;\(^{51}\) namely, citing utterances and interviewees’ responses in explanation for these same utterances and responses. But if, according to the postmodern/post-positivist argument, there is no such thing as ‘one truth’ to be unearthed through research and if interviewees’ articulations about themselves and about their experiences do not escape the confines of the interviewees’ socio-cultural, political context and reality, exactly what is a researcher supposed to study? What analytical tools and principles should she employ?

As Kitzinger explains, balancing the relationship between ‘voice’ and ‘experience’ and avoiding drawing hasty conclusions about the latter based on the former necessitates that the researcher pays attention to the details of both what is said – or not said – and of how it is said, while keeping in mind that the act of talking constitutes experience at the moment it is articulated.\(^{52}\) Based on this principle and on her empirical research, she argues in favour of a conversation analysis approach. Prioritizing what and especially how questions over why questions as an analytical approach is not exclusive to conversation analysis followers. Some forms of discourse analysis and narrative analysis also focus on talk as action-constitutive.\(^{53}\) Nevertheless, the aim of this project is not to pay allegiance to a specific methodological approach, while remaining blind to the useful insights that other approaches might elucidate. Rather, I follow Bourdieu’s ‘methodological polytheism’ that calls for the adoption of any techniques that are relevant and useful for the purposes of the project.\(^{54}\)

Fifty-five interviews were conducted and fifty-five questionnaires were distributed to the interviewees from January 2009 to November 2010. The interviewees recruited were: twenty Greek-Cypriot ‘elite’ participants – i.e., state, political party, military, Orthodox Church clergy and women’s movements


\(^{54}\) Bourdieu and Wacquant, ed. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 30, 227.
members, representatives and officials – and thirty-five Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot self-identified LGBTQ participants. The recruitment of the political elites was purposive: I chose to interview both male and female politicians who are affiliated with the four major Greek-Cypriot political parties.\(^{55}\) In addition to controlling for gender and political affiliation/ideology, I chose the specific politicians based on a background research that I had conducted on each one of them. Namely, I chose to recruit politicians who had been involved in civil rights campaigns and/or had participated in parliamentary committees dealing with equality issues. I recruited these political elites by contacting them directly – mostly via email – or by approaching cabinet staff who arranged for me to meet them. The interview questions for political elites were tailored based on each interviewee’s past and present political activities and publically articulated positions on certain topics. However, the questionnaires were identical for all participants.

I recruited military officials through ‘snowballing’. I managed to recruit both male and female officials and I made sure that they were representative of a large age span – mid-twenties to late fifties. Additionally, I made sure to interview military officials with different political party affiliations, by asking participants already interviewed if they could bring me into contact with colleagues who held different positions than themselves on questions such as ‘what do you think of Turkish-Cypriots’ or ‘what do you consider to be a favourable solution to the national problem’?\(^{56}\)

In their majority, the representatives of women’s movements whom I interviewed were elected MPs at the time the interviews were conducted. Therefore, I could control for political ideology/political party affiliation. Nevertheless, it was hard to assure a large age span among these interviewees, since Cypriot women’s movements had been particularly active only for the short period between the late 1970s and the late 1980s. Therefore, all the interviewees were women in their late forties and early fifties. I recruited these women primarily by contacting them

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\(^{55}\) These parties are: The rightist ‘Democratic Rally of Cyprus’ (Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός, DISY), the socialist-centrist ‘Movement for Social Democracy’ (Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Ένωση Κέντρου, EDEK), the rightist-centrist ‘Democratic Party’ (Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα, DIKO), and the leftist-communist ‘Progressive Party for the Working People’ (Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζομενοι Λαού, AKEL).

\(^{56}\) In Cyprus, political party ideologies are more or less centred on these two topics. Therefore, even if participants where careful not to name the political party they support, their answers to questions on these two issues were more or less indicative of where they stand on the Cypriot politico-ideological spectrum, i.e. political left, centre or right.
directly. The interview questions were tailored to suit each woman’s past and present activities pertaining to gender issues.

With regard to these three subgroups of elites, I had relative flexibility in choosing interviewees and controlling for variables. Nevertheless, the situation with high-ranking members of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus clergy was much different. Conversely to the case of political elites who might feel that they would jeopardize their good public image, if they refuse to participate in a research project in which their political opponents have already participated, high-ranking clergymen do not have to face this ‘peer pressure’. The Church of Cyprus’s official position on the issue of homosexuality is one (hostile) and nonnegotiable. Therefore, members of the clergy do not want to individually position themselves on the subject, in order not to risk saying something that would either contradict the Church’s official position, or substantiate the fact that their hostile attitudes towards homosexuality have no strong theological basis. Those clergy members I interviewed, I reached through personal contacts. In order to assure that they would stay on board and not cancel the interview, I had my contacts tell them that my project is about social equality within Cypriot society in general.

It should be noted that I do not assume that the conclusions I draw based on interviews with Greek-Cypriot elites are neatly applicable to the socio-political milieu in the occupied part of the island. Additionally, I do understand the problem created by inadequately disaggregating the concept of ‘official/public agents and discourses’ that operate within the Turkish-Cypriot context, since I do not have any data available from Turkish-Cypriot elites. Nevertheless, this lack of data is due to PhD completion time-limitations and to the difficulties this time-limitation caused in making contacts with ‘TRNC’ officials – contacts that were difficult to make, partially because I am a national of the RoC.

What is also important to highlight is my selection of elite and non-elite interviewees in relation to the character, structure and composition of Cypriot society. Although elite actors’ discourses, narratives and ideas about national identity, gender and sexuality might differ according to these actors’ power position – for example, community/municipality political elites versus national-level political representatives – in the case of the RoC, real decision-making with regard to citizens and groups’ rights and liberties lies with national-level, high-ranking political elites, such as MPs, since they are in a position to propose and vote upon legislation.
pertaining to social, legal and political equality. Therefore, and also because of the
difficulties in recruiting elite interviewees, I chose to interview national-level
political representatives.

With regard to non-elite interviewees, though, it seemed necessary to ensure
the participation of individuals from both rural and urban areas. Although the
majority of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees resided in
the island’s biggest cities – for example, Nicosia, Limassol, Larnaca and Kyrenia – a
considerable number of them had grown up in suburban areas. However, LGBTQ
participants’ approaches to national identity, gender and sexuality did not seem to be
influenced by their place of birth and/or residence. It could be argued that the small
size of the country accounts, at least partially, for the lack of differences in
perceptions and ideas among LGBTQ interviewees from urban versus rural/suburban
areas. Nonetheless, several differences with regard to perceptions about non-
heterosexual sexual identities and LGBTQ rights were found among these
interviewees. These seem to be attributed to the different degree of exposure of each
interviewee to ‘Western/European’ external discourses about sexual and gender
identities and politics. For example, Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees who had attended
university abroad, travelled, or participated in LGBTQ on-line forums seemed to be
more acquainted with, and supportive of, LGBTQ identity and rights politics.

I recruited Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot interviewees through
‘snowballing’. The majority of the interviews I conducted were one-to-one, although
I conducted a number of group interviews also. Group interviews were not initially
one of my chosen methods, since I was concerned with maintaining anonymity and
confidentiality; they were the only available option when, in some instances, I would
go meet an individual participant and found a group of friends who also wanted to
talk to me. Although I had not planned to conduct group interviews, they turned out
to be very useful. These types of interviews closely resembled participant
observation and naturally occurring talk. Thus, they afforded me the opportunity to
get an insight into LGBTQ participants’ conflicting and crossing discourses, as well as
into the ways through which they negotiate their different positions on ‘common
interests’. 57

57 Jonathan Potter, “Discourse Analysis as a Way of Analysing Naturally Occurring Talk”, in
Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice, ed. David Silverman, 2nd ed. (London: Sage
Publications, 2004), 200-21. For the differences between ‘focus groups’ and ‘participant observation’
The interviews with Greek-Cypriot participants were conducted in Greek and I transcribed them and translated them into English. The interviews with Turkish-Cypriots were conducted in English. It should be pointed out that the issue of language and translation highlighted more important points and raised more possibilities than it created problems. For example, in their majority, the LGBTQ participants initially reacted negatively to the term ‘queer’. Neither in Turkish nor in Greek has the term assumed the political impetus it carries in its English form. In Turkish and in Greek, the word continues to be used in its literal sense and stands for ‘strange’, ‘freaky’, ‘comical’ and/or ‘grotesque’. However, after explaining to the interviewees the usage of the specific adjective, noun and verb in English, some of them were much less reluctant to accept it as an eligible term for describing non-heterosexual sexual desire. A similar matter arose in relation to the term ‘trans*’. Most LGBTQ participants thought that the term stands exclusively for ‘post-surgical transsexuals’. Some reported that after having been explained what the term means and how it differs and relates to the term ‘transsexual’, they became less negative towards it.

In the past, in positivist and quasi-positivist analyses about approaches to social inquiry and about qualitative research methodology in the social sciences, leading questions were described as an error to be avoided. Such analyses that drew upon August Compte and Emile Durkheim’s sociology warned against the imperfect reality that interview data give access to. However, in non-statistical qualitative analyses like the present one, the first problem with rejecting leading questions as a bad way of conducting interviews is that there exist no specific criteria to be applied in order to tell that a question is leading.

For example, a question like ‘you do identify as a gay man, right?’ is strongly leading, especially when addressed to an interviewee who has never contemplated about sexual identity categorizations. A question like ‘how would you describe your sexual identity?’ is clearly less suggestive. Nonetheless, and still according to whom the interviewee is, such a question might still lead the interviewee into a response that does not really reflect his self-perception as a sexual being. Namely, when such

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a question is posed to him, the interviewee might choose the best available answer from a pool of existing answers/vocabulary: The interviewee might response ‘I am a gay man’, or ‘I am a homosexual’, or ‘I prefer to see myself as queer’. This question would appear to be less leading, if the interviewee chose to respond ‘none of the terminology commonly used to describe non-heterosexual sexual choice reflects the way I perceive myself as a sexual being’. Therefore, it might be more useful to think of questions along a continuum, on the one end of which the interviewer provides the details of the answer she seeks to get, while on the other end the interviewee provides all the details.\(^\text{59}\)

Additionally, whether or not an interviewee will be led into a specific answer from a specific question does not only depend on the way the interviewer phrases or articulates the question. It also depends on the interviewee’s way of understanding, his assumptions and expectations.\(^\text{60}\) Having said that, asking the interviewees to react to the terms ‘queer’ and ‘trans*’ before and after I had explained the meaning these terms have in English, might be considered as a ‘leading’ method. However, these questions aimed to verify my interpretations amidst the difficulties created by the language/translation issue. Moreover, they were used to test for contradictory and conflicting discourses/positions held by interviewees.

My approach to the interviewees’ self-articulations and narratives was interactional and reflexive. Namely, while conducting and analyzing the interviews, I focused on the dialogic process between teller and listener.\(^\text{61}\) The interviews with LGBTQs were also active. Namely, they developed into a two-way conversation during which I established a climate of mutual disclosure on some aspects.\(^\text{62}\) Nonetheless, the interviews with elites were of a different type. They were more formal, although they were also characterized by reflexivity. However, this

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reflexivity was premised on an interplay of knowledge and power. Some elite interviewees attempted to position themselves in relation to me as ‘the information/knowledge-holder’ versus ‘the non-knower/apprentice’.

Characteristically, when pressed to comment on the unequal status of women in relation to men in the Church’s organizational structure, one bishop dismissed my questions by saying that they were stupid and naive and that I was not informed well enough about the topic I sought to investigate.

This is an example of an instance in which elite interviewees try to use the interview setting in order to affirm their institutional authority. In this, as well as in similar situations, I had no option but to allow power relationships to enter my study of power. I approached this display of power as another context within which my research could occur, and I adopted an agonistic and hard-talk approach towards hostile elite interviewees. Namely, when interviewees would attempt to evade addressing certain questions by disturbing the power dynamics between interviewee and interviewer, I would push even harder for an answer. In all such instances, this approach proved to be particularly effective, since it served as a reminder to the agitated interviewee that the researcher is as much of a ‘knower’ of her research field as the interviewee is a ‘knower’ of the issues that pertain to his institution and institutional role.

An amalgam of research techniques was used and a variety of participants were interviewed for the purposes of this project. Additionally, this thesis treats subjects as diverse as nationhood and national identities, colonialism, gender and sexuality subjectivities, identifications and identities, forms of sexual politics, institutional and grassroots agency and its relationship with local and transnational/supranational discourses and power structures. However, I do not propose to offer anything like a complete, universal view of the multiple and intricate connections that emanate when numerous discourses cross. Nonetheless, I do aim to present a comprehensive analysis of the Cypriot discursive landscape.

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66 Ibid., 55.
within which imaginations, performances and political articulations of gender and sexuality become possible. For the purposes of this thesis, the invocation of the case of Cyprus aims to serve as an entrance into relatively overlooked questions and discussions about how the national identity-gender-sexuality relationship plays out, and how it is structured and restructured when the ‘local’ and the ‘supranational’ cross.

I do not want to imply that national identity, gender, sexuality, their indigenous forms and their external constructions can be reduced simply to the ‘West/Europe versus non-West/non-European’ opposition. Such a claim stakes too much ground for accurate analyses of geographical and historical particularities and it also binds us to binaries and essentialisms which ignore the politics and the forces that initially divided the world into the ‘West/Europe’ and the ‘Rest’. However, I do believe that targeting discourses of identities at different levels is a way of making sense of their importance and their artificiality, as well as of their real and often dire impact on people’s lives.

This thesis is divided in five chapters, with each one of them addressing a different angle and focusing on a different aspect of the main relationship under investigation, namely national identity-gender-sexuality. Chapter one foregrounds the ways through which the boundaries of nationhood, gender and sexuality have been policed and reinforced in Cyprus, in an era in which the traditional ways of the organization of the national collectivity and of its members’ relationships have been challenged by external, European influences, as well as by perceived ‘ethnic’ enemies – in the case of Cyprus, Turkey. It demonstrates that political and religious institutional agents – and specifically, the Orthodox Church of Cyprus – cultivate and preserve discourses that have undermined the possibility for flexibility and fluidity of social formations and understandings of national identity, gender and sexuality, and they circumscribe the available spaces for the exercise of non-elite agency. Nonetheless, it reveals that, like LGBTQ individuals, Cypriot elite institutional actors are also limited by the confines of the very discourses that they themselves propel. Yet, through the examination of some recent examples of public discussions about LGBTQ rights in Cyprus, it demonstrates that the Cypriot discursive landscape is penetrable by alternative destabilizing narratives.
Chapter two reflects on the ways through which the national identity-gender-sexuality relationship could be reconfigured, in order to broaden the available spaces for the articulation of alternative, non-heteronormative narratives of gender and sexuality. It focuses on the organization and mobilization of Cypriot women’s groups, and it attributes the lack of development of feminist political activism in Cyprus to these groups’ close allegiance with, and participation in, nationalistic, androcentric and patriarchal projects. However, it shows that this allegiance and participation has been more instrumental and strategic than ideological. Consequently, it emphasizes the importance of some forms of ‘strategic essentialism’ in milieux where, because of the predominance of patriarchal, androcentric and heterocentric nationalist discourses, there are no alternative ways for subordinated groups to get a foot into the existing power structures. Additionally, it underscores the significance of the employment of European mechanisms, institutions and discourses as a way through which the ‘strategic essentialism versus identity deconstruction’ dilemma could be prevented or transcended in such locales.

The third chapter marks two instances in which Cypriot prevalent constructions and hierarchies of gender and sexuality were disrupted by Cypriot LGBTQ individuals. More specifically, it discusses the development and the socio-political impact of two legal cases – Modinos v. Cyprus and Marangos v. Cyprus – that were adjudicated by the ECtHR and the European Commission on Human Rights (EComHR). Through the examination of the events that preceded and followed the adjudication of these cases, as well as through the analysis of the several factors that marked the beginning of the formation of a Cypriot politics of sexuality, it emphasizes the positive effects of external/transnational discourses and mechanisms at the local level. Moreover, it calls into question the applicability of

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68 By ‘strategic essentialism’ I mean, à la Spivak, ‘a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest’. See: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography,” in Subaltern Studies IV, ed. Ranajit Guha (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), 330-63. Reprinted in Ranajit Guha, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ed., Selected Subaltern Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 3-32. Quote from page 13. As the chapters that follow will argue, in the case of Cyprus, the concept of ‘strategic essentialism’ continues to have currency, as it seems to be the sole practical and realistic way for subordinate groups to escape their subaltern position within the prevailing power structures. This is the case even though Spivak, who coined the term, subsequently abandoned it by claiming that it has been misunderstood since, in its employment, the ‘strategic’ part of the term has often been ignored. See: Spivak, “In a Word,” 126-30; Dantus, Sara, Johnson, Stefan and Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, “An Interview with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak”, boundary 2, vol. 20, no. 2 (1993): 34-5.
69 Marangos v. Cyprus, 1997 (No. 31106/96); Modinos v. Cyprus.
some of queer theory’s tenets in locales like Cyprus, where the choice between radical politics of sexuality and identity/rights-based politics of sexuality is not even existent, because of the almost complete permeation of the socio-political landscape by homophobic discourses.

Chapter four focuses primarily on Cypriot LGBTQs self-perceptions. It reveals the large degree to which homophobic official narratives have negatively affected the ways in which Cypriot LGBTQ individuals understand themselves as sexual beings, as well as the fact that Cypriot LGBTQs participate in the sanctioning of non-heterosexual modalities of sexuality. For instance, it marks in-group exclusions and alienations, both intra-ethnic – that is, among Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs and among Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs – and interethnic – that is, between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs. Nevertheless, it illustrates that, although some of these exclusions are reinforced by the employment of the ‘Europe/West versus the Rest’ language, both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQ groups’ formation processes and operations have been based on tools and opportunities afforded to them by ‘Europe’.

The thesis closes with chapter five that scrutinizes the essentialisms and hierarchies embedded in the concept of Europeanization and in global sexual identities, which sometimes reinforce understandings of local cultures and of indigenous modalities of sexuality as inferior. It traces the construction of such essentialisms and hierarchies in colonial history and in ideas of ‘modernization’, which have acted as colonialisms’ ideological pillars. After placing the concepts of ‘postmodernity’ and ‘postcoloniality’ under the same type of scrutiny, it evaluates the applicability of Western European and Anglo-American paradigms of sexuality politics in other milieux. This analysis leads to the conclusion that, in places like Cyprus, the debates between proponents of radical and mainstream approaches to sexual politics offer little insight to local LGBTQ activists. The reason is that, because of the hostile environment within which they operate and which they, nonetheless, have to affect, the very newly established Cypriot LGBTQ organizations do not have the luxury of choosing between ideological approaches, or even between types of strategies. The employment of European institutions and discourses, and especially of the ECtHR and of the language of human rights is, at least currently, the only viable option towards getting a step closer to both nominal/legal and substantive equality, even if this implies that Cypriot LGBTQs

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have to succumb to group identity formation limitations, and to a foreign language about non-heterosexual sexuality that conflicts with local/indigenous understandings.

The following chapters, then, have a dual purpose. First, they emphasize local perceptions of nationhood and constructions of national identity as sites through which gender and sexuality subjectivities are controlled, and gender and sexuality demonstrations, identifications and identities are rendered as ‘deviant’ or ‘appropriate’ in relation to the national collectivity’s imagined telos. Thus, the thesis marks a fundamental reconception of the nature and workings of public official discourses on aspects of life that have been traditionally negated and/or portrayed as politically irrelevant. Second, the thesis insists on the centrality of the relationship between the local/national and the transnational/supranational. This commitment stems from the fact that, in Cyprus, as well as in other places where the discursive landscape is dominated by androcentric, patriarchal, homophobic and nationalistic discursive power structures, external influences have afforded subaltern groups the means to begin to assume some control over their lives. This is so even though this process of Cypriots’ self-realization and self-construction is yet to be completed, since it continues to be inhibited by predominant official identity discourses.
CHAPTER ONE

Who Speaks the Nation? Cypriot Discourses of Belonging and Exclusion
Introduction

Theories of nationalism have extensively highlighted the importance of constructions of nationhood and national identity towards cultivating a sense of belonging and of continuity that, consequently, preserves people’s allegiance to the national collective self, and also maintains nationalist power structures in place. Whether real or imagined, invented or constructed, elite-engineered or rooted in the past and memory, national identities have the power to define not only community, but also group and individual modes of existence. Official public discourses of nationalism interact with private ‘hidden’ discourses. Whether ‘banal’ and symbolic, or dogmatic and explicit, demonstrations of nationalism have a strong impact on subjectivities, like gender and sexuality, which the predominant literature does not sufficiently address. Both as an unbound seriality of everyday universals, and as a bound seriality of ‘governmentality’, nationalism and the politics of ethnicity circumscribe the processes through which identities and imaginable lived experience are shaped.

Discerning the possibilities for exercise of agency amidst these processes reveals the pervasiveness of such discourses, which manage to reach ‘into the very grain of individuals’. Nonetheless, it also demonstrates that they are not impermeable to alternative radical narratives. Even in milieux that are characterized by ethnic divisions and conflict, where the perceived need to protect the national collectivity from external threats is rendered as the ultimate priority, schemes of agency that prioritize elements and subjectivities other than nationhood and national identity, have the ability to destabilize – even to a limited degree – discourses of sterile groupism and national exclusivity. Such alternative discourses and schemes of

70 Smith, The Antiquity of Nations; Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations; Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation; Smith, National Identity. 
72 The term ‘hidden transcripts’ is borrowed from: Scott. Domination and the Arts of Resistance. 
73 Billig. Banal Nationalism. 
agency gain impetus as the national socio-political status quo gives way to the norms of a new global order and to the workings of supranational institutions and mechanisms.

The case of Cyprus is particularly instructive towards eliciting and answering various pertinent questions which arise when nationhood and national identity are understood as inextricably linked to subjectivities such as gender and sexuality. Namely, the example of Cyprus helps demonstrate the impact of nationalist and national identity discourses both on individual and on collective narratives about gender and sexuality in an ethnically divided locale, where ideas and ideals about the need to preserve the national collectivity interact in consonant and dissonant ways with international and regional/‘European’ discourses.

The central arguments of this chapter will be developed in three different sections. The first section of this chapter will focus on nationalism literature. It will discuss its various strands and highlight its shortcomings, which it will subsequently attempt to address. It will argue that gender and sexuality subjectivities need to be examined as elements that are central in processes of making of the national self. It will also argue that questions of exercise of agency over identity formation cannot be sufficiently addressed, unless the concept of ‘agency’ is disaggregated and unless the agents’ relation to discourses is understood – through a Foucaultian approach – both as reciprocal and flexible.

The second section will focus on the particularities of the case of Cyprus. It will discuss the processes of national identity formation among Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots from the early twentieth century until today. It will evaluate the prospects of emasculating nationalistic ideological struggles, both within each ethnic collectivity and between them. It will argue that Europeanization and the prospects of EU membership have functioned as important catalysts of change in predominant nationalist discourses. It will then attempt to identify the main obstacles towards the further emasculation of such rhetoric and it will argue that the lack of separation between state and Church hinders attempts to bring about discursive and power structure changes. However, it will conclude that change is not impossible.

The last section will focus specifically on the nationhood-gender-sexuality relationship. It will discuss the ways through which, in Cyprus, gender has been employed in order to ground nationalist discourses. It will discern the essentialisms embedded in nationalist interpretations and usages of gender and sexuality and it will
argue that some of the Cypriot gender literature is complicit in their perpetuation. It will argue that nationalism is a discourse of sexuality in and of itself, since national discourses become authoritative of what comes to be perceived by the national collectivity as ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ sexual behaviour. Specifically about Cyprus, it will argue that the criminalization of homosexuality and the intensification of inter-ethnic animosity by the British colonizers has augmented Cypriots’ feelings of abhorrence towards the ‘other’, be it the ethnic ‘enemy’ or the ‘sexually deviant’ individual.

Finally, this section will discern and analyze the Foucaultian subjectivity-discourse relationship, as this is exemplified in Cyprus. Namely, it will discuss elite and LGBTQ individuals’ relationship with predominant androcentric, heteronormative discourses of gender and sexuality. It will argue that these discourses have such an impact that they limit not only the imagination and available vocabulary of those whom they target, but also of the elites that participate in their construction and dissemination. However, it will also argue that this situation is not necessarily irrevocable. Agreeing with Kendall and Wickham’s reading of Foucaultian ‘subjectivity’, the chapter will conclude that self-shaping and action over prominent discourses are possible. This is because, as the articulation of alternative discourses and the visibility of alternative modalities of gender and sexuality are increased, exclusionary discourses lose their impetus, especially if such alternatives are couched in the language of ‘Europe’ and ‘human rights’.

Theories of Nationalism and the Question of Agency in Identity Construction

One of the central questions that theories of nationalism and national identity construction examine is how ‘the nation’ was constructed. For the ‘ethno-symbolic’ school of thought, which is represented by the seminal work of Anthony D. Smith, both the formation of the state and its operations would be impossible without the existence of a relatively homogenous ethnic core, and without the existence of a sense of identity and ancestry among people which is exemplified in myths.

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76 Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality.
77 Kendall and Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods, 54.
78 Ibid.
memories, symbols, values and traditions and cultural perceptions. Smith argues that ‘ethnicity’ should not be conflated with ‘nationhood’, which is an invented political instrument and a social engineering project, since the past and memory necessarily prevent ethnicity’s ex nihilo creation.

Smith disagrees with approaches that attribute the construction of ‘the nation’ to deceitful or self-delusional elite agents – like state officials, prelates, religious institutions’ representatives, or intellectual elites – which are represented by the work of authors like Eric Hobsbawm. Rather, he argues without the heritage of pre-modern ethnic ties that ground national identity, the modern construction of the nation would be inconceivable, and the state’s political claims would not resonate among its constituency. Namely, that there exist solid historical and sociological grounds for the continuing devotion of people to their nations and national states, to which ‘modernist’ ideology is blind. As he explicates, for many people the sense of belonging to a nation evokes a sense of continuity over generations and a sense of immemorial belonging to an ascribed community that contributes to the preservation of the collective self.

Smith posits his theory as an alternative to arguments which see nationalism as a purely instrumental and social engineering elite project and, therefore, do not sufficiently explain why people subscribe to it. Yet, not all such approaches to nationalism are liable to Smith’s critique. The work of authors like Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm and John Breuilly, who argue that nations are modern creations that have been instrumental in the genesis of capitalism, was problematized by

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80 For example: Hobsbawm, “Mass-Producing Traditions.”


84 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism; Gellner, “Nationalisms and the New World Order”. See also: Breuilly, Nationalism and the State; Hobsbawm. Nations and Nationalism since 1780; Hobsbawm and Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, 263-308.
Benedict Anderson. For Anderson, nations have a powerful hold on people’s imagination. Essentially, by falling somewhere between theories of nationalism that ignore the importance of national sentiment and focus solely on the fabrication of history and tradition as a means for achieving political and economic ends, and theories that espouse a romantic view of the importance of ethnic, religious and cultural memories for people’s lives, Anderson moves ‘the nation’ and nationalism debate beyond the ‘mythology versus reality’ pattern of argumentation.

Anderson makes a serious effort to explain why people subscribe to nationalism by transcending Gellner’s functionalist mode of explanation, which is based on economic concerns and on the competition over resources. His main argument is not one premised on the disjuncture between the ‘appearance’ and the ‘reality’ of the nation. Rather, it is based on the idea that there is nothing more real than this fiction, than this ‘imagined community.’ His most significant addition is his effort to explain nationalism’s appeal on popular imagination. He distinguishes between ‘nationalism’ and ‘the politics of ethnicity’ and interprets them as two kinds of seriality: the former is the unbound seriality of everyday universals, while the latter is the bound seriality of ‘governmentality.’ According to Anderson, it is the unbound seriality of everyday universals that offers individuals the opportunity to imagine themselves as members of larger than face-to-face solidarities and to choose to act based on these imagined solidarities. Whereas Smith sees people’s willingness to die for the sake of their nation in pre-existing ‘ethnies’, Anderson stresses a socially constructed nationalism based on cultural, political and economic factors.

However, none of the aforementioned theories of nationalism sufficiently addresses imperative questions about the dialectic and the dynamics between public/official discourses and private/ ‘hidden transcripts’ of national identity.

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85 Anderson. Imagined Communities.
88 Chatterjee, “Anderson’s Utopia”, 128-34.
In the centre of these theoretical trajectories are collective narratives and institutional actions, which are seen as seeking to achieve ideal destined missions, or as legitimizing instrumental political, social and economic aims. Therefore, these theories do not sufficiently highlight the importance of national identity as a debate and as a process/practice, which is shaped through individual lived experience.

Moreover, these theories do not exhaust the questions generated by the problem of agency: Could the ideals of nationalism be upheld without recognizing the politics of Foucaultian ‘governmentality’ as a ‘legitimate part of the ... modern political life of the nation?’ Answering this question necessitates, firstly, disaggregating the concept ‘actors/agents of nationalism’, secondly, deciphering the numerous actors’ relationship vis-à-vis nationalism and national identity and, thirdly, detecting and translating the ways in which different sets of actors internalize, articulate, embody or reject, deconstruct and perform ‘the nation’. The difficulty in answering this question, and the sub-questions that follow from it, originates from the ambiguity that characterizes the concepts of ‘identity’ and ‘nationalism’, when these are used as tools of analysis in the social sciences and the humanities. As Brubaker and Cooper argue, ‘identity’ stands either for too little or for too much: A constructivist approach to identity – namely, the understanding of identity as constructed, fluid and multiple – provides no rationale or vocabulary for understanding the sometimes coercive force of external identification. An essentialist approach – that is, the understanding of identity as the expression of a core, unified,

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89 The term ‘hidden transcripts’ is borrowed from: Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*. Please note that for the purposes of this study, the terms ‘public’ and ‘official discourses’ are used to denote the publically articulated predominant rhetoric of (primarily) the high-ranking state officials, of political parties, of the Cypriot Orthodox Church and of the military. Similarly, the term ‘official actors’ is also used in a disaggregated sense and as non-monolithic. It refers to high-ranking representatives and not to every single representative of a particular mechanism and/or institution. The same logic applies to ‘hidden, unofficial, private and group discourses’ and ‘actors’. Namely, distinctions are drawn between civil society’s different actors (representatives, grassroots, etc.), as well as between individuals’ articulated and non-articulated narratives/positions/discourses.

90 Chatterjee, “Anderson’s Utopia”, 134.

91 By asking, for example: Who is the ‘state’?

92 For example, by asking: ‘If it does, why does the state engage in national identity construction?’

93 How do individuals construct national identifications? What are the discourses on which communities and personal histories are predicated? What are the ‘hidden’/private transcripts and what is their relationship to elite-constructed public discourses?
stable unit like a collective or an individual – necessarily curtails efforts to problematize identities’ power on groups and on individuals.\(^94\)

Rogers Brubaker addresses questions of agency and of agency’s role in the perpetuation of nationalist discourses. He prompts social scientists to stop reifying nations as real and substantial entities.\(^95\) He argues that ‘we can think of a national minority … in terms of the field of differentiated and competitive positions or stances adopted by different organizations, parties, movements, or individual political entrepreneurs … each seeking to monopolize the legitimate representation of the group.’\(^96\) Studying the ethnically mixed Transylvanian town of Cluj, Brubaker concludes that although both the Romanian majority and Hungarian minority remain unresponsive to the rhetoric of ethno-national entrepreneurs, to their political projects, to their symbolic provocations and to nationalist public discourses in general, ethnicity and nationality have significance for these people at the level of social everyday life and interaction. Nevertheless, this significance is not demonstrated through ethnic tension in everyday life; rather, it is demonstrated ‘in everyday encounters, practical categories, commonsense knowledge, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, interactional cues, discursive frames, organizational routines, social networks, and institutional reforms’.\(^97\) As a way of making sense of the social world, as opposed to an analytical frame of reference, this process is what Brubaker calls ‘everyday ethnicity’.\(^98\)

Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov point out that the connection between public official discourses and popular everyday self-understandings is not sufficiently treated in the literature. Therefore, they consider categorization not only as a political project and as an everyday social practice, but also as a mental process. However, they do so without espousing a radical subjectivism, or a psychologistic and individualistic approach. By examining the distribution of ‘groupness’ as mental representations within a population – rather than as the content of representations – they attribute the appeal and resonance of classification and categorization schemes,

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\(^95\) Brubaker. *Nationalism Reframed*.
\(^96\) Ibid., 61.
as well as the salience of ethnic and national discourses, to cognitive and socio-cognitive mechanisms, rather than to an irreducible sense of identity and to unyielding emotional commitments. Consequently, they shift attention from the elitist and biased agency of intellectuals and political entrepreneurs in the construction of ethnicity and nationalism, to the less noticed everyday activities of common people, and to ethnicity and nationalism as ‘socially shared knowledge of social objects’.99

But could Brubaker’s arguments about the city of Cluj be applied to state-supported discourses of nationalism which are premised on inequalities and exclusions other than ethnic and cultural ones? How about nationalism and ‘everyday ethnicity’ in places where, in the name of ‘Europeanization’ and progress, diversity and tolerance are only nominally respected, while essentially and systematically people’s agency and negotiation over their identities – consciously or unconsciously – continues to be circumscribed along elitist constructions of normality and abnormality, of laudable or inappropriate attitudes for one’s nation? Is ‘everyday ethnicity and nationalism’ different from public elite discourses with regard to subjectivities such as gender and sexuality, and their ‘appropriate-for-the nation’ performances?

Brubaker’s agency argument disaggregates the concept of ‘actors of nationalism’ and opens up new questions about the nature of nationhood. Nonetheless, it does not extend to cover subjectivities and categorizations which, although they are less explicit and visible in the public and ‘national’ sphere, they continue to be treated as ‘deviaces’ from the national collectivity’s norms. The issue of whether, how, to what extent and with what consequences national identity is related to gender and sexuality, poses a challenge to Brubaker’s agency argument. If individual and group agency over the construction of national identity and over the negotiation of dominant discourses is possible, how far could individuals and groups stretch the limits of what fits into ‘national identity’? Why is it that, in Cyprus, gender and sexuality are still very specifically and rigidly naturalized or demonized through the national and religious prism?


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In seeing ‘everyday ethnicity’ as an alternative to nationalist discourses, Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov address subjectivities, individual transcripts and agency to a considerable extent. Nevertheless, they omit gender and sexuality subjectivities from the list of elements that are used in the process of making sense of one’s (national) self. Their scheme of agency over the construction and the negotiation of lived experience, and of national and other identities is important because it problematizes the omnipotence of dominant discourses and sterile groupism. Nonetheless, it needs to be expanded to address multiple subjectivities which often intersect. This is because being or not being recognized as a legitimate actor who is bestowed with agency over defining nationality and ethnicity is based on qualities and inequalities other than those that the predominant nationalism literature – including Brubaker’s work – addresses. This is how gender and sexuality become not only relevant, but also pertinent to any discussion of nationalism and national identity.

The study of the case of Cyprus helps to do exactly this. Namely, it highlights the effects of nationalist and national identity discourses, both on personal narratives and on people’s imagination about subjectivities such as gender and sexuality which, although they are politically relevant, their relevance is masked or denied in the dominant discourses. As the following sections of this chapter will demonstrate, ‘the desire for unified nations can never be fully realized, partly because the existence of “others” remains necessary for the conceptualization of the nation and partly because unity in any community is challenged by the presence of different narratives about reality, different cultural traditions, and different sexual and ethnic identities’.100

So, do Cypriots exercise an agency over the negotiation of their national identities that deviates from the official gendered and heterocentric nationalist discourses, which are proposed by some state, Church and military officials? This question needs to be considered in the light of the specific history and cultural context of Cyprus, to which the next section will turn.

Hierarchies of Agency: National Belonging and Exclusion in Cyprus

Previous comparative studies have demonstrated the particularity of Cyprus in numerous respects. For example, in Inglehart and Norris’s examination of seventy-five societies in the 2000-2001 wave of the World Values Survey, none exhibited the characteristics and complexities that make Cyprus a distinct case: an ethnically, linguistically and religiously divided society that is coloured by the effects of a protracted national conflict, of British colonization, and of the impact of two regional powers – that is, Greece and Turkey – and that is simultaneously exposed to the supranational elements of globalization and ‘Europeanization’. The multicultural, multiethnic and multi-religious composition of the island’s population and its recent membership into the EU raise key questions about the potency, appeal and applicability of the ‘European value system’. Such questions become even more intriguing when one takes into account the ongoing pervasiveness of discourses of nationhood and national identity. This pervasiveness is partially explained by the historical events that marked the island, especially from the 1950s until the early 2000s.

Setting the Background: The Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot Gaze

After the long Ottoman period that lasted from 1571 to 1878, Cyprus came under British colonial rule. Greek-Cypriots’ demand for union with Greece took the form of armed ‘liberation struggle’ by the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) (Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών) from 1955 to 1959, from which Greek-Cypriot communists and Turkish-Cypriots were excluded. Primarily – though not exclusively – as a result of Greek-Cypriots’ aspirations for unification with Greece, in 1956, Turkish-Cypriots called for the partition of the island along ethnic

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102 It is beyond the aim of this study to present an exhaustive historical exposition of all the complexities that have affected the course of Cypriot history. Nonetheless, a short presentation of the main events and conditions that led to the division of Cyprus in 1974 is necessary, in order to frame the particular context of Cyprus and, therefore, the context of the production and cultivation of discourses of nationhood, gender and sexuality.
The Turkish-Cypriot Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilattı) was formed in 1957 and acted as rival to EOKA. However, the negotiations between Britain, Greece and Turkey led to the formation of the Republic of Cyprus as a single independent state in 1960, regardless of the aspirations of EOKA and TMT.

From the late 1950s until the late 1960s, Cyprus witnessed a period of interethnic conflict and bloodshed. In 1971, EOKA B, an ultra-nationalist Greek-Cypriot organization whose ultimate goal was union with Greece, was created. Supported by the Greek colonels’ regime that was then headed by Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides, EOKA B launched a campaign of killings, violence and intimidation against the government of Archbishop Makarios III and against the Greek-Cypriot communist party, the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) (Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα του Εργαζόμενου Λαού). This culminated in a coup in 1974. On the pretext of humanitarian assistance to Turkish-Cypriots, Turkey invaded Cyprus and it is still occupying the north part of the island. A large number of both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots were displaced, the former to the south and the latter to the north part of the island, and since 1974 the two sides have been separated. In 1983, the occupied north was self-declared as an independent state under the name ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’), thus solidifying the separation. The two ethnic communities remained completely separated until April 2003, when the ‘TRNC’ opened the Ledra Palace checkpoint and announced that it would allow Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots to cross to, and visit the other side of the island. The RoC has been a member of the EU since 2004.

104 The literature confirms that as part of its Truman Doctrine-related activities, which sought to secure the eastern Mediterranean against infringement by the Soviet Union, the United States (US) supported the Greek military regime. For example, see: David F. Schmitz. The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1965-1989. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Examining whether, the degree and the ways through which the US supported the 1974 coup against the Makarios III government is beyond the purpose of this study. Nevertheless, the literature confirms Washington’s wariness towards ‘the Castro of the Mediterranean’. See: Leigh H. Bruce, “Cyprus: A Last Chance,” Foreign Policy, vol. 58 (Spring 1985): 115-33; Andreas Theophanous, “Cyprus, the European Union and the Search for a New Constitution,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (2000): 213-33.
Although opinions about this issue vary, especially in the relevant literature of previous decades, the partition of the island is to a considerable degree the outcome of nationalist sentiments that were cultivated by the intellectual and political elites of the two ethnic groups. The focus of the present analysis will be Greek-Cypriot nationalism, because it is the impact of elite agents of the RoC on perceptions of gender and sexuality that this chapter ultimately seeks to address. However, Turkish-Cypriot nationalism will also be briefly and comparatively discussed.

The cultivation of Greek-Cypriot nationalism, the ‘preservation’ of Greek-Cypriots’ national identity and its protection from ethnic ‘others’, as well the discourses that supported these processes, have their roots in the ‘Greek Enlightenment’. This is the period between the last years of the eighteenth century and the first two decades of the nineteenth century, when elite-produced literature in Greek introduced, for the first time, the concepts of distinct linguistic nations and ethnic identities in the Balkans. In its internal dimension, that is, inside the borders of the new state, Greek nationalism and Greek identity formation involved the Greek state providing the normative discourse of the new state institutions – one of which was the national army – based on the creation of, and the socialization into, nationalistic values. In its external dimension, Greek nationalism and Greek identity formation involved the Greek state approaching and placing under the wing of ‘Hellenism’ the Greek-inhabited and Greek-speaking territories of the Ottoman Empire – one of which was Cyprus. It attempted to do so by exporting its educational system, press, cultural activities and the allure of a liberating national Greek army through its consulates.

107 Such divergence of opinions becomes evident when one compares the work of Greek and Greek-Cypriot to the work of Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot authors. For example, conversely to other authors whose work is discussed in this chapter and who refer to ‘Turkish invasion and occupation’, Pierre Oberling argues that the 1974 deployment of Turkish military force constitutes humanitarian intervention, with the aim of preventing Turkish-Cypriot ethnic cleansing. See: Pierre Oberling. Negotiating for Survival: The Turkish Cypriot Quest for a Solution to the Cyprus Problem. New Jersey: The Aldington Press, 1991.

108 The fact that I extensively discuss Greek-Cypriot but not Turkish-Cypriot nationalism does not mean that I understand any of the two ethnic nationalisms to be more influential vis-à-vis gender and sexuality subjectivities. Rather, I focus on that ethnic nationalism which I see as having more impact on such subjectivities within the specific geographical area that I examine, that is the non-occupied south part of Cyprus.


However, elite and state agency towards the assertion of national ideals and secular nationalisms rarely – if ever – springs ex nihilo. Especially among peoples in the monotheistic traditions, like the Greeks, a sense of collective mission and destiny, a culturally-based national messianism and beliefs in ethnic chosenness by the deity, has provided modern nationalisms with a model and forceful impetus. Nevertheless, Greek Orthodoxy and nationalism were not always in the same camp. The Patriarchate in Constantinople initially opposed the so-called ‘Great Idea’ (Μεγάλη Ιδέα) – that is, the Greek aspiration to recover from the Turks the Aegean, Constantinople and large parts of Greek-speaking Asia Minor – and the Greek revolution of 1821. It was only after the Orthodox Church had split into autocephalous churches that the Church of Greece and religion were ‘nationalized’ by the Greek state. Namely, the state instilled the traditional, religious distinction between Balkan and Asia Minor populations with nationalistic ideology, while the Greek-speaking hierarchy of the previously unified Orthodox Church sacrificed the Church’s ideal of ecumenicity on the altar of ethnic and national political antagonisms, which it nurtured and spurred. Similarly to the Church of Greece, the Church of Cyprus became subject to the pressures of nationalism also. The election of nationalist Cyril II as Archbishop in 1909 placed the Church in the leadership of the Greek-Cypriot nationalist movement against British rule and Turkish presence on the island. Because of its close intellectual links to the Hellenic centre, the Church of Cyprus became the main


Kitromilides, “‘Imagined Communities’”, 177-84.
agency of Greek nationalism in Cyprus. This relationship between the Church and nationalistic politics continues intact into contemporary history.

Historical examinations of the ways that nationalism was cultivated and institutionalized in Greece and in Cyprus reveal similarities. However, in contrast to the case of Greece, in Cyprus, the state and the Orthodox Church’s discourses that pertain to ‘proper’ and ‘deviant’ identities – be it national, gender or sexual identities – have not been met with strongly articulated oppositional or alternative discourses. To different degrees, some political parties, some intellectual thinkers and some civil society groups have adopted and continue to reinforce the official trajectory of identity delineation, which is based primarily on ethnic and politico-national elements.

Especially in the early and mid-1990s, the public contestation of Cypriot identity formation was limited to the clash between Greek-Cypriot nationalism and ‘Cypriotism’, that is, the ideological position that Cyprus has its own sui generis character. In the past, the literature on community and identity construction in Cyprus had, for the most part, limited itself within the same confines. As Caesar Mavratsas explains, reducing the contest between Greek-Cypriot nationalism and ‘Cypriotism’ into a right-left party ideology opposition is an oversimplification of the broader picture. Nonetheless, by not examining other elements, subjectivities and agents besides these right-versus-left ideology opposition and its agents which affect, and are being affected by, national identity formation, analyses of Cypriot national identities remain liable to the very same critique they are projecting. Namely, they render mere historical expositions of the political opposition between ‘right’ and ‘left’ as the most important aspect of identity formation in Cyprus. Even nowadays, studies that substantially address national identity construction in Cyprus

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119 Ibid.
vis-à-vis subjectivities – such as gender and sexuality – remain limited in number, scope and analysis.

Mavratsas argues that because of the predominance of Greek-Cypriot nationalist ideology in the political culture of the island throughout most of its modern history, political discourse and social analysis by Cypriot intellectuals have either fully accepted nationalist ideology’s fundamental axioms, or they have explained its sociological role by exclusively focusing on external intervention and foreign conspiracy.120 A considerable number of works have been produced since the time Mavratsas made this argument.121 Nonetheless, his argument that issues like sexuality, the social position of women and the relation between state and religion have been ignored in Cypriot scholarship continues to be valid.122

However, it is vital to move such discussions forward and to explain why nationalist ideology has such a great appeal. It is important to determine the political, social and cultural dynamics that allow nationalist ideology to remain pervasive and to marginalize important societal issues. This is the case especially because such issues are rarely publicly discussed, based on the – mostly elite-propelled – allegation that they detract from more serious politico-national concerns. It is important to disaggregate the actors included in wide-ranging concepts such as ‘the state’, ‘the Church’ and ‘civil society’ and, in this way, to explicate why ‘the Greek-Cypriot community has been historically unable to go through any process of … political maturation [that] would require that the Greek Cypriots … raise new questions, and come to terms with the present and the future at minimal cost’.123

Yiannis Papadakis explains that expressions of Greek-Cypriot nationalism are formulated not only by the state and by political parties, but also by individual social actors. He argues that the articulation of nationalism at these different levels results in a dialectical process between ‘above’ and ‘below’, which accounts for the
persistence and appeal of specific nationalisms. The main questions that Papadakis
tries to answer is how the abstract narratives proposed by the state and by political
parties interact with personal narratives, and how personal and local history becomes
inextricably linked to the state and political parties’ narratives. He borrows from
Hayden White and argues that, in Cyprus, narrativity expressed through
commemorations of the nation in the form of military parades, of ceremonies to
honour national days and national heroes, of war museums and of school textbooks
that treat the history of a state as equivalent to that of a nation and as the only
possible way of presenting the past, is related ‘to the impulse to moralize reality, that
is to identify it with the source of any morality we can imagine’. Hence, Papadakis
concludes with Mavratsas that, in Cyprus, the social and the political domains are
merged and that social relations are characterized by an intense politicization of
private life.

Nicos Peristianis’s study focuses on individual identifications in the RoC.
Similarly to Brubaker, but with reference to Cyprus, he argues that identification
based on polarizations such as Greek-Cypriot nationalism versus ‘Cypriotism’, or
political right versus political left, does not help us to fully understand the politics of
identity formation in Cyprus. He argues that analysis needs to:

move … away from considering ethnic/national identity as an underlying essence
that must somehow be discovered and [away from considering] attitudes as the
privileged pathway that provides access to this hidden reality. Rather, the different
responses or attitudes of people … [should be] seen as actions in themselves …
which try … to argue for or against a particular public discourse.

Therefore, conversely to less optimistic positions, Peristianis argues that,
nowadays, much has weakened the ideological struggle between Greek-Cypriot

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128 Ibid., 110.
nationalism and ‘Cypriotism’. This is promising as it might indicate the possibility of national identity formation being informed by elements and discourses other than nationalist ones. But what is the case with Turkish-Cypriot nationalism? Identities, and especially national identities, are formed based not only on notions of similarity, but also on notions of difference and opposition. Therefore, an emasculation of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism that is similar to – or even greater than – the emasculation of Greek-Cypriot nationalism to which Peristianis refers, could lead to the de-escalation of nationalist rhetoric of both ethnic groups and, consequently, to the de-escalation of this rhetoric’s negative effects on gender and sexuality constructions.

In what could be called ‘the paradox of nationalism’, Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot nationalisms have been instilled and preserved in a similar fashion. As Harry Anastasiou explains, nationalist frameworks resist communicative interaction of the opposing parties not because the frameworks of rival nationalist groups are different, but because, paradoxically, they tend to be identical in their fundamental nature. Whereas the Greek-Cypriot nationalist agenda was exhibited through the attempts to unite Cyprus with Greece and claim the island as purely and immemorially Greek, the Turkish-Cypriot nationalist agenda was expressed through the pursuit of the ethnic division of the island. Similarly to Greek-Cypriot nationalism, which has its roots in Greek nationalism and in the longing of establishing the ‘Self’ as the genuine and legitimate ‘child’ of ‘motherland Greece’ while portraying the ‘Other’ as the illegitimate alien, Turkish-Cypriot nationalism has its roots in Turkish-Cypriots claiming themselves to be the suppressed – by the Greek-Cypriots – ‘child’ of ‘motherland Turkey’. These feelings of injustice and insecurity were further nurtured and reinforced by the British colonizers who saw in the Turkish-Cypriot minority a strong ally in their attempt to stop Greek-Cypriot rebellions against their rule.

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130 Ibid.
The negotiation of national identity discourses and the appeal of the ‘motherland’ rhetoric started to reveal differences between the two ethnic groups some time after the 1974 events. The memory of pain and suffering of each community was strongly and constantly reminded and revived through the nationalist public political culture of each adversary. The flushing of national symbols, the media, school curricula and other means of ideological engineering were employed by both sides in this process, which Kerwin Lee Klein calls ‘the memory industry’. Furthermore, the ‘memory industry’ was combined with the negation of the pain and the suffering of the ‘Other’ and this consequently brought about and consolidated the institutionalized alienation of the two groups. While this institutional nationalism remained intact and unquestioned by the majority of the Greek-Cypriot population until the late 1990s, by the mid-1980s, the Turkish-Cypriot gaze started to shift and the official ‘Turkishness’ and ‘Turkish nationalism’ rhetoric began to be mistrusted and questioned.

A combination of several factors contributed to bringing about this shift in Turkish-Cypriot perceptions of national identity. One of these factors is Turkish-Cypriots’ approach to organized and institutionalized religion. Conversely to Greek-Cypriots, they are not influenced by organized religion and they adhere to a very strict form of secularism. For example, in their huge majority, Turkish-Cypriots feel outraged with Koran schools and with the teaching of religion by imams at schools, and they do not favour religion classes that follow the model in Turkey. ‘TRNC’s’ strict secularism and its prohibition of mixing religion with politics certainly facilitated the pre-mentioned Turkish-Cypriot turn with regard to nationalism, national identity and the teaching of history.

Another contributing element is the recently revised approach to the teaching of history in Turkish-Cypriot public schools. As recently as in the late 1990s, both in the Greek-Cypriot and in the Turkish-Cypriot public education system, official nationalist discourses continued to be disseminated primarily through the taught subjects of history and religion. Interestingly, in the mid-2000s, the ‘TRNC’ revised the school history curricula and text books. The books that were published in 2004

135 Ibid., 56-7.
reveal remarkable changes when compared to the old books. Researchers who studied these new curricula and text books argue that, by adopting a social-constructivist approach towards history and, therefore, by presenting nationalism and national identity as outcomes of specific historical conditions rather than as primordial entities, the new books and curricula move the focus from ‘Turkishness’ to ‘Turkish-Cypriotness’ and ‘Cypriotness’. These authors also claim that, by recognizing the pain and suffering as a shared condition of both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, these books demoralize national history and free historical memory from essentialist narratives. Consequently, the revised books and curricula present identity as a matter of choice – not of birth – and as internally diverse and evolving, rather than as homogeneous and historically determined.\textsuperscript{136}

A third factor, which probably had the greatest impact on the Turkish-Cypriot national identity shift, relates to Turkey’s policy changes towards the ‘TRNC’, especially after the mid-1980s. The open interference of Turkey into Turkish-Cypriot affairs, the threat of becoming a minority because of population transfers from Turkey, the allocation of the Greek-Cypriot occupied properties to the people brought from Turkey, as well as the heavy militarization and the exercise of control by the Turkish army on all spheres of life, have led Turkish-Cypriots to shift away from Turkish nationalism and to start stressing the Turkish-Cypriot and Cypriot elements of their national identity.\textsuperscript{137}

According to Lacher and Kaymak, the political regime in the north was able to control the construction of public identity patterns among Turkish-Cypriots – or, more probably, to suppress the public articulation of anti-nationalistic identities – until the early 2000s, when the progressive exhaustion of the ‘TRNC’s’ distributive ability culminated and became widely sensed.\textsuperscript{138} Crucial among the mechanisms through which Turkish nationalism has been reproduced in the occupied north after


\textsuperscript{137} Kizilyurek and Gautier-Kizilyurek, “Politics of Identity”, 51.

1974 was the distribution of invasion spoils. By being in a position to distribute more than one third of the island’s land to twenty percent of its population – that is, the Turkish-Cypriot ethnic group – the ‘TRNC’ secured mass support. Nonetheless, after 1983, patronage and clientelism could no longer contain discontent and wide-ranging scepticism over both the lack of international recognition, and the quality of the ‘TRNC’s’ internal sovereignty. Lacher and Kaymak explain:

The key result of the development of administrative institutions was unintended. For this state generated its own expectations both among its personnel and citizens ... Their experience of the real limits on the autonomy of the TRNC’s administration created awareness of an increasingly obvious discrepancy between reality and the rhetoric of “sovereignty”.

This situation was further exacerbated by the fact that Turkey increasingly grew less willing to continue the generous transfer payments that kept the status quo in place. The authors perceive this turn as a chance for alternative visions of political community to be developed, since ‘there is ... no Turkish Cypriot ethno-nationalism, but a post-national form of identity formation, marked precisely by an absence of a singular identity’. However, as Michael Billig argued – thus problematizing Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov’s central argument – even nationalisms’ ‘banal’ demonstrations, like everyday life distinctions and categorizations that are expressed in habits of speech or in unquestioned beliefs about one’s nation glorious past, reproduce national identity and nationalistic discourses. This argument could also be raised against Peristianis’s conclusion about the now weakened ideological struggle between Greek-Cypriot nationalism and ‘Cypriotism’.

Although such changes in Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot discourses of nationalism are promising towards making reconciliation between the two ethnic communities more feasible – and reconciliation will be much more facilitated if, similarly to the ‘TRNC’ the current government of the RoC succeeds in its efforts to

139 Lacher and Kaymak, “Transforming Identities”, 150-56.
140 Ibid., 156.
141 Ibid., 160.
142 Brubaker, Loveman, Stamatov, “Ethnicity as Cognition”.
143 Billig, Banal Nationalism, 6-17.
144 Peristianis, Nicos, “Cypriot Nationalism, Dual Identity, and Politics.”
revise history text books and curricula\textsuperscript{145} – it is important to remain aware of the factors that lead to such changes. It is dangerously romantic to unquestionably accept that such changes are part of a general attempt to reconstruct political landscapes in order to achieve peace and reconciliation.\textsuperscript{146} For example, the Turkish-Cypriot gaze changes regarding nationalism and national identity were premised not only on ideological, but also on socioeconomic factors.\textsuperscript{147} The disintegration of the material basis of the Turkish-Cypriot ethno-national project, the effects of prospective EU membership,\textsuperscript{148} and the need of ‘TRNC’ policymakers to gain legitimacy on both a regional and an international level\textsuperscript{149} cannot be dismissed as some of the reasons behind the change drive. An opportunistic and iconic adoption of European mechanisms and values by both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots might increase, rather than reduce, antagonism, nationalistic and exclusionary feelings among the two groups.\textsuperscript{150}

Truly, not all expressions of nationalism lead to overt conflict. Nevertheless, it is overly ambitious to claim that in an ethnically divided milieu, like Cyprus, where until very recently one’s being was explicitly moulded based on nationalistic official rhetoric, predominant identities are ‘post-national’ or even neutral with regard to issues of nationality and ethnicity. What Lacher and Kaymak perceive as an absence of a singular (ethnic/national) identity is,\textsuperscript{151} in the best case, a hibernation. People and the power regimes might not articulate a militant version on national identity, but they might engage in ‘banal’, ‘everyday’ nationalism instead.

\textsuperscript{145} Papadakis, “Narrative, Memory and History Education”; Karahassan and Zembylas, “The politics of memory and forgetting in history textbooks”; Vural and Özuyanik, “Redefining Identity.”
\textsuperscript{146} For example, although it is certainly the case that Turkish-Cypriots are highly secular, the issue of Turkish-Cypriot opposition against religious teaching and the attempts to move the focus of school curricula from ‘Turkishness’ to ‘Turkish-Cypriotness’ and ‘Cypriotness’ are somewhat more complicated than Yesilada (2009), Karahassan and Zembylas (2006) and Vural and Özuyanik (2008) portray. Namely, the predominately left-wing political composition of Turkish-Cypriot teachers’ unions, as well as the election to government of the left-wing leader of the Republican Turkish Party (\textit{Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi}) Mehmet Ali Talat in 2005, were contributing factors to the mid-2000s shift away from Turkish nationalism. However, in 2009, the left-wing party and Mr. Talat lost the elections to the right-wing conservative National Unity Party (\textit{Ulusal Birlik Partisi}) and to nationalist Derviş Eroğlu.
\textsuperscript{147} Lacher and Kaymak, “Transforming Identities.”
\textsuperscript{148} Vural and Özuyanik, “Redefining Identity,” 133.
\textsuperscript{150} The opportunistic employment of the ‘Europeanization rhetoric’ by the Greek-Cypriot political elite will be discussed extensively in chapter three.
\textsuperscript{151} Lacher and Kaymak, “Transforming Identities.”
However, amidst an ethnic conflict situation, there is no assurance that ‘muted’ nationalism will be expressed in a less sanguineous way than overt nationalism.

Even such ‘muted’ nationalism, which continues to permeate Cypriot official and predominant discourses, suffices to sanction or ostracize lives, and to include or exclude people and subjectivities from the national collectivity. Namely, although official predominant discourses are articulated without explicitly referring to nationhood or national identity, what they ultimately glorify are modes of existence that are premised on the idea of androcentric and heterocentric national exclusivity. This reinforces the need to examine the effects of both symbolic and overt official discourses of nationalism on certain subjectivities’ invisibility and annihilation. Therefore, two sets of questions need to be addressed: Firstly, questions about the role of institutional agents in forming, preserving and communicating – banal or explicit – nationalist discourses, and secondly, questions of whether and how other elements of identity, such as gender and sexuality, have been – or could potentially be – affected by changes – or the lack thereof – in such discourses. The following subsection will focus on the former set of questions. It will attempt to address them by examining the role of the Church of Cyprus vis-à-vis predominant discourses.

The last section of this chapter will address the latter set of questions.

**Who Speaks the Nation? The Pervasive Role of the Church of Cyprus**

As Meyer and Jepperson explain, ‘agency’ and the ‘authorized agent’ are historical and continuous cultural constructions. The system of ‘agency’ is a religious and post-religious development, since authority was gradually relocated from the transcendental gods, or God, to the church, to the state and subsequently to individual souls and to individuals as citizens. Firstly, nature is rationalized and those features of humans that are considered to be natural endow the human being with justifiable and lawful interests. Secondly, spiritual authority is also rationalized, and thus the legitimate agent is attributed with the authority, the capacity and the responsibility to act. However, ‘agency’ cannot exist without structures of ‘otherhood’. The legitimate agent cannot become the subject of action, unless provided with an object upon which, for which, or against which to act. ‘Others’ are
necessary to justify – or not – an agent’s action on behalf of other individuals. The importance of this idea rests in the fact that its language may be used to suitably describe the processes of gender and sexuality subjectivization in Cyprus. Namely, the discourses of some agents aim, on the one hand, to affirm their own authority and, on the other hand, to position subjects and subjectivities in the categories of ‘agents’, recipients of ‘agency’, or illegitimate and unimaginable ‘others’.

In the case of Cyprus, the Orthodox Church constitutes such a hegemonic institutional agent that, historically, has been the main agency of nationalism. Because of its wealth, it wields enormous influence on decisions that pertain not only to the sphere of politics and ‘national issues’, but also to the structure of society. It even exerts huge influence on issues that fall within the so-called ‘private sphere’, such as marriage, divorce and family formation. In times of presidential or parliamentary elections, it is very characteristic of high-ranking clergymen – like metropolitan bishops, bishops or the archbishop – to openly support – in some cases, even financially – specific parties or candidates. The degree to which state and the Church remain affiliated is exemplified by the fact that, in the 2006 elections for a new archbishop, political parties – including ruling political parties – blatantly prompted their voters to support specific bishops.

In general, the protégés of the clerical leadership are political parties or politicians that support its official rhetoric that ‘Hellenorthodox ideals’ (Ελληνοχριστιανικά ιδεώδη) and ‘national values’ are the sine qua non of national unity and survival, in face of the ‘imminent Turkish threat’. These ‘Hellenorthodox ideals’ and ‘national values’ could be summarized as: Christian Orthodox religion; Greek historical and cultural heritage; and devotion to the nation and to the heterocentric family.

