Fighting 'Jacob's warres' : English and Welsh mercenaries in the European wars of religion : France and the Netherlands

Trim, David

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David J. B. Trim

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of War Studies
King’s College
University of London

October 2002
This thesis argues that the involvement of English and Welsh mercenaries in the French wars of religion and the Dutch revolt from 1562 to 1610 resulted from a widespread belief among the elite of England and Wales that those conflicts were essentially one -- and one that Protestants must fight together. It argues that the mercenaries were recruited from the affinities of the nobility and gentry, and funded by their patrons with the assistance of ‘godly’ merchants, foreign Calvinist refugees and occasionally the hierarchy of the Church of England. Throughout the period the mercenaries were the agents of the Elizabethan and Jacobean Protestant elite, furthering a consistent policy of aid to Continental co-religionists.

The participation of English and Welsh mercenaries in the wars in France and the Netherlands during the period 1562-1610 is well known, but little more has been known than the fact of their employment by the Huguenots and the Dutch States. As a result, they have been situated in an historiographical orthodoxy that characterises soldiers serving in foreign pay generically as unscrupulous and unreliable, drawn from the unemployed, malcontents and misfits.

This study identifies and quantifies the mercenaries’ numerical and chronological parameters, and elucidates their actual origins and affiliations. The changing meanings of the term ‘mercenary’ are examined and placed in contemporary and historiographical context. The ‘employment history’ of the Anglo-Welsh mercenaries is narrated, demonstrating the continuity of their engagement and their ongoing interaction, at the highest level, with the English court and foreign regimes. Next, the complex and arcane means by which these private-enterprise companies were financed are teased out. Then the methods of recruitment are analysed, revealing that conscription and public solicitation were less important than patronage ties, with recruiting from ‘military dependences’ (a contemporary term for a militarised affinity) very common. Finally, there is a brief survey of the motivation of the captains, which suggests that they were as confessionally committed as the patrons who deployed them. Conclusions are drawn and their implications are indicated.
This thesis makes several original contributions to scholarship. It illuminates the complex procedures by which early-modern states recruited and financed armies and reveals the significance of the mercenaries in the English body politic. It demonstrates the enduring military importance of the affinity, indicating more continuity in English aristocratic society between the late sixteenth and the early sixteenth or fifteenth centuries than is depicted in recent historiography. Finally, it shows that mercenary captains perceived the wars in which they fought as wars of Jacob (that is, as holy wars), and that they and their men served the policy ends of a committed Protestant elite, as well as (often) of the English government. All this suggests that current thinking about Elizabethan and Jacobean foreign policy needs to be adjusted; it also suggests that support for Protestantism in early-modern England and Wales was more widespread and committed than portrayed in much current scholarship.
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Quotations from the Talbot and Devereux Papers are included by permission of the Marquess of Bath, Longleat House, Warminster, Wiltshire; the Cecil Papers are cited by permission of the Marquess of Salisbury: I am
grateful to the noble lords for their permission to use their MSS. I am also obligated to the archives and libraries cited in the bibliography: in particular to the notably friendly and helpful staff of the reading rooms at the Algemeen Rijksarchief in Den Haag; the Bibliothèque Mazarine, Bibliothèque Nationale and Bibliothèque de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français, all in Paris; and the Bodleian Library, Oxford. And my research was facilitated by the efficiency of Per Lisle and Lynda Baildam at Newbold College Library.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAE  Paris: Archives des Affaires Étrangères
MDA  Mémoires et Documents, Angleterre
MDF  Mémoires et Documents, France
Add. MS(S) Additional Manuscript(s)
AE/PH Geneva: Archives d’État, Pièces Historiques
AHR  American Historical Review
APC  Acts of the Privy Council 1542-1628, ed. John Roche
ARA  Den Haag: Algemeen Rijksarchief, Eerste Afdeling
  CAAan. Collectie Aanwinsten
  CvDorp Familiewarchieven, Collectie van Dorp
  CO    Familiewarchieven, Collectie Ortell
  FAB   Familiewarchief Bogaers
  GRK   Generaliteits Rekenkamer
  RAGP  Regeringsarchieven [...] geünieerde [...] provinciën
  RvS   Archief van de Raad van State
  SG    Archief van de Staten-Generaal
ARG  Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte
ARH  Den Haag: Algemeen Rijksarchief, Derde Afdeling, Rijksarchief in Zuid-Holland
  AJO   Archief van Johan van Oldenbarnevelt
  RKA   Archief der Rekenkamer ter Auditie
  SvH   Archief van de Staten van Holland
ASCL, MSS Oxford: All Souls College, Codrington Library, Manuscripts
BL    London: British Library, Department of Manuscripts
  Cott. MSS Cotton Manuscripts
  Harl. MSS Harley Manuscripts
Blandy
William Blandy, The Castle, or Picture of Pollicy shewing forth the martiall feates lately done by our English nation, under the conduct of Sir John Norris [...] in Friesland [...] (London: 1581)

BMGN
Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis van Nederland

BN
Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale de France

CCC
Collection Cinq Cents de Colbert

MSS Fr.
Manuscripts français, Fonds français

MSS Nafr.
MSS français, Nouvelles acquisitions françaises

Bodl., MSS
Oxford: Bodleian Library, Manuscripts

Rawl. MSS
Rawlinson Manuscripts

BSHPF, MSS
Paris: Bibliothèque de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français, Manuscrits

BSG, MSS
Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève, Manuscrits

i London, 1625 edn (trans. Abraham Darcie), bk 1
ii Ibid, bk 2 (pagination contiguous with bk 1)
iii Ibid, bk 3 (bound with bks 1-2, but new pagination)
iv 2nd pt; London, 1629 edn (trans. Thomas Browne)

Cecil MS(S)
Hatfield House, Hertfordshire: Marquess of Salisbury's Manuscripts, Cecil Papers, Manuscripts


Churchyard's Choice Thomas Churchyard, A generall rehearsall of warres, called Churchyard's choise (London: 1579)

Churchyard, Description
Thomas Churchyard, A lamentable, and pitifull descript-ion, of the wofull warres in Flaunders (London: 1578).

Corr.
Correspondance, Correspondence, or Correspondentie.

CPR
Calendar of the Patent Rolls, Preserved in the Public


CS Council of State/Raad van State/Conseil d’état

CUL, MSS Cambridge University Library, Manuscripts.


EHR English Historical Review

Ferguson, Papers Papers Illustrating the History of the Scots Brigade in the Service of the United Netherlands 1572-1782, ed. James

FHS French Historical Studies

FSL Folger Shakespeare Library, Washington, D.C.

GAL Leiden: Gemeentearchief van Leiden


Harl. Soc. Publications of the Harleian Society


HJ Historical Journal

HMC Reports of the Historical Manuscripts Commission:


### HMCS

### Holles Letters

### Holt, Anjou

### Hon. Soc. Cymmr.
The Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion

### HR
[Bulletin of the Institute of] Historical Research

### HSP
Proceedings of the Huguenot Society [of Great Britain & Ireland] [originally ... of London]

### HT
History Today

### Ir.
Irish ... [in periodical titles]

### JBS
Journal of British Studies

### JEMH
Journal of Early Modern History

### Jnl
Journal [in otherwise unabbreviated periodical title]

### JSAHR
Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research.

### KB, HS
Den Haag: Koninklijke Bibliotheek, Handschriften

### KL

### KNAW, VLN
Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Verhandelingen, Afdeling Letterkunde, nieuwe reeks

### L&A

### Longleat
Longleat House, Warminster, Wiltshire: The Marquess of Bath’s Manuscripts

### DP
Devereux Papers
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<td><strong>Leycester Corr.</strong></td>
<td>Correspondence of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leycester during his Government of the Low Countries, in the years 1585 and 1586, ed. John Bruce, Camden Society [1st ser.], no. 27 (London: 1844)</td>
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PC  Privy Council


pr.  Printed or calendared in

PRO  London: Public Record Office

NB: Manuscripts are cited using PRO call numbers

Read, Burghley  Conyers Read, Lord Burghley and Queen Elizabeth (London: Jonathan Cape, 1960)

Read, Walsingham  Conyers Read, Mr Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth, 3 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925)

Redlich, Booty  Fritz Redlich, De Praeda Militari: Looting and Booty 1500-1815, Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, beiheft 39 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1956)

Redlich, Enterpriser  The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force: A Study in European Economic and Social History Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, beiheft 47 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1964)

res.  Resolution(s)

RO  Record Office


SCJ  Sixteenth Century Journal

ser.  Series

SG  States-General/Staten-Generaal/États Généraux

SH  States of Holland and West Friesland/Staten van Holland
and West Vriesland

Soc. Society [in titles of learned societies]
SRO Stafford: Staffordshire Record Office/William Salt Library.
SL F.J.G. ten Raa and F. de Bas, Het Staatsche Leger 1568-1795, vols. 1-3 (Breda: Koninklijke Militaire Academie, 1911-15)
Strada, i Famianus Strada, Van de Nederlandtsche Oorloghe, trans. from the Latin De Bello Belgico (Rome: 1632) by Guilliam van Aelst (Antwerp: 1645 [1st edn])
ii Famianus Strada, Het Tweede Deel der Nederlandtsche Oorlogen ... Beginnende met het Stadthouderschap van Alexander Farnees de Ill. Hertogh van Parma ... Van het 1578 tot het 1590 jaer, trans. from the second ten books of De Bello Belgico (Rome: 1632) by N. N. (Dordrecht: Jacobus Savry, 1655)
Sydney Papers Arthur Collins, ed., Letters and Memorials of State, in the Reigns of Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth, King James, King Charles the First, Part of the Reign of King Charles the Second and Oliver’s Usurpation: [...] Faithfully Transcribed From the Originals at Penshurst Place in Kent [...] Written and Collated by Sir Henry Sidney [...] Sir Philip Sydney [...] Sir Robert Sydney [...] etc, 2 vols. (London: T. Osborne, 1746)
TDH A True Discourse Historicall of the Succeeding
Governour's in the Netherlands, and the Civill Warres there begun in the Yeere 1565, With the Memorable Services of our Honourable English Generals, captaines and Souldiers [...], trans. T. C. and Ric. Ro. out of E. van Meteren's Historiae Belgiae (London: Matthew Lownes, 1602)


[NB: These last two works are both cited by abbreviated title, rather than by author's name(s), because the actual authorship is problematic.]

Trans. Transactions of the [...]  
TRHS Transactions of the Royal Historical Society  

UBL, MSS Leiden: Universiteitsbibliotheek Leiden, Manuscripts  


Williams, Discourse Roger Williams, A Briefe discourse of Warre (London: 1590)
Williams, Actions ________, The Actions of The Lowe Countries, ed. John Haywarde (London: Matthew Lownes, 1618)
[Both are in The Works of Sir Roger Williams, ed. John X. Evans (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972; citations to these works are in each case to this edition.)]

Wilson, Revolt Charles Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands (London & Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1970)

WHGU Werken uitgegeven van het Historisch Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht, nieuwe reeks
NOTE ON THE TEXT

In giving dates, old style has been retained where it occurs in the originals, except that the year is assumed to have begun on 1 January rather than 25 March. For events after the adoption of the Gregorian calendar on 4 October 1582, use of new style (i.e., ten days in advance of England), is indicated for English and Welsh sources since they still usually give dates in old style, but not for French and Dutch sources -- these are all in new style.

In quotations from manuscripts and printed works, spelling has been left as found in the sources, except that standard abbreviations have been silently expanded, the thorn has been transcribed as 'th', and the alternate use of 'u' and 'v', and 'i' and 'j' has been standardised according to modern conventions. Punctuation and capitalisation have been added or amended sparingly and where necessary for clarity, but otherwise have been kept as found in the sources; however, quotations from printed sources in which spelling is already modernised reflect the usage of the editions in question. When citing those calendars and records series publications in which documents are numbered, both document and page numbers are given. Where document numeration is continuous throughout a multi-volume set, this is cited first, followed by volume and page number. Where the document numbers are volume specific, they are cited after page numbers. Titles of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century publications are abbreviated as in the STC. Unless otherwise stated, translations are mine and quotations from Holy Scripture taken from the Geneva Bible -- the most widely-read English translation in the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries.¹

Sir Robert Sidney was raised to the peerage in 1603 as Lord Sidney and created Viscount Lisle in 1605; Sir Robert Cecil was first ennobled as Viscount Cranborne by James I and then created Earl of Salisbury. For

convenience sake, they are referred to simply as Sidney and Robert Cecil\footnote{The Christian name is added in this case to prevent confusion with his father, Sir William (later Lord Burghley), a predecessor as Secretary of State and Lord Treasurer; or his older brother, Sir Thomas (eventually Lord Burghley and Earl of Exeter) and nephew, Sir Edward, both of whom served in the Netherlands.} throughout the notes. Where there is a recognised English version of a foreign place or personal name, I use it. Otherwise, the style preferred in the place or by the person in question has been employed.

Before the beginning of the Dutch Revolt, the Netherlands (Germania Inferior) was a recognised political entity, its seventeen (odd) provinces covering the whole of the present-day Kingdom of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and parts of modern France. ‘Netherlands’ is used if referring to this entity up to January 1579 (when the establishment of the Unions of Arras and Utrecht separated the southern provinces from the northern) and to the geographic area of the modern Kingdom of the Netherlands thereafter. The confederation of northern provinces, ancestor of the modern Dutch state, is referred to as the ‘Dutch Republic’ or ‘United Provinces’. I generally use ‘Low Countries’ only for the period after 1579 and to refer jointly to areas in both the rebellious north and the loyal, Catholic south, or to those which were then under the control of the United Provinces, but which today are in the modern Kingdom of Belgium. ‘Flanders’ and ‘Holland’, sometimes used in the sixteenth century for the entire Netherlands, are here used only for the specific provinces of those names. ‘States’, when capitalised, refers to the governing assemblies of the various provinces of the Netherlands, either individually or collectively; but ‘States-General’ (or Staten-Generaal) refers solely to the governing assembly of the United Provinces of the Netherlands.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The splintering of the communitas Christiana into separate and contending confessions following the Protestant Reformation was a principal cause of conflict among the nascent nation-states of early-modern Europe. At the national level, feuds amongst, and organised resistance to central authority by, aristocratic or urban elites was exacerbated by confessional differences.¹ At the international level, they ‘injected a new and disturbing element into relations among European rulers’: it would no longer be ‘traditional rivalries, dynastic, territorial, merely personal, which dominated the dealings of these princes with one another’. Wars were now fought not ‘merely for contested land or titles -- or for dynastic reputation. They were ... now the wars of truth’;² or, as one English Protestant veteran of the Dutch Revolt termed them, using the rhetoric of holy war, ‘Jacob’s wars’.³

This thesis concerns English and Welsh soldiers employed by foreign Protestants in those of ‘the wars of Jacob’ waged between 1562, when the wars of religion began in France, and 1610, when the Twelve Years’ Truce between the United Provinces and Spain, and the resolution of the Jülich succession war left western Europe (briefly) at peace. They were present in forty-three of the forty-nine years considered and averaged, in a time of small armies, on the order of 3,000 men per year.⁴ Further, in a half-century when the number of peers never exceeded eighty and was usually around sixty, eighteen mercenaries were peers or heirs to titles and another eleven were created peers after first taking foreign pay.⁵ This, then, was a very significant body of men, whose cohesion, motivation, political involvement, combat effectiveness and role as cultural intermediaries are all potentially important

³ Geoffrey Gates, The Defence of Militarie profession (London: 1579); see below, p. 36.
⁴ See app. 2, below, esp. p. 342.
⁵ Listed in app. 3 (pp. 351-53) -- these are English peerages only; Lawrence Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy 1558-1641, corr. edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 758, app. vi.
Figure 1. Numbers of English and Welsh Soldiers in Protestant Employ in France and the Netherlands Each Year, 1562-1610

Source: apps. 1-2, below (p. 310 et seq.)

issues; but none of them has yet been examined, since up to now very little has been known about the men in question. This study therefore addresses basic problems: it determines the mercenaries' numbers and their origins; how they were recruited and financed; and where and for how long they served. This is in itself an original contribution while also providing a starting point for future investigations of the larger issues. However, in addition it constitutes the basis of an argument, or overall thesis.

This thesis is that the employment of English and Welsh mercenaries in France and the Netherlands resulted from action by those within the English elite who perceived the wars fought by the Huguenots and Dutch as, indeed, 'Jacob's [i.e., holy] wars' and therefore wanted England actively to support its co-religionists. Contrary to standard historiographical depictions of early-modern mercenaries, the Anglo-Welsh mercenary companies were not products of early venture capitalism initiated by 'military enterprisers', nor agglomerations of the dregs of society, disenfranchised, dispossessed and
serving as soldiers to avoid starvation, poverty or punishment. Rather, they were mustered from the affinities of militant Protestant aristocrats, through complex networks of patronage that extended down to yeomen and artisans. These mercenaries therefore had deep ties of loyalty to the men who raised and led them and so had a stake in the cause for which they fought.

Their recruitment and dispatch abroad was facilitated by members of the élites, at court and in the country, in the city of London and the Church, who were generally, though not inevitably, strongly Calvinist. Such men were always represented on Elizabeth's council and this, although their views did not always predominate, helped to ensure that the raising and transportation overseas of the mercenaries who served their ends was only occasionally hindered -- never halted. Moreover, frequently their agenda did prevail, so that often the mercenaries were employed as the tools of the government, not simply of a party within it. That party was less significant after James VI and I's accession -- but by then there was a well-established policy of unofficial military support for the Dutch (the Huguenots having made peace in 1598). In sum, though the English government occasionally equivocated, the 'Protestant cause' received active support from English and Welsh mercenaries throughout this period.7

Having stated the thesis, this chapter goes on to define and to explain the choice of subject matter -- including the geographical and chronological parameters -- by examining the contemporary and historiographical context. The sources, presumptions and terminology of this thesis are then reviewed. Finally, its structure is outlined and subsequent chapters summarised.

Subject Matter

Terms of Reference

The boundaries of this study need careful delimitation. Exactly who are its subjects? What sort of soldiers are being considered? These issues are

vitaly important yet difficult to resolve. As will be seen, modern and early-
modern definitional criteria differ; modern definitions are loaded with modern
preconceptions and must be deconstructed if the subject matter is to be
considered dispassionately; and current definitions are also difficult to apply
in practical terms. For all these reasons (explored in chapter 2), I do not offer
a prescriptive definition of what constitutes a mercenary. Some transparent
criteria are necessary, however, in order clearly to delineate the subject
matter: which English and Welsh soldiers are being considered and whose
experiences or opinions are valid evidence for the purposes of this thesis?

Many of Elizabeth I's subjects and not a few of James VI and I's 'went
to the wars'. Most served in one or other of the royal armies that operated at
various times in various places during the reign of Elizabeth, but many also
fought for other princes before and/or after serving as 'soldiers of the queen',
while others served only in foreign armies. Of those who did fight in foreign
pay, many joined the Huguenots in the wars of religion, while the overwhelm-
ing majority served the Dutch against Spain. Some fought for the Spanish,
however, either against the Dutch, or against the infidel, against whom others
also served though in Imperialist or Portuguese armies. Nor did one type of
service preclude another. Which of these are the mercenaries of the title of
this thesis -- who are its subject matter?

As will be seen, the guerres religion and the Eighty Years' War had a
fascination for contemporary Englishmen which outweighed all others. The
Anglo-Welsh soldiers who only fought in other wars were a tiny minority
compared to those who, from 1562 to 1610, fought in France and the Low
Countries. English and Welshmen who chose to engage in (or to prolong)
military service abroad, when England was not officially at war and when
their sovereigns were prepared to disavow their actions demonstrated clear-
cut commitment. The same is true of those who volunteered for service in
time of open war, but when not required by the 'army royal' and so accepted
commissions from, or fought in units paid by, the Huguenots or the Dutch
rebels who later created the United Provinces. This clear-cut commitment

* See also in ch. 2, below, pp. 62-63.
* 'Tachtigjarige oorlog' is more often used in Netherlands' historiography for the war against
Spain, 1568-1648, than 'Dutch Revolt', despite inherent problems with this terminology: see
P. J. van Winter, Oorlogsduur in oorlogsnamen: over het gebruik van getallen tot steun van
historische voorstellingen, KNAW, VLN, 77/1 (Amsterdam: 1972).
distinguishes them from the rest. It is men with this commitment, regardless of what other armies or countries they served in, who are the subject of this thesis.

Finally, while this thesis concerns the employment of these men, it is not just a commercial and contractual study. The term 'employment' refers to a person's 'regular occupation or business': his or her 'trade or profession'. The use of these troops 'in a professional capacity' and associated business transactions is therefore examined. However, the term additionally means 'a special errand or commission'; being used 'to some definite purpose' or 'as a means or instrument'; and can even imply an entwinement, involvement or inclusion in events. It is in these general senses that the 'employment' of English and Welsh mercenaries in the European wars of religion, 1562-1610 is considered.

The European Wars of Religion

Europe was dominated by wars partially or wholly confessional in character from the Peasants' War (1524-25) until at least the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659. The influence of religious ideology was so significant in engendering and/or perpetuating hostilities, even in conflicts not directly caused by confessional divisions, that the period 1525-1659 has been defined as the age of religious war.

The character of conflicts in this century and a quarter varied. The wars were divided into three more-or-less distinct periods by two short breathing-spaces of general peace: the first from the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559) until the start of the wars of religion in France (1562); the second from the end of the brief war over the Cleves-Jülich succession in 1610 (a postscript to the Twelve Years' Truce of 1609) until the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in 1618. Confessional factors were more important in some phases than in others. Recent scholarship emphasises the enduring significance of religious division as a cause of European conflict right to the

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10 OED, s.v. 'employment', ("... the state of being employed").
11 Ibid., s.v. 'employment'; 'employ'.
end of the seventeenth century. However, as Jonathan Israel and others show, the relative importance of confessional considerations, compared to secular factors, declined as the century wore on. The second period of war, 1562-1610, was declared 'one of the most brutal and bigoted in the history of modern Europe', by R. B. Wernham in the New Cambridge Modern History: the massacre of St Bartholomew's Day in France and the excesses of the Duke of Alba's Council of Blood in the Netherlands 'were merely the more spectacular barbarities of an age unsurpassed for cruelty until our own day'. Were these wars, however, really religious wars?

Some scholars still deny that the conflicts of this era in France and the Low Countries, were truly 'wars of religion'. However, recent research on the national context of war and violence, particularly the seminal work of Denis Crouzet on France, emphasises the centrality of religious issues to conflict. The international situation likewise is indicative of the importance of confessional factors. N. M. Sutherland outlines 'four ... phases of struggle against the power of the House of Austria, or, from the Spanish point of view,

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14 Jonathan I. Israel, Empires and Entrepots: The Dutch, the Spanish Monarchy and the Jews, 1585-1713 (London: Hambledon Press, 1990), xii-xiii. He is criticised by Stradling, ibid., xxi-xxii, for stressing economic explanations of Hispano-Dutch conflict after the 1620s, but Israel's point is that religion was no longer as important as it had been, especially before 1600, which is inarguable. See, e.g., I. M. Green, 'England's Wars of Religion'? Religious Conflict and the English Civil Wars', in Church, Change and Revolution: Transactions of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch Church History Colloquium (Exeter, 30 August -- 3 September, 1988), ed. J. van den Berg and P. G. Hoftijzer (Leiden: E. J. Brill/ Leiden University Press, 1991), 100-21, esp. 108, 116; Hans Bots, 'William III and his Fellow Calvinists in the Low Countries', ibid., 122-29; Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 25.
of struggle to establish and sustain her supremacy in Europe' from 1494 to 1715. Her periodisation differs slightly from that advanced here (i.e., of three periods of religious war), but she does depict her second phase, from 1559 to 1598, as that most dominated by religious strife.\textsuperscript{18} The kings of France and Spain made peace in 1559 'with the explicit aim of dedicating themselves to an active battle against the growing heresy', while thereafter, as E. I. Kouri stresses, 'militant Calvinism started to take the lead in political Protestantism', seeking directly to confront 'Tridentine Catholicism'. In the words of Sir John Elliott:

It was religious differences which ... came to the forefront after 1559, cutting across national frontiers, exacerbating old hatreds ... fomenting new, and disrupting national communities, and then the international community, to such devastating effect that ... Europe was profoundly, and permanently, changed.

The period 1562 to 1610 was thus a crucial one in early-modern history, because this period of wars was the era of most marked confessional conflict in Western Europe in the whole post-Reformation age of religious war.\textsuperscript{19}

Moreover, the wars that took place in this period, in France and the Netherlands, were inextricably and uniquely linked. It is true that Spain had multifarious cares and concerns, from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, which were to a great extent responsible for its final defeat in the Eighty Years War\textsuperscript{20} -- true, too, that although the Huguenots and Dutch relied on England and each other for help against the Catholic kings of France, Spain and the Catholic League, they additionally intrigued and made alliances with


powers from all over Christendom and beyond. Nevertheless, during this half century, France, the Netherlands, England (including its Welsh and Irish territories) and the Spanish Monarchy had a special, symbiotic relationship. Historians from a variety of perspectives agree that events in France, the (originally Spanish) Netherlands and the Tudor domains were interdependent.

In addition, there was a tendency amongst concerned Englishmen to see the hostilities taking place around them as part of one great war. This owed something to a realisation of the strategic situation, but rather more to a propensity to view these conflicts in cosmic terms. The French king was termed eldest son of the pope; the Habsburg head of the Spanish Monarchy was el rey catolico; a Habsburg cousin was Holy Roman Emperor. As a number of scholars have demonstrated, Englishmen not only accepted the identification (made by Protestants since Luther) of the papacy as Antichrist, but also believed that it was the leader of an active international Catholic conspiracy against Protestantism.

The result was that the struggle was regarded by many in Elizabethan England and Wales as being in some sense a holy war. A prominent puritan was merely reflecting a widespread and persistent opinion when in 1586 he wrote to an English mercenary captain in the Netherlands: 'These wars are holy'. Thirteen years later, in a sermon preached to Elizabeth, the war with

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Spain was called 'a war sanctified' by Lancelot Andrewes (later Bishop of Ely). In 1604 it was described similarly, as 'une saincte guerre' and as pious and agreeable to God, by an apologist for English aid to the Dutch.

Others were not as specific in their terminology, but leave no doubt as to their view of the conflict. Geoffrey Gates, lawyer and sometime mercenary, described the Habsburgs and their allies as 'champions of the kingdom of darknesse' and as 'the most famous, arrogant, & implacable enemies of the gospel of Christ'. Another veteran of the Dutch wars compared the forces of 'the Pope and Spanish king ... this Anti-Christ and his adherent' to 'wicked Angels, Locusts and Scorpions', against whom 'the lord of hosts fought' on England's behalf. These statements appeared in print, but similar opinions were held and circulated in private. In 1585 the East Anglian gentleman Sir Robert Jermyn declared that the English troops in the Netherlands were to serve 'the Lordes cause, & fighte his battailes' and a minister, Oliver Pigge, affirmed that 'the cause ... is the lordes'. Roger, Lord North, a privy councillor whose son was a mercenary colonel, believed that the war had been 'stirred up' by 'the Lord God'. Sir Henry Killigrew, who fought for the Huguenots in Normandy in 1562 and served as a diplomat in the Netherlands in the late 1580s, avowed that England's Spanish enemies served 'the grete hore of Babelon'. Looking back in 1615, Sir John Holles, one of three brethren who fought for the Dutch from the 1590s, had no doubt that the Habsburgs (aided by Jesuits) intended by their wars to reduce the Protestants of Europe once more to idolatry. Huguenot and Dutch writers, who had the same enemies, described them in similar terms.


ASCL, MS 211, ff. 23r-24r.

Gates, 22-23; TDH, 67-68.

Jermyn to William Davison, 25 Aug. 1585, Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 73r; Pigge, 'Letter sent to a Christian Knight imploied in the [...] lowe contries 1585', CUL, MS Dd.xi. 76, f. 21r; North to Burghley, 28 Feb. 1586, quoted in C. R. Markham, 'The Fighting Veres': Lives of Sir Francis Vere [...] and of Sir Horace Vere [...] (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1888), 82; Killigrew to Christopher Perceval, 30 July [1588], HMC Bath, 5:212; Sir John to Sir George Holles, 10 May 1615, Holles Letters, no. 156, 1:67.

To many Protestants involved in the wars of 1562-1610, then, the real enemy they faced in all their conflicts was the pope and the Catholic church. That assessment did not depend on an apocalyptic world view. Several of the opinions quoted on the previous page are expressed in the language of the apocalyptic prophecies of Daniel and St John, and, of course, in many ways, 'the English conception of their battle with Rome was... an apocalyptic one'. Apocalypticism, though, was merely one reason to conceptualise the wars in France and the Low Countries as 'holy'. They were rarely compared to the metaphorical hostilities in the book of Revelation by soldiers or statesmen (as opposed to divines). Comparisons to the historical wars of the Old Testament, on the other hand, were common among military and political, as well as clerical, writers. Indeed, Jacob was renamed 'Israel' by God; and, in the Old Testament, 'Jacob' is generally used figuratively for all twelve tribes of Israel; in other words, when Gates wrote of 'Jacob... his warres', 'the wars of Jacob' and the 'enemies of Jacob', he really meant the wars and enemies of the Israelites -- that is, of God's chosen people.

Gates used all these terms to describe the wars fought by Protestants against Catholics and, although he was unique in describing them as 'wars of Jacob', both other English and Dutch Protestant soldiers and polemicists frequently used similar metaphors. It was in an Old (not New) Testament frame of reference that the wars were most often discussed and this was why they were 'holy'. The enemies of the Huguenots and the Netherlands were characterised as the pharaoh who oppressed the Hebrews; the Philistines; apostates such as Saul and 'Jezebel's brood'; the Assyrians, Sennacherib and Rabshekah; or Antiochus Epiphanes, desecrator of the Temple. Other implicit and explicit comparisons to the Israelites' wars were frequently made by mercenaries and their associates, in both published works and private correspondence. Such similes were also favoured by Dutch writers.

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30 Wiener, 57.
31 Gen. 32:28.
34 E.g., Barnaby Rich, Allarme to England, foreshewing what perilles are procured, where the people live without regarde of martiall lawe (London: 1578), sig. A2v; Stubbs, Gaping Gulf, 7, 14, 79; George Gifford, Sermons [... ] (London: 1596), sigs. A2r-A5v, pr. Bauckham, 353, 356-57; TDH, 68. And see ch. 9, below, pp. 306-7.
35 Groenhuis, 119-21, 126-27, 131.
In sum, the French wars of religion and the first half of the Eighty Years' War, within which were subsumed the brief ecclesiastical succession wars over Cologne (1583-84) and Strasbourg (1592), and various rebellions in Ireland, were not perceived by contemporary Englishmen as really distinct conflicts, but rather as part of the same great struggle against international Catholicism: a holy war. Just as Philip II deployed troops, ships and money throughout the four countries as part of one great effort to stop Protestants gaining power in France and the Netherlands, so English troops took part in all these wars. There is no evidence that they or their patrons conceived of them as anything other than campaigns of the same great ongoing conflict, which was itself a new war of Israel. This thesis follows the example of contemporary Englishmen: it examines their experience in France and the Netherlands without distinction; from an English perspective, the guerres de religion and Dutch revolt are perhaps understood best as particular national aspects of one European, essentially confessional, military experience which can rightly be called the 'European Wars of Religion'.

Mercenaries and the Art of War

The wars compared by the subjects of this thesis to those fought by the Old Testament Israelites were part of a series of great and destructive conflicts which racked Europe during the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries. From the 1490s on, a series of significant developments occurred in military technology, tactics and organisation. These were accompanied by a remarkable growth in army sizes. By the mid-sixteenth century warfare was as endemic as the plague in Europe and almost as deadly.

England, however, has typically been seen as remaining militarily dormant throughout this period. England witnessed major developments in industry and commerce, along with a literary and artistic renaissance, and these advances have often been attributed by scholars to English 'immunity'

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39 E.g., Clark, Early Modern Europe, 81; Hale, War, 13-22.
to the destructive experience of war. Yet even historians with a less than positive view of socio-economic developments under the Tudors portray war as far from central to the interests of the crown or of contemporary English society in general.  

Military historians have tended to be scathing about the Tudors' management of war, with the Elizabethan regime, in particular, depicted as indifferent to and inefficient in handling martial affairs.  

In the last decade, this negative picture has begun to be revised. Not only has 'the pacific nature of Henry VII's policy been greatly overrated', but any trend towards pacificity in the latter years of the first Tudor's reign was completely reversed during that of his son: Henry VIII's record of war-making is comparable to those of such unquestioned 'warrior-kings' as Edward III and Henry V. Elizabeth then waged one of the greatest wars in England's history and did so with some success. However, revisionary interpretations of Elizabeth's military policy have yet to win wide acceptance and they have in any case focused almost entirely on the role of the central government in a process that one historian has, indeed, described as the militarisation of the English state. They take no account of the intrinsically martial nature of English society, manifested in the large numbers of men who went abroad to fight (at least nominally) for 'the Protestant cause'.

Indeed, the existence of what could almost be termed an Anglo-Welsh mercenary movement is ignored in most historical accounts, including those of revisionists. This is ironic, because the mercenary and his significance in

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both the armies and the societies of other early-modern European states is well-recognised by scholars. There have been many studies of the numbers, fighting qualities, and the social origins of and contemporary reactions to, mercenaries of most European nations in this period. I draw on these works for comparative insights. Some are thematic essays on subjects such as mercenaries' involvement in politics, and mercenaries and migration. Most, however, examine particular national groups. Little is published in English, but much in Italian and German on Italian condottieri of this period, and on the notorious Swiss. There is a wealth of material in English and French, as well as in German, on the celebrated reiters and landsknechts drawn from the German states, including particular studies of the recruiting or operational history of those who served in the armies of sixteenth-century France and England. There are specialist studies of Eastern European

Redlich, Enterpriser, includes the German-speaking Swiss. John McCormack, One Million Mercenaries: Swiss Soldiers in the Armies of the World (London: Leo Cooper, 1993) lacks critical rigour but synthesises much recent work, listed in its extensive bibliography. It must be noted that works in German and Italian are mostly beyond my linguistic abilities.
soldiers of fortune. And there is, of course, a plethora of works on sixteenth-
and early seventeenth-century mercenaries from Scotland and Ireland.

However, English and Welsh mercenaries barely figure in early-
modern historiography. The literature on them does not compare with that
on mercenaries from the rest of the British Isles, much less the rest of Europe
-- there are no studies of English mercenaries qua mercenaries. J. A. Dop's
examination of English military involvement in the Netherlands up to 1586
focuses on the royal expeditionary force of 1585-86, rather than the
mercenary companies preceding it. In any case, neither group is the main

52 Idem, 'The Albanians: Sixteenth-Century Mercenaries', HT, July 1976, 468-72; Gyula Rázsó,
'The Mercenary Army of King Matthias Corvinus', in From Hunyadi to Rákóczí: War and Society
in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary, ed. János M. Bak and Béla K Király (New York:
Brooklyn College Press, 1982), 125-40; Ferenc Maksay, 'Peasantry and Mercenary Service in
Sixteenth-Century Hungary', ibid., 261-74.
53 James Grant, The Scottish Soldiers of Fortune, Their Adventures and Achievements in the
Armies of Europe (London: G. Routledge & Sons, 1889); Grant G. Simpson, ed., The Scottish
Soldier Abroad, 1247-1967 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1992); Andrew McKerrall, 'West High-
lund Mercenaries in Ireland', Scottish Historical Review 30 (1951): 1-14; Gerard A. Hayes-
McCoy, Scots Mercenary Forces in Ireland (1565-1603) [...] (Dublin & London: Burns, Oates
& Washbourne, 1937); Robert Matthew Shurmer, 'Scottish Mercenary Forces in the Revolt of
the Netherlands and Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1566-1609' (unpub. M.Litt. thesis, University
of Aberdeen, 1989); I. Ross Bartlett, 'Scottish Mercenaries in Europe, 1570-1640: A Study in
Attitudes and Policies', The Scottish Tradition 13 (1986): 15-24; Hugh Dunthorne 'Scots in the
Wars of the Low Countries, 1572-1648', in Scotland and the Low Countries 1124-1994,
ed. Grant G. Simpson (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1996), 104-21; Graeme P. Herd, 'General
Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries -- A Scot in Seventeenth-Century Russian Service' (unpub.
Ph.D. thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1993), ch. 5; idem, 'Bravehearts Abroad': Scottish
Steve Murdoch, 'The House of Stuart and the Scottish Professional Soldier 1618-1640: A
Conflict of Nationality and Identities', in War: Identities in Conflict 1300-2000, ed. Bertrand
Taithe and Tim Thornton (Stroud: Sutton, 1998), 37-56; Mary Elizabeth Ailes, 'From British
Mercenaries to Swedish Nobles: The Immigration of British Soldiers to Sweden during the
54 Gunther White, 'Henry VIII's Irish Kerne in France and Scotland', Ir. Sword 3 (1957-58):
217-25; Gervase Phillips, 'Irish Ceatharnaigh in English Service, 1544-1550, and the Development
English Exile at the Court of Philip II (New York: Fordham University Press, 1963), 103-4,
134-55; Brendan Jennings, 'Irish Swordsmen in Flanders, 1586-1610', i, Stanley's Regiment,
1586-1587, ii, Independent Irish Companies and Regiment of Henry O'Neill', Studies 36
Flanders, 1586-1621 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1992); Robert Daley Fitzsimmon, 'Irish
Soldiers in Flanders in the Sixteenth Century', Ir. Sword 9 (1969-70): 69-70; idem, 'Irish
Swordsmen in the Imperial Service of the 30 Years War', ibid., 22-31; Jerrold Cassaway, 'Henry
O'Neill and the Formation of an Irish Regiment in the Netherlands, 1605', Ir. Historical Studies
18 (1972): 481-88; Stradling, Irish Mercenaries; Micheline Kerney Walsh, 'The Wild Goose
Tradition', Ir. Sword 17 (1987-88): 4-15; and the works cited in fn. 49, above.
55 Redlich, Enterpriser, xiv, does not include them in a list of nations well-known for 'military
enterprisers' (which does include Italians, Czechs, Germans and Scots). Despite her title, M.
E. Ailes's subjects are overwhelmingly Scottish (and entirely so up to 1609): cf. Ailes, 1n., 31.
subject of the work; it is really a study of Elizabethan culture and the military context to the English literary renaissance, using little archival material and no Dutch manuscript sources at all. There are biographical studies of a few individual mercenaries: Christopher Carleill (the least significant of them), Edward Cecil, John Norreys, Robert Sidney, Francis and Horace Vere, and Roger Williams. None focus on their subjects' foreign service and, as with biographical literature on other mercenaries, 'analysis of the significance of [their] careers ... to the [state] which employed them' is lacking. Moreover, Williams's life is only profiled in articles; Dalton's biography of Cecil, though authoritative, focuses on the period after 1610; this is also true of Markham's less reliable (and curiously anachronistic) dual-biography of the Veres. As with the particular studies of Francis Vere, Sidney, Carleill and Norreys, it is thorough and based at least partly on manuscript sources, but they all make little or no use of foreign archives and are prone to error. English soldiers of fortune are examined collectively in only a few works and never more than summarily. The mercenaries (or 'volunteers') are mentioned in all standard histories of Tudor and early-Stuart Wales and England, yet they appear in these works only fleetingly and they are wholly ignored by French and Dutch

57. Ailes, 15.
The issues highlighted at the beginning of this chapter have yet to be addressed in secondary sources.

Sources and Methodology

In terms of chronology, geography, ideology and contemporary events, then, the civil and religious wars in France and the Netherlands from 1562 to 1610 provide a discrete unit for the analysis of the phenomenon of early-modern English and Welsh mercenary service -- what a seventeenth-century English veteran of the Dutch army called the 'blessed trade'. There are, moreover, a range of sources available to carry out such an analysis, while many of the key issues have been explored by historians of other countries or periods, so that a range of comparative approaches and insights exist to be exploited.

Sources

This study utilises a number of primary sources. It relies greatly on the state papers, and official correspondence and memoranda of English government officials, preserved mostly in the Public Record Office, the British Library and at Hatfield House. These have been accessed initially through the published calendars of the PRO and Historical Manuscripts Commission, but very often I have consulted the original manuscripts, or editions that print them in full or in extenso in original spelling: particularly the indispensable eleven volumes prepared under the supervision of Baron Kervyn de Lettenhove for the Académie Royale de Belgique's Commission Royale d'Histoire (several documents from which were checked against the originals and found to be extremely accurate). I draw extensively on the correspondence of Spanish agents and ministers (especially those in England), with each other and with Philip II. I have perforce relied on modern editions, but wherever possible I have used full-text, original-language versions (such as those of the Belgian Commission Royale d'Histoire) rather than the error-prone Calendar of State Papers.

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63 See Wilson, Revolt, 157, on its importance and underutilisation by historians.
Papers Spanish. These Spanish official sources are supplemented by the reports of French ambassadors to London, Madrid and Brussels, all consulted in manuscript at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris.

The main sources of official records on English mercenaries in France and the Netherlands, however, are of course archives and libraries in those countries. In France, because the Huguenots lost, survival of their records is very incomplete. Consequently, I have had to rely on an impressionistic survey of the correspondence of leading figures in both the Huguenot forces and the Catholic armies that opposed them, supplemented by a few muster-rolls and other financial documents and miscellanea. These manuscripts are mostly in the Bibliothèque Nationale, but other Parisian libraries proved fruitful, especially that of the Société d'Histoire du Protestantisme Français. Some use has also been made of published collections of correspondence. However, the records of the Huguenot leadership concerning use of English troops do not survive.

In the case of the Netherlands, the rebels won and took over the state; as a result, while there are the problems of survival of documents typical for the early-modern era, a formidable bulk of original material is extant which provides most of the factual skeleton on which my analysis and argument is based. I have consulted the official records of the federal institutions of the United Provinces (the ‘Generality’), as well as some private papers of their leading officials, all preserved at the Dutch national archives, the Algemeen Rijksarchief. The resolutions and act books of the States-General and the Council of State, and their correspondence files have been thoroughly used by previous historians but, as I found, they still constitute a valuable resource for scholars with new perspectives; in addition, I have drawn extensively on their financial records. In this period, actual payments of troops were in theory made by provincial States, but the budget (‘staat van oorlog’) was agreed at Generality level and, in practice, payments were regularly made by Generality institutions.64 I have also consulted the archives of Holland, the most important of the United Provinces (preserved in the Rijksarchief in Zuid-Holland) -- the records of its States, of its financial institutions responsible for paying troops, and the private papers of Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, the most

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prominent figure in Holland (and therefore in the Dutch Republic) from the mid-1580s until after 1610. Finally, I have examined the municipal archives of a sample city, Leiden (preserved in the Gemeentearchief van Leiden), site of much fighting by English troops early in the revolt, and later of a hospital and winter quarters for English soldiers. In addition, the Bibliotheek Dousa at Leiden University, and published collections of documents (especially the Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën and Werken Historisch Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht series) are auxiliary sources -- of the correspondence of leading protagonists, of resolutions of the States-General, and of some financial records.

All of these have also provided material written by English soldiers, from their occasional comments on the few surviving muster-rolls, to many letters written to their Dutch employers and friends. The papers of or about English mercenaries are, however, naturally found mostly in England. I have sought out correspondence to and from mercenaries, their wills, their own or their associates' diaries or journals, and miscellaneous documents (e.g., military or estate records). The Public Record Office, British Library and Bodleian Library are the chief sources, but the libraries of Oxford colleges and Cambridge University, and local record offices in England, have also been mined, as have the publications of the Camden Society, the Reports of the Historical Manuscripts Commission, and various county records series. All of these additionally provide a range of important contextual material on the mercenaries in their native socio-political setting.

In addition to the correspondence and memoranda of mercenaries, I have also examined their publications. Using literary evidence for historical analysis does not meet with approval from many early-modern historians. Simon Adams, for example, simply dismisses both 'literary sources and contemporary narratives' as 'notoriously inaccurate'. This is, admittedly, in the specific context of their reliability as sources for troop numbers, but his criticism in the relevant endnote of Oman’s ‘uncritical employment’ of ‘literary sources’ demonstrates a more general scepticism as to the value of such sources.65 Geoffrey Parker added an excursus to his volume in the Fontana

History of Europe in order to castigate scholars who use 'prose works ... as if they were objective historical evidence'. Again, these 'works' are undefined, though Parker particularly critiques the value of Grimmelshausen (author of the celebrated *Simplicissimus*) as an historical source. Literary sources present problems of interpretation, but even Parker concedes they may have 'considerable value': it is not 'that no literary sources at all may be used by the historian ... but [that] a novel or poem is like any other source: it must be used with care and understanding.' As Redlich, who made frequent use of Grimmelshausen (amongst other authors), emphasised: 'Any source, be it a novel, a diary, letters, or administrative documents and the like demands of the historian criticism appropriate to its nature.'

Many of the texts on which I draw are actually letters of mercenaries to friends or family at home, put into print by enterprising contemporary publishers as part of the increasingly important genre of newsletters; they are effectively manuscripts that survive in printed form. Other pamphlets and books were mercenaries' narratives and memoirs, often written close to the events described, though some are reminiscences composed sometime after: Thomas Churchyard, in particular, published works which, though not first-hand accounts, were based on reports from eyewitnesses. The contemporary or near-contemporary narratives I utilise are generally by authors who had lived through the events they describe and knew many of the protagonists. Each had his own agenda, but their works are essentially factual narratives. They are no more distorted by conscious 'calculation and artifice' than the private correspondence prized by many historians at the expense of publications, which was commonly drafted and revised in order 'to fashion a carefully constructed persona'.

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57 Redlich, *Military Enterpriser*, 147. Whether Redlich himself was sufficiently critical in his use of literary sources is a separate issue.
59 A Plains or moste true report of a daungerous service by English men & other soldiers, for the takyng of Mackin (London: 1580) is based entirely on participants' reports. He also cites eyewitnesses as sources for some material in Churchyard's *Choice* and *TDH*.
theological treatises, sermons, verse narratives, ballads and prose romances -- but only those which are specifically on military subjects and/or are by men such as George Gascoigne, Barnaby Rich and Ben Jonson, who had served in France and/or the Netherlands. Furthermore, literary evidence is mostly used to supplement manuscript evidence, whether private correspondence or official records, rather than as the sole basis of arguments.

More generally, in using both literary and documentary sources, only material written by, about, or relevant to mercenaries (as defined on pp. 6-7) has been included. The experiences or pronouncements of some other soldiers, including foreigners, are used as evidence, but only if these men had at some time served alongside or against veterans of 'Jacob's wars'. Material from before 1562 or after 1610 is used if it is drawn from analogous situations, or if there is a clear connection to the events or people of the period in question. Material from other countries in this period is used, but for comparative insights, rather than as direct evidence. In short, a very wide variety of primary sources provides the basis for the thesis outlined earlier. However, care has been taken to use this wide range of sources critically and as precisely as possible.

To be sure, virtually all these writings, whether in manuscript, or prose or verse publications, were produced by members of the Tudor and Stuart elite and 'reflect the attitudes of that group'. However, because so many men of noble or gentle birth fought in the ranks, there is a remarkably large body of sources showing the common soldier's viewpoint. It might be said that such authors were not really common soldiers: the answer is that, as will be shown in chapter 6, among the mercenaries, 'common soldiers' tended to be uncommon, socially. In a European context, this itself was uncommon.

Finally, in using secondary sources, I follow G. W. Bernard's example and do 'not hesitate to search for clues in countries other than England and in periods other than the sixteenth century.' As with primary sources, I have used many studies of other European countries: and not just of France and the Low Countries, the sites of conflict. England was not only taking part in an international conflict; it was part of an transnational community and events

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71 Sawyer, 6.
and social processes in England are often illuminated by reference to what was happening elsewhere in Europe. However, the bulk of secondary sources consulted on Continental countries are studies in French and Dutch-Belgian history. In addition to comprising the theatre of war, these countries had very close links with England and, as Professor Kipling emphasises, greatly influenced sixteenth-century English culture. In addition, to provide insight into the literary texts that have been used, I have also had recourse to works of English literary scholars -- albeit again with caution, since literary critics and historians approach their subjects and view evidence in different ways.

Premises and Terminology

Historians tend not to be as terminologically precise as colleagues in the social sciences. As a prominent authority on Tudor history acknowledges, 'it is surprising how little historians reflect on language'. This frequently leads to confusion. Accordingly, the following section outlines some important premises of this thesis and, where there may be ambiguity about my usages, explains how certain terms are used and why.

Aristocracy

This thesis assumes the enduring power of the 'second estate' in sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century England and Wales. Like Dr Bernard, I doubt whether the Tudors made any attempt to destroy the power of their nobility. I also reject the standard periodisation of the transformation of the English nobility and gentry into a 'tamed' service aristocracy. A powerful school of thought, epitomised by M. E. James, argues that during the sixteenth century the traditional élite idea of honour, defined by lineage and individualistic self-sufficiency, with recourse to arms as the ultimate arbiter of honourable status, was replaced by a more modern conception, which instead privileged

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ability (especially if enhanced by education), prized conformity to the rule of law, and praised a pacifistic stance.\(^{77}\) I accept much of this schema but argue that traditional values remained predominant longer -- certainly into the late sixteenth century and probably into the seventeenth century.

This had consequences for military recruitment in a number of ways. First, the English peerage and gentry still perceived itself as having a martial role in society. This legitimated military service, even, to a certain extent, in foreign employ. Equally, many more aristocratic affinities retained a military potential, even an outright martial component, than is usually thought; these affinities then proved fertile ground for recruiting of mercenaries to pursue a Protestant internationalist programme abroad. Most of the relevant issues are dealt with in the text. The aristocratic rôle in war is explored in chapter 2. The place of affinities in recruiting emerges implicitly in chapters 3-6 and is examined explicitly in chapters 7-8; the workings of military dependences are considered in the latter chapter.

However, the 'affinity' is a concept that requires some definition. This thesis argues that aristocratic patrons and their followings played a vital role in the recruiting of mercenaries. It is important, therefore, that descriptions of the structures and mechanics of lordship are clearly understood. Despite the great amount of scholarly work done on this area, the terminology of studies of patronage and clientage is ambiguous at best.\(^{78}\) In order to avoid confusion, a specific terminological structure is used throughout this thesis. A set of terms has been adopted and is used advisedly, according to the schema in table 1 (below). The primary intention is to aid clarity, rather than make prescriptive statements and the terminology adopted here reflects at times arbitrary distinctions, but the terms are based on standard usages of historians and social scientists, though due to the debate in the field some partiality has had to be exercised. This taxonomy is fully explained, with supporting references, in appendix 5.


Table 1. Types of relationships within affinities and terms used to describe them in this thesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>CLARIFICATION</th>
<th>TERM USED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Family</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Formal service (A)</td>
<td>Household (generic)</td>
<td>Servants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(i) -- Close, personal</td>
<td>Fidèles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) -- General and/or menial</td>
<td>Servitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formal service (B)</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Retinue/Retainers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Landholding</td>
<td>Tenants/vassals</td>
<td>Tenants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Clientage</td>
<td></td>
<td>Clientele/Clientes&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Factional association</td>
<td></td>
<td>Confederates&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Militarised sub-group</td>
<td>Within affinity</td>
<td>Dependence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes
a. 'Patron' is used for the superior side of the relationship
b. 'Allies' is used for those members of a faction or party who were not member of the affinity.

In addition, the terms 'noble', 'gentry' and 'aristocracy' and cognates are also used advisedly and it is likewise desirable that this usage is understood clearly. On the Continent, all members of the second estate (everyone who was gently born or 'of gentle blood' as it came to be known in England) were legally nobles: members of the noblesse in France; edellieden in the Netherlands. This was also originally the situation in England-Wales, but eventually only peers (holders of titles of baron and above) were regarded as nobles, with the remainder of the English 'nobility' -- the knights, esquires and gentlemen proper -- classed as 'gentry'. This non-noble meaning of the term 'has been taken over in English historiography'.<sup>79</sup>

In Tudor and early-Stuart England, however, 'the distinction between parliamentary peer and non-noble' was not yet 'a very rigid boundary'.<sup>80</sup> In England, as on the Continent, 'noble' and its cognates remained terms for all members of the second estate (and the qualities associated with them) into the seventeenth century. To use contemporary English nomenclature, there

<sup>80</sup> Bernard, 'Tudor Nobility in Perspective', 2.
were both nobilitas maior and nobilitas minor: the greater and lesser nobility. The former was the peerage; the latter a wide group encompassing knights, esquires and armigerous gentlemen -- what is now termed 'the gentry'. English law and society alike distinguished at this time between lords and the rest of the second estate, but nevertheless regarded peers ('nobilitatem maiorem') and gentlemen ('nobilitatem minorem') as all nobiles.81

Contemporaries were keenly aware of the different grades of nobility/gentry and lower orders.82 However, the significance at this time of divisions within the nobilitas can be overstated. The elevation of gentlemen to peers, the (d)evolution of the peerage's cadet branches into gentry, the constant intermarriage among families from both nobilitas maior and minor, and the fact that 'both ... subscribed to the same scheme of values', all meant there was no sharp dividing line between peers and the rest of the nobilitas.83 As the Oxford divine and scholar, Lawrence Humfrey, concluded, 'this worde' [noble] embraced all 'worthies of what so ever power or place'.84 This was reflected in the acknowledgment of English gentlemen as nobles by their counterparts in France and the Netherlands.85

Thus, historically speaking, it is accurate to have a collective term for gentry and peerage; moreover, for the purposes of this thesis it is necessary to have one term, for I argue that peers and gentlemen had much in common and acted as a group. Ideally, 'noble' could be used indiscriminately as the noun for all members ('nobles') of the second estate ('nobility') and as the adjective for their qualities ('noble'). This is not a problem for the Continent, where, despite the existence of a noblesse seconde, its members were still legally nobles, edelmannen and hidalgos. For this reason, when referring to

82 E.g., 'The Magazine of honour or a treatise of the several degrees of the nobility of this kingdom with their rights and privileges, also of knights, esquires, gentlemen and yeomen', ASCL, MS 104; and instructions for heralds, BodL., MS Rawl. B.146, f. 52r.
85 See, e.g., the 'Discours sommaire' of Jehan Bernard (herald of Charles IX of France), AAE, MDA 16; idem, description of the members of the Earl of Warwick's 1572 embassy to France, BN, MS Fr. 5785. The 'edelmen' listed in muster rolls of English mercenary companies in the Netherlands (see ch. 8, below, pp. 281-82), are all gentlemen, rather than peers.
the Continent, or to the whole of Europe, I use noble(s) and nobility for the whole of the second estate. In English historiography, however, partly due to the strong modern connotations of 'nobility' and 'gentry', the 'nobility in the sixteenth century' is a 'clearly defined ... group, the lay members of the house of lords', as a study of the Henrician peerage declares. To use 'nobility' for the whole of the nobilitas in an English context, while correct in early-modern terms, would be confusing and inappropriate in modern terms, inasmuch as 'nobility' has a current, clearly understood, and much narrower meaning.

Accordingly, when discussing or referring to peers and gentlemen collectively, in an English context, I use 'aristocrat(s)', 'aristocratic' and 'aristocracy'. This is lexicographically acceptable, but I realise that these terms have usually been used interchangeably for 'peers' and the 'peerage' in Anglophone historiography. Yet that is changing: Professor Ferguson, for example, avowedly uses 'the term aristocracy to include both nobility and gentry'; Dr Hammer accepts that the term ' aristocratic' is used in many different way by historians', yet also uses it for peers and gentry collectively. Thus, while my terminology is unusual, it is not inconsistent with that of other scholars.

Companies and Captains

In considering recruitment, I focus on the raising of companies or regiments of mercenaries. Some English and Welsh soldiers enlisted in foreign units as individuals, but the majority joined either existing English units on the Continent, seeking to bring themselves up to strength, or new companies being raised as units in England. One reason for distinguishing between the agglomeration of individuals and small groups into foreign Protestants' forces, and the procurement by them of organised units for their service, is that the individuals and members of small groups who made their way to the Continent independently, especially in the early days of the religious wars,
were absorbed into the armies of their co-religionists in an informal fashion which leaves frustratingly few traces. In contrast, the recruiting of units was necessarily on a larger scale and thus has left a more satisfying documentary trail. Little explicit evidence survives of Huguenot recruiting in England; conclusions thereon are, of necessity, mostly tentative. Much more evidence on Dutch recruiting exists: few actual commissions to English captains are extant, but sufficient other evidence exists, especially financial records, for firm conclusions about large-scale recruiting to be reached. Individuals or small groups are considered where it is apparent that they were collectively important for various reasons. Since it is primarily units that can be documented, however, they are the main subject matter of this thesis. Where individuals are dealt with, it is usually their captains.

It should be noted that I use the term 'captain' somewhat loosely, as indeed it was during the sixteenth century. On occasions a captain might have a commission for only one company -- but more usually for a specific number of men. At other times, however, the same person might be commissioned to raise a large force of men, sub-divided into several 'bands' -- and he might, or might not, sub-contract other captains. This is one reason why Redlich and other scholars use the term 'military enterpriser', but this has its own problems. First is the presumption (implicit in the title of Redlich's German Military Enterpriser and apparent throughout that work) that a mercenary company was essentially a business enterprise -- though Redlich only demonstrates that this was true of the German mercenaries of the Thirty Years' War era which are his main focus. Second, the distinction between mercenary captain and government official is in practice often less than clear cut: in some cases, royal officers sought to recruit in a foreign country directly instead of contracting others to do so for them. In 1567, for example, during the second civil war in France, the Duke of Nevers needed to strengthen his army and arranged for several of his captains to try to find volunteers in Spanish Italy. Was Nevers, Lieutenant-General of Charles IX of France, an entrepreneur de guerre? In Switzerland recruiting was generally arranged by cantonal authorities: they made and filled contracts with foreign powers.

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90 Implying an appointment, or a position, rather than a rank in a hierarchy -- see below, p. 258.
92 McCormack, 74, 93-96, 110-12.
Yet it has never been suggested that they were military entrepreneurs. The roles of civil authorities in a captain's country of origin and his patrons in his own society are important issues. In England and Wales individual captains often had recourse to their lords and patrons for assistance and might, indeed, receive commissions from foreign Protestants precisely because of their connection with them. Should these powerful patrons, few of whom ever either fought on the Continent or sought a profit from their involvement, be described as military enterprisers? In this thesis, 'captain' is preferred to 'military enterpriser' or cognate terms. It is used for a man raising a body of soldiers (whether to form part of a larger force or not, whether using others as sub-contractors or not) to fulfil a contract or commission from a foreign noble, official, sovereign or state.

**Thesis Structure**

Of the following eight chapters, one addresses issues of definition and their implications; three are narratives that illumine the process by which leading English Protestants organised and coordinated military support for their French and Dutch allies; one examines financing and logistics; two analyse recruitment by the captains of their companies; and there is a conclusion. There are additionally ten appendixes. Some are statistical -- analysing the evidence for troop numbers and summarising the data thus elucidated in tabulated or graphic form. Of the remaining appendixes, two are particularly important, since they sketch out the careers of mercenaries who attained the rank of captain as well as those who became field and general officers, or held important administrative offices. For this reason, when captains are referred to in subsequent chapters, usually no references are supplied, since they can be found in appendixes 4 and 5. Where the evidence for particular points in the text is to be found in these appendixes a cross-reference is provided. However, when the point is that a man was a captain, or that he served in a particular place or at a particular time, there is no specific citation -- reference to the appendixes should in these cases be taken as read.

In the analytical chapters, examples are at times thickly clustered. But where numerous examples are provided, it is when the particular argument or points being made go against an existing historiographical orthodoxy, and
they demonstrate that the interpretations advanced do not rest on exceptions or isolated instances, but rather reflect the normal state of affairs, regardless of even widely-accepted assumptions.

In chapter 2 I address the questions of how a mercenary is defined in the present day and how he was defined in the early-modern era, exploring the historiography further. It shows that modern attitudes greatly influence how early-modern mercenaries are defined and perceived by scholars and argues that current attitudes must be confronted and consciously put to one side. Early-modern definitions provide a valuable contrast to modern ones and my analysis of them highlights important sociocultural issues. Finally, this chapter indicates the actual social composition of the English mercenary companies, providing a basis for further analysis in chapters 7 and 8.

The remaining chapters, up to the conclusion, deal with how the mercenaries came to be employed. In chapters 3-6 I examine how captains were recruited, and their terms of employment, which includes issues of pay and, to a certain extent, logistics; chapters 7-8 analyse how the mass of soldiers were recruited and amplify the evidence of chapter 2 on social composition.

Chapters 3-5 comprise a narrative of the years 1562-1610. Since this thesis is the initial treatment of this subject, it will be helpful to outline the chronological progression of events that may not be well-known. Rather than describing the mercenaries' military actions, I focus on their interactions with patrons and governments at home and abroad, though this does provide a sense of their operational history. It also, however, reveals how persistent was the commitment of English and Welshmen over a fifty-year period and demonstrates the developing attitudes of the English government and leading figures in the body politic -- it will be seen that in this last arena, continuity is more notable than real change.

The first narrative chapter (chapter 3) deals with events up to the end of 1576. In May of that year the fifth war of religion was ended by the Edict of Beaulieu; in November the sack of Antwerp by mutinous Spanish soldiers and the consequent Pacification of Ghent brought all of the provinces of the Netherlands into the revolt against Spain. The fifth civil war was a turning point, as Wood argues, because it demonstrated that 'the religious partition of France could not be significantly shifted by formal military operations' and hence marked a turn towards 'aimless and increasingly more destructive
In the Netherlands, the events of winter 1576-77 were also hugely important because they brought the withdrawal of the Spanish army and, for a time, peace and unity between the States. The second, shortest narrative chapter (chapter 4) takes events up to the spring of 1585, when the publication of the declaration of Péronne by the Catholic League resulted in the resumption of hostilities in France and the dire straits of the United Provinces led them to turn to Elizabeth for direct military intervention. This chapter covers a short period, but these few years ‘were a political and military watershed in European history’, as Professor Wilson observes. In the absence of formal war in France, English military interest had shifted wholly to the Netherlands, where there were real hopes the Dutch States might achieve united independence. English mercenaries were a major part of the States’ war effort, while in this period of relative Dutch autonomy the dynamics of the employment of English soldiers began to change. Finally, chapter 5 examines the period from 1585 to 1610. In 1585, England openly entered the war against Spain and sent a royal army to the Netherlands, while in France a new civil war broke out. English mercenaries trickled back to France, but were briefly employed in very large numbers to augment the royal army in the Dutch Republic. In the late 1580s and early 1590s almost all English and Welsh soldiers were in royal service, with just a few mercenaries employed by the Dutch and by Henry of Navarre (from 1589 Henry IV of France). From 1594, however, the States-General again raised units of English mercenaries to supplement the royal English army and from 1599 almost all English troops in the Dutch Republic were passed into its pay. The Twelve Years’ Truce with Spain was concluded in 1609, but 1610 saw a postscript to hostilities with the Jülich succession war, in which English mercenaries, employed alongside French and Dutch contingents, played a substantial role in a quick Protestant victory. It was an apt coda to a period of fifty years during which English, French and Dutch soldiers had fought shoulder to shoulder.

The bulk of these chapters deal with four major episodes. These are: the opstand, or renewed outbreak of revolt in the Netherlands in 1572, which sparked the first large-scale injection of English and Welsh troops into the

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Wilson, *Revolt*, 43.
European religious wars; the despatch of mercenaries as a surrogate for an official army in the Netherlands in 1578; the open intervention of 1585-86; and the United Provinces' government's recovery of control over their Anglo-Welsh troops in 1603-4. Each episode, as will be seen, was very important for the subsequent development of mercenary involvement in Jacob's wars. Each is also relatively well-known and thus has received previous scholarly attention, yet each has been misunderstood and usually misrepresented. For all these reasons, these episodes require more detailed analysis than other years, which can more readily be summarised.

The narrative structure of these chapters reveals how the employment of English mercenaries was affected by a variety of factors over the fifty-odd years in question. The most crucial were conditions on the Continent, which dictated how many soldiers the Huguenots or Dutch wanted. Also of critical importance were conditions in England -- not only the views of the wider English body politic, but also the attitudes of the government towards what sorts of aid should be supplied to their foreign co-religionists.

It will be seen that mercenary service with the French or Dutch rebels was in theory prohibited right up to 1585, when England openly went to war with Spain. In practice, appeals for help from French and Dutch Protestants, including requests for authority to recruit troops, were generally received sympathetically. The extent of involvement in the actual recruiting of mercenaries by its members varied over the course of the period, ranging from cognizance and consent to outright collusion. Privy councillors and JPs alike cooperated with captains and their representatives from c.1595 as part of a conscious policy of contributing to the war at reduced cost, with England supplying the manpower and the Dutch bearing the expense. Otherwise, the crown and its agents generally took a laissez-faire approach. Outside the periods of open war (1562-63, 1585-1604), requests for military assistance were nominally refused, but secretly granted, in various forms. On different forms of aid to foreign Protestants see ch. 3, below, pp. 102-4; and also D. J. B. Trim, 'The Secret War of Elizabeth I: England and the Huguenots during the Early Wars of Religion', HSP 27 (1998-2001): 189-99.
but while the government also permitted troops to be recruited for foreign service it was less hands-on in supplying men than money or military stores. Furnishing mercenaries was more the responsibility of members of the regime acting individually, albeit often with the knowledge and sanction of their fellows.

This is also revealed by the financing, equipping and provisioning of the mercenaries, as chapter 6 shows. This was an exceedingly complicated affair, thanks to the nature of early-modern military fiscal systems, which are consequently briefly explored. The importance of personal credit networks emerges, and these are also briefly explored. It becomes clear that without a reasonably wide base of support, amongst the merchant community in particular, but also from gentry and nobles, captains not only could not obtain commissions (as shown in chapters 3-4) but also could not maintain their companies in service. The reality of the workings of the military finance system has a number of important implications -- not least for the possible motivation of captains and their backers, which are briefly suggested.

Recruitment is dealt with much more directly in chapters 7-8. These demonstrate that men were rarely coerced into participation in Jacob's wars. Most mercenaries came from, or were recruited through, aristocratic affinities. The number of peers was inevitably small, but was significant in terms of the total noble community in England, while the numbers of gentlemen were remarkably high; moreover, these gentlemen were generally followed into the ranks by men to whom they had a personal connection. Thus, contrary to the picture painted by most studies of early-modern soldiers of fortune, English and Welsh soldiers on the whole chose for themselves whether or not to be mercenaries. The various possible methods of recruitment are considered in chapter 7. It shows that conscription and public solicitation for recruits were relatively unimportant sources of manpower for the mercenary companies over the period as a whole. In chapter 8, recruitment through affinity is analysed. The widespread existence of military dependences both small and large within important Protestant affinities is documented in this chapter. The 'military dependence' (a contemporary term) comprised all those followers within an affinity, regardless of their type(s) of relationship to the lord, with military experience, skill and/or propensity. The term implies that these followers were not simply a haphazard collection, but had been
embraced by the lord into his affinity at least partly for the military resource they offered. Chapter 8 argues that military dependences were often built up from very small dependences in a pyramidal structure, were historically a standard basis for military recruiting, and were of crucial importance in recruiting mercenaries. In some ways, this is the most important chapter in the thesis, inasmuch as its conclusions give rise to many questions and cast light on a number of issues. However, its arguments build on the preceding chapters and on the data contained in the appendixes.

In conclusion, chapter 9 pulls the threads together. It summarises the findings of this dissertation and shows how they support my overall thesis. It draws attention to some additional, wider implications for scholarship of what has been found in my research and is elucidated in the following chapters. It finally posits some wider conclusions about the motivation of the English and Welshmen employed in France and the Netherlands from 1562 to 1610. I suggest their main reason for fighting for foreign Protestants was (to use the words of the agent of the States of Holland in London writing to Elizabeth’s ambassador to the States-General in 1585) ‘the service that will be thereby to God and the advancement of religion and the common cause’. For those English and Welshmen who organised, financed and fought as mercenaries for the Huguenots and Dutch this was, as we will see, the leitmotif of the wars in which they participated.


\[97\] Jacob Ortell to William Davison, 27 Apr. 1585, CSPFor., 19:431.
CHAPTER TWO
CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS, MODERN AND EARLY-MODERN

An obvious question to ask about the English and Welshmen who fought in France and the Netherlands from 1562 to 1610 is 'were they mercenaries?' There is no simple answer. As will be seen, the word 'mercenary' has a narrow lexicographical meaning, but it also has a wider significance and a set of values which it generally connotes. In order fully to answer the question it is necessary to be aware of the different possible meanings and the contexts from which they originate. This is neatly brought out in the life and opinions of one English soldier, Francis Markham. In 1622, after nearly fifteen years of service on the Continent, he noted how, 'for mine owne part I have seene ... in the necessitie of affaires ... that ... voluntary Gentlemen have beene more diligent in Watches, and more severe in performing all manner of duties then any mercenary Souldier whatsoever'. By modern standards, a 'mercenary Souldier' was precisely what Francis Markham and several of his kinsmen had been, yet they neither thought of themselves, nor were thought of by contemporaries, as mercenaries. His key distinction is between the volunteer and the mercenary: for the former, service as a soldier was an avocation; for the latter it was a profession.

Definitions and Historiography

Introductory

Attempts to investigate mercenaries of any nationality or century are plagued by the problem of definition -- just what and who is a mercenary? This thesis offers two answers: the first, purely functional, defining the terms of reference of this thesis (as opposed to what mercenary means lexicographically), has

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1 It is one that has been posed to me, by British, American and Dutch scholars, after at least ten seminar or conference papers deriving from this thesis.
already been outlined. All men who either fought abroad when England was not (at least nominally) at war, and/or who, in time of open war, fought in a unit paid by foreigners or accepted a military commission from them, are considered mercenaries for the purpose of this study.

This does not, however, define 'mercenary' more generally, in terms either of universal characteristics or common denominators -- and as we will see, it is a word susceptible to many meanings. Specifying who or what mercenaries were for the purpose of this thesis begs the question, 'What are mercenaries in the wider sense?' We will also see that most scholarship that deals with mercenaries, if only tangentially, is greatly influenced by the answers given, if often implicitly, to that question. I provide two answers to it: first, what being a mercenary means in the present day; second, what it meant in the early-modern world. Analysing use of 'mercenary' and cognate terms in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century books and manuscripts reveals that both the word itself and the concept of mercenary service had well-recognised meanings and that they differ decidedly from modern ones.

Present perceptions of mercenaries are of more than just academic interest because, as will be seen, they arise from prejudices and pre-conceived ideas which have informed and still influence historical analyses of mercenaries in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Many scholars conclude that early-modern soldiers of fortune were commonly regarded with disfavour or contempt, and that the universal use of mercenaries in the period was an unfortunate necessity forced on unwilling regimes. These conclusions are based partly on early-modern evidence (as will be seen), but just as much or more on modern presumptions.

Modern Definitions

It seems easy, on the face of it, to define a mercenary. Virtually always male, he is, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, a professional soldier in the

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3 On pp. 30-31, above.
service of a foreign power for wages or hire; the French dictionary Larousse calls him a 'soldier who serves a foreign government for a price'. Historians, political scientists and journalists, as well as lexicographers, have discussed the issue of definition and, while varying on particulars, reach broadly similar conclusions; as J. E. Thomson points out, their definitions have in common the principle that 'a mercenary is one who fights for an employer other than his own state and whose motivation is economic'.

As with so many aspects of military history, however, difficulties arise in attempting to apply such abstract definitions to real examples. Indeed, the leading authority on modern mercenaries concluded that 'the only totally safe definition is a negative one', on the grounds that 'it is not so much by principles or definition as by practice and intuition that mercenaries are judged and recognised'. Such subjective judgments are not the preferred option of the scholar, but in certain circumstances they may be appropriate; it is the approach to definition that I adopt in this thesis. This is not simple and clear -- indeed, it has marked possibilities for vagueness and ambiguity; however, it is necessary to utilise broad descriptions rather than precise formulations because of the nature of the subject. As the United Nations' special rapporteur on mercenaries admits, even today there is often 'no simple and straightforward answer' to the question of who, in practice, is a mercenary, even with well-established theoretical criteria. The difficulties in applying those criteria to earlier periods are much worse and likely to lead to distortion. These difficulties are both practical and theoretical, and arise from the modern preconceptions that underpin attempts at definition: almost all

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5 OED, s.v. 'mercenary'; Grand dictionnaire encyclopédique Larousse (1982 edn), s.v. 'mercenaire': 'Soldat qui sert à prix d'argent un gouvernement étranger'.
7 Mockler, 35. See also Shearer, 18-24, 76; Tickler, 147.
assume the existence of national armies and clear-cut national loyalties. They typically discount the different types of armies and loyalties that existed in earlier periods and the consequent different possible nuances of the term ‘mercenary’.

The foreign soldier enlisting for pay is an ubiquitous type in history, as V. G. Kiernan observes. But at different times in history, quite different types of troops have been called mercenaries. ‘Mercenary’ (and its allied phrase ‘soldier of fortune’) have been and are used to describe many different kinds of troops, with different kinds of service conditions and all sorts of reasons for their service: bands of purely professional soldiers, raised, commanded and hired out by their own leaders, whatever their motivations, and whether they always strictly served their supposed employers or not; the foreign members of regular units (often bodyguards), which were part of a state’s permanent establishment; and bodies of troops hired out by one state to another, whether of its own citizens or foreigners, or a mix, under foreign officers or not. It also describes officers and technicians contracted or seconded to the armies of other states, either at their own initiative or at that of a hierarchy to which they owed loyalty; and individual soldiers of fortune, lone adventurers, who often acted as specialists, but who also sometimes commanded or served in the ranks of units of a foreign army (whatever the national origins of those units).

All these categories are, again, descriptive, rather than prescriptive, for even if one were to devise a theoretical model of all the different types of mercenary service which occurred during the European Wars of Religion it would still be difficult to correlate the nominal definitions to the examples of historical reality. As we will see, large numbers of English and Welsh troops saw active service abroad between 1562-1610, but all the original units in France and the Netherlands were mercenaries. Many of them later served with the queen’s official forces, in the British Isles, France, the Netherlands, the Iberian peninsula, or all four, sometimes thereafter serving again in mercenary companies. In any event, arrangements for recruiting and paying

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10 Kiernan, 66.
11 My discussion is informed by that in Mockler, ch. 1, esp. 33-34; see also McCormack, 110-12; Taulbee, 149; Nossal, 20-21 – the last two clearly heavily influenced by Mockler.
royal troops in Elizabeth's reign were often heavily dependent on private enterprise in any case, so that companies in national service had not always been raised by the efforts of the state. There was, in sum, only a blurred line between royal and private. Furthermore, units alternated between different types of service (royal and mercenary) within the same country, as well as between countries; and some solely English armies, operating outside the Netherlands, contained only companies raised by the crown, whereas others contained a mix of royal and privately-raised units. Different individuals, too, alternated between different theatres, as well as different types of units, while some also served in the armies of other princes and states.

Most modern mercenaries have been veterans of national armies, but their careers as mercenaries commenced on their discharge. Employment in 'private military companies' is not regarded as a step on the same career path as service in a national army.\(^{12}\) From the 1590s, however, many English veterans, applying to the government for pensions or further employment on the grounds of long service to their queen, petitioned partly -- in a few cases wholly -- on the basis of having served the Huguenots or Dutch. Both royal and private services are listed in their petitions indiscriminately: clearly, no difference was seen between the two.\(^{13}\) Units of the French royal army were commanded by members of the houses of Lorraine, Savoy, Navarre and Tour-Bouillon -- sovereign princes and their kin, yet integral members of the French court and military establishment.\(^{14}\) Many of the German troops hired by the Dutch were from the German lands of members of the Nassau clan, raised at the orders of men who were not simply condottieri, but among the chief officers of state of the United Provinces.\(^{15}\)


\(^{13}\) Examples of petitions: 'The Booke of Captaines, Lieutenaunts and other officers at the warres', BL, Lans. MS 1218, ff. 113-40; Cecil MS 41, f. 109; APC, 26:463; HMCS, 14:283. See also Henry, 43; Stone, Crisis, 457-58.

\(^{14}\) They were in some senses vassals of the king of France, but as the title of a contemporary's celebratory memoir indicates, they were still 'princes estrangers en France' [emphasis mine]: AAE, MDF 28. For lists of gendarmerie companies see: BL, Add. MS 35831, f. 159; BN, MSS Fr. 3159, ff. 132-36; 3185, ff. 15-16, 73-74; 3193, ff. 185-87; and MS Nafr. 8626, arts. 5, 10.

In short, the history of English military involvement in France and the Low Countries provides many examples of the practical difficulties in trying to pin down whether a soldier had served ‘an employer other than his own state’ -- that is, of trying to apply a modern definition to a sixteenth-century situation. Those difficulties are the consequences of a theoretical approach predicated on modern conceptions of nationality and statehood. In medieval society, loyalty was to a particular lord or hierarchy, rather than to nonexistent national governments. This was changing in the early-modern period, but while the roots of nationalism have been identified as early as the sixteenth or even fifteenth centuries, ‘nationalism’, in its current sense, developed out of the French Revolution. It is a nineteenth-century creature, associated with liberal philosophy and politics, and improved government administration and bureaucracy -- a modern, more than an early-modern, concept. Disloyalty either to sovereign or state has always been seen as morally wrong, but in the present day, taking arms for another country is regarded as intrinsically disloyal and thus immoral; yet this perspective is a consequence of the rise of nationalism and is relatively recent.

Foreign military service is, moreover, regarded as especially immoral, because war itself has come to be seen as morally dubious. This, too, is a modern development; attitudes to war in the late twentieth century are very different from those of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The view of warfare in Western society today is partly a product of developments in European civilization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, partly of the horrific experiences of the two world wars of the twentieth century. Now, more than ever, war is repugnant, to be waged only as a last resort. When it is undertaken, it is expected to have clear political goals and to be brought to an end quickly. Conflicts which do not meet these expectations are widely regarded as futile while the generals who conduct them are condemned as failures. Certainly it is accepted that civilised nations should only resort to war as a final option.

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17 See John Keegan, A History of Warfare (London: Hutchinson, 1993), 357; Mockler, 22-23; Bartlett, 16; Stradling, Irish Mercenaries, 16-17; McCorry, 5; Herd, 'Bravehearts Abroad', 119; Taulbee, 151.
Because war is now seen as intrinsically immoral, military service is also seen as wrong, justifiable only if it is for one's nation or, occasionally, in a clearly moral cause. The idea that men might take part in so infamous an activity as war for money alone is reprehensible. In consequence, when soldiers employed by a state other than their own are nevertheless fighting in what is widely perceived to be a 'just cause' (e.g., that of the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War), they are usually termed 'volunteers' -- not mercenaries. The implication is that they are motivated by principle rather than by profit and therefore that their actions are excusable. Modern mercenaries, many of whom are well-read in military history, for this reason typically insist that they are volunteers and even emphasise their potential use in peacekeeping or humanitarian relief. On the whole, however, as they well know, soldiers who fight for other countries are regarded -- at best -- as 'profliteers exploiting violence for personal gain' and -- at worst -- as 'whores of war' or even simple 'assassins'.

These modern views are important because they are directly reflected in the assessments of historians. Historians of Scottish mercenaries have complained because, 'from the tone of some authors, it would seem that Englishmen serving in foreign armies were always "volunteers" and Scotsmen "mercenaries" '. Seventeenth-century Irish mercenaries are commonly known as the 'Wild Geese' -- a term which, as a modern historian observes, has come to be used as a synonym for "mercenaries". ... its current employment is often ... a conscious and necessary euphemism ... [in contrast to] the more "realistic" image, nurtured by the traditions of the British state, of foreign mercenaries, in any age, as little more than hired killers ...

Historians rarely work in isolation from society: 'modern commentators share an implicit negative attitude toward mercenaries'. These modern preconceptions and the prejudices engendered are highly influential -- all the standard scholarly definitions are flawed, because they reflect anachronistic

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19 Mockler, 22, 34; Corvisier, _Essais_, 128, 211, 275; Taulbee, 152.
20 See Spicer, _Unorthodox Soldier_, 23-24, 28-47; Mockler, 10, 298, 483; Tickler, 150, 208; Shearer, 11-14 at 13; Nossal, 18, 33.
21 Ferguson, _Papers_, 7n. Bartlett, 16, and McCorry, 3-7, make similar points.
22 Stradling, _Irish Mercenaries_, 16.
23 Taulbee, 156.
assumptions about mercenaries and the nature of war itself. This is reflected in the definitions of mercenaries proposed even by pre-modernist historians. They attempt to avoid issues of 'nationality', but their definitions still reflect the assumption that a mercenary is, ipso facto, operating outside normal authority, motivated chiefly by self-interest and therefore likely to be disloyal. One classicist defined a mercenary as 'a professional soldier whose conduct is dictated not by his membership of a political community but above all by his desire for gain'.

A prominent medievalist sums up the mercenary neatly as being a 'specialist, stateless and paid'.

The influence of these assumptions is notably evident in early-modern historiography. Modern writers on conflicts from the late-fifteenth to the mid-seventeenth centuries highlight and indict the willingness, or enthusiasm, of mercenaries of all nationalities to strike (in effect), defy their officers or desert if they had outstanding grievances, and, when these included lack of pay, to plunder the very people they were supposed to protect; to change sides in response to bribes; and to refuse to fight, when combat was imminent, unless paid special, uncontracted bonuses: in effect, blackmailing their employers.

Spanish reliance on mercenaries has been taken as evidence that the Spanish monarchy was nefarious and weak. The pre-eminent historian of German mercenary captains characterised them as 'pugnacious, quarrelsome, courageous ... but faithless'. The pioneering military historian, Sir Charles Oman, simply attributed to all mercenaries of the era an 'absolutely

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24 Yves Garland, La guerre dans l'Antiquité (Paris, 1972), 67, quoted in Contamine, Guerre au Moyen Age, 205; and adapted by McCormack, 36.

25 Contamine, ibid.: ‘Le mercenaire devra réunir la triple qualité de spécialiste, d'apatride et de stipendié’.

conscienceless mentality'; he concluded that, 'whatever their nationality, they were most unreliable material'.

Modern Scholars and Early-Modern Soldiers

These attitudes to mercenaries are, in part, merely symptomatic of a more general drift in early-modern historiography. Soldiers of fortune are particularly liable to condemnation, but sixteenth- and seventeenth-century soldiers generally are described in negative terms.

This trend stems, at least in part, from modern views of the undesirability of war and hence of those who practice it, or are associated with it. The well-known axiom that 'war is too important to be left to the generals' has inspired suggestions that military history is too serious a matter to be left to military historians. This is given as apologia in the forewords of two important recent studies of 'war and society' and there is a clear implication that scholars who fail to accentuate the negative qualities of soldiers are, if not actually guilty of warmongering, at least not practising serious history.

In any event, the conventional view of sixteenth-century armies is that they were, in the words of Professor Corvisier

a refuge for all those who desired to escape constraints of all kinds: sons rebelling against parental authority or fleeing punishment, evading family constraints; young men unable to endure social constraints, the restrictions of the parish, village or district community; or with no taste for work and thus avoiding judicial control; delinquents ... men threatened by lawsuits or utilising the enlistment bonus to pay serious debts. ... Enlistment was a means of escaping from miserable poverty. Recruiting was easiest in times of scarcity and famine.

Similar statements have been made freely about both soldiers and recruiting

29 Corvisier, Armées et sociétés, 144-45.
processes in the whole of Europe throughout the whole of the early-modern era. However, these are generally based on studies of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (particularly Corvisier’s ground-breaking books on the French armies of Louis XIV), rather than studies of the sixteenth or early seventeenth centuries. The historiographical orthodoxy on armies of the earlier period is a product of wide-ranging surveys, textbook histories, works on later armies, nineteenth- and early twentieth-century ‘battle histories’ and biographical studies. Even specialist works are often based only on literary, autobiographical, or theoretical sources. When the existing orthodoxy is based on such foundations, it must be reconsidered.

For example, historians traditionally portrayed French and Spanish infantry of the late sixteenth century as drawn from the dregs and scum of society. However, James Wood’s definitive study of the royal French armies during the early guerres de religion argues that while the majority of ordinary foot-soldiers came from the lower orders, they were actually drawn

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31 Corvisier himself admits the chronological limitations of his evidence: Armées et sociétés, 146 (cf. 155-61), but he has not only influenced studies of the French army. H. L. Zwitzer, De militie van den staat: Het leger van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden (Amsterdam: van Soeren, 1991) -- who also draws mostly on 18th-century evidence -- relies on secondary sources including Corvisier for the pre-William III period. Parker, Army, devotes much space to the period after the 12 Years Truce (1609) and his conclusions on the 16th century are in any case obscured by the 17th-century focus of the analysis of recruitment in his influential Military Revolution, ibid., which draws heavily on Corvisier's L’armée française de la fin XVIIe siècle au ministère de Choiseul: le soldat, 2 vols. (Paris: Université de Paris Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines, 1964) and specifically recommends both Corvisier's Armées et sociétés (in translation), and Hale, War -- who also draws on Corvisier!

32 Corvisier, Armées et sociétés, 9, points out, ‘la documentation sur les problèmes abordés ici est encore très inégale de valeur ou d’accès: synthèses récentes, articles divers posant ou problématique ou de caractère monographique, ouvrages vieillis mais non remplaces, enfin, pour les pays les plus défavorisés, pages tirées d’histoires générales’. This is still true: e.g., see the works cited by J. Michael Hill, ‘Gaelic Warfare 1453-1815’, in European Warfare 1453-1815, ed. Jeremy Black (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999), 201-23, notes at 271-74.


from reasonably respectable professions: 'artisans, domestics, students, and paralegals'. Spanish recruitment in the seventeenth century did rely on the compulsion of the poor and criminals -- but this was due in large part to the effects of famine and plague in the late 1590s and the crisis of the Thirty Years' War, which forced a change from the system used during the first half of the Eighty Years' War. Up to 1609 and perhaps after, most Spaniards in arms were volunteers. In England, it is true that known criminals, vagrants, mendicants and other unemployed 'masterless men' feared by contemporary society were deliberately conscripted to serve, especially in Ireland, as part of a conscious policy of social cleansing. However, volunteers were always preferred and made up a large proportion of the rank-and-file. Some local authorities in England and Wales conscripted social 'undesirables' into royal armies, but others deliberately excluded the poorest members of society.

What of mercenaries in particular? The first Scots troops in Dutch pay (1572) were 'idle men' and unemployed soldiers, who in time of famine were ordered by the Privy Council of Scotland 'to pass to the wars in Flanders or other foreign countries', lest they were 'drawn to any desperate necessity'. Into the seventeenth century, beggars, bankrupts, and criminals, given the choice of foreign service or death or imprisonment, continued to comprise a fair proportion of Scots mercenaries on the Continent. English governors in Ireland encouraged service abroad to counter 'the potential threat [of] "idle swordsmen" in the country'; like the Scottish privy councillors, they regarded foreign military service as 'a means of social control'. German landsknechts are generally perceived as 'a species of uprooted waifs and strays', jobless

35 Wood, King's Army, 97, 99.
36 Parker, Army, 40-47; Thompson, War and Government, 104-7, 116, 121, 125 (while dating the change to the mid-1580s, Thompson, too, highlights a greater recourse to conscription after 1609); Stradling, Irish Mercenaries, 17-18, 21-22 (indicating a shift in the late 1620s); René Quatrefages, 'Un professionnel militaire: l'infante du tercío', in Homme de guerre, 191.
38 E.g., Devon RO, Q51 1/1, p. 10; Ann J. King, ed., Muster Books in North and East Hertfordshire. 1580-1605 (Hertfordshire Record Soc. Publications, 12, 1996), xx, 148.
39 Ferguson, Papers, 3; Henry, Irish Military Community, 37; and see ibid., 23-29; Herd, 'Bravehearts Abroad', 123; Shurmer, 93-95; Dunthorne, 'Scots in the Low Countries', 109; Bartlett, 20; C. A. Blake, 'Stuart Policy and Scottish Mercenaries in the 30 Years' War', in TRHS, 6th ser., 9 (1999): 356.
and often homeless men forced to choose between mercenary service or brigandage.\textsuperscript{40} The phenomenon of Swiss mercenary service is frequently explained by reference to overpopulation -- ordinary soldiers seem mostly to have been young herders from the poor alpine hinterland.\textsuperscript{41} Sixteenth-century Italian soldiers of fortune have been depicted as composed chiefly of drifters, adventure-seekers, bankrupts and criminals, 'drawn from a poor and restless population', the more 'settled and prosperous' members of which rarely enlisted.\textsuperscript{42}

There is undoubtedly some truth to these perceptions, but important exceptions need to be noted. Many Scotsmen in Dutch employment were of aristocratic birth; this was true of Scottish mercenaries throughout the period to 1609, during which time the 'vast majority of men serving in the Scottish companies volunteered to fight in the Netherlands of their own free will'. The recruitment of prisoners became common only during the Thirty Years' War.\textsuperscript{43} Similarly, while Irish 'swordsmen' were encouraged to serve overseas by the English government as a way of easing tension within Ireland, the majority of those who fought as mercenaries enlisted voluntariness, both because of strong (Catholic) religious feeling, and because they had personal ties to the many men of aristocratic birth who chose adventure or exile abroad: 'the essential nature' of the recruitment of such men, in turn, 'was voluntary.'\textsuperscript{44} As a recent study makes clear, whatever the situation in the reign of Louis XIV and after, 'a Swiss recruit in the sixteenth century was not one of the dregs of society disappearing into the anonymity of army life. He was a member of a society, temporarily away from home.'\textsuperscript{45} Many Italian noble and merchant families supplied condottieri recruits; they served in a variety of ranks, with captains commonly recruiting from their affinities, particularly from their tenants and kin networks.\textsuperscript{46} Finally, recent studies demonstrate that sixteenth- and early

\textsuperscript{40}Redlich, \textit{Enterpriser}, 118-20, at 118.
\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., 118-19, 457; McCormack, 11-13, 78-80.
\textsuperscript{42}Mallet & Hale, 315, 321-24 (at 321), 329, 487-89.
\textsuperscript{43}Ferguson, \textit{Papers}, 5-7; Herd, 'Bravehearts Abroad', 128 n.18; Shurmer, 94; Bartlett, 17-18.
\textsuperscript{44}Henry, \textit{Irish Military Community}, 40-44 at 41; see also Cassaway, 481-88; Stradling, \textit{Irish Mercenaries}, 17, 125, 134-35, 158; idem, 'Military Recruitment and Movement', 482; McGurk, 'Wild Geese', 40-42.
\textsuperscript{45}McCormack, 74, 80.
seventeenth-German mercenaries were more socially diverse than Redlich indicated -- even he conceded that, though most 'came from the lower strata of the rural and urban population ... they were not necessarily scum as were most of the contemporary English soldiers'.

Redlich provided no evidence to support the last assertion, apparently taking it as self-evident. This is indicative of the depth of prejudice that exists on this subject.

Summary

The picture of sixteenth-century soldiers that emerges from recent specialist studies is a complex and variegated one, in which mercenaries, volunteers, conscripts and men performing feudal duties all operate side by side. Thus, the received wisdom that all soldiers in sixteenth-century Europe had been compelled by the state or constrained by circumstances is a stereotype, the survival of which is due to misapplication of evidence from later periods and to frequency of repetition. It has too many exceptions simply to be applied to a particular group without further investigation.

However, the soldiers of Elizabethan and Jacobean England and Wales are still discussed in terms of this cliché in most general narratives and surveys, biographies, studies of cultural, ecclesiastical or intellectual history, and literary criticism. Moreover, the stereotype is often applied to the mercenaries who served in France and the Netherlands; consequently, when they do appear in scholarship dealing with this period it is as 'rogues, vagabonds, idle, dissolute and masterless persons'.

Thus, it is not only in proposed definitions of mercenary service that the influence of modern prejudice against mercenaries can be seen, but in historical analyses as well. As Robert Stradling observes: 'Prejudice against mercenaries comes from deep wells in [our] culture ... and is still widespread today.' in considering the English and Welsh soldiers who fought in Jacob’s

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47 Lafarge, 186-88; Burschell, ch. 2. Redlich, Enterpriser, 456-57.
48 Fortescue, 167. See, e.g., Oman, 374, 549; Read, Burghley, 139, 158; Hale, War, 109, 116, 147; Kiernan, 77; Wilson, Revolt, 29-30, 68, 107-8; Holt, Anjou, 177; Dop, 127-28; Lowe, 418-19; Michael Hattaway, 'L’Homme de guerre chez Shakespeare', in Homme de guerre, 325-35; Curtis R. Breight, Surveillance, Militarism and Drama in the Elizabethan Era (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 55-61, 176.
49 Stradling, Spain’s Struggle for Europe, 268.
wars, it is essential to abandon this prejudice, along with the stereotypical pictures of early-modern mercenaries. They are based on (frequently inaccurate) generalisations about early-modern soldiers en masse, simply transferred to these particular soldiers of fortune, without proper examination of the evidence.

