The limits of Chinese and Russian military cooperation after the end of the Cold War.

Tsai, Ming-Yen

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The Limits of Sino-Russian Military Cooperation after the End of the Cold War

by

Ming-Yen Tsai
King's College London

A dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the limits of Sino-Russian military cooperation after the end of the Cold War. This study argues that the development of Sino-Russian 'partnership' has been strained and has yet to create a stable political foundation for close military cooperation. To achieve their own state interests, China and Russia have attempted to pursue military cooperation at two levels: first, defusing remaining points of tension through confidence-building measures (CBMs); and second, developing new areas of cooperation, including arms transfers and military-technical cooperation. Although progress has been made in improving bilateral military-security relations, many limits have remained. Lingering mutual distrust and conflicts of interest have obstructed the furthering of their military cooperation. The nature of Chinese and Russian military cooperation has remained fragile. CBMs, arms transfers, and military-technical cooperation may underscore the existence of a limited cooperative security relationship. However, the sense of mutual distrust, and contradictions of geopolitical and security interests, could eventually become major sources of tension in their military relationship. In order to develop these arguments, this thesis reviews these two countries' military relationship from the point of view of history, and examines the political foundations and major components of Chinese and Russian military cooperation after the end of the Cold War.
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## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAM</td>
<td>Air-to-air missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASM</td>
<td>Air-to-surface missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATBM</td>
<td>Anti-tactical ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEW</td>
<td>Airborne early warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEW&amp;C</td>
<td>Airborne early warning and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASS</td>
<td>Chinese Academy of Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBMs</td>
<td>Confidence-building measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPPCC</td>
<td>Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Communist Party of Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Treaty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Central Military Commission (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSBMs</td>
<td>Confidence- and security-building measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3I</td>
<td>Command, control, communications and intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAIC</td>
<td>Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIH</td>
<td>Defence Intelligence Headquarters (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of Eight states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISTC</td>
<td>International Science and Technology Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>Intermediate-range ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear force (Treaty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFN</td>
<td>Most favoured nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td>Medium-range ballistic missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFER</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (Russia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASPG</td>
<td>Mikoyan Aero-Science Production Group (Russia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRV</td>
<td>Multiple targetable re-entry vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>'Partnership for Peace' programme (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People's Liberation Army (China)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLAAF</td>
<td>People's Liberation Army Air Force (China)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLAN</td>
<td>People's Liberation Army Navy (China)</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMA</td>
<td>Revolution in military affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAS</td>
<td>Russian Academy of Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-air missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ShShM</td>
<td>Ship-to-ship missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>Nuclear-powered attack submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self-Defence Force (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMD</td>
<td>Theater Missile Defence system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TREZ</td>
<td>Tumen River Economic Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>Warsaw Treaty Organization</td>
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Research Objectives and Methods

During the Cold War, the major focus of the Sino-Soviet relationship had been the possibility of military confrontation along their common border. By contrast, after the end of the Cold War, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation have sought to strengthen their military cooperation and to develop friendly exchanges between their military forces at various levels. A detailed analysis of Sino-Russian military cooperation has been neglected in the academic literature. Given this gap, this thesis seeks to examine the political foundations and major components of Chinese and Russian military cooperation in the new era in an attempt to reveal the nature of this relationship. This chapter will clarify the research objectives and methods of this study. It opens by reviewing the literature and specifying the research objectives. It then defines the scope of the topic. It goes on to present the propositions behind the study and the organisation of this thesis. Finally, this chapter identifies the research methods and data used in this study.

A) Literature Review and Research Objectives

This chapter begins with a review of the existing literature. It seeks to explore the main research issues, analytical methods, and the definitions relevant to this research topic which have been identified in the literature. To date, the literature on Sino-Russian military cooperation has been dominated by three types of subjects: first, Sino-Russian bilateral relations and strategic cooperation; second, arms transfers; and

1 'Russia and China Issue Joint Statement', Xinhua news agency (Beijing), 25 April 1996, in the BBC
third, Chinese increasing military threats to regional security.

In the first group are works which concentrate on Chinese and Russian bilateral relations and strategic cooperation. A dividing line in this group of works concerns different views about the nature of Chinese and Russian 'partnership'. The question of whether Chinese and Russian cooperation represents 'strategic convergence' or a limited 'partnership' has been a concern in this group of works.

In his 1993 article on 'Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo', Hung P. Nguyen argued that Chinese and Russian cooperation could be seen as 'a pact between two continental powers united by their real and imagined grievances against the West'. In 1997, Rajan Menon, a Visiting Scholar at the Harriman Institute of Columbia University, published an article entitled 'The Strategic Convergence between Russia and China'. In this, Menon described the Chinese and Russian relationship as 'one of strategic convergence, involving multifaceted cooperation and a convergence of views and interests on important questions of international security'. According to Menon, the strategic convergence between China and Russia led to bilateral cooperation on confidence-building measures (CBMs) and arms sales. This argument, that these two states' bilateral relationship has been consolidated by their common interests in a broad range of fields, can also be found in the general literature which has been published by Chinese and Russian diplomats and scholars.

4 Ibid., pp.107-114.
5 See, for example, Yevgeny Afanasiev and Grigory Logvinov, 'Russia and China: Girding for the Third Millennium', International Affairs (Moscow), no. 11 12 (1995), pp.45-53; Igor Rogachev,
By contrast, while commenting on Chinese and Russian 'partnership', other observers have outlined its limits. For example, in her 1996 paper on 'The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership', Jennifer Anderson, argued that Chinese and Russian cooperation in various fields did not always work well because their priorities did not coincide. In 1998, Sherman W. Garnett, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, published a report on 'Limited Partnership: Russia-China Relations in a Changing Asia'. He concluded that in spite of continued improvements in mutual understanding, bilateral trade, and military cooperation, China and Russia had unequal stakes in such issues as demographic imbalances and economic cooperation. Other skeptics of the harmony of Sino-Russian cooperation have included James Clay Moltz, Pi Ying-hsien, Ya-chun Chang, Eugene Bazhanov, and Vladimir S. Miasnikov.

Despite different views about the nature of Chinese and Russian cooperation, the issues explored in this group of works have covered the Chinese and Russian relationship in the political, economic, and military fields. On military issues, these
works only briefly comment on disarmament, CBMs, or arms transfers. For example, while addressing Sino-Russian CBMs, some works merely mention the signature of the 'Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field in Border Areas between China and Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan' in April 1996. They fail to provide detailed analysis of the content of this agreement, or to explore the major approaches developed by the parties to achieve confidence-building. Also, these works do not examine the details of arms transfers, and only cite Chinese purchases of Russian arms to prove the improvement of the two countries' bilateral relationship. The focus of this group of works is the general Sino-Russian bilateral relationship. They do not provide in-depth analyses of military affairs. Given this, these works have not produced a satisfactory explanation of the development and the nature of Chinese and Russian military cooperation.

The second group of works has concentrated on Russian and Chinese arms transfers, and, in particular, the rationales for these transfers and their implications for regional security. In his 1993 article on 'Sino-Russian Military Relations: Implications for Asian-Pacific Security', Bin Yu, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Wittenberg University, pointed out that the Tiananmen Square crackdown of 1989 led to the interruption of military cooperation


10 See, for example, Menon, 'The Strategic Convergence between Russia and China', pp.107-109; Pi, 'The Dynamics of Sino-Russian Relations', pp.22-23; Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, pp.38-42; Garnett, Limited Partnership, pp.18-19.

11 Ibid.

between China and the Western countries. Moreover, the U.S. high-level technology on display in the Gulf War increased Chinese eagerness to modernise its armed forces. Russia's economic difficulties and defence conversion problems opened the possibility of the sales of Russian arms to China. In the context of regional security, Yu argued that the Chinese purchase of Russian weapons had caused other Asian countries to upgrade their military forces, in particular their air forces. Although this article touched upon many issues relevant to Russian-Chinese arms transfers, most of the arguments made were based on brief statements and not supported by sufficient evidence.

In 1994, Taeho Kim, research associate at the Mershon Center of Ohio State University, published a paper entitled 'The Dynamics of Sino-Russian Military Relations: An Asian Perspective'. Kim stressed that Russian and Chinese arms transfers had provided these two states with strategic counterweight to the USA. While exploring the rationale behind Russian-Chinese arms transfers, Kim focused on the study of Chinese needs for Russian weapons. He did not explain why Russia was willing to supply arms to China. Considerable attention was given to the types of weapons which the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had bought from Russia. Kim predicted that:

The reopening of Sino-Russian military ties, especially the sale of advanced weapon systems and military technology, would have far-reaching implications on the regional balance of power in the form of enhanced

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14 Ibid., pp.308-309.
15 Ibid., p.307.
16 Ibid., pp.312-316.
18 Ibid., pp.3-12.
19 Ibid., pp.14-20.
Chinese power projection capabilities. Longer strategic reach for the PLA, backed by advanced Russian weapons, is also likely to increase the possibility that China will translate its growing military muscle into concrete political gains when opportunities present themselves.\(^{20}\)

In 1998, in their article on 'Sino-Russian Military Technical Cooperation: A Russian View', Alexander A. Sergounin and Sergey V. Subbotin, two Professors in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nizhniy Novgorod, explored the motives and development of Russian-Chinese arms transfers. They stressed that the first and most obvious rationale for Russia in seeking arms exports was to provide financial support to the defence industry.\(^{21}\) The two Russian scholars gained some insights into Russian arms exports by conducting interviews with Russian defence industrialists. In addition, this article provided information on arms prices and payment arrangements in some of the deals.\(^{22}\) Like Kim, Sergounin and Subbotin paid special attention to the performance of the weapons systems that China had bought from Russia, and concluded that Russian-Chinese arms deals would have a destabilising effect on regional security.\(^{23}\)

Stephen J. Blank, Professor at the U.S. Army War College, stressed that Russian arms sales to China resulted from commercial considerations and the Russian government's incapability to monitor its own arms exports.\(^{24}\) In his opinion, Russian defence industries perceived arms exports to China as an essential source of income.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., p.23.
\(^{22}\) Ibid., pp.203-205.
\(^{23}\) Ibid., pp.205-216.
In particular, these industries were able to influence the state's arms export policy for their own commercial interests. He wrote:

Because Moscow has neither devised a viable defense program, anticipated its arsenal's impending block obsolescence, nor controlled its defense industry, the latter's captains have conducted their own policies toward China and other Asian states regardless of the outcome.  

This argument was built on Blank's criticism of Russia's sale of the licence for Su-27 production to China - a deal in which, according to Blank, Russia failed to take account of its own security interests. Accordingly, Blank argued that Russian arms would encourage Chinese coercive diplomacy, degrade Asian security, and spur a brisk regional arms race.

The main research focus in this group of works has been on the rationales behind Russian-Chinese arms transfers and the impact of the transfers on regional security. Their common argument is that Russian arms sales to China have been driven by commercial profits. Also, these transfers have created uncertainties for regional security in the Asia-Pacific region (APR). However, while they outlined the influence of the defence industry on Russian arms exports, these works neglected other internal factors influencing Russian policy decision-making such as the security and defence agencies. Geopolitical and security considerations have been ignored in these studies of Russian arms transfers to China.

In the third group are works which cite Chinese purchases of Russian arms to

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26 Blank, The Dynamics of Russian Weapons Sales to China, pp.6-7; Blank, Why Russian Policy Is Failing in Asia, pp.6-7 and p.18.
27 Blank, The Dynamics of Russian Weapons Sales to China, pp.27-28; Blank, Challenging the New World Order, pp.252-253; Blank, Why Russian Policy Is Failing in Asia, pp.22-23.
prove an increasing Chinese military threat to the security of the APR. These works have accounted for the most of the literature. A good example is Robert G. Sutter and Shirley Kan's report to the U.S. Congress by the Congressional Research Service in 1994. In this paper, Sutter and Kan explored the possibility that China would pose a threat to the U.S. interest in peace and stability in the APR by assessing China's intentions and capabilities. In examining China's military capability, they stressed that Russian weapons had formed important elements in upgrading the military forces of the PLA. This group of works has addressed China's military threat to the U.S. and regional security, and only briefly cites Chinese arms purchases from Russia to show China's steady buildup of forces. Like the first group of literature, this third group of works provides very limited discussion on issues concerning Sino-Russian military cooperation.

There are three major problems with the current state of knowledge on Sino-Russian military cooperation. These concern the definitions of research topics, research issues, and analytical methods.

First, none of the literature offers explicit definitions of its research topics. This
has led to confusion in the literature. For example, the second group of works has sought to explore the development of Sino-Russian military relations. However, due to a failure to offer a proper definition for the research topic, these works have merely addressed the two states' arms transfers. Arms transfers are not the only component of Sino-Russian military cooperation and cannot present a full picture of this relationship. An examination of other important components of Sino-Russian military cooperation, such as CBMs and military-technical cooperation, is absent from the literature. These works on Sino-Russian military cooperation do not present a complete picture.

Second, the major research issues and arguments explored in these three groups of literature focus on the causes which led to the possibility of Sino-Russian military cooperation and the impact on regional security. As a consequence, the focus is on the 'terrifying effects' of Sino-Russian military ties. Important research issues, such as the problems and limitations in the Sino-Russian military cooperation relationship, are neglected.

The third problem is the lack of in-depth analysis in the literature. All of the literature is article length. Given this, relevant events in Sino-Russian military cooperation are described only briefly. Most of the literature fails to use sufficient data for supporting its arguments and statements. This has led to a problem that the patterns and course of Sino-Russian military cooperation are not explored or explained satisfactorily in the literature.

In brief, the general literature does not provide a thorough examination of Sino-Russian military cooperation. There have been numerous studies of the Sino-Russian

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1 Sutter and Kan, China As a Security Concern in Asia, pp.CRS9-10.
bilateral relationship but none of them has provided in-depth analysis of military affairs. There have also been many works discussing Sino-Russian arms transfers but none of them has evaluated the overall development of Sino-Russian military cooperation. There exist obvious gaps in the existing state of knowledge on this research topic.

This thesis aims to contribute to a wider understanding on Chinese and Russian military cooperation at three levels. First, it seeks to determine whether the establishment of a 'partnership' has created a stable political environment for Sino-Russian military cooperation. Second, it intends to investigate the limits of Chinese and Russian military cooperation by examining the major components of bilateral cooperation. Finally, it aims to outline the nature of Chinese and Russian military cooperation. As such, it will be possible to compensate for the insufficiencies of the literature, and produce an original contribution to our knowledge of Chinese and Russian military cooperation after the end of the Cold War.

B) The Scope of the Topic

The Russian Federation formally became an independent country on 31 December 1991. The time boundaries of this study range from 1 January 1992 to 31 December 1999. This research period covers an important stage of the Sino-Russian relationship from the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the period provides a steady state focus. From 1992 to 1999, Jiang Zemin was the state leader in China. He has occupied the most influential posts in the Party-military arena, including Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC), and the President of the country. In Russia, Boris
Yeltsin was the President of the country. There are therefore no problems raising from leadership transition in either China or Russia during this period.

This study is original in substance because it will examine the main components of Sino-Russian military cooperation thoroughly so as to reveal the full picture of the relationship. As stated earlier, one of the problems in the literature has been its failure to provide a proper definition for 'military cooperation'. In the international system, 'cooperation' is a situation of interactions between the states: K. J. Holsti stated that 'most collaborative transactions and interactions occur directly between two governments facing some problem or matter of common interest'. Military cooperation is defined in this study as collaborative transactions and interactions between the Chinese and Russian governments for resolving problems and achieving state interests in military and security affairs. In accordance with this definition, from 1992 to 1999, three major components of Sino-Russian cooperation in the military and security affairs can be identified: CBMs; arms transfers; and military-technical cooperation.

CBMs are defined as 'arrangements designed to enhance such assurance of mind and belief in the trustworthiness of states and the facts they create'. The first major application of CBMs occurred in Europe during the Cold War. Five basic types of CBMs can be identified from the European experience: first, communication measures; second, transparency measures; third, constraint measures; fourth, verification measures; and finally, declaratory measures. These five types constitute...
the dimensions for the analysis of Sino-Russian CBMs in this study. In addition, China and Russia have attempted to resolve disputes over territorial issues, which were not covered by the European model of CBMs but showed a major effort at confidence and security building. These will be examined also.

Arms transfers represent 'the international transfer (under terms of grant, credit, barter or cash) of military equipment, usually referred to as "conventional", including weapons of war, parts thereof, ammunition, support equipment, and other commodities designed for military use'. Financial modes, agreements, deliveries, and payments are usually included in this area of study.

As for military-technical cooperation, this study focuses on Sino-Russian 'commissioned and joint research and development of new models of weapons and military hardware', and Russian 'technical assistance in the creation of military facilities and defence industry enterprises' in China. In addition, China's acquisitions of 'dual-use' technologies from Russia are included in this study because technical cooperation in such areas as nuclear power engineering and space science may be applied by China to pursue the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA). Finally, Chinese access to Russian military technology through illicit routes, a factor which can undermine military-technical cooperation between the two governments, is
studied as well.

C) Background Analysis
After the Cold War, China and Russia announced a 'partnership'. When they set up a 'strategic partnership' in April 1996, both sides declared that they would 'further develop friendly exchanges between their military forces at various levels and further strengthen their cooperation on (sic) military technology'.\(^{38}\) Most of the literature has focused on analysing the reasons for and implications of Sino-Russian military cooperation. In contrast, this thesis aims to examine the problems and limits of this relationship.

Before starting this study, it is necessary to address the general concerns and characteristics of the major actors as well as the factors influencing policy-making in both China and Russia. This discussion can provide background understanding of these two parties' concerns and objectives in pursuing military cooperation.

In China, the process of decision-making has been extremely centralised and has been an elite exercise. The way to examine domestic forces that shape Chinese foreign policy has to begin at the top.\(^{39}\) As the CCP enjoys absolute control of this country's policy decision-making, overall control of the policy formulation process lies in the hands of the Political Bureau (Politburo).\(^{40}\) The members of the Politburo include twenty-plus top leaders. They consist of supreme leader Jiang Zemin and top leaders of the party, government, and army bureaucracies. The Politburo retains the

\(^{40}\) Shaun Breslin, 'The Foreign Policy Bureaucracy', in Segal (ed.), *Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy Reform*, p.117. Also see Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty*
power of defining the fundamental purposes of China's national strategy (guojia zhanlue) guiding not only foreign and defence policy but also critical domestic realms concerned with national construction and internal order.41

The structure and process of military decision-making has also been premised on centralised command and control. The supreme decision-making authority of the Chinese military system is vested in the CMC under the CCP Central Committee.42 In China, the supreme leaders' most important positional source of power has been the chairmanship of the CMC. Chinese supreme leaders, first Mao Zedong, then Deng Xiaoping, and now Jiang Zemin, have occupied the chairmanship of the CMC. The CMC retains the power of appointment to and dismissal from senior military posts.43 The supreme leader (as CMC Chairman) and two military leaders (as CMC Vice Chairmen) have exercised sole decision-making authority over most critical defence policy issues.44

An examination of important issues which concern the Chinese leadership has been the crucial approach to understand the rationale behind this country's policy decision-making.45 Four important issues have been of concern to the Chinese leadership. These are economic prosperity, territorial integrity, defence modernisation, and global influence. Since the end of the Cold War, these four issues

44 The CMC is charged with formulating and implementing defence or security-related activities in support of national security policy and broader national strategic objectives. These have included military doctrine, force structure, force deployments, force training, military threat analysis, arms sales, and policies concerning arms control and military-related acquisitions. See Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking, pp.37-55.
45 Gerald Segal, 'Foreign Policy', in David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds), China in the...
have constituted the Chinese national strategy guiding defence and foreign policy.46 These four goals are interlinked. The rationale for these was rooted in a sense of Chinese national identity, that is, ensuring China's status as a 'great nation' (da guo).47

Military cooperation with Russia has followed some of the lines of these objectives. Alleviating tensions along the common border with Russia was expected to create a stable external environment conducive to Chinese economic development.48 Developing arms trade and military-technical cooperation with Russia was expected to upgrade Chinese national defence capability, which was viewed by the Chinese leadership as 'both an important component and an important reflection of a country's comprehensive national strength'.49 Also, enhanced military capacity might allow China to ensure its sovereignty claims over Taiwan and the Spratlys through coercive strategies.50

The historical lesson of the unilateral Soviet termination of military ties with China in 1960 led the Chinese leadership to vigilance about dependence on foreign sources, in particular, a single source, for supplies of military equipment and

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47 For the Chinese emphasis on the notion of 'great nation', see Steven I. Levine, 'Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy', in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.43-44.
48 The author's interviews with Shi Ze, Vice President, China Institute of International Studies, the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 7 January 1998, Beijing. Also see Shi Ze, 'Chinese and Russian Partnership Growing', Beijing Review, 29 April - 5 May 1996, p.12.
technology. On 6 August 1993, General Liu Huaqing, then CMC Vice Chairman and member of the CCP Politburo, outlined the basic principle of national defence modernisation as the need to integrate self-reliance with the import of advanced technology from abroad. He pointed out:

To modernize weapons and equipment, our foothold must be on our own strength. A big developing socialist country like ours cannot buy modernization of the whole Army, whereas other countries will not sell us the most advanced things and, even if we can buy those things, we will still be under the control of others... One of the basic principles of modernization of weapons and equipment in our Army is to mainly rely on our own strength for regeneration, while selectively importing advanced technology from abroad, centering on some areas.

Since the Tiananmen events of 1989, China has been placed under a Western arms embargo, and has faced very limited alternative sources for modern military equipment and technology. (see 5.A) Military cooperation with Russia has been seen as an important means to achieve Chinese strategic goals. Accordingly, if Russia was reluctant to release advanced weapons and technology to China, Chinese desires to pursue arms trade and military-technical cooperation with Russia would be affected. In such a situation, China might pursue defence modernisation through other channels, including alternative sources, illicit routes, and indigenous research and development (R&D). This thesis will elucidate these potential uncertainties in the Sino-Russian military relationship.

In Russia, the policy-making process has been characterised by the influence of public opinion and especially of various political and economic groups.

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53 For further discussion, see Malcolm, Pravda, Allison, and Light (eds), *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy.*
formal structure of the decision-making process, the President plays a decisive role in terms of the country's foreign and security policy decision-making. In accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the President has the right to 'define the basic domestic and foreign policy guidelines of the state'. However, given the weakness of central authority and the general political instability, Russian foreign policy matters have been influenced by different internal factors such as political elites, the military, economic groups, and public opinion.

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia lost its role as the principal military and political centre of power opposing the USA, and its economy has stood on the verge of breakdown. Initially, the Yeltsin leadership adopted a pro-Western diplomatic line. In late 1992, a change of mood occurred in Russia and she started to seek enhanced relations with China so as to balance its exclusive pro-Western line. Most political groups in Russia recognised the need for a stable relationship with China. However, unlike bilateral cooperation in other fields, military cooperation with China has been a concern in Russia. The view that China is a security threat to Russia can be found uniting representatives of different political groups who have different positions on other political and diplomatic issues.

The defence industries and local governments in regions where defence

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55 Malcolm, Pravda, Allison, and Light (eds), Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy. Those 'political elites' who may influence Russian foreign policy-making include parliamentarians, academic specialists, journalists, and diplomats. See Margot Light, 'Foreign Policy Thinking', in Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Allison, and Light (eds), Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, p.41.
57 For further discussion, see 3.A.
industries are concentrated have been interested in increasing arms exports to China. On the other hand, many Russian political elites have called upon the Russian government to take account of the fact that China could become a potential enemy while developing military cooperation with China. Vassily Likhachev, Vice-Chairman of the Federation Council of Russia, warned in 1997 that China was the only country among Russian neighbours to possess the military capability to commit an act of aggression against Russia. Among the internal actors influencing Russian policy-making, the military have been particularly concerned about a security threat from China. Even though these two states announced a 'strategic partnership' in April 1996, in December 1996 the then Russian Defence Minister Igor Rodionov still included China on the list of countries which were of potential threat to Russia. In the military's view, due to geopolitical and demographic factors, China could pose a

(Spring 1999), pp.5-39.
60 For further discussion, see 5.B.
threat to Russian security. More fervent opposition to close cooperation with China has been expressed by local authorities of Primorskiy and Khabarovsk Kras. They have repeatedly warned of Chinese ambitions over the Russian territories and Chinese ethnic 'expansion' in the Russian Far East.

These domestic views have led the Russian leadership to take a cautious attitude towards military cooperation with China. The basic principle guiding Russian military cooperation with China has been to ensure that Russian security interests are not undermined. During his first visit to China in December 1992, Yeltsin himself articulated Russian policy on military cooperation with China: 'We based it on principles of not harming our own security'. In contrast to Blank's argument that the Russian government has lost its control over its arms exports, this thesis will show that, while pursuing military cooperation with China, Russia has tried to safeguard its security interests.

This thesis will posit that while China and Russia have attempted to pursue

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64 See, for example, General Mahmut Gareyev, 'Russia's Priority Interests', *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 6 (1993), p.8; Col. Gen. V. M. Baryenkin, 'Military Threats Facing Russia and Problems of Advancement of Its Armed Forces', *Military Thought* (Moscow), vol. 8, no. 1 (1999), p.3.
military cooperation, many problems and limits have arisen. After the Cold War, these two states have sought to have a more stable relationship. This has led to the possibility of bilateral military cooperation, including CBMs, arms transfers, and military-technical cooperation. Although progress has been made in lessening military tensions in the border areas, the level of mutual trust has not become solid. Lingering mutual distrust and conflicts of interest have limited the furthering of their military cooperation. The nature of Sino-Russian military cooperation has remained fragile.

D) Study Propositions and Study Organisation

This study has followed three propositions. These represent a logical set of statements to specify the research direction of the thesis and identify relevant information and data on key issues. The first proposition is that the historical experience of Sino-Soviet relations may offer useful reference for the observation of present and future military cooperation. Second, this thesis posits that a stable political foundation would be important if these two previously hostile neighbours were to attempt to develop close military cooperation. The third proposition is that the sense of distrust and the presence of conflicts of interest have obstructed the development of military cooperation between China and Russia.

Guided by these three propositions, this thesis is organised into three main sections. First, it focuses on the study of the historical legacies of Sino-Soviet military relations. Second, it explores the political foundations of Sino-Russian military cooperation after the end of the Cold War. Third, it examines the limitations on areas of Sino-Russian military cooperation, including CBMs, arms transfers, and
military-technical cooperation.

Section 1 provides a review of Sino-Soviet military relations during the Cold War period. This historical review can help to understand major changes in these two countries' military relationship since the Cold War and to comprehend potential conflicts in this relationship. Chapter 2 elucidates the historical legacies in the two parties' military and security relationship. Throughout the Cold War period, Sino-Russian military relations were unstable. Four different periods in their military relations are identified in this chapter. These are: (1) fraternal ties in the 1950s; (2) the breakdown of the bilateral relationship after 1956; (3) the military confrontation in the late 1960s; and (4) détente in the 1980s. This chapter argues that historical legacies, such as territorial disputes and mutual threats against each other's territories, have been important problems in their military-security relationship. In addition, the Chinese and Soviet military relationship was uneasy and was repeatedly transformed by their political relations.

Section 2 examines the political foundations of Sino-Russian military cooperation after the end of the Cold War. Historically, these two states' military relations have reflected changes in their political relations and the wider political environment. To determine whether there exists a solid political foundation for military cooperation, Chapter 3 explores the development of Sino-Russian 'partnership' by examining shared interests, the nature of their bilateral cooperation, and the limits of this cooperation in the realm of international diplomacy, regional security, and economic issues. It argues that limited cooperation in various fields has highlighted divergent geopolitical and economic interests between China and Russia. The future of their 'partnership' remains uncertain. This has resulted in unstable
political foundations for close military cooperation.

Section 3 is divided into three chapters. Chapter 4 investigates the CBMs developed by China and Russia during the post-Cold War period. This chapter starts by reviewing the evolution and major types of CBMs developed in Europe. Also, it explores the dynamics of Sino-Russian CBMs. It then analyses the key provisions of Sino-Russian CBMs from a comparative perspective in an attempt to reveal similarities and differences between European and Sino-Russian CBMs. Finally, this chapter explores Chinese and Russian cooperation in resolving disputes concerning territorial security issues. It concludes that although Chinese and Russian cooperation on CBMs has contributed to the normalisation of bilateral relations, the level of trust between them has not become solid.

Chapter 5 focuses on the evaluation of Russian arms transfers to China. It opens with the rationale behind these transfers through examining demand-side factors which concerned China and led to the possibility of the sales of Russian arms to China. Also, it explores supply-side factors which encouraged Russia to supply arms to China. It then argues that the Russian policy on arms transfers to China has been based on the principle of not harming Russian security. This chapter goes on to investigate the existing problems in the Russian-Chinese arms transfer relationship. Following this, it explores the potential uncertainties for this relationship. In conclusion, this chapter argues that the nature of the Russian-Chinese arms transfer relationship has remained fragile and that it has failed to fully meet their objectives.

Chapter 6 investigates China's military-technical acquisitions from Russia. This examination focuses on Chinese efforts to upgrade its technological capabilities to develop and design new weapons through Russian expertise. It starts by exploring
the priorities of China's defence technology modernisation, and the rationale behind Sino-Russian military-technical ties. It proceeds to examine three major routes by which China has obtained modern military technology from Russia. In studying legitimate routes, this chapter investigates the case of Russian technical assistance for Chinese warplanes R&D projects, and the case of the sale of the Su-27 production licence. In exploring China's acquisition of 'dual-use' technologies from Russia, it examines bilateral cooperation on nuclear power engineering and space science. Following this, it addresses Chinese illicit acquisition of Russian defence technologies. Finally, this chapter analyses the effectiveness of the three routes, and concludes that there has remained mutual distrust while these two parties have still pursued military-technical cooperation.

E) Research Methods and Sources

A major limitation on this study of Sino-Russian military cooperation is that the details of policy-making procedures and cooperation projects have been inaccessible. Despite the post-Cold War increase in information about military affairs in China and Russia, bilateral agreements on military cooperation are not to be wholly reported in the open literature. In order to collect evidence relevant to Sino-Russian military cooperation, two major research methods have been used for this study: (1) documentary research and (2) interviewing. These have provided the necessary empirical materials required for this study.

(1) Documentary Research

This thesis has extensively examined important Chinese and Russian documents
relevant to this research topic. These materials have offered sufficient information and data on issues of concern. The categories of documents are identified in the following paragraphs.

Primary sources used in the study include: first, official documents, laws, treaties and communiqués; second, public speeches, statements and comments made by leaders and high-level ranking diplomats and military officers; and third, articles published by high-level diplomats and military officers. (see Bibliography: Part I) These official documents, speeches, and comments have illustrated Chinese and Russian official stances on issues relevant to the concerns of this study. Also, these materials have been a significant means of corroborating other sources of evidence. For instance, this thesis has used the information from documents such as the Joint Communiqués concluded by China and Russia to corroborate information from other sources. In the case that information from Chinese and Russian Joint Communiqués has contradicted other sources of evidence, this study has inquired further into the topic and sought more evidence to explain the issue in question. In this way, this study has checked the case for the existence of Chinese and Russian cooperation in the realms of international diplomacy, regional security and economic affairs.

Some secondary sources, such as the analyses of Chinese and Russian specialists, have also been used in this study. The Chinese literature published by Chinese military experts has been cited for this study. (see Bibliography: Part II, 1) In addition, this study contains information from Chinese academic periodicals such as: *Guoji wenti luntan* [International Review], *Guoji wenti yanjiu* [International Studies], *Dongou zhongya yanjiu* [East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies], and *Heping yu fazhan* [Peace and Development]. (see Bibliography: Part II, 2) These
Chinese materials were collected in China and translated by the author.\textsuperscript{7} As a result, Chinese academic and military opinions - which are difficult to obtain in English - will be presented in this study. These opinions have included the priorities of Chinese defence modernisation, Chinese concerns about U.S.-Japanese security alliance, Chinese fears of a potential security threat from Japan, and Chinese disagreement with U.S. hegemony.

On the Russian side, \textit{Far Eastern Affairs}, \textit{International Affairs} (Moscow), \textit{Military Thought}, and \textit{Military News Bulletin} have been significant sources used to understand Russian civilian and military opinions on military and security affairs. Moreover, during his visit to Russia, the author collected important papers presented by Russian analysts at seminars, and unpublished works from the Carnegie Moscow Center. (see Bibliography: Part II, 2) These secondary sources have provided useful information and comments on such issues as Russian worries about NATO enlargement, the military's concerns about a potential security threat from China, and the evolution of Chinese and Russian partnership and military cooperation.

Further secondary sources in this study include information and data on arms transfers and military-technical cooperation issued by Western research institutes. Although the United Nations (UN) Register of Conventional Arms was created in 1992, the information provided is far too limited for the purposes of this study. For example, the number of weapons is given by the states, but details of their type and characteristics are only provided voluntarily. Meanwhile, there are vast discrepancies in how states have reported their arms imports and exports.\textsuperscript{7} Thus, further data on

\textsuperscript{7} The Pinyin system of transliteration has been used for Chinese names and places, except where familiar names might be confused if changed.

\textsuperscript{7} Malcolm Chalmers and Owen Greene, \textit{Taking Stock: The UN Register after Two Years}, Bradford Arms Register Studies no. 5 (West Yorkshire: Department of Peace Studies at University of Bradford,
arms transfers assessed by some Western institutions has been an important source in the study of arms transfers. These sources, which are seen to be reliable, include the SIPRI Yearbooks, The Military Balance, and data issued by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In addition, data on arms transfers and military-technical cooperation provided by professional journals and newspapers are also used in this thesis. (see Bibliography: Part II, 3) These secondary sources have been used in this thesis to show the evolution of Chinese and Russian talks on arms deals, both disputes over payment issues and weaponry pricing, the development of their technology cooperation projects, and China's acquisitions of Russian defence technology through illicit routes.

(2) Interviewing

Another originality in the research method of this thesis is that extensive interviews have been conducted by the author in both China and Russia. To collect more information and gain insights into this research topic, the author selected groups of Chinese and Russian experts for interviewing. Most of these had official connections. (see Appendix) They have provided important data requisite for this study.

Three forms of interview were applied in this study: (a) 'the open-ended interview', (b) 'the focused interview', and (c) 'the group discussion'. In conducting 'open-ended interviews', the author asked respondents for information about specific

1995), Chapter 4, pp.57-75.
areas as well as for their comments on events. In some cases, respondents played the role of an 'informant' and proposed insights into certain occurrences. Some first-hand information that has never been revealed from written sources has been acquired through this technique of collecting data. This has included information on Chinese deployments of jet fighters which it has bought from Russia, Chinese complaints about Russian refusals to supply the latest weapons to China, Russian intentions to channel China's expansion towards Taiwan and the South China Sea, and Russian delays in the installation of the Su-27 production line in China.

The second form was the focused interview. In some cases, the author conducted focused interviews with interviewees, particularly, those who have official connections, for corroboratory purposes. The author applied this technique of interviewing to gain answers to questions about Chinese and Russian objectives in setting up their 'partnership', Chinese security concerns after the Cold War, the rationales for Sino-Russian CBMs, and the dynamics behind arms transfers and military-technical cooperation.

The third form of interview consisted of group discussion. In a group discussion in January 1998, the author discussed issues relevant to this research topic with four research fellows of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies in China.\(^7^4\) This helped the author to acquire additional information as the participants reacted to views with which they disagreed. For instance, the definition of 'strategic partnership' - viewed from the Chinese standpoint - was clarified in these discussions.

Given the secrecy of military affairs, some problems in relations to data

\(^7^4\) For the participants of the group discussion in Shanghai, see Appendix: (10) - (13).
collection remain unresolved. Even so, documents and interviews have provided the author with enough evidence to answer the central questions of this study. The analysis and presentation of data and information collected from written documents and interviews have been undertaken through qualitative content analysis. In this study, the analysis of evidence has been conducted at two levels. First, it has been used in describing variables affecting the parties' choice and those actions employed to achieve objectives. However, due to the fact that the analyst is unlikely to gain access to all the details of military policy-making procedures, the second level of analysis is needed. The second level of analysis focuses on the process of interaction between China and Russia in pursuing military cooperation, including patterns of actions taken by one and reactions or responses by the other, in an attempt to show these two parties' concerns and the problems of this relationship. Through these two levels of analysis, the patterns of behaviours in Sino-Russian military cooperation can be revealed, and the nature of this relationship can be discerned.

F) Conclusions

This thesis is original in substance. Unlike the literature that addresses the reasons for and implications of Sino-Russian military cooperation, this thesis focuses on the problems and limits of this relationship. In order to understand the limits of Sino-Russian military cooperation, this study reviews these two countries' military

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75 For example, information and data on the impact of Russian dual-use technology on Chinese defence modernisation, and the real picture of Chinese recruitment of Russian technicians, have been inaccessible. Also, although the key provisions of the Chinese and Russian agreements on CBMs have been collected, little information is available on the negotiating history and the implementation of Sino-Russian CBMs.

relationship from the point of view of history, and explores the political foundations of their military cooperation in the new era. It also thoroughly examines the main components of Sino-Russian military cooperation so as to reveal the nature of the relationship.

Also, this study gains some originality from its research methods. This thesis has extensively examined important primary and secondary sources relevant to this research topic and the author has collected unique insights into this area by conducting extensive interviews with Chinese and Russian officials and strategists. This thesis brings forth new interpretation and evidence on the limits of Sino-Russian military cooperation. It will compensate for gaps in the existing state of knowledge on military cooperation between China and Russia after the end of the Cold War.

The thesis now turns to the first proposition underlying this study; that the historical experience of Sino-Soviet military relations may offer useful reference for understanding the contemporary and future Sino-Russian military cooperation. Section 1 investigates the validity of this through an examination of these two states' military relations during the Cold War.
SECTION 1 HISTORICAL LEGACIES:
Chapter 2
Sino-Soviet Military Relations during the Cold War

This chapter reviews Sino-Soviet military relations during the Cold War in an attempt to understand the long-term patterns of military interaction between these two states. Throughout the Cold War period, Sino-Soviet military relations were unstable, swinging from military alliance, armed clashes, confrontation, military containment, to détente. Between 1949 and 1991, four different periods in Sino-Soviet military relations are identified in this study.

The first period, between 1949 and 1956, was a period of 'honeymoon' in the relationship. Guided by the 'Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance' of 1950, the two states developed cooperation in the areas of economics, military, and science. The second period started in 1956 when the Soviet General Secretary, Nikita S. Khrushchev (1953-1964), pursued reforms in the Soviet political system. Following this, the Chinese and Soviet political relationship became tense, bilateral cooperation in various fields was terminated, and relations were exacerbated by territorial disputes. After armed clashes in the border areas in 1969, the Sino-Soviet relationship entered into the third period characterised by an overall military build-up in the border areas, and Soviet military containment against China. The fourth period, in which both sides sought a limited détente, started in 1982 when the first Reagan Administration (1981-1985) strengthened U.S. ties with Taiwan and China started to

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reassess its relationship with the U.S.. By the mid-1980s, attempts to achieve domestic economic reform further pushed Beijing and Moscow to normalise relations, including the resumption of military cooperation.

Although the dividing lines between these four periods are not absolutely precise, this delimitation highlights the unstable nature of Sino-Soviet military relations. History can influence a state's behaviour in at least two ways: as process and as memory. As process, history may create physical and social realities for a state. As memory, history may influence public perceptions in a state and society. Historical legacies, such as territorial disputes and the sense of mutual threat, have presented crucial problems in these two countries' military-security relations. This will offer useful background for the study of Sino-Russian military cooperation after the end of the Cold War.

A) Alliance Ties (1949 - 1956)

In February 1950, China and the USSR announced an alliance relationship. In this period, two phases can be identified: first, the limited alliance relationship before Stalin's death in 1953; and second, close cooperation in various fields after Stalin's death. During the Cold War, this period accounted for the closest military ties between the two parties. This section addresses the development of this relationship so as to reveal the features of military cooperation between them.

The Limited Alliance Relationship

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3 Ibid.
Since the period of the CCP's revolution, Mao Zedong and the Soviet leader I. V. Stalin had been often suspicious of each other. During China's war against Japan from 1937 to 1945, Mao and Stalin frequently disagreed over how the CCP should carry out the policy of a united front. When the CCP was struggling with the Kuomintang, Moscow still kept good relations with the latter. Stalin's attempt to maintain friendly relations with the United States and repeated requests to the CCP to compromise with the Kuomintang irritated Mao. Given the increasing intensification of the civil war with the Kuomintang, Mao sought to coordinate with Stalin in order to win the struggle against 'Mei-Chiang' (the United States and Chiang Kai-shek).

On 1 October 1949, the PRC was established. In addressing the issue of the new Communist China's diplomatic direction, Mao stressed that China had to pursue a policy of 'leaning to one side', that is, building close cooperation with the Soviet Union. Mao maintained that close unity with the USSR could prevent the international isolation of the PRC. Also, he argued that the experience of Soviet

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4 Since the period of the CCP's revolution, Mao had sought an autonomous Chinese Communist role. In the late 1920s, Mao developed his own revolutionary movement, emphasising the importance of peasants, workers and lower middle classes in this country. This developing approach differed from that of the Soviet Union, and led to Moscow's dissatisfaction. See Roy Medvedev, *China and the Superpowers*, Translated by Harold Shakman (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1986), pp.9-11.


6 For Mao's criticism over Stalin's policy towards China's revolution, see 'Archives: Transcript of the Conversation with Comrade Mao Zedong, March 31, 1956', *Far Eastern Affairs* (Moscow), no. 4 5 (1994), pp.134-144.


economic development could offer China a good model for its modernisation.  

In December 1949, Mao visited Moscow, where he spent two months negotiating Soviet assistance to China. According to Mao, Stalin characterised Chinese communism as nationalistic and predicted that Chinese nationalism would lead to a 'dangerous result'. This was reflected in the facts that during Mao's two-month stay in Moscow both leaders bargained hard, and Stalin's haughtiness caused Mao to be embarrassed by being made to assume a humiliating role as petitioner.

