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The development of British counterinsurgency policies and doctrine, 1945-52.

Jones, Timothy Llewellyn

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The development of British counterinsurgency policies and doctrine, 1945-52.

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Submitted for the degree of PH.D.

King's College, University of London.

Abstract:

The thesis explores the period of seminal change in British counterinsurgency [COIN] policies and doctrine, 1945-52. The first chapter outlines the nature of insurgency and COIN to indicate the requirements of successful COIN. The next focuses on British involvement in Internal-Security tasks from 1900-45, as this experience was a key factor in the shaping of postwar COIN. The subsequent three chapters identify the institutions that advanced COIN thought and policies, and analyses how the line taken by each agency was advanced after the War. The influences playing on them included individual progressive thought that displaced accepted convention and overcame institutional conservatism. And, although not hitherto fully appreciated, wartime experience of unconventional warfare and unorthodox forces, and concurrent postwar COIN campaigns, were also crucial influences. These inspired political and, more particularly, civic action policies, designed to gain popular support, notably in Greece and Malaya by 1948/9. Further, while the transformation of military policy took longer to effect, significant progress was achieved in Palestine and Greece by 1947, and especially in Malaya by 1950. The British political-institutional system worked against the rapid transfer of lessons from one COIN arena to another, but individuals sought inspiration from the recent past, and by 1948 all agencies employed 'expert' COIN advisors, which became a principle for later COIN campaigns. Moreover, by 1950 a new body of COIN policies and doctrine was formed, and refined by 1952, notably in the military sphere. Traditional policies were not wholly discarded, but a new 'Hearts-and-Minds' doctrine was formulated, and this was a major advance on the previous British COIN line. A short conclusion summarises the determinants that helped and hindered the development of this corpus of fresh COIN wisdom.
Contents:

Title-page 1
Abstract 2
Contents 3
Source note 4
Acronyms used in the text 5
Chapter 1: The nature of counterinsurgency 10
Chapter 2: The heritage—British Internal-Security policy and doctrine from the turn of the century to 1945 33
Map 1: British action against the postwar rebels, 1945-52 89
Map 2: Palestine 1945-7 90
Chapter 3: The development of British counterinsurgency policies and doctrine, 1945-7, with special regard to the campaign in Palestine 91
Map 3: Greece 1945-9 169
Chapter 4: Innovation versus status quo in British counterinsurgency policies and doctrine, 1945-9, with special regard to the British 'minimal commitment' to Greece 170
Map 4: The Federation of Malaya 1948-52 254
Chapter 5: The development of new counterinsurgency policies and doctrine, and the 'Hearts-and-Minds' line, 1948-52, with special regard to the Malaya 'Emergency' 255
Chapter 6: Counterinsurgency developments in retrospect 362
List of appendices, 1-12 376
Appendix 1: Notes on fifty of the principal characters involved with British COIN, 1945-52 377
Appendices: 2-12 389
Bibliographical note 401
Bibliography 402
Addendum 463

-3-
Source note:
Records from numerous archive sources are referred to in the text, and they are assigned the acronyms below.

AIR Air Ministry
CO Colonial Office
CAB Cabinet
DEFE Defence papers, of the Chiefs of Staff and committees
FO Foreign Office
INF Ministry of Information
PREM Premier's Office
WO War Office

Other institutions:
AHB Air Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence, London
School of Economics and Political Science, Holborn, London
GBHQ Guards Brigade HQ, Wellington Barracks, London
GMW Gurkha Museum, Peninsula Barracks, Winchester
IOLR India Office Library and Records, Lambeth, London
IWM Imperial War Museum, Lambeth, London
KCLL King's College Old Library, Strand, London
LHC Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, Strand, London
MODL Old Library, Ministry of Defence, Whitehall, London
MEC Middle East Centre, St. Anthony's College, Oxford
NAM National Army Museum, Chelsea, London
PRONI Public Records Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast
RHO Rhodes House Library, Oxford
RCS Royal Commonwealth Society Library, Charing Cross, London
RMAS Staff College Library, Camberley, Sandhurst
SRM Suffolk Regiment Museum, Gibraltar Barracks, Bury St. Edmunds
Acronyms used in the text:

A
AAHQ,Mal. Advanced Air HQ, Malaya, RAF operations centre in Malaya, 1948-9
AAPG Allied Advisory Planning Group, a US-UK aid body in Greece
AFHQ Allied Forces Headquarters, wartime Command
AHQ Air HQ, a local RAF Command
AIS Allied (later Anglo-Greek) Information Service
AMAG American Military Aid Group, Greece
AOC Air Officer Commanding
ARFM Annual Report of the Federation of Malaya

B
BCPU British Civil Police Unit, Greece
BDCC British Defence Coordination Committee, made up of the Services and regional civil authorities, responsible to the Cabinet for coordinating all military activities
BGS Brigadier, General Staff
BLO British Liaison Officer, part of a BLU in Greece
BLU British Liaison Unit, attached to GNA
BMM(G) British Military Mission, Greece
BPPM British Police and Prisons Mission, Greece
BTG British Troops, Greece, local army Command

C
CAR Colonial Annual Report
CAT Chinese Assault Team, in Malaya
CDC Cabinet Defence Committee
CGS Chief of the General Staff
CGSEA Commissioner-General, South-East Asia, responsible for representing the Cabinet on regional defence issues
Ch.Sec. Government Chief Secretary
CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff
CID Criminal Investigation Department, police
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-in-C</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Colonial Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, in army Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS/CKO</td>
<td>Chiefs of Staff/Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPO</td>
<td>Chief Police Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRO</td>
<td>Commonwealth Relations Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Central Security Committee, Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Director of Intelligence, Malaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIACP</td>
<td>Duties in Aid of the Civil Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMI</td>
<td>War Office Directorate of Military Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMO</td>
<td>War Office Directorate of Military Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMT</td>
<td>War Office Directorate of Military Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DO</td>
<td>Director of Operations, guiding security force operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>DO Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept.PR</td>
<td>Department of Public Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSE</td>
<td>Democratic Army of Greece, armed communist insurgents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSO</td>
<td>Defence Security Office, local Security Service staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DWEC</td>
<td>District War Executive Committee, Malaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAM</td>
<td>National Liberation Front, a Greek Leftwing body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIS</td>
<td>Emergency Information Service, Malaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELAS</td>
<td>National Popular Liberation Army, a Greek resistance army of the Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>Emergency Publicity Committee, Malaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEAF</td>
<td>Far Eastern Air Forces, RAF theatre Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEC</td>
<td>Federal Executive Council, Malaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FELF</td>
<td>Far Eastern Land Forces, army theatre Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLC</td>
<td>Federal Legislative Council, Malaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLCMCP</td>
<td>FLC Minutes and Council Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSS</td>
<td>Field Security Section, army</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FTC Far East Training Centre, Kota Tinggi, Malaya
G
GGS Greek General Staff
GHQMEF General Headquarters, Middle East Forces, a wartime theatre Command
GHQMELF GHQ Middle East Land Forces, postwar army theatre Command
GNA Greek National Army
GOC General Officer Commanding
GSI General Staff Intelligence, responsible for army intelligence tasks
GSO General Staff Officer
H
HC High Commissioner, of colonial administration
HO Home Office
HQPal. Local army HQ, Palestine
HQMal. Local army HQ, Malaya
I
IR Intelligence Review
IRD Information Research Department, Foreign Office
ISI Internal Security Instruction
ISUM Intelligence summary
IZL Irgun Zvei Leumi, or National Military Organisation; Palestine insurgents
J
JGF Jungle Guerilla Force, Malaya
JIPC Joint Information and Propaganda Committee, Malaya
JPS Joint Planning Staff of the COS
JUSMAPG Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group, Greece
K
KKE Communist Party of Greece
L
LHI Lochmei He'rut Israel, or Lehi, Fighters for the
Freedom of Israel, Stern Gang; Palestine insurgents

MA Military Assistant
METP9/13 Middle East Training Pamphlet by GHQMELEF
MI5 Security Service, UK
MoD Ministry of Defence
MoI Ministry of Information
MPABA Malayan People's Anti-British Army; Malaya insurgents
MPF Malayan Police Force
MRLA Malayan Races Liberation Army, (the renamed MPABA)
MSS Malayan Security Service, domestic intelligence
MTP Military Training Pamphlet
O
OAG Officer-Administering-the-Government
OD Operational Directive
ODC Overseas Defence Committee of the Cabinet
OI Operational Instruction, from HQ to army units
OO Operational Order, from HQ to army units
ORG /S Operational Research Group, /Section, of War Office
OSUM Operational Summary
P
PFLCM Proceedings of the FLC, Malaya
PIO Public Information Office, Palestine
PMF Police Mobile Force
P/W Prisoner of War
PPF Palestine Police Force
Progrep. Progress Report
Q
QHR Quarterly Historical Report, of army unit
R
RAF Royal Air Force
RAFDG Royal Air Force Delegation, Greece
RHAF Royal Hellenic Air Force
RIC Royal Irish Constabulary
RID A Rural and Industrial Development Authority, Malaya
RUC Royal Ulster Constabulary
SAC Supreme Allied Commander
SAS Special Air Service
SBS Small Boat Section
SEAC South-East Asia Command, wartime theatre Command
SEP Surrendered Enemy Personnel
SIS Secret Intelligence Service, UK, also called MI6
SNDC Supreme National Defence Council, Greek COIN planning body
SNS Special Night Squads, Palestine, 1938-9
SOE Special Operations Executive
SSC Secretary of State for the Colonies
SSW Secretary of State for War
SWEC State War Executive Committee, Malaya
TI Training Instruction
URM United Resistance Movement: IZL, LHI and Haganah
USAGG United States Aid Group, Greece
WD War Diary
WO War Office
Chapter 1: The Nature of Counterinsurgency.

Counterinsurgency was gradually recognised in the postwar years as a distinctive type of conflict. The United Kingdom was continuously embroiled with it from 1945 until 1960, and a comprehensive and coherent set of COIN policies and principles was created during this period. Britain's first postwar exposure to insurgency occurred in 1945 in Palestine and Greece, and the British security forces, (the police and the military), undertook COIN tasks. The state of British COIN policies and doctrine at that time will be assessed, as the starting point for analysing the process of COIN development, and of the factors involved in this, during the crucial years of change leading up to 1952. To do this requires a reference framework that establishes the meaning of the concepts and terms which are used in this study henceforth.

The term 'policy' is used to describe 'a flow of purposive action' that a nation-state has taken, intends to take, and is taking, in a particular field, in order to achieve an objective. National policies are formulated upon the basis of various domestic and international political interests which are defined by high level State authorities. They are derived from disparate policy options that are recommended by bureaucrats and policy executors, who provide governments with a steady stream of information and advice. Individual government officials who suggest policy alternatives are influenced by social, cultural and historical factors, as well as by an array of innate psychological determinants, such as their own preconceptions, perceptions and analytical methods. As members of a State bureaucratic organisation, they can also be affected by the prevailing institutional mode of thought on a particular subject, or its 'line'. This 'may [serve to] limit .. policy-maker's options by obscuring possible interpretations
Policy options are implemented by high level decision-makers, by low level staff who are delegated the responsibility, or simultaneously by various individuals. A nation-state's actual policy is often the synthesis of various options and it may be founded on a 'doctrine'. This is one or more principles advocated by a policy-making body for use in a given field.¹

State authorities require an understanding of insurgency if they are to counteract it successfully. Equally, the historian needs to know the meaning of 'insurgency' and 'counterinsurgency' in order to determine whether contemporary British counterinsurgents' perceptions of insurgency were correct, or if insurgency was confused with other more familiar types of Internal-Security [I.S.] threat. If British COIN forces did not have a conception of insurgency, they may well have responded to it inappropriately.

'Insurgency' is a particular form of 'intrastate conflict', a term which is used to describe any campaign by actors other than the State authorities who attempt to fulfil their goals through the use of violence, with or without assistance from external sources, (and in preference to the term 'low intensity conflict' which does not encompass all such struggles). Historically, 'insurgency' was confused by scholars ¹

and governments with other types of intrastate conflict, and often COIN lessons were 'remembered only as aphorisms.' Indeed, many different criteria have been used to define 'insurgency', and 'the variety of classificatory schemes now in use not only increases misunderstanding but is a positive barrier to the development of knowledge.' Difficulties arise in the formulation of any theoretical construct dealing with societal conflict, because atypical cases will reduce its applicability, and accumulated errors, generalisations and innate connotations about types of conflict and the terminology used to describe them pose problems. However, a universal classification of intrastate conflict is not intended in this work, and broad classes and their sub/types are delineated only so as to provide a foundation for understanding insurgency and other forms of conflict that were encountered by British I.S.


agencies between 1945 and 1952. This demarcation is 'based on various elements' such as the intensity of violence, the characteristics of the participants, their objectives, and the instruments of policy that they employ.

Intrastate conflicts can be classed as non/revolutionary, which gives the State a basic indicator of the type of threat that it faces, if not its potency, and an idea about the orientation of its response. Revolutionaries seek to alter a nation-state's system of political authority, ideological foundations or basic social structure, in what is termed 'rebellion'. Non-revolutionary actors engage in 'civil dissension', the most common types of which are 'turmoil', 'sedition', and 'social banditry'. 'Turmoil' involves localised and short-lived 'relatively spontaneous, unstructured .. violence with predominantly popular participation', such as is manifested in strikes, riots and demonstrations.4 'Sedition' is more 'structured' low intensity violence, for instance, terrorism, which is organised by a movement aiming to destabilise a country until its demands are met by the government.5 'Social banditry' is distinct from criminal banditry, or 'brigandage', because it is a 'phenomenon of social protest', and consists of 'unstructured' violence, exemplified by sporadic irregular attacks. It is usually pursued for many years in a specific geographical region.6


5. On 'sedition', ibid; Concise Collins defines it as 'an offence that tends to undermine the authority of a State.'

6. For further details on 'social banditry', E.J. Hobsbawm Primitive Rebels (London, 1959) P.84-5.
Some of the various types of 'rebellion' include 'mass uprising', 'conspiracy', and 'revolt'. A 'mass uprising' may be spontaneous or organised, and it comprises 'unstructured', short-lived violence initiated by the inhabitants of towns, as was demonstrated by the 'Great Revolutions' of history, such as that of 1789. A 'conspiracy' is 'highly organised, relatively small scale violence' instigated by a political elite with little if any popular involvement, and is illustrated by violent coups. 'Revolt' is characterised by low to medium intensity violence, ranging from riots to conventional warfare, planned and organised by a political movement that strives for mass participation over a protracted period. One of its sub-types, 'civil war', is of an 'essentially military nature', its focus being on conventional war as two 'sides face off in geographically distinct areas with rival armies as two warring governments.' It often evolves from an 'insurgency', which incorporates the policy instruments of political subversion, terrorism, and rural and/or urban guerilla warfare, the last of

7. Other terms used to describe conflicts, such as 'resistance' and 'insurrection', are not adopted in this study, to avoid confusion about various types of conflict. On 'mass uprising' see, P. Calvert Revolution (London, 1970) P.122.


Guerilla war involves semi-independent mobile military units in the ambush of mobile opposition armed forces, raids on their installations, and the sabotage of their infrastructure, using hit-and-run tactics. It can be prosecuted by nation-state regular armies as an adjunct to conventional mobile and positional warfare, or by irregular forces. Irregulars can undertake conventional warfare too, but they more commonly prosecute guerilla warfare, and indeed, are often incorrectly viewed as being synonymous with it. Before the twentieth century, many colonial irregulars practiced conventional and guerilla modes of war, but, with the emerging firepower advantages offered by rapid-load weapons after the 1870s, more irregulars switched to the latter form of fighting. Yet, many retained a propensity to revert to set-piece battles or to take up static defensive positions as it suited them, and hence they lay themselves open to imperial firepower. Such irregulars were of a common 'traditional' variety, but in a few cases the colonial renegades refined their guerilla tactics and, especially after 1900, engaged in 'modern guerilla war'. They became much better trained and organised, attacks were based on intelligence and a planned advance and dispersal, and they abandoned pitched battles with regular soldiers. These 'modern guerillas' were therefore 'tactically different' from

10. Some mistaken terminology concerning guerilla war and insurgency is found, for instance, in, R. Taber War of the Flea (London, 1970) P.17,21.
other traditional irregulars.\textsuperscript{11}

Guerilla warfare and terrorism are collectively termed 'unconventional warfare', and this element of violence is central to insurgency. Terrorists may be distinguished from guerillas, (though an individual can be both), because although terrorists might employ hit-and-run tactics, they adopt methods other than guerilla-style ambush and raid, such as remote bombing and sniping, which are commonly directed against unarmed targets. Moreover, terrorism has distinguishing characteristics that differ from those of other policy instruments. The murder of a particular person is the objective of assassination. But political terrorism involves the threat or use of extreme violence against the individual in a campaign of intended sustained attack, aimed at unbalancing a society, and mobilising popular opinion in reaction to it or to a repressive State response, which in turn pressurises the

government into making political concessions.  

Political terrorism is inherently an agent of psychological warfare, (or 'psywar' as it is commonly known), which is any activity that is specifically designed to psychologically influence the players in a power-political struggle. Both military force and political subversion can be used to this end, the latter instrument consisting of all non-military operations directed against the State by those pursuing intrastate conflict. The main vehicle of political subversion is the key psywar tool, propaganda, which is defined as 'information, ideas, doctrines, or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinion .. attitude or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor.' Political propaganda is used by a movement to mobilise the population into active or passive

support for it. 

Sir Robert Thompson proposed that 'the best' concise definition of insurgency was, 'a form of warfare which enables a ruthless minority to gain control by force, over the people of a country, and thereby to seize power by violent and unconstitutional means.' This is an appropriate description, but one that circumscribes the essential features of insurgency and does not offer a precise conception of it. Insurgency is instigated by an active minority, but it also entails 'the support or acquiescence of a substantial part of the populace.' Therefore, insurgency is defined as a form of conflict that embroils a substantial portion of a nation-state's population in a protracted struggle over the national ideological, social or political system, featuring a military campaign, ineluctably including one of guerilla warfare, in conjunction with political terrorism, and political subversion.


A knowledge of the working of insurgency is crucial to understand COIN tasks. It does not occur on the basis of objective preconditions, but appears in societies subjected to psychological and political disorientation. A revolutionary consciousness wells up among certain elements of the populace, and an active minority tries to heighten this by manipulating popular feelings of actual or aspirational deprivation in regard to their living conditions. It is possible that socio-economic or political reforms could conciliate an aggrieved opposition, but if a government acceded to the full demands of a revolutionary organisation this would involve self-defeating change. While a degree of reform may remove some points of contention, 'after a certain point, such policies could no longer alter the situation.' The inception of insurgency depends upon the interaction of numerous factors, including the options that are open to citizens to pursue political objectives peacefully, societal views on the validity of political violence, the degree of breakdown of consensus on State legitimacy and authority, and the capacity for violence on both sides. The progress of an insurgency may be stifled if its leaders and activists are arrested and the insurgent

16. For other compatible definitions of insurgency see, J. Baylis 'Revolutionary warfare', in J. Baylis et. al. (eds.) Contemporary Strategy (London, 1975) P.134; P. Paret/J. Shy Guerillas in the 1960's (London, 1962) P.37. Insurgency is termed 'revolutionary war' by some authors.

17. On popular feelings and the commencement of insurgency, Gurr Why Men P.338-9; and in 'Psychological factors in civil violence' World Politics 20, Jan. 1968, P.47,52. On the effect of reforms, Pye in Eckstein P.176.
organisation is eradicated, but this is a difficult task to accomplish quickly. State intelligence services might warn of revolutionary agitation but they often fail to detect the beginning of an insurgency because of its evolutionary nature.  

Insurgency progresses in stages that can be inter-related or disjointed, and its form is determined by many factors. These include the character of the opponents, such as their political will and resources, and the effectiveness of their respective armed forces and organisations in mobilising popular support, as well as innate societal characteristics, national geography, and the attitude of other nation-states. Nonetheless, although it is essential to adapt COIN policies to the peculiar features of each insurgency, these can be focussed


on some of its inviolable aspects. Following a careful assessment of the capabilities, interests and objectives of both sides, and identification of the basic reasons for pro-insurgent support, the State must stabilise its position by restoring security and concurrently implement socio-political programmes that are acceptable to much of the population. A regime may be poorly equipped for COIN, or encounter irresistible insurgent pressures, but it can act purposively.

Insurgency is fostered and directed by a political or politico-military organisation. The campaign is based on its efforts to build up a revolutionary consciousness among the masses, and hence attain widespread participation in the insurgency, or at least the people's general passivity. This is essential because 'the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population, or at worst, on its submissiveness.' Military action against State authorities cannot guarantee a rebel victory, and in addition, political and psychological operations are undertaken to obtain the population's compliance and thus afford the advancement of


the insurgency. The insurgents must not only destroy the machinery of the State but also its popular legitimacy, by impugning its monopoly of force and eroding its capacity to uphold the Law and protect citizens and their property. Insurgency nurtures societal polarisation by increasing the number of its own active supporters and coercing some individuals into passive support, while yet others resist it. If the insurgents secure a substantial degree of deference from the people, whether it takes the form of active or passive support, the insurgent organisation and forces can be expanded, and their activities may be sufficient to reverse national power-political relationships.

The emphasis placed on each insurgency instrument is conditioned largely by the level of popular acceptance which the insurgents command. Hence, if a large proportion of the populace extend their active support to the insurgents, political subversion and terrorism may be the main instruments they employ. But if a COIN effort is strong, the insurgents will concentrate on small or large scale guerilla warfare to undermine the State's position. Psywar is conducted throughout the counter/insurgency contest to influence popular attitudes, and insurgent political subversion includes propaganda that declares the morality of their cause and decries the government as immoral, corrupt and dysfunctional. A parallel insurgent administration might also be constructed, centred on insurgent-controlled 'liberated' areas. It assumes de facto political

Mao Tse Tung noted in *On Guerilla Warfare* (New York, 1961) P.43, that solely military action against the State cannot achieve victory: 'Without a political goal, guerilla war must fail.' Insurgency is 'organised and maintained by the masses [without whose] .. participation and cooperation, its .. development is not possible.'
authority and boosts insurgent claims to legitimacy. Political terrorism is also exercised, and includes attacks on government personnel and supporters, which has damaging psychological and political effects if it is not mastered by the security forces. It can demoralise the regime's supporters, wring compliance from some individuals who resisted subversion, and achieve 'passive support' for the insurgents from the 'politically inert .. [who] support .. that side .. which provides .. the greatest personal security.' Further, it increases pro-insurgent support by meting out 'justice' on despised officials. If terrorism is distended and wielded unselectively against the people, in order to coerce them into supporting the insurgency, it could have detrimental consequences for the anti-State forces. But if a government fails to stem terrorism, its own credibility is eroded, and wavering sections of the population may be encouraged to lean towards the insurgent side.

The accumulation of popular support provides insurgents with various tactical and strategic advantages. Citizens can provide supplies, recruits, shelter, and political and operational intelligence upon which future actions are planned. Potentially this offers armed units improved tactical surprise, initiative and mobility. Guerilla warfare is conducted to erode counterinsurgent resistance and to exert control over targeted regions, and if it is not defeated it can result in the expansion of 'liberated areas', the disruption of the economy, and the loss of security force resources. Under such unrelenting pressure a government may give in, but if it persists with its COIN campaign, the insurgents may need to supplement guerilla forces with conventional units to

achieve their goal.24

Insurgency therefore has several innate attributes, and a 'significant feature of much post-1945 COIN theory was the considerable space given to understanding the nature of an insurgency as a preliminary to its eradication.'25 Hence, counterinsurgency is defined as, a protracted campaign involving a combination of psychological, political and military action against an insurgent organisation and military forces, and their political, psychological and military operations, undertaken to preserve the socio-political structure and ideological system of the State in a form its authorities desire. 'There is no sure formula to determine the best approach .. to take',26 because of unique elements in each instance, but 'general principles have emerged, which are of

24. Mao said that insurgency developed in three stages: 1. the creation of an insurgent organisation, and the use of political subversion and terrorism to discredit the State and gain popular support. 2. the methodical development of liberated zones by this action, and by guerilla warfare. 3. having built popular support, a 'regular' army is then created for mobile and positional war and the State forces are defeated, granting the installment of a revolutionary administration: Trotsky envisaged a similar development, but in five phases, see, McCuen P.61.


-24-
The manipulation of popular attitudes is central to the consolidation of national political authority and legitimacy in any nation-state. Therefore, for COIN short of genocide, most academic authorities agree on the need for the State to maintain the confidence of the non-deviant section of the population whilst attempting to realign the rest to its side. General Thompson's 'Five Principles' exemplify the 'Hearts-and-Minds' COIN line that emphasises the building of pro-government popular support, in order for it to have the foundations required for a successful campaign. Some American scholars turned their attention to the control of those physical capabilities required by insurgents to pursue their aims, through the adoption of stringent population-resource control policies. And 'Hearts-and-Minds' exponents accept that some use of these methods is necessary. But advocates of the 'Cost-Benefit' COIN line assert that the key to success is not to be found in raising levels of government popular support, but in preventing the insurgents from converting their own active or passive support into political-military assets. However, the Hearts-and-Minds line, adapted to circumstances, offers a generally applicable COIN doctrine.

Thompson's first principle is that the government must communicate its aim to the people, which is to maintain a free, independent and politically and economically viable nation-state. The second is that COIN necessarily abides by legal and civilised standards, with 'justice' being seen to be done even if the Law and judicial processes have to be adapted, thereby underlining government legitimacy. Thirdly, COIN demands an

overall plan that delegates priorities and resources, to avoid omissions and any duplication of effort. It ought to be implemented by a central command authority, embodied in a Director of Operations, and by an efficient State machine which also continues to carry out normal government functions.  

Fourth, the main focus of COIN is on the fight against political subversion, especially propaganda, and on bolstering support for the regime through its own reforms and propaganda. It has also to eradicate the source of subversion by severing the insurgent organisation's links with the people and preventing its domination of areas targeted for 'liberation'.  

Finally, the government requires military success, by securing strategic bases, often in towns where the masses can be more easily controlled, and then instigating a methodical offensive against opposition forces that denies them the 'space' in which to launch attacks and exert their own influence. Constant military pressure is exerted and population groups most vulnerable to intimidation and terrorism are relocated to secure areas. Therefore, stamping out unconventional war is the counterinsurgent military objective, but it is also inextricably linked with the countersubversion effort, and all COIN operations share common psychological goals with regard to shaping popular attitudes.

28. On the importance of a unified effort see also McCuen P.71-86; Kitson Low P.51.

29. On counterorganisation tasks, ibid; Paret/Shy P.39-43.

It is necessary to refine these principles, because although the counterinsurgent's aim is unequivocal, cultural incommensurability means that some facets of Thompson's first maxim will not always be relevant. An authoritarian power engaged in COIN may seek to sustain its political structure and ideological system, but not to establish a 'free' society. Indeed, it is unwise for such a regime to enlighten its people about its COIN campaign if they are quiescent under State coercion and censorship, because admitting that there is a threat could spark revolutionary agitation. A further reservation is that an industrially weak power will be unable to render a nation-state 'economically viable.' The second principle of legal COIN action is correct, because societies conceive that legality must be upheld, even if 'democracy' is not lauded universally as a pillar of political legitimacy. However, the fact that COIN action is 'legal' cannot in itself bestow legitimacy on a discredited government. An overall plan is also vital for COIN, and psywar in Hearts-and-Minds COIN doctrine focuses on a 'positive approach', offering people incentives to support the authorities, while simultaneously countering the effects that insurgent activities have on the populace. Positive psywar incorporates COIN 'political action', including government political reforms, 'civic action' policies consisting of programmes for social, economic and cultural advancement, and counter/propaganda, in addition to military-security operations. Propaganda publicises the government's achievements, and political and civic action schemes are designed to eliminate social cleavages and popular dissatisfaction by achieving those political and socio-economic changes desired by the population. Indeed, government deeds are the 'acid test .. people employ' in deciding whether to support
the State or the insurgents. Other proponents of the positive psywar approach assign priority to defeating irregulars, arguing that military successes will raise popular confidence in the regime. The government must destroy the insurgent forces in any case, and victories may signal that 'militarily, the [insurgents] cannot and will not succeed.' But such military achievements are, by themselves, unlikely to convince citizens under the pressure of insurgent propaganda and terrorism to actively support COIN, and hence other COIN policies are required in conjunction with this. There are differences of emphasis among exponents of the Hearts-and-Minds line, and adaptability and flexibility is another essential COIN principle.

In the 1960s, researchers at the American think-tank, the Research And Development Corporation [RAND], shifted the focus of COIN to the 'negative psywar approach', featuring repressive measures including coercive population-resource control and military-security policies designed to defeat the insurgent military and uproot its organisation, and to pressure the population. Supporters of a 'Cost-Benefit' line argued that in nation-states where there was significant pro-insurgent support, the people may disregard an administration's


political-psychological efforts aimed at gaining their support, because 'reforms' such as local elections and cooperatives would be regarded as an attempt by the establishment to expand its control over local affairs and to introduce measures like conscription and new taxes. Strategists at RAND concentrated on the physical control of the masses and the resources with which they could furnish insurgents, because in doing so, the State could make the insurgents' tasks more difficult and perilous, and thus slow the progress of the insurgency. These analysts asserted that rather than seeking the people's active support, the government would merely require popular acquiescence, and that this could be achieved by providing strong disincentives for supporting insurgency. This entailed the State pressuring inhabitants with threats and punishments, the widespread use of force, and coercive physical control measures such as prolonged curfew. RAND stated that once a population was pacified under the weight of government measures, the security forces could then destroy insurgent forces. However, Cost-Benefit COIN action cannot guarantee government success, and popular support is necessary to prevail in counter/insurgency. Unless one camp can generate sufficient popular 'support', it is unlikely that it will be able to bring enough pressure to bear on the other side to win. The counterinsurgents must estimate the levels of influence that their opponents could conceivably command, and swiftly respond with appropriate Hearts-and-Minds

policies, including a politically sensitive application of measures with potentially negative effects on popular attitudes, such as population-resource controls.

In addition to COIN political action, counterterrorism is needed to prevent the intimidation of the people by insurgent terrorism, and the creation of an impression of State impotence as a consequence of it. Counterterrorism involves offensive military-security policies, including counter-organisation arrests, and, to reassure people psychologically, defensive physical security measures, possibly including the relocation of the most vulnerable people into protected 'resettlement' areas. This measure is also valuable for population-resource control and counterorganisation, because it can cut insurgent links with the masses, and in turn weaken the capabilities of irregular forces.

Military operations are necessary in COIN, but whereas conventional war is readily understood by State agencies, the prerequisites of counterguerilla warfare are often misunderstood. Although time-limited, set-planned, large scale/unit offensive military operations can defeat unsophisticated guerillas unversed in 'modern guerilla war', especially in easily traversible terrain, modern guerillas active in demanding environments have confounded them. These major offensives can be of considerable value in unsettling guerillas, breaking up uncomonly large guerilla forces and endangering their bases. But the crux of counterguerilla war is to gain contact with and defeat small guerilla bands. Large operations rarely do this effectively, even with the assistance

34. 'Counterterrorism' is all action taken to oppose terrorism, and includes the ambush of terrorists by security forces, which is termed 'paraterrorism'.

-30-
of control 'corsans' -permanent artificial physical barriers-
such as wire fences, minefields, sensors and guard posts,
because they impede guerilla movement but cannot prevent it.
These operations do not offer a short-cut to counterguerilla
success, which depends on strategic intelligence about the
insurgents, their resources and support, and tactical
intelligence on their actions and intentions. Intelligence is
gathered from technical and human sources and it is a lengthy
process, involving collection, collation, analysis, conversion
of 'background' into 'contact' information, and dissemination.
Counterguerilla offensive operations require prolonged
saturation area patrolling by small units of semi-independent
infantry, undertaking ambushes, raids and harassment from
strategic bases, not only on a speculative basis, but also on
intelligence. Platoons and sections rather than companies or
larger units operate in this 'paraguerilla' fashion, aiming to
restrict guerilla movement and resources, and engage and defeat
them, as a vital component of the overall COIN effort.

The process of the development of British COIN policies and doctrine can now be analysed on the basis of this frame of reference. This first demands the identification of the British COIN agencies concerned, their perception of the tasks confronting them in each instance of insurgency, and the factors which conditioned their conduct in COIN after 1945. Each institution involved had devised a 'line' on Internal Security affairs by then, and this was potentially a crucial influence on their actions.


-32-
Chapter 2: The Heritage - British Internal-Security policy and doctrine from the turn of the century to 1945.

British authorities involved in Internal Security\(^1\) included the Cabinet, various departments of State, and the security forces. The I.S. line of each agency affected their stance on COIN, and embraced a combination of political, psychological and military policies. At any one time, the I.S. line of a particular government institution could differ to that of others, and depending on the nature of that body, its line could either be fairly rigid, or more open to modification by new experiences or ideas. Its ability both to 'learn lessons' and to retain them within a central memory revolved, firstly, around the cognitive capabilities of individuals working in it and the perceived worth of new ideas vis-a-vis the existing line; and secondly, on the characteristics of its organisational and training systems. If 'lessons' were generally accepted by officialdom, they had to be assimilated into the institution's I.S. line and generally disseminated within it, ready for future reference. This process could take a considerable time to complete, because of obstacles to change such as the pervasive influence of existing thinking and individual or collective conservatism.

Historically, British security forces carrying out I.S. duties confronted many types of intrastate conflicts, but insurgency was not encountered until 1919 to 1921 in Ireland, and later in Palestine between 1937 and 1939. The British practiced COIN in these territories, as did various regimes in China, Africa and South America in the 1920s-40s, and other conflicts of the period exhibited features that were common to

1. 'IS' was an acronym commonly used after 1918 to describe government duties in intrastate conflicts.
insurgency, thereby offering experience of potential worth to Britons framing COIN after the Second World War.

Technological developments by the end of the nineteenth century, especially the breach-loading rifle and machine-gun, and later, air power, led some irregulars to alter their mode of operation. Unlike most adversaries of the Victorian era, 'modern guerillas' were characterised by the use of refined tactics, weapons and organisation, and their leaders were not inclined to favour set-piece battles. Such guerillas were often also the military arm of an ideologically motivated body, and by the interwar years there was 'a qualitative change in the nature of the colonial opposition.' \(^2\) Prior to this, the Army habitually relied on large scale/unit operations to defeat irregulars swiftly, although small units were sometimes deployed in mountains and other treacherous types of terrain. It sought unequivocal victories through the application of its man- and fire-power advantages, and in the face of numerous kinds of E.S. threat, military force became a cure-all for imperial maladies, except in the white colonies after 1902 and in India after 1919. Indeed, the Army's successful use of force meant that familiarity bred contempt for any effort by soldiers or scholars to analyse the conditions of its useability. This attitude reflected the ethos of much of politically educated English society, which 'for historical reasons connected with political development .. always found it exceedingly difficult to appreciate social, economic and emotional realities

underlying the surface unreasonableness of communal strife. Popular-based violence movements were not perceived as a manifestation of widespread aspirations or discontent, but as an innate facet of native cultures. The exercise of force was considered necessary to preserve the Empire, and the Army became the tool of this implicit political ideology. Imperial domination rested upon its supposedly unquestionable organisational, technical and tactical superiority over indigenous opposition, yet by the 1890s some military writers were studying the problems arising in imperial intrastate conflicts.

Major-General Sir Charles Callwell's Small Wars became semi-official War Office doctrine by 1906, and it proved to be influential on British soldiers' thinking about I.S. matters in the following decades. It synthesised the ideas of many commanders on how to fight irregulars, including counter-guerilla warfare, as well as Callwell's own thoughts on the

subject. He addressed the crucial issue of how best to respond to all manner of I.S. threats, including 'the suppression of insurrections', and accepted that guerilla war was 'the most unfavourable form' with which the Army had to deal. The General recognised that arduous terrain, the provision of resources by native inhabitants, and the innate mobility of guerrillas, could make them a formidable enemy. Callwell advocated the Army's Cost-Benefit line, but also supported its one customary positive psywar policy, consisting of 'flag-showing' patrols designed to demonstrate the Army's power and hence to raise 'popular confidence' in the State. These visited villages and fought any irregulars encountered, and Callwell argued that having been psychologically fortified by such displays the natives would provide the army with information. But in cases where this was not obtained, he recommended stern negative psywar collective punishments of the population to extract intelligence from them, although 'without antagonising' the majority. Indeed, he proposed the wielding of military force in order to predominate 'morally' over opponents, and the British Army's military strategy was simply to 'crush' adversaries by large scale/unit military-security operations and tough population-resource control schemes. In view of finite army resources and a widespread contemporary belief in the

vulnerability of regular soldiers to guerilla attack, the strategic goal was a quick victory, by impressing on both the population and the opposition the futility of resisting the army. It set out to accomplish this by a simultaneous clearance of areas disturbed by irregulars; but if this proved ineffective, the army would adopt a gradual area by area clearance, or 'sectorisation', using area-deployed forces. However, the long-term 'holding' of cleared areas was not contemplated by the British military establishment because swift victories against colonial opponents ought to obviate any need for this. Success was to be achieved by forcing irregulars to battle, and against tactically weak foes this could be achieved if the army acted with 'vigour and decision .. harassing the enemy and giving him no rest', through the widespread and persistent use of large columns and large scale offensives based on any available intelligence, or on speculation; and short duration small unit operations where the topography demanded them. Several companies formed 'mobile columns' designed to have a psychological effect on the population, to gather intelligence, and to fight and deter irregulars. Columns moved openly, 'trailing the coat' to entice irregulars to battle, often with 'bait' convoys nearby. Less sizable 'flying columns' of a company or two also searched out armed opposition if 'hot' information of their whereabouts was received, meeting with some success.\(^5\) But Mockaitis' statement

\(^5\) For his ideas, Callwell (1899) P.12,19,34,40,69,73,77,89, 99,102,116,127. Also on 'flag-showing', N.L. Dodd 'COIN and I.S. operations' Defence 10, May 1979, P.318. Collective punishments are legal penalties imposed on uncooperative inhabitants, such as fines, crop destruction and property seizure. They are distinct from extra-judicial reprisals in retaliation for irregular attacks or non-cooperation, and often include torture and murder.

-37-
that large scale/unit operations were a necessary 'prelude to small unit operations', in order to gain intelligence for them,\(^6\) is somewhat simplistic.

The British Army's large scale/unit tactical policies accorded with the established Principles of War, and the eagerness of commanders to test and practice their units in battle. There were several large scale variants: 'drives' involved a number of columns, each of at least a company, and often more, moving over a target area towards a natural or artificial 'block', such as a mountain or swamp, or a line of artillery, designed to oblige the opponent to fight. Another envelopment technique, called 'shepherding' or 'encirclement', involved units moving in a tightening cordon. 'Sweeps' employed them across a broad front over an area, (and 'sweeping' back and forth was termed an 'eggbeater sweep' after the 1950s).\(^7\) These large scale methods and the use of large columns were the staple of British Army I.S. experience, and their utility and familiarity enshrined them, along with the less widespread practice of short duration small unit patrolling from picquets in the mountains, as the Army's time-honoured counterguerilla military approach. However, against small bands of modern guerillas operating in testing geographical conditions, without precise tactical intelligence, exceptionally good planning, surprise execution and overwhelming numerical superiority, large scale/unit operations were all but obsolete.


Callwell emphasised the problems posed by difficult terrain and the guerilla's habit of dispersal. He favoured small unit operations in the jungle and mountains, which required infantry tactics and organisation different to those of most 'small wars', and he proposed deploying Gurkhas who 'shed their text-book tactics' to engage guerillas 'in their own coin.' Further, he affirmed that counterguerrilla ambush had 'hardly received the attention it deserves.' However, he confined his proposals to the realm of 'Mountain Warfare', and they did not supplant large scale/unit policies in that environment. Callwell 'cause[d] no .. volte face in British military thinking', and the British Army made errors in countering the modern guerilla war waged by the Boers from the summer of 1900 to the spring of 1902.

The Army tried to 'learn lessons' from the South African War, and Callwell revised his *Small Wars* in 1906. It was approved by the War Office, and restated the value of population-resource control policies, including farmstead destruction for food denial, 'corsan' wire and 'blockhouse' guard posts, and population relocation into what were termed 'concentration camps', following the 'model' of operations in Burma, (1886-92), and Rhodesia, (1892-5). In fact, these tough methods were the vital factor in bringing the War to an end. However, the 'Official History' of the War and British military experts presumed that the army's drives, sweeps and flying columns were the key to success, as they inflicted defeats on large Boer forces and produced surrenders. Callwell and other authorities did not evaluate the effects of counterguerrilla tactics vis-a-vis other measures used against the rebels, and

although many Boer irregular small units still existed in 1902, this was not regarded as a military failure. Contemporary 'strategists regarded the attenuated struggle as a consequence of the initial failure of generalship', and did not question the worth of tactical policies applied against modern guerrillas. Townshend states that the lack of strategic direction and inadequacy of population-resource control measures applied in Ireland after 1919 indicates 'how rapidly and completely the memory of the Boer War was effaced.' But although some potential 'lessons' were not learned, the British adhered to a 'well-established policy' of using local levies to bolster the security forces, and the apparent success of large scale/unit military operations in South Africa and other territories ensured that they were faithfully adhered to by the Army. Indeed, familiar policies were the essence of its I.S. line before the Irish struggle began after the Great War.


10. See, for instance, Capt. T.H.C. Frankland 'Notes on guerilla war' United Services Magazine 33, 1912, P.126.
The Army returned to 'Imperial-policing' in 1919, a role that 'was assumed rather than stated.' The types of I.S. conflict that it soon faced were 'primarily a case of the Army simply assisting the Civil Power in traditional colonial policing',¹¹ and long-established policies were practiced against rebels and dissenters in the North-West Frontier and the Middle East. But, at a time when the Army sought to revert to its familiar role after the ravages of the First World War, the Irish insurgency began, and it required a response transcending all previous British I.S. action. It was an 'organised, sustained and largely clandestine struggle', involving psywar, terrorism, and 'consciously modern guerilla

¹¹. The Army assumed Imperial-policing to be its main task, in S. Bidwell/D. Graham Firepower (London, 1982) P.150; see especially the Staff College text, Maj. D.H. Cole/Maj. E.C. Priestley An outline of British military history, 1660-1936 (London, 1936), Chapter 25 on I.S. is titled 'Back to Normal'. The Army readily took up this role, but in the UK the use of force was limited to being 'sufficient .. NOT coercion', and there was some distaste for 'duties in aid' tasks among soldiers: Lt.-Col. H. De Watteville 'The Employment of troops under Emergency regulations' Army Q'ly 12, July 1926, P.283. On duties in aid, and the use of force, Duties in Aid of the Civil Power 1919, KCLL; 1923, W032/3456; 1937, especially P.3, 19: and 1938, MODL. Also on the nature of post-1918 I.S. tasks, Beckett/Pimlott P.4.
methods', and was 'a break with rebellions of the past.' To defeat it required the fusion of police and military skills, political acumen, and an understanding of insurgent psychology, into a multifaceted COIN campaign. However, Great Britain had defeated revolutionaries before, by using its security forces or devising a political settlement, (as opposed to 'political action' which is an element of COIN). Despite recent political concessions such as the suspended Irish Home Rule Act of 1914 and the 1917 Montagu-Chelmsford reforms for India, the Empire remained intact. There was no reason for the British authorities to question the validity of their hitherto successful I.S. policies, and although Colonel T. E. Lawrence's published treatise of the early 1920s recounting his experience of modern guerillas indicated their reliance on popular support and intelligence- which could have given the Army some valuable if limited insights for COIN purposes- his 'distracting public image obscured his ideas' from the military hierarchy, and he was considered 'unsound .. and for their

purposes irrelevant.' Additionally, despite Britain's recent experience with propaganda during the War, its 'black' aspects led to a 'postwar reaction against the idea of propaganda', and it was not viewed as a military concern. This instrument was encountered before 1919, as were terrorism and guerilla war, but no high level studies of them had been initiated before the Great War, and in any case, the use made of them in Ireland was original. Following the Armistice, the Army was not disposed to adapt its existing I.S. line at short notice, but events in Ireland and India immediately conspired to undermine it, and to expose its weaknesses.

Following the Amritsar Massacre of April 1919, the Hunt Commission recommended that the Army must apply 'minimum force' in urban areas, and during the 1920s there was a 'broadening of the principle of minimum force to cover .. [many types of] disturbances .. [as is] evident in the War Office literature.' In rural areas the Army's maxim of 'all necessary force' continued for some years, and large punitive columns, 'corsan' blockhouses and 'scorched-earth' crop-burning of the kind employed in South Africa were implemented in response to tactically weak irregulars active in the Mesopotamia mandate from 1920 to 1924. But the massacre at 'Amritsar led to


repercussions in the Army and to doubts .. as to what a soldier
could do' while discharging his I.S. duties. In the interwar
period the Cabinet insisted that the Civil Power oversaw I.S.
operations, to prevent any politically damaging excessive use
of force. It sanctioned Emergency legislation and statutory
martial law rather than a resort to actual Martial Law, and any
zealousness on the part of security forces engaged in I.S.
tasks was further dampened by the growing influence of a modern
press corps. It criticised repressive State policies and
security force reprisals in South Africa, and subsequently, in
Ireland. British public opinion shifted against such methods,
and the Army increasingly found itself operating in an arena
demanding both greater political awareness and cooperation with
civil and police personnel, which had been hitherto neglected
by the British authorities in favour of a relatively non-
circumspect application of force. The Army wanted to administer
unrestrained repression in Ireland, but the level of force
officially allowed within the British Isles was circumscribed
by the Cabinet, and so the Army was obliged to devise COIN
from 1919 to 1921 without recourse to some of the firmer, more

15. On WO pamphlets, Mockaitis m/s, P.56. On the effects of
Amritsar, R. Higham Armed Forces in peacetime- the British
example (London, 1962) P.50; W. Slim Unofficial History
(London, 1970) P.71-81. On Iraq, P. Sluglett Britain in

16. On the Army's actions, Higham Armed P.52; on Martial Law,
Record of the Rebellion in Ireland, 1920-1 Vol.I, (WO,
1922) P.23,27-8, in Lt.-Gen. Sir H. Jeudwine Papers, 72/
82/2, IWM. On the influence of the media, Jeffrey in
McInnes/Sheffield P.35.
politically sensitive control policies that it had executed before 1914. Mockaitis asserts that the Army believed that 'it was fighting a war, not quelling disturbances' in Ireland. More accurately, it equated insurgency with Irish rebellions of the past and felt that this one could be similarly resolved by a variety of 'normal' I.S. measures. Indeed, it floundered at first, being both strategically and tactically moribund in formulating effective policies. A brief outline of the COIN in Ireland is necessary because of debate about its influence on the subsequent development of British COIN. Beckett states that 'Ireland provided lessons that should have been noted', but Jeffery states that 'scarcely any [COIN] lessons .. were drawn from Ireland'. However, the Army HQ collated some for the War Office and, as Mockaitis argues, it 'contributed to the eventual development of British counterinsurgency', with Irish experience being drawn upon after 1932 during the Burma revolt. Moreover, in 1939, among 'a lot of officers .. memories of the Troubles still lingered,' and Sir C.M. Gubbins and J.C.F. Holland applied their knowledge of COIN in Ireland to form the SOE, which in turn inspired COIN developments after 1945.


-45-
In 1922, following the procedure adopted by the War Office after the South African and Russo-Japanese Wars, a 'Record' of the Irish campaign was produced for future doctrinal reference. Charters notes that it was classified 'Most Secret', thereby restricting its availability, and that there was 'no reason for the Army to suppose that the Irish experience was anything but unique.' But it was actually 'Secret' and was accessible to Command and staff officers, and Townshend argues that 'it was practically inevitable that Britain would face a succession of similar challenges.' The War Office General Staff stated that operations were 'carried out under unusual conditions of great difficulty, [and a Record] will be of value to any military commander who may in future be faced with a similar problem.' The General Headquarters [GHQ] in Dublin suggested that the Record should be distributed for guidance 'in the event of similar situations arising in any part of the Empire', because Irish 'conditions .. [were] entirely unlike any preconceived ideas of military operations.' It emphasised the 'political aspects and action [because] .. political and military activities were so closely interwoven', and noted that the opposition consisted of an alternative regime and military forces that acted differently from 'ordinary guerilla war', having been trained for terrorism and ambush. However, the Record proposed fifteen counteractive 'principles .. common to all forms of rebellion', and also general policies and organisational arrangements.

The War Office's Record reiterated much of the Army's

previous I.S. line, but also sought to improve on this in various aspects, especially regarding extra-military-security policies. It reaffirmed the worth of the negative psywar approach, notably collective punishments, (although not security force reprisals), despite their adverse effect on relations with the people, and hence on intelligence provision by them. But the Record also stated that counterpropaganda 'might have modified [popular] .. views about Sinn Fein', and stressed that the conflict was 'a political problem, and no military operations could [end it]'. The report called for a clearly enunciated government policy when COIN was embarked on, as well as a Publicity Department to produce information and counter propaganda. In organisational terms, it repeated the accepted Army view that Martial Law could ensure unified command of the security forces and a centralised intelligence system. Background information was known to be vital, and the army was urged 'to piece together scraps of information with a view to forecasting the enemies probable .. moves', and then to intercept irregulars. This 'principle' was underlined because the Army as a whole was criticised for a European-War frame of mind in regard to intelligence work, which was generally seen by soldiers as 'secret service and nothing else.' The Record concluded that the Irish episode 'proved that in guerilla war the foundation of military intelligence is the battalion and detachment system and that the best information is obtained by front line troops.' It also stated that the police should be relied on to procure information from the people, but advised General Staff Intelligence [GSI] officers to build up local contacts. If these sources failed to produce sufficient intelligence, it recommended flag-showing patrolling to raise 'popular confidence.' Moreover, the document analysed the performance of military-security policies and suggested the innovative COIN concept of counterterrorist population self-protection as a means to increase intelligence provision. This
was not implemented in Ireland, but 'loyalists and moderate[s] .. organise[d] into civil guards'\textsuperscript{20} were supposed to overcome the dilemma posed between the need to concentrate military force and to safeguard against terrorism.

In response to pleas made by some officers during 'the Troubles' that the Army ought to intensify the pressure it exerted on the IRA rather than to adopt a 'compromise between conciliation and coercion', the Record argued that a more repressive course could not have resolved the situation. Its recommended counterguerrilla strategy was 'constant activity' and gradual clearance from urban to rural areas by area-deployed forces. This entailed various familiar military-security and population-resource control policies, such as mass counterorganisation arrests and movement checks, and the South African experience was drawn on with the employment of auxiliary forces, sweeps, and flying columns by 1921. But the termination of the Irish insurgency was not achieved because these tactical policies were those best suited to countering the IRA; rather, it sprang from the fact that the Republicans formed large unit forces that were more vulnerable to army offensives in 1921, and because information provision by the people increased as it tired of IRA terrorism. Indeed, South Africa-style blockhouses and drives were rejected by the British authorities as likely to antagonise the inhabitants, and the Record was an attempt on the part of the Army establishment to officially adjust its I.S. line in 1922. The Record recommended some fresh policies and rejected other

existing ones, and also pressed for 'peacetime .. [training of the security forces] to deal with this form of warfare', especially of intelligence officers. Barclay asserts that after 1922 there was in fact 'a more serious consideration of I.S. duties throughout the Empire .. [leading] to the training of all troops in these duties.'

After the 1926 British General Strike, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff [CIGS] insisted that I.S. lessons must be learned by the Army, and War Office doctrine for 'Duties in Aid of the Civil Power' was updated regularly, clarifying the army's role in responding to low-level civil unrest. But preparations for intrastate conflicts in the imperial context were not regarded as an urgent priority by high level military


authorities, and in any event, the War Office had 'little time to reflect on the Service's situation.' Moreover, it was characterised by a 'tradition of administrative incompetence .. [and] deep-seated conservatism', and this conspired to leave the Army 'with an often chronic shortage of intelligence from the War Office on its theatres of operations and the native forces ranged against it.' Despite the emphasis placed on intelligence in the Service Department's recent Record of the Irish campaign, 'the status of military intelligence' declined in the 1920s, indicating an abandonment of its own doctrine. However, the unusually high incidence of postwar irregular activity on the North-West Frontier of India, from the 1910s onwards, ensured that the Army was often involved in I.S. military operations in the Province, and fierce engagements like those common before the War, between 1919 and 1922, encouraged the Indian Army Headquarters to produce a specific I.S. doctrine for the region in 1925.

The 'Manual of operations on the North-West Frontier of India' was based on experience gained in fighting the Pathan tribesmen, and the doctrine was approved by the War Office. The Manual stated that considerable modification of the Principles of War was required to fight irregulars, and suggested a prolonged occupation of areas susceptible to guerilla disturbances. It recommended various offensive military policies, giving priority to large mobile columns consisting of several companies, including infantry, artillery, sappers and ancillary units, although it also proposed the employment of smaller 'flying columns' to pursue 'gangs'. The Indian Army's guide proposed armour support for mobile columns where it was considered appropriate, and aircraft were said to be of the 'greatest value in tactical cooperation'; but air fire-support or supply missions were not mentioned. The Manual noted that the posting of platoon picquets was one of the most common...
activities of the army in the mountains, and it urged the training of sub-units in ambushing from picquets, which gave British soldiers some experience in small unit movement. But the doctrine asserted that the 'enveloping attack often gives the best hope for success' by deploying companies or platoons in depth, often in battalion strength, on 'parallel or converging routes', to achieve encirclement. These large scale/ unit operations were designed not only to defeat the enemy quickly, but also to break their morale by negative psywar means. The booklet also encouraged the use of mobile columns for punitive missions against the population, such as crop-burning and village destruction. Officers were urged to 'study the history of past campaigns on the Frontier', and in practice familiar I.S. policies proved adequate for retaining control in the Province because of the predominantly traditional type of irregular opposition encountered there. The Army was attempting to learn from its previous experience on the Frontier, and the Manual recommended the collective training of the security forces in order to improve inter-force cooperation, the use of instructional films, and learning through 'on-the-job' practice in the hills. However, despite the Service Department's backing for the new Frontier doctrine, it relied on other bodies to take the lead in any general refinement of the Army's I.S. line, and it evidently did not feel that the direct application of Irish 'lessons' to Army basic I.S. training was warranted.