**Attitudes to Mercenaries in Early-Modern Europe**

In addition to an open mind, in order to understand what the English and Welsh mercenaries were doing in France and the Netherlands and why, it is also necessary to appreciate how mercenaries were defined and perceived in early-modern Europe. There was a strong prejudice against mercenaries. However, soldiers fighting for foreign princes or states were frequently not regarded as mercenaries. When they were, it was not because they were fighting for foreigners. Instead, those soldiers perceived as making war their profession or occupation were subject to vituperation as mercenaries, even if in the service of their own sovereign or state.

**Renaissance Hostility to Mercenaries**

There is a considerable body of evidence that modern Europeans' prejudice against soldiers of fortune was shared by their early-modern ancestors. It is not the case that 'the term mercenary in the early modern period lacked the twentieth century connotations of opportunism, brutality and rapaciousness'. One social scientist regrets that it is now 'a term of deprecation rather than a descriptive category'.\(^5\) However, this is not a new development.

In the Middle Ages, as Contamine observes, mercenaries had been 'condemned by all liberal thinkers as part of a humanist tradition going back to Vegetius'. In the sixteenth century they were still subject to vituperative condemnation, not least by many renaissance thinkers who, in approved humanist fashion, cited the opinions of classical authorities and denounced the use of mercenaries as uncivilised.\(^5\) Erasmus termed mercenaries 'a

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\(^5\) Pace Herd, 'Bravehearts abroad', 119. Taulbee, 152.

\(^5\) Contamine, Guerre au Moyen Age, 303: 'mercenaires étrangers, blâmé par tous les bons esprits, selon la tradition humaniste remontant à Végèce'; Mallet, Mercenaries, 208, 272; J. R. Hale, Renaissance War Studies (London: Hambledon Press, 1983), 342, 383; idem, War, 73.
barbarian rabble' and compared them to the Turks. Machiavelli's condemnation of mercenaries is well-known; and Sir Thomas More articulated similar opinions. The works of all three circulated widely in Tudor England and Wales and their attitudes are clearly reflected in contemporary opinion about mercenaries in those countries. Sir Walter Ralegh, for example, declared:

The extreme danger, flowing from the Employment of such Soldiers, is well observed by Machiavel who sheweth that they are more terrible to those whom they serve, than to those against whom they serve. They are seditious, unfaithful, disobedient, devourers, and destroyers of all Places and Countreys, whereinto they are drawn.

And he concluded: 'That mercinary, and foreign auxiliary Forces, are no less dangerous, than the Enemy, against whom they are entertained.'

A similar prejudice against mercenaries is present in the work of Thomas Churchyard (1520?-1604), a veteran of many wars, who defended the reputation of soldiers in many of his prolific publications, but warned that mercenaries should be used only when absolutely necessary. He reflected another tradition of negative opinion in sixteenth-century Europe, deriving from military experience, rather than Machiavelli or More. Military theorists 'repeatedly deplored' the use of mercenaries, even in France, whose kings 'relied on recruitment abroad' to fill their armies. Indeed, an anonymous memorialist of 'the great Battailes of the French nation' attributed Francis I's defeat at Pavia in 1525 to his 'many ... mercenaries or hyred soldiers [who] departed before the battaille'. The influential French military writer Raymond de Fourquevaux, whose Instructions sur le faict de la guerre [1548] was probably read by English mercenaries before it was translated into English in 1589, also ascribed the defeat at Pavia to the unreliability of mercenaries. More generally, he regretted French dependence on soldiers of fortune and

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55 Churchyard's Choice, sig. Mii verso.

56 Potter, War and Government in Picardy, 177;

57 The Muttable and wavering estate of France, from the yeare of our Lord 1460, untill the yeare 1595 [...]. (London: 1597), 16.
contended that men followed the wars from country to country at the peril of their souls. In J. R. Hale's graphic phrase: 'Just as there were good and bad wars, so there were -- to the many who thought in this vein -- good and bad soldiers.'

What was it, however, that made a soldier 'bad'? Contemporaries used 'mercenary' negatively, but modern scholars misunderstand precisely what or who it was sixteenth-century writers were complaining about. The first English translation of Machiavelli's 'Art of War (Dell' arte della guerra)' with its strictures against mercenaries was made by one Peter Whitehorne in the 1550s, while serving with Charles V's army in Africa against the Turks. According to the great Huguenot soldier-writer François de La Noue, 'forces naturelles' should always be used in preference to 'les estrangers' -- but his advice was given to the magistrates of Ypres in 1579, while he was serving the rebel States of Flanders and commanding not only Flemish and French, but also Scots, English and German troops. Churchyard's and Ralegh's statements have already been noted, yet Churchyard served the Imperialists in the 1550s and the Dutch in 1568, 1572 and 1582, while Ralegh fought for the Huguenots from 1568-70. Roger Williams, who was dismissed by the official history of the Dutch army (in which Williams served many years), as 'a genuine "soldat de fortune" ', was himself dismissive of 'mercenaries'. Sir John Peyton the younger, who disparaged 'mercenary service' in a narrative of his travels on the Continent, was the son of a soldier in Dutch pay in the 1580s. None of these soldiers and writers can have defined 'mercenary' in the same way as modern scholars. When sixteenth-century writers condemned mercenaries what they meant by the term was not what we mean by it today.

Early-Modern Definitions

The English and Welshmen who fought in foreign wars were the subject of contemporary admiration, not admonition. This was because the relative

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59 Hale, Renaissance War Studies, 247-48; Schwoerer, 18.
60 Correspondance de François de La Noue, surnommé Bras-de-Fer, ed. Ph. Kervyn de Volkaersbeke (Gand, Brussels & Paris: n.p., 1854), 113.
61 SL, 1:103; Williams, Actions, 82. CUL, MS Kk.v.2, f. 84r.
nationalities of employers and soldiers was not the real issue. Early-modern writers condemn and compliment indigenous and imported soldiers alike and rarely use the term ‘mercenaries’ based on the place of origin of soldiers. It is rather men perceived as ‘bad soldiers’ for other reasons whom they denounce as mercenaries: those who were seen to be serving illegitimately, which often, in practice, meant for pay. This seems alien, but it made perfect sense in the context of early-modern society.

Mercenaries and Nationality

In 1562, English mercenaries taken prisoner after the fall of Rouen were sent to the galleys or summarily hanged ‘for having, against the will of the Queen of England, come to serve the Huguenots’.<sup>62</sup> The French generals wanted also to execute the mercenaries’ leader Henry Killigrew, on the basis that ‘he was a vakabonde and one that was fled his contrye unknowne to the Queen’.<sup>63</sup> In 1573, between twelve hundred and two thousand soldiers of the garrison of Haarlem, some two hundred of them English, were executed by the Spanish as mercenaries after the city’s capitulation.<sup>64</sup> These episodes at first sight appear to show that ‘foreignness’ could delegitimise soldiers -- that nationality was an important factor in defining mercenaries. Hale argues explicitly that, to sixteenth-century minds, ‘the service of foreigners could not be covered by the rightness of a cause not their own.’ Thus, mercenaries could never be fighting in a ‘good’ or ‘just’ war. It is in this context that he advances his imagery of ‘good and bad soldiers’.<sup>65</sup>

However, more significant in determining the fates of these soldiers in foreign pay was the view of both Guise and his allies and the Duke of Alba that their enemies, whether Huguenots or Dutch, were rebels. This tainted their cause and all those who fought for it. The Englishmen taken prisoner at

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63 William Killigrew to Sir William Cecil, 2 Nov. 1562 and Edward Horsey to idem, 14 Jan. 1563, PRO, SP 70/44, f. 84v, 70/48, f. 207v.

64 Tragicall Historie, 3:99; Walter Morgan’s narrative, ASCL, MS 129, f. 27r; Williams, Actions, 130; Motley, Dutch Republic, 2:440-41. For the English numbers, see app. 2, below, p. 316.

65 Hale, War, 140.
Rouen and Haarlem were condemned chiefly because they were foreigners whose service 'could not be covered by the rightness of a cause not their own'. If the real reason for their treatment was probably that they were Protestants and the Catholics hoped to teach other potential foreign volunteers a lesson, what justified and allowed the victors' actions (and was almost certainly also a genuine factor in their decisions) was their perception that the mercenaries' cause was not legitimate. They were not fighting a just war, not because the cause was not their own, but because they were aiding rebels without the sanction of a recognised sovereign power (and against the declared will of their own queen); this in theory also made them rebels and thus illegitimate in their use of force. If the English at Rouen were seen as 'bad soldiers' because they were foreign, the large numbers of German troops in the royal army would have been as well. Dutch and Walloon troops were among the 'mercenaries' whom the Spanish slaughtered at Haarlem, but the Germans and Scots in the garrison were spared. In fact, nationality was incidental.

This can also be seen from the fate of the Protestant army in Mons in 1572. After it surrendered, its Walloon and French soldiers were massacred: the Walloons by the Spanish, as rebels against Philip II; the Huguenots by French Catholic troops as rebels against Charles IX. However, the army's general, Louis of Nassau, was brother and lieutenant of William of Orange, who, as a sovereign prince, had the right to wage war against Philip II if he and his brethren so pleased. Louis's German and English troops, unlike the English at Rouen and Haarlem, were fighting for a legitimate cause. *Pace* Professor Hale, the shield of Louis's legitimacy did cover at least these foreign troops. They were serving a just cause and the Spanish felt obliged to permit them 'to marche awaie in ... order and libertie of mynde'.

There is other evidence that nationality was not very significant in defining soldiers as 'mercenaries'. For example, it is notable that both native and foreign troops were maligned equally for greed and lack of devotion,

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6 In fact, as will be seen below, the English government was complicit but preferred to deny all knowledge of the mercenaries: see ch. 3, passim.
qualities usually attributed to mercenaries, with no hint of special criticism for troops of foreign origin, because of their origins. The Welsh veteran Elis Gruffydd's condemnation of the 'many depraved brutish foreign soldiers from all nations under the sun' serving with him in the army of Henry VIII is often quoted by historians and used, explicitly or implicitly, as evidence of the negative character of sixteenth-century mercenaries and of contemporary prejudice against them. Gruffydd was, however, even more biting in his denunciation of 'the captains from England' who 'took things as merrily as the heart of man could desire' and 'desired wealth quite shamelessly without bothering where it came from. And as far as taking pain and trouble in the service of the king went, the only pain they took was to lie with whores in their beds ... until dinner'. The Earl of Essex's contemporaries lamented the lack of 'manly courage [in] the mercenarie multitude of soldiers' he led to Ireland in 1599, even though all his men were from Elizabeth's domains. The notable, if eccentric, military theorist, Sir John Smythe, used 'mercenary' to mean a foreign soldier, but he also decried alike men who were guilty of 'great disorders and lack of piety ... be they subjects or mercenaries'.

In the same way, those soldiers who served well were also praised for bravery and chivalrous conduct equally, whether serving their own prince or another. A soldier who was motivated by the desire for lasting fame, or 'greediness of glorie and ... the good opinion of the Prince and people', deserved praise for any deeds of prowess, whether or not he was serving in his national army. Just as Smythe did not distinguish in his condemnation, so he praised alike 'such great captains as have been lieutenants general to emperors, kings, or formed commonwealths, or that with regiments of their own nation have served foreign princes as mercenaries'.

Indeed, service in foreign armies could even be regarded as being for country's sake. Churchyard recalled nostalgically of the reign of Henry VIII,

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71 Markham, Epistles of Warre, 22-23; and see Thomas Churchyard, Churchyard's Challenge (London: 1593), 85. Smythe, Certain Discourses Military, 15.
that 'he was counted no bodie, that had not been ... at some valauntee enterprice, And every simple subjecte was given to the advaunsement of his Countrey'. However, valiant enterprises did not advance one's country only if they were performed when serving in its own army, for a paragraph in which Churchyard summarises the deeds done during Henry's wars is followed by a section of many pages, devoted to deeds of prowess done by Englishmen serving in the French and Imperial armies in the 1550s.²²

Foreign service could equate to national service in two ways. Firstly, in a utilitarian sense, a soldier gained experience which he could later use when serving his own prince. Churchyard specifically praised those English soldiers who 'did in courage grow so stout/they travelld for hot wars to finde/And when these men abrode did rome/they brought great skill and knowledge home.'²³ This is readily understandable to modern thinking -- mercenary service can be excused because it ultimately benefits the nation-state. However, secondly and more intangibly, a soldier might simply perform his duties with courage and constancy. Acts of prowess in a just war were deemed praiseworthy, regardless of what Christian state they were performed in or for, and any praise redounded to one's own nation: when Smythe himself served with the Spanish against the Turks in Italy, his actions were 'so honourable that he advaunced the fame of his countrey by the Noblenesse of his minde', as Churchyard recalled.²⁴

Thus, in contemporary literature, soldiers of native and foreign origin are both criticised and praised indiscriminately. This lack of distinction indicates that nationality was not a significant factor in determining whether a soldier was legitimate or not and, therefore, that it was not primarily important in defining a mercenary.

Mercenaries and Wages

The key factor defining a mercenary was that he was paid, whether by another prince or state, or his own. As the Middle Ages waned, traditional obligations no longer proved adequate to supply manpower sufficient for the

²²Churchyard's Choice, sigs. Aii-Dii, at A1 r.
²³A pleasant discourse of court and wars: with a replication to them both. Written by T. Churchyard and called his cherishing (London: W. Holme, 1596), sig. B3v.
²⁴Churchyard's Choice, sig. D4r. Churchyard was one of a group of captains severely criticised by Smythe, so his praise for the latter was despite, not because of, their personal relationship.
armies which states wished to deploy and a gradual change occurred in the
general use of paid troops. Originally, the word 'mercenary' had only been
rarely used to denote a paid soldier, but as the ranks of armies came to be
filled by paid soldiers, a new terminology came into use. Like 'soldier'
(derived from the French soulde -- meaning a soldier's pay -- and related
words in other European languages) 'mercenary' was at first simply a term
used for warriors who fought for pay rather than from feudal obligations, not
necessarily for a foreign state. From the twelfth century, a distinction was
'drawn in theory between knights and gentlemen, who fought in the service
of their lords and for glory, and the mercenaries who fought for anyone who
would pay them and for loot.' This continued to be the case into the
seventeenth century. The meaning began to change during the late-
sixteenth century, by the end of which the term 'mercenary' was applied
more consistently to soldiers in the service of a foreign prince. Throughout
the period examined in this thesis, however, it was also used to describe any
soldiers serving primarily for pay, whether they were in the service of their
own state or not.

Roger Williams was contemptuous of 'Mercenaries, who we know it by
good experience, commonly they follow the best purse', while an English
veteran of royal service in the Netherlands claimed that the Dutch Republic's
generals were corrupt and, on this basis, repeatedly characterised them as
'mercenarie' even though they were all Dutch. However, mercenaries were
not just soldiers pursuing a good pay-off: they were waged soldiers full stop.
At the beginning of the sixteenth-century Sir Thomas More inveighed against
mercenaries: men 'who go forth of their country in great companies together,
and whosoever lacketh soldiers, there they proffer their service for ... wages.'
In the rest of the passage, however, he makes it clear that the reason for his
condemnation was not that they served any nation indiscriminately but that

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75 See Contamine, Guerre au Moyen Age, 174-206 and 275-95, esp. 192, 197-99, 202-5,
277; Hale, War, 61-69, 110; Corvisier, Armées et sociétés, 199; Kroener, 321-22, 349.
77 As it was by Smythe, Certain Discourses Military, 13-16, but NB, that although in general in
this passage he clearly uses the term to describe soldiers in foreign service, his second use of
it on p. 15 is rather as a characterisation of those captains whom he disliked and with whose
views he disagreed; in short, he uses it also a pejorative term.
78 Williams, Actions, 82; Thomas Digges and Dudley Digges, Four Paradoxes, or politique
discourses (London: 1604), 26, 44.
their military service was 'the only craft they have to get their living by'. The
sixteenth-century chronicler who was dismissive of the 'Switzers who for
money became mercenaries', disdained them because they were 'hyred
souldiers': to him, this was the defining quality.79 The celebrated French
Protestant general Gaspard de Coligny also equated mercenaries with
employed soldiers. Unable to pay the Huguenot army after its great defeat at
Moncontour (1569), he successfully appealed to his soldiers -- German,
English and Scottish as well as French -- for their continued loyalty 'because
they were not his hirelings, nor his mercenaries'.80 Ralegh, who was among
the troops Coligny addressed, reflected years later in his History of the World
about the soldiers used by ancient Carthage:

It is disputable, I confess, whether these African and Spanish Hirelings
could properly be termed Mercinaries: for they were subject unto
Carthage, and carried into the Field, not only by Reward, but by Duty.
Yet seeing ... it was not any love to the State, but meer desire of gain
that made them fight ... I hold them ... no better than Mercinaries.81

All these writers and soldiers, from More in 1506 to Ralegh in 1614, under-
stood 'mercenary' in terms that have little to do with nationality but everything
to do with pay -- but they also indicate that the men of whom they were really
critical were those soldiers for whom war was a full-time paid employment.
This was also expressed explicitly: de La Noue censured men who
made soldiering, 'which should be occasional', into a permanent occupation.
When in 1625 Francis Markham wrote that the 'mercynarie' service of the
Swiss 'is their blemish', he meant not that they fought for other nations: their
defect was that, 'making the Art Military their one and onely profession, ... by
the Wars they live.82

In sum, mercenaries were soldiers who served 'for pay': which meant
that they made their living by war. Most soldiers were paid, but, because
mercenaries made war into a 'profession', they were illegitimate, or 'bad',
soldiers by early-modern standards. This is different from modern standards,

79 Thomas More, Utopia (1506), quoted in McCormack, 44. Mutable estate of France, 15-16.
80 Anon. [16th-cent.], 'Histoire contenant les actions [...] de la guerre', BSHPF, MS 371, f. 143v
(emphasis mine): 'car les nestoient ... ny ses stipendiez ny ses mercenaires'.
82 François de La Noue, Discours politiques et militaires, ed. F. E. Sutcliffe (Geneva/Paris: Droz/
Minard, 1967), 210-12, quoted/translated in Hale, 139; Francis Markham, The Booke of
but it was a natural consequence of contemporary attitudes about society, the aristocracy and authority.

**Mercenaries in Contemporary Context**

Why, then, was the full-time soldier a 'bad soldier'. The reasons derive from the contemporary sociocultural perception that living by wages was incompatible with nobility. Therefore, by implication, a man who made his living from being a soldier was not a noble.

This was important since the crucial issue in early-modern definitions of mercenaries was legitimacy: mercenaries in essence were soldiers who used force illegitimately. This is a component of the meaning of 'mercenary' today, but perceptions of legitimacy were different before the development of strong nation states and national identities. The right to use force was vested not only in the nation-state, but also in nobles, who could legitimately fight for foreigners as long as the cause was just. Soldiers who were neither nobles themselves, nor the kin, servants, retainers, clients or tenants of nobles, were perceived to be waging war illegitimately. Since fighting for pay defined one as non-noble, it therefore also defined one as making war illegitimately.

**War as Aristocratic Vocation**

The word 'mercenary' was a pejorative adjective in early-modern England and not only when applied to soldiers. It was used in a financial context: the implication of doing something only or primarily for money was in and of itself negative. In reality, people were of course greedy both in business and domestic life, yet this ethos was basic to the whole of society. Acting primarily for reward was at odds with the Christian concept that too great a desire for money, or covetousness, was a sin. It was also contrary to the example of Christ, who enjoined his followers to give as freely as they had

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84 See 1 Tim. 6:10, 'the desire of money is the root of all evil'. The more familiar 'love of money' is the usage of the Authorised Version; but Tyndale in 1534 had rendered it 'covetousness is root of all evil' which is, of course, redolent of the Tenth Commandment (Ex. 20:17).
received, which, as Professor Davis shows, was an important factor in the enduring importance of the 'gift mode of exchange' in early-modern European society.\textsuperscript{85}

The nobility was no more moral than society generally, but these underlying concerns particularly influenced noble ethics and not only for theological reasons. Landed wealth was a key aristocratic attribute; and the most generally accepted distinguishing mark of a gentleman in early-modern England and Wales was that he had sufficient wealth to maintain himself without labouring.\textsuperscript{86} Those who had to do something 'for money' sent out a signal that they might not be quite aristocratic enough. Being 'given to filthy lucre' was regarded as especially incompatible with nobility and with honour -- the quintessential noble quality. Such views, again, while implicit in holy writ also had a wider currency.\textsuperscript{87} This is clear from Elizabeth's cutting advice to a great peer, involved in a protracted lawsuit against his tenantry, not to 'lose honor to gayne a lyttell money', and the assertion of the seventeenth-century writer, Edward Chamberlayne: 'Tradesmen in all Ages and Nations have been reputed ignoble.'\textsuperscript{88} It is also evident from the telling declaration by one of Elizabeth's heralds that every 'man exercising an occupation or trade [was] unfit and unworthy' to be called 'a Gentleman or Soldier'.\textsuperscript{89}

These considerations influenced the way the nobility conducted itself at war. Military service could not be (or could not be seen to be) 'for money'. This did not mean that members of the second estate could not profit from participation in war but their opportunities to do so were circumscribed by the conditions in which profit was legitimate -- conditions determined by noble culture and the place of the nobility in society.

\textsuperscript{86} Keen, 245-56; Coss, 44-45; Lawrence Stone, \textit{Social Change and Revolution in England 1540-1640} (London: Longmans, 1965), 120.
\textsuperscript{87} 1 Tim. 3:3. The expression may already have entered common currency by Elizabeth's day, since it was also Tyndale's rendering in his 1534 New Testament (and was perpetuated in the Authorised Version's 'greedy of filthy lucre').
In sixteenth-century Europe, war was regarded as properly a vocation, rather than an occupation, and as the prerogative of a limited section of the population: the nobility. This was changing, but in sixteenth-century England as in Europe more generally, the nobilitas remained the professed fighting class of Christendom, comprising a well-known medieval and renaissance triptych with the clergy who prayed and the commoners who worked. Many historians argue that a decline in the nobility’s military significance had led to the decay of traditional, martial values and attitudes among nobles, and thus to their ‘civilianization’. In fact, in the period 1562-1610 the nobility was still fundamentally martial in outlook in virtually all European countries: not least England.

Montaigne characterised ‘the military vocation’ as ‘the ‘distinctive and only and essential way of life of the nobility in France’. This is echoed in a seventeenth-century Dutch chronicler’s identification of nobility with intrinsic courage and military prowess. Recent studies show that similar views were widespread in Henrician and mid-Tudor England. This remained true to the end of Elizabeth’s reign. Gates took it for granted that those who ‘exceede in militarie prowess and worthines, soe do they excell in ... all noblenesse of hart’; Dudley Digges similarly declared that a soldier’s career ‘best becomes a Gentleman’; Markham specifically identified ‘a perfit Gentleman’ as ‘the fittest man to make a souldier’. Barnaby Rich makes a protagonist observe in a Discourse fit to be read of all Gentlemen and Souldiers that ‘the Art military is the principall profession for Nobilitie ... for him that is noble what tytle so honourable as to be called a great souldier?’ Gates, Markham and

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Rich were all veterans; Digges was a military theorist, but even an Anglican divine like Lawrence Humfrey knew that no one 'wageth warre ... but great and Noble men'.

As a result of the identification of nobility with military prowess, the longstanding aristocratic right to bear arms and conduct feuds continued into the early-modern period and, as one medieval historian observes, 'cannot fully be understood by reference to the relation of the individual and the state in the modern world'. The preoccupation of scholars since the pioneers of sociology in the nineteenth century with the rise of the modern nation-state and its monopolisation of violence, has obscured the fact that legitimacy did not only derive from the power of the relatively weak state, but also from the honour inherent in every member of the nobility. Thomson points out that today, 'the legitimate deployer of violence is the state.' In the sixteenth century, however, the 'legitimate deployment of violence', albeit a 'pre-eminent right', was not yet a monopoly, of the state, which in many countries, including England, did not even seek such a monopoly. It was the nobility's armed strength on which the embryonic state drew in time of war. The nobility's right and ability to deploy military force was vital for the state; as long as this was the case, it might aspire to, but could not actually, monopolise the use of violence or force. It 'did not yet monopolize authority or legitimacy, either .... Power, initiative, authority, legitimacy: these things could and did spring from nobles themselves'. Thus, early-modern nobles, as well as nascent nation-states, were 'legitimate deployers of violence': they had a right to use force.

The upshot was that aristocratic violence remained legitimate, or at least tolerated, even when not used directly in the state's service. This was

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\* Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns*, 16, 5; Greene, 'Cultural Significance', 43.

changing, but the powerful sociocultural imperative for sixteenth-century
aristocrats to fight as yet had no corollary that they do so in the employ of
their own state: this was desirable, but not essential.99 Nobles could deploy
force independently to a limited extent, as long as it was not directly against
their prince and as long as it was in a just war (which presupposed a
legitimate cause). All members of the nobilitas (even of the nobilitas minor)
possessed honour; but honour was inextricably linked with violence. Nobles
‘had to be prepared to use force ... in order to live honourably’, as J. P.
Cooper put it. The possession of honour thus sanctioned nobles’ recourse
to independent, or semi-independent, individual military action; as Neuschel
argues, it ‘legitimated the right to private violence’.100 This noble prerogative
was being eroded in the sixteenth century by the consolidation of princely
power and the rise of the state.101 Nevertheless, the right of honourable men
legitimately to use force against lawful enemies endured. Even in the mid-
seventeenth century an English jurist, whose family produced mercenaries,
declared ‘lawful enemies’ in personal, not national, terms.102

Consequently, nobles could, to a certain extent, obtain reward in war
without worrying too much about appearing to be pursuing wealth. Reward
from war had also always been compatible with chivalry and acceptable for
the European nobility. So long as it was gained while fighting in a just war, it
was regarded as merely the by-product of a nobleman’s or gentleman’s
military career, rather than the main reason for it -- and as Shakespeare
observed, ‘tis no sin for a man to labor in his vocation’.103

In sum, when nobles fought in a legitimate conflict they were fulfilling
their perceived social function. So were their servants, retainers, tenants

99 Churchyard’s Cherishing, sigs. B3v, B4r; and above, pp. 77-78, on praise of soldiers in
foreign service.
100 J. P. Cooper, Land, Men and Beliefs: Studies in Early-Modern History, ed. G. E. Aylmer and
101 Redlich, Booty, 2-3; Richard Barber, The Knight and Chivalry, rev. edn (Woodbridge:
Boydell, 1985), 238-39; David Potter, ‘Chivalry and Professionalism in the French Armies of
102 Howard, War in European History, 23; Richard Zouche, Juris et judicii faciales, sive, Juris
inter gentes, et quaestionum de eodem explicatio (1650), cited in Redlich, Booty, 4.
103 Henry IV, Part I, 1.2.116-17. See K. B. McFarlane, The Nobility of Later Medieval England
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 21, 36-37; Denys Hay, ‘The Division of the Spoils of War in
the Late Middle Ages’, HT, Nov. 1965, 762-69.
and clients if they went to war with their lords, for in rendering service to their social superiors they were likewise fulfilling the role society expected of them and could gain dignity and self-esteem thereby.¹⁰⁴

Legitimate and Illegitimate Forms of Aristocratic Military Reward

It was still the case, however, that nobles were not supposed to go to war only to acquire wealth; rather, they served for honour and to further a just cause (though with an expectation that their actions would be seen and rewarded).¹⁰⁵ Thus, while the nature of noble culture and the place of nobility in society meant that nobles could gain financially from military service, at the same time it limited their freedom to do so. The generally perceived incompatibility of profit (and certainly of profiteering) with nobility meant there were only limited conditions in which reward could be garnered, if the accusation of serving for money (which could be prompted by too strong a pursuit of gain) was to be avoided.¹⁰⁶ There were three forms of legitimate reward: first, reimbursement of expenses incurred in taking the field; second, authorised plunder of the recognised enemy; third, gifts from military or social superiors.

To outfit a company for war was extremely costly and soldiers needed to recoup some of their outlay if they were to be able to serve at all. The New Testament provided a warrant for payments on this basis, when the Apostle Paul posed the rhetorical question "Who goeth a warfare any time at his own cost?" thus justifying meeting one's expenses.¹⁰⁷ Much of what captains were paid was in fact genuinely 'recompense', the term used both by Coligny and the English soldier-writer Rich.¹⁰⁸ It was not pay per se, but repayment of the expenses they had already incurred in recruiting and equipping soldiers and

¹⁰⁵ See the memo of Coligny to Charles IX, 'Discours [...] pour la guerre de flandres', [1572], BN, MS Fr. 23335, f. 23r. He distinguishes between a soldier who 'sert pour sa vie et pour son honneur avecques expectation de ses services estant a la veue de son maistre et Prince pour se veoir de luy recompense', and one who 'sert que pour acquier seulement des biens'.
¹⁰⁶ Examples of criticism of aristocrats for too keen a pursuit of wealth while campaigning are in the discussion on p. 89 below.
¹⁰⁷ 1 Cor. 9:7, a text used proverbially in early-modern England (e.g., as quoted in Morrill, 137).
¹⁰⁸ BN, MS Fr. 23335, f. 23r; Barnaby Rich, Riche his Farewell to Militarie Profession [1581], ed. Thomas Mabry Cranfill (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1959), 14. See Keen, 225-26, 229; and ch. 6, below, pp. 201-2, 209.
transporting them to the theatre of war: what the Dutch termed *aenrigt geld* (or in German *enrichtgeld*), *loopgelt*, *recrutgelt* and *transportgelt*. They were not paid on presentation of receipts of actual expenses, but at an agreed rate per head which probably included a profit margin. Nevertheless, it was still the case that a captain's income was limited by his outgoings.

Plunder was a second obvious source of renumeration. It was only a slight exaggeration to say, as did one English soldier-poet, that 'The Soldiour liv's by spoile'. Scholars often assume that plundering was necessarily illicit or immoral. In fact there was legitimate as well as illegitimate plunder, just as there were legitimate and illegitimate soldiers. Plundering churches (except those of false religions), civilians, or women was illegitimate, but pillaging lawful enemies was entirely proper. This had been the case in the Hundred Years' War, for example (to which Tudor soldiers looked back as a model). It was still true in the period in question. The taking of booty from lawful enemies was acceptable because it was seen as a legitimate source of reparations for damages done to the victor; for enmity, as already noted, was still often constructed in personal, not national terms. It was justified from the Old Testament, while the widespread belief that victory in battle was divinely ordained led naturally to perceiving booty as a reward given by God. This interpretation was endorsed by Catholic and Protestant thinkers (including Luther), and by Elizabethan and Jacobean military commentators. Thus, Digges wrote of ‘the only true and everliving God that gives the victory to them that rightly call upon him for it and rewards plentifully those that deserve it.’ Plunder could thus be seen as enforced recompense or as divine largess: in effect, it could be regarded as one of the other two forms of acceptable reward.

However, to plunder without authority was close to illegitimate: booty in theory was supposed to be awarded by military and social superiors, in

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109 See ch. 6, below, p. 203
113 Cardinal de Lorraine, speech to Charles IX, 28 May 1573, BSG, MS 188, f. 347; Luther (c. 1526), quoted in Redlich, *Booty*, 25. Digges, *Four Paradoxes*, 83.
theory as gifts. This highlights the importance of gift-giving. In the sixteenth century it was natural for a noble warrior to be rewarded for good service and deeds of prowess by presents from his commander and/or lord. This was an integral part of the system of clientage and lordship.\textsuperscript{114}

It was all right, then, for soldiers to receive financial rewards, whether in cash or kind -- if they were gifts. Thus, captains and field officers in Dutch employ (in addition to repayment of expenses) were paid a ‘tractement’ (or salary) and or ‘betaling’ (or fees); but the common soldiers were paid ‘soldij’, or wages.\textsuperscript{115} Sir William Morgan raised and led a troop of horse in the Netherlands in 1572-73 ‘at his owne charges [for] he would not be bounde for wages’ -- signalling that his commitment was to a just cause, not to pay. However, he did accept plunder specifically awarded by his general and patron, Louis of Nassau.\textsuperscript{116} Elsewhere Churchyard records the careers of Nicholas and John Malbie, emphasising that they served, ‘not in paie, but uppon pleasure’ and at their ‘owne charges’ -- that is, essentially voluntarily, from aristocratic vocation rather than from a need to perform paid labour. He nevertheless highlights that the Malbies ‘received good and great entertainment’ from the Earl of Warwick at Le Havre and makes much of their receiving a 500 ducat reward from the hands of Philip II after serving the Spanish against the Turks.\textsuperscript{117} A 1592 book, aimed at Explayning the honourable exercise of Armes [and] the vertues of the valiant to artisans, emphasised that the legendary English fourteenth-century condottiere, Sir John Hawkwood, was given the castles and towers he obtained through his service as a reward for valour, and he disdained ‘hired pay’. Churchyard, in reflecting on his career and the history of war in his time, observed that

\begin{quote}
when kings from bounty fell
And made but wars for their own gaine
The wars were then a second hell
Pleasure therein, was turned to paine’.\textsuperscript{118}
\end{quote}

Reward, then, was desirable for a soldier if it came either in the course of

\begin{footnotes}
fighting that was (at least nominally) to enhance an honourable reputation, or as a gift from his lord or sovereign who himself ought to be generous. This is how it was for aristocrats, but mercenaries accepted wages, indeed, that was their chief distinguishing quality. Thus, a mercenary, by definition, was not a noble- or gentleman.

However, many aristocratic English families owed their prominence and/or wealth to ancestors who had won riches in the Hundred Years' War. Contemporary claims that military service for money derogated the men in question thus may induce scepticism and suspicions that these are rhetorical statements whose purpose was to allow the European nobilities to condemn their social inferiors for actions they wished to keep as their own prerogative. Alternatively, if only three types of reward were acceptable, it might be suspected that all rewards would simply be made to fit one of those categories.

Hypocrisy was not unknown, but its extent should not be exaggerated. Nobles were not necessarily praised and commoners condemned for the same actions. Right throughout the sixteenth century English gentlemen and foreign nobles they fought alongside were censured if their actions gave the impression that they were engaged in 'drudgerie for greedy lucre', which was incompatible with being 'numbred amongst the people of noblenesse & honor'. Those captains of Henry VIII's time who 'desired wealth quite shamelessly without bothering where it came from' and whose 'whole object was to go home wealthy' were deprecated by their fellows; Elizabeth's commander-in-chief in the war against Scotland in 1560 complained that the captains of the vital Berwick garrison 'doth rather serve for game, then for any good Will of Service: And what good Service is like to ensewe of suche Myndes?' In 1584, the officers of the Count van Hohenlohe, then the Dutch captain-general, were denounced because of their 'avarice and greediness, the cursed thirst and lust for gold, the source and original of all evils'. In 1590, the eccentric Sir John Smythe tried to discredit the captains who were

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120 Gates, 35.
122 Bizzari to Walsingham, 30 Jan. 1585, n.s., CSPFor., 19:255: the original is in Italian, but it is clearly stating the essence of 1 Tim. 6:10.
opposing his antiquated views on the art of war by accusing them of 'excessive covetousness'. The charge was probably false, but it shows that aristocrats perceived to be fighting primarily for profit were as subject to reproach as members of the third estate.

The distinctions drawn between serving for money and serving from a vocation can thus be seen to have been meant genuinely by contemporaries even if, typically of social mores, they must often have been honoured in the breach rather than the observance. Contemporary rhetoric that too strong a pursuit of financial reward was dishonourable and hence incompatible with nobility has to be taken seriously, for, as we have seen, aristocratic actions were limited by the need not to act (or be seen to act) for wages. Nobles in military service could be paid their expenses, punish recognised enemies by plundering them, and receive money or property as gifts from their commanders, lords and princes, because they were performing their perceived function in society; the same was true of their followers, when mustered and led by their lords, despite being paid actual wages ('soldij'). Aristocrats together with their followers at war were not, therefore, regarded as 'hirelings and mercenaries' because the rewards they received were deemed compatible with their place in society -- but not, however, if they showed themselves to be mercenary and ignoble in character by excessive pursuit of the legitimate forms of reward, turning their vocation into an occupation and thereby demonstrating 'covetousness'.

In sum, troops perceived to be serving for pay, or as a trade, were ipso facto defined as ignoble. By defining mercenaries as soldiers who devoted themselves to war so that it became their profession and to making a profit at the expense of honour, contemporaries were effectively declaring them as collectively ignoble. The real issue was not pay itself, but what it indicated about men. Soldiers who were obliged to make their living by war signalled that they were either of the third estate, or aristocrats gone bad; and both had their own negative implications.

123 To Burghley, 20 May 1590, in Original Letters of Eminent Literary Men of the Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. Henry Ellis, Camden Soc., 1st ser., 23 (London: 1843), 60. Smythe refers to de La Noue's criticism of Huguenot officers, but clearly applies it to English captains in Dutch service.
'Professionalism' as Plebeian

The flip side of the second estate’s right to make war in early-modern Europe was that members of the third estate did not have a right to use force, save under aristocratic authority. Contemporaries judged that men not possessed of honour could not be trusted with this right -- thus, in Thomson’s terms, they were not ‘legitimate deployers of violence’. As Rich put it, ‘he can do nothing gallantly, valiantly, or forceably, whose minde is not kindeled and inflamed with honourable desire’. However it was also believed that the amount of honour in men ‘diminished as one moved toward the bottom of society’. Masterless men, gone-for-a-soldier outside the affinities of nobles and lacking their justifications (even raison d’être) for making war, could only be seeking loot and the liberty to live licentiously, free of the constraints imposed by an ordered society; or so the social elites presumed. There was thus a corollary to the assumption that, with only a few exceptions, members of the third estate lacked honour: most of them were also assumed to lack ‘honourable desire’. This is why they were forbidden to make war unless led by nobles.

In turn, because mercenaries were seen definitively as ignoble, they, by definition, lacked the noble virtues of honour, courage and resolution; and similarly were, also by definition, making war illegitimately. They were in fact condemned, not because of their nationality, nor yet of their alleged greed, but because of their social origins. The primary evidence on which many modern historians (helped by their prejudices) base many of their criticisms of early-modern mercenaries stems from contemporaries’ reactions to troops perceived as common (or renegade noble).

For example, one chronicler noted how, after the return of the town of Tournai to France in 1518, its garrison was left unemployed. ‘Many a young gentleman, and many a tall yoman wished that they had not spent their time there’; only the latter, however, the yeomen ‘that lacked livyng fel to robbnyng, which would not labor after their returne’. Churchyard wrote dismissively of

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124 See above, p. 84.
125 Rich, Souldier’s Wishe, 15.
the 'mercionarie mane, and common hirelyng' (his bracketing of them in this way is suggestive) that, though 'necessarie instruments for the time', neither 'were souldier[s] fit to be registered, or honoured among the renouned sort of warlike people'. In a treatise on honour, William Segar, later James VI and I's Garter King of Arms, declared that 'Ploughmen' could not 'bee properly called souldiers', even though 'they become oft times men of good service', while 'Victualers, Merchants, Artificers, and generally all men attending their own private profit [were also] excluded.' Illicit, non-noble soldiers were not legitimate soldiers because their greed meant they could not be trusted: 'Full coldly some would fight, and full slowly some would march to the battell, albeit ... wages received.'

Contemporary authors (including soldiers-turned-writers) repeatedly raised the charge of greed against mercenaries and contrasted them with men serving from aristocratic avocation. These authors were themselves aristocratic soldiers, for whom it was useful to have a 'straw man', egregious non-noble soldier, on whose shoulders all faults of military men could be put. Still, the sheer weight of evidence reveals quite clearly what contemporaries perceived mercenaries to be. They were 'bad' soldiers because they made a profession or trade out of war and defined themselves thereby as not only paid, but as ignoble. Their involvement in war was illegitimate since it was (it was presumed) intended 'only to increase their wickednesse.'

**Conclusion**

Mercenaries were defined in early-modern terms, not just as soldiers who were paid (i.e., serving primarily for pay), but also as soldiers who were drawn from the lower orders, with a tendency to act independently (and so illegitimately) — and the two definitions are essentially the same. Soldiers perceived as lacking honour (men who either fought without aristocratic sanction or nobles who had gone beyond what was acceptable in their ethos

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128 Churchyard's Choice, sig. Mi v; also in Churchyard's Challenge, 85.
130 Churchyard's Challenge, 85.
131 E.g., George Whetstone's Metrical Life of George Gascoigne the Poet [1577] (Bristol: John Evans, 1815), 5; Blandy, 18v-19r; Gates, 35-36; Churchyard's Choice, sig. Mii verso; Digges, Four Paradoxes, 80.
132 Digges, Four Paradoxes, 81.
in pursuit of financial reward) were classed as mercenaries, rather than those who fought for a foreign state. This is the reason why the English and Welsh soldiers fighting for the Huguenots and Dutch were not regarded by contemporaries as mercenaries, even though by modern definitions they would be, inasmuch as they were fighting for a state that was not their own. Mercenaries were either aristocratic soldiers who, by making a profession of the calling of arms had abandoned their honour; or soldiers of non-aristocratic origin who were not commanded by members of the second estate. It was not legitimate for mercenaries to deploy violence because they were ignoble and this is why they were condemned.

The difference between ‘good and bad soldiers’ in early-modern Europe was thus between those who fought (even if nominally) chiefly for honour’s sake as part of an aristocratic lifestyle and those who fought primarily for money -- between those for whom war was a vocation and those for whom it was a profession, regardless of whose army they fought in. Contemporaries did distinguish between mercenaries and other soldiers, but the determining, defining factors were financial and, particularly, social -- not national origins. Contrariwise, aristocrats could fight for any sovereign or state which was Christian (Catholics did not necessarily count for Protestants and vice-versa) and had a just cause, without being classed as mercenaries, as long as they conformed to the noble code.

This is a crucial difference from the modern approach to definition and it does not just affect how mercenaries are viewed theoretically. The nature and origins of recruits, which are discussed in the next chapter, are crucial: if the English and Welshmen who fought in ‘Jacob’s warres’ were drawn from the lowest orders, the sweepings of society, then to contemporaries, regardless of the alleged rightness of the cause, they would by definition be mercenaries. On the other hand, aristocrats had the right to deploy violence and so aristocratic soldiers were inherently legitimate, unless they made themselves otherwise by their actions. They, together with their clients and dependents, were operating within the bounds of an ordered society and consequently they and the men under their command, even if fighting in a foreign land, were not mercenaries.

As already seen, however, the idea that military service in general and mercenary service in particular was not dominated by men drawn from
the lowest sections of society is one that goes against most historiographical
trends. That is why, in considering the evidence, an open mind is absolutely
vital. This chapter began with the opinions of Francis Markham. He was one
of several soldiers who indicated that English and Welsh mercenaries were
drawn, not from the dregs, but from the cream of society. Rather than
conscripted rogues, vagabonds and masterless men, the majority of English
and Welsh men who aided the French and Dutch Protestants were
gentlemen or their followers, serving out of choice: 'some Noblemen, some
Gentlemen, and some Yeomen, all Freemen, Good men, Able men'. This
is not the normal, stereotyped picture. It is significant that though the English
and Welsh soldiers who served in France and the Netherlands were
mercenaries by modern standards, they were not generally regarded as
such at the time. Gates concluded that 'as all Souldiers of worthinesse and
knowledge are to bee highly esteemed ... so are the gentlemen, and worthie
people of our nation that have pursued the defensory warres in the lowe
Countries specially to be praised'; Ralegh specifically qualified his ringing
denunciation of mercenaries in general, pointing out to his readers that 'the
Netherlanders [could] very safely repose confidence in the ... souldiers that
came unto them from hence'.

To return to the question posed at the start of this chapter, 'were they
mercenaries?', the answer will be different depending on what the question
is really asking. If it is 'were they mercenaries in modern terms, narrowly-
defined?', the answer is yes, for they served foreign princes; that is why this
thesis uses the term 'mercenaries' for these troops. If the question is 'were
they mercenaries in early-modern terms?', the answer is, of course, no. Most
importantly, if it is, 'were they mercenaries in a more broadly-defined modern
sense', meaning 'were they inherently avaricious, self-serving, unreliable
and/or untrustworthy?', then the answer is certainly no. The bitter
condemnations by contemporaries of mercenaries were not applied to the
English and Welsh soldiers in French and Dutch service at the time and
should not be now.

133 Markham, Epistles of Warre, 25. See ch. 8, below, esp. pp. 279-86.
134 Gates, 58; Ralegh, History of the World, 578; see also Bandy, passim, whose discourse on
what constitutes a 'good trayned souldiar' is merely a preamble to a lengthy narrative of his
own experiences with Sir John Norreys's force in Friesland.
CHAPTER THREE
CAPTAINS, CONTRACTS AND CAMPAIGNS (i): 1562-76

General Introduction

The next four chapters (3-6) examine what the mercenaries did in France and the Netherlands and how they came to be there. The employment of mercenaries resulted from two sets of interactions between three groups of men. First, the men who arranged for mercenaries to serve abroad: often the patrons of the captains; second, the captains themselves: the commanders of the mercenary companies; last, the rank and file of those companies. These four chapters focus on the initial set of interactions: arranging the service of units of mercenaries. This was a complex affair -- the captains’ services had to be procured and their conditions of service, including payment of wages and supply of necessaries, arranged.

This chapter and the two following it explore, by means of a narrative, how the Huguenots and Dutch States got English units to serve them. A narrative is used because it demonstrates how English attitudes towards the employment of mercenaries developed over the course of the period, while also providing a sense of the service records and patterns of English and Welsh troops. Chapter 6 specifically examines the financing of mercenary companies. As will be seen, nobles and their affinities were particularly important in obtaining the service of captains, but they were also active in financing them: aristocratic patrons influenced merchants (frequently also their clients or other followers) to provide cash, credit, goods and services to captains. The commissioning, arranging and financing of captains and their companies were all necessary initial steps in the employment of English mercenaries.

The captains had then to obtain men for their companies. This was the next step in recruitment and the dealings of captains and soldiers is the other set of interactions integral to the employment of mercenaries. It will be seen that captains generally relied on the help of the patrons who had previously acted as intermediaries between them and their foreign customers.
Chapters 7-8 will examine this second set of interactions and show how the captains raised the rank and file of their companies.

What emerges from chapters 3-6 is the vital role of aristocratic patrons, both peers and gentry, in the first set of interactions. What also emerges is the continuity of English military engagement on the Continent maintained though half a century. Mercenaries were present in thirty-eight (and English soldiers in forty-five) out of the forty-nine years from 1562 to 1610. This has considerable implications for our understanding of English attitudes towards Continental Protestants and the wars of religion taking place in Europe.

Between Two Governments

The Huguenots and the Dutch rebels alike had to solve the problem of how to raise an army to resist their oppressors. For both, the employment of mercenaries was an important part of the solution. As Parker and Hale observe, sixteenth-century governments had three options when raising troops: commission, contract and conscription.¹ Sovereigns and states could, by letters patent, commission a man as a captain, authorising him to raise a company within their domains; they could conclude a contract (or indenture) with a captain to supply, typically at a specified time and place, an agreed number of men -- often, but by no means always, recruited in other countries; or they could simply compel their subjects to serve, the conscripts being split up among national forces as required. Both French and Dutch Protestants for much of the period lacked the theoretical power and practical ability to compel military service, while in the Netherlands, even after the quondam rebels gained de facto legitimacy in 1577, the States-General still relied on native volunteers and mercenaries engaged by contract.²

The recruitment process began on the Continent, but its course was largely determined in England. Much about mercenary recruiting is unclear, but a basic fact stands out -- captains did not act in isolation. Enlisting troops for foreign service had to be acceptable to the powers-that-were in the area where recruiting took place. To recruit without permission from the relevant national authorities could result in dire consequences for the captain and for

¹ Parker, Army, 35; Hale, War, 77-79.
² Zwitzer, Militie van den Staat, 42; idem, 'Eighty Years War', 46-47.
those on whose behalf he was acting. To be sure, the princes of a few small German states were themselves military entrepreneurs, making requests for permission superfluous, but this was uncommon; a captain typically acted on behalf of a sovereign or state, regardless how minor, rather than on his own account. The rare captains who maintained permanent cadres were usually themselves on a retainer from a sovereign or state. Thus, when Protestant nobles, synods and magistrates in France or the Netherlands wanted to employ English and Welsh soldiers they had to find captains who would be able to carry out recruiting -- but if that search was to be successful, it had to be at least accepted, if not actually authorised, by the Elizabethan regime. To obtain the services of English captains, then, foreign Protestants had first to obtain the backing of their social and political superiors. As advocates of intervention on the Continent were aware, the agreement of the queen and council was a necessary precursor to any substantial recruiting of English mercenaries.

Official English attitudes to recruiting were complex and not fixed. The exact relationship between sovereign, elites and mercenaries is difficult to assess. Evidence of how foreign Protestants secured the services of English captains is often unclear and frequently implicit, not least because their quest for troops was generally mediated through various other agencies, including concerned nobles and merchants, the French and Dutch refugee churches, and privy councillors. Records of private institutions or persons survive only intermittently; those of government institutions are more frequently still extant but they are often unhelpful since English government ministers customarily took steps to conceal their involvement. However, on the whole Elizabeth I and (at least up to 1610) James VI and I, and their ministers, were sufficiently sympathetic to the Huguenots and Dutch to allow recruiting consistently to take place, albeit sometimes under certain restrictions.

It was due to this approval that captains could be commissioned for foreign service, but a wider degree of support amongst the English political, social and financial elite was necessary. Government officials; peers, great landowners and bishops; London and channel port merchants; French and

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4 Daniel Rogers to Walsingham and Thomas Wilson, 24 Mar. 1578, KL, no. 3833, 10:357.
Dutch refugee communities; and individual captains: all were involved in the employment of Anglo-Welsh mercenary units in France and the Netherlands.

The Early Years 1562-72

Initial Skirmishes: France and the Netherlands, 1562-68

In the first religious war of the period, in 1562, it is possible that the English government initiated the recruiting of mercenaries for the Huguenots, who only obtained the open, royal, English military intervention they wanted after protracted negotiations. Sending English ‘volunteers’ across the Channel to hold the Norman ports until a treaty could be concluded and a royal army dispatched was proposed by Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, the ambassador in France, to Sir William Cecil, the principal Secretary of State. However, the English mercenaries who fought in Normandy may have been recruited by direct Huguenot invitations. The Protestant commander in the province, the Count de Montgommery, had kin in England, while his coadjutor, the Vidame de Chartres, already knew some of the mercenaries’ officers and had passed intelligence to the English in the late 1550s. Some individual Englishmen who, early in the war, simply crossed the Channel and offered their services to the Huguenots were rejected. This may indicate the latter preferred to agree terms and conditions before they employed foreigners.

There was no organised recruiting in England during the second civil war in France (1567-68) or the first revolt in the Netherlands (1568), probably because the short-lived nature of these conflicts gave little time for recruiting English soldiers; those who did serve were in the right place at the right time. A group of English gentlemen had, in 1566-67, served as volunteers against the Turks in Hungary. Several, led by Henry Champernowne, were on their way home through France and joined the Huguenots, together with other individual English volunteers, but all seem simply to have been caught up in

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6 Throckmorton to Cecil, 26 May 1562, BL, Add. MS 35831, f. 34r.
8 Armigal Warde to Cecil, 21 Jun. 1562, PRO, SP 70/38, f. 162r.
events. In the campaign in the Netherlands shortly after, there were English and Welshmen serving as individuals or in small groups, but no English companies in the armies William, Prince of Orange and his brother Louis of Nassau led against the Duke of Alba. There is no evidence that William attempted to recruit in England and hence the Englishmen who fought in this phase of the Dutch Revolt did so on personal initiative -- though unlike those in France at this time, a few did act as agents for their queen's ministers.

This initial conflict in the Netherlands ended in complete Spanish victory. The geuzen (or 'Beggars') maintained the struggle against Spain for the next three years. They comprised the 'Sea Beggars' (watergeuzen), who operated mostly at sea, though they sometimes conducted extensive inland raids; and the 'Wood Beggars' (bosgeuzen), who fought a guerilla-style war on land." Volunteers from England joined both types, but the Wood Beggars recruited mostly in émigré communities, and though indigenous Englishmen comprised a high percentage of some Sea Beggar crews, those ships were a minority and the men enlisted as individuals. The Beggars, by their ad hoc nature, did not have a coherent recruiting policy. As we will see, it was only in the spring of 1572, at the very end of this phase of hit and miss resistance, that the Dutch finally raised units of English soldiers.

9 Camden, i.127; Churchyard's Choice, sigs. Kii, K4v-Li; Sir Henry Norris to Cecil, 11 Mar. 1568, CSPFor., 8:427, no. 2058; A. L. Rowe, Sir Richard Grenville of 'The Revenge' (London: Jonathan Cape, 1937), 60-63; chronicle of Auxerre abbey, Bibliothèque Mazarine, MS 2085, pp. 7-8. See also app. 5, p. 365.
10 Thomas Windebank to Cecil, 18 Jul., anon. to idem, n.d., and John Mersh to idem, 5 Sep., 1568, KL, nos. 1705, 1732-33, 5:129, 156, 158; 'The true reporte of the Prince of Orenges doynges' (anon., but possibly written by Churchyard), ibid., no. 1763, 5:185-90; Churchyard, Description, 39-51; TDH, 10-15; report of Ralph Cromwell, 3 Oct. 1568, BL, Harl. MS 253, ff. 116-17; P. J. Blok, Lodewijk van Nassau ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1889), 67.
Figure 2. Map of France During the Wars of Religion (1562-1598), showing areas of English Mercenary Employment
Figure 3. Map of the Netherlands, 1568-1609
In the meantime, even while the Beggars’ struggle to prolong resistance to Alba was meeting with official English indifference, the Huguenots, led by princes of the blood and other grands seigneurs, were receiving constant injections of English aid. The future of the reformed faith in France seemed increasingly at risk as the 1560s progressed so that, despite the experiences of 1563, by the time the third war of religion began in the late summer of 1568, following a royal conspiracy to kidnap or kill the Calvinist leaders, Elizabeth was happy to help the Huguenots covertly.

The (Calvinist) Cardinal de Châtillon, brother of Gaspard de Coligny (Amiral de France and mainstay of the Huguenot cause), fled to England in September 1568 shortly after the outbreak of the third war, deputed by the Huguenot leaders to persuade Elizabeth to ally with the French Protestants openly. The queen would not do this, but the cardinal and other Protestant envoys sent during the third war of religion were welcomed sympathetically by Elizabeth and her ministers and by ‘godly’ English nobles and merchants, who helped the Huguenot agents to send back to France large quantities of supplies ranging from food and shoes to arms, armour and ammunition.

Use of mercenary soldiers was part of a general policy of aid to the French Calvinists by the English government, but great care was taken to conceal it. The history of one shipment of arms brings this out particularly well.

In the first volume of the Historical Manuscripts Commission’s report on the manuscripts of the Marquess of Salisbury, what is simply termed an ‘Ordnance estimate’ is calendared. The existence of a copy is noted, but not that one of the lists is in French; nor is any connection indicated between the lists of artillery and another document, calendared simply as an agreement of 6 November 1568 between Arnaud de Cavaignes, for Prince Louis of Condé and other Huguenot leaders, and Walter Haddon, for Elizabeth, ‘to supply ordnance and munition of war to La Rochelle.’ This train of six siege

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13 Pace Susan Doran, England and Europe 1485-1603 (London & New York: Longman, 1986), 70, whose assessment assumes that active royal support for the Huguenots was not as great as is the case.
16 HMCS, 1:37-71, nos. 1202, 1208; Cecil MSS 155, ff. 126r-27r and 198, ff. 125r-26r.
guns with twenty lasts of powder, four thousand shot and all the necessary
wagons and equipment, the whole valued at £4,225 12s 8d, was specially
conveyed to La Rochelle by a convoy of merchantmen under the charge of a
well-known Puritan London merchant, Nicholas Culverwell, as a range of
other documents and references in contemporary histories reveal. A cover
story was concocted to the effect that the convoy was simply trading for salt
at La Rochelle and elaborate measures taken to make this credible, many of
the details of which are also revealed in the Cecil Papers. Yet the relevant
documents are preserved in six different volumes of manuscripts and thus
were calendared in two different volumes of the HMC report. This calendars
a contract for salt, agreed by Cavaignes and Haddon on the same date as
the treaty for ordnance, but omits Haddon’s name, making the connection
even more difficult to pick up. Because of the imperfect summary of
documents and their separation from each other, their full significance is not
apparent from the published report.

This convoy had a naval escort commanded by Vice-Admiral William
Winter and, while salt was shipped back (the opportunity for Culverwell and
his consortium to purchase salt was part of their incentive), the venture’s
purpose was to deliver matériel of war to the Huguenots. For doing so,
Culverwell and Winter were each rewarded by the queen of Navarre and the
Rochellais. They are mentioned by name in a letter from the Cardinal de

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17 See Brett Usher, ‘The Silent Community: Early Puritans and the Patronage of the Arts’, in
The Church and the Arts, ed. Diana Wood, Studies in Church History, 28 (Oxford: Blackwell,

18 Most of these are cited in the following four footnotes, as sources for particular points, but in
addition see Cecil, memorandum, Sep. 1568, PRO, SP12147, f. 194-95 (I owe my knowledge
of this to Simon Adams and Brett Usher); commission to Nicholas Culverwell, Thomas Allen
and John Barne, 18 Dec. 1568, CPR, 4:426, no. 2570; Amos Barbot, Histoire de La Rochelle,
ed. Denys d’Aussy, in Archives historiques de la Saintonge et de l’Aunis 17 (1889), 325-26;
Vidame de Chartres to Cecil, 4 Jan. 1569, CSPFor., 9:4, no.13; Agrippa d’Aubigné, L’Histoire
universelle, 3 vols (Maille: 1616-20), 1:283.

19 Lord Keeper, Leicester, Cecil and Sir W[alter] Mildmay to Allen, Peter Osborn and Thomas
Smythe, [1568], Cecil MS 4, f. 68r (HMCS, 13:91, transcribed as William Mildmay); contract
between de Cavaignes and Haddon, 6 Nov. 1568, and Throckmorton, draft articles for agree-
ment between queen, prince and merchants, n.d., Cecil MS 138, ff. 78r-79r and 82 (HMCS,
13:89-90); Châtillon to Cecil, 6 Nov. 1568, Cecil MS 202, f. 63r (HMCS, 1:371, no. 1207);
agreements between de Cavaignes and Osborn, Smythe, Allen, Barne and Culverwell, 12,
and 19 Nov. 1568, Cecil MSS 222, f. 13r, and 138, ff. 80-81 (HMCS, 13:89-90); Culverwell to
Allen, Barne and company, 4 Jan. 1569, Cecil MS 155, f. 77r (HMCS, 1:388, no. 1244).

20 La Mothe-Fénélon to Catherine de Médicis, 30 Jan. 1569, BSHPF, MS 882bis, n.f.; Patrick
Châtillon to the queen of Navarre, found on the corpse of Condé after his
death at Jarnac (13 March 1569) and summarised for royal intelligence. It
confirmed the rumours of the train already current in France and explains the
detailed knowledge French officials had of what was sent, and of its origins. Finding the summary of Châtillon's letter in the Bibliothèque Nationale led
me to investigate the Cecil Papers (not just the calendar) in order to find out
just what had been sent to the Huguenots. Consequently, these events are
here fully revealed for the first time.

Of course, what was sent was artillery, not mercenaries. This episode
has been recounted in some detail, partly because it is a complex story that
requires detailed analysis; partly because this very complexity reveals the
lengths the Elizabethan government would go to in order to keep secret the
efforts taken to aid the Protestant cause in France. It also reveals that this
aid was the result of cooperation between a range of government ministers:
both clear-cut Calvinist internationalists, such as Ambrose Dudley, Earl of
Warwick, his brother Robert, Earl of Leicester, and the Puritan Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Sir Walter Mildmay (all advised by Throckmorton), as well as
Cecil and the Lord Keeper Sir Nicholas Bacon. It was not, then, factional
activity. Moreover, the partly serendipitous discovery of these events
suggests we still do not know about all examples of official English aid to the
Huguenots -- including the employment of mercenaries.

We do know that soldiers as well as supplies were shipped to France. Many, including veterans of the second war, served as individuals in French
companies; others joined the crews of French privateers; but most subjects
of Elizabeth in France probably fought as members of English units. Their

21 BN, MS Fr. 3177, ff. 42r-45r.
22 See Norris to Elizabeth, 9 Feb. 1570, CSPFor., 9:184, no. 680; Mémoires de Michel de
de Rouen, ed. A. Héron (Rouen: Société de l'Histoire de Normandie, 1900), 357-58.
23 Kouri, 42, and Doran, England and Europe, 70-71, both refer to the episode but underestimate
and inadvertently misrepresent the nature of the aid given.
24 All are party to the official documentation cited above, save for Warwick. As Master of the
Ordnance, he would have been consulted about this supply of artillery and munitions. He is
unlikely to have overseen it personally, but that would have been done by the Lieutenant of
the Ordnance, Edward Randolph: Warwick's client and an ardent Calvinist. See Roger Ashley,
'The Organization and Administration of the Tudor Office of Ordnance' (unpub. M.Litt. thesis,
University of Oxford, 1972), 114, 117.
25 On the lack of faction amongst the queen's counsellors at this point see Stephen Alford,
26 See below, apps. 5-6 and 9, pp. 366, 379, 391, 452-53, 505.
existence is difficult to document, but some evidence survives. Henry Champernowne led a horse band in southern France from November 1568, serving first with Montgommery, then with Condé. After the prince’s death, Champernowne returned to England, probably because of his unit’s losses. He recruited a larger company with which he arrived back in France in late September 1569 and famously covered the Huguenots’ retreat after their disastrous defeat at Moncontour on 10 October 1569. This company continued in service with the Huguenots until its captain’s death in May 1570. George North and a fifty-strong band served with Condé from October 1568. In early 1569 stories were circulating in France that three thousand English troops had arrived at La Rochelle. One is inclined to dismiss these as rumours, but the English ambassador in France did not deny that it had happened. Rather, he disassociated Elizabeth from those involved on the grounds that they were ‘evil-minded people who landed solely to plunder’. The story was probably exaggerated, then, rather than fictitious. It is noteworthy that, about this time, the Wood Beggar leader, Jan Camerlynck, believed four thousand English troops had been raised in the West Country to aid Condé, so the numbers involved may have been substantial after all.

The on-going accretion of English troops into the Protestant armies greatly alarmed French Catholics in the spring of 1569, when it was raised as a matter of concern in the council of war of the king’s main army. A small unit of mounted arquebusiers was part of the guard of the Protestant train in the winter of 1569-70. And the following year, one John Young led a force that operated with some success in Aunis.

The evidence for how the Huguenots made connection with captains is sketchy, but it indicates that they partly used direct personal contacts and probably partly used the mediation of aristocratic patrons. The Huguenots had existing contacts with the gentlemen volunteers who had fought in the second civil war, such as Champernowne, who was on intimate terms with

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27 Norris to Elizabeth, 11 Nov. 1568, CSPFor., 8:573, no. 2633; North to Cecil, 11 Jan. 1569, ibid., 9:11, no. 41. On Champernowne’s company, see app. 6, below, p. 415
28 Giovanni Corner to the Signory, 6 Jan. 1569, CSPVen., 7:427, no. 448; Norris to Elizabeth and to Burghley, 10 Jan. 1569, CSPFor., 9:7, nos. 22-23.
30 BN, MS Fr. 18587, pp. 492, 500.
31 Muster roll, 1 Dec. 1569, BN, MS Fr. 25803, no. 358.
32 Aubigné, 1:326; Barbot, 2:373; Edward Horsey to Burghley, 20 Oct. 1572, KL, 6:185n.
There was only a six months gap between the second and third wars and in some parts of the country fighting actually continued so that the two conflicts virtually merged into one. The Huguenot leaders, who were in consequence planning for the renewal of hostilities almost from the Edict of Longjumeau in March 1568, envisaged the use of English troops well before hostilities ‘officially’ resumed in August 1568,\(^{24}\) and the French crown had intelligence (reported by the ambassador in London) of Englishmen with Condé’s army as early as the beginning of October.\(^{25}\) Taken all together, the evidence suggests the Huguenots recruited English captains directly in early 1568, singling out those they already knew (either while still in France, or more likely contacting them in England), and commissioning them to raise and lead units back when open warfare broke out again.

However, it is likely that English aristocrats helped to connect French Protestants to captains, though the evidence for this is only circumstantial. In addition to the recent direct contacts with potential captains, there were also links to potential patrons which could be exploited. English gentlemen and peers had interacted with their French counterparts extensively during the campaigns and negotiations over Boulogne (1544-50): the Cardinal de Châtillon and his brother Coligny had friendly contacts from those days, as did other prominent Huguenots.\(^{26}\) William Herbert, first Earl of Pembroke was a close associate of zealous Calvinist internationalists such as Leicester, Mildmay and Throckmorton. Pembroke had advocated in 1561 that England ally with the Huguenots; in 1562 he supported intervention in Normandy on their behalf and may have raised money for them; and during the second war of religion he, along with Mildmay and Leicester, was kept briefed (separately to Elizabeth and Cecil) on events in France by the passionately Protestant

\(^{23}\) See Champernowne to an unknown lady, n.d., BN, MS Fr. 23275, f. 48r.

\(^{24}\) James Westfall Thompson, The Wars of Religion in France 1559-1576 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1909), 347-49, 362-64; Coligny to the reformed churches of Normandy, [Apr. 1568], BN, MS Fr. 3190, f. 119r.


English ambassador there, Sir Henry Norris. Francis Russell, 2nd Earl of Bedford, a privy councillor, was also close to Leicester and Pembroke and had international Calvinist contacts from his time as a Marian exile. He had worked on behalf of the French Protestants since 1560, was on good terms with their leaders, such as the Vidame de Chartres, and had great influence with both the French and Dutch reformed communities in London.

Furthermore, Condé had another agent at Elizabeth’s court as well as de Cavaignes, one de Montjay who concentrated on actively soliciting sympathetic members of the English peerage. It is notable that members of the affinities of the Earls of Leicester, Pembroke and Bedford were prominent among those who served the Huguenots. Leicester was one of the patrons of John Norreys, who served with Coligny; while Champernowne reported to Leicester from France. Edward Berkeley, who initially served with Condé and later joined Champernowne’s troop, was a client of Pembroke, to whom the Raleghs, who also served under Champernowne, likewise had an affinity connection. The Champernownes were, in addition, followers of Bedford, as were most of the friends and kin on whom Henry Champernowne drew to recruit his company. The amount of military aid sent to the Huguenots from the West Country, where Bedford was one of the principal landowners and a powerful local patron, is also suggestive.

The queen and her privy councillors were certainly aware that English captains had raised men in England to fight for the Huguenots and were serving with them in France, despite protestations to the contrary. They thus

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38 DNB, 17:432-33; [Hales?]’s notes on recent history, BL, Add. MS 48023, f. 360r.
39 BL, Add. MS 48023, f. 353v; de Chartres to Leicester, Nov. 1562, and PC to Cecil, 1 Nov. 1562, PRO, SP 70/44, f. 7r; DNB, 17:432; transactions of Jehan Spencekhausen with Dutch and French churches of London, 19 Apr.-30 Oct. 1568, Hessels, 2:294-95, no. 8.
40 De Montjay to Condé, 9 Jan.1569, BN, CCC 24, f. 363r.
42 Hasler, 1:429; Hannay, 123.
43 On Champernowne’s recruiting, see ch. 8, below, pp. 276-78. On Bedford’s patronage, of the Champernownes, and more generally in the West Country, see PC, letter of 24 Oct. 1574, APC, 8:304; DNB, 17:432; Adams, ‘Protestant Cause’, 25-26; Hasler, 1:402; compare ibid., 592; Felicity Heal and Clive Holmes, The Gentry in England and Wales, 1500-1700 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), 94, 288; Rowse, Sir Richard Grenville, 51; DNB, 16:630.
approved of this recruitment, even if only tacitly, for they did not prevent it -- a point made by the Venetian ambassador in France. Elizabeth was said by the Huguenot soldier Agrippa d'Aubigné to have chosen Champernowne's gentlemen troopers. This may seem unlikely, yet the queen's complicity emerges even from the history of William Camden who, hostile to Jacobean Puritans, consistently understated Elizabeth's role in supporting Continental Calvinists. Writing from official papers, he narrated how Elizabeth personally 'permitted Hen. Champernoune' to lead his men to France because, despite the distraction of the Catholic rising in northern England in 1569, 'yet would not her Majestie neglect the Protestants in France, their State beeing at that time wretched and deplorable'. Champernowne's mother had been a lady of the household in 1559; and his paternal aunt, Katherine Ashley, had been Elizabeth's governess, married one of the queen's cousins and, in the early 1560s, was first gentlewoman of her privy chamber. Thus, the employment of English mercenaries by, as well as provision of artillery to, the Huguenots, can be linked to the queen and her chief ministers personally.

Nevertheless, no evidence survives that Elizabeth or her Secretary of State actually participated in arranging, as opposed simply to approving, the supply of soldiers. Official sponsorship and coordination was less marked in the mustering of men than in the supply of matériel, perhaps because of the greater risk of exposure -- recruiting of mercenaries resulted more from direct interaction between the Huguenots, the captains and their patrons.

1572: Nexus of the European Wars of Religion

The interaction of government officials, noble patrons and merchants was crucial during the next 'war of Jacob', in the Netherlands in 1572. This

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44 Comer to the Signory, 4 May 1569, CSPVen, 7:456, no. 456.
45 Aubigné, 1:308.
47 Family pedigree, Bodl., Rawl. MS B.74, f. 37v; information from Dr Charlotte Merton.
48 Champernowne wrote to Elizabeth from France on 28 Sep. 1569. Cecil received at least five reports from mercenaries in France -- four from Champernowne survive, along with one from North: CSPFor., 8:578, no. 2647 and 9:11, 27, 126, 131, nos. 42, 99, 446-47, 468.
49 Gates first uses the Jacob motif of this episode, giving it as an example of how 'Jacob hath prevailed in his warres' (p. 23).
'second revolt' was a crucial turning-point in Dutch history, but also marked a watershed in the history of English mercenaries. In 1572 they were used en masse by European Protestants for the first time and became established as a regular fixture in Dutch service. From then on there was continuity, both in the presence of English and Welsh troops in the Netherlands and in their personnel (though not yet in organisation). William of Orange and his chief counsellors played only a small part in this development, however. Only in December did William actually initiate recruiting in England, commissioning a Dutch officer to raise a three hundred-strong ensign. In 1572, Elizabeth's ministers were deeply complicit in the assistance given to the Dutch, but they acted jointly with the leaders of the 'stranger churches' of foreign Protestants (mostly religious refugees) in south-eastern England, and supportive English merchants and peers.

Dimensions of English Participation

In late 1571 and the winter of 1572 the Dutch rebels, under the leadership of William of Orange, laid plans for a complicated multi-pronged offensive which, it was hoped, would spark a general insurrection in the Netherlands. The plan included invasions by land from France, with French help, and from Germany, but also an assault by the Sea Beggars based in ports in the south of England. N. M. Sutherland has shown how this plan became a nexus of 'the European conflict' between Catholic and Protestant. However, the Sea Beggars were compelled (at least apparently) to act earlier than planned when Elizabeth, under pressure from foreign ambassadors, ordered their expulsion in late March. Desperate, the geuzen took the fishing-port of Brill in Holland on 1 April 1572, precipitating risings in Zeeland (including Flushing) and, in due course, a wider rebellion -- the opstand.

The troops from England who participated in the rising have, explicitly or implicitly, generally been portrayed by historians as two distinct groups: returning refugees, raised among the exile communities to help their fellows

50 Geoffrey Parker, The Dutch Revolt (London: Allen Lane, 1977), 14, and ch. 3.  
52 In the title and substance of her Massacre and the European Conflict.  
53 See Parker, Dutch Revolt, 125-26, 131-33; de Meij, 64-66, 72-74, 83-85, 93-99.
at home; and indigenous English and Welsh, raised and sent at the wishes of the queen and William Cecil, now-ennobled as Lord Burghley. As will be seen, this is a false dichotomy. It has arisen because most scholars have focused their attention on the 1,500-odd troops that served around Flushing from early June 1572, led by Thomas Morgan and Sir Humphrey Gilbert, and raised under conciliar direction. However, that force in Flushing was but part of a broad spectrum of activity by Anglo-Welsh troops in the Netherlands that year, which reflected the breadth of support for Protestantism at a vital stage in the European wars of religion.

The first English troops to fight in the second revolt went to Brill, at the very start of the opstand. At the time, the Spanish were positive the Beggars only took Brill with help from England, but these claims were investigated and dismissed by J. B. Black in a celebrated article, which Sutherland used as a starting point to assert (curiously) that Elizabeth’s policy was essentially pro-Spanish in 1572. Whatever the truth of these scholars’ assertions that the English government was not complicit, Englishmen were undoubtedly in the force with which Lumey de la Marck seized Brill on April Fool’s Day. Apart from volunteers in Sea Beggar crews, Lumey had English volunteers in his own company, plus an English foot band commanded by Captain Bellingham. Troops from England were also involved at an early stage in the rising at Flushing. It is well-known that the city’s magistrates and captains wrote to the Dutch churches in England on 26 April appealing for men and money. What is not well known is that a force of three hundred English soldiers had already disembarked at Flushing two days before, and they were followed by many more in the subsequent weeks up to Morgan’s arrival in early June.

Of course, many men who went to the Netherlands during April and afterwards were Dutch and French refugees, not native Englishmen. Indeed,
the first formal request for permission to recruit (made only in September, 
due presumably to the confused circumstances of April and May), specified 
that Dutch recruiters would target émigrés, especially from France (fleeing 
the massacre of St Bartholomew). From April to June, 450 (and maybe as 
many as 750) men were raised and sent to Brill and Flushing by the stranger 
churches of London, Sandwich, Norwich, Ipswich, Colchester and Yarmouth. 
However only about 150 of these are known to have been 'strangers'. Most 
of the references in the correspondence or accounts of the foreign Protestant 
communities to the men they raised are general ones to mustering troops, 
who are not specified as being from those communities. Indeed, they 
sometimes indicate the reverse and this makes credible Spanish reports that 
there were native Englishmen amongst the soldiers raised by the stranger 
churches. Certainly Morgan on arrival in Flushing found some two hundred 
'Englyshe men ... skateryd among others'. In addition to raising mixed-
nationality units, all-indigenous companies were also raised by the stranger 
churches. Their elders are likely to have been the 'deputies' of Lumey from 
whom, one veteran recalled, in June he received 'three English companies, 
under ... Captains Moris, Drise, and Read', as reinforcements. The muster 
roll of Read's company survives and reveals that the soldiers in these units 
were indeed 'English' (including many Welsh), rather than exiles. That the 
'deputies' were émigrés, however, is probable for on 26 June a contingent, 
sent by the Dutch refugee community and commanded by one Jan van Tryer

59 See Dutch church of Yarmouth to Georgius Silvanus, 10 Apr. 1572, Hessels, 3/1:164, no. 
187; François de Sweveghem to Alba, 23 Apr., Thomas Brown to Burghley, 29 Apr., and 
anon. letter, 30 Apr., 1572, KL, nos. 2393, 2398-99, 6:395, 403-4; Dutch communities of 
Ipswich and Colchester to Dutch community of London, 11 and 12 May 1572, Hessels, 2:404- 
6, nos. 114-15; advertisements from the Netherlands, 21 May, 1572, KL, no. 2408, 6:412; 
Herman Mode to Dutch church of London, 29 May, and Dutch church of Norwich to idem, 5 
Jun., 1572, Hessels, 3/1:166-68, nos. 195, 197; and the 'Corte summarie' (of money raised 
by the Dutch community of London), 20 Jan. 1573, ibid., 2:438, no. 123. Andrew Pettegree, 
Foreign Protestant Communities in Sixteenth-Century England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986), 253-55, provides the context. 
238. Guerau de Spes to Philip II, 15 Apr. 1572 CSPSp., 2:385, no. 322; de Sweveghem to 
Alba, and Antonio de Guaras to idem, 23 Apr. and 18 May, 1572, KL, nos. 2393, 2405, 6:395, 
410. 
61 Morgan to Burghley, 16 June 1572, KL, no. 2414, 6:426 (emphasis mine). 
62 Williams, Actions. 108 -- but his chronology is confusing, see Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch 
Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, paperback edn, 
1998), 173-75. 
63 ARA, CO 73.
arrived in Brill; it consisted of 52 members of the exile community -- and 79 Englishmen, with whom Read’s men were combined when they returned a fortnight later from a (presumably unsuccessful) sally. At the end of July another English captain, William Pierce, was said to have left for Brill, though his company may also have included immigrants as well as indigenes.

In addition, a good number of English and Welshmen were with Louis of Nassau when he invaded Hainault in May 1572. They took part in the capture of Mons and Valenciennes and most continued to serve until that city was retaken by the Spanish in September. The most prominent among them was Sir William Morgan, who was close to Louis -- possibly one of his household -- but who also commanded a troop of Anglo-Welsh cavalrymen. Some of them must have known Louis and his (mostly) Huguenot captains during the third civil war, but regardless of any prior contacts of this kind, Morgan had been deliberately placed with Louis by the latter’s admirer, Sir Francis Walsingham, then English ambassador in Paris. Walsingham also provided financial and logistical support to Louis’s force. In addition, there were some English soldiers (though not English units) in the ranks of the Huguenot army that the seigneur de Genlis led in a failed attempt to relieve Mons in July. Their presence was probably facilitated by Walsingham’s network of agents (which included one of Henry Champernowne’s veterans, William Faunte), although the surviving evidence for this is suggestive, rather than definitive. In sum, the involvement of English mercenaries with the international Protestant army in the southern Netherlands was largely due to a royal minister (who was a fervent Calvinist) acting as intermediary between the mercenaries and their employer.

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64 Ibid. (van Tryer’s ‘Registerbouck’, Jun.-Oct. 1572). The same deputies sent another 111 emigrants in early August.
67 Walsingham to Burghley, 21 May 1572, Digges, Compleat Ambassador, 202; Williams, Actions, 83; P. J. Blok, Lodewijk van Nassau (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1889), 79.
68 Williams, Actions, 94; TDH, 17; anon., ‘Discours de la defaite des troupes du S’ de Genlis’, BN, MS Fr. 18587, pp. 541-43.
69 For traces, see Sutherland, Massacre and the European Conflict, 329; Churchyard’s Choice, sig. Kii v; Williams, Actions, 148.
Areas of the Netherlands in revolt, December 1572

- Areas entirely under Orangist control
- Areas only partially under Orangist control
- Towns under Orangist control
- Towns remaining loyal to the King

Figure 4. Map of Holland and Zeeland during the Opstand, 1572-73 (from Parker, Dutch Revolt, map 8, p. 143 -- used by permission of the author).
The Expeditions to Flushing

Royal ministers were even more involved in recruiting the large expeditions for Flushing. The city's strategic position, commanding Antwerp's access to the sea, made it vitally important to England's commercial and strategic interests. Elizabeth and her chief minister wanted the city in friendly hands. The largest numbers of English troops, eventually some 1,700 in all, went to Flushing, but their captains were not just obtained by covert conciliar activity. In England, the government, powerful Protestant nobles, London merchants, and the émigré Calvinist communities all played a part in the dispatch of the mercenary contingents to Flushing.

The first such contingent, three hundred strong, had arrived (as noted above) well over a month before Thomas Morgan's three hundred -- usually said to be the first English force in the Netherlands -- and six weeks before the large reinforcement led by Gilbert. Revolt had broken out in Flushing on 6 April 1572. The men who arrived on 24 April were, unusually for English or Welsh troops of this period, all arquebusiers -- 'shot' in contemporary parlance. Only a great noble, with a large military dependence with recent experience of warfare, could have raised three hundred arquebusiers in less than three weeks. It is striking that their coats were blue trimmed with red and gold: not only the colours of the Herberts, earls of Pembroke but the coat colours consistently worn by troops raised by the first two earls of Pembroke.

The first earl rose to position and power largely because of his success as a military commander and his large military affinity, and as we have seen, in the 1560s he was supportive of aid the Huguenots. His religious views and ties to the circle of Protestant internationalists surrounding Leicester were shared by his son Henry, second Earl of Pembroke, who thus not only had

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70 Claude de Mondoucet (French ambassador in Brussels) to Charles IX, 27 Apr. 1572, BN, MS Fr. 16127, f. 39r. Cf. Kervyn de Lettenhove, Huguenots et les Gueux, 3:46, the only modern historian to mention this incident (citing a letter of de Mondoucet as his source, but not giving its location!); he identifies these troops with Morgan’s men but the date makes this impossible.

71 Just before this, Guerau de Spes, writing to Philip II (15 Apr. 1572, CSPSp., 2:385, no. 322) emphasised the lack of experienced English musketeers.


73 As discussed below, in ch. 8, p. 252.

74 Above, pp. 106-7.
the military and financial resources to raise and send three hundred shot to Flushing, but the confessional mind-set to do so. Moreover, many of the soldiers that went to Flushing in the ensuing weeks are known to have been his followers. If there can be no certainty that the three hundred men were sent by Pembroke there is enough evidence to conclude that it is likely.

No English sources refer to this force, but since it went over before the regime had decided definitely to aid the Orangists, its departure would have naturally been kept quiet, even within the country. This is in contrast to what happened once royal ministers resolved to use Morgan and Gilbert. As we will see, there is no question that Burghley and the Privy Council approved of and exercised some control over them, yet even they were not merely the tools of the government, for they also furthered the ends of the magistrates of Flushing, the 'stranger churches', godly London merchants, and Protestant internationalist nobles.

Morgan landed with three hundred men on 6 or 7 June 1572; Gilbert, with six hundred (the first instalment of a larger force) disembarked on 10 July. The two forces were both part of one strategic enterprise from the point of view of the English regime, but they had different origins. Burghley and the Privy Council were involved to some extent with the first expedition -- in late May, when de Guaras, Philip II's diplomatic agent, complained about Morgan's 'public' (publico) recruiting, they nominally took steps to stop it, but de Guaras was certain they were feigned. Indeed, the same day Burghley wrote to a colleague that, though they had allowed 'many of the strangers to depart hence', it was 'but a symple help', emphasising that Orange had to act immediately, or 'his case will never be recoverable hereafter'. Four days before Morgan landed at Flushing, Burghley noted the need 'to dyscover the ententyon of the pepell ther and to understand the strength of the hole iland' and its potential value as a fortress, and Morgan immediately sent him a report and request for 'direction'.

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75 DNB, 9:640-41; Hannay, 123.
76 See ch. 8, below, p. 262.
77 Morgan to Burghley, and [anon.] to idem, 16 Jun. and 21 Jul. 1572, KL, nos. 2414, 2442, 6:426, 465. (Cf. versions in CSPFor., 10:130, 155, nos. 419, 491.)
78 PC to Lord Mayor of London, 21 May 1572, APC, 8:77; de Guaras to Alba, 24 May 1572 KL, no. 2409, 6:414.
79 Burghley to Walsingham, 21 May 1572, BL, Cott. MS Vespasion F.vi, f. 64v (pr. with errors in Digges, Compleat Ambassador, 203); Burghley, memo, 3 Jun. 1572, KL, no. 2411, 6:421-22; Morgan to Burghley, 16 Jun. 1572, ibid., no. 2414, 6:425-27.
The surviving evidence thus indicates that the Welsh captain already had the Lord Treasurer’s blessing. Yet it also indicates Morgan’s expedition was instigated by the Flushingers and their sympathisers in England. Roger Williams, one of Morgan’s gentlemen volunteers, recalled that the unit was raised ‘with the countenance of some great men who favoured the cause, and the small helps of the deputies of Flushing’. Indeed, the city’s agents in London (including, maybe significantly, a captain in the Flushing garrison) certainly knew Morgan. They were also in the confidence of the London merchant Ferdinand Poyntz, who committed significant financial resources to the rebel war-effort; he may have been one of the Londoners who joined with the Dutch congregation of London to pay the wages of Morgan’s troops, whose officers were mostly members of Pembroke’s military dependence, as was Morgan himself.

The obvious conclusion is that Burghley did not initiate, but adopted Morgan’s force (the raising of which had already commenced), as a stop-gap measure until Gilbert’s was ready. Morgan began recruiting at, or shortly after, a great muster of the London trained bands (the select militia) on 1 May and enlisted about three hundred men in the next three weeks. At this rate, it would have taken Gilbert six weeks to muster his six hundred men and of course he arrived not quite five weeks after Morgan. Even though Gilbert partly drew on troops he had already led in royal service in Ireland, it is still probable that he began mustering men shortly before Morgan’s troops left, the latter being embraced by the Privy Council simply as forerunners to the expedition led by their chosen nominee: Sir Humphrey Gilbert, trusted royal official and Burghley’s client, with his core of veterans of Ireland.

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80 Williams, Actions, 101.
There is no question that Gilbert acted at the Elizabethan regime's behest. To be sure, Roger Williams also recalled that 'Sir Humphrey [had] contracted with the Flushingers to [raise] one thousand five hundred English; besides those who were with them before.' The States of Zeeland were again helped in footing the wage bill by exiles, while London merchants, including City aldermen, provided the money Gilbert needed in advance, as bonds. Thus, the second expedition owed something to Dutch and English private enterprise. Nevertheless, Burghley was the driving force behind Gilbert. Even before he reached Flushing, a Spanish agent claimed his men were 'raised secretly by Burghleigh's orders'. If this was supposition or speculation it had a very solid basis.

The council sent William Pelham, one of the queen's chief military engineers, along with other military experts, to Flushing, to assess whether it could be held against a strong enemy threat, a fact it attempted to conceal (in vain) by having Pelham return covertly. His mission reflected Burghley's wish to know how strong Flushing was, though it also fulfilled a promise to the Orangists. In sending Pelham's party and contemplating occupying Flushing, the government was not simply exploiting a situation that it had not created. When, around 8 August, the Privy Council finally sent Gilbert 'a memoriall of instructions', it did specify that 'your going ... out of the realme was not by comaunderment or order of Her Majestie or us', and repeated it for good measure. But it protested too much. These instructions to Gilbert may have been the first that had been put into writing, but they were carried over by yet another officer in royal service -- Captain Pickman of the Berwick garrison -- 'secretlie sent', because of Burghley's concerns that the English soldiers 'do not prosper [and] fall to pilladge'. Pickman was commanded to ensure that Sir Humphrey and his officers gave 'out by some good meanes to be brought to the Duke of Alba's knowledge that they are departed without

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65 Williams, Actions, 106.
66 As discussed below, in ch. 6, p. 214.
68 See Fogaça to Alba, 21 Jul. 1572 and 7 Aug. 1572, KL, nos. 2441, 2447, 6:462-64, 476, 480. G. D. Ramsay, The Queen's Merchants and the Revolt of the Netherlands (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), 191 n.11, rightly warns that: 'Useful as [Fogaça's] letters are, they need to be taken with a pinch of salt.' However, he is borne out in this instance by Thomas Waye to Burghley, 1 Aug. 1572, KL, no. 2447, 6:474; and Williams, Actions, 121.
70 Ibid., no. 2449, 6:487-88.
either license or knowledge of Her Majestie'. Precautions such as these deceived the French ambassador in London, Fénélon, who reported that Gilbert had acted 'without any commission or evident authority, from either the queen or her Council'. The truth was revealed soon after Gilbert arrived with the first six hundred men of his regiment, when the new junior Secretary of State, Sir Thomas Smith, contentedly confirmed to the royal ambassador in Paris: 'We... have sent over Sir Humfrey Gilbert and his Band of Englishmen' to Flushing. Gilbert gave the game away when, after two months there, he wrote to Burghley (his patron):

I dow know that Her Majeste and my Lords of the Consell are many tymes enforsyd to pretend that [which] thaye nothynge desire, wherfoer what letters so ever shalbe sent me from my Lords of the Counsell for revokyng me home, I wyll thynke them but for forme, excepte Your Honor dow wryet me your pryvat letters to retorne....

He had already expressed his gratitude for 'the many favours that we feynde in thys towen at Your Lordships handes, for vitaels and many other thinges'.

All in all, the evidence reveals that in 1572 Dutch nobles and notables and leading members of their exile communities, particularly that in London, together with godly merchants of that City and royal councilors, cooperated to dispatch English and Welsh troops to the Netherlands. Although many were pursuing the aims of their own government more than those of their employers, it is still the fact that the most celebrated contingent of English and Welsh mercenaries was deployed by the combined efforts of the rebel party in the Netherlands, aristocratic and corporate patrons in England, and the Elizabethan government.

Protestant Internationalism and the Opstand

There is a final point to be made about the employment of English mercenaries in the summer of 1572. Burghley's chief interest was Flushing,

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91 Burghley to Leicester, 10 Aug. 1572, PRO, SP 12/89, f. 25r; memorial for Pickman, 8 Aug. 1572, KL, no. 2448, 6:483-86 at 485.
93 Smith to Walsingham, 27 Jul. 1572, Digges, Compleat Ambassador, 231 (emphasis mine).
94 Gilbert to Burghley, 7 Sep. and 13 Aug. 1572, KL, nos. 2450, 2461, 6:510-11, 489.
because of its vital strategic importance; the main thrust of English governmental initiatives was therefore in Zeeland, as has been seen. The Orangist forces in Holland and Zeeland also received the bulk of funds raised and military stores sent by the refugee communities. Nevertheless, scholars who depict Elizabeth's government as concerned only with the Scheldt and Rhine estuary ports (for security and commercial reasons) are mistaken. It also supported the rebels' campaigns in the south.

Now, it is possible that Walsingham had acted on his own initiative in aiding Louis of Nassau in the spring, but it would have been extraordinary if the council had not decided to capitalise thereon. Certainly Walsingham was in constant communication with the troops in the southern Netherlands during the summer and by early June English and Welshmen were going there to reinforce Louis of Nassau's forces, albeit neither as many nor as well organised as were concurrently departing for Flushing. Later, as we have seen, others enlisted in the Huguenot army of Genlis. By August the Privy Council was regulating the flow of reinforcements and Secretary Smith took for granted that it could (if necessary) recall the men already in Hainault. Further, the queen's ministers took into account events in both the southern and northern Netherlands when reaching their decisions. The Spanish agent who believed that English initiatives on Flushing and Flanders revealed the Privy Council had just one policy for all the Netherlands was thus not far from the truth.

The web of influence that extended from London to Brill, Mons and Flushing was a great achievement for the English government. It owed much to Burghley, but it also resulted from the conscious efforts of zealous, internationally minded Calvinists such as Walsingham and Pembroke (as well as the other individual military patrons of the mercenaries who served).

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85 Trim, 'Protestant Refugees and Confessional Conflict', 70-71.
86 Cf., e.g., P. S. Crowson, Tudor Foreign Policy (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1973), 187.
87 See Walsingham to Leicester and Burghley 29 May 1571 [sic, for 1572], Digges, Compleat Ambassador, 204; de Guaras to Alba, 6 Jun. 1572, KL, no. 2412, 6:424.
88 Smith to Walsingham, 22 Aug. 1572, Digges, Compleat Ambassador, 236-37. Burghley had likewise considered 'the marytyme costes and the frontieres' together in a 'memorial' of 3 Jun. 1572, KL, no. 2411, 6:421.
89 Fogaça to Alba, 19 Aug. 1572, KL, no. 2352, 6:493.
Fighting for Survival 1572-76

Aftermath of the Massacre of St Bartholomew 1572-73

The end of the third guerre de religion in 1570 had introduced a brief period of peace in France, which even led to hopes that Charles IX might allow Huguenots to invade the Netherlands to support William of Orange in early 1572 -- one reason why the English crown in turn backed William's plans for a renewed rising that year. The balance of power changed and the upshot was the horrific massacre of St Bartholomew's (24 August 1572). During the resulting fourth civil war (1572-73) the Huguenots again exploited varying degrees of support amongst royal officials, leading nobles, and ordinary citizens, both to obtain material and naval assistance, and to muster troops.

The civil war centred on the royal siege of the Huguenot stronghold of La Rochelle. Together with smaller ports, such as Brouage, lying on the great bay the city dominated, La Rochelle had been the point of entry for most English aid to the Huguenots during the third civil war, and the main base of the Protestant privateers -- French, English and Beggar -- who contributed greatly to the Huguenot (and Dutch) war-effort. La Rochelle defied royal authority even after the Peace of St. Germain (August 1570) and the Protestant leaders were anxious about threats to it even before the massacre, both from the crown and from Spain, for the city's importance was recognised internationally. Its inhabitants therefore swiftly (and repeatedly) appealed to Elizabeth and her ministers for aid. Montgommery escaped to England with a commission from the reformed churches to organise succour there. In addition, three Huguenot 'captains' were also sent to England; they were charged with obtaining support for La Rochelle, but they also raised volunteers, or so the French Ambassador alleged.