Partly in order to prevent Mao from adopting a pro-Western line, Stalin eventually agreed to sign the 'Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the PRC and the USSR' with Mao on 14 February 1950. This agreement declared their intention to develop good neighbourly relations and to jointly prevent the resurgence of Japanese imperialism and renewed aggression by Japan or any other states that would align with Japan. This showed these two communist countries' common concern about a threat from Japan and probable military cooperation

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10 At the first session of the first National People's Congress, Mao stated his admiration for the successful Soviet model of national development. He argued that the Chinese people should energetically learn from the experiences of the Soviet Union to become a great state that was industrialised and that had a high standard of modern culture. See Mao Zedong, 'Opening Speech at the First Session of the First NPC (15 September 1954)', in Kau (ed.), The Writings of Mao Zedong 1946-1976, p.475.


13 During his stay in Moscow, Mao stressed that China might adopt a pro-Western diplomatic line. On 6 January 1950, China set up diplomatic relations with the U.K. On 7 January 1950, Mao cabled the CCP Central Committee from Moscow, arguing that China should assess the possibility of developing trade relations with Western states. See Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, p.94; 'Document: Mao Cable from Moscow re. Export-Import Trade, Jan. 7, 1950', in Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, p.245.
between Japan and the USA.¹⁴

Nevertheless, different assessments of Chinese and Soviet state interests were vividly illustrated in the Korean War, which erupted on 25 June 1950. Mao perceived American actions to intervene in Korea as a serious security threat to Communist China and decided to dispatch Chinese troops to Korea.¹⁵ After U.S. troops landed at Inchon on 15 September 1950, Stalin's primary concern was to avoid a direct military confrontation with the United States.¹⁶ Therefore, although it provided China with large amounts of ammunition and military equipment during the war years, the Soviet Union rejected to provide air cover for the Chinese land troop operating in Korea. This angered Mao and his comrades.¹⁷ More importantly, Stalin requested that China pay for all the military support Beijing had received during the war. This demand could increase China's long-term financial burden. As Chen Jian and Yang Kuisong stated: 'To the Chinese, Stalin's stinginess made the Soviets seem more like arms merchants than genuine Communist internationalists'.¹⁸

Due to Stalin's mistrust, the 'Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the PRC and the USSR' did not lead to a deepening of military cooperation. The USSR did start to supply China with armaments, such as MiG-15 jet fighters and Tu-2 bombers, in the early 1950s. However, while helping China to build its defence capability, Stalin sought to keep China dependent on the Soviet Union.¹⁹ From 1949 to 1953, by supplying China with weapons, the USSR prevented

¹⁶ Chen Jian and Yang Kuisong, 'Chinese Politics and the Collapse of the Sino-Soviet Alliance', in Westad (ed ), Brothers in Arms, p 252
¹⁷ Chen, China's Road to the Korean War, pp 190-209.
¹⁸ Chen and Yang, 'Chinese Politics and the Collapse of the Sino-Soviet Alliance', p 257.
the Chinese from building an independent military establishment, and did not assist China in its arms production.20 (see Table 1)

Table 1 China's Arms Acquisitions from the USSR in the 1950s and 1960s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon systems</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Licence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tu-2 Bat Bombers</td>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL-12 Transports</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-15 Fagot Fighters</td>
<td>1950-54</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-15 UTI Midget Fighters</td>
<td>1951-52</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-34/85 Main Battle Tanks</td>
<td>1950-54</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-2 Colt Transports</td>
<td>1954-56</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL-14 Crate Transports</td>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-1 Hare Helicopters</td>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-4 Hound A Helicopters</td>
<td>1956-57</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-17F Fresco Fighters</td>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-19S Farmer Fighters</td>
<td>1958-59</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-21F Fishbed Fighters</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu-16B BadgerB Bombers</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL-28 Beagle Bombers</td>
<td>1954-58</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-54 Main Battle Tanks</td>
<td>1956-57</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frog-1 SSM</td>
<td>1956-57</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-2 Guideline SAM</td>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-2 Sibling SSM</td>
<td>1957-59</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-N-2 Styx ShShM</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordy Class Destroyers</td>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romeo Class Submarines</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whisky Class Submarines</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


20 Ibid.
For China, the Soviet military aid programme was essential, but expensive. China was compelled to purchase all the materiel, and incurred heavy debts in the process. According to Ivan Arkhipov, who was sent by Moscow to China to work as Chief Economic Advisor to the State Council during 1950-51 and 1953-58, the total amount of Soviet credit granted in the 1950s was about U.S.$2 billion, of which half was covered by Soviet credit for the delivery of military equipment. In sum, in this phase, Stalin's personal perceptions created limitations on the development of the Sino-Soviet alliance relationship, including military cooperation. This was not improved until after Stalin's death in March 1953.

The Warming up of the Sino-Soviet Alliance Relationship

After Stalin's death in March 1953, the USSR entered into a period of so-called 'collective leadership': G. M. Malenkov assumed the Chairmanship of the Council of Ministers; Khrushchev, the most junior of the leading politicians, was the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU); and Lavrenti Beria was head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. While concerned with leadership transition, the new Soviet leadership expressed a willingness to strengthen Soviet relations with China. In addition, the new Soviet leadership wanted to use Mao to strengthen its authority in the post-Stalin communist world. In March 1954, Khrushchev claimed that Stalin had jeopardized the Sino-Soviet alliance by 'demanding too much in return for aid'.

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\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p.85.
\textsuperscript{24} John Gittings, \textit{Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute: A Commentary and Extracts from the Recent
In October 1954, Khrushchev headed a delegation visiting Beijing in an attempt to boost cooperation. As the new Soviet leadership increased assistance to China in various fields, the Soviet-Chinese alliance relationship reached a peak. During the first Chinese five-year plan, from 1953 to 1957, considerable economic assistance was delivered from the USSR. Both sides signed a series of bilateral agreements and treaties, which provided Soviet assistance for nearly 300 Chinese industrial enterprises and other facilities. By the end of 1953, China accounted for 20 per cent of the USSR's total external trade, while the USSR accounted for 55.6 per cent of the total volume of Chinese exports.25

In this accommodating political climate, military cooperation was strengthened as well. In early 1955, Beijing officially requested that the Soviet Union increase and accelerate aid to China in a number of industrial and defence construction projects.26 The new Soviet leadership supplied China with better weapons and technological know-how. China was authorised licences, blueprints, and prototypes to produce Soviet weapon systems, such as jet fighters, bombers, surface-to-air missiles, tanks, frigates, and diesel submarines. (see Table 1) According to official Russian data, released in 1993, during the alliance period of the 1950s Moscow assisted Beijing in building 256 armaments plants in China.27 With Soviet technical assistance for assembly, spare-parts production, and co-production under licences, China started to develop a military-industrial complex that produced arms in almost all categories.28

During the 1950s, China sent a great number of technicians on personnel

\[ ^{25} \text{Medvedev, China and the Superpowers, p.25.} \]
\[ ^{26} \text{Goncharenko, 'Sino-Soviet Military Cooperation', pp.152-159.} \]
\[ ^{27} \text{Says Russia Seeks "Close Ties", Agence France Presse (AFP) (Hong Kong), 11 November 1993, in FBIS-CHI-93-217, 12 November 1993, p.2.} \]
\[ ^{28} \text{John F. Copper, 'China's Military Assistance', in John F. Copper and Daniel S. Papp (eds),} \]
exchanges for training in the USSR. More than 8,000 Chinese specialists and 11,000 Chinese students were trained at Soviet research units and training institutions. Around 900 specialists from various institutes of China's Academy of Sciences studied at the institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences.\(^{29}\) In addition, over 10,000 highly skilled Soviet specialists in many fields were sent to China to help this new socialist country to develop its economic and military infrastructure.\(^{30}\)

Soviet military-technical assistance to China also covered research into nuclear physics. To counter U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower's (1953-1961) 'Atoms for Peace' proposal, in January 1955 Khrushchev launched a scientific and technical assistance programme for communist-bloc countries, including China, to develop 'atomic energy for peaceful purposes'.\(^{31}\) On 15 October 1957, in order to ensure undisputed recognition of Soviet leadership of the world communist camp, Moscow signed an agreement with Beijing on new technology for national defence. Guided by this agreement, Moscow agreed to help Beijing to develop its weapons and missile systems, and promised to continue the initial nuclear aid programmes of 1955. In 1957, an experimental reactor, a cyclotron, and modern radiophysical, chemical and other laboratories were commissioned at a research centre built in China.\(^{32}\)


From February 1956 onwards, tensions developed between the PRC and the USSR. In a tense political atmosphere, such historical problems as territorial disputes and the

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\(^{29}\) 'Interview with Ivan Arkhipov', p.44.

\(^{30}\) Ibid.


\(^{32}\) 'Interview with Ivan Arkhipov', p.44.
sense of mutual threat started to become serious issues in Chinese and Soviet military-security relations. This discussion examines the development of the rift from 1956 to 1969. It starts by exploring the breakdown of the Chinese and Soviet political relationship. It proceeds to discuss the termination of Chinese and Soviet military cooperation. Finally, it examines the resulting territorial disputes and armed clashes along the border areas.

The Breakdown of the Political Relationship

After gaining supremacy over his political rivals in the mid-1950s, Khrushchev started to reform Soviet domestic and foreign policy. At the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, Khrushchev redefined the developmental approach of the Party by debunking the cult of Stalin and arguing for the end of the class struggle. Following this, Beijing criticised Khrushchev's new approach for betraying orthodox communism. Beijing argued that all states were class states until the final establishment of communism, and labelled Khrushchev's assertions at the 20th Congress of the CPSU as 'revisionism'. At the Eighth National Congress in September 1956, the CCP emphasised that it would develop China through Mao's theories and combine Marxism-Leninism with the experience of the Chinese revolution.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU was indeed the turning point in the Sino-Soviet

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33 After Stalin's death, the new Soviet leadership entered into a succession struggle. In July 1953, Beria, then Minister of Internal Affairs, was removed by Khrushchev. In February 1955, Khrushchev appointed his ally Nikolai Bulganin to replace Malenkov as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. For further details on the political struggle, see Edward Crankshaw, Khrushchev (London: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1966), pp 175-201.

relationship. In Beijing's view, 'the 20th Congress of the CPSU is the root from which stems all the evils done by the Khrushchov (Khrushchev) revisionists'.\(^{36}\) Many analysts have argued that the Sino-Soviet ideological rift resulted from Mao's attempt to obtain leadership of the communist world and his contempt for Khrushchev, whom he saw as junior in this movement.\(^{37}\) In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the ideological debate focused on two issues: debates over the relationship between the communist camp and the U.S.; and the competition for a dominant place in the Third World. Frictions over these two issues concerned not only ideological beliefs, but also produced negative impacts on the Sino-Soviet military and security relationship.

First, Khrushchev placed emphasis on the importance of 'peaceful coexistence' between states with different social systems and postulated the need to avert a new world war. In September 1959, Khrushchev visited the USA and upheld Soviet-U.S. cooperation for the settlement of international problems.\(^{38}\) At that time, China was still economically and politically isolated in the international system, led by the USA.\(^{39}\) The improvement of Soviet-American relations caused China to worry that its interests and security would be sacrificed in the name of a friendly political climate between the USSR and the USA.

Such anxieties were deepened by the Quemoy event in August 1958 when


\(^{36}\) 'Chinese Publisher's Note on the 20th Congress as the Root of all Evils', in Gittings, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute*, p.63.


\(^{38}\) 'Speech by N. S. Khrushchev, Moscow, September 28, 1959', in Whitney (ed.), *Khrushchev Speaks*, pp.360-374.

Khrushchev refused to support Mao's military actions against the Quemoy islands controlled by Kuomintang troops in the Taiwan Strait. In this crisis, Khrushchev maintained a cautious stance. He worried that the incident would drag the Soviet Union into a military conflict and imperil relations with Washington. The Soviet position led China to no longer regard the USSR as a reliable 'ally' of the world communist camp. Moreover, in order to improve its relations with the USA, on the eve of Khrushchev's visit to Washington in September 1959, the Soviet Union terminated assistance to Chinese nuclear physics programmes. In June 1959, Moscow formally notified Beijing that the USSR would not provide China with the technical details of atomic bombs, and recalled its specialists who worked in nuclear physics plants in China. Chinese anxiety over the improved relationship between the USSR and the USA was reflected in its criticism of Soviet concessions to the USA in the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. In the aftermath of this incident, Beijing strongly condemned Moscow for betraying communist allies:

The leadership of the CPSU has become increasingly anxious to strike political bargains with U.S. imperialism and has been bent on forming a reactionary alliance with Kennedy, even at the expense of the interests of the socialist camp and the international communist movement.

A second major issue in the Sino-Soviet political dispute concerned revolutions in the Third World. Coupled with its criticism of Khrushchev's 'peaceful coexistence' policy, China condemned the USSR for collaborating with U.S. imperialism to dominate the world and for undermining the revolutionary struggle in Asia, Africa,

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and Latin America. Due to its distrust of the Soviet Union, China started to prepare to struggle with 'Soviet revisionism' and 'American imperialism' at the same time. In order to cope with the improved Soviet-U.S. relationship and seek international support, China strengthened its relations with the Third World countries and supplied arms to revolutionary groups.

The main recipients of Chinese arms included neighbouring states, such as North Korea, North Vietnam, Pakistan, Cambodia, and Laos. In addition, China offered arms to support 'wars of national liberation' in Asian and African countries such as Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, Malaya (now Malaysia), Indonesia, the Philippines, Algeria, the Republic of Congo, Somalia, and Tanzania. The weapons systems which China delivered included MiG-15 and MiG-17 jet fighters, anti-aircraft guns, T-34 and T-59 tanks, and rifles.

According to John F. Copper, of the Department of International Studies at Southwestern University, 'China's military assistance reflected an independent foreign policy, and, in some instances, anti-Soviet aims'. The Chinese challenge to Soviet leadership in the Third World and the communist camp led to rivalry between them in South Asia and Africa, and exacerbated their military and security relationship. These developments were reflected in the Sino-Indian border conflict in October 1962, when the USSR took a neutral position, sympathising with India rather than China. Moscow's offering of four MiG fighter planes to India sharpened China's

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42 Ibid., p.48.
45 Copper, 'China's Military Assistance', pp.103-122.
46 Ibid., p.124.
anxieties about the USSR. In the words of China's official *Renmin Ribao* and *Hongqi*:

They (The CPSU's leaders) have speeded up their plans for military aid to India and are working hand in glove with the United States to help India's arms expansion, so that the Indian reactionaries are able to use Soviet-made weapons against China and other neighbouring countries.

The Termination of Military Ties

As a consequence of their political and ideological rift, military cooperation between China and the USSR was suspended. Mutual distrust caused both sides to explain events as the result of the other's deliberate conspiracy.

In May 1959, the USSR's delivery of SS-2 missiles to China was followed by a demand to set up a joint military command in the Far East. In the same year, the USSR proposed to build a special radio station on Chinese territory, develop a joint Sino-Soviet navy fleet under Soviet control, and convert Chinese Port Arthur into a Soviet naval base. China perceived these proposals as an attempt to bring China under Soviet military control, and rejected them all. Mao complained that these were not based on the assumption of 'equal' status between the two states and violated Chinese sovereignty.

Chinese nationalist sentiment gradually played an important part in explaining the deepened distrust between the two communist powers. Given the split in their political relationship, the Chinese side increasingly complained about the 'unequal

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48 The Editorial Departments of *Renmin Ribao* and *Hongqi*, *Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on 'United Action'*, p.13.
status' between the two countries. In an interview in 1998, Baoxu Zhao, current Vice President of the Chinese Association of Political Science, pointed out that the issue of 'unequal standing' was one of the main problems in Chinese-Soviet bilateral relations at that time. He stressed that the Chinese leaders could never accept that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union saw the CCP as its 'son party' (erzi dang).50

The formal termination of Chinese-Soviet military cooperation occurred in 1960. In April 1960, Beijing published a series of articles condemning Khrushchev for renouncing Leninist beliefs.51 In retaliation, Moscow announced a recall of all 1,390 specialists working in China on 16 July 1960. The withdrawal of Soviet specialists left 257 scientific and technological cooperation programmes incomplete and 343 technical aid contracts cancelled.52 This seriously obstructed the development of Chinese defence industries. China's production of jet fighters, submarines, and jet medium bombers was suspended.53 The Chinese Air Force had admitted that 'the Soviet unilateral termination of its technological assistance contracts with China's aviation industries led to a serious impact on the development of Chinese aviation weapon equipment'.54 These lessons led the Chinese leadership to recognise the dangers of over-reliance on a single supplier of weapons and defence technology.55

In August 1962, Moscow notified Beijing that it would conclude an agreement with the USA and the U.K. on the prevention of nuclear proliferation through limiting nuclear testing. China complained that this agreement was 'a joint Soviet-U.S. plot to

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50 Informal statement. The author's interview with Prof. Baoxu Zhao, Vice President of the Chinese Association of Political Science, 6 January 1998, Beijing.
51 These articles were printed in Peking Review, 16 April 1960.
monopolise nuclear weapons' and that the major aim of the agreement was to deprive China of the right to possess nuclear weapons to resist the U.S. nuclear threat.\(^{56}\) In response, to ensure its security and improve its global status, China invested enormous capital and resources into nuclear weapon design and construction even though it was experiencing serious economic hardship.\(^{57}\) In October 1964, China exploded its first nuclear test. Although Chinese nuclear capabilities were inferior to those of the USA and the USSR, the advent of Chinese nuclear status dramatically altered the international power structure.\(^{58}\)

**Territorial Disputes and Armed Clashes along the Common Border**

Since the 19th century, territorial disputes had been a major problem in bilateral relations between the Chinese and Russians. Before the establishment of the PRC, on 10 March 1949, Mao had requested Stalin to establish markers along Chinese-Soviet border rivers.\(^{59}\) Along with the deterioration in their political and military relations, this historical legacy became a major source of friction between these two neighbours. In 1959, incidents occurred along the Sino-Soviet border and gradually sharpened as political relations deteriorated.\(^{60}\)

\(^{55}\) Gill and Kim, China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad, p.34.

\(^{56}\) The Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao and Hongqi, The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves, p.47. On 5 August 1963, the 'Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water' (Partial Test Ban Treat) was signed by the USSR, the USA, and the U.K.. Partial texts of this treaty was printed in SIPRI Yearbook 1983 (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1983), p.617.


On 8 March 1963, China's official newspaper Remin Ribao accused Tsarist Russia of depriving the Chinese of territory in the unequal treaties of Aigun (1858), Peking (1860), and Ili (1881), signed by the Qing Dynasty China with Tsarist Russia under the latter's pressure. (see Map 1) On 10 July 1964, Mao himself pointed out:

About a hundred years ago, the area to the east of [Lake] Baikal became Russian territory, and since then Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka, and other areas have been Soviet territory. We have not yet presented our account for this list.

Chinese positions on territorial issues were twofold. First, the USSR had to admit that the treaties of Aigun, Peking, and Ili were unequal treaties imposed by Tsarist Russia on China. Second, in the case of border rivers (the Amur and the Ussuri), the border line had to follow the main channel. Beijing argued that Soviet possession of the entire border river was unfair, and that 600 of the Ussuri river's 700 islands should be Chinese, including Chenpao Island (called Damansky Island in Russian).

The tense political atmosphere caused these two parties to perceive territorial disputes as direct threats to their interests and security. In the words of the Soviet official newspaper Pravda on 2 September 1964:

Mao Tse-tung's (Mao Zedong) pronouncements on the territorial issue show clearly how far the Chinese leaders have gone in the 'Cold War' against the Soviet Union.

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62 'Document: Mao's Statement to the Japanese Sociali t Delegation', in Doolin, Territorial Claimc in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, p.44.
64 According to international laws, based on the Thalweg Principle, where a navigation river divides the two countries, the border should be decided by the navigation channel; if not, it should be decided by the central line of the river.
Soviet concerns about a threat from China were heightened after China launched the radical 'Cultural Revolution' in 1966. During the Cultural Revolution, the struggle against 'Soviet revisionism' deepened in China.⁶⁶ This led the USSR to strengthen its military presence along its border with China. After reaching a defence agreement with Mongolia in January 1966, the USSR deployed 100,000 troops there.

⁶⁶ Medvedev, China and the Superpowers, pp.46-47.
Also, Moscow moved seven to eight divisions from Central Asia to the east of Lake Baikal.\textsuperscript{67}

From the Chinese point of view, the Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev's (1964-1982) decision to interfere in Czechoslovakia in the Summer 1968 was taken as evidence that the USSR would not hesitate to interfere in China's domestic affairs even using military force.\textsuperscript{68} To deter a possible military attack from the Soviet Union, China took pre-emptive military action, at a point when Chinese nuclear capability was becoming operational.\textsuperscript{69} In March 1969, Chinese soldiers attacked Soviet frontier guards on Chenpao Island in the Ussuri River. In April 1969, the Chinese troops tried to occupy the island of Kultuk in the Amur River. From the start of June to the middle of August 1969, no less than 488 infringements of the border and armed incidents occurred along the Chinese-Soviet border.\textsuperscript{70}

According to Roy Medvedev, the possibility of a Sino-Soviet war was created by the Chinese leadership to divert the Chinese people's attention from the serious domestic economic situation.\textsuperscript{71} After the armed clashes of 1969, Mao launched a series of campaigns to prepare for a war against 'Soviet revisionism'. He declared that 'we will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack and will defend to the last man the sacred territory of our great

\textsuperscript{67} Gurtov and Hwang, \textit{China under Threat}, p.212.
\textsuperscript{68} In 1968, the USSR sent troops to Czechoslovakia and claimed that the right revisionist elements in the leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and Government were 'anti-Socialist forces'. Moscow stressed that the defence of Socialism in Czechoslovakia was not only an internal affair of the people of that country, but a problem of defending the position of World Socialism. See 'Editorial: In Defence of Socialism and Peace', \textit{International Affairs} (Moscow), no. 9 (1968), pp.3-6.
\textsuperscript{71} Medvedev, \textit{China and the Superpowers}, p.55. In Mao's view, 'war is the continuation of politics... war itself is a political action', and 'war can only be abolished through war'. See \textit{Quotation from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung} (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), pp.58-71.
motherland'. As a result, the sense of mutual threat deepened between these two neighbours.


After these border clashes, the deep-rooted sense of reciprocal threat pushed China and the Soviet Union into an increasing military build-up along their common border. At the same time, in order to develop a more favourable international position, China started to seek a united front with Japan and the USA. Following this, the Soviet Union sought to create a form of military containment against China. Based upon a common strategic interest of coping with the Soviet threat, China sought military cooperation with the West in the late 1970s. This section will discuss these issues in turn.

The Military Build-Up in Border Areas

The 1969 armed clashes sharpened the sense of mutual threat between China and the USSR, and brought their relationship to a peak of military tension. The USSR viewed China as a genuine security threat, particularly because of Chinese claims on Soviet territory, its possession of nuclear weapons, and its growing nationalist resentment. Such fears led the USSR to undertake a military build-up along its border with China to prevent any surprise attack. As Seweryn Bialer concluded:

Sino-Soviet relations of the 1970s commenced in the aftermath of the bloody clashes on the border near Chenpao Island. Those clashes, in all probability precipitated and provoked by the Chinese side, elevated tensions from a political and an ideological struggle into the realm of a military conflict. From the moment on, Chinese behavior became a key Soviet

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security concern; Soviet middle-range hopes for change in Chinese behavior disappeared as the Soviet Union started to view the conflict from a long-range strategic perspective.\textsuperscript{73}

More importantly, the worsening relationship with China deepened Soviet geographic vulnerability in the Far East. In the analysis of Colin S. Gray:

In order to control its Far East, and even Central Asian, holdings, the Soviet Union needs a strong forward position in defense of the dual-track railroad lifeline of those holdings (the Trans-Siberian Railroad). The Inner Asian frontier zone that separates Soviet from Chinese power (in Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang [Xinjiang]) comprises continuous, virtually featureless steppes and desert to depths varying between 200 and 400 miles. The Trans-Siberian Railroad parallels the Sino-Soviet frontier along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, while - in addition - for 800 miles it is less than 150 miles from the border of Mongolia. Soviet deployment of 43 divisions along the frontier zone abutting Chinese territory (including three in Mongolia) speaks to a justified anxiety.\textsuperscript{74}

From 1969 to 1978, the build-up of Soviet troops along the Chinese-Soviet border accounted for 80 per cent of the total increase in Soviet military manpower.\textsuperscript{75}

In 1973, Soviet ground troops along the Soviet-Chinese frontier were increased from 23 divisions in 1968 to about 45 divisions - including 8 tank divisions. (see Figure 1)

In the 1970s, the Soviet Pacific Fleet developed into one of the largest fleets in the Soviet Navy, possessing around 65 major surface combatants, 70 submarines, and two naval infantry divisions.\textsuperscript{76} In 1970, intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) were deployed near the eastern border of the USSR, and covered 70 targets in China and Japan.\textsuperscript{77} By 1977, the Soviet

Union had targeted more than 170 new SS-20s against China.\textsuperscript{78}

While facing military threats from the north, China's defence policy embraced two doctrines: nuclear deterrence and 'People's War'. The former sought to deter a strategic attack; the latter sought, by mass mobilisation of a huge population, to repel a conventional land invasion. To achieve effective nuclear deterrence, Mao placed great emphasis on developing a Chinese nuclear and missile programme, including land-based liquid-propellant missiles and submarine-launched solid-propellant missiles. By the mid-1970s, China had developed sufficient nuclear retaliatory capability to deter a Soviet pre-emptive attack and to threaten major cities in European Russia, including Moscow.\textsuperscript{79} In addition, in the 1970s, China had increased the deployment of troops in the border regions from 40 divisions to 75 divisions. (see Figure 1)

**Figure 1 Number of Divisions along the Sino-Soviet Border, 1968 - 1980**

![Graph showing number of divisions along the Sino-Soviet border from 1968 to 1980.]


Throughout the 1970s, Soviet proposals to hold talks on the normalisation of bilateral relations were rejected by China. The Chinese side insisted on first resolving border disputes with the Soviet Union. Due to this stalemate and its geographic vulnerability in the Far East, Moscow continued its military build-up in order to deter any surprise attack from China. As a result, the Chinese-Soviet border area became the most militarised region in the world, exceeding the scale of the military build-up of Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Europe.

Chinese 'United Front' with the USA and Japan

Throughout the 1960s, China had adopted an independent foreign policy to struggle with 'Soviet revisionism' and 'American imperialism' simultaneously. After its armed conflict with the USSR in 1969, Mao found China increasingly isolated in international politics. In order to avoid the potential danger of a Soviet-American alliance to contain China, Mao began to seek an improved relationship with the USA even though he faced problems in explaining a rapprochement with 'U.S. Imperialism' to China's domestic political elite.

Mao's modified policy roughly coincided with the U.S. Nixon Administration's intention to 'open a door' to China. The Nixon Administration was convinced that ties with China could restore new perspective to U.S. diplomacy and increase U.S. maneuverability in its relationship with the Soviet Union. The improvement of

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Chinese-American relations was reflected in the USA's withdrawal of previous objections to China's membership of the United Nations in 1971 and President Nixon's visit to China in 1972. In the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, both sides declared their intention to promote a normalisation of bilateral relations and the strengthening of ties in the fields of economics, culture, science, and technology.

After Deng Xiaoping came to power in the late 1970s, 'pragmatism' became one of the main characteristics in the Chinese decision-making process, and the role of ideology was reduced. In order to cope with the military threat from the USSR, Deng made further efforts to seek a united front with Japan and the USA. In August 1978, the 'Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the PRC and Japan' was signed. An 'anti-hegemony' clause targeted at the USSR was included in this document. On 1 January 1979, China established formal diplomatic ties with the USA. On 3 April 1979, Beijing notified Moscow of the formal abrogation of the 1950 'Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance', which had long ceased to exist except in name.

In the early 1970s, Moscow pursued a policy of détente with the USA, partly to

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83 For a discussion of the American attitude towards the PRC's representation at the UN, see Foot, *The Practice of Power*, pp.22-51.
84 The text of Shanghai Communiqué was reprinted in *Beijing Review*, 29 June - 5 July 1998, pp.18-20.
87 The improvement of Chinese relations with the USA and Japan was also helpful for Chinese economic development. At its Fifth National Congress on 26 February 1978, the CCP announced to build 120 large-scale projects in 8 years. These included 10 iron and steel complexes, 9 non-ferrous metal complexes, 8 coal mines, 10 oil and gas fields, 30 power stations, 6 new trunk railways, and 5 key harbours. Most of the equipment needed for these projects would be imported from Western countries. In 1978, China signed contracts worth U.S.$ 6.4 billion with Western countries. See Zongli Tang, *China's Foreign Economic Policy in Post-Mao Time* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1996), pp.12-14.
offset the danger of a Sino-American alliance. At that time, the USA seemed to have obtained a favorable rapprochement with both the PRC and the USSR, and to enjoy a better place in the triangle of relations by taking advantage of the two communist countries' rivalry. However, Moscow's policy of détente changed in the late 1970s when Beijing and Washington began to highlight the strategic interests of Sino-American ties. During his visit to Beijing in May 1978, Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. National Security Adviser, announced that the USA shared 'China's resolve to resist the efforts of any nation which seeks to establish global or regional hegemony'. These Washington-Beijing strategic ties pushed Moscow to harden its policy towards both the USA and China. After Deng Xiaoping's denunciation of 'Soviet hegemonism' during his visit to the USA in early 1979, Brezhnev refused to go to the USA for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) summit.

The Chinese 'united front' with the USA led to a situation where the Soviet Union faced a threatening encirclement, with NATO in the West and a Beijing-Washington-Tokyo entente in the east. As Gerald Segal concluded, China's move to the West - China was called NATO's '16th member' - not only gave the West a strategic advantage, but was the most important change in the strategic balance since World War II.

Soviet Military Containment against China

As a result, in Asia, the USSR regarded containing China as a more important task.
than weakening U.S. influence in the region. In 1978, Moscow supported Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea to overthrow the pro-Beijing Pol Pot regime. Vietnamese military actions in Kampuchea led to the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict in February and March 1979. Due to Soviet support to Vietnam, China suffered a de facto defeat in its attempt to 'teach Vietnam a lesson'.

In late December 1979, Moscow dispatched an invasion force to Afghanistan to support the pro-Moscow regime of Babrak Karmal. Combined with the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, this Soviet action heightened Chinese fears about a Soviet plan to encircle China. The Chinese government issued a statement on 30 December 1979, strongly condemning the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan:

This armed intervention wantonly violates all norms of international relations. It not only encroaches upon the sovereignty and independence of Afghanistan but poses a grave threat to peace and security in Asia and the whole world...

The Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan led to strengthened military ties between China and the West. Soon after this event, U.S. Secretary of Defence Harold Brown visited Beijing on 5 January 1980. This visit marked the first formal contact between the military leaders of the USA and China. Both sides agreed to strengthen military cooperation to counter Soviet expansion.

Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, a major problem in the national defence

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structure of China was that too much emphasis placed on nuclear weapon programmes had led to a neglect of conventional force modernisation. By the late 1970s, Chinese conventional weapon systems were at least two or three decades behind those of Western countries. Its *de facto* defeat in the war against Vietnam in 1979 alerted China to the inadequacy of the PLA's conventional forces in a limited conflict. In its report to the National People's Congress in June 1979, the Chinese government listed defence modernisation among the strategies of 'Four Modernisations'. To modernise its armed force, China started to develop further military cooperation with the West and to import military equipment from the West.

The weapons systems obtained from the West included French SA-321 Super Frelon helicopters, British Rolls Royce Apey aircraft engines and Watchman surveillance radars, Italian Aspide air-to-air missile, and U.S. S-70C helicopters and AN / TPQ-37 tracking radars. China also obtained Japanese advanced computer and electronics that could be applied to Chinese space and guided missile systems. Although the volume of weaponry was very limited, enhanced military ties between China and the West increased Soviet anxiety. In 1981, Moscow called the Sino-U.S. political and military relationship a 'dangerous alliance'.


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99 Gill and Kim, *China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad*, pp.135-144.
101 G. Mosko, 'The USA and China: Dangerous Alliance', *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 9 (1981),
In 1982, changes in China's relations with the USA led to a limited détente between China and the USSR. To understand this, this discussion will address the rationale for Chinese and Russian limited détente in the early 1980s. It will then explore the re-assessment of Chinese and Soviet interests in the mid-1980s and the normalisation of their relationship in late 1980s. Finally, it will explore the resumption of Sino-Soviet military cooperation.

**Limited Détente in the Early 1980s**

Although Sino-Soviet relations remained at a standstill, the friendly political climate between China and the USA gradually faded in the early 1980s. On becoming the U.S. President in 1981, Ronald Reagan sought to strengthen U.S. ties with Taiwan. The Reagan Administration's military aid to Taiwan grew significantly, rising from U.S.$ 330 million in 1981 to U.S.$ 800 million in 1983. Beijing strongly condemned the USA for violating the Sino-American Joint Communiqué of August 1982 in which Washington promised to gradually reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan. This development led to a recognition in China that it needed to reassess its relations with the USA and to de-escalate the confrontation with the USSR. From then on, China started to tone down its anti-Soviet rhetoric and to view the two superpowers more equally so that it could 'achieve much greater maneuverability and flexibility in the great-power triangle'.

Moscow saw Beijing's changed policy as an opportunity for a better relationship...
with China and an improved position in the great-power triangle. In his speech in Tashkent on 23 March 1982, Brezhnev expressed a willingness to discuss possible CBMs in the region of the common border with China.\textsuperscript{105} He also stressed that the Soviet Union had never interfered in Chinese internal affairs, and had always recognised the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan.\textsuperscript{106} Soon after the Reagan Administration's decision to sell arms to Taiwan in August 1982, the first round of Chinese-Soviet negotiations since the Afghanistan invasion took place in October 1982.\textsuperscript{107}

In these talks, China and the USSR failed to solve existing disputes. China was particularly concerned about Soviet military containment. The Chinese side insisted that the normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations had to involve the solution of 'three obstacles' - the presence of Soviet military forces along the common border, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and the Vietnamese military occupation of Kampuchea.\textsuperscript{108} Talks were slowed by Brezhnev's death in late 1982, and his successors, Yuri Andropov (1983-1984) and Konstantin Chernenko (1984-1985), were so short-lived that they failed to deal with the China issue seriously.\textsuperscript{109} The improvement of Sino-Soviet relations was limited, with only exchanges of science, culture, and sport restored. Also, a trade agreement was signed on 10 February 1984.

\textsuperscript{5} 'Speech at the Ceremony in Tashkent When the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic Was Awarded the Order of Lenin', in Leonid Brezhnev, \textit{The CPSU in the Struggle for Unity of All Revolutionary and Peace Forces} (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1984), pp.499-505.
\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Ibid.}
to facilitate commodity circulation between them.\textsuperscript{110}

\textit{Assessments of National Interests in the Mid-1980s}

In the mid-1980s, Sino-Soviet relations further improved, resulting from changes in their domestic situations.

On the Chinese side, the pursuit of domestic economic reform accounted for a greater willingness to reassess its policies toward its rivals. In early 1985, Deng Xiaoping called economic reform a 'second revolution', and announced that 'China is determined to carry through its current reforms and is firm on its internal and external open policies'.\textsuperscript{111} The normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union was seen to benefit China by creating a peaceful external environment to facilitate the country's economic development.\textsuperscript{112} In early 1986, the Chinese military started to assert that 'a world war is by no means imminent, and there may be no major war within this century or for even longer than that'.\textsuperscript{113} This position highlighted a re-evaluation of China's external security environment. It also provided the theoretical basis for détente with the USSR in the military and security sphere.\textsuperscript{114}

On the Soviet side, after Mikhail S. Gorbachev became the leader of the CPSU in March 1985, the establishment of a peaceful international environment to benefit domestic reform became the priority of Soviet foreign policy. To achieve this,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Medvedev, \textit{China and the Superpowers}, p.164.
\item When he attended Soviet leader Chernenko's funeral in March 1985, Chinese Deputy Premier Li Peng publicly expressed his admiration for the Soviet achievement in building socialism. This was the first time since the two countries' ideological rifts in the late 1950s that the Chinese side admitted that the Soviet Union was one of the socialist countries. See Yao Yao and Jing Xiang (eds), \textit{Disandai lingdao waijiao shilu} [A True Record of the Third-Generation Leadership's Diplomacy] (Beijing:
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Gorbachev initiated 'new thinking' in foreign and security policy in an attempt to improve Soviet relations with foreign countries. Applied to Asia, it created the political basis for détente with China. Significantly, Gorbachev also took crucial measures to reduce the Soviet military presence in Asia.

First, the 'Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces' (the INF Treaty) was signed by the Soviet Union and the USA on 8 December 1987. In this treaty, the Soviet Union agreed to remove intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles which were deployed in Europe and in Asia, including the SS-20s targeting China.

Second, Gorbachev announced, on 8 February 1988, that the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan on 15 May 1988, and would complete the withdrawal within a ten-month period.

Third, in his 16 September 1988 Krasnoyarsk speech, Gorbachev made specific proposals concerning regional security in Asia. Gorbachev pledged not to increase Soviet nuclear weapons and naval forces in the region. In addition, he decided to withdraw Soviet troops from their bases in Vietnam, if the USA closed its bases in

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115 The key elements of Gorbachev’s new ideas can be summarised as: the primary priority on domestic economic and social policy over foreign policy and international commitments; the maintenance of a stable and peaceful international environment; recognition that Soviet interests could be promoted by the forming of a multi-polar and interdependent world; and the subordination of ideological criteria and military operation in international relations. See Allen Lynch, 'Changing Soviet Elite Views on the International System and Soviet Foreign Policy', in Frederic J Fleron, Jr. Erik P. Hoffmann and Robbin F. Laird (eds), Soviet Foreign Policy: from Brezhnev to Gorbachev (New York: Walter de Gruyter Inc., 1991), p.388 and pp.394-400.


the Philippines.  

Gorbachev's policy reduced the Soviet military threat against China. Thus, despite the fact that the 'three obstacles' had not been resolved completely, Beijing agreed to hold a Sino-Soviet summit. The summit in May 1989 symbolised the normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations. On 18 May 1989, both countries agreed to resolve all the disputes between them through peaceful negotiation. The Soviet Union announced that Vietnam would withdraw its troops from Kampuchea by the end of September 1989 under effective international supervision. The Soviet Union also decided to withdraw 75 per cent of its troops from Mongolia. Both sides agreed to take steps to reduce their military forces in the areas along the Sino-Soviet boundary. Finally, the Soviet side expressed support for the Chinese government's 'one China' position.

After the Tiananmen Square crackdown of June 1989, China's relations with Western countries became significantly strained. To protest against Beijing's brutal massacre of students, Western countries, led by the USA, suspended military sales and announced economic sanctions on China. Washington even suspended all high-level diplomatic contacts - at the level of assistant secretary and above - with China, and used its influence to delay the consideration of loans to China by international agencies. This policy resulted in China facing a new international isolation, and added to Beijing's sense of urgency to improve relations with Moscow, including

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119 Ibid.
121 Robert Delfs, 'Doddering Helmsman', Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter called as FEER), 29 June 1989, pp.10-11. After the Tiananmen Square event of 1989, China suffered Western economic sanctions. For example, the World Bank postponed discussion on U.S.$290 million worth of loans, including a U.S.$60 million agriculture loan and two loans totalling U.S.$230 million for a power project and training programme.
stable economic, political and security relations.\textsuperscript{122}

\textit{The Resumption of Military Cooperation}

The improvement of Sino-Soviet political relations in 1989 created a positive atmosphere for exchanges and cooperation in the military-security field. In May 1991, General Secretary of the CCP Jiang Zemin visited Moscow. The two parties announced strengthened cooperation in the political, economic, scientific, cultural, and military spheres.\textsuperscript{123}

Two important documents were approved that were to reduce tensions between them. First, the 'Guiding Principles of Reducing Border Forces and Enhancing Mutual Trust in the Military Field' was signed by the Chinese and Soviet governments in April 1990. In this agreement, both sides reaffirmed their pledge in the Joint Statement of 1989 that they would adopt measures to reduce military forces along their border to the level commensurate to their normal relations.\textsuperscript{124} To increase mutual trust, in December 1991, Chinese and Soviet military delegations started to visit each other's military regions.\textsuperscript{125} Second, during Jiang Zemin's visit to Moscow in May 1991, the USSR and China signed an agreement to end their dispute over the


eastern section of the border. They agreed that the navigation channel of a river would be the dividing line of their common border.126

Coupled with this improved political atmosphere, China started to seek to purchase arms from the Soviet Union. After the Tiananmen Square crackdown of 1989, a significant military contract, the Sino-U.S. 'Peace Pearl programme', was cancelled. The programme would have updated Chinese Shenyang J-8 II interceptors with U.S. avionics such as fire-control, environmental control, and electrical-powers systems. The cancellation of this contract had a negative impact on Chinese plans to modernise its aviation industry with Western advanced technology.127

Given that Moscow had adopted a 'neutral position' during the Tiananmen events, Beijing turned to import arms from the Soviet Union.128 Soviet domestic hardship opened it also to the possibility of arms sales to China.129 In June 1990, China sent a high-level military delegation to Moscow, headed by Liu Huaqing, Vice-Chairman of the CMC, to discuss the possibility of purchasing weapons.130 In October 1990, China announced an agreement to buy 24 Mi-17 HIP-H transport helicopters from the Soviet Union.131 In May 1991, when Soviet Defence Minister Dimitry Yazov visited Beijing, China expressed an interest in purchasing advanced Su-27 aircraft fighters.132 The improvement of political relations not only alleviated military tensions between

131 Gill and Kim, China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad, p.58.
China and the Soviet Union. It also paved the way for the resumption of military cooperation.

E) Conclusions: An Uneasy Military Relationship

This review of Sino-Soviet military relations during the Cold War raises two main points of interest to the study of contemporary military cooperation between these states.

