The Salvation Army's actions and attitudes in wartime: 1899-1945

Clifton, Albert Shaw

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THE SALVATION ARMY'S

ACTIONS AND ATTITUDES

IN WARTIME: 1899 - 1945

by

ALBERT SHAW CLIFTON

Ph D

( KING'S COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON )
The Salvation Army has never attempted a formal, systematic analysis of the political or moral issues arising from warfare. It is not possible, therefore, simply to read off salvationist attitudes to war from official Army statements in wartime since none address the subject directly or comprehensively. Rather, salvationist attitudes to war may be discerned by analysing salvationist actions in wartime.

Such analysis reveals three main principles which governed salvationist war reactions between 1899 and 1945: a) the spiritual priority of Christian evangelism and soul-saving; b) the practical priority of compassionate good works; c) the upholding of Christian internationalism.

The first two principles were successfully adhered to, but the third was interpreted as requiring strict political neutrality and was only partially upheld. International Headquarters (London) gave it repeated official emphasis, though leaders held private views of a partisan nature. Some territories beyond Britain, notably America, made no attempt at political neutrality or supra-nationalism in either of the World Wars.

Elements of pacifist thought have been present in the Army from its earliest years and first gave rise to tension in the Boer War. By 1939 there was a significant pacifist group of salvationist intellectuals in London. However, the Army allowed each salvationist to follow the dictates of conscience on the issue of bearing arms.

The Army's international structure suffered damage in the World Wars, links with London being frequently severed. The demands of patriotism clashed directly with the expectations of internationalism, placing the movement and its leaders under perpetual strain.
Salvationist policy-makers yielded to the dictates of pragmatism as well as principle. Their overriding goal was to hold the worldwide Army intact, come what may. Their refusal to risk giving offence or to take sides conveyed at times an impression of moral as well as political neutrality.
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- **Watson**

- **Wiggins 4**

- **Wiggins 5**

- **Wisbey**
The expression, 'the Army' where it stands unqualified in the text, refers throughout to The Salvation Army and not to the military forces of the state.

Notes to the text are placed at the end of each Chapter.
I have been thinking of all nations and peoples as one family.
- William Booth on his deathbed, 1912

Every land is my fatherland, for all lands are my Father's.
- Bramwell Booth, Christmas, 1915

The Army's internationalism is its crown of glory in peacetime, but in war it becomes a crown of thorns.
- Frederick Coutts, 1955
INTRODUCTION

1) The Project
2) The Issues
3) The Sources
1) The Project

The research for this thesis was undertaken initially because it was realised, during The Salvation Army's early preparations for the United Nations' International Year of Peace in 1986, that there existed no comprehensive record of salvationist activities in relation to war nor any thoroughgoing analysis of the Army's attitudes to war or to warring nations. The thesis therefore fills a long-standing gap in what has been written hitherto about The Salvation Army and its history, and by the same token makes also a new, if specialised, contribution to the history of the Christian church in general in the first half of the twentieth century.

It became clear at a relatively early stage in the work that no serious moral analysis of war and its associated issues had ever been undertaken formally by the Army. The sources afforded a mounting impression that salvationists were primarily, perhaps instinctively, activists reacting to the pressure of immediate needs and opportunities and not given overmuch to measured academic reflection.

The lack of serious salvationist theological or ethical consideration upon warfare is in itself remarkable since, with the Roman Catholics, the Army is a Christian denomination with an explicitly international hierarchy and organisational network which makes it especially vulnerable in time of war. The same lack, and the discovery of it, had immediate implications for academic research into the source material since it meant that salvationist attitudes to war, if discoverable at all, would become apparent only by looking closely at what the Army and its people actually did in wartime and then drawing conclusions about attitudes, policies and opinions from the nature of those actions objectively assessed.

13.
Considerations of this kind have determined the shape and organisation of the Chapters that follow. It was appropriate to take the three wars in chronological sequence in order to: a) describe, examine and explain Salvation Army actions in those wars; b) tease out carefully and pinpoint en route anything which would help to cast light on the attitudes underlying those actions; c) reach general conclusions and evaluate the coherence of whatever attitudes emerged. The elucidation of the motivations and priorities which underlay the Army's activities in wartime has been facilitated by the finding of not infrequent pastoral pronouncements by Salvation Army world leaders to salvationists generally on how members of the Army should conduct themselves in wartime.

2) The Issues

Whilst it was reasonably to be anticipated that a Christian body like the Army would find war abhorrent, it remained to be seen what degree of consistency of response was evidenced over the period of the three wars and whether or not there emerged any fundamental principles which might be seen as the ground of all salvationist attitudes in wartime. Three such principles have come to light. A recurring theme of the thesis is therefore the Army's emphatic insistence upon: i) spiritual priorities, especially evangelism; ii) the practical priority of compassionate social action to meet wartime material needs; and iii) the maintenance of those Christian ideals known collectively as 'Christian internationalism'.

From this there sprang further questions as the evidence unfolded:

1. What dangers did salvationists perceive as threatening to destroy the spirituality of The Salvation Army in wartime? Were those
dangers successfully resisted?

2. How realistic was it for Army leaders at International Headquarters in London to expect salvationists in opposing countries to exemplify a supranational ideal?

3. Did the Army's international heritage mean that a policy of political neutrality in the war was inescapable? Were there other alternatives?

4. What effect would a deliberate policy of political neutrality have upon salvationist judgments on the moral issues raised by war? Would political neutrality mean also moral neutrality? Did the Army confuse these two things?

5. Was the attempt at political neutrality truly grounded in salvationist beliefs about the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God, or was it rather the product of enlightened self-interest and an attempt to deflect the possible persecution of salvationists and the loss of the Army's presence in certain countries?

6. What would be the result for the Army and its ideals of the powerful pull of patriotic fervour in time of war? What dangers were perceived by Army leaders in the possibility of patriotic excess amongst salvationists?

7. Would those leaders personally be able to embody the attitudes they looked for in members of the Army generally? Was there room, even in a salvationist world leader with his people in every corner of the globe and often on opposing sides in battle, for private feelings on the wars? If so, how would that affect his leadership?

8. Would there be a gap, and if so how large, between official attitudes to the wars, struck on behalf of the Army as a whole,
and those welling up spontaneously in the hearts of individual salvationists in the warring nations?

9. How far would International Headquarters in London be able, or wish, to dictate policy: a) to the Army in nations at war with Britain; b) to the Army in other nations across the world, with all the problems that war presented for communications? Was a uniformity of approach around the Army world a realistic expectation? If not, to what extent could an international Army undergo or tolerate divergent attitudes and still regard itself as united?

10. What would be the implications for The Salvation Army of its uncertain and ambivalent ecclesiastical status? By what yardstick should it be measured in relation to war? Was it a church, a denomination, a movement, a para-church organisation, a charity, or simply an Army? What would such uncertainty mean for reactions to the Army by governments both in Britain and elsewhere? What would all of this mean for salvationist credibility in wartime with the churches generally and with the fighting forces? How significant in wartime would be the Army's own military and quasi-military structure and image?

11. Would the Army attempt hard and fast directives to its members on whether or not to carry arms in war? To what extent would pacifist reactions to war be found in The Salvation Army, and how far would that pacifism influence official stances?

12. To what extent would the historical evidence indicate that Army attitudes or policies underwent development over the course of the three wars? Would the rise of 'just war' thinking impact upon the Army?

13. What advantages or disadvantages lay in the salvationist insistence on granting women and men equality in opportunities
for Christian ministry? What role would emerge for salvationist women in wartime, given that war was very much a male domain?

14. Finally, what means could best be adopted by Army leaders for speaking to and influencing salvationists under war conditions? What was the role of Army literature in this regard and did that role develop or remain static between 1899 and 1945?

3) The Sources

The greater part of this research has been carried out in The Salvation Army's Archives in London and New York. The official publications of the Army, notably its newspapers and periodicals, have been extensively used. These publications should be regarded as speaking formally on behalf of the Army as an organisation and especially for its hierarchy which still actively controls editorial policy. The War Cry published in London represents the views of International Headquarters and reports chiefly upon salvationism in the United Kingdom, but offers also a fairly comprehensive coverage of events beyond Britain. Its accounts of war work are largely factual and unemotional in an apparent attempt to let the work speak for itself. The War Cry, or its counterparts (e.g. Der Kriegsruft, Cri de Guerre), published in the territories outside Britain reflects the narrower local interests of each country where the Army is established. These territorial publications are not subject to direct control from London, but are closely vetted by local Army leaders.

Some research has been done in the British Library and in the offices of the various denominational newspapers referred to in Chs.2, 14, 22 and 26. Certain primary sources were available only at the Imperial War Museum in London, e.g. the TE Russell Tapes; the
AE Renshaw Diaries; and the William Knott Diaries. These have been drawn upon in Part II.

Information not found in the formal sources has become available in the many letters and interviews which resulted from an appeal by the author published in the London *War Cry* early in 1985. Correspondence came from many parts of the world, although the Army in Germany and in Japan declined to publish a similar appeal in their periodicals on the ground that the last war is still an issue of some sensitivity for citizens in those countries. Territorial Headquarters in Germany, however, put the author into direct contact with several German salvationist war veterans.

It has been possible to draw upon salvationist material from many of those countries opposed to Britain and her allies in the three wars, but it should be noted that the German occupying forces in Europe in 1939-1945 proscribed all Army publications, creating a significant gap for the researcher. However, alternative sources became available and have been utilised in Part III.

Non-salvationist sources have yielded valuable data. The tone of almost all the non-salvationist writers and commentators is noticeably sympathetic to the Army: e.g. Arthur E. Copping, Richard Collier, FA McKenzie, the *Times History of the War*, Herbert Henson, and Charles T. Bateman in Part II (Alan Wilkinson is less euphoric); and Elinor Maudaunt, Sir Douglass Brownrigg, the Swedish press, the Australian military press, and the *Britannia Book of the Year 1946* in Part III. The London *Times* refrains from evaluating Army activity, confining itself to factual reports only. Whilst other non-Army sources occasionally ignore or under-estimate the role of salvationists in wartime, none offers adverse comment or directly opposes the Army's
position or contribution. A conscious search by the author for sources unsympathetic to the Army has not been productive.

Finally, The Salvation Army archive in New York holds extensive material on the two World Wars. This includes several private diaries from those periods, most notably the Alexander Damon Diaries. The New York data is heavily relied upon in Ch. 24.
PART I

THE BOER WAR 1899 - 1902
When the Boer War began in October 1899 The Salvation Army was only 34 years old. On 2nd July 1865 the Rev. William Booth preached to the passers-by outside Whitechapel's 'Blind Beggar' public house and, overheard by Alfred Agar (a missioner working at the Tent Mission established on the Vallance Road Quaker Burial Ground), found himself receiving a deputation asking him to take temporary charge of the Tent Mission. Booth accepted. From that decision sprang The Christian Mission which in 1878 changed its name to 'The Salvation Army' with Booth no longer its General Superintendent but its 'General'.

By 1899, following dramatic growth in Britain, the Army had pioneered work (in Army parlance had 'opened fire') in Australia, Canada, France, India and Ceylon, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland and the USA. Leading officers had already convened from all these lands for the 'War Congress' held in London in January 1886. The Army was established as an international movement. An international outlook had become part and parcel of salvationist thinking and the ever-widening spread of Salvation Army work was seen by Army leaders as a sign of divine favour. Internationalism was perceived as the Army's vocation under God. That internationalism was to come under severe pressure by the end of 1899.

South Africa was no stranger to warfare. The Zulu War of 1879 was not long over. The first salvationist martyr in Africa died in that conflict, knobkerried and assegaiied to death, his body mutilated almost beyond recognition. Lieutenant Sifalafala Ngcobo died trying to protect his own people. Commissioner J. Allister Smith says, 'In official documents he may have been recorded as an enemy, but he had striven faithfully to serve God, and he is enshrined in the hearts of us who knew and loved him, as a martyr.' Thus there were early
signs that common loyalties shared by salvationists - to God, the Army and one another across racial boundaries - would not easily be overcome by war.

It was with the Zulu that salvationist sympathies lay. George Scott Railton - a leading figure of the Army's formative years and a pioneer in South African salvationism - thought that the English had treated the Zulu nation with great injustice. Commissioner Railton had strong views on almost everything, but when it came to the Army's work in South Africa, Bramwell Booth, son of the Founder, and the Army's second-in-command (Chief of the Staff), insisted that matters be left to the General's appointee as Territorial Commander when the Boer War broke out. This was Commissioner George Kilbey who took command in South Africa on 10th October 1899, one day before war was declared. Railton had been ill and was recuperating by way of a long sea voyage. Unable to resist active involvement on reaching South Africa in January 1900, he drew the following from Bramwell Booth: 'In the name of all that is sacred I prohibit you from saying anything to him (Kilbey) that is likely to upset his confidence... So far I do not think you have done him any harm - but do be careful! Remember that you will come away and leave him there.'

Railton abhorred the war when it came. His biographer, Bernard Watson, sums up his views thus: 'If Britain was to rule the waves, and the world, it must be government by proxy, for God... No need then for Boer to slay Briton, Briton to slay Boer, the blood of both to stain the veld red in a senseless conflict which, as time would show, would settle nothing. Christ had died for all men; all men were the children of God.'

Though Railton was, in 1899, somewhat out of favour at International Headquarters in London, his views on the war would have met with approval.
from Catherine Booth, wife of the Founder. She was the first salvationist to venture into public utterance, and later print, on the subject of warfare. By 1899 she had a considerable reputation, in her own right, as a writer and public speaker. If William Booth was the dynamo of the Army, Catherine was its think-tank, perhaps more able intellectually than her very able husband. To her is due the credit for the equal role granted to women in the ministry of the Army, a role which in wartime was to prove especially effective. The following is an extract from Mrs. Booth's *Popular Christianity*, first published in 1887:

>'One of the greatest employments of every Christian government and community is to train thousands of men, not to fight with their fists only, in the way of inflicting a few passing sores, but with weapons capable, it may be, of killing human beings at the rate of so many per minute. It is quite a "scientific taste" to study how to destroy a large vessel with several hundreds of men on board instantaneously. Talk of brutality! Is there anything half as brutal as this within the whole range of rowdyism? But against all this, modern Christianity, which professes to believe the teaching of Him who taught us not to resist evil, but to love our enemies, and to treat with the utmost benevolence hostile nations, has nothing to say. All the devilish animosity, hard-hearted cruelty, and harrowing consequences of modern warfare, are not only sanctioned but held up as an indispensable necessity of civilised life, and in times of war, patronised and prayed for in our churches and chapels, with as much impudent assurance as though Jesus Christ had taught, "But I say unto you, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and, return evil for evil, hate your enemies and pursue them with all the diabolical appliances of destruction which the devil can enable you to invent."' 11

The context for this was the fifth lecture in a series of seven, delivered in London in 1887 to a non-salvationist audience. Entitled 'The Sham Judgment' it sought to explode some of the 'myths' put up by 'popular Christianity', amongst which was the myth that there was salvation in respectability. Catherine Booth ruthlessly exposed
the notion that 'brutality' was to be found alone in the lower classes.12 From boxing, to fox-hunting and on into warfare, she expounded her theme. Whilst the passage quoted was not forged in the heat of actual war conditions, it holds the seeds of attitudes which were, inter alia, to become typically 'salvationist' between 1899 and 1902: the inconsistency of warfare with Christ's teaching; the exploitation of the poor in time of war by political leaders; the awful consequences of war; its illogicality; the occasional sideswipe at 'churches and chapels' for somehow sanctifying war.13

For all this, it would be misleading to label Mrs. Booth's attitude as pacifist. It was certainly anti-war, but it is important to note that never was the next logical step taken by the Army, that of urging all salvationists to refrain from bearing arms. We shall see that there were internal tensions in the Army on this issue. Indeed, ranks split - at a considerably high level14 - and moreover, the Founder's son, Herbert Booth, was, some years later, to leave the Army over the issue.15 Not only did many salvationists, both Briton and Boer, fight in the Transvaal, but the Boer War occasioned the formal development of widespread salvationist work among the forces16, work still prospering today.

In an earlier series of lectures, Mrs. Booth had turned her mind to The Salvation Army in relation to church and state.17 At the Cannon Street Hotel, London, on March 13th 1883, she described the views she expressed as 'also those of my husband and those most closely associated with him in the direction of the Army, and therefore may be taken, as far as they go, as an exemplification of the principles underlying this great movement.'18 Certain parameters were clarified which may well account, or partly account, for the Army's non-absolutist stance on warfare. First, Catherine stressed the Army's respect for
law and its wish to encourage similar respect in others. This, she said, was because law issued from authority and 'all rightly constituted authority rests on Divine authority'. If a man is to respect the law, he must know the fear of God. Hence the conversion of the soul leads to respect for law. She does not relate this argument to a war setting, but it is only a short step from this to accepting the need for obedience to government if war has lawfully been declared. However, when she addresses war specifically she lapses, untypically, into naive piety:

'Spiritual fraternity is the most powerful of all bonds. Of course if we could only get this to reign over all the earth, we can all see what would happen. If we could bring all men to love each other as brethren, there would be an end of animosity, despotism, caste, national hatred, and war; and peace and goodwill would reign over the earth. This is God's ultimate idea for the world.'

Perhaps 'naive piety' is too harsh a commentary. In both William and Catherine Booth burned a fierce love for souls and a solid belief that God raised up the Army to encircle the globe with the gospel of Christ. 'Peace and goodwill to men, even to enemies,' wrote Catherine, 'is fundamental to us; and we utterly repudiate the possibility of being right with God while doing wrong to man! Consequently, we (the Army) have numberless instances of long-standing quarrels and animosities being healed, and the parties brought to reconciliation and amity... The precepts of Jesus Christ as to all men being our brethren... irrespective of their condition, are resuscitated and clothed in living acts before the eyes of our soldiers (i.e. salvationists) every day of their lives; they are taught that all personal considerations, such as ease, comfort, gain, reputation and associates, are to be made subservient, or, if need be, relinquished, for the salvation of their fellow-men!' That this was true of salvationist
ministry was evidenced by the lives of many converts. But scarcely would it readily be thought to prompt the claim, later to be made in all seriousness by the Army, that had the Government made available to it sufficient funds, it (the Army) could have prevented the Boer War altogether. In late October 1899, immediately after war was declared, Parliament was asked to grant £10 million for the raising and equipping of a South African task force. The official newspaper of The Salvation Army's social operations, *The Social Gazette*, greeted this news with the following observation:

'We speak quite within our book when we say that had the Government given The Salvation Army a tenth of this sum five years ago the probabilities are that an army corps and the other £9 million would not now be asked for for hostile purposes in South Africa. Wherever Dutch and English have been brought together by The Salvation Army there exists the utmost cordiality between them. We personally know of scores of cases where a rapid anti-English sentiment had been entertained by certain Dutch which when brought under the saving power of God has been entirely removed and has given place to a love for the English and we are quite sure that there is no more loyal subject to the Queen than the Dutch salvationist. There is no greater faction in the fusing of the two races than The Salvation Army. The same head and heart that devised a way out of Darkest England for the destitute Briton could devise a way out of Darkest South Africa for the indigent Dutch and a million of money would ensure the successful working out of a scheme operated by The Salvation Army.'

To many at the time this must have sounded preposterous. (It seems more cautious counsel later prevailed when a further £20 millions was voted for the war, since the Army's October 1899 claim was not repeated.) Yet Booth's track record was proven fact and such a claim would not have been lightly made. But by now it was too late. War was here, and the young, confident, eager Salvation Army was to face a stern examination of the strength of its international bonds. How would the new *enfant terrible* of the religious world stand the test?
1. Sandall I, Ch.1.
4. Ibid., 298.
6. Ibid.
7. Watson, 85.
9. Watson, 170; Railton's visit to South Africa is reported in SAWC 20-1-00:5.
10. Ibid., 168.
12. Ibid., 132.
13. CT 27-10-99, 475 gives prayers for British troops only; also CT 6-6-02, 695 - prayers of thanksgiving that the Boers lost.
17. Catherine Booth, *The Salvation Army in Relation to Church and State*, (John Snow & Co., 1890 edn.)
18. Ibid., iii.
20. Ibid., 10.
21. Ibid., 11.
22. Ibid., 15.
23. Ibid., 11, 12.
26. SG 2-2-00:1.
CHAPTER 2

TAKING NO SIDE IN THE WAR

1) Political Neutrality
2) The Army and the Churches
1) **Political Neutrality**

Less than seven years elapsed between the start of salvationist outreach in South Africa in February 1883 and the outbreak of the Boer War in October 1899. Those years saw twenty-one corps (evangelical centres) and several social work centres established, with fifty full-time officers in the field, most of whom had been raised in South Africa. Three officers had been commissioned from London to Cape Town, arriving on the *Warwick Castle* on Saturday, February 24th, 1883. They were Major and Mrs. Francis Simmonds and Lieutenant Alice Teaguer. The South African press sought in vain for the expected invading host of salvationists. 'We shall raise our soldiers here,' Simmonds told them. In response the Cape Town papers made it plain the Army was not wanted. Meetings began, however, on Sunday March 4th, 1883. There was immediate opposition with 'respectable roughs' disrupting the first public gathering. But the first convert was registered that night. An old store in Loop Street, Cape Town, was hired and a penitent form (Mercy Seat) installed, the first to use it being the four workmen who constructed it. An open-air meeting was held the next Sunday and that night 112 converts knelt at the Mercy Seat. Robert Sandall, the Army's first official historian, writes, 'Three weeks after the opening the once yelling mob were listening with quiet attention to the testimonies of the converts.' Despite further disruption, and even imprisonment, the work prospered and, one by one, the main towns and cities fell before the Army's advance: Simonstown, Pietermaritzburg, Port Elizabeth, Durban. In August 1885 a coffee palace was opened in Cape Town, the ceremony being performed by Miss Emma Murray, daughter of the Rev. Andrew Murray, head of the Dutch Reformed Church in South
Africa. (Miss Murray was later to rise to the rank of Major in The Salvation Army.)

Army pioneering in South Africa received a fillip when Commissioner George Scott Railton first arrived at Durban early in 1885. Railton, one of the outstanding figures in early Army history, was 'William Booth's first Lieutenant, his right-hand man, an inspired tactician, originator of some of the brilliant ideas that made The Salvation Army.' He was the first to hold the rank of Commissioner; he led the Army's first official overseas endeavour - to the USA; framed the first Orders and Regulations; helped to formulate salvationist doctrines; initiated and encouraged the use of spiritual war songs and military metaphors; was a leading protagonist, with Catherine Booth, in giving women equal place with men in Army commands and public ministry; decisively influenced William Booth in abandoning observance of the sacraments; and made the Army part of the 'holiness movement'.

When war broke out, Bramwell Booth (by then the Chief of the Staff, having replaced Railton as the principal influence upon the Founder) asked Railton to set sail for South Africa again. He left on New Year's Eve, 1899, his task being to negotiate with military and political leaders there (General Buller, Lord Roberts, Sir Alfred Milner) for facilities for salvationist work among the troops, both in base camps and with the front lines. Here can be seen clearly for the first time the practical outworking of salvationist internationalism and its concomitant of political neutrality, for Railton was also charged with contacting the Boer leaders to seek freedom to establish similar work among Boer troops. A non-partisan, evenhanded spirit marked the Army's approach from the beginning. But nothing of Railton's task was reported in the South African War Cry.
Kilbey arranged to be absent from Cape Town when Railton arrived, signalling his disapproval of the visit.

During his previous South African visit in 1885 Railton had originated The Salvation Army's Naval and Military League. As with many a salvationist tactic, it arose almost by accident, a practical response to immediate and obvious need. This sort of response, the implementing of compassionate and social action in the interests of the troopers and their families, was to be a cornerstone of salvationist response not only in the Boer War but in the two World Wars. Compassionate action was to take equal place with evangelism and the all-important principle of political neutrality. The Naval and Military League was the forerunner of the Army's worldwide Red Shield Services. With his wife, Marianne, Railton found Natal and the Transvaal crowded with soldiers of the Queen. They were guarding gold and diamond fields in Kimberley. They had fought the 1879 Zulu War and the 1881 insurrection, sometimes called the 'first Boer War'. The Railtons found many servicemen in their Pietermaritzburg meetings and were soon to discover the men's lack of suitable recreation and the absence of any venue where they could spend leisure hours without being cajoled into drunkenness or worse. The Naval and Military League was the Army's response, and a Soldiers' Home was established in the town. Pietermaritzburg (Natal) was later to be the Headquarters for Army military work throughout the Boer War and the Estcourt Camp in Natal was to be the site of the first Salvation Army 'hut' on a field of battle. It was opened on February 12th, 1900.

Railton, despite Kilbey's misgivings, was the right man for the job now assigned to him. He knew South Africa, he knew the Founder's mind even if he was no longer in the 'inner cabinet', and he was convinced of the role of the Naval and Military League and how it

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might dovetail with the Army's reconciling message and mission. The same self-confidence noted in Chapter 1 from The Social Gazette for October 28th, 1899, is evident in Railton's vision of Army ministry during the war:

'Remember that in almost every place in South Africa the people respect us because we are the only people who can be depended upon to care for everybody, no matter how poor or bad - the only people who hold open-air meetings regularly all the year round - the only people who hold meetings with the coloured prisoners - the only people to look after prodigals who have gone anywhere in the world - the only people who urgently teach holiness - the only people who warn the wicked to get saved at once - the only people who try to get children properly saved - the only people who urge women and children, as well as ignorant men, to speak and pray in public - the only people who constantly visit public houses and worse places, and fight there against sin and drink of every kind - and the only people who do not care whether anybody is baptised, confirmed, gets the sacrament, or where they are buried, but do care whether they are quite ready to die today.'13

If Railton was emphatic about caring for 'everybody', both Briton and Boer, the same impartiality came through in the treatment given by The War Cry to the news of impending war.14 A regular column, 'The World Week by Week', offered brief news items for readers in the days before mass circulation of popular newspapers. Hardly ever was comment offered so as to influence the political views of the reader. Certainly, in the weeks immediately prior to the declaration of war there is not the least hint that either the British Government or the Boer leaders might be thought by the Army to be in either the right or the wrong. There is a keen hope that war might be averted, but hardly at all is political comment to be found.15

It was a politically neutral treatment. This contrasted starkly with other sections of the religious press. There the causes of the war16 and the course of negotiations were subjected to close political analysis (see below).
The South African War Cry also maintained a strictly neutral tone. In referring to Boer POW's it said, 'The reason that led to their incarceration is not our business to discuss.' This refusal to debate the political issues associated with the war was made very explicit:

"With the discussion of the general political situation we, as Salvationists, have nothing whatever to do, and... we are under no obligation to have any opinion as to the righteousness or otherwise of the war. A pronouncement on its character is therefore not required from us. What we have to do is to emphasise, as clearly as possible, the fact that we are opposed to all strife everywhere."

An apolitical stance was not new to the Army. It was but part and parcel of its policy of treating all alike and fearing none. Railton, from the outset, saw the Army (he called it 'this militant party of Jesus Christ') 'ever persevering in its abstention from all political or semi-political agitations'. This did not hold back the salvationists from 'agitation' for legal reform on moral and social issues, such as the age of consent to sexual intercourse, but it meant that party political factors played no part in the pursuit of the goal or in the choice of means. When war arrived, it was not unnatural to attempt to transfer such an approach to the international scene and to seek to rise above even the claims of patriotism. With patriotism running high, this meant some risk of being misunderstood. Between 1899 and 1945 the pull of patriotism proved the greatest threat to the Army's international ideals in wartime and was only variously resisted by Army leaders around the world (see especially Chs. 15 and 24). However, other factors, as shall become plain, won a measure of public approval for the Army's stand.

The first publicised sign of political neutrality as between Briton and Boer came with the grand public meetings in London to

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farewell Commissioner and Mrs. George Kilbey to the Commissioner's appointment as Territorial Officer in South Africa. The appointment was unexpected and the Regent Hall in London's Oxford Street was thronged. The news was full of South Africa (war was but a fortnight hence) but Kilbey declared the entire world to be his battlefield. His sympathies lay not with Briton nor with Boer but with the world. In the gospel, he proclaimed, racial and national barriers disappear, and MAN, not men, is raised, so that the true salvationist thinks of Boer, Kaffir, Arabian, Hindu, Frenchman, German, Russian and Chinaman as his brother. Mrs. Kilbey rejected any notion that she or her husband were either 'Little Englanders' or 'Big Englanders' (the labels in popular use for, respectively, those against and those for the war). Rather, they saw themselves as 'World Lovers' for Christ's sake, loving both England and South Africa alike. Supranationalism of this kind was to be held out to salvationists as their calling in wartime by their leaders also in later wars, though not all leaders gave it the pride of place accorded it by International Headquarters in London (see Parts II and III).

The War Cry report in 1899 singled out for gently critical mention Commissioner James Dowdle who, it seems, at the private International Headquarters (IHQ) farewell to Kilbey a few days later, spoke of his own idea of a 'panacea for South Africa'. The War Cry found it 'a trifle militant'. No further detail is given, but clearly not all salvationists were of one mind, despite the official stance on the war. Dowdle may have been not a little influenced by patriotic public feeling which can be measured by events in Trafalgar Square that same week. The Peace Party convened a rally on the Sunday afternoon but 40,000 people shouted down the speakers, who were fortunate to escape the Square without injury. War fever
had arrived, to the loud strains of 40,000 voices singing 'Rule, Britannia'.

The first leading article on the war appeared in the London War Cry on September 30th, 1899. It was entitled 'Lord, Avert this Horror!' and condemned 'the worst side of human nature' with its 'clamour and craving for war'. That two peoples with 'so much in common in make-up and principle, who profess the same religion... must fight over questions such as those which have been raised, we cannot possibly persuade ourselves - it is against all reason.' The article goes on to blame 'unthinking prejudice or mistaken patriotism' for the low ebb in Anglo-Boer relations. If there was blame, it was shared equally by both sides. As to the causes and the political issues: 'Do not let us waste time in useless discussions upon the questions at issue or the principles at stake.' Then the bold assertion: 'This is not our business.' So there it was: The Salvation Army's function in war was not to address the political questions or the military options and certainly not to pronounce on the morality of the protagonists, still less to apportion blame.

This was the first unambiguous and official written statement by the Army articulating political neutrality in wartime. In this and later wars similar statements were to follow in large numbers.

The leader ended thus: 'What can we do...? Let The Salvation Army pray!' Simultaneously, salvationists in South Africa were called to prayer. Was this then an echo of Mrs. Booth's 'naive piety' (see Chapter 1)? Pray and all will turn out well? Apparently not, for the call to prayer was married to direct and practical action. The War Cry gave headline room to the Army's pragmatic plans: 'If war comes The Salvation Army will be at the front in the spiritual and
material interests of both Boer and Britisher. There followed an appeal for funds so that 'ministrations of counsel, comfort and practical aid' might be extended to 'the men of both armies, for among Britishers and Boers alike, irrespective of the salvationist's creed that knows no race distinctions, are many who belong to us in a spiritual sense - members of our Naval and Military League and those who have come into contact with and been influenced by the Army in various parts of the world.' An appeal for funds went out also in the South African War Cry.

A week later, with war only hours away, The War Cry reported the massing of 5000 armed burghers (enfranchised Boers) at Charlestown on the British side of Natal. British troops also were in readiness, with reinforcements arriving from India and promises of help from New Zealand, Australia and Canada - all countries where The Salvation Army had taken root. 'We deplore beyond expression the failure of diplomacy which ought to have been equal to a peaceful solution; we are disappointed beyond measure that love of the sword should have predominated over the higher tribunal of reason and conscience.' Sorrow marked the leading article that week, but again the principle of political neutrality required that neither side be singled out. What is the Army to do when Christians, including salvationists, 'are standing face to face waiting to engage in mortal combat'? The answer is the same: 'Pray! Pray for the troops' (that they may know mercy and self-control); 'Pray for the cause of The Salvation Army' (that the hard won work in South Africa will suffer no calamity); 'Pray that the fratricidal struggle... may mercifully be shortened'; and pray for 'the leaders on both sides' (that they will have a vision of 'the awful consequences' of war).
It is as if the salvationists saw themselves somehow outside or above the struggle, whilst nevertheless very much affected and involved. The Army's effectiveness in the war required absolute impartiality between the warring parties. Neutrality also lessened any risk of a breakaway by Army leaders in South Africa from International Headquarters, a risk which must inevitably have been in William Booth's mind even though it was never adverted to formally in print. The same risk presented itself more severely in later wars and like the first General, subsequent Generals did all in their power to avoid it, relying chiefly on the emphasising of the Army's evangelistic duty, its international vocation and its stance of political neutrality. Thus in 1899 the Army would condemn neither side singly, nor offer praise to one alone. It would serve both Boer and Briton, yet not require either British or Boer salvationists to refrain from arms. This was walking a tightrope. Neutrality was made no easier by the fact that International Headquarters was in London and therefore subject to the strong pull of British patriotism, and the fact that British salvationists serving in the British forces vastly outnumbered Boer salvationists fighting under Kruger (see below on the Naval and Military League) and might naturally have expected London leaders to show a patriotic sympathy to their military cause.

The Army's self-understanding in relation to the war is graphically depicted by the cover of The War Cry for October 14th, 1899, with the war just a few days old. An artist's sketch shows a military council of war bent over a map of South Africa. In the corner of the page, separated from the military scene, is a group of salvationists on their knees, praying over a map of the world. Written on the map are the words 'The World for Christ.' The whole sketch is captioned: 'Two Councils of War'. Inside, an article
bearing the same title attacks war and its military experts with their plans for killing as many men as they can in the shortest possible time... And all for what? Not one out of five would be able to furnish an accurate or intelligent reply. Duty calls them...and they lay their lives cheerfully on the gory altar of war.'32 But, says the anonymous writer there is another war. There is another, world-wide host of soldiers at the call of their King fighting 'among the hills of pride and worldliness, down in the malaria swamps of vice, and squalor and crime'. They fight 'the greatest enemy of the British Empire, the foulest thing that smears civilisation, the curse of every continent'. It is an enemy 'more relentless and merciless and murderous than war'. Neither men, nor angels, nor parliaments, nor convocations will ever invent a plan for its destruction, for this eternal foe is sin. Only God can slay it.'

The salvationist, then, saw himself encamped in two worlds. In one he was subject to the rigours of being a citizen of this world and with a duty of obedience to lawful government, even if it meant fighting in bloody battle. In the other he was a citizen of heaven, of God's kingdom, always on duty to do battle for right and for souls. Moreover, this duty never waned, even on the human and earthly battle-field of war. Two wars: one earthly, one spiritual - but only one enemy, sin. And only one ultimate leader, Jesus. Such was the salvationist's self-image in the closing months of 1899. The War Cry expressed and depicted it in the graphic, extravagant terms which are found not infrequently in Victorian writing. Although the language became more restrained in later wars and the imagery perhaps less dramatic, yet the same urging of spiritual priorities and of soul-winning through evangelism was a hallmark of all Army publications in the three wars. The holding out of such spiritual priorities was
seen as the only effective antidote to being sucked into the vortex of 'war fever'.

2) The Army and the Churches

The Christian churches in England did not all adopt a neutralist stance on the Boer War. Some Methodists, perhaps closer doctrinally to the Army than any other denominations (William Booth had resigned the Methodist New Connexion in 1864\(^33\)), found themselves unable to share the Army's attempt at impartial and evenhanded treatment of the parties and saw instead the Boers as 'rough and ignorant', 'narrow, selfish and oligarchic' in contrast with the British who were 'broad, free and democratic'.\(^34\) President Kruger, said the Methodist Recorder, did not seem to appreciate moral suasion and would respond only to force.\(^35\) Meanwhile, the British Government had offered Kruger a reasonable basis on which to argue out a settlement'.\(^36\) 'Our government appears to be acting with wisdom and firmness. It certainly does not desire war.'\(^37\) In the week when war was declared, the same pro-British tone prevailed: 'We are thankful to find there is a lessening disposition to find fault with the English Government. The Free Churches, in a resolution passed on Monday... were studiously moderate.'\(^38\) The resolution referred to was passed by the General Committee of the National Council of Evangelical Free Churches to the effect that the path of negotiation was not yet exhausted so as 'to justify proceeding to the last extremity'.\(^39\) The Committee, however, did not then know of Kruger's final ultimatum (see Note 16). The Methodist Recorder had no doubts as to the right course once the ultimatum was known: 'The Boer Government has had the effrontery to issue an ultimatum... has seen fit to precipitate war... To all
intents and purposes it makes war upon the British Government.' No negotiation was now possible. Force was the only possible reply. The willingness shown in Methodist literature to take sides publicly was not deflected by Methodist missionary interests in South Africa. 'For the first time since the Civil War in America, the Methodist household is divided against itself... This war means methodist against methodist... Many of the burghers, especially in the Orange Free State, are members of Society, our friends and comrades in the Kingdom of Jesus Christ.' Methodist chaplains were sent out with the British troops. Two chaplains plus five lay readers went to represent the Methodists, Presbyterians and Church of England. The cause of Methodism received a setback in terms of damaged properties and it is interesting to note something of a shift toward the neutral and apolitical salvationist stance in the tone of the public utterances by the time the real cost of the war was realised. For example, a 1901 leading article spoke of 'some churches which are political' whilst 'others conceive that to fulfil their duty to the State with the highest possible efficiency they must avoid as far as possible direct political action. This has been the doctrine inculcated among Wesleyan Methodists almost from the beginning. To a larger extent, probably than ever before, the Wesleyan Methodists desire that their Church should stand clear of political partisanship.' This it had not done when war broke out. Now the other extreme had been reached and by mid-1901, when the war still had a year to run, The Methodist Recorder was able to carry a Report of the South African Methodist Conference with not a single mention of the war.

Baptist feelings on the war, at the outset, contrasted starkly with those of Methodism. All was seen as failure. Christians must
possess 'a spirit of peace in war'. War meant death to brave fathers, innocent mothers and daughters, disaster to homes, devilry let loose'.

The Baptist Times, describing itself as the official organ of the Baptist denomination, recognised that 'our views may seem tame and unpopular at such a moment' but went on to claim (not unlike salvationists) that Baptists were the 'true Imperialists' since they spread the claims of Christ, not of country. The chief difference from the Methodist view, however, was on the apportionment of blame for the war. Feeling no need for anything like the salvationist restraint on political comment, The Baptist Times declared the need to form a just estimate of the Boers. 'The Boers have had abundant justification of the fear of British designs upon their independence... Mr. Chamberlain's conduct of negotiations was provocative... British preparations for war were a menace and a threat which almost warranted the Boers in commencing hostilities before resistance became hopeless... We part company with Mr. Rhodes, Mr. Chamberlain, the Government, and the Jingoes. They made peace impossible and war inevitable. With war fever rampant in England, these were bold sentiments and not designed to win friends. However, the same leader concluded its analysis of the causes of war, having placed blame squarely upon the British and having found Boer response justified, by expressing an ardent hope for a British victory! Why? Because the war would be shorter and the agony quicker if the Boers were to lose! It was an odd attempt to face in two directions at once.

Baptist criticism of the British role continued throughout the war, but only alongside efforts not to appear pro-Boer. Having pronounced on the rights and wrongs from the start, it was difficult to do this convincingly. A leader in January 1901 spoke of the
'warlike' nature of the Boers, a spirit not justified by the Jameson Raid (see Note 16). The Boers had erred, not accurately counting the cost, and Kruger's final ultimatum (see Note 16) had been irresponsible. Seldom was any good that war might secure 'worth its cost in precious life, in miseries, loss of trade, and in the arrest of moral and social and national progress'. Like the Methodists, whose views in October 1899 were markedly different, the Baptists shifted ground once the true cost of war was seen and felt. Probably this reflected changing public opinion. Salvationist reticence on the political issues saved the Army the embarrassment of changing stance, since no stance was taken.

If the Baptists were basically pro-Boer the same could certainly not be said of those Anglican attitudes represented by statements in *The Church Times*. There could be no hesitancy, it said, as to who was at fault: 'At last the Boers have made their choice. They will have war... Upon them rests all the responsibility for what will happen now... the continuance of their corrupt government was a violation of the principle of equality for the white races... All that is left to us now is to exert the full force of a paramount power.' It might have been written in Whitehall! 'Every serious Englishman will acquiesce' in the war. 'It is agreed on all hands that war is a dreadful thing, but it calls forth the exercise of many higher qualities in the human character... Could not some of the younger clergy at home attach themselves to the Ambulance and Medical Corps? Whilst *The Baptist Times* felt able to publish, in full without comment, 'The Boers' National Hymn', *The Church Times* printed partisan prayers for the British and saw war in terms of 'deeds of derring-do', 'pluck and endurance', and 'patriotism'.

44.
Like The Salvation Army and the Methodists, Anglican ties extended to South Africa, but this fact prompted no moderation in public comment on the war. Indeed, a British victory would lead to greater opportunities for the gospel since 'Boer oppression has greatly hindered the work of the Church' and 'in the Boer the black races have seen Christianity in its very lowest expression'. The Anglican Sisterhood at Bloemfontain offered to nurse Boer wounded, but no other Anglican involvement with the Boers is reported. Chaplaincy services were to British troops only. Indeed, there was open criticism of the Boers' calvinistic doctrine which taught 'that God has created men for damnation' and 'excludes some from the operation of His grace... The Dutch ministry is acknowledged by Dutch and English alike to be largely responsible for the present war.'

Anglican approval for the British position in all phases of the war continued right through to the peace settlement in early June 1902. The peace terms offered by Britain were seen as 'generous' and 'as a nation we are entitled to some degree of satisfaction'. There followed prayers of thanksgiving that the victory was to the British who, it was claimed, had conducted the war 'with scrupulous and even generous care for individuals'. This was so despite the British capacity for ruthlessness in war, but 'ruthlessness in war is, in the long term, merciful, for its shortens the agony.' The writer offered no attempt to explain how generous care and ruthlessness could co-exist in an army exerting the full force of a paramount power.

Such glimpses of certain church reactions to the war help to get The Salvation Army's reaction into some perspective. Whilst no religious newspaper can be taken to speak for all church leaders or for each and every person within the denomination, nevertheless the tone and emphases of its reporting and editorial comment can be seen
as broadly indicative of the prevailing mood within each movement taken as a whole.

The Army saw the fact of salvationist fighting salvationist as good reason for seeking to stand neutral and above the conflict. The Methodists and Anglicans, similarly affected, but perhaps to a lesser extent than the Army, came out against the cause of the Boers, commenting freely on the politics of it all. It is not impossible that the Army's highminded neutrality was prompted at least in part by fear of losing its South African work, in other words by enlightened self-interest. If that was so - and it probably was - then the Methodist and Anglican outspokenness could be seen as creditworthy in comparison, as a willingness to speak for the right as they saw it despite the risks of loss in South Africa.

However, such an assessment loses something of its credibility when account is taken of the marked change in Methodist tone once the reality of loss of life and limb struck home in 1901 and when the widows, orphans, maimed and wounded began to mount in England. The overall impression gained by a birds-eye survey of Methodist Recorder pronouncements is one of uncomfortable backpedaling from their initial support for the war. In March 1901, The Methodist Recorder reported the sixth annual National Free Church Council Conference held in Cardiff. When a resolution on the war was put up it received Methodist support, but the report is at pains to stress that the resolution was 'not political'. Rather, it was 'a passionate longing for peace'. Such diffidence on matters political, not unlike that of the Army, was absent from Methodist attitudes to the war in late 1899.

Doubt must also perhaps be cast on any suggestion that Anglican outspokenness was courageous or highly principled. As the Established
Church with close government connections, a pro-British line was hardly other than what might have been expected. That line had at least, unlike the Methodists, the virtue of consistency. It was relieved only by local involvement with Boer casualties in Bloemfontein, a welcome development and in some contrast to Methodist silence on this aspect of the war. Neither do the Baptist reports and statements indicate any practical involvement with the Boer side. The salvationists, however, highlighted their own Boer work and gave it great publicity in England, despite the level of anti-Boer feeling at home, so that political neutrality could be seen to be workable in practice and not confined merely to the theoretical or the realm of rhetoric.

Baptist difficulties in perhaps trying to please all opinions at once have already been noted. Similar difficulties did not face the Army since it simply refused to address the politics of the conflict and justified this by claiming more urgent, practical and important things to do. The gospel made salvationist duty plain - to pray for and work in the interests of all the parties on a spiritual and humanitarian level. Certainly the Baptists made great efforts to set their analyses of the issues in a gospel context, and one might suppose (although there is no explicit evidence to support it) that their doctrinal preferences predisposed them, at least initially, to see Boer actions in a favourable light.

The Army and the Baptists and, to a lesser extent, the Methodists, saw war as essentially un-Christian. There is no hint of this, however, in the Anglican view. Indeed The Church Times argued that the war would enhance and liberate the gospel in South Africa and put down the erroneous doctrines of the Calvinists. This particular Anglican newspaper showed little, if any, sign of bringing to bear an explicitly Christian mind upon the South African conflict at any stage
of its development. One may reasonably assume that in this omission it was not representative of the best spirits amongst its readers, many of whom might have been disappointed by the markedly secular tone of its editorial comments. Indeed, the leader on the peace terms,\(^7\) despite its great length, never once mentioned the gospel, or Christ, or matters of Christian or spiritual concern. It addressed in the main how best Britain might ensure that the Boer remained under control after surrender. The piece could have come from the pen of a political journalist working for a pro-government paper from the secular press. The salvationist press could not conceivably have entertained such an item.

The Boer War saw firmly established, therefore, as an integral part of salvationist reaction to the fighting a principle which came to be looked upon as fundamental to salvationism in time of war - the principle of political neutrality. The other denominations did not elevate it to the status it held in Army circles. William Booth would not swerve from it, and neither would Bramwell Booth in 1914 nor George Carpenter in 1939, despite perhaps greater pressures so to do. It should be noted, however, that in some countries Army leaders in both the World Wars were later to abandon the principle and align the Army explicitly with the war machinery of the state.
NOTES - CH. 2


2. Ibid., (and Ch.48).


5. George Scott Railton, Our South African War (SP&S, 1901), 15.


7. Ibid., 291.

8. Watson, 11. This 'warts and all' biography by one of the Army's most gifted historians contrasts sharply with the official eulogistic life written after Railton died: Eileen Douglas and Mildred Duff, Commissioner Railton (SP&S, 1920).


10. Ibid., 165; Douglas and Duff, Commissioner Railton, 108.


14. The War Cry is the SA's official newspaper. It manifested the impress of the Founder's personal views on matters of all kinds, from war to diet!

15. IWC 2-9-99 to 30-9-99.


17. SAWC 7-4-00; 3.
18. SAWC 9-6-00:1
20. Sandall III, Chs.4-8; Madge Unsworth, Maiden Tribute
(SP&S, 1954), Ch.5; Alison Plowden, The Case of Eliza
Armstrong (BBC, 1974).
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., 7.
25. Ibid., 8.
27. Ibid.
29. IWC 7-10-99:8.
30. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 2.
34. MR 24-8-99:3
35. Ibid.
38. MR 5-10-99:3.
39. Ibid., 4.
40. MR 12-10-99:3.
41. MR 19-10-99:3.
42. Ibid., 5.
44. Ibid., 3.
45. MR 25-7-01:4.

50.
46. BT 20-10-99: 728.
47. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. E.g. BT 1-12-99: 821; 4-1-01: 1: 124; 30-5-02: 397.
51. BT 11-1-01: 28.
52. Ibid.
53. BT 1-2-01: 77.
54. CT 13-10-99: 395.
55. Ibid.
56. CT 27-10-99: 471.
57. BT 1-12-99: 821.
59. CT 27-10-99: 476.
60. Ibid., 493.
61. Ibid.
62. CT 31-5-01.
63. CT 8-3-01.
64. CT 6-6-02: 691.
65. Ibid., 695.
66. Ibid., 697.
67. Ibid.
68. MR 14-3-01.
69. Ibid.
70. CT 6-6-02: 696-7.
CHAPTER 3

THE FOUNDER SPEAKS

1) Upon the Outbreak of War
2) In the Midst of War
1. Upon the Outbreak of War

The British salvationist press - and there was plenty of it in 1899 - was closely controlled by William and Bramwell Booth. Only the most trusted officers were given editorial appointments. In the earliest days Bramwell Booth proof-read everything and acted as censor of all printed material. Throughout the Boer War the Founder regularly addressed both his officers and soldiers via the printed word. If his tone was paternalistic this was on account of the unsophisticated condition of by far the majority of salvationists. Certainly, few would have been learned in matters of politics or international diplomacy. Guidance, therefore, was called for and, with the war not a week old, it was forthcoming. It was the first time the Army's press had been called upon to carry copy dealing with salvationism and warfare. What was to be the forerunner of many such articles by Army Generals between 1899 and 1945 was entitled 'How Must Salvation Soldiers Act During War?' The answers, in summary, were as follows:

1. Never encourage the spirit of war. The sword has seldom been raised in a right spirit or in support of a just cause.
2. Never take sides. British and Boer alike are brothers of salvationists.
3. Avoid reading sensational accounts of war and even conversations dwelling upon war reports.
4. Pray unceasingly for an end to the war.
5. Pray daily that salvationists 'compelled to take the sword' may be examples of faithfulness to God, leading many to seek salvation in Jesus.
6. Pray for those sent by the General to serve the bodies and souls of the two armies.
7. Give generously to equip those sent out by the General.
8. Pray for a holy revulsion against war to overtake the hearts of all men.

This scarcely requires commentary. Political neutrality, much prayer, practical and spiritual aid, obedience to lawful government, an overriding concern to win souls—these were to be the hallmarks of salvationist reaction to the strife. It is important to note that within four weeks the same guidelines were published in the South African War Cry 'since they apply equally to our South African comrades'. Some in the Army wished for a different approach (see Ch. 6). Some would have been explicitly pro-Britain, others would have taken the Army toward an out and out pacifist stance. But never did Booth even hint that official Army policy required a salvationist to refuse to carry arms. Equally, no hint was given that duty required a salvationist to fight. To understand Booth's motives several factors must be considered. First, there were salvationists already in the forces. Many of these would have been regulars or reservists when first converted. Was the General to tell them their profession was unworthy? There was, after all, New Testament precedent for their position. Next, Booth intuited that any hard and fast ruling from him could prove deeply divisive and was bound to alienate one segment or another of his people. His foremost aim was to preserve the Army united through the war and no step by him would undermine that aim. What he could not know was that within fifty years two World Wars would engulf the Army, bringing with them conscription (in 1916 and 1939), a problem he was not asked to face but which his successors had to confront. When the time came, they were glad to look back to the groundrules set down by Booth in 1899. It should be noted, however, that any risk of schism during the Boer War
was small compared with the degree of risk in the later World Wars.

The first public pronouncement on the war to carry the personal name of General William Booth, appeared in The War Cry for October 21st, 1899.⁵ His heart 'torn asunder', he lamented the war 'with deepest humiliation and bitterest regrets' and felt (by way of under-statement) he 'must give a few counsels that may be of some little service to my own people'.⁶ Two Christian peoples had resorted to 'brute force', pushing reason, humanity and religion to one side so that, instead of victory going to him 'whose cause can be proved to be most in harmony with truth and righteousness', it goes instead to the one 'who can kill and wound the largest number of human beings and keep on the longest at the wretched business.'⁷ He sorrowed over salvationist fighting salvationist, over suffering, poverty and homelessness that lay ahead, over the widows and orphans yet to be, over the hindrance to Army work at home because of the preoccupation of men's minds, and over the slowing of Army labours in South Africa.

He was alarmed lest 'the passions that almost invariably track the steps of the dogs of war'⁸ should overtake his soldiery, for 'delight in havoc and ruin and slaughter' were not in accord with the spirit of Jesus Christ. He then offered guidance on how to respond to the war, reiterating the principles enunciated one week earlier.³

However, some new themes emerged. Firstly, whilst salvationists would not take sides, the Founder acknowledged that individuals may have their preferences. In that case those preferences were not to be spoken of. (In later wars, not all Army leaders around the world were able to comply with this.) Secondly, he chose to describe the officers who would work with both sides in the Transvaal, officers of the Naval and Military League, as 'our own Salvation Red Cross Agents'.⁹ The Red Cross analogy, although not wholly appropriate

55.
(see below on the Naval and Military League), seems to have been picked up and used even in official documents. How far it reveals the Founder's understanding of the Army's role with the forces is a matter for conjecture since the parallel soon breaks down (see below).

Thirdly, Booth pleads for a redoubling of evangelical effort at home in Britain: 'For Christ's sake, don't let the poor sinners suffer in one country because of this dreadful feud that is raging in another... I am going to Yorkshire tomorrow with as desperate a determination to fight for God and the salvation of souls as has ever been my experience before.'

The General's words were picked up and reported by the secular press, apparently with some approval. Booth later indicated his satisfaction too that salvationists 'had all but universally throughout our borders' acted upon his advice. That advice was reproduced in the pages of The Officer in November 1899. On this occasion, however, the General chose to upbraid the secular press for its 'big, block letters and course and sensational words', on the war. He went on to expound his view of the real meaning of the war: vile passions, untold suffering, long-engrained grudges, racial prejudice, terrible waste of human energy and money, a harvest of social and industrial misery, and a legacy of disease and affliction. All war, he concluded, 'however gilded, however dressed, is of the devil'.

How easy and natural, as we read his words, to expect a directive to ensue that no salvationist should embroil himself in warfare, since if the war were indeed 'of the devil', then why not disassociate oneself? But always Booth stopped short. The pragmatist in him was too strong to permit him to pursue even an ideal to some potentially divisive conclusion.
2) **In the Midst of War**

With the war six months old, it became obvious that grassroots salvationist opinion at home was being influenced by patriotic and national pride. Booth was anxious to remind his people of 'their duty in relation to the war' so far as political neutrality was concerned (see Ch.2): 17

'Don't suppose that you are under any obligation to have any opinion as to the righteousness or otherwise of the war. It is very improbable whether you possess the necessary knowledge of the facts of the case to be able to do so. A pronouncement on its character, is, therefore, not required from you... Remember, that the success of British arms, however desirable it may appear to you, must and will involve great suffering, wounds and death on both sides, but especially on the side of the Boers. Even if you have a feeling that this people are in any sense in the wrong, or are your enemies in this matter, you are bound to love them, to pray for them, and do your utmost to promote their well-being.'

There followed an absolute prohibition on taking part in 'demonstrations, meetings, processions, or the like' if these were carried on upon 'political or party lines'. As for the officers, they were to 'enter upon no arrangements whatever on this subject without first consulting and receiving the consent of superior officers.' 18 Again, here can be seen the laying of foundations for later wars as well. Similar orders went out in the World Wars.

Booth's tone was now sterner, rather more autocratic, than that of six months earlier. There is no record of what may have happened to cause this, but the pulling power of patriotic fervour must have taken its toll of an idealistic political neutrality such as Booth wished for. Moreover, the directive to the officers suggests that Army halls or even Army bands were perhaps being used for meetings and rallies of a partisan and political nature. If this were so, Booth could not have turned a blind eye.

57.
The Army's political neutrality was underscored that same month (March 1900) in the pages of All The World. It came in the context of an appeal for literature, clothing and money for the Naval and Military League work:

'It is neither the business nor the mission of The Salvation Army to discuss events which led up to the present state of things in the Transvaal. The Salvation Army is not a political body. It is quite enough for the officers to see the need. Immediately they see that, they are there to help, no matter in what part of the world, or amongst what class of people.'

That the principle of political neutrality was stated with such force and clarity in a journal meant for British donors to the Army's work is some measure of the importance attached to it at International Headquarters, for those same donors could well have withdrawn support if they had taken exception to the Army's refusal to endorse the British Government's resort to armed warfare. It is important to note that in later wars the same candour on political neutrality emerges from the sources, thus evidencing consistency of response over a period of half a century (see Chs. 9, 10 and 19).

Just weeks later The War Cry published extracts from a personal letter from the General to 'one of his officers in a foreign country'. It would seem that the officer in question was pressing for Booth to bring the Army off the political fence. Booth's reply is, at times, defensive:

'You are quite right in supposing I deplore the conflict. I have ample reasons for doing so... it has already wrought sad havoc among my people in South Africa... But what can I do beyond pleading with God for His intervention, and entreating my people to stand true to their principles as peacemakers. This I have done... with a considerable measure of success.'

The aging General must have felt under particular pressure for he articulated at some length the significance he attached to political
'The object of the Army is to spread the religion of Jesus Christ through the world... we will know no man after the flesh; the distinctions and preferences of nationalities and governments, together with the disputes and differences existing between them, are not our business... which is to reconcile men to God... On this rock, by the help of God, I have built up The Salvation Army. The friendliness of governments and peoples which has so greatly helped us has been largely won on the distinct understanding that we did not involve ourselves, or take sides on questions of national or party politics. How can I possibly depart from that principle of action? To do so would probably lead to divisions which, thank God, have on such subjects been so far practically unknown amongst us. Any departure... would be likely to close... this wonderful door of opportunity which is at present so widely open before us. Moreover, such a course would, I think, be a distinct departure from the practice followed and approved by Jesus Christ, Himself and His immediate followers.'

This, then, was plain enough. A careful and studied political neutrality would continue to be official Army policy. It was justified on the grounds of being right in principle according to New Testament light, and also clearly advantageous in practice so far as the advance of the work was concerned. To ensure the widest possible audience for his sentiments, Booth had the correspondence published also in *All The World*. It should be noted carefully, however, that he states first as his motive for neutrality the risk of division in the Army and only later cites the teaching of Jesus to justify his policy. This lends credence to the view proffered earlier in this Chapter that Booth's responses to the war were those of a pragmatist, a religious statesman as it were, intent on unity in the Army at any price, rather than the responses of an absolute idealist. God had given him an international Army, and no part was to be lost if Booth could prevent it. His successors in the later wars took exactly the same approach.

Nine months into the struggle, with the fall of Johannesburg

59.
and Pretoria to the British in mid-1900, sudden hopes of peace arose. William Booth, in a further message to all officers and soldiers, warned that whether or not the peace settlement was to any individual salvationist's personal liking, it must be accepted anyway. The feelings of the vanquished were to be respected, there was to be no vindictive exultation, no ceremonies inconsistent with Army principles, and no believing the worst about an enemy, but rather to hope the best for him. Above all, 'with renewed energy push your own war, the holy war, the war of love, the war of God.' Booth never wasted a chance to bring his people back to a blunt reminder of their spiritual priorities as salvationists.

Sadly, it was all premature, for the peace hopes collapsed and the war was to run for two more years, no longer on open lines of battle but, with the Boer burghers denied access to the urban centres, by means of guerilla tactics from the veldt.

With further British success and the annexation of the Transvaal on September 1st, 1900, peace hopes emerged yet again. Even General Roberts, after his Transvaal victory, declared the war ended. Booth once more welcomed the end of bloodshed and brought home Adjutant Mary Murray who had pioneered the war work for some ten months (see Ch. 5 on the Naval and Military League).

The formal conclusion of hostilities came early in June 1902, the Treaty of Vereeniging having been signed on May 31st, 1902 at Pretoria. The self-denying restraint which the negotiators had exercised was hailed as 'the work of the Spirit of God' by The War Cry. The Salvation Army anticipated 'a not insignificant share' in the work of conciliation. Officers in South Africa had been instructed accordingly.
News of peace prompted front page artist's sketches on *The War Cry* cover depicting the advent of the angel of peace, and Boer and Briton (again, note the evenhandedness of *The War Cry* coverage) listening side by side to an officer of The Salvation Army preaching the gospel.36 The great opportunities which would now open up for soul-winning was the Founder's response to the news. From King's Lynn he telegrammed *The War Cry*: 'Now, my South African comrades, here is your opportunity. Go to work with all your might... Restore the waste places, furnish up the barracks, open the doors, up with the Flag, send the glad tidings of mercy throughout the land... recommence the grand conflict with sin, and vice, and misery, and hell.'37 For Booth, the end of the war meant getting back to first and more important things - for him, the only important thing - winning men and women, boys and girls38 to the gospel. Consistent with the principle of political neutrality, no precious time or space in Army literature would be devoted to analysing and commenting upon the Treaty. What was done, was done, and now there was sacred work to do, not only in South Africa where 6,000 Boer burghers had died and countless more were in prison camps, but at home too, where the families of 20,000 British soldiers mourned their dead and the loved ones of 70,000 wounded faced an uncertain future.39
1. Sandall II, 74, 76.
2. Ibid.
3. IWC 14-10-99:5. The guidance was issued by International Headquarters, but not in the personal name of the General.
4. The Baptists gave the same advice: BT 20-10-99:728.
5. IWC 21-10-99:8.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid. 'The dogs of war' featured also in Baptist rhetoric: BT 20-10-99:728.
9. Ibid.
10. SA's Disposition of Forces for South Africa, March 1900, 24, also uses the Red Cross analogy for Naval and Military League personnel. Staff-Captain Charles G. Clack is listed as the representative of Territorial Headquarters 'on Military or Red Cross Service', assisted by six other officers and two officer-cadets: Brian Tuck, The History of The Salvation Army in South Africa 1883-1933, Master of Theology thesis, University of South Africa, 1982.
12. IWC 31-3-00:8.
13. Ibid.
14. TO November 1899, 402. (The Officer magazine, appearing monthly, is the General's international voice to the Army's full-time officers.) Here, the General's counsel is described as 'a Manifesto to his Officers and troops'.
15. Ibid., 401.
16. Ibid., 401-403.
17. IWC 31-3-00:8.
18. Ibid.
19. ATW, March 1900, 190. (Published monthly, describing Army work internationally, and used for publicity purposes.)

62.
20. Ibid.

21. IWC 28-4-00:8

22. Although unnamed, the likeliest candidate is Arthur Booth-Clibborn, in charge of the Netherlands. He was eventually to resign over pacifism (see Ch.6).

23. IWC 28-4-00:8.

24. Ibid.

25. ATW June 1900, 383.

26. IWC 9-6-00:8.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.


30. Ibid.

31. IWC 6-10-00:6; ATW November 1900, 650.

32. Ibid.


34. IWC 7-6-02:8.

35. Ibid.

36. IWC 7-6-02:1; 21-6-02:1.

37. IWC 7-6-02:8.

38. Army children, through their own page in IWC, were taught that the name of Vereeniging meant 'a place of union', that the Boers had voted for peace and were 'our friends': IWC 14-6-02:4.

CHAPTER 4

'WAR IS AN UNNATURAL HELLISH THING'

1) Anti-war Teaching
2) The Secular Press
3) The Priority of Evangelism
1) **Anti-war Teaching**

If words like 'unnatural' and 'hellish' summed up the Army's (and many another's) feelings in 1902 about warfare, it was due to William Booth's adamantly determined to steer his still relatively infant Salvation Army through potentially troublesome and divisive seas, with the minimum of damage, schism, or loss. Whilst many lands had fallen to the salvationists since the Army's inception, there were still others to conquer and Booth's vision left no room for the risk of a split arising out of national and political rivalry. That the work of the gospel should take second priority to patriotic loyalty was, to him, anathema.

An attempt to draw together the reiterated themes and viewpoints which found almost universal acceptance throughout the Army between 1899 and 1902 shows how well Booth's mind was attuned to what would or would not see his people's judgment carried and what would or would not best facilitate the Army's onward march around the globe. What might be called 'the Army's Boer War stance' is captured in the following ten propositions:

1. All war, however dressed up, is hellish, loathsome and of the devil, bringing only human misery.

2. The supplanting of other problem-solving means by a resort to arms is a negation of man's rational powers which, if yielded to the grace of God, could and should make war unnecessary.

3. The gospel, coupled with sufficient material resources and let loose by men and women of burning conviction, such as were Booth's salvationists, could have prevented Anglo-Boer War.

4. It is for the Army to stand above the conflict, eschewing any warlike spirit, and observing an absolute and strict national
and political neutrality, with regard to all aspects of the struggle, including its origins and causes, its conduct and the timing and terms of its cessation.

5. The salvationist must respect the lawful authority of his government, being free to formulate privately and individually, according to conscience, his views on personal participation in the fighting.

6. At all times the Army's paramount concern must be for the souls of the people of both sides to the conflict, a concern given all the more urgency by death waiting so close at hand, not least to the fighting men.

7. The Army will exercise a ministry of unceasing prayer for the combatants, for the leaders of the warring nations, and for the ongoing success of the (even more urgent) war against sin.

8. Salvationists will make no distinction between the members of the warring factions, offering spiritual and material aid to both sides alike and working for their reconciliation.

9. Just as men sacrifice themselves upon the altar of war out of patriotic duty, so the salvationist will sacrifice himself upon the altar of love for Christ's sake and the winning of souls.

10. The salvationist owns no man as 'enemy', his only challenged foe being sin and its reign in human hearts.

These ten propositions may in turn be summarised in three principles, all of which have already been alluded to in this study and which constituted in the Boer War and later wars the bedrock of The Salvation Army's responses: a) evangelism; b) practical action; c) political neutrality (see further Chs. 7 and 27).

A fierce antipathy to war pervaded all salvationist literature between October 1899 and June 1902, leaving a strong impression that
the Army was out of sympathy with this particular war, although, as we have seen, this was never officially stated, for the sake of political neutrality. Hopes of the fighting being shortlived were more than once dashed. A generally anti-war position was first hinted at a month before hostilities in a pseudonymous column in which the writer, signing himself 'Enthusiast', told of passing the War Office and seeing 'the flunkey kept busy receiving and passing on the cards of men of all ages, ambitious to kill the Boers, or ready to be killed by them."

As the rumours of war became firm reality, the editorial comments became explicit as to the incompatibility of warfare with the Christian gospel, a theme underlined by the writings of Booth himself (see Ch.3). It has already been noted that no view either way was laid down on whether individuals should fight. Private conscience should decide. Pressure upon the Army in this regard would intensify in later wars with the introduction by governments of conscription, but to defeat the Boers, Britain relied only upon regular troops, the reservists, and volunteers from both at home and the colonies.

Many salvationists fought. This, despite unambiguous teaching from Army leaders that war was a hindrance to the spread of the gospel, that it was demonic, and that it was essentially unholy. (As if to reinforce for his (by then World War Two) readers this last point, Commissioner Allister Smith chooses with care the terms in which he comments on the aftermath of the battle of Colenso, where on December 15th, 1899, Louis Botha defeated General Sir Redvers Buller: 'After the war we sanctified the blood-soaked battlefields of Colenso by opening a Station on twenty acres given for that purpose by a Boer friend, John Hatting.' Teaching of this kind convinced some in the Army that pacifism (the term was not in general use by 1899 but
certainly was by 1914) was the only possible Christian response (see Ch.6). In the two World Wars (see Chs. 13 and 20) pacifism was later embraced by some salvationists in its absolutist form and argued for in terms of the teaching set out above. However, William Booth resolutely refused to be driven from his broad view of war as unnatural and hellish to a specific directive to salvationists that none of them should participate in it. That was a step no Salvation Army General was willing to take between 1899 and 1945.

Arrangements were put in hand for regular, accurate news despatches to reach International Headquarters in London from the Army in South Africa. A 'special war correspondent', Adjutant George Stevens, Editor of the South African War Cry, was appointed. He sent frequent despatches, couched in terse and vivid language. His first despatch was marked by the same heavy regret and sorrow for the war, the same antipathy to war that characterised the earlier statements published by International Headquarters Yet it is doubtful that he had seen the London statements when he wrote:

'Two white races - British and Dutch - both upholding one religion, one faith, and very largely one system of government, stand at this moment armed with the deadliest instruments, face to face, and each day brings them nearer... thousands of innocent lives will be sacrificed in order to determine - well, it is not for us to say.'

Perhaps more significantly, the Army in South Africa defied the pull of patriotism there and published sentiments of an equally anti-war nature for consumption by South African readers. War would do nothing but 'render countless homes desolate and fast augment the battalions of widows and orphans'. It consisted of 'horrible butcheries and awful sufferings... forgotten by those far removed from the battle's front'.

Across the globe the Australian War Cry depicted on its front
page for October, 1899 the spectre of 'Grim War' embracing a giant cannon labelled 'Revenge', with the following commentary:

'The Boer has his Mauser and his up-to-date Krupp, quick-action artillery and the Britisher his deadly Lee Metford, the Maxim, and Lyddite shells... War is grim, almost as grim and as horrible as hell itself. Is there to be no end of it?'

As the war ran its course and news of its impact upon the Army was released, every literary and journalistic device was employed in salvationist publications to bring to pass the prayer of International Headquarters 'that there may be created in the hearts of all men a holy revulsion against war'. For the less sophisticated reader, the message was communicated by cartoon and artist's sketch. For the more literary-minded, poems conveyed the evils of warfare, each poem either decidedly anti-war or pro-peace. The first Christmas (and the second New Year) of the war saw the same emphases promoted in editorial comment, with a directive to every Salvation Army corps to make Sunday 24th December, 1899, a Day of Prayer for an end to the bloodshed.

Every now and then, however, the holy propaganda machine got out of hand, forgetting its own previous counsel that salvationists should avoid lurid and gory accounts of the details of the fighting:

'One of the guards, a big fellow, thrust his bayonet through the body of a Boer, who, with his dying strength, shot him through the head, both men dying almost simultaneously.'

And again:

'I shall never forget seeing our fellows return after the battle. Scorched by sun, blackened by powder, maddened by thirst, sickened by the scenes of bloodshed, overcome with grief, they looked like the hollow-eyed shadows of the men who, in the morning, had marched out of the camp in all the confidence of anticipated victory.'

Even the gentle Mary Murray engaged the same technique:

'A battery galloping into action, met by a shell accurately aimed; then a confused mass of dying men and horses.
The roar and rattle of artillery, dust, smoke, scorching sun, a curse, someone crying for water, and here and there a wounded man returning to the rear..."24

And later, quoting her colleague, Captain Marmaduke Ashman:

'The sights I have seen lately have been dreadful: bodies minus heads or arms; others in atoms... a nice fellow, killed by a shell while making tea.'25

But, if some thought this inconsistent of the Army, at least it conveyed to those at home the reality of 'glorious' war. It was also a reminder of how exposed were salvationist civilian personnel to almost all the same dangers that faced the troops.

Not all the journalism was of a sensationalist kind. The salvationist press was finding its feet in wartime and setting a pattern - at least for the London publications - which was to be emulated in the later wars. Sometimes a splendid piece of quality writing would emerge leaving telling phrases in the memory. One such spoke of the wounded of both sides after victory: 'They were enemies a few hours ago, but now how fearfully akin.'26 Another article27 made subtle use of the life and works of the Russian painter Vasile Verestchagin (1843-1904)28 to convey its point that in war, regardless of the winner, everyone loses. Perhaps the finest single item, powerfully and movingly written, full of authentic details, tells of the soldier's wife hearing the newsboys crying, 'Great slaughter of the enemy, our loss trifling.' Buying the paper she read of the Gloucesters surrounded. It was her husband's regiment. Enquiries at the War Office revealed his name amongst the dead. 'But he died in a noble cause,' said the official. Some men, commented The War Cry29, 'read of death with a professional air, and follow the game of war as they do a regatta or a yacht contest.' The widow left, to hear again the newsboys' cry. 'Is my husband's death a trifle?' she asked her empty soul. Many a salvationist found that 'it is only when we find ourselves trying to
pour comfort into the heart of some bereaved mother or wife, in her agony of mind and grief, that we realise how terrible and far-reaching are the effects of war, and how little we can say or do to heal the broken heart or give expression to our sympathy. 30

2) The Secular Press

Not infrequently the Army lost patience with the secular press. 31 On the eve of the fighting The War Cry accused 'reckless and sensational cablegrams' from British war correspondents of undermining any last minute hopes of peace. 31 Many papers, the Army said, evidently hungered for war 33 and the majority were 'solely concerned in out-rivalling each other and in making money out of the horrible butcheries of war.' 34 The accusations were unambiguous (although no particular paper was ever named): the secular press was simply pandering to a thirst for news and was ready to induce in 'abominable lying' to meet that thirst. 35 The South African press (note again the balanced criticism of British and Boer) was just as bad in Army eyes, putting out 'abominably exaggerated' stories. 36 The Social Gazette criticised 'meddlesome leader-writers' who hindered chances for peace 37 and took to task the users of sensational, war-glorifying headlines. 38 William Booth was scornful: 'The little news that leaks out is spread over as much space as possible, and then re-cooked in twenty different ways and preached about until it is positively nauseating.' 39

In return, it would appear, the secular press was not unkind to the Army, giving general approval to Booth's politically neutral but down to earth stance. 40 So too the South African Standard and Diggers News published several favourable accounts of Army work amongst the troops. 41 Nevertheless, one serious incident did arise. Early in
1901, WT Stead, a leading journalist and moral campaigner of the time, published a series of articles entitled *Revelations of a British Staff Officer*, as the guerilla phase of the war dragged on. Stead had previous associations with Bramwell Booth in the fight for the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 and the London Express jumped to the conclusion that the articles were based on leaks from confidential reports sent to the Army's Chief of the Staff by Naval and Military League officers in the Transvaal. The articles were heavily critical of British military personnel. That they were wholly inconsistent in tone with the Army's by now well-known non-aligned stand on the war did not deter the Express from its accusations. The Army objected publicly to this 'painful slander on some of our devoted officers'. In an effort to minimise the adverse publicity arising from the episode the Army's public relations literature urged friends of the Army, 'before accepting reflections upon Army soldiers or administration, which may appear in public prints' to contact International Headquarters for the truth of things.

If Army newspapers expressed disgust at certain sections of the secular press, it was left to Commissioner George Scott Railton to pronounce judgment on both the Christian and unChristian press of the world (he did not trouble to exempt salvationists). Their treatment of the war had been 'the most lamentable demonstration of white ignorance, arrogance and folly that could have been possible' for amidst all the tons of paper occupied by denunciations of English or Boers... how many square inches have been used anywhere to plead the interests of the peoples of Africa?' Railton's vision was of missionary endeavour with the blacks, especially the Zulu and the Amaxosa, amongst whom already the Army had many sound converts.
To this soldier-saint, the war was wrong simply because it was war, but it was all the more evil because it held back the winning of souls, Railton's (and William Booth's) raison d'etre, and the achieving of his dream of a vast Army of African salvationists across the continent.

3) The Priority of Evangelism

Railton was less than fair if he was hinting that even his fellow salvationists had lost sight of soul-winning because of the war. In fact the Army repeatedly and emphatically highlighted this very danger to its own people and urged them on to greater efforts for Christ's kingdom. We see in the Boer War both British and South African salvationist leaders establishing in deliberate fashion a clear understanding in the minds of their peoples of the need not only for undiminished soul-winning work but also for enhanced effort because of the fragility of life and proximity of death in wartime. Evangelism in war was thus one of the three foundational principles which made up the Army's reaction to the hostilities, a principle which was to endure through future and larger scale wars. In 1900 the South African officers were singled out as choice examples to others of soul-winners under stress:

'With the fearful disorganisation which war brought in its train... our comrades in South Africa were likely to have found their soul-saving occupation gone indeed... With one set of doors closed, another set was opened... Officers have developed hitherto undreamed of talents, fresh crowds have heard the gospel message in camp and on the battlefield and trophies have been snatched from "the death that never dies"... Where possible, the barracks; minus the latter, a tent; minus tent, the unroofed veldt - it was the same grand work and purpose: the bringing of sinners to the Blood.'

Great optimism prevailed for the future of the spiritual work. South Africa could yet be a land 'distinguished because of
the conquests of the Cross' rather than of bloody battle, and where 'there may come forth for the advance of the glorious gospel opportunities undreamt of.' The Army felt sure that the present demonstration by both officers and lay salvationists in South Africa of 'the reality of Christianity, often at a cost of great sacrifice' would later tell in terms of 'a general acceptance of and rapid advance in all Salvation Army measures when the country is once more free from the horrors of war.'

It was the priority concern of the Army for souls in wartime that was made the basis of the first public appeal for funds just before hostilities. The advent of war would provide a great opportunity 'for the soldiers of the Cross to get at the souls of those who will bear the brunt of the battle; and particularly at first, when men's hearts will be tender and unhardened by sights of blood, and unembittered by feelings of revenge... it is imperative the Army should be ready.' The soul-saving would require not only money but men too: 'good men, holy men; men filled with a burning, loving sympathy... who will labour, struggle and suffer for the deliverance of sinners... Let it not be said to our shame that the men of Britain are more willing to give their lives to wage war and kill than are the men of The Salvation Army to give their lives to save souls.'

Railton went still further, so important to him was soul-winning: 'So vastly important is this, that I see compensation even in the present avalanche of war with which we are surrounded' If only cannon-balls will properly wake us up, may the cannon-balls rain!' Few in the Army, or at the front would have agreed with his closing sentiment. One who spent ten months at the front was Adjutant Mary Murray, in charge of the Naval and Military League work. She too
recognised compensations in the warring but was less abandoned than Railton: 'The men showed greater readiness to receive the message we had to deliver than would have been the case in other circumstances, and both officers and men of all ranks, from Lord Roberts and Sir Redvers Buller down, showed a kindness and sympathy.' The spiritual work of the salvationists was 'warmly appreciated' The following account is typical:

'The other night we held an open-air meeting. Being dark, we were puzzled how to procure lights. The men, however, solved the difficulty by sticking candles on their bayonets. It was a solemn meeting, each man feeling deeply the uncertainty which lay before them. Many voices were husky as we sang.' The following day the battle of Willow Grange was fought.

Not only was the gospel seen as the priority need for the individuals participating in the war, but the only solution to national and international strife was 'the love of God in the hearts of men'. This alone would prevent war and racial disharmony. If men would give up sin and 'make a full surrender to the just demands of an Almighty God' an end would be seen to sorrow and suffering, and peace would reign.

No one at the time could reasonably have doubted the Army's primary goal. It was converts. Close in second place was humanitarian and material help to the troops and the civilian victims of the war. All this had to be allied to political neutrality, swathed in prayer and soundly funded. It was a difficult balance. Salvationists at home had to be educated to the need and mobilised into giving, as well as adopting a united and non-partisan front on the issues of the war itself. With every new secular headline, the Army echoed the military language, adopting and adapting it to its own holy purposes to rouse its Christian forces to meet the spiritual and evangelistic need of the hour. If war was hellish, it could be routed only by spiritual combat. The next Chapter examines how this was carried through in a practical way.
1. IWC 14-6-02:5.

2. The Army is now in 89 countries: SAYB 1985, 42-44.

3. George Scott Railton, letter to son, David, from Kimberley, 29-5-00 (IHQ Archives); IWC 13-1-00:6; 29-9-00:7.

4. IWC 16-9-99:5.


8. AM, April 1900, 280. (Monthly newspaper of SA Assurance Society Ltd.)


12. SAWC 4-11-99:4


14. AWC 28-10-99: 1, 2.

15. Ch.3, Note 3.

16. E.g. SG 4-11-99:2, (skeletal ghoul reaching out claws to seize Africa); IWC 7-7-00:11, (housewife refusing bread to her family, with caption: 'Glorious war means dear bread').

17. E.g. SG 2-10-99:1, (British soldier leaving his wife for the war, with caption: 'Will he be spared to return to her?'). Also IWC 4-11-99:2.

18. IWC 21-10-99:9; 2-12-99:2; 17-2-00:3; 3-3-00:6; 7-6-02:7. ATW November 1901:617.


20. IWC 23-12-99:8.


22. IWC 30-12-99:6.
23. IWC 31-8-01: 5.
24. Murray, 40.
27. IWC 4-11-99: 2.
29. IWC 11-11-99: 2, 'Is my Husband's Death a Trifle?'
30. ATW April 1900, 256.
31. Anglicans too, but for opposite reasons: CT 31-5-01 (secular press criticised for commenting adversely on prisoner of war camps in Britain).
32. IWC 14-10-99: 7.
34. IWC 14-10-99: 5.
37. SG 16-6-00: 2.
38. SG 4-11-99: 1.
39. TO December 1899, 446.
40. IWC 31-3-00: 8.
42. Watson, 178.
43. ATW February 1901, 103-4.
44. Ibid., 104.
45. George Scott Railton, Our South African War (SP&S, 1901), 128.
46. Ibid., 129.
47. Ibid., 122: 'The great question of the Army's future must needs be connected with that of the native races.' (Railton nevertheless predicted a doubling of the Army's strength amongst the whites after the war.)

48. The Field Officer, August 1900, 309-310. (This was the forerunner of The Officer.)

49. ATW May 1900, 286.

50. ATW June 1900, 383.


52. IWC 13-4-00:6.

53. Douglas and Duff, Commissioner Railton, 251.

54. Railton never reached the front: Note 3.

55. Murray, vi.

56. Ibid., 45.

57. Ibid., 14.

58. SG 7-10-99:2.

59. SG 7-6-02:2.

60. IWC 28-10-99:2; 26-1-01:8; 13-4-01:6.
CHAPTER 5

FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

1) The Naval and Military League
2) The Military Response
3) Inside South Africa
1) The Naval and Military League

The principal vehicle for giving practical effect to salvationist evangelism and social outreach in the war was the Naval and Military League. With its motto of 'Love Conquers All', it became a unique expression of Christian ministry. Its aims were simple: to get military servicemen saved, principally through the agencies of their salvationist colleagues; and to keep those already saved true to God. Coupled to these primary, evangelical goals was a programme of compassionate practical service.

In its issue for May 1900, *All The World* carried an extensive account of the League's aims and purposes, its work and its witness. The author was Major Margaret Allen, then in charge of the League's work. She wrote: 'The mode of work is unique amongst movements for the benefit of soldiers and sailors, as there are not only homes to look after servicemen in the ordinary sense, but the great aim is to make every converted naval and military man a missionary to his fellows.' Each Leaguer, on becoming a member of the League, gave a promise:

'By the grace of God I promise:
1. Total abstinence.
2. Purity in thought, deed and word.
3. To discourage gambling.
4. To read daily from God's word.
5. To do my level best to bring my comrades to Christ.

Having the assurance that God, for Christ's sake, has pardoned all my sins, I am determined to love Him with all my heart, to love my neighbour as myself, and to serve God as a true soldier in the ranks of The Salvation Army.'

It will be seen that a Leaguer had first to be a soldier (full member) of The Salvation Army, having made a public commitment to Christ and having been publicly 'sworn-in' under the Army flag.
His commitment was (as today, for Army soldiers, it still is) enshrined in a document called 'Articles of War' which recites the Army's 'Articles of Faith' (the eleven doctrines) and the ethical standards by which the salvation soldier will live. This pre-condition for membership of the League is important for an understanding of how the Army perceived the role of the League. It was not some kind of mission carried on by the Army to or for servicemen. Rather it was an integral part of the Army itself. This is a crucial point. You could not belong unless you were already a salvationist. William Booth put it this way:

'Being part of The Salvation Army I look upon the League as having the same purpose as the Army, that is, to offer salvation from sin to every man, through Jesus Christ our Saviour. I expect every Leaguer to live and fight for this, whether in the services or out.'

From its earliest days the Army had shown interest in the forces of the Crown. Even before the Army was itself an 'Army', and was still The Christian Mission, the signs were there, for both practical and spiritual aid were offered to servicemen in the Ashanti War of 1874 and the Zulu War of 1879, one year after the name of 'The Salvation Army' first appeared (in May, 1878). The work began formally in June 1882 when Captain Polly Perkins established an Army corps at Colchester. Military personnel were amongst the first converts (110 on the first Sunday) and in August 1882 the War Office formally approved servicemen belonging to The Salvation Army and their taking part in indoor meetings (but not in marches or in meetings held in the open-air). In the same month official consent was given for salvationist access to the camp at Aldershot and word reached the Army in London that salvationists were holding meetings regularly on board 'HMS Agincourt' off Alexandria. In 1894 the formation of the Naval and Military League was announced, under Major Alice Lewis. It was
seen as an 'order' within the Army as a whole. By the end of 1900 the League was represented in 235 battalions and batteries of the British forces and on 131 ships of the British navy. Homes for soldiers and sailors had been established at:

Aldershot        Madras
Devonport        Cape Town
Chatham          Bloemfontein
Portsmouth       Pretoria
Gibraltar        Johannesburg
Malta            Kimberley
Yokohama         Harrismith

The leading personality of the League during the first year of the Boer War was Mary Murray. She was typical of female Salvation Army officership and ministry, and it is possible to discern in her Boer War role the prototype for the hundreds of Army women who undertook war work between 1899 and 1945 all over the world. Booth sent her to South Africa with a party of hand-picked officers to arrive in Cape Town on November 15th, 1899. Her orders were to find out:

1. What the Army could do for troops at the front.
2. What part women could play in such a work.
3. How to organise the work efficiently and economically.

She admitted that every preconceived idea vanished when she landed, for in Cape Town there was little or no sign of war once the quay was left behind. Everyone she spoke to expected the Army to engage mainly in nursing work, like the droves of fashionable women who had accompanied Murray's party on the ship. Instead, her first decision was that no salvationist would further subject the soldiers 'to the mercies of imperfectly-trained women'. Her party would split up and minister
pragmatically and spiritually as opportunity allowed and need required.

The plan was as follows:

- Major Swain To the Highland Brigade at the Modder River
- Ensign Walter Scott
- Captain John Anderson To General Gateacre's forces at Sterkstroom
- Lieutenant Wm Warwicker
- Captain Wm. Hooper To General French's column at Colesberg.
- Ensign Mary Murray To Natal to establish a central NML Headquarters
- Captain Marmaduke Ashman
- Lieutenant Laura Haines

Mary Murray was ideal for her task. She knew military life, being the daughter of General Sir John Murray, KCB, of the Indian Staff Corps. Her writings on the war and the experiences of both herself and her colleagues are full of gentle humour, relieving the grimness of all that was inflicted and suffered in battle. Her approach to the troops was at once motherly, sympathetic, concerned, and forthright about every man's need of a Saviour. This last thing was the spring of all the work. She knew full well that many men attended the Army's meetings merely 'to kill time', but, she wrote, 'a vast number were eager for spiritual help and very grateful for anything done for their temporal or spiritual welfare.'

Much was done. The Army knew that soldiers 'wanted someone to act, not only preach'. So there were recreation facilities, supplies of good cheap food, free winter clothing, and endless supplies of stationery as well as round-the-clock visitation and a letter-writing service. Officers in charge of Army corps in Britain were urged to notify the League of every soldier or sailor convert and of every salvationist going to the war. Addresses of
forces personnel at home on rest were also called for so that links might be maintained pending return to the field. A newsletter, entitled 'Under the Colours', went out monthly to all Leaguers and to the wives of Leaguers away from home. A Prayer Union for the wives was formed and the newsletter published answers to doctrinal questions submitted by Leaguers.

In the Transvaal the officers of the League hardly rested. A typical day's work is described by Mary Murray:


She adds that sometimes 100 letters a day were written for the troops. It is enlightening to follow the work rate of the young Lieutenant Warwicker, who evidently kept careful records of all he did! By February 15th, 1900, he had personally visited and counselled 487 men. He had been at it only a month. By January 26th, 1901, the number visited had risen to 1,700 and by the Spring of that year it amounted to 2,111 sick and wounded visited plus 1,800 others counselled on spiritual matters. Warwicker's military pass gave him access to 'all military camps in South Africa'.

On Wednesday October 3rd, 1900, a capacity crowd met in London's Regent Hall to welcome Mary Murray home. Her health had failed, and in any case Booth thought the war was all but ended. Commissioner Howard, leading the meeting, said, 'We at International Headquarters give a verdict from the General and the Chief of the Staff that Adjutant Murray (now promoted) and her comrades have done well. She went to do good work, and she has done it.' Booth sent a letter
to be read in the meeting. He commended Murray's work, expressed an expectation that the war would end soon, and shared a vision of the work of the Naval and Military League extending to every regiment and ship in the Queen's forces. 29

Mary Murray's first job upon returning to London was to finish a book giving an account of the work she had pioneered. 30 Much of it must have been written on her homeward journey by sea for it appeared very shortly after her return (price 6d!) and by 1901 was in its second edition. Today it is a fascinating, eminently readable source of information, but when first published it was intended quite simply as a fund-raiser for the work in South Africa. 31 Clearly, Booth intended it for chiefly non-salvationist readers in Britain since the book carefully avoids any significant mention of the Army's widespread work with the Boer side. The Founder, it seems, could be wordly-wise when he wanted to be! Again we see the hard-headed pragmatist which he was capable of being if Army interests so required.

He it was who had first conceived of 'Salvation Red Cross Agents' 32 at work with troops. But as already noted, the analogy with the Red Cross ought not to be pressed too far. That organisation's work is amply recorded. 33 Whilst its origins date back to 1864, making it a contemporary of the Army's, its entire ethos is different. The Salvation Army exists to bring people to Christ. That too was the paramount aim of the Naval and Military League. It has never been the aim of the Red Cross.

2) The Military Response

Seldom did the salvationists meet ingratitude. The troops in South Africa quickly realised the value of having the Army to hand, even if many at first expressed amazement at the sight of the uniform

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up at the front. Some thought the salvationists were fools to be under fire when not compelled to be so, but still managed to see it as lending credibility to the Army's religious motivation. To the troops, it was clearly 'no sham faith'. All the Army did was encouraged by both the Boer and the British authorities. Adjutant George Stevens, in a despatch dated November 8th, 1899, reported that formal word from the British military leaders had come authorising Salvation Army Officers to accompany the troops. Every assistance was given: free rail passes (see Note 26a), transport for tents and supplies, manpower to help lead and unload at each base, orderlies to announce meetings to the men. Indeed, it seems that only the Army were allowed to conduct meetings in the camps. Mary Murray wrote of 'unstinted kindness, help and consideration' from military personnel at all levels. The civil authorities were equally co-operative and appreciative of Army efforts to cope with the social casualties of war. The same co-operation came from high-ranking Boer commanders.

No difficulty was experienced in joint work from time to time with chaplains from other denominations.