Sutherland, Massacre and the European Conflict.
Simon Goulart, Mémoires de l'estat de France sous Charles Neufiesme, 1 (Meidelbourg: 1576), 350-51; Henry of Condé to Coligny, 8 Sep. 1571, BSHPF, MS 754/2/1, no. 1.
Thompson, Wars of Religion, 458.
The presence of French agents was vital: declarations of eagerness to fight for the Huguenots were common, but rarely came to anything, unless organised. Victuals and munitions would have been sent from England in any case; indeed, royal ministers coordinated such efforts from an early stage, for they, too, were well aware of La Rochelle's strategic significance. However, it was Montgommery who began mustering a relief expedition in the southwest of England over the winter. The expedition, which led to the employment of English soldiers in hostilities in France in 1573, was, even so, the fruit of cooperative action. Despite royal denials to foreign ambassadors, privy councillors such as Burghley and Thomas Radcliffe, Earl of Sussex, knew of and were sympathetic to the actions taken by Montgommery -- for example, the transportation of soldiers, as well as powder and victuals, on the relief fleet -- and were thus complicit in the mustering of troops. As well as councillors, a range of prominent figures, sympathetic to Protestant internationalism, were vital as facilitators for Montgommery. Once he initiated the expedition, it became a focus for the genuinely-felt anger and concern in England, particularly in London and the south, at St Bartholomew's day. Yet he still needed local assistance to convert indignation into firm contributions. Bishops Edwin Sandys of London and Robert Horne of Winchester were key in mobilising financial and logistical support, including from the mercantile communities of London and Southampton. Gifts and loans to Montgommery eventually totalled around £30,000: an astonishing sum.

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107 Burghley to Walsingham, 27 Mar. 1573, BL, Cott. MS Vespasian F.vi, ff. 5v-6r; Churchyard's Choice, sig. L4v.
108 Montgommery to to Burghley, 28 Mar. and 26 May 1573, CSPFor., 10:291-92, 344-45, nos. 848, 982; idem to Sussex, 3 Apr. 1573, BL, Cott. MS Titus B.vii, f. 250r. For Elizabeth's denials see, e.g., Léon Marlet, Le Comte de Montgomery (Paris: Picard, 1890), 141.
109 Montgommery to Earl of Essex, 27 Mar. 1573, Longleat, DP 1, f. 2r; sources in next note.
Likewise when it came to raising troops, local supporters needed the energising (and legitimising) presence of the Frenchman with his commissions from the Huguenot leadership if ought was to come of their goodwill; but he needed the endorsement and contacts of local patrons if he was to mobilise that goodwill successfully. Thus, Montgommery initially made his base in the Channel Islands. The many Huguenot refugees who had fled thence were an obvious source of recruits, but the Governor of Guernsey was Sir Thomas Leighton, a zealous Puritan and Montgommery’s comrade-in-arms at Rouen in 1562. However, the count moved on to the West Country and concentrated his troop- and ship-raising around Plymouth.

The royal vice-admiral there was Henry Champernowne’s uncle, Sir Arthur Champernowne. He had taken part in the fighting in France in 1562-63 and seized the Spanish treasure ships in 1568. His son, Gawain, fought with his cousin, Henry, in the third civil war and had married Montgommery’s daughter earlier in 1572. Soon after he learned of the massacre, Sir Arthur urged Elizabeth to break her alliance with France on the grounds of religion. He suggested that she ‘permitt some rashe, willful felo, lyke my selff, against your majesties will, to adventure the supplieing of Rochell’, and he set out a concrete scheme for raising five hundred English foot in Devon. If volunteers only began to be organised into companies by the count’s captains after he arrived in Plymouth, it nevertheless appears clear that Montgommery went to the south-west because he had strong ties to an important local patron, who was ready and able to mobilise ‘wylling contibucions’ from the local gentry.

Crisis in Holland and Zeeland, 1572-76

Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, despite the great hopes of Protestants in England and the help that came from England, the renewed revolt had enjoyed little success. A series of reverses over the summer meant that by

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112 Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 15 Oct. 1562, PRO, SP 70/43, f. 4v; PC to Champernowne, 14 Jan. 1563, APC, 7:136; Ramsay, 94; Churchyard’s Choice, sig. Kl r; Arthur Champernowne to Burghley, 19 Apr. 1572, CSPFor., 9:432, no. 1665.
the autumn of 1572 the ‘second revolt’ was in crisis. Alba and his Spanish
colonels had been victorious in the field almost everywhere. The events of
St Bartholomew’s day meant the French front of the multi-pronged offensive
planned for 1572 never eventuated. Worse, as already seen, to some extent
it distracted the English and others on whom William of Orange counted for
support.114 Moreover, the knock-on effects for the Orangists only put them in
a worse situation the ultimate effect of which was to make the English
government rethink its policy. Without French troops, William was not able
even to save his own brother, Louis, who was compelled to surrender Mons
on 19 September.

Alba now decided to negotiate from this position of strength with
Elizabeth’s government. A trade war between Spain and England had since
December 1568 prevented English merchants from doing business in the
Netherlands, to the detriment of both countries’ economies. Four years later,
‘the principals involved had little reason to continue the quarrel ... [and] the
situation was ripe for an Anglo-Spanish rapprochement’ -- but Alba also had
hopes of detaching Elizabeth from William. Negotiations to resolve the trade
dispute began in early October 1572 and continued through the winter, save
for a brief interruption after reports of Spanish atrocities. They culminated in
March 1573 when Burghley and de Guaras signed a draft treaty, which Alba
straightaway endorsed.115 This had an immediate impact on the relationship
between English mercenaries in Dutch pay and their government. On 22
August, Smith had emphasised to Walsingham that, despite Spanish
rumours, ‘as yet there is no revocation neither done nor meant of our men at
Flushing or in Flanders’.116 In contrast, the St Bartholomew’s massacre,
Mons, and Alba’s olive branch precipitated a decision that henceforth the
English would aid William of Orange’s supporters only ‘underhand’ by
‘giving money ... provisions and military munitions’, rather than by allowing
the employment of Englishmen as mercenaries.117 The Privy Council ordered

114 Mark Greengrass, ‘Financing the Cause: Protestant Mobilization and Accountability in
France (1562-1589)’, in Reformation. Revolt and Civil War in France and the Netherlands
115 See Alba to Elizabeth, 23 Sep. 1572 and 15 Apr. 1573, KL, nos. 2470, 2568, 6:525-26,
710; Read, Burghley, 97-102, at 97; Ramsay, 95-100, 177.
116 Digges, Compleat Ambassador, 236.
117 Leicester to de Boisot, 1 Oct. 1572, KL, no. 2480, 6:535-38, at 538: ‘nous donne secours
d’argent dessous la main, et laisse suyvre vivres et autres munitions de guerre’.
the recall of those on the Continent and within weeks Sir Humphrey Gilbert's regiment had withdrawn from Zeeland. His men were divided by internal disputes and despondent after defeats at Spanish hands, but he beat his retreat at royal command. As Daniel Rogers, one of the queen's diplomatic agents, who (as a zealous Protestant) disagreed with her policies, put it: the English court preferred 'an uncertain peace to uncertain wars' -- or at least to outright war.

The cooperation of spring and summer 1572 thus gave way to an interval in which the Elizabethan regime stood aloof from Dutch recruiting in England as much as possible. It lasted from late 1572 until the end of 1576, when a more general revolt began. Disputes over trade caused problems between English and Dutch throughout this period, especially since, after normal commerce with the Netherlands resumed in May 1573, it was the queux, blockading Antwerp from Flushing, who were preventing English intercourse with that city! However, the real root of official English disinterest was the desperate state of the rebels, confined to Holland and Zeeland -- provinces still partly occupied by the Spanish. Defeat appeared inevitable to observers of all nationalities and confessions. The anxiety that naturally resulted led the Dutch persistently to distrust English intentions and suspect that Elizabeth might sell them down the river to further her own ends. It also led to equivocation in English official circles. There was reluctance, in spite of the instincts of the shared confessional bond, to risk too much for the rebels, or to forbid merchants and maritime captains contracting to supply the Spanish, with whom trade and legal disputes had been resolved and who seemed likely to be victorious in the end.

118 Williams, Actions, 118-21; de Jonge to Killigrew, and Gilbert to Burghley, 27 Sep. 1572, idem, 28 Sep. 1572, Fogaça to Alba, 3 Nov. 1572, KL, nos. 2473, 2475-76, 2492, 6:530-32, 569. The Spanish agent in London reported that Burghley openly told him the queen had ordered 'ser Unfre Gilbert' in Zeeland to gather his troops and return to London: de Guaras to Alba, 4 Nov. 1572, ibid., no. 2493, 6:571.

119 Rogers to Abraham Ortelis, 20 Oct. 1572, Hessels, 1:101, no. 42: '... pacemque incertam, incertis bellis praeferendam existimemus'; see also Leicester to Boisot, ibid.

120 See de Guaras to Alba, 16 Feb. 1573, KL, no. 2540, 6:661; Merchant Adventurers' report, [19 May 1573], BL, Lans. MS 17, f. 4r; Sieur de St Goard to Henry III (of France), 15 and 23 Oct. 1574, BN, MS Fr. 16106, ff. 162r, 186v-87r; William of Orange to John of Nassau, 7 May 1574, Texts Concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands, ed. E. H. Kossmann and A. F. Mellink (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 113-15; John Cobham to Thomas Smith, 16 Apr. 1576, CSPFor., 11:312, no. 738. See also Israel, Dutch Republic, 178; Wilson, Revolt, 30-34; Wernham, Before, 328-29.
Even so, the queen and her counsellors were not hostile to the recruiting of mercenaries by the Orangist party in these years; scholars who depict them as antagonistic misrepresent the actuality. The claims of conscience and fears about eventual Spanish intentions alike ensured that they never firmly set their face against military aid to the rebel States. The Privy Council never took the initiative in these years, but while it did sometimes placate Spanish complaints by restricting recruiting, it never prevented Englishmen from fighting for the Dutch.

The Welsh and English bands at Brill stood their ground in 1572, as did the remaining followers of Louis of Nassau and some others. Morgan kept his company in Flushing for two weeks after the bulk of Gilbert's force departed, negotiating with agents of William of Orange, who commissioned him to lead a new regiment the following spring. Edward Chester, one of Gilbert's captains in Flushing, also decided at some point that autumn or winter to raise troops to serve the Orangists. Both began recruiting by the end of February 1573, by which time the Spanish ambassador was receiving reports of it, though these disagreed as to whether the men would go with Montgommery to La Rochelle, or to the Netherlands. The Privy Council was aware of both Morgan's and Chester's plans from a relatively early stage but made no attempt to hinder them.

Other recruiting was also taking place. The Anglo-Welsh troops who had remained in Holland were involved in the bitter fighting around Haarlem. Some served as part of the garrison defending it against the Spanish siege from December 1572. Others took part in William of Orange's determined efforts to relieve the city. All told, the numbers involved are more than can be accounted for by the companies known to have gone over in spring and

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121 E.g., Wilson, Revolt, 30; Shurmer, 16; Crowson, 193.
122 De Guaras to Alba, 9 and 18 Nov., and Fogaça to idem, 17 and 25 Nov., 1572, KL, nos. 2495, 2498-99, 2501, 6:576-77, 583-84, 586, 590; Mondoucet to Charles IX, 4 Jan. 1573, BN, MS. Fr. 16127, f. 126v; van Tryer's 'Registerbouck', ARA, CO 73 n.f.; Williams, Actions, 121; Churchyard's Choice, sig. K[3]v-K4r; SL 1:28
123 See KL, nos. 2547, 2551, 2554, 2564, 6:673, 678, 683, 702 -- reports from the Spanish ambassador, but the detail he provides indicates he had a real basis (as opposed to paranoia) for his belief that the English government was complicit in the recruiting. See also William of Orange to Burghley, 16 Feb. 1573, BL, Lans. MS 16, f. 34r.
124 Tragical Historie, 3:84v, 91v; and Williams, Actions, 122, who refers to 200 men (none in an English company): they may have been taken from the garrison in Brill to Haarlem by Lumey in 1572: 'Rekening van Joost de Bern, tresorier van Lumey', 1572, ARH, RKA 338, pp. 10-14.
summer. There is, for example, no record of Captain Symons in the Netherlands before he led a band of all shot into Haarlem in January 1573. The new captains had probably been commissioned late in 1572, when Captain William Pierce was sent to England by the Prince of Orange, charged with raising 'quelques compagnies' -- that is, with seeking captains and units, rather than recruits for a new unit of his own (though he obtained those also). Inasmuch as William of Orange had written to Elizabeth and Burghley asking permission for Pierce's activities, it appears to have been given, if only by default.

Morgan landed his first two companies at Brill at the end of March 1573, but most of his captains were still recruiting and he returned to supervise the process. Chester's preparations were also continuing. From mid-April 1573, however, reflecting the success of the trade negotiations with the Spanish, the Privy Council at least wanted to be seen as acting against English troops planning to cross the North Sea. It issued instructions, first to stop Chester's recruiting; then to prevent his departure; and finally to arrest him and his officers. These instructions probably were not meant seriously, albeit taken at face value by the distinguished historian E. P. Cheyney for one. Apart from the initial lack of reaction (noted above), from the middle of May de Guaras accused Burghley, Elizabeth and the Privy Council of being insufficiently active in stopping the supply of men and munitions, despite their assurances. Perhaps Elizabeth felt the need to respond to Spanish protests. Wilson points out that in early June 1573 de Guaras complained directly to the queen about the 'many English soldiers who had disturbed' Holland, to which Elizabeth responded by calling them 'traitors and rebels'.

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125 Anon., Corte en waerachtich verhael van alle gheschiedenissen Handelinge, Aenstalige, Storme, en Schermutsinghe in en voor der Stadt Heerelem [...]. (Leyden, [1573]), sig. Dr; C. Ekama, Beleg en verdediging van Haarlem in 1572 en 1573 (Haarlem: Kruseman, 1872), 115-16, 125; Tragicall Historie, 3:83r, 85, 88r, 89r; anon. report, 27 Mar., and de Guaras to Alba, 31 Mar.-1 Apr., 1573, KL, nos. 2560-61, 6:691-92; Walter Morgan's narrative, ASCL, MS 129, ff. 21r-23r; TDH, 19; Williams, Actions, 125-29.
127 The financial records of Morgan's regiment, preserved in ARA, CO 11/329, shed light on the timing of recruitment and arrival of his companies; see also anon. intelligence, 1 Apr. 1573 and de Guaras to Alba, 6 Apr. 1573, KL, nos. 2563-64, 6:700-2; Williams, Actions, 125-26.
128 See de Guaras to Alba, 10 Apr. 1573, KL, no. 2567, 6:709; PC letters, 14, 24 and 26 Apr. 1573, APC, 8:97, 100.
that had gone 'to those parts secretly', claiming she 'desired they be hanged' and declaring she and Burghley would ensure no others went to Holland.\textsuperscript{130} Neither Cheyney nor Wilson point out that, although Chester's and Morgan's captains' actions were circumscribed, they were still able to complete their mobilisation and leave in the subsequent weeks.\textsuperscript{131} The paradox is that, later that summer, reinforcements were prevented from crossing even after Pierce and Chester made a quick trip home specially to plead for permission.\textsuperscript{132}

Chester may have suffered more official interference than Morgan for domestic, not diplomatic reasons. Morgan was a follower of Pembroke, as noted earlier; Burghley was obliged to him for his efforts in 1572. Chester's place in England's social hierarchy is much less clear -- indeed, although one of the major English figures in the Dutch war effort prior to England's open entry into the war with Spain in 1585, he remains a shadowy figure.\textsuperscript{133} At any rate he seems not to have had any noble patrons. The Privy Council evidently approved of Morgan's regiment, for its officers regularly reported to Burghley on their actions in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{134} Chester acted from his own convictions and without clearing things first with the regime; having served in Flushing under Gilbert, he had direct contacts with the Dutch and thus did not need a patron to act as intermediary. His independence of action and the effects of his lack of a noble protector are alike reflected in another mercenary's comment that, because Chester had 'without the knowledge of ... hir highnesse ... stole by secrete meanes out of Englaunde', he was 'a long while frowned upon ... in Courte'.\textsuperscript{135}

At the end of 1573, Chester was able to achieve official acceptance, if not favour, but this was due to the patronage of William of Orange.\textsuperscript{136} Morgan

\textsuperscript{130} Wilson, \textit{Revolt}, 30; de Guaras to Alba, 7 June 1573, KL, no. 2594, 6:758: '... muchos soldados ingleses a perturbar esos Estados; y luego respondio: "Son unos traidores reveldes que ya me an informado que son partidos escondidamente, diziendo que ... desseo que sean ahorcados"...'.

\textsuperscript{131} See reports to Alba of May-Jun. 1573, KL, nos. 2579-81, 2597-98, 2600, 2605, 6:731-736, 760-63, 779, 786; muster documents of Chester's regiment in ARA, CO 29.

\textsuperscript{132} This might reflect confidence that the large numbers of Scots going over at this time would adequately reinforce the Dutch: see Shurmer, 13-14; Ferguson, \textit{Papers}, 5-7, 36-38.

\textsuperscript{133} He is in neither the DNB nor the NNBW.


\textsuperscript{136} See William to Burghley, 4 Jan. 1574, KL, no. 2661, 7:27 (HMCS, 2:84, no. 228); and fn. 147 below.
had been in dispute with the Prince about pay and conditions of service throughout the summer. Matters came to a head in November. Morgan was paid off and in December he took many of his troops home, not to return until 1578 -- but this did not end the employment of English mercenaries in the Netherlands. Chester promptly took advantage of the situation to resolve his own differences with William and to obtain from him a commission as colonel-in-chief of all English troops in Dutch employ. Chester soon began raising new companies to replace those that had gone with Morgan's and -- despite repeated complaints by Spanish envoys, supported by an explicit request from Philip II in which he was referred to by name -- was successful. Elizabeth's ministers consistently expressed regret or anger to Philip's representatives, but though Chester faced some difficulties, he was able to fill the contract and transport his troops to the Netherlands in March 1574, as the Spanish were aware. Walter Morgan Wolfe also filled a Dutch contract in April. Don Luis de Requesens, Alba's successor in the Netherlands, bitterly observed that it all 'shows well the little affection and good will [Elizabeth's privy councillors] bear to the affairs' of the King of Spain.

However, in May 1574 Chester's regiment, then manning two forts on the outer perimeter of Leiden's defences, 'failed ... in vertue'. When the Spanish attacked, Captain Gainsford's company fought well, as did a detachment under Ralph Cromwell, but almost all the rest of the English troops -- unpaid and short of food and gunpowder -- surrendered or took to their

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137 Pace Crowson, 193, and Simon Adams, 'A Puritan Crusade? The Composition of the Earl of Leicester's Expedition to the Netherlands, 1585-1586', in The Dutch in Crisis, 1585-1588: People and Politics in Leicester's Time, ed. Paul Hoftijzer (Leiden: Sir Thomas Browne Institute, 1988), 10 -- both assert that all English troops in Dutch service were disbanded by the end of 1573.

138 Richard Bingham to Ralph Lane, idem to Burghley, Morgan to idem, 15 and 24 Oct. and 12 Nov. 1573, KL, nos. 2634, 2637, 2640, 6:826-27, 835, 840-41; Williams, Actions, 125, 148; SL, 1:28.


140 According to de Garaas in a dispatch of 11-17 Apr. 1574, KL, 7:102n.

141 To de Sweveghem and de Boisschot, 23 Apr. 1574, ibid., no. 2719, 7:110: 'monstrent bien le peu d'affection et volonté qu'ils portent aux affaires de Sa Majesté.'

142 Camden, ii.347. There is no satisfactory modern account of the siege of Leiden: the classic narrative of R. Fruin, The Siege and Relief of Leyden in 1574, trans. Elizabeth Trevely (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1927) is in need of updating and is inaccurate about Chester's troops at Valkenburg and Alphen.
heels. Cromwell got his men into Leiden, where they fought throughout the celebrated siege, and English troops were doing good service elsewhere, but events around Leiden left 'the english regimentes in Holland' in 'confusion' and 'spoild.' Chester's command had dissolved.

English troops had already performed below expectations in 1573. After the spring of 1574, because of their poor record, they were no longer in demand in the Netherlands. For the next four years there would be only a few English companies -- no regiments -- in Dutch employ, but this reflected Dutch, rather than official English, attitudes. Although Edmund Bishop was a client of the Earl of Rutland and John Brookesby was probably a follower of the Earl of Huntingdon (both peers were notable Protestants), most of the captains in the mid-1570s (men such as Cromwell and Gainsford), like Chester, lacked noble patrons, but had proved themselves to the Dutch, who therefore contracted with them directly, without patrons acting as middle men. Anyone not trusted by the Prince of Orange was not employed. Chester remained, as captain of a single band, but also as an intermediary between William and Elizabeth. Meanwhile, in 1575 and 1576, the English troops, by prolonged good service, 'wonne there reputation againe in Holland'.

Occasional new companies were commissioned, while the bands in the Netherlands had to maintain their strength. Philip II's representatives in England complained whenever they heard about recruiting -- but this did not

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143 The interpretation of events here is based on eyewitness evidence: the 'Journaal van den Ritmeester den stade Leijden', UBL, MS BPL 284, ff. 2r-4r; Jan Orlers, Beschrijvinge der Stad Leyden (Leyden, 1614), 333-35; anon. advertisement, Dordrecht, 30 May 1574, KL, no. 2739, 7:157; and TDH, 21, which transmits other first-hand views. See also Tragicall Historie, 106-8; Guillaume Baudart, Les Guerres de Nassau, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: 1616), 1:166; Pieter Bor, Nederlantsche Oorlogen heroerten, ende Borgerlijcke oneenicheyden, 2 vols. (Amsterdam and Leyden: 1621), 1/7: 22v-23r.


149 Rogers to Burghley, 29 Aug. 1575, KL, no. 2965, 7:564.
halt it. To be sure, throughout the late summer and autumn of 1575 (for example), repeated Orangist requests for permission to recruit in England were officially refused and the queen even forbade her subjects 'to serve any foreign prince or other in warlike manner' without 'license expressly from her majesty ... under writing'. In fact, Chester was able to raise men for various captains and ship them to Holland that autumn, even though the Privy Council knew from the start that was his intention. He had reported from the Netherlands to both Burghley and Elizabeth in 1575, and continued to correspond with the government in 1576, well after the proclamation. Maybe he had a written license that has not survived; more likely he, unlike modern historians, knew that such statements were not intended to be taken at face value.

Small Investment, Big Return: the Fifth War of Religion, 1574-76

Elizabeth's attitude to the Huguenots in this period was more positive. There was the same reluctance to commit openly as during the third and fourth civil wars, but there was no hesitation in providing official subsidies and not even nominal attempts were made to prevent small-scale mercenary enterprises. The reason was that an opportunity had presented itself to support a broadly-based coalition of opponents to French royal policy.

In January 1574 Montgommery began to gather troops in the Channel Isles, under pretext of giving up war to live quietly in the islands, but actually to invade France. In March (around the time Charles IX died), Montgommery invaded Lower Normandy where he had immediate, if limited success. His

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151 Chester to Burghley, Rogers to idem, and John Hastings to Leicester/Burghley, 6, 9 and 29 Oct. 1575, KL, nos. 2984-85, 2997, 7:590, 594, 8:16; 'Rekeninghe van Gillis Gensfort', Sep. 1575-Jul. 1576, ARA, CO 37, n.f.
153 Pace Hale, 'Introduction', to Smythe, Certain Discourses Military, xviii; and Cheyney, 1:193.
154 'Articles concernant Montgomery', Jan. 1574, Bibliothèque Mazarine, MS 2592, n.f.; de Guaras to Requesens, 26 Jan. 1574, KL, no. 2667, 7:36; Marlet, 156. See Thompson, Wars of Religion, 472, 473n.
invasion took place at the same time as the intended escape from the French court of Henry of Navarre and the duke of Alençon (youngest brother of Charles IX and Henry III and, at this stage, a member of a coalition of Huguenots and moderate Catholics), who planned to join troops led by Count Christopher of the Palatinate and Louis of Nassau on the Rhenish border of France -- escape plans the English government had helped to formulate.\footnote{155} Had they succeeded the French king would have been opposed from all quarters. In fact, Alençon escaped only in 1575 and Navarre in 1576 and meanwhile, at the end of May 1574, Montgommery was isolated in Domfront castle with a small force and captured. On 26 June 1574 he was executed in Paris.\footnote{156}

There is considerable, if circumstantial, evidence that the suspicions of contemporaries that Montgommery and Louis of Nassau were participants in a wider plan of action were well-founded.\footnote{157} Louis's army included English soldiers and he originally intended to march into France (though in the end he moved back towards Holland -- in April 1574 he was defeated by the Spanish at Mook and killed, together with several English volunteers).\footnote{158} Montgommery's plans were known to sympathisers in England before he left and it was widely supposed that Elizabeth aided his preparations.\footnote{159} There is good evidence that these suspicions, too, were justified. Montgommery was at court in December, immediately before initiating his enterprise, while in Guernsey he was again aided by his old comrade in arms, Leighton, and also received support from Walsingham, now principal Secretary of State.\footnote{160} His original invasion force included about a hundred Englishmen. More were preparing to leave England to join him before his capture and there are

\footnote{155} Goulart, 3:208-13; Fogaça to Requesens, 15 Mar. 1574, KL, no. 2696, 7:78; Thompson, 
\textit{Wars of Religion}, 477-80; Holt, Anjou, 40-44; Blok, \textit{Lodewijk van Nassau}, 111.
\footnote{156} Thompson, \textit{Wars of Religion}, 484-85; Marlet, 168-69.
\footnote{157} French newsletter, 5 May 1574, UBL, MS Vulc. 104/13.
\footnote{158} See Robert Brakenbury to Earl of Rutland, 22 Mar. 1574, and William Drury to idem, 31 Mar. [1574]. \textit{HMC R}, 101-2; Churchyard, \textit{Description}, 54; Blok, \textit{Lodewijk van Nassau}, 113-17.
\footnote{159} \textit{HMC R}, 101; Fogaça to Requesens, 5 Apr. 1574, KL, no. 2711, 7:99; Marlet, 160.
\footnote{161} According to the complaint of the French ambassador, but accepted without query by Sir William Drury -- an experienced soldier who knew many of the mercenaries serving in France and the Netherlands and a friend of Walsingham: Drury to Rutland, 31 Mar. 1574, \textit{HMC R}, 101.
indications in the record of the judicial proceedings against him that some may have been with him at Domfront, though none was put on trial alongside him. It seems clear that members of the English regime were cognizant of and complicit in the count’s last venture.

Elizabeth’s government was undeterred by events in 1574. Instead, it stepped up efforts to aid the coalition of moderate Catholics and Protestants, led by Alençon in theory, but by Prince Henry of Condé in practice. These culminated in 1576, when an alliance of French princes of the blood and great nobles, and Calvinist German princes leading strong mercenary forces, compelled Henry III to grant ‘very generous concessions to the Huguenots’ in the Edict of Beaulieu. The armies that ended the fifth civil war ‘encamped in the center of France dictating peace terms’ were subsidised by the English government and included English soldiers.

Individual English volunteers had enlisted in Condé’s army in the Rhineland from his arrival there in 1574 and some were in a force composed of veterans of William’s army that joined Condé in August that year. When the English government took a hand, the queen from the first explicitly insisted that her name not be mentioned in any of the contracts with the Elector Palatine and Condé. Because of this secrecy, details are difficult to confirm. The dispatches of the Spanish agent in London, de Guaras, are a major source and even he doubted the veracity of some of the ‘facts’ he heard and reported, but other sources confirm the participation of English captains. Negotiations in early 1575 involving Condé, William of Orange, the Elector and a younger son, John Casimir, and Elizabeth’s ministers, led to a grant from the queen of 50,000 thalers (£15,000). It was transported to Heidelberg in July by several officers with Dutch experience. The money
was sufficient for John Casimir, who would command the army, to make the wage advances necessary to hire German mercenaries. John Casimir and Condé gathered their army in Strasbourg in the autumn of 1575 and the English captains moved there with the princes. They may have sent word out to other veterans, for additional English volunteers journeyed there to join them. Inasmuch as the captains did not return until the summer of 1576, it seems clear that they, too, took part in the successful invasion of France.157

Other Englishmen, meanwhile, may have served in Languedoc with Montmorency-Damville, who had visited England at least twice, in 1550 and 1561 and had been on good terms with Leicester since the latter visit.166 He had employed some English soldiers in the fourth civil war and had been party to the negotiations with Elizabeth in 1575.169 In addition, some English troops fought for the young Count de Montgommery in Normandy — perhaps the same men who had served his father.170 All these enlistments, however, were on a small scale and even in the Rhineland there was no recorded attempt to commission English units.

In sum, the employment of English mercenaries during the fifth war of religion was a logical part of a spectrum of measures taken by the English government to help the Huguenots, which included the provision of money to hire mercenaries of other nationalities. Because they supplemented armies which enjoyed a wide body of support in France there was no need for large-scale recruitment of English soldiers as there had been in the Netherlands from 1572. That need, however, was shortly to be renewed and multiplied.

157 John North’s daybook, 13 Sep. 1575, Bodl., Add. MS C.193, f. 9r; de Guaras to Zayas, 3 Sep. 1575, CSPSp., 2:502, no. 420; Williams, Actions, 149; Condé to Sussex, 16 Aug. 1576, BL, Cott. MS Titus B.vii, f. 403r. Matthew Sutcliffe, Lord William Russell (Bedford’s son), and possibly George Gascoigne, were among those in the princes’ army.
166 On his father’s embassy to England, 1550 (‘Roolle des gentilzhommes [...]’, 17 Apr. 1550, Actes de Henri II, no. 6421, 4:81; and with the party that escorted Mary Queen of Scots back to Scotland, which returned to France through England (information I owe to Simon Adams).
169 Maréchal de Montmorency to Montmorency-Damville, 28 Jan. 1573, AAE, MDF 242, f. 28; Thompson, Wars of Religion, 504.
170 Thompson, ibid., 516; Valentine Dale to [the Secretaries of State], 14 Feb. 1576, CSPFor., 11:245, no. 614.
CHAPTER FOUR

CAPTAINS, CONTRACTS AND CAMPAIGNS (II): 1577-85

The United Netherlands and English Policy

The interval during which individual English captains were the chief actors in a relatively small-scale, private-enterprise effort in support of the Orangists ended in late 1576. On 3 November, the Spanish Army of Flanders, which had been in a mutinous state for some weeks, much to the alarm of the loyal provinces, sacked Antwerp in the notorious 'Spanish fury'. On 8 November the Pacification of Ghent, which called for combined action to expel all Spanish troops from the Netherlands, was agreed by representatives of most of the States. On 9 January 1577 the provinces, more generally, committed themselves to enforce the provisions of the Pacification of Ghent, when they concluded the Union of Brussels. All the provinces of the Netherlands were united again -- at least for the time-being.

At first, the States-General seemed to have won an easy victory, for in the spring of 1577 the new Spanish Governor-General, Don John of Austria, withdrew all non-Netherlandish troops from the Low Countries, which were thus at peace. It was an uneasy peace, however, for William of Orange and Don John and their factions were plainly plotting against each other, while Holland and Zeeland were still (for the moment) excluded from the States-General and remained recalcitrant. There was widespread scepticism about the chances of a lasting peace. In the end, Don John broke with the States-General and recalled the Spanish tercios in August 1577, leading to the appointment by the States of Archduke Matthias, an Austrian nephew of Philip II, as Governor-General of the Netherlands on 9 October 1577.

1 See the first eyewitness report, by the mercenary George Gascoigne, *The Spoile of Antwerp, Faithfully reported by a true Englishman who was present* [1576], in Tudor Tracts, 420-49.
3 Parker, *Dutch Revolt*, 179-85, 189; Thomas Screven to Earl of Rutland, 16 Feb. 1577, HMCR, 111.
4 Matthias was not accepted by Philip II (unsurprisingly); he ended up under William's control and resigned in 1581: Parker, *Dutch Revolt*, 183-84, 197; Motley, *Dutch Republic*, 3:505.
Even though the two treaties of the winter of 1576-77 -- at Ghent and Brussels -- did not lead to peace, they were a turning-point in the revolt, not least from the English perspective. Elizabeth’s ministers had surveyed the deteriorating situation of the Prince of Orange with ever increasing alarm. In the summer of 1576, Burghley observed in a memorandum that William, who hath ben a bridle to the mallice of Spayne, and hath, as it weare, kept warres by the space of fower yeres, or more, out of our gates ... cannot long continue, being assayled as he is by Spayne ... the gates beinge oppen and the bridle taken away, what can her Majestie looke for but such mischeeves as the spanish mallice can yield, especyally now that Don Giovanni d’Austria repeyreth to the Low-Countryes?

He gloomily concluded ‘it will behove Her Majestie ... to looke into the perill out of hande, which can nether abyde any longe delay of consultation nor stay in execution of that which may tend to the prevention thereof.’ Even as the English government equivocated about whether openly to go to war with Spain, the Spanish troops in Brabant and Flanders mutinied -- as English observers immediately recognised, this offered a potential solution to the problem Burghley had outlined. The mutinies within three months resulted in the Spanish Fury, Pacification of Ghent and Union of Brussels, and what Parker characterises as the ‘third revolt’.

The two treaties marked a watershed and Elizabeth’s ministers soon viewed them as such; the legitimacy they gave Orange allowed the English government to justify supporting him. The rebel cause became the cause of all the Netherlands (not just Holland and Zeeland), governed by a pan-provincial institution of legitimate authority (the States-General), headed (albeit only briefly) by a Habsburg prince. This legitimacy continued, even after the southern Catholic provinces abandoned the revolt early in 1579, by their conclusion of the Union and Treaty of Arras (agreed 6 January and 9 May respectively), which virtually coincided with the northern provinces’ establishment of the separate Union of Utrecht on 23 January. It endured,

5 KL, no. 3179, 8:420, 422. This is almost a year before the ‘more than usually tremulous note’ to Elizabeth(15 Sep. 1577), that Wilson, Revolt, 57, 144 n.38, portrays as Burghley’s reluctant endorsement of William’s importance.
6 Herle to Chester, 7 Aug. 1576, Murdin, 299.
7 Parker, Dutch Revolt, ch. 4.
too, after Matthias was replaced by the Duke of Alençon (who, from 1576, was Duke of Anjou). In consequence, official English support for the United Provinces endured as well.9

The events of winter 1576-77 were therefore also a turning point for Dutch employment of English mercenaries. Elizabeth’s council was divided in these years, but contrary to an older historiographical orthodoxy, neither by faction, nor about ends, but rather about means. The issue at stake was how, not if, the Dutch should be actively sustained -- from 1577 the Privy Council was agreed that they should. Henry Hastings, Earl of Huntingdon, royal supremo in the north, had in the spring of 1576 been able only wistfully to tell an envoy about to go to William of Orange that ‘all good persons wylie favor and assyste hym with theare prayer, tho they can not ayde hym with worldly power’. By early 1578, Walsingham could write to a colleague about the situation across the North Sea: ‘We are now here in dailie and earnest consultation what is best to be don, in which generallie I see all my lords inclined to one coarse’.10 There was disagreement about whether Dutch survival required the dispatch of a royal English army, but from the Pacification of Ghent onwards it was taken for granted on both sides of the North Sea that the Dutch could raise their own troops in England. It was acceptable to conservative counsellors since it was a substitute for open war and to radical ones since it was still a means of helping confessional allies.11

Captains were still not able to recruit openly as will be seen in chapter 7, because England and Spain were still officially at peace. Their life was easier, however, because the new consensus in the Privy Council allowed more scope to individual aristocratic patrons, who now played a bigger role

10 Huntingdon to Robert Beale, 19 Apr. 1576, and Walsingham to Thomas Randolph, 20 Feb. 1578, BL, Egerton MS 1694, f. 6r, and Harl. MS 6992, f. 95r.
in arranging for captains to serve. Burghley was to be less involved than he had been in 1562 and 1572, but other officials would now take the lead. Of particular importance were Leicester and Walsingham, the most prominent advocates of an internationalist Protestant foreign policy, and William Davison, the queen’s accredited agent to the States-General. Also active, however, were Leicester’s brother, Warwick; Sir Francis Knollys, a Puritan privy councillor, father of mercenaries and the Dudleys’ brother-in-law; Sir Henry Killigrew, the captain in 1562 of English mercenaries in Normandy, but now a diplomat; and Thomas Wilson, the second Secretary of State. He and Killigrew were Dudley clients. All these men were zealous Calvinists.

This is not to say that English and Welsh soldiers in Dutch pay were merely stooges for Elizabeth’s ministers. In practice, the longer captains spent abroad the less control their patrons had over them: John Norreys, for example, effectively acquired his own military dependence. Still, captains generally served in furtherance of their affinity lords’ aims and it was those lords, or their own patrons in turn, who facilitated the captains’ appointments, and their recruiting and financial arrangements. Indeed, as will be seen, this was the period in which the influence of Protestant internationalist members of the English government, whether exercised directly or mediated through their own followers acting as patrons in their turn, was most important in arranging the employment of mercenary captains, albeit their influence grew ever less once the captains were employed on the Continent.

**Potential and Predicament: The Revolt Renewed**

**Third Revolt and Sixth Civil War**

Within four weeks of the Pacification of Ghent, the States-General had sent two nobles to England to raise troops, and early in 1577 it put out feelers as to whether the queen’s government would approve raising 3,000 men. By the summer, however, the (temporary) peace had affected the situation. Within a fortnight of Don John’s installation as Governor-General (6 May 1577), for example, the States of Holland began to disband the English and

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12 SG res., 2 Dec. 1576, ARA, SG1, f. 44v; Wilson to Burghley, 2 Jan. 1577, CSPFor., 11:473, no. 1158.
Scots companies in its employ, even voting extra funds for the arrears of pay they were owed and hiring an extra muster-master to speed the process. Several companies had been paid off by the end of July and the States was able to resolve Thomas Morgan’s contractual dispute from 1573 (having already twice tried but failed to do so in 1575-76).13

The brief hiatus in hostilities coincided with the outbreak of the (short-lived) sixth civil war in France in 1577. There were Englishmen serving as individuals with the Huguenot armies, as in all the guerres de religion.14 In addition, however, the Protestant leadership requested help from the English government.15 Thereafter English privateers with English soldiers as marines (including two veterans of the opstand, William Morgan and Walsingham’s step-son, Christopher Carleill), participated actively in the war, raiding the French coast and shipping, and transporting munitions to the Huguenots. They also attempted, albeit without success, to prevent the capture of Brouage.16 In addition, what was evidently a sizeable contingent of English and Welsh soldiers under John Norreys cooperated with a squadron of privateers in the defence of the island of Ré against Catholic attack early in September, with the knowledge of the Privy Council.17 Norreys’s force included English troops sent from Flanders. By the spring the danger there seemed to have dissipated, but the threat to the satisfactory status quo in France had alarmed the Huguenots’ Dutch allies so greatly that William of Orange proposed to Elizabeth’s agent, Daniel Rogers, that some of the (now apparently redundant) English troops in the Netherlands be sent to assist Condé and Navarre.18

The employment of mercenaries in 1577 thus probably resulted from cooperation between the Huguenots, their Dutch allies and sympathetic

13 De Villiers to Walsingham, 5 Sep. 1576, CSPFor., 11:369, no. 902; ARH, SvH 11, f. 343v, SvH 13, i, pp.152-54, SvH 281, ff. 5L2v, 5Mr-5M2r; Ferguson, Papers, 40.
14 E.g., below, app. 6, pp. 47-71 and app. 9, p. 508.
15 Condé to Sussex, 12 Jun. 1577, BL, Cott. MS Titus B.vii, f. 318r.
17 Paulet to Elizabeth, 6 Aug. 1577, Murdin, 312; John Cheke to Burghley, 17 Aug. 1577, HMCS., 2:160, no. 475; Paulet to Elizabeth, and Cheke to Burghley, 24 and 26 Sep. 1577, CSPFor., 12:190-92, 200-1, nos. 253, 276; Lloyd, Elizabethan Adventurer, 45.
18 TDH, 27-28; Rogers to Walsingham, 24 Jul. 1577, CSPFor., 12:27, no. 41.
members of the English élite. The potential for combined action in the future, if the Netherlands remained united and independent, was clear. In the sixth civil war, however, any contracting of English troops was on a small scale. The war itself was concluded quickly and France then entered a period free of overt civil war. Both the scale of warfare and the potential threat to Protestantism (and thus both the potential opportunity and the incentive for employment) would be greater in the Netherlands than in France for the next dozen years. Sir Amias Paulet, the ambassador to France, wrote to Burghley from Paris the following year: 'The great doings are now removed from hence into the Low Countries, from whence your Lordship must look for great advertisements.'

It was the Netherlands which thereafter was the focus of attention for English government ministers, courtiers, and mercenary captains alike.

The Emergency of 1578

The news of Don John’s treachery naturally made the Dutch view mercenary recruiting positively again. Whereas Edward Chester’s sole surviving band had been one of those paid off by the States of Holland in the early summer, in the late summer the States-General offered him a commission, took the States of Holland’s remaining English companies into its pay and began commissioning new ones. In contrast, Thomas Morgan promptly wrote to the States-General to proffer his services, but was simply thanked and told his offer would be taken up when needed. This was at William of Orange’s prompting and reflected the latter’s dislike for Morgan, dating back to their disputes of 1573; it was the Welshman, rather than all Welsh and English soldiers, who was surplus to the prince’s requirements. Nevertheless, recruiting of mercenaries in England remained relatively modest at this point.

20 The several English companies in the States-General’s employ by the late autumn are not specifically mentioned in a list of forces of Dec. 1577 (PRO, SP 83/4, no. 53), but probably were among the 25 ensigns in garrison in Holland; they were the subject of a res. of 24 Dec. 1577, RSG, 1:425. New recruiting: SG res., 31 Aug. 1577, Gachard, no. 623, 4:14-15; and see below, app. 5, p. 378.
21 RSG, 1:170.
22 Orange later told Rogers that as ‘Morgaine hath ben so importunate’ he was tired of hearing of English soldiers, yet the same day he avowed ‘that he did well know of what consequencie were an englishe soldier’: Rogers to Walsingham, 24 Mar. 1578, KL, no. 3832, 10:353.
Finding English mercenary captains was not yet of great importance, since in late 1577 the Dutch were in negotiations with Elizabeth for a royal army led by Leicester. These resulted in a treaty of alliance between the States-General and the queen, concluded on 7 January 1578. It provided for mutual cooperation, including, in subsidiary articles, the dispatch of an English army of five thousand foot and one thousand horse. The treaty was negotiated for Elizabeth by Sir Thomas Leighton, Leicester's brother-in-law, comrade-in-arms of mercenaries in Normandy in 1562, and Montgommery's helper in 1572 and 1574. Davison immediately began to make plans for transporting, equipping and feeding the army which Leicester was to lead. Both Leighton and Davison were ardent Calvinists, as were those who had chiefly supported the negotiations at court: Leicester, Walsingham, Knollys, Warwick and Huntingdon. The treaty was thus both a triumph for England's Protestant internationalists and the direct result of their efforts.

One reason for Davison's prompt action after the treaty was that the Dutch realised the limitations of their forces and appealed for the immediate dispatch of the English army. Their entreaties became more urgent after their main army was comprehensively defeated by Don John at Gembloux in Brabant on 31 January 1578. It was 'no tyme now to daIly if ther frendes meane to do anything for them', as Davison wrote home, urging as essential that 'Her Majestie go thoroughe with her promis to assiste them'. However, the crushing nature of the defeat meant that others were now less confident about open war on behalf of the States and the Dutch were left in anxious suspense for a month while Elizabeth equivocated. Ultimately, she heeded the advice of her more conservative counsellors, and in March rejected open war, deciding instead to turn again to John Casimir of the Palatinate.

25 Leicester to Davison, 14 Oct. 1577, ibid., no. 3607, 10:15.
24 KL, no. 3727, 10:219-23; the editor emphasises the importance of Leighton in getting the treaty agreed (10:221n.).
25 Davison to Walsingham, and to Leicester, 18 and 29 Jan. 1578, ibid., nos. 3739-40, 3764, 10:234-36, 261.
26 Wilson, Revolt, 58.
27 Wilson to Burghley, 23 Jan., and SG to Elizabeth, 29 Jan., 1578, KL, nos. 3747, 3763, 10:244, 260.
28 To Walsingham and Wilson, 1 and 3 Feb., and to Leicester, 12 Feb., 1578, ibid., nos. 3769, 3772, 3778, 10:267, 270, 278.
29 Davison to [?], 28 Feb., 1578, ibid., no. 3797, 10:301; Read, Burghley, 188; Wilson, Revolt, 60; MacCaffrey, Elizabeth and the Making of Policy, 228-29.
It is important, however, to emphasise that there was no question of abandoning the Dutch. The conciliar consensus that they had to be helped still existed, but in light of renewed, rampant Spanish military success it was decided to use other means than a royal English army since this 'would have constituted an open declaration of war on Spain', a war for which 'England was as yet hardly prepared'.

Equivocation was about how, not if, to aid the States. Nor was the deployment of John Casimir a betrayal or evasion. His intervention turned out badly, but dismissive verdicts on him and English use of him and his forces are based on hindsight. Elizabeth's earlier use of John Casimir and his 'reiters', to intervene in France in 1575-76, had been very successful. Even before Gembloux, William of Orange had suggested that John Casimir and his troops might be hired by Elizabeth and the latter had put out feelers accordingly.

In any case, there was still a role for English troops. It would take time for John Casimir to raise an army and bring it from Germany and Davison's warnings of the need to act quickly had been maintained; all concerned realised that time was of the essence. To employ independently contracted English troops was such an obvious supplementary measure that by mid-February a would-be English mercenary wrote to his patron 'it is commonly reported that there is entertainement in the Low Countries for such as desire to seek service.' The possibility of sending English troops in advance of Casimir was raised by the States-General in March and this is probably why Burghley, at this time, had the Privy Council consider the apparently already dead issue of sending troops to the Netherlands, with the associated issues of their organisation, cost and potential bases, 'which must be uppon the sea syde' (i.e., enabling communications with, and thus control from, England).

There were companies of English troops already ready to travel to the Netherlands. In late March, Rogers, sent to explain to William of Orange the

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30 Read, Burghley, 188; Wernham, Before, 336.
31 Cf., e.g., Wilson, Revolt, 61-62; Wallace T. MacCaffrey, 'The Anjou Match and the Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy', in English Commonwealth, 60.
32 Described in the previous chapter, p. 132.
34 Davison to Walsingham and Wilson, 3 Feb. and 2 Mar. 1578, and Rogers to Walsingham, 24 Mar. 1578 (1), ibid., nos. 3772-73, 3799, 3831, 10:270-71, 304, 350.
36 Wernham, Before, 332; PC agenda, 22 Mar. 1578, KL, no. 3827, 10:341.
substitution of John Casimir for Leicester, had instructions from Burghley and Walsingham jointly that he was 'also to communicate inwardlie [i.e., secretly] touchinge ... soche companies of Englishemen as were well bent to serve His Excellencie'. Rogers did this and then suggested that '2,000 or 3,000 Inglishemen' might 'render themselves under [Casimir's] charge', in order 'to fill up' his numbers, specifying that the Englishmen should 'serve him under such capitaines as should be judged mete for that purpose' -- doubtless the same captains he had just declared already 'well bent to serve his Excellencie'. William agreed to this proposal as did John Casimir's agent at Orange's court. Indeed, in the end one of his conditions for entering the Netherlands was that '2,000 inglishe souldiours may come and serve him under some good conductour and head'.

That it was an official envoy of Elizabeth who drew William's attention to the readiness of some captains to serve suggests that they had patrons at the highest levels of English political society. Those patrons soon began to take more direct steps to secure their double aims of aiding their clients and servants on the one hand, and their Dutch allies on the other, for if the States were an obvious source of gainful employment for the followers of Protestant lords of affinities, those followers were, in turn, an excellent remedy for the States' need of men. The brokerage role of aristocratic patrons was crucial in recruitment. As will be seen in chapter 8, it was vital in the process of raising rank-and-file recruits for companies, but even before that, the support of English notables was essential for a captain to be engaged: their warranty to William of Orange and his coadjutors that a captain was trustworthy was a necessary precondition for a commission. The Dutch were in dire straits in March 1578, yet, even so, Englishmen who simply went to the Netherlands expecting to obtain commands were rejected if they had a bad reputation and/or were not endorsed by recognised Protestant figures.

In mid- to late April, the first regiment of English troops arrived in Flanders. It had been raised by a step-son of the Earl of Shrewsbury, Henry

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37 Rogers to Walsingham, 24 Mar. 1578 (2), KL, no. 3832, 10:352.
38 Rogers to Walsingham and Wilson, and to Burghley, 24 and 28 Mar. 1578, ibid., nos. 3833, 3841, 10:356, 372; Walsingham to Davison, 16 May 1578, PRO, SP 83/6, f. 129v. Cf. Nolan, Norreys, 33 -- a basic summary, but slightly inaccurate.
40 See Edward Woodshawe to Burghley, 27 Mar. 1578, CSPFor., 12:571, no. 737.
Cavendish, who -- unusually -- had done so without having first received a contract from the Dutch. He was not confirmed as a colonel in the States-General's pay until July, over two months after he arrived. This reflected, first, Dutch displeasure that Cavendish had broken the convention that they should initiate, or at least approve proposals for, recruiting; second, their unhappiness at his own complete lack of previous military experience; and, third, the fact that, perhaps because he had not consulted with the locals and lacked experience, his force was insufficiently supplied and hence fell into disorder. Cavendish made such a poor impression that, even though many of his officers were veterans of the Netherlands, his regiment probably would not have been accepted into the States' pay were it not for his endorsement by Killigrew, Leicester, Walsingham and Davison.  

Other captains, meanwhile, relied on the good offices of key sponsors from the first. John Cobham obtained a commission from Archduke Matthias on 21 April to raise three companies, each two hundred strong. John was a nephew of William, tenth Lord Cobham and a client of Secretary Wilson, both of whom could have validated him in Dutch eyes. Contrary to one recent study, Cobham's men were not raised 'to join English volunteers already serving in the Low Countries under Thomas Morgan', about whom William of Orange had been so dismissive only a month earlier. Instead, although Cobham's companies ultimately served alongside Morgan's, it was because they were all incorporated into a regiment commanded by John 'Black Jack' Norreys, and both men's troops seem not to have arrived until early July.

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42 Killigrew to Davison, 12 Apr. 1578, CSPDom. Add. 1566-79, 540; Leicester to idem, 11 Apr. 1578, KL, no. 3879, 10:408; Walsingham to idem, 19 Apr. and 16 May 1578, PRO, SP 83/6, ff. 41r, 129r; Bernadino de Mendoza to Philip II, 22 Apr. 1578, CSPSp., 2:577, no. 491; SG res., 8 May and 16 Jul. 1578, RSG, 2:180, 201. Durant, 26, points out that Leicester's father had been Cavendish's god-father.

43 PRO, SP 83/6, f. 57.

44 Davison to Lord Cobham, 24 Apr. 1578, KL, no. 3879, 10:430; Wilson to Davison, 14 Apr. 1579, CSPFor., 13:492, no. 659. For Lord Cobham's patronage of John and his captains see below, ch. 8, p. 263.

45 Pace Nolan, Norreys, 33, and 254 n.6, citing CSPFor., 12:589, no. 759, an abstract of an état of the States' forces which it tentatively dates to March 1578, but internal evidence clearly shows it dates from after April 1578.
Morgan in turn was the lieutenant colonel and although Norreys probably had the right to appoint his own officers, Morgan's lord, Pembroke, may have helped to convince the Dutch to accept his retainer's return. Norreys himself had got a commission for a double-strength company of four hundred men by May. No record exists of any superior's intervention on his behalf in this matter, but he was a known commodity from his services with the Huguenots in previous years. However, in contrast to Cavendish, Norreys negotiated a contract, whose terms applied to all the companies in his regiment, before he took his men over. He also ensured that his quest for a regimental command was backed by his chief patron, Leicester, who wrote to Archduke Matthias and William of Orange on his behalf.  

Other mercenary captains, too, benefited from the support of Leicester and Walsingham. They endorsed Richard Bingham and Roger Williams, for example, and although no record survives of any intervention on behalf of Thomas Cotton (who like Bingham and Williams returned to Dutch service in 1578), W. J. Tighe called Cotton 'as much the Earl of Leicester's man as any gentleman could be' and given the earl's backing of so many other captains Leicester would presumably have also supported Cotton. Indeed, the direct connections that Cavendish, Norreys, Cotton and Williams had to Leicester indicate the earl was determined that an English army would, after all, be sent to the Low Countries, even if he did not lead it. He had suffered great 'mallincolly' when Elizabeth altered the plans of 1577. Norreys and Cotton, experienced captains and Leicester's clients, would have had important commands in any army the earl led to the Netherlands in 1578. Leicester and his fellow Calvinist internationalists helped to ensure that they did after all join the war on the Continent.

These prominent Protestant patrons also played an important part in ensuring that the mercenaries remained in service. Helping to negotiate the

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46 SG order for payment, 7 Aug. 1578, ARA, RAGP III:28, ff. 1r, 3r-7r [foliation mine]; Leicester to Davison, 26 May 1578, PRO, SP 83/6, f. 173r; and (for Pembroke's approval of Morgan's actions) Morgan to Leicester, 2 Jun. 1581, BL, Cott. MS Titus B.vii, f. 38r.
47 Walsingham to Davison, 29 Apr. 1578, Leicester to idem, 17 May 1578, KL, nos. 3886, 3917, 10:434-35, 475; Walsingham to idem, 16 May 1578, PRO, SP 83/6, f. 130r.
49 Leicester to Davison, 9 Mar. 1578, KL, no. 3811, 10:318-19.
50 Norreys had already been proposed for such a command, in 1575: anon. memorandum to queen, n.d. [1575], CSPFor., 11:223, no. 552.
employment of mercenaries was only part of a package of measures, albeit the single most important element: it necessitated other, financial measures. As will be seen in chapter 6, captains regularly were obliged to use their own resources in outfitting and maintaining their companies. These were not always sufficient for the task and captains frequently had to fall back on their patrons. Leading members of the English government disbursed money to this end in 1578—further evidence of the interest taken at the highest levels of the Elizabethan regime in the employment of mercenaries this year.

In late July 1578 it was apparent that a Spanish attack on the States' army was imminent: and that if the battle was another Gembloux, the revolt of the Netherlands might well be over. The newly arrived English forces were a vital part of the Dutch army, but were mostly unpaid. The States-General 'had great forces upon their charge ... [but] the meanes very rawe to enterte-eyne them'; they confessed to 'perplexitie' as to how to resolve their financial difficulties. At this crucial juncture Walsingham and Lord Cobham, then on a joint embassy in the Netherlands, raised nearly 30,000 florins on their own recognizance for a loan to the States-General. The cash came from English and Italian merchants in London and was sent to Davison, who disbursed it, hypothecated to the wages of Cavendish's and Norreys's regiments, to the States' treasurer for war. He then commenced payments within a fortnight. Davison and Walsingham had both already used, and would continue to use, their influence and their own credit to help the English companies in States' pay in 1578 and the following years.

There is, therefore, compelling evidence that the influx of large numbers of English troops to the Netherlands in 1578 was in direct response

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51 Mondoucet to Alençon, 16 Jul. 1578, BN, MS Fr. 3277, f. 46v; Walsingham to Sussex, 23 Jul. 1578, KL, no. 4016, 10:631.
52 Davison to Wilson, PRO, SP 83/6, f. 116r; SG to Count Lalaing, 21 Jul. 1578, ARA, Collectie Jacobus Koning 12.
54 SG, warrants to van der Beken, 7-12 Aug. 1578, ARA, RAGP III:28, f. 1r, and res., 12 Aug. 1578, RSG, 2:209.
55 Bishop to Davison, 15 Apr. 1578, PRO, SP 83/6, f. 39r; and below, in ch. 6, pp. 217, 219.
to a Dutch _cri de cœur_ after Gembloux, as part of a broad spectrum of aid given to ensure the Dutch cause survived. The Calvinist internationalists on the Privy Council were unable to convince the queen to go to war openly, but they arranged for many of the captains which would have fought in a royal army any way to join the States’ forces, as well as John Casimir’s army; and they ensured that the mercenaries were in good fighting trim, using their own resources to fill the breach where necessary. In short, despite the claims of modern historians of Elizabethan foreign policy, Elizabeth’s government did send the English troops it had promised.\(^5\) Nor should it be assumed that this was all done in the queen’s despite. The Spanish ambassador Bernadino de Mendoza was clearly right to equate the ‘many soldiers [i.e., mercenaries] to be raised here’ for the States to the dispatch of Leicester’s army -- but he also attributed the raising of mercenaries to the queen, as part of a package with the money granted to pay for John Casimir’s army.\(^6\) While Mendoza is not an authoritative source of Elizabeth’s intentions, it is striking that she granted Bingham an annual pension of fifty marks in March 1578, just after he was engaged by Cavendish.\(^7\) The queen approved of what was taking place, even if she did not initiate it.

Thus, in 1578 mercenaries were used as a conscious surrogate for a royal English army. Even before the money paid out by Davison reached them, ill-paid and ill-supplied, they played a key part in repelling Don John’s offensive. The Dutch victory at Rijmenam on 1 August 1578 was arguably of greater significance than Gembloux in its consequences (though it has never been as well known as the earlier Dutch defeat) because it resulted in a real improvement in the rebel States’ strategic position and provided them with essential breathing space, without which they were probably doomed. This vital victory was due largely to hard fighting by the English troops present.\(^8\) It was the fruit of initiatives taken by Elizabeth’s government and particularly by those ministers who were strongly Calvinist.

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\(^5\) Cf, e.g., Wilson, _Revolt_, 61; Wallace MacCaffrey, _Elizabeth I_ (London: Edward Arnold, 1993), 193-94; idem, ‘Anjou Match’, 61; Doran, _England and Europe_, 67.

\(^6\) Mendoza to Philip II, 31 Mar. 1578, CSPSp., 2:570, no. 485.

\(^7\) DNB, 2:514.

\(^8\) On Rijmenam see Markham, _Fighting Veres_, 50-51; Ad Reydams, ‘De Slag van Rymenam (1 August 1578)’, _Bulletin du Cercle Archéologique Littéraire et Artistique de Malines_ 5 (1894): 196-206. There is no modern study, but see the judgment of Fissel, _English Warfare_, 141.
Sustaining the Struggle, 1579-84

In 1578 numbers of English troops in the Netherlands shot up dramatically. In 1579 they levelled out again, but remained higher in the early 1580s than in the mid-1570s. From 1578 on, thanks to the Privy Council's approval of military support for the Dutch and broad support in the English body politic for this, the States-General and its agents and commanders, were able to be far more active in raising new companies of English soldiers, and in keeping up to strength the bands in their service already. Partly as a result, however, English notables were no longer quite as influential.

Norreys's regiment (periodically reinforced) would be the main Anglo-Welsh formation in the Netherlands for the next five years, but during that time other companies and larger contingents were also raised. The history of the English troops to 1584 reveals that while English patrons, particularly supporters on the Privy Council, were still vital in that process, the mechanics of recruitment changed. As English units became established in Dutch service, there were natural points of contact between potential employers and employed. Captains increasingly relied on direct contacts with powerful figures in the Netherlands more than domestic patrons. New officers were often placed with companies by English patrons, but the role of the latter was more and more to help fund existing companies and find them replacements, rather than to find and broker appointments for captains who could raise new units.60

Before Anjou (1579-81)

Cavendish returned to England in March 1579. Effective command of his regiment had long since passed to Bingham, due to Cavendish's defects as a tactician and administrator, but neither was he up to the ongoing financial burden of commanding a regiment. Cobham also went home about this time suffering from financial difficulties.61 Cavendish's regiment was disbanded and Bingham was among those who retired to England or Ireland. Both the English regiments had been reduced to half strength before Christmas 1578

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60 Chs 6 and 8, below.
61 Churchyard's Choice, sig. Si; SG min., 18 Mar. 1579, RSG, 2:636; ch. 6, below, pp. 209-12.
by an epidemic that swept through the rebel army, but many of the surviving officers and men remained in the Netherlands, including Cobham’s own company, albeit under a new captain.\(^6\)

Around the time Cavendish left, Cotton’s contingent was taken into the rebel army in Flanders led by the celebrated Huguenot general François de La Noue. Cotton may have benefited from Leicester’s patronage but it was because he was vouched for by a prominent local commander, the sieur de Ryhove (who had served with Cotton in 1578), that he was employed by the States of Flanders.\(^6\) Norreys’s regiment also fought under de La Noue at times, but additionally served further east in Brabant,\(^6\) from whence Morgan in late summer was seconded to de La Noue. This gave the Welshman the chance to regain a virtually independent command. In December, his troops were put under the command of Pierre de Melun, prince of Épinoy, head of a great southern Netherlands family. Morgan cultivated him, hoping this prince might be an alternative source of patronage to the hostile Prince of Orange. Their relationship was made closer by cooperation in adversity after de La Noue’s defeat and capture at Ingelmunster in May 1580, when Épinoy was made the new commander-in-chief of the States’ army of Flanders.\(^6\)

That autumn, Morgan was sent north-east to reinforce his nominal commander, Norreys, in the latter’s campaign in Friesland. The effective independence of Morgan’s force was maintained, however, because several companies stayed in Flanders and Tournai. Épinoy authorised Morgan to raise new companies in England, but he retained control over appointments of junior officers, clearly indicating Morgan’s subaltern status. Morgan spent the winter in England, getting replacements for the old, and raising the new companies, but he made the time to write to assure his new patron ‘that the chief thing at which I aim is to comply with you and obey you in all things’.\(^8\)

\(^6\) Churchyard, Description, 69; Fremyn to Davison, 26 Sep. 1578, KL, no. 4191, 11:851.
\(^6\) Davison to the Secretaries of State, and Jacques Rossell to Walsingham, both 1 Mar. 1579, KL, nos. 4408-9, 11:305, 308; TDH, 33.
\(^8\) Morgan to Épinoy, 17 Dec. 1580, CSPFor., 14:517-18, no. 518.
Norreys, meanwhile, had become increasingly trusted by his Dutch employers. Early in 1580 he successfully sought his patron's 'license to stay heer a whyll tyll it may be better seen what wyll become of thes warres', and urged Leicester to encourage more men to join the Dutch. Increasingly, he would not need Leicester's authorisation for his actions. In late 1580 he was appointed Colonel-General by both the States of Holland and the States-General. That winter (1580-81) he was appointed in place of the Count van Hohenlohe, William of Orange's Lieutenant-General, as general of the States' army in Friesland and achieved signal success in this command, in stark contrast to his distinguished predecessor. His infantry regiment had gradually expanded, though throughout the period its strength in companies fluctuated and in 1581 he was able to absorb some of of Morgan's companies back into his regiment. The Welshman was infuriated and attempted to reverse the Englishman's actions, but while he obtained Leicester's support, his appeals to William of Orange met with 'slender answer'. Norreys was confident in his position and knew Orange's view of Morgan. Hence, though he ceded Morgan's own company back to its original captain, doubtless at Leicester's recommendation, he conceded no authority over any other bands and Morgan's troops stayed brigaded with Black Jack's force in Friesland.

Protestant patrons at home did still have a role to play in finding new and replacement captains. Christopher Carleill, regimental Sergeant-Major of Norreys in the early 1580s, was Walsingham's step-son. He had fought in the Netherlands in the early 1570s and in France in the sixth civil war, but did not immediately join the English troops in 1578. He did visit the Netherlands that year, but as a courier for his stepfather. It was only in 1580 that he took up an active command again. However, it was increasingly the case that patrons placed men with the mercenaries primarily to report on events in the Netherlands, or used their influence to place those of their followers (or their followers' followers) who wanted to serve abroad with captains -- rather than that their intercession was necessary for the captains to find officers, or for the Dutch to find captains. The longer that client-captains were abroad,

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67 Norreys to Leicester, 13 Mar. 1580, BL, Harl. MS 6992, f. 110r.
68 See below, p. 155, and in app. 5, p. 363.
69 Morgan to Leicester, 2 Jun. 1581, BL, Cott. MS Titus B.vii, f. 38r; and app. 6, below, pp. 416, 442, 447.
70 Lloyd, Elizabethan Adventurer, 52.
and the more intimate that they became with their higher commanders and paymasters on the Continent, the weaker their patrons' influence over them became.

After Anjou (1582-84)

Leicester himself arrived in the Netherlands in February 1582, with a number of other prominent English Protestant peers. Most stayed only briefly, having come not to fight but to escort Anjou: the States-General's and Elizabeth's choice as new Governor-General. Anjou had been chosen because it was thought he could defeat Alexander Farnese, prince of Parma, who, since succeeding Don John on the latter's death in 1578, had proved extremely capable.

Henry III, Elizabeth and the States-General all agreed to subsidise Anjou heavily, partly to allow him to recruit the large numbers of mercenaries on which he would chiefly rely. Anjou's arrival therefore aroused a flurry of activity among English captains, since they rightly deduced that he would be willing to issue contracts for new English units. There was bitter competition for these. Anjou himself most wanted more cavalry (and sufficient aristocratic volunteers had come over with him to muster a company or two of lances). However, the rival English officers wanted commissions for regiments of foot, which would have to be raised mostly at home, but were potentially more profitable than captaincies of horse. Norreys wanted a colonelcy for a younger brother, but John North, oldest son of Lord North, was relentless in his pursuit of a regiment. He had fought as a gentleman volunteer, but had never commanded and he planned for Cotton to be his lieutenant colonel. Cotton made a successful bid for a colonelcy himself instead, though this did not prevent North from attaining his goal, while Thomas Morgan (generally recognised as a colonel anyway) had his position formalised soon after.

71 See Holt, Anjou, 166-75; and the 'Estat abregé' of Anjou's 'Recepte at despense faite en l'extraordinaire de la guerre', 1581-83, PRO, SP 78/10, ff. 308-36.
72 Williams to Walsingham, 3 Mar. 1582, CSPFor., 15:524, no. 578; Fremyn to idem, 19 Apr. 1582, PRO, SP 83/15, f. 234r; Churchyard's Cherishing, sig. A2v.
73 Fremyn to Walsingham, 10 Apr. 1582, PRO, SP 83/15, f. 232r; William Herle to Leicester, 13 Mar. 1582, BL, Cott. MS Titus B.vii, f. 44; Camden, ii.381.
74 Cotton to Walsingham, 23 Apr., and Fremyn to idem, 28 Apr.,1582, CSPFor., 15:646, 666, nos. 703, 717.
North, with his lack of experience, must have relied on pressure from England to secure his commission: Roger, Lord North was a noted Puritan, the *eminence grise* of Leicester, to whom John North presumably owed his success. Cotton was of less distinguished antecedents, but was one of the queen’s gentlemen pensioners and an assiduous correspondent of both Leicester’s and Burghley’s. Still, he had been absent from England for four years and his prolonged service in the Netherlands may well have been the crucial factor for Anjou. As for Morgan, his patron, Pembroke, had far from lost interest in his military clients (despite Dr Adams’s claim) and in any case Épinoy was now the States-General’s commander-in-chief, so Morgan had a perfect local referee. Why Norreys’s request was refused is unknown, but he had fought in the sixth war of religion, in which Anjou, who a year earlier had sided with the Protestants, commanded a Catholic army. Norreys was suspicious of the prince from the start and if Anjou sensed this he may have wanted to create a counterweight to Black Jack’s influence. In any event, not until 1605 did the United Provinces again employ four English regiments. That there were four (plus unattached companies) from 1582 to 1584 thus resulted from decisions taken in the Netherlands but reflected the influence of English patrons as well as local politics.

Unfortunately, there were sharp divisions between (on the one hand) Anjou, his French advisers and courtiers, and (on the other) William, the States-General and its agents, who had Norreys’s entire sympathies. Things came to a head in January 1583 when Anjou attempted to seize Antwerp by a *coup de main*; the so-called ‘French fury’. Some Englishmen were among those killed before the French were ejected from the city with heavy losses. Anjou withdrew in disarray, pursued by Norreys, who in this time of crisis was appointed general of all the States’ forces in Flanders by the Council of State (Raad van State). With thirty-two companies of foot, nineteen of them

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75 Adams, "Protestant Cause", 28, 68.
77 Pace Holt, Anjou, 191, who incorrectly refers to ‘the [i.e., one] English regiment’; and Nolan, Norreys, 51-53, who states there were three, but overlooks Cotton’s separate commission.
78 Holt, Anjou, 181-84; Nolan, Norreys, 57.
English (from his own, North's and Cotton's regiments, although Cotton died about this time), Norreys blocked Anjou's flight in the pays de Waes. Thus cut off from the coast, he was compelled to negotiate with the States-General, with whom he briefly papered over his differences. French troops briefly rejoined the Dutch army -- but in June Anjou and his troops would withdraw to France with their tails between their legs.\textsuperscript{59}

Disagreements and rivalry between the English captains also boiled over in 1583. Norreys made a fleeting visit to England that summer -- not, as Professor Andrews has it, because Elizabeth had ordered 'the withdrawal of all English volunteers from the Provinces', but rather to brief the queen on the fallout from Anjou's flight.\textsuperscript{60} Morgan took the opportunity to negotiate a contract with the stadholder of Flanders, the prince of Chimay, for a new and larger regiment in the pay of the States of Flanders. Morgan had insufficient men for the stipulated strength and was unable to obtain extra recruits until winter.\textsuperscript{61} He therefore purported that Norreys's regiment had been badly cut up and its remaining companies subsumed into his regiment; it was on this basis that he was commissioned. He then tried to convince Norreys's troops to follow him, precipitating a split -- some captains joined Morgan, at least initially, but most remained with Norreys's lieutenant colonel, Roger Williams; even ordinary soldiers changed companies. Cotton's captains, meanwhile, attempted to maintain a quasi-independence.\textsuperscript{62}

Norreys arrived back in the first week of July and resumed control, but he was (literally) at daggers drawn with Morgan (who claimed he had merely preserved his regiment's integrity) and Walsingham's mediation was needed to establish an uneasy peace. Thereafter, the organisation of the English mercenaries became increasingly confused: the result both of these disputes


\textsuperscript{61} Stokes to Walsingham, 4 Aug. 1583, CSPFor., 18:57, no. 67; Motley, Dutch Republic, 3:575. On timing of recruiting, see below, in ch. 7, pp. 239-42.

\textsuperscript{62} Williams to Norreys, 28 and 30 Jul. 1583 [n.s.], CSPFor., 18:26-27, 30-31, nos. 32, 38. And see below, app. 1, p. 326 and app. 5, pp. 420, 424, 479.
and of the tactical realities in the southern Low Countries, where regiments were increasingly split up into garrisons, instead of being kept together for field service. One upshot was that the five English foot companies sent to garrison Alost in August 1583 were drawn from all four regiments. John North’s regiment had also moved back to Flanders in the summer and remained there until the following spring, but by the autumn its colonel’s ‘simplicity’ was already causing problems.

Aspiring captains took advantage of the situation. North’s most experienced captain, Ralph Cromwell, had already obtained a commission for two companies of his own. In Alost Sergeant-Major Pigot exploited the soldiers’ dissatisfaction with chronic shortage of pay and food to attempt to establish his own command in the manner of Yorke. In October 1583 Pigot expelled the lieutenant colonel, Williams, and thereafter commanded the different companies himself. Doubtless due to Norreys’s influence, this move was treated as mutiny by the Dutch. In fear of retribution, Pigot and the other captains betrayed the town to Parma -- but without the knowledge of the rank and file, many of whom made their way to States’ garrisons, or surrendered, gave their parole and went home, rather than serve the enemy. However, an important link in the chain of fortresses between Ghent and Brussels had been lost, the English forces in the Netherlands severely disrupted, and their relationship with their employers sorely strained. All this was the fruit, firstly of the general and provincial States’ inability to pay and feed their men, but second, as Norreys recognised, of the rivalry and jockeying for position between the English captains. They were only slightly hindered by patrons separated from them by the Narrow Seas.

Morgan was not directly associated with events at Alost and was able to consolidate his connections with the Dutch. On 13 February 1584, when Norreys was deciding to resign his command, Morgan happily wrote to Wals-
ingham about how much he was in demand by the Dutch. It is notable that it was the States of Flanders which had commissioned Morgan at Norreys's expense in 1583, for it was there that Morgan had established good local contacts earlier in the 1580s. This incident provides another example of his ability to forge good relationships with members of the indigenous élites: first Epinoy, then Chimay. By the end of the 1580s Morgan would rely more on Dutch than English patrons.

It was not just Morgan who had Netherlandish patrons, of course. For example, Thomas Wilson (one of Norreys's captains, not the diplomat) was also on good terms with Chimay and senior Dutch officers. It was at least partly as a result of their favour that he kept a company in Dutch pay through to 1585. In addition, William of Orange and other senior Dutch figures held Norreys in high esteem and even affection throughout; they enjoyed his company in off-duty moments, as well as respecting his military prowess. Even Anjou had conceded the Englishman's worth, according him the title of 'general de notre Infanterie'. During his absence in July 1583, an English merchant reported that Dutch officers had told him 'they wish Mr Norris were here, for they lack a good commander in the field', and there was 'great rejoicing', even among the common folk, on his return. Norreys's reasons for resigning in February 1584 are unclear. It may be, as his biographer argues, that he wanted to lobby the queen in person for official English intervention, or he may have been unhappy that the States were again negotiating with Anjou for renewed assistance. He certainly seems to have been tired of six years of fighting and contesting inadequate pay arrangements for his men. His parents regarded his current employment as too dangerous and wanted him to return home, and they had always had great influence on him.

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87 CSPFor., 18:352, no. 419.
88 Like Epinoy, Chimay came from a great southern Netherlands family, in this case the Croys: Motley, 3:575.
89 See ch. 5, below, p. 171.
91 Ramsay, 209; Edward Prince to Walsingham, 12 Oct. 1583, n.s., CSPFor., 18:123, no. 145; Anjou's letterbook, 28 Jul. 1582, ARA, SG 11095.
92 Stokes to Walsingham, 14 and 28 Jul. 1583, CSPFor., 18:22, 42, nos. 27, 49.
94 Lord Norreys to Burleigh, 30 Jun. 1583, BL, Harl. MS 6993, f. 48r; and see Leicester to Walsingham, 30 Jul. 1586, Leycester Corr., 379.
is clear is that his employers did not want to lose his services. The Prince of Orange wrote to Elizabeth that he wished Norreys was staying and could only regret his absence.  

John Norreys was very much Leicester’s dependent in 1578-79; by 1586 he posed such a challenge to the earl’s authority that they were bitter enemies. This transformation derived from his expert knowledge of personalities, institutions and the art of war in the Netherlands, developed between 1578-84. It derived, too, from the fact that he was renowned, not only among the English in the Low Countries, but also among the Dutch and in France, Portugal and Spain. This reputation, in turn, resulted primarily from the courage, prowess and tactical skill he showed in great military actions -- at Rijmenam; at the storming of Mechelen (1580); during the long drawn-out relief of Steenwijk and other complex operations in Frisia (1580-81); in honourable defeat at the battle of Nordhorn (1581); his masterful covering of the retreat of the main army of Anjou and Orange to Ghent (1582); and

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56 23 Feb. 1584 n.s., CSPFor., 18:352, no. 420.
57 Leicester’s ‘Declaration’, n.d. [1587?], BL, Add. MS 48116, f. 77r; ch. 5, below, p. 168.
58 See, e.g., Antonio of Portugal to Norreys, n.d., and SG to Elizabeth, 26 Jun. 1587 n.s., Bodl., St Armand MSS 8, f. 20r, and 9, f. 52r; and the notes following.
59 Norreys’s own selection of his most notable actions is in Bodl., St Armand MS 9, f. 56r.
60 Count de Bossu to William of Orange, 1 Aug. 1578, Gachard, no. 644, . 4:57; Michiel and Lippomano to the Signory, 10 Aug. 1578, CSPVen., 7:583, no. 729; Tragicall Histone, 4:31v; TDH, 32; Emmanuel van Meteren, Historie der Neder-landtscher [...]. Oorlogen ende geschiedenissen, tot den jare 1612 (‘s-Gravenhage: 1623), 153r; Baudart, 1:296-98; Strada, i.394.
61 SG, mm., 9 Apr., and res., 24 Apr. 1580, ARA, SG 7, f. 143v, SG 3104, f. 27r; Walsingham to Cobham, 15 Apr. 1580, CSPFor., 14:239, no. 267; Thomas Churchyard, A Plaine or moste true report of a daungerous service by Englishmen, & other soldiers, for the takyng of Macklin sette forthe (London: 1580). (The egregious misdating of this to 1581 by Nolan, Norreys, 46, leads to a distortion of his general narrative.)
62 Rossel to Walsingham, 16 Oct., 1580, CSPFor., 14:454, no. 462; anon. to Hunsdon, 7 Mar. 1581, HMCS, 2:377, no. 947; SG res., 13 Jul. 1581, ARA, SG 3106, f. 86r; Baudart, 1:357; Bor, 2/16:3-6; P. C. Hooft, Nederlandsche Historien (Amsterdam, 1642), 755-56.
64 ‘Relation du voyage du duc d’Anjou [..]’, BN, MS Nafr. 4709, pp. 33-34; newsletter, 19 Aug. 1582, CSPFor., 17:625-26, no. 668; TDH, 45-48 (misdating events to 1583); Camden, iii.20-21; Baudart, 1:424; Robert Naunton, Fragmenta Regalia: or, Observations on the late Queen Elizabeth, Her Times and Favourites, in Memoirs of Robert Cary and ‘Fragmenta Regalia’, ed. Walter Scott (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable & John Murray, 1806), 237; Thomas Fuller, Worthies, quoted in Nichols, Progresses of Queen Elizabeth, 1:422n.
his interdiction of Anjou in the pays de Waes (1583). It was this distinguished career in Dutch service that made John Norreys what he was by 1586.

Summary

Some key points about the position of mercenary captains vis-à-vis foreign and domestic governments and nobles have emerged from the examination of Morgan’s attempts in 1580-81 and 1583 to establish a sphere of authority independent of Norreys; of the negotiations for contracts for new regiments in 1582; of the general interaction of colonels and captains with each other and with their employers; and of Norreys’s position in the Netherlands.

English patrons influenced events across the North Sea during this period less than in 1572 or 1578. They could sway leaders and institutions in the Netherlands, yet only up to a point; their influence was naturally greatest within existing English military organisations, but even there it was circumscribed. Captains who wanted to enlarge their commands or to raise new units required, above all, the backing of provincial estates, princes and other notables in the Netherlands. Patronage from England could be helpful in obtaining that backing, but it was just as important to manipulate local political disputes and have the patronage of local notables. Of course, mercenary captains still actively sought (and accepted) patronage from Leicester, Walsingham and others throughout the period 1577-85, since they could not afford to get too far out of the loop of society and politics at home. However, self-confident captains in the Netherlands, operating far from domestic patrons, if in the favour of their local employers and able to mobilise credit from sympathetic merchants, were able, to a great extent, to make their own destiny. This was one of the chief developments in this period.

1584: The Crisis of the Revolt

In the spring of 1584, the Dutch revolt faced crisis. Parma’s great offensive seemed unstoppable and town after town in the south fell to his armies. A

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156 But Adams, ‘Puritan Crusade’, 11, attributes more importance to the patronage of Leicester and Walsingham.
new treaty was agreed with Anjou in April, in the hopes that French aid could stem the tide, but he died on 10 June. Precisely a month later, on 10 July 1584, the Prince of Orange was assassinated in Delft by a Catholic fanatic. William's death was an almost irreparable disaster -- and the Dutch knew it. The great cities of Bruges and Ypres had already been forced to surrender by the end of May. Before summer was out, Ghent had been betrayed to the Spanish by the prince of Chimay and Antwerp was under siege by Parma's army. The revolt was now in crisis.106

Elizabeth's government recognised almost immediately that the situation was finally so serious that only intervention by the Tudor state could stem the Spanish tide before it washed entirely across the Netherlands (and perhaps on into the British Isles). 1584 had already seen the expulsion of the Spanish ambassador Mendoza for coordinating a plot to assassinate the queen. In October, within a month of the fall of Ghent, the Privy Council decided to offer to send a royal army to the Netherlands (and, separately, to assault the Spanish West Indies). For the next ten years, the imperatives of the English government would greatly influence the conduct of the war in the Netherlands and the war effort would come to be, for a time, an entirely royal/national affair, eventually subsuming all mercenary companies. However, it took time to agree terms, and mercenaries continued to be important to the Dutch war effort in 1584 (and beyond, as will be seen in chapter 5).

Thomas Morgan was the main driving force from spring 1584 through to summer 1585, as other senior English officers faded from the scene. Yorke, a crypto-Catholic, was removed from the equation when, in March 1584 he was accused of conspiring with local officers and a Scots captain to betray Dendermonde and Ghent to the Spanish. Walsingham intervened on his behalf and Yorke was eventually released in the autumn, but he was in prison throughout the summer and in any case his days as an independent mercenary commander were over.108 North's regiment remained in Flanders

106 Holt, Anjou, 206-8; Motley, Dutch Republic, 3:594-98 (and for reactions, by States General and provincial, to William's assassination, ibid., 594n., 612n.; ARA, CAan. 6, no. 13; ARH, SvH 19, p. 370); Parker, Dutch Revolt, 214-15; Wilson, Revolt, 77-79.
107 Parker, Dutch Revolt, 217.
into the spring of 1584, but by then Cromwell, his best captain, had seceded (as has been seen), while North himself had actually been imprisoned for his debts. Though the States-General finally paid him enough of his arrears for North to be released, his regiment could not keep good order and on 19 April the States-General resolved that it should no longer be paid. It then disappears from the records. Like Cavendish five years earlier, North had not been up to the burden he had taken upon himself and so his regiment faded away.

Norreys's regiment, meanwhile, had been hit both by the defections at Alost and by its colonel's departure. He had, in effect, established his own military dependence and many of his followers literally followed him back to England and thence, briefly, to Ireland. Some other English foot companies remained in Dutch service, including Cromwell's. The remaining companies of Norreys's regiment also continued to serve for a while. However, after serving with his cornet of horse in the failed Dutch campaign to restore the Calvinist Elector of Cologne, the regiment's lieutenant colonel, Williams, withdrew to England -- effectively its death knell.

Morgan was thus pre-eminent, at least until the English and Dutch governments began negotiating full-scale English intervention in spring 1585. Within a fortnight of William of Orange's assassination, English agents in the Netherlands had been sounded out about the prospect of Elizabeth sending an army of 5,000 foot and 500 horse to help the United Provinces. The Privy Council's offer in October of an expeditionary force was refused, however, because the Dutch, wrongly fearing that England might compel them to make a compromise peace, still hoped that Henry III of France would stand in for his brother, Anjou. The result was a certain coolness between Elizabeth and the States-General. Into this breach stepped Morgan, well-known to the Netherlanders and with the necessary contacts to get captains and raise men in England and Wales. By the end of May 1584, his regiment had been pulled back from the Rhineland into Holland -- now the new home of the States-General. It did not blame him for his men's performance in the

108 Bodl., North MS b.25, f. 64r. See below, in ch. 6, p. 213.
110 See below, in app. 1, p. 327.
111 Williams to Walsingham, 4 Sep. 1584, ibid., 19:50-51.
112 Herle to the Queen, 22 Jul. 1584, ibid., 18:630, no. 768.
113 Parker, Dutch Republic, 217; Wilson, Revolt, 82.
Cologne campaign and expressed confidence in him by granting him a commission for a new hundred-strong band of prestigious heavy cavalry, rather than light horse. Antwerp was so clearly in danger that, in July, the States of Brabant, albeit strong advocates of offering the United Provinces' sovereignty to Henry III, gave Morgan a contract for a new regiment of 1,500 foot to reinforce the city's garrison.\textsuperscript{114}

If accepting it put him in bad odour at the English court, however, it was not for long -- the Welshman was in contact with royal ministers from an early stage.\textsuperscript{115} However, his captains were probably not chosen or arranged by his patrons in the regime, Leicester and Walsingham, for Morgan himself contacted ex-captains who had served in other regiments and sent long-term followers back to England to recruit.\textsuperscript{116}

For the rest of the period 1584-85 Morgan and his men operated in and around Antwerp, as part of the vain effort to save the city from Parma, whose grasp tightened around it slowly but inexorably.\textsuperscript{117} The Welshman did raise 1,500 men as commissioned, but while two companies entered the city in September, only one more was able to run the blockade of the Scheldt before Morgan finally arrived with the balance of the regiment in December. Three other companies were left stranded in Flushing where the States of Zeeland made difficulties over their housing and victualling, probably since they were employed by the States of Brabant. The dispute was referred to the Council of State, the powers of which had been enhanced after William's assassination; it would be the body English captains would have to deal with in the future.\textsuperscript{118}

Once in Antwerp, after a promising start the mercenary captains were constantly at odds with the governor and local captains and magistrates over


\textsuperscript{115} Leicester to Morgan, abstract, Spanish intercept, n.d., Correspondance du Cardinal de Granvelle 1565-1586, ed. Charles Piot, 12, 1586 (Brussels: Académie Royale de Belgique, 1896), 250-51. For Morgan and his officers' correspondence to Walsingham: notes following.

\textsuperscript{116} See below, p. 241.

\textsuperscript{117} Motley, United Netherlands, 1: ch. 5; Jongbloet-van Houette, passim.

shortages of pay and victuals. Heated quarrels and accusations of bad faith on both parts resulted, along with some internal quarrels.\(^{119}\) The upshot was that by the spring Morgan had begun negotiations with Hohenlohe, now Captain-General of the United Provinces. Hohenlohe already had English captains in his army and was happy to employ more, especially since he was charged with breaking through Parma’s blockade of the Scheldt; Morgan was seeking an alternative to his unsatisfactory present arrangements.\(^{120}\) Yet despite the discontent and disputes, even the Dutch admitted that Morgan remained resolute.\(^{121}\) The English and Welsh soldiers both in Antwerp and in Hohenlohe’s army fought well in the great, unsuccessful, assault on Parma’s siege lines at Kouwensteyn dike in April. They suffered heavy losses in this and in many lesser actions, as well as losing men steadily from hunger and disease.\(^{122}\) In May, Morgan was obliged by his regiment’s losses to reorganise it into just two companies. He also received an offer from the States of Holland and Zeeland: a commission for a new regiment of ten companies.\(^{123}\)

By now, however, the attention of the northern Netherlanders had moved elsewhere. They would have certainly regarded any regiment raised by Morgan as second best to what they really wanted, and which they hoped Norreys and the English government would provide. The (northern) Dutch were perforce about to rely on England. As a result, English government ministers and peers would, for a time, once again have the whip hand in military affairs in the Netherlands -- including the employment of English and Welsh mercenaries.


\(^{120}\) Newsletters, 15 and 22 Mar., n.s., Gilpin to Walsingham, 28 Apr., and Joos de Zoote to idem, 19 Apr., n.s., 1585, CSPFor., 19:351-52, 407, 437.

\(^{121}\) Fremyn to idem, 5 Mar. 1585, n.s., ibid., 299; SG res., 2 Jul. 1585, ARA, SG3114, f. 119v.

\(^{122}\) Gilpin, Thomas James, Davison and Thomas Stokes to Walsingham, 28 Apr., 17 May, n.s., 26 May, n.s. and 17 May 1585, CSPFor., 19:437, 477-80. See Motley, United Netherlands, 1:205-23.

\(^{123}\) Morgan to PC, 31 May 1585, CSPFor., 19:507.
CHAPTER FIVE

CAPTAINS, CONTRACTS AND CAMPAIGNS (iii): 1585-1610

This is a long period -- the longest covered by any of these three narrative chapters -- but this reflects the facts that between 1588-93 almost all English soldiers on the Continent were in national service, fighting in their queen's pay in royal expeditionary forces or garrisons; and that from 1594 to 1598 mercenaries were only a small proportion of the English troops deployed in France and the Netherlands. Only between 1585-87 and then from 1599 did soldiers in foreign pay (the States-General's in particular) comprise a major element of English manpower in foreign lands. Moreover, from England's entry into the war with Spain in 1585, English companies became a regular feature of the Dutch military effort, so that they had less and less need to seek for patrons and captains. The conclusion of the French wars of religion in 1598, after which English and Welsh mercenaries were employed solely in the Netherlands, followed by James I's withdrawal from war with Spain in 1604, resulted in the ever increasing integration of the mercenaries into the Dutch army. As a consequence of this, it is possible to generalise far more about organisation while it is less necessary to analyse the role of ministers in deciding to aid the Dutch and brokering the services of captains, from 1599 to the (temporary) cessation of hostilities with Spain in 1610.

The English Nation at War 1585-1594

In March 1585, Brussels, one-time capital of the Netherlands, fell to Spanish troops; Henry III finally rejected the United Provinces' offer of sovereignty and plea for aid; the Catholic League, Spain's ally, restarted the wars of religion; while Parma's army continued slowly to strangle Antwerp, greatest city in the Low Countries, despite all the States-General efforts. Increasingly the Dutch believed that Antwerp would only be saved by relief from England. In March 1585, therefore, they appealed to Elizabeth for direct military assistance.

1 Marnix, Bref recit de l'estat d'Anvers, sig. D4r.
Royal Intervention and Administrative Confusion, 1585-87

A definitive account of the complex negotiations resulting in English intervention in the Netherlands has not yet been published, but the political story is reasonably well known. The military side of things is not. The strength and nature of English aid have frequently been and often still are incorrectly described by historians. The employment of mercenaries to supplement official aid is examined specifically only as a side issue in Dr Adams's series of insightful but brief studies of the royal expeditionary force (in turn, the only considerations of this subject). I focus here on the recruiting of mercenary forces: initially to help relieve Antwerp; and then, after its fall, to augment the royal army sent to aid the United Provinces.

Eventually, in summer 1585, the States-General would send a full-scale delegation led by Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, Advocate of Holland (who would dominate Dutch politics until after the Twelve Years' Truce). This embassy ultimately agreed the treaties of Nonsuch, by which royal English troops were stationed permanently in the Netherlands. It was in late March, however, that Walsingham began initial negotiations, with deputies from the States of Holland and Brabant. They asked for an expeditionary force of 2,000 men to be sent immediately to Antwerp even before negotiations were concluded, offering £30,000 to pay this force. Their reasons were evidently compelling, because at the end of May, in a report to Burghley, Walsingham referred to the '2,000 men which her majesty thinketh the meet to be presently sent over'. A week later, the Council of State and Hohenlohe accepted the deputies' agreements with Walsingham, who had already proposed veteran royal officers to advise on 'the choyce of the inferyor Captains', but had not yet suggested an overall commander.