First, territorial disputes and mutual threats against each other have been important problems in these two countries' military-security relationship. Border conflicts in the late 1960s awakened Chinese nationalist resentment about Russian occupation of Chinese territory from the 19th century. Also, Chinese claims deepened Soviet worries about its geographic vulnerability in the Far East. Coupled with their military build-up along the common border in the 1970s, the sense of mutual threat sharpened.

In the late 1980s, new domestic and external situations moved these two countries to normalise bilateral relations. In an improved political climate, rapid progress was made to alleviate military tensions. However, beyond this, there still remained significant historical legacies to overcome. Territorial disputes, such as the further demarcation of the common border and disputes over its eastern section, were still unresolved. Moreover, both sides continued to deploy a great number of troops in border areas, underscoring their concerns about a potential threat from the other. For these two states, territorial disputes and the sense of mutual threat have been deeply embedded in a historical, geopolitical, and national security matrix. In a tense political climate, these historical legacies may become the source of renewed military
tensions between these two neighbours.

Second, this review has shown that these two states' military cooperation has to be based on a stable political foundation. Throughout the Cold War period, Sino-Soviet political relations had been unstable and were repeatedly affected by leadership transitions, changes in their domestic situations, and their relationship with the USA. These developments led to an uneasy military-security relationship between China and the USSR, swinging from military alliance, armed clashes, active confrontation, to military containment.

In a friendly political climate, the two parties undertook arms transfers and technology cooperation to display 'fraternity' and 'good-neighbourliness'. However, the close military ties of the 1950s did not help to consolidate their political relations. On the contrary, coupled with the split in political relations, disputes over issues relevant to military cooperation became a source of tension. In the conflicted political atmosphere of the late 1950s, Soviet proposals to strengthen military cooperation were rejected by China and were perceived as an attempt to bring China under Soviet military control. The historical lessons of an over-reliance on the USSR led to a recognition in China that over-dependence on a single supplier of weapons and defence technology was a political and security danger.

This discussion has highlighted the uneasy nature of the two states' military relationship and the importance of positive political foundations for military cooperation between these two states. Throughout the Cold War period, the Sino-Soviet military relationship reflected changes in their political relations and the wider political environment. Section 2 will investigate the political framework of Sino-Russian relations since the end of the Cold War, in an attempt to determine whether a
stable political foundation exists for close military cooperation between China and the Russian Federation.
SECTION 2 THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SINO-RUSSIAN MILITARY COOPERATION:
Chapter 3
Expectations of Partnership

The second proposition behind this study is that a stable political foundation would be important for China and Russia to develop close military cooperation. As shown by history, Sino-Soviet military relations reflected wider political relations. Without a stable political foundation, military cooperation between these two states may be of short duration. Given this, a study of Sino-Russian military cooperation needs to elucidate bilateral political relations. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China and the Russian Federation sought the establishment of a 'partnership'. Since late 1992, the two countries have boosted their ties from a 'good neighbourly relationship' to a 'constructive partnership' to a 'strategic partnership'. This chapter examines shared Sino-Russian interests, the nature of their bilateral cooperation, and the limits of this cooperation in various fields. In the realm of international diplomacy, it explores Sino-Russian cooperation in coping with U.S. dominance in world affairs. In the field of regional security, it addresses two issues: first, Chinese and Russian concerns about U.S.-dominated regional security arrangements in Asia and Europe; and second, their common concerns about stability in Central Asia. Finally, it examines the two parties' economic cooperation. This examination of Chinese and Russian cooperation will reveal the nature of this 'partnership'. In this way, it will be

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1 In their Joint Statement in December 1992, China and Russia declared that they would build a good-neighbourly relationship. By September 1994 when Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Moscow, the two countries defined their relationship as a constructive partnership oriented toward the 21st century. In April 1996, during Yeltsin's visit to China, both sides announced a strategic partnership of equality, mutual confidence and mutual coordination toward the 21st century.
possible to determine whether Chinese and Russian cooperation has created solid political foundations for military cooperation.

A) International Diplomacy

Since the end of the Cold War, both China and Russia have attempted to obtain greater international influence. For both, however, U.S. dominance in world affairs has been seen as a factor that could obstruct their efforts. To understand Chinese and Russian cooperation in the field of international diplomacy, three issues will be explored in this section. These are: first, China's concerns over U.S. hegemony; second, Russia's desire to be a Eurasian great power; and third, the development and limitations of Chinese and Russian attempts to counter-balance U.S. hegemony.

*Chinese Concerns: U.S. Hegemony in World Affairs*

From the Chinese point of view, 'U.S. hegemony' represents the USA's ambition to dominate world affairs and to impose its own social system and ideology on other states.\(^2\) Such hegemony would damage China's interests by restraining its external influence, and by interfering in Chinese internal affairs.

Given its growing economic strength, China has shown more confidence in working as a major balancing factor in the APR and the rest of the world.\(^3\) While seeking increasing international influence, China has been worried about the sole superpower status of the USA in the new international power structure.\(^4\) Many leading Chinese scholars have pointed out that following the end of the Cold War the


\(^3\) Xing Hua, 'China's Successful Diplomacy', *Beijing Review*, 11-17 May 1992, pp.8-12.

\(^4\) 'Delegation Head Interviewed on Visit to PRC', *Radio Moscow*, 13 December 1991, in FBIS-SOV-
USA has sought to find a new enemy to justify its foreign policy and military strategy - and that China appears to be the main target. In 1996, the USA's decision to strengthen security cooperation with Japan and Australia was viewed by Chinese military leaders as concrete actions seeking to contain a rising China. (also see 3.B)

On 7 March 1997, Chinese Defence Minister Chi Haotian stated that China had come to play an increasingly important role in international affairs; however, some antagonistic powers had deliberately concocted the theory of a 'China menace' and tried to damage China's international image. In an interview conducted by the author on 12 January 1998, Chinese strategist Guo Zhenyuan noted:

U.S. restraint on China's rise would be detrimental to Chinese interests. China's major security concern in the new era is not an immediate military threat from foreign countries, but other great powers' restriction on China's increasingly international status.

Secondly, China has been concerned about the USA's attempt to interfere in Chinese internal affairs, in its efforts to reinforce the 'fortress of democracy' and to 'reform' China following the U.S. model. As Wang Jisi, Director of the Institute for American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, warned in 1996:

In fact, 'engagement' does not merely mean closer high-level contacts. It is not a friendly gesture but rather an attempt to pervade China with U.S. economic, political, cultural and ideological influences. Eventually, the United States hopes China will accept Western-led international norms.

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91-242, 17 December 1991, p.43.

5 The author's interviews with Prof. Chen Qimao, President of the Shanghai Society for International Relations, 15 January 1998, Shanghai; with Dr. Niu Jun, Director of the U.S. Diplomacy Division, the Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 8 January 1998, Beijing.


9 Sa, 'The "Expansion Strategy" Practiced by the United States Is Impeded', p.3.

China has criticised the U.S. Congress linkage between offering China 'most favoured nation' (MFN) status and satisfactory progress on issues of human rights. Any foreign power's interference in China's domestic affairs has been viewed as a challenge to the CCP's ruling status. In a press conference on 27 June 1995, Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng complained that 'there are some states which teach others how they should live and what social system they should choose'. He stressed that 'China is against intervention in other countries' internal affairs, no matter where it comes from and what form it manifested (sic) itself in'.

Another Chinese complaint has been U.S. interference in the question of the Taiwan Strait, which has been regarded by China as part of its territory. When Washington decided to sell 150 F-16 jet fighters to Taiwan in September 1992, Beijing strongly condemned U.S. 'hegemonistic' actions. In the words of China's official Beijing Review:

This decision flagrantly violates the Sino-US joint communique of August 17, 1982, grossly interferes in China's internal affairs, and obstructs and undermines the cause of China's peaceful reunification. The Chinese people have expressed their great outrage with and strong protest against such hegemonistic behavior.

In addition, Washington's decision to permit Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui to pay a 'private visit' to the USA in May 1995 was regarded by Beijing as reflecting a U.S. intention to openly support 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan'. The peak of military tensions between China and the USA occurred in March 1996. During the Taiwanese Presidential elections, Washington dispatched two aircraft carrier battle

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groups to the waters near the Taiwan Strait, where China was carrying out military exercises. This was regarded by Beijing as a public military provocation. In the aftermath of the March incident, the Chinese military has begun to assess the possibility of an armed conflict with the USA in this region. They have 'called for the speeding up of China's armament programme to thwart further American intervention in the Taiwan Strait'.

Distinct national interests and differing political values of these two countries might lead the USA to make use of economic pressure, military containment, or international isolation to restrict China's rise and interfere in its internal affairs. This anxiety has led China to seek further cooperation with Russia. An enhanced Sino-Russian relationship has been sought to prevent the USA from playing the 'Russia card' to contain China. The Chinese-backed Hong Kong newspapers Wen Wei Po commented on 24 April 1996 that a friendly relationship with Russia would deal 'a heavy blow to the hegemonist forces which attempted to contain China'. Moreover, developing cooperation with Russia, as a permanent member of UN Security Council, on the resolution of international disputes could help China to obtain greater international influence and increase its leverage against 'hegemonism'.

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15 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, 'Hawkish Elements within the PLA Have Called for the Speeding up of China's Armament Programme to Thwart "Further American Intervention" in the Taiwan Strait', South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 12 April 1996, p.10, in FBIS-CHI-96-073, 15 April 1996, p.42.
18 'Speech by President Jiang at the Russian Institute of International Relations', Beijing Review, 19-25 September 1994, pp.11-12.
Russian Concerns: Eurasian Great Power Status

The Russian Federation became an independent state on 31 December 1991. From late 1991 to mid-1992, in order to promote the democratic and market transformation of Russia, President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev adopted a pro-Western diplomatic line, which sought Russia's incorporation into the Western world.\(^9\) This Western-oriented policy, however, caused heated debate among Russian political elites. In February 1992, Russian State Counselor Sergei Stankevich criticised Kozyrev's pro-Western stand, and argued that Eurasianism was a better alternative for Russian foreign policy.\(^{20}\) The question of whether Russia was a European or a Eurasian power became the focus of debates on national interests and identity.\(^{21}\)

Eurasianists warned that alliance with the West would force Russia into the Western security system and alienate it from the Muslim world and China.\(^{22}\) As Mikhail L. Titarenko, Director of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies at Russian Academy of Sciences, wrote:

> In our view, the new Eurasianism, having overcome the extremes of Westernism and Slavophilism and having accepted the organic link of the

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\(^9\) Alexander Rahr, "Atlanticists" versus "Eurasians" in Russian Foreign Policy, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Research Report, vol. 1, no. 22 (29 May 1992), pp. 17-19. Proponents of the pro-Western diplomatic line included Yeltsin's close associates in the presidential quarters and cabinet of ministers, such as Gennady Burbulis, Yegor Gaidar, and Mikhail Poltoranin. Within the Foreign Ministry, the ideas of this group were shared by ministerial deputies and aides, such as Georgy Kunadze, Vitaly Churkin, and Fedor Shelov-Kovediaev. Proponents of this group were also found in the Supreme Soviet, such as Viktor Sheinis, Sergei Yushenkov, Vladimir Kuznetsov, Gleb Yakunin, and Galina Starovoitova; and among academic specialists, e.g., Nikolai Kosolapov, Konstantin Sarkisov, and Andrei Kortunov. See Alexei G. Arbatov, 'Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives', International Security, vol. 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 9-10.


\(^{21}\) According to Margot Light, in Russia, three major foreign policy views can be identified: 'liberal westernizers', 'pragmatic nationalists', and 'fundamentalist nationalists'. See Margot Light, 'Foreign Policy Thinking', in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, and Margot Light (eds), Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 44-61. For the foreign policy debate, also see Arbatov, 'Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives', pp. 8-14.

\(^{22}\) Rahr, "Atlanticists" versus "Eurasians" in Russian Foreign Policy', pp. 19-20.
unique Russian civilization with the European, Ugro-Turk and Islamic cultures, would become the paradigm for the restoration of the single democratic state of Russia.\textsuperscript{23}

This argument, that Russia should make use of its geopolitical position to strengthen its role as a great power, was supported by many Russian leading politicians. As Yevgeni Primakov, General Director of Russian Foreign Intelligence Services (and later successor of Kozyrev), stated in February 1992:

Russia lies in both Europe and Asia, and geopolitical factors continue playing a very big role in the framing of its foreign policy. I mean our policy on China, India, Japan, the United States, and not only on Europe and the Middle East but on the Third World, because Russia cannot be great, it cannot play the positive role it is destined to in the absence of such wide geopolitical scope. In promoting relations with all those countries, we must remember that history never nullifies geopolitical values.\textsuperscript{24}

In addition to the political elites' criticism of Kozyrev's pro-Western policy, increased voices were heard from the Russian public calling for the restoration of Russia's great power status. In late 1992, an opinion poll conducted in Moscow showed that 69 per cent of respondents agreed that 'Russia must stay a great power, even if this leads to worse relations with the outside world'.\textsuperscript{25} After the Soviet collapse, the USA had become the sole superpower in world politics, and many Russians felt disenchanted with the loss of Russia's international position.\textsuperscript{26} This was exacerbated by a perception of humiliation among the Russians, when promised Western aid was either not delivered or was tied to specific conditions.\textsuperscript{27} (also see


\textsuperscript{24} Primakov's speaking at the forum 'A Transformed Russia in a New World', p.96.


\textsuperscript{26} Georgi Arbatov, 'A New Cold War', \textit{Foreign Policy}, no. 95 (Summer 1994), p.97.

\textsuperscript{27} In 1993, due to its worry that Russia might become highly nationalistic in the near future, the U.S. Congress tied some conditions on U.S. aid to Russia. These included: Russia could not take any action to violate another states' territorial integrity and national sovereignty; U.S. assistance could not be used to strengthen Russian military capabilities; and Russia must keep its promise to withdraw its
3.D)

In a democratising state, the Yeltsin leadership was forced to respond to domestic sentiment against the exclusive pro-Western diplomatic line. On 25 October 1992, Kozyrev publicly announced that 'the romantic period of the relationship between Russia and the West is through'. On 27 October 1992, Yeltsin himself declared that Russia was not 'a country that can be kept in the waiting room' and that Russia was no longer 'a country that only ever says Yes'. One of the main modifications to Yeltsin's foreign policy was to take a more assertive and independent position on some international and regional issues which had a direct impact on Russian interests. One example of this in early 1993 was a more active policy towards the Balkan conflict.

Another major modification in Russian foreign policy was that the Yeltsin leadership started to emphasise Russian relations with countries in the APR to assuage domestic criticism of the previous pro-Western line. In late 1992, under strong pressure from Parliament, the Foreign Ministry was forced to revise Russia's 'foreign policy concept' from a pro-Western diplomatic line to a more 'balanced' stand. The modified 'foreign policy concept' stressed that Russia's relations with

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30 In early 1993, Russia demanded an easing of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro The Russian delegation to the UN issued a statement at the Security Council condemning Croatia. Meanwhile, the Russian parliament demanded that the Russian government should take a more active policy towards the Balkan conflict. On 17 December 1992, the parliament drafted the 'Resolution on the Attitude of the Russian Federation toward the Yugoslav Crisis'. This document argued that Russia should use its right of veto in the UN Security Council if that body intended to conduct military intervention. This development reflected the shift in Russia's foreign policy toward a more conservative stance. See Suzanne Crow, 'Russia Adopts a More Active Policy', RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 12 (19 March 1993), pp.1-6.
31 In early 1992, the Russian Foreign Ministry submitted to the parliament a draft of 'foreign policy
the APR countries would 'play a very important part in the realisation of our [Russia's] Eurasian status' and 'the attainment of a balance in our relations with the West'.

During his first visit to China in December 1992, Yeltsin explained why he sought to deepen Russia's ties with China:

We are accused of americanization, of looking towards the West all the time, that is why we are now making the second break-through into the Asian-Pacific Ocean region after the visit to the Republic of Korea. This, of course, will balance our foreign policy...

Suffering under crippling economic hardships and a continuing erosion of its international influence, Russia faced difficulty in rebuilding an image as a great power. Playing the 'China card' was seen as a way to increase Russia's foreign policy flexibility as China was a permanent member of UN Security Council and had its own tensions with the USA on issues of human rights and Taiwan. Yeltsin stated in December 1992 that 'relations with China were among the priorities of the new Russian foreign doctrine, not only in Asia but throughout the world'.

Bilateral Cooperation and Limitations

In the field of international diplomacy, China and Russia have common concerns about the dominant U.S. place in world affairs. This has led them to seek greater cooperation in this area.

First, in their Joint Declaration on 18 December 1992, China and Russia asserted...
that the new international order should be based on 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence': mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence. This political declaration made it clear that U.S. interference in other countries' sovereignty and internal affairs was unacceptable. In the words of Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng, 'Russia and China are two great powers, which cannot allow anyone to teach themselves (sic) how they should live and work.' In their Joint Statement on 25 April 1996, Russia reiterated that Taiwan was an inalienable part of the Chinese territory, and China held that the question of Chechnya was the domestic affair of Russia.

Second, China and Russia have argued that it is important to establish a multipolar world system, in which no country can pursue hegemony, practice power politics or monopolise international affairs. The Joint Statement on 3 September 1994 stressed that they would intensify their cooperation in international affairs, including the cooperation in resolving global issues. To achieve this, the two parties asserted that it was necessary to strengthen the role of the UN Security Council in maintaining international peace and security. They stressed that

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36 'Russia and China Sign Joint Declaration as Basis for New Relations', Xinhua news agency (Beijing), 18 December 1992, in SWB, FE/1568, 19 December 1992, p.A1/3. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were initiated jointly by China, India and Burma in the 1950s. Rhetorically, China has claimed that the five principles are the basic norms in handling its relations with all countries. For China's speculation on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, see Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian's speaking at the 39th Session of UN General Assembly on 26 September 1984 'China's Stand on World Situation Outlined', Beijing Review, 8 October 1984, pp.16-25.
'peacekeeping operations can be undertaken only by the decision of the UN Security Council and the approval of the countries concerned, and in strict compliance with the Security Council mandate and its supervision'.

This policy line has sought to restrict U.S. dominance and to reinforce the decisive influence of their right of veto in global affairs. In addition, from the Chinese point of view, these procedures would help to prevent the USA from interfering in any future crisis in the Taiwan Strait.

Despite Chinese and Russian declarations to strengthen cooperation in the realm of international diplomacy, bilateral cooperation has been actually limited. First, given that both China and Russia have been eager to pursue domestic economic development, they have been in need of U.S. capital, investment, and much coveted markets. Accordingly, China and Russia have sought to prevent any breakdown in their relationship with the USA. In the seven Joint Statements issued in the 1990s, Beijing and Moscow repeatedly stressed that their cooperation was not directed against any third country. Clearly, the two states have faced a dilemma that required them to walk on a tightrope between seeking increasing international influence and accommodation with the USA.
As a result, while pursuing cooperation with Russia in the realm of international diplomacy, China has insisted on an independent foreign policy. In an interview on 7 January 1998, Shi Ze, Vice President of China Institute of International Studies at the Chinese Foreign Ministry, pointed out:

China has to maintain an overall contact with foreign states. As a great power, China has to evaluate its own national interests and seek the dynamic balance among the other vital powers. As such, China can preserve foreign policy manoeuvre.

After creation of Sino-Russian strategic partnership in April 1996, China still built up a 'constructive strategic partnership' with the USA to boost bilateral cooperation in November 1997. In December 1998, then Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov visited India and called for the establishment of a Moscow-Beijing-New Delhi strategic triangle. Such a proposal did not interest China, and China declined to assume any commitment that might restrict its freedom of manoeuvre. In 1999, Russian analyst Georgy Bovt concluded:

Now China is fully prepared to play the 'Russian card', among others, in the interests of building its own relations with the West on the most advantageous terms possible for itself (and at present relations with the West are, in fact, one of the PRC's top economic priorities). Today a military alliance between Russia and the PRC, especially an anti-Western alliance, is impossible.

Moreover, cooperation in the resolution of international disputes has been limited due to different Chinese and Russian assessment of their state interests. One example of this was the Kosovo crisis in 1999. Both China and Russia watched the

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45 Since the early 1980s, China has adopted an independent foreign policy. Guided by this, China claimed that it would never attach itself to any big power or group of powers. See Wu, 'China's Stand on World Situation Outlined', p.23. Also see 2.D.

46 The author's interview with Shi Ze, Vice President, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 7 January 1998, Beijing.

47 Xhang, 'Chronology in Sino-U.S. Relations', p.16.


49 Georgy Bovt, 'Greetings to Clinton from the Middle Kingdom', Izvestiya (Moscow), 10 December
U.S.-led NATO bombing against Yugoslavia with great concerns. They feared that
American military involvement in Yugoslavia would create a precedent for
Washington to interfere in Chinese and Russian internal affairs, if and when Russia
attacked separatist forces in Chechnya, and China cracked down dissension in the
restive ethnic regions of Xinjiang and Tibet or assaulted Taiwan. China and Russia
stressed that they rejected the concept that 'human rights are superior to sovereignty'
and accused the U.S.-led NATO of flaunting the banner of humanitarianism to launch
a barbaric war against the Yugoslav people. They called for an immediate
cessation of air strike and the return of the Kosovo crisis to political negotiations.

Despite Sino-Russian commonalities in reaction to the U.S.-led NATO bombing
of Yugoslavia, there remained different assessments of their state interests. For
Russia, a breakdown in relations with the United States would be too costly. While
continuing to condemn the NATO bombings, Moscow decided to work together with
the West rather than engage in conflict with it. After the U.S. bombing of the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on 7 May 1999, Beijing took a hard line and proposed
to resolve the Kosovo problem in the UN Security Council. Yet, Russia preferred a
discussion of the Kosovo issue within the context of the Group of Eight (G8) states,
of which China was not a member. In this way, the West might have listened more
to Russia's views. A draft resolution proposed by G8 states was submitted to the

51 Luo Tongsong, 'Who Whips up Anti-American Feeling?', Beijing Review, 7 June 1999, p.12; 'Main
com features.php?id=117592
52 'Political Solution Urgently Needed for Kosovo Crisis', Beijing Review, 12-18 April 1999, p.11.
53 Gennady Sysoyev, 'Americans Feigned Attack of Topographical Cretinism', Kommersant (Moscow),
54 'Russia and China Won't Create a Bloc', Kommersant (Moscow), 3 June 1999, p.4, in CDPSP, vol.
51, no. 22 (30 June 1999), pp.18-19.
UN Security Council. It was approved on 10 June 1999, with China abstaining.\textsuperscript{55} Given that China was not fully consulted in the process of drafting a resolution on ending the Kosovo crisis, Beijing accused G8 states of treating the Security Council as a 'mere rubber stamp'.\textsuperscript{56}

In sum, interactions among China, Russia, and the USA differ in nature from the Cold-War triangular relationship. During the Cold War period, each player's strategic concerns were to dominate over all others, and mutual adversity had made each cooperative move an adjunct to the larger competitive or conflicting relationship.\textsuperscript{57} In contrast, the end of the Cold War coincided with the dawning of a new era, characterised by growing economic cooperation and interdependence, even among traditional rivals.\textsuperscript{58} As such, both China and Russia have embraced a policy of 'equal proximity' to other major powers.\textsuperscript{59} The need for a stable relationship with the USA and different assessments of their state interests have led to circumstances where actual Chinese and Russian cooperation in international diplomacy has been limited to diplomatic rhetoric.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{55} Ren Yan, 'Kosovo Issue Returns to the United Nations', \textit{Beijing Review}, 28 June 1999, pp.9-10. According to the draft resolution, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would withdraw all its military and police forces from Kosovo. The UN peacekeeping forces would be responsible for local security and the supervision of the cease-fire. In addition, the ethnic Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army would be disarmed. The UN would take the lead in establishing a provisional administrative organ and organise an election in order to decide the future status of Kosovo.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{58} Ralph A. Cossa and Jane Khanna, 'East Asia: Economic Interdependence and Regional Security', \textit{International Affairs}, vol. 73, no. 2 (1997), p.219.

\textsuperscript{59} Sherman Garnett, 'Russia's Illusory Ambitions', \textit{Foreign Affairs}, vol. 76, no. 2 (March April 1997), p.66.

\textsuperscript{60} For example, in 1999, China worried about U.S. plan to introduce the Theater Missile Defence (TMD) system to Taiwan. Chinese and Russian cooperation on this issue was merely to issue a communiqué to voice their concerns. See 'Sino-Russian Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Communiqué Issued', \textit{Xinhua news agency} (Beijing), 16 April 1999, in SWB, SU 3512, 19 April 1999, p.B 11.
B) Regional Security (I): The U.S.-Dominated Regional Security Arrangements

This section will examine specific Chinese and Russian concerns about U.S.-dominated regional security arrangements. Three issues will be addressed. First, it will analyse Chinese anxiety about the U.S.-Japanese security alliance and a Japanese potential threat. Second, it will address Russian fear of NATO enlargement. Finally, it will examine the development and limits of Sino-Russian cooperation in dealing with the U.S.-centered regional security arrangements.

**Chinese Concerns about the U.S.-Japanese Security Alliance and a Japanese Potential Threat**

After the collapse of the Soviet military threat, the driving factor that had led to strategic cooperation between China, the USA and Japan during the Cold War period disappeared. (see 2.C) On the contrary, China started to view U.S.-Japanese security cooperation and Japan itself as a potential threat.

China has increasingly seen the U.S.-Japanese military alliance as targeted against China. In the analysis of Chinese strategist Guo Zhenyuan:

> It should be particularly noted that Japanese new security strategy is based on U.S.-Japanese security alliance. Both the USA and Japan believe that after the Cold War, there remain very important common security interests between them. Coping with the so-called 'China threat' jointly is the most important aspect.\(^{61}\)

During the Cold War, China thought that U.S.-Japanese security cooperation could help to restrain a resurgence of Japanese militarism and to cope with the Soviet military threat.\textsuperscript{62} However, after the Cold War, China has become worried that the U.S.-Japanese security alliance might encourage Japan to play a more positive role in the military-security field in the APR.\textsuperscript{63} In April 1996, the USA and Japan decided to extend the application area of the 'Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation'. 'The Far East', an expression used in the past, was replaced by the 'Asian and Pacific region' to cover the area of the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea regarded by China as its territory.\textsuperscript{64} On 15 April 1996, the 'Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Armed Forces of the United States of America and the Self-Defence Forces of Japan' was signed. This agreement promoted military cooperation between the U.S. and Japan in a future international crisis.\textsuperscript{65}

In order to cope with strengthening U.S.-Japanese security cooperation, Chinese analysts have suggested that China should strengthen ties with Russia. As Li Jingjie, Deputy Director of the Institute of East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argued in 1997:

After the Cold War ended, the West led by the United States has viewed Russia as a potential threat to Europe and is now trying to contain that country by expanding NATO eastwards. Whereas in Asia, China has been the bogey, and to counteract this potential threat attempts are being made to strengthen the U.S.-Japanese alliance and so contain the People's Republic of China. This Western policy, in effect, places China and Russia in

\textsuperscript{62} Zang, 'Issues on Sino-Japanese Relations', p.27.
similar strategic circumstances.\textsuperscript{66}

Moreover, viewed from the perspective of geopolitics, Japan, in its own right, could be a major rival to China for political and economic influence in the APR. According to Bonnie S. Glaser, China has worried that, by the beginning of the 21st century, Japan will emerge as a political or military power posing a direct threat to China. If it becomes even stronger economically, Japan may terminate its security reliance on the USA and seek to become a dominating regional power. On the other hand, if Japan suffers an economic downturn, this may also create greater pressure for the country to pursue a militaristic path to restore its status and pride.\textsuperscript{67}

The historical experience of the Japanese invasion of the 1930s has created lingering Chinese distrust of Japan.\textsuperscript{68} To date, China and Japan have not resolved the territorial dispute of the Diaoyu Islands (called the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese). In China's view, the resurrection of Japanese militarism is likely. The establishment of Japanese Defence Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) in January 1997 has been seen to support this view.\textsuperscript{69} In 1997, Liu Jiangyong, Director of the Department of Northeast Asian Studies at the Institute of Contemporary International Relations, commented:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{66} Li Jingjie, 'The Progress of Chinese-Russian Relations: From Friendship to Strategic Partnership', \textit{Far Eastern Affairs} (Moscow), no. 3 (1997), pp.44-45.
\item \textsuperscript{68} According to a poll of Chinese youth on issues related to Sino-Japanese relations, over 40 per cent held a 'negative' view of Japan. Meanwhile, 96.6 per cent of those surveyed said that they were reminded of Japanese imperial atrocities in the Second World War when they saw a Japanese 'Sun Flag'. See Jiang Yuechun, 'Sino-Japanese Relations in the New Era', \textit{International Studies} (Beijing), no. 12 14 (1997), p.19.
\item \textsuperscript{69} On 7 January 1997, DIH was established to improve Japan's intelligence capabilities. Its head, Lt. Gen. Masahiro Kunimi, had an intelligence background with an emphasis on China. See 'Intelligence
After the creation of Japanese Intelligence Headquarters in this year, the military's influence on Japanese foreign strategy decision-making will be augmented. In the case that Japan is dominated by the military and utilises the 'China threat' as the basis of its strategy of China, the result will lead to a recurrence of Chinese and Japanese strategic confrontation.\(^7\)

On the Japanese side, China has also been regarded as a potential threat to its security. China's war games off the Taiwan Strait in March 1996 deepened Japanese worries that China might menace its neighbours with a diplomacy of intimidation as it gains more economic confidence and military power. According to an opinion poll conducted in Japan in May 1997, 54 per cent of Japanese respondents believed that 'Chinese military modernization would pose a threat to Asian security and stability'.\(^7\)

In reaction, Japan announced the 'Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996-FY2000)' to modernise the Self-Defence Force (SDF).\(^7\) The SDF also planned to equip the Southwestern Composite Air Division in Naha, Okinawa (which is adjacent to China), with F-15s. Meanwhile, whilst the number of P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft was being reduced nationwide, the number of P-3Cs deployed at the 5th Fleet Air Wing on Okinawa has been kept at high levels.\(^7\)

Due to such mistrust, China and Japan have interpreted the defence modernisation of the other as a potential offensive threat. In order to cope with the
possible resurrection of Japanese militarism, China has sought to develop cooperation with Russia. During his visit to Moscow on 8 May 1995, Chinese President Jiang Zemin noted the tremendous Chinese national sacrifices incurred in fighting against the Japanese during the Second World War. The Chinese leader asserted that, in order to prevent such terrible tragedies from happening again, China and Russia had to continue to cooperate in fighting against 'fascism and militarism'. This argument implied that China saw the strengthening of Sino-Russian relations as a means to prevent a resurgent Japanese military role in Northeast Asia.

Russian Concerns about NATO Enlargement

In January 1994, NATO formally launched the 'Partnership for Peace' (PfP) programme as the first step to implement the enlargement of NATO eastward to shelter the Central and Eastern European countries. This programme has led many Russian politicians to believe that the West still regarded Russia as a 'real enemy'.

From Russia's point of view, NATO enlargement would radically worsen Russia's geo-strategic situation, and could lead to its international isolation. In 1995, Sergei Rogov, Director of the Institute of USA and Canada Studies at Russian Academy of Sciences, commented:

Washington seems to be conceiving a new geopolitical strategy whose top priority is preservation of the system of military-political alliances set up by the United States during the Cold War... These developments create the impression that the West continues to play a zero-game with Russia and tries to consolidate its victory in the Cold War at the expense of the loser's

75 NATO has sought to develop military cooperation with partner states, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises, so as to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The PfP programme planned to eventually accept some Central and Eastern European countries for NATO membership. See Manfred Wörner, 'Shaping the Alliance for the Future', NATO Review, vol.42, no. 1 (February 1994), pp-5-6.
76 Andrei Kozyrev, 'Partnership or Cold Peace?', Foreign Policy, no. 99 (Summer 1995), p.11.
The Russian military has been worried that NATO enlargement would seriously change the balance of military forces in Europe. In the analysis of Major General A. F. Klimenko, following enlargement, NATO would extend a further 750 km towards the east. As a result, the Russian strategic warning period would be shortened. According to Klimenko, those new allies would increase the combat strength of NATO's ground forces by 20 per cent, and its air forces by 10-15 per cent. The new network of NATO airfields would enable its tactical aviation to increase the depth of strikes at Russia's territory up to Smolensk and Kursk.

In December 1995, Russia stressed that the 'expansion' of NATO might put an end to Russian cooperation with the West and force Russia to take counter-measures, including reintroducing Russian combat forces and tactical nuclear weapons into the western Russian and Belarusian regions. In June 1996, then Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev warned that if NATO deployed tactical weapons in Eastern Europe, this would lead to a new 'Cold Peace' between Russia and NATO.

The credibility of these threats was diluted because of Russian political and economic weaknesses. Playing the 'China card' was expected to offer Russia some compensation for its loss of influence in Europe and also to make Russia more confident to make adjustments in its relations with the USA and other NATO

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79 Ibid.
81 'Army General Pavel Grachev: In Four Years We Have Learned not only to Discuss the Army and Navy's Problems, but also to Solve Them Independently', *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), 30 May 1996, in SWB, SU/2617, 1 June 1996, p.S1 1.
members. In the mid-1990s, the Russian fear of NATO enlargement constituted an important factor which pushed Russia to enhance its relations with China. Grachev played the 'China card' in 1996, warning that if NATO expanded to the Russian traditional sphere of influence, Russia would go 'east' too and 'form a rival alliance with China'.

Bilateral Cooperation and Limitations

As a result of their disagreement with the U.S.-centered regional security arrangements in Asia and Europe, China and Russia have claimed that 'developing bilateral relations is of great significance to their common security'. In their Joint Statements during the 1990s, these two countries repeatedly condemned expansionism, power politics and the establishment of 'antagonistic' political and military groups in international and regional politics.

Although China and Russia have shown their opposition to 'bloc politics' through diplomatic rhetoric, concrete cooperation on this issue has been limited. First, while Beijing has regarded the U.S.-Japanese military alliance as a serious security threat, Moscow has seen the maintenance of U.S.-Japanese security cooperation as being in Russia's security interests. This has been reflected in the unofficial 'Russian National Security Concept for 1994' drafted by Russian political elites and defence experts:

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83 Alexei Pushkov, 'No Alliance in Sight for Two Giants', *The Straits Time* (Singapore), 15 April 1996.
The maintenance of the U.S. military presence in Japan is in line with Russia's interests in the Far East. In the event of withdrawal by the United States and of China's headlong economic and military strengthening, Japan's reaction could only take the form of accelerated remilitarization... Any sharp change of the balance of forces in favor of China or Japan and the emergence of hegemonic aspiration in one of the two powers could pose a direct threat to Russia's Far East.86

Second, in spite of Chinese anxieties about the potential Japanese threat, Russian interests have not resided in developing cooperation with China at the cost of relations with Japan. While attempting to develop its Far East areas, Russia has required Japanese participation, in particular, financial investment.87 In October 1997, Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto revised the policy of 'non-separation of economy and politics' towards Russia.88 Guided by this new policy, both sides have expressed their desire to develop economic cooperation, in particular, in the fields of energy development and the promotion of a market economy in Russia.89

Russian and Japanese cooperation has also extended to military and security affairs. In November 1997, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto and Yeltsin agreed to conduct joint military exercises focusing on humanitarian missions and disaster-relief operations. A regular exchange of visits between the chief of Japan's Joint Staff Council and the Russian counterpart was also concluded.90 In November 1998, Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi issued a Joint Statement,

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87 Nikolai Solovyev, 'Siberia and the APR', International Affairs (Moscow), no. 4 (1993), p.27.
88 In the early 1990s, Japan embraced the principle of 'non-separation of economy and politics', arguing that the resolution of territorial disputes over the Kurile islands was the prerequisite for further improvement of Japanese-Russian bilateral relations. For further discussion, see Andrei Krivtsov, 'Russia and the Far East', International Affairs (Moscow), no. 1 (January 1993), pp.77-84.
89 Peter Landers and Sergei Blagov, 'Warmth in Siberia: Hashimoto and Yeltsin Hope to Thaw Relations', FEER, 30 October 1997, p.30.
90 Robert Karniol, 'Japan's New Missions to Involve Russia Forces', JDW, 12 November 1997, p.27; Aleksandr Zorin, 'Japan's No.1 Military Man Is in Russia', Novyi Izvestiya (Moscow), 2 June 1998.
declaring the emergence of 'constructive partnership' and expressing Russian-Japanese determination to develop bilateral cooperation. Clearly, although China has seen Japan as its major geopolitical rival in the next century, Russia has sought to pursue economic and security cooperation with both China and Japan to ensure its own interests.

Third, although Chinese President Jiang Zemin publicly stated in 1996 that NATO's 'expansion' eastwards to Russia's border was impermissible, such diplomatic rhetoric had no practical influence on the process of NATO enlargement. Economic and political weakness led to a recognition in Russia that despite its dislike for NATO enlargement, Russia could not prevent it happening. On 27 May 1997, the 'Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and Russia' was signed. Both sides agreed to set up the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council to enhance their consultations on security issues of common concern.

To avoid offending the USA, both China and Russia have declared that they would not develop an alliance relationship. This has limited actual Russian-Chinese cooperation in countering NATO enlargement. More significantly, China did not show strong support for Russia's opposition to NATO enlargement. Beijing worried that strong opposition to NATO enlargement might have disrupted relations

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between China and those Eastern European states which have joined or intended to join NATO. Taiwan might exploit such a situation to develop its ties with those Eastern European states.  

These developments have suggested clearly that although China and Russia have attempted to cooperate to counter U.S.-centered regional security arrangements in Asia and Europe, a gap has existed between their political pledges and actual cooperation. Distinct geopolitical interests and different perceptions of military threats restricted these two parties' cooperation in resisting the U.S.-Japanese security alliance and NATO enlargement.

C) Regional Security (II): The Central Asia Factor

Stability in Central Asia, adjacent to both Chinese and Russian territories, has been another common security concern. An increase in ethnic extremism and Islamic fundamentalism in this region might pose a direct threat to Chinese and Russian territorial security. This discussion will explore China and Russia's concerns about stability in Central Asia, and the development and limitations of their bilateral cooperation in this area.

Chinese Concerns about Central Asia

For China, Central Asia lies in a very important geographical location. Following the demise of the USSR, three of the five new Central Asian states, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, share borders with China's Xinjiang province. Chinese concerns about Central Asia have resided in two major areas. First, China has

96 Zheng, 'The Sino-Russian Relationship', p.482.
worried that the political situation in these newly independent states could affect separatism in Xinjiang. Second, China has been interested in the development of natural resources in Central Asia.

Within Xinjiang province, Uighur, Kazakh, Tajik, Uzbek and Tatar nationalities share ethnic ties with the Central Asian countries. The disintegration of the USSR deepened China's fear that the independence of these Central Asian states would encourage separatism in Xinjiang and legitimize the separatists' struggle for independence. Also, China worried that Iranian-backed Islamic fundamentalism and Pan-Turkism would come to the borders of China.

Since 1990, anti-Communist and nationalist demonstrations have occurred in some areas of Xinjiang, such as Tacheng, Bole, Atai and Aksu. An armed rebellion, which was launched by local Muslim leaders to pursue the establishment of a Republic of East Turkestan, occurred in Xinjiang in April 1990. In March 1992, Tomur Dawamat, Chairman of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region People's Government, warned:

The changeable international situation has affected and is still affecting Xinjiang's social stability. Hostile forces, both at home and abroad, have stepped up their infiltration, subversion and sabotage.

There were reports that Muslims in Xinjiang were arming themselves with weapons smuggled from abroad. Supply routes for arms started from Afghanistan, passing

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97 The minority nationalities in Xinjiang speak the Turkish language and believe in Islam. They see Turkey and the Middle East rather than China as their spiritual and cultural home. For further discussion, see Lillian Craig Harris, 'Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China's Policy in the Islamic World', The China Quarterly, no. 133 (March 1993), p.114; Dru C. Gladney, 'The Muslim Face of China', Current History, vol. 92, no. 575 (September 1993), pp.275-280.
98 Harris, 'Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China's Policy in the Islamic World', pp 120-121.
100 Tomur Dawamat Urges Crackdown on Separatism', Zhong Tongxun She (Hong Kong), 17 March
over the Afghan-Tajik frontier to enter Xinjiang.\textsuperscript{101}

In addition to concerns about the political situation in Central Asia, China has expressed a strong interest in the development of natural resources in this region. China has argued that the most important unexploited petroleum reserves in the world lie in Central Asia.\textsuperscript{102} Given this, China has sought to enhance economic cooperation with the Central Asian countries. In 1997, China and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on petroleum production, calling on China to invest U.S.$ 9-10 billion in the latter.\textsuperscript{103} Also, China planned to build a new railroad that would start from China's eastern coast passing through Central Asia and linking eventually with Amsterdam.\textsuperscript{104} Closer economic ties with Central Asian states have been seen as a means to extend the Chinese presence in this region and increase China's leverage in preventing the Central Asian countries from supporting separatism in Xinjiang.

While developing economic cooperation with Central Asian states, Beijing has demanded that these states pay respect to the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs.\textsuperscript{105}

In order to promote its interests, China has been concerned about the development of the policies of the USA, Russia, Iran, and Turkey toward Central Asia.\textsuperscript{106} In particular, while strengthening its cooperation with Central Asia, China


\textsuperscript{102} Feng Yujun, 'Daguo ji diqu shili dai zhongya guojia suo di zhengduo jiqi yinxiang' [The Contention of Big Powers and Regional Forces for Central Asia and Caucasus and Its Effects], \textit{Dongou zhongya yanjiu} (Beijing), no. 6 (1997), p.79.


\textsuperscript{105} Chinese Premier Li Peng, 'China's Basic Policy towards Central Asia', \textit{Beijing Review}, 2-8 May 1994, p.19.