3) Inside South Africa

Whilst the work of the League was welcomed and was to prove effective, the indigenous operations of the Army in South Africa suffered severe setbacks because of the war. The Naval and Military League was in the charge of Mary Murray who answered chiefly to London, but the regular, ongoing and local work in South Africa was entrusted to the territorial leader, Commissioner George Kilbey. It fell to him somehow to hold things together for when the war was over. His colonial experience was to stand him in good stead (he had served in New South Wales and had later been Chief Secretary for Australia and

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then for Great Britain\(^4\)). In South Africa he followed Commissioner Ridsel who had built up good relationships with the Boer administration and who had received assurances from the Transvaal Government concerning Army personnel and properties in the event of hostilities.\(^4\) Kilbey's departure from London was front page news in The War Cry, which described him as a man 'with an unswerving passion for souls, which determines and colours all his projects and plans, whether official or personal, behind the scenes or on a public platform.\(^4\)

The Boer War crippled the Army's work. The evangelical effort in many towns stopped altogether, with whole populations migrating in the face of hostilities. Halls closed, income slumped and many Boer officers were called up to fight. When the war ended, William Booth summed it up this way:

>'The strife has been specially distressing for us salvationists... We have had comrades fighting on both sides. Our soul-saving efforts in large parts of the country have been all but suspended, many of our halls closed, our officers exiled or commandeered, our soldiers scattered, our income damaged - in short, everything has been reduced to confusion, if not despair.'\(^4\)

The South African War Cry (published in both English and Afrikaans) made no bones about the 'gigantic difficulties' for the Army because of the war and it reported many closures of Army centres.\(^4\) Over 50% of the Territory was severely disrupted\(^4\), but the spirit of the officers was reported as undiminished\(^4\). In the areas worst affected by the fighting and under Boer control in the first months of the war (i.e. the Transvaal and Orange Free State) eleven out of eighteen centres closed down because of the hostilities\(^4\) and many did not reopen even when the war ended\(^4\).

In the midst of this, Kilbey's personal zeal for souls and his example of never giving up shone through. Always generous with praise for his staff\(^4\), he worked unstintingly. On arriving in Cape Town

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he at once launched a spiritual and evangelical campaign, sensing perhaps the spiritual stamina that would be needed for times ahead. In one tour of Natal early in 1901 he covered 812 miles by sea, 399 on horseback, 900 miles by train and 35 by post-cart - a total of 2,146 miles. All this in war conditions. He handled gunfire and the press with equal aplomb. He insisted that the Army was prepared to undertake any task, however menial, for both Britain and Boer in the interests of easing the impact of war and ending the fighting. Here is seen his non-partisan spirit.

Early in 1902 he visited International Headquarters in London to report to the Founder. It became clear that nearly every salvationist family in South Africa had a member or relative participating in the fighting in some capacity. He secured promises of funds to buoy up the ailing finances in South Africa, but the most far-reaching policy decision arrived at was that the Army would embark on a determined campaign to win native converts and train native officers. A separate Training College would be established for this purpose. Railton was delighted (see above, Ch.4, Note 45).

Not only did the Army lose halls and income, but salvationists died in the war. The first Naval and Military Leaguers to die were reported in the London War Cry for Christmas 1899. Thirty were killed, wounded or taken prisoner. It was stressed that these were serving 'compulsorily' with the troops. Officers of The Salvation Army at that time were not exempt from military service and some were members of the Army Reserve before becoming officers. These were called up, as was an officer-cadet in the Training College at Clapton. No sign of refusal to respond to call-up emerges from the sources. Cadet McLean's place in the Training College would be kept open until
his return. The War Cry afforded a full-page obituary to Private William Barnes, killed at Belmont, near Kimberley, and described him as 'an earnest, aggressive Leaguer'. Similar features followed as the casualty numbers rose. In a manner consistent with political neutrality, Boer salvationsits who died received equally prominent treatment. They were described as 'commandeered by the military authorities'. By contrast, the award of the Victoria Cross to Leaguer FG Bradley of the Royal Field Artillery for bravery during the action of Itala, Zululand, on September 26th, 1901, was given a mere four inches of column space. Bradley had already applied, it seems, for training as a Salvation Army officer:

'Driver Bradley has won this distinction by bravery, and we trust that when this terrible war is over, and he becomes a Salvation Army officer, the same spirit, pluck and determination may characterise his fighting against the raging forces of sin until, at last, he receive the great VC of Heaven.'

This episode, for Army purposes, was worthy only of passing interest, and even then needed to be seen in the context of bigger battles to be fought. The Army's formal response to the award was not going to run the risk of glamourising the fighting. One is tempted to wonder how Bradley felt about it.

The translation of Army policy on the war from theory to practice thus fell upon outstanding leaders like Mary Murray and George Kilbey, loyally supported by like-minded colleagues. Booth had insisted from the start that the Army was friend of Boer and Briton alike and this was stressed both in London and Cape Town. The Army in Britain went out of its way to promote a sensible view of the Boers, balancing some of the impressions conveyed by the secular press. The Boers were 'not brigands, but a domesticated, home-loving people'. Their women were 'hard-working, good natured, hospitable and religious' whilst their
fighting forces displayed 'stubborn skill and daring'. Articles by Dutch Salvation Army officers were published at intervals during the war, providing further hard evidence of salvationist determination to be seen to be neutral and internationalist.

The bulk of Army work with the Boer side was not so much with fighting troops as with social casualties and prisoners of war. A Salvation Army officer-cadet, Cadet Hiten, 'commandeered' by his governmen and later captured, started nightly meetings in the camp at Green Point, Cape Town, winning 80 converts. Many Boer prisoners were transported to St. Helena and to Ceylon. In both places the Army embarked upon work amongst them, with good spiritual results. Strangely, the Army was denied access to Boer POW's in Cape Town, but open-air meetings were mounted outside the camp perimeter. Apart from this the British authorities in Cape Town were helpful to the Army and offered encouragement. The Boer military leaders used Army officers in their zones for ambulance and for town guard duty but did not insist on them fighting. Help was rendered to Boer wounded and refugees, most notably during the seiges at Estcourt and Kimberley. One officer's report reflects clearly that the neutral, evenhanded policy of Army leaders was translated into practical effect at grass roots: 'The nature of our work has thrown us into touch with both sides, and both English and Dutch have come in for a share of our thought and prayer.' Another officer reported helping 'both Boer and British' at the Orange River and the Modder River.

From the outset of the conflict, Army leaders in South Africa openly spoke and wrote about salvationist neutrality between the two sides. When assigning officers to the scenes of battle, Commissioner Kilbey wrote: 'No distinction will be shown between attending to British or Boer wounded, the object being to alleviate suffering.
generally.' The officers were to 'hold themselves ready to do the most menial thing possible' if this should provide a chance 'to do good either to British or to Boer'. When Kimberley was relieved, the Army declared itself pleased but without any 'disposition to gloat over the defeat or victory of either party'.

Railton reports the immediate recommencement of open-air witness upon the reliefs of both Kimberley and Mafeking, using both English and Afrikaans. The Army's mission was 'unaffected by the faithfulness of its soldiers to each of their respective governments'. Only the Army, Railton claimed, could hold in 'perfect union men of differing and opposing forces'.

The Army's policy of neutrality did not altogether prevent it from voicing criticism. In the main this was directed at the conditions to which the British troops were subjected. More men died through disease than through fighting. By July 1900 2,973 had died of wounds but 3,985 had died of enteric. Of the 16,358 sent home incapable of service, nearly 12,000 were sick and only 4,000 wounded. The Army offered strong criticism of the Government. This was renewed when a scheme was announced for reimbursing military officers with the costs of supplying any artificial limb appliance necessitated through service. The Army wanted to know why the ordinary serving man had to pay his own costs in similar circumstances.

It is clear at this point that the Army did not confine its wartime responses to rhetoric and fine words only. It devised practical methods for translating evangelistic ambitions, compassionate concerns, and internationalist ideals into down-to-earth action even at the front lines of battle. The response of the troops was not unappreciative, as the Naval and Military League got to work. South African salvationists weighed in too, undeterred by the savage disruption which war inflicted upon the Army in their country.
1. IWC 17-2-00:3. For an account of the origins of the League see Frederick Coutts, *The Battle and the Breeze* (SP&S, 1946), 5-35.

2. Murray, 5, 35.

3. ATW May 1900, 280.

4. Ibid.

5. Sandall III, 291.


9. Murray, vii. NML statistics vary according to the source. TFG Coates, in *The Prophet of the Poor: The Life Story of General Booth* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1905), 306, states that by 1905 there were Leaguers on 100 warships and in over 100 regiments.


12. Ibid., 4.

13. Ibid., 4-5.


15. Murray, 36.

16. Ibid., 44.

17. Ibid., 171.

18. Ibid., 25.

19. IWC 20-4-01:8.

20. ATW April 1901, 214.

21. TO February 1900, 51.

22. Under the Colours, May 1901; August 1901.

23. ATW May 1900, 281-2.

24. Murray, 75.
25. IWC 26-1-01: 8.
26. ATW April 1901, 214.
26a. Letter, HW Warwicker (Norwich), 14-9-85 enclosing a photo- 
stat copy of William Warwicker's military pass dated 
23-11-1899.
27. IWC 6-10-00: 6.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Murray.
31. Ibid., 113.
32. IWC 21-10-99: 8.
33. E.g. Beryl Oliver, The British Red Cross in Action 
(Faber & Faber, 1966).
34. ATW June 1900, 388; Murray, 49.
35. IWC 10-2-00: 5; ATW May 1900, 283.
36. IWC 9-12-99: 5.
37. IWC 9-3-01: 6; TO February 1900, 52.
38. IWC 13-1-00: 6
40. IWC 17-8-00: 6, (speech, Mayor of Cape Town); 13-4-01: 9
(meeting between Commissioner Kilbey and Sir Walter Hely- 
Hutchinson, Governor, Cape Colony).
40a. SAWC 16-12-99: 5 re work with Boers besieged at Estcourt.
41. IWC 29-12-00: 10.
42. ATW October 1899, 558 (where Kilbey is described as 'a 
dashing desperado at the supreme business of a salvationist').
43. IWC 7-10-99: 8.
44. IWC 30-9-99: 6.
45. IWC 11-11-99: 2; 16-12-99: 2; SAWC 9-6-00: 1; 5-10-01: 4 
(surveying the disruption over the previous two years).
46. IWC 7-6-02: 8.
47. SAWC 28-10-99: 4
SAWC 6-1-00: 4.

SAWC 7-10-99: 5.

Disposition of Forces for South Africa, March 1900, 18.

Disposition of Forces for South Africa, January 1903, 7.


IWC 18-11-99: 3.

ATW May 1901, 280.

IWC 26-10-01: 8.

IWC 23-12-99: 12.

IWC 4-1-02: 9; SAWC 28-10-99: 5 reported relatives of Boer officers being 'commandeered' for military service.

IWC 2-2-02: 9. Today officer-cadets in South Africa are trained on a racially-integrated basis.

IWC 23-12-99: 12.


IWC 18-12-99: 6.

IWC 14-4-00: 6.

IWC 11-1-02: 3.

Ibid.

SG 16-6-00: 2.


IWC 16-12-99: 7.

E.g. ATW June 1900, 376; September 1901, 493.

IWC 29-12-00: 10.

IWC 29-9-00: 8; 1-12-00: 3; 5-11-01: 6; 7-6-02: 6; SAWC 7-9-01: 1.

SAWC 7-4-00: 3.

SAWC 28-6-02: 3.


SAWC 16-12-99: 5.
75. SAWC 24-3-00:1, 2.
76. SAWC 23-12-99:5, report from Major Swain.
77. Ibid., report from Ensign Scott.
79. Ibid.
80. SAWC 10-3-00:1.
82. SG 7-7-00:2.
83. IWC 27-4-01:6.
CHAPTER 6

EARLY PACIFISM
The Salvation Army's attitude and response to the Boer War contributed to the resignation, on January 10th, 1902, of Commissioner and Mrs. Arthur Booth-Clibborn from salvationist service. Booth-Clibborn was the Founder's son-in-law. An Irish Quaker, he offered himself to Booth in 1882 for work in France where he was Chief Secretary to Booth's eldest daughter, Catherine, whom he married on February 8th, 1887. Booth-Clibborn later served in Switzerland, where he was briefly imprisoned for his salvationism, and eventually he took charge, in 1896, of the work in Holland and Belgium. He was in Holland when the Boer War broke out.

Described by a contemporary as of 'immense physical stature' with 'dazzling eyes' he was an effective evangelist. Happiest in public work, he never felt at home as an administrator and often found himself at odds with London over Orders and Regulations. His wife, who had become renowned on the continent and particularly in France as 'La Maréchale', also felt the growing centralisation, as expressed in Orders and Regulations, to be an unnecessary restriction upon Army work and growth overseas. Relations with London and with General Booth began to suffer. Doctrinal issues played their part also, with faith-healing and Dowieism at the centre of disagreements.

Army methods, doctrinal differences, and the moral issues related to warfare combined to take the Booth-Clibborns out of the Army. They were the first salvationist pacifists, forerunners of others to come but who never succeeded in having pacifism elevated to the status of formal Army policy. Booth-Clibborn advocated Quaker views on war, not shared by William or Bramwell Booth. On Christmas Day, 1900 they both wrote to William Booth asking for freedom to preach pacifism in the Army, but the reply was negative. Earlier that year, and whilst

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directing the Army in Holland, he wrote and had standing in type ready for issue two books expressing pacifist convictions, but 'circumstances did not permit of their being published'. He does not say it, but International Headquarters in London obviously would have withheld consent for the books to be published, given the involvement of salvationists in the fighting forces of both sides. After his resignation, Blood Against Blood came out in 1907. It is a book of much piety but little moral analysis. The tone is sermonic and the presentation sometimes muddled. But there can be no mistaking the author's depth of conviction. He openly owns his Quaker antecedants as formative of his views, and condemns all war as 'a mass of hideous contradictions'. 'There are no contradictions in true Christianity... War is therefore anti-Christian in all its forms.' War is twice as evil for the Christian as for the 'worldling' since the Christian fighter denies two ties: he kills fellow-creatures and fellow-Christians. Every new Christian convert instinctively looks on war as wrong, writes Booth-Clibborn, but is soon being persuaded that some wars are a necessary evil or even right and just, especially those of his own country. War cannot ever be Christianised 'any more than lying or licentiousness'. The conclusion is that Christians may not fight. Men not 'born again' are not similarly bound. But Christians, absolutely, must not take part in war. He says nothing of whether it is moral for the Christian to allow the non-Christian to die in his defence, nothing of the need to restrain the evil-doer, nothing of the consequences of not resisting the aggressor. The book pivots on Christ's command to 'put up the sword', a 'conclusive' command for Christians. As to practicalities, or duties to loved ones: 'It is not necessary to live, but it is necessary to do right. Better
to die than lie; better to suffer than to sin." For Booth-Clibborn there were no dilemmas, no impossible choices. On his office wall in Amsterdam he pinned one of his poems.

'For Christian war to have fair play,
The Christ must quit the field.
For just revenge to win the day
His grace to guns must yield.
Dare any Christian raise a song
Or stop a soul to save,
'Twould be to death a deadly wrong,
High treason to the grave.'

William Booth was not so absolutist. He shared the view that war was anti-Christian, but his feet were in the real world where dilemmas presented themselves, where tough choices had to be faced, where obedience to lawful government had to be reckoned with and where some of his salvationist soldiers were already soldiers in the armies of their nations. He was also concerned to hold the international Army together.

Booth-Clibborn wanted him to outlaw military service for salvationists, but the Founder refused to take that step. The son-in-law, as Territorial Commander in Holland, had sought actively to dissuade young Christians from bearing arms. Booth left it to individual conscience, but nevertheless preferred to think of salvationists who fought as either 'compelled' or 'commandeered'. He could not see any way to advocate pacifism without splitting the Army, a view subsequently endorsed by his successors in office as General in 1914 and 1939.

Booth-Clibborn was appalled by this stance. He attacked it scathingly. How could salvationist fight salvationist 'in the presence of the heathen'? He did not wish, he said, to speak disparagingly of General Booth, but the question was one of right and wrong, not persons or policies. He accused Booth of waving the Army
flag over the war 'as if joining the churches in giving destruction its blessing'. He then turned to Mary Murray's *The Salvation Army at Work in the Boer War*, criticising the cover design for its placing of the Royal Arms of England next to the Army crest. He mistook the identity of the author, confusing her with Emma Murray, daughter of the Rev. Andrew Murray (see above, Ch. 2, Note 7). Then he reviewed the Naval and Military Leaguer's pledge, remarking, 'There is no promise to obey the command: thou shalt not kill.' How could the Army bring men to Christ one day and 'cheer them on in a savage charge' the next? He claimed that the Army held back from opposing military service because to have done so would have meant that it would have practically had to cease from itself being 'an Army'. (It is worth noting that this is a rare instance between 1899 and 1945 of the sources raising the relationship of a Christian 'Army' to military life and warfare. Being an 'Army' appears to have helped, rather than hindered, salvationist endeavours in wartime since it gave a foothold readily with the troops who might have been more reserved toward 'the Church'. See also Ch. 11, Sect. 1.) Such a stance, said Booth-Clibborn, would have alienated governments and invited persecution. He was accusing Booth of lack of moral courage. Instead of saving men from war, the Army sought to save them in war. Salvationist Leaguers had to elevate the commands of their military generals above the commands of Christ. There was, it seems, no meeting point for the absolutism of the son-in-law and the instinctive pragmatism of the father-in-law.

One salvationist writer has described Booth-Clibborn's criticisms as 'holy simplicity'. No public answer was ever given by International Headquarters which felt, presumably, that the Army's record spoke for itself. By 1907 Booth-Clibborn was an outsider, and if he spoke still for any within the Army, they were few and far between and anything but vocal. Not until the 1930's did pacifism in the Army become articulate again (see Ch. 20).

2. Ibid., 109. For a life of Kate Booth see Carolyn Scott, The Heavenly Witch (Hamish Hamilton, 1981). An earlier biography, in which Kate Booth collaborated, makes no mention of the split with her father or of resignation over the peace issue: James Strahan, The Maréchale (George H. Doran, New York, 1914).


5. AM Nicol, General Booth and The Salvation Army (Herbert & Daniel, 1910), 256.

6. Collier, 188.


8. Arthur Booth-Clibborn, Blood Against Blood (Headley Brothers, 1907), Prefatory Note.

9. Ibid., 161 ff.

10. Ibid., 11.

11. Ibid., 29.

12. Ibid., 55.

13. Ibid., 71.

14. Ibid., 78.

15. Ibid., 13.

16. Ibid., 15.


17. Ibid., 27, 31. (Also Carolyn Scott, The Heavenly Witch (Hamish Hamilton, 1981, 193.)


19. Ibid., 42.

20. Ibid., 67.

CHAPTER 7

A COHERENT STANCE?
Arthur Booth-Clibborn's presentation of The Salvation Army's Boer War response was not objectively based. He yielded to the temptation to caricature his subject before criticising it. William Booth never gave destruction his blessing. He mourned for blood spilt pointlessly, he grieved for the widows, he implored God to safeguard the Army's work in South Africa. He was closer to Clibborn than Clibborn knew.

Neither was any salvationist ever found cheering on a charge by the British on the battlefield, even when Naval and Military Leaguers were doing some of the charging. All the salvationist sources speak of the fighting with a sad but matter-of-fact regret that things should be thus. Many a trooper was encouraged in his spirit and challenged in his soul by a salvationist, but no one saw Booth or Booth's people in the Boer War taking sides on the touchline of battle.

The war placed salvationists on opposing sides in battle for the first time. The World Wars were later to bring the same tensions and dilemmas, in some ways more sharply than in 1899. But by 1914 there were at least some basic precedents to go on. William Booth had laid the foundations for The Salvation Army's actions and attitudes in war by articulating a threefold response:

1. Evangelism - are the troops ready to die? If not, get them saved!
2. Compassionate action - are there human needs the Army can meet? If so, meet them!
3. Political neutrality - does the Army praise one side and blame the other? No, for the Army's priorities lie elsewhere.

However, one point made by Booth-Clibborn deserves serious consideration. This is the charge of moral weakness, the criticism that Booth stopped short of a non-combatant stance for the Army because he did not wish to alienate governments or invite persecution, thereby
putting the Army and its work at risk. Reading Booth's personal pronouncements, particularly in the earlier phases of the war, one could be forgiven for thinking that his denunciations of war, its folly, its evil, its devilry, would naturally and logically have led him to the position Booth-Clibborn so much longed him to take. Booth was clear-headed, an able thinker, but he was pragmatic too. He was in the process of building a world empire out of nothing. He dealt with the leaders of nations, with the moods of the peoples his Army sought to win and, in short, he was dispositionally disinclined to the adopting of opinions that had no mileage in them. Had he been by nature an academic or an idealist-cum-romantic like Booth-Clibborn he would have stepped quite easily into the pacifist camp. But he could not, for he was a prisoner of his own pragmatism. His failure (as Booth-Clibborn would have termed it) to go the whole hog was not so much the result of a carefully analytical weighing of the ethical, theological or political conundrums, but rather an instinctive turning toward a middle way which sprang from the soul of a man who was one of nature's survivors.

A reading of the 1899-1902 salvationist sources in search of reflective analyses of the ethical issues produces hardly anything at all. On the other hand, one is not left with an impression that the Army's stance was a self-saving or self-serving one. If, in time, it resulted in the Army being enhanced in the eyes of the public and of governments, so be it. That was not the goal; it was an unexpected but welcome bonus.

On war being declared, the intuitive salvationist response was to work out how best to be of service and meet the human needs, both spiritual and material, that would arise. There was to be no mulling
over the origins of the conflict, no quibbling over whether salvationists
ought to be or ought not to be in the forces, but simply a practical
and humanitarian answering of need. 1 Mary Murray's retrospective
reflections on her work for instance were entirely pragmatic. Not
once did she question whether her presence in South Africa or among the
troops was morally right. Her only concern was whether she had answered
the need. 2 The answering was practical, but the praying was important
too and it had to be 'impartial' as between the opposing forces. 3 The
question the Naval and Military League officers asked themselves
concerning the troops was not whether the war was just, but whether the
troopers were ready to die.

No particular conflict was perceived by the Army between the
occupation of soldiering and being a Christian, a salvationist Christian.
Bramwell Booth thought that the two things were 'singularly associated' 4
and Major Margaret Allen addressed Leaguers in the following terms:

'Never lose sight of the fact that by your very position
as a serviceman you are ordained by God to be a missionary
to servicemen first of all. Your opportunity with them
is now, while you live in their sight, and when you leave
the service your influence with them will be largely gone.' 5

In other words, the justification for being a salvationist service-
man was that you were useful to God in that role. But this was not an
Army perspective applied exclusively to servicemen. The Founder would
have seen the same argument as justifying a man being a refuse collector
amongst other refuse collectors. It was merely one specific applica-
tion of Booth's concept that The Salvation Army is love for souls.

The sources offer the occasional hint, as was to prove also the
case in later wars, that Army leaders thought about the Boer War, in
part at least, in terms associated with the just war tradition. No
systematic application of just war doctrine was made, and in fact there
was a downright refusal to weigh the causes of the war or to assess
how it was being conducted. The salvationists did not wait to
distinguish the *ius ad bellum* from the *ius in bello*, but did some-
times acknowledge the possibility of warfare being justifiable, at least
in theory. Booth even admitted that some wars were 'approved in the
providence of God'\(^6\) and unavoidable. War might be theoretically
acceptable on a utilitarian test of the greatest happiness of the
largest number of people\(^6\), but that did not seem to him so in the
present case for hardly ever had there been a just cause for war.\(^7\)
He rejected absolutely the argument that war could be justified because
of the bravery and virtue it sometimes engendered.\(^8\)

These rare uses of just war language scarcely permit any conclu-
sion that the Army, in the Boer War years, stood squarely in that
tradition of Christian response to warfare. Even after the two World
Wars that conclusion could not be drawn. (See further Ch.16.)
Explicit recognition of the validity of conscientious objection was to
come later with the introduction of conscription in 1916. For now,
it was assumed that if the state summoned, then you went in obedience.
'The question as to how far the follower of Jesus is justified in lifting
the sword will ever be at least a sorrowful one. Still, there it
is - salvation soldiers have had to jump at the bugle-call... and throw
themselves on the mercy and wisdom of God.'\(^9\) This attitude vied for
paramountcy with that expressed below, and it won:

'Ours real lack is the meekness of the Master... If we are
to be worthy followers of Christ... then it is certain we
must accept and live out His teaching who loved His enemies
and when He was reviled, threatened not.'\(^10\)

Booth's Army did not fully work through a just war position, yet
it shared that doctrine's motivation of limiting warfare through love
of neighbour. It left room for individual conscience. It recognised
the evil in man's nature and the need for restraints. It saw the

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need for humanity in warfare. But never did it articulate a recognisably just war position. The Army spirit was too strongly anti-war and too preoccupied with soul-winning to have time for leisurely philosophical reflection. Later wars, especially that in 1939-45, would make a politically neutral stance very difficult to uphold, as also a refusal to assess publicly the morality of the struggle. But for now the foundations were laid and Booth's balancing act had succeeded.

He kept his bruised Army in Africa within his international fold. Whilst the threat of schism was never great between 1899 and 1902, his instincts for survival saw him through and he must have enjoyed the unsolicited tribute of Britain's hero, Lord Kitchener, who told him: 'You have given us an example of how to live as good soldiers and how to die as heroes.'

Accepting compliments from the British leaders was balanced by post-war Boer contact. Politically neutral to the last, William Booth received the Boer generals (Botha, De Wet and De La Rey) at International Headquarters in London three months after the Peace of Vereeniging. Booth feared for anti-British resentment from the Boers, but was swiftly reassured when Botha praised the courage of three salvationists on the British side taken prisoner early in the war at Paardeberg. Two were wounded and a third gave himself up to tend them. When he had done what he could, the Boers set him free. Botha told Booth of the incident and all three Boers went on to give promises of a warm reception for the Army in the Orange Free State if work could be re-established. Discussions then centred on settling families from Britain at the Cape, using the Army's migration scheme. Booth ensured that before the three left him, they were asked about their own spiritual experience. Bramwell Booth was present at the encounter and recalls that only De La Rey
responded to the enquiry. He was 'a truly great man' writes Bramwell Booth and so impressed was the Army's second-in-command that Bramwell later sought him out for further conversation at his hotel. Botha too was 'one of the world's greatest men', but did not grasp what the Booths understood by 'the revelation of Christ to the individual soul.' De Wet was 'one of the ablest leaders in the war'.

William Booth had all three kneeling in prayer in his office. 'It was a wonderful moment,' records Bramwell, 'at a time when the echoes of that miserable war were rumbling away into the distance, to see these three men kneeling down at the table and the old General invoking upon them and their families and their exhausted land the blessing of God in Christ.'

Kitchener and De La Rey, the leaders of opposing armies, both sought out Booth and called him and his salvationists their friends. 'The old General' would have seen it as a vindication of his studied neutrality in the war. Neutrality was his intuitive response to his fear of schism. Later wars saw it copied as official Army policy, despite new circumstances. When Booth chose neutrality in 1899 he may not have foreseen how his successors in 1914 and 1939 would look back to that choice as a binding precedent. The Boer War did not raise starkly moral issues like those of later wars, especially the Second World War. The neutrality policy, seen by Booth as natural to his international Army, became in later years a strait jacket which fettered the salvationist freedom of public response to the evils of armed aggression. (See Ch.27 for further analysis of salvationist political neutrality in war.)
1. ATW March 1900, 190.
3. AM November 1899, 156.
5. Under the Colours, May 1901, 2.
7. IWC 14-10-99: 5.
9. ATW February 1900, 137-138.
10. ATW November, 1899, 611.
13. Bramwell Booth, These Fifty Years (Cassell, 1929), Ch.20, 'Three Fathers of The Veldt'.
14. Ibid., 201.
15. Ibid., 202.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 203.
PART II

THE FIRST WORLD WAR 1914 - 1918
CHAPTER 8

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

1) The International Congress 1914
2) The Boer War Precedent
3) Instinctive Prayer
4) Immediate Plans by London
1) **The International Congress 1914**

Germany invaded Belgium, Britain's ally, on 4th August 1914. Again, war had come. The Editor of *All The World*¹ could not have known what lay ahead for the Army when, in July 1914, amidst salvationist euphoria resulting from a successful International Congress, he wrote: 'Whatever is ahead of us - and he would be a daring prophet who would say - with its heart sound and its splendid battalions of beautiful young men and women full of holy zeal and Christlike compassion, ready to suffer and die, the Army will be equal to its mighty heritage.'²

The International Congress ran from 11th-26th June. It took London by storm, filling famous venues³ over and over again. Four thousand delegates came from 58 countries and colonies to celebrate salvationist internationalism. The British press gave the event some prominence⁴ but special attention fell upon the German contingent, with *The Times* noting that despite numerous letters of greeting and encouragement from heads of states around the world⁵ no such letter was received from 'the ruler of the German nation'.⁶ The official programme of Congress events⁷ spoke of public participation by the German representatives, who numbered 164 and were heralded in advance publicity as 'specially attractive'.⁸ The German Staff Band featured in musical recitals, reciprocating the visit of the International Staff Band to Berlin in 1912.⁹

The Congress was a thanksgiving for a thirty per cent growth in Army witness and work since 1904. In mid-1914, a year short of its fiftieth birthday, the Army was in 58 countries, using 35 languages at 9,516 centres, with 16,438 commissioned (ordained) officers and officer-cadets, helped by 22,150 full-time employees. The Army's social work institutions numbered 1,168.¹¹ Those countries destined to play a leading role in the war were all part of the Army's world. In Britain
and America the Army was an accepted part of national life. In France (from where work in Belgium was supervised) the work was hard, but well-established. In Germany there were 150 corps (20 in Berlin) and over 500 officers, some of whom were British. Despite no greeting to the Congress, Kaiser Wilhelm II was thought of by salvationists as a warm supporter of their work.

For the second time in its short history the Army's international ideals and network were to be tested and once again salvationist would face salvationist in battle. The 'Congress Declaration' of June 1914 stressed international bonds: 'We believe that God's mercy is for all nations, that His salvation is offered to all men... We believe it is our duty to proclaim this message to the whole world.' War would be a distraction from and a challenge to these ideals, but not entirely, for new opportunities would still open up in wartime.

With the declaration of war, The War Cry was simply grateful that God had granted the Army 'that glorious Congress free from the anxiety of this terrible international situation... for that and many other mercies let us all praise Him.' The Congress had been a timely reminder to the whole Army of supranational considerations and loyalties higher than love of country.

2) The Boer War Precedent

'The Western World has been plunged into a calamity which, except God miraculously intervene, will probably prove to be in extent and horror and far-reaching consequences, the most serious the world has witnessed for centuries.' Thus the Editorial comment of The Officer in August 1914, whose gloomy forecast was to prove true. It was not shared by everyone at the time, however, for many imagined the war would be over by Christmas. Regular soldiers and volunteers
(conscription came in 1916\textsuperscript{19}) went to the war zone with ready eagerness.\textsuperscript{20}

War fever gripped Britain. Everything German became an object of hatred, so that even Dachshund dogs were stoned in the streets.\textsuperscript{21} Belgium had fallen on 4th August, bringing Britain's formal declaration of war upon Germany at 11 pm that day.\textsuperscript{22} Two days earlier the Germans had invaded Luxembourg and declared war on Russia. In a rare Sunday edition \textit{The Times} came straight to the point: 'The great catastrophe has come upon Europe.'\textsuperscript{23} The conflict would eventually engage 5 million men including those from Africa and India who 'without consultation' were dragged into 'a war of which they understood nothing against an enemy who was unknown to them'.\textsuperscript{24} Even the citizens of the principal protagonists were unsure of what had caused the war, but later the issue of respecting Belgian neutrality emerged as central to popular apologetics.\textsuperscript{25}

Writers such as GK Chesterton pilloried Germany with powerful prose, dubbing her 'the enemy of civilisation by design'.\textsuperscript{26} Salvationist pronouncements were very different. Again \textit{War Cry} cover features and peace poems appeared, expressing sorrow and longing for peace.\textsuperscript{27} Salvationists were urged to fend off distractions which might divert soul-winners from their purpose, even though those distractions were 'of undoubted importance in their way'.\textsuperscript{28} As in the Boer War, whichever side might win the political struggle, the Army would be the loser since salvationists were on both sides by virtue of nationality.

The Army's first thought was to rediscover the lessons learned in 1899-1902. Had not William Booth found himself, only twelve years before, in the same circumstances? Had he not been pressed to take sides? Had not his reply, 'Sirs, my politics are The Salvation Army!', eventually won the respect of all parties? Salvationists
were urged not to forget that the Army was made up of men and women belonging to all nations, who 'have turned away from every earthly object to fight together under one King' and whose sole object was 'to subdue the whole world to God... and so bring about a universal brotherhood among men.' From the start, *The War Cry* in London struck the same note of supranational idealism as it had throughout the Boer War.

3) **Instinctive Prayer**

If the first thought was to recall Boer War lessons and the politically neutral example of the Founder, it was closely followed by an instinctive turning to prayer, along with Christians everywhere. For many, prayer seemed the only course open. *The War Cry* called for 'won't-take-no-for-an-answer prayer' and reminded its readers that nothing was too hard for God. The *Social Gazette* ran an editorial entitled 'What Can We Do?' and answered principally with: 'We can pray. Pray that God's will may be done... Pray that the conflict may be brought quickly to an end... Pray for salvationists in every nation... especially where our numbers are small and our opportunities limited.' This echoed the words of the now General Bramwell Booth in an interview given upon the outbreak of war and reprinted in *The Officer*: 'Pray that the area of this awful carnage may not be extended. The war spirit soon spreads... Let us cry day and night to the Lord of Hosts to stop it.'

Counsel given in the Army's press to salvationist youth in the early days of the war centred also upon the role of prayer. The young people were told they could help all mankind by praying: 1) that God's will be done; 2) for the speedy return of peace; 3) for God's blessing upon salvationists in the forces; 4) for the whole Army and especially for the General in the midst of 'this sad war'.

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Like almost all churches, the Army organised special days of prayer and intercession. These went on throughout the war, varying from large gatherings to small local groups. At local level the Army frequently united with other Christians in prayer. The Army in Britain complied with the appeal in The Times from Bishop Taylor Smith, Chaplain-General, asking all people 'when the fingers of the clock pointed heavenward at noon' to offer prayer for British soldiers and sailors.

4) Immediate Plans by London

The early weeks of war saw the rapid deploying of emergency plans by the Army at both its International Headquarters (IHQ) and National Headquarters (NHQ) in London. The first tangible evidence of crisis to greet salvationists in Britain was the immediate reduction in the number of pages of The War Cry. More serious matters took a little longer to arrange. Commissioner Edward Higgins, British Commissioner (and thus in charge of Army work in Britain), appealed to his officers to volunteer for 'Salvation Army Red Cross Work'.

All over the country officers visited families of men called to the front. Plans were laid to post officers to the military encampments, Brigadier Millner being taken from command of the West London Division to liaise with the public authorities on behalf of the Army, which expected also to send personnel to France with the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). The Army offered its Naval and Military Homes for use by the Government and the military authorities. Brigadier Mary Murray, of Boer War fame (see Ch.5), was at the time in charge of the Naval and Military League. The role of women in this work had not diminished since 1902. She prepared for departure to the battle-zone. Several Army halls (citadels) in Britain were commandeered for military use. Simultaneously the Army geared itself for

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meeting growing social needs at home due to unemployment, especially in the mining and mill areas of the North. 42

Commissioner Higgins 43 undertook an extended nationwide tour, leading 36 public meetings in three months to rally salvationists in the crisis 43 and visiting the 15 military encampments at which salvationist bases were quickly established and to which approaching 100 officers had been assigned. 44 Some Headquarters officers volunteered for field appointments to close gaps left by the need for officers in the camps and overseas. 45 Others voluntarily accepted reductions in an already meagre financial allowance and offered to forego all annual leave for the duration of the war. 46

Thus, briefly told, the Army in Britain prepared again for wartime. The task was to pursue, with political impartiality, the Army's twin vocation of saving souls and meeting material needs in the midst of sudden and unprecedented international strife. Funds were to run short; needs were to redouble repeatedly; key personnel were to be killed or displaced; buildings were to be taken over or destroyed; loyalties were to be strained; patriotism was to compete with an almost impossibly idealistic neutrality; running battles with officialdom were to hinder progress.

Meanwhile, with his world view of the Army and its peoples, for whom all roads led to London, Bramwell Booth prepared to lead the Army unitedly through the war. He had helped his father do it in the Boer War, but now it fell directly to him.

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1. See Ch. 3, Note 19.
2. ATW July 1914, 388.
3. IWC 9-5-14:16; 6-6-14:16.
5. ATW July 1914, 386-7; IWC 13-6-14:8.
8. ATW June 1914, 324.
10. IWC 4-7-14:2.
11. Ibid.
12. Coutts, 22.
13. Wiggins, 301.
15. War did not prevent the pioneering of Army work in new lands: 1915 in Burma and British Honduras; 1916 in China (proscribed in April 1952), Java, Sumatra and the Celebes: Coutts, 8.
17. TO August 1914, 505.
19. Military Service Act 1916; Military Service Act 1916 (Session 2).
22. AJPT, 2.
23. The Times, 2-8-14:1.
24. AJPT, 3.


27. E.g. IWC 8-8-14; 22-8-14; 7-11-14; 21-8-15. For peace poems see IWC 8-8-14:6, 7; 5-12-14:3; 4-3-16:6. 7; 15-6-18:5. Also ATW December 1914, 712.

28. IWC 1-8-14:8.

29. Ibid.

30. IWC 8-8-14:8.

31. SG 15-8-14:2.

32. William Booth died in 1912 ('promoted to Glory'). His son, Bramwell, succeeded him until 1929, when he was deposed.

33. TO August 1914, 507.

34. TW September 1914, 312.


36. St. Albans CHB, 5-1-18: 'Day of Intercession. Splendid day. Beautiful spirit prevailed. We remembered especially our boys.'

37. Ibid., 12-6-18 (Intercession Day, St. Albans Abbey where the local Army band 'occupied the place of honour in the West Gallery').


40. Ibid. There was no formal link between the Army and the Red Cross (see Ch.5, Sect.1). But see on the SA Ambulance Unit — Ch.11, Sect.3.

41. IWC 15-8-14:9.

42. IWC 15-8-14:8.

43. IWC 12-12-14:3.

44. IWC 17-4-15:6, 8.

45. IWC 26-9-14:7.

46. IWC 22-8-14:9.
CHAPTER 9

THE FOUNDER'S SON SPEAKS

1) August – December 1914
2) 1915 – 1917
3) 1918 and After
1) **August – December 1914**

William Booth had been swift in 1899 to offer guidance to his people and Bramwell Booth also turned quickly to his pen in August 1914. The Founder went less frequently into print. Bramwell used the columns of *The War Cry* almost weekly, so that the paper became in many ways his personal mouthpiece in wartime.

His first words were to his officers. They were to put prayer first. They were not to think of the war as a war between peoples but as between leaders of nations: 'This is a war of rulers rather than of peoples - at least, so far as its origins are concerned.' There was to be no taking sides, whatever an officer's nationality - 'As salvationists, our nation, like our Master's, includes all nations.' Whilst he did not wish 'to put up an impossible standard', and whilst it would be a man's natural desire that his own country should come through with the minimum of suffering, nevertheless whoever were to win the war, salvationists in the defeated lands would forgive and shun bitternesses, even if they could not be expected to rejoice! There were to be no 'foolish demonstrations' or 'panicky fears', no common war gossip or reliance on sensational newspaper reports. Rather, let the Army 'maintain a calm and dignified attitude' whether in defeat or victory so that men would know that salvationists were 'of the company of those who know God and trust in Him'. The war might well be able to be turned to account in helping the people of God. It would offer great scope for practical service to families of soldiers, to the soldiers themselves and to the wounded. This would call for 'the utmost economy and husbanding of sources'. Above all else, there was to be compassion for enemies, 'a Christlike spirit' like that of the great martyrs who met trial with fortitude. In short, Bramwell re-echoed his father's 1899 counsel, glad to have a precedent upon which to rely.

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So relevant were the Boer War words of William Booth that *The War Cry* reprinted them in the last week of August 1914 for all to read again. But Bramwell had already spoken to his people within hours of war being declared. In his journal he described it as 'a lugubrious message'. The great calamity of war had not been avoided. No salvationist could feel anything but sorrow. The whole Army should turn to prayer (including prayer for its General) but the work would also 'go steadily on'. A week later he addressed the issues in greater depth. First, the Officers Training College would most definitely not close. Officers would be needed as never before. On the other hand, many social centres of the Army would cease work and be handed over to the public authorities. This was sad but inevitable, since 'the safety of the realm and well-being of the men who are called to fight is, in such an hour as this, the first consideration.' Five hundred salvationists would be offered to the War Office for humanitarian ('Red Cross') work at the front (see Ch. 8, Note 40). Every salvationist, whatever their nationality, was to preserve a demeanour of simple trust in God. Finally, there was to be no selfish hoarding of either food or money. The priority of the Army, in war or in peace, was still 'the salvation of immortal souls'.

As the war gathered momentum the General continued to insist that it was a war of rulers and not of peoples. This proved to be a recurring theme by Army leaders in all three wars covered by this study. The working classes in England and Germany regarded one another as 'fellow toilers', even as 'fellow Christians'. Hearts on both sides were crying for a way out of the cruel tangle 'into which the rulers of the world have brought their peoples'. The General attempted no public apportionment of blame as between the 'rulers', but occasionally, his private mind on the origins of the war came through. Belgium had
been 'suddenly and ruthlessly attacked through no action - good or bad - of her own'. The German government itself, before a shot was fired, expressed the deepest regret for the invasion which it regarded as a necessity of the situation. As to that "necessity" I say nothing now. He did not have to. His meaning was clear and as early as October 1914 he had breached his own 'take no sides' guideline. In the same article he claimed: 'I am merely pointing out that on every hand there is compassion for Belgium and its people.' The implication of this for his mind on the German invasion, however, was all too clear. Bramwell was General of an international Army, but he was a man too and the natural desires of which he had spoken to his officers were his as much as theirs. By December he was prepared to endorse quietly but publicly a speech by the Archbishop of York in which the Germans had been blamed unreservedly for starting the war. Nothing so explicit had been said from IHQ during the Boer War. It should be noted that this was the first instance of an Army leader proffering public comment on the politics of any war. Bramwell Booth was to find restraint in these matters more difficult to achieve than had his father.

If The War Cry carried to adult salvationists the guidance of their leader, The Warrior reached the young people. In an article entitled 'How to Act in the Present Crisis' they were told to keep calm and trust in God ('we are each in His hands'); to avoid seeking to forget sorrows by flying to strong drink, worldly amusement, or other excitement ('the truest help and comfort come by leaning on God'); to practise wise economy ('cheerfully forego luxuries or dainties'); to be pliable - willing to fit in anywhere ('be ready to take any job that turns up'); to keep the soul in close touch with God ('avoid War Fever'); to serve the Army and the needy to the utmost ('workers are fewer than usual on account of many having been called away to take part in the killing
warfare'); and, finally, to pray constantly ('that God's will may be done, even through this great calamity').

The General urged his people to remember the priority of soul-winning and to be alert to new doors opening to them in the midst of war. 'Remember, that awful and hateful as war is, God has often used it to teach great lessons to the world... Already I see signs that He is doing so. Men are even now more ready to listen to His name.'

A month later: 'It is evident that God is setting before us new opportunities and opening to us new doors.' His wife, Florence, reinforced his theme. She saw the war as helping to break down barriers of creed, partly as a result of Protestant ministry to Roman Catholic Belgian refugees in England, and also because of the mingling of Indian troops with British troops on the continent. 'This union on the battlefield of different races may be very effective in breaking down prejudice of caste and class which has been so great a hindrance in the mission field.'

To Army leaders, then, the war was not entirely an ill wind. But still it was seen basically as an unspeakable horror (see also Ch.4). Mrs. Booth's views were expounded in an address delivered to a secular audience of women at London's Guildhall and reported in the Army press late in November. She exhorted her hearers above all else not to exclude the great commandment of Jesus to love one's enemies. Then she told them that unless they forgave those that trespassed against them they could not hope for forgiveness at His hands, adding, 'Remember this, and let us speak of it to our men who are going forth.' On four occasions during her speech she was interrupted by cheers, but not when she made this statement. Florence Booth also went on record with her view that to pray for victory was not an option open to Christians since 'victory must mean equally defeat for others'.
Her husband repeatedly called upon salvationists not to harbour hatred for citizens of opposing nations nor to entertain hunger for revenge. The only acceptable stance for the Christian in the face of offered hurt was a forgiving spirit. In the war zone, Bramwell, as world leader of The Salvation Army, had much to forgive. He was receiving frequent and growing reports of 'atrocious and barbarous deeds', reports not from newspapers but from 'men I know, and know to be incapable of untruth'. War was proving to be, for the Army as well as everyone else, 'the sum of all cruelties and woes'. He pulled back from expressly linking the atrocities to the invading German armies, but again was careful to exonerate the mass of the German people, blaming 'certain generals'. 'I do not for one moment believe that the German people would feel anything but burning indignation at the deeds of darkness to which I refer.... How to bring the facts to the knowledge of the German people is, of course, the great difficulty.' From day one of the war, he said, it was bound to be calamitous for The Salvation Army, whether Britain had been involved or not.

Bramwell's worst fears were being realised in these first months. Funds were tight, eased only by the use of money designed for the selection and distribution of 100 new missionary officers, a plan now frustrated by war and its impact upon the movement of nationals from one country to another. Key officers were being called up on the continent, 'compelled, at the order of their country, to fight against each other on fields of blood.' 'Men are dead who were formerly so brave and splendid in their testimony to Christ. Some of our men we have lost in the struggle against ungodliness and worldliness.' Salvationists were away from their posts. The ranks were growing
thin. Despite his vision of unforeseen opportunities in time of war, Bramwell concluded that 'war is not favourable to the religion of Jesus Christ... the influences have undoubtedly been hostile to the life of self-denial and love which the New Testament sets forth.' He blamed explicitly alcohol provided for troops by the Government and licensed brothels in the war zone, 'a sheer madness, for which the nation will have to pay dear in generations to come.'

In September 1914 Bramwell summed up the war's disruption of the Army. It was disruption on a scale greater than anything seen by the Army in South Africa in the Boer War: 'Do not let it be supposed that the war has stopped the glorious work we are doing in any of the countries concerned. It has, of course, greatly hindered us, weakened our forces and broken up parts of our Organisation and reduced us to the utmost poverty.' If his heart was aching and burdened, he found it within himself, nevertheless, to urge the Army to keep before it its raison d'etre: the souls of men, the comforting of the people of whatever faction, and the offering of Jesus as the Healer of the wounds of troubled humanity. In particular, salvationists were to fight for the souls of the soldiers in the forces. 'Be kind and patient with them,' he wrote. 'Many of them have had little chance of living clean and godly lives. Be a faithful witness of Jesus Christ. Fight for their souls.'

Of all his many forays into print in 1914, in his efforts to guide the Army, one article stands out. It appeared in The War Cry about three months into the war. His theme was the irretrievable ruin of precious things by war. He touched upon the loss of material wealth in the world, of men's time, genius and energy. Then, 'greater than all this, what a loss there is in human life! Who shall measure it?' 'Heart and mind alike are numbed...' Then he spoke of a 'still more appalling apprehension', clinging to him 'day and night'. It was
that the war 'will do its utmost to kill our sympathy with suffering... to destroy our pity for the wrongdoer... to close up the fountains of our compassion for those who injure us, and to silence our prayers for those who despitefully use our people.' He finished quite simply with: 'I am very anxious about this'. Here he was at his best, full of straightforward spiritual authority, pinpointing exactly the dangers for the spirit of the Army. If the war were to succeed in ruining those attributes, the Army would quickly die, for they jointly represented its heartbeat.

The General's last public statement in 1914 on the war was less happily chosen. He ventured the following:

'I resent exceedingly the gross and vulgar way in which the German Emperor has been treated in the newspapers, and particularly in some of the comic papers. I have a personal memory of the Emperor, very sacred to me, which makes me feel that it was with great reluctance he felt himself compelled to accept the fact that his conduct and the conduct of his ministers had involved him in a war with England; but it is very hard for a man to resist the voices which stood at his ear, which said persistently, "The hour of your nation's destiny has come; you dare not fail." I put the blame not upon the Emperor, but upon his advisers.'

The General's utterances on the war were frequently reprinted in War Crys in other lands and in other languages. This statement drew unprecedented criticism from Army leaders around the world, occasioning the first evidence since 1899 of widespread dissension from a view expressed from International Headquarters. Still deeper divergence would surface later, but typical of reaction now, and perhaps most keenly felt by the General, was that of his sister, Lucy, in charge of the work in Denmark:

'But your notes this week! Will you not bring a storm down about your head in your pronounced declaration re the Kaiser? First, I must confess to being so amazed that you are for the Kaiser - and second that you say so publicly. I am afraid it will make you trouble, won't it? I hope not. Anyway, I feel our strength as an Army is in being
neutral and your notes have helped in this hitherto. Perhaps there was some special reason for the last. 31

In her biography of her father, Catherine Bramwell Booth records his journal entry for January 17th, 1915. Lucy's fears were shared by Higgins. Bramwell wrote:

'Higgins wrote me a letter much affrighted in its tones as to the danger of being thought too friendly to Germany. I have told him in reply that unless we can love our enemies and forgive their injuries - we are lost.'

There can be no doubt that Higgins did not need to be told this. Bramwell had blundered and no amount of pious assertions thereafter could hide the fact. The available evidence permits the conclusion, however, that in these early months of war Bramwell Booth strove for a policy very like that of his father in 1899. He stressed the same three factors: evangelism, social compassion, and political neutrality. Unlike his father, he strayed from the third of these and would later do so again.

2) 1915 - 1917 33

The Times invited General Bramwell Booth to contribute a New Year message to its readers for 1915. It was an opportunity not to be missed, but what would he say? The December 1914 fracas still ringing in his ears, Bramwell played it safe and after introductory (but vague) comments on the dangers of neglecting things eternal for things temporal, he eventually found some direct words:

'As to the future, I hope the war is going to help us to a diplomacy which does not quite leave out God... and bring to the front men who realise that Jesus Christ spoke as a statesman as well as a Saviour when He said that the law of His Society was to be, "Do unto others as you would that they should do unto you."... Shall we learn the lesson that humility and truth are more than all else in national, just as they are in individual life?'

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As to the present, I deplore the menace of bitterness now growing manifest in the country... Christ's prayer for enemies was perhaps the highest of all the heights to which prayer has yet led the human spirit. Can it not be our prayer, no matter to what nation we may belong? 34

This was safer ground for the spiritual head of an international (and allegedly neutral) Christian community, and a timely reminder for the secular readership of The Times. The General expanded on similarly spiritual themes in his New Year messages in The War Cry. He felt it 'not quite fitting' to wish the Army and its friends a Happy New Year and settled instead for 'a Courageous Year, a Believing Year, a Loving Year'. 35

A week later he was at his incisive and pugilistic best again, reviving memories of his father's more pungent style. He had heard that the enemies of religion had announced that the war was final proof of the failure of Christianity. 36 There was indeed failure! It was the failure of Governments, of the Militarists, the Educationalists, the Scientists, the Humanists (with 'broken theories'), and the Socialists. 'No, it is not Christianity that has failed. Christianity has not been tried!' None of the nine or ten warring nations had acted toward the rest of the world 'on the supreme law of Christianity, the law of love.' 37

Constantly he urged the same counsel upon his salvationist forces: earnestness and perseverance in prayer 38; forgiveness of enemies 39; the priority of men's souls. 40 But in April 1915 he needed something a little different when he visited a military encampment in Greenock, Renfrewshire, to address the troops there. The General spoke of the duty of the King's soldier. 41 There was a duty to King and country which 'ought to appeal to every man'. (This was not what he had said to salvationists. Was he influenced by his audience?) There was
duty to those around. 'Do not stifle the good in a comrade. One word may do this evil thing. Take no advantage of the weak.' Lastly, there was a duty to God. 'You would expect me to say that, wouldn't you? Seek to be right with God.' The Social Gazette\textsuperscript{41} records a 'roar of gratitude' as the General sat down. Commissioner John Lawley, accompanying the General closed the gathering with prayer at the invitation of Lieutenant Colonel CJ Lynch, Officer Commanding 4th Scottish Rifles. The troops crowded after the General as he left the camp. It seems to have been a great success, despite 'the new role in which he appeared that day'.\textsuperscript{41} This so-called 'new role' gives evidence of Bramwell Booth's capacity to tailor his material to his audience. But it shows also his willingness to yield to the pull of patriotic sentiment if the occasion so demanded. It was a further sign of a degree of personal inconsistency with the high-minded neutrality he was urging for salvationists everywhere else.

The year 1915 brought other novel openings for the Army's leader to influence public opinion. In November that year The Times published a Recruiting Supplement.\textsuperscript{42} Bramwell was invited to join other leading religious figures in sending a message for publication. The Supplement was 'aimed at making the Derby Scheme a success'.\textsuperscript{43} The King's message appeared in his own handwriting on the cover page. Inside were messages from the Archbishop of Canterbury (who said no person was exempt from offering some form of service to the nation, but went on strongly to defend the non-combatant status of the clergy) and from the Archbishop of York who went much further: 'The country calls for the service of its sons... I pity the man who at such a time makes the great refusal.'\textsuperscript{44} Could the Army's leader, committed to political neutrality and with salvationists in Germany, go this far? The discerning reader will sense the General's dilemma, even embarrassment, in the text of his contribution:
'To every man serving his country I would say, be of good cheer. You are not only embarked on an enterprise of the highest moment to your own dear land and people, but you are rendering a noble service to all that is good - to all that will yet be good - among the peoples who are now arrayed against you. This war is near akin to the essential spirit of Christianity itself in this, that it is concerned with the interests of foe not less than your own.'

What did he mean? That the war was a holy war, a crusade 'akin to the essential spirit of Christianity'? Or that the British were killing Germans to make them good? The General's friends might, in kindly mood, have complimented him on not quite falling of his 'neutrality' tightrope. Others, more sceptical, might easily have accused him of semantic sleight of hand. The invitation from The Times would have been better courteously declined, even if no others would then have been forthcoming. It was, perhaps, a further error of judgment, but since it erred on the pro-British side it drew no adverse comment from other Army leaders, a sign of where their private sympathies in the conflict lay.

The General had once again flirted with a breach of his own 'take no sides' principle. As if to counter-balance The Times Recruiting Supplement observations, he chose, a few days later in The War Cry, to stress the 'ghastliness' of the war and the overriding priority for salvationists of 'the other war' which would engage them still when political conflict ceased.

The Army's true humanity and its burning love for souls would bring it through all that the evils of war could present. Perhaps he was writing to convince himself.

The end of 1915 saw the Army's leadership struggling more than ever to hold a balance between the ideal of Christian internationalism and the powerful tug of natural patriotism. Bramwell pointed to 'the awful reckoning' awaiting 'the men who made this war'. The war was 'hideous, a fierce and hellish tragedy'. The earth was 'red with
blood' and the world full of 'warlike preparations and wicked ambitions'. It was all the result of sin and only God could rescue men. The war had come through leaving God out of man's affairs. Anti-war sentiments like these were consistent with similar views voiced throughout the Boer War (see Ch. 4). All this coincided in December 1915 with a Service of Thanksgiving in the London Opera House to commemorate salvationists killed in the war. The occasion was too much for political neutrality. Patriotism won the upper hand as 1915 ran to a close. The National Anthem was fervently sung. The Union Jack and the Army flag waved side by side aloft. The General declared that those who had fallen had done so in 'the cause of righteousness' and was rewarded with applause, solemn occasion though it was. Commissioner Higgins took his cue and pronounced that the salvationist dead 'had conscientiously given themselves up for a noble cause.'

The pendulum swung back in favour of impartiality between the nations when the General chose as his Christmas message to salvationist leaders around the world: 'Every land is my fatherland, for all lands are my Father's.' There had been moments in 1915 when an independent observer might have been forgiven for thinking the General chose his sentiments too much according to his audience. In 1899 to 1902 William Booth said less and thereby managed to steer a more consistent course.

On March 8th, 1916, the General celebrated his sixtieth birthday. Harold Begbie wrote a character sketch to mark the event and it was given pride of place in the 1917 Year Book. The war could not go unmentioned and Begbie attributed to Bramwell the view that all the evils of the war were 'as a drop of water in comparison with the ocean of misery which men have so long tolerated unmoved in drunkenness, prostitution, and the exploitation of the poor by the greed of capitalism.' It was an intriguing comment, but failed to appreciate the
difficulties of weighing evils one against the other. Begbie then went on to say that the General was 'a convinced Imperialist'. It was not that the British were always in the right, just that 'this unity of diverse nations under one flag... has been of service to mankind in general.' Again, the mask of political neutrality had slipped. The enemies of the British Empire could count the Army's General amongst their opponents. There is no doubt that had not Bramwell personally vetted the article, it would not have seen the light of day in Army print and so his approval of its contents can be assumed.

The penultimate year of the war, 1917, saw a re-assertion of those basic principles enunciated by the Army at the outset. In a Foreword to a book dealing with the spiritual experiences of men in the trenches the General spoke once more of war as 'a failure to live even on the level of an intelligent humanity.' Although sometimes men and women become in wartime 'more intimately conscious of the reality and presence of the Divine than in the quietude of normal life', nevertheless for The Salvation Army 'the present fratricidal war is an inscrutable agony.'

The impression given by the sources is that in these middle years of the war General Bramwell Booth found it more and more difficult to abide strictly by the principle of political neutrality. He regularly emphasised spiritual priorities for salvationists, but bowed to patriotic pressure frequently.

3) 1918 and After

Despite his own periodic lapses with regard to a strictly apolitical and neutral stance on the war, Bramwell continued to insist on such a stance from Army leaders around the world. He had occasion
to worry about the overtly pro-Allied attitudes adopted by The Salvation Army both in the USA and Australia (see Ch.15). In July 1918 he wrote to his sister, Eva, in the USA:

'The more I reflect upon the probable condition of the world after the war, the more I see the importance of our international position.... The Central Powers must lose the war and lose it in circumstances likely to leave them greatly disorganised, impoverished and embittered.... I see that The Salvation Army has played no small part... towards the unity of the world. May it not play a still greater part in the future?'

'I do not want any of our greater personalities involved in the local or sectional interests or strifes to mar the entering in at that door.... We are only at the beginning - if we can keep our people and our spirit free from the distractions that time must always bring - distractions noble and right in themselves, but perilous to us who with Paul are to know nothing among men but Jesus Christ and Him crucified.... I know you will agree.'

If salvationist neutrality was crucial to the Army's future credibility as a reconciler of the nations, Bramwell overlooked the fact once the Armistice (11-11-18) was announced. He came out publicly and explicitly for the victors. Having claimed in his letter to Eva that 'it was apparent to me from the beginning' that the Central Powers would lose, with the cessation of hostilities he again broke his own rules and publicly examined the causes of the war. 'The destruction of Belgium welded into one mass the moral forces of Great Britain, and the heart of the Empire, feeling a deep wrong, moved its mighty arm. The destruction of women and children at sea revolted the whole spirit and conscience of the United States and, drawing its complex peoples into one heart and one mind, compelled their entrance into the conflict... Whatever else the Victory of the Allies may have shown the world it has demonstrated before the eyes of the whole human race that Right and Wrong are not the same thing... that unrighteousness and selfishness, despite guns and gunpowder - even in unlimited quantities - cast nations down.' He exonerated yet again 'the
mass of the German people' who had been the victims of a great conspiracy' and having at last discovered the truth had 'swept away their Rulers.'

The Editorial comment in the Armistice issue of The War Cry announced that 'oppression, unrighteousness, and cruelty have come crashing to naught... God has, we believe, defended the Right and vindicated His own honour.' If it was right to say these things after the war, why was it wrong to say them before and during it? The risk of dividing the Army was no greater during the hostilities than immediately afterwards.

On November 18th, 1918 the Army hired the Royal Albert Hall in London for a Thanksgiving Celebration for Peace. The event became a victory rally. All pretence at internationalism fell away. General Bramwell Booth declared that the Allies did not start the war and had never wanted war: 'I feel that it is something which has to be placed upon the record, so that it cannot be questioned in the generations of the future when this war is discussed, that it was thrust upon us by the wrong feeling and purposes of the rulers of the nations which have been engaged against us.' Victory for Britain and her allies meant that 'a wrong ambition has received a righteous check'.

With the formal signing of the Treaty of Versailles (28-6-19) a People's Great Thanksgiving Service, presided over by the Bishop of London, was held in Trafalgar Square. Mrs. General Booth addressed the crowd and endorsed the view that victory for the Allies was due to divine intervention to overcome 'evil actions' and 'evil desires'.

It would be easy, and perhaps unkind, to underestimate the difficulties facing Army leaders at IHQ during the war. It was an infinitely more complex political conflict than the Boer War. Conversely, the moral issue appears to have been straightforward. There was an
obvious and gratuitous aggressor. Ideals enunciated in August 1914 as to the Army's supranational identity were lifted directly from William Booth and his Boer War response. But as the war became prolonged, the difficulty of adhering strictly to a non-partisan line, especially in London, became clear. So much so, that Bramwell Booth more than once breached his own directives, eventually coming clean on his 'pro-Allies' views when the Armistice came. Perhaps too often he went into print, writing on the war for the Army's press almost weekly. His father would not have done it. His Boer War writings are rare compared with those of Bramwell in 1914-1918. The irresistible nature of patriotism was proved at the great public events held by the Army at the London Opera House in 1915 and at the Royal Albert Hall in 1918.

The General's rhetoric in the First World War was, for the most part, idealistically international and neutral; but there can be no doubt that in his heart and in the hearts of salvationists in the Allied countries there lay a patriotic longing for an Allied victory and the defeat of Germany. It was as if Bramwell Booth distinguished his private views from his views as world leader of the Army, but occasionally the distinction became blurred.

In 1920 he offered his reflections in hindsight on the war. It was just one more, if especially vile, result of sin. All war is transient, but the Gospel is eternal. 'One sinner saved by grace Divine will outlast the British Empire' (this from Begbie's 'convinced Imperialist'). All war opposes God, but cannot defeat His purposes. God can turn war to His advantage as can be seen in the upsurge of prayer in time of war. It generates also moral indignation, reveals evil men and inspires contrasting love.

Fine sentiments again. But the Army could not live or feed on
these. The mass of salvationists, from August 1914 onwards, were galvanised into practical action and to this we now turn.
1. TO August 1914, 505-8.
2. IWC 22-8-14:9.
3. IWC 8-8-14:9.
4. CBB 350.
5. IWC 15-8-14:9.
6. SG 15-8-14:2; IWC 19-9-14:7.
7. IWC 29-8-14:7.
8. IWC 10-10-14:7.
9. IWC 5-12-14:7.
10. TW September 1914, 311-2.
11. IWC 12-9-14:7.
12. IWC 17-10-14:7.
15. IWC 24-10-14:6.
17. IWC 17-10-14:7.
19. Ibid.
20. CBB 338.
21. ATW September 1914, 515.
22. ATW December 1917, 539.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
27. IWC 12-9-14:7.
28. Ibid.
29. IWC 7-11-14: 7.
30. IWC 5-12-14: 7.
31. CBB 352.
32. Ibid., 352-353.
33. These years saw the entry of the USA on the Allied side on 6-4-17: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 23, 1969 edn., 685-729.
34. The Times, 1-1-15.
35. IWC 2-10-15: 7.
37. Ibid.
38. IWC 12-6-15: 7.
40. Ibid.
41. SG 10-4-15: 3.
42. The Times Recruiting Supplement, 3-11-15.
43. Ibid., 2. Lord Derby's Scheme encouraged voluntary enlistment. (Conscription was yet to come – Ch.8, Note 19).
44. The Times Recruiting Supplement, 3-11-15: 5.
45. Ibid.
46. IWC 6-11-15: 7.
47. IWC 11-12-15: 6.
48. Ibid.
49. 350 from Britain by 1916: Ibid. Also The Times, 2-12-15: 5.
50. CBB 353.
51. Ibid., 7.
52. SAYB 1917, 1.
53. Ibid., 3.
54. Ibid., 4.

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55. Ibid., 5.
57. Ibid., v-vi.
58. His sister, Evangeline Booth, was Commander, USA. Commissioner James Hay was Territorial Officer, Australia.
59. CBB 359-360.
60. Ibid., 359.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., 8. Also *The Times*, 19-11-18:3.
65. IWC 28-11-18:5.
66. Ibid.
67. IWC 19-7-19:2.
69. Ibid., 49.

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CHAPTER 10

MAKING POLITICAL NEUTRALITY WORK

1) 'Enemy of None'
2) German Work Outside Germany
3) Inside Germany
Although the evidence supports the view that most salvationists, including Army leaders, hoped for the defeat of Germany, the sources reveal a conscious and sincere attempt to be evenhanded and politically neutral as between the warring parties. This attempt is seen both in the treatment of German matters in the Army press and in the practical work in Germany and for German troops, internees and prisoners.

Bramwell Booth's ideals were expressed in an early *War Cry* Editorial: 'The Salvation Army marches on, the friend of all, the enemy of none.' Army sub-editors were told not to use the word 'enemy' in any Army publication when referring to other nationalities. At one stage, the General seriously considered transferring International Headquarters to America but drew back because he was sure America would eventually cease to be neutral and enter the war.

Army writers were at pains to present the German people and even German military personnel in a favourable and human light. Mary Booth, the General's daughter, was active in relief work with the British Expeditionary Force in France and often came into contact with German prisoners or wounded. She emphasised in her book of reminiscences that the Germans she met did not want the war any more than the British and were 'compelled' to fight.

The Army rapidly established an Ambulance Unit for work at the front in France, the first of its kind. At its public inauguration, the General stated explicitly that the ambulances were for the wounded of *all* nations, including Germany. This proved to be so in practice. Independent testimony to the Army's work with wounded Germans is given by a non-salvationist in his account of Army activities at the front. (FA McKenzie thought the Army's work made for better fighters. This was not the Army's motivation.)
The Army press in Britain was ready to publish accounts of the salvationist treatment of German wounded. An article entitled 'German Soldier Gives Coat to Dying Britisher' appeared in The War Cry. The same item described the feelings of a British salvationist finding a wounded German: 'Getting down, I placed his head on my knee and gave him a drink. How grateful he was: tears of gratitude came into his eyes. I shall never forget that moment: all enmity was forgotten and we loved each other.'

One of the earliest war projects by the Army in the USA, long before America entered the war, was Evangeline Booth's 'Old Linen Campaign'. Old linen was collected, sterilised, cut and rolled into bandages and sent by the ton to the war zone. The Army's press, including its public relations periodicals circulated in England, made no bones about the fact that the bandages went to Germany as well as France, Russia, Serbia and Belgium. All governments expressed their thanks.

Army papers praised German doctors who treated civilians of the Allied nations. Readers were reminded to pray for the sons of German Salvation Army officers called up into the German forces. The General waxed eloquent on the anguish of bereaved mothers, an anguish just as deep in German mothers as in British. He devoted War Cry space to the text of a letter, stained with blood, which had fallen from the pocket of a dead German soldier. It was a love letter from his wife.

The Social Gazette gave prominence to the work of the German Red Cross and to the humanitarian attitudes of German refugee committees.

The War Cry told its readers that the Germans treated British prisoners of war with consideration. In an article called 'A Hundred
Years of Peace' (to mark the Treaty of Ghent 1814 between Britain and the USA) the claim was made, immodestly, that salvationists 'are in reality the greatest promoters of international goodwill in the world.'

The article went on to offer as contemporary proof of this claim the fact that editions of *The War Cry* published respectively in London, Berlin and Paris were sent regularly to soldiers of the opposing forces in the trenches and the internment camps; that a Dutch woman salvationist supplied comforts without distinction to Belgian and German prisoners; and that American bandages reached all the protagonists from the Army in the States.

It was to a neutral that the General turned when he wished to assess needs in occupied Belgium. That neutral was Major Wallace Winchell, an American Salvation Army officer, who set out for London on October 9th, 1915 and eventually spent several months in German-occupied Belgium before reporting back to IHQ. Refusing to debate the origins of the war or to apportion blame, Winchell recorded that his Army uniform dissolved 'nationalism and bitterness' everywhere he went because it was recognised as representing the virtues of love and mercy. He had been prejudiced against the Kaiser's troops by propaganda at home but found the officers to be 'educated men... courteous, fair-minded and human.' The Germans were doing all in their power to keep prices down. On his return to America he was asked about reports of German atrocities and replied: 'Some atrocities undoubtedly were committed... As to the disfiguring of children not one such instance came to my knowledge though I mingled with the people in all sections and heard all kinds of reports.' Winchell spoke as he found, but other witnesses had more damning evidence to offer.

Winchell's eminently reasonable approach to the Germans did not let him hide his enthusiasm for USA neutrality. His admiration for
President Woodrow Wilson shone through and his love of country could not be concealed: 'The spirit of America embodies the ideal upon which all the world should be organised.' These patriotic, political sentiments would not have appealed to Bramwell Booth, as much as to Evangeline Booth in New York (see Chs. 15 and 27 on American patriotism).

Mary Booth too could not suppress her patriotic feelings and allowed warm praise of the English troops and navy to escape her pen. In this she merely reflected what most salvationists felt (there were, quite simply, more salvationists in the countries of Britain and her allies than in those of Germany and her allies). The same natural tendency to see one's own country as in the right is found in the diaries of AE Renshaw, a salvationist in the French trenches. He wrote: 'We are confident of success. Right must triumph over wrong.' Again: 'I witnessed the downfall of a German aeroplane... The most exciting scene I have ever witnessed.'

Evenhandedness between the warring parties, albeit sincerely attempted, was never going to be perfectly achieved by the Army. A cartoon depicting the figure of 'Militarism' dressed as the Kaiser appeared in The Social Gazette and a reference to the 'War Lords of Germany' crept into All The World. Mrs. Florence Booth opened a new hostel in Victoria for troops on leave and did so with a patriotic speech about 'the great principles' England was defending. In her 'Notes' for All The World for June 1916 she equated Germany with 'the powers of darkness' and later condemned explicitly the German onslaught of Venice.

Three famous events served to make plain the true feelings in the hearts of salvationists. In June 1915 the Germany navy sank The Lusitania. 'We of The Salvation Army can only pray, "God forgive Germany."... God can forgive only when there is a complete change
in the mind and attitude of the one who has committed the offence. The article likened the crime which killed 40 infants under a year old, to the crime of Herod. There followed the execution of Edith Cavell on October 12, 1915 for assisting Allied soldiers to escape from Belgium. 'It is difficult to believe any German could be found willing to take the life of one who had devotedly nursed their own soldiers.' The third of the three events was the death on June 5th of Lord Kitchener (according to AJP Taylor 'the only British military idol of the war') in a non-military accident at sea off Scapa Flow. Kitchener had held a fond regard for the Army. This prompted a message to the palace from Commissioner T. Henry Howard (Chief of the Staff) conveying sympathy plus 'prayers that God will speedily bring our beloved land triumphantly through the dangers which now assail her...'

It is important to note that none of this held the Army back from ministering to the German people, both military and civilian, whenever the chance to do so appeared. The most highminded in the Army adhered to neutrality because of salvationist supranational ideals. Others, probably the majority, practised impartiality despite the strong pull of patriotism. It is impossible to choose which is the more commendable. The practical outcome was the same and is described in the next Section.

2) German Work Outside Germany

The Army undertook spiritual and material, Christian ministry to German civilian internees, to German military forces, and to German prisoners of war all over Europe.

Bramwell Booth resented 'the abominable attacks on innocent and law-abiding foreigners residing in this country'. German nationals in the UK were interned when war broke out. Whilst the internment process got under way, widescale abuse of Germans took place. A
Salvation Army Adjutant (not named in the report) wrote to the General to tell him of five Germans employed by a local business who were sacked after the English employees presented a petition to the manager. A salvationist working in the same business refused to sign the petition and urged the manager to reinstate the dismissed Germans. He said he would if the workforce signed a petition to that effect. The salvationist, despite opposition, eventually secured the signatures of 90% of the staff. The Germans were reinstated forthwith.

Whole new communities of German internees sprang up on the Isle of Man, numbering from 3,000 to 20,000 people, with commandants of British nationality. The Army's Captain Carvosso Gauntlett was granted War Office permits to visit these locations. The Germans received him warmly, many already having met him in prison camps he had visited regularly (see below). He complied with requests for spiritual meetings. Captain Gauntlett succeeded in visiting every internment camp in England, Scotland and Wales as well as on the Isle of Man. He was destined to become the Army's most convinced and articulate pacifist (see Ch.20).

Salvationists in South Africa regularly visited German internees in Pietermaritzburg. The result was the formation of a Salvation Army corps in the camp. A letter from the corps leader, G. Lucht, spoke of a number of converts having been won.

Salvation Army officers in occupied Belgium adopted the same attitude to men of the German forces as to those of the Allied forces. Adjutant A. Renaud, a French-Swiss officer, was in charge of the corps in Quaregnon when the English occupied it. She plied the men with tea, coffee and sandwiches as they dug the trenches. Three days later they had been driven out by the advancing Germans. The Adjutant gathered the women and children of the district into the Army hall
during the shelling. Then the German soldiers came, hungry and fatigued. The Adjutant opened up her hall to them and tea, coffee and lunches appeared again.

Reports reached IHQ that Adjutant Somers, an English officer in Strasbourg, was busy visiting and helping wounded German troops in hospitals in that city. Bramwell Booth published the fact in the Army press and gave the news his emphatic personal approval.

Salvation Army officers in Germany were drafted into the German army with all other eligible males and the clergy of all churches. Some were obliged to serve in combatant roles but many found opportunities for spiritual work as chaplains. Some worked as medical assistants. Captain P. Schmidt was appointed a sergeant in the German artillery and found himself lying wounded and unaided for 16 hours during which time he comforted those around him who, knowing he was a salvationist, asked for his prayers. Staff-Captain Grüner, Editor of the German War Cry was made scribe to his regiment. One officer was picked out at parade as a salvationist and made, on the spot, regimental chaplain. Ensign Pfau came to be regarded by his company commander as unofficial chaplain and on one occasion was asked to conduct a Salvation Army meeting for the troops in a captured Roman Catholic Church. He did not hesitate, and the Church was crowded to the doors. Adjutant Tebbe, in charge of the Army's social work in Cologne, was allowed to attend his office twice a week, although in military uniform. Some older officers were required to serve as guards in prisoner-of-war camps.

Perhaps the most effective of the German work was that carried on amongst German prisoners of war. From the beginning Commissioner Higgins was set on doing something for them in the English camps. He appointed Captain Carvosso Gauntlett in charge of this work, who
was to travel 17,000 miles a year between camps and prison-ships, addressing and visiting over 50,000 prisoners. He was particularly busy each Christmas during the war, preaching, visiting and distributing comforts and gifts. He had learned his German as a child in Berlin where his father, also an officer, had been appointed. He conducted all his meetings in German and drew attendances of 700-800 prisoners on a regular basis. He ministered, not only to Germans, but to Austrians, Serbians, Armenians and Turks; to Protestants, Jews, Catholics, Moslems and, finally, to any salvationists he could locate. Gauntlett was joined in this work by Christians from the Society of Friends. He conducted meetings on three prison-ships lying off the Essex coastline at Southend. Some 400 men out of 1,800 on the ship would regularly attend on a voluntary basis. Song-sheets in German were used. Gauntlett would undertake also to contact families of the prisoners, using the Army's international contacts. Letters received from prisoners-of-war testify to the quality of Gauntlett's work.

The Army produced Christian literature in German for distribution amongst prisoners-of-war, appealing for any other German literature suitable for evangelical work to be sent to IHQ. German copies of The War Cry were imported for the purpose. One prisoner, upon release, sent the Army a handsome donation to express gratitude.

Similar work for German troops interned was carried out in Holland and in Switzerland. On April 4th, 1917 the General issued instructions to enlarge this work in Switzerland and to seek out potential donors of funds since the War Fund could not be used for troops other than those of the Allies. On the General's first visit to Germany after the war, the manager of the hotel where he stayed expressed thanks for what had been done for German prisoners. 'I
was one of them,' he told the General. 58 It was one more proof that evenhandedness could be made to work.

3) **Inside Germany**

The picture of the German work is not complete without an account of the Army's wartime work in Germany itself. The relevant sources include the British salvationist press which used all it could glean from German reports, and also the German *War Cry* which was published in reduced size throughout the war.

British salvationists continued to feel the same bonds of fellowship with their counterparts in Germany, even though formal links between Germany and IHQ were cut for the duration of the war. 59 Frederick Coutts, a teenager in August 1914 (later the Army's eighth General from 1963-1969) writes: 'I was not entirely clear why all Germans should be regarded as Huns, lineal descendants of Attila, for but recently German salvationists had stayed in our home and plainly they were no less devoted to the Christian cause than ourselves.' 60

The only information to reach London from the Army in Germany was that contained in issues of the German *War Cry* which occasionally got through. Snippets were translated and published in the English salvationist press. Ex-patriate officers were almost all expelled from Germany 61 and, as described above, many national officers were called up for military service, some acting as unofficial chaplains to their units. 62 Bramwell Booth's plans for strengthening the Army's leadership in Germany involved the appointment of Commissioner Ulysse Cosandey (of Swiss origin) 63 but the outbreak of war necessitated a cancellation and Cosandey was sent to organise Army relief work in Belgium. There he received welcome co-operation from the German authorities due to the influence of the German ambassador in Berne.
and the Swiss Consul-General in Brussels. 64

The cutting of links with IHQ was inevitable. A brief scan of the entries for Germany between 1914 and 1919 in The Salvation Army Year Book indicates something of the difficulties caused. In 1914 65 both a Territorial Commander (Commissioner William J. McAlonan) and a Chief Secretary (Colonel Gerrit J. Govaars) are listed as in charge. Both were non-Germans and were expelled when war came. The following list gives the strength of the work (indicating work of modest but significant proportion):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps and Outposts</th>
<th>153</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers, Cadets and Employees</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Officers</td>
<td>1,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandsmen</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Institutions</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1914 entry concluded: 'Our operations are fast extending in Germany. Many excellent opportunities for advance are to be seen.' 66

It was not to be. The 1915 Year Book shows no top leadership. The statistics remained unchanged in all the wartime Year Books. Strangely, the 1915 entry 67 made no mention of war conditions despite articles elsewhere describing Army war work with troops 68. It contained, however, complimentary references to the German people, and still insisted that operations were expanding.

The 1916 entry at last acknowledged that there was a war on: 'The Army's operations in Germany have largely continued as hitherto, despite the stress of the war. Our officers have been working assiduously in various capacities, such as chaplains, visiting hospitals, and in relieving distress in the most needy localities. An additional Social Institution has been opened during the war. The names of a number of our officers have already been included in the lists of killed and wounded.' 69

151.
The entry for 1917 used similar wording. It served the purpose. In 1918 an explicit admission was included that the work statistics were four years out of date and that there had been no communication with IHQ since August 1914.

General Bramwell Booth's only direct contact with his German officers during the war came unexpectedly in July 1916 when he visited neutral Sweden to lead the Army's Annual Congress in Stockholm. Two German officers had received special consent from the German authorities to attend the Congress. One of these was Lieutenant-Colonel Treite who was temporarily holding things together in Berlin. Booth's journal entry for July 1st, 1916 reads: 'Received Colonel Treite who is older in appearance and thinner... I noticed he had no wedding ring. (All gold had been called in.) He was quiet and careful, gave me a very connected and intelligent account of the position of the Army in Germany... a remarkable story of loyal devotion... Some corps have gone down.... In Berlin the Social Work goes on - six corps out of twenty have been closed.'

The London sources reported the state of affairs in Germany accurately, as the German sources confirm. When war began Treite called his people to prayer and trust in God but, always pragmatic, appealed also for funds. Whilst his emphasis was on matters spiritual and the need 'to preach salvation', he foresaw at once large social needs to which the German Salvation Army could respond. With many officers volunteering, as in London, to forego part of their allowances during the war, he knew he could promulgate with confidence his social plans: there would be 'help for all those in need in their native land'; first priority would be the offering of spiritual comfort; then would come the passing on of information about the missing and wounded and about work opportunities in Germany for women and young people; finally, there would be every possible practical
help through liaison with the Central Committee of Women's Relief Work in Berlin and through the Army's social services. A letter-exchange to lonely men at the front was begun. Men's hostels became military hospitals at Köln and Dusseldorf and the Officer Training College in Berlin was used as an Industrial Centre for released prison inmates. Especially effective was the work amongst widows and orphans. A migration scheme for orphans resulted in 45,000 German children being re-settled in Hungary.

The German War Cry did not announce explicitly the severing of links between Berlin and International Headquarters in London. In fact, all Army work in Germany was placed under government control, for the duration of the war, because of its British origins and connections. Treite was obliged to accept the inevitable restrictions, but despite co-operation between himself and the government, the German public grew suspicious of The Salvation Army in Germany and open accusations of treachery were made. In an attempt to quell suspicion Treite ordered salvationists to remove the English 'S' from their uniforms and replace it with a German 'H' (for 'Heilsarmee'). Reassurance later came in a letter from the German Finance Minister, Schlesinger, who said he had been asked by his government to confirm in writing that the Army had shown 'a friendly spirit' to the government at all times and had tried 'to lay emphasis on the German character of the Army in Germany.' Government confidence was evidenced also by the permission granted to Treite and a colleague to make the Swedish visit in mid-1916 (see above) when they met General Bramwell Booth.

It was while the General was in Stockholm that he received word from the British authorities refusing his offer to set up work amongst British prisoners-of-war held in Berlin. Booth had proposed a spiritual and material ministry by German Salvation Army officers. The
British War Office said 'No', saying that the prisoners would be receiving parcels from home and the Red Cross. Booth was incensed: 'Parcels!!!! It makes me angry,' ran his journal entry for July 5th 1916. He had more than parcels to offer. The negative response from the War Office foreshadowed other difficulties from that quarter (see mainly Ch.12, Sect.3). To some extent, the salvationists lacked clout with the War Office, despite their Boer War record of useful work. The non-establishment status of the Army was in this regard a decided disadvantage.

At the Stockholm meeting in July 1916 Treite was cautious in his remarks to the General regarding the German evangelical work. The story was a mixture of success and failure. Treite reported that six of the twenty corps in Berlin had closed, but a new corps at Altana (Hamburg) was opened and Magdeburg reported a spiritual campaign producing 100 cases of conversion in eight weeks. Elsewhere things were not so good. In Stuttgart nine salvationists were called up and by November 1914 three had been killed and a fourth wounded. By the end of the war 20 officers had been killed on active military duty, and many more lay salvationists with them.

The conclusion must be drawn that the salvationist response to the war was almost exactly the same in Germany as it was in Britain, despite the enforced lack of communication, with the three cornerstones set up in 1899 by William Booth - evangelism, practical compassion, and political neutrality - each being honoured by Treite and his harassed people. Furthermore, just as Bramwell Booth felt within him and sometimes showed a natural patriotism for Britain, Treite too felt for the pain of his native Germany and was able publicly to describe the Army's wartime ministry in Germany as 'a patriotic work of love'. It seemed that patriotism and Christlike mercy could co-exist in an individual and
in a Christian organisation. The German sources give no hint of anti-Allied sentiment, the German War Cry concentrating on factual reports of Army work, messages from salvationists in the German forces, and spiritual exhortations to readers. Whilst no explicit directives could have gone out to the Army in Germany from THQ, 'Die Heilsarmee' conducted itself in a manner in keeping with what Bramwell Booth was looking for from salvationists elsewhere, and in accord with the precedent set by William Booth in 1899. Internationalism, interpreted as political neutrality and expressed in practical evenhandedness was shown to be both possible and pragmatic. Moreover, as Treite's personal example indicated, these things could be achieved without an excess of patriotism and whilst entertaining a proper love of country.
NOTES – CH. 10

1. IWC 22-8-14: 8.
2. Collier, 226.
3. CBB 351.
5. IWC 5-12-14: 6.
6. Barnes, 17. See Ch. 11 on the Ambulance Unit.
7. McKenzie, 52.
10. ATW December 1914, 687.
11. IWC 7-11-14: 2.
12. IWC 17-10-14: 8.
13. Ibid.
14. SG 29-8-14: 3; 20-2-15: 3.
18. Ibid., 116-117.
19. Ibid., 111.
20. Ibid., 148.
21. Ibid., 145-146. When reports of German atrocities began to circulate in England, the topics of the devil and hell re-emerged in English preaching, identifying Germany with devilry: Stuart Paul Mews, Religion and English Society in the First World War, University of Cambridge, Ph.D. Thesis, 1973, 73-75. There is nothing in the Army sources to suggest that this trend caught on in Army preaching. Had it done so, it would have been a denial of all the Army claimed to stand for in wartime.
22. Maurice Landrieux (Bishop of Dijon), The Cathedral of Rheims – The Story of a German Crime, (Kegan Paul, 1920), 2 where the pillaging of the Cathedral and the murders of its staff are named 'the blackest depth of German wrong-doing':

156.
Cardinal DJ Mercier, *The Voice of Belgium*, (Burns & Oates, 1917) recording the murders of 13 priests, wholesale shooting of civilians, and torture of women and children.


24. Ibid., 200.

25. Booth, 52, 54. (Also *The Times*, 20–9–16:10.)


27. Ibid., 25–7–15. The diaries are filled with a sense of nearness to God and an absence of anxiety in going into battle. His last entry reads: 'My future is entirely consecrated to Him' (10–3–16). Next day he was killed in action.


29. ATW September 1918, 387.

30. SG 4–11–16:2.

31. ATW June 1916, 245.

32. ATW December 1917, 529.

33. ATW June 1915, 283.

34. Ibid.


36. ATW November 1915, 563.

37. AJPT, 68. CBB 349: 'It was said, and no one enjoyed the story more than Bramwell Booth, that when the coast defences were inspected by Kitchener he remarked, "This is no use, it wouldn't keep out The Salvation Army, let alone the Germans."'

38. SG 17–6–16:349.


40. Ibid.

41. Later (1946) Territorial Commander, Germany. See Ch. 20.

42. SG 11–12–15:3.


157.
46. IWC 3-10-14: 8.
47. IWC 26-9-14: 6.
48. Note 41.
49. Collier, 226.
50. SG 15-1-16: 8; 6-1-17: 2.
51. ATW June 1916, 245-6.
52. Ibid.
53. SG 20-3-15: 3.
54. SG 29-5-15: 3.
55. IWC 22-8-14: 8; 26-9-14: 4; 5-6-15: 7.
56. IWC 10-10-14: 7.
57. CBB 355.
58. Ibid.
59. Gruner, 34.
61. USWC 12-9-14: 12.
62. About 100 officers were affected: IWC 12-12-14: 6; German *War Cry (Der Kriegsruf)*, 22-8-14: 4.
63. IWC 25-7-14: 8.
64. Coutts, 23.
65. SAYB 1914, 39.
66. Ibid.
67. SAYB 1915, 43.
68. Ibid., 76.
69. SAYB 1916, 52.
70. SAYB 1917, 60.
71. SAYB 1918, 59-60.
72. Gruner, 39.
73. CBB 356-7.

158.
74. German War Cry, 8-8-14: 6.
75. Ibid., 23-1-15:8.
76. Ibid., 6-1-17:4.
77. Ibid., 28-8-14:4.
78. Ibid., 8-8-14:6.
79. Ibid. Also Gruner, 35.
81. Ibid., 30-10-14:1; 31-7-15:5.
82. Gruner, 36.
83. Ibid., 41.
84. Ibid., 34.
85. German War Cry, 22-8-14:2; Gruner, 34, 37.
86. Gruner, 37.
87. Ibid., 34.
88. Ibid., 356.
89. TW January 1915, 15.
90. IWC 12-12-14:6.
91. IWC 14-11-14:8.
92. Gruner, 38, 45.
94. Ibid., 17-10-14:5; 1-5-15:5.
CHAPTER 11

THE ALLIED WORK IN BRITAIN

1) The Troops
2) The Funds
3) The Wounded
4) The Relatives
5) The Role of Women
1) **The Troops**

This section explains the practical, social ministries offered to members of the British forces during the war by the Army. All that is described was undertaken in an effort to honour the second of the three foundation principles enunciated for salvationists in war by both William Booth and Bramwell Booth - the principle of compassionate social outreach in response to the practical needs thrown up by the war. This applies not only to the work with the troops, but to all the ministries covered in this Chapter. (The Army's evangelical work is described later in Ch.12. See Ch.15 for the involvement of the American Salvation Army with American servicemen.) The information that follows is drawn from both salvationist and non-salvationist sources. The former, as might be expected, are not self-critical, but neither do the latter contain comment adverse to what the Army did or the way the Army did it. The following account, and that in Ch.12, reflects the tone of all the sources, which despite a conscious search by the author have not thrown up negative material. What, however, might be taken as adverse is an observation by Alan Wilkinson in his splendid *The Church of England and the First World War*. Commenting upon the churches in general he writes: 'Perhaps the most powerful (and ambiguous) contribution which the churches made to the nation during the Great War was in the realm of "imagery".' Then by way of example he specifies the Army: 'The Salvation Army consistently used the metaphors of war. Its publication was called *The War Cry*.' It is not absolutely clear whether Wilkinson regards the 'imagery contribution' of the churches and the Army in particular as helpful or unhelpful to the nation, but his tone suggests he has in mind the latter. In any case, he leaves the misleading impression upon his readers that the Army adopted military and quasi-military imagery.
specifically with the advent of war. This, of course, was not so. Wilkinson overlooks the Army's use of military structures and terminology for fifty years prior to 1914 and the continued use of those things to the present time. They reflect what the 'Army' is. He also overlooks the fact that such usage is not original to the Army, but rather to the New Testament, as in Ephesians 6. Wilkinson's point is not unlike that made by Arthur Booth-Clibborn after the Boer War (see Ch. 6) concerning the salvationist use of military and quasi-military terminology. Any suggestion that this usage encouraged warfare or inflamed patriotic excess cannot, however, be sustained by the available evidence. Moreover, any such suggestion would have to take in also the Anglican Church Army, a body not mentioned by Alan Wilkinson in this connection, but which shares something of The Salvation Army's quasi-military structure and terminology.