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2 Markham, Fighting Veres, 69; DNB, 14:573; Cheyney, 1:194-97; Dop, 153; Nolan, Norreys, 87-88; Tracy Borman, 'Untying the Knot? The Survival of the Anglo-Dutch Alliance, 1587-97', European History Quarterly 27 (1997): 308.
4 Walsingham to Burghley, 24 Apr. and 21 May 1585, BL, Harl. MS 6993, ff. 78r, 80r. Ortell to Leicester, 8 Jun. 1585, BL, Cott. MS Gaiba C.viii, f. 78r. CS res., 3-5 Jun. 1585, ARA, RvS 3, ff. 223v, 226v, 228v. The Dutch deputies' reports: ARA, RAGP I:90, lla 'Ortell en de Gysen'.
In fact, that decision had already been taken. The Dutch wanted John Norreys, whose reputation had not diminished in the twelve months since his departure; four months after commissioning Morgan’s regiment, the States of Brabant (seated in Antwerp) were wistfully hoping that Norreys would return. Their desire was now to be consummated -- albeit too late, as things turned out, to save Antwerp. On 12 May 1585, whilst still negotiating with the Dutch deputies, Walsingham wrote to Norreys in Ireland that Elizabeth had decided ‘to take upon hir the protection of the sayd [Low] cuntreyes’, and,

knowing no body more fit to be employed in some honorable charge in the entreprise then you ... hath willed me to lett you understand that hir pleasure is that your present departure over hither not givirige it out that it is by commandement for the service of the low cuntreyes but only upon some speciall busines of your own.6

On 21 June, although no decision had yet been taken to aid the United Provinces openly, the Privy Council issued a privy seal for £5,000 to John Norreys, for preparing troops to serve in the Low Countries.7

It is evident that both the Dutch and English had thought initially in terms of the provision of more government-directed, yet ‘underhand’, help of the type given in 1572 and 1578. At one stage in early to mid-July Elizabeth equivocated and declared that any assistance must be underhand; only the unanimous opposition of the Privy Council overcame her.8 In July the main delegation from the States-General arrived and negotiations began to move in the direction of open war between England and Spain.9 The recruiting by Norreys had proceeded, however, even while the hard bargaining between the two governments was still going on. As in 1562, mercenaries could be mobilised while royal troops waited an official treaty because the counsellors agreed the cause was good.10 In fact, the consensus within the regime about aid to the Dutch still existed. Norreys had raised nearly 2,000 men in 1578

5 Morris to Walsingham, 23 Nov. 1584, CSPFor., 19:151.
6 Bodl., St Amand MS 8, f. 67r. Elizabeth had indeed already communicated to the Dutch in Mar. 1585 an offer to be their protector, regardless of whether it would benefit herself: Shaw, ‘Financial and Political Relationships’, viii.
8 Lord Talbot to Rutland, 14 Jul. 1585, HMCR, 177; Read, Walsincham, 3:106, 108.
9 The report of the main embassy under Oldenbarnevelt is ARA, SG 8299.
10 See Trim, ‘Normandy Campaign’, 76-78.
with conciliar blessing -- why not raise 2,000 in 1585, when the emergency facing the rebel States was even greater? Moreover, there was now, as Guy points out, a wider consensus that England would have to go to war to save the United Provinces. Walsingham observed, no doubt with satisfaction, that "the whole council, howsoever they stand inwardly effected, do nevertheless outwardly concur in opinion that it is a dangerous course" and that England therefore had to 'enter openly and soundly' into war." The exact terms might take some time to fix but the eventual outcome was not in much doubt and so it was desirable to have a force ready to move as soon as an agreement was reached.

The end result was what is usually termed the 'Treaty of Nonsuch' -- something of a misnomer, as Adams points out. The Nonsuch accords in fact comprised four separate agreements: of 2 and 10 August and 2 and 22-23 September. The initial treaty, signed at Nonsuch on 2 August was for aid to Antwerp; it provided that Elizabeth would contribute 26 companies of foot, totalling 4,000 men, to an army of 10,000 foot and 800 horse for the relief of Antwerp. A treaty of assistance was signed on 10 August providing that after the relief the 4,000 English foot would be supplemented by 400 horse and serve as an expeditionary force in the Netherlands. They would remain for the duration of the war with Spain, during which the queen would pay them, but with all expenses incurred to be repaid by the Dutch Republic when hostilities concluded. English troops were permitted to occupy the so-called 'cautionary towns' of Flushing and Brill as surety for repayment and in the meantime the queen could nominate two members of the Council of State.

The Nonsuch accords came too late for Antwerp. Confirmation of the city's fall on 17 August arrived at Elizabeth's court three days afterwards, where it was a matter of 'tresgrand regret' to the queen. She soon offered to augment the troops 'to be entertained at our own charge during the troubles' to 5,000 foot and 1,000 horse (increases of 1,000 and 600 respectively) and to send a great nobleman to command them. These terms were agreed in a supplementary treaty of amplification, signed by the English council on 2 and

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12 Adams, 'Puritan Crusade', 12.
13 ARA, RAGP I:97, no. 35; see Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 284n.; Shaw, 'Financial and Political Relationships', xxii; Israel, Dutch Republic, 219-20.
3 September. Both treaties were ratified by the States-General three weeks later, but on the basis that the 5,000 foot were meant to comprise a field army additional to the approximately 1,400 foot of the garrisons of the cautionary towns. Ambassador Davison accepted this interpretation, agreeing a further convention of 'amplification'.

Thus, almost immediately, the queen's troops were divided into two types: 'cautionary'; and 'auxiliary' (the field forces). Though this division was often blurred in practice, it was nevertheless strictly maintained in all official documentation, Dutch and English. In addition, English troops in the Netherlands were further divided into allies of the Dutch Republic, and mercenaries in its employ. The latter, in turn, like the troops in the queen's pay, must be broken down still further. There were, firstly, English troops already in the Netherlands -- the remnants of Norreys's original regiment were in Friesland and Overijssel, while Morgan and his two companies had got away from Antwerp to Holland. Secondly, there were the 2,000 men that Norreys had, since May, been raising with royal approval for the States' pay. These were encompassed within the Nonsuch framework: by Article 7 of the treaty of 2 August the queen agreed to allow an extra 2,000 men to be raised on behalf of the States-General and at its expense, though she would advance the money to arm them.

On top of this, Norreys -- also since May -- had conducted his own negotiations with successive deputies from Holland. Their States and those of Zeeland, as noted above, had considered commissioning a regiment from Morgan, but, two days before the Welshman reported that fact to the Privy Council, the States of Holland had agreed the 'necessity' of recruiting 'an English regiment or two' -- a decision that did not refer to the negotiations for the 2,000 men, which were for the Generality. The Hollanders never did commission Morgan in 1585, so Norreys was surely the colonel they had in mind for the regiment of that resolution -- Morgan was perhaps their second choice. In July, while the Council of State (of the Generality) planned to pay

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15 SH Res., 9 Sep. 1585, ARH, SvH 20, p. 545; Morgan to PC, and commission from Norreys to Palmer, 1 and 6 Sep. 1585, CSPFor., 20:2, 10.
16 ARA, RAGP I:97, no. 35; Norreys to Burghley, 21 Sep. 1585, CSPFor., 20:30.
17 Res., 29 May 1585, ARH, SvH 20, p. 277: 'een Regiment Engelsche ofte twee'.
and feed 2,000 English mercenaries, the States of Holland prepared for
3,000 foot and a company of light horse. On 12 August, two days after
the treaty of assistance was signed, the commissioners of Holland concluded a
separate transaction with Norreys by which he would raise a cornet of horse
and twelve to fifteen hundred foot, in addition to the two thousand men in
Dutch pay provided for by the treaty for the relief of Antwerp; it included terms
for repayment of his expenses in recruiting and transporting the extra
troops.

In fact, as hinted above, Norreys did not wait for the various contracts
to be finalised to start raising his troops. By July, his plans were far enough
along to necessitate making arrangements for shipping his troops to Holland
and quartering them there. Another privy seal, for £17,000, was issued to
Richard Huddleston, Norreys's kinsman and paymaster of his troops (about
to became treasurer-at-war of the royal army) on 31 July. By this date, thirty
English captains and 2,700 men were already in Flushing and Bergen-op-
Zoom. For the rest of August, more English troops were shipped almost
daily into Holland. Norreys had not quite been able to raise the stipulated
number of men in England; therefore, as he may have always intended, the
English units left over from 1584 were incorporated into his brigade. When
this was mustered on 14 September, it totalled 100 horse and 3,144 foot (out
of an establishment strength of 3,250): just as contracted. The royal force,
mustered the same day, totalled slightly over the requisite 4,000 foot. In the
autumn, to meet a Dutch request for pioneers, Norreys raised a thousand of
them in England, increasing the number of mercenaries to 4,000 as well.

All States'-pay English soldiers were now under Norreys's command.
Some had been raised by the terms of the treaty of 2 August, some to fulfil

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1585, ARH, SvH 20, pp. 410, 528. Pace Adams, 'Gentry of North Wales', 131, Morgan never
received a Dutch commission for a separate regiment.
19 ARA, RAGP I:97, no. 33.
420-22, 429-30.
21 Neale, 'Elizabeth and the Netherlands', 184; draft instructions, 4 Oct. 1585, CSPFor., 20:63.
22 Croisilles to Parma, 1 Aug. 1585, Corr. de Granvelle, 12:333-34; SH res., 9 Aug. 1585, ARA,
24 Morgan to PC, and Norreys to Palmer, 1 and 6 Sep. 1585, CSPFor., 20:2, 10.
25 Musters, ibid., 25. Also BL, Harl. MS 168, ff. 159v-60r.
26 Norreys to Burghley, 2 Sep., and to PC, 21 Sep. and 14 Oct., 1585, ibid., 4, 32, 85.
the contract of 12 August; many had been recruited recently in England, others had already been in the Netherlands and were transferred (though with no signs of rancour) into his force. That he was able to expand the remit agreed by the English government to his own advantage and then to bring all English troops in Dutch employ into his embrace is testimony to his prestige and connections in the Netherlands. He was also appointed the commander of the 4,000-strong royal expeditionary force. He had achieved a supremacy in the Netherlands surpassing anything he or Morgan had held in the past and anything any mercenary commander would hold in the future, even Sir Francis Vere. Nonetheless, there was great potential for confusion in the circumstances, since he had both Elizabeth and the States-General as paymasters. If Proverbs 16:18 never impinged on his Calvinist consciousness, Luke 16:13 should have.

Norreys's divided loyalties did not last long. Between the first two treaties of Nonsuch and the muster of royal and mercenary troops on 14 September the English government had undertaken to increase the original expedition from 4,000 to 7,400 men and specifically pledged to put 5,000 foot and 1,000 horse in the field. Norreys's men were mostly volunteers, but to get enough recruits in England to increase his queen's-pay infantry by 25 per cent swiftly enough, conscription would have to be used. Impressment had already been used to supply at least 2,500 of the 4,000 royal troops and the English government was reluctant to use it more than strictly necessary. The obvious solution was to incorporate the mercenaries into the queen's forces and in October and November the majority were. Yet this only clarified the English troops' situation up to a point, for different companies had different reasons for existence and original terms of employment, and had been drawn from different sources by different means. Moreover, if all had been 'nationalised' the queen would have had some 7,200 English infantry in her pay (nearly a thousand more than she had actually agreed to provide). The balance therefore remained in the pay of the States-General.

27 Elizabeth to SG, 13 Aug. 1585, ARA, RAGP I:92, n.f.
28 'Pride goeth before destruction, and a haughty spirit before a fall'; and 'No servant can serve two masters'.
29 Walsingham to Davison, 4 Sep., and Norreys to Walsingham, 22 Sep., 1585, CSPFor., 20:8, 33; Adams, 'Gentry of North Wales', 131.
30 SG to Davison, 22 Oct. 1585, CSPFor., 20:80.
Thus, right from the start, English military aid to the Dutch Republic was of manifold sorts, separate yet overlapping. Leicester’s arrival in 1586 as Governor-General of the United Provinces and Lieutenant General of all English troops in the Netherlands did not change the situation. He found that Norreys had been obliged by operational necessity to garrison many of the English companies in Dutch-held towns: so many, that there were insufficient of them to form the substantial field force originally intended by the treaties.

For several reasons, however, the queen refused to raise more men at this time. She was displeased at Leicester’s acceptance of regal honours on arriving in the Netherlands. She was unhappy that his policies there on religion, and on constitutional arrangements within the United Provinces, sparked a ‘profound crisis’, that left ‘the Republic ... in a state of considerable internal tension’ which lasted into 1588. Leicester also quarrelled sharply with Norreys (himself something of a favourite of Elizabeth’s), who had been English supremo in the Netherlands for only a few months. His supremacy and independence were doomed by the clause in the treaty of amplification that Elizabeth dispatch a great nobleman as her lieutenant-general. The Dutch still trusted Norreys and appointed him as Colonel-General under Leicester, but despite being knighted by Leicester in April 1586, he felt some bitterness at being supplanted and at not being able to act as he, England’s most experienced soldier, judged best. In addition, Norreys, with his local connections, was frustrated by Leicester’s insensitivity to local political conditions. The end result was extreme antipathy between the two men; their acrimony spread and caused dissension amongst all English captains, whether in the queen’s or States’ pay.

The upshot of all this was that Elizabeth was unhappy with Leicester because of his actions; yet unhappy, too, with the Dutch for opposing her favourite and for what she perceived as their greed in wanting England to contribute more to the war effort, when she felt she had discharged her obligations. Leicester in 1586 got round her unwillingness to authorise new

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31 Errington to Norreys, and to Walsingham, 12 Sep., Davison to Norreys 17 Sep., and Norreys to PC, 21 Sep., 1585, ibid., 20:21-22, 27, 31; list of garrisons, Jan. 1586, ibid., 340.
32 Israel, Dutch Republic, 220-36, at 221, 228; and Wilson, Revolt, 91-94, 96-98.
33 See, e.g., Doyley to [Burghley], 24 May 1586, CSPFor., 20:668; Leicester to Walsingham, 30 Jul. 1586, Leycester Corr., 379-80; and also DNB, 14:574; Nolan, Norreys, 91-104; Read, Burghley, 473; Wilson, Revolt, 89-91.
levies necessary to fill up the field force by persuading the States-General to commission more English companies in their own pay. So, mercenary units were once again operating alongside the English auxiliaries and cautionary companies, whose numbers were actually exceeded by those of the 'voluntary men', as the mercenaries were generally termed.34

Anglo-Dutch relations were meanwhile increasingly strained by bitter disputes over pay. These to a great extent resulted from the confusion begot by the complex troop-raising arrangements, not least because both English and Dutch governments were generally eager that the other assumed its 'fair share' of the financial burden. When the English companies, both royal and mercenary, arrived in the late summer of 1585 the States of Holland promptly paid the captains' recruiting and transport expenses and advanced wages to their soldiers.35 This amicable situation did not last and, as early as October, Dutch and English were at odds as to whether given troops were to be paid and supplied by the States or by the queen.36 The 'incessant quarrels' over their respective financial obligations continued throughout 1586. Along with the domestic political problems in the republic sparked by Leicester's actions they made Anglo-Dutch relations difficult well into 1587.37 The new bands of mercenaries were casualties: to save expense and to simplify organisation, between December 1586 and the spring of 1587 they were mostly broken up and/or absorbed into the royal forces.38

Leicester was absent in England from November 1586 to July 1587, when he returned leading an expedition to relieve the siege of Sluys. This force included a new contingent of voluntary companies intended for Dutch employ. This complicated the situation further, but only briefly, for the States-General refused to take these new bands into its pay and by early October all had been disbanded and shipped back to England.39

34 Lord North to Burghley, 28 Jan. 1586, CSPFor., 20:328; Adams, 'Puritan Crusade', 13; see below, app. 1, pp. 329-30.
35 SH res., 6 and 9 Sep. 1585, ARH, SvH 20, pp. 537-38, 545; Norreys to PC, 21 Sep. 1585, CSPFor., 20:32.
36 SG to Davison, 22 Oct. 1585, CSPFor., 20:80.
37 Wilson, Revolt, 95-100 at 98; Neale, 'Elizabeth and the Netherlands', 170-201; van der Woude, passim; Wernham, Before, 376-79.
39 Neale, 'Elizabeth and the Netherlands', 198.
Leicester, too, had gone home, having failed to relieve Sluys, but it was not immediately apparent that he would never return. Only in December was he replaced as Lieutenant-General (but not as Governor-General) by Peregrine Bertie, Lord Willoughby d'Eresby, Governor of Bergen-op-Zoom, commander of units in both States' and queen's pay and, since Norreys's recall in June 1587, Colonel General of the English infantry. Willoughby, who had extensive estates in Lincolnshire, had his own, largely East Anglian, military clientele. In addition to Sir William Drury (who was never in Dutch pay), it included Sir Francis Vere, several members of the warlike Wingfield family and Charles Hunnings. Willoughby was another Protestant internationalist. He had helped to host the deputies of the States-General in August 1585 and that autumn was sent as ambassador to Denmark, where he cited the Bible in attempting to persuade the Danes to join the war against Spain, which he described as a religious war.

Under Willoughby's command, the rationalisation of English forces in the republic and gradual dissolution of all States'-pay units was completed. By the summer of 1588 the last remaining companies in Dutch pay had been broken up or transferred to the treaty-obligation forces. The situation was now much clearer, although some disputes over responsibility for arrears of pay for particular companies dragged on into 1591. In the spring of 1589 Willoughby left to lead a royal army to Normandy, to aid the Protestant Henry IV. He was replaced by his military client, Vere, already his Sergeant-Major-General (effectively second-in-command). Vere was placed in command of all the English auxiliaries in the United Provinces, but the governors of the cautionary towns retained command of their garrisons, and he was not given Leicester's or Willoughby's rank of Lieutenant General, nor their political authority. Thus, his situation vis-à-vis the Dutch was weak in comparison to

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40 Below, app. 5, pp. 367-68.
41 See below, pp. 171, 180; and in apps. 5-6, pp. 369, 375, 439.
43 The list of bands in queen's pay, 31 Aug. 1588 n.s., ARA, SG 12576, n.f., includes ones that were in States'-pay in spring 1587 -- pace Nolan, Norreys, 131, there is no evidence of English units in the Netherlands, save auxiliary and cautionary ones, until 1594.
44 E.g., Hay, Life of Robert Sidney, 86-87.
45 See below, app. 5, p. 369.
his predecessors. A new English ambassador, Sir Thomas Bodley, had only recently taken over in The Hague and would take time to find his feet. Finally, thanks partly to the English army, the strategic position of the United Provinces was now improved. All in all, from mid-1589 the English were less able to dominate Dutch decision-making.

However, for most of the period 1588-93 English and Welsh soldiers only served in Dutch pay as individuals. These included Sir Thomas Morgan who, after serving in the queen’s forces up to 1587, obtained the following year the post of Governor of Bergen-op-Zoom from the Council of State. Morgan, of course, had forged personal relationships with Dutch notables in 1580-81 and 1584-85 and by the time of this appointment was closer to the Dutch than any other Anglo-Welsh officer, as his comrades recognised. Further, both his lieutenant-governor and sergeant-major, John Peyton and Thomas Lovell, also relied on Dutch patronage.

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These officers, however, were exceptional. A number of other English and Welshmen held States’ commissions, but generally in addition to, or as duplicates of, offices in the royal military hierarchy, so that they were not dependent on Dutch patronage. Further, even officers who only held Dutch commissions did not put all their eggs in one basket. Peyton, for example, returned to England in the early 1590s and became a senior officer in the royal permanent establishment. Morgan only obtained the governorship of Bergen, for which there were several aspirants, because he had his queen’s support. The good offices of Morgan’s Dutch patrons with the Council of State and Elizabeth were vital, to be sure, since Willoughby wanted Drury for the post and resisted Morgan’s appointment, which had to be confirmed and maintained. Morgan married a Dutch noblewoman in 1589 and, though it was after an elopement and the bride’s family was very unhappy, the circumstances made him more dependent on the favour of local patrons. He even permitted the States-General to issue instructions to the auxiliary troops of the Bergen garrison. However, Morgan also took pains to stay in the good books of his old patron Walsingham, whose support was vital if he

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47 See app. 5 below, pp. 399-400, 401-2.
48 Stewart, English Ordnance Office, 20, 50.
was to overcome the hostility of Willoughby and his clientele. In this period of national war effort all English and Welsh soldiers in the Netherlands still depended on the patronage of the crown and its ministers, to a greater or lesser extent.

This was less true in France, where English mercenaries reappeared in Protestant service. The rise of the Catholic League, coincident with Henry III's lack of children which made the Calvinist champion, Henry of Navarre, the heir apparent, led to a resumption of the wars of religion early in 1585. Navarre's accession to the French throne as Henry IV in 1589 (though not crowned until 1593), led to an intensification of the war. Elizabeth was determined to prevent an adherent of the pro-Spanish Catholic League taking the throne as this would potentially open French ports to Spanish fleets. Thus England openly allied with the new French king, despite his lack of authority in much of his country.

The charismatic king of Navarre had long been admired by martially-minded members of the Elizabethan aristocracy, but the relative peace of the period 1577-85 meant that there was no opportunity to fight under him. When hostilities resumed, many English and Welsh aristocrats, including the young earl of Essex, William Russell and Roger Williams, were eager to join his army, as Sir Arthur Champernowne the younger avowed. After Henry became King of France he was an even greater magnet for gentlemen volunteers: Essex declared that all unemployed soldiers in England wanted to enter Henry's service. Yet what emerges from both testimonials is the fact that circumstances were different to the 1560s and 1570s. While many soldiers might want to join the Protestant army in France, only those who were 'unemployed' could actually do so, since England was now at war and

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50 E.g., during the 6th civil war, English gentlemen volunteers served in his guard, rather than with the main English force operating near La Rochelle: 'Booke of [...] officers at the warres', BL, Lans. MS 1218 f. 115r.
51 Champernowne to Viscount de Turenne, 24 Jan. 1587, LPL, MS 647, f. 207r.
52 Essex to Henry IV, n.d., AAE, MDA 97, f. 21r.
Englishmen were less free than they had been to serve wheresoever they willed. Elizabeth's open alliance with Henry IV in 1589 meant that serving the French king could be deemed to be serving the national interest; hence it was a key step towards the return of English mercenaries to France.

Nevertheless, their numbers were never great. Since individuals may go unrecorded, due to the vagaries of documentary recording and survival, there were probably others serving singly in French companies: the known examples are taken as representative. A trickle of recruits joined Navarre during 1585-87. This became a stream from late 1589: Willoughby in 1589 and Norreys during 1591-93 commanded expeditionary forces in France, many of whose soldiers decided to remain in France after those armies were withdrawn by Elizabeth, supplementing those volunteers who continued to cross direct from England. Most of these mercenaries served with forces under Henry's personal command. Some simply saw out campaigns they had started in royal service. Others remained until 1598, when the Edict of Nantes brought the wars to an end. Several distinguished themselves. Sir William Sackville and Sir Anthony Sherley were both knighted by Henry, as was Sir John Burgh, who Henry also entrusted with his dispatches after the king's celebrated victory at Ivry in 1590.

It was individuals and small groups, not companies, much less regiments, which joined Henry's forces and their enlistments were often the result of chance. Their presence was not the result of a deliberate French policy, such as that which obtained in the United Provinces from 1593. It is curious that France was always very much a secondary site of action for English mercenaries during the 1590s. Both the States-General and Henry of Navarre repeatedly asked Elizabeth to provide them with more troops, but

53 Including in 1585, Roger Williams (p. 392 below) and 'deux ou trois' others (Castelnau to Henry III, 11 May 1585 n.s., quoted in Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 244n.); and in 1586/87, John Smith (Loomie, Spanish Elizabethans, 142), the explorer of Virginia.

54 However, by a chance reference (CSPDom, 1598-1601, 328), we know of at least one who served in a provincial army, William King.

55 King; Richard Eures (on whom see BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 132r); Sir Roger Williams (again); and Sir John Burgh (below, app. 5, pp. 372, 392), are all examples.

56 E.g., Captain James Tothill (HMCS, 11:286) and Sir Charles and Sir Henry Danvers (Hasler, 2:14); and Essex's cousin, Robert Vernon (Hammer, Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics, 299).

57 On Sackville see CSPFor., 23:300; New DNB (forthcoming); on Sherley, see Andrews, 63.

58 This may not be true of the men with seemingly English names who appear in lists of soldiers in Henry's garrisons in 1597-98 (AAE, MDF 763, n.f.), but they occur only rarely, in ones or twos, in units of other nationalities.
unlike the Dutch, Henry never tried to increase the expeditionary forces she sent by hiring extra troops in his own pay. The situation perhaps reflects the fact that many Huguenots had always been wary of employing their nation’s traditional enemies, whereas the Dutch were more positive about their traditional allies and trading partners. In any event, for all the conspicuous gallantry and good service of gentlemen volunteers in the eighth civil war, the only units of English and Welsh troops in France after 1577 were those in the pay of England’s queen.

Anglo-Dutch Military Relations, 1585-94: An Overview

English troops in the Netherlands were thus of various and indistinct types. There were those in royal pay and those in States’ pay, but the former were divided into the companies garrisoned in the cautionary towns (cautionary companies), which were deployed in the field in emergencies, and the units of the treaty-obligated field army (auxiliary companies), which were at times put into both cautionary and Dutch towns as garrisons. States’ pay troops comprised those left over in Dutch pay from 1584, more raised in England in 1585 and others raised there in 1586-87, but eventually they all passed from Dutch employment into the queen’s pay.

Commanding and administering the troops were general, field and administrative officers. Although they were royal appointees, many also held commissions from the States-General -- this was true from the queen’s commanding generals, right down to provosts and muster-masters. Some captains of auxiliaries were in addition captains of States’-pay companies, while others became governors of, or officers in, States’-pay (rather than cautionary) garrisons. Sir Philip Sidney, original Governor of the cautionary town of Flushing, was additionally colonel of a States’-pay regiment, as well as captain of his own States’-pay foot band; but though famous, he was not

59 Trim, ‘Normandy Campaign’, 76-78.
60 Leicester’s commission: SG, ARA, SG 12270, ff. 1-5. Norreys’s colonel-generalcy, already cited, is an obvious example; Willoughby was commissioned by both the Raad van State and the queen when he succeeded Leicester, having already commanded States’-pay horse; see below, app. 5, pp. 367-68. Vere, who succeeded Willoughby in 1589, was not commissioned by the States-General until the English auxiliaries became mercenaries again (1598).
61 E.g., in 1586, the royal muster-master Bernard Whetstone and Provost Thomas Cheston both held Dutch commissions for the same offices, while Cheston was also commissioned as Scoutmaster of both Dutch and English forces by the Council of State.
unique. These overlapping spheres of authority resulted in an unclear chain of command and created scope for demarcational disputes: they were thus partly to blame for the bitter dissension amongst the English officers, mercenary, cautionary and auxiliary, in 1586.

In addition, even apart from the mass transformations from mercenary to 'national' service in October 1585 and in 1587 a company could pass from one pay category to another. Some of its expenses might be met by one government, even when it was nominally being paid by another. Individual subalterns, non-commissioned officers and soldiers moved freely between the auxiliary, cautionary and mercenary companies. The situation became simpler between 1587-94 when there were fewer and finally no Anglo-Welsh companies in Dutch employ: only the cautionary and auxiliary companies at the queen's charge. The tripartite division resumed at the end of 1594, as will be seen, but was to be concluded for good in 1598 when all English auxiliaries were transferred into the control of the States-General.

A complex (not to mention confusing) web had thus been spun. Its pattern has been explored in some detail, for these arrangements 'became a source of major controversy' at the time, and are frequently misunderstood by modern historians. Moreover, the overlapping and parallel hierarchies and loyalties of the English troops in the Netherlands were important factors in all subsequent interactions between the mercenaries, their employers and their own government. Finally, it demonstrates the difficulties inherent in applying modern or over-precise definitions to mercenaries in fluid, early-modern circumstances. Even so, it is appropriate to differentiate between royal and mercenary troops, as I do in this thesis, because that was what

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62 Thomas Baskerville, captain of an auxiliary foot company, was made wachtmeister of Bergen-op-Zoom, 3 Feb. 1587. Edward Norreys, also captain of an auxiliary band, was commissioned captain of a States'-pay horse company, 19 May 1586, and then Governor of Ostend, 7 Sep. 1590; Robert Jackson, who the following year served in the royal army in Brittany, was his garrison Sergeant-Major.
64 States'-pay companies were occasionally paid by the English government: Cheyney, 1:207. In addition royal troops were sometimes paid at the order of the States-General: e.g., 18 Jun. 1590, ARA, SG 12503, f. 49r; for examples from after 1594, see below, pp. 178-79.
65 E.g., the hundred men from the Stannaries sent to the Netherlands in 1586 were part of the royal army, but the recruiting and transportation expense were to be paid by the Dutch: PC to Raleigh, 11 May 1586, APC, 14:102.
66 See the petitions in BL, Lans. MS 1218, ff. 113-40; and Digges, Four Paradoxes, 35.
67 Adams, 'Puritan Crusade', 12.
68 As suggested above, in ch. 2, p. 64.
contemporaries did. The Spanish distinguished between mercenaries in their employ and troops of the same nationality serving them at the same time, but in their own state’s employ (as allies). In England and in the Netherlands, and in negotiations between the two governments, distinctions between ‘cautionary’, ‘auxiliary’, and voluntary/mercenary were always carefully maintained, since s/he who paid exercised control. Control during the ten years 1574 to 1584 had very much been in the Netherlands. From 1585, the Dutch ceased to have the upper hand in commissioning and controlling English units. Thus, Norreys’s field officers were crown-appointed and (the extra 1,500 men commissioned solely by the States notwithstanding) he himself was commissioned by the English government thanks to Dutch support, not the other way around. It is striking that in 1587 Leicester’s hostility to Norreys brought about his recall. The Dutch still had confidence in him and tried to used their influence on his behalf, yet Norreys never commanded troops in the Netherlands again. Thus, authority over English and Welsh troops in Dutch employ in this period had shifted into the hands of the English government. The 1590s would see a gradual shift back to Dutch control.

The ‘Nurserie of Soldierie’ 1594-1610

The Return of Mercenary Companies, 1594-1603

By the end of 1593 the Republic wanted more English troops, but Elizabeth, engaged in a multi-front war with the Spanish Monarchy, was reluctant to increase her already considerable financial commitments. The States-General therefore contracted with Vere to raise a new, separate regiment of ten companies, at the States-General’s expense and to be paid by them in future. Vere commissioned the necessary captains and by May 1594 the

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71 SG to Elizabeth, Jun. 1587, Brugmans, 2:321; States of Utrecht to idem, 26 Jun. 1587, Bodl., St Amand MS 9, f. 1r.
72 A metaphor commonly used to describe the English force in the Netherlands: see Donagan, ‘Halcyon Days’, 70-72.
73 It is not the case, pace Guy, *Tudor England*, 347, that ‘1,500 of his men [were] transferred to the pay of the States’ (which implies a process like that of 1587): they were raised by the terms of a new contract.
last of the companies were arriving in the Netherlands. There was again a threefold division of cautionary, auxiliary and mercenary among the English troops, and again, as in 1585, the same man was both the queen's and the mercenaries' commander-in-chief. In 1596, indeed, Vere went with the army that Essex took to Cadiz, which comprised newly-raised royal troops, Dutch allies, and English bands from the Netherlands -- some auxiliary companies under Vere's command and some of his mercenary companies. Such were the complexities of coalition warfare in the early-modern period.

The English troops in the Netherlands, both auxiliary and mercenary, served well and were greatly valued by Prince Maurice of Nassau, son of William of Orange and now the republic's Captain-General. The foot bands of Vere's States'-pay regiment were among the storm troopers of the prince's great offensives of the 1590s that secured the independence of the United Provinces as a separate nation. As the decade wore on, however, the English and Dutch governments alike focused not on the performance of the Anglo-Welsh units (regardless of who paid them), but on disagreements over the financing of the war. These came to a head when, in the spring of 1598, Henry IV, ally of both Elizabeth and the States-General, made a separate peace with Spain at the Treaty of Vervins. This led to an adjustment in the relationship between England and the United Provinces. Initial negotiations were conducted in The Hague with Bodley's successor, George Gilpin, and Sir Francis Vere representing Elizabeth. Then Oldenbarnevelt led another embassy to England which eventually concluded the York House treaty on 16 August 1598. Instead of withdrawing English troops from the Netherlands as Elizabeth had threatened, all the auxiliary companies were put into the pay and under the command of the States-General, from the beginning of 1599. The cautionary garrisons of Flushing and Brill were excluded and the queen reserved ultimate authority over the troops passed into States' pay.

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73 SG res., 24 Dec. 1593, 10 Feb., 6 and 31 Mar. and 19 May 1594, RSG, 8:44, 212, 249-50, 258. Vere had already been referred to as 'Colonel' in a CS commission of 10 Jul. 1593, ARA, RvS 1525, ff. 59v-60r.
74 Compare: list of regiments and companies at Cadiz, May 1596, Longleat, DP 2, f. 85 and the 'Estat' of Vere's regiment, 28 Feb. 1597, SP 84/54, f. 107r.
75 Fissel, English Warfare, 155-56, 169, 183-84. The English troops' combat effectiveness was a major reason why the States raised more as mercenaries: SG res., 24 Dec. 1593, RSG, 8:44.
76 Maurice selected Vere's regiment for all of his campaigns throughout the 1590s: see Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, passim.
Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of English troops in the Netherlands were once again mercenaries.\textsuperscript{77}

The captains were in a quite different position \textit{vis-à-vis} their Dutch employers than their predecessors of the pre-1585 period. First, the English companies were by this time well-established in the Netherlands. The Dutch no longer had to worry about finding captains to raise companies; now it was a matter of maintaining units of their permanent establishment at appropriate strength. Second, from the early 1590s Maurice of Nassau had initiated his celebrated military reforms. As a result, by 1598 the army was already both increasingly proficient and increasingly standardised and centralised: it had become, in many ways, the States-\textit{General}'s army, rather than the collected armies of different provincial States, as in the 1570s and '80s.\textsuperscript{80}

The republic's English troops were well aware of the reform process; their autonomy went very much against its trend.\textsuperscript{89} The Dutch took the view that, since they paid the English, the latter should be treated the same as the other numerous national mercenary contingents in their employ. Moreover, they hoped to integrate the English contingent fully into the republic's army (the \textit{staatsche leger}) without much difficulty. The boundaries between royal (whether auxiliary or cautionary) and mercenary companies had remained porous, with considerable informal interchange taking place.\textsuperscript{80} Then, too, the royal companies were in the same places, under the same captains, fighting alongside the same people. In some cases, they had even already been paid by the Dutch. Edward Norreys, Governor of Ostend, had been in States' pay from his appointment in 1590, along with his garrison Sergeant Major, Robert Jackson. Hence, although Norreys disliked it, he had been obliged to work within Dutch structures and his troops had at least once been paid by the Generality when their wages were slow.\textsuperscript{78} It had likewise helped to pay the garrison of Flushing in 1595,\textsuperscript{82} while the States of Holland

\textsuperscript{79}Francis Vere to Essex, 1 Jan. 1597, \textit{HMCS}, 7:1.
\textsuperscript{80}Men from disbanded queen's-pay companies joined Vere's mercenary regiment: Markham, \textit{Fighting Veres}, 203-4.
\textsuperscript{81}See app. 5, below, p. 374; Norreys to Burghley, Feb. 1595, \textit{L&A}, 6:85, no. 52; and CS res., 7, 18 Apr. and 5 Oct. 1598, RvS 16, n.f.
\textsuperscript{82}'Staet ende Repartitie [...] vander Oorloge', 1595, ARA, SG 8040, rubric 'Zeelandt'.
had covered the wages of some royal companies in 1596. Furthermore, many of the captains being transferred had wages or expenses outstanding; the Council of State acted swiftly to settle all their new English mercenaries' arrears, including, in many cases, those incurred in the queen's 'pay'. This must have engendered a positive attitude on the part of the troops to their paymaster at the start (although thereafter wages would not always be so regular or forthcoming so swiftly, as will be seen in chapter 6). It took time, however, for the English to be integrated fully into the Dutch military system. They would remain semi-independent of the Republic's full control for some years.

The ongoing autonomy of the English was anomalous and not shared by other national contingents in Dutch employ. It resulted from the English companies' peculiar circumstances: they had independent origins. England was not only still allied with the republic but was the dominant partner in the war with Spain and Elizabeth's insistence on maintaining final authority over them was not just a token gesture. The new arrangements had only just gone into effect when the queen withdrew two thousand of the republic's troops to defend England against a Spanish invasion scare. The queen did have replacements levied, but clearly the Dutch were not master of 'their' English troops yet.

This is especially evident from the authority over the mercenaries wielded by Sir Francis Vere. He had been a States'-pay colonel since 1593 but his English and Dutch commissions had always been for different offices. As soon as the English troops came into Dutch pay, Vere's Sergeant-Major-General's commission from Elizabeth was matched by one from the States-General as 'generael over alle de commanden Engelschen', giving him full responsibility ('last') and power ('macht') 'over die Engelsche Capiteynen, Officieren & soldaten' in States' employ. Dutch willingness to grant such authority stemmed partly from Elizabeth's trust in Vere, who in October 1598

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83 Res. (copy), ARA, RvS 1896, n.f.
85 E.g., see Ferguson, Papers, xx, 7n.
86 Wernham, Return, 264-67.
87 19 Jan. 1599, ARH, AJO 2977; registered in SG commissie boek, ARA, SG 12270, ff. 169r-70r, at 169v.
she appointed Governor of the cautionary town of Brill. Yet one reason for that confidence was his apparently privileged relationship with the Dutch!

Vere was able to attain his singular preeminence in the Netherlands by representing English and Dutch interests to each other. The influence of his kinsmen, the Earl of Oxford and Lord Willoughby, were important in the early days of his military career, while Willoughby’s patronage was vital in Vere’s rise to command the queen’s troops in the Netherlands. Once he was established there, however, he consolidated his position by virtue of his own abilities, both military and diplomatic. Vere initially benefited from the patronage of Essex, whose fidèle he was, but by 1597 he was self-assured enough to regard himself as senior to any other of the queen’s ‘swordsmen’. From being an adviser of Essex and beneficiary of the earl’s patronage, Vere became a bitter opponent. Thereafter, although he answered to no domestic English patron, his career suffered no ill-effects. Indeed, Essex’s previously considerable influence on Anglo-Dutch relations was superseded by that of his quondam client. Vere had been an able deputy to Bodley in negotiations with the States in 1591-92; he had learned from Bodley while forming cordial relations with the Dutch political establishment to match his rapport with the military leadership.

After Bodley’s departure in 1596, Vere was of equal importance with the new ambassador, George Gilpin, in a series of crucial negotiations from 1596 to 1598. Moreover, Vere (unlike Leicester) served Elizabeth’s interests faithfully right up to her death and consequently he always had her trust. At

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a ARH, AJO 2976 (English and Dutch copies notarised by Ambassador Gilpin).
b Vere Commentaries, 136-37; Holles to Lord Sheffield, 28 Mar. and 3 and 10 Jul. 1598, Holles Letters, 10-11; Chamberlain to Carleton, 30 Aug. and 3 and 20 Oct. 1598, Chamberlain Letters, nos. 6, 8, 1:42, 46, 49; Wernham, Return, 292.
c Naunton, Fragmenta Regalia, 295-96; Markham, Fighting Veres, 22-25, 81-82, 133-35.
e Hammer, Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics, 217; Borman, ‘Francis Vere’, chs 2-3. Borman’s overall picture of Vere is different to mine; however, while valuable on his English context, the only Dutch archival sources she uses are the incoming correspondence files of the States-General: she neglects its financial records and commission and order books, the entire archive of the Council of State, Oldenbarnevelt’s papers, and all records of military institutions.
the same time, the existing Dutch regard for Vere's military abilities (revealed by the award of a pension in 1593, which the queen allowed him to accept) was increasingly supplemented by esteem for his political and diplomatic adroitness. During 1596 through 1598 Vere was consistently able to portray Dutch circumstances in a positive light to Elizabeth and her ministers without losing the latter's confidence. By late 1598 he was in Maurice's confidence and Gilpin declared that the Dutch generally 'repose a very great trust' him.

When the complex history and the vexed nature of the role of English mercenaries in Anglo-Dutch relations is borne in mind, the importance and uniqueness of Vere's position becomes apparent. For thirteen years the auxiliary and mercenary companies were a bone of contention between the English and Dutch governments. From January 1599 the status of the companies was much clearer. As a result of their all being assigned to States' pay, conflicts over financial responsibility for them had been resolved (or at least postponed), yet there was actually more scope for disagreement in other areas. If the companies were not to become even more a cause of discord between the allies, someone was needed who was trusted by both governments, who could convince the States to redeploy 'their' troops to suit England's strategic requirements, yet could induce the queen to levy reinforcements when the Dutch needed them. Vere was the man. In addition to mediating between the two governments, he was also able to command the English troops in the field effectively, while being trusted by both sides to do justice to their own military priorities in doing so. Only Vere could fill both the diplomatic and military roles. As long as the two nations were allied, he was irreplaceable. This explains his autonomy and that of his entire command.

Vere certainly exercised his great authority over the mercenary bands and was careful to preserve it. When levying of new units was proposed in conjunction with Maurice's Nieuwpoort offensive in 1600, Vere insisted on

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95 He had a crucial role in negotiations after 1598: see, e.g., Gilpin to Sidney, 12 Aug. 1599, Sydney Papers, 2:116; Vere to SG and CS, 22 July 1599, ARA, SG 5883-II, no. 306; idem to PC, 28 Jun. 1601, Hatfield, CP 86, f. 126, pr. Dalton, 1:69-70; ch. 7 and app. 1, below, pp. 231-33, 334-36 (re reinforcements for Maurice's army in 1601 and 1602).
the apointing of all Captens in that service and his disapproval could kill a soldier's career. In 1603, for example, Vere received a request from his kinsman, John Holles, for 'good favour' to Holles's 'cosen William Courtney who ... hath followed you above 7 years yet remaine[s] a mean officer'. Holles emphasised not only that Courtney deserved promotion, but that it would help to scotch rumours that Vere deliberately blocked the promotion of 'all Cornish men', due to a quarrel with Captain William Lower of Cornwall.

Vere could be arbitrary in the way he used his power; he invited Francis Markham to return to service as a gentleman volunteer in 1603, yet then, for no good reason (so Markham claimed), refused him promotion. Vere's all-important approval could be obtained through a soldier's patron: for instance, Edward Cecil, son of the second Lord Burghley, decided to embark on a military career, and of course turned to his uncle, Sir Robert Cecil, the Secretary of State, to support his applications for captaincies of foot and then horse. Such an important minister's support enhanced Cecil in the eyes of the Council of State, but he also needed Vere's backing to obtain his end, simply because only Vere had the power under the States-General to make such appointments. Thus, Cecil's commissions did not simply result from Robert Cecil's decisions. Vere did back the younger Cecil -- but it was his choice, based on his wish to keep an important minister as an ally rather than to oblige a patron. Similarly, when James Tothill, who had fought as a volunteer with Henry IV in France, sought 'placing in the Low Countries', he had his own patron request Robert Cecil's 'letters to Sir Francis Vere': not to the Council of State. Cecil also asked Vere to obtain a company for his client, John Ridgeway. There was none free, but Vere promised Ridgeway command of a new company if he raised sufficient volunteers in England to fill its ranks; empowered him to recruit volunteers for the putative unit; and instructed Noel de Caron, the Republic's agent in London, to disburse funds towards his recruiting expenses -- all entirely on Vere's own authority.

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96 Whyte to Sidney, 12 Jul. 1600, Sydney Papers, 2:206.
97 14 Feb. 1603, BL, Add. MS 32464, p. 62. Courtney (later Sir William) did get promotion eventually, but only after Vere left States' employment: see app. 6, p. 419.
98 Francis Markham, Genealogy of the Markhams, ed. Clements Markham (London: n.p., 1872), 36.
99 Dalton, 1:30, 36-37, 40-41.
100 William Hals to Cecil, [14 Jul. 1601], HMCS, 11:286.
101 Ridgeway to Cecil, 16 Jul. 1601, ibid., 287.
was the only commander in the staatsche leger who could have acted in this way, without reference to the Council of State or Captain-General.

These examples indicate a slight weakness within the English body politic, but demonstrate very well Vere's supremacy over English troops in the Netherlands. He was not only semi-independent of Dutch institutional structures, he had a good deal of autonomy from English social structures as well. His choice of officers benefited his own clients, as well as other men's. 102 Even more than Norreys, Vere was able to build up his own military dependence because he had achieved a position of real influence and authority. He appointed officers, not because he was obliged to by his patrons, but as his own favours to men whose influence he hoped to exploit within English political society: men who were his allies, not his patrons.

His independence of English social norms can be seen in his ability to ignore the pretensions of men who were his social superiors in England. His claim to equivalent status with Sir Walter Ralegh on the Cadiz expedition of 1596, which caused grave offence to Ralegh, was only upheld with Essex's backing. 103 By the end of the decade, Vere needed no assistance to maintain his position. Two peers, Lord Grey of Wilton and the Earl of Northumberland, both tried to defy Vere's authority while serving in the Netherlands -- both failed. Grey was constrained to concede Sir Francis's supremacy, despite frequent complaints about it at the English court, while Northumberland was obliged to return to England precipitously to avoid acknowledging Vere's authority. 104 During his quick visit home in April 1602 to lobby (successfully) in favour of Caron's suit for English assistance for efforts to relieve the siege of Ostend, Northumberland sent Vere a strongly-worded challenge to a duel. The latter felt secure enough to send a dismissive reply to the earl. In any case, Caron had apprised the queen of the situation and she compelled Northumberland to withdraw the challenge -- a telling episode. 105

102 Ch. 8, below, pp. 275-76, 278.
103 Anthony Standen to Anthony Bacon, 23 and 24 May 1596, LPL, MS 657, ff. 5v-6r, 3r; Vere Commentaries, 107.
105 CUL, Add. MS 9276, art. 10 (three other MS copies of Northumberland's challenges and Vere's replies are listed in Markham, Fighting Veres, 336n.); Chamberlain to Carleton, 26 Apr. and 8 May 1602, Chamberlain Letters, nos. 45-46, 1:139, 143-44. The government did put its weight behind recruiting for Maurice's campaign: see below, pp. 232-33, 239, 335.
Vere even defied his former patron, Essex, the greatest military patron in England in the 1590s. Most martial dependences were only a component of a wider affinity, but Essex's affinity essentially was a martial dependence. He even hoped to monopolise all military patronage. As Adams indicates, the English troops in the Netherlands were largely free of Essex's influence, partly because he spent much of his career elsewhere and lacked a strong base there. From the mid to late 1590s he attempted to develop such a base in the cautionary town of Flushing, whose governor was his fidèle, Sir Robert Sidney. Having unsuccessfully opposed Vere's suit for the governorship of Brill, Essex tried to replace him as general of the republic's English troops with Sidney; or, at the least to obtain the latter the colonelcy of a States'-pay regiment. However, such an appointment, as Vere was pleased to observe, 'belonged to me by commission' and so Essex lost out. At Christmas 1598 Essex and the Earl of Nottingham were rivals, each on behalf of a client, for the captaincy of a new company for the Netherlands. Vere preferred Nottingham's client, William Woodhouse and deliberately rejected Essex's nominee. That the earl's influence among English units in the Netherlands remained limited to the cautionary garrison of Flushing was because Vere wanted it that way -- not for lack of enthusiasm for Essex's commitment to the Protestant cause, but as a result of the personal differences that emerged in 1597. Thus, if Vere's political clout in England was limited his authority in the Netherlands was at this time unmatched. As Dr Roy suggests, Vere was the model for a new breed of English soldiers: 'they committed themselves to the military life ... and, by breaking free of the shackles of political clientage, were able to survive the fall of favourites'. Elizabeth trusted him to command her

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108 Vere Commentaries, 135-37; Whyte to Sidney, 12 May 1600, HMCD, 2:461.
110 Chamberlain to Carleton, 15 Feb. 1599, Chamberlain Letters, no. 17, 1:68.
troops in the Netherlands\textsuperscript{112} and to promote her government’s policies there; because he accepted an apolitical domestic role in England he enjoyed real power in English military and diplomatic affairs. Maurice and other Dutch leaders valued him both as commander of the English troops that were so important in their war effort and as an intermediary to the English government. As long as Vere enjoyed these relationships, he had no need of intermediate patrons.

Reversion and Revision, 1604-1610

In March 1603, James VI and I acceded to the throne following Elizabeth’s death and almost immediately began the negotiations with Spain that concluded in the Treaty of London (August 1604), ending nineteen years of war. England, in theory, was neutral once more.

In fact, English garrisons were maintained in the cautionary towns, while the English government was still very much in sympathy with its fellow Calvinists. The new king’s chief minister was Robert Cecil, by 1605 created Earl of Salisbury, who shared the determination of his father ‘and all that love the Gospell’ to support the Dutch against Spain’s forces of ‘Idolatry and superstition’. The Jacobean government therefore adopted the pattern of the period prior to 1585 -- the States-General continued to enjoy ‘underhand permission’ to raise troops in England.\textsuperscript{113} It was permission that ministers gave, however, rather than direction. Some scholars assert that the English troops in the Dutch Republic were ‘never considered ... a mercenary army, but an English strategic reserve maintained at Dutch expense’.\textsuperscript{114} This may have been what James and his ministers aspired to; it is not at all how things actually were in the Netherlands. From 1604 the Anglo-Welsh mercenaries were very much under the control of their Dutch employers, rather than of the new British monarchy.

\textsuperscript{112} After Nieuwpoort she repeatedly declared at court that Vere was ‘the worthiest Captain of her Time’: Whyte to Sidney, 7 Jul. 1600, Sydney Papers, 2:205.

\textsuperscript{113} Cecil to Thomas Edmondes, 11 May and 10 Oct. 1605, BL, Stowe MS 168, ff. 17r, 168r. See Rowse, Expansion, 321; Pauline Croft, ‘Serving the Archduke: Robert Cecil’s Management of the Parliamentary Session of 1606’, HR 64 (1991): 289-304, esp. 291, 294, 302-3; and see below, p. 195, also in ch. 9, pp. 297-98, and app. 2, table 6, p. 340 and fig. 7, p. 343.

\textsuperscript{114} Adams, ‘English Military Clientele’, 226; cf. Shurmer, 1.
A power struggle of sorts had already developed between Vere and his one-time patron, Maurice of Nassau. In 1601 attempts by Maurice to remove some of the English troops from Vere's direction led to 'some Hart burning between Sir Francis and his Excellency'. Vere was virtually incommunicado from July to October during a prolonged convalescence following a head wound; during this time Gilpin, the most effective English ambassador in the Netherlands, died and was not replaced. Vere believed that Maurice used their absences to increase his authority over the English troops and was greatly affronted. He was then in dispute with the States-General throughout much of the winter of 1602-3, over the terms of his and his soldiers' employment. In 1603, following the queen's death, Maurice and the Council of State attempted to restrict Vere's judicial powers. The prince in 1590 had established a high military court, the Hoge Krijgsraad, intended to exercise supreme authority in military justice and discipline over all the republic's troops; and by 1597 it nearly did. There was one exception: the English and Welsh mercenaries, over whom Vere had jurisdiction. Vere believed that the title of general was 'empty and useless' if the right to administer justice was not attached to it and he was therefore determined to resist what he saw as an intolerable encroachment on his powers.

Vere had the support of the English government. He was already on good terms with Sir Robert Cecil and had additionally, by his prompt proclamation of James VI as James I in Brill, made a good impression on the king, who confirmed Vere's governorship in April. James then took a liking

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115 Browne to Sidney, 6 Jul. 1601, Sydney Papers, 2:228.
118 Markham, Fighting Veres, 339-40 -- however, pace Markham, Maurice was unsympathetic.
119 Israel Dutch Republic, 294-95.
121 Winwood 'Proposition [...] touchant le General Vero', 16 Jan. 1604 n.s., ARH, AJO 2971, ff. 1r-2v [foliation mine], et passim.
122 Markham, Fighting Veres, 345, 343.
to him during a long visit he made to England in the late summer of 1603. Vere evidently believed that, having secured the new king’s backing, he was still irreplaceable. Indeed so great was his confidence that it was while still in England that he demanded, with royal endorsement, that his old authority over the English troops be confirmed. As one ex-mercenary turned British diplomat observed, Vere sought ‘absolute command of the English troops in Holland’. However, the ‘or else’ which he threatened was his resignation. His demands were not met and his bluff was called. By April 1604 he had resigned. In retrospect, this had probably been Maurice’s aim from the start of his attempts to reduce Vere’s judicial powers.

What had changed in the relationships of the English mercenaries, their general, their government and their employers? First, the new king of England was simply not as influential in the Netherlands as the old queen had been. The Dutch might have been sensitive to James’s views since they were making great efforts to convince him to continue war against Spain, but, unfortunately for Vere, by the time of his gambit it had already become clear that James was favourably disposed to the Habsburgs. The English government’s influence in Dutch military affairs, while still considerable, was inevitably diminished.

In addition, inherent in Vere’s success were the roots of his downfall. His unusual authority was resented by the French and Dutch officers in the States’ employ. His success had also led to envy amongst a number of his compatriots from would-be generalissimos such as Sidney and Lord Grey, to his own one-time lieutenant colonel Sir Henry Docwra, field officers like Sir Callisthenes Brooke, and junior captains such as Ridgeway.

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125 E.g., ‘Memoire […]’, ASCL, MS 211, ff. 20v-26r (copy).
126 E.g., by his treatment of the Spanish ambassador at the court celebrations on 26 Dec. 1603: see ‘Journal of Levinus Munck’, 249.
127 Rowse, Expansion of Elizabethan England, 404.
their own interests, there were his brother and cousins and his client Sir John Ogle, who all actively supported him; English officers critical of Vere faced bullying by their general, or even physical assault by his followers.129 These tensions, though, only weakened Vere’s position in the republic, leaving him vulnerable to the centralising aims of its rulers.

The hostility of English captains also helped to doom an attempt by Vere in 1605-6 to regain his command. He had eventually been succeeded as colonel-general of the English troops in Dutch employ by his brother, Sir Horace (or Horatio as he was always called by the Dutch) Vere, but not until 3 May 1605 (i.e., after about a year). This delay was not for want of effort by the younger Vere, who had ‘presse[d] hard’; but, significantly, Edward Cecil would ‘not suffer to be commanded by Sir Horace Vere’. Even after the latter had finally been commissioned general his authority was more limited than his brother’s had been. He was only to ‘superintend’ the other colonels (of whom at this point there were three) in the field and he had no administrative jurisdiction over their units. The main reason (or excuse) for the limits placed on his authority by the Dutch was Cecil’s refusal to accept any Englishman above him and the factions that divided the officer corps of the Anglo-Welsh contingent.130 Then, in the campaign season that followed Sir Horace Vere’s appointment, the United Provinces were left reeling by a great offensive launched by the celebrated Spanish general Spinola. It was apparent that his onslaught would be renewed the following season and Sir Francis Vere returned to the Netherlands in December 1605, in the belief (shared by other observers) that the dire straits the Dutch were in might induce or oblige them to restore his old command on the old terms.131 Dutch recruiting of English troops had increased in the face of the renewed Spanish threat and so they were again susceptible to English governmental pressure. For this reason, Maurice and other Dutch officials made expressions of sympathy for Vere.132

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131 Parker, Dutch Revolt, 230-38; Israel, Dutch Republic, 260-61; Browne to Sidney, 12 Dec. 1605, HMCD, 3:234.
132 Idem, 7 Jan. and 24 Mar. 1606, HMCD, 239, 257; Winwood to Edmondes, 24 Feb. 1606, BL, Stowe MS 168, f. 345v; Markham, Fighting Veres, 347.
In reality, they did not regret their earlier action, but preferred the English officer corps to make the running against their former employee.

Some captains were loyal to Vere's memory. Ogle intrigued for his patron's return almost from his departure.\textsuperscript{133} The key factor in Vere's failure was the opposition of Edward Cecil. In 1599 he had written home praising 'the great worth of Sir Francis Vere' to whom he was 'daly more and more bounde'; in 1601 Sir Robert Cecil still spoke of his nephew's 'friend Sir Francis Vere'.\textsuperscript{134} By 1606, however, the ambitious younger Cecil's scope for advancement would have been limited by his benefactor's return; he was 'malcontent' at the prospect of having to resume a 'servile ranck'. Cecil led the English officers in insisting that even if Vere's command was restored he should 'not have the absolute power he had before, but be limited'. Even Ogle joined with Cecil in refusing to allow Vere to supervise their regimental accounts; nor would they concede the right Vere had previously enjoyed to nominate the junior, non-commissioned and administrative officers of their regiments' companies.\textsuperscript{135} The English captains' stance could only have been overcome by resolute action by the States-General or Council of State, which was not forthcoming.

It was not forthcoming because Maurice, in particular, did not want Vere back. Sir Francis Vere's Victorian biographer, Sir Clements Markham, took at face value the prince's professions of support for the Englishman in winter 1605-6; Markham wrote of 'the cordiality and friendship which existed, from first to last, between Maurice ... and Sir Francis Vere'.\textsuperscript{136} However, it is significant that after Vere's intention was known the Council of State decided to create another English regiment: and did so at Maurice's behest.\textsuperscript{137} A new regiment created not only another colonel, but another lieutenant colonel, sergeant major, provost and so on, and thus increased the number of officers with entrenched interests, privileges and special salaries to defend against a general's authority.\textsuperscript{138} After Vere had gone home the plan was shelved: most

\textsuperscript{133} Ogle to Robert Cecil, 14 Sep. 1604, HMCS, 16:306.
\textsuperscript{135} Browne to Sidney, 7 Jan. and 24 Mar. 1606, HMCD, 3:239, 257.
\textsuperscript{136} Fighting Veres, 349.
\textsuperscript{138} See, e.g., CS res., 13 Jan., 13 and 30 Jun. 1606, ARA, RvS 24, pp. 18, 188, 199.
likely it had merely been a ruse. The reality of Maurice’s relationship to Vere was summed up by one of the latter’s warmest contemporary admirers, Clement Edmondes, when he wrote bitterly of ‘the jelowsie which the house of Nassau hath of Sir francis Vere of whom Counte Maurice speaketh much good but geveth little furtherance’.\textsuperscript{136}

Vere’s pride would not let him accept a reduced status, but Maurice would not permit, and the English captains did not want, Vere to have his old authority. In the end, the States-General awarded Vere pension of 3,000 guilders (some £300) per annum; thus bought off, he returned home, never to lead men in battle again.\textsuperscript{140} Markham made much of the States-General’s grant of an annual pension. However, as will be clear by now, it was far from a simple gesture of ‘cordiality and friendship’; nor was it the case that Vere ‘could have had nothing but pleasant reminiscences and kindly feelings towards the rulers and people of Holland’.\textsuperscript{141} Horace Vere, who became a close friend of the Nassaus, blamed Cecil, and the two men and their clients feuded for several years.\textsuperscript{142} Francis Vere blamed Maurice to a great degree and his bitterness distorts all those sections of his memoirs in which Maurice appears. Both men’s judgments were correct; but the older brother was more correct than the younger.

The episode illustrates how the Dutch could exploit the sometimes violent personal rivalries that existed among their English and Welsh officers in order to increase their control of the mercenaries. Norreys had fallen victim to English political rivalries. Francis Vere succumbed partly to English professional rivalries, but even more to Dutch institutional politics. The difference highlights the change in the balance of power by 1606.

Full Integration

The constructive dismissal of the older Vere in 1604 marked a turning-point in Dutch efforts to integrate fully foreign contingents into the staatsche leger.

\textsuperscript{136} To Thomas Edmondes, 6 Mar. 1606, BL, Stowe MS 168, f. 356v. In 1600 he had dedicated a translation of Cæsar’s Commentaries to Vere: Webb, Elizabethan Military Science, 9.
\textsuperscript{140} SG res., 6 Jun. 1606 n.s., BL, Cott. MS Titus C.vii, art. 132, pr. Markham, Fighting Veres, 348-49; Francis Vere to Robert Cecil, 31 May 1606, HMCS, 18:154.
\textsuperscript{141} Markham, Fighting Veres, 349n., 350.
Maurice and the Council of State thereafter were able to exercise full control over the English companies in their employ.

They did not object to a tactical supremo. Sir Horace Vere’s veritably Horatian conduct at the battle of Mulheim (9 October 1605) saved the Dutch army, and greatly impressed Maurice and his brother Frederick Henry. In consequence, Edward Cecil’s pride was disregarded and, in the summer of 1606, Vere’s primacy in the field was raised beyond mere ‘superintendence’: Cecil and Ogle were to ‘receive their directions from him’. Yet each colonel kept control of ‘the disposing of the business of his owne regiment’. In short, Dutch willingness to recognise and reward operational expertise did not mean they were prepared to let one English officer create a virtual fief of his nation’s companies again.

Moreover, having divided, the Dutch proceeded (metaphorically) to conquer, as the imposition of Sir Horace Vere over Cecil in 1606 reveals. If each colonel still controlled the ‘business of his owne regiment’, what that actually entailed was more and more limited. The power to commission captains was given solely to the Council of State immediately after Vere’s resignation in 1604. By 1610, financial supervision by an English general had been replaced by rigorous control by the republic’s government; the Raad van State conducted audits of English captains’ accounts. It had also annexed the right, previously enjoyed by colonels, to appoint company officers. The colonels' control over their regiments had been diminished in other ways, too. In 1606, for instance, the Council not only permitted Captain Herbert’s ensign, Henry Williamson, to bring legal proceedings against his captain, it gave judgment for the junior officer! In matters of military justice and discipline, the English troops had become subject wholly to the authority of the Hoge Krijgsraad.

Spinola’s offensives led to English mercenaries being increased to their highest numbers ever, but the Council of State, States-General and

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143 See Markham, Fighting Veres, 376-77.
149 When is uncertain but English soldiers appear in the earliest surviving volume of its records, the (unfoliated) register for 1607: ARA, Hoge Krijgsraad 249.
Captain-General did not lose control of them. English patrons could affect the recruiting and promotion processes, but only if able to influence the Raad van State, rather than English commanders. Very few Englishmen could do so, though the Raad considered seriously the recommendations of Sir Ralph Winwood, who as ambassador in the Hague was a permanent member. In contrast to the cases of Tothill and Ridgeway (discussed earlier), William Newce asked his patron to write, not to Sir Horace Vere, but 'to the States for a company'. In practice, it was usually Salisbury a captain turned to if, like Sir John Radclyffe, he wanted the reversion of a company, though Henry, Prince of Wales, began to exercise patronage as he matured. They were the men, after all, who could instruct Winwood, or write direct to Maurice or the States-General. The situation, in short, was analogous to that in the late 1570s and early 1580s and captains preferred to negotiate directly with the Dutch if they could -- as Morgan, for example, had done -- turning to English patrons only to help raise their rank and file (this being a domestic matter).

As the ability of English patrons to help career advancement on the Continent waned, the patronage of senior figures in the Netherlands became ever more important. This was something Cecil, presumably because of his exalted English connections, never fully appreciated and he did not cultivate his employers enough. In contrast, Vere had the patronage of the Captain-General of the United Provinces; Ogle of the Advocate of Holland (the most powerful figure on the Council of State); while Sir Charles Morgan, who rose to become Ogle's lieutenant colonel, had married a daughter of Marnix de St Aldegond, William of Orange's intimate adviser, and had put himself on good terms with the powerful Amsterdam regent family of Hooft. Sir Callisthenes Brooke may have owed his original commission in the Netherlands (in 1598) to his kinsman, Lord Cobham, but a greater aid to his career after 1603 was his marriage in that year to a local woman.

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151 Newce to Robert Cecil, 1606 and Radclyffe to idem, 1 Jun. [1606], HMCS, 18:423 [emphasis mine], 155; Trim, 'Sir Horace Vere', 345-47, 350.
152 E.g., Thomas Mewlys to Robert Cecil, 9 Sep. [1606], HMCS, 18:277-78.
154 Markham, Fighting Veres, 306; Chamberlain to Carleton, 28 Feb. 1603, Chamberlain Letters, no. 61, 1:187.
The necessity of having (good) relationships with the Dutch is evident from the passing of the governorship of Brill after Sir Francis Vere's death in 1609 to Sir Horace Vere. This may appear to be the natural succession, yet Sir Edward Conway (Brill's Lieutenant-Governor), Thomas, Lord Arundell, and Sir Edward Cecil all sought the post -- Cecil's father, now Earl of Exeter wrote to his brother Salisbury (by now Lord Treasurer as well as principal Secretary of State) on their son and nephew's behalf. Vere was so strongly recommended by Maurice, however, that, even though Brill was a cautionary town, the post went to the Dutch choice. 1 It is also evident from the outcome of a quarrel between Cecil and Vere's protege, Edward Harwood. They 'exchanged as much bitterness as rage and malice can think' in 1610 during the Jülich campaign and the junior officer challenged the general to a duel. According to contemporary military etiquette, Harwood ought to have been rebuked and been compelled to apologise, as indeed Edward Norreys was obliged to do by Leicester after challenging Hohenlohe in 1586. Harwood, however, was a gentleman of Maurice's privy chamber -- the prince required both officers to make some apologetic gesture and amend their quarrel. 16

In sum, though Vere's authority was less than his brother's had been, it was still considerable. Maurice and the Council of State reserved the right to appoint all officers, but they could not investigate every possible candidate for every vacancy and so, inevitably, the recommendations of trusted officers usually determined appointments. 157 An example was the promotion of Sir John Vere, Sir Horace's kinsman, to replace Sir Callisthenes Brooke after the latter's death. An observer noted that, though there was uncertainty as to what action the States-General might take, Sir Horace had pledged Sir John the next promotion and thus he was bound to get it -- a prediction borne out in reality. 158 Captain Sir Thomas Dutton, one of Vere's clients, was dismissed in 1611 at Sir Edward Cecil's instance, after killing another captain in a duel.

155 Edmondes to William Trumbull, 14 Sep., and J. Beaulieu to idem, 19 Oct., 1609, HMC Downshire, 2:128, 163; Exeter to Robert Cecil, 31 Aug., and Arundel to idem, 8 Sep., 1609, CSPDom. 1603-10, 539, 542; SG min., 8 Mar. 1610, RSG, new ser., 1:52.
156 See Taverner to Trumbull, and Carleton to idem, 1 and 28 Jun. 1611, HMC Downshire, 3:92-93, 98; Churchyard's Challenge, 62, 103-4; DNB, 14:562.
158 Abraham Williams to Trumbull, 18 Sep. 1611, HMC Downshire, 3:142; CS to SG, 6 Dec. 1611, RSG, new ser., 1:525.
but Vere was able to resurrect Dutton’s career the following year. Vere’s power, however, owed much to his good personal relations with Maurice. As he observed, the best way for an English soldier to advance his career was to be ‘known to the principall persons that govern here’. Vere knew, better than anyone, ‘with what lymitations I … exersyse that command I have under the States’.

Conclusions: Captains and Contracts, 1562-1610

Having surveyed the whole period in chapters 3-5, it is clear that recruiting of mercenaries generally commenced only after Protestants in France and the Netherlands had commissioned, or let it be known through various channels that they wished to commission, captains. Their efforts to employ English and Welsh mercenaries were almost always known to the queen or king and to royal ministers who, although occasionally hostile to such recruiting, more frequently encouraged and facilitated it, albeit covertly up to 1585 and after 1603.

Overall, a consistent thread runs through events from 1562 to 1610. The English government was deeply complicit in the raising of mercenaries, despite its denials: as a Venetian ambassador observed, the English wanted to ‘throw the stone and hide the arms’. Ambassador Throckmorton told Cecil in 1562 that the Huguenots would best be helped ‘by suffering some of your men to come over as voluntaries’: they should be ‘let slipp … to passe’ over the narrow seas. John Norreys likewise used the language of covert operations in 1580 when he urged the need for more men to be allowed ‘to steale over here’. Throckmorton had concluded that ‘the more expedicion and the more secrecie that is used in this, the better it will prove for all respectes. The Queen’s majestie and you of her councel muste be ignorant of this matter.’ Cecil understood the importance of deniability. In 1572 he wrote to the then ambassador in Paris, prior to Morgan’s departure for Flushing, ‘Here is all covert meanes used’. Others understood it too. That

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160 Vere to Newton, 29 Sep. 1612, KB, HS 134.C.18B, pr. Trim, ibid., 351.
161 Corner to the Signory, CSPVen., 7:427, no. 448.
162 Throckmorton to Cecil, 26 May 1562, BL, Add. MS 35831, f. 34r; idem, 5 Aug. 1562, in Forbes, 2:15. Norreys to Leicester, 13 Mar. 1590, Harl. MS 6992, f. 110r.
163 Burghley to Walsingham, 22 Apr. 1572, BL, Cott. MS Vespasian F.vi, f. 49r
same year, zealous Protestants proposed to the queen that they go to war in Zeeland, with Elizabeth 'as it were but winking at their doings', and Sir Arthur Champernowne in offering 'to adventure the suppling of Rochell', declared himself ready

most willingly ... to digest with settled mynd the infamy, the exile, the shewes of offens, that shuld be published against me, so that I wer the meane whiles sure they shuld be but shewes, and my selfe sure of your majesties favor ... having commission to doo it openly or suerty of your highnes favor secretly.\(^{164}\)

It has already been seen that Leicester took care to let William of Orange know England would aid him underhand, even when it was compelled to no longer do so openly. This was an enduring theme. Elizabeth became so accustomed to it that, even in 1585, she found it difficult finally to decide 'to enter into the action otherwise than underhand', as Walsingham observed.\(^{165}\) After her death, Sir Walter Ralegh urged James to 'relieve the Netherlands underhand, as ... her Majesty did in the Beginning of their Revolt'; and in fact the new king did allow the Dutch 'an underhand permission' to raise troops, as his chief minister observed.\(^{166}\) There can be no doubt, therefore, that the employment of English and Welsh mercenaries by the Huguenots and the Dutch reflected the English government's wishes.

It reflected, moreover, not the wishes of a Protestant faction, but of a broad consensus within the English regime. Even royal counsellors not as zealously Calvinist, militant and internationalist as Walsingham, Leicester and so on, endorsed the recruiting of mercenaries as part of a package of measures, including loans, subsidies and provision of necessary supplies. Both Sir Thomas Smith and the third Earl of Sussex are well-known for their moderate or conservative religious views, yet the standard picture of them as unsympathetic to militant support for Protestants is incorrect.\(^{167}\) In fact, as we

\(^{164}\) [Anon.] to Elizabeth, [1572], HMCS, 2:38, no. 100; Champernowne to idem, 8 Oct. 1572, BL, Lans. MS 15, f. 200v.
\(^{165}\) Walsingham to Stafford, 20 Jul. 1585, quoted in Read, Walsingham, 3:108.
have seen, they were fully complicit in English aid to Continental Calvinists. As ambassador to France, Smith was involved with English volunteers in Huguenot pay in 1562-63 and as second Secretary of State he helped to plan the intervention in the Netherlands in 1572. He used the terminology of holy war about that 1572 rebellion, calling it an opportunity that 'God hath provided to deliver his poor servants there from Anti-christian tyranny'. Sussex backed Montgommery's expedition in 1573 and promoted Condé's invasion with Casimir in 1575-76 and the prince's cause generally in 1577. When Walsingham and Cobham exceeded their instructions by their support for the States (and mercenaries) in 1578 they faced great royal displeasure, but Sussex defended their actions.

The consensus on the employment of mercenaries is also revealed by the choice of English diplomats sent abroad by Elizabeth. For example, the envoy sent to John Casimir in 1578 (and on fifteen other sensitive missions to the Low Countries, the Baltic and Germany in the 1570s and 1580s) was Daniel Rogers: a zealous Calvinist and son of a Marian martyr, but also a former tutor of the Norreys brothers, a cousin of Jacob Ortell (representative of the States of Holland in the 1585 negotiations with England) and a friend of William of Orange. It is unsurprising that more English mercenaries were employed as a result of Rogers's diplomacy. The continual use made of him by the government makes a mockery of the suggestion that he was one of a 'radical Protestant diplomat's clique bent on driving' the regime in a direction it 'did not want to go'.

Still, although government ministers supported action, the action they initiated was usually only limited and indirect. Huguenot and Dutch calls for captains were often, but by no means always, mediated through English government ministers. They were also targeted at sympathetic nobles, able to field captains from their martial dependences; alternatively, those nobles'
followers at their own initiative sometimes requested their lords to endorse applications for commissions. Leaders of refugee Protestant and indigenous mercantile communities only rarely brokered captains' services, but they regularly helped to raise companies by furnishing captains with arms, ammunition, equipment and/or the money necessary to pay for fitting out units, as will be seen in the next chapter.

The role of royal counsellors, Calvinist peers, refugee consistories and godly merchants in aiding the Huguenots and Dutch is important to note, but they did not give commissions, award contracts or promote officers, and their ability even to influence those decisions varied over the period. The ability of domestic patrons to affect mercenaries' employment conditions and relationship with their employers was greatest when foreign Protestants were weakest. Conversely, when the Dutch, in particular, were strong, then patrons in the Netherlands were more influential. Men such as 'Black Jack' Norreys, 'the warrior' Thomas Morgan, and the 'fighting Veres', Francis and Horace, enjoyed, at least at times, the full trust and confidence of the Dutch and in consequence they enjoyed formidable independence and authority. If, like Morgan in 1574 and Francis Vere in 1604, their relationship with their employer soured, then they could fall spectacularly. Yet good relations with the Dutch could not save a man who lost touch with his domestic patronage base, as Norreys found in 1586-87.

The upshot was that if captains wanted to become or to stay employed then, particularly in the Netherlands, they had to cultivate local authorities, without cutting themselves off from the patronage system at home. Ultimate success required the support of high-powered ministers and nobles on both sides of the North Sea. Sir Horace Vere enjoyed a record stint as general of the English mercenaries and was never dismissed. This was partly because of his congenial character (sadly uncommon among the mercenaries, it has to be said) and his competence. It was also due to the Twelve Years' Truce, which greatly simplified his duties and to the ever diminishing involvement of the Stuart government in the United Provinces. Yet only in the 1620s did English captains in Dutch pay finally cease to have officially mixed loyalties.

As suggested at the beginning of chapter 3, arranging for captains to serve in foreign armies was a complex affair. It has been seen that it was an international affair. However, the intricacies of funding and supplying the
captains once they had been contracted were less so. It will be seen that payment of wages was so irregular and so often deficient that domestic supporters of the mercenaries' endeavours took on much of the financial and logistical arrangements. Thus, here, too, the role of patrons was crucial. This is addressed in the next chapter, the final chapter dealing with the first set of interactions in the recruiting process. Then, in chapters 7 and 8, the actual processes and mechanics by which the majority of mercenaries were recruited for service in 'the wars of Jacob' will be examined. It will be seen that the same members of the élite who supported a pro-Protestant foreign policy, obtained permission for recruiting and helped to resolve quarrels among the captains or between them and their Continental employers, also played a crucial role in the actual recruitment of soldiers.
CHAPTER SIX

FINANCES

That ‘money is the sinews of war’ was already proverbial in sixteenth-century Europe.¹ The problem facing mercenary captains was to get the money.

Modern historians increasingly use the term ‘military-fiscal state’ when writing of ancien régime governments, but the state was not yet hegemonic in the military fiscal system that obtained in sixteenth-century Europe. The state almost invariably paid in arrears (if at all) and captains consequently needed to bear charges themselves, both initially and in the long-term, often having to take out loans at interest to do so. This was on top of the vagaries of war, which might lead to one’s property or oneself being captured by the enemy, leading in the first instance to loss of what had already been gained, and in the second to the need to pay a ransom. As a result, captains had to have, or have access to, extensive financial resources in order to field military units and keep them deployed for any length of time. The situation might be ameliorated somewhat for captains in national service since they had more direct access to the state employing them. Mercenaries, however, were particularly reliant on native resources -- if not their own, then those of their lords, followers and allies, or their lord’s followers. In practice, then, the military fiscal system virtually obliged captains to utilise credit networks. The workings of these networks are an integral part of the story of how mercenary companies were recruited, financed and organised,² and they further reveal the role of England’s Protestant elites in the employment of mercenaries by the Huguenots and Dutch.

This chapter demonstrates how the limited means of governments and factions made them generally unable to pay promptly (or in full), throwing captains back on their own resources. The typical commitment was so great,

¹ A commonplace of classical antiquity, it was reformulated by Rabelais in Gargantua (1532) and by 1625 was a trivial saying, according to Sir Francis Bacon: Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations, 16th edn (Boston, Toronto & London: Little, Brown & Co., 1992), 82, 88, 139.
² These are key issues, not only in this thesis (above, pp. 1-2), but also more generally -- see, e.g., Parker, Military Revolution, 46.
however, that their native resources were invariably inadequate, which meant they had to resort to borrowing and/or credit. Thus, the military-fiscal system caused captains consistently to become indebted, both when raising a company, and throughout their period of service. Unable to cope with the necessary financial commitments alone, the help of patrons and allies was vital to fulfil contracts. The former might themselves provide financial support but more typically patrons helped captains and their agents to obtain cash in loans and/or supplies on credit from merchants and financiers -- themselves either sympathetic to militant Protestant internationalism or also followers of the patrons in question. The trail of financial patronage thus provides further traces that the employment of English and Welsh mercenaries in France and the Netherlands owed much to the consensus among the English Protestant elites that foreign Protestants had to be sustained.

The evidence for this chapter is mostly drawn from the Netherlands, because very detailed records survive of the Dutch military finance system, in contrast to a paucity of documents on that of the Huguenots. This is supplemented by evidence of the experience of mercenaries of other nationalities in the Netherlands and of English soldiers in royal service. This reveals that the experience of the English in Dutch pay was common to soldiers in all early-modern armies and thus this Dutch evidence is valid for all English and Welsh mercenaries in France and the Netherlands.

Captains, Employers and Their Transactions

Humphrey Gilbert’s contract in 1572, according to a fellow soldier, provided ‘for the entertainement of his owne persone in wages and other allowaunces verie neere tenne thousande Markes ... besides verie large allowaunces for all the Officers, Capitaines and Soldiours under his regiment’. These are spectacular sums, yet of course they meant nothing until they were paid out. Early-modern generals and monarchs might have favourable balances in official accounts, but insufficient cash in hand when in the field, and so have their campaigns ruined. Likewise, captains could have impressive nominal

\[\text{Churchyard's Choice, sig. Ri.}\]
\[\text{See Dietz, English Public Finance, 60 219; Mark Charles Fissel, The Bishops' Wars: Charles I's Campaigns against Scotland 1638-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), ch. 3.}\]
balances in their employers' accounts, but in the absence of sufficient money they could be personally ruined.

The weakness of central government institutions and the nobility's role in fielding armies meant that medieval commanders had always had to bear a share of the cost of their military endeavours. This did not change, even with the rise of 'renaissance monarchies'. War was increasingly expensive in this period, yet the evolving European states still lacked the resources and mechanisms fully to finance and control the ever-larger armies they wished to field. The mechanics of military payment became ever more intricate and convoluted as governments (or factions) struggled to meet their obligations. To a great extent the burden of raising and maintaining troops was still borne by individual aristocrats. This would be the experience of English captains in the European wars of religion in this period.

Basic Principles

The initial costs of a company -- the expenses of recruiting, arming, clothing, and transporting to the theatre of operations the rank-and-file and paying them wages in advance -- were invariably met by the captains themselves. Although they sometimes received a down payment from their employers to help with these expenses, this was uncommon.

What captains had to furnish varied, but it could be very expensive. In 1572, for example, Gilbert took 'some cast-iron ordnance ... [and] much warlike stores'. It is true that he had the backing of the government which may have helped in this respect. The same year, by contrast, 70 per cent of Read's and van Tryer's English and Welsh soldiers had to be supplied with morions, arquebuses and powderhorns by the Dutch -- the weapons they did take included boar spears! However, after the rebellious States of Holland and Zeeland became entrenched their requirements of mercenary captains increased. From 1573, the Welsh and English captains were increasingly expected to supply matériel, as well as men. For example, according to Spanish reports, Thomas Morgan took 'muchas municiones' with his men in

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5 See Wernham, Before, 344; Parker, 'Warfare', 205-8; idem, Military Revolution, 9-14, 61-64.
6 [Fogaça to Ruy Gomez], 27 Jul. 1572, CSPSp., 2:397, no. 336. See Morgan Wolf's narrative, ASCL, MS 129, f. 13r.
7 Muster roll and accounts, ARA, CO 73, n.f.
the spring of 1573. In March 1574 Edward Chester shipped six hundred breast-plates and 'gunpowder, muskets, arquebuses, pikes, halberds and morions and food' for nine hundred men, as a condition of his commission for a new regiment. Henry Cavendish was said to have spent enough to buy 'great quantities of arms', in addition to £1,000 on gunpowder for his new regiment in 1578 -- these estimates are almost certainly exaggerated, but give an idea of what could be involved.

In theory, once companies were in place, captains were compensated for their initial expenses by their employers. These reimbursements were quite distinct from the on-going payment of the troops' regular wages after they had arrived and been taken into service and from repayment of expenses incurred in the course of normal service, which were paid along with wages. It must be emphasised that wages for all soldiers in a company were always paid to the captain, who then was supposed to pay the men.

In theory, wages were paid monthly. In practice, they were invariably paid in arrears. Captains were paid 'imprests', or 'lendings' (leeningen as they were termed in Dutch), which were basically partial wages, paid in cash or kind as sums were available, rather than all the wages owed. When funds were available, or soldiers' demands grew too insistent to ignore, an 'aifrekening', as the Dutch termed it, would be made between employer and captain. All wages owed, plus extraordinary expenses incurred while on campaign, were calculated, lendings deducted, and the amount finally owing specified. This sum would then be liquidated. Ideally, all arrears should have been paid off in this fashion at least once a year, and this sometimes happened. Generally, however, captains' wages were left unpaid as long as employers could get away with it. In addition, government auditors naturally sought to rule out as many claims for recompense as possible, while

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9 Fogaça to Alba, 9 Jun. 1573, KL, no. 2598, 6:763. Thomas Robeson, who raised a Scottish foot band for Dutch service that year, also supplied his soldiers' arms: Ferguson, Papers, 5.
10 Mendoza to Philip II, 22 Apr. 1578, CSPSp., 2:577, no. 491.
11 Neale, 'Elizabeth and the Netherlands', 181-82.
12 E.g., the aifrekening of Robert Sidney's horse company for Oct. 1598-May 1599 concluded he had been overpaid; in 1605-6 States' accountants and Capt. Francis Henderson disagreed on the value of lendings to be deducted from the wages for his foot-band: ARA, SG 12536, f. 283, RvS 24, p. 4. Overpayments are also noted in accounts of English royal companies: see, e.g., auditor Jenyson to Burghley, 30 Nov. 1575, CSPir., 84; Nolan, Norreys, 31.
captains tried to get as many passed as they could. Payment of outstanding wages and expenses was thus by no means a straightforward affair and could entail negotiations that themselves took some time. Captains’ pay was frequently partially or substantially in arrears for years. They could well have positive balances on their accounts yet have received little or no actual cash.

Payment in Practice

What has been described was true in virtually all armies. In France, even the gendarmerie (noble heavy cavalry companies on which the crown relied) faced ‘delays of several months [as] the rule rather than the exception’ in payment of wages. Mercenaries’ pay was both much less and ‘considerably more tenuous’: a French captain in 1569 received wages for his ordinance company six months late; his mercenaries were paid twenty months overdue. The constant problems of paying wages in the Spanish Army of Flanders are notorious because of the crippling mutinies that resulted.\(^\text{13}\) English and Welsh soldiers in Huguenot or Dutch employ had similar experiences. This was partly because of their employers’ parlous finances: the Huguenots had great difficulty funding their war-effort,\(^\text{14}\) while the Dutch endured similar problems at least until the republic became well-established in the 1590s. However, it was also partly due to the fact that no government regularly paid in full or on time. Military finance was complex and aimed to exploit the resources of subjects (and particularly aristocratic subjects) for the benefit of the state.

First, there was obvious scope for reimbursement of initial expenses not to happen and/or to be manipulated by both sides. The resulting disputes could drag on and hence reimbursement of transportgelt or recruittelt might not take place literally for years. Thomas Smith, who raised a company in 1585, and Henry Clerk, John Wayman and Robert Hitchcock, who raised companies in 1586, all received their transportgelt only in June 1588.\(^\text{15}\)

The greatest problem, however, was not with repayment of original expenses, but with ongoing pay. Professor Neale argued that, ‘in view of the

\(^{13}\) Harding, 80-81. Parker, Army, ch. 8.

\(^{14}\) Greengrass, ‘Financing the Cause’, 247, 253.

\(^{15}\) ARA, SG 12536, ff. 89r-92r, 94v.
system of imprests', pay 'might drift hopelessly into arrears without disaster'\textsuperscript{16}. This was correct in principle, but in practice English and Welsh mercenaries in Dutch employ found from an early stage that the values and timing of payment of leeningen were generally subject to dispute, while affrekeningen were made very belatedly and sometimes paid tardily as well.

Thomas Morgan's dispute with William of Orange and the States of Holland over his salary and his troops' wages of 1574 was not resolved until 1577, despite two attempts in 1575-76\textsuperscript{17}. Chester likewise was in ongoing negotiations with the States of Holland from 1574 to 1577. Even while trying to get payment or reimbursement of sums owed to him for his regiment's service in 1574, other wages due him were mounting so that it is hard to keep track of what he was claiming and what various small payments to him were supposed to be for. Finally in August 1577 most of the States of Holland's obligations to him were discharged; yet at his death in November there were still sums outstanding, possibly greater in value than the three months' pay finally awarded to his widow to liquidate his account\textsuperscript{18}.

Ralph Salisbury, who took over John Cobham's company on 31 March 1579, was paid six times in the next ten months, receiving six and a half month's wages. In the following eleven months, he was paid only four times, receiving sums totalling six months wages. Consequently, by the end of January 1581 (when he had gone unpaid for fifty-six days), of the 29,205 guilders he was owed for his company's twenty-two months service, he had been paid less than 16,300. Furthermore, the affrekening, acknowledging a debt to him of nearly 13,000 guilders, was only concluded on 14 July, five and a half months later. Nine months later, two Scottish captains, Patton and Blair, were paid by an affrekening covering twenty-three and twenty-six months service respectively\textsuperscript{19}. By 1584, even the personal company of the Count van Hohenlohe, the United Provinces' Captain-General, was reduced to petitioning for payment of two months' back-pay\textsuperscript{20}. 

Robert Hitchcock, whose company was taken into Dutch pay in September 1586, agreed a first affrekening four months later in January 1587 but

\textsuperscript{16}Neale, 'Elizabeth and the Netherlands', 182.
\textsuperscript{17}See above, pp. 128, 138.
\textsuperscript{18}ARH, SvH 11, f. 364r, SvH 14, p. 180, SvH 281, ff. 5Gv, 5Kr, 5M, 5M2r.
\textsuperscript{19}All in ARA, CO ligg 51, n.f.
\textsuperscript{20}CS min., 5 Apr. 1585, ARA, RvS 3, f. 134r.
the sum agreed therein was only actually paid eighteen months later, in June 1588. The following month, July 1588, Lord Willoughby received 13,140 guilders to pay an affrekening for the thirteen months up to June 1587, during which he had been paid only 62.5 per cent of the wages owed.  Sir John Burgh, a mercenary in the Netherlands in 1581-82 and in France in 1590, commanded a queen's-pay company in the Netherlands in 1585-88 and a regiment in Willoughby's royal expeditionary force to France in 1589-90. He was still trying to obtain payment of 'an old debt due in the year ended October, 1587', in January 1594. In the following December, Sir Edmund Uvedale, another former mercenary, was petitioning for payment of his 'old accounts' (for queen's service) by the Privy Council.

Nothing, however, stands comparison with the enormous financial burden borne by John Norreys and his credit network. Just for his regiment's service in Friesland between August 1580 and May 1582 he was owed almost half a million Flemish ponden (about £50,000). In that period he was actually paid some 260,000 ponden, plus another 40,000 soon after. Nearly 40 per cent was still outstanding after five years. He was paid 80,000 in part settlement later in the 1580s. The remainder, almost 110,000 ponden (an astonishing £11,000) remained unpaid into the next decade. Eventually, after prolonged negotiations and a personal request from Elizabeth to settle the debts, an affrekening was agreed on 27 March 1591. This was nearly nine years after the term of service in question had concluded and well over ten years since it had commenced; and it still took the States-General two months more to agree to liquidate his affrekening. Yet this sum was just for the Frisian campaign and Norreys had other claims also still outstanding: one remained so until at least 1594.

It is true that with the reforms of the 1590s -- coinciding with greater political and economic stability in the United Provinces -- the staatsche leger

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21 ARA, SG 12536, ff. 93-94, 100r-2r.
23 ARA, SG 12578, n.f. (original), SG 12536, ff. 205r-10r (copy). Elizabeth to SG, 11 Jan. 1591 summarised in SG minute, 9 Feb. 1591, RSG, 7:396. The total amount owed to Norreys was 495,807 5s. 7d. The total still outstanding according to the affrekening was 109,569 19s. 6d. but Norreys had claimed 140,000 (to SG, 21 and 24 Mar. 1591, SG 5882-I, nos. 94-98). It was possibly a bargaining position, but he may finally have accepted less than he was actually due.
25 Norreys to SG, 14 Nov. 1594, ARA, SG 5882-II, no. 313.
began to be paid in more timely fashion; reimbursement of recruiting and transport expenses became fairly systematic and unproblematic.\textsuperscript{26} Wages, however, were not paid nearly so promptly or readily. The Dutch republic did not yet deserve the reputation it has among some scholars for paying its troops punctually.\textsuperscript{27} Things had improved, to be sure: whereas John Norreys pursued payment for a decade, his brother Edward’s claim for three months’ wages outstanding when he left Ostend in 1599 was settled by an order of the States-General for payment of 3 January 1600.\textsuperscript{28} This is comparable to the liquidation of Sergeant-Major John Cook’s account, which was ordered in December 1606 and also took place three months later.\textsuperscript{29} To take another example, in summer 1599 the companies of Captain Berry, Francis Vere and Nicholas Parker were each subject to affrekening for their service between October 1598 and May 1599; then Berry was paid on 8 July, Vere and Parker on 9 August. Their arrears were kept to about six months and affrekening were made -- and paid -- promptly.\textsuperscript{30}

However, to take a different example, although Captain Meetkerke’s company’s arrears were kept to under six months, the affrekening made for its service in the first five months of 1599 was not ordered paid until 2 June 1600; his affrekening for service to 26 March 1600 took so long to be paid that in June 1602 the States General ordered immediate payment of 500 guilders -- as an instalment!\textsuperscript{31} In 1601, the widow of Captain Duxberry was left to collect the sums owed him by the States-General, as were the widows of Captain Butler and Sir Charles Fairfax, both slain at Ostend in 1603; Mrs Butler was only owed (or received) about £10, but Lady Fairfax was paid about £100; further testimony to the frequency with which captains’ accounts remained unpaid and accumulated, even after the reforms of the 1590s.\textsuperscript{32}

Nor was this the experience only of the captains. The rank-and-file soldiers would of course not be paid their wages in full unless and until their captains received the cash. Some junior and non-commissioned officers had

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} E.g., ARA, SG 12503, ff. 341r, 373v; CAan. 879, passim.
\item \textsuperscript{28} ARA, SG 12503, f. 299r.
\item \textsuperscript{29} ARA, CAan. 879, f. 129r.
\item \textsuperscript{30} ARA, SG 12503, ff. 279r, 283v-84r, SG 12536, ff. 282, 284.
\item \textsuperscript{31} ARA, SG 12503, ff. 308r, 373v.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Ibid., f. 343r; ARA, CAan. 879, f. 63v.
\end{itemize}
special direct wages, as a result of rewards for valour or good service, but they naturally suffered in the same way as the captains. The case of James Melthorpe, English regimental ‘chirurgyn’, demonstrates this well. From the time he was taken into States’ pay, after the transfer of winter 1598/99, he had to wait literally years for his first affrekening. The date of its agreement is unknown, but it covered twenty-six months from February 1599 to March 1601. Then came the quest for renumeration in full of what was owed him. At Vere’s urging, the States-General ordered him to be paid 1000 guilders (£100) in April 1602 and 400 more in October 1603; he definitely received a payment of 1200 guilders at the end of November 1602; yet two months’ wages (414 guilders) were still owed to him by the States-General in March 1604 when it ordered this sum to be paid him. Melthorpe actually received only some 44 per cent of the wages due in the affrekening period; it took him over three years to receive the rest.\(^3\) Senior rank did not bring immunity from non-payment of wages and mounting arrears. An affrekening of June 1599 concluded that Sir Francis Vere was owed over 24,000 guilders of his salary and perquisites as general and colonel, and for his company of cavalry.\(^4\) Sir Horace Vere was appointed Colonel-General of the English troops in May 1605, but his salary was not paid until November.\(^5\)

The Dutch, then, still continued to pay their troops in arrears and often well in arrears. Even though there was an improvement and compared to other European powers the Dutch Republic probably was a prompt payer, the captains in its service still had to carry the cost of their companies for months on end. Paying was delayed until the captains and/or their soldiers requested it (or protested!), or until an imminent campaign made good order and morale imperative -- an English volunteer could observe wryly that a Dutch promise ‘to pay all count and reckonings to the captains ... argues they mean to do somewhat’.\(^6\) Thus, in April 1602, with an important campaign about to be launched, the States-General ordered that Vere be paid 2,600 ponden of his personal salary and perquisites (which were in arrears).

\(^3\) ARA, SG 12503, ff. 368v, 387v, SG 12504, ff. 36r, 52r, CAan. 879, f. 29v.
\(^4\) ARA, SG 12536, ff. 281-82 : 20,741/5/- for the former, and 3323/18/- for the latter, of which he was paid 3324 guilders two months later (SG 12503, f. 283v). The balance was paid off in various instalments in the following years, but is impossible to disaggregate from payments of subsequent accounts (note the following paragraph) and advances/leeningen.
\(^5\) ARA, CAan. 879, f. 83v.
\(^6\) Northumberland to Robert Cecil, 12 Jan. 1601, HMCS, 14:160.
despite the fact that his accounts were still to be finalised. But generally the Dutch authorities were content to wait until their soldiers pressured them to pay. Petitions to the Raad van State and Staten-Generaal for payment of outstanding wages or expenses were so numerous in the first decade of the seventeenth century that a new type of lawyer emerged: the solliciteur-militaire, a specialist in drawing up and presenting these petitions. Even the best payers in Europe were slow to renumerate their troops.

