Post-modern patrimonialism in Africa

De Fragoso Vidal, Nuno Carlos

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by

Nuno Carlos de Fragoso Vidal

A dissertation submitted to the University of London for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
King’s College, London
2002
This thesis will seek to explain the development of the Angolan political system after independence; in particular, it will attempt to assess the extent to which the country's political evolution is distinct in Africa, and if so, why?

The issues raised in this thesis are centred around Weber's principal theories regarding the expression and dynamics of internal rationality within an existing social system as embodied by the State.

There is a broad consensus within African Studies on post-colonial societies in Africa. After independence, these systems were subjected to specific social and political dynamics, the rationality of which has been identified as being patrimonial. Ties of distributive interdependence are forged between social actors in general and between rulers and ruled in particular. This will be referred to in this thesis as 'modern patrimonialism'.

However, the Angolan experience — and maybe that of other countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Nigeria — is one where a distinct patrimonial social organisation is to be found. The ties of distributive interdependence between rulers and ruled are not so much forged as diluted, and the patrimonial system undergoes different dynamics. This brings a new dimension to the notion of patrimonialism as a socio-political system and will be termed 'post-modern patrimonialism'. The creation, construction and development of this distinct form of patrimonialism occurred in Angola long before the so-called transition to multiparty system and market economy, which began in 1987.

This thesis argues that, in Angola, the different socio-political dynamics of a post-modern patrimonial system are due to three phenomena. Firstly, there was a process of insularity and autonomy characterising the economic and political power of the ruling elites, which led to the extreme dependence and lack of economic and political power of the ruled masses. Secondly, there was a cumulative movement that deepened and reinforced the principles, foundations and expressions of patrimonial social organisation, through the dilution of distributive interdependence between rulers and ruled. Thirdly, there was the civil war with increased ethnic overtones, which promoted micro-identity political alignments and economic scarcity, thus favouring the further strengthening of this new form of unaccountable patrimonialism.
- TABLE OF CONTENTS

General Introduction ........................................................................................................... 11

PART I
THEORETICAL DISCUSSION
1 Modern Patrimonialism .................................................................................................. 30
2 Post-Modern Patrimonialism .......................................................................................... 64

PART II
CASE STUDY: ANGOLA A CASE OF POST-MODERN PATRIMONIALISM
Analytical structure and methodology .............................................................................. 84

Section A: The Main Socio-Cultural Identity Cleavages, Origins and Political Significance Before the Independence ................................................................. 90
3 The Analysis of the Main Literature on Socio-Cultural Identification Cleavages and Its Political Significance ................................................................. 91
4 An Assessment of the Arguments ................................................................................. 107

Section B: The Construction of the New Post-Independence System or Partisan Modern Patrimonialism (1975-1979) ................................................................. 131
5 Context of Socio-Political Events: Nitismo and the Attempted Coup in 1977 ............... 132
6 The Construction of a New Political Framework ............................................................ 165
7 The Construction of a New Socio-Economic Framework .............................................. 194
8 The Framework of Ethical and Normative Principles ..................................................... 233
9 The State During Agostinho Neto's Presidency ............................................................... 252

Section C: Development of Post-Independence System or Presidential Post-Modern Patrimonialism (1979-1985/87) ................................................................. 254
10 Context of Socio-Political Events: Renewed Conflicts Between Left and Right at the Top .............................................................................................................. 255
11 Development of the Political Framework 1979-1985/87 .............................................. 272
12 Development of the Socio-Economic Framework 1979-1985/87 ............................... 310
13 The Evolution of the Ethical and Normative Principles of the dos Santos Regime 1979-1985/87 ......................................................................................... 338
14 The State During Eduardo dos Santos Presidency (1979-1985/87) ......................... 361

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 364

Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 381
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Indigenous Population of Angola – 1960 Census</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.3.1</td>
<td>Basic MPLA organisational Structure in the 1970’s and 1980’s</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.2.1.1</td>
<td>State Organisations</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.2.2.1</td>
<td>Military Regions and Principal Bases, 1987</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.2.2.2</td>
<td>Administrative Divisions of Angola, 1988</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.2.2.3</td>
<td>Central State Structure</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACP  African, Caribbean and Pacific (countries)
ACR  Africa Contemporary Record
ADRA  *Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente*—Action for Rural Development and Environment
ARB  Africa Research Bulletin
ANANGOLA  *Associação dos Nativos de Angola*—Association of Native Angolans
ANGOP  Angola Press
AUP  *Agrupamentos de Unidades de Produção/Groups of Production Units*
BERD  *Bank Européenne pour la Reconstruction et le Développement* European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
BM  *Boletim do Militante*—Bulletin of the Party’s Militant
BPV  *Brigadas Populares de Vigilância*—Popular Vigilance Brigades
BP  *Bureau Politico*—Political Bureau
CM  *Conselho de Ministros*—Council of Ministers
CC  *Comité Central*—Central Committee
CDS  *Conselho de Defesa e Segurança*—Council for Defence and Security
CMRs  *Conselhos Militares Regionais*—Regional Military Councils
CR  *Conselho da Revolução*—Council of the Revolution
DEPI  *Departamento de Estudos Propaganda e Informação*—Department of Studies Propaganda and Information
DINAMA  *Distribuidora Nacional de Materiais Agrícolas*—National Distributor of Agricultural Supplies
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIP</td>
<td>Departamento de Informação e Propaganda—Department of Information and Propaganda</td>
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<tr>
<td>DISA</td>
<td>Direcção de Informação e Segurança de Angola—Directorate for Information and Security of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOP</td>
<td>Departamento de Orientação Política—Department of Political Orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOM</td>
<td>Departamento de Organização de Massas—Department for Masses Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>Diário da República—Diary of the Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELP</td>
<td>Exército de Libertação Popular—Army of Popular Liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENAMA</td>
<td>Empresa Nacional de Maquinização Agrícola—National Enterprise for Agricultural Mechanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENCODIPA</td>
<td>Empresa Nacional de Comercialização e Distribuição de Produtos Agrícolas—National Enterprise for Commercialisation and Distribution of Agricultural Produce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FALA</td>
<td>Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola—Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAPLA</td>
<td>Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola—People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>FESA</td>
<td>Fundação Eduardo dos Santos—Eduardo dos Santos Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLEC</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda—Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda</td>
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<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola—National Liberation Front of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>FpD</td>
<td>Frente para a Democracia—Front for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>INABE</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Bolsas de Estudo—National Institute for Study Bursaries</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>Instituto para o Desenvolvimento Agrícola—I Institute for Agriculture Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INORADE</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional para a Organização da Administração do Estado—I Institute for the Organisation of State Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMLPA</td>
<td>Juventude do Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—Youth of the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAPESS</td>
<td>Ministério da Administração Pública Emprego e Segurança Social—Ministry of Public Administration Employment and Social Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINARS</td>
<td>Ministério da Assistência e Reinserção Social—Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPLA-PT</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola-Partido do Trabalho—People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labour Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCDE</td>
<td>Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Europeu—European Organisation for Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODP</td>
<td>Organização de Defesa Popular—People’s Defence Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIT</td>
<td>Organização Internacional do Trabalho—International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCA</td>
<td>Organização Comunista de Angola—Communist Organisation of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMS</td>
<td>Organização Mundial de Saúde—World Health Organisation</td>
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</table>
OMA  Organização da Mulher Angolana—Organisation for Angolan Women
PGR  Procuradoria Geral da República—Office of the Procurator General of the Republic
PIDE  Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado—International Police for the Defence and Security of the State
PR  Presidente da República—President of the Republic
PRD  Partido Renovador Democrático—Party of Democratic Renewal
PRS  Partido da Renovação Social—Party of Social Renewal
RPA  República Popular de Angola—People’s Republic of Angola
SEF  Programa de Saneamento Económico e Financeiro—Economic and Financial Clean-up Programme
SADCC  Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference
SOAS  School of Oriental and Africal Studies
SONANGOL  Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis—National Fuels Company
SWAPO  South West African People’s Organisation
SWB  Summary of World Broadcasts, British Broadcasting Corporation Monitoring
TAAG  Transportes Aéreos Angolanos—Angolan Airline
TPRs  Tribunais Populares Revolucionários — People’s Revolutionary Tribunals
UN  United Nations
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UN UCAH  Unidade de Coordenação das Ajudas Humanitárias — Unit for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance, of the United Nations
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund
UNITA  União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola—
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPNA</td>
<td>União Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Angola—National Union of Angolan Workers</td>
</tr>
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<td>UPA</td>
<td>União dos Povos do Norte de Angola—Union of Peoples of Northern Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPA/FNLA</td>
<td>União dos Povos de Angola—Union of Peoples of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>UTCA</td>
<td>Unidade Técnica de Coordenação da Ajuda—Technical Unity for Co-ordination of Aid, governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work would not have been possible without the support of several people and institutions. As this work has taken over five years to complete, it is inevitable that some should have been forgotten, and for this omission, I ask to be forgiven. Special thanks are due to my supervisor, Professor Patrick Chabal, for his unwavering and unlimited patience; to all the people who granted me interviews, for their kindness and friendship, and whose names are listed in the bibliography (except of those who requested anonymity); to my mother; to my wife and son, whom for many a month were deprived of my company; to the Ferreira family of Vila Alice, for their hospitality; to my friend Carlos Calado, who is like a brother to me and whose friendship and support during the hardest time was boundless; to Lila, for her hospitality; to Agostinho and Domingos Cazuza, for their friendship and practical support; to Dr Carlos Carvalho, who always looked after me during periods of ill-health in Angola; to Prof. Rui Verde, for his financial support; to my uncle, Vítor Fragoso, for some of the figures in this work; to Prof. Trigo de Abreu and Dr Vítor Ramalho, for their kindness and support; to Prof. Franz-Heimer, Prof. Jill Dias, Prof. Aída Freudenthal and Prof. Christine Messiant for their time and help; to Márcia and to Mico, whom I always stayed with in London; to Prof. Tom Young for offering me a useful archive on newspapers articles on Angola; to Christine and David Robinson, for the translation and proof-reading of this text. I must also thank the Portuguese Ministry of Science and Technology and the Praxis XXI Programme for providing me with the bulk of my financial support. I also thank all the Angolan Institutions that allowed me to undertake my research, including the Centre for Documentation and Information of the MPLA; the Secretariat of the Central Committee for Information and Documentation; the National Library and the National History Archives among others referred in the text.

Beyond all else, I thank God for His comfort during my so many moments of despair.

Finally, I dedicate this work to my grandparents, Maria do Céu Fragoso and Armando Augusto Fragoso.
General Introduction

This work aims to explain the Angolan post-independence political system through the analysis of the relationships established between rulers and ruled. It proposes an analytical framework which goes beyond that, based on a Weberian approach, developed in the complementary works of Jean-François Médard, Jean-François Bayart, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz — here termed modern patrimonialism.

The point here is to show that their approach does not apply well to the concrete case of Angola (and possibly other cases as well) and to propose a way forward through a reformulated analytical and interpretative framework — here termed post-modern patrimonialism — able to account for the realities observed in Angola. It is not my intention to create a whole new analytical framework, but to make a profitable, although critical, use of that provided by those authors, making it clear where and how it fails to account for the Angolan case.

According to those authors, in post-independence African countries (sub-Saharan African countries excluding South Africa)\(^1\) there is a specific logic (i.e., coherent relation) between the internal dominant rationality of the social actors and the kind of interdependent relationships that become established between them, especially between rulers and ruled. As we will see, these emerging frameworks of relationship established at several levels (socio-cultural identification, political, economic, ethical) are essentially patrimonial distributive in nature, but should not be confused with ‘traditional’ (pre-colonial) forms of patrimonialism, giving rise to a specific ‘modern’ (post-independence) form of patrimonialism as a system of socio-political

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\(^1\) The authors mentioned here have a high degree of generalisation in their works, referring indiscriminately to African countries (sub-Saharan African countries, excluding South Africa), which might be seen as a potential weakness of their works as discussed in sub-chapter 1.4.
organisation. Terms such as 'traditional' and 'modern' used in here to characterise forms of patrimonialism are simply employed as chronological references, 'traditional' referring to pre-colonial forms of patrimonialism, closer to those patrimonial characteristics described by Weber and 'modern' referring to post-independence forms of patrimonialism, such as those described by these authors.

In contrast to that analytical and interpretative framework, it is here argued that in such countries as Angola (and possibly others such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria), patrimonialism underwent a different dynamic and led to a different socio-political organisation. Contrary to what was supposed to happen with 'modern patrimonialism', the ties of patrimonial distributive interdependence between rulers and ruled did not settle and solidify; instead they weakened and loosened. Nevertheless, the system did not enter self-destruction, but rather a cumulative and self-reinforcing process that deepened its patrimonial organisational characteristics, leading to a new and extreme dimension of patrimonialism as a political system — 'post-modern patrimonialism' — which is quantitatively and qualitatively different from 'modern patrimonialism'.

The emerging central question is therefore to discover the reasons underlying such different patrimonial dynamics. Why is the Angolan political system characterised by the dilution of distributive interdependence ties between rulers and ruled? Why did the dilution of those ties, which were supposed to be the basis of the patrimonial system, lead not to its destruction but to a more extreme form of its development instead?

The answer to these questions, which this thesis will substantiate is that, in the case of Angola, such different patrimonial dynamics and organisation can be explained through a triple phenomenon. Firstly, there was a process of growing insularity and autonomy of the economic and political power of the 'ruling elites', which led to the extreme fragility and loss of economic and political power of the 'ruled masses'. Secondly, there was a cumulative and
reinforcing dynamic that deepened the organisational characteristics of patrimonialism through the dilution of distributive interdependence ties between rulers and ruled. Thirdly, there was the civil war with increasing ethnic overtones, which served as a powerful support of the cumulative and reinforcing patrimonial dynamics: promoting economic scarcity and social fragmentation. All these processes, concepts and notions will be defined and developed below.

In a systematic form, this study develops the Angolan case only. All the other references (secondary or complementary) made to other countries as possible cases proximate to the Angolan, are presented with the purpose that they may open up future lines of research and possible comparative studies, but it is beyond the scope of this work to examine them in more systematic comparative terms with Angola.

The time frame of the analysis

The discussion of 'modern' and 'post-modern patrimonialism' turns on the nature of the State emerging after independence and particularly the type of relationship between rulers and ruled within it (at an economic, political and ethical level). Consequently, this work is necessarily centred on the post-independence period, when such relationships came to be established. However, as will be seen, as the basis of post-independence patrimonialism (be it modern or post-modern) are ties of preferential solidarity usually based on socio-cultural identification cleavages, sometimes rooted in the pre-independence period. Thus, there is also a need to discuss any perceptible socio-cultural identification cleavages before independence. I will analyse in particular their political implications during the anti-colonial struggle (1961-1974) and the first civil war (1975-1976), showing that they are relevant to the understanding of the post-independence patrimonial dynamic.

The frontier between periods cannot be established with precision and must be understood more as an area of transition from one period to the
subsequent. Therefore, in the main subject discussed in this thesis (the establishment of relationships between rulers and ruled in the new independent country) the 11th of November 1975 (date of independence) can not be taken as the precise frontier between the pre-independence period (when those relations did not exist) and the post-independence period (when those relations came to be established).

There is a transition period stretching from the end of 1974 to 1976, encompassing the beginning of free political activity by the nationalist movements (summer of 1974), the war between them (started in March 1975), the official independence (11 November 1975) and the military victory of the MPLA (in the first months of 1976). This period might be seen at the same time as the matrix from which the relationships between rulers and ruled in the newly independent country started to evolve and also as a period when those relationships could not be effectively established due to the civil war that was going on for the control of the government and the State. For this reason the analysis of the pre-independence period contains references to events taking place until 1976 and the post-independence period includes references to events prior to independence.

This said, the time frame for the analysis of the post-independence period (the main focus of this work) ranges from 1974/76 to 1985/87, and the reasons for this limit are threefold.

Firstly, because 1985/87 marks the end of the Socialist Marxist-Leninist phase and the beginning of the so-called transition to a market economy and a multiparty system. Officially, the Socialist–Marxist one-party model existed since the MPLA's Central Committee plenary in October 1976 until the Third Congress of the party in 1990. However, a non-official criterion has been chosen for this work, based on the observed reality that, for practical purposes, Socialism–Marxism ends in 1987, the year when several changes (that could be already perceived at the II Congress in December 1985) were implemented at the economic and political levels, expressed mainly through the Economic and
Financial Clean-up Programme (SEF or Programa de Saneamento Económico e Financeiro) and the negotiations with South Africa, the USA and Cuba. These led rapidly to the change to a market economy and to a multiparty system, which although officially sanctioned only in 1990, was already discernible by 1985/87 — as has been recognised by other authors as well².

Secondly, although interesting, the period after 1987 can not be included (at least for now) within the scope of the analytical perspective here in discussion (patrimonialism as a system of socio-political organisation) because it implies too many new variables (inherent to a new formal political and economic model) whose political impact on that system can not possibly be ascertained with any reliability, for the simple reason that such transition is still taking place. Moreover, no one knows what will happen in 2002 with the promised presidential and legislative elections — especially now that Jonas Savimbi has been killed.

Thirdly, and most importantly, because the essentials of a post-modern patrimonial dynamic occurs before 1987 and consequently, before the beginning of the so-called transition to a market economy and to a multiparty system.

Structure

This thesis is composed of two parts. Part I is concerned with the theoretical and analytical discussion of the differences between ‘modern patrimonialism’ and ‘post-modern patrimonialism’. Part II is dedicated to the Angolan case study, and in its turn is divided into three sections. Section A deals with perceptible socio-cultural identification cleavages in the pre-independence period, their origins and political implications during the anti-colonial struggle and the first civil war. Section B analyses the patrimonial dynamics and

organisation of the Angolan political system during the presidency of Agostinho Neto (1975-1979). Section C discusses the patrimonial dynamics and organisation of the Angolan political system during the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos' presidency (1979-1985/87).

Research and sources

The research for this thesis was undertaken in two phases: the first, between September 1996 and December 1997, consisted of bibliographical research in Lisbon and London, mainly in the library of SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies); the second, concerned field-research, and was undertaken in Angola, between the months of January and July 1998. The sources used in Angola were two: semi-structured interviews and documentary research.

a) Interviews: Targeted Interviewees and Presentation

- Targeted Interviewees

Interviews were undertaken with persons from a wide social and professional range; they had either played significant political, economic or social roles during the times and events under study, or had an interest on the subject matter being researched and were thought to be helpful to the research.

The list of all the persons interviewed is to be found in the bibliography. It bears witness to the array of social and professional backgrounds of the people selected and includes ‘historical’ figures of the MPLA, UNITA and the FNLA; government members, from ministers to national executives, from both the MPLA and the other parties involved in government; leaders of the MPLA, from Central Committee and Politburo members to mere militants from central and provincial structures; presidential aides and councillors; members of all parties with parliamentary seats, namely party leaders and other deputies of the
parliamentary groups; the main Catholic, Baptist and Methodist religious leaders; members of FAPLA, from generals to commanders; reporters from the world of radio, television and the press, both State and private; academics; trade-union leaders; managers and workers of national and international NGOs.

- Interviews' Presentation

Although the majority of the interviews are not used explicitly in this work (i.e., quoted in the text, for reasons related to the existing problems in Angola and the necessity to safeguard the security of the interviewees), I have listed them in the bibliography.3

Transcription of the whole or part of these interviews, to be inserted as annex (even the most 'significant' ones) was not possible due to two reasons:

Firstly, most of the interviewees requested that the material not be made public and some made it a condition for being recorded4.

Secondly, these interviews are all (the most influential to this work) very extensive with a duration of two hours on average and several of three to four hours; sometimes two interviews of three to four hours with the same interviewee (taken as a whole, the interviews for this work approximately account for 6000 minutes/100 hours or 67 tapes of 90 minutes each). Thus, even if allowed, it would have been unmanageable to transcribe these interviews.

3 I refer here to formal and taped interviews and not to private conversations with key informants or with people who did not want to give formal interviews for security reasons and whose names do not appear on the list, as per their request. All the taped interviews referred in the bibliography (in my possession in Lisbon) can be consulted by other scholars (institutional document required) as long as they comply (by means of a written statement) with the request established by the interviewees at the time of the interview and following previous notice to the interviewee. I can be contacted through the department of Portuguese and Brazilian Studies at King's College.

4 Some of my interviewees (mainly politicians) allowed the usage of short quotes in the middle of the text, but not very extensive transcriptions. According to them, short quotes, even if controversial and 'dangerous' for its authors, might leave them some room to defend themselves in case of accusations made by others using those statements. In such cases they would counter argue with the 'usual formula', saying that those were 'quotations whose meaning was distorted because they were taken out of the context of a larger and deeper interview and therefore what was written was not exactly what they meant to say' and so on and so forth. Long transcriptions left no such 'emergency exit'.
An explanation on the specific strategy used in these interviews, its structure and the form they have taken, can be found in the bibliography.

b) Documentary Research: Angolan Research Institutions; Party Documents and Presidential and Governmental Legislation

- Angolan Research Institutions

In Angola, documentary research took place mainly, but not only, in the following institutions: the Centre for Documentation and Information of the MPLA and the secretariat of the Central Committee for Information and Documentation\(^5\); the National Library\(^6\); the National History Archive\(^7\); the National Institute of Statistics\(^8\); the Library of the Ministry of Public Administration Employment and Social Security (MAPESS)\(^9\); the Cabinet of Studies of the Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration (MINARS) and

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\(^{5}\) In these two party institutions access was granted mainly to party documents, pamphlets, brochures, reports, the party publication – *Boletim do Militante* (bulletin of the party militant) – and some Diaries of the Republic.

\(^{6}\) Here access was granted to the vast collection of *Diaries of the Republic*, from 1975 to 1991.

\(^{7}\) This institution was mainly used for research on other students’ thesis working on Angola all over the world. According to the rules of this institution, all students allowed to do research there, are required (by a written statement signed by the student himself) to send their works to the National History Archive when finished, thus providing the Archive with a significant and useful collection of such works.

\(^{8}\) In this institute access was granted to a few studies containing economic statistical data on very recent periods (early nineties) and mainly to the Luanda area; the organisation and publication of several of these studies became possible only after the transition to a multiparty system and benefited from the support of several NGOs working in Angola and the commitment of the Institute’s Director, Mário Adalta. Even though these studies were not directly used in this thesis (because they deal with very recent subjects, beyond the time frame of this work’s analysis) and thus are not part of the bibliography, they were nevertheless useful to the understanding of the recent development of the economic situation of lower social strata (mainly in Luanda), providing some necessary background information for field research and the interviews programme.

\(^{9}\) In this ministry, access was mainly granted to recent (post-1995) reports, studies and publications of the Ministry, such as its internal *Boletim Informativo* (Information Bulletin) and its magazine *Mérito*, specialised in public administration affairs (these two publications started only in 1997, dealing with recent subjects). Even though these periodicals and other researched studies and reports of the Ministry were not directly used in this thesis and are not part of the bibliography for the same reasons sustained for the National Institute of Statistics, they were nevertheless useful to construct a background knowledge of the actual situation and problems of public administration, providing some necessary information to understand the living conditions and needs of civil servants and other workers of the State sector that were interviewed in this work.
the Unity for the Studies on Population of the Ministry of Planning; the Centre of Documentation of Action for Rural Development and Environment (ADRA); the Office of Studies and Research of the National Institute for Religious Affairs; the Centre for Documentation of the United Nations in Angola and the Centre of Documentation of the European Union in Angola. Access was also granted to a few privately owned archives.

- Special Attention Given to Party Documents and Presidential and Governmental Legislation

As I was told by some key informants and also by some of my interviewees (especially those working near the president and with an interest in academic research), for those who know how the 'system really works', the most solid and simple evidence (although not easy to access, read or understand in its full

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10 Access was granted to studies, reports and projects on population migration movements and displaced people throughout the country produced by those two ministries with the collaboration of several NGOs, the UN and other institutions. These documents are based on very recent periods (nineties; beyond the time frame of analysis of this work), but still helpful to an overall understanding of the main problems of an important part of the population (displaced and rural, in part living in the outskirts of the cities and unable to return to their places of origin).

11 This is a very organised and relatively well supplied documentation centre, containing a very useful collection of non-published reports, studies and papers of conferences that occurred in Angola in recent years (after 1991) under a myriad of themes ranging from economic development, public administration, gender and development, poverty, nationhood and so on. It also contains an interesting collection of international periodicals (i.e. published in other countries) containing articles on Angola.

12 In this governmental office access was granted to register of churches and religious sects, its brief characterisation (according to official register), location, the name of its leaders, their addresses, the places where ceremonies take place and the approximate number of members. Access was also granted to a few studies on recent religious activities and an enquiry on the development of the number of members of the main churches acting in Angola, produced under the guidance of the Director of the office, Fátima Viegas (herself a scholar researcher over these issues). The research on this office was very important as an information background to the private interviews with religious leaders of the main churches in Angola.

13 In these institutions access was mainly granted to recent official reports on activities of UN organisations and EU in Angola, essentially in terms of Humanitarian aid programmes and collaboration with governmental organs. Even if this information is very recent (beyond the time frame of analysis of this work) it provided some important information to support the interviews with several NGOs workers.

14 Access was granted to privately owned archives of António Henriques (director of the National Institute for Foreign Investment and ex-minister of finances), Alfredo Teixeira (consultant for the United Nations Development Programme), Conceição Neto (historian).

15 Key informants were persons with whom I had (and still have) close relationships of friendship for some years now (some of them occupying offices in the Angolan State structure) with privileged access
meaning and contents) lies in presidential and governmental legislation and also in party documents, especially those produced for the various Congresses.

These documents are usually looked at with contempt and neglected by most people (researchers in particular) as official rubber-stamp documents essentially serving politically cosmetic purposes with limited research value. However, for those who know how to 'read them' (i.e., those who know how they are produced — the type of techniques used in their writing and the purposes they are meant to achieve in the political context of a given period; those who are able to identify and separate its several components and the message they intend to pass or safeguard at the moment they are produced or for future moments), these documents contain the most precise and accurate information to interpret and understand the basis of the working logic, structure and management strategy of the whole political system of a given period.

Such documents are crucial to the top leadership as the Angolan case is not just another example of ordinary presidentialism in Africa, where the ruler reaches a point where he simply ignores all institutional procedures and starts governing the whole system through a myriad of presidential decrees\(^\text{16}\). Probably due to a Portuguese tradition of an 'obsession' with bureaucracy and written laws and decrees of all kind, and probably also due to the importance of establishing complex power structures to balance a multiplicity of interests and divisions within the MPLA itself (historically made of a constantly reformulated equilibrium of forces), there was in Angola a need to support every political procedure (even the most 'obscure') in terms of legislation (especially, sometimes exclusively, at the highest level of the State, as we will see).

\(^{16}\) For a characterisation of cases where concentration of power reaches the level of 'presidential decree' type of government see, Jackson, Robert & Rosberg, Carl, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
Thus, a careful reading of such documents, often with the help of those who participated in their preparation, is of crucial importance for political analysis. The main difficulties for the analysis of these documents are two:

The first is to contextualise them within the socio-economic and political period when they were produced and within the management strategy and objectives of the President at that specific period (i.e., the major political concerns and objectives in which they are rooted) — particularly important in terms of presidential and governmental legislation.

The second is to distinguish and separate all its components, that are purposely garbled (politically important information with useless information usually of an ideological nature) — especially relevant for Congress documents. For example, the paradigmatic Central Committee’s reports to the Congress (the most important of Congress’ documents), mangle in the most confusing way three main components:

Firstly, there is the ideological component, with all the jargon and traditional Marxist ideological discourse, focusing on internal and external messages: internally, this kind of discourse usually contained a few political messages to certain groups involved in internal power struggles, but, as we will see, the terms used, such as ‘petite bourgeoisie’, do not always mean the same in Angola as in ‘classic’ Marxist regimes; externally, it focused on the major themes and issues of concern at that given moment, be it international or regional such as the World Capitalist System, Apartheid or the independence of Namibia, among others. The main problem with this component is that besides these relatively short messages, the ideological discourse overwhelmed the whole document, from top to bottom.

Secondly, there is a component made of the political objectives and strategy of the ruler (i.e., president) as the main power manager of the whole system, who imprinted the main guidelines and arrangements according to his management needs and purposes (reflecting the past or present concerns and planning the future re-arrangements). These guidelines had to be included in
order to ensure that future policies and measures to be taken according to the President’s strategy were consigned in the most important Party document and approved by the most important Party organ (i.e., no one could later accuse the President of deviation from the party’s guidelines). However, such strategic guidelines could not be explicitly stated and clearly understood through the reading of the document at the time it was presented, especially if they were to generate strong internal opposition. The anticipated knowledge of the main guidelines of future presidential management strategies would obviously generate reactions that might defuse its aims. Usually, these guidelines can only be understood several years later, carefully re-reading these documents, re-examining the policies and measures taken in the years after the Congress and contextualizing them within the ensuing legislation dispersed through the following years and the socio-economic and political course.

Thirdly, there is a component made of ‘traditional’ internal criticism that seems to be rooted in a Marxist mechanism denominated in Angola crítica e auto-critica (criticism and self-criticism) that became very common within the MPLA by the end of the anti-colonial struggle -- suggested by some students returning from China and influenced by the movement of Lin Piao17. Such mechanism became official in a larger process called Movimento de Re-Ajustamento das Frentes Político-Militares Leste e Norte (Readjustment Movement to the Eastern and Northern Political and Military Fronts), designed to solve the serious division that threatened the movement with disintegration in the very last years of the anti-colonial struggle (1973-1974) 18. At least some of the spirit of that mechanism seems to have survived after independence but

17 Students such as Xietu, Kito, Dino Matross, Bolingó, Mundo Real, Kavunga, among others as referred by Daniel Chipenda in an interview to the Rádio Nacional de Angola (17 June 1995).
18 For the most deep analysis of this movement including the referred influences from China, see Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences et pouvoir d’État: le MPLA face a lui-même (1962-1977) (Paris: Université Paris VII), These de Doctorat, chapters 3 and 4; a (shorter) Portuguese version of this work was recently published in Angola, Mabeko-Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidências e poder de Estado: o MPLA perante si próprio (1962-1974), 2 volumes (Luanda: editorial N’Zila, 2001). Interesting references to the crítica and auto-critica mechanism taken from lived experiences in the Mayombe forest during the anti-colonial struggle can also be found in Pepetela, Mayombe (Lisboa: Dom Quixote, 1980), p.198
emerging only in particular periods of major discussions within the party's life — the Congress, where internal criticism (sometimes of great magnitude) is permitted and is clearly and officially expressed. Today as yesterday (during the anti-colonial struggle), the mechanism seems to serve a threefold purpose: 1- to serve as an escape valve to free some of the internal pressure derived from internal division and power conflicts; 2- to keep the President informed of the internal feelings and criticism towards the regime; 3- to allow the President to use that criticism as if it was his own and find scapegoats to put the blame on.

As I was told and could later confirm (not only through research on previous Congresses, but also witnessing the preparations for the IV Congress to be held in December 1998 and accompanying the process of producing party documents for that congress, including the interviewing of some of its authors), the process through which the internal criticism was integrated in Congress documents was designed to be reliable and effective, being essentially based on two procedures.

On the one hand, there were large preparatory meetings to the Congress, in as many provinces as possible (rural and urban areas), occurring during the whole year before the Congress. In such meetings, delegates to the Congress and a lot of other people from the provinces (from the most diverse socio-professional occupations) discussed and expressed a wide range of major concerns, problems and criticisms (socio-economic, Party's functioning, and so on) in front of the party cadres promoting those meetings, who encouraged such censure. Such criticism did not involve the so-called 'UNITA problem' or the person of the President; normally, there were well-known (informal) limits but there was sharpness to the spirit of critica e auto-critica (this is one of the main reasons why the most accurate and damaging criticism has always come from within the party ever since the anti-colonial struggle, as it is commonly recognised in Angola and outside19).

19 In Angola such recognition was made by countless of my interviewees such as Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998); Lúcio Lara (1 May 1998); Paulo Jorge (26 June 1998) to name but a few; out of Angola that is also the public opinion of Christine Messiant as referred in a Lisbon conference where I have
On the other hand, there were several technical/political preparatory meetings between the party bodies and the presidential supporting services or 'technical entourage'. Sometimes these meetings took place in parallel with Political Bureau or Central Committee’s meetings. Such meetings were the place to express two types of internal criticisms: one from the party bases (as manifested through provincial meetings), the other from top party members (usually evidenced by the critiques of those who had a high party profile and/or an 'historical' aura).

This usually caustic internal criticism would be integrated into the Central Committee’s report presented by the President himself who would then appear as the main critic of what was considered to be hampering the ‘road to development’ and the general well-being of the country, usually finding several scapegoats, which varied in each presidency (during the Neto presidency it was the so-called ‘petit bourgeoisie’, the ‘apartheid puppets’/UNITA’, imperialism and international capitalism; during Eduardo dos Santos Marxist phase, besides all those of the Neto period, it was usually the government as identified by those ministers that were sacked, thus removing direct responsibility from Presidential hands).

As this criticism could not be presented as a whole and had to be dispersed through the document for politically cosmetic reasons (i.e., the internal and external image of the regime), it would appear garbled with the other two main components of these documents (i.e., ideological Marxist discourse and jargon; and the presidential management strategy). The final mixture would mainly be the responsibility of the President and his technical entourage (i.e., powerful supporting services).

Because of this it is difficult to find, separate and analyse the main aspects of these documents and the importance of their contents; overwhelmed by ideological and political jargon from top to bottom, bringing exhaustion to

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those who read it. The main objective of this has nothing to do with ideological or revolutionary fervour but simply with the necessity to conceal and disguise the President's strategy that must be present but not clearly understood; and the necessity to include the internal criticism dispersed and partially justified.

Given the major importance of these two sources of documents to the understanding of the structure and functioning of the political and administrative system; given the fact that this kind of extensive and all encompassing research of political/administrative legislation and party documents (Congresses) has never been done, a decision was made to give a prime (although not exclusive) attention to these two major sources of information and documentation for the post-independence period under study. An attempt was made to articulate the political, economic and social context of the periods under analysis with a careful research of these documents and crosschecking interviews (complemented by journalistic material mainly from the UK, US, France and Portugal).

The decision to give especial attention to those documents implied, amongst other difficulties: to go through countless party documents surrounding Congresses (mainly the Ist Congress of 1977; Ist extraordinary Congress of 1980; II Congress of 1985; III Congress of 1990); to examine patiently each and every page of a dusty collection of around 20,000 pages of Diario da República\(^{20}\). That work was made even more difficult because of the lack of copy facilities in the National Library and the need to hand copy all the important information contained there (resulting in 770 hand written pages). Although important support was given by the Centre for Documentation and Information of the MPLA and the secretariat of the Central Committee for

\(^{20}\) This is the official publication of all the legislation of State organs and is divided in three series: the Ist comprises general rules affecting all citizens (the most important legislation of State organs); IIнд, comprises administrative and technical rules, mainly concerning public servants of specific ministries; IIIrd, comprises announcements that according to the law must be public such as organisational statutes of companies, public contests to fulfil positions (lower rank) in public administration and so on. According to the above stated objectives, research for this work involved to go through circa 20 volumes of the Ist series, from 1975 to 1991 (comprising the governmental and Presidential legislation necessary to this work's objectives) ranging from 900 to 1000 pages each volume (depending on the year).
Information and Documentation (providing access to several missing issues or previously considered ‘restricted information’, and facilitating copies of the most extensive legislative texts), this kind of job took seven months of daily work running in parallel with an intense interviews’ programme and research in other institutions as well, and was only made possible by the help of a number of colleagues.

Other ‘more usual’ problems encountered during this research can well be imagined, ranging from atrocious working and living conditions in Angola — lack of regular water and electricity supply, shortage of food, widespread disease — to the scarcity of statistical and quantitative data on the sociological and economic realities in the 1970s and early 1980s.

- The Possibility of Using Fiction as a Source for African Political Studies

There are difficulties as well as advantages about using fiction as a source. The difficulties are obviously related to the fictional (non-real) character of the story taken as a whole, even if several characters and facts might be real or taken from living experiences. Nevertheless, it has been commonly noticed by political scientists working on Africa, that in many circumstances, African novelists have extremely accurate perceptions of the political reality of their countries and have been capable of transmitting those perceptions in a singularly simple, clear and sensitive way. This is especially true in countries where political regimes or the existing circumstances do not allow effective freedom of expression, political participation and open publication. In such cases, fictional literature with figurative characters and situations is the safest solution found by these authors to express their political opinions and criticism.

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Angola is without doubt one of such cases and the use of fictional literature as a source for political studies is particularly important for the period of the anti-colonial struggle. After independence a curtain of smoke descended over the convoluted life of the three nationalist movements during the anti-colonial struggle. Their history as political movements became a source of political legitimisation or delegitimisation and part of the war of arguments between them, thus silencing the report of the major political and military protagonists of that period.

In this case the work of one author – Pepetela – was the exception to that silence and although fictional, his works have become commonly recognised source of important information for the understanding of that period (and also for the post-independence period)\(^{22}\). This is not the case of novelist with scant or no experience of the reality he is talking about, but the case of an ex-guerrilla, who lived and fought with the MPLA guerrillas during the anti-colonial struggle. He was a guerrilla who became an important member of the independent government (Secretary of State for Education) and then gave up his post to become a full time novelist. The importance of the use of his literature to this work was consistently mentioned by several academics and interviewees, be it in London, Portugal or Angola (among others, Helder Macedo, Patrick Chabal, Franz Heimer, Christine Messiant, Mabeko Tali, Conceição Neto). After several private conversations and an interview with the writer himself, an assurance was given that the passages of two of his books that were meant to be used as evidence (about the anti-colonial and post-independence periods) and the arguments they were supposed to support

corresponded to an effectively lived experience and to the perception of the author\textsuperscript{23}.

\textsuperscript{23} From several private conversations with Pepetela in Lisbon and Luanda between December 1997 and July 1998; also from private interview (7 July 1998). The books used are: Pepetela, \textit{Mayombe}...op. cit.; Pepetela, \textit{Geração da Utopia} (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 1992).
PART I

THEORETICAL DISCUSSION:

MODERN AND POST-MODERN PATRIMONIALISM
1 - Modern Patrimonialism

A recent but influential framework of political analysis based on a Weberian approach has been developed in African Studies, mainly through the works of Jean-François Médard, Jean-François Bayart, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz. The aim of this chapter is to explore the structure of this analytical framework.

1.1 Weber's Influence on African Studies

In the work of those authors, firstly, an attempt is made to understand, interpret and explain the social organisation that has emerged in post-independence African countries through the experience and perception of its main protagonists (rulers and ruled). This presupposes an understanding of the world-vision and internal rationality prevalent within these societies.

According to Weber, historical and social existence is affirmed, essentially, through the creation and establishing of values, beliefs, principles and norms or what can be here simply termed as organisational principles. These values, norms and principles which each one of us believes in, and/or adheres to, are both an individual and a collective creation; it is both a social and historical process, the end result of our conscious response to our surroundings or to specific situations. Weber demonstrated that human behaviour in different societies could only be understood according to the general idea that men have of their own existence or the prevailing *Weltanschauung* within a given society. These would arise from a process of social and cultural identification (notions

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of ‘me’, ‘him’, ‘us’, ‘others’ and all that surrounds us), which provides us with a mental framework for self-understanding and understanding of the surrounding reality serving as the basis for a rational and intelligible social action. For Weber, the prevalent rationality within a given social group is expressed through general social practices and existing social organisations 25, which can be said to be organisational expressions of what I call the organisational principles. In these terms, what is meant by rationality,

is essentially what we can identify as the reasons which impel or convince people to think and behave as they do – what, in other words, provides an analytically coherent explanation for a given political conduct in a given historical context. 26

Consequently and secondly, following Weber’s ideas, for these authors there is a need to analyse the specific social dynamics, whereby the prevailing rationality (and its contained organisational principles) are expressed within existing social organisations (its organisational expressions), where cooperation and confrontation between social beings in general and between rulers and ruled in particular, help to determine the general framework of social relationships, in terms of socio-cultural references to identity, economy, politics and ethics.

According to Weber, societies are made up of conflict and agreement, and both are pillars of social activity. The process of integrating social actors through social relationships (soziale Beziehungen) and conflict (Kampf) can give rise either to society (Gesellschaft) or to community (Gemeinschaft). When the process of integration results in a community (Vergemeinschaftung), the group is based on a feeling of belonging common to all actors, who are motivated either by affective or 'traditional' reasons. If the process of integration gives rise to a society (Vergesellschaftung), this is due to the fact that motivation for social acts is based on personal interest, giving rise to a concert of interests. The process of social and communitarian integration brings

about groups (Verband) that form the administrative organs (Verwaltungstab) of societies and communities and consolidate a practice which results in a framework of interdependent political, economic and ethical relationships between social actors in general and rulers and ruled in particular. Reflecting a specific Weltanschauung and rationality, these frameworks of interdependence relationship are the coherent ties that form the working logic of social organisation 27 (i.e., the internal coherent relationship between organisational principles and organisational expressions).

Finally and thirdly, following Weber in a more or less explicit manner, the political organisation in post-independence African countries is characterised by these authors according to the prevalent type of political domination and the nature of legitimacy.

In Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Economy and Society), Weber looks at political sociology in two ways. In the first instance, he expounds on the typology of forms of domination (Typen der Herrschaft); in the second instance, and mainly in the last two chapters (Politische Gemeinschaften and Sociologie der Herrschaft), he describes in greater detail the differences between political regimes throughout history, using the typology he developed in the first part. Depending on the nature of legitimacy — be it traditional, charismatic or legal-rational — he determines the nature of domination as traditional, charismatic or legal-rational 28.

From then on, he demonstrates how it is possible to move from a simplified definition of one kind of domination, to the infinite diversity of historically established political regimes. Starting with the idea of traditional domination, he follows its differentiation, from patriarchal to patrimonial and feudal. The patriarchal domination is based upon kinship, respecting lineage and being a 'domestic' power. The patrimonial domination takes the patriarchal logic of power beyond kinship, emerging as soon as the political authority

26 In Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal,... op. cit. p.152.
28 Weber, Max, Économie ... op. cit.
becomes differentiated from the 'domestic' authority, supported not only by kith and kin but also by the ruler’s loyalists, clients and patrimonial servants, and develops an administrative apparatus. The feudal domination, just like patrimonialism, rests upon a system of personal loyalty relating the lord and the servant; both can be considered patrimonial chiefs and their mutual obligations are almost of a contractual nature, turning feudalism into some kind of an institutionalised clientelism of a military type.

In all these regimes authority is based upon traditional and personal criteria; in all of them the ruler’s authority is exerted in a patrimonial way, whereby all the political, administrative, judicial and economic affairs are treated as personal affairs. In the most elaborated of those forms (patrimonialism and feudalism) administrative ‘offices’ are distributed among the closest clients and loyalists (kin or not, but still having at their heart primary solidarity and feelings of personal loyalty). The governmental powers and the privileges they confer are treated as privately acquired rights to serve the personal interests of the office holders and the administrative apparatus can not be distinguished from patrimonial relationships.

At the opposite end of those traditional forms of domination we find the legal-rational authority, which relies on a rationally-established judicial and normative system, a set of laws, supported by bureaucratic and administrative mechanisms detached from the person who holds office and exerts power at any given period of time. Governmental powers are not to be treated as or confused with personal private affairs. In its most elaborate form, such type of domination constitutes the modern State.

At this level, Weber’s influences over the analysis of these authors can be found in their description of the political practice, authority and legitimacy of rule in post-independence African countries. As we will see, these authors’ works clearly characterises those countries as cases where administrative

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29 Ibid., especially pp.352-353.
offices are distributed by the rulers among their closest clients and loyalists (kin or not but still following primary solidarity) and governmental powers are treated as privately acquired rights and property to serve the personal interests of the office holders. The administrative apparatus and exercise of power can hardly be distinguished from the office holders’ search for private and personal interests.

In these terms, the political practice, authority and legitimacy of rule analysed by all these authors which have occurred in post-independence African countries are essentially patrimonial. Bayart’s caution as to the use of the notion of patrimonialism (preferring that of politique du ventre instead), can not be taken as an objection to the main logic of patrimonialism (as characterised above)\textsuperscript{31}. As Médard, with whom I agree at this point, says

\begin{quote}
La politique du ventre, qu’il [Bayart] définit comme la tendance à l’enrichissement ou plutôt à l’accumulation primitive par tous les moyens, renvoie très largement [...] au patrimonialisme. La différence et c’est d’une part la polysémie du terme qui va jusqu’à englober la sorcellerie, et, d’autre part, son enracinement dans la société et non simplement dans l’État[...]. Le patrimonialisme constitue le commun dénominateur de pratiques diverses si caractéristiques de la vie politique africaine, à savoir le népotisme, le clanisme, le ‘tribalisme’, le régionalisme, le clientélisme, le ‘copinage’, le patronage, le ‘prebendalisme’, la corruption, la prédation, le factionnalisme, etc., qu’elles soient fondées sur l’échange social (‘parochial corruption’) ou sur l’échange économique (‘market corruption’). [...] Il [le concept de patrimonialisme] a le mérite de permettre simplement de rendre compte de la logique commune à l’ensemble de ces pratiques, sans s’enfermer dans un seul type de société. Chaque société africaine particulière se caractérise par la prédominance éventuelle d’une de ces pratiques par rapport aux autres, ou par une combinaison spécifique de ces pratiques.\textsuperscript{32}
\end{quote}

This said, there is an important remark to be made about all these authors’ works: although the main logic of patrimonialism can be found in post-independence African countries the patrimonialism arising post-independence is quite specific; it is essentially rooted in pre-colonial times, but distinguishes

\textsuperscript{31} On Bayart’s caution with the use of ‘patrimonial’ see Bayart, Jean-François, The State in Africa ... op. cit. p.74; but for this same author's acceptance of the use of that notion see in the same work p.82.

\textsuperscript{32} In Médard, Jean-François, ‘L’État néo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p.329.
itself from 'traditional' (pre-colonial) forms of patrimonialism mainly through a *sui generis* historical, cultural and social process, which is the outcome of colonisation and decolonisation. The emerging political system draws from a singular combination of 'traditional' patrimonial legitimacy and 'modern' political structures such as the State and all its ancillary organisations, leading to a new, 'modern' form of patrimonialism.

Although this 'modern' form of patrimonialism is not given a common designation by these writers, it will henceforth be termed 'modern patrimonialism'. Such designation (discussed in detail in the following sub-chapters) must not be taken as identical to Médard's *néo-patrimonialisme*, because that would imply that the other authors' work could be simply subsumed into his, which is obviously not true. Even though the relevant point for discussion here is to stress what is common to those authors, I can not ignore that there are differences between them. Therefore, the designation of 'modern patrimonialism' is what I take to be common to these authors' analytical framework.

There now follows a more detailed description of the perspective common to Médard, Bayart, Chabal and Daloz and a critical evaluation of these authors' analytical stance. It will be developed in the next three sub-chapters: the first, concerned with the framework for socio-cultural identification, economic, political and ethical interdependence between rulers and ruled (1.2); the second, concerned with the State that effectively ensued in terms of working logic and management strategy (1.3); the third, dedicated to evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the 'modern patrimonial' analysis.
1.2 Patrimonialism in Post-Independence African Countries

1.2.1 The New Framework for Socio-Cultural Identification

The specificity of post-independence patrimonialism (or 'modern patrimonialism') was very much the result of countless strong external influences or 'traumatic events'\(^{33}\), such as colonisation, independence, socialism and capitalism\(^{34}\). These influences hindered the evolution of mainly endogenous processes of social identification amongst peoples living in the interior of a territory, whom colonial powers had artificially united. Generally speaking, the artificial division of African territories was not overcome, and the new independent States amalgamated, without blending, the existing identities of a sub-national dimension\(^{35}\). The non-assimilation, to any significant extent, of the macro-community identity of the new nation-State\(^{36}\), hindered the rise of a national feeling and strong collective consciousness\(^{37}\) in respect of notions such as 'national or public interest'.

Although 'traditional' political societies were imbued with patrimonial characteristics (such as vertical, sectarian, preferential and primordial solidarities; the lack of differentiation between the public and private realms; the claiming of rights inherent to political 'offices' for personal gain; the personalisation of political power), they also possessed strong feelings of group belonging and macro-community identification, which arose from an endogenous process of socio-cultural identification, including the primacy of the group as a whole over its components and a significant sense of what can be considered a 'public' or collective consciousness. Those who wielded power were expected to defend the well being and survival of the whole community,

\(^{33}\) See Bayart, Jean-François, *The State in Africa* ... op. cit. p.56.
\(^{34}\) See Médard, Jean-François, 'L'État néo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p.335.
\(^{35}\) See Bayart, Jean-François, *The State in Africa* ... op. cit. pp. 42-50.
\(^{36}\) Here and henceforward this term is used to refer the macro-community ideal and idea implied in the Eastern or Western based 'modern State' of Weberian type that is present in all these authors.
\(^{37}\) See Bayart, Jean-François, *The State in Africa* ... op. cit. pp.81-82.
to whom they were accountable and ‘could lose their head if, for instance, it did not rain’.  

After independence, because there was little sense of nationhood and a weak consciousness or identification with the ‘nation-State’, this paved the way for the growing dominance of sectarian, personalised and particularistic interests over the collective, or public, dimension. Ties of preferential solidarity based on several sub-national references to identity prevailed. These supplanted the solidarities of a universal nature (citizenship) and horizontal type (socio-economic groups of interest such as classes), that were supposed to have emerged within the Western or Eastern based ‘modern nation-State’ of the Weberian kind. According to Chabal and Daloz,

In the cities [African], high population densities, the mingling of professions should all favour more individualised social conditioning [a citizenship consciousness]. Yet what occurs is usually the reverse: urban dwellers appear to replicate the type of informal and personalised social rapport which is the hallmark of “traditional” African life. City quarters tend to mirror regional or ethnic divisions.

Médard states that,

The importance of kinship relationships in African social life is obvious: it is what strikes the foreign observer the most when he compares Africa with his own society [...] Sociologists have described how these family relations survive in cities, while continuous exchanges develop between the villages and the cities.

For these authors, sub-national references to identity at the centre of post-independence patrimonialism can be defined as ‘dynamic multi-faceted and interactive clusters of changeable self-validated attributes of individual-cum-collective references’, resulting from processes of social identification or ‘ways of defining oneself and others in accordance with a set of beliefs, values and subjective perceptions which are both eminently malleable and susceptible to

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39 See Médard, Jean-François, ‘The Underdeveloped State ...*op. cit. p.174; also Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ...op. cit. p.40; also Bayart, Jean-François, *The State in Africa ...*op. cit. p.56.  
40 In Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal,...op. cit. p.30.  
41 In Médard, Jean-François, ‘The Underdeveloped State ...op. cit. p.172; also according to Bayart, the existence, even the primacy of ethnic consciousness can not be denied, in Bayart, Jean-François, *The State in Africa ...*op. cit. p.42.
change over time. These references can include family, ethnicity, sub-ethnicity, region, sub-region, religion or even race, involving 'traditional' values and affective sentiments supporting preferential and primordial solidarities among its members (which is the characteristic at the heart of 'modern patrimonial' networks of dependence, as will be explained below). Under different circumstances and at different periods of time, one or several of these possible forms of collective identification can, 'and indeed do, become politically more prominent' than the others. These forms of social identification will henceforth be termed micro-identity references.

The supremacy of these references over those of a universal nature (citizenship) and horizontal type (such as classes) leads us to an important point that has to be made about the very broad and general operative analytical categories used by these authors concerning the central problem discussed in their works - the relationship between rulers and ruled, lower and upper social strata within the new independent State.

Here, on the one hand, all these writers regularly resort to the term 'elites' to designate the rulers and single them from the rest of the population. Although there is no specific definition or discussion of such concept in their works, it can be deduced from their use, that 'elites' are meant to designate those who have privileged or primary access to the State's top offices and in consequence to State's resources i.e., those at the top of the patrimonial system, regardless of the political regime (civil or military) and regardless of the political model (capitalist or socialist). Although such use of the concept might be debatable, it must be seen as a broad, flexible and instrumental analytical category, not so much concerned with theoretical discussions but with the

42 Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ...op. cit. p. 56
43 Ibid. p. 58; see also in the same sense p. 27, the example of the case of Nigeria.
44 For the use of the term 'elites', see for instance Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ...op. cit. pp. 2,6,8,10 and chapter 3, among several other pages and chapters; also Médard, Jean-François, 'The Underdeveloped State ...op. cit. p. 167; also Médard, Jean-François, 'L'État néo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p. 346; also Bayart, Jean-François, L'État au Cameroun (Paris: FNSP, 1979), pp. 19-20 containing an explanation to 'esquive avec superbe les débats essentiel qui portent sur quelque-uns des notions clefs - [...] d'assimilation réciproque des différents segments d'élite'; also Bayart, Jean-François, The State in Africa ...op. cit. especially chapter 6.
purpose of making sense of the realities observed. As stated by Chabal and Daloz,

There is frequently a temptation to wallow in tendentious and rather sterile discussions about ill-defined notions instead of studying political realities [...] A more concrete approach centred on the actual behaviour of leaders and other political actors in relation to rest of the population is in our view far more convincing and far more likely to make sense of what is occurring on the continent.45.

On the other hand, in the work of those authors, the ‘elites’ are usually contrasted with those who have not such privileged or primary access to the State’s offices or to ruling positions, being at the bottom rungs of the patrimonial distributive hierarchy. Therefore, the main difference between rulers and ruled and the distinguishing characteristic of the elites, is the type of relationship established with the State. As stressed by Médard, quoting in part Bayart,

“en Afrique [...] l’État est un lieu primordial d’engendrement de l’inégalité. [...] “c’est effectivement la relation à l’État qui, au premier chef, confère aux acteurs la capacité de s’enrichir et de dominer le champ social.”47 [...] L’emergence des systèmes d’inégalité, de domination et aussi d’exploitation est étroitement liée à l’émergence de l’État.48

In order to simplify the reference to these operative analytical categories and to clearly distinguish both, I will use in this work the term ‘ruling elites’ (borrowed from Chabal49; to refer to the upper layers of the patrimonial distributive hierarchy) and ‘ruled masses’ to designate those at the margins or bottom of the patrimonial distributive hierarchy. This last term was chosen for a double reason:

Firstly, because ‘ruled’ emphasises the fact that these people have not access to positions of power, allowing privileged access to State’s resources;

45 In Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p.31. See also Médard, Jean-François, ‘L’État néo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p.323.
48 Médard, Jean-François, ‘L’État néo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. pp.344-345.
49 The term ‘ruling elites’ can be found in Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p.6
and 'masses' to stress their non-elite character for being at the bottom of patrimonial distributive system and inherently at the bottom of any social hierarchy. Secondly because this was and still is a very commonly heard term in Angola, used to designate the lower social strata (the underprivileged according to socio-economic, educational and socio-professional criteria).  

Nevertheless, as we will see, such designations do not in anyway imply coherence, cohesion or hegemony within those categories. There are strong divisions and rivalries within both (that is why they are always used in the plural as 'elites' and 'masses'), rendering the stability of power very precarious. It is essentially for this reason that these categories can not be seen as proper classes ('classes for themselves'), being closer to the notion of 'classes in itself'. As explained by Médard, 'classes for themselves' presuppose a self-consciously constituted group, organised to defend its economic interests and to assert those interests against other similar groups (it would therefore imply solidarity among elites, which is usually not the case in post-independence African countries where divisions and rivalries among elites can be very deep and lead to fierce disputes). On the other hand, 'classes in themselves' does not presuppose such consciousness and it is essentially a category created from the outside (external analysis) as a flexible analytical instrument.

1.2.2 The New Framework for Economic Interdependence

As in the new framework of socio-cultural identification, the emerging framework of post-independence economic relationships was different from the economic relationships of 'traditional' patrimonialism.

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50 As I was told by some of my interviewees: this appears to be a legacy from the Socialist period, but it is being progressively replaced (especially in the political speech) by the term 'people', after the so-called transition to multipartyism; from private interviews with Paulo de Carvalho (11 March 1998); Alfredo Teixeira (18 March 1998); Filomeno Vieira Lopes (24 March 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998), among others. 51 On this subject see, Médard, Jean-François, 'The Underdeveloped State ... op. cit. pp. 170-171; also Médard, Jean-François, 'L'État néo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p.345; also Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ...op. cit. pp. 40-41; also Bayart, Jean-François, The State in Africa ...op. cit. pp.68-69, 210-211.
In the post-independence era, the emerging framework of economic relationship was influenced, on the one hand, by the modern mercantile logic introduced by colonial trade\textsuperscript{52}, and on the other hand, by post-independence patrimonialism, dominated by the aforementioned preferential solidarity based on prevailing socio-cultural references to identity (micro). In general, such mixed influences were expressed through the practice of personal or private appropriation and the use of the State’s resources (usually called by these authors predation\textsuperscript{53} or manducation\textsuperscript{54}) to benefit, unofficially (informally), oneself and one’s original communities; thus, patrimonial distributive networks of benefits and goods were formed.

The main difference between these practices and those of ‘traditional’ patrimonialism lies in the fact that pre-colonial relationships of production, distribution and consumption, however marked by strong patrimonial traits, and however merciless and exploitative they may have been, operated within the reasonably-well delineated limits of a recognised and legitimate ‘morality’ of political economy. It obeyed long-established normative principles for the maintenance of a given socio-economic equilibrium and contained specific mechanisms of accountability within the political community, with its strong collective or ‘public’ consciousness.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{52} Although most areas of pre-colonial Africa were involved to a certain extent with long-distance trade, their production was not capitalistic. The methods of pre-colonial production, as opposed to capitalistic methods of production, did not see accumulation as the means of achieving greater accumulation still. The integration of colonial economics into metropolitan and worldwide markets involved a deep-seated rupture in African moral and economic politics. See Chabal, Patrick, \textit{Power in ...} op. cit. pp.98–113.

\textsuperscript{53} See Bayart, Jean-François, \textit{The State in Africa} ... op. cit. p.76, 238-239; also Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p.41, p.99; also Médard, Jean-François, ‘L’État néo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p.326, 342, 346, 349; for the Angolan case the term ‘predatory’ is also used by Messiant, Christine, ‘À propos des..., op. cit. p.84.

\textsuperscript{54} See Bayart, Jean-François, \textit{The State in Africa} ... op. cit. p.268; also Bayart, Jean-François et al., \textit{Le politique par le bas en Afrique noire}, (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1992), p.265.

\textsuperscript{55} Chabal, Patrick, \textit{Power in ...} op. cit. pp.54–67; pp. 98-113. This line of argument seems to be also developed by Hyden, stressing that African societies should be understood as being pre-capitalist and centred on an ‘economy of affection’ that provides support, communication and informal interaction for peasants who operate in an environment characterised by a rudimentary division of labour and a high level of household autonomy. Some positive features of this economy include its function as a means of basic survival (e.g. by providing a safety net for refugees); its role in social maintenance; its facilitation of economic development (e.g. providing various informal loan arrangements). However, its limitations must not be overlooked because of the encouragement given to ‘locale-specific’ outlook, tribalism and
The new economic framework that emerged after independence saw the loss of the previous 'public' dimension and its normative principles of collective consciousness, which was in turn replaced by particularistic and sectarian concerns. In this case, the objective of the social actors was to attain the highest ranks within the existing system of patrimonialism in order to become the 'head of a network' (i.e., the top leader of distributive network or chain) and increase their power and wealth to better both themselves and their kin (dependants and supporters). Significant proportions of the available public resources were thus used to feed and expand the network of dependants from which arose the status and representativeness of the individual 'head of network'.

In this manner, a change occurred in the ties of economic interdependence, between rulers and ruled. Production in the 'modern' sense of the word (i.e., investment, saving, re-investment in order to increase levels of production and productivity) was secondary, and in its place, a predatory and distributive preferential interdependence was allowed to thrive; predation became generalised, everyone wanted to be the 'predator' and not the 'prey'. After independence, the agriculture sector seem to have been the first and main victim of this attitude, suffering from the action of marketing boards with unfavourable terms of trade between agricultural and industrial products and overvalued foreign exchange rates for the national currency, which ended up diverting the surplus of agricultural exports into the State's pockets (or its rulers), as explained by Bayart and Médard. The criteria for socio-economic

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nepotism; see Hyden, Goran *No Shortcuts to Progress* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), especially pp.6-8; also Hyden, Goran *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania* (London: Heinemann, 1980).

56 'the strategies of heads of networks resemble the capture, accumulation and partial distribution of wealth'; in Bayart, Jean-François, *The State in Africa* ...op. cit. p.228; also in the same sense is Médard, Jean-François, *L'État néo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p.338, 343, 349.

57 'The State in Africa – no matter what the political experience – has diverted the surplus and the rent of agricultural exports into its own pockets. The principal agencies of this diversion have been marketing boards, overvalued national currencies and the allocation of public expenditure. The extent of these processes, their institutional modalities and the social groups who benefit from them may all have differed from one country to another. Very few regimes however have been exceptions to the rule'; in Bayart, Jean-François, *The State in Africa* ...op. cit. p.63, see also p.87.
success were not those of meritocracy or productive effort, but preferentialism and favouritism according to micro-identity solidarity ties. This brought about a mentality qualified as *rentière*, whereby favours, goods and profits were expected in exchange for support along micro-identity lines\(^{59}\).

Economic practices, besides being predatory, distributive and *rentière*, were also subjected to cultural values deeply rooted in tradition, which generally associated prestige and social acceptance with ostentation and expenditure — the most efficient means of luring supporters within a modern patrimonial logic, as clearly expressed in Bayart’s idea of ‘politics of the belly’\(^{60}\). Generally speaking, accumulated capital was not reinvested in the productive manner of a modern socialist or capitalist economy, which would have involved saving and investment, according to a process of accumulation, characterised by frugal behaviour. Instead, accumulated capital was utilised according to modern patrimonial logic, which led to ostentation and the ‘feeding’ and enlargement of support networks,

In Africa [...] it is expected that those who occupy prestigious and highly remunerative positions will contribute to the collective prestige of their community. Above and beyond the immediate family, for which they have direct responsibility, the wealthy are meant to contribute to the upkeep of the extended network of blood relatives [...] the maintenance of the wider circle of their entourage and, beyond, of unrelated clients, is the next priority. Rank, prestige and, above all, legitimacy will be proportional to the extension of the clientelistic circle. [...] Little is re-invested productively at the local or national level. Wealth is spent primarily on luxury or prestige goods [...] As for the most sizeable African fortunes, they are usually put safely away in European or North American investment banks, a logical move, given the suspicion shown


\(^{59}\) On the *rentière* (rent seeking) practices, behaviour and ‘mode de production’ see Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ...op. cit. p.129; also the previously quoted Bayart, Jean-François, *The State in Africa* ...op. cit. p.63; also Médard, Jean-François, ‘Conclusion, ... op. cit. p.362-363. For a more ‘classic’ approach on the subject see, Krueger, A, “The political economy of the rent-seeking society”, in *The American Economic Review*, 64 (1974), pp.291-303.

\(^{60}\) See Bayart, Jean-François, *The State in Africa* ...op. cit. pp.228-259.
towards local financial institutions. In other words, they are of remarkably little use to African economies.61

1.2.3 The New Framework for Political Interdependence

The new post-independence framework of political relationship between social actors in general, and between rulers and ruled in particular (i.e., political accountability62), reflected, logically, the new socio-cultural identification framework and the new economic framework of relationship mentioned above.

When the micro-identity ‘constituent’ bases essentially claimed from their heads of network the fulfilment of distributive obligations, the notion of political representation became connected with the bettering of conditions within the group to which one belonged — defence of the interests of the micro-group. In these terms, loss of political legitimacy occurred when rulers, who represented sectarian interests, stopped fulfilling their obligations and thereby stopped having the interests of their supporters at heart, rather than when they ceased to work for the public interest, or public good, of the macro-community (‘nation-State’)63.

What happened politically, therefore was the personalisation and informalisation of political power, the non-emancipation of the State in relation to society and the increasing straddling of the public and private spheres. In places where such logic dominated, all offices in political administration were, generally speaking, distributed and occupied according to a personalised, informal and infra-institutional management (i.e., processed outside institutional channels and rules). The autonomous bureaucratic and

61 Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p.107.
62 'Political accountability is a relation of reciprocity and inequality between rulers and ruled: kings and subjects, chiefs and villagers, colonial administrators and indigenes, party leaders and followers, revolutionaries and peasants.'; in Chabal, Patrick, Power in ... op. cit. pp.54–55.
63 'it is imperative for ordinary people to maintain links with those who have power (albeit limited) by playing on ties of primordial solidarity (nepotism) or of clientelism (since all patrons need followers). That is why the legitimacy of the “big man”, which rests on his capacity to redistribute resources to his clients, is only questioned when he fails as a patron'; in Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ...op. cit. p.28; also in the same sense see Médard, Jean-François, ‘L’État néo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p.333, 349.
administrative institutionalisation of the State would, of course, have hindered this kind of logic\(^64\). According to Médard,

> On the political level, family solidarity outweighs any abstract duty toward the State. This explains why nepotism is normal, upsetting the functioning of the administration and sometimes placing important civil servants and political leaders in an uncomfortable position. Their first duty is towards their family: it is an obligation, which they neither dare nor care to neglect. The higher the position you hold, the more demands are made on you, and official revenues can never cover the needs of the family [...] Family pressure works at every level of the administration, not only at the top.\(^65\).

Thus, the new framework of political relationships between rulers and ruled differed not only from 'traditional' patrimonial forms of political accountability where political leaders were (at least in part) accountable for looking after a collective or public good but also from the political accountability of the Eastern or Western based 'modern State' of the Weberian type\(^66\).

The personalisation, informalisation and infra-institutionalisation of political relationships, are opposed to the characteristic institutionalisation of the 'modern State'. It implies the utilisation of public resources for the sectarian and patrimonial goals of feeding the networks, mixing the private and public spheres, as opposed to the separation of these two dimensions in the modern State. The legitimacy of patrimonial political power depends on the fulfilment of distributive expectations according to preferential micro-identity references, as opposed to the legal and institutional legitimacy of political and public power in the 'modern State'. Particularistic, sectarian and micro-identity interests are privileged in relation to the national, macro-social public interest or good that prevails in the 'modern State'. The preferential, vertical and

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\(^64\) See Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ...op. cit. p.14.

\(^65\) In Médard, Jean-François, 'The Underdeveloped State ...op. cit. pp.172-173; see also in a proximate sense Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ...op. cit. pp.4-8; also Bayart, Jean-François, The State in Africa ...op. cit. p.246.

\(^66\) Here and henceforward, the term 'modern State' is used to refer to the Eastern or Western based model of Weberian type, that is implicitly or explicitly present in all these authors' work; see Bayart, Jean-François, The State in Africa ...op. cit. p263; Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ...op. cit. pp.5-8; Médard, Jean-François, 'L'État néo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. pp.331-336.
sectarian organisation of power goes against the egalitarian, horizontal and universal organisation of individuals, or citizens, in the 'modern State'.

1.2.4 The New Framework for Ethical Interdependence

The dynamics of post-independence patrimonialism, as expressed through the new frameworks of socio-cultural identification, economic and political interdependence between social actors, imply the foundation of an ethos, a 'moral' framework of principles that regulate social practices and social organisation in terms of normative rights and duties, right and wrong, 'moral legitimacy'. Reflecting what has been expounded above, the ethics accompanying post-independence patrimonialism was essentially distributive, following ties of preferential solidarity. All the authors clearly identify such ethics. Bayart sees it in terms of 'manducatory' rules, whereby everyone 'eats' in proportion to their size and according to the management policy of resource distribution:

The expression 'politics of the belly' must be understood in the totality of its meaning. It refers not just to the 'belly' but also to 'politics'. This 'African way of politics' furthermore suggests an ethic which is more complicated than that of lucre. A man of power who is able to amass and redistribute wealth becomes a 'man of honour' (My Bold).67

[The expression 'politics of the belly'] denotes at the same time the accumulation of wealth through tenure of political power (implied in the proverb 'the goat grazes wherever it is tied'), the symbolic reference to family lineage and to witchcraft, and the physical corpulence which is felt to be appropriate in 'big' men or powerful women.68

To say, 'the goat eats where it is tethered' also implies that it should not eat beyond this area.69

Médard offers his own definition of this normative framework, as balanced satisfaction of the appetites of the different groups vying for power or preying on the State:

67 In Bayart, Jean-François, The State in Africa ... op. cit. p. 242.
68 In Bayart, Jean-François et al., The Criminalization ... op. cit. p. 8.
A skilful leader has to learn how to reconcile his own search for booty and spoils with the redistribution of those resources necessary to get political support and strengthen his position. Through patronage, the leader can co-opt his potential opponents and regulate the recruitment of the ruling class. The whole art of politics here consists in satisfying lavishly your own ethnic group and region, while rewarding the leaders of other ethnic groups sufficiently for them to have an interest in maintaining the status quo. The State is a pie that every one greedily wants to eat.

Chabal and Daloz refer to this normative framework as the obligation of ‘sharing the spoils [amidst] a moral economy of disorder.’

The story is similar in Madagascar, where popular wisdom has it that ‘a crocodile which has already eaten is no longer dangerous.’ In other words, well-endowed politicians are more likely than others to pay attention to the obligations of generosity which they are expected to discharge, and to ensure that those who support them also ‘will eat properly.’ The notion of political legitimacy is thus based on the expectation of the ‘sharing of the spoils’ which is at the heart of the paradigm we propose.

The ethics that is subjacent to these principles of post-independence social organisation are thus essentially distributive: ethics of regulated manducation, as in Bayart; ethics of balanced predation, as in Médard; and ethics of ‘sharing the spoils’, as in Chabal and Daloz.

As the specific processes and practices described above are common to all the social layers that formed the new community, the new ethical and normative framework was also shared by the different layers of the population, from the ‘ruling elites’ to the ‘ruled masses’.  

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69 Bayart, Jean-François, *The State in Africa* ... op. cit. p.ix.
70 In Médard, Jean-François, ‘The Underdeveloped State ... op. cit. p.167.
71 Ibid. p. 175.
72 Ibid. p.182.
73 Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p.xx. ‘See here the range of African proverbs pointing to the ephemeral nature of power and the need to take full advantage of its tenure, but always with the caveat that it must be shared with one’s “dependants”. One of many: “whoever does not rob the state robs his kith and kin”; ibid. p.107 footnote 14.
74 Ibid. p.36.
75 ‘this mindset is shared by all layers of the population and it would be deceptive as well as hypocritical to argue that it does not apply to the elites. We reject, therefore, those interpretations favouring the view that such cultural beliefs are manipulated for ideological motives, and argue instead that there is a shared ‘heritage’ valid for all and which all can aspire to use instrumentally.’; Ibid. p.132.
Being generally shared in this manner, this new ethical framework supported and legitimised the set of general practices and consequently the working logic of this modern form of patrimonialism, linking the elites with the rest of the population.

In this sense, for Bayart,

the social struggles which make up the quest for hegemony and the reproduction of the State bear the hallmarks of the rush for spoils in which all actors — rich and poor — participate in the world of networks [...] Contrary to the popular image of innocent masses, corruption and predatoriness are not found exclusively amongst the powerful. Rather, they are modes of social and political behaviour shared by a plurality of actors on a more or less great scale.  

[distributive networks] link the ‘lowest of the low’ with the highest of the high [...] the integration of African societies is all the more effective because, as we know, their populations are small [...] access to the ‘boss’ even if he is a minister is much easier than in Western industrial societies. With representations of witchcraft a factor, a notable cannot evade with impunity, the ‘courtesy visits’ of his clients and his ‘country’ and deny them access to his veranda.  

For Chabal and Daloz,

it is clear that the business of politics is more usually conducted along informal vertical channels of relations (patron-client networks, communal organisations, etc.) linking the elites with the rest of the population. Socio-political rivalries in Africa are rarely the result of a clear-cut public and communal contest. Nor is there evidence that the government’s economic orientation or the nature of the regime in place makes much difference to relations between State and society.  

What matters above all are the vertical and personalised ties which link ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics, the legitimacy of which is accepted by all whether at the top or the bottom.  

For Médard,

Clientelism is instrumental as a way of articulating the centre and the periphery. Political patronage relayed by patron-client networks rooted in the periphery creates links between centres and peripheries, while economising the costs of coercion. [...] if the

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76 Bayart, Jean-Francois, *The State in Africa* ... op. cit. pp.235, 238.
77 Ibid. p.219.
78 Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. pp.21–22. This point of view (the non influence of the economic model or regime over the relations between State and society) is also shared by Callaghy, T.M., ‘Civil Society, Democracy and Economic Change in Africa: a Dissenting Opinion about Resurgent Societies,’ in Harbeson, J., Rothschild, D., and Chazan, N., eds., *Civil Society and the State of Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994).
79 Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p.28.
definition of class is made on the objective basis of exploitation relations, one can analyse class relations in Africa as elsewhere. But these classes are ‘classes in themselves’ and not ‘classes for themselves.’ These classes do not usually function in Africa as units of political action. This is not a question of principle but one of empirical observation. 80

According to the analytical framework that is being presented, the effective principles for deciding between right and wrong, good and bad, legitimate and illegitimate, licit and illicit, depended very much on the fulfilment of specific ethical principles regarding the ‘sharing of the spoils’, or the effective distribution by the ‘heads of network’ to their dependants. Although this normative framework was not expressed officially through the existing juridical order, it nevertheless gave direction to the existing social order. In post-independence African countries, as opposed to the West, the ethical and normative order was not confused in practice, nor should it be confused in theory, with the legal order. In the ‘modern State’ (Eastern or Western), the evolution of juridical order maintains an organic relationship with the ethical order; this does not happen in Africa, where the juridical order is perhaps the most ‘foreign’ and exogenous structure.

It is in this sense that many practices considered illegal by the juridical order in African countries are considered quite legitimate by the ethical and normative standards of the populations of the countries in which these practices occur, in outright contempt of the law. Thus, concepts such as crime and corruption, which originate from a ‘modern’ juridical structure inherited from colonialism, became partially void of meaning after independence. In these terms, Médard argues that ‘what is corruption from the point of view of imported public norms is not corruption by private norms.’ 81

According to Chabal and Daloz,

In Africa the realm of clientelism and the world of crime overlap [...] Where patrons nourish their clientelistic networks, the manner in which they have managed to obtain resources will very largely be

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taken to be legitimate, even if it is illicit. [...] There has always existed in Africa a wide range of activities (such as corruption) which, although illicit from a strictly constitutional or legal point of view, have been regarded as patrimonially legitimate by the bulk of the population [...] There are in African societies well-understood, if not always well-defined, rules of conduct which mark clear boundaries between the informal sector and the criminal world.  

In the same line of argument, Bayart says that:

The rise in Africa of activities officially classed as criminal is aided by the existence of moral and political codes of behaviour, especially those of ethnicity, kinship and even religion and cultural representation, notably of the invisible, of trickery as a social value, of certain prestigious styles of life, even of an aesthetic, whose capacity to legitimise certain types of behaviour is considerable.

In sum, the new frameworks of socio-cultural identification, economic and political interdependence, were coherently structured and legitimised by an emerging normative or ethical framework. Basically, the new ethics meant the triumph of one kind of solidarity over another: the vertical over the horizontal; the particularistic over the universal; the personal over the institutional; micro-world visions over macro-world visions; the short term over the long term; immediacy over deferment; the multiple micro-community dimensions over the united macro-community dimension of the nation-State; the sectarian interests

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82 Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ...op. cit. p. 79-81. As an example, the diamond trade in Angola was at first legally forbidden after independence, then it was legalised with the arrival of multipartyism and then once again forbidden; whatever the legal rulings, it is considered completely legitimate by the overwhelming majority of the population and is a practice undertaken by all who can. This refers not only to trade in the interior of Angola and Zaire, but also to trade with the outside world. Above all, clandestine diamond mining and trading are considered as a sacred right for the Lunda people, in the same way as agriculture or cattle raising is to other people of Angola. During the first years of independence, at the height of revolutionary fervour and of the implementation of 'the Law', this conflict within the system led to complex dilemmas and confrontation between the legal system and prevalent moral ethics. The author Arlindo Barbeitos has often broached these dilemmas, as they occurred within his own family, of Mbundu origin, between a member of DISA (the State security) and a family member who was a Kamanguista (a diamond trader and trafficker). The problem arises from a widespread judicial process in early eighties brought about by the State against the Kamanguistas, during which the DISA relative would have to arrest the Kamanguista relative, in so doing, the DISA man would be strongly condemned by the prevailing morals and ethics, which places defence of the family above all else. During a family council of elders, it is decided that there was nothing condemning in the Kamanguista's activities as the diamonds were on land that belonged to the forefathers and that many generations had indulged in similar activities. Because of the position the DISA relative was in, in having to comply with the orders that he was given, a solution is found whereby the Kamanguista is made to escape to Portugal with DISA's collaboration, and to stay there until the situation settled down again and things got back to normal.

83 Bayart, Jean-François et al., The Criminalization ...op. cit. p. 15.
of micro-groups over the 'public interest' and 'public good' of the macro-community.

The new normative framework was shared by all social layers, linking vertically the bottom and top ranks of society or the 'ruling elites' and 'ruled masses'. Although such a framework was not reflected in the existing juridical order, it nevertheless provided a clear set of norms. These norms were coherent and legitimate from the point of view of the dominating internal rationality, common to most of the social actors involved, who followed such norms in their practices and in the emerging State.

1.3 The New 'Modern Patrimonial' State

1.3.1 The relationship between the dominant working logic and structure of the new State

According to these authors, as a rule, the administrative structure of post-independence African States, was based on that of the Colonial State. The new rulers did not have the political desire nor the actual means with which to overturn the preceding colonial machine, for two main reasons.

Firstly, due to the crushing domination of the State during colonial rule, the nationalists saw the first objective of independence as being the conquest of the Colonial State. To the nationalists, radicals or otherwise, capturing the State meant acquiring the means of moulding a new political community that fitted in with their objectives. Colonial rule had clearly shown how economic power depended on the acquisition of political power at the centre of the State; more concretely, it showed how the privileged social and economic status of colonial African elites arose directly from their privileged status in the administration of the Colonial State.  

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84 As a rule, once colonisation had started, the economic success of the 'African colonial elite' arose mainly from privileged statuses in colonial administrative bureaucracy; as such, socio-economic status was determined bureaucratically and politically, rather than the other way round. Under colonial rule, the acquiring and maintaining of economic power was intimately linked to the politics of power. The
Secondly, at the level of international relations, the norms of Public International Law of Western origin had long since acquired a ‘universalising’ status. Participation in International Organisations (with all the inherent rights and duties) was restricted to States, whose existence usually depended on two types of criteria: factual — the effective existence of a governing structure exerting sovereign power over land and people; juridical — official recognition of its existence by a significant number of other States. 

Thus, there was neither the will, nor the reason, to discard an administrative superstructure typical of a ‘modern State’. In these terms, the new post-independence political system had to invent its own modus operandi combining two distinctive working logics — one, endogenous, patrimonial and ‘traditional’ in origin; the other, exogenous, inherited from the colonisers and then altered by socialist or capitalist programmes, but following the external rationality of a Eastern or Western based ‘modern State’. As a rule, the dilemma concerning these two objectively contradictory logics was overcome through a more or less successful subordination of the modern political structure to a patrimonial working logic.

In spite of the differences that can be found amongst the four authors regarding the conception of the post-independence State, they seem to be in agreement about the existence of two distinctive working logics, one endogenous, and the other exogenous.

According to Médard,

The political systems of the new third-world countries should be considered as a particular type, distinct from both the modern and

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economic elites were aware of the need to gain access to the post-independence State, as the central administrative mechanism for the control of economic power, which would enable them to maintain their privileged and elitist status. In this way, contrary to what usually happened in Europe, it was the power of the State that determined class, and political hegemony that allowed economic hegemony for those elites who succeeded in capturing the power of the State after independence. Thus, the post-colonial State in Africa, is not so much the political super-structure of an economic order, but rather the political infrastructure that allows economic hegemony. In Chabal, Patrick, Power in ... op. cit. pp.68–81. Also in the same sense see Médard, Jean-François, ‘L’État néo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p.343.

See Médard, Jean-François, ‘Conclusion, ... op. cit. especially p.358.
the traditional States, but drawing from both. These States function in a specific way and follow, to a large extent, a common logic. 86

Les sociétés africaines et leurs systèmes politiques sont fondamentalement hybrides, comme nous le rappelle J.F. Bayart. 87 Il me faut insister sur cette hybridation [...] dans laquelle la logique patrimoniale se combine et se mêle avec d’autres logiques. 88

[these political systems resulted from] a contradictory combination of bureaucratic and patrimonial norms [...] Unlike the patrimonial regime the neo-patrimonial regime hides behind a public façade which is complex and differentiated. It dissimates the private while simulating the public. 89

For Bayart,

The State in Africa rests upon autochthonous foundations and a process of re-appropriation of institutions of colonial origin which give it its own historicity; it can no longer be taken as a purely exogenous structure [...] It functions as a rhizome of personal networks and ensures the centralisation of power through the agencies of family, alliance and friendship, in the manner of ancient kingdoms, which possessed the principal attributes of a State within a lineage matrix, thereby reconciling two types of political organisation wrongly thought to be incompatible. 90

For Chabal and Daloz,

We are thus led to conclude that, in most African countries, the State is no more than a décor, a pseudo-Western façade masking the realities of deeply personalised political relations. 91

The State is both vacuous and ineffectual. It is vacuous in that it did not consolidate, as was once expected, on the foundations of the colonial legacy, but instead rapidly disintegrated and fell prey to particularistic and factional struggles. It became an empty shell. 92

Africa’s political modernity is characterised by a combination of attitudes and habits which draw from a singular fusion of ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ rationalities. 93

Thus, for all these authors, the ‘modern patrimonial’ State is an operative and coherent blend (according to the dominant internal rationality) of a ‘modern’

86 In Médard, Jean-François, “The Underdeveloped State … op. cit., p.162.
91 In Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, … op. cit. p.16
93 Ibid. p. 146.
form or structure and a ‘modern patrimonial’ working logic as expounded above (distinct from traditional patrimonialism).

1.3.2 The Management Strategy of the new State

Taking into account the dominant working logic and the new frameworks of relationships discussed above, the new State became the bone of contention between all groups clamouring for political leadership and consequent economic privilege. The State was seen as the main mechanism for the allocation of all forms of income, such as from natural resources, the control of production, taxes, permits, loans, the allocation of governmental offices and all kinds of other public jobs\(^94\). Thus, after the State had been conquered by a given group or leading alliance of groups, the main task consisted in the creation of a distributive system for these resources that allowed the leading group or alliance to remain in power and to satisfy potential rivals — through co-option — in order to control their ambitions and obtain their support or consent. This type of management strategy renders precarious the equilibrium of political forces and the nature of power, under permanent pressure (demands). As stated by Médard,

> If stability exists, it is more the stability of a leader than of institutions. It is above all maintained by the political ability of a leader and by his capacity to create and head a coalition around himself\(^95\)

> Many African governments have fallen apart because the ethnic group in power could not control its greed. In such cases the President narrowed his public support rather than enlarging it, leading to his own downfall.\(^96\)

The vulnerability of such a system varies from one case to another, but regardless of the regime (civil or military) or political model (Socialist or

\(^94\) See Bayart, Jean-François, The State in Africa ... op. cit. pp.74-83.

\(^95\) In Médard, Jean-François, ‘The Underdeveloped State ... op. cit. p.163.

\(^96\) Ibid. p.175.
they all have in common a strategy for concentrating political power and centralising administration of strategic areas (those providing primary access to State's resources) in a pyramidal structure; consequently concentrating and centralising the general distribution of benefits and privileges through vertically organised chains of interdependence within that same pyramid. This strategy is crucial because if the main foundation of power in this kind of organisation (i.e., the distributive system) is politically scattered and administratively dispersed, the whole system goes into disruption, as the necessary economic privileges can still be obtained, but without having to depend on hierarchical distribution. 97

Regardless of regime or political model, the head of State is at the top of a distributive centralised pyramidal system and, depending on the existing conditions, will usually follow one of two courses: either centralise the patrimonial system to a maximum in order to prevent the formation of factions, or tolerate a certain degree of decentralisation of patrimonialism, playing one faction against the other; in this case, the head of State remains in power as arbitrator and will not allow any faction or group to acquire enough muscle to threaten his own superior power. 98

Within such a strategy of concentration and centralisation, the role of the party in African post-independence patrimonial systems is singularly different from the patrimonialism studied by political science in American cities during the nineteenth and early twentieth century and also from the patrimonialism studied in South-east Asia in the mid-twentieth century 99. Notwithstanding the

97 'l'Etat qu'on cherche ä implanter presque partout est un Etat centralise de type jacobin, et non un Etat fédéral ou décentralisé. Le cas du Nigeria est là encore atypique'; in Médard, Jean-François, 'Conclusion, ... op. cit. p.360.
98 In Médard, Jean-François, 'The Underdeveloped State ... op. cit. p.169; see also Médard, Jean-François, 'L'Etat néo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p.339. On the 'powerful centralisation of State structures' see also Bayart, Jean-François, The State in Africa ... op. cit. pp.261-262.
regime or political model involved, African post-independence patrimonialism started off by being partisan in nature, soon to become presidential, thus relegating the party to a secondary position in the patrimonial system. In most stable patrimonial regimes, patrimonialism is firstly presidential, secondly bureaucratic, and thirdly partisan. The Party as a mechanism for the centralisation of distribution was an excellent mechanism for the control and integration of bureaucracy, which would then facilitate Presidential control over the same bureaucratic and administrative elites, as long as the President then assumed the control over the Party.

Partisan patrimonialism meant that all parties were clientelist, yet faced with the growing centralisation of administration and concentration of political power, it did not disappear completely, but lost its mass component and faded away. To a certain extent, patrimonialism became 'elitist' and the masses lost a good part of their initial slice of the cake, especially in cases where they lost the ability to exchange votes for favours (one party systems). Although this 'elitist' development might have aggravated the natural 'manducatory' or 'predatory' unbalance between the ruling elites and the ruled masses, vertical, preferential and sectarian micro-identity solidarities linking rulers and ruled, survived, according to established, informal mechanisms and sanctions as stated by Bayart,

It is certainly not unheard of for a 'big man,' influenced by the ethos of munificence, to make a point of honour of doing so [redistribution of sinecures and other benefits of power]. However, it is more common for it to be imposed upon him by meetings of

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100 See Médard, Jean-François, 'The Underdeveloped State ... op. cit. p.167.

101 Such was the case in the Ivory Coast, when during the party's seventh Congress, President Houphouet-Boigny reassured his control over the party and the regime by removing from office the general secretary Philippe Yacé, who had turned the PDCI into a kind of machine controlled by himself; in Médard, Jean-François, 'Aînés et cadets en Côte d'Ivoire: le VIIème congrès du PDCI', in Politique Africaine, I (1981), pp.102–113. See also over this issue, Bayart, Jean-François, L'État au Cameroun ... op. cit.

102 'The personal relationship on which redistribution is supposed to depend is by definition highly egalitarian and hierarchical [...] "I chop you chop" was the promise of a Nigerian party. Whilst one cannot deny this, one has to stress that not everybody "eats" equally.' In Bayart, Jean-François, The State in Africa ... op. cit. pp.233-235. Also in the same sense is Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p.28.
collective savings societies in his home town or village and by the continuous stream of beggars, masters either of the language of kinship and flattery or, more disturbingly, of the accusation of witchcraft: a man who manages ‘to make good’ without ensuring that his network shares in his prosperity brings ‘shame’ upon himself and acquires the reputation of ‘eating’ others in the invisible world: social disapproval and ostracism and, in extreme cases, a death sentence may in time be his reward. 103

Also in the same line of argument, Médard says that,

[primordial solidarity] is maintained by sentimental ties and endorsed by sanctions: often the refusal to oblige the family is sanctioned by witchcraft. It is within the family that the use of poison is the most widespread’. 104

Chabal and Daloz support the same,

Although there are strong inequalities within clientelistic relations, it is well to remember that patrons suffer considerable constraints. The maintenance of their status is entirely dependent on their ability to meet the expectations of their clients [...] the acuteness of apparent inequalities is reduced by the imperative to be seen to redistribute on a scale appropriate to one’s standing. 105

Those who fail to redistribute or are perceived to redistribute too little, run the risk of facing hostility and suspicion. They will not receive recognition and deference. 106

This said, it is important to stress that insofar as the main logic of modern patrimonialism or its management strategy is concerned it is misleading to distinguish between civil or military regimes, capitalist or socialist political models. In the analysis of specific cases, however it might be useful to see if for instance military coups have in anyway changed the status quo of dominant privileged groups and elites. According to Bayart,

Political ruptures [such as military coups] sometimes open up the way to re-compositions and associations of new interests which upset the status quo. Military regimes generally operate in this way. By reinforcing the high levels of the civil service, they brought back politicians who had been ostracised, and rehabilitated the role of chief, to fill the political void which they had created by coming to power. 107

103 Bayart, Jean-François, The State in Africa ... op. cit. p.233.
104 In Médard, Jean-François, 'The Underdeveloped State ... op. cit. p.172.
105 In Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p.28.
106 Ibid. p.107.
107 In Bayart, Jean-François, The State in Africa ... op. cit. p.168.
As we will see, this was not the case in Angola, where what I call the Creole/M'Bundu alliance has managed to keep a privileged position (in the closely inter-related administrative and military structures) since the colonial period, controlling State power since independence (even if there have been permanent rivalries, disputes, challenges and power re-arrangements among the myriad of sub-groups composing this motley and always changing Creole/M’Bundu alliance throughout the years).