Salvationist services to military personnel were established before 1914. The Naval and Military League dated from the Boer War. Its centres spanned the globe and in Britain there were permanent military homes at Portsmouth, Aldershot, Chatham, Devonport, Harwich and Portsea where a serviceman could find reasonably comfortable Christian surroundings regardless of his religious or other background. Almost all of the British centres were commandeered by the military authorities when war began, but would have been freely offered by the Army to the government in any event. These arrangements did not require any diminution of salvationist involvement in the centres or any watering-down of their salvationist and Christian ethos. Leaguers, throughout the war, could read a weekly column in The War Cry directed specifically to them and containing down to earth, straightforward spiritual counsel.

Suddenly, however, the number of active servicemen rocketed. The Army's response was to establish at each military encampment centres
where the troops might relax. In addition, cheap but wholesome food was made available, and religious meetings conducted. Before more permanent premises could be constructed, large tents (marquees) were used. By the third week of November there were tents or hutments at 14 camps and The War Cry was reporting converts. At Bulford No.1 Camp between 700 and 800 men used the Army hut daily. By the end of 1915 there were 200 such huts all over the country. Non-salvationist observers wrote in warm terms of the atmosphere created at the centres and of the homely, skilful befriending of the men. (Adverse comment from non-salvationists has not come to light despite a conscious effort to find it.) The salvationist staff offered refreshments, reading and writing facilities, newspapers (free), sewing, musical entertainment, a friendly ear, and spiritual counsel with prayer if this were asked. Every hut set space aside as a 'Silent Room' for uses implied by the name.

Where the military encampments were near an Army corps, or where a corps found itself near a military hospital, a systematic programme of visitation was set in hand. Army officers were briefed in detail, early in the war, as to the best methods of gaining access to such places. They were to go first to the man at the top. They were to put their request for access in writing. They were to carry passes at all times. They were not to carry wrapped goods into hospitals. They were not to visit hospitals before noon, except in an emergency. They were to wear full Army uniform for every visit. They were to remember that they represented Christ. Detailed instructions of this kind point up salvationist determination to make a success of the work with the troops.

In every corps from which a salvationist enlisted, a Corps Military Sergeant was appointed with the task of keeping regularly in touch with
those on active service. News of corps events was conveyed, with news of family and friends and assurances of prayers. 17

The British Territory's corps network proved invaluable also in the mobilisation of the women of the Home League, under the national direction of Mrs. Commissioner Higgins, in a Sewing Scheme. Socks, shirts and garments of a practical kind were made up and distributed in the camps as need dictated. 18 In this way, the lay female salvationists augmented the ministry of the full-time commissioned women officers like Mary Murray.

Closely akin to this was the ongoing provision of 'comforts' for the troops abroad. Appeals were launched nationally asking for useful items, ranging from handkerchiefs to games and gramophones. 19 In the early months, Brigadier Mary Murray's name excited a ready response from the public with whom memories of her Boer War work in the Transvaal still lingered. 20 For Christmas 1914, all Salvation Army Scouts were asked to contribute a penny to a Comforts Fund, on the grounds that, although 'killing people is frightful work, which only men bereft of their senses can take pleasure in', nevertheless scores of Patrol Leaders, etc. were 'now with the colours' and should be 'specially thought of' at Christmas time. 21 No report of the success or otherwise of this idea is to hand, but the efforts of the Army as a whole in supplying troops' comforts accomplished much practical good in both France and England. 22 Needless to say, with the comforts went copious supplies of Army literature. 23

The supply of clean linen for bandages under the Army's 'Old Linen Campaign' in the USA has been mentioned earlier. 24

The war was not very old before it became apparent that problems were arising when troops on leave, or in transit, and passing through London found themselves in the capital late at night with nowhere to stay. They were easy prey to alcohol or to prostitutes. The military authori-
ties sought the Army's help and quickly a Night Patrol of all the London main line railway stations was mounted. Hostels were established to house the men, with London hotels commandeered by the government and placed at the Army's disposal. Separate hostels were opened for NCO's on staff work in London at the War Office and elsewhere. TE Russell was a teenager and salvationist who offered his services to the Army as a lay employee in London. He worked in the York Road Hostel in Lambeth under a Captain Robinson. The hostel was used by servicemen en route to or from the south coast. They stayed for one night only. Russell explains that the purpose of the hostel was to protect men from thieves or prostitutes. Some residents were brought in by the police at 3 or 4 a.m., often quite drunk. The men got 'no sermonising'. The Captain's wife might have a quiet word with them in the light of morning, mentioning the possibilities for a life yielded to the Lordship of Jesus, but there were no conversions. It was more by way of 'a seed sown'.

The latter stages of the war saw the introduction of the Women's Auxiliary Army Corps (WAAC). On March 3rd, 1918 the first Salvation Army hutment for the use of WAAC's was opened on Salisbury Plain. It was designed for recreation and rest and was described as 'clean, airy and commodious'. The military authorities welcomed this addition to the Army's network of facilities and expressed thanks at the opening ceremony by the Lady Superintendent of the WAAC's, Miss Gilmour.

A less publicised aspect of salvationist work with the Allied troops was the Legal Advice Bureau. Soldiers' wills were prepared free of charge as an extension of the Army's already existing 'Poor Man's Lawyer' scheme. The Army urged servicemen to remember 'the trouble and unhappiness and often family disputes caused by people dying without wills'. 'Every man going on active service should make his will. This is an
ordinary businesslike activity, and should not be regarded in any way as ill-omened... It is every man's duty to see that everything is in order, so that in the case of his death dependants upon him shall have all he has to leave them.' The Legal Advice Bureau offered advice to both servicemen and their relatives on government allowances, the law of landlord and tenant, workmen's injury compensation, the law relating to conscription, legitimacy of children, maintenance orders, and other matters bearing on the social problems of the poorer classes.

Early in 1915 measures were undertaken to assist those trying to locate missing sons or husbands in France. The Strangers' Bureau was inaugurated on March 6th, 1915. Its task was to draw upon the Army's expertise in tracing missing persons in order to link up relatives with a son, father or husband in the forces, if he were still alive. Families could place free advertisements in 'Under The Colours', the magazine of the Naval and Military League. Each month 250 enquiries were handled from all sections of British society. No figures are available to indicate the rate of success or failure. The Bureau must have been reasonably effective since its work continued unabated throughout the war.

A less practical, but equally sensitive and significant, service given by salvationists was the locating and tending of war graves. It sprang from the work of The Strangers' Bureau and cases where enquiries led to a discovery of a death not known officially to the War Office. At the end of the war the work was formalised by the setting up of a War Graves Visitation Department in London under Mrs. Commissioner Higgins. Around Ypres alone 250,000 graves were to be found, and many bereaved relatives naturally wished to visit the graves of loved ones. In 1921 the Army Council of Great Britain gave The Salvation Army a grant of £25,000 to assist impecunious relatives who wanted to visit France and
Whilst the War Office was already offering subsidised travel, this arrangement met the needs of those completely without resources.

A constantly recurring theme throughout the war was that of alcohol rations and sales to servicemen. Many organisations urged the government to act on the extent of drunkenness amongst the troops and amongst munitions workers. The brewing trade pressurised the government in the opposite direction and claimed that teetotalism had strong links with the 'peacites' and the 'little Englishers'. In fact, forgetting its non-partisan stance on the war, the Army based its appeals for moderation and even abstention precisely on the grounds of patriotism. A pledge card was issued for use by non-salvationists (salvationists were and are in any event teetotal) which gave as the reason for abstention: 'In order that I may be of the greatest service to my country...' The Social Gazette took up the issue, declaring: 'Surely the defenders of our country are worthy of a better fate!' It was pernicious that the 'boys in khaki' should be gratuitously plied with beer and spirits under the guise of friendship and goodwill. The practice in the forces of issuing rum rations was also harshly criticised and, moreover, linked in the minds of the critics with the provision of licensed brothels for troops in France. Eventually, Lord Kitchener declared himself opposed to alcoholic beverages, and later the King undertook to refrain from alcohol until the war was over. Naturally, the anti-drink lobby was delighted. The Salvation Army maintained pressure on the government, even to the extent of suggesting the nationalisation of the drink trade and holding up the examples of the Russians and the Australians who had severely curbed drinking hours and sales. The government remained impassive, settling in the main for moral exhortation only. Army literature continued to inform readers (the target was clearly the
families of servicemen) about the physical damage alcohol might cause. A reprint appeared of an announcement in The Daily Mail by eminent military doctors and surgeons that alcohol:

1. Slows the powers to see signals.
2. Confuses prompt judgment.
4. Hastens fatigue.
5. Lessens resistance to diseases.
6. Increases shock from wounds.'

Later, an article was commissioned from Sir Alfred Pearce Gould, KCVO, to spell out that alcohol was one of the soldier's 'chief foes': 'It sends him to the fight less able to strive to his uttermost.' Were the same exhortations being given by German salvationists to German troops? For the moment, the Army's abhorrence of the worst consequences of alcoholic drinks had outweighed its desire to raise above partisan spirit in the war. Bramwell Booth twice wrote letters to The Times on the topic, urging a shortening of licensing hours by 50% plus closure all day on Sundays. He argued also for a total ban on sales of alcohol to men in military uniform. For his pains he was invited to become Co-President of a newly formed 'Temperance Council of the Christian Churches of England and Wales', sharing the presidency with the Archbishop of Canterbury (Randall T. Davidson), the Archbishop of Westminster (Cardinal Bourne), and the Rev. WB Selbie, DD. The Council's aim was to secure legislative reform. The General accepted the invitation.

It would be wrong to create the impression that The Salvation Army worked alone in seeking to assist the British troops. Whilst some aspects of the Army's contribution were unique, all the major churches and many Christian para-church movements responded to the perceived needs of the servicemen. Inter-group rivalry was not a feature. FA McKenzie,
describing the work at the front in France, wrote: 'Sectarian rivalries play little part, for face to face with the situation now confronting us, ancient divisions of churches and controversies over creeds dwindle strangely small.' The Army co-operated happily with the Red Cross, even seconding personnel to them (who wore Army insignia on their Red Cross uniforms). Army corps at local level worked actively to raise funds for non-salvationist causes. No single organisation can claim exclusive credit for what was done nor be blamed exclusively for what was left undone.

2) The Funds

Before turning to the Army's work with wounded soldiers and in particular the role of The Salvation Army Ambulance Unit, it should be noted how the work with Allied troops was funded.

Finance was a constant nightmare for the Army in this and in the Second World War. At noon on July 31st, 1914 General Booth learned that the London Stock Exchange had ceased to trade and that the Bank Rate had risen overnight from 4% to 8%. Emergency consultations with Commissioner George Mitchell (the Army's newly appointed Chancellor) and Commissioner Howard (Chief of the Staff) centred on how the Army's in-house bank, Reliance Bank, could buy gold. Cost-cutting schemes were devised and officers voluntarily went without allowances or part thereof. Bramwell's journal entry for August 19th, 1914 reads: 'IHQ. Toiling nearly all day at the new situation. How to get some money... Wrote some begging letters. Important conference with Mitchell and then Carleton on our Capital finance. Feel we should come through and am deeply grateful that my plans of the last twelve to fourteen years are now, in the hour of strain, working out well. This also is of the Lord. Home 9.20.'
Parliament passed legislation on the outbreak of war imposing a moratorium on all credit.\textsuperscript{59} It meant bills went unpaid. In turn, it deprived many of the Army's friends in business and commerce of funds from which to donate to the Army's work. Bramwell was suddenly desperate: 'Our ordinary income at IHQ has almost ceased.'\textsuperscript{60} Regular donors began to write letters of apology, explaining the straits in which the moratorium had left them.\textsuperscript{61} Little could be done. National appeal funds, such as the Lord Mayor of London's Fund, were being set up and also attracting monies away from established charitable endeavours.\textsuperscript{62} The Army felt it necessary to spell out to its friends that, contrary to popular belief, the Army was receiving nothing from the national funds now created.\textsuperscript{63} Commissioner Higgins wrote to The Times explaining all that salvationists were doing in the new crisis, and managed to mention (in passing!) that the Army was sorely pressed for funds.\textsuperscript{64} The War Cry and All The World carried regular and very blunt appeals for donations.\textsuperscript{65} Again, the immediacy of things allowed ideals to be forgotten as patriotism was openly appealed to: 'In helping The Salvation Army... you are also directly supporting the country in... a life and death struggle.'\textsuperscript{66} By January, All The World (used principally for public relations purposes) declared it was no longer 'possible to maintain ground without immediate financial help'.\textsuperscript{67}

One year into the war, the General listed his immediate needs as follows:\textsuperscript{68}

- Rest and Refreshment Centres (troops) £ 5,000
- Camp Work and Belgian Relief £30,000
- Social Work in the UK £47,000
- Training of Officers £20,000
- India £26,000
- Far East and Africa £15,000
Office's Pension Fund £5,000
Sick Officers' Fund £6,000
France and Italy £8,500

A marquee for troops cost £50 and a wooden hut £150. A permanent NML home cost £10,000 in which rooms might be 'endowed' for £10 in January 1915, but for £25 by April the same year.

The Army mounted frequent War Flag Days. Lord Derby, Secretary of State for War, gave his personal and public endorsement and so did the King. This helped. However, a Flag Day planned for the Victoria area in the Summer of 1916 was banned by the Victoria War Council because the proceeds (£50,000 was the target) were to be spent, not only on the troops and war orphans, but on the Army's general purposes too, these last not being seen as 'purely patriotic purposes'.

The mid-1918 War Flag Day was preceded by a lavish Flag Day demonstration at the Royal Albert Hall depicting 'realistic scenes' of Army war services. As before, immediacy was the catalyst for patriotic fervour from a self-styled supranational Army.

Despite its General's preliminary fears, the Army did come through financially, thanks to a combination of self-denial, astute public relations work, and a fair injection of appeal to patriotic sentiment. This last detracted from the high principle of neutrality sought by Bramwell Booth, but when the money is running out the pressure to modify principle is well-nigh irresistible. The Army yielded to that pressure. If it had not done so, the range of compassionate works described in this Chapter may have been substantially curtailed.

3) The Wounded

The First World War killed 750,000 men from Britain and 200,000 from other parts of the Empire (one third of these from India). One
and a half million were permanently wounded or disabled. In the Battle of the Somme, which began on July 1st, 1916 19,000 Britons were killed and 57,000 wounded on the first day. 76

The trench experiences gave birth to a new medical term, 'shell-shock'. 77 TE Russell has described his reaction to being shelled in the trenches: 'I was alright until I was wounded. After the war, when I was training as a Salvation Army officer-cadet, I suffered a nervous breakdown and would wake up screaming with nightmares of things I had seen in the war. I could not go on a bus without thinking it would topple over. It's better now. My wife has been marvellous in my healing - for 52 years.'78

The Salvation Army carried out a massive visitation programme of wounded soldiers. Every local corps (church centre) took part in Britain. 79 Officers were specially briefed in the first weeks of the war. 80 The wives of the Army's staff officers in London were organised into a 'Visiting Unit', 60 strong, to cover the London hospitals. 81 Every wounded soldier in France was visited by a salvationist if he remained in hospital beyond a day or two. 82 Sometimes salvationists were the only people prepared to enter certain fever wards. 83 Thousands of letters were sent by officers to anxious relatives at home. 84 The letterhead ('The Salvation Army - Recreation and Reading Room for HM Troops') carried a 'Note' stating: 'The Salvation Army will be pleased to communicate with the relatives or friends of any member of HM Forces in any part of the world. Communications sent to the above address will receive immediate attention.' 85

Representations were made by the Army to the government concerning the absence of proper provisions to assist the resettlement of disabled soldiers in civilian life. It was absolutely necessary to assist 'these wrecked heroes' who would 'never again take their place in the ranks of labour'. By April 1915 2,874 men had been discharged in a disabled condition suffering from consumption, deafness, insanity, loss of limb.
or limbs, and loss of sight. No financial assistance was forthcoming from public funds once a man was discharged. The Army protested fiercely. The state must play its part in easing each man's lot after discharge. Statutory reform was won late in 1916 with a Board of Pensions Bill to allow quick and adequate allowances to disabled servicemen. The Army declared itself satisfied that the 'rights' of the now 70,000 disabled soldiers had at last been recognised.

One proposal the General was moved to make perhaps typifies the spirit in which the Army attempted to honour its fundamental commitment to do all in its power to meet compassionately the practical needs of the victims of war. Bramwell Booth's mind became burdened by the large number of men who were dying on the battlefield, without help, just where they fell - many in 'no man's land'. The Royal Army Medical Corps and the Red Cross did all they could but, of necessity, concentrated their efforts on men who were reachable and perhaps saveable. Bramwell recognised their 'superb' devotion. But many died because they fell in the firing zones or stretcher-bearers were too few in number. Reports reached London of countless men groaning sometimes for two days and nights before dying in solitude. Said the General: 'They must be still and die - without aid or comfort - without even the small consolation of sending a last request to those they love, and without the help of one kind word. More than this, in such hours of approaching death, many men recall the teaching of the past and wish to pray - wish for some word of hope and faith to help them to God... Can nothing be done for them?'

He provided his own solution. It reads best in his own words:

'I suggest the formation of a body of Searchers - godly men, not of military age, carrying no arms, dressed distinctively and under military authority - whose special duty shall be to go to those whom it is seen cannot be rescued. They would use every possible method of reaching them - creeping out in the darkness of the night - lying down beside them - doing what they could, of course, to ease pain and to assist
men to cover, but their chief business would be to take the dying such consolation as may be possible in the circumstances. I believe that we of The Salvation Army could find men so possessed of the love of Christ as to be willing to take such service, with the discomforts and dangers attaching to it, and though some of them might lose their lives, I have little doubt but that they would be used by God to the comfort of many unhappy souls and to the salvation... of some.  

The General, who sometimes veered from his own chosen path in the war (see Ch.9), struck a rich chord in many a heart with this plan. It was prompted by the highest humanitarian and spiritual ideals which had taken the Army into 58 countries. Scores of salvationists and non-salvationists alike volunteered for the task.  But it was not to be. The Red Cross and the military medical authorities advised the War Office as to the scheme's impracticality. The War Office expressed 'deep gratitude' to Booth, but said 'no'.  The General's only reaction was to observe: 'It is a novelty in their eyes that men should be willing to risk their lives merely to administer help and comfort for the soul.  

Not for the first time did the War Office reject the Army's offer of sacrificial service (see Ch.10, Sect.3). This time, however, the non-establishment standing of the Army can hardly be blamed for the refusal since the proposal from Bramwell Booth was, by human standards at least, an extraordinary one. 

Disappointment at official shortsightedness was alleviated by the success of The Salvation Army Ambulance Unit, at the outset of its work a unique unit of its kind. It was Brigadier Mary Murray who first suggested the formation of the Unit to carry wounded men from the scene of battle to hospitals in the rear.  The sources are in conflict as to the number of salvationist ambulances used during the war, but the best estimate is 30  (17 from the UK, 8 from Australia, and 5 from Canada). Forty salvationist drivers served the Unit, carrying close on 80,000 wounded men at first in the firing line with the 7th and 8th Divisions of Kitchener's Army, and eventually with the Indian and
and Canadian troops. Later the Unit functioned as transport between the battlezone and base hospitals in Boulogne.  

The first ambulances, five in all, cost £2000, most of which was raised by local corps in Britain, following a promise to this effect by Bramwell Booth to 'The Times Fund for the Wounded'. It was the most adventurous promise received. The vehicles, fully equipped and manned exclusively by salvationists, were dedicated on November 24th, 1914 in a public ceremony held at London's Guildhall in the presence of General and Mrs. Booth and the Lord Mayor. Conscious once again of his audience, the General said that the creation of the Unit was inspired by sentiments 'both patriotic and on a still higher plane than patriotic'. He was received with loud cries of 'Hear, hear!' He went to some lengths to emphasise, in the presence of civic dignitaries and of both secular and religious press, that the salvationist drivers were under clear orders to do everything possible for the wounded 'of every nationality'. This drew applause, as did his reminder that his men were equipped to give not only medical, but also spiritual, succour.  

Five further ambulances were given by the Army in Canada for use in Russia. The Czar ordered that the vehicles should bear the names of members of the royal household.  

The drivers and the Unit were formally linked to the Red Cross. At first this organisation expressed reservations as to the Army's religious motivations, but its President, the Hon. A. Stanley, swept these aside with: 'Of course the SA will have religion.' FA McKenzie, writing objectively as a non-salvationist professional reporter, records: 'While in Boulogne, examining the work of this ambulance service, I had a long talk with Major Paget, the head of the British Red Cross there. Major Paget spoke to me repeatedly and emphatically and in the strongest

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language in praise of the work The Salvation Army ambulance men are doing. The Red Cross was pleased to accept a further donation of £2000 from the Army for similar objects.

The ambulance drivers, being for the most part Salvation Army bandsmen (and all salvationists) found it convenient and useful to form a band. It was in wide demand in the Allied lines, playing to crowds of up to 10,000 at a time at open-air venues, and to an estimated 30,000 wounded men at Christmas periods. Happy to be used for Church of England parades, the band was heard by at least a million Allied soldiers in France during the war.

The Ambulance Unit was a success. Its drivers were dubbed 'The White Brigade' because they did not smoke or drink or use foul language. Mary Booth expressed her sense of pride in the Unit, which she saw at close quarters: 'What a splendid thought it was to have salvationists to run our cars - plain, simple working-men, without any nonsense, and with the real spirit of The Salvation Army.' Salvationist pride was understandable since all the non-salvationist sources also pay tribute to the ambulance work. One writer mentioned the Red Cross and YMCA, but described the Army as 'eminent among them' and whose officers' gallantry... near the firing line was splendid.

4) The Relatives

If the needs of active or discharged servicemen were large and urgent, those of their immediate families were no less unyielding. Here too The Salvation Army found ample outlets for its wartime principle of alleviating the suffering of war's victims. Unique means of coming to the aid especially of the wartime widows were eventually developed.

The first requirement to be met, however, was that of providing hospitality to relatives visiting wounded men in France. A hostel for
this purpose was opened at Boulogne. The officers in charge liaised with Lieutenant Colonel William Haines, Staff-Captain Mary Booth and their team whenever relatives felt the need of someone to accompany them to a ward. Comfort in bereavement was given, officers attending hundreds of funerals with relatives. Mary Booth has described this work, and much else, in her With the BEF in France. Having seen at first hand all that was being accomplished, the secular journalist FA McKenzie refers to Mary Booth and her team as 'Daughters of Consolation'.

Similar work, but perhaps less harrowing, was offered from the Army's hostel (for female relatives) located at Aldershot and opened in December 1916. With so many families passing through London, en route for France or parts of southern England, The Salvation Army Women's Social Work (under Commissioner Adelaide Cox) appointed a team of experienced officers to act as 'Guides' for friends and relatives of the wounded. Trains were met, strangers to London escorted to destinations, return trains arranged, and overnight accommodation offered when needed.

Soldiers' families received regular visits from local corps, organised by the Home League. In London, Salvation Army Citadels were the venues for 'at homes' to the wives of soldiers and sailors. One 'at home' was convened in July 1915 at Camberwell (South-east London). It was the fifth in the London area (following others at Wood Green, Kilburn, Kennington Lane and Woolwich). At Camberwell Lord Kitchener's sister, Mrs. Parker, spoke, as did Lady Assheton-Smith who had been bereaved of a son. Another speaker had lost both brother and son. The 'at home' was attended by 400 women, many with infants on their knees. There was music and singing, refreshments, speeches, discussion of common problems, and an invitation to sign the pledge of war-time abstinence from alcohol.

It was particularly the widows and their plight which brought out
the best in the salvationist innovative spirit. The First World War saw 'the widow problem' tackled by a combination of Salvation Army inventiveness, organisation, and co-operation with government departments. Two principal schemes emerged: the Widows' Counsellors Scheme and the War-Widows' Migration Scheme.

The Widows' Counsellors Department was launched (under Colonel Philip Kyle) in November 1916. Its aim was to seek out the neediest cases and stand in the place of the lost bread-winner. Headed by a Chief Counsellor (Kyle) with a Central Office in London, the Department established branches in 30 UK centres, coinciding with the locations of Divisional Headquarters throughout Britain. Each branch Council consisted of 12 salvationists and members of other denominations in about equal numbers. Branch Councils provided help in cash and kind until employment for the widow, or her older children, was secured. The Department co-operated with government in cases where a widow was in receipt of a military pension or war separation allowance but was unable or unwilling to use the income wisely and for the benefit of her children. Reluctant to cut off the pension or allowance, the government requested the Widows' Counsellors Department to act as almoners of the funds, spending them on the widow's behalf until matters in the home improved.

For twelve years before the war the Army had been assisting families (involving 90,000 people) to emigrate from the UK to dominions overseas, using its international network to ensure successful re-settlement. This work continued during the war, if on a reduced scale, and profits from it were ploughed back to help finance an extension of the same work designed specifically for war widows. The War-Widows' Migration Scheme was a natural follow-on to the Counsellors Scheme. The latter was able to identify suitable families wishing to start again overseas. Bramwell Booth saw care for the widow and fatherless as 'a command as
old as Christianity itself'.

'The cause of the widows has been specifically laid upon us by Almighty God as a solemn responsibility,' he said.

The Migration Scheme would meet a widow's aspirations 'without charge of any kind, without any obligation to believe all that the Army believes, or to go to the Army meetings (glad as we would be to see her)'.

Government Poor Law figures put the number of war widows at 45,000 by mid-1917. Some 20,000 of these were in receipt of Poor Law Relief. Others only slightly better off were widows of 'blue collar' workers accustomed to an income of, say, £5 weekly but now in receipt of a pension of less than 30 shillings a week. General Bramwell Booth thus appealed to the public for £200,000 to fund the Scheme.

He reminded potential donors of the mushrooming widow statistics, with 70 women from a single street in Plymouth having been widowed. He placed strong emphasis on the marked difference between the Army's approach and that of the Poor Law. The latter would often split up a family; the Army's chief aim was to hold the family together.

Booth was also aware of potential criticism as to fund-raising on such a scale in wartime for work not directly related to the war effort. He therefore announced that the Public Trustee's Office had consented to handle all the funds. Earl Grey, a former Governor-General for Canada, urged the government to take advantage of Booth's proposals and the result was a grant of £50,000 from the National Relief Fund.

The concept proved effective and ran hand in hand with the emigration of war orphans, placed in Army homes around the world until the right foster parents were found. In 1923 the Army reviewed the working of the Scheme with the introduction of the Empire Settlement Act 1922 which empowered the government to contribute up to 50% of the cost of any approved migration scheme. The Army was expressly assured of
substantial funding by the government. Between September 1916 and March 1923, 1,769 women and 1,019 children sailed to new lives under the Scheme. The Army attributed success to five factors:

1. Long experience.
2. Wise selection.
3. No red tape.
4. Personal escorts at every stage of the journey.
5. Ensuring work on arrival.

Booth could not resist the comment: 'It is helping to build and cement the Empire.' Five years after the war, he was still a 'convinced Imperialist'.

5) The Role of Women

It has already been emphasised in this study that from the Army's inception women have played an equal role with men, in matters spiritual or otherwise. One Army writer has attributed this fact to the influence of Catherine Booth, wife of the Founder: 'She opened the door into female ministry for her daughter-salvationists of the coming generations. She gave them the right to preach, to break the Bread of Life to hungry souls, to be servants of all for Christ's sake.' Salvationist women were thus taken less by surprise, perhaps, when the war brought what AJP Taylor has called 'a decisive moment in women's emancipation'. Taylor has described the chronic shortage of industrial labour (4.9 million workers joined the armed forces) which opened up the way for women to find a lifestyle not confined to the family home. Some contemporary accounts of women's war work focus only on work undertaken by women from the upper social classes and are, to that extent, misleading. Lady Randolph Churchill describes work in the war zone with the wounded, but omits mention of the Army (whose work was widely
publicised and must have been known to her).

The emerging role of English womanhood in general may have been swiftly accepted by Englishmen, but Frenchmen were less easily convinced:

'It must be remembered that the French and English looked at the employment of women in war work of any description from very different points of view. To the orderly French mind the apparent haphazardness of any voluntary organisation came as a surprise; when that voluntary organisation consisted almost entirely of women the surprise became a shock, and for some time, until the organisation justified itself, the feeling of shock was mingled with distaste.'135

This could well have been written by a woman salvationist, but Army women soon justified their role. One secular history, The Times History of The War, highlights the strain placed upon their numbers when war came:

'Salvationist women as a group formed a most useful link between the war zone and the the home during the war. There are no women of leisure in the Army.... This being so, when war broke out, bringing in its train unprecedented situations and needs, The Salvation Army had no women in reserve to call up, or new recruits to train for service. Rather, there had to be a general sharing out of more work and extra responsibility to those already fully engaged.'136

Some women demonstrated immense stamina. Mrs. Commandant Huish, serving in a hutment in France, once fried 3,000 eggs in 4 hours—not in her first flush of enthusiasm, but when she had been working in this way for three years.137 TE Russell affords a captivating cameo of one woman officer, Mrs. Commandant Windiate, working with her husband in charge of the rest hut at Bulford Camp. The Commandant, says Russell, was quiet, humble and friendly. Mrs. Windiate was 'dominant, a forceful personality' who could lift a full 8 gallon urn of tea! But she knew never to interfere in her husband's negotiations or dealings with the military authorities. She preached regularly in the meetings. Russell comments: 'After listening to Mrs. Windiate for half-an-hour, you
either felt you were alright or you felt pretty miserable. One of her themes was "What will your wife and children think of you? Will you go back with a soiled mind or bad habits? Or to bring your children up to love and serve Jesus Christ? Start now. Kneel by your bed tonight in the barracks, in front of all the men." I did this myself when I joined the forces. Only once did a chap throw a boot at me. I was largely respected. Mrs. Windiate never played on a fear of death. She presented religion as a live thing.'138

Mrs. General Booth entertained no doubts as to the calibre of the Army's women and their ability to rise to wartime need. When the Ambulance Unit (see Sect. 3 above) was formed it was proposed to the War Office that female Army officers should form part of the Unit's staff. The War Office again refused to agree to an Army proposal, arguing that the women would be exposed to rough abuse or worse. At the Guildhall Dedication Ceremony Mrs. Booth took her chance to place her views on the record:

'To me it is a matter of regret that it is not thought advisable that women should accompany the cars. Though Brigadier Mary Murray and her nurses return to the front, they are not permitted to travel on those particular cars. I would like to say, on behalf of thousands of Salvation Army women whom I represent, that I am quite sure no dangers or sufferings, not even the unmentionable and unthinkable dangers to which it is thought women might be peculiarly liable, would deter any one of us from gladly doing anything that could be done either in connection with the motor ambulances or otherwise. (Loud applause.) Personally I am convinced that women, and especially trained women, in larger numbers than they are at present at the front, could do most useful service. Therefore I make bold to say, so far as my voice in this place can reach anyone in authority at the War Office, or elsewhere (laughter and applause) - that if they can see their way to make any alteration in that decision they will find plenty of salvationist women who are ready to volunteer. (Applause.) There are some services which only a woman can render, because only women can render the services that are peculiar to mothers and to sisters.'139

The War Office did not change its mind, even though this meant a third rejection of an Army suggestion. It felt it could not take
the risk. It is, however, a matter of record, and a telling argument from silence, that during the whole of the First World War not a single report arose of any untoward or improper approach or treatment being offered to women of the Army.

As the war showed signs of drawing to a close, Florence Booth told salvationists (and friends of the Army): 'I think that Salvation Army work for the soldiers everywhere largely owes its success to the fact that we are able to employ women.' Anyone familiar with the historical sources would be slow to challenge that conclusion. But Mrs. Booth saw further still and urged each woman, with the advent of peace, and whether salvationist or not, to realise 'her responsibility to come to the front as never before, taking her place beside man in the government and arrangement of human affairs.' In the Army, women had been doing that for two generations. Without them the largescale embarking upon schemes of social and compassionate action in time of war would have foundered in many instances in the preliminary stages. It was the case in the Boer War, and no less so between 1914 and 1918.
NOTES – CH. 11


1a. Ibid., 12.

2. See Ch. 5. In 1914 the NML was under Colonel Richard Wilson assisted by Brigadier Mary Murray who went to France within weeks of war starting: SAYB 1918, 8.

2a. ATW April 1915, 181-4.

3. Ibid., 193.

4. ATW September 1914, 515.

5. SG 22-8-14:2.

6. E.g. IWC 7-8-15:2. In 1919 the NML was renamed. The homes became The Salvation Army Red Shield Homes, with funds governed by the War Charities Act 1916: Deed Poll of January 27th, 1919 executed by Bramwell Booth (IHQ Archives). See further: Frederick Coutts, *The Battle and the Breeze*, (SP&S, 1946), 37.

7. IWC 3-10-14:3, 8.

8. IWC 21-11-14:8. For a list of homes and huts by April 1915 see ATW April 1915, 214.

9. Ibid. (IWC).

10. IWC 9-1-15:3.


12. McKenzie, 66-70; Bateman, 104-112.

13. SG 10-6-16:1.

14. SAYB 1917, 22.

15. TO September 1914, 583-4.

16. Ibid.

17. SAYB 1918, 10.

18. SG 12-9-14:1.


20. Ibid. (IWC)

21. TW December 1914, 454.

23. SAYB 1917, 21.

24. Ch.10, Sect.1.

25. SAYB 1917, 21.

26. The Times, 27-10-16: 5; 6-12-16:5; 9-1-17:3 (opening of hostels at Victoria, Strand, and Southampton Row).

27. SAYB 1917, 21.


29. ATW April 1918, 151-2; SAYB 1919, 13.

30. SG 19-9-14:2.


32. IWC 3-4-15:9; 1-6-18:7.

33. SG 6-3-15:2.

34. ATW May 1916, 206.

35. ATW October 1915, 526.

36. IWC 1-6-18:4.


38. Henry Carter, The Control of The Drink Trade: A Contribution to National Efficiency During the Great War 1915-1918, (Longmans, 1919), 188. Carter lists the following as prominent: The Salvation Army, Church Army, Women's Legion, British Women's Temperance Association, YMCA, YWCA, Munition Workers' Canteen Committee.


40. TW January 1915, 11.

41. SG 30-1-15:2; 24-4-15:2 (Editorial slamming those who plied soldiers with drink and labelling them 'traitors to our defenders').

42. IWC 15-8-14:9.

43. ATW April 1915, 172; December 1917, 540.

44. IWC 7-11-14:7; 17-4-15:8.

45. ATW April 1915, 174.

46. ATW February 1916, 174.

185.
Eventually, afternoon opening hours were cut: AJPT, 32.

SG 22-8-14:2.

SG 24-3-17:2.

ATW April 1915, 174; IWC 11-12-15:8.

IWC 28-11-14:7. The reformers could not agree on the best measures. Some wanted restrictions on hours, some penal taxes on sales, some total prohibition: Marr Murray, Drink and The War - from the Patriotic Point of View, (Chapman & Hall, 1915), 122, 126.

IWC 31-7-15:6.

McKenzie, Preface.

The Times, 10-1-18:3.


With the Army, the YMCA, Church Army, Church of England Men's Society, The League of the Spiritual War, SPCK, British and Foreign Bible Society, Scripture Gift Mission and kindred societies all played a part: Times History, 330-1.

Ch.8, Sect.4. Also TO June 1915, 369.

CBB 349-50.

SG 22-8-14:3.

IWC 19-9-14:7.

IWC 26-9-14:7.

IWC 5-9-14:9.

IWC 12-9-14:9.

The Times, 8-10-14:9.

E.g. IWC 22-8-14:7; ATW December 1914, 702.

IWC 5-9-14:7.

ATW January 1915, 18.


IWC 24-10-14:7.
The only available annual Statements of Account extant from the war are those for the Army's War Fund to 30-9-17. (See Note 68 re modern equivalent values.) Total income was £503,828 (about £15.1 million in today's terms). The Fund showed a surplus of £21,214 which was carried forward. Principal sources of income were a Flag Day (£21,494) and sales in huts and hostels at break-even prices (£406,473).


E.g. Balham CHB, 1-4-18 (Easter visitation plans to local hospitals).

For anecdotes see: Booth, passim; ATW October 1915, 527.

A letter dated August 2nd, 1918, written from 'Con Depot 3, BEF France' was sent to the author by Mrs. Inez L. Girdlestone of Uxbridge on 2-7-85. It was written to her grandmother by Captain Winifred Heal to convey news of her grandmother's wounded son.

93. ATW December 1914, 687.
94. CBB 354. McKenzie gives 32 and mentions ambulances used in Italy and Mesopotamia to which the salvationist sources do not refer (Note 95).
95. McKenzie, 49-53.
96. The Times, 23-10-14:11; Salisbury CHB, 1-11-14 (£3.10.0 raised for the Ambulance Unit Fund).
97. The Times, 25-11-14:11; SG 5-12-14:2.
98. The Times, 2-2-15:11; IWC 4-3-16:6, 7.
99. CBB 354; ATW April 1915, 197-8.
100. McKenzie, 51.
101. SG 17-2-17:2.
102. TW October 1918, 309.
103. McKenzie, 53.
105. Times History, 508. This underestimates the Army's contribution, recording only 10 cars 'with attendant lorries'. It compensates for the error by saying, 'These did excellent service'.
106. Booth, 63.
107. ATW July 1915, 343.
108. Note 82.
110. The Times, 12-12-16:5.
112. SAYB 1916, 20.
113. ATW July 1915, 377.
114. SG 2-12-16:2.
115. The first at Swansea, Brighton and Paisley: Ibid.
116. SAYB 1918, 23.
117. War Report (New Zealand), (SA Archive, Wellington, New Zealand), 67. (Unpublished Report, 1918, presented to Commissioner Henry C. Hodder, Territorial Commander, New Zealand, describing war work in New Zealand and outlining Army war work elsewhere.)
The Times, 13-11-15: 15, claiming 95% success for pre-war migration work. (Also SAYB 1918, 12.) The Army admitted to only 1% failure: ATW March 1916, 101.

ATW April 1916, 176.

ATW March 1916, 100.

SAYB 1916, 24; SG 5-2-16:2.

SAYB 1918, 12.

ATW July 1916, 292-293.

ATW April 1916, 176.

SAYB 1917, 13.

Ibid., 15.


Ibid., 6.

Ibid., 7-8.

Ibid., 2.

Ch.9, Sect.2, Note 52.


AJPT 37-8.


E. Culling and J. Booth, Arms and The Woman: A Canteen Worker with the French, (Murray, 1932), 43.

Times History, 507.

ATW August 1918, 342.

Russell, Tape 7.

SG 5-12-14:2.

Booth, passim; McKenzie, 66.

ATW August 1918, 341.

ATW November 1918, 484.
CHAPTER 12

RESPONSES TO THE ARMY

1) The Men
2) The Authorities
3) The War Office
1) The Men

The response of the enlisted men to the Army in the First World War was closely akin to their response in the South African conflict of 1899–1902. Some remembered Mary Murray's work in the Boer War and recognised her amongst them in 1914 ('I have been surprised to meet so many men who have pleasant memories of little acts of kindness done for them by salvationists during the South African War.'3). The Salvation Army uniform symbolised to them practical and spiritual concern. A War Cry reporter at Victoria Station in the first days of the war was stopped three times in one day by reservists and asked to pray for them and to keep an eye on their loved ones.4 Captain Bramwell Taylor, of the Ambulance Unit, reported that in France men spontaneously asked him to pause and pray with them. Of one occasion he wrote: 'I knelt down, about a dozen men followed my example, and the remainder stood around while I prayed.'5

The tension in the younger enlisted men in the first weeks of war and particularly upon arrival in France was high. Sometimes it gave way with the sight of the Army's uniform. Mary Booth's notebook recorded: 'Did my first bit of hospital visitation. One man I spoke to burst into tears as soon as he caught sight of our bonnets.'6 This was not an isolated occurrence. Many of the men, since they had no religious affiliation, reckoned they would 'belong' to the salvationists. One Salvation Army chaplain in Egypt, Brigadier William McKenzie (see Ch.15), reported: 'We now have more than two thousand at our Sunday morning church parade. This has grown from a few hundred.'8 The Army's ambivalent status as mission/social agency/denomination/charity had much to do with it. That ambiguity which caused sometimes more traditional churches and even government officials to look askance at the Army and its ideas, allowed on the other hand the fighting men to
feel they could attach themselves at least pro tem without being seen to be aligned with the establishment or more orthodox expressions of religious piety. They also knew that the Army would go out of its way to remain in contact with those left at home, especially when personal calamity struck.

Servicemen were quick to sense hypocrisy. 'Preach as much as you like, your sermons are worth exactly what you are yourself - not a farthing more,' wrote the Army's Paris editor, summarising his contacts with the fighting men. Yet there was discernable willingness to talk about spiritual matters. Bramwell Booth, reading almost daily despatches to IHQ from France, told The Daily Chronicle: 'Do people know how eager the soldier is to talk about serious things? Our officers out there send home the most touching reports of the British soldier, showing how deeply he feels, how seriously he takes this war, and how faithfully he entrusts himself to the mercy of God.'

The General overstated the average 'Tommy's' trust in God. TE Russell gives the insider's impression, tinged with a shade more realism: 'The men appreciated Army food. But they liked our attitude too because the officers took a personal interest in the men and their families.' Russell was asked specifically by his Imperial War Museum interviewer what attracted the men so much to the Army's facilities and meetings. He was in doubt: 'They came primarily for a good cup of tea. But they always got more. Perhaps just a "God bless you", or a gentle enquiry if a chap was looking worried, or an offer to write to the kids. But no Tommy will admit to you that these other things matters. Secretly they were proud of the Army.'

An independent view from outside the Army was that of Arthur E. Copping:

'I came to the conclusion, after talking with many soldiers inside and outside the huts, that Tommy was drawn to the

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salvationists, not merely or mainly because they served him with efficiency or devotion, nor because of opportunities their huts supplied for writing, reading and music, but because salvationists were on the side of truth, wisdom, and the angels, and because of their visible character as unsanctimonious saints. Not that Tommy gave me that information in those words: "Oh, you see," he would say, "we like to go there because The Salvation Army are - well (lowering his voice to an inflection of gentleness), because they are different from other people, aren't they?" 13

Copping put the Army's success down to 'practical, organised brotherliness'. 13a His assessment is typical of the non-salvationist contemporary sources.

2) The Authorities

This Section will summarise the attitudes of both the British civilian and military authorities to the Army and what it sought to accomplish. (The encounter between the Army and the War Office is treated separately in the next Section. The American War Department's dealings with the Army in the USA are covered in Ch. 15.)

The Royal Family was encouraging throughout, the interest shown at the time of the 1914 International Congress 14 never waning. In 1918 Queen Alexandra and the King both visited centres of Army work in London and the Prince of Wales gave a donation to the annual Self-Denial Appeal. 15 The King sent a warm greeting to the War Services Demonstration at the Royal Albert Hall in June 1918 and enclosed £100 for the ensuing War Flag Day collection. 16 With the Armistice, the General received a message from the palace:

'The King gratefully recognises the splendid services of your devoted workers, both at home and abroad, in promoting the social and moral well-being of the community...'. 17

The City of London was an enthusiastic friend to the Army. 18 The Guildhall was used for numerous events during the war and successive Lord Mayors showed genuine personal interest in Booth and his forces.
None more so than Sir Charles Cheers Wakefield who took office in 1915. He gave The Social Gazette an interview, part of which is worth quoting verbatim:\textsuperscript{19}

'Should we suspend philanthropic and religious activities during the war, Sir Charles?'

'No. In many cases religion and war work can go hand in hand... The Salvation Army has been carrying out this dual function with admirable zeal. You are looking after the bodies and the souls of men. That is as it should be.'

'You are an evangelical, Sir Charles. Do you think that the evangelical gospel which you and we preach will find new acceptance when the war is over?'

'Yes. I am inclined to think that when peace is declared we shall be a sobered nation.... This will give the Army and indeed all the evangelical churches a new opportunity.... But you will forgive me if I say to The Salvation Army that this great opportunity will not recur.... The Army has lived down the abuse and obloquy that at first were hurled upon it - lived them down by the purity of its ideals and the self-sacrifice of its personnel, and today there is no public man in England who has the social and moral welfare of the people at heart who should withhold his benediction from it.'

Not every officer in the King's army would have said as much when war began. At first, some displayed misgivings about a salvationist presence at military establishments. Bramwell Booth had told his people: 'The authorities are friendly. The men are more than friendly.'\textsuperscript{20} Of the men, it was true. Not all military leaders, however, were helpful. FA McKenzie wrote: 'In the beginning The Salvation Army found considerable difficulty from some commanding officers who did not know the nature of the work, and who quietly prevented them from coming into their districts (i.e. in France). But as the real nature of their service became known this difficulty grew less and less. Today many of the old obstructionists are the most sincere sympathisers and helpers.'\textsuperscript{21} At Harfleur, near Le Havre, Adjutant Thomas Wells and his wife took charge of the Army's first BEF
Senior Officers were less than cordial to them and sited the hut opposite the latrines. They denied Wells transport. He trudged between the town and the camp carrying cases of tinned, condensed milk. But steadily the doubters fell away. By the end of hostilities Wells had ample transport, (courtesy of the military powers) and a splendid hut in a prime location, housing 1,000 men at a time.22

Commissioner Higgins reported a conversation with an unnamed 'military officer of high rank' he met on a train. Higgins, naturally, travelled in uniform and was told: 'I had never known anything of The Salvation Army before, but I have watched your men and found their influence invariably good.'23 Some officers visited Army huts and left money for the work.24 The Captain of one regiment, on embarking for France and the battle zone, sent to The Salvation Army his dress sword to mark his appreciation for services to his men.25 At one of the largest Army huts in France26 a military Colonel, who had been observing the work rate and hours of the salvationists, gathered the men: 'These Salvation Army people are really killing themselves with work for you fellows, and I am sure you will be only too willing for me to order the hut to be cleared, if only for an hour.'27 Senior Chaplain Colonel the Rev. Deane Oliver asked specifically that Salvation Army officers be sent amongst the troops at Shorncliffe, because 'you do what you can for the men's bodies, but you put such a high value on the soul'. He laid on all the tent equipment as a tangible sign of his confidence.25

The opening of Army homes and hostels in London brought high-ranking and eminent military leaders into direct and public contact with Army counterparts. The sources are full of reports of such occasions. Typical is the opening of an annexe to the NML Home at Chatham.28 It
was opened by Rear-Admiral Seymour Elphinstone Erskine: 'Speaking on behalf of the Navy, I would like to say that we owe The Salvation Army a debt of gratitude, and we heartily congratulate the Organisation on its splendid national service.' Brigadier-General F. Rainsford-Hannay also spoke and described Army war work as 'an enormous advantage to the British army'. The Mayor of Chatham, Alderman William Paine, J.P., chimed in to remind everyone that the local authority had waived its building laws and consented to the erection of the annexe, out of respect for the Army and recognition of the needs of the Navy. In January 1917 Field Marshall Viscount French similarly opened the new hostel in London's Southampton Row (Bloomsbury). That event was attended by the Prime Minister of New Zealand (WFP Massey) and the High Commissioner for Canada (Sir G. Perley).

The First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, wrote to Bramwell Booth about 'the immense amount of good' being accomplished by the Army, and Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig wrote from France on March 27th, 1918, to say how much he valued the presence of the salvationists, whom he saw as being 'one of the best influences on the moral and spiritual welfare of the troops at the bases'. Bramwell must have been quietly content.

In this way official accolades from the secular authorities were readily forthcoming. Scanning the secular sources for contrary views has produced nothing by way of contrast.

3) The War Office

Bramwell Booth was frequently anything but content when dealing with the War Office. Mention has been made above of the disillusionment over his schemes to help British POW's in Berlin, for 'Searchers' for the inaccessible wounded, and over the refusal by the War Office...
to permit women salvationists to work with the Army's Ambulance Unit. From IHQ's point of view, the government was hidebound and shortsighted. Bramwell was eventually to lose all patience. Over and above the three issues just mentioned, there were several others crucial to the Army:

1. Recognition of Salvation Army officers as ministers of religion and thus exempt from conscription;
2. Recognition of The Salvation Army as a religious denomination for the purpose of attestation by servicemen;
3. The public participation in Salvation Army religious activities of servicemen in military uniform;
4. The appointment of British Salvation Army officers as official chaplains to the forces.

From the start, the War Office adopted an ambivalent attitude to the Army. Army good works were acceptable, but Army personnel in formal capacities were not. Sir Reginald Brade, Secretary of the War Office, was eventually to admit to the Army's Parliamentary Secretary, Colonel Unsworth: 'Well, you see - you are so religious.'

The Army had made its estimation of the War Office pretty plain not long into the war by the publication of an article entitled 'Wake Up, War Office' and dealing severely with government hair-splitting which denied a military allowance to the mother of a serviceman's illegitimate children. Only days earlier the War Office had opened up the way for Army work in the UK camps by writing to all General Officers Commanding-in-Chief in the following terms:

'War Office
December 24, 1914

Sir,

In view of representations which have been made to the Army Council relative to services which The Salvation Army is desirous of rendering in regard to the moral and spiritual

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welfare of the troops, I am commanded by the Army Council to request that you will afford such facilities, as may seem to you desirable, to the members of that Organisation, both in respect of attendance on the men and their families subject to the condition that the ministrations of other recognised religious bodies are not in any way interfered with.

R.H. Brade
Secretary, Army Council

This recognition pleased the Army and made matters a good deal easier, but there remained the question of recognising Army officers as exempt from military service as ministers of religion. Bramwell saw it as a crucial test issue going to the very heart of his officers' standing in the eyes of the British Government and the world. He sent Commissioner Theodore Kitching, a former Quaker with pacifist leanings, to negotiate both formally and informally with Whitehall. The point was won.

Not only the Army, but all the non-conformist churches, were alarmed to discover in August 1914 that men wishing to be recorded as belonging to a religious denomination other than the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church faced great difficulties. King's Regulations (Paragraph 919) at that time read thus:

'A soldier will be classified under one of the following denominations: Church of England, Presbyterian, Wesleyan, Baptist or Congregationalist, other Protestant denominations (name of denomination to be noted), Roman Catholic, Jew.'

Salvationists had problems gaining any recognition at all, but before 1914 ended the War Office confirmed that salvationists could properly attest by that classification. It was another key victory. It took longer to convince the Admiralty, but the same right for salvationists in the Navy was won in mid-1916. Failure to register as a salvationist created a distorted impression of the total number of salvationists in the forces. This in turn hampered IHQ's negotiations with the War Office on the appointing of military chaplains (see below).
A further concession was won when the War Office agreed that salvationist servicemen could play in Army bands while wearing the King's uniform. After approaches by the Army, the government confirmed officially that there was no objection provided that in each case the permission of the General Officer Commanding had been sought and given. Such consent was almost invariably forthcoming.  

Important as all of these issues were to the Army, it was the refusal of the War Office to sanction the appointment of Salvation Army officers as chaplains to the British forces which rankled most. Even Germany had used Army officers in this way in her fighting units. New Zealand was the first Empire nation to take the step and eventually 13 New Zealand salvationists served as official military chaplains. Canada and Australia followed this example, and when the USA entered the war in 1917 she did not think twice about it. Between the Empire countries and the USA, some 41 salvationist chaplains were serving the Allied forces by mid-1917. But the British War Office would not yield.

In one sense, the obstinacy of Whitehall did not matter overmuch since, as All The World declared: 'Every true salvationist in the forces is an unofficial chaplain.' The expression, 'unofficial chaplain', became part and parcel of salvationist wartime jargon. The phrase served two purposes: it reminded salvationist troopers of their higher calling and duty, and it reminded government mandarins of the futility of their policy. Army literature repeatedly told stories of the devotion of these unofficial chaplains and of their 'soul-saving exploits'. Together with the officers on visitation and hutment work, these, the Army claimed, won 13,000 of their fellows for Christ.

Nevertheless, General Booth saw the War Office stance as a slight upon the Army. He was deeply resentful. The War Office had established a Chaplains Department long before the war. There had been a Chaplain-General since 1796. In 1914 this was the Right Reverend John Taylor-Smith.
who had been in the post since 1901. He claimed 'justness and scrupulous fairness' in the selection of chaplains, but came under heavy criticism from all denominations bar his own, the Church of England. He won credit for taking a firm line against the conscription of clergymen, but his selection of chaplains alienated especially the Catholics and Presbyterians, as did the fact that Anglican chaplains seemed to be granted higher military ranks than those of other churches.

There is nothing in the sources to suggest that The Salvation Army thought anything but highly of chaplains generally within the army and navy. It thought less of the Chaplains Department at the War Office and decided to say so in the public arena. Knowing that a parliamentary question would be asked in the House of Lords on October 6th, 1915 Bramwell Booth agreed that Commissioner David Lamb should write simultaneously to The Times to state the Army's case. Lamb claimed that the Army was the victim of discrimination. He said the Presbyterians had also expressed dissatisfaction with the methods of the Department and that 'within the immediate jurisdiction of the Chaplain-General of the Forces, or to state it more exactly, inside the radius of his veto, no Salvationist officer has been appointed to go to the front with the troops.' He referred to the confidence in Army officers shown by other nations and the obvious anomaly created. He concluded: 'The Salvation Army surely needs no recommendation now.'

It was Earl Grey, a long-standing friend to the Army, who raised the matter in Parliament the same day. He followed up a question put in the House of Commons on March 9th, 1915 by Mr. Robinson, MP, to Mr. Tennant, Under-Secretary of State for War, demanding to know on what ground the application of the Army to the War Office had been refused and who was responsible for such refusal. The reply in the Commons was brief: 'There does not at present appear to be a sufficiently
large number of salvationist soldiers at any one military centre at home to justify the appointment of a chaplain.' Now the issue was aired again, in the Lords. Earl Grey put five points:

1. Had IHQ's letter of November 20th, 1914 asking for the appointment of Army officers as chaplains been received by the Government?
2. Had the War Office ordered the Chaplain-General not to appoint salvationists?
3. Or had the Chaplain-General refused on his own initiative to recognise the Army?
4. Had not Empire governments appointed salvationists, who had served with singular distinction?
5. Will the Government now appoint Salvation Army officers as chaplains to British forces?

He went on to say his questions were prompted by his 'belief that in the past the Army had not been the recipient of very fair and generous treatment' and his hope that the government would now give 'a clear indication that it was not their policy to single out the Salvation Army for special disabilities'. He believed the Army had given 20,000 fighting men to the forces and would give more if the War Office showed just a bit of co-operation. It is unclear whether or not this promise was made on Bramwell Booth's authority. Clearly Earl Grey and Booth would have held prior consultations, but if Booth agreed to such a promise then it made a mockery of his non-partisan ideal in the war. The sources are inconclusive.

The Paymaster-General, Lord Newton, spoke in reply for the government. He swept the matter aside in cavalier fashion. Nobody wanted to 'disparage the value of The Salvation Army'. But the letter of November 1914 had never been received. It was all a mystery. The Army had failed to supply figures as to how many salvationists were
enlisted. There were not enough to warrant a chaplain of their own. Such a chaplain would have to roam all over the army to get into touch with handfuls of men here and there. It was a matter of practicality, not of principle. The War Office estimate was 13,000 salvationists out of more than a million troops. It was true that Australia, New Zealand and Canada had appointed salvationist chaplains, but he had no detailed information on that. How could the French authorities be expected to grasp the idea of a Salvation Army officer with the rank of say, Colonel, being a mere Captain in the military - and probably a woman at that!

It was just about bearable, until the final jibe, which drew laughter from the assembled peers. The Paymaster-General had patronised and caricatured the Army, sidestepped the central issue, distorted the statistics, ignored the fact that early impossibility of attesting as a salvationist meant the numbers on record were artificially low, and ignored too the Jewish chaplains who had been appointed with precisely the roving commission he derided for the Army - and with only 11,000 attested Jews in the combined services.

Bramwell Booth was very angry. He let a month slip by and then turned his guns on the War Office: 'The Government of this country, acting under the influence of the prejudices and the hateful sectarianism of the past, withholds its consent to the appointment of Salvation Army men (note Bramwell says 'men', not merely 'officers' - clearly in response to Lord Newton's public jibe) as chaplains.... But do not let it be supposed that because we do not have official chaplains in the purely British force, that the testimony of the Army is silent among the troops. Scarcely an hour passes which does not bring us evidence direct from the front of the fine influence which Salvation Army men (again, 'men') are exerting on all hands.... How much more might be done for the dear fellows in their hour of danger and need if we could pierce the strange
perverseness of the "official" Christians at the War Office needs no description from me.' 57 This was unusually strong, even from a usually outspoken body. The 'official Christians' were the Chaplain-General and his staff, whom Bramwell obviously identified as the culprits. Bramwell's choice of words could have been taken as a veiled allegation that the Christianity within the Chaplains Department was a sham. If that is what he meant, it was both untrue and unfair. Both sides had given vent, but things stood unchanged until well into 1918. The problem highlights the Army's unconventional standing outside the circle of respectable denominations at that time. Was it a 'mission'? Or a 'church'? Or a 'denomination'? Or a 'sect', a 'movement' an 'organisation'?

Bramwell Booth clearly felt that this issue underlay the War Office attitude.

In the meantime, however, support for the Army came from an unexpected source. At the opening of a new Army home for soldiers in Southampton Row, London (see Ch.11, Sect.1, and Ch.12, Sect.2) one of the military dignitaries supporting Field-Viscount French was Brigadier-General MacAnderson of the Australian Imperial Forces. He spoke of having met William Booth in Australia, and then went on: 'When the war broke out it was only natural we should have had Salvation Army chaplains. There would have been such a row in Australia if we had not had them - and look how they do!' He then mentioned some of them by name. 'It is curious to find our comrades of Great Britain have not seen their way to do the same. We do not quite understand that way.' 58

There is no hint in the sources as to why the War Office changed its mind, but it did. Enquiries by the writer at both the Ministry of Defence and at the Public Records Office have failed to discover any written records relating to the War Office appointments of salvationist chaplains in the First World War. The author was informed by the

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PRO that the Chaplain-General's Advisory Committee on Chaplaincy Services did not keep minutes of its meetings. Despite this, *The Times History of the War* describes the organisation of the Chaplain-General's Department as being 'as nearly perfect as it could be made'. The same source fails to make any mention of British salvationists appointed as chaplains, but in April 1918 four Salvation Army officers were made official chaplains to the King's army with the military rank of Captain. They were Major Powley, Commandant Otter, Adjutant England and Captain Purkis. Bramwell Booth dedicated them to their new work at the Westminster Central Hall on Tuesday April 9th, 1918. He told a huge crowd that these men now held three commissions: 'First, from the King of kings; second, from The Salvation Army; and now from King George.' This was no time to re-open old sores, and Bramwell was restrained. Referring to the War Office's change of heart, the *Army Year Book* said only that it was 'tardy but just'. Later Lieutenant Colonel Charles Knott was also made a chaplain. This gave the Army five, and 44 from all countries. Some of them won renown (see Ch.15).
NOTES - CH.12

1. See Ch.5, Sect.2.
2. IWC 15-8-14:10.
4. IWC 15-8-14:10.
7. Ibid., 2.
8. ATW May 1915, 233.
9. TO July 1915, 482.
10. IWC 25-9-15:2; ATW April 1915, 175, 179.
12. Ibid., Tape 7.
13a. Ibid., 182.
14. Ch.1, Sect.1.
15. SAYB 1919, 10; IWC 6-4-18:5.
16. The Times, 15-6-18:10, stating that the Army had 1,200 full-time officers engaged exclusively on war work.
18. IHQ was within 'the square mile'.
19. SG 4-12-15:2.
20. IWC 31-10-14:7.
23. ATW April 1915, 171.
25. SAYB 1915, 76.
26. Frequently, the sources fail to specify geographical locations, due presumably to military secrecy.

205.
27. Booth, 61.
29. IWC 20-1-17:8.
30. See ATW July 1917, 319-322 for generous words about the Army from Major-General Sir Francis Lloyd, Field-Marshal Viscount French, and Admiral Sir John Jellicoe (First Sea Lord). Lord Baden-Powell wrote to Booth on 25-7-17, and said the salvationists 'could be trusted better than any others': CBB 354.
32. The Times, 4-4-18:9.
32a. Ch.10, Sect.3, Note 73.
33. Ch.11, Sect.3, Notes 91, 92.
34. Ch.11, Sect.5, Note 139.
35. CBB 354.
36. SG 2-1-15:2.
37. IWC 16-1-15:7, 8.
38. CBB 361.
40. IWC 26-12-14:7.
41. IWC 3-6-16:3; 10-6-16:8.
42. ATW October 1915, 508; IWC 10-6-16:8.
43. Ch.10, Sect.2, Note 46.
44. ATW August 1914, 486.
45. SAYB 1918:13; IWC 12-9-14:6; 2-1-15:4; 8-5-15:3; 17-6-16:4; 23-12-16:3.
46. ATW July 1917, 314.
47. IWC 30-1-15:8; 10-3-17:1. Also James Gellatly, He Joined Two Armies, (SP&S, 1947) re Joseph A. Clark, 'unofficial chaplain' to the 'Old Contemptibles'. Also letter, 2-11-85, Brigadier CJ Dark to the author, describing his 'unofficial chaplaincy' activities in France in 1917, aged 17 (including sewing up corpses in blankets, ready for burial).
48. IWC 20-4-18:5.
49. This and the data on the War Office Chaplains' Department are gleaned mainly from Times History, 132.
50. For inter-denominational tensions both within and without the Chaplains' Department see Stuart Mews, Religion and English Society in the First World War, University of Cambridge, Ph.D. Thesis 1973, 192f.

51. Many chaplains committed experiences to paper. Typical is GA Birmingham's A Padre in France, (Hodder & Stoughton, 1918) in which he says the soldiers saw him as 'a padre' and 'a good sport' but he would rather have been seen as 'the minister and steward of God's mysteries' (288).

52. The Times, 6-10-15:9.

53. Hansard (House of Commons), 9-3-15, Columns 1248-1249.

54. Hansard (House of Lords), 6-10-15, Columns 1004-1011. (The Times, 7-10-15, carried a synopsis of the exchanges.)

55. Ibid.

56. For Jewish chaplains see Times History, 350.

57. IWC 6-11-15:8.

58. IWC 20-1-17:8.

59. Times History, 321.

60. IWC 20-4-18:5.

61. SAYB 1919, 7.

62. Ibid., 85. Also: Knott, 14-8-18. Numbers of chaplains from churches other than Anglican were invariably modest.
CHAPTER 13

ISSUES OF CONSCIENCE (1)

1) Those Who Fought
2) Those Who Did Not Fight
1) **Those Who Fought**

Kitchener wanted an army of 70 divisions, but the government eschewed conscription in 1914 as politically impossible. Voluntary recruiting had to do and hence Kitchener's finger pointing from public hoardings with: 'Your Country Needs YOU.' In a single week ending September 5th, 1914 175,000 men voluntarily enlisted, 750,000 by September's end, and an average of 125,000 each month until June 1915. Voluntary recruitment gave way to conscription in 1916. ¹

Thousands of British salvationists were caught up in it. General Bramwell Booth refused either to encourage enlistment or to discourage it among his people. He declared that each man must follow his conscience. In this he followed exactly the policy adopted by his father in 1899. Some saw it as a 'duty to go forth'. These, he knew, were 'true lovers of God and of His Son'. They loved their families and homes. But they saw enlistment as a patriotic duty. So be it. ²

Mrs. Booth was willing to justify enlistment by salvationists on the grounds that war (or no war) did not touch 'the essentials' of salvationism. She said, 'The enrolment of salvationists in the different armies throughout the world has helped to spread their influence, and souls have been won for Christ whom we could never otherwise have touched'.³ Volunteering was not an action necessarily inconsistent with Christian faith. Indeed, it opened doors to the gospel wherever Christians found themselves.

By the end of November 1914, there were 7,000 salvationists in the forces.⁴ Earl Grey was later to claim a figure of 20,000 (see Ch.12, Sect.3, Note 54). The War Office thought this exaggerated the position. After the entry of the USA, the Army reckoned there were, from all countries, 60,000 salvationists in the fighting forces. This 'numbers game' preoccupied the Army to a surprising degree considering its claim

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to be neutral and above the conflict. But practical issues, such as military chaplaincies, rode on the point. Even allowing for that, it smacked just a little of double standards to find The Social Gazette\(^5\) demanding that 'the authorities' say 'Thanks!' for the fact that large numbers of men volunteered from the Army's social institutions: 'It is time this country more fully appreciated the fact of what the Army has done... Perhaps enlightenment will come now.'\(^6\) The men from the institutions were not the staff, but the residents. In the early months of the war, the point was laboured by the Army. The Army had picked these men up from the gutter and transformed them into eligible volunteers for King and country: 'Thus a liability would be turned into an asset, a burden into a burden-bearer.'\(^7\) From the two London hostels (Spa Road and Whitecross) no fewer than 400 inmates volunteered,\(^8\) and 170 from the institution in Belfast.\(^9\) There were 'sufficient men to form an entire battalion' boasted Mrs. Booth.\(^10\) The Army's patriotic pride was unmistakable. What is less clear is whether or not the Army included these men (about 1000 in all\(^11\)) in their estimates of salvationists at the front. To have done so would have been less than honest since residents in hostels are, for the greater portion, not salvationists but non-salvationists simply in the Army's care. All of this points up the tension felt by salvationists, especially their leaders and administrators, due to their being caught between the understandable pull of patriotic pride on the one hand and internationalist ideals on the other. In this instance the former prevailed, leaving the Army's emphases a long way from the politically neutral posture of 1899, a posture Bramwell Booth had urged again as Britain went to war. It was well nigh impossible to decline to use statistics to highlight a patriotic advantage to the nation if that furthered the Army's work. The salvationists were human like all the rest.
Voluntary enlistment gave way to the Derby Scheme in 1915 and this in turn yielded to conscription in 1916. All British males aged 18-40 years were made subject to compulsory call-up. Ministers of religion were exempt as were (at first, but not for long) married men and widowers with dependent children. Men under 19 years were not sent to France. The introduction of conscription raised a political storm.

TE Russell was one salvationist caught by the legislation. Call-up took him unawares. At the time he was working in Army huts and hostels in the military camps and in London. On October 23rd, 1916 aged 18 years and 9 months, he reported, in full Army uniform, to Horse Guards Parade, Whitehall. A week before his nineteenth birthday he was at the front in France (see above on the 1916 Acts). He felt nothing of hatred or regard for the Germans. He had simply answered to the statutory compulsion, unaware there was any realistic alternative. He saw much action, suffered shellshock, killed or wounded nobody, but was himself wounded by shrapnel which is still in him to this day. The whole experience left him with a hatred of war, but notably no hatred of Germans or Germany, and new insights into 'the stupidity' of human beings. In all this he is probably typical of many conscripts.

Russell saw little of The Salvation Army in France. One salvationist wrote to The War Cry about his loneliness as a Christian in the forces: 'There are 142 men in my company and I am the only one who professes to be converted. They all know I'm a salvationist, and I have proved that in the fiercest temptation it is gloriously possible to serve God even in a military barracks.' Other Salvation Army volunteers and conscripts were better placed. Of the 1,800 Army musicians who volunteered in the early months, a number found themselves serving together. Several small bands were formed and sometimes used for
church parades or for entertainment.\textsuperscript{17}

Although the clergy were exempt from conscription, it was still possible for members of the clergy to volunteer for active service. Despite Bramwell Booth's wishes to the contrary (see below), some Salvation Army officers enlisted having been assured that Army service could resume on being discharged.\textsuperscript{18} Some of the enlisting officers were staff officers in London, working on IHQ or Social Services HQ in Hackney and members of the Army's (then) premier brass band, the International Staff Band. They were permitted to volunteer on condition they served in a non-combatant role.\textsuperscript{19} Other Army officers were military reservists when war broke out and so were automatically called-up and sent into action in combatant roles.\textsuperscript{20}

French Salvation Army officers of military age had no option but to serve in the French army.\textsuperscript{21} In Sweden it was the same and Army officer status availed nothing.\textsuperscript{22} In Germany, over 100 officers served compulsorily at the front, others being made chaplains or military scribes.\textsuperscript{23}

'The Salvation Army has sustained the loss of some of its brightest and most devoted soldiers,' said \textit{All The World}\textsuperscript{24} in printing a 'Roll of Honour' of salvationists killed in a North Sea naval battle in mid-1916. On nine Royal Navy vessels 15 salvationists died. In the Dardanelles campaign the loss was 200\textsuperscript{25} and the list of dead men ran to 350 for the London Opera House Memorial Service in December 1915. \textsuperscript{26} Two further great Memorial Services were held, at St. George's Hall, Liverpool, in December 1916, and at the Clapton Congress Hall in London the following month.\textsuperscript{27} At Liverpool, records \textit{The War Cry}, 'pardonable pride strove with sorrow for the uppermost place in the feelings'. The Hall displayed a giant banner saying 'Duty done, victory won', no doubt confusing the ordinary attender as to whether this was a spiritual or military assertion. In any event, it was a sad mixture of religion and war, but that
was the aura of the Army in the war as Commissioner Higgins revealed when he addressed the Liverpool congregation and affirmed that bearing arms and salvationism were entirely compatible. He spoke only what most were thinking. A poignant picture is drawn in reports of salvationists found dead on the battlefield wearing an Army jersey under their khaki, another stark symbol of the strange attempt to marry war and religion, to be a man of God whilst striving to kill as many of the enemy as possible.

Yet the evidence shows that some men felt very near to God in time of battle. AE Renshaw's diaries, held by the Imperial War Museum, are riddled with statements as to the almost tangible presence of God with him at the front in the trenches. He records that, as a salvationist, he had 'not a friend with whom I can converse on the things of God', but 'God is first, last, and all in all to me.' It was whilst on combatant service that he became convicted of a higher vocation:

'God is calling me to nobler service than that of fighting with arms. In the afternoon in our little tent I have consecrated my life on the altar of God's service if he sees fit to spare me.'

The day before a shell killed him he wrote:

'Trenches in the evening. Once again in the arena of modern warfare. I am conscious of the hand of my eternal Father guiding me at all times. My future is entirely consecrated to Him and my attitude is 'Thy will be done'.

Salvation Army newspapers carried details of all salvationists killed or wounded, whether Allied or German. This was one of the most visible signs of the Army's international bonds. Lists of German Army officers killed were published. Typical is the report of the death of Staff-Captain Fuchs at Ypres. He had been in London before the war as a member of the German delegation to the International Congress. The War Cry did not hesitate to describe him as 'one of the Army's most valiant German officers'.
Of the salvationists who fought, some turned out to be noteworthy servicemen. Acts of bravery won medals, including three Victoria Crosses. However, the episode which clings in the mind above all others recorded in the First World War sources is that of an act which earned no medal. Marine Brumpton was known to all on board HMS Cressy as a keen salvationist. A torpedo sank the ship and Brumpton found himself swimming for his life. He had located a small, floating spar when Peter Ross, another of the ship's company, and desperately exhausted, clutched the spar as well. It could not support two men and so they held on at five minute stretches each. Soon, however, it was clear that Ross could not endure without the spar continuously. Brumpton said, 'Death means life to me, so I'll say goodbye. It'll be death for you if you go down unconverted, so hold on and save yourself.' With that, Brumpton turned and swam away. Ross survived and was picked up. Some months later, in the Army citadel at Sittingbourne, he told his story. Then publicly he committed his life to Christ.

So Florence Booth's justification for salvationists in the armed forces begins to look like more than just expediency, for 'souls have been won for Christ whom we could never otherwise have touched.' And yet it is at this point, in contemplating salvationists in the forces, the role they fulfilled there, and the Army's pride in them, that the ambivalence of Salvation Army attitudes in 1914-1918 can be clearly discerned. The salvationists killed or helped others to kill whilst seeking out soul-saving opportunities. The Army displayed warm pride in them and their patriotic contribution whilst holding itself out as an example of a community capable of political neutrality in the war. If these contrasting things were not out and out contradictions, certainly they had at least to be held in an awkward tension.
2) **Those Who Did Not Fight**

The General, as we have seen, stood aside from influencing lay salvationists in either direction on voluntary enlistment. As for his officers, commissioned and ordained to full-time Christian ministry, he allowed the concession of non-combatant work and proved willing to keep opportunities open for a return to active Army officership upon discharge from the forces. He came under pressure 'to send forth officers into this dreadful conflict', but he would not do it because of 'the solemn vows which we officers have all made'. He went on to forbid officers to volunteer for combatant service:

'It seems to me that the consecration of their lives to the things of Christ, which all our officers have made, is inconsistent with their voluntary drawing of the sword in earthly warfare. There can be no doubt that they are as truly ministers of Christ's gospel as were the Apostles themselves, and as ministers of God they are covenanted to approve themselves in patience, in affliction... And so I say I cannot approve of their taking the sword, or any other carnal weapon. I think their devotion for life or death to the holy cause of the Cross of Christ and the service of man is their offering to their native land.'

Six months later, the Spring of 1915 saw a public debate raging as to whether or not ministers of religion should volunteer to fight. The Times correspondence on the issue lasted for weeks on end. Bramwell reiterated his earlier decree that Army officers were not to volunteer. They were 'doing a still greater work for the nation' in the service they were giving. An article appeared in The Officer entitled 'Ought I to Enlist?' It concluded that the people could not be left 'without a shepherd in the midst of so much tumult'. A further article for officers appeared almost exactly two years later. It tried valiantly to reconcile: a) 'the General's wishes'; b) 'the needs of the nation'; c) 'the demands of conscience'. This took some doing.

The issue came again to the fore with the introduction of the Derby Scheme, by which all males aged 18-40 years were asked to attest to their
willingness to serve in a combatant role. No exception was to be made of ministers of religion. Bramwell Booth wrote to Lord Derby:

'It has been the general custom to exempt men wholly set apart for the service of religion, no matter to what section of the Christian Church they have belonged, from liability to military service of any kind, and I do most earnestly trust that your lordship will be no party to any departure from this most wholesome and Christian practice.'

Lord Derby replied:

'I am strongly of the opinion that ministers of all denominations, however much they wish to enlist, equally do their duty when obeying the directions of those who are set in authority over them.'

Bramwell was satisfied and said again that his officers must 'remain at their posts'. But need arose yet again, before the war was over, to argue the same case with the government. In 1918 a move was made, but dropped, to conscript a stated number of ministers of religion. The General wrote on April 15th, 1918 to Sir George Cave at the Home Office:

'Speaking specially for The Salvation Army, I hope the government realises that we shall do all we can in any event, but I must point out that tens of thousands of our people... will feel their patience strained to the utmost by the spectacle of men reserved for breeding horses and brewing beer when men devoted to the service of religion are taken by force into the armies.'

Salvation Army officers were as human as the next person and some must have felt the fierce pull of patriotism. But the General's word was unambiguous - no combatant service by officers. There were others, however, for whom this directive was superfluous, for on principle they would not have taken up arms. These were the conscientious objectors.

The 1916 legislation on conscription made a concession to conscience. An application could be made to a Local Tribunal for a Certificate of Exemption 'on the ground of a conscientious objection to the undertaking of combatant service'. The Certificate, if granted, could be absolute, conditional, or temporary. There was the possibility of appeal from the Local Tribunal and then the Central Tribunal. AJP Taylor says:
'The Tribunals were composed of the elderly and retired, unsympathetic to conscientious objectors.' Some 7000 objectors agreed to perform non-combatant service, usually in ambulance work; 3000 were confined in government labour camps; 1500 remained absolute objectors and went to prison.

William Knott's diaries speak of the treatment meted out even to those who accepted non-combatant service. A salvationist, he had actually volunteered for such work in 1914 but found himself pressurised to go into the infantry: 'The RAMC depot is the servant of all at this Aldershot in the desert... They put us to road-making, a task usually reserved for the prisoners. Thus the volunteers of 1914 are dealt with. If they think this will break our conscience and hearts to the extent of putting us in the infantry, they are mistaken for no man on this earth will separate me or deter me from doing the will of my Father in Heaven.' He later described his 'indignation' at hearing of 12 men, absolute objectors, who were put behind barbed wire and starved for two days.

TE Russell admired the 'great courage' of the conscientious objectors he met, courage 'as much as to win a VC'. He mentions also their brutal treatment. The government were forced to admit in the Commons the truth of a report that an objector at Cleethorpes Camp was 'confined in a pit 12 feet below ground for 11 days and nights and for four of those days obliged to stand ankle deep in mud and water'.

William Knott appeared before a Tribunal seeking confirmation that he might remain in a non-combatant unit after the introduction of conscription. His hearing was in July 1918. The Tribunal consisted of two infantry officers and 'a Wesleyan padre who was friendly'. 'I then gave my statement as to my position in the SA before the war and my intention of returning to this beloved work after hostilities have concluded. I
also gave my personal objection to combatant service in the light of the international gospel of Jesus Christ. A great help was a statement signed by the Chief of the Staff verifying my pre-war SA duties. His application was accepted and he served in an ambulance unit.

The secular sources reveal only two salvationists who were imprisoned as absolute objectors. These followed in the footsteps of Arthur Booth-Clibborn in their absolutist stance (see Ch.6). The Army sources make no mention whatever of them and they appear only as unidentified statistics in Mrs. Henry Hobhouse's *I Appeal Unto Caesar* - *The Case of the Conscientious Objector*. On July 1st, 1917 there were 817 men in prison as absolutists. Of these, 307 recorded their religious affiliation as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Religious Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>Society of Friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Congregationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Atheist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Wesleyan</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Church of England</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Baptist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Salvation Army</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The complete silence of the Army sources on these two people contrasts sharply with the many accounts of the large number of salvationists at the front. Indeed, *The War Cry*, somehow sensing a need for readers to be, if not actually reassured, at least informed, stressed how few salvationist objectors there were. The General addressed the matter of conscientious objection three times in print. In September 1914 he said he was being urged to forbid the taking up of weapons by salvationists on the ground that 'all war is murder'. He went on:
'I cannot accept that statement. I find nothing in the Bible to support it... In days gone by God both used and approved righteous wars. The New Testament, the great message of Love to Mankind, says nothing which condemns the profession of a soldier. Nay, some of the nearest followers of Jesus Christ and the Apostles were evidently soldiers serving in the national armies of that time, and nothing is said to prohibit their doing so. I could not, therefore, proclaim that all war is murder - it would not be true.'

In mid-1915 he reaffirmed the inviolability and supremacy of individual conscience. He did not wish to cast any adverse reflections on 'Christian men who cannot take the sword, and who would even, as one of our people said to me the other day, rather be shot than shoot.' Each man 'must be persuaded in his own mind and must act according to his own conscience as God gives him light.'

Only a month later he felt it necessary to spell this out in more detail, having received correspondence expressing 'regret or surprise that I have not prohibited Salvation Soldiers from taking part in the War'. He recognised 'the sincerity and beauty' of the writers' sentiments but categorically could not prohibit participation in the fighting by lay salvationists. Nothing in the Bible, in experience, in reason or enlightened conscience could make him do so. How could it be wrong for the man who 'after thought and prayer, consecrates himself freely and deliberately to some great cause... he believes to be a righteous cause'? In such a case it is right to fight, but perhaps even better to refrain. Every man must pray and then follow his conscience.

It is not possible to read these statements and conclude that in the First World War the stance taken by the Army was 'a pacifist stance'. Yet this is the assertion found in a short unpublished paper written at York University, Canada. The writer, Shelley Page, refers to the Army's 'proclaimed pacifism', the Army's stance... as a pacifist organisation, 'the pacifist stance taken by The...
Salvation Army'64, and the Army's 'proclamations of pacifist neutrality'65. It is clear that the author is not familiar with the relevant literature, has used her terminology loosely ('pacifism' is nowhere defined in the paper65a) and reached a conclusion unsupported by the available evidence.66

Bramwell Booth's express refusal to dictate to any man's conscience (other than in the case of Army officers whose calling he regarded as precluding the bearing of arms, but perhaps consistent with military work of a non-combatant kind) and his explicit rejection of the pacifist view that all war is ipso facto immoral, would not have satisfied his younger brother, Herbert. History was to repeat itself. After the Boer War, Arthur Booth-Clibborn took William Booth to task in a pacifist tract.67 Now the Army's second General, having steered his worldwide family safely (albeit uncertainly at times) through its second inter-nation conflict faced a critic in the person of his own brother and erstwhile fellow-salvationist leader. Herbert had developed pacifist views of a rigid and absolute nature and these he put down on paper during the war, but could not find a publisher. He was living in the USA where patriotic sentiment was strong. In 1923 the book came out.68

Herbert had been estranged from his father, the Founder, since his resignation but the book was dedicated jointly to Herbert's parents and those of his wife. There is an unmistakeable attempt from the first page to leave the reader with the impression that both William and Catherine Booth were pacifists like Herbert. This was not the case, as William's Boer War pronouncements show. The Foreword opens with a sweeping assault on the leaders of the church: 'What shall be said of the crime which has turned half of Europe into a quagmire of youthful corpses - a shambles running with human
blood - over which the bishops of the world have been holding forth holy hands in benediction." His target was 'the pugilistic Christianity of the modern church', not secular governments. If it is right for Christians to kill, he argues, they would have a more urgent need to kill heretics rather than Germans since, with God, heresy is worse than imperialism. Thus it would be right for Christians to slay 'saloon-keepers and white slave traffickers' since 'the sword is a quicker method than oratory'. These arguments are typical of much of the book which relies heavily on the reductio ad absurdum.

It is not long before he turns specifically to the Army: 'Go into any "Officers Council" (something like a Church General Assembly) and thunder against booze... and you will get thunders of applause... But you say just one word against war... war itself on an anti-Christian method... and you will find you have dropped the acid test into the very doubtful solution of this world's Christianity... The sympathetic atmosphere of that gathering will turn to frigid coldness.' This was, of course, a baseless accusation. Herbert had not been near an Officers Council for 12 years before the war began, let alone during the war. True, many a salvationist endorsed both British and American arms against the Central Powers, but almost always with sorrowful reluctance, as much in these preceding pages bears out.

Herbert gave his years in the Army warm credit for instilling into him a love of all nations: 'For years I worked with my father in an organisation which perhaps more than any other then existing proved how great was the unifying power of the Cross. We had a flag which has been carried, unaccompanied by any other flag, through the streets of almost all the nations on earth... Its followers... have risen to the truest kind of citizenship.'

With these more kindly words, he launched into a condemnation of
work by Christians in military camps. The Army's military systems far exceed any committees you may care to set up, he says, but the same systems used to kill other humans become satanic, 'a superlative horror' which no 'Red Cross contrivances' can hide. Many a professing Christian had 'found a refuge from a troubled conscience in the Field Hospitals' and 'many a traitor to the Cross has hidden his shameful acquiescence in the gospel of hate behind the Red Cross of Geneva.' Herbert's strong words reflected strong feelings, but the indirect charge against the Army was clear. In humanitarian works in the battlezone the Army had sold out to the enemy, to 'the gospel of hate'. Moreover, most who went to serve the suffering did so 'for the love of mere adventure or to win the halo of earthly glory'. How did Herbert know? We can only hear his judgmental words and leave it there. The accused 'traitors to the Cross' could answer, of course, only by the quality of their actions and lives. But Herbert was not satisfied. He picked out for special mention 'one of my own devoted nieces who in the late war rendered good service at the front'. He meant Mary Booth. Damning her work in the war zone with faint praise, he then pilloried her for her silence on the 'agony' the men she visited and helped had heaped upon the Germans. He accused her of lack of sympathy for the wounded of the other side. It was a laughable indictment, suggesting perhaps that he had read her memoirs with a highly selective eye.

By 1923, when The Saint and The Sword was published, men's minds were looking forward not back and the Army was busy taking advantage of less troubled times. Like Booth-Clibborn before him, Herbert evoked only a dignified silence; and again like Booth-Clibborn before him he was now an outsider. All chance of influencing the Army disappeared the day he resigned.
Herbert Booth did not live to become aware of the rise of pacifism in the 1930's or of the emergence of a small but articulate, distinguished group of Salvation Army officer pacifists in that decade, three of whom were to succeed to the supreme office of General. Not one of them, however, ever attempted to bring the Army as a whole into line with his personal convictions. (See Ch. 20.) In all the wars covered by this study, official policy as stated in London declared private conscience to be the final arbiter on the bearing of arms. William Booth's 1899 precedent was found just as workable and just as essential in 1914-1918 (and again in 1939-1945) as it was when the Founder first faced war's dilemmas.
1. AJPT 20.

2. IWC 29-8-14:7.


4. IWC 12-12-14:3.

5. SG 10-10-14:3.

6. Ibid.

7. SG 22-8-14:2.

8. SG 12-9-14:2.

9. SG 15-4-16:2.

10. ATW July 1915, 408.

11. Bateman, 106.

12. Military Service Act 1916 (effective 1-3-16); Military Service Act 1916 (Session 2) (effective 25-5-16).

13. Ibid.


15. Letter, TE Russell, 16-7-85.

16. IWC 3-10-14:11.

17. ATW April 1915, 172.

18. Letter, Mrs. V. Lawson, 9-7-85, re her father, Alban Groom, commissioned a Salvation Army Officer in 1915, but who volunteered for the RAMC shortly thereafter, becoming a nursing orderly. He served in Russia on a hospital train travelling between Archangel and Murmansk. After the war The Salvation Army renewed his commission, honouring promises made by Army leaders when he enlisted.


20. IWC 15-8-14:10.

22. IWC 29-8-14:3.

23. IWC 12-12-14:6. See Ch.10, Sect.3.


25. The Times, 16-7-15:11.


27. IWC 2-12-16:1; The Times, 22-1-17:5.

28. IWC 2-12-16:2.

29. St. Albans CHB 14-8-17. (Five men of the corps died in action.)

30. E.g. Captain Alderson, a reservist killed at Ypres: IWC 2-1-15:8 (interview with his mother). For articles on wartime bereavement (in two parts) see Samuel Logan Brengle: 'A Word to those who have lost Loved Ones in the War' IWC 18-3-16:2; 25-3-16:2.

31. Renshaw, 4-3-15.

32. Ibid., 26-4-15.

33. Ibid., 2-5-15.

34. Ibid., 10-3-16.

35. E.g. IWC 6-2-15:3.

36. IWC 10-7-15:3.

37. SAYB 1919, 25-6. Private W. Clamp captured 35 Germans single-handed; Private Roy Holmes, also single-handed, silenced two German machine guns and took 18 prisoners; Private James Flynn bandaged wounded men under heavy fire and carried them to safety.


40. E.g. The Times, 5-3-15:9.

41. IWC 12-6-15:7.

42. TO July 1915, 465-6.

42a. TO June 1917, 309-312.

43. IWC 6-11-15:6.

44. Ibid.

45. CBB 361.

225.
Military Service Act 1916, Sect.2.

AJPT 54.


Knott, 8–6–18; 24–6–18.

Ibid., 4–7–18.

Russell, Tape 9.

Hansard (House of Commons), 19–7–17.

Knott, 7–7–18.

Ibid., 29–7–18.

Ibid., 16–17. See John W. Graham, Conscription and Conscience - A History 1916–1919, (George Allen & Unwin, 1922), 326 for 7–14–19 statement by the War Office admitting that many objectors were 'the victim of ineptitude' by Tribunals.


Ibid.

Shelley Page, 'Salvation Army Pacifism During World War One'. (Unpublished manuscript, SA Archive, Toronto, 15–8–83. Despite its title, the first mention of the war is at p.10. The paper is 13 pages long.)

Ibid., 4.

Ibid., 7.

Ibid., 8.

Ibid., 13.

For a discussion of the possible meanings of pacifism see Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill, The Ethics of War, Duckworth Press, 1979), 112ff.

Letters to York University, Ontario, attempting dialogue on Miss Page's paper have met with no response.

68. The Saint and The Sword, (George H. Doran, New York, 1923).

69. Ibid., 9.

70. Ibid., 10.

71. Ibid., 14-15.

72. Ibid., 16-17.

73. Ibid., 19.

74. Ibid., 22.

75. Ibid., 32.

76. Ibid., 33.

77. Ibid., 165.

78. Ibid., 172-173.
CHAPTER 14

THE ARMY AND THE CHURCHES (1)

1) Anglicans
2) Methodists
3) Quakers
4) Baptists

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1. Anglicans

Like The Salvation Army, the Church of England sought to meet both the spiritual and material needs of the servicemen. Anglican work in the camps, both at home and abroad, was expressed in refreshment huts and letter writing services run mainly by the Church Army. Eventually these centres numbered about 2000. A fleet of ambulances came into being, manned by clergy volunteers who acted in the dual role of pastor and driver. Comforts for the troops, visitation of the wounded and much more were undertaken. Here the Army and the Anglican Church were on common ground, as also in their provision of chaplains and their shared concern over alcohol consumption in the forces.

Bramwell Booth's heart would have warmed to the Archbishop of Canterbury's description of his church's wartime calling:

,'Our Church of England is setting itself in these months of strain to the task of deepening, strengthening, and uplifting the Christian thought, the Christian life, of the English people. We plan throughout the land a Mission to the Nation, a Mission of Repentance and Hope. We want to learn how to pray together.... We want our men when they return from war to find a new value, a new strength, a new sunshiny, in the homes they left. We believe it can be done.'