Captains and their Companies

While captains waited for overdue pay to be precisely computed and the agreed sums to be disbursed, their companies still incurred expenses. Their soldiers still had to be fed, clothed, sheltered, have their arms and armour repaired and replaced, and be given some kind of spending money. In the Netherlands, local authorities often supplied victuals and clothing, though the cash value would be calculated and deducted at the final affrekening. In all countries, cash and goods could be got by plundering the enemy and enemy territory. There was almost always still a gap between what was received and what the company needed, much less what it was owed. Unpaid and/or unsupplied soldiers often pillaged even friendly areas but captains discouraged this since, apart from any other considerations, it led to bitterness, both between soldiers and locals and between captains and employers. Moreover, an approximation of the value of depredations might be deducted at the next affrekening, so that resort to these means might spin out the paying-off process by making it more complex and debatable.

ARA, Sc 12503, f. 368r.
38 D. J. B. Trim, 'Ideology, Greed and Social Discontent in Early Modern Europe: Mercenaries and Mutinies in the Rebellious Netherlands, 1568-1609', in Rebellion, Repression, Re-invention: Mutiny in Comparative Perspective, ed. Jane Hathaway (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), 54. These petitions were received from rank and file as well as captains.
39 E.g., from 12 Oct.-14 Nov. 1576, Giles Gainsford's company received 3628 loaves of bread, 923 pounds of cheese and a tonne of herring, amongst other victuals, whose total value was estimated as just over 460 florins, which was deducted from the wages owed them, while half the value of a month's wages in January 1576 had been in cloth: ARA, CO 37, n.f. in the affrekeningen of Hitchcock and John Norreys, already cited, the value of victuals and weapons was also deducted from sums owing.
40 E.g., 72 guilders was rebated from Thomas Morgan's affrekening in Mar. 1585 for cattle consumed by his soldiers -- possibly supplied by local authorities, but possibly seized from farmers, who then complained: CSPFor., 19:326. Disputes arising from pillaging by Norreys's (unpaid) soldiers in 1580-82 helped delay settlement of his accounts for the Frisian campaign.
In fact, because pay was deficient and erratic, captains themselves had to pay the soldiers advances of their wages and meet the expenses of supplying them with necessaries. To be sure, the captains in their turn could delay and stint on what they actually paid, so that they never paid out the full sums owed to the rank-and-file. Yet there was only limited scope for this, since soldiers might protest. In any case, such skimping in practice occurred less frequently than one might suspect. Norreys showed concern about his soldiers’ pay in negotiations with the States-General and although, after the unpaid Frisian campaign of 1580-82, he was confronted by his men about rumours that he was keeping back money owed to them, he ‘so cleared himself of the slander ... that not one man ... charge[d] him’. Most complaints of captains not paying their rank-and-file come from after 1585 and relate to men in the queen’s pay. There is little doubt that those in the States’ pay were also guilty of not paying their men all the wages owed them, but since mercenaries rarely protested against their captains (as opposed to the Dutch administration) over pay, it is evident that the rank-and-file were paid at least a reasonable share of what they were owed. Not infrequently, however, their ‘advances [came] directly from the captain’s private purse’.

Nor did this end the captains’ obligations, of course. John Ridgeway had to spend £300 in just twelve months on the ‘clothing and arms’ of his company in Dutch pay and in practice the bill of keeping troops in service was generally a high one. Indeed, captains actually had to pay out in advance much of the money for these expenses, reducing opportunities for skimping.

A captain’s investment thus did not end with the original outlay to put his company in the field. Already he faced financial embarrassment if expenses were reimbursed even relatively quickly, but not as quickly as he might reasonably have hoped. When the money for Cobham’s force in 1578 was overdue by six months it caused him distress, because of the ‘great and excessive charges’ he had personally incurred to put the troops in the field;

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41 Brown to Leicester, 20 Nov. 1580, CSP For., 14:493, no. 496; Dannett to Walsingham, 19 Aug. 1582, ibid., 16:258.
43 Fissel, English Warfare, 146.
44 Ridgeway to Robert Cecil, 9 Oct. 1602, HMCS, 12:431. For other examples, see below, pp. 210, 213.
as it turned out, he was still pursuing his claims in late 1582 in any case! In addition to this, captains had to make up out of their own pockets much of any shortfall between what they received from their employers and what they owed to their soldiers; this constituted a very considerable commitment indeed. The result of being paid in arrears (and so long in arrears) was thus that captains had to bear a substantial financial burden.

This was true for commanders at all levels. Leicester spent his own money prodigally in the Netherlands, including (he claimed) over £35,000 in 1586.* Much of it went on the cost of fielding his retinue of horse, or on his personal expenses, but Leicester’s own treasurer also paid captains and field officers of the royal army and in States’ pay, although they were not the earl’s private responsibility. These payments totalled £9,139.11s.10d. for October 1585 to October 1586 alone.† Sir Thomas Cecil’s service in the Netherlands in 1585-86 cost him £5,000 in the space of just a few months (or so a House of Commons committee was told), while Lord Willoughby, who served in both queen’s and States’ pay, spent £2,200 (equal to his whole ordinary annual revenue) in 1587 and £990 more during the siege of Bergen the next year.‡ Most captains, to be sure, did not have to spend as much as Leicester, the royal lieutenant-general; Cecil, who had charge of a large garrison; or Willoughby, who had wider responsibilities than his companies of foot and horse. Most, however, also had less resources. Even relatively wealthy men might not be equal to the need to pay troops and suppliers in advance of, or separately to, late or partial payments by the employing state.

For example, despite considerable personal and family wealth, Henry Cavendish was able to put his regiment in the field in 1578, but not to keep it there; John North, too, though heir to a barony could not support the ongoing financial burden of a regiment by 1584; as already noted, in both cases, their units fell apart.§ Willoughby sold his wife’s jewellery along with much of the family plate -- but even this did not raise enough funds.‖ In 1592 Christopher

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† Adams, ‘Protestant Cause’, 58.
‡ ARA, RAGP 1:206(ii) -- the SG’s accounts of Leicester’s expenditure due for reimbursement.
§ Hasler, 1:580; West, Brave Lord Willoughby, 50.
‖ See ch. 4 above, pp. 143, 147, 153, 158.
Carleill, Walsingham's step-son and kin to several wealthy city of London merchants, lamented that, in serving the Dutch, the Huguenots and his queen, he had spent his 'patrimony and all other means ... which hath not been less than six thousand pounds.' Edward, Lord Cromwell's inheritance was entangled by lawsuits, but his long career as a mercenary captain in the Netherlands, and in royal pay in France and Spain certainly did not help his financial circumstances; rather, it was avowedly a matter of disappointment to him that he had not done better out of his service in the wars. Charles Scott, the son of a wealthy deputy-lieutenant of Kent, left his heirs in financial difficulties on his death in 1600 partly as a result of losing at least £300 as captain of a States'-pay company. Some years as a captain of horse under Prince Maurice left the finances of Thomas, Lord Grey de Wilton, in ruins. One of Horace Vere's veterans, William Booth, regretted after just seven months service that, even 'if it please God I returne, I know I shall be miserable pore'. Sir Callisthenes Brooke, who had fought for the Dutch for a dozen years, at his death in 1611, left '[h]is lady and children ... very poor'.

In sum, most captains, even peers or wealthy gentlemen, were simply unable to raise the kind of money necessary to meet their obligations in the absence of regular pay by their employers. The nature of the military-fiscal system in which captains operated meant that an integral part of the process of fielding their companies was securing external financial assistance.

Financial Patronage
Alternatives to Wages

Most captains had to go into debt to meet their obligations. This was true from the very start of the process. Captains' initial outlay was very frequently funded with loans. Leicester mortgaged several important estates, borrow-

51 BL, Lans. MS 64, f. 54, quoted in Lloyd, Elizabethan Adventurer, 172. Despite holding a profitable military office, when Carleill died the following year the value of his estate was easily exceeded by what he owed in debts: Standen to Bacon, 17 Nov. 1593, LPL, MS 649, f. 388r; grant of administration of Carleill's estate, 17 Apr. 1596. PRO, PROB 6/5, f. 164r. 52 Joel Hurstfield, The Queen's Wards: Wardship and Marriage under Elizabeth I (London, New York & Toronto: Longmans, Green, 1958), 63; 'Cromwell, Edward' (forthcoming in New DNB). 53 PC to Francis Vere, 23 Dec. 1600, APC, 31:55. 54 See Chamberlain to Carleton, 28 Feb. 1603, Chamberlain Letters, no. 61, 1:188. 55 To John Booth, 6 Apr. 1629, FSL, MS F.c.13. 56 Abraham Williams to William Trumbull, 18 Sep. 1611, HMC Downshire, 3:142.
ing nearly £40,000 in order to meet his initial military commitments in the Netherlands. If the sums were unusually large, the practice was not. For all the large sums promised Gilbert in his contract, he needed to take out both a mortgage and 'greate bandes [bonds]' in order to cover his expedition's expenses in 1572. The following spring Thomas Morgan drew on credit from English merchants to pay the cost of fitting out his troops and paying them advances of their wages. Cavendish’s financial difficulties arose from his need to take out loans to meet his initial expenses. Norreys also raised bonds to cover the cost of putting his regiment in the field in the Netherlands in 1578. According to another English officer, it was because of his facility at raising money this way that Norreys, in contrast to Cavendish, had sufficient funds left after raising and shipping his men to pay their wages up to date on reaching their first camp (a fact highlighted by Churchyard).

Once troops were in the field, payments from employers could be and were supplemented by plunder and loot. An 'advertisement' from France of December 1569 emphasised how one town captured by Montgommery, who had Englishmen with him, yielded spoil of three hundred riding horses and a hundred mules. At the capture of Valenciennes William Morgan took ‘a goodly gentleman’s house, stuffed with goodes and furnished with wine and vitualls for a long year’. However, the sack of a city could be something of a lottery as the English troops who took Mechelen in 1580 found: most of the plunder (which was considerable) fell to Scottish and Dutch troops. And the fortunes of war might prevent any opportunities arising for plunder, not least in the 1570s and '80s when the English troops were often on the defensive. Even in 1600 a chaplain in a popular play is made to observe to his troops 'you poore snakes come seldome to a bootie'. Plunder was as uncertain a source of income as properly contracted pay.

58 Gilbert to Burghley, 29 August 1572, KL, no. 2455, 6:500.
59 ARH, SvH 13i, pp. 152-54. Morgan still owed 4,000 Carolus guilders to the Merchant Adventurers (a sum owed to him in turn by the States of Holland) on his return to England.
60 See Durant, 79, 106; Wood, Mr Harrie Cavendish his Journey, iii-iv.
61 Bingham to Davison, 15 Jun. 1578, CSPFor., 13:16, no. 22, TDH, 28.
62 CSPFor., 11:160, no. 570.
63 Churchyard's Choice, sig. Kiii r.
64 Churchyard, Taking of Mackin, sig. C4; Strada, ii.188-89; Baudart, 1:340.
65 Sir John Oldcastle, quoted in Hale, War, 119.
The end result, even once start-up costs had been met, was further borrowing. After leading just one band of mercenaries for only ten weeks in Normandy (1562) Henry Killigrew was obliged to borrow £75 from one of the captains in the royal expeditionary force when it arrived. Though Captain Edward Bartlett’s company in 1575-76 was supplied with arms by the States of Holland, he still required cash or credit from English merchants for other needs. Carleil is known to have spent, or got in credit, £500 to buy ammunition for his troops in 1579-80. Roger Williams was obliged to pay out personally to replace the armour of his hundred-strong horse troop in spring 1584. These were not isolated incidents, which was why captains’ purses were not equal to their obligations.

**Mercantile Credit**

The example of Bartlett points to the fact that captains regularly resorted to merchants to supply their troops with weapons, and sometimes pay. They were not always English. John North turned to numerous local merchants and artisans in Antwerp for the ‘arms and other necessities’ of his regiment. In doing so, he incurred debts totalling some 1,200 livres (about £120) in all, including ones as small as 10 livres to one Antwerp armourer, who pursued North in the local courts and even had him imprisoned, to obtain payment. Captains Wingfield and Randolph accrued debts totalling nearly £700 to various artisans in Flushing in 1586. In most cases, though, the merchants who effectively underwrote the companies were also English and Welsh.

Particularly important were the members of the Merchant Adventurers Company. This was not a Puritan association by any means, yet many individual members of the company, including its first governor of Elizabeth’s reign, John Marsh, were certainly ‘protestant stalwarts’. When the trail of

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66 See CSPFor., 5:471, no. 1076; Trim, ‘Normandy Campaign’, 77, 80-81.
67 Accounts of treasurer of war 8 Feb. 1574-31 Jan. 1575, ARH, RKA 346a/1d. f. 4v; de Villiers to Walsingham, 5 Sep. 1576, CSPFor., 11:369, no. 902, for the decision to pay off merchants’ debts of 2,000 florins (£200) on Bartlett’s behalf.
69 North to SG, n.d. [early 1584?], BL, Add. MS 32502, f. 5r; quittance, 5 Mar. 1584, Bodl., North MS b.25, f. 62r.
70 Ramsay, 117.
financial patronage is followed, consistently we find at the end leading figures in the English mercantile community, particularly members of London companies and the Merchant Adventurers, often with ties to the great Protestant patrons of the day.

Sir Humphrey Gilbert’s bonds in 1572 were taken out with ‘Sir Roger Martin th’Alderman, and ... divers others’. Martin during his life supported the poor of the London parish of St Antholin’s (notorious at that time for radical Protestantism), donated money to Geneva, and left in his will £20 to endow sermons in the chapel of the Mercers Company. In the winter of 1572-73, two merchants, Ferdinand Poyntz and Thomas Aldersey sold Spanish ships and cargoes captured by the rebels; they used some of the profits to purchase munitions which they shipped back to Flushing, and transmitted the rest of the profits, which were used to pay the English troops who stayed after Gilbert’s recall. Poyntz (who, as we have seen, had already made a major financial contribution to the Flushingers’ revolt) was from a family notable for its hot Protestantism since Henry VIII’s reign (the Poyntzes of Iron Acton, Gloucestershire). Two of his cousins were important members of Leicester’s affinity; two more fought in the Netherlands -- Anthony, who was wounded at Flushing in 1572, and Thomas, who was a captain at the turn of the century. Aldersey, a senior member of the Merchant Adventurers Company, was a zealous Protestant and extremely hostile to Alba.

In the spring of 1573, as already noted, Thomas Morgan paid much of the start-up costs of his regiment with credit from the Merchant Adventurers. Edward Chester, whose father Sir William, had been Lord Mayor of London, obtained weapons and armour for his regiment in 1574 with money, or on credit, from ‘Mr Gybon’ and two other English merchants. When the States of Holland could not meet its obligations to Chester, one Thomas Pullison stepped in and assumed half of its debts. Though not actually a loan to a

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72 KL, no. 2455, 6:500; Foster, 129; Jean Maillet’s journal, 4 and 18 Apr., 27 May and 14 Aug. 1583, AE/PH 2066.
73 Fogaça to Alba, 17 Nov. 1572 and 16 Feb. 1573, KL, nos. 2498, 2541, 6:582, 663.
75 Ramsay, 117, 159.
6 Above, p. 212.
77 SH res., 13 Oct. 1574, ARH, SvH 281, f. 5Gr (and see above, p. 202).
78 Pullison to Joachim Orteil, 12 May and 16 Jun. 1576, ARA, CO 54, n.f.
mercenary it was a form of financial help and vital at that. Pullison, who was engaged in the cloth trade to Antwerp, was also from the radical parish of St Antholin’s, and he later invested in privateering. Thomas Heaton, then the Governor of the Merchant Adventurers, paid out £38 6s. 8d. in early 1577 ‘at the direction of Mr Secretary Walsingham’ for undefined purposes. This may well have in fact been a subsidy to Chester, for Heaton was an obvious conduit to disburse covert funds to mercenaries. His office gave him opportunity and he certainly had the inclination: a Marian exile, he, too, would later invest in privateers and his wife was Chester’s sister, Elizabeth.

It was not only English merchants, however, who contributed to the financing of mercenary companies. Chester also exploited a wide circle of small-scale financial backers, including gentlemen such as Sir Walter Waller (later captain of a queen’s-pay company in the Netherlands), who assumed part of Chester’s liabilities. At the beginning of 1584, a Dutch merchant living in London paid £400 of his own money to Ralph Cromwell to help him equip his companies. A little later that year, the men recruited by Morgan for the relief of Antwerp had their necessary wage advances paid by the consistories of the foreign Calvinist churches of London.

All the examples cited thus far are, to be sure, of men who were sympathetic to the mercenaries. This is financial ‘patronage’ in one sense. It is also evidence that support for the mercenaries’ activities was not restricted to members of the government. There was a significant community of hot Protestants in England on which the mercenaries, and their patrons, could call when official support was, for whatever reasons, limited. What evidence is there, however, of the involvement of those greater figures from the nobility and/or the Privy Council, coordinating the provision of necessary financial services to captains?

80 PC warrant, 3-4 Mar. 1577, APC, 9:298.
82 Waller to Walsingham, 20 May 1583, CSPDom., 1581-90, 109. He was perhaps a kinsman of the Waller killed in action in Friesland in 1580 (as recorded by Blandy, 23v).
83 Ortell to Jan Willemszoon, 8 Jan. 1584, n.s., ARA, CO 54, n.f; SL, 1:80.
After all, there were other ways for the captains to make contact with supportive merchants. We have seen that Norreys borrowed in 1578 to put his regiment in the field. Whom his transactions were with is mostly not known but one loan (£50 on the security of a jewel) was from the Puritan merchant Thomas Myddelton. A former apprentice and factor of Ferdinand Poyntz, he funded the printing of Psalters and Protestant books in Welsh, backed godly ministers financially, invested in privateers, and acted as treasurer for crown-sponsored military expeditions; Myddelton may also have been distantly related to Norreys and his brother, William, served in Norreys's regiment.\textsuperscript{44} Chester, as son of a former lord mayor of London, must have had contacts in the city of London: perhaps Pullison and Gybon were among them. Carleill's maternal grandfather also became lord mayor, as did a maternal uncle, and thus he too could have exploited contacts in the city's mercantile community. The widespread nature of support for military action on behalf of foreign Protestants is again revealed by these examples; but not -- apparently -- the hand of the great Calvinist patrons on the council.

In fact, however, Walsingham and Mildmay themselves were from the godly mercantile community of London, which they patronised; Carleill was, of course, Walsingham's step-son; and Myddelton worshipped in the same church as Walsingham, whose client he was.\textsuperscript{45} Few details of Carleill's borrowings are known, but regardless of how he arranged the loan of the £100 he owed to English merchants based in Antwerp (presumably Merchant Adventurers) in autumn 1580, he was able to refinance the debt, a deal arranged by Walsingham with George Hoddesdon, Carleill's brother-in-law, and George Leicester, another merchant with strong Protestant affiliations.\textsuperscript{46} The earl of Leicester, likewise, had connections in the city and the frequent participation of Poyntz, with his family connections to the earl's affinity, is suggestive. Thus, these powerful Puritan patrons could have a hand even in transactions between merchants and captains who knew each other in any case.

\textsuperscript{45} Usher, 289-91, 301; Lloyd, Elizabethan Adventurer, 10-13; Dodd, 254.
\textsuperscript{46} George Hoddesdon to Walsingham, 22 Oct. 1580, CSPFor., 14:460, no. 470.
There is also explicit evidence that militant Protestant figures in the
government were directly party to mercenaries' financial transactions. In
1578, even after Cavendish had taken loans to raise his regiment in the first
place, William Davison had to step in and use his own credit for Cavendish’s
regiment once it arrived in May. English merchants in Antwerp provided
arms to Richard Bingham on Davison’s credit in June -- an extreme form of
financial patronage by Davison, but the States faced extreme danger at this
point. As already seen, Walsingham, Cobham and Davison arranged a loan
of 30,000 florins to pay Cavendish’s and Norreys’s soldiers wages in July.\(^8\)
(Walsingham's share of the loan had still not been repaid by the States-
General on his death in 1591, by which time accrual of interest had made the
total owed by his widow about £5,000\(^8\)) Then in August 1578, a number of
Merchant Adventurers issued bonds to raise cash for a lending to Norreys’s
soldiers: at Walsingham’s direction and under Davison’s supervision.\(^9\) In
1584 Morgan relied on thousands of guilders credit from the Merchant
Adventurers at Middleburg, and the few remaining English merchants in
Antwerp, to equip, transport and help feed the soldiers he took to Antwerp --
credit given at the English government’s instructions.\(^8\)

Of course, some captains, partly by long service, were eventually able
to create more extensive credit networks, of which powerful patrons were just
a part, rather than all-important. During the winter of 1583-84, Morgan had
already sent Captain Emmanuel Lucar (son of a member of a city company)
to Middleburg (the new headquarters of the Merchant Adventurers), with
instructions 'to get a supply of money from the merchants for the sustenance
of his soldiers' -- clearly Morgan had credit facilities with the Adventurers
company.\(^9\) This was presumably the result of contacts made over his years
of service in the Netherlands. By late 1577 he was able to offer equipment
as part of a troop-raising package, which would have required a network of

\(^8\) Above, in ch. 4, p. 145.
\(^8\) Essex and Lady Walsingham to Francis Vere, n.d., BL, Add. MS 48116, ff. 86r-90r; Read,
Walsingham, 1:394, 3:443.
\(^8\) Davison to Walsingham, and to Wilson, 11 May 1578, PRO, SP 83/6, ff. 113r, 116r; Bingham
to Davison, 17 Jun. 1578, CSPFor., 13:16, no. 23; Walsingham to idem, 19 Aug. 1578, KL,
no. 4102, 10:746 (CSPFor., 13:141, no. 178, where it is dated 22 Aug.).
\(^8\) Morgan to Walsingham, 31 Dec. 1584 n.s. and 31 May 1585, and Le Sieur to idem, 26 Feb.
1585, CSPFor., 19:199, 303, 506; CS res., 3 Jun. 1585, ARA, RvS 3, f. 222v; cf. SH res., 17
Jan. 1585, ARH, SvH 20, p. 41.
\(^8\) CSPFor., 18:390, no. 470. Lucar’s pedigree, in Rawlins, 61.
This network evidently included merchants as well, for he was able to raise relatively large sums of cash in autumn 1578. The network probably included his fellow Welshman, Myddelton, whose family Morgan had known since 1572 and who is later known to have advanced cash on security to 'the warrior'.

Nothing, however, could match the credit network of John Norreys. In part this is deduction. As we have seen, Norreys must have paid out a very high proportion of, for example, the 190,000 ponden left unpaid for ten years. Only four peers could boast an annual income of half this sum or more; with his own relatively small patrimony, Norreys could not have mobilised such huge sums and he must have had the help of an extended credit network of financiers. The workings of such networks, by their very natures, tend to be opaque, but some evidence does survive of its extent.

In 1588-89 Norreys and 'his friends' were able to raise the astonishing sum of £22,000 towards the cost of the expedition to Lisbon. Among the 'adventurers as will adventure in a voyage with Sir John Norreys and Sir Francis Drake', and others who helped mount the 'voyage', were a number of merchants. They included members of the consortium who shipped the queen's artillery to La Rochelle in 1569 and/or their kin: Peter Osborne and Sir Edward Osborne; Thomas Smythe; Sir George Barne, Walsingham's brother-in-law and Carleill's uncle. Other merchant investors included men who had underwritten English mercenaries in the Netherlands in the 1570s and '80s, like George Leicester, Pullison and Aldersey; but also Sir Wolstan Dixie and William Webbe, who, like Aldersey, had contributed to the £25,000 loan raised by the Earl of Leicester from the city in 1585, while Webbe had helped to fundraise for Geneva in 1583 (as did Osborne and Aldersey), and later raised money for Willoughby. Finally, there were some of Sir John's

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96 See the 'Note' attached by Davison to Leicester, 18 Jan. 1578, KL, no. 3740, 10:236.
97 Receipt for £300, Oct. 1578, CSPFor., 13:255, no. 335.
98 Dodd, 250, 263.
99 Stone, Crisis, 760, app. VIII, section B.
100 Adams, 'Patronage of the Crown', 29, emphasises Lord Norreys's wealth, but Stone, ibid., put his income at between £1800 and £3600 per annum -- and John was the second son

Relevant documents are pr. Wernham, ENDSP, 21-26, 61-62, 117.
Lloyd, Elizabethan Adventurer, 10-13; Usher, 289-90.
Foster, 145; Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 341n.
Jean Maillet's journal, 11 Feb. and 2 May 1583, AE/PH 2066; Willoughby's will. PRO, PROB 11/98, f. 145r
own veterans and kin. Burgh, Williams, Edmund Huntley, Edward and Henry Norreys, Sir Edward Wingfield and Sir Philip Butler. This was at the end of Norreys’s service in the Netherlands, of course, by which time he was at the height of his influence. However, it is indicative of his ability to mobilise a wide cross-section of the godly community in England and there is evidence that he had already developed this ability while in the States’ service.

As we have seen, Walsingham could mobilise formidable sums on his own recognizance, as well as being able to broker help for his military clients. Sir Francis’s influence in financial circles was mobilised by Norreys and his agents in the general’s ‘affairs’ in the early 1580s. Yet by this time Norreys seems to have used Walsingham instead of being directed by him. In any case, Norreys early developed sufficient contacts with the mercantile community so that he could interact with its members without need of mediation from great Protestant patrons. He maintained a business agent in Antwerp: first, from spring 1580, Richard Soam; then, from May to October 1582 when the Merchant Adventurers withdrew to Middleburg, Thomas Doyley, a kinsman of Norreys. This demonstrates the importance Norreys placed on contacts with the English merchants at Antwerp. One of the men authorised by Norreys to collect pay for his troops, in the event of his or his captains’ absence in the field, was Thomas Myddelton -- but other English merchants were part of his credit circle as well. The resources of the network were also at the disposal of Norreys’s own military clientele. His mastery of complex financial transactions surely contributed to his increasing self-confidence of the early 1580s.

Financial Patronage: Conclusions

Brett Usher shows the importance in the domestic context of the ‘active ideological and economic support’ given by members of the godly mercantile community (particularly in London) to Leicester, Warwick, Walsingham, Mild-
may and their ilk. Many played a part in government efforts to aid foreign
Protestants and contributed to the national war effort. Those who provided
financial and logistical underpinning to the mercenaries thus did so as part
of a wider spectrum of active support for the ‘Protestant cause’, both at home
and abroad. In financing mercenaries, these merchants did hope to turn a
profit, but in practice their investment and levels of risk were more substantial
than the chance of profit warranted.

It was of course true that a captaincy was a potentially lucrative office.
Wages were usually paid regularly (though not fully) when a company was
in garrison, for example, while salaries and expenses were paid more
frequently from the 1590s; expenses could be economised; opportunities for
plunder and ransoms were real and attractive, albeit difficult for historians to
quantify. If a captain could hold on until an affrekening, then, as has been
seen, sometimes the pay-off was very large indeed. All this meant, however,
that captains and those who backed them had to be in it for the long term, yet
this was inherently risky, since there was still no guarantee of a return in the
end. Because of the tardy and incomplete nature of payment by military
employers, captains’ accounts were bound to go unpaid for long periods of
time. Likewise, merchants who subscribed to States’ bonds to help fund
mercenaries, or cashed them for captains found them, at least in the 1570s
and ’80s, to be bad debts.

Those who nevertheless chose to provide financial services to such
bad risks did so because these were not simply ‘business’ decisions. They
reflected a certain point of view about the nature of the conflict in Europe. If
these merchants, or at least their own patrons and allies, had not had that
perspective, with a concomitant impetus to help fellow believers as best they
could, English and Welsh mercenaries could have been employed in France
and the Netherlands only on a much smaller scale, if at all.

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15 Usher, 301-2 at 302.
106 E.g., from 12 Oct.-14 Nov. 1576, Giles Gainsford’s band received 3628 loaves of bread,
923 pounds of cheese and a tonne of herring, amongst other victuals, whose total value was
estimated as just over 460 florins, which was deducted from the wages owed them, while half
the value of a month’s wages in January 1576 had been in cloth: ARA, CO 37, n.f.
107 Pullison to Ortell, 12 May and 16 Jun. 1576, ARA, CO 54, n.f.; John Hammond to Beale, 29
Summary and Implications

The States of Holland and Zeeland, and then the United Provinces, were better able to finance war than many other European countries, but for them, as for all early-modern states, the expense of waging modern war was often too great. As a result, they naturally made consistent attempts to spread the burden on to the shoulders of nobles, merchants, citizens, and governments, of other nations; and also to postpone the inevitable day(s) of reckoning.

The result of the military-fiscal system of this time was that captains, particularly of mercenaries, had to have access to a good flow of money. This is perhaps true of all captains in all periods, but at this juncture they could not rely on receiving a sufficient cash flow from their employers. Yet without that revenue stream, disaster could strike. Anjou was concerned in the summer of 1582 that, because wages for the men of Norreys’s regiment were so long overdue, his companies would simply dissolve. This was more or less the fate of Morgan’s regiment in 1573, Cavendish’s regiment in 1579, North’s regiment in 1584, and, to some extent, Norreys’s regiment (after he left it) in 1585. For concerned patrons in England, then, it was not enough to place captains in the States’ employ and facilitate their departure. It was vital that they got sufficient money and necessaries to keep fighting, or they might as well not have gone in the first place.

Accordingly, supporters of international Protestantism helped to provide the requisite financial and logistical aid to captains. Members of the Privy Council were important in this process, but action was also taken, sometimes at least partially autonomously, by members of the refugee communities and middle-ranking indigenous supporters. Their role in arranging and perpetuating the service of English and Welsh captains was particularly important in the period 1573-76 when the privy council, despite secretly approving, would not initiate, coordinate or subsidise, mercenaries’ actions in support of the Dutch.

The military-fiscal system, itself intricate and complex, thus resulted in ever more complicated financial operations to furnish money and supplies separately from state structures and institutions. They are in some ways...

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Letterbook, 28 Jul. 1582, ARA, SG 11095 (quoted by Holt, Anjou, 177, but erroneously identified as being to Henry Norreys -- the letter is in fact to John).
reminiscent of the methods used by modern international terrorist groups (an analogy which the Habsburg and Valois kings might have found particularly apt), but similar, too, to the funding of international aid and relief agencies -- an analogy that would be more appealing to the soldiers in question. In any event, these financial operations are extremely difficult to untangle, although enough evidence survives to reveal their complexity. There is clearly much more that remains to be revealed about the workings of the private financial system which supplied military stores and monetary aid to the Huguenots and Dutch generally, as well as their English and Welsh military employees in particular. More research on the place of the city of London in the 'Protestant international' is especially likely to be rewarding and revealing about the nature of international Protestant connections during the era of the European wars of religion. Such research would also shed light on the whole issue of how early-modern states paid for wars, and the interrelationship of government and private finance -- still an opaque subject. This chapter, then, while it provides sufficient answers for the purposes of the thesis, also highlights a number of questions which still need to be addressed.

There is a final implication. There is an almost universal presumption that reasons for service as mercenaries were entirely, truly, 'mercenary.' Redlich called his subjects 'military enterprisers' while military entrepreneurs is another commonly-used term. As this chapter reveals, the ability to function well in the area of private enterprise and business was almost a necessity for English and Welsh captains -- it was certainly a great asset. However, what it also reveals is that prospects for profit were extremely small. The most likely outcome for captains was debt, often formidable debt. Sympathetic merchants would let bills go unpaid for years and the Dutch, in particular, were likely to pay off most of a captain's account, eventually. Nevertheless, it was necessary to service the debts in the meanwhile; and they did not go away: they still had to be paid off in the end. If they were ultimately passed on to a captain's legatees, they had not been escaped. Some officers, like Gilbert and Cavendish, served for a year and then gave mercenary employment up as a bad job, but others like Chester, Morgan and Norreys kept coming back even after they knew the probable consequences.

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100 E.g., Bartlett, 17; Shurmer, 95, 98; McCormack, 78-81; and see ch. 2, passim.
Considering how mercenary companies were financed must give pause for thought to those who portray greed and profit as being the primary, even all-consuming, motivation for captains. It cannot be squared with this evidence.
CHAPTER SEVEN
RECRUITMENT (I): IMPRESSMENT AND ADVERTISEMENT

Thus far, this thesis has examined how the supply of units and captains was arranged through a series of interactions between foreign Protestants, the English government, individual patrons within England, and merchants: in other words, the first two elements of the equation on p. 95. It is now time to turn to the second set of interactions, between the captains and the third element: the rank-and-file of the mercenary companies. So far, chapters 3-6 have demonstrated the important part played by government ministers and nobles in England in the recruiting of English and Welsh captains by French and Dutch Protestants. It is the argument of chapters 7 and 8 that even when those patrons were not needed to mediate between employers and potential employees they were nevertheless vital because captains regularly used their domestic patrons’ connections to fill the ranks of their companies.

This chapter considers the general context of recruiting in this period. It examines the significance of conscripts and publicly solicited volunteers in the mercenary bands; it shows that such recruits were a minority of the rank-and-file. The personal nature of mercenaries’ employment placed limitations on recruiting. The overt methods preferred by captains in national service were difficult to utilise for captains in foreign employ, because they had only limited access to the apparatus of their own state. This chapter also shows that, whereas many early-modern mercenary units simply filled gaps in their ranks with men from anywhere, the English and Welsh mercenaries made only very limited use of local volunteers and instead consistently recruited in England and Wales.

Although ‘impressment’ (the contemporary term for conscription) and advertisement to the general populace did bring in some recruits, captains mostly had to seek alternative methods. This chapter thus forms an essential prelude to chapter 8 in which the role of affinities and martial dependences to mercenary recruiting is explored.
Even after the captains had, like latter-day executives, been 'head-hunted', only the first step had been accomplished: they had still to recruit their 'labour force'. Companies that became well-established in foreign service (as happened in the Dutch Republic) still needed to be kept regularly supplied with men. How was all this done? There is, again, only a limited amount of surviving evidence of direct mercenary recruiting. Most of what survives is from after 1585 and England's open entry into the war with Spain -- and consequently is from the Netherlands. I therefore examine medieval precedents and the general European context as a way of filling in the blanks; but the specific examples provided come more from the end of the period in question and from the experience of the mercenaries employed by the Dutch.

Precisely how recruiters 'got their men' in early-modern Europe is not clear. A substantial amount of information is available about Spanish and, to a lesser extent, Swiss practice. However, the little that has been published on early-modern Dutch recruiting is based on evidence from the Thirty Years' War period and after, even from the eighteenth-century. The exact recruitment methods used in early-modern France are 'very difficult' to determine, and remain 'obscure' and 'unclear', as specialist studies admit. The same is true of the recruiting practices of the Venetian republic and of the landsknechts. Existing studies make a number of assertions as to what sort of men 'joined up', but do not examine how they did so. All these works have a general's, colonel's, or government official's perspective on recruiting: they show how captains were obtained, not men; they examine the issuing of commissions and exchanging of contracts, and the payment and transportation of new recruits, rather than the actual process of how men came to enlist in the first place. This is not intended as criticism, for the focus

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1 Redlich, Enterpriser, pt. 1, ch. 6 and typical of his approach to the study of mercenaries.
on the events before and after recruits were actually secured reflects, on the whole, the available sources. However, these works are not a satisfactory basis for generalised conclusions about the means by which manpower was obtained: they deal with the first, not second, set of interactions.

Just as their employers began with the three options of commission, contract and conscription, so captains, in turn, had three methods to choose between or to balance. They could obtain men by making them serve, or by asking through a public appeal, or by using personal connections. As seen in chapter 2, early-modern states generally preferred to use soldiers who had elected (even if influenced by circumstances) to serve, but that, when numbers of volunteers ran short, they used conscription. This was, however, only ever a recourse available to governments (whether de facto or de jure) or to those acting with their authority. For the English and Welsh captains in question, compulsion was seldom an alternative. They were obliged to rely on convincing, rather than constraining, their countrymen yet rarely had the option of appealing to them publicly. The official position of their government meant that, for most of the period, mercenary captains in fact had no options: only personal influence was open to them.

Compulsion

In 1562-63, prisoners from Newgate jail were sent to serve their time in the beleaguered Newhaven garrison, while pirates were released from the Devon county gaol on condition they manned the galleys which patrolled the estuary of the Seine. Many historians seem to assume this established a pattern for the rest of the reign of Elizabeth I; most or all of the English troops who served on the Continent until the queen's death in 1603, especially, but not only, the queen's own soldiers, are depicted as unwilling conscripts from 'the dregs of society'. This is misleading. As already seen in chapter 2, such

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* Above, ch. 3, p. 96.
* APC, 7:136; CSPFor., 5:422, 425, 498, nos. 966, 976, 1139-40; Amos Miller, *Sir Henry Killigrew: Elizabethan Soldier and Diplomat* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1963), 8, 84.
views largely reflect general but distorted assumptions about the nature of
sixteenth-century soldiers, and the practices used to recruit for royal service
and/or in Ireland and Scotland.

For most of the period, mercenaries' actions were really or nominally
illegal: when England was at peace, mercenary captains could not conscript.
Even in 1562-63 and between 1585-1604 when the English state was at war
and 'impressment' could be used by mercenaries, the ranks of companies in
foreign, as opposed to royal, employ were rarely filled by conscripts.

Impressment to 1600

There is no evidence that any of the mercenaries in Huguenot pay in 1562-
63 were conscripts or criminals. The episode of the Newgate prisoners took
place after the mercenaries were replaced by a royal army. The real pattern
established in this war was that of soldiers of the queen, frequently raised by
impressment, serving alongside mercenaries, who generally had not been.
Thus, in 1585-87, although it is difficult to be categorical because companies
moved, sometimes backwards and forwards, between the States-General's
and the queen's pay, it is certain that the majority of recruits raised for the
United Provinces were volunteers, whereas most of those raised for royal
service were conscripts.

Of the 2,500 men pressed in 12 counties for Norreys's expeditionary
force in 1585 the captains of 1,900 can be identified: all were in Elizabeth's
and none in the States' pay. Thus, at least 60 per cent of the 4,121 English
soldiers in the twenty-eight queen's-pay companies mustered at Utrecht in
September 1585 were conscripts. In contrast, at least 90 per cent of 3,244
men mustered in 22 companies 'at the charges of the States' were 'voluntary
men'. Indeed, Norreys in his accounts simply calls his States'-pay bands
'voluntary companies', so clearly were mercenaries identified with voluntary
recruits at this point. However, the numerical significance of volunteers in
Norreys's force is not brought out in standard historical narratives.

7 See the list in CSPFor., 19:691.
8 Muster certificates, 14 Sep. 1585, ibid., 20:25-26. The 300 conscripts shipped from Harwich
in Aug. 1585 may have been destined for Dutch, not royal, pay: Adams, 'Puritan Crusade', 16.
E.g., Motley, United Netherlands, 1:324.
Table 2. States'-Pay Companies to be Raised, 1586

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Captain's Name</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Counties to be recruited from</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. A'barrow, Edward</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>APC, 14.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Audley, Lord</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Dorset, Somerset and Wiltshire</td>
<td>Ibid., 107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Bould, Richard</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Lancashire</td>
<td>Ibid., 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Carey, Edward</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Norfolk and Suffolk</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Clarke, Henry</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Bedfordshire</td>
<td>Ibid., 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Croft, Edward</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Herefordshire</td>
<td>Ibid., 110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Dennys, Maurice</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Dorset, Hertfordshire and Middlesex, Staffordshire and Warwickshire</td>
<td>Ibid., 107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Digby, George</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Buckinghamshire, Derbyshire, Staffordshire and Warwickshire</td>
<td>Ibid., 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Dyer, Alexander</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>Ibid., 110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Farmer, George</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Huntingdon and Northampton</td>
<td>Ibid., 65-66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Gachill, John</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Hertfordshire and City of London</td>
<td>Ibid., 119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Harcourt, Michael</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire</td>
<td>Ibid., 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Hitchcock, Robert</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Buckinghamshire</td>
<td>Ibid., 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Latham, John</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Middlesex</td>
<td>Ibid., 110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Lee, John</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>(To be embarked from London)</td>
<td>Ibid., 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Moore, George</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>Ibid., 110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Paulet, Hamlet</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Berkshire and Southampton</td>
<td>Ibid., 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Sampson, Anthony</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>Ibid., 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Sherley, Sir Thomas</td>
<td>[500*]</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Ibid., 74-75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Stanton, Thomas</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Warwickshire</td>
<td>Ibid., 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Tanner, Roger</td>
<td>[150*]</td>
<td>Buckinghamshire [and ...?]</td>
<td>CSPFor., 20:667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Tatton, William</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Cheshire</td>
<td>APC, 14.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Tracy, Sir John</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Gloucestershire, Oxfordshire and Warwickshire</td>
<td>Ibid., 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. [Unnamed]</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Berkshire and Oxfordshire</td>
<td>Ibid., 55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 5,300

Notes:
* No strength listed; it was 500 strong on arrival in the Netherlands: BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 99r)
* His company is later listed as having an establishment of 150: ARH, AJO 2943, n.f.

The majority of men raised for the States-General in 1586 were, again, recruited by voluntary means. Of the 24 captains authorised to raise men for States' pay in the spring of 1586 (listed in table 2), only two used compulsion to get recruits: Sir Thomas Sherley drew on conscripts as well as volunteers and Captain Roger Tanner's band, too, was at least partially pressed. To be sure, Croft, Moore and Stanton never recruited their companies (perhaps because they could not get sufficient volunteers) and there are no figures for

the actual, as opposed to nominal strength for several companies. However, 2,858 men are known to have been in the bands of the licensed captains in the autumn of 1586, 434 of them Sherley’s and Tanner’s men. Even if as many as three-quarters of the latter were pressed, still only 11 per cent of the total had been raised by compulsion. Although evidence of some cases of impressment may not have survived it is clear that the overwhelming majority of mercenaries in 1586 were voluntarily recruited -- and this in the year that saw the greatest number of English and Welsh troops in Dutch pay. As one mercenary captain from Norfolk declared, it was ‘most sure ... that persuading without pressing will carry most and make the best soldiers’.  

Into the 1590s there are still only occasional instances of mercenary captains recruiting by impressment. In late 1593, for example, the English government was happy to accept Sir Francis Vere’s arrangement to raise a mercenary regiment for States’ service and, when Vere was unable to raise by voluntary recruitment all of the 1,500 men he had been commissioned to raise, granted him permission to fill the gaps by impressment. One hundred men were pressed in Hertfordshire, for example, in January and February 1594; but Vere’s regiment was recruited in fourteen counties and there is no indication of any impressment in most of them, so the regiment was evidently composed of volunteers, as well as (if not more than) conscripts.

Once Vere’s regiment was in the Netherlands, moreover, there is no indication that its strength was maintained by using impressment, but good evidence it did so by voluntary enlistments. Pressed men were sent across the narrow seas in subsequent years, but to reinforce royal companies, whether auxiliary or cautionary. To take two examples from opposite ends of the troop-raising spectrum: the twelve men ‘Prested out of the Hundreds of Edwinstythe and Odsey’ (Herts.) in 1596 were sent to the royal garrison of the cautionary town of Flushing. Equally, all of the nine hundred vagabonds impressed in London in 1597 were to serve in the royal expedition in Picardy

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12 'Bandes present in the campe before Zutphen', 26 Sep. 1586, pr. in E. M. Tenison, Elizabethan England: Being the History of this Country 'In Relation to All Foreign Princes', 12 vols. in 13 (Royal Leamington Spa: privately printed, 1933-60), 6:204-5; 'State and paye of the Camps before Zutphen', Bodl., MS Tanner 78, f. 160r.


or in the queen’s-pay garrison of Ostend. Although 350 men were pressed for Sir Francis Vere in April 1594, they were to make up losses in those of his auxiliary companies that had been detached to Essex’s army to Normandy and were returning. Contrariwise, when twelve months later Vere wrote to Burghley to facilitate raising a similar number of recruits for his States’-pay regiment, they were to be volunteers. In September 1596 the Privy Council instructed the authorities around London to raise four-to-five hundred men for Vere’s regiment, but specifically required them ‘to take up and impress such ... voluntary men as shalbe willinge of themselves to serve, but not to take any man by force or compulsion’.

A draft of two thousand conscripts was shipped in January 1599, after the States-General had taken over payment of all the English troops in the Netherlands. However, they had been raised and were sent under the terms of an agreement concluded before the handover of the auxiliaries to the States-General’s pay and authority, to replace an equivalent number of English veterans in the (then) queen’s forces who were being redeployed to Ireland. These pressed men were actually raised as royal troops. The mercenary units continued to be recruited voluntarily. Extensive recruiting took place in 1600, ‘especially in and about London’, to prepare for, and then to replace the losses in, the Nieuwpoort campaign, but enlistment was unforced and one courtier recorded that Elizabeth herself insisted that there should be ‘no Pressing of Men’.

Impressment post-1600

Thus, occasions when mercenaries were conscripted were exceptional. The best known were after 1600 and occurred during the celebrated siege of the vital port of Ostend by the Spanish (1601-4). This was after the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1598, after which the English forces outside Flushing and Brill were

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19 Edward Raban, Resolutions (St Andrews: 1622), sig. E1; Whyte to Sidney, 5 July 1600, Sydney Papers, 2:205. See pp. 239-39 below, for the voluntary recruiting in 1600.
paid by the Dutch and were substantially under their authority -- in other words, were all mercenaries. However, Ostend was important strategically, as a good port; and psychologically, as the last enclave of the Dutch republic in Flanders, against which the Spanish were concentrating most of their resources. The garrison in 1601 included an English contingent which the States-General reinforced with the bulk of the English companies then in their pay, appointing Sir Francis Vere as city's governor -- thus, English as well as Dutch prestige was at stake. For both these reasons the city had to be held if at all possible; exceptional measures were justified to ensure that it did not fall.

'Rogues, vagabonds, idle, dissolute and masterless persons were impressed impartially, together with men of honesty and reputation, clapped into red or blue cassocks and shipped across to Ostend'. So wrote the preeminent historian of the British army, Sir John Fortescue, in an unattributed paraphrase of the great nineteenth-century historian John Lothrop Motley's declaration: 'Detachment after detachment, the soldiers came as fast as the London prisons could be swept and the queen's press-gang perform its office.' Both descriptions are memorable -- too memorable, because both have greatly influenced subsequent perceptions of mercenary recruiting, but both misrepresent its reality in the long term. Ostend was unique. The city endured an epic three-year siege: contemporaries dubbed it the 'new Troy'. Its garrison suffered very severe casualties, their circumstances being often desperate, so that desperate measures were needed to ensure the city did not fall to the Spanish.

Initial losses were heavy, so a thousand men were 'ound by an urgent levy in the city of London in the first week of July, 1601. Due to the 'speyall cause of service' it was undertaken by a virtual press-gang which picked up 'idle, vagrant and masterless men' and other 'loose people' from 'ale-

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20 See PC to Lord Mayor of London, and to the Commissioners of Musters for Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex and Kent, 7 and 21 Jul. 1601, APC, 32:22, 78; Vere to PC, 28 Jun. 1601, pr. Dalton, 1:69-70
21 Fortescue, 1:167; Motley, United Netherlands, 4:69.
22 Francis Vere's eyewitness account, supplemented by accounts of some of his junior officers are available in a modern edition, see Vere Commentaries, 166-210. There is no authoritative study of the siege -- see Belleruche, passim, for a detailed narrative.
23 E. g., Vere Commentaries, 182,186, 202-3; Vere to SG, 29 Sep. 1601 and 14 Feb. 1602, ARA, SG 4900-II, 4902-I, n. f.
howses, innes’ and even from prisons. Just two weeks later another levy, of two thousand men, was ordered, for though ‘the ... number of men that have bin already sent will ... be of great advantage for defence [of] the beseeged towne ... the forces of the enemy encreasinge the supply must likewise be augmented’. Eight hundred men were raised in London and its environs and, since the earlier levy had shown there was around the capital a ‘great number of idle persons of able body that ... live by shiftinge and bad meanes’, they were targeted and picked up by another sudden sweep of ‘alehowses, innes, and ... the streates’, in the city and neighbouring counties. However, these methods seem to have been restricted to London and Kent; there are no equivalent instructions for the musters in Essex, Suffolk and Norfolk, which supplied nine hundred of the two thousand men. Moreover, when Vere discovered that ‘there had been great abuses in the levying’ with simpletons, boys and men over sixty among those sent over, he was ‘very careful to send them back again’.

Impressment was used again, in April 1602, to help raise troops for Prince Maurice’s planned campaign to relieve, or at least ease the pressure on, Ostend. That the queen agreed to bear the expense of this levy, rather than the States-General, shows how seriously she and her ministers viewed the situation; the speed with which the press was carried out and the strong-arm tactics used (which provoked critical comment at the time) likewise indicate the sense of crisis motivating them.

These were, however, all very much emergency measures, to ensure that English numbers were above critical mass at a critical time; recruiting of mercenaries by compulsion looms larger in the historiography of the siege of Ostend than it should, for English captains still recruited large numbers of volunteers throughout. In 1601, for example, even while men were being

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24 PC to Lord Mayor, 20 July 1601, APC, 32:73. The expenses of this levy were paid by the States-General: ibid., 69.
25 PC to JPs of Middlesex, Kent and Surrey, 19 July 1601, APC, 32:74-75; and see idem to Commissioners for Musters, 21 Jul. 1601, ibid., 77-79; Wigmore to Robert Cecil, 27 Jul. 1601, HMCS, 11:302; Elizabeth to Lord Cobham, 20 Jul. 1601, SRO, D593/S/470/5.
26 Holcroft to Robert Cecil, 1 Aug. 1601, HMCS, 11:315.
press-ganged in London and its suburbs, Captains William Crofts and John Bingham were also recruiting in the city, but raising companies of volunteers (each two hundred strong). In the case of Crofts, 'vagrant able persons and masterless men' were arrested and given the option of enlisting; only those 'willing to serve in the warres' were taken, but as they faced being 'whipped and corrected' if they refused, they were only nominally volunteers. These virtual conscripts seem to have been only a proportion, however, of Crofts's rank-and-file, while Bingham's company was entirely voluntary. John Ridgeway was in the process of raising a volunteer company, while Edward Cecil supplemented the pressed men he conducted to Ostend with fifty volunteers he had recruited on his own initiative.

In 1602, it was initially intended to raise approximately six thousand men of which most were to be raised voluntarily. In the end, three thousand men were pressed, mostly in London and Kent, but recourse was only had to coercion after almost three weeks of conspicuous efforts to persuade men to enlist by public appeal. Even then, compulsion operated in parallel with widespread attempts at persuasion, which were evidently successful, for in the end about 1,500 volunteers were successfully recruited -- not as many as had been hoped but a large number in a short space of time (and others may have crossed to the Netherlands later in the summer).

Voluntary recruitment thus continued throughout the siege, alongside impressment, and also when no compulsory levies were taking place: a draft of volunteers is known to have gone over from Kent in March 1603, for example. In addition, through the whole of the siege period payments were made by the States-General to English captains for recruiting expenses -- both for horse (whose ranks were never filled by conscripts) and for foot, for

31 Francis Vere to van Aerssen, 13 April 1602, ARA, SG 4902-II, n.f.; PC to Popham, and to Cobham, 7 Apr. 1602, APC, 32:487; PC to Cobham, 25 Apr. 1602, SRO, D593/S/4/70/6; Chamberlain to Carleton, 26 Apr. and 8 May, 1602 Chamberlain Letters, nos. 45-46, 1:139, 143.
33 Summary of levies, 1591-1603, SRO, D593/S/4/109. Unusually, no captain is listed, which suggests that the volunteers were a draft of men for various companies, perhaps raised by the recruiting parties that regularly operated in the country in wintertime: see below, pp. 239-42.
times when no presses were being conducted. It is certain, therefore, that recruiting continued even when conscription had ceased. Thus, even during the desperate days of the siege of Ostend, conscription was one, rather than the, method used by mercenaries to raise manpower.

This has been obscured because, since levies were undertaken at the command of the queen's government and utilised the administrative process of the Tudor state, impressment of mercenaries leaves a more impressive documentary trail than their voluntary recruitment; the former is noted in government records, the latter is not. From the lieutenant papers of Kent, for example, one could deduce that between the takeover of royal troops by the Dutch in 1598 and the Treaty of London in 1604 only pressed men were sent from the county to the Netherlands (save for a small number in 1603), and that none went in 1599-1600. Only men levied from Kent (for the royal reinforcement of 1598 and for service at Ostend) appear in the records, except for a group of 'voluntaryes' who are only mentioned because they accompanied a draft of 'vagrantes', probably to the cautionary towns, in March 1603. However, volunteers were raised for Dutch service in 1600. They are absent from the official records and known only through chance references in private correspondence.

After the Treaty of London, impressment was no longer a recruiting option for mercenary captains. From 1605 many members of the recalcitrant Graham clan were forcibly removed from the Anglo-Scottish borders, where they had refused to accept the realities of a new British monarchy, but though some were exported to the Netherlands, most were sent to Ireland -- 130 were sent across the North Sea, but to the royal garrisons of the cautionary towns of Flushing and Brill. This famous episode is an example, not of mercenary, but of government recruiting being used for social control. That voluntary enlistment meant just that in the years after 1604 is made

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34 SG orders for payments, 1602-3, ARA, SG 12503, ff. 373v, 391v, CAan. 879, ff. 34v, 39r; and RSG, 12:187. Other records for payments of recruiting expenses for this period survive, but as they are imprecise as to date, it is not certain whether they coincided with levies or not.
35 Adams, 'Puritan Crusade', 16.
36 Compare SRO, D593/S/4/10/9 and D593/S/4/70/5-6 with Whyte to Sidney, 5 Jul. 1600, Sydney Papers, 2:205.
clear by the experience of Sir Thomas Mewtys when raising a new company in 1606. His agents combed London for vagabonds and had those they found arrested -- but when, in jail, they were given the option of enlisting, 'not one would willingly go' and thus the exercise was fruitless.\footnote{Mewtys to Salisbury, 9 Sep. 1606, \textit{HMCS}, 18:277.}

To sum up, impressment could not be used in twenty-nine of the forty-nine years in question and, even in the other twenty, all evidence points mercenaries using it only during two brief and exceptional periods: in 1586, when the commitment to open war with Spain stretched the manpower resources of the kingdom; and in 1600-3, to maintain the strength of English units during the emergency of the siege of Ostend. Even at those times, impressment was an extraordinary and complementary method of recruiting for Dutch, and was never used to recruit for French, service. Voluntary recruiting was the rule, not the exception among mercenary companies.

\textbf{‘At the Sound of the Drum’?}

If a captain had to rely on voluntary enlistments, how was he to obtain them? The obvious way to get men to volunteer for military service was to broadcast the need for men and make soldiering seem attractive (or at least less unattractive than other careers) by various means of public display.

The procedure was similar throughout western Europe. A captain would be issued with letters patent which typically left him free to name his own junior and non-commissioned officers, but which often specified where he could recruit. He would have a flag (the ensign, or colours) made for his company and appoint its subalterns, NCOs, drummers and so on. A recruiting party would be formed from their number, together, if possible with some veterans, if the captain had any in his service. This party would then be sent out with the company colours to the authorised villages and towns, whose local justices were usually obliged to cooperate. They would then make a public appeal to the populace: the colours would be unfurled and musicians would play to attract attention while, as their fellows literally waved the flag and beat the drum, the veterans would tell stories of glory and buy rounds of alcohol. The end result (hopefully) was that volunteers would come forward; the terms and conditions to which they ‘signed up’ varied, but the general
procedure outlined was more-or-less standard in most European countries throughout the sixteenth century. The very phrase 'to sound [or beat] the drum' was recognised short-hand for 'mustering soldiers' -- as one English veteran observed, this 'levying of Souldiers ... by the sound of the Drumme ... is generally used over the most partes of Christendome'. These techniques were used both to raise new companies and to supplement existing units. For example, the captains of some English royal companies in the Netherlands sent home junior officers with the company colours, indicating an intention to raise men by public display and popular appeal.

The Limitations on Advertisement

English and Welsh mercenary captains were only rarely able to raise men by the standard method of 'sounding the drum' because mercenaries were able to recruit openly only between 1585 and 1604. As a result they were obliged to use alternative methods of recruiting (examined in chapter 8).

Up to 1585, official prohibitions on recruiting circumscribed captains' actions, even after the regime came down on the side of private-enterprise support in 1577. It was still necessary for troops to 'slip over to Flanders quietly' right up to the negotiations that culminated in the Treaty of Nonsuch because, generally, when mustering of mercenaries became too obvious, foreign ambassadors complained. The Privy Council was usually sensitive to such complaints and acted against those responsible, such as Thomas Morgan in 1572 and Edward Chester and his captains in 1573 (as discussed

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40 Markham, *Epistles of Warre*, 30. For examples, see BL, Add. MS 38033, f. 126r; BN, MS Fr. 3220, f. 81r; *HMCS*, 2:119, no. 332; *CSP For.*, 11:358, no. 871; 16:4, no. 4; Norfolk Record Office, Norwich City Records, 13a/6, f. 1r; *APC*, 32:487; *KL*, 7:xxi; no. 3183, 8:429; Falls, 51; Redlich, *Enterpriser*, 118; Mallett & Hale, 324, 489; Zwitzer, *Militie van den Staat*, 42; and the instances of mercenary recruiting examined below.

41 Nolan, 'Militarization', 398 n.29, citing 'frequent warrants' in *APC* (but NB that Nolan assumes 'ancient' means 'veteran', when of course it is in fact an alternative spelling of 'ensign', the title of the officer who carried the company colours, as well as an alternative term for those colours). The practice continued into James's reign: Browne to Sidney, 20 Dec. 1606, *HMCO*, 3:335.


43 E.g., idem, 12 Apr. 1578 and 11 Jun. 1580, Lefevre, 1:257, no. 414 and 2:30, no. 60; and see above, in ch. 3, pp. 125-30.
in chapter 3); the gentlemen who gathered ships and soldiers in Devon and Cornwall in 1577; and the unknown men who assembled at Sandwich in late spring 1579 to take ship across the channel. At times, of course, such action was nominal, as with Morgan and, on the whole, Chester. However, even nominal conciliar action could restrict captains’ freedom to meet foreign contracts. For example, in the winter of 1580 the Privy Council refused the States-General’s request for permission to recruit 1,500 men, thanks to the efforts of Bernadino de Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador. He noted that, as the English ‘wanted to avoid offending Philip II, if only openly’ they had proscribed captains from gathering men, though he believed the 1,500 men would go in small groups and still arrive, even if late. The captains may not have have been prevented from meeting their contracts by the government response to Mendoza’s complaints, but their actions were circumscribed and their programme delayed. Even if the crown only acted on some occasions this inculcated captains with the need for discretion: which could, at the least, buy valuable time free of foreign agents’ complaints. The paucity of direct evidence about how captains got their men testifies to the circumspection with which they were obliged to act.

After peace was made with Spain, recruiting by the Dutch was not prohibited but, once again, it could not be conducted openly. The demand of ‘the Archdukes’ (Albert of Austria and his wife Isabella, the infante of Spain, joint-viceroyes of the Spanish Netherlands from May 1599) that English and Welshmen be forbidden to serve the Dutch was refused by James and his chief minister, Salisbury, despite the risk of a breakdown in the negotiations. In order to obtain peace they were obliged to permit all the king’s subjects to serve the Spaniards, too: he agreed by Article 12 of the Treaty of London to ‘forbid none to any side’. Spain was still regarded as hostile and hence its agents were not allowed to recruit openly in England -- but therefore, in order


** Mendoza to Philip II, 28 Feb. and 20 Mar. 1580, Lefèvre, 1:759, 771, nos. 1243, 1335.

* E.g., de Guaras wrote to Alba on 16 Feb. 1573 that ‘de ingleses no se entiende que vayan ninguno a Olanda’ (KL, no. 2540, 6:661). It was only a few weeks later that the Spanish began to get firm reports of Morgan’s and Chester’s recruiting.

** It is, of course, also due partly to the generally haphazard survival of private records from this period; but in addition to occasional attempts by the regime to blur and obfuscate its complicity in recruiting e.g., Trim, ‘Normandy Campaign’, 74-75, 80.
to maintain England's nominal neutrality, neither were those of the States-
General. In consequence, after 1604, although mercenary captains
received some covert assistance from royal ministers, at Spanish insistence
they were specifically forbidden to recruit any longer by 'stryking of Drummes
and displaying of Ensignes'. Such methods were reserved by the king 'only
to those as were to levy men for his own service, not permitting it within any
of his dominions to the use of any other prince or state whatsoever'. At least
one recruiting party, trying to find men in Hampshire in 1605 by 'means of
beating drums and displaying colours', was arrested. In the winter of 1605-
6, Dutch ambassador Caron was 'denied to levy any new companies' -- a
necessary concomitant to refusing Spanish requests to raise 20-25
companies in England and Ireland. It is true that the archdukes' ambassador
complained that the United Provinces had actually already raised troops in
England; however, they had done so (at least nominally) without royal
knowledge and the Privy Council had made life difficult for the captains in
question by refusing to to smooth their path in the localities with letters of the
sort it had regularly issued up to 1603.

In short, 'beating the drum' was an option for mercenary captains only
between 1585 and 1604, when England was openly allied to a Protestant
state. In 1585, an agent for the captain of one of the new companies being
raised for States' pay recruited about twenty volunteers in Shrewsbury, after
he 'made there proclamation'; the following year George Digby planned to
raise his 300-strong States'-pay band similarly. Recruiting around London
in 1596 was presumably by public appeal, since it was undertaken at the
crown's command by government officers, but (as noted above) they could
not compel men. In 1600 Elizabeth gave permission 'that the Drum shall

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48 Count d'Arenberg to Archdukes, 3 and 13 Jul. 1603, Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne
sur les affaires des Pays-Bas au XVIIe siècle, 1, ed. Henri Lonchay, Joseph Cuvelier (Brussels:
49 D'Arenberg to Archduke Albert, 8 Jul. 1603, Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne, 1:157, no. 336;
Robert Cecil to Edmondes, 11 May 1605, BL, Stowe MS 168, f. 17r; Southampton to Robert
Cecil, 29 Jun. 1605, HMCS, 17:286.
50 Robert Cecil to Thomas Edmondes, 12 and 27 Feb. 1606 HMCS 18:50-51 62; Clement
Edmondes to idem, 6 Mar. 1606, BL, Stowe MS 168, f. 356v.
1 W. A. Leighton, ed., 'Early Chronicles of Shrewsbury, 1372-1603', Trans. Shropshire
Archaeological and Natural History Soc. 3 (1880): 303; PC to Shrewsbury, 30 Apr. 1586, in
'Papers Relating to the Derbyshire Musters temp Q. Elizabeth', ed. W. A. Carrington, Jnl of the
Derbyshire Archaeological and Natural History Soc. 17 (1895): 9-10.
sownd’ in order that the Dutch could ‘reinforce the English Troopes ... with Volunteire', letters being sent ‘to some shires to assist the captens by the drum’ in raising ‘voluntaries’; and in 1602, when Sir Francis Vere was ‘soliciting for men, he sent his forerunners before him, who came downe into the country ... to take up voluntaries ... with drumming and all they could do’, in a procedure authorised by the Privy Council. Such methods were probably also used on other occasions: for example, Captain Edward Reid sent home his subaltern, Richard Lovelace, in the winter of 1602-3 to recruit his company up to strength. Given that Lovelace was Reid’s ensign, and the practice, noted above, of officers of this rank in royal companies being sent home to recruit, it seems probable that Lovelace was to beat the drum and show the flag to obtain men -- literally to drum up recruits.

It must, however, be emphasised that only between the Treaties of Nonsuch and London were mercenary recruiters able to make widespread use of public displays and general appeals to raise men. Thus, while they did on occasions utilise these standard techniques of voluntary recruitment, such methods must have been supplementary for most of the period, due to the restrictions under which they operated. Indeed, it is probable that these methods were supplementary even between 1585-1604. To be sure, Reid’s dispatch of his ensign back home was typical of recruiting practice in this period, but, regardless of how Ensign Lovelace got his men, it is unlikely that most mercenary recruiters relied on beating the drum. Raising men in Wales and England was common practice for the Anglo-Welsh companies in Dutch employ for most of the period, and the evidence suggests that similar procedures were used throughout, with no disjunctures in 1585 or 1604.

Continuity of Home Recruiting

English companies on the continent recruited at home, especially during the autumn and winter months, from a very early stage. As has been seen, Thomas Morgan and Edward Chester returned home in autumn 1572 only to return in spring 1573, but each was raising a new regiment rather than bring-

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54 SG order for payment, 6 Dec. 1602, ARA, SG 12503, f. 391v.
ing an existing force up to strength. Chester’s appointment as Colonel of all English troops in Dutch employ at the end of 1573 was on condition that he return in spring 1574 with arms and reinforcements. This he did, having raised new companies and new troops for existing companies in England during the winter. Thus, his recruiting in 1574 was actually to restore and supplement his existing force, not to raise a new one.56

This pattern was to be repeated throughout the Dutch Revolt. It is not always clear just how captains did their winter recruiting and, again, there is more evidence from the end of the period than the beginning. There is sufficient evidence, though, to have a sense of the procedures in use and certainly there is no indication that they changed simply because open war with Spain allowed for overt recruiting in England, or because this option was lost. The sense is rather of continuity over the period as a whole.

In 1575, Captain Gainsford’s company had an establishment strength of one hundred men, but at the end of the campaigning season this was increased to one hundred and fifty: Edward Chester had raised forty-three ‘nieuwe soldaten’ for Gainsford in England, who arrived in Holland in November.55 Captains continued to use agents to raise reinforcements to the end of the period -- for example, Thomas Poyntz (himself a veteran) brought over fifty-four men for John White in the winter of 1606 or 1607.57 Captains also used members of their units, instead of or as well as using agents and, again, did so right through the period. Edmund Bishop sent a gentleman volunteer ‘to England to take up men for the replenishing of my company’ in summer 1580; while veterans of a horse band (by then in royal, but formerly in Dutch pay) were sent to England to bring it up to strength in early 1591.58 Recruiting for the States’ Scottish units was usually done by their lieutenants, ensigns and sergeants.59 When Vere sent home several officers of his mercenary regiment in the spring of 1595 to raise replacements for their bands he was, then, simply following standard practice.60 It continued into the

55 See above, in ch. 3, pp. 125, 128.
56 See the muster documents in ARA, CO liassen 3 and 37 (both n.f.).
57 White to Poyntz, 8 Feb. 1606 [n.s.?], KB, HS 132.G.27, n.f.
60 Vere to Burghley, 11 Apr. 1595, L&A, 6:66, no. 9
seventeenth century. As well as the recruiting parties dispatched to England by Vere in 1600 and 1602 and Reid's ensign seconded home in 1602-3, Geoffrey Holcroft's lieutenant, Roger Thomson, was sent to England in early 1606, while Michael Everett 'sent my Ensign to England to get me some men' in the autumn of that year. The dispatch by an unnamed English colonel of a sergeant 'to London for a supplie of men' in 1629, albeit a late example, is indicative of the continuity in recruiting practice.\(^{61}\)

Alternatively, captains might take personal responsibility for their own recruiting. This sometimes happened in summer -- several captains went to England in June 1580, seeking to reinforce their existing companies\(^{62}\) -- but it usually took place before a campaign season began or after it ended. In the winter of 1580-81, Thomas Morgan raised four hundred men in England for his contingent serving in Tournai.\(^{63}\) Captain Edwards went home, probably as head of a recruiting party, in autumn 1582; that same winter Yorke took '4 or 5 gentlemen' on an English trip, apparently to recruit.\(^{64}\) At the end of the summer of 1584, four captains of Morgan's regiment returned to England to recruit men for their companies which would be in garrison in Antwerp over the winter, and shipped 2-300 men over.\(^{65}\) Other English captains, when on trips home over the winter period, combined attending to personal affairs with finding recruits to bring their companies up as close to establishment strength as possible, though details are not known.\(^{66}\) Indeed, since captains (again, throughout the period) commonly visited England during the autumn and winter months to attend to 'private business' and since arrangements for their companies were, as seen in chapter 6, very much a personal obligation, it is likely that recruiting was often part of their activities on such visits home.\(^{67}\)

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\(^{62}\) Mendoza to Philip II, 11 Jun. 1580, Lefèvre, 2:30, no. 60.

\(^{63}\) Morgan to Epinoy, 17 Dec. 1580, **CSP**For., 13:517-18, no. 518.


\(^{65}\) See app. 1, below: sources cited in p. 328 n.90.

\(^{66}\) E.g., William Barker in 1591 (Norreys to SG, Apr. 1591, ARA, SG 5882-I, no. 101); Nicholas Parker in 1597 (Maurice to Robert Cecil, 10 Mar. 1597 n.s., PRO, SP 84/54, f. 101r).

\(^{67}\) E.g., by John Norreys, John Price and Edmund Huntley, autumn 1582 (Anjou's letterbook, 11 Oct. 1582, ARA, SG 11095); Thomas Wilson, winter 1583/84 (Chimay to Walsingham, 7 Dec. 1583, n.s., CSP**For.**, 18:241, no. 274); both Veres, 1595-96 (Markham, **Fighting Veres**, 216); and Captain Rockwood, spring 1606 (CS res., 26 Apr. 1606, ARA, RsV 24, p. 145).
Moreover, there are many other instances of recruiting at home in winter where precisely who was responsible is unclear.

In spring 1579 Ralph Cromwell received soldiers from England for his company. In November 1579 new drafts of reinforcements from England arrived in the Prince of Orange's army. Adolphus Meetkerke and both the brothers Vere recruited in England in 1599 (Horace twice); Francis Vere probably did so in the winter of 1600/1; Lord Grey de Wilton likewise in early 1603; Captain Reid, prior to sending his ensign home to recruit in 1602/3, had already obtained eighty-four men in England in the autumn of 1601, and we have already seen how drafts of volunteers from Kent arrived in spring 1603. Nothing changed after the Treaty of London. In 1604 Sir Callisthenes Brooke (who in 1600 had helped to supervise the recruiting of volunteers at the sound of the drum for Sir Francis Vere in south-east England) raised ninety-eight men for his own company. In 1604/5 Sir John Ogle, and in 1606 Captains Sanders and Connock, each had an unknown number of recruits raised in England for their companies. Also in 1606, 193 men were obtained by Colonel Edward Cecil and at least forty by Lieutenant Colonel Sir Hatton Cheek for their respective regiments. The frustration of English officers in Dutch employ in the spring of both 1603 and 1606 when recruits (obtained by unknown agents) arrived late is further evidence of the extent to which they relied on recruiting at home in the 'off season', both during and after the official war with Spain.

In sum, mercenary captains in the Netherlands regularly raised extra men in England in intervals between campaigns, to increase a company's establishment, or more often to bring a company up as close as possible to its establishment. Regardless of whether captains used agents, or parties sent home, or recruited personally, they must have had recourse to methods other than 'sounding the drum' prior to 1585 and subsequent to 1604, while

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58 SG res., 25 Aug. 1580, ARA, SG 3104, f. 86r.
59 Parma to Philip II, 22 Nov. 1579, Lefèvre, 1:714, no. 1243.
60 ARA, CAan. 879, ff. 9v, 11v, 12r, 34v, and SG 12503, ff. 341r, 373v.
61 Above, p. 233. They were possibly part of a larger draft of about 2,000 recruits raised in the late winter of 1603 in preparation for the forthcoming campaign season: Scaramelli to Doge and Senate, 13 Mar. 1603, CSPVen., 9:552, no. 1154.
62 ARA: CAan. 879, ff. 107v, 110r, 112v; SG 12504, f. 80v; RvS 24, pp. 137, 185.
their success both before and after those years indicates no variation in their methods. Nor is there reason to believe that, when raising companies de novo, captains preferred to recruit overtly, from the population at large, for a number of captains raised companies in 1585-86 without beating the drum and Thomas Morgan raised his original contingent of three hundred men in 1572 -- ‘without drum and standard’, as the Spanish ambassador explicitly observed.\(^7^4\) When captains did use those methods, they turned to them for two reasons. Either men were required in relatively large numbers, as in 1585-86 (when they were needed to fuel English intervention) and 1602 (when, because the summer campaign was intended to relieve Ostend, there was an added desperation), or, alternatively, men were needed urgently, as in 1573 (due to the rebels’ grave situation: it may have been Chester’s haste that made his recruiting over-obvious, thus angering the Privy Council) and 1600 (when quick replacements for men lost at Nieuwpoort were needed for the anticipated siege of Dunkirk). As we have seen, however, at such times the normal methods of voluntary recruitment were not abandoned, but rather were augmented by additional means: as in 1602, when conscription was used to supplement voluntary recruitment. The overt methods used by Vere that year to obtain volunteers might similarly have been a corollary to normal, discreet practice at a moment of great need. After all, Norreys in 1578 was able to muster a mostly new force of nearly 1,700 men discreetly.\(^7^5\) It is reasonable to conclude that even when raising large drafts, open, public recruiting methods were always supplementary, not standard.

**Conclusion**

There is little firm evidence of how the Anglo-Welsh companies in Dutch service recruited volunteers, but they did so consistently -- both for new units and to maintain established units at effective strength -- in spite of the need for circumspection. The numbers fielded between 1585 and 1604, when the mercenary captains were able to recruit by showing the flag and beating the

\(^7^4\) De Guaras to Alva, 24 May 1572, KL, no. 2409, 6:414: ‘sin atambor y bandera’.

\(^7^5\) Not only is there no evidence of beating the drum (to which Spanish agents were sensitive), but Churchyard, *Description*, 67, noted that at Rijmenam were ‘some English Gentlemen, with such bandes as they could happen upon’ (emphasis supplied), which implies that recruiting could not be carried out with much publicity.
drum are impressive, but they are equalled by those raised during the years when overt appeals to the population were not possible. Norreys in 1578 is a good example of this for the period up to 1585, but the renewed need for discretion after 1604 did not affect the captains’ ability to raise men. In 1606 the Archdukes complained that as many men from England and Wales were passing into Dutch employ as before the Treaty of London. This was not simply exaggerating for effect: in 1607-8 the number of Anglo-Welsh troops in the States-General’s service reached their all-time high.\textsuperscript{76} It is no wonder that at precisely this time a British agent in Brussels reported that the English mercenaries in Dutch employ were regarded as a major obstacle by the Archdukes.\textsuperscript{77}

There are two major conclusions to be drawn from this examination of the role of conscription and advertisement in supplying recruits to the Anglo-Welsh mercenary companies. The evidence mostly relates to those in Dutch employ, but is indicative of more general practice. First, there is no question that the English and Welsh mercenaries who fought in Jacob’s wars were, in fact, predominantly English and Welsh. Modern scholars have highlighted assertions in contemporary memoirs that indicate that a typical early-modern army was a veritable ‘Noah’s ark’ of nationalities, so this cannot be taken for granted.\textsuperscript{78} Certainly it is known that units of mercenaries from the British Isles on the early-modern Continent often failed to preserve their original ethnic identity. Scotsmen comprised only 28.46 and 23.35 per cent of the strength of two nominally Scottish regiments in French pay in 1748-49. In each case, Scotsmen constituted the largest single nationality, but these units were hardly truly ‘Scottish’. However, Scottish and Irish forces in the armies of France and Spain in the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries found it extremely difficult to recruit fellow-countrymen, since the British government was hostile to and often actually at war with their employers.\textsuperscript{79} In contrast, although units raised in their soldiers’ nominal homeland often still included

\textsuperscript{74} Edmondes to Robert Cecil, 7 Mar. 1606, HMC\textit{S}, 18:72; see below, in app. 1, p. 338.
\textsuperscript{75} HMC\textit{ Downshire}, 2:40.
\textsuperscript{76} Gruffydd, 14-15 (quoted by, e.g., Hale, \textit{War}, 70); Mallett & Hale, 317, quoting a 16th-cent. Venetian diarist.
\textsuperscript{77} See McCorry, 14-15 (in calculating percentages I have counted as Scots those men whose nationality is given as ‘not stated’, but whom McCorry notes were probably Scottish) et passim. Guy Rowlands, ‘An Army in Exile: Louis XIV and the Irish Forces of James II in France 1691-1698’, \textit{Royal Stuart Paper}, no. 60 (2001): 15-17.
foreigners, their proportion was very small -- for example, just 2.78 per cent and 3.51 per cent of two French foot companies on garrison duty in the south of France in the summer of 1567.  

The English and Welsh mercenaries of 1562 to 1610 never had the problem of being unable to recruit at home and they were therefore able to preserve their ethnic integrity. Units in Huguenot employ generally served only briefly, partly because most of the individual civil wars were short-lived, but Champernowne, the one captain known to have sustained his unit in service, recruited its strength in England. And as we have seen, captains in Dutch employ raised new or replacement soldiers at home regularly, if not annually; indeed, the problems involved with transporting men from England to the Netherlands and obtaining recompense for the expense, took up much of their time. It is not surprising, then, that only 51 out of 546 men listed in the five surviving muster rolls of bands already in foreign (in this case Dutch) pay are neither English or Welsh): less than 10 per cent (see table 3). The proportion of native soldiers in companies newly raised in England would have been still higher -- akin to those in the French companies noted above. It is striking that, of the 179 men in van Tryer's company, newly arrived in August 1572, only van Tryer has a Dutch name. The captains were always able to recruit at home and so their troops remained essentially English and Welsh.

Table 3. Percentage of Foreigners in English Companies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company (year)</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Gainsford (1575)</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.69</td>
<td>ARA, CO 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Baud (1575)</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>Ibid., 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Gainsford (1576)</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td>Ibid., 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Williams (1582)</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.74</td>
<td>CSPFor., 16:260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. J. Norreys (1587)</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17.60</td>
<td>ARA, RAGP 1:197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>546</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

81 See below, in app. 6, p. 415.
82 ARA, CO 73, n.f.
The second major conclusion relates to the voluntary nature of those overwhelmingly English and Welsh recruits. The fact that the numbers of men in service were of the same order before, during and after the period of open war indicates that there was little change in the methods of recruitment. Captains looked to recruit at home at all times and there is no sign that they significantly altered their standard recruiting procedures over the whole of the period. Between the treaties of Nonsuch and London some use was made of compulsion, but it was only very limited; while, as Salisbury noted to a colleague in 1605, 'publicq levies' with drum beating and colours flying were 'unusuall in these partes'. When these facts are taken together with the continuity it is evident that, although some members of the English and Welsh mercenary companies that fought in Jacob's wars were products of impressment and advertisement, they were not the main source of the rank and file. The mercenaries' primary method of recruitment is the subject of the next chapter.

83 BL, Stowe MS 168, f. 17r.
CHAPTER EIGHT

RECRUITMENT (II): AFFINITIES

For most of the period 1562-1610 mercenary captains could not compel and thus were obliged to convince English and Welshmen to fight in the wars of Jacob, yet generally without being able openly to solicit them. Captains or their agents would naturally have utilised, whenever possible, familiar and traditional methods of recruiting1 -- especially since most captains had either been or had comrades who had been, in the queen's pay. Impressment and advertisement were only rarely options, but they were not the only model or pattern of recruitment to follow.

The customary way to raise troops was by drawing on the members of aristocratic affinities.2 The crown's increasing preference for new methods has overshadowed the continuing reliance by the nobility and gentry on their affinities as sources of military manpower, especially for volunteer units -- which, of course the mercenaries mostly were. It is important to understand this traditional pattern of recruiting because it provides a valuable context. The generic paucity of evidence for mercenaries' activities is even more of a problem when investigating recruitment because for so many years troop-raising activities were disavowed. As we have seen, English government ministers preferred to be officially unaware of recruiting and mercenaries are in any case always less well-documented in their own state’s archives than national troops. Moreover, the official records of the mercenaries' employers (where these survive) and the reports of private observers abroad, which are all admirable sources for mercenaries' pay, organisation and actions when in the theatre of operations, do not directly bear on recruiting back in England and Wales.

Even where there is little or no direct evidence for how a unit recruited, however, there may be evidence of its composition. This permits deductions about how its soldiers were recruited. This evidence consistently reveals the

1 Compare Potter, War and Government in Picardy, 175-76.

2 It will be recalled that aristocracy and aristocratic are used here inclusively of peers and gentry.
workings of patronage; not just the influence of captains’ patrons but also the personal patronage of the captains and their own allies, kin or clients. When these traces of how recruiting was carried out are read in the context of the traditional importance of recruiting through affinities it becomes apparent that affinities were also vital in the process of raising the mercenary companies in French and Dutch employ.

This chapter’s ultimate argument, then, is that not only captains were drawn from the affinities of prominent Protestants. From the members of the affinities (and the members' own lesser affinities) captains in turn obtained the junior officers and rank-and-file of their companies. Because affinities were the main source of recruits, many of those serving ‘in the ranks’ of the mercenary companies were gentlemen, while the rank-and-file, regardless of their social status, usually had close ties to their leaders. These findings have obvious implications: firstly for the probable cohesion and motivation of the men who fought in Jacob’s wars,⁵ and secondly for how historians assess the attitudes of English and Welshmen to the European wars of religion.

**Tudor Recruiting and Aristocratic Military Power -- Precedent and Practice**

**Context**

From the Hundred Years' Wars right up to Henry VIII's wars with the Valois, the English crown raised armies by concluding indentures with aristocratic captains to supply troops. Thus, contract was the main method of recruiting, though commission was also used, especially by the early Tudors. However, even such notable warrior kings as Henry V or Henry VIII could only build up large armies by contracting with a range of captains, some of whom fielded forces of hundreds of men, but some of whom supplied only themselves and literally a handful of other soldiers. Those 'retinues' too small, or too large, to fit neatly into battle plans, were grouped, or broken down, into companies, which were the tactical units. Only a few leaders of small retinues concluded indentures with the king personally, but there were still many small bands, of gentry and their immediate followers, in the royal armies of the fifteenth and

⁵ Cf. above, p. 27.
sixteenth centuries. The large retinues were rarely monolithic; their leaders mostly fielded the contracted number of soldiers by sub-contracting, in turn, with lesser gentry, who indented to serve in person as men-at-arms, along with a few followers: usually footmen, particularly archers. Gentlemen with contracts, or more often, sub-contracts, to supply such small groups of men often fulfilled their obligations by recourse to their 'manred': servants, friends and tenants.4

How important, though, was this model of recruiting in England and Wales between 1562 and 1610? English reliance on the first two recruiting options began to give way to increased use of impressment in the sixteenth century, partly, most scholars agree, as a result of the growth in army sizes. What Dr Goring calls the 'quasi-feudal system', in which the burden of raising troops fell on great landowners and the chief officers of the royal household, was increasingly inadequate to supply the required manpower. The Tudors therefore began to exploit in new ways the ancient obligation of every man to serve his king. Henry VIII used conscripted militiamen in the 1540s; during Mary's reign the militia was adopted as the basis of all military organisation and recruitment, leading to the establishment of the trained bands -- select militia, from which servants of the aristocracy were generally excluded; and by the end of Elizabeth's reign, the militia was the single greatest source of manpower for royal armies.5 Conscription had become the most important side of the recruiting triangle, greater than contract and commission.

These developments are an important source of the long-standing historiographical commonplace that the Tudors, as a matter of conscious policy, strove to reduce, even to 'tame', the power of the nobility, which led to the end of retaining, and ultimately to recruiting by commission and indenture

4 For examples see the Agincourt roll, BL, Harl. MS 782, ff. 76r, 78r, 80-82, 85r; Simon Adams, 'Baronial Contexts? Continuity and Change in the Noble Affinity, 1400-1600', in The End of the Middle Ages?, ed. John Watts (Stroud: Sutton, 1998), 186; Barry Coward, The Stanleys: Lords Stanley and Earls of Derby 1385-1672, Chetham Soc., 3rd ser., 30 (Manchester: 1983), 97-98. And see Anne Curry, 'English Armies in the Fifteenth Century', in Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War, ed. idem and Michael Hughes (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1994), 41-45; Oman, 323-34; Miller, Henry VIII and the Nobility, 137-41; Fissel, English Warfare, 83-84; Coward, 96-97.

being replaced by the levying of men from the militia. Although this school of thought retains influence, in the last twenty years scholars have emphasised that Henry VII and his successors cooperated with their nobles whose power remained substantial. Nevertheless, the use of indentures in the traditional sense did lapse during Henry VIII’s reign. Furthermore, while retinues continued to exist throughout the century, they were, at least nominally, subject to strict regulation. Nobles required a royal license to retain and, presumably in consequence, the number and particular strengths of retinues appears to have declined in the later sixteenth century. Retaining with royal approval revived as a result of foreign wars and internal instability during the 1540s and 1550s, but this was short-lived -- Elizabeth was less willing than her siblings to issue licenses to retain. Recent scholarship, which focuses on the reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII, demonstrates the enduring significance of noble retinues and affinities under the early Tudors, but it continues to stress the difficulties of maintaining retinues during Elizabeth’s reign if it addresses her reign at all.

The disappearance of a clear scholarly consensus that in the first half of the sixteenth century the English aristocracy lost its native military power, means that evolution is in danger of being located by omission in Elizabeth’s reign. Given the undisputed increased use of conscription by royal armies, it seems natural to conclude that traditional recruiting methods fell out of use in the second half of the sixteenth century. It is an erroneous conclusion.

Affinities and Recruiting in the Sixteenth Century

The enduring military importance of affinities and the continuity between mid- and late-sixteenth-century practice is clear from even a cursory examination of some prominent affinities. What is also apparent is that the selection

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7 Miller, English Nobility, 134. They were still used into the 1550s for foreign soldiers: Millar, ‘Letter to Reiffenberg’; Potter, ‘International Mercenary Market’, 26-29, 33 and 55-57.
8 See ‘A note of all suche licenses to retayne as have [...] been graunted’, BL, Lans. MS 14, ff. 1-3; see also Cooper, 78-96; Gunn, ‘Sir Thomas Lovell’; Adams, ‘Baronial Contexts’, 167-70; idem, ‘English Military Clientele’; Mark Norris, ‘The 2nd Earl of Rutland’s Band of Men-at-Arms, 1551-2’, HR 68 (1995): 100-6; Stone, Crisis, 206-7; Starkey, ‘Court History in Perspective’, 23.
of not only captains resulted from military patronage (though it did regularly),
but that junior officers and rank-and-file were also regularly found through
affinity connections.

Henry Manners, second earl of Rutland, a career soldier throughout
the 1540s and '50s, maintained a strong retinue of heavy cavalry under
Edward VI made up of his household servants and other local gentry. In
1569 the third earl, in response to royal commission, raised a large force to
serve against the rebellious northern rebels, composed of trusted servants
(i.e., fidèles in our terminology) 'and divers other of my gentlemen, who were
my fathers men, with a great number of my tenants' In 1599, the fifth earl
exploited his tenants to help meet his obligations as a colonel of foot in the
royal army in Ireland. One Manners client was Robert Constable, a high official in the
Ordnance Office, who also had as a patron the Earl of Warwick, Master of the
Ordinance from 1560 to his death in 1590. As Dr Adams shows, Warwick
and Leicester inherited their father's following (including a powerful military
dependence) and, after their rehabilitation in 1558, restored it. Dudley
servants, retainers and clients were ubiquitous in Warwick's army in France
in 1562-63 and, thereafter, in the Ordnance Office hierarchy and permanent
garrisons. Leicester recruited extensively from the family affinity in 1585; it
was the chief source of the troops he took over to the Netherlands in 1586.

In 1573 Walter Devereux, first Earl of Essex, began a campaign to
subdue and settle Ulster. It was authorised and financially supported by the
queen, but was essentially a personal enterprise. His expedition was raised

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8 As with, e.g., the army sent to Picardy in 1596: Hammer, Polatisation of Politics, 262n.
9 Lawrence Stone, Family and Fortune: Studies in Aristocratic Finance in the Sixteenth and
10 Rutland to Cecil, 26 Nov. 1569, quoted in Fissel, English Warfare, 126.
11 Stone, Family and Fortune, 179, 181-82.
12 Rutland to Burghley, 24 Sep. 1578, HMCS, 13:160; Ashley, 113-14, 120-22, 128.
13 Simon Adams: 'The Dudley Clientèle, 1553-1563', in The Tudor Nobility, 241-65; 'Because
I am of that Countrie & Mynde to Plant Myself there': Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester and the
West Midlands', Midland History 20 (1995): 30-32, 40-41; and 'English Military Clientele', 222-
24. This interpretation is criticised by David Loades, John Dudley, Duke of Northumberland
1504-1553 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), esp. x, 276, however see Adams's review in
14 See Ashley, 114-15, 120-21, 130; Patrick Collinson, ed., Letters of Thomas Wood, Puritan,
1566-1577, HR special supplement 5 (1960), vi, ix; Adams, 'Dudley Clientèle', 241-43, 246-
47; idem, ed., Household Accounts of Leicester, 72n., 250n., 461, 474, 485.
15 Analysis of this and of the 1st Earl of Essex's 1573 recruiting follows below, p. 254 et seq.
virtually entirely from his affinity, supplemented by his allies. His heir, Robert, similarly had recourse to Devereux clients and tenants to obtain recruits for royal armies in the 1590s. He solicited his clients (successfully) and pressured his tenants (with unknown results) to raise men for the army he led to Normandy in 1591. 17 Five years later he asked his tenants, 'frindes and also his followers' to raise men for the expedition to Cadiz. 18 An unusually high number of gentlemen volunteers were a notable feature of that army. 19

Finally, the rise from obscurity to power of the first Earl of Pembroke (whose affinity's participation in the Flushing rising was highlighted in chapter 3) owed much to his troop-raising capability. During the Western rebellion of 1549 he raised two thousand men from his Welsh estates which he led to the relief of besieged Exeter. In 1554 he played a key role in quelling Wyatt's rebellion with a large force: the thousand armed men reported as wearing his livery around this time by the Venetian ambassador must have been specially raised, since the formal Herbert retinue was only 250 strong (or less). In 1557 Pembroke personally supplied more than 800 men for the army he led to St. Quentin's (more than 10 per cent of the whole) including -- but obviously exceeding -- his retinue. 20 His heir, Henry, had a smaller permanent retinue, but maintained the inheritance of military power. 21 In response to the Armada crisis he offered the Queen '300 horse and 500 foote at the least of my followers, armed at myne oune coste and with myne oune store.' 22

This was, however, just part of a larger force of 1,700 foot and over 500 horse, separate from the trained bands, supplied by a large number of peers and wealthy gentlemen and composed of their retainers, household

18 James Baskerville to Essex, 30 Apr. 1596, Longleat, DP 1, f. 265r; Hammer, Polarisation of English Politics, 272.
19 Standen to Bacon, 30 May 1596, Birch, Memoirs, 2:15. Noted by Rowse, Expansion, 306; and by Wernham, Return, 83, though he overstates the numbers.
21 BL, Lans. MS 14, f. 3v.
22 Pembroke to Elizabeth, 28 July 1588, quoted in Stone, Crisis, 206.
servants and tenants. This contingent, raised at royal request, was an important part of the forces gathered to defend against invasion. In 1599, facing another Spanish armada, the queen required her nobles and bishops 'to attend her ... with Horse and Foote', particularly ordering 'Lord Pembrooke and the other great lords to provide ... 100 horse a Pece', for her guard.

It is evident, then, that affinities continued to be valuable recruiting resources until the end of this period. 'The crown tacitly recognised that it relied for its army, in part, on the private military resources of the nobility and other large landowners.' However, as we have seen, the forces raised from aristocratic affinities frequently include 'servants', clients and tenants -- that is, they incorporated other members of the nobilitas. Magnates' tenants and clients were often themselves gentlemen, of course, but so were their servitors. Those termed 'servants' by contemporaries performed a variety of functions; trusted household members (fidèles) were generally gentlemen, but servitors were not all menials, since gentlemen filled even relatively humble positions in great households. Moreover, these aristocrats not only served as officers; they also served in the ranks. In fact, the recruiting pattern of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries still prevailed. To field large forces great patrons did not literally sub-contract, but they did build up their contingents from many groups of various sizes, led by their followers. These lesser gentlemen (servants, clients or tenants of the greater gentry or peers) then mobilised their own extended family, servants and tenants, which in these cases were predominantly from outside the nobilitas.

These points emerge even more clearly when we examine the raising of large expeditionary forces, essentially independently of royal military recruiting mechanisms, from the affinities of Essex in 1573 and Leicester in 1585. A particularly large body of evidence is extant for Essex's recruiting.