To conclude this first chapter, it has to be said that apart from certain differences in matters of secondary importance (at least as concerns what matters for this thesis), there is in the works of Africanists such as Médard, Bayart, Chabal and Daloz an analytical framework clearly rooted in a Weberian approach.

This analytical framework claims, firstly, that there is a logic (i.e., coherence) between the internal dominant rationality of the social actors and the kind of interdependent relationships that become established between them, especially between rulers and ruled — along given socio-cultural identity, political, economic and ethical lines. Secondly, the emerging frameworks of interdependence relationship between rulers and ruled are essentially patrimonial in nature, but should not be confused with ‘traditional’ forms of patrimonialism, since they give rise to a new and specific form of patrimonialism — that of ‘modern patrimonialism’, underpinned by a clear and generally accepted set of norms (although informal or not legal) regulating the organisation of African political systems.

Thirdly, by looking at modern patrimonial relations of interdependence from the perspective of the dominant internal rationality, the organisational characteristics of African States can be understood; such as, for instance, the needs that lie behind the *modus operandi* of the State, combining two distinct logics, a modern one in terms of official structure and a patrimonial one in terms of effectively dominant working logic; the fierce competition that turns
the State into a arena of contention for all groups aspiring to political leadership and economic privilege; the reasons preventing an effective institutionalisation of the State; the grounds for the common practice of concentrating power and centralising administration in strategic areas.

In sum, we are presented with an insight into the coherent operation of African political systems supported by a clear albeit informal set of norms and rules. What is seen from a Western point of view as disorder or 'chaos' is merely a different order representing a creative combination of 'modernity' and 'tradition', containing a clear form of political accountability (patrimonial distributive in nature),

The paradigm we have developed shows that what is distinct in Africa is the creative manner in which this overlap of modernity and tradition combines to create a form of political accountability [...]. By providing a coherent framework for what might otherwise appear merely as a chaos or anarchy we establish the foundations for an analytical interpretation of politics in Africa which is congruent with classical Weberian approaches.  

What we mean is that the disorder of which we speak is in fact a different 'order', the outcome of different rationalities and causalities. It appears as a disorder only because most paradigms are based on a notion of a form of social, economic and therefore, political development which reflects the experience of Western societies [...] Our approach is an attempt to explain how apparent disorder can in fact have its own logic [...]. Once it is accepted that there are in Africa well-recognised norms of political practice which do not conform to those we find elsewhere, it becomes imperative to predicate our analysis on an interpretative framework which makes sense of those norms.

1.4 Strengths and Weaknesses of a Modern Patrimonial Analytical and Interpretative Framework

The work of the above mentioned authors had the enormous merit of approaching directly and courageously several sensitive issues in African studies such as the political influence of cultural aspects and the possibility of a

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108 Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p.147.
109 Ibid. p.155.
mainly endogenous working logic of political systems — an important stance
given the long and strong tradition of external scapegoats to explain and justify
the post-independence political course in Africa (e.g., neo-colonialism,
imperialism, the ‘debt trap’, structural adjustment programmes, etc.). Moreover,
those works attempted to provide an analytical framework more influenced by
the reality they observed than by any pre-conceived notions or ‘academically/politically correct approaches’.

There are, however, four possible weaknesses in their approach. The first
two can be immediately addressed referring to the authors’ own works and
within a Weberian approach; the third and fourth can only be addressed by
means of a case-study that does not conform to such an analytical framework.
This will lead me to propose the ‘post-modern patrimonial’ analytical and
interpretative framework.

The first potential weakness of the modern patrimonial analysis lies in
the fact that it identifies a dominant rationality, deriving from the prevailing
Weltanschauung, which is inevitably a cultural specificity, leaving it open to the
critique made of ‘cultural determinism’. Such criticism can be discarded within
a Weberian based argument according to which, the cultural specificity does not
imply cultural determinism but simply takes cultural factors into account. Max
Weber did not propose a cultural or even ethical interpretation but rather
demonstrated that economic activity can be oriented by the belief system as
much as the belief system can, in a given historical period, be influenced by the
economic system. Both are possible at specific historical moments;

The second potential weakness of modern patrimonialism is linked with
the application of a Weberian rooted framework of analysis (which is in itself
mainly based on European history) to an African context. Objections made on

110 On this issue see Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ...op. cit. p.129; see also Médard, Jean-
Francois, ‘L’État néo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p.323.
111 See especially, Weber, Max, L’Éthique ... op. cit. pp.248-249.
these terms can be countered by the argument that the modern patrimonial approach only uses Weberian concepts and analytical influences selectively. The Weberian approach to the emergence of the modern State, for instance, is used less in terms of the celebrated notion of the monopoly of legitimate violence (derived from the European experience of State formation) than from the thesis which its author develops on why the overcoming of patrimonialism is a prerequisite to the successful emergence of the modern state. In the same way, what concerns all these authors, is not so much the identification of a certain form of relationship between social actors (patrimonial in nature) in any given organisational form like the Weberian ideal-type of patrimonialism or modern State, but rather the ways in which those specific forms of relationship can be articulated and embodied in new structural organisational forms (i.e., ‘the State in Africa', ‘the contemporary African State', ‘the underdeveloped State in tropical Africa' essentially operating according to what was here defined as ‘modern patrimonialism').

The third potential weakness has to do with the vision implied in the model, that is that of a relatively coherent and operative system, with an internal and specific working logic based on a dominant rationality shared and practised by all layers of society with a clear and established set of rules. Such interpretation can be accused of stressing the normative and balancing capacities of patrimonialism, not allowing much room for conflict, disruption, anti-systemic courses of action, incoherence and the change of normative values and principles over time.

The fourth and final weakness lies with the high level of generalisation implied in the ‘modern patrimonial’ analytical framework. All of the authors

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112 See Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. pp. 3-4
113 Bayart, Jean-François, The State in Africa ... op. cit.
114 Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p. 6.
115 Médard, Jean-François, ‘The Underdeveloped State ... op. cit.
mentioned here generalise, referring indiscriminately to African countries (sub-Saharan African countries, excluding South-Africa), resorting to examples from a multiplicity of countries and clearly aiming to find a common analytical and interpretative framework that may be applied to the great majority of them

Although these authors show some awareness of these two last weaknesses, their high level of generalisation has not made it possible to demonstrate concretely how such issues can be addressed and overcome in their own framework of analysis. Such demonstration could only be possible with the application of the propounded analytical framework to specific country studies that might not conform to such interpretation and analysis. The present work on Angola seeks to use the basic analytical structure proposed by those authors, but faced with a reality that did not fit the model, attempts to develop a reformulated approach.

As has long been noticed, ‘nowhere is the rate of casualty among new concepts higher than in the social sciences. Few survived the scrutiny of critical discourse, and many more end up prematurely fossilised in the pages of esoteric journals’117. Survival ‘is not mainly a function of etymological precision or even clarity of reference [...] but of how much fruitful research a new concept

116 Médard refers to the ‘underdeveloped state in tropical Africa’ and ‘even though our field research has been limited to Cameroon and Ivory Coast, we have reason to believe that the conditions we describe can be generalised elsewhere on the continent’; in Médard, Jean-François, ‘The Underdeveloped State ... op. cit. footnote 13; Bayart refers generally to the State in sub-Saharan Africa, and although he assumes the obvious impossibility of a synthesis of everything to do with politics and the State in Africa, his clear aim is to construct a general mode of analysis and interpretation of ‘African politics’ and expounds the workings and logic of an ‘African way of politics’; see Bayart, Jean-François, The State in Africa ... op. cit. especially p. viii and p.8; Chabal and Daloz assume their generalisation aim and possible criticisms in these terms, ‘This book is an attempt to make sense of what is happening in Africa today. Simple as this may appear to be, it is in fact fiendishly challenging for reasons having to do with both the diversity of the continent and the complexity of the events currently taking place there. [...] Is our undertaking over-ambitious? Should it even be attempted? Would the level of generalisation required to account for such intricate and diverse experiences reduce the validity of any of the observations we might make? We would argue, however, that it is the depth and seriousness of the present African crisis which make our enterprise necessary.’, In Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p.xv.

generates. Most concepts new or old are killed not by attack but by neglect\(^{118}\). Thus, the point here is not so much to create or introduce new analytical concepts but to use the analytical framework provided by the authors before it is prematurely buried by criticism and neglect without generating any research\(^{119}\). Such use exposes some of the inadequacies of 'modern patrimonialism', but the aim here is to propose a way of overcoming them through a reformulated analytical and interpretative framework, in order to comprehend the reality observed in Angola (and possibly in other countries as well) which is somehow different from the one expounded in 'modern patrimonialism'.

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\(^{119}\) That seems to be the case, especially with the temporary draw back of Bayart to the more fashionable approach of the *Le politique par le bas en Afrique noire*, something that he soon abandoned, returning to his initial route with *The criminalization of the State in Africa*. Such draw back, although temporary, is elucidating of the referred possibility of a premature bury. See Bayart, Jean-François, *The State in Africa* ...op. cit.; Bayart, Jean-François, *Le politique par le bas* ... op. cit.; Bayart, Jean-François et al., *The Criminalization* ...op. cit.. See also comments on this issue in Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ...op. cit. pp. 28-29.
2 - Post-Modern Patrimonialism

In Angola (and possibly other countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria), patrimonialism underwent different dynamics and led to a different socio-political organisation. Contrary to what was supposed to happen with 'modern patrimonialism', the ties of distributive interdependence between rulers and ruled did not settle and solidify; instead they weakened and loosened, amidst a context of deep social fragmentation and increasing economic scarcity, leading to a new dimension of patrimonialism as a political system, which is quantitatively and qualitatively different from 'modern patrimonialism'. The next two sub-chapters attempt, firstly, to discuss the differences between 'modern patrimonialism' and this new form of patrimonialism (2.1), secondly, to explain those differences (2.2).

2.1 Dilution of Ties of Distributive Interdependence

2.1.1 Dilution of the Ties of Economic Interdependence

Modern patrimonial dynamics imply that the whole social system is based on predatory and distributive practices that support vertical, sectarian and preferential, micro-identity solidarities throughout extensive patrimonial networks of dependants and 'heads of network'.

In Angola (and possibly other countries) the ties of economic distributive interdependence that would have been the foundations of patrimonial networks and of the whole system of socio-political organisation, did not consolidate but were instead loosened. From the end of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, the distribution of resources went down drastically and the existing networks shrank and became fragmented, with the bottom rungs being the first to be
neglected. Such reality followed a generalised tendency that has generally been explained by the economic crisis in Africa.\footnote{Africa’s crisis is the combined outcome of the weakening of its patrimonial system and of the dereliction of political accountability. And the weakening of the patrimonial system is entirely due to the diminution in the internal and external resources to feed it. Of the two, the internal is the more dramatic, making the need for increased foreign aid and investment (or precisely, increased dependence) all the more vital."; In Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal, ... op. cit. p.118; also talking about the linkage between the economic crisis and the crisis of patrimonialism is Médard, Jean-François, 'L’État néo-patrimonial en ... op. cit. p.351. Although in a different context and writing in a different period but also approaching the issue of the relation between patrimonial effectiveness and resources availability, see, Scott, James C., ‘Corruption ... op. cit. pp.1142–58; Scott, James C., ‘Patron–Client ... op. cit. pp. 91-113.}

However, it must be said that there was in countries such as Angola a growing tendency to ‘withhold resources at source’ and to divert ever-greater sums of money as one went up the networks, by those with privileged or primary access to the State’s top offices and resources (here called ‘ruling elites’). At this level, predatory practices were less and less ‘altruistic’ (i.e., aimed at feeding extensive networks of dependants and supporters) and more and more ‘selfish’ (i.e., feeding oneself and ever more restricted networks). This showed that the distributive obligations of those ruling elites were not being fulfilled, not so much because of the general ‘crisis’ in resources, but essentially because of the deliberate neglect of patrimonial obligations. The ruling elites enriched themselves whilst neglecting their dependants.

As we will see, since independence, many oil wells have been discovered in Angola and revenues from oil have increased hugely, partly as a result of a rise in international oil prices. Many other sources of increased income have appeared over the years, such as humanitarian aid and development assistance. And yet, this has had no impact whatsoever on the continued shrinkage of the networks, diminution of resources distributed and deterioration of services provided by the State (such as education, health and so on). Apart from Angola, the case of Zaire also seems to support this argument with the often mentioned situations of ever growing sums of money being diverted by the holders of the top offices of State into private foreign bank accounts.
Contrary to the expectations of modern patrimonialism, the extensive patrimonial networks that linked members of very different socio-economic status gave way to the very restricted patrimonial networks of ruling elites and their entourage, with a similar socio-economic status. This reinforced an increasing distributive neglect (i.e. non-fulfilment of distributive ‘obligations’) by the ‘ruling elites’ towards a growing number of people marginalised at the bottom of the system, representing an extreme imbalance of distributive relations — an accentuated ‘elitism’ of patrimonialism.

The ruling elites and their entourage were growing fat, literally and figuratively, whilst the populace grew so thin that their actual survival was put at risk. According to a modern patrimonial analytical framework, the problem with such attitudes and practices among the ruling elites was that they would be destroying the basis of their own power. However, even at a political level, countries such as Angola seem to exhibit a different reality from the one presented by modern patrimonialism.

2.1.2 Dilution of Ties of Political Interdependence

According to a modern patrimonial analytical framework, the notions of political accountability, political legitimacy and political representation are based on redistributive principles (‘sharing the spoils’) and related to the betterment of conditions of one’s own community. If the feeding of the networks decreases drastically, along with the number of recipients (supporters, dependants, ‘constituents’), then the political legitimacy of rulers also decreases, with an accompanying increase of claims against their rule and the growing precariousness of their power. The whole patrimonial power system is endangered.

Again, the reality in Angola (and possibly other countries) does not conform to such modern patrimonial dynamics, revealing instead a scenario of the progressive neglect of extensive economic and distributive obligations, without any profound changes in the political landscape or to the basic
patrimonial organisational principles that guide the whole socio-political organisation.

On the one hand, when looking at the background of those groups that have had privileged access to the resources of the State since independence it can be seen that, apart from permanent rivalries, disputes and power re-arrangements among the myriad of sub-groups comprising the motley and ever changing Creole/M'Bundu alliance, those groups have kept their privileged socio-economic status from independence to the present day.\textsuperscript{121}

On the other hand, regardless of the change of leadership (from Neto to Eduardo dos Santos), the organisational principles of patrimonialism (preferentialism, sectarianism and micro-identity solidarities) and organisational expressions (predatory and rentière economic practices; personalisation of political power) did not disappear. Instead they were reinforced throughout the years that followed independence. This seems to be also the case of former Zaire, simply illustrated by the substitution of Mobutu by Kabila and the substitution of Kabila by his son Joseph, which as is known, in no way changed the working logic of the socio-political system in Zaire, especially at the level of power relationships between ruling elites and ruled masses.

Along with the weakening of economic interdependence ties (i.e., the contraction of distribution), there was also in Angola (and possibly other mentioned cases) a weakening of the political interdependence ties between

\textsuperscript{121} As we will see, the privileged condition of the Creole/M'Bundu in Angola go back to the pre-colonial era, before 1885. They came to dominate the State after the independence and consolidated their socio-economic and political dominion through the presidencies of Agostinho Neto and Eduardo dos Santos. This seems to be also the case in Liberia where the Americo-Liberian aristocracy or 'assimilated elite' never lost their privileged access to resources under the rule of Tolbert, Doe and Taylor (not even after the executions on the Monrovia beach ordered by Doe). It is the case of the elite descendants of slaves 'repatriated' in Sierra Leone, under the rule of different men such as Stevens, Momoh, Strasser, Bio, Kabah, and Koroma during a period stretching from 1968 to the present day. It is the obvious case of Zaire under Mobutu or Kabila, where the 'ethnic' and 'regional elites' are still privileged in a system of co-option. It is the complex case of ethnic and regional elites in Nigeria with predominance given to the Haussa of the North, who, since 1960, are still traditionally the political and financial elite, having survived many presidents, such as Azikiwe, Gowon, Murtala, Obasanjo, Shagari, Babangida, and Abacha. On the case of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Zaire and Nigeria see Reno, William, \textit{Warlord Politics and African States} (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
rulers and ruled. Relational notions such as political accountability lost a great part of their meaning: they became diluted and the informal sanction mechanisms lost effectiveness. Objectively, the political participation and intervention (formal or informal) of the populace was considerably diminished.

The best designation for this attitude of political and economic neglect of the ‘ruling elites’ vis-à-vis the ‘masses’ (especially those furthest away from the central and primary rungs of distributive hierarchy) and their subsequent loss of political and economic power is that of *l’Afrique inutile* (as used by Reno to cases of Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia and former Zaire). This comprises ‘regions and peoples that are best governed lightly, if at all, rather than waste scarce revenues in attempts to control them.’

2.1.3 Dilution of the Ties of Ethic and Normative Interdependence

According to a modern patrimonial analysis, the construction of a framework of economic and political relationships is usually accompanied by the foundation of a clear, albeit informal, ethical and normative framework. Such principles would coherently legitimise and regulate the extensive patrimonial networks of appropriation (predation) and distribution of resources. Instead of this, what happened in countries such as Angola was the dilution of the ethical norms that regulated the patrimonial practices.

The ethical and economic obligations of extensive distribution were not fulfilled by the ruling elites, and their attitude was blatantly one of ‘selfish predation’ on a growing share of the resources. Faced with this breakdown of ‘patrimonial compromise’, a distinct ethical and normative framework began to emerge, which was both pragmatic and realistic, according to which the ends — survival for the majority, enrichment of the minority — justified, or legitimised,

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122 'Regime efforts to control resources recall some compromises made by colonial States, which were forced to choose between Afrique utile (areas that produced revenues sufficient to pay for administration) and Afrique inutile (areas abandoned by the State as too costly to administer). Whereas the contemporary version of Afrique utile is delineated in terms of controlling salable resources rather than of colonial concerns with labour [sic], its inutile counterpart still denotes regions and people that are best governed lightly, if at all, rather than waste scarce revenues in attempts to control them.', in Reno, William, *Warlord Politics ...* op. cit. p.35.
the means. This gave rise to a kind of ‘free-for-all’ in all layers of society, in which all became involved in unrestrained practices of ‘total assault’ on all available State resources: unregulated predation.

Within a pragmatic moral framework in which the ends justify the means, the boundaries between what is considered as morally legitimate and morally illegitimate become blurred, and practices prevail that were considered morally unacceptable by the ‘public morals’ of the recent past, ranging from drug trafficking, gun-running, the trade in endangered species, petty theft and organised crime, to downright theft from the State coffers. Although within a different approach than the one mentioned here, Bayart has noticed the same phenomenon in former Zaire,

In fact, the person who struggles daily to survive and who, using the energy and the spirit of survival called by the citizens of Kinshasa \textit{dévouillardise}, the local name for \textit{môts}, supplies the city with food and distributes fuel to the provinces is no different in essence from the diamond digger or the cocaine courier. In the name of the same ethos of personal \textit{savoir-faire} and initiative, he passes from one activity to another.

In countries such as Angola, the modern-patrimonial ethics did not consolidate. Contrary to Médard’s arguments, the predators did not share their prey nor the left-over food with their dependants in accordance with the norms of balanced predation; contrary to the arguments of Chabal and Daloz, the crocodiles did not reach the point of being satisfied enough to feed their dependants afterwards in accordance with the ethics of ‘sharing the spoils’; contrary to Bayart’s arguments, the ‘goats’ did not respect the boundaries of their pastures in accordance with the norms of regulated manducation.

123 Those who deviate — or steal — supposedly ‘public’ funds into private accounts abroad are indulging in a practice which, according to the modern patrimonial ethical system, is highly condemnable as it is distributively ‘selfish’ rather than ‘altruistic’. Yet they are less condemned by ‘public morals’ now than during the first years of independence, because it would be difficult to find anyone else who would not do the same were they in the same position. Everyone strives for the opportunity of accessing the main resources and when the opportunity presents itself, one has to make the most in the shortest time available because munificence from the Minister, the Director, the connection, could end any time. This reinforces the popular Angolan maxim, ‘aproveita enquanto o Braga é tesoureiro e não te preocupes porque ninguém pode atirar a primeira pedra’ (‘make the most of it while Braga is treasurer and do not worry because no one can cast the first stone.’)

124 Bayart, Jean-François et al., \textit{The Criminalization} ... op. cit. pp.38–39.
What did happen in countries such as Angola was that Bayart’s ‘goats’ began to eat more and more of what was in front of them, in more and more places. The proverb that says that ‘the goat grazes wherever it is tied and not beyond that point’ did not apply, rather it should have been rephrased as ‘the goat is no longer tied’ and grazes everywhere and everything. Instead of Médard’s elitist banquet of regulated and proportionally distributive predation over the cake that is the State, there was a ‘banquet for cannibals’, where everyone ate as much as they could, without worrying about feeding third parties. Finally, the crocodiles from Chabal and Daloz turned out to be insatiable: the more they ate, the hungrier they became, the less they fed their dependants and the more dangerous they became.

Faced with this situation of a pragmatic and flexible ‘free for all’ type of morals, the civil juridical order was completely derided and ridiculed by the greater part of the population that saw it merely as a possible source of exploitation. As a rule, the law represented a possible source of income for all those who were in a position to ‘sell’ the non-fulfilment of legal obligations, and a source of expenditure to all those who needed not fulfil them.

2.2 The Effectively Created State

In a framework where there is a marked dereliction of economic, political and ethical interdependence between rulers and ruled, the existing socio-political organisation and the State will of course differ from those analysed by modern

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125 This was an expression used by the vice-governor of Malange, Mr. Vieira, to describe the practices that led to an almost complete destruction of the industrial infrastructure in Malange; practices starting within the top positions of management hierarchy and finishing within the workers and general population at the bottom rungs of society; from private interview with Mr Vieira Vice-Governor of Malange for the economy (7 September 1995). The same expression is used in a novel by Pepetela to describe precisely the same phenomenon. In the words of a former guerrilla of the MPLA who did not want to assume power after independence, ‘it’s strange, but nowadays no one understands my lack of appetite. And they condemn me because I threw it all up in the air, I don’t want cars or houses or many wives like they have, with their voracious and insatiable appetite. I made them uncomfortable — at a banquet for cannibals I would only have taken a pastry and been happy with that.’; in Pepetela, A Geração...op. cit. p.202-203.
patrimonialism, both in terms of the relationship between the dominant working logic and the State's structure and in terms of the State's management strategy.

2.2.1 The Relationship Between the Dominant Working Logic and the Structure of the State

According to a modern patrimonial interpretation, the effective State would find a *modus operandi* able to combine in an operative manner the structural form of a modern polity (i.e., the existence of a minimally institutionalised administration, bureaucracy and government exerting some sovereign authority over land and population; a minimal 'public' dimension and prosecution of public objectives) with the working logic of patrimonialism. Important internal and external motives would ensure the survival of a minimal level of the structural expressions of a modern polity: internally, the usefulness of the bureaucratic and administrative State as an effective and central mechanism for the appropriation and distribution of resources; externally, the benefits arising from the legitimacy of the State, recognised by Public International Law and by the international community.

Contrary to that view, in countries such as Angola, the dilution of the extensive ties of distributive interdependence between rulers and ruled made it increasingly difficult for the socio-political system to combine the structural expressions of a modern polity with the working logic of patrimonialism. There was an extreme growth of the organisational influence of the latter and, consequently, an extreme atrophy of the former.

The effective reality in Angola (which seems to be paralleled by the experience of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria) was the growing distance between political practices and the action of a modern State.

The exercise of sovereignty by several of these governments (except perhaps Nigeria) is confined to the capital city, and to the main provincial towns — as is the case with Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. There is no
effective border control, nor is there adequate control over the territory or over part of the population. In more radical cases, resources are for a significant part beyond government control — as in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The pursuit of private, sectarian, interests reaches extreme heights and there is almost complete disregard for public welfare and for territories and populations belonging to *l’Afrique inutile*\(^{126}\).

The generalisation of a pragmatic and flexible normative framework, with unregulated free-for-all ‘assault’ on resources, facilitated above all the destruction of the State’s bureaucratic and administrative system — a process started by the huge ‘army’ of civil servants forgotten on the edges of the distributive system. In Angola, the exception was a nucleus of presidential services and State security services\(^{127}\), which were still indispensable to the functioning of the central government in order to ensure the minimal outward appearance of a modern State (vital for maintaining the State’s international legitimacy and privileges)\(^{128}\).

2.2.2 The Management Strategy of the Effectively Created State

According to a modern patrimonial analytical framework, independently from the regime (civil or military) or political model (capitalism or socialism), the ruling elites would follow a calculated strategy of concentration of power and centralisation of the administrative system up to a certain level (varying in each case) — thus centralising the distribution of resources, benefits and privileges. Such strategy started off by being extensively one of partisan patrimonialism but soon became ‘elitist’ — the masses were no longer able to exchange votes for

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\(^{126}\) This is what happens in Angola as we will see and it seems to be what happens in other cases as well. As stated by Reno: ‘That the pursuit of power in Africa’s worst-off states is essentially a matter of private gain becomes clear in my examination of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo (formerly Zaire), and Nigeria’; in Reno, William, *Warlord Politics* ... op. cit. p.xi.

\(^{127}\) The same seems to happen in former Zaire; according to a Zairian: ‘If, in spite of the economic crisis, there is one thing which works well in Zaire it is our intelligence services’; cit. in Bayart, Jean-François, *The State in Africa* ...op. cit. p.246.

\(^{128}\) Such privileges coming out of the international legitimacy are clearly demonstrated in Reno, William, *Warlord Politics* ... op. cit. and will be later discussed in this work.
favours. Personal and vertical solidarities relating rulers and ruled, however, survived according to established informal mechanisms and sanctions.

Contrary to that interpretation, in the case of Angola, the process of power concentration and administrative centralisation did not reach any point of operative stabilisation but continued unabated, thus restricting further the primary channels to access resources. The patrimonialism that was supposed to become partially 'elitist' became extremely concentrated in the hands of a few and led to the near-total neglect and marginalisation of the population at large.

2.3 The Proposed Framework of Analysis: a Different Patrimonial Dynamics or Post-Modern Patrimonialism

The argument of this thesis is that Angola (and possibly other cases), experienced a different patrimonial dynamics, evolving a new dimension of patrimonialism as a form of socio-political organisation, beyond modern patrimonialism.

On the one hand, the dynamics of patrimonialism did not bring about the construction of economic, political and ethical ties of patrimonial distributive interdependence between 'ruling elites' and 'masses'. Instead, it brought about the dilution of those ties, though the fragmented nature of the type of dominant socio-cultural references to identity remained the same. On the other hand, there was a gradual increase in the influence of the working logic of patrimonialism which went on to develop in direct proportion to the atrophy of the structural expressions of a modern polity.

The central question is therefore to discover the reasons underlying such different patrimonial dynamics. To be more specific, this central question can be broken down into two parts. Firstly, why did the same patrimonial organisational principles as analysed by the tenants of modern patrimonialism (vertical, preferential and sectarian solidarity ties according to dominant micro-identity criteria), generate in Angola a different kind of patrimonial dynamics characterised by the dilution of distributive interdependence ties between rulers
and ruled? Secondly, why did the dilution of those ties, which were supposed to be the basis of the patrimonial system, lead not to its destruction but to an extreme form of its development instead?

The answer to these questions, which forms the core of this thesis, is that in the case of Angola such different patrimonial dynamics can be explained by three main factors.

1) Economic and political 'insularisation'

This first phenomenon basically consists in the growing insularity and autonomy of the economic and political power of the ruling elites and, conversely, the extreme dependence and loss of economic and political power of the masses. It comprises two elements:

a) On the one hand there was a progressive monopolisation of the main sources of income by the 'ruling elites', which severely restricted access to them; this enabled them to achieve almost total economic independence in relation to the productive effort of the population.

In the case of Angola, the main sources of revenue progressively reduced to income from exportation of internationally valuable raw materials (such as oil, whose exploitation was usually entrusted to foreign companies, paying tax in dollars to the State — 'rent', accounting for almost 80% of State revenues in the early eighties) and to the economic benefits derived from international political and diplomatic alignments with the USSR (access to loans, credit, arms and so on). The 'external' nature of this kind of income facilitated its autonomous and insular management (cash accounts restricted to the top of the apparatus, mostly kept in foreign banks). The same seems to be also applicable to other 'enclave economies' such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone.\(^\text{129}\)

\(^{129}\) In the case of Liberia, the country was highly dependent on the exploitation of wood and diamonds, being a political and diplomatic client of the USA. In Sierra Leone, there was high-dependency on diamonds, gold and other minerals, being a political and diplomatic client of various 'patrons'. Former
For the ruling elites, such insularity gave them economic independence and allowed them to ignore practices of 'work exploitation' or surplus extraction from the productive effort of the general population (i.e., *mise au travail* practices\(^\text{130}\)). This contributed to the ever-increasing generalisation of a *rentière* mentality and predatory practices, which contributed to the drastic drop in internal production and productivity.

For the masses, this meant in the medium term, an extreme economic fragility due to two main reasons. Firstly, predatory practices are anti-productive in the 'modern' sense and there is increasing restriction in terms of quantity and access to resources for those who are not at the top of the system. Secondly, the informal economic sector (which starts to develop as an alternative to the formal sector, as we will see) does not provide sufficient socio-economic support such as welfare policies, thereby aggravating the economic fragility of the population. Thus, the economic negotiation power ('bargain') of the masses fell drastically, as their economic importance decreased within the patrimonial system.

b) On the other hand, the phenomenon also included the process of closing off the formal political system.

Given the personalisation and concentration of political power, the extreme centralisation of political administration and the increasing elitism of patrimonialism; the political institutional system became insulated from any effective influence on the part of the population, whose political participation was limited to personal and informal mechanisms. However, such informal mechanisms became practically ineffective because the population lacked any

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\(^{130}\) On the so-called *mise au travail* practices see Bayart, Jean-François, *The State in Africa* ...op. cit. p.110; also Bayart, Jean-François, *L'État au Cameroun* ...op. cit. introduction and Chapter 1.
economic and political importance within the patrimonial system. Economically they were not a source of income, politically they had no votes to exchange for benefits.

2) The reinforcing and cumulative dynamics of patrimonialism in Angola.

Given the progressive loss of negotiating power of the masses at a political and economic level, given the general economic crisis and the growing retention of resources at source by the ruling elites, the ties of distributive interdependence became sharply diluted. This led to a process of cumulative reinforcement of the working logic of patrimonialism at the economic, political and ethical levels.

- At an economic level, the growing neglect of distributive obligations promoted a more intense recourse to the vertical, preferential, sectarian and predatory solutions. This phenomenon is easily understandable because, in cases where the distributed resources diminish and patrimonial networks contract, the predatory devices and the vertical, preferential and sectarian ties of each individual gain in importance when seeking privileged access to scarce resources (through connections, protectors or benefactors). Therefore, a context of growing scarcity of resources favours the reinforcement of the patrimonial working logic.131

- At a political level, contrary to what might be expected, the ruling elites' neglect of their distributive obligations did not awaken any form of class consciousness within the population. On the contrary, what divided them became accentuated and what objectively united them was ignored. This made it impossible for them politically to mobilise and organise in-groups that could

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131 Although in a different context, situations of intensifying patrimonial systems with growing scarcity of resources had already been noticed in a study on patrimonialism in Italy (Naples and Palermo); see Chubb, Judith, Patronage, Power and Poverty in Southern Italy (Cambridge, CUP, 1982).
identify themselves horizontally according to socio-economic criteria such as classes.

This phenomenon can also be easily understood because, in a society dominated by the informalisation and personalisation of all social relationships (where nothing is solved by institutional means without a personal influential contact) there emerges a feeling of collective helplessness. In the face of growing living difficulties such feeling brings about an increasing resort to the same old vertical, preferential, sectarian and micro-identity channels and to the same old political practices of informalisation, personalisation and infra-institutionalisation. This inhibits the appearance of an alternative logic that would be universal (where concept of citizenship dominates) and horizontal (where groups are organised along socio-economic criteria forming social classes). Thus, a context of growing social fragmentation favours the reinforcement of the patrimonial working logic.

The growing inability to feel, think and act in durable universalistic and horizontal terms, is what impedes the emergence of alternative working logic for political, social and economic action. It is essentially for these reasons that when I refer here to such a primary social categorisation as ‘ruling elites’ and ‘ruled masses’, I am not referring to notions of class.

- At an ethical level, the non-fulfilment of extensive distributive obligations, stimulated the dilution of norms that were supposed to regulate the patrimonial system; thus bringing about ‘free for all’ pragmatic and flexible morals. This directly contributed to the intensifying of the working logic of patrimonialism because it reinforced social fragmentation and economic scarcity.

a) On the one hand, by legitimising a general assault on the available resources using all possible means (informal, illegal or criminal), in a framework of free-for-all, the system created, mainly for the urban population, the illusion of actually having opportunities (my schemes, my protectors, my
connections) in spite of the objective drop in distribution. This sustained and reinforced the individual belief, or illusion, in the effectiveness of vertical, preferential relationships and sectarian alignments. From a micro, individual, perspective, the freedom to seek solutions to problems through the ‘right’ connections and ‘by all possible means’ creates the impression that ‘the opportunity is around the corner’ and ‘everything is possible’, that ‘it’s all a matter of playing by the (informal) rules and a bit of luck’\footnote{Expressions commonly heard in the Angolan urban milieu among those who survive or live through expedience and schemes beyond the primary rungs of patrimonial distributive hierarchy, using all possible contacts and means of earning money.}. This spreads a culture of expedience, of the schemer, which ultimately means nothing more than the massive, uncontrolled increment of short-term individualised solutions, leading to more sectarianism and preferentialism according to micro-identity criteria. As a result, the social tissue becomes more fragmented, the population more divided, vulnerable, fragile and marginalised from the processes of political decision and actual power. Also, in the medium and long-term, the macro-social, or public, dimension is almost completely destroyed. The same type of dynamic seems to have occurred in the former Zaire:

\begin{quotation}
Indeed, to alleviate the poverty which affected all levels of society it was necessary for everybody to find a solution by exploiting their profession in their workplace and thereby inadvertently bringing about the ruin of the nation \cite{Bayart} for an improvement in the harsh conditions of life imposed on them by the ruling minority.\footnote{Anonymous, \textit{La Vie dans les forces aériennes Zairoises} (n.p.: n.p., n.d.) cited in Bayart, Jean-François, \textit{The State in Africa} ... op. cit. pp. 235–237. This is an excellent description, simply told by someone on the inside, of predation on the resources and public services in the vital area of the Zairian Air Forces which was demolished to the point of there being no operational planes left whatsoever, apart from Mobutu’s own C-130.}
\end{quotation}

Thus, the dilution of ethical distributive principles between rulers and ruled reinforces the primacy of the particularistic and sectarian over the universalistic, the personal and informal over the institutional, the vertical over horizontal solidarities, the micro-communities over the macro-community of the ‘nation-State’, leading to extreme social fragmentation and weakening of collective consciousness.
b) On the other hand, in objective economic terms, the freedom afforded by vertical, preferential, personal and sectarian solutions by all available means is an obvious illusion; indeed, for the overwhelming majority of the population, the activities allowed through this kind of freedom were merely a way of miserable survival. Both individually and collectively, the material benefits to which people had access decreased dramatically, as did living standards right after independence. As an example, the thousands of small traders (informal/illegal) in Luanda and in provincial main towns, whom the IMF and the World Bank wanted to see as the genesis of an entrepreneurial class, are in reality no more than a mass of people living in extreme misery by any standards, fighting desperately for physical survival and able only to provide, in most cases, a single daily meal for their families, highly unlikely to survive any form of epidemic for lack of means of access to the required treatments. 134

Their ability to save money is almost nil and there is minimal reinvestment, barely enough to ensure a residual stock for resale. In cases of rapid inflation, when prices can go up daily, the time between the sale of existent stock and the arrival of new supplies can be vital: the income from the sale, even at a profit, can be insufficient to buy the same replacement supplies 135.

In this way, by legitimising and endorsing generalised predation of all available resources by all possible means, the new ethics and normative framework did not solve the problems of scarcity and growing economic fragility of the overwhelming majority of the population; indeed, it merely made them worse.

134 From previous research on ‘business in Luanda’ (August-September 1994), non-published. Even with informal, or illegal, activities that shift thousands of dollars daily such as diamond trafficking in the Lundas, the living conditions of the traffickers are much worse than in the muceques (shanty towns) of Luanda. The veritable fortunes that pass through their hands daily are diluted daily throughout the Lunda societies, a kind of ‘Far West’ situation; the cost of products and basic services is astronomically high, there is much ill-health, health services are almost non-existent, there are all sorts of intermediaries, gangs, prostitution, attacks by UNITA or private armies on business concessions, and so on and so forth. See for instance, the newspaper article ‘No mundo de “cão come cão”’ (‘in the World of “dog eat dog”’), in Público (14th December 1998).

135 From previous research on ‘business in Luanda’ (August-September 1994), non-published.
3) The war as a powerful support of the cumulative and reinforcing patrimonial dynamics

In a system where ties of preferential solidarity based on micro identity criteria prevailed, where the State was the arena for rival groups vying for patrimonial appropriation of the available resources, the existence of a civil war reinforced all the previously expounded dynamics through economic scarcity and social fragmentation.

It promoted, justified and legitimised situations of economic scarcity and the neglect of distribution, specially regarding the State’s public socio-economic obligations (such as social services, health, education). It intensified social fragmentation through micro-identity political alignment with the two contenders.

As will be shown, the case of Angola is paradigmatic of the way in which war can reinforce the patrimonial dynamics under discussion. It might be also the case of the wars raging in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In sum, we are presented with a cumulative and reinforcing patrimonial dynamics according to which the economic and political insularity and autonomy of the ruling elites allowed a sharp dereliction of distributive interdependence relationships between rulers and ruled. This in turn generated an extreme intensification of the working logic of patrimonialism within a framework of grave economic scarcity and social fragmentation. This dynamic was fuelled in turn by the civil war. The more the distributive relationships diluted, the more the working logic of patrimonialism developed and the more the scarcity and social fragmentation increased thus further diluting the interdependence distributive ties.

This cumulative and self-reinforcing process led to a new dimension of patrimonialism. It differs from ‘modern patrimonialism’ not only in quantitative
terms (extreme development of patrimonial characteristics) but also in qualitative terms (near-total breakdown of political, economic or ethical interdependence ties between rulers and ruled), representing an unaccountable form of patrimonialism — post-modern patrimonialism.

2.3.1 Post-Modern Patrimonialism

Such new dimension of patrimonialism will be here designated as post-modern patrimonialism due to two main reasons:

Firstly, because there is a need to distinguish this reality from 'modern patrimonialism' (post, simply meaning 'coming after');

Secondly, because of the similarity that exists between the working logic of socio-political organisation in countries such as Angola and post-modern currents of thought.

Although there is no actual post-modern theory or 'school', rather a collection of remarks that have been classified as such, it is still possible to provide a very general definition of the post-modern intellectual movement mostly according to its aim to critically destroy the entire modern epistemological and scientific framework (that has been built up since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries from Descartes through the 18th century to Comte's social theory and even Marx) together with several organisational structures implied in the modern 'nation-State' model.

In these terms, post-modern currents of thought support the abandoning of modernist assumptions of a rational unified subject in favour of a social subject who is culturally plural and fragmented in identity; the relativism of truth and knowledge according to context along with the plurality of interpretations and plurality of meanings; the break from macro-interpretations of society (so-called grand narratives) and from unifying and simplifying macro-structural entities such as the modern 'nation-State' and its legal-bureaucratic rationality; the move away from any macro-intelligible structures and projects such as the modern notions of development and progress, which are taken to be relative
and subjective (conditioned by specific cultural environments), always including forms of domination and restriction.\textsuperscript{136}

In these terms, the similarities between the working logic of patrimonialism in countries such as Angola (as has been expounded throughout the whole of chapter 2) and post-modern currents of thought become clear. They are as follows.

1. Identity is based on affective relationships. This operates to the detriment of more encompassing notions of nationhood. This is in accordance with the post-modern idea of the individual as culturally plural and fragmented in identity.

2. There is a set of economic relationships, which are fragmented, vertical and selective. This resonates with the post-modern idea of dissociation with large structure entities such as the modern nation-State with its implicit idea of national socio-economic solidarity.

3. There is a progressive decline in political representation and accountability. This is related to the post-modern idea which rejects notions of political representation, which (in a view of Lyotard and Foucault) are repressive\textsuperscript{137}.

4. The weakness and flexibility of ethical and normative principles associated with patrimonialism are close to the post-modern idea of relativism according to context, which involves a plurality of interpretations and meanings.

5. The State, which has emerged in countries such as Angola, does not fulfil the normally accepted criteria applied to the ‘Westphalian’ State, which is regarded as the fundamental unit of the international political system.


\textsuperscript{137} See Lyotard, Jean-François, \textit{The Post-modern ...} op. cit.; Foucault, Michel, \textit{Language ...} op. cit.; see also Laclau, Ernesto & Mouffe, Chantal, \textit{Hegemony ...} op. cit.
Thus, the use of post-modern current of thought might be illustratively useful to support my designation of this new dimension of patrimonialism. Obviously, it is not my intention to develop here the discussion of the philosophical, theoretical or analytical questions that might arise from such use of post-modern thoughts to post-independence African political systems.
PART II

CASE STUDY:
ANGOLA, A CASE OF POST-MODERN PATRIMONIALISM
Analytical Structure and Methodology

This study will test the proposed framework of post-modern patrimonialism against the case of Angola. As stated in the introduction, the complementary references made to other countries as possible cases similar to the Angolan such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Nigeria may open up future lines of research and possible comparative studies, but it is beyond the scope of this work to examine them in more systematic comparative terms.

It is here argued that after independence, the Angolan political system more or less followed a modern patrimonial working logic during the presidency of Agostinho Neto, but exhausted that logic by the end of his presidency in 1979, evolving towards a post-modern patrimonialism essentially throughout the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos' presidency until 1987.

The case study will be divided into three main sections: SECTION A is concerned with socio-cultural identity cleavages in the pre-independence period, their origins and political implications during the anti-colonial struggle and the first civil war. The purpose is to provide an understanding of the origins of preferential solidarity ties in the post-independence period.

Section A will inevitably concentrate its attention on the MPLA for two sorts of reasons:

Firstly, because this section aims to make clear the historical basis for the development of preferential solidarity ties in the new independent State (especially between rulers and ruled). Thus, insofar as the MPLA was the
movement of liberation that has been in power since independence, it is logical
to give more attention to its historical and sociological background. Secondly,
because historical research on the sociological basis, formation and
development of the other two movements is still in its early stages. If that
research is usually said to be very insufficient in the case of the MPLA (the
most studied of the three) we can well imagine the work that has still to be done
in the case of the other movements. As Messiant said in 1997, in a seminar on
the history of Angola,

We are just at the beginning of that work — not only in relation to
the MPLA, but specially in relation to the FNLA and UNITA, not to
mention the initiatives and organisations that did not 'survive'.

Thus, the issue in this section is not to provide an analysis of the genesis of the
processes of social identity in Angola (which would require a separate study)
nor to provide a history of 'Angolan nationalism' (which in any case would not
be feasible here) or even less of the 1975-1976 civil war; but basically to
discuss the main literature and argumentation on pre-independence identity
cleavages, their origins (with special attention to the MPLA's sociological
basis) and their political consequences during the anti-colonial struggle (1961-
1974) and the first civil war. This discussion will allow me to define my
standing point in respect of it. From there I move on to the analysis of the post-
independence period and especially to the relationships between rulers and
ruled within the new State (the main focus of this work).

Closely following the theoretical discussion presented in the first two
chapters of this work, SECTIONS B and C, aim to understand the existing
working logic of the post-independence socio-political system and the
effectively emerging State. These sections analyse the dynamics through which

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138 In Messiant, Christine, 'Entre nós até o passado é imprevisível. A experiência de uma investigação
sobre o nacionalismo Angolano e, em particular, o MPLA: fontes, crítica, necessidades actuais da
investigação', in Construindo o Passado Angolano: as fontes e a sua interpretação, Actas do II
Seminário Internacional sobre História de Angola, realizado em Luanda de 4 a 9 de Agosto de 1997,
(Lisboa: CNCDP, 1997), p.859. Also stressing a lot of work that still needs to be done is Bittencourt,
Marcelo, 'A História contemporânea... op. cit. p.185.
139 According to Messiant this is a work to be done by several researchers given the magnitude of the
job; in Messiant, Christine, 'Entre nós ... op. cit. p. 858, footnote 88,
the interdependent relationships (political, economic, ethical) between rulers and ruled were formed and how they evolved through two subsequent periods of time and two presidencies: presidency of Agostinho Neto (1975-1979) and the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos presidency (1979-1985/87).

In the end, the purpose of the analysis and comparison of these periods is to demonstrate the shift from a modern patrimonial working logic (political and normative coherence in the operation of a patrimonial system ensuring social integration through distribution -- linking rulers and ruled) to a post-modern patrimonial working logic (extreme development of patrimonial organisational principles and expressions, breaking the interdependence ties between rulers and ruled). The only way to show such ‘patrimonial’ differences is to apply exactly the same analytical structure and analytical indicators to those two subsequent periods of time and subsequent administrations in order to ‘measure’ intensity and quality variations of patrimonial working logic between them. Thus, each of these sections follows a similar outline, containing five chapters each: the 1st dedicated to the context of socio-political events of each administration, relevant to the understanding of the ensuing analysis; the 2nd, 3rd and 4th concerned with the political, economic and ethical framework of interdependence relationships respectively; the 5th, related with the effectively emerging State. Other than the first chapter of each section, the remaining four follow a rigid analytical structure based on pre-defined indicators constructed to be as generalised and objective as possible.

- The analysis of Angola's post-independence political framework (second chapter of each section) attempts on the whole to describe and analyse the relationships between rulers and ruled, and is structured around three main indicators: 1) the Party, due to the importance of its role in most post-independence African patrimonial systems; 2) the exercise of executive and legislative power, because it allows one to gauge the internal power-relationships and their location within the political and administrative system.
— which is critical when it comes to access to and use of resources in a patrimonial system; 3) judicial power, as it is essential to measure the level of its dependence in relation to the executive and legislative powers in order to obtain a picture of its role in the regulation of socio-political relationships, and to assess the level of separation of powers that exist within the political system.

- The analysis of economic relationships (3rd chapter of each section) attempts to describe and analyse the relations of production, distribution and consumption, being structured around five main indicators: 1) the working of the public administration, since it is important within post-independence patrimonial systems as one of the main channels of access to the distribution of the State’s resources; 2) agricultural and industrial production, in order to gauge the degree of impact of so-called predatory practices and rentière mentality on internal production, characteristic of patrimonial economic relationships in the post-independence era; 3) the informal sector, because of the importance it assumes in the economic life of the population in most independent African countries, diverting and absorbing goods produced on the official market; 4) the economic and political impact of the war, in order to estimate the kind of influence it had on the patrimonial working logic, be it structural or disruptive; 5) social policies, inasmuch as they are objective indicators for gauging ‘collective’ or ‘public’ consciousness.

- The analysis of ethical and normative principles (4th chapter of each section) looks at the organisational ethos of the emerging political and economic framework of relationships. To this effect, the analysis will be structured around two main indicators: 1), the principles that guide the economic and political management of power used by the leader at the top of the system, which is important when measuring the criteria that influence the exercise of power; 2), the normative principles and criteria underlying and guiding the economic and social practices of the greater part of the population.
Finally, based on all the information provided by the preceding indicators and chapters, it will be possible to dedicate the last chapter of each section to a conclusion on the characterisation of the effectively existing State in terms of assessing its modern or post-modern patrimonial working logic.

Two last points must be made: one, on the fact that this thesis does not analyse UNITA; two, on the fact that this thesis stresses the internal dimension rather than the external one (such as the Cold War, the Cuban and Soviet presence). I discuss these two issues in turn.

(1) Firstly, as previously explained, the discussion about modern or post-modern patrimonial working logic concerns the relationship between rulers and ruled within the State and, therefore, UNITA can not be included since it is a guerrilla movement, operating through ‘hit and run’ operations, without a fixed territory over which it can be said to have exerted an administration with a minimally stable relationship with a settled population through established institutions and with an internationally recognised government. As stressed by Messiant

UNITA elle n’a jamais été un autre “Etat”, mais seulement un ordre, un pouvoir, armé n’ayant ni les mêmes fonctionnements internes ni les mêmes “relations internationales” qu’un Etat140

Secondly, due to its nature as a guerrilla movement, UNITA is a very insufficiently studied movement, where research is extremely difficult or biased. As also stressed by Messiant,

On peut aussi noter qu’il n’y a pas eu jusqu’ici d’analyses indépendantes de l’Unita (même par des “chercheurs sympathisants”) non seulement me semble-t-il du fait qu’une telle recherche indépendante est toujours plus difficile dans une guérilla que dans un Etat où des marges de liberté existent obligatoirement, mais aussi en raison du genre particulier de celle de l’Unita, et notamment de son caractère totalitaire et despotique141.

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140 In Messiant, Christine, ‘À propos des..., op. cit. p.72, footnote 21.
141 Ibid. p.72, footnote 21.
(2) As for the need to privilege the internal explanatory variables over the external ones, it has to do with the analytical perspective at the centre of this thesis. As previously discussed, the post-independence political systems had to invent their own *modus operandi* combining two distinctive working logics—one, endogenous, patrimonial and 'traditional' in origin; the other, exogenous, inherited from the colonisers and then altered by socialist or capitalist programmes, but following the external rationality of a Eastern or Western based 'modern State'. As a rule, the dilemma concerning these two objectively contradictory logics was overcome through a more or less successful *subordination* of the modern political structure (essentially exogenous) to a patrimonial working logic (essentially endogenous).

Therefore, this thesis and its analytical perspective stresses the internal or mainly endogenous factors and not the commonly cited external influences, such as the Cold War, the Cuban and Soviet presence, South Africa, etc. These will be mentioned as relevant but they are not taken to be explanatory variables.

No credible causal relationship can be established between the workings of a modern patrimonial logic and the presence of foreign troops, military advisors or *cooperantes*\(^\text{142}\). On the contrary, the key question is the manner in which the patrimonial logic was able to subordinate the formal political model (Socialist-Marxist) despite the presence of all the foreign experts and advisers, ostensibly helping to develop such a model. In other words, what needs to be explained is why it was possible for post-modern patrimonialism to develop despite the supposed foreign influences.

\(^{142}\) For a reference on the presence of these foreigners in Angola see Hodges, Tony *Angola to the 1990's, the potential for recovery* (London: EIU, 1987), special report n°1079, pp.17-18
CASE STUDY, SECTION – A: THE MAIN SOCIO-CULTURAL IDENTIFICATION CLEAVAGES, ORIGINS AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE BEFORE THE INDEPENDENCE

This section discusses the pre-independence identity cleavages, their origins (with special attention to the MPLA's sociological basis) and their political implications during the anti-colonial struggle and the first civil war. Within my analytical perspective the main purpose of this part of the thesis is to provide the context within which it becomes possible to understand preferential solidarity ties in post-independence (dealt in sections B and C). Accordingly, this section will be divided into two chapters. The first reviews the main arguments on the subject (chapter 3). The second develops an assessment of that literature, stressing the issues that might be politically relevant to the analysis of the post-independence patrimonial political system (chapter 4).
There are two major lines of interpretation according to which the authors can be divided\textsuperscript{143}. The fact that some of these authors wrote in different periods of time helps to explain (at least in part) some of the differences that can be found in their attempt to make sense of the changing nature of the nationalist movements over time.

The first, and also the earliest analysis, claims that ethnic cleavages were paramount in Angola and found direct expression in the three nationalist movements that emerged in the 1950s and 1960's — thus impinging on the kind of conflict that arose between them in 1975–1976, namely the civil war. In general terms, these authors stand for an ethnic explanation, identifying the sociological support of the three movements within the three major ethno-linguistic groups as defined during colonialism, approximately encompassing 75% of the Angolan population — the Ovimbundu from the central plateaux, gathered around UNITA and comprising around 36% of the population; the M'Bundu from the Luanda-Catete-Malange corridor, gathered around the MPLA and comprising around 27%; the Bakongo from the North, in the provinces of Zaire, Uíge and Cabinda, gathered around the UPA/FNLA and comprising around 12%. These percentages are usually based on 1960 population census of indigenous population of Angola, the last one comprising ethnic identities as defined by the colonial authorities (see figure 3.1).

\textsuperscript{143} The intention here is not to be exhaustive and all encompassing on the presentation of that literature but rather to expound on the development of major lines of argumentation over that theme in order to define our standing point within it (\textit{cf. infra} chapter 4).
Figure 3.1: Indigenous Population of Angola — 1960 Census (*População Autóctone de Angola. Recenseamento de 1960*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnolinguistic Group</th>
<th>Census</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bakongo</td>
<td>479 818</td>
<td>12,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M'Bundu</td>
<td>1 083 321</td>
<td>27,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunda-Tchokwe</td>
<td>357 693</td>
<td>9,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ovimbumdu</td>
<td>1 443 742</td>
<td>36,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N'Ganguela</td>
<td>328 277</td>
<td>8,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nhaneca-Humbe</td>
<td>191 861</td>
<td>5,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herero</td>
<td>25 184</td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambó</td>
<td>62 141</td>
<td>1,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xindonga</td>
<td>4 505</td>
<td>0,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koisan</td>
<td>7 049</td>
<td>0,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vátua</td>
<td>5 895</td>
<td>0,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>3 989 486</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL POPULATION (*População Total da Provincia*) — 4 830 449
PERCENTAGE OF INDIGENOUS POPULATION — 86.6

Authors such as John Marcum, René Pelissier, Douglas Wheeler and Lawrence Henderson can be included in this category. Their interpretation, because it was the 'first' and had significant influence, can be considered 'classical' and it is still today recognised as crucial in tracing the origins of each movement.

The second line of analysis represents a second wave of academic interpretation of Angolan reality. It rejects the emphasis on the ethnic factor, favouring instead a more encompassing approach including class analysis and several other factors such as: specificity due to colonialism; insertion into the world-system; the existence of dependency structures between urban centres and peripheral rural societies; international influences like the 'cold war' and apartheid; ideological disputes.

This second line of analysis can be divided into two:

a), first there is a sub-group, clearly influenced by the ideological and political issues of that time, very much marked by the stigma of 'redfeet', a term which was made known by Chabal and used by Tom Young to expose some deficiencies in the literature on Angola and Mozambique produced for many years before and after independence. Authors such as Basil Davidson,

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147 'It has recently been pointed out how little is known about many aspects of post-independence Angola and Mozambique [...] An additional complication is that for a long time after independence much of the literature on Angola and Mozambique was produced by 'redfeet'. This literature, like that produced by previous generations of redfeet though often useful, has to be assessed cautiously and critically', in Young, Tom, 'The politics of development in Angola and Mozambique', in African Affairs, 87 (1989), p.165.
Fola Soremekun, Claude Gabriel, Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, and Keith Somerville can be included in this category.

Basil Davidson is a staunch supporter of the truly revolutionary impact of the ‘people’s wars’ as exposed in the legitimating speeches of leaders such as Amilcar Cabral and Agostinho Neto; these wars would lead to ‘real’ revolution (after the failures of the first wave of independence in African countries), thereby destroying the ethnic identification imposed by colonialism on the population.

For this kind of war [liberation war or people’s war] the working masses and in particular, the peasants, who are usually illiterate and have never moved beyond the boundaries of their village or region, lose in their contact with other groups the complexes which constrained them in relation to other ethnic or social groups. They rise above the ‘tribalism’ that is pressed on them by colonial rule. The argument here is not about utopia: the argument is about the possible means of building a new society.148

Claude Gabriel is a Trotskyite, a self-nominated anti-imperialist militant; he sees the Angolan conflict as a class struggle between the masses and nationalist leadership. After independence, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in power achieved advantage in that struggle against the masses, especially after the 1977 attempted coup, benefiting from the demobilisation of the proletariat and the continued integration of Angola in the world-system.

Tout cela nous interpelle en tant que militants anti-impérialistes [...] Nous ne devons épargner aucun effort pour montrer la contradiction entre la volonté d’émancipation des masses et l’impasse programmatique des directions petites-bourgeoises [...] L’indépendance du mouvement de masses, la bataille pour les droits démocratiques les plus larges sont partie intégrante, selon nous, de la lutte d’émancipation. Et cette bataille se mène contre les directions nationalistes [...] C’est un premier essai qui aborde, à travers le sujet particulier qu’est l’Angola, la question des luttes de classes en Afrique noire.149

Fola Soremekun admits that UNITA benefited from the sympathies of the Ovimbundu people, in the same way as the FNLA benefited from the sympathies of the Bakongo and the MPLA from the Mbundu, but only in the earlier years. For him, the subsequent conflict between the three parties was based on political and ideological disputes, added to which were the pitiful nature of Portuguese colonisation and the ineptitude of the Portuguese government during decolonisation.

The party [UNITA] had the sympathy of the Ovimbundo people the same way the FNLA had the Bakongo and the MPLA the KiMbundu-speaking peoples in the earlier years.\footnote{In Soremekun, Fola, Angola: the Road to Independence (Nigeria: University of Ife Press, 1983), p.7.}

The struggle for power [between movements] was inevitable. This was so because it was basically a struggle of opposing political philosophies. It was a struggle between what could be called the forces of "genuine independence" for Angola [the MPLA] against those of "neo-colonialism". In this respect therefore, it was no surprise that the contest was bloody and brutal among Angolan brothers, like a war of religion. [...] The long and dismal history of Portugal in Angola and the equal ineptitude of the Portuguese government during the decolonisation process would seem to have presaged that inevitability.\footnote{Ibid. p.212.}

Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol argue that, after 1974, the conflict was fired not by popular support (which they claim only the MPLA had before 1974), but by the counter-revolution created by the forces of imperialism, sustaining that ethnicity was a phenomenon deliberately fostered by colonial authorities.

So what kept three rival Angolan "liberation movements" alive for the conflict that followed the Armed Forces’ movement coup in 1974 was not mass popular support. Before 1974 this had been reserved for the MPLA alone. It was counter-revolution that provided for FNLA and UNITA and that physically kept them going. And the counter-revolution was being waged by the United States, Portugal, Britain and France against the MPLA.\footnote{In Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola in the Frontline (London: Zed Press, 1983), p.4.}

All the major Western powers were deeply involved with FNLA and UNITA. [...] Yet MPLA defeated the imperialist military intervention\footnote{Ibid. p.8.}
Tribalism had been deliberately fostered by colonial authorities.\textsuperscript{154}

Keith Somerville sees the ethnic divisions as being on par with other social divisions that usually characterise rural and urban dichotomy, created by colonisation; he argues that although ethnic identities had a profound impact on the construction of nationalist movements, the MPLA had made a real effort to overcome ethnic barriers and acquire a national dimension. It was the only one of the three movements that, during and after the anti-colonial struggle, pursued true national politics, rather than the ethnic and regional politics characteristic of the other two movements.

The ethnic pattern within Angola was to have a profound effect on the make-up of the liberation movements [...] Only the MPLA made any real attempt to transcend ethnic barriers and to appeal to the nation as a whole. [...] The destruction of traditional African systems, the inhibition of African economic advancement and the denial of education to all but a tiny minority of Africans meant that at independence Angolan society was in a state of fragmentation and enforced backwardness. Apart from those nationalists organised within the other movements, there was little sense of nationhood [...] The other main social divisions that were inherited by the new Angolan State were those associated with the urban-rural dichotomy.\textsuperscript{155}

The remaining analysis is centred on the institutional and typological aspects of the post-independence State in Angola, and the legitimating discourses of the MPLA government; he believed in the MPLA's sincere commitment to the construction of Socialism and its ability to change society even against South African destabilisation\textsuperscript{156}. There remained the need to adapt Marxism-Leninism to the country's specific circumstances\textsuperscript{157}.

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid. p.140.
\textsuperscript{156} 'It is my view that the MPLA-PT is sincere in its commitment to Marxism–Leninism and that its policies have reflected this. The failure to make any headway in implementing socialist policies have been brought about by the policy of destabilisation pursued by the Botha regime in South Africa.' Ibid. p.13.
\textsuperscript{157} 'For Angola, what now remains is to ensure that the form of Marxism–Leninism it applies to its own situation accords rather than conflicts with circumstances.' Ibid. p.196.
b), second, there is a sub-group of academic researchers who eschew simple political/ideological or ethnic interpretations. This category includes authors such as Franz Heimer, Gervase Clarence-Smith, David Birmingham and Christine Messiant.

Franz Heimer sees the Angolan nationalist division and the conflict between the movements as a complex struggle between models of decolonisation — between capitalist and non-capitalist options. According to him, it was a struggle brought about by the kind of social formation created during colonialism with profound social identity cleavages that determined where the support for each of the movements would come from. The author tried to articulate class and ethnicity as explanatory variables.

On the one hand, the kind of social formation that emerged during colonialism is explained by Heimer in terms of a structure of central capitalist societies and peripheral, or tributary, pre-capitalist societies, in the style of the classic perspective of dependency theories: metropolis and satellites; dominating bourgeoisie and dependent rural peripheral societies. Using a dependency perspective, Heimer explains that although peripheral societies appeared to be beyond the reach of the process of class formation, they were in fact affected by them when integrated into the dependency system; central societies would extract from them cheap commodities and labour on a regular basis, whilst gradually expanding at the expense of the peripheral societies by an absorption of land and population;

\[\text{Developing gradually out of an extremely complex situation, the conflict over the initial choice of a decolonization model for Angola was resolved through 'conventional' warfare between two camps which, in grossly simplified terms, stood for a capitalist and a non-capitalist option respectively [...] A consensual political solution among the three independence movements proved impossible. Deep, and partly cross-cutting social cleavages assigned clearly defined constituencies to each of them [...] The rationale behind the behaviour of the MPLA was predominantly ideological, i.e., determined by the kind of decolonization model it stood for or against.' In Heimer, F.W., *The Decolonization Conflict in Angola: an essay in political sociology* (Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, 1979), pp.81–82. This book is a shorter and English version of Heimer, Franz-Wilhem, *Der Entkolonisierungskonflikt in Angola* (Munique: Weltforum Verlag, 1979). See also in the same line of argument, Heimer, F.W. 'Formation Sociale, Developpement Economique et Option Socialiste en Angola', in *Genève-Afrique*, XVIII (1980), pp.31-43.}

\[\text{Heimer, F.W., *The Decolonization ... op. cit. especially chapter 1.} \]
On the other hand, when taking into account his many years of field research in Angola, the author acknowledged the poor development of class consciousness amongst the workers and the tendency of the ethnic component of identity to remain strong, especially in peripheral societies — about 80% at that time — that were less affected by class formation.\textsuperscript{160}

Articulating ethnicity and class, Heimer argued that within the existing social formations, social identity was made of several components determining several cleavages, namely, ethnic, racial, cultural and class. Such components or dimensions of social identity were alternatives that each individual resorted to according to specific circumstances\textsuperscript{161}. With the ‘electoral campaign’ before independence and the conflicts between the three movements, a combination of those components started to delineate a pattern that had been foreseeable since the end of 1974, by which the possible outcome of elections to be held in 1975 ‘was thus almost exclusively a function of the relative demographic weight of the different population segments’\textsuperscript{162}.

The FNLA, counting mainly on the Bakongo and on part of the whites, would certainly not have obtained more than 20% of the votes, and probably substantially less. The MPLA, having the support of the Ambundu [Mbundu] and of the majority of the urbanised non-whites as well of the eastern tributary societies, might have got 35 to 40%. The sheer number of the Ovimbundu, plus part of the whites, of the southern/southern-eastern tributary societies, and of the Cabindans, would have guaranteed UNITA a relative majority of 40 to 45% \textsuperscript{163}

* Gervase Clarence-Smith was probably one of the firmest defenders of a class analysis, rejecting the relevance of the ethnic dimension of the conflict. He claims that underneath an appearance of ethnicity, the Angolan conflict concealed a class structure and a class struggle\textsuperscript{164}, and that all the liberation

\textsuperscript{160} In this sense see Heimer, F.W. \textit{Educação e sociedade nas áreas rurais de Angola: resultados de um inquérito. Apresentação do inquérito, estatísticas descritivas}, I (Luanda: Missão de Inquéritos Agrícolas de Angola, 1972).
\textsuperscript{161} See Heimer, F.W., \textit{The Decolonization ...} op. cit. pp.61-65.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid. p.64.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid. p.64.
\textsuperscript{164} ‘The Angolan civil war has often been presented as a primitive tribal conflict, and the purpose of this review article is to reveal the class structure and class struggles which underlie apparently tribal or
movements in Angola were conspiracies of class and regional interests that varied over time and had limited ethnic appeal. The impossibility of bringing about unity between the MPLA and the FNLA was due to the manoeuvres of neighbouring States, and UNITA was the outcome of the FNLA's project in the 1960s for 'a multi-ethnic alliance of Angola's peripheral rural societies.' What happened in Angola contradicted such an argument and towards the end of the 1980s, this author did admit to the force of ethnic identities, but still maintained that contrary to the opinion of Heimer, ethnicity derived from class structures, and that the reinforcement of ethnic identities was accompanied by the equal reinforcement of national sentiment.

C'est un des paradoxes de la situation africaine que les conflits de classe ont contribué à créer des identités sociales de type ethnique. On dit souvent que le tribalisme est inventé par les élites pour saisir le pouvoir ou pour le garder. Je pense que l'inverse est plus vrai: l'ethnicité est le dernier refuge du pauvre [...] La formation de classes a provoqué la création de l'ethnicité en Afrique [...] Les régions les moins touchées par le processus de formation de classes sont les régions les moins ethniques. C'est exactement l'inverse de ce qu'enseignent les 'marxistes' vulgaires [referring specifically to Heimer].

On ne peut pas nier la force du sentiment ethnique en Angola, mais le fait même que l'ethnie soit utilisée pour la conquête de la nation montre à quel point identité ethnique et identité nationale existent dans un rapport dialectique. [...] Qui plus est, le sentiment national s'est probablement renforcé pendant ces sombres années de guerre civile malgré les formes ethniques prises par les conflits.

David Birmingham's analysis of the Angolan nationalist division between three movements along with their inability to form a single movement, also stresses social cleavages articulated around several social identity regional conflicts'. In Clarence-Smith, Gervase, 'Class structure and class struggles in Angola in the 1970s', in Journal of Southern African Studies, 7 (1980), p.109.

165 'It is argued here that the Angolan liberation movements were all coalitions of class and regional interests which tended to vary over time and which used ethnic ideological appeals only to a limited extent.' Ibid. p.119.

166 'However, it is clear that UNITA was not simply an Ovimbundo replica of the FNLA, as it is often alleged. UNITA was rather the realization of the FNLA project of the early 1960s that is a multi-ethnic alliance of Angola's peripheral rural societies [...] UNITA successfully created a wide populist multi-class and multi-ethnic alliance.'; Ibid. pp.119–120.


dimensions (close to Heimer's argument) such as historical, cultural, ethno-
linguistic, racial, religious, regional, sub-regional, urban/rural and socio-
economic. Such cleavages resulted mainly from the nature of Portuguese
colonisation, based on three poles of opportunity; differing from the
conventional colonial States, where the political, social and economic life
focussed on a single capital city.

Luanda was but one of three poles of opportunity that had attracted
colonial subjects throughout the course of the twentieth century.
Luanda and its hinterland along the corridor to Malange was
unified by a river, by a line-of-rail, by the KiMbundu language, by
the Methodist network of schools and chapels, by a sad history of
Iberian conquistadores and slavers, by the rise of the black Creole
elite in the nineteenth century. But it was not closely linked to
North Angola or South Angola. These regions had their own
metropolitan centres in the Belgian colonial city of Léopoldville,
now Kinshasa, and the British railhead of Lobito, commanding the
Benguela railway to the Copperbelt. It was therefore no accident
that Angola, instead of developing a single political bandwagon
onto which everyone jumped when the liberation movement began
to roll, initially developed three political movements with three
urban focal points, three missionary traditions, three vernacular
languages and three rival sets of sub-national leaders. 169

The author's interpretation of the Angolan conflict after independence was
presented according to the tension between town and country paralleled by an
ideological tension between right and left, between entrepreneurial and
bureaucratic—the town, bureaucracy and the left being represented by the
MPLA; the country, the entrepreneurial and the right being represented by
UNITA, though at the beginning of the conflict, they were represented by the
FNLA. 170 The whole political and military conflict in independent Angola until
1991 was read in these terms. 171.

170 'The roots of the Angolan "civil" war are in part ideological. In the last years of the colonial war the
Portuguese deliberately encouraged the growth of a black capitalist peasantry in the coffee industry [...] The
black provincial entrepreneurs, predominately members of the Baptist Churches, were supporters
of the right-wing FNLA rather than the left-wing, city-oriented MPLA. After independence the rural
sector and the entrepreneurs were severely neglected. Peasant incomes dropped, opportunities for
marketing farm produce declined, the city fed itself on imported produce paid from oil revenue. The
tension between town and country paralleled the ideological tension between entrepreneurial and
bureaucratic, between right and left. By the 1980s this tension had become a key feature of the "civil
Christine Messiant developed further the previous argument about social cleavages resulting from a peculiar type of colonisation and reflecting several of the socio-cultural identification dimensions stressed by Heimer and Birmingham (socio-economic, race, religion, region, sub-region, ethno-linguistic, historical, cultural, urban/rural). The author initiates her analysis at the level of the elites or elite fractions that could be identified in colonial history, especially towards the end of the nineteenth century and during the first half of the twentieth. In her analysis, the concept of elite and elite fractions is implicitly defined as social groups privileged in socio-economic, socio-professional and educational terms. Such analysis provides an explanation for the Angolan nationalist division and the ensuing conflict between movements.

In these terms, the author claims that the nationalist movement in Angola was formed in the 1950s within a polarised framework, around two geographically separated elites, to which a third one was later added:

1st) There is a fraction of the elite that Messiant calls the 'ancient assimilados'; they came from the multiracial colonial bourgeoisie that existed until the twentieth century, comprising mainly mulattos but also including...
blacks. They sided with the whites in the structures of colonial society, adopting the Portuguese language and the catholic religion. The arrival of whites in the first decades of the twentieth century (increasing the competition for jobs within the colonial administration) together with the increased racial stratification of colonial society brought about their social demotion. It is from this group that emerged those who were to form the MPLA, who were to give it shape, its discourse and its ideology. Emerging politically in urban centres of Europe and Angola, because of their privileged status as educated elites, these militants denounced the racial domination of colonisation and the failure of assimilation; they adopted nationalism supported by values that were Creole, universalistic, national, multiracial, Christian humanistic but also Socialist.

2nd) There is another fraction of elite that the author calls 'Bakongo évolués', because of their having emerged from the numerous Bakongo emigrants to the Belgian Congo, especially in Léopoldville, where the elites were known as évolués. Following the example of the Congolese elites, this particular Angolan elite challenged colonialism, exalting the black race and the Congo people’s pride. They were the founders of UPNA (União dos Povos do Norte de Angola/Union of Peoples of Northern Angola) then transformed into UPA (União dos Povos de Angola/Union of Peoples of Angola) and finally (1962) in the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola/National Liberation Front of Angola). Therefore, the FNLA was first of all an ethno-nationalist movement, whose leaders belonged to protestant families and the aristocracy of the kingdom of the Congo. Their ideology was liberal-nationalistic, but radically African, being very much opposed not only to colonialism but also to any Portuguese cultural influence. Towards the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, there was an extreme contrast between the elites that had not been significantly marked by Portuguese colonisation and those influenced by that colonisation; both sides mutually and strongly rejected each other.
Finally, along with those two fiercely opposed poles, another elite fraction appeared, with other Angolan nationalists and other assimilados that Messiant refers to as the 'new assimilados'. These did not issue from the old colonial bourgeoisie, but from indigenous African society, to whom they belonged and in which they lived; they were black and their mother tongue was African. They were assimilated only in the twentieth century and in growing numbers after World War II, thanks to the missionary education they received in indigenous milieus (mainly protestant and foreigner, non-Portuguese). However, assimilation did not open for them the doors to social promotion because of the rigidity of racial stratification derived from white immigration, and because of the stronger competition of the 'old assimilados', most of whom were Catholic. Aware of the social and racial barriers that distinguished them from the 'old assimilados', they were a subordinated elite during colonisation, and were to value their cultural and racial differences, taking pride in those differences in relation to the 'old assimilados'.

Faced with two camps polarised between the MPLA and the FNLA, the 'new assimilados', belonging to three different religions and emerging within specific communities whose limits were ethno-linguistic (Bakongo from the Baptist missions, Mbundu from the Methodist missions, and the Ovimbundu from the Congregational missions of the central plateaux), placed themselves according to their complex experience and social relationships. Contrary to the nationalist 'old assimilados' and the Bakongo évolués, who organised themselves into political groups based on their social and cultural positions, the 'new assimilados' joined one or other of the two camps, according to the specific fracture lines of their religious, ethnic or regional group.

In the old centres of colonisation (i.e. Luanda and its hinterland and also in the small area of Lobito-Benguela), because of historically specific and proximate social relationships between the two fractions of assimilados (new and old), between Catholics and Protestants and between blacks and mestíços, most of the 'new assimilados' joined the MPLA. Away from those old centres
of colonisation, however, where those quite specific historical relationship ties did not exist, the tendency towards conflict was greater than the tendency towards an alliance, especially for the Protestant segment of ‘new assimilados’, for whom regional colonial society was less accessible. Confronted with the polarisation between the FNLA and the MPLA, most of the other ‘new assimilados’ chose the FNLA in the early sixties, in spite of its ethnic nationalism — as happened to the assimilated nationalists of the central plateaux, such as Savimbi, who later abandoned the FNLA because of ethnic bias in favour of the Bakongo and left to form their own movement, UNITA, which after independence will be increasingly related to and identified with the ethno-linguistic group of the Ovimbundu.

It is useful to remember that Messiant’s concept of assimilado should not be restricted to the legal statutory colonial condition with the same designation, meaning an effective (socio-cultural) situation (resulting from the type of colonisation in Angola) and not a legal situation. The group she so designates was far larger than the one encompassed by the legal condition174.

In sum, according to Messiant, the division of Angolan nationalism in three movements is the result of a competition between rival elites for power; a rivalry firstly exercised during the anti-colonial struggle and founded on socio-cultural cleavages (elite fractions, race, religion, region, ethno-linguistic) resulting from an unequal historical and geographic development of Portuguese colonisation in Angola.

Bien plus que comme un produit d’oppositions ethniques, la division du nationalisme angolais doit être analysée comme traduisant la compétition entre diverses elites pour le pouvoir, qui va s’exercer d’abord dans le mouvement nationaliste. Cette rivalité

174 According to Newitt there were only 30.000 official assimilados as late as 1950; In Newitt, Malyn, *Portugal in Africa* (London: C Hurst, 1981), p.138. Also supporting the same number is MacQueen, Norrie, *A descolonização da África portuguesa, a revolução metropolitana e a dissolução do império* (Lisboa: Editorial Inquérito, 1997), p.31. The legal statute was hard to attain, sometimes was not even desired due to a tax increase and depended on several subjective criteria and conditions as extensively analysed in Bittencourt, Marcelo, *As linhas que tecem o ‘eme’: um estudo sobre a criação do MPLA* (São Paulo: Universidade de São Paulo, 1996), Masters’ Thesis, chapter V; a summary of this thesis was recently published, Bittencourt, Marcelo, *Dos Jornais às Armas. Trajetórias da Contestação Angolana* (Lisboa: Vega, 1999).
Being the foundations of nationalist division (a unique phenomenon in Portuguese colonial Africa) these differences and consequent cleavages were obviously strong. But they can not be reduced to an ethno-linguistic dimension, which is only one of several components of a complex cluster of socio-cultural references to identity. That is why Messiant argues that the Angolan nationalist division, and the ensuing civil war, cannot be seen as an inevitable product of primary ethnic differences: ‘il n’y avait en effet nulle fatalité ethnique que les élites Bakongo et Mbundu s’alignent derrière des partis différents: en lui seul, le fait ethno-régional est incapable d’expliquer la stabilisation de courants rivaux.’

Finally, an important remark needs to be made about Messiant’s work in order to stress the differences between the new assimilados in the old centres of colonisation (M’Bundu from the Methodist missions) and the other new assimilados from other areas (Bakongo from the Baptist missions and Ovimbundu from the Congregational missions of the high plateaux).

Given the fact that the alliance between old and new assimilados within the old centres of colonisation and within the MPLA became a major characteristic of the Angolan nationalism that will be singled out throughout the next chapters, it might be useful to find a designation that expresses the distinct character of the elite fractions of those areas, favouring their alliance.

The most accurate designation to those elite fractions is probably that of ‘Creoles’ because ‘creolisation’ as an historical and socio-cultural phenomenon intimately combining two different socio-cultural registers (that will be analysed and defined in more detail in the next chapter) can only be argued to exist in the old centres of colonisation.

176 In Cahen, Michel and Messiant, Christine, ‘Luttes politiques ... op. cit. pp.121–122.
177 Messiant always thought that ‘Creoles’ was the most adequate designation for these elite fractions in the old centres of colonisation and the only reason why She did not use it was because ‘Ce terme pose cependant problème car il est désormais “passé dans la langue” de certains groupes en Angola pour
Therefore, throughout this work, I will resort to the designation of new and old Creoles to refer to Messiant's new and old assimilados in the old centres of colonisation (respectively).\textsuperscript{178}

Concluding chapter 3, it can be said that the major contribution of this second sub-group of authors was: on the one hand, to deny the explanatory value of the ethnic factor in itself (isolated from other factors) which was at the base of the interpretation provided by the 'classic' authors of the 'ethnic tripolarity' argument; and on the other hand, to produce a less ideological/political passionate analysis, which characterised the first sub-group of authors. Alternatively, it proposed a more encompassing and flexible analysis, stressing:

a), the power struggle between elites; b), the strong socio-cultural cleavages between those elites resulting from the historical and geographic unequal development of Portuguese colonisation; c) that such cleavages were based on several and variously combined differences such as socio-economic, racial, religious, regional, sub-regional, ethno-linguistic, historical, cultural, urban/rural; d), that the major socio-cultural cleavage arising was between the elites that had not been significantly marked by Portuguese colonisation and the elites extremely influenced by the Portuguese colonisation.

After the presentation of the major arguments, it is now time to define my standing point in this discussion.

désigner des catégories différentes (soit plus restreinte, et non culturelle mais "raciale", les métis, soit plus large), et il l'est notamment dans la lutte politique actuelle où les mots sont aussi des stigmates. Aussi en parlerai-je ici [...] comme des "anciens assimilés"; in Messiant, Christine, 'Angola, les voies ...

\textsuperscript{178} Although Birmingham also uses the terms new and old Creoles, he uses them in a different sense, which does not seem to be in agreement with Messiant, whose work is here taken as the main reference for the analysis of these phenomena. For Birmingham's use of those terms see Birmingham, David, 'Angola revisited' ... op. cit. pp.1-14.
4 - An Assessment of the Arguments

My analysis follows most closely Messiant's line of argument. As stressed by Messiant, the historical and geographic unequal development of Portuguese colonialism produced a major socio-cultural cleavage between the elites that had not been significantly marked by Portuguese colonisation and those that had. Historically specific ties between new and old assimilados in the old centres of colonisation (i.e., Luanda and its hinterland and the small area of Lobito-Benguela) favoured their alliance within the MPLA. These historically specific ties made the alliance of blacks and mestíços, Catholics and Protestants a lot easier.

Bearing in mind the analytical perspective at the centre of this work and the issues that might be politically important to the understanding of post-independence patrimonial working logic, the relevant questions to explore are: 1), what kind of socio-cultural and socio-economic processes are behind those historically specific ties (between new and old assimilados in the old centres of colonisation—here called new and old Creoles respectively) representing a major cleavage within the Angolan elites and Angolan nationalism ?; 2), what political implications can be drawn from such major socio-cultural cleavage in terms of nationalist divisions and the competition between movements towards independence ? The answer to these questions will be provided in the next two sub-chapters respectively.

4.1 Creolisation and Clientelistic Social Organisation Including Kinship

The answer to the first question goes back to the end of the 16th century when a process of 'Creolisation' started\(^\text{179}\), closely accompanied until the mid 19th

\(^{179}\) By 'Creolisation' is meant the process by which emerged a socio-cultural category — the Creoles, encompassing a broad scope of heterogeneous elements such as the descendants of locally born
century by the genesis of a complex clientelist social organisation including extended kinship ties. This kind of clientelistic organisation supported by kinship ties is usually seen as the traditional prelude to 'modern patrimonialism', as indicated by Médard. Although it is obviously not my intention to provide an in-depth historical discussion of this period, it is important to the argument to stress the historical specificity of the region and population of Luanda and its hinterland, having specific socio-cultural and socio-economic traits which are the foundation of major identification cleavages.

In these terms, the onset of Creolisation can be located at the end of the 16th century, when Portugal began favouring the North-central area (Luanda and its hinterland) to the detriment of the North (S. Salvador of Congo), following a new commercial and military strategy of incursion into the interior. Such incursion was mainly supported by the presídios (fortresses) and the guerra preta ('black army') that favoured the process of Creolisation.

The presídio was a small fortress headed by a military officer, a judge and a chaplain. A market was usually held within its walls in order to encourage trade. The first presídios took a long time to spread from the coast along the valley of the river Kwanza. Nevertheless, their slow yet relentless advance constituted an important vector for the conquest of the Angolan interior.

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European (whites and mestiços), 'detribalised' Africans more or less adapted to the European culture (so-called 'civilised' or 'assimilated' in the Portuguese colonial terminology), all of which formed an intermediate group between the Europeans from the metropolis and the majority of black rural non-aculturated population. This definition is borrowed from Dias, Jill, 'Uma questão de identidade; respostas intelectuais às transformações económicas no seio da elite crioula de Angola Portuguesa entre 1870 e 1930', in Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos, I (1984), p.61 footnote 1. See also Bittencourt, Marcelo, As linhas que ... op. cit. especially pp.45-70; also, Bittencourt, Marcelo, 'Revisitando a crise Angolana', in Revista Internacional de História de África, II (1996), especially pp.148-149; also Bittencourt, Marcelo, 'A História contemporânea... op. cit. especially pp.177-184. Also supporting the same use and definition of Creolisation and Creoles is Mateus, Dalila Cabrita, A Luta pela independência, a formação das elites fundadoras da FRELIMO, MPLA e PAIGC (Lisboa: Inquerito, 1999) chapter II; The same type of definition stressing the socio-cultural factor is supported by Messiant, Christine, 'Angola: entre guerre et paix', in Marchal, Roland and Messiant, Christine, Les chemins de la guerre et la paix: fins de conflit en Afrique orientale et australe (Paris: Karthala, 1997), p.163, footnote 6.

180 See Médard, Jean-François, The Underdeveloped State ... op. cit. especially pp.165-181.
181 The commander of the presídio was expected to ensure the greatest possible number of alliances with the African chiefs in the surrounding area. This involved a system of vassalage which determined
The black army consisted of African troops at the service of Portugal. By the 17th century these armies were fully institutionalised. This entailed the regimentation of African troops according to 'traditional' chiefdoms, who would then join the Portuguese campaigns. 182

With the new dynamics created by the conquest of the interior of Luanda, the presídios and the fairs along the rivers Kwanza, Dande, Bengo and Lukala attracted traders and farmers. With their families, they made up communities that were distinct from the rest of the populace under the jurisdiction of the traditional chiefdoms.

The backgrounds of the people who made up these communities were also different, being the descendants of: a) African women and the first Portuguese to arrive in Angola; b) freed slaves and free Africans who had placed themselves under the protection of the colonialists in exchange for diverse favours (military or other), often fleeing their original communities. This first nucleus was gradually increased by the more or less constant influx of white colonialists and black people of various backgrounds, attracted to the Portuguese fortifications as slaves or slave-traders. These communities were therefore composed mainly of blacks, with some mestíços and a minority of whites 183.

Because of the relatively high levels of wealth and education that members of these communities had access to, they were an elite in comparison

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182 In the beginning, the black army was somewhat rudimentary; there were no regular salaries, little structure and poor leadership. Nevertheless, these contingents were crucial for the survival of the Portuguese, the gradual subjugation of the various kingdoms and the conquest of the interior. In Cadornega, António de Oliveira, História das Guerras Angolanas (1680-1681), Vol. I (Lisbon: Agencia Geral do Ultramar, 1940–1942, reedição 1972), p.589. A Portuguese law dating from 1648 stated that there would be no distinctions between whites, mestíços and free blacks within the Angolan army; merit was to be the only acceptable criterion for promotion. See Boxer, Charles Ralph, Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire 1415–1825 (Oxford: OUP, 1963).
with the rest of the surrounding population. Their main capital and commercial asset lay in the exploitation of a double register — European and African — which gave them great advantage in their role as intermediaries\textsuperscript{184}. As for their social status, although their African traits dominated their Portuguese the influence of Portuguese culture was notorious, and members of these communities were given a special status by the Portuguese administration, who referred to them as ‘natives’ or ‘sons of the land’ as opposed to the rest of the population, designated as ‘pagans’ or ‘gentiles’ (uncivilised Africans).\textsuperscript{185}

As their commercial activity increased, the members of these communities realised the need to establish stronger, more regular ties, or alliances, with families of similar communities and with families belonging to the chiefdoms, and so they entered relationships of kinship, namely marriages. These relationships established a network of commercial and financial (credit) support between chiefdoms from the interior, traders from the interior and traders from Luanda. Here were located the main white-owned trading houses, many of which already had ties of kinship through relationships with black women. Thus a network grew, establishing channels for the circulation of credit, goods, protection and other services. According to Jill Dias, although these networks were essentially directed to commercial aims, their nature was clearly clientelistic, working through relationships of personal dependency based on extended preferential solidarity ties with a kinship support\textsuperscript{186}.

The status, power and the socio-economic prestige of these alliances amongst elites became more entrenched between the 17th and 18th centuries, and were based mainly on the almost total control of the slave trade in the

\textsuperscript{183} In Dias, Jill, ‘Uma questão ... op. cit. p.63.
\textsuperscript{184} In Dias, Jill ‘Relações Económicas e de Poder no Interior de Luanda ca. 1850-1875’; in Actas da Iª Reunião Internacional de História de África (Lisboa: IICT, 1989).p.245.
\textsuperscript{185} In Dias, Jill, ‘Uma questão ... op. cit. p.63. In the first half of the 19th century, blacks freed from the chiefdoms’ collective tutelage, mestiços and whites living in the interior were designated as moradores by the colonial sources; in Alexandre, Valentim & Dias, Jill (coord.) O Império ... op. cit. pp.359-360.
\textsuperscript{186} In Dias, Jill ‘Relações Económicas ...op. cit. p.245. The author explicitly defines the relationships referred as clientelist and kinship not only in the mentioned article and page but also in Dias, Jill, ‘Uma questão ... op. cit. p.64.
interior (to a much lesser extent on agriculture)\textsuperscript{187}. The policy of commercial alliances reinforced with ties of kinship and the adoption of Portuguese inheritance law enabled several families to amass great wealth over several generations\textsuperscript{188}.