However, the Army's leader would have repudiated the assertion of the leading article in The Church Times that the war represented 'the utter failure of Christianity'. Bramwell's view was that Christianity could not have failed since it had not been tried. The judgment of Paul Johnson is nearer that of The Church Times leader: '1914... was a devastating blow to Christianity... All the participants claimed they were killing in the name of moral principle... On one side were ranged Protestant Germany, Catholic Austria, Orthodox Bulgaria and Moslem Turkey. On the other were Protestant Britain, Catholic France and Italy and Orthodox Russia.' Though The Church Times recognised the need for 'shame at the sin of war', it threw its weight unreservedly

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behind the British Government, as it had in the Boer War. Hostilities had been 'forced upon us against our will', despite the 'persistence of the Cabinet' and the 'wholehearted endeavours of the King'. The German nation had 'become the tool of the Junker Party and of that spirit of aggressive militarism which has gained an increasing ascendancy of late years.' The war was entirely just: 'If our ancestors in 1588 were justified in repelling the Armada by force we are justified in fighting Germany today.... The battle is one for our national existence.' The actions of Germany were 'a menace to Christianity' and thus 'recourse to arms is a matter beyond our choice'.

In October 1914, 42 Anglican bishops publicly blamed Germany for the war in 'The Appeal to the German Evangelical Professors'. This came as a reply to accusations from German academic theologians over the origins of the war, claiming Germany had been wantonly attacked. The English reply sided openly with the actions of the British Government and made frequent references to the diplomatic papers:

'We unite wholeheartedly with our German brethren in deploping the disastrous consequences of the war... yet the principles of truth and honour are yet more dear.... We have taken our stand for international good faith and for the safeguarding of smaller nationalities.'

The Bishop of London, the Rt. Rev. AF Winnington-Ingram, went still further, professing the view that England was God's chosen weapon for chastising the German nation. All this would have been too direct for the Army, but it was not bold enough for some. Despite Anglican support for the war, the Church came under fire from those who regarded her position as half-hearted. Sir Henry Craik, MP, published an article condemning the Church of England for lack of patriotism and eulogising the French Church, the Church of Scotland, and the Presbyterians for their encouragement to the people to fight. Such criticism was wide of the mark. Anglican leaders made no bones of their feelings
toward Germany. Randall Davidson saw German aggression as 'bluntly, nakedly evil' and Ralph Inge, Dean of St. Paul's, spoke of 'the fiendish cruelty and treachery of our chief opponent... Germany, on whom rests the sole guilt of this war'. Paul Johnson records the experience of Cosmo Gordon Lang, Archbishop of York, who (like Bramwell Booth) allowed himself to be mistaken as pro-Kaiser because he objected to the vulgar treatment of the Kaiser in the popular press. Lang 'received thousands of abusive letters, was cut in the Yorkshire Club and, worst of all, detected a coolness at Windsor and Balmoral.'  

Archbishop Lang's (inadvertent) impression of half-heartedness as to the English cause was not typical of Anglicanism. Prayers for victory were called for, the war was frequently equated with a Christian crusade, and the pacifists received a tough time from Anglican critics. The overtly patriotic Bishop of London, at an open-air service outside St. Mary Abchurch in Cannon Street, said: 'Some funny things are done in answer to conscience. I am one of those who think that conscientious objectors are all wrong. It is more truly obeying conscience to throw yourself into battle.' Similarly, the Dean of Manchester Cathedral preached against pacifism in the week war was declared. He made it clear that 'the no war at any price party' would find no sympathy with him. A pacifist letter to The Church Times came in for heavy criticism and a leading article in 1916 argued that the conscientious objector 'might as well object to serving on a jury in the case of larceny because theft is forbidden by the Decalogue.' Pacifist literature received unfavourable reviews but, conversely so too did literature advocating the annihilation of Germany. A review of The Sacrament (by 'L.L.') was published in The Church Times in 1916. The reviewer found it 'appalling' in its aggressive lust for German blood. In scanning the bound volumes
of The Church Times at its offices in Portugal Street, London, this writer found between the pages of the 1916 volume a hand-written letter to the editor from one L. Longfield (L.L.). It is a humble letter, dated September 30th, 1921 saying that a drastic crisis in his life caused him to write now, regretting his book which had confounded things natural with things spiritual. He wished to thank the reviewer.

Army leaders held back from such expressions on matters of politics. They would have found eminently more fitting the balanced, clear-headed analysis of the issues offered by Cyril William Emmett in his 'War and the Ethics of the New Testament' in the Foakes-Jackson symposium. Emmett found the case for pacifism unproven, but reached his conclusion by way of a calm consideration of the New Testament references followed by a carefully drawn distinction between firstly the appeal to force on the part of an individual to defend his rights and secondly the same by the community. Bramwell Booth frequently advised his people as to their place in the war, but nowhere in the salvationist literature is there anything even half so incisively helpful as Emmett's contribution to The Faith and The War.

Salvationists and Anglicans found themselves very much on common ground when it came to the question of the clergy bearing arms in combatant roles. Bramwell Booth forbade his officers from volunteering for combatant service and actively opposed moves in Parliament to subject the clergy to compulsory call-up. In all of this he found a twin soul in the Archbishop of Canterbury who repeatedly advocated the desirability both in practice and principle of a non-combatant clergy. The Anglican press discouraged even non-combatant service, saying that priests who had volunteered for the RAMC never saw the front but were used as hospital clerks. The Church Times offered criticism of

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MP's who opposed an exemption for ministers of religion in the Military Service Act 1916, but endorsed the closure of some of the theological colleges and the entering of military service by ordinands. (Bramwell Booth refused to close his Officers' Training Home during the war.)

The Archbishop of Canterbury, in the House of Lords, defended staunchly the exemption for the clergy: 'No doubt the technical law of the church forbids the shedding of blood by those in holy orders. But we prefer to rest on another ground, namely, that the nation needs its religious basis during this time. We will not withhold them from going (as chaplains) but we also need parish priests at this time.'

The Bishop of London, despite his hawkish stance on the war, took the same line when confronted with a deputation of junior priests seeking his consent to non-combatant enlistment.

Nevertheless, some priests did enlist for combatant duties. One was Fr. Hubert Northcott of the Community of the Resurrection. Extracts from his letters were reprinted in the Community's journal and he described emptying swill tubs and scrubbing the floor at a Salvation Army hut in France: 'Do you realise the irony of the situation - a priest of the Church of England sorting out the Salvation Army's swill-tubs... I said Terce as I did it as a kind of Te Deum.' Fr. Northcott had discovered Christianity with its sleeves rolled up. The Great War was also a great leveller.

There was one issue which reared its head time and again and which found the Army differing from many Anglican leaders. It was to do with the eternal destiny of soldiers killed in battle. Alan Wilkinson describes it succinctly: 'A quasi-Islamic belief, encouraged explicitly or tacitly by many in the churches, that soldiers dying nobly in a "holy war" would immediately enter into everlasting life.' The chief advocate of this theory, no doubt prompted by commendable pastoral as well as patriotic motives, was the Bishop of London. In his first
Sunday evening sermon in St. Paul's Cathedral after the declaration of war, and with a congregation of 10,000, he said:

'If it so happens that some dear boy, the darling of your home, passes with unsullied honour, and to uphold the nation's name, into the presence of the Unseen, you will find him there, waiting for you when your time comes, one of God's own children and kept most safely in His care.'31

He recorded the same belief in 'The Conditions of Victory', his contribution to the symposium edited by Basil Matthews32, a belief echoed in part by Dean Inge in the same publication.33

The Salvation Army went out of its way to deny the truth of this doctrine:

'Think a moment. If those who lay down their lives for their country are thereby forgiven and made fit for Heaven then all who fall in this present war, of whatever nationality, are saved, no matter how full of bitterness and hatred their hearts may be.... To many, the fact of giving themselves for their country is the beginning of a new life of self-sacrifice, and opens a means by which the Spirit of God can and often does reach their hearts. But the mere fact of dying on the battlefield cannot bring pardon and peace to the heart that loves and clings to sin.... To teach that a man is saved because he gives his life for his country is both dangerous and wrong, and our men would themselves be the first to say so.'34

If this would have dismayed the Bishop of London, at least one Anglican churchman saw in the Army and its people a sign of hope for when the war was over. This was Herbert H. Henson, Dean of Durham. In 'The Church of England After The War'35 he looked afresh at pre-war doctrinal divisions in Christendom and commented:

'How much strength will bigoted theories about schism and heresy retain in a man's mind, however hitherto bound by them, who has witnessed the sublimely simple faith of salvationists and methodists, hallowing the difficult warfare of the trenches, and rising grandly in desperate moments of conflict?'36

It was a kindly, optimistic, but unfulfilled thought.

2) Methodists

Methodist work amongst servicemen in England and abroad was exten-
sive and in many of its expressions on a scale in excess of anything The Salvation Army could manage. It had, for instance, 39 homes for soldiers and sailors around the countries of the British Empire and in response to the war erected 27 additional buildings. Between 400 and 500 Soldiers' Institutes came into being at home, attached to Wesleyan churches and used by an estimated 35,000 men nightly. Comforts parcels weighing, on average, 3,000 lbs per week were sent overseas from methodists in the UK. 37 'The Service Hymnal' was published containing 55 hymns 'chosen with much care... specially suited to the needs of our soldiers and sailors and available at 7/3d. per 100. The so-called 'Methodist Rosary' also appeared, entitled 'On Active Service - For God and King', a book of devotional readings for use by servicemen, bound in red for the army and in blue for the navy. 38 Over 60,000 copies went into use. 39 Temperance work was undertaken amongst the troops and The Methodist Recorder pleaded for the prohibition of alcohol, going further than the Army which saw the impracticalities of outright prohibition (see Ch.11, Sect.1, Notes 50, 51).

Like the Army, the Methodist Church created a special War Emergency Fund designed 'to contribute its share towards meeting the great National Emergency'. Simultaneous collections in all churches took place on the last Sunday in October 1915 to launch the Fund. The Methodist Church in Canada created a Belgian Relief Fund and channelled the moneys through London.

Methodist ministers volunteered to serve as military chaplains. Before the war the one and only body of English non-conformity which was officially recognised by the War Office was the Wesleyan Methodist Church. The names of their ministers had appeared in the Army list for eleven years before 1914 and the worth of these chaplains was widely acknowledged. By the end of the second year of the war there were over 235.
150 of them plus 600 to 700 'Officiating Clergymen' who acted at home under the direct sanction of the War Office and performed chaplaincy duties whilst retaining their own pastoral charge. None of the difficulties which faced The Salvation Army over chaplaincies were encountered, although the War Office was slow to increase the number of Methodist chaplains from four when war broke out. By January 1915 there were still only eleven, of whom only four were with British troops in either England or France.

Methodism shared the Army's reluctance to admit any incongruity in a Christian serving as a soldier. Many inspiring anecdotes from the front found their way into print to show that Christians in the forces were influencing their fellows for Christ. Similar stories appeared in the salvationist papers. JH Bateson, the leading Methodist chaplain, reported the death of 'Bobbie the Cavalryman' and dubbed him 'a man of prayer - the highest type of soldier-saint'. CW Andrews was a regular contributor to The Methodist Recorder at the time and in 'Worship in the Trenches' he wrote:

'There is nothing incongruous in the thought of our warriors, sword in hand, breaking the bread and holding the chalice of the Lord's Passion. Quite the contrary, for it seems many of them are walking truly in the way of the Holy Cross.'

On the question of achieving salvation by dying in battle, The Methodist Recorder ventured the opinion that where the horrors of war and personal danger moved a man to prayer it was possible to regard him as 'converted' without an explicit recognition on his part of the need for repentance and faith: 'The leap of the soul to God is the one great thing that counts.'

Methodism came out unequivocally in support of the Allied cause in the war. It was right to pray for a British victory, Germany was 'a proud and ruthless conqueror' whose 'lack of understanding where
spirits. She had shown her quality as being 'evil to the bone, intolerably evil'. It was not possible to pray for Kaiser Wilhelm II as an enemy since 'they know not what they do' did not apply in his case.

All this would have been much too overtly partisan for the Army's leadership which still clung, precariously at times, to political neutrality. But the Methodist Conference wanted the country and the government to know where it stood:

'We the Ministers of the Wesleyan Methodist Church in Conference assembled herewith assure H.M. Government of our deep and loyal sympathy with them in the prosecution of this war declared four years ago. On the eve of the fourth anniversary of that declaration we thankfully recall the unselfish aims which actuated the Secretary for Foreign Affairs and the Government when entering the struggle. We also are grateful to God for the response which so many of our sons have freely made to the nation's appeal.'

The message ended with an assurance that if the government maintained high motives it would 'continue to merit the Divine blessing'. Methodists and Anglicans stood staunchly united against Germany, a luxury The Salvation Army could not afford as a worldwide Christian community committed to internationalism and with much to lose inside Germany. The Roman Catholic Church too was internationally structured but Methodist opinion could make no allowance on that ground for the Pope. The Methodist Recorder carried extracts from an interview with the Pope by a French journalist:

'It now appears that the Pope questions nothing...pronounces on nothing. Even the violation of Belgium is put aside with the amazing words, "That was in the Pontificate of my predecessor."

After all this futility the Pope does not hesitate to say, "I am the representative of God on earth." A more curious document (i.e. the interview) has seldom seen the light.'

A similar refusal to make allowances marked the official Methodist
attitude to conscientious objectors. The Minutes of The Methodist
Conference in the war years carried not a single mention of them or
of Methodists with pacifist convictions. CW Andrews in The Methodist
Recorder argued for recognition of the role of conscience but spoiled
it by adding: 'It is certain that a great many people believe that
amongst the 20,000 (objectors) there are cowards who have stooped to
the baseness of pleading conscience so that they may save their skins.'
In the Spring of 1916, 23 ministers and laymen came together to form a
Methodist League of Peace. They published a Manifesto called 'An
Address to the People called Methodists' arguing the pacifist case.
The Methodist Recorder reported the Manifesto but published on the same
page six letters opposing it with none in support. Later, the
Methodist Conference resolved to ban the use of the word 'Methodist' in
the name of the League of Peace, accepting arguments put up by the
Birmingham and Shrewsbury District that the idea of a 'Methodist' pacifist
group was harmful not only to Methodist interests (!) but to the interests
of the nation. This and the message to H.M. Government from the 1918
Conference leave an impression that the Methodist Church in England
feared the consequences of being perceived as less than enthusiastic
about the war and the righteousness of the Allied cause. Why else
prohibit formally the use of the 'Methodist' tag by a movement consisting
entirely of methodist pacifists? Why else refer, in a formal resolution
of support for the government's policy, to the active war service of
members of the Methodist Church? The Army never came anywhere near
(at least in London) to a formal resolution supporting British policy in
the war, but it shared the same pride shown by Methodists in the numbers
serving in the armed forces (see Ch.13).

Perhaps the truer Methodist heartbeat is found in a sermon preached
by the Reverend WH Findlay and published as part of the Basil Matthews
Findlay readily recognised the tendency of human hearts to be overcome by evil, especially in the face of 'swarming infamies and outrages', but went on to exhort his hearers and readers to be 'more than conquerors' and to gain victory over 'anger, loathing, ill-will towards the evil-doers' and then to win the still higher 'supervictory' of loving the enemy. Such love was not approval, liking or condoning. It rather 'keeps alive the sense of kinship; it is family-love... because the offender is of one's flesh and bone, is inextricably, inalienably, our own.'

With this the Army's leadership would have been pleased to agree. They sought, not always successfully, to make such teaching the main thrust of their pronouncements, eschewing the temptation to address the political questions in public or to apportion blame between the nations in a manner likely to foster anti-German sentiments. Some other opinions of the established church and of Methodism would have found no place in Army rhetoric. The main business was souls, something in which, however, the Army was not alone for all the denominations, whether willing to enter the political arena or not, at least attempted to weigh and measure their wartime life by the gospel and its claims on men and women. William Hartley, a Methodist writer, saw in the ... present crisis the possibility of a mighty religious revival'. So too did the Army.

3) Quakers

The Society of Friends and The Salvation Army have more than once turned to each other for mutual support and understanding because of their shared non-reliance upon sacramental ceremony, a non-reliance placing them in a (not always comfortable) minority position within world Christianity. Quaker and salvationist experience have touched also in the matter of conscientious objection to war and military
service, particularly before 1914 and most notably in the case of Arthur Booth-Clibborn, whose views took him out of the Army after the Boer War and produced schism in William Booth's family. It would be wrong, however, to suggest that Quakers and salvationists shared as much in common on the war as they did, and still do, on sacraments. Conscientious objection in the Army was always very much a minority response (see Chs.13 and 20). In Quakerism it was widespread and, insofar as there was an identifiable official Quaker stance on the Great War, pacifist conscientious objection denoted that stance.

In their earlier history, Friends often became soldiers and the contradiction between this and their principles was not clearly seen. Those principles stated first that human personality enshrines the divine and that Christ somehow and mysteriously indwells every person. The idea of man, therefore, as 'cannon fodder' could not be entertained. Only by making an enemy a friend could he be overcome. Each person must decide whether their trust will be placed in physical or spiritual forces. Quakers could recognise no place for dilemma in all of this; no expediency could be let cloud the issues, such as the idea of doing evil that good may come. George Fox, William Penn, John Bellers and Jonathan Dymond addressed the questions of Quakers and military service in their writings and forged the literary foundations for the Quaker views now so well known.

According to Dr. Stuart Mews, the outbreak of war in 1914 threw the Quakers into confusion. He does not elaborate on this statement or cite evidence in support of it. What is clear, however, is that the Society of Friends was anxious that traditional Quaker attitudes should not be allowed to pass sub silentio. In November 1914 the Meeting For Sufferings issued a 'Declaration on the War' and sent it to all Meetings of Friends. It said:
'All war is utterly incompatible with the plain precepts of our Divine Lord and Lawgiver, and with the whole spirit and tenor of His Gospel and no plea of necessity or of policy... can avail to release either individuals or nations from the paramount allegiance which they owe unto Him who said "Love your enemies".... We can well understand the noble instinct which makes men desire to risk their lives for their country.... The highest service is to contribute our lives to the cause of love in helping our country to a more Christlike idea of service.'

The Declaration was an attempt to hold the pacifist line which did not rule out categorically the possibility of non-combatant service by Friends, many of whom, in common with many salvationists, could reconcile the reality of the war, and its stark implications for their homes and loved ones, with their Christian faith not so much by total non-involvement but by working actively for the alleviation of suffering by sacrificial service. Such a conviction gave birth to the Friends Ambulance Unit (FAU) which functioned very much as did the Ambulance Units of The Salvation Army (see Ch.11, Sect.3). The FAU began with 8 cars and 43 men and grew eventually to engage 600 men (not all necessarily Quakers, but sharing Quaker convictions on combatant service). The Unit established 12 hospitals, ran 2 hospital ships and 2 ambulance trains. It carried 800,000 wounded servicemen and established a first rate reputation. It afforded an outlet for those not of an absolutist turn of mind (stricter Friends rejected work even in the FAU) and who did not wish to oppose conscription in general. Olaf Stapledon served in the Unit and recalls the need to refuse to carry ammunition to the front in its ambulances, a task commonly done by ordinary military ambulances. Stapledon saw the FAU as 'a sincere expression of two overpowering and wholesome impulses, the will to share in the common ordeal and the will to make some kind of protest against the common folly.' The Unit was 'an expression of minds whose allegiance was divided... a strange hybrid of militarism and pacifism'. Semi-military uniforms were worn, but the internal spirit and discipline were 'quite
Stapledon might well have been describing the Ambulance Units of The Salvation Army.

In July 1915 again the Meeting For Sufferings circulated advice to all Friends. The need arose because of the introduction of the Derby Scheme. Quakers were advised to register but to add the following reservation:

'Whilst registering as a citizen in conformity with the demand of the Government, I cannot conscientiously take part in military service, in any employment necessitating the taking of the military oath, nor in the production of materials the object of which is the taking of human life.'

The following year saw a number of Friends of absolutist persuasion under sentence of death for their convictions. Many were already in prison, being visited by a panel of nearly 70 Quaker prison chaplains, but some rejected combatant service or alternative work and were sent to France. On refusing to obey military orders there, they were court-martialled and sentenced to be shot, a sentence averted only by vigorous parliamentary exertions. The death sentence was commuted to 10 years penal servitude, but release came shortly after the Armistice.

4) **Baptists**

One of those closely involved in pleading for the conscientious objectors sentenced to death in France was the leading Baptist preacher, FB Meyer. With other Free Church ministers he interceded with Lord Kitchener and went personally to Boulogne to visit the condemned men. Meyer was not himself a pacifist and had lost his only grandson in the fighting, but his vigilance, with others, toward freedom of conscience was instrumental in saving the lives of the men in France.

The Baptist attitude to conscientious objection was perhaps closer to that of the Army than that of the other leading denominations. It
was certainly a good deal more sympathetic than that of Anglicanism or Methodism. The Baptist Times saw war as 'an evil so appalling that there can be nothing but sympathetic comprehension on the part of Christian men in regard to those of their fellow-Christians who are constrained to condemn war absolutely and without qualification.' Pacifism was acknowledged as 'an active force for righteousness none can measure'.

The difficulty, however, was in translating individual standards in Christian ethics into the principle and practice of the life of the state which could hardly discharge its duty to its citizens by allowing itself to be annihilated. Baptists thus recognised a Christian duty to maintain the state 'for the sake of the Kingdom of God, even to the point of armed force'.

Like Army leaders, the Baptists refused to blame the mass of the German people for the war. Blame attached to 'the wickedness and folly of their rulers' so that 'no doubt is any longer possible... as to who is responsible for the war or as to the sincere and strenuous efforts made by our own government to preserve our own neutrality.'

If the Baptist press was willing to apportion blame, Baptist leaders preferred a more detached response. In an open letter to 'The Ministers and Members of Churches in the Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland' the President of the Baptist Union, Charles Joseph, and the Secretary, JH Shakespeare, together with three ex-Presidents called all Baptists to prayer. It was 'not for us to apportion blame... nor to restrict intercessions to our beloved homeland' but Baptists should pray that Germany might 'regain a spirit of national sanity and self-control'. Only a week later The Baptist Times reported a sermon by Dr. Clifford at London's Westbourne Park Baptist Church on 'The War and The Churches' in which again Germany was squarely blamed for the war.
Despite this, the sermon echoed many themes found in the salvationist sources, especially that of the need to forgive enemies from the heart.\textsuperscript{74} It came closer still to Army emphases when it urged also 'the great fundamental doctrine of the solidarity of humanity' and urged the priority of 'those suffering loss, poverty or distress'. This last emphasis was repeated in reports of Baptist activity throughout the war.

In this, the relief of war distress at home, the Army and the Baptists had more in common than was the case with regard to the Army and the other churches. The Anglican and Methodist press reveal an interest more in the political course of events than in the social implications of the war at home. It is not to be denied that all the denominations contributed to relief work in the UK, but, the Army apart, the Baptists appear to have considered such work somewhat more intrinsic than did the others to their role and identity as a Christian community. The Baptist's Women's League established a Committee of Baptist women in every town, city and village to consider how best to co-operate with civic relief committees, and visitation committees systematically sought to contact distressed homes in each locality.\textsuperscript{75} Detailed reports of this work featured weekly in Baptist literature.\textsuperscript{76}

Not unexpectedly, the same prominence is given in the Army sources to relief work amongst the poor in wartime. The Army appealed constantly to its friends not to neglect the poor in the excitement of the national crisis. Funds were needed, and needed now. 'He who gives quickly gives twice,' declared \textit{All The World}.\textsuperscript{77} The salvationist's instinct was to feel most at home when with the poor and so the war saw the pioneering by The Salvation Army of communal kitchens in ten London centres and fourteen provincial localities. The model was copied by local authorities. Soup kitchens became established.\textsuperscript{78} Free breakfasts for children were provided, especially in the northern counties.
where Army officers reported themselves 'beseiged by importunate sufferers'. The Army fought to keep food prices down and published advice on the evils of hoarding. When bakers in one town announced a rise in bread prices, Bramwell Booth threatened to open a shop there and sell bread at the old price. The intended rise did not take place. The Social Gazette called on the government to freeze bread prices, but to no avail. The Army took up countless cases of inadequate allowances paid to the dependents of servicemen and published advice on National Insurance arrangements in wartime.

The overall impact of the war on the Army's social work in the UK was to move the emphasis away from work for men (because of enlistment and conscription) and towards work for women and children. 'None are too benighted, too enslaved, or too degraded for the Army to help' said All The World. One unusual development in the Army's social work was amongst munitions workers. The Army was the first to organise hostels and canteens for the munitioneers - at Woolwich Arsenal, Barrow-in-Furness and on the Clyde. Erith and Sunderland followed. The Munitions of War Act 1915 permitted direction of labour. The Army declared this invasion of liberty justified if it would hasten the end of the war. The War Cry carried articles by salvationists working in munitions factories. A salvationist foreman wrote: 'We roll out millions upon millions of rounds of ammunition.' In the next paragraph he assured the reader: 'We do all we can to push on the salvation war.' If anyone at the time saw an incongruity in this, they did not say so.

Apart from a shared concern for social conditions at home, the Army and the Baptists also shared a willingness to be evenhanded toward the Germans. The Baptist Times was careful to publicise the genuineness of German Christians and to stress the strength of personal friendships.
between English, French and German Christians.\textsuperscript{90} At the same time the German army was not spared Baptist accusations of 'barbarism and outrage... setting at defiance all the rules of civilised warfare.'\textsuperscript{91} The feasibility of 'civilised warfare' was taken for granted. As the war progressed, the air of detachment sought in August 1914 by the President of the Baptist Union receded further and further into the background. \textit{The Baptist Times} wanted Germany crushed, so that she would be prevented from regrouping and fighting again for a very long time.\textsuperscript{92}

These sentiments would have been too partisan for Army leaders in London, as would the Baptist reaction to the entry into the war of the USA. It was a decision that would 'thrill America from coast to coast' and seal the doom of 'German absolutism and German militarism for with these America will never make terms'.\textsuperscript{93} The slowness of President Woodrow Wilson to react to 'giant wrongs' had chafed, but now 'the moral effect of the intervention of the US is incalculably heightened by the delays which the President has interposed.'\textsuperscript{94} FB Meyer spoke of 'an unspeakable consolation' which was Britain's in realising that the USA understood 'the purity of our aims'. He regarded American neutrality as a temptation in the wilderness and whilst 'that great country' hesitated, 'all the world held its breath and waited anxiously to know the issue'.\textsuperscript{95}

The luxury of frequent and direct political comment such as this was one the Army denied itself, but no gap is to be found between Baptist and salvationist desire to evangelise the troops. Baptist military chaplains\textsuperscript{96} reported many converts. On one occasion Chaplain-Captain Watson appealed for men to devote themselves to the gospel of Christ and 50 responded. In that same week a total of 228 made decisions for Christ.\textsuperscript{97} There are signs of tension having arisen
between Baptists and Anglicans in the war. Some Baptist soldiers were made to feel unwelcome at Anglican Communion Services, despite their lack of the Lord's Table for over a year. The Baptist Times rejected allegations by Anglican writers that Baptist and other Free Church members were not pulling their weight in enlisting. 99

In many respects the Baptists, as in the Boer War (see Ch.2), came closest of the denominations considered above to the line taken by The Salvation Army. Yet all these denominations were overtly interested in commentating upon the politics of both the origins and course of the war in a way the Army felt unable to do because of its visibly international structure and its policy of political neutrality. All the denominations endorsed explicitly the actions of the British Government in going to war, something Army leaders never did, even when the war was over, although the demerits of the German case were implicitly recognised in Army statements and press comment. None of the denominations shared the Army's express policy of restraining from the apportionment of blame, save perhaps for the Baptists, amongst whom that policy appears not to have taken effective root. The Baptists too attempted sympathy for the German people in its press, but not to the same extent as in Army publications. Nowhere but in the Army sources are there found contemporary descriptions of work within Germany or with the German forces, prisoners-of-war or internees. It would seem that Bramwell Booth and The Salvation Army not only sought to practice neutral evenhandedness but made efforts to publicise the fact to readers in Britain who might have found it less palatable a notion if associated with a Christian movement not already expected to befriend all and sundry regardless of national origin. Bramwell stated in public his view that 'too many of the churches, instead of using the war as an opportunity to convert men to the religion of Jesus Christ,
are only struggling to associate their particular branch of the church with the patriotism of the moment. Chapter 15 will show that 'the patriotism of the moment' proved irresistible to certain parts of the Army world too.
1. CT 4-9-14: 248; 16-10-14: 385; 16-6-16: 573.
3. CT 4-2-16: 102.
4. CT 4-9-14: 248; 30-10-14: 433.
6. CT 7-8-14: 7.
7. Ch.9, Sect.2, Note 36.
9. CT 2-10-14: 334.
12. Note 5 at 22.
14. Note 8 at 478.
15. CT 14-8-14: 184, 186.
16. CT 7-8-14: 166; 6-11-14: 460.
17. The Times, 12-9-16: 5.
18. CT 7-8-14: 165.
19. CT 2-10-14: 332.
20. CT 24-3-16: 288.
21a. CT 30-6-16: 604.
24. CT 16-10-14: 385.
25. CT 28-1-16: 75.
26. Ibid., 77.
26a. IWC 15-8-14: 9.
27. CT 4-2-16: 102.
28. CT 14-1-16: 45.
30. Ibid., 180. See generally Wilkinson's Ch. 8, 'Death, Bereavement, and the Supernatural'.
31. CT 14-8-14: 184.
32. Note 5 at 137.
33. Note 5 at 93.
34. TW January 1917, 9.
35. Note 13 at 237-257.
36. Ibid., 251.
37. Times History, 346.
38. MR 7-1-15: 1, 5.
40. MR 6-1-16: 8.
42. Times History, 344.
43. MR 7-1-15: 5; 14-1-15: 4.
44. MR 13-1-16: 5.
46. MR 24-2-16: 8.
47. MR 7-1-15: 9.
48. MR 14-1-15: 3.
49. MR 6-1-16: 1.
50. MR 13-4-16: 3.

250.
51. Minutes of The Methodist Conference 1918, p.250, 'Message to the Government on the War'.

52. MR 1-7-15: 3.


55. MR 27-7-16: 7. (On 1-7-16 there were 19 Wesleyans in prison as absolute objectors: Mrs. Henry Hobhouse, I Appeal Unto Caesar, (Allen & Unwin, 1917), 17.)

56. Note 5 at 160-191.

57. Ibid., 176-178.

58. MR 7-1-15: 8.

58a. TO April 1916, 295.

59. Ruth Fry, Quaker Ways, (Cassell, 1933), 71.

60. Ibid., 77-80.


63. For the salvationist attempt to reconcile war and faith in this way see SG 5-12-14:2, reporting Bramwell Booth's Guildhall address at the dedication of the first Ambulance Unit, the first from the Army and the first of its kind from any source, a model followed by other denominations, principally the Anglicans and Quakers. See Ch.11. Sect.3.

64. Note 62 at 158.


66. Ibid., 362-3.


68. Note 59 at 91. Anti-Quaker sentiments were fired by attacks like GG Coulton's The Main Illusions of Pacifism, (Bowes & Bowes, 1916).


70. BT 21-8-14:653.

71. Ibid. Also BT 26-5-16:326; 7-7-16:418. Both items defended the conscientious objector's stance.
E.g. SG 26-11-15:2 quoting Bramwell Booth: 'We must forgive - really forgive - for our own sakes. There will be no heart-peace for us either as individuals or as a nation unless we do.' (Part of an article carried by the London Evening News, 'Is Germany Past Forgiveness?')

By 1915 there were 15 Baptist chaplains (5 in France) plus 207 officiating clergymen in England: BT 1-1-15:4.
97. BT 9-7-15: 453.
98. BT 4-2-16: 66.
99. BT 28-4-16: 264.
100. The Literary Digest, 23-10-15, 907, 'Salvationist War Theology'.
CHAPTER 15

DIVERGENCE FROM THE LONDON STANCE (1)

1) The United States of America
2) Australia
3) New Zealand
4) India
1) The United States of America

Long before the First World War began, The Salvation Army was part and parcel of American life. However, its spiritual and evangelical work was less known to the public in the States than was its social programme, which drew public praise and financial support in reliable proportions. It was to the advent of war that the Army in the USA owed its attaining of widespread public acclaim and general acceptance in the minds and hearts of Americans. One historian has said: "World War One probably marks the climax of Salvation Army history in the United States."¹ The account which follows highlights the extent to which the American Army departed from policies and standards established at International Headquarters in London.

The USA remained unofficially neutral in the war until April 1917, but the Army there began to react earlier. Bramwell Booth's sister, Commander Evangeline Booth, was in charge of the work in America. Late in 1914 she joined the World's Peace Committee,² launched a drive for funds to aid Belgian refugees,³ and laid plans to form the Naval and Military League in the States.⁴ By January 1915 she had successfully embarked upon her Old Linen Campaign which produced 400,000 packages of sterilised bandages sent to all protagonists in Europe and which provided employment for 300 women.⁵

When President Woodrow Wilson could no longer keep his nation out of the war, the Army at first experienced difficulty in finding its place in the American war effort. There was the tremendous obstacle of poverty. Eva Booth was later to say, "We did not have a spare dollar in our over-taxed exchequer."⁶ The government was slow to recognise the Army's ability to undertake relief work and there was a shortage of officers who met the stringent government requirements regarding not only health but family antecedents.⁷ So the United

255.
States declaration of war against Germany on April 6th, 1917 caught the Army at first off guard. American salvationists could scarcely regard their German comrades as blood-thirsty militarists overnight. They had been taught to think of all salvationists as part of an international family under God. The evidence suggests, however, that patriotic fervour swept most American salvationists with it once neutrality had ceased to be state policy. One Headquarters officer, Alexander Damon, recorded in his diary: 'Fever to enlist is running high on our building. Many of the young fellows feel they must go... Some who are officers decline to claim exemption even if they could.'

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The Editor of the American War Cry, Colonel Jenkins, wanted to publish a 'strong editorial in which the Central Powers were consigned to the hot place', but Eva Booth overruled him. In 1914 Eva Booth had called her people to prayer, taking a politically neutral stance. By April 1917 her tone had changed. It was no less spiritual, but now the spirituality was liberally laced with partisan spirit which excluded Germany, Germans and their allies, and threw The Salvation Army publicly behind the American Government.

While the London War Cry carried frequent reports of work in Germany and was unafraid to describe the involvement of German salvationists in the German forces, the American War Cry (and other wartime Army literature in the States) is remarkable for its absence of references to Germans or even the Army in Germany.

Eva's first statement after the US entry was strongly pro-American. It regretted 'the unprecedented war' but praised the President's 'superb magnanimity' to Germany. It eulogised Woodrow Wilson's 'phenomenal patience', 'frequent efforts to conciliate' and 'appeal for moderation'. He had displayed 'greatest executive genius' and now had 'the united spirit of a free people' firmly behind him. She recognised 'our brothers
in all the families of the earth’ and declared that the Army deplored all war. But this would not prevent salvationists 'to the last man' standing by the President. She pledged the loyalty of salvationists to the American cause and urged her people not to fail their country. There is no record of what Bramwell Booth thought of all this, but it would clearly have been too political to suit him. In writing to Woodrow Wilson to offer the Army's facilities and energies in the war effort, Eva signed herself 'Loyally yours'.

All the anti-war sentiments appeared in the pre-USA entry period. Thereafter the Commander wrote to the President: 'I feel it behoves us as a religious and charitable organisation, as well as individually, to loyally and with all the heart support the Government, and hold ourselves ready to meet the demands of the Flag in its hour of danger.'

One salvationist historian, Kenneth Hodder, has written: 'In contrast with the majority of American religious denominations which saw the British cause as a valiant defence of democracy and justice the Army never expressed substantial support for the war effort.' The sources do not justify such a conclusion, being saturated in national, patriotic fervour from the moment America entered the war. The examples are numerous.

For instance, a War Service League was formed to bring succour and relief of all necessary kinds both at home and overseas. In appealing for members to volunteer as Leaguers, Eva reminded them of the need to mobilise not only armies but the entire nation if Germany were to be defeated. She appealed openly to the patriotism of salvationists, describing War Service League work as the civilian counterpart of activity at the front.

The American War Cry, asking readers for funds, referred to 'patriotic generosity' and urged: 'Help win the war by helping the welfare of the boys who wage it.'
Eva later proclaimed how fitting it was that the Stars and Stripes and the 'Blood and Fire Flag' of the Army should fly together at the front in France with the American forces. 'So keep the flags waving,' she concluded. Similar nationalistic fervour emerged in Army reports of fund-raising events: 'The Salvation Army has spread its wings over "our boys" who are imposing their bodies between Hun and Home on the soil of France.' Commissioner Thomas Estill, in charge (under Eva) of the Army in the Western USA, pronounced upon the war as one between 'freedom and righteousness' against 'military despotism and cruelty', with victory for America and her allies assured. When the German surrender came, the Army in America greeted it as an answer to prayer.

The Army in the States published a booklet describing its war work in France and Belgium. It began by claiming to contain 'an absorbing story of patriotic devotion... an important chapter in the titanic struggle between the forces of freedom and despotism'. It stressed the high number of salvationists who 'proved that they can fight as well as pray' and even claimed that the Army contributed 'to the fighting equipment of our American troops' by instructing each salvationist serving with the forces in the rudiments of chiropody. Centre-page spreads appeared in Army publications displaying photographs of salvationist chaplains to the forces in military uniform and even giving details of the guns they wore.

There was thus a clear divergence in attitude to the war between Army leaders in London and New York. General Bramwell Booth saw it as a necessary evil. He conveyed his sense of sorrow in public utterances and aimed continually for a spirit which rose above the strife and kept the Army neutral, at least in principle. Contrary to Kenneth Hodder's assessment (see above), Commander Evangeline Booth saw the Army in the States as part of that nation's war machine and did not hesitate to say so. One biographer writes: 'On grounds of what she considered...
to be elemental justice, the whole soul of the Commander was with the Allies and against the military autocracies of Central Europe. She openly referred to Germany as 'the ruthless foe' which had trampled 'brave little Belgium... under his bloody heel'. The forces of The Salvation Army, she said, were with the Stars and Stripes 'to win the war' aided by 'all the uplifting power of their beautiful religion'. She wanted that religion to be shared with the fighting armies: the Americans, the British and the French. She made no mention of the Germans, overlooking that German salvationists knew the same 'beautiful religion'. She wrote in secular publications, stressing that modern wars could not be won without regard/ 'morale' and that this was the main concern of salvationist war work which would help to overthrow 'the autocrats of Berlin'.

Attitudes at the top filter through to lower levels and Eva's strongly nationalistic views are found echoed in the writings of others. Adjutant Helen Purviance was one of the first group of four American officers to arrive in France from the USA. She became famous as the first Salvation Army 'doughnut girl' (see below). Her account of life at the front refers to the Germans as 'the Boche' and then goes on to say:

'Our boys are such splendid fighters! When they start after the Hun nothing stops them.... Many of them have been wounded simply because they would not stop...but they want to see those Germans pushing up daisies.'

Little wonder the Army became popular in the States. Many salvationists had forgotten first things, a high price for public popularity. It was Helen Purviance who ran from a dugout one day to see a German plane. Forgetting the purpose of her calling and the reason for her being in France, she seized a nearby rifle and shot at the plane, exposing the Allied position to artillery fire as a result.

Purviance,
'in this spontaneous act, symbolised also the one-sided, overtly nationalistic spirit of the American Salvation Army during 1917-1918.

To add momentum to a post-war fund-raising drive in 1919, Evangeline Booth published her personal account of the Army's war work.\(^{31}\) It is an anti-German narrative of how The Salvation Army in America helped to win the war. Leaving aside the claims which verge on the arrogant, it betrays in decisive manner the American salvationist abandonment of neutrality, of internationalism and of spiritual priorities. Its style is emotional, sentimental and nationalistic. Its aim was to encourage Americans to give money for Army work. It succeeded in this limited aim, but stands today as an example of Salvation Army propaganda at its worst. Evangeline Booth appears in a photograph wearing military khaki. The Germans are referred to variously as 'the Huns',\(^{32}\) 'Fritzy',\(^{33}\) and 'the Boche'.\(^{34}\) American courage is eulogised, save for one insensitive reference to a lad with 'a yellow streak'.\(^{35}\) At the end of hostilities Eva wrote to General JJ Pershing:

>'The Salvation Army of America will never cease to hail you with devoted affection and admiration.... You have rushed the advent of the world's greatest peace, and all men honour you. To God be all the glory!'\(^{36}\)

She wrote also to Marshal Foch in Paris:

>'Your brilliant armies, under blessing of God, have triumphed. The Salvation Army of America exults with war-torn but invincible France.'\(^{37}\)

Here then there was none of Bramwell Booth's attempt at restraint. His perspective was that of International Headquarters, striving (at times in vain) to maintain communications with German salvationists against well nigh impossible odds. Evangeline Booth's perspective was that of National Headquarters in New York where she was responsible only for the Army in the States. What perhaps Bramwell thought privately but could not say openly, Eva trumpeted from the housetops, conveying an impression that the Army was the enemy of the German nation. This was
in fact precisely the charge levied against her by her brother, Herbert Booth, in a letter written from New York on August 14th 1918. It was one letter in a series of hard-hitting exchanges between them on the war. Herbert asked her why she pinned medals to the breasts of the 'French Blue Devils' for he had 'always understood that the only badges of honor with which the SA was concerned were those that related to good service or useful office in its ranks.' He condemned her for quoting Napoleon in her million dollar appeal since Napoleon was 'an ambitious monster out for world dominance'. He derided her claim that she was helping the morale of the fighting men: 'What have you or I, dear sister, to do with the creation of military morale? Is this the kind of stuff the SA leaders in Germany are doling out to the Prussian salvationist soldiers?' He challenged her to explain the meaning of the words, 'The Gunpowder of the Spirit', which appeared on the Army's float in the 14th July New York procession and also what she intended when she said the Army's coffee and doughnuts helped to put the boys 'over the top'. Did she mean 'over the top' in order to send the 'huns' to Hell? He deplored her 'flowery, flattering, patriotic speeches' in which she mixed up 'civilisation and Christianity, humanism and the gospel, democracy and the Kingdom of God'. He accused her of double standards, one for converts and another for fighting men, and of 'shirking the shame' of not openly siding with the US government. 'Why,' he asked, 'did you rush off as soon as the word was given at Washington and offer to hand over the entire Salvation Army to the government before you had even consulted those who had been committed to your leadership. Does the SA belong to you that you can speak of its officers as "my officers" and give them away to earthly powers?' Why her 'sudden plunge into the political arena'? Why did she appear in public in khaki and 'draped in the stars and stripes'? 261.
If she was accused of naked partisanship, her determination and her leadership skills, however, cannot be faulted. She rallied the Army in the States as never before. She was undeterred when her offer to place her personnel at the President's disposal was at first turned down on the grounds that the YMCA and Red Cross were already meeting the need. She appointed Lieutenant Colonel William Barker to lead a contingent of hand-picked officers to France, but first he was to go alone and assess how best the Army might help. Barker sought an interview with Joseph Tumulty who was Secretary to the President. Barker found Tumulty in discussion with a prominent Jersey City lawyer whose conversion to Christ had caused a sensation in New York society circles. The conversion was due to the ministry of Major Wallace Winchell and the lawyer urged Tumulty to give Barker whatever he wanted. The result was a letter from the President's office to the American Ambassador in France, William Graves Sharp, who in turn gave Barker a letter to General John J. Pershing, commanding the US armies in France. Pershing remembered the night in September 1915 when his wife and children had perished in a fire at the family home in Texas and the spiritual comfort offered then by Lieutenant Colonel Henry Lee, the Army's West Coast Provincial Officer. Pershing could not do enough and gave Barker use of a car and formal permission to go where he felt the Army could be most useful.

Evangeline Booth laid her plans swiftly for war work in the States. At a meeting attended by her Provincial Officers on 11th April 1917 the following matters were discussed:

1. Erecting huts in the American cantonments;
2. The Army's relationship to the Home Guard in the major American cities;
3. Exemptions from call-up for Army officers;
4. The possibility of having officers appointed as military chaplains;

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5. A system of recording all war work;
6. The development of the Naval and Military League in the USA.

A National War Council, with Eva as President was established, with a War Service Secretary in each Province of the country. No fewer than 34 conferences with government officials proved necessary before what the Army offered to do was deemed acceptable to the public authorities. 38a

Eva's policy was simple: find the troops and mother them! But spiritual pastoring was offered too, chiefly by officers appointed as official chaplains to the forces. A chaplain had to be 'a regularly ordained minister of some religious denomination' and in September 1917 the Acting Judge Advocate General of the US War Department in Washington, GT Ansell, officially pronounced The Salvation Army to be a religious denomination: 39

'It has distinct legal existence; a recognised creed and form of worship; a definite and distinct ecclesiastical government; a formal code of doctrine and discipline; a distinct religious history, a membership not associated with any other church or denomination; a complete organisation with officers ministering to their congregations, ordained by a system of selection after completing prescribed courses of study. In common with other churches, it has literature of its own; established places of religious worship; regular congregations; regular religious services, and schools for the preparation of its ministers... (who) perform marriage ceremonies, bury the dead, christen children, console the bereaved and advise and instruct the members of their congregations.'

The Judge Advocate went on to declare Army officers 'ministers regularly ordained within the meaning of the statutes'. 39 This had two effects. It made Army officers eligible as chaplains to the forces and permitted draft exemption for officers on the same basis as that for ordained ministers of other denominations. Only five officers became chaplains. 40

Hundreds of salvationist servicemen functioned as unofficial chaplains, and the women officers in France exercised unusually effective spiritual and soul-winning ministries. 41

The clarity of the Judge Advocate's decision and the speed with which
it was reached after America declared war, thereby enabling the Army in the States to have equal treatment with other churches, contrast sharply with the difficulties met in London at the British War Office (see Ch.12). Britain, it seems, had no system equivalent to that of the Americans for clarifying the status of a religious body and hence the ambivalent attitude of the War Office in London to the Army there. The US decision allowed the Army in America wide scope for action.

One imaginative scheme was the 'Vacant Lot Scheme' whereby salvationists volunteered to work on the land at home, to replace farmers entering the forces, and by which vacant sites were cleared and cultivated for food. The Army printed horticultural guidelines for novice gardeners. The Scheme was explicitly built on an appeal to patriotism. By October 1917, from New York alone, 133 people were placed with farmers through this Scheme.

Salvationists endured the dangers of war with the others. Some 80,000 salvationists were drafted for military service from the USA. The relief personnel working in Army huts and restrooms placed their facilities as close to the fighting as possible and frequently came under fire and shelling as a result. The services undertaken for American troops were largely similar to those rendered to British forces by British salvationists and already described in Chapter 11. Comforts, huts, food, a listening ear, a word of spiritual advice, all feature. However, two distinctive aspects deserve special mention. One was a 'Money Transfer System'. It allowed American servicemen to deposit cash with Army huts in France. Those amounts were then credited in New York and cash transferred to families around America in accordance with the wishes of the depositor.

The second distinctive feature was to become a nationally recognised symbol of Salvation Army work with the American Expeditionary Force. It was the humble doughnut. Having run short of rations, and faced with
hungry soldiers of the First Ammunition Train, women officers at the front wondered what to give them. Margaret Sheldon hit on the idea of doughnuts and Helen Purviance made the first one, the first of millions which marked out the salvationist huts as truly American and homely.48 (The question of who made the first doughnut for American fighting men is not undisputed. The published sources all accord the distinction to Helen Purviance, who also claimed it for herself.28 But in an unpublished account of her First World War experiences, Brigadier Stella Young makes her own claim to having been the first. Even as late as 1977 ex-servicemen were still writing to her expressing appreciation for assistance received in the war.48a)

Energy and devotion were displayed by salvationists at the front, but the sources reveal evidence of internal strife and tension. William Barker was appointed to pioneer and take charge of American salvationist war work in France. In May 1918 Evangeline Booth sent out Lieutenant-Colonel A. Brewer to 'take a part of the executive work from the shoulders of Lieutenant-Colonel Barker, our leader in France'.49 Brewer had been offered as 'the gift of Commissioner Estill and the West to The Salvation Army work in the war zone.'50 Colonel EJ Parker was National War Secretary in New York and later toured the front to inspect Army work during the St. Nihiel drive. His private letters to his wife from France indicate that Barker had refused to accept Brewer's appointment.51 So serious was the rift between Barker and Brewer that Evangeline proposed a formal Court of Inquiry, Parker presiding, to resolve it. Parker wrote: 'I am not going to go that far.' Three days later he wrote: 'I am doing my best to smooth things out. Now there is other trouble about Brewer and Barker.... Barker has taken a strong stand and he will not move in spite of the Commander's efforts.... She may call Barker home.... I do not think the Commander has any idea of just how big this
work is over here and what a wonderful job Barker has done.' By the 24th August Parker was complaining to his wife of Eva's evident 'lack of understanding of just how the picture looks from here'. The root of the trouble was that Brewer went to France thinking he would have separate command on behalf of the Western Territory. In the event, Barker insisted that Brewer be responsible to him. The letters of EJ Parker do not reveal an outcome but his fears that Eva would recall Barker were not realised.

Salvationists at home were happily unaware of these tensions. So too were the American troops at the front in whose interests all parties were labouring. The reaction of the servicemen to the Army was very positive. One US letter censor at the front told the Army: 'Out of 200 letters, picked at random, 180 were from men who admonish relatives and friends in America to exert themselves on behalf of The Salvation Army because of its splendid service at the front.' A woman officer recalls: 'I was in France for two Mother's days. The boys here called me "Little Mother", although I was only 24 years old and could have been a sister. I did not resent it but rather felt complimented. On Mother's Day they went to a great effort to get a bouquet of flowers for me.' This response from the men was echoed in the American secular press, extracts from which were reprinted in the American War Cry. Army work captured the imagination of the Columbia Record which emphasised to its readers the wide range of Army activities, including the ridding of military bases of camp-followers.

The popularity and success of the work was attributed by Eva Booth to three things:

1. The Army's preparedness;
2. The Army's familiarity with hardship;
3. The Army's practical religion, reducing theory to action, and revealing Christ in deeds.

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When the war ended, Eva launched a Home Service Fund in the States. 57 A grateful American public gave her 15 million dollars, 2 million in excess of the target. 58 For Eva and her people it had been a good war in the material sense. It brought enduring acceptance with the US public and financial security for the Army. But along the way, and particularly after April 6th, 1917 certain fundamental priorities of salvationism were overlooked; not least the internationalism which the Americans had celebrated with everyone else at the 1914 International Congress (see Ch.8). The Second World War was to see the same patriotic and partisan spirit emerge in the Army in the States (see Ch.24).

Just how much the partisan spirit elbowed out higher ideals and how much the American authorities were encouraged to see The Salvation Army as an auxiliary war unit is summed up by the post-war launching of a US warship named 'The Salvation Lass' with the Army flag flying from its masthead. 59 It was the sad height of incongruity. William Booth's Boer War ideals, which Bramwell at least attempted strenuously to emulate, had vanished out of sight in Eva's American Salvation Army.

It would be wrong, however, to end an account and analysis of the American salvationists' response to the war without stressing the sharp distinction between the American and British attitudes to patriotism. The Americans have never eased into the somewhat phlegmatic approach to patriotism shown by the British, and allowance must therefore be made, in assessing the Army in the States in 1917-1918, for the virtually irresistible magnetism of patriotic fervour and spirit in that country. (See also Ch.24. For a fuller analysis of the role of patriotism in the Army generally see Ch.27)

2) Australia

The insensitive inappropriateness of naming a US warship 'The
Salvation Lass' was lost on Commissioner James Hay, Territorial Commander in Australia. He called it a 'graceful act'. Neither he nor his salvationists ever quite managed conformity with London's hopes of an idealistic, supra-national spirit in the war. Like Evangeline Booth, Hay saw the issues in stark, black and white terms: the Empire was fighting for right and civilisation against barbarism.

Having pioneered work in Australia in 1881, the Army was soundly established there by 1914. The declaration of war brought forth an earnest entreaty for prayer and exhortations to 'keep a stout faith in God, who lives and will show His hand in good time' and to show 'Christ-compassion for all mankind'. Every officer and soldier was to 'keep continually before him the great business for which the Army exists, the salvation of immortal souls'. There was to be no yielding to 'the lust of carnal warfare in any degree'.

All of this satisfied IHQ in London, as did the desire of Australian salvationists to seize new opportunities for evangelism afforded by war conditions, and their condemnation of war as 'insensate folly' pursued only by 'incurable barbarians, smeared with a veneer of diplomatic dubbin'. The General would have glowed on reading Hay's 1915 Christmas piece in the Australian War Cry on true heroism, decrying claims that Caesar or Attila or Napoleon had shaped the world and proclaiming that 'Christ the Conqueror' was arbiter of the world's ultimate destiny.

Yet for all this, an undoubted tone of political partisanship pervades the Australian sources, particularly the official history of the Army's Australian war work, The Army That Went With The Boys, and in the biographies of the leading Australian military chaplain, an Army officer called William McKenzie (see below). In his Foreword to the official history, Hay saw the war as a 'gallant stand for God and Empire' and described his vivid memories of 'the prayers of soldiers of a great
cause... who looked to the God of Battles for vindication of their cause'.

The opening lines of Chapter 1 stated that the Army's aim was to 'assist in winning the Great World War' and Chapter 8 claimed that 'no religious organisation... showed a greater response to the King's call than The Salvation Army'. Servicemen killed in action were said to have died 'For God and Empire', suggesting the war as a holy crusade, and public prayers for the Empire and its soldiers were described. The Armistice resulted in a giant poster on the facade of Headquarters saying, 'Truth and Right Win the Fight'. Hay delivered an Armistice address at a great Thanksgiving Service on November 12th, 1918 in which he said that Germany's defeat was the work of God. John Bond described the address as 'a very fine effort, the effect of which was electric'.

The ambivalence of the Australian Salvation Army to the war was personified in William McKenzie, a legendary figure nicknamed 'Fighting Mac'. Only four days after reaching home from the 1914 International Congress in London, he agreed at once to become Australia's first Salvation Army military chaplain. His service in this role was to win him the Military Cross and establish his name across Australia. Harold Begbie described him as 'a great, hearty, fight-loving Australian and it was his love of a good fight which drew from General Bramwell Booth in London a not too mild rebuke to Commissioner Hay in Melbourne when the Australian War Cry carried the following eye-witness account of McKenzie's heroics in Gallipoli:

'In the firing lines there is Captain McKenzie. My word, every soldier knows him; he is the finest man I ever met. There is nothing too much for him to do. When we get downhearted he would have us cheered up in quick time; he is the kindest-hearted man in the world, and can be firm when necessary. We all liked him. When all our officers were shot down, he rushed to the front, shouted "Come on, boys," and led us to the attack. Just the right man in the right place.'
The General, who had instructed officers not to undertake combatant roles (see Ch. 13), wrote to Hay on December 29th, 1915 in the following terms:

'I have been a little nervous in looking at your War Cry the last week or two, lest you and some of our comrades should get mixed up in the worldly aspect of the war. With that we have nothing to do. Beware of it. Keep in mind that you are international - as Jesus Christ was... We must hold up the great principles of love and universal brotherhood, and the unity of all peoples in the presence of Calvary. Now I am not complaining. I am only raising a note of warning, and a word to the wise is sufficient....'

Hay may or may not have taken due note. The sources are no less patriotic in tone after the date of Bramwell's letter than before it. Certainly, nobody would alter McKenzie's mind or methods, methods which, in spiritual and evangelical terms, were pretty effective. In a speech upon his return to civilian life he reported that up to 3000 men in khaki had publicly made decisions for Christ in his meetings at the front. 81
His preaching style shunned sensationalism. Private Leslie Ford wrote to his mother:

'We see a good deal of Captain McKenzie.... He does not in his addresses tell them that they may die the next minute, but just talks in a friendly manner, with a few biblical illustrations, and that style does a deal of good amongst the men.' 82

McKenzie braved every danger with his men, was constantly under fire and was eventually wounded, at Suvla Bay, in the hand and side. 83
He could still write home: 'I am supremely happy and will die for my country.' 84 He was unable to distinguish between serving his country and serving God. He saw his Christian duty as helping to defeat the enemy by making his men the best they could be. He fought every immoral influence upon the men, even invading Cairo night clubs and brothels in person and dragging men out. One such establishment was burned down by rioting troops, but McKenzie disclaimed the honour of motivating the episode, though others heard him exclaim the wish that 'the whole block
The real McKenzie was a man of deep and sensitive conviction, capable of crying himself to sleep after long meditation on the death of Christ. He wrote of divine guidance when in danger:

'I am quietly conscious of a guardian angel's presence... I hear his voice sometimes saying: "Do not go there!", "Get in here!", "Wait five minutes here!", or "You are quite safe here!"... I now know that if I pay heed and obey God I shall continue unharmed until my work is finished, so if I fall on the field you will know the reason.'

For a year after the war he could not sleep, except fitfully. Commissioner Hay told of travelling overnight with him on a train and listening to him crying out with snatches of a prayer, or of the burial service, a sob, or 'Here, lad, drink this. Yes, I'll tell them.'

So profoundly did McKenzie affect the lives of his battalion, both officers and men, that when he left them to return home a parade was held in his honour, something usually reserved for military Generals. One eye-witness tells how he shook hands with every man on the parade ground, and was living proof 'that faith and fighting qualities can go together'. His public welcome meeting in Melbourne attracted 7000 people with another 1000 turned away. One writer present called him 'a proper soldier-priest'. McKenzie's speech on that occasion bore this out, for again piety and patriotism were inextricably intertwined.

Hay had given him an Army flag at the start of his tour of duty. Now he returned it:

'I hand you back this Salvation Army flag and trust it will be cherished as a token of the Great World War, in which the Allies are fighting for those principles of righteousness on which the whole foundation and superstructure of our civilisation is built, and by which the nations of the earth can worship God... none daring to make them afraid.'

McKenzie was succeeded as chaplain to the 4th Infantry Battalion by Brigadier Robert Henry who previously had been the Army's National Service Secretary. A total of 12 Australian officers served as military chaplains.
The Army in Australia was second to none in self-sacrifice for the servicemen, both at home and overseas. But, whilst never indulging in some of the extremes found among the USA salvationists, it could not remain as aloof from the political and patriotic issues as Bramwell Booth would have wished. Whilst popularity was not the primary goal, it was a by-product of the war years in Australia almost as much as in America. In both places the price was a tarnished idealism.

3) New Zealand

Compared with the USA or Australia the Army's presence in New Zealand was, in 1914, of modest proportions though significant. It rose to the outbreak of war in a style and manner not unlike the Army in Australia, with extensive and varied services to the troops and their families. The post war report of this work presented to the Territorial Commander, Commissioner Henry C. Hodder, in 1919 left the unwarranted impression that The Salvation Army was exclusively aligned with the Allied Forces:

'From Honolulu to Hong Kong, from the Arctic to Cape of Good Hope, the needs of the man of war - be he New Zealander, Australian, British, Ally or neutral - are being met in every conceivable direction, and help brought by every possible means.'

No mention of Germany or her allies was made, or of Army work with German civilians and forces both inside and outside Germany. Neither was it made clear that the Army, as a world movement, was aligned with neither side. Salvationists in New Zealand perceived their role as helping only their own forces. Like their American and Australian counterparts, they were incapable, in time of heightened national feeling, of an international perspective, yielding to the power of patriotism.

Yet spiritual priorities were not lost sight of, for the Hodder Report stressed that the 'vast amount of service which has been rendered'
was 'to provide powerful counter-attractions to evil' and due to 'the supreme purpose of all Salvation Army effort - the spiritual betterment of the men'.

The first marquee and later permanent building for troops was erected at Trentham Racecourse. It was the first of many. The first hostel went up at Rotorua in 1915 for use as a Convalescent Soldiers' Institute, Rotorua being chosen for its thermal springs. The Institute owned both a car and a motor-launch for trips for any wounded men able to enjoy them. 'The highest work of the hostel is to fortify the soldier, morally and spiritually,' declared the Hodder Report. At Featherston 8000 men were encamped, so the Army opened a Relatives' Hostel in November 1917, built 'in record time'. In these and other centres the troops and their families had access to concerts, games, books, writing materials, food, Bibles, advice and spiritual counsel. Advocacy at courts martial was also undertaken, as well as the writing of Wills. Such was the demand from New Zealand servicemen that some centres were repeatedly enlarged during the war.

Before 1914 a few Salvation Army officers were already part-time military chaplains with the territorial reserves so that at the outbreak of hostilities they simply transferred themselves and their equipment to the permanent camps. Chaplain Major Greene was the first salvationist chaplain to leave for the front in Egypt. In January 1916 Chaplains Walls and Garner followed him. New Zealand was the first Empire country to appoint salvationists in this way. Walls and Greene won the Military Cross. Other Army chaplains who made a name for themselves were Charles Walls and John Bladin, the latter known as 'the singing padre', for obvious reasons. Eight officers in all served as chaplains. The Hodder Report carefully stressed the role and influence of the Army's 'unofficial chaplains', whose work and witness
were 'an imperishable legacy' as they served as enlisted men.

Any patriotic excess in the Army in New Zealand was low-key, but no less intense on that account. The Hodder Report resists the pull of patriotism more or less successfully until the end when no longer can the writer hold back the opinion that 'Germany forced war upon the world' and that 'The Salvation Army flag followed the Union Jack'.\textsuperscript{109} Considering that General Bramwell Booth himself gave way to the temptation to apportion blame between the warring parties once the war was over, this lapse may be understood. The New Zealand public perceived the Army as throwing its efforts behind the Allied cause and gave money gladly 'for patriotic purposes' when the Army made appeals.\textsuperscript{110} The war years, as happened elsewhere, enhanced the Army's standing with the public, which had been given no opportunity to think that the Army wished to both serve and save, and remain above the strife.\textsuperscript{111}

4) India

All parts of the British Empire contributed fighting men to Britain's cause in World War One, not least India.\textsuperscript{112} Salvation Army hospitals there were turned over to the government for wounded Indian soldiers returning from France and Gallipoli. The Thomas Emery Hospital at Moradabad became highly popular with the soldiers and some even complained of getting well too soon.\textsuperscript{113} Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Andrews was the Army's medical officer in charge at that time. Andrews was later awarded posthumously the Victoria Cross for bravery under fire in 1919 (October 22nd) at Waziristan on the North-West Frontier. His portrait hangs in the Headquarters Mess of the RAMC at Millbank in London.\textsuperscript{114}

Two further things of note emerged from India. One was the bizarre request of the military authorities in the Persian Gulf that The Salvation Army raise two regiments in India of 'porter coolies'. More bizarre
still was the Army's willingness to do it, and accordingly two non-
combatant regiments, each 800 men strong, left India for Mesopotamia.
They were known as 'The Salvation Army Porter Coolie Corps' and were used
in loading and unloading ships in the Gulf. They were each in the charge
of three British Salvation Army officers, holding the military rank of
Second-Lieutenant with two Indian Salvation Army officers, known as
'Sardars', assisting. The whole exercise was a flagrant denial of
everything Bramwell Booth sought to uphold on the Army's stand in the
war years. Yet it is hard to think of it happening without his consent.
We may reasonably assume that his embarrassment over the circumstances
was reflected by the total absence of any mention of them in salvationist
publications around the world. The only salvationist source to touch
the subject is the Hodder Report, apart, that is, from an inconspicuous
item in the IHQ 1917 accounts showing an expenditure of £200 on 'work
among Indian troops'.

The second noteworthy occurrence in India involved a further abandon-
ment of Army principles in the face of war conditions. Frederick Tucker
was converted in 1880 when he attended an Army meeting in the Exeter Hall
in London's Strand. He was then an Assistant Commissioner in the Indian
Civil Service. By 1914 he was Commissioner Booth Tucker and head of
the Army's work in India which he had pioneered in 1882. With the
war only months old he begged Bramwell Booth not to send him officers who
originated from the continent of Europe, lest they be taken as German.
The General was loath to comply, but in the end gave in. He wrote to
Booth-Tucker:

'Aliens. Very well, I have acceded to your request and we
will send no more for the present, although I am very sorry...
it seems to show that we (the Army) are more English than
is the fact! Do you follow me? I am contending on all
hands that we are international, and that we know no man after
the flesh in this matter, to which it may be replied: Well,
but if you refuse to send out people to India who wish to
devote their lives to the salvation of the heathen, simply because their political sympathies are un-English, is not that showing sympathy in a very pronounced and very definite form with a purely English view of things? However, we won't torment you any more, and beyond what has already been done, no more arrangements are being made for aliens till after the war is over."

When pragmatism vied with principle in America, Australia and New Zealand, pragmatism won. Now, in the Army's first and vanguard mission field, principle was again a victim.
1. Wisbey, 159, 169; see also McKinley, 114.
2. IWC 3-10-14:7.
3. IWC 31-10-14:7; IWC 7-11-14:7.
5. IWC 2-1-15:8; ATW April 1915, 230.
7. Ibid., 8.
8. Technically, the USA fought to defend her neutral right to international sea lanes. For a survey of British views on the American failure to condemn the German invasion of Belgium and the growing disillusionment in Britain toward the USA see Armin Rappaport's The British Press and Wilsonian Neutrality, (OUP, 1951), 10.
8a. Alexander Damon Diaries, NYA Ref. RG20.38, entry for 4-12-17.
8b. Ibid., entry for 13-4-17.
9. USWC 29-8-14:8.
10. USWC 21-4-17:12.
11. USWC 12-5-17:9, text of letter dated April 12th, 1917 acknowledged by Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War.
12. USWC 29-8-14:8; 12-9-14:8; 14-11-14:9.
13. USWC 30-6-14:9.
14. USWC 22-12-17:21.
17. USWC 29-6-18:9.
18. USWC 30-11-18:8.

20. Ibid., 3.


22. Ibid., 11.


29. Ibid., 653.

30. McKinley, 124.


32. Ibid., 49, 147.

33. Ibid., 151.

34. Ibid., 192, 214, 224.

35. Ibid., 230.

36. Ibid., 288.

37. Ibid., 289.

37a. The letter runs to 26 pages of single-spaced typing and is highly passionate in tone. A copy was supplied to this writer by the Salvation Army Catherine Booth Bible College, Winnipeg, on February 21st, 1988.

37b. Both officers and lay persons eventually served with the Army, following the lines of the American Expeditionary Force. Lay persons were engaged on a one year contract and were obliged to be ready for any duties the Army required during that time: NYA, File Ref. 26-6-9 (legal correspondence). The New York Archive holds several diarised accounts of French war work experiences, e.g. Ethel Renton Diaries; Florence Turkington Diaries (NYA Ref. Box 206/E); Mary Young Diaries, (NYA Ref.
RG20.29 218/10). All of these are anecdotal, with no evidence of reflection upon the ethical issues raised by the war or the Army's role. The Turkington Diaries concentrate almost exclusively on the weather and what the writer of the diary chose to wear each day. See also: 'Serving the Soldiers During the Great War', anonymous and unpublished ms., NYA, which shows a similar reluctance to analyse or even recognise the possibility of moral issues arising out of the war and out of the Christian response to it.


39a. Ibid. The 'statutes' were the New Army Act which came into force on 18-5-17.

40. Wisbey, 168.


42. Soldiers of the Soil, (SA, New York, 1918).

43. Ibid., 3.

44. Report, NYA, Ref. 26-4-40.


46. Helga Ramsay, War Service in France and Army Occupation in Germany, unpublished manuscript, NYA, 2, 3, 7.

47. Note 45 at 178-9.

48. Note 28 at 649-650. For 'doughnut' photographs see 'Around the World with The Salvation Army', Evangeline Booth, National Geographic, April 1920, 347-368 at 361-2. A useful summary of the work of seven War Work organisations, including the Army, is John D. Rockefeller's Service to our Soldiers and Sailors, (Greater New York United War Work Campaign Committee, undated, NYA.)


49. War Service Herald, May 1918, 10.

50. Ibid.

52. **Answering the Call of Humanity**, (SA, New York, September 1918), 14.

53. NYA, Record Group 20.2: Mary Bishop Papers, 1974, Box 206/9, handwritten ms.


55. 'What The Salvation Army Has Done', *Literary Digest*, 16-3-18, reprinting Columbia Record article.


57. USWC 17-5-19.

58. Note 45 at 186.


60. SAYB 1914:38 lists 1252 corps; 70 social institutions; 1826 officers and employees.

61. AWC 8-8-14:10.

62. AWC 15-8-14:8.

63. AWC 3-10-14:9.

64. AWC 17-10-14:8.

65. AWC 25-12-15:3.

66. Ibid., 6.

67. Ibid., 9.


69. Ibid., 5.

70. Ibid., 151.

71. Ibid., 158.

72. Ibid., 165.

73. Ibid., 169.

74. Ibid., 179.

75. Ibid., 178.

76. AWC 3-10-14:9.
77. ATW March 1918, 102.
78. IWC 13-1-17: 1.
79. AWC 11-12-15: 11.
80. CBB 358-9.
81. ATW June 1918, 268.
82. AWC 18-12-15: 11.
83. Percival Dale, Fighting Mac, (SP&S, undated); Also: ATW September 1915, 456; IWC 30-10-15: 8.
84. ATW September 1915, 456.
86. Ibid., 35.
87. Ibid., 50-51.
88. Ibid., 57.
89. McKenzie, 54-6, 63.
91. Ibid., 101.
92. Ibid., 102-3.
93. Ibid., 128.
94. SAYB 1916:51. Also: AWC 25-12-15:6. All the chaplains were decorated. McKenzie received the OBE (1920) and later the Army's highest honour, the Order of the Founder (OF).
95. SAYB 1914, 38 lists 260 corps; 21 social institutions; 471 officers and employees.
97. Ibid., 2.
98. Ibid., 1
99. Ibid., 3.
100. Ibid., 13-14.
101. Ibid., 40.
102. Ibid., 14.
103. Ibid., 5.
104. Ibid., 4, 42.
105. Ibid., 2, 6-7.
107. Ibid., 101-102.
109. Ibid., 57.
110. Note 106 at 103. The public gave £150,000, equivalent today to £4,500,000.
111. Note 106 at 103. Bradwell notes that the 1913 annual Self-Denial Appeal in New Zealand produced £17,000, but £57,000 by 1920. The war work made the difference.
112. For the war and Indian regiments see *India and The War*, (Hodder & Stoughton, 1915).
119. Ibid., 71.
120. Letter, 5-2-15: CBB 360.

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CHAPTER 16

DEVELOPING A SALVATIONIST THEORY OF WAR

1) 'Just War' Influences
2) Practical Considerations
1) 'Just War' Influences

The salvationist First World War sources offer no systematic analysis of the ethics of war. The sources, both official and private, published and unpublished, leave an overwhelming impression of religious and humanitarian activists striving manfully to respond, under their evangelical gospel, to a sudden and unexpected crisis on a vast, international scale. The Army was, and is, a multi-cultural international body, particularly vulnerable to crises across national boundaries. For the Army, all roads lead to London. It is not necessarily the same for the rest of the world.

In terms of analytical moral reflection, leisurely and systematically undertaken, by 1918 the Army had not gone much beyond where it stood in 1902 when the Boer War ended. Small signs, however, began to appear after August 1914 to suggest that Army thinking on warfare (related to but not synonymous with salvationist thinking on the Army's role in warfare) was beginning, perhaps unconsciously, to approximate to the concepts associated with the just war tradition. Insofar as that tradition embodies a distinction between the moral factors governing the embarking upon a war (ius ad bellum) and those governing the conduct of a war (ius in bello), the salvationist sources reveal that Army leaders were drawing a similar distinction and beginning to offer comment and guidance to salvationists accordingly. Those comments addressed the issues of (in the context of ius ad bellum):

1. The justness of the war;
2. A right intention in going to war;
3. The probability of success in declaring war.

They addressed also (in relation to ius in bello):

4. Discriminating between combatants and non-combatants;
5. Pacifism and conscientious objection.

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Bramwell Booth went on record as denying that the German assault on France, via Belgium, was justified. He held that an action by a state which constituted a breach of international law could not amount to a just cause. Any such action could not be left unchallenged and the response to restrain the wrongdoer was thus justified, the more so if it was a response undertaken to honour a treaty commitment, such as Britain's to Belgium. He could not accept that soldiering as a profession was, ipso facto, wrong. The New Testament did not say so, and in any case, not all war can be called murder if the cause is just. As for the soldier who kills in battle, even if his victim is our loved one, he cannot be regarded as personally responsible for his act any more than can a state executioner. He is doing merely the work allotted to him, terrible as it is, and may well have no hatred or anger in his heart.

Bramwell concluded early in the war that Britain's cause was just. Her use of the sword was 'a justifiable defence of the Empire'. It was 'defending the world's rights' and thus 'a righteous conflict'. In the USA, Evangeline Booth was of the same opinion and said so frequently, not least in the context of fund-raising. She saw the war, after April 1917 and the entry of America, as a struggle for 'world-peace and freedom'. The just cause lay in the fact that it was necessary to exorcise 'a political cancer which has eaten away at the vitals of the world'. She saw this goal as the pursuit of 'high principles', but could not avoid confusing the political aims with the aims of piety, or resist the expression 'high and holy principles'.

Bramwell Booth regarded the cause of a war as just if it amounted to any of the following:
1. Promoting 'the cause of true freedom';
2. 'Protecting the weak';

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3. 'Emancipating the slave';
4. 'Guarding the moral standards of the world'.

Right intention in *ius ad bellum* is closely related to just cause and sometimes indistinguishable from it. Many of the examples cited above could as well address right intention as just cause. Bramwell's wife, Florence, wrote that the war could only be justified if the intention was to 'fight for great principles'.

The need to weigh up the probability of success in waging a war and to refrain if the prospect of success is minimal forms part of the just war tradition. Only Evangeline Booth turned her mind explicitly to this fact, long before the USA abandoned neutrality. 'There are vast interests at stake,' she said. 'But are they worth the price we shall pay?'

It is not difficult to discover in the sources the use of terminology such as 'combatant' and 'non-combatant', suggesting implicit recognition of the principle of discrimination (*ius in bello*) even if it was not called by that name. The Army roundly condemned air-raid attacks on 'non-combatants' and deplored the sinking of the 'Lusitania' since it could have 'no military significance'. Bramwell wrote that 'the conduct of this war is questionable' and a War Cry editorial in 1915 expressed profound misgivings at the 'setting at nought the recognised usages of warfare' and the killing of 'non-combatant men... and innocent women... without the slightest military advantage'.

Earlier chapters have shown that Army leaders did not endorse a pacifist stance for the Army as a whole. The General, however, insisted on the primacy of the conscience of each person on the issue of bearing or refraining from bearing arms. It is consistent with just war thinking that such a place be given to conscientious objection. Both saw the choice as so momentous in its implications that it simply had to be left to the individual.
None of this permits a conclusion that Army thinking on war between 1914 and 1918 fell firmly within the just war tradition. Or even that such thinking amounted to 'a theory of war'. The evidence points merely to the early growth in Army circles of certain just war concepts and criteria, not always called by their traditional names and, perhaps more often than not, unconsciously and even instinctively formulated. It was the response of activists rather than those with time for leisurely reflection. 'Just war' categories were to become a more conscious part of Army thinking and writing in the Second World War (See Ch.19, Sect.1).

2) Practical Considerations

What reflection Bramwell Booth did engage in was concentrated principally upon keeping the Army around the world undivided. The Army, he believed, had been given to his father, William Booth, as a sacred trust from God and had been similarly entrusted to him upon his father's death in 1912. He saw his duty under God, therefore, as a duty to keep the Army intact come what may. If that meant spurning the luxury of political comments, or leaving to individual conscience the decision about bearing arms, or suppressing patriotic fervour, then these things were in his view little enough price to pay for an Army united after the hostilities. There must have been times when he feared greatly, not only for the internationalism of the Army, but also for its unity within national boundaries. In public, however, he reckoned the war had strengthened the Army's international character.

The General had, necessarily, a world perspective. He was the one who, as it were, had his head above the trees and could see the whole forest. Territorial leaders had a different perspective, one that allowed the pull of overt patriotism to influence their actions and words (see Ch.15). Even Bramwell yielded from time to time (see Ch.9), but his
primary theme was throughout a spiritual one. He saw all nations, not just Germany, as the victims of self-seeking and materialism and continually asked others to see the war in its true light: 'This war is nothing - nothing compared with the murderous destruction of sin.'

International Headquarters in London thus reflected between 1914 and 1918 the basic principles that William Booth had established in 1899: the priority of soul-winning, the need for compassionate action, and a studied political neutrality (see Ch.7). Because he was IHQ based, General Bramwell Booth could influence strongly the nature of public statements, actions and policies in London and the rest of the United Kingdom. Whilst his leadership was never questioned (that would happen later in 1929) and whilst Army leaders elsewhere were loyal to him, nevertheless, his direct influence over events and Army policies grew less and less as distances from London grew greater and as the war inhibited communications, especially visits in person by the General to his overseas territories. The fact that no other leader or territory outside the United Kingdom managed London's objectivity about the war was due not only to more localised parochial perspectives in those places, but also - and this is probably of greater significance - to the absence within The Salvation Army of any formal authority in matters of faith or conscience. There was, and still is, no magisterium.

Even the General, as the administrative and legal head of the Army, could not tell salvationists what to think or believe. He could offer guidance, and did so. He could, and did, persuade, enjoin and exhort. But in the last analysis he could not speak ex cathedra to his people or even to his officers when it came to what views should be held. The Army's Articles of Faith declared the Scriptures to be the only 'divine rule of Christian faith and practice' (Article 1), and although acceptance of the Articles was, and is, a pre-condition of soldiership in the Army,
those Articles could not be interpreted by anyone in the Army, great or small, as pre-determining a particular view of contemporary events. Bramwell Booth's ordeal and that of the international Army ended without schism, as had that of the Founder in the Boer War. That in itself was a justification of sorts of the policies adhered to in London. But it did not hide completely the Army's lack of an underlying coherent rationale for neutrality. As in 1899, the non-involvement policy was aimed at preserving salvationist unity. This was its pragmatic purpose. Any philosophical basis for it failed to see daylight. The sources offer no reasoned ethical or theological justification for it beyond passing references to New Testament insights about the solidarity of the human race and the oneness of those who are in Christ. There thus arise questions about the policy's coherence which the salvationists did not address, or perhaps even recognise as arising in the first place. These questions are dealt with in Chapter 27.
NOTES - CH. 16

1. See Ch.7.


4. Ibid., 29-32.


6. IWC 29-8-14:7.


8. TW January 1917, 9.


10. Ibid., 11.

11. IWC 4-3-16:7. Notes 9-11 represent rare political comment by Bramwell Booth in public print.


15. IWC 17-10-14:7.

16. IWC 10-7-15:7 where items 2-4 are named. Bramwell was offering illustrative examples, not a definitive list of just causes.

17. SG 4-11-16:2.

18. USWC 29-8-14:8.

19. E.g. TO August 1914, 506 (by Bramwell Booth); IWC 12-9-14:7.

20. SG 26-6-15:2.


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26. The Literary Digest, 23-10-15, 907, 'Salvationist War Theology'.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.
PART III

THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939–1945
Long before war broke out late in 1939 there was a growing feeling that the Treaty of Versailles in 1918 had not put an end to political tensions in Europe. In 1929 The Daily News invited the Army's world leader, General Edward J. Higgins¹, to contribute an article to a series on 'That Next War'. Higgins accepted because he wanted to combat the widely held view that nothing could stop another war. He pointed to the 'foul obscenities' of the last war, a 'ghastly orgy of blood', and 'a blasphemous debasement of human life'. How could men see these as unavoidable? Accepting the need for justified use of force to restrain the wrongdoer, (further evidence of 'just war' influences on Army leaders), he argued that combativeness, 'part and parcel of human nature', could be directed to better ends, such as the destruction of everything jeopardising the peace of mankind. Dedicated to a high ideal, the fighting instinct could become most powerfully beneficent, as the Army's own history demonstrated. The next war could be averted, but only when there was a 'universal acceptance of the Gospel of Christ' and renewed conviction of the truths of the Fatherhood of God and the universal brotherhood of man.² A leading article in The News Chronicle (quoted in The Staff Review³) said Higgins was the first contributor 'to deal with the subject constructively', the only one with 'any real remedy to suggest'.

Higgins was keen to do whatever was possible for world peace and therefore supported the World Disarmament Conference, sharing a platform at the Westminster Central Hall, London, in June 1931 with Archbishop Temple, eighteen bishops, Lord Robert Cecil and other non-conformist leaders.⁴ Not long afterwards Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf was to appear on sale in English bookshops, adding fuel to an ever-mounting debate about whether to arm or disarm, whether to rely on strength or embrace pacifist doctrines.
Salvationists were not unaffected by the debate. Whilst Arthur Booth-Clibborn (see Ch. 6) and Herbert Booth (see Ch. 13) were virtually lone voices in their day, now the salvationist pacifists began to emerge in numbers. Some found themselves attracted and convinced by articulate Christian writers on pacifism like Professor GHC MacGregor of the University of Glasgow who published under the Fellowship of Reconciliation banner. Others drew on the anti-war poetry of 'Woodbine Willie', GA Studdart Kennedy. Then again, the writings of non-Christians also left their mark. The ranks of the pacifists in the Army gradually, but significantly, grew until they embraced people like George Carpenter, Carvosso Gauntlett, Ben Blackwell, Catherine Baird, Wilfred Kitching and Frederick Coutts (see Ch. 20). Some, like David Durman, signed the pacifist pledge of The Peace Pledge Union whose short pamphlets held considerable popular appeal. However, as in society generally, the majority rejected the pacifist case and saw people like Durman as 'mis-guided'. In fact, in the 1930's large numbers of salvationists volunteered as regular soldiers in the military forces, due probably to the economic security such a course offered, and found themselves as front-line troops when war came. They were not without ecclesiastical support or theological backing, the Army refusing to allow itself to be aligned with groups like the Quakers (see Ch. 22) and the established Church finding able protagonists, like Dean Inge, to put the traditional 'just war' point of view.

The Army saw, with others, warning signs in the Spanish Civil War. The international War Cry, published in London, spoke of Spanish housewives going to market through air raids, but who were easily forgotten by readers of the British press. The same issue, in a leading article, sternly rebuked those who had declined hospitality to Spanish refugee children, even as they contemplated the possibility of their own children being evacuated. The Army assisted hundred of Spanish refugees in...
1936 in Gibraltar through Adjutant Soal, in charge of the Red Shield Home there, 'with that complete disregard for considerations of race and religion which has always marked the Army's activities'.

As war loomed nearer salvationists resorted to ever more earnest prayer. General Evangeline Booth (having succeeded Edward Higgins) led a lunchtime rally in London's Sion Chapel to pray for world peace and to stress the Army's internationalism. (She had not done so in the States in 1917-1918: see Ch.15.) The War Cry declared that Christians should 'get on their knees', not for 'vain repetitions', but to share in prayer 'the crushing weight of the world's sins and sorrows, as our Saviour did in Gethsemane, and to contribute to national repentance'. Prayers to 'give us victory' were 'worse than useless' since they could only 'confirm our own errors and drive us further from God'. The General called on all Territorial Commanders around the world to let salvationists hear a 'Call to Prayer'. Among the first to respond was Colonel Franz Stankuweit, the Army's leader in Germany. London tried to stress, as it had repeatedly stressed in the two previous wars, that the general populace in Britain and Germany were not for war.

Army leaders in London were concerned lest the intensifying of prayerful intercession proved to be an ephemeral thing, lacking the shape and structure to captivate the mind and heart. Thus was launched the 'Spirit of Love' Campaign. Its goal was to affect every branch of Army life, every centre, every soldier, every land and thus affect the world as well. It would be the Army's best gift to the world in a state of 'bitter upheaval'.

Still the prospect of war increased. Anti-war articles appeared in the Army's press when Mr. Neville Chamberlain brought back to Britain momentary hope after his Munich meeting with Hitler in September 1938. Even if war were avoided, the underlying roots and causes should
still be dealt with. They could, said the Army, be removed 'by reason and mutual co-operation'.

Holy naivety had joined a forgetfulness of the analysis offered by Higgins in 1929 (see above). Also forgotten was Higgins' recognition of the need for effective defensive preparations. The War Cry, in late 1938 and early 1939, found calls for re-arming 'disturbing and perplexing'. They were opposed to God's ideal and smacked of warmongering. Whilst 'facile optimism' was inappropriate, the salvationist with his 'strong international ties' would stand on the following six points:

1. Forgiveness is the only ultimate solution for offence in any realm.
2. Violence creates a vicious circle leading to more violence.
3. Vengeance belongs to God, however extreme the provocation.
4. God reigns and His will cannot be paralysed, even if man may frustrate it.
5. Prayer must overcome the temptation to believe in the efficacy of violence.
6. Prayer must be made for the leaders of men - which means for the German as well.

Those were themes that had appeared over and over again in Army publications and in official statements by Army leaders in the two previous wars. Except for point 2, they constituted a series of theological assertions designed to undergird the hoped-for attitudes of individual salvationists, rather than the attitudes of nations or political leaders. They were intended as pastoral guidance, not as a political creed. They were too naive and other-worldly for this last purpose. Even recognising their pastoral function, they still strike the reader, on first acquaintance, as platitudinous. But they were offered to readers of The War Cry as simple (not simplistic), distilled, spiritual wisdom. Readers hoping for something which got to grips more
directly or practically with the mounting international crisis were disappointed. Political analysis was not the Army's raison d'être, and no editor in London was about to put his neck on the line by asking his leaders to approve the sort of copy that had been carefully and self-consciously avoided in 1899 and 1914.
NOTES - CH.17

1. Higgins became the Army's first elected General in 1929 after Bramwell Booth was deposed.


3. Ibid., 170.


5. Adolf Hitler, My Struggle, (Hurst & Blackett, 1933).


8. Not least Bertrand Russell as in his Which Way to Peace?, (Michael Joseph, 1936). See also (of 'Winnie the Pooh' fame) AA Milne, Peace with Honour, (Methuen, 1934), 105-106.

9. Letter, Commissioner David Durman, (London), 8-1-86. Durman later changed his views in the face of Hitler's rise and obvious territorial ambitions (see IWC 20-3-43:3). Others, like Frederick Coutts, could not reconcile war and the Gospel: see his comments in International Company Orders, 8-10-39: 226.


12. Letter, WJC Whitebrook (Mansfield), 1-7-85.


17. Ibid.


20. IWC 8-10-38: 6.

299.

22. IWC 5-11-38: 4, 9 (for Armistice Sunday, 1938). (This issue reported the promotion to Glory of Mary Murray: see Ch. 5.)


27. IWC 1-10-38: 6.

CHAPTER 18

ON A WAR FOOTING AGAIN

1) The Outbreak of War
2) Enforced Adaptation
3) Air Raids and Losses
1) The Outbreak of War

When war was formally declared between Britain (and France) and Germany on 3rd September 1939\(^1\) the Army had extended its mission to 97 countries, using 104 languages and having 26,877 commissioned and ordained full-time officers leading a growing laity.\(^2\) Salvationist response to war was swift. Barely a fortnight into hostilities *The Times* reported 300 full-time Salvation Army war workers (with the number increasing daily), 46 war work centres for military personnel open in Britain, and a party prospecting in France to discover the best methods of serving the British Expeditionary Force (BEF).\(^3\) This strong beginning in Britain was eventually to culminate in: worldwide ministry to a total of 225,000,000 servicemen; 3000 Red Shield Clubs; 595,000 sick and wounded visited and helped; 1000 mobile canteens (one mobile could serve 4600 men on one trip) travelling a distance equivalent to four times around the world.\(^4\) For the third time in its history, the Army reacted to war with practical, compassionate action on a considerable scale (see further Ch. 21).

But before the Army was able to turn its collective mind to the exigencies of war, other events clamoured for attention. General Evangeline Booth was about to retire and a High Council was convened in London on 18th October, 1939 to elect her successor. Five nominees agreed to stand for election. It should be noted that not one delegate put forward to the nominees any question even remotely related to the fact that the world, or by then at least a major portion of it, was at war.\(^5\) Not even the absence of Germany's Franz Stankuweit from Berlin helped to turn the High Council's minds outward. Alfred J. Gilliard's comment that 'they had done their work with the interests of their own organisation at heart' and that the eight High Council days had 'almost shut them off' from the onset of war\(^6\) is meant as an excuse, but is in
fact a terrible indictment of the Council and its parochialism. The
election brought George L. Carpenter to office. He would govern the
Army world until 1946. The Times welcomed his election and referred
to the Army as 'among the wonders of the modern world'. However, the
most significant aspect of Carpenter's succession to lead the Army in
time of war was not reported by either the Army or the secular press:
Carpenter was warmly and sympathetically inclined to pacifist views
(see further Ch. 20).

He hated war and attributed its origins to 'diabolical' factors,
mainly 'drift and lack of costly purpose' in men's lives and in the
affairs of nations (echoes of Higgins?). But he was not yet in
office and it fell to Evangeline Booth, as almost her last official
word, to speak to the Army as her brother, Bramwell, and her father,
William, had spoken before her in 1914 and 1899 respectively (see Chs. 9
and 3). She renewed her call for prayer and reminded salvationists
of their precious heritage of international bonds and selfless service.
Her term as General at International Headquarters had perhaps given her
a broader appreciation of the Army's internationalist heritage. She
had not, however, altogether thrown off her partisan tendencies seen so
clearly in the USA in 1914-18 and could not resist praising Chamberlain's
'long, patient and heroic struggle' to avert the crisis. His attitude
had been 'faultless'. The Army would be ready, she avowed, but could
not forget that its flag was 'interlaced with the flags of all peoples',
including Germany. War kills our sense of proportion, she declared,
and Christians ought always to 'seek forgiveness for sins, shared by
ourselves, which have brought so fearful a nemesis upon the world'.

That nemesis had broken upon salvationists as they attended their
Sunday morning Holiness Meetings. It was not totally unexpected, and
many corps officers had planned their morning worship services accordingly.
In Weymouth, the corps historian recorded 'a most impressive, never-to-be forgotten Sunday'. But not all officers could be relied upon for enterprise or initiative and, for many, the war represented uncharted waters. Instinctively the Army looked back to 1914 for inspiration (as in 1914 it had looked to 1899) and the Army's press began to reproduce relevant items from which timeless lessons might be drawn. Mrs. General Minnie Carpenter wrote of her family's personal First World War experiences and The Warrior republished a high-minded piece by Mildred Duff offering advice on balanced, Christian attitudes in young people. However, something more was needed.