Even in current times, the Church continues to attempt to patronize the state regarding issues that fell under its authority before the creation of states; and it

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153 Kizilyurek, “From Traditionalism to Nationalism,” 60.
157 Bryant, Imagining the Modern, 129-81.
does so often supported by nationalist political circles.\textsuperscript{158} This effort to control domains other than the religious one is legitimized on the pretext that anything which challenges the axioms of religion endangers both individuals’ morality and the preservation of the religio-national collectivity. As a metropolitan bishop expressed this fear:

I notice a loosening of morals and this is a danger that relates to our spiritual existence ... Namely, I believe that the loosening of morals can in some ways affect our national identity, its recognition and the dispersal of the cultural values of our people ... [We should not] continually become copycats or imitators.\textsuperscript{159}

The Church of Cyprus exerts a pervasive influence on all social and political matters. Its influence is so great that social and political institutions’ representatives purposefully remain deaf to citizens’ claims that challenge the religio-national discourse – for example, LGBTQ claims – because they are afraid of the political cost of attending to such claims. While describing his lobbying activities, Alecos Modinos, the man who successfully challenged the criminalization of homosexuality in the RoC at the ECtHR, reported:

The politicians did not dare to support me openly, because the Church was publicly stating on its television channel ... and in press conferences through its


\textsuperscript{159} “Interview with Metropolitan Bishop 210022”, \textit{Interviews with Elites 2009}. Interviews by Nayia Kamenou. Nicosia, 13 January 2009. Response to the question: ‘According to your opinion, are there any situations or phenomena that have a negative impact or that could have a negative impact on our national identity?’
representatives ... that the politicians and the MPs who would vote in favour of amending the criminal law wouldn’t get reelected.\textsuperscript{160} Of course, the majority of the MPs were already biased, irrespective of the Church’s statements. You have to be a very honest politician in order to take the risk and vote for a legal amendment like this [i.e., homosexuality’s decriminalization].\textsuperscript{161}

Although the Church of Cyprus is indisputably highly politicized and, as such, continues to have a strong say and impact on issues that pertain to the spheres of the political, the social, the personal and even the legal, it does not do so in a ‘dictatorial’ manner. Namely, its discourses continue to exert great influence not only because state officials and politicians do not openly and assertively challenge them, but also because individuals see the central role that the Church assumes in the Cypriot socio-political milieu as positive.

Yesilada, Noordijk and Webster’s quantitative study on the religiosity and social values of Cypriots revealed that, conversely to Turkish-Cypriots, Greek-Cypriots generally follow organized and formal religion, that is, the Church’s rules and dogmas.\textsuperscript{162} As the researchers explain, this finding contradicts previously established notions deriving from secularization theory. According to these notions, as states develop, as individuals become less insecure, less exposed to unemployment, wealthier and more educated, the level of faith in the church and of practicing religion declines. The authors argue that this deflection from previously established conclusions is related to the unique historical role and to the continued influence of the Church of Cyprus in Cypriot politics and economy.\textsuperscript{163} Roudometof reports that, according to the 1998 International Survey Programme, Greek-Cypriots demonstrated considerable respect towards the Orthodox faith and the Church of Cyprus; nearly seventy per cent of the public rejected the view that Cyprus would be better off if religion and the Church were less influential.

\textsuperscript{160} Jean Christou, “Chrysostomos Opposes Bill to Legalise Homosexuality,” \textit{Cyprus Mail}, 3 March 1995, 8. This newspaper article confirms that the 1995 Church spokesman, director of the Archbishop’s office and regular interviewer on the Church-owned television channel ‘Logos’, Mr. Nicos Nicolaides, made numerous public comments of this sort, which received the full support of the Archbishop.

\textsuperscript{161} “Interview with Alecos Modinos: The Official and Unofficial Side of the Modinos Case”. Interviewed by Nayia Kamenou. Nicosia, 27 April and 8 May 2009.


\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., 25.
Roudometof also rightly argues that the appeal of Christian Orthodox religion and of the Church of Cyprus among Greek-Cypriots is related to the Church’s nation-leading role.\textsuperscript{164} The Church’s role in creating, preserving, and disseminating discourses of ‘Hellenorthodox’ nationalism dates back to early twentieth century.\textsuperscript{165} Among the various ways through which the Church exercised its nation-leading role, one stands out as specifically instrumental towards developing Greek-Cypriots’ trust towards the Church. This is the Church’s involvement with the ethnic community’s education.\textsuperscript{166}

Well before the creation of the RoC in 1960, and especially after the devastating events of 1974, the Church funded the restoration and the building of new schools on its own land. Although in the interviews I conducted high-ranking clergymen denied that the Church continues to have the power to impose its positions regarding the context of education,\textsuperscript{167} in the past it closely scrutinized the content of school subjects such as religion and history.\textsuperscript{168} Even nowadays, the Church feverishly opposes the attempt of the current government to develop a plan for multicultural and non-nationalistic education.\textsuperscript{169} Therefore, religion via the Church becomes a central aspect of identity politics and it constructs subjectivities and social exclusion practices, which it disseminates through the state educational system.\textsuperscript{170}

In the interviews, high-ranking clergymen described Greek-Cypriots’ national identity as ‘genetically Hellenorthodox’ and although they categorically denied that the Church assumes political powers or nurtures societal segregation, they said that its position about the content of public education should be taken into consideration by the state.\textsuperscript{171}


\textsuperscript{165} Kitromilides, “‘Imagined Communities’”, Bryant, Imagining the Modern:

\textsuperscript{166} Bryant, Imagining the Modern, 123-81.

\textsuperscript{167} “Interview with Metropolitan Bishop 210022” and “Interview with Bishop 210031”.

\textsuperscript{168} Bryant, Imagining the Modern, 129-81.

\textsuperscript{169} Pavlos Pavlou, «Για τη διδασκαλία της ιστορίας», Πολίτης. 8 February 2009, 19; Chrysostomos Perikleous, «Ιστορία: Το τελευταίο ανάχωμα του ’πατριωτισμού’», Πολίτης, 18 January 2009, 68; Politis, «Αγνώμονες οι Κύπριοι».


\textsuperscript{171} “Interview with Church Metropolitan Bishop 210022”; “Interview with Bishop 210031”.

Nayia Kamou
Asked to comment on the ongoing issue of education reform in Cyprus and on the role that the Church should have in the process, a high-ranking clergyman stated:

I would say that the Church is an institution whose activities involve the cultivation of literacy. And literacy in Cyprus has been cultivated and transmitted through the Church’s norms ... The Church has great experience on educational issues. I believe that it would be very useful, if its opinion were voiced in some collective institutions that make decisions [about educational issues]. [This should be done] without [clergymen] demanding a vote [on such decisions] or imposing our own views ... The source [of humanities studies and human rights] is the Gospel. Therefore ... we claim a say [in educational issues].

Another high-ranking clergyman was more vocal and assertive on the issues of Greek-Cypriot national identity, the relationship between church and state and the Church’s role in public education. When asked to comment on Greek-Cypriot national identity, he said:

Our national identity is the way through which we live in this country. Namely, our Greek heritage, our Greek origins and above all, our Christian experience and our way of life for the past 2000 years ... [The fact that] we have this identity constitutes a duty and a superiority ... towards other peoples ... All these derive from our DNA ... Therefore, we declare this identity everyday through our ways, and attitudes, and literacy, and education; [through] our language, [through] our Greek language and behaviour.

On whether or not the Church becomes involved in state affairs that pertain to public school curricula, he commented:

The Church is not going to assign an examiner over school curricula. It goes without saying that the school curricula are not, according to my opinion, the Synod’s business. It is the job of the Ministry of Education but, de facto, the Ministry of

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172 The question was: ‘According to your opinion, should the Church have a say on the issue of educational reform?’
173 “Interview with Metropolitan Bishop 210022”.
174 The question was: ‘According to your opinion, which elements make up our national identity?’
175 “Interview with Bishop 210031”.

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Education cannot trespass certain thresholds. These thresholds are the customs and the identity of this land, of this people.176

Ten days before the interview with this bishop, the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CyBC) had broadcast a show on the issue of the impact of the Church on Cypriot society. Specifically, the show was titled, ‘Church: Discourse of love and unification or discourse of social segregation?’ During the discussion among panel members in the studio, viewers could call and vote in favour of one of the two positions. Forty-nine per cent of the viewers who voted expressed the view that the Church communicates a discourse of love and unification, while fifty-one per cent of the viewers expressed the view that the Church’s discourse contributes to social segregation. I asked the bishop to comment on the specific television show and on the results of the telephone vote. What follows is the conversation that my asking of the specific question sparked.178

I do not know whether you had the chance to watch the show «Το Συζητάμε» on January 12th.
I was in Estonia from the 11th until the 18th. But tell me, what was the subject?
The topic was ... [interviewer interrupted by interviewee]
The topic of the show was the Church. [I know] because I saw something about it in the press when I got back. Is this that show on which the bishop of Paphos appeared?
The show ended up discussing the educational reform issue, but the central topic [of the show] was [premised on] the question: ‘Church: Discourse of love and unification, or discourse of social segregation?’
These are slogans. Marketing.
I will accept this [position].
Oh, was this the topic of the discussion? [ironically]
The title of the show ... [interviewer interrupted by interviewee]
Say this again! It’s nice! [ironically]
‘Church: Discourse of love and unification, or discourse of social segregation?’
Three thousand viewers called and voted on this. Forty-nine per cent voted in

176 Ibid.
177 Το συζητάμε. Produced by the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation 1(CyBC 1), 12 January 2009. Throughout the show, ‘societal segregation’ was defined and commented on as ‘segregation between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots’.
178 Interviewer quoted in bold.
favour of the position that the Church communicates a discourse of love and unification, while fifty-one per cent voted in favour of the position that it communicates a discourse of social segregation.

First of all, I didn’t watch the show and, secondly, I consider these [shows] to be set up. Directed.

**Ok. Therefore ...** [interviewer interrupted by interviewee]

Do you disagree? Do you disagree? [shouting]

**What I would like to ask you ...** [interviewer interrupted by interviewee]

What answer did metropolitan bishop 210022 give you on this question? [still shouting]

**I am afraid that the content of the interviews is conf[idential] ...** [interviewer interrupted by interviewee]

What answer did metropolitan bishop 210022 give you on this question? I am not going to answer unless ... [still shouting, but even more angrily; then pauses]

**He said that the Church might have made a few mistakes, but he was not certain about the validity of the vote results.**

Of course. That one knows about surveys...

**I would like to move on and ask you whether ...** [interviewer interrupted by interviewee]

Because they care about viewer numbers and they didn’t want to spoil things for themselves. They just wanted to stir the waters ... [To show that] ‘probably we don’t need the Church; probably the Church doesn’t know what it’s doing. Probably, the Church doesn’t know its role because of the people who currently represent it. Probably we need to make these shows just to create noise’. [They thought to]

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179 Commenting on this show, metropolitan bishop 210022 said: ‘[It is] the Church that caused [the results of this vote]. It seems that the Church did not communicate the right messages and that is why it has been misunderstood. I believe that, if this research [by the CyBC programme producers] was serious and objective, it must seriously trouble the hierarchy of the Church ... because it is us that decide about the rules of the Church. [The Church prelates need to think about the Church’s role] in order to communicate our messages to the people in a better manner. The excessive worry [of the Church] over national issues and the way in which this has been communicated to the people – not the content but the way – should be noted, in order [for the people] to better understand the Church’s intentions and not to characterize [the Church] as nationalistic or backward or conservative. I, of course, represent a new spirit in the Synod ... but I have the impression that even the more senior prelates did not have any [bad] intentions when they were communicating their worries about the solution to the Cyprus national problem.’

180 Metropolitan bishop 210022 and bishop 210031 belong in different ‘camps’ within the Church of Cyprus. The animosity between these ‘camps’ was made very explicit during the 2006 elections to fill in the position of the late Archbishop Chrysostomos I. For example, see: “Acrimony Mars Cyprus Church Vote,” BBC News, 25 September 2006, <http://cdnedge.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5379660.stm> (20 February 2011). It is important to highlight that different political parties openly sided with and supported different ‘prelate camps’ in these elections.
themselves], ‘since we broadcast the show and we scored high in viewer percentages we need, no matter what, to stress what we want [to communicate]: That the Church communicates a discourse of segregation, that it confuses people. But we will say this mildly, that is [we will claim that there is] a two or three per cent difference [between the two positions]’ ... [Their] aim was to shake things up, yet without causing social unrest. [They thought to themselves] ‘Let this hibernate in the back of people’s heads’. 181

This interview excerpt reveals the bishop’s tendency, which is common among other high-ranking clergymen also, to dismiss and negate critiques about the role of the Church in Cypriot politics and society. When asked about the role of the Church in the formation of public education curricula, this interviewee stressed that the Church does not attempt to trump the state, in order to communicate to the interviewer that the state and the Church’s roles are separated. However, when confronted with the results of the vote by the show’s viewers on the effects of the Church’s publically articulated discourses, this bishop blasted numerous accusations against the publically owned national television channel and doubted the credibility of the voting process. He claimed that the CyBC purposefully raised the topic of the role of the Church, that it manipulated the way in which the discussion unfolded and that it tampered with the voting results because the ultimate aim was to portray a false, negative picture of the Church and of its representatives.

His great unwillingness to admit to the possibility that the results of the vote might be accurately representing the people’s changing perception towards the Church was further demonstrated by his stance towards the interviewer: If the interviewer believes that the results of the vote are valid and not set up, then the interviewer is complicit in the conspiracy against the Church and, therefore, the interviewee has no reason to answer the question. The fact that another high-ranking clergyman answered the question and admitted that the Church might indeed be on the wrong was also distrusted and dismissed since, according to the interviewee, this other clergyman is one of those who participated in the distortion of surveys that measured Greek-Cypriots’ candidate preferences during the 2006 archbishop election campaign period.

181 “Interview with Bishop 210031”.

Nayia Kamenou
Given the Church’s approach to nationhood and national identity, as well as the extent and the degree of its impact on national politics and societal norms, could a change in identity construction and dominant perceptions of gender and sexuality actualize? Regardless of the Cypriot Orthodox Church’s traditional influence in almost all aspects of social and individual life, its long pre-colonial past as the predominant religious body in a diversified and pluralistic religious milieu proves that it is not necessarily or irreversibly incompatible with pluralistic ideals. 182 Nevertheless, the above examination of the degree of, and of ways in which the Orthodox Church of Cyprus and its representatives not only participate in, but also generate and disseminate nationalist discourses, makes it hard to imagine how it could return to its once ecumenical and unifying role.

Moreover, the obstacles presented by the impact of the rhetoric of the Church are reinforced by the state and political elites’ unwillingness and/or inability to allow the formation and public articulation of alternative, non-nationalistic, non-heteronormative discourses, modes of identification and expressions of gender and sexuality. Once again, the case of public education curricula is particularly demonstrative of the ways and of the extent to which official public discourses circumscribe alternative understandings and expressions of identities. It shows that the state also limits the possibility of a discourse change within the Cypriot milieu.

In nationalistic, gendered, sexist and homophobic milieux, it is through the body and its physique that one is called to assert his ‘national purity’, ‘gender morality’ and ‘sexual normality’. Therefore, discourses of ‘appropriate’ corporeality and somaticity could not but also be reflected in public school curricula. 183 History and religion are not the only school subjects through which the alienation of the ‘other’ becomes possible. Regardless of a government-initiated attempt in 2003 to modernize education in general, 184 and to reorient the home economics curriculum towards health and nutrition issues, its end result remains unchanged. Namely, it initiates children into the heterocentric and heteronormative Cypriot social system.

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183 By ‘corporeality’ I mean bodily form or nature. By ‘somaticity’ I mean physical demonstrations of the body.
which elevates the nuclear family as the only imaginable type of family. The 2007 and 2008 instructions for teachers of the Cypriot Ministry of Education and Culture and of the Greece Home Economics Association for the International Federation for Home Economics – from which the Cypriot Ministry of Education and Culture draws upon in curricula designing – outline the targets of the course. An indicative list includes:

Students to realize … the importance of marriage towards creating a healthy family within the conditions of current Cypriot reality … the biological bond between a mother and her child … the crisis of the family-as-value because of cohabitation outside marriage … that the health of the nation depends on the health of women … the position and the role of the two genders in the Christian religion … that the two genders are not unequal but different … that abortion is associated with serious psychological and bodily problems … [and also] invite a clergyman to class to talk about these issues.\(^{185}\)

Even when issues of sex and sexuality are addressed, the focus is placed on avoiding contracting sexually transmitted diseases through heterosexual sexual intercourse.\(^{186}\) The concerns of adolescents who do not conform to normative constructions of gender and sexuality are left denied and unaddressed, as if these individuals do not exist, or as if they do not merit recognition of their existence and needs.

This substantiates the argument that, within the Cypriot context, ‘real’ Cypriot identity and ‘right’ Cypriot citizenship are equated with having a specific religious, gender and sexual identity. The way gender and sexuality and their ‘appropriate’ performance and embodiment are constructed through Cypriot public education demonstrates that: firstly, gender and sexuality constitute grounds for inclusion or exclusion from the Cypriot national collectivity, although in the public


nationalist discourses this inclusion/exclusion is premised not on national identity cues, but on the invocation of ‘nature’ and ‘biology’; and secondly, through their naturalization and essentialization, corporeality and somaticity become fundamental grounds for the generation and perpetuation of exclusionary nationalist discourses. For as Githens-Mazer explains, borrowing from Paul Connerton: ‘the performance of the nation makes it powerful, in words and oaths, as well as in set postures, gestures and movements’. 187

To summarize, the case of Cyprus exemplifies Meyer and Jepperson’s argument about the role of ‘authority’ in the demarcation of ‘agency’ and ‘otherhood’. 188 Within the Cypriot context, ‘real’ identity and ‘right’ citizenship are equated with performing and/or identifying with a specific religious, gender and sexual identity. That is, in order to qualify as the subject and/or object of legitimate action, one has to appear and/or identify as Greek-Cypriot, Christian Orthodox, heterosexual, masculine – if a man – or feminine – if a woman – and to espouse, or at least not challenge, the prevailing dogmas that pertain to what and whom lies within the realm of the natural and the thinkable.

**Nationalist Constructions of Gender and Sexuality**

There is a close link between gender relations, sexual behaviours and national cohesion. Yuval-Davis explains that since gender relations play an important role in the nationalist project of preserving the unity and perpetuating the existence of the national ‘imagined community,’ these relations are determined by the cultural and religious customs/codes and gender constructions/symbols of the national collectivity. 189 Specifically about Cyprus, Yuval-Davis explains that the depiction of the mourning mother in photographs and posters was symbolically used in

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188 Meyer and Jepperson, “The ‘Actors’ of Modern Society”.

In Cypriot nationalist discourses, the physical body of the nation is thought of as having a soul and spirit, which managed to keep the Greek-Cypriot soul pure and chaste even under enslavement. The land is equated with femininity and the feminine, that is, with the ideal Cypriot woman, and Cyprus is usually depicted in poetry, graphic art and theatre as a mother and as a maiden; as the Virgin Mary mourning for her missing sons. And, like the Virgin Mary, this virgin mother – that is, Cyprus – is protected by a celibate spiritual father, namely the Cypriot Orthodox Church. In the Greek-Cypriot ‘genealogical’ discourse, in which historical ‘proof’ is aimed at demonstrating ‘truths’ that are already taken for granted, Cypriot identity and gender relations are trapped in the discourse of a primordialist nationalism that could be described, in Sherry Ortner’s terms, as one in which ‘female is to male as nature is to culture.’ These customs and constructions assume an almost authoritarian character. They do not allow enough space for internal power conflicts within the national collectivity, nor do they allow for interest differences along gender lines. They also treat gender as a homogenous category and ignore how gender divisions relate to other divisions, such as sexuality.

These assumptions are reproduced in some of the Cypriot gender literature also. This literature does not clearly explicate that, in Cyprus, gender has been sexed and naturalized in the name of (re) producing the nation. Moreover, it does not sufficiently problematize the essentialisms embedded in gender and sexuality binary correlations. Admittedly, some of this literature productively discusses the relationship between gender and the nation. However, its assumptions that

190 Ibid. See also: Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nation, 45; Klein, “On the Emergence of ‘Memory’ in Historical Discourse”. Such pictures are included and discussed in chapter two (images 2.1 to 2.4).
193 Yuval-Davis, “Gender and Nation,” 628-30. Please note that I do not assume constructions of gender and sexuality vis-à-vis nationhood to be identical for Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. This issue and the relevant literature will be extensively discussed and analyzed in chapters two and four.
‘gender’ stands exclusively for the man/woman, male/female, masculine/feminine binary, and that sexuality is correlative to this binary – namely the assumption that ‘gender’ and ‘sexuality’ stand for either the female, non-transgendered, heterosexual, or for the masculine, non-transgendered, heterosexual – need to be further challenged and problematized. Instead of depicting the implication of nationalism in the construction of exclusionary discourses, some of this literature seeks to remedy its evils by ‘adding women and stirring’. Such an approach carries the danger of overshadowing other important determinants, like sexuality, and of downplaying the degree to which such determinants have been purposefully and thoroughly gendered in nationalist discourses.

Maria Hadjipavlou has been writing for years on Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot women’s role towards conflict resolution and identity reconstruction. She argues that ‘women’s dialogue can challenge the omnipotence of the state and may open up a new space whereby a diversity of perspectives and mutual trust can emerge’. Hadjipavlou rightly criticizes the literature on the Cyprus conflict for not mentioning, for the most part, gender power relations as a significant factor in Cypriot society, and for consequently tending to perpetuate this conflict. Although this is a valid comment, placing gender in the centre of analyses of power relations without questioning the assumptions that the concept of ‘gender’ carries could lead to some serious theoretical omissions and to the perpetuation of some perilous assumptions that Hadjipavlou herself warns against. For example, she says:

One assumption upon which I work is that both feminist perspectives and conflict resolution processes open spaces for mutual acknowledgement of power disparities, creation of empathy, the need for ‘emotionality’ which lead to the development of a


195 The expression is attributed to Charlotte Bunch who used it in a conference panel presentation: “Visions and Revisions: Women and the Power to Change,” NWSA Convention, Lawrence, Kansas, June 1979. Although the feminist debates about the ‘add women and stir method’ are far more complicated, a succinct – though incomplete – explanation of the expression, which has been used extensively in feminist theory, is: the method/act of incorporating women into existing social and/or political structures, as opposed to changing the structures themselves in order to accommodate women. See also: Marilyn J. Boxer, “For and about Women: The Theory and Practice of Women’s Studies in the United States,” Feminist Theory, vol. 7, no. 3 (1982): 661-95.


197 Ibid., 343, 348.
new shared narrative representing the ‘whole story’ thus avoiding the
‘compartmentalisation’ of issues which constitute part of the current unresolved
Cyprus problem’.199

Although Hadjipavlou correctly stresses the diversity of women’s experiences, her argument needs be taken a step further. It is important to explicate that it is gender-biased to portray ‘woman’ as a generic woman who is emotional and compassionate, and ‘man’ as a generic man who always appears as the perpetuator of violence. Essentializing the concepts ‘man’ and ‘woman’ obscures intra and inter-gender heterogeneity. Additionally, ‘women’ are not always and everywhere necessarily the construct of the nation-state’s masculinist, patriarchal and nationalist discourses. It is pertinent to question whether this is the case, and if yes, to decipher why and how ‘the nation-state’ constructs ‘women’. This is because addressing such questions leads us to disaggregate the concept of ‘agent of nationalism’ and to explore the possibilities of disrupting such masculinist, patriarchal and nationalist discourses. As it has been documented in literature about the role of women in national and nationalist projects outside Western contexts, in some cases, national projects have served as a site for women’s liberation.200

For example, specifically regarding Cyprus, a female Greek-Cypriot MP of the centre-left in her early fifties who used to be active in a women’s group stated:

Besides our struggles for [a solution to] the national problem, for which we are proud, women’s groups have always fought a double fight. And we [i.e., women’s groups] think that we did a lot besides the women’s marches [for the national problem], which took place after 1980, when the Cypriot problem stagnated, and thus everybody ended up focusing on us, and talking about us ... We should always keep in mind that the women who participated in these marches have never been independent. They were all involved in the Cypriot [political party] structures. But beyond this, who pressed their political parties and the parliament to amend the laws ... pertaining to women’s equality, family, maternity, equal payment? ... What does this mean? ... It means that we might be women’s groups that fight for the national cause, but we are also women’s groups that try and exert pressure [on the

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199 Ibid., 330.
government] to amend the law, in order to help women have a better life within the new environment in which we live.201

This female politician’s statements substantiate the argument that, especially in postcolonial contexts, women’s participation in nationalist projects may constitute a route – sometimes the only route – into androcentric and male-controlled political structures. Once women enter the political arena, it becomes easier for them to press for rights. Therefore, ignoring some parameters of the question about the relationship between women’s participation in nationalist projects and women’s emancipation and applying conclusions reached by studying ‘Western’ settings to ‘non-Western milieux’, runs the risk of perpetuating the very same discourses and binaries that gender theory sets out to challenge.

For instance, some gender theorists who argue in favour of gender mainstreaming claim that, in states where a large number of women participate in the centres of decision-making, the priorities focus more on peace, on women and on equality issues.202 Although this argument might indeed apply to some political milieux, it is not free of gender biases. By claiming that state policies around issues of peace and equality are causally correlated with the number of women participating in the centres of political decision, the two – and only two – ‘genders’ are taken for granted, while heteronormativity’s work in such essentialist understandings of the two – and only two – non-transgendered, biological ‘genders’ is left unquestioned. Namely, success is defined by the large number of women participating in politics in some counties, and not by these countries’ treatment of gender as dissociated from the heterosexual norm and from the ‘man/woman as masculine/feminine and as rational/emotional’ binaries. By talking about two realities, those of men and those of women, and by focusing on women’s wants and needs that are claimed to be different from those of men – for example, want and need for empathy and apology – women are naturalized as different from men; and, in the past, this provided a good excuse for women to remain excluded from the sphere of political representation.203

202 For example, see: Hadjipavlou, “No Permission to Cross”.
Specifically about Cyprus, while describing the results of a women’s bi-communal workshop, Hadjipavlou explains that by working together, Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot women contributed to the mutual understanding of the pain and suffering that the conflict has been creating for all women.\(^{204}\) Although the coming-together of women from the two ethnic communities has unquestionably contributed to the deterioration of the boundaries erected by nationalistic official rhetoric, one should be careful about highlighting ‘women’s understanding of each other’s pain’. Statements of this sort carry with them the peril of reinforcing women’s nationally-driven symbolization as the carriers of the ‘pain of the nation.’ Rather, the different ways in which nations and national projects are gendered need to be questioned, while the public and domestic gender regimes that support these national projects need be distinguished and disaggregated.\(^{205}\)

Another problem with the literature that studies the relationship between gender and nationalism is that it tends, for the most part, to focus primarily on women,\(^{206}\) while it often takes little notice of men who only reappear in these studies as the perpetrators of violence. However, addressing the activities and self-perceptions of men becomes pertinent, if gender and feminist studies are to be seriously and sincerely concerned with the patriarchal character of societies.\(^{207}\)

The self-perceptions of men, and especially of heterosexual men, are revealing of what a closer study of men could demonstrate about the national identity-gender-sexuality relationship. Loizos and Papataxiarchis explain that the horror of homosexuality among Greek men is so huge, that its prospect is deflected either through heterosexual marriage or through masturbation.\(^{208}\) Although Loizos and Papataxiarchis do not explicitly apply the argument to Greek-Cypriots, it would not be an unfair assumption to say that this behaviour describes Greek-Cypriot men also. The fact that the authors mention Cyprus throughout the study as well as the fact that, for the most part, Loizos’s work focuses on the Greek-Cypriot social

\(^{204}\) Hadjipavlou, “No Permission to Cross,” 338-9.


\(^{206}\) Anthias and Yuval-Davis. Racialized Boundaries; Blom, Hagemann, and Hall. Gender Nations; Cusack, “Janus and Gender,” 541-61; Yuval-Davis. Gender and Nation; Yuval-Davis and Anthias, ed. Woman-Nation-State; Walby, “Gender, Nations and States”.


context show that, regarding the subject of male identity demonstrations, the authors consider Cypriot society and social attitudes as part of the Greek mainland social milieu. Therefore, in the Greek – and Cypriot – context, male masturbation is understood as a healthy expression of powerful physical needs.

Having discussed how nationalism nurtures and thrives upon essentialist conceptions of gender, as well as how essentialist approaches to gender ignore or obscure determinants like non-heterosexual sexuality, it is imperative to examine how nationalism and sexuality relate. It is vital to comprehend nationalism as a discourse of sexuality in and of itself, since its language and demonstrations generate, regenerate and become definitive of what counts as ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ sexual behaviour. Mosse explains that the generation of nineteenth-century European nationalisms was accompanied by the creation of ideas about bourgeois proper behaviour pertaining to marriage and to sexual relationships. Nationalism and propriety were viewed as mutually supporting and sexual passions were redirected into the love for one’s nation.209 Consequently, sexual identity and national identity essentially merged and the borders of national belonging and exclusion corresponded to ‘normal’ sexuality and gender behaviour.210

The case of Cyprus strongly exemplifies Mosse’s arguments about the nationalism-gender-sexuality relationship. It would not be an exaggeration to argue that, in Cyprus, humanness is a concept qualified along gender lines. This is most evident in the language: in the Cypriot traditional dialect the word άδρωπος (άνθρωπος) – that is, ‘human’ – stands for ‘man,’ whereas the word γεναίκα (γυναίκα) – that is, ‘woman’ – simply means ‘woman’. In Cyprus, the fear of the sexually ‘deviant other’ and the anxiety about homosexuality were combined with bigotry and homophobia, since defending a nationalist identity also means defending a sexual identity against threats from others. This explains, to take an example, the refusal – legal or substantial – to admit women and/or homosexuals on equal standing with ‘normal’ soldiers in several national armies, including the Cypriot one.211

209 Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality, 9, 31, 80, 64, 147, 151.
As Karayanni argues, Cyprus’s historic turns and especially the effect of the British colonizers’ discourses, which spread hatred between the two ethnic communities and, for the first time, depicted and de-legalized non-heterosexual male sexuality as deviant and inferior, have caused a profound crisis in modern Cypriot identity. 212 Guarding the boundaries of heterosexual masculinity – even through means such as appropriate cultural expression, like dances – became central within the Cypriot context, in the attempt of Greek-Cypriots to distinguish themselves from the ‘other’ – that is, the Turk – whose image was constructed both as barbarian and as effeminate; effeminate, because according to a widely popular Cypriot notion, sex between men is a distinctly Eastern, Turkish practice. 213

Although in the past this notion might have been popular among Greek-Cypriots, nowadays it seems that it is not as prevailing. For example, almost all the participants I interviewed reported that they never encountered this notion. The few – older – interviewees, who reported that, at some point in the past, they had encountered this notion, said that they disagree with it. 214 Nevertheless, it could be argued that the negative effects of such notions and discourses that associate non-heterosexual sexual choice with ‘sin’, ‘unnaturalness’ and ‘sickness’ – the sickness primarily of others, and certainly not ours – consciously or subconsciously continue to influence both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots.

For example, the majority of the elite interviewees expressed the opinion that non-heterosexual sexuality is caused by genetic or hormonal anomalies, or that it is the result of serious psychological traumas. Characteristically, a male military representative in his mid-thirties stated:

If one of those [LGBTQ individuals] is born sick in this way, it’s not his fault. But those who bring it upon themselves have nobody to blame but themselves; because

214 Interviews with Elites 2009; Interviews with LGBTQ Participants 2009. The question was: ‘Have you ever heard being said that same-sex sexuality is a distinctive Eastern and/or Turkish practice?’ ‘If yes, what do you think about this notion?’ Please note that by mentioning that the majority of Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees reported that they had never encountered this notion, I do not mean to imply that such notions no longer exist or that their impact is not real and significant. For example, see: Massad, Desiring Arabs, 160-90. Such orientalist legacies and their influence on national and transnational/international sexual politics will be discussed in chapter five.
they have caused themselves to have this unnatural characteristic [i.e., non-heterosexuality].

A gay male Greek-Cypriot in his mid-thirties reported:

I was called a ‘sinner’ by my family. They even had me go and confess ... The priest ... was looking at me as if I were a worm, and not a human being. He said that I had … to get rid of the sinful thoughts in order to become a human being, and then go to communion. You see, before doing as told, I was not a human being.

Not surprisingly, based on the aforementioned position of Turkish-Cypriots towards religion and religious institutions, the Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees reported that in the ‘TRNC’ homosexuality is not described as a sin. A Turkish-Cypriot bisexual woman in her mid-twenties, stated: ‘In north Cyprus most people say that homosexuality is a sickness or a trend, but not a sin ... In the north we are secular and we don’t practice the Muslim religion’.

In Cyprus, defining national identity along sexuality lines has led to a repugnance towards men engaging, or thought to be engaging, in receptive same-sex sexual activities, as opposed to penetrative same-sex sexual activities that carry less – if any – stigma. The importance of this argument rests upon the fact that in such perceptions and discourses ‘the deviant’ is not defined by the sexual act per se; rather, it is the (perceived as) ‘effeminate’ and ‘passive’ male. Such understanding of homosexuality has important gender meanings. For what is excluded from the realm of the thinkable are non-essentialist and non-heteronormative gender performances, rather than certain types of sexual activity, since ‘it may be accepted and even considered macho for a man to engage in sexual intercourse with another man so long as the latter is effeminate and passive’. The fact that criminal law in various countries, and in Cyprus, never made reference to same-sex genital relations between women substantiates this argument, because ‘the absence of this specific female

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218 Karayanni, “Moving Identity”; Karayanni, Dancing Fear and Desire.
body from the criminal law, where the female body as sexuality is represented, might suggest that while same-sex genital relations might be understood as sexuality they might also be understood as primarily gender relations.\(^{220}\)

The interview results support the above argument. Almost all the elite interviewees and one third of the LGBTQ participants said that they are against adoption rights for same-sex couples. As they claimed, a child cannot be brought up properly or be accepted by her peers and society, if she grows up without having both ‘gender models’ – that is, ‘female’ and ‘male’ – available. A Greek-Cypriot centre-right male MP in his early sixties said:

Ask them this question [i.e., those people who support adoption rights for same-sex couples]: What will a child think, if she grows up seeing two women or two men, saying to one another ‘we are a couple’, when all the other children have a male father and a mother? Isn’t this psychological violence against the child? I do not know whether other countries allow it, but this thing cannot happen in Cyprus. And where it was allowed, have [these countries] conduct a research, and then we will see whether the children who grow up this way will survive it, and what kind of psychological problems they will have.\(^{221}\)

Such statements demonstrate that, in Cyprus, attitudes towards non-heterosexuality are directly linked to constructions of gender and gender roles, as well as to the heteronormative, patriarchal model of the family – since the father has to be ‘male’ – which is thought to be the sine qua non of national survival and societal stability.

The clergymen I interviewed denied that they treat men and women differently,\(^{222}\) although studies conducted by other researchers point to the opposite. Georgiou’s study showed that, regarding men who have deviated on sexual matters, Cypriot Christian Orthodox priests often diverge from the official legalistic rigidity

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\(^{221}\) “Interview with Politician 210011”, *Interviews with Elites 2009*. Interviews by Nayia Kamenou, Nicosia, 7 January 2009. The question was: ‘In your opinion, should the right of LGBTQ individuals to family life be recognized?’ My italics.

\(^{222}\) After summarizing the results of Georgiou’s 1992 study (see footnote 223), I asked: ‘Would you agree with the findings of this study, i.e., that the clergy treats men and women differently with regard to issues of sexual nature?’
of the Church’s Fathers, as long as these men remain within the limits of heterosexuality. Yet, they do not apply this same practice to women, even if they remain within the limits of heterosexuality.223

Additionally, the high-ranking Church clergy members’ positions on non-heterosexuality demonstrate that, for the Church, forgiveness and salvation is possible only if the sinner remains within the limits of heterosexuality. A metropolitan bishop said that, although LGBTQ people should not be ostracized since ‘they were born ill’, they should not be allowed to serve in public positions or as educators because, as he claimed, ‘it has been scientifically proven through studies that eighty per cent of homosexual people have the potential of becoming paedophiles’ and could, therefore, corrupt other people.224 A bishop said that ‘these people bring it upon themselves because they are pleased with nothing, so they push their senses to the limits, thus deflecting from Christ’s path’.225

So, do these oppressive discourses really have such power that they reach ‘into the very grain of individuals, [touch] their bodies and insert [themselves] into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives’, as Foucault argues?226 To what extent do public, dominant, discourses of sexuality penetrate people’s bodies and minds? And how does this penetration affect people’s exercising of agency over their own identities, as well as over the naming of ‘others’? Although evidence produced by interviews cannot be used to accurately determine the degree to which Cypriot elite interviewees are authors and/or subjects of such discourses, it is pertinent to highlight the fact that the force of such discourses is so great, that even those who have the prerogative of constructing and publically articulating them, are also defined and subjectivized by them to a considerable extent.227

224 “Interview with Metropolitan Bishop 210022”. The metropolitan bishop did not specify the studies he made reference to.
225 “Interview with Bishop 210031”.
227 In accordance with Kendall and Wickham’s understanding of Foucault’s work on the relationship between ‘subject’ and ‘discourse’, when I use the term ‘subjectivization’ I refer to the different subject positions in discourse. The fact that subjects are positioned in discourse does not necessarily render subjects’ role passive, since subjects are not only products of power but they are also producers of themselves. Such understanding of ‘subject’ and ‘subjectivization’ precludes discourse determinism and the essentialization of power. According to Kendall and Wickham, ‘the triad power, knowledge and the subject is so systematic that it makes little sense to consider each component separately – they all condition, and form the conditions for, each other. Thus it is inaccurate to suggest

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For example, as a response to the question ‘in your opinion, what are the causes of LGBTQ sexuality’, a left-wing female MP in her mid-fifties, who is also a physician, said:

The problem is not always hormonal or biological, like many people think. Usually, those [non-heterosexual people] who have a severe biological problem try to change sex, and they undergo gender reassignment surgery. In the other category are those who have the inclination, either because they grew up in a family where the environment allowed them to develop the womanly sense, or – when we talk about girls – they are those with minor hormonal imbalances, which could have been treated, if their families had realized the problem early on. And there are those people who choose it. Maybe that is psychological. For example, from the time they are toddlers [they decide:] ‘I want to play with dolls, I want to wear high heels, I want to wear dresses, even though I have a weenie’.

Responding to the same question, a centre-right male politician in his early sixties said:

I know what ‘homosexual’, ‘lesbian’ and ‘bisexual’ mean. But what is this? What is ‘transgender’? I didn’t know that such category existed, and I have some difficulty understanding; I mean understanding how this person functions. [Does he/she change genders] everyday, or does [he/she] have a gender for two, three years and then for the next two, three years, takes on another [gender]? There is definitely a psychological anomaly at play in such situations. They could decide to be both [genders] like the transsexuals. This is the first time I am hearing about this. There is something that is not normal about them beyond genetics. You mean that such a person can function properly both as a man [i.e., heterosexual man] and as a gay [man] and, if she is a woman, she can function both as a woman [i.e. heterosexual woman] and as a lesbian? Something about this doesn’t make sense!

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229 “Interview with Politician 210011”.

that discourse determines the subject, or that power in the last instance is responsible for the production of subjectivity: the circularity of interdependence precludes questions of primacy, since none of the components of the triad would exist (except in virtual form) without the others’. See: Kendall and Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods, 54.
There are numerous interesting – and even conflicting – discourses at work in these politicians’ statements, which need to be disaggregated in order to get a better understanding of how predominant discourses of sexuality are both constructed by, and impact upon elite agents. In her attempt to rationalize what she understands to be a ‘biological sex-gender mismatch’, the female politician identifies three possible scenarios: Some LGBTQs suffer from hormonal and psychological anomalies that could even be ‘treatable’, that is, their ‘problem’ has to do with ‘nature’; others have been brought up to be LGBTQ, that is, their ‘problem’ has to do with ‘nurture’; in the last category there are the people who, more or less, willingly chose not to abide with their ‘biological’ sex and gender roles.

The male politician’s statement is indicative of elite interviewees’ difficulty grasping how non-heterosexual sexuality and gender identifications could ground an identity. The male politician is especially puzzled about trans* identities. Once faced with identity fluidity, he realizes that the ‘nature’, ‘nurture’ and ‘(bad) choice’ arguments do not sufficiently explain all the existing and possible expressions of gender. His frustration escalates as he cannot propel an alternative fourth argument that could render trans* identities and individuals as ‘abnormal’, and consequently justify his repulsion towards them.

Although none of the three scenarios that the female politician offers are free from bigotry, what needs to be highlighted is not only her active participation in the perpetuation of heterocentric discourses, but also the fact that her reasoning and her articulations remain limited within the prevailing gender and sexuality discourses, which render non-heteronormativity as necessarily problematic. That is, the female politician seeks to explain and partially ‘justify’ alternative demonstrations of gender and non-heterocentric modalities of sexuality. However, at no point does she consider the possibility that LGBTQ sexuality and non-binary gender identification need not be an anomaly whose causes need to be identified and explained. Similarly, besides being indicative of the prejudice that is prevalent among Cypriot elites, the male politicians’ statements about trans* individuals also reveal the extent to which the elite producers of heterocentric discourses are limited within, and by, their own product: Once deprived by the binaries and essentialisms that form the predominant gender and sexuality discourses, the male politician is at complete loss and cannot even grasp the possibility of being and living outside the heteronormative boundaries of the national collectivity.

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Because of the power of representation and the ability to form and communicate public discourse – which they gain either through their election in office, or through their assignment in power positions within their parties – political elites constitute one of the agents of ‘othering’ that operate within the island’s socio-political and cultural arena. The elite interviews substantiate the arguments that concepts of ‘the nation’ and national identity are both premised on, and also define the boundaries of ‘proper’ and ‘normal’ expressions of gender and sexuality.

According to the elite interviewees, the only imaginable and acceptable sexuality for ‘the nation’ is heterosexuality which corresponds to the heteronormative male/female gender binary. When asked about the relationship between biological sex, gender and gender roles, the majority of the elite interviewees did not distinguish between sex and gender. They characterized both as a description and result of nature. Additionally, their understanding of LGBTQ identities could be summarized as ‘a man (or a woman) wanting to be, or acting like a woman (or like a man)’. The majority of the elite interviewees described non-heterosexuality as some kind of genetic, hormonal or psychological anomaly and they said that gender and sexuality do not constitute grounds for identity formation.

But what is the relationship between public/elite and private/grassroots discourses? What is the dynamic between public official discourses and personal narratives that pertain to non-heterosexual sexuality? The interview results point to the fact that public discourses and the official rhetoric of some state and institutional elites have managed to penetrate LGBTQ individuals’ self-perceptions to a considerable degree. For example, the majority of the Greek-Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees reported than they disagree with adoption for same-sex couples. One Greek-Cypriot female gay participant in her mid-twenties said:

Raising a child is a huge responsibility and gay relationships are more problematic than straight ones. In same-sex relationships we have two people who are the same.

230 Interviews with Elites 2009.
231 Ibid.
232 The question was: ‘Do you agree or disagree with granting LGBTQ individuals the right to marry and adopt children?’
It’s easier for them to have fights and break up and this will have negative effects on the child. I hold the same belief about same-sex marriage also.233

On the issue of same-sex marriage and adoption, a Turkish-Cypriot male gay interviewee in his mid-thirties remarked: ‘It won’t be healthy for the children, because of the rules of society. I am not saying that same-sex marriage or adoption is against nature, but some orders should not be touched; because if everyone were gay, then nobody would have children’.234

I asked LGBTQ participants whether they think that men should be ‘masculine’ and women ‘feminine’, regardless of their sexual choice.235 The answers to this question revealed the existence of sexist and gender stereotypes among the LGBTQ participants. Almost all the women said that they completely associate with the term ‘woman’, that they feel very offended if called ‘tomboys’ and that they do not like butch lesbians. Almost all men said that they are very annoyed by effeminate gays and that they do not want to be around ‘sissies’ who ‘ridicule themselves’ and consequently embarrass the whole male gay community.236 The answers did not differ between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. This raises a crucial question about how Cypriot LGBTQs understand ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ gender performances. Their answers lead to the conclusion that, even among non-heterosexual Cypriots, performing virility – if men – and femininity – if women – is indistinguishable from self-dignity. Dignity and propriety, as well as their accompanying gender performances are, as mentioned before, inextricably linked to the belonging and exclusion boundaries that the national community prescribes.237

As Karayanni nicely summarizes it, ‘in male public discourse, the taboo of homosexuality confirms male privilege and, through reassurance, generates fresh rigour, pleasure, and confidence in embodying a male, heterosexual, and Hellenic national identity.’238 And he concludes by explaining that, in Cyprus, homosexuality is not just a type of sexual activity. Articulated as identity, it threatens to become an ‘other’ in a society that sees its purity in expelling all ‘others’. Karayanni rightly

233 “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 333333A”, 2 April 2009.
234 “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 212529”, 1 April 2009.
235 The question was: ‘Do you believe that, regardless of sexual choice, men should be “masculine” and women “feminine”?’
236 Interviews with LGBTQ Participants 2009.
vindicates a change of bodily and cultural understandings beyond changes in public and official discourses. But could Cypriot cultural, corporeal and private imaginings change, unless preceded by a change in the rhetoric of the institutions of power, that is, the state and the Church? Two relatively recent events—one took place in Greece, while the other took place in Cyprus—exemplify that institutional public discourses impede the genesis of alternative gender and sexual imaginings. Moreover, they demonstrate that, even when alternative imaginings do exist, these are not taken into consideration by the political elite when it makes political, social, economic and public-policy decisions.

On June 3rd 2008, and in a climate of oppositions and threats from the Greek Orthodox Church and from some political and state elites, the mayor of the Greek island of Tilos conducted two same-sex wedding ceremonies. He explained that his act was in accord with human rights values and that conducting the ceremonies fell under his administrative authority. The ceremonies were only of symbolic value, since same-sex civil union, as well as the rights that accompany it, have yet to be legally recognized in either Greece or Cyprus. Nonetheless, the Greek Supreme Court prosecutor warned Mayor Aliferis of the legal repercussions of his ‘breach of duty’, although Greek legal scholars explained that there are no grounds for such prosecution under the Greek civic code. They explicated that same-sex marriage is a social issue whose legality is to be debated and decided in Greek and European courts, since the Greek constitution does not make any provisions about the issue.

In May of 2008, the Cypriot Ombudsman raised the issue of considering the recognition of civil unions for both homosexual and heterosexual Cypriot couples, arguing that this is in line with human rights values and European law pertaining to rights to marriage and family. Her suggestion was met with opposition from the Church, while the state and political party representatives chose to remain less vocal.

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239 Ibid., 259, 261, 264.
242 Antonis Manitakis, «Ανυπόστατος σήμερα ο γάμος ομοφυλοφίλων, ελεύθερος ο νομοθέτης να το προβλέψει», Ελευθεροτυπία, 9 June 2008, <http://www.enet.gr/online/online_hprint?q=%F3%F5%EC%F6%F9%ED%EF%F2+%F5%EB%E5%F5%E8%F5%F1%E7%F2+%F3%F5%EC%E2%E9%F9%F3%E7%F2&a=&id=80864200> (9 June 2008).
In June of 2008, following the events in Greece and the Cypriot Ombudsman’s suggestions, the CyBC broadcast a discussion show on the issue of partnership rights for heterosexual and homosexual cohabiting, unmarried couples. During the show, viewers could call and vote either for, or against the legal recognition of civil partnerships for same-sex and heterosexual couples.²⁴⁴

Particularly interesting was the panel participants’ focus on the ‘biological factors’ that ‘cause’ and ‘justify’ homosexuality. Some scholars on the show panel founded their arguments in favour of homosexual people based on claims about homosexuality’s ‘biological determinism’ and ‘inevitability’. However, by premising equality on ‘deficient’ biology these scholars essentially presented LGBTQ individuals not as the legitimate subjects of equal respect, but of pity. Additionally, the problem with such causal approaches is that they leave important historical and political questions unaddressed. The imperative issue is not discovering whether non-heterosexual sexuality is the result of ‘nature’ or ‘nurture’. The crucial task it is to bring to light its interpretations and representations within specific socio-cultural contexts, to emphasize the effects of such interpretations and representations on the way in which sexual lives are organized and to analyze the power structures and relations that render specific interpretations and representations hegemonic.²⁴⁵

Such attitudes partly account for the present differences between Cypriot and Greek civil society, although a historical examination of the ways in which nationalist and sexist discourses were cultivated in the two countries reveals numerous similarities. Although the legal framework pertaining to LGBTQ issues is very similar in the two countries, Greek society – or at least Greek urban society – is much more tolerant towards LGBTQ individuals. In Cyprus, LGBTQ organization or mobilization is a very recent phenomenon, whereas in Greece the first substantial LGBTQ mobilization took place as early as the 1970s, while there is a number of organizations working on, and scholarship pertaining to, LGBTQ issues.²⁴⁶

²⁴⁴ Το συζήτημα, Produced by the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation 1(CyBC 1), 2 June 2008.
During the CyBC discussion show, Cypriot right-wing politician Tasos Mitsopoulos insisted that the religious and cultural values of the Christian Orthodox Cyprus could not possibly be allowed to degenerate because of external societal influences, which Cypriot society is not ready to embrace.247 Yet, the fact that sixty per cent out of the fifteen hundred programme viewers who telephoned and voted on the issue supported the recognition of same-sex and heterosexual civil partnerships, raises multiple and interesting questions about the relationship between public and private sexuality discourses. Is Cypriot society open to LGBTQ recognition, while the centres of power remain deaf to the people’s will? Do private discourses differ from the sexist and homophobic public ones?

Commenting on the outcome of this vote, political scientist Nikos Trimikliniotis made a significant remark. He argued that the results of the vote do not necessarily imply that Cypriot society is ready to fully accept LGBTQ individuals as equals among equals. As he explained, they might only point to the fact that the recognition of ‘cohabitation contracts’, short of all the rights that accompany marriage, is the only allowance that society is willing to make.248 The above-mentioned positions of elite and LGBTQ interviewees on the rights to marriage and adoption for same-sex couples further support this argument. Trimikliniotis also noted the absence of lesbians from the discussion panel.249 The hostess of the show explained that this was due to the difficulty in finding and convincing lesbian women to speak publicly – a plausible explanation considering the position of women, and specifically of lesbian women, in Cypriot society.

Cynthia Cockburn reports that when she tried to document lesbian subjectivities in Cyprus, she was told that Cypriot lesbian women escape abroad in order to be able to freely live their lives. She also mentions that, when Andreas Onoufriou was conducting his research on gendered subjectivities among Cypriot students, he was not able to find a single case of a Cypriot lesbian woman living in Cyprus. Although the research results and the interviews I conducted with both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot lesbian women who reside in Cyprus contradict

247 Το ουράνιο, 2 June 2008.
248 Ibid.
249 The only representative of non-heterosexual people in the panel was the president of the Cypriot Gay Liberation Movement (Απελευθερωτικό Κίνημα Ομοφυλοφίλων Κύπρου, abbreviated ΑΚΟΚ), Mr. Alecos Modinos.
Cockburn and Onoufriou’s claims, the argument that most Cypriot lesbian women are forced into invisibility is valid.\textsuperscript{250}

Nonetheless, this pervasive effect of dominant discourse on non-heteronormative demonstrations of sexuality and gender is not irreversible. Truly, such discourses have led to the silencing of alternative narratives and to the invisibility and non-heterocentric modes of existence. However, identity formation processes – and their accompanying discourses – are not static. Rather, they are the outcomes of debates and of processes which are shaped and reshaped through individual and collective lived experience. The example of the debate about civil unions in Greece and in Cyprus demonstrates how disruptive instances have the ability to initiate a shift in what is publically articulated. For example, the symbolic same-sex marriage ceremony in Tilos led to a heated debate about LGBTQ rights in Greece, which rapidly spilt over to Cyprus. This new trajectory in public discourses consequently affected both institutional elites and the centres of power, and Cypriot LGBTQs: The former Cypriot Ombudsman raised the question of recognizing same-sex civil unions, while – as it will be extensively discussed in chapter five – Cypriot LGBTQs started, for the first time, to organize and mobilize not only for non-interference with their right to privacy, but for complete, substantive equality.

Significantly, these new alternative institutional and grassroots discourses increased their impetus by employing a language that state and political elites cannot negate, since they have themselves used it extensively, in order to justify national claims. This language is the language of ‘Europe’, ‘Europeanization’ and human rights which, as chapters two and three will demonstrate, could become an invaluable tool in groups and individuals’ equality struggles.

Conclusion

As Brubaker has argued, rendering the abstract concept of ‘the nation’ as the central actor behind the construction of national identity omits too many essential

questions that pertain to the nature and demonstrations of agency.\textsuperscript{251} For how could an abstract concept act as a signifier and as an actor? Such limited understandings of ‘agency’ and ‘public discourses’ overlook how determinants other than politico-national ones, as well as non-heteronormative gender and sexual subjectivities affect the negotiation of exercise of agency over identity formation; how public and private discourses intersect and influence each other. In order to grant Cypriots with real agency over the formation of their identities, interpretive schemes of the social world and of experienced reality need to extend Cypriots’ reality and identity-shaping culture beyond political ideologies and nationalist loyalties struggles. Further examination is needed about whether other categories through which existence could be imagined or articulated, have left – or not – the island intact.

The relevant literature identifies a degree of change in Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot nationhood narratives and national identity formation processes. There exists evidence that besides the politico-national discourses of ‘Greekness’, ‘Turkishness’ and ‘Cypriotness’, additional elements have started to inform Cypriots’ national identity formation.\textsuperscript{252} Nevertheless, questions about whether and how gender and sexuality have been affected by changes in nationalist ideological struggles and national identity formation processes need to be addressed.

In doing so, disaggregating the concept of ‘agent’ and examining the subjectivity-discourse relationship more closely and systematically becomes pertinent. The Orthodox Church of Cyprus continues to have a pervasive influence on the socio-political domain. Through means such as education, it manages to demarcate what stands as ‘appropriate’ modes of collective and individual existence. Nonetheless, the Church is not the sole agent of nationalism on the island, as the state and political elites remain reluctant to allow the articulation of alternative discourses and the development of identity formation processes which escape androcentric and heteronormative understandings of gender and sexuality.

This, however, does not preclude other possible scenarios, especially since a Foucaultian approach to discourse, power and subjectivity demonstrates that their relationship is both changeable and reciprocal. Importantly, in recent years, Cyprus has witnessed several important socio-political changes, a number of which are the

\textsuperscript{251} Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity’”; Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov, “Ethnicity as Cognition”.

\textsuperscript{252} Peristianis, “Cypriot Nationalism, Dual Identity, and Politics”; Lacher and Kaymak, “Transforming Identities”.

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direct result of the country’s Europeanization. For example, EU admission requirements have led both the ‘TRNC’ and the RoC to abandon their previously explicitly nationalistic rhetoric in favour of more moderate articulations, which are structured around concepts such as ‘European ideals’ and ‘human rights’. At least to some degree, these – admittedly strategic and opportunistic – changes are reflected in school curricula, in civil society organization and mobilization and even in the vocabulary that elites employ when making public statements.

As the examples of the same-sex union debates in Greece and in Cyprus demonstrate, both the weight that the ‘language of Europe’ carries and the fact that it has successfully inseminated – at least to some degree – official public discourses, has facilitated the articulation of alternative discourses of gender and sexuality. The disruption that the ceremonial same-sex marriage in Tilos had created generated an opportunity for LGBTQ issues to come to the forefront and to gain momentum as the focal point of public debate. This raises the question of how such disruptive instances come to maintain momentum, in order to consequently lead to a politics of gender and sexuality. How about organized civil society and grassroots movements, and their negotiations – or internalizations – of popular official discourses pertaining to gender and sexuality? How are gender and sexuality identities constructed and negotiated, either sub-culturally and under the official radar or within, and as part of, the official structures?

The rest of the chapters will discuss the ways in which official gender and sexuality discourses have been appropriated, negotiated and challenged by civil society and grassroots groups. By employing the example of Greek-Cypriot women’s groups and movements, chapter two will discuss the dialectic between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ discourses. It will disaggregate the agents of grassroots transcripts. Moreover, it will discuss whether and to what extent these agents and a transformed attitude towards gender and sexuality could serve as antipodes to official narratives. It will question and discuss the strategies and mechanisms through which such groups could affect a change of attitudes towards nationalism and national identity, a shift in dominant political and social structures, the negotiation of collective and individual understandings of gender and sexuality and – most importantly – the moulding of disruptive moments into a politics of gender and sexuality.
CHAPTER TWO

Mobilization Obstacles and Opportunities
Introduction

Within a context, like Cyprus, where nationalist discourses prevail, gender and sexuality subjectivities have too often been considered as issues of personal identification that are unrelated, or trivial when compared, to socio-political ‘public sphere’ matters.\(^{253}\) However, although these subjectivities are often effortlessly assumed to be unrelated to public life, it is in the public sphere that the effects of their stigmatization are being mostly felt. This chapter will encourage a more systematic and extended attention to how heteronormative gender binaries and heterosexual sexuality manifest themselves, amidst the social and political discourses that idealize them.

This chapter will also highlight the essentialisms that are embedded in some feminist discussions of gender and nationalism. Although they are important in that they expose nationalism’s great impact on gender subjectivities, analyses which focus on the gender-nationalism binary often do not follow through sufficiently those questions that pertain to gendered agency, gendered sexuality, personal narratives and unofficial discourses.\(^{254}\) A central problem of the gender-nationalism binary is that, on the one hand, interpreting nationalism as diametrically contradictory to women’s emancipation assumes too much about nationalist discourses’ ability to annihilate women’s agency, and often understands women as a cohesive group with essentialized characteristics. On the other hand, arguing in favour of ‘feminist nationalisms’ ignores questions of sexuality and the problematics of overlapping subjectivities, while it leaves unquestioned the structures of power within which


\(^{254}\) Among others, Nira Yuval-Davis, Floya Anthias, Maria Hadjipavlou, Myria Vassiliadou, Cynthia Cockburn, Rebecca Bryant, Anna Agathangelou, Deniz Kandiyoti and Mary N. Layoun have made significant contributions regarding the analysis of the gender-nationalism relationship. However, they primarily focus on women and not on men/masculinities and (non-heteronormative) sexuality.
‘feminist nationalisms’ become possible. 255 Moreover, questions arise as to whether a concept such as ‘feminist nationalism’ is pragmatically viable. This is because national, ethnic and cultural specificities, social solidarity and religious homogeneity have been projected in several settings by the ruling – male and female – elite, in order to mask discrimination against various groups, including women and non-heterosexual individuals. 256

The main argument of this chapter is that there exists a self-destructive contradiction inherent in nationalist and official discourses that women, sexual ‘others’ and other national ‘exiles’ could take advantage of. By strategically employing nationalism’s contradiction and its ability to reinvent itself, the destabilization of exclusionary discourses and the articulation of new grassroots narratives of subjectivity and identity become possible. Instead of unquestionably siding with either of two positions – that is, ‘anti-nationalist feminism’ or ‘feminist nationalism’ – this chapter will highlight how this contradiction allows alternative formations and understandings of gender, sexuality and national identities to emerge and to disrupt the currently dominant discourses. Furthermore, it will argue that the gender-nationalism relationship is especially intricate. Moreover, when sexuality is inserted in this binary relationship, several new questions surface. Answering such questions helps elucidate numerous pertinent facets of the nation-identities relationship. Therefore, raising questions of sexuality is necessary towards reaching a complete and coherent understanding of the nature, causes and effects of essentialist constructions on subjectivities, self-perceptions, identifications and identities, as well as of the ways in which these relate and overlap. 257

How, then, do actors express their relationship to essentialist categories? For Foucault, ‘where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power’. 258 But how do individuals claim agency and their own spaces within the exiting matrices of power? These questions are at the heart of the second and third parts of this chapter that will focus on obstacles and opportunities for grassroots mobilization in Cyprus. They will draw attention to Cypriot women’s groups, to the difference between

257 For my differentiation between, and employment of the terms ‘subjectivity’, ‘identification’ and ‘identity’, please see the introductory chapter.
258 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, 95.
feminist movements, women’s movements and women in movements and they will assess the usefulness of identities and strategic essentialism for communicating movements’ objectives. Cypriot women groups will be studied in relation to local institutional forces, in order to discern how the former and the latter interact. The ways in which the ‘public’ and the ‘private’, the ‘official’ and the ‘hidden’ are intertwined and negotiated will be problematized. It will be argued that, although in the case of Cyprus this intertwining currently restrains female agency, it does not render it impossible, especially in light of the positive impact of Europeanization on local processes of identification and modes of mobilization.

**Approaches to the Gender-Nationalism Relationship: Women as Victims and Perpetrators**

Beyond its effects on communal life, as Otto Bauer pointedly noted, the idea of the ‘nation’ is intrinsically interconnected with ‘ego’. Namely, the aura that surrounds the nation – that is, the nation’s ‘ego’ – affects individuals’ ‘egos’, self-perceptions and identities. When making this statement Bauer was referring neither to gender nor to sexuality elements of collective and personal ‘ego’ and identity. Nonetheless, since ‘the nation’ is a construct that is based on male heterosexual needs, objectives and fantasies, the nation’s ‘ego’ is inextricably linked to notions of patriarchy. Patriarchical norms and a presumed male superiority allow men to both render women as a different ‘Other’ and to control their behaviour pertaining to the demonstration of their gender and sexuality. Historically, this control has been exercised primarily – but not exclusively – through the creation of moral codes that aimed to preserve the established patriarchal, androcentric and heterocentric social and political national order.