The extension of these elite networks (from the coast to the interior) did not imply its homogeneity, but rather its diversity, encompassing important socio-economic sub-divisions and internal rivalries. In the mid-nineteenth century, there could be clearly identified two main nuclei (one on the coast and the other in the interior) and three surrounding or dependent groups\textsuperscript{189}:

Firstly, there was in the coastal region a relatively westernised central nucleus based in Luanda (here designated as A), composed of a tiny 'aristocracy' made up of a dozen families.\textsuperscript{190} They occupied prestigious posts in the colonial institutions, such as the administration, the military, the church and local government. From these activities they gained an added legitimacy in their commercial activities and their clientelistic networks. These families tried to remain as white as possible, preferentially marrying their daughters off to high-ranking army and navy officers from both Brazil and Portugal. This reinforced their commercial and political ties with these countries and allowed

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item In the mid-eighteenth century, very few Europeans were involved in the slave-trade in the interior of the territory, be it northern or southern. There were laws and decrees that forbade the incursion of Portuguese traders into the interior beyond specified points such as Pungo Andongo. Besides that, the traders themselves knew that the tributary costs incurred by crossing the lands of non-subdued chiefdoms, as well as the price of slaves, went up drastically in the presence of a European. From 1700, the Portuguese used mainly the services of Africans and \textit{mestiços}, other local traders and intermediaries, and merchants, who acted as agents for the trading houses along the coast. In 1800, most of the intermediaries, agents and dealers in the interior were non-European. See Henriques, Isabel Castro, \textit{Percurso da modernidade em Angola} (Lisbon: IICT, 1997), pp.115-123. Also over the same issue of the primacy of African and \textit{mestiço} traders in the interior see Dias, Jill 'Relações Económicas ... op. cit. pp.241-258.; Also Dias, Jill 'Mudanças nos Padrões de Poder no Hinterland de Luanda, o impacto da colonização sobre os M'Bundu (c.1845-1920)', in \textit{Penélope}, nº14 (1994), pp.43-91.
\item Reference to these subdivisions is essentially based in Dias, Jill, 'Uma questão ... op. cit. pp.65-66.
\item The most powerful families dated from the 17th century, such as the Matoso de Andrade, the Pinheiro Falcão, the Velasco Galiano and the Van Dunem; in Dias, Jill, 'Uma questão ... op. cit. p.65; By the end of the 19th century to these families others should be added such as Matoso da Câmara, Amaral Gurgel, Beça, Furtado Antas, Castro Francina, Ribeiro Castelbranco, Vieira Lopes, Pinto de Andrade, Regadas, Françonzi, Escórcio, Rangel, Nascimento, Mata, Maia Ferreira; in Freudenthal, Aida, 'A utopia Angolense (1880-1915)'; in \textit{Actas da III Reunião Internacional de História de África} (Lisboa: IICT, 2000), p.562, footnote 5.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
them to accumulate a significant patrimony in terms of land and slaves, especially around Luanda, and in the districts of Bengo and Dande.

Secondly, in the interior, there was a main nucleus in the centres of trade and colonial administration east of Luanda (designated as B). Given that Europeans were fewer in the interior, this nucleus was composed of oligarchies whose ancestry was mainly black. They were characterised not only by a darker skin, but also by a greater degree of Africanisation and the maintenance of closer ties of relationship (through more frequent marriages) with the ruling African elites of the chiefdoms from the interior. The more eminent of these families also made alliances through marriages with members from the lighter-skinned families from the coast. This connected the chiefdoms and the 'aristocracy' of the interior with the 'aristocracy' of the coast. Yet their commercial and social rivalry remained strong.

Thirdly, around the main nucleus on the coast (i.e. around — A) gathered a sub-group (that can be designated as A1) that issued from the marriage of some of the 'aristocracy' with families of more recent origin — mulattos, children of white fathers (traders or colonial civil servants) and black women (usually slaves or concubines).

Fourthly, around the 'aristocracy' of the interior, there was a sub-group (that can be designated as B1) made up of so-called 'civilised' Africans, who were freed from the chiefdoms' collective tutelage by their personal wealth, amassed from the slave-trade and agriculture. This legally exempted them from forced labour as bearers and other colonial manual work.

Fifthly, there was a third type of sub-group that could be found around the edges of the first layer of dependants of the aristocratic nuclei of the coast (i.e. around A1, representing a second layer of dependants on the central nuclei, something like a A1.1). It was made up of thousands of craftsmen and specialist workers who were there mainly to satisfy colonial needs, such as tailors, shoemakers, masons and carpenters. Many of them were freed slaves. They wanted to be socially integrated within the Creole elite, to access
education, adopt Portuguese manners and codes of behaviour, dress in a European style and wear shoes — ‘the shod blacks’ — in order to derive some socio-economic advantages in their relationship with whites as well as with Africans. They distinguished themselves socially from the mass of other Africans who considered them white in spite of their colour.¹⁹¹

Despite the important socio-economic differences and rivalries between the groups that made these clientelistic networks, the ties that linked them soon overcame the purely commercial, kinship and clientelist type of relationships, and developed singular or very specific common socio-cultural traits. The specificity of all these groups consisted in the ‘art’ of combining (not without internal contradictions) a double inherited register, African and European: an European register acquired from the particularly strong influence and impact of the Portuguese in Luanda and its hinterland; an African register acquired from the ‘original’ inhabitants of that area that for a long time had been defined by the Portuguese as Ambundu (M’Bundu peoples), speaking KiMbundu and inhabiting the territories between the Dande and Kwanza rivers.¹⁹²

In this intense mixture of double inheritance lies the essence of the Creole as a socio-cultural phenomenon (and which can never be reduced to the question of skin colour) whose boundaries as a socio-cultural group are very imprecise given its hybrid character, being lighter skinned in the coast and darker skinned towards the interior.

This process of creolisation accompanied by complex clientelistic social organisation including extended kinship ties, suffered a major setback in mid-nineteenth century due to the important transformations which then occurred in the Angolan colonial economy (replacement of the slave-trade by ‘legitimate trade’ such as sugar, coffee, cotton; and the growing economic competition at

¹⁹¹ On this lower sub-group see also Alexandre, Valentim & Dias, Jill (coord.) O Império ... op. cit. pp.359-360.

¹⁹² Neighbouring in the North with the Kongo kingdom, in the West with the Luba empire and in the South-East with the Bantu pastoralists [Ovimbundu in the colonial terminology]. See Birmingham, David, Trade and Conflict in Angola (Oxford: OUP, 1966), p.17.
all levels from the increased arrival of white Portuguese\textsuperscript{193}). Such setback also led to a progressive economic and political downgrading of the Creole elites, generating their first cultural/political reaction between 1870 and 1930, sometimes called proto-nationalism to distinguish it from a subsequent so-called modern nationalism—developing in the 1950’s within the Creole elites and from which the MPLA will emerge as the organisation with the most clearly defined political project\textsuperscript{194}.

Beyond the specificity and intricacies of the Angolan nationalism, the important issue to stress in this study is that such process of creolisation remained the main distinctive socio-cultural feature of the Luanda-Malange corridor elites towards the 20th century. It represented a common heritage of all the ‘Creole elites’ in the old centres of colonisation from the coast to the interior; all of them touched in a more or less intense degree by that process, be it old or new Creoles -- beyond the above mentioned rivalries and the specificity of the latter in relation to the former.

Such common heritage is at the core of the MPLA’s formation, facilitating the subsequent alliance between those two fractions of the Creole elite within that movement. It is also at the origin of the major socio-cultural cleavage between elites of the various Angolan regions as stressed by Messiant, i.e., between those elites strongly influenced by the Portuguese colonisation and those elites who were not.

\textsuperscript{193} On this subject see Dias, Jill ‘Relações Económicas ... op. cit. pp.241-258; Dias, Jill ‘O Kabuku Kambilo (c. 1850-1900): Uma identidade política ambígua’, in Actas do Seminário Encontro de Povos e Culturas em Angola (Lisboa: CNCDP, 1995), pp.14-53; Dias, Jill ‘Mudanças nos ... op. cit. pp.43-91.

\textsuperscript{194} For an accurate discussion on these issues see, amongst others: Messiant, Christine, 1961 — L’Angola ... op. cit.; Pelissier, René, La Colonie ... op. cit.; Marcum, John, The Angolan Revolution, Vol I ... op. cit.; Bittencourt, Marcelo, As linhas que ... op. cit.; also Guimarães, Fernando Andresen, The origins ... op. cit.; Freudenthal, Aida, ‘A utopia ... op. cit. pp.561-572; Messiant, Christine ‘Luanda (1945-1961)... op. cit. pp.125–199; Dias, Jill, ‘Uma questão ... op. cit. pp.61-93; Coelho, Antonieta Rupture and Continuity: the State, Law and the Economy in Angola, 1974-1989 (Warwick: University of Warwick, 1994) especially pp.62-80.
4.2 The Political Implications of the Major Socio-Cultural Cleavages During the Anti-Colonial Struggle

During the anti-colonial struggle and the beginning of the civil war (broadly encompassing the period between the armed uprising of 15 March 1961 and the 1975/1976 civil war), there are three main political issues that derive from the above discussion: firstly, the nationalist division or the lack of a common front against colonialism; secondly, the emergence of centripetal forces generating what will be here termed a great and diversified Creole/M'Bundu alliance; thirdly, and closely connected with the previous two, there can be seen a dynamic of increasing ethnic overtones to the conflict between the different nationalist movements. I discuss these three main points in the following three sections.

4.2.1 Nationalist Division

In terms of Angolan nationalism, the major socio-cultural cleavages between elites had four political consequences, as has been noted by Messiant.

Firstly, the original partition of Angolan nationalism between the MPLA and the UPA/FNLA based on mutually exclusive socio-cultural distinctions between two groups such as ‘old Creoles’ (miscegenated and acculturated) and Bakongo evolués (neither miscegenated nor acculturated with the Portuguese). As Guimarães writes,

Pointing to the FNLA’s characterisation of it as a movement dominated by mestiços, the MPLA in turn accused Roberto’s front of being racist. The MPLA would focus on the Bakongo origins of the UPA and charge that it was an uni-racialist and, therefore, unrepresentative movement. 195

Secondly, the emergence of an alliance within the old centres of colonisation between old and new Creoles in the MPLA is critical. Thirdly, there is an

195 In Guimarães, Fernando Andresen, The origins ... op. cit. p.63; For an accurate FNLA’s image of the MPLA as a movement of civilizados and assimilados see Guimarães, ibid. pp. 25-26.
alliance of the other new assimilados out of the old centres of colonisation ('Ovimbundu' from the Congregationalist missions and 'Bakongo' from the Baptist missions) with the 'Bakongo evolués' within the UPA/FNLA. Finally, there is the three-way division of Angolan nationalism in the mid-sixties after the departure of Savimbi and his followers from the UPA/FNLA -- accusing the movement of favouring the 'Bakongo'\textsuperscript{196}, but still finding the MPLA too Creole, assimilated and \textit{mestiço} to be joined by them -- forming instead their own movement — UNITA\textsuperscript{197}.

In these terms, such major socio-cultural cleavages represented a strong impediment to the unification of the nationalist movements against colonialism. Instead, these different movements fought amongst themselves for the hegemonic leadership of Angolan nationalism, to such an extent that the anti-colonial struggle often took second place. Such conflict for nationalist hegemony became evident from the very beginning of the movements' formation with the dispute over their respective foundation dates. Both the MPLA and UPA/FNLA wanted to claim for themselves the status of founder of nationalism. There was also the no less controversial subject of who effectively started the anti-colonial armed struggle\textsuperscript{198}; soon followed by effective military confrontation between guerrilla groups of the MPLA and UPA/FNLA along the


\textsuperscript{197} 'It was very difficult at that time for blacks to understand why \textit{mestiços} should be leading a liberation movement to fight the Portuguese. It was not clear to us that \textit{mestiços} were suffering in Angola; they were privileged people'; Savimbi's statement in Bridgeland, Fred, \textit{Jonas Savimbi: a key to Africa} (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986), pp.45-46. Reaffirming the above mentioned cleavages, two of UNITA's leaders, Lusaka Sangumba and Tony da Costa Fernandes, together expressed UNITA's eagerness to unite with its rivals but unwilling to accept MPLA's multiracialism because it would mean domination by \textit{mulatos} and \textit{assimilados}. Whites would be 'accepted as visitors — never more as leaders'; In a June 28, 1974, interview with executive editor Hoyt W. Fuller of \textit{Black World} (Oct. 1974, pp.56-79) in Lusaka; cited in Marcum, John, \textit{The Angolan Revolution}, Vol. II... op. cit. p.429, footnote 59.

\textsuperscript{198} These two mentioned disputes involve mainly the MPLA and the UPA/FNLA; UNITA's later appearance (1966) partially excludes her from those disputes. For an accurate discussion on these issues see among others: Messiant, Christine, 1961 — \textit{L'Angola...} op. cit.; Pelissier, René, \textit{La Colombie...} op. cit.; Marcum, John, \textit{The Angolan Revolution, Vol.I...} op. cit.; Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, \textit{Dissidences...}op.cit.; Bittencourt, Marcelo, \textit{As linhas que...} op. cit.; Serrano, Carlos Moreira Henriques, \textit{Angola: nasce uma nação; um estudo sobre a construção da Identidade Nacional} (São
Northern frontier of Angola that lasted from the months immediately after the 15 March 1961 uprising until the end of the anti-colonial struggle. As remarked by René Péllissier,

[The UPA leadership] had to defend their pre-eminence in the nationalist [anti-colonial] struggle by preventing soldiers sent by their rivals, the MPLA, from reaching the Dembos where it seems that from late 1961 if not earlier, rivalry between partisan leaders led to inter-guerrilla massacres [...] UPA's policy [was] of intercepting and destroying reinforcements sent by the MPLA to the Mbundu who were asking for help from Nambuangongo and the Dembos [resulting in a] fratricidal warfare. 199

The first major accusation (i.e. first of a long list of regular and constant accusations) of UPA/FNLA tribalism and attacks on MPLA guerrillas on the Northern frontier came at the beginning of March 1962 from its own dissident head of military forces, Commander Marcos Kassanga (a member of the N'Ganguela ethno-linguistic group). He accused Holden Roberto and its leadership of being responsible for the death of 8000 non-Bakongo Angolans, mainly M'Bundu, assimilados and mestiços during the months following the March uprising. He also accused them of being responsible for the assassination in October of a group of 21 or 23 MPLA guerrillas led by Tomás Ferreira who were intercepted near a UPA base while attempting to reach the Dembos area and responsible for having ordered the assassination of a 'Cuanhama' (Southern pastorals ethno-linguistic group) Commander of UPA, João Batista Tavares Pereira killed in February 1962 near Bembe.200 Although we can cast some doubt on the 8000 deaths and the specificity of the accusations made by a dissident, the important is to stress the regularity of these accusations throughout the whole anti-colonial struggle and from the most diverse sources, several of these already proven201.

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199 Text of René Péllissier in Wheeler, D. and Pelissier, René, Angola... op. cit. p.203.
200 Ibid. pp.204-205; also referred in Marcum, John, The Angolan Revolution, Vol.1 ... op. cit., p.218; also in Guimarães, Fernando Andresen, The origins ... op. cit. pp.64-65.
201 See for instance Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences...op.cit. especially p.156, footnote 3.
According to Guimarães (an author that follows a line of argument close
to that of Messiant in terms of socio-cultural divisions between elites and
movements), it could be argued that the Angolan civil war of 1975 began in
Léopoldville in 1962 when the MPLA's leadership officially installed itself in
that city; direct fighting between the MPLA and the UPA units became common
and ‘it was increasingly clear that a rivalry was emerging in Angolan
nationalism, one that would dominate the anti-colonial war and beyond’. Soon
‘their political rivalry developed into overt aggression’\textsuperscript{202}.

The same kind of military confrontation occurred in the East in the late
sixties, but this time between MPLA and UNITA guerrillas. The late
appearance of UNITA in relation to the UPA/FNLA and the MPLA, its
inexperience and many political and military errors brought the new
organisation to the brink of dissolution\textsuperscript{203}. Such difficulties ‘pushed’ Savimbi to
take a pragmatic option, to the detriment of any ideological or moral principles,
by negotiating an agreement with Portugal in which he agreed to fight the
MPLA's forces in the East in exchange for armaments and the survival of
UNITA in the region; an agreement that some argue to have started in 1972 and
lasted until early 1974\textsuperscript{204} and others to have started much earlier and lasted until
1972/73 \textsuperscript{205}.

In the end, the net result of these rivalries was the loss of effectiveness
of Angolan nationalism, as stressed by Hodges:

\textsuperscript{202} In Guimarães, Fernando Andresen, \textit{The origins} ... op. cit. pp. 64; 57-58.
\textsuperscript{203} On these errors see text of René Péliissier in Wheeler, D. and Pelissier, René, \textit{Angola}... op. cit.
p.225.
\textsuperscript{204} See Correia, Pezarat \textit{Descolonização de Angola} (Lisboa: Inquérito, 1991), pp.37-40. Also following
Pezarat is MacQueen, Norrie, \textit{A descolonização} ... op. cit. p.56. Correspondence allegedly changed
between Savimbi and Portuguese authorities confirming the agreement was first published in the
magazine \textit{Afrique-Asie}, 61 (8 July, 1974) under the title ‘La longue trahison de l'UNITA’. This
collaboration has been recently reconfirmed by the present President of the Portuguese Assembly,
Almeida Santos (who was one of the representatives for Portugal in the Alvor agreement) during
statements made on the radio programme \textit{Angola, 25 anos depois}, broadcast by the Portuguese TSF, on
10 November 2000.
\textsuperscript{205} According to Heimer such agreement between UNITA and the Portuguese army was unilateraly
suspended by the portuguese Comander-in-Chief, General Luz Cunha; in Heimer, Franz-Wilhem, \textit{Der
Entkolonisierungskonflikt} ... op. cit. p.111. In private conversation Heimer told me that during his
research trips in Angola in the seventies he was able to identify and talk to the Catholic missionary that
Even while they were fighting a common enemy, the three movements never collaborated, despite attempts to promote unity by the OAU. [...] movements fought each other [FNLA and MPLA in the northwest, MPLA and UNITA in the east]. This internecine conflict weakened the nationalist movement as a whole.  

4.2.2 The Great Creole/M'Bundu Alliance

The second main political implication here stressed is a centripetal force that seems to have developed essentially after the 15 March 1961 UPA uprising. During the following six months of attacks and reprisals before the Portuguese re-established their military control of the North, a significant (although uncertain) number of assimilados and mestiços were killed along with whites. This demonstrated feelings of resentment towards those who, whatever the colour of their skin, had a closer relationship with the Portuguese culture from which they had derived certain benefits during colonialism. As remarked by René Pelissier,

From the beginning of the revolt, there were massacres not only of whites but also of mestiços, assimilados and some of the Ovimbundu contract workers on the coffee plantations. Portuguese propaganda immediately seized on this error, which can only be accounted for by basic tribalism, group resentment against the African elite and hatred of colonial institutions. The rebellion not only rejected the white overlord but also the heritage of colonisation: the mestiço, and the 'assimilated' (and hence educated) African. [...] It rejected the Portuguese, and also considered the Ovimbundu a friend of the white man, and therefore the UPA's enemy. Of course, not all contract workers, assimilados and mestiços caught in the north were killed, but the number of those assassinated was sufficient to show Angola, and especially the townsfolk, that although the Bakongo had risen for independence — a goal approved by many Africans — it entailed the possibility of the elimination of other Angolans by the UPA.  

served as intermediary between the Portuguese and UNITA, who stopped his work with the arrival of Luz Cunha. At the presentation of Pezarat's book Heimer alerted him to the fact.  

206 Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. p.7  

Those events (in a period stretching from 15 March to September 1961) and the subsequent recurrent military attacks launched by UPA soldiers on MPLA's guerrillas (which continued until 1974), further supported the MPLA's previous accusations of UPA's racism and 'tribalism'. Pictured and largely seen in these terms within the old centres of colonisation, those events had an important double impact.

Firstly, they gradually reinforced the awareness of commonly shared socio-cultural identification traits by the great variety of sub-divisions of the Creole elites, acting as a centripetal force that progressively brought together the majority into the same political project: the MPLA. This alliance of several sub-divisions of the Creole elites in the MPLA is an illustration of the above-mentioned alliance between old and new Creoles. As explained by Messiant, old and new assimilados are analytical categories that do not ignore the more specific internal sub-divisions contained in each of them and their changing character over time\textsuperscript{208}.

The socio-economic and political relevance of the sub-divisions of the so-called 'Creole elites' and the type of rivalries and compromises established between them varied through the years and during different historical periods. As a short illustration of the richness and changeability of these internal divisions before independence (that can not be developed here in greater detail\textsuperscript{209}), I should like to stress:

- until the end of the 19th century the internal divisions within the 'Creole elites' were mainly, on the one hand, between those of the old 'aristocratic' Creole families of Luanda and those of the 'aristocratic' families of the interior; and, on the other, between those of the

\textsuperscript{208} As explained by Christine Messiant to the author during a private interview in January 1998 (tape recorded), a few days before the field research trip to Angola and also in several other conversations and occasions after the research trip. See also her article, Messiant, Christine, 'Entre nós ... op. cit. especially p.812, footnote 14 and p.813.

\textsuperscript{209} For reasons already explained, these divisions cannot be developed in here: firstly, because they are not central to this work's main discussion; secondly, because there is a need for deeper historical research on these issues.
‘aristocratic families’ and those at the margins of the clientelist networks, between lighter and darker skinned\textsuperscript{210};

- during the first decades of the 20th century, and at a more ‘popular’ level, there is special relevance in the divisions between those from the \textit{baixa de Luanda} (city centre) and those from the \textit{muceques de Luanda} (poorer suburbs), between \textit{assimilados} and \textit{indígenas}. At the more elitist level, the differences were mainly represented in the bipolarisation of the assimilado associations in Luanda, divided between the African Society, founded in 1914, which attracted mainly lighter skinned \textit{mestiços} and a few whites born in Angola, and the Angolan League, founded in 1912, attracting mainly black, darker-skinned \textit{mestiços} and a large proportion of town-dwellers from the interior (namely, Malange, Dondo and Catete). Its members had on the whole a lower socio-economic status than the members of the African Society. After these associations had been made illegal in 1922, they were reborn in 1930 — the Angolan League became the National African League, and the African Association became the Association of Native Angolans (ANANGOLA) — but maintaining the socio-economic, regional and racial distinctions of its predecessors\textsuperscript{211};

- during the anti-colonial struggle there were several differences such as between those from Luanda and those from the interior, Protestants and Catholics, those from Catete and those from Nambuangongo/Dembos (both can be considered within the new assimilados category), between \textit{mestiços} and negroes, intellectuals and non-intellectuals, ‘famille de Cabinda’, ‘famille de la Première Region’, ‘famille de la clandestinité’, ‘famille de l’Est’ and so forth\textsuperscript{212}.

\textsuperscript{210} On these differences see Dias, Jill, ‘Uma questão ... op. cit. pp.61-93; also Dias, Jill ‘Relações Económicas ...op. cit. pp.241-258.
\textsuperscript{211} On these differences see Messiant, Christine, 1961 — \textit{L’Angola...} op. cit.; Messiant, Christine ‘Luanda (1945-1961)... op. cit. pp.125–199; Messiant, Christine, ‘Entre nós ... op. cit. especially p.812, footnote 14 and p.838, footnote 56.
\textsuperscript{212} On these differences see Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, \textit{Dissidences...op.cit.} with special relevance to chapter VI, pp.172-197
Even if short, these illustrative examples are sufficient to explain: on the one hand, that broad and more encompassing analytical categories such as new and old Creoles do not ignore other sub-divisions; on the other hand, the reasons underlying the necessary flexibility (adaptability) of concepts of social classification to the Angolan case as 'elite and elite fractions' (used by Christine Messiant), integrating in their definition several criteria (as previously defined) in order to better understand a constantly changing and complex reality, especially in terms of political alignments. The analysis of the post-independence period (the main focus of this work) will stress the most politically relevant internal divisions and rivalries that emerged throughout the administrations of Agostinho Neto and Eduardo dos Santos.

Secondly, the effective or imagined threat (essentially born out of the 15 March 1961 uprising) against all those whose minimum common denominator was their relatively stronger historical contact with the Portuguese culture along the old centres of colonisation, came to be felt not only by the several sub-groups forming the diversified network of Creole elites, but also by the general population along the Luanda-Malange corridor. This feeling became accentuated with the open warfare between the three movements during the 1975-1976 civil war. As stressed by Jill Dias, beyond the Creole elites, the Portuguese 'conquest' of the interior of Luanda had a strong impact on all the peoples inhabiting that region213. Thus when the open and total warfare between these movements broke out, massively involving the whole population, the relatively stronger and longer (commercial, military, colonial) impact of the Portuguese in this region naturally led these rural populations to

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213 'From the 16th century onwards, all the African societies involved with the European trade in the interior of Luanda, experienced a long process of desintegration, re-grouping and re-definition. In the nineteenth century, the various social and political groups of the same region are still involved in a constant process of formation and transformation mainly influenced by commercial contacts. In fact, at the same time that it reveals the process of interdependency developed through the centuries between African and European structures in Angola, the colonial documentation also stresses the contradictions and paradoxes characterizing that process'; In Dias, Jill 'Relações Económicas ...op. cit.p.241.
feel closer to the Creole elites and 'their' most significant, effective and encompassing political project — the MPLA\textsuperscript{214}.

In these terms, that effective or imagined threat began progressively to represent the main cement of a great and diversified Creole/Mbundu alliance not only of elites but also encompassing a significant component of the general rural population of that area. The fear represented was embodied during the anti-colonial struggle by the UPA/FNLA, which was seen as an ethnic movement representing the Bakongo (even if that does not seem to be the most accurate analysis\textsuperscript{215}) and, after the independence by UNITA, gradually identified with the Ovimbundu, based more and more on the affirmation of their specific identity (rural, African, black, subjugated) as opposed to the Creole/Mbundu alliance (seen as assimilated, acculturated, \textit{mestiço}, urban, privileged)\textsuperscript{216}.

The centripetal force at the basis of a large and diverse Creole/M’Bundu alliance is, thus, the second significant political implication of the major socio-cultural cleavages that has been outlined.

4.2.3 The Increased Ethnic Overtones of the Conflict

The third main political factor to be stressed within the scope of this work’s perspective is linked to the previous two and concerns the dynamics set by the

\textsuperscript{214} As explained by Heimer, for instance, 'Most important seem to have been the traditional assimilado [creole] alignment with the MPLA and hostility to the "alien" FNLA, as well as the ethnic identification of the Akwambundu [Mbundu] with the MPLA, and ethnic hostility to the FNLA south of the Bakongo area'; in Heimer, F.W., \textit{The Decolonization ...} op. cit. p. 64.

\textsuperscript{215} In fact, there are some references to socio-economic, religious, regional and ethnic sub-divisions within the so-called Bakongo ethno-linguistic group with political implications during the anti-colonial struggle such as, for instance, divisions between protestants and Catholics, those from Matadi and those from Kinshasa; Baxicongo, Bazombo and Cabinda; however, that is not relevant to the way in which the Creole/M’Bundu saw UPA/FNLA (the important point to our discussion) and besides, as previously explained, such divisions and political implications during the anti-colonial struggle are very insufficiently studied (the same happens to the 'Ovimbundu') and this is not the place or the occasion to explore them. During my interviews programme some of the interviewees provided in a complementary way a few statements containing informations that might be explored by those interested in developing such research. As said, that information (scarce) will be at their disposal. Over this subject some references can be found in Marcum, John, \textit{The Angolan Revolution, Vol.1} ... op. cit. chapter two; also the text of René Pélissier in Wheeler, D. and Pelissier, René, \textit{Angola}... op. cit. especially pp.166-172.

\textsuperscript{216} See Messiant, Christine, 'Angola, les voies ...I, op. cit. pp.155-210; also Messiant, Christine, 'Angola: entre guerre et paix' ... op. cit. p.169.
conflicts between movements, degenerating into open warfare in the summer of 1975 and leading to civil war. The war soon reinforced 'ethnic solidarity', as explained by Birmingham\textsuperscript{217}, and gave an increased ethnic overtone to the conflict. As noticed by Messiant, two main reasons seem to be at the basis of these dynamics:

- on the one hand, there was strong instrumental use of social and cultural differences by the elites leading the nationalist movements in order to legitimise their political division, autonomous existence and quest for the hegemonic leadership of Angolan nationalism;

- on the other hand, the dynamics of a civil war massively involving the population and the Cold War alignments (often instrumentalised by the nationalist movements\textsuperscript{218}) contributed to a strong exacerbation and politicisation of the differences between peoples, hardening the opposition between movements, giving another dimension to the conflict, not only in terms of ideological alignment, but also in terms of ethnicity.

C'est principalement la rivalité entre nationalistes appartenant aux diverses élites produite par la colonisation portugaise, et notamment l'opposition entre d'une part l'élite historique, multiraciale, créole et de l'autre, deux types d'élites subalternes (assimilées, provinciales ou Bakongo émigrés) qui les a amenées à se valoriser les unes contre les autres, dans un champ politique alors polarisé, leurs capitaux propres pour pouvoir mener une lutte armée rendue nécessaire par la situation coloniale et pour légitimer leur différence et leur existence.

Il y a eu très précocement exacerbation et politisation des différences et aussi fixation des oppositions entre les trois organisations par les alignements de la guerre froide. Mais c'est la guerre qui chevauche l'indépendance qui change la dimension et la nature du conflit, ses implications pour la société. Cette guerre a été la première forme d'engagement massif des Angolais pour ou dans des champs alors en guerre totale. Elle a à la fois, étant donné les implications extérieures, idéologisé les ralliements et, sur la base

\textsuperscript{217} See Birmingham, David, \textit{Frontline Nationalism}... op. cit. p.88.

\textsuperscript{218} On this subject (i.e., internal instrumentalisation of external allies) the most developed study is probably Guimarães, Fernando Andresen, \textit{The origins} ... op. cit.; the author basically sustains the argument that 'the Angolan civil war was a domestic conflict for power which was deliberately internationalised by the rival movements'; ibid. p.199.
As explained, it is not my intention to analyse the transition process according to the intricacies of the 1975-1976 civil war and the complexities of the effects of external involvement. I want mainly to understand the development and expression of socio-cultural identity cleavages during that period. Therefore, the following paragraphs should be seen as providing the necessary context to the understanding of the increasing political expression of those cleavages.

In terms of socio-cultural cleavages, the violent rivalry between these movements during the anti-colonial struggle did not augur well for the transition towards independence. After the signing of cease-fire agreements between Portugal the MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA (summer of 1974), a process began for the transfer of power, which culminated in the signing of a quadripartite agreement between Portugal and those three movements in Alvor, Portugal, on 15 January 1975. It made provisions for a transitional and coalition government, whereby ministries were allocated to all three movements, which was to exercise its functions until the general elections and independence proper on 11 November 1975. The tripartite government rapidly fell apart because of direct-armed confrontation between them, which started in March 1975. From then on the conflict developed into civil war. Despite several

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220 For a detailed account of the political and military events of the 1974-1976 period towards the civil war and the increasing ethnic overtones of the conflict see among others: Marcum, John, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II... op. cit. chapter VI; Heimer, F.W., The Decolonization ... op. cit. especially chapter 6 and 7; Guimarães, Fernando Andresen, The origins ... op. cit. especially chapters 4-7; also Heywood, Lynda, Contested Power in Angola, 1840’s to the Present (New York: University of Rochester Press, 2000), especially chapters 6-7; Correia, Pezarat Descolonização ... op. cit.; Cardoso, Silva Angola, anatomia de uma tragédia (Lisboa : Oficina do Livro, 2000), especially Part II; For a good synthesis of the decolonization process of Angola relating the internal (Angolan) events with those occurring in Portugal and also mentioning the ethnic factor see MacQueen, Norrie, A descolonização ... op. cit. chapter 6; For a good chronology of the events on this period see Simpkins, Gregory B Angola : a chronology of Major Political Developments February 1961 – September 1996. (Alexandria VA: Institute for Democratic Strategies, 1996) pp. 11-17 ; a good chronology can also be found in ‘Dix-neuf mois d’affrontements’ in Le Monde (12 November 1975).
international attempts to save the transition process\textsuperscript{221}, by July 1975 the fighting had spiralled out of control.

Following directly on the escalating of the conflict, there was an increase in the intensity of foreign involvement that went back to the anti-colonial struggle. The FNLA had the support of regular Zairean army units fighting alongside its armed forces, and had also received covert aid from the USA since January 1975. The MPLA, which had been military weakened by the loss of Soviet arms deliveries in 1973-1974\textsuperscript{222}, negotiated a resumption of Soviet supplies in March 1975\textsuperscript{223} alongside with Cuban aid (including a few hundreds military advisers). As Soviet and Cuban aid for the MPLA escalated, from March onwards, covert US aid to the FNLA was increased and extended to UNITA. Foreseeing the possibility of a hostile ‘internationalist’ MPLA government coming to power on Namibia’s northern frontier, the South African Defence Force invaded Angolan territory in August, placing itself on the side of the FNLA and UNITA’s (who joined forces against the MPLA). The invasion triggered an immediate response from the USSR, which increased its military support for the MPLA and Cuba, which sent thousands of troops, thus turning the tide of the war. In face of this the US halted its support to the opposite side. The stigma of association with South Africa’s apartheid regime and the post-Vietnam mood provoked strong domestic opposition to US support for the FNLA/UNITA/South Africa side and on 19 December 1975 the Senate adopted the Clark amendment, which barred all aid to the Angolan factions.

From July 1975 the country began to divide up into zones controlled by rival party armies based on their respective socio-cultural strongholds. During that month, the FNLA pushed the MPLA out of the 'Bakongo' provinces of

\textsuperscript{221} There was a re-run of the Alvor agreement in May 1975, under the auspices of Portugal, pressured by the UN and one month latter, in June, the three movements met again in Nakuru under the auspices of Kenyatta and the OUA in order to set their divergences.

\textsuperscript{222} As will be seen in the next chapter, by then the USSR decided to support the Chipenda faction ('Eastern Revolt') disputing the MPLA’s leadership with Agostinho Neto’s faction and the Active Revolt faction.

\textsuperscript{223} At this point the 'Eastern revolt' had definitely lost the fight for the movement’s leadership, being expelled from Luanda by Neto and having integrated the FNLA. We will return to this subject in the next chapter.
Uíge and Zaire, while the MPLA expelled the FNLA and UNITA from Luanda and then consolidated its military control in the Luanda-Catete-Malange corridor. UNITA moved to control its 'Ovimbundu' bastions of Huambo and Bié.

When independence came on 11 November 1975, two declarations were made: one in Luanda, where the MPLA announced the formation of the People’s Republic of Angola with Agostinho Neto as president; the other, proclaimed by Holden Roberto and Savimbi, announced the formation of the Democratic Republic of Angola, which was to be governed by a UNITA–FNLA coalition with its headquarters in Huambo. The coalition soon disintegrated as the FNLA stopped UNITA from operating in its northern regions, and UNITA responded in kind in the south, starting a war between the two where UNITA prevailed, thus expelling Holden’s movement from the main towns in the highlands. Benefiting from ever-growing Soviet and Cuban assistance, the MPLA defeated in February 1976 the forces of the FNLA to the North and the forces of UNITA to the South. Left isolated by the US and having to face an increasing number of well-armed Cuban troops, the South Africans withdrew back to Namibia in March 1976.

Despite an increasing ethnic overtone, the struggle between nationalist movements can not be said to have been transformed into a mere ethnic conflict. That is in large part due to the MPLA’s relatively greater flexibility and capacity for integration, or selective co-option, of members from other regions and ethno-linguistic groups — thus broadening the scope of the Creole/Mbundu alliance in a way not paralleled by the other two movements\(^\text{224}\). Such a singular feature was most probably related to the practice of internal compromise within the Creole/Mbundu elites and buttressed by an initially strong universalist discourse, sustaining principles that were essentially

\(^{224}\) This co-option and integration was not without significant internal conflicts, be it at the leadership level or at the level of the guerrilla fighters as clearly exposed by Pepetela from lived guerrilla experiences in the Mayombe forest and the eastern military front; in Pepetela, *Mayombe...* op. cit.; Pepetela, *A Geração...* op. cit.; also in Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, *Dissidences...* op.cit.
Christian humanistic and Socialist (with some impact at least on the part of the leadership, as we will see below), criticising any form of division based on socio-cultural references to identity.

The fact is that Agostinho Neto’s movement, although clearly dominated by the ‘Creole elites’ was capable, throughout the anti-colonial struggle and towards independence, of integrating members from the ‘Bakongo’ ethno-linguistic group, or members from Eastern groups (‘Lunda-Tchokwe’; ‘Mbunda’, ‘Luchaze’); or from the extreme South (‘Herero’, ‘Cuvale’). The integration of members from the central plateaux (of the Ovimbundu ethno-linguistic groups) was much more difficult and remained that way after independence.

Concluding section A and bearing in mind its purpose, it can be said that on the whole, the pre-independence period was marked by three main characteristics:

1. The most privileged elites (in economic, political and educational terms) were those with more proximate historical relationship with the Portuguese culture and colonial structures (commercial, military, administrative) — the Creole/M’Bundu elites of the Luanda-Malange corridor;

2. Those elites were ‘traditionally’ marked by clientelistic relationships of preferential solidarity including extensive kinship ties (usually seen as the prelude to ‘modern patrimonialism’);

3. The existing socio-cultural cleavages became deeper and assumed stronger ethnic overtones during the anti-colonial struggle.


On the specificities of the integration of people from the extreme South in the MPLA see Carvalho, Ruy Duarte de, Aviso a navegação (Luanda: INALD, 1997).


See Médard, Jean-François, The Underdeveloped State …op. cit. especially pp.165-181.
Bearing in mind such context, the bi-partition and then tri-partition of the nationalist movement, brought about a hegemonic power struggle for control of the State and the management of its resources. The State was seen in the colonial period as a mechanism for control of administrative, military and economic structures and in this way it controlled social and economic success or failure. In these terms, it seems logical that the struggle for power in the future State (especially acute during the 1975-1976 open warfare between movements) had taken on a vital importance (‘bloody and brutal [...] like a war of religion’\textsuperscript{229}), and had become a ‘zero-sum struggle’\textsuperscript{230} where the winner would take the ‘lion’s’ share and for an indefinite period of time, while the losers would have to count on the winner’s co-option but would always come second in any political, economic hierarchy.

Accordingly, the conflict surrounding independence (1975-1976) is officially described by the MPLA as a ‘struggle for the hegemony and exclusivity of power’\textsuperscript{231}. On the FNLA’s side the conflict was seen in the same way, ‘convinced that its military strength would in the end permit it to “grab the whole cake”\textsuperscript{232}. And for UNITA, the expected electoral victory or even a possible federalist political arrangement was seen as the most desirable way ‘to get the biggest share’ and the leading role in the new political system\textsuperscript{233}. Nevertheless, the military confrontation for the hegemony of power was taken as the most realistic scenario and led Savimbi’s movement to a strong reinforcement of its military forces\textsuperscript{234}.

Moreover, as stressed to the author by Jaka Jamba, the Alvor agreement signed with Portugal in January 1975 (establishing the political and

\textsuperscript{229} In Soremekun, Fola, Angola ... op. cit. p.212.
\textsuperscript{230} Term used by Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. p.8.
\textsuperscript{231} In MPLA, 40 anos por Angola (Luanda: MPLA, 1996), p.51; also referring the MPLA’s hegemonic ambitions is Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences... op. cit. p.187.
\textsuperscript{232} In Heimer, F.W., The Decolonization ... op. cit. p.65. The same point of view was assumed by Lucas N’Gonda member of the FNLA’s Politburo in private interview (19 March 1998).
\textsuperscript{233} In Heimer, F.W., The Decolonization ... op. cit. p.65.
\textsuperscript{234} This hegemonic intention and perspective on UNITA’s side was confirmed to the author by Jaka Jamba, member of the transitional government in 1975, who is still today a member of UNITA and always trusted by Savimbi; in private interview (7 June 1998).
institutional process towards independence) and especially the provisional government composed by the three parties, was basically seen by all of them as a way to assess each other’s strength and prepare for the decisive battle in order to find a ‘winner’ in the struggle for exclusive hegemony. Also confirming this perspective, Almeida Santos, member of the Portuguese government, revealed recently that on the eve of signing the agreement, he tried to persuade the leaders of the three movements to alter the wording in order to allow for a rotation of power between the three because according to him, he was quite convinced that the model of elections with one winner would not work. Whoever got into power would not be willing to share it and whoever was left outside would not accept exclusion. At a first meeting, all the leaders accepted the new agreement, but the next morning it was rejected and the old accord was signed.

Beyond all the intricacies of that process, the most important point to stress here is that the MPLA came to win that struggle for the State’s hegemony after the open military confrontation between the three movements, also winning thereby the leadership and dominance of the patrimonial system that was soon implemented. The new (independent) Angolan political system then is here said to have initially followed a ‘modern patrimonial’ dynamics (during the presidency of Agostinho Neto), then evolving towards a post-modern patrimonial dynamics (through the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos’ presidency, until 1987). This evolution will be analysed in detail in the remainder of this thesis.

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235 From private interview with Jaka Jamba (7 June 1998).
236 In public interview of Almeida Santos to the radio programme Angola, 25 years on, on the Portuguese TSF radio news (10 November 2000). Also sustaining the ineffectiveness of the Alvor agreement due to the ‘real conflict’ for power fought between movements is MacQueen, Norrie, A descolonização ... op. cit. p.219.
237 Although there are a few references to patrimonialism and clientelism in one of the most recent texts of Christine Messiant, such themes are treated for the post 1987 period and under a different analytical perspective and different conceptualization that should not be confused with the ones that will be presented here. See, Messiant, Christine, ‘À propos des... , op. cit. pp.61–95.

CASE STUDY, SECTION – B : THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NEW POST-INDEPENDENCE SYSTEM OR PARTISAN MODERN PATRIMONIALISM (1975-1979)

Section B seeks to understand the working logic of the post-independence socio-political system and of the State during the presidency of Agostinho Neto (1975-1979). In order to achieve that aim I will analyse the dynamics through which the framework of relationships (political, economic, ethical) between rulers and ruled developed during that period.

In the end, the main purpose of this section (as well as that of section C) is to explain the modern or post-modern nature of the existing patrimonial working order. Modern patrimonialism is about political and normative coherence in the operation of a patrimonial system, ensuring social integration through distribution (linking the higher and the lower social strata, the rulers and the ruled). Post-modern patrimonialism is about the extreme development of patrimonial organisational principles and expressions breaking the interdependence ties between rulers and ruled.

The analysis in this section (as well as in section C) will be structured in five chapters. The first is dedicated providing the historical context, discussing the main socio-political events of each administration which are relevant to the understanding of the ensuing chapters and to the main discussion at the centre of this thesis. The second, third, and fourth, respectively are concerned with the political, economic and ethical framework of interdependence relationships. The section concludes with a characterisation of the effectively existing State in terms of assessing its modern or post-modern patrimonial working logic.

Therefore, the following chapters are not intended to give an account of the country profile on economy, politics, and normative procedures during Neto’s presidency, but an assessment of the nature of the patrimonial logic which operated and gave the political system its character.
5 - Context of Socio-Political Events: *Nitismo* and the Attempted Coup in 1977

Agostinho Neto's presidency (1975–1979) hinged from the start on a new political and sociological phenomenon at the core of the great and diverse 'Creole/Mbundu alliance' -- a political activism pro-MPLA, which went out of control and climaxed with the attempted *coup d'état* on 27th May 1977, led by Nito Alves. The specificity of such phenomenon here designated as *Nitismo*\(^{238}\) influenced in many ways the ensuing formal political model, the State and framework of relationship between rulers and ruled.

Accordingly, in order to better understand the following chapters it is important to analyse *Nitismo* in terms of its socio-political and economic background (sub-chapter 5.1), its strategy to conquest power (5.2) and the reaction it provoked in the MPLA's leadership (5.3). The present chapter does not aim to be an overall 'historical introduction' to the presidency of Agostinho Neto, but rather a selected analysis and contextualisation according to the needs of the analytical perspective here in discussion.

Given the fact that this is one of the most insufficiently studied themes on contemporary Angolan politics and sociology; given its importance to the subsequent development and understanding of this work; this chapter will necessarily go into some considerable detail.

5.1 Sociological, Political and Economic Background of *Nitismo*

Taking advantage of the unexpected freedom of association and expression brought by the 25th April 1974 (the Portuguese revolution) and the agitated period derived from the war between the competing nationalist movements

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\(^{238}\) 'Nito-ism' or 'Nito-ist'; a term denoting the socio-political phenomenon behind the attempted *coup d'état* led by Nito Alves, but going beyond the person of Nito himself and the concrete event of the attempted *coup*. 
(1975-1976), which did not allow the MPLA to enforce internal discipline, old and new power disputes within the MPLA gained in strength and challenged Agostinho Neto’s leadership.

On the one side there could be identified the remaining political echoes of an old fraction of elite, essentially representing the coastal Creole/M’Bundu 'aristocracy' within the Old Creoles category, whose influence had been decreasing since 1962, when Agostinho Neto assumed the movement’s presidency. Led by members such as Gentil Viana, Mário and Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, linked to the origins of modern nationalism and the MPLA itself in the late fifties, they formed a political faction in May 1974 -- the so-called Active Revolt, essentially based in Brazzaville, fighting to regain the leadership of the movement during the Lusaka congress in August 1974. At this Congress, besides the Active Revolt, two other factions were disputing the movement’s leadership: the so-called presidentialist faction (led by Agostinho Neto and Lúcio Lara) and the Eastern Revolt (which had emerged in 1972/73, led by Daniel Chipenda; essentially based on the Eastern military front near the frontier with Zambia). After insurmountable disagreements and fearing a political defeat the presidential faction abandoned the Congress and arranged a new ‘congress’ in September 1974, in Moxico, Eastern Angola (Conferência Inter-Regional de Militantes; Inter Regional Militants Conference) where the totality of delegates and military commanders were pro-Neto, thus ensuring his re-election as President239. From the three factions present in Lusaka, the Active Revolt was the smallest in number of delegates and several of its members abandoned the project soon after that congress, returning to Luanda where they tried to be re-integrated within Neto’s MPLA (a group of members led by Joaquim Pinto de Andrade and Dr Eduardo dos Santos); while other

239 On all the intricacies of this process which cannot be analysed in detail here, see Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences…op.cit. especially chapter 6.
members continued to fight Neto (such as Gentil Viana, Manuel Videira and Fernando Paiva among others)\textsuperscript{240}.

On the other side, benefiting from the same post-25th April 1974 freedom, there emerged dozens of new autonomous political micro-groups (committees), principally led by a young generation that had grown up during the last phase of colonialism and were supportive of Neto's MPLA (emerging mainly in Luanda but soon spreading to other cities along the Luanda-Malange corridor and also along the Lobito-Benguela axis — i.e. the old centres of colonisation). They included the 'Amilcar Cabral Committees' (close to the Portuguese extreme left, defending an Albanian Marxism based on the writings of Enver Hodja); the 'Hojy-ya-Henda Committees' (also related to the Portuguese extreme left but supporting Maoism); the Cita Vales' groups of thought (close to the Portuguese Communist Party and consequently supporting a pro-Soviet route); the 'Talahadi Committees' (from the very beginning surrounding Nito Alves and with an initial pan-African, racist and Maoist discourse); other less significant groups such as 'N'Zinga Committees' and 'Joseph Stalin Committees', among several dozens of others\textsuperscript{241}.

For Neto's leadership, the remaining echoes of the 'old' factionalist disputes (the survivors of the Active Revolt) were not too much of a problem. He had been dealing with their criticism since becoming President in 1962 and had always managed to defeat it. In spite of the ability and credibility of its leaders, its potential sociological and political 'constituency' (the heirs of the Creole 'aristocracy') was too damaged by its relatively privileged status within

\textsuperscript{240} From private interviews with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16 and 20 April 1998); The Eastern Revolt allied itself to the FNLA and progressively disappeared along with that movement's military defeat. For the most detailed and accurate study on these factions, its genesis and development before and after independence see Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences... op.cit. chapters 3 to 6.

\textsuperscript{241} On these committees see Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences... op.cit. especially chapter 10. Although there is a lot of historical research to be done on the important role of these committees, this generation and their political dynamism, this study is the most complete reference. Its author's 'kinship' links with Lúcio Lara (some kind of an adoptive son, living with Lara's family in Luanda since 1976, but with close relationship with that family since the early seventies in Brazzaville, during the anti-colonial struggle) allowed him to be the only researcher (absolutely without any other exception), to have a relatively free access to Lúcio Lara's private archives (a real treasure to the researcher over this period).
the colonial system. It was demoralised and shamed by the massive running back to Portugal of the whites and some of its own members who, fearing reprisals, chose to pursue their careers in Portugal. The option for the great majority of this elite was to integrate themselves quietly into the new political disposition, whilst trying to maintain their socio-economic status by obtaining posts in public administration; using to this end their wide experience and relatively high education. Besides, those few elements still insisting on the Active Revolt were strongly repudiated by the majority of youth committees, especially by the ones close to Nito Alves who, as minister of the interior pushed for their arrest in April 1976.242

The real threat to the movement’s leadership came progressively and increasingly from these youth committees due to three main reasons that will now be developed: 1) they were the representatives of a new sociological and political phenomenon within the Creole/Mbundu elites; 2) they became gradually disillusioned and frustrated with the movement’s leadership and its ideological, political and economic course; 3) they began to have significant power derived from their ability to link their activity to that of the lower social strata organisations.

5.1.1 A New Sociological and Political Phenomenon

The majority of members composing the youth committees were from a generation unknown to the MPLA’s leadership (itself composed of an older generation or nationalist generation) who had never had to deal with them. They were aged circa 17–27 and as a general rule had not taken part in the struggle for liberation; their activism mainly consisted of clandestine political group discussions and pamphleteering propaganda within colonial society. They had grown up during the last phase of colonialism, in an Angola different to the

242 When the arrests pushed by Nito Alves took place, negotiations were going on between Neto and members of the Active Revolt through Joaquim Pinto de Andrade; Neto was insisting on the usual 'criticism and self-criticism' to re-integrate those members, something that was not being accepted easily by them. From private interviews with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16th and 20th April 1998).
one the nationalists had known and from which they had been kept away for twenty years, since the late fifties. It was a generation that had benefited from the democratisation and development of the colonial educational system from the 1960s onwards\(^{243}\), which in general terms provided them with a relatively high level of education and preparation, making them potential competitors to most of the MPLA's political and administrative cadres. It was also a generation that experienced the accentuated economic growth of Angola (1961-1973)\(^{244}\) and became dominated by the passionate, 'romantic', political-ideological discussions typical of that day and age (the sixties).

During a period of rapid social transformation and rapid economic growth (sixties and early seventies) followed by an abrupt and agitated political transformation (1974-1976) the 'traditional' socio-economic, regional and racial sub-divisions of the Creole/M'Bundu elites cut across this younger generation. They had a heterogeneous socio-economic, racial and regional background (mixing for instance, so-called progressive whites with educated blacks and mesticos; youngsters mainly from the city centre of Luanda, but also some from the muceques; mainly from the coast but also from the interior).

What they had in common was in fact their relatively high education their

\(^{243}\) This development within the educational system was part of a number of changes undertaken by colonial politics during the sixties in order to counter the international criticism and reproof against the violence and shortcomings of the Portuguese colonial system at war with the nationalist movements. As stressed by Heimer, 'The overall picture changed to a significant extent as a consequence of a new colonial policy that began to emerge in the late fifties, and was officially adopted and applied in response to the 1961 uprisings and the ensuing guerrilla war. The rationale behind this new line [...] could be characterised by the ideological keywords "development" and "integration".' In Heimer, F.W., \textit{The Decolonization} ... op. cit. p.12. 'l'expansion presque brutale de l'enseignement surtout à partir de 1964 [...] réussit à quintupler les effectifs scolaires en quinze ans. L'objectif déclaré en fut l'intégration culturelle.' In Heimer, Franz-Wilhelm, 'Formation sociale ... op. cit. p.37. Primary education grew 400\% from 1960/61 to 1972/1973. Secondary education grew 500\% within the same period and superior education was open in Angola in 1963 with the foundation of the Luanda University. For a deeper account of educational colonial policy between 1926 and 1974 see Marques da Silva, Elisete \textit{O papel societal do sistema de ensino na Angola colonial (1926-1974)} (Bissau: II Colóquio Internacional em Ciências Sociais sobre a África de Língua Oficial Portuguesa, Novembro 1991). This work contains a lot of references to important although unpublished research produced by Heimer in colonial Angola.

\(^{244}\) An accentuated economic growth of all economic sectors with special significance to the industrial sector occurred in Angola mainly between 1961-1973; on this issue see Neto, Ana Maria \textit{A Industrialização de Angola 1961-1975} (Lisboa: Escher, 1991); also Zenha Rela, José Manuel \textit{Angola entre o presente e o futuro} (Lisboa: Escher, 1992), especially Part I and II; also Bhagavan, M R, \textit{Angola's political economy 1975–85} (Motala: Swedish International Development Authority, 1986),
young age and their extreme political-ideological positions centred on Marxist theories.245

Thus, although in several specific cases there were close or distant kinship relationships between members of this generation and members of the 'nationalist generation' (those that could be clearly identified and classified within the 'traditional' elite segments according to the existing sub-divisions as expounded above), these young people represented a new sociological and political phenomenon; they could not be simply classified within the 'traditional' segments of the Creole/M'Bundu elites according to the 'traditional' criteria mainly because their political alignment and procedure did not fit those criteria.

5.1.2 The Youth's Disillusion With The MPLA's Leadership

The increasing disillusion and frustration of the youth committees with the MPLA's leadership was ideological, political and economic.

Ideologically, their disillusion came as soon as some of their members had their first contact with the movement's leadership during the Lusaka Congress (August 1974). They went there as delegates from Luanda and talked with Agostinho Neto, expounding their commitment and enthusiasm for Marxist theories and the Socialist mode of production, but were struck by Neto's answer that it was too soon to talk about such issues and that the MPLA had the intention to establish its own model of Socialism.246 During that

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245 Also talking about a conflict of generations behind the Nitista phenomenon is Carreira, Iko, O Pensamento estratégico de Agostinho Neto (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 1996), pp. 147-148.
246 From private interview with Jaime Cohen (member of that delegation) conceded to Mabeko-Tali, cit. in Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences...op.cit. p.305. Also stressing Neto's pragmatic approach towards Socialism is his personal friend, Davidson, Basil L'Afrique au XXe Siècle — L'éveil et les combats du nationalisme africain (Paris: Éditions Jeune Afrique, 1980), p.284. Neto always wanted to ensure some autonomy and by then had very fresh in his mind that the USSR stopped supporting him since 1973, favouring instead the Eastern Revolt faction, overtly standing for Chipenda during the Lusaka congress, then resuming its aid after Neto's arrival in Luanda and the magnificent (legitimising) reception he had there in February 1975; from private interviews with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16 April 1998); Pepetela (7 July 1998).
Congress and the subsequent Inter Regional Militants Conference (September 1974), these young delegates constructed a negative ideological judgement over the MPLA’s leadership.

The only palliatives to such disillusion were the ideologically aggressive speeches of the young political commissar of the MPLA’s Ist military region (Dembos forest) Nito Alves, to whom the young delegates coming from Luanda felt increasingly attracted. Later on, in November 1974, when a first major delegation of the MPLA arrived in Luanda led by Lúcio Lara, a proposal was made to these committees in order to simply integrate them into the existing structures of the movement, but such a proposal was strongly refused by the bulk of them, opting to maintain their organisational autonomy in the face of the movement’s ideological vagueness \(^{249}\). It is worth to note that as late as August 1975, Agostinho Neto was wisely stating that,

> The MPLA is not a Marxist-Leninist organisation. Nor is our leadership Marxist-Leninist. [...] We are a large organisation with various shades of opinion and different types of groups. [...] As a heterogeneous organisation, it contains both Marxist and other points of view \(^{250}\).

\(^{247}\) Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, *Dissidences...* op. cit. p.178.

\(^{248}\) Ibid. p.304.

\(^{249}\) Ibid. p.282.

\(^{250}\) In *Afriscope*, August 1975, cited in *Africa Contemporary Record -- ACR*, 8 (1976), p.B423. The MPLA had always remained an eclectic front as stressed by Marcum and most accurately analysed by Mabeko-Tali; some ideas expressed at Dolisie, Congo-Brazzaville, at the ‘Ist Regional Assembly of the Ist and IInd political and military regions’ in February 1968, according to which the movement should convert itself into a revolutionary vanguard party ideologically well defined, were deferred until such time as study groups could produce a solid nucleus of ideologically prepared cadres, something that never happened until 1977 when such vanguard party was effectively formed as we will see below. On
Several years later Chipenda re-stated the same,

As a whole, as a synthesis, the MPLA [as a nationalist movement] was not a communist movement. That does not mean that there were not within the movement several elements that were communist. 251

Equally, the first version of the constitution (11 November 1975) does not have any reference to the construction of Socialism 252; something that deepened the youth committees disappointment in ideological terms.

Politically the major disillusion and frustration for these youngsters came with the non-fulfilment of the expectations they nurtured for themselves in terms of the role they intended to play within the new socio-political system and State. In a country short of cadres, especially after the exodus of the Portuguese, the relatively high level of schooling of this politically active and ideologically fervent generation gave its members great hopes of playing leading roles (politically relevant) in the construction of the new socio-political project. But it did not take long for them to realise that the leading political jobs of the top echelons of the new State were the prerogative of the earlier nationalist generation who had effectively been fighting the colonial system (from outside), regardless of academic preparation 253.

Economically, a major disillusion came when members of this younger generation experienced a sharp drop in their living standards (in a country which they had known during a phase of accentuated economic growth — 1961-1973), accompanied by increased corruption, especially at the top echelons of the movement and of the State onto which they projected so many ideological candid principles and projects. According to one of these young people at the time:

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251 In Public interview of Daniel Chipenda to the National Radio of Angola, programme Foi há vinte anos, (17th June 1995).
253 From private interviews with Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); João Melo (17 April 1998); JM Mabeko-Tali (27 April 1998); Vicente Pinto de Andrade (11 May 1998).
[In 1975–1976], there was unbridled corruption in the cities and we, the young ones, we could not accept this corruption. We had our sights set on independence and we agreed with the Marxist-Leninist theory and if it was socialism that the MPLA wanted, there must have been something wrong. Corruption was not going to lead us to any kind of Socialism. [...] We knew that we were worse off than during colonialism. As young men not from the peasantry but middle class, from petite and middle bourgeoisie, we knew we were worse off, with many problems, and yet the leaders had all they could possibly want, assuming a deplorable attitude of ostentation and display of wealth, the worst of them being Iko Carreira [Minister of Defence], who was known to be a diamond trafficker. 254

Supporting the same idea of a drop in living standards and increased corruption at the top of the governmental hierarchy generating increasing criticism, Mabéko-Tali states that,

La détérioration de la vie socio-économique de la population dans son ensemble, et l'installation de la corruption dans les moeurs des gouvernants de la jeune République viennent au secours de cette activité [jeune et contestataire] 255.

Also stressing the increasing corruption right before the attempted coup is Fauvet,

Corruption was rampant (...) Public Supplies Enterprise had to be dissolved because of the gross corruption within it, with the failure of goods to arrive at their destination, mysterious destruction of documents by the fire, etc. 256

5.1.3 The Increased Autonomous Power of The Youth Committees

In face of such ideological, political and economic disillusionment and given their inability to reach immediately the top structures of the movement, the youth committees tried to construct an autonomous base for their power within the new socio-political system. To this end their aim was twofold.

254 Private interview with Luís dos Passos (13th May 1998); he is one of the only two surviving leaders of the attempted coup d'état of 27 May 1977. His statement on the traffic activity of Iko Carreira was very common within the Nitistas and even expounded by Nito Alves to the plenary of the Central Committee on the 20th May 1976 as we will see.

255 Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences... op. cit. p.423.

On the one hand, they started to develop their revolutionary theories and political projects (beyond ideological nuances) around the issue of poder popular (popular power), generally supporting a flexible interpretation of Marxist ‘democratic centralism’ in favour of a political system where the power is effectively, actively and permanently exerted by the bottom layers of society (the so-called ‘people’) whose organisational structures these committees wanted to control with exclusivity and autonomy vis à vis the movement’s leadership.

On the other hand, and fulfilling such projects, they became deeply involved with the lower social strata organisations, be it in terms of neighbourhood para-military self-defence organisations or workers’ strike movements and independent unions, to whom they lent a political discourse, orientation and structured organisation.

In terms of para-military organisations, some of the youth committees became increasingly related to spontaneously emergent self-defence neighbourhood commissions where they promoted a democratically elected structure, with direct elections being held as soon as November 1974. Although these commissions considered themselves pro-MPLA, all the democratic processes took place without any relationship with the MPLA’s formal structures. Such independent and direct democratic processes led those commissions to comprise the most diverse elements, from marginals, through workers, to political activists of each neighbourhood, forming Comissões de Bairro/Neighbourhood Commissions and Comissões Populares de Bairro/Neighbourhood Popular Commissions, later articulated (in part) with

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257 See Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, *Dissidences* ... op.cit. especially chapter 10.
258 Neighbourhood Popular Commissions became democratically elected by informal neighbourhood assemblies (November 1974) and also democratically co-ordinated by a Co-ordination Organ elected by the Neighbourhood Commissions; see Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, *Dissidences* ... op.cit. especially chapter 10.
259 On the marginal component of several members of these commissions see, for instance, Fauvet, Paul, ‘Angola ... op. cit. p.91.
the ODP—*Organização de Defesa Popular*/People's Defence Organisation*260*. Their para-military activity was crucial in helping the MPLA to defeat and expel from the cities (especially Luanda) the other two movements (UNITA and FNLA) during the 1975-1976 confrontation*261*. Because of this crucial help, the MPLA's leadership adopted at first a paternalistic and condescending attitude towards their autonomous and parallel activities.

In terms of labour strike movements, the dynamics, organisational experience, political and ideological support provided by the youth committees in Neighbourhood Commissions and Popular Neighbourhood Commissions was transposed into workplaces, especially factories, in the form of autonomous Workers Commissions and micro independent unions. Benefiting from such support offered by those committees (in the form of courses, lessons, pamphlets, direction of assemblies etc.) the anarchical wave of workers protesting for an improvement in their living conditions (which started spontaneously after 25th April 1974) soon became a true, politically and economically worrying strike movement; as reported by David Ottaway in May 1976,

> Workers no longer necessarily accept orders from their would-be bosses (be they state or private leaders) and sometimes hold meetings to decide whether to obey or to refuse. Conflict between workers and managers even in recently nationalised factories has become of such concern to the government that party and labour union leaders are now going from factory to factory to explain why discipline and production must be the order of the day. *262*

The increasing articulation between youth committees and the organisations of the lower social strata does not mean that the latter were simply manipulated by the former and indirectly by the former's disillusions and ambitions. People from the lower social strata (in general) had their own sound and specific

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*260* The ODP was set up by the MPLA in September 1975 to complement the FAPLA (armed forces), representing an attempt to integrate, organise and control the spontaneously emergent self-defence neighbourhood commissions.

*261* On the 'military' help provided by these commissions to the MPLA see Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, *Dissidences...* op.cit. especially chapter 10.

*262* See article of David Ottaway in *Herald Tribune* (18 May 1976).
reasons to contest the evolution of the new socio-political system; reasons that derived from their frustrated economic expectations with the independent State.

As stressed by David Birmingham in relation to the attempted coup, 'The workers in the capital had discovered that their expectations had been pitched too high and independence was not all golden'\textsuperscript{263}. Essentially, their expectation towards independence seemed to be distributive, basically meaning a massive distribution of material benefits and privileges by the leadership in terms of compensation for the colonial exploitation; a rent coming from the riches of Angola (natural resources previously 'stolen' by the colonialists). At least in part, this kind of expectation is thought to have been nurtured by some in the nationalist movements during the anti-colonial struggle, as expounded by Iko Carreira, Daniel Chipenda and others. According to Iko Carreira (trying to explain popular support of Nitismo),

\begin{quote}
A great part of the population had a very different idea of independence. For some, the simple change from the Portuguese to an Angolan leadership would bring richness and rest [riqueza e descanso]. Several, touched by the propaganda of the nationalist organisations constantly stressing the Portuguese theft on Angola, seemed to believe that it would not be necessary to work anymore after independence\textsuperscript{264}
\end{quote}

According to Daniel Chipenda,

\begin{quote}
Within the most exploited rungs of society, the less educated, there was not the possibility to define and analyse the reasons of colonial exploitation. Others [the leadership] knew better those reasons. That is why I say that there was a very broad notion of independence. For some it was simply to be in the place of the colons. [...] I can tell you for instance that once, when I was director of the organisation of cadres, a comrade came to me saying: comrade Chipenda I want to study. I asked him what for? He answered, to become a postal clerk! [chefe de posto; one of the lowest positions within the colonial administrative hierarchy, but with a considerable power and material benefit within the rural milieus]. Well, as you see, we were fighting for independence, but he, within that concept of struggle, wanted to be a postal clerk. [...] If you do remember well our programme, it said for instance, that the MPLA was the movement to defend the interests of the most exploited classes and that was in fact an easier way of mobilising
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{263} Birmingham, David, \textit{Frontline Nationalism}...op. cit. p.81
\textsuperscript{264} Carreira, Iko, \textit{O Pensamento} ... op. cit. p.148.
the less educated rungs of society, because there was no dialogue between the ones and the others [top and lower rungs of society], and that in fact served as a necessary incentive to the least educated, to bring them to fight; naturally, if they were to find there that phraseology it would be easier to convince them. However, We should have said that our struggle was for all and not just for the most exploited classes; we should have simply defined that our struggle was against a common enemy, colonialism. That aspect [that phraseology] in our programme brought us some problems creating different notions of independence [different expectations].

For the general population, the first phase between the 25th of April 1974 and independence, had been one of great freedom, with houses being occupied and the possessions of colonists fleeing back to Portugal being appropriated. This gave the impression that the distributive expectations of independence were being fulfilled by the MPLA and that, once victory over the FNLA and UNITA had been completely achieved, things would be even better, with the generalised enjoyment of the great wealth of Angola through the extensive distribution of income, privileges and benefits\(^{266}\). However, this did not happen and despite the large oil revenues, instead of the promised abundance and distribution, the economic situation of most of the population fell sharply into a state of acute shortage, with miserly ‘peoples’ shops’ and luxurious ‘leaders’ shops’ (as we will see in the next chapters). The new economic situation made itself felt through austerity and increased appeals to production and workers’ sacrifices, engendering an understandable dissatisfaction and popular criticism, which were politically channelled by the youth committees towards the strike and protesting movement; thus representing:

- on the one hand, a link between the frustrations of the younger generation and the lower social strata in general;

\(^{265}\) Public interview of Daniel Chipenda to the National Radio of Angola, programme *Foi há vinte anos* (17th June 1995). Also supporting the same argument of a different conception of independence among the lower rungs of society, essentially based upon expectations of material benefits is Pepetela in private interview (7th July 1998).

\(^{266}\) Obviously, such distribution was expected to discriminate ‘the enemy’, UNITA and FNLA, and its internal supporters, increasingly identified with the Ovimbundu and Bakongo that did not adhere to the MPLA, as referred above.
- on the other hand, a political articulation between the youth committees and the lower social strata organisations.

If we bear in mind that such political articulation took place within an unrestrained and totally out of control (anarchic) dynamic of poder popular, it is understandable that this was favourable ground for the emergence of a new faction, bent on challenging the movement’s leadership.

5.2 A New Political Faction and its Strategy to Challenge the MPLA’s Leadership

The new emerging political faction comprised in its leading core, two groups:

Firstly there was a group originating from the MPLA’s first military region (Dembos forest), including some elements from an older generation, such as Bakalov (Eduardo Evaristo), Monstro Imortal (Jacob Caetano João), Sianouk and Ho-Chi-Minh (Bernardo Ventura). The first military region was the oldest (since 1961) and the most mythical, given its survival up to the end of the anti-colonial war in almost complete isolation from the rest of the MPLA\(^{267}\).

Mainly because of its isolation, the first military region developed an identity very much its own and was very critical of the movement’s leadership, whom they accused of negligence and blamed for the lamentable conditions which the region had endured since the beginning of the armed struggle: lack of arms, ammunition, food and communication with the outside world. Some of its members, considering themselves the true and most legitimate heroes of the

\(^{267}\) Only in June 1966, an MPLA reinforcement, the Cienfuegos Column, managed to reach the Dembos forest after an epic trek from the Zaire frontier. In January 1967, a few survivors of another MPLA detachment, the Camy column, reached the Dembos after being sequentially ambushed by the UPA/FNLA guerrillas and the colonial troops. Besides those two occasions and despite several other suicidal attempts (decimated either by the UPA/FNLA or the colonial troops) there was no further contact between the first military region and the rest of the movement until 1974. From Private interviews with: J.M Mabéko Tali (27th April 1998); Lúcio Lara (1st May 1998); Alexandre Sebastião (4th May 1998); Commander Bagé from the first military region (26th May 1998); Luis dos Passos (13th May 1998); Filomeno Vieira Lopes (24th March 1998); Pepetela (7th July 1998).
anti-colonial struggle, deserving the leading role within the movement never allayed this criticism and resentment\textsuperscript{268}.

Secondly, there was a group representing the above mentioned youth committees generation, with some young ex-political prisoners from the São Nicolau Camp (in Southern Angola)\textsuperscript{269} led by José Van Dunem and other young activists, including so-called progressive whites such as Sita Valles (married to José Van Dunem after independence) and Rui Coelho, amongst others\textsuperscript{270}.

This motley alliance between nationalists from the first military region, and members of the young generation of activists who had not fought the war, was achieved by Nito Alves (or Bernardo Alves Batista, to give his full name), a representative of both groups: he was a political commissar from the most mythical military region (the Ist, of Dembos forest), but his young age (born in 1945, at Piri, Dembos), his short but effective path as a high school student in Luanda\textsuperscript{271} and his aggressive and unorthodox (i.e. confused) ideological discourse made him close to the young activists.\textsuperscript{272} Nito soon became the most

\textsuperscript{268} From Private interviews with: J.M Mabeko Tali (27th April 1998); Commander Bagé from the first military region (26th May 1998); Luis dos Passos (13th May 1998); Filomeno Vieira Lopes (24th March 1998); Pepetela (7th July 1998).

\textsuperscript{269} These young political prisoners were arrested in mid and late sixties (mainly students at high schools involved in clandestine political activities against colonialism); they are not to be confused with the first generation of political prisoners arrested in late fifties and early sixties (mainly deported to Tarrafal in Cape Verde or even to Portugal) to whom we will come back later.

\textsuperscript{270} Because there seems to be some doubt about the 'ethnic' background of Sita Maria Dias Valles, we must stress that she was white, born in Angola in 1951, within a family of colonial classe moyenne, of a Portuguese mother and father (her father was of Goan origin), student of Medicine in Lisbon where, in the early seventies she became a member of the Portuguese Communist Party and an activist of the Union of Communist Students; she re-entered in Angola after the 25th April 1974 where she married and had a child with José Van Dunem; for bibliographical data see Expresso (25th January 1992). Rui Coelho was also white, born in Lobito and had always studied inside Angola at a high school level but with very profound interest in political ideologies, being responsible for the Nitistas sector of intellectuals and political education along with Sita Valles; his family was of Portuguese origin and very close to the author's own family, also from Lobito.

\textsuperscript{271} Nito Alves studied at an evangelical mission near Piri, and then from 1960 in Luanda, living in the muquece of Sambizanga and studying at the Salvador Correia high school where he became involved in anti-colonial activity. When a number of his colleagues were arrested in 1966 and incarcerated in São Nicolau prison, Nito Alves left Luanda and joined the guerrilla fighters of the MPLA's first military region in the Dembos forest. After 25 April 1974, Nito went to Luanda where he came to regain contact with his former colleagues (then released) and started his political activity before going to Lusaka to attend the Congress in August 1974 with some of his old colleagues and new partners (young activists). For bibliographical data on Nito Alves see Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences...op.cit. p. 398; also Fauvet, Paul, 'Angola ... op. cit. pp. 88–104.

\textsuperscript{272} As we have previously mentioned, the younger generation of the micro-groups developed an eclectic ideological approach ranging from pro-Chinese, pro-Soviet, pro-Guevara, Trotskyites, pro-Albania,
politically prominent member of those two groups — a rising star ever since the Congress of Lusaka (August 1974), where he made use of an extremely aggressive discourse against the other two factions disputing the movement's leadership — for which Neto was grateful, supporting Nito's promotion to the CC (Central Committee) at the Inter Regional Militants Conference (September 1974) and later, after independence, to minister of Internal Administration.

Embodying the frustrations and ambitions of both groups, Nito assumed their goal of increased power within the movement and the State. To this end, the Nitistas strategy was directed to a double target that we will now analyse: 1) towards the base structures of the new political system, pursuing the hegemony of poder popular and its institutionalisation; 2) towards the middle and top structures of the MPLA and consequently of the new State.

5.2.1 Pursuing the Hegemony of Poder Popular

In order to achieve the hegemony of poder popular, there was a need for the Nitistas to integrate the competing committees and dissolve those that refused to be integrated; a process that took several months—between mid 1975 and March/April 1976.

At this level, although the number of youth committees surrounding and supporting Nito progressively became the majority (mainly bringing together the Henda, Sita Valles and Talahadi Committees) they were unable to integrate the Amilcar Cabral Committees, which fought their hegemonic ambitions; a struggle that took place within the MPLA's base structures such as Departamento de Orientação Política-DOP (Department of Political
Orientation) and Departamento de Organização de Massas-DOM (Department for Masses Organisation). Despite the above-mentioned option by the bulk of the youth committees (mainly the Amilcar Cabral and Henda) to maintain an organisational autonomy vis à vis the MPLA's structures, they still tried to take over those departments in order to start imposing their propounded political/ideological projects.

The Amilcar Cabral Committees were the first to enter the DOP, directed by Carlos Rocha 'Dilolwa' and also the DOM, directed by Lúcio Lara and Pedro Pacavira; they began to dominate important press organs such as Libertação Nacional (national liberation) and Revolução Popular (people's revolution). Members of the top echelons of the MPLA such as Dilolwa, Lara and also Pepetela did feel some initial sympathy for these committees; long time Maoists like Dilolwa and Pepetela found here the opportunity to express and develop restrained ideological beliefs and became leading members of these committees.273

Within the DOM and DOP, the Amilcar Cabral Committees soon faced the competition of the Henda Committees allied with the Sita Valles group and the Talahadi Committees, an alliance that progressively homogenised its ideological position in terms of a pro-Soviet stance (as propounded by the Sita Valles groups of thought). This group (Nitista) came to dominate the main press organ of the MPLA, A vitória é certa (victory is certain) and important radio programmes such as Kudibanguela (our struggle) and FAPLA's Povo em Armas ('people in arms'; under the influence of José Van Dunem, who was the second national Political Commissioner of FAPLA).

Due to the increasing power of Nito Alves as Minister of Internal Administration and his persecution of the Amilcar Cabral Committees (pushing for the arrest of their members), the later opted for a total break with the MPLA in early 1976 and went underground transforming themselves into the OCA (Communist Organisation of Angola), but as early as March/April 1976 the

273 See Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences...op.cit. p.316, footnote52.
organisation disintegrated, with several arrests. By then, the war for hegemony over *poder popular* was won.

Having eliminated the competition, the next step for the *Nitistas* was the institutionalisation of their domain over *poder popular*. At this level, another major battle came to be fought with the discussion of the Law of *Poder Popular*, which would officially define such power, its organisational structures and their relationship with the movement's top organs. On the one hand, there was the *Nitistas*’ position, standing for the flexible approach of Marxist democratic centralism, allowing and assuring effective autonomy for the new structures; on the other hand, there was the position sustained by the main leadership surrounding Neto at the Political Bureau, defending an orthodox interpretation of democratic centralism, meaning a strict control over *poder popular*, whose organisations could not have the autonomy desired by the *Nitistas* vis à vis the top organs of the movement.

A compromise solution was found within the legislative text, stressing the principles of democratic centralism as sustained by the movement's leadership (subordination of inferior echelons to superior ones; the possibility to suspend deliberations and procedures of inferior organs by superior organs), but still leaving a broad and effective political autonomy to the organs of *poder popular* at the regional and local level. Together with the decree approving the criteria for election to the Neighbourhood Popular Commissions, the Law of *Poder Popular* represented the legal mechanism through which Nito Alves could institutionalise his power over the new organs, something that he effectively did with the elections being held in May 1976. Such electoral process, closely monitored and prepared by the *Nitistas* assured them the control over powerful Neighbourhood Popular Commissions such as

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274 Ibid. p.294; also from private interviews with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16th and 20th April 1998); also with Luis dos Passos (13th May 1998).
275 See articles 37 to 39 in Law 1/76 DR, 29, 1st (5th February).
276 See Law 1/76 DR, 29, 1st (5th February), especially articles 4° to 36°.
277 Decree 45/76 DR, 130, 1st (3rd June).
Sambizanga, Patrice Lumumba, Nelito Soares, Operário, Rangel, Neves Bendinha and Prenda. 

5.2.2 Pursuing Power over the Movement and State's Top Structures

Having accomplished the first stage of their move towards increased power (at the base structures' level), the Nitistas engaged the second and decisive one: the infiltration of governmental/administrative structures, as well as the military and the mass party organisations in order to finally take over the top leadership of the movement and consequently of the State.

Thus, the leading members of the Nitistas, built a parallel network of power, spreading trusted elements throughout all the governmental, military and party structures, not only in Luanda but in several provinces as well.

At the governmental and administrative levels, as minister of Internal Administration Nito had the power to propose provincial commissioners (the highest executive position within the provincial administration). Even though the power to effectively nominate provincial commissioners rested with the Council of the Revolution (following a proposal by the Minister of Internal Administration), this was only a formal procedure. Neto and the Council of the Revolution approved most names proposed by Nito. This allowed the Nitistas to place their trusted members in several provinces such as Malange, Benguela, Huila, Kwanza-North and Kwanza-South besides Luanda's provincial commissariat under the direction of Pedro Fortunato. At the top, in central government, Nito counted on the active support of the Minister of Trade, David Aires Machado (a former activist of labour strike movements), among several other second rank cadres within ministries.

At the military level, Monstro Imortal became Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and José Van-Dunem the number two of the National Political

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278 See Fauvet, Paul, 'Angola ... op. cit. pp. 96-97.
279 On this issue see Boletim do Militante -- BM, 3, (27 June 1977); also BM, especial number (12 July 1977); also Fauvet, Paul, 'Angola ... op. cit. pp.88-104; also Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ...op.cit. pp.404-407.
Commissariat of FAPLA. After the death of the National Political Commissioner, Commander Jika (loyal to Neto), José Van Dunem proposed the name of Bakalov in his place. Together, they started to infiltrate their men (prepared in specific Centres of Revolutionary Instruction -- political/military schools -- such as Certeza from the 1st military region) into the military police, into units of the armed forces (such as the 9th brigade—an elite unit) and exerted influence over all military/political schools of FAPLA.

At the level of party structures, the increasingly autonomous secretariat of Sita Valles based at DOM was able to establish Nitistas' cells all over the MPLA's mass organisations—JMPLA (MPLA Youth), UNTA (National Union of Angolan Workers), OMA (Organisation for Angolan Women), also manipulating important press organs and radio programmes to promote Nito's political image.

Having infiltrated those organisations, the Nitistas then started a campaign to enlarge their support as much as they could, not only internally, but also externally.

Internally, in an attempt to accommodate all the discontented and make the most of a difficult social and economic situation, Nito and his followers developed an opportunistic argumentation, tailored to the various audiences. When addressing middle social strata (young middle cadres from the State administration; middle ranking officers from the armed forces) the Nitistas denounced the lower living standards compared with the colonial period and with the ostentatious wealth of the new rulers, who had access to restricted and luxuriously supplied stores, contrasting with miserably supplied 'people's stores' for general access. When addressing lower socio-economic strata, their discourse included racist arguments, confusing class with race, blaming the petite bourgeoisie (identified with the mesticos and whites at the top of the apparatus—Lúcio Lara, Carlos Dilolwa and Iko Carreira; the most publicly

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280 Due to his military inexperience José van Dunem could not replace Jika; from private interview with JM Mabéko-Tali (27th April 1998).
281 From private interviews with Luis dos Passos (13 May 1998); Pepetela (7 July 1998).
known *mestiços*)\(^{282}\) for the scarcity and non-fulfilment of the general distributive expectations of the population and denying the long desired ‘power to the people’. At this level (lower social strata) such discourse had an enormous impact as stressed by Mabéko-Tali,

Cette rencontre entre l’ancien guérillero [Nito] et les masses des quartiers pauvres va être cimentée par [...] la perspective d’une vie meilleure après l’indépendance, et le rêve d’un pouvoir d’abord et uniquement pour la masse noire des musseques. D’où la grande popularité de la notion de ‘pouvoir populaire’. [...] Or, le discours politique, social et idéologique de Nito Alves se fera pas faute d’encourager ces aspirations, et de soulever les questions les plus sensibles, tels les privilèges sociaux de certains groupes somatiquement déterminés de la société angolaise sous la colonisation [whites and *mestiços*]. Il invoque la nécessité de remettre en cause ces privilèges par le combat politique—d’où l’identification de la classe et de la race qui va caractériser les discours populistes de cette époque\(^{283}\).

Externally, the *Nitistas* deliberately looked for the USSR’s support, seen as a key partner in any possible internal conflict\(^{284}\). As mentioned, under the influence of Sita Valles groups the *Nitistas* assumed a pro-Soviet stance and started a campaign portraying the MPLA’s top leadership (mainly the Political Bureau) as dominated by anti-Soviets, Maoists and Social Democrats led by Lúcio Lara, Carlos Dilolwa and Iko Carreira\(^{285}\). Leading the Angolan delegation at the XXVth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in March 1976, Nito Alves and José Van Dunem presented Nito as the representative of the purely Marxist-Leninist wing, supported by former members of the Portuguese Communist Party and of the Union of Communist Students such as Sita Valles; the move seems to have had some impact and Nito was treated as an effective Chief of State and paid serious political attention\(^{286}\).

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\(^{282}\) From private interviews with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (20th April 1998); JM Mabéko-Tali (27 April 1998); Pepetela (7 July 1998).

\(^{283}\) Mabéko Tali, Jean-Michel, *Dissidences*... op. cit. pp400-401.

\(^{284}\) Although the USSR had no military forces in Angola, there were many Cuban troops and war material, and the USSR could ultimately influence the alignment of the Cuban forces in any possible internal conflict.

\(^{285}\) See *BM*, 3, (27 June 1977), p.5; p.29; see also Fauvet, Paul, *‘Angola ... op. cit. p.97*; also in the same sense are private interviews with JM Mabéko-Tali (27 April 1998); Luis dos Passos (13 May 1998); Commander Bagé (26 May 1998).

\(^{286}\) See Mabéko Tali, Jean-Michel, *Dissidences*... op. cit. pp.416-419.
When Nito returned from this trip, the Nitistas seemed to have all in their favour. Besides the external support (at least thought by the Nitistas to have been assured\(^{287}\)), their internal strategy effectively gathered broad social support, that ranged from a substantial part of the generation of young activists (from the so-called progressive whites to educated blacks and mesticos), workers’ commissions and small independent labour unions, through to the general population of the lower social strata, including the so-called lumpen proletariat\(^{288}\). Others came from the civil service, especially from the lower and middle levels; from the armed forces, especially low to middle-ranking officers; from Party mass organisations such as JMPLA, UNTA and OMA.\(^{289}\)

Nevertheless, such support turned out to be insufficient or was made insufficient by the strategic reaction of Agostinho Neto’s leadership.

5.3 Agostinho Neto’s Leadership Reaction to Nitismo

Notwithstanding all the above mentioned assets, the failure of Nitismo seems to have resulted essentially from its inability to attract any of the elite segments at the top of the movement’s leadership (mainly the CC and the Politburo). Although I will come back to this issue in more detail, it must be stressed for now that the leadership was at that period essentially divided into two major political groups of unconditional supporters of Neto, corresponding in part to two sub-divisions of the Creole/M’Bundu elites, by then assuming opposite political sides—what can be considered a left and a right wing according to

\(^{287}\) From private interview with Luis dos Passos (13th May 1998).

\(^{288}\) For the official use of this term see speech made by Neto on 11 June 1977, cit. in BM, 3 (27 June 1977), pp.28-29. For the academic use in relation to Angola see Birmingham, David, *Frontline Nationalism*...op. cit. p.79. For the most general (Marxist) definition of this term see Marx, Karl, ‘Class struggles in France’ in Fever, Lewis S ed, *Marx and Engels: basic writings on politics and philosophy* (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959); Engels, Friedrich ‘Preface to the war in Germany’ in *Marx and Engels selected works* (New York: International Publishers, 1968).

\(^{289}\) See BM, 3, (27 June 1977); also BM, especial number (12 July 1977).
criteria that will be specified later (in chapter 8) in terms of positions assumed at the level of economic policy, political management and foreign policy.\footnote{For a discussion on the use of political left and right in African context see Wallerstein, Immanuel, \textit{Left and Right in Africa}, in \textit{The Journal of Modern African Studies}, 9, 1 (1971) pp.1–10.}

For now, it is important to stress that right and left wing can not be confused with previous party factions such as the Active Revolt or the Eastern Revolt (i.e. organised groups with a project and strategy to capture the party's top leadership — the presidency). That was not the case because both wings were made up of Neto's staunch supporters who wanted to achieve primacy around him and not replace him, essentially aiming to influence the political and economic path of the country and obviously to place themselves at the centre of decision-making. These wings were more like an aggregate of personalities linked by several types of solidarity ties but without a rigid and well-defined political alignment and strategy. Just like all the other socio-political classifications of the Angolan reality, these classifications must be seen as operative analytical categories implying generalisation, flexibility and located within a specific historical period. I will now provide a brief classification and return to the specific analysis and explanation in chapter 8.

On the one hand, coming under the fierce attack of Nito Alves, there was a group mainly comprising \textit{mestiços}, related to a coastal non-protestant segment of New Creoles, heirs of the colonial bourgeoisie of the beginning of the century (not to be confused with the old coastal aristocracy segment of the 'old Creoles', like those of the Active Revolt). Despite, or probably because, their heritage (as we will see later), they could politically be considered left wing, assuming a strong ideological (Marxist) stance, but obviously distinct from Nito Alves' positions. All of them were sincere supporters of Neto. Their most prominent members were Carlos Rocha Dilolwa, minister of economic planning, Lúcio Lara, party secretary for organisation, Iko Carreira, minister of defence and António Jacinto, writer.
On the other hand, there was a group comprising the darker skinned, protestants, New Creoles from the interior (mainly from Catete), including some of the survivors of the nationalist insurrection of 1961 and the first generation of political prisoners of the late fifties, represented by Agostinho Mendes de Carvalho (‘Uanhenga Xitu’, the most prominent figure), Domingos Paiva da Silva, Imperial Santana, Bernardo de Souza and Manuel Pedro Pacavira. From all these personalities, the only one that was not from Catete was Pacavira, who was from Golungo Alto (located between Catete and Malange). Their education level was lower than the leftists, whom they saw with resentment as ‘intellectuals’ and their political stance had nothing to do with Marxism or any ideology, which they clearly rejected from the very beginning, but with what can be considered tradition and ethnicity, defending a M’Bundu (black) base of power with a dominance of the M’Bundu from Catete, the birth place of Agostinho Neto. They came to create their own Committees, the ‘4th February Committees’ (aiming to dominate the People’s Defence Organisation - ODP and the Neighbourhoods’ Commissions).

The main common denominator between these two groups was their proximity to and support for Agostinho Neto, because he had links with both and provided a useful balance within the leadership. He was Protestant, but communist; he was black from Catete in the interior, but quite acculturated, being a medical doctor who had trained in Portugal and even married a white Portuguese, had a long and strong friendship with many mestiços such as the above mentioned Lúcio Lara, Iko Carreira and Carlos Dilolwa (the most prominent figures of the left wing).

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291 As re-confirmed to me by Agostinho Mendes de Carvalho, they always rejected Marxism and were never Marxist. He even warned several of his colleagues at the Central Committee of the danger of such an option, but had to adapt themselves to it as soon as the option was made; from private interview with Agostinho Mendes de Carvalho (17th July 1998).

292 In Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences...op.cit. p.411. Again it must be stressed that these classifications are generalisations and there were some rare exceptions to the general rule: there could be found some darker skinned people from the interior who belonged to the left wing and vice versa.
The Nitistas were unable to attract any of those two major socio-political groups at the top of the leadership, partly due to their proximity to Neto, but partly due to the specific strategy followed by the Nitistas themselves:

- on the one hand, choosing as their main targets all the mestiços and whites at the centre of the MPLA's leadership, blaming them for the existing problems and frustrated expectations, the Nitistas immediately and naturally set the left wing against them;

- on the other hand, the Nitistas also distanced themselves from the right wing due to several reasons: a) their pro-Soviet crusade; b) their view that 'the new should replace the old' (disrespecting the historical legitimacy gained by those who had survived the first anti-colonial insurrection and had been victims of colonial prisons)\textsuperscript{293}; c) the fact that Nito and some of his followers were from Dembos and the majority of the right wing tendency was from Catete (there was an acute rivalry between those M'Bundu from Dembos and those from Catete since the anti-colonial struggle, as I have earlier mentioned); d) their aim to rule over the People's Defence Organisation, was challenged by the right wing and by its '4th February Committees' (such dispute led the Nitistas to attack Pedro Pacavira, in charge of the DOM, who as soon as the May 1976 elections took place, denounced the existence of a ‘Nitista plot to take over the MPLA’s leadership’\textsuperscript{294}).