It came with the publication of War Time Problems and The Salvation Army Officer. Issued by authority of General Carpenter it was a comprehensive and systematic manual of guidance for officers facing problems new or old. Again, First World War experience proved helpful. The following list indicates the manual's scope and practicality:

- Public expectations of the Army;
- Salvationist neutrality;
- Air raids;
- Evacuation of children or adults;
- Chaplaincies in the armed forces;
- Work with servicemen;
- Sexual morality amongst servicemen;
- Conscientious objectors;
- State benefits in wartime;
- Bibliography of information sources;
- Risks of spiritual burn-out.

This last subject was especially timely and relevant. It applied to officers beset by a constant drive of activity, whether engaged in helping civilians or in ministering to troops. Rest, leisure, slowing
down, all those would be in scarce supply and a parched soul could be the result. The manual offered clear advice about devotional exercises designed to overcome such a contingency. The vivid lessons learned in 1914-1918 were recalled.

Being on a war footing necessitated also changes of a practical, administrative nature and a Secretary for War Work was appointed forthwith. This was Colonel Thomas Blow, who was assisted by Major Edgar Grinstead. Brigadier James Weaver was added to the team as was Major Will Cooper. Women officers were also attached to the newly-formed War Department. Later, the Department's jurisdiction was extended to cover war work in both Britain and France.

Other immediate and practical measures saw International Headquarters relocated to the site of the William Booth Memorial Training College in Denmark Hill, South London. The Salvation Army Assurance Society went to Reading; the London and Southern Territorial Headquarters went to Sunbury-on-Thames; the Women's Social Work to Hadley Wood; and some Departments of IHQ to St. Albans. Soon, however, the 'phoney war' enticed the Army to retrace its steps and 101 Queen Victoria Street, in the City of London, filled again early in 1940. The commuting by staff was a daily nightmare. Windows in IHQ were frequently blown out, and in the end the entire International Headquarters was burnt down (see below, Sect.3).

The officer-cadets being schooled at Denmark Hill vacated the College to make way for IHQ in September 1939. 'Depots', rather reminiscent of the Army's early-day training methods, were established at Manchester, Liverpool, Leicester and Leeds for the men, and at Brighton, Pontypridd and Glasgow for the women. Despite these inconveniences, 260 cadets were commissioned in London in 1940 before a full Clapton Congress Hall where optimistically they sang, 'The day is breaking! War shall cease!'
The kingdom of the Prince of Peace at last shall dawn.'

2) **Enforced Adaptation**

Had the Army been inflexible, it would never have survived to face the problems of another war. Whilst effort was directed to adapting to meet public and military needs (see Ch.21), there were continuous adaptations made to routine programmes.

Severe problems arose in youth and children's programmes. In one city the local authority unilaterally cancelled all Sunday Schools, but Army workers went along as usual and found the building full of boys and girls who refused to stay away! Two main factors could not be overcome, however. The first was the loss of local youth leadership due to military conscription. The second was loss of children attending because of evacuation of urban centres. The Army exhorted a 'second mile effort' from leaders unaffected: 'You do not want any closing down!' declared *The War Cry*. Also, a procedure was devised for keeping in touch with evacuees and linking them up with the Army corps in their new locality. Many evacuated children met the Army for the first time during the war and entered its ranks. Wilfred Kitching was then National Young People's Secretary and he writes of the ingenuity of local leaders in maintaining children's work. Co-operation with local authorities was eased by the Army's standing as an accredited youth organisation. The Army's youth clubs for teenagers, Torchbearer Clubs, were just getting going but reached an enrolment of 10,000 during the war. United Youth Rallies were introduced despite the evening blackout, the first being attended by 2000 young people in the Westminster Central Hall. Throughout this period the Sunday School teaching material was prepared by Frederick Coutts, a pacifist like Kitching. Coutts wrote also a weekly Bible page for *The Young Soldier* which had a circulation of over 250,000 each week.
The Army's women again responded to the crisis. The role played by women in each of the three wars is a prominent feature of the salvationist response. They were the backbone of salvationist compassionate outreach in the wars. Many came forward to local leadership to fill a gap left by husband, father or son. In its newspapers the Army asked for women of 'resourcefulness, physical strength and spiritual courage' to offer for work with troops. Many became drivers of mobile canteens.

Mrs. General Carpenter held special conferences with women officers to review what could be done best by women in the Army, such as:

- Comforts for the troops;
- Visitation of afflicted homes;
- Family worship services;
- Correspondence with servicemen on behalf of a corps;
- Hospital survey and visitation;
- Linking up with women in the forces;
- Literature to service personnel.

Throughout Britain, corps organised a Women's Service Group. Each Group consisted of 3 to 15 members and had a local leader. Membership was confined to converted women having (or having lost) a husband, son or daughter in the forces. The purpose of the Group was to keep in touch with wives and mothers of all servicemen in their area. A card was used saying: 'Prayer our Weapon - Sympathy our Service'. In addition, the Home League provided its usual social fellowship for any women wanting to attend. General Carpenter told Home Leaguers that in an age when pity was dried up by the 'scorching windows of hatred' it was their task to 'refill the wells of pity'. Later in the war, the League of Mercy was launched with Mrs. General Carpenter as President. Its chief aim was effective ministry in hospitals.

Each corps in Britain appointed a 'War Sergeant'. He or she would
be the principal liaison between salvationist servicemen and their own corps and would ensure hospitality to visiting and home-coming members of the forces. 45

The evacuation of children from British cities (see above) was planned well before war began. Sir John Anderson masterminded the scheme which was to include all schoolchildren, plus mothers with children under five. Not all children registered, but hundreds of thousands were relocated. 46 The Army gave assistance in this 'fantastic nightmare'. 47

But officers were urged to be alert to unscheduled migrations of civilian population in response to air-raids. Officers were 'to throw open the halls... visit encampments... care for the sick and provide washing facilities for the children.' All evacuated children were to be spoken to. It was an officer's 'business to be inquisitive'. 49

All over the country salvationists came forward to help in any way possible. In Lowestoft salvationist children 'adopted' an evacuee pal. 51 Weymouth Corps was involved from the outset and at Peterborough the Army ran a communal laundry for evacuees. 53 Gifts for the children 'poured in' from the Army in Canada. 54 The British Government invoked the Army's co-operation in a scheme to evacuate school-children between 5 and 16 years to lands overseas: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and, later, the USA. 55

Lieutenant-Colonel M. Owen Culshaw sat on the Advisory Council on Children's Overseas Reception and chaired one of its regular sub-committees. 56 Army officers were designated to accompany the children 57 and all arrived safely, despite hostile action. 58

Ministry to refugees was also undertaken. Many of varied nationality stayed in Army social service hostels and special weekly meetings were organised at East Finchley in French for Belgian and French refugees. 60 German refugees were selected for medical training courses.
at the Army's 'Mothers' Hospital in Clapton. Much work was done in France and Belgium in the early months of war for refugees fleeing before the invader. Belgian seamen were accommodated in Weymouth when their ship sank in the channel.

Ongoing salvationist concern with poverty at home was unabated by war. New problems presented themselves, such as rationing. The system was seen by many as slow, clumsy and unnecessary, but the Army saw it as simply 'the unavoidable consequence of wickedness'. Officers were specially briefed, however, in the intricacies of state benefits claimable in war (war injuries allowances, war damage claims, billeting allowances, war pensions, official distress funds, etc.) and assisted thousands from the poorer classes accordingly. General Carpenter was incensed by a report of a committee set up by the National Federation of Women's Institutes on slum conditions in England. He wrote passionately to The Times condemning the report for containing 'nothing new'. His slum officers working in 'the verminous, overcrowded dwellings of the poor' had 'worked much and talked little', unlike the committee.

A retired Army leader, Commissioner David Lamb, published in the USA his personal analysis of Britain's social problems (poverty, inequality and unemployment). He wanted thinking to begin early on economic conditions after the war. He foresaw a united Europe, with national states co-operating in matters of commerce. It was a prophetic document. Lamb was strenuously 'against the swastika' which was seeking to be 'a slave state enslaving other states' and 'to defend we must attack'. In retirement he spoke on politics for himself, not for the Army. But few salvationists would have disagreed with his assertion that the allies were in the war to 'redeem freedom for all nations', even if the leadership at International Headquarters was reluctant to say so openly.

309.
3) **Air Raids and Losses**

Indiscriminate bombing of civilians terrorised the populations of both sides in the war.\(^69\) The government laid Air Raid Precautions (ARP) plans early\(^70\) and the Army encouraged its officers to volunteer for ARP training.\(^71\) But more important was the need to respond to the human crises produced by the bombing. This was a threat the British population had not faced in the First World War and it now offered still further opportunities for salvationist compassionate action in wartime. Such action had been continually stressed since 1899 as integral to the Army's war role. Officers were to know 'the value of humour' and in air raid shelters could lead the singing of secular songs first and then the hymns (since these latter 'might have died into silence if proposed in the first tense moments').\(^72\) All over London, hundreds of officers endured with the populace through endless nights of fear and discomfort, offering cheer and spiritual counsel.\(^73\) Concerns for loved ones and even for earthly possessions were freely discussed, with the salvationists speaking of an equanimity borne of a faith in Christ.\(^74\) Two million garments were distributed free to victims of air raids.\(^75\)

A complete record of air raid work in the east end of London is found in an unpublished report by Lieutenant-Colonel Hector J. Wright, Divisional Commander for the East London Division. It covers the period August 1940 to October 1942 and records widespread destruction. Loss of life among salvationists was 'comparatively slight' but loss of property was 'considerable'. Meetings were 'greatly hindered' but the people did not accept defeatism. The first corps to suffer was Hadleigh. Buckhurst Hill cared for an average of 500 people daily and at Becontree Adjutant Kathleen Thompson 'did duty at the mortuary which gave a unique opportunity to be of real blessing to the sorrowing.'
At Cambridge Heath there were 'cases of conversion through quiet ministry in Anderson Shelters'. Such cases were 'not rare'. At Limehouse a salvationist ARP warden won an OBE for gallantry on duty, but his wife and daughters died in the same raid. The Poplar hall was bombed repeatedly. The front of Divisional HQ was blasted in and rendered unusable for weeks. In all a total of 11,844 hours were worked by the officers of the Division. East London was typical of Army Divisions throughout Britain.

An independent, unsolicited testimony to the skill and bravery of salvationist staff is given by Elinor Mordaunt. She writes of overhearing a member of a Demolition Squad say to a young female officer: 'I'll never laugh at you Army girls again now I've seen what you face.'

The air raids naturally impinged upon the Army's open-air witness and marches, activities then close to the hearts of British salvationists, their right to mount street processions having been protected by Parliament at Westminster since the Army's earliest days. Corps were exhorted not to bow to pressure to abandon open-air meetings since even in blackout conditions of pitch dark the public were displaying 'a new desire to listen'. One police force encouraged the Army to sustain this form of ministry in the belief that it was 'reassuring to citizens'.

The Army gave way in one particular - the carrying of a flag on the march. Army flags traditionally bear the placename of the local corps. When fear of invasion caused all place signs to be obliterated or removed, authorities asked the Army to cease the carrying of named flags. It did so, but not without a smile or two at the thought of the invader having to rely on an Army flag for knowledge of his whereabouts.

The Army's morale, as well as its ideals of internationalism, were sorely tried when the air raid menace resulted in the entire destruction
of International Headquarters in Queen Victoria Street, London, on the night of Saturday, 10th May, 1941. For London it was a night of 2000 fires, 1400 casualties and failure of the city's water supply. Somehow it was fitting that the Army should be one with London in its suffering. 'IHQ in Ruins' proclaimed the front page of *The War Cry*. The Times linked the Army's loss with the bombing of St. Clement Danes church which was 'merely a battered shell', for 'the Army is linked with the Church of England in this painful review of destruction.... A worldwide influence in the Christian cause emanated from these buildings.' Messages of sympathy poured in, including word from Buckingham Palace, the Baptist World Alliance, the Methodist London Mission, and Army leaders worldwide. The destruction was due, not to a direct hit, but to fire spreading from the east along Upper Thames Street which leapt upon 101 when the wind suddenly veered from the south-east. There were no casualties. An immediate transfer to Denmark Hill was arranged, although some of the Finance and Property Departments stayed on in an only partially destroyed section of offices to oversee the recovery of the safes and strongboxes from the basement strongroom. For some Departments the short-term was chaos. The Literary and Editorial staff worked at home for many weeks before securing cramped offices at 224 Upper Thames Street. General Carpenter launched an immediate appeal to salvationists for a rebuilding fund, refusing to go outside the Army for monies for this purpose. A formal scheme came later in 1944 when £500,000 was estimated as the cost of a new building. Only half of this would come from War Damage Act compensation. It was to be more than twenty years before the dream came true.

The blow to salvationists everywhere when the news broke is not hard to imagine. But Army leaders set it in a larger perspective.
General Carpenter declared: 'Desks and offices don't make armies. I fancy that, if anything, they tend to immobilise them.' An editorial in The Officers' Review reminded readers that ultimately the Army's centre 'is a spiritual thing - not a building or even any particular city or country.' Adversity had driven the Army back to consideration of first principles. And especially noteworthy is the fact that, in the thousands of words written by salvationists about the incident, not one syllable of anti-German sentiment appears. This highlights the extent to which the Army's internationalist attitudes had been preserved intact after 18 months of war, at least amongst the leadership. It was an instinctively salvationist response to the episode, a response which is further examined in Ch.19.
NOTES - CH. 18

1. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1969 edn., Volume 23, 734. (For further discussion of the origins and causes of the war see 729ff; also Charles Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, (Methuen, 1949); Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, (Collins, 1952).

2. SAYB 1939, 38.


4. Britannia Book of the Year 1946, (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Chicago). For war work details see Ch. 21 below.

5. Minute Book, High Council 1939, (IHQ Archives). The same happened at the High Council 1946 (May) when Albert Orsborn was elected - not one question arose out of a Europe in ashes and ruins (Minute Book, High Council 1946) and when the Army's top leadership met in Conference in 1949 again post-war conditions in the world were not discussed (File 46/55/3, IHQ Archives). On the 1946 election see IWC 16-3-46:3 and 18-5-46:3.


7. The Times, 24-2-45:2 reported the unusual procedure of granting to Carpenter an extension in office beyond the constitutional five years, 'in view of the abnormal world situation'.

8. The Times, 25-8-39:13. For the reaction of the British churches see Ch. 22.


12. See Ch. 15.


14. Ibid.

15. IWC 16-9-39:3.


19. TW October 1939, 292.

314.
War Time Problems and The Salvation Army Officer, (SA, London, 1940).

Ibid., 57-60.

Grinsted later became British Commissioner. He had been a pilot in the First World War.

Weaver's son, Bramwell, became a leading conscientious objector (see Ch.20).

Cooper, like Grinsted, was to rise to the office of British Commissioner. The men chosen in 1939 represented the cream of those available to the Army.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. Tatnall assisted Blow in Britain. In France this task fell to Brigadier Climpson.

ATW January-March, 11 (article by Ben Blackwell).

IWC 13-1-40:3.

IWC 28-9-40:5.

IWC 31-5-41:5.

ATW January-March 1945, 14.


Ibid., 54-56. Kitching was a pacifist, but omits from his autobiography any mention of his conscientious objector tribunal work (see Ch.20).

Frederick Coutts, No Continuing City, (Hodder & Stoughton, 1976), 73. Coutts' material found its way even to salvationists in Japanese internment camps in the Celebes.


IWC 28-6-41:4.

IWC 2-12-39:12.

TOR April-June 1943, 127.
43. IWC 4-10-41:4.
44. IWC 12-2-44:3.
46. AJPT 434. Taylor says 69% registered in London, 80% in Newcastle, but only 15% in Sheffield.
49. Ibid.
51. Ibid., 6.
52. Weymouth, CHB 3-9-39.
54. IWC 3-2-40:12.
55. IWC 29-6-60:6.
56. IWC 6-7-40:2. Culshaw was then Secretary to the Chief of the Staff for Social Affairs.
57. Ibid.
58. IWC 7-9-40:2. A liner carrying children in the charge of Captain Elma Shaw was torpedoed.
59. IWC 1-6-41:2.
60. IWC 15-6-40:2; IWC 7-9-40:6.
61. IWC 3-2-40:10.
62. IWC 8-6-40:3.
64. AJPT 464.
65. IWC 20-1-40:2.
67. The Times, 1-4-43:5.
69. AJPT 535, where Taylor records that bombing of civilians was begun first by Britain.

316.
70. The Protection of Your Home Against Air Raids, (Home Office, March 1938).

71. Problems, 11-12.

72. Ibid., 11.

73. ATW April-June 1941, 4-5.

74. IWC 6-7-40:1.

75. United Empire, July 1945: 'The Salvation Army and The Services', by Lieutenant-Commissioner Booth Davey (an address to the Royal Empire Society).


77. Elinor Mordaunt, Here Too is Valour, (Frederick Muller, 1941), 40.


80. IWC 16-9-69:15.

81. Orsborn, 149.

82. History of the Salvation Army, 242.

83. IWC 31-5-41:1.

84. The Times, 16-5-41:7.

85. IWC 31-5-41:5.

86. Ibid., 8. This page carried a fully detailed account of the fire and its immediate aftermath.

87. Frederick Coutts, Interview 1-8-85; IWC 5-7-41:4.

88. Ibid. Also: Portrait, 64.

89. IWC 31-5-41:7.

90. The Times, 17-3-44:7.

91. IWC 205-44:3; 8-4-44:3.

92. History of the Salvation Army, 243. The writer's present office in the new 101 overlooks Upper Thames Street from where the fire came.

93. IWC 7-6-41:3.

94. TOR July-September 1941, 191.
CHAPTER 19

REITERATING THE BASIC PRINCIPLES

1) The 'Other War' and Spiritual Priorities
2) Striving for Political Neutrality
1) The 'Other War' and Spiritual Priorities

General George Carpenter published his first book in wartime under the title *The Other War*. His great fear for The Salvation Army was expressed in his Foreword: 'These words were prepared with a view to guarding against our spiritual energies being so occupied with current events that we lost our zeal for the struggle against the sin which attacks and destroys the peace and usefulness of the individual.' It was a fear that somehow the Army would be sidetracked in wartime from its principal raison d'être, the need to offer the people salvation in Christ. Carpenter went on to put it more graphically:

'I was deeply impressed with the fact that if the Devil could persuade us to give all our time and thought to the useful work of running canteens, knitting comforts, caring for refugees and evacuees, collecting funds... till the boys come home, he would have every justification for gloating over the imminent downfall of The Salvation Army.'

In other words, the war threatened the very life of the Army, not because of what Hitler might do, but because the Army's own instinctive response to massive and urgent need held within it the capacity to draw salvationists away from first things. Certain great themes thus needed to be reiterated at regular intervals and in all the practical and compassionate outreach in war those themes had to shine through, or the Army would be lost. Carpenter had to teach and exhort, resisting the pull of partisan spirit in himself and in his Army as had William and Bramwell Booth before him.

First, salvationists should see the war, as in 1899 and 1914, as a vast new opportunity, an open door inviting new initiatives for God. In war the people shed, even little by little, their reluctance to mention the name of God. Political leaders felt able to include references to God's help when they spoke in public. Newspapers allowed more comment of a religious flavour. Hours of trial and the sharp
impact made upon safe, comfortable lives produced changes in spirit. Salvationists could welcome this, reading the signs. Not that the nation should appropriate God 'as a tribal deity', not because he likes us better than other nations, but because the changing mood would open the door for victories in 'that other war' and a return of honest repentance and humility before God. Carpenter underlined this theme of new opportunities by addressing himself directly to salvationist servicemen in New Battlegrounds. It was a pocket-sized volume sent to every serving man (and woman) for Christmas 1941. He told them to recognise 'the positions of vastly more strategic value for the Kingdom now held compared with when they were at home'. The loss to the Army in conscription was 'as an Organisation, not as a power for God'. Salvationist forces personnel were now 'getting vital contact with all kinds of men and women who have no interest in religion' and the scene was set for them to 'thrust out as ambassadors for Christ'.

Secondly, came the great priority of soul-winning. This was the prime task of salvationists in peace or war, but in war it became especially urgent and had been elevated by William and Bramwell Booth, in 1899 and 1914 respectively, to the status of an all-consuming passion. Man had failed in the realm of the spirit, said Carpenter. There could be no lasting hope in turning to science, or political systems, or art. The way of world recovery was to be found only in Christ. The Officers' Review carried an article by Robert Marshall on 'Soul-Saving in Wartime' which stressed that soul-saving was the instinctive salvationist reaction to all circumstances. That not a little success was accomplished in this is evidenced by a report of 'more than 2300 men of the forces' having sought Christ through the ministry of one Australian officer alone, Brigadier William Jarvis, Chaplain to the Red Shield Services of the Army in Melbourne. General Carpenter, in a message to mark the
Army's 75th anniversary, reminded his people that had the Founder, William Booth, been alive in 1939 he would have been gripping the arm of the mobile driver or canteen manager to say, 'Remember too to feed their souls!'.

Concern and love for souls, which to the salvationists is the highest love a human can offer another, was manifested not only by salvationists called up but also by their loved ones. Chief Petty Officer Stevens of the Royal Navy was drowned when the 'Royal Oak' was torpedoed and sunk. His last act was to assist youngsters into a life-raft. At the funeral service, Mrs. Stevens overcame her grief and tears to assist another grieving widow from the same ship and to lead her gently to the Army Mercy Seat and altar, there to claim Christ as Saviour.

The third great theme of instinctive salvationism was prayer. It had been thus in 1899 and 1914 and was no different now. With all the churches, the Army observed in the pre-war months the Noon-Tide Prayers for Peace. Salvationists were asked to pray for political leaders; 'because this is God's world'; 'to cleanse the mind of bitterness'; 'to lose sight of nationality in face of the Cross of Christ'.

Difficulties in wartime praying were clearly recognised. A 'quest after knowledge of the will of God' competed with 'an expression of what we would like to see' and sometimes the latter won. But praying through a National Day of Prayer involved an 'abandonment of the easy assumption... that we already know what justice, freedom and truth mean, and that our cause... is well-pleasing to God.... Our expectations may need to be changed.' All centres participated in special prayer gatherings but Carpenter emphasised repeatedly that the main concern of the prayers had to be that God's will would be done, since it was not for man to dictate to God. He saw God's will as having 'little to do with national patriotism as such' and sensed dangers in a National
Day of Prayer when there had not first been a National Day of Repentance. Daily prayer was 'far more effectual' than great national days of prayer, particularly when daily prayer asked for a sensitivity 'to evil in ourselves as well as in others'. Regularity in prayer was the aim also of the British Commissioner, Albert Orsborn. He issued a directive in the following terms:

'From now on, for the duration of this lamentable war, every senior Salvation Army meeting, no matter what its character, shall commence with a united act of prayer....for national repentance and revival, for divine deliverance, and for the wisdom and love of God to prevail over the folly and cruelty of men. Every corps in the British Isles will set aside one public week-night meeting each week for prayer. The formation of Intercession Groups will be encouraged.'

Prayer continued as the cornerstone of salvationist response until the end of the war, with even a special prayer suggested for certain returning servicemen entitled 'For those who have lowered their Standards'.

Undergirding these three great and oft-repeated themes of new opportunities for God, evangelism, and prayer was a fundamental abhorrence of war. The same abhorrence had been expressed by the Army from its earliest involvement in war. Now once again men saw 'madness blazing over the world' and although 'the intentional spreading of darkness over the world' was 'an ancient offence' its skills were practised now as never before. Carpenter saw a generation 'far too familiar in their youth with violence, agony and destruction', growing up in an 'age steeped in shed blood'. But he exhorted them to turn evil experiences to good advantage. Their lives could have 'a new and deeper note' because they had 'seen awful things and knew men's pitiable condition without a Saviour'.

Army literature made repeated references to war's evils and Army writers were not slow to express their hatred of war. In December 1939 Carvosso Gauntlett told youthful readers of The Warrior about his First World War experiences and concluded: 'I must confess that nothing I saw from 1914 to 1918, or afterward, detracted from my hatred of war.'
Coutts (writing as 'Ensign) is worth quoting at length: 30

'A war between nations who employ their brains to increase their powers of mutual destruction makes any thoughtful man sick at heart. Well he knows what awaits the callow lads from mill town and mining village who listen so unsuspectingly to the Sergeant-Instructor's tip to "give the bayonet a d____ good twist round" before they pull it out. And as for that "War to end war" to which he - the reflective person - rushed so eagerly in his younger days, fearful lest the affair should peter out before he had his whack, perhaps it would be best if the phrase rotted in its grave undisturbed.'

The War Cry called it 'the most horrible and destructive war in all history' using 'monstrous perversions of science'. A new period in human history 'was being born with much travail'. 31 And the cause was 'not this or that national leader... but SIN, the rejection of God's will and way.' 32 It followed that true peace would flow only from 'a way of life called the way of righteousness', whether for individuals, nations, or the world.

The utterly abhorrent nature of the war was not, however, to be allowed to blind salvationists to God's ultimate victory and the establishing of his Kingdom. What the Army, in all its human weakness, stood for would long outlast all the military power the world could muster. 34 For behind the politicians, the massing armies, the manoeuvering fleets, God moves on, unconquerable. 35

Yet a pressing theological question needed to be confronted. It was the age-old issue of theodicy, the righteousness of God in face of a manifestly evil world. The Officers' Review 36 admitted that the war was a challenge to everyone who believed in a wise and loving Creator. God's proclaimed goodness was in danger of being discredited. 'There is no God' was a response to atrocity and suffering which was as old as man. God 'can make enormous wrongs work enormous good,' reminded Evangeline Booth when the war broke out. But the best response to the challenge was the freewill argument. The sins of men could not
prove the non-existence of God. Moreover, if men asked 'Where is God?'
the answer was that God was in the midst of the conflict, suffering with
men, striving for order out of chaos. Said The War Cry: 'He is
there with the Cross in the heart of the struggle, His crown the follies
and sins which made the war, His purpose to share the pain and the burden,
and by sharing to bring peace.' To cries for God's intervention, the
salvationist would reply that God has already intervened in the affairs
of men - by sending Christ.

The Christian apologist's task was not made easier by the ever lower
depths resorted to by the protagonists. Recognising that the bombing
of civilians represented the use of a method despised at the start of the
war, and having applauded Neville Chamberlain's 1940 assurance that it
would not happen, the Army spoke out strongly against the abandonment
of non-combatant immunity. The blanket bombing of Hamburg and Coventry
drew sharp words from the Army's press and when church leaders were
accused of ignoring the issue the Army protested that it would use 'all
its influence' to discourage such 'acts of vengeance'. The extending
of bombing away from only 'legitimate targets', so that babies and the
aged were killed and maimed, caused 'hot indignation'. In a rare
editorial slip which all but recognised the war as a just war on Britain's
part, the 'righteous duty' of the Allies was not to be allowed to descend
the slippery slope into 'evil vindictiveness'. Adherence to normal
just war standards was warmly greeted when Lieutenant-General HDG Crerar,
Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian forces, forbade the shooting of
prisoners. This accorded with the Army's earlier plea for 'every
chivalrous act' possible in war, so that the cruelties might be offset.

The War Cry comments here on non-combatant immunity reinforce the
impression that 'just war' categories were by now more consciously a part
of salvationist reflection upon the course of the war. An unconscious
use of such concepts has been noted in relation to the 1914-1918 war (see Ch.16), but with 'just war' ideas part of the popular debate on international relations in the 1930's and 1940's, their more marked appearance in Army comment after 1939 might reasonably be expected.

Seeing new openings, soul-winning, prayerfulness, a hatred of war, and a trust in God's goodness even in the face of catastrophe - these were basic components of the salvationist attitude to the war. The priorities were to do with the spiritual life. However, it was the Army's internationalism which yet again faced the sternest test.

2) Striving for Political Neutrality

Twice before had The Salvation Army's internationalism come under furious testing when world events conspired to bring salvationists from lands far apart face to face on the battlefield. Their bonds with brothers and sisters around the globe were a very precious, nigh sacred, heritage. William Booth's last coherent conversation with his son, Bramwell, had the Founder saying: 'I have been thinking again of the world as a whole. I have been thinking of all nations and peoples as one family.' This was how the salvationist continued to think of the world. But it was a two-edged sword. Frederick Coutts put it best: 'The Army's internationalism is its crown of glory in peacetime, but in war it becomes a crown of thorns.'

Officers like Coutts and Carvosso Gauntlett took every chance in their travelling and leading of meetings to stress the need to guard jealously this heritage. Whilst most hearts were gladdened by the reminder, not all were appreciative. Gauntlett once received a letter (anonymous naturally!) saying: 'Why do you want to give a whole Sunday afternoon to try to make us internationally minded when we don't want to be any such thing?' Nevertheless, from day one of war, Army
leaders pinned internationalism to the masthead, as had their predecessors at International Headquarters in previous wars. Evangeline Booth spoke in 1938 of international bonds of brotherhood 'not severable by any occurrence, in any land'\(^5\), and on the outbreak of hostilities George Carpenter let it be known that the word 'enemy' would not pass his lips or appear in Salvation Army literature.\(^5\)

The first wartime issue of the youth magazine, The Warrior, was devoted entirely to highlighting the international fellowship of the Army and readers were reminded that the word 'enemy' was not part of a salvationist's vocabulary.\(^5\) The 1940 Year Book carried an article entitled 'All One Army We!' It said: 'In an age of self-sufficient, often narrow nationalism, the Army rejoices in the maintenance of a spirit of brotherhood and happy co-operation between its peoples throughout the world - one flag, one General, one Lord and Master.'\(^5\) But such 'happy co-operation' ended in a practical sense when communications were severed between London and Berlin and the other occupied countries. The Army, however, saw this merely as 'testing', not 'destroying' its internationalism and the movement would emerge stronger in the end through being tried.\(^5\)

Even in prayer salvationists were meant to shun nationalistic attitudes. 'We come to God not as Britishers (or Americans) who happen to be Christians, but as Christians who happen to be Britishers, etc.,' proclaimed The Officers' Review.\(^6\) People of other lands were not 'a fearsome bogey'; they 'pray and suffer and grieve even as we do'.\(^6\) For this reason the Army would bring 'disinterested aid to all who need it'.\(^6\)

When, at last, Carpenter could visit his people on the mainland of Europe he found to his relief an unfaded spirit of international unity and co-operation. This was found in Denmark and Sweden, but especially
in Norway. At the end of the war in Europe stories began to emerge which demonstrated that for the third time in its history the Army had survived intact as one worldwide unit, despite enormous strain. Belgian, Russian, German and British salvationists had formed a guard of honour at the bier of a Belgian Army officer killed in an air raid; Dutch officers sent to German labour camps were welcomed warmly by salvationists in Stuttgart and asked to lead meetings there; German salvationists with the occupying forces in the Netherlands were invited to take part in Army meetings there; Dutch and British comrades joined with German salvationists in Hamburg to hold an open-air meeting of witness as soon as war was over.

The Army's press in the UK made no secret at all of war work undertaken with opposing nations by salvationists in those nations. 'The Army's war work is international' declared All The World, a public relations and fund-raising magazine. It went on to refer to reports coming in of Army work in Axis countries. (Such openness about Army links with enemy countries had been the editorial policy of All The World in the previous war, and of all Army literature published in London in the Boer War.) The Officers' Review carried an item describing the work of a German woman officer. The War Cry in London made repeated and open references to German salvationists. It scoffed at racialist ideas such as banning the music of Wagner and wrote of many 'faithful and inoffensive' souls living in nations opposed to Britain. It repeated verbatim a sermon by Carpenter broadcast on the BBC World Service in which the General said that morality was unrelated to nationality but rather the fruit of a faithful heart. It also objected strenuously to references in the secular press to the Japanese being seen as 'suicidal insects', for where was any hope for eventual understanding if such was the British mentality? Most important of
all, the Army would not engage in apportioning blame for the war between the political protagonists. This was the third time such a policy had been adopted in wartime.

Internationalism and a striving after universal brotherhood, such as that urged by General Higgins in 1929 (see Ch.17), required moral courage. When Lieutenant-Commissioner Booth Davey addressed the Royal Empire Society in 1945 on the Army's war work he mentioned plans for post-war relief work in Germany. This prompted a barbed question from Vice-Admiral Wade Caulfield: 'Did this imply linking up with Germans who belonged to The Salvation Army?' Booth Davey's reply was unambiguous: 'The Army is an international body and does not recognise any particular nation. We are all one in Christ.' The Admiral's reaction is not recorded.

Salvationists who served in the forces or who lost loved ones in air raids have spoken to the writer about their lack of bitterness toward the Germans, Italians or Japanese. Typical are the views of Major Fred Hill: 'I recently attended a lecture in London on 'forgiveness' and I heard people talking of trying to overcome the bitterness they felt towards the Germans... I felt I simply could not identify with them for I have never experienced that hatred and bitterness.... I knew many Germans who were lovely Christians.' Official policy at the top was not always far removed from attitudes of grassroots.

From time to time, it must be recorded, the ideal of evenhandedness between the nations and of rising above narrow patriotism was simply not achieved. One of the chief culprits was the Army's (at the time) foremost brass band, the International Staff Band. Ignoring the first word in its own name, the band put on blatantly patriotic programmes of music wherever it went. In its first wartime concert, two months into the war, it played 'a number of patriotic melodies'. The band's historian, Brindley Boon, describes the opening march of the concert as 'a bugle call'
and refers to the 'pistol-like crackle of the side drum'. He gives no hint that he sees anything incongruous in this sort of thing. In January 1943 the band mounted a concert as a 'tribute to the music of the Allies'. The national flags of Russia, the USA, and Britain were unfurled in front of the platform. The only possible explanation is that the organisers had forgotten entirely salvationist ideals in the war. How International Headquarters staff responsible for the band's activities could allow it, is hard to understand. But the episode serves as a reminder of the fiercely seductive power of patriotic emotion to which all at that time were subjected.

It must, however, be admitted also that the publications issuing from International Headquarters, whilst very largely maintaining a high and idealistic tone, fell occasionally to more human levels. But only once did The War Cry in London let 'enemy' slip past the proof-readers, in a reference to 'enemy planes' raiding in Finland. Another report on the Army's assets in Finland referred to 'anti-God' forces taking over and the same religious motivation came out in criticising Nazism (although not using that word) as 'the sinister anti-Christian philosophy that has enslaved so many'. Certainly Evangeline Booth saw freedom, truth and justice as under threat from 'the powers of evil', a theme which reappeared in The War Cry infrequently, but clearly, a number of times before 1946. The war was 'a defence of civilisation' against a system out to 'dominate a great part of the world' but the 'mighty machinery created by greed, jealously and fear' would eventually crush those who made it. With reference to the Russian front, the 'racial' policies of Germany (not explicitly named) and the 'dialectical materialism' of Russia (not explicitly named) denoted the 'bankruptcy' of the human spirit without God. In an uncharacteristic editorial article Japan was accused of 'fanatic cruelty' and when Albert Orsborn called the British Territory to prayer

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in August 1940 he linked this explicitly to the special needs of 'the Empire'.

These ten or so instances of partisan spirit rearing its head in the Army's leading newspaper between 1939 and 1946 would not be at all remarkable were it not for the Army's own professed stance of political neutrality in this and previous wars. The comments, albeit partisan, are relatively mild and, most would say, absolutely true. They show mainly two things: that salvationists were not superhuman; and that political neutrality was more an organisational theory than a reality in the minds of British salvationists. Only by the Army's own standards do they represent anything approaching failure. (See Ch. 27 for a detailed consideration of the coherence of the policy of political neutrality.)
2. Ibid., 3.
3. Ibid.
4. IWC 3-8-40:1.
5. Carpenter 1.
6. Ibid., 7-9.
7. ATW January-March 1942, 1.
8. TOR April-June 1941, 73.
9. TOR April-June 1945, 72-74.
10. IWC 6-7-40:3.
11. ATW January-March 1940, 6-7.
12. See Ch.2.
13. See Ch.8.
15. IWC 7-10-39:8.
16. TOR April-June 1943, 64.
17. Weymouth CHB, 8-9-40.
18. TOR October-December 1940, 320.
19. Carpenter 2, 16.
20. Ibid., 14.
22. *Cuthbert History*, 240.
24. See Ch.4.
26. IWC 16-3-40:2.
27. Carpenter 2, 6.
29. TW December 1939, 370.
30. TOR November-December 1939, 499.
31. IWC 16-12-44: 1.
32. TOR November-December 1939, 576.
33. IWC 18-8-45: 1.
34. IWC 12-4-41: 3.
35. IWC 19-4-41: 5.
36. TOR November-December 1939, 499-503.
38. IWC 3-2-40: 2.
39. IWC 8-6-40: 1.
40. IWC 2-1-43: 1.
41. IWC 2-5-42: 1.
42. IWC 20-3-43: 1.
43. IWC 24-2-40: 2. But see Ch. 18, Note 69.
44. IWC 21-9-40: 4. Also IWC 30-3-40: 2.
46. IWC 31-5-41: 5.
47. IWC 5-4-41: 5.
48. IWC 8-6-40: 1.
49. IWC 19-8-44: 1.
50. IWC 24-2-40: 2.
51. See Chs. 2 and 10.
53. Portrait, 18.
54. Ibid., 66.
55. IWC 1-10-38: 6.
56. Gilliard, 69.
57. TW October 1939, 291.
58. SAYB 1940, 20. This carried several clear references to the Army's German work.
59. IWC 18-10-41: 3.
60. TOR October-December 1941, 255.
63. IWC 29-9-45: 3.
64. TOR October-December 1941, 251.
65. ATW July-September 1943, 22.
66. TOR July-September 1946, 191.
68. IWC 14-6-41: 5.
70. IWC 21-7-45: 1.
71. IWC 16-12-44: 1.
72. United Empire, July 1945, 134.
73. Letter, Major Fred Hill (Northampton), 23-1-87.
75. IWC 20-1-40: 3.
76. IWC 30-3-40: 2.
77. IWC 14-6-41: 5.
79. IWC 31-5-41: 5.
80. IWC 29-7-44: 1.
81. IWC 6-1-40: 2.
82. IWC 30-10-42: 3.
84. IWC 31-8-40: 4.
CHAPTER 20

ISSUES OF CONSCIENCE (2)

1) Conscription
2) The Pacifists
1) **Conscription**

At no time in its existence had there been unanimity in The Salvation Army over the morality or otherwise of bearing arms in time of war. There is, unsurprisingly, still no such unanimity. William Booth's rubric that each one should follow the enlightened dictates of conscience in the matter was always adhered to. Bramwell Booth refined this only to the extent of stipulating that his officers, because of their spiritual calling, would not volunteer to carry weapons but could undertake humanitarian, unarmed duties such as medical work or chaplaincies. The Second World War did little to lessen the age-old dilemma, and nothing to change the Army's position.

The first men, on reaching twenty, to be conscripted did not register until June 1939 and began active service the following month. The initial intention was that they would serve only six months as preparation for a possible war in 1941 or 1942. Peace-time conscription raised an outcry in Parliament from Liberals and Labour in the opposition parties. In the event, conscription moved slowly and only men to the age of 27 had registered by May 1940. It seemed that the military authorities were hard pressed to cater for them.

When conscription was first called for in 1938 The War Cry lamented the inability of the nation's leaders to see any other way out and called for something far above National Service:

'With the call to National Service comes a transcending demand for a Super-National Service, a determined undermining of the barriers of fear and hatred by those weapons of the soul which, consecrated to Christ, are more powerful than fleets of the sky or sea.'

There were signs that the Army in Britain did not really know what to say to its people in the pre-war months. The necessity for conscription was on the one hand 'deplored', but on the other 'the people will expect all salvationists, as hitherto in our history, to
take their places where the need demands them to be.' In the same
breath, salvationists were told: 'The Salvation Army cannot issue
instructions to its people on such points.' The laity could be for-
given if they found this confusing. The Army was naturally concerned
with the impact conscription would have upon its own men. 'The souls
of these lads are of infinite importance to us,' declared The War Cry.
Corps officers were to ensure each enlisted man was 'armed with the utmost
faith' since 'loyalty to standards of salvationism will be more severely
tested than hitherto'. The 1914-1918 war had resulted in 'severe losses
in the way of backsliding among men who, placed amidst strangers, did
not sustain that thorough-going, taunt-proof separation from the world
which is the only brand of personal Christianity that can survive the
rigours of a military training camp.' At no point during the First
World War was this admission to losses through 'backsliding' ever made.

The first conscripts went on 3rd June 1939. Marking this watershed
date, the Army commented: 'So long as the world remains content to
become a mighty arsenal... it is about as safe as a petrol tank in front
of an open fire.' Nine months later, with conscription picking up
pace and another 324,000 men called up, the Army spoke of the strain
placed upon its own manpower at local level. In the end not one corps
or centre remained unaffected, and the older folk came forward 'wondering
whether they can manage another spell of more active service.' When
eventually those aged 18 were conscripted, the Army urged the need for
special attention to be paid to their 'moral welfare'. The salvationist
youths involved had to ensure they were 'known for what they are'.

As in the First World War, the great majority of eligible salvation-
ists felt it was their duty to go. Those who did so express their
feelings variously today, but not dissimilarly: 'I felt the need to
join up, not to "join in the fight", but because I felt I could not sit
back in safety and comfort whilst others bore the brunt of the respons-
sibility.'

'Whatever ones feelings to one's fellowmen, there is sometimes no alternative.'

'I felt that what we were confronted with in this war was evil and I would not be helping to defeat it by refraining from taking part. I felt I had what it takes to be a parachutist and therefore I offered to do my part to overthrow the awful scourge on the continent.'

'The evil as represented by the Nazi and Fascist powers could only be overcome by force and, as an extension of that, it was my duty to play my part in this.'

One estimate claims 20,000 salvationists served with the Allied forces (worldwide).

Just before the official declaration of war the first salvationists were called up and the Army's press published comprehensive lists of names and addresses of Army officers and centres near to the military encampments so that every opportunity for contact, support and fellowship might be maintained. Not surprisingly, some found the experience daunting. But it had a certain enlarging quality, as one young man explained in a letter to General Carpenter:

'Mentally I have grown; spiritually my horizon is wider and I cannot help feeling that this disruption in the placid way of living that was mine is by far the best thing that has ever happened to me. I came woefully unprepared except for my faith into a world through which I endeavoured to pick my way, mazed by the unlimited problems that faced me. Now, with God's help, I can plainly see my path. Time has strengthened my resolve. I stand humbled before God that he has permitted me to be used by Him in an atmosphere where hatred is the cult.'

Carpenter's prime concern was to let these men know that they were still an integral part of the Army with a role to play. He wrote to them:

'You count, and count a great deal, as a witness to the reality and power of Christianity, at a time of darkness akin to the blackest periods in the history of the world.'

He offered them down-to-earth advice on practical morality - bad language, sexual matters, drinking, smoking, personal honesty. He told
them that it would be foolish to suppose all of them would come through unsullied and some may already have yielded. Then he reminded them of forgiveness and grace and the love of God for them in all circumstances. Carpenter's New Battlegrounds is a remarkable little volume. Published in pocket-size, it was sent free to every salvationist - man or woman - in the forces. But in keeping with the principle of international neutrality it was addressed also to salvationist conscientious objectors (on which see below) and to German salvationists in the German forces. Over 1.5 million copies were printed because it was adopted for use as the official handbook for all Protestants in the USA forces, a singular tribute to its author.

Carpenter's exhortations about taking a spiritual stand in the forces were not ignored. The War Cry carried accounts of brave witness, and sometimes a story of ingenuity overcoming reticence. One young Salvation Army bandsman of retiring disposition made his stand by placing above his bed in the barracks a photograph of his girlfriend in her Army uniform and bonnet. Soon, another man enquired about the picture and spoke of his own Christian faith. The friendship was the first of many others. The Army did what it could by way of support. Apart from General Carpenter's books, a tiny Song Book was produced measuring 2¼ by 2¼ inches containing 121 Army hymns and songs. It was Carpenter's 1942 Christmas gift to Army servicemen.

One aspect of salvationist activity hit especially hard by conscription was The Salvation Army Assurance Society Ltd. Scores of its staff were called up. Its in-house journal published full lists and throughout the war carried letters from staff in the forces. Occasionally, an account of war experiences by a staff-member was published. Vacancies caused by conscription were filled frequently by the wives of the men called up. In Scotland, by mid-1941, the Society was using
64 wives in this way, 60 of them being fully-uniformed salvationists.  

Past experience had taught the need to educate salvationist servicemen as to their rights with regard to religious attestation on joining the forces. King's Regulations permitted attestation under 'other denominations' and the denomination named by the serviceman had to be recorded. Later, the Regulations referred to The Salvation Army by name. 

Every effort was made to inform salvationists as to the official position. The War Cry published full details and exhortations. The Naval and Military League (NML) supplied a booklet referring in detail to the military, naval and air force regulations governing salvationists and: attestation, church parades, participation in Army meetings, and wearing of Army uniform. Attestation as a salvationist ensured:

1. Access to The Salvation Army Welfare Officer (see Ch.21);
2. Notification to the Welfare Officer when a man entered a military hospital;
3. Notification to the Army if a man were wounded;
4. The right to attend the nearest Army centre for Church Parade.

Things were not always straightforward in practice, however, for some of the military staff in charge of registration were ill-versed in the rules. In the early months salvationists met frequent difficulties. By 1941 matters had improved and military chaplains proved helpful in the formalities needed to amend a mistaken attestation. There was, however, a continuing need to publish data in The War Cry and to post information in Salvation Army citadels.

Army papers regularly published lists of salvationists killed, wounded, missing in action, or taken prisoner-of-war. Over 300 members of the Naval and Military League died. Stories of heroism slowly emerged, the first coming to light at Dunkirk when the British forces escaped the French beaches in 220 light warships and 650 small
civillian craft. An unnamed salvationist gave up his place in a fishing boat for two wounded men left on the beach. Another salvationist, still on the beach, spoke to a fellow-serviceman about his spiritual life and was shot shortly afterward. The serviceman survived to be converted in England and to attend the Army corps at Thornton Heath. A number of salvationists were honoured for bravery.

2) The Pacifists

It has already been noted in Ch.17 that an appreciable number of salvationists embraced pacifist thinking in the years between the two World Wars. There were probably more pacifists in the Army in the late 1930s than ever before, though there had always been an anti-war element going right back to Catherine Booth. As in 1914, a system of Tribunals was set up to test the genuineness of an individual's objection to military service on grounds of conscience. Some 58,000 and 2000 women applied to the Tribunals. Of these, 40,000 were granted conditional exemption, the condition being discharged only when the war ended. Unconditional exemptions were given to 2900. About 5000 were sent to prison for refusing military service despite being not exempt. Most objectors registered an objection to war in general, not to this particular war with Hitler.

The Army gave little, if any, acknowledgment to its pacifists in 1914-1918, but was more relaxed on the subject by 1939. Its officers in the field were issued with details of how the Tribunal system worked. It was clearly stated that a young man had a right to ask an Army officer to appear at the Tribunal as his 'friend'. Every officer, without exception, should therefore be familiar with the simple procedure to be followed. Officers could witness to an applicant's sincerity whether they shared his views or not. It was to be remembered that the applicant
was not a criminal before a judge, but a citizen of good standing seeking that relief of conscience allowed for by Act of Parliament. Full advice could be obtained from The Central Board for Conscientious Objectors and salvationist objectors could write direct to the office of the British Commissioner. That advice of this kind was given is some measure of the influence of Army pacifists at 101 Queen Victoria Street. Nothing comparable is to be found in the 1914-1918 sources.

General Carpenter, in addressing salvationist youth, drew no distinction between those who served and those who objected. He recognised explicitly that 'some have felt that duty to Christ called for an objection to combatant service.' However, the sensitive attitude of the leadership amongst whom were a number highly sympathetic to pacifist convictions (see below), was not always matched by lay salvationists at local level. Not always was The War Cry's appeal observed when it asked that differences in outlook on the issue should not affect 'the bonds of fellowship'. At Shoeburyness the young Warren Hooton suffered, as he puts it, 'a bit of ostracisation' after he sought exemption, having concluded that 'it would be wrong for a Christian to fight and, in view of the internationalism of The Salvation Army, absolutely wrong.' Wilfred Kitching and Frederick Coutts appeared for Hooton at his Tribunal hearing. Bram Weaver 'found more objection and bad feeling from fellow salvationists than from the public' when he applied to a Tribunal in March 1940. He was at Wood Green Corps as a teenager where a pacifist group flourished. It surprised him how so many salvationists did 'a volte face' in October 1939, having for months previously spoken of the evilness of war. He was supported at the Tribunal by, again, Wilfred Kitching and by a letter from Carvosso Gauntlett. It is instructive to read the grounds for his objection as stated to the Tribunal:

'My objections to any form of Military Service are based
on the following:

(1) War is definitely irreconcilable with the life and teaching of Jesus Christ of whom I am a follower.

(2) Being the son of Salvation Army officers I have been brought up in close association with the SA, an international organisation which propagates the Gospel in ALL countries and is NON-POLITICAL. As a lifelong salvationist my conscience will not permit me to be identified with the military machine whose object is the destruction of life.

(3) I consider it more important for the Kingdom of Jesus Christ to be established than the mere preservation or extension of ANY nation or empire.

(4) War is no real and lasting remedy for existing evils and civilisation needs a method different from the senseless and barbaric murder of countless lives.

(5) The above-mentioned convictions which have been rooted and grounded in me for many years make it impossible for me to participate in war.'

Weaver's pacifism was absolute. It is instructive to note in his second ground his firm emphasis upon salvationist apolitical and international traditions, the only possible consequence of which he saw as a refusal to participate in war. He expressed to the author, in interview, his failure to understand why his fellow-salvationists did not draw the same conclusion, which to him was inescapable.47

Leslie Kimpton of Willesden Green was sent by a Tribunal to join the Non-Combatant Corps, which in his view imposed 'hard and heart-breaking work' on the men 'all to break their spirits so that they would give up their ideals'. Frederick Coutts supported him at the hearing.49 Henry Griggs from Colchester was an absolutist and served three months in Chelmsford Prison for his convictions.50

Although the experiences of salvationist objectors were not always of the happiest and although fellow-salvationists were sometimes less than Christian to them, it is clear that the official Army attitude on the matter was more balanced than in the last war and one of open acceptance. It was recognised early in the war that some had 'developed
strong convictions' with regard to war's 'futility and utter waste' and could respond only with 'undisguised repugnance'. Indeed, those with conscientious objections were to be treated with 'profound respect' said The War Cry:

'The Army in Great Britain also faces the task of properly appreciating those in its ranks whose consciences will take them before tribunals.

The Salvationist (wrote the General in these pages in September of last year) will not allow any difference in outlook upon calls made upon him as a citizen to affect the bonds of comradeship which bind the Army together.

On the contrary, we feel sure, there will be profound respect for those young men who, because of their convictions, will choose the path of unpopularity, misunderstanding and possibly greater hardship.

We long ago learned that the jibe flung at the conscientious objector is a swift boomerang, labelling the speaker far more accurately than the one who, because of his sense of duty to God and man, swims against the tide.'

To drive this home, the following week The War Cry carried an article on the relative merits of pacifism and non-pacifism. It appeared in print just days before the first batch of conscripts answered their country's call on 3rd June 1939. What was a salvationist's duty when Christian thinkers and leaders differed widely in interpreting the mind of Christ in regard to war? Each individual was 'thoughtfully and prayerfully' to make his choice between the opposing views. 'The Army's leaders do not, and indeed cannot, undertake to decide that either the one or the other point of view is wholly right.... It is essentially a matter for the individual conscience.' The least a salvationist could do was to recognise the sincerity and honest conviction of those of different opinions from himself. He would carefully 'abstain from all heated and rancorous controversy' on the subject. He should realise that despite a freer attitude by the government than in 1916, 'the position of the conscientious objector is likely to call for the exercise of the highest moral courage' in enduring 'jibes and
unworthy aspersions'. Not only would a salvationist shun such behaviour toward an objector, he would go further and give to that person 'the sympathy and moral support due to everyone who is prepared to stand by, and if needs be, to suffer for convictions honestly held.... That is the salvationist's bare Christian duty as a servant of Christ and lover of his fellow-men.\textsuperscript{53}

Despite all this, The War Cry found salvationist conscientious objectors hardly newsworthy. Just three lines at the foot of an inside page, in the smallest typeface possible, were merited during the war:

'A number of salvationists have sought and been granted exemption from military service on conscientious grounds.'\textsuperscript{54} Frederick Coutts has commented: 'No small searching of heart and mind lay hidden in the laconic announcement.'\textsuperscript{55} However, the issue was further addressed as time went by\textsuperscript{56} and culminated in the claim, only partially convincing, that 'the Army has been known for its championship of those willing to suffer for conscience sake... even though thousands of salvationists are not able to view the question of war as they do.'\textsuperscript{57} It is probably truer to say that whilst official pronouncements were more than tolerant of objectors and genuinely reflected the thinking and ideals of the leadership, nevertheless, the vast majority of ordinary salvationists found it very hard to identify with conscientious objectors and were in the main influenced by the patriotic atmosphere of the time and country in which they lived. If the Army had indeed championed the objectors, it was only through the intense activities of a handful of pacifist officers who found themselves forming spontaneously during the war a likeminded fellowship at 101 Queen Victoria Street. What follows, therefore, is a brief consideration of the leading personalities: George Carpenter, Carvosso Gauntlett,\textsuperscript{58} Frederick Coutts and Wilfred Kitching.
General George Carpenter is here included in this distinguished group of pacifist salvationists even though there is evidence in the sources that he might not always have applied the 'pacifist' label to himself. Coutts considered him to be a pacifist, like himself. However, Carpenter's biographer, Alfred Gilliard, who also had frequent personal contact with the General, records that he said more than once that life would be easier 'if my judgment were completely carried and I could become a convinced pacifist.' Moreover, John Whitebrook recalls speaking with Carpenter in 1943 prior to a 'Day of Prayer' to be held in the Regent Hall in Oxford Street when the General spoke to him of how proper it was for salvationists to respond patriotically to the call to arms. What is not in doubt is his warm sympathy for the pacifist stance and his readiness to risk being publicly perceived as belonging to the pacifist camp. At a 'Day with God' held in London's Queen's Hall in May 1940 he was asked by his staff, who planned the day, to lead the large congregation in special wartime prayers. He rose to the rostrum and confessed in his quiet, conversational style that he 'felt no guidance towards prayers for victory, but rather a strong urge that the will of God should be accomplished among the nations, whatever the cost.' Gilliard, who was present, records 'The confession penetrated slowly. Not until the next day did bewilderment, and in some cases the resentment it created, come into the open. It would have been so much easier to have called for God's destroying hand to fall.' Conversely, The War Cry reported an 'evident assent' to what Carpenter had said. The recollection of Frederick Coutts is closer to that of Gilliard. He remembers the General speaking privately with him the next day and saying how the IHQ Commissioners, chiefly Commissioner William Maxwell, had taken him to task. He confessed to being 'astonished' at the reaction and had no idea his words would bring 'obloquy' upon him.
Carpenter placed himself in the neutralist tradition of Salvation Army Generals before him when it came to assessing the cause of the war. He shunned any temptation to make political comment or apportion blame between the warring nations and instead stressed that the cause was man's poverty of spirit. The churches could not escape blame: 63

'There can be no doubt that the tragedy of these days is directly related to the failure of a large section of the Christian church. It has often missed its way and allowed too much of the spirit of the world. It has consequently surrendered its power to lead.... It would be foolish to pretend that the Army has remained entirely unaffected by this widespread spiritual decline.'

He went on to accuse the Army of letting 'a spirit of worldliness' rob it of power which could have helped the nations in their desperate need, for the war was the consequence of 'ignoring the plain teaching of Jesus Christ'. 64 He maintained the same theme when preaching at St. Clement Danes for the Anzac Day Service on 2nd May 1940: 65

'Unless there is a spiritual content in men's plans for the days to come, I can see nothing but disaster and confusion worse confounded, no matter what brilliant success of arms may be achieved.'

When he broadcast on the BBC from Luton Temple Corps, again his entire emphasis was on things of the spirit. No politics entered his thinking. But he did refer evenhandedly to the lack of relation between moral standards and nationality. 66 Again, he took the chance offered by his New Year message for 1941 to reiterate that the war was the result of 'a godless conception of life'.

His generalship was marked by a burning anxiety for salvationists in lands cut off from London because of the war. International visits were, for the most part, impossible. Gilliard says that 'the bogey of frustration crouched on his desk'. 68 In 1940 the Army celebrated, quietly, its 75th Anniversary and Carpenter's special message referred deliberately and prominently to salvationists in Germany and Italy 'for the moment hidden from our view'. 69 He did the same on the first
anniversary of the declaration of war, linking salvationists in occupied parts of Europe 'with their companions in service toiling in German'.

As a wartime General he embodied the best ideals of Salvation Army internationalism.

Carpenter's abiding fear was that the war would divert the Army from spiritual soul-winning to ultimately arid community service for its own sake. Something of this has been noted already (see Ch. 19, Sect. 1). It was a theme he never abandoned. Souls were all-important. In a New Year message for 1944 he said he wanted to see in the Army 'more burden for souls, a more urgent approach to the hearts of the unsaved'. Simply everything was understood by him in the light of the Gospel. When he met President Theodore Roosevelt in the White House on 1st September 1942 the conversation was of spiritual values, and when victory over Japan ended the war he told his people not to be naive about political peace, since 'God alone can make wars to cease by taking sin out of the human heart.'

It was no mere chance that George Carpenter made Carvosso Gauntlett his Editor-in-Chief and acting Literary Secretary in the autumn of 1941. The Army's press was the single most influential factor during the war in holding at bay amongst salvationists the secular influences of living in a society geared up for total war, and now Carpenter had placed in a position of the utmost strategic importance the Army's most outspoken, and indeed articulate, pacifist. Moreover, Gauntlett had spent his childhood and formative years in Germany and had served in editorial work as an officer in Berlin. Thereafter he took up appointments in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Denmark and England, imbibing the international spirit of salvationism. Frederick Coutts, his friend and biographer, and who served under him at IHQ, freely admits to having been converted finally to pacifism through Gauntlett who was the first person Coutts had met.
Pacifism in Gauntlett was not devoid of emotional factors, but it would be wrong to think that the cerebral played less part. Albert Orsborn, who refers to him as 'my great and wonderful friend', and who as General in 1946 appointed him as Territorial Commander for Germany, described Gauntlett as 'a thinker of great penetration, unique sincerity, ready to speak his mind, and politely reckless of reaction unfavourable to himself.... I suspected that he watched the human parade with an occasional quiet chuckle, especially when consequential people went strutting past. Gauntlett did nothing, nothing at all, to try to impress people.... He spoke high German without the least trace of accent; so that educated Germans marvelled at it, and were frankly incredulous when told he was an Englishman.

Independence of mind was needed to maintain a pacifist stance. Gauntlett had shown how independent he could be when the Army's legal constitution in Britain was altered by the Salvation Army Act 1931. When the Act was in Bill form before Parliament, Gauntlett was the only officer to avail himself of General Higgins' permission for any officer, who so wished, to oppose the Bill before the Parliamentary Committee. Again, in the years of the First World War, he ploughed a fairly lonely furrow by devoting himself to German internees in Britain, covering 17,000 miles in the process and preaching to just under 50,000 men. In 1916 his pacifist convictions had caused a brush with Army authorities. The Military Service Act of that year envisaged the calling up of ministers of religion. On 8th April 1918 all officers were asked to notify the Army if they had any objection even to non-combatant service. Gauntlett replied by return in the affirmative. The circular from National Headquarters promised that any officer conscripted would not forfeit seniority when future promotion fell due. The pacifist replied.
'Though complex questions of seniority have little interest for me as matters stand, it would no doubt be reassuring to my father to know that I could resume my Army service at the conclusion of the war or imprisonment.'

At the conclusion of the war in 1918 he was appointed to corps work at Bridgwater in the company of another young Captain. This was Wilfred Kitching, of Quaker stock and holding convictions on war as firm as Gauntlett's. In 1933 The Officers' Review carried a series on 'Moral Issues of Today'. Gauntlett contributed an article on 'War'. In it he spoke for a growing, but then still small, number of salvationist pacifists and made the following points:

1. War is savage, cruel and futile.
2. War is an impractical tool for problem-solving between states.
3. War is not, as claimed, a biological necessity.
4. War does not, as claimed, ennoble men.
5. A soldier's death in battle is not a martyrdom.
6. War negates truth and deludes the populace.
7. War stimulates evil passions and fosters lax morality.
8. War degrades God's supreme creation, the human personality.
9. War makes Christ's command, to love one's enemy, high treason.
10. War is practical atheism.
11. Life is to be sacrificed before principle.
12. To defend the weak we may interpose our bodies but we may not attack the adversary.
13. True patriotism is to adhere to the spirit and standards of the Kingdom of Heaven.
14. War repudiates God's method of dealing with evil, i.e. with spiritual weapons.
15. War addresses effects; the Gospel addresses causes.

The article presupposes the incompatibility of the Gospel and fighting in the war. Gauntlett's views sprang from his interpretation of the
overall life and teaching of Christ rather than any specific scriptural utterances. This 'Gospel factor' was then undergirded by attempts to demonstrate that in pragmatic terms the Gospel alternative to war had not been tried. This alternative includes the use of 'positive spiritual weapons' such as: the power of prayer; aggressive love; dependence on the sufficiency of 'Thine arm alone'. In reviewing, for The Officers' Review, an SCM publication which approved military service for Christians he referred to salvationists who had borne arms, but questioned whether to do so could be called 'a Christian's duty'. It is a 'vocation' for 'some'. Because of this - and it is a vitally important point if Gauntlett is to be understood - never did he insist on others copying his stance. Instead he urged the Army's international spirit, and left his hearers or readers to form their own reaction. Only if invited would he be involved in the dilemmas being worked out by others, and so it was that he found himself caught up in the Tribunals for conscientious objectors.

As the war drew to a close Gauntlett gathered together as many illustrations and anecdotes as he could find to exemplify salvationist internationalism in action. These were published in book form with a cover photograph showing Dutch, German and British salvationists conducting open-air witness in Hamburg in July 1945. This was typical of Gauntlett's unceasing promotion of internationalist considerations throughout the 1940's.

In the immediate post-war period Gauntlett found it necessary to go on applying pressure upon Army leaders at International Headquarters so that wartime official attitudes to conscientious objection by salvationists were not allowed to regress. In 1946 the government published plans for a new Conscription Act. It was to have the by then usual machinery for conscientious dissent. But when Gauntlett, as
Editor-in-Chief, wanted to publicise in *The Musician* the Tribunal procedures, he met with obstructions. The new Chief of the Staff, Commissioner John J. Allan, gave instructions to remove the material at proof-page stage. This was done. Allan was American and had spent the war in the USA where patriotic fever in the Army ran higher than in London. He had spent two years as a senior military chaplain in the States (see Ch. 24, Sect. 3) and now jibbed at an article he thought unpatriotic (see Ch. 24 for the Army in the USA in wartime). Undaunted, Gauntlett wrote to him. It was a 'very important question'; *The War Cry* had carried similar guidance in mid-1939; there could be no question of opposition to a government measure (although the Army had never backed away from such opposition if principle required it); Army youth had a right to be guided in matters of conscience as much as in matters of active service; the Army was the only prominent religious body to have no distinctive Peace Society to whom young people could turn; industrial service was an honourable alternative to military service; the guidance should be made publicly available in the Army's press. Allan was not to be convinced. In his own hand he wrote on Gauntlett's letter the following comment: 'If it is right to fight to maintain our honour and institutions, it cannot be wrong to be prepared for the struggle to the end that success may be more speedily and economically secured.' In short, Allan had missed the point, but he had his way.

A third leading pacifist at this time was Frederick Coutts. Between the wars he was active, with Gauntlett, in advocating the claims of pacifism and publicising amongst salvationists the exemptions allowed by law on grounds of conscience. He found an appetite amongst his hearers for clear guidance from the Army. His own published writings were clear enough: war was horrific and a menace to the Gospel (see Ch. 19 and the text for Note 30). On the outbreak of war he sent a circular
letter to a 'small group' of salvationist pacifists. This points to the existence of an organised group of some sort, probably very informally linked but sufficiently organised to afford Coutts a mailing list. The letter said:

'My dear Friend,

For some days now I have felt a concern to write to all salvationists I know who have taken up - or shown a sympathetic understanding of the Christian pacifist position.

For my own part, I am as convinced as ever that war and the teaching of Jesus cannot be reconciled. In saying this, I gratefully acknowledge that The Salvation Army has publicly and officially recognised the legitimacy of our stand (see 'The War Cry' for May 13th last, page 5.)

It would be foolish to deny that we are but a small group. Let us encourage our hearts, however, with the thought that God is able to use us, not according to our numbers, but according to His power.

We must continue to pray for and keep in touch with one another. This we can do in a spirit of perfect loyalty to the international movement to which we are privileged to belong.'

This sort of action, together with his appearances at Tribunals, gained Coutts, as he put it, 'some notoriety'. When he undertook a series of lunchtime sermons to workers at the Army's Campfield Press in St. Albans, the Director of the Press, Colonel Samuel Tucker, told him he wanted to hear 'no pacifist rubbish'! Occasionally also a colleague at 101 would take issue with him. He recalls Arch R. Wiggins, Editor of The Musician (see Note 92) being 'very conservative, with no grasp of pacifism, but vocal about it'. He, himself, would never have resigned over the issue since that would have been self-righteous, as if only he could be right. Nevertheless, there were some in The Salvation Army Students' Fellowship who left the Army because no official endorsement of pacifism was forthcoming.94

Like Gauntlett, Coutts' chief concern was for the spiritual things which war threatened. Writing a regular column for The War Cry in
1944 he echoed Carpenter's fear that the war would divert salvationist energies from first things. He quoted Cromwell's chaplain, Richard Baxter, who said, 'I never saw the work of God go well in war.' It was essential, wrote Coutts, for the Army 'to keep both hands on the Gospel plough'.

The sources reveal very little about Wilfred Kitching's pacifism, save for his early friendship with Gauntlett (see above) and his frequent appearances before Tribunals to represent salvationist applicants. Letters to the author from Bramwell Weaver and Warren Hooton bear out this latter point. Coutts believed that Kitching later 'moved to moderate ground' on the matter. Certainly, in his autobiography he gave it no space at all.

The sources thus make it clear that salvationist pacifism, whilst traceable back to Boer War days, reached its acme in the Second World War, due no doubt not only to increased public debate on the subject between the wars but also to a more liberal legislative framework of which the conscientious objector could take advantage. As in society generally, the pacifists in the Army were always a minority; not the loaf, but perhaps serving to leaven it.
1. See Ch. 13.


6. Ibid.


8. IWC 16-3-40:2.

9. IWC 7-11-42:3.

10. Letter, Major BF Ayres (Zillmere, Australia), 2-10-85.

11. Letter, VE Blyth (Ilford), 8-7-85.

12. Letter, NK Cotton (Cosham), 23-6-85.

13. Letter, Colonel G. Sharp (Beckenham), 4-7-85.

14. United Empire, July 1945, 133.

15. IWC 22-7-39:8.

16. Carpenter 2, 35.

17. Carpenter 1, 11.

18. Ibid., 16-23.


20. IWC 19-4-41:4.


22. AM, October 1939, 157.

23. AM, January 1940, 10; September 1940, 120.

24. See AM, October 1945, 78-79 for an account by Staff Sergeant Don Ashman (RAMC) of his training as a parachutist.

25. Letter, LA Kimpton (Clayton South, Australia), 24-12-85.

26. IWC 14-6-41:5.
27. IWC 15-11-41: 2.


29. War Office ACI 546, 7-11-22; War Office 114/General/7320, 9-1-34; KR Para.1571; KR 1236; Admiralty Monthly Order 376/1916; Admiralty Letter to IHQ 26-10-34; Air Councils Instructions for the Royal Air Force, KR paras. 833, 835 (1938); Air Ministry 114/Miss/1789, 18-8-233 and 23-11-34.


31. Letter, NK Cotton (Cosham), 23-6-85. He writes of 'puzzle-ment and non-comprehension' on the face of a young 2nd Lieutenant when Cotton asked to attest as a salvationist. Later, however, he was singled out to assist an illiterate serviceman, because he was a salvationist. See also Bernard Watson, Reluctant Hero, (SP&S, 1963), 15 for similar problems encountered by Lawrence Smith. Also IWC 7-9-40: 2.


33. Memorandum, Lieutenant-Colonel M. Owen Culshaw to Colonel Charles Durman, 15-10-41, IHQ.


35. Frederick Coutts, The Battle and The Breeze, (SP&S, 1946), 57.

36. ATW October-December 1945, 23.

37. E.g. IWC 6-7-40: 6.

38. See Ch.1. Also: Frederick Coutts, Interview, 1-8-85.


41. See Ch.13.

42. Problems, 63ff.

43. Carpenter 1, 11.

44. IWC 1-10-38:6.

45. Letter, W. Hooton (Shoeburyness), 25-6-85. Hooton was conditionally exempted and gave 5 years in the Thames Fire Service to meet the condition, as well as doing non-combatant duties in POW camps in England.

46. Letter, Bram Weaver (Woodford Green), 24-6-85.
Weaver was exempted on condition he undertook ARP work. On applying to the Fire Service, however, he was informed there were no vacancies.

Letter, LA Kimpton (Clayton South, Australia), 24-12-85.


IWC 13-5-39: 6, 'Pacifism or Non-Pacifism - Which is Christian?' by Alfred G. Cunningham (then Editor-in-Chief). Cunningham was not a pacifist, but the article was a model of objectivity.


Ciuýs 168.

Cuiys 14-9-40: 4; 22-3-41: 5; 9-9-44: 1.

IWC 1-8-42: 3.

Carpenter was already General. Kitching and Coutts were destined eventually to succeed him to that highest of Army offices. Thus, whilst the numbers were few, the pacifists at 101 were people of immense calibre. Among their number were also Ben Blackwell and Catherine Baird (see her peace poem in TOR October-December 1940, 332 entitled 'Defence' which ends with the couplet:

'Now shall we take the unsafe way, at last, Unarmed and unprotected, save with God!' and see also The Song Book of The Salvation Army, (SP&S, 1953), Song 890 by Catherine Baird, based exclusively on pacifist sentiments and in which she says: 'We lay all carnal weapons down, to take His shining sword.'). Albert Orsborn was not part of the group, but expressed his anti-war view unambiguously in his autobiography: Orsborn, 170. He too became General. Gauntlett, Coutts, Blackwell and Baird all worked in the Literary and Editorial Departments at International Headquarters and would have been regarded by most salvationists at that time as intellectuals.

Frederick Coutts, Interview, 1-8-85. Coutts said that he and Carpenter conversed on the subject.

Gilliard, 69. Gilliard, according to Coutts, was not of pacifist leaning.
61. Letter, WJC Whitebrook (Mansfield), 1-7-85. Whitebrook admits he cannot recall Carpenter's exact words.


63. IWC 2-3-40:7.

64. IWC 30-3-40:12.

65. IWC 4-5-40:2.


67. IWC 4-1-41:3.

68. Gilliard, 66.

69. IWC 6-7-40:3.

70. IWC 2-11-40:1.

71. IWC 1-1-44:3.

72. IWC 19-9-42:3.

73. IWC 25-7-45:1.

74. Portrait, 56; IWC 13-9-41:5.

75. Portrait, 17-54.

76. Frederick Coutts, Interview, 1-8-85. Coutts calls Gauntlett 'an absolutist' on war and Christianity, mainly due to the 1930's influence of the Rev. Dick Sheppard.

77. Orsborn, 173.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid., 174-175.

80. Portrait, 55.

81. Ibid., 20. See Ch.10. Gauntlett was in his early twenties at the time.

82. Ibid., 25.

83. Ibid., 26.

84. TOR September-October 1933, 427-432.

85. TOR January-February 1940, 80.

86. Ibid: The Christian as Soldier, by Hugh Martin. (Gauntlett wrote under his initials of CG. or SCG. He was also 'AE' - Assistant Editor; 'KIP' - Knowledge is Power; and 'Bibliophile' - Lover of Books.)

357.
87. Ibid.
88. See Ch.19.
89. E.g. Letter (undated) from Gauntlett to Tribunal Chairman hearing the application by Bramwell Weaver: See Note 48 above.
90. SAYB 1947, 22.
91. Letter, Gauntlett to Allan, 19-11-46.
92. This episode may have been caused partly by the fact that the Editor of *The Musician*, Arch R. Wiggins, was dismissive of pacifist views: Frederick Coutts, Interview, 1-8-85.
93. A copy of the letter, dated 6-11-39, was supplied to the author by Major R. Street, Editor, *Salvationist*, on 10-6-86 just after Coutts' death (promotion to Glory). It had been sent to him by HV Cattle who had been amongst those circulated in 1939. Cattle wrote: 'This letter meant much to me in and since those dark days of 1939.' Street prepared Cattle's letter and the copy of Coutts' letter for publication but had to withdraw it following a request to this effect from Mrs. General Olive Coutts and instructions from General Jarl Wahlström. This may have reflected a tendency by Coutts in later years to play down the pacifist issue. However, he was extremely forthcoming about it when interviewed by the author at his home in 1985.
94. Information in this paragraph from Frederick Coutts, Interview, 1-8-85.
95. IWC 29-1-44:1.
96. Letters: Bramwell Weaver (Woodford Green), 24-6-85; Warren Hooton (Shoeburyness), 25-6-85.
97. Note 94.
CHAPTER 21

BRITISH WAR WORK

1) With the Troops Again
2) The British Expeditionary Force
3) The Channel Islands
4) In Prison Camps
1) With the Troops Again

In the Second World War The Salvation Army in Britain mounted once more a vast effort to meet the spiritual and physical needs of the fighting men and women. Again this was a visible outworking of the primary salvationist principle of evangelism, hand in hand with compassionate social service in response to wartime human needs. Total world statistics have already been given (See Ch. 18, Sect. 1). In general, this work resembled closely that undertaken in the First World War, and so what follows in this Section is but an overview, with emphasis upon aspects of the work novel to 1939 or contrasting with 1914.

The principal method of keeping contact with the Army's own conscripts was still through the Naval and Military League (NML) which in 1939 had 35 Homes around the world, serving both salvationists and non-salvationists. It was opened to women salvationists for membership in April 1940 and by the end of 1942 had about 9000 members in all. The booklet issued to members gave information on attestation rights, forthright spiritual exhortation, scriptural injunctions, and the addresses of all NML centres. Regular articles of an inspirational nature were featured in The Warrior and aimed explicitly at NML readers. There is evidence of considerable keenness amongst members to be active as salvationists in their military setting. Three Leaguers began an informal meeting in a cabin on board 'HMS Warspite' in the summer of 1939. They moved to the ship's chapel when the cabin grew overcrowded and were there interrupted by the ship's chaplain who had them charged with 'convening an unofficial religious service'. They were reprimanded, but so impressed the Commander when paraded before him that he granted use of the chapel freely thereafter. As in previous years (see Chs. 5 and 11), the League's rationale was simply
to support salvationist Christians in their trying military surroundings and to encourage them to take a stand and witness there. Toward the end of the war the League marked its 50th anniversary. Frederick Coutts wrote an article for the 1945 Year Book outlining the history of the League and recording a total of 15,000 members, 340 of whom were prisoners-of-war (see Sect. 4 below).

The War Emergency Department ran the Red Shield Clubs. These provided recreation rooms, refreshments, quiet rooms, games, books, writing materials (all free, if need be) and a Christian influence. They had mushroomed all over the Army world in the 1914-18 War and it was no different now. The aim was pragmatic and, whilst there could be no mistaking the Christian atmosphere, 'emotional appeals' and 'rhetorical preachments' were studiously avoided. Just 14 months into the war Britain boasted over 100 Red Shield Clubs and a further 85 opened during 1942 at a cost of £150,000. This work was designated by the government as 'work of national importance' and those engaged in it could not be withdrawn for war work of other kinds. Those looking to employment bureaux for work could be directed to Red Shield work under statutory powers. By the end of 1944 there were 418 clubs in Britain, new openings usually being presided over by a public dignitary to maximise the public relations potential of the event and attract further funding. Typical statistics for a club show 132,000 meals per month served and up to 300 men accommodated nightly. By March 1945 the Army had opened 1107 Red Shield Clubs all over the world (eventually to top 3000), serving 8 million forces personnel each month.

At the beginning of hostilities The Salvation Army clearly expected to have officers appointed as official military chaplains. This had happened on a small scale toward the end of the First World War but only after a row with the War Office and questions in the House of Commons.
The Minutes of the Imperial War Fund Council show that it was decided to bring to the Council 'names of chaplains for consideration', but appointments were to be made by the Chief of the Staff. Moreover, detailed guidance was issued to officers as to the role of a salvationist chaplain, but it was not to be. By mutual consent with the government, the Army appointed no chaplains during the war but settled instead for officially recognised and accredited 'Welfare Officers'. These would look to the spiritual needs of British salvationists in the forces inside the UK. The first four were certificated by the War Office on 17th June 1941. They were to answer in the first instance not only to the Army War Emergency Department but also to the Assistant Chaplain-General of the Commands to which they were posted. They would be invited to Command Conferences for chaplains. The War Office paid to the Army the sum of £500 annually towards the cost of 'religious ministrations to salvationists in HM Forces', provided the numbers in the forces approximated at least 5000. Soon the Welfare Officer scheme was extended with the appointment of two officers to the Scotland Command and the Northern Ireland Command. A seventh Welfare Officer was appointed to the South Eastern Command on 18th November 1941. These arrangements avoided the difficulties raised by the War Office in the First World War (see Ch.12), but at the same time afforded the Army ample scope for what it wished to do. They also meant that the Welfare Officers were not perceived by the rank and file as part of the military hierarchy, a perception which some chaplains found hampered their work. Yet they were expected to concentrate on an explicitly spiritual ministry, leaving the material side of things to the huts and mobiles, etc.

The War Emergency Department convened a conference of Welfare Officers in September 1941 to review progress. Problems of attestation by salvationists were discussed along with the difficulties caused by
overlapping with NML work and personnel. A need for more literature for troops was recognised, and emphasis was placed upon good liaison with corps officers. It was found that relationships with the military authorities and with military chaplains were excellent. The delegates each reported an encouraging start. However, after a full year of the system being in operation Lieutenant Colonel Owen Culshaw accompanied Colonel Charles Durman to the War Office to discuss certain difficulties which had arisen. They saw the Chaplain-General on 14th May 1942 and raised the following matters:

1. The W.O's were treated as civilians, hindering access to bases and freedom of movement generally.
2. They were hindered in visiting sick personnel.
3. They were not consulted in regard to burial of the dead.
4. The title of 'Welfare Officer' had been challenged by another department of the War Office.
5. Their permits were too restrictive.
6. Invitations to chaplains' conferences had not been forthcoming, as promised.
7. Petrol was unavailable.
8. Salvation Army officers should be made 'Officiating Chaplains'.
9. Could women officers be 'Officiating Chaplains'?

The meeting was 'cordial' and the War Office response was not unreasonable. Chaplains were appointed if a denomination had 1100 men in any one unit. This was a Treasury ruling. Whilst the Army fell short numerically, the officers would have to remain civilian in status. However, a special badge would be issued and worn showing 'SA (Crest) SO' so that access to bases became easier. In addition, the title should become 'Salvation Army Services Officer'. Invitations to chaplains' conferences would most certainly be issued, and the sick-
ness or death of a salvationist serviceman would be notified to the Army rapidly where the man had attested as a salvationist. The matter of petrol was different, however, since there was none to be had! The War Office favoured strongly the appointment of women Army officers as Services Officers and the matter would be taken forward swiftly. The question of 'Officiating Chaplains' was not pursued (but see Ch. 22). The idea of adopting a khaki uniform was dropped. Culshaw and Durman left not dissatisfied. 31

The new 'Services Officers' were expected by the Army to deal, inter alia, with matters of personal morality among the troops. Indeed, this was expected of all officers having to do with the forces. Down to earth guidance was circulated to officers on problems of sexual morality usually encountered in wartime, including venereal disease, the issuing of free contraceptives to troops, and homosexuality. 'The lad struggling with homosexual desires... is no more a sinner because he is homosexual than he would be if he were diabetic. He sins when he allows his unnatural desires to lead him into immoral conduct.' This was a fairly liberal view for the time. It was accompanied by a clear word on the issuing of contraceptives to servicemen: 'Whether for prevention or cure, the acceptance of such a packet implies a mental assent in the soldier to the possibility of it being useful some day, and when the temptation presents itself, provision for this contingency is scarcely likely to strengthen a man's resistance.' The subject was in the news (not unlike the AIDS debate in the late 1980's) and the Army knew its mind: 'Service habits are not always left behind with Service life' and the only answer was 'to bring a man into contact with the living Christ whose power can stave off the fiercest temptations.' The new 'It's OK if you can get away with it' morality would not serve the men or their country. 35 The Army therefore called for strong government action to prevent prostitution near military camps. Were
'scolding or condemning' would do nothing; the solution lay in 'deep, strong sympathy, a watchful eye, timely guidance and a friendly hand... strengthened by constant prayer.' The Army's press publicised literature available from the Association of Moral and Social Hygiene in Westminster. The reporting of 70,000 new cases of VD in 1942 at last compelled the government's hand and regulations were introduced providing for compulsory screening in certain cases. This was welcomed by the Army, as was the introduction of compulsory medical treatment for VD.

On a distinct but related matter, Army leaders expressed concern. This had to do with the fact that some co-habitees of servicemen were receiving larger state allowances than some wives. Each man, on registering, was asked to say whether he had a 'married wife' or an 'unmarried wife'. The Army supported the Archbishop of Canterbury's suggestion that the latter expression be exchanged for the rather cumbersome 'unmarried dependent living as a wife' since it carried the right 'suggestion of irregularity' rather than 'a slick acceptance of a wrong situation'. 'The nation which treats lightly the family and its sacred obligations is steadily digging away at its own foundations.'

Salvationist ministry to the material and physical needs of the troops was in large part a more streamlined version of what was done in the First World War, and the work of the NML and Red Shield Clubs has already been referred to earlier in this Section. A War Comforts Department was opened under the personal oversight of Mrs. General Carpenter and was visited by Queen Elizabeth in May 1941. The Times reported 73,000 garments produced by Army 'knitting circles' of which there was 'one in every town', including one consisting entirely of blind persons. Items of clothing poured in from Britain and overseas and by mid-1942 a million articles had been handled. This figure
doubled within a further two years and the Army shipped goods worth £500,000 in 97,384 cases and 465 sacks and bales in 490 ships.\textsuperscript{44}

The war provided novel openings for Army ministry in military prisons.\textsuperscript{45} Brigadier John Wainwright of the Men's Social Services had access to 21 military detention barracks and naval quarters.\textsuperscript{46}

A further departure was the opening of a hospital at Lowestoft for sick (not wounded) servicemen.\textsuperscript{47} This brought salvationists into contact also with many relatives. One work of particular importance to families of servicemen was that of the Missing Servicemen's Investigation Bureau, 95\% of whose enquiries were received from non-salvationists.\textsuperscript{48} A hostel for relatives of servicemen was opened at the request of the War Office in Leinster Square, London.\textsuperscript{49} Another opened in Brighton on 14th June 1940.\textsuperscript{50}

As in 1914, railway station patrols were mounted, most notably at Waterloo Station in London\textsuperscript{51}, but a new venture was the running of buffets on the trains themselves.\textsuperscript{52} The first was between Perth and Thurso, then London to Glasgow, and London to Edinburgh so that eventually London to Thurso was serviced. A man could travel 711 miles with access to an Army buffet all the way.\textsuperscript{53}

Structured services on a national scale were augmented by initiatives by corps on a local level. For instance, at Hamilton, Lanarkshire 1000 men each week received refreshment, and New Testaments were distributed\textsuperscript{54}. St. Albans opened a Rest Room\textsuperscript{55}; at Whitchurch 125 soldiers ate Christmas lunch.\textsuperscript{57} One non-salvationist veteran of the war has written of 'the amazing and infallible hospitality shown by Army folks, in any locality, to servicemen'.\textsuperscript{58}

In 1943 an exhibition was organised at London's Dorland Hall entitled 'Services for the Services'.\textsuperscript{59} One of the principle aspects focussed on Salvation Army mobile canteens. The first was on the road on 1st November 1939. It was manned by Captains Hector Main and Jack Lewis and inspected.
On 29th November 1939 a further two mobiles were inspected by Sir George Coxen, Lord Mayor of London, at the Mansion House. Generous donations reached the Army for further vehicles, such as £15,000 from the British Allied War Relief Fund which paid for 50 canteens on wheels. Donations were made locally too, like the gift of a mobile to Weymouth Corps from the British Women's Temperance Association. The British War Relief Society of America sent 14 mobiles built in the USA. They were presented to General Carpenter in London by Mrs. Winant, wife of the American Ambassador. A further international gift was a mobile canteen from the women of Bengal, on whose behalf it was presented to the Army by Mrs. Anthony Eden, wife of the Foreign Secretary. Army mobiles went with the BEF to France early in the war (see further Sect. 2). Nine were inspected by King George on 16th April 1940, models of 25 cwt., adapted for instant conversion to ambulances. There were 59 in France with 140 salvationist staff by June 1940. In 1944, as part of the invasion plan and Operation Overlord, Army mobiles returned to France. Some 39 were donated by the YMCA, YWCA, Church of Scotland, Catholic Women's Guild and the Church Army.

Practical ministries were established to meet the needs of female members of the forces. The first Red Shield Club for women opened at Perth, Scotland in October 1939. As the work spread to various parts of Britain, it was put under the charge of Brigadier Jean Stewart, in September 1941, who was moved from the International Training College for the purpose. Clubs for women opened rapidly and by the end of 1945 were established at 16 venues, including Northern Ireland. The War Cry reported that of 100 ATS girls who wrote about their first week in camp, 75 mentioned with appreciation the Army canteen. Women
Salvation Army Services Officers were certificated by the War Office. Work similar to that described here for military personnel was extended also to essential war workers, described by *The War Cry* as 'soldiers out of uniform'. These included the 'Bevin Boys', so called because of a scheme for exempting coal miners from military service and introduced by Mr. Ernest Bevin, then Minister of Labour. In March 1944 Mr. George Griffiths, MP focussed attention on the Army by a question in the House of Commons implying that conditions for Bevin Boys in the Army's Hostel in Coventry were well below the acceptable. He was following up a report in the *Daily Worker* of 17th March 1944 which listed several shortcomings. Mr. Bevin replied that he was well satisfied, as were his inspectors, with the Army's care and the press article referred to was 'a tissue of lies', a 'Communist method of supporting the war'. Mr. Griffiths gave an assurance that he was 'not attacking The Salvation Army'.

Not all the work for the services was met from government funds and the Army appealed almost unceasingly for public support. *The Times* reported the Army as in need of £150,000 'at once' for its war work as follows:

- £50,000 25 huts
- £30,000 BEF
- £32,000 Extensions to NML Homes
- £10,000 Emergency kitchens in the UK
- £10,000 First-aid equipment
- £17,000 Work for munitions workers

Mrs. General Carpenter addressed society women at the home of Lady Cory in Belgrave Square, London and spoke of officers in Finland dodging machine-gun fire in forests to take help to mothers and children. The child mortality rate was 1 in 10 there. Appeals such as these were
not unheeded. Alderman JG Graves of Sheffield gave £40,000 'as a tribute to the officers and men of The Salvation Army who rendered outstanding service to sufferers through enemy action in this city in December 1940.' A Red Shield hut could cost £2,500. £750 would buy and maintain for one year a mobile canteen. The Army told its potential donors that its war work was 'economical and effective' and 'on behalf of every serviceman, irrespective of class or creed'. A gift would assist 'the chain of moral and spiritual protection which every good woman prays shall be given to her men folk in time of war'.

Surprising lengths were gone to in order to arouse public generosity. The Army arranged a Sunday evening appeal broadcast by the BBC and made by a serviceman's mother, who 'had never spoken into a microphone before this occasion'. The appeal was nothing if not emotional. The canteen and buffet services were largely self-financing and even showed some profit, which under the terms of the War Charities Act had to be kept separate from all other funds.

The public reaction to what the Army did in the war was warm, as in the First World War. Expressions of thanks and recognition, with tributes to the spirit in which the service was rendered, came from royalty, diplomats, those in government, military leaders, the police, the fire brigade, the ARP authorities, and local authorities. What mattered most, however, was the reaction of the fighting men and once again, as in 1914-1918, it was one of gratitude. The response from the wider civilian population in Britain can be gauged perhaps by the tone of comments as to the Army and its ministry found in local newspapers across the country. These spoke of 'a grand work' and 'a labour of love; 'those unselfish men; 'a colossal task; 'an organisation the name of which is constantly on the lips of servicemen and women the world over. Formal honours, unsought but received gratefully, came in the 1943 New Year's Honours List, with an MBE for
Colonel Charles Durman, Director of the Emergency Department, and a BEM for Adjutant R. Chalker of Thurso. The King's Birthday Honours List 1943 included a CBE for Albert Orsborn.