\textsuperscript{106} Ou Zhongyan, 'Dui dangqian zhongya diqu xingshi di jidian sikao' [Reflections on the Current
has recognised the need to take into account the Russian political, military, and economic presence in this region.\textsuperscript{107}

\textit{Russian Concerns about Central Asia}

Russia's relations with Central Asian countries are important politically and in terms of security. In 1993, Russia developed a 'Monroe Doctrine' for the former Soviet periphery, which allocated to Russia the role of sole guarantor of security in the 'near abroad'.\textsuperscript{108} Guided by this doctrine, Russia has built close security relations with the Central Asian states.

Historical and geopolitical factors have led Russia to regard Central Asia as part of its sphere of influence. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia has sought to strengthen its role as a security guarantor in the region by means of bilateral treaties with these former Soviet republics, and through the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) collective security system.\textsuperscript{109}

In order to ensure stability in Central Asia, Russia has also played an important role in defending the external borders of these CIS members. Russian border troops remain in Tajikistan. In this way, Russia has sought to prevent ethnic extremism, arms smuggling, and terrorism from spreading into this region, and to strengthen its role as regional security guarantor.\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{107} Ou, 'Reflections on the Current Situation in Central Asia', p.43; Feng, 'The Contention of Big Powers and Regional Forces', pp.78-84.


Moreover, many ethnic Russians still live in Central Asia. Ethnic Russians accounted for 38 per cent of population in Kazakhstan, 22 per cent in Kyrgyzstan, and 8-10 per cent in Tajikistan. In its military doctrine, Russia stressed that the suppression of the rights, freedom and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation residing in foreign states' was a potential source of military threat. Russia did not discount the possibility that inter-ethnic conflict in Central Asia could lead to Russian military intervention in these states.

Bilateral Cooperation and Limitations

Regional security concerns in Central Asia may provide the basis for Russian and Chinese cooperation. However, these could also create antagonism in their relations. In the context of bilateral cooperation, shared concerns about Central Asia's stability have given reasons for China and Russia to coordinate and consult on security issues arising in Central Asia. The maintenance of regional stability and the prevention of Islamic extremism have been vital issues enhancing Chinese and Russian cooperation in Central Asia.

At the five-nation Alma-Ata summit on 3 July 1998, the leaders of China, Russia, and three Central Asian countries - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - declared that 'any form of national splittism (sic), ethnic exclusion and religious extremism is unacceptable'. The parties declared that they would strengthen multilateral cooperation in controlling international terrorism, organised crime, arms smuggling,
and the trafficking of drugs. The five leaders pledged not to allow their territories to be used for activities which would undermine the national sovereignty, security and social order of any of them.115

During the post-Cold War period, China and Russia sought to cooperate in this region based on realistic assessments of political developments. In developing relations with the Central Asian states, China has had to take account of Russia's close ethnic, political, and security ties with the states in this region.116 Although Russia has played the role of guarantor of security in this region, it has had to face the fact that Central Asian states have been eager to develop economic cooperation with China, a growing economic power.117

Nevertheless, there still exists potential competition between China and Russia for political influence and economic resources in Central Asia. To retain the near abroad countries in its sphere of influence, Russian has tried to keep these countries dependent on arms supplies from Russia.118 However, China has tried to extend its military presence in the Central Asia. In 1994, Russian military officers warned that China had commenced arms deliveries to some Central Asian states.119 Concerns over increasing China's presence in Central Asia partly accounted for why Russia sought to create the CIS Defence Council in the mid-1990s.120 According to the

115 Ibid.
116 For official statements on Chinese respect for Russia's links with Central Asian states, see 'Meeting with Kozyrev', p.A1 2; Li, 'China's Basic Policy towards Central Asia', p.19.
Kazakh Defence Minister Mukhtar Altynbayev, Kazakhstan has started to receive military aids from China. This aid included 'communication equipment and other equipment needed for headquarters'. Both sides also planned to strengthen their cooperation in military education and training. In addition, China also sought to develop military cooperation with Tajikistan.

Moreover, China's objective to use its economic strength to strengthen its involvement in this region could lead to Russian anxiety over Chinese competition for economic assets in this region. Russia has seen the Chinese plan to build a new railroad that would link the Chinese eastern coast passing through Central Asia as 'extremely disadvantageous to Russia'. The new railroad could deprive the Russian Trans-Siberian Railroad of all international transit freight. In April 1997, Russia declined to send a delegation to the Tashkent conference, at which China, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan signed a memorandum on the construction of this new railroad. In 1998, in commenting on the potential competition between China and Russia in this region, Walter Schilling concluded:

The future role of China in the Central Asia (sic) region is already becoming clear. In deciding to build a 3,000 km pipeline from Kazakhstan (sic) to western China, Beijing has given notice of its major interest in the region and has unambiguously signaled that it regards itself as a competitor with Russia and America for the raw material reserves of Central Asia. The estimated cost of this huge project, $10 billion, represents China's largest foreign investment to date.

Given that Russia has regarded Central Asia as part of its sphere of influence, Russia is likely to seek to prevent any third party, including China, from achieving or

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124 Ibid.
obtaining major political-military access to the region at the expense of Russia. If China's political influence in Central Asia grows with its military and economic involvement, potential competition between China and Russia may arise.

D) Economic Affairs

Beijing has regarded economic reform as a priority for Chinese development. Moscow similarly has viewed the achievement of economic recovery as a vital national interest. To understand bilateral cooperation, this section will address Chinese concerns to increase economic prosperity in the border areas. Also, it will explore Russia's eagerness to enhance trade cooperation with China. Finally, it will examine bilateral economic cooperation and the problems this has faced.

*Chinese Concerns to Increase Economic Prosperity in the Border Areas*

During the post-Cold War period, Chinese leaders have viewed it as an important political task to accelerate the country's economic reform and to increase prosperity. In an attempt to facilitate economic development, China has sought to create special economic zones, open coastal areas, and increase border trade. Several factors explain the Chinese interest in developing trade cooperation with Russia.

First, the Russian level of development and types of economic structures have been close to those of China's northern provinces - Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and

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Heilongjiang. Developing border trade with Russia might help to increase economic prosperity in these areas. The concentration of economic growth on the Chinese coastal areas has left the three northern provinces with a growing recognition of the need for trade with Russia. Economic development along the Chinese-Russian border areas has been seen as a means to assist China in balancing the current concentration of economic growth on the country's coastal provinces and decreasing differences in economic development between these areas.

Moreover, it was argued that trading complementary commodities could meet the objective requirements of both countries' economies. China could export consumer goods, foods, daily necessities, and light industrial and textile products for which Russia has a need and which it could not buy from the West because of a lack of hard currency. On the other hand, Russia could export power equipment, raw materials, transport machinery, and chemical products which were in short supply in China due to its rapid economic development.

China also has been interested in the development of natural resources in Russian Siberia and the Russian Far East, as the region accounts for around half of the world coal deposits, over one-third of natural gas, and around one-fifth of oil. An ambitious project called the 'Tumen River Economic Zone' (TREZ) project has sought to create a large free trade belt along the Tumen River Delta. It has planned to develop the rich natural resources of this region through labour from China, Russia.

1993, p.III.
and North Korea, as well as with the participation of capital and technologies from Japan and South Korea. As growing economic and industrial development has highlighted the need for natural resources, Beijing has shown a stronger interest in the development of TREZ than other countries. In September 1994, Chinese President Jiang Zemin claimed that geographical advantages and complementary economic structures had made economic cooperation with Russia possible and desirable.

**Russian Concerns to Seek Economic Recovery**

Economic recovery has been a vital component of Russian national interests. While pursuing a pro-Western foreign policy in early 1992, the Yeltsin leadership expected that Western economic assistance would help Russia to overcome economic hardship. However, the greatest portion of the U.S.$ 24 billion Western aid package focused only on trade credits, and less than U.S.$ 2 billion of the aid was paid out in 1993. The only exception in Western assistance was the defence-related programme, which helped Russia to eliminate nuclear warheads. By 1994, due to opposition

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34 North Korea was the first country to venture a proposal to explore the delta with international assistance. In July 1991, the UN Development Programme convened the first international conference on the TREZ project, in which China, North Korea, Mongolia, and South Korea participated. See ‘Tumen River Delta: Far East's Future Rotterdam’, *Beijing Review*, 20-26 April 1992, pp.5-6. For further details on this project, see Andrew Marton, Terry McGee and Donald G. Paterson, ‘Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation and the Tumen River Area Development Project’, *The Pacific Affairs*, vol. 68, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp.8-33.


36 ‘Speech by President Jiang at the Russian Institute of International Relations’ p.12


38 John Edwin Mroz, ‘Russia and Eastern Europe: Will the West Let Them Fail?’, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 1 (Spring 1993), p.47. On 17 June 1992, Russia and the USA signed an agreement on safe and reliable transportation, storage, and destruction of weapons and on prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation. Based on this agreement, another seven agreements were signed. They included: provision of containers for fissile materials for U.S.$ 50 million in June 1992; delivery of complete equipment packages for converting railroad freight and guard car for U.S.$ 20 million in August 1992; provision of equipment to control the effects of emergencies and associated radiation for U.S.$ 15 million in June 1992; delivery of protective covers for U.S.$ 2.5 million in June 1992; designing of a
from the U.S. Congress, U.S. aid for Russian economic reforms decreased by 94 per cent.\textsuperscript{139}

Given its disappointment with economic aid and the shift away from a pro-Western diplomatic line, the Yeltsin government started to focus on developing economic cooperation with the APR states. This was reflected by a document entitled 'A New Approach to National Security Issues', which was drafted by the Russian Security Council in 1996. This document asserted that strengthening economic cooperation with countries in the APR could reduce Russia's diplomatic and economic dependence on the West.\textsuperscript{140} However, Russia has never been an active actor in the economic development of the APR. With obstacles in Russian-Japanese relations in the early 1990s, Russia had expected to build closer economic ties with China in an attempt to develop its Far East and enter into joint economic activities in the APR.\textsuperscript{141}

In addition, the successful experience of China in building private businesses, joint ventures, and special economic zones, as well as in converting military industries to civilian purposes, was expected to provide Russia with useful ways of seeking economic recovery.\textsuperscript{142} During a visit to China in May 1994, then Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin had stated: 'The economic zone in Shanghai is a

\begin{itemize}
\item Solovyev, 'Siberia and the APR', pp.26-30; 'Talks with Jiang Zemin', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 27 May 1994, in FBIS-SOV-94-104, 31 May 1994, p.10. For the obstacles in Russian-Japanese relations in the early 1990s, see 3.B.
\item Alexander Lukin, 'Russia's Image of China and Russian-Chinese Relations', \textit{East Asia}, vol. 17, no. 1 (Spring 1999), pp.10-16.
\end{itemize}

113
real miracle, and the Chinese experiment should be put to use in Russia as quickly as possible.  

The rapid growth of border trade in the early 1990s has led many areas of the Russian Far Eastern regions to depend economically on the neighbouring provinces in China. In 1993, China's share in the foreign trade of the Jewish Autonomous Region and the Amur Region in Russia amounted to 94.6 and 92 per cent. In this year, in the east of Primorskiy and Khabarovsk Krays, China's share in the total trade was nearly 48 per cent. With growing border trade between Russia's Far East and China, local authorities of the Amur and Chita regions have been interested in trade cooperation with China.

**Bilateral Cooperation and Limitations**

Chinese and Russian expectations for closer trade cooperation have been reflected in their Joint Statements, which have expressed a determination to strengthen their economic cooperation and bilateral trade. Although China and Russia have shown strong interests in developing trade ties, bilateral cooperation has failed to reach the level expected. In 1992 and 1993, about 80 - 90 per cent of Sino-Russian bilateral trade was conducted at the cross-border and local level, while the major trade partners were mainly small companies and shuttle merchants. Even though Chinese-

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145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
148 Li, 'The Progress of Chinese-Russian Relations', p.46.
Russian trade reached U.S.$ 6 - 7 billion annually in the mid-1990s, this trade volume accounted for a mere 5 per cent of Russia's total foreign trade, and 2.5 per cent of China's.\(^{149}\)

Viewed from the perspective of 'strategic cooperation', the U.S.$ 6 billion in Russian-Sino annual trade may be considered insignificant when compared to Sino-American annual trade totaling U.S.$ 50 billion. (see Table 2) Chinese and Russian leaders have worried that the failure to boost the scale of economic cooperation may create problems for the development of their 'partnership'.\(^{150}\) The factors which obstructed bilateral trade cooperation have included the poor quality of Chinese products, confusion in the Russian system of taxation, a lack of effective administrative management in Russia, and the low consumption capabilities of the Russian population.\(^{151}\)

**Table 2 Sino-Russian Trade, 1992-1998**

(Unit: U.S.$ billions)

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<tr>
<td>Turnover</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
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\(^{15}\) The author's interview with Prof. Xia Yishan, Head of the East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies, CIIS, the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 7 January 1998, Beijing.

\(^{15}\) Zhao Huasheng, 'Guanyu zhonge guanxi changqi wending fazhan di sikao' [Thoughts on the Long-term Steady Development of Sino-Russian Relations], *Guaji weti luntan* (Shanghai), no. 3 (1997), pp.63-64.
Chinese and Russian cooperation in multilateral economic activities in the APR has been limited, even though China has supported Russia's admission to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Chinese and Russian joint ventures in the Far East region have remained small scale projects, such as hotels, canteens and restaurants, cloth-making, and medical centres. Moreover, although local governments of the Amur and Chita Regions have supported economic cooperation with China, local authorities of Primorskiy Kray have voiced concerns about China's expansion into the Russian Far East. Local authorities have expressed opposition to the TREZ project, in which China was interested. In their opinion, China may build a sea port in this region, and this project would decrease the importance of the Russian ports of Vladivostok and Nakhodka. Local opposition led China to modify the TREZ project in 1995.

In order to achieve economic recovery, the Yeltsin government expressed strong interests in developing long-term and large-scale cooperation projects with China. At their fifth summit in December 1997, Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin announced the strategic objective of achieving a bilateral trade volume of U.S.$ 20 billion by the year 2000. These two sides declared that they would develop large-scale joint projects in such fields as petroleum, natural gas, electricity, aerospace and nuclear power.

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It is doubtful that these states can increase trade cooperation through political measures. The question here is that while Russia has been eager to develop large-scale joint projects with China, China has seen Western high technology as a better option for its industrial modernisation. In August 1997, the failure to win the U.S.$750 million contract to participate in the world's largest 'Three Gorges' hydroelectric power station in China frustrated Russian attempts to take part in large-scale and long-term development projects in China. Moreover, when Russia stood on the verge of economic bankruptcy in autumn 1998, Jiang Zemin postponed a scheduled visit to Moscow so as to prevent Russia from expecting too much from economic cooperation with China. The ambitious projects to supply China with surplus electricity from nuclear power plants in the Russian Far East and to deliver 1 million tons of Russian oil to China remained in doubt.

These developments suggest clearly that there remain divergent economic interests between these two parties. In the short term, Russia's unstable and worsening economic situation has raised deep uncertainties for the development of Sino-Russian economic cooperation, beyond limited cross-border trade. In the long term, enhanced Russian economic capacity may not be in China's interests. After resolving its domestic problems, Russia may strengthen its penetration into the APR

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Since the early 1990s, the Russian leadership and consortium had been interested in this project. But French, Swiss, Canadians and Germans won the tender in 1997. See Moiseev, 'The Kremlin's Eastern Policy', p.35.


and become a competitor of China in the region. These problems have made the pledge to develop strategic cooperation in economic affairs unrealistic.

E) Conclusions: An Unstable Political Foundation for Military Cooperation

China and Russia have aimed with their 'partnership' to have a 'long-term', 'equal', and 'stable' relationship. However, this objective has not meant that a stable political environment has been created. Both sides have different perceptions and expectations of the 'partnership'. The future development of the relationship remains uncertain.

From the Chinese point of view, building 'strategic partnership' with other great powers will demonstrate that China is on the course to becoming a world power. As one Chinese analyst explained in a 1998 group discussion:

"Today, for China, strategic partnership does not mean security or military connections with foreign states, but a long-term, equal, and stable relationship with world superpowers or vital great powers. China has been very careful to use this term - 'strategic partnership' to define its relations with other powers. To date the USA and Russia are the only two great powers with which China agreed to set up a 'strategic partnership'."

The creation of a 'strategic partnership' with both Russia and the USA was seen as a means to show China's status of a quasi superpower in the new era. Moreover, since the 19th century, China has complained of an 'unequal position' in its relationship with Russia. The establishment of a 'strategic partnership' with Russia has symbolised the advent of a new era in the Sino-Russian relationship, in which China

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160 Dr. Yang Jiemia, Director of the Department of American Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), group discussion, 15 January 1998, Shanghai. The Chinese deliberate terminology was illuminated in that China used the term - 'comprehensive partnership' to define its relations with France and the U.K., and the term - 'a friendly and cooperative partnership' for Japan. See 'China, France Sign Joint Declaration', Beijing Review, 2-8 June 1997, p.7-9; 'China-UK Joint Statement', Beijing Review, 26 October-1 November 1998, pp.6-7; 'Partnership Needed for China,
has started to enjoy an 'equal position' in its relations with Russia. Given its increasing economic strength, China has shown greater confidence in dealing with Russia. In interviews in China in 1998, the author found that many Chinese analysts believed that China would even get the upper hand in the future development of the Sino-Russian relationship.

Russia has also seen Russian-Chinese 'strategic partnership' in terms of 'stable', 'long-term', and 'equal' relations. Russia's expectation for such a relationship highlights the decline of its political and economic influence. In terms of Sino-Russian cooperation, the Yeltsin leadership played a more active role than its Chinese counterpart, particularly, after its shift away from a pro-Western diplomatic line in late 1992. In early 1994, Yeltsin proposed setting up a 'constructive partnership' between the two countries. During his second visit to Beijing in April 1996, Yeltsin insisted on using the term 'strategic' regarding the Russian-Chinese partnership. This emphasis on 'strategic partnership' underscored the Yeltsin leadership's attempt to play the 'China card' to compensate for the continuing erosion of Russia's international and regional influence and to participate in regional

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161 The author's interview with Shi Ze, Vice President of the CIIS, the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 7 January 1998, Beijing.
162 The author's interviews with Guo Zhenyuan, Deputy-Chief of the International Strategy and Security Division, China's Center for International Studies, the Chinese State Council, 12 January 1998, Beijing; with Xin Qi, Research Fellow, Center for Peace and Development Studies, General Political Department of the PLA, 4 January 1998; and with Xia Liping, Deputy Director of the Department of American Studies, SIIS, 15 January 1998, Shanghai.
164 In early 1994, it was proposed in a private letter from Yeltsin addressed to Chinese President Jiang Zemin that 'a constructive partnership looking beyond this century be established between the two countries'. See 'Speech by President Jiang at the Russian Institute of International Relations', p.13.
economic activities. However, given the shift in power relations between these two countries, playing the 'China card' was increasingly viewed as a risk by Russian political elites. As Vassily Likhachev, Vice-Chairman of the Federation Council of Russian Federal Assembly, questioned in 1997:

'Strategic partnership' in a situation, when one partner is reeling in a deep economic and military decline and the other is on the upswing, will make the weaker partner the underdog of such relations... It is just impossible to speak of strategic partnership in conditions when China's real strategic interests, indeterminate as they are, will largely depend on the strength of the Russian positions in the Far East, inherited from the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, and viewed by the Chinese as historical injustice.

During the Cold War period, these two countries' military relations were repeatedly affected by changes in their domestic situations and in their relationship with the USA. After the Cold War, some of the literature has argued that Chinese and Russian bilateral relations have been consolidated by their common interests in a broad range of fields. In contrast, this examination suggests that the development of the Sino-Russian 'partnership' has remained strained. Bilateral cooperation has been developed to meet their own concerns formed by domestic and external environments. The unsound nature of this relationship has been reflected in that bilateral cooperation has been limited to 'contradictory commitments' and 'hyperbolic

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166 The author's interviews with Dr. Vasilii I. Krivokhizha, First Deputy Director, Russia’s Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS), 6 July 1998, Moscow; with Dr. Dmitri G. Evtafiev, Leading Research Fellow, RISS, 6 July 1998, Moscow; with Dr. Dmitri V. Trenin, Deputy Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, 7 July 1998, Moscow; with Prof. Ioceri Fedorov, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, the Russian Foreign Ministry, 8 July 1998, Moscow; and with Peter V. Vlassov, correspondent of ITAR-TASS news agency and Expert magazine, 10 July 1998, Moscow.


Curbed cooperation in the counter-balancing of U.S. hegemony, different perceptions of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance and NATO enlargement, potential competition in Central Asia, and limited economic cooperation have underlined geopolitical and economic contradictions between China and Russia. The future of the relationship remains uncertain. The establishment of a 'partnership' has not created a favourable strategic circumstance or a stable political foundation for close military cooperation.

Given the standstill in bilateral cooperation, the Yeltsin government expected that military cooperation could help to consolidate the relationship. This thesis seeks to broaden understanding on the nature of Chinese and Russian military cooperation. The third proposition underlying this study is that an enduring sense of distrust and conflicts of interest have continued to obstruct Chinese and Russian military cooperation. Section 3 will examine the development and limits of the major components of Sino-Russian military cooperation.

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SECTION 3 COMPONENTS OF MILITARY COOPERATION:
Chapter 4
Confidence-building Measures (CBMs)

After the end of the Cold War, CBMs have constituted an important component of Chinese and Russian military cooperation. In the context of Sino-Russian military cooperation, CBMs have sought to create an atmosphere of mutual trust and to resolve lingering problems in the military-security field. This chapter examines the nature of Sino-Russian CBMs, and reveals their limitations. It opens by reviewing the evolution and major types of CBMs which were developed by the participating states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) since the 1970s. Also, it addresses the rationale for Sino-Russian CBMs. Following this, this chapter examines the key provisions of Sino-Russian CBMs from a comparative perspective in an attempt to reveal similarities and differences between European and Sino-Russian CBMs. Finally, it explores Chinese and Russian cooperation in resolving issues of territorial security, which were not covered by the European model and have shown significant

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1 According to James Macintosh, Director of the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, although there is some sense in the distinction between CBMs and their second-generation variation, confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), it hardly seems necessary to engage in this sort of terminological inflation. In this thesis, the term CBMs is used to encompass all varieties of confidence-building measures. See James Macintosh, 'Confidence- and Security-building Measures: A Sceptical Look', in UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (ed.), Confidence and Security-building Measures in Asia (New York: The United Nations, 1990), p.93.


3 In 1995, in order to make the CSCE a permanent organisation, the participating states started to strengthen the structures of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and to increase its potential for political consultation and conflict management.
effort to increase confidence and security building. This chapter closes by arguing that Sino-Russian cooperation on CBMs has helped to lessen military tensions in the border areas and to avoid a surprise attack from the other. However, it has not meant that these states have trusted each other in the wider military and security field, or that the level of trust between them has become solid.

A) The Evolution and Basic Types of CBMs

Before Sino-Russian CBMs may be examined, certain vital concepts and issues related to CBMs require exploration. This section consists of two parts. The first part reviews the evolution and major types of European CBMs. The second part addresses the dynamics and content of Sino-Russian CBMs.

*The European Experience of CBMs*

CBMs are a concept whose primary policy application was rooted in the political and military context of Europe during the Cold War. This concept originated, when NATO and WTO member states signed the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 in an attempt to promote peaceful coexistence and cooperation under the political atmosphere of détente. In the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, a set of principles on CBMs, including prior notification of military manoeuvres involving at least 25,000 troops, was agreed by the participating states of the CSCE.4

Following that, the participating states convened a series of conferences to discuss

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further confidence-building. The Stockholm Conference, which was held between January 1984 and September 1986, agreed to constraints on military activities and deployments, as well as verification measures, which were together viewed as significant military steps toward security-building. In the late 1980s, Gorbachev's 'new thinking' led to the improvement of political and military relations between NATO and WTO. (see 2.D) On 17 November 1990, the CSCE states signed the 'Vienna Confidence- and Security-building Measures Document'. According to this document, the CSCE participating states would conduct an annual exchange of information on their military organisations, manpower, weapon systems, plans for the development of new weapon systems, and defence budgets. On 19 November 1990, the 'Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe' (the CFE Treaty) was signed. It set common ceilings for NATO and WTO with regard to five major categories of offensive conventional armaments and equipment - battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters.

The collapse of the USSR put an end to the East-West military confrontation. The 'Treaty on Open Skies' was signed on 24 March 1992. In this, the parties agreed to establish a multilateral regime for the conduct of observation flights by unarmed reconnaissance aircraft over the territories of the parties in the area from Vancouver to

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Vladivostok. On 28 November 1994, the CSCE states signed 'The Vienna Document 1994', in which the parties concluded more elaborate procedures for the disclosure of defence budgets, allowing for visits to air bases, observation of military activities, joint military exercises, and verification.

Five basic types of CBMs can be identified from this experience. These are: first, communication measures; second, transparency measures; third, constraint measures; fourth, verification measures; and finally, declaratory measures. (see Table 3) Communication measures seek to keep channels of communication open between states that have tense relations so as to help defuse tensions during moments of crisis. Transparency measures attempt to share information on the postures, capabilities, and policies of states in the military-security field so that the parties can reduce suspicions and misunderstanding. Constraint measures seek to impose reciprocal limits on the activities of the parties which have military significance, so as to reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. Verification measures are designed to collect data or provide first hand access in an attempt to confirm or verify a state's compliance with a particular treaty or agreement. As for declaratory measures, they are defined as generalised statements of interests, norms, and beliefs espoused by the parties as a guide to the conduct of relations.

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11 The Henry L. Stimson Center, Confidence-Building Measures Project.
13 Ibid.
14 The Henry L. Stimson Center, Confidence-Building Measures Project.
among them.\footnote{Acharya, \textit{The ASEAN Regional Forum}, p.2.}

### Table 3 Basic Types of CBMs

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<th>Communication Measures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Hot lines</td>
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<td>• Joint crisis control centres</td>
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<td>• Regularly scheduled consultations (annual meetings between the armed forces, direct military-to-military contact)</td>
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<table>
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<th>Transparency Measures</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Data exchanges (publication of defence information, information exchange, consultative commissions, publication of defence budget figures)</td>
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<th>Constraint Measures</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Limited force deployment zones (no threatening manoeuvres or equipment tests, no threatening deployments near sensitive areas such as tanks on a border, manpower limits, nuclear-free zones)</td>
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<td>• Pre-notification requirements (advance notification of exercises, force movements, mobilisations - including information, mandatory invitations with information about the activity)</td>
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<td>• 'Tension-reduction' measures (no harassing activities)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Verification Measures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Aerial inspections</td>
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<td>• On-site inspections</td>
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<tr>
<th>Declaratory Measures</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Any variety of undertaking to act in a way that will increase confidence, understanding, etc. (non-first use of nuclear weapons and non-first use of force)</td>
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</table>

The major goal of these measures is to exchange information and knowledge about military activities so as to clarify their true nature. Also, they aim to inhibit the use of
force and to prevent the display of large military forces. As such, the parties may increase predictability in their security relations, enhance stability and security, and improve the political climate.

The Dynamics and Content of Sino-Russian CBMs

While developing CBMs with a potential adversary, a country may face a security dilemma between the elements of cost and benefit. One of the major costs of CBMs is that military secrecy will be open to scrutiny by a potential military adversary. This will reduce a country's capacity to create surprise in a situation of war. On the other hand, CBMs can bring benefits, particularly, stability, predictability and security in a country's relationship with a military adversary. To evaluate the costs and benefits of CBMs, a country has to consider the wider political landscape as well as its grand strategy.

It has been argued that the pursuit of CBMs depends on pre-existing political détente between two states. As was stated in Chapter 2, in the late 1980s, new domestic and external environments had pushed China and the USSR to normalise bilateral relations. In April 1990, the two parties signed the 'Guiding Principles of Reducing Border Forces and Enhancing Mutual Trust in the Military Field'. In December 1991,

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19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Desjardins, Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures, p.5. Also see Jing-dong Yuan, Sino-Russian Confidence Building Measures: A Preliminary Analysis, Working Paper no.20 (Vancouver: Institute of
Chinese and Soviet military delegations had started to visit military regions of the other. After the collapse of the USSR, China and Russia stressed the importance of having stable bilateral relations. This policy paved the way for their cooperation on CBMs. At the 1992 summit, Jiang Zemin and Yeltsin agreed that the 1990 agreement would serve as the basis for negotiations on CBMs and arms reduction.

In addition to changes in the political climate, other factors accounted for Chinese and Russian interests in pursuing confidence-building in the military-security field. For China, the military build-up along the border was a heavy burden in its defence spending. In the early 1990s, ground forces constituted 2.3 million out of 3 million in total PLA manpower, and three-quarters of the PLA's ground troops were deployed in the north. Due to financial considerations, between 1990 and 1993, China had withdrawn about 25 divisions from its border with Russia, leaving another 25 there. According to the PLA's General Staff Department, the reduction of troop strength along the border with Russia annually saved nearly 7 billion renminbi in Chinese military expenditure. Also, alleviating tensions along the common border with Russia could help to end the necessity for a large standing ground force along China's northern border. In this way, China has sought to concentrate resources to modernise the air and naval forces and to deter against international relations, University of British Columbia, 1998), p.12 and p.25.

22 The author's interviews with Shi Ze, Vice President, China Institute of International Studies, the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 7 January 1998, Beijing; and with Prof. Evgeny P. Bazhanov, Director of the Institute of Contemporary International Studies, the Russian Foreign Ministry, 6 July 1998, Moscow.


25 Chuan Hsun-che, 'High-Level Think Tank Suggests "China Allying Itself with Russia against the United States"', Cheng Ming (Hong Kong), no. 193 (1 November 1993), pp.20-21, in FBIS-CHI-93-213, 5
Taiwan's attempts to attain independence.\textsuperscript{26}

After the USSR signed the CFE Treaty with NATO in 1990, China had worried that Moscow would move military hardware from the European theatre to east of the Ural Mountains. According to a report of \textit{Far Eastern Economic Review} in November 1992, following the signature of the CFE treaty in 1990, Moscow transferred more than 16,000 tanks, 16,000 armoured fighting vehicles and 25,000 artillery pieces to east of the Urals. 50 per cent of the armour, in particular, modern T72 and T80 tanks, was transferred to re-equip Russian military units in Central Asia and the Far East.\textsuperscript{27} Moscow explained that the re-deployment of military hardware was a normal result of the country's military modernisation. Yet, in China's view, the dramatic growth in the number of modern weapons systems located in the Russian Far Eastern regions represented a threat to its security, since the quality of Chinese military equipment was inferior.\textsuperscript{28} Pursuing cooperation with Russia on CBMs could ease Chinese anxiety over this issue.

On the Russian side, the maintenance of massive military forces was also a heavy budgetary burden, as the country continued to suffer economic hardship and its defence spending was drastically reduced. Maintaining a smaller force was seen as an advantageous option for Russian defence policy. In 1996, the Yeltsin government


\textsuperscript{27} Tai Ming Cheung, 'The Eastern Front: Russian Military Deployment in Asia Sparks Concern', \textit{FEER}, 26 November 1992, p.28.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Ibid.}
planned to reduce its armed forces by more than one million servicemen.\(^{29}\) The Russian and Chinese negotiations on reductions coincided with Russian intentions to conduct an overall reduction of its armed forces.

In addition, due to draft evasion and budget cuts, Russian forces have stood at a low level of readiness. In 1995, it was estimated that only one-fifth of the Russian tank fleet was usable.\(^{30}\) According to James Clay Moltz, in 1995, Russian forces facing China consisted of less than 40 divisions, with many of them reported to be at less than 40 per cent strength. This led to the situation where the actual troop levels deployed along the border with China were only 200,000 strong.\(^{31}\) In an interview conducted by the author on 10 July 1998, Peter V. Vlassov, correspondent of ITAR-TASS and Expert magazine, pointed out that Russian conventional armed forces would no longer be able to cope with a large-scale ground attack launched by China. As such, China would be able to occupy many of Russian territories in the Far East within 12 hours.\(^{32}\) The talks with China over CBMs were designed to ease such worries.

Based on these assessments of their interests, between 1992 to 1999, several political declarations and documents concerning confidence-building were agreed to by China and Russia. In their Joint Statements on 18 December 1992 and 3 September 1994, Chinese and Russian leaders issued declaratory measures on the non-use of force and on non-aggression. In the 'Agreement on Military Cooperation for the Next Five Years'

\(^{29}\) Address of President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin to the Leaders of the Russian Armed Forces on May 29, 1996’, Military News Bulletin (Moscow), vol. 5, no. 6 (June 1996), pp.3-6.
\(^{32}\) The author's interview with Peter V. Vlassov, correspondent of ITAR-TASS and Expert magazine, 10
signed in November 1993, some information and communication measures were agreed to by the two Defence Ministers. In the 'Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities' on 13 July 1994, 'tension-reduction' measures were issued by the Defence Ministers. On 3 September 1994, Chinese and Russian leaders signed an agreement of declaratory measures on non-first use and non-targeting of nuclear weapons. In August 1995, in the 'Agreement on Cooperation in Border Defence', the two sides agreed to strengthen information and communication measures between neighbouring military districts. In the 'Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field in Border Areas between China and Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan' on 26 April 1996 (called the Shanghai Agreement thereafter), the parties agreed on notification measures, observer measures, and constraint measures. In the 'Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas' on 24 April 1997, China, Russia, and three Central Asian states went beyond the Shanghai Agreement to conduct force limitations in the border areas.

A major limit to an examination of Sino-Russian CBMs is that relevant information has been inaccessible. Except for the Sino-Russian Joint Statements, these documents have remained secret (Unofficial translations and partial texts of these documents have been available). European CBMs have been well examined as information about initial proposals, negotiations, disputes, final agreements, and implementation has been available. In contrast, little information is available on the negotiating history and the implementation of Sino-Russian CBMs. In 1997, Amitav Acharya, a CBMs expert,
called upon the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) members to urge China and Russia to provide more details on their CBMs so that others could learn from them.³³

Given this limitation, this discussion of Sino-Russian CBMs will analyse key provisions of these agreements from a comparative perspective. Concluding documents on CBMs has meant that the parties have agreed to accept specific demands for transparency in their military affairs. An examination of their key provisions can help to understand the security concerns of China and Russia while they sought to develop CBMs. Sino-Russian CBMs have paralleled the five major European types - communication measures, transparency measures, constraint measures, verification measures, and declaratory measures. This chapter below will explore similarities and differences between European and Sino-Russian CBMs in order to reveal the nature of these measures.

B) Similarities of Sino-Russian CBMs to the European Model

Some similarities can be found between European and Sino-Russian CBMs. These have resided in four areas: first, declaratory measures; second, transparency measures; third, communication measures; and finally, constraint measures. These will be explored in this section.

Declaratory Measures

Declaratory measures seek to increase mutual confidence and understanding in different

³³ Acharya, *The ASEAN Regional Forum*, p.16.
fields and on different issues by clarifying security policy. (see 4.A) For this, the CSCE states declared that they would refrain from the threat and use of force in the 1975 Final Act and the 1990 Vienna Document.\(^{34}\) During the Cold War, the USSR had emphasised the need for building mutual trust through declarations on the non-use of force, in the belief that such declarations could help to strengthen confidence among states.\(^ {35}\) On 19 May 1991, in their Joint Statement, China and the USSR declared that they would resolve disputes through peaceful measures and would not use force or threaten to use force.\(^ {36}\)

In December 1992, Jiang Zemin and Yeltsin reaffirmed that both countries would resolve all controversial issues by peaceful means. The two parties also announced that they would not resort to military force or threat in whatever form against each other, including threats that were created from the use of the territory, territorial waters and air space of a third country.\(^ {37}\) In addition, they agreed that neither should take part in military and political alliances directed against the other party. Neither side would sign treaties or agreements with any third country that were detrimental to the state sovereignty and security interests of the other state.\(^ {38}\) Moreover, no party would allow its territory to be used by a third country to the detriment of the state sovereignty and interests of the other.\(^ {39}\) These joint statements are related to issues of general principles and govern bilateral politico-military relations. They can help to increase stability in the

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\(^{34}\) 'Vienna Document 1990', p.475.


Sino-Russian relationship.40

Since the Cold War, reciprocal nuclear threat has been a main security concern of Beijing and Moscow. (see 2.C) To reduce the perception of mutual nuclear threat, in September 1994, China and Russia announced the non-first use of nuclear weapons against each other and the de-targeting of strategic missiles away from each other.41 This agreement echoed similar documents that Russia had signed with the USA and the U.K.. Although the number of strategic missiles between Russia and China is asymmetrical, 'China's nuclear weapons have become more survivable through cave-basing, road mobility, and strategic submarine deployment'.42 In the unofficial 'National Security Concept for 1994', Russian political elites and defence experts had warned that the growing nuclear-missile potential of China could pose a military threat to Russia. Reducing the nuclear threat from China was seen as one of the vital tasks for Russia to parry potential external threats in the 1990s.43

In an interview on 6 July 1998, Vasiliy I. Krivokhizha, First Deputy Director of Russia's Institute for Strategic Studies, noted that Russia had the capability to re-target its strategic missiles in twenty minutes.44 Therefore, the meaning of the pledge on non-first use and de-targeting has been largely symbolic. The aim of such a declaration was to

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38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Yuan, Sino-Russian Confidence Building Measures, p.27.
44 The author's interview with Dr. Vasiliy I. Krivokhizha, First Deputy Director, Russia's Institute for Strategic Studies, 6 July 1998, Moscow.
show a psychological breakthrough in both sides' security relationship. Nevertheless, it was alleged in July 1997 that strategic missiles deployed on the territory of China were still targeted at Russia. Naturally, this report drew Russian concerns. This led China to reaffirm that it would abide by the joint statement on non-targeting of strategic missiles and non-first use of nuclear weapons. This event implied that the level of trust between the two parties still remained weak and that reciprocal nuclear threat was an enduring major security concern of China and Russia.

Transparency Measures

Lack of information on military matters can lead to mistrust and tension between states. According to one analyst of CBMs, when 'there is a lack of information about other states' military capabilities or activities, officials tend to make worst case analyses'. To prevent this from happening, the CSCE states cooperated to achieve military transparency by means of providing each other with hard data and facts with regard to significant military activities, force structure, and force planning. In addition, regular and joint discussion of military doctrines and security concepts was conducted. This enabled these states to 'share information on the mind-set, the philosophy and the ideas guiding the activities and structure of each other's armed forces'.

Similarly, China and Russia have exchanged information on armed forces deployed

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46 Ibid.
47 Desjardins, Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures, pp.21-22.
49 Ekeus, 'Multilateral Measures to Increase Military Transparency and Their Alternatives', pp.56-57.
in border areas. In the 1996 Shanghai Agreement, China, Russia and three Central Asian states agreed to exchange information on the personnel strength and the quantities of major military equipment of all their forces (ground, air, air defence aviation, and border guard troops) deployed in the 100-km geographical area on each side of the border line. For the first time, China and Russia agreed to exchange information annually on military deployment in the border areas.

Additionally, China and Russia have also developed information exchanges of military doctrines and security concepts. In the 'Agreement on Military Cooperation for the Next Five Years' in November 1993, they agreed to improve the transparency of their military affairs by informing the other about their military doctrines, their experience in armed forces construction, and other matters which concerned both sides.

Data exchanges relevant to armed forces deployment in the border areas and military and security concepts have been seen as important steps in the confidence-building process. (see 4.A) Chinese and Russian agreements on these measures have demonstrated their desire to ease tensions and establish an atmosphere of trust in their relationship.

Communication Measures

Communication between military representatives can help to promote mutual

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50 'Unofficial Translation: Agreement between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the People's Republic of China on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area' (hereafter called as 'Unofficial Translation: the Shanghai Agreement'), in Acharya, The ASEAN Regional Forum, Appendix 3, p.58.

understanding of the intentions of potential adversaries. The exchange of views among personnel directly involved in military planning, decision-making and training may overcome misperceptions and prejudices. According to Martine Vukovich, of the Austrian Foreign Ministry, 'the development of human relations through these means is of no less importance than the exchange of professional views'. For these reasons, the CSCE states agreed in the 1990 and 1994 Vienna documents to exchange visits between senior military representatives, increase contacts between military institutions, and exchange visits by naval vessels and air force units.

In April 1996, China and Russia announced the establishment of a telephone hotline between the leaderships. In addition, both sides have sought to increase contacts between their armed forces in an attempt to reduce the scope for misunderstanding. Guided by the 1993 'Agreement on Military Cooperation for the Next Five Years', the two sides enlarged the staff of the military attachés in their embassies in Beijing and Moscow by three persons, in order to focus on increasing exchanges and contacts between both defence ministries. In 1993, a direct communication channel was set up between the commanders of the Russian Far Eastern Military District and the Chinese Shenyang Military Region, which are the main military regions along the common

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53 Ibid., p.44.


55 'Russo-Chinese Agreements Signed', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 25 April 1996, in SWB, SU 2596, 26 April 1996, p.B 6. Although it is not known what information can be passed on the hotline, its establishment offers a channel to exchange time-urgent information, clarify intentions, and take preparatory measures to control crisis escalation in periods of tension.

56 Patrick E. Tyler, 'China and Russia Act to Avoid Conflicts', International Herald Tribune, 4 December 1993; 'On Grachev's Signing of Accord', AFP (Hong Kong), 11 November 1993, in FBIS-CHI-93-217, 12
border. Commanders from both headquarters have conducted exchanges with each other's forces. In August 1995, the two countries signed the 'Agreement on Cooperation in Border Defence'. As a result, exchanges and visits have developed between the Chinese Jilin and Heilongjiang provincial Military Districts and Inner Mongolia Military District and the Russian Pacific, Far East, and the Rear Baykal Border Guard Districts.

Furthermore, Chinese and Russian naval forces resumed reciprocal port calls, which had been terminated in the late 1950s. In August 1993, three ships of the Russian Pacific Fleet, under Deputy Commander Vice Admiral Khmelenov, visited the Chinese naval base of Qingdao. In return, in December 1993 a Chinese fleet visited Vladimir, and also sent a ground force delegation to Russia's Far Eastern training facilities and military academies. On 28 July 1996, a PLA Navy destroyer participated in a naval review commemorating the 300th anniversary of the Russian Navy at Vladivostok.