The Nitistas' attacks towards these two major political groups led the leadership to unite against what was perceived as an immediate and common threat\textsuperscript{295}; a product of an unknown generation that did not entirely understand the 'order of

\textsuperscript{293} In Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences... op. cit. p.412.
\textsuperscript{294} Ibid. p.412-414. Sita Valles' autonomous secretariat at DOM exerted strict control over the electoral process and the names eligible for the Popular Neighbourhood Commissions, something that was too obvious and provoked immediate criticism; on this issue see also Fauvet, Paul, 'Angola ... op. cit. p.93.
\textsuperscript{295} Although using a different denomination for those groups (calling 'Traditionalistes' what is here called right wing and 'gauche étouffée' what is here called left wing), this same 'alliance' between those two groups against Nitistas is also stressed by Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences...op.cit. p.412.
play’ nor accepted their ‘acquired’ rights to manage the system. Thus, their reaction to such threat was firm and determined. Putting a double strategy into action (internal and external), the CC held one of its most important plenary sessions (the third, 23-29 October 1976), defining the official political and economic model of the future State (as we will see such model did not in any way constrained the development of a patrimonial working logic, on the contrary it was well adapted to it).

1) Externally, the leadership attempted to cut the links between the USSR and the Nitistas, trying to ensure the support (or at least the neutrality) of the USSR and Cuba in case of conflict. To this end, the MPLA finally declared its official allegiance to Marxism-Leninism; a date was made for the end of 1977 for the first congress of the movement which would have as a main item on its agenda the formation of a vanguard party of the working class, with the aim to construct Socialism in Angola296. After the plenary, Iko Carreira officially announced that ‘for the MPLA, the only socialism that exists is the Socialism of Marx, of Engels and of Lenin, scientific socialism’297. It is worth noting that Neto had visited Moscow earlier that month (7-13 October 1976), having signed on the 8 October, a twenty year Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with the USSR298.

2) Internally, the leadership attempted to break the Nitistas ties with the lower social strata organisations (neighbourhood commissions and labour strikers’ movement). To this end, and after studying several reports that had been previously requested and prepared within a discussion on organisational party problems, it was stated that the main obstacle in the organisation of the movement was the existence of two MPLA’s, the official one and the one led by Nito Alves and José Van Dunem, leaving the idea of possible fractionism. It also suggested that these two CC members, whilst exercising their official functions, had purposely caused food shortages to stir up discontent. It was then

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decided that a commission of enquiry should be set up (led by José Eduardo dos Santos) to investigate dissident activity at the core of the MPLA and look into the reports on food shortages.\textsuperscript{299}

Knowing that the discontent amongst the great majority of the population (lower social strata) arose from frustrated economic distributive expectations, by blaming the main activist leaders for the situation of economic scarcity, and promising senior posts to the working class in a future Socialist society, the leadership turned the mistrust and competitiveness of the bottom rungs of the population (who had little or no schooling or political preparation) against the young activists (who did have schooling and political preparation) and against the middle professional cadres who might sympathise with Nitismo.

In the meantime several important decisions were immediately made by the CC representing a major setback to Nitistas' plans: Nito Alves and José Van Dunem were to be suspended forthwith from their party and governmental offices until the enquiry came up with its conclusions. The Ministry of the Internal Administration (led by Nito Alves) was to be abolished and its major functions (liaison with Provincial Commissioners) to revert to the Council of Ministers and its day-to-day functions to lie in the hands of the Prime Minister and the President. A strong criticism was directed towards the behaviour of FAPLA's national political commissariat and it was decided that the CC should exercise greater control over that commissariat. Monstro Imortal and Bakalov were then suspended from the CC. Sita Valles and her partners were removed from DOM. The right to MPLA's membership was limited to Angolan citizens (automatically excluding several extreme left Portuguese working alongside the Nitistas such as Virgilio Frutuoso, director of the newspaper \textit{Diário de Luanda}). All organs of information were brought under the control of the MPLA's Department of Information and Propaganda and the Ministry of Information was suspended. \textit{Diário de Luanda} was suppressed as well as the

radio programme *Povo em Armas* (Kudibanguela, had already been suspended earlier). Nito Alves' appropriation of the organs of *poder popular* was strongly criticised and consequently, the legitimacy of the organs elected in May under the Law of *poder popular* was withdrawn. New elections were only to be held 'where MPLA structures were sufficiently strong, organisationally stable and mature'.

With the October 1976 CC's plenary, siege was laid to the Nitistas. From then on, Alves and his most proximate collaborators probably started to plot the coup. Despite the setback imposed by the plenary's decisions, their activities were intensified through clandestine channels (pamphleteering, neighbourhood meetings, even activities through the Sambizanga football club of which Nito was president), but always closely monitored by the leadership.

In face of the most obviously expected result of the enquiry — confirmation of fractionism — the coup came to be planned to coincide with the meeting deciding on the expulsion of Nito and José Van Dunem initially scheduled for the beginning of the year of 1977. However, the meeting kept being adjourned under the justification that the report was not complete (maybe to give more time to the leadership to prepare itself) and was finally announced for the 20th May 1977 at the Museum of Natural History. The group rushed to prepare the coup for that day, which was supposed to start with a popular rally in front of the Museum against the harsh economic conditions. According to the plan, the rally would provoke a violent reaction from the police protecting...
the meeting, which was the pretext for a military intervention by those FAPLA's units infiltrated by the Nitistas. However, the party leadership was so well-informed about Nito's supporters' moves that, alerted to the plan by DISA, they decided at the last minute to change the venue to Futungo de Belas (a relatively distant place south of Luanda where the President effectively lived), thus thwarting the conspirators' plans.304

As expected, the two-day CC meeting concluded that there was de facto fractionism, led by those two elements and expelled them from the CC. Nito still tried to deny the accusations resorting to what his supporters had been working on and circulating for several months -- *Treze teses em minha defesa*/Thirteen thesis in my defence, a 156-page document, analysing the nature of the MPLA and its political right-turn, accusing Lúcio Lara of being a 'social democrat', a 'Maoist' and the person leading this right-turn. He claimed that corruption, incompetence and nepotism were rife within the MPLA, that ministers were engaged in diamond smuggling or debauchery (citing the name of Iko Carreira among others);305 denouncing the deficiencies of the movement's course such as sectarianism, elitism, paternalism, manipulation and alienation from the grass roots (characteristics that we will clearly see developing through the next years, as shown in the following chapters).306

Nito was still offered the usual way out (i.e. a process of criticism and self-criticism admitting his faults) but refused and it became clear that the conflict was inevitable.307 Thus, immediately after the end of the CC meeting (mid-day on the 21st May), and fearing Nitistas' reaction, Neto rushed into a public

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304 See Fauvet, Paul, 'Angola ... op. cit. pp.95-96; Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, *Dissidences*...op.cit. pp.423-424; *BM*, especial number (12th July 1977), p.21
305 From private interviews with Luís dos Passos (13th May 1998); also in Fauvet, Paul, 'Angola ... op. cit. p.97.
306 See Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, *Dissidences*...op.cit. pp.421-427; also Fauvet, Paul, 'Angola ... op. cit. pp.96-97; also confirming all this information are private interviews with Luís dos Passos (13 May 1998) and Commander Bagé (26 May 1998).
307 From private interviews with Luís dos Passos (13 May 1998) and Commander Bagé (26th May 1998).
meeting where once again he re-affirmed the main guidelines of his double strategy:

Internally, at the same time he publicly announced the expulsion of Nito Alves and José Van Dunem for fractionism and although the food shortages accusation was not proved by then, Neto still implicitly linked them to the scarcity of supplies,

This is a serious time as regards the internal situation. Comrades, you know that very well. The problem of food supplies is serious. There is no cassava, no potatoes, no groundnuts, no palm oil. There is nothing in the market. No fish [...] This situation pleases no one. We pass by the Jumbo supermarket, we see long queues. A lot of people are there to buy things that do not exist. 308

Feeling the need to defend the mesticos under attack, the President stated that he had absolute confidence in the key mestiço leaders of the MPLA, naming personally Lúcio Lara (Party Secretary for Organisation), Iko Carreira (minister of Defence) and Carlos Dilolwa (minister of Planning) 309. It is important to stress once again that the Nitistas' accusations although personalised around these three prominent mesticos encompassed a wider target — whites and mesticos in general (mixing class with race as previously explained); Agostinho Neto himself later recognised this broader racial/class attack beyond personal attacks 310.

Externally, Neto reiterated his 'sovietism',


309 Cited in ACR, 10 (1979), p. B497; see also Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences... op.cit. pp. 426-427.

310 After the coup attempt Neto stated that 'The new factionalists duped the masses and our militants, classifying this or that militant, this or that leader as 'right-wing', 'ultra-left', 'Maoist', 'anti-Soviet', 'national socialist', 'social democrat', thus camouflaging their essentially reactionary, regionalist and racist ideology', in BM, 3 (27th June 1977), p.5. Speaking on the 1 June, the President described the 27 May events as 'a confrontation between radicals and the comrades who follow the movement's line', adding that 'We defend national unity and they do not. They would like to see the working class rule, but rule alone and continuously fighting the other classes. I cannot conceive of this. One of the issues which has come under very frequent attack has been the racial question. Those individuals thought it necessary to remove whites and mesticos from the leadership and this explains some of the personnel attacks on certain comrade leaders'; cit. in ACR, 10 (1979), pp. B497-B498.
We know what the Soviet Union is. When we started the organised armed struggle here, the Soviet Union was at our side. It helped us, and so did all the other Socialist countries. We can never forget that if we achieved our independence, it was because we had the support of countries like the Soviet Union. We cannot be anti-Soviet because, objectively, we are with the Soviet comrades.\(^{311}\)

The long planned strategy of the leadership had succeeded. The core leaders of the *Nitistas* started to receive contradictory messages from the USSR embassy (probably hesitating whether to support the *Nitistas* or not) and in the *muceques* of Luanda there was a lot of rumour and fear about 'a popular uprising being prepared against the movement's leadership'; something that should have alerted Nito to the lack of the surprise factor\(^{312}\). The group became confused, hesitant and finally launched a *coup d'état* on 27th May 1977, resulting in total failure\(^{313}\):

- At an internal level, for a coup counting on massive popular support, it was an almost absolute failure, gathering only a few hundred of scared supporters, brought by Nito's partners from the *muceques* to the occupied National Radio from where they were supposed to march into the Presidential palace, something that did not happen. The FAPLA 9th brigade, infiltrated by *Nitistas*, did revolt and even assaulted the prison of São Paulo where some prisoners were released. But as soon as a tanks unit entered Luanda (coming from Cacuaco, north of Luanda, led by Delfim Castro from DISA and Moracém, a black Cuban probably in charge of that unit\(^{314}\)) the

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\(^{312}\) According to the only two survivor leaders of the attempted coup, a week before the attempted coup the USSR's embassy assumed an ambiguous position, but Nito was still certain of their support, reassuring everybody that as soon as the rebellion was under way they would support it. Days before the coup Luis dos Passos had contacts with people from the USSR embassy and got the impression that they were not that supportive; equally, within the neighbourhoods several anonymous people were talking about the date of the uprising and Luis dos Passos warned his partners about these problems but no one seemed to care; from private interviews with Luis dos Passos (13 May 1998) and Commander Bagé (26th May 1998); also on the atmosphere surrounding the attempted coup see what Tali, who was there, has to say in *Mabeko Tali*, Jean-Michel, *Dissidences* ... op.cit. p.427.

\(^{313}\) See *BM*, especial number (12th July 1977), pp.20-31; also Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, *Dissidences* ...op.cit. pp.393-397.

\(^{314}\) Moracém had fought as a guerrilla in Cabinda during the anti-colonial struggle and also alongside Che Guevara. His precise functions at that tanks unit in Cacuaco is not disclosed by Iko Carreira, who says that the unit belonged to DISA, but from the report it also seems that he was somekind of an operative responsible for the unit. Delfim Castro went there as soon as the attempted coup started and
9th brigade composed of armoured cars had no military chance of successful opposition and Luís dos Passos immediately ordered the surrender of his men315;

- At an external level, considering the Cuban participation (through Moracém) and the contradictory messages sent to Nito and his partners by the USSR embassy, it seems that the MPLA's leadership achieved, if not the neutrality, at least the passive impartiality of the USSR, not obstructing Cuban help to Neto's leadership. Despite the fact that the extent of the USSR involvement in the 27 May events and the contacts that might have occurred between this country and Cuba were never disclosed (allowing a great amount of speculation316) it seems most unlikely that Moscow and Havana could have backed opposing sides; therefore in the end the passive neutrality of the USSR must have been decisive to Cuban help317. Although much beyond the scope of this work, a possible explanation might also consider the fact that the change to a Marxist regime in Angola formally took place in 1977 (after the decision of the CC in October 1976), the same

Moracém came with him, both leading the unit towards Luanda to end up with the uprising; see Carreira, Iko, O Pensamento ... op. cit. pp.153-154.

315 From private interview with Luís dos Passos (13th May 1998).

316 Officially, Moscow and the MPLA strongly repudiated the allegation that the USSR had in any way supported the attempted coup, however, according to Mabéko-Tali, 'pour les dirigeants du MPLA cette implication [USSR] ne semble faire l'ombre d'aucun doute, au regard des difficiles rapports qu'entretenait Agostinho Neto avec son puissant allié' in Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op.cit. p.393. Even the Political Bureau on the eve of the coup confirmed contacts between the 'factionalists' and the USSR embassy, stating on the 26th May that 'the new factionalists have shielded themselves by means of a simulated devotion to this or that friendly country, not hesitating even to visit certain embassies where they engaged in slanders against the MPLA and certain of its leaders and militants, in BM, 3 (27th June 1977), p.5. As reported by the Financial Times, 'According to semi-official account, Sita Valles sent a plea for help to the Soviet embassy in Luanda after the coup attempt failed. The message was intercepted but demonstrated that, whatever the position of the Soviets, the coup leaders believed they had the Kremlin's blessing'; in Financial Times (26 January 1978); Also referring the same Nitista hope towards the 'soviet rescue' is Birmingham, David, Frontline Nationalism...op. cit. p.81. Finally, according to Iko Carreira, 'in the subsequent interrogation of the arrested putschistes, competent authorities made a balanced account of the situation and the range of external complicity. The most serious one was the Soviet participation. Two secretaries of the embassy's military representative had directly participated in the attempted coup. One of them, Pavel Stariakov (the other one was Yuri Fedin) had rented a house in Sambila [Sambizanga], using his own name, so certain was he of the victory; from there he could follow the course of the whole process and advise the putschistes. When the internal security went to look for them, they were gone. Contacts were made with the embassy and information was given that they had left for Moscow that same morning'; in Carreira, Iko, O Pensamento ... op. cit. p.155.

317 Also supporting this idea is ACR, 10 (1979), p.B509.
year that this happened in Mozambique, following what must been strong external pressures from the USSR and the Eastern block to push these regimes to clearly and officially define their political model. In these terms, the ambiguous positions of the USSR towards the Nitistas might be seen as a way of pressuring Neto to clarify once and for all his political alignment. As soon as this was assured (October 1976, with the 20 years treaty signed in Moscow and the CC meeting adopting Marxism-Leninism) the Nitistas were no longer that useful. Support was halted and Cuba was allowed to help Neto. However, such speculation would have to be tested through further research.

As will be seen in the following chapters, the importance of analysing the phenomenon here called Nitismo (its background, strategy and the reaction it provoked in the MPLA's leadership) has to do with the strong and direct influence it exerted from then on, on the framework of political, economic and ethical relationships between rulers and ruled. For instance, it had an impact on the fearful and resigned political behaviour assumed by the population in general and by the following generations in particular.
6 - The Construction of a New Political Framework

As previously explained, within the main discussion of this work, this chapter aims to analyse the type of political relationships that came to be established between rulers and ruled during Neto’s presidency. The general purpose is to assess how successful they were in terms of integrating rulers and ruled, bottom and upper social layers or on the contrary breaking those links, insulating the political system from the effective participation of the population. For reasons already explained, this chapter will be structured around three main analytical indicators, namely the party (6.1), the exercise of the executive, legislative and administrative power (6.2) the judicial power (6.3).

6.1 The Party: Purge, Authoritarianism, Rectification and Discrimination

6.1.1 The Social and Political Purge and the New Policy of Cadres

Speaking to the nation right after regaining control of the National Radio Station (occupied by the Nitistas), President Neto still assumed a conciliatory discourse and even admitted the possibility of re-integrating Nito Alves and José Van Dunem within the MPLA’s leadership after a long process of rehabilitation. However, as soon as it became known that the rebels had killed top MPLA governmental and military officials, the conciliatory discourse was replaced by a radical campaign for the cleansing of society and of the political apparatus. There followed a savage witch-hunt.

And now the problem for our people is to find the minds behind this counter-revolution, the minds behind this attempted coup. They

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318 In Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences... op.cit. p.394: also in Carreira, Iko, O Pensamento... op. cit. p.154
319 The rebels killed top MPLA government and military officials: Commander Nzaji (Eugénio Veríssimo da Costa), a member of the CC, the Council of Revolution and FAPLA’s chief of security; Major Saidy Vieira Dias Mingas, the Minister of Finance, member of the CC and the Council of Revolution; Commander Perigoso (Paulo da Silva Mungungo), member of the CC, the Council of Revolution and FAPLA’s general staff; Commander Bula Matadi (José Manuel Paiva), member of the Council of Revolution and deputy chief of staff of FAPLA; Helder Ferreira Neto, member of DISA (Angola’s Directorate of Information and Security); and António Garcia Neto, director of the international co-operation section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In BM, especial number (12th July 1977), pp.15-16, pp. 22-26; See also West Africa (6 June 1977).
are buried away in basements, hiding. But with the help of everyone, we can find out where they are and bring them to justice [...] we are going to hunt them out in every neighbourhood, every town, every *senzala*, and every *kimbo*. We shall search for the reactionaries. As soon as we find them, they shall be brought to justice [Neto was talking of revolutionary justice and not exactly of formal judicial system, as we will see].

Implicitly pointing out the targets, the leadership described the social basis of *Nitistas*, clearly singling out the generation that followed the nationalists and grew up during the last stages of colonialism in Angola.

Comrades! The social support for Nito’s followers came from the following:

Certain sectors of the petite bourgeoisie, whose origins go back to the period after the beginning of the armed struggle for national liberation (1961); seeing their development process interrupted by the proclamation of independence, they converted to radical politics. These sectors of the petite bourgeoisie, meant by colonialism to be the elite of the neocolonisation that they intended to impose on us, were mobilised mainly on racist arguments [against the *mestiços* and whites in leadership]. They played a major role in the quashed *coup d'état*.

The unemployed and the marginalised, usually designated as *lumpens*, the unstable and discontented. They were mobilised through the populist promises of easy solutions to their problems.

A sector of the youth, young people from the cities, attracted, through their inexperience and thirst for personal affirmation, by the grandiose cries of the dissidents and by the simplistic theories they thought would help them to understand Angolan society and the revolution.

A number of workers, duped by their pseudo-revolutionary phraseology into believing that the current troubles were due to the government’s not being able to solve such problems.

Those who took part were mainly elements from Luanda, intellectuals from the bourgeoisie or the petite bourgeoisie. Some were our own countrymen, others were foreigners [...] Elements from the youth, elements from OMA, some People’s Neighbourhood Commissions, some members of government, some members of mass organisations, some members of managing

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320 In ‘Comunicações de Agostinho Neto ao país de 27 a 30 de Maio’, cit. in BM, 3 (27 June 1977), p.20.
commissions [at public enterprises]. They made the most of all the discontent. \(^{322}\)

The campaign resulted in innumerable deaths throughout the country, somewhere between 5,000 and 30,000, depending respectively on optimist or pessimist sources of information \(^ {323}\), with particular and obvious incidence on young activists, intellectuals and cadres, who from then on stopped being a threat or a nuisance to the old nationalist generation. As stressed by Mabéko-Tali who lived that experience in Luanda,

Des rafles sont alors organisées dans les quartiers les plus affectés par les réseaux nitistes [...] C’est même l’occasion de règlements de compte personnels, à travers des délations fantastistes, au point que le pouvoir semblera lui-même perdre pied dans le processus de liquidation physique qui va saigner le pays de cadres politiques et militaires, mais aussi administratifs, et de jeunes à peine éveillés à l’action politique. Cette dérive de la répression s’illustre particulièrement dans les provinces, sous l’action de Commissaires provinciaux qui avaient des comptes personnels à régler avec des cadres jeunes qui avaient eu le privilège d’une meilleure éducation et un niveau scolaire plus élevé à l’époque coloniale. Tel sera le cas de la province de Mexico, mais aussi la Huila. Dans cette dernière province par exemple, le principal dirigeant politique déclarera quelque temps plus tard, alors que nous nous y trouvions nous-mêmes, que tous ceux qui avaient la Quinta Classe devaient être considérés comme ‘des ennemis de classe’ \(^ {324}\).

Neto’s power was strengthened by this bloody purge and the arrest of Nito Alves, was filmed, photographed and published throughout the country, so that there could be no doubt that ‘the Chief killed the snake and brandished the

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\(^{322}\) Speech made by Neto on 11 June 1977; cit. in BM, 3 (27 June 1977), pp.28–29.

\(^{323}\) Although there is no official pronouncement over the subject, a discussion on the number of deaths resulting from the leadership reaction to the attempted coup was open among the press with the ‘20th anniversary’ of the event (May 1997). The pessimist opinion on the number of deaths (twenty to thirty thousand) is usually defended by the polemic newspaper Folha 8 and its director, the Journalist William Tonnet and also by Leopoldo Baio, Director of the newspaper Actual Fax; the optimist opinion (five thousand) is naturally sustained by the ones more sympathetic to the MPLA’s leadership such as the Director of the newspaper Angolense, Graça Campos or the Director of the newspaper Jornal de Angola, Luis Fernando; the moderate opinion (10 to 15 thousand) is defended by those newspapers and directors aiming to represent a ‘balanced opinion’ such as Comércio e Actualidade, directed by Víctor Aleixo and Agora, directed by Aguiar dos Santos. The subject will obviously remain open to speculation because it is extremely difficult to produce a sound calculation. From private interviews with Víctor Aleixo (26th March 1998); Luis Fernando (26th March 1998); William Tonnet (30th March 1998); Aguiar dos Santos (31st March 1998); Graça Campos (3rd April 1998); Leopoldo Baio (27th May 1998).

\(^{324}\) In Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ...op.cit. p.395; also in the same sense are private interviews with Luís dos Passos (13 May 1998); Víctor Aleixo (26th March 1998); William Tonnet (30th March 1998).
stick’ as ‘traditionally’ demanded\textsuperscript{325}. The terror inspired by the purge had the effect desired by its main executors, including Onambwe, Ludy Kissassunda, Lúcio Lara and Iko Carreira; who have reportedly stated that ‘no one will dare to rise against the president for the next twenty years’\textsuperscript{326}. Effectively, the purge and its traumatic memory\textsuperscript{327} became a powerful inhibitor of organised popular protest against the MPLA’s leadership. Since then, at the first signs of any potential opposition demonstration (which have been banned since 27 May 1977), all State security has to do is to circulate special troops around the streets in military vehicles, which is more than enough to dissuade the mentors of such projects\textsuperscript{328}.

As a general rule, the young people belonging to that generation and who escaped the purge, learnt their lesson and never again dared to make the slightest protest. They became politically silent but very competent professionals within State administration. In fact, it is to these elements and to the heirs of the old Creole aristocracy (who entered civil service as referred), that the maintaining of minimum effectiveness in public administration is owed, for a few years after independence\textsuperscript{329}.

\textsuperscript{325} This is a traditional saying (commonly heard in Malange) according to which \textit{a chief who is really a chief must kill the snake and brandish the stick. Then all heads will bow}. From private interviews with several traditional chiefs in the rural areas of the province of Malange within a research on participatory development that took place in September 1995.

\textsuperscript{326} From private interviews with Luis dos Passos (13th May 1998); William Tonnet, director of the newspaper \textit{follha 8} (30 March 1998).

\textsuperscript{327} The trauma of 27 May and its decimated generation is still felt today, as can be noticed in private publications in 1997, on the twentieth anniversary of 27 May: ‘how much suffering! How many people had to die to pay for the death of six ‘leaders’! Rivers of blood, highways of flesh and lakes of bones. My God! How could there be so much savagery! But we shall be reborn as a nation: the ‘African intelligentsia’, the favourite target of the mentors of the 27\textsuperscript{th}, is being reborn again in a new and brilliant generation.’ In \textit{Jornal Folha 8} (30 May 1997), p.10.

\textsuperscript{328} From private interviews with Victor Aleixo, Director of the newspaper \textit{Comércio e Actualidade} (26th March 1998); Leopoldo Baio, Director of the newspaper \textit{Actual Fax} (27th May 1998).

\textsuperscript{329} Although going a bit beyond the time scope of this work, but still useful to its global understanding, it is worth noting that these resigned cadres (generation of the youth committees that escaped the purge) became politically silent until very recently (1991-1992). From then on, they did voice some degree of criticism against the social situation (though very little regarding sensitive political matters) under the cover of the new multiparty freedom and the new jobs they found in the NGOs and other international organisations. In general, however, they remained loyal to MPLA and rarely embarked on new political party projects; some exceptions included Filomeno Vieira Lopes from the Amilcar Cabral Committees, who joined his uncle João Vieira Lopes from the old coastal Creole aristocracy, in order to form a new political party, the FpD (‘Front for Democracy’), but without any significant political expression. On the professional course of these cadres see Vidal, Nuno, \textit{Estratégias de
Having in mind the problems caused by the young generation (of the youth committees) educated during the last period of colonialism (benefiting from the colonial expansion of the education system) a new control over education was established by the party not only at the specific level of the party schools, but more generally at the highest levels—high schools, universities and studies abroad. Through a presidential despatch dated February 1979, Neto determined that the Council for Student Grants towards Professional Training and Education Abroad and the Scholarship Fund (Internal and Abroad) should now be answerable to the Central Committee’s Department of Party Cadres, itself directly answerable to the Party President. In this way Neto created an obvious mechanism of economic and educational dependency of the scholarship students on the party’s top organs—a mechanism that was used (although informally) to reward or punish the students political behaviour.

Moreover, beyond scholarships, all the opportunities for the professional and social advancement of all cadres came under the party’s strict control (through the nominations system) as clearly outlined in the CC report to the first extraordinary congress,

[The Party]

Leads the State and Mass Organisations by selecting, educating and appointing the main cadres of the different State and Mass Organisations; [...] Accomplishes its leading role by transforming its main executives into main State and mass organisation executives.

The new policy had its results; as a general rule, the generation that followed the one of the youth committees understood and respected the new rules.

Desenvolvimento Participativo (Lisbon: ISCTE—Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa, 1997), a Master’s dissertation.

330 On these schools see Relatório do Comité Central ao Iº Congresso do MPLA (Luanda: DEPI, 1977), pp.20-22.

331 Legal Despatch, DR, I, 29 (3 February 1979).

332 From private interviews with António Cazevo (10 March 1998); Victor Aleixo (26 March 1998); William Tonnet (30 March 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998); JM Mabeko-Tali (27 April 1998); Cornélio Caley (2 May 1998); São Vicente (5 May 1998); Luís dos Passos (13 May 1998); Eleutério Freire (30th May 1998); Ruy Duarte de Carvalho (15th July 1998); also from my own personal knowledge and friendship with several scholarship funded students in Lisbon and London.
concerning the behaviour that was expected from them in order to access professional education and social betterment. They became politically well-behaved young members of the party, loyal to any given protector expecting benefits and retributions in exchange for loyalty and political correctness, with no 'fancy' ideologies. As we will later see, those who fitted within these parameters went on to higher education and did well; in the early 1980s, they were given top jobs in State administration (both in government and State enterprises) and those within FAPLA were promoted to higher ranks. A lot of them were recruited by the new president Eduardo dos Santos to become part of the powerful presidential administrative and political shadow government and military structure surrounding the presidency, provoking the resentment of some of the party's old nationalists who pejoratively called them *miúdos do Futungo* ('Futungo kids', after the name where the presidency is settled and where these 'kids' work), a term that is commonly used by people within the Angolan political and media milieu to designate the new presidential entourage.

6.1.2 The authoritarianism of the new workers' vanguard party

At the same time as the purge, Neto made explicit the directives for the construction of a new party in search of unity, cohesion and internal security: the MPLA would now be in total control. The permanent commission of the Central Committee (the politburo or Political Bureau) would be in charge of

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334 From private interviews with Victor Aleixo (26th March 1998); Filipe Amado (27th March 1998); William Tonnet (30 March 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23rd April 1998); JM Mabeko-Tali (27th April 1998); Comelio Caley (2nd May 1998); Luis dos Passos (13 May 1998); Eleutério Freire (30th May 1998); Ruy Duarte de Carvalho (15th July 1998).

335 The term *miúdos do Futungo* was usually employed (with the explained meaning) by several of my interviewees such as: Diógenes Boavida (13th March 1998); Gerônimo Belo (17th March 1998); Victor Aleixo (26th March 1998); Luís Fernando (26th March 1998); William Tonnet (30th March 1998); Aguilar dos Santos (31st March 1998); Graça Campos (3rd April 1998); João Vieira Lopes (13th April 1998); João de Melo (17th April 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (20th April 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23rd April 1998); JM Mabeko-Tali (27th April 1998); Vicente Pinto de Andrade (11th May
everything within the MPLA; no opposition or centre of power parallel to the MPLA would be tolerated,

The course must always be set by the MPLA. And we will stick firmly to this line. That there will be no parallel organisations within the country. Here in Angola, it is the MPLA who is in charge. In the government, the members of the government must submit to the course set by the politburo, which is the permanent organisation of the Central Committee. There are to be no governmental decisions that are not controlled by the politburo. All ministers, all those who run the country must know that they can only do what is permitted by the politburo, and when the politburo makes a decision, that decision must be fulfilled with the utmost urgency. [My bold]\(^{336}\)

In accordance with the decisions made at the third plenary of the Central Committee in October 1976, and putting into practice Neto’s directives, in the wake of the attempted coup, the movement held its first congress in December 1977.

Approval was then given to the document submitted by the CC, which described the MPLA as an instrument to lead the revolutionary classes towards Popular Democracy and Socialism, a Workers’ vanguard Party organised and structured according to Marxist-Leninist principles, adding PT to its logo (Partido do Trabalho/Labour Party).\(^{337}\) The new principles were later integrated within the constitution, revised and approved in February 1978, whose article 2 clearly stated for the first time that,

MPLA-PT constitutes the organised vanguard of the working class and, as a Marxist-Leninist party, it will provide the political, economic and social leadership of the State in its efforts towards the construction of a Socialist Society.\(^{338}\)

In order to demonstrate and reinforce the party’s integration of the Armed Forces, one third of Congress delegates and half the fifty-four elected members of the new Central Committee were also members of FAPLA or belonged to

1998); Leopoldo Baio (27th May 1998); Pepetela (7th July 1998); Mendes de Carvalho (17th July 1998), among several others.


\(^{337}\) Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso ... op. cit. ...1977, p.17.

\(^{338}\) Article 2 of the Constitutional Law, DR, I, 31 (7 February 1978).
other security organisations. After independence this was the first step of an increasing interpenetration between party, State and military structures, which became accentuated with the rectification campaign that was to follow. As reported by international press correspondents at that time,

The reality of the new MPLA-Labour Party is that the absence of working class members is compensated for by the presence of a large contingent of military members. They form half of the party central committee.

Dans telles conditions le premier congrès ressemble plus à une réunion d'état major qu'à une session parlementaire. Sa preparation qui semble avoir restreinte à un cercle très étroit de militants, indique sans l'ombre d'un doute que le MPLA, même s'il reste une 'organisation de masse' cédera la direction du pays à un parti d'avant garde de la classe ouvrière.

Probably remembering the ideological 'liberalism' of the youth committees, affirmation was made of the party's ideological unity and cohesion of action at all levels of its structure, based on the rigid application of Marxist-Leninist principles; stressing that all manifestations of fractionism would be strongly fought. Also bearing in mind the Nitista flexible interpretation of democratic centralism and the ensuing results in terms of autonomous (parallel) structures of Poder Popular, the Congress stressed that Principles of Democratic Centralism were to be applied more drastically to the running of the whole organisation and to party discipline; implying not only the previous 'submission of the minority to the majority and fulfilment by the lower echelons of the guidelines and decisions of the superior echelons', but also adding that democratic centralism 'presupposes the existence of a centralised leadership

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339 See Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola ... op. cit. pp.163-167; also Le Monde (22 December, 1977); also Marches Tropicaux et Mediterraneens (23 December 1977); also in ACR vol.10 (1979),p.B503.

340 In West Africa (2 January 1978).

341 Article 'Le Premier Congrès du MPLA s'est ouvert à Luanda' of René Lefort in Le Monde (8 December 1977).

342 Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso ... op. cit. ...1977, pp.19-20.

343 Ibid. p.20; these principles had previously been institutionalised by the mentioned Law 1/76 of Poder Popular, in section I, art. 37 and ff., DR, I, 29 (5 February 1976).
selection of membership candidates). Two ways of selecting new Party members were established: on the one hand, 'according to previous register', which took into account those members registered before the first congress; on the other hand, 'according to the Assembly of Workers', whereby the qualities of the worker in his workplace were taken into account, then followed by an interview.

Thirdly, in accordance with the Central Committee directives, the movement for rectification had to break up the previous structures of *Poder Popular* such as Action Groups and Action Committees (the structural form assumed by the youth committees) and Provincial Directive Commissions; replacing them with cells, party committees, assemblies and hierarchical conferences. (See figure 6.1.3.1).

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348 Ibid. pp.12-13. From the beginning of the movement for rectification until the first Extraordinary Congress, in December 1980, selections were made, resulting in the recruitment of 15,294 militants (of whom 974 were women), 15,804 'aspirants' (aspiring or expecting to become members, of whom 1,694 were women), 4,000 members for the JMPLA and over 6,200 sympathisers; 2,765 party cells were established, 65 local work committees and 4 sector committees, Ibid. pp.17–18.

Figure 6.1.3.1: Basic MPLA organizational structure in the 1970’s and 1980’s

Bearing in mind the infiltration strategy of the Nitistas, the main targets for the movement of rectification were: a) the mass organisations; b) the forces for defence and security (especially the younger officers, who expressed some sympathy for the Nitistas).

a) At the level of mass organisations, the leadership structures of UNTA, JMPLA and OMA were disbanded straight after the attempted coup; national and provincial restructuring committees (specifically directed to each of these organisations) were then set up. The restructuring process of UNTA, co-ordinated by Pascoal Luvualo and managed by Beto Van Dunem, was concluded in September 1978, when the first conference of the new era took place and UNTA was clearly and definitely changed into co-operative-style trade union federation. OMA was restructured under the supervision of the party’s number two, Lúcio Lara, who also brought his undertaking to a conclusion in September 1978, presenting it at the national conference in Malange. Finally, in October 1978, the national conference of a restructured JMPLA was presented in Luanda.350

b) With regards to the forces of defence and security, after the physical elimination of ‘harmful elements according to revolutionary justice’ during the generalised purge351, the youth were the main concern of rectification due to the previous support that was given to Nitismo by young officials. Accordingly, the process of rectification in its third phase demanded a stronger presence of the party inside the defence and security apparatus in application of the ‘Regulation for Base Organisations and the Youth’.352 The Minister of Defence, Iko Carreira, took personally the leading role in this rectification process353.

350 All these restructuring processes were reported in Radio Havana (19 October 1978), cit. in ACR vol.11 (1980), pp.B486-B487. After being rectified, the national leadership representatives of JMPLA and OMA became part of the Council of Revolution, following previous nomination by the politburo; in art. 36 of the Constitutional Law, DR, I, 31 (7 February 1978).
351 From private interviews with General António Farrusco (2nd May 1998); Adérito Correia (13th April 1998); Diógenes Boavida (13th March 1998).
352 The movement of rectification was divided into four main phases, according to the nature of the problems to be dealt with. The third phase took place between the 5th and 6th national seminars on rectification — it was dedicated to: the implementation of rectification in rural areas; the formation into cells of rectified elements; age control of Party members; establishment of the first committee for neighbourhood sectors; implantation of the Party inside the organisms of defence and security, with the
In order to partially fill the void left by the dissolution of Nito Alves' Ministry of Internal Administration, a new secretariat of State for Internal Order was established in September 1978; it was a militarised organisation directly responsible to the President, aimed at keeping public order, internal security and control over the population. Subsequently (October 1978) the designations of the general army staff, the national political commissariat, and various other sections of the army staff were changed, ending the restructuring process within these organisations.

As with the mass organisations, the process of rectification within the defence and security forces was completed by the end of 1978 and it can be said to have had very similar results to those of the new policy of cadres: the new rectified officers who fitted the established parameters (loyalty, political correctness and no ‘fancy’ ideologies) rose within the military and administrative/governmental structure. The presence of the young officers and cadres at the 1980 congress was already significant and several of them were to integrate the emerging young presidential entourage in early eighties — as ‘Futungo Kids’.

Here it must be stressed how complete the integration was between party, State and military structures in Angola, as a result of an old MPLA strategy during the anti-colonial struggle based on the need for firm political direction of the guerrilla units and the military structure. Such strategy was implemented in two complementary ways: political indoctrination and institutional penetration. Political education became an integral part of FAPLA's military training and political commissioners were attached to guerrilla units to ensure compliance with the movement's political directives. The integration and

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recommended application of ‘Regulation for Base Organisations and Youth’ within the defence and security forces; launching of the newspaper A Célula ('The Cell') to stimulate communication between base organisations and to standardise their work. In Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit...1980, pp.13-15.

353 See BM, 37 (September 1978), pp.6-13
355 Executive decree 22/78, DR, I, 250 (21 October 1978).
penetration between the political and military structures was achieved through the simultaneous occupation of posts in both structures\textsuperscript{357}. It was very common for political leaders (dirigentes) to hold military posts (even for those spending most of the time in foreign countries\textsuperscript{358}).

After independence, FAPLA was transformed into a conventional army, but the interpenetration with the MPLA was maintained throughout both organisations' hierarchies. Many of the independence leaders continued to hold concurrent positions in the party, government and military structures. At the regional level, the overlapping of military and political positions was also common practice and many of the provincial commissioners were both MPLA Central Committee members and FAPLA's Lieutenant-Colonels. Political commissioners within each unit of FAPLA reported not up the military chain of command but to the political leadership of the region or province\textsuperscript{359}. However, during the transition period up to the attempted coup (1974-1977), the leadership partially lost the control of political indoctrination and preparation of FAPLA units due to the Nitista strategy (as explained), but this was a very short period and that is probably one of the reasons why the Nitista strategy did not bear much results at the military level (besides the disaffected veterans of the 1st military region only young officers of the 9th brigade of armoured cars effectively came out onto the streets).

From then on the leadership regained control over the political preparation of FAPLA and intensified politicisation of the military by institutional means (with special attention being paid to younger officers).

Later, as we will see, the continuous war against UNITA and South Africa, brought what can be called a militarisation of society with more and more people involved in military or para-military structures: military conscription became compulsory for both men and women over the age of eighteen and after

\textsuperscript{358} From private interview with Pepetela (7 July 1998)
\textsuperscript{359} See Collelo, Thomas, ed., \textit{Angola, ... op. cit.} p.212-213.
military service, all personnel were obliged to enrol in the ODP or other para-military organisations. Ensuing re-structuring of State administration (mainly during the presidency of Eduardo dos Santos) took the interpenetration of the top party, state and military structures to an extreme, making it ever more difficult to distinguish between them, starting with the president himself, who effectively exerted the functions of Head of State, Head of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. This deep and progressively increasing interpenetration was probably the soundest obstacle impeding the military from becoming an autonomous political, economic or even social force as happened in other African countries such as Nigeria.

Therefore, it is misleading to distinguish between the military, the State and party’s top organs as autonomous structures, since they were all equally subjected to other more relevant forms of socio-political divisions (such as those that have been stressed throughout this work) and to the prevailing patrimonial working logic.

6.1.4 The Balance of the purge: discrimination and ‘elitism’

The balance of the first three years of rectification was presented at the first Extraordinary Congress, in December 1980; it was above all marked by a significant drop in the number of effective members of the new MPLA–PT, down to 31,098 members from 110,000 members at the time of the first congress, in December 1977. In an estimated population of 7-8 million in

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360 Recruitment and conscription were carried out by the General Staff’s Directorate for Organisation and Mobilisation through provincial and local authorities. A two-year conscription period was initiated in 1978 and the 1980 party congress decided for universal and compulsory military training. Officials in charge of workplaces and schools were instructed to deny admission to anyone not properly registered for military service and women effectively played a role in national defence; in Collelo, Thomas, ed., Angola, … op. cit. pp 222-223. In practice the time limits for military service were usually extended and people could stay in the army for ten or more years; from private interviews with General Farrusco (2 May 1998) and also from personal knowledge of people in this situation. Also supporting the idea of an increasing militarisation of society is a 1978 report from a British pilot stating that ‘Everyone seems to be in the army, and I am told you are either in the army or on the reserve from 18 to 35’; in The Sunday Telegraph (25 June 1978).

361 See Bayart, Jean-François, The State in Africa … op. cit.

1980\(^{363}\), the new party members represented circa 0.4\% of that population, which was quite small considering that it was a single party system.

By then, selection criteria of members (ordinary members\(^{364}\)) were said to have strictly followed the orientations established at the first Congress of 1977 in order to achieve the purpose of the new Party — a vanguard organisation to lead the revolutionary classes towards scientific socialism\(^{365}\).

In these terms, the CC report to the 1980 congress explained that,

> If the party fights for the construction of scientific socialism, its members must be intransigent fighters of all the obstacles and distortions to socialist guiding principles [...] set the example in terms of work, study and discipline, [...] defend the principle of proletarian internationalism keeping solidarity with all the peoples fighting imperialism, capitalism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism.

[Therefore] the MPLA [will be] formed by the more aware elements of revolutionary social classes and social strata\(^{366}\)

Accordingly, in order to become one of 'the more aware elements of the working class and the working masses dedicated to the proletariat cause'\(^{367}\) (usually taken as those capable of studying and quoting the manuals of political instruction distributed by the party); members of the new party would need a minimum of education and preparation to study and defend socialist principles, especially during the interview set to approve or reject the candidate

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\(^{363}\) There was no national census since 1970, when a population of 5.62 million was recorded (excluding an estimated 500,000 refugees). Estimatives to 1980 indicate 7 to 8 million; from private interviews with Manuela Gonzales (6 March 1998) and Carlos Pinto (16 February 1998).

\(^{364}\) We are talking of ordinary members, because top members of the party and State hierarchy—usually called dirigentes or responsáveis—as long as they had not any participation on the attempted coup, had almost automatically assured their membership and political positions. The target of rectification was obviously not the top leadership of the party and the State such as the members of the CC, the politburo, the General Staff and the government’s ministers (restricted and relatively small organs within which it was easy to find and eliminate the Nitistas and pro-Nitistas).

\(^{365}\) See Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit...1980, pp.12-13; also in the same sense are previous recommendations of Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso ... op. cit. ...1977, pp.18-19.

\(^{366}\) Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso ... op. cit. ...1977, pp.18-19; 22. Introducing these paragraphs, a previous sentence stressed that 'the MPLA as an organised political force will be formed by the best elements of the workers class and other revolutionary social groups'; ibid. p.18.

\(^{367}\) Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit...1980, p.39.
member\textsuperscript{368}. Such educational criteria represented a first selection mechanism for party base membership, discriminating not only against the 'less aware workers' but especially against the peasants, given their relatively limited access to information, education and instruction (most of them were illiterate)\textsuperscript{369}.

Looking at the social composition of the new party membership, it was clear that the peasantry had effectively been the main victim of rectification merely representing 1.9\% of that membership\textsuperscript{370}. In the words of Lúcio Lara (Party Secretary for Organisation), priority was given to workers in the selection process: they only had to undergo one year's observation, as opposed to the peasants' two years, before becoming members.\textsuperscript{371} The CC report clearly assumed such priority of the working class over peasantry towards membership in the following terms,

The working class, though small in numbers, is the most suitable for the assimilation of Marxist–Leninism [...] its living and working conditions are the guarantee of greater capacity for organisation and discipline in order to follow the scientific and technical progress as well as a higher level of collectivism [...] thus, it is the guiding force of our revolution. The working peasantry, because of their living and working conditions, is not able to lead the struggle. This is because the peasant, as our late Comrade President Agostinho Neto said, is a 'capitalist in the making', because he owns a piece of land and has means of production, and aspires to increase them all the time.\textsuperscript{372}

As stressed by Somerville, such criteria simply ignored the fact that 60\% of the whole working force worked in agriculture, most of them as peasant farmers

\textsuperscript{368} From private interviews with Mário Sêteco (10th March 1998); Carlos Pinto (16th February 1998); Benjamim Castello (20th February 1998); all these interviewees had effective contact with this kind of rectification sessions in several provinces.

\textsuperscript{369} The above mentioned expansion of education — especially primary education — during the last stage of colonialism did not have much impact out of the urban centres. See Marques da Silva, Elisete \textit{O papel} ... op. cit. pp.18-19. By the first congress in 1977, the illiteracy rate was reported to be at 80\% of the whole population; see Somerville, Keith, \textit{Angola} ... op. cit. p.91; see also Bhagavan, M R, \textit{Angola's} ... op. cit. p.9.

\textsuperscript{370} In a sample of 49\% of the 31.098 party members, there were 49.1\% workers (25.9\% industrial and 23.2\% agricultural—i.e working in State cooperatives); only 1.9\% were peasants; 1.6\% were intellectuals and technicians; 16.8\% employees; 22.5\% office workers and 3.4\% others. In \textit{Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso Extraordinário}... op. cit...1980, pp.17–18.

\textsuperscript{371} Cit. in Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, \textit{Angola} ... op. cit. pp.167–168.

\textsuperscript{372} In \textit{Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso Extraordinário}... op. cit...1980, p.35.
and that 74% of the population still lived in rural areas.\textsuperscript{373} In other words, such selection criteria for party membership mainly discriminated against the lowest (although larger) social strata, already at the margins of society (the poorest, the less educated, the less close to the urban centres); they became distanced or discarded from the party\textsuperscript{374}.

The genesis of this process can be traced to the October 1976 plenary; its motives (beyond Marxist-Leninist directives), seem to be related to Neto's distributive promises to the urban working class within his attempt to break the Nitistas ties with the labour strikers' movements (\textit{Cf supra}). Later, at the 21 May 1977 Central Committee plenary (where Nito and José Van Dunem were expelled from the CC), Nito Alves explicitly denounced the effects of such process, calling it party 'elitism' promoted by the top leadership and later on, during the 1980 congress, the delegates to that congress approved a resolution denouncing the existence of such 'elitism' as one of the 'reactionary practices of the petite bourgeoisie'\textsuperscript{375}.

Despite such denunciations\textsuperscript{376}, party discrimination and 'elitism' continued to increase during Eduardo dos Santos presidency (as we will see later), but for now it is important to stress that these phenomena started with Neto's administration.

6.2 The Administrative Centralisation and Concentration of Power

The new political framework was characterised by a process of administrative centralisation and concentration of power in the hands of the President of the

\textsuperscript{373} See Somerville, Keith, \textit{Angola ...} op. cit. pp.96–97.

\textsuperscript{374} As reported by several of my interviewees, an 'elitist' official slogan emerged by then, according to which \textit{Não é do MPLA quem quer, mas quem pode} (The MPLA is not for those who want to be in it, but for those who can be in it); from private interviews with Gerônimo Belo (17th March 1998); João de Melo (17th April 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (20th April 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23rd April 1998); Vicente Pinto de Andrade (11th May 1998); Pepetela (7th July 1998); Gabriela Antunes (18th June 1998); several private conversations (not interviews) with Conceição Neto during the research period. Also Messiant stresses the extreme marginalisation of peasants within the new political and social system; in Messiant, Christine, 'À propos des...', op. cit. p.77.

\textsuperscript{375} In \textit{Resoluções e Mensagens do 1º Congresso Extraordinário do MPLA–PT de 17 a 23 de Dezembro} (Luanda: Secretariado do Comité Central, 1980), p.36.
Republic and in the Central Committee (to be more precise, in the politburo, dominated by the President of the Republic). This process unfurled in four main stages:

1) The first stage goes back to the above mentioned third plenary session of the CC in October 1976, and seems to be greatly influenced by the necessity to counter the effects of the Nitista strategy of infiltrating the governmental and administrative structures (as discussed). By then, probably alerted by the danger represented by the autonomy and effective power of the executive members of the government (Nito Alves, David Aires Machado and several other pro-Nitistas), the plenary decided to revise the constitution. It concentrated executive and legislative power in the Presidency of the Republic and also in the MPLA’s Central Committee at the expense of the government and the Council of Revolution (the supposedly main executive and legislative organs as previously defined by the constitution).

At the level of the Presidency, the President of the Republic was considered an integral part of the executive and presided over the Council of Ministers, combining the role of chief executive and head of government (previously, the President of the Republic was not part of the government, which was presided over by the Prime Minister). He became responsible for nominating and removing from office the provincial commissioners, a task which previously befell the Council of Revolution, but was effectively exerted by Nito Alves as Minister of Internal Administration, who effectively used such power to place his trustees in provincial commissariats throughout the country (as explained). By then, probably envisaging a possible confrontation with the

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376 Denunciations produced at the congress were made within the discussed spirit of critica and auto-critica.
377 Law 71/76 in DR, I, 266 (11 November 1976) whereby articles 32, 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 48 and 50 were re-written.
378 See articles 35 to 45 of the Constitutional Law, DR, I, 1 (11 November 1975).
379 See article 1 of Law 71/76 in DR, I, 266 (11 November 1976).
380 Under Law 1/76, the provincial commissioners were hierarchically answerable to Nito Alves as Minister for Internal Administration; although they were officially nominated by the Council of Revolution, many had been selected by Nito himself in his strategy of parallel power as explained above. See Law 1/76, in DR, I, 29 (5 September, 1976).
Nitistas, the President was also empowered to declare a state of siege or of emergency, which used to be the preserve of the Council of Revolution as well.\(^{381}\)

At the level of the Central Committee (already relieved of Nitistas suspended from their positions at that same plenary) all its members were integrated into the Council of Revolution, whereas before, only members of the politburo were allowed in. Integrating the Council of Revolution itself, the CC members (and especially its permanent commission — the Politburo) thereby exerted a great part of the power of that supreme organ, including the guidance of internal and external policy\(^{382}\).

From the measures adopted it can be seen that the Nitistas' strategy had a clear influence over this first stage of presidential concentration of powers. However, the Nitista threat to Neto's leadership must be seen as the then most recent of such previous threats and challenges (such as the Active Revolt, the Eastern Revolt or the OCA). Therefore, the President probably saw the concentration of power and centralisation of administration as a necessary overall and long-term strategy to counter such recurrent challenges beyond Nitismo. That is probably why this was just the first stage of a long process developed long after the Nitista threat had disappeared (developed not only by Neto but also by his successor, as we will see).

2) The second stage in the process of concentration of power involved another CC plenary in August 1977, which within the same line of procedure altered once again the constitution. This time, power was given to the President to nominate and remove from office the Prime Minister and other members of the government; previously, the Prime Minister and other members of the government were nominated or removed from office by the Council of Revolution following indication from the MPLA\(^{383}\).

\(^{381}\) See article 1 of Law 71/76 in DR, I, 266 (11 November 1976).

\(^{382}\) See articles 4 and 5 of Law 71/76 in DR, I, 266 (11 November 1976).

\(^{383}\) Law 13/77, DR, I, 194 (7 August 1977), whereby articles 32 and 38 of the Constitution were rewritten; these concerned the powers of the President of the Republic and the Council of Revolution, respectively.
3) The third stage comprised another revision of the constitution approved by the CC in January 1978 (right after the first congress—December 1977). This revision not only reflected the already high level of presidential concentration of powers (resulting from earlier stages of that process\footnote{The President of the Republic was the President of the Party, who was the Head of the State and of the government, who was also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces; his powers included presiding over the Council of Ministers, administering national security and defence from above, nominating and removing from office provincial commissioners, and choosing from among them those who were to become part of the Council of Revolution (art.6, 31 and 32); local administration was to be guided by democratic centralism in its dealings with central organisations. (article 54); the commissioners nominated in the provinces and in municipalities were considered organs of local power and administration, but were also considered representatives of the central government in their different spheres of action (art. 55); in Constitutional Law, \textit{DR}, I, 31 (7 February 1978).}, but also represented another important Presidential ‘absorption’ of the powers of the Council of Revolution (CR) and the Council of Ministers (CM).

In terms of the CR, the constitutional revision determined the creation of a Permanent Commission for that council, able to decide on its behalf emergency cases and composed only of those of its members present in Luanda at any given time (art.37)\footnote{Constitutional Law, \textit{DR}, I, 31 (7 February 1978).}. In practice, this meant that the President could preside and decide for that supreme legislative organ (CR) whenever he wanted, without having to depend on the presence of all its members in Luanda as previously established.

In terms of the CM (already presided by the President of the Republic as Head of Government), the constitutional revision clearly defined it for the first time as the executive organisation of the government (art.40). Again (as in the CR’s case) a new permanent commission was created to run the CM’s affairs between ordinary sessions (art.44). Such Permanent Commission of the Council of Ministers was also to be presided over by the President of the Republic in order to co-ordinate the various ministries and central organisations, being able to decide on the competence of the CM; it was to be the responsibility of the CM itself to decide on who would belong to the said permanent commission (art. 44). The CM was to have a Secretariat responsible for the resolution of day-to-day problems and for monitoring the implementation of its instructions.
and decisions (art. 45). The Prime Minister was now to be considered no more than a direct collaborator of the President of the Republic (art. 46)\textsuperscript{386}.

In order to facilitate the effective (although not officially assumed) Presidential government, subsequent legislation determined that ministers and secretaries of State would form two commissions within the CM, namely, the Commission for socio-political matters and the Commission for socio-economic matters\textsuperscript{387}. In these terms the government became divided into two main areas in order to facilitate the President's governmental activity.

In practice, all these measures meant that the President of the Republic effectively governed the country, through restricted and more manageable organisations such as the permanent commission of the Council of Revolution (able to decide on behalf of that legislative organ at any time), the permanent commission of the Council of Ministers (able to decide on all executive matters to do with the Council of Ministers) and the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers (able to solve day-to-day problems and monitor the whole executive process); all these restricted organs were directly dominated by the President himself.

The importance of the CM's Secretariat increased over the years, at the same time as executive and legislative power became more and more concentrated in the person of the President of the Republic. In due course, the President, the Secretariat of CM and the person responsible for the Secretariat (the Secretary of the Council of Ministers), working daily in the same space, namely the presidential buildings based in Futungo de Belas (a few miles south

\textsuperscript{386} Constitutional Law, \textit{DR}, I, 31 (7 February 1978).

\textsuperscript{387} This measure arose, not from the constitutional revision, but from art. 3 of 'Regulations of the Council of Ministers', approved by the Council of Ministers itself (no Law or decree number is provided), in \textit{DR}, I, 278 (24 November 1979); according to the same regulations, amended by \textit{DR}, I, 13 (16 January 1980), the commission for socio-political matters was to comprise the ministries for education, justice and health, and the secretariats of State of social affairs, sports and physical education, and old veterans; the commission for socio-economic matters would comprise ministries for planning, finance, internal trade, external trade, work and social security, industry and energy, oil, fisheries, building and housing, transport and communications, provincial coordination and foreign relations, and the secretariat of State for cooperation.
of Luanda, away from the city centre and the ministries), became the true and effective nucleus of government, dominating the executive process: they prepared the subjects and plans to be discussed in the meetings of the Council of Ministers and in the meetings of the Council of Ministers’ permanent commission; they solved the current problems, and monitored the implementation of instructions and decisions made by the CM and by the CM’s Permanent Commission. The executive and legislative autonomy and initiative of the ministers and their respective ministries were thus substantially reduced.

4) The fourth and final stage of centralisation of administration and concentration of power during Neto’s presidency occurred at the CC’s plenary in December 1978. The plenary, once again approved new executive and legislative powers for the President, not only regarding central power, but also regarding local power. The posts of Prime Minister and Vice-Prime Minister were abolished, following Neto’s public argument that this measure would enable him to relate directly with the ministers, with no intermediaries. A new ministry was created for provincial co-ordination and provincial commissioners were integrated into the Council of Ministers, therefore giving more regular account of their actions to the President. The number of specialised departments in the Central Committee was increased ‘in order better to control government activity’, thus ensuring that the specialised departments of the Central Committee fully supported the President’s executive functions.

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388 Neto gradually based the presidency in Futungo, transferring it from the government palace in Luanda, probably as it was more shielded from popular manifestations and attempted coups; from where the Council of Ministers, the permanent commission and the secretariat operated. Neto’s successor strengthened this process by building from scratch various residential infrastructures, such as the presidential palace, and accompanying support services.

389 In ‘Regulations of the Council of Ministers’ (no Law or decree number provided), in DR, I, 278 (24 November).

390 In art. 45 of Constitutional Law, DR, I, 31 (7 February 1978).


393 Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit...1980, p.6.
By then, the process of personalisation, centralisation of administration and concentration of executive and legislative powers in the person and institution of the President of the Republic had already reached a very high level — as demonstrated by Law 1/79 introducing the decisions of the plenary, mixing constitutional matters (such as the abolition of the posts of Prime Minister and Vice-Prime Minister) and ordinary legislation (such as changes in ministerial organisation)\textsuperscript{394}, without revising the constitution (as it should). The constitution was to remain in force without the suppression of the articles relative to the Prime Minister and Vice-Prime Minister, although in practice, the referred Law had already abolished these posts.\textsuperscript{395}

In sum, with these four main stages of increased centralisation of administration and concentration of powers in the Presidency, Agostinho Neto was able to run the government directly, without intermediaries or limits imposed; as a direct and obvious consequence, the governmental ministries and respective ministers became substantially devoid of their powers (be it legislative or executive initiative).

As mentioned, these stages were gradually achieved under the auspices of the Central Committee dominated by the politburo and the President himself (through CC’s plenary sessions where major decisions on that process — such as constitutional revisions — were firstly approved). The CC support for such a process was later assumed, explained, justified and sanctioned by the Central Committee’s report to the first Extraordinary Congress (December 1980) under the argument of the party’s prominent social and political role at all levels:

According to Party statutes, [...] the party ‘(...) is the superior force of all the Angolan People’s Republic life, the force directing the Angolan State and society’. [...] [Thus] The State and the Mass Organisations exert their activities according to Party directives and decisions, as expressed in the resolutions made by the Congress, the Central Committee and its politburo. At the same time, through the secretariat of the Central Committee, through the intermediate and basic organisations and through its members, the


\textsuperscript{395} For a discussion on this matter see Correia, Adério and Bornito de Sousa, \textit{Angola, História Constitucional} (Coimbra: Almedina, 1996), pp.27-28.
party helps the State and the Mass organisations to apply its decisions. The monitoring of the fulfilment of these directives is also an important aspect of the work of the party leadership, which is why art. 3 of its statutes states that 'in all domains of activity, the MPLA–PT will determine the political lines to follow, guiding their application and striving for the fulfilment of party directives' [my bold].

6.3 The Judicial System: Military and Political Control

The restructuring of judicial power was undertaken in parallel, complementary lines with the aforementioned processes (social and party purges; concentration of powers in the presidency) forming the new political framework. The process of judicial restructuring was based on three main pillars:

1) The first was the legitimisation of revolutionary justice. As referred, revolutionary justice, incited and authorised by Neto, had degenerated into a savage and terrifying witch hunt against all the conspirators (effective or simply reported Nitistas) and involved varying degrees of illegality also promoted by Neto himself,

We are definitely not going to waste too much time on trials. We shall pass sentence. We shall not resort to the usual process, which would not be fair. We shall be as swift as possible in resolving these problems and we shall make decisions according to Revolutionary Law.

The so-called revolutionary justice — violence and assassinations — completely overturned the judicial system, which had been incapable of controlling the hearings and summary executions throughout the country; the most elementary procedures, as written in the constitution and complementary legislation, were not adhered to, in some cases going so far as to dispense with

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396 In Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit...1980, pp.39–40.
397 In ‘Comunicações de Agostinho Neto ao país de 27 a 30 de Maio’, cit. in BM (27 June 1977), pp.9–10.
the gathering of any proof whatsoever of the collaboration or the participation of the accused in the plot.\textsuperscript{398}

Unwilling or unable to stop the violent and illegal purge process, the solution later found was in part to legalise and legitimise such revolutionary justice through the approval of the death penalty (Law 3/78).\textsuperscript{399} This was basically reserved for all civilians guilty of an attempt against internal and external State security, endangering the main interests of the revolution (a long list specifying these crimes are part of the Law 7/78).\textsuperscript{400} They were to be put on trial before the People’s Revolutionary Tribunals (Tribunais Populares Revolucionários—TPRs), who would be given new remits according to a new law establishing the right procedures to hold trials (Law 8/78).\textsuperscript{401} However, in order to officially justify and legitimise the purges (killing) after the attempted coup, it was publicly acknowledged that the death penalty had already and previously been used under revolutionary justice.\textsuperscript{402}

2) Gradual militarisation of the judicial system represented the second main pillar of judicial restructuring. In parallel to the People’s Revolutionary Tribunals (civilian courts answerable to the Minister of Justice), a military judicial system evolved, answerable to the Minister of Defence. It meted out heavy penalties, punishing many crimes with the death penalty or with twenty-four year prison terms (Law 16/78)\textsuperscript{403} and it was given broad competencies, which coincided with those of the TPRs (Law 17/78),\textsuperscript{404} increasingly meshing the civil and military areas.

\textsuperscript{398} Often the criterion for determining a person’s participation in the attempted coup was the answer given to two questions: had they ever read Thirteen Thesis in my Defence, by Nito Alves, and what level of education did they possess (with tragic consequences if they had significative high school or university education). From private interviews with Luis dos Passos (13th May 1998), William Tonnet (30th March 1998), Victor Aleixo (26th March 1998); JM Mabeko-Tali (27th April 1998); see also the already quoted Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences...op.cit. p.395.
\textsuperscript{399} The death penalty was introduced with Law 3/78, reformulating n°. 1 of art. 55 of the penal code.
\textsuperscript{400} Articles 1 to 32 of the Law 7/78, DR, I, 136 (10 June 1978).
\textsuperscript{402} Cit. in ACR, 11 (1979), p.B487.
\textsuperscript{403} Law 16/78 (Law of Military Crimes), DR, I, 15 (24 November 1978).
\textsuperscript{404} Law 17/78 (of Military Penal Justice), DR, I, 15 (24 November 1978).
The law on military penal justice (Law 17/78) started off by providing the Military Tribunals with the ability to pronounce at criminal trials where a military person stood accused; this would include members of the armed forces, of security forces, of internal order, other para-military forces and all citizens subjected by law to the military forum (art. 9). However, the same law added that, in the event of war or of military operations, those tribunals could adjudicate in all cases where civilians or military were on trial, whatever the nature of the crime (art. 9, no. 4); thus by-passing art. 5 of the law on People’s Revolutionary Tribunals (law 8/78), by which this civilian court had previously been given the authority to judge crimes against State security committed by civilians or military alike.

Many people were involved in one way or another with military or para-military organisations; the war was increasing in intensity, and affecting all spheres of national life, be it directly or indirectly. This coupled with art. 9, no. 4, meant that military justice and its judicial system became the most important, effective and feared judicial system for the majority of the population by-passing the civilian tribunals (TPRs). However, such ‘militarisation’ of the judicial system was to be mainly applied on political and security issues and not much at the level of ordinary crimes such as the ones committed against the state’s property as we will see in the next chapter.

3) The third main pillar for the restructuring of the judicial system consisted of the politicisation and the political control of military and civilian judicial systems:

a) Regarding the political nature of judicial systems, in the case of the People’s Revolutionary Tribunals, such can be confirmed by its legitimacy, which according to law,

[...] Arises from its nature as a creation of the supreme State organisation of the People’s Republic of Angola, namely the MPLA [watching over] the preservation and continuity of the revolutionary
process, aimed at establishing _poder popular_, and creating a fair society and a new man.\(^{405}\)

As for military tribunals, the existing legislation also stated that ‘the juridical penal role of the armed forces derives from Revolutionary Power.’\(^{406}\)

b) Regarding political control, the two judicial systems (civil and military) and their respective tribunals were subordinated to the party, and ultimately to the President of the Republic inasmuch as: on the one hand, the president of the military tribunal of the Armed forces would be nominated by the National Security Commission of the MPLA’s Central Committee (presided over by the President of the Party/President of the Republic), after consultation with the Minister of Defence\(^{407}\); on the other hand, all the judges in the People’s Revolutionary Tribunals were also nominated or removed from office by the said Commission.\(^{408}\).

Concluding chapter 6, it can be seen that during Agostinho Neto’s presidency the construction of the new framework of political relationships was marked by three main characteristics:

- Firstly, the onset of a process of substantial partisan discrimination (called ‘elitism’ by the _Nitistas_) towards the lowest social strata, after a violent purge and selective rectification campaign within a monolithic party built upon a rigid hierarchical/pyramidal structure (according to the new democratic centralism).

- Secondly, a high level of administrative centralisation and concentration of executive and legislative powers at the top structures of the Party and the State (namely the Central Committee, the politburo and the President of the Party/President of the Republic); a process legally supported by the CC (the organ empowered to revise the constitution).

\(^{405}\) Preamble to Law 7/76 that instituted Popular Revolutionary Tribunals; _DR_, I, 102 (1976). See also preamble to Law 8/78 in _DR_, I, 137 (26 May 1978).


\(^{407}\) Art. 6 of Law 17/78 in _DR_, I, 15 (24 November 1978).

\(^{408}\) Art. 7, no 1, Law 8/78 in _DR_, I, 137 (26th May 1978).
Thirdly, an authoritarian, and much feared 'militarisation' of the judicial system with drastic penalties (mainly for political and security crimes), functioning under a vague and almost limitless revolutionary legitimacy.

Insofar as the central discussion of this work is concerned (relationships between rulers and ruled), such characteristics mainly represented the beginning of a process of political 'insularisation', i.e. the political, institutional (legislative plus executive) and juridical systems became dominated by the President and his entourage at the CC and Politburo, who now operated with a very large degree of autonomy. These systems became to have limited possibilities of formal intervention or participation by the general population.
7 - The Construction of a New Socio-Economic Framework

This chapter attempts to analyse the type of economic relationships established between rulers and ruled. The main purpose is to assess how successful they were in terms of integrating rulers and ruled through rentière and distributive practices (modern patrimonialism) or on the contrary, breaking those distributive ties (post-modern patrimonialism).

At independence, the MPLA leadership was faced with a difficult economic situation due to two major sets of reasons.

Firstly, the war. After the withdrawal of South African forces from southern Angola in March 1976, the military situation did not get better and probably worsened with the changeover from conventional military confrontation to guerrilla warfare: in Cabinda with the activities of FLEC, supported by Mobutu’s Zaire; in the North, with FNLA also supported by Zaire; in the South, with UNITA, strongly supported by South Africa.409

In the ensuing years, although the FNLA was disbanded410 and FLEC was controlled militarily, UNITA reinforced its alliance with South Africa and greatly increased its military and destructive capacity through the guerrilla warfare that gradually spread to an ever-growing number of provinces. The immediate aim of guerrilla activity was to disrupt the MPLA’s economy, attacking and destroying the infrastructure throughout the country, such as power stations, dams, water supplies, roads, bridges and communication.

409 See Birmingham, David, Frontline Nationalism... op. cit. pp.80-81.
410 As we will see below, some disbanded FNLA guerrilla groups survived until October 1984, when the last groups surrendered to the MPLA, but during all the period until then, they had no significant military impact.
411 South Africa needed UNITA’s support in fighting SWAPO, who operated from Angolan territory. On the ‘alliance’ between UNITA and South Africa and their military activities see Guimarães, Fernando Andresen, The origins ... op. cit. especially chapter5; Soremekun, Fola, Angola ... op. cit. chapter7; Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola ... op. cit. chapters 1-4 and 10-11; also ACR, 11 (1980), pp.B488-B491, and ACR, 12 (1981), pp.B672-B678; on the area affected by UNITA’s activities see The Times (27 September 1977); on UNITA’s activities reported from inside see The Sunday Times Magazine (10 September 1978), pp.29-35.
systems\textsuperscript{412}. Attempting to escape the war, part of the rural population migrated towards the cities\textsuperscript{413} and in some cases emigrated towards neighbouring countries such as Zambia in the East and Namibia in the South\textsuperscript{414}. Important agricultural and industrial concerns were then abandoned\textsuperscript{415}. Therefore, directly and indirectly the war affected the production in these sectors.

However, it must be remembered that the war does not in any way explain several other problems equally affecting the production levels such as the rentière mentality, thefts, diversion of means of production, absenteeism, the organisation of networks to divert and sell official produce in the black market, lack of co-ordination between State ministries and so on. These other problems will be stressed in this chapter as being at the centre of this work’s main discussion (the type of economic relationships established between rulers and ruled). Thus, the fact that the well-known and commonly reported problems of the economic impact of war are not extensively explored in here, does not mean that they are undervalued, but just that other factors must be highlighted within the analytical perspective and discussion of this work\textsuperscript{416}.

Secondly, the Portuguese had left en masse and therefore the country had lost most of its businessmen, commercial farmers, senior and mid-level civil servants, engineers, doctors, teachers and shopkeepers\textsuperscript{417}. In August 1976, over 80% of farmland had been abandoned by previous Portuguese landowners; only 40% of industries were still operating (under the control of its previous owners or managers) but in miserable conditions and far from its regular production capacity; over 30,000 technicians, professionals and skilled workers had left the

\textsuperscript{413} Officially, such migration movement (not even estimated until the early eighties) was recognised and defined as ‘an exodus of rural population towards the cities’; in Relatório do Comité Central ao 1\textsuperscript{\textdegree} Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit... 1980, p. 72.
\textsuperscript{414} See ACR, 10 (1979), p.B508.
\textsuperscript{416} Our approach is mainly political/sociological, but even approaching the war impact on a strictly economic point of view, the production decline can not in no way be basically explained with the war as argued in an interesting thesis of the economist Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, A Indústria em tempo de Guerra (Angola, 1975–91) (Lisbon: Edições Cosmos/IDN, 1999).
\textsuperscript{417} See Bhagavan, M R, Angola’s ... op. cit. pp.7-8; also Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990’s ... op. cit. pp.30-31.
country; 2,500 businesses closed down, 75% of which had been abandoned by their owners; from the 135,000 vehicles registered before independence, only 8,000 remained operational; circa 130 bridges in main roads had been destroyed during the civil war; the system of trade and distribution (mainly composed by 25,000 small trade businesses) collapsed with the departure of the bush traders.  

Faced with this urgent situation, the government went for State intervention in the economy, but limiting its involvement to the most important commercial and industrial enterprises abandoned by their former owners and to the large strategic industries as stated by the ‘Law on political economy’.  

Private interests and activity were to be respected, protected and guaranteed as determined by the constitution. There was no intention to follow a policy of nationalisation as stressed by Eduardo dos Santos (by then in charge of foreign affairs).

Un principe général est inscrit dans notre constitution. Nous sommes prêts à respecter les intérêts des compagnies multinationales en Angola si elles aident au développement de notre économie et au bien être de notre peuple. Nous sommes donc ouvres aux investissement de l’Est comme de l’Ouest. En règle  


419 Law 3/76 ‘on the political economy of resistance’ stated that: I. ‘The economic politics of resistance are characterized by the construction of economic planning comprising three sections: State economy, cooperatives and private businesses [...] The material basis for this economy requires the broadening of cooperatives, as well as the development of a State sector to take control of medium and large strategic industries. On the other hand, it is essential to make full use of existing resources, many of which have been abandoned by the colonists and are currently unproductive. The private sector, according to the economics of resistance, will have to be encouraged and supported by the State, as long as it acts in accordance with the economic and labour policies of MPLA. 2. It is precisely this chaotic situation, inherited from colonialism and worsened by the imperialist war that created the need to nationalise forthwith some of the business and goods abandoned or belonging to traitors [those who collaborated with fascist colonialist or anti-nationalist organizations, UPA-FNLA/UNITA, FLEC, ELP (‘Army of Popular Liberation’), a whites’ party]; in Law 3/76, DR, I, 52 (3 March 1976).  

420 The general principles of Angola’s approach to economic policy were written into the constitution. ‘The RPA recognises, protects and guarantees private interests and activity, even from foreigners, as long as they are useful to the country’s economy and in the interests of the Angolan people (art. 10); Constitutional Law of the People’s Republic of Angola, DR, I, 1, (11 November 1975); Also in the same sense is Law on economic policy 3/76 quoted in the previous footnote.
Nationalisation was imposed mainly on fishing, sugar production, textiles, cement and steel. It included 386 of the existing 482 coffee plantations, establishing coffee, sugar and sisal state farms. Intervention committees were set up to manage the abandoned businesses.

The major change in economic policy orientation occurred with the October 1976 CC’s plenary once the movement officially declared its adherence to Marxism-Leninism and commitment to the construction of Socialism. In that same month, the government took over the two main banks (Banco de Angola and Banco Comercial de Angola renamed Banco Nacional de Angola and Banco Popular de Angola respectively; other smaller banks were shut down). In general terms, the plenary decided to concentrate the economic policy ‘on ways of increasing government control and supervision of the economy, encompassing decisions to continue with confiscation and nationalisation’; to draw up yearly plans for 1977, 1978, 1979 and multi-year plans thereafter; to continue the measures tending to guarantee a state monopoly on foreign trade. These economic policies were put into practice mainly during 1977, and by the middle of that year, the State had already confiscated and nationalised around 85% of designated businesses. Later (right after the first congress) the constitution was accordingly revised to include the new macro economic orientation in its article 9, stating for the first time that,

The basis for economic and social development is socialist ownership, consolidated through state ownership and co-operative

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421 From interview with José Eduardo dos Santos (Foreign Minister) to René Lefort; Le Monde (14 February 1976).
422 From Jane Bergerol article ‘MPLA confiscation’ in Financial Times (6 May 1976).
423 In ACR, 9 (1978), p.B475; also Zenha Rela, José Manuel Angola ... op. cit. p.50-51
424 Latter on, in February 1978, banking was formally made a State monopoly; in Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990’s ... op. cit. p.32.
ownership. The State will take the measures necessary for the constant broadening and consolidation of socialist production relationships.\textsuperscript{427}

The official adherence to a Socialist economic system was thus constitutionally proclaimed. However, as we will see, that did not impede the development of a patrimonial working logic. The new economic framework that emerged during the presidency of Agostinho Neto will now be more accurately analysed, according to the previously outlined and explained five main indicators: public administration (7.1); material production (7.2); the informal sector (7.3); the economic and political impact of the war (7.4); the social policies (7.5).

7.1 Public Administration: the Inefficient Growth of the State’s Bureaucracy

In conformity with Socialist political and macro-economic practice, but also fulfilling the previously mentioned patrimonial distributive promises and expectations (pressures), the public sector underwent enormous growth; it grew not only in terms of an increased number of businesses and economic activities, such as commercial farms and various industries, but most of all in terms of administrative bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{428}

The huge growth of the public sector partly satisfied the aspirations of the urban masses in obtaining work for the State, jobs they had long hankered for and which had been the most highly prized during colonisation. As a general rule, positions within public administration were distributed among members of the Creole/Mbundu alliance, be it at the top, medium or base levels of the hierarchy.

At the top of the public administration, posts were mainly occupied by the descendants of the Old Creoles' 'aristocracy' (coastal and interior nuclei). Despite their links with the Portuguese administration and privileged position during colonialism, their experience in the Portuguese administrative system,

\textsuperscript{427} Article 9, Constitutional Law in DR, I, 31 (7 February 1978)
their relatively high levels of education and the generalised lack of cadres were a great advantage to them. They were soon followed (but at medium level of the hierarchy) by the survivors of the youth committees generation discussed above.

At the medium and lower levels of the hierarchy, positions were mainly and massively occupied by civil servants belonging to the great Creole/M'Bundu alliance but with no qualifications whatsoever for their posts, immediately representing technical inefficiency of public administration not only because of the lack of qualifications of the new personnel, but also because of overstaffing.

The non-Creole/Mbundu who were not long time MPLA members were excluded from State administration and, as a general rule, were 'forced' into the emerging alternative of informal markets; this included especially those Bakongo who did not belong to the MPLA, and had increasing FNLA and anti-Creole/Mbundu connotations, having returned in large numbers from Zaire in 1977 (around 200,000). These returnees were from the start subjected to a strong social discrimination, pejoratively called Zairotas—implying that they were not Angolans but Zairian. Given their knowledge and the experience of

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428 The figures on the workforce are few and imprecise due to the confusion that developed between the Party, the State, the Forces of Defence and Security; it is estimated that public enterprise employed 45% and public administration, 40%. See Roque, Fátima et al. Economia ... op. cit. pp.176–178.
429 See Somerville, Keith, Angola ... op. cit. p.86; Also Zenha Rela, José Manuel Angola ... op. cit. p.48.
430 In terms of overstaff, in order to find occupation to all the new civil servants, activities had to be divided; the work that was previously done by one person came to be performed by several, but given their lack of qualification and increasingly difficult articulation between too many people, work division represented an enormous cost in terms of wasted hours to get the most simple tasks and services done; from private interviews with Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); António Cazevo (10 March 1998); Carlos Feijó (10 April 1998); Pitra Neto (8 July 1998); also Zenha Rela, José Manuel Angola ... op. cit. p.49.
431 See Messiant, Christine, ‘À propos des...', op. cit. p.79, footnote 38.
433 For the most complete approach on this problem of the retornados from Zaire (a problem whose roots can be found long before the independence, during the anti-colonial struggle as we have previously mentioned and still goes on today with dramatic episodes) see Mabeko-Tali, JM Les Bakongo et la Transition Démocratique en Angola: Démocratie ou Représentation Ethnico-Regionale? ’ (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique/CNRS, 1993), Rapport Scientifique de la Mission à Luanda; Groupe de Recherches 846 ‘Afrique Australe’; see also ACR, vol.15 (1984), p.B597.
the small-time marginal trade that was widespread in the cities of Zaire, they brought about a marked upsurge in informal markets for a wide variety of small businesses producing goods and providing services\textsuperscript{434}.

Such type of discrimination in State employment along with the high socio-professional status of civil servants during colonialism and rentière mentality of post-independence (as discussed) all favoured an attitude of haughtiness and disdain of the new public administration towards the people (lower social strata). As a general rule, the public servants behaved as though they were not there to serve the public but to charge a right supposedly due or promised by the State and to fully exert the privileged professional, economic and social status that was usually given to the administrative sector during the colonial period\textsuperscript{435}.

Even though the majority of the new civil servants had been underprivileged people in relation to Creole/M'Bundu segments of elite during the colonial administration, the new attitude was to become the general rule from top to bottom of the State’s administration. In the face of this, Lúcio Lara (party secretary for organisation), found it necessary in 1977 (in the run up to the first congress) to warn against party officials and civil servants adopting superior, bourgeois attitudes towards poorly educated workers and peasants\textsuperscript{436}. Lara also criticised ‘some civil servants who questioned the ability of illiterate workers and peasants to govern the country’ and opposed to the idea of a party comprising only an educated elite\textsuperscript{437}. In other words, Lara was criticising

\textsuperscript{434} As described by Birmingham: ‘In Kinshasa, Zairians held the State jobs and the immigrants held the private sector jobs, often under the high patronage of the State president who was the greatest private entrepreneur of them all. In Angola the returnees found that the State sector was monopolised by the supporters of the MPLA, but the private sector was vacant and open to them. The private sector in Angola had been dominated by white migrants from Portugal until ninety per cent of them fled in the panic of 1975. There were therefore openings for taxi-drivers, shirt-makers, shop-keepers, bar-tenders, cook-stewards, electricians, plumbers, lorry mechanics, and every kind of wheeler-dealer; in Birmingham, David, ‘Angola revisited’... op. cit. p.3.

\textsuperscript{435} This idea with some nuances is supported by several of my interviewees such as Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); António Cazevo (10 March 1998); Carlos Feijó (10 April 1998); Pitra Neto, minister of Public Administration (8 July 1998).

\textsuperscript{436} Cit. in Somerville, Keith, \textit{Angola} ... op. cit. p.83.

\textsuperscript{437} Cit. in Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, \textit{Angola} ... op. cit. p.164.
exactly the same attitude that had been previously denounced by Nito Alves as ‘elitism in the civil service’ along with ‘elitism’ in the party.

In order to avoid the Nitista terminology, such attitude was officially termed burocratismo (‘bureaucratism’), defined by the party as,

the ideological cover or the ideological expressions of bureaucracy. An aggregate of ideas and attitudes which represent the ideological support of bureaucracy [...] and are part of the reactionary bourgeois ideology [...] revealing, above all, a deep disrespect for the great majority of workers and peasants.

Thus, there was the consciousness that such phenomenon was much more than isolated attitudes and the same party document proceed on its general analysis stating that,

Civil servants exhibit haughtiness and superiority in relation to the public, they became inaccessible and with a spirit of ‘omniscience’. Such superiority and ‘distance’ usually conceal a deep incompetence [...] They have not yet understood the role of workers and peasants in our society and have not yet understood that in the end workers and peasants created and create the conditions allowing the exercise of their functions as civil servants. Within this perspective, public servant must bear in mind that he is in his place essentially to serve those who look for his services and not to become an untouchable element, distant, to whom one must ask for favours. [...] They do not want to understand that they are fulfilling their duty and not doing any favour. [...] It must also be noticed that [...] this attitude goes on] with the acquiescence of responsáveis or hierarchical superiors who also participate in such disrespect for those who work. [...] Such attitudes are expressions of petit bourgeois ideology that must be fought.

A few months after this statement, within the previously explained mechanisms of self-criticism, the CC report to the 1980 congress also stressed the need to fight ‘bureaucratism and parasitismo [parasitism]’.

Such attitudes of civil servants along with the unsolved technical problems (overstaff and lack of qualifications), led to an overall inefficiency of public administration.

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438 See Alves, Nito Discurso no comício de encerramento da campanha eleitoral para os órgãos do poder popular (Luanda: DOP-MPLA, 1976), pp.21-26, cit. in Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ...op.cit. p.414.
441 In Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit...1980, p.89.
7.2 Material Production: the Decrease in Agricultural and Industrial Output and the Increased Dependency on Oil Revenues

7.2.1 Agriculture

The new independent State considered it essential to get agriculture production going, as around 60% of the economically active population was engaged in agriculture and that 74% of the population still lived in rural areas (cf. supra). At first, particular attention was paid to coffee, as Angola’s second major export; this however was not very successful since the coffee farms had depended heavily on an estimated 120,000 to 180,000 ‘Ovimbundu’ migrant workers, the majority of whom left the northern coffee estates when the country was plunged into war in 1975-76, returning to their place of origin (the central highlands). In an attempt to overcome the flight of these workers, the government forcibly recruited a large number of urban unemployed and students into harvesting teams. This repressive and unpopular exercise, named Operation Coffee, started with the July 1976 harvest but with no effective results because people resisted given the freedom allowed during the youth committees' period. Consequently, production was nil in 1976 (other than for the selling of already existing stock, stored during the last years of colonialism). The same repressive procedure was carried out in the following year, this time with effective results under the fearful authoritarian policies of the post-27th May 1977, with 90,000 recruits and 100,000 tons of harvested coffee. However, the continuing war, the passive resistance of workers, and

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442 From private interviews with Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); António Cazevo (10 March 1998); Carlos Feijó (10 April 1998); Pitra Neto (8 July 1998).
443 In Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990’s ... op. cit. p.91
446 See Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990’s ... op. cit. p.91; also Birmingham, David, Frontline Nationalism...op. cit. p.77; also ACR, vol. 10 (1979), p.B515
447 Birmingham, David, Frontline Nationalism...op. cit. p.77.
the neglect of coffee plantations (with beans left unpicked causing pest infestation and the spread of root fungi) \(^{450}\) progressively destroyed the bulk of plantations and drastically decreased the production from 1979 onwards \(^{451}\).

After the October 1976 CC’s plenary and the move towards Marxism-Leninism, co-operative peasantry became the main agricultural objective and also involved an increasing governmental and administrative control at all levels: prices, quantities, investment, trading, distribution, export and import. Agricultural activity was divided between: a) State farms, or AUPs (Agrupamentos de Unidades de Produção/Groups of Production Units), financially and administratively dependent on the government, with no autonomy on production decisions and producing almost exclusively for the State; b) farmers’ associations (Associações de Camponeses) which produced autonomously from the State programmes; c) the campesinato, small producers and herdsmen with very rudimentary systems of production and very limited production; d) the few Portuguese farmers who had not left. \(^{452}\)

All these producers were dependent on the government for the provision of support services, which were absolutely crucial for the good functioning of State agriculture: ENAMA (Empresa Nacional de Maquinização Agrícola/National Enterprise for Agricultural Mechanisation) providing mechanical support to agriculture; DINAMA (Distribuidora Nacional de Materiais Agrícolas/National Distributor of Agricultural Supplies) which bought and distributed agricultural tools, fertilisers and insecticides; Agro-Sementes, responsible for the buying and distribution of seeds; and ENCODIPA (Empresa Nacional de Comercialização e Distribuição de Produtos Agrícolas/National Enterprise for Commercialisation and Distribution of Agricultural Produce) first led by the Ministry of Agriculture and latter by the Ministry of Internal Trade, responsible for the commercialisation and

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\(^{451}\) In 1979 the production was 40,000 tons, in 1980 was 33,366t and in 1981 was only a mere 21,501t (approximately one tenth of 1973 production), in ACR, vol. 14 (1983), p. B597.

\(^{452}\) In Roque, Fátima et al. Economia ... op. cit. pp.213–214.
distribution of consumer goods in rural areas in exchange for agricultural produce.\footnote{Ibid. pp.213–214; also in Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990’s ... op. cit. pp.85-86. Also in the same sense are private interviews with Benjamim Castello (20 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998).}

In theory, the entire Agriculture State sector was precisely structured and ready to work in full, but in practice it was an almost absolute failure, be it in administrative or economic terms.

In administrative terms, the whole system gradually went into self-strangulation essentially due to a double reason: firstly, the bureaucratic complexity along with the lack of specialised personnel to run central coordination of all these organisations (a mega-structure encompassing the whole country and several ministries)\footnote{See Relatório do Comité Central ao Iº Congresso Extraordinário ... op. cit...1980, p.88; see also in the same sense another document issued from the same congress, ‘Principais resultados do desenvolvimento económico-social da RPA no triénio 1978-1980’ in Orientações Fundamentais para o Desenvolvimento Económico e Social para o período 1981-1985 (Luanda: Secretariado do Comitê Central, 1980), pp. 10-11; also Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990’s ... op. cit. pp.85-86.}; secondly, the lack of efficient communication and transport between the capital city (where major decisions were taken) and the provinces (where agricultural production took place).\footnote{In Zenha Rela, José Manuel Angola ... op. cit. pp.53-56, the author was a consultant of the Angolan Ministry of Agriculture until 1987 and also professor of economy at the Agostinho Neto University; also in the same sense is ‘Principais resultados do desenvolvimento económico-social da RPA no triénio 1978-1980’ ... op. cit. pp. 10-11; also in the same sense are private interviews with Vigilio Ribeiro da Silva (8 September 1995); Benjamim Castello (20 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998).}

In economic terms, administrative inefficiency represented the failure of crucial services to producers. Such inefficiency in conjunction with other policies and events (rejection of market incentives and unfavourable terms of trade between agricultural and industrial products\footnote{Agricultural products were undervalued and industrial products were overvalued in the official systems of trade; from private interviews with Vigilio Ribeiro da Silva (8 September 1995); Benjamim Castello (20 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998); also Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola ... op. cit. p.143.}; massive population shifts due to the war, mostly towards the cities\footnote{From 1975 to 1985, this migration movement in relation to the whole urban population went from 18% to 31%; from private interviews with Carlos Pinto (16 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Manuela Gonzalez (6 March 1998).}; hostility of rural people to
collectivisation\(^{458}\), all contributed to the slump in agricultural production\(^{459}\). In the end, as stressed by Birmingham, 'the whole of the food distribution network failed at three levels, in production, in transport, and in retailing'\(^{460}\). This failure represented a major setback not only to the production level but also to the collectivisation process itself\(^{461}\).

By 1979-1980, agriculture production became mainly directed to personal consumption (subsistence economy)\(^{462}\) and surplus production was preferentially diverted to black markets where prices were substantially higher. As stressed by Wolfers and Bergerol

The root of the problem in building links between town and country lay in marketing the peasant's surplus. Government buyers wanted priority over private buyers, but many peasants were committed to the private market; because 1) government purchasing was disorganised and infrequent, centring on market towns but lacking transport to get the crop to the market place; 2) government tended to pay in script instead of cash; 3) government prices were lower, and finally the adverse effects of inflation and shortages on the money economy by mid 1978, resulted in many peasants bartering their crops for industrial goods, which private traders willingly provided. Some provincial authorities half-heartedly tried to cut out private buyers instead of improving their own buying organisations and providing more industrial goods to attract the producers. [...] Consequently, private purchasing continued to grow, a proportion of which increasingly supplied the black market in Luanda, and further demoralised the state marketing boards.\(^{463}\)

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\(^{458}\) From private interviews with Vigilio Ribeiro da Silva (8 September 1995); Benjamim Castello (20 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998); also in Financial Times (26 January 1978).