2) The British Expeditionary Force

After the formal declaration of war the BEF was moved to the Continent as quickly as possible. The Force was under General Viscount Gort, VC, but he in turn was under orders from the French Military authorities. In 1899 the Army had entered the Transvaal. In 1914 it had followed the lines of battle in France. In this third conflict the salvationist aim was once again to get as close as possible to the front lines to carry out both spiritual and practical ministries. Colonel Booth Davey was summoned at once, therefore, from his post as Chief Secretary for Scotland to take charge of the Army's team to accompany the troops. He went immediately to France to assess the openings and did two tours, each of 600 miles. The soldiers urged him to 'come quickly!'. The Army therefore advertised for lay personnel who had to be 'godly, energetic and have initiative'. In January 1940, 38 handpicked officers were farewelled for France. At their public send-off in London's Regent Hall General Carpenter told them they were to work with their hands but to let their hearts do the communicating of eternal values. The War Cry called them 'a miniature Expeditionary Force against the temptations assailing the men in a foreign land'. Soon afterwards parties of lay salvationists, mostly women, were sent out. A total of 120 staff were in place by April 1940, of whom 70 were women. Altogether, 141 salvationists from Britain served the BEF. Some 25 centres were established within a matter of weeks, with 3 for ATS personnel. The regular hours for the staff were 19 hours daily - 7 am to 2 am; at 8.30 pm each evening an officer would lead a hymn, read from Scripture, and offer
prayer.  

Taking into account also the work of the mobile canteen/ambulances, the effort was an extraordinary one by any standards. The Army's speed of response was recognised by Lieutenant General Sir Douglas Brownrigg: 'Without disparaging in any way the work of others, I was amazed at the speed with which Booth Davey and his officers got hostels and clubs started in the forward and back areas, as well as running 20 mobiles.' General Carpenter was able to visit France in May 1940 and complete a tour of 600 miles, returning to London deeply convinced that the endeavour was worthwhile, 'regardless of the financial burden'.

What he did not foresee was the calamity which overtook the Allies and drove them back to the beaches and sea at Dunkirk, where after days of bombardment a total of 335,000 men were rescued by almost 900 vessels of every description. As the troops poured back into south coast ports, Army mobiles again went into action, with 80,000 snack meals served in the first two days. It was during the retreat that Mrs. Brigadier Climpson was killed when a car in which she and her husband were travelling was bombed. After burying her, Brigadier Climpson eventually found himself on a naval vessel crossing the Channel for home. The ship's Captain asked him to lead the ship's company in singing 'Abide With Me'. This he did, despite (or perhaps because of) his grief and then, instinctive salvationist that he was, he spoke to those on deck about God's love for them and about eternal values. All other workers (140) returned safely, but Major Frank Golightly 'arrived in England suffering from shock and exposure after a journey of hairsbreadth escapes, wearing trousers given him by a British soldier, slippers given him by a Frenchman, a scarf given him by a young woman and a coat loaned by a YMCA man.'
Some of the officers were last to leave their towns, like Major and Mrs. Robinson at Amiens. The Army lost 17 new huts, 26 other buildings, 17 mobiles (only 2 were saved), and all stores and equipment. The loss was valued at £65,000. The Army in the USA sent £20,000 as a gift toward the loss, and £7500 came from the Malaya Patriotic Fund. Commissioner Albert Orsborn, until these gifts came, found himself unable to sign cheques already made out for him by his cashiers. The coffers had been emptied.

Yet there were compensations beyond monetary evaluation. NML members came home with inspired testimonies of faith under fire and a deepened trust in God. The War Cry reminded its readers that in war God does not take sides, save on the side of justice and right. In a leading article on Dunkirk, and referring to the mood of prayer which had swept the nation in the hour of crisis, The War Cry stated: 'History does not lead us to believe that great evils are immediately ended when people pray. But it does reveal that the eternal values of justice, mercy, compassion and truth survive all attacks upon them, and it is for the preservation of these values — that is for the triumph of God's Kingdom — that we must pray.'

One eye-witness later affirmed that during the retreat the Army's BEF team had turned their hands to everything, not confining their help to the military, but assisting refugees and all in need.

As Hitler's forces weakened, the Allies planned a second BEF as part of the invasion force for Europe in 1944. The 21st Army Group were to have salvationists in attendance and therefore Owen Culshaw found himself once again in negotiation with the War Office. Culshaw reminded the authorities of the arrangements for Salvation Army Services Officers, both men and women, worked out for the Commands in Britain. Colonel Medlicott of the War Office agreed that the SO's did all that chaplains could do. It was important now to get clearance from the Chief Staff Chaplain of the 21st Army Group, Colonel (Revd.) R. Yale. Yale was 372.
asked to join them at once and was 'very warm' toward Culshaw, offering every help in getting Army officers to France. Culshaw said that 5 officers (3 men, 2 women) were standing ready to depart. This was 'readily agreed to' and dates settled for departure. Medlicott would organise shipment of vehicles and equipment. The officers would answer to the Chaplain-General's Department ('It was just as I wanted,' recorded Culshaw.) All Red Shield and practical catering work was to be kept separate from the role of the SO's. The interview was 'extremely cordial'. Culshaw thought it 'the most effective one I have ever had with officials'. So it was that yet again doors of opportunity opened up for salvationist ministry to a BEF in France. This time the work would be more directly spiritual through the SO's, thus relieving to some extent the staff engaged in practical outreach through huts, clubs, mobiles and canteens. The attitudes prevailing at the War Office were generally more constructive than experienced by the Army in 1914-1918 (see Ch.12).

3) The Channel Islands

The Channel Islands were occupied by German forces in the summer of 1940 and had to be abandoned by Britain until liberated four years later.

The occupation impacted severely upon the Army in the Islands and had repercussions for salvationist work elsewhere. Large numbers of civilians were evacuated as invasion became imminent. Thousands of them arrived at Weymouth. 'In this... the Salvation Army, under Major Taylor, played a most important part. At the request of the military authorities we instituted a buffet on the railway station and many thousands of cups of tea and refreshments were supplied free of charge. Sunday, June 23rd, 1940, must remain a never-to-be-forgotten day. Thousands of evacuees
swarmed the station and adjoining yards. Our party assisted the transport of luggage in addition to supplying refreshments. It is needless to say how great was the appreciation of the townspeople of the great practical help rendered by the salvationists, showing a spirit of true Christianity. The work was continued for several nights and days. Major Taylor and his team slept in the porters' room of the station. 129

Many salvationists were among the evacuees and The War Cry printed appeals for them to let the Army know of their whereabouts on the mainland. 130 As it happened, all the commanding officers of the six corps in the Channel Islands were in England on leave when occupation began. 131 Consequently, the representative there of The Salvation Army Assurance Society Ltd., Major John Ferguson, took charge of all the Army's work. 132 He co-operated with the Rotary Club in distributing food parcels and kept the meetings going as normal until the last Friday in June 1940 when they were banned by the Germans. Open-air marches and meetings had been prohibited as soon as the Islands were occupied. The wearing of Army uniform was not permitted. In the smaller centres indoor meetings continued until January 1941. 133 The Methodists at once invited the salvationists to unite with them for worship and this was gratefully accepted. 131

Meanwhile, the work of the Salvation Army Assurance Society Ltd. flourished, permission from Berlin, strangely enough, having been obtained to carry on. In September 1942, however, Major Ferguson and his son, aged 15, were sent to Germany and there interned. Ferguson had forfeited a chance to leave since it meant abandoning his son. Mrs. Ferguson had died in the first year of occupation. 134

The Army citadel in L'Islet was closed by German order dated Saturday, 18th January, 1941 and was subsequently used by the occupying force as a flour store, surrounded by bars and barbed wire. 135

374.
Commandant Joseph Griffith, a retired Army officer of nearly 70 years of age, dismantled the Mercy Seat in the citadel and hid it in his garden shed, camouflaging it with trees and shrubs. He restored it to its rightful place on liberation. Griffith assumed the leadership of the 'underground' Salvation Army, arranging regular cottage meetings and monthly prayer rallies in all six Army centres. The citadel at St. Peter Port was commandeered and used as a furniture repository, as was that at St. Helier. St. Sampson's Citadel was used as a canteen and beer hall. Hal Beckett writes of the premises: 'Paintings in deep black adorned the walls and enemy slogans were seen everywhere. It took some time to restore the sanctity of this place of worship.' (Beckett lets 'enemy' slip through.) The Army had been given only four hours' notice of the seizing of their premises. No other churches were similarly treated. It was in stark contrast to the German toleration of the Army's commercial activities in the insurance field (see above).

Joseph Griffith and his wife were tireless. Apart from their activities already mentioned, they organised parties for children at which bread was given out since sweets were a luxury of the past. Griffith, in 4½ years of occupation, went from island to island exhorting, leading and encouraging. He telephoned and kept up correspondence when he could not travel. He conducted 20 funerals, 19 dedications of newborn children, and 2 weddings - all in the L'Islet Methodist Church.

When liberation came at last the Army played a minor but noteworthy part in the unconditional surrender by the Germans. A salvationist, Lewis Johns, was a wireless operator on board HMS 'Bulldog' which liberated Guernsey (HMS 'Beagle' liberated Jersey). It was on 'Bulldog' that Major-General Heiner signed the unconditional surrender on 9th May, the terms of which had been partially re-typed at the last minute by Lewis Johns. Johns tells how 'the excited islanders came out to greet
us in small boats.' Food was passed out through the portholes. Later, a Service of Thanksgiving was held on board, and Johns, being known as a salvationist, was asked to lead the hymn-singing. 140

Free again, the salvationists brought out their flags, uniforms and instruments which they had buried prior to invasion. 131 Griffith at once sent off a letter to Brigadier Hal Beckett describing events of the last four years and saying, 'My wife and I don our uniforms today for the first time in 4 1/2 years!' Then he distributed invitation leaflets to the first public meetings held by the Army since occupation. He had had them printed 12 months previously - in faith - leaving blanks for the date, time and venue. 137 Beckett at once made plans to visit the Islands and arrived in St. Peter Port on 12th July, 1945. 141 He stayed many days and at L'Islet conducted the dedication ceremony of a newborn child, the first in the citadel for six years, and at which were present the child's father, grandfather and great grandfather - all in full Salvation Army uniform. 131 On Saturday, 21st July, 1945 the first open-air meeting was held in St. Helier. Beckett's own words describe it best:

'At the first tap of the drum, crowds came running from all directions into Royal Square until hundreds had assembled. As the meeting was about to close, I said to Bandmaster Le Marinel: "Seeing this is the first gathering in the Square for years, I think we should play the National Anthem." When the announcement was made, men doffed their hats and policemen and British tommies stood to attention, as tears of joy ran down the faces of many in that vast singing crowd.'

Liberation allowed news to reach International Headquarters of the death of Major Marie Ozanne, taken ill after weeks of imprisonment at the hands of the occupiers. She died (was promoted to Glory) on 25th February 1942. 143 She was arrested for protesting persistently to the German authorities about the treatment of forced labourers in the Channel Islands. She could hear shrieks from an internment camp near her home in The Vale, Guernsey. Four weeks in prison left her seriously
ill. Prior to arrest she had defied the German order on uniform-wearing and on open-air witness, reading Scripture aloud to milling crowds in the market at St. Peter Port. She even began to learn German so that she could share the Gospel with the occupying forces. When 'V' for victory signs appeared on public buildings, she offered herself for punishment if this would spare the population as a whole. Her illness in prison led to an early release and an early death at the age of thirty-eight. Her diary entry for one month before her death reads: 'Still pursued by the thought of writing to Nurse M. about her soul; do so!... Pray with Miss... before operation; speak to E. re being a Christian... speak to Miss K. about being either a nominal or converted Christian.'144 Joseph Griffith saw her as 'our first martyr' during occupation.143

4) In Prison Camps

Hundreds of salvationists became either prisoners of war or civilian internees between 1939 and 1945. Whilst this Chapter is devoted to British war work, it is convenient to place this Section here since the majority imprisoned were of British origin. However, many non-British salvationists spent time in captivity and some are mentioned in what follows which is merely an outline sketch of Army attempts to uphold behind bars and barbed wire those same fundamentals - evangelism, compassion, internationalism - which salvationists everywhere were urged to uphold.

Major John Ferguson (see Sect. 3 above) spoke for salvationist prisoners generally when he described God's presence as 'very near and very real' to himself and his son in the camp at Biberach, South Germany.145 The War Cry did what it could to publish lists of salvationists captured or arrested, but information was in short supply and often unreliable.146 After the war, first-hand accounts of courage and of
personal witness, caring and ministry by individual salvationists emerged. Many of these were published as a collection in book form in 1947 under the title *Campaigning in Captivity*. Sub-titled 'Salvationist "ambassadors in bonds" during the Second World War', it sought to articulate the motivation behind the experiences recorded:  

'The rank and file salvationist... says: "Where I am, there is The Salvation Army!"... Deprive him of the fellowship of salvationists, place him in a spot a thousand miles away — and he is no more a mere cog; he becomes the whole machine... He waits for no written instructions. He establishes The Salvation Army right where he is... the natural outcome of his salvationism. He is convinced that God... has placed him there to fulfil a mission no one but he can fulfil.'

A significant number of men and women lived out this theory. To name only some: Major Arthur Best, interned in Germany; Adjutant Gilbert Abadie of France — sent to Germany, as was his compatriot, Major Jean Bordas, who became Protestant chaplain at Krefeld Stalag VI J; Colonel Mary Booth, arrested in May 1940 in Brussels for being 'a very dangerous spy' and sent to camps at Cologne, Mannheim and Freiburg; Bandsman Stanley Thomas from Limehouse who began open-air meetings at Camp XXA in Danzig; Yuzo Homma, a Japanese salvationist from Osaka who was held POW at Bougainville off the northern coast of Australia; Major Harold Hosier, an Australian officer-chaplain captured in Greece. Walter Flade, a German medic and Salvation Army Bandmaster from Hamburg, made POW by the British in Tunis; Captain Fred Hill, a Britisher captured with his mobile canteen at Tobruk; Commissioner A.J. Benwell, arrested in Rotterdam in December 1940; Brigadier Bernhard Fjaerestrand, the Army's Editor-in-Chief in Norway, who was imprisoned for mentioning the birthday of King Haakon in *Krigsropet* (The War Cry); Brigadier Carmelo Lombardo, arrested in June 1940 in Rome; Walter Busse, interned on the Isle of Man whilst Mrs. Busse languished in Holloway Prison and whilst their daughter, Captain Katharine Busse, was removed forcibly from her post as midwife at the Army's Maternity Home in Glasgow and imprisoned.
in Scotland; Brigadier George Walker who, after being arrested in Shanghai in China on 5th November 1942, was allowed to see his wife for 20 minutes per year; the many salvationists who met up in the vast Changi Camp in Malaya and started up and ran an entire Army corps there; Harding Young, Private Secretary to the Territorial Commander in the Netherlands East Indies, arrested in March 1942 at Bandoeng and kept in solitary confinement for seven months; Fred Buist, interned in Shantung Province, China; and Richard Dallas who in Lamsdorf, Germany, passed within feet of his own brother but they failed to recognise one another, so changed were their appearances.

Campaigning in Captivity concentrated exclusively on the courage of salvationists in confinement and consequently was written in euphoric terms, as illustrated by the extract given above from its Preface. That extract must be understood as describing the spirit of only the most dedicated of salvationists. Wiggia's book offered no analysis of right or wrong in the war. It conformed to salvationist principles of internationalism, studiously avoiding anything which could even remotely be interpreted as giving offence to Germany or Japan. Based as it was on personal and eye-witness accounts, if we assume its tone reflects truly the tone of those accounts, then the salvationists involved emerged from captivity with little or no grudge against their captors. This seems scarcely human, but they attributed the fact not to human resources but to the resources of divine grace.

George Carpenter credited divine grace for all the practical ministrations of salvationist war work in 1939-45. The British work, in the UK and in France, was somehow carried out both patriotically (if you were a serviceman) and with an apolitical neutrality (if you were a salvationist administrator). The tension between the actual and the ideal never went away and was present in the Army as an organisation as much as it was part and parcel of the inner experience of each salvationist.
NOTES - CH. 21

1. For an account of the 1914-1918 work see Ch. 11.

2. SAYB 1939, 38.

3. ATW April-June, 1940, 22.


5. See Ch. 20, Sect. 1 and the text for Note 29.


7. E.g. TW January 1940, 25-27.


9. Ibid., 54-56.

10. SAYB 1942, 5-6.

11. SAYB 1945, 15-16.


13. Ibid., 12.


15. TOR July-September 1942, 192.


17. E.g. See The Times, 13-2-42, 2 reporting a new opening at Guildford Street, Russell Square, London by Lord Croft, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for War.


20. See Ch. 12.

21. Imperial War Fund Council Minutes, 26-6-41. (This Minute was produced from memory after the original was destroyed in the IHQ fire of 11-5-41. It summarised decisions made up to 26-6-41.)


23. Letter, Staff Chaplain HC Davies to Lieutenant-Colonel Owen Culshaw, 17-6-41. The four were: Major Edward Nicholson, (London Command); Major Herbert Horsley (Northern Command);
Major George Higgins (Western Command); Adjutant Arthur Smith (Southern Command) - Letter, Culshaw to Davies, 28-5-41;
IWC 31-5-41:5.

24. Letter, Deputy Chaplain - General Brunwell to Culshaw, 24-7-41.

25. Letter, Culshaw to Colonel John Bladin (Chief Secretary, British Territory), 21-8-41.


27. Letter, Deputy Chaplain - General Brunwell to Culshaw, 8-11-41. Strangely, The War Cry announced the appointment of a further three Welfare Officers (IWC 28-6-41:4), Brigadiers Climpson, Lister and Tucker, but the sources reveal no formal certification of these by the War Office even though Culshaw was given their names for submission to the War Office by 6th June, 1941: Letter, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Durman to Culshaw, 6-6-41. It is not clear whether the three Brigadiers were to function in the UK or with the British Expeditionary Force in France. Climpson ended up in France (see Sect.2), but The War Cry announcement had him in Glasgow!


31. Ibid.

32. Problems, 54.

33. Ibid., 55.

34. IWC 8-11-41:3.

35. IWC 22-8-42:3; 24-10-42:3.

36. IWC 2-3-40:2; also 29-4-40:2.

37. IWC 2-3-40:2.

38. IWC 2-1-43:3.


40. IWC 23-3-40:2.
41. Ibid.

42. The Times, 3-5-41:2.

43. ATW April-June 1942, 32. Gifts came from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, West Indies, and India.

44. ATW January-March 1945, 19.


46. IWC 12-12-42:4.

47. IWC 2-3-40; 10-2-40:10. Forty beds were provided with a staff of one nurse and five assistants.

48. IWC 25-4-42:3.

49. IWC 9-3-40:10.

50. IWC 22-6-40:3.

51. IWC 23-3-40:9; SAYB 1941, 7, recording advice at Waterloo to 500 men daily.

52. Station buffets were also set up by the Army: IWC 16-9-39:9; 21-10-39:7.

53. IWC 23-11-40:2; 1-2-41:4; 22-2-41:5; 14-6-41:5.

54. ATW April-June 1940, 6.


57. ATW April-June 1941, 6.

58. Letter, Revd. JAD Ridholls (Ferranporth), 30-1-87.

59. IWC 305-42:3.

60. ATW April-June 1945, 22.

61. ATW January-March 1941:12.

62. Imperial War Fund Council Minutes, 26-6-41.

63. Weymouth CHB, 24-2-41.

64. The Times, 25-7-41:2.

65. The Times, 14-2-42:6. Mrs. Eden had worked with an Army mobile for 16 unbroken hours at Dover when Dunkirk was evacuated (Ibid.)

66. ATW April-June 1945, 22.
67. ATW July-September 1945, 23.

68. The Times, 29-3-44:6.

69. ATW April-June 1945, 23; IWC 14-10-39:7 and 27-4-40:10. For photographs see IWC 1-6-40:1; for anecdotes see IWC 19-7-41:1.

70. IWC 20-9-41:3.


73. IWC 25-7-42:3.

74. ATW January-March 1943, 31.

75. IWC 1-8-42:4.

76. Hansard, House of Commons, 30-3-44, Columns 1528-1529.


78. The Times, 19-3-40:5.


80. ATW October-December 1942, 2.

81. IWC 102-40:12.

82. IWC 9-3-40:3.

83. War Charities Act 1940; IWC 30-1-43:3.

84. See Ch.12.

85. See above on mobile canteens. Also The Times, 12-5-42:8 (Duchess of Gloucester).

86. IWC 8-6-40:8 (Hon. Vincent Massey, High Commissioner for Canada).

87. IWC 15-6-40:2 (Mrs. Anthony Eden); IWC 7-11-42:3 (Mr. Brendan Braken, Minister of Information).

88. United Empire, July 1945, 132 (Lieutenant-General Sir Douglass Brownrigg of the BEF).

89. IWC 25-1-41:2 (Sir John Maxwell, Chief Constable of Manchester).

90. IWC 25-1-41:2 (Chief Fire Officer, Liverpool).

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91. IWC 11-1-41:5 (FJ Harrison, ARP Chairman, North Staffordshire).

92. IWC 25-1-41:2 (Lord Mayor of Sheffield); IWC 27-7-40:2 (Dr. JS Carpenter, Mayor of Bath).

93. ATW January-March 1941, 12; IWC 10-2-40:10; 22-6-40:3; 20-6-42:3.

94. Gainsborough Evening News, 8-2-44.

95. East Devon County Press, 16-2-44.

96. Wokingham Times, 18-2-44.

97. Tamworth Mercury, 11-2-44. (Notes 94-97: see press cuttings held in IHQ Archives).

98. IWC 16-1-43:3; 19-6-43:3.

99. This Section explains the work of British salvationists with British troops in France 1939-1940. For the work of the French Salvation Army, see Ch.23.

100. Falls, 24-5.


102. IWC 27-1-40:12. Davey was accompanied by Major Samuel Nicholson. He asked the military authorities for 152 locations and was given 52 (later to rise to 79). It became hardly possible for a British tommy to go from England to the front line without encountering The Salvation Army; ATW July-September 1945, 21.

103. Ibid.

104. IWC 16-12-39:11.

105. IWC 27-1-40:12.


107. IWC 2-3-40:3; 16-3-40:2; 23-3-40:2.

108. IWC 20-4-40:12.

109. IWC 29-6-40:2.

110. IWC 6-1-40:10.

111. IWC 9-3-40:10. Other agencies working in other sectors were YMCA, YWCA, Toc H, Church Army: The Times, 2-1-40:5.


113. IWC 2-3-40:10.

114. United Empire, July 1945, 132.

384.
117. IWC 8-6-40: 3; Weymouth CHB, 19-5-40 notes 'thousands of French troops pouring into Weymouth' with salvationists playing 'a prominent part' in providing for them.
118. IWC 29-6-40: 2.
119. Ibid.
120. ATW July-September 1945, 24.
121. The Times, 17-8-40: 5.
122. Gilliard, 68.
123. IWC 15-6-40: 1.
124. Ibid.
125. IWC 22-6-40: 1.
126. United Empire, July 1945, 132, tribute by Sir Douglass Brownrigg of the Royal Empire Society.
127. What follows is drawn from Culshaw's Notes of Interview (compiled 2-8-44) with Colonel F. Medlicott, Director of Welfare Services, Rear HQ, 21st Army Group.
128. Falls, 63.
129. Weymouth CHB, 22-6-40.
130. IWC 24-8-40: 6.
131. Hal Beckett, The Chariot Rolls, (unpublished ms., 1967), 73. This account of Beckett's personal experiences as an officer of The Salvation Army was prepared in Toronto and is dated 1-8-67: NYA File Ref: RG20.23-212/15. Beckett was Divisional Commander for the Southampton and Channel Islands Division during the war.
132. AM September 1945, 66-67.
133. IWC 21-10-44: 2.
134. AM October 1945, 77; IWC 21-10-44: 2.
135. IWC 2-6-45: 3; 4-8-45: 3.
136. IWC 4-8-45: 3.
137. IWC 2-6-45: 3.
138. IWC 21-10-44: 2. Also CT 1-6-45:311, reporting that Anglican churches remained unaffected by the occupation.
139. IWC 9-6-45:3.

140. Letter, Major Lewis Johns (Ilford), 18-7-85. Also, copy of contemporary note made by Johns on 8-5-45 and 9-5-45, written on a Guernsey postcard published to mark the liberation.

141. IWC 28-7-45:3.

142. IWC 4-8-45:3.

143. IWC 2-6-45:3.


145. AM October 1945, 77; November 1945, 81.

146. E.g. IWC 20-1-40:12; 1-6-40:2; 8-11-41:2 (POW's). IWC 25-1-45:5; 17-4-43:3; 26-2-44:3 (internees).

147. Arch R. Wiggins, Campaigning in Captivity, (SP&S, 1947). What follows is gleaned from this volume to give merely cameo impressions of what took place.

148. Ibid., Preface.

149. See also SAYB 1943, 12.

150. See also SAYB 1943, 13.

151. Lawrence Smith, being in a part of the camp separated from the section containing the corps, crawled to the meetings on his stomach: Bernard Watson, Reluctant Hero, (SP&S, 1963), 23-29. In another part of the camp Stanley Leeder (from Diss) discovered a salvationist Japanese guard: Ibid., 43-44. See also IWC 9-11-85:4.

152. Salvationist, 8-11-86:1.

153. Interview, Major Richard Dallas, 13-1-87. Dallas, who joined up 'unaware and naive', lost two brothers killed in the war. His father died instantly of a heart attack on hearing the news of the death of his youngest son who was shot after being taken prisoner.
CHAPTER 22

THE ARMY AND THE CHURCHES (2)

1) Introduction
2) Anglicans
3) Methodists
4) Baptists
5) Others
1) Introduction

General George Carpenter was under no illusion about the condition of religion in Britain when war broke out: 'The whole Church... is suffering from loss of touch with people.' There was a 'need for being thrown into new kinds of contact with men'. In support of his contention he cited British and Foreign Bible Society figures showing 9 out of 10 servicemen had never possessed a Bible, and a survey in Manchester which claimed 70% of those aged 14 to 25 in that city were untouched by church or voluntary organisation.

The problem, he said, was the result of a fundamental lack of vision in the churches: 'If we cannot see the people and their need, we cannot grieve, and if we do not grieve we cannot act.' Nevertheless, in weakness shared, the Army showed itself willing to engage in joint and inter-church ventures during the war, ranging from the united leadership of services in London's underground rail system whilst air raids raged to participation in the Bishop of London's Reconstruction Committee which co-ordinated repairs and applications for licences for the renewing of London's 15,000 ecclesiastical buildings destroyed or damaged in the blitz. Furthermore, through the Free Church Federal Council, salvationists added their voice to calls by religious leaders for recognition of spiritual values in wartime. In September 1939 a 'Message to Citizens and especially Christian Citizens' was published jointly by the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, and the Moderator of the Federal Council of Evangelical Free Churches. It stressed the Christian obligations of penitence, prayer and charity as war came upon the nation. The Army gave ready endorsement but pleaded still further for an absence of ill-will or hatred toward Germany, since 'we believe that German and British salvationists now feel themselves to be as good comrades as ever under the Army flag.'
A spirit of ecumenical solidarity was again evident when for New Year 1944 a joint statement came from the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, Cardinal Hinsley of Westminster and the Moderator of the Free Church Federal Council. It opened with a theme dear to the Army's heart: 'The present evils in the world are due to a failure of nations and peoples to carry out the laws of God.' It pleaded for all nations to be seen as 'one family under the Fatherhood of God', a plea which the internationalism of the Army prompted constantly from Army leaders and writers. The statement then expressly approved and adopted a series of 'Five Points' put by Pope Pius XII concerning international relationships between states, disarmament, and racial justice.7

This brought into focus the similarities and dissimilarities between The Salvation Army and the Roman Catholic Church in relation to the war. Both were and are worldwide in scope and international in outlook. Both had a centralised system of international rule, married to strong national or local leadership. But there, in relation to wartime, the similarities ended. The Roman Catholic Church was vast in numbers and centuries old. The Army was relatively small (barely 4 million) and was born only in 1865. The Vatican was a state in its own right and had formal diplomatic relations with other states. None of this was true of the Army and in comparison, therefore, the Army was very much 'small fry'. It could not hope to influence events on the grand scale as could the Vatican.8

Whilst the Army could respond warmly to the 'Five Points' of Pius XII, it could not accept his assertion, set out in October 1939 in his first encyclical, Summi Pontificatus, that the origins of the war could be traced back to the Reformation of the sixteenth century 'when many of the Christian family separated themselves from the infallible teaching of the church'.9 To salvationist ears, this would have sounded much too close to claiming that the Reformation in Germany eventually produced the evil that was Hitler.
The acme of wartime inter-church endeavour was the launching of the British Council of Churches early in October 1942. The War Cry called it 'the most important event in the religious life of Great Britain for a long time'.\(^{10}\) It would enhance united Christian witness and thus the Army was a founder member, being represented by Commissioner Alfred Cunningham, Chief of the Staff, and Commissioner Albert Orsborn, British Commissioner.

2) Anglicans

The 1939 High Council which brought General George Carpenter to office was made the subject of editorial comment in The Church Times.\(^{12}\) William Booth had 'rejected the authority of the church' and 'scorned its sacraments' yet he was 'more Papal than any Pope'. True, the 'movement' he started and inspired 'had made a large number of bad men into good men'. What rubbed with The Church Times was that Booth had 'vulgarised' religion and presented it 'in the terms of the music hall'. The 'Franciscan spirit of the Salvation Army sisters' was acknowledged but, 'unlike the Franciscans' they had not had 'the stimulant of the sacraments and the guidance of the Church'. As a result, the Army's 'spiritual effectiveness seems to have decreased... Its bands still play, but the message has lost much of its fervour.' These were harsh observations. There was no grasp by the commentator of what inspired salvationists, who sang:

\begin{verbatim}
'My life must be Christ's broken bread;
My love his outpoured wine.'
\end{verbatim}

(Albert Orsborn)

The Army was 'vulgarising', whilst Carpenter saw the traditional churches as 'out of touch' (see Sect.1) No public reply was made to the comments in The Church Times, but Carpenter would have read them and been saddened.

Nevertheless, there were many things that Anglicans and salvationists
held in common during the war. Both declared Christ as the only answer for mankind; both were prepared to recognise the failure of religion between the wars; both called for repentance by the citizenry and by the churches. Again, both saw the war as one mounted by a godless philosophical system rather than by the mass of the German people, and both regarded Germans as no more and no less moral than the British.

Both agreed that patriotism was not enough and that men needed 'a call to the highest... to the way of the Cross'. Both saw the war as heightening public interest in religion. Both disapproved the distribution of contraceptives to the servicemen.

All was not agreement, however. The Army declined to pronounce officially on the apportioning of blame between the protagonists (except, perhaps, for Evangeline Booth) but the established Church, as it had in 1899 and 1914, said openly that Britain was in the right and, as in previous wars, offered detailed comments on the diplomacy and politics of it all. The Church Times said there was a duty to pray for 'a victorious end' something on which the Army's top leadership was divided but to which Carpenter was determinedly opposed (see Ch.20, Sect.2). If there were tensions in the Army on the point, the Church of England was hardly unanimous. The Archbishops of Canterbury and York had 'a somewhat ludicrous dispute about it, the former believing he could pray for victory and the latter believing he could not. Some clergy felt one must even pray for Hitler (as salvationists would agree), but as the war went on 'most people's early scruples about hating the Germans began to melt.' Norman Longmate, in his history of everyday life during the war, suggests that the Church of England 'never really did sort out its attitude to the enemy'. This was related, in turn, to the need to think through the role of the churches and of religion in wartime. The Anglican 'Christendom Group' told clergy that they should be ready to give guidance to parishioners
on whether or not to fight but on no account should they allow themselves
to become nothing more than recruiting officers. The clergy also had a
duty to teach a true concept of the judgment of God who 'purges by fire',
together with a clear preaching of charity to the enemy. Penitence also
was to be preached since war did not come from the greed or pride of only
one nation or leader, and penitence was the only fitting response to the
slaughtering of 'fellow-communicants'. Finally, there was a duty to
teach forgiveness, especially if Britain were to find herself victorious.23a
Any salvationist reading these things in The Church Times would have
found them not unlike what he was accustomed to reading in The War Cry.

Even more clearly, however, would he have acknowledged what Bishop
George Bell was saying to his fellow-Anglicans. Bell has been described
as 'one of the few Christian prelates in either of the world wars who
tried to think about what a Churchman ought to do in these circumstances'.24
Only eight weeks into the war the Bishop published an article in The
Fortnightly Review in which he shared his mind on the function of the
church in war.25 He warned that many who filled the churches in wartime
would turn in disillusionment if the Church was found merely echoing the
popular cry or saying only what the statesmen said or if sermons seemed
'overmuch concerned with the justice of the nation's cause'.26 The task
of the Church was 'at all costs to remain the Church'.27 It had not
managed this in the First World War because its message and witness were
coloured by 'the national cause, the national effort, the national
honour'.28 The choice facing the Church of England in 1939 was either
to 'strike a universal note' or 'say ditto to the State'.29 He recognised
that all the resources of the State were concentrated on winning the war,
but the Church was not a part of the State's resources. The function of
the Church was rather to declare, as in peacetime, the principles of
'equal dignity of all men, respect for human life, the solidarity for
good and evil of all nations of the earth, fidelity to the plighted word, and the appreciation of the fact that power of any kind must be co-extensive with responsibility. In short, the Church had to declare what was just, on the clear conditions that the Church was humble about it and openly disinterested and independent. There was no special Gospel for time of war: 'It is for us, it is also for our enemies. It applies equally to every time and place.' Bell told the House of Lords in February 1944 what was just, or rather unjust. He publicly denounced the British bombing of civilians in German cities but, according to Norman Longmate, 'the public as a whole simply did not believe the Bishop's charges.'

Anglicans and salvationists came perhaps into closest contact in the military context. Relationships between salvationists and Anglican chaplains were generally good. Indeed, sometimes the 'sleeves rolled up' work of the Army gave the Church of England man a boost he needed. One Anglican chaplain at the Western Front wrote to the Army: 'I take my hat off to your people.... If I want to point out the value of Christianity, all I have to say to the men is, "What about The Salvation Army?" and the lads say a fervent "Hear, hear". It is worth more than a hundred sermons.'

The Church of England found difficulty in encouraging the clergy to volunteer for service as military chaplains. At the end of 1941 there were vacancies for 300 more, so that parishes and bishops were urged to let the priests go. It was not a happy picture and contrasted sharply with the Army's longing for more scope from the military authorities, and with Army officers volunteering in numbers for active work at the front. Former chaplains wrote to the Anglican press in cautionary and discouraging tones: 'In many cases a chaplain is little more than an entertainments officer'; there were risks in chaplaincy work of
wanting to be 'a man's man' instead of 'God's man', of wanting to be 'popular in the mess', and of being seen as 'a government official and not as a priest'.

In the summer of 1942 a Chaplains' Conference was held in Liverpool where complaints were aired about obstacles to proper worship created by officers in the forces, and about apathy among the troops. A high-ranking military officer replied to the complaints that the chaplains should concentrate on befriending the men and stop making 'demands'.

The Church Army undertook practical work similar in many ways to that of The Salvation Army, but on a smaller scale. Their work was admirable. Over 50,000 ex POW's from Belgium were helped in 1945 and 'Militiamen Evangelists' were placed in some military encampments. Some parishes were slow to co-operate, however, and Wilson Carlile, Church Army Chief Secretary, wrote to the Anglican press appealing for parishes where troops were located to do more in the way of affording facilities to the Church Army. It was natural also that parish priests and curates should react compassionately in the air raids. Longmate describes 'heroic service' given by most, but writes also of 'a few who could be seen, according to contemporary observers, wandering about aimlessly in the Rest Centres'.

The war did nothing to damage relations between the denominations and indeed the Anglican press thought the war was having a positively uniting effect, creating 'a comradeship' (a fine, old-fashioned Army term!) 'which they (the churches) will not readily forfeit.' However, for some Anglicans 'comradeship' could be taken too far and when the Bishop of London, Dr. GF Fisher, invited The Salvation Army into St. Paul's Cathedral for a Service of Thanksgiving to mark the anniversary of the conversion of William Booth, the Church Union found it hard to bear. Sir George Arthur, Prebendary ED Merritt and the Revd. Harold Riley wrote to The Times on behalf of the Union to express 'grave disquiet' regarding
the use of St. Paul's for such a purpose. The invitation implied approval of 'the non-credel, non-sacramental type of religion' and constituted 'a dangerous innovation'. But the Revd. CO Rockett flew to the Army's defence and wrote from St. John's Vicarage, Surrey Road, Bournemouth to say he regarded it as 'eminently right and fitting' for the Army to use St. Paul's since it had reached 'large numbers of the masses' the Church had been 'unable to touch'. Eventually the Bishop of London replied for himself to say that the invitation was merely 'an act of friendship' and it was not unusual to extend hospitality to 'a Christian society engaged in evangelistic, social and philanthropic work'. He added that the Army 'is not and does not claim to be a part of the Church' and that his invitation was not to be taken as endorsing the Army's 'denials concerning the sacraments'. The Bishop clearly did not understand the Army or its self-perception any better than the Church Union, but he did reveal much Christian love and a tolerant spirit which endeared him to the Army at the time.

The War Cry comment on the episode struck an over-sensitive note: 'The good souls who have been greatly disturbed by the hospitality thus extended to heretics needn't worry. The Army marched out again and will stay out where it belongs, among the people who don't go to church and where its soldiers long ago learned to pray for their detractors. But won't some people have a bad time in Heaven when they see the sort of folk gathering there? Over-sensitive and a shade self-righteous. Feelings cooled a few weeks later and the Army put out a piece entitled 'Allies' in which it was said that the churches should not become 'a mutual admiration society' but strive for 'a due appreciation of the virtues of another's way of life' and 'a sincere respect and co-operation which marks the relationships of true allies.' On an inside page was reproduced in full an article by the Bishop of London in his Diocesan
Leaflet, some priests in the diocese having expressed disapproval of his action. The Bishop said of the Army: 'They follow not with us, yet do cast out devils in the name of Christ... We should thankfully acknowledge that other Christian bodies are our allies in the defence of our Christian heritage.' It was the last word.

3) The Methodists

Like the Anglicans, the Methodists commented publicly upon George Carpenter's election as General. This time the reaction was a warm one and spoke of the new General's 'humility of spirit and his absolute selflessness' which 'made him a brother beloved wherever he has been'. He would lead the Army 'into the deepest places of spiritual experiences'. It was a harmonious start to a period in which the Army and the Methodists would speak with one voice on many matters.

The 1930's witnessed an upsurge of interest among Methodists in issues of war and peace, arms and disarmament. Like the Army, Methodists could not remain altogether immune from general social trends and their Temperance and Social Welfare Department was increasingly concentrating on peace issues. In 1933 the Methodist Conference adopted a 'Declaration of the Methodist Church in respect of its attitude to Peace and War' which made five points:

1. War is contrary to the teaching of Jesus.
2. The Church has a duty to promote peace and prevent war.
3. Grave urgency is required to prevent future war by a worldwide reduction of armaments leading to their eventual abolition.
4. A spirit of strife is harmful as between nations and as between individuals.
5. A decision by an individual to fight for his country and a decision to refrain can both express true loyalty to personal spiritual conviction.

When that 'future war' became a fact, Methodism found justice
to be on the side of the Allies who were defending 'sanity, decency and goodness' against 'the cynicism and unscrupulousness' of the enemy and, unlike the Army's press, the Methodist press offered detailed analysis of the diplomatic developments immediately preceding the outbreak of war. Methodist voices were added, however, to those of Anglicans and salvationists urging that an absence of hatred for Germans be retained since the German people 'have not willingly gone to war' but 'only reluctantly assented to the dictates of the Führer and his associates.' General Carpenter's call was echoed as Methodists were exhorted not to 'speak of them as "enemies".'

No divergence existed between the Army, the Methodists and the established Church on the true function of the Church in time of war. It was as if the Methodists had read Bishop George Bell's views and now adopted them: 'Part of the answer to the question as to why the churches failed in the First World War was that there was a misconception of the primary work of the Church and the Church was satisfied with the good instead of giving the best. The call of this vital hour is to a proclamation of the fundamental truths of the Christian religion and an expression of them in actual life such as the world has not yet seen.'

Tensions found in the Army and in Anglicanism over praying for victory surfaced also in Methodism. The President of the Methodist Conference, the Revd. Richard Pyke, in a message to Methodists on the eve of war exhorted them to pray, not for victory, but rather 'as Jesus prayed, "Not my will, but thine be done."' But a leading article in The Methodist Recorder entitled 'War and the Christian' argued: 'If we cannot pray for success, ought we to be fighting for it?' A few weeks later, an article by the Revd. JA Findlay entitled 'Prayer in Time of War - Can we rightly ask God for Victory?' said: 'Have we not a right to pray for an end to Hitlerism? This would imply the victory of the Allied cause.' Findlay concluded: 'I am conscious of my
ignorance, but until God has given me more light, I shall go on telling Him how much I long for victory.' There were, of course, Methodists in Germany telling God how much they longed for a German victory, as evidenced by the report of the Revd. George Richards who spent a year in Germany before the war. He wrote of German Methodist students, some of whom had spent time in England, who 'said that God was using Hitler for his own inscrutable purposes'. Mr. Richards, however, was convinced they were blinded by 'the propaganda of Dr. Goebbels'.

Appeals by the Methodist President that Methodists (like salvationists) would refrain from apportioning blame for the onset of war and would 'put aside all uncharitableness of heart' were not universally heeded and, indeed, in the very issue of The Methodist Recorder in which he made his plea, a leading article appeared accusing 'the Nazis' (this term is not found anywhere in the British salvationist sources) of 'insensate folly and greed'. Greater consistency was to be found, however, in the Methodist pronouncements on conscientious objection. Methodist objectors would be few, but their church would show them 'protection'. Their rights would be guarded vigilantly, but so too would the rights of the 'conscientious assenter'. True to its promise of guidance, the church published full details of the statutory rights of objectors and the procedures to be followed by the Tribunals. (The Army had also published those details, but in a form available only to officers, not to lay salvationists who needed them most (Ch.18, Note 20). The leading pacifist in Methodism at that time was Donald Soper (later Lord Soper) who ran the West London Mission. He announced that there would be no 'dramatic or sensational statements from his platform' and that he would simply devote himself to the service of the people. It was a response General Carpenter had urged upon his officers.
Thousands of Methodists were conscripted. Even in time of peace there had been over 20,000 in the regular forces, served by 17 Methodist chaplains and 221 'Officiating Chaplains' who ministered to troops stationed in the vicinity of their churches. In 1939 the Revd. George Standing liaised between the Methodist Church and the Royal Navy, Army and Air Force Board. A system was set up for notifying him of all Methodists called to the colours. A War Comforts Department, not unlike the Army's but somewhat smaller, was established at the Central Hall, Westminster, and the Publishing House produced 'wallets'. Field libraries were also provided, as in Army Red Shield Clubs. In Britain 700 Methodist canteens functioned, and overseas several Wesley Houses for servicemen offered Christian fellowship. George Standing appealed incessantly for funds. He wanted to establish an Emergency Fund of £5000 for work with Methodist military personnel but found it necessary to chide readers of The Methodist Recorder for their slow response.

He expressed in unambiguous terms also his anxiety with regard to 'slackness' by Methodists in attesting as Methodists, although (as the Army also found) some fault lay with the military authorities with whom he meant to 'deal drastically'. Matters improved as chaplains were deployed. By the end of the war over 430 Ministers served in a full-time capacity as chaplains, but problems were reported to Conference in 1946 in finding for many of them a smooth return to civilian life. Three were killed in action and twelve were made prisoners-of-war (eight in Germany and four in Japan).

With the Army and other agencies, Methodists shared the burden of caring for evacuees and victims of air raids. The buildings of the South London Mission were reinforced and equipped as air raid shelters for the crowds from the huge slum tenements around the Mission centre, and three Homes on the south coast were formally recognised as voluntary hospitals to nurse air raid casualties. The 1941 Conference at Leeds...
sent 'affectionate greetings' to all other Christian denominations which shared the distress of the blitz. In forwarding a copy to General Carpenter, an appreciation was expressed for the Army's work in the air raids.76

The Army and the Methodists shared a common conviction about the dangers of alcohol in wartime and as consumed by the troops. The Methodist Temperance and Social Welfare Department noted 'increased insobriety in certain congested areas'77 and called on the government to act.78

One further, but very different, area of agreement between Methodists and salvationists was in the matter of women and the ministry. The announcement by the Methodists in 1945, as war ended, that women would henceforward be ordained was noted in The War Cry with the remark that Susannah Wesley, mother of John and Charles, would have 'enthusiastically endorsed' the decision, though perhaps with 'a caustic comment as to why they had been so long arriving at so obvious a choice'.79

4) **Baptists**

Baptists in Britain between the wars struggled, like their fellow-Christians, with issues of war and peace. The Baptist mind is reflected in a Report by the Special Committee appointed by the Council of the Baptist Union and set out in an Appendix to the Baptist Union Annual Report for 1936.80 The Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. Ernest Brown MP, urged the establishment of an organisation on a world scale with 'an international judicial system' having adequate powers to enforce that organisation's decisions. Because of 'the sinfulness of the human race' force was foreseeable in three forms:

1. Aggressive action by a state in its own interests;
2. Action in self-defence by a state:
3. Action in defence of law and the common good by the police of the 'world organisation'.

No loyalty could come before loyalty to the Kingdom of God. Love of country and of fellow-citizens, even reverence for British institutions, have a legitimate and inevitable hold upon us but patriotism should always be 'a duty of so shaping the life and policy of the land we love as to make it a praise to God in the earth'. Force cannot establish the Kingdom of God, which can never be identified with any form of international or social organisation, since the Kingdom is a Kingdom of redeemed souls. Some Christians feel a duty to renounce military force under all conditions. The followers of Jesus are to be guided by His Spirit and not by the letter of His sayings. Jesus gives only one ethical command – the command to love. However, the majority in the Committee felt that the pacifist case failed to take account of the realities of the world in the twentieth century. A world peace-keeping organisation would require the use of force on occasion. Jesus cannot have intended His disciples to stand aside from life. The religious life is not an ineffective separation. The profession of a soldier is 'not necessarily un-Christian'. Signing peace pledges treats the teaching of Jesus as if it were a conditionless and absolute precept and fails to recognise that the guidance of the Spirit comes 'in that hour' in an actual situation.

This statement indicates how far the Baptist position had moved since 1918, for it reveals a much less supportive and warm attitude to the pacifist opinion than was evidenced in the First World War. Early in 1939, however, The Baptist Times brought to its readers' attention a further Report by the Robert Hall Society on Peace and War. It was commented upon by Allan Rose, a former President of the John Bunyan Society of Oxford University, who said: 'I would like to associate myself unreservedly with the opinions of the pacifists in the group.'
He commended the Report heartily to the Baptist Church 'as an expression of what its younger members are thinking.' Furthermore, when conscription began in mid-1939 Baptists noted with satisfaction that the government was meeting its pledges about the treatment of conscientious objectors. One correspondent to The Baptist Times wanted the church to make it much clearer to Baptist conscripts that there was the possibility of an absolute exemption from military service as well as merely a conditional exemption. The Tribunals came in for glowing praise for 'the courteous and painstaking way' they approached their task. Clearly, the Baptist heart still glowed somewhat for the rights of the dissenter. It glowed also for the rights of persecuted minorities. Baptists were condemnatory of anti-Semitism, 'all racial animosity and every form of oppression or unfair discrimination towards the Jews, toward coloured people or toward subject races in any part of the world'. This was far more explicit than anything said by The Salvation Army on Hitler and the Jews. The Army's reluctance to go public in condemning Hitler could by comparison, have been taken for moral timidity.

When George Carpenter emerged as the Army's world leader after the 1939 High Council the Baptist reaction was closer to that of the Methodists than to that of the Anglicans, reflecting the Army's closer natural affinity with the free churches. However, Baptists saw in the High Council procedure itself a similarity to the Catholic Conclave of Cardinals summoned to Rome to elect a new Pope. They detected also a waning of autocracy in the Army and opined that since William Booth the Army had not had a truly great autocrat. Further comparison with the Catholics was made: 'In its internationality The Salvation Army is now second only to the Roman Church.' The writer recalled 'the ferocity with which salvationists were attacked sixty years ago' and then concluded: 'Now there are very few who do not respect the Army and wish it peace within its walls and prosperity within its citadels.'
Baptists confessed in July 1939 that they did not believe things would come to war, but they nevertheless tried to spell out, as did the other churches including the Army, the proper role of the Christian community should war come. Like the Army, the instinctive Baptist reaction was not politically or theologically reflective, but rather practical and compassionate: 'We have to do all we can to minister comfort and help to the people.' Then came a duty to pray, even for enemies. The Secretary of the Baptist Union, ME Aubrey, wanted churches open daily for both private prayer and services of intercession. But the primary duty of Baptists was to maintain 'a calm confidence' testifying to 'their faith in Jesus Christ'. Salvationists had been similarly exhorted.

In 1914 the Baptist Church had tried very hard not to take political sides. In 1939 it was able to say, in a spirit more openly partisan than the Army felt able to express, that Britain, in all her long history, had not entered upon war with a conscience more at ease or with a conviction more clear of a righteous cause. To Baptist spokesmen the war was a just war. But not all Baptists were happy with this position and letters reached The Baptist Times complaining that Baptists were beginning to sound like Anglicans and were taking sides in favour of the British Government rather than remaining neutral in the war. Baptists, as a church, ought not to support war. Some of the letters were from non-pacifists. A leading article hit back at these correspondents saying that all Hitler asked of Martin Niemöller was that he should keep out of political affairs and remain neutral. A Christian could not do that unless he became 'traitor to his faith'. There was only one neutral church in the early days and that was described in the Revelation. It was the church of the Laodiceans and it was neither hot nor cold, an offence to God and man. It was strong stuff. In fact, it was not all that far from the position taken in 1915 when The Baptist Times wanted Germany 'crushed' to ensure no second war.
At the 1939 Baptist World Congress Dr. SW Hughes, a British Baptist leader, roundly condemned Hitler and 'Nazism'.\(^98\) (The Army's sensitivities on the use of this term have already been noted in Sect.3.) This offended German Methodists, as did the remarks by ME Aubrey on the same theme. A German Baptist, Dr. Paul Schmidt, wrote an article for the Baptist press in Britain asserting that the British Baptists at the Atlanta Congress were guilty of muddled thought. Condemning totalitarianism, he said, was not the task of the church any more than was defending democracy. The fate of democracy and of Christianity were not bound up in each other and British Baptists were mistaken in thinking they were.\(^99\) A few weeks later another German Baptist wrote to say he felt *The Baptist Times* had not dealt fairly with Germany and had ignored Hitler's virtues, such as having introduced strong temperance legislation and pornography controls. *The Baptist Times* hit back saying all this was being bought at too high a price and reminded readers of the elimination of the Jews and the use of concentration camps. It was this kind of internecine squabble, politely conducted though it was, which the Army sought to avoid by shunning political, and especially anti-Germany, comment. However, Baptist commentators did emphasise their belief that the war was not one wished for by the German masses. This theme occurred in the literature of all the denominations referred to in this Chapter and echoed assertions made by the Army repeatedly in the three wars between 1899 and 1945.

American Baptists most definitely wanted their country to stay out of the war. Basil Matthews, then Professor of World Relations at Boston University, surveyed the opinions expressed in Baptist periodicals and came to this clear conclusion.\(^102\) However, the survey showed also that the American Baptist community was 'strongly hostile to the whole Nazi (that word again) ideology' and to Hitler's 'religion of blood and soil'.

404.
Matthews went on to predict that America would enter the war if the prospect appeared likely of Britain and France being defeated. When American entry came, *The Baptist Times* applauded. 103

At home, the introduction of conscription alarmed Baptists much more than salvationists. It was seen as 'an inroad upon our historic liberty' and could even lead to 'a censored press'. This, of course, happened after war was formally declared, but more immediate Baptist concerns by then were for military chaplains and, like the Army, for accurate attestation by their conscripts. Many were apparently being registered as Church of England, which according to one Baptist chaplain was 'a terrible difficulty we are up against continually'. 105 ME Aubrey found grounds to complain at the slowness of Baptist ministers in 1939 to come forward for chaplaincy work. 106 He complained again, after many months of war, that Baptists joining the forces were not being given a New Testament or one of the specially prepared 'wallets'. He could not afford the money to supply these from Church House 107 and pleaded with local churches to see that it was done. This contrasted with Baptist fervour in 1914 to evangelise the troops, a fervour as keen then as that of the Army. 108

Appreciation for salvationist services to the troops was shown in the Baptist press in reporting the Army's 'Services to the Services' Exhibition in Regent Street's Dorland Hall in 1942 (see Ch.21, Sect.1). Statistics of salvationist work were reported with some warmth: 'Red Shield work is now in operation from Iceland to Port Darwin with 1226 clubs and hostels', but the account stressed that all this was extra, since the Army's usual peacetime activities were continuing.

With the Methodists and the Army, Baptists were anxious about the wartime effects of alcohol abuse. 110 *The Baptist Times* 111 also joined the Army's call to the BBC to refrain from introducing low vulgarity into radio programmes for servicemen.
The picture emerging in Sections 1 to 4 of this brief comparison of denominational responses in the war suggests again that the Baptist Church was perhaps a more natural ally of the Army than any of the others. That is not to say that the churches as a whole did not sound a fairly united note in the war. It is merely that Baptist reactions came closest, as in previous wars, to those of the salvationists.

5) Others

The rise of Adolph Hitler raised certain aspects of the just war doctrine which some Quakers in 1939-1945 could not easily dismiss. If the First World War created dilemmas of conscience for members of the Society of Friends, so too did the Second War when issues of right and wrong appeared more starkly. In 1914 many Quakers joined the Friends' Ambulance Unit (FAU) and did heroic work of a non-combatant nature (see Ch.14). In 1939 the Society was not absolutely or uniformly pacifist. Faced with an international situation of bewildering complexity, many young Friends could see no alternative to service in the forces, but corporately the Society maintained its long-standing testimony for peace.

The FAU was revived. Its constitution kept it theoretically separate from the Society but membership was confined to 'men and women who share Quaker views on peace and war'. A total of 1314 men and women served in the Unit until 1946. A. Tegla Davies, the Unit's historian, writes vividly of joining the Unit:

'I was one of 60 who arrived that day...They all had one thing in common. They were pacifists, exponents of an unpopular creed in wartime, but anxious to do a job of work. Now they felt that pacifism, having been recognised by the state, should show in action what it could do to relieve the suffering and agony which years of war were bound to produce. And they would serve on a maintenance only basis, without payment.... It was practical pacifism, pacifism in action, an outlet for the energy and idealism of young people who would not fight.'
Interestingly, The Salvation Army did not produce its own ambulance unit in the second war. In 1914 The Salvation Army Ambulance Unit earned a reputation in France like that of the FAU, but now it settled for 25 cwt canteens convertible to ambulances speedily as need might arise. Fleets of these canteen-ambulances went to France in 1939 (most were lost at Dunkirk - see Ch.21, Sect.2) and again in 1944 for the D-Day landings. Many salvationists would have felt not out of place in the FAU.

In 1940 the Congregational Union Assembly passed a resolution which expressed 'profound sorrow' at the tragedy of war but which recognised that the issues involved were 'of final moment in the history of nations'. The resolution explicitly condemned the 'trampling of small and defenceless peoples' in many European countries and the persecution of the Jews. It went on to recognise the pacifist conscience, but regarded the British entry into war as 'inevitable'. The government was fighting for 'human liberty' and 'those moral principles which can alone provide a foundation for true living both for men and nations'. The Congregationalist position was not unlike that of the other churches, but the Army in Britain never found itself able to be officially quite so unambiguously behind the government.

A comparison of the responses by the Army, Anglicans, Methodists and Baptists to the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan in August 1945 is given in Ch.26.

Space does not permit a comparison of the wartime work of Christian Science which has been comprehensively written up by authority of The Christian Science Board of Directors, but by an anonymous author.

Once again the chief difference between the Army and the churches was the Army's strong reluctance to venture political comment on the war or its origins. There were numerous points of convergence, as the accounts in this Chapter indicate, probably more obvious (as already
indicated above) between the Army and the Baptists than between the Army and the others. However, only the Army was under the impossible pressure of an overt internationalism, and only in the salvationist sources can be found regular and high-profile references to work and activities in countries with whom Britain was at war (see Ch. 23, Sect. 1.)

The Army knew where moral blame for the war lay, but internationalist considerations dictated a discreet and diplomatic restraint in the interests of salvationist unity both during and after the war. To some observers the Army's reticence may have appeared as lack of honesty, and some of those observers may have been looking on from the inside.

One issue which preoccupied the churches in the First World War does not seem to have featured prominently in church debate in the second war. It was that of whether or not dying in battle was a martyrdom leading to the salvation of the soul. The Army spelled out its view in the early months of war: to convey by words or by silence that a battle-death meant salvation was neither to comfort the dying nor to deceive the living. It was a view which 'lost some padres in the last war the respect of the men'. However, it became something of a non-issue, eclipsed by argument about the appropriateness or otherwise of prayers for victory.
1. Carpenter 1, 10. Carpenter could not resist adding: 'It might be claimed, with good reason, that we are less in need of it than many other denominations.' For comparisons between the Army and the churches in previous wars see Chs. 2 and 14.

2. Ibid.

3. Carpenter 2, 32.


5. Ibid., 275.


7. IWC 18-1-41:4-5.

8. For appeals made by Pius XII in the weeks leading to the outbreak of war see CM Cianfarra, The War and The Vatican, (Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1945), 162-163, 183-184, 186-187.


10. IWC 10-10-42:3.

11. Ibid. Cunningham had represented the Army at the World Conference on 'Life and Work' at Oxford in 1937 and was also a member of the 'Faith and Order' Conference at Edinburgh which worked on into the late 1930s through its Continuation Committee, on which he also sat (Ibid.).


15. Ibid.


17. CT 2-4-42:206.


22. Ibid.


25. The Fortnightly Review, Vol. 146, December 1939, 638-645, 'The Function of The Church in Wartime', by the Bishop of Chichester. (Bell was in contact with German Christians throughout the war, including Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and when war ended he spoke for the integrity of the German Church in having repudiated Nazism: CT 3-8-45:439.)

26. Ibid., 638.

27. Ibid., 639, 645.

28. Ibid., 640.

29. Ibid., 641.

30. Ibid., 642.

31. Ibid., 644.


33. United Empire, July 1945, 133.

34. CT 28-11-41:700.

35. CT 12-12-41:734.


37. CT 24-7-42:411. On Anglican chaplains see also: The Official Year Book of the Church of England, (SPCK), 1945, 3 (which said the chaplains were winning 'golden opinions').

38. CT 1-6-45:318.

39. CT 9-9-39:210, appealing for gifts of £20 per evangelist.


41. Note 32 at 387.

42. CT 31-7-42:422.

43. IWC 17-6-44:1.
44. The Times, 5-6-44: 6.
45. The Times, 8-6-44: 5.
46. The Times, 5-7-44: 7.
47. IWC 17-6-44: 1.
48. IWC 22-7-44: 1.
49. Ibid., 3.
50. The Army has been invited to use St. Paul's Cathedral on numerous occasions since the unhappy fuss triggered by Dr. Fisher's act of kindness.
51. MR 31-8-39: 1. Methodist kindness to the Army in the Channel Islands has already been noted - see Ch.21, Sect.3.
52. Ch.17 and Ch.20, Sect.2.
53. GT Brake, Policy and Politics in British Methodism, (Edsall, 1984), 443.
54. Ibid., 444-445.
57. MR 24-8-39: 12.
58. MR 7-8-39: 3.
59. Ibid.
60. MR 30-11-39: 10.
61. MR 7-12-39: 3.
63. MR 7-9-39: 3.
64. Ibid., 12.
68. Note 53 at 675.
73. Note 53 at 675-676.
74. Ibid.
76. IWC 9-8-41:3.
78. MR 5-10-39:1. See also IWC 3-6-39:6; 6-7-40:1; 3-10-42:3; 8-4-44:3.
79. IWC 4-8-45:1.
80. Baptist Union Annual Report 1936, Appendix III.
81. See Ch.14.
82. BT 5-1-39:4.
83. BT 20-7-39:567.
84. BT 27-7-39:584.
86. BT 5-1-39:2.
87. BT 17-8-39:635. The observation was justified.
88. Ibid. This comment also was true and would be true today. But autocracy today is not in fashion and leadership styles in all walks of life have changed.
89. BT 31-8-39:667. And see Sect.1.
90. Ibid.
91. BT 27-7-39:583. In 1914 the Baptists were again closest to the Army in stressing compassionate outreach - see Ch.14.
92. BT 31-8-39:663.
93. BT 7-9-39:677. The article went on to urge Baptists to engage in open air song services (again, like the Army) and to seek out 'a thousand and one ways' to mother the boys and girls who would be evacuated.
94. Ibid.
97. See Ch.14, Note 92.
98. BT 10-8-39: 622.
100. BT 7-9-39: 686.
102. BT 19-10-39: 762. For American salvationists and the war see Ch. 24.
103. BT 25-12-41: 638.
104. BT 20-7-39: 567.
107. In Southampton Row, London, and which was partially evacuated to Arundel House, Brighton by permission of the government: BT 7-9-39: 676. Congregational and Presbyterian HQ moved to Cambridge (Ibid.)
108. See Ch. 14.
111. Ibid.
112. IWC 16-9-39: 3; 27-1-40: 2; 8-6-40: 1; 8-3-41: 5; 26-4-41: 5.
115. For the FAU in 1914-1918 see Ch. 14, Sect. 3.
116. Note 114 at 484.
117. Note 114 at 481.
118. Note 114 at 2-3.
119. See Ch. 11, Sect. 3.
120. BT 13-6-40: 374.
122. Problems, 51.
CHAPTER 23

SALVATIONIST REACTIONS UNDER GERMAN AUTHORITY

1) Germany
2) France
3) Belgium
Chapter 23 concentrates on The Salvation Army in the three countries in mainland Europe which were principally caught up in the events of the war: Germany, France and Belgium. It should be noted that the German War Cry (Der Kriegsruf) was soon outlawed by Hitler, depriving the researcher of what would otherwise have been a valuable source of information. Some data is preserved, however, in the London War Cry which made considerable efforts to inform its British readers of Army life in Hitler's Germany using reports coming via neutral Sweden (see below). It has also been possible to enter into correspondence with German salvationists caught up in the war, and to draw upon some first-hand accounts of wartime experiences which appeared in the immediate post-war Army press.

Hitler persecuted certain sections of the church in Germany long before war with Britain began. On 30th June 1934 a number of leading Catholic laymen were murdered, but by then the Catholics had come to terms with Hitler and had signed a concordat on 20th July 1933. Paul Johnson's somewhat cavalierly compiled History of Christianity claims that only the 'free sects' merited outright persecution for sticking to their principles and singles out the Jehovah's Witnesses for particular praise. What Johnson does not say is that the persecution of that sect, evil as the persecution was, sprang from the single issue of absolute refusal by its members to bear arms in war and not from political opposition to Hitler or his regime on broad grounds of Christian principle. Conscientious objection was not an option in Germany. You either joined the German forces or were shot. A second omission by Johnson is his failure to mention The Salvation Army under Hitler (his entire volume makes no reference whatever to the Army) and the severe, almost crippling, effect the war years had on
German salvationism.\textsuperscript{5} When the First World War started the German Army could boast 150 corps and 500 officers.\textsuperscript{6} In 1939 these were:

- Officers: 391
- Lay employees: 68
- Corps: 94
- Outposts: 45
- Social Centres: 34

The first war had decimated the work, but sufficient recovery had been made so that by 1939 the Germany Territory could spare 40 officers for service in 12 other countries, including missionary areas.\textsuperscript{8}

With the rise of national socialism, curbs were placed on Army activity and on 14th February 1934 Himmler and Heydrich ordered that the salvationists should be restricted as much as possible. However, on taking office as General, Evangeline Booth nevertheless cabled Hitler on 19th October 1934 as follows: \textsuperscript{8a}

'Please permit me to express my very deep appreciation and sincere gratitude for your conciliatory attitude toward The Salvation Army in Germany.... I want our people to do their full part individually and collectively toward making a better Germany.'

If at first taken aback by this, Hitler later took a warmer attitude to the Army and on 8th December 1934 the Gestapo in Berlin sent out the following directive: \textsuperscript{8b}

'The Führer has recently said that he was not opposed to the activity of The Salvation Army, which has never engaged itself politically, and that out of considerations of foreign policy he wanted no action to be taken against them.'

When war with Britain came, the Territorial Commander was Colonel Franz Stankuweit whose Chief Secretary (second-in-command) was Lieutenant Colonel Johann Büsing.\textsuperscript{9} This second war was to devastate the Army's work (see below). As in 1914\textsuperscript{10}, all able-bodied male officers were compelled to join the armies of the state.\textsuperscript{4} There is
some hint in the sources that not all salvationists thought Hitlerism a bad thing (compare German Baptists - Ch.22, Sect.4). For instance, Willi Kothe, who was eventually to become the Army's centenary historian in Germany, speaks of feeling 'the humiliation of the Treaty of Versailles 1918' and 'national shame' so that by the time he was in the Luftwaffe and captured by the Russians in France in June 1944 he found himself praying in captivity 'that God would bless the Führer and lead him to victory' since he was 'absolutely convinced of his good intention'. However, active Army officers too old for military service (or being female) had cause to be disillusioned earlier than the end of the war. Many were forced to undertake full-time secular work simply to finance the Army's programmes and to have food on which to survive since government restrictions on the Army slowly but firmly increased, cutting off sources of fund-raising.

London gleaned sporadic news from occasional copies of Der Kriegsruf (The War Cry) which arrived via neutral countries like Sweden. However, no formal contacts remained between Berlin and London. Territorial Headquarters in Germany would have wished it to be otherwise and merely had to trust in London's understanding. They need not have feared. International Headquarters could see very plainly how things were, and knew that silence from Berlin did not signal a repetition of the attempted breakaway which had occurred earlier in the 1930's. Then, with William Howard (an Englishman) as Territorial Commander, a group of Army officers in the Rheinland had set up a breakaway 'German Salvation Army' independent of London and any international ties. National socialism had penetrated deeply and an attempt had been made to persuade all officers in Germany to defect. A circular from 'The Rheinland Separatists' had been rejected by the great majority of personnel.

The London War Cry gave news of the Army in Germany whenever it
could. The information filtering through indicated that salvationists under Hitler were clinging valiantly to evangelical and compassionate priorities, and that although overt evidence of continuing international considerations and loyalties could not be given. Nevertheless a silent and prayerful bond was being maintained in the hearts of German salvationists with their fellows in other lands. A few weeks into the war London received 'authentic information' that German comrades were 'doing all in their power to serve their countrymen in a true Army spirit'.

Word came through that news bulletins in English by radio stations in Hamburg and Cologne spoke of the Army working on despite great difficulties. Details of the difficulties did not emerge. The War Cry challenged its Army readers: 'Will you pray for your comrades with the German troops, that their faith may not fail?' It was made clear to salvationists in Britain that their 'comrades' in Germany had endeared themselves to the ordinary people:

'We have not forgotten that during the difficult inflation period The Salvation Army distributed some million tins of condensed milk to undernourished children, that we distributed millions of free meals from our Field Kitchens, gave lodging to the homeless, work to the workless, clothing and food to the needy, and, in general, accomplished much relief work.'

Franz Stankuweit had been ill. News of his death in April 1940 was the first significant bodyblow to German salvationism. Notices of his promotion to Glory which appeared in the Army's British press were almost provocatively blunt: 'Franz Stankuweit was a patriot, a German who loved his fatherland with all the intensity of his nature; but his love to God and the Army was paramount.' The Officers' Review told of Stankuweit's reply in January 1939 when asked whether Hitler's lack of adverse attention to the Army meant that German salvationists were over-patriotic. His eyes blazed as he said, 'You tell your English Christians, you tell them that German salvationists are, and will be, true to Christian and Army principles. The Army's
spiritual work has never been interfered with by the government. If
the day should come when our religion is challenged, on that day we
shall be ready to fight or suffer for it, as God wills.' 22 This
'impresive and kindly Army leader' 23 did not live to feel the steel of
Hitler's grip once his attention was turned to the Army.

Johann Busing became Acting Territorial Commander, with Lieutenant
Colonel Max Grüner becoming General Secretary on a pro tem basis. 24
The War Cry in London said 'the General has appointed' Busing and Grüner,
but this was merely a form of words to regularise de facto events well
beyond the control of International Headquarters. However, some degree
of communication was kept up between London and Berlin through the Army
in Sweden, a neutral country. Adjutant Eric Wickberg, who spoke fluent
German, was appointed to Sweden expressly to keep in touch with the
German Army. 25 He entered Germany when he could and gained first-hand
information, discovering in late 1940 that 'throughout practically the
whole of Germany, open-air meetings and indoor meetings are being held
without any restrictions.' The social centres were full. However,'most male salvationists' had been 'called to the colours'. 26 What
he did not report was that Army marches were obliged to be headed by
a flag, bearing the Swastika-Cross. 27 Hermann Göring's gifts of toys
at Christmas to Army children's homes 28 did not prevent him from dis-
banding the Army Girl Guide groups. 29 All youth activities fell under
state control. Then the burning of Bibles began, including those of
the Army. Major Josef Heitmann told the SS guards at one bonfire that
manmade flames could not put out the Word of God. 30

Then came more specific warnings. One was printed after an open-
air meeting and appeared in the Ebingen daily newspaper. It read: 31

'To The Salvation Army in Ebingen:

We notify this organisation, that yesterday, in connection
with the sports parade, some of your members at Balingen
behaved in a most provocative way. The persons referred
to did not only fail to salute the symbol of our present State and of the Party, the Hakenkreuzflag, but on the contrary, with an ironical smile they expressed their disregard for the flag.

The comrades of the Party and the people on parade were upset and I want to recommend The Salvation Army to avoid our town in the future, because we will not permit those who take advantage of the decency of our present State, to try to prevail upon their international objects through an apparently nice way of begging, and furthermore think that they can disregard the symbol of our State.

This is intended as the first warning. Other matters follow. Heil Hitler.

Province Director'

*Der Kriegsruf* was banned. All youth work collapsed. No public fund-raising was permitted. Büsing was summoned with ever increasing frequency to the Ministry of the Interior, having first been sent for on 17th February 1941 to meet Ministerial Councillor Ruppert who appeared friendly. However, summonses began to arrive from Gestapo Headquarters, interspersed by calls to attend at the Ministry of Church Affairs. The use of military ranks was stopped on government orders. Salvationists could not be referred to as 'soldiers'. Inevitably, the demand came that all property should be handed over to the state. Büsing refused. Months passed quietly and then Councillor Ruppert sent for Büsing to tell him the Army was to be dissolved. In fact, the order encompassed only the social work, and the spiritual work was allowed to continue but stripped of quasi-military style or form. The central government instructed Büsing to hand over all the institutions to the local and municipal authorities where each institution was located. When he tried to do so, to his delight he found that the cities were not keen. They had no one to run them and simply asked the Army to keep going.32

Many officers in charge of local centres were interrogated by the Gestapo. The prevailing suspicion was the organisational link with England, a not unreasonable cause for official alarm in the circumstances.33
One officer, Mrs. Major Seils of Könisberg, was later to write: 'Neither the prohibitions of the party, nor the requisitioning of our halls, nor the call-up of men for military service, were able to put a stop to our work.' Another, Adjutant Ilse Hille from Magdeburg, was to say: 'When I appeared before the Gestapo, I was not afraid, for it always seemed that I did not speak, but that a Supreme One spoke through me.'

The real devastation, however, did not come from Hitlerian action, but from Allied aircraft. Territorial Headquarters and the officers' accommodation adjacent to it were gutted by fire on the night of 2nd February 1945 when 1000 Allied planes raided Berlin. When Berlin eventually fell, the Russians stabled their horses in the basement of the ruins. The defilement is not difficult to imagine. Further bomb damage happened to Army centres at Dortmund, Freudenstadt, Nuremberg, Mannheim, Darmstadt, Mainz, Kassel, Cologne and Hamburg where one raid created a lake of fire eight miles square. In all, 33 out of 80 citadels were totally destroyed and six more were seriously damaged. Of the social work centres and residences 13 were destroyed and five damaged extensively. Over 200 salvationists died either in battle or in air raids, and because of the subsequent political division of the country the Army lost all its work in what had been East and West Prussia, Silesia and Pomerania. Allied bombs killed Captain Ilse Händel when the Army's Maternity Hospital and Children's Home were demolished in Berlin, resulting also in the loss of 100 maternity bed facilities. Albert Orsborn saw Hamburg in 1946 and wrote in his autobiography: 'I just looked and wept.... It was a charnel-house... all naked horror.'

By May 1945 Salvation Army Red Shield mobiles from Britain had entered Berlin, with the first static canteen already established in Germany and situated at Goch, an 'almost demolished town'. Everywhere the Allies went, the Red Shield services followed. On the 21st July, 1945 The War Cry in London carried the first direct report of British
salvationists at a German Salvation Army meeting since 1939. It happened at Lübeck and was reported by Staff-Sergeant F. Bishop from Snodland, Kent. As July ended, Johann Büsing and Max Grüner (about to be promoted by the General) met British Red Shield workers who were given 'a delighted reception' and were asked for 'news of the Army world'
The first woman German salvationist to be contacted by Red Shield staff was spotted in a Berlin street and was visible because of her Army bonnet. Major John Moores, in charge of Red Shield in Germany, wrote: 'When she saw us she came running to greet us with mouth wide open and hands in the air.' Then he added one brief sentence which told of the spirit of salvationism under Hitler: 'She was visiting the people.'

By August 1945 twelve Red Shield clubs were operating all over Germany, including one at Belsen. Meanwhile, British salvationists united with their German colleagues to re-establish regular Army activity. Major John Moores reported: 'At each of the German meetings I have attended on the past three Sundays, people have knelt at the Mercy Seat.'

October 1945 saw Commissioner Frank Barrett, after release from internment in occupied France, visiting Berlin to inspect conditions. His report gives a glimpse of life in vanquished Germany which reveals both deprivation and yet a nobility of spirit among the ordinary people:

'BERLIN, Monday, Oct. 29, 1945

This morning I went with Lieutenant Commissioner Büsing (Germany, TC) to see the SA Men's Hostel in the Kastanienallee, 74 now being run by a retired officer, Lieutenant Colonel A. Tebbe. This Shelter is situated in the Russian zone, and accommodates 280 men. It is generally full.

I was first shown into a room where I saw how the poorest of the poor help the poorest of the poor. Colonel Grüner, the General Secretary, had made an appeal for these refugees to those who could with truth ask, "How can we help? We have nothing. We have lost all."

They went home and thought it out, and came back in ones and twos with gifts - a piece of bread, a potato, a carrot or two, a worn article for a child.

Nothing that I saw could have been worth more than twopence. Yet in it all came and some hundreds of starving bodies were fed and warmed.'
Barrett's visit constituted the restoration of formal links between salvationists in Germany and International Headquarters in London. The return of Germany to the Army's international fold was sealed by the visit of General and Mrs. George Carpenter to the Territory in March 1946. The Lord Mayor of Berlin, Dr. Werner, welcomed the Army's leaders as 'a promising symbol, as a voice of love and fellowship'. Not long afterwards, Büsing was summoned to London as a delegate to the 1946 High Council and to participate in electing a successor to George Carpenter. At the public welcome to all the overseas delegates Büsing appeared 'thin and shabby in his badly-worn uniform', but the great crowd gave the German an ovation louder and longer than most of the others. British salvationist hearts were still beating with something of an international, supra-national pulse.

The Germany Büsing had temporarily left had now an Army on its knees, praying and 'unterdrück', (see Note 11). Frederick Coutts has put it this way: 'The Army in Germany slowly lost touch with itself after it had lost touch with the outside world.' It has never recovered, even to this day. Compare the 1939 statistics given above with those for the early 1980's:

- Officers: 139
- Lay employees: 321
- Corps: 47
- Outposts: 8
- Social Centres: 32

Let the last word in this account of sad heroism for the sake of Christ be from one whose heart was pierced by the war, but especially by the plight of German salvationism - Carvosso Gauntlett:

'In no country, probably, has the internationalism of salvationists been so severely tested as in Germany. Through two wars - together just on ten years - to belong to a uniformed Movement organised on a military pattern, whose Head and Headquarters belong to an "enemy" nation, can hardly
have made for popularity. But loyalty has marked the service of the Salutisten as well as aggression against evil. As they emerge from the tragic happenings of recent years - their heads and hearts "bloody but unbowed" - fellow-salvationists everywhere proudly and gratefully greet their German comrades.'

2) France

The German occupying forces in France proscribed The Salvation Army there. The French War Cry (En Avant) was banned, but firsthand accounts became available, most notably from Commissioner Frank Barrett. In 1940 Barrett (an Englishman) was the Territorial Commander and Colonel Emile Studer was his Chief Secretary. They were responsible for work comprising:

- Officers: 339
- Lay Employees: 256
- Corps: 59
- Outposts: 81
- Social Centres: 52

It was not a large work as compared with many other parts of the Army world, but it was significant in a country and culture predominantly Roman Catholic. As soon as France was placed on a war footing Barrett embarked on special war work services to the community. The authorities entrusted thousands of evacuated children to the Army's care and a Correspondence Bureau was set up to maintain weekly contact between servicemen and their wives. Things were seriously hampered, however, by the conscription of almost all male officers and other male salvationists. No system of conscientious objection operated. It meant additional burdens upon the women of the Army. The 1941 Year Book carried an extract from an article by a Swedish journalist working in Paris. It indicated the attitude of French officers in the midst of national mobilisation:

'I meet a French salvationist. He goes about with a bandaged
head selling "The War Cry". He looks happy and I cannot help stopping him. I buy his thirty copies of "The War Cry" for 100 francs and offer him a cup of hot chocolate. He tells me that he has just returned from the front, where he received a wound in the head.

He is home on a month's leave, but he cannot keep still. The majority of his fellow-salvationists are called up and there is so much to do. So he has put on his uniform of peace.

We are about to part when I notice something shining under the lapel of his coat. It is France's medal for bravery.'

Discussions opened between the Army and the military generals as to how best the Army's ministry might serve the needs of the fighting men. Major Charles Péan negotiated for the Army. As a first step, 10 Soldiers' Homes were opened and the distribution of Bibles to servicemen began. Barrett visited International Headquarters in London to confer with Carpenter on wartime extensions and agreement was reached on establishing a further 30 Soldiers' Homes and Rest Rooms over and above the 20 by then up and running. The 'Foyers', as they came to be called, proved very successful. By April 1940 the salvationists had completed the opening of 46 out of the 50 targeted. Barrett wrote to London reporting 33,000 men every week in the Foyers and a total of 295,000 to date. Six of these centres were within two or three kilometres of the Maginot Line, making it 'a nerve-racking, comfortless life for the officers', all of whom, without exception, were women ('les Directrices'). The French military authorities prohibited, as they put it, 'religious propaganda' in the Foyers and so no services or meetings were held such as those known in the Red Shield Clubs of the British. Instead, hundreds of personal conversations accomplished the spiritual ministry which the Army saw as paramount. Barrett's own words described best how things were done:

'At these times some are troubled with 'cafard', the little black beetle in the brain which gnaws and eats all hope in a man - the evil product of the mud of the stifling trench, the desolated no-mans-land, the thunder and moaning of war, its freezing in winter and its sweltering in summer. There is at these times a minor conversion that leads toward the greater spiritual change. Kindness, sympathy and understanding
kindle hope, make him realise that the sun is shining and that flowers are blooming, give him the vision of a Heavenly Father on high and of his own ploughshare here below to which he will return when the war is ended.

This work can only be accomplished by personal conversations. Hundreds of such take place every week, conducted by salvationists and Christian friends who, understanding the mentality of the soldiers are able to answer their questions, resolve their doubts and show them the way to God.'

Every co-operation was otherwise forthcoming from the French military leaders. Barrett was given broadcasting time on 24 radio stations so that his plans and work could be widely publicised. The number of men benefitting by the Foyers rose to 55,000 weekly, despite setbacks when 3 centres at the front line were bombed and shelled to destruction, but without salvationist casualties.

As the German advance neared Paris, Barrett sent his second-in-command, Emile Studer to unoccupied Southern France to establish a provisional Territorial Headquarters at Valence. Studer and his party left Paris on Tuesday, 2nd July 1940 but encountered such grave conditions that Studer asked all the British officers to agree a diversion to Bordeaux in the hope of finding passage out of France. Eventually a Dutch vessel ensured escape.

Barrett himself declined to leave. 'No Salvation Army Commissioner leaves his people. I will stay here whatever happens,' he told Studer. He informed London of his decision: 'I am remaining with a few officers in Paris. It is difficult for me to reconcile all that faith in God means with the idea of flight from danger.' He was then approaching his seventieth birthday.

Some signs of success were seen despite the occupation. A 'Seeking the Lost Sheep' evangelistic campaign resulted in many converts, and in 1940 some 25 young people offered themselves to the vocation of Salvation Army officership: there was even time to publish a revised and enlarged edition of the French Salvation Army Song Book for use in meetings and worship.
military general urging Barrett to open 300 and saying: 'Your Foyers are not a success, monsieur, they are a triumph.' In unoccupied France, where the Army had 26 corps and nine social work centres, salvationist activity went on unabated under Studer's supervision. Marshal Pétain gave personal encouragement to the work and sent donations on two occasions of 6000 and 5000 francs. As Paris was about to fall, the social work centres in the north were full to overflowing, placing many strains upon the skeleton team of officers with Barrett. On the day the German High Command entered the city, he called the officers together. In his last despatch to London he wrote: 'We reconsecrated ourselves to God and the Army.'

It was not long before Barrett was arrested and imprisoned as an enemy alien in occupied terrain. Mrs. Barrett received the news in England with 'calm faith'. His captivity, however, was to be short-lived, for after only seven weeks in the Fresnes Penal Prison near Paris he was released under house-arrest. During the weeks as a prisoner he was chaplain to all his fellow-prisoners and President of the Internees' Welfare Committee in the prison. His release was secured through 'representations made by friends to whom the entire Salvation Army is thus indebted'. The Army's press, for obvious reasons, could not identify the 'friends', but Barrett stood in great esteem amongst church leaders in Paris. His impact upon the inmates at Fresnes is measured by their subsequent gift to him of an album signed by 600 of the 700 imprisoned with him.

House arrest did not permit effective command of the Army, despite the London War Cry's rather optimistic claim that Barrett's release meant he was 'back on duty'. It made sense therefore when Colonel Ernest Dejonghe came out of retirement to act as territorial leader. After liberation he told of the Army's fate following the fall of Paris. At first, certain restrictions were imposed such as the banning of
En Avant (the French equivalent of The War Cry) and of open-air meetings. Indoor meetings were allowed to continue at first. The social work was unaffected. Then came a fullscale search by the Germans of Territorial Headquarters and the removal of all the Army's files and records. This was quickly followed by formal proscription of the Army. No meetings could be held, no uniforms could be worn, no literature could be produced. The social work alone was permitted to go on, with the officers out of uniform. Dejonghe appointed Brigadier Irene Peyron to visit salvationists in all parts of the occupied zone to keep salvationism alive at least in spirit. This she did, leading cottage meetings everywhere despite the ban. When the order came to sell all Army assets and hand over the proceeds to the government, the Army was rescued by the help of Monsieur Marc Boegner, President of the Federation of Reformed Churches in France, who made legal arrangements to incorporate the social work within his own church constitution. He arranged also for salvationists to unite with his church congregations for worship. The final phase of German anti-salvationist activity came with the decision to occupy the whole of France following the Allied invasion of North Africa. Prime Minister Laval was instructed to close down the Army in the South of France and this he did by order dated 9th January 1943. Again the Reformed Churches acted to protect salvationist assets from expropriation. Thus matters stood when the D-Day landings on 6th June 1944 led eventually to the liberation of Paris on 25th August 1944. Only one week previously Dejonghe had been under interrogation at Gestapo HQ, fearing the worst.

In the years of silence between Paris and London, French Salvation Army officers were caught up in varying facets of war and life in an enemy-occupied country. Major Jean Bordas was taken prisoner-of-war on 24th June 1940, an event which was to open many doors. Confined at Colmar, Alsace, he conducted three religious meetings each week for 50 Protestant prisoners. At Otzenrath he led daily devotions for 15
Roman Catholic forced labourers. At Stalag VI J at Krefeld he was made Protestant Chaplain, using Bibles and literature sent by 'La Commission Oecuménique Pour L'Aide Spirituelle Aux Prisonniers De Guerre' based in Geneva. At Gerresheim, near Dusseldorf, he was made chaplain to a hospital for sick and wounded Allied prisoners numbering 1000 patients. He wrote at the close of the war: 'God has been marvellously true to His promises.'

Paul Tzaut, with his wife, found himself running an Army eventide home in Bordeaux. Under German rule he hid Jewish citizens in the home, having 17 in hiding just prior to liberation. In 1975 the government of Israel presented him with the 'Medal of the Righteous'.

Major George Flandres was the corps officer at Montpellier and a man of pacifist convictions. In his ministry he visited prisoners in the town prison, but he came under suspicion from the Germans and sought refuge in Marseilles. There he was drawn, little by little, into the activities of the French Resistance Movement, adopting the codename 'Montcalme'. He worked to set up the Allied landings near Cannes in June 1944, but was betrayed to the Gestapo by a former prisoner from Montpellier who met and recognised him in Marseilles. On 13th June 1944 he was shot. Later he was buried with full national honours.

Raymond Delcourt was selected in 1943 for forced labour in Germany and opted instead to join the Resistance. With his wife he went to the French-Swiss border town of Haute-Savoie and worked ostensibly with refugee children from Lyon, most of his time being occupied with clandestine activity for the underground movement. He writes: 'I was 29 and very much exposed. I risked arrest by the police or Gestapo many times.... It was a miracle I escaped.' Another who risked arrest and execution was Brigadier H. Keuchkerian who hid Allied escaping prisoners-of-war in his social work centre at Lille.

The Allied invasion in June 1944 brought an end to house arrest.
for Barrett. He sailed for Liverpool with 638 released prisoners-of-war, was met at Liverpool Docks by hundreds of salvationists, reunited with his wife, and given a public welcome in London's Congress Hall at Clapton 7th June 1944. In the Army's Central Hall in Paris the first public Salvation Army meeting since proscription took place on Sunday, 17th September 1944 and was attended by many British Red Shield personnel, including Brigadier Bloomfield, in charge of Red Shield services in France. Also present were Monsieur Marc Boegner (see above) and Colonel Medlicott, Chief Welfare Officer, 21st Army Group with whom Owen Culshaw had negotiated in London prior to the D-Day landings (see Ch.21, Sect.2, Note 127). It was not long before *En Avant* was once more in production. French salvationists embraced their comrades accompanying the Allied invasion force and the Red Shield network spread rapidly as the German armies fell back.

General Carpenter seized the opportunity of speaking by radio broadcast to those who had kept the flame of French salvationism burning. By courtesy of the BBC he called upon them to rededicate themselves to Christ, to reconsecrate themselves to service for the friendless and desolate, and to remember especially the need to win the young for Christ's Kingdom. The following summer he was with them in person and met all the officers in Council. It was, he said, a 'most deeply stirring' experience: 'To listen to their testimonies was like unfolding a new chapter of the Acts of the Apostles.... There was not a word of self-pity.'

3) Belgium

When Belgium found herself at war in 1939 Major Pieter W Cohen was responsible for The Salvation Army there. Belgium, for Army purposes, was a sub-Territory, being a work of modest proportions:
Cohen issued a 'Proclamation' to his small band of fellow-salvationists. He reminded them that their Sovereign, King Leopold III, had asked each citizen to stay at his post calmly. Salvationists, he said, must now be more than ever an example of obedience to the King's exhortation, for what was important in secular life was doubly so in the spiritual life. It was the Army's task to console and encourage with the Gospel. Sunday, 9th September 1939 would be set aside for prayer. Every salvationist must play his or her part since their General, their country, and God were counting on them.

Cohen led the way by ensuring that Foyers were set up for the use of Belgian troops. Three were opened in Brussels and everything, including meals, was provided free of charge. Further centres for servicemen were established at Verviers and at Liege. Cohen responded at once to an invitation from the Minister of War to join an ad hoc working party to discuss how best to ensure the moral and spiritual welfare of the Belgian forces and simultaneous negotiations were opened with the Military Commandant of the Antwerp Province. Captain Frans Vingerhoedt was made Assistant Chaplain in the Belgian military forces and charged with the care of Protestant soldiers in Antwerp.

Meanwhile, International Headquarters had decided to upgrade the sub-Territory to Territory status and Colonel Mary Booth (daughter of Bramwell Booth), a fluent speaker of German, was appointed Territorial Commander, with Cohen re-designated as General Secretary and second-in-charge. Scarcely had Mary Booth established herself when German armour swept into Belgium on 10th May 1940. The Army in Brussels was at full stretch coping with the refugees pouring into the city.
On the day of the invasion *Cri de Guerre* published its final issue for 4 1/2 years. It spoke of 'devastating battalions' having violated Belgium's borders. With Germans in Brussels, Mary Booth and her Private Secretary, Lieutenant Colonel Eva Smith, were soon interned. Cohen resumed command but died suddenly on 10th December 1941, being succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel Georges Vanderkam.

As was the case in France, some salvationists engaged themselves in underground Resistance activities, most notably Captain Paul Boutet who undertook to hide wanted men and Allied airmen shot down over Belgian soil. (Another was Major Bovigny.) One of the pilots helped by Boutet, FJH Heathfield, recalls a conversation with him in which he asked the Captain what view The Salvation Army took of his clandestine activities. Boutet replied: 'The Army exists to combat evil in the world and that is what I'm doing. I have tendered my resignation as an Army officer so that the Army would not be implicated in any way by what I do, but the Colonel in charge of Belgium has refused to accept my resignation, saying no consideration could be given during wartime.' (This would suggest that Boutet failed to make plain in his letter his reasons for offering to finish.) Boutet was eventually discovered by the Germans and imprisoned in Germany where he died. He typified so many salvationists in occupied Europe, being a victim of his faith and yet a victim of his patriotism.