Mockaitis contends that as scores of thousands of British troops served in Ireland, COIN lessons were unofficially accumulated within the regiments and disseminated in and between them. Such a casual diffusion of I.S. information cannot be readily analysed, and the purported 'lessons' applied in subsequent campaigns may not have reflected the War Office Record of 1922 or even been viable for COIN purposes. But the Army was a customarily non-doctrinaire institution, having a General Staff structure and regimental system that had not been designed with the centralised accumulation of I.S. knowledge and the advancement of I.S. military thought as primary considerations. The British Army relied on an informal transfer of I.S. wisdom between officers sharing a similar social standing. Company majors commanding 'in the field' mixed socially with their seniors and engaged in a 'two-way flow of information', resulting in some I.S. 'lessons .. being absorbed and transmitted.' In addition, the Cardwell regimental system allowed at least one of a regiment's two battalions to serve in the Empire at any given time, offering it opportunities to acquire first-hand I.S. experience. Indeed, many officers believed that a lack of doctrine was advantageous, because it
allowed 'on-the-job' training,24 wherein officers new to an I.S. theatre could hone their military skills and share the 'character-building' hardships that were endured by their peers. This method of learning gave rise to a body of 'general knowledge' within the Army which soldiers regularly drew on during their active service in the Empire. It captured the essence of the institutional I.S. 'line', and various factors could help or hinder its formal and informal shaping.

The Army's I.S. line could have been amended as a result of various factors, such as experience gained from colonial campaigning, or independent critical thought. But the British Army was intrinsically conservative and distrusted 'serious intellectual effort.' Any initiatives on the part of its officers to study I.S. problems or practices were not officially encouraged, and military thought on the subject was

characterised by inertia. The acceptance of new ideas was patchy, as some formations were willing refine I.S. procedures in the light of operations undertaken during their colonial tours of duty, while others simply adhered to 'proven' policies. If I.S. 'lessons' were to be generally learnt within the Army, the prevailing climate had to change, and the army colleges and journals were a potential source of inspiration for fresh military thinking.

During the interwar years, the Sandhurst and Woolwich army academies tutored from 400 to 700 and 250 pupils per term respectively, and the Staff College at Camberley had sixty officers in attendance. These men could have disseminated the I.S. instruction that they received at these institutes to their units, and although 'relatively little is known about what took place' there, college 'Notes' are a basic indicator of the state of the Army's I.S. line at an official level. By 1920, Sandhurst held courses on Indian Frontier Warfare based on War Office guidelines, and 'wood and village fighting techniques.' Woolwich also offered tuition in these subjects, and at least by 1930, an examination of I.S. tasks in the Army's usual 'training grounds' in Africa, India, and Palestine. But while this gave soldiers a foundation for


-54-
combatting irregulars, these theatres of operations rarely generated many of the problems posed by insurgency. Indeed, college syllabuses contained no guidance on the crucial issue of how to identify particular types of intrastate conflict that might be encountered by the Army. The Staff College dealt with I.S. problems, and Mockaitis notes that in 1923 it organised discussions and lectures on military aspects of COIN in Ireland. But this was not subject to regular enquiry and Camberley concentrated on studying conventional warfare. This was also a preoccupation of the Imperial Defence College, founded in 1927 as a forum where officers from across the Empire could review sundry military matters. It gave no I.S. lecture until 1934— the year that the War office published its new I.S. doctrine— and when the military colleges tackled the subject, they confined their attention to tactical methods, which were easier for officers to grasp than the complex political and psychological policies demanded in COIN. Propaganda was 'still new enough to be practically unknown to many' officers, and a 'military education [did] .. not guarantee .. [a] knowledge [of it]'. Unorthodox military thought, including that of Lawrence, was disparaged by the colleges during the 1920s-30s, and the subject of fighting in the jungle was not even raised because it was regarded by most officers as impossible to wage war in and was anyway 'not ..
proper soldiering." The focus of I.S. studies in the Army institutes was on familiar colonial irregulars rather than atypical insurgents, and the War Office did not contemplate altering the Army's I.S. line or consider it necessary to supplement these somewhat incomplete official I.S. preparations. Nevertheless, another potential source of change outside official circles were the widely-read army journals.


27. Regarding the status of the army journals, Bond P.35-6; Higham Intellectuals P.35.
In an *Army Quarterly* article of 1922, a British officer argued that the Army must learn from its COIN campaign in Ireland. He questioned the value of reprisals, and supported the employment of columns acting on intelligence supplied by the people, although he also endorsed drives and encirclement.\(^2^8\) Such 'lessons' were not readily available for use by the Army when it crushed the Moplah rebellion of 1920 to 1921 in the Malabar region of India, but a 1923 journal article criticised large scale offensives which had failed both there and in Ireland. Success against the Moplah irregulars stemmed from set-piece battles, control methods based on South African lines, and some unusual tactics 'of great interest to the student of war' that 'had to be thought out' by officers 'on the spot.' These included smaller mobile 'flying' columns, which were deployed in South Africa in 1901 and 1902, and during the counter-rebellion in Burma after 1886. Moreover, in 1921, area-deployed forces patrolled from their bases and set ambushes for the Moplah guerillas, while the police offered counterterrorist protection and held cleared areas in an inventive 'Clear-and-Hold' military-security strategy. This was a considerable advance on the Army's past I.S. practice, and another military writer remarked in 1926 on the 'useful lessons' that the defeat of the Malabar rising offered; although he did not perceive that familiar tactical military

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policies might have become outdated. In 1926, just after the Indian Army produced its Frontier Manual, the reform-minded Major B. Dening proposed that the Army should publish a universal 'clear doctrine' on counterguerilla war. He recognised that the Army was encountering ever more armed revolutionary and nationalist opponents, and that the 'most effective remedy [to rebellion is to remove] the main causes of grievance upon which [it] .. lies for sustenance', therefore backing political action as well as propaganda to raise pro-British support. He documented some of the mistakes committed by the Army in South Africa and Ireland, and pressed for the unified command of the security forces, a Clear-and-Hold strategy, and tactical adaptation to the terrain. However, such progressive ideas were tempered by his support for age-old military-security policies which he considered 'sound .. in all cases.' Thus, during the 1920s, there was some advocacy for the revision of the Army's existing I.S. line, and also the creation of a basic doctrine, yet its traditional 'general knowledge' was widely believed within the ranks to be valid for all I.S. missions. Indeed, its continued application and success against rebellion and dissension in various other colonial territories attested to its apparent worth.


The RAF became more involved in I.S. affairs in the twenties, carrying out punitive bombing and flag-showing operations, and tactical lessons were accumulated at staff level, although no formal doctrine was written. Its use of force at a low financial cost threatened to reduce the Army's role in 'Imperial-policing'. But by the 1930s, the domestic political imperative to regulate the level of force employed against native opposition and to apply it in a 'fair' and 'sporting' manner, allowed the Army to retain its preeminence in these duties. In 1930, troops assisted the colonial police in putting down disturbances in districts of Burma and Bengal. But despite the presence of some veterans of the Malibar episode, neither formal instruction nor informal routes of enlightenment adequately prepared the security forces for I.S. action. Mockaitis states that there had been a 'transfer of experience by individuals' within the regiments, but 'lessons' were not widely assimilated into the Army's 'general knowledge' and its I.S. line had not been reshaped by then.

Between 1930 and 1936, Burma was subjected to a mixture of sedition, sectarian violence, and brigandage, as well as a revolt that incorporated sporadic guerilla warfare, pitched battles, and concerted campaigns of political propaganda and terrorism. In 1930 and 1931, counterguerilla drives by the army and paramilitary police failed to eradicate all Burmese irregulars, which included 'modern guerilla' bands, and Mockaitis argues that the persistent use of drives was not 'too doctrinaire .. [because] there may have been sound reasons for


32. Mockaitis m/s, P.364.
Dispersion of manpower .. may have outstretched [the army, and] .. small patrols also required precise intelligence.' But although this reasoning may have been sound at first, the fact remains that the army adhered to major offensives and mass arrests for a considerable length of time because it sought to have a psychological impact on the population and to win a quick military victory. When it failed to achieve this by the autumn of 1931, the State authorities changed their tack and a single commander of all the security forces in the 'disturbed areas' was appointed, and charged with implementing an overall plan devised by a civil-military-police committee, the first British tripartite I.S. structure of its kind. Area-deployed counterterrorist patrols protected endangered communities in 1932, and intelligence obtained from them increased thereafter. By then, locally raised levies performed counterguerrilla small unit patrols of a short duration, ranging from a few hours to days, and thousands of people were being relocated into 'camps' near their villages in a novel resettlement scheme designed for population-resource control. This was also furthered by widespread population registration and issuing of identification-cards. In addition, Sir John Anderson was appointed as the new Governor in 1932. He had been involved in COIN in Ireland, and hence rejected repression and instead developed some basic Hearts-and-Minds policies. Government propaganda, amnesty offers and social welfare schemes heralded a shift to the positive psywar approach, and winning popular support became the administration's first priority in 1933. By learning from past COIN experience after the failure of old I.S. policies in Burma the British formulated new extra-military action, as well as improved counterguerrilla tactical policies and original organisational arrangements. Yet, most of the army's energies were spent on fighting tactically weak Burmese irregulars, whose 'repeated frontal assaults' and 'pitched battles with few
firearms' were easily repelled. The conspicuous recurrence of this familiar aspect of rebellion, and its defeat, apparently tainted the Army's assessment of the reasons for the eventual success of the Burmese authorities. Despite an abundance of new policies which were evolved during the revolt, it emphasised the elements of continuity in both the opposition and the response to them, and did not consider that a major reappraisal of its I.S. line was necessary. Mockaitis states that this episode gave the British authorities 'valuable experience in combatting well organised guerillas', but to be truly 'valuable', newly acquired I.S. knowledge had to displace outmoded elements of traditional wisdom. Details of some new I.S. measures devised during the Burma campaign were recorded in a military journal in 1932, but the War Office apparently made no attempt to circulate any 'lessons' throughout the Army.

The Army Quarterly's prestigious 'Prize Essay' of 1933, by Captain D. Wimberley, criticised the organisational structure of the British Army which prevented any centralised, systematic collation of I.S. 'lessons', and dissemination of them within it. He wanted general training based on lessons derived from COIN in Ireland, and expeditions in the North-West Frontier, not least because 'exactly the same mistakes made in [Ireland in] 1920 were made again [on the Sub-Continent] in 1930.' He pointed out that encirclement could not cope with some of the

33. Mockaitis m/s, on tactical policies, and on the value of the experience, P.364. On the nature of the conflict, and details of British action, 'The Burmese Rebellion' JUSII 267, Apr. 1932, P.148,152,156-8; D.J. Clark The colonial police and anti-terrorism D.Phil., 1978, P.12,26,33-5,57, 68-70,80-4,86,89,92-3,121-4,131-2,135-8; M. Adas Prophets of rebellion (Chapel Hill, 1979) P.38,40,170; U.M. Maung From Sangha to Laity (New Delhi, 1980) P.83-8,91-5.
Army's more astute armed opponents, and recommended that higher authorities 'detail some infantry brigade to explore thoroughly the action of a column operating on the North-West Frontier', so that lessons could be deduced and I.S. policies adapted. However, the Essay typified the interwar Army's military-centric view of I.S. tasks by focussing on tactical policies and paying scant attention to extra-military action. Moreover, although Wimberley referred to the COIN in Ireland, it was the Frontier that he and his contemporaries regarded as the archetypal I.S. training arena. Indeed, it was the theatre where most British regiments gained their 'Imperial-policing' experience. With military officialdom slow to alter the Army's I.S. line formally, if I.S. lessons were being informally transferred within the regiments, the North-West Frontier was potentially the most important arena in which new wisdom was being shaped.

The Army was regularly active on the Frontier against traditional irregulars, embarking on punitive excursions and large scale offensives, as well as daily picquetting and convoying. Following directives from London, by 1933 'troops were ordered to make war peacefully, keeping down casualties', and the ancient maxim of 'all necessary force' was limited to RAF punitive bombing of the most warlike tribes in the remotest

quasi-colonial regions. However, endemic brigandage in these mountain areas, coupled with the infrequency of attention from Fleet Street reporters, afforded an opportunity to apply a greater degree of force than in other territories where political repercussions would prevent this. Military force rather than effective social policy was the instrument applied to control the tribesmen, and irregulars often obliged the army by meeting it in battle. The army used drives, sweeps and large mobile columns, as well as small unit picquetting and short duration patrols in 'the heights'. But it relied heavily on enemy weaknesses to retain its domination in this, its professed I.S. 'training ground', where 'no one seemed really sure what [they were] .. supposed to do.' This state of affairs prevailed throughout the years of peace, precisely because the army did maintain its superiority, as the defeat of the Peshawar 'Red Shirts' in 1930 exemplifies. This poorly organised rebellion featured propaganda, short-lived terrorism, and clashes involving up to 5000 irregulars, in which the army prevailed. Traditional tactical policies, like those


contained in the Frontier 'Manual of Operations' were judged to have been validated by campaign successes in the 1910s-30s. And with 'intellectual military life .. almost non-existent' in the Province, the only potential source for the transfer of any new lessons there lay in informal regimental contacts. However, soldiers were seldom subjected to fighting conditions that would lead them to question fundamentally the validity of Army I.S. policies. In addition, the Indian Army maintained virtual autonomy from the War Office, and while that Department wanted to institute some changes in military practices in India, such as the centralisation of intelligence work, it rarely interloped into the Indian Army's jurisdiction, least of all in its 'speciality' of 'Imperial-policing'. Therefore, the Frontier did not act as a fount for new ideas, and when the War Office finally answered critics like Wimberley and General Archibald Wavell by producing an I.S. doctrine, it proposed little that was new.

The War Office's 'Notes on Imperial Policing, 1934' was designed for universal use by soldiers undertaking I.S. missions, and was distributed to the higher ranks of the Army. The Notes 'undoubtedly reflect[ed] a widespread military attitude', and reiterated 'duties in aid' doctrine for dealing with riots. Further, the manual classified two other forms of conflict, which were general unrest, and organised guerilla war

and terrorism. To handle the latter form of disorder, it recommended the Army's familiar 'subjection' line, entailing its normal clearance strategy and I.S. policies, including large scale offensives based on available intelligence, (especially drives), counterorganisation arrests, and movement controls. It reaffirmed 'flag-showing', but the negative psywar approach was Favoured for the purpose of information-gathering and to impress on the population the advantages of resisting rebel intimidation and refusing them assistance. The Notes advocated tactical adaptation in the light of the particular terrain and opposition, and suggested the formation of smaller columns if guerilla resistance was protracted. Further, it urged counterterrorist protection of loyalists in 'defended posts' to encourage intelligence provision, echoing the measure adopted during the South African War and the recommendations of the War Office's Irish Record. However, its Notes additionally supported relatively uncommon 'corsan' blockhouses and wire-barrier control measures like those used in South Africa.38 The War Office's study of history led it to reinforce the Army's Cost-Benefit I.S. line rather than to reject repressive policies. But, its doctrine proposed a few useful innovations, and furthermore, the Field Service Regulations of 1935 emphasised the advantages of air support and light equipment for smaller columns operating in difficult terrain, which was also derived from previous I.S. experience.39 Therefore, the Service Department was not ignorant of the potentially valuable


39. Field Service Regulations, II (1935), P.176-9, MODL.
insights that could be gained from analysing past I.S. entanglements, yet it failed to capitalise fully on the experience of insurgency and revolt gained in Ireland and Burma, as few appropriate COIN lessons were attained.

In 1936, Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn's *Imperial Policing* was published, and became a 'basic text' at Camberley and a quasi-official War Office doctrine. It was reprinted several times and after years when I.S. was 'half-forgotten', and there was 'no readily available corpus of lessons learned', it had considerable influence. Despite the War Office's recent pamphlet, Gwynn asserted that without further guidance for the Army, 'I.S. ... tradition becomes the only means of broadcasting experience.' He referred to several episodes after 1918 and offered analyses of various I.S. threats and Britain's responses to them as a learning tool for the Army. Another Staff College text of the period posited that the Irish and Moplah affairs were 'particularly important' in preparations for I.S. duties. Yet, the Army was not encouraged to study Irish COIN at the College, and Gwynn cautioned that generalisations inferred from that 'unusual' case were unsound.40 In fact, insurgency was not the most common form of intrastate conflict which the Army confronted, and Gwynn clearly concentrated on those examples that he believed would

40. On Gwynn and WO doctrine, Jeffery in McInnes/Sheffield, P.31; Mockaitis m/s, P.423. On the printing of *Imperial Policing*, Jeffery *Intelligence* 1987, P.146. Gwynn was recommended in Cole/Priestley, P.395: which Mockaitis m/s, P.62, notes was also a Camberley text. On the subsequent use of Gwynn, Charters *Jewish Insurgency* P.137; Chapter 3. On the status of interwar I.S. thought, Shy/Collier in Paret, P.832. On particular I.S. examples, Cole/Priestley P.395; Gwynn passim, especially, P.6,108.
offer the greatest practical benefit to officers. But such selectivity, similarly practiced by the War Office in its study of history, militated against any radical reassessment of the Army's I.S. line.

Gwynn classified several types of conflict, including one that featured revolutionary irregulars, and he identified the people as the key to the provision of counter/guerilla resources. He envisaged 'a battle of wits in which the development of a well-organised intelligence system, great mobility, rapid means of communication and close cooperation between all sections of the Government are essential.' In addition, the former Camberley Commandant proposed the adoption of some unusual I.S. ideas, including a civil-military-police committee responsible for producing an overall I.S. plan, and a single army commander acting under Martial Law or Emergency powers to implement it. He argued that these were 'general principle[s]' for countering rebels and declared that the 'Army should neglect no methods by which it can attain its objective', including assisting the government with its propaganda effort. He also pointed out that in the recent Burmese revolt, drives and encirclements designed to 'surprise and capture [rebels]. .. w[ere] almost out of the question', because of inadequate intelligence, the rough terrain and guerilla dispersal. Yet Gwynn trusted 'the normal pattern', believing that it was not immediately made defunct by unusual I.S. circumstances, and he contended that the Army had to make its policies work by improving its I.S. training and practice. Similarly, Staff College guidance asserted that the opposition
'could not hope to win.'

The Army's I.S. line was also scrutinised by Major H.J. Simson in his Staff College text of 1937, British Rule and Rebellion. He insisted 'that our methods of dealing with modern rebellion, are comic .. [in the face of the rebels'] new methods .. it is time that we armed ourselves with new methods of ruling.' Simson stressed that the widely expounded view that each intrastate conflict 'should be dealt with on its own .. as it arises .. [ignores the] experience of Ireland, Palestine and elsewhere .. if we keep losing or mislaying our experience .. we only preserve tactical lessons.' He wanted an 'inquiry into the methods adopted' by the army in Palestine in 1936 and 1937, reflecting the precedent set by the Record of 1922, and the Army was criticised for being 'unaware that it ha[d] a new problem to face', which he labelled 'sub-war'. This was prosecuted by groups employing propaganda and terrorism to isolate the people from the authorities, and guerilla war against the State's armed forces. Indeed, he understood the underlying causes of trouble, but reiterated the current military view that it was 'not the business of the armed forces to find a cure' for disorders in the imperial body, and he entreated the Colonial and India Offices to take the requisite remedial extra-military action. Simson proposed to prevent challenges to authority by executing 'good government' and 'a policy of conciliation' to address any 'national grievance.' Further, he encouraged government propaganda to gain popular

41. Gwynn, on I.S. policies, P.5,11-2,14-5,21-3,25,33,81,98, 100,108,114,311,327,330: on flaws in policy, P.322; also see Cole/Priestley P.280, who noted that in South Africa guerillas subjected to drives 'usually got away.' But they still had faith in ultimate British success, P.40,279; also, Gwynn P.114.
cooperation, and small unit patrols for 'anti-intimidation'. Following the recent Palestine events, he also pressed for more effective population-resource control, a tripartite operational planning committee, and the prosecution of operations under a single commander. 42 Hence, like Gwynn, he accepted some valuable, innovative I.S. concepts, but continued to advocate 'normal' I.S. policies.

Colonial police forces were increasingly involved in joint I.S. operations with the Army during the interwar years, and the Colonial Office apparently made a greater effort than the War Office to transfer I.S. 'lessons' to them. The Colonial Office had a 'long-established .. system of filling senior [police] posts by transfer from one colony to another [so that] .. a good deal of interchange of knowledge and experience [occurred. This] .. fostered [the] application in one territory of lessons learned in another.' Thus, members of the Royal Irish Constabulary [RIC] and its Auxiliaries were seconded to Palestine and other unruly areas in the 1920s, and senior colonial police officers were trained in Dublin. Some key I.S. policies were also generally applied, such as area-deployment of the police in local posts for patrolling and intelligence-gathering. The Colonial Office furthered the trend towards a common approach to policing by urging colonial administrations to accept the advice of visiting Scotland Yard Special Branch experts, and there were high level contacts between numerous

forces and the UK, allowing I.S. lessons to be exchanged. But COIN probably was not dealt with in communications between London and the outposts of Empire, and the Colonial Office did not attempt to systemise I.S. lessons from various colonial police forces into a general doctrine ready for future usage.

The Palestinian Arabs rebelled from 1936 to 1937, and uncoordinated irregulars who 'knew little about guerilla tactics and had virtually no training' acted alongside propagandists and terrorists, and were nurtured by extensive popular support and urban disturbances. The British response to such unusually widespread mass opposition was to apply a trusted formula of local military/police action, along with a separate political initiative by London, in this case a proposed Royal Commission to investigate the possibilities of a general Palestine settlement. The Mandatory adopted negative psywar with threats of Martial Law and repression, and the army undertook drives and encirclements that inflicted casualties on Arab irregulars, especially as new roads, motor transport and air support increased its mobility against the tactically weak opposition. The army was able to use 'tactics based on NWF principles with common sense modifications', and the recent War Office manual which was 'a close and constant guide.' By the spring of 1937, the rebel campaign petered out because of I.S. operations and the promise of a Crown enquiry which deprived


-70-
the rebels of their support, and this revolt therefore gave the Army little reason to reassess and revise its I.S line.

The Palestine administration faced a resurgent Arab opposition from October 1937 to the winter of 1938 to 1939, when a new insurgent organisation engaged in political propaganda, terrorism and modern guerilla warfare, as well as other irregular activities. But familiar I.S. policies again succeeded, mainly because of the innate weakness of the government's foe. Interfactional fighting and feuding led to the provision of information to the British, much of the population were apathetic to the insurgent cause by 1938, and many irregulars stood and fought against the army instead of dispersing. The lack of security force cooperation,


their defective intelligence organisation arrangements, and reliance on large scale/unit military policies, indicates that the few fresh proposals for I.S. action contained in approved Camberley texts of 1936-7 made no obvious impression on British officers in the field. Nonetheless, by May 1938, Major Orde Wingate developed counterguerrilla tactics by forming an unorthodox force for snap raids on Arab houses and overnight ambushing of trails frequented by guerillas. Further small unit experimentation occurred with the creation of pseudoguerrilla 'gangs' that feigned active rebel status, including some former guerillas who were 'turned' to the counterinsurgent side. Indeed, by the end of the year, most army operations were 'of small units .. more often of platoons.' Yet the army headquarters in Palestine affirmed that 'envelopment will always achieve best results', and the War Office was disturbed by allegations of torture by Wingate's Special Night Squads [SNS] and insisted on their disbandment. Moreover, the upheavals of 1936 to 1939 were seen by the higher levels of the Army in a similar light to those of 1919-21. These rebellions were of an exceptional nature, in that a majority of the population was embroiled in them for a prolonged period, and in view of this fact, top army officers warned that 'care should be taken in applying lessons from Palestine to elsewhere.'46 The infrequent occurrence of insurgency, and its atypical character, led the Army to treat problems experienced with its I.S. policies as being unique to the situation, while COIN success by 1939, albeit partly reliant on the shortcomings of the adversary, meant that once again established policies appeared justified.

46. I.S. adaptation was limited to tactical policy, as in the WO's Reports, W0191/70; H.M.G. 'The Political History of Palestine' (1947) P.19-20, CO537/2343; Marlowe Rebellion P.195,216,224,228; Bowden ibid P.248. On Wingate, C. Sykes Orde Wingate (London, 1961) P.141,147,156,172.
The War Office updated its 'duties in aid' doctrine in 1937 and 1938, but the Army's late mastery of rebellion indicated no imperative need to alter the 1934 'Notes'. As another European War loomed, the War Office understandably paid scarcely any attention to 'Imperial-policing', and up-to-date files on unconventional war were not kept. Its repository of wisdom was confined to two works on guerilla warfare by Sir Colin M. Gubbins, a veteran of Irish COIN during 1921-2, which were written for Home Defence in 1939. These detailed the character of 'modern' guerillas, and also indicated that sweeps and drives could be avoided by utilising intelligence, mobility and difficult terrain. This should have alerted the War Office to possible flaws in its I.S. doctrine, but it had other more immediate and pressing conventional war problems. The Staff College also concentrated on these, and prior to the outbreak of war conducted 'only three brief I.S. exercises.'

In 1939, the War Office Directorate of Military Operations [DMO], the Chiefs of Staff [COS], and senior officers, were initially slow to appreciate the possibilities offered by non-conventional modes of warfare. In the Government, only Hugh Dalton readily extolled the virtues of 'political and subversive warfare', and other proponents of guerilla war

outside the government were ignored. However, 'wars are the
perfect medium for .. the development of new ideas', and
numerous individuals set about doing just that. In 1939, the
War Office Directorate of Military Intelligence [DMI] formed a
small Military Intelligence (Research) staff, and it studied
guerilla warfare. The section included Gubbins, who possessed
first-hand knowledge of the Frontier, Gerald Templer, a veteran
of the Palestine campaign, (and later on, Malaya), and J.C.F.
Holland, with Irish COIN experience. Holland and Gubbins
analysed twentieth century guerillas in South Africa, Arabia,
Russia, Spain, and China, and the group 'shared many ideas.'
Holland suggested that the British should form what he termed
'Commandos', for guerilla-style raids, but found he was able to
'make little headway against .. [dominant War Office]
thetical thinking.' Nevertheless, Colonel Dudley Clarke,
Military Assistant to the CIGS, General John Dill, who had been
the GOC, Palestine, from 1936 to 1937, carried out similar
research, and in May 1940, Clarke proposed small sea-launched
coastal raids. With the desperate Continental situation,

48. On the DMO, and Dalton, Foot France P.2. On the COS's
opposition to the widespread use of regular guerillas, A.
Kerr Guerilla (London, 1942) P.9. On army officers' views,
Tulloch P.147. Popular works of the time included those by
A. Kerr Guerilla; The Art of Guerilla fighting and patrol
(London, 1940).

49. On wars as a source of new thinking, W. Seymour British
Special Forces (London, 1985) P.126. Wartime ideas and
their background in, D. Dodds-Parker Setting Europe Ablaze
(Surrey, 1983) P.35; M.R.D. Foot SOE (New York, 1986)
P.11-2,17; J. Ladd Commandos and Rangers of World War 2
P.296,315.
Churchill and Dill backed his notion, and the War Office soon fell into line. It planned short, sharp raids, as well as large ones on the enemy's main coastal forces. Gubbins proposed the formation of 'Independent Companies' for small scale raiding expeditions, and the War Office called on the services of '20 experts on mountain warfare, flown home from the .. Frontier [to] .. put to good use their knowledge'; indeed, many of those in the ranks of the early Commandos served there before the War. However, the War Office's use of I.S. experience was not extensive and it lost its enthusiasm for small raids after July 1940. The High Command perceived them as a relative waste of resources, and only 1250 Commandos continued such minor raiding exploits in 1940 and did relatively few thereafter.

Indeed, 'most if not all the Prime Ministers advisers, led by .. Brooke were opposed to the concept of Commandos [altogether]'. Yet, by 1941, Churchill, who generally supported 'the unorthodox in warfare', approved of Special Operations Executive [SOE] training in sabotage and, especially after 1942, guerilla warfare. He also supported the employment of fairly small numbers of regular guerillas such as those of the Small Boat Section [SBS], Popski's Private Army, and Captain David Stirling's Special Air Service [SAS]. Stirling's idea of semi-independent 4-12 man patrols operating for several weeks at a time, often 'behind-the-lines', was championed by Major-General Neil M. Ritchie and General Harold Alexander, (who were both concerned with I.S. matters from 1945), and the SAS achieved regimental status by 1942- 'something the British Army did not do lightly.' General Bernard L. Montgomery was dubious about the worth of such a '"special force"', but there was a
general 'measure of acceptance' of it in the Army. By that time, 500-man Commando groups were commonly undertaking large seaborne raids, and from September 1942 some 'spear-head[ed] invasions' and acted as a vanguard force, giving a tactical thrust to several offensives. However, the SAS maintained its original guerilla-style role, offering the Army a potentially valuable insight into the mechanics of such operations.


51. On the Commandos, Morris Uniform P.182; Warner P.96; P. Young P.156; Seymour P.13,34-5; Ladd Rangers P.55,123: and the SAS, SAS P.40,67; Seymour P.212-3,251-2,262.

-76-
Experience in guerilla war was also accumulated by Wingate, who adapted Frontier tactics and his SNS concepts to organise a guerilla 'Gideon Force' in Eritrea in 1941. In addition, Stirling's comrades, Majors Mike Calvert and Spencer Chapman, trained 'V Force' in Singapore during 1941, backed by Major-General Sir William Slim, and Alexander and Wavell, who likewise saw unorthodoxy as a virtue. Calvert drew on the expertise of officers familiar with the Boer revolt, Eritrea, and COIN in Ireland and Palestine, to devise guerilla tactics, tapping a rich source of wisdom, just as various British COIN agencies did after the War. Meantime, Wingate devised 'deep penetration', incorporating large scale raids, guerilla ambush, and air support, and although opposed by conservatives in the Indian Army, the War Office, and the RAF, the theory was accepted by Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff. Following its inconclusive practice in the spring of 1943, a second Chindit venture from the winter of 1943 to spring 1944 'alternat[ed] guerilla tactics with conventional attack and defence', as Wingate tried out his 'stronghold' concept, involving 500-man columns operating from strategic bases to provoke battle. The Chindits' overall worth is still disputed, but they were important in that, as Admiral Louis Mountbatten stated, by 1944 'the whole Army was Chindit-minded.' Slim understood the need for 'tactics never taught in a Western Staff College', and the impression made by the Chindits permeated many British

institutions concerned with I.S. matters, inspiring numerous individuals who subsequently developed COIN tactical thought. While the Frontier was the Army's interwar I.S. archetype, 'to say an officer was "Frontier-minded" [now] was to condemn him.' The Army exploited the I.S. knowledge of serving men to devise unorthodox units and policies, with War Office approval and assistance, and the methods that they devised and the fact that they proliferated and gained successes during the War gave a new impetus to British military thought. By '1944, jungle warfare became respectable in training manuals', and just prior to this, a military journal implored the Army to use Commandos instead of 'stereotyped military Frontier columns', for ambushes and raids against irregulars. Furthermore, Lieutenant-Colonel F. Simpson's prophetic article called for it to 'take to the hills and fight [the guerilla] .. at his own game', by employing Commandos and paratroops with helicopter support, and acting on 'the sober framework of a new tactical doctrine', derived from wartime experiences, from which there were many 'lessons to be learnt.'

who understood how [guerillas] should be properly employed', or how to develop unorthodox forces for peacetime uses. Indeed, in 1943 Captain Basil Liddell Hart stated that the Army would always defeat colonial opponents with policies applied in South Africa and Ireland,\textsuperscript{54} despite the failings of Cost-Benefit policies like collective punishment and stringent controls implemented against partisan irregulars by Axis forces. The British military formed several unorthodox forces during the War, and trained and fought as guerillas; and although the Army was yet to analyse their characteristics, capabilities and possibilities, or indeed, other non-military aspects of 'partisan war' that could prove beneficial for COIN purposes, in 1944 the War Office foresaw the spectre of a long drawn-out Nazi underground resistance to Allied invasion, and studied contemporary unconventional war in readiness for devising counteraction to it.

The War Office analysed the Nazi reaction to partisans, which concentrated on the negative psywar approach, coupled with the limited use of positive measures such as offers of rewards for information, and propaganda. Well-known coercive controls were the mainstay of the German response, along with counterguerilla encirclement, drives and sweeps. But by 1944, small unit 'jagdkommando' and pseudogangs were also operating with improved results, although they often extracted intelligence from the population by force. The War Office recognised that small units using 'imitation and innovation' could prove a worthwhile development, and large scale

\textsuperscript{54} On the lack of understanding in the Army about guerilla war, Strawson P.121; Foot France P.390; MacDonald P.25. Support for old I.S. schemes in, K. Chorely Armies and Revolution (London, 1943) P.37,41,50,61; B. Liddell Hart, in Foreword, P.10.
operations were considered 'seldom successful .. [as] guerilla[s] withdraw and disperse.' It pondered new tactical policy options, and also called for propaganda to 'win over the population.' A second report suggested that population identification-cards could cut irregulars 'off physically and morally from the local[s]', while the government was 'securing the[ir] cooperation .. against the guerillas' with 'measures of protection', including innovative counterterrorist self-defence forces. But, at the same time, the report endorsed customary I.S. ideas and explicitly discouraged intelligence collection by army units, in contrast to the astute recommendations of the War Office's Irish Record. Once information was received, 'to obtain decisive results .. surprise must be gained and .. [the Army had to marshal] forces .. adequate in numbers and sufficiently mobile to achieve encirclement.' The report identified 'mobility' as the key military principle in counter-guerilla warfare, and hence proposed air-supported troops, to reinvigorate tactical policies that appeared to have been impaired when practiced against partisan 'modern' guerillas. Therefore, War Office analysts advanced certain aspects of military thinking about unconventional war, although those Commands that received its reports were given only a limited reappraisal of the Army's prewar I.S. line.

During the winter of 1944 to 1945, the Allied Forces HQ distributed 'Notes' on guerilla war, covering its occurrence in Russia in 1812-4 and 1918-21, the Great War, interwar China, and the Second World War. Some sets of notes emphasised


'intensive intelligence work' to identify guerilla supporters and their organisation, as well as to produce tactical information. They also commended the achievements of 'jagdkommando' and pseudogangs, and maintained that repressive policies were not 'even temporarily successful.' But others recommended vintage military-security and control policies, including blockhouses and concentration (as opposed to wartime Nazi extermination) camps.\textsuperscript{57} These notes therefore offered an array of possibilities rather than firm conclusions about the best counterguerrilla policies, and left individual Commands-responsible for I.S. affairs in their particular theatre- to decide how best to apply them. There was insufficient high level direction to the Army to guarantee the general assimilation of novel ideas at the start of 1945, while establishing a new bureaucratic organisational structure capable of ensuring unified policy-direction was not a postwar government priority, and was 'contrary to the whole political culture and ethic of British .. government.'\textsuperscript{58} Thus, in early 1945, the War Office continued to delegate much of the responsibility for procuring sound I.S. schemes to lower levels of the Army, and it was soon plunged into 'post-hostilities' I.S. commitments, having had little chance for rumination on the subject.

The army relied on standard 'duties in aid' riot control and curfews to put down turmoil in south French Indo-China in the winter of 1945, and the RAF flew Frontier-style punitive

\textsuperscript{57} AFHQ 'Intelligence Notes' on guerilla war: 59,61, Nov. 1944, 78,84,86,91, Jan. 1945, W0169/19521.

\textsuperscript{58} On British political culture, M. Edmonds (ed.) 'The higher organisation of defence in Britain 1945-85' in \textit{The Defence Equation} (London, 1986) P.58.
raids against recalcitrant villages. But army reprisals for actively assisting guerillas operating by November 1945 were opposed by the Chiefs of Staff, (as they were in the Netherlands East Indies). The army tried to clear small rural areas of irregulars using drives, encirclements, and 'strong offensive patrols', but although some of its opponents were tactically unskilled, British units were evaded frequently.\(^\text{59}\)

However, the validity of its tactics was not questioned on the basis of this somewhat minor skirmish. Indeed, the army successfully crushed traditional irregulars concurrently operating in Iraq using large Frontier-style columns. Further, during the Dutch East Indies rebellion in the winter of 1945 to 1946, it relied on counterguerilla reactive patrols, settlement cordon-and-search for arms and rebels, and movement control road-blocks. The South East Asia Commander, Mountbatten, warned London that a position 'analogous to Ireland [in 1919-21]' might develop, but the military were engaged mostly in urban pitched battles and soon dominated the rebel opposition. However, the Cabinet limited the scope of British involvement in the Dutch colony, and did not authorise the Army to embark on COIN operations. The Government had recognised the nationalists in India, and therefore wished to avoid using Indian troops to stamp out another native Asian nationalist movement. This would have been politically damaging, and indeed, the Government also resisted any major entanglement in

the postwar civil disorders in India. Over 30,000 British troops were involved in security operations in the French and Dutch possessions, but these did not indicate any need to question the Army's traditional I.S. policies. Nonetheless, Godfrey argues that the East Indies episode was 'to prove valuable as Britain in turn faced the first of .. [its postwar] demands for political independence', and counterguerrilla tactical innovations there were a forerunner to those that followed in British COIN campaigns. However, any encouragement for the Army to develop its tactical policies was balanced by its experience during other I.S. commitments, such as that in Burma from 1945 to 1947. Dacoity was endemic there and police-military flag-marches and deterrence patrolling on the traditional pattern were applied. Furthermore, communist guerillas emerged by November 1946, and the General Officer Commanding [GOC], Major-General Harold Briggs, held daily conferences on the situation. He organised multi-battalion operations to 'flush [them] out .. in an encircling drive', and the security forces pressured dacoit-communist bands for two months in 'Operation Flush' and eventually crushed them. Although victory was mainly achieved because of the 'very bad' 

tactics of the Burmese,\textsuperscript{61} large scale/unit offensives were once more practiced successfully, and traditional policies were therefore validated.

Britain faced insurgency at the end of 1945, and for many British citizens 'traditional values [had] lost much of their force .. and imperial greatness was [considered to be] on the way out',\textsuperscript{62} resulting in their diminished willingness to support the whole imperial edifice. But the Government's primary priorities remained the protection of the Empire, and I.S. tasks.\textsuperscript{63} Many career soldiers who were familiar with the prewar I.S. line stuck to it, and when the RAF reviewed I.S. questions in the spring of 1945, it reaffirmed recognised


\textsuperscript{63} 'Provisional requirements of the postwar Armed Forces', COS memo, DO(46)7, 17 Jan. 1946, CAB131/2. First priority went to imperial I.S., followed by 'General War'. Also, 'Statement on Defence', Cmd. 6746, (1946), which outlined eight 'essential commitments', including imperial I.S., Palestine, and remedying the unstable Greek situation.
policies, as did the Joint Planning Staff [JPS] of the Chiefs of Staff. Further, most British military writers 'thought and wrote in terms of traditional ideology', although they focussed on conventional war more than I.S., which was a topic whose advancement offered soldiers few prospects for promotion, and was not even covered at Camberley in 1945. Indeed, the 'failure to include any instruction on the mechanics of the news process' there, at the army training colleges, or in War Office doctrine, resulted in the Army's inability to handle COIN propaganda issues. Moreover, 'political warfare' units possessing knowledge of propaganda were disbanded in 1945, and 'experts returned to civilian life, leaving politicians, civil servants and servicemen as ignorant on the subject as if the War had never been.' This was on account of postwar cutbacks, but also 'persistent negative official attitudes towards SOE and all its associations', which were run outside normal

channels, much to their displeasure. The major government departments therefore made no attempt to retain this accumulated expertise which could have been useful to counter-insurgents. But, Darby's statement that the Army 'assumed that policing tasks would continue on the traditional pattern .. [and so] postwar operations were undertaken in accordance with this', as was the case in 1919, is somewhat oversimplified. The Army did not undertake COIN wholly in congruence with tradition in the early postwar years.

The Army and other agencies fought insurgency in a media and political environment that was characterised by greater criticism of repression. Further, wartime familiarisation with unconventional warfare sparked debate in the Army over its potential applications, and in 1945 the SIS secured official approval to retain a body of expert wisdom on the subject, and it enlisted numerous SOE officers for this purpose. The Secret Service also liaised with MI5, which was responsible for counterintelligence in the Empire, to assist the security forces in their COIN tasks. Additionally, despite the War Office's concentration on 'General War', leading SAS officers pressed the Chiefs of Staff and other senior soldiers to study

65. On inadequate instruction about the media for the Army, A. Hooper The military and the media (Aldershot, 1982) P.211. The WO's 'DIACP' doctrine was updated in 1945, see, 'Notes on Imperial Policing and DIACP, 1949', MODL. On postwar staff cuts, Tugwell PHD, P.42-3; J.B. Black Organising the propaganda instrument- the British experience (Den Haag, 1975) P.x. The SOE, and 'political warfare' in, Dodds-Parker P.213-4; N. West The Friends (London, 1988) P.9; B. Pimlott P.307.

66. Darby P.45.
unorthodox forces and assess their possible future roles, specifically including COIN missions. Indeed, within the wider ranks of the Army, 'officers were not cynical and yawning with boredom as they had been in the 1930s [but were] ... far more professional and ambitious', and they were more willing to develop military thought. However, senior officers were aware that it was 'the eccentrics, the social oddities ... [who had been] attracted to irregular and clandestine units', and the idea of retaining substantial unorthodox forces 'threatened unwelcome change in the structure of the military organism ... [which was initially] beyond the sympathy ... of those in power.' The War Office lent no particular urgency to the debate about unconventional war, and during 1945 and 1946 the Army was obliged to undertake COIN operations without any immediate move by the upper echelons of the State to adapt wartime experience for I.S. purposes.

The army colleges were amalgamated at Sandhurst in 1945, and catered for 965 students by 1947. In the absence of any prompt postwar direction to reassess I.S. wisdom from other


established I.S. agencies, it and the professional military journals, which became even more influential than hitherto,\textsuperscript{69} offered other fora for the development of I.S. concepts. The crux of the following analysis is to identify the factors encouraging the process of COIN doctrinal and policy development, and those militating against it, from 1945.

\textsuperscript{69} Changes at Sandhurst, Shepperd P.163. On military journals, Bidwell/Graham \textit{ibid.}
BRITISH ACTION AGAINST THE POSTWAR REGELS, 1945-52:
Chapter 3: The development of COIN policies and doctrine, 1945-7, with special regard to the campaign in Palestine.

The Jewish insurgency of 1945 to 1947 succeeded a minor wartime rebellion, and like the wider Arab-Jewish Question, it is referred to only so far as it affected later COIN developments. Three Jewish political violence movements with different previous strategies started an insurgency at the end of the War. The Jewish Agency, responsible for representing the interests of its community in Palestine, the 'Yishuv', controlled a military force, the 'Haganah'. This was trained in guerilla warfare from 1937, but confrontation between the Mandatory and the Agency during the Second World War was limited to the latter's diplomatic pressure for mass Jewish immigration into Palestine. However, the Cabinet deferred to Arab interests and rejected such an influx in the summer of 1945, and thence the Agency's attitude changed and it supported military action to erode Britain's 'position .. and .. convince Whitehall that without the consent of the Jews, Britain could not keep Palestine.' The Agency's political propaganda attacked Britain, and the Haganah initiated guerilla war, along with the Irgun Zvei Leumi [IZL] and, (from 1947), the Lochmei He'rut Israel [LHI], two fanatical groups that also began a campaign of political terrorism. Their covert units had jointly initiated a rebellion from February 1944 until April 1945, following separate and sporadic propaganda and terrorist efforts in 1942 and 1943, and this gave the British some experience of the instruments used by the insurgents from 1945.

1. For details about Haganah, which numbered 50,000 in 1945, Y. Allon The Making of Israel's Army (London, 1971) P.25.

2. On the Jewish Agency's shift, Bell On Revolt P.52. For terms of immigration, see the 1939 White Paper, Cmd. 6019.
From 1942 to 1944, police and intelligence sources in Palestine identified the IZL as a cellular organisation of 5000 personnel, and the LHI as a 'politically insignificant' group of 100. Indeed, its leaders were arrested on information provided by the Yishuv in February 1942, and the police also knew about Jewish Agency control of the Haganah. Yet, little was known about the rebels' strategy, organisation or membership. In November 1943, the Secretary of State for War was informed by officials that 'the experience of Ireland in 1919-21 holds many warnings for what may well arise in Palestine', but there is no evidence that the War Office directed the Palestine authorities to act in the light of past COIN. Many Palestine police officers had served with the RIC.


but few if any were experienced in countering urban terrorism or guerilla warfare, and the force was poorly equipped to fight it.

The Palestine police understood that information was vital for effective military-security action, and Kimche asserts that 'intelligence in Palestine was pretty good.' But the CID Political Branch in the mandate was undermanned, its information-gathering effort was flawed by inadequate contacts with the Yishuv, and there was no effective intelligence processing system. The GHQ Middle East Forces, responsible for theatre military I.S. preparations, noted that most 'troops we are not trained for or intended' to do intelligence duties; and although the security forces acted under the wartime command of the GOC, theoretically affording centralised operational planning and control, their reliance on CID intelligence ensured that military-security operations were impaired in practice. Indeed, by 1944 the Yishuv were 'less inclined to cooperate' because of the Cabinet's refusal to allow a massive influx of Jews from the Diaspora following the Holocaust. Therefore, the security forces relied on a reactive 'striking force to deal with local disturbances', and few in-roads into the rebellion were made. Although the IZL and LHI 'were never more than a fringe minority' [emphasis added], London and Jerusalem were 'neither impressed [n]or particularly concerned'

-93-
with such 'gangsters', and they underestimated the dangers posed by their terrorism and propaganda campaigns.

The potential power of propaganda to influence popular attitudes was evident to the mandate authorities during the

War, and they provided reporting facilities in a Public Information Office [PIO]. But with an estimated ninety percent of the Yishuv opposed to rebel terrorism, a propaganda campaign for I.S. purposes was not contemplated, and its use was limited to trying to forge better inter-communal relations as a groundwork for a postwar political initiative by London. In response to the IZL/LHI campaign, British officialdom put its faith in a well-trodden I.S. path, introducing Emergency powers for arrest, detention, deportation and execution, in March 1944. The negative psywar approach was reinforced by a public warning to the Yishuv that unless information about the rebels was forthcoming, repression would ensue. The GHQ Middle East Forces decreed that 'ordinary tactical doctrines apply', and the military approach to I.S. was enshrined in its Middle East Training Pamphlet 9/13, issued in July 1943, and adhered to by the army in Palestine until its withdrawal in May 1948. The Pamphlet concentrated on riot procedures, disarmament, and offensives based on the principles of mobility, the economy of force and police cooperation 'which cannot be overstressed.' This reflected the War Office's 'Notes' of 1934, and 'Duties in Aid' of 1937, and it was updated and given 'to every officer' in July 1944. The pamphlet advocated large 'mobile columns' for reaction to 'incidents', urban deterrence patrols, and curfew. In addition, the GHQ proposed the creation of a joint operations room and posting of inter-force liaison officers, an organisational scheme derived from the precedent of Palestine.

between 1937 and 1939. Contrary to Hoffman's belief, some mobile columns were formed in 1944 with the approval of the theatre GHQ, the Chiefs of Staff, and the Cabinet, and by September 1944, large scale cordon-and-search was sanctioned for its counterorganisation and negative psywar effects.

The sizable commitment of army manpower to I.S. duties in Palestine was unwelcome during the War and the authorities


sought to end it quickly. Hence, they pursued not only direct counter-rebellion measures, but also attempted to conjure up an indirect solution by pressuring the Jewish Agency to act against the rebels. This course of action was inspired by its prewar cooperation with the British administration, and by the Agency's expressions of concern that militancy might jeopardise the chances of achieving a pro-Zionist settlement by alienating the British, and even unleash a repression that would harm the Yishuv. By 10 October 1944, the Agency instigated a 'Saison', excluding the Jewish rebels from Yishuv life and encouraging the people to assist with police enquiries. Then, at a time when the British Cabinet was pondering a political solution for Palestine, the LHI murdered Lord Moyne, a friend of Churchill, resulting in the Prime Minister's suspension of political progress. The 'Saison' was intensified and the rebellion was crushed by April 1945, which can only have confirmed the British perception both of the extremists' weaknesses, and the value of a dual counter-rebellion strategy. The administration suggested employing the Haganah in future counterterrorism, but this proposal was rejected by the Agency. Nevertheless, the dual strategy had a lasting impact on British counter-insurgents, and furthermore, the negative psywar approach of coercive measures and the threat of repression appeared to have been successful.

British I.S. preparations in 1945.

Palestine was not one of the Cabinet's priorities in 1945, and it was more concerned about the possibility of renewed

Arab violence than a Jewish resurgence, because of the significant menace to imperial strategic interests that an Arab revolt posed. The security forces prepared for violence from whatever quarter throughout the year, and COIN operations from October 1945 were founded on formal doctrinal instruction, training and exercises, as well as the knowledge possessed by individual officers. The fighting experience they gained before and during the War moulded the army's action to a degree that cannot be verified, although Tugwell asserts that I.S. 'general knowledge' was all but forgotten and had been supplanted by conventional war thinking. However, other studies on this subject have overlooked the security forces' I.S. preparations during 1945. Much traditional I.S. wisdom was retained at both theatre and local level, as well as by the police, and this was disseminated in tuition given to all officers and non-commissioned officers [NCO] in Palestine. The average twenty year-old British soldier serving there could boast little if any experience of I.S. duties and some were 'veterans of battles in Europe', but they too acquired basic guidance. Despite the fact that some senior officers tried to minimise its 'interference' with training for conventional war, and that

'the British still did not feel seriously challenged', the subject of I.S. received considerable attention in 1945.

Hoffman states that the army referred to the War Office's Notes of 1934 for COIN guidance at the outset, and its 1937 Duties manual was consulted by some officers later on in the campaign. Moreover, the theatre Command and the Palestine HQ produced 'various manuals and pamphlets' reflecting War Office I.S. doctrine, and the HQ ensured that intensive training was undertaken following the defeat of the December 1944 Athens Revolt by British troops and the occurrence of other post-Liberation disturbances in Europe. In readiness for possible disorder in Palestine, an I.S. exercise tested the movement of mobile columns and riot procedures on 13 January 1945, and there were similar drills in April and May. Indeed, a GHQ directive to form large columns was fulfilled by some units in the spring of 1945, and these were retained until October. The local army HQ also conducted exercises in large scale settlement cordon-and-search in February, April and May, and traditional I.S. wisdom was reiterated at the Staff College in

Haifa, which gave instruction on Mountain Warfare and organised training sessions in June and November. In addition, all units underwent I.S. tests, and the HQ arranged a conference on I.S. policy for 14 June. Finally, both the Palestine and the General Headquarters updated their I.S. doctrine in 1945 and this was used for COIN by the army.  

By January 1945, the War Office had taken the unusual step of informing the Middle East GHQ about recent counter/guerilla developments. This guidance could have been used by local British HQs to adapt their I.S. plans and improve their chances of success against armed opponents. The Department was slow to give unsolicited I.S.-related information to the Army during the interwar years, but was probably encouraged to do so in 1945 by the concurrent rebellion in Greece. Furthermore, the Chiefs of Staff recognised that Jewish partisans arriving in Palestine demonstrated a 'good technique in guerilla war' and posed an I.S. threat. In January 1945, the Middle East Forces studied War Office and Allied HQ guerilla reports written in 1944 and 1945, and produced 'Notes on the Development of Guerilla Warfare', which was forwarded to Palestine by March.

The theatre Command remarked that 'guerilla warfare is closely related to IS ops', and its 'Notes' endorsed key aspects of accepted British counterguerrilla wisdom, but also raised questions about large scale/unit operations and suggested limited tactical and organisational innovations. Further, the local Staff College studied the Chindits in early 1945, and guerilla warfare in May. Indeed, the Palestine HQ was eager to learn from I.S. operations in 1945, and it ensured that the army was kept apprised of new 'lessons' through its Operational Orders and Instructions. Yet, although an official precedent for utilising wartime experience was set, it is evident from other contemporary local I.S. doctrine that high level army studies of unconventional warfare caused no instant re-evaluation of I.S. practices by COIN agencies.

The Middle East Forces reiterated 'normal' procedures at the beginning of 1945, and suggested that 'junior officers .. [should] be made aware of civil disturbances [of] .. the past.' Indeed, the army HQ recommended 'Gwynne's [sic.] "Imperial Policing" [not as a] .. book of reference .. [but] as a guide to .. some of the .. problems' arising when countering I.S. threats. The GHQ stated that the likely danger came from two types of civil disorder, and a distinctive 'organised revolt .. [comprising] guerilla war [that] .. may require a definite military operation .. to suppress [it, and also] .. armed raids, sabotage, ambushes, sniping and acts of terrorism.' The military features of insurgency were described, and to counter them was considered easier than tackling rioters because riots

required a more discriminate and hence demanding use of force. The basis for responding to rebellion was laid down in the HQ's Operational Instruction 21/1 of February, and in the GHQ's updated 9/13 Training Pamphlet of May 1945.\textsuperscript{14} The former booklet, revised in October 1945, was an I.S. 'book of reference', and contained measures that were applied against Jewish rebels a year before. But the Command realised that political considerations may restrict the postwar application of coercive I.S. policies, and it therefore queried whether suppression like that of 1936 to 1939, involving many executions, military-control areas, and the ready use of military force in rural areas, would be acceptable in future.\textsuperscript{15}

The methods that defeated the Arab revolt were persistently referred to by some British officials as offering the best format for COIN, and the army was urged to consult the government's 'The Handbook of Palestine', and 'The Palestine


Problem', written by the GHQ, for accounts of interwar events. But, having assessed the rebel Jewish opposition by the autumn of 1945, the GOC, Lieutenant-General John D'Arcy, asserted that there existed 'no precedent and little help in our long history of Imperial policing.' Indeed, he implied that the threat from the Palestinian Arabs seven years before differed from that currently posed by the Jews. Having studied the Arab revolt and the Irish insurgency, he stated that the Jews were trying to emulate the 'limited success of revolt' resulting in the Free State and the 1939 White Paper. However, D'Arcy was unable to draw any COIN lessons from past campaigns, and, like other British officials, he confirmed the correctness of applying the Army's existing I.S. line against postwar insurgents.16

The revised local I.S. doctrine acquired by the army in 1945 was supplemented by the tutelage of the GHQMEF Training Team 12, which incorporated training exercises, lectures, and models for riot control, convoys, mobile columns, and the 'village clearance' familiar to graduates of the army colleges. It visited all formations in Palestine and instructed over 500 officers and NCOs in February 1945, and many more later on that year. Its teachings were considered 'vital' by some units.17


and all were well-versed in traditional I.S. wisdom when insurgency broke out.