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23 Letters from peers, CSPDom, 1581-90, 495, 498-99, 501, 503, 507, 509, 516; Gray and Mildmay to Leicester, 5 Jul. 1588, ibid., 499; Shrewsbury to Justices of Derbyshire, 16 May, and to John Manners, 30 Jul., 1588, HMCPR, 249, 256; Rowse, Expansion, 361.
24 Whyte to Sidney, 4 and 5 Aug. 1599, Sydney Papers, 2:112-13; [Shrewsbury to John Manners, 7 Aug. 1599], HMCPR, 355; Archbishop of Canterbury to bishops and clergy, 1599, BL, Harl. MS 168, f. 137.
25 Coward, 155.
26 Stone, Crisis, 209, 211-13.
27 None of Essex's original requests are extant, but 29 of the replies survive in Longleat, DP 1. There is no study of the 1st earl's affinity, but Howell A. Lloyd, 'The Essex Inheritance', Welsh History Review 7 (1974): 13-39, discusses his resources more generally.
It allows a fascinating insight into the workings of a military dependence. Due to the effectively personal nature of his enterprise, Essex (like a mercenary captain) needed money, munitions and victuals, as well as men and he requested his followers for help in all these areas. When it came to getting men, he interacted directly with his commoner tenantry in an attempt to raise some of his infantry force. However, Essex obtained most of his troops from his followers, on whom he put the onus of supplying men. At least one was requested to raise relatively large numbers from the wider populace, but this proved difficult since he was unable to use compulsion.

Generally, though, they were asked to send a 'man [or men] of [their] owne chardge', instead of, or as well as, serving themselves. Many were unenthusiastic but there were sufficient positive responses for Essex to raise a force some 600 strong.

This was done via a complex web of interactions. The earl's kinsman, George Devereux, and client, Sir Thomas Baskerville, were both charged with liaising with others of Essex's followers to raise men; he communicated with his remaining followers directly. Baskerville recruited four of Essex's 'servauntes and Tenantes' to serve personally, plus three of his own family. Devereux mobilised twelve foot and horsemen, through other clients. One knight, in turn, prompted one of his own gentleman followers to serve as a horseman, who was, in turn, accompanied by 'his man'. Of two other gentry supplying cavalry, one was 'hymselfe furnished'; the other 'sett onto' three horsemen: whether these followers were common or gentle is unclear. Two gentlemen fielded 'two men as shot' each, and another aristocrat 'furnishe[d]' a footman. The implication is that these were all servitors or non-gentle tenants. A last gentleman was to 'serve hym self' as a footman.

This pattern was replicated with those of Essex's aristocratic followers whom their patron approached directly. A few were able only to serve themselves. However, a goodly numbers supplied servitors, or common tenants,
to fight alongside themselves, but again, only in ones and twos (occasionally four) at a time. Unsolicited offers for individual service were also received: one such volunteer brought along a veteran who was in his father's employ. In all cases, the numbers of followers these gentlemen brought with them were insufficient to constitute discrete units. The evidence indicates that the individual contingents were combined to form convenient sized units, just as in the late-medieval and early-Tudor armies. Thereafter, these followers of Essex presumably served in the ranks: a number of gentlemen are known to have done so and certainly Baskerville's sons served as the earl's 'household men'.

Twelve years later, Leicester raised both foot and horse for the army in the Netherlands. Most of the foot were probably raised from his common followers directly. In October 1585 he was authorised by the queen to raise 'five hundred of his tenants and servants throughout England and Wales' as foot. Some four hundred of his tenants (in two companies) were actually put in the field. Little is known about how they were actually recruited but the yeomen tenants on Leicester's Denbighshire estates were obliged by their leases to serve 'in tyme of warre' and few of those raised in 1585 seem to have been of the gentry. Thus, of the four hundred 'tenants and servants' who served as foot, most were not from the nobilitas.

This contingent was exempted from the legislation against retaining, but Leicester did build on his retinue which, authorised by a license of 1565, was one hundred strong. Both gentlemen and commoners were among his retainers (as in the first Earl of Pembroke's retinue, discussed below), who provided the basis of his original guard (of foot) in the Netherlands in 1586. Twelve of its fifty rank and file were Leicester's gentlemen retainers, but it is

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55 Thomas Riddle, Thomas Trencham, Giles Pole and A. Stock to idem, 13, 17, 21 and 24 Jun. 1573, ibid., ff. 27r, 34r, 44r, 58r; see also Gwynn to idem, ibid.
56 Thomas Cokayne to Essex, 19 Jun. 1573, Longleat, ibid., f. 20r; Nolan, Norreys, 18.
57 Longleat, DP 1, f. 52r; and see The Booke of Captaines, Lieutenaunts and other officers at the warres', BL, Lans. MS 1218, ff. 115r, 125r, 126r; and Chuchrard's Choice, sigs. F1, F4.
58 Copies: PRO, SO 3/1, f. 41v; CSPFor., 20:129; DCPR 1584-85, 26.
59 Leicester to Walsingham, n.d. [Oct. 1585?], Leycester Corr., 11; Adams, 'Gentry of North Wales', 133-34; idem, 'Military Obligations of Leasehold Tenants in Leicestrian Denbigh: A Footnote', Trans. Denbighshire Historical Soc. 24 (1975): 206 -- this obligation, unlike many similar leases, was not limited to service in the sovereign's wars.
60 BL, Lans. MS 14, f. 3r.
61 List of 12 Jan. 1586, BL, Cott. MS Galba C.viii, ff. 96v-97r; compare Adams, ed., Household Accounts of Leicester, 350, 463, 468, 480; and see Adams, 'Baronial Contexts', 169-70.
notable that twice that number -- half its strength -- were clients 'preferde' to the unit by their own patrons.42 The guard of the Governor- and Lieutenant-General of the United Provinces was akin to that of a sovereign prince, so it is to be expected that aristocrats would feature in its ranks, since that was the nature of such units.43 But Leicester wanted more than a guard company and he recruited from the gentry of his wider affinity, drawing on more than just his retinue, to secure something like the numbers he needed -- in particular of horse.

His aristocratic tenants provided a number of light horse: their leases, too, included military service obligations. In addition, Leicester personally equipped forty-five more of his retinue as demi-lances.44 He raised rather more cavalry, however, by writing to the aristocratic members of his affinity, requiring his 'good friends and servants' to furnish themselves, mounted and armed for service, together with any extra horsemen they could provide by drawing on their own clients and followers.45 These efforts generated almost two hundred separate responses, including, but certainly not limited to, more of the earl's gentlemen retainers. As Leicester himself wrote to Walsingham, since there were two hundred 'of my one gentlemen in my company, imagin they are not without servauntes, and so owr number must be great'.46 Indeed, the respondents' contributions collectively totalled approximately 750 men. Most individual contingents were not of company strength, so, in accordance with standard practice, the various noble followings were recombined into military units, a reorganisation carried out at The Hague in January 1586.47

Leicester's 'train' of horse was thus, as Adams suggests, effectively a giant dependence built up from a number of smaller dependences.48 The Scott family, clients of Leicester, had raised a company of queen's-pay foot but were asked by their lord to field twenty-five men 'towards a cornett of horse' as well. They raised thirty-nine 'very good and serviceable horses, and diverse talle gentlemen of good abilitie to serve upon them'; Sir Thomas

42 BL, Cott. MS Galba C.viii, f. 97r.
43 Rowlands, 'Aristocratic Power and Elite Units'.
44 Adams: 'Military Obligations', 206-7; 'Gentry of North Wales', 133-34.
45 Idem, 'Gentry of North Wales', 138; Leicester to Sir John Wynn, 26 Sep. 1585, pr. ibid., 147.
48 Adams, 'Puritan Crusade', 19.
Scott then asked Leicester ‘that my sonne (your Lordship's poore kinsman) may be allowed ... to have the leading of these, and soe many more as your Lordship shall thinck meete, to make up a Cornett of horse.' His request was not granted, but it illustrates very well the way that recruitment through affinities worked. Those who were personally able to field enough men for a company, such as Sir Thomas Cecil (heir of Lord Burghley), utilised a similar process in miniature: Cecil’s fifty-strong band of horse comprised five men of his father’s household, twenty-eight of his own, plus another seventeen provided by seven more 'gentlemen as go voluntary with me'.

The mechanics by which Essex and Leicester raised troops in 1573 and 1585-86 have been examined in some detail because they show the workings of an affinity 'up close'. Contemporary descriptions usually simply state that followers were recruited, assuming that correspondents or readers knew what was involved. We have to recreate that knowledge by detailed elucidation and these cases are rare instances where it is possible to do so. What emerges is reminiscent of the methods used to raise royal armies for the French wars of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. What also emerges (and the rest of the chapter confirms this) is that the enduring military power of the English aristocracy was not limited to the great nobility; middle-ranking gentry commanded military resources. Indeed, recruitment through affinities was pyramidal, reflecting 'the pyramidal nature of ... society'. Lords of great affinities drew on their more important followers, who occasionally had their own retinues, sometimes their own martial dependences and certainly their own military potential -- yet they, too, generally drew on their own lesser followers. If the gentry, as well as nobility, had not continued to command military resources, recruiting through affinity could not have continued.

The two earls’ recruiting procedures are particularly relevant because of their particular circumstances. The expedition of 1573 was not mobilised for mercenary service on the Continent but it had the queen’s blessing (albeit open and explicit, rather than covert); it was motivated partly by patriotic and confessional factors, yet its goals were primarily private, not national. Many of those who fought for Essex in Ulster had already served as mercenaries

46 Scott to Leicester, 2 Mar. 1586, BL, Cott. MS Titus B vii, f. 67r.
51 Coward, 154.
and/or did so later. Essex could not use compulsion; instead, recruits were secured through personal contact with the members of his affinity and (in turn) of their own affinities. Many of Leicester's recruits likewise already had served, or later would serve, in Dutch pay, and they fought side by side with fellow-countrymen who were in States' employ. There is every reason to believe, then, that the methods used by the two earls were the same as those used for mercenary recruitment.

The Nobilitas and Military Service: Summing Up

When gentlemen served in the ranks they rarely did so alone. Rather, like their fifteenth-century predecessors they brought their own followers with them. The traditional pattern of recruiting remained particularly attractive to those captains, or their patrons, who were raising men for 'private enterprise' ventures, and/or raising companies of volunteers.

Into the late sixteenth century (and in some countries after) there was no officer corps: the 'knight' had not yet become the 'officer'. Nobles might serve together, literally in the ranks, of a unit in which they predominated, or might command units whose rank-and-file in turn might be wholly aristocratic, wholly common, or a mixture. There was not yet a clear hierarchy of ranks through which one could (or indeed needed to) 'rise' in the modern sense, partly because military and social rank were not yet clearly distinct. The lack of, or confusion in, career structure hierarchies reflected a similar situation in military organisation. Regiments were often ad hoc structures; the company was everything: to be captain of a company was the chief desire of a soldier. Generals and colonels had their own companies, since with rare exceptions it was their rank as captain which gave them the right to higher command; a 'captain' could and did take command of regiments and (effective) brigades, yet then return simply to commanding his company.

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52 Not coincidentally -- the Privy Council had declared a preference for recruits with previous experience of the Netherlands (Adams, 'Puritan Crusade', 15-16).
53 A point made by Redlich, Enterpriser, 15n.
54 See Keen, Chivalry, 240-43; Webb, Elizabethan Military Science, 57-58, 81-83, 123; C. Storrs and H. M. Scott, 'The Military Revolution and the European Nobility, c.1600-1800', War in History 3 (1996):1-41. See also Oman, 377; Hexter, 19; Redlich, Enterpriser, 8-15, 46, 108-9n.; Hale, War, 130-31; Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 50-54; Boynton, Elizabethan Militia, 103-4; Dop, 130-33; Zwitzer, Militie van den Staat, 130-33.
The consequence was that for members of the nobilitas there was no dishonour in fighting in the ranks. To be sure, initial service as a gentlemen volunteer was often akin to serving an apprenticeship, prior to becoming a captain, but for many gentlemen and even some peers it was enough simply to serve. And indeed, since the model of recruiting from aristocratic affinities was prevalent in Tudor England, they served alongside varying numbers of their own followers, whether also aristocratic, or common. Even in the trained bands, created to be under the control of the crown rather than the nobility, soldiers were still frequently the followers of their captain; indeed, the Elizabethan commissioners for musters for Essex were rebuked by the council because they did not appoint Sir Thomas Mildmay captain of a company in the county trained bands composed mostly of his tenants and neighbours.56

This was not only the medieval precedent and contemporary practice in Tudor England, it was common in early-modern society. In the Spanish army, for example, a recent study demonstrates that 'reciprocal ties of loyalty and affection crisscrossed the divisions of rank and class in the army'.57 As Thompson observes, a captain raised his company by tapping 'the loyalty of his friends and relatives'. González de León describes the Spanish army of Flanders as 'like a pyramid', throughout the whole of which ran the ties of clienteles, and camaradas -- the latter self-constructed sub-units within a company, made up of small groups of gentlemen volunteers and other soldiers, often already bound by ties of affinity and/or locality.58 English and Huguenot mercenaries in Dutch pay were well aware of the role of camaradas in their enemies' army and the term was used by contemporaries to describe sub-sets of soldiers within English companies serving in the Netherlands.59

Elizabethan English observers expected voluntary companies to be raised from gentlemen rankers and their dependants. Bishop Pilkington of

55 Boynton, Elizabethan Militia, 104.
56 Fernando González de León, ‘“These waters flow from higher up”: Mutiny and Discontent in the Spanish Army of Flanders, Revisited’, paper read at the conference ‘Mutiny: Narrative, Event, and Context in Cross-Cultural Perspective’, Ohio State University, 10 Oct. 1998.
57 Thompson, War and Government, 110, 117; González de León, ibid.
58 Churchyard, Description, 54; de La Noue, ‘De l’usage des Camarades, qui sont fort recommandees entre l’infanterie espagnole’, in Discours politiques et militaires, 341-47; Standen to Bacon, 17 Nov. 1593, LPL, MS 649, f. 388r.
Durham wrote in 1562 of how, 'when neighbours, friends and cousins are together under a captain whom they love and know, it emboldeneth them [and] they cleave together'. This was an ideal, but it remained so forty years later, when Chief Justice Popham of Ireland regretted the high proportion of conscripts in companies sent from England. He wished instead that they 'might be of gentlemen of the best sort, to be accompanied with their friends, neighbours and tenants, who would keep their companies full for their own safety'.\footnote{The Works of James Pilkington, B.D., ed. James Scholefield (Cambridge: Parker Soc., 1842), 426; Popham to Robert Cecil 22 Aug. 1602, HMCS, 12:314.} There was thus a well-established model for mercenary captains to follow when seeking the volunteer recruits on whom they depended -- that of recruitment through aristocratic affinities.

**Affinities and Mercenary Recruiting**

It is because the evidence for recruiting is incomplete and often unclear that understanding the nature of recruitment through aristocratic affinities is vital. Understanding the 'standard operating procedure' for recruiting volunteers in Tudor and early-Stuart England allows the evidence to be interpreted with confidence. This evidence is firstly of the influence exercised by members of the élite in England and Wales, in their capacity as patrons, over the engagement of soldiers in companies, and secondly of how the ties of lordship and affinity operated even at very basic levels.

Mercenary captains naturally turned to the methods used by many of their fellows (often friends and family) in royal pay -- the same methods some of them had used when themselves in the queen's pay, or when raising men for private enterprises of noble patrons. They and their patrons used affinity connections: like their forefathers and their allies and enemies they relied on gentlemen serving as private soldiers, with those gentlemen's own followers filling up the ranks and files around them.

In some cases, captains' patrons mobilised common tenants and retainers for military action on the Continent, but typically they participated in the recruiting process by influencing their aristocratic kin, clients and retainers to enlist, alternatively or additionally prompting their tenants and perhaps servitors to do so. Such actions were essentially to assist captains,
whether in response to their request or at the patrons' initiative; but patrons also obliged those followers who wanted a military career by placing them with captains. These greater patrons thus established a foundation for companies on which the captains could build. The captains then reproduced this process at a lower level in the social hierarchy. They induced their own followers either to serve in person, or to draw, in turn, on their own kinsmen, servants, clients and tenants as recruits. As a result, a significant proportion of all mercenaries in Huguenot and Dutch employ, whether officers or private soldiers, were aristocrats.

Protestant Patrons and Their Influence

The Protestant nobles and government ministers who helped to broker and to finance captains' service with foreign Protestants were also consistently party to their recruiting. These great patrons only rarely mobilised their dependences on a large-scale but on occasions they did initiate widespread mercenary recruiting and, because they were seeking relatively large numbers, they had recourse at these times to tenants and other members of the lower orders directly, rather than via gentlemen serving in the ranks along with their own followers.

The evidence for this is mostly implicit. I have already suggested that the three hundred men who arrived in Flushing on 24 April 1572 were raised by the Earl of Pembroke. Such a force of arquebusiers could only have been raised so quickly if it drew in part from tenantry, though retainers may well have been at its core. This was not the end of Pembroke's military aid to the Dutch, however, for members of his martial dependence were prominent in the expeditions that followed under Morgan (who, as already noted, was said by one of his soldiers to have recruited in 1572 'with the countenance of some great men who favoured the cause') and Gilbert.

A 1570 list of the first earl's liveried retainers provides major clues. Morgan himself was not on that list, yet he was unquestionably a Herbert follower, even if at that time he did not wear their livery. He displayed their

\[^5\] In ch. 3, above, pp. 114-15.
\[^6\] Williams, Actions, 101.
\[^7\] The checke Role of all my lordes servauntes [...] wering his lordshippes lyverey [...]1570', BL, Harl. MS 7186, ff. 195r-96r.
arms, carved in stone on the walls of his home and on the ensigns of his mercenary bands in the Netherlands in the 1570s. The arms of a great magnate like Pembroke were not used without permission; further, ensigns customarily displayed the arms of the man, or corporation, responsible for raising the units in question. Gilbert also had links to Pembroke. Although this would have only been a secondary allegiance, one of Gilbert's captains was Walter Morgan Wolf, a tenant or retainer of the second earl. Philip Watkins and Thomas Lovett both served as ensigns under Gilbert at Flushing; both these names are on the list of Pembroke's liveried retainers, together with that of Roger Williams and Roger Hussey, both of whom also fought at Flushing in 1572. Three more retainers, Robert Eure, Edward Kemys and Edward Philpott may be the men of those names mentioned in an English soldier's letter home from Flushing. Furthermore, Pembroke's affinity was not only a source of captains. Morgan and Morgan Wolf were captains but Lovett and Watkins were junior officers, and Williams (at that time), Kemys, Philpott and Eure were gentlemen rankers. Equally, two more Herbert retainers, William Kent and Richard Badger may be the men of those names who fought with the Huguenots and Dutch respectively in the mid-1570s: Kent was a captain, but Badger served in the ranks.

There is evidence, then, that the ardently Protestant Earl of Pembroke, in the emergency situation of 1572, took the chance to raise men from his dependence en masse, though thereafter, due perhaps to domestic political and foreign diplomatic circumstances, he only acted through followers who served both as officers and gentlemen volunteers. In any event, Morgan and Gilbert were not alone in benefiting from a noble patron's assistance. There is also strong evidence that John Cobham recruited his companies in Dutch service in 1578 from an affinity.

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63 Stone, Crisis, 208; Morgan to Leicester, 2 Jun. 1581, BL, Cott. MS Titus B vii, f. 38r.
65 Hannay, 123.
67 Williams, Actions, 101, 116, 149; Gilbert to [Essex?], 13 Aug. 1572, Longleat, DP 2, ff. 7v, 9r 115r.
68 In Captain William Baud's company: muster roll, 10 Sep. 1575, ARA, CO 30.
It is virtually certain that Cobham raised his men in Kent. Not only was he from Kent himself, but he was influential in the county, particularly the area around the Medway estuary, and played a significant role in the local militia. He thus had excellent opportunities for recruiting. Further, both his captains -- his brother, Edward, and Anthony Sampson -- were also from Kent, where they are known to have raised troops later in the period. This all indicates that Cobham’s three companies were raised in Kent (just across the sea from Flanders). In this case, he would surely have raised troops from the affinity of his uncle, William, Lord Cobham, the most powerful man in Kent. A body of troops raised in that county would almost certainly have included some of his clients; in addition, after John Cobham received his commission from Archduke Matthias, he immediately headed not only for England but for his uncle. Lord Cobham evidently had influence over at least some English troops in Dutch service in 1578, for he and Walsingham were asked jointly to ‘interpose [their] good countenances to persuade our young captains to the good acceptation of John Norris for theyre onely coronell’. The other captains (other than those brought over by Norris himself) were those of Morgan and Cavendish, neither of whom had any connections to Kent: it is logical to conclude that the troops over whom Lord Cobham had such influence were those from Kent, and that they included his followers in their ranks.

Thomas Cotton, when trying to fill the ranks of his contingent in early 1582, asked Walsingham ‘to further us’ if any chance arose. This produced results: eighteen months later, Norris, referring to English troops in a letter to Walsingham, referred to ‘those that are here at your commandment’. John Ridgeway, needing a company’s worth of volunteers in order to secure

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70 See in app. 6, below, pp. 417, 465.

71 Davison to Lord Cobham, 24 Apr. 1578, KL, no. 3880, 10:430. John Cobham also carried a letter from Davison to Burghley, ibid., 427-29, no. 3879.

72 Knollys to Walsingham, 10 Aug. 1578, ibid., no. 4075, 10:713.

73 Cotton, and Norris to Walsingham, 23 Apr. 1582 and 20 Nov. 1583, CSPFor., 15:646, no. 703, and 18:223, no. 253.
a captain’s commission in the summer of 1601, sent home his lieutenant to recruit, accompanied by a request to their patron Sir Robert Cecil that the officer ‘might have your furtherance herein’. Matthew Everett, needing to strengthen his foot band in the autumn of 1606, sent his ensign to England, on whose behalf he had first solicited, through an intermediary, the ‘favourable assistance’ of Robert Sidney, Viscount Lisle.74

Although efforts to raise multi-unit forces probably involved patrons in direct recruiting among their commoner, as opposed to aristocratic, followers it was still the case that most recruiting, even of relatively large numbers of men, was done via members of the nobilitas. That is, gentlemen who were followers were probably recruited first and then they brought others along.

In the case of Cobham, Cotton, Ridgeway and Everett, it is not clear how the patron was expected to effect enlistments. However, Pembroke’s followers in the regiment in Flushing in 1572 were gentlemen rankers, as well as captains and subalterns, which is suggestive. Furthermore, when in 1586 Edmund Cary, sixth son of Lord Hunsdon, was commissioned to raise three hundred men in Dutch pay in Norfolk and Suffolk, Hunsdon wrote on his son’s behalf to his clients in Norfolk, requesting them to ‘further him in the gathering of [the volunteers] in what you maye, And in so doing shall thinke my selfe beholding to you and will requit yor curtesy in what I may’.75 This is comparable to the mechanics of Essex’s recruiting in 1572 and suggests that Cobham, Walsingham, Cecil and Lisle likewise worked through their gently-born followers. Thus, even when seeking to raise the equivalents of small regiments and whole companies, it was the aristocratic members of affinities to whom patrons turned.

Certainly from the surviving evidence it seems that the majority of patrons primarily interacted with their followers to recruit individuals and small groups as building blocks of units, rather than to field contingents or whole units. To be sure, if patrons sought to conceal their aid to mercenary recruitment, evidence for en masse recruiting is less likely to survive, since its instigators would destroy it; because those recruited were less likely to


75 Hunsdon to Sir William Parsons, 8 June 1586, Bodl., Douce MS 393, f. 29r. Although the letter implies that the company was to be in royal service, it was in fact in Dutch pay: see below, in app. 6, pp. 412-13.
attempt to suppress evidence, traces of recruiting on a personal, ad hoc, basis might naturally survive more frequently. On the other hand, some patrons could of course do no more than influence gentlemen to activate their own immediate followers -- they had no wider tenantry or retinues to muster. Regardless of whether or not it was the sum of their military potential, the captains' patrons consistently influenced recruiting.

Captains always nominated their own surgeons and chaplains, as Webb observes.76 Their authority over their companies went beyond these specialist appointments. A few of those who obtained regimental commands even had other captains' commissions in their gift. The exact terms of Norreys and the other English colonels' authority over their regiments in the Netherlands in the late 1570s and early 1580s are not known, as their own contracts with the States do not survive. It will be seen that patrons mediated with them on behalf of captaincies. This may have been a matter of asking the colonel to endorse a man to the Dutch, but comparable practice suggests otherwise -- that the colonel commissioned the captain himself. The power to appoint captains in the quasi-royal, but essentially private-enterprise army Norreys and Drake led to Lisbon in 1589 was vested not in the crown directly, but in the two commanders and they used it -- a commission from them to Thomas Finch (a possible veteran of Cavendish's regiment in 1578) for a company of foot is still extant.77 As we have seen, Vere exercised this authority over the English troops in Dutch pay until 1603. It thus seems likely that the English colonels in the Netherlands twenty years earlier enjoyed the same powers to make captains and probably some junior officers.

It was, however, generally understood that the captain himself then controlled his own company. As already noted, few actual commissions to, or contracts with, captains survive; all of them, spanning a number of years, specifically grant the captain the power to ordain his lieutenant, officers and soldiers; none indicate that the terms granted were extraordinary, so it is probable that all the Anglo-Welsh mercenary captains had this authority.78

77 SRO, D593/S/4/20/1; queen's commission to Norreys and Drake, 11 Oct. 1588, Wernham, ENDSP, 12-14 (DCPR 1587-88, 36).
78 See, e.g., the commissions to John Cobham (21 Apr. 1578), PRO, SP 83/6, f. 57; and to Sir Michael Harcourt, Richard Spenser and Robert Hitchcock (Jun.-Nov. 1586), ARA, RvS 1524/i, ff. 126r, 130v, 131r. It was also standard contractual practice for all troops employed by the States of Brabant: [anon.] to Walsingham, Dec. 1577, PRO, SP 83/4, no. 62.
Even from the late 1590s, when control was increasingly centralised — initially in the hands of the senior English officers and, from 1604, with the Dutch — the right to appoint supernumeries and voluntaries to their own companies remained in practice in the captains' hands. This is evident from frequent requests to captains from their own patrons or allies for places in companies for others of their followers. Nevertheless, though captains had the right to make such appointments they were themselves part of patronage networks and consequently their decisions frequently reflected obligations to, or were actually at the behest of, others.

Patrons frequently influenced the appointments of officers. As seen in chapter 3, Mont-gommery in early 1573 deliberately shifted his base of operations from the Channel Islands to Plymouth, the locality of his kinsman, Sir Arthur Champernowne, who had already made concrete proposals for raising troops in the south-west to aid the Huguenots. The Champernowne family in any case had impressive local military resources on which they could draw. Little evidence survives of the details of Mont-gommery's force, but of the four known officers, Sir Arthur's son Gawain was one and a brother of Champernowne's ally, vice-admiral William Winter, was another.

Other examples of patrons influencing appointments of officers are more clear-cut. When Morgan was in London in the late autumn of 1580 Épinoy wrote to him from Tournai to have one Robert Denis appointed lieutenant of Morgan's company. Robert Sidney obtained the captaincy of a foot band in John Norreys's regiment in 1583, thanks to the influence of his brother, Sir Philip. The following year Henry, second Baron Cromwell, got his heir, Edward, appointed as a captain by Ralph Cromwell, a distant kinsman. In 1585 or '86, William Browne was made lieutenant of a States'-pay foot band, thanks at least partly to 'his master', Walsingham. In 1600, a commissary's place in a company in the Netherlands was 'procured' by Lord

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79 See above, in ch. 3, p. 122.
80 Below, p. 271.
81 Marlet, 136; Churchyard's Choice, sig. L4v.
82 Morgan to Épinoy, 17 Dec. 1580, CSPFor., 14:517, no. 518. He may have been kin to the Captain Morris Denys who commanded a company in the Netherlands in the 1580s.
83 Robert Sidney to Norreys, Bodl., St Amand MS 8, f. 69r. See app. 6, below, p. 468.
84 Walsingham to William of Orange, Feb. 1584, CSPFor., 18:373, no. 450.
85 Pace Adams's suggestion ('Protestant Cause', 62) that it was because Browne was 'a family retainer' of the Sidneys; but see Browne to Walsingham, 6 Oct. 1585 and 28 Jan. 1588, CSPFor., 20:67 and 21/4:37, for the latter's role as his military patron.
Burgh for one Thursby, described as 'my Lord Bourrowes man'.

Around this time the wealthy astrologer Simon Forman helped get the lieutenancy of a company in the Netherlands for his apprentice, John Braddedge. One Coningsby, who had been an officer in Spanish pay, returned to England in 1601 and, 'by means of his friends', obtained letters of recommendation from one of the royal secretaries to Sir Francis Vere. Although Vere distrusted Coningsby, he felt 'unable to refuse' the latter's patron and appointed him as subaltern in a company in Ostend. Just after the end of this period, Ogle agreed to 'do his best' to secure a commission 'in the States army for Sir J. Manwood', in response to a request from the Marquess (later Duke) of Buckingham.

Patronage also influenced the selection of gentlemen volunteers. Captains were often not obliging a lord, but rather helping a friend; however, patronage was still being exercised on behalf of those who would serve as volunteers. In the winter of 1577/78, Harry Caltropt, a bastard of Sir Henry Killigrew, and the young William Woodhouse, each obtained a gentleman volunteer's place in companies in Dutch employ, thanks to the request of the English agent William Davison, acting in turn at the behest of Killigrew and the noted puritan John Stubbs. John Browne, one of Leicester's servants, served as a volunteer with Norreys in 1580-81, thanks to the earl's influence. In the mid-1580s the princess of Orange solicited a place for a former page of her late husband in Norreys's personal company. Sir John Holles successively put his younger brothers, George and Thomas, into the ranks of Francis and Horace Vere's companies respectively in the late 1590s.

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88 Browne to Sidney, 6 Nov. 1605, HMCD, 3:225.
87 A. L. Rowse, Simon Forman: Sex and Society in Shakespeare's Age (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974), 51. It is possible that Braddedge joined a cautionary company, but as he served in the Ostend garrison he clearly entered States'-pay even if he did not start in it.
86 Histoire Remarquable, 40v: 'par le moyen de ses amis, envers l'un des Secretaires de la Royne, qu'il eut des lettres de recommandation addressantes au sieur F. Vehr Capitaine general des Anglois dans ostende, ayant ces lettres, il s'en alla à Ostende, & les presenta au sieur F. Vehr, & le pria de le mettre de sa compagnie, ce que le sieur Vehr ne luy peut refuser'.
89 Ogle to Buckingham, 4 Dec. 1619, Bodl., Fortescue Papers, no. 276 (MS Add. D.109, f. 10r).
90 Miller, Sir Henry Killigrew, 189; Stubbs to Davison, 30 Apr. 1578, in Stubbs, 'Gaping Gulf' and Other Documents, 107; Killigrew to Davison, 8 May, and 1 Nov. 1578 CSPFor., 12:670-71, no. 853, and 13:256, no. 336.
91 Browne to Leicester, 1 May 1580, BL, Cott. MS Titus B.vii, f. 90r; idem, 20 Nov. 1580, CSPFor., 14:492, no. 496; Richard Soam to Walsingham, 4 Feb. 1581, ibid., 15:44, no. 42.
92 Louise de Coligny to Norreys, 20 Jan. [1586?], Bodl., St. Amand MS 7, f. 22r.
and also placed one of his servants as a volunteer with the older Vere. Later still, after George Holles had become a captain himself, Sir John secured places for two of his clients in his brother's company. Sir Thomas Fairfax put his son, William, into the company of Sir John Ogle, client of his friend Sir Horace Vere. Likewise, Sir Dudley Carleton, who had served as factotum to Sir Edward Norreys, later put one of his own pages with Vere as the first step in a military career, while also at Carleton's behest a kinsman of his friend John West was given a gentleman volunteer's place in one of Vere's companies. In 1610 Edward Herbert served as a volunteer with Cecil during the campaign against Jülich. One of his younger brothers was Cecil's page, so it is likely that the Herberts' patrons included the Cecils, on whom they prevailed to obtain military experience for their progeny.

What is striking is that while only great nobles such as Pembroke could raise whole units from their affinities, a wide range of patrons influenced the selection of officers and men within units. The Leicesters, Walsinghams and Cecils were all involved, but they did not, at least in the surviving examples, predominate. Other peers and a variety of lesser magnates also exercised patronage and thus contributed to determining the composition of mercenary companies.

Military Patronage Within Affinities

Captains were not necessarily wholly reliant on the patronage of others for recruiting. Many themselves had personal, or family, affinities that embodied considerable military potential -- even, in effect, to martial dependences. To be sure, in many cases these were 'mini dependences', since there were not levels of patrons and followers underneath those whom were called directly for military service as in larger affinities. Some captains drew directly on the lower orders, as well as calling on other, lesser gentry, which was the first

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93 Holles, Memorials, 73, 83; Sir John to Lady Holles, 29 Dec. 1599, and to Sir George Holles, 15 Jul. 1615, Holles Letters, 1:17, 74, nos. 38, 162.
94 Simon Healy, 'Thomas Fairfax', forthcoming in History of Parliament, Jacobean House of Commons (I am grateful to Dr Healy for a copy of the text of this article).
port of call for most captains. Those minor nobiles minores then gathered others of their ilk and their own local, common, dependants. Thus, recruiting was done through affinity ties, at all levels of the mercenary companies. As John Peyton, later a captain in Dutch pay, observed in 1585: 'The gentlemens of the Cowntyes ar the onely Captaynes to drawe the persones or the purses of the Common people into martyall actyons.' In other words, captains utilised their local connections to recruit and those who could do so were the most successful recruiters.

Mercenaries' Martial Resources

The men who fought for the Protestants of France and the Netherlands lived in a society still geared for war. There was an increasing reliance on the law courts to settle disputes and acceptance that the state should be supreme in regulating and using violence, but traditional attitudes were still entrenched. English aristocrats not infrequently had recourse to violence to further their private quarrels and hence continued to maintain a military capacity.

Retinues, for example, were not the prerogative only of peers. They were maintained by gentlemen, as well as the few nobles licensed by the crown, including mercenaries and their family members. Thus, the decline in licensed retaining by the greater aristocracy during Elizabeth's reign is to some extent irrelevant. Retaining remained especially common in the West Midlands, Wales and the Marches, areas that produced many mercenaries. The Carmarthenshire gentleman Alban Stepneth, who was asked by the younger Essex in 1596 to field men for the Cadiz expedition and may have served as a mercenary, maintained a retinue and was even convicted of a breach of the statute against unlicensed retaining. The absence of similar convictions does not mean that Stepneth was unique: if gentlemen maintained soldiers in their pay in ones and twos (or even half-dozens), as did a number of those on whom the older Essex called in 1573, they were

97 To Walsingham, 19 Sep. 1585, quoted in Boynton, Elizabethan Militia, 102, citing PRO, SP 12/181/21.
99 Stepneth to Essex, 28 Apr. 1596, Longleat, DP 1, f. 309r; Lloyd, Gentry, 208.
100 See, e.g., Cokayne to Essex, 19 Jun. 1573, Longleat, DP 1, f. 20r.
not likely to attract any attention for breach of the retaining laws. Thus, the lack of legal proceedings against them does not mean that such 'mini-retinues' did not exist.

We have already seen that tenants were a latent source of manpower for the great nobility. The first and second Earls of Pembroke, the third Earl of Rutland, the first and second Earls of Essex, and Leicester, all turned to their tenants for troops. It was not only peers, however, who recruited their tenantry. A wider range of landlords had a 'military relationship' with their tenants, as Coward observes, but though he observes that this continued to be the case 'into the sixteenth century', his examples are only from its first six decades; thus, analysis of Elizabeth's reign is necessary. At its beginning, Bishop Pilkington wrote of how, 'when a mean gentleman hath gone to the wars, his tenants would strive who should go with him first; and if he refused any to go, he thought his master loved him not.' Sir John Holles, who served as a gentleman volunteer in his youth, underpinned two brothers' service in Dutch employ and may have raised a regiment for the Jülich campaign, deliberately inserted military service clauses into his tenants' leases. Sir Charles Morgan, who raised several companies for foreign service over many years, was known for both his wealth and for his warlike tenantry in south Wales.

In addition, many of the gentry clearly commanded military resources. Aristocratic access to manpower did not have to derive from the provisions of leasehold agreements or formal retinues; gentlemen and their families could use the ties of loyalty, affection, proximity and patronage to create a military capacity. Mercenaries or their kin certainly did so, creating a potential recruit base for foreign service.

Several members of the Courtney clan, from Devon, served in Huguenot and Dutch pay. According to the 1569 survey of Devon's militia, four Courtneys, all gentlemen and personally well armed, were among the leading men of their various parishes. Also in Devon was Dartington, home

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101 Coward, 96-98 at 98.
102 Works of James Pilkington, 427.
103 App. 9, below, p. 506-7; Stone, Crisis, 216.
105 Camden, i.127; Churchyard's Choice, sig. Kii verso; and app. 6, below, p. 419.
of Sir Arthur Champernowne, whose assistance to the Huguenot cause has been discussed. The parish had great martial potential, being able to field no fewer than forty-seven men, an unusually high number; and of these only one was an archer, as opposed to seven arquebusiers, though in the county as a whole archers outnumbered shot by more than two to one. The militarisation of nearby Modbury, the home parish of Henry Champernowne, was even more remarkable: it could field 110 able men, of whom eighteen were archers and twenty-nine arquebusiers. That this was not coincidence, but reflected a lord of the manor of warlike intent, is hinted at by the fact that in Champernowne's will, the very first of his goods to be bequeathed were his 'corsiettes, pikes and other armes', to his uncle Sir Arthur. Nearby, St Budeaux was the home of Henry's lieutenant, Philip Buddockshide and his uncle, Roger Buddockshide, the wealthiest man of a parish which mustered the unusually high total of fifty-one able men, including fifteen arquebusiers (but only seven archers).

The Somerset gentleman Edward Berkeley, who fought in Henry Champernowne's cornet of horse in France, need not have served alone. In 1569, his father, Sir Maurice Berkeley, was able personally to field no fewer than six demi-lances and two light horse. It is striking that Brewton, the home of the Berkeleys, could field as many as ninety-six able men; while eleven of the eighty-five foot were arquebusiers, as opposed to fifteen archers, though in the county generally there were only 382 calivermen and arquebusiers, and 2,900 archers. It is likely that such military strength reflects the direct influence of the wealthy and important Berkeley family, with their personal interest in military activities.

In Dorset, also in the muster of 1569, the trained men of the liberty of Melbury Stampforde comprised 'none but John Yonge Esquyer and his servauntes', totaling no less than twenty men, including four horsemen, with the balance all pike and shot (i.e., no archers or billmen, although they made

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106 A. J. Howard and T. L. Stoate, eds., The Devon Muster Roll for 1569 (Bristol: privately printed, 1977), 1-2, 36-37, 64, 215, 245.
107 Ibid., 215-18. PRO, PROB II/52, f. 239v.
108 Howard and Stoate, Devon Muster Roll, 184.
110 See Hasler, 1:429-32; Green, Certificates of Musters, xix-xx. Sir Maurice was chief banner-bearer of England to Henry VIII in 1544 and served Edward VI and Mary in their campaigns.
up 63.4 per cent of the county's militia as a whole). Such a degree of martial preparedness and 'modernity' suggests this was the otherwise unidentified John Young, who the next year distinguished himself in action with the Huguenots near La Rochelle. The tithing of Horton could field ten foot, plus one horseman, while the nearby tithing of More Crichel could field nine foot, plus, again, one horseman -- the two horsemen were Francis and Henry Uvedale, the father and uncle of Edmund Uvedale (or Udall), who in 1584-85 was a captain in Dutch pay; a kinsman, Hugh Udall, fought as a volunteer for the Huguenots in 1569-70.

Not only did many mercenaries have militarised affinities; in a number of cases they or their families also had a history of deploying them for private ends. The followers of Sir John Selby's family successfully prosecuted a feud with a rival family, in which a number of the latter's dependants were killed and wounded; it would have been curious if Selby's company in Dutch pay had not included some of these devoted, warlike followers. The same is true of the family affinity of George Gascoigne, company commander in Zeeland and Holland in 1572-74. In 1557 he had taken part with his father, Sir John Gascoigne, in a notable armed assault on a rival local gentleman, accompanied by twenty armed yeomen and retainers of their family, and these men were in action again in an affray with Lord Latimer in 1564. Sir John Holles's grandfather had been known for his 'very great' retinue of 'fifty followers in ... blue coates and badges', while his father led a band of 252 foot in the army sent against the Northern Rebellion in 1569. Holles himself waged a bitter private war against the Markham family (part of the larger, notorious feud between the Talbots and Stanhopes), which included at least one armed affray between their followers, and he relied on extended family members and their own followers in this feud. This further suggests

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112 See ch. 3, above, p. 105. John Yonge (or Young) was a very common name.
113 DNB, 20:75-78; family pedigree, Bodl., Rawl. MS B.139, f. 5v; Stoate, Dorset Tudor Muster Rolls, 155-56; Churchyard's Choice, sig. Kii.
115 Holles, Memorials, 45, 63; Tenison, 1/2:42.
that his affinity continued to embody military potential, even if the formal
retinue of his grandfather's day had been discontinued and regardless of
whether he obliged his tenants to serve or not.

Several captains who served the Dutch in the 1580s (John, Edward
and Henry Norreys, Michael Harcourt, and possibly Captains Wayman and
Bridges) were from Thames valley families that had maintained retinues in
mid-century.\(^\text{117}\) The Norreys brothers' maternal grandfather, Lord Williams of
Thame, maintained a retinue from the 1540s and raised large numbers of
men from his estates and from royal stewardships during the succession
crisis of 1553; their father kept a store of arms sufficient for over a hundred
men, along with two cannon, as part of his household until his death in
1601.\(^\text{118}\) The family military capacity was mobilised for John and his brethren.
Early in 1574 he took to Ulster, to join Essex, a company of eighty foot, raised
under his father's supervision in Berkshire and Oxfordshire (where the bulk
of the family's lands lay), comprising 'servants, tenants [and] other "proper
men" who owed allegiance to the Norreys family.'\(^\text{119}\) As commander of the
royal army in Brittany (1591-94) he cooperated closely with his father, now
Lord Lieutenant of Berkshire and Oxfordshire, to facilitate the dispatch of
Berkshire men as reinforcements -- probably a continuation of arrangements
existing while Norreys fils led the queen's army in the Netherlands. It would
be natural if it was also their practice when he was employed by the States.\(^\text{120}\)
Norreys's biographer suggests that Lord Norreys used his position as Lord
Lieutenant to build up the family armoury 'which then outfitted his sons [sic]
companies' (although there is no direct evidence for this).\(^\text{121}\) The sons
developed their own military resources. When the oldest brother, William
Norreys went to Ireland in 1579, for example, he was accompanied by 'divers
gentlemen ... very well horsed'; John's pay for his service as Lord President
of Munster in 1584-85 was for 'himself and his Retynewes'.\(^\text{122}\)

\(^{117}\) Peter C. Beauchamp, ed., The Oxfordshire Muster Rolls 1539. 1542. 1569 (Oxfordshire
Record Soc., 60, 1996), xxx-xxxi.
\(^{118}\) Ibid., xxxii; GEC, 12/2:651; Nolan, Norreys, 16; Sharp, In Contemplt of All Authority, 20.
\(^{119}\) PC to Norreys, 25 Feb. 1573, APC, 8:201-2; Nolan, Norreys, 23.
\(^{120}\) Lord Norreys to Henry Neville, 5 Oct. 1592, Berkshire RO, D/EN 04/1. See Nolan, Norreys,
16-17.
\(^{121}\) Nolan, Norreys, 17.
\(^{122}\) John Savage to Rutland, 8 Oct. 1579, HMCR, 118; Norreys's 'reconninge', 1585, Bodl., St
Amand MS 10, ff. 15r-16r, at 15r.
The gentry maintained small martial dependences, centred upon their households and clienteles, to the very end of the period. In the so-called Midland Revolt (1607), the Northamptonshire trained bands were disaffected and unreliable. Accordingly, the county JPs, having decided the local rebels had to be dealt with by force, recruited horse from the local gentry and foot from ‘many of their owne servants and followers’. It is notable that among the Northamptonshire JPs were Sir Robert Wingfield, a veteran of Mountjoy’s royal army in Ireland and kinsman of several mercenaries; Sir Edward Watson who, like his relative, Thomas, had served in States’-pay in the mid-1580s; and Sir George Farmer, who, together with his kinsman, Richard Farmer, commanded three hundred Northamptonshire and Huntingdonshire volunteers in Dutch employ in 1586-87.

Mercenary Captains as Military Patrons

In many cases, then, captains had, or came from families that had, militarised affinities. If in some cases all that is known is that they possessed a martial potential, there are sufficient surviving instances of how that potential was deployed to underline the vital importance of affinities in recruiting for service in France and the Netherlands.

As with greater patrons, captains’ affinity connections sometimes were the basis of recruitment for multi-unit forces. Gilbert raised at least some of his men in 1572 through affinity connections: at Flushing in early September, he was counting on his ‘Weste-Countre ... freyndes’ to find ‘moer sodiers to come’ over. When Cavendish raised his own regiment in 1578, he initially created his own military clientele, taking into his service many experienced officers. In addition, however, he drew on a wider militarised affinity, already existing and drawn from Staffordshire and Derbyshire. It is notable that he used ‘his servantes and folowers’ in local ‘matters of quarrell and pyke’.

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125 Gilbert to Burghley, 7 Sept. 1572, KL, no. 2461, 6:510.

126 Shrewsbury to Burghley, 30 May 1592, Longleat, Talbot Papers, MS 2, f. 102 (I owe this reference to Paul Hammer); and see Wood, Cavendish His Journey, p. vi, citing APC, 22:463-64, 510-1, 518-19.
Leicester wrote in his letter of reference that among the soldiers Cavendish was bringing over, some were 'of purpose trayned and expert souldiours': that purpose being 'by their skyll to supply ... any want ... in him selfe'. These included Captains Edwards, Fitzwilliam, Liggins, Palmer and Wingfield, several of whom were veterans of the opstand; as well as Richard Bingham. The members of this military clientele dominated the regiment's officer corps. However, 'the moste parte' of Cavendish's five to six hundred soldiers were, as Leicester observed, men 'of his own countrye [...] where he dwelleth [who] of good will are desirous to followe him'; they were drawn from leading local families, including known clients of the Cavendish-Talbots clan, among them at least one captain, William Markham.\textsuperscript{127}

The modus operandi of patronage is also apparent in the selection of subalterns, supernumeries and gentlemen rankers. Captains preferred men from their personal or family affinities as often as they obliged allies or their own patrons.

The captains of John Norreys's regiment in the Netherlands in 1578-84 included in addition to his two brothers, Edward and Henry, Captain Doyley, whose family were clients and kinsmen of Lord Norreys.\textsuperscript{128} Adams identifies four (out of twenty-one) Dutch-paid captains in 1585 as 'immediate followers' of Norreys, including the treasurer at war, Richard Huddlestone, his cousin; but additionally his force's provost-marshal was Peter Cripps -- in Churchyard's words, 'a follower of [Norreys] in ... his first service, and in all others afterwards for a long time'.\textsuperscript{129} Captain John Brookesby's ensign in 1579 was one Joseph Brookesby.\textsuperscript{130} In 1582, John North appointed as a captain in his regiment Thomas Kellaway -- probably one of the Kellaways which were clients of Lord North.\textsuperscript{131} The captains of Vere's regiment from 1595 through 1597 are suggestive of a dependence, since they included a brother, Horace and a kinsman, Daniel, plus Captains Heydon and Upsher -- respectively Vere's 'neighbour' and 'countryman'.\textsuperscript{132} (Sir Horace Vere later

\textsuperscript{127} Leicester to Davison, 11 Apr. 1578,KL, no. 3864, 10:408; and see MacCaffrey, 'Talbot and Stanhope', 79.
\textsuperscript{128} Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 331n.; Lord Norreys, alienation of land to John Doyley, 2 Dec. 1587, DCPR 1587-88, 94; Nolan, Norreys, 16.
\textsuperscript{129} Adams, 'Puritan Crusade', 14, TDH, 27-28.
\textsuperscript{130} Anon., 'A True Report of Maestricht', 19 Jul. 1579, CSPFor., 17:524, no. 538.
\textsuperscript{131} William Kellaway to Lord North, 30 Dec. 1586, Bodl., Douce MS 393, f. 32r.
\textsuperscript{132} Markham, Fighting Veres, 203 (it was John, not Christopher, Heydon but they were from the same family); Vere Commentaries, 115.
had another Heydon, Edward, as his regimental quartermaster. 133) In 1606 Captain Humfrey Parkes had as one of his subalterns a Mr. Lucas, who was one of his followers. 134 A few years later, the lieutenant of Captain Thomas Sanderson was his eldest son, Robert. 135

Officers also selected their rank and file from men with whom they had an affinity connection. Henry Champernowne's lieutenant in 1569 was his cousin Philip Buddockshide and they had other relatives serving in the ranks of his troop: Walter and Carew Ralegh, and Gawain Champernowne, their first cousins; Edward and Francis Berkeley, Champernowne's half-brothers; and Thomas Courtney, probably his third cousin. 136 Robert Gainsford joined the company of his brother Giles as a private soldier in 1576 and Francis Vere's first service in the Netherlands in 1581-82 was in the ranks of Roger Williams's company of horse -- in which his older brother, John Vere, was the lieutenant. 137 Edmund Uvedale had at least one relative, Jacob Uvedale, serving with him in his queen's-pay company in 1586 and he may well have also served when Uvedale was in States'-pay. 138 One of the troopers of Sir John Norreys's mercenary horse band in 1587 was William Norris (probably a member of the Fifield branch of the Norris family), formerly a lieutenant. 139 Holles, who placed his kin and servants with Sir Francis Vere, as discussed already, was himself Vere's cousin by marriage. John Ridgeway's company in Dutch service in 1603 included his brother and family servants. 140

As this last example indicates, the rank and file were not only drawn from officers' kin, but from their servants, tenants and clients -- both those which were aristocrats and those which were not. Henry Killigrew's family

133 SG warrant, 27 May 1606, RSQ, 13:705.
135 Holles, Memorials, 72.
137 Muster roll, 21 May 1576, ARA, CO 37, n.f.; muster roll, 20 Aug. 1582, CSPFor., 16:260, no. 263; Williams to Burghley, 13 May 1591, PRO, SP 78/24, f. 132r.
139 Muster roll, 8 May 1587, ARA, RAGP I:197, f. [4v]; Henry A. Napier, Historical Notices of the Parishes of Swyncombe and Ewelme (Oxford: privately printed, 1858), 255.
140 Browne to Sidney, 16 Sep. 1603, HMCD, 3:59; Daniel Poyntz to Thomas Poyntz, 17 July 1604, KB, 132.G.27, n.f.
had a long history of retaining -- and using -- armed servants; among the
English troops which in 1562 he led to Normandy before the the royal army's
departure were five horsemen 'whose wages and equipment were paid out
of his own pocket'. 141 Two of Henry Champernowne's neighbours, Richard
Kirkham and one 'Rannolls', were gentlemen volunteers in his troop in 1569
and may have had other ties to him. 142 John Owen first saw service under
Thomas Morgan at Flushing. His Welsh name and the fact that he first fought
under Morgan suggests they had a pre-existing connection -- a deduction
reinforced by the fact that, after service with four or five other captains, Owen
found a berth with Morgan again as a gentleman volunteer. 143 Edward
Harwood first service as a page may well have been with Sir John Ogle,
whose wealthier family was from an adjacent Lincolnshire village. 144

These cases are suggestive, rather than definitive, but other examples
are unambiguous. George Peters, a Sussex man, served as a soldier with
the Beggars in 1571 alongside five other servants of his (unknown) master. 145
At least one of Edward Chester's servitors, Richard Lazenbee, joined his
master and served as a soldier in Holland from 1574. 146 John Probarte, who
first saw action as a gentleman ranker in Captain Thomas Wilson's band in
Flanders in the 1580s, was one of Wilson's household. 147 Captain Richard
Chatterton was originally 'a man' of Thomas Morgan's. 148 The troopers of
John Norreys's horse band in 1586-7 included not only his kinsman William
Norris (as noted above) but also one of his fidèles, Audley Dannett, and
Henry Cripps -- possibly a kinsman of his devoted follower, Peter Cripps. 149

141 Miller, Sir Henry Killigrew, 82; see ibid., 5, 8, 17; H. L. Douch, ed., The Cornwall Muster Roll
for 1562 (Bristol: privately printed, 1984), 78.
Arthur Champerowne Jr to Essex, 19 Dec. 1598, HMCS, 8:509. Since one Thomas Kirkham
married Thomazine Carew, first cousin of Henry Champerowne, Richard Kirkham may have
been his kinsman by marriage: J. L Vivian, ed., The Visitation of the County of Cornwall, in the
143 Owen's list of his services, c 1593, BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 127r.
144 See Joseph Jackson Howard and Joseph Lemuel Chester, eds., Visitation of London,
145 NNBW, 8: col. 1254.
146 Inventory of Lazenbee's goods, 1574, GAL, Archief der Secretarie 1364.
147 Probarte's list of his services, c. 1593, BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 130r.
148 Morgan to Leicester, 2 Jun. 1581, BL, Cott. MS Titus B vii, f. 58r.
149 Muster roll, 8 May 1587, RAGP I:197, ff. 3v, 14v. Dannett had been Norreys's secretary
(Hasler, 2:12) and was later a staff officer in the royal army he commanded in Brittany: 'A Briele
Accompte [...] ', 1 Oct. 1591, PRO, SP12/240, f. 55r.
We have already noted the Norreys family's use of a retinue; it is striking that when Sir John left the Netherlands in 1587 he was accompanied by twenty men of this band who, like retainers, wore coats and rode horses all provided at his expense. Sir Philip Sidney's States'-pay company of foot in 1586 included his servants, while at least one of Sir Robert Drury's soldiers in 1600 was 'a Gentleman, being a servant of his'. When the Vere brothers went to the Netherlands in 1585 they took old and loyal family servants with them, and later several of the Veres' servants became the nucleus of the embryonic staff which they had as Generals.

The earlier analysis of the first Earl of Essex's expedition to Ulster revealed how gentlemen servants, within the rank-and-file of Elizabethan military companies, were frequently themselves accompanied by kinsmen, servants, tenants and (less often) clients. The same is true of gentlemen volunteers in mercenary companies -- like their captains, they solicited their followers to serve with them.

In 1567, the small parties of English gentlemen serving as volunteers with the Huguenots were essentially kinship groups: John Norreys served with his older brother, William; in another group were Champernowne, Buddockshide and Richard Grenville, their cousin by marriage. In 1572, Edward and Henry Jobson (the former a retainer, the latter probably a client, of Leicester) both served under Gilbert. Simon Norwich, a Northamptonshire gentleman, went to the Netherlands in 1575 and took two servants with him. In 1578, when one of Rutland's servants, William Gunter, wanted to serve in the Netherlands, he noted in his request for permission that he had arranged for 'some of my friends to spend some time there' with him. When in 1586 Robert Fulford and John Tracy, Junior, answered Leicester's call for volunteers of horse, each was accompanied by a brother, James Fulford and Giles Tracy respectively; both, plus John Tracy, rose to captaincies in Dutch

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150 Above, p. 273; Nolan, Norreys, 104.
151 CS commission, 26 May 1586, ARA, RvS 1524/i, f. 38v; Vere Commentaries, 158, 162.
152 Markham, Fighting Veres, 25, 43, 50; Rowe, Expansion, 402-4; Vere Commentaries, 161, 182, 197, 200, 205.
153 App. 5, below, p. 365; Rowe, Sir Richard Grenville, 62.
154 Newsletter, 13 Aug. 1572, Longleat, DP2, f. 7v; bill for Leicester's livery cloth, [1567-68], in Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 426 (and see ibid., 30n.).
155 License to go beyond the seas, 9 Mar. 1575, PRO, E 157/1, f. 1.
156 Gunter to Rutland, 23 Feb. 1578, HMCR, 116.
157 'The whole nomber of horsemen at the Hage', Tenison, 6:46.
pay. As we have seen, Lord Hunsdon asked his East Anglian clients to help his son, Edmund, to gather volunteers, but he could not have expected three hundred of his followers (if he even had so many in the two counties) to enlist directly -- the logical deduction is that Hunsdon expected his clients, like the first Earl of Essex's, to fill the band's ranks by bringing in their own followers. John Holles had preceded his younger brothers as a volunteer in Sir Francis Vere's company, but at that time was accompanied by one of his servants, Robert Orme. Later, at the end of the period, William Booth obtained places in an English company first for himself and then for a cousin.

Mercenaries: Scum or Cream of Society?

The vital role of affinities in recruiting is, finally, evident in the end product of recruiting -- the 'labour force' (in Redlich's phrase). Companies were built up of gentlemen -- enlisted through patronage connections, serving in the ranks, whether recruited directly by captains and/or patrons, or as followers of other gentlemen. As a result, an unusually high proportion of the English and Welsh mercenaries employed by foreign Protestants were aristocrats. Rather than being the 'scum of the earth', many were the cream of society.

Most of the examples cited so far, revealing the workings of patronage in recruiting, are from the experience of captains and units of foot, rather than of horse. This is important, since the horse, due to its prestige and traditional associations, would naturally attract a high number of aristocratic volunteers. That so many gentlemen served with the foot is important, for their numbers, quality and effectiveness have been downplayed by modern scholars such as Dop, on the basis of a limited survey of literary texts, rather than a scrutiny of records. The percentage of gentlemen rankers in English mercenary companies was greater, often much greater, than in other foot companies in Dutch service, in the French armies, or most royal English forces.

Sergeants and corporals were widely regarded as 'gentlemen' at this time, so the actual number of aristocratic mercenaries was much higher
than the numbers of gentleman rankers. However, the proportions of officers did not differ significantly in companies of all types in all nations' service. The Anglo-Welsh mercenaries were unusual in the proportion of 'gentlemen voluntaries'. Fifty years ago Professor Wijn drew attention to this, vis-à-vis other nationalities in Dutch service during the early years of the opstand, but his insight has not been pursued, perhaps because it was only a passing comment.\(^{162}\) Early in the revolt, the proportion of noble private soldiers in foot units serving the rebels varied from a high of 7.07 per cent down to 1.09 per cent and nil, and was typically at the lower end of this spectrum (see table 4). This was not high, but it would decline further.

### Table 4. Percentage of Nobles in Ranks of Selected Non-English Companies in Dutch Employ, 1573-77\(^ {165}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Captain</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Noble Rankers</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Jacques Hennebart</td>
<td>1573</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>ARA, CO 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Duran</td>
<td>1575</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>CO 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. van Egmont</td>
<td>1575</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.07</td>
<td>CO 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. de la Garde</td>
<td>1575</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>CO 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Jacques Cristall</td>
<td>1577</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>CO 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>586</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.90</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Noord-Hollandsche regiment's establishment provided for noble rankers in 1574; it no longer did so in 1583.\(^ {164}\) After the reforms of the 1590s there was no provision for edelluyden at all in the establishments of Dutch foot companies.\(^ {165}\) Elsewhere, although the Spanish infantry was known for its high numbers of noble pike trailers, Wood's study indicates that they made up only between 3 and 6 per cent of French royal foot bands.\(^ {166}\) In England, provision was made for gentlemen volunteers in royal forces throughout the

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\(^ {162}\) Wijn, 'Noordhollandsche regiment', 241.

\(^ {163}\) The sources in each case are muster rolls. This is necessarily a random sample, determined by survival of muster rolls. In each case strengths are actual, rather than establishment.

\(^ {164}\) See SL, 1:254-57.

\(^ {165}\) Regulations of 1595 and 1599, ARA, CAan. 877, RvS 2476, pp. 91-92, and FAB 46, n.f.

sixteenth century, but in small numbers, varying from about one per twenty-five to one per sixty-six of establishment (between 4.0 and 1.5 per cent).\footnote{Charles Cruickshank, *Henry VIII and the Invasion of France* (Stroud: Sutton, 1990), 148-49. Elizabethan regulations: Jan. 1586, CSPFor., 20:340-41; 28 Sep. 1587, ARA, FAB 46, n.f.; 27 Jul. 1589, APC, 17:443; and 28 Sep. 1589, ARA, SG 5881-II, n.f.}

By contrast, at least one-third of the three hundred volunteers Morgan took to Flushing in June 1572 were gentlemen, as noted in chapter 3. This was a very high proportion indeed and such heights were not reached again, but relatively large numbers were not exceptional. A high percentage of aristocrats is a feature of the English mercenary companies in the period 1560-1610. Furthermore, in the mercenary companies, unlike other units in the Dutch and English armies, it remained common for gentlemen to serve 'in the ranks' into the seventeenth century. Although precise figures cannot be calculated, the order of magnitude is obvious from both impressionistic and detailed descriptions, surviving in both memorialistic and documentary sources -- including the few surviving muster rolls of actual companies.\footnote{In calculating numbers of gentlemen volunteers a conservative approach has been taken. Generally, men are only counted if their 'rank' is clear in the roll, but additionally some men on rolls can be identified as members of gentry families, either by context or their occurrence in other sources. Those about whom the evidence does not permit a firm conclusion have not been counted; thus, the following figures are minimums.}

Champernowne's company in the third civil war in France is known to have been a hundred strong; Camden in his history stated that the men were all 'Noble, voluntary, Gentlemen', but even if this was an exaggeration, the brief description of the company's exploits by Thomas Churchyard (who knew some of its members and was writing closer to the time) singles out several for praise and thus reveals that, even in the unlikely event that they were the only gentlemen in the cornet, at least 14 per cent of its rank and file were aristocrats.\footnote{Camden, i, 224; Churchyard's Choice, sig. Kii verso.} Only five of the band of 179 men at Brill at the end of June 1572 can be identified as gentlemen volunteers (2.8 per cent), but at this stage Morgan's 300-strong battalion included at least a hundred gentlemen volunteers and many of the (admittedly much smaller) force with Louis of Nassau at Mons were also gentlemen.\footnote{Muster roll, ARA, CO 73. See above, ch. 3, pp. 115-16, 112.} Thus, perhaps 20 per cent of all the English and Welsh soldiers in the Netherlands in June 1572 were aristocratic volunteers. The proportion in Gilbert's regiment which followed in July and August is not known, but frequent references in the soldiers' letters indicate
that it was significant. The following spring Elizabeth, as her chief minister admitted, had 'much a doo' to prevent 'hir people ... from aventryng in gret nombres ... to Rochell ... not of the popular but noble men and gentlemen'.

Now, in 1575 only two or three of 103 men in William Baude's company in Holland are identifiable as gentlemen volunteers and in Gainsford's band the ratio was between one per nineteen and one per twenty men (about 5 per cent). However, two years earlier, gentlemen volunteers comprised more than 10 per cent of the total strength of the companies of Morgan's and Chester's regiments, as shown in table 5.

Table 5. Percentage of Gentlemen Volunteers in Selected English Companies in Dutch Employ, 1573

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Captain</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Gentlemen rankers</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Chester*</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Green</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Morris</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Wore</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. York*</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTALS | 1,144 | 124 | 10.84 |

* Two companies, mustered together

As many as one in six (16 per cent) of Norreys's 1,696 men in 1578 may have been gentlemen rankers. Count Bossu, the victorious States' general at Rijmenam, for one, was struck by the presence of large groups of aristocratic volunteers, serving together in the ranks of Norreys's regiment.

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171 E.g., Longleat, DP 2, ff. 7, 9r; KL, nos. 2442, 2473, 2476, 2479, 6:465, 529, 532, 534.
172 Burghley to Walsingham, 27 Mar. 1573, BL, Cotton MS Vespasian F.vi, f. 5v.
173 But many more may have been -- muster roll, 1 Sep. 1575, ARA, CO 30.
174 Musters, 1 Sep. and 5 Nov. 1575, ARA, CO 37: 5 out of 92 and 5 out of 100.
175 Calculated from several separate muster documents in ARA, CO 29, all n.f. Again, as in table 4, these are all actual, not establishment, strengths.
176 SG order for payment, 7 Aug. 1578, ARA, RAGP III:28, ff. 1r, 3-9, esp. 5v [foliation mine] -- the conclusion is tentative due to the near illegibility of the manuscript. There are what appear to be breakdowns of the total number into different categories of pay-rates: a higher wage is one way of distinguishing gentlemen volunteers.
177 As reported by Williams to Leicester, 8 Nov. 1578, KL, no. 4283, 11:315.
William Blandy's eyewitness narrative of the Friesland campaign in 1580 mentions by name sixty of the soldiers who took part: colonels Norreys and Morgan, plus one major, eleven captains, nine lieutenants, six ensigns, two corporals and twenty-nine others, twenty-two of whom were gentlemen volunteers.\textsuperscript{178}

Those veterans who turned writers consistently stress the role played in operations by 'gentlemen' (as opposed to officers). Of course, the authors were themselves gentlemen, writing for those who could read and afford to buy books. They had an incentive, then, to highlight the achievements of those soldiers who, like both the authors and the probable readership, were of the nobilitas. However, they happily praise the deeds of 'private soldiers' and distinguish clearly between officers, gentlemen and ordinary soldiers, whether narrating their exploits, or outlining the theoretical organisation of an army and its table of ranks.\textsuperscript{179} These works all indicate the high proportion of nobiles serving at all levels in the mercenary companies.

This remained characteristic of the English companies into the second half of the period in question. It was one in twelve (8.33 per cent) in John Scott's band raised for Norreys's force in the States-General's pay in 1585.\textsuperscript{180} The queen felt it necessary to warn him to be careful of the lives of 'the yong gentlemen of best birth that did accompany youe'.\textsuperscript{181} Two years later, when gentlemen volunteers comprised 6.4 per cent (more than one in sixteen) of Norreys's cavalry company,\textsuperscript{182} the queen observed that the English troops in the Netherlands were 'as many of them nobles as others'.\textsuperscript{183} It was an exaggeration, but conveyed a truth. In 1600 Sir Francis Vere's company had an establishment strength of two hundred. At the Battle of Nieuwpoort that year, sixteen 'gentlemen of Sir Francis companie' were killed: even in the highly

\textsuperscript{178} Blandy, passim.

\textsuperscript{179} See Churchyard, Description, 54, 67; Churchyard's Choice, sigs. Ai-i, Sii recto; idem, Taking of Macklin, sigs. Ci-Cii; TDH, 11, 19, 21; Gates, 45-46, 58; Blandy, 18v-26r; Tragicall Historie, 3:116, 4:64; Williams, Discourse, 49, and Actions, 87, 104, 119, 147; Markham, Epistles of Warre, 17, 25-28; and the works cited in n.184, over. See also Webb, Elizabethan Military Science, 57, 78-79, 82.

\textsuperscript{180} Adams, 'Puritan Crusade', 16, citing PRO, SP 12/181/48: 12 out of 144, three times the royal establishment. Although taken into royal pay, it was originally a mercenary company.

\textsuperscript{181} Elizabeth to Norreys, 31 Oct. 1585, Bodl., St. Amand MS 8, f. 59r.

\textsuperscript{182} Muster roll, 9 Jul. 1587, ARA, RAGP I:197.

\textsuperscript{183} Elizabeth to SG, 15 Jun. 1587, ARA, SG 12576, n.f.: 'vous aydant aussi d'un nombre si grande des nos subjects, tant de ceux de la noblesse que d'aultres'
unlikely event that all the gentlemen volunteers were slain they had still comprised at least 8 per cent of the unit, with its establishment of two hundred. A range of contemporary correspondence and memoirs bear witness to a very high proportion of gentlemen volunteers involved in the great campaigns of 1600-2, the siege of Ostend, the decisive fighting in 1606-7 and finally the campaign against Jülich in 1610.

It was not only gentlemen who served as private soldiers. When peers went into foreign service they did not necessarily do so as captains. Indeed, of the twenty-nine peers or heirs to titles who fought for the Huguenots or Dutch to 1610, twenty did so as gentlemen volunteers; although several later became captains or generals in royal service, the only experience of military service many of them had was as a 'voluntary'. The very high proportion of aristocrats serving as private soldiers in French and Dutch pay is striking. It testifies to the way in which captains and their patrons, through the pyramidal structure of affinities, used ties of affection, loyalty and obligation, to put men into the field to fight the wars of Jacob.

Affinities and Recruiting for Jacob's Wars: Conclusion

It is appropriate to conclude with the assessment of Sir John Smythe, himself a veteran of mercenary service against the Turks in the 1550s and 1560s, but not an admirer of those who served in France and the Netherlands per se. Smythe was undoubtedly eccentric, but he had experience not only as a soldier of fortune, but in government at both national and county level. And he was the only contemporary to attempt to analyse the social composition of the English troops in the Netherlands -- including those who served there as mercenaries. His views therefore deserve serious consideration, regardless of his personal parochialism (or peculiarity). He wrote:

184 Chamberlain to Carleton, 1 Jul. 1600, Chamberlain Letters, no. 31, 1:103. For the strength of Vere's colonel's company, see app. 1, below, p. 334.
185 Vere Commentaries, 158, 162, 178, 180-81, 195, 205, 209; Aubigné, 3:97; Chamberlain Letters, nos. 47-48, 119, 1:146, 150, 297; Sydney Papers, 2:228; HMCS, 11:293; anon., The Copie of a Letter from the Campe before Grave (London: 1602), sig. A3v; Histoire remarquable, 18v; HMCD, 3:260-1; anon., The True Coppy of a Certaine Letter from Sluce, Concerning an exploit attempted by the enemie against the said towne (London: J. Flasket, 1606); Raban, sigs. E1v-E2r; Life of Edward Herbert, 54-57.
186 See app. 3, below, pp. 351-53.
But now for excuse used by some ... for the ... loss of such great numbers and many thousands of our gallant English people in those Low Country Wars, as also in later wars ... some ... have not been ashamed many times to report and say that all those brave people ... were the very scum, thieves, and rogues of England and therefore have been very well lost .... Whereas, contrariwise, it is very well known unto all the justices of peace in all shires from whence those soldiers did go ... even from the beginning of the first voluntary wars until this day ... that they were in very great part young gentlemen, and in a far greater part of yeomen and yeomen’s sons and the rest of the bravest sort of artificers and other lusty young men, desirous, of a gallantness of mind, to adventure themselves and see the wars; ... and there were no rogues nor thieves nor the scum of England, as [some do] oftentimes report, for it is very well known in all shires by experience that such malefactors and base-minded people never had any desire nor will to go into wars and actions military, but have hidden and absented themselves away.\textsuperscript{187}

This sums up very well the evidence, of both contemporary publications and archival documents, as to the nature of the soldiers from England and Wales who fought for the Huguenots and Dutch between 1562 and 1610. It reflects the choice of commoners to accompany the aristocratic followers recruited into the ranks.

The answer to the question of how the mercenary captains recruited their labour force is now clear. Generally unable to resort to impressment, they raised soldiers by turning to their gentry kin and clients and/or those of their patrons, who in turn brought in their own servants, tenants and friends (to use the very terminology of so many of the references quoted above): just as English and Welsh captains had raised troops for at least two centuries. Even though publicly-solicited volunteers and impressed conscripts were to be found in the mercenaries’ ranks, men who had strong ties to their leaders, whether gentlemen volunteers or officers, made up the bulk of those fighting in Jacob’s wars. All the evidence indicates that at the heart of the mercenary forces were men with strong ties of loyalty to those who led them.

The contrast with the usual historiographical picture of ‘the mercenary’ (outlined in the first part of chapter 2) could not be more marked. Rather than

\textsuperscript{187} Certain Discourses Military, 25-26 (emphasis mine). Smythe is often quoted and/or cited by military historians, but only Webb, Elizabethan Military Science, 74-75, cites the view expressed here (and he makes little of it). It is used by a literary critic (Breight, 215), who distorts the sense by quoting neither those parts referring to voluntary wars, nor Smythe’s characterisation of the majority of the soldiers.
press-ganged criminals, vagabonds, drunkards and misfits, the great mass of English and Welsh mercenaries serving in France and the Netherlands were gentlemen and their dependants. These social origins, and the close bonds between officers and rank and file, mean that modern stereotypes of unreliable, undependable and mutinous mercenaries are of little relevance. The unusually strong commitment of these soldiers to their employers makes sense, given the strong unit cohesion and group identity which would result from their recruiting methods. These, in turn, also reveal the enduring power of the aristocracy -- and the strong commitment of many of its leading lights to 'the Protestant cause'. The willingness of captains to serve in spite of poor financial reward indicates that they were not primarily impelled by the profit motive, as we have seen in chapter 6. Given what has been seen in this chapter, the underlying motivation of the mass of soldiers is also unlikely to have been financial. The reliance of patrons, when recruiting, on affinities, and the commitment of the soldiers indicates that the rank and file could well have shared the ideological world-view of the captains and their patrons.

Trim, 'Ideology, Mercenaries and Mutinies', 52.
CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION

In the first part of this chapter, the conclusions of the previous chapters are elaborated and related to each other. The argument and the most important findings of this thesis are summarised. Next, those secondary findings which have general implications for scholarship are outlined and the issues arising from them are briefly explored. This provides the basis for wider conclusions to be drawn. Finally, the findings of the thesis prompt obvious questions in the areas of military and religious history: some are highlighted and possible answers are outlined. These are not definitive, but are indicators of paths for future research; indeed, the need for more research emerges throughout this chapter. This conclusion, then, is (or ought to be) also a starting point.

Summary of Key Findings and Argument

As noted in chapter one, all standard histories of late-Tudor and early-Stuart England mention the participation of English and Welsh 'volunteers' (that is, mercenaries) in the wars fought in France and the Netherlands from 1562. However, neither the mercenaries' numbers, their effective function as agents for the English elite, nor their own aristocratic connections, have ever been recognised. They are therefore depicted, implicitly when not explicitly, as marginal. This study breaks new ground by revealing the dimensions of Anglo-Welsh mercenary involvement in the European wars of religion and by demonstrating the soldiers' internal and international political and social significance.

New knowledge is provided firstly by the statistical data contained in the appendixes, which allow authoritative estimates (the best that can be hoped for from this period) of mercenaries' numbers and reveal the chronological distribution of their employment. What is revealed is that actual troop strengths were much greater than has ever previously been suggested, and that significant involvement was not limited to the start of the opstand (1572), the aftermath of St Bartholomew's (1573), the first advent of Norreys (1578)
or Sir Francis Vere's heyday (1600-3), as standard narrative and textbook histories all indicate. After brief service in 1562-63 and 1567-68, English mercenaries were ubiquitous in Continental Protestant service from the autumn of 1568 to the fall of Jülich in July 1610 -- and indeed until after the end of the Eighty Years' War. More English troops were employed by the States than by the queen in 1586; the greatest sustained commitment of mercenary manpower was in 1586, 1607 and 1608.

However, the narrative and analysis in chapters 2-8 also make an original contribution to scholarly knowledge by establishing, for the first time, the origins of the mercenaries and how they came to fight the wars of Jacob. Scholars characterise them generally, with few exceptions, as mere soldiers of fortune, while just how these English and Welsh soldiers interacted with the English court and with foreign regimes has been uncertain.

They have been subsumed within the general image (described in chapter 2) of soldiers from the British Isles and mercenaries of any nationality as criminal, mendicant, destitute and/or loose-living -- mere seekers after rapine or would-be evaders of social constraints, if not actually conscripted -- and in any event undependable, led by unprincipled military entrepreneurs, seeking to exploit war for their own profit. Any connection they had with the elites would, almost by definition, be fleeting and marginal. Some individual aristocratic officers were encouraged by their noble patrons to seek foreign employment, but only 'to train with the leading continenta armies' and learn 'the military trade' more expertly so they would serve more proficiently in the crown's armed forces. A few captains were principled and capable, but had no influence on government actions. Equally, action by rivy councillors or other royal officials to facilitate military (as opposed to moral) support for the Huguenots or Orangists was almost non-existent. Only the Calvinist zealots, Leicester and Walsingham, defied the 'politique' aloofness of Elizabeth and Burghley to take an active role and even then it was limited. This is the traditional historiographical interpretation, but similar conclusions can be

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1 H. R. Knight, Historical Records of the Buffs [...] Formerly Designated the Holland Regiment, 1, 1572-1704 (London: Gale & Polden, 1905), 57-81.
2 See below, app. 2, table 6 and fig. 5, pp. 340-41.
3 Adams, 'Puritan Crusade', 11; Wilson, Revolt, 91.
4 Usefully summarised by Alford, 5-6, 216; and Susan Doran, Elizabeth I and Foreign Policy 1558-1603 (London & New York: Routledge, 2001), 47, 63-66.
drawn from more recent, revisionist work -- Adams additionally proposes that affairs were thus partly because only Leicester had an affinity with a significant military capacity. All in all, it is unsurprising that the Anglo-Welsh soldiers in French and Dutch pay are generally perceived as having been of little significance either in English internal or in international politics.

In fact, chapters 2, 7 and 8 show that the majority of mercenaries were gentlemen, yeomen and artisans, and that (unsurprisingly given such social origins) they were not recruited by the equivalent of press-gangs. Most had strong ties to their captains and those serving alongside them. Chapter 6 establishes that captains were not ruthless profiteers. Rather, as chapters 3-5 and 8 demonstrate, they were part of an English Protestant solidarity, the members of which were willing to commit considerable resources (human, financial, material), with little prospect of return, to what they regarded as a war against the enemies of true religion. In consequence of all this, English and Welshmen in Huguenot and Dutch employ were not perceived by contemporaries as serving illicitly, or as 'mercenaries'. They were regarded as a valuable asset both because of their fighting qualities (as noted in chapter 5) and because they were recognised as particularly trustworthy by the standards of the time. This is why the Dutch remained eager after nearly forty years, to hire English and Welsh soldiers -- a mystery if the accepted image was accurate.

Moreover, chapters 3-5 and 8 reveal that the Protestant solidarity in England possessed considerable martial power, and that its military assets were reasonably widely distributed. Leicester did not have a 'near monopoly of military patronage in the thirty years between 1558 and his death'. The Herbert affinity was also clearly a major source of recruits until at least the mid-1580s, while there is also strong evidence that Bedford, Cobham and others deployed military resources on behalf of continental Protestants; the actual military capacity of these (and other) nobles warrants further research. They were friends and allies, but not clients, of Leicester. To subsume their resources and endeavour under him is to misrepresent

NB above, pp. 59, 285.
See, e.g., Browne to Sidney, HMCD, 3:177-79; Ralegh, History of the World, 578; also Croft, 'Serving the Archduke', 295; and Trim, 'Ideology, Mercenaries and Mutinies', 50-54.
Adams, 'English Military Clientele', 224.
their autonomy, and the breadth both of existing aristocratic military power and of support for military action on behalf of European Protestants. Furthermore, the contribution to the war-effort of the middle-ranking affinities of the Champernowne, Cavendish, Norreys and Holles families, indicates that military power was not limited to the great nobility, even apart from the fact that the larger martial dependences were ultimately built up from the combined military resources of many minor gentry. These findings indicate that late sixteenth-century English society was militarised to a greater extent than social historians currently recognise -- here, too, further research is needed.

In addition, chapters 3-5 reveal the significance of mercenaries in the formulation of English policy, and in England's relations with other countries. Their potential influence on the making of English policy, particularly on the Netherlands, has been little appreciated; this is especially true of the reign of Elizabeth. Nor has their importance simply as the men in place, on the ground, been sufficiently recognised. For much of the period the English government drew much of its information on events and attitudes in France and the Netherlands from mercenaries and their associates. As chapters 3-4 establish, when the Elizabethan regime acted to aid the Huguenots and Dutch the execution of its plans was very often in the hands of mercenary captains, acting beyond the reach and sometimes beyond the control of their patrons. Moreover, as chapter 5 demonstrates, mercenaries played a vital mediating role between England and the United Provinces. To be sure, only Norreys and Vere actively participated in policy debates at the highest levels of the two governments, but the many officers holding commissions in both national military hierarchies ensured that Anglo-Dutch cooperation never broke down. Mercenaries, whether as active participants in, or the subjects of, international discussions could facilitate or frustrate the coordination of different national interests. This pivotal role needs to be examined and

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9 There have been intimations of the central place of mercenaries in James's reign: compare Dalton, 1:11, 184-98; Pauline Croft 'The Parliamentary Installation of Henry, Prince of Wales', HR 65 (1992): 181; idem, 'Serving the Archduke'; and Trim, 'Sir Horace Vere', 344-46.
9 On Vere's role, see ch. 5, above, pp. 180-81. Although Norreys was sent as an ambassador to the United Provinces after ceasing mercenary service, he was used because of the prestige and contacts he built up in Dutch employ. For his embassies, see Nolan, Norreys, 129-31; Wernham, After, 271, 276-78.
assessed in more depth if we are to understand fully the relationship between England and European Protestants.

What is additionally clear from chapters 3-8 is that mercenaries did more in national politics than influence Privy Council debates by providing information to its members, or act on their behalf in negotiations with foreign factions and governments. And even that sort of influence was not simply due to coincidence or happenstance as, for example, was the case with many merchants who provided intelligence to, or acted as intermediaries for, the regime, because they were simply in the right place at the right time. The English and Welsh soldiers in French and Dutch pay were there by design. They did not only informally influence policy-making -- they were employed abroad as part of a conscious programme. Their actions, as informants and diplomats, as well (of course) as soldiers, resulted from a policy of providing military aid to Protestants in France and the Netherlands; their permanence after 1568 was the fruit of an equally persistent determination among the English élite to support foreign Protestants.

The extent of concern among members of that élite for developments in the European wars of religion, and the breadth of willingness to contribute active support, which alike emerge from this study, have implications for our understanding both of English Protestants' attitudes to their Continental counterparts and of the English government's foreign policy. These are considered below. It is safe to conclude that the full extent to which the Protestant élite in England acted to support their French and Dutch allies has not been realised -- this is among the most important findings of this thesis.

To sum up, in arguing that mercenaries were from aristocratic affinities and serving the policy ends of committed Protestants, this thesis is saying something new. It establishes the broader significance of the mercenaries, by revealing their social background; their origins in a relatively widespread Protestant military solidarity within England's elites; that they were employed due to a consistent policy of the Protestant elite; and their ability to influence English government policy and English relationships with foreign Protestants more generally. In all these ways, this study makes an original contribution to our understanding of the European wars of religion of 1562-1610 and of late-Tudor and early-Stuart England and Wales.
Some Wider Conclusions

In addition to the main argument and conclusions, however, this thesis also casts light on a number of other issues of importance, some of which have already been hinted at. Some are not directly related to this study's subject matter, though they are the subject of ongoing historiographical discussion. For example, chapter 2 supports those scholars who argue for the necessity of exploring closely the language used by contemporaries, since it so often illuminates political and social processes. Chapter 6 is a contribution to the small but growing body of work that explores the actual workings of military finance and seeks to illumine this vital area in the rise of the modern state. This study contributes to the growing body of scholarship which posits that members of affinities could have agency -- that they were not necessarily mere cat's-paws of privy councillors or other patrons, but could have autonomous attitudes and, to an extent, act autonomously too. If captains were placed abroad by their patrons, in many cases this could have been at their own request; in any case, once abroad they acted independently, or even in despite, of their patrons, as chapters 4-5, in particular, indicate. Chapter 8 casts light on the debate among historians of continental Europe on whether early-modern patronage systems were necessarily limited to social elites. Its findings suggest that in England, at least, they penetrated much deeper.

In other cases, though, conclusions can be drawn from the evidence and analysis presented in this thesis which, though not directly part of its argument, are relevant to it and which provide greater understanding of the issues associated with the employment of English and Welsh mercenaries.

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11 E.g., John Guy, 'Introduction' to Tudor Monarchy, 1-7; Alford, 3, 7, 47. For an example of how examining the early-modern concepts underpinning terms still used in modern society can yield valuable insights: Margaret Greaves, The Blazon of Honour: A Study in Renaissance Magnanimity (London: Methuen, 1964).

12 See Michiel de Jong, 'Dutch Public Finance during the Eighty Years' War: The Case of the Province of Zeeland, 1585-1621', in Exercise of Arms, ed. van der Hoeven, 133-52; Guy Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in press 2002), chs 4-5.


It must be noted that, although much changed in England, France and the Netherlands over this long period, from the point of view of the English mercenaries, there was much continuity between 1562 and 1610 and for them the greatest changes came after that terminal date. Dr Laforge argues in her study of German mercenaries of the Thirty Years' War that the effects of a ‘process of secularisation’ are evident from the 1620s on and that the soldiers of the early seventeenth century lost their interest in religious ideas. It is notable that by 1639 Edmund Verney, scion of an English family with a history of service in Protestant armies, could write home from Flanders that ‘Twere sport for us to heare that all the world were in combustion, for then we could not want worke. O tis a blessed trade!’ This is in marked contrast to the English soldiers whose careers began before 1610, such as Gates, Killigrew and Holles, all quoted in chapter 1, who saw themselves as participants in a holy war, rather than a ‘blessed trade’.

The changes in the Netherlands polity in this period were, arguably, literally revolutionary. ‘The legacy of the Revolt affected almost all areas of Dutch society to a greater or lesser extent.’ However, the impact of these changes was not really felt by the English troops in Dutch employ. Only with the Counter-Remonstrant coup of 1618 did Dutch political developments directly affect the Englishmen in the republic's pay; thereafter, they were closely linked to the princely party in internal disputes. Before then, however, what chiefly affected them was alterations in the balance of power between the Dutch Republic and England, rather than within the republic. During the early days of the rebellion of Holland and Zeeland, and then from the United Provinces' slide into crisis in the early 1580s until the early 1590s, English privy councillors and patrons exercised great influence over their fellow countrymen, who looked back across the North Sea for direction. In contrast, when there was a clear central authority in the Netherlands that was itself in a strong military position, as was the case in 1577-78, briefly in

15 Laforge, 186 (‘le processus de sécularisation’), 188.
17 Above, p. 35.
19 Israel, Dutch Republic, chs 19-21; New DNB, s.n. 'Ogle, John' and 'Vere, Horace'; Rowen, 56-58.
1581 and again from the 1590s on, the Dutch were able to treat their English and Welsh soldiers simply as employees, albeit highly valued ones.

Within England, too, there was generally more continuity than change in the period, at least from the perspective of those who fought in Jacob's wars. A number of scholars identify a difference in the internal politics of the Elizabethan administration before and after the mid-1580s, especially in the unity (and hence the operation) of the Privy Council; the 1590s have even been termed a 'second reign'. However, such changes did not affect the collective attitude of the regime towards the employment of mercenaries in France and the Netherlands. The Privy Council's internal disputes about foreign and military policy during the 1560s and 1570s had been over 'the practical application of policy and not on principle' -- about how the Huguenots and Orangists should be helped, not about the need to help them. Likewise the disputes in the 1590s between the Cecils, Essex and their partisans were over how the war should be conducted, not the need to prosecute it. The moderates were not prepared to make peace at any price and their debate with Essex was about whether to attempt negotiations with the Spanish, rather than whether to make peace. The point was moot in any case, since neither England nor Spain was actually prepared to make the concessions necessary for peace: this had been the case during the various sterile diplomatic exchanges of the 1570s and 1580s and remained true of the abortive Ostend (1588) and Boulogne (1600) negotiations. Certainly it was still universally accepted that English and Welsh troops in foreign pay were a valuable part of that war effort.

It is striking that changes in the dynamics of domestic administration had little effect on the employment of mercenaries in Europe. Eventually, politics in Elizabethan England was polarised, but while this had an impact on the workings of patronage within the Anglo-Welsh companies, it did not change the conditions of service, methods of recruiting, or operations of the troops in the pay of the United Provinces. Even the accession of James VI

20 E.g., Guy, ed., Reign of Elizabeth I; cf. Alford, 209-12, 214-15; Adams, Leicester and the Court, 7, 34, 62.
21 Alford, 29; above, ch. 4, pp. 136, 146 et passim.
23 The term of Hammer, Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics.
and I and the advent of peace with Spain did not bring about such changes immediately. During the first eight years of the first Stuart's reign, English and Welsh troops were employed by the Dutch on much the same basis as during the last Tudor's reign -- only in greater numbers! Things changed somewhat thereafter. The Edict of Nantes (1598) had seemed to secure the future of the reformed religion in France, while the Twelve Years' Truce was an effective acknowledgement of Dutch sovereignty; the Protestant cause on the Continent thus seemed much safer by 1611 than at any time for forty years. Moreover, the new king's ecumenical vision and related desire for a Spanish match for his heir, and the death in 1612 of Robert Cecil, first Earl of Salisbury who, like his father, saw the Habsburgs as natural enemies of Protestantism, reduced the degree of sympathy for the Calvinist Dutch at the highest level of political society; the States' repayment of the debts, inherited from Elizabeth's reign, by redeeming the cautionary towns in 1615 removed a strong incentive for James to stay on amicable terms; and the increasing Anglo-Dutch competition in the East Indies resulted in greater hostility to the Dutch within the previously supportive English mercantile community. All of these developments, though, occurred after the period in question.

The continuum in official attitudes to 1610 reflects an enduring consensus among the élite of England and Wales that they needed actively to support Protestants on the Continent. That there was such widespread concern about developments in the French wars of religion and the Dutch Revolt, and such widespread willingness to contribute actively to those conflicts, is an important conclusion that must affect our understanding of the interaction of religion, politics and society in early-modern England and Wales.

We have seen that a consensus on support for foreign Protestants existed within the Privy Council. It also extended to the church hierarchy. As described in chapter 3, the bishops of London and Winchester helped Montgommery's expedition to mobilise in 1573. Sandys of London (later -- from 1576 -- of York) had mercenary captains as a brother-in-law and a nephew. See ch. 5, above, p. 185; Roger Lockyer, The Early Stuarts: A Political History of England 1603-1642, 2nd edn (London & New York: Longman, 1999), 156-57, 161-62. On numbers of mercenaries from 1603-10, see app. 2, below, table 6, p. 340 and fig. 7, p. 343.

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*Sergeant-Major Sir Thomas Wilsford and Captain Edward Wilsford: see apps 5-6, below. pp. 400, 480.*
Horne of Winchester co-signed Archbishop Parker of Canterbury’s response to the church of La Rochelle’s appeal for help and Horne’s nephew was sent as a confidential royal envoy to the German princes to discuss a military response to the St Bartholomew’s massacre. Their facilitation of mercenary recruiting was thus in character for both bishops. Matthew Sutcliffe, afterwards Archdeacon of Taunton and Dean of Exeter, served the Huguenots in the 1570s and later, under Leicester, in the Netherlands. William Fenner, a gentleman volunteer in the Dutch army from 1602, later benefited from the ‘favour’ of Thomas Morton, in the 1620s Bishop of Lichfield and Coventry, whose clientele included other mercenaries. George Abbott, the Jacobean Bishop of London (later Archbishop of Canterbury) supported ‘an aggressive Protestant foreign policy’ and endorsed the Franco-Dutch intervention with English troops in Jüllich. Nor did only puritans have a positive attitude to English and Welshmen in foreign Calvinists’ employ: Lancelot Andrewes, the Jacobean ‘anti-Calvinist’ bishop of Ely, corresponded on theological matters with Sir John Ogle, who was in turn on friendly terms with the Dutch Arminians with whom Andrewes had strong links. The material support given by the ‘stranger churches’ of London to their fellow-countrymen is well known, as is the theological interchange between the Church of England and Continental Protestant churches. To these connections must be added the support of key members of the English ecclesistical hierarchy for the war-effort of French and Dutch Calvinists.

Finally, there were the sovereigns. Elizabeth’s intimate knowledge of and interest in aid to the Huguenots during the third war of religion shows that, contrary to claims by her most recent biographer, she backed Protestant aggression before the papal bull of deposition of 1570. In addition to her close personal ties to Henry Champenowne, Elizabeth also had an intimate

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28 English episcopate to church of La Rochelle, [autumn 1572], Bodl., Tanner MS 80, ff. 1v-2r; Fogaça to Alba, 25 Nov. 1572 and 16 Feb. 1573, KL, nos. 2501, 2541, 6:589, 663.
connection to the Norreys family.\textsuperscript{29} Like her counsellors, she accepted that
rench and Dutch Protestants needed men as well as matériel and was only
cautious about whether the military aid provided should be overt or covert.
Hence, she approved of (or at least was not displeased by) the commitment
of mercenaries to foreign service. Thomas Cotton’s status as a gentleman
pensioner was not affected by his service as Gilbert’s lieutenant colonel at
Flushing, though contemporaries commented on it.\textsuperscript{30} The queen appointed
John Norreys Lord President of Munster immediately on his return from the
Netherlands in 1584 and granted a monopoly to the ex-mercenary Edward
Horsey.\textsuperscript{31} She also awarded pensions or property ‘for services in the wars’ to
several other mercenary captains in the late 1570s, 1580s and early 1590s:
Richard Bingham, Robert Hitchcock, Henry Swanne, John Young, John
Raynes, Roger Williams and Thomas Churchyard.\textsuperscript{32} If not all these men were
rewarded for their mercenary service, having fought for foreign Protestants
certainly did them no harm.