Exchange visits to military bases and units have also been conducted on a voluntary basis. In November 1993, the Chinese military arranged for then Russian Defence Minister Grachev to visit the Chinese Lushun naval base in Liaoning Province, an important site never previously seen by either Soviet or Russian military servicemen. On this visit, Grachev stated that 'the fact of visiting Lushun (Port Arthur) is evidence of the

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Chinese side's respect for our state and its striving for strong ties with Russia. In return, the Russian military allowed the Chinese to make their first visits to regional detachments of Russian armed forces. In September 1994, a military delegation was sent by China to visit the Russian Transbaikal Military District. In June 1999, a Chinese military delegation, led by the Vice-Chairman of China's Central Military Committee Zhang Wannian, was allowed to visit a unit of Russia's Strategic Missile Troops.

Such communication measures have no implications for military secrecy. However, these personnel contacts may reduce the scope for misperception between the two sides. For this reason, both China and Russia have been enthusiastic about communication measures, particularly in contacts between high-level military officials. These various forms represented important 'confidence-building exchanges' and have contributed positively to Sino-Russian relations.

**Constraint Measures**

As was stated, constraint measures seek to impose reciprocal limits on the activities which have military significance, so as to reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. An important constraint measure consists in limiting threatening manoeuvres near sensitive areas. In the 1990 Vienna Document, the CSCE participating states agreed not to carry

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out military activities, subject to prior notification involving more than 40,000 troops.\textsuperscript{65} Similarly, in the 1996 Shanghai Agreement, China and Russia agreed to limit the scale of military exercises within the 100-km border zone. (see Table 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Area</th>
<th>Scale Limits of Military Exercises</th>
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| In the 100-kilometre geographical area on both sides of the border line | 1. The parties shall not conduct troop exercises with the number of participants exceeding 40,000 people in the Eastern part of the Chinese-Russian border; and 4,000 or 50 battle tanks in the Western part of the Chinese-Russian border and on the border of the three Central Asian states separately or jointly.  
2. The sides shall conduct troop exercises with the number of participants exceeding 25,000 people no more than once a year. |
| Within the 15-kilometre area                         | The sides can conduct troop exercises with no more than one regiment participating in live firing exercises. |
| Within the 10-kilometre area                         | The sides shall not deploy new combat units other than border troops.                               |


Another important constraint measure consists in pre-notification requirements. Within the context of CBMs, provisions on advance notification of military exercises seek to reduce the scope for biased perception and the likelihood of inadvertent

\textsuperscript{65} 'Vienna Document 1990', p.483.
escalation. The sole binding provision of the Helsinki CBMs was the notification provision for exercises involving more than 25,000 troops. (see 4.A) In the 1990 Vienna Document, the CSCE states agreed that exercises above 13,000 men or 300 battle tanks had to be notified. Additionally, annual calendars of military activities were introduced.

Achieving a clearer understanding of the nature and intentions of exercises in the border areas was an important element of the Shanghai Agreement of 1996. In this Agreement, these sides agreed to notify each other of military activities within the 100-km geographical area on both sides of the border line, when: (1) there was a troop exercise with the number of participants exceeding 25,000 people, and (2) troops and equipment deployed beyond the 100-kilometre geographical area on both sides of the border line were temporarily brought into this area, in numbers of nine thousand and more, or 250 battle tanks and more. Notifications of these military activities had to be presented no later than 10 days before their commencement. The notification had to contain information on the total number of military personnel involved; the number of military formations at the level of regiment and above; and the numbers of battle tanks, battle armoured vehicles, artillery systems of 122 mm caliber and above, battle aircraft, battle helicopters, and tactical missile launchers. Information on the tasks, duration, zone

68 'Unofficial Translation: the Shanghai Agreement', p 59.
of military activities and levels of command would also be provided. 69

Together with advance notification of military exercises, the CSCE participating states had agreed that military activities would be subject to observation whenever the number of troops exceeded 17,000 troops. 70 Like the European states, China and Russia also agreed to invite each other to observe military exercises when the number of participating troops equaled or exceeded 25,000 people or 13,000 people and 300 battle tanks. The invitation would be sent to the other not later than 30 days before the commencement of such exercises. The invited party could send no more than 6 observers to the military exercises. 71 In July 1996, the 'Amur-96' command and control exercises of the Border Troops of the Russian Far Eastern Military District were attended by military observers from the Chinese Defence Ministry and Public Security Ministry. For the first time, Chinese military officers were invited to observe Russian Far Eastern Military District exercises. 72

Such observer measures are to ensure that military activities would be conducted in a non-threatening manner and in accordance with information previously released. As such, the parties can reassure each other of the non-aggressive nature of their behaviour. 73

For China and Russia, with nearly 4,300 km of common border and with a difficult past during the Cold War, observer measures, coupled with prior notification of military exercises, can provide early warning of attack, and help to ease mutual concerns about

69 Ibid., pp.59-60.
71 'Unofficial Translation: the Shanghai Agreement', pp.60-61.
surprise attacks.\textsuperscript{74}

C) Differences between Sino-Russian CBMs and the European Model

In addition to the similarities, some differences between the European model and Sino-Russian CBMs can be identified. These differences consist in the different extent and scope of application of these measures. They may provide insight into the difference in Chinese and Russian security concerns from those of the CSCE states. These have included four major issues: first, the absence of disclosure on defence spending; second, the emphasis on ‘tension-reduction’ measures; third, the lack of inspections and verification; and finally, the failure to conduct overall force limitations in the border areas.

Absence of Disclosure on Defence Budgets

Although China and Russia have exchanged information about armed forces deployed in the border areas and on military doctrines, the information has not included defence spending, an important element in the context of transparency measures. The disclosure of defence spending can help to enhance predictability because it offers the full picture of the other state's military systems and future development and procurement.\textsuperscript{75} Guided by the 1990 and 1994 Vienna documents, the CSCE participating states have exchanged information on their military budgets on an annual basis. More importantly, each

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{75} Holst, 'Confidence-building Measures: A Conceptual Framework', p.11.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
participating state has had the right to ask for clarification of the budgetary information provided by any other participating state.76

As a CSCE member, Russia has provided the CSCE with information on its defence budget. This information is itemised on the basis of the categories set out in the UN 'Instrument for Standardised International Reporting on Military Expenditures' adopted on 12 December 1980. Data on the status of budget figures, clarifications of inflation, operating costs, procurement and construction, and R&D are to be provided.77 As a result, the evolution of Russian military development has lost some of its secrecy.

In contrast, any evaluation of China's defence spending remains based on guesswork. The Chinese government published Defence White Papers in 1995, 1998, and 2000.78 In these Papers, a description has been offered of China's military doctrine, organisation, education, training, and defence industry structure. However, the Papers still lack transparency in such key areas as the military's weapons list, force deployments and defence purchases. In addition, China offered information on defence budgets in its Defence White Papers. According to the Papers, China spent only U.S.$ 6.39 billion on defence in 1994, U.S.$ 9.8 billion in 1997, and U.S.$ 14.6 billion in 2000.79 It is widely believed that actual Chinese defence spending is between two to five times higher than the official budget.80 Such areas as R&D, military pensions, and earnings from overseas

77 Ibid.
4 For China's three Defence White Papers, see Website http. www.china-embassy.org issues/Defense.htm
79 Ibid
arms sales and civilian production have been excluded from official budget figures.81

According to Chinese military tradition, 'there is no such thing as total transparency for the military - there is only proper transparency'.82 Conservative Chinese thinking about secrecy has resulted in an absence of provisions on defence budget disclosure in Sino-Russian transparency measures. Although it is unclear whether Russia has complained about this, the lack of a provision on defence spending disclosure has meant that the application scope of Sino-Russian transparency measures has not reached that achieved among the CSCE states.

**Emphasis on 'Tension-Reduction' Measures**

So-called 'dangerous military activities' include actions taken by armed forces, their subdivisions or individual servicemen in peace time which can be detrimental to military personnel, civilians, military hardware, and installations, the environment, and therefore the strategic stability of another state.83 Such activities can create tensions between armed forces deployed by opponent states in sensitive neighbouring areas. To avoid this, in the 1990 Vienna Document, the CSCE participating states set up a mechanism for consultation and cooperation on 'unusual military activities' and 'hazardous incidents of a military nature'. It was agreed that matters relating to information about hazardous

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82 Ibid.
incidents would be discussed by participating states at the Conflict Prevention Centre.\textsuperscript{84}

As a result of their historical experience, China and Russia have placed more emphasis on the prevention of dangerous military activities than the CSCE states. This emphasis on the prevention of dangerous military activities has highlighted their common concern to avoid incidents that could damage their wider political relations, as had occurred during the Cold War. China and Russia have clearly defined relevant measures to prevent 'dangerous military activities' in the 'Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities' of 23 July 1994.

Partial texts of this Agreement have been revealed by China's official news agency \textit{Xinhua} and other sources.\textsuperscript{85} This Agreement provided for several measures to prevent dangerous military activities. These included: safeguards against accidental missile launches; bans on the use of eye-damaging lasers, which can damage the personnel or material of the other state; a prohibition of the electronic jamming of communications; and an early-warning system to prevent each other's aircraft, helicopters, and ships from straying too close to the other's territories.\textsuperscript{86} Additionally, these two sides agreed on an annual meeting to review the implementation of the 'Agreement'.\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{84} 'Vienna Document 1990', p.477.
\textsuperscript{86} According to Russian military analyst Pavel Felgengauer, the 1994 Agreement codified a system that when any plane, helicopter, or ship unexpectedly approached the other's territory, its commander would be warned off at the frequency of 121.5 or 130 mHz (ultra-short wave) a polite code warning: 'Close to territory'. (pronunciation officially agreed upon by both sides) See Pavel Felgengauer, 'Moscow-Beijing: A Russian and a Chinese Are Brothers Forever Once Again. The Agreement "On Preventing Dangerous Military Activity" Has Been Signed', \textit{Segodnya} (Moscow), 13 July 1994, p.2, in FBIS-SOV-94-135, 14 July 1994, p.6.
\textsuperscript{87} 'Agreement to Prevent Dangerous Military Confrontations', p.8. In July 1997, Chinese and Russian defence representatives met in Beijing and consulted on the fulfillment of the 1994 Agreement. The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to prompt exchanges of information on dangerous military activities.
Moreover, a provision on the compensation of damages resulting from dangerous activities was included in the 1996 Shanghai Agreement. The parties agreed that the damage resulting from dangerous military activities of one state would be compensated by that state in accordance with generally recognised principles and rules of international law. Such a provision was not covered in the European 1990 Vienna Document. The historical experience of the 1960s when armed incidents leading to military tensions in the border areas has led China and Russia to develop stricter tension-reduction measures. In order to lessen military tensions in the border areas, the prevention of dangerous military activities and incidents has been an important element in the Sino-Russian CBMs.

*Lack of Inspections and Verification*

In the context of CBMs, the provisions for inspections and verification are in themselves deterrents to non-compliance with the agreement. For this, aerial inspections and on-site inspections have been developed. Aerial inspections enable the parties to monitor compliance with force deployment limitations in restricted areas, to confirm information exchanges on the disposition of military forces, and to provide early warning of potentially destabilising activities. On-site inspections, 'challenge' and routine, are designed to help to verify that the parties are complying with agreements.

See 'Russia, China Take Specific Measures to Prevent Dangerous Military activities', RIA news agency (Moscow), 29 July 1997, in SWB, SU 2984, 30 July 1997, p.B 10


8 Lodgaard, 'A Critical Appraisal of CSBMs by Category', p.25.

90 The Henry L. Stimson Center, *Confidence-Building Measures Project*.

91 Ibid.
In Europe, the CSCE participating states developed elaborate provisions for inspections and verification. These included the right to conduct on-site challenge inspections with no right of denial, and aerial inspections. In the 1990 Vienna Document, up to 35 articles agreed to by the participating states were linked to the implementation of verification. On 24 May 1992, the 'Treaty on Open Skies' was signed to conduct observation flights by unarmed reconnaissance aircraft over the territories of the parties. In the 1994 Vienna Document, up to 32 articles were concluded to standardise the procedure for aerial and ground inspections.

The absence of a mechanism for inspections and verification is an important weakness of Sino-Russian CBMs. In the Sino-Russian Shanghai Agreement, only 4 articles touched upon inspections and verification. This agreement stipulated that inspections could be carried out only if there were clear signs of irregular and threatening activity. More importantly, the Shanghai Agreement did not specify the details of inspections, that is, the inspection equipment, transportation tools, or the procedure for inspections.

The major purposes of inspections and verification are to ascertain compliance with an agreement. It is an important step in the process of trying to achieve confidence. As Marie-France Desjardins concluded in 1996:

In the absence of verification it is difficult to create confidence. As was so often noted in the context of arms-control negotiations, verification is the most important means of gaining assurance and confidence... the absence of verification removes an important procedure which could greatly and probably

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95 'Unofficial Translation: the Shanghai Agreement', p.64.
much more rapidly enhance confidence building - which for most advocates is the 'ultimate' purpose of CBMs.\footnote{Desjardins, \textit{Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures}, pp.40-41.}  

The lack of elaborate procedures for inspections and verification underlines these two states' reluctance to develop total transparency in their military affairs. This suggests clearly that confidence between China and Russia has remained weak and has not reached the same level of trust achieved among the CSCE members.

\textit{Failure to Conduct Overall Force Limitations in the Border Areas}

Another constraint measure resides in manpower and equipment limits - an important step towards reducing the possibility of war.\footnote{In the late 1970s and early 1980s, arms reduction was a difficult task to achieve in Europe. Thus, at that time many analysts and policy-makers tended to separate CBMs from politically unpopular arms reduction so as to accomplish something constructive. By the mid-1980s given the shift of the political environment in Europe, CBMs started to be viewed as an important step in curbing the dynamics of the arms buildup and in undertaking arms restraint and disarmament. See Macintosh, 'Confidence- and Security-building Measures', pp.93-94; Lodgaard, 'The Building of Confidence and Security at the Negotiations in Stockholm and Vienna', p.437.}  

The restrictions on the deployment of forces have a central role to play in the imposition of constraints and the reduction of the dangers of escalation.\footnote{Yair Evron, 'Arms Control in the Middle East: Some Proposals and Their Confidence-Building Roles', in Alford (ed.), \textit{The Future of Arms Control: Part III}, p.33.} For this, the 1990 CFE Treaty had set common ceilings for NATO and WTO with regard to five major offensive categories of conventional armaments and equipment - 20,000 battle tanks, 30,000 armoured combat vehicles, 20,000 artillery, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 combat helicopters. The area of application covers the entire land territory in Europe.\footnote{\textquotesingle{}Desjardins, \textit{Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures}, pp.40-41.}  

In April 1990, China and the USSR had signed the 'Guiding Principles of Reducing Border Forces and Enhancing Mutual Trust in the Military Field'. Following that, it took
seven years for China and Russia to complete talks on this agreement. The definition of
the zones of force limitations was the major dispute during Chinese and Russian talks.
The zones for force limitations or disarmament usually cover geographical points of
strategic or tactical importance, and cover an area extensive enough to make surprise
attack more difficult.\textsuperscript{100} Although China and Russia agreed on the 100-km 'geographical
zones' for force limitations on the eve of Yeltsin's first visit to China in December 1992,
talks on force limitations were deadlocked.\textsuperscript{101} The major reason for this was that both
sides had completely different military deployments in the border areas.

The Chinese armed forces along the border were deployed deep inside its territory.
This position resulted from two factors. First, China enjoys impregnable natural barriers
such as the Great Khingan mountains and the Lesser Khingan mountains which provide
geographical shields against northern invaders. Wide and unoccupied spaces in
Manchuria and Xinjiang offer China operational space for military use.\textsuperscript{102} Second, Mao
Zedong's concept of the 'people's war' was based on a trade-off between space and time
with the aim of luring the enemy deep into Chinese territory, before drowning him in a

\textsuperscript{99} 'Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe', pp.461-488.
\textsuperscript{100} Dimitris Bourantonis and Marios Evriviades, 'Disarmament and Arms Limitation: The Case for
\textsuperscript{101} Vladimir Kuzar, 'Russia-China: New Level of Cooperation: Boris Yeltsin's Official Visit to the PRC
Begins Today', \textit{Krasnaya Zvezda} (Moscow), 17 December 1992, p.3, in FBIS-SOV-92-244, 18 December
1992, p.11. The disarmament talks were attended by a joint delegation of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan, which was led by Director of the First Asian Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry N.
Solovyev. The Chinese delegation was ed by Ambassador Wang Gonghua. On 28 November 1992, these
four CIS countries and China completed the eighth round of talks on mutual cuts of armed forces and
armaments in the border areas. See 'Four CIS States and China Held Talks on Armed Forces in Border
\textsuperscript{102} Gerald Segal, \textit{Defending China} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p.13; Georges Tan Eng Bok,
'Strategic Doctrine', in Gerald Segal and William T. Tow (eds), \textit{Chinese Defence Policy} (London: The
'sea of people'. This strategy led China to adopt a defensive position of mass mobilisation against the threat from the north throughout the 1970s and the 1980s.

In contrast, in Russia, the unpopulated and flat Far Eastern sector is a vulnerable area in terms of geographical and military security. (see 2.C) Major industrial centres and transportation lines in the Far East are close to the border with China. The Trans-Siberian Railway line, which is of strategic importance to Russia, runs in some places merely 5 km from the border. The distance between the vital industrial centre, Khabarovsk, and the border is only 7 km, and Vladivostok, a major base for the Russian Pacific Fleet, is only 70 km away from the border. To defend its Far Eastern section, Moscow had concentrated its armed forces within 100 km of the border since the 1960s. As a result, 90 per cent of the forces of the Far Eastern and Baikal Military Districts were concentrated along the frontier.

The Russian military have been concerned about a security threat from China. Accordingly, they argued that the process of force limitations should be based on the principle of equal, proportional downsizing of Russian and Chinese troops and weapons to the entire depth of the sides' border troop contingents. As Colonel N. M. Maslyayev suggested in 1994:

The most acceptable downsizing option for Russia is in zones to a depth of 800 km and more from the state border because the main grouping of the People's Liberation Army of China is stationed precisely at this depth while 80 percent

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1 Bok, 'Strategic Doctrine', p.6.
of Russian troops in the Maritime and Amur Region are positioned near the border in a zone of up to 100 km, and Russia has no possibility to redeploy them into the country's inner parts owing to climatic, geo-physical, and economic conditions. Therefore it is our view that the agreement reached in December 1992 on troop downsizing within a 100-km border zone by each side effectively means a unilateral downsizing of Russian troops.\textsuperscript{107}

Even though 15 rounds of the talks had already been held, in a meeting between the Defence Ministers in May 1995, Russian Defence Minister Grachev still refused to conclude a final decision on force limitations in the border zones. In the words of Grachev:

The figures suggested by China are unacceptable to Russia. They are unacceptable only for the reason that Russia's geographic position and climate conditions differ from those of China... all Russian equipment and armaments are situated in that zone, while the 100-kilometre zone of China is virtually clear of arms.\textsuperscript{108}

In 1997, Yeltsin started to play a central role in pushing for an agreement with China on force limitations. At the ceremonial signing of a joint declaration with China on 23 April 1997, Yeltsin revealed that the consultations on force limitations had been completed by the state leaders and not the Defence Ministers. He stated:

(During the talks of border disarmament) The two defence ministers had dug their heels in. We pushed them aside and resolved the controversial issues ourselves. So the two heads of state cleared the matter up... We discussed more than 20 issues with our Chinese partners. They included issues on the borders, the level of armaments along the borders...\textsuperscript{109}

On 24 April 1997, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan formally signed the 'Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas'. In this, the

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., p.3.
five countries set ceilings on the number of troops and the amount of military equipment each country could have within 100 km on each side of the border. This Agreement covers personnel, battle tanks, armoured vehicles, tactical missile launchers, artillery systems upwards of 122mm caliber, combat aircraft and combat helicopters. Russia and the three Central Asian countries may maintain a total of 3,900 tanks, 4,500 armoured vehicles and 290 aircraft within the zone, while China may have the same number on its side. In addition, the military manpower of China and the four CIS states would be limited to 130,400 troops on each side.

Two major differences between the CFE Treaty and the 1997 five-state agreement can be identified. First, the latter included specific restrictions on military manpower, which the former did not. Guided by the 1997 five-state agreement, Russia will have to reduce the actual number of its troops in the border areas by 15 per cent before the year 2000. As stated earlier, the great number of troops deployed in the border areas was a serious financial burden for both China and the USSR / Russia. Since the détente of the late 1980s, these two parties had started to reduce troops in the border areas. This was undertaken unilaterally in the pursuit of each state's interests. On 25 April 1997, Russian analyst Ilya Bulavinov derided the restrictions on military manpower by stating: 'these reductions would have been made anyway, even without the five-state agreement - they were planned by the General Staff in the context of overall reductions in the Army'.

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Another major difference is that the area of application of the CFE Treaty covers the entire land territory in Europe. The 1997 five-state agreement merely focuses on force limitations in border areas within 100 km on each side of the border. Most importantly, two vital Russian cities in border areas, Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, are excluded from the reductions. The arrangement highlights the Russian military's worries about the country's geopolitical vulnerability in the Far Eastern regions and their concerns about a potential security threat from China. On 25 April 1997, commenting on the 1997 disarmament agreement, the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta concluded that this document did not completely eliminate the real problems that existed between these parties. This suggests clearly that although Yeltsin regarded it as an important task to develop a more stable relationship with China through force limitations in the border areas, Russia did not discount the possibility of China representing a security threat.

D) Chinese and Russian Cooperation in Resolving Issues of Territorial Security

In the guiding principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Stockholm Document, the participating states of the CSCE declared that they would respect 'the inviolability of frontiers' and 'the territorial integrity of States'. In contrast to Cold War Europe, territorial disputes have been the main source of tension in Chinese and Russian relations. Since the end of the Cold War, China and Russia have sought to resolve

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existing and emerging disputes relevant to territorial security. To understand this, two issues will be examined: first, the Chinese and Russian border demarcation process; and second, the problem of illegal Chinese immigrants in the Russian Siberian and Far Eastern regions.

Border Demarcation

The Yeltsin government saw border demarcation as an important step in achieving a stable relationship with China. Russia feared that the Chinese might raise territorial disputes against Russia, as Mao Zedong has done in the 1960s and 1970s. Should this happen, it would represent a nightmare scenario while Russia suffered from serious internal problems and China was becoming a world power. The comments of Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Panov on 31 August 1994 reflected Russian worries about this issue clearly:

In 1970s, the then Soviet Union spent over 200 billion rubles equipping our borders. There was no other solution but the demarcation of the border. There could not be combat actions over every single island. If we do not carry out the demarcation of the border now, the situation could become more complex in the future. In China there are certain circles which could make major territorial claims on us. The completion of the demarcation process will remove the problem of possible claims.  

On 16 May 1991, China and the USSR had signed an agreement on resolving disputes over the eastern section of shared borders. They agreed following the international law based on the Thalweg Principle that the navigation channel of a river should be the dividing line for their common border. (see 2.D) After the Soviet collapse,

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talks between China and Russia on the resolution of border disputes had begun in Moscow in July 1992. The talks concentrated on two major areas: first, defining the 55-km western sector, and second, demarcating the 4,300-km eastern border. (see Map 2)

Map 2 Sino-Russian Border Demarcation

When Jiang Zemin visited Moscow in September 1994, the leaders signed a protocol on the western section of the common border, defining the 55-km section in Altay Kray. (see Map 2) They also agreed to continue demarcating the eastern section of the common border. By November 1997, at their fifth summit, Jiang Zemin and

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Yeltsin announced officially that all points of contention regarding surveying and demarcating the eastern section of the Sino-Russian border were resolved according to the agreement signed on 16 May 1991.119

Although China and Russia called this a historical achievement, potential problems have remained. First, the 1991 agreement omitted contentious territories claimed by both parties in the eastern section of the common border. These include the islands of Tarabarov and Bolshoy Ussuriyskiy near Khabarovsk (30 km in length and 350 square km in area) and Bolshoy Island on the river Argun (28 km in length and 58 square km in area).120 (see Map 3) To maintain a friendly political atmosphere with China, Russia announced that the resolution of these disputed islands might be passed onto the next generation.121 Shelving disputes does not signal the final resolution of sensitive territorial issues. On 22 July 1997, after conducting in-depth interviews with local authorities, residents, and border guards in Khabarovsk Kray on the issue of territorial disputes with China, a Russian television channel warned: 'We are bequeathing a time bomb to our future generations'.122

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120 'Official Explains Border Agreement', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 3 September 1994 in FBIS-SOV-94-172, 6 September 1994, pp.20-21; Kireyev, 'Demarcation of the Border with China', pp.105-106. In the Chinese-Russian border agreement, both sides did not mention how to resolve these disputed islands. They stated it this way: 'Because there are considerable differences of opinion over these islands, the talks will continue'. See Kozyreva, 'A Partnership Oriented toward the 21st Century', p.16.
121 Yuriy Savenkov, "Before You Paint a Tree, See How It Grows". Moscow and Beijing Strive To Abide by This Chinese Proverb', Izvestiya (Moscow), 2 September 1994, p.3, in FBIS-SOV-94-171, 2 September 1994, p.6.
122 'Far East Region Worried over Future of Islands on Chinese Border', NTV (Moscow), 22 July 1997, in
Local Russian authorities and the people of Primorskiy and Khabarovsk Krays have accused the Yeltsin government of territorial concessions to China that damage Russia's interests and security. In 1994, Viktor Ysayev, chief executive of Khabarovsk Kray, openly criticised the Sino-Russian border eastern frontier accord as an 'unjust accord', and called for its revocation. In 1996, Yevgeny Nazdratenko, Governor of Primorskiy Kray, threatened to disobey the Russian government if the Russian-Chinese border was revised. In March 1996, the local Duma of Primorskiy Kray even requested that the

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125 Balburov, 'Maritime Population Wants No "Fair Frontier" with China', p.4.
Russian Constitutional Court examine the constitutionality of the border agreement with China.126

Among the internal actors influencing Russia's policy-making, military leaders have been particularly resistant to making any territorial concessions to foreign states.127 They have expressed their disagreement with the Yeltsin leadership's border demarcation with China. On 4 April 1996, Major General Valery Rozov, Chairman of the Border Demarcation Commission for Primorskiy Kray, resigned, claiming that he could not supervise the transfer of 'strategically important Russian lands' to China.128 Also in 1996, Vitaly Poluyanov, leader of the Ussuriisk Cossack Force, declared that the Russian-Chinese border should remain unchanged, otherwise he would enlist the support of local authorities to take extreme actions.129 On 18 April 1997, Feliks Gromov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, openly warned that the demarcation of the eastern section of the border would change the strategic balance in the APR, particularly if China were to build naval base in the region.130

Disputes over territory have gone to the heart of each state's strategic interests. This is particularly important for Russia, a state which has suffered a marked loss of power and international status.131 Although regional and military resistance failed to force

128 Felix Corley, 'Russia Hands over Land to the Chinese', Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 3, no. 6 (June 1996), p.3.
129 Balburov, 'Maritime Population Wants No "Fair Frontier" with China', p.4.
130 'Navy Chief Says China Border Agreement May Lead to Change in Strategic Balance', Interfax (Moscow), 18 April 1997, in SWB, SU 2899, 22 April 1997, p.S1 1.
Yeltsin to halt border demarcation with China, this domestic opposition has represented an enduring source of uncertainty for a final resolution of border disputes between these two neighbours.

*Illegal Chinese Immigrants in Russia's Far East*

From late 1992 to 1993, Chinese and Russian central and local authorities concluded agreements on visa-free visits between civilians in an attempt to encourage cross border contacts. The Chinese local authorities in the Heilongjiang province particularly encouraged the export of Chinese labour to take part in the development of Russian Far East areas. However, given the increasing number of illegal Chinese immigrants, Russian central and local authorities have expressed concerns about a Chinese 'economic offensive' and 'ethnic expansion' into Siberia and the Far Eastern regions, where Russia faces problems of strategic vulnerability, remote location from the country's centre, and low population levels. This has created tensions between Russia and China. In the words of then Russian State Duma Chairman Gennadiy Seleznev, 'this phenomenon (the illegal settlement of Chinese immigrants in Russian Far East areas) is fraught with creeping territorial expansion'.

In these areas, such problems as severe climatic conditions, a sharp deterioration of the economic situations, food crisis, unemployment, and growing crime, have led ethnic

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Russians to emigrate to west of the Ural mountains. The total Russian population of eastern Siberia and the Far East is only about 8 million, and the population of China's northeastern provinces is more than 110 million. According to some unofficial estimates, the number of the Chinese flowing into Russia has reached 2 million and Chinese immigrants have outnumbered the local Russian population in some settlement points in Russian Far Eastern areas.

In order to prevent the illegal Chinese immigrants from flowing into the Russian Far East, two agreements on visa travel, which tightened control of border crossing, were signed by the Chinese and Russian governments on 29 January 1994. On 5 May 1995, an agreement on cooperation between Chinese-Russian border regimes also entered into effect. Although the Chinese and Russian governments have tried to reduce the impact of this issue on their political relationship, alarming complaints from the local Russian population against the Chinese have occurred. According to Yevgeny Afanasiev and Grigory Logvinov, high ranking diplomats of the Russian Foreign Ministry, in a 1995 opinion survey in Russia's Far East, almost 70 per cent of the population expressed a negative attitude towards the Chinese.


The number of Chinese immigrants living in Russia may be exaggerated. But it has been widely cited in Russian papers. Ibid., p.136; Lukin, 'The Image of China in Russian Border Regions', p.825; Ho, 'Inside Story on Yeltsin's Letter to Jiang Zemin', p.8.

8 Afanasiev and Logvinov, 'Russia and China: Girding for the Third Millennium', p.49.
9 Ibid., p.51.
The issue of increasing Chinese immigrants in Russia's Far Eastern regions can be a source of potential conflict in the Sino-Russian relationship. The Constitution of the PRC stipulates that 'all persons holding the nationality of the People's Republic of China are citizens of the People's Republic of China'. It also argues that 'the People's Republic of China protects the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese nationals residing abroad'. As early as 1958, the issue of 'overseas Chinese' led to serious frictions between China and Indonesia. The 'management' of Chinese immigrants could become a disputed issue between China and Russia as well. In 1995, Russian border troops, the Interior Ministry, and the Federal Counterintelligence Services carried out an operation code-named 'Foreigner' to catch Chinese people with overdue visas or forged passports. The Chinese government criticised this policy and called upon the Russian government to avoid human rights violations in this operation. It is possible that increasing Chinese immigrants in Russia's Far East may provide China with an excuse to criticise or interfere in Russia's internal affairs. In 1998, Russian military expert Dmitri Trenin warned of such a scenario:

There is a forecast that by mid-21st century there will be 7 - 10 million Chinese living in Russia who will thus become the second largest ethnic group in Russia after Russians themselves. This possibility alone should revolutionize Russian mentality and mobilize the will of the authorities. In these conditions the lack of a clear and consistently implemented immigration policies virtually guarantees frictions on the inter-ethnic basis that may lead to an inter-state conflict between Russia and China.

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140 The PRC’s Constitution Chapter Two: Article 33 and Article 34, Website http: www.qis.net/ chinalaw lawtran1.htm
141 In 1958, the Indonesian government forbade Chinese merchants from trading in the villages and sent them to the cities. This policy provoked angry protests from the Chinese government. See Jusuf Wanandi, ‘ASEAN's China Strategy: Towards Deeper Engagement', *Survival*, vol. 38, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), p.118.
143 Dmitri Trenin, *Russia's Chinese Problem*, unpublished paper (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center,
Clearly, with a shift in their power relations, demographic tensions between China and Russia have deepened. Increasing Chinese immigrants in Russia's territories, and Russian fears of Chinese 'expansion', have created uncertainties for the future of the two parties' security relationship.

E) Conclusions: The Search for Trust between China and Russia

Confidence-building should be seen as a 'process' as well as a 'procedure'. This dual characteristic leads to two separate dimensions of confidence-building. The 'process' dimension of a definition of confidence-building stresses that CBMs themselves consist of a process of psychological transformation. The 'procedure' dimension focuses on the content and objective of CBMs. This conceptual duality has led to debates over the practical scope of confidence-building. After addressing the key provisions of Sino-Russian CBMs from a comparative perspective, it is worth applying these two dimensions of confidence-building to outline the nature of Sino-Russian CBMs.

The 'process' dimension emphasises that debating, developing and negotiating CBMs are all integral parts of the confidence-building phenomenon. Bilateral consultations and dialogue may allow the parties to explain their views, discuss their positions, and uncover each other's perceptions. Even though there remain different perceptions and debates, this process of dialogue is considered to contribute to the development of confidence-building. Viewed from this point of view, Chinese and Russian negotiations and cooperation on CBMs have shown their attempt to have a more...
stable relationship, as their CBMs have included some of the major types of European CBMs. In particular, communication measures, transparency measures, and tension-reduction measures concluded by the two parties have helped to lessen military tensions in the border areas. Also, constraint measures, such as constraints on the scale of military exercises within the 100-km border zone and pre-notification requirements, can help to reduce the possibility of a surprise attack from the other. These have contributed to the improvement of bilateral military-security relations.

However, viewed from the 'procedure' dimension, which focuses on the content and objective of CBMs, there remain many problems in Chinese and Russian CBMs. Compared to the European model, many insufficiencies have remained in Sino-Russian CBMs. Unlike the European model which developed a comprehensive instrument applying to military developments anywhere in the territories of the parties, the focus of Sino-Russian CBMs has been only to reduce military tensions in the border regions.\(^{146}\) China has been reluctant to allow more elaborate and constraining CBMs. Following a holistic approach to arms control and CBMs in general, China was only interested in the limited applicability of CBMs within the 100-km border areas.\(^{147}\) This has led to the situation where beyond the lessening of military tensions in these areas, Sino-Russian CBMs have failed to create an outcome in which both sides rule out the possibility of a potential security threat from the other.

This was reflected in that Sino-Russian information exchanges did not include disclosures on defence spending, thus preventing both sides from tracing the full picture

\(^{145}\) Desjardins, *Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures*, p.18.

\(^{146}\) Acharya, *The ASEAN Regional Forum*, p.18.
of the other's military system and future military development and modernisation. In addition, the lack of elaborate procedures for inspections and verification is a serious weakness in their CBMs, highlighting that the level of trust between China and Russia has remained weak. Moreover, it is significant that given its geographic vulnerability in the Far East, Russian concerns about a potential security threat from China have remained salient. Due to geo-strategic and security considerations, these parties have not fulfilled overall force limitations within the 100-km border zone.

More importantly, bilateral cooperation has not gone so far as to eliminate historical problems such as territorial disputes and enduring perceptions of mutual territorial threat. Russian regional and the military resistance to the results of Yeltsin's border demarcation with China may become a problem for a final resolution of the two countries' territorial disputes. Also, given the increasing numbers of Chinese immigrants in the Russian Far Eastern areas, Russia's anxiety about Chinese 'expansion' and ambitions towards Russian territory has risen. Potential inter-ethnic friction between Chinese and Russian peoples in Russia's Far East cannot be ruled out.

Within the context of Sino-Russian military cooperation, CBMs have sought to create an atmosphere of mutual trust to enable the two sides to tackle the problems that have been irritants in their relations. This process was initiated by Gorbachev, and was continued under Yeltsin, particularly, after his shift away from a Western-centric foreign policy in late 1992. Bilateral cooperation 'is sustained not by trust and goodwill but by calculated self-interest'.\footnote{Rajan Menon, 'The Strategic Convergence between Russia and China', \textit{Survival}, vol. 39, no. 2 (Summer 1997).} Compared to the past, significant progress has been made to

\footnote{Yuan, \textit{Sino-Russian Confidence Building Measures}, p.30.}
reduce military tensions in the border areas and to avoid a surprise attack from the other. Beyond this, however, the sense of mutual threat has remained, preventing both sides from trusting each other in the wider military and security field. Although cooperation on CBMs has contributed to the normalisation of bilateral relations, the level of trust between China and Russia has not become solid.
Chapter 5
Russian Arms Transfers to China

Another important component of Sino-Russian military cooperation has been arms transfers. This chapter examines bilateral cooperation and reveals the limits of it. It opens with the examination of demand-side and supply-side factors that led to the possibility of Russian and Chinese arms transfers. It proceeds to elucidate the basic principle of Russian arms transfers to China, that is to ensure that Russian security interests are not undermined. This basic principle is illustrated in two facts. First, Russia has maintained tight controls over the types of weapons supplied to China. Second, Russia has sought to maintain the PLA's power projection vector to focus towards the south through these transfers. Following this, it addresses existing problems in these two states' arms transfer relationship. These have included three major issues. First, China has suffered problems with absorbing Russian weapons. Second, arms exports to China have not been profitable to Russia. Third, disputes over weaponry pricing have delayed arms deals. Also, this chapter explores potential uncertainties for this relationship: first, the alternatives available to China; second, probable armed clashes between China and other Russian arms customers; and finally, U.S. diplomatic pressure. This chapter closes by arguing that the Russian-Chinese arms transfer relationship has remained fragile as it has failed to fully meet both sides' objectives.

A) Demand-side Factors

This examination of Russian-Chinese arms transfer relationship starts by
investigating the rationales behind China's purchases of Russian weaponry. Two major issues will be addressed. They include the new Chinese military strategy in the post-Cold War period and the reasons why China has required Russian weapons for its defence modernisation.

**New Military Strategy and Defence Modernisation**

With the improvement of relations with the USSR in the late 1980s, China's sovereignty claims over Taiwan and the Spratlys highlighted that China's potential conflict areas were increasingly concentrated on the country's coastal islands. To cope with this new security environment, China has shifted from a strategy of preparing the armed forces for an early, large-scale, nuclear war to one of preparing the army for local and limited conflicts.¹

Since the early 1990s, resolving territorial disputes over coastal islands had been viewed as a vital task of China's defence policy. In February 1992, the PRC's National People's Congress passed the 'Law on the Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas', asserting China's ownership over Taiwan and the Spratlys. This law claimed the Chinese right to adopt all necessary measures to prevent and stop the harmful passage of vessels through its territorial waters, including the right of the PRC's warships and military aircraft to expel the intruders.² In 1998, Chinese Defence Minister Chi Haotian made it clear that the basic goal of China's defence policy was to consolidate national defence, resist foreign aggression, defend the

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nation's territory, territorial air and waters and maritime rights and maintain national integrity and security.³

However, due to its limited air and naval projection capability, China has suffered serious problems in preparing for possible conflicts over Taiwan and the Spratlys.⁴ The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) possessed 3,000 J-6s (copies of MiG-19), 500 fighters of Chengdu J-7s (copies of the early MiG-21), 100 Shenyang J-8s (revisions of MiG-21), and 120 Xian H-6 bombers (copies of Tupolev Tu-16 Badger).⁵ Most of the aircraft date back to Soviet designs of the 1950s. Since the late 1970s, China's development efforts have failed to provide the PLAAF with a modern fleet. Given this, China has been eager to obtain new fighters that possess superior capabilities to combat in the air and attack targets on land and water.⁶

In the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), major surface combatants and submarines were also obsolete. The equipment of major surface combatant, such as electronics, radar, surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, naval artillery, and anti-submarine accouterment, were almost exclusively derived from old Soviet models and design.⁷ The new classes of Chinese-developed major surface combatants, the Jiangwei frigate and the Luhu destroyer, still lacked modernised communications,
electronics, and defence systems. Air surveillance radar and fire control radar were based mainly on old Soviet designs or relatively simple systems of Chinese origin. Additionally, an outdated submarine fleet has been an important weakness of the PLAN. The PLAN submarine fleet has consisted of obsolete Whiskey and Romeo-class traditional submarines built with Soviet blue-prints of the late 1950s. A 1994 report of the U.S. Congressional Research Service concluded:

A large (100) submarine force with very dated boats (as many as one half may no longer be operational); difficulty in communications adds to reasons for keeping boats close to shore. China's record of fatal sub accidents is among the worst in the world, especially given the limited amount of time such boats actually spend at sea.

In the 1990s, improving the weaknesses of the country's military forces was viewed as an important task by the Chinese leadership. In his report to the Eighth National People's Congress on 15 March 1993, then Chinese Premier Li Peng stressed that defence modernisation must 'adhere to the strategic principle of active defence and constantly increase its combat effectiveness and defence capabilities under conditions of modern warfare'. In order to deal with probable conflicts over coastal islands, upgrading the projection capability of air and naval forces has been seen as a priority in China's defence modernisation. In an article published in *Jiangfanjun Bao* on 6 August 1993, General Liu Huaqing, Vice Chairman of the CMC, made this point clear by stating:

Priority must be given to the development of the Navy and Air Force and to strengthen the building of technical arms... In order to protect our country's oceanic interests, we should build a strong navy. Under modern conditions, be it a war on land or at sea, we cannot part with the support of air force.

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Therefore, we must put modernisation of the Navy and Air Force in the priority position.\textsuperscript{11}

In addition to the aim of modernising its air and naval military hardware, commercial and political-military factors have encouraged China to purchase arms from Russia.

\textit{Why Russian Weapons?}

After the end of the Cold War, many traditional arms export states began to reduce their investment in defence production and to encourage their defence firms to seek foreign markets, so as to maintain a profitable scale of production. Increasing competition in international arms market led to the emergence of a buyer's market, in which the buyer could drive harder bargains in arms agreements.\textsuperscript{12} However, this trend did not bring obvious profits for China. Since the Tiananmen events of 1989, China has been placed under a Western arms embargo, and has very limited sources for 'lethal military equipment'. (see 2.D) In 1998, one report of the U.S. General Accounting Office concluded that 'we found no cases of EU members entering into new agreements to sell China lethal military items after 1989'.\textsuperscript{13} Since 1989, Russia and the Middle East have accounted for almost 90 per cent of China's imported military items.\textsuperscript{14}

In addition to limited alternative sources of arms supplies, several commercial

\textsuperscript{11} Liu Huaqing, 'Unswervingly Advance along the Road of Building a Modern Army with Chinese Characteristics', Jiangfanjun Bao (Beijing), 6 August 1993, pp.1-2, in FBIS-CHI-93-158, 18 August 1993, p.21.