\(^{459}\) 'The production of maize dropped from 333,800 tons in 1973 to 36,800t in 1977 and to 23,700t in 1981; taking the same reference years, dried cassava fell from 61,800 tons to 1,200t but then rose to 19,000t [and then dropped again to 1,000t in 1983]; beans declined from 33,500 tons to 6,700t and then fell again to 1,070t [...]; cotton from 79,300 tons to 1,400t to 1,050t; and so on for all the major food crops, cash crops and livestock and dairy products.' In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's ... op. cit. p.19. See also 'Principais resultados do desenvolvimento económico-social da RPA no triénio 1978-1980' ... op. cit. p.16.

\(^{460}\) Birmingham, David, Frontline Nationalism...op. cit. p.77.

\(^{461}\) In 'Principais resultados do desenvolvimento económico-social da RPA no triénio 1978-1980' ... op. cit. pp.15-16, 22-23.

\(^{462}\) Ibid. pp.22-23; also from private interviews with Vigilio Ribeiro da Silva (8 September 1995); Benjamim Castello (20 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998); Heimer also stesses that 'L'affaiblissement de la societe centrale [apres l'indépendance] a diminué de façon dramatique son interaction avec les sociétés périphériques, particulièrement ont sans trop de mal pu assurer leur reproduction matérielle, en renforçant leur économie d'autosubsistance.' In Heimer, Franz-Wilhelm, 'Formation sociale ... op. cit. p.38.

\(^{463}\) Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola ... op. cit. p.143.
In parallel to the decrease in agriculture output, the fishing industry reduced drastically its production levels. Fisheries like agriculture and other sectors suffered from the 1975-76 upheaval with onshore installations abandoned by Portuguese owners, managers and technicians. Since then, even if this sector was not directly affected by the war, the problems of shortages of skills, delays in supplies of vital inputs and spare parts all contributed to the slump in fishing production. Attempting to solve the problem, the government licensed foreign fleets and 'the fishing industry was by agreement taken over by the Soviet Union and Cuba whose refrigerated vessels took all but 15% of the catch to overseas markets, the remainder going to Angola. However, that did not solve the problem either and the fish landed by foreign fleets (98,500 tons in 1981) was far below the 467,000 tons landed in 1973.

As an obvious consequence of this downward trend in agriculture and fishing output, the country soon went from being able to export food (during the last period of colonialism) to having to import massive amounts of foodstuffs of all kinds. As soon as 1979, the level of agricultural production within commercial circuits controlled by the State provided just 12% of consumers needs and circa 15% of raw materials to the industry. In face of the growing evidence, in the 1979 May Day speech, Neto admitted that the country was 'short of food and the cost of living was extremely high', something that had been previously reported by several foreign observers (in December 1978).

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464 See Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. p.97.
465 In Financial Times (26 January 1978).
466 In Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. p.98.
467 Estimates of annual tonnage of fish landed in 1977-1980 varied between 30,000t and 90,000t a year, way below the 467,000 landed in 1973, of which 162,000 were exported; in ACR, vol. 14 (1983), p.B597.
468 In 'Principais resultados do desenvolvimento económico-social da RPA no triénio 1978-1980' ... op. cit. p.16; also in the same sense see Meyns, Peter, 'O desenvolvimento ... op. cit. pp.121-122.
469 Cit. in Associated Press (2 May 1979).
470 During the visit of US senator McGovern to Luanda, several reporters described the situation of food scarcity, commercial and distributive disruption: 'Food is scarce. Long lines of people in front of shops wait for distribution of potatoes and grain. The port is clogged and functions only sporadically. Shops and offices abandoned by the Portuguese at the time of independence in 1975 remain closed and partly destroyed. Urban transportation is difficult with people piling on the few rickety buses running',
Finally, the 1980 report of the Central Committee to the congress confirmed in full all the above mentioned phenomena on the agriculture sector during Neto's presidency, not only in terms of production failure and inefficiency, but also in terms of the discrimination against peasants within the party (as discussed), all resulting in the deterioration of their living conditions and increased differences between town and country.

The lack of barely satisfactory supplies to rural areas contributed towards the sharp absenteeism of agricultural workers, who often felt obliged to pay more attention to subsistence. This lack of regular, satisfactory supplies also played a part in the disbanding of the agricultural co-operatives and of the often forgotten peasants' associations, and also in discouraging market production in general.

We must recognise that those matters related to the betterment of the peasants' living conditions were not given sufficient importance. We must not forget that during the first liberation struggle [anti-colonial], the majority of our fighters came from the peasantry and it is the peasants who have always been the safety back up of our fighters. Because of this, and because they are the majority of our population, it would be logical that the State and party organisations should pay more attention to them. However, that did not happen and their living conditions are little better than during the colonial period; changes in production relationships are not much more than goodwill. The peasants do not have the support to increase production; peasants have difficulties in selling the goods they produce and manufactured goods are almost non existent in the country. Differences between town and country did not disappear in the least, but showed instead a tendency to increase.471

These remarks made by the congress (like all the others) must be seen within the previously discussed self-criticism mechanisms used in the preparation of congress documents (see introduction) and not so much as an effective commitment to change the situation -- which in fact only got worst as we will see.

471 Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso Extraordinário ...op. cit...1980, p.53; also in the same sense see 'Principais resultados do desenvolvimento económico-social da RPA no triénio 1978-1980' ... op. cit. pp.22-23.
7.2.2 Industry -

Although the government’s economic aim during the first few years of independence was to restore production to pre-1974 levels, the effective production of manufacturing industry between 1975 and 1977 was (according to different sectors) between 20 and 30 per cent of the 1973 levels.\textsuperscript{472} Diamond production, the third major export after coffee, had gone down to 400,000 carats in 1977, compared with 2 million before independence.\textsuperscript{473}

Beyond the lack of specialised manpower, the lack of qualified managers, the shortage of raw materials, the destruction of infrastructures and lack of efficient water and electricity supply caused by the war, the production of manufacturing industry was deeply affected by the previously discussed wave of labour strikes. Therefore, unable to immediately act upon the other constraints, the leadership could only act upon the labour strike movement, which was gradually fought after the October 1976 plenary when all the Workers’ Commissions and independent trade unions were forced to join UNTA and wages were frozen\textsuperscript{474}. The repression was increased after the attempted coup, when non-authorised strikes and street demonstrations became overtly suppressed; the violence of the purge was more than enough to dissuade once and for all such practices, as mentioned. This was reinforced with the effective application of austere, punishing legislation on workers’ activities that had not been implemented until then, such as:

a) The ‘Law for the Disciplining of the Productive Process’ (Law 11/75), which outlined various crimes against productivity, including passive resistance in the workplace, paralysis of work and strikes not led by the

\textsuperscript{472} See Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, \textit{A Indústria} ... op. cit. p.468.
\textsuperscript{473} In ACR, 10 (1978), p.B495.
\textsuperscript{474} All wage negotiations that had been dragging on since the time of the transitional government were suspended from 5th July 1976; in \textit{Africa Research Bulletin -- ARB}, 1 (August 1976); and wages were frozeed since the implementation of the October 1976 plenary decisions; in ACR, 10 (1979), p.B514.
syndicates or trade union commissions; these were to be punished by prison sentences of up to two years in labour camps.\textsuperscript{475}

b) Law 57/76 (formulated as a result of the inefficiency of the previous law) which broadly and arbitrarily defined as economic sabotage all actions seen as damaging to the steady evolution of the revolutionary process in the field of national economy (art. 2). Crimes of economic sabotage were more severely punishable and ranged from two to eight years' imprisonment in production camps.\textsuperscript{476}

The effective application of this legislation during the more repressive period that followed the attempted coup in May 1977, contributed to a slight recovery of the production levels of the manufacturing industry (reaching its peak in 1981 with 40% of 1973 levels) but from then on, it was to return steadily to its downward trend (to the levels of 1976) and soon to even lower levels\textsuperscript{477}.

Confirming a tendency that grew over the years, from 1976-1977 onwards, only the oil industry functioned normally, first through Gulf Oil and then through other foreign companies operating in Angola, producing in 1976, 130,000 barrels a day, compared with 150,000 barrels a day before independence and reaching the pre-independence levels in 1977\textsuperscript{478}, which were soon surpassed with an ever increasing production coming from the exploration of new oilfields\textsuperscript{479}. The oil production also benefited from the rise in


\textsuperscript{477} See Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, \textit{A Indústri... op. cit.} p.468.

\textsuperscript{478} In article of René Lefort in \textit{Le Monde} (8 December 1977); \textit{Financial Times} (26 January 1978); also \textit{ACR} vol. 13 (1982), p.B655. Tony Hodges gives slightly different numbers but still supporting that pre-independence levels were achieved as soon as 1977, which is the only thing that is important to stress here: 172.282 b/d in 1974; 101.837 b/d in 1976; 171.200 b/d in 1977; in Hodges, Tony \textit{Angola to the 1990's} ... op. cit. p.53.

\textsuperscript{479} The steady increase in oil production was recognised by the CC report to the congress, stating that 'In the oil industry [...] much work has been done in the domains of research and the increased extraction of oil from oil-producing fields. New oilfields are being explored [...] and some structures with fine prospects have been discovered. The increase in oil reserves achieved over the past few years has enabled us to guarantee an increased production in the years to come'; in \textit{Relatório do Comité Central ao 1° Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit...1980}, p.74; also in the same sense is 'Principais resultados do desenvolvimento económico-social da RPA no triénio 1978-1980' ... op. cit. p.17.
international oil prices, representing major revenue of circa 800 to 1200 million of US dollars a year between 1976 and 1980.

As internal production decreased (agriculture and manufacturing), oil became the main revenue source for the State budget, financing not only the inevitable growth of imports (all kinds of goods sold at subsidised prices in State shops), but also the wages of inefficient manufacturing industry and agriculture State sector along with the public administration. The CC report ended up implicitly recognising that wages paid to all those inefficient sectors were at least in part a State subsidy (or a rent) with no relationship with production or even less with productivity,

Most of the goods in commercial circulation come not from internal production, but from importation; therefore there is no direct relationship between the wages fund and the volume of products in circulation. We can say that salaries paid to the population were higher than the population's contribution to production, or in other words, were higher than the goods and services available to the population.

Another congress document noted the lack of vision of several workers, managers and ministerial directors with the ambition of simply extracting from the State as much as they could.

In sum, a rentière type of relationship was established between the majority of employees (workers in the manufacturing industry, State agriculture and public administration) and the State (main employer). This rentière relationship was financially supported by the oil revenues managed by the State/Party top organs, thus also representing a distributive type of relationship

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481 See Hodges, Tony, Angola from Afro-Stalinism... op. cit. p.2; also article of René Lefort in Le Monde (8 December 1977); Financial Times (26 January 1978);

482 In Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit.1980, p.74; also in the same sense is 'Principais resultados do desenvolvimento económico-social da RPA no triénio 1978-1980' ... op. cit. p.13. A previous official statement justifying the suspension of wage negotiations on 5th July 1976 had already stressed the lack of relationship between wages and productivity; cit. in ARB (1 August 1976), p.6293

483 In 'Principais resultados do desenvolvimento económico-social da RPA no triénio 1978-1980' ... op. cit. p.28.
between the upper and lower layers of society. However, the oil revenue did not solve all the needs, expectations and economic problems of the lower social strata and the rentière relationships evolved with increasing strain. One immediate consequence of the lack of relationship between production and productivity, the report said, was the reinforcement of speculation, parallel markets, inflation and the decreased purchasing power of salaried employees.

The low level of production and productivity did not allow the necessary increase of revenues to the state budget, creating growing imbalances between the monetary mass in circulation and the volume of merchandise on the market, with all the ensuing negative consequences coming from there — speculation, queues [in people’s shops], parallel market and, finally, the maintenance of favourable conditions to high prices and consequent low purchasing power of national currency.484

7.3 The Informal Sector: Development and Relationship with the Official Sector

The conjunction of previously discussed factors such as: a) the one party system with discriminatory and selective criteria for membership; b) economic scarcity (that was increasing since the transition to independence and the civil war in 1975-1976); c) the frustrated distributive and rentière expectations of a significant part of the population (derived not only from economic scarcity but also from the decreased purchasing power of frozen salaries); c) the administrative centralised management of the economy with subsidised official prices and salaries (without any connection to productivity); all triggered a double and inter-related phenomenon:

Firstly, the development of the informal/parallel/black market with higher prices than the official market, thus attracting ever more goods and

484 In Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit...1980, p.83; also in the same sense is ‘Principais resultados do desenvolvimento económico-social da RPA no triénio 1978-1980’ ... op. cit. p.27. As early as July 1976, when wage negotiations came to a halt it was officially acknowledged that ‘random rises out of all proportion with productivity are causing inflation, speculation and illegal trade [black market] and are weakening the country’s economy,’; in official statement justifying the suspension of wage negotiations on 5 July 1976; cit. in ARB (1 August 1976), p.6293.
factors of production from the official market through predatory practices (as defined in Part I);

Secondly, an ever increasing relationship between formal and informal markets through straddling activity, spreading throughout the whole social strata, but still under party control. These phenomena will be now expounded in more detail.

**7.3.1 Development of informal markets through predatory practices**

The emergence of parallel markets implied the development of new economic practices (predatory) which were necessary to feed it, including: diversion of means of production, straightforward theft of goods and merchandise, bribes, corruption (taking personal/private advantage of official positions) and absenteeism to work. These practices spread out through several economic sectors (including public administration) in order to compensate for the salaries' loss of purchasing power, thus further contributing to the drastic fall in production levels. The first official acknowledgement of these practices came as soon as December 1975 in the 'Law for the Disciplining of the Productive Process' (Law 11/75), whose text states clearly that:

> Considering that there are 'workers' who inject corruption and other deviations into the heart of the masses, [crimes against production will include] [...]: the diversion of means of production that reduces or paralyses the production process [...]; all extortion even when not committed by a civil servant [...]; bribes, perjury and corruption even when not taking place in public offices [...]; theft and larceny in the workplace [...]; lack of punctuality at work [...]; absence from work during working hours without previous authorisation from above [...]; unjustifiable absences. [My bold]485

Facing a more repressive attitude from the authorities after the attempted coup, with frozen salaries and continuing scarcity, the workers turned their demands towards the appropriation of part of the factories production in which they worked — a practice that came to be known as self-consumption (auto-
consumo). The produce acquired in this way was then sold on the black market making it possible for those workers to buy other consumer goods that were not available on the official market. Although never legally authorised, auto-consumo rapidly developed (almost as an acquired right) and spread throughout all State production units, be it industrial, agricultural or commercial; a fact that led the 1980 CC report to highlight the need for such practices to cease:

It has become [...] paramount to eliminate situations of inequality and injustice resulting from the practice of improper appropriation of a part of the production (inappropriately known as self-consumption) from within the Units of Production and Commercialisation. 486

Despite the post-27 May attempt to make more effective the application of legislation disciplining the productive process (which ended up essentially acting upon salaries and prohibiting independent labour movements), predatory practices not only spread but rapidly reached a higher dimension, with the organisation of networks in all sectors of activity in order to satisfy the ever increasing demand of informal markets, as officially reported and condemned at that same 1980 congress,

[Measures must be taken] regarding the individual or organised practice of networks of deviation and thefts in ports and airports, on the railways, in factories, warehouses and shops; the hoarding of deviated and stolen goods to feed the illegal parallel markets; the speculative use of private, even State, means of transportation; the speculative sale of food and industrial produce in legal and illegal markets, in the streets and in people's homes; the acquisition of goods for resale at speculative prices [...] the speculative sale of home-made food; the destruction of the people's possessions, including means of transportation, all without due sanctioning of the offenders [my bold]. 487

Absenteeism and lack of assiduity in the work place, although condemned by the law, was the norm, and the reason for this became obvious through the reading of that same document — which highlighted the workings of the parallel market, including production of cakes and other food stuffs for sale at

486 Resoluções e mensagens do Iº Congresso Extraordinário ...op. cit...1980, p.39
home or in black market, private transport in private or State cars, specialised technical out-of-hours services, and so on\textsuperscript{488}. These practices thrived with the complicity of hierarchical superiors as recognised by other congress documents remarking that Ministries, managers of State companies, co-operatives and other organisations were not committed to the enforcement of labour and State discipline and assumed liberal and condescending attitudes towards laziness, absenteeism and the damage of socialist property such as theft and \textit{auto-consumo}\textsuperscript{489}. As stressed by several of my interviewees, everybody had to find an \textit{esquema} (scheme) to compensate for the low official income. Soon (in the first years after independence) it became a commonly accepted practice to take the afternoon off in order to engage in other more profitable activities; such practices started within the public administration but gradually spread to all other sectors of the economy (mainly when State companies began to fail on their provision for food and transportation services)\textsuperscript{490}.

The congress noted that all those practices here called predatory, representing 'distortions within the distribution and commercialisation circuit', considerably worsened 'the already insufficient purchasing power of the working masses'\textsuperscript{491}. In fact, the more the parallel economy grew through predatory practices, the more the official economy weakened and the more the purchasing power of official salaries eroded due to the hidden inflation of the black market; leading to a renewed need to join the parallel economy in search for an extra income. This vicious circle did not provide a viable solution for the lower social strata (whose purchasing power continued to decrease), but benefited mainly the main speculators:

\textsuperscript{487} Ibid. p.40
\textsuperscript{488} Also confirmed in several private interviews: Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernands Vieira (2 March 1998); Pitra Neto, minister of public administration (8 June 1998).
\textsuperscript{489} In 'Principais resultados do desenvolvimento económico-social da RPA no triénio 1978-1980' ... op. cit. p.27.
\textsuperscript{490} From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Pitra Neto, minister of public administration (8 June 1998).
\textsuperscript{491} \textit{Resoluções e mensagens do 1º Congresso Extraordinário} ...op. cit..1980, p.39
We must stress the existence of a deep and progressive unbalance between the monetary income and expenses of the population, implying an increase in the cost of life and having a negative impact over the real purchasing power of the population.

Such relative scarcity of consumer goods caused the large scale functioning of speculation, with prices several times superior to the official ones. It is important to underline that the speculation market [black market] led to real insufficiency of the salary, although such salary is higher than the respective production, and above all it led to the transfer of important monetary funds from the workers to the speculators. [My bold]

7.3.2 Increasing Articulation Between Formal and Informal Markets

Economic scarcity allied to Socialist administrative centralised management of the economy and the one Party State had two main effects. First, it produced the rationing and discriminatory system common to other socialist systems, with access to official supply channels and other benefits determined by the position occupied within the State and/or Party hierarchy. Second, it led to the equally common straddling between official and parallel markets — though still closely controlled by the party.

Although differences in salaries were not broad (from 1 to 3 in average\textsuperscript{493}), there emerged three major mechanisms of socio-economic differentiation between top and bottom of the party/State/military hierarchy and also between those who were members of the party and those who were not (even though, in the early eighties there was not much difference left between the bottom members of the party and the bottom social layers outside of the party in terms of economic advantages, as we will see):

1) A primary and most obvious mechanism of socio-economic differentiation was the shop system, which supplied food and industrial goods

\textsuperscript{492} Relatório do Comitê Central ao Iº Congresso Extraordinário ... op. cit...1980, p.74; also in the same sense see 'Principais resultados do desenvolvimento económico-social da RPA no triénio 1978-1980' ... op. cit. p.13.

\textsuperscript{493} Officially, the salary levels span a scale of 1 to 19, the lowest being 1 at 5.000 Kwanza a month, the highest being 19 at 35.000 Kwa/month, however the bulk of cash income earners lie in two broad categories: 10.000-15.000 Kwa/month and 15.000-25.000 Kwa/month. The top end (35.000/month) and the bottom end (5.000/month) were thinly populated. Thus, the dominant income differential was 1 to 3; In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's ... op. cit. p.63. It must be stressed that the field research for this work
at low controlled prices (official). This system was divided into four types of shops following the socio-political hierarchy of the State and the Party: a) the people's shops (for the bottom social strata, i.e. all the working class belonging to the party or not and the urban poor; b) the shop for responsáveis (middle-level cadres, party members or not); c) the shop for the dirigentes (higher levels in State and Party bureaucracy such as executive directors of several CC departments, national directors of ministries and managers of State companies, amongst others); d) the shop for the top levels in State and party (CC and politburo members, ministries and secretaries of State, FAPLA's Major General Staff). Prices for basic commodities were the same in all four shops; the differences were in terms of type, quantity and quality of the products available.

The existence of broad differences between official and black market prices (30 to 100 times higher on the black market, in the late seventies and early eighties) opened up several opportunities for making money. People bought as much as possible at official prices in State shops and sold it afterwards on the black market with considerable profit. Such profits were obviously proportional to the position occupied by each one within the party/State/military hierarchy and, consequently, to the type of shops each one had access to.

2) The second major mechanism of socio-economic differentiation was the system of requisicões and credenciais, which allowed access to scarce goods, ranging from the highly prized apartments and cars to more 'ordinary' electric generators, cookers, motorbikes, refrigerators, water pumps, house furniture and so on. Theoretically, anyone could be given a requisição or credencial to access those goods, but in practice it would follow the usual

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494 From private interviews with Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); J-M Mabéko-Tali (25 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Gerónimo Belo (17 March 1998); see also Bhagavan, M R, Angola's ... op. cit. p. 21; There were also 'Especial shops' well-stocked of products, but only to be accessed by foreigners who payed in hard foreign currency, and 'shops to cooperantes (foreigners working for the government)' with salaries payed in local non-convertible currency (Kwanza), also state-supplied and suffering from the same shortages as the peoples shops; Ibid. p. 21

495 In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's ... op. cit. p. 22.
Party/Military/State hierarchy and discriminatory procedures favoured middle and top members of those structures. Again, just like in the shop system, a significant part of goods accessed through this way ended up re-sold in parallel markets (obviously excluding apartments, that could not be sold).

3) A third major mechanism of differentiation was the privileged access to foreign currency at the official rate (an overvalued rate) for work or tourist trips to foreign countries. Work trips or viagens de serviço (arranged for the most diverse motives) became so common that they were seen as a perk, a compensation for the officially low salaries, whose frequency became informally established as once a year for middle cadres and at least twice a year for top members of the State and Party hierarchies. Such trips were subsidised with US dollars according to the position held within those hierarchies and the time spent abroad; allowing to afford not only the living expenses abroad (in very comfortable conditions) but also to spend on shopping, most of which also ended up on the Angolan black market with significant profits.

To give just one of several possible examples on how the dynamics of the informal markets grew: from the experience of work trips, a new business (within middle social strata) rapidly emerged in the late seventies and early eighties consisting in ‘tourist’ (commercial) trips to Brazil and Portugal where the most varied articles were bought and sold back in Angola on the black market. The scheme was quite simple and people recall it nowadays with sweet nostalgia as ‘those days of the one party system, when we could travel around...’

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496 From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Gerónimo Belo (17 March 1998); see also Messiant, Christine, ‘À propos des..., op. cit. p.78
497 From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Gerónimo Belo (17 March 1998).
498 As an example, subsidies for top hierarchy members of the State and Party would be calculated to support a luxurious lifestyle during the time spent abroad, including prices of five star hotels, top rental cars, top restaurants, pocket money including shopping and so on; usually ranging between two to four hundred US dollars a day for trips to Portugal, which was an absolutely outrageous amount in late seventies and early eighties. For the middle cadres it was not that much (50 to 100US$/day) but still allowing an extremely comfortable life abroad; from private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Gerónimo Belo (17 March 1998).
the world with a box of beer’. This commonly heard sentence means that once having access to a box of beer — 24 bottles — at the official price, it was resold in the parallel market for a hundred times more. Then, the profit was in a very small part used to buy an airline ticket (at an officially low price) and subsequently to access a significant amount of US dollars (at the official rate) allowed for tourist trips abroad (in fact used for commercial purposes). Even considering the fines that had to be paid for luggage excess (paid at an official exchange rate; meaning ridiculous amounts) and the bribes to the airport customs, it was an extremely profitable business499.

All the schemes developed at an incredible speed through all sectors of economic activity, directly and indirectly involving ever more people and assuming ever more elaborated forms, taking advantage of the above mentioned mechanisms of socio-economic differentiation and the possibility of straddling between formal and informal markets. Just like in all commercial businesses, as much as the profits allowed it, the network of intermediaries grew from the first buyer to the final consumer, also involving several other agents that had to be bribed at every step of the business, such as authorities (customs and police) or civil servants (bank workers to get more foreign currency for each trip; people working in the national airline to get tickets abroad or to the provinces when needed; workers at the ministries departments of human resources to arrange work trips, and so on and so forth in an endless network of schemes500).

Therefore, the economic need for some and the possibility of making a huge profit for others, led to a growing involvement of the population in

499 From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Gerónimo Belo (17 March 1998).

500 Towards the eighties, new and even more elaborated schemes were developed in all sectors of activity, be it with the national airline almost transformed in a cargo line to support informal trade, not only from Portugal and Brazil, but also and especially to the provinces where industrial products could be bartered with agricultural products which would then be resold in Luanda at extremely high prices on the black market; be it with the national shipping company which would serve the same purpose transporting containers full of illegal trade that were then introduced in Luanda’s black market with the knowledge and collaboration of port authorities; from private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Gerónimo Belo (17 March 1998).
straddling activities, from the lower to the upper social strata; a reality officially admitted by a congress resolution,

These practices [all the above quoted from this same document, such as generalised thefts, deviations, corruption, organised networks and so on] worsen day by day, through corruption, protectionism and liberalism on behalf of leaders and managers; through the inefficiency of the mechanisms of prevention and repression and the generalised lack of control over the people’s possessions [...].

Considering that the above mentioned situation tends to be generalised, it necessarily affects the class situation of the masses, in particular workers and peasants, and leads to their ideological degradation by turning them into small traders [...]

The Congress draws special attention to the need to punish most of all the leaders, the managers, the technicians, the agents for defence and security and all workers in the State sector in general who practice, aid or abet these practices, or who are in any way connected to the counter revolutionary practices which are the subject of this resolution. [My bold] 501

Despite these denunciations (allowed within the ambit of auto-critica mechanisms discussed at the introduction) no effective measures were ever taken against such practices as a whole 502. On the contrary, the leadership learnt how to manipulate it and control it, making it structural to the political-economic system 503. As explained by Messiant,

L’existence de l’informel et de la corruption est ainsi le corollaire oblige de la rareté, de la dictature et de la gestion administrative. Avec un cercle vicieux, donc, dès lors qu’aucune garde-fou, si ce n’est celui ‘du parti’ lui-même—qui laisse faire, manipule, contrôle ou réprime cette corruption en fonction de ses propres critères (et luttes internes) 504.

Insofar as the party dominated the discriminatory apparatus, which gave access to the main supply channels (privileges and benefits), it also controlled the bulk of the informal sector. Therefore, the informal sector became an integral part of

501 Resoluções e mensagens do 1° Congresso Extraordinário ... op. cit... 1980, pp.40-41.
502 As observed by Bhagavan in 1983, ‘one finds that a “high price” parallel economy is functioning outside of the realm of the State. It is an economy that the State knows about, and with good sense and wisdom has so far allowed to function’. In Bhagavan, M R, Angola’s ... op. cit. p.23. Also in the same sense see Messiant, Christine, ‘À propos des..., op. cit. pp.78-79
503 Christine Messiant calls it ‘nécessité structurelle’; in Messiant, Christine, ‘À propos des..., op. cit. p.78 footnote 37.
504 In Messiant, Christine, ‘À propos des..., op. cit. p.78
the centralised system of Party control and domination over the whole emerging framework of economic relationships. Informal activities could not provide significant economic power independently from the party. It is important to note that the great majority of products feeding and fuelling the black market (legally or illegally imported goods) were all paid with US dollars coming from exactly the same source — the oil rent, distributed according to party criteria. In the end, the oil revenue came to support the running of the informal sector inasmuch as it supported the official sector (as previously analysed), thus allowing the party to control both.

Within the main discussion of this work, it is important to stress that such increasing economic dependency on oil brought about the beginning of a process of economic autonomy of the ruling elites in relation to the productive effort of the ruled masses due to the enclave nature of this major source of revenue (as explained in Part I).

7.4 The Economic and Political Impact of War

As already explained, this thesis seeks to stress not so much the intricacies of the war in Angola in terms of the concrete military situation and the impact of the Cold War, but its influence on the pattern of relationships that was evolving between rulers and ruled.

7.4.1 The Socio-Economic Impact

The disruption of economic activity, destroying the infrastructure throughout the country (blowing up or sabotaging power stations, dams, water supplies and communication systems, mining roads and bridges) was the main objective of UNITA/South Africa military activities. Such type of actions was a lot easier in the countryside (provinces) than in the urban centres. It had two main effects: on the one hand it greatly affected the communication and transport systems between the capital city and the other provincial cities; on the other hand, it caused an exodus of rural population fleeing the war, migrating towards the
cities\textsuperscript{505} or to neighbouring countries (Zambia and Namibia\textsuperscript{506}) in search of security and better living conditions.

With this kind of warfare, economic activities were hardly viable in the provinces. Thus, in economic terms, the war actively and directly represented: on the one hand, an impediment to the development of significant local and regional (provincial) economic activity; on the other hand, a contribution to economic scarcity (through the disruption of the agricultural and industrial production, destroying infrastructure and absorbing resources to support the war effort). Consequently, the war (indirectly) reinforced the overall economic dependency on oil and inherently, the process of economic autonomy of the ruling elites in relation to the productive effort of the ruled masses.

7.4.2 The Socio-Political Impact

In socio-political terms the impact of the war was mainly twofold:

Firstly and insofar as the war was an impediment to the development of provincial economic activities, it ended up supporting the extremely centralised political and economic system, not allowing the possibility of constructing provincially autonomous political constituencies through the distribution of economically autonomous benefits by so-called local bosses or strongmen, as happened in so many other African countries, such as the Cameroon or Nigeria\textsuperscript{507}.

Secondly, the war strengthened the link between the Ovimbundu and UNITA, especially after the 1975-1976 civil war, when the MPLA retook the highlands and UNITA increased its guerrilla activities. By then, the violence exerted by the MPLA's armed forces in the highlands (probably unable to avoid a straightforward and primary identification between Ovimbundu and

\textsuperscript{505} In Relatörio do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit...1980, p.72.
\textsuperscript{506} See ACR, 10 (1979), p.B508.
\textsuperscript{507} See for instance Bayart, Jean-François, The State in Africa ...op. cit.; also Bayart, Jean-François, L'État au Cameroun ...op. cit.
UNITA\textsuperscript{508}), ended up favouring this process by effectively pushing more Ovimbundu towards UNITA. As explained by Messiant,

\begin{quote}
C'est la violence de la guerre sur le haut plateau [...] l'ampleur de la répression menée par l'UNITA d'abord puis par le MPLA quand il reprend possession des territoires qu'avait occupés l'UNITA [1976], qui donnent à celle-ci son premier [solide] ancrage ethnique, une partie des élites et de la population s'associant à son sort ou étant rejetée vers elle.\textsuperscript{509}
\end{quote}

In another work Messiant reinforces this argument stressing that

\begin{quote}
L'organisation [UNITA], qui s'est fortement "Ovimbunduisée" avec l'afflux qui suit la défaite, s'est aussi ruralisée dans sa composition et dans son expérience et elle s'est militarisée. Elle est une organisation politique où la transmission de l'idéologie et de l'identité organisationnelle est très forte\textsuperscript{510}.
\end{quote}

Also similar is Heywood stating that

\begin{quote}
By 1974 the regional and ethnic orientation of UNITA's leaders led to fundamental rifts between UNITA and the MPLA. [...] UNITA became a forum for rural, regionalist, and ethnic sentiments.\textsuperscript{511}
\end{quote}

Insofar as the growing ethnic identification of UNITA represented a socio-cultural threat against the great Creole/M'Bundu alliance (as previously discussed), the development of the civil war also reinforced the consciousness of a specific identity among the Creoles/M'Bundus themselves. This consciousness prevented the break up of the alliance despite all the differences and rivalries between its groups. Moreover, this threat did not just affect the elites but also the populations of those areas most influenced by colonisation. Thus, the ethnic threat of UNITA guaranteed the MPLA elites significant popular support and legitimacy despite growing scarcity, loss of purchasing power, austerity measures and so on.

In sum, the war had a reinforcing effect on the framework of relationships that had been developing between rulers and ruled, namely,

\textsuperscript{508} From private interviews with Fernando Pacheco (25 February 1998); Júlio Morais (11 April 1998); General Farrusco (2 May 1998).
\textsuperscript{509} Messiant, Christine, 'Angola, les voies I, op. cit. p.169.
\textsuperscript{510} In Messiant, Christine, 'MPLA et UNITA... op. cit. p.46. Also in the same sense is Messiant, Christine, 'Angola: entre guerre et paix' ... op. cit. p.169; also Messiant, Christine, 'Angola, les voies I, op. cit. pp.155-210.
\textsuperscript{511} In Heywood, Lynda, Contested ... op. cit. p.152.
strengthening the increasing dependency on oil (and consequently the increasing economic autonomy of the ruling elites) and favouring micro-identity political alignments and solidarities.

7.5 Social Sectors: First Signs of Neglect by the end of Neto's administration

Social sectors are the last analytical indicator chosen for the analysis of the framework of economic relationships. The purpose here is to gauge the level of commitment to public services, which is very low within a modern patrimonial working logic and almost non-existent in a post-modern patrimonial working logic.

Regarding these sectors, during the first few years after independence, at the height of ideological and revolutionary fervour, there was a certain degree of commitment to the idea of implementing the programmes and policies for the development of the social action sectors, including education, health, housing, social support and community services. This commitment was also fired by the arrival of Cuban volunteers trained in these areas, especially in health and education, who made a contribution to its management and organisation. By 1977 these Cubans numbered 5000\(^{512}\). However, after an initial phase during which the government showed some concern in these areas, by the end of Neto's presidency (1977-1979) there were clear signs of contraction in social expenditure, which led to the strangulation of many projects in most sectors, starting off a process that would accelerate during the ensuing decade (despite the presence of those foreign technicians).

- Education.

During the first few years after independence, several measures were successfully implemented for the development of education. These included the massive intake of children for the first four academic years; in 1979, the intake was 2,4 million children, four times greater than in 1973\(^ {513}\). Significant efforts

\(^{512}\) In *Le Monde* (9 November 1977); also *ACR*, 10 (1979), p.B510.

\(^{513}\) In *Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso Extraordinário...* op. cit...1980, p.80.
were made in adult education, especially for the veterans of FAPLA, workers and peasants and between 1976 and 1979 around 330,000 people were made literate.\textsuperscript{514} Almost 759,000 illiterate adults were enrolled in 37,000 literacy classes; 70,000 literacy teachers had been trained and 615 literacy brigades constituted, composed of 4,950 young volunteers.\textsuperscript{515} A system of technical and professional training was set up. The Faculty of Juridical and Administrative Sciences was inaugurated, as was the Higher Institute of Educational Sciences; by 1980, there were over 2,000 university students.\textsuperscript{516}

However, between 1979 and 1981, the number of primary-school children remained exactly the same\textsuperscript{517} and the number of literate people grew by only 9,000 \textsuperscript{518}; an insignificant number when compared with the previous 330,000 and the already mentioned illiteracy rate of 80\% at the time of independence. From the two thousand university students enrolled in 1980 it was later known that only 180 had finished their courses and the number of literacy enrolments drop in the ensuing years from the previous 759,000 to just 100,000\textsuperscript{519}. These were clear signs of regression in the education sector, a tendency that would drastically increase in the ensuing five years as we will see during the analysis of Eduardo dos Santos presidency (in section C).\textsuperscript{520}

- Health.

During the first few years after independence, much help was given by foreign doctors (the number of Cuban doctors increased by 16.5\% between 1977 and 1980).\textsuperscript{521} The government set up, under its own auspices, 1,260 health units; the most important of which were the Central Hospitals of Luanda. It comprised 8 hospitals, 16 provincial health centres, 32 municipal hospitals, 16 centres for

\textsuperscript{514} Ibid. p.80.
\textsuperscript{516} Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit...1980, pp.80–81.
\textsuperscript{517} In ACR, 13 (1982), p.B651.
\textsuperscript{519} Relatório do Comité Central ao 2º Congresso do Partido, realizado em Luanda de 2 a 10 de Dezembro de 1985 (Luanda: Edição do Secretariado do Comité Central, 1985), pp.120–122.
\textsuperscript{520} Ibid. pp.120–122.
\textsuperscript{521} In Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit...1980, p.81; see also ACR, 13 (1982), p.B651.
mothers and children, 16 leprosy hospices and 6 tuberculosis sanatorium. Several free vaccinations campaign for children were launched every year. Healthcare beyond the hospital walls was developed, with the creation of health centres, especially in rural and suburban areas. A project for the education of paramedical professionals was implemented, for the training of nurses, midwives and other health care technicians.

However, as with education, many problems including a distrust of Cuban physicians, the contraction of disposable means and lack of financial and material resources, along with poor transportation to the provinces and bad co-ordination between sectors for import and distribution of medicines, all brought about the rapid dereliction of the short lived successes of the health sector.

- Housing

After the colonialists' departure, apartments and villas were in part confiscated to house the new rulers and in part occupied by the general mass of population already living in those cities (with a clear priority given to the urban middle social strata).

Despite such occupation of vacant places, housing became one of the most severe social problems due to several factors: a), the continuous exodus of rural population towards the cities, prompted by the war; b), the arrival of an

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522 In *Relatório do Comité Central ao Iº Congresso Extraordinário*... op. cit...1980, p.81.
523 For example, to mark World Health Day (7 April 1977), 1,5 million children were vaccinated against polio; see *ACR*, 10 (1979), p.508.
524 In *Relatório do Comité Central ao Iº Congresso Extraordinário*... op. cit...1980, p.81.
525 As ironically mentioned by several of my interviewees, the only thing Cuban doctors were good at were amputations; from private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16 April 1998). The same idea is reported from Angola by David Lamb in *Los Angeles Times* (3 December 1978), who also states that Agostinho Neto himself had expressed the popular displeasure with Cuban physicians and suspicion towards the knowledge of a 22-year-old Cuban head surgeon at one 300-bed hospital in Luanda; see also in the same sense *Herald Tribune* (6 December 1978).
526 Serious failures in medicine distribution emerged throughout the whole country, as reported in *Principais resultados do desenvolvimento económico-social da RPA no triénio 1978-1980*... op. cit. p.25.
527 See *Relatório do Comité Central ao IIº Congresso*...op. cit...1985, pp.123–125.
528 From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); António Cazevo (10 March 1998); Mário Séteco (10 March 1998); Pedro Kiala (13 March 1998); Francisco Tunga Alberto (16 March 1998).
increasing number of foreign advisers, counsellors, technicians, military and so on (the majority of whom were Cuban\(^{529}\)); c), the formation of new State cadres in the meantime, demanding to be properly housed by the State\(^{530}\).

For the lower social strata, who were flocking to the cities coming from rural areas, the solution was obviously to build more *muceques* and these spread out-of-control around the cities, especially in Luanda, in a process which started as soon as 1976/77 \(^{531}\), increased during the eighties and still goes on today. As mentioned above, among the new comers to the capital city were the returned Bakongo (returned from Zaire), 200,000 as soon as 1977, who set up their own *muceques* such as Palanca, Maborr or Petrangol\(^{532}\).

For the new middle cadres of the State and the Cubans, a few dozens of low-quality blocks of flats were built in Luanda in late seventies and early eighties, with Cuban co-operation. However the State’s building sector did not go beyond those few buildings in Luanda and soon became totally stagnant. Once again, it was the informal sector that filled that void and the whole city of Luanda turned to informal anarchic construction\(^{533}\), whereby thousands of annexes were built in the yards and gardens of houses or even on the flat roofs of blocks of flats\(^{534}\).

- **Social Support**

During the first years of independence, several national projects of social support were discussed and started to be implemented under the pressure of

\(^{529}\) The number of Cuban military was not made official but in 1978 was estimated in 19,000; in *ACR*, vol.11 (1980), p.B493. As referred, as soon as 1977, the number of Cuban civilians in Angola under co-operative agreements (economic, scientific, cultural, technical and so on) was 5,000; in *Le Monde* (9 November 1977); also *ACR*, 10 (1979), p.B510.

\(^{530}\) From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); António Cazevo (10 March 1998); Mário Séteco (10 March 1998); Pedro Kiala (13 March 1998); Francisco Tunga Alberto (16 March 1998).

\(^{531}\) In *ACR*, 15 (1984), p. B597; We are obviously talking of enlargement and construction of new *muceques*, because as it is known, *muceques* do exist since the colonial period.

\(^{532}\) From personal knowledge of these *muceques* and also from private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); António Cazevo (10 March 1998); Mário Séteco (10 March 1998); Pedro Kiala (13 March 1998); Francisco Tunga Alberto (16 March 1998). See also Bhagavan, M R, *Angola’s ...* op. cit. p.24.

\(^{533}\) In ‘Principais resultados do desenvolvimento económico-social da RPA no triénio 1978-1980’ ... op. cit. p. 25.
workers and neighbourhood commissions as well as youth committees and mass organisations, including: nurseries for children of working women; socio-economic support to former guerrillas, widows and orphans of guerrillas; homes for the elderly and handicapped persons; refugee camps for people fleeing the war. In 1977 around 50,000 Namibian refugees, targeted by South Africa, were transferred from the South to the North, where new camps were set up to this effect. In the north-east provinces (Lunda South and Lunda North), camps were set up for around 18,000 refugees from Shaba (in Zaire) and several other initiatives of this kind were taken to support hundreds of thousands of displaced Angolans.

However, as early as the end of 1977 and 1978, the necessary means to support such initiatives decreased and the first signs of neglect and deficient functioning of those projects became evident. By the 1980 congress, the results of such programmes were reduced to a mere declaration of future intentions towards the sector, but without presenting anything concrete. As an alternative, and especially in terms of refugees and internally displaced people, the Angolan government increased its demands for international support from organisations such as the UN system (UNHCR, UNICEF, OMS, FAO, WFP), the League of Red Cross Societies and Northern European countries such as Sweden and Norway. These were the first signs of a

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534 From personal knowledge and private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Pedro Kiala (13 March 1998); Francisco Tunga Alberto (16 March 1998).
535 From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16 April 1998) among several others.
537 From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16 April 1998) among others.
538 See Relatório do Comitê Central ao 1º Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit...1980, pp. 93-94.
539 In UNHCR publication, 5 (October 1977), p.2; The UNHCR built up a sum of US$1.2 million into its 1977 emergency programme and a further 4.1 million for 1978 to finance the relief phase. A programme of longer-term assistance was to follow; ibid. p.2. Significant humanitarian aid to Angola began during this period (late 1977-1978), when the first signs of collapse in the social sectors emerged. Such aid strongly increased during the first five years of the 1980s as we will see.
tendency, which grew stronger in 1979 \(^{540}\) and even stronger during Eduardo dos Santos presidency (as we will see in section C).

- Community Services

In the field of community services, in parallel with the main responsibility belonging to provincial commissariats, several tasks were given to ODP groups (People’s Defence Organisation). Apart from their role as paramilitary forces, these groups were to provide community services in their respective provinces, communes, neighbourhoods or villages, such as carrying out maintenance and repairs on schools, hospitals and various other public buildings, cleaning and sanitation. Beyond the ODP and commissariats, in the first years of independence (1975-1977), there were regular government appeals to voluntary civic work on specific days of the month to clean the streets. These activities were quite successful\(^{541}\).

Nevertheless, as early as 1978, neither the commissariats nor the ODP or even less the voluntary activities were effectively fulfilling their tasks and community services soon became markedly neglected not only in the provinces but even in the capital city. In 1978, Luanda was reported to have fallen ‘into a tatty and dirty state of disrepair’\(^{542}\) ‘turning to decay, with rubbish and rubble in the ill-repaired streets’\(^{543}\) with chronic and progressively acute lack of water, electricity, basic sanitation, drains and rubbish collection \(^{544}\).

In sum and taken as a whole, the analysis of the Angolan social sector reveals an initial concern and effective commitment with this kind of policies, but, even before the end of Neto’s presidency, the first signs of political failure in these sectors started to appear. The major question is why?


\(^{541}\) From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16 April 1998).

\(^{542}\) Reported by David Lamb to the Los Angeles Times (3 December 1978).

\(^{543}\) Reported to The Sunday Telegraph (25 June 1978).

\(^{544}\) From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998).
The standard answer is that this was due to the war effort and the increasing imports of consumer goods and equipment (and that will be in part the official argument used\textsuperscript{545}). However, if such increased expenditure must be acknowledged, it can not be taken as the main reason for that sudden collapse (end of 1977 and 1978) because: a), that period also coincides with the increase in Angolan oil production (as we saw) and with the drastic increase of the international oil price (progressively rising from US$12 per barrel in 1974 to US$14 between 1974 and 1978, and then to US$28 in 1979)\textsuperscript{546}, representing an average income of US1000 million/year between 1975 and 1980\textsuperscript{547}; b) arms expenditure remained relatively constant in late 1970’s (around US$500 million per year) and only increased significantly in early eighties\textsuperscript{548}; c) those services did not depend exclusively on the State, also significantly relying on voluntary work and community commitment of the general population. Thus, a different explanation must be looked for.

From the government’s perspective, the decline in social policies seems to be related with the appearance of a phenomenon explained in Part I, whereby the ruling elites became progressively comfortable in socially, politically and economically neglecting the ruled masses mainly due to a double reason here discussed:

- Firstly, they became to feel quite secure in economic terms, with a huge oil rent that did not depend on the productive effort of the ruled masses;
- Secondly, they also felt politically secure, because; a) the ruled masses had no votes to express their political disaffection within a centralised administration and concentrated power system within a party, purged, rectified, tightly controlled and able to count on a fearful political police and judicial system (especially and mainly towards political and security

\textsuperscript{545} On the use of the war argument to justify the non-achievement of several socio-economic goals during the three year period of 1977-1980 see See Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit... 1980, p.83.
\textsuperscript{546} In Shell Bulletin SBS (1986), cit. in Stoleru, Lionel L’Ambition ... op. cit. p.144.
\textsuperscript{547} Hodges, Tony, Angola from Afro-Stalinism... op. cit. p.2.
\textsuperscript{548} In Collelo, Thomas, ed., Angola, ... op. cit. p.234.
crimes); b) insofar as UNITA was still militarily active, the government could always count on support generated by the fear of UNITA, which represented a threat against the great Creole/M’Bundu alliance.

From the people’s perspective (those supposed to participate in voluntary work) the reasons for the lack of community commitment seem to be twofold:

- Firstly, it seems to be related with the post-27th May 1977 repression. As mentioned, the repression was mainly directed towards the revolutionary and ideologically fervent generation of the youth committees (usually involved, concerned and committed with social policies, mobilising and pressuring the people for several voluntary activities), also castrating the independent activity of workers and neighbourhood commissions, syndicates and mass organisations (related with the youth committees in terms of social initiatives)\textsuperscript{549};

- Secondly, the decline of social service seems also to be related to the general disillusion that came from betrayed expectations of redistribution, followed by the austerity of the economic situation and the need for an increasing involvement in intense time consuming informal activities\textsuperscript{550}.

Condensing these two reasons, Zenha Rela states that,

> [The 27th May] marks the end of any état de grâce that the politicians might have had to mobilise the people. It was the crude awakening from the state of euphoria in which people lived until then, the consciousness of daily difficulties and a transformation of attitude: the solution of problems which was until then considered as a collective action [...] became each one’s problem, because each one had to solve its own problems; if ‘schemes’ were the only way to solve these problems, then everyone tried to be involved in one\textsuperscript{551} [my bold].

\textsuperscript{549} From private interviews with Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16 April 1998); JM Mabéko-Tali (27 April 1998); Luís dos Passos (13 May 1998), among others.

\textsuperscript{550} This reason is also supported by some of my interviewees such as Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16 April 1998); JM Mabéko-Tali (27 April 1998).

\textsuperscript{551} Zenha Rela, José Manuel Angola ... op. cit. p.53.
Therefore, from the government or the people’s perspective there were clear signs of a weak public commitment to public welfare. The palpable result was a decline in social services by the end of 1977 and during 1978. Consequently, not only did the existing living conditions deteriorate for most of the people (in terms of education, health services, housing, social support and community services), but their future perspectives were also jeopardised (diminishing, for instance, their and their children chances of socio-professional and economic promotion as well as their life expectancy). In the medium and long term, such decline meant an increasing economic, political and social fragility for the bottom layers of society (the majority of the population) most in need of social support.

Concluding chapter 7, and based on the five main analytical indicators used, it can be asserted that during Agostinho Neto’s presidency, the construction of the new framework of economic relationships was essentially marked by a double characteristic: firstly, the general inefficiency and lack of productivity of the State sector, be it in terms of public administration, agriculture or manufacturing industry; secondly, an overall economic dependency on the oil rent.

This brought about the beginning of a process of economic autonomy of the ruling elites in relation to the productive effort of the ruled masses and also the increasing economic fragility of the ruled masses, most affected by the scarcity and loss of purchasing power (that was not entirely compensated by the informal practices, which mainly benefited the upper social strata). Factors such as the war or the neglect of social sectors reinforced all this process (the war contributed to economic scarcity; the social sectors neglect further reinforced the economic fragility of the lower social strata).

The oil rent ended up as the main support of the whole economic system: directly supporting the official/formal economy (financing the subsidised prices of goods and equipment and also the salaries of the inefficient
and unproductive State sector), and indirectly supporting the unofficial/informal economy (financing all the administrative economic distortions, privileges and benefits which allowed straddling activities).

The party top organs controlled all this oil supported system, be it at the level of the formal economy (managing the government and the State structure), be it at the level of the informal economy (managing the nominations giving access to all the main privileges and benefits).
8 - The Framework of Ethical and Normative Principles

I now turn to the normative rules that emerged during this period, clarifying the emerging political and economic framework of relationships between rulers and ruled. According to a modern patrimonial perspective these principles sustain the personalisation of political power, along with the legitimisation of *rentière* and predatory economic practices, through lines of micro-identity solidarity. Such principles shared by all social layers support and reinforce the existence of extensive distributive chains of dependence between rulers and ruled. A post-modern patrimonial system sustains the existence of those same principles and practices at the top or bottom social layers. Nevertheless, in face of the non-fulfilment of the distributive obligations by the ruling elites towards the population, a flexible or pragmatic normative framework emerges, according to which the ends justify the means (unregulated predation) breaking the normative interdependence ties between rulers and ruled.

In order to gauge the emerging framework of normative principles during the presidency of Agostinho Neto, this chapter will be structured around two main indicators: the principles that guide the economic and political management of power used by the leader at the top of the system, which is important when gauging the criteria that influence the exercise of power, its guiding principles and inner logic (8.1); the normative principles and criteria underlying and guiding the economic and social practices of the greater part of the population (8.2).

8.1 The Main Principles at the Top of the System

Clarification of the principles that were to guide the economic and political management of power emerged after a direct confrontation between the left and rightwing at the December 1978 CC plenary.

The struggle and internal balance of forces between both wings inside the party went through different stages. Right after the independence the rightwing seems to have acquired a first advantage in this struggle. Their influence over Neto was significant and came to be ironically referred within the leadership as *Catetização do Poder*. As explained by Mabéko-Tali,

Les conceptions de cette tendance [called rightwing in this work and *traditionnaliste* in Tali's work] tournent autour de la défense d'une base M'Bundu du pouvoir politique, avec prédominance des
M'Bundu de Catete—dont est originaire Agostinho Neto [...] C’est d’ailleurs déjà le facteur fondamental de leur relative influence sur Agostinho Neto. [...] ce fut un facteur non négligeable dans la manière dont le chef de l’État gérât alors le pouvoir: les décisions prises en haut lieu pouvaient cependant—dès l’indépendance—être altérées en fonction des entrées et sorties du palais présidentiel des “sages” ou d’autres personnalités importantes Catete, liées ou non à ce groupe. 

Thereafter, due to the Nitista threat (bringing about the union of both wings against the Nitistas — seen as a common threat) and to the October 1976 plenary (with the official adherence to Socialism), the leftwing achieved a political preponderance. However, as soon as the Nitista threat disappeared (with the purge and rectification), divergences between both groups re-emerged and became progressively more acute in late 1977 during the preparations for the first congress. By then the rightwing attempted to place as many of its members as it could in the CC and to get at least one seat in the Politburo; a move that was so obvious that it was criticised by some at the congress\(^553\) and reported externally as the action of a ‘regional lobby known as the Catete group’ \(^554\). Although the rightwing failed to get the long desired Politburo seat, it nevertheless secured several places at the CC\(^555\), regaining its initial advantage on the internal power struggle.

Progressively (by the end of 1977 and during 1978), such power struggle became more politically defined in terms of opposing organisational principles and concrete policies sustained by each side as expounded below and close to the main criteria established by Wallerstein to define left and right in Africa (economic policy; political management/ideology; foreign policy)\(^556\). Before entering into the concrete analysis of the opposing political positions assumed, it must be once again stressed that these are not fixed and need to be placed into the specific historical context, as explained by Wallerstein:

\(^{552}\) In Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, Dissidences ... op.cit. p.411.

\(^{553}\) See Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola ... op. cit. p.167.

\(^{554}\) In Somerville, Keith, Angola ... op. cit. p.86; also Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola ... 

\(^{555}\) From the previously mentioned prominent members of the rightwing, Imperial Santana was the only one out of the CC.

\(^{556}\) See Wallerstein, Immanuel, 'Left and ... op. cit. pp.5-10.
Of course, the appropriate labels vary, the programmatic contents of the parties vary, the relative strengths of the factions vary, the forms of political alliances vary — all according to the particular historical circumstances, both nationally and internationally. This said, the left and right wings here mentioned, must be understood as any other socio-political classification used in Angola — useful to explain a specific period (1975-1983) but changeable over time, and fading in importance from 1982/83 onwards as we will see.

Hence, the leftwing (whose most prominent or publicly known members were Lúcio Lara, Carlos Dilolwa, Iko Carreira and António Jacinto) defended the notion of a Marxist-Leninist ideology and a steady progression towards Socialism:

a) In terms of economic policy, they advocated an all-out fight against the anti-revolutionary practices such as the black market, absenteeism, diversion of produce and non-fulfilment of production targets, as well as deeper economic co-operation with countries of the Eastern block, especially Cuba. This leftwing position on economic principles was led by Carlos Dilolwa (minister of planning and second deputy prime minister);

b) In terms of political management, the leftwing supported a system exclusively determined by revolutionary criteria, i.e. if the main objective was the construction of Socialism, then the top (strategic) positions of the Party and the State should be occupied by a vanguard, well-versed in Marxist–Leninist theory, deeply committed to that aim; rejecting any criterion of demographic weight within the

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557 Wallerstein, Immanuel, 'Left and ... op. cit. p.2.
558 It must be stressed that the classification of left and rightwing is mine according to the criteria presented and following Wallerstein's mentioned article. The people interviewed on this subject have other classification for these two groups; for instance, Mabéko-Tali calls the rightwing traditionalistes and the leftwing gauche etoufée (as previously referred), all the other interviewees call them just 'tendencies', because it was recently accepted within the MPLA the right to political tendency and therefore, it became the most commonly used term in political millieux. Nevertheless, the important here is to define the concrete positions of each side.
559 From private conversations with late Carlos Dilolwa (August-September 1994); also from private interviews with Costa Andrade N'Dunduma (30 March 1998); Raúl Araújo (2 April 1998); J.M Mabéko Tali (27 April 1998); Lúcio Lara (1 May 1998); Paulo Jorge (26 June 1998); Pepetela (7 July 1998); António Cardoso (10 July 1998).
Creole/M'Bundu alliance, therefore rejecting the rightwing pressures for a black M'Bundu base of power (mainly from Catete, *cf. supra*)\textsuperscript{560}. Although respecting the possible ideological honesty of such position, we can not ignore that it served well the personal interests of its proponents within the party; i.e. despite the smaller demographic weight of this lighter skinned coastal segment of elite (basically sustaining the leftwing), their relatively higher educational level and ideological preparation would ensure their political primacy in a vanguard party.

c) In terms of foreign policy, the leftwing stood for an intransigent and radical path alongside other Socialist countries, reinforcing the Cuban presence at all levels of co-operation (military and civil), rejecting any concession towards the U.S/South Africa demands for Cuban troops withdrawal and rejecting any relationship between the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and the implementation of UN 435 resolution (independence of Namibia).\textsuperscript{561}

On the other side, rejecting Marxism or any other ideology and defending culture and tradition, the rightwing (whose most prominent members were Agostinho Mendes de Carvalho, Domingos Paiva da Silva, Imperial Santana, Bernardo de Souza and Manuel Pedro Pacavira) sustained:

a) In terms of economic policy, a more pragmatic and flexible position, accepting socio-economic organisation as it now was, i.e. an officially proclaimed Socialist model masking and indirectly supporting a generalised and effective straddling between legal and illegal markets (private business) through an hierarchical/discriminatory distributive system of benefits and

\textsuperscript{560} From private conversations with Carlos Dilolwa (August-September 1994); also from private interviews with J.M Mabéko Tali (27 April 1998); Lúcio Lara (1 May 1998); Paulo Jorge (26 June 1998).

\textsuperscript{561} From private interviews with Costa Andrade N'Dunduma (30 March 1998); Lúcio Lara (1 May 1998); Paulo Jorge (26 June 1998); António Cardoso (10 July 1998).
privileges managed by the top leadership of the Party. They had little faith in the communist policies of collectivisation of the land and criticised the leftwing radical stance towards the private initiative.

b) In terms of political management, the rightwing supported a leadership system respecting the demographic weight of each Creole/M'Bundu elite segment within the MPLA, through which, though darker, less educated and from the interior of the country, they could achieve political primacy, dethroning the leftwing lighter skinned, coastal ideologues or intellectuals (as they called them). Once assured of their primacy within the Creole/M'Bundu core of the MPLA and following the same logic, they favoured a balanced representation of other regional and ethnic sensibilities, providing them with places within the party hierarchy, but obviously without challenging the Creole/M'Bundu primacy over the whole political system. Towards those groups outside the MPLA, the rightwing stood for a pragmatic solution, i.e. the co-option or integration of their members within the middle rank hierarchy of the party (and consequently within the distributive hierarchy), thus broadening the socio-political support of the MPLA;

c) In terms of foreign policy, they placed nationalism above internationalism, having serious reservations about the Cuban presence, sustaining a more flexible and pragmatic approach on

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562 From private interviews with J.M Mabéko Tali (27 April 1998); Pepetela (7th July 1998).
563 From private interviews with J.M Mabéko Tali (27 April 1998); Pepetela (7th July 1998); As previously referred, according to Mendes de Carvalho, (the most prominent leader of the right wing) he and those who shared his opinions always rejected Marxism and were never Marxist. He even warned several of his colleagues at the CC (‘those who were always defending Socialism and Marxism’) of the danger of such an option and that ‘it was going to lead us nowhere’; from private interview with Mendes de Carvalho (17 July 1998).
564 From private interview with J.M Mabéko Tali (27 April 1998); and from what can be clearly deducted from private interview with Mendes de Carvalho; without specifying any further Mendes de Carvalho sustained that ‘We must be realistic and cautious towards the regional and racial factors and to the majority in order to avoid negative comments like those usually heard among the people, pointing to the privileges of some [obviously the whites and mesticos]. This has nothing to do with racism, just diplomacy, wisdom and good sense’; from private interview with Mendes de Carvalho (17 July 1998).
diplomatic issues concerning the West and especially the US and South Africa; i.e. accepting the possibility of making concessions towards the US/South Africa demands for Cuban troops withdrawal in order to facilitate the implementation of UN resolution 435 and the US recognition of the Angolan government.  

The struggle for power and for opposing organisational principles between left and rightwing reached its height at the CC’s plenary in December 1978 (6th to 9th December). There the two wings had a head-on collision, pressuring Neto to take sides, but the President’s hybrid nature (whereby he represented some features of both sides) and his already strong personal control over the whole political system, allowed him options very close to the ones sustained by the right wing, but without making it look like a defeat for the left, as we will now see.

8.1.1 The normative principles of economic practice

At this level, the leftwing suffered a major setback. The pragmatism and flexibility sustained by the rightwing won right out:

a), internally, the CC meeting gave the go-ahead to private Angolan businessmen to set up construction companies and trucking businesses (merchandise transport to provinces). At a rally in Luanda on 10 December, the day after the meeting, Neto stressed that private Angolan capitalists would have a role to play in the country’s economy and a week later, on the 17 December, declared ‘the need to offer more possibilities to private initiative in our country [...] which is not as counter-revolutionary as might seem at first.’; he also announced the lift of the prohibition towards informal construction (recognising the State’s incapacity in the housing sector) and suggested a more
flexible attitude towards the *petit commerce* as a possible way to help the recovery of rural markets, recognising that ‘men and women who live in the country suffer a lot, because they can hardly sell, buy or even produce’\(^{568}\). Even foreign observers usually sympathetic to leftwing positions such as David Ottaway, admitted and justified the need for Neto’s pragmatism,

> The need for pragmatism is apparent to the visitor. Every Luanda grocery store seems to have a long queue outside, and fruit, vegetables and meat are in short supply. In a land that once ranked among the world’s leading coffee exporters, there is little coffee available in the capital.\(^{569}\)

Apparent or not, such pragmatism was seen as a major setback to the leftwing, especially to Carlos Dilolwa who expressed his disagreement not only towards such concessions, but also towards the ‘patrimonial way of managing the economic affairs’\(^{570}\), having immediately resigned his place in government (as second deputy-prime minister for economy) and his politburo seat. The prime minister Lopo do Nascimento, by then assuming a position close to Dilolwa (although it is arguable if he in fact assumed a leftwing stand in all matters), lost his place at the politburo and also his place as prime minister, a position that was quite simply abolished (as previously discussed).\(^{571}\) Other leftwing members such as António Jacinto ended up accepting Neto’s pragmatism\(^{572}\).

A few months later, during his May Day speech, Neto specified the new areas open to private initiative, particularly limited private commercial activities of food and consumer goods in order to help to make up for shortages caused by inefficient production and distribution\(^{573}\). While Neto was publicly

\(^{568}\) Reported by Augusta Conchiglia to *Afrique-Asie*, 177 (25th December 1978), pp.23-25; also in Radio Nacional de Angola (10th December 1978), cit. in *SWB* (13 December 1978); see also *Le Monde* (12 December 1978).

\(^{569}\) Article of David Ottaway ‘Angola tries new pragmatism; Neto asks for help to repair economy’ in *Herald Tribune* (27th December 1978).

\(^{570}\) From private conversations with Carlos Dilolwa (August-September 1994); also in Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, *Dissidences* …op.cit. p.410.

\(^{571}\) Contrary to Dilolwa who resigned from all posts within the Party and the government, Lopo do Nascimento kept his seat at the CC and was later reassigned to a place representing Angola in the OUA (obviously a demotion) and then as provincial commissioner; from private interviews with Diógenes Boavida (13th March 1998); Victor Aleixo (26th March 1998); Adérito Correia (13 April 1998).

\(^{572}\) In Mabeko Tali, Jean-Michel, *Dissidences* …op.cit. p.410.

\(^{573}\) Cit. in *Associated Press* (2 May 1979).
announcing several concrete concessions towards the private sector, the only thing the leftwing achieved was a vague and vacuous May Day politburo statement denouncing the retrograde values of capitalism sustained by some sectors of the ‘petite bourgeoisie’ (obviously referring to the rightwing).

Some sectors of the petite bourgeoisie want to step into the shoes of the colonial bourgeoisie and thus increasingly assume the ideological and moral values of capitalism — disdain for the working class, refusal to solve the concrete problems of the masses, the love of luxury and the easy life, the spirit of ostentation, negligence, political and economic corruption, opportunism, spreading of obscurantism and superstitious concepts [most probably referring to traditional superstitions related with sorcery] — in a word all the retrograde moral values of the enemy [my bold].

b), externally, Neto showed some signs of pragmatism and liberalism even before the CC plenary. In an attempt to normalise economic relationships with the West, the President began to approach the EEC countries in general and Belgium in particular, whose foreign minister was told by Neto that Angola was eager to establish co-operative economic relations with West European countries in order to diversify its international relations and reduce its dependence on Cuba and the Soviet bloc. Beyond government-to-government agreements, Neto showed his interest in private Western investment on a large scale, mainly directed to oil exploration (open to other companies besides Gulf and Petrofina), but also including development projects in other areas such as fisheries, the recovery of the port of Lobito, the

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574 Cit. in The Guardian (US) (9th May 1979).
575 In July 1978, the EEC’s Commissioner for Development, Claude Cheysson, visited Angola and according to his own words, ‘Angola wanted to increase trade with the West and welcomed Western investment [...] I was struck by the desire of Neto and his Ministers to immediately discuss certain development problems. Their traditional partners cannot offer them much in this field’; cit. in ACR, 11 (1980), p.B497.
576 Such statement was made during a visit of Henri Simonet (Belgian foreign minister) to Luanda in September 1978; in New York Times (18 September 1978); also ACR, 11 (1980), p.B497.
Benguela Railway, iron- and uranium mines. In the mean time, Angola was granted the status of observer in the renegotiations of the Lomé Convention.

At the level of foreign economic policy, a few days before the plenary Western reporters already talked of a 'shift from ideology to pragmatism' as the internal 'economy founders' and by the time of the CC plenary (6-9 December 1978) the economic approach towards the West was re-affirmed and made concrete. Neto, thus announced the preparation of a new and more attractive law for private foreign investment which was effectively passed in July 1979, covering all aspects of economic activity, allowing several benefits such as the repatriation of profits, guarantees of compensation in the event of nationalisation, exemption from tax and from customs duties. In the specific case of the oil sector, the new law was even more 'liberal' than the ones already approved in 1978.

8.1.2 The normative principles in terms of power management

After the plenary Neto definitely put in place a management system based upon the distribution of privileges and benefits through rotating nominations to Party and State top positions; making for a kind of a carrousel of posts on which the key elements of the Party rotated according to the political needs of a system which took into account micro-identity internal (ethnic, sub-ethnic, regional

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578 In West Africa (23 October 1978).
580 In article of David Lamb 'Angola moving to end isolation from the West and dependency on Cubans' in Los Angeles Times (3 December 1978); also article of David Lamb 'Cuban advisers downgraded; Angola turns pragmatic as economy founders' in Herald Tribune (6th December 1978); also article of David Ottaway 'Angola tries new pragmatism; Neto asks for help to repair economy' in Herald Tribune (27th December 1978).
581 In article 'Angola states terms for investors' by Quentin Peel in Financial Times (11th July 1979); see also Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. pp.32-33.
582 As stressed by Bhagavan, just like the earlier 'Oil Law' (13/78 of 1978), this new law appeared somewhat liberal compared with other African countries with similar economic systems, providing benefits such as guaranteed non-nationalisation for 10–15 years; guaranteed payment of adequate indemnities and interests for a later nationalisation allowing the transfer of profits of up to 25% of the invested capital; access to the Angolan credit market; exemption or reduction in taxes and import or export duties during the first years of production; authorised transfer of ways of paying foreign debts. In
and racial) balances. Obviously, as should be clear, this balance was in fact meant to be skewed in favour of the Creole/M'Bundu core of the MPLA, assuring them the political and economic supremacy over the great alliance represented by the MPLA and, consequently, over the State. Such supremacy was achieved not only through the Party’s all powerful presidency (occupied by Neto), but also through the occupation of a higher number of top positions -- mainly in the Politburo, the Central Committee, the General Staff, central and local government (ministers, vice-ministers, secretaries of State and provincial commissioners), top management of public companies and embassies.

In these terms, after the plenary the President remodelled the top organs of the Party and of the State, starting with the Politburo, which was to comprise three *mestiços* (Lúcio Lara, Iko Carreira and António dos Santos França N’Dalu)\(^{583}\), three black Mbundu (Agostinho Neto, Eduardo dos Santos and João Luís Neto Xietu), three Bakongo (Pascoal Luvualo, Rodrigues Joao Lopes Ludy Kissassunda and Ambrósio Lukoki) and two Cabindan (Evaristo Domingos Kimba and Pedro Maria Tonha Pedalé)\(^{584}\). The supremacy of the Creole/M'Bundu was clear with six elements. The Ovimbundu were the only ethnic group, from amongst the larger and more political relevant groups, that were not represented in the Politburo because of the resentment provoked by renewed UNITA/South Africa offensives and growing linkages between the Ovimbundu and UNITA. Nevertheless, below the Politburo level some MPLA Ovimbundu old time members managed to achieve top positions; such was the case of Faustino Muteka who was nominated minister of transport in January 1979.\(^{585}\)

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\(^{583}\) As previously mentioned, the other two *mestiços* in the politburo — Dilolwa and Lopo do Nascimento — had resigned and been dismissed, respectively. Although Lopo is not a *mulato* (son of a black and a white parent like Dilolwa), he is still a *mestiço* (those with some degree of mixed race between black and white) coming from an old family of mixed race in Golungo Alto (Kwanza Norte province); information drawn from personal knowledge of some members of his family.

\(^{584}\) The secessionist tendencies, the activities of FLEC and the growing economic dependency from oil demanded special attention to Cabindans, reserving them important places at the top organs of the Party.

\(^{585}\) In Rádio Nacional de Angola (17 January 1979), cit. in *SWB* (19 January 1979).
identity balance there was reshuffling in the Central Committee and also in the central and provincial governments; in consequence of such rotation, in 1979, all provincial commissioners were ex-officio members of the government.\textsuperscript{586}

Beyond those very top organs, at an intermediate level of the State hierarchy, a few months before the plenary Neto had already shown signs of wanting to manage the political system based on the strategic or selective integration and co-option of members of other movements and even of dissident groups within the MPLA. Therefore, in September 1978, he announced in Cabinda, his policy of clemency and partial amnesty followed by integration within the MPLA, towards members of the FNLA, the FLEC, the Active Revolt, the Eastern Revolt and Nito’s sympathisers (still without mentioning UNITA)\textsuperscript{587}. Later on, right after the plenary, Neto stated that all those who once belonged to such organisations ‘must have the same opportunities and rights without any discrimination whatsoever’.\textsuperscript{588} As a result of this new policy of clemency, several members of the FNLA deserted and surrendered to the MPLA during 1979, after which they were reintegrated within State structures along with the freed members of MPLA’s dissident groups.\textsuperscript{589}

In sum, with the exception of UNITA and the Ovimbundu (for the reasons explained), the management strategy pursued was becoming clearly close to the one characterised as modern patrimonial in part I -- according to which the art of politics consists in satisfying lavishly your own socio-cultural

\textsuperscript{586} Due to the enormous extension of all these reshuffling it is not possible to describe it in here in detail; for a complete outline of such reshuffling see Diário da República, I, November–December 1978, especially from no. 266 to no. 301, and January–December 1979.


\textsuperscript{588} In Rádio Nacional de Angola (17th December 1978), cit. in SWB (19th December 1978).

\textsuperscript{589} Five leaders of the FNLA, all old members of Chipenda’s Eastern revolt, returned to Luanda in January 1979: Victor Kambuta and Luis Azevedo Jnr, both members of the FNLA’s politburo; Manuel António, Silva Neto and Dinis de Moura, both members of the FNLA’s Central Committee. Due to previous negotiations with Zaire in late 1978, Neto got Mobutu to announce the expulsion of the FNLA and the FLEC from Zaire; latter, on 27 October 1979, even Holden Roberto was expelled from Zaire, taking refuge in Paris with several other leaders of the movement, representing a major and definite military blow to Holden Roberto’s FNLA ambitions; In ACR, 12 (1981), p.B674; on the agreement Neto and Mobutu see Wolters, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola ... op. cit. pp. 216-223.
and identity group, while rewarding the elites of other such groups sufficiently for them to have an interest in maintaining the status quo (cf. supra, Part I).

8.1.3 The guiding principles in terms of foreign policy

In parallel to the attempted normalisation of economic relationships with the West (during the summer of 1978), Neto also pursued a foreign policy designed to weaken external support for UNITA (and what was left of FNLA and FLEC), approaching diplomatically not only the EEC countries as mentioned, but also Portugal (where UNITA found support among the Portuguese returnees)\(^{590}\) and even cultivating the US (by discussing the intention of reducing dependency on Cuban and Soviet influence). On the US side, the move was immediately reciprocated in June 1978 by the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, announcing that Washington ‘wished to improve its relations with Luanda’\(^{591}\) and right after the CC plenary a US delegation visited Angola (13 December) and was told by Neto that Angola was ‘prepared and willing to establish diplomatic relations with the US, although it could do nothing about reducing the number of Cuban troops because of South Africa’s daily attacks’\(^{592}\). By then, during the ‘Carter administration’, Washington came very close to recognise the Angolan government despite the Cuban military presence\(^{593}\).

\(^{590}\) In June 1978, there was an historic meeting between Neto and Portugal’s President Ramalho Eanes in Guinea-Bissau which resolved many of the issues that had kept Angolan-Portuguese relations very cool since independence such as the activities of the FNLA, UNITA and FLEC in Portugal. For the amazement of many observers, Neto invited the estimated 7000 refugees in Portugal to return home and a contingent of Portuguese technicians was expected to go to Angola; in Herald Tribune (6 December 1978); see also ACR, 11 (1980), pp.B496-B497.


\(^{592}\) As reported by David Ottaway to The Washington Post (14 December 1978); see also the report of Flora Lewis to The New York Times (13 December 1978); also The Sun (US) (13 December 1978).

\(^{593}\) See Wright, George The Destruction of a Nation, United States’ policy toward Angola since 1945 (London: Pluto Press, 1997), chapter 5 and 6; also in the same sense, Patricio, José Angola — EUA, os caminhos do bom senso (Luanda: Executive Center, 1997), pp.50-51. However, the recognition did not happen and was delayed with the Reagan Administration (1981-1984) and the increased number of Cuban troops. The number of Cuban troops progressively increased from the estimated 19.000 in 1978 to 40.000 in 1987; see ACR, vol.11 (1980), p.B493 and ACR, vol.20 (1989).
In sum, it must be stressed that although in general terms the rightwing prevailed in terms of normative principles at the top of the system, this did not represent a decisive political defeat to the leftwing members. With the exception of Carlos Dilolwa who in fact resigned from his functions at the Politburo and the government (against Neto’s will\footnote{According to Dilolwa, Neto became furious when confronted with his resignation and tried to change his mind by all possible means. However, for Dilolwa, the economic concessions made by that plenary was a decisive setback on the road to Socialism and a major crackdown on the principles he sustained and believed in; their long friendship and complicity since the anti-colonial struggle came to an end, because, according to Dilolwa, Neto could not stand to be so publicly rebuked. From private conversations with late Carlos Dilolwa in Luanda (August-September 1994).}), the leftwing members in general kept their seats within the CC and the Politburo\footnote{As previously stressed, Lopo do Nascimento (although it is arguable if he was with the leftwing in all matters) lost his place at the politburo but not at the CC.}, as much as the rightwing members kept theirs at the CC\footnote{Those that we have previously mentioned as prominent ‘rightwing members’ such as Mendes de Carvalho, Domingos Paiva da Silva, Bernardo de Souza and Manuel Pedro Pacavira remained at the CC and those we mentioned as prominent ‘leftwing members’ such as Lúcio Lara and Iko Carreira remained in Politburo; from private interviews with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16 April 1998); Mário António Carvalho (6 May 1998); Paulo Jorge (26 June 1998); Mendes de Carvalho (17 July 1998).}. Thus, the internal balance of forces between the two socio-political groups was in general maintained.

8.2 The Main Principles for the Whole Population

Beyond the top of the system, there emerged a normative framework in terms of economic practices, prevailing solidarities and political procedure, which began to affect the day-to-day living conditions of the general population.

\textit{8.2.1 The normative principles in terms of economic practices}

For the majority of the population, the pragmatic (rightwing) economic position assumed by Neto at the top of the system was obviously seen as a first concession to the private/informal/illega procedures based on straddling that had been rife in all sectors of activity and throughout all social strata. Much more than that, it was implicitly taken as a first ‘official’ acceptance of the legitimising principles supporting those practices. Such procedures were made legitimate in the face of two simultaneous processes: a), the State’s ever
decreasing fulfilment of its distributive ‘obligations’ towards the majority of the
people (decreasing purchasing power of the salaries, shortage of food and
goods at official prices, deterioration of social support); b), the ever
discriminatory and selective character assumed by the party and State
nominations (and consequently, the ever discriminatory and restrained access to
benefits and privileges allowed by such nominations).

Beyond any discussion about the justification for this pragmatic
legitimacy\textsuperscript{597}, it is important to stress that once it was ‘officially’ accepted it
became a way of legitimising predatory practices. According to Messiant,

\begin{quote}
Un tel système, en Angola comme ailleurs, dès lors qu’il repose sur
l’inégalité de l’accès aux biens entre la nomenclature et le peuple et
sur la seule ‘loi’—donc l’impunité—du parti, est particulièrement
propice au (ou, plutôt, obligatoirement producteur du) développement de la corruption—au sens, ici, de l’abus individuel
de position de pouvoir —, celle-ci prenant de l’ampleur, en même
temps qu’une fonction sociale et une ‘valeur’ accrues, au fur et
tà mesure que la gabegie liée aux critères politiques-partisan de
nominations et à la bureaucratisation réduit l’ampleur des dites
libertés réelles—notamment la satisfaction des besoins de
subsistance élémentaires—et aboutit à une économie de rareté.
[... ] la ‘débrouille’ individuelle et la corruption des serviteurs de
l’Etat: c’est la pratique qui se développe à un niveau individuel
des détournements et des vols sur les lieux de production et de
travail, ce sont surtout bientôt, pour répondre aux besoins les
plus essentiels que l’Etat remplit de moins en moins (dont
l’alimentation, l’habillement). [my bold]\textsuperscript{598}
\end{quote}

From then on, a self-fulfilling cumulative process was unleashed through which
the increasing weakness of the official economy to provide goods and services
along with the party’s nomination system (‘elitist’ and discriminatory),
legitimised the informal economy and pushed for its ever increasing
development, further weakening the official economy and further legitimising
the informal/illegal.

\textsuperscript{597} Strictly from an economic point of view such an argument is clearly fallacious and unacceptable,
essentially resulting from unsustainable distributive expectations: \textit{ceteris paribus}, the destructive effects
of informal practices over the official economy necessarily diminish the State’s capacity to fulfil
expected obligations.

\textsuperscript{598} In Messiant, Christine, ‘À propos des..., op. cit. pp.78-79.
Therefore, contrary to Neto’s announced provisional character for the concessions made to private initiative\(^{599}\), the obvious truth to everybody was that those concessions were just the first of a long list to come. In fact, as soon as 1981/1982 there were already many signs of the irreversible character of this self-legitimising cumulative process supporting the spread of predatory practices and the informal market; according to Zenha Rela,

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\text{[In early 1980] 'Despise the private' so characteristic of the first years of independence, was progressively transformed in 'desire to be private' [...] Those in 1976 who attacked the saboteurs of the economy [the ones in the informal/private sector] were now beginning their path towards 'entrepreneurship', having gone through the intermediate and uncomfortable phase of candongueiro [person acting in the black market]. In 1981/1982, signs that this course was already on the way were too many and allowed one to state its non-reversible character. [My bold]}^{600}
\]

Insofar as the pragmatic or self-reinforcing legitimacy was obviously not legal, there emerged a distance between such pragmatic legitimacy and the legal legitimacy; i.e. informal practices that were illegitimate from the legal point of view, were in fact legitimate according to the accepted and spreading pragmatic legitimacy. The net result of this distancing was the general disrespect and contempt for the juridical order\(^{601}\) reported by the CC in 1980 as ‘non-fulfilment of the Law’\(^{602}\) and by other congress documents in more drastic terms,

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\text{[The non-enforcement of sanctions] increased the discredit for legislation and for the seriousness of principles, thus decreasing the state’s authority and facilitating petit-bourgeois attitudes such as the lack of discipline, o deixa andar [don't give a damn] and even the moral, intellectual and material corruption. Therefore, the established legality or, to be more precise, the legality that was}
\]

\(^{599}\) Right after the plenary when Neto announced that small private enterprises would be allowed, he stressed that such move did not mean that the aim of establishing a communist State was abandoned, adding that he looked forward to the day when every Angolan would stand up and say proudly “I am a communist”. Things would be different in 10, or 20, or 30 years, but the immediate and urgent need was just to get the society working smoothly and to solve the people’s problems; reported by Flora Lewis to The New York Times (13 December 1978).

\(^{600}\) Zenha Rela, José Manuel Angola ... op. cit. pp.57-58

\(^{601}\) We are obviously talking of civil matters; on defence and security matters the juridical order was feared and respected as we mentioned above.

\(^{602}\) In Relatório do Comitê Central ao 1º Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit...1980, p.95.
aimed to be established, has suffered some serious infractions. [My bold] 603

[Besides several other factors mentioned] The fundamental causes for the low level of accomplishment of those resolutions made by the 1st congress of the MPLA [in 1977] were [...] the non-exercise of authority by the police and the generalised non-fulfilment of the law [my bold] 604.

Recalling the argument in Part I it can be said that the moral order was becoming distinct and distant from the juridical order.

8.2.2 Normative principles in terms of prevailing solidarities

A specific type of solidarity began to prevail more in consonance with the developing economic procedures. The 1980 congress, which had denounced all the informal activities (generalised thefts, diversion of produce, corruption, organised networks, involvement of managers, cadres and security forces, and so on) also attacked the prevailing solidarities making it possible, namely the 'regionalism, racism and sectarianism [...] which contributes to the disorganisation and lack of discipline in production and distribution, hampering the progress [...] towards Socialism'. 605 The CC report went even further, stating that,

The divisionist elements who take advantage of still-existing prejudice, be it tribal [ethnic], regional or racial, within Angolan society, just so they can pretend to be 'defenders of the people' whilst striving for personal interests or those of their group, must be persecuted as enemies of the working class, of the Angolan nation and of Socialism [...] Regionalism, tribalism and racism are reflections of pre-capitalist production relationships and colonial domination. These concepts, as we have been seeing, bring about divisions that can be taken advantage of by opportunistic elements in order to divide the popular masses. 606

603 In 'Principais resultados do desenvolvimento econômico-social da RPA no triénio 1978-1980' ... op. cit. p.11.
604 Ibid. p.27.
605 In Resoluções e mensagens do 1º Congresso Extraordinário ...op. cit...1980, p.36.
606 In Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit...1980, p.37.
A third congress document, drawing an economic and social balance of the 1978-1980 period added to those prevailing solidarities the 'nepotism'\(^\text{607}\) and *apadrinhamento* [i.e. patrimonial protection or preferentialism], thus 'promoting incompetence'\(^\text{608}\).

What made ethnicity, regionalism or nepotism 'a problem' in Angola as elsewhere in post-independence Africa was basically the preferential, sectarian and discriminatory type of solidarities it supported and the subsequent socio-economic distortions it generated\(^\text{609}\); distortions that could be effectively felt in Angola's daily life, not only at the level of informal business but in more general terms, as a national phenomenon spread throughout the whole country, as stressed by Neto in 1978, before that 1980 congress,

We know that there is tribalism still [meaning ethnicity]. It exists and we can feel it here in Bié [an 'Ovimbundu province'], in Luanda [a 'Creole/M'Bundu province'], in Zaire [a 'Bakongo province'], and in the provinces of Cabinda [of 'Cabindans'] and Mexico [Eastern and SouthEastern ethnic groups such as Lunda-Tchokwe, M'Bunda, Luchaze, among others]. It is there, despite the work we have been undertaking in order to accomplish national unity. We have achieved much through this effort. However, we have to recognise that tribalism exists. [My bold]\(^\text{610}\)

In these terms can be understood the advantages of the principles of political management developed by the President at the top of the system (in favour of a more 'balanced' ethnic and regional composition of top organs): on the one hand, as an attempt to set an example from above in order to avoid a radicalisation of such distortions throughout the whole society and country; on the other hand, as an 'official' acknowledgement of the necessity to manage such reality, thus integrating it instead of fighting it. In one way or another, the

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\(^{607}\) 'Principais resultados do desenvolvimento económico-social da RPA no triénio 1978-1980' ... op. cit. p.11.

\(^{608}\) Ibid. p.27.

\(^{609}\) For a comprehensive discussion of this subject see Bayart, Jean-François, *The State in Africa* ... op. cit. chapter 1.

position taken by Neto represented an allowance or acceptance of micro-
identity solidarities, even if politically managed and controlled.

8.2.3 The normative principles in terms of political practice

The beginning of the process of the insularisation of the formal political system
after the 27th May attempted coup (analysed in chapter 6) effectively
represented the beginning of political demobilisation and alienation for the
majority of the population, be it from formal or informal political mechanisms.
As stated by Messiant,

Sur cette question aussi [débrouille individuelle et corruption des
serviteurs de l'Etat] il me semble important de prendre en compte
dans le développement du phénomène, outre sa 'nécessité
structurelle' [...] certains facteurs politiques, non seulement ceux
liés aux aspirations et aux divisions au sein du pouvoir 'marxiste-
leniniste', mais aussi certains 'effets' sociaux de la répression du
coup d'Etat de 1977 qui aliène au pouvoir une partie de sa base
sociale, notamment urbaine et populaire. [my bold] 611

Also in a proximate sense is Zenha Rela, previously quoted, stressing that the
post-27th May repression and discrimination represents 'the end of any état
de grâce that the political power might have had to mobilise the people'612.
However, insofar as the socio-political impact of the war ensured the
continuation of significant political support for the MPLA, because of the fear
of UNITA, such political demobilisation and alienation did not represent a
straightforward loss of political legitimacy. It was the beginning of an
ambiguous process through which it was possible for the government politically
and economically to alienate the majority of the population but without loosing
its support (at least of those identified with the Creole/M'Bundu alliance).

Concluding chapter 8, we see that throughout Neto's presidency, the emerging
framework of ethical and normative principles was essentially marked by a
double characteristic:

611 In Messiant, Christine, 'À propos des..., op. cit. footnote 37.
1) At the top of the system, a clearly modern patrimonial model was adopted in terms of power management; a kind of patrimonial 

*carrousel* within which key elements of the party circulated according to the political needs of a system balancing micro-identity criteria through distribution. The main aim was for the leading group (the Creole/M'Bundu core of the MPLA) to ensure its control and primacy in sharing the spoils, whilst at the same time satisfying the needs of potential rivals, and to try to co-opt and integrate elements from other movements and ethnic backgrounds or internal rivals (except for the Ovimbundu).

2) At the bottom of the system, predatory practices spread throughout the whole social strata, legitimised by the decreasing fulfilment of the State’s expected distributive obligations and the party’s ‘elitism’. It was the beginning of the collapse of ethical and normative distributive principles between rulers and ruled and the breakage of extended distribution, even though this did not represent a straightforward loss of political legitimacy.

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612 In Zenha Rela, José Manuel *Angola* ... op. cit. p.53.
9 - The State During Agostinho Neto's Presidency (1975-1979)

The Angolan State, as has been shown, was to adopt the structure of a modern polity (Socialist–Marxist as opposed to other countries which adopted a Liberal-Capitalist model) whilst at the same time submitting that structure to a patrimonial working logic, thus bringing together two theoretically incompatible rationalities.

In practice, as has been demonstrated, the working logic of patrimonialism was quite compatible with, and even benefited from, adopting a Socialist–Marxist model of economic and political organisation of society and the State. According to such model, there is one Party only, ruled by principles of monolithic democratic centralism, which deeply penetrates the State and the armed forces. The Party manages the whole administratively run economy and the hierarchical system of access to material privileges and benefits. Therefore, within such a structure, the party/State became a valuable asset for patrimonial management, which required the concentration of power and centralisation of administration into a pyramidal configuration in order to subsequently concentrate and centralise the general distribution of benefits and privileges (as discussed in part I).

As in much of Africa, Angolan patrimonialism started off by being markedly partisan, soon displaying signs of presidentialism -- a process of concentration of power in the person and institution of the President of the Republic/President of the Party. The President then took on the main leadership of the patrimonial system. However, inasmuch as this presidential concentration of powers was based on and exerted through the party’s top organs (the Politburo and the CC), the party maintained a central role in the management of the system.

In sum, because of the general similarities between this State and the kind of State described by the modern patrimonial perspective and because of
its essentially partisan form, the Angolan State and the social organisation it supported during Neto’s presidency, will be here designated as ‘partisan modern patrimonialism’. Even though by the end of Neto’s presidency the political and economic framework of relationships between rulers and ruled already showed some signs of post-modern patrimonialism (such as the beginning of the dissolution of distributive interdependence ties) it still can not be considered post-modern as defined in part I
CASE STUDY, SECTION – C: DEVELOPMENT OF POST-INDEPENDENCE SYSTEM OR PRESIDENTIAL POST-MODERN PATRIMONIALISM, 1979-1985/87

After discussing in section B, the construction of the new post-independence system of social organisation in terms of the emerging framework of political, economic and normative relationships, we will now analyse the development of this system during the Socialist-Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos's presidency (1979–1985/1987).

The purpose is to compare two administrations and two subsequent periods of time in order to gauge differences in terms of patrimonial working logic. In short our intention is: 1) to see if those patrimonial principles and expressions as analysed in Neto's presidency did stabilise or whether they intensified; 2) to see if they did integrate rulers and ruled or on the contrary broke the ties that linked both. The aim is assess the main differences between modern and post-modern patrimonialism.
10 - Context of Socio-Political Events: Renewed Conflicts Between Left and Right at the Top

After the death of Agostinho Neto on September 9, 1979, the choice of Eduardo dos Santos by the politburo and the Central Committee was relatively smooth for three main reasons.