James VI and I was also sympathetic to mercenaries. He appointed
Sir Francis Vere Governor of Portsmouth, despite stiff competition, and
granted him other subsidiary profitable offices in the vicinity.\textsuperscript{33} The king
granted the governorship of Brill to Sir Horace Vere on his brother’s death
(as seen in chapter 5) and, on Ogle’s return to England, named him to high
military offices. Of course, such appointments, and those of ex-mercenaries
such as Francis Markham to muster-masterships and other militia posts,
might have merely reflected a desire to maximise existing military expertise,
while the ‘provision of a court appointment’ to Sir Edward Cecil might have
simply resulted from his distinguished connections.\textsuperscript{34} However, other former
mercenaries, too, such as Sir Richard Wigmore, were granted important
offices at court.\textsuperscript{35} The king not only allowed one of his favourite courtiers, Sir
Henry Carey, to serve in the Netherlands, but ransomed him when he was

\textsuperscript{1} E.g., Nolan, Norreys, 9; DNB, 14:562.
\textsuperscript{29} App. 5, below, p. 379; Churchyard’s Choice, K4r.
\textsuperscript{30} Nolan, Norreys, 67; DCP\textsubscript{R} 1587-88, 69.
\textsuperscript{31} Above, p. 146; CPR, 9:37-38; DCP\textsubscript{R} 1588-89, 252-53, 324, 379-80; PRO, SO 3/1, f.
497v; William M. Schutte, ‘Thomas Churchyard’s “Dolfull Discourse” and the Death of Lady
\textsuperscript{32} Grants of offices, 15 Jun. 1606, CSP\textsubscript{D}om. 1603-10, 321; A. Ersteild to Robert Cecil, [Jun.]
1606, HM\textsubscript{C}S, 18:176.
\textsuperscript{33} DNB, 12:1050, 14:934; PC to Ogle, 30 Jul. 1623, HMC, Tenth Report, 110; Hasler, 1:570.
\textsuperscript{34} Chamberlain to Carleton, 23 Jan. 1609, Chamberlain Letters, no. 110, 1:282.
In addition, James’s ministers regularly intervened with local authorities on behalf of returned mercenaries to ensure they were paid the pension for royal soldiers. All told, the evidence shows that mercenaries did not pass into royal disfavour on the death of Elizabeth. Certainly, as we have seen, the king and his councillors kept essentially the same attitude to the employment of British mercenaries by the Dutch.

The consistency of support for fellow-Protestants in France and the Netherlands over half a century indicates that too strong a distinction should not be drawn between royal and private in the military or quasi-military sphere. As Professor Wood’s study of the royal armies in the French wars of religion reveals, early-modern states could rarely successfully wage war on their own resources alone. For this reason, they regularly combined royal or national with private resources in order to deploy armies and navies, as maritime historians have long been aware. Expediting the employment of mercenaries and the provision of artillery, ammunition, arms and cash or credit, were not measures undertaken as alternatives to war. All of these, plus the dispatch of an army to the Continent, were complementary, rather than competing, means of achieving a policy end which most of the political nation agreed was desirable.

**Important Questions**

A number of questions arise from the findings of this study. Some have been posited earlier in this chapter but there are others, relating to English identity and European expansion, military history, and religious history. Only the last is explored here but the others are outlined. All warrant further scholarly investigation. For example, what does the support of merchant-financiers to mercenaries indicate about the financing of privateering, voyages of explora-
ation and plantation? A quick survey reveals that the same men often supported mercenaries as well as one or more of these apparently different types of enterprise; further, a number of mercenaries served, not only in the Netherlands or France, but in voyages of exploration and settlements in the New World. What does this indicate about contemporary English attitudes to Europe, the so-called 'Atlantic world' and the wider world?

Military Issues

A number of the questions which arise relate to military issues. Some relate to war and society, others to combat effectiveness and military organisation.

Why did the Tudors change their preference for recruiting to pressing of men with a militia liability? Was it truly because of an increased need for manpower to compete with larger armies in Europe, which traditional means of recruiting could not manage? As noted in chapter 8, this is the argument of most scholars. However, as many troops were raised for the Dutch in 1585-86 as by Elizabeth's government; most were volunteers as we have seen, but many of the royal troops were, too; and affinities remained the basis for recruiting considerable numbers of mercenaries into the middle of the first decade of the seventeenth century. This indicates that conscription was not necessary to field relatively large armies; affinities remained not just potent sources of military manpower, but a reasonably efficient basis for recruiting as well. Is it the case, then, that the switch to impressment reflects government policy, not exigency? That it resulted in enhanced control by the state has always been known, but was its purpose in fact to increase the power of the state? More research is needed here.

How significant was the mercenaries' military contribution? A full assessment of their combat effectiveness would require a separate paper, at least. A survey of figures 17-18 in appendix 10 shows that at times English and Welsh mercenaries comprised a high proportion of Dutch army strength, but never as much as 25 per cent; while they were rarely numerically significant in the Huguenot war effort. This poses a question as to whether their contribution was of any military significance to their foreign employers, regardless of what it reveals about English society, politics and policy.

\[\text{Below, pp. 513-14.}\]
As J. A. Lynn argues, however, in sixteenth-century warfare, 'when victory depended on the ability to maintain huge armies in the field for years on end, resource mobilization held the key'. Raising soldiers in England and Wales allowed the mobilisation of resources otherwise unavailable to the Huguenots and Dutch. It is certainly striking the extent to which the brunt of the English war-effort in the Netherlands in 1585-87 was borne by troops in the pay of the Dutch Republic. In October 1585 half the English troops in the Netherlands were in the States' pay. Over eight thousand mercenaries served the States-General during 1586, in contrast to a royal establishment totalling 7,400 men (inclusive of cautionary garrisons as well as the auxiliary troops); even taking only the known strength of the mercenaries (7,675 men) their actual numbers still exceeded the nominal figures of the royal army.

Moreover, sometimes quality counts as much as quantity. Henry Champernowne's troop attracted a disproportionate amount of attention from contemporaries. This reflects their delaying action after Moncontour, which probably saved the Huguenot army. With that army Coligny undertook a celebrated nine-month campaign that was instrumental in obliging the crown to make peace. La Rochelle defied royal authority until 1628, providing a vital base for the Huguenots throughout the wars of religion. However, but for Montgommery's expedition of 1573 it could well have fallen in that year. Even thereafter, it might have fallen much earlier than its eventual terminus if Norreys and his men had not saved the island of Ré in 1577; fifty years later, Ré's capture, after the defeat of an English force, allowed La Rochelle to be cut off from the sea, prefacing its fall.

The ability of English captains in Dutch pay stood out enough in the 1570s and 1580s for several, including Cotton, Chester and Norreys, to be known by name at the distant Spanish court. Professor Parker observes: 'Philip II, unlike modern Dutch historians, rated the contribution of English men and money to Holland's resistance very highly.' As with other early-

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3 See below, app. 1, pp. 329-330.
5 See Lockyer, 167-68.
6 Sieur de St Goard (French ambassador in Madrid) to Charles IX, 3 Feb. 1574, BN, MS Fr. 16106, f. 13r (Cotton); and above, pp. 128 (Chester), 155 (Norreys).
7 Parker, Spain and the Netherlands, 35 (cf. Geyl, 201).
modern armies, but (for financial and political reasons) perhaps even more so, the Dutch army was divided into garrison and field units. The Dutch habitually placed English and Welsh mercenaries in the field army, rather than in garrisons, except during the early 1570s, when garrisons in Holland and Zeeland were actually on the front line and, unlike later, genuinely faced the danger of sieges. It was the field army which did the hard work of first consolidating and then expanding the United Provinces' border: the English mercenaries had a major part in this process. All this suggests that the English and Welsh had excellent fighting qualities. However, exactly what made them such desirable employees; how effective they were in combat in comparison to other nationalities; and what contribution, if any, they made to the developments in tactics and organisation under Maurice of Nassau, that are generally characterised as key components of a 'military revolution' -- all are questions requiring more research.

Religion and Motivation

An obvious question is what motivated the captains, officers and soldiers to take up foreign military service. Indeed, the original intention of this study was to explore why so many English and Welshmen left the relative calm of their homeland to travel across the narrow seas and join in the very bitter religious wars being fought on the Continent. However, because so little was known about them it was essential to establish the statistical, socio-economic and political parameters of their employment. Having done that, this thesis, especially chapters 6 and 8, prompts even more the question: ‘Were the mercenaries motivated by religion?’

We have seen that the employment of English mercenaries resulted from a tripartite effort, involving those who organised their service abroad, the captains, and the soldiers and junior officers. We have seen that one leg of the tripod which sustained the Anglo-Welsh mercenary effort was certainly confessionally actuated: the patrons and supporters who arranged contracts for captains and assisted in the logistical effort of putting their companies in

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49 See Wood, King’s Army, 95-96; Adams, ‘Tactics or Politics’, 36-41; Israel, Dutch Republic, 262-67; and below, table 12, p. 512.

50 As noted above, in ch. 5, p. 177.
the field on the Continent, including both financing and recruiting. Chapter 6 suggests strongly that the second leg, comprising the captains, may have had a religious basis as well. However, is there any additional evidence that captains were more than military professionals, making their career in the best place possible, or aristocrats seeking adventure and/or education? Finally, is it possible that the great mass of soldiers were confessionally motivated -- and even if these soldiers were not the scum of the earth, surely it is well known that money is what impels mercenaries to fight?

These are questions that require detailed analysis, not least because religious motivation and military motivation are both complex issues, which require an appropriately sophisticated interpretative framework. Attempting to decide whether, or to what extent, motivation is religious is notoriously difficult. But assessing what motivates men in war is equally complicated, because, as Professor Lynn shows, there are different types of motivation: he identifies 'categories of initial motivation, sustaining motivation, and combat motivation, based upon the circumstances in which decisions and actions are taken'. Questions about the motivation of the rank and file must await a dedicated study. However, an initial examination of the evidence for captains' motivation, albeit only a reconnaissance, is very suggestive.

There is much to indicate that captains shared their patrons' and backers' confessional commitment, and that Protestant religious convictions formed a large part of the reason for service on the Continent. The evidence is mostly implicit but is nonetheless telling. It is notable, as a starting point, that their employers preferred mercenaries who shared their faith -- the Huguenot François de La Noue advised the States-General that this was as important as wisdom in their captains. Then, at the general level, the degree of commitment and persistent service (noted earlier), in spite of the frequently poor position of the Protestants in France and the Netherlands, particularly in the 1560s and 1570s, suggests an ideological motivation. Turning to specifics, it can, firstly, be demonstrated that many captains had a strong Protestant faith -- more, they tended to Calvinism, with its particularly

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53 De La Noue to SG, endd. '1584' [actually 1577-78], AAE, MD France 242, f. 25v.
militant ideology. This is evident from their family backgrounds, their own and their troops' behaviour patterns, and their own declarations.

The Norreys family, for example, on both maternal and paternal sides, had been supporters of, or at least sympathetic to, Protestantism as early as the 1530s, and during the Marian era. Sir Henry Norreys, later Lord Norreys, challenged even the sincerity of the Earl of Leicester's 'godliness' at one point, put aside a bitter local feud in an attempt to obtain a lectureship for the militant Puritan minister John Field, and as Lord Lieutenant of Berkshire tried to suppress maypoles, morris dances and other 'pagan' festivals. Collective prayers were a feature of the Norreys household. John Norreys's own personal, iconoclastic, hatred of Catholicism, especially its external signs, is evident from the conduct of troops under his command. When his men sacked Mechelen in April 1580, 'especially thei searched the Cloisters and Religious places', seeking copes, surplices and vestments, so 'that no Masse should bee songe nor saied in MackIm many a long yere after, for wante of gilted Challlices, and golden Copes', and saints' shrines were 'terriblie handeled'. In 1583 his men affronted Anjou's (mostly Catholic) troops by openly profaning sacred objects plundered from Catholic churches; and similar events occurred with his royal troops in Brittany in the 1590s. Norreys was more than a Protestant, he was a Calvinist. He urged Elizabeth to help the Dutch because they were more than fellow Protestants fighting Papists: they had 'no other relygion but the Rformed'. Before embarking on the expedition to Lisbon in 1589 (which aimed to put the pretender Dom Antonio on the Portuguese throne) Norreys and Drake asked Field's London classis, of Calvinist clergymen, if 'a prc*essour of the true

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56 Heal & Holmes, Gentry, 367.
57 Churchyard, Taking of Macklin, sig. C4 and see passim; also Strada, ii.188-89; Baudart, 340.
58 Biron to des Pruneaux, 26 Apr. 1583, in Documents concernant les relations entre le Duc d'Anjou et les Pays-Bas (1576-1584), ed. P. L. Muller, A. Diegeriek, no. 820, vol. 5, WHGU, 61 (Amsterdam: Johannes Muller, 1899), 73. Nolan, Norreys, 12.
59 See Nolan, Norreys, 12-13, for an insightful discussion of Norreys's religion in personal life.
60 'A Discourse ... Concerning the Lowe Countrie's', endd. 1588, actually from 1587, Bodl., Rawl. MS C.836, f. 6r (emphasis mine).
reformed religion may without offence to god ayde a popish king to recover his kingdome’ (even against Philip II!).

Other captains also came from families known for their reforming zeal. For example, Captain Upsher, an Essex man, was almost certainly related to the Puritan minister Upsher, a returned Marian exile who made Colchester a bastion of the godly. Sir Edmund Uvedale’s grandfather, Sir William, had supported the Henrician evangelicals; his kinsman, Richard, had been a key member of the Dudley conspiracy against Mary; and the Puritan, John Udall, a firebrand associate of Field, was also related, though more distantly. Lord Willoughby was born abroad whence his parents, both early adherents of Protestantism, had fled the Marian persecution and his boyhood tutor was a ‘godly’ minister. William Russell, from 1603 Lord Russell of Thornhaugh, was the second son of the Calvinist internationalist second Earl of Bedford.

Most of these are known to have lived up to their family backgrounds while other mercenaries also show evidence of firm reformed commitment. Russell ‘was a very diligent reader of the Bible’ who heavily annotated his copy of the Bible. Uvedale requested in his will that no ceremony be used at his funeral, which was typically Calvinist. Lord Willoughby had a strongly Calvinist preamble to his will and also instructed that he be buried ‘avoyding superfluous chardge’. Henry and Sir Arthur Champernowne, too, are clearly revealed by the wording of their wills as strong Calvinists. George Gascoigne was bitter because the mass was still allowed to be celebrated in Holland after the opstand. Henry, Thomas and William Knollys all came

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61 'A Briefe report of a disputacion held amongst certaine ministers of the churches of London', Nov. 1588, CUL, MS Hh.vi.10, ff. 1-59, at f. 1v. Extracts are pr. Wernham, ENDSPE, 28-31. See Lake, ‘Significance’, 176n., for the identification of Field’s classis.
64 Bertie, 1-3; West, Brave Lord Willoughby, 14-20.
65 William Walker, A Sermon preached at the funerals [sic] of the right honourable William, Lord Russell, Baron of Thornhaugh [...] the 16 of September 1613 (London: 1614), 47.
from a family known for its Protestant zeal: their father and uncle were both Marian exiles and both strong advocates of Calvinist internationalism; Henry, before serving in the Netherlands, financed a privateer that attacked Spanish shipping and left a will with a religious preamble. Sir John Holles was well-known for his Puritan sympathies; his brother, Sir Thomas, according to a fellow-officer, was 'a religious soldier and would not swear an oath' and his 'Calvinisticall discipline' was later recalled by a kinsman as a distinctive trait. Sir Edward Harwood was similarly praised by the celebrated Puritan minister, Hugh Peter, for his godly behaviour and anti-Arminianism. Sir Edward Cecil was dedicatee of a collection of hymns (made by one William Lisle of Wandsworth) and his three daughters each married into a Puritan family.

Sir Richard Bingham's career also evinces Protestant commitment, in spite of a contradictory start. In 1562 he was found guilty of conspiring against Elizabeth with several other men, but Bingham (who had pleaded not guilty) was pardoned in May 1567. He had been wrongly convicted, was a long-term double agent, or converted to Protestantism after 1562, for from the 1570s his Protestant zeal cannot be questioned. He took a leading part in the notorious massacre at Smerwick of surrendered soldiers of the Papal expeditionary force sent to Ireland in 1581 and in 1588 was assiduous in slaughtering survivors of Spanish Armada shipwrecks. This was not just bloodlust, for Irish chroniclers decried his opposition to 'true' religion. In the Netherlands in 1578 Bingham requested Davison to use his connections to obtain a chaplain, which was 'badly wanted in our regiment'. Later Bingham used his position as Governor of Connaught to benefit his chaplain there: a 'most godlie and learned Minister'.

Other captains, too, supported godly ministers. It is notable that the lecturership in Henry Champernowne's home parish of Modbury went to a

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66 Hasler, 2:414-18; above, in ch. 4, p. 137.
70 Dalton, 1:362, 364.
71 Letters of pardon, 2 May 1567, PRO, C 66/1035, m. 26.
73 Bingham to Davison, 17 Jun. 1578, *CSPFor.*, 13:16, no. 23; idem to Essex, 15 Feb. 1594, Longleat, DP 1, f. 136r.
well-known Puritan, Samuel Hieron. There are indications that Norreys encouraged Puritans in the early 1580s, while in 1585 some captains of his expeditionary force had their ‘Souldiours ... well instructed from the mouth of the preacher’ in England. Willoughby contemplated appointing the Puritan divine, John Knewstubs, as chaplain at Bergen in 1586, at the suggestion of the Puritan pamphleteer, John Stubbs, whom he had already employed as his secretary. Willoughby’s cousin Sir Horace Vere protected and furthered the careers of two radical ministers, William Ames and John Burgess, whom he appointed to military chaplaincies. The one-time mercenary Sir Robert Sidney, whilst Governor of Flushing, supported the presbyterian Thomas Pott as minister of the garrison, as did Sidney’s deputy, the States’-pay veteran, Sir William Browne, who praised Pott for his Puritanism. Despite Ogle’s Arminian sympathies, his will is Calvinist in its reference to ‘the elect of God in heaven’, while his regimental chaplains were a Scots presbyterian, John Douglas and an anti-Catholic polemicist, William Crosse. Harwood patronised Ames and Crosse after Vere and Ogle retired and in his will left £100 to be distributed for ‘piouse uses’ to be chosen by godly ministers.

Not only were many mercenary captains strongly Protestant -- many also viewed the conflicts in which they were employed in terms of holy war. This was partly because they were explicitly encouraged to think so. Field’s classis responded positively to Norreys and Drake’s request for advice and likened the war against Spain to those of the Israelites. Other ministers, writing encouraging letters to English captains in the Netherlands, did likewise and, like some of the greater gentry which raised ‘volunteers’ for the

74 Mark Stoyle, Loyalty and Locality: Popular Allegiance in Devon during the English Civil War (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1994), 196.
75 Jermyn to Davison, 25 Aug. 1585, Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 73r. See Williams to Walsingham, 12 Oct. 1583 n.s., CSPFor., 18:125, no. 146.
76 Stubbs to Willoughby, 14 May 1586, in Stubbs, ‘Gaping Gulf and Other Documents, 127; ibid., xlii.
81 CUL, MS Hh.vi.10, ff. 1r, 6r, 44v, 45r.
Dutch in 1585, declared the cause to be that of 'the Lord of hostes'.

We know similar opinions were held by the captains. Morgan Wolf, reflecting on his experiences in 1572-73, termed those fighting for the Dutch 'Protestants' and 'of the religion' -- in distinction to their enemies. Sir Humphrey Gilbert avowed himself ready 'to taecke any thynge in hande with Gedion's fayethe' and termed Alva one of the 'enemies of the Christian cause'. The implied belief that the enemy were anti-Christian was held by other captains. Thus, to Killigrew, the English mercenaries' commander in Normandy in 1562, the Spaniards were servants of 'the grete hore of Babelon'. One of his clients, Thomas Lovell (who fought for both the Huguenots and the Dutch) enthused to Walsingham in 1585 that an alliance with the Netherlands would 'through God's help ... establish His Word through Christendom within few years and the putting down of Antichrist, for this is the way by land to Rome' and he called the Spaniards the 'enemies of God's gospel'.

We saw in chapters 3-5 that captains came from the affinities of godly patrons; we saw in chapter 6 that they are unlikely to have been avaricious men; we have now seen that many had a deep belief in the ideology which was the (at least) nominal reason for the wars. There was a logical upshot to such a belief. Since, as Stubbs wrote to Willoughby, the war was 'holy and just', it was important that captains serve 'not of vainglory but of zeal to God's glory and relief of his oppressed children'. One clergyman, Oliver Pigge, writing to an English captain in the Netherlands in 1585, stressed the need to be wary of 'transgressing ... as did Achan' -- that is, of being greedy (or mercenary, in fact) in a holy purpose.

The influence of belief can be seen in the rare explicit statements about motivation. Sir Arthur Champernowne, as we have seen, offered to serve the Huguenots despite disavowal, affirming he would do so 'neither of ambition, nor for gayne (none of them both being likely to folow hereof) but

-- Oliver Pigge 'to a Christian knight imployd in [...] the lowe contries, 1585', CUL, MS Dd.xi.76, ff. 21r, 21v, 22r, 23r; Jermyn to Davison, 25 Aug. 1585, Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 73r; Scott to Leicester, 25 Mar. 1586, BL, Cott. MS Titus B.vii, f. 67r.
-- Above, p. 35. Lovell to Walsingham, 10 May and 5 June 1585, n.s., CSPFor., 19: 440, 498.
-- 21 Apr. and 6 Jun. 1586, Stubbs, 'Gaping Gulf' and Other Documents, 124, 139.
-- CUL, MS Dd.xi.76, f. 23r; cf. Jos. 6:18-19, 7:1 and 10-26.
of suche zeale, as I woold willingly beare the manifest overthro ... of life it self, in the heate of that adventure'.\textsuperscript{87} According to Churchyard, Gilbert had 'served the Prince of Orange in the cause of Religion' and Sidney had fought 'in conscience cause'. The reason Ralegh believed that 'the Netherlanders [could] very safely repose confidence in' their English and Welsh troops was because the 'souldiers that came unto them from hence' were 'not only regardful of the Pay that they should receive; but well affected unto the Cause that they took in hand'. Captain Barnaby Rich wrote that 'the souldiour maintaineeth [religion] with the losse of limme and life.'\textsuperscript{88} Sir Henry Peyton affirmed in his will that he had 'determined god willing to passe the seas for the better discharge of my conscience and dutie to god'.\textsuperscript{89} Mercenary captains' deeds, as well as words, evince the importance of their beliefs. The betrayal of Deventer to the Spanish by the Catholic Sir William Stanley in January 1587 has always been a basis for Dutch excoriation of English soldiers.\textsuperscript{90} Yet most of the troops in Deventer were Irish Catholics. Stanley had to arrange safe passage to Dutch lines for the three English captains in the garrison and their bands because, albeit desperately short of pay and victuals, which the Spanish had undertaken to provide, they refused to change sides.\textsuperscript{91}

The question of motivation is, indeed, illuminated by reference to the experience of the other English and Welsh mercenaries of this period, those fighting on the other side of Jacob's wars, though the number of English and Welsh troops in the Spanish army of Flanders was small by comparison to those in the staatsche leger.\textsuperscript{92} But many of those who fought for Spain were motivated by religion. Stanley betrayed Deventer after coming under the influence of his Catholic brother, Rowland, and Sir Willie affirmed that he had acted 'only for religion's sake.'\textsuperscript{93} After the Treaty of London permitted Englishmen once again to enlist in Spanish pay, among those who did so

\textsuperscript{87} BL, Lans. MS 15, f. 200v; ch. 5, above, p. 195.
\textsuperscript{89} PRO, PROB 11/143 f.142.
\textsuperscript{90} Jennings, i.407-8; Loomie, Spanish Elizabethans, 139.
\textsuperscript{91} Table 15, in app. 10, below, p. 516.
\textsuperscript{92} This trend is alive and well: A. Th. van Deursen, Maurits van Nassau, 1567-1625. De winnaar die faalde (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2000), 35-38.
\textsuperscript{93} Rowse, Expansion, 393; HMCS, 13:185-86; Simon Adams, 'A Patriot for Whom? Stanley, York and Elizabeth's Catholics', HT, July 1987, 49; cf. Loomie, Spanish Elizabethans, 137-44.
'were mercenaries only interested in paid employment, [but] the vast majority were recusants'. It is clear, then, that religion was an important motivating factor for English and Welsh mercenaries during the European wars of religion, even though the exact dynamics require more detailed exploration.

This offers the opportunity to test religious commitment in a new way. Dr Questier has recently criticised the 'revisionist tendency ... to measure Protestantisation in England by referring to aspects of post-Reformation English Catholicism, or ... of indigenous conservative thought and practice in Church matters'. It is necessary instead to measure the extent of devotion to Protestantism by studying the Protestant community. This study shows that a significant number of English and Welshmen were sufficiently committed to Protestantism, not just at home but also abroad, to risk life and fortune overseas. A deeper investigation is necessary, but genuinely offers the prospect of a richer understanding of religious experience in England and Wales.

Summing Up

Detailed analysis of the rank and file's motivations must await full treatment elsewhere. What is clear, however, is that English and Welsh mercenaries were employed by the Huguenots and the Dutch in large numbers as part of a sustained effort to aid Continental Protestants. The mercenaries' captains received contracts and commissions through the mediation or endorsement of principal Protestant counsellors and magnates. Their companies' service abroad was financed by those promoters, with the aid of merchants from the 'godly' community and, to a lesser extent, the leaders of émigré Protestants. The captains on the whole demonstrated strong commitment to the reformed cause and recruited their soldiers from men closely connected to them or to their higher Protestant patrons. When the mechanics of how English and Welsh mercenaries came to be fighting in the wars of religion waged in France and the Netherlands from 1562 to 1610 are borne in mind, there is a compelling case that they were fighting not just any war, nor for any cause -- they were fighting 'Jacob's wars'.

Croft, 'Serving the Archduke', 293.

APPENDIX 1

NUMBERS OF MERCENARIES (i): SOURCES AND ANALYSIS

Introductory Remarks

Any attempt to establish precise troop numbers for early-modern armies is almost hopeless. Statistics from the period are inherently unreliable and in any case they are often avowedly theoretical, rather than even purporting to be actual. Large-scale états of armies and financial budgets are some of the most common sources in archives, but all represent intentions, ideas and even illusions, rather than reality. This has not been taken on board by many historians. For example, an important study of the Elizabethan war effort in the Netherlands simply assumes that companies' strengths were the same as their official establishment. The only scholarly quantification of English troop levels in the Elizabethan war with Spain does not distinguish between nominal and actual strengths. Yet contemporary military administrators were well aware of the need to distinguish between the establishment strengths of companies and those strengths 'nearest to the truth'. Thus, as one of the pioneers of a scientific approach to the study of army sizes pointed out: 'The actual strengths of armies are of capital importance in the history of the art of war.'

The problem lies partly in the survival of documentation. Evidence of the mustered strength of units often survives only as isolated examples that are of marginal value in calculating the strength of armies. Where mustered strengths of a large number of units from one year exist they are usually of a particular force within an army, rather than the army as a whole. If one takes

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2 Shaw, 'Financial and Political Relationships', xxxiv: 'The Foot now numbered 5250 men' -- in fact this was what it should have numbered, but though he earlier (ibid. xxx) cites the mustered strength of the initial force in the Netherlands, Shaw seems oblivious to the fact that this figure was from a muster, whereas the 5250 figure was an establishment strength.
3 Nolan, 'Militarization of the Elizabethan State', 418.
4 State of the Anglo-Dutch army in Sep. 1586, annotated by the chief muster-master, CSPFor., 21/2: 176.
5 Lot, 13.
them as a representative sample then calculation is possible, but the total strength arrived at will be an approximation. It is only rarely that authoritative actual troop strengths for an entire army survive. There is also a problem, though, with the nature of musters themselves and again not all scholars are sufficiently sensitive to this issue. Thus, Geoffrey Parker, in presenting troop strengths of the Spanish army of Flanders, is careful to tabulate only figures from ‘formal musters of the entire army’ and does not attempt to estimate its strength for years when these do not exist. Over a long period, such as that considered by Parker, the surviving musters do build up a picture of trends in army strengths; yet his approach not only privileges the evidence of formal musters, but implies that figures from other sources are flawed. This ignores the fact that musters in this period were often carried out irregularly, allowing for successful muster fraud to a much greater extent than in armies of the late seventeenth century and after -- throughout Europe, numbers in companies were increased at the moment of inspection by use of temporary place men, as a matter of course.

Faced with the problems inherent in the evidence, the only figures of which one can be certain are the number of companies in an army or state’s employ and it is striking that officials of the period often did count companies rather than men. However, this really does not take us very far in assessing how many English and Welshmen served as mercenaries. In attempting to estimate actual strengths muster figures are clearly to be preferred where they exist, but this is not to say that only full musters of the entire force employed by a state or party are authoritative. Although contemporaries’ estimates of army strengths are often hopelessly exaggerated or simply misleading, this is truer of letters that simply recycle rumours and histories by authors distant from events, either geographically or chronologically, than of reports (whether printed or in manuscript) by participants, or those who knew participants. The numbers in these latter reports may be no less and no more approximate than those from some musters. It is appropriate, therefore, to use contemporary descriptive evidence as well as musters in order to make some calculation of actual strengths. These will be estimates, but a careful

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6 E.g., no formal musters of the whole Spanish army of Flanders took place between 1592-1606 inclusive: Parker, Army, 273.
7 Ibid., 271-72, app. A.
8 Lot, 13.
sifting of evidence can produce estimates that are authoritative at least in order of magnitude -- the most that can reasonably be hoped for any early-modern statistics.

In this appendix, the sources for each year are briefly analysed as a basis for estimates of the total actual numbers of English and Welsh mercenaries fighting for the Huguenots and the Dutch. Where actual muster figures exist these are indicated, as are the official establishments, where they are known. The maximum strength known for a unit is always used in calculating total strengths. This means constructing a notional total in some cases, since not all units necessarily had the same maximum strengths at the same time; in some cases they may not even have existed at the same time. However, this gives the best indication of the total number of English and Welshmen employed abroad in a given year. Where strengths at musters exist for a reasonable number of units in a given year, some attempt is made to use averages and multiply the strength out to estimate the total number of troops actually employed. For years in which figures exist for few or no units (so that there is no representative sample), more sweeping generalisations have been made in calculating estimates, but the rationale is always explained. In any case, despite the evidential problems, for purposes of comparison some estimate has been made of the total actual strength of English and Welsh troops in foreign Protestant employ for every year. Estimates consistently err on the side of caution; thus, the figures that follow are generally minimums. Despite the uncertainty of figures in particular years, the orders of magnitude and trends that are revealed are authoritative -- and certainly instructive.

The analysis that follows is entirely textual, but deals with each year (or small set of years) separately. The establishment, estimated and muster-ed strengths cited in the text here are summarised and tabulated in appendix 2, to which the reader is referred for a quick overview of different strengths.

**Annual Actual Strengths**

**1562-63**

As I have argued elsewhere, Henry Killigrew was in command of between three and four hundred men in and around Le Havre in September 1562, when another hundred were at Dieppe, possibly under a French or Scottish
captain. Others had served either as individuals or in small groups earlier in the summer. Counting the (inevitable) losses that would have been suffered earlier by the troops present in September, five hundred was probably the maximum strength.9 In addition, others served with the main Huguenot field army in summer and autumn of 1562 and with Montgommery in the spring of 1563: easily another hundred in all.10 (This does not include the companies that Warwick detached for service with Montgommery or Coligny, since they were raised as part of a royal army and were in the queen’s pay throughout.)

1567-68

Only one formed group of Englishmen served in the second civil war. It was made up of Henry Champernowne ‘with xij gentlemen or more’, but several additional English and Welsh gentlemen volunteers in Huguenot service can be identified in the records, while presumably there were others who cannot.11 Even taking into account the servitors which would have fought with them, the number of Welsh and English participants would not have exceeded a hundred.

1568-69

English and Welshmen in the Netherlands were distributed in units of other nationalities and one can only guess at their total. Including men serving the Beggars, there may have been a hundred. In the first twelve months of the third war of religion there were several small units of English troops operating with the Huguenots in France. Their numbers are difficult to ascertain, but in addition it is clear that there were also many individuals or small groups again in Protestant service. Even assuming contemporary reports of three and four thousand English to be typically grossly exaggerated, then, estimating at 10 per cent, they are indicative of four hundred English and Welshmen in Huguenot service in early 1569, inclusive of North’s and Champernowne’s troops.2

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9 See Trim, ‘Normandy Campaign’, 85-86 et passim.
10 CSPFor., 5:565, 582, 590, 630, nos. 1274, 1317, 1336, 1467, 6:72, no. 150; Churchyard’s Choice, sigs. Lii r-L4r; BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 114r.
11 Churchyard’s Choice, sgs. Kii v, Lii r; and see apps. 6-7, below, pp. 365 and fn., 453, 508; and BM, MS 2085, pp. 7-8.
12 See ch. 3, above, pp. 104-5.
There is greater certainty about units in the period from the summer of 1569 through to the Peace of St Germain in the summer of 1570. As well as Champernowne’s hundred-strong cornet of horse, other forces operated with the train of the main Huguenot army and in the area of La Rochelle, though their strengths are not known, and there were the usual collection of discrete volunteers in France, including the survivors of those who had been there in the first year of the war. Champernowne’s company was evidently larger and Young’s apparently was new, but existing numbers would have declined through attrition. Four hundred in Huguenot service again is probably about right.¹³

Three hundred men reached Flushing in late April, a further three hundred went with Morgan and about another hundred crossed individually or in small groups.¹⁴ Gilbert’s regiment of ten companies had a contracted establishment of 1,500.¹⁵ However it did not reach that strength. Claims by a Spanish agent that 1,500 men left England probably reflects intelligence of the contracted figure.¹⁶ Just after arriving, one of Gilbert’s soldiers reported home that there were about 600 men in the force and as he also noted that it was mustered within a week of arrival this is a reliable estimate.¹⁷ No more than six of his companies had come with Gilbert,¹⁸ though Chester brought over a further 300 men at the end of July (the number, again, is the estimate of an English soldier; a Spanish agent’s claim that it was 600 is most likely a simple exaggeration).¹⁹ Up to this point there is evidence of only nine captains;²⁰ it is probable that Captain Cox’s company, which is known to have been at ‘Campfier’ [Ter Veere], was the tenth of Gilbert’s companies

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¹³ Ibid., 105-6; and see app. 6, below, p. 415.
¹⁴ Ch. 3, above, pp. 110-14; Morgan to Burghley, 16 Jun. 1572, KL, no. 2414, 6:426.
¹⁵ Williams, Actions, 109, 106.
¹⁶ [Fogaça to Ruy Gomez], 27 June 1572, CSPSp., 2:397, no. 336.
¹⁸ Waye to Burghley, [1 Aug.] 1572, KL, no. 2445, 6:473.
²⁰ See [Gilbert] to [Essex?], 13 Aug. 1572, Longleat, DP 2, ff. 7r-9r; Williams, Actions, 116; see also table 10.2 in app. 7, p. 487.
and a standard estimate of its strength would be a hundred. Thus, the original companies of Gilbert's regiment totalled about a thousand but, when combined with the English troops already in Flushing on Gilbert’s arrival, his regiment would have mustered about 1,400. The total maximum strength, then, of units and groups of English and Welshmen sent to Flushing over the course of the spring and summer as a whole was 1,700: a hundred in Dutch units, three hundred arquebusiers, three hundred in Morgan’s force and a thousand in Gilbert’s regiment (two-thirds of its 1,500 establishment).

It is known that five companies of English troops went to Brill over the summer of 1572. The strength of the band which accompanied Lumey de La Marck on his original storm on 1 April is not known, nor is that of any of the three companies sent him from England in June, though that of Captain Reid was a hundred strong in July when it was merged into Jan van Tryer’s mixed force of returned émigrés, seventy-eight English and Welshmen, and locals. In July Spanish sources claimed Captain ‘Piers’ (Price) was leading three hundred men to Brill, but the same report estimated the men taken to Flushing by Chester at twice their actual strength, so a strength for Price’s band of 150 (a typical establishment) is more likely. Reid’s force was a hundred strong after losses and there were said to still be at least three hundred Englishmen in Lumey’s force in December. This is consistent with the three companies of June also having a strength of 150 each. Added to Price’s band, van Tryer’s own Anglo-Welsh recruits, Bellingham’s original company and the individual volunteers known to have served with Lumey indicates a minimum total of some eight hundred English sent to Brill.

It is impossible to estimate accurately the number of English or Welsh soldiers which served in the southern Netherlands with Louis of Nassau or

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21 Lans. MS 1218, ff. 114r, 136r. Alternatively, if Baker’s Chronicle was correct in its assertion that there were only nine bands in Gilbert’s regiment, Cox’s was an independent company, perhaps raised to garrison Ter Veere: Richard Baker, A Chronicle of the Kings of England, rev. edn (London: George Southbridge, 1679), 349.
22 About 200 English were in Flushing on Morgan’s arrival and his 300 had suffered about 100 casualties: KL, no. 2414, 6:426; Williams, Actions, 104. Williams, who was there, attributed a strength of 1,400 to Gilbert in his opening campaign (ibid., 109), which must be either error or exaggeration; however, if he was recalling his estimate of the total strength later in the summer it would explain the otherwise unusual inaccuracy.
23 Williams, Actions, 108; ARA, CO 73.
24 [Fogaça] to Alba, 21 July 1572, KL, no. 2441, 6:462.
25 Fogaça to Alba, 17 and 25 Nov., and de Guaras to idem, 15 Dec., 1572, KL, nos. 2498, 2501, 2508, 6:584, 590, 598.
associated forces. William Morgan served with 'tenne great horses' which probably meant a troop of about thirty. Apart from this, the sources give a general impression of considerable numbers, but since no formed units are mentioned they are realistically likely to have been in the dozens rather than the hundreds. A cautious estimate of approximately one hundred has been adopted here.

1573

Two hundred Englishmen 'without any Ensigne of their own' were in Haarlem, as well as the companies of Captains Simons and Hunter, the former a hundred, the latter perhaps two hundred strong. There would thus have been five hundred in the Haarlem garrison at maximum strength; there would not have been this many at the fall. Apart from losses, in June, shortly before the capitulation, the Dutch commander Jerome de Tseraerts led a good proportion of the shot in the town out to join William of Orange's army. Simons's company was all shot, de Tseraerts had earlier been associated with English troops brought into the city and some of Morgan's regiment took part in the covering operation, this contingent included a number of English. A Huguenot chronicler heard that an English company was left at the city's surrender. In addition, an unnamed English captain's company brought supplies into Haarlem in March and then pulled out again. It was part of the rebels' army which endeavoured to save the city over some months. This was before the arrival of Morgan's or Chester's troops, so it must have been independent of their units. Two such independent companies are known; a standard estimate of a hundred men each is circumspect.

28 Churchyard’s Choice, sig. K4r. Contrast it with Churchyard’s description of Champemowne, who ‘served with an hundred men’ (sig. Kii v, emphasis supplied). The ‘horse’ or ‘fance’ by this time had a well recognised meaning of a small unit, rather than a man: see Contamine, Guerre au Moyen Age, 161, 244, 302; Redlich, Enterpriser, 8-9; Potter, War and Government in Picardy, 159; Norris, 104.
27 See ch. 3, above, pp. 112, 119.
29 Williams, Actions, 122.
30 Tragicall Historie, 3:85, 88r; TDH, 19.
32 Lancelot de Ia Popelinière, historical notes [16th-cent], BN, MS Fr. 20787, f. 2r. Huguenot troops were in the garrison so this is a credible report.
33 Tragicall Historie, 3:89r.
See table 10.6, in app 7, below, p. 487.
Morgan's regiment was evidently contracted to have companies of 200 men each. Many, though unfortunately not all, of the companies were mustered in the summer and much of the regiment's financial documentation is extant. The eight bands, whose strengths were recorded by the muster-commissioners, totalled 1,313 men. Taking these eight as a representative sample, at full strength the ten-company regiment would have mustered some 1,600 men. This is consistent with estimates by an eyewitness that the strength of the four companies in a battle of July 1573 (after losses had already been suffered) was about six hundred.

Montgomery had of course raised a force in the west of England for the relief of La Rochelle. The best modern estimate is that it was between 1,800 and 2,000 strong: 'Anglais, Français, Flamands'. It is impossible to know how many were English, but a reasonable approximation, given the circumstances, is that there were as many French as other nationalities combined with more English than Dutch. This would give some five to six hundred Englishmen, about four hundred of them soldiers. This is consistent with Burghley's observation that 'gret nombres' wanted 'to pass to Rochell'; it indicates that Montgomery may have adopted Sir Arthur Champernowne's original plan to raise a force of 500 foot in two bands. That only two English captains are known (Winter and Palmer) might thus be because only two English companies were involved, rather than due to a deficit of evidence.

Equally, after the fourth civil war was concluded, Montgomery dispatched the balance of his force under his son, Jacques de Lorges, to aid his co-religionists in the Netherlands; three hundred of the force, which was taken into the pay of the States of Holland, were said to be English. This is a credible figure for a force which had started four hundred-strong but suffered

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34 ARA, CO 29, n.f.: rubric 'Specificatie aengane den oncosten [...].
35 Unfortunately, the different pieces and files are unnumbered and the contents themselves are unfoliated or numbered. The strengths of several, though not all, companies are pr. Wijn, 'Noordhollandse Regiment', 259 (app. ii), albeit with small errors.
36 Jewks to [?], KL, no. 2609, 6:792.
37 Marlet, 136.
38 Bl, Cott. MS Vespasian F:vi, f. 49r, Lans. MS 15, f. 201v. Sir Arthur Champernowne's son also accompanied Montgomery (Marlet, 136, 141), but his status is uncertain -- it is possible he was on his father-in-law's personal staff, rather than a captain.
39 Di Cavalli to the Signory, 7 Jul. 1573, CSPVen., 7:489, no. 550. Bor, 1:275r; Williams, Actions, 138; rekening of payments for SH, Jul. 1573, GAL, Archief der Secretarie, 1033, f. 12r, [43v]. It is notable that Palmer's company appears in Holland's pay for the second half of 1573 (below, app. 5, p. 395).
casualties, desertions and departures. All the evidence, then, points to an approximate total of four hundred English soldiers.

1574

Whatever strength Chester had contracted for, the troops he brought over totalled about nine hundred men. This is consistent with a number of Spanish reports, suitably adjusted for exaggeration or inaccuracy. Further, Chester supplied enough weapons and armour for nine hundred and an English observer declared at the end of May that Chester's force was 900-strong. However, ultimately his regiment was a thousand strong. There were nine English companies around Leiden, as several reports agree. The four at Valkenburg were said by one of the captains, Gascoigne, to total five hundred men; a Dutch chronicler's figure of six hundred is an error, an exaggeration, or reflects a contracted strength of 150 per company. The only estimate for the strength of the five bands at Alphen (five hundred men) is a credible figure, since five bands were present. Evidently, then, Chester had got another hundred-odd men, perhaps by absorbing Englishmen remaining in the Netherlands over the previous winter.

Walter Morgan Wolf had raised a company, said by Spanish spies to be be five hundred strong, but this is improbable. Another four companies served in the Netherlands alongside Chester's regiment. One, Digby's, was left over from the previous year; the others may have been newly raised, though at least one, Baud's, may have been an existing band under a new captain. They may well have averaged less than a hundred men, save for Morgan's, for which a figure of 150 is realistic. A credible report stated that Montgommery's troops in Normandy included a hundred Englishmen; and English volunteers were in Louis of Nassau's army defeated by the Spanish

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44 See Gascoigne, 'The Fruits of War', cantos 147, 152, in Selected Poetry and Prose, 85-86; 'Journaal van den Ritmeester den stade Leijden', 1574, UBL MS BPL 264, f. 35r; Tragicall Historie, 3:106r-7r; and Orlers, Beschrijvinge der Stad Leyden, 333-34, who does indicate five bands at Valkenburg, but probably includes a Dutch unit.
45 E.g., anon. report, 29 Nov. 1573, KL, no. 2644, 6:852.
46 See app. 6, below, p. 406.
in the spring of 1574. An overall total for all these troops of six hundred is possible -- in excess of that is unlikely.\footnote{See ch. 3, above, p. 131.}

**1575**

In a survey of ten foot companies (of all nationalities) employed by the States of Holland in 1575, the average establishment was one hundred and the average strength eighty-seven. The only English company in that survey was Gainsford’s, which was ninety strong (out of an establishment of a hundred).\footnote{ARA CO 3.} In addition, Baud’s company was mustered that autumn and numbered 103. It is safe to surmise that the three other English foot bands had the average strength; plus Baud’s and Gainsford’s men, and assuming only about fifty volunteers with the Protestant army in the Palatinate, the maximum strength of English and Welsh mercenaries in 1575 would have been approximately five hundred.

**1576**

The war effort of Condé and Jean Casimir increased its intensity and this is revealed in the higher incidence of known examples of Englishmen joining their army -- again, this doubtless reflects an increase in the overall number of individual volunteers and small groups. Some may also have served with Jacques de Lorges in Normandy and Montmorency-Damville in the south, though probably not many -- a precise estimate is impossible.\footnote{Ch. 3, above, p. 133.}

In the Netherlands, the siege of Zierickzee, which had begun in 1575, was seen by both sides as crucial.\footnote{Parker, Dutch Revolt, 167-68.} This resulted in a considerable increase in recruiting: some six hundred Englishmen were said to have arrived in Holland in March 1576.\footnote{John Strype, Annals of the Reformation and Establishment of Religion, and other Various Occurrences in the Church of England, During Queen Elizabeth's Happy Reign, new edn, 2, pt ii (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1824), 17.} This may not be an exaggeration; the one company mustered in 1576, Gainsford’s, was now 136 strong, a 50 per cent increase. In addition, commissions for two new companies were given (to Bartlett and Brookesby). If each of the existing companies was reinforced up
towards an establishment of 150 and two new companies were raised at this
strength the total of recruits necessary would be about six hundred. As with
Gainsford’s company, most probably did not reach 150 men, but even if his
band was unusually strong these seven companies would have numbered
about nine hundred in sum.\(^5\) If one takes into account volunteers in France
then a total strength of approximately one thousand may be a minimum.

1577

English help to the Huguenots during the sixth civil war in France was mostly
naval. However, soldiers operated as well, even if mostly on coastal areas.
There were rumours that a force of 1,200 men was en route to France in
August.\(^5\) This is unlikely, but it probably refers to a force under Norreys and
John Zouche and there is evidence that Norreys raised a 300-strong band,
while Zouche had either his own company or own ship.\(^5\) In addition,
Christopher Carleill, though primarily a naval commander in this episode,
also commanded a body of English soldiers.\(^5\) There were additionally some
volunteers with the main Huguenot field army; only a few are known, but as
usual there would have been others, evidence for whom does not survive.\(^5\)
The total number of soldiers and marines, as opposed to mariners, would not
have exceeded six hundred and a total of five hundred is a safer estimate.

In the Netherlands, the number of companies employed by the States
of Holland was initially the same, but over the course of the summer all were
eventually paid off. For the period in service there are no existing musters;
there is also no evidence of the arrival of large drafts of replacements as in
the previous year. If a one-third wastage rate (the rough consensus of
scholars as to a rate of attrition in early-modern war years) is applied to the
estimated strength of 1576, then the strength in 1577 would have been
around six hundred men.\(^5\)

\(^5\) With a standard 30 per cent attrition rate to the previous year’s 450 strength, an infusion of
some 600 recruits would likewise bring the strength up to roughly 900.
\(^5\) Paulet to Elizabeth, 6 Aug. 1577, Murdin, 313 (HMCS, 2:158, no. 472).
\(^5\) Cheke to Burghley, 26 Sep. 1577, CSPFor., 12:201, no. 267; TDH, 27.
\(^5\) Lloyd, Elizabethan Adventurer, 45.
\(^5\) Ibid.; BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 115r.
\(^5\) Parker, Army, 207-9; Thompson, War and Government, 103; Stradling, ‘Military Recruitment
and Migration’, 490; Henry, 67.
Several different contingents were contracted by the States, some of which were then combined with others.\(^5\) However, there are a variety of good estimates and actual musters of strengths.

Cavendish’s regiment in April was said by knowledgeable observers to number upwards of five hundred men.\(^6\) Churchyard records that it totalled 1,200 at Rijmenam; his description of the battle, which is consistent internally and with Dutch histories, indicates that this was not just an exaggeration, but close to the mark.\(^7\) The larger figure includes a 200-strong company of Norreys’s that fought with Cavendish’s regiment, but there still must have been an increase of five hundred or more; this could easily have happened in June. An early muster of the field army gathered to fight Parma showed the equivalent of eighteen English companies, each with an establishment of two hundred, in the States’ army, but by early July there were only fifteen companies. However, only fifteen of the original eighteen were formal units with the rest drafts of recruits.\(^8\) Even if, as is likely, they fell short of six hundred their incorporation into Cavendish’s regiment explains its increase in strength; as his six bands averaged less than a hundred men each it would be natural for the Dutch to assign him these extra men. His regiment would thus have totalled 1,100 (out of an establishment of 1,200).

These fifteen companies included all of Thomas Morgan’s battalion, which was to be incorporated into Norreys’s regiment along with Cobham’s battalion -- it included none of these latter companies. By the time Norreys’s personal companies had arrived and been mustered, along with Cobham’s three, the field army had marched south to Rijmenam and Morgan had linked with Norreys. Eight companies were mustered because three of Morgan’s companies were en route.\(^9\) They totalled 1,696 men, but included Norreys’s own company, which was double-strength (as was common for colonels in

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\(^{5}\) See ch. 4, above, pp. 142-44, for an overview of developments.

\(^{6}\) Leicester to Davison, 11 Apr. 1578, KL, no. 3864, 10-408; Killigrew to idem, 12 Apr. 1578, CSP Dom., Addenda, 1566-1579, 540.

\(^{7}\) Churchyard’s Choice, sig. Si; van Meteren, 153r.

\(^{8}\) ‘Estat de guerre et gaiges chaque mois’, 1578, UBL MS VuIc. 104/37 (this seems the same as CSP For., 12:589, no. 759, which is misdated to Mar. 1578); ‘The States’ Forces’, CSP For., 13:48-49, no. 61.

this period). The other seven averaged 194 per company with Morgan's companies each two hundred. Even if muster-fraud had occurred, clearly his force was close to establishment; it is reasonable to suppose the same was true of the other three companies and for the one company of Norreys that had yet to arrive. Based on the average strengths of the seven captains mustered in July, plus Norreys's own company, his regiment would thus have been almost 2,500 strong (out of an establishment of 2,600).

In addition, the three companies of Captains Bishop, Cromwell and Gainsford were taken into the employ of the States-General (or reconstituted thereby) at the start of 1578; they too had an establishment of two hundred. However, as all extra recruits seem to have gone to Cavendish and perhaps Morgan, it is unlikely that they were so close to establishment. Finally, there was a force under Thomas Cotton in the pay of the States-General, which used his contractual provisions as a model for those with Norreys. The next year, when it was taken into the pay of the States of Flanders, it comprised a cornet of horse and two companies of foot: neither nominal nor real strength is known. Two hundred being the normal establishment in 1578 for foot companies, it presumably applied to Cotton, though his actual strength would surely have been less. A total of seven hundred foot and a hundred horse between all these companies is a conservative estimate.

1579

The English troops had suffered badly from an outbreak of the plague in the autumn of 1578: in September the troops of Norreys, Cavendish and Cotton together mustered only 1,500 men. Norreys did not try to replace Captains Aman and Liggins, killed at Rijmenam, but rather used their companies for replacements for the remainder, compressing his regiment into ten bands.

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61 The companies of Captains Morris, Yorke, Almond and Lloyd, on whom see below, pp. 387, 393, 404, 446-47.
62 CSPFor., 13:48, no. 61, for the establishment of 3,000 for 15 English companies, including these three (listed together (though evidently not formally grouped): UBL, MS VuIc 104/37, f. 2v (CSPFor., 12:589, no. 759); compare the earlier 'Estat', ARA RAGP 111:32, dated to 1578 in the published inventory, by R. Bijlsma and C. H. van Marle ('s-Gravenhage: ARA, 1976), 49.
63 ARA, RAGP III:28.
64 Corr. de La Noue, 57-58.
65 Ch. 4, above, pp. 147-48; David Stewart, 'Sickness and Mortality Rates of the English Army in the Sixteenth Century', Jnl of the Royal Army Medical Corps 91 (1948): 35; see 'Estat en brief [...] de gaiges et soldes des gens de guerre', [1578], ARA, Collectie Jacobus Koning 16.
New drafts of recruits came over in 1580 however and when Captains Fitzwilliams and Salisbury decided to remain after Cavendish and Cobham departed with most of their captains, their companies were not reduced into those of other captains, but maintained, while those of Bishop and Gainsford were added, along with new ones. Norreys's regiment finally comprised 14 companies, each having an establishment of 150 men: totalling 2,100 in all. Additional to this were four companies commissioned by the Union of Utrecht, with an establishment of 150 men each. Finally, there was Cotton's contingent which were taken into the pay of the States of Flanders in May. The establishment of these companies is unknown, but he was taken on at the instance of the lord of Ryhoven, the establishment of whose own infantry companies was also 150, and cavalry cornet 100.

However, no musters have been found to provide a basis for an approximation of actual strengths in 1579. The English and Welsh troops employed by the various States of the Low Countries should have numbered some 3,100 men. As we will see, the following year they seem to have been at about 74 per cent of their establishment; given the epidemic in the autumn of 1578, one might suppose the proportion of actual to nominal strengths in 1579 would have been much lower -- however, as noted, replacement drafts arrived. Furthermore, a reduced establishment was agreed, so it is probable that it reflected the reality. The proportion of 1580 can therefore reasonably be applied to 1579, giving a total maximum strength of around 2,200 men.

1580

The States-General budgeted in January for an army which included fifteen English companies, all in Norreys's regiment; plus three cornets, two newly commissioned to Norreys, with a sum establishment of 270 men. One of

66 ‘Staet & corte van het voetvolck ende peertvolck [...]’, 19 Aug. 1579, ARA, RvS 1226, f. 3v. Only Captain Higman is named -- but Cromwell is known to have been employed by the Union in 1579; Kent is known to have been killed at 's-Hertogenbosch in December, which is when troops of the Union unsuccessfully tried to seize control of the city; and Brookesby is known to have had a company this year that was separate from Norreys's regiment and logically makes the fourth of the Union's companies. On these captains, see below, in app. 6.
67 SL, 1:55, 57.
68 See Orange, memorandum to SG, [4 Jan.] 1580, GAL, Stadsarchief 3021; summary of the States' army, May 1580, CSPFor., 14:262, no. 287; SL, 1:55-56, 63.
Cotton's companies of foot was 'lost' at the fall of Mortaigne in the first week of January 1580 and his other bands eventually became defunct, too.\(^6\)

When Norreys, with seven of his companies stormed Mechelen in April, they were eight hundred strong, according to both English and Dutch chroniclers (writing independently).\(^7\) The balance, under Morgan, were still in Flanders and Tournai. Applying this average would give an approximate actual strength of some 1,600 men. In July Norreys was sent with eleven companies and one cornet to the northeastern provinces leaving four companies and one cornet in Tournai.\(^2\) Meanwhile, there were two other foot-bands, one employed by the States of Brabant, one by the States of Flanders; since most companies in the States' forces now had an establishment of 150 it is probable that they did also. No contemporary estimates of their actual strengths are extant, but two to three hundred is reasonable. If the Anglo-Welsh horse units totalled about two hundred, plus say a hundred to two hundred between Cotton's two companies before their demise, the maximum actual strength in 1580 would have been about 2,200 men.

### 1581

Throughout the year, Norreys's eleven-company regiment of foot, with attached horse, continued to campaign in Friesland. The foot were mustered three times, with a maximum strength of 1,962. The musters are striking as they show that many companies were well over the 150-man establishment; possibly it had been increased for the foot-bands in Friesland, but this is unclear. During the course of the year Roger Williams and Thomas Morgan both had horse-bands commissioned so that by November there were three cornets with a sum establishment of 230 men.\(^7\) The smaller cavalry troop vanished; Morgan's mustered its small establishment, but while the other two were relatively strong, based on descriptions of their participation in battles in Friesland, the three probably did not exceed 150 men all told.

Back in the south, the force in Flanders had been reinforced over the winter by four hundred men raised by Morgan as replacements. Later that

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\(^6\) Rossel to Davison, 7 Jan. 1580, CSPFor., 14.126, no. 129; below, app. 5, p. 380.

\(^7\) Chuchyard, Taking of Macklin, sig. B3v; Baudart, 1:340.

\(^2\) SL, 1:61, 264 n.5; Blandy, 21v, 22v.

\(^7\) 'Affrekeninghe vande [...] regiment vanden Generaelen Nourreys [...]', 1 Aug. 1580-1 Apr. 1582, ARA, SG 12576 n.f. ('Stucken concernende [... ] Norijts') SL, 1.103.
year, in the autumn two new bands arrived at Rotterdam. Given Morgan’s recruiting, the four bands in the south associated with him should have been close to establishment. The other two companies would have suffered more from attrition and so been much weaker, perhaps only a hundred together.

1582

Only one actual muster has been found for 1582, of Williams’s cavalry cornet which was 89 strong when mustered in August. However, there is a wealth of documentation for 1582 and 1583 on the supply of bread and other food to Anjou’s and the States-General’s troops. A loaf weighing a pound and a half was the standard issue per man per day, so it is possible to calculate ration strengths -- that is, the real strength of units. With the inauguration of Anjou as Governor-General the English forces were expanded to thirty-one companies in four regiments and six cornets, with a total establishment of 4,850 foot (27 companies of 150 each and four colonels’ companies of 200 each) and 650 horse (two cornets of 150 each, three of 100 and one of fifty). All existing companies were subsumed within the new regiments yet their colonels were still hard put to raise the contracted strengths. There are a variety of accounts for the ‘vivres’ but even taking the maximum strength of each regiment they still only total 2,120 foot and 389 horse.

1583

Two cornets of horse became defunct during 1582; over the winter three new companies of foot were commissioned and a third cornet’s establishment in-

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74 Morgan to Epinoy, 17 Dec. 1580, CSPFor., 14.518, no. 518. SL 1:264 n.5.
75 CSPFor., 16:260, no. 263. In July it had been ‘threescore’ strong, according to Williams to Walsingham, 13 Jul. 1582, ibid., 155, no. 154.
76 See ‘Estat pour dix mil homme tant de piet que de cheval’ [1582], and ‘Estat Abrege de la distribucion des vivres [...]’, Antwerp, 13 Jan. 1583, n.s., ARA, CvDorp 971, n.f., and 986, n.f. These are not exceptional: 1 1/2 lbs of bread ‘was recognised to constitute the minimum daily ration’ for a soldier in the Spanish army, while in the English army it was 1 lb. of biscuit or 1 1/2 lbs of bread, also per man per day: Parker, Army, 162-63; McGurk, Conquest, 204.
77 See Orange, memorandum, 18 Sep. 1582, ARA, SG 11096, 2nd foliation, ff. 29r-30r; Anjou order, 21 Jul. 1582, ibid., 11095, n.f.; SG min., 5 Apr. 1583, HSG, 4:53-54. On the expansion in English forces under Anjou, see ch. 4, above, p. 150.
creased to 150. There was also a company employed by the Count van Nieuwenaar in the east of the Low Countries, commissioned by him independently. The total nominal strength of the thirty-five companies and four cornets was thus now 5,450 foot and 550 horse: six thousand men, for the first time.⁷⁹

All the troops in the Generality's pay (save one cornet) were deployed in the same field army in the late spring -- the budgeted food rations indicate a strength of 2,200 foot and 300 horse.⁸⁰ These are clearly approximations, albeit reflecting real rather than nominal strengths. They are consistent with the estimates of English commanders, who put English strengths in the early summer at some six hundred in Norreys's remaining companies, which meant, before defections to Morgan, about nine hundred men: the rations it had been drawing. They estimated five hundred in Morgan's regiment (consistent with the three hundred for whom he had been drawing rations) plus two-to-three hundred under Yorke, who was carving out his own command.⁸¹ North's troops at the same time numbered 280 according to a Flemish captain: not much fewer than the three hundred for which they had drawn rations in the spring.⁸² Thus, these estimates are very probably accurate, but the total strength for the mercenaries for 1583 is an estimate all the same.

If the fourth cornet, like its fellows, numbered about a hundred, and if Nieuwenaar's company numbered about the same (not improbable given that it was newly raised) then the total number of English and Welsh troops was about 2,700.

1584 (up to spring 1585)

The betrayal of Alost the previous autumn had caused a major reduction in English strength at one stroke. Attrition was especially destructive as a result of poor pay and supply and numbers were in continual decline in the winter of 1583/4 and during 1584.

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⁷⁹ 'Memoir des gens de guerre tant de pied que a cheval estant presentement au camp', [Apr.-May 1583], ARA, CvDorp 986, n.f.; SG, min. 5 Apr. and res. 15 Apr., 1583, RSG, 4:53-54, 60; advertisements, 31 May 1583, CSPFor., 17:700, no. 740.

⁸⁰ 'Liste et declaration des vivres que Monseigneur le mareschal de biron gñal. de larmee des pardecha entend estre distribuee journellement', [1583], ARA, CvDorp 971, n.t.

⁸¹ See Williams to Norreys, 28 Jul. and 30 Jul. 1583, n.s., CSPFor., 18:26, 30-31, nos. 32. 38. See also Stokes to Walsingham, 14 Jul. 1583, ibid., 18:23, no. 27.

⁸² Fremyn to Walsingham, 17 Jul. 1583, n.s., CSPFor., 18:10, no. 13.
A proposal in the autumn of 1583 to disband North's regiment and to reduce its remaining companies, those that had been in Cotton's regiment and those in Norreys's regiment, into a single ten-company regiment, 1,500 strong, strongly suggests that this was about the remaining strength of those units. The plan was officially approved by January 1584; the imprisoned Yorke's cornet was, additionally, combined with Henry Norreys's. However, it took time for the measures to be implemented and North's troops lingered on in the pays de Waes until April. Moreover, Morgan had transferred his regiment to the States of Flanders the previous summer and so survived the compressions; but in May it was transferred again, to the States of Holland and was reduced from five to two companies. Cromwell's two companies had never been included and also remained independent.

In light of the reasons for the proposal, Norreys's reformed regiment would have numbered about 1,300 men (with 150 horse), Morgan's about 250 and Cromwell's perhaps 150. Morgan's cornet was eighty strong in January, but was combined in May with Roger Williams's cornet, which was sent to join Nieuwenaar's army, campaigning in Cologne: the combined unit was 150 strong in June, according to its captain. The total in all English units would have been two thousand men. But Norreys's regiment had not long survived his departure: many of his officers accompanied him and it was disbanded. Some of his companies were then sent to join the army in Cologne, some remained in the United Provinces, but others broke up.

Morgan was commissioned by the States of Brabant in July to raise a new regiment for the relief of Antwerp. Odd companies of English troops were still in States' pay in the autumn of 1584 and the spring of 1585, even apart from Morgan's regiment -- Wilson's company, for example, remained in service until March 1585 -- and there were numbers of English and Welsh soldiers in companies of different nationalities. An estimate for the latter is

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1 See SL, 1:264-65.
2 Above, ch. 4, p. 158.
3 SL, 1:264.
4 See Cromwell to [Walsingham], 12 Dec. 1583, n.s., Walsingham to Orange, 28 Feb. 1584, CSPFor., 18 255, 373, nos. 289, 450.
5 SL, 1:265; Williams to [Walsingham], 26 Jun. 1584, n.s., CSPFor., 18:553, no. 678.
6 See de Villiers to Walsingham, 19 Apr. 1585, n.s., CSPFor., 19:407; above, ch. 5, p. 165; and app. 6, below, p. 472.
impossible, but there could have been some two hundred men in the various companies.

There were about four hundred men in two companies which arrived in Antwerp in September 1584. More troops arrived in October and, with the men already at Antwerp, mustered in November, between 1,200 and 1,300 strong, so Lieutenant Colonel Morris reported. In December Morgan finally arrived with the rest of the regiment. He claimed to have raised and shipped more than 1,400 men, which were in addition to two-to-three hundred men left from his old regiment. This is consistent with his report of finding eight hundred troops in the city on his arrival and two hundred casualties, since seven hundred were at Mechelen. When the regiment was mustered again on 5 March 1585, it had a strength of only 558, plus 160 sick.

Since the various reports of Morgan’s strength in and around Antwerp are consistent, it is credible that he had raised 1,400 men in addition to the 250 men in his regiment from the beginning of 1584. If they are added on to the figure of 2,200, from above, then the combined maximum strengths of the English and Welsh troops in the Netherlands in 1584 (but including the spring of 1585) would have been 3,600 men.

1585

The twenty-one companies of English foot in States’ pay were mustered at Utrecht on 21 September 1585. They numbered 3,144 men -- remarkably close to the 3,250 establishment. There were additionally 100 lances in one cornet. Later, in mid-October, the thousand pioneers arrived (numbering 1,037 men in fact), as did a twenty-second States’-pay company.

1586

In the autumn of 1585 many of the States’-pay companies had been taken into the queen’s pay in order to increase her contribution as agreed by the

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Le Sieur to idem, 7 Sep. and John Morris to idem, 23 Nov., 1584, Morgan to Walsingham, 31 Dec. 1584, n.s., and Lucar to idem, 1 Jan. 1585, n.s., CSPFor., 19:54, 151, 197-99.
Ibid., 326.
CSPFor., 20.25.
convention of amplification, but in the winter and early spring Leicester and the States-General reached an agreement to raise extra English troops in Dutch pay and in April and May the Privy Council authorised the raising of the new companies.⁹⁴

On 31 May 1586 the English companies of foot numbered thirty-nine in the queen's pay (the requisite 6,400 men) and twenty-one in the States'. At least another seventeen new States'-pay foot-bands arrived by the end of June.⁹⁵ By early September, there were three English States'-pay cornets and fifty-three companies (including one of gunners and the two foot guard companies of the Lieutenant General and the Lord Marshal); of these, thirty bands of foot, the three bands of gunners and guards, and two cornets, were in the army that besieged Zutphen.⁹⁶ This was the apogee for the States'-pay forces.

After the Zutphen campaign concluded, a process began by which the bands in Dutch pay were broken up (or 'cassed' in Dutch terminology), some being absorbed into the remaining companies, but some retiring to England. When Leicester returned to England himself in November he left thirty-nine companies and eleven cornets in royal pay: their total establishment was precisely the 6,400 foot and 1,000 horse the queen was obliged to field. In theory, twenty-three States'-pay foot companies and two cornets remained.⁹⁷ In fact, only during the winter was the reduction to those numbers completed.

The fifty-three companies at the end of August should have had an establishment of some 8,250 men; for the three cornets it was 250 men.⁹⁸ But this is close to irrelevant, since a large number of companies had a greater actual than nominal strength; this was very unusual but presumably reflected

⁹⁴ See in chs. 5 and 7 above, p. 169, and the sources for table 2, p. 228.
⁹⁵ English companies in queen's and States' pay, Apr.-May 1586, and voluntary companies recruited, Apr.-Jun. 1586; BL, Add. MS 48084, ff. 119-20, f. 99r.
⁹⁶ 'English Bandes in the Estates paye in September and October 1586', BL, Add. MS 48084 f. 86r; and state of the army, Sep. 1586, CSPFor., 21/2:176; see Shaw, 'Financial and Political Relationships', xxxvii. This total does not include Sir William Stanley's Irish companies (listed in these sources jointly as one band) but it does include the English companies of his regiment (which are listed separately).
⁹⁷ PRO, SP 84/10, f. 270: cited by Adams, 'Puritan Crusade', 13; pr. Tenison, 6:209-10. There is another copy of this abstract: BL, Egerton MS 1694 ff. 54r-55r.
⁹⁸ The muster-masters put the establishment strength of the foot at a total of 7,500: CSPFor., 21/2: 176. However, this was on the basis of 150 men per company -- several clearly had 200-man, while at least two were 100-man, establishments (ARA, RyS 1524/i, ff. 126r, 130v). The figure stated is calculated partly on the basis of strengths from the documents cited above; for the horse establishment: SL, 1:108.
that these captains were willing to enlist anyone they could, whereas royal captains had supplied to them, by county justices, the numbers dictated by higher officials. What, then, of actual strengths?

There are two abstracts of musters of the army at Zutphen: the second, overall stronger one, reveals a total strength of 130 horse and 4,616 foot (including gunners and foot-guards). However, some six companies were individually stronger in the first muster—a matter of an extra 131 men. There are also two bands whose strength is blank or illegible on the second muster abstract, with a combined strength of 239 men. Finally, one company’s peak mustered strength was actually on arrival, albeit only stronger by some seven men than at Zutphen. Thus, the maximum mustered strengths of the bands at Zutphen totals 4,993. In addition, mustered strengths for seventeen of the remaining twenty companies are extant from other dates in 1586. They total 2,534 men. Thus, adding to these the figures from the musters at Zutphen gives a total of 7,527 foot; assuming the average strength of the remaining three companies to be that of the other fifty, they would total some 450 men, so that the net strength of the States’-pay foot was probably about 8,000. As for the horse, mustered strengths survive for two cornets, totalling 148 men. Even were the other cornet well below its hundred-strong establishment, and in 1587 it was over strength, the horse would be at least two hundred strong in total. Thus, there were probably about 8,200 English and Welsh troops in States’ pay in 1586.

1587

The reduction of the Anglo-Welsh States’-pay companies which had been begun in the autumn of 1586 was only concluded in the spring of 1587. It left only thirteen companies of foot in States’ pay (one of which had not been on the autumn 1586 list to be retained!). Another five were taken onto the royal establishment whole, two had gone over whole to the Spanish at Deventer and three more were left with so few soldiers after the betrayal that they were

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99 Bandes present in the camp before Zutphen’, 26 Sep. 1586, Tenison, 6:204-8, esp. 204-5; and ‘State and paye of the Camps before Zutphen’, Bodl., MS Tanner 78, ff. 160r-62r, esp. f. 160r. Stanley’s Irish troops are, again, excluded.
100 Afftrekeningen, ARA, SG 12536, ff. 89r-94r; ‘Liste des Compaignies Angloises […]’, 20 Mar. 1587, ARH, AJO 2943.
101 ARA, SG 12536, f. 100r -- Willoughby’s cornet was stronger in June than at Zutphen.
combined into one; Leicester's bodyguard had accompanied him home, and the remaining thirty foot-bands were cassed, the survivors going either into existing English units (whether royal or mercenary) or home. The thirteenth company faded away before the spring and became defunct. The twelve remaining bands had a total establishment some 2,000 strong; an abstract of the spring shows an actual strength of 1,877 men. Willoughby's cornet passed into royal pay on his appointment to succeed Leicester in June but was mustered first; and Norreys's cornet was also mustered: the horse totalled 225 men at maximum strength. By 1588, the English companies had all passed into royal pay or been disbanded.

1588-93

There were only individuals and small groups in foreign Protestant employment during these six years. There were probably more serving in France than the Netherlands, but with one exception there is no evidence that any groups exceeded a dozen or so. However, eighty Englishmen joined Henry of Navarre at the end of 1589 -- they left Willoughby's royal army, which was being shipped home, and decided to continue serving with the king. But whether this was in a formal unit, or simply as a group, is not clear. In any case, this is the one example of a company-sized group in foreign Protestant service between 1588-93, though the number of individual cases suggests a possible total of about a hundred each year, but this is largely conjecture.

1594

Vere's mercenary regiment entered States' pay in March, 1,500 strong in ten companies, but in February an extra three companies (450 men) had been commissioned and these arrived in May. The last three companies raised some four hundred actual soldiers. The original ten companies, plus two of the second tranche, mustered 1,600 strong in May -- an average of just over 130 men per band, which was also the average of all the last three bands.

102 ARH, AJO 2943: the number of companies listed as cassed is actually 31, but one company had split into two over the winter. On Deventer, see Jennings, i.407-8, 410 n.49 -- as above, Stanley's Irish companies are not included here.
103 Ibid.
104 ARA, SG 12536, f. 100v, and RAGP I:197.
15 L&A, 1 321, no. 561.
This indicates with some certainty a total strength of 1,730 men. Adding volunteers with Henry IV, a total of 1,800 is probable.

1595

Vere's regiment was involved in the great siege of Groningen in 1594 and probably took heavy casualties; by October Sir Francis Vere's own band was down to 113 men. Presumably from a desire to reflect reality, the States-General in the spring set the establishment of the English companies at 120, save for Vere's, as colonel, which was 200. Even then, recruiting of three to four hundred men still had to be undertaken in England to bring the units up to strength. In the circumstances, the regiment would have been very close to its establishment of 1,640 men. Indeed, a Dutch observer put its strength on 13 July at 1,600 men; that this was actual, rather than nominal, is evident from the same source's observation that on 19 October the English mustered 1,230 strong (including four auxiliary companies). Adding volunteers in France, total number of mercenaries would have been about 1,650 men.

1596

The official establishment was increased in 1596, back to 150 per company, save for Vere's which was 200. The reason is not known, but may reflect the dispatch of drafts from at least eight companies of the regiment on Essex's expedition to Cadiz that summer. The strengths may have been increased to ensure a reasonable cadre in the Netherlands. In any event, back in the Netherlands, on 25 September the eighteen mercenary and auxiliary bands in the field army mustered 1,836 men; taking the average strength would give an actual strength of 1,326 men in Vere's regiment. Volunteers in France could have brought the total up to a little short of 1,400 men.

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106 See in ch. 5, above, pp. 176-77; Markham, Fighting Veres, 203, SL, 2:30.
107 RSG, 8:287. See Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 97-108.
109 See SL, 2:35-37. The actual estimate was 1,600 including the auxiliary companies from Flushing; assuming the average strength was duplicated in the thirteen mercenary bands they would total about 1,230 men.
110 Longleat, DP 2, 1. 85v (pr. Birch, 2:15-16).
SL, 2:49.
1597 and 1598

Early in 1597 Vere's regiment mustered a total of 1,869 men out of its 2,000-man establishment. This establishment remained the same until the end of 1598, but no muster figures have been found for 1598.112 The actual strength at the 1597 muster was over 90 per cent of the nominal, but the actual strength in 1598 seems to have fallen below 1,500 men -- this is the clear impression from the records of sums due to captains at the end of the 1598 campaign season.113 An actual strength of 1,400 would be a proportion of establishment of 70 per cent, which is credible given the proportions in the years immediately preceding and following.

1599

The auxiliary companies of horse and foot were, of course, transferred into States' pay from January, but during the winter the queen withdrew a nominal 2,000 men to Ireland, to be replaced by new drafts raised in England at the end of the previous year.114 In the end eight auxiliary companies and three cornets were transferred into the States' pay, joining the thirteen companies of Vere's regiment. The eleven transferred units nominally totalled 1,450 men.115 The drafts of replacement companies were well short of the 2,000 figure; thirteen companies had been sent, but were reduced into seven.116 Finally, two of Sir Francis Vere's existing companies were combined. Thus, by April 1599 there were twenty-seven companies of States'-pay foot in the Netherlands. A second foot regiment was created, also with thirteen companies, under Sir Horace Vere while Sir Edward Norreys's band remained in Ostend. It was realised that the year's envisaged campaign, for control of Bommel, would require a considerable strengthening of the 26 companies of the Veres' regiments. The necessary

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112 'Estat du nombre et payement Regiment Angloise', 28 Feb. 1597, PRO, SP 84/54, f. 107r; 
113 ARH, AJO 2945. 
114 Above, ch. 7, p. 230. 
recruiting was done and the English in late June and early July mustered in total 4,298 foot and 249 horse: 4,547 men in sum.\textsuperscript{117}

1600

The English establishment remained the same for 1600 -- twenty-seven companies (one in Ostend) and three cornets.\textsuperscript{118} Three companies were left in the Republic, while twenty-four companies and the horse were taken on the ambitious amphibious invasion of Flanders that finally culminated in the celebrated battle of Nieuwpoort (2 July 1600). The English units would have started the campaign reasonably close to establishment, after the winter's recruiting, but there is no estimate of their strength until after the campaign was underway. The most recent study of the battle posits an English strength there of 2,400 foot -- an average of a hundred men per company. The horse probably totalled about 250 men with perhaps 350 in the other foot bands.\textsuperscript{119}

1601

At the end of 1600 a new establishment was put into place, reflecting the losses of the previous year's ambitious campaign. The same number of English units were kept, but except for the two colonels' companies, which remained 200 men apiece, all the infantry companies were now to be 113 strong, with the horse cornets 80 men each.\textsuperscript{120}

However, the great siege of Ostend began that summer. The initial total establishment of some 3,500 was swiftly surpassed: over four thousand recruits in new companies and replacements for the old ones poured into the city. New companies were raised, then reduced into other companies; there was some rotation of existing companies in and out of Ostend; captains were killed and their replacements are not always clear; all the while a succession of drafts of reinforcements arrived. This is a confusing period, about which it is impossible to be definitive, but adding the numbers in the initial drafts of

\textsuperscript{117} 'State' of captains of horse and foot, Apr.-Oct. 1599, ARH, AJO 2950. See the 'Staet' of military expenses, Apr. 1599, and also Vere to SG, 16 Apr. 1599, ARA, SG 4891, n.f.; Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 127-30.

\textsuperscript{118} Extraordinary expenditure account, 1598-1609, for end of 1599, ARA, CAan. 879, f. 15r.

\textsuperscript{119} See Orlers, ibid., 156-57; Vere Commentaries, 144-65; Dalton, 1:59-60; and J. P. Puype, 'Victory at Nieuwpoort, 2 July 1600', in Exercise of Arms, ed. van der Hoeven, 97.

\textsuperscript{120} State van oorlog, Holland ARA, RvS1226, ff. 131r-32r, also ARA, GRK 1232; Dalton, 1:60.
replacements to the probable strength of the original companies (estimated from contemporary assessments of the strength of the garrison at various stages) indicates a probable maximum strength of around 5,300 men.\(^{121}\) At the end of September, the total nominal strength of the English component of Ostend's garrison was 7,350 men in 29 companies, but the total mustered was 2,440 an average of only 84 men -- and many companies had fewer.\(^{122}\) There seem always to have been six foot-bands outside Ostend (though the actual units varied with rotation) and three cornets with the field army, which would have had a greater strength than their fellows in beleaguered Ostend; since the establishment of all had just been reduced they were presumably close to that figure: at three-quarters strength this would be another 700 men in all.

1602

By 3 March only 958 men were left in the 27 companies then at Ostend.\(^{123}\) However, most of the English companies were withdrawn and deployed with the field army during the summer campaign of 1602. A big effort was made to distract Spanish forces from Ostend and the English contingent was increased. The cornets of horse all had their establishment restored to 100 men and a fourth was commissioned; the number of foot companies was raised to fifty-two. As for the foot, the six companies of the colonels and field officers were all to have 200 men each, the remaining bands 150. And as for their actual strengths, at least 4,500 men were recruited in the spring, partly to ensure units were close to establishment; informed opinion in London had it that there were eight thousand English in the States' army that summer.\(^{124}\) This would be 94 per cent of the 8,500 total establishment, but since similar proportions were reached in 1586, 1597 and 1599 this may be only slightly exaggerated. The mustered strengths of 24 foot-bands from the end of the

\(^{121}\) For some indication of movements of troops in and out, and numbers of reinforcements, see the letters from captains in or en route to Ostend, HMCS, 11:261 et seq.; of 20 Jul. and 5 Sep. 1601, Letters from Sir Robert Cecil to Sir George Carew, ed. John Maclean, Camden Soc., 88 (London: 1864), 88, 94; Histoire remarquable, 5r, 10v, 19r; and Belleruche, 445.

\(^{122}\) Markham, Fighting Veres, 317.

\(^{123}\) SL, 2:65.

\(^{124}\) See extraordinary payments in May 1602, ARA, CAan. 879, f. 25r; list of regiments, winter 1602/3, ARH, AJO 2946; SG res., 23 May 1602, RSG, 12:186; Chamberlain to Carleton, 27 June 1602, Chamberlain Letters, no. 49, 1:153; SL, 2:125; and ch. 7, above, pp. 232-33.
campaign season totalled only 1,823 men, just half their nominal strength.\footnote{RSQ, 12:186-87.} But this is unrepresentative of the maximum strengths that would have been reached around May and June. A total strength of about 7,500 men is likely.

1603-4

For these years there is no state van oorlog, or complete abstract of musters for the army; the Anglo-Welsh contingent has to be reconstructed with only limited information. A list of the army’s regiments and companies at the end of 1602 includes indications of who succeeded to companies by the spring and together with collected references permits a reasonably accurate picture to be drawn. The number of cornets was not changed, but one company was cassed and the companies of two dead or departed captains were combined under one new captain. There was thus a reduction from to fifty-four to fifty-two companies of foot.\footnote{ARH, AJO 2946; SG res., 25 Feb. 1603, RSQ, 12:490.} In both years 100 men was the typical strength for cavalry units; in 1604 it is known that most English foot companies had an establishment of 113 men, with the colonels’ bands still 200 strong.\footnote{See SL, 2:358-62: there are only incomplete records for the staatsche leger as a whole for these two years.} The best estimate for the total establishment strength for the English and Welsh, then, is just under 6,700 men. It is notable that twelve companies at Ostend, mustered in June, numbered only 316 men, but this was after experiencing the rigours of the siege.\footnote{SL, 2:277.}

Only forty-three English companies of foot can be identified in 1604, though the number of cornets again remained steady at four. This reduction is consistent with indications that the (increased) strength in 1605 was the result of deliberate policy. The sum establishment would have been just over 5,500 men. In 1605 the Anglo-Welsh troops would reach three-quarters of their establishment strength, but an effort had been made to increase the strength, so a slightly lower figure of about 70 per cent is more likely for 1603 and 1604. This would produce approximate total actual strengths of 6,700 and 3,800 men respectively.
1605

Over the winter the Dutch government decided to take the offensive in 1605 and prepared an enlarged army accordingly. An English contingent of forty-six companies of foot and the four cornets of horse was originally planned. In the spring, however, more recruiting was ordered, both to bring the forty-six companies up to strength and to raise a thousand extra men (that is, about another nine companies). Indeed, in the end fifty-five companies of Anglo-Welsh foot can be identified in the States' army in 1605, now divided into four regiments. However, only Sir Horace Vere, as colonel-general of the English foot, had a 200-man establishment in his company -- it was 113 for all the rest, with the horse remaining at 100 each. The total establishment was thus about 6,700. Mustered strengths for forty-nine foot companies are extant: they totalled 4,210 men. If the remaining six had the same average strength then the total number of infantrymen would have been about 4,720; including the horse, the aggregate actual strength was probably some 5,000 men.

1606

The Dutch Republic was grappling with the threat posed by Spínola and thus the number of companies of foot employed rose to fifty-eight, which it would remain for the next two years. This did not include an extra English company dispatched on a naval expedition to Spain, so that the increase was really of four companies. The same establishments were kept for foot bands and horse cornets. Since an extra nine hundred men were recruited in England in July it might be supposed that they were relatively close to their nominal total strength of just over 7,000 men. In the absence of a state van oorlog, or more detailed financial records, an estimate of actual strengths is difficult. But in the preceding year, the English real strength was 75 per cent of their establishment. Assuming a similar, but slightly lower proportion of 70 per cent, the approximate total actual strength would be about 5,000 men.


\[131\] 'Staet van alle de compaignies' of foot, 1605, ARA, GRK 1232, n.f.; abstract pr. SL, 2:364-65. One of these companies was Vere's, 153 strong; the average manpower of the remaining 48 units was thus 84.5. It is this which is used as a multiplier for the unmustered companies.

During the winter of 1606/7 a number of Anglo-Welsh captains ceased to be in States' pay. Some evidently lost their companies: part of the somewhat panicky Dutch reaction to the poor performance of the Staatsche leger as a whole to Spinola's offensive, but a number had been casualties. However, the number of companies remained the same, albeit one cornet was cassed, as part of an initial plan to 'make only a defensive warr' and reduce the field strength accordingly. Ultimately, however, the States-General reflected its concern about a renewed offensive by Spinola and instead increased the army by increasing the strengths of many units. Only a quarter of the English companies remained at an establishment of 113 men, with the rest being increased to 150, 200 and, for colonels, even 300 men. The new nominal total strength was 300 horse and 8,771 foot. This amounted to the highest aggregate establishment ever (though not for long). As for the real numbers, applying the same 70 per cent ratio of actual to establishment strengths indicates about 6,350 English and Welsh troops in the Netherlands.

The same number of units, each with the same establishments, were maintained for foot and horse, but a new troop of mounted infantry was raised, bringing the total establishment of the Anglo-Welsh contingent to 9,184 men. The mustered strength of every company is also extant and comes to a total of 407 horse and 7,466 foot. The actual maximum known strength was thus 7,873 men. This was the greatest number of English and Welsh soldiers in foreign Protestant employ since 1586 and possibly ever. In fact, 1608 was relatively quiet, as negotiations were conducted which ultimately culminated in the Twelve Years' Truce. However, the fruit of the crisis years of 1605-7 was that 1608 was the high-water mark of English and Welsh mercenary participation in the European wars of religion.

132 Browne to Robert Sidney, 20 Dec. 1606, ibid., 335; SL 2:131; Ferguson, Papers, xiv.
133 State van oorlog, ARA, SG 8043, also GRK 1232, n.f. (the figure of 33 English companies in the abstract pr. SL 2:366, is erroneous).
134 This 75% ratio would normally be high very high, but is reasonable in light of the known rata in 1605 and 1608.
135 State van oorlog, ARA, SG 8044, also Collectie Goldberg 295.
On 9 April 1609 the 'truce of Antwerp' which was to last for twelve years, was agreed and the first stage of the Eighty Years' War was over. The Dutch had begun cutting their army strength in 1608 and in May 1609 carried out a comprehensive reduction. The company of dragoons were dismounted, but fifteen companies of foot were disbanded (though most of the captains were kept in States' pay, against the need to expand the army again rapidly). The new establishment was for three cornets, each of 70 men; and forty-four companies of foot: three (the colonels') of 200, three of 100, fifteen of 90, sixteen of 80 and seven of 70 men -- or 4,020 foot in all. This establishment was initially maintained for 1610, but with the conjunction of Arminian disorders in Utrecht and the looming war over Cleves-Jülich, the Dutch authorised the recruiting of another five companies (2 x 90, 2 x 80 and 1 x 70), increasing the total establishment by 410 men. They were effectively divided into four regiments, because Ogle was sent to deal with Utrecht and remained in garrison there with five companies. His regiment was made up by the new companies, and committed to the attack on Jülich (with all the other English and Welsh foot) under the command of Sir George Holles.

As for the actual strengths, since the establishment of English troops had been reduced, for 1609 a proportion of 70 per cent (as used for 1606-7) is credible. This would produce about three thousand men in Dutch pay. In 1610 a flood of volunteers crossed to join the campaign, and arrangements were made to draw on the cautionary garrisons to ensure the units were close to establishment. Thus, a proportion of real to nominal strength of 80 per cent is credible (in 1608 it was 85 per cent); this gives an actual strength, for the last year of the era of at least about 3,700 English and Welsh soldiers, employed by the Dutch and fighting alongside Huguenot troops.

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137 See staten van oorlog, 1609-10, ARA, RvS 1226, 1236, ARH, Collectie Goldberg 296-97. See also Ogle to Oldenbarnevelt, 9 and 15 Jun. 1610, AJO 1318; the official Dutch order of battle, SL, 3:14; and Simon Stevin (chief Dutch military engineer), 'Castramentation du Prince d'Orange', 1610, BN, MS Fr. 654, f. 26v.
138 Life of Herbert of Cherbury, 52-57.
139 PRO, SP 84/67, ff. 40, 46, 84, 96 (I owe these references to Conrad Russell).
APPENDIX 2

NUMBERS OF MERCENARIES (ii): TABULATED EVIDENCE

Table 6. Estimated Actual Numbers of English and Welsh Mercenaries in Huguenot and Dutch Service Each Year, 1562-1610

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1562-63</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1590</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1567-68</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1591</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1568-69</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1592</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1569-70</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1593</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1572</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>1594</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1573</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>1595</td>
<td>1,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1574</td>
<td>1,600</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1577</td>
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<td>1599</td>
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<tr>
<td>1578</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>1600</td>
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<td>1579</td>
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<td>1583</td>
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<td>5,000</td>
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<td>1584</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1585</td>
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<tr>
<td>1586</td>
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<td>1608</td>
<td>7,873</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2,102</td>
<td>1609</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<td>1588</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1610</td>
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<tr>
<td>1589</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The years of the first three French civil wars are counted as they are in table 6 due to the wars' duration. The first was from April 1562 to March 1563; the second from September 1567 to March 1568; the third from August 1568 to August 1570. To count these conflicts as being of (respectively) two, two and
The total numbers each year, as presented in table 6 (and in figure 1, above, p. 28), are plotted in figure 5 as a curve, revealing trends over the period. The source for both is appendix 2.

three years’ duration, when counting participation of mercenaries and their average annual strength, would thus be a distortion -- though English and Welsh troops were present in France in the modern calendar years of (for example) 1562 and 1563, their operational commitment was only slightly longer than eight months. In contrast, from the beginning of the opstand in April 1572 English troops were committed abroad throughout each year until the autumn of 1610: this can thus reasonably be counted as a period of thirty-
nine years. But for the period 1562-63 and 1567-70 it is more representative of contemporary reality to use the then current calendar and count a year as from 25 March to 24 March. Counted thus, English and Welsh mercenaries were employed in France and the Netherlands for forty-three years between 1562 and 1610; this, in turn, gives an annual average of just over 2,660 men.

The main focus of this study, however, has been 'on the raising of companies or regiments of mercenaries'.¹ In the second guerre de religion and from 1588-93 inclusive there were no companies (and, consequently, only very few men) engaged in France and the Netherlands. If we take only the thirty-six years in which Anglo-Welsh units were in foreign Protestant employ, then they totalled instead some 113,850 men: an average of slightly over 3,160 men each year. In either case, it can thus reasonably be said that the average strength was of the order of three thousand men per year.²

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¹ Above, in ch. 1, p. 51.
² As in ch. 1, above, p. 27.
It is instructive also to compare the totals for the years of Elizabeth I's reign with those for the years of James VI and I. The raw total is, of course, much greater for Elizabeth's reign than that of James because the period in question is predominantly Elizabethan -- but, as figure 7 shows, the average strength abroad was greater during the eight Jacobean years than during the thirty-five Elizabethan years in which they were employed up to 1602.³

As noted in table 6 and figure 5, these are all estimates of actual troop strengths. They are drawn from the appendix 1, but this produced different types of figures -- the estimates have different evidential bases, even apart from the establishment (nominal) and mustered (real) strengths. Since the key data is the approximate actual strengths, it is these which are presented in figure 1, figure 5 and table 6, however, they in turn are drawn from table 7.

³ Elizabeth died in 1603 but in March. Consequently, 1603 is counted as Jacobean. This is also the practice, in tabulating troop numbers, of Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 290-91 and McGurk, Elizabethan Conquest, 55, 58-59, 62 (tables 1-3).
This is the complete, as it were, tabulation of the numerical data extrapolated from appendix 1.

Table 7. Classified Annual Strengths 1562-1610

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Establishment (partly estimated)</th>
<th>Establishment (official)</th>
<th>Actual Estimated (descriptive)</th>
<th>Actual Estimated (part musters)</th>
<th>Actual Mustered (Whole)</th>
<th>Actual Mustered (partial)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1562-63</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>110 a</td>
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<td>1567-68</td>
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<td>550</td>
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<td>1,600</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1,313</td>
<td>203</td>
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<tr>
<td>1569-70</td>
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<td>4,500</td>
<td>1,696</td>
<td>1,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2,950</td>
<td>1,992</td>
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<td>7,873</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1583</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>9,184</td>
<td>4,230</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>2,440</td>
<td>2,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1584</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>4,230</td>
<td>4,640</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>2,440</td>
<td>2,440</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTALS:** 61,350 73,021 39,150 52,075 23,323 29,195

a These 'mustered' strengths include unusually reliable figures from narrative sources (Churchyard's Choice, sig Kii; Williams, Actions, 101 -- both also supported by other evidence).
The data in table 7 is of six types. The figures in the first two columns are establishment strengths: first, the establishment based partly on known official figures but partly deduced from contemporary descriptions; second, the actual establishment as recorded in official documents. Either one or other will exist for a given year, of course, not both -- though establishment figures do not exist for years when only small groups and individuals served and do not survive for a few years. It is possible, therefore, by combining the figures from the first two columns of table 7, to produce transparent figures of official establishment strengths, at least for years where they are known.