Although varying and changing throughout history, nationally prescribed femininities and sexualities for women have often been premised on the expectation for sexual modesty or purity. Women have been used to represent and embody a feminized nation in need of protection by its male guardians from foreign –

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physical/actual and, or cultural/metaphorical – penetration. Moreover, by constructing women as the biological and sexually moral reproducers of the ‘nation’, the female body has become both the carrier of the ‘nation’ and the marker of its boundaries. In this way, nation, gender and sexuality have intersected, and nationalist discourses have become linked to discourses of corporeality and somaticity. These processes have had an impact on men also: In a similar manner that in the context of national projects ‘womanhood’ has been equated with femininity and female sexuality has been equated with procreative heterosexuality and modesty, ‘manhood’ has been associated with masculinity, while male sexuality has been associated with sexual vigour. This is because, according to nationalist narratives, sexuality that is expressed in ways that fall outside the heteronormative boundaries is unimaginable in the case of women, while in the case of men it is the sin and/or the perversion of national others.

Yuval-Davis argues that in nationalism-infused cultures – namely, in ethnically divided societies where the nation-state is, or it is imagined to be, facing an imminent threat – women’s citizenship is of a dualistic nature. That is to say, it both includes and excludes women from the general body of citizens, even if formal/legal gender equality is in place. She explains that, although omitted from the national production and reproduction literature, it is women who are expected to biologically, culturally and symbolically reproduce the nation. Nonetheless, simultaneously excluding and including women and sexual ‘others’ from the body-politic and from the body of the ‘nation’ is not exclusive to Cyprus. Rather, as numerous scholars argued, it has been common practice in nation-building processes and in national projects across the globe. The dissemination and prevalence of such notions and practices has its roots in Western theory and social and political order, which have created the division of life into the ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres.

261 Mosse. Nationalism and Sexuality; Parker et al., ed. Nationalisms and Sexualities; Pryke, “Nationalism and sexuality, what are the issues?”, 529–46.
263 Yuval-Davis, “Gender and Nation”, 621-32.
Based on this dichotomy, women have been confined in the ‘private’ sphere, while nationalisms and nations have been discussed as part of the ‘public’ sphere.265

This division of the civil sphere into the ‘private’ and ‘public’ domains has its roots in Hobbes and Rousseau, who portrayed the transition from the state of nature into orderly society based on what they assumed to be exclusively male characteristics, namely aggressiveness and reason.266 Since, in the past, Western political theory has understood women as being close to nature and as unable to reason, their control and subordination was interpreted as one of the bases of social order.267 Consequently, different gender relations came to play an important role in all dimensions of national projects. Some of these dimensions include: a) citizenship, which was premised on heterosexual marriage and the bourgeois heterocentric family; b) race, of whose the ‘purity’ was ‘preserved’ by controlling women’s sexual activities; c) and culture and religion, which were constructed around the symbolism of women as the biological reproducers of the national collectivity and as the transmitters of national culture and honour.268

Since the national project has been defined primarily by men, femininity and feminine sexuality have been constructed in relation to masculinist, patriarchal, nationalist notions. Moreover, they have been regulated by nation-state policies and laws pertaining, for example, to marriage and abortion, as well as by demographic engineering methods, such as pronatalist policies.269 Pronatalist policies, which function as tools of predominantly masculine nationalist projects, seek to maintain or establish national and politico-economic superiority, by employing women’s wombs

265 Yuval-Davis, “Gender and Nation”, 622.
267 Yuval-Davis, “Gender and Nation”, 621-3.
268 Ibid., 624-30.
269 Mayer, “Gender Ironies”, 16.
as weapons in the numerical superiority inter-ethnic wars. The examples of Greece and Cyprus exemplify this argument.

Symptomatic of tensions that usually arise when trying to balance ‘modernity’ and tradition, discourses of population decline – which supposedly endangers national sovereignty and existence – took central stage in Greek public life in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{270} The ‘demographics problem’ [το δημογραφικό πρόβλημα] was portrayed as a central and dire national problem in the Greek press and media and it spurred endless political and public debates over the then new position of Greece in Europe, over the modernization of the Greek nation-state and over the rights and ‘national duties’ of Greek women. In the mainstream rightist and centrist press, women were usually portrayed as the root of Greece’s problems, since they refused to procreate to the levels that they were expected to, and therefore endangered the preservation of Greek national identity amidst the threat of hostile neighbours – ranging from Macedonia to Albania and Turkey – and of the influx of Kurdish, Polish, Filipino and other immigrants. Abortion was portrayed as a sin against the nation, Hellenism and Orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{271}

In the case of Cyprus, pronatalist policies were introduced soon after 1974, in an attempt to preserve numerical strength over the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot groups. Considering their post-1974 economic and political losses, as well as the fact that Turkey had moved large numbers of settlers from Anatolia to the occupied north, Greek-Cypriots felt that their national existence was greatly threatened. The RoC adopted measures to encourage both larger families and the participation of women in the labour force, since reconstructing the economy heavily depended on women’s industrial labour. In order to encourage fertility while simultaneously allowing women to participate in the economic sphere, marriage and maternity allowances were increased, while sex equality measures were introduced to protect pregnant women from job dismissal.\textsuperscript{272}

The fact that the engineering of population growth through the immediate or indirect control of women and men’s reproduction is central in nationalist projects is

\textsuperscript{270} The concept of ‘modernity’ and the huge debate around its meaning will be discussed at length in chapter 5.


\textsuperscript{272} Anthias, “Women and Nationalism in Cyprus”, in Woman-Nation-State, 163-4.
further explicated by the history of abortion laws in Cyprus. Abortion was legally prohibited until 1974, when the law was amended under the auspices of the ecclesiastical courts. The major factor that led to this change was the raping of numerous Greek-Cypriot women by Turkish soldiers during the July and August invasions of the island. It is important to note that what prompted this legal reform was not rape per se but rape by Turkish soldiers, as well as the fear of the likelihood of Greek-Cypriot women bearing the ‘enemy’s’ children.\textsuperscript{273} Therefore, although this reform granted Cypriot women a right over their bodies, which women elsewhere had to organize and struggle for years in order to obtain, the reasoning behind the reform was far from related to ideas about women’s right to choice. On the contrary, it was another expression of institutional power and of its sexual control over women, in order to assure the ‘purity’ of the national stock.

Since national collectivities are composed of family units, the family units’ coming into being, their dissolution, their structure and composition and the role of each member are determined within the boundaries of the collectivity.\textsuperscript{274} This is especially true in the Greek and in the Cypriot context, where the conjugal model premises the definition of female and male identities, while it is considered the epitome of the sexes’ complementarity and the ultimate achievement of personhood.\textsuperscript{275} Since in Greece and in Cyprus the household is seen as the link between the ‘private’ and the ‘public’ spheres of life – hence, the importance that the state and the Church place on marriage – men and women gain prestige through the expression of their ‘different’ ‘natural’ roles within the household.\textsuperscript{276}

Nonetheless, such examples of nationally constructed female identities do not render the gender-nation relationship monolithic, or women as the perpetual and necessarily passive victims and objects of men’s control. Through kinship power structures and as members of family units and of the ‘national family’, women also partake in the regeneration of gendered, sexist and nationalist discourses. They do so not only by enforcing the masculinist and patriarchal moral codes and modes of thought, but also by participating in the definition and perpetuation of these codes


\textsuperscript{274} Cusack, “Janus and Gender”, 628.

\textsuperscript{275} Loizos and Papataxiarchis, ed. \textit{Contested Identities}.

and modes through the employment of ‘othering’ as a means of disciplining those women who refuse to abide by the rules of the national collectivity. As Yuval-Davis explains:

...very often it is women, especially older women, who are given the roles of the cultural reproducers of ‘the nation’ and are empowered to rule on what is ‘appropriate’ behaviour and appearance and what is not and to exert control over other women who might be constructed as ‘deviants’. As very often this is the main source of social power allowed to women, they might become fully engaged with it.277

According to Myria Vassiliadou, in Cyprus, the project of ‘othering’ women – in order to preserve ethno-national coherence and moral/sexual purity – continues to be conducted primarily by women themselves. Nonetheless, as she explains, this process of naming internal ‘others’ is also a means through which Greek-Cypriot women create places and in-groups for themselves and acquire a sense of self and group identity. The focal point is not who is constructed as the ‘other’ but that through the creation of the ‘other’ – the Asian domestic worker, the Eastern European prostitute, the female Turkish-Cypriot enemy, the homosexual – women assert their being.278 Even middle-class, urban Greek-Cypriot women, who proclaim to be ‘gender aware’, do not necessarily oppose dominant patriarchal and nationalist discourses. The reason behind this was succinctly and accurately phrased by Paulo Freire, who argued that ‘during the initial stage of the struggle, the oppressed, instead of striving for liberation, tend themselves to become oppressors or ‘sub-oppressors’.279

This process of group and personal identity construction which Vassiliadou describes puts Bauer’s argument about the interdependence between individuals’ ‘ego’ and the nation’s ‘ego’ into context. According to Vassiliadou, Greek-Cypriot women construct their identities and cast themselves as clean, pure and moral, through the ostracizing of the unclean, promiscuous ‘other’. However, such a description of Greek-Cypriot women’s identity formation processes – one that sees

277 Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nation, 37.
all women as both victims and culprits of patriarchal and nationalist discourses – underestimates their ability to reason about, and exercise agency over, their lives. Additionally, it portrays patriarchal and nationalist notions as everlasting and impermeable.\(^2\) This is an overly pessimistic approach to the issues of nationalism, identity formation and agency.

Applying the logic of the ‘woman-as-victim’ and/or of the ‘woman-as-co-perpetrator’ is a simplification of the ways in which nationalism, identity and agency intersect. Truly, the history of nationalisms around the world gives some credit to such interpretations of women’s agency, or lack thereof. Nonetheless, feminist and gender studies research, which has been carried both within and outside the Western context, demonstrated that women’s involvement in men-orchestrated nationalist projects has not always been forced upon them, or to their disadvantage. A closer historical examination of women’s roles and exercise of agency amidst nationalist projects shows that women have not always been nationalism’s victims, co-perpetrators, or a combination of the two.

According to some strands of feminist and gender theory, nationalism does not necessarily contradict women’s projects. Women’s participation in national projects differs across geographical locations, historical instances and cultural milieux, while the affiliation of some women’s movements with national projects – especially outside the Western context – has even proved empowering.\(^2\) ‘Feminism’ is not a monolithic concept but, rather, describes a plurality of movements. Similarly, nationalism is a broad term, which is descriptive of multiple variants. Therefore, nationalism and feminism could be compatible if, for example, performing the nurturing, caring and family ‘passive’ roles that nationalist discourses prescribe is treated by women themselves as less important than gaining their autonomy, exercising agency and actively participating in the public and political arenas.\(^2\) Women in various contexts have strategically employed their ‘passive’, auxiliary and men-directed involvement in nationalist and nation-building projects, in order to get a foot into the public and political arena that otherwise would have been inaccessible to them. In some instances, based on their ‘national contributions’

\(^2\) This argument about female national identities in Cyprus will be further discussed in the last section of this chapter.
and on the organizational and other skills that they had acquired by being involved in these projects, women pressed for, and consequently won rights and favourable public policy implementations. The case of Greek women’s involvement in nationalist projects demonstrates how such projects can propel female agency in the ‘public’ arena.

Irrespective of its detrimental effects on the general Greek population, the Greco-Turkish war of 1897 gave upper and middle-class Greek women the opportunity to integrate themselves in national structures by assuming an active role in the national war efforts. Athenian women from upper socioeconomic strata assembled around the Ladies’ Journal (Εφημερίς των Κυριών) and its editor, Kalliropi Parren. Based on a nationalist discourse that had been constructed primarily by men, they attempted to delineate a scope of action in the public sphere for women of their strata, which would incorporate them into the national body. Through public activities – such as collecting funds, caring for refugees, soldiers and their families, training the first Greek nurses and forming alliances with women’s organizations abroad – the group drew a lot of attention. Especially after the Greek defeat and amidst a new nationalist discourse that focused on the need for national self-awareness, the group was given an active role in the work of ‘national recovery’. The experience gained through ‘national contribution’ later became the basis for further demands for women’s rights and gender-oriented state policies. Therefore, regardless of whether or not Greek women sincerely believed in the Greek nationalist discourse, their activism could be classified as the first wave of feminism in Greece.

This pattern is not exclusive to the Greek context. The case of women’s emancipation in Turkey overall resembles the Greek case: It gained its momentum in times of national struggles and, initially, did not explicitly contradict masculinist, official nationalist discourses. Wars gave Turkish women the opportunity to become more involved in public life. Nevertheless, and similarly to the Greek case, Turkish

284 Ibid., 70.
women’s participation in nationalist struggles and in the labour force intensified, rather than diminished, their roles as mothers and reproducers of the nation.\footnote{Kandiyoti, Deniz, “Women and the Turkish State: Political Actors or Symbolical Pawns?” in Woman-Nation-State, ed. Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias (London: Macmillan, 1989), 129-36.} However, in contrast to the case of Greece, Turkish women did not need to employ their contributions to national wars and struggles as the basis for demands of rights and liberties. The reason is that they had been granted a lot of rights as part of the nationalist efforts guided by male elites to secularize, modernize and ‘Westernize’ Turkey. The main legitimizing discourse for the women’s question in Turkey was that of Turkish nationalism and Turkish modernization. Therefore, women’s mobilization in Turkey operated within the limits of existing political structures and manifested its limitations towards significantly altering these structures.\footnote{Ibid., 139-45.}

As the following section on Cypriot women’s groups will reveal, similarly to Turkish and Greek women, Cypriot women have been used to some extent as tools in nationalist projects. However, nationalism does not always contradict women’s projects. The ‘nation’ cannot establish its ‘ego’ and it cannot exist, unless it constantly opposes itself to those that it expels. This ‘othering’ that the ‘nation’ performs, which is essential to its being, is also its weakest point: If the ‘nation’ needs to constantly measure itself to those whom it ostracizes, it means that it is neither primordial nor unchanging, although nationalist rhetoric depends on cultivating the idea that it is. This paradox, this self-destructive contradiction is inherent in all nationalisms that aim not only to differentiate and mark the distance between ‘us’ and ‘them’, but also to oppose the ‘other’.

Nationalisms that are premised on opposition and portray the ‘other’ not only as different, but also as threatening towards the national collectivity are especially prominent in ethnically divided, gendered and deeply homophobic locales like Cyprus. Nonetheless, the fact that the existence of such nationalisms is premised on the existence of what they opposes, as well as the fact that their proclaimed primordial existence and continuity is being confirmed only by the (imagined) existence of novel ‘threats’, opens up opportunities. Those whom the ‘nation’ challenges could raise a challenge against the ‘nation’. If the ‘nation’ is shaped based on what and whom it opposes, then those who are being opposed, the outcast, have an impact on how the ‘nation’, national identity and gender and sexuality

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\footnote{Kandiyoti, Deniz, “Women and the Turkish State: Political Actors or Symbolical Pawns?” in Woman-Nation-State, ed. Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias (London: Macmillan, 1989), 129-36.}

\footnote{Ibid., 139-45.}
constructions are being debated and formed. The next section will examine whether, to what degree and why, Cypriot women’s groups have – or have not yet – pursued such opportunities.

Cypriot Women’s Groups and National Projects

Centring Cypriot life around the state-qua-nation without addressing issues of agency carries the danger of reinforcing the merging of the social with the politico-national and of politicizing the personal via nationalizing it. Although among Cypriots national sentiments continue to be intense, this does not necessarily imply that the sweeping force of official rhetoric has rendered Cypriot civil society stagnated and immobilized. Therefore, an approach that places agency, individual narratives and ‘the personal’ in the focus of analysis is indispensable. The relevant literature has, for the most part, focused on nationalism’s effects on the division of the world in nation-states. However, as Yael Tamir explains:

If nationalism was necessary for the development of democracy, it was not because it established political equality but because it gave a rationale for the division of the world into distinct political units in which democratic principles could be implemented.\(^\text{288}\)

Hence, it is vital to also address the division of these democratic – or not so democratic – nation-states into the units of so-called ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres. By doing so, the understanding of the nature of national communities and the determination of the totality of the effects of nationalism on individual lives and subjectivities will be facilitated.

Similarly to the cases of nineteenth-century Greece and twentieth-century Turkey, Greek-Cypriot women’s groups have not – yet – managed to form and operate completely outside of the predominant nationalistic and patriarchal socio-political status quo. Pre-1974 women’s organization and mobilization about purely women’s issues existed. Nevertheless, it was the Turkish invasion and occupation that triggered not only the creation of multiple women’s organizations, but also their

merging even deeper into politico-national discourses and the stronger embracing by women of their ‘female roles’ as biological and cultural reproducers of the nation. The Cyprus Federation of Women’s Organizations (POGO) was the first women’s organization. Formed in the late 1930s, it is the ‘female branch’ of the communist-leftist AKEL and of the leftist Panckyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) workers’ union. Its founding ideology is based on Marxism and on ideals of pacifism and demilitarization, while its activities focus on ameliorating the position of women in the labour force. Nevertheless, even this group stresses the contributions of its members to the national struggle against British colonial rule. It does so regardless of the fact that, during the period those struggles took place, it was declared illegal ‘like all the other organizations of the Populist Movement’— that is, the leftist groups and organizations. Other women’s groups, which are affiliated with political parties of the political centre and the right, were created much later. Since their inception, these other women’s groups – that is, the Socialist Women’s Movement, but especially the Democratic Party Women’s Organization (GODIK) and the Democratic Rally of Cyprus Women’s Organization (GODISY) – have been closely aligned with nationalist discourses.

In varying degrees, all Cypriot women’s groups have adhered to official discourses of national identity. In the early 1990s, citizen-led activities aiming at the reconciliation of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities grew in number, mostly because of financial and coordinative assistance by third parties such as international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and research groups. These activities involved the coming together of groups from the two communities, in which both men, but mostly women, participated in order to discuss a collective vision for peace.

290 Γυναικείο Κίνημα ΠΟΓΟ (POGO Women’s Movement) <http://www.pogo.org.cy> (22 September 2009).
Although, at numerous times, the volunteers who participated in these programmes were faced with threats and even physical violence from nationalists – who considered rapprochement activities as a betrayal to ‘the national cause’ – they continued attending the bi-communal meetings. Yet, ironically, when the issue of Cypriot national identity was discussed, the self-proclaimed anti-nationalist representatives of the two groups would express disagreeing views. This demonstrates that even those Cypriots who were committed to anti-nationalist and peace ideals, regardless of the threats of violence and of the social stigmatization they faced, nonetheless felt uncomfortable with embracing a poly-ethnic and inclusive national identity. Instead, they insisted on continuing to espouse the essentialist official identity constructions of ‘Greek-Cypriotness’ versus ‘Turkish-Cypriotness’.

Adhering to the official national identity discourse impeded these participants’ self-ascribed objective of embracing ‘otherness’. This constitutes an example of how people’s socialization into a nationalistic culture, which defines not only the ‘national self’ but also the ‘self’ based on the exclusion of the ‘other’, restricts people’s agency over the negotiation of their individual and group identity. The effects of this restriction are more evident among Cypriot women and sexual ‘others.’ This is so because in nationalist, patriarchal and sexist settings, like the Cypriot one, challenging the established order carries heavier sanctions for those who already rank lower in the socio-political hierarchy.

Cypriot nationalist rhetoric has not been able to imagine women as the acting subject of politics, but only as its passive object and recipient. Therefore, in Cypriot official discourses, the active role of women in national matters and in the public sphere has been muted. An example of this muting relates to women’s participation in the Greek-Cypriot national struggle for liberation from British rule in the mid-1950s. Numerous women assisted in the struggle by carrying weapons, acting as foils for fighters and accompanying men for whom the British had issued arrest warrants into the mountain hide-outs by pretending to be their wives, fiancées or sisters – thus jeopardizing their socially demanded sexual honour and ‘good name’. However, none of them received the accolades given to ex-fighters after independence. Their names remained unknown, with the exception of those women

\[293\] Ibid., 199.
who were publicly acclaimed as mothers of the fallen national heroes. Conversely, in official discourses around displacement, refugees and missing persons, women have been assigned a central role in the state’s attempts to internationally expose Turkey and, in this way, to gain external support for its national prerogatives.

The images of crying women dressed in black continue to decorate history textbooks, the Green Line, as well as television screens and newspaper front pages on the anniversary of the 1974 Turkish invasion. Images 2.1 and 2.2 are demonstrative of the way in which the Greek-Cypriot mourning women have been rendered as the symbols of the Greek-Cypriot protests against Turkish invasion and occupation. In fact, these grieving women were summoned to participate in nearly every state and political-party ‘national cause’ demonstration. Images 2.3 and 2.4 show posters produced by refugee associations. These associations were formed after 1974 and demand the return of internally displaced Greek-Cypriots to their occupied home-villages. In their vast majority, the numerous posters and photographs that I collected from the archives of the refugee association Unconquered Kyrenia (Αδούλωτη Κερύνεια), resemble images 2.3 and 2.4 and picture mourning women dressed in black, who hold pictures of their missing loved ones. This is not the least surprising, considering the fact that it is women and children who suffer the greater losses in wars and conflicts. Consequently, images that capture their pain and destitution become vital tools in (primarily men-led) national campaigns.

294 Anthias, “Women and Nationalism in Cyprus,” in Woman-Nation-State, 159-60.
295 The line that divides the island and that runs through the capital city of Nicosia.
IMAGES 2.1 & 2.2: Greek-Cypriot women dressed in black, holding pictures of their missing sons and husbands at Ledra Palace and Solomos Plaza, Nicosia, during the mid-1990s.

Source: Unconquered Kyrenia Refugee Association Archives
IMAGE 2.3

ΚΥΠΡΟΣ 1974: 1619 Αγνοουμένοι

Απαίτούμε να μάθουμε για την τύχη τους
IMAGE 2.4

IMAGES 2.3 & 2.4: Posters produced in the 1980s by the refugee association Unconquered Kyrenia, portraying the mothers of the missing and of the fallen soldiers.

Poster 2.3 reads: ‘We demand to know their fates.’ In the context of the Greek-Cypriot national project, women and their embodiment of the national pain have been extensively used to legitimize politico-national claims for international assistance towards the Greek-Cypriot cause, and sanctions against occupier/perpetrator Turkey.

Source: Unconquered Kyrenia Refugee Association Archives
Since, in Cyprus, women have traditionally occupied the domestic sphere, the loss of their homes, family members, village lives and supportive kinship networks has dramatically affected both their social and economic conditions. That is to say, the official narrative of the ‘mourning mother’ and ‘widow’ has been premised on real and dire post-1974 conditions. Nonetheless, the perpetuation of this symbolization of women for decades has been strategically employed and used in the pursuit of a ‘comfortable impermanency’ – as former RoC president, Spyros Kyprianou, called it – and in the name of national interests – that is, Greek-Cypriots’ return to their pre-1974 political, social and economic realities.297

Vassiliadou argues that the position of women vis-à-vis nationalist objectives constitutes a continuation of the struggle for independence in the 1950s’ and that women passively espouse predominant nationalistic, patriarchal discourses, in order to ensure a securer position within the current power structure of Cypriot society.298 However, such sweeping claims and generalizations overlook differences between women within specific contexts and they appear to reduce women’s agency. It is hard to tell whether and to what degree the essentialization of the ‘public-private’ hierarchy and of the ‘natural’ and ‘nationally proper’ gender and sexuality order has been internalized by Cypriot women of all social and economic strata, or whether this essentialization continues to affect Cypriot women today in the degree it did twenty or thirty years ago.

Because of the predominance of the ‘national issue’ in all public discussions, efforts pertaining to ‘women’s issues’ and women’s liberation from patriarchy had to be pursued without openly contradicting nationalist discourses. This is because, if the centres of power – that is the state, the Church and political parties – considered that these efforts distracted society away from the ‘national’ cause, they would have attempted to curtail them, in the same manner that they have attempted to silence claims to sexual equality during the 1990s and early 2000s – claims that gained impetus when, in the Modinos v. Cyprus case, the ECtHR ruled that the

criminalization of homosexuality by the RoC was incompatible with the rights enshrined in the EConvHR.\(^{299}\)

The fact that Greek-Cypriot women have often premised their demands for rights and public policies on the ‘national good’ rhetoric, as well as the fact that they have employed the language of nationalism, especially when addressing national elites, cannot be denied. However, it is hard to determine whether this adherence to nationalism is sincere, or whether it is a type of strategic ‘political correctness’ – that is, a manoeuvre for avoiding offending prevailing nationalist sentiments. Since the politics of national prerogatives are the predominant politics in Cyprus, it is principally through nationalism and its discourses that Cypriot women’s voices could be heard and understood. The concept of a dominant national, gender or any other identity, no matter how flawed, is strategically useful to those engaged in social movements. When projecting claims, women – like other marginalized groups – needed to be mindful of their audience and of the prevailing ideology.\(^{300}\) An investigation into the nature and work of civil society organizations in Cyprus, and especially into women’s groups, substantiates this argument.

Civil society organizations existed before 1974 but, for the most part, they were premised on nationalist agendas, that is, on the aim to expell British forces from the island. Groups founded before and after 1974 have never been completely autonomous. Like the various aforementioned women’s groups, they have been situated within political parties’ structures, while even the majority of NGOs continue to be essentially charity organizations and sports clubs, which do not focus on changing political processes or social norms. Political party ideologies and the ‘right versus left’ rhetoric remain at the core of the majority of Cypriot organizations’ structure. The concept of civil society as independent from state and party politics continues to be almost inexistent in Cyprus.\(^{301}\)

One of the few independent groups that formed after 1974 was a women’s group which, through its mobilization, managed to draw international attention and

\(^{299}\) *Modinos v. Cyprus*. The political and institutional Greek-Cypriot elite’s reaction to this case’s ruling will be extensively discussed in chapter three.


support, although it failed to increase women’s involvement in politics. Women Walk Home (WWH), an exclusively women’s group, attempted to confront the failure to negotiate a solution to the island’s division. It challenged the idea prevalent in the Cypriot context that women cannot be political actors but mere followers, symbols and servants. WWH constitutes an important example of Cypriot mobilization because its formation, operations and subsequent dissolution, helps highlight the operations of power and the structure of politics in Cyprus, which remain stubbornly inaccessible and even hostile to citizens who dare to challenge them.

The objective of WWH was ‘the reunification of the divided island of the Republic of Cyprus and the peaceful coexistence, without outside interference or artificial barriers, of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities’. The group formed in 1975 and it managed to mobilize some 30,000 women, including a large number of international feminist celebrities and female politicians from other countries. It also tried to reach out to Turkish-Cypriot women and summon them to the cause, though the restrictions on freedom of movement and the difficulties in communicating across the divide made this a difficult task. The forms of protest of the group were peaceful and unarmed marches, as well as attempts to cross the patrolled dividing line. The only weapon they would carry were white flags and posters stating, in both Greek and Turkish: ‘we come in peace.’ When, in 1989, a number of women were arrested and briefly detained by the Turkish military, WWH got attention in the international media. Yet, not even this anti-nationalist group managed to escape the dividing effects of nationalist rhetoric. In a mixed-sex demonstration in July 1989, which was initiated by a subset of nationalist women engaged in partisan politics, nationalist symbols were brandished, thus defying the group’s initial cause. This act restated the monopoly of Cypriot politics by political parties and, as women who were active in WWH report, it signalled the death of the group.

The fate of WWH with its initial devotion to values such as peaceful coexistence and security, grants some support to the above-mentioned arguments.

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303 Ibid., 6-7.
propelled by some theorists that nationalism could prove empowering for women; yet, only for some women. Namely, nationalism is empowering for women who are already in a privileged position, that is, for heterosexual women who do not challenge their nationally prescribed roles as bearers and nurturers, as well as for upper strata women who have access to state and political parties’ masculinist power structures. Unless ‘empowerment’ is understood as the collective, conscious and strategic appropriation of the structures and operations of nationalism by women for the purpose of getting a foot in the public arena as a group – or, at least, of promoting their chosen female representatives within existing political parties’ hierarchies – the nationalism-feminism relationship becomes dangerous. This is because when nationalism appears to promote feminism, in essence it may benefit some women at the cost of the group and limit even further women’s agency, while leaving heteronormativity and the ‘public-private’ rigid dichotomy intact.  

The interview results substantiate this argument. A female Greek-Cypriot MP of the centre-left in her early fifties who was active in WWH reported:

Believe me, I took part in almost all the women’s marches and [these marches] weren’t easy. We should always keep in mind that women were [politically] independent. [She pauses for two seconds and then continues] Well, no! The women were not [politically] independent! They were women who were members of the political parties’ women’s groups. Who was independent? Myself? X, Y, Z, A or B? Yet, who pressed their political parties and the Parliament to amend the law pertaining to women’s rights?  

Although this MP initially said that the women who participated in WWH activities were independent, she eventually ‘admitted’ that, in reality, they were not. She also recognized the fact that the central figures of WWH – herself, X, Y, Z, A and B – are currently elected officials or political parties’ high-ranking members. However, she stressed that through their power positions, elite women fought for and managed to ameliorate all Cypriot women’s legal position.

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304 Vassiliadou, “Questioning Nationalism,” 473.  
305 “Interview with Politician 212527”. In order to assure anonymity and confidentiality, the names of the five other women mentioned by Politician 212527 who participated in WWH activities and who are currently active the Cypriot political scene are not mentioned. They are replaced with the letters X, Y, Z, A and B.
Admittedly, in Cyprus, civil society organization and mobilization heavily depends on individual initiative and personal capacity. Individuals – scholars, journalists and other notable community figures – acting in their personal capacities have been successful in some instances. Nevertheless, as the case of WWH demonstrates, placing too much importance on individual – rather than on collective – agency might, in some cases, render group activities as the vehicle for personal and individualistic gratification. It could be argued that, in Cyprus, this danger of opportunism is real, since – until recently – alternative avenues for women to penetrate the patriarchal and masculinist status quo and to become engaged in politics did not exist.

However, although this lack of alternative avenues curtails women’s agency, it does not render it unthinkable. The female elite that – in one way or another – managed to penetrate the state and parties’ structures propelled arguments and achieved a number of top-down positive legal changes. The personal ambition of some women elites is not the major reason for the perpetuation of gender power imbalance in Cyprus. Rather, it is the notion of patriarchy that even women elites have a hard time challenging. Referring to male colleagues, the same female MP said:

The truth of the matter is that they always take advantage of us. And the big truth is that many times we [i.e., female politicians] catch ourselves letting things go, although we get annoyed. We say to each other: ‘Now, am I going to get up and start yelling so that they [that is, male politicians] will say that I create arguments all the time? Let it go’ ... How many times do we read in the newspapers, especially during European parliament elections, that we [i.e., the party] propose, say, five male candidates, Mr. X, Z, Y, T, E and only one female candidate ... How many times did they [i.e., male politicians] say: ‘Find a young, beautiful woman to preside.’ Well, excuse me! ... And do you know how many times it happened [to me], to be sitting around a table, holding a meeting session, and they [that is, male colleagues] say: ‘[Interviewee’s name], would you go make me coffee?’

This demonstrates that female politicians are constantly reminded by their male colleagues of their ‘inferiority’ as women and of their secondary role within the

307 “Interview with Politician 212527”.
structures of the party and of the parliament. The difficulties that women who are already in the system have to face in order to maintain their position, demonstrate how difficult it is for them to break away from the established male norms. Adopting a ‘radical’ approach to feminist politics that would potentially promote not only legal, but also the substantive equality of all Cypriot women is not an easily feasible task. Therefore, in the first stages of women’s emancipation, assimilation and the adoption of the male paradigm is essential for surviving the effects of the androcentric patriarchal system.

As the above-mentioned and the rest of the interviews with Cypriot female politicians and activists confirm, even after the country’s accession into the EU, the paradigms of political and political party structures from other countries have had limited and slow effect on Cypriot politics. Although accession procedures and accession per se have created a general shift towards equality in political representation – because of both EU-imposed guidelines and of an attempt to align with ‘European’ trends – women continue to be under-represented in governmental and official positions, while they are not assigned leadership positions within their political parties’ structures. This is probably because Cyprus’s efforts, both before and after EU accession, were primarily directed towards security and other ‘national’ political agenda issues, as well as towards reinforcing official discourses about an imperilled and embattled nation at the cost of marginalizing serious social issues.

This need for women to assimilate in, and adopt the characteristics of the system that torments them seems to be the reason why all female elite interviewees strongly opposed feminist ideology and activism. Characteristically, all of them described feminist ideology and activism as ‘extremist’ and as divisive of the Cypriot social collective. One female interviewee in her late fifties who was an active member of POGO for more than two decades stated:

Cypriots are low profile people ... Personally, I don’t like the word ‘feminist movement’ because although I am a very open-minded person, feminism goes beyond the limit ... Unfortunately, some feminist movements in Europe went out of control and reached the point of upholding [the view] that [women] must have the upper hand, meaning [that they must] extinguish men ... Here [in Cyprus] we are organized ... And because of this, I believe that the Cypriot woman has a lot to win.\footnote{“Interview with Women’s Group Representative 210023”}

Even the earnest and most carefully planned women’s bi-communal efforts to break with the nationalist and militarist Cypriot culture did not manage to completely disavow national politics and to move from a ‘feminist nationalism’ to a feminism that reclaims gender, sexual, bodily and emotional freedom, as well as a place in discursive structures. In 2002, a diverse group of women formed the NGO Hands Across the Divide (HAD). According to Hadjipavlou who was one of the principal organizers of the group’s activities, HAD’s stated objectives were:

\begin{quote}
[The] interconnection between feminist ideology and conflict resolution values … the role of change agents … [to] promote a culture of inclusion and tolerance of the views of the Other … [and to] voice the anger and impatience at the continuing impact of militarism and patriarchy on their [i.e., women’s] daily lives.\footnote{Maria Hadjipavlou, “Cyprus: Peace is Too Precious to be Left to Men Alone,” in Gender Mainstreaming in Conflict Transformation: Building Sustainable Peace, ed. Rawwida Baksh-Soodeen et al. (London: Commonwealth Secretariat: 2005), 117-31. See pages 119-20 and 125. On the history and activities of HAD see also: Cockburn, The Line, 143-68.}
\end{quote}

Nonetheless, the effects of official nationalist rhetoric circumscribed this group’s feminist and anti-nationalist objectives. Although, consequently, they had some impact on eroding these discourses, due to the peril of the group being dismissed, if it openly objected official discourses, the bi-communal dialogues remained centred on cultivating empathy instead of dynamically tackling the problem of nationalist and national identity constructions.\footnote{Demetriou and Gurel, “Human Rights, Civil Society, and Conflict in Cyprus,” 39-43. Also: Cockburn, The Line, 169-94; Katia Economidou, “Women’s Peace-Building Activities: the Case of Cyprus,” Canadian Women’s Studies, vol. 22, no. 2 (Fall 2002-Winter 2003): 133-6.}

The difficulties faced by WWH and HAD towards effectively challenging nationalist discourses and articulating an anti-essentialist feminism –which focuses primarily on women and their needs, rather than on the needs of women as these are
defined and prioritized by nationalism – could be partially attributed to the internalization by some women of the sexist and masculinist assumption that the androcentric order of things is the norm and the only reality. Hadjipavlou’s results from her numerous studies with Cypriot women from all ethnic groups partially support this argument. Through questionnaires and focus interviews with Cypriot women, she concludes that because they lack an understanding of the concept of patriarchy – as there exists no public dialogue or education on such issues – many of the women believe that being in control of household affairs renders them socially equal to men.\textsuperscript{312} She explains that they see motherhood as the ultimate personal gratification while, in a self-oppressive manner, they do not take pride in being women. Thus, they tend to value the community and its prescriptions more than their individual needs. Additionally, they do not trust other women and in this way they reinforce female ‘otherhood’. Hadjipavlou explains that the prioritization of the collective over the individual is reflected in Cypriot women’s adherence to religious dogmas and moral systems, an example of which is their perception of abortion as unacceptable and of marriage as essential. Therefore, she concludes that, in Cyprus, ‘while on a hypothetical level there is a trend toward liberation and choice, this is not manifest in the more directly private realm’.\textsuperscript{313}

As Hadjipavlou and Vassiliadou’s studies – among others – claim, at least in the past, Cypriot women did not escape the local discursive confines: They either consciously and strategically remained silent when marginalized because they understood that openly challenging nationalist discourses’ monopoly of political discussion could alienate them from the nation-state and damage their relatively superior status – superior when compared to more ‘otherized’ ‘others’, such as immigrant women and homosexuals; or they remained completely unaware of the sources and of the agents behind their marginalization and socio-political inequality – that is to say, their compliance in nationalist projects was not the result of informed choice, but of false consciousness about their role, value and the exclusions that permeate the Cypriot context.\textsuperscript{314}

\textsuperscript{313} Hadjipavlou, “Contesting Patriarchy,” 30.
\textsuperscript{314} Ibid. See also: Vassiliadou, “Women’s Constructions of Women”.

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The idea that women’s socialization into a masculinist and nationalist culture caused them to internalize, at least to some degree, part of its rhetoric cannot be completely rejected. The infiltration of private, hidden, non-statist discourses and self-perceptions by nationalist rhetoric, has to do with the symbolic violence this rhetoric carries. As Bourdieu explains, masculine domination – and to this I would add masculinist nationalist domination – is so deeply embedded in our consciousness, that we hardly perceive all of its dimensions and demonstrations. Masculine domination as symbolic power is eternalized through its dehistorization, while this dehistorization takes place within the social institutions of the family, the school, the Church and the state.315 This probably partially accounts for the fact that, at least until the early 2000s, Cypriot women – similarly to women in former socialist countries or in religious, traditional milieux – have been slow in taking full advantage of the tools and opportunities afforded to them by the EU, which would facilitate the formation of a feminist conception of politics and the raising of claims for substantive – beyond mere legal – equality.316

Nonetheless, overstressing arguments about women’s false consciousness and opinions regarding the prevailing patriarchal norms and their own ‘right’ position within the existing powers of structures completely annihilates all forms and conceptions of female agency. The idea that to a considerable degree, Greek-Cypriot women have internalized and have participated in the reproduction of androcentric and heteronormative oppressive narratives cannot be completely rejected. However, focusing exclusively on this idea, leads to hasty, misinformed and incomplete assumptions about the causes of Greek-Cypriot women’s subordination. False consciousness could be one of the reasons for their continuing impasse. However, there exist other reasons, even more important and pervasive, that need to be discerned, if the chances for Greek-Cypriot women’s emancipation are to be correctly and realistically evaluated. For example, an explanation of Cypriot women’s impasse might be that the momentum that in other parts of the world


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generated purely feminist movements was missed in Cyprus. A female left-wing politician in her late forties who was involved in the activities of POGO explained:

.. work has been done by political parties and unions pertaining to [gender] equality issues, and maybe this is one of the reasons that we have not had a feminist movement in Cyprus; because the first demands which the feminist movement set decades ago in other countries, are demands that, in Cyprus, have been taken up by the unions’ movement and by the political parties ... But this [i.e., union and political parties’ gender-related activities] got up to a point. We do not see any substantial progress [on gender equality issues] beyond this threshold, even though more complex acts are needed. But this is because, at this point in time, it is harder for a purely feminist movement to be created and to mobilize; because, currently, there are issues that are harder for the masses to comprehend.317

This situation, namely the alienation of Cypriot civil society groups towards feminist ideology and methods, is also reflected in the structure and operation of Cypriot NGOs.318 As a recent independent study revealed, gender hierarchy and a system that separates values into ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ ones is characteristic of the organization and structure of Cypriot NGOs in general, and even of NGOs that work on equality issues, including women’s equality.319 According to the study, although in Cyprus women participate in NGOs, their participation in leadership positions within NGOs is extremely weak, both because of predominant sexist perceptions that see women as incapable to lead and of women’s own lack of confidence in their skills. Other obstacles towards women leadership in NGOs that the research highlights are family responsibilities, social norms and expectations, discrimination, the lack of acknowledgement and reward and poor information and training available to women.320

The fact that NGOs are short of funds and volunteers and, therefore, depend on state and interstate funding, also limits their possibilities for transforming into

318 NGOs include research groups, youth organizations, trade unions and other organizations that work on issues of discrimination, equality, marginalized groups, health and health rights, etc.
320 Ibid., 53.
democratic and egalitarian representatives of those values that they are supposed to be projecting and protecting.\textsuperscript{321} Nevertheless, and although they might limit the span and the type of the activities that NGOs undertake, funding concerns do not in any way prescribe NGOs’ internal operations and structure, especially when the NGOs in question are organizations whose stated mission is the combat of discrimination.

Additionally, external financial support cannot always be viewed as negative, or as a way through which the neoliberal capitalist order regulates newly formed or independent states, as some argue.\textsuperscript{322} Especially in the case of Cyprus, the formation of a number of NGOs and bi-communal initiatives would not have actualized, unless it was assisted and coordinated by external bodies such as the United Nations (UN), the EU and international research centres. In places infused by nationalist rhetoric and subjectivization discourses, like Cyprus, transnational and international cooperation between, and networks of, marginalized groups might prove to be the only solution.\textsuperscript{323}

The fact that, until now, the majority of Cypriot women’s rights and policies have been provided to them by their government (especially in the aftermath of 1974), by the Church (for example, abortion) or by the EU, has indeed resulted in limiting women’s opportunities to initiate action.\textsuperscript{324} In Cyprus, there never existed a women’s movement similar to those generated in other countries mainly in the 1960s and 1970s – which were purely feminist movements – or an instance of women’s mobilization that was completely disassociated from national or ethnic matters.\textsuperscript{325} Nonetheless, this lack of an activist culture does not necessarily mean that women’s agency and human rights in Cyprus are doomed. A female agency that is restricted within existing masculinist structures is not the same as lack of female agency.\textsuperscript{326} Truly, nationalism is inherently built upon imposed coherence and systematic exclusions, and especially on gender and sexuality exclusions. Gender per se


\textsuperscript{322} For example: Agathangelou and Spira, “Sacrifice, Abandonment, and Interventions for Sustainable Feminism(s)”, 112.


\textsuperscript{324} Vassiliadou, “Questioning Nationalism,” 476-7.


\textsuperscript{326} Vassiliadou, “Women’s Constructions of Women,” 63.
presents a challenge to the ‘nation’ and to the purity of national identity. Yet a feminist politics as transversal politics, that is politics that places female desire above nationalist claims of women’s ‘natural’ gender roles and of the importance of ‘preservation’ of their sexual purity, is promising. Transversal politics as ‘a framework of dialogical politics across differences’ has the power – if not to deconstruct – to work around nationalist discourses and to challenge their subjectivization projects that subordinate women and other marginalized groups.  

Admittedly, in their majority, Greek-Cypriot women do not associate with the term ‘feminism’. However, their mobilization aims and means could justly be described as demonstrations of ‘feminism’, rather than as instances of ‘feminist nationalism’. Although they have been implicated in nationalist projects – especially until the mid-1990s – their consistent appeals for peace and abolition of suppressive gender structures reveals some level of conscious and planned strategy, regardless of the concessions they had to make periodically, in order to assure that they would not be excluded for the body of the nation-state and from the public sphere. As the next section will reveal, this is a type of an anti-essentialist first-step choice when having to balance powerful nationalist discourses and masculinist state prerogatives with feminist objectives. In many respects, it resembles the strategies that have been employed successfully by women in other European countries throughout the history of female mobilization. What I will aim to answer next is why, conversely to elsewhere within the European context, Cypriot women’s agency has not yet fully escaped the confines of what has been previously described as ‘feminist nationalism’. Answering this question becomes more pertinent when the changing circumstances – that have been created primarily because of European and global alliances – which have weakened the ideological contest between politics of the ‘right’ and of the ‘left’ and between ‘Hellenocentric’ and ‘Cyprocentric’ definitions of identity, are taken into consideration.  

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328 On this weakening of the (until recently) pervasive nationalist and political party discourses in Cyprus see: Peristianis, “Cypriot Nationalism, Dual Identity, and Politics”.

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Europe and the Periphery: Women’s Movements, Feminist Movements and Women in Movements

Although the term ‘feminism’ was not coined until much later, issues that concern the place of women in the ‘public’ and ‘private’ sphere and their role in political life were raised by women as early as the fifteenth century. World War II had already created the need for, and facilitated women’s incorporation in the work-field while in the 1960s, European feminism turned its attention to issues of substantive, as opposed to mere legal, equality. Namely, the gender stereotype of the woman as mother and wife was challenged, and feminists articulated the demand for the possibility of personal realization beyond essentialized, naturalized stereotypes.

However, although demands for women’s equal rights in the work field were expressed by POGO and workers’ unions in the 1930s, Cyprus has not been part of this feminist ideological tradition. Rather, the demands of POGO and of workers’ unions have been premised on Marxist/socialist ideology that located women in the working class and did not recognize them as a separate movement. Additionally, due to the lack of a specifically ‘female’ ideology and of identification with feminist consciousness and its developments, demands for women’s rights in Cyprus have not assumed a counter-culture character like elsewhere in Europe during the 1960s. Cypriot women have remained closely linked to either ‘left’ or ‘right’ political party structures and ideologies, instead of attempting to change them. Moreover, consistent with the national ideology that permeated the Cypriot milieu, they have not challenged the stereotype of woman as mother and wife.

Especially right after 1974, Cypriot women’s mobilization and exercise of agency was almost exclusively part of nationalist or anti-nationalist/peace projects. Ironically, both types of projects were premised on ideas about ‘womanly nature’. For example, the claim was made that because historically women have been excluded from most forms of power and from power structures, their collective understanding of how power should be redistributed differs from men’s

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331 Vassiliadou, “Questioning Nationalism,” 474-5.
understanding. Nevertheless, claiming that women are ‘more willing to cross ethnic or national boundaries and borders’, or that peace, human rights and development could or should be “‘feminized’” reinforces essentialist understandings of women and of womanhood.

Such essentialized and naturalized understanding of women as more emotional and peace-prone have permeated the Cypriot literature on women, as well as the ideological underpinnings and structure of Cypriot women’s groups and NGOs. For example, writing on her experiences with members of HAD, Katrivanou notes that even the HAD activists had internalized sexist and feminized stereotypes, which they reproduced and reinforced. Characteristically, she reports an instance in which one HAD woman was accused by the others of ‘not being a woman’, because she sided against the 2004 Annan Plan that, among other things, made provisions about the unification of the island. Therefore, she concludes that in Cyprus – like elsewhere – the ethnic conflict’s all-encompassing nature causes all women and men to be assumed and represented as peace-carriers and war-carriers respectively, while the ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ ways of negotiating peace, power and reality are ‘naturalized’.

Nonetheless, this is not a novel phenomenon or one that has been exclusive to Cyprus. As Anthias and Yuval-Davis explain, ‘every feminist struggle has a specific ethnic (as well as class) context’. Sex difference has been central to the idea of national self-determination and to the construction of the national and international spheres of political agency and influence, during what Glenda Sluga calls the ‘apogee of nationalism’ after World War I. Sluga argues that gender and the history of ‘First World’ feminism are implicated in the history of nationalism, since sexual difference has been central to prevailing conceptualizations of the principles of nationality and national self-determination, which have been

333 Ibid.
336 Ibid., 72.
337 Ibid., 66-76.
338 Anthias and Yuval-Davis, “Contextualizing Feminism,” 62.
encouraged in the peace processes after the War.\textsuperscript{340} As she explains, during the peace processes that followed World War I, organizations of European women – that is, of white, female elites – stressed female self-emancipation as the sine qua non of the democratization of nations. Thus, feminist and national goals merged. Additionally, based on a feminized notion of peace, these women tried to re-conceptualize the international political sphere as a more ‘feminine’ one, in which the presence of women was both natural and beneficial.\textsuperscript{341} Therefore, it becomes clear that joining, rather than challenging, the established order and national projects has been successfully employed by various women’s groups around the world.

In a historical exposition of the development of feminist ideology and mobilization in Europe, Karen Offen notes that even nowadays the word ‘feminism’ does not resonate well with a considerable part of the European public, as well as with many European women, who are, nonetheless, in favour of projects that could be described as ‘feminist’.\textsuperscript{342} As the analysis of interviews with Cypriot female politicians and activists illustrated, the phenomenon that Offen describes is applicable to the case of Cyprus. This phenomenon can be traced back to the history of the development of feminism and feminist ideology in Europe during the nineteenth century. In political theory and practice generated in Great Britain and in the United States, women’s ‘equality’ assumed a primarily legalistic definition, since the primary aim of feminist movements was to gain access to male privilege and power by stressing ‘sameness’ between men and women. On the contrary, in continental Europe, feminists saw male and female equality as the prerequisite of male and female complementarity. Namely, continental European feminists celebrated their ‘womanhood’, their ‘natural’ gender and sexual difference, their role as mothers and nurturers and couched their claims in the language of ‘equality in difference’. Relational feminism – that is, continental European feminism – proposed a gender-based, sexual dimorphism-based, yet egalitarian vision of social organization, while it understood the non-hierarchical male-female couple and the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid., 496.
\item Ibid., 497-501.
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nuclear family as the basic units of society. ‘Individualist feminism’ – that is, Anglo-American feminism – placed the individual, irrespective of gender, sex (and sexuality) as the basic unit of society and as the recipient of universal, human rights.\textsuperscript{343}

In Cyprus, the national aspirations for unity and ethnic survival in light of the threat posed by an opposing ethnic group have resulted in the proliferation of discourses that placed the group above the individual. This is probably why Cypriot women tend to hold a negative view of ‘feminism’, although they might have been active in struggles for women’s equality. As the interview excerpts show, Greek-Cypriot women understand ‘feminism’ as an extremist form of political act that prioritizes egoism and opposes co-national men, instead of creating an equal and organic society.

Offen claims that, since relational feminism has been mostly adhered to within the European context, and since it has been faced with less opposition and with more success than individualist feminism, it could be the solution towards overcoming the contemporary resistance to feminism. Therefore, she argues in favour of integrating relational and individualist frameworks, in order to create a more fruitful model for contemporary feminist politics, which accommodates diversity among women and across national boundaries.\textsuperscript{344}

This position is not without merit. A feminist approach that highlights both issues of individual autonomy and of social relations could be more accepted. A more popular approach that is less contradictory of existing power structures could lead to more positive results. However, it is important to question whom these positive results would benefit and whom they would further subjectivize and alienate. A relational feminist approach not only carries the peril of essentializing and naturalizing socially constructed gender roles; under the rubric of social and national order, it could also be used to legitimize gender hierarchies and patriarchy both within the family and within the public sphere. Additionally, the relational approach is bluntly heteronormative and blind to gender expressions and sexualities that do not correspond to the male-female binary. It might prove beneficial for heterosexual women who cherish marriage and motherhood but at the cost of other groups of people – like lesbian women and same-sex couples who wish to raise

\textsuperscript{343} Offen, “Defining Feminism,” 122-4.
\textsuperscript{344} Offen, “Defining Feminism,” 153-6.
families, or heterosexual and LGBTQ individuals who do not see the family as the basic unit of society or as the epitome of their self-realization. Like ‘nationalist feminism’, this feminist framework is severely destabilized when the element of non-heterosexual or non-monogamous sexuality is introduced. Furthermore, it is questionable whether preserving, abiding by or working in alignment with the current gender and sexuality status quo qualifies as any type of ‘feminism’. There is a difference between ‘women’s movements’, ‘feminist movements’ and ‘women in movements’. Also, the relationship between women’s movements and political parties, between women’s movements and other groups, as well as between women’s movements and the state create different political opportunities for women that can (or not) be gendered. The tendency to identify all types of women’s activism with women’s or feminist movements is problematic because it ignores questions of power structures, objectives, interests and much more. Women movements’ relation to political parties and other civil society institutional agents can determine their fate. If these agents are conducive to women’s issues, they become valuable allies, especially if feminist and women’s movements adopt a ‘double militancy’ stance – that is, if they work in conjunction with these agents. But if these agents are unreceptive, they can become a serious structural barrier to women’s political participation.

Furthermore, ‘double militancy’, coalitions and assimilation into the state apparatus and political structures carries the danger of benefiting some elite women over other women, of limiting the movement’s autonomy, of circumscribing its ideological foundations and of restricting its sources of funding. The Greek and Cypriot cases described above substantiate this argument. Democratizing Greece was a top-down project initiated by political elites after the end of dictatorship in 1974. As part of this project political parties gained a stronghold on political process and this limited the effects of women’s non-partisan activism, which had developed significantly during the national and political struggles of the 1940s through the 1970s. Similarly, in Cyprus, women groups’ heavy dependence on political parties and their close affiliation with nation-state projects has kept them rooted in a

346 Ibid., 435-6.
347 Ibid., 439- 42.
relational feminist framework. Therefore, their ideology and activities have never radically contradicted the established order or the discourses pertaining to gender roles and sexual behaviour expectations.

Jill Vickers compared women-friendly policies in numerous European democracies that have either a history of ‘continental/ relational’ or of ‘individualistic’ feminism. She concluded that, in places where women have been mobilized by nationalism and have been part of the process of establishing nation-states – for example, in Finland and Norway – they have managed to ‘get in on the ground floor’ before political and state institutions became male-controlled. Early entry of women into the nation-state, the attainment of citizenship at the same time and on the same grounds with their male co-nationals, as well as women-friendly policies established during nation-states’ democratization process have been legitimized based on women’s participation in, and contribution to national projects. Conversely, in places like France and the UK where democratizing women’s position occurred a long time after the nation-building process, women continue to have lower presence in politics and there exist fewer policies that benefit them.

The case-studies that Vickers discusses substantiate her argument. Nevertheless, nation-state building processes that have actualized amidst political and historical circumstances other than those Vickers describes, have not resulted in women’s better position or to their integration into political and state institutions, even though women have had a strong presence in the nation-state building processes. For example, Cypriot women have played a central role in the post-1974 national project, while even nowadays Cypriot women’s movements work closely with political parties and within the existing power structures. Nevertheless, Cypriot women’s presence in politics remains low when compared to other European countries. The fact that Cyprus deviates from the examples described by Vickers

350 Ibid.
351 Vassiliadou argues that Cypriot women did not take advantage of nationalist struggles to promote their cause and did not choose to combine nationalist struggles and their struggles through the embracing of a ‘feminist nationalism’. Vassiliadou’s argument is valid, if qualified: i.e., Cypriot women did not massively appropriate nationalist struggles or developed a nationalist feminism, though numerous Cypriot women (especially from the middle and upper socioeconomic strata) did attempt such moves. See: Vassiliadou, “Questioning Nationalism,” 473.

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is at least partially explainable by Cyprus’s colonial past. As Anne McClintock explains:

... no ‘post-colonial’ state anywhere has granted women and men equal access to the rights and resources of the nation state. Not only have the needs of ‘post-colonial nations’ been largely identified with male conflicts, male aspirations and male interests, but the very representation of ‘national’ power rests on prior constructions of gender power. 353

Colonialism and postcolonialism, along with patriarchal Christianity, continue to legitimize women’s exclusion from – or at least their unequal access to – political and economic power. 354 The Cyprus example supports McClintock’s argument. 355 A gender-structured understanding of politics, citizenship and societal organization was predominant in Cyprus among both ethnic communities, even as recently as the late 1990s.

Besides its blindness towards non-heterosexual sexuality, a relational feminist framework also reinforces an understanding of citizenship as intrinsically gendered, as well as an understanding of the public-private dichotomy as valuable for the smooth operation of society. However, a political, social and/or civic citizenship of women that does not destabilize both public and private patriarchy becomes a mere transition from private to public patriarchy. 356 Citizenship that highlights the role of women as mothers and wives, locates them in the household and stresses their domestic and caring ‘duties’ over their participation in the public sphere through laws, public policies and special benefits, makes the state the new patriarch whose duty is to determine women’s lives by delineating their choices. 357 Nonetheless, feminist approaches that argue in favour of the eradication of the idea that women are the primary care-givers within societies have been accused of partaking in the ‘neoliberal capitalist project’; a project that seeks to further exploit women by refusing them welfare rights and by rewarding their labour only when it is

354 Ibid.
356 Ibid.

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performed in the workplace. Such critiques have been mostly raised regarding the relationship between feminism, substantive democracy, corporate capitalism and ‘corporate globalization’ in the ‘non-Western’ periphery, part of which is Cyprus, according to some authors.\textsuperscript{358}

So, what is the answer to the gender ‘sameness versus difference dilemma’? European mechanisms, anti-discrimination and tolerance directives that promote both equality and human rights in their liberal sense, as well as a minimum state welfare system could help address concerns over the position of women in globalized economies and/or in nationalism-infused settings. It is hard to deny that the changes which the RoC made to its nationalist policies before and after EU accession were strategic in order to gain advantage over Turkey. It is also difficult to refute the position that, since Cyprus’s EU accession, efforts have been primarily directed towards security and other ‘national’ political agenda issues at the cost of marginalizing serious social problems.\textsuperscript{359} Nonetheless, this does not mean that perceptions of Europe, gender and sexuality in Cyprus will not change in the future.

EU accession has had ambivalent and even contradictory results on gender power structures and on women’s mobilization and networking in several new Central and Eastern European member-states. One of the problems has been the difficulty in enforcing compliance with top-down reforms.\textsuperscript{360} Nevertheless, through time feminist mobilization and networking around gender equality in the EU have resulted in both ‘boomerang patterns’ and ‘ping-pong effects’; that is, state resistance has been faced with criticism by other member-states, international groups and supranational entities, while the EU power centres and member-states have ameliorated their gender policies, based on effective patterns and policies available in other member-states.\textsuperscript{361}

Regardless of their usefulness towards ameliorating the position of women and challenging traditional understandings of gender, EU policies have not had the same effects on altering perceptions of sexuality in all member-states. Not only in Cyprus but in other EU member states also, homophobia is still the norm at the

\textsuperscript{358} Agathangelou, “Envisioning a Feminist Global Society”; Agathangelou and Spira, “Sacrifice, Abandonment, and Interventions for Sustainable Feminism(s)”.  
\textsuperscript{359} Featherstone, “Cyprus and the Onset of Europeanization,” 145-6; Featherstone, “Introduction: In the Name of ‘Europe’,” 18; Vassiliadou, “Questioning Nationalism,” 476-7.  
\textsuperscript{360} Roth, “Sisterhood and Solidarity?” 477-8.  
\textsuperscript{361} Ibid., 461.
popular and elite level. In order to compensate for the EU’s lack of enforcement mechanisms on issues such as gender and sexuality equality, and in order for positive effects within member-states’ national contexts to last and not back-fire – for example, by the creation of ultra-conservative groups that denounce ‘foreign’ involvement in national matters pertaining to the ‘morals’ and to the structure of local society – grassroots, ‘bottom-up’ reforms are also needed. A first essential step is directing existing EU funded NGOs towards the cultivation of a feminist and anti-sexist consciousness among EU national populations. Group consciousness in not only a prerequisite for the enforcement of EU or externally originated directives. It is also a prerequisite for political mobilization in places where democratic and equality principles are disregarded in the name of national, political or economic prerogatives.