Firstly, because Eduardo dos Santos had been the implicit choice of President Neto, who left him in charge during his final trip to Moscow (where he died).

Secondly, because Eduardo dos Santos was able to get the support of the majority of the party leadership. He was seen as a sociological and political compromise between both groups: he was from the coast (Luanda), like most of the leftwing members, but unlike them he was from the muceques with very humble origins, not coming from the colonial bourgeoisie. As in the case of

613 After the death of President Neto, the Central Committee decided unanimously to nominate Eduardo dos Santos as Party President on the 20th September 1979. Born on 28 August 1942 in Luanda, José Eduardo dos Santos became the second President of the People's Republic of Angola. He was a black M'Bundu who grew up in Luanda's muceques and left colonial Angola to join the MPLA in 1961, the year the anti-colonial struggle was launched, and quickly rose to become a youth leader in Leopoldville (Kinshasa) and then chief representative in Brazzaville, where he underwent military training. Chosen for scholarship, Eduardo dos Santos went to the USSR in November 1963 where he spent six years graduating as a petroleum engineer. After his graduation in 1969, he took a military telecommunications course in the USSR, and in 1970, he went into the field as a radio operator and deputy head of telecommunication services in the MPLA's second politico-military region, Cabinda. At independence, dos Santos became the country's first foreign minister and later, first deputy-prime minister. After the 1977 Party congress where he was elected onto both the Central Committee and the politburo, he headed the Party Economic Development and Planning Secretariat and after the 1978 reorganisation, he became Minister of Planning in place of Carlos Dilolwa. At the MPLA-PT's first Extraordinary Party Congress held in 1980 (17 to 23 December), dos Santos was unanimously confirmed as the MPLA's president. The politburo's member, Lúcio Lara, told the opening session that all members of the Party had expressed confidence in dos Santos at provincial and municipal meetings. According to the Angolan Constitution, the Party leader was automatically Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the FAPLA. For bibliographical data on José Eduardo dos Santos see ARB (September 1979), p.5400 a-b; also ARB, (December 1980), p.5902; also Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. p.11; also Biografia Oficial de José Eduardo dos Santos, Presidente da República de Angola (Luanda: np, nd); probably written in 1994 after the signature of the Lusaka protocol which is the last event mentioned.

614 His father was a mason of humble origins without resources and although his mother still bore the Van Dunem name (a family belonging to the 'old coastal aristocracy'), it was not a 'legitimate' or direct familiar link. As explained to me by Pepetela who did some research on the background of the Van Dunem family before the writing of his book A gloriosa familia, there are hundreds (probably more than a thousand) people bearing the Van Dunen name, but the great majority of them are poor,
the leftwing members—he was quite acculturated, having finished his high school education in the Liceu Salvador Correia (the most prestigious high school in Angola, mostly attended by whites and mestiços), but like most of the rightwing members he was black. He was a communist, with further education obtained in the USSR (petroleum engineer), but a moderate one, known for his discreet and conciliatory stance over antagonistic positions within the politburo, the CC or the government\textsuperscript{615}, showing some signs of pragmatism during the time he was deputy foreign minister \textit{(cf. supra)}. Besides this hybrid stance between left and rightwing, he could even be considered a bridge to the younger generations, being very young (37 years old), but not from the youth committees generation, having left Angola in 1961, when the anti-colonial struggle began. Thereby he represented what several of my interviewees have referred to as the ‘lowest common denominator between the main tendencies at the top leadership’ (called left and rightwing in this thesis).\textsuperscript{616}

Thirdly and finally, because both wings within the top leadership of the MPLA could see in Eduardo dos Santos, because of his young age and unclear political stance, the possibility of manipulating and influencing him in favour of their respective interests.\textsuperscript{617}

The political practice of Eduardo dos Santos when President confirmed these observations about his hybrid nature and his capacity to articulate antagonistic positions. However, to the great disappointment and frustration of the competing party wings, the new President, whilst adopting a political stance very close to that assumed by Neto at the December 1978 plenary (closer to the underprivileged in socio-professional or economic terms and without any relationship to prominent members of the family. Some are bastard descendants of original Van Dunem, born from their relationships with slaves or concubines; some others are descendants of slaves or workers of the family who ended up informally adopting their name (as Van Dunem’s property); from private interview with Pepetela (7th July 1998).

\textsuperscript{615} Pepetela remarked on how José Eduardo dos Santos always made a point, during government meetings, of being the last to talk; he would then take the stance he saw as most neutral and conciliatory; he usually did the same at CC and politburo meetings as Pepetela was told (Pepetela only had access to government meetings); from private interview with Pepetela (7th July 1998).

\textsuperscript{616} From private interviews with João Melo (17 April 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998); JM Mabéko-Tali (27 April 1998); Pepetela (7 July 1998).

\textsuperscript{617} Several interviewees provided this angle: Mabéko Tali (27th April 1998); João Melo (17th April 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23rd April 1998) and Pepetela (7th July 1998).
pragmatic rightwing line), soon affirmed his power downgrading right and leftwing members, taking advantage of a favourable political context (as we will see).

According to one of his close collaborators, Eduardo dos Santos set himself two major strategic objectives by the time he assumed the presidency:

Firstly, the President wanted to assert his personal and institutional power beyond all groups and individuals within the Party and the State, ending the proximity and effective influence that 'old' prominent party members (of both political wings) had over the presidency during Neto's administration. The new president aimed to be surrounded by younger cadres, more technically and professionally prepared (be it in governmental or military issues) and less politically involved in old power disputes.

Secondly, he wanted to find a solution to the 'UNITA problem', be it through military destruction or integration, or a combination of both. Such a solution would necessarily imply coming to terms with South Africa and the US in order to cut their support to Savimbi, involving negotiation on the Cuban and Namibian issues (i.e. Cuban troops withdrawal and Namibian independence). The sensitivity of this second objective implied that the first objective be completely achieved (i.e. personal and institutional assertion of presidential power over the whole political system, groups and individuals); allowing him to take control of Angolan foreign policy.

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618 This information was given to me by Carlos Feijó, secretary of the Council of Ministers for several years and commonly known as very close to the president. According to Feijó, these objectives were explicitly and personally discussed by the president himself. Such information was taken as credible not only by the credit such person deserves within the Angolan political milieu, but essentially because the analysis of Eduardo dos Santos practice during his Marxist phase confirms it; from private interview with Carlos Feijó (10th April 1998).

619 In the words of Carlos Feijó, 'The president wanted to refresh the presidential entourage and therefore we were born', referring to himself and whole the other technicians and cadres pejoratively called 'kids from Futungo' as previously explained; from private interview with Carlos Feijó (10th April 1998). Also referring to the young technocrats as an emerging influential group in 1982 see the report of Michael Holman in Financial Times (21 June 1982). Even the official biography of Eduardo dos Santos contains a reference to the emerging young cadres around the presidency; see Biografia Oficial ... op. cit. p.6.
Insofar as the achievement of that first major objective greatly influenced, not only the achievement of the second major objective, but also the development of the political and socio-economic system during the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos (the main focus of this section), there is a need to analyse it as the proper context for the understanding of the remaining chapters. The analysis of the pursuit of the second objective will be provided later in sub-chapter 13.1.3.

10.1 The Internal Political Affirmation of the New President: 1979-1982

Attempting to take advantage of the transition period between presidential administrations, the leftwing launched new political offensives in order to recover from previous defeats, especially in terms of economic policy. Such new offensives resulted in three famous political/judicial cases (known as the Monty, Angonave and Kamanga cases) and the infamous incident of 'the picture and the play'. It was the manner in which the President handled this sequence of cases that enabled him to assert his personal and institutional power beyond all groups and individuals.

The first great leftwing offensive against the rightwing happened as early as September 1981, with the Monty case. It involved the Minister of Oil, Jorge Augusto de Morais 'Monty', a mestico, former chief of the MPLA's guerrilla and brother-in-law of Agostinho Neto, by then a leading left-winger, especially in terms of the fight against widespread corruption and the straddling activities that permeated the national oil company, Sonangol, from the top down. Monty publicly denounced the managing director of Sonangol, Hermínio Escórcio of receiving bribes and 'making irregular contracts for the sale of crude to the Gulf Oil Company'. He wanted to investigate fully the

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620 From private interviews with Júlio Morais (11th April 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16th April 1998); Cornélio Caley (2 May 1998); Mendes de Carvalho (17th July 1998).

621 In Foreign Report (11th November 1981), published by The Economist, p.5.
corruption, pointing out the need to keep the oil accounts firmly under governmental control (thus, under his own control as minister of oil). 622

Hermínio Escórcio, in turn, though also a mestiço, was not in anyway aligned with the leftwing, being close to the economic positions of the rightwing (even if he was not in any way directly related to them), being essentially a loyalist to the president or what is called in Angola um homem de lealdades pessoais (a man of personal loyalties) -- unconditionally loyal to his ‘boss’, to the one who ‘feeds’ him, the one who employs him in high places where one has access to privileges and benefits. He was not concerned with more encompassing strategies and manoeuvres of power influence like those of the left and right. Like so many others, he simply decided to make the most out of his position as long as he could. However, probably quicker than others, he understood that such possibility depended upon the new president’s personal will. 623 This is exactly the type of men that the president wanted around him.

The president nominated an ‘independent’ commission of inquiry and denied Monty the possibility of leading the investigation as Minister of oil. Probably dubious about the efficiency of that commission, Monty still tried to participate in the investigation 624 and was soon dismissed by presidential decree in November 1981 (approximately forty days after the accusations were made) 625. Hermínio Escórcio kept his place, although his guilt was clear to a lot of people 626. From then on (as we will accurately see in chapter 11), oil accounts came under the personal and institutional control of the President and

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622 From private interviews with Júlio Morais (11th April 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16th April 1998); Cornélio Caley (2 May 1998).
623 Ibid.
624 Ibid.
625 ‘The Oil Minister, Jorge Augusto de Morais “Monty”, is removed from office for not having presented valid reasons to justify his disobedience of the President of the Republic’s orders regarding the exercise of his office of oil minister and taking into account that his behaviour has contributed to the deterioration of working relationship between the oil minister and the Sonangol company, causing the breakdown of authority and discipline in the oil sector; also considering that the allegations against two Sonangol directors of bribery to the sum of US$10,000 each were not proven to this day, forty days having already passed.’, in presidential decree 88/81, DR, I, 262 (6 November 1981); see also Le Monde (3, 5 November 1981); also ARB (November 1981), p.6241-a; also West Africa (9 November 1981).
626 From private interviews with people who asked strict anonymity, for obvious reasons.
were sheltered from the fiscal control of the government -- and any leftwing members within it.

Given the failure of the first offensive, two others followed, which had far greater repercussions. Several months after the Monty case, in mid 1982, some anonymous rumours and documents were strategically put into circulation within the higher echelons of the party and State hierarchies (most probably by elements linked to the leftwing which dominated the Party's sectors for propaganda and information), uncovering frauds, deviations of funds and corruption schemes in Angonave, the national shipping company\

Subsequently, and using the same strategy, denunciations and damning information were spread in the second half of 1982 regarding another scandal, that of a network of diamond trafficking (Kamanga), which was rife at the very top of the party/State/military apparatus. So many people and so many posts were said to be involved that it was almost an 'institutionalised' activity\

The last great offensive by the leftwing took place almost in parallel with the previous ones, on the 28th August 1982, on the occasion of the celebrations of the President's birthday. It took the form of a picture (a satirical cartoon of the President that was given to him during the official ceremony of his birthday) and a play (which ridiculed, belittled and indirectly insulted some of the rightwing ministers, including its most prominent member, the Minister for Health and CC member Agostinho Mendes de Carvalho, known as Uanhenga Xitu, implicitly characterising them as corrupt, incompetent and ignorant). The new offensive provoked the immediate reaction of several

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627 From private interviews with Júlio Morais (11th April 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16th April 1998); Cornélio Caley (2 May 1998); Mendes de Carvalho (17th July 1998).
628 From private interviews with Júlio Morais (11th April 1998); Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16th April 1998); Cornélio Caley (2 May 1998); see also Le Monde (11th December 1982); also Expresso (7th July 1984); also ACR, Vol.17 (1986), p.B611 and p. B625 footnote 9.
629 In the cartoon, the President was represented as a footballer with a ball at his feet, with an oil well spouting cash, a sensual woman at his side and a woman's sexy legs coming out of a rubbish bin, a reference to his new girlfriend and the girlfriend he had recently left, the implication being that the President was happy-go-lucky, caring only about football, women and money. From private interviews with Raúl Araújo (2nd April 1998), the person who personally handed the picture to the president; Pepetela (7th July 1998); also from private interview with Christine Messiant (January 1998).
630 From private interviews with Raúl Araújo (2nd April 1998); Pepetela (7th July 1998); also from private interview with Christine Messiant (January 1998). Although Costa Andrade N'Dunduma, the
members of the rightwing; especially those most targeted in the play. They alerted Eduardo dos Santos to the mockery of the picture and the play and dramatically interpreted it as lack of respect towards the President\textsuperscript{631}.

In Angola (as in most patrimonial systems) accusations of corruption, deviations or thefts do not have a significant impact, either on those who stand accused, or on public opinion in general, given the spread of these practices throughout the whole society. However, personal mocking is a totally different matter, especially to people in leadership positions, \textit{responsáveis} or \textit{dirigentes}, as called in Angola. These acts are dramatically referred to in Angola as \textit{falta de respeito} (lack of respect), and have a devastating effect on the capacity to keep a leadership position. If this person is the Head of State, then it becomes even more serious since the attacks imply that he lacks all credibility as Chief, unable to display the main attributes of a leader, namely strength and authority.

Playing with this argument\textsuperscript{632}, the rightwing members led by Mendes de Carvalho 'pushed the President against the wall'. The fight between left and right had come to its climax and the Head of State was, therefore, left with no alternative other than to 'kill the snake and exhibit the stick' -- in other words, he had to affirm his personal and political authority with strength and might.

This is exactly what he decisively did. However, he did it not only towards the left but also towards the right, taking the opportunity offered him by the internal contenders themselves. On the one hand, the left had given him the necessary weapon to politically demoralise and neutralise the rightwing

\textsuperscript{631} From private interviews with Costa Andrade N'Dunduma (30th March 1998); Raúl Araújo (2nd April 1998); Pepetela (7th July 1998); Mendes de Carvalho (17 July 1998).
members who feared that investigations and trials on corruption cases might reveal possible the implication of its members; on the other hand, the right had given him the long desired legitimate argument (traditional) to react with firmness against the disrespectful attitude of the leftwing, which allowed him to neutralise the power of its members within the party.

The president could count on a lack of reaction from those two groups, firstly, because they were in a fragile position with the attacks they threw at each other; secondly, because a presidential punishment against both sides would not represent a victory of one over the other in their direct confrontation; thirdly, because it was clear to everybody that the party could not afford another bloody purge that would necessarily follow if any of them decided to resist the president; fourthly, there was no other member within the politburo that could embody the same political and sociological balance as Eduardo dos Santos; fifthly, because UNITA's guerrilla activity was increasing (with the help of South Africa) pressing the party to unite against that common threat.

In the face of renewed internal discipline problems and new South African incursions from August 1981 onwards\(^{633}\), Eduardo dos Santos demanded from the CC sweeping 'special/emergency powers', including military (which will be accurately analysed in the next chapter). Such powers were unanimously conceded at the CC's 11th ordinary session (held from 30 November to 8 December 1982) and served in the first place to initiate a selected political purge (more like a punishment) directed at some right and leftwing members at the top of the party and government, without avoiding two of the most prominent figures — Lúcio Lara for the left and Mendes de Carvalho for the right; both of whom had approved such powers at the CC's plenary probably

\(^{611}\) Such position (using that argument) was confirmed in private interviews with Costa Andrade N'Dunduma (30th March 1998); Raúl Araújo (2nd April 1998); Pepetela (7th July 1998); Mendes de Carvalho (17 July 1998).

without even imagining that they would be the first to be punished. That plenary marks the beginning of a new period of Eduardo dos Santos — a period of near-absolute personal control over the power apparatus and complete mastery over internal divisionism — that is the successful achievement of his first strategic objective.

10.1.1 The assertion of presidential power over the leftwing

The punishment of the left started soon after the mentioned 11th CC's plenary with the imprisonment of the author of the play, Costa Andrade N'Dunduma, a *mestiço* clearly aligned with the leftwing, secretary of the journalists' union and former official biographer of Agostinho Neto. N'Dunduma was arrested on 22 December, accused of factionalism and 'lack of respect for the President'. There then followed the arrests of prominent members from the DEPI — *Departamento de Estudos Propaganda e Informação* (Department of Studies Propaganda and Information) and from the Department for Organisation, both dominated by leftwing members; all under the same accusation of 'lack of respect for the President'. Within the DEPI, the most significant arrests and dismissals were those of Raúl Araújo, who had personally handed over the cartoon to the President, and Vantagem Lara, the adoptive son of Lúcio Lara. Within the department for organisation, directly supervised by Lúcio Lara as Secretary for organisation and cadres, the most significant arrest was that of one of its leading figures, Simão Paulo followed by the suspension of Ruth.

634 From private interviews with JM Mabéko-Tali (27 April 1998).
636 See *Diário de Notícias* (10th February 1983); also in *ARB* (February 1983), p.6739.
637 According to Raúl Araújo, the President's immediate reaction to the picture was one of relative indifference; the real problem came with the amplification given by 'other people' (obviously the rightwing members), who tried to take political advantages from it; from private interview with Raúl Araújo (2nd April 1998).
638 Simão Paulo was soon released (a month and a half later) with both Vantagem Lara and Raúl Araújo; from private interview with Raúl Araújo (2nd April 1998). Costa Andrade N'Dunduma, however, remained imprisoned until 25 January 1984; from private interview with N'Dunduma (30th March 1998).
Lara, the chief of MPLA’s section of cadres and wife of Lúcio Lara. The assaults on these two departments clearly represented a major attack on Lúcio Lara, usually considered internally and externally as the party’s number two.

The purge also included the head of DEPI, Ambrósio Lukoki, a Bakongo, old time member of the MPLA and Neto’s companion. He lost his seat at the politburo and also at the CC. Although Lukoki was not aligned with the leftwing, he allowed them great room for manoeuvre within the DEPI and did not care much about their effective domain over the department’s day-to-day activities. His dismissal was for having authorised the showing of the play without first having checked its content. In a clear demonstration of force, Lukoki was replaced in the politburo by Lt.-Col. Francisco Magalhães Paiva N’Vunda, head of FAPLA’s political commissariat and Vice-Minister of Defence. At the DEPI, Lukoki was replaced by Roberto de Almeida, a man distanced from the disputes between left and right, basically a loyalist to the new president as he had been to Neto, known as an ‘apparatchik’, inflexible follower of orders and bureaucratic procedures, who was to imprint an austere environment within the department.

On 23 December, the purge reached the government, with the removal from office of three members of the executive, usually identified with the left: the governor of the National Bank, José Vitor de Carvalho (replaced by the Finance Minister, Augusto Teixeira de Matos) and two vice-ministers, Luís Fonseca dos Santos, from the Ministry of Construction, and Artur Pestana Pepetela (the novelist), from Education.
By the end of December 1982, the purge had brought about the arrest of 32 members from the DEPI and the department for organisation. In February 1983, having asserted his power and calmed down the Party groups, the President reshuffled the ministries and took the opportunity to readmit 18 of the 32 suspended members, but only those who had proved to have had only minor involvement in the case. Ruth Lara, however, remained suspended from office, a mighty blow for Lúcio Lara who, from then on, gradually lost importance within the apparatus, being removed from the Politburo at the earliest opportunity, namely the following Congress in 1985; and his portfolio as secretary for organisation was absorbed into that of the president of the party.

10.1.2 The assertion of presidential power over the rightwing

Demonstrating that the rightwing itself was not to escape the President’s power, on July 1982, Manuel Pedro Pacavira was dismissed as Party Secretary for Production for alleged errors in his previous position as Minister of Agriculture (which he had relinquished two years previously -- obviously a pretext). Another prominent member of the right, Paiva Domingos da Silva was dismissed from his post as leader of the ODP and even Agostinho Mendes de Carvalho (the main target of Ndunduma’s play and the most prominent or

planning to do for a long time already and that had nothing to do with the picture and the play, but as his resignation occurred when it did and as the author was clearly linked to the leftwing, such resignation represented another loss for the left. This idea was reinforced a few days later, on 29 December, when Pepetela publicly criticised the arrest of Costa Andrade during an open debate amongst writers from both party wings in the Union of Angolan Writers. At that debate, the leftwing were in the minority and went out defeated in the criticism against N’Dunduma’s arrest. Abroad, the removal of Pepetela was interpreted in exactly the same way, as can be checked in the mentioned articles of Le Monde (7, 11, 24 January 1983) and also in ACR, 15 (1984), p.6598.

See Le Monde (8, 28, 31 December 1982).

In Diário de Notícias (10th February 1983); also in ARB (February 1983), p.6739.

Ibid.

In ARB (February 1986), p.7925a,b,c, and p.7926a; see also ACR, vol.18 (1987), p.620.

See ACR (July 1982), p.6538; also The Guardian (25th July 1982).

Ibid.
visible personality of the rightwing) was later dismissed from his post as Health Minister and dropped from the Council of Ministers on 3 June 1983.

In order to keep the right neutralised and fearful during 1983, the presidency promoted and allowed free judiciary investigation of the more visible cases of corruption, such as Angonave and Kamanga (launched by the leftwing in order to implicate rightwing members). The Monty case was an exception, being investigated by a special commission of inquiry nominated by the president, which was said to have found nothing, but still resulted in Monty’s dismissal. Besides this exception and probably for the first time in post-independence Angola, investigations on corruption followed a free course almost without political interference (the only political intrusion occurred when unexpectedly, some clues came to suggest a possible implication of the presidency in the Kamanga case, a suggestion that was immediately ruled out by the presidency itself). Regardless of that ‘little’ incident, the investigations provided concrete data for the elaboration of judicial processes, which made possible for trials to take place and judgement to be passed -- for the first and last time in cases of corruption.

The Angonave case was heard on 17 March 1984, but previous investigation revealed,

[...] The level of anarchy and disorganisation prevailing in the company and it was noted that the crisis was due to large scale economic sabotage [the usual term to designate all informal/illegal practices] involving almost the entire company management. [...] Who together with their relatives, used to travel abroad and stay in luxury hotels. These managers often acquired excess commodities and spent unjustified and astronomical sums when working for the company.

The People’s Revolutionary Tribunal in Luanda judged and condemned in absentia the managing director, Carlos Osvaldo dos Santos Rúbio, to eight

654 See ‘Speech of the President to one of the working commissions on the Party’s leading role’ in Documentos da 1ª Conferência Nacional do MPLA-PT, de 14 a 19 de Janeiro (Luanda: Edição do Secretariado do Comité Central, 1985), pp.76–77.
655 In Rádio Nacional de Angola (10th January 1983), cit. in SWB, weekly economic reports (18th January 1983).
years imprisonment for misappropriation of funds and several other company managers to lighter sentences.\textsuperscript{656}

The Kamanga case (lawsuit 105/83) was heard two months after the Angonave hearing, in May 1984, in the midst of great media attention; 124 defendants were taken to court\textsuperscript{657} (a very small number in relation to the size of the effective network and did not include the main leaders\textsuperscript{658}). They were accused of trafficking in diamonds and of illegal tender (US dollars). Of the 124 accused, 28 were tried \textit{in absentia} and 60 were foreign (56 Portuguese)\textsuperscript{659}. Several employees of the State Airline TAAC, including 8 pilots, were accused of helping to carry smuggled diamonds out of the country. Several senior state officials and high-ranking FAPLA officers were involved too\textsuperscript{660}. Two members of the Central Committee, Lt.-Col. David António Moisés ‘Ndozi’ and Celestino Bernardo ‘Tchizainga’ were suspended from their party positions (but not accused) following a report to the Party leadership from the Ministry of State Security suggesting they were implicated \textsuperscript{661}. The trial ended on 30 October with the death sentence for one Angolan defendant of Portuguese origin, Francisco Fragata, and 73 jail sentences, ranging from 5 ½ to 16 years\textsuperscript{662}. On 5 November, Roberto de Almeida, member of the CC announced that circa 500 people had been detained on diamond theft and trafficking charges. A series of smaller trials began after the main Luanda trial ended on 30 October\textsuperscript{663}.

As the main objective of the president with those investigations (during 1982/83) was to strengthen his power and to keep the ‘right’ neutralised and fearful, rather than fight corruption (whose ramifications were everywhere,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{656} In \textit{ACR}, 17 (1986), p.B611.
\item \textsuperscript{657} In \textit{Expresso} (7th July 1984).
\item \textsuperscript{658} From private conversations with a member of the ‘Kamanga network’ who asked me for anonymity. Also related to this ‘Kamanga’ process is the episode occurred within the family of Arlindo Barbeitos (writer) and reported in Part I as an example of conflict between judicial norms and moral norms.
\item \textsuperscript{659} In \textit{Expresso} (7th July 1984).
\item \textsuperscript{660} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{661} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{662} In \textit{ACR}, Vol.17 (1986), p.B611.
\item \textsuperscript{663} Ibid. p. B625 footnote 9.
\end{itemize}
including members of the CC and allegedly the presidency), once the power of the new president had been made manifest, the sentences (passed in 1984) turned into nothing. In the Kamanga process all the defendants appealed right after the trial and had their sentences commuted\textsuperscript{664}, and none of them served more than 1-\(\frac{1}{2}\) years of their sentences, including Francisco Fragata\textsuperscript{665}. As for the Angonave case, excluding Osvaldo Rúbio (who simply and strangely ‘eluded local vigilance forces and succeeded in leaving the country before the hearing’\textsuperscript{666}), all the other condemned managers appealed and were freed shortly afterwards\textsuperscript{667}.

Later on, in January 1985 during the national conference preparing the congress, at a time when the president had already assured his ‘absolute’ control over the power apparatus, he made himself quite clear on all the ‘corruption cases’ (Monty, Kamanga, Angonave), arguing the existence of a ‘class struggle’ (the usual Marxist term used to characterise all the power struggles within the MPLA) between two sides with different interests: on the one hand the ‘supposedly great Marxist–Leninists’ or Monty’s partisans (called leftwing in this work); and on the other hand, ‘other partisans’ (non-specified; but obviously referring to those here called rightwing). However, distorting the facts, the leftwing was blamed for the unsuccessful outcome of judicial processes.

Regarding the case of the former oil minister, Mr. Monty; he […] made an insulting intervention during the Extraordinary Congress [December 1980] Many comrades considered him a great Marxist–Leninist. Now they might say that this is no longer the case, but it seems to me that at that time, he was considered a great Marxist–Leninist.

It was not easy for me to deal with this matter regarding Monty because there were grave accusations of deviations of funds and

\textsuperscript{664} Ibid. p. B611.

\textsuperscript{665} Whose family I personally know for more than 20 years.

\textsuperscript{666} As reported by Rádio Nacional de Angola (10th January 1983), cit. in SWB (18th January 1983). According to some of my sources (people who worked at that time in Angonave with Rúbio and nowadays work in Secil Maritima, a company which came to replace several commercial activities previously done by Angonave), Rúbio was ‘officially’ allowed to leave the country before the trial in order to avoid the implication of higher echelons of the party and the government in the scandal; these sources asked for anonymity.

\textsuperscript{667} From private conversations with people working for Secil Maritima and who worked in Angonave by the time of the process; these sources asked for anonymity.
commissions. We responded speedily, and once again I resorted to the legal services to investigate the matter in order to attribute responsibility, because there were reciprocal accusations between a member of the Central Committee [Herminio Escórcio] and a member of the government [Monty] [...]. Nothing came out of it, the legal services were unable to attribute responsibility, because [...] when it comes to class struggle, there are interests and of course partisans on either side, and at that time, Monty's partisans made sure that the trials did not come up with the desired results, the same can probably be said about Angonave, the same could probably be said for other situations, for otherwise it would not make sense that blows were aimed at me too, as President of the Party, as Head of State, so that by using the services of my cabinet, we had to make public interventions during trial 105 [Kamanga] in order to redress the truth. I believe they wanted to hit me because I am José Eduardo dos Santos [President of the Party] because if I was José Eduardo dos Santos, worker in any company, nobody would worry about me.

But it was a hard knock because certain accusations were made up: vehicles were illegally appropriated, they tried to implicate me in diamond trafficking, and so on. A hearing took place without any one from my cabinet or even myself being consulted or heard. It was the Procurator General of the Republic [Procurador Geral da República or Procurador Popular] who at a certain point became concerned enough with that hearing at court to inform the President of the Party, because at the end of the day that tribunal depends on the President of the Republic. This is not normal behaviour in capitalist societies, let alone in our own.

Explanations about 'the picture and the play' were given at the CC’s report to the second congress (December 1985), interpreting that episode within the same context as the Angonave and Kamanga cases, namely as a reflection of the activities of Monty's partisans or the supposedly great Marxist–Leninists.

The incident of the picture and the play was mainly directed against the institutionalised power of the country and against the President and the party leadership; it somehow shook the party unity and cohesion and represented a serious violation of democratic centralism. When analysing this process, the Central Committee realised that there was a coincidence between the positions of the authors of the picture and the play and the stances taken by a group of party militants during the Party's first Extraordinary Congress [Monty's partisans]. These demonstrations expressed the position of a minority current within the Party, who must be completely eliminated. They were duly attacked and the main people responsible duly punished.  

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668 "Speech of the President to one of the working commissions ... op. cit. pp.76–77.
669 In Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso ... op. cit...1985, p.69.
As we will see in the next chapters, once the President had ensured his domination over the power apparatus (mainly from 1982 onwards), he then had more space for manoeuvre and to impose his own policies without constraints: on the one hand he gradually deprived the government and Party apparatus (where members of both party wings held posts) of effective executive power; on the other hand he took to extremes the centralisation of administration and concentration of executive and legislative powers in the institution and person of the President (as Head of State, Head of government and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces) and in subsidiary organisations, such as the secretariat of the Council of Ministers, the cabinet of the President of the Republic (with a civil and a military branch) and the cabinet of the Head of Government.

Although the posts and organisations that surrounded the presidency were subsidiary and supposed to provide only practical support, their effective power was on the increase. These institutions comprised mainly young people, namely the post-27 May generation; they were the ‘Futungo kids’, purged and rectified by Neto, submissive and subservient to the President to whom they owed their social, professional and economic advancement (above referred). They held military and technical administrative positions and were regular party members. By then, it can be said that the president had fully achieved his first major strategic objective (through a process that we will analyse in detail).

Concluding chapter 10, it must be stressed that in terms of the pursuit of the expounded presidential objectives, the administration of Eduardo dos Santos during his Marxist phase can be divided into two sub-periods: a first transitional period, between 1979-1982, during which the new president had to affirm internally his power within renewed conflicts between left and rightwing; a second period, from December 1982 onwards, which definitely saw the imposition of the President’s personal and institutional power over the
political system. This context is necessary for the understanding of the remaining chapters.
11 - Development of the Political Framework 1979-1985/87

This chapter aims to analyse the development of political relationships between rulers and ruled during dos Santos' administration so as to compare them with those prevalent in Neto's presidency. In short, the purpose is to gauge if the signs of 'insularisation' of the political system that were to be seen by the end of Neto's presidency increased and effectively excluded the ruled masses from formal political participation. In order to compare the two administrations this chapter will follow the same analytical indicators used to analyse Neto's presidency.

11.1 Party: More Rectification and Discrimination

Due to party discrimination and centralisation (all signs that were clearly to be seen during Neto's presidency), the lower levels of the party structure (party cells) were increasingly neglected in the distribution of privileges and benefits. In the early eighties, those party members who held positions in such marginal structures had no special material privileges in relation to other workers who were not party members, on the contrary, party work meant an additional burden, taking time that could be used in informal activities:

> They were paid the same wages as other workers, they shopped at the same shops, and the burden of party work actually meant they had less free time, since party cell meetings took place outside normal working hours. Party membership did hold the promise of reaching higher positions in your profession, but this was not guaranteed.670

Such type of party membership and party work at the base, became ever less attractive and the obvious result was the paralysis of party cells activity (socio-economic and socio-political programmes), especially at the provincial level. The first official warning regarding this situation came from the CC's report to the first extraordinary congress in December 1980, commenting on the increased problems of communication between the top and the bases of Party organisational structure, inasmuch as the decisions and directives from the

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670 Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola ... op. cit. p.177.
leadership were neither promptly nor efficiently passed down to the bottom, ending up as archive documents with further other use whatsoever. According to the report it was necessary to imbue the cells and the methods used with more dynamism in order to fulfil the Party's programmes.\textsuperscript{671}

Considering the inactivity of the party bases; considering the amorphous condition of mass organisations (J MPLA, UNTA, OMA) after the purge; considering the need to mobilise the masses towards party programmes (security tasks and socio-economic production campaigns); the new President therefore exhorted the Congress to reflect on means of ensuring revitalisation of the basis, expecting everyone to take part in Party activities, increasing Party membership, but without questioning the principles of rectification (i.e. without questioning the selective and discriminatory criteria as implemented during the Neto's presidency),

The huge growth of the party must not deceive us, instead we must concern ourselves with \textit{changing quantity into quality} and this Congress must take on the responsibility of reflecting on the mechanisms that will allow the next stage of normal ingress of members through the cells to establish, on the one hand, the necessary filter inspired by the principles of rectification and on the other hand, to ensure the ideological education and cultural improvement of each member, demanding that all should take part in party activities. [my bold]\textsuperscript{672}

It was difficult to increase party membership maintaining the same selective discriminatory ('elitist') criteria, especially because what was needed were mainly members from the provinces to occupy the provincial party base structures, where membership had less privileges and people were less educated (thus less capable to fulfil such criteria). The Campaign for Party Growth began recruiting in 1983 and its stated objectives were to double membership from

\textsuperscript{671} In Relatório do Comité Central ao I\textsuperscript{º} Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit...1980, p.21.

\textsuperscript{672} 'Opening speech of the President to the Congress' in Relatório do Comité Central ao I\textsuperscript{º} Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit...1980, p.5. Later on, during the above mentioned CC's plenary of December 1982, the situation had not improved in anyway and the plenary 'studied the reasons for the poor functioning of party structures'; in Rádio Nacional de Angola (9 December 1982), cit. in \textit{SWB} (13 December 1982).
30.000 to 60.000. However, given these difficulties, the figures quoted two years later (by the CC report to the 1985 congress) accounted for just 3.634 new members, far fewer than the 30.000 hoped for.

The alternative found by the party to integrate the masses in its programmes was a new mass organisation created in August 1983 through which, all Angolan citizens (men or women) were expected to volunteer for security and socio-economic development programmes – the BPV (Brigadas Populares de Vigilância/Popular Vigilance Brigades). Without selective criteria and pressuring people to volunteer, the recruitment for BPV comprised over 800.000 members, existing side-by-side with the ODP (People’s Defence Organisation; with an estimated force of 500,000 men).

Nevertheless, without any palpable benefits and not even being considered members of the party, the new BPV members contributed little to the revitalisation of the party organisation or its programmes. The functioning of the party at the base level got even worse, as can be later understood from the President’s own words to the first National Party Conference in January 1985,

[Party organisation still has] insufficient mechanisms for communication and information at various levels, between central and peripheral structures, and between these and base organisations [...] it is up to the Party leadership to take the necessary measures

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673 This decision was taken during a CC meeting in June 1982. In his opening speech, Eduardo Santos said that ‘we now feel the need to expand the party by admitting new members who may bring to the party new resourcefulness and greater dynamism.’; in Radio Nacional de Angola (29 June 1982), cited in ACR, 15 (1983), p.B597.
674 In Relatório do Comité Central ao 11º Congresso ...op. cit...1985, p.22–23.
675 ‘Considering that the defence of the Angolan revolution [...] demands that all Angolan citizens, from Cabinda to Cunene, do their bit towards popular vigilance [...] the politburo of the MPLA-PT, during the meeting on 17 August 1983, approved the basic principles and institutionalised the BPVs as a mass organisation that functions under the guidance of the MPLA-PT, integrating Angolan citizens willing to undertake work complementary to that of the Defence and Security.’ (in preamble of the Law); BPV’s tasks ranged from security to ideological education, promotion of public health, cleaning of neighbourhoods, promotion of voluntary work for economic and social programmes and any other determined by the MPLA-PT (in art. 2 para. a. to g.) in ‘Regulations for the BPV’s’ approved by presidential decree no. 47/83, DR, I, 221 (19 September 1983).
676 From private interviews with Mário Sétoco (10 March 1998), also Elias Santos (4 June 1998).
677 In Relatório do Comité Central ao 11º Congresso ...op. cit...1985, p.64.
678 In Collelo, Thomas, ed., Angola, ... op. cit. p.92.
in order to wrench the base organisations from the pernicious state of apathy they have slumped into. 679

Implicitly confirming that the party selection criteria (initiated by Neto and maintained afterwards) were mainly discriminating against the peasantry and rural areas, Eduardo dos Santos told the national conference that,

The Movement of Rectification ended its mandate without fully achieving the goals it had set itself for structuring the Party in rural areas. The criteria established for the selection of members did not allow for recruitment of members in the rural areas. 680

Insofar as the above-referred party programmes were especially needed in the countryside (rural areas; where guerrillas' activities were spreading 681), the maintenance of such discriminatory criteria for party membership was perfectly counter-productive. Alternative manoeuvres such as the membership in the BPV could only fool but the party leadership itself.

Thus, one year after the First National Conference and two and a half years after the party membership and BPVs campaigns, the CC report to the Second Congress (December 1985) again mentioned: on the one hand, the 'noticeable deficiencies in passing information to the bases, regarding decisions and guidelines from the top and the lack of a corps of activists to maintain regular contact with base organisations' 682; on the other hand, the 'slowness in the constitution of party structures in rural areas. [Acknowledging that] established criteria for membership selection in the countryside has made this process more difficult' 683.

In fact, the analysis of the socio-professional background of the delegates to the second Congress showed that, in terms of integrating the

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681 Ibid. p.16.
682 In Relatörio do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso ...op. cit...1985, p. 20. The same deficiencies in party functioning had also been previously referred in Documentos da 1ª Conferência Nacional do MPLA–PT (Luanda: Ediçäo do Secretariado do Comité Central, January 1985),p.59.
683 In Relatörio do Comité Central ao 2º Congresso ...op. cit...1985, p.19, see also p.16; the same deficiency had also been previously referred in Documentos da 1ª Conferência Nacional ...op. cit...1985, p.61.
masses in general and the peasantry in particular\textsuperscript{684}, there had been no actual progress: out of the 628 delegates, only 12 were peasants whereas administrative office-workers numbered 269 (most of them civil servants)\textsuperscript{685}. The absurdity of keeping such selective criteria went so far as to exclude from party membership several MPLA guerrillas from the period of the anti-colonial struggle (illiterate and of peasant origin), something that was recognised by the First National Conference\textsuperscript{686} and also by the II Congress\textsuperscript{687}.

It is worth reminding ourselves that the adoption of these criteria was the result of a party policy of rectification seeking to assert internal security and ideological discipline after the attempted coup. Rectification restricted the party to a limited number of members and the selection criteria ended up favouring the urban and literate against the rural and illiterate. However, this can not be seen as a deliberate decision to exclude peasants and ex-guerrillas of peasant origin, but as an indirect consequence of the existing criteria. It should also be remembered that despite criticism produced by the congress documents (within the critica and auto-critica mechanisms, including criticism expressed at provincial level) those selective criteria were to remain until late eighties, when the transition to multipartyism began.

In sum, by 1985 the party had reinforced its 'elitist', selective, discriminatory and restrictive character as implicitly recognised by the President,

\textsuperscript{684} These terms ('masses' and 'peasantry') are the same ones used in the CC report; in Relatório do Comité Central ao II\textsuperscript{o} Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p.19.

\textsuperscript{685} Attempting to increase the number of peasants in the social make-up of the whole Party, the CC report, in an administrative legerdemain, started to include in the term 'peasantry' a large number of those who had previously been referred to as 'agricultural workers and others' (most of them working in State co-operatives which survived mainly through subsidies as we saw), thus stretching the percentage of peasants from 1.9% in the 1980 report to 23% in the 1985 report, and shrinking the numbers of agricultural workers from 23.2% in 1980 to 8.6% in 1985. According to the 1985 report, the social make-up of the Party comprised peasants, 23%; industrial workers, 26.4%; agricultural workers, 8.6%; intellectuals and technicians, 6%; employees, 12.9%; managers, 21.9%; others, 1.2%. This administrative 'coup' was unmasked when it was discovered that out of the 628 delegates to the Congress, only 12 were peasants and more incredible was the number of administrative office-workers (269) among the 628 delegates to the congress. See Relatório do Comité Central ao II\textsuperscript{o} Congresso ... op. cit...1985, pp.22-23; compare with previously given figures of Relatório do Comité Central ao I\textsuperscript{º} Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit...1980; see also Somerville, Keith, Angola ... op. cit. p.105.

\textsuperscript{686} In Documentos da I\textsuperscript{ª} Conferência Nacional ... op. cit...1985, p.61.
In organisational terms, the main problem remains the small number of party members when compared with the size of the whole population of the country. Consequently, the party can not physically exist in vital and priority sectors of the nation's life. Another problem is the number of bureaucratic workers within the party, too high when compared with the total number of party members, thus favouring bureaucratic work instead of political activity.688

11.2 Executive, Legislative and Administrative Powers: extreme reinforcement of centralisation and concentration in the presidency

When taking over the presidency, Eduardo dos Santos resumed the development of his predecessor's policy of centralisation of administration and concentration of power within the institution and person of the President. However, he took these to extremes, especially after reasserting his power internally.

The extreme levels of this process were achieved through the construction of a complex institutional web. Although intricate, such web is extremely important to the understanding of the socio-political system. It is one of the main distinctive features of the Angolan case, which is not merely another example of ordinary presidentialism in Africa, where the ruler reaches a point where he simply ignores all institutional procedures and starts governing the whole system through a myriad of presidential decrees689. At the highest level of State organs every power relationship or political procedure (even the most 'obscure') is supported by legislation (which is not the case at lower levels of administration, as we have seen above). As previously explained, this was due not only to a Portuguese colonial bureaucratic tradition but also to the necessity of establishing and clarifying a complex power structure to balance and manage

687 In Relatório do Comitê Central ao 1º Congresso ...op. cit...1985, p.16
688 'Opening speech of the President to the 1st National Conference' ... op. cit. pp. 16-17
689 For a characterisation of cases where centralisation of power reaches the level of 'presidential decree' type of government see, Jackson, Robert & Rosberg, Carl, Personal Rule...op. cit.
a multiplicity of interests within the MPLA itself (an issue to which I will return in sub-chapter 13.1.2).

During the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos' presidency, we can identify three main political steps towards the construction of such extremely centralised and concentrated power web.

11.2.1 The institution of new organs for 'poder popular'

The first step took place during the very first months of the new president's mandate, at the CC meeting on 10 December 1979 (three months after Neto's death). It consisted in the adoption of a measure that had been planned by Neto before he died and left almost as his last testament, concerning the institution of new organs for poder popular, especially the People's Assembly that was to replace the Council of the Revolution as the supreme legislative organ. By then, after the whole purge and rectification process, the President probably felt that the party was organisationally stable enough to allow the process of poder popular to take place. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the previous experience of the organisation controlled by Nito Alves, the new electoral legislation established the method of indirect elections that were restricted and controlled at all levels by the Party central structures.

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690 On the eve of Neto's last trip to Moscow he told Lara and other colleagues at the Politburo about his will to implement the new organs of poder popular and especially the people's Assembly during the following year (1980); from private interview with Lúcio Lara (1 May 1998).

691 See ACR, 13 (1982), pp. B646-B647. The earlier process of instituting poder popular was begun by Nito Alves in June 1976 during his strategy for taking over power; it started with the election of neighbourhood committees, but was soon after suspended by the Central Committee on October 1976, as discussed earlier.

692 Certain directives were put together for the Party's provincial sections, containing methods for selecting delegates for the electoral conferences and candidates for deputies, and for the preparation and running of the electoral conferences in each province. Thus, the delegates for the provincial electoral conferences were elected, from 23 August 1980 onwards, by a show of hands, into State and co-operative economic units, military units and other institutions chosen by the Party's provincial committees and commissions (6,750 delegates were chosen in this manner); these delegates elected the provincial assemblies, on 12 October 1980, and their members in turn elected the deputies to the People's Assembly. At all stages and levels, this process was supervised by the National Commission for the Institution of Poder Popular, which was responsible for presenting the candidates previously selected by the Party and by its mass organisations. In this manner, 203 deputies were elected to the People's Assembly (58 workers, 48 'peasants' [i.e. workers of State co-operatives], 7 intellectuals, 6 civil servants, 20 members of the defence and security forces and 64 political and administrative
The institutionalisation of new organisations forced the CC to amend the Constitution, during the meeting on 11 August 1980, by changing the articles referring to the organisation of the State (its institutions, principles, organs and attributes). By analysing these amendments it can be seen that, although it might appear as a means of formalising the separation of powers (i.e. potential decentralisation and de-concentration), it was in fact much more of a reinforcement of the earlier process of administrative centralisation and power concentration, both in terms of the relationship between the presidency (central power) and local power, and in terms of the relationship between the presidency and other organs of central power:

a) In terms of the relationship between central and local power, the amendments to the constitution, on the one hand defined the new organisations of poder popular as sovereign organisations of State power at each level of the political and administrative hierarchy of the State, i.e. People’s Assembly at the national level and Popular Assemblies at the levels of province, municipality, commune and village (art. 33); relying on the initiative and participation of the people in collaboration with social and mass organisations (art. 32). However, on the other hand, it also gave the President and the Council of Ministers new powers to control and revoke all executive or legislative acts of the new organisations of poder popular.

Regarding the President of the Republic, he was now able to revoke all decisions of the provincial commissioners that went against the general interests of the country (art. 53, para. j). It was effectively left to the President to decide what did in fact constitute the ‘general interests of the country’ at any

leaders). In Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit...1980, p.44. See also ACR, 13 (1982), p.B647; also ARB (August 1980), p.5772-b

693 Amendment to Constitutional law, DR, I, 225 (23 September 1980).

694 Although such change had nothing of democratic (as will be seen), according to some foreign reports the constitutional amendments were meant ‘to introduce democratic institutions at all levels’; see ARB (September 1980), pp. 5799 b-c, 5800-a.

695 Amendment to Constitutional law, DR, I, 225 (23 September 1980).
given point in time. In other words, the President was allowed to revoke any decision made by the provincial commissioners.696

Regarding the Council of Ministers (led by its permanent commission or, to be more precise by the head of government, in fact the President -- as discussed during the analysis of Neto's administration) it was now able to propose to the People's Assembly the revocation of the deliberations of the local popular Assemblies (provincial, municipal or communal) that went against the general interests of the country or other administrative and political areas (art. 58, para. k). Again, it was up to the Council of Ministers and its president to assess the general interests of the country and of any other political and administrative areas. This meant in fact that all decisions by all local Popular Assemblies could be revoked as well.697

Thus, the institutionalisation of new organisations of poder popular and the accompanying constitutional changes meant that, in terms of the relationship between central and local power, the process of administrative centralisation and concentration of power in the presidency and the Council of Ministers was greatly reinforced, as can be clearly and simply observed in the State organisations' chart (see figure 11.2.1.1).

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696 Besides those powers, the President's constitutional rights in relation to local power were substantially increased well beyond appointing or removing from office provincial commissioners; he was now able to appoint or remove from office all assistants to those posts (art. 53, para. d); all provincial commissioners were from then on considered as representatives of the President and his government (art. 70; previously they only represented the government); in Amendment to Constitutional Law, DR, I, 225 (23 September 1980).

697 The Council of Ministers would direct the whole administrative activity of the State's local organisations (art. 58, para. i); would also be able to revoke all the decisions made by any local government members who violated constitutional law or contradicted any other law and legal disposition, the resolutions made by the People's Assembly or the Council of Ministers (art. 58, para. j); in Amendment to Constitutional Law, DR, I, 225 (23 September 1980).
b) In terms of the relationship between the presidency and other organs of central power, there was a generalised increase of the President's attributes, both with regards to other holders of public office in the central apparatus, and with regards to the National People's Assembly, the government and the Party itself.

With regards to other holders of public offices in the central apparatus, the new constitutional text granted the President, besides the extension of nomination and demotion powers, the power effectively to revoke all and any decisions made by any member of the central government.

With regards to the People's Assembly (the legislative organisation *par excellence*), the new constitutional text considered it the supreme organisation of State power expressing the sovereign will of the people (art. 37), and granted it (at least in theory) wider competence as befitting a legislative chamber such as changing the constitutional law (art. 38 para. a.), controlling government decisions (art. 38 para. g.), revoking and modifying the legislation of the CM-Council of Ministers contrary to the legislation approved by the Assembly (art. 38 para. j.). Nevertheless, the new constitutional text also implicitly revealed that those powers were to be more formal than effective, by establishing the PR-President of the Republic as the President of the People's Assembly (art. 41), and giving him enormous powers over that supposedly sovereign organisation. The assembly was to be convened by its President only twice a year in ordinary sessions (art. 42) and between those sessions the functioning of the Assembly was assumed by a permanent commission (art. 49) to be convened and presided by the PR and essentially composed of the

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698 It extended the nomination and demotion powers of the President now to include all judges from the Supreme Court, the Procurator and the Vice-Procurator General of the Republic, the Governor of the Central Bank, university Rectors and Vice-Rectors (art. 53, para. d); in Amendment to Constitutional Law, *DR*, I, 225 (23 September 1980).

699 It granted the President the power to revoke any and all decisions made by members of central government who violated constitutional law, other laws and legal dispositions, or contrary to the general interests of the country (art. 53, para. j); it was up to the President, or the organisations he controlled, to define at any point in time what constituted the best interests of the country, which enabled him in fact to revoke all and any decisions made by members of central government; in Amendment to Constitutional Law, *DR*, I, 225 (23 September 1980).

700 In Amendment to Constitutional Law, *DR*, I, 225 (23 September 1980).
MPLA’s politburo (art.50). Although the permanent commission could not actually alter the constitution on its own (art.49) it was granted privileged legislative initiative for changing the constitution\textsuperscript{701}. In practice, the People’s Assembly became reduced to a chamber for the ratification of its permanent commission’s decisions and initiatives, completely dominated by the President and the members of the Politburo\textsuperscript{702}.

With regards the government (an essentially executive organisation, though with some legislative competencies) there ensued an intensification of the practice that had been initiated by Agostinho Neto, whereby the President (besides the power directly assumed) indirectly absorbed executive governmental powers through smaller organisations such as the CM’s permanent commission and the CM’s secretariat and specialised commissions.

Therefore, more powers were conceded to these organisations (and thus, indirectly, to the President). Whereas the CM had previously been considered the government’s executive organ, the new constitutional text considered it the effective government of the People’s Republic of Angola, and therefore, the supreme organisation of State administration (art.56)\textsuperscript{703}. In the same way, according to the new internal regulations of the Council of Ministers\textsuperscript{704}, its specialised commissions (the inter-ministerial planning commission, the commission for socio-political affairs, the commission for socio-economic affairs) played an increasingly legislative and executive role. Their original functions (such as analysis and discussion of proposed laws and supervision of the execution of legislation approved by the CM\textsuperscript{705}) were now duplicated and

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{701} Ordinary legislative initiative to change the constitution was shared by several organisations, namely the Central Committee, the Permanent Commission of the People’s Assembly; other deputies and commissions of the People’s Assembly, the Council of Ministers and UNTA’s Central Council (art. 45); in Amendment to Constitutional Law, DR, I, 225 (23 September 1980).

\textsuperscript{702} On 13 November 1980, two days after its first session, the Assembly elected its permanent commission comprising 25 members: the President, 13 members of the Politburo, all of them deputies, and a further 11 members proposed by the Central Committee accomplishing with the determinations of art. 50 of the Amendment to Constitutional Law, DR, I, 225 (23 September 1980).

\textsuperscript{703} In Amendment to Constitutional Law, DR, I, 225 (23 September 1980).

\textsuperscript{704} The Council of Ministers’ new internal regulations were approved in July, two months before the constitutional amendment; in decree 87/80, DR, I, 172 (22 July 1980).

\textsuperscript{705} In ‘Regulations of the Council of Ministers’ Commission for Socio-Political Affairs’, art.4 of decree 39/80 of the Council of Ministers, DR, I, 110 (10 May 1980).}
were superimposed not only on the functions of the various working commissions of the People's Assembly, (such as discussing, studying and preparing legislation for approval), but also on the functions of specialised departments of the Central Committee (such as studying and preparing orientations and directives to be adopted and applied to the State organs). In comparison to the specialised departments of the CC and the working commissions of the People's Assembly, the CM's specialised commissions were more restricted and more directly open to manipulation by the presidency (apart from the planning commission which was personally co-ordinated by the President himself, the other two commissions were co-ordinated by one minister each, chosen from the CM's permanent commission nominated for this purpose by the President).

As the range of executive and legislative tasks for the permanent commission of the Council of Ministers became broader, the role of its secretariat increased. Consequently, the Secretary (nominated by the President of the Republic) in charge of the secretariat also played an increasingly important governmental role in supporting the executive and legislative tasks of the head of government, not only by running the secretariat, but also by co-ordinating the secretariats of the Council of Ministers specialised commissions for socio-political and socio-economic affairs.

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706 In art. 3 and art. 24 n°2 of Decree 87/80, DR, I, 172 (22 July 1980), approves the Council of Ministers' Internal Regulations. The coinciding competence of the working commissions of the People's Assembly can be found in art.4 of the People's Assembly regulations, DR, I, 89 (16 April 1981).

707 In art. 2 and art. 24, n°1 para. a, b, c, of Decree 87/80, DR, I, 172 (22 July 1980), approves the Council of Ministers' Internal Regulations. The coinciding competence of the specialized departments of the Central Committee can be found in Regulamento do Comité Central do MPLA-PT (Luanda: Secretariado do Comité Central, 1987), especially art. 53, para. b), c), and art.54, para. 1-d) and 2.

708 In art. 26, Decree 87/80, DR, I, 172 (22 July 1980); see also art. 24 to 28 of this same decree.

709 According to the new statute, it was now, inter alia, in charge of the resolution of current problems (art.3) and in control of the preparation and execution of the deliberations made by the Council of Ministers and by its permanent commission, along with the decisions made by the head of government (art.3, para.1); in Decree 25–B/80, DR, I, 78, addendum (2 April 1980); this approves the organisational statutes of the Council of Ministers' secretariat.

710 Art.5, Decree 25–B/80, DR, I, 78, addendum (2 April 1980).

711 In art.6, para.g., Decree 25–B/80, DR, I, 78, addendum (2 April 1980).
Thus, indirectly, via the Council of Ministers (in general), via the CM’s permanent commission, the CM’s specialised commissions, secretariat and Secretary (in particular), the President of the Republic broadened, deepened and reinforced his executive and legislative powers in relation to the government.

Finally, with regards to the Party (but also the government itself), the President of the Republic began to isolate certain areas of government that were previously under strict Party control, namely foreign economic affairs; to this effect, a new subsidiary organisation — the President of the Republic’s Cabinet — was created on 1 April 1980, directly dependent on the President, and that was to support him in the exercise of his functions as Head of State.\(^{712}\) According to its statutes, the new organisation was divided into various secretariats with their own secretaries according to different areas of activity: socio-economic, juridical, defence and security, information, foreign affairs and others (art. 2); apart from its more mundane functions — collecting and co-ordinating matters for study and information, elaboration of reports and enquiries, giving public information and advice — it was expected to ‘establish, maintain and develop contacts with public or private foreign entities when asked to do so by the President of the Republic’ (art. 1).\(^{713}\)

The President’s intention to dominate, isolate and make autonomous the State’s business affairs with private and public entities abroad was beginning to become clear. The purpose was to escape any possible interference, surveillance and control, not only by the People’s Assembly (its permanent and working commissions),\(^{714}\) but especially by the Party’s top organs, mainly the

\(^{712}\) Implicitly confirming the increasing institutional and administrative duties of the President of the Republic, the presidential decree which created the President of the Republic’s Cabinet justified itself with the following statement: ‘the complexity and the exercise of the Head of State’s duties, either politically or administratively, demand the creation of structures around the President of the Republic able to adapt to the needs for effective response in all domains of presidential activity.’ Presidential decree 25–A/80, DR, I, 72 (1 April 1980).

\(^{713}\) Presidential decree 25–A/80, DR, I, 72 (1 April 1980).

\(^{714}\) According to its amendment of 23 September 1980, article 38 of constitutional law expected the People’s Assembly to ‘g) exercise the highest control over the activities of the government and other State organisations [...] q) to deliberate over other fundamental questions of internal and external State politics.’; See Constitutional Amendment, DR, I, 225 (23 September 1980)
Central Committee, which had specialised and influential departments in external affairs with private or public entities, thus controlling the income from oil -- a percentage of which devolved directly to the Party, as established during Neto's presidency.\textsuperscript{715}

By then, despite the already high level of administrative centralisation and concentration of power, there was still a certain amount of permeability and informal control between various organisations at the top of the central political administration (the politburo, the CC, the Council of Ministers, the government and the People's Assembly's permanent and working commissions), especially because these organs included several members of the right and leftwing seeking to leak information against each other as part of their political struggle. The President therefore felt it was necessary to create a new body under his exclusive control, run by younger cadres and impervious to those State and Party organs, allowing him to have autonomous control over external sources of income — the main means of political power in a patrimonial system like the Angolan.

However, as already mentioned, at the time of the creation of the new cabinet (April 1980) the president was still trying to assert his personal power and the cabinet did not achieve immediate results. During the Monty case (September 1981), some information on the oil business was disclosed and used as a political weapon between left and rightwing. Nevertheless, the President was able to nominate the investigation commission and avoid an effective trial where a lot more information could have been disclosed.

It was only when the President managed to consolidate his hold (December 1982 onwards) that there could emerge secret, direct negotiations and autonomous agreements between the presidency (i.e. the President and a very restricted group of his trusted collaborators) and various public and private

\textsuperscript{715}The percentage was established according to the price of each oil-barrel and calculated according to the number of barrels produced yearly; from private interview with Mendes de Carvalho (17 July 1998).
foreign entities — which only came to light recently, but have their origins in early eighties 716.

11.2.2 The Regional Military Councils and the Council for Defence and Security

The second main step towards reinforcing the process of administrative centralisation and concentration of power started with the previously mentioned eleventh ordinary plenary session of the CC, from 30 November to 8 December 1982, which unanimously decided to grant the President special emergency powers 717.

Above and beyond allowing the President to discipline the left and right wings, the new emergency powers turned into a veritable political and administrative revolution, taking the earlier processes of power concentration and administrative centralisation to extremes, as became apparent at the level of the relationships between: a) the President (central power) and local power; b) the President and other organs of central power.

a) Regarding the relationship between central and local power, the aim of the President’s new powers and his emergency plan was only established at a later date (July 1983) through Law 5/83 approved by the permanent

716 These activities are only now being uncovered by media outrage, with cases such as the ‘Mitterrand, Falcone and Gaidamak scandal’ and the ‘Global Witness Report’, but their origin lies in a complex institutional web gradually put together by Eduardo dos Santos, since the beginning of his presidency. These cases are only mentioned here as a concrete example of how these activities evolved, but its deeper analysis is not here included for being out of this work’s time frame. For an in-depth approach on the scandals of gun-running, diamond trafficking and money-laundering that recently involved Jean-Christophe Mitterrand (son of François Mitterrand), Jacques Attali (former president of BERD, Bank Européenne pour la Reconstruction et le Développement), Pierre Falcone (arms dealer and main supplier of arms to Luanda) and Arkadi Gaidamak (arms and diamonds merchant, holder of the former Angolan debt to the USSR), with multiple ramifications (including Sonangol), see O Independente (23 July 1999); also Público (5 and 6 December 1999), (14 January 2000), (11 April 2000), (30 July 2000), (9 December 2000), (23 December 2000); also Expresso (16 December 2000), (8 September 2001); also the reports by Global Witness that names several members of the presidential clique involved in networks of arms dealing, missing accounts from oil income to the State and so on: ‘A Crude Awakening: the role of the oil and banking industries in Angola’s civil war and the plunder of the state assets’, a report by Global Witness, December 1999; also ‘All the Presidents’ men’, a report by Global Witness, March 2002: also ‘A Rough Trade: the role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict’, a report by Global Witness, December 1998 Editions at [www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/].
commission of the People’s Assembly. In the face of a worsening political and military situation, a new national political, military and administrative structure was created -- the CMRs (*Conselhos Militares Regionais*/Regional Military Councils).\textsuperscript{718} The CMRs took over the political, military, economic and social leadership of their various areas of jurisdiction (art. 1) and, within the exercise of their duties, they could ‘impose restrictions on the freedom of movement of people and goods, as well as requisition of people and goods’ (art. 3). They were directly answerable to the President of the Republic in his role as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces (art. 2). The President had the power to nominate the CMRs’ authorities (art. 2); determine the areas of national territory that the councils were to target (art. 5); ‘approve the defining norms for the composition, organisation and competence of CMRs and any other norms demanded by the political and military situation or by the effective application of this current law’ (art. 5)\textsuperscript{719}. In short, the CMRs could be and do anything that the President wanted them to be or do.

Under the cover of the worsening military and economic situation, and in the face of intensified internal political conflicts, the President became almost plenipotentiary with his new emergency powers, which enabled him to make drastic changes to the structure of military, political and economic administration (see figures 11.2.2.1 and 11.2.2.2)\textsuperscript{720}.

\textsuperscript{717} See *ARB* (December 1982), p.6678, b; also Rádio Nacional de Angola (9 December 1982), cit. in *SWB* (13 December 1982); also *ACR*, vol.15 (1984), p.B598.


\textsuperscript{719} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{720} As can be seen from the above mentioned figures, the jurisdiction areas of the CMRs did not coincide with the existing political and administrative division, clearly representing an alteration of such division.
Figure 11.2.2.1: Military regions and principal bases, 1987

Figure 11.2.2.2: Administrative divisions of Angola, 1988

Therefore, the new administrative and political system became increasingly militarised taking to an extreme the previously discussed interpenetration of the military, state and government structures. The overwhelming majority of the CMRs were led by FAPLA's Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels holding concurrent positions at the top of the party apparatus (usually at the CC)\textsuperscript{721}. Their authority in their respective regions superseded that of the supposedly sovereign organisations of \textit{poder popular} (the Provincial Commissariat, the Provincial Commissioner and all the local People's Assemblies), reporting directly to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (the President), the highest authority of the CMRs\textsuperscript{722}.

Thus, through the CMRs, the President reinforced his legislative and executive powers over the whole territory, above and beyond any other State organs.

b) Regarding the relationship between the President and other organisations, the new emergency powers meant the immediate demotion of the People's Assembly (supposedly the supreme organisation of State power). The same CC meeting that gave emergency powers to the President deferred the ordinary session of the People's Assembly (due 14–17 December 1982), until such a time as the emergency plans for the State's safety, defence, economy and apparatus had been implemented\textsuperscript{723}. New elections to organs of \textit{poder popular} (due in 1983) were cancelled and at its sixth ordinary session, held from 22-24 February 1983, the People's Assembly voted to extend its term of office as well as that of Local People's Assemblies until 1986\textsuperscript{724}.

As for the remaining organs of central power and the structure of the central apparatus in general, the aim of the President's new powers and of the


\textsuperscript{722} See Law art. 2. of Law5/83, \textit{DR}, I, 179 (30 July 1983); see also Collelo, Thomas, ed., \textit{Angola}, ... op. cit. p. 170.


emergency plans were established in January 1984, with the passing of Law 3/84 by the permanent commission of the People’s Assembly, whereby the CDS (Conselho de Defesa e Segurança/Council for Defence and Security) was created. It was ‘a collegial organisation (órgão colegial) of reduced membership for the management of affairs of State and for directing the war, a body to assist the Head of State and the Commander-in-Chief of the FAPLA in the exercise of the special powers granted to him by the Central Committee.’

The CDS fulfilled the need for an operational, dynamic and even more restricted organisation, having complete freedom to direct the new CMRs’ administrative structure, forming a sort of crisis government with almost unlimited powers and competence:

1) It assumed the duties of the Council of Ministers between sessions (art.1), thereby replacing the Council of Ministers’ permanent commission whose internal regulations were expressly revoked by this law; it held weekly sessions on defence and security matters, and twice-weekly sessions on all other issues;

2) It was chaired by the President of the Republic and comprised the minister of Defence, the minister of Internal Affairs, the minister of Planning, the minister of Provincial Co-ordination, the vice-minister of Defence/General head of Staff of FAPLA (art.2) and the CC’s secretary for ideology as a non-permanent member (still following the ‘old’ tradition of politicisation of the military or the militarisation of politics; by now there was no distinction between the two);

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725 Law 3/84, by the Permanent Commission of the People’s Assembly, creating the CDS, DR, I, 22 (26 January 1984).
726 In Relatório do Comitê Central ao 11o Congresso ...op. cit...1985, p.54.
727 Decree 87/80, regulations of the Council of Ministers was expressly revoked by art.8 of law 3/84, DR, I, 22 (26 January 1984).
728 Art.5, no.1 of decree 6/84, DR, I, 79 (3 April 1984), approves the regulations of the Council for Defence and Security.
729 Law 3/84, by the Permanent Commission of the People’s Assembly, creating the CDS, DR, I, 22 (26 January 1984).
730 In art.2, no.3, of decree 6/84, DR, I, 79 (3 April 1984).
3) It was structured into three working commissions: defence and security; propaganda and counter-propaganda; planning, finances and foreign trade, banking and international co-operation.\textsuperscript{731} These commissions took on important executive duties, superseding the Council of Ministers’ specialised commissions, the People’s Assembly’s working commissions and the specialised departments of the Central Committee (which had already lost much of their powers to the Council of Ministers’ specialised commissions, as previously discussed);\textsuperscript{732}

4) It assumed direct authority over the CMRs;\textsuperscript{733}

5) It was given far-reaching and almost unlimited martial law powers such as: directing military action; mobilising the country’s human and material resources according to the needs of national defence, security and economy; co-ordinating actions connected with the organisation and cohesion of defence and security forces; co-ordinating the management of the economy and socio-economic development; co-ordinating, directing and controlling the activities of ministers, State secretariats and local administration organisations; taking measures to improve the administration of the State; and \textit{controlling all financial dealings with the outside} \textsuperscript{734}; i.e., confirming that external relationships and financial dealings with the exterior (effectively made through the president’s cabinet as explained) would from then on be controlled exclusively by the President himself through the CDS.

In sum, there was now a new structure for political, economic and military administration (the CMRs) and a new, all-powerful executive (the

\textsuperscript{731} Art.4 of decree 6/84, \textit{DR}, I, 79 (3 April 1984).
\textsuperscript{732} These CDS commissions were given an important executive power, fulfilling all the duties incumbent to the CDS; they controlled the execution of duties entrusted to central administration within their areas of speciality; they pointed out to the CDS the necessary means for bringing about the fulfilment of their duties; see art. 17 of Decree 6/84, \textit{DR}, I, 79 (3 April 1984).
\textsuperscript{733} The CMRs stopped being subordinated to the President to become subordinate to the CDS (itself completely dominated by the President), though it was still the President’s personal prerogative to nominate CMRs members (art.6 of law 3/84). In this sense, art.8 of law 3/84 explicitly revoked art.2 of law 5/83 which subordinated the CMRs directly to the President; See Law 3/84 creating the CDS, \textit{DR}, I, 22, (26 January 1984); also Law 5/83, creating the CMRs, \textit{DR}, I, 179 (30 July 1983).
\textsuperscript{734} Art.4 of law 3/84, in \textit{DR}, I, 22 (26 January 1984).
CDS) under the President's total domination in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces (see figure 11.2.2.3).
Figure 12.2.3

CENTRAL STATE STRUCTURE

1. Cabinet of the President of the Republic
2. Ministry of State for Social and Economic Affairs
3. Ministry of State for Prosecution
4. Ministry of State for State Inspection and Control
5. Cabinet of the Head of Government

- President of Republic
- Commander-in-Chief on the Armed Forces
- Head of Government
- Council of Ministers
- Council of Defense and Security
- Defence and Security
- Ministry of Defense
- Ministry of the Interior
- Ministry of State Security

- Propaganda and Counter-Propaganda
- Ministry of Planning
- Ministry of Industry
- Ministry of Finance
- Ministry of Agriculture
- Ministry of Education
- Ministry of Health
- Ministry of Environment
- Ministry of Communications
- Ministry of Construction

In Law 2/86, DR, I, 9 (1 February 1986)

(1) Added by the author based upon Presidential decree 25-A/80, DR, I, 72 (1 April 1980)
(2) Added by the author based upon art. 4, para. d) of Presidential decree 6/86, DR, I, 72 (21 April 1986)
(3) Added by the author based upon art. 3, para. n) of the CDS decree 26/86, DR, I, 95 (29 November 1986)
(4) Added by the author based upon art. 3, para. o) of the CDS decree 26/86, DR, I, 95 (29 November 1986)
(5) Added by the author based upon Presidential decree 15/87, DR, I, 62 (3 April 1987)
The regime had gone as far as it possibly could in the interpenetration of the military and political spheres; run by President Eduardo dos Santos, exerting in full his functions as Head of State, Head of Government and above all Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, as if he had become some kind of generalissimo at the apex of the CMRs and CDS structure. The increasing military role of the president was later to be given formal recognition when the president resolved to create in the armed forces the rank of Official General, which he attributed to himself exclusively (all other promotions were to lower ranks such as Major-General, Colonel-General, Lieutenant-General)\textsuperscript{735}.

By then, the president had complete control over the armed forces and the top State and Party organs, having promoted younger officials and cadres (whose positions had been reinforced since the first extraordinary congress in December 1980\textsuperscript{736}) not only at the FAPLA's level, but also at the top of the government and party as was the case for the Lt-Colonel Manuel Alexandre Rodrigues 'Kito' (Minister of Interior since 1980) and Lt-Colonel Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem 'Loy' (Minister of Energy since 1980 and also of Oil in 1981) -- both were promoted to the Politburo during the second congress (December 1985)\textsuperscript{737}. Such promotions occurred in parallel to the demotion of party veterans such as Lúcio Lara and Ludy Kissassunda, along with Henrique de Carvalho dos Santos 'Onambwe', Major Evaristo Domingos 'Kimba', Paulo Jorge and even Iko Carreira the head of the Air Force and once Minister of Defence and General Commander of FAPLA. Lara, Onambwe and Kimba

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\textsuperscript{735} The resolution 14/86 by the Permanent Commission of the People's Assembly, DR, I, 98 (8 December 1986), created the rank of Official-General within the FAPLA, and resolution 13/86, by the same commission, DR, I, 101 (20 December 1986), attributed the rank of Army General to the Commander-in-Chief of the FAPLA, José Eduardo dos Santos, also promoting several other officers and party members but to lower ranks in relation to the President.

\textsuperscript{736} From report of Jean-Claude Pomonti in Le Monde (29 January 1981), cf. supra sub-chapter 6.1.3.

\textsuperscript{737} See ACR, vol. 18 (1987), pp. B619-B.620. Although these two young cadres were not exactly from the post-27 May purged generation as the majority of those who were promoted within FAPLA and State administration, they were quite young (the same age of the president) and with a similar position in terms of distancing from the 'old' left and rightwing disputes. Loy was a close friend and former colleague of president dos Santos from Baku University, with exactly the same age of the president. For a small biography of 'Loy', born in Catete (died in September 1997 from disease) see Carvalho, Mendes de, Cultos Especiais (Luanda: Edição do Autor, 1997), pp.9-14.
\end{flushright}
retained their CC seats, but Kissassunda was dropped even from the CC; Paulo Jorge and Iko slipped to the rank of alternates at the CC.\(^{738}\)

The case of Iko Carreira is paradigmatic of the president’s strategy to demote veterans and promote younger cadres. Iko had been member of the politburo, Head of FAPLA and minister of defence since independence but he was clearly identified with the leftwing. He was especially targeted by the rightwing members who had always nurtured a peculiar hate towards him for his proximity to and strong friendship with Neto and most of all for being extremely light skinned (almost white) holding such prime position in the armed forces.\(^{739}\) A lot of veiled criticism circulated within the top party and State ranks on Iko’s military preparation (he had no advanced military training to justify such office).\(^{740}\) Although Neto never cared about that and had always supported his friend and minister (as was obvious during the Nittistas attacks), as soon as Eduardo dos Santos assumed the presidency, such criticism and pressures grew and in December 1979, Iko opted to go to a military academy in the USSR.\(^{741}\) From there he was supposed to return as an academically legitimated General Commander of the armed forces. Iko effectively returned two years later, in 1982, with all the required preparation (the highest in Angola at that time), however, he suffered from the infighting between left and right (being a close friend of N’Dunduma) and never again recovered his previous place in the army or at the Politburo, being nominated Head of the Air Force, later downgraded during the 1985 congress to the post of alternate member of the CC\(^{742}\) and retired a few years later.\(^{743}\)

Finally, with regards to party organs, it is important to notice that the 1985 congress also represented a significant decrease in the effective political power

\(^{739}\) From private interviews with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (16th April 1998); General António Farrusco (2nd May 1998).
\(^{740}\) Ibid.
\(^{743}\) Later Iko started to have serious health problems, which took him to be treated in Spain where he lived for several years until his death in late nineties.
of the CC. This organ was enormously enlarged (from sixty to ninety members and alternates\textsuperscript{744}) and from then on it became ever more difficult to discuss any important issues, reach consensus or take decisions among so many people with endless and usually inconclusive debates\textsuperscript{745}. From the original 35 members at the beginning of Neto's presidency\textsuperscript{746} the CC was progressively enlarged and had now reached proportions that limited its once prominent role.

11.2.3 The System of Ministers of State

The third and final step towards the most extreme reinforcement of the process of administrative centralisation and concentration of power during the Socialist–Marxist phase, occurred with the CC extraordinary session (16–17 January 1986) which, following the guidelines approved by the Second Congress of the MPLA–PT (December 1985), revised again the constitution in order to create a system of three Ministers of State\textsuperscript{747}. They were to be nominated by the Head of Government (President) and answerable directly to him, with the specific objective of ‘co-ordinating the main areas of government activity, assisting the Head of Government in his executive duties.’\textsuperscript{748} This restructuring was an attempt at simplifying the Head of Government’s enormous legislative and executive activity by concentrating government activity into three ‘super-ministries’, led by three trusted ‘super-ministers’, who would depend personally and institutionally on the President (see previous figure 11.2.2.3). They were Maria Mambo Café, Minister of State for social and


\textsuperscript{745} From private interview with Mendes de Carvalho (17 July 1998).

\textsuperscript{746} For the names of the original 35 members of the CC elected at the Inter Regional Militants Conference in September 1974 and who came to exert those positions at the independence see Coleção de Textos do MPLA: Programa, Estatutos, Lei de Disciplina, Membros do Comité Central e do Bureau Político, Conferência Inter-Regional de Militantes de 12 a 20 de Setembro de 1974 (Luanda: Edição do Departamento de Informação e Propaganda, n.d.), pp.31-32.

\textsuperscript{747} Amendment to the constitution, Law 1/86, DR, I, 9 (1 February 1986) created the system of Ministers of State.

\textsuperscript{748} In the introduction to law 2/86, DR, I, 9 (1 February 1986), which approved the new organisational structure of the central State apparatus to include the Ministers of State.
economic affairs; Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem ‘Loy’, Minister of State for production; and Kundy Paihama, Minister of State for State inspection and control. From then on, all the other ministers were to become subordinated to the State Ministers, be it in executive or legislative matters.

This organisational restructuring represented another step in political and administrative centralisation and concentration of power in the institution and person of the president in terms of relationships between a) the President and local power organisations; b) the President and other organisations of central power.

a) At level of the relationship between the presidency and the organisations of local power, the organisational restructuring brought about the extinction of the Ministry of Provincial Co-ordination, whose functions became the responsibility of the Council of Ministers’ secretariat and the respective secretary. According to a new organisational statute, the CM’s secretariat was

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749 This Minister was responsible for the ministries of planning, finance, foreign trade, work and social security, health, education and internal trade; the National Bank of Angola; the Secretaries of State for co-operation, sports and physical education, culture, social affairs, housing and war veterans; in appendix to law 2/86, DR, I, 9 (1 February 1986).

750 This minister was responsible for the ministries of agriculture, industry, oil and energy, transports and communications, construction and fisheries; see appendix of law 2/86, DR, I, 9 (1 February 1986).

751 This minister was responsible for a central organisation of inspection and control to be created by law; in appendix of Law 2/86, DR, I, 9 (1 February 1986). Paihama is from the south, from the Ovambo ethnolinguistic group, a small group that adhered to the MPLA since the early days of 1974 due to its long – pre-colonial – conflict with the Ovimbundu or those from the ‘nano’ as they call the Ovimbundu (i.e. those from above, the high plateaux); on this issue see Carvalho, Ruy Duarte de, Aviso ... op. cit. Paihama is an old time member of the MPLA, absolutely loyal to the president and as usual with a governmental and military trajectory, from FAPLA official to provincial commissioner to minister. Although beyond this work’s time frame, it might be interesting to notice that he was until recently Minister of Defence and Chief of Staff of FAPLA after replacing General João de Matos (another young cadre promoted by Eduardo dos Santos up to the position of Chief of Staff of FAPLA after the 1992 elections). Together they were responsible for the reorganisation of the armed forces after the pillage that followed its restructuring in 1991.

752 At an executive level, the new State ministers had the competency to co-ordinate, guide, control and approve the activities and action-plans of the various organisations within their respective fields of responsibilities, especially ministries and secretariats of State; they were expected to give regular accounts to the Head of Government on the degree of accomplishment in the above-mentioned areas. At a legislative level, they were given the competency to analyse the legal documents and proposals by the organisations they co-ordinated before submitting them to the approval of the Head of Government; they could exercise any other duties entrusted to them by the head of government; see law 2/86, DR, I, 9 (1 February 1986) and decree 10/86, DR, I, 45 (7 June 1986), which approved the general regulation of the role and competencies of the State Ministers.

753 The aforementioned law 2/86 of 1 February brought the Ministry of Provincial Co-ordination to an end. As a result, the Minister for Provincial Co-ordination left the CDS, as mentioned in the decree 67/86, DR, I, 32 (21 April 1986), which approves the new regulation of the CDS.
seen as the government organ that should act as the link between the Central State apparatus and the organs of local power (art. 1). 754

Inasmuch as that secretariat and its Secretary (the highest ranking secretary, now promoted to minister) were institutionally and personally dependent on the head of Government 755, the broadening of their competence in terms of local power reinforced, albeit indirectly, the process of concentration of the President's powers at local level.

b) At the level of the relationship between the presidency and other organisations of central power, the restructuring brought about the immediate broadening of the President's constitutional rights, and he was now entitled not only to appoint and remove from office any new minister of State, but also to nominate or sack from office the Vice-Governors of the National Bank of Angola. 756 With this move, there was no significant post beyond the direct powers of the presidency.

Regarding the People's Assembly, the restructuring represented once again a downgrading of its powers.

- On the one hand, the three new Ministers of State were to become 'automatically' part of the 24 members of the permanent commission of the People's Assembly 757; they were to co-ordinate 3 of the 11 working commissions of the Assembly. 758 This integration of Ministers of State preceded the second general elections for the organisations of poder popular in December 1986, which, just as in 1980, took place indirectly and

754 Decree 26/86, in DR, I, 95 (29 November 1986), approving the new organisational statute of the Council of Ministers.
755 Ibid.
756 New wording of art. 53, para. d, of the Constitution, introduced by law 1/86, DR, I, 9 (1 February 1986).
757 Resolution 7/86, DR, I, 90 (10 November 1986), contains the names of the 24 members of the permanent commission of the People's Assembly.
758 All the other co-ordinators were also members of the permanent commission of the People's Assembly. Resolution 8/86, DR, I, 90 (10 November 1986), contains the names of the People's Assembly's working commissions and their respective co-ordinators.
were highly controlled at all levels by the Party; again, the ministers of State were automatically included within the eligible positions.759

- On the other hand, and according to new organisational statutes, the CM's secretariat was given broad competence to 'co-operate' with the secretariat of the People's Assembly; this meant that in practice the Ministers of State and the CM's secretariat, following the directives from above (the President), could prepare and directly introduce the issues to be discussed in the sessions of the People's Assembly, as well as influence and direct the reports and proposals of the People's Assembly's working commissions to the Council of Ministers and its organs.760

Regarding the CDS, the new restructuring led to the approval of a new regulation (on 21 April 1986) that defined five main areas of activity, to be personally co-ordinated by the different Council members, but all under the ultimate direction of the President of the Republic and the President of the CDS.761 By dividing the Council's tasks into areas of activity and providing

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759 According to the existing legislation regarding the electoral process, the mandate of the deputies elected in 1980 should have come to an end in 1983; however, as referred, due to the war situation the CC prorogued their mandates until December 1986, when the second elections for these posts were held. The second electoral process followed the same lines as the first, namely indirect elections controlled at all levels by the Party; a national electoral commission and provincial electoral commissions were set up for the explicit purpose of 'leading and controlling the electoral process in accordance with the principles and guidelines set from above.' The national and provincial electoral commissions were to be co-ordinated, respectively, by the Central Committee's Secretary for State and judicial organisations and by the Party's provincial first secretaries. This second legislature increased the number of working commissions, but they were still co-ordinated by the usual members of the Central Committee and the politburo. Apart from Lúcio Lara (who was excluded in this second legislature for the reasons mentioned above: his son's arrest and his wife's suspension), all the previous co-ordinators became 'automatically' the co-ordinators of the second legislature, which also increased the number of members on the permanent commission to 30, compared with 24 before; the permanent commission was made up of all the commission co-ordinators and remaining members of the Central Committee and the politburo. See resolution 6/87 on the working commissions of the People's Assembly, and resolution 7/87 on the constitution of the second legislation of the People's Assembly and its permanent commission; both resolutions in DR, I, 17 (7 February 1987).

760 The Council of Ministers' Secretariat was given the broad competence to 'co-operate' with the Secretariat of the People's Assembly in the co-ordination of measures necessary for the preparation and running of the permanent commission of the People's Assembly (art.3, para.d) and to 'analyse the reports and proposals of the working commissions of the People's Assembly on the activities of the Council of Ministers and its organisations' (art.3, para.e); Decree 26/86 of the CDS, DR, I, 95 (29 November 1986).

761 Although the new regulation allowed the competencies and duties of the CDS to remain the same (according to the above-mentioned law 3/84) with the inclusion of new members, the CDS was
them with specific co-ordinators the President further reinforced his personal domination over each area and over each co-ordinator, thereby diminishing the range of influence and participation of each one of them on activities beyond their own. This weakened an organisation that was supposedly one of collective deliberation and responsibility (colegial), where all members were supposed to consider all matters concerning all the duties within the competencies of the Council.

Regarding the Council of Ministers’ secretariat, the restructuring meant, once again, a considerable broadening of this organ’s duties and competence. According to its new organisational statute the secretariat had to ensure all the necessary support to the State’s main executive organisations such as the CM, the CDS and the Ministers of State (art.1). This turned the secretariat into a kind of unofficial government, under the President’s personal orchestration. Consequently, in more ways than one, the CM’s Secretary took on the role of unofficial Prime Minister (standing-in for the President in day-to-day governmental matters).

structured into five areas: defence and security, personally co-ordinated by the Head of Government; the three areas co-ordinated by the three Ministers of State (socio-economic affairs; production; State inspection and control); the area of propaganda and counter-propaganda, co-ordinated by the Central Committee’s secretariat for ideology; in Decree 6/86, DR, I, 32 (21 April 1986), approves the new regulation of the CDS.

762 Decree 26/86 by the CDS, DR, I, 95 (29 November 1986), gives approval to the new organisational statute of the CM’s secretariat, revoking the earlier organisational statute approved by mentioned decree 25-B/80, DR, I, 78 addendum (2 April 1980).

763 Amongst other duties, it was the secretariat’s job, for example, to propose to the Ministers of State what the best measures were for improving the running of the areas they co-ordinated (art.3, para.m); to guarantee the running and the activities of the State Ministers’ cabinets in financial, administrative, technical and material terms (art.3, para.p); to provide all and any data and information on the work of the government to the Head of Government and, when told to do so, to pass his recommendations on to the organisations and the populations (art.3, para.f); to suggest to the Head of Government the measures best able to improve the running of the Council of Ministers, the Council of Defence and Security and the working commissions (art.3, para.l); to proceed with the study and analysis, and comment, on all matters deliberated in the meetings of the Council of Ministers, the CDS and their working commissions (art.3, para.h). In decree 26/86, DR, I, 95 (29 November 1986). The aim of broadening the executive powers of the secretariat of the Council of Ministers had been previously and explicitly assumed in Relatório do Comité Central ao 11º Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p.21.

764 Apart from the above-mentioned tasks inherent to the secretariat, it was the Secretary’s personal duty to suggest to the Head of Government means of verifying and controlling the degree of fulfilment of all the tasks that were supposed to be performed by the ministers of State, by the Regional Military Councils and by the provincial commissioners (art.4, para.c); to write the reports of all meetings of the Council of Ministers and the CDS (art.4, para.d); to write the reports of the meetings of the CDS working commissions and the areas co-ordinated by the Ministers of State (art.4, para.e); to undertake...
Finally, in August 1987, the President felt the need to create a new subsidiary organisation, again to come under his own personal rule, namely the Cabinet of the Head of Government, parallel in structure to the Cabinet of the President of the Republic, this time for the support of the growing governmental duties, both executive and legislative, of the president in his role as head of Government (see previous figure 11.2.2.3).\textsuperscript{765}

In sum, it can be seen that this last step in reinforcing powers into the institution and person of the President was taken, on the whole, indirectly (through his three trusted super-ministers and the subsidiary organs of practical support such as the Council of Ministers' secretariat and Secretary and the new Cabinet of the Head of Government), proving that the process of the direct concentration of power in the president had been achieved.

\textit{11.2.4 Powerful subsidiary organisations supporting the Presidency}

As expounded, the subsidiary organisations (such as the Council of Ministers' secretariat, the Cabinet of the President of the Republic and the Cabinet of the Head of Government) came out significantly empowered by the three main steps of the process of administrative centralisation and power concentration. Apart from the gradual broadening of their effective competence, the most important point to mention is the nature of their staff, carefully chosen amongst the post-27 May generation. As referred in the previous chapter, this had been one of the main strategic objectives set by the president since the beginning of his administration, but was only fully achieved after he managed to assert power over the left and right-wing of the party. In these terms and within such context, speaking to the National Assembly on the 23 February 1983, the

\textsuperscript{765} The cabinet was divided into three main sectors: socio-economic affairs, production affairs and support for the emergency programmes. Presidential decree 15/87, \textit{DR}, I, 62 (3 August 1987), created the Cabinet of the Head of Government and approved its organisational statute.
President made clear that medium and high-ranking technical cadres (several of them holding concurrent military positions or at least with a previous military path, given compulsory conscription since 1978) would be professionally and economically compensated for their status. Eduardo dos Santos mentioned the fact that these cadres were increasingly discontented with their professional and socio-economic situation and that some of them were either leaving their jobs to seek employment in foreign companies working in Angola or were leaving the country in order to find better living conditions abroad\textsuperscript{766}. Their dissatisfaction arose from the perennial shortages in foodstuffs and consumer goods, the lack of suitable housing and public transport. Some were also leaving the country because they rejected socialist ideology and politics\textsuperscript{767}. According to the President, urgent measures would be taken in order to promote this technical elite to adequate positions and to provide them with essential goods, suitable housing and private transportation; he appealed to their patriotism to get them to stay in the country and contribute to national reconstruction\textsuperscript{768}.

From then on, the new policy was strictly planned and executed under the President’s close supervision. Therefore, the aforementioned law 3/84 which created the CDS in 1984 also gave that Council a double competence in this area: 1), the CDS would co-ordinate the execution of a policy on cadre formation (art.4)\textsuperscript{769}; 2), the CDS would be charged with taking the necessary measures to improve the running of the State’s administrative apparatus (art.4)\textsuperscript{770}. These measures thus accomplished the presidential stated objectives of appointing better prepared cadres to middle and top positions within the State’s structures.

\textsuperscript{766} Cit. in Bhagavan, M R, Angola’s ... op. cit. pp. 31-32.
\textsuperscript{767} Ibid. pp. 31-32.
\textsuperscript{768} Ibid. p.32. Later, in 1985, congress documents specified several directives in terms of policy of cadres, again referring that some were leaving the country to Portugal and stating the need to promote and nominate the recently formed cadres to managing positions among other measures; in Documentos da Iª Conferência Nacional ...op. cit...1985, pp.70-72; see also Relatório do Comité Central ao Iº Congresso ...op. cit...1985, pp.99-100.
\textsuperscript{769} Law 3/84, DR, I, 22 (26 January 1984), created the CDS.
\textsuperscript{770} Ibid.
Later on, with the restructuring that ensued from the creation of the Ministers of State, the policy was entrusted to the Council of Ministers' secretariat, whose new statute gave it responsibility for two main organisations dealing with this matter: INORADE (Instituto Nacional para a Organização da Administração do Estado/Institute for the Organisation of State Administration) and INABE (Instituto Nacional de Bolsas de Estudo/National Institute for Study Bursaries); (see previous figure 11.2.2.3).