Security force I.S. preparations were confined to the military-security sphere, and therefore excluded propaganda and political measures, (which were given the contemporary label of 'political warfare'). This was regarded as falling within the purview of civil organisations, or specialists like those working in the SOE. However, by the summer of 1945, of the War Office's 175 Political Warfare experts, and 7500 SOE personnel, only a handful of the former and 63 of the latter were in the Middle East, and consequently there was a dearth of military experience in this field. The local MI5 Defence Security Office Field Wings summarised Jewish propaganda to help the army acquaint itself with its opposition, but the military was intrinsically suspicious of the media and did not consider trying to use it to its advantage, merely ordering good conduct in the ranks so as to avoid hostile press coverage. The police and the Public Information Office gave interviews and some press conferences, and the PIO also continued its wartime propaganda.18 But there was no initiative to adapt it for I.S. usage after the War ended.

The onset of insurgency and the British COIN line.

Communal tension and riots in Palestine in May 1945 generated 'sufficient general hostility' to rekindle the rebel movements recently subdued by the 'Saison', and they were given a boost in September when the Cabinet agreed to sanction only minimal new Jewish immigration. Following this decision, official Zionist bodies pressed American politicians to alter the British Government's attitude and policy. The Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, felt that American support was crucial for devising and implementing any workable settlement, and to reduce Zionist pressure and involve the US, a British-American Committee of Enquiry into Jewish refugees and the future of Palestine was set up on 11 October. Bevin envisaged that its report would form the basis of an interim Arab-Jewish agreement, followed by United Nations ratification. Hence, all other political 'policy discussions were suspended until the .. Committee' reported,19 and with a settlement consigned to an indefinite future, the Agency decided to enter into a marriage of convenience with the IZL and LHI, as the United Resistance.

Movement, or URM. It began an insurgency in October, and COIN was handicapped at the outset by having the counterinsurgent's 'political arm' tied until the Committee presented its report on a separate political settlement.

The URM tried to build support both within Palestine and across the globe through its political propaganda, and non-cooperation with the Mandatory was encouraged. The Haganah organised illegal immigration, and its elite 'Palmach' forces prosecuted guerilla warfare. They were joined in this by IZL units from the spring of 1946, although the Irgun and the Lehi concentrated on political terrorism against civilians and the police. From 21 November, the new High Commissioner, Major-General Sir Alan Cunningham, was responsible for I.S. to the Colonial Secretary, George Hall, and the Colonial Office 'tended to follow' Cunningham's lead. He and the GOC, D'Arcy, were in broad agreement on the COIN line needed in 1945, although policy debates and divisions were to emerge later between the War Office and the Chiefs of Staff, and the Colonial Office. Some high level army officers wanted a Cost-Benefit military repression, and the Chiefs of Staff favoured an unyielding use of firepower against rural opponents in early 1945. This course was discussed locally until November, and the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces [CINCMEF], Major-General Bernard C.T. Paget, who had fought on the Frontier in 1936 and 1937, said that 'it might be necessary to use full force.' Indeed, the CIGS, Field-Marshal Alan F. Brooke, commended extensive large scale/unit military-security operations and

stringent population-resource control measures, including mass disarmament and arrests. Generals Paget, D'Arcy and Cunningham agreed that the latter counterorganisation measure would be valuable, and proposed police supervision of Agency leaders. But they conceded that this could provoke 'systematic sabotage and guerilla warfare over a prolonged period', and as a consequence the plan was shelved. In the event, protracted guerilla war occurred anyway, but Bevin convinced the Cabinet to reject full-blown repression in late 1945, in view of the need to retain American goodwill during the search for an overall political solution. Further, he probably bore in mind the adverse American reaction to the bloody fighting between British troops and Greek rebels from December 1944 to January 1945, as well as the growing British public distaste for coercion.

Insurgency began in October 1945, and the military


responded, equipped with basic GHQ background information on Jewish rebels provided in August. This gave fair estimates of the strength of the LHI, IZL and Haganah, and noted that the IZL consisted of 50-man guerilla small units, and the LHI of 3-man terrorist cells. However, the security forces still knew little about their organisational structure, strategy and supporters. The army was instructed to 'obtain as much information as possible about the locality, inhabitants, their habits, leading personalities', and to plan operations on police intelligence. But with flaws in its system of information procurement and insufficient sources, security force action was all too infrequently based on firm foundations. Their problems were accentuated by an inadequate overall COIN organisation until early 1946, whereby the military and police relied on informal meetings to discuss COIN policy, which resulted in a lack of central coordination and direction, and further diminished the effects of applied policies.

COIN military-security policies in the winter of 1945-6.

The Cabinet backed the Palestine government's relatively 'mild' Cost-Benefit line, and in January 1946 reiterated its support for any action that was 'obviously justifiable and necessary.' Security force operations were based on their I.S. indoctrination and training conducted during 1945, but the insurgent's offensive centred on urban areas and therefore large mobile columns were not deployed. Joint patrolling was


-108-
carried out as 'a matter of course' to deter and to 'seek out and destroy' irregulars, but it was not systematically planned until after spring 1946, initially being in reaction to attacks 'as and when .. necessary.' In addition, population-resource control measures designed to 'interfere .. with hostile plans .. by restricting movement' were limited at first to the protection of vulnerable points, pass schemes with road-block checks, snap searches, and curfews for up to thirty-six hours. But from 20 November, large cordon-and-search operations were authorised for control and counterorganisation by 'restrict[ing] movement with a demonstration of force, in order to [arrest] known ringleaders and/or wanted persons.' These policies were enforced throughout the winter of 1945 to 1946, and some formations declared that they would 'eliminate terrorist activities.'

During these early months of COIN, the Middle East Command asserted that 'recent practical experience has shown that training has been based on correct principles [and methods]', and although no real progress was evident, the GOC stated in March 1946 that it should take '4 to 6 months to break the back of the resistance.' Such optimism may have been

fuelled by the success of cordon-and-search, patrols, curfew and movement restrictions in urban areas of south Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies during winter 1945 to 1946. These I.S. ventures certainly did not cause the army to rethink its COIN policy in Palestine, although the GHQ recognised the need for 'constant improvement of our methods' and noted that 'new lessons will be incorporated [into I.S. guidance]'. The Army was keen to learn from new experiences, but saw no reason to question the 'mild' Cost-Benefit line and policies used so far.

British psywar policies, and views about COIN political action in the winter of 1945 to 1946.

The authorities paid scant attention to matters outside the military-security sphere at the beginning of the COIN. The army provided Public Relations Officers to inform the media about its activities and to try to prevent a 'bad press', and the Chief Secretary, John Shaw, warned Jewish newspapers


-110-
against incitement to violence in November 1945.26 The High Commissioner also realised that Zionist propaganda could rally anti-British sentiment. But he only voiced concern about the URM's campaign outside Palestine and took no steps to ensure that a realistic State counterpropaganda effort was formulated, probably because of London's misgivings about the idea of Britain engaging in peacetime propaganda. The COIN positive psywar approach was confined to standard army 'flag-showing' patrols, and Cunningham supported 'punitive' curfews and searches that constituted part of the military's preferred negative approach. These measures were afforded by what he termed 'drastic' Emergency legislation, but its provisions were not primarily designed to further the negative approach by pressuring the Yishuv. Indeed, Cunningham opposed reprisals, and although new laws in January 1946 authorised the 'stick' of collective punishment, he applied it infrequently, and then only on those locales definitely implicated in supporting the insurgents. The High Commissioner believed that coercion could alienate the population, and moreover, favoured more positive psywar action than has hitherto been credited.

Cunningham suggested political moves as an incentive for the people to assist the State, on the basis that a majority of

the Yishuv resented terrorism, and therefore might be enticed from their passivity into either resisting it, or helping the security forces. And he identified two issues as the key to Jewish behaviour: firstly, the promise of a future political settlement, and secondly, parochial concerns about land tenure, immigration, and economic matters. Recognising that the insurgents played upon these grievances for support, and with an overall political settlement out of his hands, Cunningham stated that, 'if in anyway the humanitarian part of the problem can be reduced, if a wedge could be driven between .. political and humanitarian issues, the extremists might well lose much of their power.' Thus, he pressed London for a sharp increase in Jewish immigration to bolster moderates in both the Yishuv and the Jewish Agency. It had 'preknowledge .. of most incidents' and 'an enormous degree of influence over the [Yishuv]', and he wanted it to encourage opposition to the insurgency. However, he knew that the Cabinet was unlikely to increase immigration quotas for fear of a violent reaction by the Arab community that would upset the prospects for a successful outcome from the British-American initiative. 27 Thus, while Cunningham basically understood the benefits that could be derived from some COIN political action, the British Government was unwilling to introduce any. As the insurgents gained ground he did not completely rule out the Chiefs of Staff's preferred

option of applying the routine Cost-Benefit I.S. line involving repression like that used from 1936 to 1939, and in early 1946 he agreed with the GOC that it was necessary to effect a 'forcible suppression of the armed opposition.' But he countenanced greater military pressure only as a last resort, advocating the continuation of present security force policies 'in the earnest hope that [he could] .. avoid .. the weight of large scale operations.' The High Commissioner therefore tried to moderate the Cost-Benefit line, while relying on its provisions in practice.

Security force COIN policies and doctrine up to mid-1946.

The administration concluded at the start of 1946 that the insurgency 'constitute[d] an entirely different problem in regard to I.S.' from all the previous threats that it had encountered. Indeed, some officers were disgruntled by the army's lack of progress in countering Jewish irregulars, and the commander of the Third Infantry Division, Major-General Lashmer Whistler, admitted, 'I am pretty stumped for ideas.' Therefore, he sought inspiration from the War and suggested '"commando"-type patrols' of small units moving into a disturbed area where they would attempt to ambush irregulars and then swiftly exit. He did not propose a paraguerrilla mode of operation, but the General evidently tried to adapt the style of the early British Commandos for COIN purposes, and this was an original idea. However, it demanded changes in the constitution of units which contradicted 'War Office policy [directives that formations undertaking I.S. tasks must]..

28. The HC on military action, its effects and the Agency, to SSC, 31 Jan., 19 Feb., and Note, 27 June 1946, Cunn.1/1, MEC; CO537/1708.
remain organised as a standard infantry division.' The conditions for cultivating new tactical ideas clearly were absent, as Whistler's proposal was not developed into a new policy. Instead, the security forces continued to tackle the insurgents with familiar I.S. tactics.

The Chiefs of Staff persistently sought reassurances that the COIN commitment would not interfere with training for General War, and the Middle East GHQ stated that the army should only be diverted to I.S. tasks when it was absolutely necessary. Yet, by the middle of 1946, the army took the lead in operational planning, and while some units relied on 'learning on the job' and many officers viewed active duties as 'excellent training for young leaders and troops', army I.S. indoctrination and training was continued in 1946 to a greater extent than has previously been imparted. Between February and April, there was a concerted effort by every battalion to set aside about one month for I.S. studies. This incorporated practice in cordon-and-search, 'village fighting', and curfews.


but also 'I.S. Discussions' in which tactical and procedural lessons were 'passed on to all ranks' in a systematic attempt to disseminate new knowledge. These periods were discontinued by the autumn, and the six-man GHQMEF Training Team 12 was also disbanded in August as part of postwar cut backs. But prior to that, during January and from March to April, through lectures, models, discussions and exercises in Palestine, the Team recapitulated wisdom enshrined in the GHQ Training Pamphlet 9/13 and the HQ Instruction 21/1. After summer 1946, the responsibility for providing a grounding in I.S. went 'to Commands and units', but lessons continued to be relayed by the
Palestine HQ and exchanged within the lower echelons. Although the central assimilation of all new lessons was not achieved by the army authorities, they did attempt to institutionalise the local refinement of COIN policy.

The army was well aware that COIN operational success depended 'on good information', but when its patrolling was reduced in the largest Jewish cities during April and May, probably due to overconfidence about its 'calming' effect on the Yishuv, as well as to allow unit training for conventional

war, anti-British sentiment was manifested in rioting. The security forces' operations were failing to stem the insurgent tide and consolidate the government's position, and although the 'passing, receiving and processing of information was part of the operational routine' of the security forces, the CID Political Intelligence Branch procured insufficient background information on the insurgents, and contact intelligence was sorely lacking. Hence, the State's forces found themselves in a position where, on the whole, they could only react to 'incidents' and pursue speculative patrolling. However, the army did not attempt to remedy this situation through any initiative of its own, adhering to its conviction that 'intelligence and counterintelligence .. [was] a secondary task.' Only five army HQ officers worked on I.S. intelligence from November 1945, and they were 'too young and inexperienced' to produce results. Indeed, their commander from the middle of 1946 had no previous relevant experience, and although there were weekly meetings for 'constant liaison between all intelligence staffs', inter-agency coordination left a lot to be desired. The Palestine HQ collated considerable background data and distributed fortnightly summaries to units, but it was endowed with neither the inclination nor know-how to forge productive links with the Yishuv. Several units independently established useful local contacts, but their efforts were undermined by unit movements and the transfer of some of their personnel within or out of Palestine, resulting in the loss of linkages between individual soldiers and the few helpful
citizens amongst a generally uncooperative Jewish community. The only major British COIN advance by the summer of 1946 was the creation of a new committee system to replace ad hoc high level security force meetings. This was an unusual step and its origins are unclear. However, it resembled the structure created by the British authorities in Burma in 1931 during the nationalist revolt, and Cunningham certainly studied that conflict in 1947. In addition, the Palestine HQ examined Gwynn's *Imperial Policing* at the start of 1945, and it advocated a committee organisation. The Palestine Central Security Committee was an improvement on I.S. arrangements of the preceding decade, bringing military, police and civil agencies into a central planning forum for weekly meetings. The police Inspector-General represented the security forces, and the GOC attended only when necessary, which was a potential flaw. But he was rarely absent during 1946 and 1947, and the local MI5 and army intelligence chiefs were members of the

tripartite Committee. It was responsible for overseeing and guiding the operational planning and execution carried out at district army HQs with police and RAF liaison officers. Inter-force coordination was still imperfect in 1947, and the committee system was not moulded into a powerful executive tool with jurisdiction over all COIN business. However, it was served by six tripartite District Committees consisting of police, army and civil authorities, which discussed both operational issues and analyses provided for the Committees by intelligence agencies represented on them. The Districts produced recommendations for the Central Committee on request, and it decided on broad COIN policy matters. The system produced a better conceived and more unified security force effort, and was an alternative to the Martial Law mechanism recommended for coordinating their actions in War Office I.S. doctrine.33

Debate over the British COIN line in the summer of 1946.

In April 1946, the British-American Committee proposed a binational state and the immigration of 100,000 Jews. But the Cabinet baulked at the financial cost that this would entail

and the probability of a violent Arab reaction, while the American President would not agree to give money or troops to help institute it. Therefore, Bevin insisted that the insurgency must be ended before the Report could be adopted, and he set up a special committee of experts to evaluate the likely effects of its implementation.\textsuperscript{34} In the meantime, the IZL murdered six sleeping soldiers in what became known as the 'Car Park Killings', and the increasing scale of insurgent attacks and the stalemate over a separate political solution led to debate about COIN policies. By May 1946, the Palestine HQ considered imposing a huge collective fine and extended curfews on Jewish cities, and occupying Jewish buildings, as local commanders demanded 'drastic and spectacular punitive action' both to retain troop morale and for negative psywar effects on the people. But in view of the pending British-American initiative, the Cabinet refused to authorise this.\textsuperscript{35} Nonetheless, from 10 to 18 June, the URM carried out scores of bombings and kidnapped five army officers, and as senior officers' fears rose that the security forces would undertake their own reprisals if there was no official response, on 20 June the Cabinet sanctioned a 'full plan against Jewish illegal organisations and the Jewish Agency.' Operation AGATHA was put into effect nine days later to supplement the indecisive COIN operations carried out so far, and it incorporated large scale urban cordon-and-search and curfews lasting for several days.

\textsuperscript{34} Cohen \textit{Palestine and Great} P.110; Palestine to Israel P.221; Ovendale \textit{Britain} P.120.

\textsuperscript{35} Military view, COS(46)61, 17 Apr., CAB79/47; D'Arcy and local officers, in Chief Sec. J. Shaw, Memo for 26 Apr., 1 May meetings, Cunn. 5/4, MEC; Gale P.168: political constraints, SSC to HC, 16 May 1946, Cunn. 1/1, MEC; Cohen \textit{Palestine and Great} P.80.
It explicitly aimed for the counterorganisation arrest of Palmach leaders, to gain evidence of Jewish Agency promotion of insurgency, and to disrupt opposition planning. But AGATHA was designed to have a psychological and political impact too, as success could give a boost to government supporters, reassure the Arabs, stabilise the security forces, and enhance British claims to legitimacy. Further, as Clark suggests, it was used for negative psywar to pressurise the Yishuv. The High Commissioner was instructed by the Colonial Office to announce that the enterprise was not a collective punishment, but it was meant to sway the Yishuv into assisting the forces of law-and-order by disrupting their social and economic life, and thus convince them of the need to forestall any repetition of such action. It also served to renew the administration's interest in the indirect strategy of pressing the Jewish Agency to relieve the Yishuv's discomfort by instigating another Saison. Moreover, Operation AGATHA significantly increased the debate among COIN agencies about the best psywar approach to follow, and Cunningham, and also on occasion the GOC- from June 1946, Lieutenant-General Sir Evelyn H. Barker\textsuperscript{36} differed on their preferred COIN line from the theatre Commander, the Chiefs of Staff and the War Office.

General Cunningham agreed to AGATHA, despite the paucity of intelligence on which to act, because he believed that it was 'essential to do something drastic' to bolster security force morale after recent insurgent atrocities. Indeed, he also suggested suspending Jewish immigration, imposing collective fines, or intensifying arms searches, in spite of realising that this would have 'severe political repercussions.' The Cabinet rejected his proposals on these grounds, and while Cunningham's attitude hardened as a result of insurgent excesses, his recommendations did not signal a shift in his opposition to the wholesale subjugation of the Yishuv as a means to compel them to cooperate with the COIN forces. Rather, he judged that swift and stern action was necessary to retain the State's political credibility and to achieve limited psychological effects. Although the High Commissioner publicly proclaimed that AGATHA would 'root out terrorism [and] restore order', this was to boost government supporters' morale. He appreciated that the situation could 'not be settled by force', and privately never viewed AGATHA in this light.37

The new GOC, General Barker, assessed the COIN position on his arrival in Palestine, and affirmed that the key to the conflict was 'the support, active or passive of the general Jewish public.' He understood that many of them were

uncooperative owing to terrorist intimidation, and he endorsed the army's chosen psywar approach of trying to foster popular support by gaining military successes, combined with a degree of coercion of the Yishuv to convince it that opposition to the insurgency would be to its benefit. However, the continuous exertion of negative psychological pressure was not his favoured approach, because it was 'impossible perpetually to subjugate a country by force.' He was wary about initiating large scale operations that could 'rouse .. the Yishuv against us', and he approved of AGATHA mainly to improve security force morale and influence the Jewish Agency, sharing the High Commissioner's reasoning behind the operation. In addition, Barker referred to the prewar SNS to suggest incorporating the Haganah into the police for COIN action, underlining British interest in the indirect strategy. But he recognised the ultimate need for a 'satisfactory political answer', while repression would exacerbate the position. Therefore, the local political and military hierarchies were cautious about the widespread and persistent use of large scale military-security operations and tough controls that were akin to the traditional and more rigid Cost-Benefit line. However, this line received the blessing of higher British Army authorities.

The CIGS from 26 June 1946, Field-Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery, was a key figure in postwar British COIN, and he acted as a bulwark against radical new changes in policy. His views and actions were based on his past experience of COIN in Ireland and Palestine, and the Second World War, (and subsequently, of COIN in Greece). In early June, the then

38. Lt.-Gen. E. Barker, 'Military Action to be taken in order to enforce law & order in Palestine' 22 June, drafts, Cunn. 5/4; W0275/29,W0261/568. Also, notes, 11 July, W0275/27; 00, 25 July 1946, Cunn. 5/4, MEC.
CIGS, Field-Marshal Brooke, and the CIGS-elect, discussed the Palestine conundrum, and compared conditions there to concurrent turmoil and factional violence in India, although these were essentially dissimilar I.S. problems. However, it was the Palestine campaign of 1936 to 1939 that had made the deepest impression on Montgomery, and he persistently referred to it and forcefully upheld the Cost-Benefit line which triumphed there. The CIGS wanted to 'reorient the Army' away from its present methods to prewar policies of multiple large mobile columns, large scale searches and sweeps, military-controlled areas, extended curfews, and a liberal dose of executions to counter the 'un-English methods' of the Jew. He contemplated a 'war with the Jews [to] .. smash forever [the URM, to] .. completely and utterly defeat .. the Jews as soon as possible', and to coerce the Yishuv out of their presently uncooperative stance. He stated that such a 'showdown' would be 'handle[d] quite easily', and visualised 'matters purely from a military angle.' The Field-Marshal had no conception of Hearts-and-Minds action, in fact noting that it was his 'duty .. to avoid becoming involved in the political side of this problem.' His views were reiterated by the CINCMELF, Major-General Sir Miles C. Dempsey, and these high level army authorities hoped that AGATHA could be the first step in altering the COIN line applied in Palestine. The CIGS asserted that his opinions 'greatly influenced the Cabinet', with more drastic legal powers being sanctioned by July 1946, but he failed to obtain approval for a reversion to the panoply of interwar I.S.
AGATHA soured relations between the administration and the Jewish population and political institutions, consequently damaging the COIN effort in the long run. However, it led to a lull in insurgent attacks until August 1946, and to the arrest of half the leadership of the Palmach. Moreover, the Jewish Agency withdrew the Haganah from the URM on 23 August, and moderate elements within the Agency supported political talks with Britain. In the interim, the Cabinet rejected the British-American Report on 11 July, and two weeks later backed the new Morrison-Grady plan, which focussed on provincial autonomy. When, for electoral reasons, President Harry Truman opposed its pro-Arab clauses, Bevin was forced to try to bring


40. On AGATHA's success, Wilson P.166-76; Bethell P.253; Bell *Terror* P.177; *On Revolt* P.59. Cf. its disadvantages, Kimche P.168; Cohen *Palestine and Great* P.80.
about a settlement without American assistance. But the Jewish Agency reconsidered its position and decided to support the partition of Palestine, and promised to attend a conference on the subject if several detained Jewish leaders were released. However, the Cabinet considered that there was no real prospect of agreement between the Arabs and Jews, and formal contacts were ended by 2 September. Although Agency officials moderated their political demands after AGATHA, prospects for a settlement remained poor in the summer of 1946.41

On 22 July 1946, the IZL murdered ninety one people in the 'King David Hotel Bombing' in Jerusalem, an attack on the Palestine HQ and the administration Secretariat. The British authorities were understandably bitter, and Barker protested that the Yishuv 'bore a share of the guilt .. if the Jewish public really wished to stop these crimes they could do so .. I am determined they shall suffer punishment.' This could only increase Jewish animosity towards the Mandatory, and Major-General Richard Gale, commanding the First Infantry Division, warned his superiors that it would further damage relations with the Jews and push them towards the insurgents. But Barker feared security force reprisals if there was no official riposte, and as a result Cunningham authorised a huge collective fine and arrests of Jewish Agency leaders implicated in sponsoring the insurgency. He did not approve out and out repression, but, realising the inadequacy of present COIN policies he hoped that these punitive measures might pressure the Agency into agreeing to another 'Saison', having concluded that 'the .. only hope lay in securing Haganah help .. [for]

preventive measures' against Jewish irregulars. In the event, despite scarce intelligence, the Cabinet quickly subscribed to large scale cordon-and-search operations and curfews on the major Jewish cities in Operations HARRY and SHARK from 29 July to the first week of August 1946, ostensibly with the aim of arresting IZL and LHI members. District army HQs believed that this action helped to restore order in the short term. But there were few tangible results, and the Cabinet concluded that these operations had failed. Bevin was engaged in a fresh round of diplomacy and as a 'senior and powerful minister .. in Cabinet' he successfully opposed the CIGS's favoured COIN line. Hence, the COIN forces continued with their operational routine, and 'large scale Chiefs of Staff planning ceased to be approved in London.'

**COIN authorities' anxiety about operational policies from summer 1946, and the introduction of 'expert' advice.**

42. HC for fine, Bethell P.269. On Yishuv, Note, 1 Aug., to SSC, 29 July, Cunn. 1/1, MEC. On Haganah usage, Clark D.Phil., P.216-7; HC, R. Gale *A Call* P.168; in CM(46)73, 25 July; and GOC, in CM(46)72, 23 July, CAB128/6, W032/10260. GOC on fines, note, 26 July 1946, CO537/2291.

The administration and the army were aware by 1945 that guerilla war and political terrorism were devised and executed with the help of European Jews seasoned in unconventional war against the Axis. Cunningham noted that, of illegal immigrants in 1946, 'former guerilla fighters in Europe are given priority .. [due to] their experience', and by at least 1947 he equated the URM with wartime underground resistance movements. Most COIN institutions apparently did not bear the War in mind when analysing the insurgency and devising counteraction, although the Colonial Office selected Lieutenant-Colonel W. Nicol Gray to replace Captain John Rymer-Jones as the police Inspector-General from 10 May 1946. Gray was their second choice for the position, but he was picked as a training expert and forceful personality, and also because he had served during the Arab revolt and as a 'protege of Laycock' in the wartime Commandos. In practice, he was a 'mobility and firepower' exponent and was unable to devise effective COIN policies or organisation. But his unorthodox war record supplemented his knowledge of I.S. and was evidently viewed by the Colonial Office as offering a fresh perspective on COIN policing, for Gray was appointed despite vocal and deep-rooted opposition within the police force to the choice of a soldier for this post, rather than a

44. HC to SSC, 25 July 1946, Cunn. 1/1, MEC; Notes for RIIA lecture, 22 July 1948, Cunningham Papers, 8303-104/26, NAM; 'The last days of the Mandate', International Affairs 24, summer 1948, P.485-6.
policeman from the Empire. However, this was the extent of Colonial Office 'intervention' in COIN that year, as it generally waited on the High Commissioner's opinions about the situation.

The Colonial Office's worries about the I.S. position were amplified by Cunningham after the large scale operations of summer 1946. He informed the Colonial Secretary on 1 August that he was 'anxious to be assured that our police methods are the best that can be devised and I would welcome a visit of some expert .. to advise me', especially on the CID, which may 'require some new ideas.' Cunningham was uncertain as to whether current police organisation and tactical policies were the most appropriate in the circumstances, and he showed special concern for the present lack of contact intelligence. He proposed Major-General Sir Charles E. Wickham, who was a former chief of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [RUC] and presently Head of the British Police and Prisons Mission to Greece, to advise on police reorganisation and COIN. Wickham's Hellenic posting was arranged before the Palestine insurgency began, with the approval of the Foreign, Colonial and Home Offices, and he was widely regarded as an expert on I.S. issues. Cunningham wanted to benefit from his 'experience of terrorist activities in an unfriendly population', hoping that his knowledge of unusual I.S. conditions would assist the Palestine police. Although this search for fresh ideas was not initiated by the Colonial Office, not least because it believed

that there were no available personnel in the Empire who were qualified for advising on such matters, it enthusiastically took up the proposal, and agreed that Wickham and two officers who had been exposed to IRA methods should visit Palestine in October 1946. By August 20, Wickham requested Captain R.H. Hamilton, who served with him in the RIC during the Irish COIN in 1920, and Lieutenant-Colonel William H. Moffatt of the RUC Special Branch, who was familiar with conditions in Ulster. Although Hamilton refused the offer, Moffatt was seconded on 16 October, and he studied the CID from 2 November. Wickham began to look more generally at the police force and its tasks a fortnight later.46

The Colonial Office and the High Commissioner questioned the police COIN effort and then considered modifications suggested by hand-picked men conversant with Irish COIN, and also the conflict in Greece, a country which, like Palestine, was a responsibility of the GHQMEIL. However, it evidently drew no parallel between COIN in Greece and in Palestine; understandably in view of the different emphasis placed on various policy instruments by the Jewish and communist insurgents, and the contrasting rural and urban settings. But, although pressure for the amendment of COIN practices in Palestine did not come from the theatre Command, some local army units underscored the concerns of civil authorities in the mandate.

During the summer of 1946, the Sixth Airborne Division HQ noted that advice on I.S. from the theatre and local HQ levels failed to take account fully of the needs of the situation. Army I.S. training continued on the basis of a revised 9/13 Pamphlet of July 1946, and tactical revisions were incorporated into Operational Orders and Instructions 'based on experiences gained in Palestine.' Indeed, the Division's commander, Major-General R.D. Wilson, appreciated that it was 'the duty of the Army to keep abreast of .. changes and adjust methods accordingly.' But the Airborne HQ criticised the Middle East Training Team's I.S. instruction, with its concentration on mobile columns, as 'breaking .. the principles .. of aid to the civil power.' Although they did not elaborate on this criticism, the formation pointed out that the Palestine HQ's advice was basically 'written .. as a result of experience in the Arab troubles of 1936-9', and that this fell short of providing the foundations for success in the present circumstances. The critics presented no alternative military-security policies, but they were unhappy with the operational formula followed by the army throughout 1946, and referred to current events in India as 'the nearest parallel', in a bid to derive I.S. lessons from this source.47 The problems encountered in the dissolving Raj clearly could not offer solutions for counterinsurgents in Palestine, but some patently felt that a new impetus was required.

COIN agencies on extra-military-security action in 1946.

The administration's limited propaganda effort was continued after April 1946 by a new Central Office of Information, which relied on the printed word and official statements to attack the opposition and call for assistance. But Cunningham's efforts to improve the COIN campaign were confined to the operational scene until September, when the GOC proposed a separate 'psywar department' that could devise propaganda. They adhered to the accepted wisdom that this must be a civilian rather than military body, and agreed that it should liaise with the Security Service and army intelligence to tap all information sources and secure the help of these organisations in developing its product. Indeed, the theatre Joint Intelligence Committee invited the Colonial Office to appoint a 'political warfare officer' in November, and Barker asked for a person who knew 'Palestine conditions and especially the psychology of the [Yishuv]'. Clearly, as time went on local COIN authorities appreciated the importance of counterpropaganda, yet no psywar department was created, probably because of Whitehall's unease about using propaganda, an attitude which prevailed until the emergence of the Cold War during 1947. Nonetheless, increasing local interest in the instrument was reflected in Central Security Committee meetings, where henceforth considerable attention was given to domestically-oriented Jewish propaganda. Furthermore, although such activity lay outside its normal compass, from September 1946 the Field Security Section [FSS] number 317 team began a systematic effort to inform all army units of insurgent propaganda. In turn, some units indicated the importance of providing swift press statements on events and gaining 'the right angle to the story', and by December the GSI was coordinating Army Public Relations policy. However, this increased awareness of psywar did not result in a transformation of COIN practice, and the army's own positive psywar effort was restricted to treating the Yishuv 'with
decency .. [to] get .. them on our side.' Therefore, COIN authorities were extending their vision, but they lacked the proficiency and the political backing to translate their concerns into the necessary action.

**Security force operations in late 1946.**

During the winter of 1946 to 1947, some army formations increased the frequency of their small unit half-hour patrols in areas prone to insurgent attack, in order 'to check terrorist activity' and 'annihilate' them in 'an ambush and recce role.' But these operations were 'largely deterrent by hampering movement and training', because of the dearth of tactical intelligence required for pre-emptive military-security action. In addition, the control routine continued, with security units carrying out, for instance, two snap checks and two road blocks a day, and two night patrols a week. The new Colonial Secretary from 4 October, Sir Arthur Creech-Jones, noted that no new policy options were proposed by any official


-133-
British source, and most of the security forces functioned within an analytical vacuum. The only suggested alternative came from top army officers who wanted to repeat the supposed past glories of large scale/unit operations and repression, but these methods were not supported by local COIN authorities, and such a course was anyway inhibited by Bevin's diplomatic mission. Despite the release of detained Jewish leaders to attend a conference in October 1946, the Foreign Secretary's effort was handicapped by intransigence on both sides. The Jews pushed for partition, especially after Truman's supportive speech of 4 October, while the Arabs were wholly opposed to it. By December 1946, Bevin contemplated offering the apparently intractable problem to the USA or U.N., but persevered again in London at the start of 1947, and while political bargaining proceeded, the Cabinet was reticent about sanctioning a sterner Cost-Benefit COIN line.


Debate between the Army establishment and local COIN agencies over the Cost-Benefit line by winter 1946-7.

In November 1946, the CINCMELF, General Dempsey, noted that 'the main reason we catch no terrorists is that the people .. take no action directly or in giving evidence' about the insurgents. He sought to wring contact intelligence from the Yishuv by intensifying the State's negative psywar action, dispensing fines 'on all and sundry' and carrying out suspended capital sentences. Further, he desired a tougher military approach that would also be of negative psywar value by 'bringing physical pressure to bear' on the Jewish community. The CIGS affirmed that 'the only means of combatting terrorism .. [is] constant harrying, which will keep the terrorists on the move and disrupt their plans', and he supported the large scale/unit offensive policies contemplated by Dempsey. Montgomery maintained that the menace disturbing Palestine had 'appeared in many countries at various times' in the past-implicitly equating insurgency with other types of intrastate conflict- and hence he believed that insurgent forces could be beaten by vintage 'robust methods' which were not 'concerned with politics.' He argued that 'no real harm will be done to the population, and they will tire of being upset and cooperate' by providing information and resisting pressure.

51. CINCMELF, to WO/CIGS, 16 Nov., W0216/194, Montgomery, 211/2, IWM; to CIGS, 21 Nov., W0216/194; to WO, 21 Nov., Cunn. 1/1,3, MEC; in HC to SSC, 23 Nov. 1946, CO537/1731.


-135-
exerted on them by insurgents. This was an unrealistic view of the dilemma facing the Yishuv, who were under the influence of insurgent political terrorism and propaganda, and obviously the Chief of the General Staff did not understand the workings of insurgency. Nonetheless, his outlook was accepted by the War Office and so reflected the British Army's COIN line at an official level, which was no different to that of the 1930s. Although the Cost-Benefit line was not fully implemented in Palestine in 1945 and 1946, it was persistently questioned at the time by local COIN agencies.

The High Commissioner was cautious about resorting to the I.S. policies propounded by military traditionalists, especially as Sir Charles Wickham's ideas about COIN conflicted with them. He wrote to Cunningham in early October, stating that to defeat Palestine's 'particular brand of the IRA' posed a most difficult problem. He pointed out that there were 'no rules' or written principles for tackling such opponents, recognising the atypical nature of insurgency and the previous lack of British doctrinal preparation for countering it. But Wickham applied his experience of policing and COIN in Ireland and Greece, and stated that the key to victory was 'information, and you don't get [that from the people] .. until you get some success.' Thus, he advocated the usual security force offensive operations aimed at inflicting visible losses on the opposition and thereby giving the population the confidence to assist them in future. However, he was unsure whether such positive psywar action would produce the desired results, bearing in mind that 'the informer has always been a feature of Irish revolt' but that this was not the case with the Jews. Wickham could offer no new positive psywar ideas, but he rejected the strong negative psywar approach of Montgomery.
and his supporters,53 which would undermine rather than advance the British position.

In November 1946, the British police advisors studied the Palestine force and its tasks, and proposed to fight unconventional war by an 'intensification of normal procedure and operation .. which includes [the] assistance of the armed forces.' Wickham indicated the importance of local police posts as bases for small unit security patrols, and such an area-deployment pattern followed the examples of interwar Ireland 'and elsewhere', not least Greece where he had instituted this counterterrorist policy during 1945 and 1946. He emphasised that 'the public .. [was] the main source of information', and that it was therefore vital 'to establish friendly relations with the public and obtain its respect and confidence.' This required a reorientation of the Palestine police force from paramilitary to normal civil policing, with particular attention being given to intelligence procurement. He clearly overestimated the effect that the presence of police units could have on a population subjected to intense propaganda and terrorism, but he considered that widespread military pressure was only acceptable in reaction to an 'open rebellion',54 (meaning a mass uprising). Wickham's findings can only have served to underline Cunningham's misgivings about Montgomery's favoured line.

There are claims that Cunningham readily supported large scale/unit military-security operations and other repressive measures, and it is true that he supported a measure of


'punitive' action, especially to retain British morale. But although he threatened coercion, this was to further the indirect strategy of pressuring the Yishuv and especially the Jewish Agency 'to deal with the matter themselves', as both he and the GOC believed that this was the easiest way to resolve the situation. But the Agency proved uncooperative, and from late November to early December 1946, as Wickham wrote his police report for Cunningham's scrutiny, the head of the administration also sought lessons from history. He perspicaciously noted that irregulars in postwar Palestine were unlike the Arab rebels active between 1936 and 1939, and he asserted, in rather broad terms, that there was 'no comparison between that situation and the present.' He concluded that State intimidation then, and in Ireland from 1919 to 1921, had 'not the slightest effect on terrorism and might well increase it.' He insisted that repression would ostracise the 'major section' of the Yishuv who were 'the only feasible weapon for controlling the terrorists', making the COIN task even more difficult. Montgomery protested that, 'I cannot follow such reasoning', but General Barker also took issue with the proposal to resort to wholesale collective punishments which would 'hit a large number of innocents', and while positing that large scale military-security operations would disturb irregular planning and activities, he realised that they could not eliminate Jewish paramilitary forces. Cunningham subsequently stated that the CIGS 'never appreciated that dealing with Jewish terrorists hidden by the whole population was a very different matter to the previous activities of the

55. On Cunningham and coercion, Hurewitz P.281; Begin P.231. HC's actual views, to SSC, 6,12 Dec., in DO(46)33, 20 Nov., SSC to HC, 10 Dec., CO537/1731; HC to SSC, 23 Nov., 5 Dec. 1946, HC Note, 3 Jan. 1947, Cunn. 1/4; GOC view, 21 Nov. 1946, to MELF, Cunn. 1/3, MEC.
Arabs', and he advised London that Montgomery's military approach would be 'ineffective against the type of terrorism' encountered in 1946. Although Cunningham was unable to answer the tantalising question of how to gain the people's active support, he hoped that tactical modifications to present security force policies and better police intelligence work would improve operational results. The local executive clearly did not share some senior officers' firm belief in the prewar COIN model.

Cunningham was equally unconvinced of the merit of releasing detained Jewish leaders and assuring them that large cordon-and-search operations would be suspended, in order to prepare the way for a conference in October 1946. This would throw away a useful political threat and an element of his indirect strategy, and he complained that one-off political 'gestures' were detrimental to the British position, at a time when they could be construed as concessions to terrorism. Cunningham recognised that to have any impact, COIN political action needed to be part of a policy, such as his oft requested increase in Jewish immigration quotas. The GOC agreed that 'no action taken by the military alone can stop terrorism .. [and it] must be in support of some political policy which is not existent at present.' Although Barker visualised a separate political settlement more than dedicated COIN political action, he nonetheless felt that the State was neglecting its 'political weapons', placing an emphasis on COIN different to that of Field-Marshal Montgomery, who was condemned by Cunningham for viewing COIN 'solely from the military point of
The political aspect is in no way considered. The High Commissioner and the GOC reappraised past I.S. doctrine and practice in the light of the failure to eradicate the Jewish insurgents, and the Colonial Office was informed of and agreed with their views, in contrast to the Army establishment.

The IZL flogged two British officers on 29 December 1946, and taken together with its earlier kidnappings and the stalling of the diplomatic effort, London reacted firmly to this blow to British morale and authority. On 1 January 1947, the Cabinet directed Cunningham to pursue 'all possible steps' to improve the I.S. position, and the Chiefs of Staff suggested the adoption of their tough traditional I.S. line. Meeting at the Colonial Office at the beginning of January 1947 to decide on future COIN action, Montgomery and Cunningham were 'at complete variance.' The CIGS pressed for a blanket application of Cost-Benefit policies against what he termed

56. HC on the CIGS, to SSC, 3 Dec. 1946, PREM8/864, Cunn. 1/3; and on reprisals, Note, n.d., Cunn. 4/2; letter to Daily Telegraph, 9 Dec. 1958, Cunn. 5/4. Montgomery on HC views, to VCGS, 2 Dec., 177/9, IWM. HC on Ireland and Palestine examples, Note, 18 Dec., WO216/194; to SSC, tele.'s, 23 Nov., C0537/1731, 2345; WO216/194, PREM8/864, Cunn. 1/1; and HC/GOC on COIN in, MacDonald, CO, to Montgomery, 23 Nov., 211/18, IWM. GOC on action for psywar/morale purposes, BGS/HQPal., for GOC, to GHQMELF, 21 Nov., Cunn. 5/3. HC on positive psywar, 23 Nov. 1946, Cunn. 1/4, MEC.

57. The Cabinet's decision, DO(47)1, 1 January, CAB131/5; Montgomery P.469; CO Brief for SSC, 15 Jan., C0537/3870: COS views, COS(47)2, 2 Jan.; HC, in GHQMELF QHR, 20 Mar., WO261/546. CO/WO in Conf. notes, 3 Jan. 1947, Montgomery, 211/24, IWM, Cunn. 5/4, MEC.

-140-
'terrorism and lawlessness', illustrating his undifferentiated conception of the conflict in progress in Palestine. Although not demonstrating a complete understanding of insurgency, Creech-Jones and Cunningham shared the view that 'terrorism', (or, more precisely, insurgency), 'was quite distinct' from other threats to I.S. in the mandate, suggesting their greater appreciation of the dangers posed by the insurgents than the CIGS. Indeed, Cunningham called for calculated COIN action, rather than the blunt and unsophisticated path favoured by Montgomery, who countered that the High Commissioner was 'definitely wrong.' The CIGS wanted 'large scale country-wide action .. [turning Palestine] upside down .. without waiting for evidence .. [with the land] flooded with mobile columns', and 'the most ruthless methods [applied,] such as razing to the ground of .. most .. villages to get at hidden weapons', thus displaying his faith in the old ways.58 After more than a year of impasse in the mandate, Attlee agreed with Montgomery that Yishuv attitudes were unlikely to change drastically, and with Creech-Jones 'shouted down' in the Cabinet, a directive was sent to Cunningham urging him to take all steps 'as may be necessary' to restore order. Charters notes that the Cabinet was 'inclined to minimise the role of the police', and under pressure from the Cabinet and military officialdom, the High Commissioner publicly warned the Jews of impending 'drastic' action if their assistance was not forthcoming. But he hoped

58. CIGS, SSC, and HC views in, CO Conf. notes, 3 Jan., Montgomery, 211/24, IWM, Cunn. 5/4, MEC. On 1936-9 style I.S. policies, CIGS to CINCMELF, 15 Jan., in Pyman, 6/1/2, LHC. On army action, CDC, DO(47)1, 1 Jan., CAB131/5; Montgomery P.467; CO Brief for SSC, 15 Jan., CO537/3870; CINCMELF to CIGS, 15 Jan., W0216/194; CIGS note, 4 Jan., 210/4, IWM; Jan./Mar. diary notes, 180/1,5, IWM. On its psychological impact, CP(47)3, 15 Jan. 1947, CAB128/9.
that they might yet cooperate in COIN, or with another Agency-led 'Saison', and hoped to cultivate their sympathy by persistently championing increased legal Jewish immigration. Furthermore, following the reorganisation of the police force by January 1947, and months of limited intelligence accumulation, from 30 December 1946 the security forces markedly increased the number of their small unit operations. Cunningham tried to put off action desired by the CIGS for as long as possible, and a leading civil official recorded the administration's conviction that 'every possible chance must be given for Jewish authority to assert itself.'

Adjustment of the COIN military approach in early 1947.

In January and February 1947, a series of security force small unit ambushes, searches and raids took place during Operation OCTOPUS. It did not herald the army's rejection of its existing tactical policy in order to concentrate on developing paraguerilla operations, but the continuing frustration of counterinsurgent offensives led them to experiment with 'sudden swoops onto selected targets rather than the more elaborate searches over a large area.' Much of their activity was still speculative half-hour patrolling of

59. HC on the Yishuv, Agency, and immigration, CO Conf. notes, 3 Jan., ibid; Note, 3 Jan., Cunn. 1/4, Note, 17 Jan., Cunn. 5/1; in Lt.-Gen. G.H.A. MacMillan 'Narrative of events', 3 July 1948, in Stockwell, 6/25/1, LHC. Also on these issues, Under-Sec. E.R. Edmonds, for SSC, to Maj.-Gen. Hollis, WO, 14 Jan., CO537/2269; OAG to SSC, 7 Jan., CO537/2294. Cabinet directive, CM(47)6, 15 Jan., CAB128/9; SSC to HC, 20 Jan., CO537/3870; Charters PHD, P.59. On the PPF, HC note, 3 Jan., Montgomery, 211/1, IWM; Under-Sec., CO, Trafford-Smith, to HC, 10 Jan. 1947, Cunn. 5/4, MEC.
'known blackspots' by platoons, to deter and keep insurgents 'on the run', because tactical intelligence remained 'extremely weak.' But thirty suspects were arrested, and there were some 'antiterrorist slipper patrols' to ambush irregulars, which was an advance on previous military-security tactical policy. The Sixth Airborne HQ noted that, 'the large scale operation .. SHARK .. [failed to achieve success, and this] serves to confirm that .. [a] very small scale raid based on sound intelligence is likely to catch more terrorists than an extensive operation without information.' The GOC commended OCTOPUS, and envisaged the 'suppression of terrorists being a long business', rather than the relatively short-lived affair that proponents of large scale/unit tactics envisaged.60 However, OCTOPUS was flawed in practice by meagre intelligence, and moreover, many local commanding officers failed to appreciate its potential, as was evident in January 1947, when brigade and district army areas were swapped over. This broke existing security force links with members of the Yishuv, and consequently discarded the knowledge which they had acquired about their patrol areas, annoying some army officers. Further, the CIGS evaluated the operational scene in late January and complained that the implementation of 'the new directive [is]
useless.' Thereafter, he badgered the CINCMELF about securing the implementation of more large scale/unit offensives.61

Continuing debate among COIN agencies over the Cost-Benefit line in early 1947.

Concurrent with OCTOPUS, Cunningham tried to advance his indirect strategy by proclaiming that 'plans were in train' to implement Montgomery's tough COIN line. The Jewish Agency responded with an ineffectual 'Little Saison', but on 28 January, Creech-Jones announced that repression was imminent.62 The High Commissioner was under pressure to intensify Cost-Benefit action, and so Operations POLLY and CANTONMENT evacuated non-essential Britons and concentrated the rest into defended areas, as a means of protection against further kidnappings rather than as an integral COIN policy. By 4 February 1947, Cunningham accepted the imposition of statutory martial law in principle, to afford army control of specified areas and the implementation of sterner population-resource control and negative psywar measures; but on the condition that this followed insurgent attacks that created an atmosphere in which such procedures would be more politically acceptable. He also authorised the army to occupy some Jewish houses, as a negative psywar measure as well as to encourage Jewish Agency assistance, admitting that this was 'devised to get that help either by pressures or through willingness.' Then, on 13 February, the British government's search for a Palestine

61. On Army movements, Charters Jewish insurgency P.89: criticism of them, Gale P.171. Montgomery's views, to CINCMELF, 30 Jan. 1947, 211/30, IWM.

political settlement came to an end, and the problem was referred to the U.N. by the Cabinet. With political restraints on the Cost-Benefit line reduced, the course favoured by the Chiefs of Staff was realised — if not wholeheartedly by the High Commissioner. He believed that military control areas were a 'diehard' Army device, and the GOC agreed that they were 'a last resort.' Alternative Hearts-and-Minds policies continued to lie outside Cunningham's grasp, but he consistently warned London that the State could not 'stop terrorism by any military or repressive action alone', and contended, with General Barker's support, that the Cabinet must 'either increase the immigration quota, which gives the only chance of cooperation or .. embark on a period of military repression', with unpredictable consequences. In these circumstances, the GOC foresaw conditions 'only deteriorat[ing]'. He and Cunningham favoured political action instead, and the High Commissioner vowed, 'I will not .. proceed with military control if it can be possibly avoided.' But Creech-Jones retorted that political measures would require a 'period of quiet' to ensure that they could not be perceived as concessions to terrorism and cause an Arab backlash. The pressure on Cunningham became inexorable, and following the murder of 18 troops on 1 March 1947, he inaugurated statutory martial law in major Jewish cities. This involved stringent controls and a suspension of civic services.

for two weeks, 'to bring the greatest possible pressure to bear on all sections of the JEWISH community in order to force them .. to assist the security forces.' Cunningham identified 'the crux' of these negative psywar operations as their impact on Jewish business, but he was not certain whether they could deliver any long term benefit. Only limited information was elicited during the martial law period, while considerable Yishuv hostility was engendered.64 General Barker conjectured that statutory martial law 'should get more [Jewish] cooperation .. and greater willingness to tell us details of the [insurgents] .. this may, however, not be the case.' He was therefore uncertain about negative psywar methods, and he opposed an increase in the number of executions which would undoubtedly anger the Yishuv. But the army HQ staff was willing to test the martial law weapon in preference to simply relying on routine COIN policies. The new GOC from March 1947, Lieutenant-General Gordon H.A. MacMillan, also preached firmness, urging that the State had to bring 'home to the Jewish psychology by strong armed and economic pressure and coercion' the importance of their cooperation. However, he too warned against 'military dictatorship', in view of the fact that since only an estimated one percent of Jews were

64. All /ref's in CO537/. HC on martial law, to SSC, 14 Feb., and with GOC, 20 Feb., /2234; to SSC, 24 Feb., /2294. GOC, Security Conf., 23 Feb., Cunn. 4/1. Political action, HC/GOC, to SSC, 20 Feb., HC to SSC, 3,9 Mar., SSC to HC, 27 Mar., /2234; HC to SSC, 14 Mar., /2299; 29 Apr., /2294; On the Yishuv's attitude, to SSC, 2 Mar., /2299. Army views, Conf., 5 Feb., Cunn. 4/2: action, CM(47)33, 27 Mar., CO537/2334; HQPal. Report, 30 Mar., WO261/566. HC on psywar, to SSC, 16 Mar., /2299; Conf., 5 Feb. 1947, Cunn. 4/2, MEC; RIIA notes, 22 July 1948, Cunn., 8303/104-26, NAM.

-146-
participating in the insurgency, the government must avoid being manoeuvred into a harsh reaction to terrorism that would alienate the rest.\textsuperscript{65} Despite his own circumspection, Cunningham also agreed to investigate the prospects of the traditional strict Cost-Benefit line.

Operations ELEPHANT and HIPPOMINIMUS [sic.] carried out in March 1947 netted many insurgents and their supporters, and this 'punitive' action lead to a short term influx of information to the security forces. Further, Charters notes that, judging by the diminished incidence of insurgent violence in the following months, they were 'apparently a major blow' to the insurgents. Indeed, the Joint Planning Staff in London studied the possibility of extending military-control areas nationally, following the 1938 example. However, the new CINCMELF from July, General Sir John T. Crocker, reflected that the army's modus operandi was now a course of 'last resort', and sterner army control methods were discounted on the grounds of their predicted ineffectiveness, drain on manpower, and the likelihood of a violent Arab reaction. At this time, Cunningham also extended the scope of his analytical vision to the War, and criticised such plans on account that 'not even Nazi ruthlessness' defeated underground movements, which he equated to the Jewish insurgent organisation. By the summer of 1947, General MacMillan also accepted that popular support

\textsuperscript{65} On martial law, HQPal. note, 5 Feb., W0275/36; Barker to HC, 3 Feb. 1947, in Stockwell, 6/1; MacMillan, 'Narrative', 3 July 1948, 6/25/1, LHC; Appreciation, 23 Mar., W0261/666; guesstimate of active insurgent support, CM(47)33; HC note, 27 Mar. 1947, PREM8/864.
would not be attained by the traditional Cost-Benefit line. Statutory martial law was invoked again in July and August, but this was primarily to maintain security force morale in response to more insurgent atrocities.

The Army considered its COIN line during the summer months, while Cunningham re-stated the differences he saw between the prewar Arab rebels and the current Jewish insurgents. He contrasted their disparate military tactics and organisational structures, as well as the general Jewish distaste for political violence vis-a-vis past Arab support for it. Hence, he concluded that persuasion rather than overt pressure was required to persuade the Yishuv to oppose it. To


67. On the use of statutory martial law for morale, HC to SSC, 4 Aug., CO537/2299; 7 Aug. 1947, Cunn. 2/2, MEC.
devise more effectual COIN policies he diligently sought further historical guidance, yet derived nothing of importance from the Irish COIN of 1919 to 1921 or the Burmese revolt of 1930 to 1934, commenting that it was 'not possible to compare theiable situations' with Palestine. He listed dissimilarities between irregulars and their infrastructures, the Burmese possessing a relatively weak organisation and tactical methods, while the Jews were 'trained in .. underground tactics employed in wartime Europe.' His unusual reference to partisan warfare did not immediately spark new COIN ideas, although Cunningham noted that, within local COIN agencies the 'search for novel action is continuous.' The High Commissioner's concerns were shared within the army in Palestine, and Colonel Norman, its head of intelligence, declared in July, 'how [the insurgents] .. are going to be eradicated, I don't know.' Moreover, the HQ's Chief of Staff, Brigadier John M. Kirkman, provided supplementary counsel to units in the summer of 1947, for their 'interest, information and guidance.' He was conversant with Greek COIN efforts during 1945 and 1946, but he was obviously unable to suggest any lessons from this conflict, distributing only the HQ's own 'Notes on the Arab Rebellion 1936-9.' Kirkman added that 'recent experience has enabled us to improve on the procedure recommended', and the Palestine HQ emphasised the value of employing air support and night operations. However, these Notes focussed on recounting the prewar Arab campaign and the British response to it, and recommended using the War Office's 1934 Notes, and 'N.W.F.[rontier] principles' adapted

68. HC, Memo, to SSC, 19 July 1947, Cunn. 2/1, MEC; Begin, P.321,329. On the development of COIN ideas, HC to SSC, 4 Aug. 1947, CO537/2299.
to Palestine. The local army Command recognised that its guidance had limitations, but was unable to devise any substitute policies. And the idea of developing COIN policy through the application of wartime experience initially came from outside the ranks of the military.

New tactical military-security policies and counter-terrorism proposals up to the spring of 1947.