The cultivation of consciousness through the employment of EU mechanisms and institutions also helps overcome the ‘strategic essentialism’ versus ‘identity deconstruction’ dilemma. Postmodern theorists of gender are suspicious of modernist variations of feminism. As they argue, in the best case, these modernist approaches relocate or rename binaries – such as men/women, black/white, First/Third World – while, in the worst case, they reinforce them. Identities are essentialized and fixed not only internally by the group that assumes them, but also by the external political arena that opposes the group and that, in doing so, delineates its identity. However, an approach that would completely reject identities and

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362 See, for example, the infamous statement by Italy’s European commissioner-designate, Rocco Buttiglione, that homosexuality is a ‘sin’. Stephen Castle, “MEPs: ‘Homophobic’ justice chief must quit,” The Independent, 12 October 2004 <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/meps-homophobic-justice-chief-must-quit-535197.html> (20 June 2011). This is not the only exemplification of homophobic views among European-level politicians. On 10 December 2008, the International Human Rights Day, the European Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA-Europe) launched the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) families roving exhibition at the European Parliament. Labour MEP for the West Midlands and Co-President of the European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT Rights, Michael Cashman, had circulated an email among Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) informing them about the event. The email was accompanied by attachments of ILGA-Europe photographs, which portrayed various forms of families (i.e., non-heterosexual and heterosexual couples with children). Greek-Cypriot former MEP Marios Matsakis responded to Mr. Cashman’s email by stating: ‘Mr Cashman, I find these pictures offensive. Please don’t send similar ones to me again. Incidentally, it is my view that, children living with gay couples are not getting the best environment for their upbringing. This is my personal opinion and I hope I am still able to hold it.’ This email communication between Cashman and Matsakis was forwarded to me on 12 December 2008 by an ILGA-Europe administrative officer who wishes to remain unidentified.
identity politics would leave itself exposed to a number of valid criticisms. One of them is that by rejecting identities even for strategic reasons, the need of a notion for some version of the subject that is being rejected is actually reinstated and reinforced; that is, the need for a universal human position which can operate outside of power and its constraints. Butler explains:

Construction is not opposed to agency; it is the necessary scene of agency, the very terms in which agency is articulated and becomes culturally intelligible. The critical task of feminism in not to establish a point of view outside of constructed identities ... The critical task is, rather, to locate strategies of subversive repetition enabled by those constructions, to affirm the local possibilities of intervention through participating in precisely those practices of repetition than constitute identity and, therefore, present the immanent possibility of contesting them.363

Additionally, if all identities are effects and enactments of productive and multiple powers that always reside in them, and if identities do not express a way of being, then what happens to resistance, agency and especially to concrete political actions? It is difficult to support the argument that a politics of gender and sexuality is possible while social power cannot be escaped, but only possibly destabilized or disrupted.364 According to Martha Minow:

By taking another person’s difference into account in awarding goods or distributing burdens, you risk reiterating the significance of that difference and, potentially, its stigma and stereotyping consequences. But if you do not take another person’s difference into account – in a world that has made that difference matter – you may also recreate and re-establish both the difference and its negative implications.365

In an attempt to address both the critiques against identity politics and the critiques against the postmodernist disembodied subject, Susan Hekman argues in favour of removing identity entirely from the political realm. What Hekman essentially argues for is a middle ground between ‘modernist’ and ‘postmodernist’ approaches towards the concept of identity – what she calls ‘identity and a stable

sense of selfhood as an ungrounded ground and socially constructed core’— and the transcendence, rather than replication, of the errors and essentialisms of identity and identity politics.\textsuperscript{366} As she explains:

... political participation should not be predicated on any conception of identity, even if a diverse array of identities is available... [and] the political conclusion for feminism must be a non-identity politics that defines politics in terms of pragmatic political action and accomplishing concrete political goals.\textsuperscript{367}

Although Hekman’s call is appealing and might indeed help transcend the pro-identity versus con-identity argumentative deadlock, it is unclear whether and how it would remodel actual political mobilization. Politics of identity are sometimes exclusionary towards some group members who do not completely affiliate with the group’s identity. Nevertheless, it is questionable how a politics of identification based on common interests would have the impetus to assemble and mobilize members and assure that these members will remain devoted to, and active towards, the group’s stated political cause. This is more the case when the cause takes a lot of effort and time to be achieved and/or when it is faced with fierce opposition. Another problem that a politics of identification could exacerbate is the creation of sub-groups within the group that could attempt to benefit at the group’s expense through their access to, and influence on, the centres of power.

Consequently, regardless of the numerous and valid critiques against identity politics and the employment of identities, pragmatically, they seem to remain the best approach for fostering a minimal group consciousness and coherence, for mobilizing groups and for achieving political aims. Identity politics does not necessitate that personal experience remains confined within group political stance, while group identities need not necessarily be dogmatically internalized by group members. Identities and political stance are most of the times symbolic, non-ontological, evolving, changing labels and strategic manoeuvres. As such, not only do they allow for internal differentiations, but they can also serve towards deconstructing categories or identities such as ‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘gay’ and ‘straight’. Additionally, a causal link between the achievements and failures of identity-based

\textsuperscript{366} Hekman, “Beyond Identity,” 303-4.
\textsuperscript{367} Ibid.
movements and the fact that these movements are identity-based cannot be assumed, unless extensive comparative studies of identity-based movements are undertaken. Lastly, and as the next chapter will further emphasize, especially in light of globalization, identities and legal approaches – and specifically European identities and law – seem to be the best and most effective form of political national, international and transnational group organization and mobilization against repressive national structures of power.

**Conclusion**

Cypriot men and women might have not mobilized around issues of gender and sexuality in the ways or to the degree that their European counterparts have. Especially before the RoC’s admission into the EU, due to the prevalence and the continuance of the ‘national problem’, to the hegemonic role of the Church and to the prioritization of the traditional heterosexual family, Cypriot civil society and its organizations did not have the chance nor the financial means to mobilize for gender and sexual equality. However, as the study of Cypriot women’s movements has demonstrated, Cypriot men and women are not mere passive recipients and do not necessarily succumb to an identity created for them by oppressive discourses. Rather, by working within the confines of nationalist projects and without explicitly challenging them or renouncing them, Greek-Cypriot women have managed to gain a considerable degree of legal equality. Some women have managed to successfully place themselves in the public sphere, which had been completely inaccessible before their involvement in the nationalist projects. Cyprus does not share the legacy of purely ‘feminist’ movements that characterizes other countries, like the UK and the US, which has provided the ideological and organizational model for gender and sexuality equality mobilization. Nonetheless, Cypriot women have managed to gain a number of gender equality rights through the strategic appropriation of nationalist

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discourses and of the language of identity. This has created social, legal, political and cultural precedents and has sparked a ‘domino effect’ which, through time, could lead to more individual-oriented – rather than national community-oriented – rights for women and for non-heterosexual individuals.

Of course, these strategic politics need to be rethought and re-approached from a different angle, if they are to continue to be effective. Nationalist discourses do not always, necessarily or completely victimize women, or deprive them of their ability to exercise agency and propel alternative discourses and claims to equality. Equating women’s involvement in national projects with pro-nationalist discourses, or interpreting women’s achievements made during, or as part of, national projects either as ‘complicity’to, or as demonstrations of, ‘feminist nationalism’ assumes that – conversely to men – women are unable to avoid internalizing nationalist discourses. It assumes that no action or agency is possible outside the power structures of nationalism and that the exercise of agency is necessarily and ‘naturally’ gender-specific and gender-derived. Examples of such assumptions are claims that women’s struggles for peace and empathy are the result of their ‘womanly’ nature, sentiments, needs and realities. Yet, alternative and more effective strategic politics that challenge all types of inequality depend on cultivating both an anti-sexist and an anti-homophobic consciousness. This could be achieved through a grassroots educational ethic.

Ethnic conflict has resulted in an exclusionary state structure, which directs its efforts into retaining ethnic exclusivity. These efforts have been supported by discourses that promote a selective ethnic and communal – as opposed to an individual – understanding of ‘human rights.’ Namely, in Cyprus, the concept of ‘human rights violations’ stands primarily for the grievances suffered by Greek-Cypriots as a result of the 1974 Turkish invasion and occupation. The aim is to cast Turkey as the perpetrator of gross human rights abuses, the RoC as the protector and guarantor of human rights and the solution to the ‘national problem’ as the restoration of only those rights that the foe has breached. Initially, women’s groups had to adhere to this understanding of human rights, if they were to achieve their aims. However, it is time for them to project a more inclusive understanding of human rights and equality.

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369 Demetriou and Gurel, “Human Rights, Civil Society, and Conflict in Cyprus”, 4-8.

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According to Foucault, not only do gender and sexuality have a history, but they are also integrally intertwined with institutionalized power structures. As a term that pertains to the personal, the institutional, the social and the political ‘gender’ must be seen as a subjectivity that intersects with other forms of social difference and inequality, such as class, ethnicity, race and sexuality. According to Harriet Bradley, all these subjectivities/differences are both social constructs and sets of social relations/lived realities: there is a dynamic sense in them. Their intersectionality and the individual’s/group’s ‘multiple positioning’ have an effect on different access to social resources and power. Therefore, ultimately, difference translates into inequality with regards to both material and symbolic aspects.

Bradley concludes that the concept of intersectionality of various social dynamics is essential to a politically useful gender analysis because not only does it help reveal specificities, but it also looks for regularities in patterns of intersection. Namely, while intersectionality looks at specific subjectivities such as gender, class, or sexuality and at their social positioning in relation to power, its focus remains open beyond limited and relativist concentrations on identity and processes of identification that – especially in postmodern thinking – tend to ignore valid generalizations about structural inequality. Firstly, notions of somaticity, gender and sexuality need to be viewed in relation to nationalism. Secondly, this nationalism-gender-sexuality relationship must be understood not only as a cultural, but also as a political phenomenon. This is because keeping gender and sexuality identifications and nationalism expressions within the realm of the ‘cultural’ masks the use of culture by the state and other institutional agents for the purpose of accumulating and consolidating their own power.

The Foucaultian view that institutional power – with its methods of modern governance – aims at objectifying the individual and the body is not without merit. However, as Brubaker argues, this is not a one-way process. Even amidst these

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371 Harriet Bradley, Gender (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 180-4 and 190-4. Bradley’s work is an excellent example of how although in their postmodern arguments gender studies focus on individual subjectivities and question the reality of group identities, in their modernist arguments they help reveal the intersectionality of subjectivities, as well as their social manifestation.

methods and processes, though malleable, the individual is not completely powerless and calculable. As John Breuilly noted, ‘nationalism is one particular response to the distinction between state and society. It seeks to abolish that distinction’. Other responses are available. An important step is to problematize the discussions that interpret gender as ‘men versus women’ and the approaches that focus on ‘gender versus nationalism’, by placing sexuality in the centre of analysis. Especially in Cyprus, sexuality as a lens of analysis of nationalism and gender has been almost completely ignored.

Therefore, chapter three will focus on the relationship between institutionalized heterocentrism/compulsory heterosexuality, nationalist discourses and alternative discourses of sexuality. Through the examination of both the legal and the social aspects of two cases that were brought before the ECtHR and the EComHR against the RoC – the Modinos v. Cyprus and the Maragos v. Cyprus cases – it will raise the question of the relationship between local/national and European/supranational discourses of sexuality. It will examine the ways and the degree to which Europeanization discourses and institutional mechanisms could contribute to the destabilization of exclusionary heteronormative rhetoric and to the articulation of alternative narratives and modes of sexual subjectivity.

373 Breuilly, John. Nationalism and the State, 374.
374 Marangos v. Cyprus; Modinos v. Cyprus.

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CHAPTER THREE

‘Cyprus is the Country of Heroes, Not of Homosexuals’: Legalizing and Demonizing Non-Heteronormative Sexuality
Introduction

This chapter will examine whether and through which ways Europeanization and more specifically, European law and litigation that pertain to LGBTQ issues, both affect local legal standards and allow LGBTQ individuals to challenge locally prevalent presumptions about same-sex sexuality. This will be done in two steps. The first two sections of this chapter will discuss and evaluate two attempts to disrupt Cypriot understandings and hierarchies of gender and sexuality by two gay male Greek-Cypriots, Alecos Modinos and Stavros Marangos, who took cases to the ECtHR and the EComHR. Modinos challenged the criminalization of homosexuality and Marangos the lack of protection against the discrimination that homosexuals face in public state institutions. Next, the third section of this chapter will assess the impact of supranational legal mechanisms, and more specifically the effects of ECtHR litigation, at the local level, while the fourth section will discern the promises and pitfalls of legal and identity-based approaches to sexual politics.

An analysis of the cases of Modinos v. Cyprus and Marangos v. Cyprus is pertinent because they draw attention both to developments and to limitations in the Commission and the Court’s reasoning and rulings on issues that relate to non-heterosexuality. Additionally, an examination of the ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ local contestations that these cases generated reveals the interdependency between nationalist projects and institutionalized heterocentrism/compulsory heterosexuality within the Cypriot context. Even more importantly, such an analysis points to the fact that the heteronormative Cypriot gender and sexuality status quo is not impenetrable by alternative imaginings and articulations/demonstrations of sexuality and desire. This is because, although nationalism is inherently built upon exclusionary dichotomies – such as heterosexual/homosexual, normal/deviant, citizen/enemy – the appeal of nationalist rhetoric decreases as the artificiality of these and other binaries is exposed.

According to Foucault, since discourses of sexuality and systems of power are all around us, they are also created, reflected, crystallized and perpetuated in/through law. He explains:

375 Marangos v. Cyprus; Modinos v. Cyprus.
Power is essentially what dictates its law to sex. Which means first of all that sex is placed by power in a binary system: licit and illicit, permitted and forbidden.

Secondly, power prescribes an “order” for sex that operates at the same time as a form of intelligibility: sex is to be deciphered on the basis of its relation to the law.

And finally, power acts by laying down the rule: power’s hold on sex is maintained through language, or rather through the act of discourse that creates, from the very fact that it is articulated, a rule of law. It speaks, and that is the rule. The pure form of power resides in the function of the legislator; and its mode of action with regard to sex is of juridico-discursive character.\(^{376}\)

Therefore, a focus on law, and especially on European/supranational legal narratives, is important because it highlights a number of questions that relate to the nationhood-gender-sexuality relationship. How do national trends that pertain to gender and sexuality relate to changing European/supranational trends? In which ways are the concepts of citizenship and national identity affected, when national/local and European/supranational conceptions of gender and sexuality clash and/or merge? Are European/supranational discourses emancipatory, or do they merely relocate the circumscription of modalities of sexuality from the national to the supranational level? This chapter will address these questions, in an attempt to discern the ways through which Cypriot dominant, suppressive narratives of gender and sexuality could be replaced by alternative ones.

An attempt to explicate the relationship between legal mechanisms and social change draws attention to a number of issues. Firstly, the official and unofficial aspects of the Modinos and Marangos cases, which the first two sections of the chapter will examine, highlight the importance of addressing questions of agency and agency shift. That is, how attempts by LGBTQ individuals and/or groups to challenge heteronormative discourses of gender and sexuality become possible and how effective they are; through what means and methods an LGBTQ assertion of agency could be actualized and what effects it has in locales like Cyprus, where the available spaces for legitimate/legitimized political expression and mobilization are restricted by the homophobic elite guardians of ‘national’ traditions, values and morality.

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\(^{376}\) Foucault, *The History of Sexuality Volume 1*, 83.
Secondly, the degree to which top-down changes prescribed by regional/supranational institutions – like the changes affected as a result of the ECtHR Modinos ruling – successfully alter the local socio-political context and result in substantive equality – that is, equality that goes beyond formal equality – needs to be examined. Do such top-down changes have any effects on the self-perceptions of Cypriot LGBTQ individuals and on their political awareness with regard to the meaning of ‘sexual equality’, ‘citizenship’, ‘democracy’ and ‘civil society’? What are the effects of such changes on the organization of local political life and on local elites? To answer these questions, the third section of the chapter will contextualize the cases of Modinos and Marangos through the discussion of a small selection of other LGBTQ-related cases that the ECtHR examined. This discussion does not aim to offer a complete or thorough legal analysis of ECtHR LGBTQ-related case-law. Rather, it seeks to highlight the development of the ECtHR’s reasoning during the past few decades with regard to LGBTQ issues. This will permit me to evaluate the argument that litigation at the regional/European level constitutes an important mechanism for progressively achieving LGBTQ substantive equality, since European litigation can translate into both legal and socio-political change at the national level.377

Lastly, the fourth section of this chapter will present some additional arguments that pertain to the question of queer theory’s role in locales like Cyprus, where identity-based LGBTQ legal activism at the regional level seems to be particularly successful towards promoting legal and socio-political change at the local level.378 To be sure, for the most part, queer theory has rightly exposed the numerous perils that accompany strategic essentialism and legal identity approaches. Nevertheless, such approaches – and especially a European legal identities approach – seem to be the most effective towards disrupting predominant perceptions of sexuality in contexts, like the Cypriot one, where powerful official nationalist rhetoric overshadows alternative imaginations of existence and curtails grassroots socio-political mobilization attempts. However, the successes of rights and identity

377 This analysis will be limited to LGBTQ-related adjudication in the ECtHR since the right to apply to this court – as opposed to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) – is open to individuals and groups of individuals, as guaranteed by Article 34 of the EConvHR, after exhausting domestic legal remedies.

378 This issue was raised and partially addressed in chapter two.
approaches do not make the need to scrutinize, castigate and rectify the exclusions and essentialisms that these approaches entail less important or less urgent.

Cypriot examples of assertion of LGBTQ agency challenge the applicability of the ‘identity politics versus queer politics’ debate in ‘non-Western’ locales. In places where non-heterosexual sexual desires, lives and realities have become visible in the public arena only recently, an exclusive employment of one of these two approaches does not sufficiently or constructively inform struggles for sexual equality. An argument will be made that striving for sexual equality within the Cypriot context necessitates a combination of approaches – that is, grassroots mobilization based (or not) on identities, lobbying and litigation, as well as queer/ anti-normalizing politics. Therefore, as a conclusion to the discussion of the relationship between queer theory and rights/identity-based understandings of sexual politics, the fourth section of this chapter will also present a number of ways of employing identity/legal strategies effectively while, in accordance with queer theory, also remaining aware of the pitfalls that the identity and legal-based approaches entail.

**The Modinos v. Cyprus Case: Challenging Cypriot Gender and Sexuality Discursive Regimes**

The *Modinos* case constitutes a culmination of the clash between predominant discursive regimes, to which gender and sexuality are subjected, and alternative discourses that seek to destabilize them. In the early 1980s, Alecos Modinos decided to challenge the discriminatory Cypriot Criminal Code sections. During a legal conference in 1983, Modinos publicly asked the then attorney general whether the Code was going to be amended based on Recommendation 924 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE to the Committee of Ministers after the *Dudgeon* decision. The attorney general replied that recommendations are mere

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380 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (10th Sitting), “Recommendation 924 on Discrimination Against Homosexuals,” Strasbourg: 1 October 1981; *Dudgeon v. United Kingdom* 1981 (Series A, No. 255-C). The *Dudgeon* case is the first in a trilogy of cases (*Dudgeon v. UK, Norris v. UK* and *Modinos v. Cyprus*) in which the ECtHR decided that the prohibition of and/or punishment for homosexual conduct between consenting adults in private constitutes a violation of the EConvHR right to respect for private and family life, i.e., Article 8. These three cases will be further discussed in this chapter.
recommendations and that the RoC was neither obliged nor intending to act on them.\(^{381}\)

Despite Modinos’s intense, decade-long lobbying efforts, the government’s official publicly articulated position remained blatantly homophobic. From 1986 to 1992, various ministers made statements to newspapers that they were not in favour of amending the law.\(^{382}\) Characteristically, the 1985–88 Minister of Justice and Public Order publically stated that the law would be amended ‘only over his dead body’.\(^{383}\) As Modinos reported, in one of their private discussions, the Minister of Justice told him that ‘women are not prosecuted but men are, because if men get penetrated, they become impotent and this is something we cannot afford given the Turkish presence on the island’.\(^{384}\)

Referring to the Cypriot political elite, Achilleas Demetriades, Modinos’s lawyer at the ECtHR, reported:

> They were making fun of us ... The derision and jeer and taunt were incredible. [When I decided to take the case to Strasbourg] they would say to me: ‘Where are you going? What are you trying to achieve? You side with “these ones”. As if ‘these ones’ are not human beings.\(^{385}\)

The RoC ratified the EConvHR in 1962. Modinos was the first individual to employ the right of individual petition afforded by Article 25 of the pre-1998 version of the EConvHR and to challenge the RoC in the ECtHR.\(^{386}\) He filed his case in 1989, arguing that sections 171, 172 and 173 of the Cypriot Criminal Code constituted a violation of Article 8 of the EConvHR. Sections 171, 172 and 173 criminalized ‘carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature’,\(^{387}\) while

\(^{381}\) “Interview with Alecos Modinos”.


\(^{383}\) “Interview with Achilleas Demetriades”.

\(^{384}\) “Interview with Alecos Modinos”.

\(^{385}\) “ Interview with Achilleas Demetriades”.


\(^{387}\) Modinos v. Cyprus, para. 8.
Article 8 of the EConvHR protects the right to respect for private and family life.\textsuperscript{388} In line with its reasoning in \textit{Dudgeon v. United Kingdom} and in \textit{Norris v. Ireland},\textsuperscript{389} the ECtHR decided in favour of the applicant.

Although many aspects of the ECtHR’s reasoning in the \textit{Modinos} case had already been articulated in \textit{Dudgeon} and \textit{Norris}, the case is significant because the Court reasserted that an applicant could be considered a victim and be negatively affected by offending legislation, even in cases where there exists a policy not to enforce the legislation – which is what the RoC argued in its defence.\textsuperscript{390} The \textit{Modinos} eight-to-one judgement – the only dissent came from the ad hoc Cypriot Judge Pikis – rejected unequivocally the idea that a state can justifiably criminalize male homosexual conduct when it is consensual, when it is between adults and when it is undertaken in private.

Therefore, on 21 May 1998 – and after various draft laws were put before it between 1995 and 1998 – the Cypriot House of Representatives was forced to decriminalize homosexuality.\textsuperscript{391} None of the parliamentary parties at the time was willing to propose an amendment to the law because doing so would contradict the Orthodox Church of Cyprus’s position on the issue. The then President of the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs tried to alleviate the concerns of MPs by stating: ‘Those MPs who will side in favour of the decriminalization will not in any way morally justify homosexual conduct; they will merely side in favour of the decriminalization because they would have realized what the political cost will be [if they will not]’.\textsuperscript{392} The then Senior Lawyer of the RoC explained to the MPs:

Voting in favour of the legal amendment ... does not mean that the specific [i.e., homosexual] conduct will be endorsed. Simply ... the law becomes clearer, thus

\textsuperscript{388} Article 8 states: ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’

\textsuperscript{389} \textit{Dudgeon v. United Kingdom; Norris v. Ireland}, 1998 (Series A, No. 142).


\textsuperscript{392} Vasos Vasilieou, «Βουλευτές: Ευρωπαίοι κατ’ανάγκη». \textit{Φιλελεύθερος}, 12 April, 32.
freeing the police’s hands to prosecute and bring to justice cases of intercourse against the order of nature that take place either in public or between minors.393

When the law was finally amended, the majority of the MPs publicly stated that they would not have voted in favour of the amendment, if they had not been pressured by the CoE through its institutions.394 The government and the politicians’ officially articulated rationale for the amendment was that not complying with the ECtHR’s Modinos ruling would imperil the country’s stance in the CoE.395 Additionally, it would jeopardize its national objectives, since noncompliance with European instructions would have a negative impact on the enforcement of the ECtHR’s judgement in the Loizidou v. Turkey case,396 which concerned the consequences of the 1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus and the occupation of the north part of the island ever since.397

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393 Machi, «Ανεκτέλεστη κινδυνεύει να μένει η απόφαση για την Τίτινα Λοϊζίδου». Μάχη, 5 November 1997, 16.
394 Until 1998 when it amended the relevant criminal law, the RoC was the only member of the CoE with laws banning homosexuality. The CoE set 29 May 1998 as a final deadline for the RoC to comply with the ECtHR’s ruling in Modinos and warned that non-abidance could mean expelling from the CoE. See: Martin Hellicar, “Government Pleads with Deputies to Allow Gay Sex,” Cyprus Mail, 5 November 1997, 2; Sydney Levy and Scott Long, “Repressive ‘Reform’ in Cyprus: Will They Get Away with It?,” The International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, 26 May 1998 <http://www.sodomylaws.org/> (15 February 2010). Referring to the stance of the RoC in the CoE, the then Deputy Secretary General of the CoE, Christian Kruger, stated in an interview: ‘There is an urgent need now to come to some rapport ... I really don’t know what would happen if the law is not amended.’ See: Kambas, Michele, “Cyprus Should Lift Gay Ban, European Official Says,” Reuters 14 May 1998 <http://www.sodomylaws.org/> (15 February 2010). The European Parliament also expressed its annoyance with the RoC’s noncompliance. See: Helena Smith, “Cyprus divided over gay rights,” The Guardian, 16 October 2001 <http://www.sodomylaws.org/> (15 February 2010). See also: “Interview with Achilleas Demetriades”.
395 This fear of the Greek-Cypriot political elite was realistic. For example, see: Jean Christou, “Why One Euro MP Will Keep on Voting Against Cyprus’ Accession,” Cyprus Mail, 11 October 2001, 7.
397 Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996 (No. 15318/89). In the Loizidou case, the ECtHR found that ‘the denial of access to the applicant’s property and consequent loss of control thereof is imputable to Turkey’ and not to the self-proclaimed ‘TRNC’, like the respondent state had argued. Thus, it ordered Turkey to compensate the applicant for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, as well as for costs and expenses. Both the judgement and the reasoning of the Court were of enormous importance for the RoC’s national objectives. Essentially, Turkey’s long articulated claim that it has no implication in the actions of ‘TRNC’ – since whatever happens in the occupied part of Cyprus falls under the ‘jurisdiction’ of the ‘TRNC’ – was officially rejected by a European institution. In sum, for the RoC, this decision and its implementation meant that: after more than twenty years Turkey was held legally liable for its 1974 invasion and subsequent occupation of the island; Turkish attempts to portray the ‘TRNC’ as a sovereign ‘state’ were dismissed based on European and international law; and it was established in a regional forum that the internally displaced Greek-Cypriots continue to have rights over their occupied properties. Making sure that the momentum of the Loizidou decision would not go to waste, government representatives appealed to the imperative need to ‘succeed’ to European
Although homosexuality was finally decriminalized in 1998, the amended law was more degrading to people of same-sex sexual choice than the previous one. It included ambiguous provisions designed to ensure that living as a homosexual in Cyprus would be harder than pre-1998. For example, it replaced the gender-neutral ‘carnal knowledge’ reference contained in the old section 171 with references to ‘unnatural licentiousness between men’, while it interpreted the concept of ‘public’ in the broadest sense. This procrastination on the part of the Cypriot political elite to fully align the RoC’s legislation with regional/European and international trends continues, although the offending term was replaced with ‘intercourse between men’ in 2000 and the age of consent for heterosexual and homosexual men and women was set at seventeen in 2002.

The Church, though, was not convinced by the ‘dilemma’ argument or by the ‘political necessity to Europeanize the country’ rhetoric. For the Church, this strategic, politico-national, quid pro quo game was the ultimate threat to Cyprus’s national survival. From 1997 to 2002, the late Archbishop Chrysostomos I and other high-ranking members of the clergy feverishly engaged in a war of libels and threats against anyone who supported or expressed tolerance towards Modinos’s cause. The Church’s official and publicly articulated stance was that its moral values do not and will not succumb to the wishes of Europe or of anyone else.

In an interview on national television, the Archbishop scoffed at homosexuality and at the Modinos ruling. He said that only enemies of the nation would endorse the decriminalization of homosexuality. He also claimed that if Cypriots do not stand firm and tell Europe that homosexuality does not conform to the moral standpoint of the nation, Europe will eventually tell them to become homosexuals, in order to be accepted in the EU. On several occasions he condemned homosexuality as an unutterable sin and tried to intimidate Cypriots by invoking ‘the national problem’. According to the late Archbishop, in case of a military threat it would be impossible to fight the Turks, if Greek-Cypriot men were pressures over the enforcement of the Modinos decision. See the relevant comments of the then President of the House Legal Affairs Committee in: “Homosexuality Law Could Threaten Loizidou Ruling,” “Interview with Achilles Demetriades”; “Interview with Alecos Modinos”; Levy and Scott, “Repressive ‘reform’ in Cyprus”.

Vasileiou, “Βουλευτές: Ευρωπαίοι κατ’ ανάγκη”.
As Sedgwick argued, whether the ideology is of the right or left, religious or secular, or has any account to offer on the status of the ‘nation’, nationalism tends to become the form of last resort for every legitimizing – or delegitimizing – political appeal.402

Besides the petitions that PAHOK distributed under the guidance of the Church, which urged the public to condemn the legalization of homosexuality, the Church also sent letters to MPs calling on them to vote against the decriminalization.403 PAHOK’s spokesman said that his group would ‘keep track’ of MPs who voted in favour of decriminalization and would make sure that, when the time comes, it would punish them in the ballot.404 On the day of the vote, the Archbishop offered free bus rides and gathered children and elderly Cypriots – mostly women – outside the parliament, to demonstrate in the name of ‘Christian love’ by holding banners which read: ‘Cyprus is the country of saints, not of homosexuals!’.405

The similarities between the woman holding the banner that reads ‘Cyprus is the country of saints, not of homosexuals’ in image 3.1 and the women in images 2.1 to 2.4 in chapter two – and especially the woman in picture 2.4 – are striking. In this setting, the black-dressed woman, who has come to symbolize the national collectivity’s sorrow for its lost men and its imperilled future due to the wrongdoing of external ethnic enemies, serves as the embodiment of a heterocentric and religious-based cultural tradition, whose survival is allegedly threatened by internal ‘others’, that is by non-heterosexual Greek-Cypriots, like Modinos.

404 “Interview with Alecos Modinos”; Jean Christou, “Black List Threat for Gay Vote”, Cyprus Mail, 21 May 1998, 7. I do not have evidence that any specific politician was indeed punished in the ballot by the Church because of the way they voted on the issue. However, political elites were so fearful of the Church, that the RoC attorney general from 1984 to 1988, Stella Souliotou, suggested that Modinos and political party representatives come to a non-public agreement about the amendment to the criminal law before the vote in parliament, in order to avoid the Church’s retaliation. See: “Interview with Alecos Modinos”. It should be noted that on 21 May 1998, and although the House of Representatives finally voted 36 to 8 in favour of the decriminalization of homosexuality, 12 MPs abstained from voting. This is indicative of the large pressure exerted by the Church on the MPs.
405 Smith, “Cyprus divided over gay rights”
IMAGE 3.1


Source: Σελίδες [Selides Magazine]. Nicosia: 3 November 2000

The banner reads: ‘Cyprus is the island of saints and not of homosexuals!’

The commentary on the left reads: ‘Cypriot society evolves (?) but racism against homosexuals continues to thrive. Luckily, the anachronistic homosexuality bill has been modified after all, although there were MPs who supported [the view] that our children are in danger because of homosexuals, as if [homosexuality is] an infectious disease. As of the priests who gathered outside the parliament holding crosses in their hands and shouting against the amendment to the [criminal] law, for now, they are dealing with their “house matters”, since the “enemy” is “within the walls”. Nonetheless, all this noise increases racism against homosexuals even more.’
Remembering the day of the vote on decriminalization, Demetriades commented: ‘What happened with the prelates was a piece of work! It was marvellous ... [seeing] all of them together marching outside the parliament against the “sinners”, the “Modinoi”!’ In fact even nowadays, Modinos’s name stands for ‘(male) homosexual’ especially among older Cypriots. This demonstrates the intensity of the Church’s homophobic campaign and the degree to which it demonized Modinos. As Mosse explains, in the ‘religion of nationalism’ and in its accompanying discourse of respectability, ‘it was no longer the specific sexual acts alone that were considered abnormal, but the entire physical and mental structure of the person practicing these acts. Such person was excluded from society and the nation’. Accordingly, in the ‘religion of Greek-Cypriot nationalism’ Modinos was demonized as the sexually dissident individual who imperilled the nation’s survival, by attempting to alter the gender and sexuality system on which the Greek-Cypriot national collectivity was premised.

The hostile reaction of the Church and of its supporting groups to the prospect of the decriminalization of homosexuality, as well as their forceful attempts to portray Modinos and non-heterosexual Greek-Cypriots as dangerous for the preservation of the Greek-Cypriot national collectivity become all the more interesting, when the internal troubles of the Church between 1996 and 2001 are taken into account. In 1996 – that is, before the legal amendments were made and at a time when the Church’s campaign against homosexuals was at its peak – the Church faced allegations about gay bishops and priests. These kinds of accusations were levelled by prelates themselves against ‘internal enemies’, that is, against their opponents in Ecclesiastical elections. The accusations against Archimandrite Pancratios Meraklis, a then candidate for the Morphou Bishopic, are exemplary. In 2000, similar accusations were raised against the then Limassol Metropolitan Bishop, Athanasios. The case of Athanasios was eventually brought before the District Court of Nicosia. This internal war – in which the major weapon against...
one’s opponent was to claim that he was a homosexual – was so fierce, that it led to a Major Synod to resolve the issue, which summoned bishops and patriarchs from all corners of the Christian Orthodox world.\(^{410}\)

Within this climate and torn between pressures emanating from the CoE to remove the offending and discriminatory provisions from the 1998 legislation pertaining to same-sex sexual activity and pressures emanating from the Church, on 8 June 2000, the Parliamentary Legal Committee presented the new amended bill to the Parliamentary Assembly without this being on the agenda, thus taking the forty-four MPs who were present off guard. Thirty-three MPs walked out of the assembly while of the remaining seventeen, two voted against the amendment to the criminal law. Therefore, it passed with only fifteen votes.\(^{411}\) The fact that the Parliamentary Legal Committee had to resort to taking MPs by surprise, as well as the fact that, when faced with the vote to amend the criminal law the vast majority of the MPs refused to take a stand, demonstrate the MPs’ unwillingness to deal with the issue.

The timing that the Parliamentary Legal Committee chose to present to the MPs the suggested amended law confirms that the MPs unwillingness was primarily the result of the Church’s pressures and threats against them. Although the first amendment to the criminal law in 1998 was debated and postponed for years, it was dealt with during a period when the high-ranking clergy was preoccupied with internal conflicts over sexual and homosexual sexual scandal allegations. Therefore, it was less focused on its war against the amendment. According to the Greek-Cypriot press, the Parliamentary Legal Committee did not preannounce its plan to bring the vote on the amendment to the criminal law before the MPs. The Committee did so in order to get the MPs to attend the parliamentary assembly meeting and to avoid allowing Church and Christian groups to organize demonstrations.\(^{412}\)

As the analysis of the Modinos case and the reactions to it demonstrated, the discourse of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus is based on the idea that the preservation of the traditional heteronormative family and of an exclusively


\(^{412}\) *Polítis*, «Αιφνίδια τροποποίηση νόμου για ομοφυλοφιλία».
heterosexual masculine sexuality is the sine qua non of the continuation of Greek-Cypriot blood lines, of national coherence and of Greek-Cypriots’ military might. Any alternative approach, even if purely strategic, is dismissed as ‘unpatriotic’. The case also revealed that the Cypriot political elite attempted to balance notions of tradition and modernization, as well as national values and the values of Europeanization/globalization, in order to propel its politico-national objectives through the EU platform.

Cypriot political and other institutional actors’ discursive regimes are based on the idea that civil society and private agents bear a duty not to jeopardize the national project, by seeking to alter the elite-engineered modus operandi of the national community. Both the political and the religious representatives have used extensively the EU and human rights discourse and legal mechanisms, in order to couch and propel national demands. Yet, Modinos’s claim was far from perceived as a human rights claim, thus casting doubt on the sincerity of the Cypriot political elite’s commitment to the concept of human rights.

To be sure, such efforts to preserve, to mould or to alter traditional ideas of nationhood and sexuality amidst the Europeanization-national identity conflict, are characteristic of other new EU members also. For example, in Romania, arguments in favour of a reform of the laws against same-sex sexual practices and identities have been couched in the language of Europeanization and European politics. Nonetheless, whereas European politics in Romania has enabled social movements and actors to place sexuality in the centre of struggles around ‘identity’, ‘westernization’, ‘international human rights’, ‘globalization’ and ‘transnationalism’, in Cyprus sexuality has remained a marginal issue; the collateral damage and price to pay for EU membership.

Most Greek-Cypriots’ approach to the EU and to Europeanization has been inextricably linked to economic prosperity and, mostly, with national and security issues. Over the 1990s, EU membership became the central objective of Greek-Cypriot foreign policy. Being disappointed by – what they perceived as – a failed UN approach to the ethno-political problem, both Greece and the RoC anticipated that accession would help bring about a favourable settlement. They hoped that accession would internationally strengthen the status of the RoC as the only

legitimate government of the island and discredit ‘TRNC’s’ claims to sovereignty, through the implementation of the acquis communautaire. Moreover, they expected that accession would bolster Greek-Cypriots’ claims to the rights to freedom of movement and enjoyment of property that occupying Turkey has been violating, offer the RoC a platform to present its politico-national cause and increase security, since Turkey would be reluctant to attack an EU member-state.414

The lifting of the conditionality to reach a settlement before admission led the RoC to harden its stance. As Cyprus entered the EU and the EU benefits were delivered to Greek-Cypriots, the RoC – especially under the leadership of hard-liner Tassos Papadopoulos – used its membership to strengthen its negotiating position at the expense of Turkish-Cypriots. Whereas in the past the Greek-Cypriot leadership was phrasing its positions by employing the rhetoric of human rights, after accession it started utilizing the language of the acquis communautaire and of EU discourse, in order to justify its inflexibility and pressure Turkey. This inflexibility culminated in 2004, when Papadopoulos called on Greek-Cypriots to reject the Annan Plan.415

Interviews by other researchers with Greek-Cypriot opinion leaders and decision makers from politics and the media, state institutions, the academia and NGOs revealed that these people view ‘modernization’, ‘westernization’ and ‘Europeanization’ as the transition from a traditional to the ‘modern’ organization of public, political and economic life, without considering the effects of this transition on social relations that fall within the ‘private’ realm,416 such as gender and sexual hierarchies. As Argyrou explains, ‘westernization’ and ‘modernization’ are a mechanism by which, in the context of colonialism and postcolonialism, societies ‘constitute themselves and are constituted as Western subjects’.417 The culture of ‘modernity’ that Cypriots embrace serves as a mechanism of legitimation of class, of race and ethnic differentiation, of androcentrism and heteronormative masculinity’s

414 Tocci, EU and Conflict Resolution, 28-52; Richmond, “Shared sovereignty and the politics of peace,” 149–76.
417 Argyrou, Tradition and Modernity in the Mediterranean, 183.
perpetuation, as well as as mask for gender – and, I would also add, for sexual choice – differences.\footnote{Argyrou, Tradition and Modernity in the Mediterranean.}

Especially in the past, the impact of discourses of nationalism on the modern and contemporary history of Cyprus and on local perceptions of ‘national’ vis-à-vis ‘European’ identity was pervasive. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that although the RoC has been more than eager to secure its EU accession and extensively used the EU and human rights discourse and legal mechanisms to couch and propel its national demands, it did not accept the right of individual petition under what is now Article 34 of the EConvHR until 1 January 1989. Although the EConvHR was employed by the RoC and by Greek-Cypriots in order to expose and punish Turkey for its 1974 invasion and continuing occupation, the acceptance of Article 34 also signalled a string of applications to the ECtHR against the RoC by both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots – the first of these cases was the Modinos case.

Although the RoC’s political elite had invested a lot in the country’s accession, membership in the CoE and the EU proved to be far from a panacea. Whether or not ‘Europe’ and Europeanization alleviated the RoC’s national headaches, they also highlighted a problem common among new EU members: Namely, societal reforms and cultural transformation are needed in order for the country to be in harmony with the rest of the European ‘family’. Part of these reforms involves assuring equal citizenship for all minorities, or for groups and individuals who embrace minority views.

To conclude, in Cyprus – though to a lesser extent than in previous times – ‘Europe’ continues to be instrumentalized as a bastion against external enemies, while the values and ideals that the EU expects its members to adopt are not only ignored by the elite, but they are even interpreted as anti-national notions. Namely, the concept of ‘human rights’ stands for ‘national rights violated by external enemies’ and for a sense of individualism restricted within its masculine, Western origins and structures, which bind persons within communal, religious, heteronormative and procreative familial embeddings.\footnote{David John Frank, and Elizabeth, H. Mceneaney, “The Individualization of Society and the Liberalization of State Policies on Same-Sex Sexual Relations, 1984–1995,” Social Forces, vol., 77, no. 3 (1999): 912.} The value of equality is only paid lip service, while the nation-state continues to define itself based on the
expelling of whomever it sees as a threat. Anybody who seeks to remedy social injustices – like Modinos – is automatically labelled as a ‘national liability’.

To be sure, national and patriotic homogeneity dictates the preservation of gender and sexuality binaries. Through its institutional elites, the patriarchal state assures the perpetuation of essentialist, sexist, gendered and homophobic notions, as well as the creation and public reverence of symbols such as ‘the national (masculine) hero’ and ‘the mourning (sexually modest) mother-of-the-nation’, while it demonizes and ostracizes (non-heterosexual) ‘others’. However, as the case of Modinos and its social effects demonstrated, even in a limited degree and at a slow pace, national identity-formation and the negotiation of what constitutes ‘nationally acceptable’ demonstrations of sexuality is always a process. Therefore, although in Cyprus modalities of same-sex desire continue to be regarded as a ‘national hazard’ by the elites, because of Alecos Modinos’s legal activism the criminal law was amended. Hence, even though the decriminalization of homosexuality does not suffice to bring about LGBTQ equality, it did provide a new and very different platform for articulating and negotiating LGBTQ identities, rights and claims to substantive equality.

The Marangos v. Cyprus Case: Challenging LGBTQ Discrimination in the Public Sphere

The Modinos v. Cyprus case functioned as a catalyst towards assuring rights to privacy for homosexuals. Nonetheless, sexuality does not only pertain to sex and to sexual acts; it does not merely name interpersonal relations that remain restricted within the ‘private’ sphere of life. Taken as a category of human identification and interaction, sexuality names –or, rather, describes – a domain of power relations. Social goods, opportunities and rights – such as custody and adoption rights, employment and its security, access to pensions and inheritance of property, among other things – are distributed based on the ‘sex-gender-sexuality’ heteronormative

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420 Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality.
421 Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1, 81-102.
system, which is sustained and perpetuated by public practices and institutions – including the law.\footnote{Susan Marks and Andrew Clapham, \textit{International Human Rights Lexicon} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 327.}

Therefore, discrimination against LGBTQ individuals extends beyond sexual life per se and beyond the ‘private’ domain into the ‘public’ sphere. The \textit{Marangos v. Cyprus} case points to the artificiality of the ‘private’/‘public’ sphere division. It also highlights the need for, and the responsibility of, the RoC to move beyond the recognition of negative/non-interference rights for non-heterosexual individuals to the adoption of protective measures and the removal of discriminatory rules, in order to ensure that these individuals are not disadvantaged in the ‘public’ sphere because of their sexual choice.\footnote{As Robert Wintemute explains about Article 8 of the EConvHR and its interpretation by the Court and the Commission, ‘establishing a violation of “the right to respect for ... private ... life” is, in most cases, a three-stage process. It must be shown: (1) that Article 8(1) applies, i.e. the challenged law or decision affects a freedom or activity that falls within the scope of “private life”; (2) that there has been, contrary to the opening phrase of Article 8(2), an “interference by a public authority with [the applicant’s private life]”; and (3) that there exists no justification for the interference under Article 8(2). Where an applicant challenges, not an active “interference by a public authority with [the applicant’s private life]”, but a public authority’s passive omission or failure to take certain steps to ensure “respect” for their private life, the Court and Commission seem to combine the second and third stages. The question becomes whether or not “respect” for private life, in the circumstances, entails not only the “negative obligation” to refrain from active interference, but also certain “positive obligations” requiring the public authority to act. If so, it would seem that breach of a “positive obligation” under Article 8(1) cannot be justified under Article 8(2)’. See: Wintemute, \textit{Sexual Orientation and Human Rights}, 98.}

In 1974, Marangos left Cyprus and came to the UK to study. On 24 May 1984, while he was still a student in the UK, his passport expired. The Cyprus High Commission in London renewed it until 30 June 1984. Before his passport had re-expired, Marangos travelled to Athens. The Consular Department of the Embassy of Cyprus refused to renew his passport, since he had not served in the National Guard, as he was supposed to.\footnote{In the RoC, serving in the National Guard is compulsory for all male citizens.}

In 1989, Marangos applied to the Ministry of Defence for exemption from military service on the ground that he was a permanent resident abroad, but his application was refused. In 1990, he renewed his application claiming that, as a homosexual, he could not live in Cyprus given the country’s then existing law, which criminalized homosexuality. In 1991, he was exempted from military service as a permanent resident abroad, but he was informed that, upon repatriation, he...
would be liable to a nine-month period of military service.\footnote{Nine months is the period that male repatriates had to serve in the army in 1991, whereas male citizens had to serve for twenty-six months.} In 1993, Marangos wrote to the minister of defence and to the attorney general alleging that the real reason behind the ministry’s reversal of its original decision to reject his application was the information he had disclosed about his sexual orientation. Upon his request of information pertaining to the case of Marangos, the attorney general received a confidential letter from the General Director of the Ministry of Defence that, among other things, stated:

\begin{quote}
(The applicant) has declared ... that he is homosexual and, as you know, homosexuals in Cyprus are exempted from military service once their ‘sickness’ is certified by a competent conscription board or the committee which examines whether prospective conscripts are physically capable for military service. As a result it is up to (the applicant) to invoke, if he so wishes, his homosexuality, if he permanently settles in Cyprus and reports for the draft within the time limits provided by the law. If he does not present himself he will be considered a deserter and will be prosecuted in accordance with the ... law.\footnote{Marangos v. Cyprus. See paragraphs on case admissibility.}
\end{quote}

In the meantime, Marangos had returned to Cyprus but failed to present himself to the Conscript Board, although he had received two call-up papers. In 1994, the International Association for the Protection of Human Rights in Cyprus asked the ministry of defence to exempt Marangos from military service, given than the National Guard did not accept in its ranks persons who had disclosed their homosexuality. It also asked the ministry not to use Marangos’s homosexuality to declare him psychiatrically unsuitable for military service, as this would constitute a violation both of the RoC’s constitution and of its international obligations.

Between 1994 and 1995 the ministry responded that the law made no provision for exempting homosexuals from their obligation to serve in the National Guard and that although homosexuality is not considered to be a disease, the ‘competent military committee’ examined the presence of personality disorders. In reply, the Association invited the minister of defence to clarify whether homosexuality was considered a personality disorder. The ministry replied in the negative and clarified that if he was drafted, Marangos would go through the same
standard examination as other prospective conscripts. The Association continued to press for a clarification of the ministry’s stance on homosexuality. Although until 1995 Marangos kept receiving call-up letters and for a period of time was not allowed to travel, he also kept receiving assurances from the Office of the Military Prosecutor that no criminal proceedings had been issued or were pending against him.\(^{427}\)

Also in 1994, Marangos complained to the then Ombudsman that he had been refused employment as an architect in the public sector – specifically at the ministry of defence – because of his pending military service obligations. In 1995, he lodged another complaint with the Ombudsman, claiming that he had been rejected for a part-time job with the Department of Research Statistics, because he wore an earring. Later that year, the Ombudsman rejected Marangos’s claim pertaining to the Department of Research Statistics, explaining that his candidature had been examined by a collective organ that had the right to take into account candidates’ appearance, since recruited personnel would have to interact with all strata of Cypriot society.

In 1996, Marangos submitted an application against Cyprus to the EComHR, claiming that the prohibition of male homosexual conduct between consenting adults in private was in violation of Article 8 of the Convention. He also claimed violations of Articles 3, 8 and 14, and 17 with regard to the manner in which he had been treated by the Cypriot authorities because he is a homosexual. Article 3 prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, while according to Article 17:

> Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.\(^{428}\)

\(^{427}\) Ibid.

\(^{428}\) European Court of Human Rights. The European Convention on Human Rights: Convention for the Protection of Human Rights as Amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14. According to Cannie and Voorhoof, ‘with regard to certain types of hate speech, the European Court of Human Rights and the former Commission have developed a tradition of applying Article 17 ECHR (i.e., EConvHR); the so-called abuse clause. This application leads to categorical exclusion from protection of the right to freedom of expression (Article 10), an approach that contrasts sharply with the Court’s general attitude toward accepting and even creating a broad scope of protection under this right’. That is, it is mostly governments, especially in ‘hate speech cases’, and not so much individuals that rely on
Article 14 prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of any of the Convention rights based on ‘any ground, such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status’. 429

He also claimed a violation of Article 3(2) of Protocol 4 – ‘no one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national’ – because the Cypriot authorities refused to issue him a passport while he was in Greece and therefore he could not enter the RoC. Since for a period after his return to Cyprus he was not allowed to leave the country, he claimed a violation of Article 2(2) of Protocol 4 – ‘everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own’. Lastly, he raised Articles 6(1) and 13 of the Convention, since he was not provided the necessary means and aid to institute court proceedings – Article 6(1) pertains to the right to a fair trial and Article 13 to the right to an effective remedy before a national authority.

The Commission declared admissible only his allegation of a violation of Article 8, while it dismissed the rest of his complaints. Though in 1997 the EComHR found that the criminal law in Cyprus, which had yet to be amended based on the Modinos ruling of 1993, constituted a violation of Article 8, in 1998 the ECtHR refused to hear Marangos’s Article 8 case, based on the reasoning that the principle had already been established in earlier cases, namely in Dudgeon, Norris and Modinos. 430

The fact that the Marangos case involves the military, the bureaucracy and the general Cypriot society’s stance towards same-sex sexuality makes it an excellent prism for looking at the nexus between law and society with regard to LGBTQ issues. From a legal point of view, it would have been very interesting if the Commission and the Court had upheld some of Marangos’s claims, for example his claims against the Cypriot National Guard. 431 However, for the purposes of the

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429 My italics.
430 Marangos v. Cyprus.
431 The ECtHR later held that the dismissal of members of the armed forces on grounds of homosexuality constitutes a violation of the right of respect for private life. See: Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. United Kingdom, 1999 (Series A, No. 259); Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, 1999 (No. 33985/96 and 33986/96). The Court rejected the respondent state’s appeal to the threat to national security – a legitimate ground for interference according to Article 8 – since this appeal was
current analysis, Marangos’s claims of discrimination against homosexuals in the military and in employment – that is, in the ‘public’ sphere – will be discussed as part of the more general analysis of the question about the RoC’s responsibility to render realizable LGBTQ individuals’ rights to equally.

Article 14 of the EConvHR prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of other Convention rights. Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU empowers the EU to take appropriate measures to combat all discrimination, including discrimination based on sexual orientation. Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which came into full legal effect with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December of 2009, prohibits discrimination by EU institutions – and EU member-states when implementing EU law – on any ground, including sexual orientation, while Council Directive 2000/78/EC prohibits discrimination in employment and vocational training on the grounds of sexual orientation. Nonetheless, as the Marangos case highlights, in Cyprus, LGBTQ claims to equal participation and involvement in the organized life of the political community are circumscribed by the predominant nationalist discourses, which elevate heteronormativity and heteropatriarchy as the organizing principles of the politico-national collectivity. Irrespective of a rapidly transforming regional/European legal environment, in Cyprus, the politics of citizenship and based ‘solely upon the negative attitudes of heterosexual personnel towards those of homosexual orientation’. It also stated that regulations that express such attitudes are not justified because ‘they represent a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual minority’. For an analysis see: Waaldijk and Bonini-Baraldi, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the European Union, 21-3 & 38-40.

432 European Union, “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2008/C 115/0113),” Lisbon: 13 December 2007. Article 19 reads: ‘Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties and within the limits of the powers conferred by them upon the Union, the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.’


434 Council of the European Union, “Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation,” Brussels: 2000. Although an examination of CJEU LGBT-related cases is beyond the purposes of this chapter, it is important to note that on 10 May 2011, the CJEU delivered its judgement in the case of Jürgen Römer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, which dealt with the issue of lower supplementary retirement pension for registered same-sex partners. The CJEU ruled that registered same-sex partners must be treated equally to married partners and that such pension falls under the meaning of ‘pay’ within the EU Employment Framework Directive (Directive 2000/78/EC). See: Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, 2011(Case C-147/08).
national belonging continue to be conflated with heterocentricity and, in this way, LGBTQ voices are not allowed into the ‘public’ sphere.

The Cypriot state’s continued ability to retain norms of heteronormativity and heteropatriarchy is founded on the gap that continues to exist between European law and national practice, despite their close interrelationship. Regarding Marangos’s complaint that homosexuals are excluded from the army after they have been certified as ‘physically incapable’ by the Conscription Board, the Commission stated that the EConvHR does not guarantee the right to serve in the armed forces.\footnote{Marangos v. Cyprus.}

By merely highlighting the fact that the Convention does not include provisions regarding the way member-states’ armed forces should operate, the Commission allowed the RoC and the Cypriot Ministry of Defence to maintain an unwritten policy towards conscripts who disclose their non-heterosexual sexual orientation.

The interviews I conducted with military officials illustrate that prejudice and biased practice continue to exist in Cyprus, regardless of whether relevant laws and policies are in place. All of the military officials I interviewed – their ages ranged from twenty-seven to fifty-one – reported that they are not aware of the existence of a specific policy pertaining to homosexuals in the army.\footnote{Interviews with Military Officials 210012, 210013, 210014, 210017, 210018, 210019, 210020 and 210021, “Interviews with Elites 2009,” Interviews by Nayia Kamenou. Nicosia, 7-12 January 2009.} Moreover, they all admitted that the way a homosexual conscript is treated falls under the discretion of his superiors, while six out of eight interviewees expressed the view that, if a homosexual conscript were to disclose his homosexuality to his fellow soldiers, the organization and the operations of the National Guard would be negatively affected.\footnote{Interviews with Military Officials 210012, 210014, 210017, 210018, 210019 and 210021.} These six military officials also expressed the view that allowing

\footnote{Law 58(I)/2004 applies to all natural and legal persons in both the private and public sectors’. See: Haris Kountouros, \textit{Summary of Legislation Implementing Directive 2000/78/EC with Respect to Sexual Orientation in Cyprus}, Written at the request of Kees Waaldijk and Matteo Bonini-Baraldi, 2005.}

\footnote{Interestingly, in his partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion in \textit{Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom} the Cypriot ECtHR Judge Loucaides propelled a similar argument. In sum, the majority of the military officials supported some form of the (now repealed) US-style ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’
homosexuals to disclose their sexuality carries the risk of discrediting the armed forces and of offending military dignity. Three of them said that another problem with homosexuals in the army is that they are less trustworthy, in the sense that it is easier for them to be ‘allured’ by the ‘sexual promises’ of an ‘enemy spy’, that is, a Turk, disclose vital military information and in this way jeopardize national security. When I asked ‘couldn’t a heterosexual soldier fall into the same trap if approached by a woman spy?’ some of the military officials said that because it is harder for homosexuals to find a sexual partner, they would more easily succumb to temptation.\textsuperscript{438}

Another aspect of the Marangos case that the Commission did not fully examine but that is of interest is the applicant’s claim of discrimination in access to employment. Marangos argued that the fact that he had been refused a job with the Department of Research and Statistics because of his appearance – that is, because of the fact that he was wearing an earring – constituted a violation of Article 8. However, the Commission disagreed:

... the Convention does not guarantee the right ... to be recruited in public sector employment. In any event, even assuming that the authorities’ conduct could give rise to an issue under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention, in the particular circumstances of the case there could be no interference with the right to respect for private life ... it has not been established that, if the applicant’s appearance had not been taken into consideration, he would have been offered a temporary contract with the Department of Research and Statistics.\textsuperscript{439}

The plaintiff could not provide the Commission with proof that he would not have been offered the job, even if his appearance satisfied the potential employer. Nonetheless, it could be argued that the state’s argument was ill-founded. Explaining why Marangos’s application had been rejected by the Department of Research and Statistics, the then Cypriot Ombudsman merely stated that his candidature had been examined by a collective organ that had the right to take into account candidates’ appearance, since recruited personnel would have to interact

\textsuperscript{438} “Interviews with Military Officials 210012, 210017 and 210019”.
\textsuperscript{439} Marangos v. Cyprus. See paragraphs on case admissibility.
with all strata of Cypriot society. However, no explanation was given as to how wearing an earring would limit Marangos’s ability to interact with all strata of Cypriot society. Although it cannot be asserted with certainty, Marangos’s rejection based – among other things – on his appearance might be related to his potential employer’s expectations pertaining to sexual choice (in)visibility and gender performance. One could question whether wearing an earring made Marangos look ‘feminine’ to his potential employer, whether earrings on men are understood as an indication of non-heterosexual sexual choice and consequently, whether Marangos’s visible ‘femininity’ and/or non-heterosexual sexual choice was the real reason he was judged incapable of interacting with all strata of Cypriot society – especially the homophobic ones.

Directive 2000/78/EC was transposed into Cypriot law on the eve of RoC’s accession and a separate law was enacted that appoints the Ombudsman as the national equality body whose mandate includes sexual orientation. Nevertheless, ‘prejudices amongst society and the lack of targeted awareness raising measures have so far prevented Cypriot LGBTQ persons from using the equality body procedure’. Despite the Directive’s introduction and the legal amendments that the Modinos case and EU-accession requirements have necessitated, public attitudes and perceptions towards homosexuality remain negative. For example, in a study commissioned by the Ombudsman Office in 2006, eighty per cent of Greek-Cypriots reported that sexual relationships between people of the same gender are always or most of the times wrong, while seventy three per cent reported that they do not personally know someone who is a homosexual person. This data suggests that regardless of positive legal amendments, Cypriot LGBTQs continue to exist in invisibility.

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Ibid.

In Cyprus, especially in previous decades, a man wearing an earring was socially perceived and labelled as a rebel or as a trouble-maker if the earring was on his left ear (or if he wore earrings on both ears), and as a homosexual if the earring was on his right ear.


Nonetheless, as it was demonstrated through the analysis of the Cypriot elite’s reaction to the cases of Marangos and, especially of Modinos, such negative attitudes towards LGBTQ individuals are preserved, and even encouraged, by political elites themselves, as well as by the hostile stance that they adopt when making public statements about LGBTQ issues. As the European Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA-Europe) and the CoE’s Parliamentary Assembly recently confirmed, the RoC continues to remain one of the counties in Europe which are not advancing towards greater recognition of LGBTQ rights.444

Supranational Legal Mechanisms and Local Effects: ECtHR and EComHR LGBTQ-Related Case-law

The Modinos and Marangos cases epitomize the clash between predominant local discursive regimes, to which gender and sexuality are subjected, and supranational alternative discourses that seek to destabilize them. However, in the case of Modinos, the ECtHR did not go beyond articulating what it had already decided in the cases of Dudgeon and Norris. Namely, although the Modinos case was successful, it only examined the question of same-sex sexuality vis-à-vis the right to privacy, but it did not go beyond the question of homosexuality’s criminalization. The Marangos case was declared admissible by the Commission based on Marangos’s allegation of a violation of Article 8, while the rest of his complaints were dismissed. However, in 1998, the ECtHR refused to hear Marangos’s Article 8 case, based on the reasoning that the principle had already been established in earlier cases, namely in Dudgeon, Norris and Modinos. Therefore,

444 ILGA-Europe, Rainbow Europe Map and Index 2011: Legal Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans People in Europe <http://www.ilga-europe.org/home/news/for_media/media_releases/rainbow_europe_map_index_2011_legal_situation_of_lesbian_gay_bisexual_trans_people_in_europe> (30 May 2011). According to the ILGA-Europe Rainbow Europe Map and Index 2011, which rate European countries’ laws and administrative practices that protect or violate the human rights of LGBT people (the map and index do not reflect the social situation of LGBT people), based on a scale between 17 (highest score: respect of human rights and full legal equality of LGBT people) and -7 (lowest score: gross violation of human rights and discrimination against LGBT people), Cyprus scored a very low -2. Only Ukraine (score: -4) and Moldova and Belarus (score: -3) fared worse than Cyprus. For comparative reasons, please note that the UK was assigned to highest score among the fifty countries under examination (score: 12.5). See also: Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, “Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity (Doc. 12087),” Strasbourg: 8 December 2009.
although they are important with regard to their social and political effects at the local level, the two regional/European LGBTQ-related cases against the RoC – Marangos and Modinos – do not fully illustrate the Court’s progressively developing reasoning towards LGBTQ issues, especially since the 2000s.

Primarily as a result of the growing of acceptance of non-heterosexual people and of LGBTQ-friendly legal changes in a number of EU member-states, the ECtHR has progressively moved from a ‘morality-based’ to a ‘European consensus’ approach in its dealing of cases that pertain to sexuality and has demonstrated its willingness to interpret the EConvHR dynamically, by setting aside anachronistic precedents. As the discussion of some cases that follows will demonstrate, it has also detached ‘sex’ from biological determinism, ‘gender’ from ‘sex’ and the concept of ‘family’ from ‘(hetero)sexuality’.

Although in the past the Court would grant respondent states a wide margin of appreciation with regard to the interpretation of the EConvHR, this is no longer the case, especially when it examines allegations of infringement of rights to respect for private and family life and to non-discrimination. This development of the Court’s reasoning has positive effects at the national level. EConvHR signatory states can no longer claim that the persecution, prosecution, lack of recognition or unequal treatment of their LGBTQ citizens falls within the scope of their margin of appreciation. The ECtHR’s adaption of the ‘European consensus’ approach forces such countries to align their laws and policies according to the Court’s prescriptions and according to other European countries standards and norms. Once legal precedent has been established, all signatory states are essentially bound by it, regardless of whether or not applicant complaints were brought against them.

At the time when the Modinos and Marangos cases were adjudicated, the ECtHR had not yet extended the application of the EConvHR rights beyond what


446 For example, in B v. France, which concerned a French citizen who was registered with the civil status registrar as of male sex but had ‘adopted female behaviour from a very early age’ (para. 10), the applicant claimed a violation of Article 8, because she was refused the change of her forename. The Court found a violation of Article 8 because, as it stated, ‘[the applicant] finds herself daily in a situation which, taken as a whole, is not compatible with the respect due to her private life. Consequently, even having regard to the State’s margin of appreciation, the fair balance which has to be struck between the general interest and the interests of the individual ... has not been attained, and there has thus been a violation of Article 8’ (para. 63). See: B v. France, 1992 (No. 13343/87).
falls exclusively and narrowly within the meaning of ‘respect for private life’.

Moreover, the RoC managed to postpone the amendments to the criminal law that the Modinos case ruling had necessitated for more than a decade. Therefore, drawing conclusions about the impact of European litigation at the national level based solely on these two cases is misleading. A closer look into the Court’s reasoning and decision-making in more recent LGBTQ-related cases against other EConvHR signatory countries, as well as into the impact of such reasoning and decision-making on the legal framework and the socio-political realities of the responding and other European countries, shows that changes at the supranational European level do initiate LGBTQ-friendly legal and public policy changes both at the national and the transnational level. Through a short discussion of LGBTQ-related ECtHR case-law, this section will address the following two questions: Do legal changes at the regional/European/supranational level really have an impact on national legal and socio-political realities? And if they do, how broadly are European legal institutions willing to interpret ‘LGBTQ equality’?