Results from the strategic policy pursued in terms of younger and more technically prepared cadres surrounding the president, became clearly perceptible as soon as the second ordinary congress took place (December 1985), and culminated in the enhanced authority of the president as reported by foreign observers,

There was a distinctly technocratic flavour to the debates [...] this was reflected in the elections to the party leadership, which brought in or promoted younger, more professional people at the expense of some of the veterans of the struggle for independence. The congress confirmed the growing influence of the armed forces (an inevitable consequence of the regime's preoccupation with defence), while President José Eduardo dos Santos personally emerged with enhanced prestige and authority.

Equally, at an internal level, the official biography of president Eduardo dos Santos confirms such strategic options, stating that

The first attempts to create the objective and subjective conditions towards the deep political and economic reforms dates from the first half of the eighties; such attempts had the support of young pragmatic militants that came out of the faculties of Engineering, Law and Economy. The situation of war did not allow a quicker materialisation of those attempts, but the second congress of MPLA-PT in 1985 approved this pragmatic line and confirmed José Eduardo dos Santos in all his positions [cargos].

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771 In art.3, para.n, decree 26/86 by the CDS, DR, I, 95 (29 November 1986).
772 In ACR, vol 18 (1987), p.B617; Foreign observers remarked the growing political influence of younger and more technically prepared cadres surrounding the presidency since 1982 (when the President affirmed his power); see for instance the article of Michael Holman in Financial Times (21 June 1982); also mentioning the promotion of younger cadres at the 1985 congress is Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. p.14.
773 In Biografia Oficial ... op. cit. pp.vi-vii.
New presidential power (extremely centralised and concentrated) created new powerful individuals among those surrounding the president and fulfilling the subsidiary organisations — most obviously as was the case for the secretary of the Council of Ministers, to give but one example. However, contrary to the influential left and rightwing members, these new powerful individuals did not have any political capital of their own, i.e. their young age, their recent and technocratic career, their distancing from the traditional political and historical cleavages and disputes within the great Creole/M'Bundu alliance (as expounded in chapter 4), their 'cocooned' and discreet political life in Futungo; all transformed them into some kind of 'stars without a light of their own' (estrelas sem brilho próprio\textsuperscript{774}) extremely dependent on the president (be it in the presidency or in the army). Unlike members of the left and right-wing and those associated with other dissident movements (such as the old aristocracy of the Active Revolt or even the youth committees generation) whose political legitimacy derived from personal and effectively lived political parcours (be it in colonial jails, armed struggle or even internal subversive activity), these Futungo Kids had no other political legitimacy other than the one given by the president and while the president wanted it. They thus posed no political threat to Eduardo dos Santos (at least not the type of threat represented by the old cleavages).\textsuperscript{775}

On the 'veterans' side (from the left and right), as much as they tolerated the existence of these Futungo Kids (for the reasons explained in sub-chapter 10.1), the option was therefore to accept the positions they were given within

\textsuperscript{774} Using this same expression to characterise these young cadres or sustaining the same idea are several of my interviewees: Gerônimo Belo (17 March 1998); Victor Aleixo (26 March 1998); Aguiar dos Santos (31 March 1998); Lucas N’Gonda (19 March 1998); Raúl Araújo (2 April 1998); João de Melo (17 April 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998); Jaka Jamba (7 July 1998); Pepetela (7 July 1998); Mendes de Carvalho (17 July 1998);

\textsuperscript{775} They will most probably be intensively involved in any future struggle for the succession of Eduardo dos Santos, but until then they will hardly be a threat to his power; from private interviews with Gerônimo Belo (17 March 1998); Victor Aleixo (26 March 1998); Aguiar dos Santos (31 March 1998); Lucas N’Gonda (19 March 1998); Raúl Araújo (2 April 1998); João de Melo (17 April 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998); Jaka Jamba (7 July 1998); Pepetela (7 July 1998); Mendes de Carvalho (17 July 1998); for a discussion on the succession of Eduardo dos Santos, the expected candidates and respective supporters see \textit{Expresso} (8 September 2001).
the nominations *carrousel* initiated by Neto and developed to the extreme by the new president, thus being unable to construct and enlarge significantly their own political constituencies due to three main obstacles: firstly, due to their constant circulation through several positions within the State and party structures not only in the capital city but also in the provinces, never staying too long in a place; secondly, due to their economic dependence on Presidential largesse (access to State resources coming through positions held at the top of the apparatus); thirdly, because of the lack of development of provincial economic activities that could serve as an independent source of revenue for these 'veterans' and also as an autonomous base for the construction and enlargement of their own political constituencies (their own chains of dependants through their own autonomous distribution) as seen in other African countries (becoming so-called local bosses)\textsuperscript{776}. Changes in the model of power management during dos Santos' administration will be accurately discussed in chapter 13.

11.3 Judicial System: Reinforcement of its Militarisation and Political Control

The final analytical indicator for the analysis of the political framework of relationships regards the judicial system. Once again, Eduardo dos Santos intensified the processes started by his predecessor of political control and militarisation of the judicial system.

a) The reinforcement of political control over the judicial system was achieved in a double way:

- On the one hand, through the approval of the Organisational Regulations of the PGR (*Procuradoria Geral da República*/Office of the Procurator General of the Republic) in 1980, which made this important judicial organisation and its highest officer (the procurator-general) directly dependent on the President of the Republic; the Procurator was considered

\textsuperscript{776} On local bosses and the construction of provincial networks of dependants see for instance Bayart, Jean-François, *L'État au Cameroun* ... op. cit.; Bayart, Jean-François, *The State in Africa* ... op. cit.
subordinate to the President (art. 1) and it was decreed that he should receive
direct instructions from the President of the Republic, which he was obligated
to fulfil (art. 2)\(^\text{777}\). As we have previously seen, this was a smart move that came
to bear its fruits as soon as the Kamanga case emerged (1982), unexpectedly
implicating the presidency;

- On the other hand, it was achieved placing the whole ministry of
justice under the direct subordination to the president of the republic as can be
clearly seen in the diagram of the State’s central structure (see previous figure
11.2.2.3).

b) The reinforcement of the process of militarisation of the judicial
system was achieved through the creation of CMRs (Regional Military
Councils) in July 1983, which broadened the range of competence of the
military courts, deeming them fit to try ‘all offences against State security,
economic sabotage, speculation and disobedience to orders issued by the
CMRs, as well as all offences damaging or endangering the interests of
collective defence and security within the CMR’s areas’ (art. 4 of Law 5/83)\(^\text{778}\).

Inasmuch as it was the role of the military tribunals to decide what
constituted an offence damaging or endangering the interests of collective
defence and security, and their role to define the interests of collective defence
and security, the military tribunals were in fact free to try any offence.

Following on from this broadening of competence, the new regulations for
the organs of military justice\(^\text{779}\) explicitly granted juridical preponderance to
regional military tribunals within the areas of jurisdiction of their respective
CMRs, thus placing them above civil circuit tribunals\(^\text{780}\): allowing them to hold
normal trials for all offences (as defined in art. 4 of law 5/83) committed by
military or civilians alike\(^\text{781}\), and to hold summary trials (within 15 days) when

\(^{777}\) Decree 25/80, DR, I, 70 (24 March 1980), approves the organisational regulation of the Office of the
Procurator General of the Republic.

\(^{778}\) In Law 5/83, DR, I, 179 (30 July 1983).


\(^{780}\) Previously (by the end of Neto’s administration) the primacy of military tribunals over civil tribunals
was of an implicit type and occurring from practice as discussed.

the perpetrators were caught in flagrant *delictum*.\(^{782}\) Again (as stressed during the analysis of Neto’s administration), such judicial militarisation was mainly to be applied to political and internal security issues and not so much to ordinary civil crimes, such as those against the state’s property, which massively increased as we will see in the next chapter.

The political control of the military tribunal magistrates was ensured since the presidents and the professional judges of the regional military tribunals were to be directly nominated by the President of the Republic.\(^{783}\)

Concluding chapter 11, it can be said that after the extreme reinforcement of the various processes started by Neto (be it in terms of party discrimination; administrative centralisation and power concentration or judicial militarisation), the formal political system became almost totally ‘insulated’ -- i.e., the system began to have almost no possibility for formal (institutional and minimally effective) intervention or for allowing participation by the general population, being dominated with near-absolute autonomy by the President of the Republic. This meant a near-total political distancing of the ruled masses from the formal political system. Therefore, the difference with Neto’s administration was not just quantitative. It was primarily qualitative.

\(^{782}\) Art. 4, n°1 para. a, b, c, d, e, f, of Law 14/84, *DR*, I, 168 (17 July 1984) ‘regulation of organs of military justice’.

\(^{783}\) In art. 7 para 2 of Law 14/84, *DR*, I, 168 (17 July 1984) ‘regulation of organs of military justice’.

This chapter aims to analyse the development of economic relationships between the rulers and ruled during dos Santos’ administration and compare them with those obtaining under Neto’s administration. The main purpose is to see if the predatory and *rentière* practices intensified and led to the effective breakage of the distributive ties between rulers and ruled as argued within a post-modern patrimonial perspective. As explained in order to compare the two administrations this chapter follows the same analytical indicators as those used for the Neto’s presidency.

12.1 Public Administration: Greater Inefficiency

During Neto’s presidency, Socialist practice and patrimonial distributive promises and expectations, led to an enormous growth in the public administration, which comprised a minority of bureaucrats coming from the colonial period, a few survivors of the youth committees generation and a majority of personnel without the required qualifications (mainly Creole/M’Bundu). The fact that most were unqualified staff with a *rentière* and haughty bureaucratic attitude (*burocratismo*) and their need to spend a significant amount of time on informal activities, all led to the inefficiency and low work productivity of the state’s administrative apparatus. Throughout the first half of the eighties, the problem only got worst, leading the President himself to admit it during his opening speech to the first national Party conference in January 1985:

> During the period since the first Extraordinary Party Congress [from 1980 to 1985] we also noticed that a large part of our State budget was absorbed by the salaries paid to workers in public administration with no significant improvement, in return, in the effectiveness of their work. The increase in the number of civil servants has raised neither efficiency, nor the quality of the services, mainly because there are, as yet, no criteria to enable us better to select workers fit for the posts they hold and with the prerequisites to occupy positions of responsibility.\(^{784}\)

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\(^{784}\)‘Opening speech of the President to the 1st National Conference’ … op. cit. p.22.
Therefore, the Conference stressed that there was a need,

To continue with the reorganisation of the system of supplying urban areas, in order to implement the principle that "he who doesn't work, doesn't eat", so that everyone is forced to work for themselves and for society.\(^7\)

In other words the conference admitted that there was a lot of people eating (benefiting from State goods), but without working (at least for the State). Even though salaries were drastically losing purchasing power, they were still a rent, since productivity was plummeting, as remarked by the second congress (December 1985), not only in the public administration, but in the whole State sector, acknowledging that there was 'a divorce between the level of salaries and the level of work produced'.\(^6\) Rentière mentality remained strong throughout the whole State sector and, as observed by Bhagavan in 1983, unrealistic expectations prevailed according to which the State was supposed to perform the role of the big man, freely dispensing goods and services\(^7\).

Within the explained mechanisms of critica and auto-critica, problems such as haughtiness, contempt for the people or burocratismo were again remarked by congress documents in 1985,

We must fight against all incorrect behaviour amongst leaders, cadres and party members such as acomodamento [laziness], burocratismo, auto-suficiência [self-sufficiency, i.e. haughtiness]\(^8\).

We must fight [...] petit bourgeois behaviour such as contempt for the people\(^9\).

Inasmuch as the whole Socialist economic system depended very much on the functioning of public administration, therefore an increasingly inefficient bureaucracy had an increasingly 'deadening effect on most activities'\(^7\) with an 'incalculable economic cost' during Eduardo dos Santos administration\(^7\).

\(^{7,8,9}\) Documentos da 1ª Conferência Nacional ... op. cit... 1985, p.44.
\(^{7,6}\) Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p.106.
\(^{7,7}\) In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's ... op. cit... 1985, p.106.
\(^{7,8}\) In Documentos da 1ª Conferência Nacional ...op. cit...1985, pp.64-65.
\(^{7,9}\) In Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso ... op. cit...1985, p.33.
\(^{7,9}\) *The government bureaucracy, operated as it is by a mere handful of dedicated and skilled civil servants, backed up by an army of semi-literate manual workers has a deadening effect on most
12.2 Material Production: Reinforcement of Agricultural and Industrial Inefficiency and Oil Dependency

Before entering the concrete analysis of economic activity, it is worth repeating that our analytical perspective, although acknowledging the economic impact of the war on the production levels (in terms of destruction of infrastructure, utilisation of resources and so on), stresses all the other factors also contributing to the decline of production and that cannot be explained by the war: namely the lack of co-ordination, absenteeism, predatory and rentière practices. The war did increase from 1980 onwards and within this work’s discussion I will stress its effect on the pattern of relationships that was evolving between rulers and ruled — as in sub-chapter 12.4.

12.2.1 Agriculture: production collapse

The situation of the agricultural sector during the first half of the eighties was one of generalised collapse both at: a), the co-operatives level; b), the private, peasant level.

    a) During the first half of the eighties co-operative farms or State farms survived almost entirely on State subsidies792. Even those economic analysts who most sympathised with the Socialist path acknowledged that ‘these [state] farms have failed in an economic sense. The value of their output has been lower than the value of their input.’793

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791 As observed by Birmingham in the eighties, ‘Many of the places in the administration serve no earthly residual function but to abolish them would be politically inconceivable. [...] The cost, however, in terms of thousands of staff-hours wasted queuing for valueless permits, unnecessary licences, authorisations, chits, booking forms, boarding passes, meal tickets, provincial visas, lodgings registrations, laissez-passer stamps is uncalculated and incalculable.’; in Birmingham, David, ‘Angola revisited’ ... op. cit. p.8.
792 From private interview with the director of IDA-Malange (‘Institute for Agricultural Development’ of Malange), Virgilio Ribeiro da Silva (8 September 1995).
793 In Bhagavan, M R, Angola’s ... op. cit. p.39.
The disruption caused by the war could not be taken as the only explanation of such generalised collapse in the whole country. Several provinces in the Southwest, with direct access to seaports and not much affected by the war (such as a good part of Benguela, Namibe and Huíla) were in the same situation\textsuperscript{794}. Beyond the war, one of the main problems was clear. It was the increasing incapacity of co-ordinating several sectors by an enormous and ever inefficient administrative apparatus that was supposed to back-up a centrally planned agricultural system. The evidence of such reality forced its official recognition by the CC report to the December 1985 Congress:

As the main problems expressed by this sector concern its relationship with other sectors, who are either badly run or running late and can therefore affect the whole agricultural year, it is necessary to look again closely at who is responsible for carrying out decisive tasks for agricultural production, including the importation and distribution of seeds, fertilisers and tools, trading in the fields, the distribution of mercantile production and support for the peasantry sector.\textsuperscript{795}

Moreover, according to Hodges, nationalisation itself proved a failure,

Starved of skilled personnel in all domains, the government could not provide cadres with the requisite managerial and technical skills to operate hundreds of modern farms [...] The AUP's [state farms as already explained] began to break down, spare parts were difficult to obtain, technical expertise was scarce, production inputs arrived late or not at all, and consumer goods became ever scarcer, farm labourers lost interest in working for wages. Much of the AUP's land was appropriated for individual family farming and almost all their cattle was stolen and absorbed into peasant herds. By the early 1980's the remaining AUP's were a manifest failure, dependent on state subsidies to cover regular, sizeable deficits\textsuperscript{796} [my bold].

b) At the private level (peasants and farmers), during the first half of the eighties it can be said that the tendency that was already in evidence towards

\textsuperscript{794} To give but one example, the valley of the Cavaco river between Lobito and Benguela was a very productive area during the colonial period. After the independence it was a safe place and had a short access to the port of Lobito (c20km of safe road) or to the Benguela airport, however its production also collapsed. From private interviews with Virgilio Ribeiro da Silva (8 September 1998).
\textsuperscript{795} Relatório do Comité Central ao 11º Congresso ... op. cit...1985, p.109. Several concrete examples of such lack of co-ordination were reported to me by Vicente Pinto de Andrade in private interview, about the mid-eighties while he was manager of a State company in a southern province (11 May 1998). A concrete example of such lack of coordination can also be found in Pepetela, A Geração...op. cit. p.234.
the end of Neto’s presidency worsened, whereby the overwhelming majority of peasants stopped trading in formal commercial systems, and turned to producing for personal consumption, exchanging their little surplus with private traders who went out to the rural areas. As mentioned, extremely high prices for agriculture products in the parallel markets were an incentive to this kind of business. However, contrary to what could have been expected, such non-official trade was unable to develop agricultural production because there was a limited variety and quantity of goods that could be offered by the peasant to the private trader (unable to expand production in face of the recrudescence of the war) and also a limited variety and quantity of goods that could be offered by the private trader to the peasant, due to the restricted number of supply sources and goods that could be legally or illegally obtained by the trader for further resale. As observed by Bhagavan in 1983,

The private trader has three main sources for the basic commodities which are in high demand [...] The first is the people who queue up to buy at the people’s shops and resell to traders at a substantial monetary profit to themselves. The second source is the workers who sell part of the commodities they get paid in or have the right to buy at subsidised prices in factories where they themselves produce these goods — this is called 'self-consumption'. The final avenue is those workers, supervisors, petty bourgeois elements, etc., who simply steal goods from their workplaces in ports, airports, factories, state owned internal commercial establishments, etc., and sell these stolen goods.

To these three sources we must add the previously mentioned illegal/informal importation through work and tourist trips to the exterior, but also with definite limits. All these sources were obviously incapable to generate a regular and substantial flux of products to feed a large scale economic business with peasants through the whole country (at least in the most secure areas) in order to compensate for the inefficient state sector.

796 In Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990’s ... op. cit. pp. 85-86.
797 In 1983, the price for the same agricultural products was anything from 30% to 100% higher in the parallel market; in Bhagavan, M R, Angola’s ... op. cit. p.22; this tendency was to continue in the following years as reported in 1986 by Tony Hodges in Financial Times (4 August 1986)
798 In Bhagavan, M R, Angola’s ... op. cit. p.23.
Faced with the total failure of the system of supplying agricultural produce and attempting to attract some produce into the official channels, in 1981, the government launched a trading campaign, organising markets for barter that coincided with the harvest-time of specific crops, in areas of intensive agriculture. Lorry-loads of industrial products were taken to the fields where they were exchanged directly with the peasants for agricultural produce. However, the exceptional character of such measure, limited in time and space, did not solve the immediate problem, and even less the general problem. Therefore, it was unable to avoid the continuous downward trend in agricultural production (be it in the coffee, cassava, cereal, cotton or sisal production). Despite not being directly affected by the war, the fishing industry also declined.

If during Neto's presidency reports talked about chronic food scarcity in people's shops, during the first half of the eighties, the situation was even more

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799 See Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, Angola ... op. cit. p.143.
800 From private interview with the director of IDA-Malange ('Institute for Agricultural Development' of Malange), Virgílio Ribeiro da Silva (8 September 1995).
801 Only four out of a total eighteen provinces were part of these campaigns due to transport problems and UNITA's ambushes; in Rádio Nacional de Angola (2 November 1981), cit. in SWB (4 November 1981).
802 Such measures were unable to avoid that marketed production was down 26 per cent in 1981, creating widespread shortages in the towns; as reported by Michael Holman in Financial Times (21 June 1982).
803 By 1981/82, coffee production had fallen to 20.040t (334,000 bags of 60Kg) compared with the 21.501t of 1981 (see figures presented during Neto's presidency); there was a further fall in 1982/83 to 17.400t (290,000 bags) and to 10.589 t. in 1984 (176,483 bags), recovering slightly to 13.686t in 1985 (228,100 bags); in ACR, vol. 16, (1985), p.B612; also ACR, vol.18 (1987), p.B631.
804 Angola's production of dried cassava fell from 19,000t in 1981 to just 1000t in 1985; cereal production in 1984 was estimated to be circa 7% less than the average estimated output in 1979-1983 and in the year to 31 March 1986 Angola required 330,000t. in cereal imports and the UN's World Food Programme established food aid needs at 120,000t. Another commercial crop facing difficulties was sugar; the only three estates still in production fell short of their production targets to 1984/85 due to shortages of inputs and was less than a third of its usual level in the 1970's. Sisal and cotton production had shrunk by roughly similar proportions, in ACR, vol. 16, (1985), p.B612; ACR, vol.17 (1986), p.B621; ACR, vol.18 (1987), p.B631.
805 The national fishing fleet had to reduce its already very low 1984 plan target by 38% to 65,000t (even less than the 75,890t landed by Angolan boats in 1983), and still apparently could not meet even this lower target because many fishing boats needed repairing and spare parts were in short supply or entirely unavailable; in ACR, vol.17 (1986), p.B621. According to Hodges, in 1985 the catch went down to 62,500 tons; in Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990's ... op. cit. p.98. Problems such as the paralisation of part of the fishing fleet, deficient technical and material support to fishing industry and regular lack of food to fishermen, is reported in congress documents such as: Documentos da 1ª Conferência Nacional ...op. cit...1985, p. 37; also Relatório do Comité Central ao IIº Congresso ...op.
alarming. Fresh fruit and vegetables had simply disappeared from official retail markets in Luanda, even fish was in shortage and the situation was far worse in the provinces. The search for sufficient food was a major part of daily life; strikers in Luanda harbour demanded food and not salaries' increase.

Regardless of the food scarcity, and in parallel with the discrimination of peasants within the party, agricultural activity as a whole was progressively neglected by the central government which started to pay it less and less attention in terms of the investments and expenditure that were crucial to its recovery; as confirmed by the CC report to the second party congress, summing up the first five years of the decade:

The values reached during the five-year period were not only much lower than planned, but production fell yearly, dropping sharply in 1983 [...] a careful analysis of State accounts shows how little attention this sector received compared to other sectors of our economy because the figures do not support the definition of agriculture as the basis of our development. By analysing the money spent from the budget, it can be seen that agriculture was given [...] only 8% of budget expenditure.

This type of economic neglect might be referred to as the corollary of 'a long-term policy of feeding the city but neglecting the farmers', to use Birmingham's
expression (bearing in mind that even the cities were now facing scarcity of food).

Reflecting in very simple terms on the downward trend of the agricultural sector during the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos’ presidency, the 1985 CC report concluded that ‘the country has to import most of the food it eats’. To this statement we must add that the country was already receiving substantial quantities of food aid in order to compensate for acute malnutrition and hunger in several provinces throughout 1985.

12.2.2 Industry: production collapse

At the level of the manufacturing industry, the more austere application of repressive labour legislation right after the attempted coup (cf. supra) became absolutely innocuous from 1980/1981 onwards. Practices that emerged during Neto’s presidency such as absenteeism (while working on the parallel market), diversion of produce (to feed the parallel market), lack of discipline and efficiency in workplaces, became the general rule for workers and managers alike. In 1983, Bhagavan described the situation of the manufacturing industry in the following terms:

[There is] absence of a commitment to work. Absenteeism is rife at all levels and among all strata of workers and employees.

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810 Birmingham says that ‘Six months after the 1977 coup Angola was forced to airlift 30,000 bags of maize from Zambia for emergency feeding. It was the beginning of a long-term policy of feeding the city but neglecting the farmers’; in Birmingham, David, Frontline Nationalism…op. cit. p.78. If that is said to be the beginning of such policy, therefore we may say that the CC’s reported lack of investment was the corollary of that same policy.


812 In June 1982, FAO announced that it was giving US$21m to Angola; in Rádio Nacional de Angola (6 June 1982), cit. in SWB (8 June 1982). This same organisation reported on 15 January 1985 that Angola expected to commercially import about two-thirds of its 1984-1985 food deficit and had succeeded in securing food aid pledges for most (71,000t) of the 83,000t balance; cit. in ACR, vol.17 (1986), p.B621.

813 ‘More than 500,000 people are estimated to be in critical need of assistance, mainly in the Northern, Central and Southern provinces. [...] Assistance Measures: some 96.1 million dollars are urgently required in order to meet outstanding needs’; in Africa Emergency - UN Office for Emergency Operations in Africa (June 1985); on the decline of food production and acute hunger see also ACR. vol.18 (1987), p.B631, see also Hodges, Tony Angola to the 1990’s... op. cit. p.89.

814 In Bhagavan, M R, Angola’s… op. cit. p.27.
Workers avoid work, and so do the managers. Workers and managers come to their workplaces in the morning, record their presence for the sake of their job security, wages and salaries, and disappear after a while. What do they do the rest of the “working hours”? [...] It seems that the skilled workers spend their time away from the factories providing services in exchange for other services and goods in the so called “informal sector” (this kind of activity is called esquema in popular parlance) [...] The lack of industrial self-discipline is endemic in all workplaces [...] Work efficiency is very low because of the combined and cumulative effect of the following: the absence of systematic and planned execution of work; the impossibility and indeed the inadvisability of relying upon someone to do a piece of work he has been given to do, or taken the responsibility to do, within a margin of reasonable and acceptable delay; lack of care of tools, implements, machines, etc.; the persistence of anarchic individualism among all strata of employees.815

Acknowledging the ineffectiveness of previous repressive legislation and the general surrendering to such practices, the CC report to the second congress merely stressed ‘the urgent need to formulate a new law that will punish more severely and in a more cautionary manner all those who commit offences against the national economy.’816 But the matter went no further and even foreign observers acknowledged the ‘impossibility or unwillingness (or both) of imposing industrial discipline from the outside, using threats of punitive action’.817

In consequence of such practices, and also because of the disruptive effects of the war on the infrastructure and the supply of raw materials, production in the manufacturing industry fell dramatically during the first five years of Eduardo dos Santos presidency. As early as 1981, Roberto de Almeida, the party secretary for economic and social policy warned that several factories were not producing ‘even to meet the salaries of their workers’818. The meagre

815 In Bhagavan, M R, Angola’s ... op. cit. pp.39-40. It should also be taken into account the previous quote from this same work, where Bhagavan refers the three main sources to access basic commodities, including ‘those workers, supervisors, petty bourgeois elements, etc., who simply steal goods from their workplaces in ports, airports, factories, state owned internal commercial establishments, etc., and sell these stolen goods.’; ibid. p.23. Quentin Peel also reports the problem of lack of skills meaning a ‘lack of maintenance of all forms of equipment, causing frequent breakdowns and often the complete destruction of machinery”; in Financial Times (14 September 1981).
816 Relatório do Comité Central ao IIº Congresso ...op. cit...1985, p.23.
817 In Bhagavan, M R, Angola’s ... op. cit. p.27.
recovery between 1977-1981 (reaching a production peak in 1981 of 40% of 1973 levels), regressed to its 1976 figures in 1982 (c. 35% of 1973 production), falling again in 1983 to 32% of 1973 production level, then to 30%, just to drop once again in 1987 to 20% (a level of production that was to be maintained in the following years). By 1983, it had already become clear that the manufacturing industry had simply collapsed — as stressed by authors such as Peter Meyns or Bhagavan,

It is not an exaggeration to say that the manufacturing industry has collapsed. Compared to 1972, when 5,561 manufacturing enterprises were functioning, by 1981 this number had dropped to 148, out of which 97 were entirely state-owned, 44 were entirely private, while 7 were joint-ventures between the state and private owners. In these, capacity utilisation is down 20–30%. Correspondingly, there has been a massive reduction in the total number of employees from 125,373 in 1973 to 38,851 in 1981.

Faced with the evidence, the CC report to the second congress acknowledged the chaotic situation and tried to explain it in these terms:

[The situation in manufacturing industry] was aggravated by the war, by the stagnation and fall in prices [official prices], by the insufficient supply of technical materials, by the interruptions in the provision of water and electric energy and by the economic and financial mismanagement of finances, of stocks, of raw materials and cadres [...] the gross value of estimated production has dropped and this sector's contribution to the total internal product is around 8%, including the food industry, light industry and heavy industry.

The picture was no better in the mining industry, with a sharp decrease in the volume of diamond production, due to, among other factors, the illicit trade and the worsening of the military situation, all contributing to the national diamond-mining company being in deficit (it must be noticed that illicit trade included...)

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819 In Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, *A Indústria* ... op. cit. p.468.
820 As observed by Meyns, 'Because of the great decrease in industrial and agricultural production, added to a continuous, severe strangulation of supplies, it has become obvious that the [official] economic structure of the country is aiming for collapse'; In Meyns, Peter, *O desenvolvimento* ... op. cit. pp. 121-122.
821 In Bhagavan, M R, *Angola's* ... op. cit. p.25.
822 *Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso* ...op. cit...1985, p.111.
823 'Activity in this sector is characterised by annual decrease in production. [...] The inefficient use of the installations for treatment of gravel, the irregular supply of technical materials, the illicit trade and the worsening of the military situation, all contributed to the national diamond-mining company being in deficit'; in *Documentos da 1ª Conferência Nacional* ...op. cit...1985, pp.38–39.
not only UNITA's activities, trafficking diamonds since 1977\textsuperscript{824}, but also practices of organised crime run from Luanda, as exemplified by the above mentioned lawsuit 105, or Kamanga case).

After several years of a supposed dictatorship of the proletariat, by the end of the Eduardo dos Santos Marxist phase, the industrial proletariat represented a mere 1% of the entire national workforce and the number of employees in the organised/official sectors of the economy, i.e. employed waged labour in agriculture, mining, construction and manufacturing, represented less than 2% of the entire national workforce.\textsuperscript{825}

By then, the gross domestic product per capita had dropped by 10% in relation to 1981\textsuperscript{826} and the economy was more dependent on the oil sector than ever. The increase in exploration, the additional wells being drilled, the increase in production and the growing number of operating foreign companies\textsuperscript{827} — the result of the politics of ‘opening up to the West’ towards the end of Neto’s presidency — meant that the oil sector was the only one showing any significant growth (47.5 million barrels produced in 1981, nearly 75 million in 1984 and 80 million in 1985), representing almost 90% of all exported merchandise.\textsuperscript{828} Within the usual mechanism of critica and auto-critica the CC report showed concern at such dependence, but also as usual with this kind of internal criticism, it had no other effect whatsoever. As we saw, the agriculture sector was being increasingly neglected in terms of State investments.

\textsuperscript{824} UNITA’s selling of diamonds and gold to raise money to buy weapons dates from 1977 as confirmed by Georges Sangumba, the group’s foreign affairs secretary, stating by then that ‘we are sitting on a pile of riches. The country from north to south is loaded with diamonds, gold and precious minerals. We are in business, very big business’, also referring some of the countries selling them arms in exchange of US dollars raised with diamonds sale; in The Times (4 November 1977); also Agence France Press (3 November 1977).

\textsuperscript{825} In Bhagavan, M R, Angola’s ... op. cit., p. 44.

\textsuperscript{826} Relatório do Comité Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit...1985, p. 89.

\textsuperscript{827} Documentos da 1ª Conferência Nacional ... op. cit...1985, pp. 40–41.

\textsuperscript{828} Relatório do Comité Central ao 11° Congresso ... op. cit...1985, pp. 112–113. It must be noticed that as soon as 1982, foreign observers already reported that ‘à la exception de la recherche et de l'extraction du pétrole, pour l'essentiel off shore l'économie s'est peu à peu paralysée.’; in article of Jean-Claude Pomonti in Le Monde (11 December 1982). The reality of oil companies operating in Angola led Bhagavan to call them ‘islands of Western enterprise and technology’, where ‘the management, organisation, marketing, technology and the highly skilled personnel all belong to the multinationals, “only” the labour is Angolan.’; in Bhagavan, M R, Angola’s ... op. cit. p. 28.
The sectorial analysis of the GDP is worrying for, during the past five years, the only sector that has maintained a high growth rate (19%) is the oil sector, which increases the national economy's dependence on its production and export, inasmuch as there has been a decrease in the production and export by most of the other sectors. [...] In spite of the statistical insufficiencies, the available indicators show [...] signs of decline in the production of sectors of fundamental importance for the people's well-being, such as agriculture, the mining industry, the manufacturing industry, transport and communication.829

Not even the drastic fall in oil prices in December 1985 (during the congress) changed such situation, merely representing a doubled deficit on the current account (from US$236m in 1985 to US$447m in 1986) and an increased foreign debt (from US$2.7bn in 1985 to US$3bn in 1986)830. Insofar as the production collapse in agriculture and manufacturing industry was not made good, dependence on oil revenue was to continue in the following years (representing up to 95% of export earnings831 and benefiting from a new increase in oil prices as soon as 1987832), which led Tony Hodges to characterise Angola as an oil single export country833.

12.3 The Informal Sector: Extreme Development

The presidency of Eduardo dos Santos was characterised by a reinforcement of the factors that were at the basis of the informal sector's development during Neto's presidency such as: a), increasing hierarchical discriminatory access to material privileges and benefits through an ever more 'elitist' party b), increasing economic scarcity; c) increasing failure to meet distributive expectations (due to growing economic scarcity); d) maintenance of an

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829 Relatório do Comité Central ao 10º Congresso ...op. cit...1985, p.90.
830 In article of Tony Hodges in Financial Times (7 July 1987).
831 See article of Tony Hodges in Financial Times (4 August 1986); also article of Ned Temko in The Christian Science Monitor (7 July 1987).
832 Oil revenues decreased from c. US$1900m in 1985 to US$1100m in 1986, but rose again to US$2000m in 1987; in Hodges, Tony, Angola from Afro-Stalinism... op. cit. p.2, compare with data provided during Neto's presidency.
833 In article of Tony Hodges in Financial Times (7 July 1987).
administrative and centralised management of the economy (including fixed
prices, quantities, imports, foreign exchange rate and so on).

The worsening of these factors led to the extreme reinforcement of the
informal sector, representing, on the one hand, the ever increasing perverse and
socially unfair dynamics of the parallel market; and on the other hand, a
massive generalisation of predatory practices. Such phenomena will now be
analysed in more detail.

12.3.1 The ever increasing social unfairness of the parallel market

During the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos' administration, the growth of
the parallel economy reached extreme levels. In the first years of the new
presidency, the informal market had already grown up to the point of
overshadowing the official market as reported by Quentin Peel in 1981,

The only thriving market is the black market, where more goods are
available than in the proper shops.834

Accordingly, prices in the parallel market went through a 'frightening
increase'835, as if they had 'taken leave of reality altogether: [in 1981] one fish
cost Kwanzas/Kw 4.000, almost one month's average wage836; [in 1983] a
skirt cost 2000Kw and a shirt 1500Kw837.

Given that clothes, vegetables and fruits had simply disappeared from
government shops (most in particular people's shops)838; knowing that monthly
salaries in 1983 ranged between 5.000-7.000Kw (unskilled manual worker),
10.000-15.000Kw (skilled factory worker), 16.000-18.000 (middle civil servant
and middle managerial cadre) and 32.000-35.000 (top civil servant and top

834 Reported by Quentin Peel (Africa editor) in Financial Times (14 September 1981). Reporting to
1982, very interesting references to the strength of the black market and the straddling activity
involving the leadership and candongueiros [main traders acting in the black market], both capable of
doing anything to achieve their aims, can be found in Pepetela, A Geração... op. cit. pp.200, 222-223,
228.
835  In Documentos da 1º Conferência Nacional ... op. cit... 1985, p.43.
836 Reported by Quentin Peel in Financial Times (14 September 1981).
837 In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's ... op. cit. p.62.
838 Ibid. p.62.
technical cadre); it becomes clear that salaries were an ever less important part of the people’s revenues, the bulk of which was coming out of parallel activities. According to Peter Meyns, as early as 1984 the survival of at least half of the population (obviously those most discriminated in the access to state resources as explained) was made possible by the informal sector.

The more the informal economy grew, the more the national bank had to print money, which was absorbed by the informal circuits without ever returning to banks, therefore fuelling inflation. The more the national currency depreciated in the informal sector, the greater was the distortion between the official rate (US$1 to $30Kwanzas; maintained since 1977) and the parallel rate (reaching a peak of US$1 to 1000Kwanzas in 1983). The more the inflation grew, the deeper was the difference between official and informal prices for goods.

Insofar as these economic distortions (prices and exchange rate) were the origins of the profits made in informal business, its growth also represented the growth of profit in the informal sector. However, due to the fact that primary access to official prices and exchange rate was processed through an extremely discriminatory system (essentially the party during Neto’s administration and essentially the presidency from 1982 onwards), therefore, the increasing informal profits were more and more absorbed by the top echelons of the party/State/military structures. For the majority of the population informal activity merely represented the possibility of physical survival in ever degrading conditions. As remarked by Birmingham, parallel markets sprang everywhere allowing precarious living to some and a comfortable living to others (those who operated them with ‘political and bureaucratic protective cover’).

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839 Ibid. p.63
840 In Meyns, Peter, ‘O desenvolvimento ... op. cit. pp. 121–122.
841 In Bhagavan, M R, Angola’s ... op. cit. p.62.
842 In Birmingham, David, Frontline Nationalism... op. cit. pp.97-98.
Because those increasing economic distortions, and the profits derived from them, were financed by the state budget, which in its turn was financed by the oil rent, the growth of the informal business also meant that an ever substantial part of the oil revenue was indirectly made available to the chosen ones of the regime, something that led Ennes Ferreira to call them an ‘oil nomenclature’\textsuperscript{843}.

Facing the growing evidence, the 1985 CC report partially acknowledged (within the critica and auto-critica mechanisms) this perverse and socially unfair relationship between the economic distortions, the informal market and the state budget,

There is currently no relation between prices and production costs for nationally made goods [for imported goods, the distortion was even greater due to the overvalued official foreign exchange rate]; there is great difficulty in establishing production costs because of the organisational problems companies have in determining prices that compensate agriculture and livestock production; there are failings in the system of distribution to towns and the rural areas and, finally, the pay-structures and wages are divorced from work productivity. The combination of all these interdependent factors has led to the formation of clandestine parallel markets where, because of their nature, values are distorted [...]

As these markets exist on the margin of the law and the economic organisation of the country, their activity escapes State control and become a place where all diverted goods converge. The discrepancy between the prices and the value of the products increases and constitutes an incentive for the diversion of merchandise, leading the State’s general budget to finance this situation.

The discrepancy between the revenue generated by salaries and the volume of circulating merchandise, with the consequent internal devaluing of the money, leads to processes of self-supplying as a means of safeguarding buying power, which ends up accentuating the inequalities amongst workers. [My bold]\textsuperscript{844}

In sum, confirming the signs that were to be seen by the end of Neto’s administration, in the medium and long run, the growth of the informal sector was unable to improve the purchasing power of the lower social strata (further


\textsuperscript{844} Relatório do Comité Central ao IIº Congresso ...op. cit...1985, pp.106–107. Also in a proximate sense is Documentos da Iº Conferência Nacional ...op. cit...1985, p.34.
worsening it), mainly benefiting the top ranks of the party/State/military structures.

12.3.2 The spiralling increase in predatory practices

The continuous growth of the informal sector necessarily implied the continuous growth of predatory practices. Thus, after assuming the presidency and while he was still under the pressure of the leftwing (1981-1982), the new president felt constrained to officially act against the expansion of such practices. Accordingly, under the aegis of the politburo leftwing members, a major drive against corruption was announced in April 1981, acknowledging that ‘individualism, black marketing, indifference to the people’s difficulties, and bureaucracy had produced dangerous manifestations of corruption, speculation, ideological confusion and opportunism’ creating a need for a great ‘offensive against carelessness and inefficiency’.

People were invited to denounce irregularities exerted by responsáveis – that is, middle and top party cadres and civil servants. Corruption within State shops was one of the most important issues and according to Eduardo dos Santos,

> J’espère que tous les camarades sauront dénoncer avec courage ceux qui détournent les produits qui sont mis en circulation par le ministère du commerce intérieur. J’espère que seront dénoncés ceux qui se servent du sucre que nous importons pour faire du kaporroto [une boisson alcoolique distillée]; ceux qui dans les services publics, vendent des habits et des chaussures, ainsi que ceux qui, par l’intermédiaire de réseaux d’amis, vendent des bouteilles de whisky volées dans les dépôts du commerce intérieur. Sans l’engagement des travailleurs l’offensive ne pourra atteindre ses buts.

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847 Ibid. p.31.
The offensive had no effective results, as was later recognised by the 1985 CC report and the reasons for this failure were two: firstly, the offensive was launched under the pressure of the leftwing at a time when they still held some influence (before 1982) but did not count on the effective support of the President, who accepted predatory practices as soon as he managed to assert his power (as we will see); secondly, other than the most committed members of the leftwing (a demographically small segment of the elite), there was no one left to cast the first stone and as soon as the president asserted his control over them (from 1982 onwards), there was absolutely no one to fight such battle and the campaign was nothing more than cosmetic. So-called predatory practices were everywhere, from workers through managers to ministers, crossing the whole social spectrum as observed by Bhagavan in 1983,

Theft and corruption have begun to make inroads into the moral values of the working class and the managerial strata. The grave shortages in food and essential consumer goods that have persisted over the last few years have put a premium on these goods. They can be exchanged for other desirable goods, or sold for extremely high prices in Kwanzas, on the parallel open market (called kandonga in popular vocabulary). This temptation has proved too strong for sections of the working class and managerial strata. Goods are pilfered from seaports, airports, warehouses and government shops, etc. Dockworkers are notorious for liberally helping themselves to all kinds of goods from the cargo that ships discharge at Luanda and Lobito ports. This is often done with the connivance of the security guards who get their share [...] On the other side of the social spectrum, it is strongly assumed that some top state officials and a couple of government ministers have been caught accumulating large sums of money in convertible currency abroad through shady import deals, granting of supply contracts to foreign companies, and the smuggling of diamonds.

Congress documents in 1985 confirmed the increase of these practices throughout the whole social spectrum during the period of 1980-1985: referring to 'the practice of taking commissions' in public affairs (for top ranks of the

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848 Such failure was admitted in Relatório do Comité Central ao Iº Congresso... op. cit... 1985, pp.11-12.
849 In Bhagavan, M R, Angola's... op. cit. p.41. Reporting to 1982, several interesting references to such corruption and schemes here called predatory practices exerted by the whole social strata, can be found in Pepetela, A Geração... op. cit. pp. 193, 200-202, 211-212, 222-223.
party and State structures)\textsuperscript{850}, the existence of ‘various synchronised actions of economic sabotage’ (i.e. networks such as those of Kamanga and Angonave) led by ‘cadres with certain responsibilities regarding decision-making and capital management’\textsuperscript{851}; or the large-scale theft of merchandise\textsuperscript{852}.

This massive increase in predatory practices was a major new development under Eduardo dos Santos. As explained, the more the predatory practices and the informal market developed, the more the official economy weakened and the worse the economic situation of the lower social strata became. Their position was fragile and dependent. The reason is simple, the sources of revenue upon which the lower social strata could exert predatory practices shrunk: the internal production had collapsed; their salaries had lost purchasing power; people shops were almost empty; public assets, infrastructures or equipment once stolen were not replaced. Their economic importance to the top of the system was limited. They did not have access to oil or any other ready source of cash. Being an intermediary in the informal market was a miserable way of survival since the bulk of profits going to the party and State top ranks.

Considering that those main economic distortions allowing straddling activities were afforded by the oil rent, which in turn was managed with total autonomy by the Presidency, considering that the primary access (and the only really profitable) to those economic distortions was under close control of the presidency through the nominations’ system; therefore, the massive spread of predatory practices, be it at the top or bottom of the social spectrum did not pose any challenge to the all powerful presidency controlling with autonomy the one and only major and constant source of revenue — the oil rent, the one that really matters.

\textsuperscript{850} Documentos da 1º Conferência Nacional ...op. cit...1985, p.78.
\textsuperscript{851} Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso ...op. cit...1985, p.69.
\textsuperscript{852} In Documentos da 1º Conferência Nacional ...op. cit...1985, p.43; also in Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso ...op. cit...1985, p.94.
It is important to note that even for the mentioned top ranks of the party and State structures the profits allowed by the straddling activity although very significant (especially in comparison with the masses) could not be used to construct their own patrimonial networks and political constituencies capable of threatening the power of the President. In a very small political milieu such as the Angolan, where all the elite members know each other and are known by the president any strategy of such type would immediately come to the knowledge of the President, the person in question would most probably be punished and access to resources cut\textsuperscript{853}.

In sum, the collapse of internal production and the extreme economic oil dependency strengthened the process started during Neto’s presidency — the economic autonomy of the ruling elites (headed by the Presidency) in relation to the productive effort of the ruled masses (more fragile than ever).

12.4 The Growing Socio-Economic and Political Impact of the War

The worsening of the military situation was one of the main features of Eduardo dos Santos’s Marxist phase. After Reagan’s election in 1980, the United States evolves a new political approach towards Angola with the so-called Constructive Engagement (mainly consisting in co-operating with South Africa, calling for the linkage between the withdrawal of Cuban troops and the independence of Namibia)\textsuperscript{854}. The South African regime felt politically supported; thus increasing its military activity, not only against SWAPO guerrillas, but also against Angolan military and economic targets, reaching the point of a new military incursion into southern Angola during the Protea Operation in August 1981\textsuperscript{855}. The military range of action of South Africa and

\textsuperscript{853} Also supporting this idea is Bayart stating that ‘In this respect [knowledge of all the elite] the small population of most African states is a major advantage. It enables a leader in power for one or two decades to acquire direct knowledge of every individual with money or influence. Sékou Touré took surveillance of the social elite to extremes.’; in Bayart, Jean-François, The State in Africa ... op. cit. p.233.

\textsuperscript{854} See Wright, George The Destruction ... op. cit. p.99.

\textsuperscript{855} On the Protea operation see several selected newspaper articles such as: articles of Patrice Claude in Le Monde (27 and 28 August 1981); The Economist (29 August 1981); The Times (26 August 1981);
UNITA substantially increased with the logistical support of Mobutu, who, under the pressure of the US, allowed them to use Zairian territory to launch military operations in the East and North of Angola (Mobutu no longer honoured the agreements made with Neto in 1978)\textsuperscript{856}.

With the drastic stepping up of military attacks, there was also an increased destruction of infrastructure\textsuperscript{857}, not only in the provinces and rural areas as before, but also with sabotage actions in major cities such as Luanda\textsuperscript{858}, Lobito or Huambo\textsuperscript{859}. As a consequence, the rural population continued migrating to major provincial cities and surrounding areas\textsuperscript{860}.

As previously discussed, within this work’s analytical perspective we need to stress the effect of the war upon the framework of relationships between rulers and ruled.

Firstly, it made easier the economic autonomy of the ruling elites and the economic fragility of the ruled masses. This happened by contributing to economic scarcity (disrupting productive infrastructure), thus reinforcing the

\textsuperscript{856} On the agreement between Neto and Mobutu and also on Mobutu’s breakage of the agreement in early eighties see Wolfers, Michael and Bergerol, Jane, \textit{Angola} ... op. cit. pp.216-223; such Zairian support was to increase in mid 1980’s, especially to channel CIA’s covert military aid to UNITA as referred in Collelo, Thomas, ed., \textit{Angola} ... op. cit. p.196, 207, 244. Reporting to 1982, some references to the stronger guerrilla activity of UNITA can also be found in Pepetela, \textit{A Geração}...op. cit. pp.235-236.

\textsuperscript{857} In \textit{Relatório do Comité Central ao 11º Congresso} ...op. cit...1985, p.7, pp.74-75.

\textsuperscript{858} One of the most spectacular urban sabotage attack committed in 1981 sent part of Luanda’s Petraagol oil refinery up in flames during the night of 29-30 November, and was a major example of the new military posture of South Africa; in \textit{ACR}, vol.14 (1983), p.B586; also in \textit{Foreign Report} (25 December 1981), published by \textit{The Economist}, p.1; also \textit{Rádio Nacional de Angola} (10 December 1981) cit. in \textit{SWB} (12 December 1981); on UNITA’s strategy towards economic targets see also article of William Claiborne in \textit{The Washington Post} (9 July 1987).

\textsuperscript{859} ‘Sabotage [...] included attacks on the Luanda refineries, the partial destruction of the hydroelectric dam at Lomaum, the planting of underwater mines on ships in the port of Luanda and the attack on fuel deposits in the city of Lobito [...] shocking terrorist attacks on the city of Sumbe, the sabotage of power supplies to the city of Luanda and, more recently, the attempted destruction of an industrial zone in the city of Huambo.’ In \textit{Documentos da 1ª Conferência Nacional} ...op. cit...1985, pp.26-28; also mentioning sabotage actions in Luanda, Benguela, Lobito, Moxico, Bié, Huambo, Malange, Kwanza Norte among other provinces, is \textit{Relatório do Comité Central ao 11º Congresso} ...op. cit...1985, pp.74-75.
overall economic dependency on oil revenues (managed with autonomy at the top);

Secondly, it strengthened micro-identity political alignments, whereby the stronger was the guerrilla activity of UNITA and its identification with the Ovimbundu, the stronger was the threat to the Creole/M'Bundu alliance, thus providing the MPLA with far more support than would otherwise have been the case. This was the main factor making it possible to proceed with the ambiguous process through which it was possible for the government to alienate (economically and politically) the majority of the population but without losing its political support (at least of all those identified with the Creole/M'Bundu alliance). It was also one of the main supports to the presidential policy of promoting younger cadres and downgrading some party veterans without fearing a violent reaction on their part (see chapter 10). As noticed by Hodges,

[there is] one key point about how UNITA is perceived [...] this is to do with UNITA's character as an essentially Ovimbundu movement, its ethno-populist appeal and its apparent hostility to the relatively acculturated urban Africans and mestiços [...]. Fear of arrests and killings in the event of UNITA’s entry into the cities is sufficient reason [...] to want to keep UNITA well away. The status quo, difficult but at least safe (for those living in the cities), is preferable to the risks of the unknown.

This fear and socio-cultural identity cleavage (whose remote origins we have already analysed) is absolutely crucial to understanding not only the relationship between rulers and ruled in the independent state, but also the relationship between ruling elites at the core of the MPLA, as well as the legitimacy of rule and the political system in general (not only during the time period covered in this thesis but until today).

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860 In 1985, it was estimated that there were half a million people displaced by war from a population estimated at 8.5 million; in ACR, 18 (1987), p.B619.
861 For the stronger identification between Ovimbundu and UNITA in the eighties see Birmingham, David, *Frontline Nationalism...* op. cit. pp. 82-83. On the 'loyalty of the Ovimbundu' towards UNITA in the eighties see also ACR, vol.15 (1984), p.B594. Also in the same sense are private interviews with Júlio Morais (11 April 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998); General Farrusco (2 May 1998); Reginaldo Silva (9 July 1998).
862 In Hodges, *Tony Angola to the 1990's...* op. cit. p.23
Thirdly and finally, the war reinforced the centralisation of the administration and the concentration of power that was under way. This happened not only through the mentioned decline of significant local and regional economic activity (preventing provincially autonomous patrimonial constituencies), but also through a new type of territorial administration, progressively and essentially restricted to the network of main cities all over the country.

By 1985-1986, UNITA’s bush war had spread to the great majority of the country and the MPLA administration was restricted to a network of cities. However, this does not in anyway mean that UNITA controlled the countryside or the rural areas. The areas most affected by UNITA’s activities (the south and south-east provinces of Cuando-Cubango, Cunene, Moxico, part of Bié) became ‘a no man’s land’: firstly, because out of the main urban centres population density was always very low, especially in those affected areas; secondly, because that low density was increasingly aggravated by the rural exodus towards the cities\textsuperscript{863}. By early 1987, about 600.000 peasants had been uprooted (about half a million in the central highlands, where the UNITA activity was more intense, and the rest in the extreme south, where the population displacements had been caused by successive South African incursions near the frontier with Namibia)\textsuperscript{864}; thirdly, because UNITA, even with South African support, could not realistically expect to seize and hold any major city in view of the strength of Angola’s armed forces (the largest and best equipped in the whole SADCC region, with c.40.000 men) and in view of the presence of c.30.000 Cuban troops effectively fighting on the battlefield\textsuperscript{865}.

\textsuperscript{863} According to the last population census (1970), Angolan population density was 4.8 persons per square kilometer-s/k and the provinces of Cuando Cubango and Moxico had less than 1 person per s/k; the provinces of Cunene, Huila, southern part of Bié and Lundas ranged between 1 and 5 persons per s/k. After the independence due to the rural exodus especially acute in south-east and extreme south that ratio was surely aggravated; for the 1970 census on population density see \textit{Atlas Geográfico da República Popular de Angola} (Luanda: Ministério da Educação, 1982),p.24.


\textsuperscript{865} See \textit{ACR}, vol.18 (1987), pp.B625-B626; also \textit{ACR}, vol.19 (1988), p.B621. It might be worth to remind that FAPLA possessed very sophisticated military equipment such as battle tanks T54, 55 and 62 and air fighters Mig17, 21 and 23 which were above the South African \textit{mirage} and \textit{impala}; see also \textit{ACR}, vol.19 (1988), pp. B625-B626.
We must bear in mind that despite any propaganda by UNITA, South Africa, US and some Western media in the eighties, FAPLA never lost military primacy. Its last great military offensive against UNITA's forces in the extreme south-east (operation 'final assault' in 1989, just before the transition to multipartyism) inflicted a major military defeat on Savimbi's movement. It is also important to note that the massive predatory practices that spread throughout the economy and throughout the whole society did not permeate the FAPLA to the same extent (on security matters the punitive legislation was effectively implemented as we mentioned earlier). Such predation came to occur only after 1991 when the armed forces were re-structured, reduced and most of its men demobilised within the transition process to multipartyism (but that is out of this work's time frame).

In sum, the intensification of the war indirectly reinforced the pattern of relationships that was evolving between rulers and ruled, be it in political, administrative or economic terms.

12.5 Social Sectors: More Neglect

This final indicator for the analysis of socio-economic relationships focuses on the dereliction of public social policy. As discussed earlier, social sectors can be taken as expressions of public consciousness, which is almost absent in a post-modern patrimonial system. During the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos presidency, social sectors were almost entirely neglected, thus reinforcing the tendency that began to be noticed by the end of Neto's administration (1977-1979).

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866 On this military operation see the article with the clarifying title 'Mavinga: a última batalha. Quinze anos depois da independência trava-se em Mavinga a última batalha por Angola. Mas a guerra ganha-se na imprensa mundial' (the last battle is in Mavinga but the war is won in the international press), in Grande Reportagem, 2 (March-June 1990), pp.105-113.

867 In late eighties there were a few officially reported cases of theft and drunken military drivers, but that was the exception and not the rule; on the reported cases see Collelo, Thomas, ed., Angola, ... op. cit. p.231. Confirming the good organisation and discipline of the Armed Forces before 1991 is General Farrusco in private interview (2 May 1998).
As clearly admitted by the CC report to the 1985 congress, all sectors of social policy regressed between 1980 and 1985, be it education\(^{868}\), health\(^{869}\), housing\(^{870}\); social support\(^{871}\); or community services\(^{872}\). Such regression (at a time of greater want, due to a deterioration of socio-economic conditions and a worsening war) had the most immediate and dramatic effect upon the lower social strata, not only in rural areas (where an estimated 500,000 to 700,000 displaced people were in critical need of social assistance\(^{873}\)), but also in the urban areas, where: there was a dire need for water\(^{874}\); street cleaning and public sanitation systems collapsed\(^{875}\); several diseases such as yellow fever and cholera made a frightening reappearance of plague killing as early as

\(^{868}\) [EDUCATION]: 'In spite of the efforts made, there was drop in the education system [...]. The literacy programmes that were so successful during the first years of independence, also show signs of regression'; in Relatório do Comité Central ao IIº Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p.121. According to Mohanty, 'From 1980-85, in primary education there was a decrease in the number of pupils (10 per cent annually) and teachers (14 per cent annually) on average'; in Mohanty, Susama, Political Development ... op. cit. p.209. Education accounted for 2 per cent of the country's total foreign exchange expenditure during 1980-85; ibid. p.209.

\(^{869}\) [HEALTH]: 'The sharp deterioration during the first phase of the five-year period was expressed through the negative evolution of available indicators, including health cover [...] and increased morbidity of the main contagious diseases.'; in Relatório do Comité Central ao IIº Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p.123. 'Health, like education, accounted for 2 per cent of the country's total foreign exchange expenditure during 1980-85'; in Mohanty, Susama, Political Development ... op. cit. p.209.

\(^{870}\) [HOUSING]: 'It is a fact that without building new housing and finishing the building work that has already been started, it will not be possible to solve the problems of housing [...] on the other hand [...] State housing have not been regularly maintained and have even deteriorated somewhat, which again adds to the complexity of the problem.'; in Relatório do Comité Central ao IIº Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p.128.

\(^{871}\) [SOCIAL SUPPORT]: 'In terms of support to displaced populations and integration of returned populations there have been difficulties in bringing the guidelines to fruition [...]. In spite of the high levels of international aid, the resources given were insufficient.'; Ibid. p.125.

\(^{872}\) [COMMUNITY SERVICES]: 'During the past five years, the services were not given the necessary means to function.' This justified their obvious breakdown; Ibid. p128.

\(^{873}\) According to the UN in 1985, 'More than 500,000 people are estimated to be in critical need of assistance, mainly in the Northern, Central and Southern provinces. [...] Many displaced people are in dire need of clothing, blankets and shelter; In Africa Emergency - UN Office for Emergency Operations in Africa (June 1985). Under the clarifying title 'Les stigmates d’un effondrement', Jean-Claude Pomonti reported that 'Le comité international de la Croix Rouge, qui dispose d’antennes locales, estime la situation 'très grave'. Sur les hauts plateaux [...] se trouveraient la majorité des 467.000 'personnes déplacées' selon les calculs officiels angolais. En fait, d’autres sources font état, pour l’ensemble du territoire, de 700.000 refugiés de l’intérieur, soit un habitant sur dix'; In Le Monde (28 January 1981). Reporting to 1982, a description of these refugees camps full of diseases and hunger can be found in Pepetela, A Geração... op. cit. pp. 212-213, 239.

\(^{874}\) Article of Jean-Claude Pomonti under the title 'Les stigmates d’un effondrement' in Le Monde (28 January 1981); the same problem of the lack of water is reported by Quentin Peel in Financial Times (14 September 1981).

\(^{875}\) Article of Jean-Claude Pomonti under the title 'Les stigmates d’un effondrement', in Le Monde (28 January 1981); also stressing the grubby and run-down condition of Luanda is the report of Michael
1981; in 1985, cholera was responsible for the dead of 4000 people in the city of Luanda alone and one out of every three children died.

The main official argument used to justify such collapse was the difficult financial situation resulting from the increased war effort,

The activity in the social domain over the past five years has reflected the general difficulties caused by the military situation and by financial and economic matters, which were affected by the limitations on budget, foreign currency and investment. Indeed, arms expenditure doubled in 1980 (increasing to more than US$1 billion) and in 1983 it was estimated that Angola spent 50% of its foreign exchange earnings into defence. However, such an explanation cannot be taken at face value for two main reasons: firstly, because the same argument had already been used to justify the first signs of regression in those sectors observed by the end of Neto’s presidency; secondly and mainly, because the report itself denied such argumentation when, despite all the chaotic situation in that area, it clearly set as the main objective for future social policy the reduction in spending, with the absurd argument that people did not realise the true value of the social services provided by the State,

Some measures have been taken and others are under way aimed at diminishing the dependence of these sectors on the State’s general budget, so that those who benefit from them can realise the true value of some of the services that the State provides for them.

In other words, the government’s neglect towards social sectors (mostly affecting the bottom social layers) was to become the norm, independently of any possible later increases in State revenues. So, the obvious question is why?

From the rulers’ perspective the answer here provided is mainly twofold:

Holman in Financial Times (21 June 1982). Reporting to 1982, a description of these problems can also be found in Pepetela, A Geração…op. cit. pp. 212-213, 234, 236-237.


According to Western aid workers ‘it was a miracle that not more people died’; article of Paul Betts in Financial Times (21 September 1987)

In Africa Emergency - UN Office for Emergency Operations in Africa (June 1985).

In Relatório do Comité Central ao IIº Congresso…op. cit…1985, p.120.

Until then they had remained stable (around US$500 million per year in late 1970’s); In Collelo, Thomas, ed., Angola, … op. cit. p.234.

Firstly, because the phenomena associated with Neto’s presidency became reinforced, i.e. the social layers most affected by the neglect in social policies had a decreasing economic and political value. Economically, the ruling elites were more autonomous than ever in relation to the productive effort of the ruled masses. Politically, there were virtually no formal mechanisms by means of which the masses might express their political disaffection and the government could still count on significant political support because of the fear of UNITA engendered by the worsening of the war.

Secondly, because as has already become plain by the end of Neto’s presidency, there were a number of international donors willing to fund social initiatives in order to save people from starvation. Therefore, the government intensified its requests for international aid during the first five years of the 1980s, having received a very positive answer from several countries and organisations, namely: UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, FAO, WFP, UNESCO, OIT, OMS, co-operation and development agencies from northern countries, the EEC, Western countries, and the International Red Cross (which was regularly helping to feed thousands of people in the most affected provinces since 1981).

Accordingly, the government’s future strategy for social policy became clearly determined and officially outlined in that same December 1985 CC report,

Resorting to international co-operation to complement the resources available internally and to accelerate the pace of national reconstruction and of social and economic development is an objective necessity.

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882 In Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p.120.
883 Ibid. p.140. In June 1982, UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) announced it was giving US$21m to Angola; In Rádio Nacional de Angola (6 June 1982), cit. in SWB (8 June 1982); Three years later, in 15 January 1985, the same organization announced that Angola expected to commercially import about two-thirds of its 1984-1985 food deficit and had succeeded in securing food aid pledges for most (71.000t) of the 83.000t balance; cit. in ACR, vol.17 (1986), p.B621.
884 In Bhagavan, M R, Angola’s ... op. cit. p.20.
885 Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso ... op. cit... 1985, p.146.
As a consequence of the new policy and despite the major recovery in oil revenues (which nearly doubled in 1987)$^886$, the emergency aid requested by the government went from US$96.1m in 1985$^887$ to US$116m in 1987$^888$. It thus becomes clear that expenditure in social sectors had very little to do with the availability of internal resources.

Over the years, this strategy was taken to the absurd extremes encountered nowadays, whereby the State is minimally responsible for very little expenditure in social areas and the role of international co-operation has gone from being a supposedly complementary one to being central. They now provide most of the social services. Although an examination of the post 1987 period is beyond the scope and time frame of this work, some considerations on social policy during the so-called transitional period will be provided in the conclusion$^889$.

Concluding chapter 12, based on the five main indicators used, it can be said that during Eduardo dos Santos’ presidency the evolution of the socio-economic framework of relationships was characterised by the extreme reinforcement of phenomena that were to be seen by the end of Neto’s presidency. There was development of the State sector inefficiency (be it public administration, agriculture of manufacturing industry), a growing dependence on oil revenues, the widespread development of the informal market, the worsening of the war; neglect of the social sectors; all resulting in more economic fragility, instability and insecurity for the masses and the near-total economic autonomy of the ruling elites.

$^886$ Angola’s annual oil revenues almost doubled, from previous US$1.100m in 1986 to US$2.000m in 1987; in Hodges, Tony, Angola from Afro-Stalinism... op. cit. p.2.
$^887$ In Africa Emergency - UN Office for Emergency Operations in Africa (June 1985).
$^888$ Reported by Paul Betts to Financial Times (14 and 21 September 1987).
$^889$ On the discussion and data for this subject see Vidal, Nuno, Estratégias ... op. cit.; also forthcoming Master’s dissertation on international and national NGOs in Angola, of Marisa Vidal in Lisbon, ISCTE; also Angola: as aparências de ‘normalização’ escondem graves cenas de guerra, relatório de Médecins Sans Frontières (Luanda: MSF, 9 November 2000); also A Crude Awakening ..., a report by Global Witness ... op. cit.
The main revenue coming from oil was now managed with complete impunity by the very top (the President and his close entourage at the presidency) and the distribution of State resources was ever more restricted to the middle and top ranks of the party/State/military structures. For the majority of the population, survival entailed massive and generalised resort to predatory practices. However, such unregulated assault on the State's resources (apart from the oil rent) did not solve the economic problems of the lower social strata (i.e. the majority of the population). On the contrary, their socio-economic conditions only got worst (starvation, diseases, lack of education, sanitation, healthcare and so on).

By the end of Eduardo dos Santos' Marxist phase, the very feeble relationships of economic distributive interdependence between rulers and ruled that had prevailed in the first years of independence (and that had survived till the end of Neto's presidency) were now completely gone. There was now in place a socio-economic and political system that cut off the top elites from the masses. The difference with Neto's administration was thus substantive.
13 - The Evolution of the Ethical and Normative Principles of the dos Santos Regime: 1979-1985/87

This chapter aims to analyse the development of normative principles during dos Santos’ administration and compare them with those in operation during Neto’s administration. The main purpose is twofold: -at the top of the system, to see if principles of patrimonial management of power were maintained and reinforced; - at the bottom of the system, to check if in face of an increasing distributive contraction, a flexible or pragmatic normative framework developed (unregulated predation) confirming the collapse of normative distributive principles between rulers and ruled. As usual, this chapter employs the same analytical indicators used to the analysis of Neto’s presidency.

13.1 The Main Principles at the Top of the System

Although, as we have seen, dos Santos asserted his authority against both the right and left wings of the party, this did not entail a break with the nature of the regime as it had evolved under Neto, whether in terms of economic practice, political management or foreign policy.

13.1.1 The normative principles of economic practice

At an economic level, the reinforcement of the principles that came to prevail by the end of Neto’s presidency (i.e. pragmatism or tolerance of existing predatory practices; relaxation of Socialist norms; and an economic overture to the West), continued apace as the president consolidate his power over the left and rightwing.

a) In terms of tolerance with existing practices, it occurred through the outcome of the three discussed cases that happened right at the beginning of Eduardo dos Santos’s presidency, namely the Monty, Angonave and Kamanga.

In the Monty case, the president more or less explicitly protected Hermínio Escórcio (the Sonangol director accused of corruption), not allowing a normal judicial process and dismissing Monty (the accuser, minister of oil). In the
Angonave and Kamanga cases, although judicial processes were effectively formed during 1982 (within a period when the leftwing still had some power), trials were only held in 1984 (after the president had asserted his power over the left and rightwing) and had virtually no practical outcome for those accused and sentenced as discussed.

With such an outcome, a clear and simple message was passed: the President took the rightwing pragmatic stance regarding the acceptance of the widespread predatory economic practices (personal appropriation of state assets, taking private advantage of state offices, straddling activities, traffic and corruption networks, etc.) that were rife throughout the whole social spectrum.

b) In terms of the relaxation of Socialist norms, after re-asserting his power internally and having centralised the whole political and administrative system to an extreme, the President felt strong enough to introduce the first official changes in the direction of the economy. This happened at the very first opportunity, in 1985, within the ambit of the second congress, whose main documents\(^{890}\), indirectly questioned the Socialist economic model for the first time. The methods of management and the direction of the economy\(^{891}\); the anachronistic, all-encompassing and ineffective economic planning system with distorted investment policies\(^{892}\); the fixed pricing system not reflecting production costs;\(^{893}\) the extensive and counter-productive bureaucracy\(^{894}\); the

\(^{890}\) The main documents (already quoted) are those of the first national conference in January 1985 (preparing the congress) and the CC report to the congress in December 1985.

\(^{891}\) At the first national conference, Eduardo dos Santos stated that, 'in the next five years general economic measures that are politically far reaching must be pursued, leading to the stabilisation and subsequent development of the national economy'. He noted without elaborating, 'the need for profound change in the management and administration methods in our economy and enterprises'; cit. in ACR, vol. 18 (1987), p.B618. Such change is also stated in Documentos da 1ª Conferência Nacional ...op. cit...1985, p.95; also in Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso ...op. cit...1985, pp.99, 105, 111-112.

\(^{892}\) Documentos da 1ª Conferência Nacional ...op. cit...1985, pp.33-35; also in Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso ...op. cit...1985, pp. 90-92.

\(^{893}\) Documentos da 1ª Conferência Nacional ...op. cit...1985, p.34. See also Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso ...op. cit...1985, pp.93-94 and pp.106-108.

\(^{894}\) In Documentos da 1ª Conferência Nacional ...op. cit...1985, p.22; also in Relatório do Comité Central ao 1º Congresso ...op. cit...1985, p.95, p.106.
profound financial and macro-economic imbalances that could not be exclusively explained by the war\textsuperscript{895}, all this were criticised overtly. In addition to that criticism, the same documents stressed the need to take advantage of the internal and external private initiatives\textsuperscript{896} and the CC report clearly assumed the existence of ‘good conditions to face the tasks that would lead to the economic and financial clean-up of the country [\textit{saneamento econômico e financeiro do país} – or SEF] in the next five years’.\textsuperscript{897} In fact, such SEF came to be introduced two years later, in August 1987, in order to correct the internal and external financial imbalances and to restructure and rehabilitate the economic system\textsuperscript{898}.

The programme included the privatisation of non-strategic companies, reducing the State sector, legalising the private sector (i.e. small trade, public and commercial transport, construction, etc.), ending budget subsidies to the remaining State companies, returning state farms to the peasantry, increasing prices to reflect the production costs, authorising free circulation of products between provinces, and allowing the free flow of supply and demand within these markets.\textsuperscript{899}

From the measures proposed it was clear that the new programme meant a lot more than a reinforcement of the tendencies initiated during Neto’s presidency (relaxation of Socialist norms and tolerance towards the \textit{petit commerce}), it represented a turning point in the formal economic system (`a

\textsuperscript{895} In \textit{Documentos da 1\textdegree Conferência Nacional} \ldots op. cit.\ldots 1985, pp.29-32; The national conference explicitly stressed that such imbalances could not be excused or justified by the war situation even if the war impact was acknowledged.

\textsuperscript{896} In \textit{Documentos da 1\textdegree Conferência Nacional} \ldots op. cit.\ldots 1985, pp.110-111 and 143; also \textit{Relatório do Comité Central ao 1\textdegree Congresso} \ldots op. cit.\ldots 1985, pp. 107, 145.

\textsuperscript{897} In \textit{Relatório do Comité Central ao 1\textdegree Congresso} \ldots op. cit.\ldots 1985, p.89.

\textsuperscript{898} Introducing SEF, the president explained that it was fulfilling the orientations of the second congress and justified its delay with the need to pay more attention to emergency measures in the mean time; In \textit{Telex Angop: transcrição integral do discurso} \ldots op. cit. Part 2, 3, 4. The same speech translated in French and an extensive presentation of SEF can be found in \textit{Programme d'assainissement économique et financier et loi sur les investissements étrangers en Angola} (Luanda: République Populaire d'Angola, n.d), probably from the end of 1988 due to the inclusion of the law on foreign investments dated from July 1988; for an analysis of SEF see also Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, ‘A política de recuperação econômica na República Popular de Angola’, in \textit{Politica Internacional, 1, 1} (1990), pp.107-132; see also \textit{ACR}, vol.20 (1989), pp.B582-B585.

\textsuperscript{899} In \textit{Telex Angop: transcrição integral do discurso} \ldots op. cit. Part 5, 9, 10, 11, 12.
new stage' as referred to by the president or la fin d'une époque as stressed by foreign observers); gradually transforming the previous Socialist economy into a market economy, that came to be officially announced at the third congress in 1990. For the reasons already explained in Part I, such transition period is beyond this thesis’ time frame (some short considerations on the impact of this formal transition will be provided in the conclusion; a more systematic analysis will form part of a forthcoming research project).

c) In terms of the economic approach towards the West: once the SEF’s main objectives had been presented, it became clear that it followed the World Bank and International Monetary Fund recommendations in terms of economic policy towards African countries. As the Angolan State’s financial accounts had been worsening, the SEF was in fact intended to facilitate a petition for membership in these organisations so as to access loans and debt rescheduling.

900 Ibid. Part 5.
901 In article of Pierre Haski in Libération (20 August 1987).
902 Such worsening of the balance of State accounts is also admitted by the presidential speech introducing SEF, namely: a 50% decrease in imports of consumer goods to feed the population from 1985 to 1986; a 33% decrease in imports of raw materials which led several companies to an absolute paralysation of its production; an increase of the deficit in State budget; an increase of the external debt; decreasing purchasing power of salaries; low productivity of work; inefficiency of State companies and banking system. In Telex Angop: transcrição integral do discurso ... op. cit. Part 3 and 5; see also Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, 'A politica ... op. cit. p.119.
903 In Telex Angop: transcrição integral do discurso ... op. cit. Part 7 and 8. According to the president, the external debt amounted to US$6.000m in December 1986 and increased to US$7.000m during 1987; the problem was not the amount of the debt in itself but the short-term concentration of financial reimbursements in the following years; ibid. part 7. The intention to access membership and loans provided by those international financial organisations was re-affirmed a few days later by the Angolan minister for production in the clearest terms: ‘We believe that our SEF programme is not so different from the demands made by the IMF and the World Bank as a requisite for affiliation or presentation of proposals for economic and financial clean-up [saneamento]. I can even go so far as to say that, in certain aspects, our programme is somewhat more rigid. [...] Only with the financial means usually provided by the World Bank can we accomplish a programme such as this one'; in interview with the Minister of Production, Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem 'Loy', in Jornal de Angola (21 August 1987), cited in Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, 'A politica ... op. cit. pp.119, 120. On the intention to join the IMF see also article of Pierre Haski in Libération (20 August 1987); also articles of Paul Betts in Financial Times (14 and 21 September 1987). On the debt problem see also the article of Tony Hodges, ‘Angola pins hopes on unique debt strategy' in Financial Times (7 July 1987).
After a difficult and complicated process\textsuperscript{904}, Angola was finally admitted as a member of the IMF in July 1989, despite the objection of the USA\textsuperscript{905}. As soon as this was achieved, SEF fell from grace, especially in its more internally criticised policies such as the national currency devaluation or the downsizing of the inefficient public sector\textsuperscript{906}.

13.1.2 The normative principles of political management

As soon as Eduardo dos Santos asserted his power over the competing party wings, he acquired greater internal authority and was able more easily to manage the political system according to the principles set towards the end of Neto’s presidency: 1), increasing the patrimonial \textit{carrousel}; 2), intensifying a policy of clemency and integration of prominent members of rebel groups within the patrimonial/distributive system in order to enlarge the political support of the MPLA.

1) Regarding what was here called patrimonial \textit{carrousel}\textsuperscript{907}, the new President took it to extremes, constantly reshuffling central and local

\textsuperscript{904} In September 1987 (a month after the presentation of SEF) the Angolan president began a diplomatic offensive visiting countries such as France, Belgium, Italy and Portugal with the purpose of achieving several major objectives — to impress on European governments the seriousness of Angola’s new economic recovery programme, SEF; to secure European support for Angola’s application for membership of the IMF in the face of US opposition; to prepare the groundwork for the necessary debt rescheduling; to promote trade and investment; and to explain Angola’s position on such issues as Namibia, UNITA, the future of the Cuban troops in Angola, and the talks with the US; in the second semester of 1988, the President went to China and India, members of the Angolan IMF adherence committee, and to several Socialist European countries; in Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, ‘A politica ... op. cit. pp.120-121. See also \textit{ARB}, (October 1987), p.8648, a,b,c, and p.8649-a.; also articles of Paul Betts in \textit{Financial Times} (14 and 21 September 1987).

\textsuperscript{905} See Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, ‘A politica ... op. cit. p.120-121.

\textsuperscript{906} On the internal resistance to the application of some measures and the ensuing failure of SEF see \textit{ACR}, 21 (1990), pp. B558-B559; a complete and accurate explanation on how the whole process of SEF developed and failed was given in private interview by José Cerqueira, one of the major technicians of SEF (20 April 1998); a few remarks over this issue, regarding the period post 1987 (so-called transition) can be found in the conclusion.

\textsuperscript{907} As defined during Neto’s presidency, by patrimonial \textit{carrousel} is meant a mechanism for power management whereby the primary distribution of State’s resources (privileges and benefits) is made through the rotation of key-figures for the top jobs in party and state structures, taking into account political and micro-identity balances. The aim of such strategy is to satisfy lavishly the Creole/M’Bundu core of the MPLA (assuring them the political and economic leadership of the system) while sufficiently rewarding the elites of other socio-cultural and micro identity groups for them to have
administrative structures, always taking into account the necessary political balances (according to distributive and micro-identity criteria), but, unlike his predecessor, Eduardo dos Santos gradually excluded from this rotation the subsidiary organs that surrounded the presidency and also, to some extent, the politburo.

Considering that the president centralised the administrative system and concentrated political power (executive and legislative) for himself and in subsidiary organs (see chapter 11); considering that such power was taken out of other organs such as the central and local government and party structures (apart from the politburo); therefore, it can be said that he excluded from the patrimonial carrousel all those organs and posts that were now having the effective political (legislative and executive) power and/or influence (i.e. the subsidiary organs surrounding the presidency and the politburo).

In other words, the president was splitting the state and party top positions into two:

- on the one side, the posts that were exclusively to fulfil patrimonial needs (distribution of economic benefits and privileges to those who had to be rewarded for the sake of maintaining the internal equilibrium and the status quo; i.e. the old fractions of elite of the Creole/M’Bundu alliance and some co-opted elites of other socio-cultural groups). These posts had formal but no effective or significant governmental and administrative power and no autonomous economic power;

- on the other side, there were the posts that effectively held and exerted governmental and administrative power, with access to the management of the main revenues (at source). They were the all-powerful presidency, its subsidiary organs and to a much lesser

an interest in maintaining the status quo (with the partial exception of the Ovimbundu, as explained); Cf. supra sub-chapter 8.1.2.
degree the politburo. For this reason they were excluded from the patrimonial *carousel*.

Such distinction between those state and party positions that were to be exclusively part of the patrimonial *carousel* and those that were not, represents a first major difference with the management system initiated by Neto. It might be seen as the formula found by the new President to conciliate the necessities of the patrimonial management constructed by Neto with that of effectively exerting personal power over the whole political system. State resources could still be distributed by the President through rotation within top party and state structures without interfering with the effective governing power of the president and his control over the business with public and private foreign entities, including the oil business (the main source of revenue).

This is not to say that because the president asserted his power over the ‘old’ members and because he took effective power out of the posts they came to occupy he simply neglected them or stopped needing their acquiescence. On the contrary, if he included them in the patrimonial *carousel* it is because he needs to satisfy them with economic benefits and political honorary positions such as some ministerial posts, positions as secretaries of state, national directors, public companies managers, ambassadors, provincial commissioners and so on. These old members have a political legitimacy of their own acquired historically (see sub-chapter 11.2.4). The resentment of old members against the Futungo Kids is because these Kids despite holding theoretically inferior posts (in subsidiary organs such as secretariats) have in fact more power than the majority of ministers or provincial commissioners. Again it should be born in mind that these old members were downgraded within a very specific context that constrained them to accept such policy without any other type of reaction (see chapter 10).

This is also not to say that subsidiary posts are not handsomely rewarded (they are, as we saw), but they do not hold positions for the sake of the logic of
the patrimonial carrousel. The president does not need their political support, he needs their absolute political loyalty, subservience, technical competence, confidentiality and dependence, without any legitimacy of their own. Therefore he does not need to rotate them. This is also why it was so important to analyse the process of power concentration and administrative centralisation and all the balances and mechanisms created (chapter 11).

Once the politburo was taken out of the patrimonial carrousel it was filled only with loyalists to the president, thus changing the previous balance introduced at the end of Neto’s presidency. There was now a majority of black Creole/M’Bundu. Thus, that eleven-member party organ (politburo) came to be composed of: only one Bakongo (Pascoal Luvualu) when previously there were three\textsuperscript{908}; only one Cabinda (Pedro Maria Tonha ‘Pedalé’) when previously there were two\textsuperscript{909}; one Southern Ovambo (Kundi Paihama, who had previously been an alternate member\textsuperscript{910}); only one mestiço (França N’Dalu) when previously there were three\textsuperscript{911}; and seven black M’Bundu when previously there were only three\textsuperscript{912} (José Eduardo dos Santos, Afonso Van Dunem ‘M’Binda’, Francisco Magalhães Paiva ‘N’Vunda’; Julião Mateus Paulo ‘Dino Matrosse’, Roberto de Almeida, Manuel Alexandre Rodrigues ‘Kito’, Pedro de Castro Van Dunem ‘Loy’; the last two were young cadres promoted by the president along with Maria Mambo Café who came to occupy an alternate seat)\textsuperscript{913}. The Ovimbundu of the MPLA were still kept out of the top party organs\textsuperscript{914}.

\textsuperscript{908} Ludy Kissassunda and Ambrósio Lukoki were the other two Bakongo who previously held politburo seats, as mentioned.
\textsuperscript{909} Evaristo Domingos Kimba was the other Cabinda who held a seat at the politburo during Neto’s administration.
\textsuperscript{910} During Neto’s administration, Paihama had been alternate member of the politburo together with a mestiço (Henrique de Carvalho Santos ‘Onambwe’) and a black M’Bundu (Francisco Magalhães Paiva ‘N’Vunda’); see Resoluções e Mensagens do I° Congresso Extraordinário... op. cit... 1980, appendix.
\textsuperscript{911} Lúcio Lara and Iko Carreira lost their seats for the reasons already explained.
\textsuperscript{912} During Neto’s administration, besides Neto himself and José Eduardo dos Santos the other black M’Bundu was João Luís Neto ‘Xietu’ as mentioned.
\textsuperscript{913} After the second congress, there were only two alternate members: António Jacinto, a party veteran (white) previously member of the CC; Maria Mambo Café (mestiça), young cadre promoted by the president); see ACR, vol. 18 (1987), p.B620.
\textsuperscript{914} For the reasons explained, the Party’s Ovimbundo were kept in second place, as during Neto’s presidency; Faustino Muteka was the only Ovimbundo in the top ranks of the State (minister); this situation was to change slightly after 1986 when Marcolino Moco, another Ovimbundu, was made
Progressively, the whole system of political management became clarified, especially in terms of positions within the patrimonial *carrousel*. These were the subject of increasing struggle, not only because they afforded access to the first lines of internal distribution, but also because they allowed the appointment to secondary positions within the State’s hierarchy (and consequently, an increased possibility to employ close family, friends, informal business partners and so on, as publicly recognised by the president\(^{915}\)). Thus, as soon as the leftwing was defeated (1982 onwards), the President made a point of clearly establishing, by decree, all those posts for which the post-holder had to be nominated by him in central and local State structures, and what would, in turn, be the post-holder’s nomination powers (to the secondary posts in the government structure, ranging from cabinet directors, through chief secretaries, to provincial delegates)\(^{916}\). As a whole, such a decree represented some kind of an institutionalisation of the hierarchy and structure of nominations within the patrimonial *carrousel* and consequently an institutionalisation of the distributive hierarchy as well\(^{917}\). I am obviously talking of middle and top rank posts within those structures and therefore of a relatively limited number of positions. Beyond or below those levels of the distributive pyramid (be it in the state administration or public companies)

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\(^{915}\) During a speech in June 1980, Eduardo dos Santos clearly stated that ‘Some directors are more concerned about the jobs they have than about carrying the job out. Instead of hiring and promoting the most deserving, the most honest and the most hard-working, they hire and promote their friends from home or their relations, they allow themselves to be corrupted’; cit. in *Guardian* (US) (4 June 1980). As explained at the introduction of this work, these words must be understood within the process of *auto-critica* occurring before congresses, whereby the President usually assumed the positions of the most severe criticism heard throughout several meetings (in this case there was a preparation for the 1980 congress going on). It should not be understood in terms of a sincere commitment to change such practices in the future, something that never happened as we saw.

\(^{916}\) The decree included a long list of posts appointed by the President (art.1), by the Ministers and State Secretaries (art.2), by the Minister of Provincial Coordination (art.3), by the Minister of Justice (art. 4), by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (art.5), by the Minister of Education (art. 6), by the Minister of External Trade (art.7), the Procurator-General of the Republic (art.8), the Provincial Commissioners (art.9) and the Rector of the University of Angola (art.10); in Decree 94/83, *DR*, 133 (7 July 1983). This decree was changed at a later date, when the post of minister of Provincial Coordination was scrapped, by removing art.3 referring to that post; see decree 15/86, *DR*, 62 (4 August 1986).
posts no longer had any significant privilege (like access to special shops, the system of *requisições and credenciais*, working trips, US dollars at the foreign exchange rate and so on), and the wages were ridiculous.

According to this institutionalised structure of nominations, every time the President rotated the names within the top positions of the hierarchy, there followed an almost automatic rotation within secondary lines of nominations, because those nominated by the President to a place would immediately fill those posts under their nomination power, with close family, business associates, and so on\(^{918}\). Insofar as the rotation speed of nominations by the president increased, up to the level of the absurd\(^ {919}\), the rotation of names at secondary levels of the central and local government structures also gathered pace.

The rapid increase in the regular change of presidential nominations served not only the usual purpose of providing access to benefits and privileges for all those that were thought to be useful in terms of the political and micro-identity equilibrium and support to the statu quo, but also to achieve a new aim, namely to exonerate the President from policy failures; i.e. government reshuffling (central and local) was also used to ‘make heads roll’ at times of heightened crisis, finding scapegoats (ministers, secretaries of State, provincial commissioners and so on) to take personal responsibility for the failings of government — whereas this was a responsibility which in fact they did not have, as legislative and executive power was concentrated in the presidency

\(^{917}\) Decree 94/83, *DR*, 133 (7 July 1983).

\(^{918}\) From private interviews with Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Mário Sêteco (10 March 1998); Filomeno Vieira Lopes (24 March 1998); João Melo (17 April 1998).

\(^{919}\) Only a few of the immense reshufflings on the patrimonial *carrousel* are mentioned here, with references to the year, number and month of the *Diário da República* editions in which they were reported (the extension of names listed and the speed with which they are appointed, dismissed and re-appointed is such that it is not possible to be more accurate): in 1980, *DR*, 160 and 164 (July), 206 (August), 217 and 229 (September); in 1981, *DR*, 65 (March), 111 (May), 134 (June), 290 and 294 (December); in 1982, *DR*, 45 (February), 191 (August), 275 (November), 302 (December); in 1983, *DR*, 88 (April), 161, 162 and 176 (July), 193 (August), 207 (September), 289 (December); in 1984, *DR*, 32 (February), 71 and 75 (March), 160 (July), 249 (October), 261 (November); in 1985, *DR*, 7 (January), 24 (March), 35 (April), 38 (May); in 1986, *DR*, 1 (January), 10 and 11 (February), 18 (March), 28 and 34 (April), 48 (June), 81 (October); in 1987, *DR*, 18, 19, 21 and 26 (March), 42
and its subsidiary organs. This new aim in the reshuffle policy represents a second major difference from Neto's management.

Those ministers who were publicly demoted and sometimes even humiliated, after a very brief period spent 'paying for their sins' (which they usually had not committed), would then be re-nominated to another post on the patrimonial carrousel. As can be imagined, therefore, there was enormous pressure on the president to re-appoint those who had been dismissed. To deal with such pressures became a very difficult task for the president, as he himself made clear in the most elucidating speech:

Finally, I want to tell my comrades that the constitution grants me certain competencies, as head of government, as head of state, to replace members of the government and ambassadors, and to appoint them. But I have a feeling that the application of these competencies are not always fully accepted. We are amongst militants and we shall speak frankly. We do not always readily accept renewal or reappointment; there is always someone who worries about these problems. When someone is replaced, there is always a current of opinion for it and a current of opinion against it, that is, in my experience, one side of the story. The other side is that until this person is given another post, there are always concerned elements ready to suggest that 'he could come here now', 'he could go there now, because the post is vacant' [...]. This is the situation and some even resists my decisions.

This is not as easy to solve as my comrades think and even in those cases when the replacement was based on proven mistakes committed by the post holders, where we put together commissions to look into the matter [i.e. corruption, incompetence], it was not easy either. Comrades, don't think that these matters are easy to deal with [...] we shall have to grow a bit more as a class Party in order to demand from all members that their obligations and duties be fulfilled, but we have not yet reached that stage.

In practice, and I am speaking from experience, comrades cannot imagine what I must do in order to resolve such situations. But this is how our Party is, this is how we are. [my bold]

Later on, while noting the 'objective difficulty that Angola has few cadres', the President warned that officials 'must finally be held responsible for their acts and a new era of accountability must start'; offending officials would 'have to

(May), 53 (July), 75 (September), 91 (November), 92 (December); in 1988, DR, 5 (January), 6 (February), 13 (March), 17 (April) and 50 (December).

920 'Speech of the President to one of the working commissions ... op. cit. pp.75–79.
spend a longer time without holding top leadership posts. In other words, the speed of the patrimonial carrousel should slow down. In practice, however, this warning had no effect, since it was meant above all to placate the international community, in order to give credibility to the SEF. In the end it was just another cosmetic move like the 1981 campaign against corruption.