Administration officials sanctioned unorthodox military-security operations by the SNS in 1938 and 1939, and during the War they originated an indirect counter-rebellion strategy, pressing the Agency to curb rebel Jewish elements. During 1946 the Jewish Agency resisted overtures from Cunningham to organise a programme against the insurgents. But he became exasperated by the shortcomings of COIN policies and was under intense pressure from his superiors to take effective action by January 1947, and thus he suggested to Agency officials that they act against the IZL and LHI, while the authorities would 'turn a blind eye to whatever the Haganah might do.' Cunningham also referred to the action of British Special Constables between 1939 and 1945 to propose a counterterrorist population protection force led by the Palmach. Both proposals were imaginative and recognised the need for active Jewish COIN participation. But Cunningham initially conceived operations directed by the Agency, probably incorporating paraterrorism,

69. CoS, Brig. J. Kirkman notes, 2 Sept., and HQPal. G(Trg), 'Notes', incorporating three reports by 8 Inf. Div./HQPal. of 1937-9, W0275/111. Kirkman was formerly with BMM(G) and LFGHQ, see Appendix 1. Col. Norman, lecture, July, 87/57/2, IWM. There was hardly any use made of air support from 1945 to 1947, although it was advocated in WO 1934 Notes, and as in, 1 Inf. Div. ISI7, 1 Oct. 1947, W0261/182.
as an alternative to the reshaping of British military-security policies, rather than as a point of departure from which to develop government unorthodox COIN methods. In the event, the plan was discarded on the Attorney-General's advice that it would be legally 'very tricky.' Nonetheless, the High Commissioner was evidently inspired by the idea, retaining an interest in the indirect strategy and in new forces during 1947. He favoured the formation of Jewish 'watchmen' to defend the Yishuv, a scheme similar to the 'Home Guard' created in Greece in October 1946 with the War Office's assent. The Service Department did not press Jerusalem to adopt the policy in Palestine, but Jewish self-protection units were approved by January 1948, albeit in the face of Arab rather than Jewish violence. Moreover, in the period during which the Mandatory resorted to 'strong-arm' military tactics from March 1947, Cunningham became convinced of the desirability of security force trials in unorthodox military-security operations, and he observed that 'the search for new methods is continuous.' He defended Wickham's view that in general the police should not be diverted from their prescribed 'normal duties', but he accepted some experimentation in principle. Hoffman notes that the venture with unorthodox forces in Palestine during the spring of 1947 represents a shift in police COIN practice, rather than in Army thought, but the War Office also helped to
develop the new tactical policy, and this clearly reflected a wider British military interest in non-conventional warfare at the time.

From 1945 there was growing curiosity in the Army about unorthodox forces, and broadly in unconventional war, despite 'hostility in some parts of the military establishment.' A War Office Directorate of Tactical Investigation committee was formed in 1945, following pressure on the CIGS and other officers by 'Calvert, Franks and other senior' SAS soldiers, who wanted unorthodox units for wartime and particular I.S. roles. It 'analysed the history of all such units, with a view to formulating future policy', and the Committee stated that the SAS was the best example for intelligence-based small unit patrol. Its re-constitution was recommended in September 1946,

70. HC on indirect action, to SSC, 8,29 Apr., Cunn. 1/4; to SSC, 6 June, Cunn. 1/2, MEC. HC/Attorney-General on new methods, Security Conf.'s, 5 Feb., and Agency attitude, 7 Feb., Cunn. 4/1; HC to SSC, 16 Mar., CO537/2299. HC states that a local Tel Aviv 'watchmen' scheme is 'significant', note, 28 May 1947, Cunn. 1/4; to SSC, 6 Jan. 1948, CO537/3852. HC on Wickham, in W.W. Clark, CO note, 12 Feb. 1947, CO537/2270. Hoffman PHD, P.131. On Greece, see Chapter 4.
and this occurred a year later. Further, the War Office and the Chiefs of Staff approved of 'commandos' for Greek COIN in late 1946. Apart from this official interest, the influential military journals featured guerilla war and COIN, and there were many popular works on the Chindit expeditions. The Indian Army's foremost journal regarded I.S. duties as 'distasteful' but warned that they would be 'at least as numerous and serious' as before the War, and it therefore considered that 'inten[se]' study of existing doctrine was necessary. However,


others discerned that the war years held potential lessons for I.S., and writing about the conflict in the Netherlands East Indies in 1946, Major P.N. Moore proposed policies that departed from War Office I.S. doctrine. He compared the Indonesian insurgent organisation and campaign to wartime Resistance, as guerillas aimed to form 'liberation' zones and an alternative regime, while popular support was built upon military success and propaganda. Major Moore urged, 'let us profit from the lessons taught us in Europe', and he proposed a politico-military response, at the heart of which was the need to 'get the politics right.' He wanted propaganda to raise pro-government levels of support, and catalogued the consequences of Nazi repression to question the negative psywar approach. He did not elaborate Hearts-and-Minds policies, but the Cost-Benefit line was criticised. Further, although he supported encirclement tactics, he also commended the German development of air-supplied small units designed for the ambush of guerillas on their favoured supply routes. Moore did not rework the German concept into a new paraguerilla theory, but he proposed army units operating from strategic bases to 'control the surrounding country by active patrolling in strength', following the example of 'the Chindit organisation.' Thus, he promoted the pressurisation of guerillas by continuous offensive operations with highly mobile troops acting on intelligence. In addition, Moore favoured control measures including a 'series of operations pinching out food producing areas' for food-denial, and garrisons stationed in villages to stifle the growth of the insurgent organisation, because 'without it no guerilla can function effectively.' Finally, he recommended that all COIN action should be executed in a single strategic plan. These were astute proposals and the Army Quarterly's 'Editorial' noted that 'most .. of his
arguments seem logical and sound', implicitly supporting the adaptation of the Army's COIN line. Although the influence of this treatise on British counterinsurgents cannot be gauged, some new COIN thought was evidently emerging.

The Indonesian rebellion was opposed with familiar I.S. policies in the winter of 1945 to 1946, but some army officers experimented with unorthodox forces and pursued small unit patrolling in 1946. Lieutenant R. 'Turk' Westerling drew on his experience with the SOE, Commandos, and Chindits, to train native forces for lengthy infiltration into the jungle where irregulars were active, and to ambush them on information from tribes-people and captives. Westerling procured this by adopting a heterogeneous line, comprising basic civic action, such as befriending locals and giving them medical aid and trinkets, in addition to counterterrorist protection; and if this failed to produce intelligence, he was not averse to adopting the Asian tradition of the beheading and public display of dead irregulars. This gained insurgent surrenders and information, and he even 'turned' some opponents for use in a pseudoguerrilla role. However, although he devised some innovative and valuable military-security tactics, Westerling also experienced 'differences of opinion .. [with his] British superiors.' He disagreed with the policy of collective punishment, which would alienate innocent people, (an advance

on the British Army's preferred psywar approach), but senior British officers rejected Westerling's extreme brand of military action in 1946. Nevertheless, small unit patrolling by former SOE men also defeated Kuomintang guerilla bands in Malaya in the spring of 1946. It is unclear whether security force personnel in Palestine were aware of such episodes, but some tried to adapt techniques devised during the War for COIN usage by 1947.

In early 1947, following Cabinet pressure to 'tak[e] every possible step' to defeat the insurgents, the Palestine Police Inspector-General, Colonel Gray, proposed innovation in military-security tactical policy. Undoubtedly inspired by his own wartime Commando experience, and with the High Commissioner's knowledge, Gray asked his assistant, Major Bernard E. Fergusson—who had fought with the SAS and Chindits, and in Palestine in 1937 and 1938—to suggest new tactics. Fergusson looked to recent military history for stimulation, referring to the prewar Arab guerillas and Wingate's 'Gideon Force' of 1941. Moreover, he drew on wartime Burma to suggest air support to enhance the mobility of ground forces. Yet he felt 'destitute of ideas' for countering urban terrorism and guerilla warfare, and in March 1947 he therefore consulted

others who were seasoned in unconventional war. The War Office Directorate of Military Operations supported his search for the 'small number of officers who have both technical and psychological knowledge of terrorism having themselves been engaged in similar operations on the terrorist side' in the War. Bevin endorsed the application of such 'know-how', both in Palestine and, six months later, in Greece. The Home Office was unable to provide any expert assistance, but the SIS was consulted by the Colonial Office, and the department agreed to employ three officers trained in 'special operations' and guerilla war - they had been in the SAS, SOE and SIS - which met with the approval of the Director of Military Operations, Major-General A.D. Ward. Thus, officials in all COIN agencies now accepted the potential value of wartime experience for COIN, and sought men with the appropriate background.

In practice, two army officers organised twenty Palestine Police constables - half of whom were ex-SAS or Commandos themselves - into small units in the middle of March 1947. Fergusson fostered new tactical thinking, and in what was a

75. Fergusson P.28,72,142,184; Horne P.558.

first step towards the development of paraguerilla action, his force's role was 'not to terrorise or repay in kind, but anticipate and give a bloody nose' to attackers. The concept required refinement, as short duration covert foot and motor patrols were deployed to gather information and lay ambushes, but prolonged area patrolling based on contact intelligence was not evolved.  

Hoffman has criticised the rationale behind the employment of personnel who had themselves only grappled with conventional Nazi formations rather than with urban guerillas or terrorists. But they had engaged in unconventional warfare against the Axis, and their experience furnished them with a potentially valuable insight into the organisation and employment of insurgent forces, which could have been utilised to frame tactics in the light of perceived irregular weaknesses. In fact, operations were flawed by inadequate contact intelligence, and because, in view of the Cabinet's demands for quick results and of the declining security position, insufficient attention was paid either to it or to tactical methods. Indeed, it is possible that summary justice was resorted to in order to achieve swift 'success'. One squad's commander, Captain Roy Farran, a member of the Second SAS Regiment in 1944, remarked later that the administration itself was unsure of his units' role; probably reflecting Cunningham's indecision about the legality of paraterrorism, and the broader influence of the Wickham report which discouraged abnormal police practices. Farran stated that '[we acted] as we pleased', and Lapping asserts that paraterrorism was sanctioned by the State: In May 1947, Captain Farran was accused of the abduction and murder of an insurgent. He was tried, and acquitted in December, although the CID were

convinced that the kidnapping was his work. However, the Chief Secretary, Henry Gurney, (who became a central figure in Malayan COIN), declared that police units were empowered only to use 'ordinary police methods', and so paraterrorism was probably not established as an official policy. Nonetheless, COIN authorities in the mandate and the mother country agreed to experiment with new tactical ideas based on wartime unorthodox forces, and some senior Army sources supported this.

A month after the formation of the new unorthodox force, Gray wrote to Lieutenant-General Richard N. Gale, commanding officer of the First Infantry Division, about the possibility of extending the experiment, and inspired by this, 'for the first time, army patrols left main roads and tracks. Efficient ambushes in constantly changing locations were placed.' Charters notes that tactical improvements were unit-specific and never permeated the army as a whole, but Operation MAGNET from May to June 1947 was acclaimed by the Palestine HQ as an advance in military-security tactics. It involved the deployment of 'strong fighting patrols to operate off [the] roads' as 'ambush parties to intercept terrorists', and to undertake 'sudden swoops on small selected targets.' Gray suggested that 'if a smaller number of men .. [were] introduced in a more clandestine manner .. and if these tactics were introduced all over PALESTINE, terrorist planning would be difficult', and contacts should increase. However, the 'Farran Case' erupted in May 1947, and Fergusson's Forces were promptly disbanded. Moreover, as a result of Farran's controversial activities, there was intense media and public pressure on the
British authorities and a minor political outcry; all hardly conducive to convincing the higher levels of the State to support greater COIN unorthodoxy. Those devising tactical policy in Palestine displayed a fair degree of creativity, but the circumstances in which new ideas were implemented militated against their being generally assimilated by the British Army or incorporated into new COIN doctrine. Following the Farran episode, the security forces made no further attempt to develop new tactical policies. They proceeded with their COIN operational routine and the infrequent declaration of military-control areas, until the effective end of the COIN in October 1947. Thereafter, the army and police undertook riot duties and self-defence although the I.S. threat was not officially re-

defined as intercommunal violence until mid-December 1947.79

The state of COIN doctrine in Palestine during 1947.

Army training for I.S. duties in Palestine continued on the basis of standing doctrine, supplemented by tactical lessons from the local HQ. 80 But it recognised by early 1947 that the turnover of formations often resulted in the loss of newly acquired knowledge. Therefore, the army produced 'Notes for Officers acting in Aid of the Civil Power', as an advance on the 9/13 pamphlet, and worked on a new 'training pamphlet [and] .. form of battle drill.' A draft was circulated by April and 'Combined military and police action' was published in June. This tactical doctrine was co-authored with police officers and was distributed to all 'platoon commanders and junior police ranks' during the summer. Some army formations criticised the early draft copy, for instance, the Sixth Airborne Division HQ, which commented that it must have been


written by officers who had no I.S. experience! But it was hardly amended at all, and embodied previous doctrine on control measures, short duration small unit multipurpose patrol, riot control, and large and small scale search methods. However, minor advances were made regarding the accommodation of the media by the security forces, and its de-emphasis of the role of mobile columns. And the form of the pamphlet itself, as the first doctrine designed explicitly for both police and military usage,81 demonstrates a general recognition that this unusual type of rebellion demanded a more uniform and coordinated security force response.

Some agencies became increasingly aware of the media's role in the conflict, and Cunningham commented in January 1947 that 'far more publicity of the nature of the problem and exactly what the Army [we]re trying to do' was needed. Yet, he failed to translate his understanding of the value of basic counterpropaganda into a directive to the Central Office of Information to devise a campaign, probably because he bore in mind the hostile attitude of Whitehall officials to peacetime political propaganda. It was not until August that the army began to forward reports of its operational successes to Jerusalem for inclusion in the Office's still limited propaganda, and the GSI chief, responsible for army Public Relations policy, admitted, '[[it is] one part of my job I do

not really care for.' While the army gradually appreciated the need for counterpropaganda and improved links with media correspondents, these matters were given low priority. Therefore, the army made a minor advance in terms of its non-military concerns in 1947, but the overall propaganda effort was of limited COIN value.

High level development of I.S. doctrine in summer 1947.

During the last year of COIN in Palestine, the Cabinet's Overseas Defence Committee, consisting of senior representatives of all British COIN agencies, reviewed overall imperial defence preparations, since 'experiences of the recent war show that it now needs considerable revision.' The Colonial Office was called on to examine I.S. arrangements, and its review ran parallel to a similar investigation by the War Office Military Training Branch. The military study of I.S. possibly reflected a degree of anxiety about the army's difficulties in Palestine as well as an interest in developments there. In the spring of 1947, Lieutenant-Colonel


C.A. Wigham worked on a draft I.S. doctrine, and it was amended by Lieutenant-Colonel C.P. Warren and Colonial Office officials. The resulting 'Internal Security Duties 1947' was ratified by the Colonial, Home and War Offices as 'a military training manual .. for the guidance of military officers in the UK and overseas', and further, as a 'common doctrine' for the use of 'all units' of the security forces, both within the Empire and in 'occupied countries and other foreign territories', hence including Greece. It was the first truly universal British I.S. doctrine, and several hundred copies were ordered for colonial governments by Creech-Jones. The 'Duties' document of 1947 was discussed by the Colonial and War Offices in the winter of 1947 to 1948, and was the precursor to the latter's I.S. doctrine printed in June 1949. However, Britain's COIN role in Greece was over by then, and the unpublished copy available before 1949 offered no radical new thinking. Indeed, it was designed to 'combine and supercede the earlier booklets "Notes on Imperial Policing, 1934" and "Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, 1937"', and it repeated much of their contents verbatim. The War Office Branch additionally carried out a 'study of evidence of the past' and 'experience gained in overseas commands', especially in 'India and the Middle East', and stated that I.S. 'methods must never be stereotyped' and that 'study and training somewhat outside the normal vision of military commanders' was required to devise I.S. schemes. It identified various forms of 'unrest', and commented on the 'difficulty of codifying rules for the conduct of troops' when countering opponents ranging from


-164-
'small mobs to highly organised, armed insurrection with terrorism and sabotage.' But existing War Office I.S. doctrine was not contradicted, and the 'correct' response to rebel irregulars was said to include large mobile columns and large scale, time-limited, set-planned offensives based on police intelligence, or in its absence, either on a speculative basis or, as Callwell advocated, by employing a 'tempting bait' of a convoy to draw irregulars to battle. Security forces were to clear areas of armed opposition simultaneously, or gradually if insufficient manpower was available, and such operations were judged to be 'usually successful.' The paper demonstrated an ignorance of the complexities of modern guerilla warfare and terrorism, and in spite of the shortcomings of old policies executed in Palestine these were not repudiated. The CIGS's view that constraints imposed on the Cost-Benefit line by the Cabinet led to its failure in practice was evidently shared. In September 1947, War and Colonial Office officials rejected the idea of nation-wide martial law in Palestine, but the 1947 pamphlet backed the negative psywar approach, asserting that collective punishment would bolster government supporters and pressurise its enemies. Indeed, it proposed 'military coercion' of the people by widespread searches and demolitions like those implemented in Palestine


in 1947, and also forced labour and even hostage-taking as a means to prevent insurgents undertaking kidnaps and road mining.87 These methods mirrored recent Nazi practices and also previous COIN action in Ireland during 1921.

The War Office's 'I.S. Duties 1947' incorporated some advances in I.S. thought, such as its recommendation for 'systematic dissemination of accurate information and fair commentary on the situation' by the government. This reflected the current view of the army in Palestine that propaganda for 'influencing public opinion' was a crucial element of COIN which the Civil Power must organise.88 Further, the manual underlined the importance of decentralised operational control and noted that military-security operations were 'more often of platoons than companies', probably alluding to the late growth of small unit activity in Palestine, although large scale/unit tactics were not displaced as the preferred policy. Regarding the police role in COIN, its authors clearly bore in mind the campaigns in Palestine and Ireland to conclude that, 'experience has shown' that a civil rather than a paramilitary force was the most suitable. Additionally, the 1947 draft proposed counterterrorist 'keeps' to protect loyalists, echoing their appearance several decades before in the South African War and recently in Palestine, as well as in the recommendations of the War Office's Irish Record. Moreover, the new I.S. work advocated 'central and local i.s. committees charged with reviewing plans for general and military action', pointing out the importance of attending to extra-military and


-166-
operational issues within a central COIN planning body. A committee system was evolved in the mandate in 1946, but 'IS Duties 1947' advised further reorganisation in the intelligence sphere, suggesting either the introduction of a single agency, or efficient liaison officers, to remedy an evident deficiency of Britain's latest COIN campaign. The manual also stressed the need for peacetime civil-military-police training ready for future emergencies,\textsuperscript{89} recognising that Britain might well meet similar threats and required better preparations than hitherto to defeat them.

**Summary.**

There was a continuing internal debate in the War Office over operational aspects of I.S. policy, the DMO supporting an experiment in unorthodox operations in Palestine during the spring of 1947, while the political uproar that it caused allowed its opponents in the DMT- responsible for I.S. doctrinal development- to champion accepted I.S. wisdom. Most British counterinsurgents advocated the traditionalist I.S. line during the COIN campaign, and few developed their thinking beyond simple 'Imperial-policing' terms. Any petition by Colonial Office officials for a review of Cost-Benefit policies in the light of the failure of repression fell on stony ground. Hence, although Montgomery fought a losing battle over the COIN line in Palestine before 1947, he won the war over War Office I.S. doctrine that year. Nonetheless, some COIN agencies were developing new COIN practices in Greece by that time, such as unorthodox forces and counterterrorist protection measures,


-167-
with mounting support from the authorities in the United Kingdom, including senior War Office officials. The British involvement with COIN in Greece gave Whitehall departments another opportunity both to refine familiar I.S. policies and to develop new ones for COIN, and to devise a dedicated COIN doctrine.
Chapter 4: Innovation versus status quo in British COIN policies and doctrine, 1945-9, with special regard to the British 'minimal commitment' to Greece.

Britain's political, economic and strategic interests in Greece ensured its involvement with the COIN campaign there from 1945 to 1949, and during these years various British agencies began to understand insurgency as a distinctive type of revolt. Britons rarely participated in operations themselves and did not assume the primary responsibility for planning and executing them. Nevertheless, they acquired an influential role as operational counsellors and consultants, which was authorised by the Cabinet, although never publicly acknowledged. A new British COIN doctrine was not devised on the basis of the experience gained by those operating on the ground in Greece, but numerous original policies and principles were developed: a fact not previously appreciated.

Details of I.S. conditions in Greece are outlined in order to indicate how the threat confronting the British evolved, and because their perceptions of it conditioned their actions during the Greek conflict. The state of disorder in Greece was encouraged by the native Communist Party, the KKE, which adopted a dual strategy for achieving political power, consisting of constitutional agitation and secret preparations for revolutionary action if the legal option failed. It took advantage of post-hostilities social conditions to foster sedition against consecutive Greek regimes, and this developed into insurgency by the winter of 1945 to 1946. There is historiographical debate about the KKE's preferred course of action, but it boasted a revolutionary heritage, and allowed

the initiation of insurgency by communist activists in 1946.

The Foreign Office Southern Department and the Cabinet were convinced that the KKE and its National Liberation Front-National Popular Liberation Front [EAM-ELAS] affiliates were a threat to Greece, and from 1943 to 1944 the Left attempted a violent seizure of political power. But the ELAS commander, George Siantos, convinced the KKE to make a more peacable presentation of its demands, and on 2 July 1944 it publicised its proposals for the 'sharing' of positions of authority. These would actually have handed it control, and the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, and the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, were determined to prevent this and to establish a democracy that supported Imperial interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, by November the Foreign Office and local intelligence sources predicted a KKE 'coup d'etat' attempt and pressed for the despatch of an expeditionary force to forestall it; a course the Cabinet approved. The Party's actual intentions at this juncture are unclear because 'the evidence .. means what the particular author wants it to mean', with Siantos favouring a lawful path, and Ares Velouchiotis and other influential comrades advocating the use of armed force. But Nikos Zachariades, (who subsequently became

2. N.B.- Hereafter, all 'R' ref's are in FO371/. On the KKE and the coup threat, 'D' BLU report, Dec. 1943, to FO, R1019/43650; FO minute, Second Sec., Sir Denis Laskey, 28 Aug., R13102/43691; Ambassador R. Leeper, to FO, R17752/43695; Middle East IR, 14 Nov. 1944, in, General Sir R.M. Scobie Diaries, 82/17/1, IWM.

the KKE leader in May 1945), supported a dual approach, thereby masking communist intentions.\(^4\) Whichever was the favoured route, confronted by Rightist paramilitaries in December 1944, the KKE staged a rebellion that led to heavy clashes between British troops and ELAS, and the Foreign Office reiterated its perception of a future communist subversive threat to Greece.\(^5\)

The ELAS was subjugated by January 1945, but within a short time the KKE orchestrated sedition 'to foment .. disorder',\(^6\) whilst considering its future alternatives. This was carried out by uncoordinated communist regional cells and consisted of political subversion and sporadic terrorism aimed mainly at consolidating the Party's hold in various regions. Following the failed rebellion it might have been 'too stunned to exploit the situation, .. faced by 80,000 British troops.' But by June, the politbureau propagated a 'self-defence' underground organisation for the masses, or 'aftoamyna', which


\(^5\) FO minute, Sir D. Laskey, 10 Dec. 1944, R20361/43697.

\(^6\) On the start of the sedition, Woodhouse Apple P.234.
retained arms and tried to build up political support, thereby giving the Central Committee more options during a period of flux. Further, from the spring of 1945, Velouchiotis inspired irregular groups attacking Right-wing forces and those elements of the Greek security forces engaged in terrorism. He claimed to have started an armed revolution, but these independent bands comprised only a twenty-five percent pro-communist membership, and they displayed limited objectives and capabilities amounting to social banditry rather than a revolt. In the months before the end of the War, the security forces were additionally confronting brigands and irregular groups engaged in internecine conflict. Furthermore, in the light of Britain's support for the Greek State in 1945, the Communist Party intensified the sedition, and it 'had ... revolutionary aspects and use[d] revolutionary methods ... a simulacrum of revolution.' This state of endemic violence was the basis upon which British personnel were assigned to devise I.S. schemes; a situation which would have been recognisable to


-173-
any Briton familiar with northern India or southern Arabia.

Churchill made a limited commitment to Greece in early 1945, promising to assist both with postwar reconstruction and the framing of a new constitution and electoral system. The dire state of the United Kingdom's finances prevented a very large aid package, but the British Government's opposition to communism was implacable, and on 12 March, the Cabinet approved material and advisory support, including economic, law enforcement and military missions to provide guidance on essential organisational and policy matters. This led to their entanglement in the business of COIN after 1945.

Britain's aid effort was directed by a multi-agency Missions Coordination Committee, chaired by the GOC, Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald M. Scobie, from April to July 1945, and then weekly by the ambassador, who shouldered ultimate responsibility for all British assistance efforts. In this unique position, where the UK advised another European nation-state on I.S. matters, the Foreign Office played a key role as, together with police and Service personnel, its officials became involved in the evolution of British COIN thought. The ambassador, Sir Reginald Leeper, kept the Foreign Office up to date with appreciations from local sources, including those of the British Police and Prisons Mission [BPPM] and its forerunner, the British Civil Police Unit [BCPU], formed in December 1944, as well as the Allied Information Service [AIS] and the Military Attache. Some were forwarded to the Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff and their committees, and to other

Departments including the Colonial and War Offices, which also followed concurrent I.S. developments in Palestine. The War Office additionally received the reports of the British Military Mission to Greece [BMM(G)], formed in January 1945 from an existing army Liaison Unit. Despatches from the RAF Delegation to Greece [RAFDG] and its earlier Unit, also created in 1945, arrived at the Air Ministry. These agencies became important players in Greek COIN, and their views on the KKE threat were the foundation for the British development of an understanding of insurgency.

**Perceptions of the I.S. threat to Greece in 1945, and reactions to it: British political organs.**

From the war years through to February 1946, the Allied Information Service produced reports on the situation in Greece that were circulated in Whitehall. Although not easily digestible and offering less than concise analyses of the KKE's activities, these communications gave an accurate description of the Party's organisation and noted that ELAS was not 'only an army but an idea, and [that] one cannot effectively be disarmed without the other.' The Service understood that the communists could manipulate existing socio-economic and political injustices to raise mass support through their legal endeavours and, simultaneously, by campaigns of political subversion and terrorism. It informed the Foreign Office that popular grievances must be addressed to deflect the appeal of communism, and that the government could not beat it solely by taking military action. AIS reports also described the KKE's

propaganda and urged the formulation of counterpropaganda to end the Greek people's 'ignorance [of State policies] .. and distortion' of them by the KKE. Further, the Service attested to the need for action against the KKE's legal and underground infrastructure that disseminated its propaganda. Detailed counterorganisation methods were not outlined by the AIS, but London was forewarned that 'British soldiers cannot be expected and are certainly not qualified to unearth and crush [it]'. Army intelligence units in Greece added that the afťoamyna's 'underground nature .. [means that] a new intelligence technique is required to deal with this .. which may be a foretaste [of the future KKE method of operation]' Hence, by the start of 1945, the Foreign and War Offices were notified about the inherent difficulty of identifying KKE clandestine supporters, the Party's likely use of propaganda in a future rebellion, and the necessity of counteraction aimed at both the instrument's source and effects.

In the spring of 1945, the ambassador agreed with AIS reports that 'large masses [were] under the influence of KKE propaganda or violence .. [and therefore were] fearful of cooperating with the government.' By February, the Service had predicted that the communists would instigate political terrorism to increase their support and force the population into submission. It proposed to prevent this by deterrent patrols of a 'special police force' on an area-deployment pattern- the counterterrorist policy employed in Ireland. But the AIS went further, endorsing a locally-initiated Greek

12. AIS reports to FO, 2 Jan., R917/48246; Col. Johnstone, (BLO), and AIS, 27 Jan. 1945, R21981/43700, R2689/48254.

population protection scheme incorporating civilian self-defence militias. Other British institutions withheld their support for it at first, on the grounds of the project's supposed political impropriety in taking over a proper function of the police.\textsuperscript{14} However, by April officials in Britain and Greece responsible for political matters shared a basic conception of political subversion and terrorism, and realised that novel counteraction was vital to prevent communist gains, and also to increase the level of intelligence provision by the people.\textsuperscript{15}

The AIS informed its superiors that the KKE would probably attempt another 'coup', but also warned that the Party was 'building up in secret, the armed strength .. to seize and enforce control' through a prolonged rebellion. It advised the need for military-security operations based on a 'country wide intelligence service, to provide both political and military


information [on irregular] bands', appreciating that both background detail on the politico-military character of the opposition and contact intelligence for security force operations was required. The amalgamation of guerilla warfare with the assorted policy instruments of sedition into a revolt was not foreseen by the AIS, but in early 1945 it pressed for 'effective military and police forces .. competent administration .. a propaganda organisation .. to instruct the public .. [and] .. constructive economy, finance and supply policy.'\textsuperscript{17} The Service did not furnish the Foreign Office with a clear view of the I.S. threat, but it propounded the importance of organs and policies to invalidate the communist activities it described, and forwarded familiar and innovative proposals to this end, which met with the approval of other local British authorities.

**Perceptions of the I.S. threat to Greece in 1945, and reactions to it: British military-security organs.**

At the beginning of 1945, the Supreme Allied Commander [SAC], Mediterranean, General Harold Alexander, described conditions in Greece for the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He understood the impact of terrorism on the masses, and proposed to clear all areas of irregulars gradually using area-deployed forces. Moreover, Alexander, who had been interested in guerilla warfare and unorthodox units during the War, suggested


\textsuperscript{17} AIS reports, to FO, 14 Feb., R3353/48256; 7 Feb. 1945, R3397/48256.
that guards should 'maintain [the] authority of [the] Government, and law and order, in each area as cleared thus relieving .. regular forces .. to deal with subsequent areas.' This idea stemmed from the fact that Greece could not muster adequate military manpower to dominate all areas afflicted by irregulars at once, which was the offensive military-security strategy preferred by the British Army. Nonetheless, the SAC's proposal for 'Clear-and-Hold' offered a foundation for resolving the problem of how to dispose of many widely distributed small guerilla bands, and this concept was relayed to the Chiefs of Staff and the War Office. It was affirmed by the GOC, Scobie, although he wrote in more familiar terms that the Greek situation was like 'the Northwest Frontier all over again', exemplifying the pervasive influence of this theatre on many experienced British military men. Indeed, his leaning to traditional I.S. wisdom was evident when he opposed an original Greek proposal of 21 March 1945, to deploy armed civilians to hold cleared areas. However, this was because he believed that the KKE could brandish civilian as opposed to police law-enforcement as evidence of government bankruptcy in its propaganda, indicating that Scobie had an uncommon appreciation of non-military I.S. matters for a soldier.


The Land Forces Greece HQ, responsible for the British army garrison and the BMM(G), also outlined the danger. Its staff noted that the extreme Left maintained a 'lie low' posture, and that although they aspired to electoral victory, if this was not attained they would start a rebellion

'by means of espionage, propaganda and sabotage. [The former elements] demand. [no] special measures apart from normal security countermeasures. [but] sabotage is vastly different. To effectively control the activities of ELAS supporters or even to establish their identity is an almost impossible task. A campaign would necessitate heavy g[uard] commitments and the adoption of a drastic system of civilian control.'

The Land Forces' counteraction proposals included population-resource controls, 'e.g. curfew', which British troops were authorised to enforce 'in emergency.' In April 1945, a report by the HQ's Captain Cassavetti, stated that the people were in 'a state of mental terrorisation organised by 2 or 3 inhabitants of a village or a descent from the hills by guerillas.' To remedy these conditions, he recommended summary trials of armed militants, and 'some form of combined action to meet the exceptional needs of the situation', based upon emergency powers. The 'measures necessary' for success were outlined as an intelligence officer with information on irregulars, 'a striking force to mop up armed bands in the hills. [but also] simultaneously, [a] National Guard deployed to establish order in each area as it is freed.' In addition to tried and tested I.S. wisdom, he repeated the atypical and astute strategy favoured by Alexander, and in a like vein, Cassavetti added that customary collective punishments should not be implemented because it would lead to
a spiral of violence.\textsuperscript{20} However, at that time responsibility for I.S. lay principally with the police and so fell within the sphere of the British Police Mission, a position reaffirmed by the Cabinet Defence Committee in August.\textsuperscript{21}

The Police Mission was assigned the task of re-forming the Greek police forces, and orienting them for both civil and I.S. duties. Leeper was determined to ensure that it was capable of preparing the police for action against irregulars, and at the start of 1945 he told Eden that officials like the Consul in Patras, Major K. Nicholls, who 'had relevant experience' of such matters during his service on the staff of the High Commissioner in Palestine, should be called upon to offer their expert advice to the BPPM.\textsuperscript{22} Indeed, British staff dealing with political issues in Greece consistently emphasised the value of utilising historical, and especially imperial experience, to devise I.S. schemes. The Foreign Office section concerned actively sought to ensure that advisors handling I.S. issues were properly qualified. Hence, in January 1945 it proposed the employment of former Palestine, India and Ireland policemen, and suggested Colonel S. Prosser, formerly of the Palestine force and now Head of the Civil Police Unit in Greece as the new mission commander. This was predicated upon his 'experience


\textsuperscript{21} On police primacy, see Chapter 2; CDC in, DO(45)4, 8 Aug., PREM8/49. On the BCPU's role, LFG WD/notes, Apr. 1945, WO170/7550.

\textsuperscript{22} Leeper, to Eden, 27 Jan. 1945, R2761/48254.
of actual conditions with which the Mission would .. deal.' In
the event, Sir Charles Wickham was appointed to this post and
Prosser became his assistant, but Wickham's selection was
acceptable to the Foreign Office because 'his experience in
Ireland ought stand him in good stead, since Irish conditions
approximate to Greek.' He had served in the South African War,
with the RIC from 1920 to 1921 during the COIN, and then in
Ulster, and he asserted that he could restore 'law and order'
by utilising his 'knowledge and experience', and that of fellow
officers whom he selected on the basis of their police I.S.
records.23 This application of past I.S. experience to the
present situation became a procedure adopted consistently by
the Foreign Office, the Police Mission, and other local COIN
agencies, from early 1945 onwards.

The 48-strong British Police and Prisons Mission began its
work in February 1945, advising on the organisation, training
and use of the police and gendarmerie. Irregulars active during
that year were evidently perceived by the BPPM as being similar
to traditional imperial armed opponents, because it wanted
'normal' mobile patrols operating from police posts for
'preventive work', supported by army units as and when
necessary. In addition, the Mission proposed offensive drives
and sweeps, although in practice the 'results were

23. On the need to use colonial police officers, FO notes, 24
Jan., R1841/48250; 10 Feb., R2986/48365. On Prosser, FO
Permt. Under-Sec., Sir Orme Sargent, to Asst. Under-Sec.
G. Gater, CO, 13 Feb., R3007/: on Wickham and his
background, minutes, 22 Feb., R3803/; 2 Mar., R3878/48365;
Appendix 1. Wickham on officer selection, note, 7 Aug.
1945, WO204/8928; use of 2 ex-RUC Inspectors, R. Gransden,
N. Ire. Office, to F. Newham, Home Office, 29 Sept. 1946,
CO537/3847.
disappointing.'24 Then, early in 1946, irregulars engaged in social banditry and interfactional strife, and brigand bands, collectively labelled as 'bandits' by forces supporting the State, were joined by more organised guerillas who formed part of an evolving insurgency. The nature of these insurgent irregulars was not initially understood by the Police Mission, the prevailing view being that all armed clashes were a manifestation of 'banditry'.

On 15 September 1945, the Greek Government reiterated that the police were responsible for the maintenance of internal order, but exactly three months later, as skirmishes proliferated, the Greek National Army [GNA] was also assigned I.S. duties. In the interim, the British army contingent grew increasingly concerned about conditions in Greece, and considered possible responses to the increasing disorder. But the Military Mission's primary task was to advise on the supply, training and organisation of the GNA in order to enable it to fulfil its primary function, designated in February 1945 by the Chiefs of Staff and the Greek military authorities as repelling a conventional attack from a neighbouring nation-state. It was not meant to be 'trained and armed [as] a permanent i.s. force', although it was obliged to assist the police if requested to do so, 'particularly in dealing with

guerilla bands', or to 'quell a major revolt' while the police handled 'small organised resistance.' The Greek General Staff was responsible for GNA I.S. preparations, but the BMM(G) 'supervised' .. [the] higher direction and control' of the Greek Army in 1945, and it 'nearly had the force of command.' Indeed, it played a major role in devising army I.S. schemes drawn up by May, and British Liaison Units [BLU] at GNA Training Centres and corps HQs also advised on planning for I.S. 'emergencies'. However, unlike the staff of the BPPM, the 1121 members of the army group were not chosen for their 'relevant' I.S. background, but for 'field experience', and the Mission Command and rank-and-file alike were grounded in 'General War'. This meant that they were also unable to identify correctly the nature of the insurgency threat that emerged in the winter of 1945 to 1946, and they simply adopted orthodox British Army I.S. doctrine. The tendency to block any progressive thought about I.S. was underlined by high level directives from London that prevented the BMM(G) from studying the situation 'in the field', and by budgetary constraints on
the Greek military\textsuperscript{25} that served to concentrate British advisors' attention on the GNA's main tasks rather than on non-conventional war matters.

The GOC, General Scobie, reiterated his concern about mounting 'KKE guerilla' activities in August 1945. Soon afterwards, the new Mission Commander, Major-General Stuart B. Rawlins, proposed an I.S. programme to prepare the GNA for operations in support of the police. The BMM(G) Command's perception of irregulars operating in Greece mirrored that of much of the prewar British Army, in 'think[ing] that they enjoyed a spontaneous birth, springing from .. guns .. and .. political indignation', and it urged universal disarmament. But Rawlins appreciated that this was difficult to accomplish, and suggested army training 'for mobile operations in the hills and guerilla tactics.' The Greeks supported this on 2 October, and although British Mountain Warfare Training Units had been disbanded in May, the CIGS, Field-Marshal Brooke, readily

accepted his proposal for British army training of GNA units in 'Mountain Warfare' techniques. This began on 3 November and included patrolling, the movement of columns, and drives to kill irregulars and 'break the will' of their leaders. The BMM(G) Command was concerned about the disappointing results of gendarmerie-army operations in 1945, and some officers criticised them as inadequate for countering what they regarded as 'partisan irregulars' rather than mere 'bandits'. However, the Command blamed operational failures on inadequate secrecy in Greek planning and inefficient execution, and these were indeed major factors. Hence, traditional and ineffective I.S. measures were prosecuted against the insurgents who appeared in 1946 with little further reflection by British army advisors.

**British perceptions of the emerging insurgency threat in the winter of 1945 to 1946.**

The Communist Party did not plan for insurgency in late

1945, despite assertions to this effect by some authors. On 29 August, Zachariades authorised the expansion of the aftoamyna, and he stated that, 'we are dealing with the possibility of a peaceful transition .. [to socialism], not with the certainty.' But the Party boss indulged in 'verbal radicalism' and no decision for revolt was made. Nevertheless, as the year drew to a close, the communist sedition began unconsciously to evolve into insurgency, with local activists intensifying their political subversion and instigating progressively more organised irregular operations. Indeed, perceptive British officials reported that these 'bandit' operations were distinct from the plain brigandage of previous months. The Foreign Office, the theatre Commander and the BMM(G) Command argued that they were witnessing a communist attempt to influence public opinion prior to the March 1946 national elections, and the constitutional struggle was reaffirmed by the Party hierarchy in February. In contrast, the influential Markos Vafiades persistently pressed his colleagues to plan terrorism and guerilla war, and although these

27. O'Ballance Greek P.119, and E. Averoff-Tossizza By fire and axe (New York, 1978) P.183, contend that a decision for revolt was made on 15 Dec. 1945, at Petric, Yugoslavia, prompted by promises of aid from Tito. But no actual decision for insurgency was made, see for instance, E. Smith Victory P.238.

instruments were not the cornerstone of the politbureau's strategy, it gradually drifted towards his line. The KKE abstained from the spring 1946 elections on the grounds that Right-wing paramilitaries were attacking supporters of the Left. But this decision stemmed equally from the Party's poor electoral standing, and its hopes of obtaining Soviet political and financial support to give it a wider range of options in the future.29 Indeed, following the return of a Right-wing government, Zachariades allowed Leftist 'ODEK' groups to organise guerilla warfare in several regions. However, Stalin refused to assist the KKE in April and hence the Greek Communists gave no open support to insurgency, only tacitly sponsoring it by instituting a 'limited armed aftoamyna' from 12 May. They concurrently prepared for a plebiscite on a new Constitution in September, the KKE leadership seeking to exhaust all legal routes before concentrating on rebellion. In the event that this became necessary, it remained undecided whether to favour insurgency or a Soviet-style 'armed uprising in the towns.'30 But from 16 June, the KKE coordinated the activities of communist subversives and irregulars, and Markos organised attacks on the security forces in southern Greece, in


order to disrupt government links with the people. The outcome of the plebiscite was unaffected by communist pressures and the Greek monarchy was restored, and on 20 September the politbureau publicly admitted its propagation of insurgency. This form of opposition was only officially adopted as Party strategy in February 1947, but considerable resources were devoted to it by the summer of 1946. Thus, insurgency started with locally organised communist irregulars and propaganda in the winter of 1945 to 1946, but after six months there was more central direction, and the security forces were obliged to react to this.

The position of British agencies, and their views on COIN in 1946.

The BMM(G) and the BPPM 'exercised continuous and decisive influence in deciding military policy' prior to the onset of insurgency. However, both the new ambassador from May 1946, Sir Clifford Norton, and British Intelligence units, were worried that previous British I.S. advice was being ignored, and Wickham's Mission reported Greek 'improvisations to emergencies.' Norton asked the Foreign Office to secure authorisation for the provision of binding British I.S. operational advice, but the Cabinet was wary about the repercussions of such a course. The UK's minimal commitment was

31. KKE decisions, O. Smith in Baerentzen P.175.

founded on financial constraints, and on 22 June 1946, the Cabinet Defence Committee agreed that the GNA could only be subsidised up to 31 March 1947. It reiterated that the BMM(G) might well function for considerably longer, but refused to underwrite an expansion of its activities. Moreover, London was unwilling to extend British responsibilities if this could lead to a direct clash with armed communists that would have adverse political consequences both in Westminster and in relations with Stalin. The Cabinet wished to give him no grounds for trying to extend Soviet influence using the pretext of British 'aggression', and thus it attempted to 'divorce all advisory functions from politics.' Policy directives from London restricted the missions to advising on the organisation, training and disposition of Greek forces, which in practice allowed only an informal provision of I.S. tactical guidance. In addition, the BMM(G) commander was authorised to give specific operational advice to the Greek Supreme National Defence Council [SNDC]- by then responsible for devising I.S.

policy- if it requested his views.\(^{34}\) But, while Wickham noted the dangers of political subversion, because of this high level delimitation of each mission's official areas of concern, he did not view it as his responsibility and made no attempt to devise counteraction. The Cabinet's directives discouraged individuals from assessing the overall I.S. position, and no dedicated analysis of the developing insurgency was initiated by British agencies. Norton persistently pressed for British operational planning advice, especially as 'the situation in northern Greece was beginning to resemble the one in Palestine.' In June he was supported by the CIGS-elect, Field-Marshall Montgomery, but the ambassador did 'not place too much reliance on the effect of a conversation at very high level regarding the day to day problem of law and order',\(^{35}\) recognising that the home authorities were unlikely to be willing to alter their political stance.

Greek military-security operations were directed by the police up to 26 June 1946, but the GNA took on overall command


\(^{35}\) Norton, on Palestine, Louis P.95. On Montgomery, to Hayter, FO, 29 June 1946, FO286/1175.29.
on 28 September. By May, Wickham assessed the threat and proposed changes in police practices, with the encouragement of other British officials. His 'considered opinion' was founded on his experience of I.S. in Ireland, and although not explicitly describing the nature of insurgency, Wickham envisaged a Greek revolt involving political subversion and terrorism. He noted their damaging impact on the amount of intelligence provided by the people, itself considered an 'absolute necessity' because 'without good information, [the security forces] rely on .. chance .. encounters .. in the hills where evasion [is] simple.' He remarked that the current conditions of ruptured police-population relations were 'the most difficult situation which can face a police force, and is very similar to that .. in Ireland after the Treaty.' In response to these circumstances, Wickham proposed police 'mobile patrolling' based 'on normal lines' to enhance communal security, and the familiar positive psywar approach focussing on operational successes to encourage citizens to cooperate. However, the Mission chief realised that 'where the population is uncooperative .. normal police and legal methods are inadequate', and he therefore advocated 'exceptional methods', namely counterterrorist population protection. He initially disparaged civilian self-defence units, bearing in mind his 'experience of [reprisals by] B Specials' in Ireland from 1920 to 1921, but soon after accepted the worth of 'Home Guards'. They freed security forces from static duties and actively committed the people to the government side, and he stated that

military action alone 'would not eliminate the problem.' The BPPM therefore advocated interwar I.S. wisdom in mid-1946, but also supported an unusual COIN security policy by that time.

British army officers concurrently reported on I.S. to the War Office, and the BMM(G) is criticised by O'Ballance for a persistent misconception of communist guerillas as mere 'bandits' during 1946 and 1947, hence leading to its failure to organise and train the GNA effectively for counterguerrilla war. However, although it is evident that an insurgent threat was not perceived by the BMM(G) Command in 1946, equally, it was not guilty of identifying all irregulars as brigands, despite their common tag of 'bandits'. The Mission perceived KKE guerillas as being politically motivated and operating in a sophisticated manner by the summer of 1946, and Rawlins' reluctance to support the use of the army in counterguerrilla operations was not because he considered that irregulars did not warrant the attention of the GNA. Rather, he appreciated that its organisation, equipment and training for conventional war made it incapable of countering unconventional opposition competently at that juncture, and that this would continue to be the case until the Greek regime relinquished its aspirations for a model conventional army. Its steadfast resistance to this

37. Wickham, to Theotokis, Greek Minister of Public Order, 24 Apr., FO286/1175.29; in Norton, to FO, 20 May, R7674/58692; to FO, 21 May, R8060/58693, FO286/1175.29; to FO, 22 May, R8060/58693; notes, and to Norton, 4 June, FO286/1175.29; note, 7 June, R8532/58695; BPPM report, 13 July, AIR24/759. Local accord with his views, Peck to FO, 4 May 1946, R7360/58750.

38. Criticism of BMM(G) as in, O'Ballance Greek P.129, and also see Woodhouse Struggle P.187.
obscured Rawlins' reasoning and his actual conception of the communist guerillas.

In May 1946, the Mission chief advocated the age-old military principles of taking the offensive and applying concentrated force for I.S. operations, and emphasised the importance of intelligence for locating evasive bands. The BMM(G) trained Greek army units in short duration patrols and drives, and these were prosecuted unsuccessfully against guerillas in the mountains. But the failure of British stereotyped Imperial-policing policies in practice does not necessarily mean that the Mission was nonchalant about the military I.S. threat. Rather, the BMM(G) was imbued with orthodox military thought, and this was reinforced both by prewar French training of the GNA, and I.S. instruction given at the Land Forces Greece HQ by the Middle East Forces Training Team Number 12. It provided tuition based on the theatre Command's Training Pamphlet 9/13 during April and May 1946, duplicating that offered in Palestine, and this theatre level guidance served to underline traditional I.S. wisdom.

Other interested senior British army officers analysed the situation as insurgency appeared, and Lieutenant-General Kenneth N. Crawford, the GOC from spring 1946, warned London that the GNA could not eliminate guerillas by itself, because 'political banditry ... is essentially a long term problem ... [and the security forces merely] driv[e] bandits temporarily to earth [rather than] ... eliminat[e] them.' Furthermore, Lieutenant-Colonel P. Sayley, at the Land Forces HQ, noted that guerilla warfare was only one element of a campaign of 'propaganda .. sabotage, and armed force', directed towards a 'primarily political' goal. He surmised that the aim was to influence the outcome of a future legal political contest, a perception substantiated by the KKE's dual approach, and he
correctly identified the functions of its underground organisation as coordinating military intelligence, and material support and recruitment from the population. By May 1946, the British army HQ in Greece recognised the instruments of insurgency and the form of its organisation, and informed London that extra-military counteraction was necessary.

The Military Mission and army HQ criticised Greek failures against communist guerrillas during 1946, the defensive strategic posture imposed on the GNA by politicians who demanded the protection of their urban constituents, and the Army's reliance on chance encounters to seek and destroy irregulars. Indeed, British army officers are described as having seen 'errors of policy and leadership, Greek officers' inexperience in counterguerrilla war, and lack of imagination in counterguerrilla policies.' But while the Greeks undeniably made operational and organisational mistakes, the implication that British soldiers themselves possessed the counterguerrilla experience or 'imagination' to devise effective policies is unsound. The BMM(G) understood that KKE guerrillas were far more militarily adept than mere brigands, but its expertise was


40. British views of the GNA, Crawford 'Note on the GNA', 4 Oct. 1946, R15192/58852; Tossizza P.181; and on BMM(G) officers, Alexander P.218.
essentially in conventional war, and it relied on familiar British I.S. wisdom. The War Office evidently presumed that the Mission could cope with any I.S. problems with which it might be presented in Greece, and it had already circulated copies of its most recent reports on guerilla warfare to the Middle East Forces GHQ, which was responsible for the British military in Greece. The Command's own 'Notes' were sent to the army in Palestine in early 1945, but it apparently failed to assist the BMM(G) in a similar manner, probably because the Mission provided minimal I.S. operational planning advice to the Greeks during 1945 and 1946. Indeed, the GHQ despatched its Training Team to Athens, indicating that it shared the local British army contingent's belief that communist irregulars could be tackled effectively with traditional I.S. policies and doctrine. Hence, during 1946 about half the GNA received some instruction in traditional 'Mountain Warfare' methods. Up until the summer of 1946, this British perception of the opposition was apposite, but it became obsolete as the KKE insurgency developed, and the Mission's traditionalist I.S. training was insufficient for COIN purposes.

As internal disorder spread in Greece, the Cabinet's concern grew, and on 23 June 1946, Field-Marshal Montgomery met Norton, Crawford and other senior officers in Athens. The CIGS-elect stated that the GNA should be reoriented to concentrate on I.S operations, and he supported an extension of the BMM(G)'s role to allow it to provide I.S. advice as it saw fit. He also authorised the three remaining British brigades, totalling 16,000 personnel, to 'show-the-flag' to deter

41. On WO, GHQMEF, and Guerilla War Notes, see Chapter 3. On 'mountain warfare' training, Tossizza P.189; and the use of age-old Imperial-policing practices in, KRRC Chronicles 1946 P.49-50.
irregulars. Therefore, customary I.S. procedure was emphasised, but Montgomery's visit encouraged the BMM(G) Command to study the current field situation, in readiness for the possible provision of operational planning advice by the Mission.

General Rawlins toured north Greece from 7 to 17 July 1946, and reported on a guerilla war in the mountains that had 'centralised control' and was 'based on co-ordinated planning.' He understood that terrorism 'deprived .. [the State's] ill-coordinated forces of intelligence, which is essential in coping with small and highly mobile bands', and recommended large scale offensives to eliminate swiftly communist 10-50 man guerilla bands and small terrorist cells. He urged improved operational execution by devising better arrangements for inter-force cooperation and coordination, and suggested that the failure to secure cleared areas could be remedied by stationing gendarmes to prevent reinfiltration by irregulars. Rawlins did not envisage this as a long term 'holding' commitment, hence undermining its potential value, because the Mission retained its belief in rapid counter-guerilla clearance. But, by July 1946, the I.S. missions agreed on a basic Clear- and-Hold military-security strategy, albeit that it needed to be refined in order to produce counter-guerilla success. However, despite this minor advance, General Rawlins stated that 'provided .. the army is employed for i.s. in accordance with normally accepted principles and not dispersed .. it

42. CIGS's views and resulting action in, Norton, to FO, 1 July, R9735/58697; FO memo, 24 July, R10946/58699; Montgomery, 1 May-26 June diary entries; notes on talks, 23 June; LFGHQ Summary by the CIGS, in 175/1,/6,/7, IWM. Actual GNA organisation by Nov. 1946 in, J. Iatrides Revolt in Athens (New Jersey, 1972) P.158.
should carry on .. [an] efficient execution of duties in aid', 43 emphasising the value of familiar I.S. practices.

British deliberation about I.S. in the light of current, traditional, and wartime experience, from the summer of 1946.

The BMM(G) commander advised the SNDC on operational plans that were executed by the Greek military on Mount Olympus from 1 to 11 August 1946. The GNA's weaknesses were manifest, its various commitments having prevented thorough re-training in 'Mountain warfare', 44 and the operation was flawed in principle as well as practice. The Greek General Staff planned and implemented drives and sweeps, and provided for the short term holding which Rawlins favoured. But the SNDC only acted on advice that accorded with its own preferred COIN style, and the Greek line was to destroy the enemy and its will-power by employing force with little restraint, which included conventional assaults involving artillery and armour. The tactics adopted failed to beat the many small communist guerilla bands conversant with their local terrain, and the Foreign Office commented that the Greeks applied military force ineptly. The British charge d'affaires, David Lascelles,


equated the Greek action with punitive expeditions on the North-West Frontier, and the BMM(G) made similar criticisms. It recommended a more discriminating use of force in 'drives' and 'encirclements', and the army task force referred not only to imperial precedent, but pointed out the Nazis' failure to eradicate Greek partisans by 'scorched earth' methods.45 However, the Mission's appreciation that brute force failed to defeat wartime guerillas was not matched by a realisation that large scale German operations similar to those it advocated also had major deficiencies. Indeed, when Rawlins was again called upon to give advice to the Greek generals, he vouched for sweeps, drives, and patrols 'conducted on the lines of training exercises' from 'firm bases.'46 Furthermore, the GOC, General Crawford, who likewise desired better Greek army I.S. training, and reorganisation to improve inter-force liaison, also harked back to previous British I.S. experience. He cited the example of Palestine in the late 1930s to recommend a four to one numerical advantage in favour of the State's forces over the opposition, clearly seeking to make accustomed policies work. But, both he and the GHQ realised that the answer to the 'perplexing' guerilla problem lay in analysing recent as well as past operations, which 'will prove valuable if .. lessons which have emerged are understood.' Crawford outlined these as the need for greater junior officer operational initiative,


enhanced security force mobility, and air support, all of which are vital for a COIN military campaign.