The fact that legal changes initiated at the regional level do not always or immediately transplant into local social contexts does not mean that they are ineffective. Especially in the last decade, the ECtHR has adopted a progressive attitude towards LGBTQ issues. Whatever the reason for the adoption of this progressive reasoning, the ECtHR is steadily transforming into a forum where LGBTQ subjects are granted recognition not only as private individuals, but also as parents, family members and as members of society whose relationships deserve both abstention from interference, as well as public recognition and support.

For example, the Court took a dynamic approach in the Grand Chamber case of Goodwin v. United Kingdom and restricted the deference recognized to the legal developments within the respondent state.\(^447\) This case concerned the extent of state obligation to recognize the new personalities of post-operative transgender individuals under Article 8. Although in previous cases the ECtHR had granted the UK a wide margin of appreciation and thus had not found a breach, in this case it argued that the right to respect for private life under Article 8 had been breached. By doing so, it highlighted the ‘clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing

\(^{447}\) Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002 (No. 28957/95).
international trend in favour not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals
but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals’.448

The Goodwin case and the largely identical I. v. United Kingdom case449
demonstrate that, as part of a number of strategies to be used by LGBTQ
movements, litigation in the ECtHR could be very promising; not only for effecting
formal legal recognition, but also for achieving substantive equality and
transformation of legal, societal and cultural norms across Europe. As Rudolf
explains, these are landmark decisions because the ECtHR found violations not only
under Article 8 with respect to private life, but also under Article 12 on the right to
marry and, by doing so, it overturned previous judgements.450 Therefore, these cases
are important in that they highlight the willingness of the ECtHR to interpret the
Convention dynamically and to set aside anachronistic precedents.

Positive legal developments regarding LGBTQ issues in CoE member-states
and in other countries have an impact on how the ECtHR adjudicates on such issues.
However, the relationship between the ECtHR and states is multidirectional:
Because of the ECtHR and of some EU member-states’ growing recognition of
LGBTQ rights, other EU member-states – usually the newly admitted ones, like
Cyprus – are compelled to review their domestic legal frameworks. For example, in
2002, because of the precedent set by the ECtHR in the Goodwin case, the Cypriot
House of Parliament Legal Affairs Committee was forced to examine the issue of
extending civil marriage rights to trans* individuals.451 When asked about the issue,
an MP stated: ‘In order to get married, the couple must produce documentation
proving who they are, including birth certificates. If they decide to give false papers
... we will not be able to do anything about it, because we will not know. However, it
is not something we will accept.’452 This statement demonstrates that, regardless of

448 Ibid., para. 85.
449 I. v. United Kingdom, 2002 (No. 26580/94). Since this case and the Goodwin case dealt with the
same issue and since the ECtHR delivered its judgement for both cases on the same day, I. v. United
Kingdom adds nothing to Goodwin. The two cases are largely identical.
451 “Amendment Planned to Allow Transsexuals to Marry,” Cyprus Mail, 7 December 2002
<http://www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/amendment-planned-allow-transsexuals-marry> (1 March
2010); “Transsexuals will not be Allowed to Marry in Cyprus, Deputy Insists,” Cyprus Mail, 28
September 2002
< http://www.cyprus-mail.com/akis-agapiou/transsexuals-will-not-be-allowed-marry-cyprus-deputy-
insists> (7 June 2010).
452 “Transsexuals Will not be Allowed to Marry in Cyprus”. Considering that in such cases the
trans* individual, for example a legally male but de facto female person, cannot get married to her
some Greek-Cypriot political elites’ unwillingness to grant LGBTQ citizens equal citizenship rights and of their attempts to deflect their EU obligations, sooner or later they must succumb, even if unwillingly. Therefore, European laws and litigation have the potential to become instruments of transformation at the national level.

Unlike national law in many European countries, the EConvHR and EU law proved to be more open to LGBTQ claims to equal citizenship. Also, in numerous jurisdictions, political action was taken on LGBTQ issues only after European court proceedings were initiated. Through their mechanisms, institutions and bodies, the EU and the CoE are creating at least soft law norms. EU accession processes that compel applicant countries to adopt the acquis communautaire legislation are promising, since the acquis can guarantee fundamental protections for LGBTQs since it encompasses both binding EU law – for example, directives – and non-binding pronouncements by authorities – for example, recommendations, resolutions and opinions. Obviously, not all CoE and EU institutions and bodies raise sexual orientation issues within the context of enlargement. Nonetheless, both the CoE and the European Parliament have done so repeatedly. Additionally, since Article 6(2) of the pre-Lisbon Treaty on European Union linked the EU to the standards set by the EConvHR, it set a foundation for requiring applicant and member-countries to comply with the case-law of the ECtHR that pertains to LGBTQ issues.


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For example, with regard to the right to marry, the ECtHR dissociated sex from chromosomal factors, pointed out that Article 9 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights leaves out the reference to men and women – as opposed to Article 12 of the Convention\(^459\) – and emphasized that the right to marry and to found a family is not based solely on the ability or possibility of procreation.\(^460\) This interpretation of the Court’s stance towards same-sex couples and their right to family life is substantiated by its decision and reasoning in the case of *Schalk & Kopf v. Austria*.\(^461\) The applicants submitted an application against Austria to the ECtHR, claiming a violation of Article 12, of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, and of Article 1 of Protocol 1 because they had been refused the right to marry.

The Court found the applicants’ complaint admissible under Article 12 and under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, but it found no violation of Article 12 or of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8. However, this case is important: The ECtHR did not interpret Article 12 as requiring CoE member-states to allow same-sex couples to marry. Nonetheless, it made it clear that this conclusion can change, when more European countries end the exclusion of same-sex couples from legal marriage. In particular, the Court decided that the reference to ‘men and women’ in Article 12, which was deleted from Article 9 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, no longer means that ‘the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 must in all circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite sex’.\(^462\) Therefore, in the case of *Schalk & Kopf v. Austria*, the Court ruled that same-sex couples enjoy ‘family life’, just as different-sex couples do.\(^463\) In

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European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, Article 6(2) of the pre-Lisbon Treaty on European Union is replaced by Article 6 (3), which reads: ‘Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's law.’

\(^{458}\) Langenkamp, “Finding Fundamental Fairness”, 458. Article 6 (2) states: ‘The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's law.’

\(^{459}\) Article 9 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights states: ‘The right to marry and the right to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these rights.’

\(^{460}\) Rudolf, “European Court of Human Rights”, 717.

\(^{461}\) *Schalk and Kopf v. Austria*, 2010 (No. 30141/04).

\(^{462}\) Ibid., para. 61.

\(^{463}\) The most important part of the Court’s judgment for same-sex couples is its finding that Article 14 was applicable in combination with the ‘respect for family life’ branch of Article 8. See: *Schalk and Kopf v. Austria*, paragraphs 93-94. The paragraphs read: ‘The Court notes that ... a rapid evolution of social attitudes towards same-sex couples has taken place in many member States. Since
this way, this judgment left open the possibility that the absence of any form of registered partnership law for same-sex couples could violate the Convention. Pending and future applications by same-sex couples will allow the Court to address this issue.

In the case of *E.B. v. France*, the Court extended the principle that sexual orientation cannot be cited as a negative factor in deciding upon custody cases.\(^{464}\) In this case, the adoption claim of an unmarried lesbian woman who was cohabiting with another woman was rejected by the state based on the woman’s ‘lifestyle’, as well as on what the state deemed as inability on her part ‘to provide a child with a family image revolving around a parental couple such as to afford safeguards for that child’s stable and well-adjusted development’.\(^{465}\) The Court found a violation of Article 14 combined with Article 8 and stated that ‘the domestic authorities made a distinction based on considerations regarding [the applicant’s] sexual orientation, a distinction which is not acceptable under the Convention’.\(^{466}\) This is a very important decision, since the Court demonstrated transformation in its reasoning pertaining to LGBTQ issues: The Court found a violation even though the lesbian woman had no genetic link with the – as yet unidentified – child. Recently, the Court declared admissible an application from a same-sex couple which concerns adoption by one woman of the child born to the other woman through donor insemination – a ‘second-parent’ adoption case.\(^{467}\) This case was heard by a Chamber of the Court on 12 April 2011, and judgement is awaited.\(^{468}\) It will be interesting to see whether the Court will satisfy the applicants’ claim and extend its reasoning in *E.B v. France* from an individual lesbian woman to a lesbian couple.

In the same spirit, regarding LGBTQ associations and the right to freedom of expression, assembly and association that Articles 10 and 11 guarantee, in

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\(^{464}\) *E.B. v. France*, 2008 (No. 43546/02).

\(^{465}\) Ibid., para. 10.

\(^{466}\) Ibid., para. 96.

\(^{467}\) *Gas and Dubois v. France*, 2010 (No. 25951/07).

\(^{468}\) Chamber Hearing in the Case of *Gas and Dubois v. France*, 12 April 2011 (Registrar of the Court Press Release No. 324).
**Bączkowski v. Poland** the Court found that the state’s refusal to grant a permit for the LGBT Pride March in Warsaw in June 2005 constituted a violation of Article 11, as well as of Article 14 combined with Article 11.\(^{469}\) On the same issue, the Court delivered a stronger judgement in *Alekseyev v. Russia*, which concerned several banned LGBT Pride Marches in Moscow.\(^{470}\) In this case, the Court unanimously decided that there had been a violation of Article 11, of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 11 and of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 11.

Therefore, as the decisions and the reasoning of the Court in the above-mentioned cases demonstrate, the ECtHR transcended the heterosexual binary and it detached sex from biology, gender from sex, gender-identification from biological sex and familial relationships from procreation and sexuality. To conclude, conversely to earlier critiques of the ECtHR’s approach to LGBTQ issues as conservative,\(^{471}\) the case-law of the last decade illustrates that the ECtHR has moved from a ‘morality-based’ approach to a ‘European-consensus’ approach, which is very promising for LGBTQ individuals, couples, families and movements. Therefore, as part of a larger strategy, European human rights litigation is of great practical, strategic and symbolic value for LGBTQs, since European human rights law and the ECtHR are progressively and increasingly accepting alternative gender and sexual identities.\(^{472}\)

\(^{469}\) *Bączkowski v. Poland*, 2007 (No. 1543/06).

\(^{470}\) *Alekseyev v. Russia*, 2010 (No. 4916/07, 25924/08, and 14599/09).


\(^{472}\) For LGBTQ people in countries like Cyprus, which do not meet the LGBTQ-relevant legal standards on which there is an established ‘European consensus’, the ‘European consensus’ approach is extremely helpful. Nonetheless, the ‘European consensus’ approach could be frustrating for LGBTQs in countries where the national law guarantees more rights to LGBTQs than those demanded in order to comply with ‘European consensus’ on LGBTQ issues. This is because their applications to the ECtHR are unlikely to succeed, since they are probably complaining about family law issues (marriage and adoption) with regard to which there is not yet sufficient ‘European consensus’. The case of *Schalk and Kopf v. Austria* is illustrative of how the ECtHR is not in a position to satisfy the demands of LGBTQs, when the respondent state fares better than the majority of other signatory states with regard to LGBTQ legal equality.
The Promises and Perils of a Legal and Identity-Based Approach

The language of rights, including the language of human rights, has the ability to correct legal and judicial biases and consequently to alter cultural and social norms. This section will suggest how LGBTQ movements could invoke and use human rights law and discourse to their benefit, while avoiding the perils that might be implicit in the language of human rights. This process involves five aspects: LGBTQ narratives; an alternative understanding of morality; the stressing of rights over needs and interests; the re-conceptualization of the rights-litigation relationship; and NGOs’ activities.

False stereotypes about marginalized groups result not from personal experience, but from cultural transmission in the form of narrative and storytelling. The ‘homosexuality narrative’ reduces LGBTQs to one-dimensional creatures and to exclusively sexual beings, which are defined solely by their sex and sexuality and which are likely to corrupt or abuse adolescents, if not children. The ‘family narrative’ presents them as incapable of providing a healthy role model to minors and therefore assumes them to be a peril to the institution of the (heterocentric) family. It has been argued that such narratives influence judicial decision-making and affect its impartiality towards LGBTQ subjects. However, LGBTQ narratives presented in litigation proceedings actually have the power to counter prejudices by refuting false stereotypes. Therefore, their articulation in popular culture, legal scholarship and courtroom advocacy is necessary in order to

inform judges, lawyers and legal scholars and consequently achieve a shift in predominant norms and attitudes.\textsuperscript{475}

Judicial narratives can serve as catalysts for changing social norms, since they have the ability to incorporate and validate ‘outsider’ narratives.\textsuperscript{476} By validating such narratives, the law and the courts function as social engineers and cause these narratives to disseminate into society. This is because judicial decisions have effects beyond the parties who appear before the courts.\textsuperscript{477} Moreover, courts influence both their own and other societies, since national legal decisions assume transnational validity, especially within the EU context. Additionally, these influences are not merely symbolic. As the case of Modinos exemplified, they are also practical, since they often result in legal amendments at the national level.

Furthermore, the negotiation of gender and sexual legal identity in court is both inevitable and productive and it could be framed as a power struggle, in which the stakes are self-determination and self-definition.\textsuperscript{478} Through her American case-law analysis, Richman concludes that the construction of identity in the law is not a one-way process. Through litigation, LGBTQs presented self-images that contradict those to which the courts had been accustomed. In doing so, they asserted their own understandings and expressions of selfhood and power. By their mere standing before the law they have forced it, if not to formally recognize, at least to confront and document the existence of alternative sexualities and familial lives.\textsuperscript{479}

Altering predominant negative perceptions also necessitates asserting alternative sexualities and gender self-perceptions as not immoral. Instead of trying to show that LGBTQ lifestyles are non-oppositional to traditional understandings of morality, LGBTQ movements should strive to portray a different understanding of morality through the invocation of human rights discourse and the pursuit of litigation. According to Nowlin, this should be based on a critical moral thinking that is inspired by John Stuart Mill’s understanding of morality as critical morality.\textsuperscript{480} He

\textsuperscript{475} For a less optimistic view on the ability to evade judicial biases see: Herman, \emph{Rights of Passage}, 128-44.  
\textsuperscript{476} Lin, “Social Norms and Judicial Decisionmaking”, 739&751.  
\textsuperscript{477} Ibid., 766-7; See also: Richman, “Lovers, Legal Strangers, and Parents”, 286-8.  
\textsuperscript{478} Richman, “Lovers, Legal Strangers, and Parents”, 290.  
\textsuperscript{479} Ibid., 317-18.  
explains that Mill saw morality in utilitarian terms; that is, as a matter of social well-being or harmfulness and as justice and fairness or social harm and personal injury, which arises from breaches of contract. Thus, Mill’s understanding of morality dissociates the concept of morality from sexual activity, since the immorality of activities relates not necessarily to their unlawfulness, since the law per se could be unjust, but to the dishonesty, the unfairness or the selfishness that they involve. Consequently, non-heterosexual sexual acts, like all sexual acts, are not per se immoral, but only if they are immoral acts involving sexual circumstance; that is, if they involve non-consensual exploitation of others. Therefore, legal moralism and moral majoritarianism, which are premised on common or established conceptions of morality, should be abandoned in favour of a moralism that is premised on understanding, pluralism, tolerance and respect for differences.\textsuperscript{481} The ECtHR case-law analysis illustrated that the Court seems to be moving towards this direction.

Rights sceptics raised the argument that stressing interests and needs is a better strategy than engaging in the ‘myth of rights’, which ignores real life experiences and power structures. Hunt disagrees with this position and argues that law and rights could affect not only legal change, but not real emancipation and social transformation. He explains that the ‘counter-hegemonic’ political strategy envisioned by human rights critics actually requires a transition from the ‘discourse of interests’ to the ‘discourse of rights’.\textsuperscript{482} This is because as a transcendent project, counter-hegemony necessitates the employment of hegemonic discourses – like the human rights discourse – since such an employment introduces elements that transcend the discourse itself. Through such a process, elements once dominant are being used to eventually give way to new ones.\textsuperscript{483}

This is true in the case of LGBTQ equality and to the role of the ECtHR towards achieving it. ECtHR litigation on privacy and discrimination opened the door to the recognition of family and marriage rights and gradually to the recognition of adoption, assisted procreation, education, health care, housing, inheritance and other rights. Additionally, in this litigation the Court highlighted both the negative and the positive obligations that states have towards their citizens. Therefore, the

\textsuperscript{481} Ibid., 266-77.
language of human rights and the Court do not conceptualize LGBTQs as solely sexual beings, but as citizens who deserve protection and as individuals with emotional, intimate and familial relations to one another. Moreover, even if the law per se is part of the problem of LGBTQ subordination, arguing that it is possible for a movement or a group to achieve transformation and transcendence while refusing to engage with the conditions within which social change is grounded is delusional.\textsuperscript{484}

Williams also stresses the importance of a rights defence.\textsuperscript{485} She argues that the view that the utility of rights is gained at the expense of larger issues is erroneous because rights are not posed against, but are asserted on behalf of social reform.\textsuperscript{486} The ‘need versus right’ argument is a word game because unless ‘needs’ are transformed into a form of rights, they have no bite. Writing on the black struggle for civil rights in the US, Williams explains that although black people were describing their needs for generations, this only resulted in legislation overlooking these self-described needs. Historically, rights served as the political mechanism through which this denial of need, of name and reference, of existence and humanity was eventually confronted.\textsuperscript{487} Claims to needs and interests are not self-legitimating. To assert a need or interest as the basis for this need’s legitimization is a bad, circular argument. Conversely, in various and numerous instances, social interests were legitimized through the deployment of the rights discourse and of human rights litigation.

Additionally, there is substantial gain in the pursuit of rights strategies since rights do not only stand for litigation. Litigation deployment is but one aspect of a ‘counter-hegemonic rights strategy’ that is primarily a political rather than a legal process. As such, it is responsive to fears that human rights atomize issues or that they take away from the political substance of the objectives of social movements.\textsuperscript{488} Litigation and rights are vehicles to political emancipation, though not exclusively and in isolation from other strategies. They do not only involve or premise struggles and contests, but they are contestable themselves. Consequently, as part of a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{484} Hunt, “Rights and Social Movements,” 320.
\item \textsuperscript{487} Williams, “Alchemical Notes,” 410-16.
\item \textsuperscript{488} Hunt, “Rights and Social Movements,” 317; Smith, “Social Movements and Equality Seeking”.
\end{itemize}
movement’s strategies, judicial analysis of rights does make a difference, but without itself being deterministic of conditions and outcomes. As Williams phrased it, ‘rights are to law what conscious commitments are to the psyche’. This means that rights and the law are not themselves constricting, but they become that when they are limited in a constricted plane; and it is when they are not challenged from within and based on their own terms, or when they are abandoned as inherently problematic that the discourses of rights and law remain constricted and become constricting towards new discourses.

For that reason, rights and the law should be interpreted and approached as a communal language of social contexts, in which norms can be generated and assigned meaning. Legal rights are not trumps, but a language of progress with only temporal resting points, from which new claims can be made; from which conflict is not generated but is given voice. If they are understood and approached as a vocabulary for organizing relationships within communities and institutions, rights become flexible without this emasculating their legitimacy. In sum, if used critically through an interpretive framework, they can shift the balance and create new connections between meanings and power.

There is then, a considerable degree of agreement in the relevant literature that the relationship between law, rights, (sexual) identities and human relations is dynamic and reciprocal. Though a specific social space and a particular set of cultural practices, the law provides the context for political struggles. While it delineates the parameters within which the representation of human relations becomes possible, its language is not fixed or unchangeable. On the contrary, it has the ability and does generate new meaning of the very same legal terms and identities through which social relations are produced and policed. Therefore, although the truth about sexuality is produced through legal practice, legal practice also becomes a vehicle for producing and (re)imagining the truth of sexuality.

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490 Williams, “Alchemical Notes,” 424.
491 Minow, “Interpreting Rights”.
492 Ibid., 1876-97; See also: Herman, Rights of Passage, 54-76.
493 Moran, The Homosexual(ity) of Law, 2-11.
Consequently, law and its language ‘ought to be recognized as an important means of mobilization, as a way of fashioning the present’. 494

Nonetheless, and specifically for the purposes of this project, the question remains whether this relationship between law and the language of rights and identities, on the one hand, and social relations (including sexuality) and their representations, on the other hand, holds at the transnational level. Moreover, opinions divide as to whether it is progress in national legislation and judicial interpretations that propels similar changes at the regional and international level, 495 or if it is progress on the regional and international levels that disseminates into the national level. 496 However, framing the question in this way obscures the fact that in an era of globalization, the relationship between the national and the regional/international level is increasingly becoming reciprocal. National changes towards LGBTQs – legal, social or cultural – influence the regional and international level. Similarly, changes at the regional and international level inspire change at the national level. It is an interactive and balanced process. As such, it provides – at least partially – a response to accusations that progressive regional courts – such as the ECtHR – engage in judicial activism and transcend their interpretive role by engaging in a legislative process that trumps national legislative procedures.

This reciprocal process between the national and the regional/international level also draws attention to the role that both national and international NGOs can play in the promotion of LGBTQ human rights, especially in countries where national laws and policies suppress LGBTQ communities. For example, Canadians see themselves as tolerant towards difference and the majority of public opinion sides with LGBTQs’ objectives. In Canada, there is no well-organized religious opposition against same-sex sexuality, 497 courts are progressive and the administration is sympathetic, if not supportive, of LGBTQ-friendly judicial

494 Ibid., 9.
497 Even in the predominantly Roman Catholic Quebec, starting in 1959 with the Quiet Revolution, the Roman Catholic Church’s institutional and social influence has progressively been considerably limited. Thus, it had to reconsider its stance on issues such as sexuality. For example, see: Benoit Laplante, “The Rise of Cohabitation in Quebec: Power of Religion and Power over Religion,” The Canadian Journal of Sociology, vol. 31, no. 1 (2006): 1-24.
In such a setting things are much easier. But where religious, political and other opposition to LGBTQ movements thrives – like in the US and in some European countries, like Cyprus – international NGOs could function as a link between national movements and unite them against state suppression through transnational action.

Hagland argues that the ability of NGOs to interact not only with states but with non-state actors also, gives them the character of transnational organizations. As such, they unite groups beyond national boundaries and therefore, they are able to bypass unfriendly state systems. In this way, not only do they affect state policies by exercising pressure, but they also facilitate the transformation of social and cultural attitudes that support oppressive policies. This process begins at home and becomes transnational through interaction among non-state actors. In its turn, transnational interaction among non-state actors complements NGOs’ international and intergovernmental activity, which is important for increasing LGBTQ movements’ visibility and voice within and across states, as well as in international fora. Additionally, since NGOs play an important role in the monitoring and advocacy of human rights, international institutions like the United Nations Human Rights Committee increasingly rely on their work.

Several valid claims have been raised about the limitations of the rights discourse with regard to achieving substantive equality. For example, Lehr argues that by equating ‘freedom’ and ‘exercising choice’ with rights and the institutional structures that rights serve – for example, marriage and the heteronormative family – the rights language inhibits questioning what ‘freedom’ really means. She argues that a rights-based approach does not really challenge power, but only allows the already privileged gays and lesbians to gain more access to it, since rights take issues of

500 Ibid., 384 & 387-8.
501 Nicole Laviolette and Sandra Whitworth, “No Safe Haven: Sexuality as a Universal Human Right and Gay and Lesbian Activism in International Politics,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 23, no. 3 (1994): 576. For example, ILGA-Europe enjoys consultative status at the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and participative status at the CoE, while it receives financial support from the European Commission. It is also a member of the Platform of European Social NGOs. Therefore, it is in a position to initiate and fund research and projects about LGBTQ issues in Europe.
debate out of politics and thus reduce the importance of collective decision-making and of mutual self-creation.\textsuperscript{502} Therefore, Lehr suggests that social movements turn to ‘radical democratic politics’, which involve cultural struggle instead of legal process. She prompts LGBTQ activists to understand identity as less fixed and as a function of history and public discourse and consequently to locate subjects and their rights in the contexts of their lives.\textsuperscript{503} Lehr concludes that this radical approach to the politics of sexuality would allow LGBTQs to participate in the construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of their identities, and to think of themselves not as mere subjects but as agents.\textsuperscript{504}

Human rights law and identity discourse’s complicity in the perpetuation of essentialisms have been justly and successfully criticized by numerous queer theorists. To be sure, law and the language of right and identities are implicated in the reinforcement, if not in the creation, of classes of exclusion. However, there are not only stakes in law and in rights; there are also opportunities and spaces for resistance.\textsuperscript{505} For example, although Leslie J. Moran points to the ‘romantic politics of sentimental and nostalgic domesticity’ that grounded the recognition of same-sex civil partnership in the UK, he does not reject this politics in total or same-sex civil partnership per se. Rather, he argues that this politics ‘needs to be sustained in conjunction with a perspective that does not shy away from the perils of domesticity: a diabolical romance’.\textsuperscript{506}


\textsuperscript{503} Lehr, \textit{Queer Family Values}, 38-42. Lehr agrees with Weeks (1995) and Kaplan (1997) that scholars who study gender and sexuality need to focus less on abstract rights and instead recognize the limits of liberal individualism and the need to locate individuals and their rights and needs in the contexts of their lives. See: Weeks, \textit{Invented Moralities}, 140-54; Kaplan, \textit{Sexual Justice}.

\textsuperscript{504} Lehr, \textit{Queer Family Values}, 99-101.


Butler also explicates that she does not reject rights, although she disagrees with the ways they are conceptualized, as well as with the premises on which they are recognized and put into practice.\textsuperscript{507} Using lesbian and gay marriage as an example, she argues that its promotion as the norm of organizing sexuality and kinship reinforces assimilationist and essentialist norms, and thus threatens to render illegitimate and abject those sexual and familial arrangements that do not comply to its form.\textsuperscript{508} Hence, she proposes disarticulating rights and obligations currently associated with marriage so that rights and obligations of kinship may take many forms, while marriage is retained only as a symbolic practice, available for those who wish to pursue it.\textsuperscript{509}

Through this approach, Butler attempts to move away from the ‘essentialist versus constructionist binaries’. She explains that in the language of rights and as subjects before the law, individuals and groups have to stand as delineated and as defined by sameness in order to secure legal protections or entitlements. These legal definitions are not adequately descriptive of who people are. Nonetheless, LGBTQ movements need to make legal claims as part of the political task of remaking reality and reconstituting the human in ways that are liveable. International human rights are a means of intervening in legal, social and political processes by which the human is articulated, and of subjecting the human to an ongoing process of redefinition and renegotiation.\textsuperscript{510} There is a double path in the language of human rights: asserting entitlements in ways that affirm the constitutive role of gender and sexuality, but also subjecting these categories to scrutiny. This is a process of

cultural translation that brings together the two paths, thus leading to ethical and social transformation.511

Admittedly, the approach that I suggest – one that is based on strategic identity politics and aims to secure rights – may imperil those modalities of sexuality and desire which legal narratives and the concept of identity do not grasp or include. I am not arguing that there is no place for queer conception of sexualities in the Cypriot discursive landscape. What I am arguing is that a strategic utilization of identities and of the European human rights discourse would actually expand the space in which several types of desire could be articulated and expressed. In sum, the strategy I propose does not negate queer understandings of sexualities. Rather, through the use of already established and institutionalized identities, it seeks to open a ‘first door’ for Cypriot LGBTQs out of invisibility and into the current structures of power; to allow them to put a foot into the public arena and to be heard.

As Weeks argues, it is possible to find a way out of the dilemma between the ‘discourse of rights’ and the ‘discourse of emancipation’. This exit point is what he calls ‘radical pluralism’. Weeks’s ‘radical pluralism’ is a language of, and approach to (sexual) politics that recognizes the positive value of diversity. As such, ‘radical pluralism’ escapes both the difficulties that the assumed universality of rights creates when rights are actually placed within specific socio-political and cultural contexts, and the uncertainties and conflicts over the meaning, representativeness and aims of an emancipatory project.512 Nonetheless, Weeks’s radical moral pluralism is premised on certain key ideas. One of them is the presupposition of certain ‘rights of everyday life’. These are the right to difference, the right to space of personal life, the right to exit from minorities and the freedom of voice, which is a ‘public freedom’ and ‘the guarantee of all the freedoms and rights of everyday life’.513

By applying Weeks’s suggestions to the case of Cypriot LGBTQ sexual politics, the need to assure the right to speak and to be heard becomes even more evident. As the analysis of the Modinos case highlighted, within the Cypriot context, the discourse and the legal mechanisms of ‘Europe’ are currently the most effective – if not the only – way for LGBTQs to be heard. This is more the case since

progressive and emancipatory political projects – as opposed to cautious and strategic initial approaches – carry the peril of backfiring and engendering even direr socio-political effects.\textsuperscript{514} Once the freedom to speak and to be heard is guaranteed, Cypriot LGBTQs would be able to move away from particularist rights-based demands and fight for the freedom to diversity and pluralism.

In sum, rights through politicized identity employment do not necessarily only bind and regulate personhood.\textsuperscript{515} Rather, they can emancipate the subjects produced through regulatory discourses – such as LGBTQ subjects – since ‘they function to encourage possibility through discursive denial of historically layered and institutionally secured bounds, by denying with words the effects of relatively wordless, politically invisible, yet potent material constraints’.\textsuperscript{516} Namely, rights transcend the level of the legal and of the political and operate on the level of the symbolic. Therefore, they do not only confer a position within temporal and spatial power structures. They also confer the possibility to perpetually push the boundaries of the universal or not so universal, historical or a-historical, cultural or a-cultural, contextual or a-contextual notion of ‘humanity’. This is a type of an anti-essentialist first-step choice, when one has to balance powerful nationalist discourses and masculinist state prerogatives with sexual equality objectives.

\section*{Conclusion}

The EComHR declared Marangos’s case admissible only based on his allegation of an Article 8 violation, while in 1998 the ECtHR refused to examine the case, since it reasoned that the principle in question had already been established in earlier cases. In the \textit{Modinos} case, the ECtHR did not go beyond the examination of same-sex sexuality vis-à-vis the right to privacy or beyond the examination of the legality of homosexuality’s criminalization. Therefore, when viewed solely from a legal perspective, these two cases are not as indicative of the development of the Court’s reasoning with regard to LGBTQ rights, as cases of the 2000s and 2010s are.


\textsuperscript{516} Ibid., 134.
Nonetheless, the importance of the Marangos, and especially of the Modinos case rests on the fact that they had a great impact on Cypriot society and on Cypriot predominant narratives of sexuality. Once questions about non-heterosexual sexuality became the focal point of public debate because of these two cases, the progressive weakening of institutional discourses became unavoidable.

This is exactly why legal narratives and mechanisms are so important in struggles for sexual equality. Though when seen from a purely legal lens some European legal narratives and litigation might appear to be of limited importance, their local/national level effects are far greater. Therefore, they constitute the best available route towards sexual equality especially in places, like Cyprus, where other avenues are limited or even inexistent, as a result of the pervasiveness of oppressive official discourses. Moreover, legal narratives and litigation that take place at the regional/European level are significant because European legal institutions are norm-setters. That is, their reasoning and decisions are – more or less willingly and sooner or later – adopted by individual states. Nonetheless, the legal and identity approach is not without problems.

In some cases, LGBTQ movements strategically focus on assuming a fixed identity, in order to facilitate their entrance into mainstream power politics. Nonetheless, an identity structured with the purpose to appeal to a communicative environment that is wary of alternative conceptualizations of gender and sexuality is inherently problematic. By employing identity politics, social movements may create classes of exclusion similar to the ones they oppose. Although the notion of a fixed identity assists mobilization, external communication and internal coherence it may alienate a number of LGBTQs, if it does not resonate with their self-understandings. Therefore, instead of only trying to enter mainstream discourses and their institutions, LGBTQ movements also need to discern and challenge the forces that necessitate the construction, internalization, and communication of such identities.

Advocates of progressive ‘politics of freedom’ and ‘radical democracy’ correctly expose the perils that the invocation of mainstream discourses entails. To be sure, conceptualizing identities as the foundation of rights and as the point of reference of desire leaves power-structure problems intact. However, some queer theory approaches are also limited, since they do not transcend the objects of their own critique – that is liberalism and rights – or articulate practical solutions beyond
the rhetorical level. Such approaches understand human rights as conceptualized, recognized and exercised on the basis of sexual and gender identities that reinforce heterosexuality and other classes of exclusion. Although such scepticism is not without merit, it is sometimes based on a narrow understanding of rights and of rights’ relation to democratic political processes.

Empirical findings about the beneficial effects of human rights for excluded groups and individuals should not be ignored. There is a transformative and self-transformative aspect in rights and in the law: Although they shape identities and partake in discourses of power they also provide a basis for contesting and rearticulating rights and identities. This compels us to find a way to achieve both formal and substantive legal, social and cultural equality, while retaining the distinctive lives and self-understandings of LGBTQ people.

A great part of the answer sought is to be found in LGBTQ human rights litigation. In the ECtHR litigation, LGBTQ subjects have been recognized not only as private individuals but also as parents, family members and members of society who deserve public recognition and support. The Court has progressively transcended gender binarism and has detached sex from biology, gender from sex and self-identification from sex and gender normativity. Consequently, as part of a larger project, European LGBTQ human rights litigation is extremely promising for LGBTQ movements. Legal mechanisms are not a panacea to the problems that the LGBTQ community faces, but they provide an impetus towards fundamental change. Prevailing social ideas help shape the law, so it cannot stand outside culture and autonomously change it. But if culture and the law are in productive tension, then the law could shape society and culture as much as they shape it. The process is mutual: culture gives meaning to law, and law to culture. Therefore, law is flexible enough to accept sexuality as a fluid concept.

An invocation of human rights that could maximize benefits and eliminate perils for LGBTQ movements is a process that consists of five aspects. The first aspect pertains to LGBTQ narratives. False stereotypes are created by traditional narratives that reduce LGBTQs to exclusively sexual creatures that are incapable to participate in familial worlds. These narratives affect judicial decision-making on LGBTQ issues. Yet, LGBTQ narratives could counter these prejudices, deconstruct false stereotypes and shift the norms towards substantive equality.
The second aspect involves promoting an alternative understanding of morality. Morality as critical moral thinking is detached from sexual activity, legal moralism and moral majoritarianism and it is premised on understanding, pluralism, tolerance, and respect of difference.

The third aspect entails prioritizing rights over needs and interests, since the language of rights is vested with legitimacy and, therefore, can propel social change. For that reason, the human rights discourse needs to be used as part of a transformative and emancipatory project.

The fourth aspect is premised on the re-conceptualization of the rights-litigation relationship. Rights do not only stand for litigation. Rights, the law and litigation need to be approached as a language through which norms are debated, interpreted, generated and reformed.

The fifth aspect highlights the role of NGOs in the promotion of LGBTQ human rights. Through transnational action, NGOs serve as a link between national movements, non-state actors across borders and supranational institutions. Such multi-sectional invocation of human rights is promising for LGBTQ movements, since it helps to move from a formalistic to a substantive approach of equality. It does so by understanding gender and sexuality not as types of fixed identity that must be moulded to fit restricted settings, but as fundamental dimensions of one’s humanity.

In the past, the discourses and the values that are embedded in the concept of ‘Europeanization’ have been strategically limited to their external dimensions both by the Greek-Cypriot and by the Turkish-Cypriot political elite, in order to gain advantage over external enemies. Nonetheless, as the Modinos v. Cyprus case illustrates, through the employment of European mechanisms and values even a single individual can redefine agency over the negotiation of identity and place sexuality and gender in the centre of public debate and action. More such moves could stimulate the generation of a grassroots group consciousness and subsequently lead to more extensive social mobilization.

However, it should not be ignored that the effectiveness of any type of strategy is inextricably linked to individuals and groups’ willingness to mobilize. Namely, unless Cypriot LGBTQs realize the importance of political mobilization,

there is not much point in efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of strategic techniques. Therefore, Cypriot LGBTQs’ self-perceptions and their views about law, rights and political organization and mobilization, as well as the effects of official discourses on personal narratives will be the focus of the next chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR

Cypriot LGBTQ Perceptions: Narrating and Constructing the Self amidst Dominant Discursive Regimes
Introduction

This chapter examines how Cypriot LGBTQs construct and negotiate self-perceptions and their identities amidst dominant gender, sexuality and nationhood discourses. It explores how both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQ individuals who do not conform to the predominant heteronormative discourse understand, interpret, articulate, legitimize or participate in the disapprobation of their sexual desires and practices, in the process of situating themselves within their social, political and cultural environment. It discusses how these LGBTQ self-understandings relate to existing theories about non-heterosexual desire and identities. It also examines whether and how the theories and the self-perceptions under examination stimulate or inhibit certain types of political mobilization and activism.

Given the preceding discussion about the impact of prevailing nationalist, gender and sexuality discourses on the delineation of ‘acceptable’ and ‘imaginable’ subjectivities, it is evident that power resides in the ability to name both the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. What we call ourselves – and what we call others – has immense implications for political practice. Therefore, studying how Cypriot LGBTQs construct themselves via naming and narrating the ‘Self’ and to what extent their articulations could be perceived as ‘political’ – with the term being broadly defined as any action or inaction that has the impetus to challenge the political status quo – is important.

Addressing questions about Cypriot sexual subjectivities and LGBTQ identities by drawing upon Cypriot LGBTQ individuals’ own perceptions and self-perceptions is pertinent. This task is important not only because such questions have not been sufficiently addressed in the existing literature, but also because some of the few attempts to address such questions were overtly and unapologetically based exclusively on heterosexual Cypriots’ perceptions of the non-heterosexual ‘Other’. For example, in his PhD thesis, Andreas Onoufriou claims that through his interaction with graduate and ex-graduate students, he could not find any female student who identified as a lesbian. As a result, he ends up discussing lesbian desire based on interviews with heterosexual female participants, ‘who were telling stories

of female friends who went through the pains and the fears of negotiating lesbian desire’. The claim that ‘in his research on gendered subjectivities among students, [he] was unable to find a single case he could identify as a lesbian currently living in Cyprus’ is reported – and reinforced – by Cynthia Cockburn, while very recently, Onoufriou once more drew conclusions about lesbian subjectivities in Cyprus based solely on female heterosexuals’ narrations about lesbians.

To be sure, finding Cypriots who reside in Cyprus and who identify, or admit that they identify, as LGBTQ and convincing them to give an interview about their sexual identities and self-perceptions is not an easy task. Nonetheless, ‘in proxy’ discussions of LGBTQ subjectivities might do more harm than good: Attempting to locate and socially situate the ‘other’ – that is, the LGBTQ individual – based exclusively on the perceptions and understandings of the ‘dominant’ – that is, of the heterosexual male – or of the ‘not-so-othered’ – that is, the heterosexual (white, middle or upper-class) female – about the ‘other’ reiterates difference. Moreover, it alienates and further silences LGBTQ individuals, while it deprives them of any possibility of exercising agency.

This thesis aims to be both a political and an ethical project. In alignment with feminist approaches, the thesis in its whole, but particularly this chapter, aims to reclaim and to validate the experiences of Cypriot LGBTQ individuals and therefore to challenge the heterocentric and nationalist-centred monopoly of truth. Listening to Cypriot LGBTQs and attempting to make sense of their perspectives on their own experiences fills in a gap in the currently existing literature. Nonetheless, it is important to point out that I do not consider the present work to be ‘truer’ than other work about Cypriot sexual subjectivities. Namely, I do not assume that Cypriot LGBTQ voices offer an insight into any kind of reality or that an ontological

519 Onoufriou, “In Search of Voices,” 213.
520 Cockburn, The Line, 135.
521 Andreas Onoufriou, “Falling in love with someone from your own sex is like going against Cyprus itself...” discourses towards heterosexual and female-to-female subjectivities at the University of Cyprus,” Journal of Gender Studies, vol. 18, no. 1 (2009), 13-23.
522 Similar arguments have been raised and elaborated by numerous feminist theorists who have attempted to expose the essentialisms embedded in ‘first’ and ‘second wave’ feminism which, arguably, were premised on a universal female identity that was, nonetheless, prioritizing the experiences and needs of upper and middle-class white women. It is not the purpose of this chapter to address the whole variety of such arguments or discuss all the strands of feminist theory that represent such arguments. However, bell hooks could be referred to as one of the feminist authors who have produced seminal work on feminist essentialisms. For example, see: bell, hooks. Ain’t I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism. Boston, MA: South End Press, 1981.
523 Kitzinger, Celia, “Feminist Approaches”.
and ‘pure’ ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’, ‘bisexual’, ‘trans*’ or ‘queer’ identity, which constitutes a prerequisite for speaking and/or understanding ‘true’ LGBTQ ‘essence’, exists.\footnote{As Heaphy, Weeks and Donovan explain, ‘the interview does not represent the story of respondents’ intimate lives, but rather a particular narrative ... that is likely, at least to some extent, to be framed in the language that the researcher brings to the interview (461)’. Moreover: ‘With regard to our respondents’ accounts, we cannot claim that our findings reveal the essential truth about non-heterosexual life today. That was not our intention, nor do we believe that it is possible (466).’ Therefore, the research objective is ‘not so much to demonstrate final truths, but rather to understand the consequences of telling a particular story under specific circumstances (467)’. See: Brian Heaphy, Jeffrey Weeks, and Catherine Donovan, ‘“That’s Like my Life: Researching Stories of Non-Heterosexual Relationships,” Sexualities, vol. 1, no. 4 (1998): 453-70.}

Nevertheless, making arguments about the self-perceptions of Cypriot LGBTQs while claiming that it has not been possible to find Cypriot LGBTQs to speak about their selves and perceptions, and basing arguments on data collected by working only with heterosexual individuals reinforces Cypriot LGBTQs’ invisibility. Additionally, it reiterates the difference between the ‘researcher-as-all-knower’ and the ‘researched-as-calculable’, as well as the difference between the heterosexual subject as the authority over matters of sexuality and the non-heterosexual subject as the non-agentic object of science.

Cypriot LGBTQs self-perceptions are important to study, since they reveal the interesting interplay between such self-perceptions and dominant discourses, not least that of national identity. Such a study also reveals how LGBTQ identifications are implicated in the creation and perpetuation of in-group exclusions and alienations. This helps highlight that identities, including gender and sexual identities, are not rigid and fixed. Rather, they are formed, debated and reformed as part of a constant process of seeking to be recognized and legitimized by those same forces that render them ‘inappropriate’ and ‘unthinkable’. Namely, identity formation and gender and sexuality articulation are situated within a matrix of power, within which each ‘player’ seeks to position herself and secure her position by both challenging dominant identities, and by dominating more inferior ‘others’. As this chapter will argue, this process also exposes the malleability of gender and sexual hierarchies. Therefore, this process is promising towards challenging the Cypriot discursive status quo.

The research problems that this chapter addresses are firstly, how LGBTQ participants locally produce contexts for their interaction and secondly, why and to what extent they are affected by institutional and socio-cultural constraints. The objective is to understand the possibilities and the limits of attempts at social
reform. In deciding how to approach these problems methodologically and analytically, I have chosen to employ an amalgam of tools that are used in conversation, narrative and discursive analysis, while adopting a Foucaultian approach to the question of power/knowledge and of technologies/techniques of the self.

My choice has been informed primarily by the variety of data I collected – individual interviews, group interviews, participant observation through naturally occurring talk, archive material and questionnaires. Such a variety of data necessitated approaching them from several different angles, in order to make the best use of them. In accordance with ‘continental’ Foucaultian discourse analysis, my empirical research material revealed that, in the case of Cyprus, there exist numerous overlapping and conflicting, defined or undefined, articulated or non-articulated ‘discourses’ about each topic. Such discourses were employed by different interviewees or by the same interviewee at different instances during the interview. This forced me to move my attention beyond language-as-language and to understand discourse ‘as the result of collusion: [as] the conditions of the political, social and linguistic practice [that] impose themselves practically behind the back of the subjects, while the actors do not see through the game’. The material itself also highlighted the need to focus on interrelationships between elements/discourses, rather than on individual elements/discourses.

In order to address the questions that arise from the interplay between Cypriot LGBTQ self-perceptions and official dominant discourses, this chapter will be based on research data analysis, and specifically on interview analysis, which will be structured around themes. Drawing upon Foucault’s work, the analysis will be

526 For a detailed discussion of my thesis research design (recruitment, sampling, ethics and interview process), methodological approach and analytical perspective, please see the introductory chapter of this thesis.
528 It should be stressed that, in agreement with most analysts of Foucault, when I refer to a Foucaultian approach or framework I do not claim that Foucault offers – or aimed to offer – a complete, step-by-step theoretical or methodological formula. In my attempt to examine the issue of the processes of self-identification among Cypriot LGBTQs, I employ the Foucaultian oeuvre as a toolbox. See: Gavin Kendall and Gary Wickham, “The Foucaultian Framework,” in *Qualitative Research Practice*, ed. Clive Seale et al. (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 129-38; Kendall and Wickham. Using Foucault’s Methods.
premised on three intersecting and mutually supportive pillars. These are: subjectivity, governmentality and power/knowledge.

According to Foucault, subjectivity formation – also referred to as ‘subjectivization’ – denotes the different subject positions in discourse. This means that the production of the subject and its actions are located within discourse and that power is implicated in subjectivity via discourse. However, even though subject formation and positionality are always situated within the confines of discourse, the idea and possibility of agency is not annihilated. Rather, discourse determinism and the essentialization of power are prevented because the subject/agent-discourse relationship is reciprocal and flexible. Foucaultian governmentality has a double meaning: In the first sense, it refers to the collective way of how we think about governing and authority, which is based on collective socio-cultural forms of knowledge. In the second sense, it refers to the emergence of new thinking, knowledge and techniques of exercising power within specific social contexts. Therefore, governmentality is a form of power that is not possessed but that is practiced, while knowledge and power are closely linked, since knowledge is employed in order to select and establish techniques of power, which serve to control subject formation.

The four sets of themes/problems that will be discussed are seen as correlative to the subjectivity-governmentality-power/knowledge relationship. Additionally, these themes/social problems will be examined through two different perspectives, namely, elite and LGBTQ perspectives. The aim is to identify disruptions, discontinuities, overlaps and crossings within discourses proffered by individual agents within these two interviewee groups; disruptions, discontinuities, overlaps and crossings within each group discourse; and/or disruptions, discontinuities, overlaps and crossings when group discourses are compared. The themes/problems around which the analysis will be structured are: the victimizing-
blaming interplay in elite understandings of LGBTQ subjectivity; the legitimization and/or sanctioning mechanisms that Cypriot LGBTQs employ in their attempts to understand and articulate themselves; the nationhood-sexuality nexus and how this impacts LGBTQ identity formation processes and in-group dynamics; and the ‘Western/European’ binary discourse negotiation by Cypriot LGBTQs and its impact on identity and identification processes – or to phrase it otherwise, the ways in which this discourse has the ability to both weaken and to reinforce exclusions that are based on conceptions of nationhood.

The ‘Western/European’ binary discourse negotiation data analysis section will argue that although ‘Western/European’ discourses alienate the ‘non-Western/non-European’ ‘Other’ and although Cypriot LGBTQs’ engagement with these discourses is unavoidable, the results of this engagement are not predetermined. Consequently, the chapter will conclude that, to the degree that such discourses do not reflect local modalities of sexuality, conceptions about identity and/or understandings of political action, Cypriot LGBTQs need not fully embrace them. Rather, they could selectively employ elements of such discourses, as part of the process of forming their self-identifications and of challenging dominant repressive discourses.

Research Data Analysis: Findings and Theoretical Implications

Victimizing versus Blaming

In their attempts to explain non-binary gender identifications and non-heterosexual sexual choice and to justify their views about non-heteronormative gender and sexuality, the vast majority of both male and female elite interviewees assumed at least one of these three positions: a) ‘LGBTQs are the victims of some sort of sickness or of deficient nature’; b) ‘LGBTQs are the perpetrators of the “crime” of transcending the established/natural/proper norms that pertain to gender and sexuality and therefore, nobody is to be blamed for their problematic situation but themselves’; c) ‘although they are the victims of some illness and/or although they have been less “blessed” (by nature and/or God), Cypriot LGBTQs lose their

536 The question was: ‘In your opinion, why are some people homosexual and some other people non-heterosexual?’
victim status and they turn into a threat for the Cypriot social net, once they start propelling demands – such as the right to family life – based on their deficient/problematic existence’.

I call these three positions *homophobia-couched-as-pity, outright homophobia* and *qualified homophobia.* The following excerpt from an interview with a high-ranking clergyman is paradigmatic of all three positions/types of discourses:

Interviewer: In your opinion, what are the causes of homosexuality?

Interviewee: I believe that there are two reasons for which a person decides to tamper with his nature or use it in a manner other than the normal one; in a manner that is different from that through which man is made [i.e., heterosexual sexual intercourse]. Firstly, there are hormonal imbalances ... These people who suffer from a hormonal imbalance are patients and the Church must see them in a therapeutic manner and approach them with lots of love ... like [in the case of] a child who is born with leukaemia: Doctors must stand by him until they manage to beat the disease. And they do beat the disease. This is also how we [i.e., the Church] approach spiritual illnesses ... This is the first category of the aforementioned people.538

At this point of the interview, the high-ranking clergyman portrays non-heterosexual individuals as the less fortunate of humankind, who need to be embraced with love and be provided the spiritual and religious guidance needed in order to overcome their ‘inherited’ disease. This is an example of ‘*homophobia-couched-as-pity*’ discourse. Namely, what must be feared, fought against and eventually eliminated is not the homosexual individual; it is the ‘spiritual and/or hormonal disease’ that placates him. Nonetheless, he continues to present a second category of people who, according to his opinion, deflect from the path of ‘nature and God’:

The other category is constituted by those people who ... have lost their social and religious beliefs. They have lost the pillar of the values of life and they are trying to satisfy their flesh, or their ego, or their desires by experimenting and by being unsatisfied with everything in life. There are numerous people in this state. You see

537 Some of the arguments propelled by elites that fall into the first two types of positions have already been discussed in chapter one.
these people changing religions, countries, jobs, women [i.e., they engage in adultery], families [i.e., they divorce and remarry].

Here, the prelate moves into the ‘outright homophobia’ discourse. The homosexual person in now portrayed as an arrogant and insatiable creature that has voluntarily deflected from the path of God and nature.

While attempting to address the following questions, the interviewee employs the ‘qualified homophobia’ discourse:

**Interviewer:** What about a homosexual person who strives to change but cannot change? Will this person be considered an eternal sinner [by the Church]?

**Interviewee:** [The Church] must always find new ways to communicate its messages and to help these [i.e., homosexual] people find themselves. But this does not mean that I will approve of gay and transsexual nightclubs; [This does not mean] that I will approve of these people who have such problems being employed as educators ... It is one thing to accept anyone who suffers from an identity crisis ... and it is another thing to allow this sin and this mistake, or whatever it could be called, to be cultivated and transmitted to others.

**Interviewer:** Earlier, you spoke about the importance of human rights. Let’s talk about European human rights law, and specifically about the right to family life. What is your opinion about same-sex civil unions?

**Interviewee:** I disagree with same-sex civil unions ... These people [i.e., homosexuals] need our love, but allowing [such] a sexual union would cause other problems ... The groups of these people [i.e., homosexuals] have terrible [psychological] complexes and, in their local communities, one can observe that serious problems are created for families ... The religious aspect aside ... marriage still functions as an institution that protects the family.

**Interviewer:** Do you agree or disagree with the decriminalization of homosexuality in Cyprus?

**Interviewee:** Personally, I am against the criminalization of spiritual diseases [i.e., same-sex sexual attraction] ... But I agree with the criminalization of crimes [i.e., non-heterosexual sexual conduct]. You see, there is a problem. It has been scientifically proven through studies that eighty per cent of homosexual people have the potential of becoming paedophiles ... We have a problem.

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539 Ibid.  
540 Ibid.
At this point of the interview, the respondent starts making qualifications about which rights should or should not be granted to non-heterosexual individuals. According to him, although non-heterosexual individuals are worthy of the Church and society’s love and support – since they were unlucky enough to be born ill – they should not be allowed to work as educators, enter civil unions or create families. This high-ranking member of the clergy also qualifies the love and acceptance that the ‘inferior other’ is worthy of: Those spheres of life which – according to his opinion – homosexuals would threaten, if they were allowed to participate in them, are reserved for the ‘normal’ heterosexuals. Moreover, his answer to the question about homosexuality’s decriminalization in Cyprus shows that he is ambivalent about whether same-sex sexuality is a ‘crime’ or a ‘spiritual disease’ (or both). Nonetheless, he claims that there is a causal relationship between same-sex sexuality and paedophilia. Therefore, he concludes that the decriminalization of homosexuality can create ‘problems’.

Examples of qualified homophobia are particularly interesting since they reveal not only the justificatory and often conflicting discourses that are employed by those who espouse this position, but also the gaps in, and the fluidity of, such discourses. Namely, the qualified homophobia position does not outright oppose homosexuality and sexual choice equality based either on ‘bad choice’ or ‘deficient nature’ claims. Rather, by being based on boundaries and thresholds about what is ‘acceptable’ and what is not, the qualified homophobia position reveals that norms about sexuality are flexible and that, as such, they are also changeable. For example, a male military official in his early forties commented:

> I do not believe that [being gay] is [morally] permissible. Yet, I do not believe that [the right to be gay] should be rejected either. [On the one hand], if someone who is a man doesn’t feel like a man, we cannot do anything about it. It’s his issue. But, on the other hand, I do not believe that it would be positive if governments,

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organized groups, associations, etc, were to reach the point of proclaiming that it is perfectly normal for a person to be outside his nature. What I mean is that, nowadays, we have reached a point where in England, I believe, Elton John – a classic example – got married to his boyfriend! It is his right to do whatever he wants. Still, the state and the polity cannot grant these people the right to adopt a child; because children are pure. When they adopt a four-year old child, how is she going to grow up? Now, one might argue that, theoretically, we have taught the child [to think] this way. No! Nature says that [a child] should have a mother and a father. And let us come to the example of the child who will not have a mother. The passive man [in the gay couple] will play the role of the mother. How could this work? Under which circumstances will this child grow up? What right do we have to modify and tamper with nature?542

The crossings and overlaps of various discourses that this interviewee employs in order to position himself on the issue of non-heterosexual sexualities are numerous and revealing. Firstly, he points out the ‘paradoxical phenomenon’ of ‘a man who does not feel like a man’, which is embedded in gender reductionism and binary constructions. However, this interviewee also employs the discourse of rights: It is the gay man’s ‘issue’ and ‘right’ to be attracted to other men; it is his personal choice. The interviewee’s discourse about ‘personal rights/preferences’ does include gay marriage – he states that Elton John had a right to marry his boyfriend. However, the interviewee also employs a third and a fourth discourse, which complicate his perception of LGBTQ subjectivities: A ‘personal right/choice/issue’ is one that does not involve/affect minors, and this is because ‘children are pure’. Besides qualifying what ‘rights’ for LGBTQs stand for – that is, LGBTQ rights are permissible when ‘rights’ are narrowly interpreted as ‘one’s freedom of personal sexual taste’ that stops where the discourses of the heteronormative family life and of gender binarism begin – he also qualifies ‘homosexuality’ and ‘heterosexuality’: Children are ‘pure’ and their purity is imperilled by the ‘impurity’ of same-sex sexuality and sexual conduct. However, any ‘impurity’ that sexual conduct as such might carry is not attributed to heterosexual sexual conduct. Namely, heterosexual sexual conduct is

542 “Interview with Military Official 210017”. Response to the question: ‘Do you think that LGBTQ rights – like to marriage, family, adoption etc – should be recognized?’
‘pure’ – since it is ‘dictated’ and ‘sanctioned’ by nature, whereas homosexual sexual practices are ‘impure’ and perilous, since they oppose nature.

This third discourse of ‘purity-impurity’, which is used by the interviewee to determine stereotypes for children, is complimented by a fourth discourse, that is, the discourse about ‘active’ and ‘passive’ parental roles. The interviewee claims that the ‘passive’ male in the gay partnership cannot properly assume the role of his ‘passive’ correlative in the heterosexual relationship, that is, the role of the woman/mother. This discourse renders ‘passivity’ and ‘vigour’ not only as the grounding binary rule of sexual relationships, but also of gender relationships and of the harmonic operation of the (always heterocentric, nuclear) family. The conclusion drawn from this is that same-sex sexuality per se is not necessarily excluded from the realm of the thinkable, although it does not partake in the realm of the ‘natural’ and of the ‘normal’. Rather, what is rendered unthinkable is the crossing of the borders of gender binarism which functions as the grounding pillar of ‘governmentality’, as this operates saliently within the Cypriot context, even if subjects – like this interviewee – merge it with, and mistake it for, ‘deviant’ sexual activity.\(^{543}\)

Such attitudes are reminiscent of Foucault’s argument that the ‘man-man-woman’ erotic triangle reflects how gender, sex and sexuality relate to power, even when the forms they take are not overtly or obviously sexual.\(^{544}\) The effects of the operations of this triangle are primarily gender-related. As Foucault explains, sexual activity between men is a matter of culture and of how power is determined.\(^{545}\) However, the issue of determining and distributing power is inextricably linked to policing the borders of gender binarism. This ‘power-governmentality-subjectivity’ link with regard to understandings of gender and sexuality can be discerned in the majority of interviews with elite participants. The above three excerpts are representative of the responses given by politicians, military officials, clergymen and representatives of women’s groups about Cypriot LGBTQ subjectivities. During the course of their interviews, each of the elite interviewees adopted at least one of the three types positions – that is, homophobia-couched-as-pity, outright homophobia, and/or qualified homophobia.

\(^{543}\) This discourse of ‘qualified homophobia’ is prevalent in discussions about LGBTQ subjectivities in Cyprus. For an ‘archaeological’, à la Foucault tracing of the genesis of the employment of such ‘knowledges’ see: Παγκύπρια Εταιρεία Ψυχικής Υγιεινής. Ομοφυλοφιλία. Λευκωσία, 1982.

\(^{544}\) Sedgwick, Kosofsky Eve, “Gender Asymmetry and Erotic Triangles”, in Between Men, 524-8.

\(^{545}\) Foucault. The Archaeology of Knowledge, 212-13.
Admittedly, members of the clergy were more inclined towards employing all three types of positions. This is because as the spokespersons of Orthodox Christianity ‘that is based on love’, 546 they could not outright blame LGBTQs for their sexuality and portray them as criminals. Therefore, they employed the homophobia-couched-as-pity rhetoric. However, as spokespersons of the institution of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus, which is the main agency of preservation of heteronormative familial structures, they could not but reject the idea of same-sex civil unions and of non-heterocentric families. Consequently, they also adopted the qualified homophobia discourse. Nonetheless, at some instances, the crossing of these two types of discourses was further complicated by high-ranking clergymen’s employment of the outright homophobia rhetoric. Like other elite interviewees, during the course of their interviews prelates could not always abide by the rules of ‘political correctness’ and would express hostile opinions about LGBTQ individuals which, ironically, would attempt to premise them on the dogma of Orthodox Christianity that is supposed to be premised on love. What follows are more examples of elite discourse crossing and discontinuity, which highlight the discrepancies between elites’ intended/politically correct and unintended/politically incorrect articulations about Cypriot LGBTQs and about gender and sexuality subjectivities.

In chapter one, I made reference to Georgiou’s study on the sexual attitudes of Orthodox priests in Cyprus. This study concluded that priests often diverge from the official rigidity of the Church’s Fathers on issues of sexual ‘deviance’, as long as the men who deviate remain within the limits of heterosexuality – for example, adultery in same-sex marriage. Yet, they do not employ the same practice in the case of women, even if ‘sinning’ women do not cross the boundaries of heterosexuality. 547 After summarizing the results of this study, I asked the Bishop what the current approach of the Church is towards such matters. He responded that, ‘what this study describes is a situation of the past. The Church and Christ himself have destroyed the gap and the inequality between the two genders. Now, if by “gender equality” you mean men becoming women and women becoming men, this

546 “Interview with Metropolitan Bishop 210022”; “Interview with Bishop 210031.”
is an anomaly’. My asking for a clarification of what the interviewee understood ‘gender equality’ to stand for led to the following discussion:

**Interviewer:** Would you like to further elaborate on this [i.e., gender equality according to the Christian Orthodox dogma]?

**Interviewee:** … The Holy Scripture says that, by nature, man is the one [who is supposed] to keep his home secure. By nature, woman must feel and act as a wife … From the moment that the wife feels that she can climb on the man’s neck, the household is dissolved. That’s why our society has been dissolved … Nowadays it is probably women who have more extramarital relationships, not men.