The occupation imposed a less rigorous regime upon the Army than was known in either Germany or France, but general lack of funds left its practical cutting edge blunted. A million marks were needed without delay as soon as liberation came. Evangelistic witness on the streets resumed at once, with the first open-air meeting taking place in Brussels on the 10th September 1944. The first British salvationist to make contact with Belgian salvationists for 4 1/2 years was Pte. William Tickner from Thornton Heath, serving in the British
Liberation Army. The Red Shield soon opened up centres for Allied troops at Antwerp and Brussels, eleven staff being stationed in Brussels by November 1944.

On 25th November 1944 the Cri de Guerre re-appeared to greet its readers with 'une joie profonde'. Suggestions had been made during its absence that it could hardly return, after years of war, with the same name ('The War Cry') as before the hostilities. But, protested the first liberation edition, 'the War goes on for salvationists; it goes on until evil is vanquished!' The spirit of Belgian salvationism was apparently alive and well.

Formal re-establishing of links with International Headquarters was completed when Commissioner Astbury, International Secretary for Europe, and Lieutenant-Commissioner Hugh Sladen visited Brussels in February 1945. Carpenter sent a message to say: 'Never cease to look up! We praise God for your faithfulness and ask Him always to be your Guide.'

The evidence points to a response by salvationists in Germany and in other parts of occupied Europe fully in accord with the three seminal principles of salvationism in wartime - evangelism, caring social ministry and political neutrality born of Christian internationalism. The third principle could not, in the circumstances, be openly lived out, yet was kept alive in the minds of those living under Hitler's control, as indicated by the immediate re-establishment of links with London and international leaders once opportunity presented itself. Political neutrality was not, however, the abiding guideline for officers such as Flandres in France or Boutet and Bovigny in Belgium who became active in the Resistance. This was in breach of the generally accepted principle that officers would not engage in combatant activities, but it can scarcely be imagined that what they did drew censure from Inter-
national Headquarters and nothing in the sources suggests that this happened. The officers concerned acted in their capacity as private citizens and not as accredited representatives of the Army. Thus they followed their consciences and, under the provocation of occupation, were true to themselves.


3. Note 2 at 489: A third of Witnesses were killed and 97% suffered persecution in one form or another.

4. Letter, Major Peter Müller (Tünsdorf), 8-10-85; Letter, Lieutenant-Colonel Walter Flade (Angelburg), 23-7-85.

5. The Army in Germany celebrated its centenary in 1986; Salvationist, 21-6-86: 4. For a thumbnail sketch of the history of the Army in Germany see SAYB 1986: 13-17, 'Die Heilsarmee', by Francy Cachelin (Territorial Commander in Germany, 1979-1984.)

6. Portrait, 70. Also Ch.10, Sect.2.

7. SAYB 1940:84.

8. Ibid., 83. The countries were Brazil, Netherlands-Indies, Chile, Hungary, China, Holland, Britain, Switzerland, Argentine, Bohemia, India and Peru.

8a. EC Helmreich, The German Church Under Hitler, (Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1979), 384 citing material held in Bundesarchiv in Koblenz (Reichskanslei, R43 11/179).

8b. Ibid., citing in addition material held in the Schumacher Collection on Church Affairs, Berlin Document Centre (T580, R48).

10. Ch.10, Sect.2.

11. Letter, Major Willi Kothe (Baden-Baden), 22-7-85. Kothe goes on: 'Not until I returned from the war and imprison-
ment (16 months) were my eyes opened to the deeds of cruelty,
which had been perpetrated in the name of the German people.'
See also Willi Kothe, Unterdrückt — aber nicht umgekommen: 
Geschichte der Heilsarmee im Dritten Reich Und den Jahren 
danach, (Verlag der St. Johannis Druckerei C Schweikhardt, 
1986), 15. The title echoes the Pauline phrase in 2 
Corinthians 4:9, 'Knocked down but... never knocked out!',
as JB Phillips has rendered it.

12. SAYB 1940:84.


15. IWC 18-11-39:3.


18. IWC 12-4-41:5.


20. IWC 29-4-40:3.

21. TOR April-June 1941, 81-84.

22. Ibid., 83.

23. SAYB 1941:3.

24. IWC 11-5-40:3. Also: Hildegard Bleick, Holy Defiance —

25. Kothe, 22. Also: Bernard Watson, The Ninth General, 
(Oliphants, 1970), 45. (Wickberg became the Army's ninth 
General in 1969, succeeding Frederick Coutts.)


27. Kothe, 11.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., 14.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., 16.

436.
This paragraph based on Bleick, 33-42. (Exact dates for each development do not appear in the sources. This is accounted for by the banning of Der Kriegsruf, which would otherwise have served as the salvationist journal of record.)

Kothe, 44.

TOR September-October 1948, 270.

TOR September-October 1947, 294.

Portrait, 70.

Ibid., 75-76.

History, 197. See also Note 54.

IWC 22-3-41: 5.

Orsborn, 171-2.

IWC 19-5-45: 3.

IWC 7-7-45: 3.

IWC 21-7-45: 3. See also IWC 11-8-45: 1.

IWC 28-7-45: 3.

IWC 4-8-45: 3.

IWC 4-8-45: 1.

IWC 18-8-45: 3.


IWC 6-4-46: 3; 13-4-46: 3.

IWC 18-5-46: 3. Albert Orsborn was elected.

Bleich, 68-69.

Portrait, 71.


SAYB 1946: 10, from a short article written to mark the 50th anniversary of the Army in Germany. Even as Gauntlett penned his brief tribute, German salvationism was bracing itself for still further storms; Russian Sector military authorities proscribed The Salvation Army in the areas under their control: Kothe, 45, 59, 60, 69.

SAYB 1941: 81.

57. Ibid. Also SAYB 1941:18-20; IWC 27-4-40:3.
58. SAYB 1941:18.
59. It was Péan who secured the closure of the French penal colonies in French Guiana, including the notorious Devil's Island: see Carvosso Gauntlett, Social Evils the Army has Challenged, (SP&S, 1954), Ch.7.
62. The Times, 2-1-40:5.
63. IWC 6-1-40:10; 13-4-40:5.
64. IWC 27-4-40:3.
65. Ibid. Barrett reported that one Foyer could be opened and run for six months on £60: - IWC 18-5-40:8.
66. IWC 8-5-40:8.
68. IWC 3-2-40:6.
69. IWC 15-6-40:3.
70. IWC 6-7-40:2. The Britishers were Mrs. Barrett, Brigadier and Mrs. Best, Major Ethel Woods, Adjutant Florence Mitchell, Adjutant and Mrs. Harold Evans.
71. Ibid.
72. SAYB 1942:72.
73. IWC 13-7-40:6.
74. IWC 10-8-40:2; 8-3-41:5.
75. IWC 21-9-40:2.
76. Ibid.
77. The Times, 4-9-40:3.
78. IWC 7-9-40:4.
79. History, 6, 184.
81. IWC 24-6-44:3.
82. IWC 12-10-40:4.
What follows is drawn from IWC 24-3-45:3.

This paragraph is based on a letter from Bordas to General George Carpenter dated 21-5-45 and sent from Paris. A copy was supplied to the author by Colonel Jean Bordas from Aigle, Switzerland on 17-10-85.

Ibid. See also Belgian War Cry (Cri de Guerre) 9-3-74: 3-8, 'Une Histoire Incroyable et Pourtant Vraie!'..

Letter, Colonel Paul Tzaut (Neuchâtel), 27-12-85.

Ibid. Tzaut writes about Flandres: 'Who will judge him? It would have been so much more secure to do nothing, don't you think?'.

Letter, Commissioner Raymond Delcourt (Valence), 25-11-85.

Letter, H. Keuchkerian (Lamastre), 20-12-85.

IWC 10-6-44:2; 24-6-44:1, 3.

IWC 19-10-44:3. Medlicott expressed himself 'deeply impressed' by the event.

IWC 9-12-44:3.

IWC 4-11-44:2. The first Red Shield centres in liberated France were at Rouen, Dieppe and Paris. Mobile Canteens were also operated.

ATW January-March 1945, 3.

IWC 7-10-44:3.

IWC 9-6-45:3.

SAYB 1940:64.

Cri de Guerre, 9-9-39.

Cri de Guerre, 19-10-39; 2-12-39.


Cri de Guerre, 11-11-39.


SAYB 1940:64.


109. *The Times*, 27-7-40:2. Booth and Smith were held at Constance, on the shores of Lake Constance. See also: *IWC* 3-8-40:3; *SAYB* 1941:64.

110. Cohen, a converted Dutch Jew, died of a heart condition after several strenuous interviews with the Gestapo in late 1942. He left a wife and five children: Interview, Mrs. Colonel Lydie Ord (London), 6-1-87. Mrs. Ord was an adolescent in Brussels at the time.


112. Ibid., 156. See also AH Ruchat, *Un Suisse Dans La Tourmente*, (Private Publication, 1977), 9. Ruchat was a Swiss officer stationed in Belgium during the war. Mrs. Colonel Lydie Ord (see note 110 above) informs the author that, in her opinion, many of his wartime recollections as recorded in his 18-page publication are either inaccurate or exaggerated.

113. *ATW* January-March 1945, 4; *IWC* 21-10-44:3.

114. *IWC* 7-10-44:3.

115. Ibid.


117. *Cri de Guerre*, 25-11-44.

CHAPTER 24

DIVERGENCE FROM THE LONDON STANCE (2)

1) The USA: Introduction
2) Pearl Harbour
3) Practical Service in the USA
4) Attitudes in the USA
1) The USA: Introduction

Not until the attack on Pearl Harbour on 7th December 1941 did the USA go to war.¹ There were, however, repercussions in the Army to the 1939 declaration of war by Britain and France against Germany and some of these were evident amongst the officers. Major RC Starboard, who had gained war service experience in 1916-1918, wrote to the National Commander, Commissioner EJ Parker, some weeks prior to the beginning of the war and offered himself for war work again.² Parker wrote back as follows:³

'At the present time there is nothing at all I can tell you in regard to future Army participation in war work so far as the US is concerned. It will be my guess that we shall take no definite action and supply no workers unless America is drawn into the conflict, and this is an eventuality which I am sure we all hope will not materialise.'

However, Britain's declaration of war after the invasion of Poland produced a somewhat less phlegmatic note and initial plans were drawn up for war work by American salvationists.⁴ Parker then asked International Headquarters what the Army in Britain was doing.⁵ He pointed out that the American Neutrality Act barred the raising in America of funds for use in countries at war⁶, but he was keen to know details of new activities by the Army in the war, as well as of services regularly established. His concluding remarks, in keeping with traditional Army attitudes, would have been well-received by the leadership in London:

'It seems to me that there certainly can be only one answer as to the stand of the Church⁷ regarding war and that is that we are, as followers of the Prince of Peace, at all times opposed to the slaughter of precious human beings and we are praying earnestly that our Heavenly Father will soon turn men's hearts and minds toward a peaceful settlement of the nation's differences without further bloodshed.'

Information came back on the adaptations made necessary by the blackout, describing largescale disruption of Army worship and witness programmes in Britain. General Carpenter wrote personally to Commissioner McMillan in the USA Western Territory to stress that there
had been some initial over-reaction in Britain to the formal declaration of war and that now the people were more willing to gather in numbers, even in areas which had suffered greatly through bombing. Carpenter was at pains to stress the key role of the officer-in-charge locally. He or she might lack courage, or be tired physically, or may have lost ground spiritually. Where these things were found, the people's morale was low. The letter ended by reminding McMillan that Britain was within 20 minutes of being bombed from the Continent of Europe and that, compared with this likelihood, the chance of a serious aerial attack on America was remote. Consequently, the American Army should modify its programmes as little as possible.

At this very early stage in the war, there was no indication from the States as to how Army leaders there judged the reaction of leaders in London to world events. The American Army, under Evangeline Booth, had not felt obliged to conform in the First World War to the internationalist and neutralist policies urged by London and it yet remained to be seen whether divergence from International Headquarters' attitudes would again emerge in the States. Parker's sentiments quoted above were certainly in line with all that was being said at International Headquarters and with what was appearing in the London edition of The War Cry. But, surprisingly, one USA leader, Commissioner Alexander M Damon, felt bound to record privately certain misgivings as to George Carpenter's first public statements on European events. Damon saw it reported in The New York Times for 4th September 1939 that Carpenter (then General-elect and still clearing his desk in Toronto prior to taking office in London after Evangeline Booth's retirement) had told the Canadian press that Britain's Neville Chamberlain 'had made sure for himself and Great Britain an enduring place in the world's esteem through his struggle for peace' and that 'the fighting troops will find The Salvation Army's spiritual and physical aid available in full measure.'
Damon recorded in his personal diary: 'This will not be read in all quarters with pleasure. There may be a reaction in Germany. I sent cable to General and GC.'

The General was still Evangeline Booth, whom 'GC' was to follow. In view of what was to emerge, both in terms of Carpenter's transparently apolitical and supranational leadership through the war, and of the American Army's notably one-sided stance after Pearl Harbour (see below), Damon's fears were to prove ironic and unfounded. It is fair to say, however, that Damon (who retired just as America entered the war) was more sensitive to issues of war and peace than many of his salvationist contemporaries in the States. This was evidenced not only by his keen interest in pacifism but by the tone and content of his Armistice Day addresses. At the New York Temple on Armistice Day 1938 his sermon included the following passage:

'For more than seventy years the US has paid huge sums in pensions to those who were left after the First World War. The total expenditures amount to well on toward twenty-five thousand million dollars and for more than fifty years to come there will be continued pension allowances running into billions more.... Will we never learn the futility of war! The second General of The Salvation Army once said: "War violates almost every rule God has laid down for men." He was right. The majority of men in the civilised countries of the world subscribed to this heartily most of the time. Would that they believe it all the time!'

Then he told his listeners, many of whom were war veterans and active servicemen, about 'The Salvation Army remedy' which was not only a preventative for war but 'an absolute cure for every evil which assails mankind'. The remedy lay in living out the commands of Christ 'to love and forgive one's enemy'. Had he stopped there, he would undoubtedly have left his hearers profoundly challenged, but he pulled back and said, 'Strict obedience to such a command would in time of war be posted as treason.' Damon was not alone in wrestling with impossible dilemmas!

The following year, with Armistice Day falling just weeks after Britain went to war, he asked the congregation:
'Isn't there something sadly wrong somewhere in asking our adventurous youth to spend their days in destructive slaughter when their constructive genius could be called upon for the greater welfare and happiness of other people?'

A month before Pearl Harbour he preached his last Armistice Day sermon as Territorial Commander and raised his people's sights to noble aspirations, little foreseeing what was about to befall them:

'There were fervent hopes twenty-three years ago. And they still are, although the present conflicts abroad seem to have blasted our visions and to have nullified the effects of the Armistice of 1918. Our very natures cry out against war as unnecessary and destructive. We believe that man was made to live and to serve a nobler purpose than to be slain however nobly on fields of battle. We believe that men can live peacefully together and can settle differences without the shedding of blood. Oh, how we long for the day which Micah prophesied when men shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks when nations shall not lift sword against nation. When that day comes we shall have peace. There can be no brotherhood, no respect for persons of other races, creeds, or conditions, no permanent peace until the causes of war are driven from mens hearts and are replaced by motives of love, tolerence, friendship, and kindness.'

Evangeline Booth, once she was retired and back in the States, cast off the restraints of being the incumbent world leader of an international, globe-encircling Army. Her reactions in public print to the onset of war, made in her final weeks of office in London, had been a model of considered neutrality and spiritual priorities. Her visit to Germany immediately before Britain's declaration of war must still have been fresh in her mind, but no sooner was she once again on American soil than she reverted to political comment reminiscent of her leadership of the American Army in 1916-1918. If Damon was worried by Carpenter's mild New York Times statement, what must he have thought of the newly-retired General's broadcast address from the Hotel Pierre in New York, early in 1940, when she first made an explicit disclaimer of any part in politics and immediately went on to warn America to learn from the Allied lack of 'preparedness' which was 'written today upon the walls of the bleeding conflict in Europe'. That she cited Ezekiel 38:7 in support of her warning did not make her statement any the more appropriate.
for one who had retired only weeks previously from The Salvation Army's top post.

If those of like mind and spirit to Damon were tempted to think her retirement had come not a day too soon, then they cannot be blamed for that. Her 1916-1918 track record in the USA of brilliant and dynamic leadership, spoiled by an abandonment of so much that was seen by others as priceless to international salvationism, plus the benefit of hindsight, prompts the conclusion that William Booth's daughter was not whom the Army needed at the helm of its global vessel as the world plunged yet again into strife and violence.

She knew what was involved for the international Army in time of war. She knew of the examples of her father and brother before her in 1899 and 1914. She knew of the need for restraint in public utterances if the Army was to rise above the warring parties and maintain its idealistic neutral stance. She had shown herself capable of self-control in the closing weeks in London of her Generalship. Yet now, freed from the burden of world leadership, she cast aside inhibition in a way that hinted at playing to the American gallery. Had she been sincere in her posture whilst in London? Or had moderation in public statements been forced upon her by senior colleagues? Her sudden change of tone raises these and other questions. Not least, it prompts the question again of whether or not the moderation and reticence of leaders in London to pronounce on the justness or otherwise of the war was an effective or even morally acceptable policy. What Evangeline Booth said in the States was simply what most salvationists in Britain thought privately anyway. In retirement she voiced the popular feeling, whereas in office she held to the movement's party line. The gap between the feelings of the mass of salvationists and the policy adopted at the top deserves closer attention and is discussed more fully in Ch.27.

The mass of American salvationists doubtless thought less about
issues of Salvation Army statecraft than about what was happening daily to their comrades in Britain and the rest of Europe. News of the bombing and the Army's relief work in air raids won publicity. For instance, the USA Southern War Cry carried an article by Catherine Baird (see Ch.20, Note 58) describing the spirit of Londoners in the blitz and giving some account of the Army's work in the air-raid shelters and Underground tube stations. News of the destruction of International Headquarters in May 1941 was given prominent coverage in the American Army newspapers and factual details were reprinted from a circular letter to all territorial leaders from Alfred J Gilliard, then Editor-in-Chief in London. The Territorial Commander in USA Southern sent a copy of Gilliard's letter to every officer in the Territory, reminding them of General Carpenter's assertion that the episode was going to 'work together for good' for the Army in accordance with the promise in Scripture.

2) Pearl Harbour

The period of American neutrality did not prompt much public debate in the American editions of The War Cry (there was an edition each week in each of the four Territories). For the most part, what comments did appear were syndicated from non-salvationist, Christian publications, but that they were published by the Army at all may be taken as an expression of broad approval. For example, one such article called for a neutrality based on 'high and sacrificial motives', not motives of physical safety, or in pursuance of 'an impossible isolation from world problems' and certainly not for reasons of 'commercial gain'. Another item warned against mistaking neutrality by way of not taking up arms with a moral neutrality which refused to judge the rights and wrongs of the war in Europe.

The theme of commercial gain through a neutral political stance was one of the features of a splendid article by the Editor of The War Cry.
Cry in USA Southern. Entitled 'He Who Lives by the Sword must Die by the Sword' and described as 'an Armistice Day Reverie', it launched a scathing attack upon the hypocrisy of neutrality. Because of its directness, its willingness to give holy offence to government, and its salvationist-officer origin it stands out amongst the American sources as a most refreshing piece of writing. The following extract needs little comment:

'Now the alarms of war sound again. As this is written, we are not going into war again. Our boys are not going to sail away overseas, no more of that kind of thing. This time we are going to be safe. We are going to stay at home and manufacture the articles of war. We are going to sell these for cash and warn all Americans not to be found in troubled waters. All we intend to get out of this war is cash, good American dollars, precious gold. Thus we salve our conscience, only we do not. Thus we earn the undying hatred of every fighting nation.'

Early in the morning of Sunday, 7th December 1941 neutrality ended. The Japanese sent wave after wave of aircraft from carriers over the Hawaiian island of Oahu, where the American Pacific Fleet lay in Pearl Harbour. The attack caught the Fleet, airfields and surrounding troops off guard and before long the Fleet was incapacitated. The civilian population were terrorised, including a Japanese community on the island. The Schofield Military Barracks, where Major and Mrs. Alva M Holbrook were stationed, came under attack. The Holbrooks saw machine-gun bullets 'turn the house across the street into a sieve'. Then began the American Salvation Army's first war work with troops in the Second World War. Given every co-operation by the military authorities at Schofield Barracks, Mrs. Holbrook spent the next 24 hours producing 4000 doughnuts for both servicemen and civilians. The Barracks held a total of 13,500 men.

The Divisional Commander for the Hawaii Islands Division was Brigadier AW Brewer and his formal report of the attack and the salvationist response affords a clear impression of a swift and effective relief operation whilst under the severest pressure. The bombing began on a Sunday morning.
The Army had five corps and four institutions on Oahu. Even by quarter to nine in the morning several families were seeking refuge from The Salvation Army in the Upper Manoa area. The salvationists immediately supplied sleeping accommodation and food. That night, more than one hundred individuals were cared for in the institution at Manoa and more than one hundred further families in the gymnasium of the boys' home in Kaimuki. However, it was three or four days before a proper clearance house could be set up to relocate mothers and children with fathers who were busy at Pearl Harbour on the day of the blitz. The Japanese citizens on the Island were particularly nervous. On the night of the 7th a crucial activity was begun, operating nightly thereafter - a temporary food station to care for hungry civilian men, many of whom were single and had worked all day in Pearl Harbour on only meagre meals. Officers were stationed on both sides of the street near the divisional centre at 664 South King Street and every man passing by on returning from work at the harbour was asked whether or not he had had anything to eat. On the first night 127 men received meals. Members of the police force also took advantage of the arrangement, and service continued for five nights until adjustments had been made and proper food stations established. The provision of food continued from the night of Pearl Harbour being attacked until late 1944. During the first week after the raid it was vital that the homes of the Japanese, in particular, should be visited and so visits to more than 1000 homes in the congested downtown area were arranged. The girls' home in Upper Manila was designated as the receiving station for lost children, as well as distraught and sick women. Under the direction of Mrs. Brigadier Brewer, Salvation Army women and other women (75 in all) were drawn together to develop a Red Cross surgical dressing unit which was based at the Citadel on King Street. Every nationality on the Island was represented in this group which produced more than 500,000 surgical dressings.
Brewer's report ends on a proud note when he mentions that all of this was accomplished within his existing and regular financial budget and without need to ask either the public or his Territorial Headquarters for money. He also concluded: 'When the history of World War Two in Hawaii is written, The Salvation Army will have meritorious recognition and remembrance. In the meantime, no glory is sought or desired other than the glory of God.' Brewer's modesty was not matched by his Territory's War Cry report of the attack. Describing the role of salvationists, it eulogised: 'Another chapter of glorious organisational effort is being written.'

'Glorious organisational effort' was not uppermost in Alexander Damon's thoughts when he learned of the Japanese attack. His diary entry for 7th December 1941 reads: 'War has begun. Treachery and deceit and vilehearted action. While ambassadors of Japan are carrying on talks for peace, ships have been steaming east to attack. Tomorrow Congress will declare war and Britain will follow. Now we are actually in. God have mercy on us and on all nations that send their choicest manhood to face death. Hate and murder fill the minds of millions today.' Four days later he wrote, in his small, spidery hand: 'US declares war on Japan. There is little of the earth that is not at war. God have mercy upon this earth and turn the hearts of men toward Thee.' At least one salvationist heart across the Atlantic beat true with those of Carpenter, Gauntlett, Coutts, Baird and Blackwell in London (see Ch.20, Sect.2).

The national feeling that the States had been pushed unavoidably into war reflected in the Army press by statements from senior officers. Commissioner EI Pugmire, Territorial Commander in USA Central, said: 'Everything that could, with honour, be done to avoid it was done.' The Chief Secretary for USA Southern, Colonel RJ Stretton, agreed: 'War, which our government has sought so earnestly to avoid, has been thrust upon us.'

450.
Pearl Harbour resulted in the internment of the few officers in America who were of Japanese nationality. The best known of these was Major Masahide Imai, the Corps Officer at Fresno. In March 1942, with his family, he was interned at Little Rock, Arkansas, where he continued to wear his Army uniform and where he preached at the Protestant services. Officers living nearby sought out the Imai family and hosted them regularly for meals. Salvationist fellowship bonds again held strong in the face of national conflict. Imai later attended five conferences in five major cities as a representative of Japanese ministerial groups in the internment camps, to assist in planning post-war Christian work amongst Japanese Americans. 76

Once America entered the war, Parker put the Army on an immediate war footing. 37 He presided over meetings of the National War Service Council formed in mid-1941 to co-ordinate emergency and war work between the four Territories 38, and a Territorial Defence Secretary was appointed in each Territory. 39

The Western Territory was the one most directly affected by events at Pearl Harbour and Commissioner McMillan cabled Parker at National Headquarters to report that he had convened forthwith a conference of all his Divisional Commanders to ensure total readiness for further emergencies. All centres were kitted out with blackout equipment, and State Governors and military leaders were informed that all Army facilities were at their disposal for civilian and military personnel. 40 This last fact was reported in The War Cry 41 as was McMillan's order to his staff 'that the best possible service be rendered the Government'. 42 Similar arrangements in Britain had been effected, but were reported and conceived as serving not 'the Government', but the people, whether civilians or servicemen. In the USA, the Army served the state during the war and did this best by relief programmes to the people. In Britain, it was simply a matter of the Army serving the people, whose needs had arisen.
because the state had gone to war (see further Sect. 4).

When McMillan wrote to the Chief of the Staff in London a fortnight later he had to say that many regular Army programmes had been disrupted or at least curtailed with the Territory 'working under extreme tension'. However, he knew where the priority lay: 'I have no hesitancy in saying that the central purpose of our work - the preaching of the Gospel in season and out of season, in a convenient place and under untoward circumstances - will be pushed to the limit.'

Like Christians in every continent, American salvationists had resorted to more earnest, more disciplined prayer, their 'mighty weapon', as soon as war in Europe broke out, with special prayer meetings being held in every corps. President Roosevelt's calls for National Days of Prayer did not go unheeded by the Army and its people. But once again, as was the case in Britain, confusion reigned over whether or not prayers for victory were appropriate. One writer in the Western Territory thought they were, but only if the petitioner was 'right with God' first, in which case prayers for military 'victory in His name' could be made.

This was written very shortly after Pearl Harbour, which may account for what was said, but it effectively implied that the American and Allied cause was a holy crusade. An entirely opposite view was expressed in the Central Territory. There The War Cry carried an item discussing the war and prayer, which said starkly: 'He has no chosen people.' Readers, said the writer, should understand that God does not take sides in matters of arms. It is for men to choose God, not for God to side with some men against others. General Carpenter would have agreed (see Ch. 20, Sect. 2).

It is significant that Carpenter's opinion was echoed at all in an American War Cry which after Pearl Harbour was overtly patriotic and pro-America. It may be assumed that virtually every salvationist in the Allied countries was praying for the defeat of Hitler, at least in
his private prayers. Again the issue emerges of a gap between the party line and the opinions of grass roots salvationists (see further Ch.27) and the question is unavoidable of how far the official Army position in the war, or indeed in the two previous wars, conforms to what is found in the Old Testament of the prophets and their direct involvement in issues of political and social justice. Again, the Army's stance was an implied criticism of 'just war' thinking which contemplated the acceptability of war in given circumstances, and yet it has been noted that there were signs of 'just war' concepts helping to shape some Army views. These issues are discussed more fully in Ch.27.

3) Practical Service in the USA

The practical and compassionate outreach of the Army in the States was channelled through two separate organisational structures: the Red Shield work and the United Service Organisations (USO). The Red Shield was part of the Army; the Army was a member of the USO.

The Red Shield work was closely akin to that performed in Europe and already described. It took up in late 1941 where it had left off at the close of war in 1918. As Frederick Coutts has put it: 'Though the masterly improvisations of Helen Purviance and Margaret Sheldon in 1917 had perforce given place to large-scale business techniques, the spirit informing the operation was the same as ever.' 49 That spirit, according to one American officer, was embodied in the personnel because of their aim to be 'convincers that all of war is not hell'. 50 All funds for Red Shield operations came from the Army's own coffers. 51 The first of the 219 units 52 opened at Mount Clemens in Michigan in June 1941. 53 Clubs were eventually to be found as far north as Alaska 54 and a club for negro soldiers only was busily patronised in Harlem. 55 In addition to the static clubs, mobile canteens functioned all over America. During 1943, eight mobiles worked the Hawaii zone travelling 453.
165 miles each night getting through a nightly quota of 1000 cups of coffee, 1500 doughnuts, 50 cans of cream and 40 pounds of sugar. In Greater New York between 1943 and 1945 there were 3 mobiles in use. They served 1,326,436 people with refreshments, but more significantly, distributed Christian literature on 50,865 occasions.

The USO work of the Army sprang from a meeting held before US entry into the war, in New York on 11th October 1940 to discuss the formation of an organisation which would service and fund aid to military personnel and avoid overlap between the various voluntary agencies. The Army was the moving force behind the first discussions. A Board of Directors was formed comprising five representatives from each participating agency with a further fourteen members at large. The salvationist Directors in 1942 were:

- Commissioner EJ Parker (National Commander);
- Commissioner EI Pugmire (Territorial Commander, USA Eastern).
- Walter Hoving (New York);
- Robert Strawbridge, Jnr. (New York);
- Preston Arkwright (Atlanta).

Walter Hoving was also elected President of the Organisation. Three Vice-Presidents were chosen, one Catholic, one Jewish, and one Protestant. Parker was elected to a number of key committees including the Executive Committee. To dovetail Army administrative machinery with that of the USO, Major William Parkins was made National Programme Director at National HQ, with Major LW Turrel as National USO Auditor. Each Territory appointed USO supervisory officers. It was the function of each Territorial HQ to receive reports, recruit and appoint personnel, conduct training courses, make periodic inspections and in all other ways administer USO operations designated to the Army.

Early plans for 339 clubs were laid to meet the requirements of 1.4 million men, and a public appeal for $10 million was launched.
which eventually brought in $13.4 million. The first Salvation Army USO club was opened in August 1941 at Fort Dix, New Jersey when Commissioner Damon made a public presentation of the title deeds to Walter Hoving. By the end of October 1942, the Army was operating successfully 90 USO clubs in 36 states, plus 25 mobiles. In the USA Central Territory there were 44 clubs in use during the war in seven states. Of these, 15 were for use either by negroes alone or had an extension added for segregating non-white services personnel (see above on the Harlem Red Shield Club). The sources offer no comment on this approach to the work.

The USO work by the Army fell into four channels:

1. USO servicemen's clubs;
2. Salvage of waste material;
3. Plans for the emergency evacuation of civilians;
4. Mobile canteens.

Paper salvage brought in 30,000 tons per month. Civilian evacuee work was carried out in Hawaii (see Sect. 2) and plans were set down to convert at short notice 306 social work centres into evacuee reception units, 58 centres in the Rockies and Pacific region being in the hands of Civil Defence personnel by the Spring of 1942. The Army had at its disposal a fleet of 1125 vehicles for use as mobile canteens. Among the many services performed was the returning of private clothing to the homes of men called up.

At the height of its activities the USO as a whole, which was legally incorporated on 4th February 1942 with the name of 'United Service Organisations for National Defense, Inc.', had 2403 centres in 47 states and 10,000 paid staff supplemented by 600,000 volunteers. The assertion in HE Neal's The Hallelujah Army that 'the USO in World War Two included some 3000 Army Red Shield Centres' is mistaken and is based on a confusion as to the proper distinction between the Red Shield
work and that of the USO.

In 1942-1943 the Army's USO centres numbered 120 and were used by 800,000 men each month. The following activities featured in the programme:

- Religious services
- Personal counselling
- Christian fellowship
- Educational classes
- Homely club atmosphere
- Games and recreations
- Social events
- Information service

The rationale for the Army's participation was that it afforded unlimited opportunities to assist the enlisted men to a true standard of Christian living and purpose. The Army stressed in its explanatory literature that the first and foremost commitment in the USO's 'Statement of Program' was to religious ministry. Despite this, as one historian has said, 'no effort like that at regular Salvation Army meetings was made to obtain conversions.' As in the French 'Foyers' (see Ch.23, Sect.2), the ministry to the souls of the men was undertaken on a less obvious, but not necessarily thereby less effective, basis.

It cannot be doubted that the USO was a political and partisan organisation. To the extent that the Army participated in the life of the USO and helped to shape its attitudes and constitution, the Army was aligning itself with a given political stance. Perhaps it would be fairer to say 'patriotic' rather than 'political', but a similar alignment in Britain could not have happened. In advertising for 16 new workers for USO clubs, the Army stated the aim of the clubs was 'to make each fighting man 100% effective' since the club workers were 'the forces (of the state) behind the lines'. Parker, in his 1943 volume of
personal memoirs, quotes with approval the statement of John D Rockefeller in February 1942 to USO Field Supervisors: 'To our fighting forces we must bring spiritual power if they are to be invincible.' And when the Army published recruiting literature for volunteers for its USO Hostess Organisation it printed on page 1 a statement that thousands were coming forward because they 'want desperately to win the war'.

All of this (and see also Sect. 4) suggests that American salvationists in USO work saw themselves as part of the national and state machinery for winning the war, and not so much as simply meeting human need for its own sake - though innumerable needs were met through what was done. That this was how the Army saw its role is confirmed by Parker's frank admission:

'The Salvation Army, as a participating agency in the broad and comprehensive program of USO activity has become a necessary part of America's program for national defense.'

However, all did not turn out to be plain sailing. In 1944 a row broke out between the government-backed National War Fund and The Salvation Army. It followed complaints to the administrators of the Fund that salvationist fund-raising efforts for its independently funded Red Shield work for the Army overseas were undermining public appeals for the National War Fund and were being mounted on the same dates as national patriotic appeals, causing confusion in the minds of the public. The complaints had been lodged by the national office of the USO and the President's War Relief Control Board. Formal application had been made to the Secretary of State in Washington DC on the 20th May 1940 for permission to undertake collection of funds from the American public for medical aid and assistance, for food and clothing, and to relieve human suffering. An applicant organisation was required to undertake formally that no contributions solicited or collected would be distributed to any organisation acting on behalf of governments involved in the hostilities in Europe or elsewhere in the world. The Army's application was submitted
by the National Commander and was supported by a report on The Salvation Army's work amongst troops in France and England (including amongst Canadian troops in England). By letter of the 27th May 1940 from the Department of State in Washington, National Headquarters was informed that the application had been accepted. Financial contributions for use in England, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway were permitted. Registration was not required for Finland since it was never proclaimed a belligerent. The Salvation Army had been numbered Organisation 323 for the purposes of the solicitation of funds, and reports would be submitted to the Department of State on a monthly basis, whether or not monies had actually been collected during any particular month.

On 15th May 1944 a meeting took place in Washington DC attended by:

James Brunot (Executive Secretary, President's War Relief Control Board);
Judson Dickerman (Consultant, President's War Relief Control Board);
Commissioner Donald McMillan;
Brigadier Samuel Hepburn.

The purpose was to discuss the complaints against the Army. Mr. Brunot was not sympathetic to the Army's explanations and seemed unable to grasp the multiple character of The Salvation Army's appeal for funds or to be over friendly in his approach. Commissioner McMillan explained that the Army operated both within the USO and, in a parallel manner, independently of the USO. Brunot urged the Army to consider a modification of that approach so as to bring their fund-raising completely within the USO and the National War Fund. The meeting closed with the government representatives being moderately satisfied with most of the Army's answers and explanations, but with Mr. Brunot still expressing certain reservations.

On the 25th July 1944 Commissioner McMillan wrote to Judson Dickerman at the President's War Relief Control Board in Washington, giving him a
breakdown of all Salvation Army service programmes on a world basis. 83
But on 18th August 1944 the National War Fund issued a circular to all agency executives, state executives and Community Chest executives seeking to clarify the course of discussions which had taken place between it and The Salvation Army. The circular pointed out that the suggestion had been made to Commissioner Donald McMillan, National Secretary of The Salvation Army, that in view of serious conflicts with local war and Community Chest campaigns the Salvation Army should defer any independent fund-raising appeals during October and November 1944. The proposal was to be discussed at The Salvation Army Commissioners' Conference on 13th and 14th September 1944. Every effort was thereafter made by the Army to avoid a conflict of dates between local Salvation Army appeals and appeals to the public by the National War Fund. McMillan felt justified in asking Brunot to withdraw the comments made about the Army in his 18th August bulletin. 85

The National Chief Secretary sent out a circular on the 30th August 1944 to all Divisional Commanders insisting that appeals for funds for war services should be clearly stated to be local appeals and in no circumstances should they be designated part of a national campaign or a national fund. In addition, no appeal would be made to the public for funds during the period 1st October to 11th November, by agreement with the National War Fund and the President's War Relief Control Board. The period was to be kept clear for the National War Fund Campaign. 86

On the 11th September 1944 at 11 am a meeting was held at the National War Fund Office in New York City. The Army was represented by Commissioner McMillan and Brigadier William J Parkins, Assistant National Director SA/USO. The government was represented by Mr. Seymour, Campaign Director of the National War Fund and Mr. George Hamilton, Special Services Division of the National War Fund. Commissioner McMillan insisted that the recent statement about The Salvation Army in the National War Fund
McMillan said that if the statement was not withdrawn he would release to all concerned the correspondence between the Army and the National War Fund which gave the Army full authorisation to collect in the manner in which it had been collecting. Mr. Seymour agreed that it had been an error for the official organ of the National War Fund to have carried such a statement without clearance with the National Office of The Salvation Army and promised he would do everything possible to clarify the situation.

Mr. Seymour's undertaking was not fulfilled. James Brunot, to whom Seymour answered, had not been present when it was given and he refused blankly to withdraw the August bulletin. He told colleagues that he took full responsibility for the comments made in it about the Army and he would, in future, deal in person with Army leaders. Brunot, at this stage, was the only one still dissatisfied with the Army's position. Judson Dickerman telephoned McMillan a few days later to 'confirm emphatically' that the Army had met the requirements of the President's War Relief Control Board and was therefore free to raise funds in America for use outside America. McMillan waited to hear from Brunot but in the end telephoned him for a final answer. According to McMillan, Brunot stated that the matter was still to come before his Board, but when pressed for precise details of what it was that still troubled him, Brunot proved 'evasive' and said a letter would follow. A further conversation resulted in Brunot promising to visit New York on 18th October 1944 to clear up the matter once and for all. The sources contain no record of any subsequent meeting, but on 24th October 1944 the National War Fund retracted the 18th August bulletin comments which had reflected adversely upon the Army's work. War meant bureaucratic battles to be fought. This was an important one, for the Army's reputation.
in matters fiscal had been at issue.

These high-level dealings went on side by side with many fund-raising endeavours undertaken at a more local level. Major Samuel Hepburn's Division\(^93\), for example, made every effort in 1940 to support the Army's War Relief Fund. He discussed matters with his officers and then wrote to Commissioner Damon reporting their reaction. His letter revealed suspicions levelled at the Army by reason of its international links, suspicions not unlike those which prompted James Brunot's obstructionism later in 1944 at a national level (see above):\(^94\)

\begin{quote}
'All the officers felt that an immediate response should be made to the appeal, and returned to their corps to work out the scheme on the basis of the 'Self Denial' effort. The officers themselves felt that they should respond personally with a week's salary. Soldiers' Meetings would be conducted and all the necessary contacts made with Community Chests, Advisory Boards, etc. The Philadelphia Advisory Board met today and approved our sending out a letter to about 10,000 of our friends asking for their support.... I was really amazed at the definite bitterness on the part of some of the Board members toward Germany. Several even suggested that The Salvation Army should assure the public that none of these funds would go to Germany. However, other members reminded them of the high ideals of The Salvation Army and its international spirit which should overlook all boundaries of race and creed, and the board decided that the appeal should be made and the money turned over to The Salvation Army without any strings whatsoever.'
\end{quote}

Hepburn's hopes were for $15,000, and by the date of this letter $12,480 had reached him from his centres.\(^95\)

Many American salvationists found themselves suddenly exchanging their Army uniform for that of the armed forces. Some came through the war having become conscious of a higher calling and offered themselves for Salvation Army officership at the close of hostilities.\(^96\) Some Army officers, as in the First World War, became military chaplains. The strength of the regard felt by 1916-1918 American war veterans for The Salvation Army was demonstrated by the appointment of Brigadier WG Gilks at the end of 1940 to be National Chaplain to the one million members of the American Legion.\(^97\) A further notable appointment was that by Secretary of War, Henry L Stimson, of Colonel John J Allan in the

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Autumn of 1940 to serve as one of the five-man staff in the office of the Chief of Chaplains in Washington DC. Allan carried the military rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, having served in the previous war and been awarded the Croix de Guerre. This assignment was to last two years, but events at Pearl Harbour caused Allan to wonder if his discharge would now go through. He thought that it would be taken as unpatriotic were he to step down as originally planned. He knew that General Carpenter intended to give him the command of the Central Territory and he did not wish his future to be jeopardised in this regard. In the event, he was released from Washington and went to the Central Territory as Territorial Commander.

Thirty Army officers became chaplains. All served in either the US Army or the Army Air Corps. The Navy would not waive a stipulation that all its chaplains should have a college degree, plus three years training in a seminary or theological college, something few officers at that time in the States could claim. Many came under enemy fire. They worked well with chaplains of other denominations and found that 'bullets have smashed denominational walls for good, opening a reservoir of real religion.' Captain Joseph Landau, with the 109th Infantry Division, carried both a Catholic and a Jewish prayer book at all times as well as his Protestant literature. Converts were not a rare occurrence. A number of Army chaplains were decorated for bravery, but there is evidence that some saw their function as bringing spiritual inspiration to their men because 'the enemy cannot be overcome by military action alone, but by a greater spiritual force.' Again, an impression emerges from the sources that the chaplains were considered by salvationists as an integral part of the military drive for armed victory.

The spiritual ministrations of the Army's official chaplains were augmented, as in all parts of the world where salvationists found themselves in the war, by lay salvationists through private witness.
Some of these became unofficial chaplains, such as Bill Hasney (from Waukegan, Illinois) who led services in the Coast Guard unit at Puerto Rico, and William H Roberts (from Chicago) who preached to the men of the 720th Railway Operating Battalion 'somewhere in Europe'.

The chaplains were called upon not only to preach and conduct worship, but also to give moral guidance. This meant addressing sexual matters and in particular the spread of venereal disease amongst the troops. The Army's approach was to go to the spiritual root of the immoral conduct, which approach alone would produce a complete cure. All USO social programmes aimed at encouraging natural, open and healthy relations between the sexes through a programme involving a rota of 'junior hostesses' to mingle with the men in a social context.

Taken overall, the practical and caring outreach of the American Salvation Army during the war was an impressive and sizeable effort. It was organised and efficient, widespread and relevant. If it was not quite as flamboyant or spectacular as in the first war, nevertheless it was on a scale which by comparison with 1916-1918 can only be described as vast. An idea of this is gained when it is considered that in New York alone the Army was ready, at only an hour's notice, to feed over 10,000 people and house 400. New York was never bombed, so the plans were never activated, but the USA Eastern Territory alone ministered through war work to 15,231,963 people, distributing 1,387,729 separate articles, and offering spiritual counsel to 1,269,738.

A footnote to this story of the war work of salvationists in the States concerns a plan by London to honour and recognise all salvationists who rendered significant war work service. A medal and a certificate were to be awarded. The medal would be of silver and of a design approved by the General. This would be granted to officers, soldiers and employees of The Salvation Army provided that their war service had been given directly by appointment of The Salvation Army or had definitely
arisen from and during the course of such appointment. War service undertaken voluntarily as members of the public or in public units, such as firefighting units, would not qualify. The service would have to have covered a period of not less than thirteen weeks continuously. It would also have to have been given and brought to a conclusion in a manner satisfactory to The Salvation Army and its leaders.

All this was received with some disquiet in America, and Colonel Chesham, Chief Secretary USA Central, wrote to Commissioner Donald McMillan in August 1946 to say that the scheme was drawn far too widely. He raised also the question of whether or not it would include administrative officers who had supervised war work. 115

In February 1947 the Chief Secretary of the USA Eastern Territory wrote to McMillan protesting that the General would have to sign literally thousands of awards if the Minute concerning The Salvation Army medal were carried out to the letter. He felt that the entirely wrong approach had been taken to the matter by London. 116 On the 21st May 1947 Commissioner Pugmire in USA Eastern received a letter from Major William D Ware, Under Secretary in the Overseas Department at IHQ, saying that difficulty was being experienced in obtaining metals for the medals and materials for the ribbons due to post-war shortages of these items. 117 In November 1948 Commissioner Joseph Smith, International Secretary at IHQ write to Pugmire to say that no medals or ribbons would now be issued but that the illuminated certificate alone would have to serve the purpose. 118

As late as July 1950, Robert A Hoggard, Chief Secretary, National Headquarters in the USA, was writing to Commissioner Smith in London to ask if certain officers could still be considered for a certificate under the Minute of the Chief of the Staff concerning the award of a War Medal by The Salvation Army. The officers in question, Lieutenant-Colonel and Mrs. TM Larsen, who were stationed in Minneapolis, Minnesota, during the
the war had been too sensitive about filling in the application form and were only now asking for recognition.119

4) **Attitudes in the USA**

Note has already been made of a highly patriotic spirit permeating the war work of the Army in the States. The same degree and intensity of partisan spirit does not emerge from the British sources. However, once again note should be taken of the fact that Americans as a whole were (and probably still are120) more intensely and openly patriotic, not to say nationalistic, than the more reserved and somewhat wry approach to patriotism found in the British (see Ch.15, Sect.1). This difference in national disposition may in part account for the divergence of attitude, but American salvationists had also inherited the highly partisan stance taken up by Evangeline Booth in 1916. Public expectations in 1941 would have demanded, perhaps, a second response to the country being at war no less supportive of government policy than in the first war. Then again, it is clear that the international perspective naturally available to and prevailing amongst the Army's top leadership in London and at International Headquarters cannot reasonably be expected to have been as dominating a factor in an Army Territory (or, in the case of the USA, four Territories) housed within national boundaries and closely caught up with the aspirations of the populace. This might have been true also for the British Territory, but the relationship of that Territory to International Headquarters has always been unique amongst the Territories of the world, and in time of war the response of the senior Headquarters (IHQ) would have been thoroughly imbibed by the leadership and officers of the British Territory. After all, the staff of International Headquarters shared the same building, mingled daily, and worshipped together in Army corps in the London area. All of this points to the likelihood of the public British war effort by salvationists being less overtly
partisan to one particular government than was the case overseas.

Evidence of partisanship by American salvationists has already emerged in this Chapter. There was Evangeline Booth's broadcast comment from the Hotel Pierre on 26th February 1940, warning America to arm herself. There were the public comments by Commissioner Pugmire and Colonel Stretton, in December 1941 and January 1942, absolving the American Government from all blame for the war. The USA Western War Cry advocated prayers for an American victory, provided those praying were 'right with God'. The Army aligned itself with the USO whose very title included the phrase 'for national defence' and whose rationale, albeit religiously motivated, was to add to the likelihood of an American victory by raising troop morale. In recruiting both employees and volunteers to its USO centres, the Army made strong appeal to patriotic fervour. The work of salvationist military chaplains was sometimes perceived as empowering the fighting men spiritually, so that they might achieve military victory.

It is true that the Army in America gave vent to anti-war feelings and hopes for peace when Britain went to war. War was the enemy of civilisation and of science which, in its modern guise 'preys upon defenceless civilians'. The idea of a 'war to end wars' was 'a snare and a delusion'. War was never God's way for it caused 'useless suffering' and left 'the living-dead in hospitals and asylums'. But sentiments like these were published only in the pre-Pearl Harbour days. Once America entered the war, the Army refrained from further comments of this kind and threw its weight unreservedly behind government policy.

From December 1941 on, the sources assume a clearly partisan attitude. Salvationist young people were told to be, not just all out for God, but 'all out for God and country'. They were 'to make significant contributions to the national war effort in such activities as the government, through local defense committees, may from time to
time deem essential'. Their theme song would be entitled 'On The Victory Side' and say:

'On the victory side,
On the victory side,
No foe can daunt us,
No fear can haunt us,
On the victory side.

On the victory side,
On the victory side,
With Christ within
The fight, we'll win,
On the victory side.'

Commissioner EJ Parker announced that he had placed The Salvation Army 'on a war footing with its entire personnel and facilities at the call of the President' so that the war could be prosecuted 'to the victory that must follow'. The Red Shield Services of the Army were there for 'morale building for victory'. Commissioner McMillan said publicly that the Army was in the USO 'to serve the men in uniform in such a positive manner that a speedy victory shall be ours' and that the USO might 'play a large part in an Allied victory'. Red Shield workers were 'fighters behind the fighters' and when tips to women on domestic economies were proffered, the item was called 'Ways to Win the War'. The War Cry in USA Eastern said that 'all trueblooded Americans' would both enlist for country and for God. A book of daily devotional readings for use by servicemen was adopted by the Army and over-printed with the Red Shield symbol. It carried the words of 'The Star-Spangled Banner', 'America', and 'America the Beautiful' and was entitled Strength for Service to God and Country. When morale slumped amongst the men on board US landing craft (known as 'expendables' because of the high casualty rate in delivering troops to enemy beaches) the Army formally sponsored four ships through the 'Landing Craft Infantry Sponsorship Scheme' of the government. Mrs. Lieutenant-Commissioner John J Allan performed the launching ceremony for a new naval vessel on behalf of '14,000 Home League women of the USA Central Territory'.

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When British Red Shield workers moved back into Europe in June 1944, the Army's Public Relations Department in New York put out a press release to state that an Army canteen now functioned 'where Black Shirts once swaggered'.

To mark the end of hostilities, a 38 page booklet was published of service club stories, each one written in an entirely political tone. The Army's self-image as part of the state war machine was the same as the state's perception of what the Army did and why the Army did it. In May 1946 General James A Van Fleet presented to The Salvation Army in America the combined United States Army and Navy Award of Merit because, he said, the Army had dedicated itself 'to the common purpose of victory' and its 'contribution was of substantial aid in the successful prosecution of the war'.

Salvationist publications in the USA repeatedly stressed that the Gospel and military service were not incompatible. Articles by Samuel Logan Brengle printed in the First World War were resurrected to give assurance that killing in battle was not a breach of God's laws, and examples were held up of famous military generals who were also Christians: General GC Marshall, General BL Montgomery, General CG Gordon, and General Chiang Kai-Shek who had 'the light of God within'. The favourite prayer of General Eisenhower was quoted, saying to God, 'The concepts... your Son expounded to the world... are in peril'. Salvationists were told to 'read Romans 13' and then 'get out and do your duty... by serving in the armed forces.... If you are wounded you will be sent home. If you die, there is a resurrection.'

Conscientious objectors were told, 'Live in blissful isolation until you die, and when you die the world will not miss you much. You have no right to share in the benefits of the government.' It will be noticed how different all of this was from the treatment of similar issues by the Army in Britain. The words of General Carpenter on conscientious objection, expressing the official Army line, were,
however, published in the American salvationist press, making it clear that it was all a matter of the private judgment of each man's conscience, since 'men equally devout, equally informed, equally anxious to know and do the will of Christ' held conflicting views. Apart from this, no real attention was paid to the plight of the dissenter by The Salvation Army in the USA. The sources offer no hint that there were any salvationist conscientious objectors, although American law allowed exemption from combatant training service for persons who 'by reason of religious training or belief' were conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. President Roosevelt had received strong representations from the historic peace churches (Society of Friends, the Mennonites and the Church of the Brethren) prior to the introduction of laws governing conscription urging adequate provision for conscience, and during the Conscription Bill hearings during July and August 1940 further representations in favour of exemptions were made by:

- Society of Friends;
- 'Catholic Worker';
- Fellowship of Reconciliation;
- Socialist Party;
- Seventh Day Adventists;
- Mennonites;
- Church of the Brethren;
- Disciples of Christ;
- Methodist Commission on World Peace;
- Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America.

The Army played no active role in this. Over 5000 absolutist conscientious objectors were imprisoned in the States during the war, a total eight times that of the previous war. Most of these (72%) were Jehovah's Witnesses (see also Ch.23, Sect.1) and only 8% came from large religious groups. Conscientious objectors also served in
Civilian Public Service Camps and of the non-pacifist churches it was the Methodists who had the largest representation amongst these.

It is clear that the Army stood firmly with those American churches which identified themselves entirely with government policy. Despite its relatively large number of objectors, the Methodist Church backed the government, as did the Roman Catholics whose archbishops and bishops met in Washington in November 1942 and issued a 'Statement on Victory and Peace' advocating the all-out prosecution of the war until the defeat of the Axis powers. After Pearl Harbour the following bodies pledged their support for the government, having first invoked 'divine guidance':

Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America;
International Council of Religious Education;
Home Missions Council;
Foreign Missions Conference of North America;
National Council of Church Women;
Council of Church Boards of Education;
Missionary Education Movement.

The contrasting emphases between the Army in America and International Headquarters in London are encapsulated in a dispute which broke out over how the Army should treat any of its officers who left his appointment voluntarily to carry arms in the war. Late in 1940 before Pearl Harbour the Chief of the Staff, Commissioner AJ Cunningham, circulated all Territorial Commanders in the relevant countries in the following terms:

'In countries where military service is compulsory on all citizens including ministers of religion no option is left to officers. They are duty bound to answer the call of authorities. This is the position in most countries on the continent of Europe where universal conscription is in force. In Great Britain and in the British Commonwealth of Nations it is generally recognised that ministers of religion in time of war best serve the highest interests of the nation by sustaining the morals of the people by means

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of spiritual ministrations, and the British Government has expressly recognised that commissioned officers of The Salvation Army are regular ministers of a religious denomination and not liable therefore to be called up for military service under the Military Services Acts. No encouragement should be given to an officer who proposes to relinquish his work in order to engage in military service if he is under no legal obligation to do so. An officer who insists on volunteering in spite of the wishes of his leaders should be plainly given to understand that he thereby jeopardises his officership. By preferring military service to his vows of dedication to God and his written engagements with The Salvation Army, he shows plainly that he sets aside that conviction as to the spiritual dignity and moral value of his high calling as a minister of Christ and servant of the people which it may be assumed caused him to become an officer, and which indeed alone could have justified his being commissioned as such. Every endeavour should therefore be made to dissuade officers so minded. They should be warned that such a course will terminate their officership and that if later they wish to be re-accepted they cannot return with the rank they relinquished.'

This was consistent with the position taken by General Bramwell Booth in 1914-1918. Nevertheless, it drew a sharply critical reaction from Territorial leaders in the States. One Commissioner expressed the view that if America were to go to war there would be a wholesale volunteering by both officers and by salvationists in the USA. That would be the time to stipulate how their status would be affected. Another Commissioner said that the impression given by General Bramwell Booth during World War One was that the Army was actually opposed to patriotism. This had caused great concern in the States. There was also a need to make clear that the views expressed by General Carpenter through the Chief of the Staff did not apply to any officer taking up a post as a military chaplain. Commissioner Alexander Damon wrote to the Chief of the Staff in January 1941 pointing out that if the United States entered the war this would alter the situation. In the last war officers in the United States had volunteered and served and were not penalised in any way. He also pointed to the need to make an exception in the case of officers serving as chaplains. Commissioner Damon urged that the entire matter be most carefully reconsidered, but went on to say that he was
writing this letter 'faithfully yours under the flag'.

In February 1941 Commissioner Pugmire also wrote to the Chief of the Staff to point out that patriotism was rising higher and higher in the States and if the government entered the war a large number of officers would wish to join the ranks of the servicemen. Pugmire could not see any real or valid distinction between the call of the authorities and the call of patriotism, and both would leave an officer equally duty bound. He could not see that it was right to warn officers that they would be penalised for acting from motives of patriotism, loyalty or even conscience. He thought it better to avoid drastic rulings and to use instead tactful persuasion as to the validity of special emergency work in a civilian setting. If officers did not respond to such persuasion they could be regarded as being on furlough for up to a year, and thereafter be regarded as having broken service, rather than having to undergo a diminution in rank. 160

The Chief replied through Commissioner Parker at National Headquarters to make it clear that officers serving as military chaplains were a special case and there was no question of them being penalised. The original letter had only in view those who had no legal obligation to serve, but who went off to do so against the wishes of their leaders, thereby surrendering their vocation as ministers of the Gospel in order to engage in armed military operations. He confirmed that such officers should most definitely be treated according to the General's wishes as expressed in his earlier letter of 27th November 1940. 161

After the USA entered the war, Lieutenant-Commissioner Barrett, USA Western, sent word to London to say that with the lapse of time and the attack at Pearl Harbour in the Philippines he now had several cases of officers wanting to enlist in the armed forces for normal combatant service. He reiterated his views as to the unwisdom of a blanket ruling that such officers would lose their officership or be returned to officer-
ship with a reduced rank. He asked London for a clear directive. 162

Again word came back through Parker at National Headquarters to say that it was the view of London that the proper work of Salvation Army officers in wartime was preaching the Gospel, guiding the way with ministry to the sick and sorrowing, comforting the bereaved and so maintaining the morale of the people. All of this was of vastly greater importance than serving with the armed forces. He went on to say: 'How any man or woman who has received the call of Christ to a life of soul-winning and is conscious of having received from Him the ordination of the pierced hands could wish to abandon such work for a lesser task, however seemingly urgent, is difficult to understand.' However, Cunningham went on to concede that, because of the apparently clear-cut nature of the moral issues at stake in the war, it would be desirable that leaders, whilst using every possible means to dissuade officers from abandoning even temporarily the sacred work to which God had called them, should withhold the threat that officers would suffer a reduction in rank if and when they were to re-apply for acceptance after the war. 163

This was, in effect, a climbdown by International Headquarters. The sources do not indicate whether leaders in America were consulted before the original ruling was issued, but in view of the strong reaction against it this possibility appears unlikely to have been the case. As the first anniversary of Pearl Harbour approached, it was agreed by London that no officer would be penalised in rank and would be shown in official lists as being merely 'without appointment'. Patriotism, American-style, had carried the day, but the exchange may have applied something of a break to enlistment fever among American officers. (See further Ch.27, Point 9.)

(For the views of the Army in America on the first military use of the atomic bomb in August 1945, see Ch.26.)
The work of the four American Territories in the war was not the sum total of salvationist effort in North America. A large Red Shield operation was carried out by the Canada Territory. It functioned in the same way as Red Shield services in Britain and the USA. This work has been comprehensively written up by Scott Young in a well-organised account published soon after the war. Many Canadian troops were stationed in Britain and the Canadian Red Shield followed them overseas to serve their spiritual and material needs. The story of this work has also been published in 1943. Canadian Red Shield officers accompanied Canadian forces to Sicily and Italy in 1943, and to Normandy in 1944.
1. For the American Salvation Army and the First World War see Ch.15.


3. NYA Ref. 161/17, letter, 26-9-39. Similar replies were sent to many non-salvationists who applied for war work (Ibid.).

4. NYA Ref. 161/17, letter, 17-10-39, Chief Secretary USA Eastern to Commissioner EJ Parker.


6. This obstacle was later overcome. Generous gifts of money reached London from the American Army: IWC 20-7-40: 3; 28-8-40: 3; USWC/E 3-8-40: 9.

7. Note the American Army's self-perception as a 'Church' and see Ch.22, Sect.2 (text for Note 46).


10. Alexander Damon Diaries, NYA Ref. RG20.38, 5-9-39. Until December 1941, Damon was Territorial Commander, USA Eastern Territory.

11. USWC/E 27-12-41:10.

12. A large portion of the NYA Damon Collection consists of press cuttings and pamphlets gathered by Damon over many years and all dealing with pacifist and anti-war opinions.


15. Damon, Armistice Day address, 11-11-41.


17. IWC 29-7-39:8.

18. NYA Accession 78-25, Notes of Address, Evangeline Booth, 26-2-40.

19. USWC/S 4-1-41:5, 14.


21. NYA Ref. 161/17, letter, 12-6-41, Arnold to all officers in USA Southern.
22. The American War Cry at this time relied heavily on syndicated material to fill space, giving the papers a lack of immediacy and a blandness not found to the same degree in their sister publications in other territories around the world.

23. USWC/C 7-10-39: 5.


26. The War Cry in USA Southern in the early part of the war and before Pearl Harbour had at times a tone almost of pacifist conviction. This fell away as the war went on. The anti-government note in this article would probably not have been introduced had America then been at war. After Pearl Harbour, all Army publications in the USA were explicitly patriotic in content and tone.

27. Falls, 141.

28. SAYB 1943:5.

29. Mrs. Major LB Alva Holbrook, One Officer's Experiences in Two World Wars, (unpublished and undated manuscript, NYA Accession 85-21).


31. USWC/W 24-1-42:14. Also The Red Shield, January 1942:1, which made no mention of the death at Pearl Harbour of a salvationist serviceman, JD Buckley, killed manning a machine-gun: USWC/W 27-2-43:12; McKinley, 175.

32. Damon Diaries, 7-12-41.

33. Damon Diaries, 11-12-41.

34. USWC/C 27-12-41:9.


36. McKinley, 176-177 (Note 45). (McKinley bases his information on a personal interview with Major Imai.) (The American War Cry had difficulty in distinguishing between 'internees' and 'prisoners-of-war'. See USWC/W 3-1-42:3, where officers interned as enemy civilians in Germany are described as 'prisoners-of-war'; and USWC/E 3-10-42:10, where the two expressions are used as though interchangeable; also USWC/E 20-1-45:4, 14.)

37. USWC/C 3-1-42:7.

38. Chesham, 221.


476.
Ibid. The report detailed a large number of war work activities already in hand in each of the seven Divisions of the Territory, ranging from serving refreshments to airwardens in Seattle to conducting first-aid classes at Salinas.

NHA Ref. 161/17, letter, 13-1-42, McMillan to Dyer.


USWC/C 13-1-45:13. See also USWC/C 11-11-39:8, condemning prayers for victory.

The Red Shield, October 1942, 1, 'Spirit of the Red Shield', by Adjutant Paul Harvey. Much of the article suffers from rhetorical overkill and organisational self-aggrandisement.

Parker, 302.

Chesham, 227.

IWC 7-6-41:5.

USWC/W 9-1-43:10.

Edward McMahon, Report of Salvation Army War Services in Greater New York, (unpublished; held in NYA; submitted to Commissioner El Pugmire in 1946), Sect.11. The Report shows that in 1945 a total of 574,259 negro servicemen used the club, but of these only a tiny proportion took advantage of the religious activities (8,150). The club had 18 paid staff, but benefitted from the services of 1,368 volunteers. (See Notes 70, 70a, and 71 below.)

Chesham, 229.

McMahon Report, Section 7.

Parker, 283-284. The other participants were the YMCA, the YWCA, the Catholic Community Services, the Jewish Welfare Board, and the Travellers' Aid Society: McKinley, 174.

The Salvation Army in the USO for National Defense, (SA, New York, 1942), 10. This 23 page booklet was sub-titled 'A Manual for Salvation Army Officers'. (NYA Ref. BB106.)

Ibid., 8.

Parker, 288.
62. USA Eastern: Brigadier HR Smith; USA Southern: Lieutenant-Colonel CJ Hickey; USA Central: Brigadier John Marshall; USA Western: Colonel WS Barker.

63. IWC 14-6-41:5; USWC/E 7-6-41:8.


65. IWC 16-8-41:3.

66. IWC 24-10-42:2.

67. NYA, USO Clubs List - USA Central Territory.

68. But salvationist programmes were for 'anyone who needs a helping hand regardless of race, creed or circumstance': The Salvation Army and The Armed Forces, (pamphlet, NYA Ref. BB113).

69. IWC 14-3-42:3.

70. Parker, 285; McKinley, 175.

70a. Ibid., 296.


72. Worker's Index, (SA, New York, 1943), 32-33.

73. Note 59 at 13.

74. Ibid., 7.

75. Wisbey, 204.

76. USWC/E 9-5-42:2, 3.

77. Parker, 297-298.

78. Volunteers in the War Emergency Services of The Salvation Army, (SA, New York, undated, NYA Ref. BB108). The document, 22 pages long, was prepared by Mrs. Brigadier H Smith, USA Eastern.

79. Parker, 286.

80. NYA Ref. 161/18.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid., Memorandum of Conference, 15-4-44.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid., letter, 29-8-44, McMillan to Lieutenant-Commissioner WH Barrett, USA Western.

86. Ibid.
87. Ibid., Memorandum of Conference, 11-9-44.

88. Ibid., Memorandum, 16-9-44, Glyn Hauser (National War Fund) to GF Hamilton (National War Fund).

89. Ibid., Note of telephone conversation, 18-9-44, McMillan and Dickerman.

90. Ibid., Note of telephone conversation, 29-9-44, McMillan and Brunot.

91. Ibid., Note of telephone conversation, 16-10-44, McMillan and Brunot.

92. Ibid., National War Fund circular, 24-10-44.

93. South Eastern Pennsylvania, Southern New Jersey and Delaware Division.

94. NYA Accession 81-74, Divisional Correspondence, letter, 12-6-40, Hepburn to Damon.

95. Ibid. The NYA file holds a letter dated 26-7-40 to Hepburn from DS Wolcott of the Lukens Steel Company, Philadelphia. Lukens was anxious to support the Army's war relief efforts, but first wanted a categorical assurance that none of the money would be spent in Germany. By reply dated 22-8-40 Hepburn told him the money would be applied in 'the countries which have been viciously overrun by the War Machine'. (Not only cash, but gifts in kind and especially of clothing, reached England from American salvationists: USWC/W 10-5-41:9; USWC/E 3-8-40:9.)

96. One such was Kenneth Stange: USWC 20-7-85:4-5.

97. IWC 7-12-40:6.

98. On whom see Ch.20, Sect.2.

99. Chesham, 223; McKinley, 205-206.

100. Damon Diaries, 7-12-41. Allan became the Army's first American Chief of the Staff in 1946. See Ch.20, Sect.2.

101. Wisbey, 205. Also American Chaplains of the Fifth Army Corps, (US Army Chaplain Corps, 1945), 83, listing Harold G Barry, SA. McKinley, 175, follows information received by him from Commissioner RE Holz and puts the number of chaplains at 32.

102. McKinley, 175, based on interviews with Commissioner RE Holz who served as a military chaplain in the war. See further on Holz: USWC 23-12-78:8-9.

103. IWC 2-9-44:2; also 28-7-45:1.

104. USWC/W 21-4-45:3.

105. Ibid.
106. E.g. USWC/W 28-4-45:3, report by Chaplain Arthur C Reedie of 15 conversations.


112. McMahon Report, Sect.3c).

113. McMahon Report, Sect.3h).

114. Minute by the Chief of the Staff (Commissioner Charles Baugh), 10-4-46.

115. NYA Ref. 162/5, letter, 14-8-46, Chesham to McMillan.

116. Ibid., letter, 3-2-47.

117. Ibid., letter, 21-5-47, Ware to Pugmire.

118. Ibid., letter, 4-11-48, Smith to Pugmire.

119. Ibid., letter, 6-7-50, Hoggard to Smith. (The NYA file closes without indicating whether or not this request, rather late in the day, was ever granted.)

120. USWC -5-7-86, front cover and Editor's article, 'God Bless America!'


125. *Salvation Army Youth Victory Service*, (SA, Chicago, undated). Written by John J Allan, this was a Manual of Instructions for young people in the USA Central Territory.

126. Ibid.

127. Ibid.

128. *The Red Shield*, January 1942, 1-2. For overtly partisan articles in *The Red Shield* see May 1944, 11, 'The American Creed'; July 1944, 15, 'This is America'; November 1944, 13, 'For These We Fight'.


480.
130. USWC/W 17-1-42:8.
135. McMahon Report, Section 3d).
136. USWC/C 21-4-45:10. A Home League knitting programme had as its motto: 'Remember Pearl Harbour – Purl Harder!': Chesham 226. It thus appealed to baser motives of revenge.
137. NYA Damon Collection, Ref. RG20.38.
138. *It Happened Here – A Look Through the Window of a Salvation Army Service Club*, (SA, undated). The stories were compiled by Dorothy Cheyny. NYA Ref. BB114.
139. Chesham 220.
142. USWC/E 9-12-44:5.
146. Ibid.
149. Ibid., 46-47.
150. Mulford Q Sibley and Ada Wardlow, *Conscientious Objectors in Prison 1940-45*, (Pacifist Research Bureau, Philadelphia, 1945), preface. (Allowing for the greater overall numbers conscripted in the second war, the total was still three times higher, Ibid.)
151. Ibid., 12.
numbered 209 out of 1 million, Presbyterians 192 out of 2 million, Northern Baptists 178 out of 1½ million. Ewing makes no mention at all of salvationists.

153. Ibid., 137-138.

154. CM Cianfarra, The War and The Vatican, (Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1945), 295. Catholic support for US Government policy amounted to 'substantive nationalism' by the bishops, who 'conceded to the state the right to determine its own means of defense since they themselves were to deal only with "the things of the spirit"': EJ MacCarthy, The Catholic Periodic Press and Issues of War and Peace 1914-1946, (Stanford University, Ph.D. Thesis, 1977), 258.

155. USWC/C 3-1-42: 7. These groups represented 35 million members.

156. The dispute illustrates the Army's unceasing problem of legislating centrally, albeit on the basis of wide consultation, for a Christian community accustomed to acting uniformly but representing diverse cultures and diverse national interests.


158. See Ch.13, Sect.2.

159. NYA Ref. 161/25, letter, 6-1-41, Damon to Cunningham.

160. Ibid., letter, 7-2-41, Pugmire to Cunningham.

161. Ibid., letter, 7-2-41, Cunningham to Parker.

162. Ibid., letter, 16-1-42, Barrett to Cunningham.

163. Ibid., letter, 28-3-42, Cunningham to Parker.

164. Ibid., letter, 1-12-42, Parker to Cunningham in which Parker's comments show that the position had already been conceded by London.

165. SAYB 1943:60.

166. Scott Young, Red Shield in Action, (SA, Toronto, 1949). The style is largely anecdotal. Also ATW April-June 1941, 8-9. For further details on the Canadian work see WC Poulton, Canadian War Services Story, (SA Archives, Toronto, unpublished ms., 1945); also Memorandum of Agreement 18-4-40, between SA and Government of Canada creating SA as a Services Auxiliary Organisation (SA Archives, Toronto).


168. Note 166. Also RG Movies, The Blood and Fire of Canada, (Peter Martin, Toronto, 1977), Ch.6. Also IWC 26-8-44:2; 23-12-44:3; 10-2-45:3; 31-3-45:4.

482.
CHAPTER 25

ANTIPODIAN WAR WORK

1) Australia
2) New Zealand
1) Australia

By 1939 the Army's presence in Australia had grown to such an extent that the administration had already been shared between two Territories: Australia Southern and Australia Eastern. The figures which follow reveal the size of the Army when war broke out late in 1939: 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Southern</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>1093</td>
<td>925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lay Employees</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps, etc.</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Centres</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commissioner Robert Henry (Southern) and Lieutenant-Commissioner William Dalziel (Eastern) were the Territorial leaders. An Emergency War Board was in place by mid-September 1939 based in Sydney 'to consider the most complete way in which the Army could render service to the troops in war conditions'. 2 The first meeting was chaired by Colonel John Bladin, Chief Secretary (Eastern) and it was resolved to offer Salvation Army spiritual and welfare ministrations to the troops, an offer conveyed to the Ministry of Defence in person by Lieutenant-Colonel Pennell. The offer was welcome in view of the Army's 1914-1918 record. 3 Many retired officers volunteered for work with the troops and 'frequent expressions' were heard from 'men in the street' hoping that the Army would 'repeat its memorable war work'. 2 The War Board was eventually established on an inter-Territorial basis to co-ordinate finance, supplies and the war work in general. It met quarterly alternating between Melbourne and Sydney with the Chief Secretaries of each Territory presiding in turn. 4

Further administrative foundations fell into place with the establishing of a Military Council in the Eastern Territory under the chairmanship of Commissioner Dalziel. It comprised leading staff officers, with Commissioner William McKenzie, 'Fighting Mac' of First World War fame,
being made a member. The appointment of Major Reuel McClure as Secretary for Welfare Work completed the administrative machinery in the Territory. The Southern Territory, meanwhile, had not been idle. Commissioner Henry, with his Chief Secretary, Colonel Ernest Harewood, had negotiated arrangements with military authorities in Melbourne so that 'in readiness for every emergency' salvationists would be able 'to minister to the spiritual, moral and physical needs of Australians who may be called to the defence of the realm'.

A 'Message to all Salvationists' was put out jointly by the Chief Secretaries in the absence of their Territorial Commanders who were travelling in connection with the 1939 High Council in London. Its tone was entirely in accord with the internationalist emphases that would be maintained by General Carpenter throughout his wartime term in office in London. The 'Message' filled an entire page of the Australian War Cry. It deplored the news of war in Europe and asked Australian salvationists 'calmly to pursue the normal tasks of life and service, to keep up a glorious witness to the truths of the Gospel..., rigidly to exclude any feeling of harshness towards any of the peoples of the earth, and to be ready and willing to serve all in need at any time of day or night.' It went on to say that the Army was ready to minister to servicemen 'as our comrades did with such signal success in days gone by'. The 'Message' ended with an exhortation to prayer 'for all people everywhere'. It was a message far less partisan than would have gone out to Australian salvationists in 1914.

The Salvation Army in all parts of Australia stood in good stock with servicemen and veterans of national service in the forces. This was due to the success of war welfare work done 25 years earlier and was marked by the Army's close involvement in the inter-war years with Anzac Day celebrations. Again, in 1940, the Army led the Anzac Commemoration Service in the Sydney Domain, the occasion being broadcast nationwide and
on the world-radio service. Over 100,000 people attended and heard Commissioner Dalziel declare: 'If civilisation is to endure, it must have faith in eternal values.' War-scarred nations were remembered in prayer. Some 300 Army bandsmen led a march of 50,000 ex-servicemen prior to the Service which took place 'in softly-falling rain'.

If the Army was thought of highly in military circles in 1939 it was because of the relevance of the ministry carried on by salvationist chaplains in the first war. Now the same doors of spiritual opportunity re-opened. The first salvationist chaplain in Australia to be appointed during the Second World War was Major GW Sandells who went with the 2nd Australian Invasion Force (AIF) to the Middle East. Chaplaincy appointments went also to (inter alia): Major John Dent, Major Stephen Somerville, Lieutenant-Colonel W Pennell, Major R Pennell, Major F Ward, Major AC Rothwell, Major A Albiston, Major W Gates, Major E Pentecost, Major R Smith, Major F Saunders and Major A MacCarthy. It should be recorded that not all the salvationist chaplains were overmuch impressed with the regular military chaplains they encountered in wartime. Edwin C Robertson sailed to the Middle East with troops of the 17th Brigade (AIF) on board the 'Queen Elizabeth I'. He began prayer cells and Bible studies as well as chapel services because 'the paid padres were not interested'. Robertson's impression was that also of EH Francis who writes: 'Some of the padres did not stand out too well with the men because they leaned to the officers and drinking, etc.'

The Salvation Army contributed only 2 out of every 100 chaplains to the Australian forces. Appointments were proportional to the attested denominations of the conscripts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPD</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OPD meant 'Other Protestant Denominations' and included Congregationalists, Baptists, Salvationists and members of the Church of Christ. Each of these was permitted 2% of the appointments. Colonel Garnet Palmer has explained the relationship between the salvationist chaplains and the military system. A General Routine Order was issued in 1943 (GRO 216) which determined that welfare personnel of philanthropic bodies accompanying the troops would be known as 'accredited' personnel. Chaplains, on the other hand, were 'attested', having taken an oath of loyalty to the sovereign. Chaplains thus 'attested' became an integral part of the military system with officer status, rank and due authority. The status of 'accredited' personnel covered Army officers with troops performing Red Shield work. The Army declined a suggestion early in the war that these should carry military ranks instead of their usual Salvation Army ranks since, as Palmer puts it, 'As Salvation Army officers we could approach the ordinary digger or get right through to the General.' Five Red Shield officers went with each Division, one per battalion, one at Brigade HQ, and one at Divisional HQ. A total of 409 Red Shield officers and lay salvationists served with troops as 'accredited' staff over and above those salvationists made military chaplains.

Major Harold Hosier went to Palestine as chaplain with the 1st AIF and went through the Libyan campaign. He arrived in Greece in March 1941 but was taken prisoner-of-war a month later. It was then that 'one of the greatest experiences' of his ministry opened up. Some 10,000 British troops entered the prison camp at Corinth. Together, Hosier and the Revd. Alan McLauchlin, a Presbyterian, announced the first meeting. Thousands of men attended and, as Hosier later described, 'the almost overwhelming feeling that, in captivity, everything had crashed, was arrested by a strange realisation that God had not left us.' A choir of 50 voices was formed and Bible classes begun. Later Hosier was parted from his men in the ranks when the camp inmates at Corinth were marched
to Germany. There, because he had military officer-status, he was confined with other officers. On release, he passed through London and was interviewed by The War Cry which quoted him as saying:

'I knew the teaching, "Love your enemies", but now I know it can be worked out.... I have learned to differentiate between systems and men and to have the true Christian feeling toward the one while hating the other.'

In February 1926 Hugh McIlveen, who received a knighthood in 1970, was made chaplain to the Citizens' Military Forces but in 1939 was 53 years of age and beyond the age for an official chaplaincy in the war. His formal status was therefore as an 'accredited' Red Shield officer but he went with the 2nd AIF in May 1940 on board the 'Mauretania'. The voyage included a stop-over in Britain and whilst at Salisbury Plain, Wiltshire, Brigadier Leslie Morshead made him unofficial OPD padre to the 2/9th Battalion. On New Year's Eve, 1940, he arrived in Egypt at Alexandria. He went with his men through the siege of Tobruk and somehow managed to keep his gramophone playing in all circumstances. It became known as the battalion's secret weapon! Eventually, it was placed in the Australian War Museum in Canberra. One group of wounded men, returning to Australia from Tobruk were asked who was the best-known Australian there, and all replied: 'The little Salvation Army bloke.' In 1947 the 2/9th Battalion Association made McIlveen its first life member by unanimous choice. His MBE came in 1961, and the knighthood 'for distinguished services to servicemen and ex-servicemen' in the New Year's Honours List for 1970. In 1967, General Frederick Coutts bestowed upon him the Army's highest distinction, the Order of the Founder.

Naturally, many lay salvationists were called up. Early accounts in the Army's Australian publications reported them as maintaining 'well-known standards' and helping 'to bless their fellows under canvas'. Many of those conscripted were Salvation Army bandsmen and musicians and in both Melbourne and Perth a Battalion Band in the 2nd AIF was
formed principally of salvationists. From the Army corps at Perth Fortress, out of a band of 34 men, 14 enlisted and were made bandmen. They were to act as stretcher-bearers. From the Melbourne Staff Band six men joined up, plus six more from Brunswick. This group was eventually taken prisoner and all but one were killed when the ship on which they were being taken to Japan was torpedoed near the Philippines.

One of a significant number of men, who during military service experienced a spiritual vocation, was Donald H Campbell. He joined up aged 18 years as part of 'an all out effort by all God-fearing patriotic Australians'. He has described his calling in the following words:

'I simply want to testify that through the rigours of that activity and that kind of life the Lord has made it plain to me that, should I be spared the conflict, I must serve Him in a full-time capacity in one way or another. A period of four months can be defined as a spiritual pilgrimage when, between September 1943 and January 1944, I searched my soul, God's Word and, in prayer, His will for my life. All this occurred during the pressures of the war effort, but in hindsight I can see how that the Lord reached down to me in that situation and established a firm conviction that I should become an officer of The Salvation Army.'

When the war ended Campbell at once took steps to obey the direction he has described and is now the Territorial Commander in the Australia Southern Territory.

The Red Shield work was the counterpart of that already described in relation to other Army Territories. Australia had 60 permanent hostels for troops, literally hundreds of huts and marquees, and 213 mobile canteens functioning in the war years. Some centres recorded use by 500,000 men in five years. The mobile units were specially designed by Captain Henry Tyrer so that eventually every desire of the Red Shield staff was met, even down to providing music. Amongst many monetary donations for vehicles was one of £4000 from the Western Australia Trotting Club, and the women of Toorak in Melbourne raised sufficient funds to purchase eight mobiles at a cost of £890 each. The first Red Shield
hut opened at Long Bay Camp with Major Ralph Satchell in charge. Some corps officers in charge of Army centres close to troop concentrations did not wait to be invited to open a centre for troops. They simply went ahead regardless in face of the obvious need for wholesome recreational facilities for the conscripts. One such was Edwin Robertson at Colac Corps, Victoria who opened a marquee within days of the war being announced. Later, the famous 'Hop-In' signs were designed, consisting of a life-sized bouncing kangaroo cut out of plywood, depicted in full flight springing in long hops from his tail. It was a sign which no Australian serviceman failed to recognise, whether it appeared in town, country, jungle or beachhead.

The Red Shield work was funded by public appeals and immediately war began a drive to raise an initial £25,000 was launched, with the public being told that no profits would be made and no man would ever be refused assistance. Commissioner Dalziel became a member of the Executive of the Lord Mayor's Patriotic Fund in Sydney, the Fund making grants for the Army's war work. Donations reached the Army from all kinds of sources and even the Melbourne Conservatorium Symphony Orchestra mounted a fund-raising concert in the Melbourne Town Hall.

Work with women in the forces was pioneered by Adjutant Myrtle Watson. Leave Hostels were opened in Melbourne. Salvationist nurses from the Army's 'Bethesda' Hospital took up appointments with the Australian Army Nursing Service and gave service in Australia, the Middle East and Papua/New Guinea. By mid-1943 there were eight women officers serving as Welfare Officers with the Women's Australian Auxiliary Air Force in the Southern Territory.

The first Red Shield ship was launched after being donated by the Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works Employees Patriotic Fund. It was used for visiting servicemen along the NW coast of Australia and was named by Commissioner Dalziel, 'The Salvo'.
Harmonious relationships were established early in the war with non-salvationist welfare agencies and none of the problems found in the USA were encountered. Only five bodies were officially recognised by the Australian Defence Authorities for welfare work with the troops:

- The Salvation Army;
- The Australian Comforts Fund (ACF);
- The Australian Red Cross Society;
- YMCA;
- YWCA.

Recognition was granted to the Army in view of its 1914–1918 service and due to its having trained personnel ready to take on welfare work duties at short notice. Agreement was reached between the Army, the ACF and the YMCA that, whilst each body would retain its own identity, there would be united action on fund-raising, on the procurement and distribution of comforts, and on the provision of amenities. The Army was to submit detailed budgets six months in advance to the ACF which would forward monies to meet the anticipated expenditure. All vehicles were to carry both Army insignia and an ACF sign so as to indicate the joint nature of the exercise. The same was agreed for huts, marquees and stationery. All property paid for by ACF funds would remain the property of the ACF. The arrangement worked well in New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania, but not so smoothly in Queensland, South Australia or Western Australia since ACF Headquarters was in Sydney and communications with the Army's Eastern Territory were so much easier than with the Southern. The ACF paid for 70.5% of the total war services of the Army both at home and abroad. The official history of the ACF states that the Army's service in the combat zones 'merits a very high tribute' since it used 'practical, common-sense officers whose courage was well recognised by the troops and who were always ready to push forward as close as possible to the front line.'
The reaction of the troops was a gratifying one. The official magazine for Australian fighting men carried an article about Red Shield work which praised the ministry rendered, and spoke of salvationist evenhandedness in assisting the wounded of both sides in No Man's Land areas.

Gratitude by the conscripts was matched by the relatives who were assisted by the Army's 'Soldiers' Dependents Bureau' which located missing or wounded soldiers.

It is thus apparent that the Australian salvationists in 1939-1945 followed activities and maintained attitudinal emphases closer to those of Army leaders in London than had been the case in 1914-1918. There is no evidence of significant divergence. Evangelism and compassionate action continued unabated amongst the troops and their families, and whilst the Army was able to co-operate easily with Australian government agencies, it did not forget its place as part of a worldwide Army with loyalties above patriotic ties.

2) New Zealand

The effectiveness of New Zealand's salvationist ministry in the First World War far exceeded the relative size of the Army's work in that country and, once again, this proved to be so in 1939 and the difficult years that followed.

The main difficulties would stem from relationships with the other churches in New Zealand, the only serious instance of such a problem anywhere between 1899 and 1945. Commissioner J Evan Smith was responsible through the war as Territorial Commander, for:

| Officers:    | 617 |
| Lay Employees: | 213 |
| Corps, etc.  | 405 |
| Social Centres: | 37 |
His people were at once busy raising money for war relief by the Army in Britain and gathering good quality clothing for victims of London's air raids. But he was not to see their work firsthand until his arrival from London in March 1940 in succession to Lieutenant-Commissioner F Adams. The short interregnum between Territorial leaders left the Chief Secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel George Grattan, in charge and he it was who established a War Services Board to organise and oversee work with the armed forces.

As in Australia, the Army enjoyed a good reputation in the community, among the servicemen and servicewomen, and also among those in authority. Vice-regal interest in what the Army was doing was twice shown in September 1941 by the visits of the Governor-General of New Zealand, General Sir Cyril Newall, with Lady Newall, to the Wellington Girls' Home, the Maternity Hospital and the Miramar Industrial Centre. Sir Cyril found his way also to Burnham Camp and expressed warm appreciation for the comfortable amenities offered to members of the forces. Such high level patronage and encouragement did not, however, prevent considerable obstacles being placed in The Salvation Army's path to hinder it from doing all it wished in the early part of the war by way of spiritual work with the troops.

The New Zealand Government, under strong pressure from certain of the churches, decreed that the only bodies to be allowed to carry out welfare work with New Zealand forces overseas would be the YMCA and the Church Army. Following a resolution passed in the Presbyterian General Assembly, a deputation of Presbyterians, Baptists, Methodists, and the Church of Christ saw the Minister of Internal Affairs to argue that The Salvation Army ought not to be permitted to accompany the troops overseas or to be one of the expending agents of the National Patriotic Fund Board (see below) since this would be to discriminate unduly in favour of a very small denomination. The deputation overlooked the Army's special gifts and experience and urged that the YMCA be approved as an expending
agent since it was both international and non-denominational. The other denominations were determined to prevent a repetition of what they regarded as special treatment for the Army in the previous war. The upshot was that only the Anglican Church in New Zealand, with the YMCA, secured separate representation in overseas military welfare work.

The 1914-1918 experience had taught the government certain lessons. Then, nearly 600 separate agencies had embarked upon wartime fund-raising efforts and the degree of confusion and overlap was not to be permitted to happen again. On 4th October 1939 an Order in Council was made bringing into force the Patriotic Purposes Emergency Regulations 1939 which created a National Patriotic Fund, based on eleven Provincial Funds to be controlled by Provincial Centennial Councils which would be free to appoint spending agents such as the Army, Red Cross or YMCA for welfare services to the forces. The scandals and waste of the previous war's fund-raising would thus be avoided. However, the Regulations would not hamper the spending of monies for exclusively spiritual work among troops where such monies were raised within any particular denomination. This gave the Army considerable scope within New Zealand and in fact it became, with the YMCA, a main expending agent of the National Patriotic Fund Board. A 'Fighting Services Welfare Appeal' early in 1940 raised £140,000 for the National Fund.

But still the path to welfare ministry with the troops overseas was barred. Commissioner J Evan Smith took up the cudgels and put out a Memorandum toward the end of 1940 to give an official reply to the many enquiries he had received about Salvation Army Officers performing welfare work with New Zealand troops outside New Zealand. (The bar did not apply to chaplains, on whom see below.) The Memorandum spoke of what was achieved in 1914-1918 and said that the Army's 'supporters' (donors) were ready to assist a similar undertaking at home and abroad in the present war. The National Fund was then created and the Army
had co-operated 'in perfect harmony' with the YMCA to raise a large sum (see above). The Army's supporters had given to the Fund, assuming the Army would be with New Zealand servicemen wherever they were to be found. The Army was not able to merge its war work with that of the YMCA, as some had proposed. Every opportunity opened up to salvationists within New Zealand had been seized 'to the complete satisfaction of all concerned'. British Red Shield staff, and also Australian, were working with troops from their countries in France, Belgium, the Middle East and elsewhere. The same was true of the Canadian Red Shield. All of this would explain the 'surprise and dismay' of The Salvation Army in New Zealand at being confined within national boundaries. The Defence Minister had justified the bar by claiming that every denomination would want representation overseas if it were given to the Army. Yet the Church Army was already separately representing the Anglicans. The Army had not been consulted in the matter and had not been invited to conferences where the issue was discussed. No logical reason had been given from any quarter for the failure to meet the Army's case or to 'satisfy a considerable public whose confidence we enjoy'. Repeated appeals to the Defence Ministry had proved fruitless and now a final, desperate appeal lay on the Prime Minister's desk.

The Prime Minister could not assist. Four months later J Evan Smith wrote to Norman Bicknell (on whom see below) and spoke of being 'still engaged in a terrible struggle' over the matter. He spoke of the personalities involved:

'I am sorry to say that Mr. Nimmo of the YMCA and one or two of the leading people in the Presbyterian Church are wholly opposed to our having any place in ministering to troops overseas. The Prime Minister is friendly but his hands seem to be tied.'

Cyril Bradwell, the Army's centenary historian in New Zealand, has examined the National Patriotic Fund Board files in the New Zealand National Archives which reveal puzzled letters to Prime Minister Fraser.
from former prime ministers, GW Forbes and JG Coates. The replies by Fraser referred to threats by the Presbyterian Church should the Army have its way, and also to the nonconformist churches being 'bitterly hostile to any Salvation Army comfort workers going overseas'. No logical reason for opposition to the Army emerges from the sources which leave an impression of inter-denominational rivalry giving rise to some unbecoming lobbying of government officials by the Christian churches, some of which resented the privileges accorded the Army in 1914-1918.

The purity of the Army's motivation was cast in doubt when the Secretary to the National Fund wrote to one enquirer: 'The Salvation Army are worrying more about the advertisement they get out of the show than they are about assistance to the men.' It was, perhaps, a harsh observation.