The BMM(G) informed the War Office about persistent flaws in Greek military planning, communications, training, intelligence and inter-force coordination during the winter of 1946. Montgomery noted that the Greek General Staff accepted British counsel on some aspects of the army's organisation, and asserted that the GNA met 'with correspondingly better results.' But while the 'exchange of ideas between General Rawlins and [the] G[reek] G[eneral] S[taff] [wa]s constant', the Greek authorities resisted pressure from him and the Middle East Forces to set up a Combined Services HQ to oversee COIN operational planning and execution. Senior local officers dealing with Greece realised that such a central planning system was vital for COIN; as had the British agencies which established a committee structure in Palestine in 1946. Moreover, the BMM(G) eventually appreciated that some adaptation of tactical military policy was necessary, and in early October 1946 General Rawlins and the Air Officer Commanding [AOC], Air Commodore Geoffrey Tuttle, proposed to expand the role of the Royal Hellenic Air Force [RHAF] from


mere 'flag-showing flights' to air fire support missions.\textsuperscript{50} Furthermore, the wartime Commandos inspired a British army proposal for tactical modification,\textsuperscript{51} which signalled a departure in the British counterguerrilla military approach. The impetuses for change were the recognition that GNA operations had failed thus far, and the British Army's heightened interest in unorthodox forces. It is unclear who originated the concept, but Rawlins emphasised that new COIN measures were needed when he visited the War Office on 19 November. The Department had been kept apprised of the Greek I.S. position throughout 1945 and 1946, and supported the proposed COIN experiment with an unorthodox force, having approved the re-constitution of the SAS in September 1946, mindful of its potential for undertaking a similar I.S. role in the future. By 28 November, the Chiefs of Staff, including Montgomery, who had been sceptical about the value of such units during the War, approved the formation of forty 'commando' companies, initially totalling 2900 men, for 'deep patrolling' missions. They were not designed for large scale raids like those associated with most of the wartime Commandos. Rather, they took on a dual role: firstly, to invigorate major military operations as a vanguard force providing a cutting edge, echoing Commando exploits in Europe after 1943; and secondly, to act like the very first Commandos, and especially regular guerillas such as the wartime SAS, by undertaking 'deep patrols' into irregular dominated areas in order to put them under more sustained pressure. The BMM(G)\textsuperscript{50, 51}

\textsuperscript{50} RHAF tasks, in RAFDG reports, 31 Aug., 31 Oct., AIR24/759. BMM(G)-RAF discussions, in notes, 7, 11 Oct. 1946, AIR24/752.

viewed mobility as the key to counterguerilla warfare, and its rationale behind the 'commandos' was that they should combine maximum firepower with minimal logistical support, and be able to outmanoeuvre and outwit guerillas as a force more mobile and better trained, disciplined and equipped than them. In addition, Tuttle also followed an example set in the War to suggest air supply for light infantry COIN forces. The British Army gave this concept little attention prior to 1939, but it was readily accepted in Greece, and evidently both the RAF and army missions expended considerable time and effort in October and November 1946 analysing tactics and devising a new military approach based on wartime experiences. Although they did not fashion a paraguerilla policy, the missions made considerable advances. The BMM(G) was optimistic about the GNA's chances of success using traditional large scale tactical policies supplemented by air-supported 'commandos', and they were approved by the British Army establishment and by the Cabinet. However, although the Mission pre-empted charges of failing to address the weaknesses of a Greek army it helped to prepare for COIN, it was more justifiably criticised for subsequently placing too much reliance on the 'commandos' to achieve victory.

in 1947.

Field-Marshal Montgomery was in Athens from 1 to 4 December 1946, and he ordered the British army contingent to reverse the trend of Greek military failure. He suggested that the authorities in London had failed to recognise the precariousness of the Greek government's position, and implicitly derided the British bureaucratic system for contributing indirectly to it. Montgomery's diaries record his view that, 'the truth [was] .. nobody at home really knew what the true situation in Greece was', and to him it was 'a never ending cause of astonishment .. to observe the extraordinary value of personal contact on the ground', yet to find 'that there is no laid down drill for ensuring that this contact is maintained by responsible emissaries proceeding periodically from Whitehall to trouble spots overseas.' He criticised the lack of top level analysis of I.S. problems in the UK, and encouraged greater future British involvement in Greece.53 Then, characteristically, he set about trying to rectify the situation personally by proposing vigorous action.

The CIGS met the Greek General Staff, leading British officers, and Norton, and stated that, 'the situation has been allowed to deteriorate owing to the faulty organisation and use of the Greek Armed Forces.' On 2 December, he pressed for complete GNA retraining in 'Mountain warfare', better inter-force cooperation, an immediate rise in army manpower from 92,000 to 115,000, and in regard to anti-communist strategy, the Greeks were told to 'kill the whole lot of them.' Montgomery's ebullient approach stemmed from his own I.S. experience, including postwar Palestine, which he compared to Greece. Despite the 'commando' innovation, he again asserted

53. Montgomery, diary notes, 1-4 Dec. 1946, 177/1, IWM.
the value of sweeps to 'harry' irregulars 'from pillar to post.' And although the Military Mission deputy-chief, Brigadier Henry Wood, reflected that 'encirclements' flopped because of the guerilla's mobility, General Rawlins stood by the British Army's military-security wisdom, as well as the use of force for negative psywar effect. Norton concurred with this psychological approach, but he also wanted supplementary non-military action to undermine the KKE's support. However, the CIGS countenanced no such measures, perceiving the Greek malady as one induced by transnational communist aid that had to be eliminated to make COIN progress possible. His diagnosis, confirmed by Rawlins, does not indicate a knowledge of the nature of insurgency, and hence Montgomery prescribed 'conventional' rather than 'alternative' medicine—solely military action to eliminate the 'bandit' symptom—which could not cure Greece of its communist affliction.

While Montgomery was touring the Middle East during December 1946, the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, considered halting aid to Greece to save money. But the Chiefs of Staff and Ernest Bevin were adamant that Britain must continue with the tempo of its I.S. assistance. Already, as RHAF operations increased during the autumn of 1946, and command was handed over to the Greeks by the RAF Unit on 11 September, more RAF advisors were

sent to offer assistance by 12 October. Furthermore, by December the gravity of the situation was made apparent to the Chiefs of Staff through reports from the CIGS and the BMM(G). Thus, on 11 December, the Chiefs recommended authorisation for the Mission to advise the Greek military on COIN operations without restrictions. The Greeks readily agreed to this, realising that it would mark an increase in the British COIN commitment.

British military thought on counterguerrilla war by 1947.

Up to December 1946, Greek security force operations were planned at army District and corps HQs, with police assistance. These followed instructions from the SNDC, which devised broad plans in the light of advice given by Rawlins. But, when Montgomery was in Athens, he became convinced that the BMM(G) must take on much of the burden of central planning, and on 4 December, Rawlins and Crawford produced outlines for Clear-and-Hold by means of a one month offensive including air support. Then, a week later, the Mission deputy-chief, Brigadier Wood, and Major-General Vimblis of the Greek General Staff, wrote a memorandum on the GNA's Order of Battle and future I.S. policy. The GHQ Chief of Staff, Brigadier John M. Kirkman, noted that


all parties agreed that 'the problem is not so much major reorganisation, as implementation of measures progressively evolved since the bandit situation became acute this summer.' But subsequently, there was significant reorganisation, a Combined Services HQ for operational planning and execution opening in the new year. Moreover, the BMM(G)'s future counterguerilla approach was officially to be based on 'lessons' gleaned from operations and simulative counterguerilla exercises, and COIN authorities proposed offensives based on intelligence, featuring light infantry, mountain artillery, air support, commandos 'for recce and long-range patrolling', and a National Guard to hold cleared areas. The BMM(G) also gave specific 'Irregular Warfare Training' to GNA units, and by 17 December, corps commanding officers met to canvass ideas for a 'tactical doctrine for counterguerilla operations .. as a basis for organisation and tr[ainin]g .. and for the planning of operations.' The resulting 'Policy for 1947' Paper was based on the joint British-Greek memo of 11 December, and it was then refined by the BMM(G) and RAF Unit on 31 December. On 2 January 1947, the army mission presented an
'I.S. Paper/BMM(G)' to the Greek General Staff. The proposed COIN changes were approved by high level British military authorities, and further, a local Joint Planning Committee including BMM(G) and RAF officers was formed. On 10 January 1947, it appealed for improved inter-force liaison, operational initiative, and a Commander-in-Chief to execute its operational plans.

As new military-security plans were drawn up in Greece, the Chiefs of Staff pressed their political superiors for an extension of BMM(G) and RAF Unit functions. On 1 January 1947, they argued in the Cabinet Defence Committee that the missions should provide unlimited COIN operational advice until order was restored, and the British Government approved an enhanced British COIN role 'on the advice of the CIGS.' On 14 January, the BMM(G) received a new directive authorising it to advise clandestinely on Greek Army, National Guard, and 'MAY' self-defence force operations as it saw fit. Hence, it was reoriented 'to give the GNA the greatest possible assistance' and the Greek army was 'organised to conduct intensive

operations so as to restore i.s.' Further, British Liaison Units were permitted to travel into combat areas and advise Field Units. If British advice was ignored, Rawlins was directed to request the CINCMELF to make strong representations to the Greeks. The BMM(G) and RAF group now operated as key players in COIN policy-making, and although Montgomery's traditionalist influence was pervasive, the BMM(G) appreciated the importance of special training in counterguerrilla warfare, some tactical innovation, and organisational restructuring to ensure a unified operational effort.

The Greek I.S. plan for 1947 reflected British COIN ideas, and featured a three stage strategy: firstly, a preparatory phase where security forces trained and reorganised, second, the gradual clearance of two corps areas and their holding by gendarmerie, and finally, their consolidation and eventual return to civil control. The BMM(G)'s large scale policies were incorporated into plans, along with Greek designs for massive encirclements and conventional assaults. And the enhanced British COIN role was emphasised by the creation of Mountain Warfare Instruction Teams, the appointment of an intelligence officer to the Athens Infantry School, and the Greek General Staff's acceptance of air support arrangements. Furthermore, on 11 January a RAF Delegation came into being, and soon after, Wing Commander Phillip Broad, an officer with 'considerable experience in air support, was sent out by the Air Ministry to help .. advise the Greeks', and the RHAF approved RAF 'anti-

59. British missions and the new planning committee, RAFHQ report, 11 June, AIR46/62. COS, 1 Jan., DO(47)1; Bevin, 2 Jan., DO(47)2, CAB131/4. HMG policy directive, to Rawlins, 14 Jan., in, Pyman, 6/1/2, LHC; and, CIGS and BMM(G) role, Brig. C.D. Steel, BMM(G) memo, 30 Jan. 1947, W0261/637.
bandit doctrine.'60 Air support had become an established COIN concept in both the RAF and British army groups, and the Air Ministry mirrored the practice of other British institutions in despatching specially selected personnel to advise the Greeks on COIN matters.

The principle of applying pertinent experience to COIN was adopted by local agencies in Palestine by the summer of 1946, and the BPPM chief, Wickham, was seconded there to study the problems of its police in COIN. The Police Mission was left under the supervision of his deputy, Colonel Prosser, who supported well-known 'Mountain Warfare' methods. But he was also intrigued by unusual action taken by the Greek Army to destroy the urban-centred communist underground.61 Indeed, by the winter of 1946 'all [COIN authorities] understood that [the aifoamyna, or 'YIAFKA'] .. was quite as dangerous as the bands .. who could not thrive without it', and that its elimination

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61. Prosser, to FO, 8 Aug., R12683/58759; Wickham, to FO, 13 June 1946, R9790/58758.

-209-
was crucial for COIN progress.62

**British acceptance of new Greek counterorganisation and counterterrorism policies in the spring of 1947.**

British agencies were aware of the guerilla's reliance on the people for intelligence, supplies and recruits, and realised that, unlike in past rebellions, these capabilities were now well organised by the YIAFKA underground organisation. Consisting of about 50,000 members, it engaged in subversion and was the cornerstone of communist unconventional warfare. British authorities supported the use of previously dependable imperial population-resource control methods to undermine the YIAFKA, assuming that citizens would shake off its influence if they were protected from terrorism and psychologically pressured into doing so.63 The Greeks implemented curfews, house searches and arrests in a piecemeal fashion, and introduced a population identification-card scheme. But the insurgents were not checked by these measures, and therefore elements of the security forces decided to act against the whole YIAFKA. Their new population-resource control policy was instituted gradually after the autumn of 1946 and soon gained the backing of the State, but it had few precedents in British I.S. experience, involving the forcible relocation of sections of the people to remove the insurgent infrastructure. The control objective was also furthered by the denial of food and U.N. emergency refugee relief aid to villages suspected of pro-

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insurgent support to prevent it reaching guerillas, and this had a negative psywar objective too.

By November 1947, 250,000 persons were relocated and the YIAFKKA was progressively eroded, but the depopulation policy was not supported by the British at first, because of its initially maladroit application. It was not accompanied by any welfare provision for those moved, and the absence of Hearts-and-Minds social amenities left many discontented and a focus for KKE propaganda. This improper execution obscured the potential benefits of the policy, and the Foreign Office noted in October 1946 that relocation was unlikely to lead to COIN success. But, from the start of 1947, and through into 1948, the GNA moved 15,000 people per month and set them up in government "security camps" where they were under the care of the State', which provided them with basic facilities. By 1947, British political officials and BMM(G) officers understood the counterorganisation value of resettlement, and later on the requirement for some basic civic action. Indeed,

64. Depopulation schemes, A.E. Laiou, 'Population movements in the Greek countryside during the civil war', in Baerentzen P.63: BMM(G) backing, P.69. British views on it, Peck to FO, 4 Oct., McCarthy, FO minute, 19 Oct., R15193/58711; BPPM, in, McCarthy minute, 19 Nov. 1946, R16572/58714. Some authors incorrectly claim that it was devised by the BMM(G), Eudes P.277; C. Chiclet 'The Greek civil war, 1946-9' in M. Sarafis/M. Eve Background to contemporary Greece (London, 1990) P.208. Details of government 'camps' in, J.V. Kofas Intervention and development (Penn., 1989) P.94-6. Britain had tried population relocation most recently in the South African War, and in a small scale resettlement project instituted during the 1930s Burma revolt, see Chapters 2, 5.
a more extensive and well-conceived population resettlement programme and civic action policies were a feature of COIN in Malaya from 1949.

A concurrent Greek innovation was a civilian 'Home Guard', formed to involve the people actively on the side of the government by enlisting them in counterterrorist population protection and local pursuit of irregulars. From the winter of 1946, the BPPM and BMM(G) approved of newly formed civilian 'Country Self-Security Units', or 'MAY', although the British army HQ was not enthusiastic about the formation of such 'militia'. Nonetheless, this Greek COIN policy became accepted as standard, and a similar measure was introduced in Malaya during the summer of 1948.

Advances in extra-military-security COIN policies up to the end of 1947.

The British military in Greece began to assimilate new military-security schemes by late 1946, but the Foreign Office realised that physical confrontation with communist irregulars and their supporting infrastructure could not alone relieve insurgent pressures. It recognised that harsh socio-economic conditions resulted in increased political support for the insurgents, and its officials therefore sponsored national economic reconstruction as a means to raise Greek prosperity,

and consequently, levels of popular support for the State. British political representatives emphasised the worth of politically beneficial action by the government, and from September 1946 it ran a systematic campaign of counter-propaganda. However, the British Embassy in Athens condemned Greek Emergency laws as 'draconian', and although Emergency legislation was integral to the British response to rebellion, London was warned that summary trial, execution and banishment would exacerbate the situation by promoting KKE support. In the winter of 1946 to 1947, the ambassador came to realise that military-security policies approved by the BMM(G) would not, in isolation, defeat the communists. Hence, Norton wanted 'measures to eliminate the bandits, involv[ing] political action to limit them to the hard core of irreconcilables .. and military action to extirpate the latter.' He suggested that the political aspect should include reconstruction, the creation of a broad coalition government, and an amnesty to induce the surrender of weak or enforced insurgent 'supporters'. Hence, having recognised the Communist Party's revolutionary goal and the policy instruments it used to try to achieve this, he evidently had at least a rudimentary understanding of insurgency. As a result, he proposed to counter this with a politico-military programme, although he realised that it would be regarded as 'a tall one' in Whitehall in view of Britain's acute financial problems and its resultant inability to underwrite major new Greek expenditure on COIN. Even so, his

66. FO views, such as, Under-Sec. M.S. Williams, minute, 26 Nov., R17544/; Parliamentary Under-Sec., Rt.-Hon. H. McNeil, minute, 29 Nov. 1946, R17463/58716.

opinions were reinforced by the chargé d'affaires who also called for political steps to be taken to divorce the KKE core 'from its accretions of sympathisers .. those under arms and those not.' By 1947, British emissaries and political staff in London advocated government political action and counter/propaganda; a crucial non-military element of COIN. Indeed, with the onset of the Cold War in that year, the Foreign Office formed an Information Research Department to develop psywar techniques, which could have been applied to the I.S. sphere. In March, the Foreign Office summarised the 'Red threat' in Greece as 'a determined and well-organised effort to overthrow the State by political and military action', and officials in both London and Athens agreed that enemy casualties were insufficient to raise the levels of government support necessary for it to win. Likewise, General Crawford backed a combined political-military course, revealing a growing British consensus about the COIN line required.

British COIN activities and Army counterguerilla warfare policies and doctrine prior to autumn 1947.


The BMM(G)'s increased COIN responsibilities from January 1947 should have given its members an opportunity to adapt the British Army's I.S. line in the light of Greek COIN operations, but circumstances conspired to prevent this. By 16 January, Dalton argued in Cabinet that cuts in foreign aid expenditure were imperative, and 'throughout January, Bevin [opposed him and was] .. urging his government to aid Greece while seeking a sharing agreement with the US.' On 30 January, despite the current UK economic crisis, the Cabinet accepted the findings of the CIGS's report on Greece, and backed him and Bevin by agreeing to retain four battalions there and to increase the BMM(G) from 1452 to 1700 personnel, as well as to seek more American assistance. The Mission commented that this reflected 'the present [supportive] policy of H[is] Majesty's] Government as regards [the] training and administration of the Greek Army.'70 However, by 18 February, Bevin accepted that there might be some value in terminating British finance for the GNA on 1 April, not 'because of the [financial costs of the harsh winter] weather, or .. Dalton's persistent complain[ts]', but because of the Greek government's 'dalliance', and in order to bring 'matters to a head' by pushing Truman into offering more help. However, Dalton's diary records that six days later he was 'constantly being pressed to provide more money for the Greeks.' Frazier asserts that this entry 'is worthless', since

it 'almost certainly' confused an earlier meeting with Bevin. But in fact, it was not till 3 March that the Foreign Secretary, who was tired and ill, agreed to abandon the financing of the Greek forces, with Dalton commenting that Bevin was 'not perhaps knowing what he was agreeing to.' Following this decision, British-American talks started on the allotment of 'Allied' tasks in Greece, and the new Secretary of State from 18 February, General George C. Marshall, pressed Britain to assume the leading role in military matters. On 20 March, the State Department implored Bevin to retain the BMM(G) at least until an American aid programme could be organised, and the Cabinet agreed that 'concurrent .. with US aid .. [it] would continue assisting' through its missions, with the proviso that the Americans met their costs from April 1947. However, as bilateral talks opened, the unpublicised operational advisory role of the British military missions was ended, because the Cabinet was anxious to encourage a broader American involvement in the emerging Cold War. Thus, the BMM(G) was once more confined to advising the Higher Military Council—formerly the SNDC—on army organisation and training matters, BLUs were withdrawn from 'the Field', and the BMM(G) was
During their short period of COIN operational advising, British officers received a draft plan for a 'systematic clearing up' of irregulars, circulated by the Joint Planning Committee on 22 February. The need for army-air cooperation and 'holding' forces 'was stressed' by the British, because Greek soldiery was said to be 'set and old-fashioned in their ideas.' However, despite having accepted some valuable new COIN concepts, high level British military figures felt that clearance would be achieved in what was an unrealistic timescale of a few months. Nonetheless, the Greek Minister of Public Order, Napoleon Zervas, proposed to clear all regions of Greece simultaneously, but he was opposed by General Rawlins, who ensured that the blueprint for a progressive Clear-and-Hold

strategy was adopted.72

After March 1947, the level of aid for Greece from Washington greatly increased, and a 40-man US Aid Group arrived on 24 May, followed on 6 June by a 14-man Military Assistance Group. The army mission's task was to advise the Greek General Staff, although its precise responsibilities had not been decided upon. By then, the BMM(G) had 'lost touch .. [and] its influence on the conduct of operations .. [was] virtually nonexistent.'73 Between May and August, operations such as 'SWAN' were planned without a direct Allied input, and the restrictions placed on the BMM(G) from March can only have


discouraged it from evolving its COIN thought. However, the War Office allowed it to advise on the employment of a new 21,000-man static National Defence Corps, designed to improve Clear-and-Hold,\textsuperscript{74} and the DMO's approval of this scheme makes it likely that it appreciated that British Army doctrine on counterguerrilla strategy required adjustment.

The BMM(G)'s broader military approach during the spring of 1947 is further illustrated by the implementation of some British ideas in Greek COIN operations. On 9 April 1947, a British-Greek plan for Operation TERMINUS was put into effect, featuring the arrest of 600 insurgent supporters, followed by encirclements and drives that relied for success on 'blocks' placed on roads and rivers 'reckoned .. uncrossable.' Mass arrests dislocated the YIAFKA, but British-sponsored offensive policies foundered because of guerilla dispersion. The GNA inflicted losses on some insurgent units holding defensive positions, the communist Democratic Army [DSE] having begun a gradual 'conventionalisation' process in March 1947, although the bulk of its manpower still fought as guerillas during 1947 and for most of 1948. Indeed, as the GNA encountered more conventional insurgent 'brigades', Greek authorities were reassured about their adherence to conventional war methods. However, the RAFDG criticised the TERMINUS operation, and asserted that the 'RHAF has a clearer grasp of the situation

\textsuperscript{74} Rawlins and static units, in Under-Sec. G. Wallinger, FO minute, 10 July 1947, R8651/67004. On the US role, Amen PHD, P.179.
than the army.\textsuperscript{75}

In late April, the BMM(G) was eager to pinpoint the reasons for continued operational misfortune, and distributed questionnaires to BLUs to gauge their views on the validity of operational planning, execution and methods. But although the RAFDG acknowledged the shortcomings of encirclement,\textsuperscript{76} the army mission doggedly stated that faulty execution was the cause of the problem, and similarly, Sir Charles Wickham requested 'proper' implementation of operations in future. However, following further setbacks during the spring of 1947, Wickham came to realise 'the rottenness of methods applied.'\textsuperscript{77} A new Military Attaché, Colonel Arthur C. Shortt, arrived on 3 March, and established close contact with the British missions. He too noted that though counterterrorist population protection could lead to the provision of tactical intelligence, even if this occurred, military success was not guaranteed. He criticised the BMM(G) for supporting policies that failed to clear targeted areas of guerillas, as well as poor holding that left them prone 'to 40% .. reinfiltration.' Shortt reported that the


\textsuperscript{76} On the BMM(G)'s efforts to learn, Lt.-Col. P. Flowers, notes, 25 Apr., W0202/893. RAFDG, report, 11 June 1947, AIR46/62.

\textsuperscript{77} Rawlins, on GNA, to WO, 22 July, W0202/893; Wickham, in BPPM report, to FO, 26 June 1947, R8890/67031.
GNA could only win using its present tactics if the DSE was demoralised and lost its cohesion, or if it shifted to positional warfare. He foresaw neither course as likely for committed communist irregulars, and informed London about the BMM(G)'s lack of insight.

The War and Foreign Offices also followed the course of events in Palestine. BMM(G) officers met army intelligence agents there in July 1947, and at least ten Palestine police had been seconded to the BPPM by the Foreign Office. But neither the Middle East GHQ nor the War Office attempted to draw parallels between the two situations, not least because the COIN effort in Palestine revealed no successful new policies that could be applied to Greece. In addition, the Military Mission's COIN operational planning and execution advisory role was short-lived and covert, making the provision of any extra assistance unlikely. However, the burgeoning interest in guerilla warfare within the British military became apparent during 1947, and in June, the War Office Directorate of Military Training [DMT] received a report commissioned by the Indian Army, entitled 'Mountain Warfare against a Guerilla Enemy.' It investigated the effects of new technology on I.S. duties and was designed for application in Asia, the Middle East, and the Balkans, including Greece. Yet, it was either not forwarded to Athens, or if it was, it made little impact.

Indeed, the Report noted that ‘[its authors’] final recommendations [were not as revolutionary as the original directive demand[ed]’, probably resulting in it receiving less than urgent attention from British military officials. Further, the Report observed that, despite the recent proliferation of guerillas, this would 'NOT in future' lead 'to specialis[ation] or confine the interests of the Regular Army (viz. GHQ Directive)’, indicating that guerilla warfare continued to be assigned secondary importance at a high level. Nonetheless, it was written as a basis for future training and doctrine and was retained by the War Office for reference purposes. Furthermore, it contained some information of potential value to individuals adjusting their COIN thinking in Greece.

The Report stated that 'the characteristics' of postwar guerillas were not very different to those of the prewar era, and that age-old principles were central to counter/guerilla war. Its findings were drawn from simulative exercises, and 'a century of practical experience' including conversations with 'senior officers with long experience in guerilla war.' The treatise also referred to the Chindits' air support methods, reflecting interest in them within the broader ranks of the British military, but the main basis for analysis was 'opposition encountered on the N.W. Frontier', consisting of both unsophisticated irregulars, and the less common 'modern' guerilla bands that were active in Waziristan between 1933 and 1935 and in 1937. The Report advocated military principles and policies contained in the Imperial-policing 'Manual' on

'Frontier Warfare', the strategy being to 'provoke or entice the enemy to battle', by familiar tactics such as sweeps, columns, and patrols between picquets. It continued that the outcome depended on the specific terrain, the nation-state's physical infrastructure, and the availability of contact information. However, the Report also advocated some reshaping of traditional I.S. wisdom and the displacement of the 'conservative element in military thought [prominent in] .. the 1930s.' It stated that 'modern guerillas' were endowed with superior tactical awareness and organisation, and therefore encirclement or 'shepherding' was not 'realistic [as] there is little hope of holding a ring', because guerillas 'always slip out.' It tacitly recognised that the guerilla had undergone a qualitative change, and to cope with this it argued that, 'by increasing our mobility .. we can surprise, and with luck, inflict casualties', [emphasis added]. It proposed large scale offensives and 'protracted operations' by mobile columns to 'achieve decisive results.' Small patrols in the mountains were also considered worthwhile, with the 'best [tactics] a combination of both.' These demanded some army reorganisation, coinciding to an extent with contemporary BMM(G) opinions: 'in contrast with old methods of columns on a total infantry marching basis', the Report suggested specially trained air-supported light infantry to execute a strategic plan under the direction of a joint military headquarters. However, it denounced 'commandos' as a waste of resources, and in view of the scarcity of intelligence, and an enduring belief in the vulnerability of regulars to ambush, it dismissed any idea of attempting the 'ambush of guerillas.' Ergo, the Report did not seek to develop small unit tactics into a paraguerilla policy, only to modify the 'familiar style.' Indeed, it questioned War Office support for unorthodox forces at the time of the Farran episode, which undoubtedly encouraged the traditionalists. Nevertheless, the Greek commandos were
sponsored by the War Office, and in September 1947, it took the 'unusually imaginative decision' of forming the 21 SAS (Territorial) Regiment, explicitly for wartime unorthodox operations.80

The BMM(G) and RAF Commands approved plans for relocation and encirclement in Operation SWAN, executed from June to July 1947. Rawlins appreciated that removing the YIAFKA eased the army's task, although he never believed it to be of crucial importance, and both Wickham and the Foreign Office noted that it was 'of itself no solution.'81 But in criticising the BMM(G), the Military Attache stated that 'the importance of the self-defence organisation in the occupied villages has been underestimated.' He added that, 'this organisation consists of "cells" .. responsible for providing the bands with supplies, information [and] recruits .. once this organisation has been cleared up .. the exclusion of bands and [the] general control of the area is very greatly simplified.' The RAF mission shared his view that the YIAFKA could endure in 'cleared' areas 'occupied' by gendarmes and hence an effective clearance and counterorganisation effort was required. Colonel Shortt


reported that 'the principal OBJECT of the GNA [by the middle of 1947 was] .. the systematic eradication of this organisation', and remarked that its removal would result in improved 'popular morale.' During Operation SWAN, 2700 suspects were arrested and target areas were depopulated prior to military offensives. As a result the guerrillas apparently became less effective than hitherto. However, they were not eliminated by encirclements, and the British army HQ- formerly Land Forces Greece, now British Troops Greece [BTG]- blamed insufficient information and manpower, and the mountain topography for this. It consoled itself that the Nazis had also failed to defeat Greek partisan guerrillas, but while the BMM(G) was then in no position to effect changes in Greek COIN tactical policy, neither the current nor wartime failure of large scale counterguerrilla offensives convinced the HQ of the need to propose alternatives. Nonetheless, the RAF group applied experience gained during the War to suggest a revision of COIN tactics, because 'from discussions with British officers who have played a bandit role, SIS etc., in the last war .. the bandit fears paratroops more than anything.' In fact, paratroopers deployed as part of major COIN offensive operations offered no panacea, but the Delegation condemned the BMM(G)'s proposals for reorganisation of the GNA as 'half measures', and urged its fellow mission to press the Greeks for a further adaptation of tactical military policy.


In a report to Montgomery in August 1947, the CINCMELF, General Crocker, reiterated the importance of the innovative Clear-and-Hold strategy and paramilitary COIN forces, and argued that 'possibly Rawlins has got a bit too close to the problem .. [He is] a bit too optimistic as to [the GNA's] condition and abilities.' Crocker admitted that the British army mission might well have 'stifled' the Greek Army's 'material characteristics and fighting potentialities .. [and] this wants watching both in regard to organisation, and tactical methods/training.' He criticised current Greek tactics and their failure to appreciate 'sufficiently in planning counter-op[eration]s [against the DSE that] as the [communists] become better equipped, they are bound to become less flexible and mobile and, thus, more vulnerable.' Crocker appreciated the differences between unconventional warfare and conventional positional and mobile war, and hoped that in future the insurgent military opposition would be a conventional rather than a guerilla army, which would enable the Greeks to apply their numerical and firepower advantages more profitably. However, he declared that if this was to transpire, better preparation of the GNA than hitherto was necessary, so that it would be capable of defeating whatever form of military opposition it encountered. This in turn demanded renewed British freedom of movement and provision of advice on COIN operational planning and execution to Greek Field Units,84 founded on greater tactical reflection and adaptability on the part of British army officers.

Foreign Office officials frequently criticised the BMM(G)

for its preparation of the GNA, because operations revealed 'examples of disadvantages of the existing organisation, which cannot . be put down solely to shortage of men and material.' It derided current efforts 'designed to swat flies with a sledge-hammer', and sought to end 'the complacency of General Rawlins, whose optimism was shared by the War Office', and to effect a change in 'training and operational methods [that] have now become habitual.' There was a growing trend in the British military to look to the experience of the War for COIN inspiration, and similarly the Foreign Office proposed that the GNA should be 'changed into a looser body of units after the Chindit pattern, with .. greater freedom of action .. [for officers trained] in the Wingate and Laycock school rather than the armoured tradition.' Although Wingate's stronghold and deep penetration strategies were not a solution to guerilla warfare, the Chindit operations featured considerable small patrolling from bases, and therefore gave a basic indication of the type of junior level tactical initiative that was required in counterguerilla war. Although the Foreign Office's suggestion did not result in a new tactical policy, British COIN agencies referred to wartime unorthodoxy more and more, and the Army was encouraged to do the same after mid-1947.

Despite Tsoucalas' assertion, the responsibility for COIN advising was not monopolised by the United States after 1947. On 2 September, the chief of the American missions, Dwight Griswold, proposed Allied advising on COIN operational planning and execution, and twenty-five US officers began to give their

assistance within days. By 29 September, the American ambassador, Lincoln MacVeagh, asked Norton whether the British could 'provide direct operational advice' too, and by the middle of October BLUs were again allowed to visit operational areas, and to restructure army intelligence.\(^86\) However, the Cabinet was undecided about a wider, operational advisory role. Norton asked London to ensure that if this was granted, BMM(G) advisors would take account of new COIN ideas, but its predisposition was to 'reject off hand any suggestion made to them by mere civilians as to their professional task', hence excluding 'interference' from non-military officials like himself, despite his understanding of insurgency. Indeed, during the time that the army mission made preparations to resume operational advising, American officers advocated encirclements,\(^87\) and therefore created a climate in which fresh COIN thinking was unlikely to burgeon. The Foreign Office realised that in order to alter the BMM(G)'s military policies, intervention at a high level was necessary.

By October 1947, the growing acceptance of fresh COIN ideas such as the Clear-and-Hold strategy, population self-protection forces, and political reforms, was demonstrated by


\(^{87}\) On local counsel to BMM(G), Norton to Bevin/FO, 19 July 1947, R8478/67004. American thinking on operations, H. Jones P.88.
the Foreign Secretary's support for them in the Cabinet Defence Committee. However, Bevin also aired his misgivings about the BMM(G)’s record and recommended the transfer of Indian Army officers to it, asserting that they possessed 'useful and recent experience of the type of operation' required in Greece, while most Mission officers had lately practiced conventional warfare in France and Germany. Furthermore, he pressed for the counterinsurgents in Athens to apply guerilla experience 'in occupied territory during the war' to Greece. Bevin did not display a knowledge of all the requirements for COIN success, and his power to influence its course in Greece was limited. But he did argue for change based upon old I.S. procedures and relatively new experience of unconventional warfare, and encouraged non-military COIN action.

British support for extra-military-security policies in the winter of 1947 to 1948.

The Foreign Office sponsored COIN political action by pressing the Greek government to initiate steps towards national political reconciliation, and to devise social welfare schemes as a means to secure popular support. Additionally, it proposed '"political warfare" .. [by] attempting to detach the rank-and-file of guerillas from their .. leaders by offers of amnesty and a more moderate administration of justice .. a useful complement to armed warfare, which all wise governments should adopt.' British agencies recognised that many


89. FO minutes, Balfour, 30 Sept. 1947, R757/72238; Second Secretary John M. McCormick, 28 May 1948, R6326/72212.
insurgent 'supporters' were actually forced into their ranks, and the Foreign Office hoped that they would be prised away by counterpropaganda and civic action. The use of the military instrument for its positive psychological effect on the population was no longer viewed as sufficient in the psywar battle, and the Department was in the process of accepting basic Hearts-and-Minds policies as the cornerstone of any COIN campaign.

At the end of the year, Wickham elaborated that the KKE thrived in the grim socio-economic and political climate in Greece, and that the 670,000 displaced persons created by the conflict by 1948 were a 'fertile ground for Communist propaganda.' This made 'promises directed at the minorities .. [for example, regarding religion,] economic conditions .. or liberty and democracy.' Wickham recommended not only counterpropaganda, but socio-economic measures to efface the living conditions fostering pro-insurgent support, thereby reinforcing the growing trend towards British support for a basic Hearts-and-Minds line by 1948.

British military tasks, and work on the Army's COIN line in the autumn of 1947.

In October 1947, when Whitehall criticisms of the BMM(G) reached their height, and Bevin called for the application of wartime experience of guerilla warfare to adapt tactical policy, General Rawlins initiated a study of GNA operations to determine the 'essential needs for .. Army success.' He concluded that it was 'problematic whether banditry can be stamped out', but believed that 'the antibandit campaign in

Greece is similar to any other guerilla campaign', evidently equating insurgency with other conflicts involving guerillas. However, the military task in Greece differed to that of many previous rebellions, in that the insurgent forces were prosecuting a modern guerilla war, supplemented by conventional 'brigades' of 3-700 men by 1948. Nevertheless, after October, the American army group chief, General S. Livesay, 'came into repeated disagreement over .. training, operations and administration' with the British Military Mission. The BMM(G) Command's Review suggested a new military approach, commending sustained

'deep patrols .. [by air-supplied] light infantry .. operating like highly efficient bandits .. If bands feel insecure in the hills .. continually hunted .. they will be concerned chiefly with their own safety .. it follows that to defeat bandits, the bulk of the Greek Army must be in the hills operating like highly trained Andartes [or guerillas]. It must be the object of every .. sub-unit to obtain accurate information about the enemy, to gain contact with a band .. to harass .. and finally to destroy [it]', [emphasis added].

Senior BMM(G) officers favoured 'vigorous active patrolling' because 'success in antibandit operations depends ultimately on the junior commanders', and proposed the collection of 'intelligence from the population' by small army patrols, hence abandoning the British Army's traditional opposition to I.S. tactical intelligence-gathering by soldiers as well as police. At last the Mission Command was coming to grips with previous counterguerilla deficiencies, but it appreciated that getting


92. DSE operations in, Woodhouse Struggle P.220.
its proposals implemented would be difficult, as 'few [Greek] commanders will order any form of deep patrolling because they feel that a patrol of a section or platoon would be incapable of looking after itself.' The Mission Command was itself still guilty of seeking a swift victory through small unit forces and its proposals fell short of paraguerilla action, but this was a major advance in British counterguerilla military thought. Additionally, the Review emphasised the Clear-and-Hold strategy, because 'the importance of consolidating an area [was] not always appreciated' by the Greek authorities.93

However, the BMM(G) had not regained its unrestricted COIN operational advisory role, and when Rawlins was asked for his views on future plans by the Greek authorities, he fell into line with their thinking. The Greeks emphasised the employment of more Commando Raiding Forces as a vanguard in large scale offensives, rather than in widespread independent patrolling operations. The conservatism of the Greek General Staff, along with limited Greek financial resources, and pressing operational commitments, conspired to prevent a very large expansion and training of 'commando' forces, or a reorientation of the GNA to small unit patrolling as the BMM(G) Review recommended. In these circumstances, despite his Command's report, General Rawlins adhered to the Greek and American conviction that encirclements should be made to succeed, and he approved plans incorporating them, thereby disavowing proposals for a radical shift in operational policy.

By December 1947, the GNA implemented fewer sweeps and drives in some districts and more 'commandos' and light infantry with air support instituted 'continuous offensive

93. Regarding AMAG/BMM(G) disputes, and for the American view on operations, H. Jones P.90,104. Details of British proposals, BMM(G) Command Review, ibid.
operations.' Their duration was less rigidly limited, involving day and night attacks for over a month to 'systematically .. expand .. control over well-defined areas.' But small unit operations were regarded as being of secondary importance, and additionally, holding forces were often unable to keep targeted areas clear. The prevailing reactionary attitude to tactical military policies was underlined by the Greek Army's plans for conventional frontal assaults in response to the DSE's defence of 'liberated' areas from September. Indeed, from 3 November, American officers advised GNA units at division level, and by 18 November there was a Joint Greek-American Staff devising plans which initially 'overshadowed the BMM.' Sir Charles Wickham voiced his fears that American officers 'appear to have failed to profit by our experience in Greece.'

In the winter of 1947 to 1948, Greek conventional assaults and large scale counterguerrilla operations continued to make meagre progress.

The BMM(G) Command Review outlined not only military-security policy, but stressed that 'it must be appreciated that the Greek Nation as a whole is engaged in war and not .. merely the Fighting Services .. all the forces of the State must be mobilised and Civil Authorities must realise that it is their responsibility to take every measure for the protection of the people.' The Mission did not contemplate the central direction of all COIN efforts, and it asserted that 'military victory is an essential prerequisite to political settlement, and economic recovery', indicating that, unlike some other British COIN

94. GNA operations, Kousoulas P.255-7; C. Falls 'The Greek Army and the guerillas', Military Review 28, Mar. 1948, P.75. DSE action, and GNA changes in, O'Ballance Greek P.155: on the American position and their views, P.156; Wickham, in FO minute, J.A. Turpin, 1 Nov. 1947, R15323/67053; Wittner P.236; H. Jones P.108.
agencies, it had not developed an appreciation of the need for a multifaceted COIN campaign. But it had expanded its vision considerably, and the War Office was informed about its new tactical thinking.95

The renewal of British operational advising, and COIN progress, especially in regard to military-security and control policies, from early 1948.

During much of 1947 the BMM(G) was criticised for its stagnant I.S. thinking, and in the autumn Bevin contemplated asking the Americans to shoulder the whole responsibility for operational advising, while the British Mission would be restricted to training the GNA. But in December, responding to American requests for British help, and probably feeling that their inexperienced partner should not be left to cope alone at such a critical stage in Greece, the War Office and the Chiefs of Staff pleaded for some British soldiers to be given the 'same responsibilities and freedom of movement' as members of the new Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group [JUSMAPG] formed on 31 December. On that day, Bevin agreed to their request.96

In January 1948, the CINCMELF drafted a new directive for the BMM(G), requesting the 'closest possible collaboration' with the Americans. Scholars mistakenly assert that

95. Regarding the importance of a politico-military campaign, see Chapter 1. On BMM(G) ideas, its Review, ibid.


-234-
henceforward only the JUSMAPG advised on operational plans. In actual fact, Crocker informed Montgomery, 'I feel (as does LIVESAY), that we should take our full share of advising on operations. The Americans fully recognise that our knowledge and experience can add a useful contribution in this sphere.' The Air Ministry informed the RAF Delegation that their ally 'stressed the point that there is no intention on their part to usurp any of the functions now undertaken by the British', and General Livesay helped Crocker to draw up a directive, the CINCMELF noting that,

'very purposely we kept the directive as loose as possible and avoided limiting the British Mission purely to organisation and training. [while] we were careful to word it so that no impression could be given in American circles that the British were concerned in policy affecting the dispersal of American dollars.'

An Allied agreement delegated responsibility for advising on army organisation and training to the BMM(G), and logistics and operational planning to the JUSMAPG. But the British were expected to, and did play a key operational role, and this was successfully concealed by the Foreign Office. The Foreign Secretary had called for new expert advisors for the BMM(G) in October, and by 20 January, the War Office agreed to send 46 new officers to Greece, all chosen for their 'battle

experience.' Another 50 more British army advisors were bound for Greece by March, and all were ordered to make a 'continuing study and appraisal of the developing situation' and to provide 'stimulating and aggressive advice' along with the JUSMAPG. The 175 BLOs assigned to Greek Field HQs were free to move and give operational advice with 50 USLOs from 16 January, a year since Britons first assumed such a role.

New British army advisors outranked their JUSMAPG counterparts, and Britons provided most operational advice from spring to the summer of 1948, while the American 'involvement dealt largely with the conventional aspects of military activity.' Despite Tossizza's assertion, British-American military relations by the middle of the year were strained, with the BMM(G) Command frequently at odds with the American army mission chief—Lieutenant-General J. Van Fleet.

98. WO despatches new advisors, 'History of BMM(G)', W0202/908; Pyman, note, 3 Mar., 6/1/14, LHC; and on numbers, GHQMEF QHR, 20 Mar., W0261/548; MacFetridge interview; H. Jones P.158, records a total of 75—actually 96. On operational advising, Gen. Livesay, to BMM(G), 15 Jan., W0202/895; WO Brief (draft), to BMM(G), 15 Jan., W0202/894: BLU advice and numbers, COS(48)9, 19 Jan., R925/72238; COS (48)20, 10 Feb., R2396/72239; WO Paramilitary Establishments, 19 Jan., W033/2641; Brief, 14 Feb. 1948, R2405/72240; H. Jones P.127.

In early 1948, the BMM(G) drew up draft operational plans, and by April BLUs were directed 'to advise the appropriate GREEK authorities on the efficient development and employment of their land forces.' Further, the Mission Command advised the Greek General Staff to execute a strategic plan encompassing all security forces under a single commander.100 Unified command is an ancient military principle, but the BMM(G) realised that a director of all security forces was essential for COIN progress, and this was a significant departure from usual British I.S. practice. Crocker and the army mission pressed the Greeks to appoint a single commander, and a similar step was taken by Britain in Malaya by 1950. Indeed, the importance of central, unified operational planning and execution was understood by the Vice-CIGS, Lieutenant-General Gerald Templer, who studied reports on Greek COIN in 1948,101 and ensured that the requisite organisational arrangements were in place when he was the High Commissioner in Malaya from 1952.

In January 1948, General Crocker informed Montgomery that, 'Rawlins is a bit bogged down', and that Major-General Ernest E. Down should replace him in order 'to influence .. this year's vital campaign.' The CIGS agreed that Rawlins was 'too long mixed up with this difficult problem .. [and] a fresh


101. Crocker presses for a C-in-C, 31 Jan., to CIGS, W0216/679. Templer on operations and organisation, COS(48)24, 18 Feb., DEFE4/11. He kept up to date with Greek COIN, for example in, COS(48)20, 9 Feb., DEFE4/10; COS(48)38(0), 17 Feb., DEFE5/10; COS(48)91, 2 July 1948, DEFE4/14.
brain [wa]s wanted', recognising the need for a new impetus if the GNA's fortunes were to change. Down was viewed as eminently qualified for the task, having commanded a division in Greece from 1946, followed by eighteen months as the GOC. Rawlins officially stayed in command until April, but by 27 March 1948 Down controlled the BMM(G), and henceforth gave it a 'new lease of life.'

General Down desired changes in the GNA's practices and stressed that British advice should be impressed on the Greek generals, because the conflict was 'an ideological and civil war, of which many soldiers understand little.' Indeed, on 4 March, he convinced the War Office and Bevin to attach initially another dozen new BLOs to Greek brigades, where they advised without American counterparts. These British advisors were chosen on the basis of their experience, particularly of unconventional and mountain warfare. They supplemented their own knowledge with guidance from time-honoured works such as Passing it on by General A. Skeen, 'an expert' on mountain warfare, and some of them 'agreed .. [that their experience]
gave .. [them] an advantage' when devising COIN advice.\textsuperscript{102} The War Office was making an unprecedented effort to provide its policy executors with COIN expertise, clearly because it was determined to ensure that the first communist revolt of the Cold War would be defeated. Its procedure was now more like that of the Foreign Office, combining a number of influences to frame COIN action. But although it accepted the value of providing expert COIN advisors, opponents of unorthodoxy in the Army establishment evidently argued successfully against Whitehall advocating any radical transformation of COIN tactical policy, in contrast to the BMM(G) Command Review. For while Kousoulas states that American advisors devised COIN planning at this time, in mid-March BLUs received a draft operational plan from the War Office, which the RAF group noted was 'top secret .. [V]ery few Greeks know, or are

\textsuperscript{102} On Rawlins' replacement several months before the WO originally planned, on General Down, and changes in the BMM(G), Shortt, IR, 15 May, R6706/72212; CINCMELF, to CIGS, 31 Jan., CIGS to CoAirStaff, 5 Feb., W0216/679. On the transition of the BMM(G)'s command, MacFetridge, interview; Pyman, note, 3 Mar., 6/1/14, LHC. Down at the WO, and on operational plans and the nature of the rebellion, Lt.-Col. C.H.T. MacFetridge \textit{A Memoir of Greece in 1948} (Ascot, Berks., 1987) P.26; interview; WO to GHQMELF, 4 Mar., Pyman, \textit{ibid}; Shortt IR, 1 Nov. 1948, R12585/72241. Skeen's status, Bond P.105. On Bevin, Shortt, IR, 1 Nov., R12585/72241; MacFetridge interview; and on Down and the selection of BLOs; letter, 30 June 1989; \textit{Memoir} P.7; 'History of BMM(G)', W0202/908. A BLO was killed by a mortar, 10 Feb. 1948, GHQMEF note, W0261/548, one of three British fatalities during the conflict. On JUSMAPG responsibilities, Wittner P.236-44.
supposed to know, anything about it.' British army advisors studied the War Office draft, and contributed to planning in an Allied Advisory Planning Group [AAPG], along with Greek and American officers, in March 1948. British thinking helped to shape plans for Operation DAWN, and the status of prevailing War Office counterguerrilla thought prior to General Down taking over command of the BMM(G) can be discerned from this.

Operation DAWN was executed from 15 April to 5 May, with the aim of clearing a targeted region by mass arrests of the YIAFKA, and by repeated encirclements to 'shepherd .. as many bandits as possible into the killing area.' These inflicted casualties on the communists and hence encouraged American and Greek planners to support the continuation of such tactics. But BMM(G) officers appreciated that security force gains were essentially a result of the disruptive effect of counter-organisation arrests and relocation, so that 'for the first time an operation was mounted without the bandit knowing in advance the plan, in time for counteraction' by evasion. Moreover, the GNA's military victory was viewed as the result of good fortune rather than judgement, because the DSE only sustained major losses when some of its units defended their ground, whereas when they scattered the GNA's achievements were considered paltry. The British army mission therefore did


104. BMM(G) on operations, QHRs, 20 May, W0202/982; 20 Aug., W0202/893. Regarding DAWN, Shortt, to FO, Apr., and FO minute, 13 May, R6329/; IR, 15 May 1948, R6706/72212.
not give encirclement the credit that others bestowed on it, and its views contradicted those of the War Office traditionalists, and the BMM(G)'s former commander.

In the spring of 1948, Colonel Arthur Shortt repeated his criticism of the BMM(G) for its 'lack of imagination in the study of the problem .. [and] lack of officers with the particular type of experience required.' He was also unhappy about GNA encirclements involving only a token 'commando' element, and testified to the desirability of more of these forces, as well as of light infantry and holding units. Further, he warned his superiors against being blinded by recent GNA successes in battles with conventional insurgent formations, the result of a mistaken shift by the DSE that was 'so at variance with [its] hitherto successful guerilla tactics.' American and Greek planners concentrated on fighting conventional war, while Shortt stressed the counterguerilla task. He also shared the growing British belief that 'political pressure [as well] as military' was required for success, in contrast to the JUSMAPG's clear-cut 'military objective.' The Military Attache's strictures were accepted by both the Foreign and War Offices.105

In March 1948, Down contemplated GNA organisational improvements including a single operational commander, and an increase in its ceiling from 147,000 to 250,000 to afford Clear-and-Hold. Moreover, he set about answering the Mission's critics and framing a counterguerilla policy that accounted for 'the complications of guerilla war', aware that, in spite of

the War Office's plans, 'the scope for encirclement was very limited.' But while the guerilla menace remained unresolved in 1948, the urgency of this task was diminished by gradual DSE conventionalisation and its creation of defended mountain positions in northern Greece from the winter of 1947 to 1948. Indeed, Down was 'profoundly grateful' that the GNA was increasingly pitted against a conventional rather than a guerilla opposition, because this was one that the GNA was in a better position to fight.

O'Ballance asserts that the JUSMAPG planned and directed operations in the summer of 1948, instituting 'US methods and doctrine.' And Van Fleet told the press that the JUSMAPG 'appears to be in charge of operations.' However, while the Americans seemed to be directing the security forces during Operation CROWN, the BMM(G) maintained a significant planning capacity, while BLUs supervised its execution up to September 1948. The American army mission gave advice in the Allied joint planning group where it retained four permanent members compared to the BMM(G)'s two, probably reflecting the USA's position as the provider of most Western political and financial support to Greece. But Britons and Americans offered COIN advice separately in the field, and while JUSMAPG was just below 300 strong and maintained 20 officers at GNA units, the

106. Down's criticism of encirclement, MacFetridge interview; and on necessary counterguerilla action, in, Under-Sec. G.A. Wallinger, FO minute, 23 Mar., R4402/72241; Shortt IR, 1 Nov. 1948, R12585/72241.

107. Down's views, RAFDG note, 30 Apr. 1948, AIR46/1871; MacFetridge interview.

BMM(G) had over four times more men overall and seven times their number in Liaison Units. Indeed, when trans-Atlantic advisors disagreed with each other, the Britons tactfully pressed the Greeks to adopt British advice, and Down, who commanded the respect of the Greek Army Chief, General E. Tsokalotos, pressed his generals to adopt British thinking and therefore to place a greater emphasis on small unit patrolling. The GHQ noted that during the summer operations General Down 'gained the confidence of the GREEK commanders by going among them and quietly telling them how to win their battles .. [acting as] Advisor-in-Chief on tactical matters.' Furthermore, RAF officers on the ground cast a 'critical eye' on the RHAF, and BLUs advised on the execution of operations down to brigade level, while their JUSMAPG associates were only present at higher echelons, and British advice was 'generally .. valued and acted upon' by Greek Field Units. The BMM(G) reported that British officers enjoyed 'influence far greater than [the] AMERICANS', a fact that was successfully concealed for several decades.

Operation CROWN featured more small unit pursuit of guerillas over many weeks than previous operations, but although some Greek officials realised the need for sustained '"government guerilla warfare"', there was 'a gap .. between

intention and action [on their part]. The Greek authorities insisted on further attempts at counterguerrilla encirclement, while concentrating military resources on conventional assaults against DSE positions. During CROWN, engagements differed from 'those previously undertaken .. [in that] the army [wa]s up against prepared defences', and insurgent bases were substantially damaged by the GNA and RHAF. The BMM(G) commended its planning for conventional offensives against DSE bastions as 'well conceived tactically and administratively', but it criticised the performance of Greek commanders, and the failure of Greek counterguerrilla operations to eradicate DSE guerilla units. The CINCMELF also assessed Operation CROWN, in which the RHAF supported large scale offensives and also 'commando' operations, and he noted 'the value of the air arm .. [for] recce .. [air] strikes and supply.' The Chiefs of Staff supported an expansion of the RHAF and agreed that if Britain 'were faced with this problem, we should base op[eration]s on the maximum use of airpower'; which was an advance on the British Army's prewar indifference to air support in I.S. operations. General Templer also emphasised air support, together with the requirement for sufficient manpower to institute effective Clear-and-Hold operations. The British operational involvement in Greece gave the VCIGS and the rest of the British Army establishment an opportunity to study the requirements of COIN, including counterguerrilla warfare in


111. Crocker, notes, and draft letter, to Van Fleet/COS, 23 June, Pyman, 6/1/17, LHC. COS on RHAF, COS(48)124(0), 2 June, COS(48)155, 19 July; and Templer's views, in, COS (48)81, 14 June, AIR8/1258. CsINCME/COS on COIN operation1 requirements, COS(48)127(0), 10 June 1948, DEFE5/11.
tortuous terrain and weather conditions, concurrent with the start of the communist insurgency in Malaya.

The air aspect of counterguerilla action was elaborated on by the RAF mission in the summer of 1948. It advocated more RHAF fire support 'to give the bandits the least possible respite', and wanted 'greater emphasis on destroying food and equipment reserves [rather] than [on] inflicting casualties.' Indeed, it realised that military attrition was no solution because 'the problem in Greece though factually, is not fundamentally and entirely a problem of bandits', revealing its understanding of the politico-military nature of the conflict; and it pressed for improved government propaganda. Moreover, as the BMM(G) focussed its attention on the execution of major GNA operations against DSE 'liberated areas' in mid-1948, and neglected the problem of developing a successful counterguerilla tactical policy, renewed criticisms ushered forth from the Mission's RAF colleagues. The Air Force Delegation argued that, 'our past battle campaign has been at fault [and] .. we as advisors must acknowledge that our experience in the type of warfare being fought in Greece is negligible, therefore we must learn as we progress.' The RAF proposed that the GNA should be 'beating the bandits at their own game' as a 'highly trained mobile force of infantry, capable of operating for prolonged periods without a "tail".' The Delegation stated that this could be achieved if the GNA was 'free[d] .. from .. dependency on road or animal transport' by using air supply, following the Chindit example. The RAF group evidently appreciated some of


-245-
the requirements of COIN and counterguerrilla warfare, and pressed the BMM(G) to pursue its proposals for developing improved small unit tactics.