…

**Interviewer:** Would you agree with women being allowed to act as priests in the Orthodox Church of Cyprus?

**Interviewee:** If you had understood anything from what I have just said, you would have realized that your question is stupid and naïve! [Shouting]

**Interviewer:** Why is that?

**Interviewee:** No, [it is] not [only] naïve. It is naïve, anyways! [Your question is also] pointless! [Still shouting]

**Interviewer:** Could you explain to me why? Personally, I understand the concept of ‘equality’ from a human rights perspective. You … [Interviewer interrupted by interviewee]

**Interviewee:** If you had any understanding of what I have been explaining to you all this time, you wouldn’t be telling me this stuff about human rights! Where do human rights start from, and where do they stop? If I dress like a woman tonight and go out in the streets, is this a human right? [Shouting even more angrily]

**Interviewer:** I don’t understand why … [Interviewer interrupted by interviewee]

**Interviewee:** Understand it! Control your ego and you will understand it! [Still shouting]

**Interviewer:** I beg your pardon?

**Interviewee:** Yeah, you heard me! I told you to become a member of the Church! This is all because you are not a member of the Church! If you were a pious woman who went to Church … [Interviewee’s screaming interrupted by interviewer]

**Interviewer:** I am trying to do my job and the reason I am here is because you agreed to give me an interview. I would appreciate it, if you could respond to my questions

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548 “Interview with Bishop 210031.”

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and if you refrained from ad hominem critique. If you could not do that, I could always leave, you know.

Interviewee: Ok, I take it back. But my experiment has worked! Thank you! You have really helped me! Now, let me respond to you: Human rights are really fuzzy things. Human rights have limits. [Still upset, but more calmly]

Interviewer: Thank you. What is your opinion about homosexuality?

Interviewee: I don’t have an opinion! I don’t know this subject! That’s the end of this interview! [Screaming again]

Interviewer: In that case, thank you very much for your time.\textsuperscript{549}

Both because of the way in which the dynamics of the discussion between the interviewer and the interviewee developed, and because of the interviewee’s complete inability to balance his personal opinions and his institution’s discourses with Orthodox Christianity’s alleged values, this example constitutes the culmination of conflict in elite interviewees’ discourses. Although initially this Bishop tried to communicate to me that he and his institution are advocates of gender equality, when pressed to elaborate on his views he could not help but reveal his true feelings about gender and sexuality and about non-heterosexual individuals. The bigotry that characterizes him is so intense, that he tended to interpret every interview question as a challenge to the religious dogma he represents. Consequently, his anger escalated to a verbal attack against the interviewer.

None of the other elite interviewees, including prelates, exemplified such a degree of prejudice against same-sex sexuality and gender equality. Nonetheless, it is important to highlight that these kinds of opinions were common among the vast majority of elite interviewees, even though they did not express them with such intensity. All types of elite interviewees – military officials, Church representatives and prelates, politicians and representatives of women’s groups – expressed similar homophobic and androcentric perceptions of gender and sexuality to varying degrees. In general, representatives of women’s groups and politicians propelled the most subtle articulations, probably because of the former’s exposure to feminist discourse and the latter’s training in the art of diplomacy. As the above interview excerpt exemplifies,\textsuperscript{550} military officials expressed their views positions about gender and sexuality more ‘tactlessly’ than the rest of the elites, probably because

\textsuperscript{549} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{550} “Interview with Military Official 210017.”
military ideology and culture is less sensitive (if not antithetical and hostile) towards non-heteronormative expressions of gender and sexuality. Similarly to politicians, prelates and representatives of women’s groups, they also employed conflicting discourses. However – probably because of their lack of exposure to alternative unbiased discourses and of the fact that they are not restrained either by dogma or the ballot – military officials felt no need to justify the discontinuity between the various discourses they employed: For example, although the above-mentioned interviewee described homosexuality as ‘socially impermissible’ behaviour, he also stated that being a homosexual is one’s ‘individual right/choice’.551

Beyond the loopholes and the disruptions that the crossing and overlap of such conflicting and contradictory elite discourses creates, these discourses are important because of their impact on Cypriot LGBTQs. The next section will attempt to reveal and evaluate the effects of this impact. Are the LGBTQ discourses that the next section presents articulated because of, or despite of, predominant elite discourses? How does the articulation of ‘discourse within discourse’ differ from the articulation of ‘discourse against discourse’, when self-identification and identity formation are at stake? How do power/knowledge, governmentality and subjectivity interact when gender and sexuality are viewed from the perspective of Cypriot LGBTQs?

**Legitimization and Sanctioning Mechanisms**

The victimizing-blaming interplay is inextricably linked to attempts to legitimize one’s perception of the self and one’s position in the socio-political and national body, as well as/or to attempts to render the ‘other’s’ self-perception and position as problematic. The ways through which Cypriot elites legitimize heteronormativity as the dominant discourse and render LGBTQ subjectivities as inferior and/or deficient were discussed in the previous section. What is particularly revealing of the ‘power-knowledge-subjectivity’ triadic interplay are Cypriot LGBTQs’ narrations and articulations both of the ‘Self’ and of the other ‘Others’, with the other ‘Others’ being defined as those LGBTQ individuals who – because of

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551 Ibid. For an example of crossing of contradictory discourses about non-heterosexual sexuality by politicians, see interview excerpts with politicians 210030 and 210011 and analysis in chapter one.
their ethnicity, excess display of masculinity or femininity or some other reason – are aborted from the more or less consolidated group.

During a group interview with three Greek-Cypriot women in their mid-twenties and early thirties who identified as lesbians, one of them stated:

I never felt different [in relation to heterosexual women] because I fall in love. I am not [different] because, the point is, what I value most is feelings and not sexual satisfaction; as opposed to gay men, who only care about sex.\(^{552}\)

This interviewee attempts to legitimize her self-perception and sexual attraction to other women via ‘moralizing’ them. She invokes the discourse that portrays women as sexually modest and emotional and she says that she partakes in it; therefore she presents herself as no different from women who are attracted to men. In this process of her subjectivity’s legitimization, she also draws upon the discourse of sanctioning ‘otherness’: Gay men – because they are men – are primarily concerned with sexual satisfaction and not with feelings like ‘us’, that is ‘like women’.\(^{553}\) This lesbian interviewee defines who she is with regard to her sexual choice by drawing upon the difference versus sameness discourse. Namely, she defines the essence of her being based on the ‘fact’ that, regardless of her sexual choice, she is a ‘woman’. Since she sees herself as a woman who is similar to all other women, she argues that she prioritizes love over sex, as opposed to both homosexual and heterosexual men who – as she claims – are primarily interested in sex and not in romantic love.

The difference versus sameness as well as the choice versus determinism debate – that is, attributing sexual preference to either choice or genes – have led to numerous and long theoretical discussions among gay and lesbian theorists and they have been employed by gay and lesbian groups in order to press for rights and recognition.\(^{554}\) Therefore, it is not surprising that, when asked to comment on their sexual choice and sexual identity, most of the Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees employed the language of such discourses. It is noteworthy that all the lesbian and bisexual female participants distinguished themselves, whom they portrayed as being

\(^{552}\) “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 333333B.”


primarily interested in finding a loving partner, from gay men, whom they described as overly sexual. The answers did not differ between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot women. A Greek-Cypriot gay woman in her early twenties said:

Gay men are completely different from gay women, from lesbians. I think that you found the right person to take a stance on this [issue] ... For me, looking for and finding someone just for sex would be like two pieces of meat... [She pauses]. I’m sorry I’m expressing myself in this manner. To me this is pointless and that’s why I have decided that if [a person] is worth it, she will come into my life at some point. If the person is not worth it, you get hurt. Of course, in Cyprus, it’s very difficult to maintain a relationship. And I don’t mean those two-month relationships. I’m talking about a person one can dream with ... [Gay] men don’t have these kinds of issues and they don’t mind finding sex anytime and anywhere. I think that [gay] women meet each other through friends ... What I mean is that you cannot approach a [gay] woman and tell her, ‘you know what, I want to have sex with you’, or something like that. This doesn’t happen, unless you have already met the person through friends.555

Additionally, all gay women, both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot, said that they are very annoyed by butch lesbians since they find their ‘excessive masculinity’ repulsive. A Greek-Cypriot gay woman in her late twenties said:

It’s a matter of aesthetics. It’s ugly for a woman to be too masculine, regardless of whether she is gay or not. No matter what [her sexual choice] is, she must not completely lose her femininity. Again, this is a matter of aesthetics, meaning that it looks bad when you see a girl who is macho. Even men are not like this [i.e., macho like butch lesbians]! ... I don’t call this [i.e., some women’s ‘excessive masculinity’] anything but when I see it, I will comment on it. What I mean is that when I see [a person like this], I cannot help but start laughing.556

555 “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 212547,” 3 April 2009. The questions asked by the interviewee were: ‘Do you find it easy to meet a sexual and/or love partner?’ and ‘Where do you usually meet a partner?’
556 “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 212550,” 4 April 2009. The questions asked by the interviewee were: ‘Do you think that gender and sex do or should always correlate?’ and ‘How would you describe that situation in which they do not correlate?’
When asked with whom she prefers spending most of her free time – that is, with non-heterosexual or with heterosexual people – another Greek-Cypriot gay woman in her mid-twenties said, ‘I don’t mind, but I do not like loud gay people. I think that they cross the limits’. When asked about her sexual identity, a fourth Greek-Cypriot gay woman in her mid-twenties said, ‘I don’t like the word “lesbian”. It reminds me of butch lesbians. It’s violent, like a disease. I prefer the term “gay”’. A Turkish-Cypriot woman in her mid-twenties said:

I never had bad experiences and people never told me anything [with regard to my non-heterosexual sexuality]; just my mother. She was telling me to wear skirts and to walk in a girlish manner, but this was because I was always angry about this thing [i.e., about her telling me these things], and she didn’t want to talk about it [i.e., about my sexual choice], plus she knew I wasn’t going to change so, eventually, she stopped telling me these things. When she realized that I’m fine, she stopped complaining and asking me to do these things [i.e., dress and act in a more ‘feminine’ manner].

The following excerpt from an interview with another Turkish-Cypriot gay woman in her early thirties is especially revealing with regard to the ways Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot gay women perceive ‘masculine’ lesbians, the ways they define themselves in relation to ‘masculine’ lesbians, as well as the ways they are defined by others:

**Interviewer:** How would you describe your sexual identity?

**Interviewee:** I don’t like the word ‘lesbian’. We both [i.e., me and my girlfriend] don’t like it, I think. But yes, I’m gay. I don’t like the term ‘lesbian’ because it reminds me of butch lesbians, that’s why. I’m not manly. I’m not manly at all. And I get disturbed if anyone says that I’m a tomboy. No, I wouldn’t fit into [the concept of] ‘queer’ but ‘gay’, yes. I would accept the term ‘gay’.

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557 “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 333333A.” The question was: ‘Who do you spend most of your free time mixing with?’
558 “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 333333C,” 2 April 2009. The question was: ‘How would you describe your sexual identity?’
559 “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 212572A”. The question was: ‘Have you ever received negative or hostile treatment, insults or ridicule or have you ever been verbally or physically harassed because of your sexuality, or because of what others assume to be your sexuality?’
Interviewer: Do you think that gender and sex do or should always correlate?

Interviewee: I’m not that sharp [i.e., opinionated about this issue], although I am a bit disturbed by butch lesbians, as I have already told you. I am not really disturbed by feminine men, which is interesting. So, probably, this has something to do with me. I don’t want to see myself in that way and I am trying to... [She pauses] you know! If I see that [i.e., that I look ‘masculine’] in the mirror, I’ll just stop doing whatever it is I am doing and I’ll change that [i.e., that image of myself].

Interviewer: Why don’t you like butch lesbians?

Interviewee: First of all, I know that it [i.e., ‘masculinity’] comes from their inside, but in the end it looks as if they are pretending. I know that they are not. [On the one hand] something [about butch lesbians] tells me that they are not pretending but, on the other hand, it doesn’t look right to me. It’s weird. But this doesn’t mean that I don’t find it [i.e., ‘masculinity’ in women] attractive. It’s a bit weird in this respect!

Interviewer: Have you ever received negative or hostile treatment or made to feel degraded and embarrassed because of your sexual choice or sexual identity, or because of what others assume to be your sexual choice and identity?

Interviewee: Yes, of course. First of all, as I told you before, the nasty joke that you get from childhood is that you are a tomboy. And I still do get it sometimes and my friends do get it sometimes and I am really disturbed by it.

Interviewer: Who told you this?

Interviewee: It can be your mother. Surprisingly, it happened to me once [i.e., my mother said I am a tomboy]. And it happened recently, three years ago. I was shocked. And it does come from your grandmother ... They just slap you in the face with it. They [i.e., family members] use expressions like that, not [people] from around [i.e., strangers] because, as I told you, I am not really... [She pauses] I don’t know. I probably fit into the [heterosexual] stereotype, so that’s why they didn’t push me that much [to change].

The above interview excerpts highlight three different issues. Firstly, there is the ‘visibility and propriety’ issue. Both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot gay and bisexual women stressed the importance of looking ‘feminine’ in order not to disrupt the socially predominant ‘heteronormative aesthetics’. Ideas about bourgeois proper sexual and gender behaviour served as one of the pillars of nineteenth-century European nationalisms. The cultivation of such ideas about dignity and modesty,
and especially about women’s sexual modesty, are to be found in Cyprus also. Rules about women’s gender performances and sexual behaviour have been inextricably linked to the belonging and exclusion boundaries of the national community.⁵⁶² Even though Turkish-Cypriots are not restricted by religion to the degree that Greek-Cypriots are,⁵⁶³ lesbian and bisexual female interviewees from both ethnic groups employed the visibility and propriety discourses. This is because ideas about visibility and propriety are not exclusively related to nationalism and religion; they are, above all, the products of patriarchy and androcentrism, the presence of which is particularly manifest in traditional and ethically divided societies, like the Cypriot one.⁵⁶⁴

Such patriarchal and androcentric notions are related to the second issue that these interview excerpts highlight. This is the ‘othering’ issue. Both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot gay and bisexual women identified as gay or as bisexual via distancing themselves from both gay men and from a subclass of gay women, that is, butch lesbians, whom they described both as repulsive and as attractive. Almost all lesbian and bisexual interviewees distanced themselves from gay men and from non-heterosexual women who – according to these interviewees – look ‘masculine’. Most importantly, the descriptions, expressions and reasoning they employed were similar in both instances of disassociation. Additionally, some of these interviewees reported that they dislike butch lesbians although they might be attracted to them. This is particularly important. It might point to the fact that these women were particularly eager to denounce butch lesbians because although they actually find the latter’s gender performances attractive, they also realize that if they associate with such a ‘deviant’ gender performance, they will exacerbate their own, already severe, social stigmatization. Consequently, in an attempt to distance themselves from this sub-group of ‘social outcasts’ they renounce them, even if they are attracted by them.

The similarities in the views of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot women are partly explained by the pervasiveness of patriarchal and androcentric conceptions about gender and sexuality. A presumed male superiority has allowed men to both ‘otherize’ women and to control their behaviour with regard to the

⁵⁶⁴ Hadjipavlou, Women and Change in Cyprus, 15-49.
demonstration of their gender and sexuality. Nonetheless, these same norms have circumscribed men’s gender and sexuality also: ‘manhood’ has been associated with the performance of machismo and male sexuality has been associated with the demonstration of excessive sexual vigour. Therefore – and since identification occurs through the distancing from, and the naming of, internal ‘others’ – both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot lesbian and bisexual women distanced themselves from gay men, whom they described as unemotional and as overly sexually active in accordance with phallocentric discourses about ‘manhood’.

These female interviewees employed gendered and sexist discourses with regard to other women also. Namely, they differentiated themselves from the other ‘others’, that is, from butch lesbians. As it has been argued in chapter two, within the context of the national collectivity, women reinforce masculinist and patriarchal moral codes through the employment of ‘othering’, which serves as a means of disciplining those women who refuse to abide by the rules of the national collectivity. In a similar manner, lesbian and bisexual Cypriot women who see ‘femininity’ as integral to their identities engage in the reinforcement of androcentric and phallocentric discourses, by ‘othering’ non-heterosexual women who do not abide by the rules of gender binarism.

The third issue that these interviews highlight is the ‘family pressure issue’. It is noteworthy that most of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot gay and bisexual women listed their closest family members, rather than strangers or society in general, as the major source of pressure to change their gender performances. Moreover, they have named their mothers and grandmothers as those family members who pressure them the most. Again, this is explainable by the rules of the formation and preservation of national and ethnic collectivities, in the preservation of which women partake. It is older women, like mothers and grandmothers, who are vested with the social power to enforce masculinist and patriarchal rules of ‘proper’ behaviour and appearance on the collectivity’s younger female members.

566 Mosse. Nationalism and Sexuality; Parker et al., ed. Nationalisms and Sexualities; Pryke, “Nationalism and sexuality, what are the issues?” 529-46.
568 Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nation, 37.
569 Ibid.
Similarly to gay and bisexual women, gay men also brought up the issue of gender performance and ‘aesthetics’. A Greek-Cypriot gay man in his mid-thirties commented:

I don’t know if ... [He pauses]. I don’t know how to say this. I am probably negating myself by telling you this, but I feel annoyed, I don’t feel comfortable, I don’t feel nice. Maybe [what I feel] has to do more with aesthetics than with [sexual and gender] identification. I am annoyed by ‘trans*’; I mean ‘trans*’ as an image. But I think that this is a matter of aesthetics. For example, if I see a man who is perfectly dressed up as a woman and, therefore, he can fool me [into thinking that he is a woman], I don’t mind at all. And it did happen to me when I was living in Greece. When I was working in a movie theatre, trans* girls would come with their boyfriends, but you couldn’t tell that they were not girls. They were really beautiful, so ok, no problem. It didn’t bother me. However, I also saw people who liked dressing up this way just to provoke. This is something I consider to be repulsive.570

Additionally, almost all gay men said that they are very annoyed by effeminate gays and that they do not want to be around ‘sissies’ who make a fool out of themselves, thus giving all gay men a bad name.571 The following except from an interview with a Greek-Cypriot gay male couple – interviewee one was in his mid-thirties and interviewee two was in his early twenties – is indicative of the ways through which Cypriot gay men rationalize their identity both as ‘gay’ and as ‘non-feminine’, as well as of the social discrimination they face. It also demonstrates that age does have some impact on Cypriot gay men’s opinions about these issues:

**Interviewer:** If you have ever experienced any negative feelings in relation to your gender, sexuality or sexual choice, what was the reason?

**Interviewee 1:** Basically, I think I was feeling bad about my sexual orientation both because of others and because of myself ... And I still feel bad sometimes, because I am different. I am proud to be gay, but sometimes I think to myself: ‘Why couldn’t I be more normal?’ ... I make my parents sad and, later on, this might have a negative

570 “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 212545,” 2 April 2009.

impact on my son. I must not say anything about [i.e., reveal] my sexuality now. In public, I have to act properly. Outside of my house, I have to appear to be straight. Because if anything happens, my father is going to know and my ex-wife and my son are also going to know.

... Interviewer: What do people in your social environment think of you with regard to your sexuality?

Interviewee 1: Now you see me here, in my house, where I am relaxed and merry. In public I act appropriately, as I should be, and therefore nobody ever had a chance to say anything about me. Besides my ex-wife back then [i.e., when I told her that I am gay], nobody has ever said anything [to me or about me], or changed their behaviour towards me.

...

Interviewer: Do you think that gender and sex do or should always correlate?

Interviewee 2: No, I don’t mind it [when gender and sex do not correlate]. But ok. It’s one thing to say that I don’t mind it and it is another thing to say that I’m not bothered [by it]; because I might be a bit bothered. Ok, it is not the best thing ever to see a feminine man. I don’t like it much. I don’t mind him being like this but I don’t like looking at him. I believe the same thing about a woman who is masculine. I would go out with them, talk to them, be friends with them, but I think that the answer I gave to you has to do with my aesthetics; because if you want to change your gender, you should move into the transgender category. For example, my partner and I have a relationship, but this doesn’t mean that I have to dress up like a woman or get waxed etc.

Interviewee 1: I don’t like extremes. I don’t like those ridiculous, lame sissies! I don’t like them and I don’t want them to be around me! I do not want them to come closer to me than one meter! This is because, if someone sees me with them, I will have to explain to others why the person sitting next to me is different. I don’t want to deal with such situations, that is, having to explain to people I know and to my relatives why a sissy is sitting next to me, especially since I would never date someone like this. Maybe it has to do with the fact that I grew up in a family [in which] military rules [were imposed]. But still, what bothers me is that I will have to explain to others. So, I prefer to keep my distances.

...

Interviewer: Have you ever felt that your masculinity is being questioned or criticized?
Interviewee 2: Yes, always; and mostly by my family. For example, they wouldn’t let me wear the clothes I wanted. My mother would say: ‘You are not going to wear this feminine t-shirt.’ When I was younger, my brother would also criticize me and say: ‘Don’t walk this way, don’t sing feminine songs.’ This created a conflict inside me. Because my parents would let me be friends with girls and I can remember many instances when I played with girls’ toys.

... Interviewer: You said that, in Cyprus, there exists a lot of discrimination based on sexual choice and sexual identity. In your opinion, why is that?

Interviewee 1: I believe that homosexuals themselves are not careful enough. For example, for me, it is unthinkable to go for a walk in the city and insult someone with my behaviour. I cannot do it. If someone does something that I don’t approve of in front of me, I won’t like it. Therefore, I don’t want to hassle other people. I cannot stand the provoking behaviour of some feminine gays. When I’m at home it is a different thing but in public, among strangers, we should show character.

Interviewee 2: What my partner is trying to say and what I have realized during the six years I have been living as a gay man is that Cypriot gays get accustomed to their environment. Why provoke when you know what the situation in society is? These are defences that all gay men in Cyprus develop. Society is restrictive, it binds you, so protect yourself, create your shield. You do not have to show yourself, demonstrate who you really are. If you want to come out and scream it, do it. But you have to be logical and know that your act is going to have consequences. For example, a lot of people know about me [i.e., about my sexuality]; people that I don’t even know. I’ve been exposed a lot. I’ll tell you the story some other time but, even as far as in Crete, they know about me. But I don’t mind. I know I’ll find a job and I’ll succeed in life. Thank God I’m in a relationship!

It is obvious that although both men equate self-dignity with non-excessive femininity, the older interviewee is much more concerned about his image and the visibility of his sexual choice, as well as about the image and visibility of other non-heterosexual men. As it was argued in chapter one, this raises a crucial question about how Cypriot LGBTQs understand ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ gender performances. These two gay interviewees’ comments, which are similar to those of the majority of LGBTQ interviewees, lead to the conclusion that, for Cypriot LGBTQs, performing virility – if men – and sexually reserved femininity – if

572 “Interview with LGBTQ Participants 212564A and 212564B,” 15 April 2009.
women – is indistinguishable from preserving self-dignity. This is because, for both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs, dignity and propriety and their accompanying gender performances are inextricably linked to the belonging and exclusion boundaries that the national community prescribes.⁵⁷³

As Sedgwick argued, ‘effeminophobia’ among gay men and phobia of ‘masculine’ lesbians among gay women are driven by the need to disrupt a long tradition that perceives gender and sexuality as continuous and collapsible categories; that is, a tradition that assumes that everyone who desires a man, whether male or female, is by definition feminine, and everyone who desires a woman is masculine.⁵⁷⁴ Nonetheless, such attitudes among gay people alienate the effeminate boy/man – and the masculine girl/woman – and contribute to the reinforcement of discourses that depathologize non-heterosexual sexuality via pathologizing non-binary gender identifications.⁵⁷⁵ As the interview excerpts demonstrate, Sedgwick’s argument is particularly applicable to the case of Cypriot LGBTQs: In their attempts to legitimize and depathologize their non-heterosexual sexuality, Cypriot LGBTQs create in-group distinctions and hierarchies. In order to render their sexual choice as ‘proper’, they pathologize non-binary gender identifications among non-heterosexual Cypriots, whom they regard as inferior and ‘abnormal’.⁵⁷⁶

The Nationhood-Sexuality Nexus in Cypriot LGBTQ Identity Formation Processes

Nationalist discourses are deeply embedded in predominant perceptions and understandings of gender and sexuality, while the production of the ‘Self’ as a sexual

⁵⁷³ Yuval-Davis, “Gender and Nation.” 621–32.
⁵⁷⁵ Ibid., 18-27. See also: Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, 9-11, 47-8; Sedgwick, Tendencies, 1-20.
⁵⁷⁶ This internalization of such gender binarisms by Cypriot LGBTQs is probably the main reason behind my difficulties in recruiting trans* interviewees. As the interviews indicate, Cypriot LGBTQs do not view themselves as being gender-variant people. Consequently, the distinction commonly assumed between ‘trans*’ and ‘gay/lesbian’ remains meaningful to them and plays a central role in their self-identification processes. Therefore, it is not surprising that gender normative non-heterosexual individuals were more likely to agree to be interviewed since, within the Cypriot context, less stigma is attached to non-transgressive gender identities. This approach to gender probably accounts for the strong negative response among interviewees – both elites and LGBTQs – to the idea of gender transgression as a mark of (sexual) identity. For an ethnographic account of ‘trans*’ as an emerging category of collective identity and political activism vis-à-vis the ‘gay/lesbian’ category of identification, self-identification and sexual political mobilization, see: David Valentine. Imagining Transgender: An Ethnography of a Category. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007.
and gendered being is enmeshed in processes of power. The examination of the
nationhood-sexuality nexus through Cypriot LGBTQ individuals’ perceptions and
discourse employment is important, since it raises a number of questions about the
ways in which Cypriot LGBTQs understand themselves and construct their
identities. How do predominant discourses about nationhood affect Greek-Cypriot
and Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs’ identity formation? In the case of Cypriot LGBTQs,
do alternative discourses about gender and sexuality coexist, or do they conflict with
ideas about national, ethnic and/or religious exclusivity? What are the effects of such
coexistence and/or conflict? The interviews with Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot
LGBTQ participants demonstrate the particularity of the ways in which they form,
negotiate and reconstruct their gender, sexual and national identities.

During a group interview with three self-identified lesbian Greek-Cypriots,
two of them in their mid-twenties and one of them in her early thirties, the
following debate arose:

**Interviewer:** What do you know about the intimate relationships between non-
heterosexual Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots? What is your opinion about these
relationships?

**Interviewee 1:** The ethnic element plays out a lot [with regard to Greek-Cypriot and
Turkish-Cypriot same-sex relationships]. You cannot have sex with the enemy. It’s
like a national betrayal.

**Interviewee 2:** Well, I don’t know... [She pauses]. I’m open-minded towards these
types of relationships.

**Interviewee 3:** What? Are you for real? I’m totally against them! This has to do with
our nationality, not with whether one is gay or not. I feel that these people [i.e., the
Turkish-Cypriots] have mistreated me. They are guilty for what happened in 1974.

**Interviewee 2:** You [to interviewee 1] were in a relationship with a Turkish-Cypriot
woman for quite a long time, though.

**Interviewee 1:** Well... [She pauses]. She was different.

**Interviewee 3:** Yes, she was not like the rest of them.

**Interviewer:** In which sense? [Silence]

**Interviewee 1:** Well, look. The thing is that when we were together we would not
discuss politics.578

577 Interviewees 1, 2 and 3 were in their mid-twenties. Interview 2 was in her early thirties. “Interviews
with LGBTQ Participants 333333A, 333333B and 333333C,” 2 April 2009.

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When asked about ethnicity and national identity, the same interviewees said:

**Interviewee 1**: I consider my national and ethnic identity to be Greek. I feel this way partially because of what happened with the Turks. Being Greek has to do with values and with our religion.

**Interviewee 2**: Well, I feel anything but Greek! Cypriot, yes. But this is not the same as Greek.

**Interviewee 3**: My national and ethnic identity is Greek. Regardless of its numerous occupiers, Cyprus has always been and remains Greek. We have the Greek culture and our religion, and these have never changed.

Whether or not they consciously attempt to create the ‘Self’ through a radical political process that directly challenges predominant prescriptions of national, gender and sexuality identity, subjects remain rooted – though not in fixed positions – within the ‘subjectivity-power-knowledge’ matrix, which characterizes their historically specific social body. This restricted, yet not defined, subject positionality sometimes leads to the production of ‘contradictory subjectivity’. These interviewees’ perceptions about nationalism and religion on the one hand, and the positive view of one of the interviewees’ Turkish-Cypriot ex-girlfriend on the other hand, position interviewee one and interviewee three in two different and contradicting ways in relation to discourse. As a result of the effects of nationalist rhetoric on them, these two women reject the idea of being emotionally and sexually involved with the ‘enemy’, that is, with Turkish-Cypriot women. However, their positive view of the Turkish-Cypriot ex-girlfriend disrupts the effects of nationalist rhetoric. In their attempts to resolve the contradiction they argue that ‘she was different from the others’, though they cannot offer any explanation as to how she was ‘different’ for other Turkish-Cypriot and, therefore, ‘better’.

Interviewee two avoids contradiction between the discourses that she employs to describe herself by adopting a civic – rather than an ethnic – understanding of national identity. Being ‘Cypriot’ – which she sees as something that has nothing to do with being ‘Greek’ – spares her from the trouble of having to

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578 “Interview with LGBTQ Participants 333333A, 333333B, and 333333C”.
579 The question was: ‘How would you describe your ethnicity and national identity?’
articulate criteria for labelling Turkish-Cypriots as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Consequently, she also avoids being classified as ‘unpatriotic’ based on her views since, as a ‘Cypriot’, she does not necessarily have to evaluate Turkish-Cypriots based on elements such as religion, culture or ethnicity.

Nevertheless, there were a number of interviewees who defined themselves, both as Greek-Cypriot and as gay, by completely distancing themselves from, and even positioning themselves against, the Turkish-Cypriot ethnic ‘other’. The following excerpt from an interview with the aforementioned Greek-Cypriot gay male couple is revealing:

**Interviewer:** What do you know and what do you think about the intimate relationships between non-heterosexual Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots?

**Interviewee 2:** A guy I know liked this Turkish-Cypriot man and everyone would tell him: ‘With a Turkish-Cypriot? Why? Aren’t there any [Greek] Cypriots?’ You know, we left aside the fact that he is gay and now the issue is: ‘With a Turkish-Cypriot?’ [For some people] having sex with a Turkish-Cypriot is ok, but not a relationship; whereas with a British [man] or a German [man], or whatever, there is no problem.

**Interviewee 1:** I don’t mind someone having sex with a Turkish-Cypriot, but I don’t like the relationships [between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots]. I wouldn’t do it. What? Would I pick up a Turkish-Cypriot? He is Turkish-Cypriot! Here is why I hold this belief: He is Turkish!

**Interviewee 2:** Why not? I met Turkish-Cypriots who are very clever people and to them, all these religion and culture issues are complete nonsense.

**Interviewee 1:** Would you have sex with a Turkish-Cypriot? [Surprised]

**Interviewee 2:** Would you have sex with a British?

**Interviewee 1:** Yes! Why not?

**Interviewee 2:** Why not with a Turkish-Cypriot?

**Interviewee 1:** The British is European!

**Interviewee 2:** So what? A Turkish-Cypriot is European too! He lives in the other half of Cyprus, which is Europe!

**Interviewee 1:** If there is a solution [to the Cyprus problem] and the rest of Cyprus becomes part of Europe, I’ll think about it!

**Interviewee 2:** Oh! So currently a Turkish-Cypriot is worthless and tomorrow, when there will be a solution, he won’t be worthless!
Interviewee 1: No! He will still be worthless! I had sex with Turkish-Cypriots many times. But just sex! To make Cyprus and Greece proud and fuck the Turk is ok! But this is where you draw the line! No relationship!

... 

Interviewer: How would you describe your ethnicity and national identity?

...

Interviewee 1: I don’t hate Turks because I feel I am Greek. But they came and took our houses and properties, so why should we like them? I don’t get it! My family had so much property and now I cannot call my family’s property and land my own, because they remembered to come from Turkey and take it!

Interviewee 2: Yes, but I know Turkish-Cypriots who are from Larnaca... [Interrupted by interviewee 1]

Interviewee 1: There are no Turkish-Cypriots anymore! With all those settlers they [i.e., Turkey] brought [to the island], what has been left of Turkish-Cypriots?

Interviewee 2: There are!

Interviewee 1: Yeah, right! When they kick out the settlers, let them find the Turkish-Cypriots and I will tell them [i.e., the Turkish-Cypriots] ‘Hello my friends!’.

The analogy between ‘inter-ethnic’ sexual intercourse dynamics and the 1974 events was repeated by numerous Greek-Cypriot male gay interviewees. A Greek-Cypriot gay man in his early thirties reported:

When some [Greek-Cypriot gay men] are having sex with a Turkish-Cypriot, especially if the Greek-Cypriot is assuming the passive role, it’s sort of... [He pauses]. Do you know what I mean? Sex role dynamics alternate in the case of men. It’s not like ‘man-woman’. A man-man [sexual relationship] is very different. A Turkish-Cypriot once told a friend of mine: ‘I fucked you like you fucked us in 1974.’... If I was to be told this, and I am not a racist... [He pauses]. But hey! ... It’s not you [i.e., Turkish-Cypriots] who won against us, it was Turkey... I heard of many [Greek-Cypriots] who date Turkish-Cypriots. Because there is anonymity, there is no reason it should stop happening. Also, because of what gay Greek-Cypriots go through within Cypriot society, they hate their country. Thus, they do

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581 Larnaca is a city in the non-occupied part of the island. Before the division of the island, a large percentage of Turkish-Cypriots used to live in Larnaca. This is why interviewee 1 attempts to employ the example of Turkish-Cypriots that were displaced from Larnaca.

582 “Interview with LGBTQ Participants 212564A and 212564B”. 
not care having sex with Turkish-Cypriots ... Personally, I am a bit more protective towards my country. Just because Cyprus has hurt them, they don’t care at all. An article was written somewhere about this, in a [Greek-Cypriot] online gay magazine or blog. I don’t remember which one. I read it and it matched my thoughts about the issue.\textsuperscript{583}

The usage of gender and sexual metaphors to describe and negotiate ethno-national conflict is very common. For example, Baruk and Popescu studied the major metaphors that are used to organize nationalistic discourse about Cyprus in two online forums for Turkish university students. They found that the employment of gender and sexual metaphors is very frequent.\textsuperscript{584} Such metaphors are reminiscent of the language employed in the nationalist discourses that were discussed in chapters one and two, which portray countries as maidens who are in need of protection against the enemy’s (sexual) aggressiveness.\textsuperscript{585} However, in these forums, the metaphor was reversed: Sexual aggressiveness was not employed to describe national threat; rather, it was referred to as a weapon against the enemy ‘other’ and as a means for getting (ethno-national) revenge against past injustices. This is because ‘the taboo of homosexuality confirms male privilege and, through reassurance, generates fresh rigour, pleasure, and confidence in embodying a male, heterosexual ... national identity’, as Karayanni pointedly phrased it.\textsuperscript{586}

**The ‘Western/European’ Binary Discourse Negotiation and Identity versus Identification**

What is also worth being highlighted is the employment of discourses about ‘Europe/the West versus the Rest’ by a number of Greek-Cypriot and, to a lesser degree, Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees. Although as formerly colonial subjects Cypriots have been rendered as inferior when compared to their Western European colonizers, it seems that some of them participate in the perpetuation of

\textsuperscript{583} “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 212573,” 25 April 2009.


\textsuperscript{586} Karayanni, “Moving Identity,” 261.
binary discourses that hierarchically organize the world into a ‘civilized’
‘Western/European’ centre and an ‘less civilized’ periphery. This tendency is all the
more striking since it is to be found among some of the other ‘Others’, namely
among ‘non-Western/European’ non-heterosexual individuals. In interviews with
them, while trying to define themselves as non-heterosexual and to position
themselves within the local matrices of power, some Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs
replicated the ‘European versus Other’ discursive binarism. That is, the distinguished
between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs and described the former as
‘European’ and ‘modern’ and the latter as ‘non-European’ and ‘backward’.

The relevant statements by a gay Greek-Cypriot man who was quoted above
are illustrative of the way in which Greek-Cypriot non-heterosexuals – mostly men –
define themselves both as non-heterosexual and as superior to the other ‘other’, that
is, the Turkish-Cypriot non-heterosexual individual. This interviewee attempts to
define himself as a Greek-Cypriot, as a ‘European’ and as a gay man through a triple
act: Firstly, he asserts his Greek national identity by ‘othering’ Turkish-Cypriots;
secondly, he defines ‘Europeans’ as superior to ‘non-European/non-Western’
‘others’; and thirdly, he claims that a Greek-Cypriot, European gay man – like
himself – cannot and must not be romantically engaged with the ‘enemy’, since such
an act would be diminishing both for him as an individual and for his country which,
as he reasons, has suffered great pains because of the ‘enemy’.

Such kind of reasoning demonstrates that although the argument that
discourses of ‘Europe’ oppose nationalist rhetoric was developed in previous
chapters of this thesis, discourses about Europe and about Cyprus’s admission into
the EU do not necessarily have solely a weakening impact on nationalistic
predominant discourses. Namely, although Europeanization has widened the space
and offered a language for the articulation of alternative identity discourses, it has
not yet fully obliterated nationalist rhetoric and its impact on Cypriots’
understandings of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. As the discussion of the Modinos and
Marangos cases’ legal, social and political effects demonstrated, when appropriated
by oppressed groups and individuals, European mechanisms and institutions can help
bring about change. However, as the interviews with the above-mentioned and other
Greek-Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees demonstrated, the fact that the non-occupied,

587 “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 212564A”.

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primarily Greek-Cypriot inhabited part of the RoC was admitted to the EU while the occupied, primarily Turkish-Cypriot part was excluded supplied already existing ideas about ethnic superiority with new rigor and impetus. This is a peril that needs to be kept in mind when propelling arguments about ‘Europe’s’ impact on nationhood and national identities.

In seeking to narrate and construct themselves, subjects need to have recourse to a language. Although the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees have not fully escaped the confines of local predominant discourses that pertain to nationhood, gender and sexuality, almost all of them described the effects of Europeanization as positive. However, their comments demonstrate that the ‘European’ and ‘human rights’ discourse have not affected people and social values and views in the same ways or to the same degree that they have affected politicians’ attitudes and local institutional arrangements. Commenting on the employment and utilization of the ‘European’ and ‘human rights’ discourse by the Turkish-Cypriot organization Initiative Against Homophobia, one of its founding members – a gay activist man in his mid-thirties – reported:

What we are trying to explain to the politicians was: ‘Ok, you always mention that you are more European than the Greek-Cypriot politicians. If you take steps like that, if you look at the law which was [articulated] three times at the ECtHR in the Norris, in the Dudgeon and in the Modinos cases, [you will realize that] the law we currently have [in the ‘TRNC’] was condemned three times [by the ECtHR].’

There is no other way to show how ridiculous and meaningless this law is. ‘Europe’ is a good pressure tool. The other thing we are trying to explain to them is this: ‘If you let the Initiative [help you] make the [legal] amendments before going to Court [i.e., before some Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQ applicant resorts to the ECtHR], this will help you prove what you are saying to others, to the EU. You are saying about yourselves that you are more ‘European’ [than Greek-Cypriot] but you have to prove how [this is the case], in a way that makes sense.’

According to the Turkish-Cypriot activist, the Initiative Against Homophobia bases its demands for LGBTQ equality on the ‘European’ and ‘human rights’

588 That is, the ECtHR decided against the criminalization of homosexuality among consenting adults in these three cases.

discourse. Namely, ‘Europe’ has provided Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs with a language and with the means to organize and mobilize. Nonetheless, regardless of the fact that in its official rhetoric the Turkish-Cypriot political leadership attempts to establish itself and the ‘TRNC’ as ‘more European’ than the Greek-Cypriots and the RoC, its acts do not match its discourse. According to the Initiative spokesperson, the Turkish-Cypriot political elite does not move beyond its official rhetoric towards the amendment of the laws that pertain to the criminalization of homosexuality, in order to prove that it is indeed as ‘Europe-friendly’ as it is claiming to be.

A Greek-Cypriot gay activist man in his early thirties stated:

People [in Cyprus] grew up learning how important it is to project a ‘good face’ to the outside world. [Would you like to know] another reason that, in Cyprus, there are various forms of discrimination against LGBTQ people? It [i.e., the existence of discrimination] is also related to the fact that [geographically] we are close to Muslim, Asian and African countries so, whether we like it or not, we are affected [by their socio-cultural trends]. These are close-minded societies and because we are affected by them, we do not broaden our horizons ... I [also] find political leadership [in Cyprus] to be extremely problematic: I believe that they [i.e., Cypriot politicians] are procrastinating [with regard to addressing LGBTQ issues] and all their acts are directed towards winning a seat [in parliament]. Nobody is really trying to change the country’s foundations and to make it more liberal, more European, more tolerant.590

Similarly to the Initiative representative, this Greek-Cypriot LGBTQ activist accuses the Greek-Cypriot political leadership of not practicing what it is preaching. He argues that the Greek-Cypriot political elite employs the ‘Europe’ discourse only as a façade to its true aim, which is to get reelected. According to this interviewee, ‘Europe’ is opportunistically employed by the Cypriot elites in order to firstly, assure reelection and secondly, ‘to project a “good face” to the outside world’.591

590 “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 212552,” 4 April 2009. This interviewee is a member of the newly formed Greek-Cypriot group Accept-LGBT. The formation and activities of Accept-LGBT will be discussed in chapter five.

591 Ibid.
However, even those participants who described the ‘European’ and ‘Western’ discourse as somewhat conducive towards changing local social attitudes and, consequently, achieving LGBTQ equality, were quick to point to its limitations and drawbacks. A male gay Greek-Cypriot interviewee in his early thirties reported:

[Cypriot] people haven’t become gay all of a sudden. It’s just that, nowadays, they allow themselves to become visible. Is this because they feel a bit more comfortable? Is it because they feel more suppressed? Is it because they cannot be suppressed anymore? I am not sure why. Maybe it has to do with the fact that Cyprus has become a member of the EU. During the past fifteen-twenty years, we started coming closer to Europe. More and more young people would go [to study] in the United Kingdom and in the United States – especially in these two countries. When you come back and you are and feel alive, you go like: ‘Nice. I cannot continue being the way I was before I left [Cyprus].’ So, the more young people go abroad to study, the more we [i.e., Cypriots] become open-minded; because they [i.e., the young people] came out of the box. But whoever does not come out of the box remains the same. Unfortunately, our parents are here, in this box. Now, you might think I am telling you that there has been a change. Well, yes, but only among those people who leave their country. And this percentage is what? Ten per cent? 592

Beyond the question, which is prevalent in political science debates, of whether or not Europeanization and a European identity could affect values and ideologies at the local level, Cypriot LBGTQs’ stance towards ‘Europe’ and the ‘West’ also raises the question of whether the ‘subaltern’ can really ‘speak’. According to Spivak, the tendency to conserve the subject of the West, or West as the subject in Western literature and discourses, results in the epistemic violence of constituting the colonial – and the postcolonial – subject as the ‘Other’. 593 Spivak is critical of poststructural theory since, as she argues, philosophers and theorists like Foucault and Deleuze are blind towards the ‘Other’ as subject. Namely, their oeuvre is situated in, and addresses a specific socio-cultural and historical terrain, from which the ‘true’ subaltern is excluded. According to Spivak:

592 “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 212573”.
For the “true” subaltern group, whose identity is its difference, there is no unrepresentable subaltern subject that can know and speak itself; the intellectual’s solution is not to abstain from representation ... How can we touch the consciousness of people, even as we investigate their politics? With what voice-consciousness can the subaltern speak? ... The planned discontinuity of imperialism rigorously distinguishes this project, however old-fashioned its articulation ... All three [Marx, Foucault, Deleuze] are united in the assumption that there is a pure form of consciousness.594

As Spivak argues, this tendency is complicit in a hidden essentialist agenda: The ‘West’ is produced by the imperialist project – though Foucault and other poststructuralists remain ignorant towards this fact – and this constitutes a reflection of the European problem of ethnocentrism, in which the ‘subaltern’ cannot speak.595 Therefore, beyond addressing the question of whether the language and discourses of ‘Europe’ and of the ‘West’ are instrumental towards the emancipation of the ‘non-Western/non-European’ ‘Other’, or whether their employment by ‘non-Western’ subjects, such as Cypriot LGBTQs, relocates the ‘West/European versus the Rest/Periphery’ power dynamics within the periphery itself – and consequently creates divisions among LGBTQ ‘non-Western/European’ subjects – what needs to be considered is whether the ‘true subaltern’ could be represented and spoken about and whether it could represent and speak itself.

If one accepts Spivak’s argument – and it is difficult not to, since it accurately describes subject formation and representation within discourse – then, with regard to sexual subjectivity, the ‘true subaltern’ has never existed in Cyprus. In Cyprus, modalities of sexuality were first spoken about, represented, classified, sanctioned and delegitimized through ‘Western/European’ colonial discourses. Nowadays, because of the island’s Europeanization, sexual ‘others’ assume ‘Western/European’ sexual identities in order to speak and describe themselves. In this way, Cypriot LGBTQs are actively engaging with those discourses that have initially ‘otherized’ them: Cypriot LGBTQs constitute themselves as LGBTQ by adopting the ‘Western/European’ sexual identity discourse, and via differentiating

594 Ibid., 285-6.
595 Ibid., 217-313.
themselves from other sexual ‘others’, that is, the ‘subaltern’, ethnically and culturally inferior, non-European sexual ‘others’.

Nonetheless, this is not necessarily bad for Cypriot LGBTQs. Discourse Eurocentrism and the effects of colonialism have unquestionably muted alternative voices and understandings. Even if subjectivity cannot exist outside (‘Western/European’/external) discourse, subjects are not passively and pervasively constituted by discourse. The fact that subjectivity is necessarily positioned within discourse does not mean that subjects lack agency because subjects are both products of power and discourse and producers of themselves. Consequently, although Cypriot LGBTQ subjects ‘provide the bodies on and through which discourse may act ... [they also] form some of the conditions for knowledge’. That is to say, although processes of identification and sexual identity formation are embedded in ‘Western’ and ‘European’ discourses, their outcome is not predetermined or unavoidable.

The issue of whether the postcolonial ‘non-Western’ subject can speak and narrate itself is closely linked to questions about identity formation, identification articulation and political organization and mobilization. As Epstein explains, the notions and concepts around which identities crystallize are determinative of the nature that LGBTQ politics will have, as well as of their appeal and success. Kitzinger argues that gay affirmative research that constructs lesbianism in liberal humanistic terms as a form of self-actualization is non-liberating. Additionally, it reinforces an oppressive and depoliticized construction of the lesbian, while it undermines radical feminist theories of lesbianism. Therefore, it allows male supremacy to thrive, while it ignores institutionalized oppression. Consequently, although such rights and identity-based concessions have delivered some positive benefits to gay and lesbian people, the price paid for them is denying political meaning to lesbianism and relocating it to the sphere of the ‘private’ and ‘personal’.

597 Kendall and Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods, 53.
598 Ibid.
599 Ibid.
601 Ibid., 496.
Based on arguments like Kitzinger’s – that is, that liberal humanist approaches to sexuality subjectivities depoliticize them – and on arguments like Spivak’s – that is, that Western discourses ignore and do not allow the ‘subaltern’ to speak – what does the future hold for Cypriot LGBTQs?

When asked to give their opinions about sexual identities and about the prospect of LGBTQ organization and political mobilization, the majority of the LGBTQ interviewees – both male and female, Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot – were reluctant to categorize themselves. They said that they do not like labels and categories. When I asked them to choose a label from the vocabulary available to them, most of them adopted the ‘Western-imported’ ‘gay’ label. They reported that they prefer the English term ‘gay’ over the Greek terms ‘ομοφυλόφιλος/ομοφυλόφιλη’ (‘homosexual’) and ‘λεσβία’ (‘lesbian’). When asked why they differentiate between the Greek and English terms, they explained that the Greek terms carry a lot of stigma while the English, newer – to them – term, seems to be less polluted by derogatory innuendos.

A Greek-Cypriot gay male interviewee in his early thirties reported: ‘You are asking me to tell you how I identify with regard to my sexuality. Human being. That’s it. I am a human being.’ A Turkish-Cypriot female interviewee in her mid-twenties, said: ‘I am a woman who likes everybody!’ Additionally, in their majority LGBTQ interviewees argued that although these labels/identities/identifications could be and are being used to premise political mobilization and activism, they would never mobilize. A Greek-Cypriot gay male interviewee in his mid-thirties reported:

In Cyprus, they [i.e., LGBTQ people] cannot do something like this [i.e., engage in political mobilization]. There are only five or six pitiable of us [i.e., LGBTQ people]. If I appear on television to talk about rights, one hundred people from all over the island are going call my father and tell him ‘Your son was on television!’ How many are we? There are millions [of LGBTQ people] in the US and in Europe. But even if I lived there [i.e., in the US or in Europe] and appeared on television, who would care to watch me? No! Of course I wouldn’t feel comfortable being part

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602 The questions were: ‘How would you describe your sexual identity?’ and ‘Would you associate with an LGBTQ community or movement/organization?’
603 “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 212568,” 16 April 2009.
604 “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 212572A”.

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of such a group [i.e., LGBTQ group] ... There is no way I would appear on television, and hold flags, and cry, and write slogans on my body ... The decriminalization [of homosexuality] did not affect me in any way; because when you go out somewhere and people realize that you are gay, they get annoyed. So, whether it was decriminalized or not, it does not make a difference. We still need to be careful.605

As Judith Butler has phrased it: ‘When the “I” seeks to give an account of itself, it can start with itself, but it will find that this self is already implicated in a social temporality that exceeds its own capacities for narration.’606 So how could the Cypriot LGBTQ subject speak itself? Which language could render its subjectivity – with all its traditional, postcolonial, European and post-European complexities – legible? How could Cypriot LGBTQs come to recognize and identify the discursive processes that are involved in their alienation and consequently challenge them? How could the subject produce itself?

Although the subject cannot escape from the constraints of ‘governmentality’, it does partake in the production of knowledge that premises ‘governmentality’. Another way to phrase this is that although the ‘I’ is subjected to discourse, its agency is not annihilated and its positionality is not predetermined, since the ‘I’ is not bound to specific, established forms of subject formation; only to the sociality of any of a number of possible relations. This offers an occasion for self-transformation.607 In the case of Cypriot LGBTQs, this occasion of linguistic and social transformation is created by the disruption and by the almost parallel crossing of locally predominant discourses, which pertain to gender and sexuality, and of the ‘imported/European/Western’ human rights discourses. Truly, the former negate Cypriot LGBTQ subjectivities, while the latter do not pay sufficient attention to their specificities. Nevertheless, the space between these two sets of discourses constitutes an open space for LGBTQ subjects, which they could occupy and adjust to their needs by prioritizing some and abandoning some other elements of these ‘local’ and ‘external/imported’ discourses.

605 “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 212564A”.
607 Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 26, 114, 120, 130.
Conclusion

Two broad meanings can be distinguished in Foucault’s ‘governmentality’. In its first sense, ‘governmentality’ refers to the different ways we think about governing. This way of thinking is collective and relatively taken for granted: The way we think about authority draws upon forms of knowledge that are part of our social and cultural product. In its second sense – and this second sense constitutes a historically specific version of the first sense – ‘governmentality’ denotes the emergence of new forms of thinking about power and of new forms of exercising power in certain societal contexts. This emergence is characterized by forms of knowledge and techniques/technologies of the human and social sciences, which become integral to the art of government of the state as a distinct activity.608

Thus, for Foucault, the state is the result of practices of government and not the cause of practices of government, as theories of the state usually maintain. ‘Governmentality’ is ‘the conduct of conduct’.609 As such, it is applicable both to macro-social processes – i.e., to the processes that pertain to the state – and to micro-social processes – i.e., the processes that pertain to the individual. ‘Governmentality’ as a kind of meta-analysis is a tool of examining the objects of political science – namely the state, individuals and their formations – rather than a tool for making political science.610 ‘Governmentality’ is a kind of power, while power is to be understood as never merely repressive but rather as productive and as inextricably linked to resistance; ‘where there is power there is resistance’.611 Power is not possessed, but rather practiced and exercised.612 Knowledge goes hand in hand with power, since ‘knowledge is being used to select some techniques of [power] over others and to implement the chosen techniques in the attempts to impose control or management on the objects concerned’.613 Namely, power and knowledge are not the same. Rather, knowledge supports power in action, i.e., in governance.614

608 Dean, Governmentality, 16-9; Kendall and Wickham, “The Foucaultian Framework”, 130.
610 Ibid., 129-38.
611 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, 95.
612 Kendall and Wickham. Using the Foucault’s Methods, 49-52.
613 Hunt and Wickham, Foucault and the Law, 90; Kendall and Wickham. Using the Foucault’s Methods, 52.
614 Kendall and Wickham, Using the Foucault’s Methods, 55.
Admittedly, Foucault’s subject is inextricably linked to power’s productivity. The subject is a product rather than a producer. Nonetheless, Foucault does not reject the subject’s ability for agency. On the contrary, he sees subjects as having an active role in producing themselves as subjects subjected to power. It should also be stressed that, conversely to the way that it is usually being employed, Foucault’s ‘subjectivity’ does not stand for the ‘individual’, for the rational being which is the origin of human action. Foucault’s subject is historically contingent. And it is this subject that becomes the object of technologies and techniques of the self. The subject is produced through discourse and its actions are situated within discourse.

Therefore, since power is involved in subjectivity via discourse, subjects affect and form some of the conditions of knowledge. This reasoning is particularly important for the purposes of this study. What this means is that human action is not completely externally defined. Rather, it is always positional and context-specific. Additionally – and this is also pertinent to the present analysis – the different subject positions within discourse could be contradictory and irrational. Based on these two important aspects of the ‘power-knowledge-subjectivity’ triad – namely, that subjects partake into knowledge and that it is possible for the subject to be differentially positioned in discourse in ways that are contradictory and irrational – I argue that, in its second sense, ‘governmentality’ is penetrable. Although subjects might lack a view and understanding of the operations of ‘governmentality’ in its first sense, they could recognize and identify the discursive processes involved in the historically specific version of ‘governmentality’ and challenge them. In this manner, they will affect some degree of change on the collective unity of government mentality which is not readily accessible or examined by those who reside in it, that is, by subjects.

The interview excerpts discussed in this chapter attest to this argument. Elite interviewees attempted to justify their negative view of non-heteronormative gender and sexuality by employing numerous discourses that, at times, conflicted. These discourses were classified under three broader categories of positions/approaches: Through the articulation of outrightly homophobic claims, elite interviewees described non-heteronormative gender and sexuality as a moral flaw and as a self-inflicted disease; as a bad choice that renders the non-heterosexual individual as a

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615 Ibid., 52-6.
616 Ibid.
criminal and a moral villain. Through the employment of the *homophobia-couched-as-pity* language, these interviewees interpreted non-heteronormative gender and sexuality as an ‘inherited’ flaw or disease, with which non-heterosexual persons are cursed. Under such interpretation, the LGBTQ individual merits society’s pity and help. However, this pity for the LGBTQ individual’s condition is based on a set of conditions that the LGBTQ individual needs to meet. Namely, according to the third approach, what I call *qualified homophobia*, the heterocentric society’s sympathy stops where LGBTQ claims begin.

On a first reading, this last approach might lead to the conclusion that the future of Cypriot LGBTQs seems to be gloomy. However, a closer look at this elite-assumed position reveals that perceptions and norms about gender and sexuality are actually flexible and, consequently, changeable. For example, a Greek-Cypriot military official reported that although he would not mind same-sex marriages, he disapproves of same-sex couples raising children. This is because his rationalization of non-heteronormative gender and sexuality is deeply embedded in gender binarism. However, this interviewee’s stance towards LGBTQ sexuality constitutes a useful demonstration of the workings of the subjectivity-discourse-governmentality-power/knowledge relationship and of the fact that the effects of these workings are not predetermined. Namely, if gender binarism is challenged – that is, if there is a change in the predominant knowledge and discourses about sexuality – there will be a change in subjectivity formation – that is, in the way that LGBTQ individuals are perceived by their others – and, consequently, a widening of the possibility and modes of exercising agency.

The examination of Cypriot LGBTQs ideas about gender and sexuality led to similar conclusions. The interview excerpts discussed in this chapter show that LGBTQ Cypriots are enmeshed in, and are limited by heterocentric, patriarchal and androcentric binarisms. For example, lesbian and bisexual women were eager to distance themselves from ‘sex-addicted’ gay men and ‘masculine’ lesbians, while gay men expressed an intense dislike towards ‘effeminate’ gays. Moreover, some of the LGBTQ interviewees – Greek-Cypriots mostly – employed a number of in-group distinctions and categorizations, which they premised on ethnicity and national identity discourses. Some Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs defined themselves as

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‘European’, via casting Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs as ‘non-European’ and, therefore, ‘inferior’.

It is not only the impact of nationalistic discourses that such attitudes demonstrate; they also attest to a replication of the dynamics of colonialist, Eurocentric and Western-centric discourses at the local level. Yet, even such approaches might prove promising towards the destabilization of the Cypriot discursive status quo. The importance of nationalism lies both in its inherent contradictions and in its ability to reinvent itself.\textsuperscript{618} In a similar manner, external, supranational, ‘European’ discourses have a double potential impact at the national level. This chapter demonstrated that ‘Europe’ with its language, mechanisms and institutions can function as a vital pressure tool in the hands of Cypriot LGBTQs, if they seek recognition and rights from their political elite. Furthermore – as the next chapter will demonstrate – it could also lead to the formation of less nationalistic and ethnicity-based LGBTQ individual and group identifications and identities, without annihilating local understandings and modalities of non-heteronormative gender and sexuality.

My research results and analysis point to the fact that the lack of political awareness among Cypriot LGBTQs is not what is keeping them subordinated. They are very much aware that one must take responsibility for inventing and producing one’s own self as Foucault urges,\textsuperscript{619} even though their exposure to, or agreement with, poststructuralist, queer, identity and rights approaches to sexuality and gender is limited, or even inexistent. The issue that needs to be addressed both by Cypriot LGBTQs themselves and by scholarly analyses on the topic of constituting the ‘Self’ amidst numerous contradicting or parallel discourses is how to engage with, and stand in relation to, these discourses; how to invoke them in ways that expand the plane of the thinkable and the recognizable. These questions will be the focus of the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{618} This argument is extensively elaborated in chapter two.
CHAPTER FIVE

Intersections of Europeanization, Globalization and Sexual Subjectivities in Cyprus
Introduction

The previous chapter concluded that although Cypriot LGBTQs are not necessarily familiar with, or supportive of poststructuralist and queer approaches to gender and sexuality, they are aware that one could and should take responsibility for inventing and producing one’s own self, as Foucault urges.620 Nonetheless, they are reluctant to do so in a way that openly challenges the sexual status quo. This chapter will examine this seeming inconsistency, by analyzing two sets of issues. Firstly, it will discern the reasons for Cypriot LGBTQs’ reluctance to challenge locally predominant discourses of sexuality through political action. Secondly, it will evaluate the prospect, as well as the possible ways, of invoking the existent numerous contradicting or parallel discourses of sexuality, in order to expand the plane of thinkable and recognizable sexual subjectivities in Cyprus.

The questions and problems that arise from these two broader issues, and which this chapter will address, are numerous. The first concerns the ways in which same-sex desires relate to other elements/parameters which inform one’s subjectivity and understanding of the self, one of them being national identity. The second question that needs to be addressed is how – if at all – local same-sex desires are influenced by the types of articulation, demonstration and politicization of same-sex desires in other locales, like Western Europe and the US. Therefore, the chapter will evaluate the relationship between global/transnational ideas and local understandings that pertain to sexual identity, politics and citizenship. Namely, it will attempt to discern what happens when local sexual subjectivities are faced with, and challenged by external, and specifically by ‘European’ and/or ‘Western’ notions of LGBTQ identities, politics and citizenship. To phrase it otherwise, it will examine how the vocabulary of ‘European’/ ‘Western’ discourses of sexuality is appropriated by Cypriot LGBTQs, as well as what the promises and/or perils of such appropriation are.

The examination of intersections and overlaps of ‘colonial’ and ‘Eurocentric/Western-centric’ discourses in ‘postcolonial’ settings, like Cyprus, elucidates how and why local and global/transnational sexual discourses conflict, how and why they are negotiated, as well as how, why and in which ways they

620 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” 39-42.
become fused. Ultimately, such discursive overlaps at the local level complicate and help expand conceptualizations about, and interlinks between power, gender and sexuality. Therefore, this chapter will examine the effects of ‘postcolonial’ notions of ‘modernity’ on local social organization and identities. It will question whether ‘postmodernity’ has any currency beyond destabilizing cultural understandings; that is, if beyond provocatively questioning ethnographic, historical and theoretical accounts of contemporary sexualities, ‘postmodernity’ also emasculates binary distinctions and informs/renders feasible any kind of LGBTQ political action.

The chapter’s first section will focus on the recently emerging Cypriot LGBTQ politics. It will describe the formation, structure, operations and strategies of the three organizations: the Greek-Cypriot group Cypriot Gay Liberation Movement (Απελευθερωτικό Κίνημα Ομοφυλοφίλων Κύπρου) and the Turkish-Cypriot group Initiative Against Homophobia, while it will focus primarily on the newly established Greek-Cypriot organization Accept-LGBT. It will describe and analyze these groups’ engagement with state structures, as well as political and state elites’ stance towards these groups. By focusing on some suggestive instances in LGBTQ politics and activism in the US, this section will also engage with ‘assimilationist’ and ‘radical’ approaches to sexual equality, and it will evaluate their practicability and applicability in ‘non-Western’ contexts, like Cyprus. It will debate whether political mobilization that pertains to same-sex sexual desire could benefit from either of the two standpoints, from a melange of the two or from a third position that emanates from the confrontation.