\textsuperscript{13} The EU arms embargo against China is based on a 1989 political declaration that EU members will embargo the 'trade in arms' with China. Each EU member may interpret and implement the embargo's scope for itself. The U.S. arms embargo against China is enacted in laws and bars the sale to China of all military - lethal and non-lethal - on the U.S. Munitions List. See United States General Accounting Office, \textit{China: Military Imports from the United States and the European Union since the 1989 Embargoes} (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, 1998), p.2. For the non-lethal military items EU members sold to China, see 5.E.
and political-military benefits explain the Chinese interest in Russian weaponry. First, viewed from the perspective of commercial interests, the price of Russian weapons has been lower than other alternative sources. As early as May 1991, the CMC drafted a report, emphasising that the cost of modernising Chinese military forces with Russian weapons was comparatively cheaper than with other sources. It concluded that modernising the PLA’s military hardware through imports from Russia could save Chinese spending on purchases of foreign arms.

Another commercial enticement was that in the early 1990s Russia accepted a very flexible arrangement for payments. Before the mid-1990s, to strengthen its competitive profile in the world arms market, Russia allowed arms payments to be paid by clients through flexible forms of settlement, such as counter-trade. For China, such flexible settlement structures were seen to reduce the drain on Chinese financial resources, helping to lessen the negative economic impact of Chinese arms purchases from abroad. Moreover, such a structure could also expand the export of Chinese goods and commodities. A 1993 research report, drafted by the CMC Policy Research Office, suggested that China should make use of Russia’s economic weakness to offer it light industry goods, foods, and meat in exchange for purchases.


17 According to Aleksandr Kotelkin, General Director of Rosvooruzhenyi, 'tactical flexibility' in payment forms, including partial payment in barter, could help Russia to achieve the 'strategic' objective of increasing arms exports. See Aleksandr Kotelkin, 'Russian Aviation Export: A Breakthrough into the 21st Century', Military Technology, Special Supplement, 1995, p.15. By the mid-1990s, due to increasing financial pressure, Russia adjusted such a policy and demanded arms clients to pay more hard cash for Russian arms. See 5.D.
of modern weaponry.  

China's purchases of Russian weapons have also been related to assessments of political and military utility. The Yeltsin leadership was eager to build a friendly relationship with China, and agreed on the principle of non-interference in Chinese internal affairs. (see 3.A) Russia therefore was seen as a source for the supply of modern weapons and technologies without the threat of sanctions over Chinese human right violations. In addition, while purchasing arms from abroad, a country has to consider whether it has the capability to absorb imported weapon systems. Given that most of Chinese military hardware was dominated by Soviet manufacture and design, Russian weapons and technology were seen to be an efficient way to achieve the modernisation of the PLA's military forces.

B) Supply-side Factors

After exploring the rationales behind China's purchases of Russian weaponry, this discussion examines the factors that affected the Yeltsin government's decision to supply arms to China. This section will address Russian interests in arms transfers to China, ranging from commercial profits to strategic considerations.

Arms Transfers as an Economic Tool

After the Soviet collapse, a deep economic crisis, profound reductions in military

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expenditures, and drastic defence conversion resulted in Russian defence industries suffering serious challenges to their survival.21 On 26 March 1992, S. Shuklin, Chairman of the All-Russia Trade Union of Defence Industry Workers, pointed out that Russian arms exports in 1992 were 3.8 times less than in 1989, while the USA had increased arms exports by about 2.2 times in the same period.22 Meanwhile, nearly 21 per cent of Russian defence enterprises stood on the verge of bankruptcy, while 43 per cent would soon be classified as barely viable.23 By 1993, the financing of arms production had been reduced by nine times, and Russian military orders were fulfilled by no more than 10-15 per cent of the defence industry's production capacities.24

Faced with the drastic reduction of domestic orders, in 1992 Russian defence enterprises expressed a desire to increase arms exports by up to 40-50 per cent.25 After the end of the Cold War, the Russian defence industry viewed China as a vital market for arms exports. UN-sanctioned embargoes against Iraq, Libya, and Yugoslavia, as well as various arms transfer restrictions on Iran, India, Cuba, and North Korea led to the loss of traditional Russian customers. On 18 May 1993, Sergei Glazyev, then Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, declared that Russia's support to UN sanctions banning weapons deliveries to some countries had led to the

23 Ibid.
loss of U.S.$ 16 billion in revenues. Moreover, with the disintegration of the WTO, the former customers of Russian defence industries in Eastern Europe turned to seek political and military cooperation with NATO, including arms purchases. These developments pushed Russian defence industries to struggle to find new arms buyers. As one Russian analyst pointed out, 'Russia's increased exports of combat aviation equipment to China are partially a response to the West thwarting its efforts to retain a monopoly over Eastern Europe's aviation market'.

In 1994, it was estimated that Russian defence industries consisted of 2,000 production facilities and 660 research centers, which accounted for nearly 60 per cent of Russia's industrial production value. In addition, they employed 4 million people, of whom 800,000 are scientific personnel. There were about 80 defence industry towns where defence production accounted for more than 80 per cent of local economic activity. To prevent unemployed defence workers from forming a source of social and political instability, many local governments supported the military-industrial lobbies in promoting arms sales abroad. The regional governments of Yekaterinburg, Irkutsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, St Petersburg and Tula, where defence industries were concentrated, supported arms exports in an attempt to lighten economic hardship and support employment in the defence industry. This was illustrated in that many regional governments received Chinese military delegations

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28 Nickolay Novichkov, 'Russian Arms Technology Pouring Into China', *Aviation Week & Space Technology* (hereafter *AWST*), 12 May 1997, p.73.
and warmly welcomed Chinese purchases of Russia's arms.\textsuperscript{32}

Deteriorating economic conditions at home and the growing need to earn hard currency abroad led the Yeltsin leadership to seek an increase in arms exports. In early 1993, Yeltsin put strong pressure on the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (MFER) to restore Russian positions in the world arms market.\textsuperscript{33} The Yeltsin government stressed that profits earned from arms exports would be used for the conversion of defence industries.\textsuperscript{34} In November 1993, the state Rosvooruzheniye company was established to coordinate Russian arms exports and technical cooperation with foreign countries.\textsuperscript{35} At the end of 1995, eight arms producers were permitted to negotiate on arms deals with potential foreign customers.\textsuperscript{36}

In order to increase its competitiveness in the world arms market, Russia set out to make modern military hardware available for export. Major weapon systems on the list for export have included: MiG-29 and Su-27 jet fighters, and their modified


\textsuperscript{33} In February 1993, Petr Aven, then Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, was removed by Yeltsin. He was accused of failing to make effective policy for arms exports. Aven's successor Sergei Glazyev was also threatened with the same fate by Yeltsin if he could not push Russia's arms exports. See Stephen Foye, 'Russian Arms Exports after the Cold War', \textit{RFE/RL Research Report}, vol. 2, no. 13 (26 March 1993), p.60.

\textsuperscript{34} Edwin Bacon, 'Russian Arms Exports - A Triumph for Marketing?', \textit{Jane's Intelligence Review}, vol. 6, no. 6 (June 1994), p.268.

\textsuperscript{35} For functions of the state Rosvooruzheniye company, see Director General of Rosvooruzheniye Alexandre Kotelkin, 'Russia and the World Arms Market', \textit{International Affairs} (Moscow), vol. 42, no. 4 (1996), pp.31-38. Also see Chairman of Rosvooruzheniye V. I. Samoylov's speaking in a TV interview, "Aty-Baty" Views Arms Sales Abroad', Russian Television and Dubl Networks (Moscow), 20 August 1994, in FBIS-SOV-94-183, 21 September 1994, p.17.

\textsuperscript{36} These firms included: fighter jet manufacturer MiG-MAPO, helicopter maker Rosvertol, light arms manufacturer Luzhmash, maker of air defence systems Antei, a hydraulic equipment maker Gydromash, utility vehicle manufacturer Metrovagonmash, component manufacturer Ufa Production Association, and scientific instrument maker Byuro Priborostrojeniya. Although these arms producers were permitted to negotiate with foreign customers on arms deals, all exports were still required to follow the licencing process. These arms producers' success in selling weapons to foreign states was limited by their lack of expertise in the international arms market. See Peter Litavrin, 'The Process of Policy Making and Licensing for Conventional Arms Transfers', in Anthony (ed.), \textit{Russia and the Arms Trade}, p.110; Andrew J. Pierre, 'Toward An International Regime for Conventional Arms Sales', in Andrew J. Pierre (ed.), \textit{Cascade of Arms: Managing Conventional Weapons Proliferation
versions; T-72S and T-80U main battle tanks; BMP-3 mechanised infantry combat vehicles; MI-8 and KA-25 helicopters; Smerch multiple Launch Rocket systems; Thor-M1 and S-300 air-defence systems; and Kilo- and Amur-class diesel-powered submarines.37

Arms sales to China were seen as a means to lighten the financial crisis in the Russian defence industry. In September 1992, after meeting with then Chinese Defence Minister Qin Jiwei, then acting Russian Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar called Russian arms exports to China as an opportunity to employ the capacity of Russian defence industries in connection with the sharp reduction of military expenditure.38

Arms Transfers as a Strategic Issue

Arms transfers were viewed by the Yeltsin leadership as one of vital elements for developing the strategic goal of a 'friendly' relationship with China. (see 3.E) To achieve this, meetings between both state leaders were scheduled to deal with arms sales.39 The 'Memorandum on the Principles of Military and Technical Cooperation' between China and Russia was signed by Yeltsin and Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng in December 1992.40 Praising this memorandum, Yeltsin said that 'in this way, the friendly character of our relations has been strengthened'.41

41 Ibid., p.A1 2.
Under normal circumstance, a country only exports arms to friendly or neutral governments. Arms transfers therefore can serve as 'gestures of political support'. In November 1993, Russian Defence Minister Grachev claimed that military cooperation with China would 'contribute to the consolidation of good-neighbourly relations'. While pursuing a stable relationship with China, the Yeltsin leadership supported the supply of weaponry to China, stressing that military and technical cooperation with China was 'a key sphere of bilateral relations'. Such diplomatic rhetoric showed Russia's intention of using its arms transfers to China as a symbol of their friendly relations.

It has been argued that the growing economic and military power of China, the world most populous country, could destabilise regional security and challenge U.S. political and military predominance in the world. Arms transfers involve a series of bilateral consultations, training support, and maintenance assistance. This process was seen as a means to boost Russian ties with the Chinese army and to increase Russian influence over Chinese defence modernisation. In an interview in July 1998, while commenting on Russian arms transfers to China, General Anatoly Bolyatko stressed that apart from the purely economic advantages, supplying weapons to China could provide a chance of influencing China's military and political strategy and maintaining ally-like relations with that country. As such, Russia might increase its

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43 'Russian Defence Minister Arrives in China', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 9 November 1993, in SWB SU/1845, 13 November 1993, pp.S1/1-2.
46 The author's interview with Major General Anatoly Bolyatko (also Boliatko), the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), 1 July 1998, Moscow. Also see Anatoly Boliatko, 'Military and Technological Cooperation, and Prospects of Russian-Chinese Strategic Interaction', *Far Eastern Affairs* (Moscow), no. 3 (1997), p.56.
political leverage in the region and in relation to the U.S." 47

Many factors have motivated Russia and China to undertake arms transfers. However, important problems have arisen. Mutual distrust and conflicts of interest have still obstructed bilateral cooperation. In particular, Russia has tried to safeguard its own security interests when supplying weapons to China. This development has given rise to uncertainties in their arms transfer relationship.

C) The Principle Guiding Russian Arms Transfers to China: Safeguarding Russian Security Interests

This discussion so far reveals relevant patterns in Russian arms transfers to China. Russian arms transfers to China have been based on the basic principle, that is to ensure that Russian security interests are not undermined. This is supported by two facts. First, Russia has maintained tight controls over the types of weaponry supplied to China. As such, Russia can prevent these deals from damaging its own security. Second, through its arms transfers to China, Russia has sought to maintain the PLA's power projection vector to focus on the south so as to prevent any threat to Russian security. These two issues will be addressed below.

Tight Russian Controls over the Types of Weapons Supplied to China

The Yeltsin leadership's desire to have a friendly relationship with China, and the defence industry's enthusiasm for commercial benefits, accounted for supply-side factors behind Russian arms transfers to China. However, these have not meant that Russia has ruled out the possibility that China could present a direct military threat to

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47 Russian desires to influence Chinese military defence could bring increasing diplomatic pressure

Although Russian defence enterprises have been eager for profits from arms exports, the military has expressed its worries about the potential risks of enhanced Chinese military capacities. In 1993, General Mahmut Gareyev, an officer lionized by the General Staff, had warned:

\begin{quote}
Currently China is pursuing - to the satisfaction of all - what may be described as a generally positive policy by promoting all-round cooperation with Russia. But we should remember that regardless of the attitude of this or that politician, the demographic factor may have a decisive impact on the conduct of that country. China's foreign policy and military doctrine uphold the thesis that the country will implement the concept of 'strategic frontiers and space required for life' as the complex (economic, scientific, technological and military) power grows. These boundaries would be expected to shift in step with the growth of the 'complex power of the state' far enough for the country to be able to pursue its real interests by using armed forces. This amounts to an attempt to justify territorial claims primarily on Southeast Asian countries that may, however, extend to CIS countries.\footnote{See, for example, Sergei Rogov, 'Military Interests and the Interests of the Military', in Stephen Sestanovich (ed.), \textit{Rethinking Russia's National Interests} (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), p.73; Alexei G. Arbatov, 'Russian National Interests', in Robert D. Blackwill and Sergei A. Karaganov (eds), \textit{Damage Limitation or Crisis?: Russia and the Outside World} (Washington and London: Brassey's, Inc., 1994), p.72; Sergei Repko, 'To the People's Republic of China, Russia Is an "Unquestionable Enemy" or "Belligerent Force"', \textit{Nezavisimoye voyennoe obozreniye} (Moscow), 25 July, pp.1-2, in CDPSP, vol. 48, no. 30 (21 August 1996), p.22; Victor Larin, 'Russia and China on the Threshold of the Third Millennium: So Who Is Going to Defend Our National Interests?', \textit{Far Eastern Affairs} (Moscow), no. 1 (1997), p.24; Iurii Fedorov, 'Interest Group and Russia's Foreign Policy', \textit{International Affairs} (Moscow), vol. 44, no. 6 (1998), p.178.}
\end{quote}

After the creation of a 'strategic partnership' between Russia and China, in December 1996, then Russian Defence Minister Igor Rodionov voiced concerns about attempts of certain Asian countries, including China, to 'sharply increase the armed forces' from the USA against its arms transfers to China. See 5.E.
offensive capabilities'.

Despite Russian economic difficulties, the military have stressed the need to assess the strategic consequences of Russian arms exports. In the Military Doctrine of 1993, the military made it clear that while supplying arms to foreign countries, it was important to ensure Russia's 'military-political and economic interests in a balanced way'. Following the establishment of Rosvooruzheniye in 1993, the Defence Ministry sent a number of military officers to this state company in order to provide engineering support for arms exports. More importantly, the Defence Ministry was charged with defining forms, volumes, and the range of arms for export. It also took part in talks with foreign customers, defining the quantitative aspects of any deal. The Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation of the General Staff was also directly involved with these matters.

Although details of policy-making procedures have been inaccessible, the results of Russian policy have shown that safeguarding Russian present and future security has been a vital principle when supplying armaments to China. In December 1992, Yeltsin had made it clear that Russian policy on arms transfers to China was based on the principle of not harming Russian security. Some of the general scholarly

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literature has questioned the Russian government's capability of conducting such a policy and ensuring this principle. However, the evidence available demonstrates that Russia has tried to prevent arms deals with China from damaging its own security. This has been reflected in two facts: first, Russia has not sold to China its most advanced weapon systems, and second, Russian arms transfers to China have not reached the level of quality it has supplied to other Asian states.

First, Russia has refused to supply China with the latest weapons. This was illustrated in that Russia turned down the Chinese proposal to purchase Tu-22M Backfire supersonic tactical-strike bombers. Tu-22M bomber's combat radius can reach over 2,486 miles, double the distance to that of Chinese Tu-16 Badger bombers. The supply of such tactical bombers along with its associated weapons systems to China would considerably alter the military balance in this region, giving rise to a potential threat to Russia. In contrast, Russia has planned to supply India with Tu-22 bombers. Also, due to security considerations, in 1994, Russia rejected the Chinese plan to purchase Russian Su-35 fighters.

As importantly, Russia has been cautious about which missile systems are used

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60 Rahul Bedi, 'India to Lease Russian AEW&C Aircraft and Buy Tu-22 Bombers', JDW, 17 November 1999, p.5.

61 'Moscow Not to Supply Su-35 Fighters to China', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 10 August 1994, in FBIS-SOV-94-154, 10 August 1994, p.11. The Su-35 is equipped with the AL-35 engine, which possesses 12 per cent more thrust than the Su-27's AL-31F. Additionally, the Su-35 is a multi-role fighter-bomber with enhanced air combat capability and revised capabilities to use advanced weapons in the air-to-ground and anti-ship roles. See Sergio Coniglio, 'The Sukhoi Su-27 Combat Aircraft Family', Military Technology, Special Supplement 1995, p.29.
to equip the aircraft it planned to sell to China. One factor which delayed the deal on the Su-30 fighter / bomber was that Russia refused to supply China with advanced R-77 (AA-12 'Adder') medium-range air-to-air missiles (AAM). The sales of two Sovremenny-class destroyers and SS-N-22 'Sunburn' surface-to-surface guided missiles might help to improve the strike capability of Chinese surface combatants. Russia only agreed to export such a missile system to China because, in May 1999, the Russian navy deployed the latest type of anti-ship cruise missile system 3M54 Alfa whose strike range was over 300 km.

Second, compared to its arms sales to other Asian states, Russian arms transfers to China have been more cautious. While negotiating with Vietnam on the deal of Su-30s, Russia agreed to supply a range of tactical weapons currently in service with the Russian Air Force. These have included: AA-12 medium-range AAMs, Kh-29 (AS-14 'Kedge') and Kh-59 (AS-13 'Kingbolt') medium-range air-to-surface missiles (ASM), and Kh-31 (AS-17 'Krypton') medium-range anti-ship missiles. Russian arms transfers to India are also illustrative. Russia has agreed to supply India with Su-30 MKI long-range multi-role fighters, Tu-22 supersonic tactical-strike bombers, the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier, the most up-to-date T-90S main battle tank, and the quietest running Russian nuclear submarine, the Project 971 - Bars. (see

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63 'E jiang wei zhonggong shengchan xianjin fanjian feidan' [Russia Will Produce Advanced Anti-Ship Missiles for Communist China], *Chungkuo shihpao* (Taipei), 16 April 1998, p.9. (author's translation).
64 Nikolai Novichkov, 'Hanoi Close to Russian Fighter Deal', *JDW*, 1 December 1999, p.4.
65 A corresponding memorandum on Russian sale of 4,000-ton aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov to India was signed in December 1998. The Tu-90 tank is the latest main battle tank made by Russia. Russia has supplied India with T-90 tanks to replace its T-55 and Vijayanta tanks. In July 1999, Indian army completed tests of the T-90, and planned to use these new tanks to arm five regiments so as to spearhead the army corps deployed near the border with Pakistan. As for the Project 971 multi-role nuclear submarine, it has a running depth of 600 metres, a speed of 35 knots, and 100-day endurance.
MKK's detection range is given as only 100 km and can track only two targets.\textsuperscript{69}

Moreover, the Indian Su-30 MKI has been equipped with advanced AA-12 Adder medium-range air-to-air missiles which Russia has resisted transferring to China.\textsuperscript{70}

\textbf{Table 5 Russian Arms Transfers to Asian Countries in the 1990s}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Weapon systems</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Sovremenny-class Destroyers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$800 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS-N-22 ShShM Systems</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS-N-22 ShShM</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IL-28 Beagle Bombers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IL-76 Candid Transport Aircraft</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>$140 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kamov Ka-27 Multi-Purpose Helicopters</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA-10 (S-300) SAM Launchers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA-10 (S-300) SAM</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Su-27SK Fighters</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Licenced Production of Su-27SK</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>$2.2 bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kilo / type 877E Submarines</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$180 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kilo / type 636 Submarines</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T-80U Main Battle Tanks</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A-50 AEW&amp;C Aircraft (under negotiation)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tor-M1 Air Defence Missile System</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Su-30 MKK Fighters (under negotiation)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>$2 bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Su-30 MKI Fighters</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MiG-29SE Fulcrum C Fighters</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>$500 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kilo / type 877E Submarines</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA-19 Grisom SAM</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Licenced Production of S-300V ATBM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>$1 bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Krivak-4 Class Frigates</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$360 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS-N-25 ShShM Systems</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS-N-25 ShShM</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KA-31 Helix AEW Helicopters</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>$92 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T-90S Main Battle Tanks</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>$750 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Licenced Production of Su-30 MK Fighters</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>$1.8 bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kilo / type 636 Submarine (under negotiation)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Admiral Gor hkov Aircraft Carrier</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$2 bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Project 971 multirole nuclear submarines</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tu-22M Backfire Bombers (under negotiation)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{69} 'Shou zhonggong suai sansi Eguo liuyushou' [Selling Su-30s to China. Russia Retains Advanced Technologies], Chungkuo shihpao (Taipei), 3 September 1999. (author's translation)

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Weapon systems</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>MiG-29C Fulcrum Fighters</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>$600 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Su-27SK Fighters</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>$200 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BPS-500 Type Fast Attack Craft</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS-N-25 ShShM Systems</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS-N-25 ShShM</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS-N-2 Styx ShShM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Su-30 Fighters (under negotiation)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Su-30 Fighters (suspended)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mil Mi-17 Helicopters (suspended)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>BMP-3 Combat Vehicles</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Payment for Russian debt to Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T-80U Main Battle Tanks</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AT-11 Sniper/9M119 Anti-tank Missiles</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA-18 Portable SAM</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* -- = unavailable


For Russia, the major difference between China and India - the two largest customers for Russian arms and technology - consists in that China is a potential security threat to Russia, while India is not. Russian policy on arms transfers has provoked Chinese complaints. In the author's interviews in China in 1998, many Chinese experts complained that Russia had not sold to China its best weapons.  

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71 The author's interviews with Prof. Zheng Yu, Head of the Section for Russian Studies, the Institute
the analysis of Chinese analyst Zheng Yu, the Russian military's opposition to the sales of sophisticated weapons to China has become a major source of uncertainty for the development of the arms transfer relationship. In these circumstances, China has continued to develop next-generation weapons indigenously. In explaining why China sought to develop the B-7 (FBC-1) strike bomber, Chen Yi-jian, General Designer of the aircraft, stressed: 'It is unlikely to buy the latest weapons from abroad. Foreign states usually retain important technologies while exporting arms'.

This refusal to supply China with offensive and the latest weapons systems suggests clearly that Russia has remained concerned about a potential security threat from China. Even though it has called China a 'strategic partner' and has been enthusiastic for revenues from arms exports, Russia has tried to reduce the impact of these transfers on its own security when supplying arms to China.

Russian Attempts to Influence the PLA's Power Projection Vector

After examining the weapons sold to China, it is clear that air and naval weaponry have accounted for most of Russian-Sino arms deals. (see Table 5) This trend highlights China's intention of upgrading its power projection capabilities in air and naval forces and of implementing coercive diplomacy strategies on the disputed coastal islands.

An important objective of Russian arms transfers to China was to maintain the
PLA's military projection vector to focus towards the south. In an interview conducted by the author on 7 July 1998, Russian military expert Dmitri V. Trenin pointed out that Russia's objective interests resided in trying to channel China's expansion towards Taiwan and the South China Sea with Russia acting as a third party taking the sweepstakes. In an unpublished paper, Trenin wrote:

A power solution to the Taiwan problem will not probably cause rejection by Moscow which can try to gain some benefits from the tension between Beijing and Washington (although a China-U.S. clash is unlikely). The conflict in the South China Sea as well as tensions in the Taiwan Strait area will naturally detract Chinese leadership's attention from the Northern borders...

Tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea may increase China's needs for Russian supplies of arms and spare parts, and lead China to seek further strategic cooperation with Russia to counter U.S. support for Taiwan. To achieve this, Russia has supplied modern, but not the most sophisticated, air and naval force equipment to China.

The deal behind the Su-27SK (K for kommercheskiy or commercial) fighter aircraft is a good example of this Russian attempt to influence China's power projection. In a confidential interview with the author in China in January 1998, one Chinese analyst revealed that, while selling Su-27s to China, Russia tried to 'push' China's Su-27s projection vector to focus towards the south:

While it sold the Su-27 jet fighter to China, Russia demanded China not deploy these aircraft fighters on the north side of the Yellow River. Russia's intention is to push Chinese deployment of Su-27s towards the south part of Chinese territories, and reduce the Chinese Su-27's potential threat to Russia. Due to the fact that China has to deal with a probable clash that may break out over coastal islands, China accepted the Russian proposal.

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74 The author's interview with Dr. Dmitri Trenin, Deputy Director, Carnegie Moscow Center, 7 July 1998, Moscow.
75 Dmitri Trenin, Russia's Chinese Problem, unpublished paper (Moscow Carnegie Center, 1998), p.16.
76 Confidential interview, Beijing.
The first batch of Chinese Su-27s is deployed in the PLAAF's Number Three Aircraft Division at Wuhu Air Base in Anhui Province, and the second batch at Suixi Air Base in Guangdong province. Both air bases are situated such that Chinese Su-27s' combat radius fails to reach Russia. On the other hand, the supply of a total of 50 finished Su-27s could help China to create a potent tactical force that will reach most of the South China Sea. (see Map 4)

Another example resides in the sale of two Sovremenny-class destroyers to China. The Sovremenny is equipped with SS-N-22 'Sunburn' ship-to-ship supersonic missiles and SA-N-17 'Grizzly' surface-to-air missile launchers. The acquisition of Sovremenny-class destroyers could improve the PLAN's surface strike capabilities and its ability to deploy over long distances. U.S. military analysts have warned that Chinese Sovremenny-class destroyers could act as a limited deterrent in a probable crisis in the Taiwan Strait. In this view, the Chinese purchase of two Sovremennys and their supersonic missiles was designed to 'make the American navy - and Taiwan - feel more insecure'.

The sale of two Kilo-class Type 877 and two Type 636 submarines to China is also indicative. Kilo-class submarines are incorporated with modern noise reduction devices, and have a range of 9,650 km with a duration to stay at sea for 45 days. The acquisition of Kilo-class attack submarines could improve the PLAN's capability to provide further protection for its surface combatants intending to operate in a tense situation in the water areas of coastal islands. The acquisition of these submarines

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79 'Russian Imports Step in to Fill the Arms Gap', p.27.
reflects China's objective to deter the U.S. Navy and keep it away from the probable areas of Chinese military operations.\textsuperscript{80}

Map 4 Combat Reach of Chinese Su-27s


\textsuperscript{80} Yossef Bodansky, 'The PRC Formulates a New Military Strategy for Taiwan', \textit{Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy} (September 1997), p.9.
Through the sale of modern air and naval force equipment to China, Russia attempted to maintain the Chinese armed force towards focusing in the south and projecting into the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. However, it is difficult for Russia to prevent China from using these weapons against Russia in a crisis situation between the two. As such, the sales of modern air and naval weapons may only meet Russian short-term strategic and security interests. More importantly, Russian sales of modern weapons have provoked concerns from other states in the region. Continuous sales of modern air and naval equipment to China will bring increasing diplomatic pressure from the USA against Russian arms transfers to China. (see 5.E)

D) Existing Problems

Although Russia and China have concluded a great number of arms deals, many problems have arisen in their arms transfer relationship. These have included three major issues. First, China has suffered problems with integrating Russian weapons into the Chinese armed forces. Moreover, arms exports to China have not been profitable to Russian defence enterprises. Furthermore, disputes over the price of weaponry have delayed arms deals. This section will address these issues in turn.

Chinese Problems in Absorbing Russian Weapons

Viewed from the perspective of the performance of weapons systems, Russian weapons might help China to extend air and naval coverage to coastal islands. (see

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However, so far the impact of Russian weapons on Chinese defence modernisation has remained limited. The major reason is that at operational level, the PLA has suffered problems with absorbing Russian weapons.

As stated earlier, one of factors encouraging China to purchase Russian weapons was that the weapons might be easier for the PLA to absorb. However, after importing military hardware from Russia, China has suffered reliability problems with the weapons. This was reflected in Chinese acquisitions of the first two Kilo-class submarines - Type 877 models. China took delivery of two Kilos in 1995; however, they still were not operationally capable by 1999. Difficulties were compounded when Russia translated only part of the technical document into Chinese, a constraint resolved with the fourth Kilo delivery in late 1998. Chinese Kilo submarines have suffered several breakdowns, electrical generator overload and battery collapse. These have led to serious damages to these ships. Two of the Kilos were out of service for lengthy spells. Along with problems of logistical support, the PLAN has failed to integrate Kilo-class submarines into its submarine fleet effectively. A report of Jane's Defence Weekly on 18 August 1999 pointed out that although additional training was undertaken, the PLAN still did not take the Kilos below a depth of 50m. In June 2000, China decided to send its Kilo submarines back to Russia for repair.

China has also had problems with flying the Su-27 jet fighter. Before deliveries

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84 Sae-Liu, 'Second Song Submarine Vital to China's Huge Programme', p.17.
of the first batch of Su-27s in 1992, about 200 military pilots from China were sent to the Russian Serov Joint Technical Flying School in Krasnodar for six-month training.\textsuperscript{86} Meanwhile, a group of military pilots from the Russian Far East military district left for China to train Chinese pilots.\textsuperscript{87} According to some Russian pilots, who had visited the PLAAF's training sites, 'the quality of Chinese pilots was rather inferior'.\textsuperscript{88} Another problem with Chinese pilots is that they have not become accustomed to flying fourth-generation jets yet. In 1997, Kenneth Allen, a former U.S. air attaché in Beijing, pointed out that Chinese pilots never trusted the radar of the Chinese-made J-8 fighters they used to fly. As a result, they were reluctant to rely on high-tech radar in those Russian advanced fighters as well, and only employed visual detection of their targets.\textsuperscript{89}

As importantly, many of the Chinese Su-27s were non-operational because of poor maintenance. Two Chinese Su-27s have since been lost in training, and at least 17 were badly damaged by a typhoon in 1996. Russian specialists have reportedly expressed their surprise at the level of damage to Chinese Su-27s, and considered that the damage to three of them was too serious to be repaired.\textsuperscript{90} The Chinese Su-27s flew only 10 hours monthly, and Chinese pilots were not permitted to fly them aggressively - a practice that had led to a low attrition rate.\textsuperscript{91}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{86} 'Chinese Pilots Train on Su-27 Fighter Planes in Krasnodar', \textit{Russia's Radio} (Moscow), 12 February 1992, in SWB, SU 1304, 14 February 1992, p.A3 2.
\item\textsuperscript{87} 'Pilots to Train Chinese', Interfax (Moscow), 3 August 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-152, 6 August 1992, p.21.
\item\textsuperscript{88} Tso Ni, 'Chinese Pilots Will Be Trained in the USSR', \textit{Cheng Ming} (Hong Kong), 1 May 1991, in SWB, FE 1062, 3 May 1991, p.A2 1. According to a 1995 RAND report, Chinese pilots did not fly as many hours as their Western counterparts. Chinese fighter pilots flew 100 to 110 hours per year while the standard minimum training for fighter pilots in NATO was 180 hours per year. See Allen, Krumer, and Pollack, \textit{China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century}, p.130.
\item\textsuperscript{89} Nigel Holloway, 'Revolutionary Defence', 24 July 1997, \textit{FEER}, p.24.
\item\textsuperscript{90} 'Sukai eshiqi huailiao yidapi' [Many Su-27s Are Damaged], \textit{Lien Ho Pao} (Taipei), 15 April 1997, p.9. (author's translation)
\item\textsuperscript{91} Jonathan Brodie, 'China Moves to Buy More Russian Aircraft, Warships, and Submarines', \textit{JDW}, 22
\end{itemize}
*Flight International* in September 1997, the Chinese air forces had complained about Russian Su-27s because of problems of poor engine reliability and lower time between overhaul.\(^9^2\)

Integrating Russian weapons into the Chinese armed forces has not been as easy as China expected. In order to avoid an over-reliance on Russian weapons, China has continued to develop military hardware indigenously. Given the operational problems of the Kilos, China decided to continue the programme on the development of Type 039 Song-class diesel-electric patrol submarines, with series production forecasted to start in 1999.\(^9^3\) In addition, aided by its booming economy, China has also pursued highly ambitious warplanes R&D projects. (see 6.B) In 1999, the Chinese-made B-7 (FBC-1) strike bomber entered into service. The FBC-1's combat radius can reach over 1650 km. It can help China to extend its air coverage to reach the South China Sea and conduct missions similar to the Russian Su fighter.\(^9^4\)

Administrative and managerial problems have restricted the absorptive capacity of the PLA. It is a difficult process for China to integrate foreign weapons into its armed forces. Many factors, such as wider cultural antagonism, insufficient training, and the lack of information, have complicated this process.\(^9^5\) If China fails to overcome the problems with weaponry absorption, further Chinese purchases of Russian weapons could be delayed. Moreover, Chinese efforts to improve indigenous

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\(^9^4\) Sae-Liu, 'Second Song Submarine Vital to China's Huge Programme', p.17.

design and manufacturing capability for new weapons could be another factor affecting Chinese purchases of Russian arms. (see Chapter 6)

Unprofitable Barter Deals with China

Arms transfers to China were expected to lighten the Russian economic hardship and improve the defence industry's financial crisis. Flexible arrangement of arms payment was one of the commercial enticements for China to purchase weapons from Russia. In 1993, the CMC Policy Research Office had suggested that China should make use of Russian economic weakness to offer Russia light industry goods and meats in exchange for purchases of Russian modern weaponry. (see 5.A) However, under increasing financial pressures, barter for arms payment has failed to satisfy Russian defence enterprises' long-term commercial needs. Russia has gradually viewed barter trade as a less preferable choice since the mid-1990s. This development has led to problems in Russian and Chinese arms transfer relationship.

The sales of military hardware to China have been not profitable to Russian defence manufacturers. In the deal concerning the first batch Su-27s in late 1992, China only paid 35 per cent of this U.S.$ 1 billion contract in hard currency. The remainder was paid in goods such as running shoes, parkas, canned meat, and other consumer goods. Russia found that those goods offered by China were very poor quality, preventing Russia from finding a suitable market for them. Russian analysts have argued that barter for arms payments paid by China seriously damaged Russian interests.

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96 Sergounin and Subbotin, 'Sino-Russian Military-Technical Cooperation', p.204.
97 Laskin and Glebova, 'Russian Defence Sales', p.49.
By the mid-1990s, given its successful sales of armaments to India and Malaysia, (see Table 5) Russia obtained a more favourable position in the bargaining of arms payment issues with China. Faced with the political reality of the West's arms embargo, China had no choice but to accept Russia's demand to pay more hard currency for its weapons. In September 1994, both sides concluded an agreement in which China agreed to pay for a large part of Russian exports in hard currency and not through barter. In 1994, in the deal to transfer Kilo-class submarines to China, Russia had shifted the portion of hard currency and barter to 50:50. However, this deal remained unprofitable to Russian defence manufacturers. After paying taxes and commissions, the Krasnoye Sormovo plant reportedly could only earn 8-10 per cent of the contract's value.

In 1995, in the second batch Su-27s, 50-70 per cent of the purchase price was paid in hard currency and the remainder through barter. Barter payments for this were mainly paid with canned pork from China. Given that foot and mouth disease had spread through Chinese central provinces, Russia worried that it would receive poor quality canned pork in these payments. To prevent this, Moscow sent a task group to inspect the meat manufacture factories in the Chinese Szechwan province even though this inspection activity led to some protests from Beijing.

Throughout the 1990s, cheap Chinese commodities, such as towels, sheets, blankets, bedspreads, and pillow, were used for payment to Russian defence

2 "Zhrou huan zhanji, eguo you yiye [Swapping Fighters for Pork. Russia Expressed Its Disagreement], Chungkuo shihpao (Taipei), 30 March 1997. (author's translation)
enterprises. This provoked strong protests from these enterprises. In 1998, the Russian Accounting Office decided to inspect such deals, and the State Duma prepared special hearings on these. It is significant that, compared to its arms sales to other states, Russian arms exports to China have not been economically beneficial to Russian defence manufacturers. Given this, defence industrialists have insisted that in the future an arms export contract can only be signed along with an agreement on the method of payment so as to increase Russian influence on deciding the hard currency portion of a deal and in selecting the Chinese goods accepted as barter.

However, Russian desires to limit the amount of barter involved in arms deals may place limitations on the amount of military equipment China is prepared to purchase. This has been reflected in that China has intended to purchase only small amounts of modern Russian weapons off the shelf and to enlist Russian assistance to produce such equipment indigenously. This policy has created new controversies, as Russia has insisted that the sale of production licences for advanced aircraft to China be based on the precondition that China agrees to purchase large numbers of aircraft. Debates over this issue have delayed the sale of licenced production for

104 Ibid., pp.20-21.
105 For example, in 1994, Russian sales of BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles and Smerch multiple rocket launchers to Kuwait were paid in hard currency. In this year, Russia supplied Malaysia with 18 MiG-29 fighters. About 60 per cent of the value of this contract was paid in hard currency. The remainder was paid in goods such as palm oil and textiles, which could contribute directly to revenues. See 'Arms Sales to Kuwait "Most Profitable Deals"', Izvestiya (Moscow), 11 August 1994, p.2, in FBIS-SOV-94-157, 15 August 1994, p.10; Ian Anthony, 'Economic Dimensions of Soviet and Russian Arms Exports', in Anthony (ed.), Russia and the Arms Trade, pp.90-91.
107 Gill and Kim, China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad, p.70.
Russian Su-30s.\textsuperscript{109}

Given that China has not been a profitable arms customer, Rosvooruzheniye has actively sought other arms buyers.\textsuperscript{110} On 30 November 1999, Rosvooruzheniye Deputy Director Aleksey Roshchin named Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Sri Lanka as the most promising states of the APR from the viewpoint of arms trade.\textsuperscript{111} Potential arms deals have included the sales of Su-30s, MiG-29s, and air defence systems to Malaysia; the supplies of Su-30s, Mi-17 helicopters, T-76 tanks and BTP-80A combat vehicles to Indonesia; the export of air defence systems to Singapore; and the deliveries of MiG-29s to Sri Lanka and the Philippines.\textsuperscript{112} On the other hand, while negotiating with China on arms deals, Russia has insisted on China paying the full price for the weapons. This has led to disputes over weaponry pricing.

\emph{Disputes over Weaponry Pricing}

Although Russia's weapons are cheaper than Western arms, Russia has insisted on China paying the full price for weapons. In contrast, China has attempted to negotiate lower prices. Disputes over the price of military hardware created tensions between Russia and China. In June 1997, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin visited Beijing and sought to allay this situation.\textsuperscript{113}

These different positions on arms pricing have even delayed certain arms deals. The deal on the Sovremenny-class destroyers took more than three years because of

\begin{itemize}
\item 'Arms Company Targets Asia-Pacific Region', Interfax (Moscow), 30 November 1999, in SWB, SUW 0618, 10 December 1999, p.WA/12.
\item ibid.
\item ibid.
\end{itemize}
tough negotiations over pricing. The Russian side complained that the difference in expected prices between Russia and China amounted to nearly U.S.$100 million per ship. Due to Russia's insistence on the full commercial price, China eventually agreed to purchase two destroyers at a combined cost of U.S.$ 800 million. Other arms deals have also been delayed because of disputes over pricing. In 1997, Russian defence officials complained that China managed to cut prices on other Russian military hardware, such as the BMP-3 armoured vehicle and Smerch multi-rocket systems.

Prolonged and tough bargaining on pricing highlighted the Russian insistence on ensuring revenues from its arms transfers to China. During the Cold War, armaments were supplied to foreign states at a lower price or by grant or credits to serve as a symbol of support and friendly relations. While Russia has tried to use arms transfers as a strategic tool to consolidate its relations with China, commercial profits have clearly not been neglected.

Bargaining over weaponry pricing will continue to be a contentious issue between Russia and China. Russian ambitions to promote its arms exports to Asia were set back by the Asian economic crises in 1997. However, this crisis did not have a serious impact on Russian arms exports. In spite of this crisis, Russian arms exports in the first six months of 1998 increased U.S.$ 300 million from the same

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114 Ibid
115 'China Expands Reach with Russian Destroyers', p.5.
period of 1997, and reached U.S.$ 4 billion by the end of 1998.119 Until the West lifts its arms embargo against China, it will be difficult for China to obtain a favourable position in bargaining on weaponry pricing. Russian and Chinese disputes over weaponry pricing have illustrated the fundamental tension between the Russian eagerness to increase commercial benefits and the Chinese desires to modernise its armed force through the acquisition of Russian weapons at lower costs.

E) Potential Uncertainties

The discussion so far has raised the important question about potential uncertainties for Russian arms transfers to China. This section will evaluate the issue of each state's 'leverage' on the other through addressing the alternatives available to China. It will also explore 'reverse leverage' by examining probable armed clashes between China and other Russian arms customers. Finally, it will address probable diplomatic pressure from the USA against Russian arms transfers to China.