The main military threat in Greece after CROWN, however, came from conventional rather than guerilla DSE forces, with which the KKE aimed to gain rapid success through civil war. Hence, General Van Fleet wanted the Greek military to undertake conventional assaults and encirclements against them, and he disparaged the BMM(G)'s proposal to retrain some GNA units specifically for counterguerrilla war and others for conventional combat. The American commander demanded simultaneous offensives against guerillas in the south and in the DSE's northern mountain strongholds, asserting that the former should be 'a much easier problem' to resolve. General Down disagreed that a quick victory over insurgent forces was possible, in contrast to the beliefs of his predecessor, General Rawlins, and the Chiefs of Staff and the War Office now agreed with the BMM(G) chief. After several weeks, Van Fleet acceded to Down's wish for separate efforts against the DSE's defended internal bases and those regions afflicted by

guerillas, but the GHQ feared that the rift in Allied relations could spread beyond Greece. Indeed, as a consequence of these difficulties, the JUSMAPG insisted that it alone should advise on 'all operational matters ... tactical training of combat units, supply, movement and evacuation in operational areas.' Therefore, the UK army mission relinquished its operational role in September 1948, restoring the Allied front but leaving it devoid of responsibility for 'policy or higher direction or advice to the Greek Government and high military authorities', except on basic training. 'There would be one mission [in future, the JUSMAPG] .. responsible for advice .. on all major policy matters.'

The BMM(G) played no part in COIN operations after October 1948, but General Down outlined the KKE's campaign and sought 'lessons' from the BMM(G)'s COIN involvement. He stated that if Britain encountered a similar threat, it should aim to Clear-and-Hold by employing very substantial manpower in constant offensives from strategic bases with air support. His 'Appreciation' embodied an innovative counterguerrilla approach, and it was affirmed by the Chiefs of Staff. Indeed, with more time to reflect, in early 1949 the Mission stressed the need 'to patrol constantly in order to obtain information and


115. BMM(G) on their role in, BGS(Plans&Ops), to CoS, GHQMEFL, 6 Sept.: JUSMAPG on COIN advising, notes, Pyman, 6/1/20, LHC. CINCMELF on Allied Missions' status in, notes, 1 Oct., to WO, 16 Oct. 1948, W0202/899.
security'\textsuperscript{116} and hence to defeat guerillas, although it was not then in a position to pressure the Greek authorities to effect a policy of protracted small unit patrolling. Nevertheless, the BMM(G) substantially reshaped its counterguerrilla military approach after 1945, and it gained a greater understanding of the nature of insurgency. Further, the CINCMELF commented in June 1948 that, 'the rebel menace will continue and there will be fresh infiltration by bandits .. unless some political settlement can be achieved .. [and Greek forces] can hold and keep clear areas won .. [to] cover the long process of economic stabilisation.' Crocker's conception of COIN tasks was approved by Foreign Office officials who shared the enhanced COIN vision of local British agencies.\textsuperscript{117}

Refinement of British thought on COIN psywar and political action in 1948 and 1949.

Towards the end of 1948, Norton reported that many Greeks refused to assist the State's forces because they foresaw 'no concrete prospects of a better deal ahead for the ordinary


\textsuperscript{117} Crocker, and FO, in, G.A. Wallinger, FO memo, 26 June, R7562/72243. On the multifaceted nature of the conflict, Norton, to FO, 21 June, R7475/72242; First Sec. D.P. Reilly, to FO, 23 July 1948, R8688/72243.
citizen.' He proposed popular reforms as a means of securing their support, and in December the Foreign Office described the conflict as, 'equally political, military, and economic .. [and suggested that government] effort[s] will require concerted action in all three fields in greater measure than .. hitherto.'

The ambassador provided no detailed proposals for civic action policies, but in January 1949, the Foreign Office commented favourably on an analysis by A. Kellar of MI5, who had studied the Palestine COIN in 1946 and had fought with the Greek guerillas during the War. Drawing on his varied background in unconventional warfare, Kellar stated that, 'to know what to do .. we must ascertain why it is that .. the partisans continue in rebellion' and retain their support. He concluded that the population was 'either terrorised, or frustrated, or both, [while the insurgents] offered something which the .. Government cannot offer .. or .. get them .. [such as] agrarian reform .. village dispensaries, new elections.' Therefore, Kellar suggested that the regime should 'realise some of the desired reforms .. and .. announce them loudly as a New Deal' in its counterpropaganda.

This was an exposition of the Hearts-and-Minds COIN line, and Whitehall and Athens political staffs supported it.

The British Army on counterguerilla warfare in the spring of 1949.


From December 1948 to January 1949, the Greek army cleared most guerillas from the south by mass arrests and then lengthy small unit patrolling. The GNA's improved operational methods contributed to rapid success, but this was achieved mainly because of the widespread provision of intelligence by the people, who were subjected to insurgent terrorism. Indeed, the DSE 'could have gone on indefinitely if the .. [rebels] had stayed with guerilla tactics and continued to receive' assistance including safe-havens from neighbouring Balkan communist states. But the Greek Communist Party concentrated on conventional war in 1949, partly obviating the need for the GNA to refine its counterguerilla tactics further.

The BMM(G) retained its interest in the COIN campaign after 1948, and it endorsed Greek-American plans for Operation ROCKET for a Clear-and-Hold from south to north, under the direction of a single commander. This incorporated counter-organisation arrests, frontal attacks on defended DSE positions, and sustained small unit pursuit of the remaining guerillas. In March 1949, the new CIGS, Field-Marshal William Slim, believed that the civil war would continue until at least 1951, and concluded that victory would only stem from what Down termed the DSE's 'ill-thought out tactics.' But the CIGS, who was also concerned about the concurrent counterguerilla war in Malaya, realised that Greek guerillas 'cause[d] the more serious and widespread disruption of the economy', and he advocated large forces of air-supported small unit patrols to fight them, subscribing to the evolving British military approach to counterguerilla warfare. During 1949, the Greek security forces inflicted severe blows on the DSE, although they still numbered 18,000 in October. However, in that month, the KKE abandoned its civil war, not least because of major cuts in international communist aid and the denial of sanctuaries, notably by Yugoslavia following Tito's rift with
Summary.

British political and military agencies involved in Greece understood the fundamental character of insurgency by 1948, and officials were formulating various COIN ideas and policies addressing all of its aspects. Local and Foreign Office political staffs began to comprehend its nature in the winter of 1946 to 1947, and within two years they supported a Hearts-and-Minds COIN line. British soldiers took considerably longer to understand the conflict and work out a response, owing to their innate military-centric viewpoint. But by the time the British military missions' COIN role ended, the Army and RAF groups and the Chiefs of Staff appreciated many of the demands of COIN, and they had substantially reassessed their counter-guerilla thinking. Those Britons developing COIN policies were affected by various influences, and in the early stages of the campaign individuals' thought was conditioned primarily by the I.S. 'line' of the institution in which they worked. At first this led to a degree of inertia in British COIN thinking, and this tendency was underlined by the restraints placed on

personnel by high level directives from London. Nonetheless, numerous officials, especially those with political as opposed to military-security responsibilities, were able to shake off the external influences that prevented others from advancing COIN thought. Their perceptions were shaped by their own experience of I.S. conditions in Greece, but also such factors as their knowledge of innovative Greek counterterrorism and counterorganisation policies, and other instances of unconventional warfare and wartime unorthodoxy, all of which were utilised to advance British COIN policies and apparatus. Prior to the onset of the Malaya Emergency, British counter-insurgents established the value of unusual and original policies including population relocation, civilian self-protection forces, extended small unit patrolling, and civic action. Many recognised British I.S. practices were adhered to by the UK military-security missions, but the traditional I.S. wisdom that they advocated from 1945 to 1947 was transformed by 1948 through the secret British involvement with COIN in Greece.

The employment of personnel with 'relevant' experience also became an accepted premise upon which to frame British COIN efforts in Greece, but BMM(G) and RAF officers continued to work there between 1949 and 1952 and were not available for reassignment to Malaya. Therefore, their COIN knowledge was not directly transferred to the Far East, and there is no available evidence that the War Office or Air Ministry, or indeed other British agencies, forwarded relevant COIN information to the Malayan authorities during 1948. Hence, as was the case in postwar Palestine, the British institutional-bureaucratic system ensured that COIN concepts developed in Greece were not pooled and entrusted to a central repository ready for distribution to British authorities, but remained in an inconcise and unrefined form. In addition, contemporary
insurgent treatises on the conflict are said to have made 'no very serious impact on traditional Western thinking about the nature and practice of guerilla war.' Yet, Campbell contends that the British-backed Clear-and-Hold military-security strategy of Operation ROCKET was adopted in Malaya in 1949.121 Identifying the extent to which the Greek experience was applied there, and how this came about, will indicate whether and how British agencies had learned any COIN lessons by 1948/9.

121. On the BMM(G) after 1948, MacFetridge interview. On the impact of the insurgency, Bell Myth P.74. On similarities between COIN action in Greece and Malaya in 1949, Campbell P.305; Thompson World P.68.
Federation of Malaya, 1948-52:
Chapter 5: The development of new COIN policies and doctrine, and the 'Hearts-and-Minds' line, 1948-52, with special regard to the Malaya 'Emergency'.

Insurgency began in Malaya in May 1948, and this was the crucible in which 'Hearts-and-Minds' COIN policies and doctrine were forged. The process of their development involved several influences that have hitherto been ignored or neglected. The structure of the Federation of Malaya, comprising nine Malay 'states' and two British 'settlements', afforded local autonomy on many internal affairs, but resulted in a bureaucratic framework that prevented swift, centralised COIN planning and execution in practice. In these circumstances, advances in COIN thought made by British officials were not immediately put into practice, and hence their progress has not been appreciated by historians. Some Cost-Benefit I.S. policies were unceasingly applied in Malaya during the period under review, and traditional British Army wisdom on counterguerrilla war was not wholly discarded by it, but there was a period of formative change in COIN policies and doctrine in the years up to 1952. A new COIN line was framed by then, and the foundations laid for subsequent campaigns by Britain and many other nation-states across the world.

The onset of insurgency, early British reorganisation, and the State's military-security policies.

The Malayan Communist Party [MCP] practiced political subversion to advance its goal of achieving national political power during 1947, but by March 1948 the politbureau concluded that an armed revolution may be required to attain this. It did not choose between an orthodox communist urban coup or a Maoist 'revolutionary war' but on 10 May, under the pressure of strengthened Federal Emergency regulations that allowed
detention and banishment from April, the MCP approved political subversion and terrorism by local communist cadres. The Party visualised their continuation throughout 1948, both to pressure the government, and it hoped, to inspire a mass uprising. In the interim, the MCP organised its supporters for insurgency, which they would pursue if an urban rebellion failed to materialise.\(^1\) By 18 June, the High Commissioner, Sir Edward Gent, responded to mounting terrorist attacks by declaring a State of Emergency. Communist irregulars were most active near commercial estates that covered about 14\% of the Federation, as well as in the jungle that constituted over 80\% of the remaining land. The Malayan People's Anti-British Army [MPABA] was supported by an underground organisation designed to lead the masses into revolt, the Min Chong Yuen Tong, or 'Min Yuen', and these military and political bodies received broad guidance from the MCP politbureau through a hierarchical committee structure. By August, the MPABA fielded 2500 guerillas in platoons that could combine to undertake attacks in large

units, and 600 personnel in small terrorist cells. In addition, 'armed workers' assisted with the day-to-day maintenance of this army.\(^2\)

Gent and the British Commissioner-General for South-East Asia, Malcolm MacDonald, assessed the situation on 20 June 1948. MacDonald chaired the theatre Defence Coordination Committee comprising top civil and military authorities, and also kept the Cabinet up to date with I.S. issues. However, the High-Commissioner and Commissioner-General were reluctant to take drastic I.S. action without the Colonial Office's approval, owing both to their concern about upholding civil liberties, and fear of provoking widespread civil dissension. But of equal importance was the fact that they had no clear idea about the nature of the I.S. threat. Intelligence work was carried out by the Malayan Security Service, the police and the army, but their efforts were uncoordinated and none of these agencies possessed adequate intelligence capabilities for COIN purposes. Their warnings of impending rebellion in 1948 were

hedged with doubts about its timing and scope, and an insurgency as such was not foreseen by intelligence sources in June 1948. The security forces were therefore handicapped from the outset, as they were in Palestine, both by poor intelligence resources and by broader weaknesses in the Malayan Police Force [MPF]. It maintained insufficient contacts with the rural population, especially with the crucial Chinese element which made up 38% of the populace and provided most of the MCP's support. In addition, police ranks received insufficient training, and the police relied on 'Strike Forces' to quash unrest. 'By 1946, lessons from the European resistance movements were .. .available' to Malay state police chiefs, but these evidently did not cause the Force to rethink its methods or organisation, and it was not capable of undertaking

effective COIN action in mid-1948. The Police Commissioner, J.D. Langworthy, ordered counterorganisation mass arrests from 17 June to 23 July, as well as familiar control measures like spot-checks, searches of Left-wing premises and deterrent road patrolling. In the meantime, the Government prepared legislation for curfews, protected places and a re-formed Special Constabulary. The Commissioner-General anticipated that specials could protect economic targets from sabotage, supplementing unofficial estate guards formed after disturbances in 1946 and 1947. However, he appreciated the need to replace this initially ad hoc state response with a planned I.S. campaign, having studied the COIN effort in Palestine between 1938 and 1939, when he was Colonial Secretary. On 22 June 1948, MacDonald contacted the Commander of the Far East Land Forces [CINCFELF] Major-General Neil M. Ritchie, and emphasised that military-security operations must be based on information rather than mere speculation. Furthermore, he proposed to set up committees and joint staffs to coordinate


5. Police response, CAR, 1948 P.183,188; Communist Banditry P.30; Col. A.E. Young, notes, 1953, 2/1, RHO; Short P.74,94.
operational planning and execution. Sunderland states that this idea came from British officials who knew about wartime and Indian organisational arrangements, but MacDonald retained his interest in the mandate, and the COIN committee system in place there by 1946 could well have inspired his proposal. Whatever the source of the scheme, Gent opposed it, and as a result, the Commissioner-General convinced the Colonial Office to appoint a new High-Commissioner.6

On 25 June, MacDonald announced the formation of a Local Defence Committee [LDC] as a tripartite planning forum to allot I.S. tasks to Federal Government departments, and an Internal-Security Committee to allocate resources. Within five days, several Malay states set up their own civil-military-police Security Committees, and a Federal Joint Operations Room opened. Further, on 2 July MacDonald created a Combined Intelligence Staff [CIS], consisting of representatives of all intelligence agencies, with the task of developing background

information on MCP leaders, the Party's organisation, its strategy and tactics, and then reporting its findings to the Local Defence Committee. Numerous joint staffs at state police HQs were also established to coordinate regional intelligence efforts. In addition, the Colonial Office recommended an 'overhaul' of existing intelligence arrangements, thereby encouraging states that were contemplating the formation of their own committees to do so. However, there was no unified national system of information collection and processing, and although the Special Branch was assigned responsibility for these tasks by the Federal Government in August, the Branch lacked the skills to produce sufficient contact intelligence. Furthermore, although the British security forces reorganised for COIN far more promptly than they had in Palestine, and despite the potential advantages of a committee system for planning operations, it was hamstrung from the start by clashes of personality and jurisdiction, bureaucracy, and complacency.7 Thus, in practice, COIN military-security operations, as in Palestine, were initially short of both central direction and a sound intelligence basis.

The British Defence Coordination Committee [BDCC] realised that the Federal Police Force was not capable of coping with

the I.S. threat, and on 26 June MacDonald asked the Colonial Office to transfer 200 ex-Palestine policemen to Malaya, and also to receive the advice of their chief, Colonel W. Nicol Gray. The Colonial Office approved this request, and the Palestine Inspector-General was flown out to Kuala Lumpur on 4 July. The Department noted that his mission was to 'give the benefit of his advice in the light of his experience of terrorism in Palestine.' This was consistent with the Colonial Office's previous practice of utilising I.S. expertise for COIN purposes. Furthermore, Sir William Jenkin of Indian Central Intelligence, an acknowledged expert on terrorism, concurrently urged the Colonial Office to apply Indian I.S. experience to Malaya, equating the I.S. situation in the Sub-Continent to that in the Federation in a similar manner to Colonial Office officials. He recommended the secondment of Indian officers to reorganise the CID, and for the Malayan police to make mass arrests like those carried out in India during 1947. Gray subscribed to Jenkin's suggestions, and although the Colonel had been recently selected for a posting to Accra, he was 'especially selected' by the Colonial Office to become the new Malayan Police Commissioner on 20 August 1948. Furthermore, he was accompanied by 551 'specially selected' former Palestine
Additionally, MI5 was interested in the Malaya police reorganisation, and A. Kellar, who had worked in Palestine in 1946, (and was to review the Greek internal situation for the Foreign Office in 1949), agreed with proposals for the CID to be restructured along Indian lines, reiterating the value of past I.S. experience for framing COIN measures.

The BDCC concluded that until the Malayan police service was revitalised through reorganisation and retraining, the military must take the leading role in I.S. operations. The British Army was subsequently criticised both for having little idea about 'how guerilla warfare was conducted and hence what countermeasures would be appropriate', and retaining 'no lessons from which to draw [on]'. Indeed, Major-General Sir Harold Briggs, who became the Federal Director of Operations in 1950, commented that the Government had 'very little


understanding [of] the size and scope of the measures required' in the middle of 1948. But some British COIN agencies, including the Army, sought guidance from other I.S. theatres and applied this knowledge to devise their COIN policies. This has not been properly appreciated until now, and assertions about British ignorance of their tasks, and of the lessons of the past, are misplaced.

British Army I.S. preparations and doctrine from the beginning of 1948.

Army formations in Malaya received basic guidance on I.S. matters in 1948, and although much instruction was provided 'on-the-job' during operations against irregulars, units held training exercises and received high level advice. This supplemented 'general knowledge' about I.S. and non-conventional warfare gained by individuals prior to the Emergency. The most recent type of action seen by most army officers and NCOs was that of conventional war, but a good many were career soldiers who possessed 'ample experience of "Imperial-Policing" .. in the main India and the Middle East', although some of them referred to the counterguerrilla campaign during the South African War for guidance. Official army I.S.

10. Academic study regarding the use made of previous I.S. experience in Malaya has been neglected, and the Greek insurgency disregarded, probably because the British COIN role there was covert and was not perceived as a possible factor in the Malayan campaign by other writers. Gen. Briggs, Director of Operations Report, Nov. 1951, AIR20/7777. Critics of the British Army, such as, Stubbs P.247; Stanborough M.Litt., P.7,52-3; H. Miller Jungle War in Malaya (London, 1972) P.20; J.P. Cross In Gurkha Company (London, 1986) P.29; Jungle Warfare (London, 1989) P.116.
instruction in Malaya followed traditional lines too, concentrating on exercises in cordon-and-search and control measures, and short one to three day 'platoon patrolling in jungle' from the start of 1948. This had become accepted by the British Army establishment after the development of jungle patrolling during the wartime campaigns in the Far East. According to Sunderland, over and above this groundwork in more familiar I.S. policies, about half of the British officers and six of the nine battalions in Malaya served in wartime Burma, and two battalions fought against Burmese irregulars from 1946 to 1947. Hence, many infantrymen would have been exposed to air-supplied small unit patrolling and ambushing. Furthermore, the Air Officer Commanding, Air-Vice Marshal Sir A. Clifford Sanderson, noted on 1 July 1948 that, the 'type of warfare' confronting the security forces was comparable to 'that of the Burma campaign', and he proposed the adoption of air supply, in addition to air strikes that were 'used effectively in operations in Palestine during 1938/9.' The local RAF contingent favoured the 'Air Pin' technique after June and staged exercises in it in September 1948, as well as carrying out a study on the potential role for air supply in the preceding month. Thus, the air force group readily referred to previous I.S. and wartime experiences when designing COIN operations in Malaya. However, few army units swiftly adapted their knowledge of wartime Burma into new tactical plans in

Malaya, and in the early stages of COIN, a more familiar I.S. path was trodden.

In May 1948, the army performed road patrolling, large unit 'recce in force' and multi-company sweeps reflecting 'normal training', as well as short duration small unit patrols. The GOC, Major-General D. Ashton L. Wade, was concerned about the escalation of irregular attacks, and he ordered the training of 'subunits .. in jungle warfare', including ambush and night operations. Indeed, some local commanders set up a 'permanent platoon locality' and favoured 'special jungle patrol training', incorporating short small unit patrol and ambush that was considered 'special operations.' But traditional I.S. wisdom was underlined by the local army HQ, which later on that summer stated that, 'in general the provisions of "Notes for Training in DIACP in the


Malayan Union" should be observed.' Although some authors assert that Whitehall gave the army no guidance, there was 'much anxious deliberation at the War Office' over the Malayan situation. Reinforcements were equipped not only with standard British Army riot control and cordon-and-search training but they also obtained the Malaya 'Notes', prepared prior to 1948 following War Office counsel, as well as its Military Training Pamphlet 52, and 'Jungle Jottings, 1945.' These included guidance on jungle patrolling in addition to more 'orthodox' methods.14 But the Service Department proposed no radical new tactical ideas, reflecting wider current Army thinking about I.S. affairs.

During 1948, the War Office deliberated over the revision of its 'IS Duties 1947' document, and the Directorate of Military Training enlisted 'specially selected' officers to craft an 'I.S. Military Training Pamphlet', obviously in recognition of the need for expert preparation of I.S. doctrine. The Directorate also commissioned separate manuals on 'long-range penetration (including guerilla warfare)' and 'jungle warfare', but officials apparently made no reference to these subjects when reviewing I.S. wisdom. The DMT did not share the DMO's enthusiasm for small unit tactical

experimentation, and it failed to appreciate the potential value of applying wartime experience of unorthodox operations to I.S. matters. It endorsed the traditional wisdom championed by the CIGS, as did both lecturers at Camberley—where a one week I.S. course included lessons from the Palestine campaign, while reiterating customary policies—and British military writers.15

The formulation and basis of counterguerilla strategy and tactical military policies, from the summer of 1948.

At the start of the Emergency, army units still lacked central operational direction, and local commanders devised plans at their own discretion. The army undertook routine road and settlement security patrol work, cordon-and-search and

'flying squad' reaction to attacks. It also pursued offensive operations including brief small unit jungle patrolling, based on a prevalent belief in the British Army that infantry sections would tire after ten days 'in country', and on 'the myth of the Malaya jungle's impenetrability.' But in addition, large columns were frequently active for periods of up to several weeks for both reconnaissance and to confront and defeat irregular forces, in line with long-standing Imperial-policing procedure. Some writers argue that officers' knowledge of conventional warfare and related exercises 'appeared to be the basis of .. large scale' operations, but sweeps, drives and encirclements were familiar to many soldiers, not least the


Gurkhas who had practiced them against postwar Burmese irregulars. Mockaitis contends that large scale operations were consistently adhered to, despite their meagre results, not because of the 'inability of officers' to accept the need to alter their tactics, but because they were valued for accumulating tactical intelligence required for small unit patrolling. But, although this type of reasoning was advanced more often by army officers during 1949, these operations were primarily instituted to tackle the growing number of MPABA large units confronting the security forces. Moreover, in the early days of COIN, sweeps and drives were initiated because local commanders had faith in traditional I.S. tactics. Indeed, small unit patrolling was often pursued at that stage 'due to the lack of information upon which to base offensive operations', and if contact intelligence became available it was used by units 'for a thorough sweep of .. [a targeted] area'.

By the middle of June 1948, General Wade advocated jungle 'sweeps and drives' and patrolling, to forestall MPABA attacks, dislocate their organisation and deprive them of resources. The War Office passed no comment on his tactical proposals, probably in view of the fact that by 22 June COIN plans were being drawn up by General Ritchie and the GOC-elect, Major-General Charles H. Boucher. He has been criticised for his over-optimism during the summer of 1948 about the army's chances of success, although Boucher based his assessment on

intelligence estimates which predicted that the MCP would not be fully organised before November, and because he was 'told to do this by his political masters' so as to boost the morale of the Federation's population. As a consequence of their lack of early tangible military success, senior army officers were roundly condemned by historians for displaying little comprehension of the I.S. problem facing them. But the military-security strategy and tactics adopted in Malaya were not devised without some knowledge of COIN requirements.

As CINCFELF, General Ritchie assessed all threats to the Far East theatre, and he considered that these were 'primarily one of I.S.'. In mid-1947, he attended a conference on communism, where the Malayan Security Service chief, John Dalley, warned that the MCP would act 'in precisely the same manner as in other countries.' He reiterated this in May 1948, and stressed the importance of relocating and controlling Chinese squatters who might provide resources to irregulars, notably food; a view most 'local commanders ridiculed' but which Ritchie accepted. He had already witnessed large scale counterguerrilla operations and 'vigorous patrol' against communist forces in Burma during 1947, and his study of postwar rebellions incorporated an examination of the communist revolts in China and Greece. He 'studied the[ir] lessons' to date and

drew 'useful conclusions', identifying a 'regular technique' of communist insurgency. Indeed, although Ritchie never visited Greece, his interest in it was reinforced by family connections there. His sister was a personal assistant to Brigadier John Kirkman at the BMM(G), and he became Ritchie's Chief of Staff during the spring of 1948. As the MCP began to organise its revolt, the theatre HQ 'believed .. [that it] would follow the usual communist technique.'

On 23 June, Ritchie sent Boucher his 'deductions', and outlined a two-fold military-security plan. This featured simultaneous police security patrolling and guarding to raise popular confidence in the State and to attain 'battle intelligence', and the military clearance of large MPABA units and platoons. He agreed with Wade's premise that pressuring them in the jungle could effect food-denial, and he proposed 'offensive operations' conducted 'from "firm bases"', including 'mobile patrolling' and 'sweeps'. General Ritchie emphasised area-deployed patrolling, and he also suggested the formation of 'small columns [to operate] in .. the jungle' with air support, following Burma experience. He added that they must be


better organised than 'in the past.' The RAF theatre command similarly recommended air supply and fire-support missions, techniques recently evolved for COIN operations in Greece, but MacDonald and local army commanders were less enthusiastic about air support, and most early RAF 'Firedog' flights were for reconnaissance and transport purposes. Nonetheless, although COIN policies applied against other communist insurgents had yet to achieve success in practice, Ritchie adjusted British COIN operational policies in the light of experience. He was willing to learn from both past and present COIN campaigning, and at the end of June planned future military conferences 'to consider lessons .. [and] discuss tactics, organisation' and methods.

The CINCFELF's interest in the Greek conflict was shared by the Malayan Combined Intelligence Staff, and in July 1948 it warned against allowing the creation of 'liberated [areas] .. on the lines of [the] General Markos "Governments" in Greece.' This view was reiterated by the Malayan Security Service and within the GHQ. Further, in the following year, the Greek army noted that 'many of those' soldiers currently in Malaya, notably the Suffolk Regiment, had served in Greece. Moreover, the RAF dropped napalm in the Federation during 1948,


undoubtedly with Air Ministry approval. This followed its first ever peacetime trials in Greece a few months before on the recommendation of the RAF Delegation to Greece, and with the consent of the Air Ministry. Furthermore, MacDonald urged General Boucher to oversee 'the military show' until the police could take over, and after consulting local civil and military authorities, the new GOC presented a security forces plan on 5 July 1948. He said that it reflected Staff College principles, and Boucher himself had fought on the North-West Frontier and studied the Palestine COIN campaign of 1938 and 1939. But in addition to this Imperial-policing background, the General had commanded a division in Greece for a year from January 1945, and although this period was 'almost certainly not' the basis of his COIN ideas, because he encountered only a few weak irregulars there, Boucher announced that his knowledge of 'terrorism' in India and Greece qualified him to act in Malaya. He declared that the MCP was 'far weaker in technique' than the Greek communists, evidently referring to KKE insurgents, and on leaving Greece to take up the command of the Second Indian Airborne Division in March 1946, he spent a month with the Division and their commander, Major-General Ernest Down, who

became the BMM(G) chief in 1948. Thus, General Boucher was keenly interested in the Army's involvement in Greece, and he 'mentioned this from time to time' at the Malayan army HQ.26 Boucher followed Ritchie's planning outline, while emphasising mobile columns, the 'Air Pin', and 'periodical sweeps', as well as 'other well tried methods.' These included registration to help control the population, which was being done at the time by the Greek government. Moreover, the army HQ advocated not only traditional wisdom, but also an unorthodox counterguerilla force to 'ferret them out of their holes', and the control of rice and squatters in order to deny the MPABA resources.27

In June 1948, General Boucher sanctioned the formation of


a Jungle Guerilla Force [JGF] code-named 'Ferret', derived from 'the lessons of various special forces.' Ritchie later noted that the Chindits and SOE Force 136 endured 'somewhat similar conditions', and ex-SOE men had already set up ad hoc counter-guerilla patrols, undoubtedly encouraging the Kuala Lumpur army HQ to develop its own force. Indeed, four former members of Force 136 recommended three to four day small unit patrolling at the jungle 'fringe'. The HQ deliberated until early July, and considered excursions of up to three to four months duration, but it concluded that two to three weeks was the maximum time that jungle patrols could be sustained. Then, 'as had been the case in Greece .. small elite units' were formed, initially four groups of eighty men, half their intake being civilians on three-month contracts. The creators of 'Ferret Force' hoped that its example would 'raise the general standard of "jungle worthiness" of the troops', but it was primarily designed to fulfil a dual operational role: to 'locate and destroy insurgent elements .. [and] .. to drive them .. into more open country where they can be more easily destroyed', in
conjunction with other security forces. This resembled the pattern set by the Greek 'commandos', and Boucher and his staff were probably inspired not only by wartime unorthodox units, but also by a similar COIN force deployed against other communist guerillas. The 'Ferrets' were trained under Lieutenant-Colonel Walter Walker, and, impeded by a dearth of contact intelligence, each group contained 32 Chinese-speakers and, later on, Dyak trackers from Borneo. Walker adapted wartime Burma experience to deploy groups in estates and the nearby jungle for three-man 'recce' missions and ambushes laid for a few hours, and also larger air-supplied patrols into suspect areas for periods of up to several weeks. This was in

28. The JGF's codename, HQFELF to HQSingapore, 19 July 1948, W0268/8. On its training role, and various sources of inspiration for the JGF, Pocock P.86; Ritchie, (a strong supporter of the SAS during the War, see Appendix 1), Report, W0106/5884, especially regarding wartime units; Barber P.36; Heussler P.171; C. Allen The savage wars of peace (London, 1990) P.49; Short P.132, and on local groups; J.C. Litton, Circular 3, 27 Feb. 1949, RHO. Ferrets were formed by Boucher/HQMal., as in, 'Ferret Force', by 'Weasal', Malaya 1, Sept. 1952, and also on their role, P.21-5; Sir R. Thompson Make for the hills (London, 1989) P.88; letter, 21 Feb. 1991. On HQMal.'s operational studies, Short P.133; G(Ops)FELF QHR, 30 Sept., W0268/8; 2/2GR QHR, 30 June, W0268/674. The DMO supported its formation, and its Director, Maj.-Gen. A.D. Ward, had supported trials with unorthodox forces in Palestine in 1947, see Chapter 3. On Greek units, Cable P.77, and see Chapter 4. Details of Ferret operational roles in, HQFELF to WO, 9,18 Aug. 1948, W0268/8; Ritchie ibid; and the JGF's structure, Messenger P.13-6; Blaxland P.82; J. Scurr The Malayan Campaign (London, 1982) P.9-10.
addition to their activities in large operations. Indeed, many army officers preferred to employ large columns, sweeps, and drives towards ambushed 'stop lines' with ground or air fire support, or scaled down versions of these tactics with a few platoons. But large scale army operations accounted for 'only a small % of all', and the Ferret example encouraged local experimentation with platoon patrolling from one to five days.

On 19 and 20 August, General Ritchie presided over an army conference to review COIN lessons gained so far, and issued a new directive three days later. This stated that MCP tactics

29. Ferret training and operations, ibid: 'Weasal', P.21,23; Short P.132; Pocock P.86; Messenger P.13; Litton; Thompson P.88. Also, Stanborough M.Litt.,P.53; Kukri 1, May 1949, P.54. GOC presses for Dyaks, Victor Purcell, to Hugh Pagden, (Federal minister), 9 Aug. 1948, CO537/3757.

30. Regarding inadequate central operational direction, 1/2GR, reports, 30 Aug., 24 Sept., 2GR,155, GMW. All /ref.'s in W0268/. On small unit patrolling, 1/2GR QHR, 30 Sept., 2/2GR QHR, 9 Oct., 2GR,133, GMW; 1 Mal. QHR, 30 Sept., /650; 1/7GR, 1 Oct., /683; N.Mal. ISUM, 5 Oct., /775; 1/6GR ISUM, 20 Aug., /783; McAlister P.32,47. On sweeps, Johore OD, 23 Aug., 2GR OIs, 7,12 Oct., 2GR,133, GMW; 1/6GR QHR, 30 June, reports, 24 Aug., 28 Aug., /681; ISUM, /783; HQJohore QHR, 30 Sept., /703; 1/2GR Operations Diary, 29 Aug., 2GR,155, GMW. On drives, 1/2GR ibid; AHQ Operations Record Book, to 31 Dec., AIR24/1925; 1/6GR report, 16 Aug., /681; ISUM, 28 Aug., /783; 1/7GR, 19 Aug., /787; and on the % of each type of operation, Brig. Robert C.O. Hedley, HQJohore, Conference notes, 24 Sept. 1948, 2GR,133, GMW.
were 'similar to those employed in CHINA and GREECE', notably terrorism and the graduation towards 'normal warfare', and he advocated an 'overall south to north' clearance and civil measures to control squatters and potential guerilla food sources. Dalley had advocated such measures, and similar COIN policies were also being applied in Greece during 1948. The CINCFELF reiterated the importance of area-deployment for police information-gathering from local posts, and Boucher and Gray considered this a 'priority'. Furthermore, General Ritchie pressed for 'a minimum "framework" of troops upon which to build up additional .. reserves (Striking Forces).' Along with the 'Ferret' groups, these were designed 'for offensive operations.' He also emphasised that "framework" troops should NOT be shifted about .. so that they [can] get some knowledge of the local country' and their fellow COIN agencies on the ground. Ritchie proposed patrolling for two to three weeks by 'light forces' with air supply in suspect areas and on any available intelligence. This reinforced the support given by high level local army authorities to the development of small unit tactics, and he added that each formation should form its own 'Ferret element', and that Colonel Walker and the Far East Training Centre [FTC] would train battalion commanders in Ferret-style operations as a first step to their general adoption by the army in Malaya. Indeed, Walker subsequently told the CINCFELF that 'large scale cordon operations were a complete waste of time', but local commanding officers held the tactical initiative, and the GOC recommended that they proceed with "framework" operations and major offensives.31

General Ritchie combined recent Malayan operational experience with that of other concurrent COIN, and developed British counter guerilla thought substantially as a result.

The army implemented large scale operations throughout the summer of 1948, but some formations were troubled by their shortcomings and therefore 'cordonning off and then "sweeping" [of] fairly extensive areas was soon abandoned in favour of small patrols operating offensively within very restricted areas, i.e., "saturation patrolling". This 'intensive patrolling for a given period' was extended by many platoon commanders from a few days to 'protracted periods' of up to three weeks following "Ferret" principles.32 This tactical adaptation did not produce startling results because patrol

activity was based mainly on speculation and on what little contact intelligence was available. Inadequate police cooperation with the military on intelligence matters exacerbated operational difficulties and therefore army intelligence officers tried to collect information themselves, guided by the War Office Directorate of Military Intelligence. But there were only twelve GSI officers in each brigade, and they used outdated intelligence procedures. However, at another conference on 21 September, Ritchie reaffirmed that despite its lack of success so far, a 'permanent "framework"' was 'right in principle', and Boucher supported the general adoption of week-plus patrolling similar to that practiced in recent War Office jungle warfare exercises. The GOC and CINCFELF suspected that the MPABA would not be readily beaten by 'orthodox methods', and 'compared recent events in MALAYA with past history in CHINA and GREECE.' General Ritchie assessed the relative value of 'large scale sweeps, small scale "comb-outs"' involving small units, 'and "staying put"' for area patrolling by companies. The GOC, Singapore, Major-General Dermott Dunlop-who had fought in the Middle East throughout the Second World War-favoured large scale offensive tactics. But Ritchie and Boucher and their staffs were more perceptive, arguing that while large scale operations could 'keep the enemy on the move' and break up large MPABA forces, once enough intelligence had accumulated, 'operations in general [should] involve smaller numbers of troops and the big sweeps would become rarer.' They preferred Ferret-style patrolling, and following conference recommendations, the Second Malay Regiment was trained specifically for this. However, General Boucher was


-281-
anxious to prevent Ferret groups becoming the 'private armies' of local CID's, and hence, he and Ritchie agreed that once they had proven their worth, Ferret members whose contracts expired in November should be encouraged to provide widespread 'specialist training' to the army. A future major alteration of tactical military policy was therefore accepted by key senior local officers, but it was not generally effected by the army in 1948, and consequently, their theoretical advance has been ignored by scholars.

In late 1948, local tactical development by army formations was encouraged by the Kuala Lumpur HQ, which itself instigated a 'periodical review of lessons from operations', and at least one of the army's four Malaya District commanding officers recognised the importance of supplementing 'the "trial-and-error" method' by analysing operations for lessons. In September, Brigadier Robert C.O. Hedley recommended that tactics should not be 'too stereotyped', and he stated that although 'saturated patrol for 4-5 days' achieved few immediate successes, trials in extended patrol and ambush were proper in view of the failure of drives and encirclements. Furthermore, the Far East Training Centre at Kota Tinggi provided unit training cadres with up to six weeks 'intensive training in


35. HQMal. in, Phillips Diary, P.428, GMW. Operational lessons, for example in, 1/10GR QHR, 30 Sept., W0268/677. HQJohore, (one of four sub-District HQs), Brig. R. Hedley, OD2, c.Oct., Conf. minutes, 24 Sept. 1948, 2GR,133, GMW. On his background, see Appendix 1.
jungle warfare' by officers who claimed they 'knew all about it', having battled on the Frontier and in Burma from 1944 to 1945. This recurrent mix of past I.S. and wartime influences was reflected in their instruction. Rather than reliance on more orthodox I.S. practices alone, they trained for night operations, air supply, and three-man 'recce' patrols from bases to gather intelligence. 'Senior officers were divided in their opinion' about the viability of these patrols, but the Training Centre adhered to the prevailing British Army belief that small patrols ought to remain in the jungle only for a few days. Moreover, the Centre taught that once patrols gained contact with irregulars, they should call in reinforcements for encirclements by 'Companies and even Battalions', reflecting familiar tactical policy. Instructors declared that their guidance provided only a foundation upon which units should make their own tactical investigation, and this groundwork consisted of a blend of old I.S. policies and more recent ideas. The Training Centre was criticised for poor air supply procedures, and subsequently by Charters for its inappropriate training in movement, organisation and tactics. But the application of its teachings depended upon the attitude of individual cadre officers, and even if they accepted fresh tactical concepts, heavy operational commitments often prevented them disseminating new ideas within their units or formations. This tendency was reinforced by a fairly common reliance on 'on-the-job' learning, which was approved by the
By early November, the Jungle Guerilla Force was disbanded having attained 'high standards and results', and Ritchie urged its members to "spread the doctrine" and 'raise the whole standard of operational efficiency' of the army. The Force's ranks possessed 'invaluable experience upon which the technique was built up' after 1948, inspiring not only more widespread small unit patrolling, but also a pseudoguerilla pilot scheme. By 1949, security force Chinese Assault Teams were trained under a civil official, John Litton, and they originated ruses and undertook extended patrols based on information. They proved to be a forerunner of similar forces formed in many later COIN campaigns, as well as those in Malaya after 1950. The contracts of Ferret Force personnel were not renewed for 1949, although this option was considered, because officials raised questions about its administration and tactics.

Regarding the latter, objections were probably made over its style of patrolling, which often ranged over large areas, in contrast to the army's growing interest in 'saturation patrol' of small areas. The Force's dismemberment also received 'the complete support of the War [Office] traditionalists', at a time when, with officer recruitment and basic training in mind, they were discouraging unorthodox styles of leadership.37 However, its dissolution did not discourage further high level discussion of tactical policy, and in October 1948 the army HQ stated that 'the value of large and elaborate sweeps is doubtful.' The new High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, remarked in November that, with fewer large unit MPABA forces currently active 'our plans have been laid accordingly' for more patrolling, as the GHQ advocated. Further, at another conference on 13 December, the theatre Command argued that the army should 'intensify and continue the present system', approving its 'tactics of operating for prolonged periods in a given area' in preference to large operations that 'seldom

result .. in [substantial insurgent] casualties.'38 This was a significant development of tactical military thought, and one that should have sparked the interest of the Army authorities in London.

Growing Whitehall interest in COIN lessons during the autumn of 1948.

Within the War Office, the DMO and DMI were traditionally most interested in I.S. matters, and the DMO was especially progressive in regard to tactical developments in Greece and Palestine. Despite the postwar military rundown, COIN in these countries and in Malaya prevented any 'retreat into lethargy', and MI2, (a section of the DMI), handled both colonial insurgencies, and during August 1948 it compared them. It noted that fighting guerillas and terrorist cells in Malaya would prove difficult, as men 'who took part in the Palestine operations know.' Further, MI2 cautioned that encirclement relying on large manpower or 'to block escape .. by fire, is usually impossible',39 indicating its anxiety about this traditional military policy. In September, General Boucher


suggested sending films illustrating tactical lessons to London to help prepare reinforcements, and by December, the Directorate of Military Training demonstrated a similar wish to learn from operations. Following the example of the Cabinet's Overseas Defence Committee, it requested monthly 'lessons' from the army and a 'pamphlet on lessons' from the GHQ by the new year, in a systematic attempt to benefit from COIN experience. The Colonial Secretary, Creech-Jones, also decided that the current state of imperial I.S. warranted a more coordinated high level transfer of I.S. information. A Police College was opened and attended by senior colonial police officers, and he persuaded the War Office to provide 'duties in aid' courses for them. Moreover, he produced a Circular for all colonial governments in August 1948, sponsoring an interchange of I.S. knowledge and offering expert advice from London. Further, he encouraged the application of methods recently adopted in 'metropolitan countries' to any future outbreak of 'terrorism' like that presently raging in Malaya. With the onset of this third postwar COIN campaign, British COIN authorities sponsored greater inter-cooperation and transferral of I.S. wisdom between those bodies dealing with it, as well as the study of the Malayan operations for lessons.

Development of population-resource control policies, and military strategy, up to the autumn of 1948.

Before the insurgency began, some army formations in Malaya appreciated the value of food-control measures designed to erode irregular capabilities. Jungle camp-burning during April was called a 'waste of effort' by one battalion commander, when 'the first essential [was] to remove ALL squatters', and thereby deny resources to irregulars. The importance of food controls was affirmed by the Malayan Security Service, and General Wade's military strategy of forcing the MPABA into the deep jungle rested on food denial. In July, Boucher recommended this, as well as familiar controls including cordon-and-search and a national registration scheme. Senior army officers also recommended Frontier-style road construction to make the control of remote areas easier, but the Malay states refused to finance it. Nonetheless, despite divided local opinion over population-resource control policies, the GOC, CINCFELF and many army units supported population relocation by August 1948. Such a project was implemented in Greece in 1946, and was refined by the
introduction of resettlement camps during 1947 and 1948, hence coinciding with studies of other communist rebellions by high level army authorities in Malaya during the summer of 1948.

By September 1948, Far East Land Forces staff realised that the age-old rapid clearance strategy was foundering, because, when security forces moved away from an area, it 'almost invariably result[ed] in [the] recrudescence' of irregular activity. Therefore, it 'emphasis[ed]' that the 'civil administration [had] to follow-up and take over cleared areas', considering military and civil measures to be 'complementary'. The GHQ proposed a Clear-and-Hold strategy and trials with both population relocation and police security patrolling of squatter areas. A Malay 'Home Guard' for counter-terrorist population protection, by then a broadly accepted


-289-
British COIN principle, was authorised by Montgomery in August 1948. But the initiation of a similar measure for Chinese illegal aliens, and any relocation of them, strictly speaking, was the responsibility of the Malayan states. Therefore, in deference to state autonomy, the Commissioner-General formed a committee of state Premiers to study the squatter problem. However, this resulted in a lengthy and damaging halt to COIN progress. In September, only one state sanctioned relocations, and then only if those moved were communist supporters. In the meantime, army commanders pressed for rapid action, and Operation KUKRI on 15 October was the first of several which removed 10,000 squatters in 1948. They were instigated initially for 'the clearance of a battle ground' and to disrupt the activities of irregulars, and had 'at least the cognisance' of General Boucher. But he also believed that relocation was vital for a long term counterorganisation impact, and supported it 'in order to clean up the areas entirely and
successfully.42 Indeed, Gurney noted that 'all my advisors [the Local Defence Committee included, want] .. an immediate and serious attempt to deal with alien Chinese squatters who are providing bases from which bandits operate and are helping them.' On 8 October, he ratified legislation for collective detention and deportation of those assisting insurgents, and in November set up a Federal Committee to study the squatter question. It made only slow progress, but this was because of the reluctance of Malay states to assist Chinese illegals, 'not for [a] lack of appreciation of the problem.'43


43. Gurney, his advisors, and their action, HC to CO, 29 Oct., F15040/F0371/69698; to SSC, 2 Dec. 1948, F17892/F0371/69630; CAR 1948 P.189; PFLCM 1948-9 P.B617-9; Short P.188; and also on the situation, Sunderland 4173 P.24-7.
Advancement of extra-military-security policies from 1948 up to the middle of 1949.

The Colonial Office learnt from the campaign in Palestine that concentrating on a negative psywar approach was not viable for COIN, and that positive incentives were required to mobilise popular support. Gent followed its edicts on colonial development during 1948, and he resisted political subversion by sponsoring 'positive and negative steps .. to counter communist influence', the positive measures including trades union laws and constitutional reform plans. In June, the Colonial Office emphasised the value of a long term 'programme which commands not merely the acquiescence of the people .. but their enthusiastic support', as 'past history shows.' Indeed, MacDonald supposed that when considering a replacement for Gent, the Department would 'no doubt' prefer a man 'sympathetic [to] .. democratic, social and political reform[s]', such as Sir Henry Gurney, who was the Palestine Chief Secretary. He was chosen in preference to three other candidates, partly for his experience, although not 'mainly as an expert in strong-arm methods.' Until his arrival on 6 October 1948,44 no progress on civic action was made in Malaya.

At first, the British COIN psywar effort focussed on the negative approach and consisted of time-honoured policies. Legislation passed on 5 July allowed the application of curfew, detention, and searches of people and premises, which were not

44. CO on requirements in Malaya, memo, 28 Apr., CO537/4751; T. Lloyd, notes, Aug., CO537/3758; Short P.121. On Gurney and the CO, CGSEA to SSC, 29 June; CO to CGSEA, 10 July, CO537/3686; HC to SSC, 18 June, in, A. Creech-Jones Papers, MsIos.128, RHO. Gent and the CO, J. Dalley, Conf. notes, 26 June 1948, Papers, RHO.
only designed for control, but also to 'cajole' the population into opposing communism. Gurney reinforced this with powers wielded in Palestine, as he felt that a 'show of force' and 'stern measures [we]re necessary' to indicate his determination to prevail over the rebellion. By November, collective punishments such as extended curfew and food sale restrictions were introduced. But Gurney confined the negative approach to measures that would affect those unprotected persons who were most vulnerable to MCP pressure, and who at the time were said to veer to the side that 'frightens them more.' However, General Boucher preferred the Cost-Benefit I.S. line, supporting familiar aspects such as existing banishment laws, and urging collective fines and property seizures like those administered in Eritrea during 1948, where Britain faced sectarian terrorism. He accepted the army's use of punitive searches, curfews, food removal, and the burning of suspected communists' huts. But when Gray became Police Commissioner, in August, he stopped these officially-backed punishments.


However, reprisals continued and he issued a directive on 16 November ordering an end to torture and killings,47 which he knew from his Palestine days would alienate the people.

The Army also applied its traditional positive psywar approach, 'flag-showing' patrols and major operations being carried out to boost popular confidence in the State.48 Palestine procedures for avoiding a 'bad press' were copied, including press conferences and briefings, and allowing reporters on operations and to interview senior officers. But the army was also more aware of propaganda than hitherto, facing a communist insurgency in a Cold War climate, when peacetime propaganda was becoming more common-place and politically acceptable in London. Indeed, the Federal Public Relations Department believed that the army was well placed to devise 'operational propaganda' from intelligence data, and early on in the campaign some units spread their own simple 'propaganda .. calculated to belittle bandit leaders.' In August, backed by the GOC, General Ritchie insisted that the

47. GOC's attitude, Short P.154,166; HQJohore notes, 1,28 Sept. 1948, 2GR,133, GMW. He noted later that the shooting of 28 Chinese by Scots Guards in Nov. 1948 at 'BATANG KALI .. had had a good effect', in, 3 Jan. Conf., note, 11 Jan., in G(Ops)FELF QHR, 31 Mar. 1949, W0268/744. Gray's action, A. Hayter The second step (London, 1962) P.208-15; McAlister P.37-8; Phillips Diary, P.407-8, GMW.

army must make an effort to understand civilian psychology and also suggested the production of anti-communist films. In addition, Dunlop requested publicity for security force successes, and the commanders noted that 'our counter-propaganda needs to be stepped up.' Furthermore, they acknowledged the worth of expert I.S. advice, requesting the assistance of the War Office's Director of Publicity, while stressing that counter/propaganda was a civil responsibility, thus displaying a considerable awareness of psywar requirements.

In June 1948, the Public Relations Department was responsible for 'supporting the actions of the Government and security forces', and its chief, J. MacHugh, possessed wartime psywar experience. The following month, the Colonial Office was pressed by Sir William Jenkin to ensure that the Federal authorities devised effective counterpropaganda, but no PR Department officials received training for this, instead concentrating on education information matters. Furthermore, the security forces often failed to provide it with intelligence for use in designing propaganda, and despite a national 60% illiteracy rate, the Department was equipped with only twelve public address systems and therefore relied on leaflets and press conferences. The psywar effort concentrated on demoralising MCP leaders, and although rewards for their

capture were introduced on 27 August, there was precious little inventiveness. In September, the Federal Government asked for a psywar expert from the UK, and formed an Emergency Publicity Committee to coordinate various media with the security forces, but its output was limited both in quantity and quality. 50

The local army authorities agreed in September 1948 that 'civil measures were complementary' to military-security operations, but no civic action programmes were implemented prior to Gurney's arrival. He has been credited with announcing the desirability of winning 'the Hearts and Minds of the people', and acclaimed for his 'vision'. Yet, while it is true that 'Gurney and his local advisors laid the foundations' of the Hearts-and-Minds COIN line, certain influences on Gurney have been overlooked. Various Federal departments were already working on preparations for squatter administration, some social services, and agricultural and educational improvements, and in November Gurney outlined these publicly. He also visited

some of the first resettlement camps which were furnished with welfare arrangements by local civil officials, and he lent his support to such schemes in two Malay states. The army agreed that 'the cure lies in removing those squatters on whom the bandit organisations are based . . and then removing the conditions in which Communism can flourish', representing a basic local consensus on the requirement for counter-organisation and civic action by late 1948.51 This progress was founded not only on deductions from recent experience in Malaya but also from previous cases of COIN.

Gurney knew from his service in Palestine that information from the people was vital for COIN progress, and that its availability ultimately depended on popular confidence in the State. In August 1948, before arriving in Malaya, he proposed to organise Chinese community leaders into a new advisory body with links to the authorities, evidently deriving this idea from the example set by the Jewish Agency in Palestine. By December, he outlined a Malayan Chinese Association to improve government contacts with the population and gain their 'active help', as well as a Chinese Advisory Board and Secretary for Chinese Affairs to improve relations and encourage Chinese

51. The army on relocation and civic action, G(Ops)FELF QHR, 30 Sept., W0268/8; HQMal. BGS, IR8, 23 Dec. 1948, W0208/4104; Ritchie Report, W0106/5884. Gurney invents 'Hearts and Minds' phrase notes Capt. R.S.N. Man 'Victory in Malaya', in, Greene P.120. Regarding Gurney's vision, Barber P.61; Miller P.47. On the HC and advisors, A.H.P. Humphrey, m/s, RHO. On local COIN initiatives, C.E. Howe A few memories m/s, 1965, in BAM, III/14, RCS; Col. H.S. Lee, memo, to CO, 28 Feb. 1950, CO537/6090; Communist Banditry P.18; McAlister P.46; Barber P.65-7,82.
enrolment into the police Auxiliaries, thereby committing them to the COIN. Apart from his first-hand experience, following the practice of army colleagues, Gurney also looked to Greece for further guidance on COIN. He suggested the construction of police posts and 'roads and schools', which he termed 'familiar' measures in early 1949, and in May that year, when writing 'lessons' for the Colonial Office, he quoted at length from an article in a September 1948 issue of The Spectator. This compared postwar conflicts such as those in Burma, Palestine, and China; and various British counter-insurgents in Malaya drew similar comparisons. The article's author, Chris 'Monty' Woodhouse, focussed on the Greek revolt and identified three phases from organisation and terrorism to 'full rebellion.' COIN was said to be mainly 'a civil and political task', and Woodhouse assigned priority to policing and 'the building of roads and schools to eliminate the physical conditions and moral incentives' that led to communist rebellion. Finally, on the military side, referring to the Greek 'commandos', he recommended 'the technique of counter-guerillas.'

52. On the need for Chinese help, HC to T. Lloyd, CO, 28 Nov.; to SSC, 19 Dec. 1948, CO537/3758; CGSEA to SSC, 20 Apr. 1949, CO537/4751. HC's ideas, Short P.264-5; to T. Lloyd, 8 Oct., CO537/3758; and on the MCA, to J. Paskin, CO, 10 Dec. 1948; to J.D. Higham, CO, 10 Feb. 1949, CO537/4242; Heussler P.173-4; Pye Lessons P.40. On the example of the Jewish Agency, see Chapter 3.