2) Regarding the rebel groups fighting the MPLA, Eduardo dos Santos also resorted to the strategy outlined at the end of Agostinho Neto’s presidency, based on co-option and integration within the middle ranks of the State apparatus (and consequently within the middle ranks of the patrimonial/distributive system). A new campaign of clemency was launched, asking for the surrender of rebel groups, acknowledging the ‘deep-seated historical reasons that had led many people to join those groups’, but promising an ‘honest work on the production line’ to all those who showed themselves to be truly repentant. As a direct result of the campaign, in October 1984, thousands of guerrillas and FNLA supporters surrendered, amongst them Johnny Edward Pinock, who had been prime minister of Angola’s tripartite transitional government in 1974, and Tonto Afonso de Castro, head of FNLA’s armed forces. Both were integrated into State companies, occupying highly remunerated management positions. For the first time, the clemency policy was explicitly said to include UNITA members, although not with as much success as in the FNLA case.

During the past year [1984], many fellow countrymen belonging to the now defunct FNLA decided to put an end to their useless sojourn in the bush and have been integrated into the great Angolan family in order to take part in the economic and social...

923 Cit. In ARB (October 1984), p.7407C.
924 Surrender took place after the publication of an editorial in Jornal de Angola reiterating the government’s appeal for the surrender of all rebels in the interest of national unity and reconstruction; in ARB (October 1984), p.7407C.; The surrender definitely finished with the weak FNLA guerrilla that survived the 1976 civil war.
925 From private interview with Cornélio Caley (2 May 1998).
reconstruction of our country. Some members of UNITA have also laid down their arms [my bold].

13.1.3 The guiding principles in terms of foreign policy

Finally, with regards to foreign policy, after the defeat of the leftwing, the President found the necessary room for manoeuvre to pursue a negotiated settlement over the Cuban and Namibian issues (the President's second major strategic objective mentioned in chapter 10), as negotiations had hitherto been blocked due to the intransigence of the leftwing in this matter.

Thus, as soon as that political obstacle was 'definitely' overcome, a first agreement between Angola and South Africa came to be signed through the mediation of the US, in February 1984 — the Lusaka Agreement — according to which both parties agreed to establish an effective cease-fire in the border war and to open the way for a wider peace settlement in the region, and for the independence for Namibia. For the first time, Angola agreed to announce the pending departure of the Cubans as soon as the last South African soldier left its soil. In return the US agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Angola.

However, after the signature of this first agreement, new and serious setbacks emerged in the way of the president's aim, not only at the level of

926 In Documentos da 1ª Conferência Nacional ...op. cit...1985, p.29. The clemency policy was developed in the following years, especially in 1988, when a national seminary on clemency was organised by the party and a new campaign was launched including a 'framework for effective re-integration of Angolan citizens [...] in the economic and social construction of the country'; see Discurso do Camarada Ministro da Defesa da República de Angola Proferido na Abertura do Seminário Nacional sobre a Política de Clemência e Harmonização Nacional (Luanda: Editorial Vanguarda, 1988), especially p11.

927 Still within the scope of emergency powers granted by the CC to the President in December 1982, the President conceded himself diplomatic competency and the possibility of autonomously negotiating a cease-fire with South Africa, but the active pursuit of that aim by the President was delayed until the defeat of the leftwing was completely achieved. Although the President's new powers had not been specified when the CC granted them to him in December 1982, the Angolan news agency did mention at the time that they were related to the application of an emergency plan and that they would allow more room for manoeuvre in the field of defence, including the possibility of negotiating a cease-fire with South Africa and the implementation of economic austerity programmes. The decisions were taken at the same time as a top-level Angolan delegation was talking to the South African government in Cape Verde about a possible cease-fire in the South of the country. See ARB (December 1982), p.6686.

928 In ARB (February 1984), p.7150.

929 Ibid. pp.7150-7154.
subsequent violations from South Africa\textsuperscript{930}, but also and mainly with Angola’s own minister of foreign affairs. The minister, Paulo Jorge (a \textit{mestiço} with a moderate but clear leftwing position in terms of foreign policy\textsuperscript{931}) had somehow survived the previous presidential assault on the left\textsuperscript{932} and inconveniently decided to express his point of view during the visit of the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Frank Wisner in mid-October 1984. During a meeting to discuss the Namibian and Cuban issues, Paulo Jorge unexpectedly took a very aggressive stance and almost provoked a diplomatic incident by asking Mr. Wisner on what grounds he was present, as the US government did not officially recognise the Angolan government — which effectively scuppered the meeting\textsuperscript{933}. Paulo Jorge was immediately dismissed\textsuperscript{934} and the president personally took charge of foreign affairs\textsuperscript{935}. The ministry was placed under the President’s direct institutional tutelage and was made autonomous in relation not only to the Council of Ministers but also to the CDS, as detailed in the diagram of the State’s Central Structure (see previous figure 11.2.2.3).

After the dismissal of Paulo Jorge and a temporary break in the negotiation process (due to the repeal of the Clark’s amendment in July 1985

\textsuperscript{930} Soon after the signature of the agreement, Angola accused South Africa of increasing support to UNITA in contravention of the accord; see \textit{ARB} (October 1984), pp. 7407c and 7408a.; other military confrontations followed in 1985; see \textit{ARB} (August 1985), p.7725; also \textit{ARB} (October 1985), p.7776a,b,c p.7777a,b,c.

\textsuperscript{931} Paulo Jorge tried to reject the Cuban withdrawal as a pre-condition for a Namibian settlement; on the external characterization of Paulo Jorge as a leftwing member see \textit{ARB} (July 1982), p.6538a; for a characterization of Paulo Jorge as a member of the pro-Soviet side within the party see \textit{ARB} (October 1984), p.7401a,b,c; p.7419c, 7420a-b; for a characterization of Paulo Jorge as a hard-liner within the government see article of Jim Hoagland in \textit{Washington Post} (23 October 1984). Also during the private interview Paulo Jorge gave to the author of this thesis, he still assumed a pro-Communist inflexible stance despite all the ideological change occurred within the party in 1990; from private interview with Paulo Jorge (26 June 1998).

\textsuperscript{932} Probably for being a very cautious politician and diplomat and for not having the slightest involvement in ‘the picture and the play’ episode; not even of solidarity with the ones being arrested as was the case of Pepetela in relation to N’Dunduma.

\textsuperscript{933} This attitude was confirmed by Paulo Jorge himself, during a private interview (26th June 1998).


\textsuperscript{935} The President held the brief for foreign affairs until April 1985 when a new minister was appointed, Afonso Van Dunem ‘M’Binda’; a man of absolute confidence to the president (a ‘loyalist’ as defined), who had been until then the head of the President’s cabinet; in \textit{ARB} (April 1985), p.7565.
Talks resumed in November 1985, in Lusaka, leading to some meetings during 1986 and 1987 (even while US military overt aid to UNITA continued). Negotiations definitely entered a new phase in May 1988 with the inclusion of Cuba along with South Africa and Angola under the mediation of the US, discussing concrete terms for Namibian independence and the Cuban retreat. The first tripartite accord came to be signed in Brazzaville on December 13th soon to be followed by the New York agreement (22 December 1988) which finally set the seal for the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops.

By then, the president's second major objective was half achieved. Angola had finally come to terms with South Africa and the US as desired by the president, solving the Cuban and Namibian issues. However, neither the political integration of UNITA nor its military destruction (or a combination of both, as intended) was accomplished. Nevertheless, Luanda was convinced that once Namibia was independent and her long time friend Sam Nujoma was president, UNITA could no longer count on the help of the South African Defence Force and the military protection it previous had in Namibian territory. Without such support, UNITA was much more vulnerable even if the Cubans were to leave and US aid to Savimbi was to continue. FAPLA's large contingent and its sophisticated war material were thought to be more than enough to keep UNITA's actions under control while a political solution was prepared. The

936 See Wright, George The Destruction ... op. cit. pp.76-77.
937 See ARB (December 1985), p.7874.
938 See ARB (February 1986), p.7952.a-b; also ARB (June 1986), p.8089.
939 See Financial Times (6th January 1986); also Financial Times (10th November 1986); also ARB (June 1986), p.8089; also ARB (July 1987), p.8547.
940 With the renewed victory for the Republicans in the US (electing George Bush in November 1988), it became confirmed the continuing support to Savimbi, putting even more pressure on both sides for an agreement, reached in the following month as referred.
942 From private interview with Carlos Feijó (10 April 1998); See also in the same sense ACR, vol.21 (1990), p.B549, B551; also ACR, vol.22 (1991), pp.B487-B491.)
diplomatic process, the political and economic transition that followed, leading to a market economy and a multiparty system, will not be discussed here as it beyond the scope of this work.\(^{943}\)

13.2 The Main Principles as they Affected the Whole Population

13.2.1 The reinforcement of self-legitimising morals sustaining new predatory practices

As we have seen, during the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos presidency, there was a reinforcement of all the factors (contraction of distribution and party ‘elitism’) that were said to be at the basis of the previously analysed self-legitimising morals supporting predatory practices throughout the whole population.

The continuous development of this cumulative process led not only to the massive and generalised dissemination of these practices (as previously explained in chapter 12), but most importantly, to new predatory practices such as outright theft and commercialisation of natural resources and art objects, as recognised in the report to the second congress,

In the economic and social domain, it is remarkable to note the attempts of the petite bourgeoisie to consolidate their economic position by hoarding, corruption, speculation, bribes, exploitation of the workforce, theft of natural resources and even doing business with cultural patrimony [my bold].\(^{944}\)

\(^{943}\) If as mentioned, the first signs of an economic transition can be said to have occurred as soon as 1985 and 1987 with SEF, the first clear signs of a political transition can be said to have occurred as soon as the 1st October 1988 (even before the New York agreement), in Franceville; there, the heads of state from the Congo, Gabon and Angola, held a summit meeting to look at the progress of the four-partite negotiations (between South Africa, Angola, Cuba and the USA) for the solution to the conflict in South-East Africa. The President of Angola held a press conference and mentioned that once the four-partite negotiations in Brazzaville were over [leading to the above mentioned Brazzaville agreement in December 1988] a peace process would then start in Angola that would be inspired by the lessons learnt in other African countries who’d had similar experiences [those countries were on the way to holding multi-party elections]. The explicit agreement by the Angolan government to hold general elections occurred towards the end of 1989 as part of a reformulated plan for internal peace date 27 December. Regarding the extensive negotiation process that led to a multiparty system in Angola, see mainly the Relatório do Comité Central ao IIº Congresso ...op. cit...1990, pp.6–16.

\(^{944}\) In Relatório do Comité Central ao Iº Congresso ...op. cit...1985, p.68.
The reported theft of natural resources referred not to the already mentioned 'old' diamond traffic, but to the emerging illicit trade in ivory, which in the mid-eighties ran into large sums and transcended international boundaries as reported by Birmingham, according to whom, the old border markets of Zombo and Noqui thrived on border traffic and smuggled goods as never before. As for the business on cultural patrimony it was a reference to the ransacking of museums, whose objets d'art were sold on the black market.

These new predatory practices did not exist during Neto's administration, not so much because it was not possible to commit them but most probably because the existing public morals strongly condemned them. However, inasmuch as predatory practices acquired legitimacy through the worsening of the economic situation, they progressively became morally legitimate and were therefore indulged by ever more people. Several examples can be given apart from the shocking ones discussed above. Street selling or the informal petit commerce in Angolan cities (mainly Luanda) was given great impetus by the regressados (Bakongo returning from Zaire after 1975), who behaved as they had in the large cities of Zaire. Merchants circulated throughout the cities with all kind of articles approaching people all over, even in cars stopped at red lights or cross roads. They turned street alleys or open fields into informal anarchic markets without sanitation, where food or medicines were (and still are) sold near small rivers of sewer, where garbage

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945 From private interviews with Mário Séteco (10 March 1998); Eduardo Kuangana (7 April 1998); Júlio Morais (11 April 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998).
946 In Birmingham, David, Frontline Nationalism...op. cit. p.100.
947 From private interviews with Mário Séteco (10 March 1998); Filipe Amado (27 March 1998); Eduardo Kuangana (7 April 1998); Júlio Morais (11 April 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998). In 1995, the author of this thesis was invited to visit a museum in a Southern town to select some items of his choice. When asked how it was at all possible to buy museum-pieces, the 'guide' answered, as if it were the most natural thing in the world, that he would go off and make another piece to replace the one the author wanted. This business went on with the cooperation of the museum employees, as though the museum had turned into an artefact store. Judging by how long these practices had been going on for, it was highly likely that all the museum pieces were in fact copies. Later on, I discovered that one of the ways of rapidly aging new pieces, especially wood, was to bury them for a few weeks in very damp soil, near the mangrove swamps, and then dry them in the sun, making the pieces look quite like antiques.
948 From private interviews with Mário Séteco (10 March 1998); Filipe Amado (27 March 1998); Júlio Morais (11 April 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998).
accumulates all over in a smelly and full of flies environment. Prostitution, small guns, false documents and drugs became regular items and services within these markets. At first, they were strongly attacked and criticised by most of the inhabitants and authorities of Luanda, who accused them of wanting to 'turn Angola into a Congo' (an allusion that went back to the anti-colonial struggle and was used as a synonym for anarchy, confusion and law-breaking)\textsuperscript{949}. With the passing years, however, with the worsening of the economic situation for most of the population, and the collapse of the extensive patrimonial distribution, an increasing number of non-Bakongo people became involved in this kind of activity, and by the mid-1980s, the majority of the urban population was directly or indirectly involved in this type of \textit{petit commerce}, thereby legitimising activities that they themselves had previously proscribed and condemned. Soon the Bakongo returnees became a slim minority in these commercial activities\textsuperscript{950}.

In simple words, by the end of the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos, the large increase in predatory practices had become morally acceptable. Such phenomenon represents an important qualitative distinction with the period of Neto's administration, proving the cumulative and reinforcing character of self-legitimising moral decline -- which is one of the most important differences between modern and post-modern patrimonialism.

In the face of the increasing dissolution of the patrimonial compromise and an increasing party elitism, an ethical framework emerged, according to which the ends (survival) justified, or legitimised, the means (predatory practices).

\textsuperscript{949} From private interviews with Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Carlos Pinto (16 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); J.M Mabêko-Tali (23 February 1998); Pepetela (7 July 1998), among several others.

\textsuperscript{950} Another more recent example is petit theft, which was morally condemned in late eighties, with burglars beaten and burned till dead in the streets by the population when caught in flagrant \textit{delictum} (most of the times without interference from the police); however, in late nineties the same type of crimes was not punished in the same way (sometimes there was beating, but most of the time they were handed to the police), being somehow understood and partially excused by public morals under the argument that they had nothing to eat or no godfathers to appeal to (I could commonly heard arguments such as 'they have no godfathers in the kitchen'; 'their crimes are ridiculous when compared with the millions stolen by the rulers' and so on); from personal experience and from private interviews with: Paula Braz (13 February 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 February 1998); Fernanda Vieira (2 March 1998); Mário Séteco (10 March 1998); Pepetela (7 July 1998).
The more the discrimination and economic difficulties increased, the more practices prevailed that had been considered moral illegitimate by the public morals of a recent past and the more the boundaries between what was considered as moral legitimate and moral illegitimate, became diluted and blurred. The more this happened, the greater became the distance between the moral legitimacy and the legality (i.e. between the moral order and the juridical order), up to the point where people and organisations no longer believed in the judicial system to solve civil cases and either left criminals unpunished or took the law into their own hands — as revealed by the first national conference (January 1985),

At the level of the administration of justice, we have noticed an excessive delay in dealing with cases referred to those organisations responsible for administering justice. Consequently, certain organisations and people, no longer understanding the usefulness of these organisations, opt either for leaving citizens unpunished for their crimes, or for taking the law into their own hands [...] there remains in some organisations, a lack of respect for the law and for certain citizens' rights, the lack of respect for the protection of socialist property and for national patrimony, whereby it is necessary for the Party and state organisations concerned to consider taking more effective measures to control the applying of the law and bring back lawfulness.[my bold]951

Such extreme discrepancy between moral and legal order (much broader than during Neto’s presidency) represents another clear sign of what is here called the cumulative process of self-legitimising morals.

13.2.2 Normative principles and prevailing solidarities

During the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos’ presidency, there was maintenance of the preferential, sectarian and discriminatory type of solidarities952 based upon criteria such as ethnicity, regionalism and nepotism.

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951 In Documentos da 1º Conferência Nacional ...op. cit...1985, pp.23–24.
952 As noticed by foreign observers as soon as 1981, people could only get what they want ‘having the right connections’; reported by Quentin Peel in Financial Times (14 September 1981); and as previously quoted, Eduardo dos Santos himself had acknowledged such type of solidarities in his speech of June 1980, ‘Some directors [...] instead of hiring and promoting the most deserving, the most
The first national conference (January 1985) was perfectly clear about the continuing existence of such micro-identity criteria and even informed the delegates about the Politburo’s decision to order a research project on the country’s ‘ethnic specificity’ in order to facilitate the management of society. Twelve months later, the report to the second congress not only re-affirmed the presence of those same criteria but also acknowledged the emergence of a new type of discrimination based upon differences in lifestyles.

The experience acquired during the construction of our young nation has shown that not only do tribalism, regionalism and racial prejudice threaten national unity, but also other complexes that arise from our social mosaics — the cultural differences in lifestyles, and behaviours engendered by colonialism, the social injustices we have inherited and have not yet totally overcome. [my bold]

Those ‘other complexes’ and ‘cultural differences in lifestyles’ mentioned by the report, although not specified, referred most probably to the rural-urban cultural cleavage that deepened with the increasing arrival of rural migrants to Luanda. They were called pejoratively by the people of Luanda ‘Bantu’ and consequently discriminated against in much the same way as the zairotas/regressados had been discriminated against.

Acknowledging the existence of those micro-identity criteria along with the preferential, sectarian and discriminatory type of solidarities it supported, and relating those to practices of ‘liberalism’ and ‘corruption’ (called in this work predatory practices), the report went on to conclude that,

Thus our ideological objectives for the next five-year period must focus on [...] strengthening our attack against remainders from colonial society such as tribalism, regionalism and racism [...] paternalism, nepotism, liberalism [or laissez faire] and corruption [my bold].

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honest and the most hard-working, they hire and promote their friends from home or their relations, they allow themselves to be corrupted'; cit. in Guardian (US) (4 June 1980).

953 In Documentos da 1° Conferência Nacional ...op. cit...1985, p.19.

954 In Relatório do Comitê Central ao IIº Congresso ...op. cit...1985, p. 7.

955 According to Birmingham it was ‘a term of unexpected opprobrium applied to those who did not speak Portuguese or adopt the middle-class table manners of the departed colonials’; in Birmingham, David, Frontline Nationalism...op. cit. p.99.

956 Relatório do Comitê Central ao IIº Congresso ...op. cit...1985, p.33.
Such recommendations had no effect\textsuperscript{957}.

The above mentioned prejudice against rural people reveals in stark form the fact that in Angola, unlike in most other African countries, there are virtually no distributive networks linking the elites at the centre with the rural areas in the provinces.

In Angola, therefore, the system did not accord with that presented within the modern patrimonial perspective which assumes the continuous distributive linkage between ruling elites and ruled masses, between the top and the very bottom of the patrimonial pyramid. In Angola, such micro-identity linkages became progressively fragmented. Aggregation was limited to those with proximate socio-economic and political status (be it at the top or at the bottom of the system)\textsuperscript{958}. Therefore, progressive patrimonial fragmentation effectively represented deep social fragmentation.

Such social fragmentation or the erosion of more extensive ties of solidarity was also noticed by Zenha Rela in early eighties in terms of `the beginning of “all against all” in the day-to-day living struggle'\textsuperscript{959}, by Wernerus in 1982 in terms of salve-se quem puder [those who can, should save themselves]\textsuperscript{960}, by Bhagavan in 1983 as ‘anarchic individualism’\textsuperscript{961}, or even brilliantly portrayed by Pepetela as the death of Utopia, when selfish and particular ambitions definitely smashed a more encompassing social notions\textsuperscript{962}.

However, it is worth noting that such deep social and patrimonial fragmentation between top and bottom of the system did not represent the end

\textsuperscript{957} Five years later, in 1990, the CC report to the third congress still complaint about the deep incrustation of feelings such as tribalism and ethnicity, but this time explaining it as a general problem of African states artificially constructed by the colonizers; see Relatório do Comitê Central ao IIIº Congresso ... op. cit... 1990, p.8.

\textsuperscript{958} From private interviews with Gerónimo Belo (17 March 1998); Victor Aleixo (26 March 1998); João Melo (17 April 1998); José Cerqueira (20 April 1998); Fernando Pacheco (23 April 1998); Pepetela (7 July 1998).

\textsuperscript{959} In Zenha Rela, Jose Manuel Angola ... op. cit. p.56.


\textsuperscript{961} In Bhagavan, M R, Angola’s ... op. cit. p.40.

\textsuperscript{962} See Pepetela, A Geração...op. cit. chapter ‘O polvo (Abril de 1982)’, pp.187-255; see especially pp. 202, 227-228. An also excellent description of preferential alliances between people of proximate socio-economic status can be found in the last part of that book, pp.259-316 (even if refering to 1991).
of political micro-identity alignment or the end of political legitimacy of the ruling elites of the MPLA due to the stronger threat represented by UNITA. A threat that was to continue towards the 1992 elections and afterwards.

Concluding chapter 13 we may say that the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos was clearly marked by the extreme development of those characteristics that had begun to emerge by the end of Neto’s administration:

1) at the top of the system (besides the two major differences discussed), there was an institutionalisation of a management system based upon the patrimonial carrousel, whose rotation speed increased dramatically — still maintaining the primacy of the Creole/M’Bundu in sharing the spoils, satisfying rivals and co-opting enemies;

2) at the bottom of the system, the near-total dereliction of distributive ethical principles that were supposed to link rulers and ruled, led to an extremely flexible moral order of a ‘free-for-all’ type allowing as much predatory practices as the imagination of people could conceive (a hallmark of post-modern patrimonialism).

There followed, therefore, the near-total dereliction of any ethical distributive principles that might have existed in the very first years after independence or that might have survived by the end of Neto’s presidency.

Bearing in mind all the preceding chapters, it can be said that at the end of the Marxist phase of the dos Santos presidency, the model of power management and political administration was similar to what I have defined in Part I as post-modern patrimonialism, distinguishing between l’Afrique utile (administratively: the network of cities over which the government exerted sovereignty, maintaining an international legitimacy of rule; politically and economically: the elites at the middle and top ranks of the state/party/military ranks) and l’Afrique inutile (administratively the regions that were beyond the
network of main cities; politically and economically the so-called masses whose productive effort was irrelevant to the economic sustenance of the top elites). The potential weaknesses of such model will come to the surface with the changes occurring in early nineties (transition to multiparty system and market economy and a new international context). Although that period is beyond the limits of this thesis, a few remarks will be provided at the conclusion.
By the end of the Socialist-Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos's presidency, it was obvious that the previous articulation between the working logic of patrimonialism and the structural form of a modern polity was no longer tenable. There was an extreme reinforcement of the organisational influence of the former and, consequently, an extreme atrophy of the latter.

1) In terms of the links of distributive interdependence between rulers and ruled, there was a near-total collapse. Politically, there was an almost total institutional autonomy of the ruling elites in relation to the ruled masses deprived of any formal political participation. Economically, there was monopoly control over the significant sources of (external) income by the ruling elites (the President and his entourage), who thereby attained an almost total economic independence in relation to the productive efforts of the ruled masses who, in turn, found it increasingly difficult to survive. Ethically, there was a near-total neglect of the ruling elite's patrimonial and distributive obligations towards the masses, leading to the full development of a pragmatic morals of a 'anything goes' type.

The working logic of patrimonialism had reached extreme levels, be it in terms of patrimonial organisational principles (vertical, preferential and sectarian ties of primordial solidarity according to micro-identity criteria, leading to deeper social fragmentation) or patrimonial organisational expressions (predatory practices, rentière posture, centralisation of administration and personalisation and concentration of political power).

2) In terms of the structural form of a modern polity, there was an increasing dereliction of the functions identified with the 'modern State' -- i.e. a minimally efficient administration, bureaucracy and government exerting sovereign authority over land and population; a minimal pursuit of public objectives. The generalised climate of predation favoured the
commercialisation and destruction of the State's bureaucratic and administrative apparatus (with the obvious exception of those organisations surrounding the presidency in Futungo de Belas, the State security and FAPLA). The full exercise of the central government's sovereignty over people and land became mainly restricted to a network of cities. There was no effective border control, and South African forces and UNITA increasingly violated the country's frontiers (especially in the south and southeast, but also in the north through Zairean territory). UNITA's guerrilla activity extended over the majority of national territory (even if there was never the possibility of seizing any major city). The control of some resources was clearly decreasing, especially in places such as the Lunda regions where UNITA exploited some diamond mines for its own benefit and war effort. In the social sphere, the main area of public consciousness and pursuit of public objectives, revealed massive negligence towards the masses (the people of l'Afrique inutile), increasingly left to their own feeble predatory devices or in the care of international organisations.

Summarising and concluding, by the end of Eduardo dos Santos presidency, the Angolan State and the social organisation it supported was no longer to be considered 'partisan modern patrimonialism', mainly due to two sorts of reasons:

- Firstly, because the party was clearly subservient to the presidency, which controlled all the most important economic and political areas (major business affairs with public or private external entities; diplomatic negotiations with the US and South Africa);
- Secondly, because there was a near-total collapse of the interdependence distributive ties between rulers and ruled, thus undermining the logic of modern patrimonialism.
For these reasons, it is appropriate to characterise the Angolan State and the social organisation it supported by the end of the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos, 'presidential post-modern patrimonialism'.
CONCLUSION

It has been shown that in Angola the existing patrimonial dynamics are quite different from what is usually referred to as modern patrimonialism (it might also be the case of other countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Liberia).

It was argued that the socio-political and economic system in Angola started off by following a path close to that of modern patrimonialism but that, because of the cumulative and self-reinforcing dynamics we have discussed, it evolved into a new dimension of patrimonialism as a system of social organisation — post-modern patrimonialism. In short, this evolution can be explained by a triple mechanism:

1) The economic and political power of the ruling elites became detached from the ruled masses; they in turn lost their economic and political negotiating capital and became weaker and fragile within the patrimonial system;

2) Given the autonomy and insularity of the political and economic power of the ruling elites, given the extreme economic and political weakness of the ruled masses, there followed a sharp dilution of their distributive interdependence relationships. This dilution generated an intensification of the working logic of patrimonialism (i.e. of its organisational principles and organisational expressions) within a framework of intense economic scarcity and social fragmentation;

3) In the case of Angola, these dynamics were facilitated by the continuance of a civil war with increasing ethnic overtones, promoting micro-identity political alignments and economic scarcity.

Flourishing amidst economic scarcity and social fragmentation, these dynamics hindered the mobilisation of alternative paths (horizontal and universal types of
social organisation), limited social change, preserved the status quo and produced a society built on the exacerbation of selective, sectarian and limited privileges among the ruling elites and widespread misery for the bulk of the population, who became increasingly divided, fragile, vulnerable, weak and marginalised within the patrimonial power system.

This said, it is now time to conclude with a very important distinction that needs to be made between post-modern patrimonialism as presented here and other recently described phenomena such as William Reno’s ‘Warlordism’\textsuperscript{963} or Bayart’s ‘Criminalization of the State’\textsuperscript{964}.

It has been made clear that towards the end of Agostinho Neto’s presidency (1978-1979), the Angolan political system had already exhausted its modern patrimonial dynamics. It evolved towards a post-modern patrimonial dynamics during the Marxist phase of Eduardo dos Santos presidency (1979-1985/87). Therefore, post-modern patrimonialism occurred in Angola before the so-called transition to a market economy and a multiparty system.

In these terms, contrary to the theories of ‘Warlordism’ and ‘Criminalization of the State’ (that we will briefly analyse below), post-modern patrimonialism can not be in any way explained by the new international changes that emerged in late eighties and early nineties, namely the end of the Cold War, the end of Apartheid and international pressure in favour of economic and political liberalisation.

One can not ignore the fact that such international changes had a huge impact on the way post-modern patrimonial dynamics had been evolving until then. However, it must be noticed that changes in the economic and political structure did not in any way mean a change in patrimonial working logic. Surprisingly or not, such formal changes ended up further reinforcing and making more visible the dynamics of post-modern patrimonialism. Although this work’s time frame ends in 1985/87, the distinction that needs to be made in

\textsuperscript{963} Reno, William, \textit{Warlord Politics} \ldots op. cit.

\textsuperscript{964} Bayart, Jean-François et al., \textit{The Criminalization} \ldots op. cit.
relation to ‘Warlordism’ and ‘Criminalization of the State’ leads us to offer a few remarks on the so-called transitional period.965

The new international conjuncture of the late eighties/early nineties posed a double challenge to the patrimonial working logic as it had been evolving in countries such as Angola. Firstly, it brought strong pressure in favour of democratisation and economic liberalisation. Secondly, it brought new commercial actors onto the stage who tried to cash in on informal or illegal international activity taking advantage of the new wave of globalisation.

Economic Liberalisation and Democratisation966

With the end of the Cold War, the ‘bankruptcy’ of the Eastern Bloc and the ‘failure’ of its political and economic model, strong international pressure was put on African countries to restructure their economic and political systems in terms of freeing the markets, making structural readjustments, balancing internal and external accounts, reducing the public sector, introducing multiparty systems with free, direct and universal elections. As stressed by President Eduardo dos Santos in his inaugural speech to the III congress of the MPLA (introducing the transition to the multiparty system and market economy in 1990),

A real democratic revolution dominates the world today. That revolution surpasses a lot the reform movements of countries in the previously designated ‘Socialist Community’ and corresponds to a common aim of the whole Humanity at the end of the XX century,

965 A more in-depth work on such period will be part of a forthcoming research project.
966 As explained I am just providing a few remarks on these issues that are out of this thesis time frame, therefore only a few bibliographic references are given. On the so-called political and economic transition in Angola some of the most important references are: Hodges, Tony, Angola from Afro-Stalinism... op. cit.; Mabeko-Tali, Jean-Michel, 'L'interminable transition angolaise et les multiples dangers de l'incertitude politique', in Lusotopie, 5 (1997) pp. 87-103; Messiant, Christine, 'Angola: le retour à la guerre ou l'inauvable faillit de une intervention internationale' in L'Afrique Politique, (1994) pp. 201-229; Messiant, Christine, 'Angola, les voies ... II, op. cit. pp. 181-221; Messiant, Christine, 'MPLA et UNITA... op. cit. pp.40-57; Messiant, Christine, 'Angola: entre guerre et paix' ... op. cit.; Messiant, Christine, 'La Fondation Eduardo dos Santos (FESA): autour de l'investissement de la societé civile par le pouvoir angolais', in Politique Africaine, 73, (1999), pp.82-101; Messiant, Christine 'L'Angola ? Circulez, il n'y a rien à voir', in Lusotopie (2000), pp.9-26 ; Messiant, Christine 'Introduction', in Schubert, Benedict, A Guerra e as Igrejas, Angola 1961-1991 (Basel : P. Sclettwein Publishing Switzerland, 2000, Portuguese version), pp. 1-16 ; Messiant, Christine, 'À propos des..., op. cit. pp.61-95.
which sees in democracy (understood as power of the people for the people, exerted by its elected representatives) the only fair and legitimate form of organisation of the social, political and economic life of peoples and nations. [...] 

The strength of democratic ideals is everywhere and there is also a growing certainty that economic development is able to sustain and materialise such ideals. This implies a permanent articulation between the economies of the world and more flexible (ágeis) forms of management and competitiveness inside each country.

Thus, at the end of the XX century, the legitimacy of power and economic maturity of peoples [povos; in a sense of peoples of the world] are increasingly connected to their level of organisation, education, social mobility, free communication, political participation and democratic government.

Only in this way will it be possible to face and surpass the serious political and economic crises reaching in the first place those countries with fewer resources and development, among which is naturally the majority of African countries.967

However, the results of this new international wave of democratisation and liberalisation were very different from the objectives stated at the start of the transition to a multiparty system and the market economy, be it economically or politically.

Economically, pressures for liberalisation ended up as an important support for the existing patrimonial dynamics and the best example to illustrate this is the above discussed SEF, which was officially devised to fit the demands of the IMF and World Bank so as to become a member of those institutions, have access to loans and debt rescheduling. The programme proposed to remove several economic distortions such as an overvalued foreign exchange rate, the provision of significant goods at subsidised prices and the enormous public sector.

However, inasmuch as these distortions had become structural to the patrimonial system, such measures were never implemented and as soon as Angola was admitted to the IMF and managed to solve its debt problems (by

means of short-term reimbursements), the spirit of the SEF was subverted. The supposed reduction of the public sector and stimulation of private initiative were seen not so much as a reduction of State structures and employees, but more as:

a) the concession of State commercial, industrial and agriculture real-estate to chosen members of the ruling elite at ridiculous prices (so-called privatisation, but in fact representing a reinforcement of private appropriation of public assets — predation) and also an allowance for them to initiate private commercial activity\textsuperscript{968}, thus transforming them into the new entrepreneurial class of the future market economy (but still under the direct dependency of the State’s top structures for credit lines, import licenses, access to foreign currency at official rates, and so on);

b) further neglect of the State’s social responsibilities (health, education, social security, sanitation and so on), through the arrival en masse of international aid and co-operation — from international organisations to NGOs, churches, charitable institutions, solidarity assistance and so on. This led to a situation in which the State is minimally responsible for very little expenditure in these sectors. The role of international co-operation has gone from complementary to central\textsuperscript{969}, but always under

\textsuperscript{968} As early as 15 July 1989, various pieces of legislation were approved aimed at restructuring the State’s economic sector and changing commercial activity; see decree 31/89, DR, I, 27 (15 July 1989); decree 34/89, DR, I, 27 (15 July 1989); also executive decree from the Ministry of Internal Commerce 24/89, DR, I, 27 (15 July 1989), which approves the concession of commercial establishments belonging to the State to other economic agents. For an overall analysis of such ‘privatisation’ process coming out of SEF see Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, ‘A politica ... op. cit. p.107-133; also Ferreira, Manuel Ennes, ‘La reconversion ... op. cit. pp.11-26. Stressing the ineffectiveness of SEF especially in terms of those most ‘controverse’ measures, see ACR, vol.21 (1990), pp. B558-B559. A complete explanation on how all this process developed (i.e. SEF and privatisation processes to safeguard the ruling elites economic position) can be found in an extensive interview conceded to the author of this thesis by José Cerqueira (one of the major technicians of SEF) (20 April 1998). Also confirming the strategic objective of privatisation to ensure the economic primacy of the party and its rulers after the so-called transition to a market economy and multi-party politics is Mendes de Carvalho in private interview (17 July 1998). A previous research project developped by the author of this thesis in Luanda on entrepreneurial activity in August/September 1994 (non-published) reached to the same conclusion.

\textsuperscript{969} Although beyond of this work’s time frame it must be stressed that only now and very slowly, the international community and its many organisations are becoming aware of their true role in the social politics of Angola, namely taking over the financial responsibilities of the State. According to Jean
close control of the government, which supervised not only the amounts of aid coming in, but also its distribution inside the country\textsuperscript{970}. Spending on social provisions thus declined despite the astonishing and continuous growth in annual oil revenues\textsuperscript{971}.

The SEF programme was latter abandoned and periodically replaced by other official commitments more or less imposed on the government by the IMF and the World Bank, but with no significant results whatsoever. To this day (fifteen years after SEF) the Angolan government is still been able to prevent any effective implementation of structural adjustment and has even managed to keep its oil accounts secret sustained international pressure. For the essential, all the mentioned economic distortions remain until today (double foreign exchange rate; privileged access to subsidised goods and services; supply cards to high ranking cadres; privileged access to foreign currency at the official exchange rate; an enormous and inefficient public sector). The main difference

Marc Perrain, chief executive of MSF/Angola (‘Médecins Sans Frontières’), it is not understandable how a country as rich as Angola, producing and selling oil and diamonds, with an estimated annual oil revenue of US$7.000 million per year, can invest so little in areas such as health: ‘In our view, it is not normal that a humanitarian association such as MSF should provide absolutely everything that is required for the running of a hospital, be it in Kahala or in Kuílo. This does seem to be quite illogical. It would appear logical to us that complementary assistance be given to the Ministry of Health because of the difficult situation in the country at present.’; from statements made by Jean Marc Perrin in Angola, on 9 November 2000, broadcast on channel 2 of the Rádio Televisão Portuguesa news programme ‘Jornal de Àfrica’ (11 November 2000); see also Diário de Notícias (12 November 2000); Público (27 April 2000). For the year 2002, the requested need for emergency aid is US$233m as announced in Luanda by the UN organizations on the 27th November 2001, cit. in Rádio Difusão Portuguesa Àfrica, news programme ‘Jornal das 9’ (27 November 2001). On contemporary Angolan social policy see also Vidal, Nuno, Estratégias … op. cit.

\textsuperscript{970} Even though much beyond the scope of this work, it is important to notice that it was not a matter of completly substituting the State, because due precautions were taken by Angolan government who did not want to lose its intimate control of international aid resources and invested heavily (in early nineties) in setting up mechanisms for the coordination and management of the international organisations' activities, both in the provinces, through provincial governments and in Luanda through MINARS (Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration) and UTCA (Technical Unity for Coordination of Aid); initially in the direct dependence of the Council of Ministers to whom all NGOs had to pay a percentage of their annual budget, and now depending on MINARS; not to be confused with UN UCAH (Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination Unit, of the United Nations). Thus the government came to have a significant influence over NGOs coordination, management and definition of priority projects (controlling its activities and resources and attempting to articulate them with and integrate them into the existing distributive patrimonial system); On the discussion of this subject see Vidal, Nuno, Estratégias … op. cit.
in relation to the Marxist phase is an even more restricted and selective access to those privileges and benefits (i.e. further ‘elitism’).

In the end, the new economic model of a market economy (still under implementation) merely represented a reinforcement of sectarian, personal and preferential solutions and an even more intense (wild, frantic and speedy) predatory assault on all the remaining (meagre) resources by all social layers -- resulting in Angola being classified as the fifth most corrupt country in the world\textsuperscript{972}.

Politically, regimes such as the Angolan were pressured to re-legitimise their systems according to new criteria. Political legitimacy in Angola had been based on the conquest and taking over of power at the time of independence, and on the socialist revolutionary legitimacy that had now been discredited. Multiparty systems with direct universal elections were the new internationally approved criteria for political legitimacy\textsuperscript{973}.

Nevertheless, the transition to a multiparty system only served to confirm the existing patrimonial working logic in terms of: a), fierce competition between two main contenders to maintain or conquer hegemonic power; b), micro-identity political alignment.

a) As happened in 1975, the 1992 electoral process was transformed by the two main parties’ strategy into a renewed scramble for hegemony over the new ‘democratic State’, which according to the existing logic would most certainly continue being the main source of patrimonial resources (regardless of its notional multiparty complexion and the introduction of a market economy).

\textsuperscript{971} Angola’s oil revenue raised from the mentioned US$2.000m in 1987, to US$3.500m in 1990, to US$5.100 in 1996 and to US$7.000m in 2000; in Hodges, Tony, Angola from Afro-Stalinism... op. cit. p.2; see also Angola ... relatório de Médecins Sans Frontières op. cit.

\textsuperscript{972} The report on corruption was produced by the NGO Transparency International, published and presented in Berlin (13 September 2000), based upon criteria established by the OCDE convention on corruption (European Organization for Cooperation and Development); cit. in Diário Económico (14 September 2000). According to the same report Nigeria is the most corrupted country in the world.

\textsuperscript{973} See the above quoted speech of the Angolan president, Discurso pronunciado ... na Sessão de Abertura do III Congresso ... op. cit. pp.8-9
The fear and suspicion on both sides (supported by sixteen years of war with increasing ethnic overtones) created the feeling that the winner would again 'take it all', namely would achieve political and economic primacy through the capture of the patrimonial system. Thus, understandably, both contenders resorted to all available means, including military to achieve or maintain power. On UNITA's side the whole military apparatus remained intact and hidden from international observers, ready to be used if the electoral outcome was not the one expected. On the MPLA's side, despite the effective demobilisation of FAPLA and the significant predation of its equipment (after the 1991 demobilisation and restructuring and not before), a new special military force was created (Polícia de Emergência, or more popularly called Ninjas for their fearful appearance), just to ensure a minimally prepared military structure in case of conflict.

Therefore, since the main players acted according to such logic and the international community (UN) had not the necessary means to supervise a rush implemented agreement with unrealistic deadlines for the electoral process to take place, the outcome was a failure. As sincerely admitted and accurately analysed by Abel Chivukuvuku, former parliamentary leader of UNITA,

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974 Although the internal functioning of UNITA is little studied, for obvious reasons to do with its being a guerrilla movement, it is known that the logic of preferentialism and favouritism according to micro-identity criteria was indeed a reality, which, among other factors, led the movement to progressively lose its few non-Ovimbundu members. The kith and kin of Savimbi and the Bailundo (where Savimbi was from) were the ones who were privileged and promoted, receiving technical and university education, entering the diplomatic service and so on. The armed forces of UNITA (FALA—Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola), their counter-intelligence and their representatives on the Joint Political and Military Commission (the organisation that was to monitor the implementation of the Bicesse agreements along with UNITA, the MPLA, the USA, Russia, Portugal and the special envoy from the UN general Secretary) were all headed by his nephews (sons of his sister), the legitimate heirs to Savimbi according to the matrilineal Bantu tradition. Regarding a few (scarce) characteristics of UNITA after independence, see Bridgland, Fred, 'Savimbi et l'exercice du pouvoir: un témoignage', in Politique Africaine, 57 (1995), pp.94–102; also Loanda, Guilherme de, 'La longue marche de l'UNITA jusqu'à Luanda', in Politique Africaine, 57 (1995) pp. 63–70; also Marcum, John A., 'Angola: War Again', in Current History, vol.92, 574 (1993), pp.218-223; also Messiant, Christine, 'Angola: entre guerre et paix' ... op. cit. pp.166-175. For a comment on the inexistence of independent analysis on UNITA see Messiant, Christine, 'À propos des..., op. cit. p.72 footnote 21.

975 See Messiant, Christine, 'Angola: le retour ... op. cit. pp. 201–229; also Messiant, Christine, 'Angola, les voies ... II, op. cit. pp. 181–221; also Messiant, Christine, 'MPLA et UNITA... op. cit. pp.40–57; also Messiant, Christine, 'Angola: entre guerre et paix' ... op. cit.; also Anstee, Margaret J., 'L'ONU et le maintien de la paix', in Politique Africaine, 57 (1995) pp. 103–111.
The agreements that were signed in order to put an end to armed conflict [May 1991 Bicesse agreements], were always distorted by the real aim of contenders — the scramble for the maintaining or conquest of power, never necessarily thinking of what Angola should be [in terms of political and economic project]. On the one hand, there was the MPLA trying to maintain itself in power by all means, legal and illegal, and on the other hand, there was UNITA trying to get into power by all means, legal and illegal and never did they concern themselves about what Angola should be […] In Angola, the exercise of Party or State power is an end in itself and is not necessarily the platform from which to undertake a task, a mission or a political project. 976

b) Contrary to 1975, in 1992 voters effectively went to the polls and results essentially confirmed political micro-identity alignments partially conditioned by a bi-polarised framework (as had been evolving since the military disappearance of the FNLA977) and by the long-term MPLA's co-option strategy towards members of other (smaller) ethnic and regional groups within the great Creole/M'Bundu alliance. Such co-option ability bore its fruits and proved to be the crucial difference that assured the MPLA's victory as observed by Marcum and Bender,

Both the MPLA and UNITA carried their core constituencies. The MPLA won its traditional bailiwick of four provinces — Luanda, Bengo, Malange and Kwanza North […] In its four-province core support area of Huambo, Bié, Benguela [the eastern side of the province] and Cuando-Cubango, UNITA came out ahead […]. As seasoned Angola analyst Gerald Bender has observed, what proved crucial was that outside their respective cores, the MPLA outpolled UNITA in every instance […] It won in all 10 remaining provinces but Zaire where […] the FNLA veteran Bakongo leader Holden Roberto gained a slim plurality. Savimbi and UNITA lost in outlying regions in the south, east and far north areas that they had expected to carry. Ethnic communities (Ovambo, Tchokwe N'Ganguela, Bakongo) in provinces such as Cunene, Lunda Sul, Namibe, Moxico and Uige were unrepresented in UNITA's topmost ranks. Over time they had become alienated from a leadership that increasingly centred around Ovimbundo with regional and family ties to Savimbi.

Hapless third parties demonstrated their inability to convince members to subordinate personal ambitions, transcend regional loyalties and unite as a plausible political alternative in the few

976 From private interview with Abel Chivukuvuku, then-parliamentary leader of UNITA (28 May 1998).
months allotted for organising and campaigning before the elections. Aside from the FNLA in its long-time stronghold of Zaire province, the only regional party to make a significant showing was the Party of Social Renewal [of the Lunda–Tchokwe], which received 33% of the legislative votes in the eastern province of Lunda Sul.978

Beyond the analysis of the whole democratic process (reasons for the electoral results, reasons for failure of the so-called transition, reasons for the renewed military conflict and so on; which is not here the place to analyse), the important conclusion is that multiparty elections did not change the political status quo, be it in terms of power holders or, most importantly, in terms of patrimonial working logic. The phenomenon was nothing new. In other contexts, such as Latin America, Asia and Southern Europe, several writers had claimed that even with an electoral and multiparty system, those political systems that arose from patrimonialism showed that the participation by the population remained fragmented, personalised and tending towards the status quo. They argued that patrimonialism had an inhibiting effect on the emergence of universal horizontal politics, even with free, direct and universal multiparty elections.979

In sum, the so-called transition to a market economy and a multiparty system reinforced the post-modern patrimonial working logic. The return to war and the renewed intensification of the conflict’s ethnic overtone (which had already worsened during the electoral campaign), also conspired against any fundamental change.

**The New International Economy of Crime**980

A second challenge brought about by the change in the international context in late eighties and early nineties was the emergence of new actors with profound

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978 In Marcum, John A., ‘Angola: War ... op. cit. pp.220–221. For a break down of electoral results (both presidential and legislative) according to provinces, see Bittencourt, Marcelo, ‘A questão étnica e racial nas eleições angolanas’, in Estudos Afro-Asiáticos, 25 (1993), pp.225–250. Although this text looks at the question from a different angle, it contains detailed charts of the election results.
979 For a comprehensive discussion of this subject see Roniger, Luis & Gunes-Ayata, Ayse Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), chapter 2.
knowledge (acquired during the Cold War and Apartheid) of the way African States functioned and of the informal or illegal international channels that could be used for business. For years they had secretly penetrated different States, trafficking in arms, in diamonds and ivory, having knowledge on the functioning of other international traffic channels; they were intent on cashing-in their know-how under cover of the new wave of globalisation. One of the notorious examples of this kind of actor is the Executive Outcomes company and its associates. It was set-up by former South African army officers who offered their services to various African States, including Angola and Sierra Leone.\textsuperscript{981} These new actors represented both a threat and an opportunity for the regimes in question.

They were a threat because in countries where the working logic of patrimonialism had become extremely developed, where the structure of a modern polity had been reduced to a minimal bureaucratic and administrative apparatus (unable to control significant parts of the population and of the land including borders), it was extremely easy for the new international actors to bypass the central power of these regimes. The new international actors thereby established privileged commercial relationships with local or regional strongmen moved by personal and sectarian ambitions, with feeble or non-existent public consciousness and used to predatory practices. These strongmen exploited the resources in ‘their’ regions and sold them directly to new outside partners, with their business income escaping central power control and furnishing them with the necessary means to form private armies that ended up fighting the State; they became Warlords.\textsuperscript{982}

\textsuperscript{980} Here main reference is made to Reno, William, Warlord Politics ... op. cit. and Bayart, Jean-François et al., The Criminalization ... op. cit.

\textsuperscript{981} In Angola, ‘Executive Outcomes’ first assignment was to seize and guard Soyo oil installations which had been under attack since 1992 [...]. The assignment later included conquering and defending diamond mining areas in Cafunfo province and elsewhere near the Congo border where UNITA diamond traders did business with Congolese. The struggle to control this trade showed that other clandestine Cold War commercial networks had survived.’ In Reno, William, Warlord Politics ... op. cit. p.64. It is worth to note that several of these officers had a close knowledge of how UNITA functioned, having trained Savimbi’s men for several years before the end of Apartheid.

\textsuperscript{982} Reno, William, Warlord Politics ... op. cit. pp.1-4.
Inasmuch as these new international actors represented a threat, they also presented an opportunity for the ruling elites because they provided the governments with privileged and ‘legitimate’ access to the same kind of informal, illegitimate and criminal channels. In the new commerce, being an internationally recognised State was of great value to this kind of business, a mask of international legitimacy that the potential rivals did not have.\footnote{This is quite clear in the case of Liberia where Charles Taylor soon realized the importance of international recognition and the legitimacy it brought with it; it is also clear in the case of Sierra Leone with the recent UN embargo on diamonds with no certificate from central government (embargo dating from 6 July 2000) and of Savimbi in Angola, also through UN sanctions and embargos. On the diamonds traffic in Angola see \textit{A Rough Trade \ldots a report by Global Witness \ldots} op. cit.; also \textit{Revista Visão} (25 March 1993), pp.41-43; \textit{Público} (14 December 1998; 11 April 2000; 23 December 2000);.}

Faced with this scenario, of both threat and opportunity, where the pursuit of sectarian interests reached extreme levels, where there was a near-total disdain for the public dimension, the response of the ruling elites was to involve the State in international channels of informal commerce, turning into what Reno and Bayart have called the Criminalization of the State.

The real question for these rulers is how to manage elites who discover a dramatically wider scope for personal gain through the manipulation of global political and economic changes \ldots\ Heads of factions emerge when it is easy to become a military or commercial entrepreneur. From their regional bases, these entrepreneurs try to assemble and control resources and convert them to their own political advantage. Rulers of weak states confront these elites on this terrain. The result is a reflexive ‘Criminalization of the state’ \ldots\ and a militarisation of the economy that is the target of political struggle.\footnote{In Reno, William, \textit{Warlord Politics \ldots} op. cit. pp.28–30. In one of his recent works, Bayart seems to see things in a proximate way: ‘The Criminalization of politics and of the state may be regarded as the routinization, at the very heart of political and governmental institutions and circuits, of practices whose criminal nature is patent, whether as defined by the law of the country in question, or as defined by the norms of international law and international organisations or as so viewed by the international}

In a complex and absorbing international network of politics, crime and commerce that encroached on the territory of various African States, the international legitimacy of the State and the ‘legal’ status of its actions became the defining difference between, on the one hand, rebels, warlords, adventurers, illegal traders in drugs, arms, ivory and diamonds, and on the other hand, the governments. All were in pursuit of equally private profits
with no concern whatsoever for public interests or public good; they all resorted to a broad spectrum of relationships with external partners for the commercialisation of all resources at their disposal; they all resorted to private violence in order to defend their economic and power interests, through private armies for the warlords and through mercenaries such as Executive Outcomes for certain central governments.985

The ability of the ruling elites to respond to this external challenge varied according to each case and specific conjunctures. For example, in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, with large swathes of ungoverned territory and a variety of valuable natural resources (wood, gold, diamonds), the ruling elites seem to have been less able to stop potential rivals from accessing the new commercial opportunities and developing warlord strategies. On the other hand, in countries with valuable enclave resources (such as oil in Angola and Nigeria), the ruling elites appear more capable to dominate the new commercial opportunities for their own benefit and at the same time to bar internal rivals from accessing those opportunities, thus making it difficult for warlords. In the case of Angola, the existence of a bi-polarised civil war with marked ethnic overtones, helped to avoid the slippery road to Warlordism, keeping relatively strong the alliance in power, in the face of the UNITA threat to the power, culture and identity of the great Creole/M'Bundu alliance.

It is important to notice, however, that despite the external nature of the context favouring so-called Warlordism and the Criminalization of the State,

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985 ‘During the 1980s, Recce squadrons and other security units set up a front company, Firma Intertrading, to market ivory and rhino horn clandestinely to help finance UNITA’s operations; South African military officers later moved into private ivory and rhino horn trading [...] Other Firma associates, set up to transport arms and wildlife products for UNITA, appear among bidders to provide services to the Angolan regime [...] Angola’s rulers recruit these commercial operations not only for specific services but also to keep international trade routes under Angolan control to help the country manage resources [...] Foreign mercenaries and associated mining companies can help the President deny to potential rivals that these resources exist. The most attractive foreign firm partners [are] firms such as Executive Outcomes, with roots in military networks.’ In Reno, William, Warlord Politics ... op. cit. pp.65-66.
the explanation for such phenomena should not centre on the regional and
international dimensions such as the end of the Cold War and Apartheid, or the
development of an international economy of crime, as in Reno and Bayart
Instead it should rest on the specific dynamics of post-modern patrimonialism
that created conditions of extreme social fragmentation at all levels (economic,
political and ethical) and provided a fertile terrain for that kind of phenomenon
to develop. As a villager from Katepa, in the province of Malange, mentioned,
in the context of another discussion, ‘it is not opportunity that makes the
opportunist, but the opportunist who makes the most of an opportunity’. To
centre an analysis on ‘opportunity’ is utterly to distort the problem and, yet
again, to turn one’s attention away from the essential to the accessory and to
add a new external scapegoat to the already long list that takes the main
responsibility for African post-independence political course out of the hands
of its rulers and people (the slave trade, colonialism, decolonisation, neo-
colonisation, Soviet and American imperialism, the ‘debt trap’, the structural
adjustment programmes of the IMF and the World Bank and now, globalisation,
the end of the Cold War, the end of Apartheid and the development of an
international economy of crime).

Reno asks,

Can weak-state rulers who adopt internal warlord strategies but
who (mostly) conform to minimal external standards of sovereign
state behaviour later pursue a more conventional state-building
project? The difficulty in such a reversal lies in its lack of external
support. In fact external factors mitigate (sic) against it.

The question ought really to be asked the other way round. Instead of external
factors being seen as preventing a reversal in this kind of organisational

986 Reno, William, Warlord Politics ... op. cit.
987 Although within a different perspective, as analysed, this author similarly blames external factors for
the new ‘criminal’ practices: ‘The translation of such a heritage [features of social capital] into a
specific configuration of crime and politics [...] owes a great deal to historical contingencies such as
the current economic crisis, the failure of structural adjustment, and the development of an international
economy of crime. These historical contingencies are the factors which precipitate, in the chemical
meaning of the word, the transformation of la politique du ventre.’ In Bayart, Jean-François et al., The
Criminalization ... op. cit. p.33.
988 From private interview with peasants from the Katepa village in Malange (September 1995).
989 Reno, William, Warlord Politics ... op. cit. p.224.
pattern, it is the dynamics of patrimonialism specific to these countries that, by previously facilitating such processes through extreme levels of social fragmentation, inhibits its reversal and the emergence of a more institutionalised polity.

Reno believes that,

It is not the mere absence of "civil society" that makes the crucial difference. Rather, a partial answer lies in the capacity of organised groups to force rulers to heed their demands [...] I argue however, that societal groups were never missing (except perhaps in scholarly eyes). Rather, warlord politics is in part about those groups' lack of capacity to make rulers listen. 

The opposite could equally be argued. The social groups that present real alternatives to dominant patrimonial working logic are either weak, with no significant representation, or non-existent. The inability of the masses to acquire group awareness according to horizontal socio-economic criteria and to move on to the representation of group interests such as class struggle, lies precisely within the basic patrimonial logic, its fragmented socio-cultural identification framework (shared by the overwhelming majority of social actors) and the specific cumulative self-reinforcing dynamics that we have discussed in this thesis. This seems to be the reason why, regardless of the regime in question, regardless of the political-economic model, regardless of the frequency or infrequency of leadership change, the organisational principles of the system are never questioned and are repeatedly put into practice by the overwhelming majority of people of all social layers.

In these terms, post-modern patrimonial dynamics is concerned with phenomena and processes that might underlie and support practices resembling those described in Warlordism and Criminalization of the State, but are chronologically prior to those described practices associated with the end of the Cold War, the end of Apartheid, or the introduction of market economy and multiparty politics.

990 Ibid. p.218.
The analysis of the construction and development of the Angolan socio-political organisation shows that the working logic of patrimonialism can intensify and perpetuate itself through adverse conditions, such as economic scarcity, social fragmentation and war, under different economic and political systems (socialist or capitalist), and through factors such as the new 'international economy of crime'. However, this does not allow one in any way to conclude that this cumulative and self-reinforcing movement is either fatal or irreversible. In Angola, it is possible to perceive small indications that a different logic might emerge in due course, if only it were sufficiently stimulated and supported to do so. This could happen through public discussion, the formation of critical public consciousness, as evidenced by the short-lived case of the parliamentary debates broadcast live on television, under the auspices of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation, before the return to war and the departure of Savimbi's UNITA from parliament (by the end of 1998). Those debates (which I attended on several occasions), including the interpellation of the ministers and discussions of the problems in public administration, began to raise questions of profound relevance to the root causes of patrimonialism such as micro-identity preferentialism, sectarianism, vertical alignments, lack of public consciousness, rentière attitudes and predatory practices – though the terms themselves were not uttered.

However, behind these small and so far insignificant signs of a possible alternative, deeper research into the argumentation of all the party leaders represented in parliament (interviewed during the field research for this work) revealed the force of the perennial patrimonial rationality, as most simply and elucidatingly described in the words of the president of the PRD (Partido Renovador Democrático/Party of Democratic Renewal), which bring this thesis to an end.

991 It was replaced by UNITA-Renovated, but it had no credibility whatsoever because it was created by the MPLA with UNITA deputies it had 'co-opted'.
When my critics accused me of being close to the MPLA, of having millions, and so on, I paid no attention, because it was important to do so [have millions]. Here in Africa, when a politician is poor, he is worthless; if he is poor he cannot be powerful, he is worthless. Savimbi was given money by South Africans, he was in their hands, but despite that he is leader of the Ovimbundu, he is a leader, he is a man who possesses power. The day I have half of the money Savimbi has, I shall be a leader here amongst the KiMbundu [Mbundu], I could be President of the Republic here. If my supporters found out that I was poor, that I lived in a small apartment, that I drove a car that was falling to bits, badly dressed and with no display of power or wealth, no one would follow me anymore. That's why the whole campaign of my critics based on saying that I had loads of money, that I had received millions of dollars, that the MPLA had bought me, instead of making me go under as my opponents would have liked, it made even more people come over to my side, because the day they find out I haven't got that money, they will leave me. They will leave because nowadays, within political parties (and everyone knows what the life style of parties are), the militants do not pay membership fees, they don't make any contribution at all. [...] party members think that it is the Party that has to serve the militant and not the militant who has to serve the Party. Therefore, and I don't know how, but we must help all, when someone of their family is dying, when there's trouble at home, when there are health problems, unemployment, etc. Therefore the Party is a purse that has to serve the interests of Party members [...]. So you see what the culture is like here? 

992 From private interview with Luis dos Passos, President of the PRD (13 May 1998).
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INTERVIEWS:
Strategy, Structure, Form and List of Interviewees

As interviews followed a peculiar and specific path, it is worth explaining in some detail how they were carried out in terms of strategy, structure and form.

- Interviews 'Strategy

Differently from what might be considered common practice, I never treated my interviewees as objects of study from which I wanted to extract as much information as possible in the usual form of an enquirer submitting the interviewee to an enquiry. Taking into account previous field research experience in Angola, especially within the rural areas of Malange, where in 1995, I was first introduced to the 'art' of 'interviewing in Angola' by an Angolan rural technician, my approach to the interviewees was different, being straightforward in discussing the purpose and nature of the work, thus aiming above all to achieve the help and collaboration of the interviewee.

Usually, interviews started with an introductory explanation of the whole work, including the goal of that interview (help me to understand the Angolan political system); the structure and guiding arguments of the thesis; including a discussion of current Angolan politics, clearly showing to the interviewee that I was 'aware' of the 'real' (underground) politics, including the most recent 'Mujimbo' (KiMbundu word for rumours and gossip). By referring to, but appearing to give little credence, to that type of information, I would let him/her know that a lot of that information was given by previous interviewees (usually without quoting their names), thus making him/her more comfortable to approach themes and deal with information already provided and disclosed by others.

This approach, particularly important given the political context in which I was working, marked as it was by suspicion and fear, enable me, firstly, to give a sense of intellectual respect from the interviewer (which is extremely

994 A more 'classic' approach to interviews was followed by the author in 1994 during a research on business in Luanda and the results were what I was later able to realise a partial failure. However, it gave me the opportunity to learn with the mistake and look for help within Angola in the best way to structure and conduct interviews, which I could find in the following year in Malange (1995) working with a rural technician of the Ministry of Agriculture, with a long interviewing experience in rural milieux and a long path within the central and provincial structures of the MPLA. His teaching and guidance was invaluable, not only during the research in 1995 but also in 1998; someone who did not want to have his name revealed.
important to get the trust, friendship, interest and participation of the interviewee), secondly, to indicate that there was no point going through the ‘politically correct’ or ‘standard’ discourse — thus saving me long and useless conversations.

After the introduction the interviewee was invited to set the rules for the use of the interview and was assured that the contents of the interview would be used accordingly, bearing in mind the existing problems in Angola and the necessity to safeguard the security of the interviewee. This is the main reason why direct quotations could not be used as much as desired.

The results of this type approach were extremely satisfactory (at least in Angola and with Angolans; other difficulties emerged when interviewing foreigners in Angola). Particularly noteworthy is the fact that when the interviewees are invited to produce their interpretation and discuss openly and critically the functioning of the political system, they reveal a lot of new information in order to support their views and arguments, often disclosing in the process what might be considered extremely ‘compromising information’.

A clear proof of the commitment and interest showed by most of the interviewees, is the time they were willing to spend on the interview — two/three hours in average and on countless occasions the interviews took four hours; sometimes a second interview was proposed by interviewee. The sensation I got from the majority of my interviewees, was that this was a unique occasion for them to discuss seriously and issues of real interest, beyond day-to-day politics. A few of them (historical figures from the period of Angolan nationalism — MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA), gave me the impression of wanting to leave their historical and living testimony for the future.

The reaction of a younger generation (young people working with the President or with high responsibilities in the government) was even more surprising, willing as they were to provide a technically precise way to approach each and every theme (including compromising revelations). Their receptivity and open minded reaction is most certainly related to the fact that several of them are involved in academic activities and are sensitive to the problems and needs of an academic research and usually want to distance themselves from the image of internal repression, security obsession and obscurantism with which the political regime was usually characterised (especially during the Socialist-Marxist phase). Usually neglected by researchers, this younger generation is indispensable to the understanding of the Angolan political system, especially because of their increasing importance within it. Their contribution to this work was invaluable at several levels.

Naturally, all the information that was gathered through interviews, which constituted original material, was crosschecked during other interviews with

995 Here we are obviously talking of Angolans, excluding foreigners, whose interviews rarely exceeded 20/30 minutes and the information given was either ‘official’ (publicly known) or of a ‘politically correct’ type, thus not of much use. Their contribution was mainly on data related to social politics.

996 The same impression was reported by Christine Messiant in 1997, a few months before my research; see Messiant, Christine, ‘Entre nós ... op. cit. p.826, footnote 36.
other interviewees and through documentary research. As the interviews went on, the opinions and statements of other interviewees would be introduced in the interview (usually without referring to the name of its author) in order to confront the interviewee's ideas and making him reveal more information and develop his thinking, but always in a constructive perspective.

- The structure of the interviews

In accordance with the type of interviews' strategy discussed, the interviews' structure had a personalised character adapted to the specific characteristics of the interviewee and a semi-structured plan, but allowing total flexibility for both interviewer and interviewee.

The approach to each interview took into account the 'tips' received by key informants and journalists who have the best knowledge of the 'Mujimbo' world of Angolan politics, a world that everyone doing research on political matters must be aware of (the support of a journalist colleague working with me on a daily basis was invaluable).

The format of the interviews (non-written, to avoid any kind of formality which would be counter-productive) usually followed the thesis' chronology: the anti-colonial struggle (the origins of the nationalist movements; disputes between movements; internal organisation and working procedures; the involvement of the 'masses'; so-called 'tribalist problems'; critical happenings in the movement's life; political context around independence); the post-independence period divided between the presidency of Agostinho Neto and Eduardo dos Santos (the first years of independence; the 27th of May attempted coup; the construction of the political system; internal and external influences; the process of concentration of power and political and administrative centralisation; 'presidentialism'; party 'elitism'; the armed forces; 'the masses' involvement'; the social organisation and stratification; favouritism based on micro-identity criteria; the political role of the so-called 'kids from Futungo'998; the transition to a market economy and multiparty system; whenever it was felt important, more recent issues were included such as the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation).

Finally, a word must be said about the initial requests for interviews, that could take several forms that are not irrelevant in the Angolan context, such as: direct personal contacts in public meetings usually with previous introduction by a third person; formal letter (with or without an introductory card from a third person) -- I would give the most scant information on the works' structure (simply stating that it was an academic thesis for the University of London on

997 As previously mentioned, key informants were persons with whom I had (and still have) close relationships of friendship for some years now (some of them occupying offices in the Angolan State structure) with privileged access to non-public information on the functioning of the Angolan political system.
998 As referred in this thesis, this is a pejorative name used by an older generation to designate the younger and technical entourage of the President working with him in Futungo de Belas (where the 'presidential palace' is located).
the development of the Angolan political and administrative system and requesting the invaluable contribution of the person in question to the work) -- phone calls in the name of a third contact who would give the phone number and allow me to use his/her name to approach the potential interviewee. In several other interviews (especially within the top of the governmental party) there was a need to be personally introduced by a well-placed connection that would request the interview on my behalf and acted as a guarantee of my 'trustability'. Research within the MPLA and also elsewhere was made a lot easier through these indirect channels.

- Recording the interview

An important decision had to be made as to the use of a tape recorder. The advantages are obvious — the value of an oral document that is kept exactly in the original form, containing all the characteristics of the interviewee's speech, all the emphasis, changes of oral tonality, etc. But the drawbacks are the possible inhibition or mental conditioning of the interviewee, especially in cases (such as in Angola) where the issues under debate are politically sensitive, where freedom of expression although explicitly protected by the national Constitution is not effectively respected in a country at war and with frightening national security services.

Taking into account all the factors, I opted for the use of a tape recorder whenever possible:

Firstly, given the extension of the issues under debate and knowing the need to win the trust of the interviewee by being willing to follow the train of their initial conversations, a tape recorder would be indispensable, otherwise after half an hour of interview the notes would be immense, imprecise, diverting my attention from the conduct of the interview and preventing me from keeping a check on its development.

Secondly, several techniques were used in order to avoid the usual inconvenience of a tape recorder. After my introduction and when the interviewee was asked to set the rules for the use of the material, he was given reassurance about wise and cautious usage of the taped information and was given the possibility to request the disconnection of the tape recorder at anytime. The results were extremely satisfactory. Usually (except for foreigners) the interviewee accepted the use of a tape recorder. On some occasions (older generation of participants in the Angolan nationalist struggle) the use of a tape recorder was initially suggested by the interviewee (some of them wanted 'to save their testimony for the future'). On other occasions the interviewees felt the need to produce some opinion and give some compromising information (very recent) without recording, but generally, after the first half an hour of conversation the tape recorder was forgotten and

999 The tape recorder was usually placed to the side, not between the interviewee and the interviewer. This is another useful technique to avoid a possible constraint produced by the tape recorder on the interviewee.
each and every one of my interviewees proceeded to speak freely and reveal much useful information.

Thirdly, these interviews benefited from a unique period of political openness and political public debate and freedom of expression, during the first six months of 1998 (before the return to war):

a), due to the effective multiparty functioning of the National Assembly (including UNITA) with publicly attended sessions, broad and free coverage from the private and State owned media (direct television broadcast of every parliamentary discussion);

b), due to a vigorous political multiparty dynamic and negotiation preparing a wide parliamentary discussion for the revision of the Constitution which for the first time in Angolan history would require the participation of other political forces besides the MPLA (a Constitutional revision demanded 2/3 of the parliamentary votes and the MPLA would have to make political concessions to UNITA, FNLA and minor parties which held 1/3 of the votes and could block any revision that might exclude them);

c), due to the functioning of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, which included members of all the political parties with parliamentary seats and whose work started to be questioned, discussed and supervised by the parliament, making use of several of its Constitutional provided mechanisms, namely the possibility publicly to question every minister on his ministry procedures and policies.

In sum, it was a unique political period in Angolan history, where multiparty politics and a glimpse of democracy (with wide public and free discussion) started to become real. Nevertheless, soon after this research was over an official return to war in September/October 1998 and the ensuing withdrawal of UNITA parliamentary group (replaced by the 'governmental UNITA-Renovada') meant and end to the opening and a return to the old ways.

Thus, benefiting from this favourable environment, the balance of using a tape recorder was extremely positive, although a few (very limited) interviews could not be taped given the high confidentiality of the matters involved.

- List of Public and Private Interviews in Chronological Order

Public Interviews:

Public Interview with Daniel Júlio Chipenda; broadcast on the Angolan National Radio, during the programme ‘foi há vinte anos’ (17th June 1995); former leader of the Revolta do Leste faction, former candidate to the 1992 presidential election, died in the late nineties from disease.

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1000 This new atmosphere in that period is also recognized in Messiant, Christine, ‘Entre nós ... op. cit. pp.841-843

1001 Also in favour of taped interviews is Messiant, Christine, ‘Entre nós ... op. cit. p.836, footnote 53.
Public Interview with Almeida Santos, president of the Portuguese National Assembly and former representative of the Portuguese government during the Alvor agreement; broadcast on the Portuguese Tsf radio news, during the programme Angola, 25 years on (10\textsuperscript{th} November 2000).

Public Interview with Jean Marc Perrin, the MSF (Médicins Sans Frontières) chief executive in Angola; broadcast on channel 2 of the Rádio Televisão Portuguesa (Portuguese Television Public Channel) news programme 'Jornal de África' (11 November 2000).

Radio Programme 'Jornal das Nove', broadcast on Rádio Difusão Portuguesa-África (27 November 2001). This was not an interview but a news programme from where data was taken and used in this thesis.

Private Taped Interviews:

Private interview with Mr. Vieira, vice-governor of Malange for economic affairs; black\textsuperscript{1002}, middle-aged\textsuperscript{1003} male (Malange: 7th September 1995).

Private interviews with groups of villagers of Malange; black peasant males, middle-aged and elders, many of them members of the MPLA's provincial structures (Malange: September 1995).

Private interview with Virgilio Ribeiro da Silva, executive director of IDA-Malange (Instituto de Desenvolvimento Agricola de Malange/Institute for Agricultural Development of Malange); middle-aged, \textit{mestiço}, male (Malange: 8th September 1995).

\textsuperscript{1002} Racial background will be presented here almost in the same terms as it is legally presented in Angola, i.e. in three categories: Black, White; \textit{Mestiço}. In Angola, as strange and distasteful as it might seem, every identity card of every citizen has on the back an item for race in the same way as it has for height, birthplace and so on. Everybody is officially classified as Black, White or Mixed (\textit{Mistura}; the designation found to include all \textit{mestigos}).

\textsuperscript{1003} Information on the age of the interviewees will be presented in three broad and subjective categories (according to my subjective evaluation of each interviewee and/or the information previously given by key informants and/or previous research): young (below 40 years old); middle-aged (ranging between 40 and 60 years old); elder (above 60 years old); when the person is thought to be in a frontier between one of these age groups we will characterise him/her as young/middle-aged or middle-aged/elder. I never asked my interviewees' age for two sets of reasons: first it would give the impression of a formal enquiry, which I tried to avoid for reasons explained; secondly and most importantly, because age (as much as regional/ethnic background) is a very sensitive subject in Angola, especially because of its use as weapon in political disputes between persons or groups as previously mentioned in this thesis (such as the case involving 'elders' of the party and the so-called 'kids from Futungo'). A direct question on age (as much as ethnic background) could generate uncomfortable situations for the interviewee and the interviewer and ruin the interview (be it in the case of an elder, middle-aged or young).
Private interviews with Christine Messiant, academic researcher and author of several published works on Angola; taped before the author left for research in Angola (January 1998)

Private Interview with Allan Cain, Director of the international NGO, Development Workshop; Canadian, middle-aged, white male (Luanda: 12th February 1998).

Private Interview with Rosalino Ricardo Neto, executive secretary of the Angolan NGO AAD (Ação Angolana para o Desenvolvimento/Angolan Action for Development); former cadre of the ministry of Agriculture and member of the MPLA, middle-aged, mestiço male (Luanda: 12th February 1998).

Private interview with Mariana Henriques de Sousa, Angolan director of the international NGO, ACORD (Agency for Cooperation & Research in Development), former public servant, middle-aged, black female (Luanda 12th February 1998).


Private interview with Aidan Joseph Mc Quade, executive director of the International NGO, Oxfam-UK; British, middle-aged, white male (Luanda: 16th February 1998).

Private interview with Carlos Pinto, Angolan executive director of the Portuguese NGO, Oikos-Cooperação e Desenvolvimento (Co-operation and Development), and former cadre of the Ministry of Agriculture; middle-aged, mestiço male (Luanda: 16th February 1998).

Private interview with Palmira Tchipilika, executive director of the national UTCA (Unidade Técnica de Coordenação da Ajuda/Technical Unity for the Coordination of Aid), wife of the minister of justice Paulo Tchipilica (former cadre of UNITA-União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola/National Union for the Total Independence of Angola); middle-aged, black female (Luanda: 16th February 1998).

Private interview with Catherine Gibbons, executive director of the international NGO, PACT (Private Agencies Collaborating Together Inc.); middle-aged, American white female (Luanda: 17th February 1998).
Private interview with David Kramer, executive director of the IRI (International Republican Institute); young, American white male (Luanda: 17th February 1998).

Private interview with Benjamim Castello, Angolan executive director of the AIA (Acção da Igreja em Angola/Church Action in Angola), former cadre of the Ministry of Agriculture; middle-aged/elder, black male (Luanda: 20th February 1998).

Private interview with Fernando Pacheco, executive director of the Angolan NGO, ADRA (Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente -- Action for Rural and Environment Development), former cadre of the Ministry of Agriculture; middle-aged, mestigo, male (Luanda: 23rd February and 23rd April 1998).

Private interview with Jean-Michel Mabeko-Tali, researcher and professor of Social Sciences at A Neto University, close to Lúcio Lara’s family since the days of the anti-colonial struggle when the MPLA established its office in Brazzaville in 1963; has lived with Lara’s family in Luanda since independence except for the period of his PhD in France; middle-aged, black male (born in Congo-Brazzaville) (Luanda: 25th February and 27th April 1998);

Private interview with Fernanda Vieira, executive director of IED (Instituto de Estudos para o Desenvolvimento/Institute of Development Studies), former civil servant of several State institutions; middle-aged, white Angolan female (Luanda: 2nd March 1998).

Private interview with Fátima Viegas, executive director of the Instituto Nacional para os Assuntos Religiosos (National Institute for Religious Affairs); middle-aged, black female (Luanda: 2nd March and 16th March 1998).

Private interview with reverend André Cangovi Eurico, chief representative of the Congregational Evangelical Church; middle-aged/elder, black male (Luanda: 3rd March 1998).

Private interview with Bishop Emilio de Carvalho, of the United Methodist Church, West Conference; elder, black male (Luanda: 4th March and 8th April 1998).

Private interview with João da Silva, general secretary of the Angolan Baptist Convention; elder, black male (Luanda: 5th March 1998).

Private interview with Manuela Gonzalez, coordinator of UN UCAH (Unidade de Coordenação das Ajudas Humanitárias -- Unit for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance, of the United Nations), former Co-ordinator of
development projects of a Portuguese NGO in Malange (*Oikos—Cooperação e Desenvolvimento*), with a great experience working with Angolan rural communities; middle-aged, Portuguese white female (Luanda: 6th March 1998).

*Private interview with António Cazevo*, director of the Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration; middle-aged, black male (Luanda: 10th March 1998).

*Private interview with Mário Sétoco*, chief executive of the national unit for displaced populations; young, black male (UNITA militant, son of an influential Church minister of the Congregational Evangelical Church) (Luanda: 10th March 1998).

*Private interview with Paulo de Carvalho*, journalist and sociologist with a company of socio-economic survey; young, *mestiço* male, brother of a member of the MPLA’s Politburo, Mário António Carvalho (Luanda: 11 March 1998).

*Private interview with Diógenes Boavida*, MP for the MPLA and former minister of justice after independence; elder, black male (Luanda: 13th March 1998).

*Private interview with Pedro Kiala*, executive director of the project Population and Development of the ministry of planning; young, black male (Luanda: 13th March 1998).

*Private interview with Francisco Tunga Alberto*, general secretary of FONGA (*Forum de Organizações Não Governamentais Angolanas* -- Forum of Angolan NGOs); middle-aged, black male (Luanda: 16th March 1998).


*Private interview with Lucas N’Gonda*, vice-director of the A Neto University and member of the FNLA Political Bureau (*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola*—National Liberation Front of Angola); middle-aged, black male (Luanda: 19th March and 1st April 1998).

*Private interview with Filomeno Vieira Lopes*, president of FpD (*Frente para a Democracia*/*Front for Democracy*), cadre of SONANGOL (*Sociedade
Nacional de Combustíveis—National Fuels Company) and member of an old Luanda family closely linked to the MPLA (as mentioned in this thesis); young, black or dark mestico male (Luanda: 24th March 1998).

Private interview with Luís Fernando, director of the newspaper Jornal de Angola, former cadre of the ministry of Information; young, black male (Luanda: 26th March 1998).

Private interview with Victor Aleixo, director of the newspaper Jornal Comércio e Actualidade, former civil servant; middle-aged, mestico male (Luanda: 26th March 1998).

Private interview with Filipe Amado, professor of economy at the A Neto University; elder, very light skin mestico male (Luanda: 27th March 1998).

Private interview with Carlos Teixeira, attorney, professor of law at the A Neto University, working with the President of the Republic, participant in the writing up of documents for the 1998 party congress; young, black male (Luanda: 30th March 1998).

Private interview with Costa Andrade N'Dunduma, MP for the MPLA, novelist, former editor of Jornal de Angola, biographer of President Neto and directly related with the case of 'the picture and the play' as explained in this thesis; middle-aged/elder, very light skin mestico male (Luanda: 30th March 1998).

Private interview with William Tonnet, director of the newspaper Jornal Folha 8; young, black male, son of an MPLA MP (Luanda: 30th March 1998).

Private interview with Aguiar dos Santos, director of the newspaper Jornal Agora; middle-aged, mestico male, brother of previously mentioned Fernando Pacheco (director of ADRA) (Luanda: 31st March 1998).

Private interview with Alberto Neto, presidente of PDA (Partido Democrático Angolano -- Angolan Democratic Party), third most popular candidate in the last presidential elections; middle-aged/elder black male (Luanda: 1st April 1998).

Private interview with Raúl Araújo, attorney and professor of law at the A Neto University, directly related with the case of 'the picture and the play' as explained in this thesis; middle-aged, mestico, male (Luanda: 2nd April 1998).

Private interview with N'Gola Kabango, general secretary of the FNLA, the party’s number two and long time companion of Holden Roberto; elder, black male (Luanda: 3rd April 1998).
Private interview with Graça Campos, director of the newspaper Jornal o Angolense; young, black male (Luanda: 3rd April 1998).

Private interview with Eduardo Kuangana, president of the PRS (Partido da Renovação Social/Party of Social Renewal), a party especially aggregating people from the Lunda provinces; middle-aged, black male (Luanda: 7th April 1998).

Private interview with Jorge Chilcoti, vice-minister of foreign affairs, president of FDA (Forum Democrático Angolano -- Party of Angolan Democratic Forum) and UNITA dissident; young, black male (Luanda: 9th April 1998).

Private interview with Carlos Feijó, ex-secretary of the Council of Ministers very close to the President Eduardo dos Santos, professor of constitutional law at the A Neto University; young, black male (Luanda: 10th April 1998).

Private interview with Júlio Morais, ex-vice minister of Agriculture; elder, white Angolan male (Luanda: 11th April 1998).

Private interview with Adérito Correia, professor of constitutional law at the A Neto University, attorney and former cadre of the ministry of justice; white Angolan male (Luanda: 13 April 1998).

Private interview with João Vieira Lopes, MP for the AD (Aliança Democrática—Coligação/Party of Democratic Alliance), from a very old Luanda family, closely linked to the MPLA during the time of the anti-colonial struggle; elder, dark mestico male (Luanda: 13 April 1998).

Private interview with João Pedro Francisco, vice-president of the National Assembly, nominated by the FNLA; middle-aged/elder, black male (Luanda: 14th April 1998).

Private interview with M'Fulupinga Lando Victor, MP and president of the PDP-ANA (Partido Democrático para o Progresso da Aliança Nacional -- Democratic Party for Progress of the National Alliance), professor of mathematics at the school of economy at the A Neto University; middle-aged, black male (Luanda: 14th April 1998).

Private interview with Manuel Difuila, secretary general of CGSILA (Central Geral dos Sindicatos Independentes e Livres de Angola/Federation of Free and Independent Angolan Labour Unions), former cadre of UNTA (União Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Angola -- National Union of Angolan Workers), accused by other UNTA's members of assuming positions proximate of UNITA during the election period; black middle-aged/elder male (Luanda: 15th April 1998).
Private interview with Rui Ferreira, attorney, professor of law at the A Neto University and presidential advisor for juridical matters, participant in the writing up of documents for the 1998 party congress; young, mestiço male (Luanda: 15th April 1998).

Private interview with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, historical member of the MPLA, ex-leader of the ‘Revolta Activa’ faction and ex-president of PRD (Partido Renovador Democrático/Democratic Party for Renewal); elder, mestiço male (Luanda: 16th and 20th April 1998).

Private interview with João de Melo, MP for the MPLA, novelist and son of an ‘hero’ of the MPLA anti-colonial struggle, Aníbal de Melo, killed before independence; young/middle-aged mestiço male (Luanda: 17th April 1998).

Private interview with José Cerqueira, counsellor of the Angolan National Bank and ex-member of the Programa de Saneamento Económico e Financeiro -- Economic and Financial Clean-up Programme (SEF); young/middle-aged mestiço male (Luanda: 20th April 1998).

Private interview with Nzunzi Sumbi, president of the PSD (Partido Social Democrata -- Social Democratic Party); young, black male (Luanda: 22nd April 1998).

Private interview with Norberto de Castro, director of Communication of the national oil company (SONANGOL) and UNITA dissident; middle-aged/elder, mestiço male (Luanda: 23rd April 1998).

Private interview with Rui Cruz, professor of law at the A Neto University, attorney and presidential advisor for juridical matters, participant in the writing up of documents for the 1998 party congress; young, mestiço male (Luanda: 27th April 1998).

Private interview with Anália Vitória Pereira, MP and president of the PLD (Partido Liberal Democrata/Liberal Democratic Party), formerly exiled in Portugal before the transition to multipartyism in 1991; middle-aged, mestiça female (Luanda: 27th April 1998).


Private interview with Lúcio Lara, MP for the MPLA, recently re-elected member of the CC and also an historical figure in the MPLA; elder, very light skin mestiço male (Luanda: 1st May 1998).
Private interview with Cornélia Caley, director and manager of human resources of the national oil company (SONANGOL), ex-secretary of State of the transitional government in 1975 appointed by UNITA, former colleague of mine at the University in Portugal; elder, black male (Luanda: 2nd May 1998).

Private interview with António Farrusco, General of the Armed Forces and vice-governor of Luanda for military affairs, defected from the Portuguese army to join the MPLA during the anti-colonial struggle and usually considered one of the main military figures in the war against the South Africans after independence; elder, white Angolan male (Luanda: 2nd May 1998).

Private interview with Alexandre Sebastião, MP and president of PAJOCA (Partido da Juventude Operários e Camponeses de Angola -- Party of Youth, Workers and Peasants), former member of the MPLA youth; young, black male (Luanda: 4th May 1998).

Private interview with São Vicente, economist and researcher with several works published, son in law of late president Agostinho Neto; middle-aged, mestiço (Luanda: 5th May 1998).

Private interview with Antonieta Coelho, professor of law at the A Neto University; middle-aged white Angolan female (Luanda: 5th May 1998).

Private interview with Mário António Carvalho, director of the MPLA’s department for information and communication, member of the Politburo, former Commander of the Armed Forces in the South of Angola; elder, mestiço male (Luanda: 6th May and 30th June 1998).

Private interview with Vicente Pinto de Andrade, professor of political science at the A Neto University and nephew of the late Mário Pinto de Andrade – one of the founding figures of the MPLA; young/middle-aged, mestiço male (Luanda: 11th May 1998).

Private interview with Luís dos Passos, president of PRD (Partido Renovador Democrático -- Party of Democratic Renewal) and one of the only two surviving leaders of the 27th May attempted coup; middle-aged, black male (Luanda: 13th May 1998).

Private interview with João Martins, director of the MPLA studies department, participant in the writing up of documents for the 1998 party congress; young, mestiço male (Luanda: 13th May and 23rd June 1998).

Private interview with André Júnior, executive director of UNTA’s statistical department; middle-aged, black male (Luanda: 19th May 1998).
Private interview with António Henriques, director of the national Institute for Foreign Investment and ex-minister of finances responsible for the Economic and Financial Clean-up Programme (SEF); middle-aged/elder black male (Luanda: 22nd May 1998).

Private interview with Burity da Silva, minister of education; middle-aged, mestiço male (Luanda: 26th May 1998).

Private interview with Gaspar Domingos da Silva, MP and president of PNDA (Partido Nacional Democrático de Angola -- Angolan National Democratic Party); young, black male (Luanda: 26th May 1998).

Private interview with Commander Bagé, one of the two only surviving leaders of the 27th May attempted coup and an historical guerrilla from the MPLA's 1st military region (Dembos forest) during the anti-colonial struggle; elder, black male (Luanda; 26th May 1998).

Private interview with Leopoldo Baio, director of the newspaper Jornal Actual Fax, former colleague of the assassinated journalist Ricardo de Melo; young, black male (Luanda: 27th May 1998).

Private interview with Ramalho Ortigão, Portuguese ambassador in Angola and member of the political and military joint commission (comprising Portugal, the USA and Russia); middle-aged Portuguese white male (Luanda: 28th May 1998).

Private interview with Abel Chivukuvuku, MP for UNITA and leader of UNITA's parliamentary group; middle-aged, black male (Luanda: 28th May 1998).

Private interview with Alves da Rocha, economist at the Ministry of Planning, researcher and author with several published books on Angola's economy, participant in the writing up of documents for the 1998 party congress; middle-aged white Angolan male (Luanda: 29th May 1998).

Private interview with Eleutério Freire, economist at the Ministry of Planning; middle-aged mestiço male (Luanda: 30th May 1998).

Private interview with Elias Santos, executive member of the International Republican Institute in charge of organising seminars for the smaller Angolan political parties, former civil servant; young black male (Luanda: 4th June 1998).
Private interview with Jaka Jamba, MP and also an historical figure in UNITA, member of the transitional government in 1975; elder, black male (Luanda: 7th June 1998).

Private interview with Pitra Neto, Minister of public administration and social security, very close to the President of the Republic; young/middle-aged, black male (Luanda: 8th June 1998).

Private interview with Lopes Faria, national director of the local administration at the ministry of internal administration; middle-aged black male (Luanda: 10th June 1998).

Private interview with Mena Abrantes, presidential advisor for the media; young/middle-aged white Angolan male (Luanda: 11th and 16th June 1998).

Private interview with Ruy Duarte de Carvalho, researcher, professor of Anthropology at the A Neto University and writer with several books and articles published; middle-aged, white Angolan male (Luanda: 12th and 15th June 1998).

Private interview with Gabriela Antunes, writer and director at the ministry of culture; middle-aged mestica female (Luanda: 18th June 1998).

Private interview with Paulo Jorge, MPLA secretary for international relations, ex-provincial commissioner and also an historical figure in the MPLA, ex-minister of foreign affairs; elder, very light skin mestico male (Luanda: 26th June 1998).

Private interview with Pepetela, historical figure in the MPLA, former guerrilla of the MPLA during the anti-colonial struggle, former secretary of State of Education and novelist; elder, white male (Luanda: 7th July 1998).

Private interview with Reginaldo Silva, journalisit correspondant of the BBC in Angola; young, mestico male (Luanda: 9th July 1998).

Private interview with António Cardoso, former political prisoner during the anti-colonial struggle, novelist and director of the MPLA Central Committee centre for documentation and historical research; elder, white Angolan male (Luanda: 10th July 1998).

Private interview with Mendes de Carvalho, historical member of the MPLA, MP, member of the Central Committee and ex-minister of Health, writer; elder, black male from Catete, the place of origin of Agostinho Neto as mentioned in this thesis (Luanda: 17th July 1998).