Salvationist chaplains, however, travelled with the troops. Four saw overseas service, in the Middle East and the Pacific. The 1942 Year Book recorded 10 chaplains in all, both in New Zealand and overseas. Chaplains functioned on a unit basis and thus were not confined to ministering solely to men of their own denomination. Appointments were made according to the denominational ratios in the general population which in 1942 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church of England</td>
<td>44.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
<td>27.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>15.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>8.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) had a final establishment of 50 chaplains, represented therefore in the following way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church of England</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Methodist 4
Others 4

The four 'others' were the Army, the Baptists, Church of Christ and Congregationalists.

In September 1942 a Chaplains' Dominion Advisory Council was created. At first it had no separate Salvation Army representative. The Army requested separate membership and this was granted, Brigadier S Hayes being the officer appointed to the Council.

Best known among salvationist chaplains was Norman Bicknell, who accompanied the First Echelon for the Middle East on 5th January 1940. Bicknell regarded his appointment to be a military chaplain as divinely inspired, the news reaching him as he prepared to lead his congregation in the Sunday morning Holiness Meeting on 31st December 1939. Lieutenant-Colonel Grattan asked him to respond at short notice. His mind in turmoil, he looked over the notes for his sermon that morning, based on Joshua 1. He writes: 'As I looked over my notes and the thoughts to be emphasised, I came to the only conclusion left to me - I must say "Yes" to Colonel Grattan or I could not preach that sermon to my congregation.' There followed service in North Africa and Greece. He was in German hands for a few days and upon being wounded was restored to New Zealand to become the Army's Secretary for War Services. He later spent four years as Chaplain Commandment to the Royal New Zealand Chaplains' Department, a post normally reserved for one of the larger denominations. His place overseas was taken by Major WJ Thompson who was mentioned in despatches whilst serving with the Anti-Tank Regiment.

Two women officers, Captain Dick and Lieutenant Jenkins of Norsewood, were appointed chaplains to the Home Guard in the Norsewood district, the only instance in either of the world wars and in any Army Territory of women being made chaplains to male troops.
The Red Shield opened its first club in 1939 at the Wellington Railway Station and in the first six months it was used by 401,938 servicemen. Church parades were conducted by Army officers regularly at dozens of guard posts around Wellington, but the more personal ministry in the centres resulted in solid cases of conversion.

New Zealand's salvationists, therefore, did not lag behind their fellows in other countries in mounting soul-winning and practical wartime ministries. Whilst the blocking tactics of some of the churches meant a scaling-down of Army compassionate action amongst the troops leaving New Zealand, nevertheless the few chaplains who went with those troops won the gratitude of the men. The Second World War sources do not indicate the degree of divergence from London which was evident in the Great War (see Ch.15, Sect.3).

The rise of pacifist convictions in the inter-war years did not bypass New Zealand. The Methodist Church was particularly affected but Methodist conscientious objectors found little support from their church once war began. There were few salvationist objectors, but CG Bell remembers pacifist articles in the New Zealand War Cry between the world wars having an influence on his thinking. He applied for exemption from military service and was sent to a Field Ambulance Unit which contained many Christians, among them several salvationists. Cyril Bradwell, like Bell, recalls the impact of the inter-war years upon his attitude to war and peace. The stance of the Peace Pledge Union and the advocacy of Dick Sheppard were given wide coverage in New Zealand, and Bradwell absorbed also many of the pacifist ideas of Leslie Weatherhead, so that 'in the 1930's there were times that one fervently felt that pacifism was the only possible Christian position.' However, Bradwell, with the great majority of eligible salvationists, felt unable to ignore the rise of Hitler. Weatherhead's repudiation of his earlier pacifist stance (in his Thinking
Aloud in Wartime) convinced Bradwell that participation in armed struggle was justified. After seeing newsreel of British soldiers at Dunkirk he volunteered for service, having been 'profoundly moved'. Bradwell's wrestling with these issues showed the agony of a sensitive mind and an internationally salvationist spirit in the face of mounting aggression from Germany and her allies. His ultimate response put him among the majority of salvationists in New Zealand and in other parts of the world. Yet the Army in New Zealand did not lose sight in the war of its internationalism, instituting work with 'enemy' internees in the camps, a task which J Evan Smith described not only as 'possible', but also 'welcome'.

The Salvation Army in the South Pacific and Far East was affected by the war also in Singapore, Malaya, Hong Kong, Korea and Japan. The largest work of these countries was in Singapore and Malaya, united for Army purposes as one Command under Herbert Lord's leadership. In Japan the war meant severe restrictions upon the work there, expropriation of Army assets, and the merging of the Army with the United Church of Japan. All links with London were necessarily severed.

In the Middle East, Red Shield work was carried out in Egypt and Palestine as the Army followed after the military lines.
NOTES - CH. 25

1. SAYB 1940: 60-62.
3. See Ch. 15, Sect. 2.
5. AWC 11-11-39: 8; IWC 6-1-40: 12. On 'Fighting Mac' McKenzie see Ch. 15, Sect. 2.
6. IWC 6-1-40: 12.
11. These officers were listed in IWC 2-3-40: 3.
12. Letter, Lieutenant-Colonel AC Rothwell (Reservoir, Victoria), 16-2-86. Rothwell served 13 months as a chaplain in the Royal Australian Air Force.
13. Letter, Lieutenant-Colonel EC Robertson (South Blackburn, Victoria), 26-3-86. Robertson finished the war as Chief Commissioner of the Red Shield Services with the honorary military rank of Colonel.
14. Letter, EH Francis (Springwood, NSW), 6-8-85.
15. IWC 7-10-44: 3.
16. Ibid.
17. What follows is based upon Nelson Dunster, Padre to the 'Rats', (SP&S, 1971) supplemented by IWC.
18. IWC 6-7-40: 6.
20. For information on the Red Shield work of Garnet Palmer see ATW April-June 1943, 27-28, 32; AWC 2-8-41: 4; 17-8-45: 5 (22-part series: 'Middle East Maelstrom', Garnet Palmer).

500.
22. ATW April-June 1942, 7.

23. Information on bandsmen from Colonel Garnet Palmer, letter, 12-3-86. See also Note 10 at 105-106 for further details of salvationists killed.


25. Ibid.


28. ATW April-June 1942, 7.


31. AWC 2-8-41:4.

32. Letter, Lieutenant-Colonel Marjory Scoble (South Blackburn, Victoria), 20-4-86.

33. IWC 22-5-43:4. See AWC 6-9-41:5 for the work of salvationist women in knitting comforts.

34. IWC 29-4-44:1.


36. Ibid., 164-165.

37. Ibid., 166.

38. Ibid., 167.

39. Ibid., 169.

40. Ibid., 171-172. Also: With the Army in Bomb Street, (SA, Australia Eastern, 1941), 9.

41. AWC 6-9-41:5 quoting extracts from letters written by servicemen.


43. IWC 25-10-41:5.

44. See Ch.15, Sect.3.

45. SAYB 1941:101.

46. SAYB 1942:89-90.

48. IWC 18-10-41: 3.

49. SAYB 1942: 89.

50. Note 47 at 105; History, 251.

51. Note 47 at 106.

52. New Zealand Hansard, Vol. 256, 4th October 1939, 609-610, Statement by Minister of Internal Affairs.


55. The Prime Minister was Peter Fraser.


57. Note 47 at 106, 202 (Notes 10, 14, 15, 17).


59. SAYB 1942: 89.


61. Ibid., 16.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., 17.

64. Ibid., 181-182.


66. Ibid.

67. Ibid. Also New Zealand War Cry 6-9-86: 4.

68. Ibid. Also IWC 25-10-41: 6.

69. Ibid. Also IWC 23-1-43: 4; Note 60 at 38.

70. Ibid.

71. Note 60 at 71.

72. IWC 4-10-41: 4.

73. ATW April-June 1945, 25. The club used 47,208 pies, 14,729 lbs of bread, and 4,935 lbs of sugar in the same period.

74. IWC 25-10-41: 6.
75. Ibid., reporting eleven such cases at Whangerei; and further cases at Wairouru. See further on Red Shield Clubs in New Zealand: IWC 16-12-39:10; 22-3-41:8.

76. Note 65. The same happened to Methodists in the USA - See Ch.24, Sect.4.

77. Letter, Major CG Bell (Auckland), 14-9-85.

78. Letter, Cyril Bradwell (Wellington), 3-10-86.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.


82. For Lord's heroism and leadership in the war and for accounts of officers interned by the Japanese see: Albert Kenyon, Valiant Dust, (SP&S, 1966); The Forests Shook, (SA, Toronto, 1959); History of The Salvation Army in Singapore and Malaysia 1935-1946, (unpublished, anonymous ms., IHQ Archives, undated); Roy GW Bungay, The History of The Salvation Army in Singapore and Malaysia, (Trinity Theological College. Singapore, Master of Arts Thesis, 1983), 54-74; ATW April-June 1942, 30; IWC 27-12-41:1; 4-8-45:3; 15-9-45:1; History 6, 219-220.


84. IWC 25-4-42:3; 16-5-42:4; 20-6-42:1.

85. IWC 4-10-41:4.

503.
CHAPTER 26

DIVERGENT RESPONSES TO THE ATOMIC BOMB
General George Carpenter saw early a need for specialist teams of relief workers to enter Europe in an effort to assuage the suffering of the millions displaced and ravaged by the war. His Chief of the Staff, Commissioner AE Cunningham, issued a Minute in 1943 creating at International Headquarters a Post War Relief Department under Lieutenant-Commissioner Hugh Sladen and a Post War Relief Council. The Department would function in harmony with the Ministry of Economic Warfare's Consultative Committee. Research groups were already working in various parts of Europe and 5000 officers were available across the continent as soon as conditions afforded opportunity. In the event, relief teams followed in behind the Allied forces after the landings in Normandy in June 1944. Salvationists were suited to the task because of their non-political ideal, and previous experiences of mass feeding programmes in China and of relief work in Europe after 1918. The new Department mounted training courses for its team members and co-ordinated the movement of officers between Army Territories in Europe. Neutral Sweden, which had done so much to facilitate wartime links between London and Berlin (see Ch.23, Sect.1), offered willing help in Germany once that country was in the hands of the Allies, but International Headquarters declined, perhaps a little insensitively, and Swedish salvationists turned instead to relief work in Norway and the Baltic Islands. The episode created a modicum of tension, in the short-term, between London and Stockholm.

Just as the post-war relief operation found its stride, the war with Japan came to an abrupt end when atomic bombs were exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Accurate statistics of those killed or maimed have never been agreed, but within weeks of the Japanese surrender a new municipal government was set up in Hiroshima under Allied military control and with the aid of statisticians the following figures were the earliest to be put out:
Killed: 78,150  
Missing: 13,983  
Injured: 37,425

Subsequent assessments range higher, but in August 1945 these were the facts relayed around the world with pictures of the wasted landscape that was once a thriving city, a landscape created in merely a moment of time. Gordon Sharp saw the photographs and heard the accounts of human death and suffering, but could feel only 'a tremendous relief' at the news of the defeat of Japan, a relief shared, he says, by almost every salvationist he knew.

Rumours had been rife of some kind of totally new and unforeseen weapon based on the researches of atomic science and as early as 1941 The War Cry in London struck an attitude of grave concern over such a possibility:

'The suggestion by a Soviet scientist that it may be possible to produce a sub-atomic bomb capable of destroying whole cities at one blast is yet another reminder of the danger threatening from man's intellectual progress unless his moral nature be equally destroyed.

The call to invent in order to destroy may seem laudable when grave peril faces a nation. But who is to control the devilish inventions once they are let loose?

Nothing can save the world grown so capable of destroying itself but the government of God, revealed in Jesus Christ, whose supreme counsel for men was love for their neighbours equal with love for themselves.'

News of secret weapons was 'yet another manifestation of the utter and shameful bankruptcy' of civilisation. As men's mastery over the forces of nature grew and grew, the picture took on a 'demonic' quality.

News of American rocketry advances drew forth the following Editorial comment from the Army's official mouthpiece:

'News that America is "improving" on the flying bomb and concentrating on rockets is not very inspiring. They are, as many may well know, the most inaccurate, indiscriminate and horrible of weapons.

Prophecies that they may "change the strategy of the
"future" only indicate that the last shreds of restraint are to be flung aside.

War is to be a quick-smash process, of civilian and combatant, bloody and bludgeoning, hard luck for babies. But who cares?

Better news would be that a Great Power had decided to strive to keep its hands as clean as it can.

Perhaps that is far too much to ask in a real world. All must get into the mud together. And must stay there, so long as mankind looks down upon its own quarrels and sins, instead of up to God for its Salvation.

When International Headquarters learned of the fate of Hiroshima, the pacifist Ben Blackwell (Assistant Editor of The War Cry) was inspired to write quite simply the best article to be found in all the salvationist sources having to do with the war. It was written only 48 hours after the bomb and published 10 days later with the title, 'Mightier than the Mighty Atom'. In the centre of the item, in a box and in bold type, was printed the verse:

'M mightier than the mighty atom
Threatening men with awful woe,
Is the tender love of Jesus
Which a sinful world may know.
Let me Jesus,
Through my life Thy goodness show.'

Blackwell's reaction to the bomb was one of immediate and instinctive salvationism. It had the wholehearted approval of General George Carpenter, and began by pointing to the grievous burden placed upon the national conscience of America for inventing history's most diabolical weapon. The announcement of its use, made with such a proud sense of achievement, had done far more spiritual and mental harm to mankind than even the unparalleled physical harm perpetrated at Hiroshima. Would now London, Berlin, New York or Paris be devasted in another few minutes in another war? What good might not have been done with the £500 million spent on the weapon? How would the political and military leaders answer the man in the street? Would that man now despair of living, of marrying, of having children? Or would he escape into pleasure-seeking and a quest
for this world's goods? To Christian men and women the news of Hiroshima would bring a new and dreadful awareness of man's spiritual and moral danger. A choice now faced the world: to end wars, or to end the human race.

The perceptions here shown by Blackwell are remarkable considering that he had absorbed news of the event only hours earlier. But the main thrust of his conclusions revealed his intuitive salvationist response and all that was best in the Army's passions for people torn by war. He moved in one confident stride from a history-splitting event to compassion and longing for the souls of the people:

'But the Christian will see more deeply than the choice between peace and total destruction: he will see that the triumph of peace will demand a power mightier than the mighty atom. If the man in the street asks: Is there such a power? the Christian - that C of E man in the office, that Baptist in the shop, that Congregationalist in the factory, that Methodist in the workroom, that Salvationist next door - has the answer. It is the omnipotent love of God, the saving grace of the Lord Jesus Christ and the almighty power of the Holy Spirit.

If the love of God controls the men who control the atom, then its tremendous power will open up to mankind the 'treasure house' of which Sir John Anderson speaks.

From his reflections, then, the clear duty of every Christian man and woman will emerge: he must press forward with the proclamation of the Good News that there is almighty power in the love of God to overcome every evil. The threat of world calamity must lead to world evangelisation.'

Salvationists were not to slide into the commonly held feeling that the bomb was something they could do nothing about. There was 'the enormous advantage of faith' and a widening sense among the people of the world that 'glory in war is dead'. General Carpenter went into print over his personal signature, to welcome the cessation of war, but also to remind the nations that they were still 'on the edge of an abyss of horror' and that 'there must be no more war if the race is to survive'.

The Army wondered what future generations would think of war once the bitterness and horror of Hiroshima had faded in the collective
consciousness. The current determination to see an end to all war would fade and so fear could not be relied upon to save the world. There had to be 'a positive realisation of the brotherhood of man'. Fear must give way to love, 'the far harder way'. Neither were political agreements to be relied upon since a country's good faith was not certain in every circumstance, as the war had shown. The War Cry thus received cautiously the news that atomic secrets would be confined to the USA, Britain and France until an international forum could be entrusted with the knowledge. It was ironic that things as microscopic as a microbe or an atom could wreak so much harm, making 'the war-monger a more frightful menace than ever'. And yet there was a third small power of which Jesus had spoken - faith like a grain of mustard seed.

It is noticeable that official Army statements, through the pages of the London War Cry, appeared with unusual frequency after Hiroshima, always on the front page and in prominent type-setting. How far this response represented that of the Editorial Department (which included a strong pacifist contingent) and how far it spoke for the mass of lay salvationists cannot be determined (see above on Gordon Sharp), but what is clear is that what was written represented the mind of the top leadership in London who still, like William Booth and all who came after him to lead the Army, kept close, personal control over what went into print. Only once did comment appear which might have left an impression that there was merit in the bomb. In describing the sufferings of the people of Europe, All The World remarked that some of them 'might almost have welcomed an atom bomb as the more swift and merciful instrument of death' compared with slow disease and starvation. But this was intended merely to point up the level of human misery in Europe where the Army's relief teams were working. The principal reaction to the bomb was one of horror, sorrow, realisation of the precariousness of mankind, renewed confidence in the Gospel, and a new recognition of the urgency of evangelism.
In America, The Salvation Army's response to Hiroshima was a deafening silence. Commissioner Alexander Damon, in retirement, wrote in his diary for the day Hiroshima died: 'The discovery will be marvellous for days of peace.' But, disinclined by all his instincts to narrowness, and with a night's reflection, he added: 'This is one of the greatest discoveries made by man. He must control it or it will control and destroy him.' However, there was not a word of reporting or of comment in any of the four editions of The War Cry which were published in America. The reason for this can only be surmised. It is clear that the American Editors and Territorial leaders knew what London was publishing over a period of six months after Hiroshima, for periodicals were and are circulated to all countries and all Headquarters. The American silence is thus all the more puzzling. No doubt comment which could be made in London would have seemed unpatriotic in the States, where uncritical patriotism was as common as breathing. Then again, primary responsibility for the use of the bomb lay with the American Government and the Pentagon, for the data on which the decision to drop the bomb was based was available in its entirety only to the USA. But secular American reactions to Hiroshima were not all pro-government, and opposition to what had been done came even from those engaged in scientific pursuits.

The silence of the American salvationists meant, ironically, that International Headquarters found itself suddenly closer to some Anglicans on the issue than to the Army in the States. The Church Times at once proclaimed that only Almighty God could now help man to conquer himself after he had conquered nature. The bomb should be outlawed forthwith since its use by the Allies put Attila the Hun in the shade! The conversion of the world had become more urgent now than at any time since Calvary. Letters to The Church Times were heavily against the bomb and a leading article claimed that the path which had ended at Hiroshima...
had begun when the Allies started bombing civilians in Germany. These were noteworthy comments, considering the emphatically pro-government stance of the Anglican press up to that point. The Dean of St. Albans said Hiroshima was the most dreadful precedent in the history of mankind and refused the use of his cathedral for a service of thanksgiving for the victory over Japan.

Like the Army, the Methodists felt disinclined to entrust the secrets of the bombs to a world organisation and they shared the salvationist and Anglican conviction that the Gospel was now more urgent than ever. All the letters published by The Methodist Recorder immediately after Hiroshima were strongly against the use of the weapon.

General Carpenter's view, that wars must now stop or the race would perish, was echoed in the Baptist press. Baptist letter-writers called for a rediscovery of the nonconformist conscience which would be fearless in identifying evil wherever it were found and by whomsoever it were caused. One writer said that had Germany used an atomic bomb, Britain and the USA would have reacted with moral outrage.

The Salvation Army found itself moving into 1946 trying hard to recover from war's wounds, not least to the Army's international links. When Armistice Sunday was reinstituted in Britain that year, the Army renewed its sorrow for the world but wanted its people to let their sorrow be all-embracing:

'Let us link our sorrow with that of the French, the German, the Dutch, the Russian, the Japanese and other nationals. Let us be supranational in our grief at least and think of all men as human brothers afflicted by a common suffering.'

Within a span of only 46 years The Salvation Army had three times been tried and tested by war, each time with more and more devastating consequences, especially in Europe. It had striven for consistency of response, fidelity to its spiritual ideals, and solidarity in its international community. How far it succeeded and whether or not its responses withstand scrutiny are issues examined in Ch.27.
1. Minute by the Chief of the Staff, Post War Service Council 3-3-43.


3. SAYB 1945:5-6. Also: Salvationist, 11-4-87:18.


6. Ibid., 107.

7. Letter, Colonel Gordon Sharp (Beckenham), 4-7-85.

8. IWC 25-10-41:5, 'Sub-Atomic Terrors'.

9. IWC 1-1-44:3, 'Secret Weapons'.

10. IWC 21-10-44:1, 'Demoniac'.

11. IWC 23-12-44:3, 'Improvement!'.

12. IWC 18-8-45:1. This page carried also an item on the Potsdam Conference and offered rare political comment on the agreement reached there.

13. Frederick Coutts, interview, 1-8-85. According to Coutts, the article was 'just what Carpenter would have wanted to say'.

14. IWC 25-8-45:1, 'Something Can Be Done'.

15. Ibid., 'Peace Is a Call'.

16. IWC 6-10-45:1, 'One Remedy'.

17. IWC 20-10-45:1, 'Fear Cannot Do It'.

18. IWC 1-12-45:1.

19. IWC 19-1-46:1, 'Three Small Things'.

20. ATW October-December 1945, 14.

21. Orsborn, 147 where Orsborn rejects the moral acceptability of nuclear weapons or their ultimate effectiveness as a deterrent to war.

22. Damon Diaries, 6-8-45.

23. Ibid., 7-8-45.

512.
24. One cover design for USWC/S 8-9-45, however depicted a cross with the caption: 'The Cross is stronger than the Atom'.

25. John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, (HMSO, 1956), Vol.VI, 275. Britain was told in April 1945 that the weapon would be used against Japan towards the end of the year. The decision to drop it with no warning to the Japanese was taken for three reasons: a) fear of a demonstration being a dud; b) there were no bombs to waste; c) the Japanese might have crowded the target area with Allied POW's: Ibid., 277-278.

26. John H Sachs, *Behind the Atomic Bomb*, (Lincoln Way Booklets, 1947) in which Sachs accused the US Government of having decided, before Roosevelt's death and whilst Japan was suing for a peaceful end to the war, to drop the bomb come what may, as a retort to Pearl Harbour.

27. CT 10-8-45:447.
28. CT 17-8-45:463.
29. CT 24-8-45:475.
30. BT 23-8-45:2.
32. Ibid.
34. BT 16-8-45:2.
35. BT 16-8-45:8.
PART IV

CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER 27

CONCLUSIONS
This Chapter will assess first the emergence of the three cardinal responses of salvationists in wartime: i) evangelism and spiritual priorities; ii) practical compassionate action; iii) Christian internationalism, expressed in political neutrality. Then will follow a consideration, based on the historical data, of the 14 questions listed in Sect.2 of the Introduction.

First Cardinal Response

The first and most apparent element in the Army's triadic response to war was a renewed emphasis upon the spiritual life and its importance, with a redoubling of soul-winning work. William Booth's immediate reaction to hostilities in 1899 was not to ask about the political causes or to blame any party for the war but simply to say: 'Are the troops ready to die? If not, get them saved!' Ch.4, Sect.3 has drawn attention to the Army's Boer War evangelical priorities, priorities established in William Booth's first public pronouncement on war - see Ch.3, Sect.1. His exhortation to salvationists to 'push your own war, the holy war, the war of love, the war of God' (Ch.3, Sect.2) typified his attitude throughout the conflict and, moreover, justified in his mind the formation of the Naval and Military League whose only raison d'être was soul-winning within the military structure (see Ch.5, Sect.1).

In the First World War Bramwell Booth's generalship was marked by the same concern that soul-winning and the spiritual life should be put first. He urged repeatedly the need for a prayerful life by his people (see Ch.8, Sect.3 and Ch.9, Sect.1). They were to 'put prayer first' in all things since in his view spiritual victories would outlast even the British Empire (Ch.9, Sect.3). The same emphasis was seen amongst German salvationists - see Ch.10, Sect.3.

In 1939 it came instinctively to George Carpenter to lead the Army through the war with an unceasing vigilance toward evangelism and the...
spiritual life. Perhaps of the three wartime Army generals he was the gentlest spirit. His priorities and chosen themes have been set out in Ch.19, Sect.1 above: the need to seize new initiatives for God in wartime; the need to win converts; and the need for constant and fervent prayer that God's will might prevail.

The conclusion cannot be avoided that spiritual and evangelical considerations influenced fundamentally the Army's attitudes and actions in all the wars. Mention is made below of the threats posed by war to the spirituality of salvationists. It was a matter of ensuring that the Army's mission to souls was not only safeguarded in war but also re-focussed in whatever way and to whatever extent was necessary in order to impact upon the fighting men and women. The Army saw this as the greatest service it could render in wartime, whatever the country concerned.

Second Cardinal Response

The second cardinal element in the basic, threefold salvationist response to war was organised, compassionate and practical outreach to the victims of the fighting and to their families. Pioneered by Mary Murray from the first weeks of the Boer conflict (see Ch.5, Sect.1), this practical ministry grew and grew with each succeeding war. It was not regarded as enough merely to minister to souls. The true gospel demanded compassionate service to men and women in their actual and material circumstances. Thus, just as the evangelical work was re-focussed for wartime, so too was its social counterpart. Perhaps this latter ministry was not so immediately and readily adaptable as was that which was directly spiritual. It called for innovation, flexibility and not a little ingenuity. It manifested itself from the beginning in both large and small ways - from homes of rest for soldiers and
sailors to visitation and letter-writing.

The beginnings have been described in Ch.5. It was perhaps the simplicity and directness of much that was done which drew an appreciative response from the military personnel and their families (see Ch.5, Sect.2). The sources reveal also an early willingness on the part of the salvationists to give themselves unstintingly. An obvious example was Lieutenant William Warwicker (see Ch.5, Sect.1). Combined with this was the salvationists' desire to be where the fighting was, alongside the men, sharing their dangers. This was true of salvationists ministering to both British and Boer and was seen also in the 1914-1918 struggle.

The practical reaction by the Army in 1914 was swift and was targeted upon the military encampments until a salvationist presence was established in each (see Ch.11, Sect.1). Again, the range of services was wide - from sewing help to the 'Silent Room' found in each centre. The First World War revealed also the ingenuity and flexibility of the practical ministry with the founding of Station Night Patrols, a Legal Advice Bureau, a Strangers' Bureau, a War Graves Visitation Department, the Widows' Counsellors Department, and the Widows' Migration Scheme (see Ch.11, Sects.1 and 4). Some projects, like the Searchers Scheme (see Ch.11, Sect.3) were abortive, but most, like the Ambulance Unit, were markedly effective. The Army in North America, Australia and New Zealand (see Ch.15) worked on similar lines to meet the practical needs of the hour.

It happened again in the Second World War (see Chs 24 and 25). The American services to the forces, mainly via the USO, were vast in scale, evidencing much administrative talent (see Ch.24, Sect.3). In Europe, most notably in the United Kingdom, work similar to that of the First World War was mounted with Salvation Army Services Officers
(initially known as Welfare Officers) appointed instead of salvationist chaplains (see Ch.21, Sect.1). In occupied Europe the social outreach was necessarily on a smaller scale but nonetheless valuable where it was found (see Ch.23). As the BEF moved across continental Europe, the salvationists followed again a policy of getting as near as possible to the front line (see Ch.21, Sect.2).

Just as evangelism in war came instinctively to the Army, so too did these compassionate and practical services. In peacetime the Army existed to offer a combination of spiritual and social succour, and so in wartime the same dual emphases, suitably retailored, were apparent wherever wartime human needs presented themselves as susceptible of a salvationist response.

Third Cardinal Response

The priority of soul-winning and the significance placed upon practical and caring ministry are perhaps not unexpected from an explicitly Christian body like The Salvation Army for, as already shown, these things represented in any case the Army's peacetime mission, adapted merely to crisis conditions. In this sense it was a fairly unremarkable combination, although the absolute emphasis found in the salvationist sources upon soul-winning in the war is not quite so apparent in the literature of the other United Kingdom denominations. However, combine this dual response with the third fundamental factor in the salvationist reaction to war, the principle of political neutrality, and there emerges a unique response to the wars.

It was unique in 1899, 1914 and 1939 for no other Christian organisation attempted (and perhaps would not have wished to attempt) such a combination of outlook at any of those times. Only The Salvation Army refused, as a matter of official policy at its international centre, to
pass judgment or make formal comment of any kind upon the warring parties, or to offer political or moral opinion as to the origins or course of the conflicts. It is this which marks off the salvationist actions and attitudes in wartime and therefore it is to this third basic consideration of the salvationist response that most attention should be given.

Closer analysis of this as a philosophical position follows below, under Points 3 and 4. For now let it be noted that Army leaders in London (less so elsewhere - see Point 9 below) saw political neutrality as the only possible way forward in all three wars. The Army's internationalist ethos was regarded as necessitating such a policy. They held fiercely to the conviction that all persons are of equal worth in the eyes of their Creator and belong to a single human family under one Father, God. They had to be seen, even (perhaps especially) in wartime, as living proof of the Scriptural teaching that all men and women share a common inheritance and are equally in need of grace. The sources indicate that no serious consideration was given by salvationists in any of the three wars to whether it would have been possible to continue to bear witness to these New Testament truths and yet adopt some line of policy other than that of being politically neutral (see further Point 3 below).

The worldwide nature of the Army's work and membership was therefore allowed to be directly formative of the Army's neutralist policy in the wars. With the exception of the Roman Catholics, this factor played no part in the formulating of attitudes by the other British denominations. It was an attitude struck by the Army from the first days of the Boer War when Railton was ordered to contact British and Boer alike to see what service could be rendered by salvationists (see Ch. 2, Sect. 1 and Ch. 5, Sect. 3). From the outset The War Cry took on an impartial tone and said bluntly of political or moral judgments: 'This is not our business.'
It was in sharp contrast, for example, to the reaction of the Anglican press (see Ch. 2, Sect. 2), but even the Army's fund-raising literature stressed: 'The Salvation Army is not a political body. It is quite enough for the officers to see the need.'

The same candour on neutrality is evident in salvationist publications in all the wars, at least in the London-based press. The 1914 assertion by Bramwell Booth that the Army was 'friend of all, enemy of none' (see Ch. 10, Sect. 1) set the tone for a neutral policy identical to that followed in the Boer War years. The salvationist First World War sources produce nothing like the public condemnation of Germany, on moral grounds, by the Anglican bishops (see Ch. 14, Sect. 1) or, for instance, the unequivocal support shown by the Methodists for the Allied cause (see Ch. 14, Sect. 2).

General Carpenter sustained the same neutralist outlook as his wartime predecessors, though faced with pressure unknown by them in a war in which the role of Adolf Hitler and his theories might have permitted, even demanded, some public stance on the moral issues at stake. Even the loss of the International Headquarters building in May 1941 through German air raids did not provoke anti-German sentiment or a reconsideration of official policy (see Ch. 18, Sect. 3). That policy, seen by the Army as the only option for an international Christian community in wartime, was by then so deeply entrenched that change was unthinkable (see Point 3).

We may thus regard as the ground of all salvationist attitudes and actions in wartime these three things: soul-winning, practical compassion, and political neutrality. The sources bear out this conclusion over and over again.

Given this broad assessment, further issues emerge to be addressed and to be set in the context of the threefold general policy. These are the issues set out in Section 2 of the Introduction and it will be convenient to follow, for the most part, the same enumeration:
1. **Dangers to Spirituality**

War posed threats not only to Salvation Army properties or programmes, not only to personnel through military service or direct attack on civilians, but to salvationist spirituality in its deepest sense. All the wartime Generals saw clearly those threats and attempted consciously to deflect them.

William Booth's very first printed pronouncement in wartime (see Ch. 3, Sect. 1) drew attention to the practical hindrances war brought to the Army's work, but highlighted also the way war could be allowed to take over and preoccupy even Christian minds. He spoke of the risk of war passions overtaking salvationists so that they eventually delighted in havoc, ruin and slaughter. To counteract this he exhorted and pleaded with his people to deepen their prayer lives. In April 1900 he claimed that his pleas were proving effective. ³

Bramwell Booth too saw prayer as the only genuine antidote to war fever and relentlessly said so to salvationists, especially salvationist youth (see Ch. 8, Sect. 3). He also concentrated on promoting the concept of 'a leaders' war', so that salvationists would not grow to hate the general population of an opposing state (see Ch. 9, Sect. 1). He wanted, he said, his Army to concentrate on perceiving new doors opening to them in wartime for spiritual and evangelical achievements. But Bramwell's most eloquent plea to the Army asked for a recognition that war could kill not only the body, but the Army's sympathy with suffering, its pity, the fountains of its compassion, its prayer life. In short, he feared war's brutalising impact.

So too did George Carpenter in the Army's third war. But he articulated an even more subtle danger, one arising out of the Army's own practical and compassionate instincts - that the war would enmesh salvationists so closely in good works (canteens, comforts, fund-raising, ⁴
etc.) that all of this 'useful work' could leave neglected the principal work of offering salvation in Christ (see Ch.19, Sect.1). Part III of this study stresses the impact of Carpenter's writing, not least on salvationists in the forces, and in relying chiefly upon the written word as his main weapon he emulated William and Bramwell Booth in their efforts to keep alive salvationist spirituality. (See further Point 14 below.)

It was, however, in the Boer War that the temptations were most easily overcome. The issues then were less clear-cut and the power of mass communication perhaps not so forceful as in the World Wars. Again, Carpenter's fear of good works being elevated to first place was more likely to be realised in the Second World War when the Army's international structure was at its most diverse and the administrative challenges at their most demanding. The practical, organisational problems of Army endeavour in 1899-1902 were nothing by comparison. The acme of the Army's organised humanitarian works can be seen in what American salvationists accomplished in the Second World War, but even though the USA in both World Wars (and Australia too in the First World War) departed from London's neutralist policies (see below and also Chs.15 and 24), the pragmatic programmes mounted there were never divorced from Christianly spiritual motivations or regarded by American salvationists as an outright substitute for evangelism.

It may therefore be said that the wars were perceived by Army leaders everywhere as threatening the essential spiritual life of the Army, for reasons both obvious and hidden, but that through exhortation, via principally the printed word, those threats came to be largely understood by the mass of salvationists and thereby resisted with some success.
2. Realism and Ideals

The demand made in all the wars by the Army's international leadership upon salvationists in all countries that they should remain above the conflict and should exemplify a supranational spirit was an onerous one by any human standard. Point 6 below deals with the powerful pull of patriotism, the principal danger to any internationalist approach in time of war. Point 9 will show again the degree of divergence between London and Army headquarters in some other countries when it came to the practice of political neutrality. However, the gap between expectations evinced by International Headquarters and, on the other hand, actual results showed itself not only as between the various Army centres of command but also as between the London leadership and the mass of lay salvationists, both in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. The leaders did not attempt to suppress natural love of country or a proper patriotic pride, but they did in all three wars consistently urge salvationists to find a visible, real freedom from narrow nationalism, from hatred of the citizens of opposing countries, and from any spirit of undue longing for the downfall of others.

Since even the leaders themselves could not always hold to the highest of supranational ideals (see Point 7 below) it is not surprising that the laity also found it difficult. There is evidence that a majority, even a large majority, accepted the concept of internationalism in principle, even despite war conditions, but it was unrealistic to expect universal compliance. It was even more unrealistic, given that salvationists were enlisting in large numbers. Supranational exhortations in war could have perhaps co-existed more naturally with an out and out pacifist stance by the Army as a whole (see on this Point 11 below). Coupled, however, with rationalisations for Christians becoming servicemen (see, for instance, Ch.7, and Ch.13, Sect.1) those exhortations...
must have been perceived as urging something altogether impractical. The idea of being somehow above the fighting, in one's inner spirit, could perhaps be given some form of lip-service by the salvationist serviceman, but the problems of living out that idea in practice as you shot or bayonetted other men (even, conceivably, other salvationists) must have been utterly beyond solution.

The same tensions would have prevailed amongst their loved ones and friends, leaving very large numbers of salvationists who could regard supranationalism only as a theory to which the Army in its organisational life somehow aspired. At individual and grassroot level the realities of wartime emotions were altogether something else. (What is said here applies also to the issue raised by question 8—see Introduction, Sect. 3.)

If evidence is required, one needs to think only of the Second World War activities of the International Staff Band referred to in Ch. 19, Sect. 2, the involvement of French and Belgian salvationists in the underground Resistance (see Ch. 23, Sects. 2 and 3), and the anti-German mood which American salvationists made no attempt to conceal once America had entered the World Wars (see Ch. 24). The anonymous letter-writer who chided Carvossa Gauntlett for preaching internationalism to the Army in wartime (see Ch. 19, Sect. 2, Note 54) probably spoke for many who thought the same but were gracious enough not to discourage the preacher. Similarly, the extent to which international or supranational policies failed to take root among British salvationists in the Second World War is plainly revealed in the isolation from fellow salvationists experienced by the Army's small band of British conscientious objectors (see Ch. 20, Sect. 2).

It may thus be concluded that any hope by leaders in London that salvationists generally, in their private attitudes, would breathe a
spirit of rising above the wars was a fairly naive one, perhaps especially in and after 1939. Supranationalism found its life only at an organisational level - in formal guidance to salvationists, in published statements, and in the Army press (except in the USA). That it assumed tangible form in the practical and organised caring ministries of the Army and in an evenhandedness often displayed by salvationists in their official capacities in the various battle zones ought not to obscure the fact that the great mass of salvationists in the Allied countries in the World Wars, and in Britain in the Boer War, longed to see their opponents beaten. There is no reason to suppose that Boer, German or Japanese salvationists felt in general any differently about Britain and her Allies.

3. The Neutrality Policy

The formal policy of political neutrality adopted by International Headquarters in the three wars requires close attention and it will be convenient to combine Points 3 and 5 for this purpose.

There were, clearly, alternatives open to the Army's leadership. They might have come out in support of one side or another. They might have condemned openly both sides and struck an expressly pacifist stance. Other Christian bodies (see Chs. 2, 14 and 22) did not feel under restraint as did the Army. They did not, however, have to take into account a hierarchical structure and organisational network controlled from the capital city of an Allied country. Only the Roman Catholic Church was similarly affected, but attention has already been drawn to the difficulty of pressing too far any parallel between it and the Army (see Ch. 22, Sect. 1). The Army was small, vulnerable, and a ready prey to unfriendly governments in enemy-occupied territory. Such governments, ready to fetter the Army, might think long and hard before acting against the
Catholic Church. Thus the Army's international structure became in war a liability, something likely to attract undue attention from those in power in the opposing states.

Army leaders opted, therefore, perhaps intuitively, for a policy which would give little offence to the authorities, a policy of taking no sides and passing no judgments - strict neutrality. Put in this way, the policy can be seen as prompted primarily by pragmatic considerations and salvationist self-interest. It is not to be denied, however, that principle did enter into things. The Army's leadership in the three wars could not bring themselves to identify the gospel with a particular political cause. To have thrown the weight of the international Army behind one warring faction or another would have been to claim that the dictates of Christ's gospel so required. This was never part of a salvationist understanding of the claims of Jesus. As Edward Norman was later to write: 7

'Christ's call upon the loyalty of men depends upon its unique authority - as originating outside historical circumstances - and upon its deliberate evocation of timelessness. That should make us cautious in identifying the ultimate purposes of God with the shifting values of contemporary society.'

However, it would be a gross distortion of the evidence to suggest that Army leaders acted throughout on theological considerations. Their motivations were a mix of the practical and the spiritual. When William Booth wanted to justify his political neutrality in the Boer War he put forward first and foremost the dangers of a split in the ranks that any other policy would produce, and only afterwards did he speak of the tenets of the Bible and of the Fatherhood of God over all men (see Ch.3, Sect.2, Note 23). Political onesidedness would have been, for him, a misapplication of the gospel under which all political systems or causes stood to be judged, but more important still in his mind and in the minds of his
son and George Carpenter after him was the feared main effect of political partiality - a split Salvation Army.

The overriding need to keep the Army united was the wellspring of all salvationist policy-making at International Headquarters in wartime. After each war there had to be in place conditions as favourable as circumstances allowed for the natural resumption of international ties and the re-assumption of control by the General at International Headquarters. The constant promotion of international attitudes during the conflicts and the unending calls to salvationists everywhere to maintain an all-inclusive Christian love, whatever the pressures to the contrary, not only conformed to the New Testament emphases but militated in favour of a united, coherent Army when the fighting at last was over.

The motives of Army leaders in war for a politically neutral stance were thus both pragmatic and spiritual. A proper understanding of those motives requires an understanding of the way in which the three wartime Generals regarded their generalships. If there was organisational self-interest in their policy-making, there was no personal self-interest, for all the Generals from William Booth onwards have regarded the international Salvation Army as a sacred trust from God (see Ch.16, Sect.2). Without its international dimensions and loyalties the Army could no longer be the Army as God intended it to be. Such thinking therefore made of first importance the need to hold the Army together in all three wars. Nothing was to be said or done which would threaten schism or alienate any section of the Army's soldiery (membership). Hence the banning of the use of the word 'enemy', and the assertion often made that the wars were wars of political and military leaders, not of the masses of the people. Hence also the urging of mutual respect between salvationists who fought and those who could have but did not. It is possible in this way at least to understand the minds of the Army's leaders, even if the view is
taken that a more robust, less cautious role might have been preferable. Obedience to what was perceived as a sacred charge was all that mattered for them. Divisiveness was to be avoided at whatever cost.

Such 'political' considerations are easier to discern than considerations of principle. The neutralist policy chosen by the Army in all three wars appears to have had no clearly articulated underlying rationale. The Army offered little by way of philosophical or theological justification for it, being content with cursory references to the well known New Testament verses. In the absence of a compelling rationale, the very fact that amongst the Christian communities the Army stood alone in its official policy of political neutrality and silence raises acutely the question of whether or not the Army was in error. Put another way, was Evangeline Booth right and were the three wartime Generals wrong? Exactly what principle spawned the assertions that political comment, or the passing of judgments upon the actions of the protagonists, was 'not the Army's business'? Had these avowals been accompanied by some claim that the Army was subject to a distinctive vocation within the universal body of Christ to dissociate altogether from politics, then neutrality could have been seen as an obedient response to that vocation. But no such vocation was (or has subsequently been) claimed, either for the Army as an organisation or for salvationists individually. From its earliest days the Army had been willing to involve itself in the political process, acting in a non-partisan role, yet urging upon governments the proper demands of social justice, a practice which leaves unavoidable the forming of judgments on government policy. Moreover, salvationists have not been slow to participate individually in local and national politics. The only conclusion possible is that what the Army was willing to do in relation to domestic policies in peacetime it was unwilling to do in relation to inter-state policies in wartime. Nowhere in the sources do we find a reasoned attempt to justify or explain this shift from one
approach to the other. Indeed, in all the thousands of words and hundreds of publications printed by the Army in the wars there is no indication that this anomaly even occurred to the salvationists.

Any retrospective, objective attempt to tease out some basic rationale for the Army's wartime neutrality is hindered throughout by the salvationist assumption pervading the sources that internationalism simply meant having a structure which crossed national boundaries and being willing to regard all nationalities as friends. No meaning less vague than this was attributed by Army leaders or writers to terms like 'international' or 'supranational'. There was no acknowledgment that other ideas might be involved or that there were many other concrete ways of expressing internationalism in practice. The terminology was thus loosely used by salvationists. No tightly formulated definition or theory of internationalism was ever articulated by the Army to provide a philosophical or theological foundation for neutrality. Instead the policy sprang from an intuitive granting of priority to the need to keep the Army world united in time of war, that unity being seen in turn as a visible out-working of the New Testament statements referred to above (see Note 1). If the Army can be seen as having erred in its wartime policy of neutrality, the error lay not in regarding salvationist international structures and ties as a reflection of New Testament teaching, but rather in the apparently automatic assumption that the existence of that international unity necessitated neutrality in a war context. It is the causal connection between an international structure and wartime political passivity which cannot be demonstrated as a matter of logical necessity.

Moreover, it can be argued that certain interpretations of internationalism not only do not lead to political passivity or neutrality, but positively demand political involvement of some kind. The religious insight that teaches that all men and women are children of one God leads
on to the assertion that all are of equal worth and that what they share in common ought, in human affairs, to be treated as more significant than any differences that arise. Any theory of internationalism, Christian or otherwise, has these considerations of equality and human solidarity at its heart. How to give practical expression to the theoretical ideals is, however, another matter. The twentieth century response in the international arena was the setting up of the League of Nations after the First World War and of the United Nations Organisation (UNO) after the Second World War. In the Army's reaction to the creation of the UNO can be seen again the logical difficulties into which salvationists fell. Having declared an apolitical and neutralist policy throughout the 1939-1945 hostilities, immediately proposals for the UNO were known the Army came out publicly in favour of its creation, thus at once dabbling in matters political and potentially controversial. The War Cry's formal comments show that the Army saw the UNO as an improvement upon the League of Nations since it would have at its disposal the joint use of force to suppress threats to peace. There is no hint in the official Army statements that salvationist writers or leaders recognised the anomaly of endorsing the creation of the UNO and of welcoming its access to an international peacekeeping force, whilst simultaneously refusing to pronounce on international relations in other contexts and whilst denouncing all use of force for settling international disputes. Neither did the Army seem to recognise that in taking up a position firmly for the UNO it was impliedly rejecting, or at least reserving judgment about, other possible models for the preservation and promotion of peace, such as a single world ruler model, or a federation of states model, international arbitration by a world council, the development of international law and international courts, and the abolition of the modern nation state in favour of major world communities such as a United States of Europe. All or any of these ideas might be seen as 531.
inspired by some concept of 'internationalism', but there is no evidence in the sources to suppose that salvationists, whether in time of war or peace, ever thought closely about preferring one model over another or even began to recognise the complexities which underlie relations between states. Salvationist attitudes were confined to broad (some might say politically simplistic) concepts of the Fatherhood of God and the consequent brotherhood of man, with man in need of moral regeneration through the gospel.

Having noted the neutralist policy and the mixed motives which inspired it; having noted the absence of any convincing rationale behind it; having recognised logical difficulties inherent in it; and having concluded that the salvationists did not think through in any thorough manner its implications, it is important to look at how the policy was formulated. Perhaps 'formulated' gives at once a misleading impression, for the path of salvationist neutrality in wartime was simply announced by the Army's Founder, William Booth, in 1899 at the outbreak of the Boer War. Thereafter it was emulated by Bramwell Booth in 1914 and by George Carpenter in 1939, neither man showing even the slightest inclination to depart from it as a matter of broad organisational policy. The absence in the sources of any serious questioning of the policy points to the immensely strong and lasting influence of William Booth on later leaders and later generations of salvationists. The policy came about because it was his private conviction that no other would hold the Army united in the circumstances of 1899. The question must be asked whether he saw himself as somehow legislating for the Army in all wars in later years. Would he have been satisfied with Bramwell Booth's conscious turning in 1914 to his father's utterances in 1899? Would the publication in 1914 of his 1899 guidance to salvationists have pleased him? Or would he have been expecting his successors to think for themselves in the light of new issues and new
circumstances? Whilst William Booth's autocratic and larger-than-life personality held sway when he was in charge, and whilst neutrality suited him in 1899, there is no reason to suppose that, had he been around in later years, he would automatically have lifted a policy from 1899 and applied it slavishly to new wartime circumstances in 1914 or 1939. On the other hand, perhaps only a William Booth could have carried through a non-neutralist policy in, say, 1939. It would have taken a man of equal stature to the Founder to abandon the Founder's own precedent. No such person has been available to the Army since Booth's death in 1912. His successors were left to govern the Army with its autocratic system, yet not having within them the same autocratic genius. As later wars erupted they were only too glad to have a precedent - any precedent - to guide them. It was assumed that neutrality, if it was appropriate in 1899, was appropriate still. Yet it is almost impossible to think of William Booth, had he been alive in 1939, allowing the war to run its course year after year whilst remaining officially silent on the evils of Nazism or the rightness of opposing it and its originators by all available means.

Failure to review the 1899 policy was due not only to the lesser stature of Booth's successors, but also to certain inadequacies in the Army's form of governance. No formal machinery existed, beyond the office of the General at International Headquarters, for settling universal Army policy in matters of ethics. The General did not have available a formal consultative council until after 1946. Army leaders, whilst willing to teach their people and to offer guidance, never claimed a right to bind the consciences of others (thus the refusal to fetter a salvationist's choice concerning the carrying of arms in war), but neither did the Army have a forum of any kind in which to consult the membership or their representatives. In other words, salvationist autocracy was not taken as far as Papal authority in matters of faith and morals, yet neither were
there alternative democratic arrangements in place to allow the analysis of current issues and the development and adoption of a policy properly informed by grassroots participation. The Army thus entered the two World Wars lacking any administrative device which would have made possible an examination either of the moral rightness of a neutrality policy or of the extent to which that policy carried the judgment of salvationists generally (see Point 8 below). This militated in favour of the old 1899 policy being adopted by default. No other policy could realistically have been considered because there was no adequate process for initiating major policy reforms.

A further unavoidable question raised by the neutrality policy is whether the fears which led to its adoption would have been fully realised had it not been in place. Those fears were basically threefold: 1) fear that outspokenness by International Headquarters against a warring state or its leaders would result in the persecution of salvationists who were citizens of that state, e.g. of Germany, Italy, Japan, etc; 2) fear that outspokenness would cause proscription of the Army as an organisation in an enemy state; and 3) fear that taking political sides would produce schism within the international Army, so that for instance Italian or German salvationists loyal to their country and its government might move to secede from the international Salvation Army, rejecting the authority of International Headquarters and of the General.

It is worth looking at these three possibilities more closely. Firstly, persecution of salvationists - merely because they were salvationists - was virtually unknown in any of the wars. Nothing happened to compare, for example, with Hitler's persecution of the Jehovah's Witnesses. Any individual suffering incurred by members of the Army was rarely directly attributable to their salvationism. However, it is not unreasonable to suppose that matters would have been different had they been
perceived as part of a movement openly opposed to the ambitions of their nation. At the same time, it should be remembered that the open, high-profile role of the Army in the USA in both World Wars in support of its government's war aims did not lead to persecution of salvationists elsewhere. Whether or not the adoption of a USA-style stance by International Headquarters would have been more likely to stimulate persecution is something that can only be guessed at. Leaders in London, at least in 1939-1945, were obviously influenced by this very possibility. They were closer to events than we are. It could be said, of course, that even if persecution had been a likely consequence, the Army should have sided overtly with the righteous cause regardless of the cost since justice demanded it. That is an easy judgment to make in comfort generations later. Things would not have looked so clearcut to the wartime Generals in London in either of the World Wars.

The second fear, that of being outlawed, was all but realised in those countries opposed to the Allies in the World Wars, although it never appeared likely in South Africa in 1899-1902. Formal proscription was not encountered in Europe, but Hitler slowly squeezed the Army in Germany to the point where its public image was all but lost and its evangelical work stifled. He cut off its sources of revenue. Clearly, the neutrality policy of International Headquarters was helpless to prevent the imposition of restrictions.

The third fear, that the Army would be split, did not materialise. However, there is a strong case to be made that schism could in any case have been averted even had International Headquarters abandoned political neutrality. Other churches made no secret, for example, of their opposition to Nazism, to Hitler, and to German political ambitions both before and during the war, yet were not necessarily taken to be turning their backs on or condemning fellow-Christians in Germany. By
careful preparation, using the Swedish connection to Germany in the Second World War, the Army's world leadership in London could have forged appropriate attitudes at an official level and expressed them in terms which left salvationists in Germany sensing plainly that any condemnation of Hitler, or of his policies, was not to be taken as distancing the worldwide Army from local German salvationists struggling under governmental restrictions. The same could have applied to Italy or Japan, or to the Army in German-occupied territories. Such an approach would have been but a simple extension of the Army's oft-repeated statement that the wars were not wars between the masses of the peoples but between their governments. Any risk of schism could thus have been effectively minimised, that risk being not large in the first place given the importance attached by salvationists everywhere to their international bonds.

It is possible to conclude, therefore, that of the three feared consequences of turning away from a policy of political neutrality, only the first — persecution — was in any real sense likely to be a direct result. Yet even persecution was not so great a risk as might have been supposed at the time, and one view would suggest that it would have been a price worth paying had it freed the wider Army from its traditional wartime silence and allowed a prophetic salvationist voice to be heard in the world addressing in a specific and relevant way events which exercised people everywhere, salvationists included. But the Army played safe. Political neutrality was enshrined as part and parcel of the Army's ways in wartime. At International Headquarters it was so deeply engrained that no serious challenge to it was ever mounted. Perhaps most to be regretted was the impression thereby, but unintentionally, conveyed that the Army was weak on the moral issues too. Political neutrality came close to moral neutrality and to this we now turn.
4. Neutrality and Morality

The Army's explicit refusal to take sides politically in the wars, maintaining a silence on the issues of who was to blame and whose cause was right, meant that the Army's voice was not heard on the moral issues inherent in the conflicts. The three Generals consciously ran the risk of being seen in wartime as though they were reluctant to engage the world and its affairs on a secular basis. Booth-Clibborn accused William Booth of lacking moral courage (see Ch.6) because he tried to save men 'in war' rather than 'from war' between 1899 and 1902. Whilst the accusation failed to give credit for Booth's singular perspective as the leader of salvationists on both the Boer and British sides, nevertheless one can understand Booth-Clibborn's frustration that salvationist public comment was confined to generalities about the dreadfulness of bloodshed.

Even in 1939-1945, when the moral issues were, to some extent, clearer and when Nazism was condemned by large portions of world opinion, The Salvation Army proffered no unambiguous condemnation of Hitler or what he stood for. A contrast has been drawn between, for example, the Baptist views expressed on Hitler and the silence of the salvationists (see Ch.22, Sect.4). If the Army was forming judgments, none was reported in print or spoken aloud on a reportable public occasion. The result is an impression of moral timidity.

The more the Army confined itself, at least in public and in official statements, to moral platitudes on war in general, the more the impression was created that the salvationist leadership refused to address the basic question of the morality of war or of the policies of the Third Reich and its allies. If the Army opposed what Hitler was doing, it issued no formal statement to say so. If it thought anti-Semitism was evil, it remained silent in terms of publicly-stated policy at International Headquarters. The things the Army did say or publish were so vague and
general (albeit sincere and heartfelt) that they were difficult to disagree with. Who, after all, thinks war and bloodshed are good ideas?

It has been noted (see Ch.18) that even the convening of the 1939 High Council some weeks after war had been declared could not turn the minds of Army leaders outward from specifically Army affairs. The record of the proceedings offers no hint that the world was already at war. The same narrowness was evidenced at the 1946 High Council (see Ch.18, Note 5), the record of which makes no allusion to the fact that the world was just recovering from six years of unprecedented international trauma. It was a strangely blinkered attitude for a body which otherwise saw itself as made up of 'world citizens'.

The rightness of the apolitical stance is thus less than self-evident. The motives of Army leaders in adopting it have been examined in Point 3 above, but the manner of their adherence to it was perhaps over rigid, over nervous, in that it brought about an impression of moral paralysis. It prevented, or was allowed to prevent, the Army from aligning itself openly with those in the moral right. 12

It might be argued that those originally in the moral right came to use war tactics which deprived them of moral authority. The Second World War blanket bombing of German civilians is a case in point. It might be said the Army was thus wise to remain aloof. Yet this would miss the point that even before such tactics became known the Army was still silently neutral, and that it would have been possible (as some churches did) to applaud the cause without necessarily blessing every means chosen to further it.

Whilst the sources thus leave an impression upon the researcher that the Army could have and should have come clean on some of the moral aspects of the conflicts, it is noteworthy that it escaped censure for
its silence. Perhaps its readiness to engage everyday social problems and to offer social work answers for the less well off masses discouraged churlish comments about moral weakness. A more plausible explanation might be that individual salvationists, including the leaders in their private capacities (see Point 7 below), let it be known where their sympathies lay. Official policy was something else. It existed at an organisational level only, and even then was not adhered to uniformly in all parts of the world (see Point 9 below).

5. Salvationist Self-Interest

See the comments under Point 3 above.

6. The Influence of Patriotism

There is ample evidence to show that the mass of salvationists in all three wars covered in this thesis had to cope with the powerful pull of patriotism. It was inescapable. Citizenship meant that loyalty to one's country was expected. Membership of the Army meant that loyalty to a higher cause was expected too, with constant exhortations from International Headquarters to salvationists in all countries and at all levels to be mindful of the Army's inter-racial fellowship and its supra-national goals. Patriotism, in moderation, was recognised as good and natural. There was such a thing as proper love of country. But it was a lesser patriotism, qualified at all times by the greater loyalty to God and to the human family of all nations and races under God. The result was a perpetual tension during wartime, not only within the Army as an organisation with international ties and national expressions of work, but within individual salvationists including the top leadership (see Point 7 below) who wanted to be dutiful to both their country and their wider ideals.

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The three wartime Generals readily recognised the threat inherent in patriotism to the Army and its international spirit. They saw the threat also as one to the finer spirits of individual salvationists. They knew how easily patriotic excesses and war fever could carry all before them. Hence the incessant calls to the Army to remain concentrated upon higher loyalties; to understand, in the words of Joseph Morray, that patriotism was a two-edged thing, bringing both selfless sacrifice and hatred of the outsider. The fears of the leaders, especially those in London, could have been expressed in the words of Reinhold Niebuhr's treatise on war and patriotism, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, published between the World Wars:

'There is an ethical paradox in patriotism which defies every but the most astute and sophisticated analysis. The paradox is that patriotism transmutes individual unselfishness into national egoism. Loyalty to the nation is a high form of altruism when compared with lesser loyalties and more parochial interests. It therefore becomes the vehicle for all the altruistic impulses and expresses itself, on occasion, with such fervour that the critical attitude of the individual toward the nation and its enterprises is almost completely destroyed.... Thus the sentiment of patriotism achieves a potency in the modern soul, so unqualified, that the nation is given carte blanche to use the power, compounded of the devotion of individuals, for any purpose it desires.'

This, translated into religious terms in the minds of Army leaders, meant that patriotic feelings taken to excess could lead to an idolatry in which the state becomes god, in which country is revered whether right or wrong and in which is developed 'a fellowship of phobias toward the outsider'.

Nowhere was the pull of patriotism more pronounced than in America (see Chs.15 and 24). In both World Wars the Army there abandoned any stance based on political neutrality and consciously permitted itself to be explicitly aligned with the war machinery of the state (see Point 9 below). In reality, the Army in the USA faced the prospect of doing this or being labelled unpatriotic, a sentiment which to the American
mind was then anathema. Any assessment of American divergence from the policies of Army leaders in London must take this strongly into account. Joseph P Morray writes:15

'Patriotism is an established virtue in the American ethic. One of the main objectives of the school system has been to inculcate an American patriotism in the diverse immigrants arriving from other lands.... It is patriotism which crowns the glories of America's greatest heroes: Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, Jackson, Lincoln, Grant, Theodore Roosevelt.... To call a man unpatriotic is an insult of extreme provocation.... Patriotism is very much a part of good American character. It is considered an honour to have given proof of patriotism.'

American salvationists in wartime saw no conflict between the pull of patriotism, with all its honourable association, and the constraints of their salvationism or the internationalist structure of the wider Army to which they belonged. They saw their patriotism as binding them together as a people in a just cause. Unlike Army leaders at International Headquarters, they made moral judgments and acted openly upon them. Leaders in London saw patriotism as binding a people, but potentially dividing peoples. They saw it as a tainted virtue, given to violence and tending to xenophobia. Hence their repeated calls for a world patriotism, a supranational loyalty. They saw the salvationist as called to love of humanity, a higher love than love of nation.

The American Salvation Army was not alone in yielding to the power of patriotism. Patriotism proved decisive in Australia (see Chs.15 and 25) and also on the mainland in Europe, particularly in France and Belgium (see Ch.23). Whilst the activities of Bouquet and Bovigny in Belgium were scarcely in accord with political neutrality, nevertheless, it is hard to imagine that Army leaders at International Headquarters would have wished to condemn what they did under conditions of enemy occupation. However, they did it in their capacity as Belgian citizens and not as representative salvationists. This is a crucial difference between their reactions and those of the American salvationists (see 541.
If any segment of the Army exemplified the internationalist ideals of William Booth and his successors in office, whilst yet displaying a proper national loyalty, it was that segment which came under perhaps the severest test - the Army in Germany after 1914. Perhaps this was the least expected place in which to find the tension best resolved (see Ch.10). Treite and his people were faithful to the cardinal salvationist principles of evangelism, good works and internationalism. Yet they drew sympathy from the German authorities despite the Army's status as a body owing allegiance to a single head (the General) in an alien and enemy country. It is important to stress that the Army, in urging for its members a loyalty above ordinary patriotism, was not opposed to nationhood per se. Rather, the goal was to balance love of country with obedience to New Testament teaching about the brotherhood of man. That this balance was not altogether impossible is proved by the example of Treite's Army in the First World War.

However, as already noted in Ch.10, Sect.1, any success throughout the Army generally in resisting nationalistic excess in wartime was achieved very much despite the magnetism of patriotism, rather than directly because of the attractions of internationalism. Salvationists, like everyone else, lived in the real world and that meant no automatic exemption from the sway of patriotic feeling upon the heart.

7. The Personal Views of Leaders

It has already been noted that the majority of lay salvationists in wartime held patriotic views natural and proper to their status as citizens of particular national states (see Points 2 and 8). It has further been noted that their leaders in the Army repeatedly cautioned against overt partisanship and pointed them to higher ideals as members
of a world fellowship. It is unsurprising that those same leaders found rising within themselves partisan emotions sometimes at variance with the exhortations they proffered in their official salvationist capacities.

The evidence suggests that some leaders were capable not only of entertaining properly patriotic feelings for their native country, but also of appealing quite deliberately to the partisan spirit in their hearers to further the Army's interests in wartime. It would be too harsh a judgment, however, to speak of anything like cynical double standards. It was rather a case of instinctively exploiting the prevailing mood of the moment in order to achieve an urgent goal.

For example, even William Booth, who first set down the political neutrality principle for The Salvation Army in time of war, permitted Mary Murray's Boer War memoirs to be published without a mention in them of Army work amongst Boer soldiers and civilians. To have included those things would have lessened the volume's impact as a fund-raising device in Britain. (See Ch.5, Sect.1.) Again, the gentle Mary Murray herself indulged in lurid, gory accounts of the fighting despite advice to ordinary salvationists to shun such things in the popular press (Ch.4, Sect.1). It was as if the desire to make an impact for public relations purposes overcame salvationist wartime principles which would otherwise have been followed without demur.

The sources indicate clearly that of all the wartime leaders it was Bramwell Booth in the First World War who proved least able to match personal views with official policy. He found it very difficult to refrain from political comment, despite the policy of neutrality. He let it be known that he thought Belgium had been 'suddenly and ruthlessly' attacked (Ch.9, Sect.1); after the Armistice he openly blamed Germany for the war, as did his wife, Florence (Ch.9, Sect.3); he dropped all
pretence of supranationalism when addressing British servicemen (Ch. 9, Sect. 2); he permitted, and participated in, nationalistic public meetings to mark the deaths of salvationists in the forces (Ch. 9, Sect. 2); he appealed openly to patriotic sentiment in the general public when the need for funds became desperate (Ch. 11, Sect. 2); he mounted anti-alcohol campaigns, again based on considerations of partisanship (Ch. 11, Sect. 1); he did not hesitate to allude to partisan purposes when dedicating field ambulances at the Guildhall in London (Ch. 11, Sect. 3); and he used primarily patriotic arguments in his efforts to see Army officers made military chaplains (Ch. 12, Sect. 3 and Ch. 13, Sect. 1). None of these things would be especially remarkable, were it not for the fact that they flew in the face of the General's own exhortations and instructions to the Army to rise above partisanship in the war. Bramwell was open to the charge that he did not always practise what he preached.

George Carpenter's record from 1939 to 1945 was, by comparison, consistency itself. The sources reveal nothing to suggest he did not carry in the privacy of his own heart and mind those same convictions concerning an international and evenhanded spirit of which he so frequently spoke and wrote during his wartime generalship. In 1940 he even refused in public to pray for victory for one side in the war (Ch. 20, Sect. 2). There is thus no evidence to tar him with the same brush as either Bramwell Booth or his sister, Evangeline. The latter dropped the high-minded tone of her comments on the war in her closing weeks as the General as soon as she set foot again on American soil following her retirement (Ch. 24, Sect. 1). By contrast, Carpenter's wartime utterances hold no hint that they came somehow from 'the office of the General' and not from the man himself. This is accounted for largely by his pacifist leanings and his intuitive abhorrence of the war, attitudes not shared by his predecessors.

It must be concluded that, with the exception of Carpenter, the
wartime Generals (and Bramwell Booth in particular) found it extremely difficult to achieve full personal consistency with all that they asked from salvationists in the warring countries. Any significant degree of inconsistency became apparent chiefly as a result of the Army's immediate and pressing needs, when an appeal to Britain's cause in the conflicts and to the patriotism of the people were seen as likely to help on the work of the Army.

8. **Official Policy and Grassroots Opinion**

See the comments under Point 2 above.

9. **Divergence from IHQ Policy**

It was clearly the wish of International Headquarters to see a uniform policy emerging from the various Territorial and local command centres in wartime. The sources show a general uniformity in all three wars when it came to the two cardinal principles of evangelical work and practical caring outreach. The same sources reveal, however, a profound degree of divergence from London policies on its stand of political neutrality. In his *Modern Nationalism and Religion* Salo Baron has pointed out that any religious leader with world responsibilities, (like a salvationist General, or a Pope) who tries to state opinion or policy for his international family will eventually run counter to some local interests and prejudices. This was precisely the problem for Bramwell Booth in 1914 and for George Carpenter in 1939.

Interestingly, divergence from IHQ positions was kept to a minimum by salvationists and their leaders in countries opposed to Britain in the two World Wars. It was in the allied countries that the IHQ policy of non-partisanship did not take root.

The Boer War took place on a scale much more limited than in the later wars, which meant that the question of divergence scarcely arose.
Only Britain and South Africa took part and there is no evidence that Army leaders in South Africa, or Boer salvationists in the Transvaal, were not at one with William Booth's three cardinal principles for the Army in time of war. If there was divergence, it came in the form of internal disagreement with Booth on the question of pacifism (see Ch. 6 on Arthur and Kate Booth-Clibborn). This aspect is dealt with under Point 11 below.

Substantial departure from the third of the three cardinal principles initially became apparent in the First World War. That Army leaders outside Britain were not all slavish followers of General Bramwell Booth's opinions was first seen in their adverse reaction to his comments attacking the British press for its 'vulgar' treatment of the Kaiser (Ch. 9, Sect. 1, Note 30).

However, it was the Army in the USA which decided to disregard entirely the policy of political neutrality. Any attempts to adhere to neutrality as an expression of internationalism are evidenced only in the pre-USA entry sources, that is, those dated earlier than 6th April 1917. After that date the American sources are distinctly partisan and anti-German. Details of this have been given in Ch. 15, Sect. 1. The Alexander Damon diaries record the patriotic fervour which swept the headquarters in New York. The American War Cry studiously avoided any mention of Germans or even salvationists in Germany, showing not only a rejection of neutrality, but of traditional Army international principles too. Evangeline Booth committed the Army in the States publicly to the cause of the government and went out of her way to ensure it was perceived both by the authorities and the public in general as part of the national war machine. Her own account of the Army's role in the war (see Ch. 15, Sect. 1, Note 31) rings with patriotic, one-sided sentiment. Her policies drew from her brother, Herbert, allegations
that she had betrayed salvationist ideals in a misconceived quest for popular approval.

Her counterpart in Australia, James Hay, was scarcely less partisan (see Ch. 15, Sect. 2). The Army in New Zealand made little attempt at non-partisanship (see Ch. 15, Sect. 3). Even in India the IHQ policy failed to take root, with the creation, inter alia, of The Salvation Army Porter Coolie Corps (see Ch. 15, Sect. 4).

The Second World War found the Army in the USA once again unable or unwilling to adopt the neutrality policy. As in 1917, the American entry into the fighting (in December 1941) resulted in the Army in the USA being explicitly aligned with the policies of the State, principally through its formal ties with the United Services Organisation, a political and partisan body (see Ch. 24, Sects. 2 and 3). The evidence indicating how far American salvationists diverged from official IHQ stances in the Second World War is set out mainly in Ch. 24, Sect. 4. There is a total absence of anything approaching internationalism or the neutrality promoted by IHQ as official policy in the World Wars. Conversely, the American Army offered no response, save silence, to the use of the atomic bomb in August 1945. This contrasted starkly with the willingness at IHQ, for once, to analyse and comment upon the moral issues involved (see Ch. 26).

The fierceness of the magnetic pull of patriotism in America has been referred to in this work more than once. The conclusion is unavoidable that in 1917 and 1941 its power eclipsed any chance of a high-minded internationalism prevailing amongst American salvationists. The Army in the USA shunned not only neutrality. It abandoned, for the duration of the wars, the international spirit of salvationism that was deemed integral to being a salvationist. It should have been possible to manifest that spirit, even if patriotism, or considerations of the justness of the American cause, drove Army leaders in the States to side openly with the
government. It was one thing to reject the neutrality which International Headquarters saw, perhaps mistakenly, as the logical outcome of internationalism (see Point 3 above). It was quite another to turn away, however temporarily, from internationalism itself. Stated briefly, the demands of being an international community were overestimated in London, but underestimated in America. What is surprising is the absence in the sources of evidence of real tension between American leaders and IHQ in wartime as a result of the divergence here described. Bramwell Booth appears to have allowed Evangeline a free hand after April 1917, and George Carpenter was powerless in the Second World War to prevent the Army in the States from re-adopting its roles and attitudes established under Evangeline's unstoppable, charismatic leadership.

Certainly, the American position in the World Wars and that of IHQ in relation to the third cardinal principle and how it should be expressed in practical policies, were mutually exclusive. Yet the divergence caused no lasting damage to relationships after the wars. It was as though IHQ, with its world perspective and its main priority throughout of worldwide cohesion within the Army, could live with the consequences of the fact that Territorial leaders would naturally feel first national and local pressures and respond to them more urgently than to any others. In so doing, they were saved from some of the tensions and inconsistencies found in the London policy (see Point 3 and 7 above).

10. The Army's Ecclesiastical Status

None of the wars did much to clarify the precise ecclesiastical status of The Salvation Army, with the notable exception of the Army in the USA (see below). In most countries where it worked, the Army carried the uncertainty and ambivalence of being seen sometimes as a religious denomination, sometimes as a charitable body, sometimes as a mission, and
sometimes as all or a combination of various of these things. The Army's perceptions of its own status were not always exact. It could refer to itself as a church, as part of the body of Christ, or as merely a movement or an organisation, terms vague enough to incorporate any other more precise concepts as need dictated.

The Boer War gave rise to little or no problems with regard to the exact standing of the Army (see Ch. 2, Sect. 2) mainly because no issue arose which called that standing into question. In particular, the issue of salvationist military chaplains was not on the agenda until the First World War.

Bramwell Booth was sure it was the Army's perceived uncertain status, together therefore with the perceived uncertain status of its commissioned officers, that held back the War Office for so long in appointing Army officers as military chaplains after 1914. Only in 1918 did the first appointments come (see Ch. 12, Sect. 3). The same problem underlay the slowness of the War Office to issue orders permitting servicemen to attest as salvationists (see Ch. 12, Sect. 3). The Army's ambivalent status proved a disadvantage again when Bramwell Booth offered to establish work amongst British prisoners-of-war in Berlin (see Ch. 10, Sect. 3) and when he offered the War Office a team of volunteers under his abortive 'Searchers Scheme' for the dying men in no-man's-land (see Ch. 11, Sect. 3).

In contrast, the fact that the Army was patently not an establishment creature nor linked with the established church accounts in part for the readiness of the fighting men (and women) to be seen in Army huts and other centres during the wars. It was possible for a man to attend an Army worship meeting and to enjoy Army hospitality without necessarily attracting from his fellows charges of overt piety. The same was true for his relatives at home (see Ch. 12, Sect. 1). There was, therefore, no credibility problem in the long term with the fighting forces, either
with regard to the troops or their officers. What credibility problems were encountered stemmed from the War Office (see Ch.12, Sect.3), or (less significantly) from the established church, whose Dean Herbert Henson (see Ch.14, Sect.1) represented a kindlier, more liberal face.

Alan Wilkinson has commented upon the Army's use of quasi-military imagery (see Ch.11, Sect.1, Note 1), drawing attention to its potentially incongruent place in time of war. Wilkinson's view, as argued in Ch.11, does not withstand examination and is not supported by the evident ease with which salvationists identified with the lot of the servicemen. Nevertheless, Wilkinson's observations do prompt the thought that the Army could not reasonably expect to find a ready understanding and insight into its status, workings, or self-perceptions on the part of an officialdom more naturally accustomed to the terminology and structures of the Church of England or the principal non-conformist denominations like the Methodists or the Baptists.

Outside Britain these problems were less intractable. In Australia the Army was expected immediately to provide military chaplains (see Ch.15, Sect.2). The same was true in New Zealand (see Ch.15, Sect.3). Events in America in 1917 exposed Britain's lack of bureaucratic machinery for determining swiftly the standing of a particular group in relation to the military authorities. In September 1917 the Acting Judge Advocate General handed down a judgment establishing clearly the Army's status as a religious denomination and its officers therefore as regularly ordained ministers (see Ch.15, Sect.1). Had a similar judicial device been available in Britain, the Army would have been saved much anguish and its chaplains appointed long before the last weeks of the 1914-1918 war.

The 1917 decision in the States held good for the Army there when war returned in 1941. In Britain, however, the same battles loomed for
IHQ with Whitehall. They were circumvented finally by mutual agree-
ment on the chaplaincy issue (see Ch. 21, Sect. 1). Certain credibility
problems with the Anglicans emerged when some used the occasion of George
Carpenter's election to denigrate the Army's non-sacramental tradition,
and later when some dissented publicly from the Bishop of London's
consent to the Army to use St. Paul's Cathedral (see Ch. 22, Sect. 2).
The over-sensitive response of the salvationists was not helpful, but
these episodes did not damage the Army's ecumenical activities generally
(see Ch. 22, Sect. 1) or reduce the Army's role during the war.

It may be concluded that the ambivalent status of the Army worked
to its disadvantage in wartime more than once with the British authorities,
but not, generally speaking, with the equivalent authorities in the allied
countries overseas. Relations with some Anglicans were strained,
especially in the Second World War, but not to a significant degree.
Relationships with the non-conformist churches were always cordial. The
Army's non-establishment position and its uncertain ecclesiastical
standing allowed it to distance itself from government action if it so
wished, mainly by refraining from overt statements of support, and
simultaneously brought a ready acceptance of its wartime role by the
general public and the men and women in the forces. All of this allowed
the salvationists to be judged exclusively on the merits of their wartime
work and ministries, the only real credentials they could offer.

11. The Place of Private Conscience

The triple combination of evangelism, compassionate action, and
political neutrality did not prove too much of a straitjacket for
salvationists. Soul-winning and social work were to them as natural as
breathing, as was the marrying of the two. The third limb of the
policy, silence on the respective merits of the causes being pursued,
regardless of one's personal and private views and of one's national
loyalties, left sufficient room in practice for the co-existence of
those of different persuasions within the Army as to the rightness of
bearing arms.

Policy emanating from International Headquarters placed the dictates
of private conscience as paramount in the issue. It was a deliberate
course chosen first by William Booth in the Boer War and designed (as
with the neutrality policy) to prevent schism in the Army. He lost
the pacifist Booth-Clibborn over it as well as his equally pacifist
children, Kate and Herbert, but for the Army taken as a whole the stance
proved workable, in that unity was maintained.

The vast majority of those eligible chose to join up. The
conscientious objectors were just about tolerated in 1916-1918. By
1939 their number had grown and they had an easier, but still uncomfort-
able, time from fellow-salvationists (see Chs.13 and 20).

Certain pacifists rose to high office after 1945, the pacifist
group at International Headquarters in the 1930's and 1940's representing
some of the ablest of the officers at that time (see Ch.20). Theirs
was a pacifism born of religious convictions. It went further than
the definition of 'pacifism' given by the Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary:

'The doctrine or belief that it is desirable and possible
to settle international disputes by peaceful means.'

Such a belief was probably held by many Christians between the World
Wars and most likely by the bulk of salvationists. Salvationist
pacifism rejected violence as a means of settling a nation's disputes,
but typically ruled out also participation in war by any means.
Carvosso Gauntlett was the prime example of one who held such views and
was chief architect of the London pacifist group. Some more moderately-
minded salvationists with pacifist leanings offered for non-combatant

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service, especially in 1939-1945. No officer was permitted to leave his appointment for combatant service in either of the World Wars.

Such scruples, whether restricting by policy the role of officers, or ruling out because of personal conviction an affirmative answer to the call to arms, sprang from a particular understanding of the life and teaching of Jesus. Carvosso Gauntlett held that it was not necessary to go on living or even to live in freedom, but it was absolutely necessary to obey Christ. To adopt the terminology and classification of types of pacifism attempted by the American, John H Yoder, the London pacifists in The Salvation Army held to 'the pacifism of absolute principle'. The 'thou shalt not kill' of the Ten Commandments could admit of no exceptions. It was a divinely given absolute. It was seen as demanding an obedience and an allegiance above that required by love of country or patriotism. Indeed, adherence to it was claimed to be ultimately more patriotic than any other response. It was not a popular position. It took hold only in London. No other part of the Army world saw a similar movement during any of the three wars covered in this thesis.

Pacifism in the Army played hardly any direct part in the formulation of wartime policy. Neither William nor Bramwell Booth were pacifists. Evangeline Booth certainly was not. Only George Carpenter aligned himself with such convictions, but still made no attempt to impose somehow his private views on the Army as a whole. He did, however, make Carvosso Gauntlett his wartime Editor-in-Chief, with the result that between them they controlled everything going into the salvationist press in wartime London (see further on this - Point 14 below).

It needs to be asked why William Booth and his successors felt able to leave the carrying of weapons in war to the private consciences...
of salvationists whilst nevertheless being prescriptive in other areas of moral choice. For example, it was not possible to be a salvationist at all without complying with clear rules on the consumption of alcohol, the use of tobacco, and on sexual conduct. These, it should be remembered, were well established principles long before the Army was caught up in the war of 1899. They had emerged in a specific form largely because of the social vices of the day and because they were the chief enemies of many amongst William Booth's first congregations and converts. Thus clear undertakings on these things became an integral part of salvationism. Pacifism (or its non-pacifist counterpart) was simply not of the same order. It was not at any time on the salvationist agenda before the Boer War and, when it did eventually come up, William Booth intuitively chose a course (that is, freedom of conscience) least likely to split his people (see Chs. 6 and 7). 'Pacifism or not' was never an issue going to the essence of what it meant to be a salvationist, either by reason of the early history of the Army or by reason of practical necessity. In fact, practical necessity militated against the adoption of pacifism as essential to the Army. The pragmatist in William Booth would never have allowed him to risk such a potentially divisive step. The same was true of the later Generals, even the pacifist George Carpenter. No general debate took place in any of the wars within the Army concerning the ethical or theological justifications for pacifism. The sources indicate that the only attempts to address these matters came from the small group of pacifists in London in the 1930's and 1940's.

12. Development and Salvationist Policies

The sources do not indicate any major development of basic Army policy in relation to warfare between the end of the Boer War in 1902
and the end of the Second World War in 1945. The creative years for policy-making were 1899 and 1900 when William Booth faced war for the first time, resulting in the articulation of the three cardinal principles of soul-saving evangelism, compassionate and practical caring, and strict political neutrality based upon broad internationalist convictions.

It has already been shown that these remained the foundation for salvationist actions and attitudes in the later wars. Indeed, the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 forced the Army to go back to the Boer War precedents in a conscious way (see Ch. 8, Sect. 2 and Ch. 9, Sect. 1). Boer War policies were deliberately researched, re-discovered and re-applied. (See further the analysis under Point 3 above.) This was, perhaps, the natural thing to do since, despite the death of William Booth, the senior leaders in London in 1914 were still largely those who were in place during the Boer War, most notably Bramwell Booth and Mary Murray. Only twelve years had passed.

The conclusion has been reached in Ch. 16, Sect. 1 above that Army policy underwent no significant development of any kind between 1902 and 1918. Some evidence of 'just war' thinking emerged but only by way of the passing use of 'just war' terminology. If 'just war' concepts became, to a limited extent, part of Army thinking about war in 1918, that process was entirely an unconscious one and did not affect overall war policy.

The Second World War followed the great debate of the inter-war years on the morality of warfare and hence salvationists became more accustomed to the conscious use of 'just war' categories (see Ch. 19, Sect. 1). But still no major impact was evident upon formal policies in wartime. The three cardinal principles took the Army through to 1945, so that in the course of 46 years the policies used by the Founder in 1899 underwent no meaningful change at all (see Point 3 above).
Outside Britain, in the USA and in Australia there was clearer evidence of 'just war' criteria being applied to the World Wars and of conclusions being reached as to the apportionment of blame between the warring nations. This happened in Australia in 1914 (see Ch.15, Sect.2) and in the USA in both World Wars (see Ch.15, Sect.1 and Ch.24). The Army in those places was willing to go public with its findings, something which IHQ never did, though it made use of 'just war' ideas in commenting in a general way upon war and the modern means of pursuing it. What London did not see clearly was that at the heart of 'just war' thinking is the question of which side's cause is the just one. To have gone all the way, like the Army in the States and to have made a judgment and then to have acted upon it would have been ethically and philosophically consistent. So too, albeit in an opposite direction, would have been an outright rejection of 'just war' thinking. London, however, adopted an approach which, philosophically speaking, was neither one thing nor the other - the partial use of 'just war' concepts, and a conscious refusal to judge the righteousness of the conflict. As argued in Point 3 above, ethical coherence was sacrificed to the pragmatic considerations of holding the international Army together, and of saying or doing nothing from IHQ which would have damaged the Army's interests in those countries opposed to Britain or which would have endangered salvationists in those places. In other words, the politics of international religious leadership took control at IHQ, in a way that did not apply at a local, national level.

13. The Role of Women

The sources yield overwhelming evidence to support the conclusion that the Army's impact in wartime would have been greatly diminished but for the work and ministry of its women. They had always been accorded a place equal to that of men in the Army's full-time ministry and no
position was barred to them. Notably it was to a woman that William Booth turned when he first considered what to do in the Boer War. He sent Mary Murray to South Africa in November 1899 with instructions to explore the openings for work by the Army's women (see Ch.5, Sect.1). She reported that women not only could, but should play a part, not confined to practical work alone but extending to an explicitly spiritual ministry. This was done. It set the pattern for the later wars.

The contribution of the women in the 1914-1918 war has been described in Ch.11, Sect.5 above. It included all kinds of practical things, but made priorities of teaching, preaching, praying and counselling. The Second World War saw the same result, with women officers in New Zealand even being made military chaplains (see Ch.25, Sect.2).

The Army's wish, in the First World War, to utilise its women so fully created difficulties with the War Office in London which banned them from the Ambulance Brigade, much to the Army's chagrin (see Ch.11, Sect.5). It also created misunderstandings in the minds of the British authorities when the Army pressed for its officers to be accepted as military chaplains (see Ch.12, Sect.3). However, these things were minor discouragements which could not, in the end, prevent an impressive service being rendered in many countries in all the wars.

It is probably no exaggeration to claim that the part played by salvationist women in the wars was a decisive factor in the carrying through of the Army's second cardinal principle of compassionate and practical outreach. They offered 'services peculiar to mothers and sisters' (see Ch.11, Sect.5, Note 139), an approach emulated by American Army women who were told by Evangeline Booth simply to find the troops and mother them (see Ch.15, Sect.1). It was, however, Mrs. General Carpenter who caught more profoundly the task to which the women were called in wartime when she urged them to 'refill the wells
of pity' (see Ch.18, Sect.2, Note 43).

All the evidence points to a faithful discharging of this calling in every country caught up in the wars. The response from the troops and their families showed how vital a ministry it was.

14. The Written Word

In all the wars between 1899 and 1945 the Army's printed publications formed the single most influential factor in communicating to the mass of salvationists the policies and official attitudes of the leadership in London. In particular, The War Cry maintained a central role. It should be understood that this was true mainly of the periodicals published in London, where the General kept a personal hand on the contents of everything going into print.

The Army papers and journals in all the wars devoted much space to exhortation, war work reports, anecdotes to exemplify the Army wartime spirit, peace poems, and even the occasional anti-war sketch or cartoon. The overall coverage of the war work was painstakingly evenhanded, most discernibly in the London War Cry. There was hardly any political comment of note, the most obvious exception being the reaction to events at Hiroshima (see Ch.26). Deviation from the third cardinal principle was not altogether unknown, but examples were very rare (see, for example, Ch.19, Sect.2).

The earlier literature of the Boer War period was markedly more paternalistic than in the later wars. The readership would have been less sophisticated than in later decades. On the whole, William Booth was content to leave the writing to his editors and only occasionally went into print himself (see Ch.3). When he did he was direct and pungent. It has been noted in Ch.4, Sect.1 above that the quality of the writing could vary considerably, but that at its best it could be powerfully moving.
Bramwell Booth wrote more in wartime than any of the leaders before or after him. He wrote weekly for *The War Cry*, with the result that the impact of an article over the name of the General was diminished. It is not a harsh judgment to say he wrote too much. This accounts in part for his not infrequent lapses into partisan and political asides (see Ch. 9), though the impression cannot be gained that in his main themes he was unfaithful to the three cardinal wartime principles he copied from his father. He made telling use of *The Officer* magazine (see Ch. 9, Sect. 1) which was (and is) the General's main means of speaking directly to all officers.

George Carpenter's writings were also frequent, but somehow more tranquil and consistent than those of Bramwell Booth. There was a spiritual quality pervading them which was not apparent to the same extent in the salvationist press in the earlier wars. Again, one's attention is caught by the gentle spirituality of Carpenter, a spirituality not divorced from the real world, as shown by his wartime books for those in the forces. Most notable of these was *New Battlegrounds* which sold over 1.5 million copies and which became the official handbook for all non-Catholics in the USA forces (see Ch. 20, Sect. 1, Note 19). He protected the tone and content of the Army's London publications in wartime by appointing the Army's pacifist par excellence, Carvosso Gauntlett, as his Editor-in-Chief. It proved to be a crucial step. Gauntlett's own output was prolific and he had moreover a gift of communicating with the young. There is no evidence that he used his position to foist pacifist opinions on the readership but, like Carpenter, he conveyed a spirit of untarnished sincerity in all he wrote. It was no great effort for him to urge salvationists to keep their eyes on higher things, or to exhort his readers to place first the inviolable brotherhood of man above lesser loyalties such as loyalty.
to country. As Editor-in-Chief he represented all that was good in salvationist wartime publishing and demonstrated repeatedly the strategic importance of the written word in holding at bay the secular and potentially impoverishing influences of a world at war.

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It is thus perhaps fitting to let the final quotation of this study be from the pen of another Army pacifist, Frederick Coutts, writing about his mentor and fellow-pacifist, Carvosso Gauntlett. Coutts was anxious that he should impress upon the reader the absolute centrality of internationalist ideals in the life of Gauntlett. Then, alluding to the tension undergone by any sensitively-minded salvationist responding to Army demands in wartime, Coutts writes: 20

'The Army's internationalism is its crown of glory in peacetime, but in war it becomes a crown of thorns.'

The Salvation Army's actions and attitudes in wartime find their distinctiveness in a combination of the three cardinal tenets highlighted throughout this study. The chosen means of carrying out the third principle, internationalism, produced both internal and external stresses. If this brought sometimes 'glory', sometimes 'thorns', the best salvationists would have recognised therein the lot of the Lord they tried to follow. But in following a policy of political neutrality, something the world leadership in three wars mistakenly saw as flowing logically from international structures and ideals, the Army displayed itself also as though disinclined to wrestle with the real issues, and as complacent concerning a truly deep involvement with a world at war. It settled for old policies in new situations. All the splendid intensity of its soul-saving efforts in the wars, and all the burning energy poured out in devotion to practical human need do not, in retrospect, hide the ultimate inadequacy of the neutrality wrung from the third cardinal principle.

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1. See 1 Corinthians 12-13; Galatians 3:28; Ephesians 4:4-6.

2. ATW March 1900, 190.

3. IWC 28-4-00:8.

4. IWC 7-11-14:7.


6. It has been argued (convincingly) that the Roman Catholics were saved from the worst effects of nationalism because of their single headship in Rome, embracing all the world: see Salo W. Baron, *Modern Nationalism and Religion* (Harper, New York, 1947), 90-91. The Salvation Army's international hierarchy, with extra-territorial authority based in London, would have served similarly to turn salvationist minds regularly beyond national boundaries in everyday matters, thus discouraging any deep penetration of salvationist attitudes by nationalist ideologies.


8. The author's present appointment since 1982 as the Army's Legal and Parliamentary Secretary at International Headquarters involves him in frequent contact with the Civil Service and with Ministers in an effort to modify government policies in a wide range of matters – from taxation and social security law to divorce law reform and public order. This work continues the tradition of salvationist political action referred to in the text.


10. The author is indebted to Dr. James E Read, Associate Professor at the Catherine Booth Bible College, Winnipeg, for his unpublished paper, *Positional Statements* (1988), which considers the means by which the Army develops and adopts positions on moral issues.

11. Nowadays the Army seeks to combine autocracy with consultation on a wide and regular scale. The Advisory Council to the General acts as a sensible limitation upon the General's powers, with all major issues coming before it. It has never, however, included in its membership officers below the rank of Commissioner or non-officers. Its composition is thus perpetually elderly, minimising the likelihood of fresh thinking on old, recurring themes.

12. An almost exact parallel can be seen today in the Army's response to apartheid in South Africa, where its refusal to venture into the political arena (for fear of adverse consequences for its work and personnel) is taken by non-white
church leaders like Allan Boesak and Desmond Tutu as a neutrality bordering on moral cowardice, despite salvationist efforts to oppose apartheid by fostering a genuine, multi-racial community within the Army's own ranks.


20. Portrait, 18; also Coutts, 19.
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