Sir Henry Gurney did not immediately adopt a Hearts-and-Minds line, and the COIN authorities supported some 'ruthless measures.' Indeed, Gurney imposed capital sentences on communist activists, and sixteen collective detentions were carried out from January 1949. They were designed 'to deprive [the insurgents of] .. large bodies of .. supporters', but were only 'conceived as a limited operation' by Gurney until resettlement, (by then recommended by a Federal Committee), was underway. Banishment orders were also imposed in the belief that in the short term vulnerable squatters would side with the camp inspiring 'the greater fear', at a time when counter-terrorist population protection was not widely available. But while negative psywar policies were applied by the State, there was a general feeling locally that this should not become the Government's long term approach. This view was shared in the Colonial Office, where the performance of statutory martial law in Palestine between 1936 and 1948 and in Aden during 1943 was evaluated. Officials discounted its adoption in Malaya, and Gurney and high level army sources considered that the consequences of its introduction would be far 'worse' than Emergency laws, indicating the general acceptance in Malaya.


that a stern Cost-Benefit line would fail.

The positive psywar approach was progressively emphasised, another army conference in January 1949 agreeing that 'incidents [of misconduct by the security forces] are tantamount to playing into Communist hands.' Moreover, that spring, for the first time ever, British army units were encouraged to develop their own civic action. This entailed offering 'such goods as salt, tobacco, axeheads and cheap sarongs' to Malay villages, as well as distributing propaganda pamphlets. The GOC and police Commissioner were patrons of a mixed psywar strategy, proposing both pressure through detentions and repatriations, and encouragement by resettlement, population protection and MCA activities. But they and many Whitehall COIN authorities agreed by April 1949 that 'drastic measures' which alienated the people were impracticable.

While a new Federal land policy was worked out by Malayan government departments, Gurney formulated COIN political programmes, especially civic action policies, from the beginning of 1949. He sought to give the people an 'object of affiliation' other than communism and gain their 'wholehearted


support', providing squatters with social amenities and administration as a first step. The Colonial Office underlined that the State must 'fire the [populace's] imagination' by 'publication of our political, economic and social etc. policy.' It shared his appreciation that to defeat an 'underground war' required 'positive measures of resettlement', in conjunction with 'civil and political measures [dealing with, for instance,] .. squatters, national registration .. [and] trade unions.' The positive psywar approach was further augmented by an initiative of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, E.D. Fleming. Recently appointed by the High Commissioner, 'early in 1949' Fleming suggested an 'experiment along the lines' of British P/W re-education, and moreover, a Greek COIN scheme devised by 1948 involving the psychological reorientation of insurgents through training and education. Details were available in a booklet designed by the Greeks for universal COIN usage, and 'the principles upon which the Macronissos experiment was run were modified to suit .. Malaya.' Gurney sanctioned the project on 16 September 1949,

58. HC on popular support, O.H. Morris, CO notes, 2 Feb., 21 Apr., CO537/4750,1. On the means to gain it, HC to SSC, 8 Jan., DEFE11/32; PFLCM 1948-9: Report 3, of the Committee appointed by His Excellency the H.C. to investigate the squatter problem 10 Jan., P.C535-7; HC, 17 Feb., P.B770; to SSC, 14 Feb.; D.R. William, CO note, 9 Feb., CO537/4750; CP(49)52, 5 Mar., CAB128/33; HC to SSC, 11 Apr., minute, 31 May, CO537/4751; COS(49)180, 17 May 1949, DEFE5/14; ARFW 1949 (London, 1950) P.212-3; Communist Terrorism P.56; Short P.158; Stanborough M.Litt.,P.206.
and three rehabilitation centres opened soon afterwards. In March, the Colonial Office had suggested that Government 'methods and achievements' should be publicised. But the Emergency Publicity Committee's 'basic plan' for 1949 concentrated on threatening communist supporters and publicising insurgent losses, and the chance to gain some practical advantage by advertising civic action policies in government propaganda was missed.

The Federal Government's plans for basic civic action were retarded by 'complacency, red-tape, .. and opposition to change' in 1949, only five Malay states supporting resettlement by March. But Gurney's conviction that it afforded essential 'administration and protection' led, by 28 May, to his demand that the states give it priority treatment. Further, in October, he strongly urged the states to 'regroup' isolated estate and mine workers. Moreover, by 1 June, the High Commissioner 'virtually ended the mass evictions and deportations of squatter[s]', dropping this policy altogether in October. Gurney was adjusting 'the balance between the


constructive remedies and the more unpleasant medicine', and there was consensus among COIN agencies on a gradual shift towards positive psywar and political action.

The view from Whitehall, and new I.S. doctrine, in 1949.

The Cabinet Overseas Defence Committee sponsored the production of 'I.S. Duties 1947' by the War and Colonial Offices, and in view of the Emergency, it sought 'lessons' for 'general guidance' to the colonies by early 1949. The War Office collated tactical lessons throughout the year for inclusion in 'periodical training pamphlets', and by June 1949, Colonel G.W. Turner had revised the 1947 document and completed 'Notes on Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, 1949.' It retained much traditional I.S. wisdom, but also incorporated some COIN 'lessons' from Palestine, Greece, and Malaya. These included counterorganisation against underground movements, counterterrorist population protection, and the prevention of 'liberation' zones. Indeed, the 'Notes' identified a 'New Pattern' of graduated rebellion from

subversion to liberated areas, founded on 'the relics of [wartime] undergrounds.' To deduce this, its author must have studied more than one communist insurgency, basing his findings not on the Malaya insurgency alone, but also other examples of the 'communist-inspired pattern', such as Greece. Furthermore, the manual advocated offensive operations initiated in both jungle and settled areas by junior officers commanding columns and small patrols. The emphasis of the 1934 Notes on 'drives' was absent, and the new pamphlet recommended that security force units should not act at random but on information from a civil police force rather than a paramilitary-styled force, probably in the light of the weaknesses displayed by the police in the Palestine campaign. It also advocated press arrangements like those used in the mandate, although these were to be reinforced by 'psychological warfare' and 'counter-propaganda', and government punitive action was rejected. The 1949 Notes did not alter COIN policies wholesale, but significant advances are evident. However, the doctrine did not provide sufficiently detailed outlines of new methods, and in any case it was not generally disseminated until after January 1950, because it had to be revised to take account of other new British COIN doctrine. The Colonial Office commented that the War Office Notes 'reflect[ed] .. the "orthodox" or at least "traditional" doctrine' regarding the role of police in counter-rebellion, but Sir Henry Gurney's new '"heterodox" doctrine' argued that police responsibilities extended beyond civil policing and intelligence duties, to leading the planning and execution of

military-security operations.63

The Overseas Defence Committee requested lessons from the Malayan authorities, and in his 'Despatch 5' of May 1949, Gurney concentrated on relating the features of the 'standard Communist plan', from the organisation of an underground to 'liberation'. The High Commissioner stated that 'lessons' had been forged not only from the Malayan experience, but also from a study of 'the Maquis .. and similar movements elsewhere, during and since the War.' Indeed, he clearly referred to the Palestine example to recommend the formation of an I.S. Committee under civil control to plan a COIN campaign, including an effective propaganda effort, which he admitted had been missing in the mandate. He recommended joint military-security operations on information 'for the conduct of an underground "war"', and also proposed civic action, quoting at length from Woodhouse's article about Greece to emphasise that COIN was mainly 'a civil and political task.' The Despatch exploited wartime and especially postwar COIN experience to suggest numerous improvements to COIN policies and procedures, and it encapsulated the essence of a Hearts-and-Minds COIN line. General Ritchie attested to Gurney's 'admirable exposition of the lessons', and wanted it sent on to Camberley, the Imperial Defence College, and all British Army Commands. By August 1949 it was distributed to 22 colonies as the first step to becoming universal British COIN doctrine by the spring of

The evolution of military-security policies and Army doctrine up to the autumn of 1949.

The police Commissioner, Gray, was ostensibly 'in charge of operational planning' by 1949, but was overworked and relied on General Boucher. In January, they repeated that complete army training in Ferret-style patrolling was required, reflecting a 'growing feeling' that small unit tactics held out a greater chance of success than large scale offensives. By April, they wrote a paper on the Clear-and-Hold strategy, advocating 'intensive patrolling' in the jungle and at its fringe, and ambush ing in probable MRLA (formerly the MPABA) food supply areas. In addition, they pressed for resettlement and detentions, large scale operations and air strikes against MRLA large units, and 'normal but intensified police work' in 'cleared' areas.

A month before the police-army report, the army HQ


65. On COIN planning, HC to SSC, 28 Feb.; J. Paskin, CO, to HC, 23 Mar., CO537/4750; CO memo, 28 Apr. 1949, CO537/4751. And the GOC's role, Sunderland 4171 P.23-4; Robinson P.149. Army on small unit operations, Commander's Conf. minutes, 12 Jan., W0268/774; minutes, 4 Apr.; HQJohore QHR, 31 Mar., W0268/582; HQMal. IR10, 6 Jan., W0208/4104; FTC QHR, 31 Mar. 1949, W0268/116; Sunderland 4170 P.127-8; and on large scale operations, P.132; Messenger P.17; Komer P.48-50.

-306-
concluded that jungle patrols of two months duration were not viable, but besides continuing short patrolling, many army units were extending their jungle treks for several weeks. This was made possible by the deployment of police specials who could dominate army base areas while units were on patrol, and because the army was relinquishing what the RAF called its 'complex' about self-reliance and was coming to accept the merits of air supply for its patrols. Further, some units attempted to ambush irregulars as they collected foodstuffs from pick-up points, and Surrendered Enemy Personnel [SEP] were used for tracking to try to improve security force contact rates with the insurgents. However, tactical progress occurred mainly through 'on-the-job' learning and was therefore patchy. Numerous units still preferred to move in large columns for some weeks, while many small patrols relied on speculative two
to three day 'recces'. Gurney and the local RAF HQ criticised persistent deficiencies in the intelligence system, noting that the importance of contact information was a 'lesson not apparently yet ... generally learnt.' Boucher also criticised the performance of the police, whose routine policing and


-308-
cordon-and-search secured inadequate intelligence. Indeed, in January 1949, the High Commissioner asked the Colonial Office for experts to reorganise the Special Branch. But a Scotland Yard officer, and W.C. Johnson, the Colonial Office's Police Advisor, did not arrive in Malaya until June and were subsequently given little help by Gray. He was too busy restructuring the police force— which Gurney compared to that of Palestine— with the objective of forming 235 'Jungle Squads' to assist with counterguerrilla operations. In the interim, flaws in the intelligence organisation undermined the security forces' efforts, and although Clear-and-Hold was promoted by senior officers, it was not practiced effectively at the start of 1949. A strong central command authority was essential to ensure that improved counterguerrilla strategy and tactics were implemented, but in its absence, advances were unit-specific and made a necessarily limited COIN impact.

The upper echelons of the army in the Far East supported large scale operations to stem a reported resurgence of MRLA large units in March 1949. In the following month, Ritchie instigated 'Priority operations' in three states where the MRLA threatened to establish liberated areas, and the GOC affirmed

that 'the flushing principle' of using air strikes to drive the MRLA from targeted localities was sound. The Training Centre offered guidance on this technique, and indeed, many unit commanders clung to the idea that large scale operations would 'be [the] most effective' counterguerilla tactics, clearing areas 'once and for all.' The CINCFELF from August 1949, General A.F. John Harding, noted that 'almost without exception the officers commanding units and formations' serving under him had fought in the Second World War. Their predisposition to
support large operations was underlined by their training in conventional war in the UK, and individual officers would not yet have been able to reassess their own I.S. knowledge in the light of recent Malayan lessons received by the War Office. Many British soldiers were dismayed by the poor results of


-311-
sweeps and drives by the middle of 1949, but the majority of senior officers attending a conference in July maintained that these tactics should be implemented as long as there was a threat posed by large MRLA bands. In view of this menace, Ritchie also questioned the tactical efficacy of the three-man 'recce' patrols favoured by the Training Centre. Nonetheless, the conference delegates reiterated that section patrolling should be at the heart of army basic training in Malaya, patently favouring the use of small unit tactics.

Many army units lost personnel through transfer 'turbulence' in 1949, and also as a result, their knowledge of operations. But some units held learning periods and others sought to update their techniques by sending cadres to the Far East Training Centre. It also ran a touring 'demonstration platoon', and distributed the War Office's Military Training Pamphlets 51 and 52, its 'Jungle Jottings, 1945', and 'The Jungle Book, 1943.' Two of these works, on wartime Burma, were written by Field-Marshal Sir William Slim, the CIGS from 1 November 1948, and he was more amenable to changes in COIN than his predecessor. But less than 240 men attended Jungle Warfare Courses from April to October 1949, and 'officers and NCOs [were] ... not ... given the opportunity to "spread the gospel"' due to operational commitments. Indeed, with an


'intensification of operations' from September, Training Centre tuition for the year came to a halt,\textsuperscript{71} the tempo of operations preventing a more widespread refinement of small unit tactics.

The expansion of army operational policies and thought, by the autumn of 1949.

The DMO had a consistent interest in unorthodox forces, and in April 1949 it received the support of the Colonial Office and the Prime Minister for an initiative which echoed a COIN precedent set in Greece. The Directorate asked General Ritchie if he required 'a special corps of Commando or guerilla type [soldiers] .. including ex- .. Force 136' men. But the CINCFELF stated that adequate resources for small unit operations were already at his disposal.\textsuperscript{72} However, progress in a new direction was made as some units patrolled suspected insurgent food-supply areas, and by May the HQ tried to create


\textsuperscript{72} Proposal for new force, J. Paskin, CO draft, to HC, Apr.; CO Priv. Sec., W.F. Dawson, to W. Geraghty, WO (DMO), 4 Apr., CO537/4751. Reply, CGSEA to SSC, 20 Apr., DEFE11/32; CO memo, Apr., DEFE11/33; Dunlop, notes, 12 July 1949, WO268/582.
intelligence by identifying insurgent food suppliers in Operation SNOW-WHITE. It failed to achieve its goal because food control measures were lifted too swiftly. Nonetheless, by August the HQ stressed the importance of resettlement, controls and policing to keep cleared areas 'permanently denied.' The police were urged to 'smash or disrupt the "Min Yuen"' organisation and MCP committees, and counterorganisation was considered 'of equal if not greater importance than' military offensives. Gurney and top local armed forces commanders realised the importance of arrests and resettlement, although the latter was not effectively carried out by most of the Malay states until after 1950.

Debate over military-security policy, and reorganisation, in the autumn of 1949.

On 2 August 1949, Major-General John Harding became the CINCFELF, and he agreed to more operations in insurgent 'feeding and breeding grounds' near the jungle fringes. A conference on 26 August commended 'fighting patrols' there, and officers were encouraged to 'try anything that appears to be a good idea ... we must NOT allow our tactics and methods to


become stereotyped.' 75 But Harding realised that the current COIN efforts of the police and civil authorities were inadequate, and so he set the army the task of creating a 'breathing space' for them by stepping up the military pressure on the MRLA. He wanted 'intensified routine patrol', especially as Gurney was offering the MRLA surrender terms on 6 September, and because of the boost given to the communists by Mao's victory in China. 76 From September, many units sustained 'saturation .. or platoon fighting patrols' on the "inside" .. with base camps in the jungle on the lines of "Ferret Force"', and used 'recce' groups 'until the Sakai, [or other jungle aboriginals, could] .. be permanently won over' and


-315-
intelligence procured from them. 77 But encirclement remained 'an attractive theory to some officers' who despatched small patrols simply to gather 'information for a future large operation.' Others insisted that encirclements would succeed given more manpower, though they usually met with a

'disappointing' outcome, and the army HQ stated that large operations produced 'uncertain' results. The GOC sought to increase the amount of sustained patrolling carried out, laying plans for this in Operation SMOKE. But most companies failed to gain successes because they neglected to 'operate[e] as three platoons' and moved in large columns. The army HQ therefore 'decided to develop .. [the] tactical technique and [urge commanders to] maintain patrols in the jungle' for two


months during Operation LEMON, which featured small unit 'intensive patrolling, ambush, and road-blocks.' It foundered because of insufficient contact intelligence, but its planners noted that this was bound to be the case until widespread resettlement and population protection was completed, and they accepted that no quick victory could be achieved unless the MRLA offered a 'large and worthwhile .. target' like the DSE did in Greece. Thus, the HQ kept up-to-date with events there, and pressed for improved counterguerilla tactics and resettlement, appreciating that success against the Malayan communists would not be achieved so readily as in the Balkans.

The army's Priority operations ended on 1 November, by which time Boucher had overseen the establishment of tripartite operations committees 'at all levels', as well as a Federal Joint Operations Centre. The Colonial Office Police Advisor, Johnson, informed London that Gray, who was swamped by the amount of work required in reorganising the police force, was unable to direct operations properly. But, as a consequence of Boucher's effort to set up an extensive committee structure, better machinery for invoking Gray's directives was now available to him. On 12 November, the police Commissioner recommended that the army concentrate its efforts on small unit patrolling of the jungle, and the Malaya HQ encouraged patrol work near squatter areas, realising that such military-security operations would also enhance resource control, counter-


-318-
organisation, and intelligence production. Intensified patrolling was not immediately put into practice by all officers, but despite continuing debate over tactics in Malaya, this was an important local high level shift on tactical policy.

The implementation of positive psywar policies during the winter of 1949 to 1950.

Gurney and the security forces wanted an accelerated resettlement programme to provide 'physical and moral' protection for the people, but he also wished to 'broaden [the] front' of extra-military action. By November 1949, he planned an 'Anti-Bandit Month' for the following February, to 'mobilise the population' against the MCP. In January 1950, he underlined that the key to success was 'the achievement of a political, social, and administrative programme capable of convincing the vulnerable elements of [the people of] the advantages of opposition to Communism', and to 'satisfy .. legitimate Chinese aspirations.' A Federal Development Plan was therefore not only an important step towards eventual self-government, but was conceived by the High Commissioner as 'an important anti-Communist weapon.' The Plan incorporated universal primary education, and employment and welfare benefits. Other 'administrative, social and protective services' included

Federal Home Guards, a Communities Liaison Committee to discuss the extension of citizenship rights to more Chinese, local elections, a government 'Member system' that would give selected Malayans greater influence over socio-economic policy-making, and economic help for Malays from a Rural and Industrial Development Authority. Furthermore, Gurney and MacDonald agreed that this programme required publicity, and in January 1950 a Joint Information and Propaganda Committee [JIPC] was created, 'to coordinate all the information and propaganda services' and 'organise effective counter-propaganda.' Under MacHugh scant progress was made in this sphere, but civil COIN authorities attempted to address the need for positive psywar policies.

Military-security and control policies and doctrine in early 1950.

By February 1950, Gray accepted that resettlement could take 'a few years' to complete, and he believed that 'too much faith should not be placed [i]n' it. He and Boucher pressed for

82. HC on 'Anti-Bandit Month' and requirements, CO note, May, C0537/6018; Joint Information and Propaganda Committee, notes, 28 Apr., C0537/6759; ARFM 1950 P.1; PFLCM 1949-50 P.605; Communist Banditry P.10; Short P.216-20: the Anti-Bandit Month mobilised 400,000 people in government security schemes. On resettlement and Home Guards, HC to CGSEA, 15 Feb.: civic action, HC 'Despatch 3', to WO, 12 Jan., C0537/5974; to CGSEA, 7 Mar.; to Dato Onn Bin Jafar, 15 May, C0537/6018; to SSC, J. Griffiths, 9 Apr. 1950, C0537/5971.

83. JIPC, notes, 10 Feb. 1950, C0537/6759; H.C. Greene, psywar report, 19 Sept. 1951, C0537/7255; Short P.416.
an improved effort by the Malay states, involving the 'civil authorities follow[ing]-up and establish[ing] Government control' of cleared areas through more effective administration. Furthermore, on 6 January, the GOC argued that while army officers should orchestrate their own operations, they also ought to follow the Kuala Lumpur HQ's 'tune.' Boucher emphasised that 'in future operations will be .. on a system of "saturation patrolling" sustained for several weeks, based on a "framework" area-deployment intended to allow them to dominate the ground 'between the enemy's jungle hideouts and sources of food.' He and the police Commissioner also supported the employment of "Striking Forces" in large scale operations when they were considered necessary by army officers. But in February, Boucher and Gray recommended police domination of settled areas, the stationing of army platoons and police Jungle Squads at the fringe, and sustained patrolling in the deep jungle by the army. The strategy and tactical policies encapsulated in their Report of February 1950 were approved by the Chiefs of Staff and by the War Office, making them accepted Army COIN policy.84 On the ground, some


-321-
officers repudiated their previous practice of 'hopeful .. sweeping' operations, and others concentrated on intelligence-based patrolling rather than a mere speculative 'groping' by patrols. Various army units held learning periods, as did the Training Centre, but it accommodated only 26 officers on its Jungle Warfare courses up to April 1950, and hence the Centre's patrol training made no dramatic impact on the style of army operations. Indeed, a 'constant change of units' in early 195085 further hampered the widespread adoption of improved tactical techniques.

General Boucher fell ill and was replaced by Major-General Robert E. Urquhart, who became the temporary GOC on 3 March. He was not disposed to encourage tactical evolution, and although Mockaitis correctly notes that large scale operations were often executed because of the continuing lack of contact intelligence, most of Urquhart's staff preferred 'large scale operations designed to disrupt, and then separate .. guerillas' from their support. For instance, his close advisor Colonel F.I.S. Tuker discouraged small unit experimentation and disparaged the Training Centre's instruction on patrolling. His attitude was undoubtedly conditioned by his previous experience

of large scale I.S. operations in Mesopotamia from 1919 to 1920
and on the Frontier in 1937 and 1938, as well as conventional
war in North Africa and Europe. Encirclements with 'killing
areas' were sanctioned by the HQ, and some battalion commanders
incorporated small unit patrols into major offensive efforts
like Operation CARP, which was planned 'after Gen[eral] Boucher
[and] would .. not have appealed to him.'86 The War Office
considered that senior officers in the field were best placed
to devise tactical policy, but its newly revised 1949 'Notes'
were sent to Malaya at the start of 1950. By April they were
'issued down to platoon commands', and some units noted that
they were 'extremely sound .. and deserve .. close scrutiny by
all officers.' The doctrine advocated patrolling from bases but
did not explicitly encourage the development of small unit
tactics nor reject large scale operations. Hence, in 1950 the
rate of high level tactical progress slowed under General
Urquhart, a trend that was not reversed by new officers who
arrived in Malaya inadequately prepared for COIN. The Staff
College recommended the War Office manual, but its 240
graduates a year were still only instructed in riot control,

86. On Urquhart, Commander's Conf. notes, 27 Feb., WO268/781;
Communist Terrorism P.87; Communist Banditry P.72.
Mockaitis, m/s, P.383,390. On Tuker and other Colonels,
Calvert, interview; Paper. Also on commanders, Cross
Company P.43; Smith Kathmandu P.28; Pocock P.93. Large
scale operations, McAlister P.283; Scots P.32, GBHQ; 1
Sheil-Small P.43; Oldfield P.12,15; RAF P.62,65, AHB; RAF
0Os, Jan.-Aug., passim AIR24/1935,1936,2275-9; 1 Suff.
0I6, 11 Mar., WO268/612; 1/7GR QHR, 31 Mar., W0268/685;
Truss Memories; 2GR, 'Operation CARP Report', Apr. 1950,
2GR,146: on Boucher's views, Phillips Diary, P.459, GMW.

-323-
cordon-and-search, and 'lessons' from Palestine. The War Office evidently continued to support the adoption of large scale operations by local commanders, while the guidance offered in its new I.S. doctrine was limited in its scope, and thereby, in its usefulness for COIN.

Progress on military-security and organisational issues in the spring of 1950.

General Harding was concerned that if patrolling was concentrated on the fringes, the counterguerilla war in the deep jungle might be neglected. By February, he rekindled the DMO's interest in unorthodox forces and it set in motion discussions about forming a 'long-range penetration squad' under the former Chindit leader, Colonel Mike Calvert, who was selected for his wartime experience. War Office officials debated the force's size and functions, but after Calvert reported on its requirements in August, the Malaya Scouts 22 SAS was formed. Furthermore, in February the army received films on air-supply techniques from London, and the CINCFELF requested a War Office Operational Research Group to assist with tactical investigation, which arrived in June. The Department also made use of wartime experience, accepting an


-324-
Australian offer to send a Military Mission comprising eight 'experts' who had served in New Guinea from 1943 to 1945, to advise on counterguerrilla warfare and the SAS's role. The Mission visited Malaya during July and August 1950. 89

Tactical improvements were not Harding's only concern, and he and MacDonald were instrumental in organisational changes that had far-reaching consequences for future COIN. Harding believed that a 'supremo' was necessary to give orders regarding military-security policy, in order to ensure that all COIN agencies applied the correct measures in future. Gurney was worried about the idea of a soldier planning all COIN policies and 'thought this idea crazy.' But by January 1950, as Boucher stressed the need for more patrolling but could not ensure that it was prosecuted by all army units, Gurney changed his mind. On 23 February, he requested the appointment of a 'senior officer of military experience' who could both centralise the planning and direct the execution of operations. 90 British COIN authorities agreed that it would be an advantage if the new man possessed appropriate I.S.-related experience, and the CINCFELF suggested Major-General Richard

89. Films, ARFM 1950 P.144. On the ORG, Harding to WO, 11 May, F1016/F0371/84477. DMO, COS(50)76, 15 May, CO537/5975. On Australian advisors, SSW note, 12 Oct. 1950, CAB134/497. British officers also gave COIN advice in 1949 and 1950 to visiting soldiers from, for instance, Burma, Thailand, Ceylon, the Phillipines, the USA, France and all the Dominions, see, for example, CO537/6005; DEFE11/34.

Gale, who had served in Palestine during the COIN of 1945 to 1947. The High Commissioner proposed four candidates, favouring Sir Fitzroy MacLean, 'whose [wartime] experience of guerilla warfare would certainly be' valued. But the CIGS consulted General Ritchie, and he recommended either Major-General Sir Harold Briggs, or Major-General Rob M.M. Lockhart, both experienced in confronting irregulars. Briggs was well known to Slim and the War Office for his successful campaign against the postwar Burmese militants, and although he was their second choice, he was the 'expert' finally chosen by Slim. He reached Malaya at the end of March 1950, and assumed the role of a Director of Operations, charged with coordinating and directing security force operations. But he was not armed with executive powers of command, because Gray fought 'hard' to retain control of the police, and therefore Briggs was obliged to rely on the goodwill of others to institute any changes that he desired.

'The Briggs Plan': 1) COIN organisation.


In the week following 3 April, the Director of Operations devised what became known as 'the Briggs Plan', which has been acclaimed as 'a remarkable feat.' However, it was written with the help of civil staff and military and police officers, who drew essentially on existing COIN strategy and policies. Briggs then applied his own I.S. knowledge to assign priorities and refine policies. It is probable that he had studied the Burma rebellion of the 1930s in which his regiment had fought, and the response there included an I.S. Committee structure, drives, small unit area-deployed patrolling, and small scale resettlement. Moreover, from 1945 to 1948 he was the GOC, Burma, where irregulars were defeated in 1947 by multi-battalion encirclements and drives, and air-supplied patrols. He introduced a basic Committee structure to coordinate operations in Burma, holding daily 'Morning Prayers' meetings for this purpose, and he applied this system to Malaya. Briggs formed a tripartite Federal War Council to decide on COIN operational policy, and an Operations Committee to draw up military-security plans. To attain the coordinated execution of policies, he sent directives to civil-military-police State and District War Executive Committees [S/DWECs]. Further, a Joint Intelligence Advisory Committee studying intelligence matters was set up on 26 April, following the recommendation of the Maxwell Police Mission, and Briggs also adopted its

findings by requesting 30-40 Special Branch officers with 'experience in the Indian Police.' In addition, Sir William Jenkin was appointed as an Advisor to the CID. He arrived on 15 May and was assisted by John Morton, the Head of the Combined Intelligence Staff, who wanted a Director of Intelligence to coordinate all agencies- Jenkin was appointed to this post in November 1950. Furthermore, Special Branch officers were trained by MI5, and although they were not part of the State and District Committees at first, Briggs gave intelligence matters considerable and 'expert' attention. He did not seek to embrace non-military-security planning in his reorganised COIN framework, because it lay within the scope of Federal departments. But the new organisation made possible the central assignment of all operational tasks, and brought about a more unified security force effort.

'The Briggs Plan': 2) Military-security policies.

On 11 April 1950, General Harding reaffirmed the policy of

94. The committee system, DOD1, 26 Apr., DOD2, 15 May, CO537/5975; Communist Terrorism P.94; Sunderland 4171 P.40-1; Short P.240; Clutterbuck Long P.58; Paget P.57-8; McCuen P.184, 188-9; Oldfield P.24; Renick Journal of S.E. Asian History 1965, P.5; see Appendix 9. The Maxwell Mission was a trio of police experts employed by the Colonial Office to study the MPF at Gurney's request during Nov. 1949- A. Maxwell Report of a Commission of Enquiry into the Malayan Police Force 16 Mar., (Kuala Lumpur, 1950). Intelligence advice, COS(50)216, 27 June, CO537/5975; MoD to GHQFELF, 16 May, CO537/5974; ARFM 1950 P.153; Miller P.91. On MI5, Bloch/Fitzgerald P.30. For the role of the Director of Intelligence, W. Jenkin, to Ch.Sec., S. Sutton, 11 Oct., Sutton to HC, 21 Nov. 1950, CO537/5973; West P.43.
small unit patrols following up intelligence rather than engaging in 'prophylactic and will o' the wisp patrolling', reiterating Boucher's tactical policy recommendations in his final report as GOC. The Clear-and-Hold strategy and tactical policies devised while Boucher held that position were likewise adopted and refined by Briggs. He proposed a minimum 'Framework' of one company per regional district, and patrolling for up to five hours trek from the fringe, in order to lay ambushes at points known or suspected to be frequented by guerillas, such as water or food sources or jungle tracks. He believed that information would be attained from a population fortified physically, and hence psychologically, in resettlement camps with counterterrorist guards and police posts. In addition, Briggs emphasised the importance of resettlement for counterorganisation, which Slim was said by War Office staff to have 'always been' in favour of, regarding it as a prerequisite for COIN success. The CIGS had 'found in similar operations' that this was so, having witnessed it first-hand during a visit to Greece in 1949. Briggs also drew on his past experience to emphasise that 'areas [must be] dominated to such an extent that food, money, information and propaganda are denied the enemy', as 'was proved in Burma.' He also wished to see mounting pressure on the MRLA in the deep jungle through air strikes and the deployment of 'Striking Forces' for large scale operations as and when necessary, again following 'past experience.' These methods were retained to
accelerate the south to north clearance in Priority areas, although policing and army small unit patrols became the foundation for tactical progress.

'The Briggs Plan': 3) Extra-military-security policies.

While General Briggs' responsibilities were officially confined to the military sphere, he stressed the importance of 'Reward and Punishment' measures. He proposed negative psywar action such as preventing uncooperative individuals from owning land, and positive action to give the Chinese a stake in the State, and thereby in assisting the counterinsurgents. Briggs conceived the resettlement of initially 300,000 people as the foundation for the positive approach, because they would require socio-economic help, which could itself be publicised in propaganda for wider effect. Further, he advocated the formation of camp committees to cultivate popular support, to organise Home Guards, and to gather information.

The Briggs Plan was accepted by all British COIN authorities,\textsuperscript{96} and was the basis of all subsequent military-security action.


The High Commissioner persistently used various negative psywar measures, concentrating on punishing active pro-insurgent supporters in order to deter others. But collective punishments were infrequently applied, as Gurney stressed that they were 'objectionable' and that he would not adopt 'ruthless measures.' Briggs urged property forfeiture for offenders, and Gurney and Harding considered collective fines, but concluded that 'the whole trend of experience .. suggests [that they are] not really an effective weapon.'\textsuperscript{97} Previous I.S. experience


\textsuperscript{97} Military views in, Malaya Committee minutes, 24 Apr.; and SSC, 14 July, CAB134/497. HC in, Attorney-General notes, Nov. 1950, CO537/6007.
encouraged Gurney to concentrate on the positive psywar approach in the summer of 1950, to prevent 'social disappointments' and provide the Chinese with 'good conditions, in order to bring them over to our side.' Resettlement camps received 'after-care' such as basic drainage and sanitation systems, agricultural assistance, health, education and community centres, and in some cases, village councils. The new Colonial Secretary, James Griffiths, stated that, 'development and expansion of the social services .. is one of our most important weapons' in the struggle. Economic assistance was also made available, and by June political reform included twenty-two municipal elections, and the Legislative Council discussed the extension of Chinese citizenship rights and a 'Member system' for Malays. This was 'not only as part of progress towards self-government but also to satisfy public demands for democratic as opposed to Communist methods' of change. Legislation for local elections was drafted in September, followed by approval for nine non-British Executive 'Members' of the Legislature from December 1950. Briggs and some senior officers wanted to slow 'major political changes' and focus attention on the military-security effort, but all other COIN authorities agreed that building 'active and enthusiastic' popular support by COIN political action demanded
priority treatment.98

In May 1950, Gurney pressed not only for more civic action and political reform, but also improved government propaganda, which he considered to be reactive and negative 'as [it had been] in Palestine.' The Director of Operations agreed that COIN political initiatives required publicity, and that a unified State propaganda effort was required. By June, the former Controller of Broadcasting in Palestine, Alex Josey, headed an Emergency Information Department, and MacHugh planned to publicise government achievements and its impending reforms. But Gurney wanted a fresh assessment of requirements from someone who knew about 'propaganda in war conditions', and by September, the Colonial Office secured from the BBC the services of Hugh C. Greene. He worked in the BBC's Eastern Europe Department and had a 'political warfare background', having served as the Controller of Broadcasting in the British zone of occupied Germany from 1946 to 1948. He set about coordinating propaganda activities, and introducing new measures like the manipulation of SEPs for anticommmunist


The Colonial Office noted in May 1950 that there had been 'lengthy consideration in Whitehall' about the state of imperial I.S. and the danger of revolt, and as a result, the Overseas Defence Committee had decided to distribute new doctrine to all colonies and military Commands, as well as to Camberley and other military teaching institutions. The I.S. authorities in London made an unprecedented effort to prepare local I.S. agencies for confronting imperial rebels, and numerous valuable new ideas were incorporated into the Colonial Office's 'I.S. : Lessons of the Malaya Emergency.' It was circulated together with Sir Henry Gurney's 'Despatch 5' by September 1950. The 'Lessons' pamphlet repeated the revised War Office 'Notes' in regard to military-security policy, while adding more detail about counterorganisation and counter-terrorist 'Guards'. It did not reject 'quasi-military' police units, but gave priority to civil policing and intelligence tasks. The manual also proposed a committee structure for COIN organisation, and if necessary, a Director of Operations, which was a major new doctrinal direction. Furthermore, it
recommended the use of Gurney's Despatch, with its emphasis on COIN political action. The Hearts-and-Minds line was accepted by British COIN authorities, as it was by some contemporary military writers,100 and was a significant advance in British COIN doctrine.

For a period of eighteen months after February 1950, the British U.N. Trust Administration in Eritrea confronted factional terrorism and sporadic guerrilla attacks, involving 2000 irregulars. Early security force drives, air strikes and large mobile columns failed to crush the opposition. But the new I.S. doctrine went to all Army Commands in the autumn of 1950, and it was evidently adopted in Eritrea by 1951. The Administration reformed intelligence procedures, set up a new committee planning system, and a Home Guard for counter-terrorist population protection, and large scale operations were supplemented by army small unit area patrolling. Although they were applied less frequently in Malaya, collective punishments were widely used in Eritrea, but re-education, social assistance programmes and a general amnesty were all instituted in 1951, bringing the conflict to a close.101 This was not a COIN campaign, but the new doctrine formulated in the


101. On Eritrea, Trevaskis P.108-12; U.N. Report, (1952), P.67-9, Trevaskis Papers, 2/2, MsBEs.367, RHO; E.S./R.K.P. Pankhurst Eritrea and Ethiopia (Essex, 1953) P.181-90: the Trust Administration was responsible to the FO.
light of Malayan events probably had a considerable impact on concurrent British I.S. action.

The evolution of military-security policies, and additional military doctrine devised in 1950.

Senior army commanders in Malaya exchanged tactical ideas at periodic conferences, and at one on 11 July, they agreed that large scale operations were still of considerable value for pressuring and dispersing MRLA concentrations. The War Office echoed some officers' fears that Malayan guerillas might yet try to liberate targeted areas with large unit forces, following the strategy recently seen in China and Greece. But though Colonel Calvert's proposal for 'very small patrols' caused 'considerable disagreement' among officers over whether they could prevail if confronted by large insurgent forces, fringe platoon patrolling was broadly supported. Indeed, commanding officers asserted that 'FTC training covered the requirements' for small unit patrolling, along with the War Office's 'Warfare in the Far East' Military Training Pamphlet, and local doctrine. A handful of commanders wanted the Training Centre to distribute operational lessons, but the majority argued that this was a unit responsibility, and their conservative attitude prevented a uniform development of tactics.102 However, the Overseas Defence Committee's effort to learn from Malaya was soon followed by the War Office DMT. Its Director-General, Lieutenant-General Richard Gale, had supported experimentation with small unit patrolling in Palestine during 1947, and the Directorate requested a copy of

the Federal HQ's notes on this conference, for use in revising its doctrine on 'antibandit tactics.' The resulting War Office report, 'Tactics in Malaya', supplemented instruction given at Camberley and six other military institutes, and subsequently, officers from Malaya delivered lectures on communist insurgency and unconventional war at the Staff College. New British Army woodland training as a preparation for Malaya was also introduced in the UK.\textsuperscript{103} The Army establishment sought tactical lessons and adapted doctrine and training accordingly, thereby providing better COIN preparation for British soldiers after 1950.

By the summer of 1950, most army officers in Malaya were said to have realised that 'a strong section [of infantry] was a match for any' MRLA platoon, and although a lot of patrolling was speculative, resettlement and improved policing and intelligence procedures increased contact rates at the fringe.\textsuperscript{104} Calvert also wished to improve results, and he told the War Office that the SAS could force irregulars out of the jungle towards its fringes by paraguerilla patrol, tapping intelligence sources such as the Sakai aboriginals who might provide information in exchange for protection and the benefits


-337-
of civic action. Additionally, he tried to gain approval for an enlarged SAS ready for COIN anywhere in the Empire, but the War Office rejected his request—four companies started training from August. Most of its intake came from the SAS of 1941-5, and the wartime experience of an Australian Advisory Mission was also exploited. MacDonald noted that it advised on "unorthodox" methods, and the Mission confirmed the merit of SAS deep jungle operations. Furthermore, while the Chiefs of Staff saw little scope for tactical deception when they examined the subject in May 1950, and Gurney and Briggs were wary of stirring up political disquiet by adopting these techniques, the Australians encouraged the Federal Government to utilise the expertise of former SOE men. In July, the Special Branch welcomed an army advisor on deception, and in late 1950, the theatre Command was assisted by Lieutenant-Colonel S.D. Calvert and C. Cholmondeley, 'who had wide experience of covert deception in the last war', with the
Chiefs of Staff's approval. Some units still retained their faith in large scale operations, and debate over tactics continued to be reflected in British military literature. But the gradual shift towards lengthy small unit area patrolling was supported by higher authorities by late 1950.

General Briggs advocated air strikes to harass the MRLA, but the War Office and Air Ministry complained that RAF


resources could be better employed on other tasks, and that air strikes were only being practiced because there was currently 'no other effective method' of harassment available. By the end of 1950, the AOC, Sir Frank R.L. Mellersh, approved of small scale air strikes, but rejected 'air drive' or 'flushing' tactics. Along with numerous other British military officers, he had studied current events in Indo-China, where the French were trying to stem a developing civil war, and concluded that 'to close all escape routes from an area target in jungle is an impossibility.' Therefore, he concentrated his attention on other forms of air support, notably transport and supply.107 Moreover, by September Briggs was disturbed that the area-deployment 'framework' was 'not being operated satisfactorily', but was 'abandoned, sometimes for long periods to permit .. large scale operations .. [which achieved] no tangible results.' In October, he decided to drop sweeps by 'Striking Forces' and instead employ them for intensified patrolling. The BDCC noted that 'improvements in tactics and technique are under constant examination', and Briggs drafted a directive on 15 November for six-week area patrolling by 'small controlled units with a view to ambushing in the fringes.' Harding agreed with this 'broad disposition and method of employment', and by

1951 two-thirds of the army was so deployed. Senior army COIN authorities had eventually made prolonged small unit area patrolling the basic military tactical policy, and hence transformed British counterguerrilla wisdom.

In view of the growing number of insurgent 'incidents', albeit that most were minor in nature, such as the slashing of rubber trees and sabotage of non-essential commercial premises, the Director of Operations wanted the tempo of military operations stepped up. Indeed, the theatre Defence Committee argued that these should take priority over all other COIN activities during the winter of 1950 to 1951. Gurney convinced the Cabinet to provide substantial immediate extra financial support for Malaya to allow an 'all-out effort' because 'as in Ireland and Palestine, armed insurrection and terrorism can quickly paralyse an administration.' But he wanted to concentrate new resources on accelerating resettlement rather than the military effort, as the basis of counter-

organisation, resource control, and protective and civic action. And all COIN agencies in Whitehall agreed that extra-military action warranted precedence at the end of 1950.109

**Progress in COIN psywar and political policies up to the summer of 1951.**

In December 1950, the Cabinet approved new collective punishments for those assisting insurgents, and local counter-insurgents carried out military operations designed to have a psychological effect on the MRLA. But Gurney realised that these methods would not build up government levels of support and were 'only justifiable so long as [they were] .. balanced by constructive and progressive measures to assist the people', in order to win 'the battle of ideas.' He again referred to the Palestine COIN campaign, to illustrate the need to strike the correct balance between 'severity and encouragement', and stated that 'the best guarantee of I.S. is normally a good administration pursuing policies acceptable to the people.' In March 1951, the Federal Legislature ratified a proposal to double the number of Chinese eligible for Federal citizenship,

and local elections in four Malay states were planned for August. Briggs too supported the goal of 'contented communities', and in February directed that all resettlement camps must form Home Guards, 'to commit the Chinese to combat[ting] Communism actively.' In addition, the Emergency Information Service advertised government civic action through an expanded array of media including 1700 community radios. In April 1951, several colonial police chiefs, Army officers, MI5 representatives and other Whitehall officials dealing with I.S. issues, attended a Colonial Office conference convened to formulate 'constructive answers' to insurgency. They agreed with the COIN line being taken by the Malayan authorities.110

Advances in military-security and resource control policy during 1951.

Despite General Briggs' intentions, in some Malay states 'the senior officers ha[d] a strong dislike' for patrolling and preferred large scale operations, and the Director of Operations was not empowered to compel them to alter their tactical policy. Indeed, although the SAS undertook deep jungle patrols, with the approval of the DMO- its Director from 1951, Brigadier R.W. McLeod, commanded the SAS from 1944 to 1945- they were also employed against large MRLA bands and as part of major operations in some states. Nevertheless, a general 'intensification and improved methods' were evident by summer 1951 and 'everywhere active patrolling .. [was] carried out and ambushes laid.' Some units' prolonged small patrolling of suspect areas was refined with the gradual accumulation of intelligence, and this paraguerilla action met with increasing

Hence, communist irregulars switched their attention to vulnerable 'labour lines' such as estates and mines. Local civil and army authorities foresaw this as a likely consequence of better military-security policies like resettlement, and indeed, food-denial was 'often' discussed by them from 1950. But it was self-evident that effective food control was not feasible until extensive resettlement was completed. By 1951, over 125,000 people were resettled, and Briggs felt able to develop the 'Food-restricted areas' scheme that limited food availability. It was devised in August 1950 to give those under the greatest communist pressure an 'alibi' for not providing them with resources. On 16 June 1951, DWECs were directed to extend food controls in order to undermine MRLA elements attempting to contact the 'Min Yuen'. In addition, Operation STARVATION was 'a means of creating intelligence' by forcing underground suppliers to 'surface', thereby leaving the insurgents more vulnerable to security

force operations. Subsequently, this proved to be a valuable new operational direction.

**Developments after Gurney, and the new COIN 'experts'.**

In spite of increasing MRLA activity, by June 1951, Briggs and Gurney sensed a 'turning point' in the campaign. Indeed, the MCP realised that its terrorism was alienating the people, and therefore ordered its curtailment from October. In that month, the High Commissioner was murdered, and this sparked the authorities in London and the Far East into introducing organisational changes which assisted COIN progress. In July 1951, the CIGS chose Major-General Rob Lockhart to replace Briggs as the Director of Operations from 12 November. His selection was consistent with the now common British procedure for appointing vital COIN personnel, Lockhart having been

113. Food control in 1950, FLCMCP 1952-3 Paper 33, P.B314; Barber P.109; Komer P.59; Sunderland 4173 P.38. Insurgent shift to attack labour, RAF P.19,81, AHB; Communist Banditry P.22; Communist Terrorism P.36; ARFM 1951 P.8; and discussion of controls, P.49; DOD10, 15 Jan., CO537/7262; DO Progresps., 15 Feb., CAB130/65; 26 Apr., 31 May, AIR20/7777; Sandhu in Nyce/Gordon P.11; Stubbs P.123-4: on STARVATION, P.105-7,111,166; DO Progresps., 31 Aug., AIR20/7777; DOD14, 11 June, CO537/7262; HC/DO Appreciation, 4 June, DEFE11/45; ARFM 1951 P.2; Sunderland 4173 P.ix,7,65-8; Paget P.61. On intelligence aspect and results of STARVATION, Clutterbuck Conflict P.213.

114. HC/DO in, Malaya Committee minutes, 4 June, DEFE11/44. On the MCP, Maj.-Gen. R.M.M. Lockhart, DO, 'The situation in the Federation of Malaya', 26 Nov. 1951, CO537/7263; Clutterbuck Long P.67,70; Conflict P.198; Short P.472.
picked for his 'character, temperament and experience.' Senior Army sources noted that he had been a Governor of the North-West Frontier Province, 'a lively political-military job', and displayed a 'knowledge of minor warfare'. In the interim, clashes between Briggs and Gray over the role of the police and their organisation led the Federal Government and General Harding to press Whitehall to improve the direction of the military-security campaign. Indeed, in March 1951, the Foreign Office referred to General de Lattre de Tassigny's position as the single COIN civil-military commander in Indo-China as a possible exemplar for the Malayan authorities to follow. The Colonial Office agreed that such 'a "supremo" .. might have a tonic effect.' MacDonald rejected the idea, but after Gurney's death in October, the Officer-Administering-the-Government, M.V. Del Tufo, agreed to merge the Federal Executive and War Councils, resulting in a body capable of dealing with all COIN matters. He also tried to secure executive powers for the new Director of Operations, who reported on the position to London in November. Lockhart recommended the appointment of either a 'supremo' or a single security forces chief, explicitly in preference to customary 'Martial Law' or liaison arrangements.

outlined in the War Office's recent 'Notes'. In reaction to reports from the anxious Malayan authorities, the Prime Minister from November 1951, Winston Churchill, sent out Oliver Lyttleton, the new Colonial Secretary, to report on the situation. On 12 December, Lyttleton urged improvements in the Home Guards, civil service, civic action and policing, and recommended a 'supremo' who could execute a comprehensive COIN plan. Lyttleton and Churchill sought an appropriately qualified man for the post of Director of Operations and High Commissioner, the Prime Minister desiring someone of national standing and insisting on personally interviewing all candidates. Seven men were considered, including Montgomery, Mountbatten and Scobie, who all possessed postwar I.S. experience. But the War Office proposed Major-General Brian Robertson, who had been Deputy-Governor of the UK zone in occupied Germany, and was at present commanding British forces engaged in fighting with irregulars in the Suez Canal Zone. He wished to continue there and refused the offer, and therefore a ninth name, that of Major-General Gerald Templer, was submitted to Churchill, and approved by him in early January 1952.


Templer was proposed by the War Office on account of his experience,\(^ {118}\) and he used it to good effect to develop COIN policies, to an extent that has been overlooked.

General Templer was an Irishman and would have been interested in the COIN in Ireland, and he fought Arab irregulars in the Palestine rebellion of 1936 to 1937. He later worked on intelligence at the War Office, and in 1940 studied past unconventional warfare with experts on the subject, such as J.C.F. Holland and Sir Colin Gubbins. During 1945 and 1946, he grappled with civil and police issues as the Military Governor of the British zone in Germany. He then became the Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office from 1946 to 1948, and was charged with briefing the Chiefs of Staff on external and I.S. threats.\(^ {119}\) He would therefore have been kept informed about the activities of armed Burmese communists, and on becoming the Vice-CIGS in February 1948, the insurgency in Malaya became a preoccupation of his for two years. In addition, although it has been previously ignored by historians, Templer's ideas about the appropriate style of COIN action were probably conditioned in part by the Greek experience. He was kept up to date about the situation in Greece as DMI, and then as VCIGS. Further, on becoming the Federation's High Commissioner, he was briefed by the DMI, Colonel Arthur C. Shortt, who took up that post in 1949 immediately after returning from Athens, where he had been the Military Attaché. Some army commanders in Malaya had served


119. On Ireland, Palestine, Germany, and WO: Cloake P.59,61, 68,70,165,171; Stubbs P.144.
there recently too, and DMO staff compared the problems posed by Greek and Malayan guerillas in the 'Official History' of the BMM(G) written in 1952. Such connections with, and allusions to Greece, might have encouraged COIN authorities in Malaya to draw comparisons between the two communist revolts. This was not the main source of Templer's COIN policies, but he said that 'Germany and Whitehall enabled .. [him] to tackle' the situation in the Federation, and some of his ideas were 'long harboured in the back of his mind.'120 Certainly, the conflict in Greece cannot be discounted as an influence shaping his adopted COIN line.

Templer arrived in Malaya in February 1952 and met local officials, including the new Police Commissioner from 25 January, Sir Arthur E. Young. Colonel Gray was removed unceremoniously after persistent disagreements over the role of the police with other high level Malaya authorities. Young was selected by Lyttleton for his 'wide police experience', including a spell with the British Military Government in occupied Germany during Templer's Governorship. The High Commissioner soon secured the appointment of other former colleagues, including the new GOC from 1 June, Major-General 120. Templer's knowledge of Malaya as VCIGS, Cloake P.181; Clutterbuck Long P.80. Templer on his influences, interview t/s, 30 Mar. 1977, P.5,11,13, in, D.L. Lloyd-Owen Papers, 8011-132-2, NAM; Barber P.197. On Greece, see Chapter 4; on Shortt, Appendix 1; MacFetridge, letter, 24 Jan. 1991. On officers, including Maj.-Gen. L.E.O.W. Perowne, (BMM(G) Head, 1950-2), Brig. M.C.A. Henniker Red shadow over Malaya (London, 1955) P.159; and DMO reference to Malaya, Maj. R.E. Austin, MO3, in 'The History of the BMM(G), 1945-52', WO202/908, written in 1952- MoD Booklist 312/6, MODL.

-350-
Hugh Stockwell, though it was General Lockhart who was made responsible for army tactical and training development, as Templer's Deputy-Director of Operations. General Templer also asked for specialist assistance with intelligence and psywar matters, and all the major COIN authorities in Whitehall helped to provide him with the experts he sought. Although R. White, his first choice for the position of Director of Intelligence, was unavailable because of his secondment by MI5, the post was filled by John Morton, who had worked at Indian Central Intelligence between 1930 and 1947 and then with the CIS. He was advised by the British Security and Secret Services, and these agencies also assisted both the new chief of the Special Branch, Guy Madoc, who came from the Singapore CID, and the new Director-General of the Information Service, Alec Peterson, the former Deputy-Director of Psywar in the wartime South-East Asia Command. A specialist Foreign Office unit was additionally secured to offer him guidance. Further, Templer acquired a War Office Operational Research Section for research into tactical and technical aspects of counterguerrilla war.\(^{121}\)

\(^{121}\) Templer meets locals, Cloake P.210-3. On Young, see Appendix 1; Young, in Fyfe, (Home Sec.), letter, 16 Jan., Young, 4/4, RHO; Stanborough M.Litt., P.130; ARFM 1952 P.208: on the ORS, P.4-5; C.H. Everett, COSC Sec., note, 1 Feb., DEFE11/47; and new GOC/CoS, Communist Terrorism P.155; WO to FELF, 12 Mar. 1952, WO216/630; Cloake P.211-2. On Lockhart, HC Statement, 4 June 1952, CO1022/7. On intelligence and advisors, ARFM 1952 P.6; Andrew P.490-1; Miller P.93; Short P.360; Cloake P.228; West P.44; Communist Terrorism P.163: on psywar, P.152-3; Templer, interview t/s, P.13, Lloyd-Owen, NAM. And advisors, Bloch/Fitzgerald P.72: on the FO's advisor, T. Hodge, A.D.C. Peterson 'Federation Information Services' Malaya 2, Feb. 1953, P.87.
he established a central Intelligence Staff and restructured the Director of Operations Committee in order to hasten operational planning. Moreover, he proclaimed that COIN and all other government activities were inextricably linked, and injected new vigour into the COIN effort by his forthright statements, extensive national tours and demands for swift action.122

Extra-military policies and the consolidation of the Hearts-and-Minds line in 1952.

Templer approved some negative psywar measures to punish those assisting insurgents, and authorised the razing of a dozen houses of such people in August 1952, because he 'had to do something.' He also accepted that controls like curfew could have a punitive impact, but resorted to collective punishments far less often than his predecessor.123 Templer's most celebrated use of such measures was his order for extended curfew, food rationing and searches at Tanjong Malim in April, following a nearby terrorist attack. But although this produced a punitive effect, he was adamant that his aim was population-resource control and information-collection in the innovative

122. On Templer's reorganisation, HC to SSC, 28 Feb., C01022/ 60; ARFM 1952 P.4-5; Communist Terrorism P.155; Cloake P.241-2,251-2, 301; Templer interview t/s, P.11, Lloyd- Owen, NAM; and HC on need for urgency, P.25; Stubbs P.146, 155.

123. Templer on the need for him to act, interview t/s, P.18, Lloyd-Owen, NAM. On the destruction of huts at Permatang Tinggi, HC to SSC, 25 Apr., C01022/55; DO Staff notes, 9 Oct. 1952, C01022/56; Malaya under P.30-3; Sunderland 4174 P.39; Cloake P.273.
Operation QUESTION, involving secret questionnaires about the insurgents. He said his measures were 'in no way collective punishments', and he opposed any broadening of the negative psywar approach, having learned that 'in Palestine .. collective fines did not pay a dividend.' Thus, General Templer drew on previous I.S. campaigns to shape his Hearts-and-Minds COIN line.