The Evaluation of Leverage: China's Alternative Sources for Arms Supplies

It has been argued that through arms transfers, suppliers may obtain leverage or influence in their relationship with the recipients.120 This concept has been referred to as 'built-in control' by K. J. Holsti. As the recipient imports weapons from the supplier, it can not operate a force effectively unless the supplier is also willing to provide the necessary training support, replacement parts, and maintenance. These controls provide the supplier with a partial guarantee that the recipient will use their

military forces in a manner compatible with the interests of the supplier.\textsuperscript{121}

As China has experienced reliability problems with Russian modern weapons, theoretically Russia could obtain leverage in its relationship with China. However, the historical lessons of 1960 when the USSR withdrew its military specialists and advisors has made China very vigilant about its dependence on foreign sources, and in particular a single source, for supplies of arms and spare parts. In an interview conducted by the author on 5 January 1998, Chinese analyst Zheng Yu commented:

\begin{quote}
At present, China does not have too many alternative sources for modernising its military forces but through Russian weaponry. Over-dependence on a single arms source will be very dangerous for China's military modernisation projects.\textsuperscript{122}
\end{quote}

Within the context of arms transfers, it has been argued that lasting leverage in arms transfers relies on the condition that the recipient has limited ability to obtain arms from other alternatives.\textsuperscript{123} Although the Chinese principle of 'self-reliance' placed emphasis on the importance of modernising national defence capability with Chinese own strength, it also stressed the need to selectively import advanced equipment and technology from abroad. In order to increase alternative sources for military equipment and technology supplies, China has lobbied European countries to abolish the arms embargo against China. Russia's success in exporting arms to China has led some Western states to change their arms export policies toward China in an attempt to compete with Russia.\textsuperscript{124}

Some EU members have started to supply China with 'non-lethal military items'.

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{122} The author's interview with Prof. Zheng Yu, Head of the Section for Russian Studies, the Institute of East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies, CASS, 5 January 1998, Beijing.
\end{footnotes}
For example, Britain has supplied China with radar surveillance equipment; France has offered parts to Chinese helicopters; Italy has sold aircraft-radar and electronic countermeasures equipment to China; and Germany has supplied engines for the Chinese navy.  

Significantly, two EU members, Italy and Spain, have started to question whether the embargo should be continued. At the same time, China has called for the USA to abolish its export prohibition of arms and military technologies to China.

More fundamentally, China has tried to avoid an over-reliance on Russia for spare parts and training. For this reason, China has declined the services of Russian instructor pilots. China stressed that pilot training would be handled by Chinese instructors who had learned to fly the aircraft in Russian air force units. Meanwhile, China has started to develop military cooperation with Ukraine - a country which may be an alternative source of spare parts for Russian weapons. In 1997, China

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126 According to EU officials, 'the EU arms embargo against China could be formally ended by unanimous consent or informally eroded by individual EU members' resumption of military trade with China'. Among the 15 EU members, the Netherlands, Denmark and other Nordic nations still strongly criticise China's human right violations, while France, German, Spain, and Italy focus on commercial profits more. See *Ibid*; United States General Accounting Office, *China: Military Imports from the United States and the European Union since the 1989 Embargoes*, p.3.
127 'Junshou Beijing oumeng kaolu jiejin' [EU Considers to Abolish Arms Embargo on Beijing], *Lien Ho Pao* (Taipei), 11 April 1997; 'Gongjun chuanjiang tiaozheng zhihui jiejun' [The Communist Army Is Alleged to Adjust Its Command Structure], *Lien Ho Pao* (Taipei), 4 April 1998. (author's translation)
planned to purchase spare parts from Ukraine for its Su-27s in service. In 1997 also, Chinese armed forces sent personnel to the Academy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for military training. These developments could undermine Russian attempts to deepen its relationship with the Chinese armed forces through arms supplies. In 1998, Russian analysts had voiced their concern about the possibility of the establishment of an intergovernmental commission on military-technical cooperation between China and Ukraine.

Reverse Leverage: Probable Armed Clashes between China and Other States

Moreover, arms transfers can also give the recipients 'reverse leverage' over suppliers. Christian Catrina has pointed out that 'as a consequence of arms transfers the supplier may, without deliberate decision and against his will, become involved in a recipient's war.'

China's security relations with other Asian states have been complicated. Many of China's potential rivals are Russia's major arms customers. To date, China, Vietnam, and Malaysia, three of Russia's arms customers, have claimed possession of the Spratly islands. More importantly, China and India - two countries which accounted for about 60 per cent of Russian arms exports - have viewed the other as a geopolitical rival since the early 1960s. Armed clashes or tensions

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135 Catrina, 'Arms Transfers and Dependence', p.72.
136 'Military Cooperation with China to Get Fresh Momentum', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 10 August
between China and Russia's major arms customers in the region would pose serious problems for Russia.\textsuperscript{137} In such a situation, three possible scenarios that place Russia in a difficult position can be identified:

First, if Russia made use of its leverage in arms transfers to stop China's military actions, China would disregard Russia as a reliable source for arms supplies, and might seek other alternative sources such as Ukraine for spare parts supplies and training cooperation. This development would damage the relationship between Russia and China, and might terminate China's further purchases of Russian weapons.

Second, if Russia provided China's rivals with the necessary maintenance, technology assistance, and spare parts in such a conflict, this would offend China and also have a negative impact on the Russian-Sino relationship. According to Thomas W. Zarzecki, of Pennsylvania State University, in the case that Russia has to make a choice between arming India and arming China, India will win any such contest. In his analysis, India's pattern of arms purchases is more economically beneficial to Russia's defence industries than China's. Compared to China, India is a more prosperous market for Russia's arms. In addition, Russian and Indian relations historically have been cordial.\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{137} Thomas W. Zarzecki, 'Arming China or Arming India: Future Russian Dilemmas', \textit{Comparative Strategy}, vol. 18, no. 3 (July September 1999), p.272.

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.274-275. In December 1998, then Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov visited India. The Russian side planned to assist India in defence R&D and with military supplies that could be worth as much as U.S.$ 16 billion. See Pushpinder Singh, 'Closer India-Russia Ties Alarm Pakistan', \textit{AWST}, 4 January 1999, p.34. For the potential arms deals between Russia and India, see S.C.
Third, if Russia did not offer China satisfying logistics support, China might still no longer regard Russia as a reliable source for arms supplies. This problem occurred in 1958, when Khrushchev refused to support Mao Zedong's military actions against Kuomintang troops on the Quemoy islands. After this event, China began to distance itself from the USSR. (see 2.B)

Given its increasing arms sales to China, Russia may become 'hostage' to China in an armed conflict or a situation of tension between China and other major Russian arms customers. Due to the sensitivity of logistical support, the Russian-Sino arms transfer relationship will be deeply influenced by the development of politics in this region.

**U.S. Diplomatic Pressure**

As stated earlier, Russia has attempted to reinforce the focus in China's force postures towards the south. Tensions between China and the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea may be in Russia's short-term strategic interests. However, this could become a source of U.S. diplomatic pressure against Russia to halt its arms transfers China.

The U.S. cannot ignore a situation in which Russia helps China to upgrade its air and naval forces to a level that could threaten the regional security in Asia. U.S. analysts have voiced their concern about the threat of China's military modernisation to regional security. As Zalmay Khalizad and David Ochmanek, of RAND, warned in 1997:

The defining factor in [Asia's] regional security over the coming decades will be the growth of Chinese economic and military power and, with it, uncertainty about how Beijing might seek to pursue its interests in Asia and
Given Russian sales of Su-27s, Kilo-class submarines, and Sovremenny-class destroyers to China, U.S. analysts and politicians have become worried about the challenge posed by improved Chinese military forces. U.S. military officers have accused Russia of 'helping turn China into a regional superpower with expansionist inclinations'. A 1994 report of the U.S. Congressional Research Service suggested that the U.S. government should use its influence to curb Russian sales of sensitive equipment to China. Some U.S. Congressmen have even asserted that the U.S. should limit its loans and economic aid to Russia until it has restricted its arms exports to China.

In 1995, the U.S. government noted that China was modernising its forces slowly and with limited effect. However, the U.S. government has been aware of the regional impact of Russian arms transfers. Thus, the U.S. has called upon China to increase the transparency of its military programmes. On 9 October 1997, U.S. Defence Secretary William Cohen stressed that it would be important to push China for more military transparency. It is likely that Russia's continued assistance in upgrading China's air and naval projection capabilities into the periphery areas will result in stronger U.S. diplomatic pressure on Russia. In 1997, Dmitri Trenin and Andrew J. Pierre concluded:

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144 'A U.S. Push for Chinese Military "Transparency"', *International Herald Tribune*, 9 October 1997,
Russian arms exports to China have yet to reach the amount and technological level to induce serious U.S. anxiety, but as Russian sales continue, Washington's concern is rising. While China's development as a military superpower is years away, Russia's role in this process may prove significant. China's use of Russian weapons in the Taiwan straits or the South China Sea would create serious problems for Russian-American relations.  

In commenting on Russian arms transfers to China, Russian analyst Sergei Troush called for a more cautious and balanced approach. He warned that arms sales might push Russia into entering a closer military relationship with China. Such a relationship might lead to a new global confrontation between blocs. Increasing diplomatic pressure from the USA against Russian arms transfers to China would force Russia to take a strategic decision between moving closer to China or distancing itself from it. While suffering economic hardship, Russia has so far sought to maintain a cooperative relationship with the USA. Diplomatic pressure from the USA may hurt the arms transfer relationship between Russia and China.

F) Conclusions: The Fragile Nature of the Russian-Chinese Arms Transfer Relationship

Russian-Chinese arms transfers have been motivated by the calculations of their own state interests. Behind these transfers, demand-side factors have included limited Chinese sources for arms supplies, Chinese ambitions to modernise its air and naval forces, commercial enticements, and the convenience of integrating Russian weapons

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The author's interview with Sergei Troush, Senior Fellow, the Institute of USA & Canada Studies, RAS, 8 July 1998, Moscow. Also see Sergei Troush, 'Prodazha rossiyskogo oruzhiya Kitayu: rezony i opaseniya' [Russia's Arms Sales to China: Reasons and Doubts], *Nezavisimoye voennoye Obozrenye*, addition to *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (Moscow), 25 April 1996, pp.6-7. (author's translation)
into the Chinese armed force. Supply-side factors have included Russian attempts to use arms transfers as an economic tool and to consolidate its relations with China. However, many limitations on these transfers have arisen. These transfers have failed to fully meet Chinese and Russian objectives in pursuing bilateral cooperation in this area.

First, Russian policy on arms transfers to China has been based on the basic principle of not hurting Russian security. Although it supplied arms to China, Russia has still regarded China as a potential security threat. This has led Russia to not supply China with its most sophisticated weapons. Russian arms transfers to China have not reached the level of quality supplied to other Asian states. These developments suggest clearly that Russia has tried to reduce the impact of these transfers on its own security. The Russian refusal to supply China with latest weapons has led to Chinese complaints. In these circumstances, China has continued to develop weapons indigenously. Also, given its reluctance to rely on a single source for arms supplies, China has sought alternative sources for arms and spare parts. These developments could give rise to uncertainties in the Russian-Chinese arms transfer relationship.

Russian weapons might serve as 'technology demonstrators' of the PLA. However, the impact of Russian weapons on Chinese defence modernisation so far has been more symbolic than substantial. China has suffered problems with integrating the weapons into its armed force. Absorbing Russian weapon systems has not been as easy as China expected. This could delay further Chinese purchases of Russian weaponry.

Conflicts in commercial interests have been another uncertainty in the
relationship. Throughout the 1990s, the poor quality of Chinese goods paid for Russian arms undermined Russian expectations that arms sales to China could help to lighten the financial crisis in its defence industry. Given this, Russia has demanded more hard currency for payments and insisted on the price of weapons which it sold. This has weakened the Chinese desires to modernise its armed forces through Russian weaponry at lower costs. Conflicts of commercial interests have led to frictions between the two states, and have delayed and limited their arms deals.

It is doubtful that these transfers can contribute to a 'long-term' and 'stable' relationship between China and Russia. For Russia, an important objective in the supply of modern, but not the most sophisticated, air and naval force equipment to China was to reinforce the PLA's power projection vector to focus to the south, so as to ensure Russian own security interests. However, this could lead to armed tensions between China and other Russian customers in the region, landing Russia in a dilemma of logistical support. In addition, tensions between China and the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea may result in stronger U.S. diplomatic pressure on Russia, which could also impact the development of Russian arms transfers to China.

The nature of Russian-Chinese arms transfer relationship has remained fragile. These transfers have failed to fully meet Chinese and Russian objectives in setting up an arms sales relationship. Behind these deals, Russia has still seen China as a potential security threat. On the other hand, China has sought to avoid an over-reliance on Russian arms, spare parts and training. An enduring sense of mutual distrust and conflicts of commercial interests have restricted the deepening of the Russian and Chinese arms transfer relationship. This relationship could be sharply
reduced, if China could obtain modern military equipment from other sources or improve indigenous design and manufacturing capability for new weapons.
Chapter 6
China's Military Technology Acquisitions from Russia

Technology cooperation is another important component of Sino-Russian military cooperation. The study of military-technical cooperation has been absent from the general literature on this topic. From a long-term perspective, however, the significance of military-technical cooperation can be more important than that of arms transfers. This chapter focuses on Chinese efforts to upgrade its technological capability to develop and design new weapons through Russian expertise. To reveal the development and limits of Sino-Russian military-technical cooperation, this chapter first explores the rationales behind their military-technical ties. It then examines three major routes by which China has obtained defence technology from Russia: (1) legitimate routes; (2) dual-use technology; and (3) illicit routes. In examining legitimate routes, this chapter investigates Russian technical assistance to Chinese weaponry development and production projects, including assistance in China's R&D projects on next-generation warplanes, and the sale of the Su-27 production licence to China. In exploring Chinese procurement of dual-use technology from Russia, it focuses on the cases of nuclear power engineering and space science. Following this, it will address China's acquisition of Russian defence technology through illicit routes. Finally, this chapter assesses the effectiveness of each route. The conclusion outlines the nature and limits of Sino-Russian military-technical ties.

A) Rationales for Sino-Russian Military-Technical Cooperation
This discussion begins with an examination of the rationales behind Chinese and Russian military-technical cooperation. It will address the priorities of Chinese defence technology modernisation. In addition, it will explore Chinese and Russian interests in military-technical cooperation.

Priorities of Chinese Defence Technology Modernisation

Since the establishment of the PRC, the Chinese defence industry has suffered many technical, organisational, and managerial deficiencies. The termination of Sino-Soviet military-technical ties in 1960 exacerbated the problems. In the mid-1980s, Karen Berney concluded that many problems obstructed the modernisation of the Chinese defence sector. These included outdated technical know-how in microelectronics, poor design-engineering and system-integration abilities, inadequate R&D, and ineffective coordination between research and production.

Iraq's swift defeat in the Gulf War in 1991 added to Beijing's sense of urgency in obtaining advanced technology for military use, as much of Iraq's weaponry was provided by China. According to Chen Mingshan, Deputy Commander of the PLAN, this war taught China lessons on the importance of advanced weapons and technologies:

[The Gulf War] was the first high-tech, moderately intensive, modern local war with global impact which has broken out since the end of the Second World War. This war has not only had a great impact on international order but also provided us with the latest material for studying modern warfare; it has taught us many lessons about building up China's national defence....

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2 Gordon Jacobs, 'Chinese Naval Developments post Gulf War', Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 5, no. 2

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Since the Gulf War in 1991, military scientific research has vigorously pursued this topic in the Chinese army. The Chinese military has published a vast number of research reports - 700 books and 20,000 theses - on military science and theory.\(^3\) Due to global competition over the technological revolution, China has stressed that technological innovation will be a major challenge for the country's development in the future.\(^4\) Based on this perception, the Chinese leadership has stressed that 'developing national defence-oriented scientific and technological research is at once a technical issue and a strategic issue bearing on China's prosperity and security'.\(^5\)

The basic principle behind China's national defence modernisation has been to integrate self-reliance with the import of advanced technology from abroad.\(^6\) Guided by this, China has highlighted several priorities in an attempt to improve the Chinese capability for a limited war under high-tech conditions. First, given that air power played a key role in the 1991 Gulf War, Chinese military leaders have recognised that a modern air force will be an important element in a limited war. In the words of then CMC Vice Chairman General Liu Huaqing:

Modern air forces are capable of independently carrying out large-scale, unremitting, and prolonged air attacks, so that air battles play a more important

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(Feb. 1993), p.81. This report is based on Jacob's interview with Chen Mingshan, Deputy Commander of the PLAN.


role in war that they did before.\textsuperscript{7}

In order to promote its claims over Taiwan and the South China Sea, China has perceived the need to gain air superiority over these areas. Yet, throughout the 1980s, the Chinese aviation industry failed to develop a new, satisfactory jet fighter for the PLAAF.\textsuperscript{8} The air force was seen as the most backward armed service in the PLA.\textsuperscript{9} In 1994, two analysts of China's National Defence University pointed out that obsolete weapons systems and limited combat radius had dramatically weakened the PLAAF's combat readiness. As a result, China was in a threatening position with respect to enemy air strike.\textsuperscript{10} In the 1990s, building a modern air force fleet was placed at the top of military priorities, and the PLA's procurement budget was concentrated on upgrading air capabilities.\textsuperscript{11}

Second, the impact of the 1991 Gulf War highlighted for China the need to develop information warfare.\textsuperscript{12} Concepts of information warfare have become important slogans in the Chinese army: 'information is combat effectiveness', 'command of information is the priority target of high-tech warfare', and 'information will become the key factor in the combat process and outcome'.\textsuperscript{13} In particular, command, control, communications

\textsuperscript{7}Ibid., pp.17-18.
\textsuperscript{9}By 1988, in the PLAAF, 48.8 per cent of aircraft, 53.9 per cent of aircraft engines, 42 per cent of radar systems, 50 per cent of H-Q-2 surface-to-air missiles, and 42 per cent of HQ-2 missile guidance sites were not operational. See John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, 'China's Search for a Modern Air Force', \textit{International Security}, vol. 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999), p.74.
\textsuperscript{13}Ibid.
and intelligence (C3I) have been given the top priority for improvement. In order to establish an effective information net and gain superiority in a future limited war, the Chinese military has viewed it as important to develop space-based technology for conducting reconnaissance, radar jamming devices, and precision missiles.

Third, dual-use technology, which has legitimate commercial use and also significant military applications, has been seen as an important means for obtaining foreign advanced technology. While suffering under the West's arms embargo, imports of dual-use technology from abroad were seen as a channel to help solve technological problems crucial to research related to nuclear weapons, guidance systems, composite materials, and satellite technologies. For this reason, in 1995, General Liu Huaqing demanded that the Chinese military do its best to turn advanced technologies developed for civilian use into technologies for military use so that the Chinese defence technological level could be upgraded.

After the end of the Cold War, aided by its booming economy, China's investments on military spending have increased, from U.S.$ 7.56 billion in 1991 to U.S.$ 11 billion in 1998. Chinese funding for military R&D has been covered by various parts of the state budget. This has included funding for the Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defence, the State Science and Technology Commission, and

defence-related ministries and industries. In 1995, it was estimated that Chinese defence R&D spending was between U.S.$ 0.9 and 1.7 billion. To boost the country's level of defence technology, the Chinese government announced an increase in spending for science R&D for the period of 1996 - 2000 from less than 1 per cent of Gross Domestic Product to 3 per cent. The additional funds would offer both civilian and defence science and technology organisations more financial resources for importing foreign advanced technology through various channels.

**Chinese and Russian Assessments of Interests**

In seeking advanced foreign military technology, one major problem facing China was that it had few alternative sources. Since 1989, Chinese military-technical ties with the West have been terminated. Non-Western sources, such as Russia and Israel, have been major sources for supplying China with modern defence technology.

Several factors explain Chinese interests in Russian military technology. First, for China, technology cooperation with the USA in the 1980s had been an unpleasant experience. The Sino-U.S. 'Peace Pearl' programme, which was originally designed for upgrading Chinese J-8II fighters, was terminated by the U.S. embargo against China after 1989. (see 2.D) China had smarted over the many conditions which were imposed by the USA in that programme. China was not allowed to use the modified model against

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Taiwan. The fire-control system offered by the USA for the J-8II did not exceed that of Taiwan's F-5s. Moreover, the number of modified J-8IIIs was only to be 55.21 The Chinese side complained that Western partners were unreliable, as their military technology transfer decisions usually let 'politics' get in the way. The failure of the Peace Pearl programme was cited by Beijing as a major reason for why it has developed military-technical cooperation with Russia.22

Moreover, since the 1950s, the Chinese have had far more experience with reverse engineering and copying Russian weapons systems rather than with Western military technology. Russian defence technology has been seen as an effective and cheap way to modernise outdated military hardware. As John J. Schulz, former editor of Arms Control Today, commented in 1998:

The collapse of the Soviet Union has meant the sudden availability of high-technology assistance (including production technology) at bargain basement prices at a time when Russia is poor and eager and China is increasingly rich and interested.23

On the Russian side, several factors have accounted for Russian interests in defence technical cooperation with China. First, defence technical cooperation with foreign states has been seen as a means for Russia to influence the recipient's subsequent technological development and to push the recipient gradually into accepting Russia's technical basis and technical support concepts.24 Developing defence technical
cooperation with China could offer Russia the opportunity to influence the development of Chinese defence modernisation. In an interview conducted by the author on 6 July 1998, Evgeny P. Bazhanov, Director of the Institute of Contemporary International Studies at the Russian Foreign Ministry, commented:

If Russia refuses to develop cooperation with China in this area, China will eventually obtain advanced technologies from other sources such as Western Europe. In that case, Russia will face more uncertainties and more challenges from China's military modernisation.25

Pursuing technical cooperation with China could also help to increase Russian exports of military goods to China. In 1998, Alexandre Kotelkin, Director General of the State Company Rosvooruzheniye, stated that the development of military-technical cooperation with foreign countries on a long-term basis was the best means to strengthen Russia's position in the arms markets.26

Moreover, earnings from technical cooperation with China could provide funds for Russian defence industries to develop new weapon systems.27 This was illustrated in the sale of the Su-27 production licence to China. On 25 July 1996, Mikhail Simonov, General Designer of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, pointed out that one of the reasons why Russia sold China the production licence was that the Sukhoi needed funds to develop and produce the fifth-generation fighter - Su-37.28

Sino-Russian military-technical ties have been driven by their state interests; while

27 The author's interview with Prof. Iocesi Fedorov, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, the Russian Foreign Ministry, 8 July 1998, Moscow.
China sought to modernise its armed forces with Russian expertise and technology. Russia intended to earn commercial profits and influence China's subsequent technological development. In December 1992, these two states signed a memorandum on the principles of military-technical cooperation. In November 1993, the Defence Ministers signed the 'Agreement on Military Cooperation for the Next Five Years'. This provided a legal foundation for bilateral cooperation in the military technology field.

**B) Legitimate Routes: Russian Technical Assistance to Chinese Weaponry Development and Production Projects**

This section investigates legitimate routes in Russian technical assistance to Chinese weaponry development and production projects. Two major areas of bilateral technology cooperation will be explored: Russian assistance to Chinese warplanes R&D projects; and the sale of the production licence for Su-27 jet fighters to China. These two cases are closely related to the upgrading of the Chinese air force. An examination of these will provide insight as to whether these two states have trusted each other in the pursuit of technological cooperation.

**Russian Technical Assistance to Chinese Warplanes R&D Projects**

After 1989, U.S. assistance in upgrading the PLA's jet fighters was terminated. In the process of developing new jet fighters, China has suffered technological problems in

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such areas as aircraft and airborne equipment, aircraft system design technology, aircraft auto-control technology, radar technology, advanced materials, and manufacturing technology.\(^3\) In the 1990s, given the country's economic growth and its ambitions to project its air force into peripheral areas, Chinese aviation industries sought to develop highly ambitious warplanes R&D projects. Along with its purchases of Russian weaponry, China started to introduce Russian technology into its existing R&D projects on next-generation warplanes, including FC-1, J-8IIM, and F-10 fighters. Russian technology has become the major technical support for Chinese R&D projects on next-generation warplanes in many vital areas. (see Table 6)

In the process, many problems have arisen. First, in assisting China to improve the design of its next-generation warplanes, Russia has tried to deepen Chinese dependence on its technology and expertise. This was reflected in that Russian technicians refurbished the analogue processor, exciter, power supply, and signal processor for the Chinese-designed J-8IIM fighter.\(^32\) The Russian Mikoyan Aero-Science Production Group (MASPG) used its MiG-33 design to replace the existing central building block of the FC-1 project, which was designed by Israel in the 1980s.\(^33\) In addition, Russian aerospace companies provided up to two-thirds of the required technical and design work, including avionics and power plant, for refurbishing the Chinese F-10's airframe.\(^34\)

Given that Russia has refurbished Chinese-designed warplanes on a large scale, Russia

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has had opportunity to influence the quality of Chinese next-generation warplanes.

### Table 6 Russia's Technical Support for Chinese Warplanes Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Design Corporation</th>
<th>Russian Tech Support</th>
<th>Production Licence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FC-1 Fighters</td>
<td>Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation (CAIC)</td>
<td>central building block, Phazotron Komav radar, Klimov RD-33 turbofan</td>
<td>RD-33 turbofan (for Chinese Liyang Machinery) fire-control radar</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>J-8IIIM Fighters</td>
<td>Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC)</td>
<td>the analogue processor, exciter, and power supply Phazotron Zhuk-8II radar</td>
<td>Zhuk-8II radar (for Chinese Letri Avionics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-10 Fighters</td>
<td>CAIC</td>
<td>two-thirds of the required technical and design work, including avionics and power plant Phazotron Zhemchoug radar single-Lyulka AL-31 turbofan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, despite the fact that Russia refurbished Chinese-designed warplanes in various areas, it is still doubtful that Russia provided the most advanced technology for the Chinese aircraft. This is illustrated in that Russia used its MiG-33 design, which was rejected by the Soviet Air Force in the mid-1980s, to be the central building block of the

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Chinese FC-1.\textsuperscript{35} This policy highlights the Russian reluctance to release up-to-date technology to China.

Moreover, while developing technical cooperation, Russia has tried to increase the exports of military goods to China. To achieve this, Russia refurbished the Chinese-designed jet fighters to fit Russian equipment. This led to a situation where Russian turbofan, radar, and avionics equipment became the major equipment of Chinese next-generation warplanes. (see Table 6) In this way, Russia can not only increase the exports of its military goods, but also obtain the opportunity to control the quantity of Chinese next-generation warplanes.

Although Russia made Chinese warplanes to fit Russian equipment, this has not meant that the performance of Chinese warplanes was successfully upgraded. This was illustrated in that Russian technicians modified the F-10 to fit the Russian single-Lyulka AL-31 turbofan engine, two of which also powered the Chinese Su-27s. Yet, the incorporation of the AL-31 engine into the F-10 airframe has proven difficult. Technical problems have delayed the development schedule of the Chinese F-10 project.\textsuperscript{36}

Another conflict of interest between Russia and China has resided in their different positions on the costs of warplanes R&D. As a technical supplier, Russia has been interested in commercial profits earned from its technical cooperation with China. For China, increasing spending on purchasing Russian technology and equipment has meant

\textsuperscript{35} Nick Cook, 'Lifting the Veil on China's Fighters', \textit{JDW}, 31 January 1996, p.52. The FC-1 is being developed with joint investments from Chinese CAIC and Pakistan's Aviation Integrated Company. The aircraft is expected to replace the F-7 M/P fighters in service in the Pakistani Air Force. CAIC has sought to persuade the Chinese air force to use the FC-1. See Hsiao Yu-sheng, 'China's New-Generation Main Military Aircraft', \textit{Kuang Chiao Ching} (Hong Kong), no. 278 (16 November 1995), pp.70-72, in FBIS-
a higher cost for the production of its next-generation warplanes. Spending on Russian technology has led China to incur at least an additional U.S.$ 500 million for the development of the F-10.\(^{37}\) This has increased production costs of the F-10, which are even higher than that of Su-27s. Increasing production costs will force China to reduce the production figure of the F-10 from 100-150 to 50 a year in the future.\(^{38}\)

Various fighter R&D projects suggest that the modernisation of the PLAAF's outdated aircraft fleet has been put at the top of Chinese defence modernisation. To date, Russia has participated in China's warplane projects in such technical areas as design and production of airframes, fire-control radar, avionics equipment, and airplane turbofan. (see Table 6) However, while China has attempted to build a modern air force fleet, Russian concerns have been to ensure that its security and interests are not undermined. Given the Russian intent to maintain the technological gap, and increased production costs, the future development of official technical cooperation on Chinese warplanes R&D projects faces uncertainties.

**Licenced Production for the Su-27**

Under a 1995 contract, Russia sold China a licence to build Su-27 jets worth a total of more than U.S.$ 2 billion. The Su-27 production project was to be undertaken at China's SAC, and China designated the SAC-produced version of Su-27s as the F-11 (Jian-11).\(^{39}\)

Commenting on this Russian sale, the general literature on this subject has focused on

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\(^{36}\) 'First Flight for F-10 Paves Way for Production', p.17.
\(^{38}\) 'First Flight for F-10 Paves Way for Production', p.17.
either Russia's incapability of controlling its arms exports, or the impact of the Chinese Su-27 on regional security. In contrast, this discussion will examine this deal in an attempt to reveal the problems of Sino-Russian military-technical cooperation.

This thesis argues that Russia has tried to ensure that Russian security and interests are not undermined in this deal. A close look at the agreement on the Su-27 production licence shows that Russia has taken deliberate measures to do so. First, the Russian sale of Su-27s production licence to China was a copy of the original model of the aircraft. This was designed to increase the Chinese aviation industry's dependence on Russian technology in a step by step process. A report in the Russian newspaper, Kommersant-Daily, on 7 February 1996 revealed:

As for leaks of military know-how, Kommersant was assured by experts in the field of aircraft construction that any military hardware manufacture under licence is a copy of the original and does not contain the most important modification elements. In other words, according to this view, China's purchase of a licence to manufacture Su-27s means that its Air Force will become 'tied' to the Sukhoi Special Design Bureau. For Russia will be able to receive additional money for every modification of the Chinese-made Su-27s.

For the sake of security and commercial interests, the 1995 contract of the licenced production for the Su-27 stipulates that any changes to the Su-27 produced in the Chinese SAC can be made only with the agreement of the Russian side. This highlights

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4 'China Gears Up for Licence Production of Sukhoi Fighter Aircraft', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 11 February 2003.
Russian concerns to preserve a technological gap with China.

Second, the Chinese Su-27 production project was scheduled for a long-term period of more than 15 years. According to this schedule, China would build 200 platforms in total before the year 2015. Nevertheless, given that sophisticated technologies of the Su-27's design and manufacturing were 15 years ahead when compared to capabilities of the Chinese SAC, the Russian side planned to 'gradually' upgrade the SAC's manufacturing sophistication, including both equipment and training. This led to a situation where the SAC could only initially assemble around 50 Su-27s from kits before beginning partial production. In the case that SAC suffers technical problems and fails to meet its annual production target of 10 - 15 aircraft, Russia's Su-27 facility in Komsomolsk will provide China with substitute aircraft.

Third, while it has sold the production licence, Russia has still retained control over vital areas of technology. Unlike Russian technology assistance to Chinese-designed warplanes, such as FC-1, F-10 and J-8IIM fighters, the Su-27 is the basic model for all fourth-generation jet fighters in Russia. In order to ensure its own security, Russia has tried to control the export of sensitive technology in this deal. China is only allowed to produce 70 per cent of the aircraft. More importantly, the Sukhoi Design Bureau has retained the right for China to produce the AL-31 engine and radioelectronic equipment,

43 'Russian Imports Step in to Fill the Arms Gap', JDW, 10 December 1997, p.28; 'Beijing Builds Su-27 Fighters from Russian Kits', p.12.
45 'Beijing Builds Su-27 Fighters from Russian Kits', p.12.
46 Ibid.
which are fundamental features to the design of the entire Su-27 family.\textsuperscript{47} This arrangement underscores the Russian attempt to create permanent Chinese dependence on Russia for supplying engine and electronic equipment for its Su-27s.\textsuperscript{48} In addition to security considerations, it would also help to prevent China from exploiting licencing agreements to export cheaper versions of the Su-27 to other states.\textsuperscript{49} At present, China has been required to send the engine back to Russia for repair. These circumstances have provoked angry protests from the Chinese military leadership.\textsuperscript{50}

Fourth, the Su-27 SK jet fighter has flight refuelling capabilities.\textsuperscript{51} However, Russia did not transfer these technologies to China. If Chinese Su-27 jets possess air refuelling capabilities, after taking off from a Beijing airfield, they could reach Moscow in two and a half hours with one mid-air refuelling. Given this, Russia has not provided Chinese Su-27 jets with such offensive capability.\textsuperscript{52} In contrast, in 1997, Russia offered India air-refuelling technology and IL-78 tanker aircraft when it sold to it 40 Su-30 long-range fighters.\textsuperscript{53}

Finally, due to the fact that the Russian Sukhoi Design Bureau failed to ensure the production of 'fifth-generation' fighter, Su-37s, Russia delayed the schedule of the

\textsuperscript{47}Ibid; Koretsky, 'China will Build Russian Planes Itself', p.24; 'China Gears Up for Licence Production of Sukhoi Fighter Aircraft', p.S1/3; 'Russian Imports Step in to Fill the Arms Gap', p.28.
\textsuperscript{49} 'Beijing Builds Su-27 Fighters from Russian Kits', p.12; 'Russian Imports Step in to Fill the Arms Gap', p.28.
\textsuperscript{50} 'China-Assembled Su-27s Make Their First Flight', \textit{J DW}, 24 February 1999, p.16.
\textsuperscript{52} Since the late 1980s, China has sought to develop the air refuelling capability with the assistance of either Iran or Israel. China has planned to use the Y-8 or H-6 bomber as a tanker to refuel Chinese aircraft. See Gill and Kim, \textit{China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad}, pp.126-127; Allen, Krumel, and Pollack, \textit{China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century}, pp.170-171.
\textsuperscript{53} Siemon T. Wezeman and Pieter D. Wezeman, 'Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons', in \textit{SIPRI
delivery of Su-27s production line to China. According to a confidential interview conducted by the author with one Chinese expert in 1998, by early 1998, the two parties were still negotiating on the discharge of the contract. In February 1999, a report of *Jane's Defence Weekly* revealed that a portion of the facilities of the production line for Su-27s was still under construction. In 1999, to assuage Chinese complaints about delays in the production schedule, the Russian side supplied China with ready-made components, assemblies and systems so as to 'build' two aircraft in China. The delayed installation of Su-27s production line in China suggests again that Russia has attempted to preserve a technological gap between the two states' air forces.

In legitimate routes for technical assistance in Chinese weaponry development and production projects, Russia has tried to retain advanced technology and to maintain a technological gap with China. This development has raised uncertainties for their military-technical cooperation. In these circumstances, China has sought to acquire Russian expertise and technology through other channels such as joint R&D projects on dual-technology as well as illicit routes.

C) China's Acquisition of Dual-Use Technologies from Russia

As stated earlier, in order to extend access to foreign advanced technology, China has placed emphasis on the interchangeability of civilian and military technology. In Russia,
due to economic hardship, many formerly secret R&D institutions have sought cooperation with foreign customers to finance new research activities.\textsuperscript{57} These circumstances have provided China with opportunities to gain access to Russian advanced defence technology through developing joint R&D projects on dual-use technology. This discussion will focus on China's procurement of dual-use technologies in two vital technical areas, nuclear power engineering and space science.

\textit{Nuclear Power Engineering}

To upgrade its nuclear technology, China has sought cooperation with Russia in the field of nuclear power through commercial contracts and joint R&D projects. While developing nuclear technical cooperation with foreign states, the Russian government has faced a dilemma. In December 1992, in order to monitor exports of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment, the Yeltsin government announced a list of 'dual purpose' industrial equipment, materials and technologies that could be used for nuclear purposes. Over 200 items, including pulsed lasers, supersensitive detonators, roots with sensor control, machine tools with numerical programme control and chemical materials, were allowed to be exported only on the basis of a licence.\textsuperscript{58}

On the other hand, in circumstances of economic crisis, there has been a strong commercial argument for nuclear power cooperation with foreign states. Commercial profits have motivated the Russian government to support nuclear technological

\textsuperscript{55} 'China-Assembled Su-27s Make Their First Flight', p.16
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid; 'China Gears Up for Licence Production of Sukhoi Fighter Aircraft', p.S1 3.
\textsuperscript{58} 'Russia to Restrict Export of Nuclear Technologies', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 23 December 1992, in
cooperation with China for peaceful uses. This development has made it difficult to identify and monitor transfers of nuclear technology intended for military use without hampering legitimate commercial trade.

When Yeltsin paid his first visit to China in December 1992, these two countries signed an agreement on the construction of a nuclear power station in China. This set the stage for a growing nuclear relationship. In accordance with this agreement, Russian specialists would help to build a nuclear power station consisting of two power units with water-moderated and water-cooled reactors with the capability of 1,000 megawatt each. Russia also agreed to provide China with its experience and knowledge in the area of nuclear power engineering.

Another important agreement on cooperation in the use of nuclear energy was signed in April 1996. According to Viktor Mikhaylov, Russian Minister for Atomic Energy, about 30 areas of bilateral cooperation were covered in Sino-Russian cooperation projects. Based on security considerations, the Russian side demanded that China guarantee that it could not use Russian nuclear technology in its military research and development. However, the Chinese emphasis on the interchangeability of civilian and military technology has placed this guarantee in great doubt. China has gained access to Russian nuclear technology that has secondary military applications. Russian analyst A. Kabannikov warned in December 1992 that the nuclear power technology
which China obtained could be highly usable in projects to create, for example, the reactors of nuclear submarines.63

Additionally, the Chinese government has called for domestic units to create joint research units with Russian counterparts so as to tap Russian technology in nuclear industry. In 1992, the Sino-Russian Center for Nuclear Studies was set up in China's Harbin city, and China planned to send its researchers to a well-known Russian nuclear center in Dubna, near Moscow.64 In 1994, both sides further decided to build in China a plant for the enrichment of uranium through centrifugal separation.65 This has provoked concerns from Russian experts. The Russian military analyst Pavel Felgengauer warned in 1997 that cooperation in this area would enable China to use enriched uranium for its nuclear reactors and nuclear warheads:

Previously, the Chinese obtained enriched uranium for nuclear reactors and weapons-grade uranium for warheads by means of an expensive and wasteful gas diffusion method. Now the PRC has more effective technology for the uranium enrichment process.66

It is difficult to evaluate the extent to which nuclear technology obtained from Russia has contributed to the accumulation of Chinese knowledge for innovating its nuclear weapons. Yet, it is certain that, in order to achieve defence modernisation, China

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has sought to make use of Russian economic difficulties to gain access to advanced nuclear technology, which could be used for both civilian and military applications.

**Space Science**

Space science is closely related to the core of information warfare, particularly with respect to navigation, intelligence, and communication. In the words of a PLA expert Liang Zhenxing: 'Information will be the primary tool for waging war... Controlling space and seizing air and space superiority will be important contributing factors in seizing the war initiative'. Based on this perception, the Chinese military has claimed that space industry is of strategic importance for the country's development and defence modernisation.

To fight a limited war under high-tech conditions, China has made every effort to upgrade its capabilities in such fields as satellite-imaging systems, airborne early-warning sensors, global-positioning systems for guiding missiles, and modern command-and-control networks. The Chinese government estimated that the country's overall electronics demand would total U.S.$ 120 billion by the year 2000, much of it for military use. Meanwhile, the Chinese government has encouraged defence companies to obtain military technology in such vital areas as C3I systems and electronics by setting

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71 Holloway, 'Revolutionary Defence', p.25.
up joint ventures with foreign defence companies. In November 1992, China signed a contract worth U.S.$ 100,000 with Russian enterprises to purchase certain advanced components and systems for Chinese satellites. The systems included in the deal could also be used to improve China's missile guidance capability.

In addition, China purchased Russian manned craft docking units, life support and rocket engines in an attempt to implement an orbit flight. A crewed flight will make China the third state to launch a manned flight after the USSR and the USA. More importantly, China has obtained Russian technical assistance in producing a heavy lift booster, capable of placing 20,000 kg into Earth's low orbit. This has enabled China to use Russian rocket engine technology to upgrade its missile delivery capabilities. On 21 May 1996, U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry warned Russia that it would be 'a significant mistake' to transfer SS-18 technology to China. Yet, he conceded that making SS-18 booster rockets available for space launching could be the exception. Clearly, joint research on space exploration has offered China the opportunity to obtain Russian SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) rocket engine technologies without sanction from the USA.

Chinese cooperation with Russia has also covered the study and utilisation of space science in broad fields. In December 1992, both sides signed an intergovernmental agreement on outer space cooperation. The agreement embraced their cooperation in

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72 'Post-2000 Delays to China's Arms Goals', pp.21-22.
75 Ibid.
76 'Alleged ICBM Transfer from Russia to China', Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 6 (June 1996), p.45.
such fields as studies of the solar system and cosmic matter, space medicine and remote probing of the Earth. According to Lurii Sergeevich Osipov, President of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), Chinese and Russian scientists have planned to launch two spacecraft on missions to Mars to explore its climate and geology and search for evidence of life. Meanwhile, scientists from both states have made use of remote sensing technology and high-altitude balloons to detect cosmic rays and the space environment.

China has sought to gain access to Russian space technology with secondary military applications. Chinese purchases of Russian advanced satellite components can be used to upgrade its missile guidance systems. Chinese cooperation with Russia in production technologies for rocket engines may improve its missile delivery capability. Joint space science research has enabled China to obtain advanced space technologies such as satellite and airborne remote sensor systems. If the current level of space research and cooperation is sustained, this will have a significant effect on China's satellite sensor capability, C3I technologies, and missile delivery power. In 1999, Major Mark A. Stokes, U.S. Assistant Air Attaché in Beijing from 1992-1995, stressed that China had a wide variety of programmes which indicated its ambition to become a major player in space in the 21st century. He concluded that the Chinese emphasis on dual-use systems could provide significant value added benefits to future PLA operations.