The second section of this chapter will attempt to provide an evaluation of the up-to-now impact of the newly-established Accept-LGBT on the political, social and cultural context within which this group operates. Through a suggestive, as opposed to an exhaustive, analysis, this section will try to discern those ways of action that seem to work best for sexually dissident groups that aim to communicate their aims and objectives to unreceptive audiences. Specifically about Cyprus – yet

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621 Similar movements existed and exist in other countries, which might be similar or not to the US example. However, this chapter does not attempt to address the specific details of the course of such movements or to present a complete study of sexual politics in these countries. The aim is to evaluate whether the issues addressed and the mobilization strategies employed by activists in the ‘West’ are transferable and applicable to the Cypriot context, as well as to discern points of contact and points of divergence between activism in these different locales. By doing so, it will highlight the importance of selective appropriation of external/transnational paradigms of sexual politics by local actors. The focus will be placed on the movement in the US, since it has acted as a pace-setter for what could be labelled as the ‘Western’ LGBT movement.
in a way that captures issues of sexual equality, citizenship and mobilization in comparable locales – this section will examine whether ‘Europeanization’ and ‘Europe’ constitute a new, distinctive way of negotiating sexuality claims.

**Intersections of ‘Westernization’, ‘Eurocentrism’, ‘Modernity’ and ‘Postmodernity’ in the Cypriot ‘Postcolonial’ Setting**

‘The Occident’ and ‘the Orient’, ‘the West’ and ‘the East’, ‘the West’ and ‘the Rest’,\(^{622}\) are binarisms that consolidate bifurcated discourses. Such discourses arbitrarily distinguish the universe into inherently unequal and rigidly distinct social, cultural, political and economic zones, while these binarisms’ pervasiveness is assured by the continuous employment of rigid and unscrutinized geographical divisions in the analysis of human condition. The complexity of cultural distinctions and the variety of local socio-political operations cannot be grasped through the unscrutinized employment of essentialized analytical concepts like continents, nation-states, world regions and supra-continental blocks. Rather, it can only be unthoughtfully glossed-over or ignored, at the cost of leading to erroneous and incomplete understandings.\(^{623}\)

Eurocentrism is one of the consolidated bifurcated discourses that such binarisms generate and reflect. However, Eurocentrism also generates and perpetuates such binarisms.\(^{624}\) By ‘Eurocentrism’, I mean the elevation of Europe as the centre and as the paradigm of human history and the depiction of the rest of the world as ‘primitive’ and ‘lacking’ with regard to cultural, social, political and economic achievements, when compared to the paradigm – that is, Europe. By ‘Westernization’, I mean the elevation and magnification of the north-western parts of the globe; that is, Europe and North America or those places that are meant to be

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\(^{622}\) One of the aims of this chapter is to problematize the essentialisms embedded in these and in similar binary notions. The fact that at some points in the chapter these terms are used without quotation marks is not meant to be interpreted that I unquestionably accept such terms and their connotations.

\(^{623}\) Lewis and Wigen, *The Myth of Continents*, 1-19. Lewis and Wigen explain that the aim of their project is not to render all geographical structures as fictitious. Rather, it is ‘both to deconstruct and to conserve; to highlight fluidity and indeterminacy, but also to map out real geographical structures ... to uncover the political motivation behind metageographical conceptualizations, without implying that they are all reducible to strategic interests’. See page 17. See also: Said, *Orientalism*, xi-xxii.

\(^{624}\) Lewis and Wigen interpret ‘Eurocentrism’ as a ‘by-product of the continental and nation-state myths’ (see: Lewis and Wigen, *The Myth of Continents*, 10). To this, I add – à la Said and Spivak, among others – that Eurocentrism both rationalizes and it is being rationalized by the division of the world into two (‘European’- ‘non-European’) unequal spheres.
captured by the ‘First World’ notion of the now anachronistic metageographical tripartite scheme of ‘First, Second and Third World countries’.  

According to David Lyon, ‘modernity’ is the social order that emerged following the Enlightenment, when tradition was either dismissed or marginalized in favour of a belief in progress, and in the power of human reason to produce freedom. It signifies the consequences of the social and political processes that followed the industrial, capitalist and technological developments in Europe. Beyond that, modernity – as an economic, technological, political and cultural affair, as the constellation of the characteristics of European and Western societies, and in conjunction and supported by pseudoscientific social Darwinism – has been seen both as an inevitable and as a desirable process. It has been understood as a patent or as a set of steps that could be exported and that, if followed, would inexorably lead any society to its destined, optimal future. Subsequently, this self-justifying principle has also been employed in order to render the colonizing ‘Nation’ as the ‘evolutionary Family of Man’, both within and outside its borders.

Colonialism and Western imperialism are the offshoots of the merging of modernity’s logocentrism – which has equated human progress with the marginalization of traditional ways of thinking and living – with the ‘Enlightened’ countries’ expansionism – which has been self-justified through modernizing/civilizing missions that sought to ‘free’ the ‘non-West/the Rest’, from its ‘backwardness’. As Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has astutely and succinctly phrased it, ‘the most frightening thing about imperialism, its long-term toxic effect, what secures it, what cements it, is the benevolent self-representation of the imperialist as savior.

In Cyprus – like in other places they had colonized – through legal practice, the British attempted to ‘tame’, ‘civilize’ and ‘modernize’ Cypriot life, and to

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625 Given the demise of Soviet and Eastern European communism, the tripartite is anachronistic. However, ‘the categorization scheme has survived far longer than was ever warranted, in large part because it served the ideological needs of both Cold War American partisans and, on the opposite side of the political spectrum, the most vigorous opponents of American neo-imperialism’. See: Lewis and Wigen, The Myth of Continents, 4.
626 David Lyon, Concepts in Social Thought: Postmodernity, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 25-8; Lewis and Wigen, The Myth of Continents, 7; McClintock, Imperial Leather, 45, 357.
implement ‘a European governmental rationality and categorization’. For example, combating crime became a priority for British administrators who stressed that policing Cypriots’ ‘nature’ was important towards achieving of this task. As stated in the handbook for Cypriot police officers, that was published by the British administration in 1896, ‘bad characters’ were to be closely surveilled and their names, addresses and activities were to be reported to the colonial rulers. Such colonial laws categorized certain traditional practices, which were deemed as deriving from the ‘nature’ of the colonized, as backward, uncivilized and punishable. As Bryant explains:

In colonial legal practice, however, that “nature” was also “culture”, in contrast to the presumably non-cultural individualism enjoyed by British Subjects themselves. ... In colonial practice, only from the presumably non-cultural vantage point of European colonizers was full individualism possible; others were not yet advanced enough to break away from the shackles of their cultural nature.

Such laws constitute an example of the type of surveillance, discipline and punishment that Foucault interprets as the most important demonstration of Western governmentality. For example, the British colonial ‘civilizing’ mission has been portrayed by the British colonizers not only as justified, but also as invited by the Cypriot colonial subjects themselves. The following remark by Sir Richard Palmer, the British colonial governor of Cyprus, during a meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society in London in 1939, is illustrative:

Several thousand years ago a lady called Aphrodite landed in Cyprus, and the island was never quite recovered. The people of Cyprus make a luxury of discontent and always pretend they do not like being ruled, and yet, like the lady I have mentioned as a prototype, they expect to be ruled, and, in fact, prefer it.

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629 Bryant, Imagining the Modern, 49.
630 Ibid., 48-51.
631 Ibid., 50.
The symbolism is self-explanatory: Cyprus, like the promiscuous, wild-natured goddess of love, seeks to be dominated by the colonial ruler who is characterized by reason. Thus, imperialist colonial ideology is rendered not only justified, but also welcomed by the colonized Cypriot subject.

Nonetheless, and despite its pervasiveness, modernity and the colonial discourse that it supported carried in them the seeds of their own demise. As a historically created form of consciousness that challenged previously held assumptions about human knowledge, nature, social formations and political and economic organization, modernity paved the way for its own transcendence. By the twentieth century, the civilizing project of Westernization and of colonial imperialism started to crumble. The idea of universal knowledge and culture, as well as an understanding of modernity as a recipe that can be transplanted anywhere and that unavoidably leads to ‘progress’, were severely challenged both by the colonial peoples and within Western intellectual circles.

Within the hubs of its production, modernity had described man as a concrete, stable unit and had placed the autonomous self centre stage; man was inherently the bearer of civil, political and social rights. Far from its promise though, and in order to assure its perpetuation, modernity necessitated hierarchical distinctions and categorical inequalities at home, which were similar to those that supported the imperialist project in the colonies: Gender, race and class are realms of experience that come into existence not in isolation, but in, and though their relation, while this relation is pertinent to the control of access to value-producing resources.\textsuperscript{635} In this way, the modern individual becomes entangled in a system that controls, qualifies and inscribes life within the state order.\textsuperscript{636} This is because ‘the “body” is always already a biopolitical body and bare life, and nothing in it or the

\textsuperscript{635} For example, see: Charles Tilly. \textit{Durable Inequality}. Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA & London: University of California Press, 1998. Tilly proposes a socially relational approach to equality and durable inequality. As he explains, ‘categorical organization helps produce individual differences as a consequence of structural differentials in contacts, experiences, opportunities, and assistance or resistance from others. Bonds, not essences, provide the bases of durable inequality (236)’. Although Tilly argues that categorical inequality is not necessarily bad, since it could generate vital organizational solutions, he warns against needless and harmful categorical distinctions and durable inequalities that, besides their negative effects on some groups’ welfare (228), could even destabilize democratic political processes (223, 246). What I find problematic is Tilly’s insistence on binary categorization – for example, male/female, black/white. Durable inequality is sometimes structured and sustained when subjectivities overlap. Such an example is the national identity-gender-sexuality axis that this thesis focuses on.

\textsuperscript{636} Agamben, \textit{Homo Sacer}, 121.
economy of its pleasure seems to allow us to find solid ground on which to oppose the demands of sovereign power’.  

Beyond a movement or current of thought, ‘postmodernity’ designates a larger transformation of thinking and social existence, which has evolved as a response to modernity’s failures. It has been even argued that ‘postmodernity’ refers to a diverse range of activities that amount to a new era in human history, since nothing ever again could escape being questioned; not even reason and reality. Concrete knowledge and its possibility, as well as the modern belief that structures of knowledge reflect and legitimize social structures were replaced by flexible discourses, and by a deconstructive approach towards modernity’s dichotomies and binarisms. Nietzsche’s proclamation that ‘God is dead’ was followed by Foucault’s assertion that the sciences of man are dead, because ‘man’ is dead.

However, postmodernist, poststructuralist and postcolonial studies have not been more immune to critiques than modernist approaches. For example, it has been argued that the term ‘postcolonial’ is haunted by the figure of the linear development – from ‘the pre-colonial’, to ‘the colonial’, to the ‘postcolonial’ – that it seeks to rebuke. Namely, although postcolonialism proclaims the end of an era – that is, the era of colonialism – it does so by invoking the same figurative language of linear history and progress that has sustained colonialism. Instead of decentring history, it recentres it around European time and consequently, shifts the focus away from questions of power, domination and exploitation. Similarly to postmodernist and poststructuralist approaches, postcolonialist approaches are not free from binary oppositions. On the contrary, their essence is premised on the ‘colonial-postcolonial’ opposition, which carries the danger of inverting, rather than overturning, dominant notions of power.

To be sure, postcolonial experience includes Western hegemony. However, if the West is omnipresent, that is, if the West is present both within the West and outside it, then it is not possible for a postcolonial critique that is unpolluted from colonial experience to arise. Rather, what postcoloniality does is to engage in what

637 Ibid., 187.
640 McClintock, Imperial Leather, 10-11, 15.
Spivak calls ‘catachrestic criticism’; that is, it confiscates the omnipresent apparatus in order to reverse and displace it:

Within the historical frame of exploration, colonization, and decolonization, what is being effectively reclaimed is a series of regulative political concepts, the supposedly authoritative narrative of whose production was written elsewhere, in the social formations of Western Europe. They are thus being reclaimed, indeed claimed, as concept metaphors for which no historically adequate referent may be advanced from postcolonial space. That does not make the claims less urgent. A concept metaphor without an adequate referent may be called a catachresis by the definitions of classical rhetoric. These claims to catachreses as foundations also make postcoloniality a deconstructive case. 642

Moreover, arguments have been raised that the postmodernist approach is more a sensibility than a coherent theoretical stance and tends to mirror the theories and concepts that are the object of its critique. For example, it has been argued that postmodernist critiques against Eurocentrism do not manage to go further than merely revise Eurocentrism’s ethical signposts and render the ‘non-West’ as morally and intellectually superior than the West. 643 However, the raison d’être of postmodernist thinking is to call into question the exploitive and individualistic character of modern existence. As such, it does not abandon ethical considerations, political responsibilities or the rigors of thought, like Habermas argues. 644 Regardless of its scrutinizing of universal principles and of its embracement of relativism, postmodern thinking does not necessarily lead to the abandonment of social and political concerns. As Palmer explains:

being postmodern ... means that one has reached the point of turning against ... all confidence that just a little more of this or that – humanizing psychology, cleaning up government, teaching “values” (in the abstract), controlling inflation, population,

644 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourses of Modernity.
or pollution – will solve the crisis that faces “modern” man. For the problem may be precisely his modernity.

As this chapter will argue through the employment of the US example, the ‘essentialist versus social constructionist’ controversy – especially during the 1970s and 1980s – and the ‘queer versus identity and rights-based approach’ debate – especially during the 1990s – among activists and theorists, delineated the ways in which questions about the position of non-heterosexual sexuality within matrices of power and about notions and forms of (sexual) citizenship are approached. Beyond the ways in which such theoretical debates have informed LGBTQ activism in the West, what it is also important to examine and what this chapter will focus on is: Firstly, whether these debates adequately describe the concerns of LGBTQs elsewhere, and especially in postcolonial Cyprus; secondly, whether the approaches adopted by LGBTQ groups in the West – as a result of the influences of these two debates – are useful when employed by non-Western LGBTQ groups, like Cypriot LGBTQ groups, or whether LGBTQs outside the West would fare better if they sought an alternative trajectory of action; thirdly, whether ‘Europe’, both as a supranational institution and as a new, transnational ‘ethic’ about the ways in which ‘citizenship’ is defined and practiced, is – or shows the way towards – a new distinctive way of doing LGBTQ politics.

**Modernity, Postcoloniality and Cypriot LGBTQ Politics: The Gaze at Europe and the West**

To be sure, the people within LGBTQ movements who seek narrow reformist objectives through non-radical and non-confrontational means are usually those who already have a degree of standing in, and access to, mainstream institutions. Moreover, the assimilation and ‘sameness’ rhetoric, both across and within (sexual) ‘categories’ – that is, when LGBTQs say to heterosexuals ‘we are like you’ or when non-Western LGBTQs say to Western LGBTQs ‘we are like you’ – creates sameness

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645 Palmer, “Toward a Postmodern Interpretive Self-Awareness,” 319.
(a sameness that is already divided hierarchically based on the binaries of the heteronormative Western centre, and which is replicated in the periphery) only by reinstating difference. This raises questions about the ability of the LGBTQ movements that employ mainstream discourses – one of these discourses being the human rights discourse – to move from legitimization and access to rights, to real transformation and freedom; to transformation and freedom for all the LGBTQ individuals whom they are claiming to be representing and not only for those who already have access to, or are part of, the existent structures of power.

Several voices have warned that the institutionalization of social movements might result in legal and political successes, but it distances them from their grassroots base and creates divisions within the movement. Mainstreaming is problematic both as a means and as an end. The reason is that access to political power and an excessively legislative focus do not secure actual political power to influence political outcomes. As a result, the success of such political, legislative or legal campaigns is only parochial; it achieves only ‘virtual equality’ and does not diffuse into the daily lives and realities of the people that the movement is supposed to be representing.

With regard to LGBTQ politics in the US, it has been argued that while a focus on the utilization of identities functions a means of securing group solidarity and of representing sexual communities in civil society, sexual politics need to be transformed into ‘a politics of anti-normalization’. Whereas a politics of normalization seeks to share or expand the boundaries of normalcy, an ‘anti-normalizing politics’ seeks to displace notions of normalcy altogether. Furthermore, it moves beyond the ‘assimilationism versus separatism’ dilemma because it challenges the very grounds upon which negotiations of inclusion and exclusion are made. Additionally, it challenges sexual and gender identities such as ‘homosexual’, ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’, ‘women’ and ‘men’, on the grounds that they are inherently problematic, since they are not flexible enough to describe a self and a sexual subject that is constituted by multiple desires.

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647 Manalansan, “In the Shadows of Stonewall,” 436.
As Meeks explains, it is impossible for someone to make claims to rights or to equal representation under the law, when the very identity categories through which these articulations are being made are problematic.\(^652\) Therefore, he concludes that the aim should be to imagine and treat difference differently and to broaden theoretical definitions of civil society beyond formal processes, in order to embrace the ‘politics of anti-normalization’, which contest the norms that currently govern intimacy and desire.\(^653\) However, Meeks’s analysis of what the US LGBTQ movement’s politics should be is no less open to criticism than assimilationist and or/communicative approaches.\(^654\) Firstly, a ‘politics of anti-normalization’ approach downplays the benefits that the invocation of human rights has brought to LGBTQ movements, in the same way that assimilationist approaches downplay the perils that the language of human rights embeds. Secondly, ‘politics of anti-normalization’ are only prima facie promising towards social, cultural and political transformation; for their proponents do not explicate how such politics could be divided from law and rights, from civil society and its formal processes, from democratization, from legitimization and recognition and from the public sphere, while remaining political. Thirdly, although this approach highlights the negative effects of a strategic utilization of identity on subjects, it does not rebuke the real forces behind the construction of essentialist identities. Essentially, the problem with such ‘radical’ approaches is that they leave unaddressed the objects of their own critique since:

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\(^653\) Ibid., 325-43.
power matrices. They attempt to avoid the dangers of identity-based politics and of a universalizing project while simultaneously remaining sensitive to local and historical distinctions, and while approaching the ‘state’ not as a monolithic centre of power, but as a constellation of different agencies, institutions, laws and ordinances. Their objective is to find, and point to the ways through which activism and theories learn from and inform each other in their common effort to reform the institutions and the practices that shape and constrain us. Their suggested course for sexual politics is ‘disestablishment’. It involves supplementing equality and difference rhetoric, the language of rights claims for a fixed minority and calls for antidiscrimination with elements of the liberal discourse that seeks to separate church and state. As they explain:

We might argue that public policy and public institutions may not legitimately compel, promote or prefer intergender relationships over intragender attachments. Without appropriating too much of the liberal baggage of the discourse of religious tolerance, we might borrow from this rhetoric a strategy for reversing the terms of antigay propaganda and exposing the myriad ways that state apparatuses promote, encourage and produce “special rights” for heterosexuality.

Furthermore, this proposal involves comparing sexual desire to religion in order to highlight it as not natural, fixed or a-historical and, simultaneously, as not trivial or shallow. The aim of this approach is to render sexual desire as a ‘lifestyle choice’ and as a deep commitment that is resistant to coerced conversion and that merits free expression and political protection. As Duggan and Nan argue, this ‘disestablishment’ approach avoids debates about morality, values and biology and...

bypasses differences among activists, while it grounds and supports demands for freedom of association and freedom of speech.\textsuperscript{658}

Admittedly, these authors make a striking effort to have the best of both worlds and they succeed at making proposals that seem to be both transformative and effective – at least when applied in the US context. But what would happen in the ‘Rest’, that is, in places that are differ from the Anglo-American and Western European paradigm? How transferable and flexible is such a proposal, especially when the focus is placed on milieux where the state and the church are not separated; where heterosexuality is the norm, the only possibility; where ‘rights’ are what heterosexuals and other ‘legitimate’ groups get, whereas ‘special group rights’ are the allowances made to the classified as ‘less-than-human’ because of pity; where biology makes ‘norm’ and ‘proper’; where all of the above remains unchallenged even under the rubric of a (merely nominal) liberal democracy?

Practices of gay and lesbian rights and lobby politics at the European/regional level are not unrelated to binary and hierarchical orders of dominance. Gender and sexuality politics simultaneously contest and reinscribe those laws and orders that organize human existence and culture around sexual and gender identities and identifications.\textsuperscript{659} As the analysis of LGBTQ litigation in the ECtHR has demonstrated, since the 1980s, the language and mechanisms of European rights and identities has been significant towards promoting LGBTQ rights and national-level equality.\textsuperscript{660} However, although such legal and political wins have assured some space for LGBTQ individuals within the gender and sexuality status quo, they have not demolished its basic pillars or obliterated its organizing logic.

The fact that the reordering of the gender and sexuality status quo remains a difficult task, even when pursued through the invocation and employment of some of liberal democracy’s most effective rhetoric and mechanisms – that is, through the invocation of the (European) human rights discourse, institutions and mechanisms—demonstrates that liberal democratic structures depend on gender and sexuality binaries and on normative structures. Drawing on Butler, Beger explains that all rules that are connected to the ability to articulate and assert the self in liberal humanist discourse are fundamentally connected to gender hierarchies and

\textsuperscript{658} Duggan and Hunter, \textit{Sex Wars}, 180-1.
\textsuperscript{659} Beger, \textit{Tensions in the Struggle for Sexual Minority Rights in Europe}, 1-4.
\textsuperscript{660} See chapter three.
compulsory heterosexuality.\textsuperscript{661} Although inconspicuous when compared, for example, to racism, heteronormativity and heterocentrism are so fundamental to Western/European socio-cultural and political structures that their interrogation, although paramount, continues to be a difficult task, even in an era of human rights proliferation.

From a queer theory perspective, the problem with human rights is not only that they are premised on a gendered perception of humanness. Beyond that, what is also problematical, specifically with regard to European LGBTQ rights and litigation, is the treatment of gender as the manifestation of biological sex. In the tradition of European law, ‘sexual identity’ was treated as a conflation of anatomical sex, socially constructed gender and sexuality. As Beger explains:

\[662\] Ibid., 131-2.
\[663\] Stychin, \textit{Law’s Desire}.

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... the law rests on two assumptions: there are two types of human bodies, and two distinct sets of gendered behaviour – including sexual object choice – follow from this alleged natural fact. The existence of sexual orientation as a marker of difference arises out of the construction of sex and gender as previously described. Any legal proceeding concerned with questions of homosexual, transgender, or women’s rights contributes to the definition of the relationship between sex and gender ... In that logic, penis equals male and male equals sex with female.\textsuperscript{662}

Thus, in European law, sexual orientation discrimination was understood as sex discrimination, while any relationship between non-heteronormative gender identity and sexual orientation was silenced or bypassed.

However, regardless of these shortcomings of European human rights discourse and litigation, the legal realm constitutes a vehicle towards the shifting of the gender and sexuality status quo. Legal narratives that are articulated in courtrooms make alternative conceptions of gender and sexuality thinkable.\textsuperscript{663} It might be the case that, in European human rights discourse, the concept of individuated ‘humanness’ is – or, rather was – premised on normative sexualities and gender binaries. Nonetheless, since the concept of humanity is contestable – that is, it is not natural, objective or universal but historically and culturally contested – LGBTQ individuals could politically invoke this concept. According to Beger, this
would imply abandoning the idea of sexual identity as liberation and as a rupture from the current sexuality and gender status quo, and instead embracing human identity as a political strategy; that is, articulating LGBTQ humanity, freedom, equality, recognition, respectability and integrity as a strategy that is intelligible in institutional political discourse, and that needs to be employed as a means to an end.\(^6\)

Nevertheless, the most important and widespread effects of supranational legal and political battles are those that are manifested at the national and the transnational level. LGBTQ national and transnational movements’ attempts to disrupt normative assumptions about gender and sexuality and to push for policy changes are inspired and legitimated by legal and political wins at the regional/European level. As the case of Cyprus exemplifies, regardless of the legal bite that such pro-LGBTQ regional decisions have, and regardless of whether or not enforcement mechanisms are in place in order to assure their implementation, the mere fact that they emanate from ‘Europe’, from the European centre, carries enough symbolic credit for such decisions to be used by local and transnational LGBTQ activists in the periphery as a political pressure tool against national/local governments.\(^7\) For example, as the analysis of the Modinos v. Cyprus case and of its impact at the local level demonstrated, European mechanisms and discourses have been – at least partially – conducive towards Cypriot LGBTQ visibility.

Nonetheless, as the employment of ‘Western/European’ discourses of sexuality by Cypriot LGBTQs demonstrated, to some degree, LGBTQ organization and mobilization in Cyprus also seems to affirm those notions that see tolerance towards non-heterosexual sexuality, non-heteronormative gender identities and LGBTQ equality as part of an evolutionary process, which emanates first in the ‘advanced’ centre/West/Europe and which is subsequently exported in the ‘backward’ Periphery/Rest. It also demonstrated that, at least some Cypriot LGBTQs perceive Western/European sexuality politics and identities as inappropriate in relation to their needs and to their social, cultural and political national/local reality.

For example, numerous Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees described Cyprus as

\(^6\) Beger, Tensions in the Struggle for Sexual Minority Rights in Europe, 98.
\(^7\) For example, and as the case of Cyprus demonstrates, although the decisions of the ECtHR are binding and European Convention law supersedes the national law in member-states, other European bodies and groups whose decisions and declarations are not mandatory and are not supported by any enforcement mechanisms – for example, the European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT Rights – have been active and effective with regard to exposing homophobic national policies.
‘backward’ with regard to LGBTQ issues when compared to other countries, like the UK and the US,\textsuperscript{666} while some others claimed that LGBTQ organization and mobilization similar to the Western/European example is something that they do not approve of.\textsuperscript{667} Some Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs even employed European/Western discourses in order to render themselves as superior when compared to Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs since, as they claimed, they are ‘European’ while Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs are not.\textsuperscript{668}

A similar conflict between local discourses of sexuality and European/Western ones is evident in the cases of Cypriot LGBTQ organized groups also. However, as opposed to some Cypriot LGBTQs who described the idea of sexual identities, politics and mobilization as inappropriate for the case of Cyprus, the spokespersons of these Cypriot LGBTQ organizations reported that European/Western discourses of sexuality and LGBTQ politics have provided them with the rational to organize their groups and also helped them to confront locally predominant suppressive discourses. The cases of the Greek-Cypriot Cypriot Gay Liberation Movement (\textit{Άπελευθερωτικό Κίνημα Ομοφυλοφίλων Κύπρου}, abbreviated AKOK) and of the Turkish-Cypriot Initiative Against Homophobia exemplify how the European/Western example of sexual politics informs local activists in non-Western settings. However, the case of AKOK also exemplifies how local, dominant perceptions of sexuality – both elite and non-elite – have the power to limit the positive effects of European/Western discourses of sexuality on local LGBTQ organization and mobilization.

The Greek-Cypriot AKOK was established in 1987 by the activist Alecos Modinos.\textsuperscript{669} Since at the time of the establishment of AKOK homosexuality was illegal, the organization was never officially registered as a legal person. Even after Modinos’s success at the ECHR against the RoC and the decriminalization of homosexuality, the number of AKOK members remained very low. As Modinos

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\textsuperscript{666} “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 212573”.
\textsuperscript{667} “Interview with LGBTQ Participants 212564A and 212564B”.
\textsuperscript{668} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{669} However, according to Alecos Modinos, the nucleus of AKOK was formed as early as the autumn of 1979, when the first public discussion of homosexuality took place in Nicosia, under the auspices of the Cyprus Mental Health Commission. See: Alecos Modinos, “Love that Dares Not Speak its Name: Gay/Lesbian Rights in Cyprus,” Paper presented at Department of Law Annual Conference, University of Nicosia, Nicosia, 28 November 2007. For the speeches presented at the Cyprus Mental Health Commission Seminar, which was titled ‘Homosexuality’ and took place at Philoxenia Hotel in Nicosia on 20 and 21 March 1982, see: Παγκύπρια Εταιρεία Ψυχικής Υγείας. \textit{Ομοφυλοφιλία}. Λευκωσία, 1982.
\end{flushleft}
explains, this was a direct result of the stigmatization and demonization he suffered by state and political actors, but primarily from the then Archbishop Chrysostomos I, and by other high-ranking members of the clergy of the Church of Cyprus. Societal intolerance towards non-heterosexual sexual choice and towards its demonstration in the public sphere also contributed to keeping AKOK’s number of members low. As Modinos explains:

AKOK did not evolve because the Cypriot homosexual, whether a man or a woman, experiences the bad elements of [the discrimination against] homosexuality from a young age. Although they are not to blame for not being accepted, they might even feel guilty [about their homosexuality], although I think that this is less common among the younger generation. Therefore, they hide and they camouflage themselves and they protect themselves. I could expose a homosexual friend of mine.

The prevalence of such attitudes among Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs is confirmed by Hüseyin Çavusoğlu, one of the founding members of the Turkish-Cypriot group Initiative Against Homophobia. Referring to his attempts to come into contact and create links with Greek-Cypriot LGBTQ activists, Çavusoğlu remarked:

The first thing I did when I started [being involved with] the Initiative was to try to connect with [people in] the south. And I was a bit disappointed when I figured out that there is only Alecos [Modinos], or [Modinos and] very few people around him. I was expecting more people. After Cyprus joined the EU, I thought that more young people would be involved, but I didn’t manage to reach out to them. There is this idea ... and they [i.e., young people] think that if they become [involved with LGBTQ activism], society would think that they are gay.

Even with low membership numbers, AKOK actively organized and led a number of initiatives that pertained to LGBTQ issues. Most notably, Modinos and other AKOK members operated a support telephone line in Modinos’s house. Additionally, they would emotionally and financially support HIV and AIDS-

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670 “Interview with Alecos Modinos”.
671 Ibid.
672 “Interview with Hüseyin Çavusoğlu”.
positive individuals at a time when the government had not yet initiated a relevant campaign and when being diagnosed with the virus led to social ostracizing, as well as to one’s rejection by her own family.\textsuperscript{673} Another important activity undertaken by Modinos was intense lobbying for the amendment of discriminatory language and provisions in the Cypriot law, even after homosexuality had been decriminalized. Both because of pressures from the CoE and of Modinos’s constant pressures and lobbying, the relevant law was reamended and the discriminatory provisions were corrected by 2002.

Similarly to Modinos, Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs also employed the language and mechanisms of ‘Europe’ in order to press political elites to decriminalize homosexuality in the ‘TRNC’. The Turkish-Cypriot Initiative Against Homophobia was created in 2007. Although the Initiative’s attempts to convince the ‘TRNC’ parliament to decriminalize homosexuality have not yet succeeded, the organization managed to be officially recognized and to be registered by the ‘TRNC’ authorities as a NGO. As Çavusoğlu reported, the 2009 visit of Michael Cashman – the British Labour Member of the European Parliament for West Midlands and co-President of the European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT Rights – was decisive. He explained:

We are a registered organization since the end of April 2009 ... [Initially], we got an answer from the District Office that we won’t be registered because of the existing law [that criminalizes homosexuality]. But I think that Michael Cashman’s visit and his meeting with the President of the Republic [i.e., the ‘TRNC’], with the President of the Parliament and with some political parties and NGOs was very effective. They got scared of the European representative. Even Mr Talat [i.e., Mehmet Ali Talat, the former president of the ‘TRNC’] didn’t understand why we were there when we visited him. He thought that we just wanted to register and that this did not happen [i.e., he was unaware of what the Initiative represents]. Then he said: ‘I will see to it and I will examine what could be done.’ He helped. We got registered while two days before that happened, we were told we wouldn’t.\textsuperscript{674}

As Çavusoğlu argued, it is very important for the ‘TRNC’ political elite to show, especially to ‘Europeans’, that the ‘TRNC’ and Turkish-Cypriots are more

\textsuperscript{673} “Interview with Alecos Modinos”.
\textsuperscript{674} “Interview with Hüseyin Çavusoğlu.”
'advanced', ‘modern’ and ‘European’ than their Greek-Cypriot enemies who, nonetheless, have been admitted to the EU. As he has explained, by doing so, Turkish-Cypriots would prove that they also deserve EU membership, probably even more than Greek-Cypriots. Çavuşoğlu explained that it is through the strategic manipulation of this ‘wish to appear to be more European that the Greek-Cypriots’ that the Initiative managed to bypass conservative political elements and get the approval by the ‘TRNC’ former president Mehmet Ali Talat himself to officially register as an NGO. He reported:

Europe is a good pressure tool ... When Michael Cashman was here he gave an interview and he also mentioned this: A couple of years ago – in 2004, before Cyprus joined the EU – he was in Cyprus again, in the south part, and he met with the political parties about this issue [i.e., the socio-legal status of LGBTQ Greek-Cypriots]. And he said that he faced more problems and bad opinions [about same-sex sexuality] in the south. He said that this never happened in the north. We did a very good job putting pressure on the ['TRNC'] government with the help of Michael Cashman. We will see what will happen with Europe and Europeanization. I am actually shocked that they accepted us as a registered organization, but this is the first step towards the government making a change.675

Çavuşoğlu also stressed the importance of AKOK and of Modinos’s activism and success at the ECtHR for the inception and creation of the Initiative. In the initial stages of the group’s formation, the Initiative Organizing Committee was in close communication with Modinos, from whom it sought advice.676 Modinos expressed his support for the Turkish-Cypriot group and stressed the importance of cooperation towards the amelioration of the lives of all Cypriot LGBTQs.677 In striking contrast to the Greek-Cypriot AKOK, the Initiative enjoys relatively high membership numbers, while its young Organizing Committee members make good use of mass media and communication technologies. For example, the group has a profile page on Facebook and a webpage that it is often updated, where information can be accessed in both Turkish and English.678 Additionally, it is affiliated with numerous

675 Ibid.
676 Ibid.
677 “Interview with Alecos Modinos”.
other national and transnational groups, including ILGA-Europe, while in May of 2008, it celebrated the International Day Against Homophobia with a march in the streets of the occupied part of the capital and with activities aimed at raising awareness about same-sex sexuality and about the group’s claim for the decriminalization of homosexuality in the ‘TRNC’.  

The Turkish-Cypriot case is especially important, since it complicates our understanding about the relationship between law and claim-making in general, but also about the relationship between Cypriot LGBTQs’ legal standing and their claims-making capacity: Even though homosexuality remains a criminal offence under ‘TRNC’ law, the Turkish-Cypriot political elite seems to be less hostile towards LGBTQ organization and mobilization than the Greek-Cypriot political elite, even though homosexuality was decriminalized in the RoC. Greek-Cypriot elites’ negative stance towards LGBTQ equality is all the more problematic since the RoC ratified Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and is a signatory to the 2007 UN Declaration on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.

This seeming paradox can be explained, at least partially, by two factors: Firstly, in the occupied north, organized religion does not enjoy the status that the Orthodox Church of Cyprus does in the non-occupied south. Trying to account for the difference in membership rates between the Initiative and AKOK, Çavuşoğlu explained: ‘Luckily, [in the north] we don’t have the religion and church power influence. This allows people to use their minds.’ Secondly, with its demands for EU admission having been met, the Greek-Cypriot political elite no longer needs to prove itself to be ‘European’ or ‘Western’ to the degree that the Turkish-Cypriot elite does. Namely, for the Greek-Cypriot elite, the discourse of ‘Europe’ lost much of its currency once EU admission had been achieved, whereas for the Turkish-Cypriot elite the language of ‘Europe’ and ‘human rights’ continues to serve political aims.

So, where does this leave struggles for sexual equality at the local level? What is the future of Greek-Cypriot LGBTQ activism? Despite the pivotal significance of Modinos’s activism towards the amelioration of – at least – the legal

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680 ILGA-Europe, “Cyprus”.
681 “Interview with Hüseyin Çavuşoğlu”.

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aspect of the lives of Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs, AKOK’s important work – and even its existence – remained unknown to the Greek-Cypriot mass public. This was not least due to Modinos’s demonization by the Church and due to the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s media’s tendency to remain silent with regard to non-heterosexual sexuality and other ‘taboo’ issues. This lack of familiarity with the Modinos case is widespread among Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs also. Remarkably, almost none of the Greek-Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees were aware of Modinos’s ECtHR case or of the existence and activities of AKOK. 682

Although Modinos has been described to me by numerous foreign LGBTQ activists and scholars as a ‘living legend’ with regard to LGBTQ equality struggles, 683 and although he was honoured by ILGA-Europe in 2009 for his activism and contribution to European LGBTQ equality at home, he does not enjoy similar recognition, even among self-identified LGBTQ individuals. Does this fact challenge the actual importance of Modinos’s legal action and of his organization’s activities at the local level? Namely, are AKOK and Modinos’s activities merely symbolically important at the regional/international level, while they have not really impacted the lives of Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs? Is this unawareness of the majority of Greek-Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees about AKOK and about the Modinos case indicative of the nature of Cypriot civil society and of the prospects for local grassroots LGBTQ mobilization?

Cypriot elites tend to understand ‘modernization’, ‘Westernization’ and ‘Europeanization’ as the transition from a traditional to the ‘modern’ organization of public, political and economic life, without considering the effects of this transition on social relations that fall within the ‘private’ realm. 684 Moreover, although it is not sincerely committed to the concept of human rights, the Greek-Cypriot political elite has attempted to balance notions of tradition and modernization, and national values and the values of Europeanization/globalization, in order to pursue its politico-national objectives through the EU platform. However, such explanations and approaches do not account for the attitudes of LGBTQ non-elites regarding the aims, the objectives, the effects and the importance of organization and mobilization around issues of sexuality.

682 “Interviews with LGBTQ Participants”.
683 Personal communication with scholars and activists at the ILGA-Europe 2008 Vienna Conference.
684 Welz, Gisela, “‘One Leg in the Past, and one Leg in the Future’,” 11–30
As the interviews I conducted with Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs demonstrate, their unawareness or limited knowledge about the *Modinos* ECtHR case and about AKOK cannot be hastily interpreted as political unawareness and passivity, which could severely hamper LGBTQ organization and mobilization prospects. Rather, it seems that it is linked to the concepts of the ‘closet’ and ‘coming out’. For example, a Greek-Cypriot male LGBTQ interviewee in his late twenties explained:

Personally, I wouldn’t want to ‘come out’ in the sense of going out there into society and yelling it [i.e., that I am gay], because this would draw a lot of attention. Many things [about my life] would change. As I told you before, I live my life and people probably think that I am a metrosexual. Therefore, people think this is the reason that I go to the places I go and do the things I do. I think that if I lived under the ‘gay’ label, my life would be much different.\(^685\)

This interviewee’s rejection of the idea of ‘coming out’ and of a ‘gay identity’, which was common among both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees, is a strong exemplification of the non-Western subject’s questioning of Western/European ideas about how self-realization, identification and sexual politics are constituted in the ‘Periphery’, that is, in places other than those where the ideas of the ‘closet’ and of the ‘coming out’ of have been conceptualized as the sine qua non of non-heterosexual sexuality’s articulation and of sexual politics’ formation.

In gay and lesbian scholarship that emanates primarily from the US and the UK, ‘coming out of the closet’ has been described as a social and cultural event. It has been interpreted as a ‘rite of passage’ that changes individuals’ consciousness and shifts the way they understand the world, the ‘Self’ and identity, and consequently leads them to espouse new values. Following this logic, ‘coming out of the closet’ and renouncing one’s ‘closeted’ self is the process through which one becomes ‘gay’.\(^686\) However, turning the spotlight on ‘the closet’ and on the importance of renouncing it – through such public cultural events as gay pride parades – in order to achieve ‘liberation’ according to the European/Western

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\(^{685}\) “Interview with LGBTQ Interviewee 212559,” 10 April 2009.


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paradigm – leaves the notion of visibility/invisibility unaddressed and the discourses that support it unchallenged, while it ignores specific particularities of ‘non-Western/non-European’ locales.  

As the interviews with Cypriot LGBTQs demonstrated, this visibility/invisibility notion assumes a primary role in their self-identification processes.  

What needs to be critically examined is: ‘what kind of conceptual space is the closet, that confines people who seem neither highly politicized nor self-reflexively “gay”? As Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot understandings and negotiations of global/transnational gay culture and politics show, ‘coming out’ and the public affirmation of a gay identity is not uniformly seen as self-constituting or self-fashioning. Moreover, ‘the closet’ and its denouncing is usually not the primary preoccupation of non-heterosexual people.

The historical specificity of the categories of the ‘closet’, ‘coming out’ and of a primary ‘gay’ identity is manifested even in the Western centre that has produced and circulated them as the foundational accounts of modern homosexuality. Focusing on the sociology – as opposed to the politics – of the closet, some theorists of sexuality argue that the closet is not only repressive. Rather, since it creates a protected space within which individuals are permitted to fashion a gay self and create gay social networks, the closet can also be seen as a strategy of both accommodating normative heterosexuality and resisting it. Seidman, Meeks and Traschen argue that emergent social patterns in the US indicate the declining significance of the closet in some environments since people seem to fashion their lives ‘beyond’ the closet, through (admittedly incomplete) interpersonal, not institutional ‘routinization’ and ‘normalization’ of their sexuality. That is, individuals develop informal ways through which they integrate their homosexuality into their conventional social lives – for example disclosing to family or co-workers – and through which they describe some negative feelings about their homosexuality – for example describing such feelings as residues of living in a heteronormative society.

Besides fear, shame, guilt, considerations over ‘outing’ others and

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687 On the ideas of the ‘closet’ and ‘coming out’ see: Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet  
688 See chapter four.  
690 Ibid., 434.  
692 Ibid., 11, 19.
attempts to avoid stereotypical reaction, what also seems to be conducive of ‘interpersonal routinization’ is the fact that numerous individuals do not experience their homosexuality as an identity or as the most important aspect of their identity.693

What also needs to be critically examined is how the concepts of ‘the closet’ and ‘coming out’ stand in relation to the operations of heteronormativity. Sedgwick convincingly made the argument that a set of the most essential sites for the contestation of meaning in twentieth-century Western culture – secrecy/disclosure, private/public, ‘the closet’/‘coming out’ – is ineffaceably marked by the historical specificity of homosocial/homosexual definition.694 Although ‘the epistemology of the closet’ has been productive of modern Western culture and history, this is no reason for scrutinizing those who remain in the closet, while excluding those who participate in the heterosexual culture, those who command the closet and whose intimate representational needs ‘the closet’ serves.695 According to Sedgwick:

We must know by now ... better than to assume that there is a homosexual ... waiting to be uncovered in each of the closets constituting and constituted by the modern regime of the closet; yet it is by the homosexual question, which has never so far been emptied of its homophobic impulsions, that the energy of their construction and exploitation continues to be marked.696

The ‘normalization and routinization of homosexuality’ trend transcends the categories of the ‘closet’ and ‘coming out’ and offers LGBTQ individuals an alternative approach to the social management of their sexuality. Simultaneously, although it leaves the institutional normalization of heterosexuality unchallenged, it decentralizes ‘coming out of the closet’ as the ultimate political act. Furthermore, it does not undermine sexual politics; rather, it encourages a post-identity sexual politics which challenges the norms that regulate same-sex and heterosexual bodies, desires, pleasures and intimate practices.697

Another important factor that needs to be taken into consideration is that there are places where Western global/transnational notions of sexual identity pose a problem not because of their swiping force against local sexual identities, but

693 Ibid., 18, 26, 28-9.
694 Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, 72.
695 Ibid., 68-9.
696 Ibid., 246.
697 Seidman, Meeks, and Traschen, “Beyond the Closet?” 10, 30.
because such notions of identity do not exist. In many cultures, including the Cypriot one especially before colonization, same-sex sexualities were – what Peter Drucker calls – ‘transgenderal’, or continued to exist parallel to emerging gay and lesbian identities and communities. ‘Transgenderal’ same-sex sexualities involve assigning a gender identity to one sex partner that is different from his or her biological sex, while the other sexual partner maintains his or her gender identity as a ‘real/proper’ man or woman. In the case of Cyprus, in ‘transgenderal’ same-sex sexual relations the ‘real’ man – that is, the man who penetrates another man – is often expected to enter a heterosexual marriage and procreate. However, this does not apply to the penetrated man. In Turkey, for example, although secularization brought about the rise of gay and lesbian identities, especially in cities like Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, ‘transgenderal’ same-sex relationships continue to be pertinent for non-heterosexual men.

Therefore, it seems that because of the pre-existence of diverse same-sex identities and/or practices in the non-West; because of the non-West’s rapid economic and social change due to the rise and export of a global capitalist economy; because of cultural influences from the West; and because of major local political developments, gay and lesbian identities are characterized by ‘combined and uneven social construction’. Namely, there is a tension between increasingly influential discourses and institutions of homosexuality and heterosexuality, and between local sexual ideologies and subjectivities that are often resistant and aspire to be anti-hegemonic. As Povinelli and Chauncey explain:

Homogenization, diversification, hybridization; the local, the global, and the glocal; locality, localization, and translocality; globalization and transnationalism; flows, linkages, scapes, and circuits: we are witness to a proliferation of conceptual conjunctions and neologisms that describe, or more simply that demarcate, the

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698 Karayanni. Dancing Fear and Desire.
700 Ibid., 11-4.
701 Bereket and Adam, “The Emergence of Gay Identities in Contemporary Turkey,” 131-51.
703 Povinelli and Chauncey, “Thinking Sexuality Transnationally,” 446.
dense, variegated traffic in cultural representations, people, and capita that increasingly characterizes the social life of people around the world.  

Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that a real commonality of identity has not been created or that any attempt to systematically conceptualize LGBTQ oppression and liberation is essentially Eurocentric. What needs to be investigated is how the Western/European discourse pertaining to LGBTQ struggles against the institutional and social legitimization and solidification of compulsory heteronormativity might merge with and complement – or at least exist in parallel and not antagonize – local understandings of sexual liberation, sexual justice and sexual citizenship. The case of the recent formation of a new LGBTQ organization in Cyprus, of Accept-LGBT, and of its members’ struggles to balance Western/European sexuality discourses with their own indigenous understandings, is illustrative of the processes involved in the attempts of non-Western LGBTQs to define themselves both as sexual and as political beings, amidst local and hostile, and external and unfamiliar discursive influences.

In October 2009, a group of approximately 30 young Greek-Cypriots, most of them educated in Western Europe and in the US, came together and started planning the formation a new LGBTQ organization. The group was provisionally called the Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transgendered People of Cyprus (LGBTCY), while its members included self-identified gay, bisexual and heterosexual individuals. As one of the founding members reported, both a change in social values that is inextricably linked to Cyprus’s Europeanization, and the tools afforded by the European Community to local NGOs – like financial assistance, training and the EU human rights discourse that recognizes LGBTQ rights as human rights – have been the cornerstones of the new organization’s inception and the basis of its operation. This group member also reported that the Greek-Cypriot LGBTCY might seek cooperation with the Turkish-Cypriot Initiative. It still remains to be seen to what extent this new group will work within the current Cypriot structures, or whether it will seek a radical change of the local sexuality status quo. Nevertheless, a
number of events and discussions that took place, both among the groups’ members and between the group and the Greek-Cypriot political elites during the last year, are suggestive.

I conducted interviews and held numerous discussions with three of the founding members of this group, which was subsequently named Accept-LGBT. One of the issues discussed by the organization’s members concerned the organization’s name. According to Yoryis Regginos of Accept-LGBT’s Steering Committee, the ‘T’ in the organization’s acronym stands for ‘transgendered’ – rather than for ‘trans*’. Nonetheless, according to Regginos, the groups’ members understand and use this term as an ‘umbrella’ term to refer to ‘transgendered’, ‘transsexual’ and ‘intersexed’ individuals. As he explained, the organization’s members found it difficult to decide upon the precise interpretation and translation of English terminology, although they use it in their discussions.

As Petros Papadopoulos, another member of the Accept-LGBT Steering Committee reported, the problem arises from the fact that a lot of the English terminology does not even exist in Greek or, even if it does, its meaning is unclear to the groups’ members, as well as to Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs in general. He commented:

The Greek translation of [the acronym] ‘LGBT’ can be found in Greek translations of gay and lesbian theory literature, or even in gay and lesbian theory works by Greek scholars. However, while reading these works, I came across various translations and interpretations of the ‘T’. It’s really hard to come up with the Greek equivalent.

The debate over whether to translate the ‘T’ in the English – and widely used by Greek-Cypriot LGBTs – acronym ‘LGBT’ as ‘transgendered’ or ‘transsexual’ partially explains why the Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees – both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot – expressed intense dislike for the English term ‘queer’, although most of them said that they dislike labels and fixed identities like ‘gay’ or ‘lesbian’. For example, when asked to describe his sexual identity, a Greek-Cypriot male gay

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interviewee in his late thirties reported: ‘Gay, bi, queer ... [pauses]. I never liked labels!’  

To the same question, a Greek-Cypriot female participant in her mid-thirties responded:

Look. Generally, I don’t like identities. I don’t like labelling people. I think that you [i.e., somebody] can have whomever you want [as a sexual partner], any time you want, as long as the other person wants it too. You don’t need to state to the other person: ‘Hi, I’m X, and this is my sexual identity.’ This [statement of sexual identity] has nothing to do with anything.

A Greek-Cypriot man in his early twenties stated:

All this ‘trans*’ and ‘queer’ stuff! According to my opinion, these [identities] are not related to homosexuality; for example, when a man wants to dress like a woman. According to my opinion, a homosexual is a man who has sex with a man, or a woman who has sex with a woman. Not a woman, quote, unquote ‘trapped’ in a man’s body ... One is a man, either straight or gay. That’s it!

Remarkably, Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees treat the concepts ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’ and ‘queer’ in exactly the same manner. These terms constitute part of a terminology that is – at least until now – foreign to them. The importance of such stances is further highlighted if one considers the gay/lesbian-queer opposition, as this has infused Western/European theory of sexuality, especially in the 1990s. However, although Cypriot LGBTQs are unacquainted with, or even indifferent towards, the different connotations that the ‘gay/lesbian’ versus ‘queer’ terms have assumed in Western/European sexual politics and theory, they are not ignorant of the fact that the language that they employ to describe themselves and their activism is useful ‘to the extent that it constitutes a self-critical dimension within activism, a persistent reminder to take the time to consider the exclusionary force of one of activism’s most treasured contemporary premises’.

It seems that, in the case of Cyprus, the Western/European discourse pertaining to LGBTQ struggles against the institutional and social solidification and

710 “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 212536,” 1 April 2009.
711 “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 212551,” 4 April 2009.
712 “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 212580,” 29 April 2009.
713 Butler, Bodies that Matter, 227.
prioritization of compulsory heteronormativity might merge with and complement – or at least exist in parallel and not antagonize – local understandings of sexual liberation, sexual justice and sexual citizenship. By February 2010, primarily because of the difficulties in appropriately translating English terminology into Greek, the name with which the organization would apply for registration came under discussion by the members of the group, whose number kept increasing. The temporary Steering Committee had proposed ΛΟΑΔ (Λεσβίες, Ομοφυλόφιλοι, Αμφισέξουαλοι και Διαφυλικοί) Κύπρου (LGBT Cyprus) and explained:

This is something we discussed during our last meeting. The term ‘διαφυλικοί’, for those [of our members] who do not know, is the [Greek] translation of [the term] ‘transgender’, which refers to individuals whose biological sex does not match their gender identity – for example, I was born a woman but inside me I feel like a man, and this is being expressed in my way of life and it might lead to a sex change operation, though not necessarily.\footnote{\[Αυτό είναι ένα θέμα\] το οποίο έχουμε συζητήσει και στα πλαίσια της προηγούμενης συνάντησης. Το \["διαφυλικοί"\], για όσους ίσως δεν γνωρίζουν, είναι η μετάφραση του \["transgender"\], το οποίο αναφέρεται στα άτομα όπου το βιολογικό τους φύλο δεν ταυτίζεται με την ταυτότητα φύλου τους (π.χ. έχω γεννηθεί γυναίκα αλλά νιώθω μέσα μου άντρας και αυτό εκφράζεται στον τρόπο ζωής μου και μπορεί να οδηγήσει και σε ερχέταιρη αλλαγή φύλου, όχι απαραίτητα όμως).\] Michaelidou, Despina (on behalf of the Steering Committee). Discussion topics for the January 3\textsuperscript{rd} 2010 meeting of the LGBT-CY group. Email communication with group members (24 February 2010).}

In an online member-only vote on the group’s webpage,\footnote{www.acceptcy.org} the majority voted in favour of the transliteration of the ‘T’ in the English abbreviation ‘LGBT’, i.e., ‘\[\text{Τρανς}\]’ (‘\[Trans\]’), thus settling the debate over which of the two terms – that is, ‘transsexual’ (‘διαφυλικός’) or ‘transgender’ (‘διεμφυλικός’) – is the most appropriate. Therefore, in May 2010, the organization was officially named ‘Accept-LGBT Cyprus’ (in Greek, Αποδεκτή ΛΟΑΔ Κύπρου). As a member of Accept-LGBT who does not wish to be named stated, ‘knowing the terminology and being politically correct and all is nice. Nonetheless, debates like this mean nothing, unless we remain united and are clear about what we want to achieve. I personally do not care about labels. What I want to see is real change’.\footnote{“Discussion with Accept-LGBT Cyprus Member B,” Nicosia, 20 August 2010.} However, ignoring issues of terminology does not merely mean avoiding unnecessary debate and confrontation,
which could divide the group’s members. A group’s inclusion and exclusion rules affect its ability to communicate and have its aims and objectives met.\footnote{Bernstein, “Celebration and Suppression,” 531-65; Bernstein, “Identities and Politics,” 531-81; Gamson, “Messages of Exclusion,” 178-99.}

For example, from its rise – symbolically located in the 1960s – until today,\footnote{Although LGBTQ struggles for equality can be traced long before the 1960s, as a convention I will symbolically assume the 1969 Stonewall riots in New York to be the moment of birth of the modern US movement.} the LGBTQ movement in the US has been characterized by deep ideological divisions.\footnote{I employ the term ‘US LGBTQ movement’ to refer to exclusively and mixed male gay, lesbian, bisexual, trans* and queer groups in the US, as well as to coalitions between such groups. I do so without assuming that such groups necessarily have anything in common beyond their aim to achieve (broadly defined and variously pursued) ‘sexual freedom’.} Some activists within the movement and some scholars writing about US sexual politics have focused on assuming a more conservative and assimilationist approach and others on adopting a more critical and radical stance towards mainstream norms and their supporting institutions.\footnote{For a description of numerous national gay and lesbian movements, see: Barry D. Adam. The Rise of a Gay and Lesbian Movement. Revised Edition. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1995.} Gamson’s study of the exclusion of the North American Man/Boy Love Association (NAMBLA) from the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) and of female transsexuals from the 19\textsuperscript{th} Annual Michigan Womyn’s Music Festival (MWMF), is illustrative of the strategic and ideological disagreements that have beleaguered US sexual politics.\footnote{Gamson, “Messages of Exclusion,” 178-99.}

NAMBLA has been – and still is – being accused of promoting paedophilia. In 1993, NAMBLA’s practical participation in the ILGA became public. As a result, ILGA’s consultative status to the United Nations Economic and Social Council was imperilled. Therefore, in order both not to risk its consultative status being revoked and to distance itself from paedophilia accusations, ILGA decided to expel NAMBLA. Similar concerns of organizations about the image they communicate, both to their members and to outsiders, and about distinguishing between legitimate/socially tolerable and illegitimate/socially intolerable objectives are reflected by the MWMF incident also. Transsexual women were initially refused entrance to the festival, since a large number of the women involved in the MWMF did not recognize them as ‘real’ women and demanded that they should not be admitted to the festival.\footnote{This hostility towards, and rejection of trans* women – i.e., transphobia – by the women involved in the MWMF is illustrative of how the transgression of (admittedly essentialist) gender and sexual}
NAMBLA members and transsexual women threatened the existing symbolic boundaries of the gay and lesbian group and of the lesbian feminist group respectively. Therefore, under pressure originating both from organization outsiders and from insiders, ILGA and the MWMF organizers were forced to redraw their inclusion and exclusion boundaries in order to retain solidarity among the group – in the case of MWMF – and to retain the ability to communicate their demands to a cultural system that devalues non-traditional identities – in the case of ILGA.723

Gamson distinguishes between symbolic and actual boundaries and between symbolic exclusion and practical participation. He argues that identity boundaries are nothing but public communication tools that are used for political purposes, since the contestation of identity has substantial social, legal and political effects; it influences the distribution of resources, services, access and legitimacy. It is not the participation of particular people in sexuality and gender movements that is threatening. For example, NAMBLA was active in the ILGA for many years before its expelling, while transsexual women were quietly allowed in the MWMF after their official exclusion. Rather, there exists a gap between practice and public discourse that explains debates over inclusion or exclusion as ‘public communication strategies’, which depend on a group’s communicative environment – that is, the location and nature of its primary audience.724

With regard to the gay and lesbian movement and its campaigns in the US, Bernstein also argues that identity deployment is a form of strategic collective action that is informed by the movement’s interaction with the state and with state actors, as well as by its access to polity and opposition. Because the movement has transformed from one seeking cultural transformation to one seeking achievement of rights, it has gradually abandoned its emphasis on difference from the heterosexual majority in favour of stressing its similarities to it. However, Bernstein does not see this trend as problematic. She argues in favour of abandoning essentialist characterizations of social movements as either ‘expressive/cultural’ or identities could be perceived by some activists as a threat to group successes that were premised on the employment of such essentialist identities. What should also be noted is that this suspicion towards trans* is to be found in feminist literature also. Some feminists point out to the conformist tendencies of trans* and argue that trans* participates in the replication, confirmation and perpetuation of essentialist and stereotyping gender imagery. For example, see: Janice G. Raymond. The Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1979.

‘instrumental/political’, since such an approach ignores structural and contextual factors.\textsuperscript{725} A shared collective identity is utilized in various ways within movements: it is necessary for mobilization; it can be a goal of activism (either gaining acceptance of a stigmatized identity or deconstructing categories of identities); and it can be utilized as a political strategy for either cultural or instrumental goals.\textsuperscript{726}

The history of the LGBTQ movement in the US demonstrates that political and cultural goals are not mutually exclusive. Rather, depending on the conditions in which the movement is situated, emphasis is placed either on political or cultural strategies. Moreover, these conditions are more determinative for the movement than a notion of fixed identity, since the impact of constructed identities depends on the cultural and political climate in which they are communicated and contested. For example, in seeking cultural and political change, the sexual liberation movements that emerged in the 1960s employed the discourse of emancipation and developed radical – though vague – political strategies that sought to eradicate all forms of exclusion and suppression. However, by the late 1970s and 1980s when both opposition and political access increased, they assumed an assimilationist approach and reoriented identity politics towards the attainment of particular group-specific rights.\textsuperscript{727} By 1986, given the government’s lack of response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the defeat in \textit{Bowers v. Hardwick},\textsuperscript{728} a large number of LGBTQ activists and scholars turned to criticizing dominant cultural practices through the espousal of the language of queer politics. This shift between approaches demonstrates that both political and cultural strategies have the ability to influence and even transform both political structures and dominant cultural patterns. Consequently, distinguishing them or categorizing movements either as identity-based, political or cultural ones is misleading and unresponsive to historical reality.\textsuperscript{729}

\textsuperscript{725} Bernstein, “Celebration and Suppression”, 531-65; Bernstein, “Identities and Politics,” 531-81. Bernstein explains that cultural goals include challenging dominant constructions of masculinity and femininity and homophobia and heteronormativity, whereas political goals include changing laws and policies in order to gain new rights, benefits and increased protection. See: Bernstein, “Identities and Politics”, 536.


\textsuperscript{727} Weeks, “The Sexual Citizen,” 48.

\textsuperscript{728} \textit{Bowers v. Hardwick}, 1986 (478 US 186).

\textsuperscript{729} Bernstein, “Identities and Politics,” 537-71. For a similar point of view and a comparison between the LGBT movements in Britain, Canada and the US, see: Rayside, “The Structuring of Sexual Minority Activist Opportunities in the Political Mainstream,” 23-55.
To summarize, the US LGBT movement has managed to achieve a degree of formal legal equality by adopting mainstream discourses. Yet, this assimilationist approach is far from unproblematic. It glosses over the fact that the need to assume gender and sexual identities in order to challenge their current boundaries proves that there are certain forces which produce and have a stake in maintaining these very same social and legal constructions. On the one hand, identity categories such as race, sex or gender, form the basis of legal protections and benefits. On the other hand, forming one’s identity based on rigid categories violates a person’s sense of the self. Therefore, it is important – both for activists and scholars – to maintain a double consciousness regarding identities. To be sure, identities are cultural creations and social constructions. Nonetheless, even though fictitious, they remain significant since as the case of LGBTQ activism in the US demonstrates, ‘they provide the means through which we negotiate the hazards of everyday life in a world in a process of constant change’.

Although it has not yet been formally addressed by the organization, Accept-LGBT’s stance towards sexuality identities, membership rules and, by extension, its public face and image, is something that already concerns some of its members. For example, when I was in Cyprus in July 2010, I saw one of the group’s members whom I had previously interviewed. He approached me and asked for my advice as an ‘expert’. He explained that although this was not something that he had brought up for discussion during the group’s meetings, he was concerned by the fact that although the ‘LGBT’ acronym constituted part of the group’s official name, there were no trans* members in the group. He said that he knew some Greek-Cypriot male-to-female trans* people, but he was hesitant about asking them to join the group. He explained that because they were so ‘flamboyant’ and because he thought that one of them was working as a prostitute, he was worried about jeopardizing the group’s image. I said that the dilemma was about what kind of organization its members wanted Accept-LGBT to be. Almost apologetically, he replied:

I know we need to be all good and nice gays and lesbians, if the Church and the politicians are not to stone us to death! This is why I side in favour of gay marriage.