Templer energetically implemented a Cabinet Directive instructing him to prosecute COIN first and foremost, while simultaneously making progress towards self-government and instituting nation-building measures. In fact, there were local elections in February 1952, and the State was already introducing labour welfare schemes, building public housing and setting up cooperatives. These projects were regarded by General Templer as essential for COIN purposes, and on 19 March, he declared that the crux was to win over people's 'hearts and minds.' He proposed the extension of Chinese citizenship, local elections, Home Guard units and private land ownership, as well as the formation of youth groups and a Federation Regiment, and other civic action which he considered

124. HC's action and ideas, to SSC, 2 Apr., 26 May, CO1022/54, 56; HC Political report 4, 22 May 1952, FZ1018/FO371/101224; letter, to V. Purcell, 1954, in Templer Papers, 7410-29/5, NAM.
to be 'an integral part of the fight.'

From May to November 1952, the High Commissioner steered legislation through the Federal Councils that resulted in more welfare assistance to workers, the Federation Regiment, expanded education schemes, municipal elections, the doubling of Chinese citizenship, and their first restricted opportunity to enter the Malayan Civil Service. This programme was publicised by the Information Service, and it devised new types of SEP propaganda, such as instructional entertainment and lecture tours. By October, 'voice aircraft' were also used to disseminate propaganda. There was consensus among local COIN authorities that 'civil measures' were at the fore of a


-354-
campaign comprising 'a combination of political advancement and political-military action.' Indeed, at the end of 1952, when the application of collective punishments against the Mau-Mau rebels in Kenya was debated, the Colonial Office echoed Sir Henry Gurney by insisting that if they were considered necessary, punitive methods must be 'balanced by constructive and progressive measures.' It recommended the adoption of positive psywar action by the Nairobi authorities, leaning towards a Hearts-and-Minds rather than a Cost-Benefit COIN line.

Military-security and resource control policies, and refinement of COIN doctrine in 1952.

By 1952 'big operations in the jungle' were 'most unpopular [with the security forces] .. throughout Malaya.' The Air Ministry accepted that 'air forces cannot adopt .. their traditional [I.S. punitive bombing] role', and the AOC in Malaya argued that 'with certain types of very successful ground tactics, air action [meaning offensive fire-support

missions] is .. unnecessary.' The SAS was assigned to fight the few major MRLA forces left in the jungle that 'normal security force patrols' were unable to cope with, operating in considerable strength and experimenting with deployment by parachute. But the SAS mainly practiced small unit deep jungle patrolling, and 'routine' army training and operations increasingly consisted of 6 to 25-man paraguerilla action, inherently featuring not only speculative movement in suspect areas, but ever more intelligence-based prolonged patrolling and ambush. Information accumulated as COIN policies began to take effect and also because the security forces reformed their intelligence training and practices. Further, MI5 advised the Special Branch on infiltrating the insurgent infrastructure and the 'turning' of SEPs to the counterinsurgent side, and by


1952 many assisted security force patrols. Tactical adaptation also occurred in individual units that decided 'to adopt bandit tactics' and consider 'the use of civilian clothes', in what they termed 'Q' or 'Ranger' pseudogangs. In April, Templer noted that rapid troop transportation by helicopters appeared to be 'the only new technique in sight', but they were not available in any quantity until 1953. Notwithstanding this, he encouraged the process of tactical refinement at the Training Centre, and furthermore, ordered junior officers to write reports on all patrol operations, so that the Operational Research Section could 'collate all the accumulated information ... [and then] draw conclusions' from this material and propose adjustments to methods and techniques. He was also accompanied by a staff of four 'wise men' on his frequent nation-wide tours, and they collected new ideas and ensured that lessons were adopted by COIN agencies. Indeed, the staff contacted Far East Land Forces officers who met their GHQ counterparts in Indo-China, although apparently no significant COIN 'lessons' were drawn from the civil war there. In addition, advice about deception techniques from former SOE men was supplemented by a scientific research team approved by the Chiefs of Staff. In October 1952, its leader, Dr. Cockburn, recommended boobytraps and electronic warfare to improve small unit contact rates.

131. Police retraining, ARFM 1952 P.14,208-11; Stubbs P.156-7. Special Branch and MI5, HC Political Report 2, 13 Mar., FZ1018/F0371/101224; Miller P.94-7; Barber P.162-3; Cloake P.229; Sunderland 4172 P.2,20-4,30-1,34. HQMal. held 10-day intelligence courses for all COIN agencies by 1952, Sir A.E. Young, MPF Training Programme, spring 1952, CO1022/68. On 'Q' patrols, 26GR Inf. Bde. TI3, 14 Feb.; 1/2GR OIs, 23 Feb., 5 Apr. 1952, 2GR,133, GMW; 1 Suff. WD, 30 Jan. 1951, B1/24, SRM. Cf. to CATs.
These measures were implemented progressively after 1952.\textsuperscript{132} Taken together, this was an unprecedented effort to develop British counterguerrilla tactical policy, and considerable progress was made by mid-1952.

During the summer of 1952, the Malaya HQ received a proposal from an army intelligence officer, Captain H. Latimer, for a three-month build-up of intelligence in a target area, afforded by minimum military action and increased intelligence collection and food control, followed by the 'turning' of

identified insurgents, and then the relaxation of controls to allow pro-insurgent supporters to contact and supply irregulars, in conjunction with intensified military-security operations. This 'target manipulation' was implemented during Operation HAMMER from October 1952, and unlike previous schemes, it incorporated 'really effective food control', proficient intelligence work, and then 'a host of minor operations' rather than large scale methods. It proved to be a successful and subsequently much copied progression of military-security policy.133

General Templer vigorously pursued better COIN practice throughout 1952, by August instructing the seventy-one DWECs to set up training courses for all security forces. The curriculum covered all aspects of COIN, including the insurgent threat, intelligence and organisational arrangements, outlines of small unit tactics and military-security policies, resettlement, guards, and controls, as well as the requirements of extra-military COIN action.134 Templer was especially 'disturbed' by the army's loss of knowledge about operations

133. Capt. Latimer's scheme in, Clutterbuck Conflict P.211-2, 215-9; Long P.96-7,117,121; Miller P.101; Henniker P.138-9,144; HAMMER, Orders, 3 Oct., in W.B. Tucker Papers, Ms IOs.125, RHO; 1 Suff. WD, HAMMER, 13 Dec. 1952, B1/28, SRM; Operation notes, n.d., Stockwell, 7/3, LHC; ARFM 1952 P.11-2; Stubbs P.167-8,177-9; Clutterbuck Long P.122,226; Short P.376-7; and on previous trials, P.440.

134. Templer's views, to G(Ops)HQMal., 'Notes for DWEC courses', 26 Aug.; and on DWEC courses, DO Staff, notes, 1 Aug.; DWEC Directing Staff, Notes- 'The machinery of command for planning', 'Joint plan with appreciation', Aug. 1952, Stockwell, 7/4, LHC.
through unit 'turbulence', and therefore, to ensure its thorough preparation for COIN, he commissioned 'The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations, Malaya, (1952).' This new doctrine was written by a team led by Major-General Walter Walker in 1952, as a basis for army training. It reiterated the guidance provided by District authorities, and supplemented this with more detail on Clear-and-Hold and small unit tactics. Air strikes and large scale operations for harassment were also advocated, but the shortcomings of these tactics were mentioned. The emphasis was placed on sustained small unit area patrolling based on intelligence or using 'recce' groups, and the CATOM manual advocated a counterguerrilla strategy and paraguerrilla tactics that were a major advance on prewar British Army I.S. doctrine. Furthermore, it incorporated new COIN principles, including a Committee system, resettlement and food controls, and civic action as part of the positive psywar approach.135 It was designed for use in Malaya, but as a rebellion gradually emerged in Kenya, the administration there followed the example set during the 'Emergency', adopting such measures as national registration, stringent controls and Home Guards. There was not a swift systematic transfer of 'lessons' from Malaya to Kenya during 1952 because of the comparatively weak threat that the Mau-Mau posed at first, a resultant degree of complacency in Nairobi, and also because of the nature of the British bureaucratic-institutional structure. Nonetheless, as a result of Britain's postwar COIN experience, by the time that this fourth revolt broke out, Whitehall authorities were better prepared to manage it than ever before. During the spring of 1953, the CATOM book was 'used in Kenya almost word for word, with only minor changes,' and the 'Malaya model' of COIN was applied. The CATOM proved to be the prototype 'for

subsequent COIN pamphlets and .. a source of doctrinal principles and procedures. But Malaya was only one chapter of the British COIN story, and likewise, the Malaya manual was only a single element of Britain's new COIN doctrine, the others being Gurney's crucial 'Despatch 5' of 1949, and the Colonial Office's comprehensive 'I.S. : Lessons of the Malaya Emergency' of 1950. Together these works encapsulated the basic Hearts-and-Minds COIN line and key policies used in later campaigns. They represented a transformation in British COIN wisdom after 1945, and were the culmination of eight years of seminal COIN development.


137. The Hearts-and-Minds line was adopted across the globe from the 1950s onwards, for instance, in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Turkey, the Phillipines. Selected policies were also widely used, for example, resettlement, in the USSR, Algeria, Iraq, Spanish Sahara, Zimbabwe.
Chapter 6: Counterinsurgency developments in retrospect.

British COIN reflected traditional I.S. policies and doctrine in 1945 and 1946, and the security forces also relied on 'general knowledge'. When the familiar style of operations failed to make progress against insurgency, high level political and military officials in Palestine and Greece conscientiously sought guidance from imperial I.S. history. But in the main this featured conflicts other than insurgency, and what little COIN experience there was offered few obvious universal lessons to the early-postwar counterinsurgents. The frequent success of traditional I.S. wisdom in practice between the wars ensured that individuals and institutions initially adhered to its tenets,¹ a tendency underscored by British perceptions of minority rebellions with limited popular participation that should be eradicated by the usual Cost-Benefit I.S. line. The British authorities at first failed to fully appreciate the potency of the insurgent threats they confronted, and only after customary measures faltered in practice did COIN agencies try to devise new methods.

The security forces in Palestine received normal I.S. training and indoctrination throughout the campaign, but the Cabinet's qualms about applying a ruthless Cost-Benefit line in the light of political considerations about British public and American government opinion prevented the repression desired by many of the Army's most senior officers. Field-Marshals Brooke and Montgomery supported time-honoured I.S. procedures like those practiced between 1936 and 1939, but the Cabinet was convinced by political arguments against the adoption of this line until 1947, when the search for a separate political

1. Concerning the influence of individual Britons on the process of COIN development, see Appendix 1.

-362-
settlement ended. However, the High Commissioner, General Cunningham, was not only ill at ease with the idea of State coercion, but also wanted integral COIN political action, although its approval by the Cabinet was not feasible because of the prevailing conditions in Palestine. Cunningham eventually accepted a resort to the tough measures administered in the mandate before the War, but the Colonial Office concluded that the traditional British I.S. line was defective. Further, the Department's responsibility for devising programmes of gradual socio-political development in various regions of the Empire gave its officials the opportunity to study nation-building measures that would become the basis for an alternative to repressive I.S. methods. However, the Army's sphere of responsibility was restricted, and, as a consequence, so was its vision in assessing the nature of the insurgent threat and the possible types of counteraction to it. The Army was concerned about its failure in Palestine and sought to ascertain why its policies had not succeeded, in order to make them work in future. But it was an innately conservative institution, and its upper echelons were not psychologically ready to discard knowledge built up over decades because of what could be perceived as an aberration. The War Office's review of its I.S. doctrine in 1947 reflected this predominant attitude within the military establishment.

Montgomery believed that the fault in Palestine lay not with the Army's actions, but with those of the Cabinet, which prevented the implementation of more forceful military-security and control policies until 1947. In reality, these were not best suited for COIN, and the War Office was uninterested in

2. For an account of CO duties and plans for imperial development, see chapters on the postwar period in, J. Cross The fall of the British Empire, 1918-68 (London, 1968).
altering its doctrine during 1945 and 1946, not simply because of its innate conservatism, but because it believed that its existing I.S. practices were adequate for coping with the insurgent threat. Further, in the circumstances of postwar military cuts, unit turbulence, and the need for swift training of conscripts in order to enable them to undertake their I.S. duties promptly, following the traditional path was obviously the least complicated way of preparing soldiers for COIN. Furthermore, large scale operations were familiar to those who fought in the War, and this style of I.S. tactics was therefore easier to adopt than to develop new small unit patrol methods. The War Office accepted some adjustment of existing policies by soldiers on the ground through the accustomed practice of learning on-the-job. But immediately following the War, the British Army was not disposed to reappraise its I.S. wisdom, and it could not have acted upon any other framework at the start of its peacetime COIN commitments. However, as the Palestine embroilment drew to a close, the War Office Military Training branch attempted to learn from the two year conflict, following a lead taken by the Cabinet's Overseas Defence Committee. The War Office's researchers appreciated the potential benefits of a tripartite committee system coordinating COIN efforts, like that created in the mandate. But they evidently concluded that the Army's inability to defeat the insurgents stemmed from the mis- or non-application of I.S. policies due to political constraints, echoing Montgomery's feelings. The Department's traditionalists were clearly in the ascendant successfully opposing those in Whitehall who were more ready to alter operational policies in

3. The WO's 1949 'Notes' emphasised the need for inter-agency cooperation, but did not propose a committee organisation, indicating that the concept was not universally accepted within the Department.

-364-
The lack of COIN success in Palestine led at least one local formation commander to contemplate tactical refinement in the middle of 1946, and he referred to the Commandos as a model for change. His initiative was not widely supported, but facing similar flaws in familiar large scale operations in the autumn of 1946, the BMM(G) embraced the idea of tactical adaptation founded on the exploits of the wartime Commandos. In the context of the desperate situation there, the War Office DMO supported a trial with an unorthodox force of nearly three thousand men. Montgomery also overcame his previous scepticism and approved of the new force, which was designed to complement large scale operations rather than to replace them, reflecting the War Office's Report on guerilla warfare of late 1944, which recommended air-supported small units assisting in major offensives, (although the Greek 'commandos' were to patrol independently too). The War Office therefore supported limited tactical adaptation in Greece, possibly wishing to evaluate the performance of the 'commandos' while bearing in mind a potential future COIN role for the SAS, whose re-constitution it had approved two months before. Moreover, although the Army hierarchy advocated large scale offensives in Palestine and Greece during 1947, early in that year the High Commissioner proposed new COIN schemes founded on wartime example, and the formation of another unorthodox force comprised of special police units was supported by the SIS, the Colonial Office and the DMO. A growing interest in unorthodox wartime activities was reflected in contemporary British military literature, and there was a small scale shift in security force tactics in Palestine during the spring of 1947, the Army undertaking more short duration small unit patrol and ambush. However, the political uproar caused by the inept practices of new special police squads enabled opponents of unorthodox tactics to
emphasise traditional tactical policies for COIN purposes. A report on guerillas sent to the War Office in the summer of 1947 also backed air-supported light infantry as a complement to large scale operations. But it gave no fresh impetus for the further development of small unit tactics, and at that time the traditionalists were able to shape the War Office's I.S. doctrinal review and ignore new tactical ideas.

Some progressive British COIN thinking resulted from the UK's effort to assist the Greek government from 1945, which included a brief spell of COIN operational advising in 1947. Indeed, by the middle of that year, the DMO approved of the Clear-and-Hold military-security strategy, population self-protection Home Guards and relocation. However, from March 1947 until 1948, Britons had no COIN operational role and British COIN thought was not advanced, and the Foreign Office criticised the War Office and the British army mission for complacency over the Greek situation. The Foreign Office, like other British COIN authorities, looked to the recent War for tactical inspiration, referring to the Chindits as an example of the type of flexible military thinking required in Greece. Indeed, with the persistent poor showing of large scale offensives, the British military missions in Athens reviewed counterguerrilla tactics between July and October 1947. The RAF asked the SIS for new ideas, and it suggested parachuted COIN

4. RAF officers in Greece and Malaya displayed a considerable degree of tactical awareness, often being more ready to develop counterguerrilla tactics than their army compatriots. This fact probably stemmed from the comparatively minor involvement of the RAF in I.S. duties between the Wars, and the consequent absence of a long-established body of traditional I.S. 'general knowledge' within it.
forces. In addition, following wartime precedent, the Air Force and Army groups sponsored greater use of air support. Moreover, the Military Mission recommended the general adoption of army extended small unit patrolling, which was a major advance in counterguerrilla tactical thinking. However, the Mission was not empowered to demand that this was practiced, its Commander was in any case non-committal about a radical change of direction, and the Greek armed forces and American army advisors were conservative-minded in terms of tactics and also opposed a major shift because of the lack of available resources to effect it. Furthermore, while the RAF Delegation pressed for more prolonged patrolling in mid-1948, the Greek insurgents gradually shifted towards outright civil war. British Service personnel played a key role in COIN operational advising until September 1948, but the two sides increasingly concentrated on conventional rather than counter/guerrilla war, and the importance of devising new counterguerrilla tactics decreased. The campaign did not give the BMM(G) the opportunity to devise and evaluate a paraguerilla policy, and indeed, War Office planners produced orthodox tactical outlines for use in Greece at the start of 1948. The traditionalists also dominated both Staff College instruction and, apparently, the Department's continuing review of I.S. doctrine, which omitted any study of wartime unorthodox forces or Resistance movements. Nonetheless, in early 1948 it made an unparalleled effort to assist local army personnel undertaking COIN tasks, by providing nearly one-hundred new advisors specifically selected for their experience, a substantial amount of which was in unconventional warfare. This followed the example set by the Colonial and Foreign Offices which sought to employ specially qualified individuals for COIN tasks, and applying I.S. expertise in this manner became a principle adopted by all British agencies before the start of the Malaya insurgency. Moreover, in October 1948, the highest levels of the British military establishment
commended reports from the BMM(G) that recommended that were Britain to encounter another communist insurgency like the one in Greece, Clear-and-Hold should be carried out with the maximum number of air-supported troops. Significantly, this signalled a new willingness to adapt British COIN operational policies, and this occurred in Malaya after 1948.

Field-Marshal Montgomery, the CIGS from mid-summer 1946, never grasped the subtleties of the political-psychological action required of counterinsurgents, and during the Palestine and Greece campaigns he maintained his conviction that it was not his business to consider such matters. However, these fell within the purview of Colonial and Foreign Office staffs, and by the autumn of 1946, Cunningham called for COIN political action. Within a year, numerous British officials independently concluded that political action was necessary in Greece, and the Foreign Office advocated a politico-military course. Further, although Whitehall was uneasy about the idea of peacetime propaganda— and there had been a glaring deficiency in this regard in Palestine—as the Cold War emerged, the Foreign Office began to take considerable interest in this instrument and itself formed an Information Research section. Six months before the Malayan revolt, the Foreign Office wanted civic action policies developed in Greece, and MI5 agreed with it. Foreign and Colonial Office officials dealt with political issues as a matter of course, and their exposure to insurgency in Palestine and Greece convinced them that the familiar coercive I.S. line would not defeat revolutionary underground mass movements. Although there is no evidence that the Colonial Office prepared COIN political action plans after 1947 in readiness for a future campaign, when the second communist insurgency began, it favoured a new COIN line. Hence, with this in mind, Gurney was appointed as the new High Commissioner of Malaya, and he subsequently drew on both the Palestine and the
Greek experiences to begin constructing a new COIN path, in preference to total reliance on familiar Cost-Benefit policies.

The War and Colonial Offices had yet to develop new COIN procedures when, only a month after Britain's withdrawal from the Levant, they were faced with another insurgency. Indeed, the Army received familiar I.S. training and indoctrination prior to the Emergency, and London once more relied on the local authorities to produce viable COIN plans in the light of prevailing conditions, rather than trying to transfer COIN policies directly from other countries to Malaya. It was fortuitous for the British Government that local political and military personnel possessed an awareness not only of familiar I.S. practices, but also of wartime unorthodox units and undergrounds, and recent COIN campaigning. These factors in the shaping of British COIN action have not been properly appreciated, and British counterinsurgents' reference to COIN in Greece has been completely overlooked by historians—yet they clearly played a significant role.

At the start of COIN in Malaya, MacDonald, the Commissioner-General, requested Palestine veterans to reinforce the police, and ensured that a basic committee organisation was created. The Colonial Office supported his efforts, and despite having been appointed as the Gold Coast police chief, Colonel Gray was sent to Malaya to advise on COIN, and soon after he became its new Police Commissioner. The Colonial Office obviously drew comparisons between the two rebellions, and moreover, it sought to learn from the Malaya conflict and to transfer lessons to other colonies that it perceived might also be threatened by such movements in the future. It tried to organise better inter-agency cooperation and coordination on I.S. matters by late 1948, pressed for improvements in colonial intelligence arrangements, and
together with the Overseas Defence Committee, undertook a concerted effort to devise new COIN guidance by the spring of 1949.

The CINCFLF readily referred to previous I.S. experience to devise COIN action, Major-General Ritchie having surveyed the activities of armed communists in Burma, China and Greece. The Army's initial reaction to the Malayan guerillas was to implement large scale/unit operations and short jungle patrols, and their lack of swift, tangible military success has overshadowed progressive British COIN thinking and given rise to blanket criticism of British soldiers by historians. But within weeks high level Army authorities in the Far East not only reaffirmed well-known tactical policies, but vouched for the Clear-and-Hold military-security strategy, population relocation, and an unorthodox counterguerrilla force operating both independently and in major security force offensives. Senior commanders' knowledge of wartime unorthodox units and Greek COIN featured in their calculations, and although at first local officers in the field were slow to adopt air support for jungle patrols, many units experimented with extended small unit patrolling and later with air supply, encouraged by recent operations in Burma and guidance from the General and local army HQs. But, they did not give a strong lead on tactical policy, resulting in erratic rather than universal progress towards a new small unit area patrol policy. They continued to support major operations, especially against large communist forces, and numerous individual commanders believed that these tactics were the key to counterguerrilla success. Indeed, the War Office traditionalists encouraged the demise of the Ferret Force, and large scale operations were only slowly rejected as officers experienced their shortcomings time and time again in practice. But small unit patrolling was increasingly practiced from late 1948, and
following his visit to Greece in March 1949, Field-Marshal Slim recommended substantially enlarged Greek 'commando' forces, and counterorganisation relocation. The CIGS's support for counterguerilla tactical adaptation must have encouraged its proponents in the British Army, and a fortnight later, backed by the Colonial Office and the Cabinet, the DMO asked Ritchie whether he required a 'Commando'-type force. Indeed, the War Office sought COIN lessons and approved of tactical refinement based on operational experience, although without explicitly rejecting old I.S. policies and doctrine. Its new I.S. manual of June 1949, two and a half years in the making, incorporated several important COIN lessons drawn from Palestine, Greece and Malaya, including counterorganisation, population protection guards, better intelligence organisation and processing, and counterpropaganda. Furthermore, it advocated intelligence-based patrolling, disparaged military action for the sake of it, and, unlike prewar doctrine, did not emphasise 'Drives'. But the Notes were not distributed for another six months because of debate between Whitehall officials about British I.S. doctrine, which resulted in the general acceptance of ideas enunciated by Sir Henry Gurney.

By December 1948, there was consensus among high level Malayan political and military authorities that a politico-military campaign was required, and in 1949 the Army took the original step of initiating military civic action programmes. Moreover, Gurney set about gradually moving away from the Cost-Benefit I.S. line and developing new COIN political action. He combined his first-hand knowledge of I.S. with an analysis of wartime partisan movements and recent British COIN campaigning to derive COIN lessons and devise policies, and this was the most sophisticated example so far of British actors utilising historical experience for COIN purposes. He concluded that civic action and counterpropaganda programmes were essential,
and summarised his proposals in a Despatch to London in May 1949. This was praised by officials in both the Far East and in Whitehall, and the pamphlet was distributed across the Empire by the spring of 1950, laying the basis for the Hearts-and-Minds COIN line.

The War Office continued to review Malayan events and to receive tactical lessons during 1949. But its new Notes, distributed in early 1950, neither provided details about small unit patrolling, nor rejected large scale/unit tactics. Indeed, most commanding officers who arrived in Malaya in 1949 were World War Two veterans, and they naturally preferred large scale operations, as did the staff of Major-General Urquhart, the new GOC from March 1950. Nevertheless, many units refined small unit tactics, and while the War Office DMT was not inclined to officially adopt a new counterguerrilla tactical policy, the DMO sponsored the formation of a small SAS counterguerrilla force in 1950. It was not convinced of the need for a larger SAS capable of responding to insurgency anywhere in the Empire, but the Malaya Scouts nearly doubled in size in 1951. Moreover, the War Office accepted the value of advice on small unit tactics and techniques from former Australian guerillas and British SOE men, in a similar manner to the DMO's application of wartime experience to develop small unit tactics in Palestine in 1947.

Colonial Office and War Office officials discussed COIN organisational arrangements in early 1950, and supported the appointment of a Director of Operations to oversee security force activities. This was a major departure in British I.S.

The SAS expanded from 142 in 1950, to approx. 250, in W. Elliot, COSC note, 13 June, DEFE11/37; COS(50)184, 23 Nov. 1950, DEFE11/42.
organisation and followed growing criticism of the ineffective higher direction of operations. General Briggs applied his own expertise to refine the Malayan committee structure, creating central and local tripartite operational committees throughout the Federation to improve inter-agency cooperation and coordination, following the example set in Burma during the 1930s/40s. He also drew on his I.S. knowledge to support both large scale operations and small unit patrolling, but following the continuing failure of major operations in the summer of 1950, he considered the possible benefits of concentrating on the latter. In November, he recommended more small unit intelligence-based area patrolling, giving high level encouragement to the army's gradual progress towards a paraguerilla policy. However, he could not ensure that all units adopted his proposals, and the continuing lack of contact information and some commanders' firm conviction that large scale offensive action was the best counterguerilla tactical policy conspired to prevent a rapid and wholesale reorientation of tactics. Nevertheless, the majority of military operations during 1951 consisted of small unit patrol and ambush, and in 1952 these tactics were refined by units extending the duration of their patrols and improving their manipulation of intelligence. Paraguerilla patrolling became the main tactical policy, and the army 'CATOM' manual of 1952 relegated large scale operations and emphasised sustained small unit action, hence altering the British Army's long-established counterguerilla approach.

In 1953, a version of the Malaya army doctrine was produced for use in Kenya, and although individual British officers fighting in later campaigns often drew on the Army's pervasive I.S. 'general knowledge', the assimilation of new COIN ideas throughout such a bureaucratically inept and conservative institution was bound to take a considerable time.
The War Office did not reject familiar I.S. tactical policies at a stroke, but new counterguerrilla strategy and tactics had been formulated by 1952. Furthermore, although senior officers in the Far East emphasised the military-security effort in late 1950, the importance of reorienting the State's campaign away from the Cost-Benefit I.S. line was accepted within all COIN agencies.

Gurney gradually introduced more COIN political action after 1949, and the Overseas Defence Committee was anxious that other colonial administrations should be made aware of Malayan advances. This third postwar British COIN involvement, within the wider context of the Cold War, clearly encouraged the Committee to press British COIN authorities to improve their I.S. preparations. The Colonial Office in particular tried to sponsor the high level exchange of I.S.-related information concerning police, propaganda and intelligence matters in 1949, and recommended the adoption of Malayan lessons. The structure of the imperial system allowed it to guide local civil COIN authorities with ease, while the War Office was more constrained by its traditional system of predelegating responsibility for I.S. matters to the lower echelons of the Army. In May 1950, the Colonial Office offered a new universal Hearts-and-Minds COIN doctrine, embodied in the 'I.S.- Lessons' pamphlet and the Gurney Despatch. These outlined counter-organisation, counterpropaganda, relocation, counterterrorist guards, civic action, military-security details, a committee organisation and- if it was considered necessary- a Director of Operations.

The Foreign and Colonial Offices also drew on French COIN in Indo-China to suggest the appointment of a supremo by early 1951. The idea of a soldier dictating civil affairs is alien to
the British political tradition, but a combined civil-military supremo was considered necessary to ensure that desired changes in COIN policy were carried out. Major-General Templer was selected for this post in 1952, based on his relevant experience. The procedure of employing 'experts' for vital COIN positions was firmly established among high level British authorities, and was reinforced by Templer in Malaya, and subsequently by other British officials in later COIN campaigns. Templer encouraged the local refinement of policies and ordered improved training and indoctrination of the State's forces, including new lessons regarding food control, resettlement, civic action and small unit methods, all of which were incorporated into the 'CATOM' manual in 1952.

Despite the limitations of the British bureaucratic-political system, which meant that no one central body was responsible for collating, analysing and developing COIN knowledge into a single universal doctrinal work, the various British agencies involved in COIN had learnt a wealth of lessons by 1952, and attempted to disseminate these throughout the I.S. organs of the Empire. The metamorphosis of I.S. wisdom built up over decades could not occur over-night, and lessons were not always universally applied in COIN during the 1950s. But, the creation of a new set of dedicated COIN policies and doctrine in the few years immediately following the War was a substantial achievement by those innovative and perceptive British counterinsurgents who adapted and devised new COIN ideas. Indeed, their work during this period has proven to be the most crucial period of COIN development in history.

6. On British attitudes to military rule, Townshend Civil P.15.

7. For example, Gen. Harding became the DO in Cyprus in 1955.
List of appendices, 1-12:

1: Notes on fifty of the principal characters involved in British COIN, 1945-52.
2: Graphic representation of the number of 'incidents' instigated by insurgents in Palestine, 1945-7.
3: Graphic representation of the number of security force search operations in Palestine, 1945-7.
4: Graphic representation of the number of casualties resulting from the Palestine rebellion, August 1945 to August 1947.
5: Map of the approximate positions and strengths of communist insurgent military forces in Greece in the spring of 1947.
6: Map of the approximate positions and strengths of communist Democratic Army forces in Greece during 1948.
7: Map of Democratic Army external camps and bases, 1948 to 1949.
8: Simple representation of the Malayan Communist Party structure.
9: Simple representation of the Malaya COIN organisation after General Briggs' restructuring.
10: Graphic representation of the number of 'incidents' instigated by insurgents in Malaya, 1949-54.
11: Graphic representation of the number of security force contacts with insurgent forces in Malaya, 1950-4.
12: Graphic representation of the number of casualties resulting from the Malaya Emergency, 1948-54.
Appendix 1:

Notes on fifty of the principal characters involved in British COIN, 1945-52.

Field-Marshal Harold R.L.G. Alexander
As SAC Med., Alexander was interested in Greek I.S. in 1945, and proposed an innovative counterguerilla strategy. He had served on the North-West Frontier, 1935, as GOC, Burma, 1942, and he supported wartime unorthodox forces.

Lieutenant-General Sir Evelyn H. Barker
The GOC, Palestine, 1946-7. He had fought in the War, yet was more supportive of COIN political action than his superiors who wanted the old style of stern I.S. military repression.

Ernest Bevin, M.P.
The Foreign Secretary, 1945-51, Bevin supported counterguerilla tactical development in Greece in late 1947, on the basis of existing British I.S. practices and wartime experience. He also urged that British I.S. experts should be employed to devise COIN schemes in Greece, and the War Office sent new advisors there three months later. Further, Bevin helped convince the Cabinet to allow Britons to secretly undertake COIN operational advisory tasks in Greece during 1947 and 1948.

Major-General Charles H. Boucher
The GOC, Malaya, 1948-50, he had served before the War on the Frontier, and after it in Greece, 1945-6, and India, 1946-7. He initially advocated the Cost-Benefit I.S. line for COIN, but accepted that small unit patrol and ambush might be valuable for jungle counterguerilla war, and proposed the formation of an unorthodox COIN force. Its missions were similar to those of the Greek 'commandos' formed in 1946. He supported the Clear-and-Hold strategy
in 1949, and recommended that the Army concentrate its efforts on small unit patrolling in 1950. Boucher also established a basic structure of civil-military-police committees in Malaya during 1949 and 1950.

**Major-General Sir Harold Briggs**

Appointed as the Malayan Director of Operations in 1950 for twelve months—his contract was extended for another nine—Briggs was selected by Slim upon the basis of his counterguerrilla experience as GOC, Burma, 1945-8. He adopted Burmese organisational arrangements in Malaya, but became disillusioned with the large scale operations that had succeeded in Burma and recommended more small unit area patrolling. He also supported Gurney's gradual reorientation of the government's I.S. line from coercive measures to COIN political action.

**Field-Marshal Alan F. Brooke**

As the CIGS, 1941-6, he supported the traditional I.S. line in both Greece and Palestine. His main interest was in conventional warfare, having spent much of the interwar years in the War Office and Staff Colleges.

**Colonel J. Mike Calvert**

During the Second World War, Calvert formed the regular guerilla 'V Force', and referred to prewar guerilla campaigns in a bid to devise effective tactics. He became a Chindit commander and fought under Wingate in 1944. During 1945-6, he pressed the War Office and senior army officers to retain a SAS force, in order to fulfil unusual military tasks, notably COIN, in the future. In 1950 he was selected by the WO to organise a Malaya SAS force.

**Winston S. Churchill, M.P.**

Churchill served in the South African War, and maintained his interest in guerillas: as the Prime Minister, 1940-5, he supported the creation of various types of unorthodox military units, (then called 'special forces'). During his
second premiership, Churchill authorised the expansion of 22 SAS and appointed a supremo in 1952.

**Sir Arthur Creech-Jones**
The Colonial Secretary, 1946-50, Creech-Jones backed the formation of special police units in Palestine in 1947. Furthermore, he encouraged the transfer of I.S. experts between colonies in order for them to advise on COIN policing matters, and this became a COIN principle by 1948. During that year and the next, he urged colonial governments to adopt improved intelligence, policing and propaganda techniques, and to exchange I.S. lessons.

**General Sir John T. Crocker**
The CINCMELF, 1947-50, he had fought in Europe during 1944-5. In 1947/8, he accepted that a politico-military campaign was needed in Greece, and he supported fresh ideas such as the Clear-and-Hold strategy and counter-terrorist Home Guards.

**General Sir Alan G. Cunningham**
The High Commissioner of Palestine, 1945-8. He was GOC, Northern Ireland, 1943-4, and served in the UK for the rest of the War. He approved of a new tripartite committee system, and tried to improve policing in the mandate by requesting expert assistance from the Colonial Office in 1946. He also agreed to an experiment with unorthodox forces in 1947. Furthermore, he frequently pressed London to adopt COIN political action in preference to repression.

**Lieutenant-General John D'Arcy**
The GOC, Palestine, 1944-6, D'Arcy had fought irregulars on the Frontier, 1930-1, and commanded an armoured division, 1939-44. He referred to British I.S. history in an attempt to glean COIN lessons, but found nothing of value in interwar campaigns in Ireland and Palestine. Thus, he advocated familiar tactical military-security
policies.

**Major-General Sir Miles C. Dempsey**
The CINCMELF, 1946-7, Dempsey was one of the Army's most ardent advocates of Cost-Benefit COIN. His most recent active service was in Europe, but his enthusiasm for time-honoured I.S. measures derived from his witnessing their success against irregulars in Mesopotamia, 1919-20, and in French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies, 1945-6.

**Major-General Ernest E. Down**
Commander of the BMM(G), 1948-50, Down was selected by London for his knowledge of Greek conditions, having been in command of the Fourth British Division and GOC, BTG, since 1946. He pressed for Clear-and-Hold operations by air-supported small units and rejected encirclements in 1948. The Chiefs of Staff agreed with his counterguerilla proposals.

**Captain Roy Farran**
An ex-SAS officer, Farran was specially employed by the Colonial Office to lead a police unit experimenting with unusual tactics in Palestine. In 1947 he was accused of killing an IZL propagandist. He fled to Syria, causing a diplomatic incident and a political furore, which, despite his trial and acquittal in December 1947, undoubtedly harmed the cause of those hoping to develop COIN small unit tactics.

**Major Bernard E. Fergusson**
Fergusson was an Assistant Inspector-General of the Palestine Police, 1946-8, and in 1947 his superior, Colonel Gray, asked him to develop new military-security methods. He tried to apply his Chindit and SAS experience, and assisted by the DMO, the SIS and the Colonial Office, formed special police units that developed tactics based on wartime unorthodox techniques, from March to May 1947.

**Lieutenant-General Richard N. Gale**
Gale commanded the First Infantry Division in Palestine, 1946-8, and from the spring of 1947 he sponsored increased army small unit patrolling and ambushing, following a proposal to adopt these tactics by the Police Inspector-General. These operations did not produce dramatic successes, but when he was the Director-General of Military Training, 1949-52, Gale ensured that it kept up to date with Malayan tactical lessons, and that general I.S. instruction in the UK was adjusted accordingly.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. Nicol Gray

The Inspector-General of the Palestine Police, 1946-8, Gray was chosen by the Colonial Office because of his background as a training specialist and Royal Marine Commando, 1939-46. He was an exponent of unusual military tactics and the driving force behind the formation of unorthodox police groups in 1947, and the subsequent development of small unit tactics. In 1948, the Colonial Office chose him for another COIN task, this time as Malayan Police Commissioner. He concentrated on reshaping the police for jungle counterguerilla war, but his persistent disagreements with army officers about the correct COIN roles and methods of the police and army eventually led to his forced resignation in early 1952.

Hugh C. Greene

Appointed Head of the Emergency Information Service in Malaya in 1951, Greene was one of several specially selected experts employed there. Prior to this, he worked for the Broadcasting Department in the British zone of occupied Germany, 1946-8, and then with the BBC East European Service, 1949-50. In Malaya he devised new types of propaganda, manipulating both human and media resources in original ways.

Major-General Sir Colin M. Gubbins

Gubbins studied previous guerilla campaigns at the WO from
1939, and wrote official pamphlets on it. He had served as a major in Ireland, 1921-2, and then on the Frontier in the late 1930s. He was a central figure behind the development of SOE and wartime clandestine resistance.

Sir Henry Gurney
Gurney was Palestine Chief-Secretary, 1946-8, and had worked in colonial government in interwar Kenya and Jamaica, wartime East Africa, and the Gold Coast, 1944-6. But it was mainly his experience of postwar COIN that held him in good stead for his service as High Commissioner of Malaya, 1948-51. Malcolm MacDonald noted that Colonial Office officials considering candidates for this position would undoubtedly bear in mind Gurney's commitment to political development and nation-building. This must have been reinforced by the failure of repression in Palestine in 1947. Gurney also studied wartime undergrounds and Greek COIN, concluding that COIN political action and relocation were essential. He imposed some familiar coercive I.S. policies but progressively sponsored more civic action after 1949. His ideas were enshrined in a new universal COIN doctrine in 1950, and he is the founding father of the Hearts-and-Minds COIN line.

General A.F. John Harding
The CINCFELF, 1949-51, Harding had a conventional war background but accepted the value of undertaking more small unit operations in Malaya after 1950, and was instrumental in achieving the formation of SAS jungle units and the appointment of a Director of Operations.

Brigadier Robert C.O. Hedley
A formation commander in Malaya, 1948-51, he was one of those officers who encouraged trials in small unit patrolling after the failure of large scale operations in 1948, and in the following year fostered the refinement of these tactics. He had fought traditional irregulars on
the Frontier, 1923-4/1930, but also served in Burma, 1942-5, and the Dutch East Indies, 1946, which evidently made him well disposed to jungle small unit operations.

**J.C.F. Holland**
A veteran of Irish COIN, Holland chose to study previous guerilla wars at General Staff(Research) in 1938, and pursued his interest with the WO MI(Research) section in 1939. In 1940, he suggested 'Commando' forces, the SOE and deception services, which inspired numerous COIN ideas.

**Sir William Jenkin**
Jenkin served with the Indian police from 1919 and became Deputy-Director of Indian Central Intelligence. In 1948 he suggested improvements to MPF practices, and was selected by the Colonial Office as CID Advisor to the Federation in 1950, and soon afterwards as the CID chief.

**A. Kellar**
Kellar was one of MI5's key advisors to the British security forces on COIN police and intelligence matters. He advised the authorities in Palestine, 1946, and in Malaya, 1948, and then assessed the COIN situation in Greece for the Foreign Office in 1949.

**Brigadier John M. Kirkman**
Kirkman served with the BMM(G), 1945, MEFHQ, 1946, as the HQPal. Chief of Staff, 1947, and in the same position at the HQFELF, 1948. He distributed 'lessons' of the 1936-9 campaign to units in Palestine in 1947, and he almost certainly encouraged FELF staff to compare communist rebels in Greece and Malaya in 1948, concurrent with General Ritchie's study of the Greek conflict.

**Major-General Rob M.M. Lockhart**
Lockhart was selected by Slim as the new Malaya Director of Operations in 1951, partly because of his experience of irregulars as the Governor of the Frontier in 1947. Lockhart recommended the appointment of a supremo in 1951,
and he became Deputy-Director of Operations in 1952 when General Templer assumed command.

Malcolm MacDonald

MacDonald was Governor-General of the Malayan Union, 1946-8, and Commissioner-General for South-East Asia, 1948-53. In 1948 he acted swiftly to try to ensure that COIN was properly organised and conducted, requesting the Colonial Office to send 200 Palestine policemen to bolster the MPF, and proposing an I.S. committee organisation. This probably stemmed from an awareness of the recent Palestine COIN, not least because he had been centrally involved with I.S. affairs in the mandate during his term as the Colonial Secretary, 1938-40.

Major-General Gordon H.A. MacMillan

The GOC, Palestine, 1947-8. He had fought in Europe during the War, and was not inclined to encourage major tactical development, instead approving the use of typical large scale I.S. operations.

Field-Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery

Montgomery was instilled with traditional I.S. wisdom before the Second World War, fighting irregulars in Ireland, 1920-1, and Palestine, 1936-9. He was a leading sceptic of wartime unorthodox forces, although he accepted their relatively small scale use. As CIGS, 1946-8, he continued to display an ambivalent attitude to unorthodoxy in COIN. He supported the formation of a Greek 'commando' force in 1946, but it had only 3000 men. The following year, the SAS was resurrected, but as a Territorial Regiment and without any express COIN role. Montgomery championed familiar coercive military methods in Greece and Palestine in 1946 and 1947, thereby discouraging the development of new COIN ideas. The I.S. traditionalists in the military establishment retained their dominance while he was CIGS, and more progressive thought only burgeoned
when Slim took over in late 1948.

**John Morton**

The Director of Intelligence, Malaya, 1952-4, Morton was specially chosen by Templer because of his experience, including work with Indian Central Intelligence from 1930, and intelligence duties in Iraq, 1947-9.

**Sir Clifford Norton**

The British ambassador to Greece, 1946-50. After the spring of 1947, he persistently told the Foreign Office that COIN political action was required in Greece. He also pressed London to allow the BMM(G) to advise the Greeks on counterguerrilla warfare, and he supported British army proposals for tactical changes in 1947.

**A.D.C. Peterson**

The Director-General of the Information Service, Malaya, 1952-4, and another expert picked by Templer. He had been employed at the Ministry of Information, 1940, and was the Deputy-Director of Psywar at SEAC, 1944-6.

**Major-General Stuart B. Rawlins**

Commander of the BMM(G), 1945-8, Rawlins had served in the artillery during the Second World War, and held various positions at the War Office and Staff Colleges before that. He had only a secondary interest in COIN, and advocated the traditional British I.S. line in Greece from 1945 to 1948. He refused to abandon his belief in large scale offensives and ignored tactical advancements by the British army in Greece after 1947.

**Major-General Neil M. Ritchie**

The CINCFELF, 1947-9, and architect of the military strategy and tactics adopted in Malaya after 1948. Ritchie had served in North India, 1933-7, and Palestine, 1938-9, where he gained I.S. experience, and he backed Stirling in the formation of the SAS in 1941. At FELFHQ he pursued his interest in irregulars, witnessing I.S. operations in
Burma, 1947, and studying the communist campaigns in China and Greece in 1948. He proposed Clear-and-Hold by area-deployed forces practising both large scale offensives and small unit patrolling, and also supported the formation of a Jungle Guerilla Force, and population relocation. Ritchie was willing to adapt policies in the light of experience gained from Malaya and other postwar COIN.

Major-General Sir Ronald S. Scobie
The GOC, Greece, 1944-6, Scobie fought in the War, and crushed a Greek communist rebellion over Christmas 1944-5 with heavy firepower. He advocated traditional British I.S. wisdom as a basis for the I.S. training of the GNA.

Colonel Arthur C. Shortt
The Military Attache in Athens, 1947-9, Shortt informed London about the BMM(G)'s lack of progress in developing effective counterguerrilla tactics. He urged the employment of expert military advisors in 1948, and emphasised the importance of Clear-and-Hold, relocation, and a politico-military campaign. As Director of Military Intelligence, 1949-53, it is likely that, when briefing senior officers bound for Malaya on the subject of communist insurgency, he alluded to the Greek example.

Field-Marshal Sir William Slim
The CIGS from November 1948, Slim was more willing to accept changes in Army I.S. policies than Montgomery. Slim had fought traditional irregulars on the Frontier in the 1930s, but he also backed Wingate's employment of unusual tactics and techniques in the Chindit expeditions in Burma, 1943-4. He approved of the 'V Force' in 1943, and the use of other regular guerillas in New Guinea. During the Emergency, he supported the development of small unit tactics and new policies based on experience gained from Malaya, and also from Greece, where he had visited in 1949. In 1950, he picked General Briggs as the Director of
Operations, and, in 1951, his successor, General Lockhart, partly because of their experience of irregular opponents.

Major-General Sir Hugh Stockwell
Commander of the Sixth Airborne Division and GOC, Palestine, 1947-8, and then GOC, Malaya, 1952-4. Stockwell had fought in Burma, 1942-5, and was selected as GOC, Malaya, by Templer, whom he had served with in the UK in 1951. The GOC organised the writing of the 'CATOM' in 1952.

Major-General Gerald Templer
The Malayan High Commissioner and Director of Operations, 1952-4. His selection as supremo was based on his experience of politico-military problems, including service in Palestine, 1936-7, periods studying unconventional war and intelligence matters at the WO during and after the War, and first-hand involvement with civil and police issues as Governor of the British zone of occupied Germany, 1945-6. He consolidated the committee structure in Malaya, ensured that lessons were learnt throughout the COIN forces, and ordered the production of new training and doctrine reflecting the Hearts-and-Minds COIN line.

Air Commodore Sir Geoffrey Tuttle
The AOC, Greece, 1946-9, Tuttle spent the War years concentrating on France and proposed air supply for land forces. In Greece during October 1946 he advocated significant COIN tactical advances including air supply for patrols and air fire-support missions.

Major-General Robert E. Urquhart
The GOC, Malaya, 1950-2, Urquhart was chosen as a temporary replacement for Boucher. Urquhart served in India, 1938-40, North Africa and Europe during the War, and then in the UK, and his experience had not made him inclined to favour counterguerrilla tactical development.
He adhered to familiar I.S. wisdom after 1950.

**Major-General D. Ashton L. Wade**

The GOC, Malaya, 1947-8, Wade was replaced in the opening days of the Emergency by Boucher. From 1937 to 1947 Wade served in India, including a spell on the Frontier. In mid-1948 he advocated traditional large scale offensives, but also short-duration jungle small unit patrolling. Both types of tactics were practiced in Malaya from 1948.

**Lieutenant-Colonel Walter Walker**

Walker served in Waziristan, 1939-41, and Burma, 1942/1944-6. He encountered traditional colonial irregulars, but also endured jungle warfare, and he combined these experiences into instruction at the FTC, where he was the Commandant, 1948-50. He encouraged tactical adaptation based on operational experience, and recommended the adoption of both short small unit patrols and large scale operations. But he emphasised patrolling after 1949, and oversaw the writing of the CATOM manual in 1952.

**Lieutenant R.P.P. Westerling**

Westerling served in the Commandos, Chindits and SOE, and was in the first Allied group parachuted into the Dutch East Indies in 1945. He set up local irregular security units, and continued to train for small unit patrolling in 1946, under the auspices of the British army HQ. However, his senior officers disagreed with some of his more distasteful methods. After the British left in November 1946, Westerling expanded his activities with the Royal Dutch Army, carrying out mass summary executions of suspected insurgents/supporters from 1947 to 1949.

**Major-General Lashmer G. Whistler**

Commander of the Third Infantry Division in Palestine, 1945-6, Whistler had served there before, 1936-7. Despite his grounding in traditional I.S. practices, he proposed the development of new tactics in 1946, taking inspiration
from the Commandos.

**Major-General Sir Charles E. Wickham**

Head of the BPPM, Greece, 1945-50, Wickham was selected by the Foreign Office because of his I.S. experience. He had served in the South African War, with the RIC, 1920-1, and then the RUC, becoming its Chief-Constable just before the War. The Colonial Office also utilised his expertise for the restructuring of the PPF in 1946. He sponsored police area-deployment in Greece after 1945, and emphasised COIN civil policing and intelligence duties rather than paramilitary activities. He also supported COIN political action in Greece in 1947 and 1948.

**Major-General Orde Wingate**

Wingate grappled with Palestinian Arab rebels, 1937-9, and set up the SNS to pre-empt attacks. In 1941, he organised the guerilla 'Gideon Force' in Eritrea as an adjunct to conventional offensives. He then applied his Middle East experiences to Burma, where he planned the Chindit expeditions of 1943-4, including guerilla operations and air-supplied patrolling.

**Sir Arthur E. Young**

The Malayan Police Commissioner, 1952-4, Young was chosen to replace Gray by the Colonial Secretary, in view of his varied background. Young had been in constabularies in Britain from the 1920s to 1941, in Allied Italy, 1943-5, and in occupied Germany and the UK after the War. He was also an advisor to the Gold Coast Police in 1951.
APPENDIX 2:

GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE NUMBER OF 'INCIDENTS'

INSTITUTED BY INSURGENTS IN PALESTINE, 1945-7.
APPENDIX 3:

GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE NUMBER OF SECURITY FORCE SEARCH OPERATIONS IN PALESTINE, 1945-7.

INFORMATION SOURCE:
Charters, Jewish Insurgency.
APPENDIX 4

Graphic representation of the number of casualties resulting from the Palestine rebellion August 1945 - August 1947.

Information source:
Charters Insurgence.

Number of killed and wounded.

Origin of casualties.

Total: 1172.
APPE NDIX 5:

KEY:

- Insurgent military locations.
- Strength.

SCALE: MILES.

- 10 to be 50 ft.

INFORMATION SOURCE:

GSI, LFG HQ, 25/3/47.

APPRA SIMATE POSITIONS AND STRENGTHS OF COMMUNIST INSURGENT MILITARY FORCES IN THE SPRING OF 1947. (TOTAL STRENGTH, c. 19,500).
APPENDIX 6:

KEY:

* 10 to 30 and over

SCALE: MILES.

O DSE concentrations.

( ) Strength.

INFORMATION SOURCES:

O'Ballance
Greek.

Papahatziadis

APPROXIMATE POSITIONS AND STRENGTHS OF COMMUNIST DEMOCRATS

ARMY FORCES DURING 1948. (TOTAL STRENGTH, c. 23,000).
APPENDIX 7:

KEY:
- 10 20 30 40 50

SCALE: miles.
- Insurgent camp
- Supply base.

INFORMATION SOURCE:
Averoff Tassizza.

APPENDIX 8:

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CENTRAL COMMITTEE
  ^       ^
  DOWNQUO   MILITARY
               COMMAND

STATE/REGIONAL COMMITTEE

DISTRICT COMMITTEE

BRANCH COMMITTEE

MPABA REGIMENT

INDEPENDENT PLATOONS

COMPANIES

PLATOONS

ARMED WORKERS UNITS, MIN YUEN, VARIOUS SUPPORT ORGANISATIONS & FRONTS

"THE MASSES"

PASSIVE/COERCED SUPPORT

ACTIVE SUPPORT

(DIRECT LINK AFTER NOV. 1949 RATHER THAN THROUGH COMMITTEES)

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SIMPLE REPRESENTATION OF THE MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY STRUCTURE.

INFORMATION SOURCES: Briggs Report, Nov. 1951, AIR20179777;
Clutterbuck Conflict; Thompson Defeating.

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APPENDIX 9:

SAMPLE REPRESENTATION OF THE MALAYA CON ORGANISATION AFTER BRIGGS.

INFORMATION SOURCES: Briggs Report, Nov. 1951, AIR20/7777;
Clutterbuck Conflict; Thompson Debating; McCven Art.
APPENDIX 10.

GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE NUMBER OF 'INCIDENTS'

INSTI GiATED BY INSURGENTS IN MALAYA, 1949-54.

INFORMATION SOURCE:
Clashes/Clash Conflict.
APPENDIX II:

INFOGRAPHIC SOURCE:
Clutterbuck Conflict.

GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE NUMBER OF SECURITY FORCE
CONTACTS WITH INSURGENT FORCES IN MALAYA, 1950-4.
APPENDIX 12:

NUMBER OF CASUALTIES (IN 100'S): SEE KEY BELOW.

KEY:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Forces</th>
<th>Insurgents</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Killed, Captured, Surrendered</td>
<td>Missing, Presumed Killed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INFORMATION SOURCE:
Clutterbuck Conflict.

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The main focus of the thesis is on postwar COIN in Palestine, Greece, and Malaya, and analysis of these campaigns is based on a comprehensive study of all relevant UK archives, public and private, including previously neglected sources. Those of greatest import in regard to Palestine were in the War and Colonial Office files at the Public Record Office, Kew. Foreign Office records on the mandate were not consulted for COIN material, in the light of Foreign Office subject Indexes, and the work on the Palestine insurgency of D. Charters.1 All the available files in the PRO regarding Greece were used, including Foreign Office records, although many of those of the War Office have been 'weeded' or remain closed. American archives containing documents about British action in Greece were examined by H. Jones, while Greek archives are closed until 1997 and beyond.2 All UK Malaya records were similarly utilised, although War and Colonial Office files at the PRO again proved to be the most useful. Malaysian collections were examined by Short.3 Finally, some reports previously in regimental museums are no longer available,4 while other previously neglected sources have come to light.

1. Dr. D. Charters, letter, 9 May 1990: author of The British Army and the Jewish insurgency in Palestine, 1945-47

2. H. Jones P.xi.

3. A. Short The communist insurrection in Malaya, 1948-60

4. For example, T. Mockaitis British counterinsurgency 1919-60 M/s, (1989), Bibliography, notes a 1950 army report at the Devonshire Regimental Museum. This is no longer retained, L.J. Murphy, letter, 11 Dec. 1990.
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