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79 Ibid.
In 1998, the American analyst Richard D. Fisher also warned that China's ambition to develop advanced space technology would pose a security threat to the USA:

Overall, China has demonstrated it has ambitious plans for military and civilian use of space. It may seek Russian and Western assistance to build its radar satellites, which, unlike regular imaging satellites that are limited by cloud cover, can be used to follow U.S. naval forces in Asia in all weather conditions. This capacity could be used to target U.S. forces with new ballistic and cruise missiles or attack aircraft. China is developing an improved imaging satellite and, like the United States, can be expected to use commercial imaging satellite for military purposes.81

If China can successfully apply its expertise and knowledge in the field of space science to military uses, it may be able to surprise potentially hostile states, including Russia, with an upgraded military space capability in a future international crisis.

D) China's Acquisitions of Russian Defence Technology through Illicit Routes

In addition to intergovernmental technical cooperation projects, China has also tried to obtain advanced Russian military technology through illicit routes. This section will first address different illicit routes by which China has acquired Russian defence technology. It will then explore the difficulties facing Russia in preventing a brain drain. To understand the implications of Russian technology for China's defence modernisation programmes, this section will also examine the development of Chinese strategic and cruise missiles, and its next-generation nuclear submarines.

Illicit Routes

China has argued that military technologies from abroad can be acquired in more ways than by direct purchase, and may involve the hiring of foreign expertise and sharing of technologies.\textsuperscript{82} In its technical assistance to China, Russia has tried to preserve a technological gap in an attempt to safeguard its security and interests. In these circumstances, China has sought to gain access to Russian expertise and technology through illicit routes.

First, China has recruited many Russian defence engineers and scientists to work in China. Russian scientists specialise in broad fields of defence technology and could assist China in overcoming its technological bottleneck in developing its next-generation weapons. As Glenn E. Schweitzer, the First Executive Director of the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) which was set up by the USA, Europe, and Japan in Moscow to prevent a Russian brain drain into other states, pointed out:

\begin{quote}
the number of Russian specialists who developed and designed weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems and who should be of interest to the ISTC was about 60,000... the 60,000 core specialists had many years of direct hands-on experience in the laboratories and on the test ranges where components and materials for thousands of real weapons were developed and fired. Such experience was lacking in most other countries.\textsuperscript{83}
\end{quote}

Given that Russian specialists and technicians have had to subsist for months without pay, presumably, these professional personnel have been vulnerable to foreign recruitment.\textsuperscript{84} China has allegedly offered salaries of around U.S.$ 1,000 - 2,000 a month to Russian technicians and advisors. This might be considerably less than they

\begin{table}
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\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Year} & \textbf{Device} & \textbf{Result} \\
\hline
1995 & LOM-2000 & Successful tests \\
1996 & LOM-2000 & Operational \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Overview of Russian Laser Technology Development}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{83} Schweithzer, \textit{Moscow DMZ}, p 103.
could earn in Western countries, but a lot more than in Russia.\textsuperscript{85} It was estimated that the number of Russian engineers and scientists who were secretly working for China was roughly between 1,000 and 3,000.\textsuperscript{86} These Russian specialists were excellent in fields such as aircraft construction, rocketry, anti-submarine warfare and air defence. Some of them have been attached to research institutes under the Chinese Aeronautics Ministry to assist China in R&D of new weaponry.\textsuperscript{87}

Moreover, some Russian scientists visiting China for short trips have provided vital information on military technologies to their Chinese counterparts. According to Stephen J. Blank, the Chinese Military-Technical Cooperation Coordinating Centre invited Russian weapons designers and other specialists to China for preliminary talks in 1996. At these talks, Russian scientists gave 'secret' lectures to their Chinese counterparts. The defence information China received from Russian experts may have helped to save 15-20 years of R&D and hundreds of millions of dollars.\textsuperscript{88} Furthermore, it was reported in 1997 that many Chinese specialists had maintained contact with their Russian counterparts through computer networks. This channel enabled China to obtain the latest information and knowledge on Russian defence technologies.\textsuperscript{89} In the deal regarding the production licence for Su-27s, China chose to buy only those plans


necessary for the basic mainframe. The Russian side complained that the Chinese were not interested in additional equipment, because they might have already obtained the blueprints for these.90

On 16 June 1994, Sergey Stepashin, Director of the Russian Federal Counter-intelligence Service, warned that the Chinese intelligence services had been active in Primorskiy Kray, involved in direct recruitment and military espionage.91 Russian counter-intelligence departments have sought to prevent the leakage of defence technologies to China.92 In 1999, Russian security agents in Vladivostok seized illegal defence technology in the process of being exported to China. The acoustic laboratories of the Pacific Institute of Oceanography in Russia designed 'acoustic modules' for China's Harbin Engineering University. After determining that the equipment had military application, the acoustic laboratories were sealed pending further investigation.93 The theft of Russian defence technology has highlighted Chinese ambitions to upgrade its military capacity through foreign advanced technology. It has also thrown a shadow over 'mutual trust' between the two states.

The Difficulties of Preventing a Russian Brain Drain into China

In Russia, the out-flow of defence technology has provoked concerns. Russian analysts have called for a stricter control over the Russian defence sector and its personnel

90 Holloway and Bickers, 'Brothers in Arms', p.21.
93 'Russia Seizes Suspected Military Exports', JDW, 22 September 1999, p.20.
disclosure of advanced technology. As A. Kabannikov commented on 11 December 1992:

In the present situation, when the defense industry, struggling for survival, has independently made a dash for the foreign market, albeit under government supervision, the consequences of this unprecedented expansion inspire alarm. Whereas it is somehow still possible to keep an eye on its finished products, government structures are proving clearly incapable of monitoring the spread of technologies.94

As a member of President Yeltsin's team negotiating with the Chinese leadership on military-technical cooperation in December 1992, Russian Deputy Premier Aleksandr Shokhin voiced his concerns on the issue by stating:

We do not want to go beyond the line that separates the sale of defensive and offensive weapons, although many of our enterprises have made such proposals. Moreover, we would like to preclude attempts to promote creeping, uncontrolled arms trade and to transfer technologies. Unfortunately, there have been cases when representatives of designing (sic) bureau and enterprises had tried to reach corresponding agreements while on private visits. And although such cases are not very numerous, especially as regards China, we would like to establish a tougher control mechanism. It is necessary, apparently, to conclude an agreement with all countries on the protection of intellectual property and to stiffly control the transfer of know-how, patents, etc.95

A Russian brain drain into China has reflected the shift of national economic strength between the two countries. Given the country's economic hardship, it was difficult for the Russian government to prevent this drain. On 9 June 1994, Yuriy Baturin, National Security Adviser to the Russian President, pointed out:

If our specialists were guaranteed more appropriate living conditions, there would be no need for more active counter-intelligence activity, nothing would find its way to China via these specialists, and they themselves would never leave for China.96

96 Shalnev, 'Russia Has Become a Proving Ground for "Exotic Intelligence Services"', p.10.
This development has attracted the West's concern. In 1993, to prevent a Russian brain drain into other states, the ISTC was established by the USA, Western Europe, and Japan in Moscow. This Centre provided financial support to Russian scientists, engineers, and technicians who could develop and design weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The basic purpose has been to prevent these specialists from being recruited by other states.\(^7\)

However, many problems have arisen from this plan. In its first two years, the ISTC allocated a total of U.S.$ 82 million to finance 199 projects.\(^8\) In Russia, there were about 60,000 specialists able to develop and design weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The number of Russian specialists financed by the ISTC was inadequate. Moreover, the ISTC became operational in 1993, and its financial support mainly went to those Russian specialists residing in Russia with no intention of emigrating.\(^9\) No evidence suggests that those Russian specialists who were recruited by foreign states before 1993 had returned to Russia because of the establishment of the ISTC.

The ISTC has admitted the difficulties of controlling Russia's brain drain. According to Glenn E. Schweitzer, the First Executive Director of the ISTC:

> At the same time, we witnessed the emergence of a variety of new channels for transferring abroad technical information originating in Russia. Many weaponeers were making short-term visits to other countries. Foreign

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\(^7\) For further discussion, see Schweithzer, *Moscow DMZ*.


\(^9\) As early as 1992, the International Science Foundation was established to provide long-term grants for Russian basic scientists. However, weapons developers were not included in this programme. See Dorothy S. Zinberg, *The Missing Link?: Nuclear Proliferation and the International Mobility of Russian Nuclear Experts*, UNIDIR Research Paper no. 35 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995), p.31.
representatives in Russia with undisclosed home affiliations increased. Also of great significance, electronic communications from remote locations in Russia to other countries developed quickly.\(^{100}\)

According to the ISTC, Russian nuclear experts might provide the Chinese with special in-depth experience to refine their approaches and help to assess their capabilities and shortcomings.\(^{101}\) A Russian brain drain into China has important implications for the innovation of China's strategic forces.

The Implications of Russian Expertise for China's Strategic Forces

In the Chinese military's view, ballistic missiles can influence a war situation in a crucial way. In this view, ballistic missiles possess over-all depth strike capabilities, surprise and speedy attack capabilities, amazing strike effects, and can have decisive influence on the result of a war.\(^{102}\)

Western sources have pointed out that China has obtained the components, engine and guidance technology of Russian SS-18, the core of Russian nuclear arsenal.\(^{103}\) In addition, China has sought to obtain technologies from the Russian SS-24 or SS-25 to improve the mobility and accuracy of Chinese land-based and single-warhead nuclear missiles - the CSS-4.\(^{104}\) The SS-24 multiple targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) missiles can be rail-mobile or silo based. The single-warhead road-mobile SS-25 has a range of

\(^{100}\) Schweithzer, *Moscow DMZ*, p.101.

\(^{101}\) Ibid.


\(^{103}\) Joseph C. Anselmo, 'China's Military Seeks Great Leap Forward', *AWST*, 12 May 1997, p.70; 'One Arrow, Three Stars: China's MIRV Programme', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, vol. 9, no. 6 (June 1997), p.267. For China's acquisitions of components and booster rockets of Russian SS-18, see 6.C.

over 10,000 km and pinpoint accuracy. The successful integration of Russian SS-24 and SS-25 technology into Chinese nuclear missiles would enable Chinese strategic forces to carry more warheads and be more mobile and accurate.\textsuperscript{105}

In addition, China has viewed new-generation nuclear submarines as crucial for ensuring its mastery of the sea in modern warfare, and is trying to build a survival, sea-based nuclear retaliatory force.\textsuperscript{106} China has planned to develop a new generation Type 093 nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) and Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) in order to replace its outdated nuclear submarine fleet after the year 2000.\textsuperscript{107} The Type 093 SSN was built in China's Huludao shipyard with the technical assistance of Russian engineers from the Rubin Design Bureau in St. Petersburg. It has been reported that the project of Type 093 SSN, which was based on Russia's 'Victor III', would be completed in 2001.\textsuperscript{108}

Russian technicians have assisted China in developing a new nuclear propulsion system for powering its new generation nuclear submarines.\textsuperscript{109} These technicians also assisted Chinese SSNs in coating their hulls to improve noise insulation. The noise problem was a particular vulnerability of Chinese Han-class SSNs, and enabled the USA

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} 'China Receives First Russian "Kilo"', \textit{Po nter, Jane's Intelligence Review}, vol. 2, no. 3, (March 1995), p.1. The first of Chinese Han-class SSNs was brought into service in 1972 and the fifth in 1990. The submarine had to surface in order to launch its missiles, thereby risking detection and destruction by hostile aircraft. Along with problems of high internal radiation, the PLAN decided to discontinue the Hans. The single Xia SSBN was essentially a modification of the Han SSN. See John Jordan, 'The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)', \textit{Jane's Intelligence Review}, vol. 6, no. 6 (June 1994), p.279.
\textsuperscript{109} 'China Should Receive Its Third "Kilo" by November', \textit{JDW}, 30 July 1997, p.16.
and Japanese navies to detect Hans with sophisticated anti-submarine warfare systems. The successful development of a new noise insulation system will enable new-generation nuclear submarines to approach closer to hostile states' fleets and place them under direct threat from the Chinese navy. Moreover, the Chinese hull-mounted sonar system was developed in the 1950s and had a very limited detection range. China has expressed an interest in the Russian towed array sonar system - which has omnidirectional detection with a maximum effective range of 80 km - and the multi-target torpedo control system for its SSBNs.

If it can successfully integrate Russian advanced technology into its new-generation SSNs and SSBNs, China will have a more reliable sea-based deterrence capacity. The new-generation nuclear submarines could sow doubts in the mind of any state contemplating a pre-emptive nuclear strike against China. These circumstances have worried Russian defence planners. In an interview conducted by the author on 6 July 1998, Vasilii I. Krivokhizha, the First Deputy Director of Russia's Institute for Strategic Studies, stressed:

From the view of geopolitics, Russia has to take account of a potential security threat from China. Given the decline of the country's economic strength, Russia may be not able to maintain an effective conventional force. In case of a tension or conflict with China, Russia will need to count on strategic forces whose survival capability and precision are more superior than those of China to deter China's military actions.

With the assistance of Russian scientists, China has pursued the upgrading of its strategic

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3. The author's interview with Dr. Vasilii I. Krivokhizha, First Deputy Director, Russia's Institute for Strategic Studies, 6 July 1998, Moscow.
forces. The development of China's new-generation nuclear submarines, coupled with MIRV missile systems, could pose a challenge to Russia's security, at the least complicating the situation for Russian decision-makers in a crisis situation between the two countries.

E) Assessment of the Three Routes

In order to access the effectiveness of each route, it is necessary to understand three major flows of knowledge and technology. As shown in the Table 7, Flows A and B, production knowledge and know-how, can contribute to the development of the recipient's weapons production capacity. China's right to produce the Su-27 jet fighter and to assemble the RD-33 engine for the FC-1 and the Zhuk-8 II radar for the J-8IIM under Russian production licences should be listed in technologies of Flows A and B. Under these contracts, the Russian side may agree to partly supply China with the knowledge and know-how which were related to blueprint specifications or production and maintenance procedures.

However, it should be noted that it is the knowledge in Flow C - important scientific principles and engineering skill - that can fundamentally assist a recipient in developing technological capabilities to design new weapons by itself. To preserve a technological gap between them, Russia has constricted transfers of Flow C technology and knowledge to China. This has been reflected in that, despite its urgent need for funds, Russia has still refused the Chinese proposal to participate in joint development and share funding of

\[^{113}\text{The following discussion is based on the ideas of Erik Baark. See Erik Baark, 'Military Technology and Absorptive Capacity in China and India: Implications for Modernization', in Eric Arnett (ed.), Military}

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Project 1-42, a fifth-generation multi-role fighter that Russia touted as a counter to the U.S. planned F-22.\textsuperscript{114}

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<th>Table 7 Three Flows of International Technology Transfers</th>
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Source: Baark, 'Military Technology and Absorptive Capacity in China And India: Implications for Modernization', p.91.

In legitimate routes of technical assistance, Russia has retained sensitive technology and knowledge. Although Russia has refurbished Chinese-designed warplanes and helped to resolve its technical problems, Russia has not transferred Flow C technology and knowledge to China. Given this, 'dual-use technology' and 'illicit routes' became the major means for China to obtain Russian technologies of Flow C and to improve its weaponry design capabilities. In the name of peaceful use, China has developed joint

\textsuperscript{114} Barbara Opall-Rome, 'Economics, Russian Reluctance Slow PLA Arms Drive', \textit{Defense News}, 8
research projects with Russia on dual-use technology. This has enabled China to obtain knowledge and technology of Flow C for nuclear power engineering and space science that have application for military uses.

Additionally, China has made efforts to gain access to Russian advanced defence technology through illicit routes. It has enabled China to obtain advanced military technologies not open to export by the Russian government. One example of this is that Russia has refused to export advanced air-to-air missiles to China. Yet, Russian engineers have assisted China in the development of anti-radar missiles under private contracts.115

The recruitment of foreign expertise can be an easy way to upgrade a country's military technological potential. The USSR's acquisition of German expertise and technology on missile guidance systems in the 1950s is a good example. After the end of the Second World War, a number of German experts, led by Helmut Gröttrup, began to help the Soviet Union to develop its ballistic missile programme. By the 1950s, based on the theoretical aspects of German navigation technology, the Soviet Union had laid the basis for a purely Soviet R&D effort in this field and surpassed the German level.116

This point has been illustrated in the development of cruise missiles, which are viewed as 'the paradigmatic weapon of the RMA', in China.117 In 1993, China recruited

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an entire cruise missile R&D team from Russia to work in China's Shanghai city.\textsuperscript{118} According to Chong-pin Lin, who was a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and now is Vice-Chairman of Mainland China Committee at the Taiwanese Executive Yuan, with the assistance of Russian technicians, Chinese cruise missiles have entered the test firing stage. Chinese satellites are now able to provide sufficient topographical information for inputting target data into the missile's memory.\textsuperscript{119} The U.S. Pentagon also pointed out that, due to technological assistance from Russia and Israel, Chinese cruise missiles would be air-launched from bombers, with a sea-launched variant possibly following. The first of the Chinese cruise missiles will probably be operational early after 2000.\textsuperscript{120}

Russian scientists might also provide China with the expertise and technology that had been restricted by the Russian government, and help China to create an indigenous design and manufacturing capability for new weapons systems. All of these are ongoing secretly and a real picture of the situation is unavailable. However, the Chinese recruitment of Russian specialists can undermine the development of official technical cooperation between the two states. It can also reduce the Russian government's leverage in official technical cooperation with China.


\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{120}
F) Conclusions: The Unstable Nature of Sino-Russian Military-Technical Cooperation

The nature of Sino-Russian military-technical cooperation is unstable. Enduring distrust and conflicts of interest have obstructed the furthering of these relations. This examination of Sino-Russian military-technical cooperation has thrown light into two areas not covered in the general literature.

First, while it provided assistance to Chinese weaponry development and production, Russia has sought to protect its own security and commercial interests. Russia has not been a reliable source for technological supplies as China had expected. In the process of providing technological assistance to Chinese next-generation warplanes, Russia has tried to deepen China's dependence on Russia's technical basis and equipment supply, in an attempt to control both the 'quality' and 'quantity' of China's next-generation warplanes. In addition, despite the fact that Russia has sold China the production licence for the Su-27, it has taken deliberate measures to safeguard Russian security interests. Russia's efforts to maintain a technological gap with China has underscored Russian concerns about a security threat from China. Also, Russian technical assistance to warplanes R&D projects has increased Chinese production costs, which could create uncertainties for the modernisation of the Chinese air force.

Second, given Russia's reluctance to release up-to-date technologies to China in legitimate routes, China has sought to gain access to advanced defence technologies through dual-use technology and illicit routes. Russia's economic weakness has offered

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120 Anselmo, 'China's Military Seeks Great Leap Forward', p.70.
China opportunities of access to Russian dual-use technology in such areas as nuclear power engineering and space science through joint R&D projects. Ties between Chinese civilian and military departments are close. According to China's official news agency, Xinhua, Chinese civilian firms have actively participated in various areas of national defence R&D such as nuclear weapons, nuclear submarines, guidance missiles, satellites, and materials.¹²¹ In the context of joint R&D projects on dual-technology, China has been an ambitious partner, trying to make use of Russia's economic hardship to achieve its ambition of becoming a credible military power.

China's illicit acquisition of Russian defence technology has raised deep questions about the future of official defence technical cooperation. China's access to Russian advanced technology through illicit routes could render the Russian arms and military-technical exports control mechanism and procedures ineffective, and might help China to upgrade an indigenous design and manufacturing capability for new weapons systems. This development will have important implications for the relationship between the two states. As stated by Russian military expert Dmitri Trenin in 1998, 'Russia may lose its military technology edge on China, which so far is its most important advantage before its neighbor in the field of defence'.¹²² Combined with territorial disputes and demographic tensions and given China's growing economic strength, China's increasing military potential could be a direct threat to Russia's security.

¹²² Dmitri Trenin, Russia's Chinese Problem, unpublished paper (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 1998), p.20.
Chapter 7 Conclusions

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China and Russia have sought to develop cooperation in various fields and announced a 'partnership'. In 1997, Rajan Menon described this relationship as one of 'strategic convergence', involving multifaceted cooperation and a convergence of views and interests on important issues. In contrast, this thesis suggests that the development of this relationship has remained strained. This has been illustrated in the limits of Sino-Russian military cooperation.

During the post-Cold War period, China and Russia have sought to develop military cooperation at two levels to achieve their own state interests. First, these states have sought to defuse remaining points of tension through CBMs. Second, they have developed new areas of cooperation, including arms transfers and military-technical cooperation. Compared to the past, progress has been made in improving bilateral military-security relations. However, many problems and limits have remained. Mutual distrust and conflicts of interest have obstructed the development of Chinese and Russian military cooperation, including CBMs, arms transfers and military-technical cooperation. As a result, the nature of Chinese and Russian military cooperation has remained fragile. This conclusion will underline the limitations on Sino-Russian military cooperation and highlight the persistent challenges in this relationship.

A) Limitations on Sino-Russian Military Cooperation

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1 Rajan Menon, 'The Strategic Convergence between Russia and China', Survival, vol. 39, no. 2
Chinese and Russian military cooperation has been motivated by the calculations of their own state interests. For China, arms trade and military-technical cooperation with Russia was to promote its defence modernisation, which was viewed by the Chinese leadership as an important strategic goal in the new era. In China’s view, Russian economic difficulties offered the opportunity to swap light industry goods and foods for purchases of Russian military equipment and technology. This could expand the export of Chinese commodities, and save Chinese spending on purchases of modern armaments.

For Russia, the strategic objective of military cooperation with China was to consolidate its relations with China. In 1992, Yeltsin declared that ‘we [Russia and China] are prepared for cooperation in all fields, including the most sophisticated weapons and armaments’. Such political pledges showed Russia’s intention of using its military cooperation with China as a symbol of their friendly relations. Military cooperation with China was also seen as a means to increase Russian influence over China’s defence modernisation. In addition, commercial enticements gave cause for Russia to pursue arms trade and military-technical cooperation with China. Russia expected that bilateral cooperation in these areas could help to lighten the financial crisis in its defence industry.

This thesis concludes that many problems and limits have arisen while China and Russia have attempted to pursue military cooperation. After examining the main components of Chinese and Russian military cooperation, this study argues that

First, Chinese and Russian desires to have more stable bilateral relations led to the possibility of their cooperation on CBMs. Within the context of Sino-Russian military cooperation, CBMs have sought to increase mutual trust to enable both sides to resolve lingering problems in the military-security field. Although cooperation on CBMs has helped to normalise bilateral relations, the level of trust has remained weak.

In order to have a peaceful external environment for domestic economic development, China and Russia have adopted major types of European CBMs - communication measures, transparency measures, constraint measures, and declaratory measures - to achieve confidence-building. Through these, significant progress has been made to lessen military tensions in the border areas and to avoid a surprise attack from the other.

However, viewed from the perspective of the 'procedure' dimension of confidence-building, which focuses on the content and objective of CBMs, many insufficiencies have remained in Chinese and Russian CBMs. Unlike the European model that developed a comprehensive instrument applying to military developments anywhere in the territories of the parties, Sino-Russian CBMs have merely focused on the reduction of military tensions in the land border regions. This has led to the situation where, beyond the alleviation of military tensions in these areas, both sides

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have failed to promote mutual trust in the wider military and security field.

For example, while pursuing transparency measures, China did not disclose defence spending, thus preventing Russia from tracing China's wider military development and modernisation. Also, the lack of elaborate procedures for verification has highlighted the weak level of trust between China and Russia. More importantly, given unequal geographic conditions, Russian worries about the vulnerability of its unpopulated Far East areas have remained. This was illustrated in that while these two parties pursued force limitations within the 100-km border zone, two important Russian cities in these areas, Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, were excluded from the reductions. This development has clearly suggested that the sense of distrust has remained. Bilateral cooperation on CBMs has failed to create an outcome in which China and Russia eliminate enduring perceptions of mutual threat.

Second, although these states have undertaken arms transfers and military-technical cooperation, Russia has remained concerned about a potential security threat from China when supplying arms and technologies to China. Lingering mutual distrust has restricted bilateral cooperation in these two areas.

In contrast to its political pledges, Russia has tried to safeguard its security and has not supplied China with the most sophisticated weapon systems. Unlike what Stephen Blank claims, Russian arms transfers to China have been cautious. Russia has sought to maintain tight controls over the types of weaponry supplied to China.

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Russian arms transfers to China have not reached the level of quality it has supplied to other Asian countries. This has underscored Russian concerns about the potential risks of an enhanced Chinese military capability.

Russian policy on arms transfers has provoked Chinese complaints. While selectively importing advanced military equipment and technology from abroad, China has been vigilant against dependence on a single external source. To prevent this, China has sought to develop alternative sources of spare parts from Ukraine for its Su-27s and has lobbied Western states to lift their arms embargoes against China. An enduring sense of distrust has restricted the further development of Chinese and Russian cooperation in this field.

Mutual distrust has also obstructed Chinese and Russian military-technical cooperation. While China attempted to import Russian expertise and technology to promote its defence modernisation, Russia has been reluctant to release up-to-date technologies to China in legitimate routes of technical cooperation. The sale of the Su-27 production licence to China is an example that weakens the case for the existence of 'mutual trust'. The Russian plan to upgrade Chinese SAC's manufacturing sophistication was scheduled for 15 years, and China could produce only 70 per cent of the fighter. Russia has retained the rights for assembling the sophisticated AL-31 engine and electronic equipment, and China has been required to return the AL-31 engine to Russia for repair. As the Russian Sukhoi Design Bureau failed to ensure the production of fifth-generation fighter, Su-37s, Russia has delayed the schedule of the delivery of Su-27 production line to China. As such, Russia has attempted to preserve the technological gap between the Russian and Chinese air
forces so as to protect its own security interests. These policies have provoked anger from the Chinese military.

Given Russian measures to maintain the technological gap with China, military-technical cooperation with Russia, in particular, through legitimate routes, has failed to fully meet Chinese aims of achieving technology innovation. Guided by the principle of integrating self-reliance with the import of advanced technology from abroad, China has tried to obtain Russian expertise and technology through joint R&D projects on dual-technology as well as illicit routes. Most importantly, China has recruited Russian scientists and engineers to improve indigenous design and manufacturing capability for new military equipment. This development has reduced Russian leverage in its relationship with China and undermined Russian efforts to retain sensitive defence technology in its arms trade and military-technical cooperation with China. This has also raised questions about 'mutual trust' forged by these two countries.

Third, the sales of military hardware to China have not been profitable to Russia. The fundamental tension between the two states is that while China has intended to make use of Russian economic hardship to offer it light industry goods and foods in exchange for purchases of Russian modern weaponry, Russia has sought to ensure revenues from these transfers.

Throughout the 1990s, cheap and poor quality Chinese commodities were used for payment to Russian defence enterprises. This undermined the Russian objective of lightening the financial crisis in its defence industry through arms exports to China. On the other hand, increasing Russian demands for more hard currency for arms
payments and its insistence on appropriate weaponry pricing has increased costs for China to modernise its armed forces through Russian weapons. Disputes over these issues have even delayed arms deals. These developments have failed to fully meet commercial enticements behind these transfers, and have heightened the fragile nature of this relationship.

Additionally, in order to ensure sufficient revenues from its military-technical cooperation with China, Russia has tried to push China into accepting its technical basis and technical support concepts. This was illustrated in that Russia had made the Chinese-designed warplanes to fit Russian equipment, even though the incorporation of certain equipment into Chinese warplanes airframe had proven difficult. Spending on Russian technology and equipment has increased the production costs of Chinese next-generation warplanes. Also, while it sold China the licenced production for the Su-27 in the 1995, Russia provided China with a copy of the original Su-27 that did not contain the most important modification elements. Russia's aim was to tie the Chinese aviation industry to the Sukhoi Design Bureau and to receive additional money for every modification to the Chinese-made Su-27s. Given conflicts of commercial interest, and increased production costs, the development of official technical cooperation on Chinese combat aircraft development and production projects has faced uncertainties.

In brief, after the end of the Cold War, calculated self-interests motivated China and Russia to pursue CBMs, arms transfers and military-technical cooperation. It is significant that, while these states attempted to consolidate their relations and to create an atmosphere of mutual trust through military cooperation, they have still seen
the other as a potential security threat. A gap has existed between their political 
pledges and the reality of cooperation. A sense of mutual distrust has remained, and 
conflicts of security and commercial interests have arisen. These factors have 
underscored the fragile nature of Sino-Russian military cooperation after the end of 
the Cold War.

B) Persistent Challenges

For China and Russia, reciprocal threats against each other are deeply rooted in 
historical, geopolitical, and national security dimensions. The deep-rooted sense of 
distrust constituted a significant barrier to the furthering of their military cooperation.

Historically, China and Russia have been hostile neighbours. Throughout the 
Cold War period, their military relations were unstable. The friendly relationship 
between them only lasted for seven years, from 1949 to 1956. The termination of 
military ties, armed clashes in the border areas, China's claims on Soviet territory, 
military build-up along the common border, China's preparation for a war against the 
USSR, and Soviet military containment against China sharpened the sense of mutual 
distrust between these two neighbours. As a result, both sides perceived the other as 
a genuine security threat.

From the point of view of history, these two states' military relations have 
reflected changes in their political relations and the wider political environment. For 
these two states, any change in the political relationship will influence the 
development of their military relations. After the Cold War, China and Russia have 
announced a 'strategic partnership' and sought to develop cooperation in various fields.
However, bilateral cooperation in the realms of international diplomacy, regional security, and economic affairs has been limited. In particular, strained cooperation in counter-balancing U.S. hegemony, the U.S.-Japanese security alliance, and NATO enlargement has highlighted Chinese and Russian divergent geopolitical and security interests. In contrast to what Menon argues, limited cooperation in these fields can hardly be portrayed as a favourable strategic circumstance or a solid political foundation conducive to the deepening of Chinese and Russian military cooperation.5 Many Russian political elites have cast doubts on the necessity for a 'strategic partnership' with China. The future development of the relationship remains uncertain.

More importantly, many problems, which result from contradictions of geopolitical and security interests, could deepen the sense of distrust between these states. These will remain as uncertainties for the future of Sino-Russian military relations. First, historical legacies such as territorial disputes remain lurking sore points in Sino-Russian relations. In the 1990s, the Yeltsin leadership sought to conduct border demarcation with China. However, disputes over the ownership of the islands off Khabarovsk and the Argun River still exist. In 1997, the Chinese side had admitted that Yeltsin had played an important role in the process of demarcating the Sino-Russian common border, and voiced its concerns about the future of the border demarcation after Yeltsin stepped down.6

On 31 December 1999, Yeltsin resigned and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was

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Zhao Huasheng, 'Guanyu zhonge guanzu changqi wending fazhan di sikao' [Thoughts on the Long-term Steady Development of Sino-Russian Relations], Guoji wenhi luntan (Shanghai), no. 3 (1997), p.57.
appointed Acting President. In the presidential election in March 2000, Putin was elected Russia's president. Although Putin is not an ultra nationalist, it has not meant that potential Chinese and Russian frictions on unsettled islands can be removed. The question here is not whether a future Russian leadership takes a cooperative approach toward border demarcation with China, but if it will be able to reconcile domestic opposition against territorial concessions to China. While Russia has suffered a marked loss of regional and international status, maintaining territorial integrity has been seen as important to preserve this country's pride. Russian regional authorities and the military have been particularly concerned about border demarcation with China. Their resistance to territorial concessions to China may become an obstacle to a final resolution of the two countries' territorial disputes. Any friction over territorial issues will exacerbate Chinese and Russian military and security relations, even though some of CBMs have helped to reduce military tensions in the border areas.

Second, with an obvious shift in power relations between China and Russia, demographic tensions have added significant uncertainty to their security relationship and may become more serious in the future. Given its growing economic strength, China has shown more confidence in dealing with its relations with foreign states, including Russia. Since the 19th century, for the first time, China perceives itself as a great power, even a quasi superpower. Historically, the Chinese leaderships have complained about unequal border agreements and the Russian occupation of Chinese

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territories. After the Cold War, given the growing number of Chinese immigrants in Russia's Far Eastern regions, Russian anxieties about Chinese 'ethnic expansion' and ambitions toward Russian territory have increased. The Russian military expert Dmitri Trenin has warned that by mid-21st century Chinese could become the second largest ethnic group in Russia. Potential inter-ethnic friction between Chinese and Russian peoples in Russia's Far East cannot be ruled out. Demographic tensions can be a source of potential conflict in the Sino-Russian relationship.

Third, although China and Russia have shared common concerns about regional stability in Central Asia, there still exists potential competition between them for political influence and economic resources in this region. The Russian military has voiced its concerns about China's arms supplies to Central Asian states. Also, China's intentions of using its economic strength to increase its influence in Central Asia could lead to Russian anxiety over growing China's presence in this region. Russia has viewed Central Asia as part of its sphere of influence. If China's political influence in Central Asia grows with its military and economic involvement, Sino-Russian competition in this region may arise. Future competition in Central Asia could sharpen the sense of mutual threat between China and Russia, and may have a negative impact on the development of their military cooperation.

Another source of tension resides in the increasing Chinese intention and capacity to act as a military great power in the APR. This development will deepen Russian fears of security threats arising from China. While pursuing arms trade and military-technical cooperation with China, Russia has tried to preserve the

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8 Dmitri Trenin, *Russia's Chinese Problem*, unpublished paper (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center,
technological gap between the two states. However, in order to upgrade its military capability, China has sought to obtain Russian advanced defence technology, such as missile guidance systems, rocket engine production technologies, and satellite and airborne sensor technologies, through joint projects on dual-use technology. Also, China has tried to acquire advanced technology by illicit routes and to recruit Russian engineers to improve the Chinese capacity for developing new weapons, including strategic forces. Despite the Western arms embargo, China has made efforts to introduce high-tech machine tools into its defence factories and to 'steal' advanced defence technology from the West. China has also boosted its defence technology ties with Israel. These could, if they have not already, narrow the technological gap between China and Russia. This would have two important implications for the future of Sino-Russian military cooperation. First, the Chinese need to pursue

9 In September 1994, the U.S. government granted McDonnell Douglas licences to export 19 sophisticated machinery to China to produce civil-aircraft parts in China. However, China installed six of the machines at Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Company to produce Silkworm missiles. This prompted the U.S. government to tighten its controls over the export of high-tech machine tools, which have military applications, to China. For further details on this case, see Nigel Holloway, 'Playing for Keeps', FEER, 8 February 1996, pp.14-16. On 25 May 1999, U.S. Congressman Christopher Cox issued an investigation report, accusing China of stealing advanced defence technology from the U.S. See Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, House Report 105-851, Website http://www.heritage.org/features/coxreport.html. In response, the Chinese government stressed that this report 'is a great slander against the Chinese nation and is typical racial prejudice'. See Zhao Qizheng, 'Cox Report Undermines Sino-US Relations', Beijing Review, 14 June 1999, pp.9-11. The Cox Report has led to controversies between the Clinton Administration and Congressmen. The Clinton government agreed with the Committee on the need to take effective measures to prevent the diversion of U.S. technology and prevent unauthorised disclosure of sensitive military information. However, the Clinton government emphasised that not every allegation was a proven fact. The U.S. intelligence community has concluded that classified information obtained by China probably accelerated its programme to develop future weapons. But they are not sure whether any weapon design documentation or blueprints were acquired and they cannot determine the full extent of weapons information obtained. For controversies associated with the Cox Report findings, see 'U.S.-China Relations: Spring Brings A Chill', Foreign Policy Bulletin, vol. 10, no. 5 (September October 1999), pp.53-82.

military cooperation with Russia would be reduced. Second, Russian fears of a 'China threat' would be deepened. These circumstances would impact severely upon bilateral military cooperation.

Lastly, there are two external factors that may create uncertainties for the development of Sino-Russian military cooperation: first, in the case of the West's lifting the arms embargo against China, and second, as a result of U.S. diplomatic pressure. Russian success in exporting arms to China has led some Western states to change their arms export policies toward China in an attempt to compete with Russia. Some European states have started to offer China 'non-lethal military items'. Chinese interests in Western military equipment have mainly focused on advanced 'force multipliers' and technologies, which can improve Chinese patrol and reconnaissance capabilities, and air and sea defence.\(^\text{11}\) China may not purchase a great number of heavy weapons from the West. However, lifting the arms embargo against China would increase Chinese alternatives for military equipment, such as air defence and missile systems and C3I technology. In these circumstances, Chinese and Russian arms transfers and military-technical cooperation might be negatively influenced.

The second external factor which might influence Chinese and Russian military cooperation is that of U.S. diplomatic pressure. An important objective of Russian arms transfers to China was to maintain the PLA's power projection vector to focus towards the south. This may lead to tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Such a development may result in increasing diplomatic pressure from

\(^{11}\) Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, *China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad*, SIPRI Research Report no. 11
the USA against Russian arms trade and military-technical cooperation with China. This also might impact upon the development of Russian arms transfers to China.

C) A Summing Up

After the end of the Cold War, calculated self-interests have encouraged China and Russia to pursue military cooperation. In spite of all the progress in the development of military cooperation, there remain potential conflicts in this relationship. In the process of pursuing military cooperation, lingering mutual distrust and conflicts of interest have obstructed the furthering of their bilateral cooperation. It is significant that, while China has sought to modernise its armed forces, Russia has tried to ensure that its security and interests are not undermined. This has resulted from contradictions of geopolitical and security interests between these two neighbours. In the short term, CBMs, arms transfers, and military-technical cooperation may create a less hostile political atmosphere and underline the existence of a limited cooperative security relationship. In the long term, however, reciprocal threats against each other's territories, and China's increasing ambitions and capacity to act as a great military power in the APR, could eventually become major sources of tension in the Sino-Russian military relationship.


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Appendix: List of Interviewees

I. People's Republic of China

1. Beijing

(1) Shi Ze (7 January 1998)
   Vice President, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), the Chinese Foreign Ministry
   Senior diplomat of the Chinese Embassy in Moscow

(2) Xia Yishan (7 January 1998)
   Head of the East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies, CIIS, the Chinese Foreign Ministry
   Senior diplomat of the Chinese Embassy in Moscow

(3) Prof. Guo Zhenyuan (12 January 1998)
   Member of Executive Board, Deputy-Chief of the International Strategy and Security Division, China Center for International Studies, the Chinese State Council

(4) Xin Qi (4 January 1998)
   Research Fellow, Center for Peace & Development Studies, General Political Department of the PLA

   Head of the Section for Russian Studies, the Institute of East European, Russian & Central Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)

(6) Dr. Niu Jun (8 January 1998)
   Director, the U.S. Diplomacy Division, the Institute of American Studies, CASS
(7) Prof. Baoxu Zhao (6 January 1998)
School of International Studies, Peking University
Vice President, The Chinese Association of Political Science
Chief Editor, *China Studies*

(8) Dr. Zhu Feng (4 January 1998)
Department of International Politics, Peking University

2. Shanghai

(9) Prof. Chen Qimao (15 January 1998)
President, Shanghai Society for International Relations
President Emeritus, Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS)

(10) Dr. Yang Jiemian (15 January 1998)
Director, Department of American Studies, SIIS

(11) Prof. Bao Shifen (15 January 1998)
Senior Research Fellow, Department of European Studies, SIIS

(12) Colonel Xia Liping (15 January 1998)
Deputy Director, Department of American Studies, SIIS

(13) Chen Dongxiao (15 January 1998)
Junior Research Fellow, Department of American Studies, SIIS

(14) Prof. Feng Shaolei (17 January 1998)
Vice President, Shanghai Society for International Strategy Research
Vice President, Shanghai Europe Studies Society

3. Hong Kong

(15) Prof. Byron S. J. Weng (21 January 1998)
II. Russia

(16) Prof. Evgeny P. Bazhanov (6 July 1998)
Director, the Institute of Contemporary International Studies (ICIS), the Russian
Foreign Ministry
Vice President of the Diplomatic Academy, the Russian Foreign Ministry

(17) Prof. Vladimir F. Li (6 July 1998)
Deputy Director, ICIS, the Russian Foreign Ministry

(18) Dr. Dmitri Trenin (7 July 1998)
Deputy Director, Carnegie Moscow Center

(19) Dr. Vasiliy I. Krivokhizha (6 July 1998)
First Deputy Director, Russia's Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS)

(20) Dr. Dmitry G. Evstafiev (6 July 1998)
Leading Research Fellow, RISS

(21) Prof. Iurii Fedorov (8 July 1998)
Moscow State Institute of International Relations, the Russian Foreign Ministry

(22) Sergei M. Troush (8 July 1998)
Senior Fellow, the Institute of USA & Canada Studies, Russian Academy of
Sciences (RAS)

(23) Dr. Alexander G. Larin (1 July 1998)
Senior Researcher, the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, RAS
(24) Prof. Major General Anatoly Bolyatko (1 July 1998)
       Institute of Far Eastern Studies, RAS

(25) Peter V. Vlassov (10 July 1998)
       Correspondent, ITAR-TASS news agency and Expert magazine

III. Taiwan (Republic of China)
(26) Dr. Chi Su (22 December 1997)
       Deputy Secretary-General, Office of the President

(27) Dr. Ting Shou-chung (22 December 1997)
       Former Chairman of National Defence Committee, the Legislative Yuan

(28) Dr. Hu Wei-jen (7 January 2000)
       Deputy Secretary-General, National Security Council, Office of the President

IV. U.K.
(29) Dr. Roy Allison (15 October 1997 / May 1998)
       Head of the Russia and Eurasia programme, The Royal Institute of International
       Affairs (RIIA)

(30) Dr. Keun-Wook Paik (21 February 1997 / 27 November 1997)
       Senior Research Fellow, RIIA

(31) Prof. Margot Light (22 July 1997 / 27 April 1998)
       Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and
       Political Science (LSE)

       1998)
       Department of International Relations, LSE
(33) Dr. Irina Isakova (28 April 1998)

Research Fellow, the Institute of USA & Canada Studies, RAS
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