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you know? What I want is freedom, but I know that we cannot win, unless we play their game. Still, they [trans* individuals] should be represented. Well, after all, we claim that we are represent them.732

Besides other debates that might arise among the organization’s members with regard to identity and representation, what this ‘lost-in-translation’ incident highlights is, most importantly, the pervasiveness of Western/European terminology, ideas and even values in relation to LGBTQ identification, organization and mobilization in the ‘Periphery’. What it also demonstrates is that regardless of the applicability – or lack thereof – of Western/European sexual and gender identities in non-Western milieux, the question of ‘freedom versus assimilation’ is one that troubles ‘non-Western’ Cypriot LGBTQs also. Although Cypriot LGBTQs do not enjoy the Western/European rights that have been won elsewhere based on identity politics and litigation – for example same-sex marriage, civil unions or adoption – they are already concerned about the effects of identity politics, mainstreaming and assimilation on their indigenous modalities of desire. The importance of this rests on the fact that it might indicate that Cypriot non-heterosexuals value gender and sexuality fluidity, as well as indigenous ways of making sense of gender and sexuality more that rights, which necessitate assuming a fixed – even if merely strategic – identity.

For example, as Tarik Bereket and Barry D. Adam report based on interviews with Turkish non-heterosexuals, local gay identities are ‘syncretic’. Although gay (gey) identities have been taken up by Turkish men, the active-passive distinction (actif-pasif) remains the primary organizer of sexual relations among men. ‘Lubunya’ or ‘pasif gey’ are the terms used to describe men who assume the penetrated role and who assume and declare a feminine gender identity, while the term ‘laço’ or ‘actif gey’ is used to describe men who assume the penetrating role and assume and declare an ultra-macho gender identity. The sex roles between a lubunya and a laço are strictly observed, although some interviewees reported that laços often assume a ‘passive’ role during sex, although never with ‘their’ lubunya. This reversal of sexual roles is something that takes place in total secrecy, usually between a laço and a stranger.

732 “Discussion with Accept-LGBT Cyprus Member A”, Nicosia, 23 July 2010.
What is also interesting is that the *gey* identity was described by interviewees in terms of gender. As they reported, the *gey* Turkish man is one who avoids the extreme gender bifurcation and identifies as someone between a *laço* and a *lubunya*. Men who identify as *gey* form relationships only with men who also identify as *gey*; with people of the same gender identification. Similar understandings of same-sex sexualities that are based on the different gender identification of the same-sex partners are also reported to exist within the Greek context. As Dennis Altman explains, even in places where a strong homosexual tradition predates the Western impact, it is Westernization that introduces the idea of a homosexual identity.

The case of gay identities in contemporary Turkey that Bereket and Adam describe, Karayanni’s analysis of Greek-Cypriot expressions of sexuality and Loizos and Papataxiarchis’s’ work on Greek and Greek-Cypriot gender subjectivities prove that local modalities of desire and of gender performance did exist before the sweeping globalization of Western/European gender and sexual identity stereotypes. The new challenge in locales like Cyprus consists of moulding these new political global stereotypes, images, values, ideals and ideas based on local needs and understandings; namely, shaping these new concepts and this new language whose aim is to speak a way of being that – until recently – was silenced, in ways that local LGBTQs see fit for their aims and purposes.

The argument that in the case of Cyprus – and elsewhere –official elite-led attempts to build the country and its’ people ‘modernity’ are based on Eurocentric ideology and on the reproduction of a colonialist rhetoric that is mounted against the cultural ‘other’, i.e. the Turkish-Cypriot, is hard to dismiss. As Argyrou argues, since in such and in similar locales ‘modernity’ constitutes a historically constructed instrument of cultural and ethnic division and of the reproduction of one’s own subjectivization, it seems that ‘modernity’ is neither a destination to be reached, nor an object to be appropriated. However, and without denying the ‘West’ and ‘modernity’s’ complicity in domination, I argue that these mechanisms of

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733 Bereket and Adam, “The Emergence of Gay Identities in Contemporary Turkey,” 131-51.
736 Bereket and Adam, “The Emergence of Gay Identities in Contemporary Turkey”.
738 Loizos and Papataxiarchis ed. *Contested Identities*.
subjectivization could serve as tools of emancipation once their ‘victims’ become aware of their position in the power game, the rules of the game and their available options.

The ways in which Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs consciously organize and mobilize within the ambit of the existing structures supports the argument that when rupture from the system is not a viable option, a temporal appropriation of the system’s logic and mechanisms could afford Greek-Cypriot LGBTQ activists with the tools and the legitimacy needed, in order to negotiate their current stance on the chessboard of socio-political relations. In the process, local modalities of sexuality and same-sex desire, as well as local sexual identities, will be influenced by both the socio-cultural context within which they emerge and by transnational discourses of sexuality. The fact that the articulation and communication of LGBTQ identities in Cyprus is currently in a flux does not undermine the importance of sexual identities or their centrality to Cypriot LGBTQs’ sense of the self. Such identities are not perse under negotiation. Rather, what is being negotiated are the means through which such identities can be named and articulated in ways that do not violate LGBTQ Cypriots’ self-understandings; the means for rendering these identities legible in the wider socio-political and cultural context and malleable enough in order to allow for cross-cultural and cross-border LGBTQ alliances.

**What’s next for Cypriot LGBTQ Activism?**

Before further discussing Cypriot LGBTQ activism, I ought to clarify what I am aiming and what I am not aiming to do in the process of building my argument. Restaging the process of Accept-LGBT’s formation and of Cypriot LGBTQ activism’s development, and delivering a judgment on how the group’s founding and other members ought to have acted or should act in the future is beyond the purpose of the current analysis. This is because, firstly, it is still too early to make judgements and draw conclusions about the group’s patterns of internal organization and external communication; and, secondly, even if such task were possible, it would not have any effects on what the focal point of the current analysis is. Instead, I am interested in analyzing some of the patterns of organization of Accept-LGBT by focusing on the social, cultural and political goals that its members articulate, as well
as on the actual social, cultural and political effects – if any – that their practices had from the time of the creation of the group until today.\textsuperscript{740} I will attempt to do so by examining the reaction of Accept-LGBT activists to, and interaction with elite discourses that pertain to LGBTQ issues that have been publically articulated since 17 May 2010, when Accept-LGBT was formally launched. In order to do this, I will use information that I collected through personal interviews and unofficial/non-recorded conversations with Accept-LGBT members.\textsuperscript{741} I will also draw upon media and press coverage on the organization and its activities, as well as on media and press information on elites’ responses to the activities of Accept-LGBT.\textsuperscript{742}

Even while the \textit{Modinos} case was debated at the ECtHR, the major Greek-Cypriot newspapers referred to its development only sporadically.\textsuperscript{743} When they would refer to it, relevant articles were kept very short, they were published in the pages towards the end – usually near the wedding announcements, advertisements or obituaries sections – and they were merely descriptive. If any comment was made, it

\textsuperscript{740} For a similar, yet much more extended, analysis of LGBT activism in Greece, see: Riedel, Brian, “Elsewheres: Greek LGBT Activists and the Imagination of a Movement,” PhD Thesis, Rice University, Houston TX, 2005.

\textsuperscript{741} By ‘unofficial/non-recorded conversations with Accept-LGBT members’, I mean conversations that I had with some of the group’s members outside the context of the official recorded interviews, yet still for the purposes of this project. Some of the group members are friends, while I keep in contact with some other group members, whom I interviewed as part of my research. Therefore, I had the chance to engage in one-to-one conversations and group discussions with these people before and/or after the official interviews with them.

\textsuperscript{742} The idea of forming Accept-LGBT Cyprus arose in October 2009 but the organization was not officially launched until May 2010, i.e., after I had completed the interviews with elites. Therefore, it was not possible to get the elite interviewees’ opinions specifically on Accept-LGBT Cyprus, although some of them positioned themselves regarding the possibility of LGBTQ activism and mobilization.

\textsuperscript{743} Cyprus Press Information Office (PIO) newspaper archive research covering the period between 1980 and 2010. I looked for articles about LGBT and gender/women’s issues – legal, social, cultural and ‘medical’. My choosing to look for articles that had been published between 1980 and 2010 was purposeful. Namely, since this thesis aims to examine constructions of gender and sexuality identities in relation to constructions of national identity and national/nationalist narratives and discourses, I chose to start by looking for material published in 1980, since the early 1980s more or less constitute the era during which the RoC constructed and widely – i.e., both nationally and internationally – began to articulate its official discourse in relation to the 1974 events. I chose to look at four Greek-Cypriot ‘major’ newspapers: «
\textit{Φιλελεύθερος}» (Phileleftheros), «
\textit{Χαραυγή}» (Haravgi), «
\textit{Σιμερί}» and «
\textit{Μάχη}» (Machi). By ‘major newspapers’ I do not mean those with the biggest issue sales. Rather, these four newspapers represent the four major Cypriot political/ideological stands, since each of them – as almost all the Greek-Cypriot newspapers up until the 2000s – is affiliated/supports one of the major Greek-Cypriot political parties (that is, DIKO, AKEL, DISY and EDEK). I also looked at two newspapers published in English: The Cyprus Mail and the Cyprus Weekly. Although sometimes – especially in articles published in the 1980s and up until the mid-1990s – a ‘tone’ of Western superiority over the ‘less advanced Cypriots’ can be detected in the ‘voice’ of these two newspapers (for example, Cypriot negative social attitudes and discriminatory public policy decisions are explained away through the employment of the ‘West v. Cyprus’ binary), in general, these newspapers maintain a neutral stance with regard to national and human rights – including gender and sexuality rights – issues.
was very negative and it usually defamed non-heterosexual individuals via criticizing Modinos’s lack of ‘moral values’. Gay and lesbian issues gained a slightly more prominent position in the Cypriot press and media after Modinos won the case at the ECtHR. However, even then, press articles and radio and television programmes focused on the legal aspects of homosexuality. The commonly shared argument was the ‘need’ to abide by the Modinos ruling due to political concerns over the standing of the RoC in the CoE, the country’s EU admission prospects and the prospects for regional/EU support to the RoC with regard to the negotiation of the ‘national problem’. When the media would engage with aspects other than legal ones, the positions articulated and the arguments propelled would remain limited and solely address questions of the type: ‘Is homosexuality biologically determined’ – or otherwise phrased, ‘is it infectious?’; ‘What do our (Christian Orthodox) religious dogma and Church have to say about homosexuality?’; ‘Is there anything that parents could do to “help” (i.e., “cure”) their (problematic) homosexual children?’; ‘How do psychology and psychiatry explain this “condition”?’.

After the legal amendments that the Modinos ruling had prescribed were made, LGBTQ issues were again pushed into invisibility and were almost completely banished from public dialogue. Questions pertaining to LGBTQ lives were taken up again in the late 2000s, largely because of the dealing by the Ombudman’s Office with complaints brought to it by LGBTQ individuals residing in Cyprus. These complaints concerned the RoC’s legal framework pertaining to the right to asylum for foreigners facing persecution in their home countries because of their non-heterosexuality, as well as to the rights to residence and employment for Cypriot nationals’ same-sex partners. Nevertheless, these cases did not really enjoy media coverage.

744 According to my research, the general pattern was as follows: left-leaning Χαραυγή did not go beyond the exposition of mere facts, while centre-rightist-leaning Φιλελεύθερος (to a moderate degree), and right-leaning Σημερινή and Μάχη (to a high degree) employed discriminatory language against LGBT individuals and/or attacked Modinos.
745 See chapter three.
746 Based on PIO archive research results and analysis.
747 However, the Office’s suggestions and efforts to ameliorate LGBT individuals’ legal standing are made public and are available from the Ombudsman’s Office to those interested in the topic. The Office was created in 1991. Iliana Nicolaou, the Cypriot Ombudsman from 18 December 1998 until 16 March 2011, has made proposals to the government with regard to the need to address LGBTQ legal and social issues. See, for example: Office of the Commissioner for Administration (Ombudsman), “Annual Report of the Authority against Racism and Discrimination (suggestion granting asylum to Iranian partner of Cypriot gay citizen; suggestion for equal treatment with regard to residence and work rights towards Canadian husband of Cypriot gay citizen),” Nicosia: 2008.
The first relatively major ‘break’ of LGBTQ issues into the public sphere and public discourse took place in the summer of 2008. Although as two different countries Greece and the RoC have different legal frameworks, the conduct of two same-sex wedding ceremonies by the mayor of the Greek island of Tilos and the debates and events that followed this event, sparked a reaction in the Greek-Cypriot media. The moral ‘appropriateness’, the possible socio-cultural effects and the possibility of legal recognition of same-sex civil unions became the topic of a primetime show on the CyBC.\textsuperscript{748} Since then, LGBTQ topics continue to appear in the Greek-Cypriot press and media – especially the privately-owned – and even make headlines. For example, the free weekly newspaper of the island’s capital, named City, devoted two whole issues to homophobia.\textsuperscript{749} Nevertheless, it is important to note the more reserved stance by the publically owned national television channel: Although in the past the CyBC had broadcast a discussion show on the issue of same-sex civil unions,\textsuperscript{750} it refused to show anti-discrimination advertisements that were part of a European Commission-funded campaign by the Ombudsman’s Office. The CyBC’s director at the time deemed one advertisement that featured a lesbian openly discussing her same-sex relationship as ‘inappropriate’ for the Cypriot audience. Nonetheless, the privately-owned television channels did not share this opinion and broadcast the advert.\textsuperscript{751} The CyBC director’s decision was criticized in the Cypriot press and, in this way, generated a new wave of public debate over same-sex sexuality issues. Therefore, through such events that culminated in May 2010 with the official launch of Accept-LGBT, the predominant public and official discourses of gender and sexuality in Cyprus started to be significantly challenged.\textsuperscript{752}

Even before the idea for the formation a new LGBT organization was born in October 2009, the need to finally address several LGBT issues, which became pressing because of the RoC’s continuing reluctance to abide by developing

\textsuperscript{748} Το συζητάμε, 2 June 2008. See chapter one for a discussion.
\textsuperscript{749} City, issue no. 160, 15-21 May 2009; City, issue no. 214, 25 June-1 July 2010.
\textsuperscript{750} Το συζητάμε, 2 June 2008.
\textsuperscript{752} Reporters from all the major Cypriot newspapers were present at, and reported on the group’s press conference, which took place on 17 May 2010.
European trends pertaining to LGBT rights, became apparent. Due to a number of complaints about RoC’s refusal to recognize same-sex civil unions and marriages of Cypriot nationals with foreigners that had taken place abroad, in July 2009, the former Cypriot Ombudsman, Iliana Nicolaiou, and the Cypriot Authority against Racism and Discrimination submitted to the government a report that referred to the issue of equal treatment of same-sex couples, which Council Directive 2004/38/EC addresses.

While Accept-LGBT was still in the initial stages of its formation, a gay male individual submitted to the Ombudsman’s Office a complaint about the lack of legislation pertaining to same-sex civil marriage. After examining the case, the Ombudsman suggested the examination of the complaint by the Attorney General Office.

It is important to note that, in his report to the Ombudsman, the complainant made extensive reference to ECtHR litigation in order to justify the grounds and merits of his request.

The complainant had the official support of the new LGBT organization and of Modinos’s AKOK, while by the time he submitted his complaint, the Ombudsman’s Office had already made numerous suggestions to the government regarding LGBT issues. Because of the resonance of the complainant’s claim among Cypriot LGBTQ activists and because of the suggestions made by the Ombudsman’s Office, the political elite finally started sensing that ignoring the complaint would not be tolerated – at least not by the Cypriot LGBTQs, who had started organizing and mobilizing. The complaint was directed to the legal services of the RoC and on 12 April 2010, the attorney general’s decision was announced to the complainant. In

753 These developing trends are discussed in detail in chapter three.
756 Among other cases: Kozak v. Poland, 2010 (No. 13102/02); L. and V. v. Austria, 2003 (No. 39392/98 & 39829/98); S.L. v. Austria, 2003 (No. 45330/99).
sum, the decision argued that amending the law falls under the authority of the legislative branch. Therefore, the attorney general and the governments’ legal branch were not in a position to make any amendments to the law. The decision also stressed that the relevant ministry – that is, the Ministry of Interior – had no obligation under international law and under human rights law to amend the law in question; if it ever decided to do so, it would be a matter of discretion.\footnote{The letter to complainant from the legal services of the RoC, a copy of which was give to me by the complainant himself, stated: ‘Θα πρέπει όμως να τονίσω ότι το καθ’ ύλην υπουργείο δεν έχει καμία υποχρέωση απορρέουσα από το Διεθνές Δίκαιο και το Δίκαιο των Ανθρώπων Δικαιωμάτων να τροποποιήσει την εν λόγω νομοθεσία. Αν το πράξει, αυτό επαφίεται στη διακριτική του ευχέρεια.’ (‘However, I must stress that the ministry responsible [for matters pertaining to marriage] has no obligation under international law or human rights law to amend the legislation in question. If it does so, this would be a matter [that falls under] its discretion.’). The same argument was also propelled by the Cypriot Supreme Court in its ruling over a case concerning the recognition of a same-sex civil marriage conducted in Canada between a Canadian and a Cypriot citizen. See \textit{Politis}, «Το Ανώτατο απέρριψε προσφυγή ζευγαριού ομοφυλοφίλων», \textit{Πολίτης}, 24 July 2010, 51.}

Two aspects of this case need to be noted. The first, and most obvious one, is the fact that the development of this case was being covered in the press since its submission to the Ombudsman’s Office. Besides reporting the facts of this case, newspapers dealt with the social dimensions of the possible recognition of same-sex civil unions also, as well as with the consequences of the current lack of such recognition on Cypriot LGBTQs. Moreover, the attorney general’s decision was published in all major newspapers and was accompanied by comments for and against the recognition, while numerous readers’ letters and opinion articles were also published.\footnote{For example, see relevant articles and commentary in the newspapers \textit{Politis} and \textit{Cyprus Mail} from 12 April 2010 to 26 April 2010. Available online at: <www.politis-news.com> and <www.cyprus-mail.com>.}

What is of great importance to highlight is that, in their majority, these readers’ letters and opinion articles were supportive of the complainant’s claim for recognition of same-sex civil unions. Although these letters and opinions cannot substantiate the claim that a general shift in public opinion towards LGBTQ people and their rights has occurred, it could be argued that Greek-Cypriot public opinion has started to be inseminated and affected by LGBTQ discourses that link sexual equality claims to the language of European human rights. The second aspect that needs to be noted is the less prominent one: the discourse that the Attorney General’s Office employed in order to justify its decision to keep a hands-off position and not to press the government to deal with the issue.

In the mid-1990s and early 2000s, while balancing the costs and benefits of abiding with the \textit{Modinos} ruling, the Greek-Cypriot elite employed the rhetoric of
unless we succumb to Europe, our national aims will be jeopardized’. It did so in order to justify its compliance with an official, regional legal ruling, which was premised on one of the basic pillars of liberal democracy – that is, the respect of privacy and self-determination of the individual. This being the case, the government of a country that was aspiring to join the EU needed not to offer any further justification. In the mid-2000s case that pertained to the claim for recognition of same-sex marriages the legal arm of the state once again prioritized the ‘nation-state’ (over the ‘state’ that in the 1990s was aspiring to become part of a regional organization – the EU – which, among other things, represents a set of values), but did so by turning its mid-1990s and early 2000s argument on its head: The RoCs refusal to recognize civil unions is a result of the lack of exercise of pressure and of the lack of relevant CoE enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, the argument that, in Cyprus, the recognition or abuse of human rights is not a matter of principle or of shared ‘European’ values but, rather, a decision that is informed primarily by national interests is confirmed.

A further issue became prominent because of this case and of the fact that it attracted so much attention in the national media: The issue of ‘morality’ – or rather, lack thereof – of same-sex desire and of its ‘detrimental’ social impact arose again in attempts to ground opposition to same-sex civil unions. An – at that time – MP of the right-wing party DISY, Andreas Themistocleous, made numerous public statements not solely regarding the specific case, but also regarding homosexuality as a question of ‘morals’. During a live radio show in April 2010, Themistocleous unleashed a verbal attack against LGBTQ people. While debating with the then Ombudsman, Iliana Nicolaou, about the legalization of same-sex civil unions he said: ‘Just because there exist among us paedophiles, people who practice bestiality, necrophiliacs and other criminals, should the state legitimize their status too?’ His statements immediately sparked a huge wave of reactions, not only from his political opponents but from the wider civil society also. Within hours of his statements, a

group called ‘MP Themistocleous’s statements about homosexuality are unacceptable’ was created on Facebook and within few days almost two thousand people joined the group.\footnote{\textit{Politi\c{s}, «Facebook εναντίον βουλευτή», \textit{Πολίτης}, 26 April 2010, 3.}
\textit{Politi\c{s}, «Μέτρα για τους απείθαρχους», \textit{Πολίτης}, 12 May 2010, 4. Nonetheless, DISY clarified that its disapproval of Themistocleous’s comments does not affect the party’s position on the issue of recognition of same-sex civil unions, which remains negative.}
\textit{See also Themistocleous’s letter to the Intergroup’s co-presidents Michael Cashman and Ulrike Lunacek. \textit{Politi\c{s}, «Ανοικτή επιστολή στους Κασχάν και Λουνάκε», \textit{Πολίτης}, 25 July 2010, 64.}


who forcefully opposed public homophobic discourses and institutionalized homophobia.

The aforementioned Facebook group, which was set up by some Accept-LGBT members, continued to exist until April 2011 and it helped summon a continuously growing number of citizens to the LGBTQ cause for sexual equality. The reactions of the wider Cypriot public to Themistocleous’s statements served as a ‘testing of the waters’ for the new organization, which has now managed to gain a space and a voice in the Cypriot socio-political arena: Besides the fact that it keeps...
growing in size, it organizes numerous conferences, symposia, art festivals and exhibitions; its members have formed links with other national and transnational LGBTQ groups, like the Homosexual and Lesbian Community of Greece (Ομοφυλοφιλική Λεσβιακή Κοινότητα Ελλάδας) and ILGA-Europe. The possibility of organizing the first Pride Parade in Cyprus in 2012 is currently under consideration by Accept-LGBT, while the group participated in the 2011 Athens Pride Parade and was funded and assisted by ILGA-Europe in order to conduct the first large-scale survey on Cypriot LGBT perceptions and attitudes. Additionally, in light of the May 2011 parliamentary elections, Accept-LGBT lobbied candidate MPs from all political parties.

As Petros Papadopoulos of Accept-LGBT reported, the number of prospective MPs that responded to the organization’s lobbying was much higher than the activists expected. However, he also pointed out that both he and the organization as a whole remain sceptical towards the supportive responses they received. He said:

> Surprisingly, we got a lot of positive responses. We expected to be dismissed, at least by some [prospective MPs]. It’s hard to believe, but the DISY [the rightist party] candidates were the most supportive. Some people from DIKO [the right-centrist party] and from EDEK [the socialist-centrist party] were also pretty supportive. The AKEL [i.e., the communist-leftist governing party] people are the ones who kept silent. They have not yet responded to the letter we sent them. They are already governing so, I don’t know. Maybe they have less at stake by not assuring our votes? But we do not really think or expect much of this [supportive response by prospective MPs] anyways. They [i.e., prospective MPs] always give you the sweet talking when elections are around the corner. Talking, talking, talking... [Pauses]. We will see how supportive they are of our cause, after they climb on the chairs [i.e. win seats in parliament]!766

Papadopoulos’s pessimistic view of Cypriot politicians’ ‘true’ interest in the Accept-LGBT cause is supported by the fact that the relevant RoC authorities have not yet accommodated the organization’s request to be officially registered and recognized as a legal person. As an Accept-LGBT member reported, in February

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2011, the Ministry of Interior requested four ministers – the ministers of employment, justice, education and health – to submit their observations and recommendations as to how they would respond to the request of Accept-LGBT, while the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, Mr. Lazaros Savvides, stated that before reaching a decision, he would also consult the Church of Cyprus.  

This approach by the RoC to the group’s request to be officially recognized likely constitutes a discriminatory interference with the right to freedom of association that article Article 11 of the EConvHR protects since soliciting four ministries is excessive, while there is no reasoning to support the Church’s entitlement to have a saying on this issue.

However, regardless of the remaining obstacles, it seems that this is a very good time for Cypriot LGBTQ activists to organize and mobilize: Not only do they have the open support and assistance of external regional bodies and transnational LGBT organizations, such as ILGA-Europe; the local environment also seems to be offering fertile ground for pushing the boundaries of social imagination with regard to the construction and expression of gender and sexuality identities. The opportunities are there and Accept’s response to these opportunities has been quick and effective. Nonetheless, practical and ideological/theoretical problems still remain. It might be the case that external attacks by political elites, like Themistocleous, help bring activists together, reach across to other parts of civil society and form alliances within and across national borders. However, the existence of these types of stimuli cannot be guaranteed. The important issue of framing the human rights agenda in LGBTQ activism in a more constructive manner remains. With this issue in mind, it is important for LGBTQ groups, and especially newly formed groups that operate in closed and traditional social environments, like Accept-LGBT, to be aware of: a) their stance in the matrix of power, both locally and in relation to the ‘West’; b) their available options, as well as the best ways to combine them and make the best usage of them; c) the fact that there are limits to the ideological sacrifices that any group can make in the name of

767 “Email communication with Accept-LGBT Activist,” 20 February 2011.
768 I am grateful to Professor Robert Wintemute for this insight.
769 Cruz-Malavé and Manalansan IV, ed. Queer Globalizations.
strategic purposes, if it is to preserve its unity and its aims and objectives clear both for group members and for external audiences.\footnote{For example, interviews and discussions with Cypriot LGBTQs and with Accept-LGBT Cyprus members revealed that, in their majority, these people attribute sexual choice to biology, ‘nature’ and genes. Confirming or discrediting this position is irrelevant to the purposes of this study. However, the implications of such arguments, which are premised on biological determinisms, on the impetus of Cypriot sexual politics is something that Cypriot LGBTQs should think about. If sexual equality is grounded in biology and genes and if ‘problematic’ genes could one day be isolated and controlled for, where does this leave sexual politics? Even if non-heterosexuality were biologically determined, Cypriot LGBTQ activists should consider whether this is the line of argument that they want to prioritize in their struggles for equality. This issue, i.e., the ‘gay gene’ debate and its political implications, has been extensively addressed in the literature. For example, see: David Fernbach, “Biology and Gay Identity,” \textit{New Left Review}, no. 228 (March-April 1998): 47-66.\footnote{Carl F. Stychin, “Same-Sex Sexualities and the Globalization of Human Rights Discourse,” \textit{McGill Law Journal}, vol. 49 (2004): 951-68.}}

Becoming and remaining aware of these issues necessitates embracing what Stychin calls the ‘double movement of globalization’.\footnote{Carl F. Stychin, “Same-Sex Sexualities and the Globalization of Human Rights Discourse,” \textit{McGill Law Journal}, vol. 49 (2004): 951-68.} Stychin highlights the need for LGBTQ activism to balance the notion of the globalization/transnational nature of human rights as a criterion of progress with a degree of resistance to (or, at least, with the qualified acceptance of) the notion of globalization of same-sex sexualities as identities. The events and reactions described in this section seem to suggest that, even at this embryonic stage, Accept-LGBT has managed to reach a considerable level of understanding of this ‘double movement’. Although Cypriot LGBTQ activists constructively use the language of universal human rights and European rights to gain sexual equality, they also embrace multiple and intersecting identities. Human rights and multiple identities allow them to ground their demands for the country’s ‘Europeanization’ with regard to its legal framework and set of embraced values without negating local modalities of desire that do not fit neatly into the ‘European/Western’ model of LGBTQ identities.

\section*{Conclusion}

The discussion of some instances of ‘Western’, and specifically of US, politics of sexuality highlighted some of the ideological and practical problems that, more often than not, LGBTQ groups need to tackle in the process of defining their aims, objectives and identity, as well as in their attempts to communicate their aims, objectives and identities to unreceptive audiences.
Useful links can be drawn between the case of such ‘Western’ movements and the case of the newly-formed LGBTQ movement in Cyprus. For example, Facebook was employed by Cypriot LGBTQs in order to expose an MP’s homophobic comments and to summon a large number of supporters against the bigotry of some Cypriot political elites. It could be argued that such moves contribute to the erosion of political and institutional discursive monopoly. This chapter showed that the language of ‘Europe’ works as a valuable pressure tool in the hands of Cypriot LGBTQs, since the local political elite cannot disregard the need to abide with European norms and rules: Individual ‘European-minded’ politicians have better prospects for reelection, while both the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot political elites heavily depend on Europe for the satisfaction of their respective ethno-national objectives.

Nonetheless, although European discourses, institutions and mechanisms proved to be effective for Cypriot LGBTQs as a group, the language of ‘Europe’ is also being employed by some Cypriot LGBTQs – mostly Greek-Cypriots – in order to render Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs as inferior, that is as ‘non-European/non-Western’. This raises the question of how local/individual and ‘European/Western’ discourses of sexuality need to be balanced in order to achieve sexual equality while avoiding in-groups exclusions. Namely, how and to what extent legal and identity sexual politics need to be scrutinized based on queer theory considerations, if they are to maintain their beneficial impact on the lives of all Cypriot LGBTQs.

Admittedly, diasporic movements and the technological advances in the field of mass media and communication have had a profound impact both on LGBTQ culture and on LGBTQ activism and politics. Ideologies, practices and images travel from the ‘West’ to the ‘Rest’ and vice versa while, through transnational alliances, LGBTQ activism increasingly assumes the characteristics of a globalized movement. It is still too early to discern all the effects of this trend both in the ‘West’ and in the rest of the world. Has it increased public space for public self-representation and public debates? It certainly has. Has it facilitated the connection among sexual expressions and a unity of speech? It has to a considerable degree.

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However, does it contribute to the fostering of Duggan and Hunter’s concept of ‘sexual dissent’, which involves the emasculation of hierarchical relations?\textsuperscript{773}

It has been argued that the cultural production, circulation and reception of a presumably international/global LGBTQ movement is problematic, since this process is essentially defining LGBTQ liberation by ‘tracing the trajectories of modernity’.\textsuperscript{774} Allegedly, the rhetoric of a transnational LGBTQ movement and of transnational LGBTQ identities silences questions about the legitimization of the circulation of ideas, processes, practices and political strategies, which are deployed to either justify/establish or resist the search for local/indigenous modalities of sexuality and the imposition of international egalitarian notions. The subordination of local subjectivities by transnational structures and the hierarchical relations between ‘metropolises’ and ‘peripheries’ is concealed under the rubric of the terms ‘gay’, ‘bisexual’, ‘trans*’ and even ‘queer’.\textsuperscript{775} However, a closer look at Western/European discourses of sexuality and categories of sexual identity reveals that they are not monolithic or inflexible. On the contrary, they are adopted in multiple and constantly negotiated ways in different cultural and social settings, as part of the process of formulating hegemonic or counter-hegemonic responses to global/transnational LGBTQ agendas.

Although the Cypriot politics of sexuality and Cypriot LGBTQ organization and mobilization are currently in the initial stages of their formation, groups like the Greek-Cypriot Accept-LGBT and the Turkish-Cypriot Initiative Against Homophobia have already faced the need to negotiate and balance often conflicting local understandings of gender, sexuality, identity, rights and politics with ‘Western/European’ discourses that pertain to these issues. As the interviews with Cypriot LGBTQs demonstrated, both organized groups and individuals find themselves in a similar negotiating position, when they attempt to understand and articulate themselves as sexual and political beings. However, striking a balance between local conceptions and individual self-identifications on the one hand, and increasingly pervasive transnational ‘European/Western’ discourses of sexuality on the other hand, is not impossible, although it is not an inevitable or an uncomplicated process.

\textsuperscript{773} Duggan and Hunter. \textit{Sex Wars}.
\textsuperscript{774} Manalansan, “In the Shadows of Stonewall,” 425-6.
\textsuperscript{775} Ibid., 426-9; Drucker, “Introduction: Remapping Sexual Identities,” 9-41.
Therefore, what needs to be kept in mind both by LGBTQ activists in ‘non-Western’ milieux and by scholars who study sexual subjectivities and politics in such locales is that unless external European/Western discourses and paradigms of political activism are scrutinized and selectively employed by local LGBTQ movements based on their particular needs and aims, then such discourses and paradigms carry the peril of merely replicating – or, even worse, reinforcing – those suppressive discourses against which they are targeted.
It has been a long while since the ‘essentialism versus constructionism’ debate with regard to sexual categories and identities was put to rest in Anglo-American scholarship, since forceful arguments about the historical specificity of such categories and of identities in general made the sustention of claims about essential and intrinsic attributes impossible. Moreover, the perils of assuming Western experience and Western paradigms of the organization of, and mobilization around sexuality to be transferable to places and/or beneficial for peoples with different socio-cultural patterns and experiences, have been substantially highlighted. Arguments have also been raised, especially by ‘Western/European’ LGBTQ activists and legal scholars, about the pitfalls of cultural relativist approaches to non-heterosexuality and about the inherent universality of human sexual rights – and especially of European rights that pertain to sexuality. What remains obscure, though, are the dynamics and the effects generated through the employment of such ‘Western/European’ approaches in locales like Cyprus, which are simultaneously ‘European’ and ‘non-European’; that is, they are European based on geographical and political categorizations but non-European when viewed through the prism of local culture and locally predominant discourses.

So, how do Cypriots – elites and non-elites – engage with ‘Europe’ and react to the values, ideas and discourses that their recent Europeanization entails? How are national, gender and sexual identities formed and/or reformed in the interaction of indigenous norms and external influences? These questions constituted the focus of this thesis, which argued that – like all concepts – the concept of ‘Europe’, as well as its language, institutions and mechanisms, are employable in numerous ways. Moreover, they have the potential to ground and support different, often contradicting, elite and non-elite objectives.

The case of Cyprus exemplifies this argument: In their attempts to propel their objectives, elite political and institutional agents – like Cypriot politicians and prelates of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus – and non-elite actors – like Cypriot

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women and LGBTQs –have assumed different positions in relation to European and to national discourses at different times. Whether or not such attempts have been successful, they point to the fact that the country’s Europeanization does have an impact on locally predominant values and understandings of nationhood, gender and sexuality. Moreover, the engagement with ‘Europe’ exposes the artificialities embedded in nationalistic and heteropatriarchal elite-propelled discourses and helps subordinated groups, like women and LGBTQs, to come out of invisibility, publically articulate their wants and needs and be heard. Nonetheless, as the events surrounding the decriminalization of sexuality in Cyprus illustrate, this is neither as easy nor an immediate process.

According to the Cypriot Orthodox Church-supported PAHOK’s mid-1990s statement about the possibility of homosexuality’s decriminalization, ‘those men who have succumbed to the satisfaction of their unnatural desires will face God’s wrath ... [and] our dynamic resistance’. 779 Regardless of the CoE’s prescriptions to the RoC to comply with the Modinos ECtHR ruling,780 the Church and its affiliated religious groups, which united under the umbrella of PAHOK, held the view that the legalization of homosexuality needed to be opposed since ‘homosexuality is a sinful and slimy act that goes against nature and God’s law’. 781 Moreover, as their reasoning went, ‘the government can have its obligations towards Europe. The Parliament, however, which represents us, cannot and should not be controlled by anybody and [in this manner] violate the will of the people that has elected it’. 782 because:

By upholding this despicable law [i.e., the decriminalization legal provisions] our morals and dignity are being challenged, our children are put at imminent risk, the family institution is being threatened, our society is being corrupted, our national struggle is being jeopardized and, lastly, our rights as worthy and decent citizens are being violated.783

779 Circular distributed by the religious group Fighters for Moral Values. See image 1.5 in introduction.
780 Modinos v. Cyprus.
781 The petition of the Pancyprian Committee for the Fight against the Decriminalization of Homosexuality, dated 8 April 1998. See image 1.4 in introduction.
782 Ibid.
783 The resolution of the Pancyprian Committee for the Fight against the Decriminalization of Homosexuality, dated 8 April 1998. See Image 1.6 in introduction.
These statements illustrate that in nationalist discourses, ideas about ‘morality’, ‘dignity’ and ‘propriety’, as well as the preservation of the social institution of the heteropatriarchal family, are rendered as the premising pillars of the national collectivity and of the ‘nation’s’ struggles against external – namely, Turkey – and internal – that is, non-heterosexual Cypriots – enemies. The existence of these patriarchical, androcentric and heterocentric ideas and institutions is based on the castigation of alternative discourses – for example, the European human rights discourse that recognizes LGBTQ rights as human rights – and narratives about gender, sexuality and the organization of familial lives. Moreover, it is not solely non-heterosexual sexual acts and their legalization that are portrayed as deadly in religio-nationalist discourses. The people who embody such acts and the demand that the law and the polity recognize their existence are demonized. Their entire mental and physical structure is rendered as slimy, abnormal, sinful and dangerous for the survival of the national collectivity.784

To be sure, the debate over the decriminalization of homosexuality did not generate the Cypriot predominant nationalist discourses or the essentialist perceptions of gender and sexuality. Yet, the preoccupation with gender and sexuality and with their physical embodiment has always been a recurrent theme in narratives about the ‘nation’, as well as in state and institutional attempts to police its inclusion and exclusion boundaries. For example, as feminist and gender theory has amply demonstrated, ideas about ‘womanhood’, ‘manhood’, female sexual modesty and male sexual vigour are recurrent themes in nation-building narratives,785 even though the mainstream literature on nationhood and national identities tends to ignore questions about gender and sexuality. Although the ‘nation’s’ policing and regulation activities have been primarily directed towards women, men have not been excluded from control, even though the scholarship on national identities, gender and sexuality has been slow in fully discerning the impact of national identities and nationalist discourses on both men and women.786 This is all the more unfortunate since not raising or sufficiently addressing such questions implicitly

784 Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality, 186.
786 Of course, exceptions exist. See, for example: Nagel, “Masculinity and Nationalism,” 242-69. Specifically about Cyprus and Greece see: Loizos and Papataxiarchis, ed. Contested Identities.
reinforces or leaves unchallenged essentialist and binary approaches. Such approaches tend to lead to hasty conclusions and to dangerous generalizations since they equate ‘gender’ with ‘women’, ‘sex’ with ‘gender’, ‘sex’ with ‘sexuality’ and assume women to be ‘emotional’ and ‘peace loving’, while they present – primarily heterosexual – men as the nationally driven creators of conflict.  

Sex differences are constituted through political societies rather than being constitutive of political societies. This is to say that political societies reproduce themselves by producing sex and gender dichotomies of masculinity and femininity through the control of women, the policing of the processes of reproduction and the regulation of the relationships between women and men. This control is exercised through marriage and other kinship rules, while the sex and gender system is essentially the difference that results from the rules that place bearers and non-bearers into a particular relationship with one another.  

In Cyprus, the continuing predominance of such essentialisms and binarisms is exemplified both through official elite-articulated discourses and through the internalization of these discourses by non-elite agents. For example, even though conscious and strategic to a considerable degree, the participation of Cypriot women in nationalist projects and their implication in the perpetuation of exclusionary essentialist discourses substantiates the argument that unless we move from the study of women’s history to the study of gender as a relational category, numerous forms of ‘othering’ remain unaddressed.

Indeed, the problematization of the national identity/nationhood-gender relationship needs to be complicated further by the concept of sexuality. A study of sexuality unearths the omissions and generalizations of, as well as the binarisms and essentialisms embedded in Cypriot national identity and gender literature. Moreover, it illustrates the penetrative force of such essentialisms, binaries and homophobic discourses. Even non-heterosexual Cypriots tend to see their lives, their familial worlds, their emotional needs and their status as the recipients of rights as inferior when compared to the heterosexual norm and to those who abide by it. Finally, and most importantly, disruptive instances in which sexuality becomes the focus of

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public debate – in the case of Cyprus, examples of such instances are the *Modinos* and *Marangos* cases and the claims submitted to the Ombudsman by Cypriot citizens for the recognition of same-sex civil unions.° This thesis showed that nationalist discourses have had a considerable degree of impact on the shaping of the Cypriot discursive landscape. However, contrary to earlier analyses about the impact of nationalist rhetoric, it is gradually becoming obvious that such discourses have been neither omnipresent and omnipotent, nor unsurpassable. Although in the past they have limited non-elite and subaltern agency, they have not managed to render it unthinkable – even though the powerful political institution of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus has invested a lot of effort into cultivating and preserving exclusionary discourses, while the political elite has either supported or tolerated the Church’s stance.

Nationalism includes the seeds of its own destruction and subsequent reinvention. Namely, since the ‘nation’ and ideas about the existence of a coherent national identity cannot exist unless they constantly measure themselves to what they expel, it becomes apparent that the idea of the ‘nation’ and of ‘national identity’ is not unchanging or impenetrable. The ‘Self’ is constituted through its distancing from the ‘Other’. Therefore, the ostracized ‘Other’ does have an impact of how national identities and the borders of national collectivity are debated and formed. Cypriot women’s engagement with androcentric and patriarchal nationalist discourses allowed some of them – admittedly middle and upper-class educated women – to enter the existing power structures. Once they had become part of the system, they extensively employed European discourses, mechanisms and institutions, managing to gain women-specific rights and to promote gender-oriented public policy implementation. In the past, the discourses, mechanisms and institutions of Europe had been strategically and opportunistically employed exclusively by the male

° For example: Mavratsas, “Ideological Contest,” 730.
Greek-Cypriot political elite, in order to legitimize nationalist objectives.\textsuperscript{792} However, by initially adopting the predominant nationalist rhetoric, Cypriot women won a place in the public and political sphere and consequently based their demands and claims on European standards about the position of women. In this way, they initiated the process of the reconfiguration of the nation-gender relationship. With the help of ‘Europe’ and through a form of ‘strategic essentialism’\textsuperscript{793} Cypriot women successfully engaged in transversal politics. This approach enabled them ‘if not to deconstruct ... to work around nationalist discourses and to challenge their subjectivization projects, not only against women but against all marginalized groups’.\textsuperscript{794} In this way, they highlighted those Europeanization elements and processes that protect and support subordinate classes.

The appropriation of ‘Europe’ has functioned in a similar manner in the case of Cypriot LGBTQs. Due to the limited spaces and opportunities for the formation of alternative discourses of sexuality and of sexual politics of ‘anti-normalization’,\textsuperscript{795} the heated debate of ‘strategic essentialism/rights and identities politics versus identity deconstruction/radical politics’, which marked Anglo-American scholarship and activism in previous decades,\textsuperscript{796} has been absent in Cyprus. This absence substantiates arguments made in this thesis that outside the ‘Western/European’ context, the exclusive adoption of one of these two approaches is not informative or useful for local LGBTQs. Nonetheless, over time, Cypriot LGBTQs have managed to turn the dominant elite-propelled nationalist rhetoric on its head and become visible in the public sphere, even though the ideological wars of the ‘Western/European’ politics of sexuality have not been characteristic of the case of

\textsuperscript{792} Featherstone, “Cyprus and the Onset of Europeanization,” 141-64; Featherstone, “Introduction: In the Name of ‘Europe’,” 3-26; Tocci, \textit{EU and Conflict Resolution}, 28-52; Richmond, “Shared sovereignty and the politics of peace,” 149–76.


\textsuperscript{795} Meeks, “Civil Society and the Sexual Politics of Difference,” 325-43.

\textsuperscript{796} For a discussion of this debate and a noteworthy attempt to bridge it, see: Duggan and Hunter. \textit{Sex Wars}. In addition to the qualified and careful employment of rights claims and litigation strategies, Duggan and Hunter advocate in favour of a concept of ‘gender dissent’ through the employment of rhetorical strategies. The ‘gender dissent’ concept avoids the need to communicate a desire to be accepted within the unchallenged structure of marriage and an identity based on sexual orientation; rather, it enables everyone who wishes to do so – not only LGBTQs – to participate in the dismantling of the hierarchy of power (see pages 116-18). To their credit, Duggan and Hunter are aware of the disadvantages of such as strategy. They list its roots in liberalism and its consequent development of a negative relation to the state. As they admit, this might lead to sexuality being removed from state action completely instead of it being impartially treated by state institutions (see pages 181-2). See also: Duggan, “Commentary: Dreaming Democracy,” 851-6.
Cyprus. ‘Europe’ and its discourses, mechanisms and institutions have been extremely conducive towards initiating this process.

The pre-mid-1990s silence over, and invisibility of non-heterosexual modalities of sexuality was complemented by references to ‘European human rights’, in order to represent the Greek-Cypriot collectivity as inherently Christian Orthodox, Greek, heterosexual and as the victim of human rights abuses by Turkey.797 However, because of Modinos’s activism, the Modinos ECtHR case and this case’s impact on the Cypriot socio-political terrain, sexuality surfaced as a topic of public discussion, yet without escaping Foucault’s ‘repressive hypothesis’.798 Non-heterosexuality was criminalized and indigenous modalities of sexuality were placed within the confines of law for the first time, with the transplantation of the infamous Labouchere Amendment to the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 into colonial Cyprus by the British.799 ‘On the subject of sex, silence became the rule’,800 while the taboo of homosexuality empowered the notion of heterosexual national identity.801 The disruption that the Modinos and Marangos cases created led to the breaking of this silence and to the emergence of public debates about the legal and social status of Cypriot non-heterosexuals. However, because of their gaining of voice, non-heterosexual individuals were even more intensely and loudly portrayed as sinners, psychopaths, and/or sociopaths, especially by the Orthodox Church of Cyprus.802

This surfacing of debates about non-heterosexuality in the public domain had both positive and negative effects. To be sure, homosexuality and the ‘stereotypical’ homosexual man, who was located in the face of Alecos Modinos, were demonized

797 Featherstone, “Cyprus and the Onset of Europeanization,” 141-64; Featherstone, “Introduction: In the Name of ‘Europe’,” 3-26; Tocci, EU and Conflict Resolution, 28-52; Richmond, “Shared sovereignty and the politics of peace,” 149–76.
798 Namely, in contrast to the idea that the silencing over issues of sexuality, especially during the nineteenth century, led to the repression of expressions of sexuality, it was this silencing and repression that led to the proliferation of discourses/knowledges about sexuality, placed sexuality within the domain of ‘identity’ and made it the object of state and self-control techniques. Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume I, 1-35.
800 Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1, 3.
802 On the move from religious discourses about homosexuality to medical/psychiatric/pathologizing ones see: Sedgwick, “How to Bring Your Kids up Gay,” 18-27; Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, 9-11, 47-8; Sedgwick, Tendencies, 1-20; Παγκύπρια Εταιρεία Ψυχικής Υγείας, Ομοφυλοφιλία.
as lethal for the survival of the Greek-Cypriot national collectivity and of its ‘Hellenorthodox’ values. Foucaultian ‘bio-power’ gained more impetus and rigour through the stimulation of discourses of sexuality, which functioned as the prerequisites of the extension of state power into the regulation of bodies and lives. Nonetheless, this public manifestation of alternative discourses of sexuality also exposed one of the major artificialities and myths of the predominant local nationalist discourses. Namely, it became obvious that the country’s EU admission necessitated the adoption of policies and norms that recognized and protected individual lives and human dignity. As a result of the ECtHR’s decision in the Loizidou case, ‘Europe’ was being lauded as a panacea for the RoC’s national, Turkey-inflicted headaches. However, after the ECtHR Modinos ruling, it was no longer perceived as such. The Church and its affiliated groups described ‘Europe’ and European political officials as the ‘Chief Priests’ who were forcing Greek-Cypriots to sell out their ‘morals’ and ‘values’ for ‘thirty pieces of silver’, while the Cypriot political elite tried to communicate the idea that the decriminalization of homosexuality was the heavy price the RoC had to pay in order to assure the implementation of the ECtHR Loizidou ruling, as well as the country’s standing in the CoE.

The case of the Turkish-Cypriot organization Initiative Against Homophobia and especially the case of the Greek-Cypriot Accept-LGBT group exemplify the second step in the process of the destabilization of the discursive status quo through the employment of discourses, institutions and mechanisms of ‘Europe’, which the Modinos and Marangos cases had set in motion. The centrality of the ideas, mechanism and institutions of ‘Europe’ in Accept’s aims and activities is reflected in its statute. Accept’s mission includes ‘the demand of basic human rights and the fight against prejudice and discrimination against LGBT individuals’, as well as ‘the promotion and the implementation of policies, laws, programs and jurisprudence of the European Union and the Council of Europe with regard to combating discrimination and promoting the principle of equality, especially regarding sexual

803 Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1, 140-44.
804 Loizidou v. Turkey.
805 Circular distributed by the religious group Fighters for Moral Values. See image 1.5 in introduction.
806 See the comments of the then President of the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs and of the then Senior Lawyer of the RoC in chapter three.
orientation and social gender.\textsuperscript{807} As some of the founding members of Accept reported, the group’s creation has been premised on the idea of human rights that the EU and the CoE promote, as well as on the funding, training and support available to local groups by the ‘European’ centre.\textsuperscript{808} This highlights a great degree of change since the mid-1990s when the issue of the decriminalization of homosexuality was being debated, with regard to the way in which ‘Europe’ and external, transnational and international discourses are being appropriated and employed by non-elite Cypriots. ‘Europe’ is no longer the remedy to injustices that take place at the national level against LGBTQ people; it is the reason why there should not be any injustice in the first place.

The stance of part of the political elite towards Accept’s request to respond to a set of questions that pertained to LGBTQ rights and social equality during the 2011 parliamentary elections political campaign season, substantiates the argument that opportunistic elite views of ‘Europe’ are progressively giving way to an understanding of ‘Europe’ as the bastion of liberal democratic values. This is more so among younger Greek-Cypriot politicians. Accept had prepared a set of questions that it sent to numerous candidates from different political parties, asking them to respond. Some of the questions targeted politicians’ stance towards the former Ombudsman’s suggestions for recognition of same-sex civil union and towards European/regional attempts to eradicate all forms of homophobia.\textsuperscript{809} Candidates’ attempts to appeal to LGBTQ voters and/or political party efforts to portray their young new candidates as open-minded and progressive cannot be rejected as reasons for the numerous supportive responses to Accept’s questions. However, the argument that a sincere ‘Europe-driven’ change is taking place in elite political discourses about sexuality cannot be rejected either.


\textsuperscript{808} “Interview with Despina Michaelidou”; “Interview with Yoryis Regginos”; “Interview with Petros Papadopoulos”.

\textsuperscript{809} The questions were: ‘According to the Ombudsman’s latest 2011 report, same-sex couples do not enjoy equal treatment in relation to heterosexual couples with regard to employment, inheritance, property, taxation, insurance, pension and many other issues. This is the result of the existing law. Would you personally commit to amending the existing law by voting in favour of laws that guarantee equality for same-sex couples?’ And: ‘The EU is globally considered as a trend-setter with regard to the elimination of all types of discrimination, including homophobia. In Cyprus, numerous organizations, either independently or in cooperation with Accept, support these [i.e., the EU’s] efforts through their activities. As an elected representative, through which activities would you support these organizations’ efforts?’ Original in Greek. My translation into English. See: Accept-LGBT Cyprus, «Βουλευτικές Εκλογές 2011» <http://www.acceptcy.org/ekloges2011> (27 July 2011).
Admittedly, there are numerous essentialisms and hierarchies embedded in ‘European’ discourses and global/transnational LGBTQ identities. For example, some Greek-Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees employed ‘Europe’ and the RoC’s EU admission in order to substantiate their perceptions of the other ‘others’—that is, of Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs—as inferior, backward, and uncivilized. Moreover, as the case of Cyprus illustrates, Western European and Anglo-American paradigms of sexual identities and politics often conflict with, or do not sufficiently inform local understandings of sexuality. Even so, potentially, ‘Europe’s’ language, mechanisms and discourses have a changing effect on local discourses and power relations. The existing examples of organization and mobilization around issues of sexuality in Cyprus prove that, regardless of the fact that some individual Cypriots employ the language of ‘Europe’ in ways that reinforce in-group and inter-ethnic divisions, Cypriot LGBTQ groups would probably not have existed if the language and tools of ‘Europe’ had not been available. Therefore, and in this manner contributing to the currently existing literature, this study and analysis of Cypriot LGBTQ organizations showed that there is a third way of pursuing the politics of sexuality, which the ‘queer theory versus rights/identity-based approaches’ scholarly debate has not fully explored. That is a politics of sexuality that is empowered by external/transnational legal and identity discourses, but that is also moulded to fit local activists and LGBTQs’ particular needs and objectives.

There is a dialectical and productive relationship between the abstract character of rights and the particularity and determinative character of identities. The universal and the particular are not opposed and liberal democracy is not defined by opposing individual rights. Rather, liberal democracy and rights support and presuppose one another, thus leaving a space for the relation between the universal and the particular to be contested and reformulated. Therefore, according to this reasoning, although rights shape identities, they simultaneously provide a basis for contesting and rearticulating new rights and identities.

811 For example, see: Bereket and Adam, “The Emergence of Gay Identities in Contemporary Turkey,” 131-51.
The case of Cyprus confirms Butler’s point that the ability of rights and identities to stretch and shrink according to particular and/or local circumstances is not the major reason behind the inevitability of essentialisms, binarisms, hierarchies and of the rights and identities discourses that are based on them. In an attempt to reorient the discussion about rights and identities, Butler challenges the idea that postmodern bodies and sexual identities are the product of freely chosen decisions and argues that their construction is neither artificial nor dispensable. Construction remains a constitutive constraint even after having deconstructed heterosexuality, homosexuality and all the other classifications that are based on male and female anatomy.813 She concludes that even if homosexuality transcends the domain of what is culturally possible, there is a relation to be identified between the abjection of homosexuality by the heterosexual binary and heterosexual identification because of the mere fact that the two are mutually exclusive. Disavowing heterosexuality and refusing to identify with it means that, at some point, identification with it has already been made.814 This argument is reminiscent of the Foucaultian view that subjects are simultaneously products of discursive power and producers of themselves, though within the ambit of discourse.815 This line of argument is also helpful in understanding the case of Cyprus. Although both Cypriot LGBTQ self-understandings and Cypriot elite perceptions about gender and sexuality are located within a specific discursive context, the possibility of agency is not annihilated: Discourse guidelines how the ‘Self’ or the ‘Other’ speaks and is spoken about, but the act of the articulation and the result of the articulation are not given or predetermined.

This thesis argued that this logic applies to the relationship between the ‘local’ and the ‘external/European/transnational’ also. Namely, although ‘Western’ and ‘European’ discourses may reinforce cultural hierarchies, their appropriation at the local level remains flexible in the hands of the indigenous excluded groups and individuals who find in them a first – if not the only – way into the existing power structures and, consequently, out of invisibility. It demonstrated that discourses of nationhood and national identity always have had, and continue to have,

814 Lyon, Concepts in Social Thought, 95-6, 101.
815 Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume I, 60.
ramifications far beyond those that the mainstream nationalism and national identities literature has addressed. In the case of Cyprus, gender and sexuality become occasions for reflecting on such ramifications, as well as for evaluating their impact in locales beyond the hubs of the production of the majority of scholarly literature – that is, in places outside the of ‘West/Europe’.

Sexuality remains a zone of management, containment, regulation and conformity, but also of resistance. In Cyprus, the regulation of sexuality through – among other things – the criminalization of male homosexuality, was part of the British colonial mission to ‘civilize’ the ‘primitive’ Cypriot subject. As it is usually the case in formerly colonial/postcolonial milieux, in the pursing of their national struggles, formerly oppressed peoples replicate such repressive discourses and practices. In the case of Cyprus, the colonial narratives that had named and classified non-heterosexuality as a vice resurfaced with new rigor and slightly modified as part of nationalist missions. These missions were headed primarily by the Orthodox Church of Cyprus and aimed to keep Cyprus ‘pure’ and safe from external and internal enemies. In this way, nationalist discourses about the ‘ethnic other’ who threatens ‘our’ survival have been accompanied by discourses about the sexually ‘normal’, ‘deviant’ and ‘pathological’, which have their roots in the era of the island’s colonial domination.

Therefore, until the mid-1990s, the non-heterosexual Cypriot individual remained invisible and constrained within the unspeakable discourse that had constructed him as ‘despicable’. In the mid-1990s though, because of Modinos’s attempts to have the RoC amend its criminal law with regard to homosexuality, Modinos and ‘all sorts of Modinoi’ were ruthlessly attacked and publically portrayed as the culprits behind the Greek-Cypriot national collectivity’s need to sell out its values and morals to ‘Europe’. According to Cypriot religio-nationalist narratives, Modinos and non-heterosexual people were to have no rights, if such rights challenged the heterocentric predominant norms. However, and although as a result of the Modinos case homosexual people have been demonized and publically humiliated by the Church and by its supporting groups to a degree like never before,

816 Bryant, Imagining the Modern, 48-51; Papadakis, “Aphrodite Delights,” 237-50.
817 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 27.
818 Circular distributed by the religious group Fighters for Moral Values. See image 1.5 in introduction.
the Modinos and Marangos cases initiated a process through which, eventually, the dissonance between nationalistic employments of ‘Europe’ and the real, liberal rights and values that ‘Europe’ represents was irreversibly unearthed. Almost two decades later, the newly formed Cypriot LGBTQ groups Accept and Initiative started following Modinos’s lead and premising the new wave of Cypriot politics of sexuality on the language, values and tools that have become available to them through the country’s Europeanization.

To be sure, ‘Europe’ and Europeanization discourses, mechanisms and institutions are not free from concealed remnants of a quasi-modernist/colonial logic that sees the world as hierarchically compartmentalized. Nonetheless, as the employment and analysis of the case of Cyprus demonstrated, local modalities of sexuality and local identity formation processes are much more flexible and resilient than scenarios about an amalgamating globalization presents them to be. Cypriot LGBTQs, like LGBTQs in other locales with similar characteristics, have consistently exercised agency in their encounters with various discourses – both friendly and unfriendly, both local and external – even though the exercise of this agency has not always been easy or apparent.

In conclusion, there is more than one way in which the idea of Europeanization and the discourses and mechanisms of ‘Europe’ can be interpreted and employed by people at the local level. These ways are sometimes contradictory. For example, whereas in the past the language of ‘Europe’ had been explicitly appropriated by the Greek-Cypriot political elite in an opportunistic manner in order to propel politico-national objectives, the ECtHR’s decision in the Modinos case – and the CoE’s demand that the RoC abided by it – made clear to the RoC’s political and institutional elites that the respect of citizens’ private life is not to be sacrificed at the altar of hegemonic, nationalistic, androcentric and heteronormative discourses. The Modinos ruling created an important precedent for Cypriot LGBTQs. Namely, through its legal and institutional mechanisms, as well as through its non-discrimination discourses, ‘Europe’ proved to be an ally and a lever against local exclusionary and discriminatory discourses and practices.

Strikingly, ‘Europe’ and the language of human rights have been repeatedly employed both by the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot political elite in order to render their respective ethnic groups as the victims of the ethnic ‘other’. ‘Europe’ has also been used by some non-elite actors. It has been utilized by some Greek-
Cypriot LGBTQs in order to portray Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs as inferior and backward and to present themselves as superior, more ‘modern’ and more ‘European’. This distancing of the ‘Self’ from the ‘Other’ is probably a sine qua non of any attempt to define one’s self or group and, as Brubaker argued, constitutes a less precarious form of ‘everyday ethnicity’. 819 Nevertheless, this tendency is particularly unfortunate since by ‘othering’ Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs, these Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs participate in the perpetuation of symbolic, yet dangerous, national and nationalistic discourses, which are to be blamed for their own exclusion from the Greek-Cypriot national collectivity.

Nonetheless, this potential double-role of such external, transnational and supranational trends and narratives about gender and sexuality is of utmost importance. This is because the result of the interaction between internal frameworks and local level power structures and global/transnational paradigms is not predetermined. Rather, as the analysis of the case of Cyprus illustrated, it allows people at the local/national level to invoke external norms, trends and discourses in those ways that would allow them to restructure their cultures and local socio-political realities as they see fit. Even more importantly, the appropriation of European external discourses by local non-elite agents constitutes an effective way of challenging locally hegemonic nationalistic, heterocentric and androcentric discourses. This will eventually lead to replacing elite nationalist-based schemes of social organization with more inclusive ones; with narratives that prioritize respect for difference – be it sexual, gender, ethnic, national or religious – over difference.

Sexuality’s oxymoronic status as both the object of local and transnational discourses, and as the force behind subaltern agency formation and demonstration means that, in order to fully comprehend it, we have to escape easy assumptions and generalizations about its role and impact on collective and individual lives both in the ‘West/Europe’ and in the ‘Rest’. This thesis attempted to respond to this challenge by approaching sexuality as a multifaceted and powerful analytical tool, which is indispensible in any scholarly attempt – be it a work on nationhood and national identities, on gender or on sexuality – to understand the nature and the dynamics of discursive ‘wars’ and interconnections, as well as local and global

circuits of power and their impact on real lives and stories. This is precisely because if approached in this manner, sexuality as an analytical concept allows us to navigate the dynamic and reciprocal relationship between the ‘official’ and the ‘hidden’, the ‘spoken’ and the ‘silenced’, the ‘local’ and the ‘transnational’, the ‘indigenous’ and the ‘foreign’.
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