Establishment strengths are important: firstly because they were the currency of most military planning at government level; secondly because they show what Protestant patrons and captains in England and Wales felt they could deliver. Since they allow an insight into the Anglo-Welsh private-enterprise war effort these strengths are shown in figures 8-11.4

* For a comparison with the establishment of the Dutch army as a whole, see below, in app. 11, pp. 513-14.
Figure 9. Establishment Strengths 1575-87: Trend

Figure 10. Establishment Strengths Per Annum 1594-1610

Figure 11. Establishment Strengths 1594-1610: Trend
In addition to establishment strengths, table 7 lists figures for actual strengths. These are of three types: estimates (which are in turn of two subtypes) and 'real' figures. The latter are straightforward: they are figures from musters for all the English and Welsh troops (often taken from musters for larger forces of which they were part -- sometimes the whole army). Musters more frequently exist only for some of the Anglo-Welsh companies; they are then the chief grounds for an estimate, based partly on their average strength but supplemented by contemporary reports and comparison with other years and other forces. This supplementary evidence is, however, the main base for the second type of estimate, which is made when no figures from musters are available, or only from an unrepresentative sample of units.

It should be stressed that actual musters for the whole Anglo-Welsh force, estimates based partly on mustered strengths, and estimates based solely on descriptive evidence and deduction, are alternative types of data. When a complete muster exists, it is used for the total actual strength; when it does not, but there is a representative sample of mustered units, an estimate based on these figures is preferred; in the absence of either, an estimate is made based solely on contemporary narratives and correspondence and/or inference. Thus, only one of these exists for each year and it is the basis for the actual strength posited for that year.

It is these three types of data on troop strengths, listed in the third-to-fifth columns of table 7, that are the basis for all assertions of total numbers and all calculations of annual averages: that is, for all the material presented in figures 1 and 5-7 and table 6. What, however, of years where strengths are extant from musters but not of the whole Anglo-Welsh force of mercenaries? These are listed in the final column of table 7. If the estimated strength for a year is based partly on musters (that is, if the strength is drawn from the fourth column of table 7), a strength will also be listed in column six. An explanation has already been given in appendix 1 of how the estimated total is calculated from this subtotal, but these partial strengths are tabulated, as they provide the basis for an easy comparison of minimum, with likely maximum, actual troop strengths, and the desired, establishment figures.5

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5 As done by, e.g., Shurmer: 'Total Number of Scots Mercenaries Fighting in the Netherlands, 1566-1609' (unnumbered table between pp. 117-18).
Mustered strengths are minimums -- at the very least it is certain that roughly the number of men mustered were present in the employer's service that year. Mustered strengths are not extant for every year, of course, hence they are graphed in two tranches, for 1569-87 and 1594-1608, in figures 12-13 and 14-15 respectively.
These minimum known strengths can be compared and contrasted with the estimated totals (already listed in table 6) which are maximum actual
strengths (although of course sometimes they are the same as the minimum known figures, since estimated actual totals in some years are drawn from complete musters). Finally, establishment strengths, as noted above, are nominal, but because they reflect desire and intent it is instructive to assess the extent to which these were consummated. The totals were almost never attained, but individual units at peak strength exceeded their establishment on occasions. As table 7 and figure 16 reveal, although at times there was a vast gulf between nominal and actual, at others they were remarkably close.

Figure 16. Trends in Minimum and Maximum Actual, and Establishment Strengths, 1562-87, 1594-1610

And in 1581 the companies of Norreys's regiment were so strong that they made a mockery of their nominal establishment: see app. 1, above, p. 324.
### APPENDIX 3

**MERCENARIES AND THE ENGLISH PEERAGE**

#### TABLE 8

**PEERS OR HEIRS TO PEERAGES WHO SERVED AS MERCENARIES WITH THE FRENCH AND/OR DUTCH 1562-1610**

1. Peregrine Bertie, twelfth Baron Willoughby d’Eresby*
2. Charles Blount, heir to the seventh Baron Mountjoy (succ. 1594)*
3. Henry Brooke, eleventh Baron Cobham¹
4. Grey Brydges, fifth Baron Chandos²
5. Edward Cromwell, heir of Henry, second Baron Cromwell (succ. 1592) †
6. Thomas, fifteenth Baron Grey de Wilton*
7. William Herbert, heir to Henry, second Earl of Pembroke (succ. 1601)³
8. Theophilus, Lord Howard de Walden, heir of Thomas, first Earl of Suffolk (succ. 1626)⁴
9. Roger Manners, fifth Earl of Rutland⁵
10. William Norreys, heir to Henry, first Baron Norreys of Rycote⁶
11. Dudley North, son of John North, below; after his father’s death (1597) heir to Roger, second Baron North (succ. 1600)⁷
12. John North, original heir to Roger, second Baron North*
13. William Parker, fourth Baron Mounteagle⁸
14. Henry Percy, ninth Earl of Northumberland⁹
15. Henry, fourth Baron Rich⁸

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¹ He accompanied Maurice’s army in the Nieuwpoort campaign (1600); though sent as an observer by queen or council, he also fought for the States: *Sydney Papers*, 2:206; Hay, *Life of Robert Sidney*, 107; *HMCD*, 2:473-4; Dalton, 1:59.
² *Life of Edward Herbert*, 53.
³ *DNB*, 9:678.
⁴ *Life of Edward Herbert*, 54-57.
⁵ *Sydney Papers*, 2:205-6; Dalton, 1:59.
⁶ *Sydney Papers*, 2:228; *DNB*, 14:594.
⁸ *DNB*, 16:997. He later commanded the fleet sent in 1627 to aid Buckingham at Ré.
16. George Touchet, eleventh Baron Audley (Earl of Castlehaven, 1616)*
17. Henry, fifth Baron Windsor†
18. Henry Wriothesley, third Earl of Southampton**

* Served in foreign pay as a general or field officer: see appendix 5.
† Served as a mercenary captain: see appendix 6.
** Served as a mercenary gentleman volunteer; later became a captain or field officer in royal service: see appendix 9.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
a) Philip Sidney is not included, as his barony was French, not English.
b) Thomas, fifth Lord Burgh of Gainsborough, 'served as a private volunteer with Maurice' in 1589 but did so in royal pay along with other English auxiliaries."

c) Edward Conway Jr began serving as a mercenary prior to the creation of his father (a soldier with experience in the Netherlands, but entirely in royal pay) as Viscount Conway; thus, although an heir, he is not counted here.

TABLE 9

MERCENARIES IN FRENCH OR DUTCH SERVICE WHO WERE LATER CREATED ENGLISH PEERS

1. Robert Carey (Earl of Monmouth, 1626)‡
2. Dudley Carleton (Baron Carleton, 1626; Viscount Dorchester, 1628)‡
3. Edward Cecil (Viscount Wimbledon, 1626)*
4. Henry Danvers (Lord Danvers of Dauntsey, 1603; Earl of Danby, 1626)‡
5. Fulke Greville (Baron Brooke, 1621)‡
6. John Holles (Baron Haughton, 1616; Earl of Clare, 1624)‡

‡ He served on the Nieuwpoort campaign as a volunteer: Chamberlain Letters, no. 30, 1:101. He had earlier wanted to go on Essex's Calais relief expedition: Stone, Crisis, 477.
§ Life of Edward Herbert, 70; an earlier trip to the Netherlands coincided with the Nieuwpoort campaign but it may have been only to fight a duel: Chamberlain Letters, no. 32, 1:107.
†† L&A, 1:116, no. 78.
‡‡ See Chamberlain Letters, nos. 2-22.
§§ Ibid., no. 6, 1:43; Markham, Epistles of Warre, 141.
7. William Knollys (Lord Knollys of Greys, 1603; Viscount Wallingford, 1616; earl of Banbury, 1626)
8. Henry Rich (Baron Kensington 1623; Earl of Holland, 1624)
9. William Russell (Baron Russell of Thornhaugh, 1603)
10. Robert Sidney (Baron Sidney of Penshurst, 1603; Viscount Lisle, 1605; Earl of Leicester, 1618)
11. Horace Vere (Baron Vere of Tilbury, 1625)

* Served in foreign pay as a general or field officer: see appendix 5.
† Served as a mercenary captain: see appendix 6.
†† Served as a mercenary gentleman volunteer; later became a captain or field officer in royal service: see appendix 9.

ADDITIONAL NOTE:
a) This does not include Sir Henry Carey, Sir Thomas Fairfax and Sir Oliver Lambert, all former captains in States' pay: created, respectively, Viscount Falkland in 1620 and Baron Fairfax of Cameron in 1627, both in the peerage of Scotland; and Baron Lambert of Cavan in 1618, in the peerage of Ireland.

* DNB, 16:997; Dalton, 1:179.
APPENDIX 4

STRUCTURES OF LORDSHIP IN EARLY-MODERN ENGLAND

In considering aristocratic patronage it is essential to be clear in terminology. This appendix defines and clarifies the terminological usage in this thesis, as already outlined briefly in chapter 1.2

The structures of lordship in early-modern society attracted particular attention from French historians in the early 1970s (most notably from Roland Mousnier), though their studies were mostly tangential, arising from analysis of other issues.3 In the late 1970s, however, patron-client relations became a popular subject among anthropologists, political scientists and sociologists.4 This led to renewed historical analysis, drawing on sociological insights and approaches: Harding’s examination of the provincial gouverneurs of early-modern France was one of the first such works.5

Scholars have now proposed a wide variety of possible relationships and different loyalties that could exist within the patron/client structure; these are mirrored by the wealth of terms used to describe them, often carelessly. Social scientists recognise a lack of ‘etymological precision [and] clarity of reference’ in studies of clientelism and patronage.6 This extends to historical studies. Scholarship on early-modern systems of patronage and clientage is dominated by historians of France, whose terminology is typically ambiguous since they use ‘a modern social science terminology in English that cannot be translated easily into French, and an early modern French terminology that lacks standardization of usage and [is] entangled in Mousnier’s model of patronage relationships.’ The terms adopted by Mousnier and his adherents

1 This was the basis for a paper read at the North American Conference on British Studies, Boston, Mass., 18-20 Nov. 1999.
2 See table 1, p. 49.
3 I draw on the thorough review of the literature on patronage and clientage of Kettering, ‘Patronage in Early Modern France’.
6 Eisenstadt and Lemarchand, 7.
and opponents are used ‘interchangeably without distinguishing between them’ and, consequently, the language of current patronage studies ‘is often confusing and imprecise’.” In consequence, one prominent historian of early-modern France even suggests that ‘the vocabulary of patronage’ ought not be used ‘by anyone who does not define his or her terms.’

Ideally, different terms should be used (consistently) for different types of relationships. This is not to imply strict boundaries and mutual exclusivity between different types -- both theoretical boundaries and specific membership tended to be ambiguous and shifting. As a tool to aid understanding and as a basis for terminological clarity, however, rather than as an end in itself, some categorisation is useful. There is much debate about what types of relationships existed, how they should be defined, and what they implied in practice, but the model used here is descriptive, rather than prescriptive. Different terms are used for different types of relationships, but these were not necessarily mutually exclusive -- actual interpersonal relations were not limited to only one type of relationship at a time. With these caveats, the following terms are used in this thesis advisedly and according to the schema in table 1 (which, for convenience, is reproduced below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>CLARIFICATION</th>
<th>TERM USED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Family</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Formal service (A)</td>
<td>Household (generic)</td>
<td>Servants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(i) -- Close, personal</td>
<td>Fidèles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) -- General and/or menial</td>
<td>Servitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal service (B)</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Retinue/Retainers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Landholding</td>
<td>Tenants/vassals</td>
<td>Tenants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Clientage</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Clientele/Clients$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Factional association</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Confederates$^b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Militarised sub-group</td>
<td>Within affinity</td>
<td>Dependence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes
a. ‘Patron’ is used for the superior side of the relationship
b. ‘Allies’ is used for those members of a faction or party who were not member of the affinity.

$^7$ Kettering, ‘Patronage in Early Modern France’, 847, 849, 851.
These are somewhat arbitrary distinctions, whose primary purpose is as an aid to clarity, but they are based on the usages of other historians and social scientists, although due to the debate in the field, some partiality has had to be exercised. Each term is defined as follows.

‘Affinity’ is used to describe a network of persons: one of them the lord or patron; and all the others, each subaltern in a vertical relationship to their lord/patron. The appropriateness of ‘affinity’ in this context is contested by Professor Kettering, partly because it can be understood to mean that an affinity (i.e., a ‘natural friendliness, liking or attractiveness’) always existed between a lord and his subalterns, so that their relationships were ‘voluntary [and] social’ -- but this was frequently, rather than necessarily, the case. This point has been well made, but Kettering ignores the arguments advanced against the use of her own preferred term, clientele. No matter what term is used, the possibility of misunderstanding exists. Other dictionary definitions of affinity include (appropriately enough) an alliance, group or association ‘of people sharing a common purpose or interest’.9 (Furthermore, ‘clientele’ is the most logical term to apply to a group of clients and so it is used in that fashion here.) Seven different types of vertical relationships to the lord are identified: those of kin, servants (fidèles and servitors), retainers, tenants, clients and confederates.

First, kinship. ‘Kin’ is used for actual, acknowledged family members, whether by blood, marriage, or adoption.10

The second and third types come under the general heading of household service. Household members would, of course, have a wide variety of relationships to their lord and would include some kin, but also a...
range of other persons in the formal service of the lord, ranging from important gentlemen to ordinary menials. They are sub-divided into two further categories, but 'servant' is used generically for all members of the household.

Second, fidèles. French historians have used fidèle for various types of clientage relationships (sometimes including family), but it is used here strictly for non-family members of the household (important servants, or 'friends') who were trusted by and in intimate contact with their Lord. They would receive some reward from the relationship, but were motivated by friendship and devotion more than overt self-interest or ambition; and they often shared a sense of confraternity and conviviality with each other as well their lord. 'Fidèle' is used rather than 'friend' to describe such relationships with a lord, since genuine friendship relationships require 'the relative equality of the participants in this relationship'. Men of high rank were bound to suspect that those purporting to be their friends were counting on some gain from the relationship. The necessary equality of relationship might exist among fellow-fidèles, but not between them and their lord.

Third, servitors. This is used here for those servants who were merely paid or maintained to do a job, including those who were relatively senior (which is why terms such as 'menial' are not used), but who lacked an intimate relation with the lord. Many menial servants might, of course, have strong loyalties, sometimes hereditary, to their employer and his family, but others would have served purely for pay. Also included are the numerous people who might be fed at a great noble's house to demonstrate his power and the general hangers-on of a household who lacked a clear position or salary (hence the avoidance also of 'hireling').

Fourth, military service. A following of soldiers (or at any rate of men with access to arms), maintained for military duties, paid for their service in cash or in kind, and frequently (though not always) provided with a livery, is

12 Greengrass, 'Noble Affinities', 282-83; Carroll, 'Guise Affinity', 127; Eisenstadt and Roniger, Patrons, Clients and Friends, 2; see Peter Burke, Sociology and History, Controversies in Sociology, 10 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), 73-74.
termed a 'retinue'; 'retainer' is used for its members. Retinues included kinsmen, clients and fidèles of their lords, while retainers in some ways fit the description of servitors. Nevertheless, their special status vis-à-vis their lord (because of the martial role of the nobility) and their special role in traditional military recruiting warrants a separate category. It must be emphasised that though 'retinue' was a medieval term its use is not anachronistic.¹⁵

Fifth, landholding. Persons occupying land by virtue of a lease from, or of service rendered or on conditions of homage and allegiance to, a lord, are termed 'tenants'. Fidèles, retainers and clients might also hold land from a lord/patron, but 'tenant' describes someone whose relationship with the lord arose only/essentially from living on his land.

Sixth, clientage. A lord had relationships with many people who were not his kin, servants, retainers or tenants. The subaltern members of such relationships are here termed 'clients', with 'clientele' used to describe a lord's clients collectively.¹⁶ Thus, simply stated, a clientage relationship is a relationship other than those defined above. This is a practical distinction: some French specialists distinguish between clientele and fidèle relationships, but others argue persuasively that being a client did not necessarily exclude one from being a fidèle. The intention here is not to subscribe to any of the theoretical positions in that debate, but simply to make plain the distinction between those whose relationship with a lord was on a formal basis (that is, those in the previous categories) and those whose relationships were more intangible.¹⁷ 'Patron' is used for the lord when described vis-à-vis his clients. Clientele could include 'friends', but being especially difficult to define, they are not distinguished separately and will be found among both fidèles (as noted above) and clients. Client status is thus not necessarily indicative of strength of attachment.

Seventh, factional or party alliance. Those persons whose primary link with a lord was that they were pursuing similar political (or, on occasion,}

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¹⁵ See the discussion of retaining retinues and their role in 16th-century recruiting in ch. 8.
¹⁶ Adams, 'Baronial Contexts' 158 n.11, notes that he originally used the term clientele but, for simplicity rather than dogmatism, adopted the English form (used here) 'clientele'. However, his impression that 'French usage of the term clientele has a heavy bureaucratic emphasis', is a curious one, revealing an evidently narrow knowledge of the historiography (ibid, n.12).
¹⁷ Although I accept that in thus defining 'clientele' as part of, rather than synonymous with, the affinity I do effectively support one side of the debate. See Kettering, 'Patronage in Early Modern France', 844-46, 849-51; idem, 'Clientage', 223-24, 234-35, 239; Neuschel, 119, 183; Carroll, 'Guise Affinity', 126; Greengrass, 'Noble Affinities'; Adams, 'Baronial Contexts' 167.
ideological) aims, or had been subsumed within his faction (if one existed), are here termed 'confederates.' This is another informal relationship: indeed confederates in effect comprise a sub-group within a clientele, but they were of sufficient importance often enough to warrant separate categorisation. Furthermore, some would be of roughly equivalent social status and as 'patron-client relations entail hierarchical differences between the patron and his protege', they cannot accurately be termed members of a clientele. 'Confederates' is used for supporters of a party leader, moderately junior to him, or who at any rate ceded primacy to him; as opposed to those who were of (and asserted) equivalent status, who are termed 'Allies' (who, because not having a subordinate relationship with a lord, are not deemed members of his affinity, which confederates are).

This thesis also uses three other terms advisedly: follower, connexion and dependence. 'Follower' is used generically for the various subaltern members of an affinity, each of whom had one of the seven types of vertical relationship with the lord. It is necessary to be able to describe groupings of followers within affinities. Such a grouping is termed a 'connexion'. For example, while Essex had considerable numbers of followers both in southwest Wales and in Staffordshire, each group was discrete (though of course connexions less geographically distinct might overlap). The term is also useful for a group defined in other ways: by common ideology, for example, like Essex's Catholic followers. Thus, a connexion is a group of persons defined by a type of horizontal relationship (to each other), which was additional to their vertical relationships (to the lord).

Within some affinities existed a grouping of martial men, gathered specifically because of their martial interests and/or abilities and with their employment in mind. Such a grouping, is here termed a military, or martial, 'dependence'. This is a cross-section of different sets from each of the seven affiliations and thus a kind of specialised connexion. The term 'dependence' is not found in other patronage studies, but it is used here for two reasons.

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18 Eisenstadt & Roniger, Patrons, Clients and Friends, 2.
19 See ibid, 49, 173; Loades, John Dudley, 276.
20 OED, s.v. 'connexion': 'A body, or circle of persons connected together, or with whom one is connected by political or religious ties, or by commercial relations; a body of fellow worshippers, of political sympathizers, a circle of clients'. See Eisenstadt and Roniger, Patrons, Clients and Friends, 228-29.
First, in spite of the frequently self-serving and independent nature, and the typically flexible and/or parallel loyalties, of subaltern members of an affinity (especially of clients, servitors and confederates), they were all to some extent dependent on the man who was its head. Second, ‘dependence’ was the term used by contemporaries themselves to describe what some modern scholars term ‘military clienteles’ (or ‘military affinities’).

One of the best-known military patrons in sixteenth-century England was Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex. Even before his execution for an attempted coup in 1601, Essex had been warned by his friend and client, Francis Bacon, of the potential dangers arising from having ‘a nature not to be ruled ... an estate not grounded to his greatness ... a popular reputation [and] a military dependence’. Bacon observed that, although all these things created a bad impression,

The impression of greatest prejudice ... is that [created by having] a military dependence. Wherein I cannot sufficiently wonder at your Lordship’s course; that you say the wars are your occupation, and go on in that course ... the disposing of the places and affairs both, concerning the wars ... will of themselves flow to you; which will preserve that dependence in full measure. It is a thing of all things I would have you retain .... But I say, keep it in substance but abolish it in shows ... For ... that kind of dependence maketh a suspected greatness.

This indicates very well the characteristics of military dependences: they were martial in nature; they consisted of confirmed soldiers, many of whom were attracted by the rewards (especially in terms of offices and positions) that would derive from their association with their lord; they were a distinctive sub-form of the affinity and were distinguished by contemporaries; and they were intended to be used.

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22 The definitions in the OED, s.v. ‘dependence’, imply ‘subordination’ and ‘subjection’, but can also refer to relationships more generally. Further, it offers as an early-modern definition ‘A body of dependants or subordinates; a retinue.’

23 Adams, ‘English Military Clientele’, 217 et passim. But as I have argued already, ‘clientele’ logically should be applied to a group of clients and so it is herein used in precisely this way — a dependence would comprise not just clients, but also other types of followers from a lord’s affinity, so that ‘military clientele’ is not accurate for a whole military dependence (though a dependence may well include a ‘military clientele’. As for affinities, the term is of course used herein for the entire following; medieval affinities, from whence the term has been borrowed, were primarily military organisations (e.g., Walker, 39, 42-43) but the 16th-century affinity had other functions.

24 To Essex, 4 Oct. 1596, Spedding, Letters and Life of Bacon, 1:41 (emphasis supplied), 43.
My terminology follows sixteenth-century usage: ‘military (or martial) dependence’ is used to describe a specific grouping within an affinity, made up of those of the lord’s followers (whether kin, clients, servants, or others) who had skill at arms, experience of warfare, or simply an enthusiasm for it; and intended for military deployment of some kind. It might include an actual retinue of armed men kept in the lord’s pay, wearing his badge or livery; and/or might incorporate a genuine ‘military clientele’ (or subdivision of clients deliberately taken up by a patron because they had an aptitude for war and/or manpower resources); but the balance would comprise a cross-section of men from all, some, or none of the affinity’s other connexions.
Appendixes 5 and 6 list English and Welsh captains who were in French and Dutch employ between 1562 and 1610. Due to the nature of the sources, no such list can be definitive—some company commanders are still to be identified. What follows, however, provides a guide as to who served where and when and supplies information relevant to the subjects' military careers.

It is in two parts: the first lists all those captains who eventually became administrative, field and general officers; the second lists the great majority who remained company captains. Together, these lists give a good idea of career trajectories and also provide the basis for appendixes 7, which lists the units and formations in foreign service each year and 10, which indicates the geographical origins of the captains.

General Officers

Horse

Sidney, Sir Philip (1554-86)

He was made first cautionary Governor of Flushing on 8 November 1585, but a contemporary's reminiscence that Sidney was appointed both 'for Garrison, Governor of Flushing, and for the Field, General of the Horse' is correct, despite E. M. Tenison's doubts, which were based on the fact that Essex was appointed Colonel-General of the Horse in royal pay on 10 January 1586.3

In fact, Sidney's commission was from the States, as Generaal der cavalerie, on 5 February 1586.4 In April and May commissions followed as

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1 Listed by horse and foot, each section in chronological order of appointments.
2 DCPR 1584-85, 197 — full text pr. Tenison, 6:34.
4 ARA, RvS 1.01.40, p. 2.
Governor of Flushing (to match that from the queen) and colonel of a States'-pay regiment of foot, as well as captain of his own company in it, consisting of Walloons and Flemings, rather than English and Welsh. Indeed, of the twenty companies in his regiment (which mustered 2,824 strong on 9 May 1586), none were English or Welsh.5

Most of Sidney's offices were thus in States' pay and even those to which he was appointed by the queen were matched by commissions from the Dutch. This 'mercenary' aspect of Sidney's service in the Netherlands, which is overlooked by even his most recent biographer, supports Dr Poort's contention that the Dutch wanted Sidney to succeed his uncle, Leicester and were manoeuvring to that end.6

Infantry

Norreys, Sir John (1547?-97), of Berkshire7

Appointed Colonel-General by the States of Holland on 3 November 1580, a commission confirmed by the States-General on 22 December 1580.8 He was officially styled 'general de notre Infanterie' by Anjou on 28 July 1582 and referred to as 'général Norris' by William of Orange on 25 March 1583.9 His title as *kolonel-generaal* was reconfirmed by the States-General in the autumn of 1583 and in January 1584.10 As commander of the force to relieve Antwerp, he was a general both of the States of Holland, by whom he was styled 'den Heere Generael Nouritz' in resolutions of 6 September 1585 and

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5 ARA: RvS 15244, ff. 15, 16v, 38v; FAB 23 n.f. (rubric 't Regiment van den Heer van Sidney'); RAGP 1:93, n.f. (10 Apr. 1587).
7 See, generally, Nolan, Norreys.
8 RSG, 3:44; Hooft, 716; Bor, 2/15:229r; SL, 1:263; CSPFor., 14:492, no. 496: he was commissioned 'Veldeoverste', but his title is also given as 'Overste Velt-heer', and one of his gentlemen volunteers reporting to Leicester called the office 'Master of the Camp' the Spanish term for a colonel (Parker, Army, 274). Literally translated, the Dutch means 'Colonel of the Field' (or 'Master-Colonel of the Field'), which implies a higher degree of authority than a colonel's, and this appointment carried with it command of an operational formation rather than a regiment. Thus, colonel-general is the best translation: see SL, 1:264. It is notable that the great Huguenot soldier de La Noue's rank as commander of the States' forces in Flanders was also 'Veldeoverste': van Meteren, 185.
9 ARA, SG 11095, n.f.; Muller and Diegerick, no. 786, 4:536.
10 SL, 1:263-65.
thereafter, and of the queen, having been already on 12 August (fifteen days earlier) commissioned ‘colonel-general and governor of the Queen’s forces’.

Norreys was paid in this last capacity from August to December 1585, but from 12 October 1585, his appointment was as Colonel-General of the infantry under the Earl of Leicester who (though he had yet to arrive) was Captain-General. An equivalent commission came from the Dutch on 5 May 1586 when Norreys (who had recently been knighted by Leicester) was appointed Colonel General de l’infanterie Angloys (Kolonel-generaal der Engelse infanterie) by the Council of State. After he was replaced in June 1587 he later commanded English royal armies in Portugal, Brittany and Ireland. Sir John Norreys was the only English mercenary in this period who held independent commands in the field while in foreign pay.

The initial military experiences of ‘Black Jack’ Norreys are attributed to a variety of places and times by scholars and their assertions are not always supported by evidence. His early career was crucially important, for in it he made contacts and had experiences which served him in good stead for the rest of his career, and to some extent determined the location and nature of his career. The details can in fact be fixed with reasonable certainty.

His first military service was as a gentleman volunteer with Coligny in the second war of religion in France. This is based on a seventeenth-century tradition, but one that was strong and credible. Naunton recorded that Norreys had been ‘trained from a page, under the discipline of the great Captain of Christendom, the Admiral Castillon’. On the back of a letter from Lord Norreys to Burghley about his son, a seventeenth-century hand, presumably that of an early manuscript collector, has recorded what the owner had heard of John Norreys -- including that ‘he first followed the civil warrs under Admiral Coligny in France’. The late-seventeenth-century monument to Norreys at Yattendon church similarly states he ‘was first trayned up in those [military] Exercises in the Civil Wars of France under

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11 ARH, SvH 20, pp. 537-38; DCPR 1584-85, 194.
12 From Paul Hammer’s notes on PRO, AO 1/292/1906.
13 See ARA, RvS 1.01.40, p. 2. See Tenison, 6:217; SL, 1:263, 265; CSPFor., 20:669.
15 Naunton, Fragmenta Regalia, 237; BL, Harl. MS 6993, f. 49v.
Admiral Coligny'. Naunton, in particular, could have had his information from sources who knew Norreys, while the monument was erected by a later family member (though it is not without errors). Nor was it uncommon for young English aristocrats to be placed in great French nobles' households. Thus, his connection to Coligny is credible. It is known that Norreys was at the battle of St Denis (10 November 1567), the great battle of the second civil war, together with his brother William (and their cousin by marriage, Edward Berkeley) and it is logical to suppose that he was at St Denis as one of Coligny's pages; Norreys's biographer depicts him and William simply as observers, but this is merely an hypothesis. When the brothers' sketch of the battle was sent home by their father it was with a dispatch written on 29 November 1567, nearly three weeks after St Denis. This is consistent with their being caught up in the retreat of the Protestant army, whereas if they were merely chance observers they could have got into Paris more quickly. Norreys is not on the muster roll of Coligny's ordonnance company, taken on 2 June 1567, but there was time for his father to have placed him in the Admiral's household after that date -- not least since it was only from late July that war seemed possible and most observers were taken by surprise when hostilities actually broke out in late September.

Both John and William returned home at some point in the spring of 1568. John may have served with William of Orange in the Netherlands in the late summer and early autumn of 1568, but he was certainly in England by the spring of 1569. His father summoned him back to France that
summer. There is no definite evidence that John served in the third civil war, but at one point William (who stayed out of hostilities) escorted their mother from the king's camp back to Paris -- John was evidently elsewhere; when William was sent home to serve against the northern rebels John stayed in France.\textsuperscript{25} Given his connection to Coligny and his later career, the best explanation for his whereabouts in the autumn of 1569 and winter of 1569-70 is that he was serving with the Huguenots again. Moreover, a memorandum to the queen, undated but probably from 1575, notes that 'Colonel Norris ... has always been friendly' with the Huguenots.\textsuperscript{26} Both this and the later tradition that he was 'trayned' by Coligny suggest a more substantial association between Norreys and the Huguenots than a few weeks' service in 1567. It is thus fairly certain that Norreys served in both civil wars, initially as a gentleman volunteer, perhaps ending as an officer.

That memorandum from c.1575 proposed military intervention in the Netherlands on behalf of the Dutch against the Spanish, and proposed that 'Norris should be placed in command ... as he knows the country well'. This could refer to experience in 1568; not only is it questionable whether he did serve in 1568, however, but given the nature of the campaign it would hardly qualify as providing good knowledge of the Netherlands. Even apart from this memorandum, there is a general sense from the evidence that the Dutch knew Norreys already. This may show that he served with Louis of Nassau's troops around Mons in 1572, as Nolan suggests.\textsuperscript{27} Alternatively, it may just reflect that because of his early service in France with the Protestant hero, Coligny, Norreys was trusted by the Huguenots and, because of their close ties with William of Orange, this also gave him credibility with the Dutch.

The broad lines of the rest of Norreys's career have already been sketched out in chapters 4 and 5.\textsuperscript{28} But on points of detail, it should be noted that he had his own foot company in Dutch pay throughout the period 1578-84 and additionally had two cornets of horse from 1580, though these were commanded by Roger Williams, Rowland Yorke and, later, Henry Norreys.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 9:96, no. 327.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 9:143-44, 150, nos. 511, 539.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 11:223, no. 552.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Nolan, \textit{Norreys}, 18, but this seems to be purely supposition. It is, of course, credible that he knew Louis of Nassau, given the latter's lengthy service with the Huguenots between 1567-70.
\item \textsuperscript{28} For his service in Ireland from 1573-75 and then in 1584-85 see Nolan, \textit{Norreys}, chs 2, 5.
\end{itemize}
In 1585 he had two foot companies in Dutch pay as well as a cornet of a hundred lancers which he had been authorised by the States of Holland to raise, instead of foot, as part of his contracted 1,200-1,300 men in their pay. In November 1585 one of his foot-bands was transferred from the pay of the States to that of the queen, and thereafter was in royal service. The cornet of horse was transferred in 1586 to his brother Edward Norreys.  

Pelham, Sir William (d. 1587), of Sussex

Pelham was a senior figure in the permanent English military establishment, and a skilled engineer. He served briefly in Flushing in 1572, but whether this counts as in Dutch employ is debatable. He was appointed Lord Marshal of the army by Leicester which was matched by a Dutch commission as Veldmarschal, which he held from 25 July 1586 to 24 November 1587 but his jurisdiction was really always the English troops in the Netherlands. However, in addition to this office and because of it, the States' allowed for a special guard company, seventy strong. It was one of the companies cassed in the winter of 1586-87.  

Bertie, Peregrine, Lord Willoughby d'Eresby (1555-1601), of Lincolnshire

He was commissioned by the States as 'Lieutenant General of Her Majesty's forces of foot and horse' on 14 December 1587. Willoughby took over from Leicester on 4 December 1587 (the date from which he was paid), but he did not receive his actual royal commission until 22 January 1588, so he was officially a Dutch lieutenant general before an English one! However, the queen had already appointed him as Colonel-General of the Foot on 15 June 1587, replacing Norreys after the latter's recall, and she had styled him 'General de notre Infanterie' in a letter to the States-General as early as 10

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29 BL, Harl. MS 168, f. 159v; ARH, SvH 20:545; Shaw, 'Financial and Political Relationships', xxxiii; PRO, E 351/240 (information from Paul Hammer's notes); and below, p. 374.
31 ARA, RvS 1.01.41, p. 40. Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r; Tenison, 6:204; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r. ARH, AJO 2943 (i), f. [3r].
32 ARA, RvS 1524/i, ff. 169v-170; PRO, E 351/240, f. 4v.
June 1587. Willoughby had arrived in the Netherlands in late February 1586 and, at Philip Sidney's behest, been appointed Governor of Bergen-op-Zoom in March, an office he held into late summer 1587.

This was followed by commissions from the Council of State for the colonelcy of an eight-company regiment of foot and captaincy of a cornet of a hundred lancers. Commissioned on 14 May 1586, the foot regiment (which included at least one queen's-pay and one States'-pay English companies) was presumably a grouping of existing units and was formed immediately; the horse company took until June to muster and was in Dutch pay until June the following year (1587). On his promotion to general it was taken into Elizabeth's pay (and at the same time he was made captain of a queen's-pay foot-band).

He left the Netherlands in March 1589, but did not confirm his intent to retire from his command until May and he was not finally formally discharged from his offices in the Netherlands until 20 August 1589 (only to be commissioned general commanding the royal army being sent to France less than a month later).

(NB: Willoughby's commissions as general effectively were simply Dutch endorsements of English appointments and so were really on a different basis to the commissions of Norreys, the Veres and Cecil. But in addition his other positions were held more authentically in States' pay.)

Vere, Sir Francis (1560?-1609), of Essex

Vere was commissioned Generaal der infanterie in the States' army on 19 January 1599. He was already Sergeant-Major-General of the queen's forces in the Netherlands, having been commissioned on 3 December 1588. Willoughby had wanted Vere to replace him, but though Burghley was...
impressed by Vere, the Lord Treasurer had doubts because of Vere's age and favoured Lord Burgh (Governor of Brill). But Burgh was unenthusiastic and so Willoughby's patronage and Vere's own abilities carried the day. In 1589 he succeeded Willoughby in command: not, however as Captain- or Lieutenant General and he was kept on the same wage -- something he agitated about. By a warrant of 29 June 1590, he received extra wages from the queen of 20s. per diem from 12 October 1590 to 13 July 1596, indicating either a slightly higher than normal status as Sergeant-Major-General or at least satisfaction with his work. He was Lord Marshal and Lieutenant General of Essex's army at Cadiz in 1596 and commanded a regiment of 750 men there, and was Lord Marshal in Essex's army on the Azores voyage in 1597.

Vere had been given the honorary status of colonel by the Council of State in a commission of 10 July 1593 and appointed to a supervisory role (as a kind of Brigadier General) over all the troops in the county of Zutphen during the winter of 1595/6. He may have been appointed acting lieutenant general to Maurice over the army in the field in April 1601 -- a report to this effect was heard by Sir William Browne -- and he was commissioned Governor of Ostend on 7 July 1601, an office he held until March 1602.

Vere's first military service might have been as a gentleman volunteer in Polish service on a visit there of c.1580, but he may not have seen any fighting at this time. From there he went to the Netherlands where in 1582 he served as a gentleman volunteer and his career thereafter was in the United Provinces, except for the two occasions he was detached to the Atlantic in 1596 and 1597. He captured a States'-pay company of foot in his own regiment from 1594 through to his enforced retirement in 1604. In addition, he had a cornet of cuirassiers commissioned by the States-General on 19 January 1599.
NOTE: Vere has variously been described as successor to Lord Burgh, Lord Sheffield, and Sir Edward Conway, as Governor of the Brill. Burgh remained Governor after was transferred to Ireland in the spring of 1597 -- Conway, who was the Lieutenant-Governor, exercised command in his absence. After Burgh’s death in October 1597, eventually, in February 1598, Sheffield was appointed to replace him. However, for financial and personal reasons he never actually took up the office; he finally decided against it in July, despite attempts by his cousin, John Holles, to persuade him, and in October Vere was commissioned.

Vere, Sir Horace, or Horatio (1565-1635), of Essex, later Lord Vere of Tilbury

He was commissioned Generael over alle d’Engelsche compaignien on 3 May 1605. He had been a colonel in States’ pay since May 1599. His first colonel’s command was commanding a regiment of 750 men at Cadiz in 1596, where he was knighted by Essex. Thereafter, he was always in States’ pay. Vere had a personal foot company from 1596, while in 1606 his brother’s cornet of horse was transferred to him.

Cecil, Sir Edward (1572-1638), later Viscount Wimbledon

Cecil’s appointment as general dates from 1610, when at James I’s request he was appointed commander in the field of the English and Scottish troops in States’ service on the Jülich campaign. Sir Horace Vere did accompany the army with his regiment, but in a semi-unofficial capacity. Cecil evidently distinguished himself in the operations, for the States-General voted him a gold chain and medal in reward, and agreed additionally that, although his actual field commission was only for the duration of that campaign, the title would carry on and from that autumn Cecil is termed ‘Generael’ in the resolutions of the Council of State.

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48 Above, in ch. 5, pp. 179-80.
50 BL, Lans. MS 81, f. 188r (one of several contemporary lists of the Cadiz knights); Longleat, DP 2, f. 85v.
51 SL, 2:125. On his career more generally see Markham, Fighting Veres.
Cecil first became a colonel in similar circumstances. He was described by another captain as 'Colonel Cecil' when he took draft of 1,000 men to Ostend in 1601, but his own letters to his uncle were endorsed 'Captain Cecil'. It is in fact clear that he held only a captain's commission from the Dutch until after Sir Francis Vere's enforced departure when he was appointed to replace his one-time mentor as regimental commander. All references prior to this to him as 'colonel' are honorary, reflecting that he had informally exercised a colonel's command in gathering reinforcements for Ostend. He had earlier been commissioned as captain of a company of foot on 30 March 1599, and a company of horse in June 1600, in succession to Sir Nicholas Parker.

General Notes

1. From the time of the English intervention, officers could hold dual posts, in both English and Dutch hierarchies, but the appointments were from different bodies and might be dated differently.
2. Essex, colonel-general of the English horse, succeeded Sidney as States' 'Luitenant-generaal der cavalerie' in October 1586. Since this appointment essentially duplicated an English one and Essex unlike Sidney, Pelham or Willoughby, had no other office in Dutch pay, he is not considered here.

Governors of Cities

Burgh, Sir John (1562-1594), of Middlesex

Younger brother of Lord Burgh of Gainsborough, John Burgh's initial service was as a gentleman volunteer with John Norreys in the early 1580s. Burgh was captain of one of the first's queen's-pay companies in the Netherlands in 1585 and distinguished himself in action. As a result, he was appointed Governor of Doesburg, after its recapture from Spain. This office was in the States' pay, though Burgh maintained his auxiliary foot-band and continued.

55 ARA, RvS 1.01.40, pp. 1-2.
56 *HMCR*, 133.
to campaign with the field army throughout 1587. In early 1588, he took up a captain’s post at Brill, where his brother was governor; he did not serve in Dutch pay again. He was colonel of one of the regiments in Willoughby’s royal army in France in 1589. When it was withdrawn in January 1590, Burgh defied orders and stayed behind, joining Henry IV as a gentleman volunteer. He distinguished himself in the battle of Ivry in March 1590 and Henry made him a member of a French order of knighthood and gave Burgh his dispatches to Elizabeth, which Burgh took home. Thereafter he served in privateering expeditions and in the aftermath of one was killed in a duel.

Conway, Sir John (d. 1603), of Warwickshire

Leicester commissioned Conway as Governor of Ostend on 29 December 1586, but he did not accept the States’ commission until twelve days later. However, he would thereafter be paid by the States-General. He was given license to return to England in July 1590. He had earlier been Master of the Ordnance for the army in the Netherlands and held a States’ as well as a royal commission for this office.

Morgan, Sir Thomas (1542?-95) of Glamorgan

A celebrated soldier, he ended his career as Governor of Bergen-op-Zoom, an office to which he was formally appointed on 24 September 1588 and which he held until his death. Morgan had famously led a contingent of three hundred English troops to Flushing in 1572. Offered the governorship of Flushing, he declined it and instead loyal served as second-in-command to Sir Humphrey Gilbert on his arrival. When Gilbert and most of his Anglo-Welsh troops returned to England that autumn, however, Morgan stayed and negotiated a contract for his own regiment in States’ pay in 1573. He was

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CSPFor., 20:25, 561; TDH, 74; Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 354; SL, 1:88, 193; Stowe, 739.

Tighe, 340; BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 132r.


Tighe, 340-41.

New DNB, s.n. Conway; BL, Egerton MS 1694, f. 89r. DNB, 4:983, citing Murdin, 794.

ARA, RAGP I:206 (ii), f. 2v; PRO, AO/1/292/1096 (information from Paul Hammer’s notes).


Williams, Actions, 105-6 et seq.

Above, in ch. 3, p. 125.
formally commissioned 'couronnel de six ensignes des soldats anglois' on 19 April 1573 -- this was the first commission given by the Prince of Orange for an English regiment. After a drawn-out pay dispute with the prince, however, Morgan and part of his regiment transferred to Ireland in January 1574. However, Morgan never gave up hope of retrieving a command in the Netherlands, albeit the dislike of William of Orange made it difficult. It was only in 1578, with the great increase in the English contingent in States' pay that he obtained a new commission and even then it was subordinated to that of John Norreys, whom he served as lieutenant colonel. He and his six bands served with Norreys's regiment until December 1579, when they were detached to serve under the Prince of Épinoy, but in January 1580 he was captured by the Spanish. Ransomed back by Norreys in April, he was back in Flanders by early May when, in the aftermath of the defeat and capture of de La Noue at Inglemünster, Morgan was appointed deputy to the Sergeant-Major-General of the States' army in Flanders by Épinoy.

He accompanied Norreys to the north-east of the Low Countries in the second half of 1580 with two of his companies but returned to England in the autumn, in order to raise new companies of foot and replacements for his other bands, left in Flanders. In his absence, Roger Williams was advanced to lieutenant colonel in his place, while the captaincies of his two companies were given to others by Norreys, promoting heated complaints by Morgan to William of Orange and Leicester. Morgan still served alongside Norreys in Friesland in 1581 and, because of Norreys's extra duties commanding the States' army, Morgan acted as regimental commander, including at the battle of Nordhorn in November. He was able to regain control of his two companies and was also commissioned captain of a small troop of horse.

In the spring of 1582 Morgan obtained a commission for a separate regiment, finally regaining the status he had in 1574. He maintained it until 1585, but transferred in July 1583 from the pay of the States-General to that
of the States of Flanders; again in May 1584 to that of the States of Holland; and in July 1584 he obtained a commission for a new regiment from the States of Brabant. By the summer of 1585 there were only two companies left, but Morgan was now commissioned as colonel of a regiment in the pay of the queen. He served in the auxiliary troops until appointed to Bergen-op-Zoom’s governorship, which restored him to States’ pay, albeit in parallel to his queen’s commission.

Norreys, Sir Edward (c.1550-1603), of Berkshire

The younger brother of John Norreys, he was commissioned Governor of Ostend on 7 September 1590, in succession to Sir John Conway. He was appointed at Elizabeth’s specific request, but by the Raad van State, which specifically commissioned him on the same basis as Morgan at Bergen, and the Dutch paid his salary throughout his term of office.

Norreys, who was knighted in 1586 by Leicester, was made captain of a mercenary company of lancers on 19 May 1586, probably succeeding his brother as captain; it remained in States’ pay until the end of 1587. He was additionally (from 1585 to 1598) captain of an auxiliary company of foot. In 1599, this company, with all the other auxiliaries, passed back into Dutch employment. Norreys and his men continued to garrison Ostend, but in August came the news of the death of both his remaining brothers in Ireland and, at his mother’s behest, a recall from the queen. He left Ostend sometime after 19 September, when his company was mustered, though his commission as governor was not finally terminated by the States-General until 21 December 1599.

Wingfield, Sir John (d. 1596), of Suffolk

Wingfield was a royal captain and colonel in the 1590s, but may have been a gentleman volunteer in the Netherlands earlier. He was appointed governor

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74 CSPFor., 18:57, no. 67; SL, 1:264; Adams, ‘Puritan Crusade’, 11.
75 RSG, 12:183-84; ARA, RvS 1524/ii, f. 125, and SG 8040.
77 Information from Paul Hammer’s notes on PRO, AO 1/292/1096 and E 351/240.
78 ARA, SG 4891, n.f.; AJO 2950 (rubric ‘Andereongerepartitioned voetknechten’); DNB, 14:562; Chamberlain Letters, no. 22, 1:82; SL, 2:275, 278.
of St Geertruidenberg in 1587. This appointment owed something to his relationship to Willoughby, whose client he was and whose sister he had married. Wingfield commanded no English troops at St Geertruidenberg -- only German mercenarie, who mutinied, held him prisoner and betrayed the city to the Spanish in his despite. The Dutch at the time and historians since have blamed Wingfield and his purportedly English garrison. In fact, in R. B. Wernham’s words, this is ‘one of the most persistent of historical legends’. 

**Field Officers**

Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels

**NOTE**

This category includes several officers that were temporary commanders of regiments, and/or were given operational jurisdiction over regiment-sized formations, in the exercise of which commands they were often described by contemporaries as ‘colonel’.

**Ball, Thomas (d. 1602), of Devon**

He was a step-son of Sir Thomas Bodley. He served as captain-lieutenant of Prince Maurice’s own cavalry cornet at Nieuwpoort, a position doubtless obtained through his step-father’s influence. He obtained his own company of foot in Dutch pay in the aftermath of the battle, replacing one of the several dead captains. His company served in the Netherlands through 1601 and 1602. In July he commanded Sir Francis Vere’s regiment in the field when Vere was commanding one of the three divisions of the army; contemporary reports call him ‘Colonel Ball’. In October 1602 he died in an epidemic.

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80 E.g., *SL* 1:204; *Wilson*, 107-8.
81 CSPFor., 23:xviii-xix.
82 I.e., ranks of major to colonel: these are listed in alphabetical order.
84 Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 156-57; Vere Commentaries, 158, 164.
85 ARA, GRK 1232 and RvS 1226, f. 132r. HMCS, 12:269.
86 HMC Various Collections, 71; Chamberlain Letters, no. 54, 1:169-70 (CSPDom. 1601-3, 259).
Bedwell, Thomas (fl. c. 1586)

One of Leicester's servants, the earl made him commander of the thousand pioneers raised by Norreys for States' service in the autumn of 1585. He and his men continued in service into 1586, paid by the Dutch, but disputes about which government was liable for their pay meant that the 'regiment' was allowed to become defunct through attrition.  

Bingham, John (fl. c. 1580-1616), of Dorset

A Captain John Bingham served in the royal army in Ireland in the 1580s and was highly thought of by the queen's ministers. In August 1601 he was commissioned to raise one of the companies to reinforce the garrison of Ostend, commencing a long period in States' employ.  

Bingham, Sir Richard (1528?-1599), of Dorset

He was the 'Lieutenant' (i.e., lieutenant colonel) of Cavendish's regiment in 1578. Cavendish's failure meant that command of the regiment effectively devolved onto Bingham: he commanded it at Rijmenam, contributing greatly to the victory and winning as much praise as Norreys.  

Bingham was a long-time soldier, well thought of by William of Orange, whose recent experience included fighting the Turks in the Mediterranean in 1572. He had accompanied Thomas Morgan to Holland in 1573 as a gentleman volunteer, but took over in place of Morgan's Captain-Lieutenant
Green on the latter's demise and returned to England with Morgan in January 1574. Bingham joined Henry of Condé in the summer of 1574 and though he returned to England the following summer he was then one of the captains that conveyed money to the Palatinate and then joined the army of Condé and John Casimir. On his return, in late 1576, he was sent on Sir Edward Horsey's embassy to the Netherlands, possibly with the intention that he procure military intelligence.

Bingham left the Netherlands in the spring of 1579, after Cavendish's regiment dissolved. Thereafter, he spent his career in Ireland, save for a brief return to the Netherlands as one of Leicester's commanders in the 1587 expedition to Sluys.

Brooke, Sir Callisthenes (d. 1611), of Kent

In November 1601 he was 'made colonel of sixe companies of English' at the siege of 's-Hertogenbosch by Maurice. He had entered States' service when his auxiliary company was transferred at the end of 1598. Thereafter, Brooke served in the Netherlands in States' pay until his death.

Cavendish, Henry (1550-1616), of Derbyshire and Staffordshire

He raised a regiment of six companies which served in the Netherlands from the late spring of 1578 to the spring of 1579. Despite various rumours, he never held a military command again, reflecting his complete ineptitude.

Cheke, Sir Hatton (d. 1608), of Essex (?)

He had become a lieutenant colonel by 8 June 1606 when the raad van state

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84 Williams, Actions, 125. KL, nos. 2634 and 2637, 6:824-27, 833-35. APC 8: 176. 85 CSPFor., 10:529, no. 1487; CSPSp., 2:494, 496, 497, 502, nos. 412, 415-16, 420. 86 CSPFor., 11: 444, 456, no. 1067, 1094. 87 DNB, 2:514-15; Brugmans, nos. 435, 473, 543, 3:48, 134, 272. 88 Chamberlain Letters, no. 43, 1:136. 89 ARA, SG 5883, no. 231; Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 155; Sydney Papers, 2:205; Dalton, 1:60; Chamberlain Letters, no. 61, 1:187; HMCD, 3:60; ARA, CAan. 879, ff. 77r, 107v; ARH, AJO 2946; and sources for the lists of captains for 1599-1600, 1605, 1607-8, 1610, in app. 7, below. 90 Above, ch. 4, pp. 143, 147-48. 91 Knighted by James I and VI at Charterhouse in 1603 among the same group as one Thomas
referred to him in a resolution by that title. He first obtained command of a company in 1602 and continued in States' pay till his death.

Chester, Edward (d. 1577), of London

He was the fourth son of Sir William Chester, Lord Mayor of London in 1554-55. Edward Chester's first known military service was as a captain in Gilbert's regiment in Zeeland in 1572. He took over the second draft of the regiment, some three hundred strong, in July. Curiously, he and his force were originally refused admission to Flushing, perhaps due to the ongoing Anglo-French rivalry, and he was obliged to go on and landed on the Flemish coast. He soon linked up with Gilbert and campaigned with the rest of the regiment thereafter. Chester raised two companies of his own the next year, but they were subsumed into Morgan's newly-commissioned regiment. As discussed in chapter 3, he then obtained a commission for a regiment of his own, but its poor performance outside Leiden in 1574 led to it being disbanded. Chester kept his own company in Dutch pay and kept on good terms with William of Orange and presumably had a good chance of regaining a colonelcy. However he drowned whilst en route from England to Holland in November 1577.

Cobham, John (fl. 1570s-80s), of Kent

He was probably the son of Sir Henry Brooke alias Cobham, younger son of George, ninth Lord Cobham. He was thus a nephew of the powerful William, tenth Lord Cobham. Although he was never actually appointed a colonel, he was commissioned on 21 April 1578 to raise three companies. They were not termed a regiment, but they comprised a separate contingent,

[cont] Cheke of Essex: [Thomas] [illington], The True Narration of the Entertainment of His Royal Majesty [...] Together With The names of those Gentlemen [...] honoured with Knighthood [1603], in Stuart Tracts 1603-1693, ed. E. Arber, Thomas Seccombe, intro. C. H. Firth (New York: Cooper Square, 1964), 48 -- the editors annotate Sir Hatton as from 'Essex?'.

102 ARA, RvS 24, p. 185.
103 RSG, 12:186, and new ser. 1:292; ARA, CAan. 879, f. 119v; lists of captains for 1605, 1607, in app. 7, below.
104 DNB, 4:204-5.
105 Above, app. 1, p. 314. KL, nos. 2425, 2445, 6:440, 474; Longleat, DP 2, ff. 8v-9r.
106 APC, 8:97, 100; ARA, CO 29; Williams, Actions, 138.
107 CSPFor., 12:27, 173, 344, 384, 673, nos. 41, 235, 461, 513, 855.
108 CSPFor., 12:751 (index).
109 PRO, SP 83/6, f. 57.
albeit soon partially merged into John Norreys's regiment. The patronage of his uncle helped obtain the backing of Davison which doubtless helped him obtain his commission from Archduke Matthias. He had probably first visited the Netherlands in 1576 as a prisoner after his ship was taken by Flushing corsairs. However, he quickly became interested in the Dutch military struggle and by the end of the year had a privateer cruising off Dutch waters.

By 31 March 1579 Cobham had gone home leaving his own company to Ralph Salisbury. He visited the Netherlands again in early 1582, but whether in any military capacity (as, for example, one of the many gentlemen who served for a time as volunteers with Anjou) is unclear. His martial career thereafter was limited to service as a muster commissioner and captain of a trained band in Kent.

Cotton, Thomas (d. 1583), of Cambridgeshire

There is some confusion with different primary and secondary sources as to Cotton’s family connections and date of death. It is possible that there were two Thomas Cottons, both soldiers, both serving at the same time and in similar places, but for lack of firm evidence the more obvious assumption that there was just one has been adopted.

Cotton fought the Turks in Hungary and the Mediterranean in the late 1560s. In late 1568 he joined William of Orange in his unsuccessful invasion of the Netherlands, following him to France in 1569 where, like the prince, he served the Huguenots. Cotton was made a gentleman pensioner in 1571 and remained one to his death; this did not stop him accepting in 1572 the lieutenant colonelcy of Gilbert’s original regiment and serving throughout the campaign in Zeeland.

110 ARA, RAGP III:28, f. [7r]; Churchyard’s Choice, sig. Siii.
111 See above, pp. 143, 263.
112 CSPFor., 11:259, 305, 312, nos. 650, 723, 738; HMCS, 13:138.
113 ARA, CO 51, n. f.
114 HMCS, 2:512, no. 1178.
115 Thomson, Twysden Lieutenancy Papers, 67-68; Wake and Goring, Northamptonshire Lieutenancy Papers, 10-11.
116 Camden, i:127; CSPFor., 8:197, 478, nos.1050, 2261, 9:478, no. 1645, 15:674, no. 727; Digges, Compleat Ambassador, 57.
117 Tighe, 127; Longleat, DP 2, f. 7v; KL, no. 2458, 6:506.
On the regiment’s return Cotton moved into the royal forces, serving the following spring at the siege of Edinburgh. His movements for the rest of 1573 are uncertain -- Churchyard stated that he served in the campaign to relieve the siege of Haarlem, but this was written nearly thirty years later. Cotton was said by Spanish sources in early 1574 to be newly arrived in the service of the Dutch; it is likely that he was not in the Netherlands in 1573 and Churchyard was out by a year. In 1574 he was apparently discredited by the disaster to Chester’s regiment at Leiden and obliged to return home, for there is no evidence for his presence in Dutch forces again until 1578.

He raised troops and took them to the Netherlands that year, for the recruiting expenses of Norreys’s troops were to be paid at the same rate as Cavendish’s and Cotton’s. They presumably comprised, or included, the two companies of foot and one of horse which in May 1579 were paid off by the States-General and passed into the pay of the States of Flanders -- they had probably served in Flanders for the preceding twelve months in any case.

One of his companies was wiped out in a Spanish attack in January 1580 and by the end of the year his cornet of horse and other foot-band had both also become defunct. Consequently, the following year he joined John Norreys’s regiment in Friesland as a company commander and fought there throughout the year, being badly wounded at Nordhorn. On the return from Friesland in the spring of 1582, Cotton sought and obtained a colonel’s commission from Anjou. His regiment served throughout 1582 and into 1583, but Cotton died while campaigning, that January or February.

Cromwell, Ralph (fl. 1568-85)

In 1583 this long-standing veteran of the Dutch Revolt obtained what was, in effect, a colonelcy, though he was not been formally commissioned as such. His career closed out with him as a kind of lieutenant colonel.

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118 Camden, i.334; Thomas Churchyard, The Firste parte of Churchyardes Chippes, contayning twelve severall Labours (London: 1575), 93. TDH, 19; BN, MS Fr. 16106, f. 13r.
119 ARA, RAGP III:28. BL, Cott. MS Titus B vii, f. 28r. RSG, 2.636n.; Correspondence de La Noue, 57-58.
120 ARA, SG 3104, f. 86r; CSPFor., 14:126, 388, 392, 443, nos. 129, 399, 404, 443; Cecil MS 2, f. 60v; and app. 6, below, p. 409.
121 ARA, SG 12576, n.f. (rubric ‘Stucken concernende den Ambr. Norijts’); Camden, iii.4-5; Baudart, 370.
122 CSPFor., 15:646, no. 703; 16:9, no. 9; 17:36, no. 30; ARA, SG 11095 (4 Oct. 1582); TDH, 47; CvDorp 986. Tighe, 354.
He had first served as a gentleman volunteer with William of Orange in 1568. He was lieutenant of George Gascoigne’s company in 1574, so had probably served in France and/or the Netherlands in the interim. He was out scouting when the Spanish attacked Valkenburgh and so was able to get his men back into Leiden where they served throughout the siege. Later he was rewarded by the States of Holland for this good service.\textsuperscript{123} They also made him captain of his own company, which he commanded until the summer of 1577, when, with the other companies in Holland’s employ, it was paid off.\textsuperscript{124} During the following winter he obtained a captaincy from the States-General. This was an independent company; it fought at Rijmenam, though in neither Norreys’s nor Cavendish’s regiments.\textsuperscript{125}

Cromwell maintained his company as an independent unit throughout the next three years. In 1579 his company was employed by the Union of Utrecht as part of its distinct forces. When in January 1580 his company was paid off, he was able, with a recommendation of the States of Holland, to get it employed by the States of Flanders. When Rowland Yorke moved to Friesland to serve with Norreys’s regiment there in early 1581 Cromwell was appointed to command the English companies detached in the south, an office he filled until the end of that year.\textsuperscript{126}

In 1582 he joined North’s regiment as either its lieutenant colonel or sergeant-major. But this did not satisfy his ambition (or at least independent-mindedness) and he obtained a commission to raise two companies for the Generality in the winter of 1582/83, which he successfully raised (possibly partly from the regiment of the late Thomas Cotton) by the spring of 1583.\textsuperscript{127} Despite the States-General’s intention to reduce the number of English units in their pay at the end of 1583 and some tension over Cromwell’s back pay, his commission as separate commander of two foot-bands was renewed in December.\textsuperscript{128} At some point in late 1584 or in 1585, his battalion either was

\textsuperscript{123} BL, Harl. MS 253, f. 116r; KL, no. 2815, 7:317; GAL, Secretarie Archief, 1334; SL, 1:28n.
\textsuperscript{124} BL, Lans. MS 1218, ff. 122r, 125v; ARH, SvH 11, f. 340v, SvH 281, ff. 512r, 5Mr; CSPFor., 11:312, no. 738; Ferguson, Papers, 40.
\textsuperscript{125} KL, no. 3771, 10: 276; CSPFor., 12:512, 571, 589, 636, nos. 658, 737, 759, 818; UBL, MS Vuc. 104/37, ff. [2v, 4r]; Churchyard’s Choice, Siii r.
\textsuperscript{126} SL, 1:28, 61, 264; ARA, SG 3104, f. 86r, SG 3106, f. 81r; BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 136v; RSG, 3:233; CSPFor., 15:401, no. 427.
\textsuperscript{127} ARA, SG 3110, ff. 130, 236r; ARA, CvDorp 971, n.f. (rubric ‘Liste et declaration des vivres [..] estre distribuee journellement’); and see BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 138v.
\textsuperscript{128} ARA, CO 54, n.f. (8 Jan. 1584, n.s.); CSPFor., 18:254-56, 373, nos. 289, 450.
dissolved or was transferred into the new expeditionary force led by Norreys and Cromwell himself retired.

Digby, Sir George (1550-87), of Warwickshire

Digby had a troop-raising capacity in his own country, but it was somewhat limited, to judge from Warwickshire musters. This is reflected in the fact that he raised his company in 1586 in three other counties as well, while he recruited only about two-thirds of the men he was authorised to enlist.  

Digby was commissioned colonel in the spring of 1586 by Leicester. He was an important member of Leicester’s affinity and his appointment was part of a regimental reorganisation of the English contingent partly intended to reduce Norreys’s authority. It was nominally a States’ commission, but his regiment included queen’s-pay companies and his appointment was never endorsed by the States-General, nor was it really accepted by the Dutch. However, his own company of volunteers from the West Midlands was in States-pay; it served throughout 1586 until disbanded in the winter of 1586/7.

Docwra, Sir Henry

He was lieutenant colonel of Vere’s mercenary regiment from 1594 to 1599, but quarrelled with his colonel and left in the early summer of 1599 to join Essex in Ireland.

Drake, Robert (d. 1604)

He became a captain in Sir Horace Vere’s regiment in the late summer or autumn of 1600, probably as a replacement for Joseph Duxberry who had been killed at Nieuwpoort in July. He served throughout 1601, 1602 (when he was falsely reported as having died) and 1603. In March 1604 he was

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129 E.g., he fielded four light horsemen in October 1577: Warwick RO, HR 65/3. APC, 14:80.
131 He is referred to in English-produced documents as colonel; but in Dutch ones as captain: e.g., ARA, RAGP I:206 (ii).
132 APC, 14:80; Tenison, 6:204, 210; BL, Add. MS 48084, ff. 86r, 99r; ARH, AJO 2943 (i).
133 ARA, SG 4891, SG 8041, SG 8042; PRO, SP 84/54, f. 107r; ARH, AJO 2943 (ii); HMCS, 8:507-8.
134 ARA, RvS 1232, RvS 1226, f. 131v; ARH, AJO 2946; Chamberlain Letters, no. 54, 1:170.
sent to Ostend, as acting colonel of the English troops in the garrison. He was killed in action there on 26 March 1604 (n.s.).¹³⁵

Fairfax, Sir Charles (d. 1604), of Yorkshire

He first served as a gentleman volunteer with Sir Francis Vere in the early 1590s and was promoted to captain to replace John Upsher in 1599 after the latter’s death. Fairfax distinguished himself at Nieuwpoort and Ostend and was knighted in May 1603.¹³⁶ In the autumn of 1604 he was appointed colonel or acting commander of the English companies in the Ostend garrison. He was mortally wounded there in September, just before the capitulation.¹³⁷ Sir Charles was an illegitimate brother of Sir Thomas Fairfax, who was a captain in Vere’s regiment in 1594-95.

Gilbert, Sir Humphrey (1539?-83), of Devonshire

He was ‘Colonell over the English soldiers’ at Flushing and Williams asserts that he had a Dutch contract; it came from the States of Zeeland. Gilbert is better known as a would-be educational reformer and an oceanic explorer than as a soldier, but he had previously commanded royal troops in Ireland. This, however, was his only time in foreign pay.¹³⁸

Grey, Thomas, Baron, of Wilton (d. 1614)

In 1602 he commanded a division of the horse of the army, in effect filling a colonel’s or lieutenant colonel’s role. He had been commissioned a captain of horse only in 1601, but he had been a colonel of horse under Essex in Ireland in 1599. He first served in the Netherlands as a gentleman volunteer in 1600. Grey wanted a permanent colonelcy and believed he would have had it but for Sir Francis Vere; in consequence he served only till the autumn of 1603 when he resigned his company to his lieutenant, John Selby.¹³⁹

¹³⁵ See SL, 2.277, 279 n.32; ARA, CAan. 879, f. 71r; KB, HS 132.G.27, n.f.
¹³⁶ ARH, AJO 2950; Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencranks, 154, 157; Dalton, 1:60; Vere Commentaries, 182-83, 192-96, 329; ARA, RvS 1226, f. 132r; Tammel, 37, 217, 287, 295; RSG, 12:522; Venn, 2:117.
¹³⁷ SL, 2.279 n.34.; Belleroche, 476, 478, 515-16; RSG, 13:136; CSPDom., 1603-10, 68.
¹³⁸ Williams, Actions, 106; ch. 3, above, pp. 115-18; DNB, 7:1206-9.
Harwood, Sir Edward (1586?-1632), of Lincolnshire

According to his funerary monument, he first saw service in the Netherlands in 1599, was promoted ensign at Ostend in 1602 and lieutenant in 1606 at the siege of Rheinberg. The next year he was promoted captain for his name appears on state van oorlog and kept his company until the end of this period. He remained in Dutch service and eventually rose to command a regiment in States' pay, being killed at the siege of Maastricht in 1632. Haselby, Ralph (fl. 1573-78)

He was either lieutenant colonel or sergeant-major of Chester's regiment in 1574. After the disastrous defeat at the forts around Leiden in the summer, Haselby, together with most other captains in the regiment, had his company cassed. Embittered, he conspired with de Guaras, the Spanish agent in London, offering eventually to betray the important fortress of Bommel. But nothing came of this (doubtless because Haselby now lacked any post in the Netherlands) and whilst the English government may have suspected him of treachery he was still free in 1578.

Holles, Sir George (1577-1626), of Nottinghamshire and Lincolnshire

He succeeded to the command of the company of Captain Edward Wilsford on his death in Ostend early in 1602. He was a captain thereafter in Horace Vere's regiment. In 1610 he was made acting colonel of a regiment formed from the companies of Sir John Ogle and some newly raised companies, on the Jülich campaign. This was a temporary appointment and probably given at the instance of his older brother, Sir John Holles. It was only in 1614 that he was made Vere's regimental sergeant-major, but he later achieved other high offices in the Dutch army, in which he served until his death.

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140 From the Cloister Church, The Hague, pr. in Knight, Historical Records, 72-73.
141 See lists of captains for 1607-10, app. 7, below.
142 Knight, ibid.
143 ARH, SvH 281, f. 5Er.
145 See CSPSp., 2:596, no. 513.
146 Holles, Memorials, 73-74; ARH, AJO 2946 and RvS 24, p. 133; RSG, 12:194; and lists of companies for 1605, 1607-8, 1610, in app. 7, below.
147 BN, MS Fr. 654, f. 26v; and see below, app. 9, pp. 506-7.
148 Holles, Memorials, 75-82.
Horwell, Sir Thomas (fl. 1602-10)

He first served as a captain in 1602. In 1605 he was appointed lieutenant colonel of Henry Sutton's regiment, but this was a short-lived appointment, due to Sutton's death and the consequent reorganisation. Horwell, though, continued to serve as a captain to the end of the period.140

Killigrew, Sir Henry (1528-1603), of Cornwall

Commander of a force of mercenaries equivalent in strength to a small regiment in Normandy in the late summer of 1562. This was his only actual mercenary service, but he supported English and Welsh soldiers in Dutch pay during his later diplomatic career.150

Knollys, Sir Thomas (d. after 1610), of Oxfordshire

He first served in the Netherlands as a queen's-pay captain in 1585; he later distinguished himself at the siege of Bergen in 1588 and was knighted by Willoughby.151 He returned to the Netherlands in January 1599, having been put in command of the two thousand men levied in southern England in late 1598. This is called his regiment in English sources, but he was not actually commissioned a colonel by the Dutch at this time. Instead, they reduced the thirteen companies he brought over to seven, though he was commissioned as captain of one of them.152 Knollys was then a captain in Sir Horace Vere's regiment up to 1605, when he probably succeeded Henry Sutton as Vere's lieutenant colonel, after Sutton obtained his own regiment. Knollys is known to have held a lieutenant colonelcy in 1605 and Adolph van Meeterke was only appointed to the office in January 1606, after Knollys had left the States' service.153

Meeterke, Adolph (fl. c.1590-1610)

In common with his brothers, he fought in royal service in the 1590s before

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140 RSG, 12:186, 13:705; ARH, AJO 2946; HMCD, 3:177, 234-35, 270; ARA, GRK 1232, n.f.; and lists of captains for 1607-8 and 1610, in app. 7, below.
150 Trim, 'Normandy Campaign'. Miller, Sir Henry Killigrew.
151 TDH, 74; BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 131r; Markham, Fighting Veres, 132.
152 See app. 1, above, p. 333; ARA, RvS 1525, f. 205v.
153 Orlers, 155; Dalton, 1:60; ARH, AJO 2950, 2946; RSG, 12:194n.; ARA, CAan. 879, f. 73v; SL, 2:160-61.
his company was transferred to States’ pay at the end of 1598.\textsuperscript{154} They were sons of a famous Flemish statesman who was forced into exile in England because of his adherence to Leicester in 1585-86. However, throughout his long service in the Netherlands, he (like his brothers) was always regarded, by British and Dutch alike, as English.\textsuperscript{155}

Meetkerke’s company was in Sir Horace Vere’s regiment from 1599 on, including service at Nieuwpoort and Ostend in 1600-1.\textsuperscript{156} He was made Vere’s regimental sergeant-major by 1602 and commissioned its lieutenant colonel on 13 January 1606. His company was in States’ service for the rest of the period.\textsuperscript{157}

Morgan, Sir Charles (1575?-1643?) of Glamorgan

He was the younger brother of Sir Matthew Morgan. When his brother chose not to serve the States following the transfer of auxiliary companies to Dutch pay at the end of 1598, Charles Morgan took command of his brother’s company.\textsuperscript{158} He was a captain in Sir Horace Vere’s regiment for the following six years.\textsuperscript{159} The Dutch military historians de Bas and ten Raa’s assertion that he was lieutenant colonel of Sir John Ogle’s regiment (then of eight companies) from 1605 is unreferenced, but he certainly did hold that office by summer of 1606.\textsuperscript{160} He continued as a States’-pay captain and Ogle’s lieutenant colonel to 1610 and beyond.\textsuperscript{161}

Morris, John (fl. 1572-85)

Morris attained his highest military office at the end of his career, when lieutenant colonel of Thomas Morgan’s regiment raised to defend Antwerp in

\textsuperscript{154} PRO, E 351/241 (from Paul Hammer’s notes); ARA, SG 5883, no. 231, 4891.
\textsuperscript{155} See Trim, ‘Confessional Conflict’, 73-74.
\textsuperscript{156} ARH, AJO 2950; ARA, SG 12536, ff. 308r, 373v, RvS 1226, f. 132r; Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 155; Dalton, 1:60; Vere Commentaries, 203.
\textsuperscript{157} Copy of a letter from Grave, sig. A3v; ARA, RvS 24, p.18, SG 8043, n.f. (‘Tractementen op Hollandt’); CAan. 879, f. 67r; RSG, 12:194; and lists of captains for 1605, 1607-8 and 1610.
\textsuperscript{158} See ARA, SG 5883, nos. 230-31 and SG 4891.
\textsuperscript{159} Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 155; Vere Commentaries, 163; Dalton, 1:60; ARA, CAan. 879, f. 23r, SG 12503, f. 349r; HMCS, 11:291; Copy of a Letter from Grave, sig. A3v; RSG, 12:194, 507; ARH, AJO 2946.
\textsuperscript{160} SL, 2:161; HMCD, 3:284.
1584-85. However, he first served as a captain in the Netherlands in 1572, when he commanded one of the companies sent to Brill that June. It was one of those that remained over the winter and the following spring he joined his company to Morgan’s regiment -- the beginning of a long association. In July 1573, while Morgan and the captains of the companies he had newly raised were haggling over terms and conditions, Morris committed his men to an attempt to take supplies into Haarlem. Morris evidently went home on the dissolution of Morgan’s regiment at the end of 1573, although he pursued financial claims into 1575.

In 1578 Morgan’s return to the Netherlands meant Morris’s return, too, as Morgan’s lieutenant colonel, but Morgan’s battalion was swiftly subsumed within Norreys’s regiment so Morris served as a captain. Morris’s company remained in service through to 1582, one of the four bands left in the south. However, when Morgan obtained a commission for his own regiment in 1582, Morris was one of his captains and may even have been his lieutenant colonel then. Confusingly, Captain William Morris was also in Morgan’s regiment at this time, but contemporary descriptions distinguish between the two by reference to their age; John Morris’s continued presence is evident from a reference to ‘Old Captain Morrys’ in the fighting outside Ghent in August (in contrast to descriptions of a young captain ‘Morrice’ at the same episode).

Morris presumably remained in Morgan’s regiment in 1583 and was certainly appointed lieutenant colonel of the new regiment, contracted by the States of Brabant, in 1584. He conducted over the second draft of troops in November 1584 -- four companies. Only he tried to force Parma’s blockade of the Scheldt; he did so successfully, but then his troops suffered badly from battle casualties and disease. Morris himself survived but eventually fell out with Morgan, with whom he quarrelled bitterly. This, together with his,

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162 Williams, Actions, 108; BL, Lans. MS 1218, ff. 123r, 136v; ARA, CO 29; Ferguson, Papers, 36.
163 KL, no. 2609, 6:792.
164 Ibid., no. 2955, 7:553.
165 CSPFor., 12:589, no. 759; UBL, MS Vulc. 104/37, ff. [2v, 4r]; and see the analysis of troop strengths in 1578 above, in app. 1, pp. 321-22.
166 App. 1, above, pp. 324-25; CSPFor., 15:401, no. 427.
167 CSPFor., 17:625, no. 668. He was similarly characterised as ‘old Captain Morris’ in 1585 -- ibid., 19:405, 432.
168 Ibid., 102, 109, 151, 254.
North, John (1550?-1597), of Cambridgeshire and London

The eldest son and heir of Roger, second Lord North. He travelled on the Continent for two years between the autumns of 1575 and 157. He went out and back through the Netherlands, but passed through both times without engaging in military service, though he may have made some arrangements for the future in November 1577. As described in chapters 4 and 6 North obtained Anjou’s commission for a regiment of foot in 1582 which he raised and commanded in the Netherlands up to 1584, though without much skill or success.

He returned to the Netherlands, serving as a gentleman volunteer with his father and Leicester in the royal forces in 1586-87. He later served in the royal army in Ireland and was knighted. He served in the Netherlands a third and final time in 1597 and died there.

Ogle, Sir John (1569-1640), of Lincolnshire

Ogle obtained a commission for his own regiment by June 1605 -- initially of eight companies, but its establishment was later increased. He had been made lieutenant colonel of Sir Francis Vere’s regiment by 1601 and he was the commander, with the honorary title of colonel, of the thirteen English companies garrisoned in Ostend in August 1602 and the twelve companies there in June 1603. He had first served in the Netherlands in 1591 but did not obtain his own captaincy till 1599 when he replaced William Constable in Sir Francis Vere’s regiment and he served thereafter until 1618. In 1610 he was made commander of the States’ troops of all nationalities garrisoned in Utrecht.

169 Ibid., 405, 432.
170 PRO, E 157/1, f. 2v; Bodl. Add. MS C.193, ff. 5r, 9r.
172 DNB, 14:612. However, by then he had not been a States'-pay captain for 13 years so he is not included on the list of captains who died on active service.
173 HMCD, 3:173.
174 ARA, CAan. 879, f. 23v; SG 12503, f. 349r. SL, 2:277.
175 DNB, 14:933-34; ARA, SG 4891.
176 See RVs 28, f. 70; and app. 1, above, p. 331n.
Pakenham, Philip (fl. 1602-c.35)

Pakenham was made a captain in Sir Francis Vere’s regiment in 1602 and continued in that capacity until he was appointed Edward Cecil’s regimental sergeant-major in 1605. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1608. He continued in Dutch pay as late as 1635, having been Cecil’s lieutenant colonel at least until 1620.177

Poyntz, Thomas (d. 1607?), of Gloucestershire

In 1606 he was made lieutenant colonel by the Council of State, having been made Sergeant-Major-General of the garrison of Ostend in 1603.178 He had served as a gentleman volunteer in Vere’s regiment from the mid-1590s, serving on the Cadiz expedition in 1596 and possibly the Islands voyage of 1597. He was in Captain Dennis’s company in Ostend in 1600, but left the garrison under something of a cloud, due to a quarrel with his captain and/or with Sir Francis Vere. Poyntz served thereafter not only in Dutch pay, but outside the English companies and his lieutenant-colonelcy was of Dutch troops.179 He was from a strongly Puritan Gloucestershire family and related to Sir Thomas Heneage, Treasurer of the Chamber to Elizabeth.180

Sherley, Sir Thomas (1542-1612), of Sussex

Sherley in effect raised his own States'-pay regiment in 1586: his ‘company’ was over four hundred strong in June 1586 and there is no doubt that the company of Anthony Sherley, Sir Thomas’s son, was drawn from these men. Sherley additionally exercised operational command, if not administrative control, over the bands of Morris Denney and George and Richard Farmer in the Zutphen campaign. Sherley’s own band was made a cautionary unit in the winter of 1586/87.181 But it was no longer under his command -- Sherley

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177 ARH, AJO 2946, AJO 2952; SL, 2:160; and lists of captains, 1605, 1607-8, 1610, in app. 7, below. BSG, MS 3338, ff. 179v-82v; Sellin, 215 n.13.
178 KB, HS 132.G.27, n.f., is a dossier of documents relating to Poyntz, collected by his son. See also ARA, Rvs 24, p. 22; SL, 2:276.
179 KB, HS 132.G.27; HMCD, 3:93, 97, 125.
181 APC, 14:74-75; Tenison, 6:204; Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r; ARH, AJO 2943 (i), f. [3v].
had given it up and taken on instead the office of Treasurer at War for the English army in the Netherlands, which he held from 1587 to 1597. He was accused in 1593 of having misappropriated the astonishing sum of £30,000. However, he had no access to such funds as a States'-pay captain and during his time as a mercenary his opportunities for malfeasance would have been restricted by the limited wages received.

Sutton, Henry (d. 1605)

He was formally commissioned lieutenant colonel to Horace Vere in 1603. In the spring of 1605 there was much discussion about how the English troops would be divided into regiments and who would be made the new colonels (in addition to Sir Horace Vere). At first it seemed that Sir Edward Cecil and Sir John Ogle would gain colonelcies, but that Sutton (who as contemporaries pointed out was not a knight) would not. However, he stood 'upon his reputation' and was commissioned on 11 May 1605. This speaks something about his career to that point and the value placed on him by his Dutch employers. Sutton had first been commissioned by the Council of State as a captain of one of the new English foot-bands in early 1599. He was thereafter a captain under Sir Horace Vere throughout 1599-1604 and was already acting as Vere's second-in-command at the battle of Nieuwpoort in 1600, albeit not commissioned as such until 1603. The irony of Sutton's success in 1605 is that he was shot and killed or mortally wounded in June 1605. By December 1605 there were two 'competitors for Colonel Sutton's regiment' but it was merged back into the three knights' regiments.

Touchet, George, eleventh Baron Audley (1551-1617) (later created Earl of Castlehaven), of Somerset

Audley raised close on three hundred men from his Somerset estates and the vicinity during the spring of 1586. He commanded this large company

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152 Guy, Tudor England, 396.
153 RSG, 12:522 n.3.
154 HMCD, 3:158, and see ibid., 152, 154; SL, 2:159, 265n.; HMCS, 17:156.
155 ARA, RvS 1525, f. 205v, and CAan. 879, f. 67v; ARH, AJO 2950; Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 155, 157; Vere Commentaries, 163; Dalton, 1:60.
156 HMCD, 3:168, 235.
157 APC, 14:107; Adams, 'Protestant Cause', 68; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 99r.
in the Netherlands for the rest of the year and was knighted after the battle near Zutphen in which Sidney was mortally wounded. During the Zutphen campaign Audley commanded a regiment of English States'-pay troops -- it was possibly an operational post rather than a formal commission. Over the winter of 1586/87 he was in command of the garrison of Utrecht and even after Stanley's and Yorke's betrayals, the regents of the towns of Gelderland declared themselves willing to accept English garrisons if Audley was in command. His company was kept in States' pay throughout 1587, still 200-strong; it was one of the last mercenary bands transferred to cautionary status. Audley's later, royal service was in the Netherlands and Ireland where he finally settled.

Williams, Sir Roger (c.1540-95), of Monmouthshire

A long-term mercenary, who first served as a teenager on the St Quentin campaign (1557), his first time as a field officer came at the end of 1580. The return of Thomas Morgan to England for the winter left Norreys without a lieutenant colonel for his regiment in Friesland and Williams was appointed. He kept the post even after Morgan's return in the late spring of 1581 and thereafter was Norreys's lieutenant colonel.

Earlier he had probably served as a volunteer with Coligny. This is partly his modern editor's informed speculation, but Williams had certainly had previous military experience before he joined Morgan's three hundred in 1572, by which time he was already familiar with the Huguenots. In the autumn of 1568 he had been one of the couriers that carried bonds to the Palatinate to raise German troops for the Huguenots and he could well have stayed on to fight.

He served as a gentleman volunteer with Morgan in Zeeland in 1572 and Holland in 1573. He then served in Spanish pay from early 1574 to the summer of 1577, either as a spy for Walsingham, as an alternative to death

158 Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r; Tenison, 6:204, 210; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r, Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r; Hammer, Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics, 51.
159 Tenison, 6:204; Adams, 'Protestant Cause', 69; Brugmans, 2:69.
160 ARH, AJO 2943 (i), f. [2r]. GEC, 3:86.
161 ARA, SG 12576, n.f. (rubric 'Stucken concernende den Ambr. Norijts').
162 Above, ch. 4, p. 152 and sources cited there; CSPFor., 18:240, no. 273.
163 Williams, Works, xiii, 101 et seq.
164 CSPFor., 8:564.
or imprisonment, and/or because his religious convictions at this time were not yet resolved.195 He probably left Spanish service in April 1577 when Don John perforce sent Spanish troops home from the Netherlands; but certainly by the end of 1577 he was back in England as a servant of Walsingham's.196

He joined the English army in the Netherlands in 1578, probably again as a gentleman volunteer, though his experience meant his advice was taken seriously by senior officers.197 He may have been one of Norreys's captains in 1579, but certainly joined him in 1580 as captain of one of his two cornets of horse. Williams gave this up, initially to Christopher Champernowne, then, on his death, to Henry Norreys, over the winter of 1580/81, when he was promoted lieutenant colonel, but in June he was commissioned for his own company of 100 lancers.198

Williams led his company of horse in the failed Dutch campaign to restore the Calvinist Elector of Cologne in 1584.199 In 1585, he briefly served with Henry of Navarre in early summer,200 but by August he was back in the Netherlands. He was again the lieutenant colonel to Norreys, this time of the expedition raised to relieve Antwerp.201 He was appointed acting colonel of a force of nine companies of English volunteers paid by the States for the defence of Flushing and Brill from October to December 1585.202 He lost this field command after Leicester's arrival, but in 1587 was appointed sergeant-major-general of all the royal horse.203

In 1589 he once again took service in Henry IV's pay, together with a small group of volunteers.204 However, not much more than a month after they arrived in France, so did Willoughby's royal army; Williams joined it and thereafter served in royal pay, in northern France, in 1589-90 and 1591-93.205 He did not see military service again before his death.

195 Williams, Actions, passim
196 CSPFor., 12: 441, no. 574; Parker, Dutch Revolt, 181.
197 Churchyard's Choice, sig. Sii v.
198 SL. 1:103: this commission was from the States of Holland, but it was confirmed for the States-General in September.
199 CSPFor., 18:371, 553-54, nos. 449, 678.
200 CSPFor., 19:448; Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 244n.
201 Shaw, 'Financial and Political Relationships', xxxii; CSPFor., 20:25.
202 From Paul Hammer's notes on PRO, AO 1/292/1097.
203 PRO, E 351/240, ff. 2v, 22r.
204 Miller, 'Sir Roger Williams', 92; Evans, 'Introduction', to Williams, Works, xxxvi.
205 Miller, 'Sir Roger Williams'. 
Woodhouse, Sir William (fl. 1578-1604), of Norfolk

As a youth he had served in the States' army as a gentleman volunteer. He was a client of the Earl of Nottingham, in whose regiment he served at Cadiz in 1596. Woodhouse was given command of one of the companies raised in late 1598 to reinforce the English contingent in the Netherlands, in spite of opposition from Essex, thanks to Sir Francis Vere, but his band was one of those reduced by the States so as to form seven larger companies. Yet he stayed on in the Netherlands, serving as a gentleman volunteer again, and was made a captain in Sir Francis Vere's regiment in 1601. He filled that office through the next two years.

In April 1604 he replaced the recently deceased Robert Drake as colonel of the English companies in the garrison of Ostend, then serving as a captain again into 1605. A kinsman, Henry Woodhouse, replaced him by the spring of 1606.

Yorke, Rowland (d. 1588), of Yorkshire (?)

He was commissioned Thomas Morgan's lieutenant colonel on 19 April 1573, having previously been Morgan's captain-lieutenant at Flushing in 1572 and had greatly distinguished himself in the fighting in Zeeland. He later acted as sergeant-major of Morgan's contingent in 1578.

He was with Norreys's battalion at the storming of Mechelen in April 1580. When Morgan went north-east with Norreys in the summer of 1580 Yorke took over as captain of one of Norreys's two companies of horse and he replaced Morgan, both on the council of war of the Prince of Épinoy and as commander of the English foot in Flanders which he held with the title of Sergeant-Major. He continued in this office until February 1580; his exploits included storming the town of Condé in December. In the spring of 1581, however, weary of Flanders (for unknown reasons), he joined Norreys in Friesland, commanding a company in his regiment for the rest of the year.

206 Ch. 8, above, p. 267. Birch, 2:16.
207 Above, ch. 5, p. 184, and app. 1, p. 333. HMCS, 11:291. ARH, AJO 2946; RSG, 12:194.
208 SL, 2:277, 279 n.34; ARA, GRK 1232.
209 SL, 1:28n., 263; Williams, Actions, 125, 111 et passim. Churchyard's Choice, sig. Siii v.
210 Churchyard, Taking of Macklin, sig. C3v.
211 SL, 1:63; CSPFor., 14:418, 445, 501, nos. 426, 454, 505.
212 CSPFor., 15:44, no. 42; ARA, SG 12576, n.f. (rubric ‘Stucken concernende [...] Norijts’).
He left his company of horse in the south, but without affecting its status as "his".  

He returned with Norreys to the south in 1582 and resumed command of his cornet of horse, probably giving up his company of foot in Black Jack's regiment. In 1583 he took advantage of the confusion engendered by the bitter quarrel between Norreys and Morgan to establish his own, informal, independent command. But he conspired with the Spanish, was arrested, imprisoned and lucky to avoid execution. He was chosen by Leicester for a royal command in 1586 and betrayed an important fort to the Spanish -- but he was not in States' pay after 1584.

Sergeant-Majors (1): of Regiments

Bagenal, Sir Samuel (fl. 1594-1602)

Brother of Sir Henry, the marshal of Ireland. Bagenal was sergeant-major of Sir Francis Vere's States'-pay regiment from 1594-98. He served at Cadiz in 1596, where he was knighted by Essex. He left Dutch employ in the first half of 1598, conducting reinforcements to Ireland that summer; he ably served in the royal forces in Ireland until the end of the war against Tyrone.

Carleill, Christopher

He had already served as a gentleman volunteer in Holland and Zeeland in 1573-74 and had command of a ship of war in 1574. In 1577 he aided the Huguenots, commanding both ships and troops at Brouage and La Rochelle.

In 1579 he returned to the Netherlands as a captain in Norreys's regiment. Having distinguished himself in the fighting around Groningen in 1579, the following year he was promoted to the sergeant-major of Norreys's regiment, even though Yorke, the previous sergeant-major, had returned.

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213 SL, 1:64.
214 ARA, CvDorp, 971; CSPFor., 18:23, 25, nos. 27, 31. Ch. 4, above, p. 157.
215 ARA, SG 8040, SG 8041; PRO, SP 84/54, f. 107r; ARH, AJO 2943 (ii), AJO 2945; Falls, 211, 225, 324.
216 Lloyd, Elizabethan Adventurer, 33-38; Williams, Actions, 148.
217 Lloyd, Elizabethan Adventurer, 43-45.
218 CSPFor., 14: 100, 311, nos. 100, 332; ARH, SvH 15, p. 63; Blandy, 24v; ARA, SG 12576, n.f. (rubric 'Stucken concernende [...] Norijts').
At the end of 1580, however, his career in States' service ended. Thereafter he served as a naval and military captain in the English royal forces.

Cooke, John (fl. 1601-8)

He was appointed Henry Sutton's regimental sergeant-major in 1605, a post which was only short-lived since after Sutton's death that June his regiment was dissolved, the companies going into other regiments. Cooke may have first served as a gentleman volunteer in 1586, but was made a captain in 1601. He continued in States' service until 1608, but as a captain, though in line with contemporary custom he continued to be referred to as Sergeant-Major Cooke.

Jaxley, (Hammond? Robert?) (d. 1600)

Jaxley became a captain in Vere's States'-pay regiment in 1594. He served in it up to his death at the battle of Nieuwpoort in 1600. In 1599 he replaced Sir Samuel Bagenal as regimental sergeant major.

Palmer, Nicholas (fl. 1570s)

Sergeant-Major of Cavendish's regiment in 1578. There were two Palmers that served under Montgommery in 1572-73, one of whom held a captaincy under the count. That captain was almost certainly Nicholas for at the end of the fourth civil war, Montgommery sent much of his force to Holland and it then served in the pay of the States of Holland. It is surely no coincidence that the company of Nicholas Palmer commenced service in the Netherlands about this time, receiving payments from the treasurer of the States of Holland for the latter half of 1573 and first half of 1574. Palmer's company seems to have been discharged from Dutch employment that summer after the failure of Chester's regiment at Leiden, but he himself with a small group of gentlemen volunteers may have continued serving with the Huguenots for

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21 SL 2:160.
221 See lists of captains for 1595-1600, in app. 7, below; Dalton, 1:56, 60; Chamberlain Letters, no. 31, 1:103.
222 CSPFor., 10:291-92, no. 848.
223 See app.1, above, p. 317.
a time.  

In 1578 Henry Cavendish secured the services of one Palmer as his regimental sergeant-major. Given that Nicholas Palmer had experience of the Netherlands, this was surely him. His foreign Protestant employment ended with that of the regiment, early in 1579.

Panton, Sir Thomas (fl. 1602-14)

The sergeant-major of Ogle’s regiment from about 1605. Panton first commanded a company in States’ pay in 1602, but this was evidently an acting command only. He received his own captaincy in 1603 and served as second-in-command to Robert Drake in command of the English companies of the garrison of Ostend in the first quarter of 1604. His company remained in States’ pay at least to 1614.

Pigott, (fl. 1581-83)

Pigott was sergeant-major of Norreys’s regiment by September 1583 and possibly earlier. The first definite reference to him as a captain is from December 1581, when he was commanding a company in Flanders. But since he was a captain in Norreys’s regiment, his captaincy probably dates from in early 1581 -- Pigott would have taken over from Rowland Yorke when he was transferred to Norreys’s regiment in the campaign in Friesland. By the spring of 1582 Norreys regarded him highly enough to use his company as advance guard; by January 1583 Pigott was a trusted subordinate. Yet in September, he expelled the regiment’s lieutenant colonel, Roger Williams, and in November he was the ringleader of the notorious conspiracy which betrayed Alost to the Spanish, though even some of his own NCOs refused to be party to his treachery. His fate is a mystery.

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224 BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 121v; Ferguson, Papers, 36.
225 Churchyard’s Choice, sgs. Sii v, Siii r; BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 121r.
226 HMCD, 3:188; SL, 2:261.
227 RSG, 12:186; SL, 2:279 n.32; ARA, GRK 1232; lists of captains for 1607-8 and 1610, in app. 7, below; Tammel, 162; Peacham, sig. D3v.
228 CSPFor., 18:240, no. 273.
229 Ibid., 15:401, no. 427.
230 ARA, CvDorp 986, n.f.: ‘Estat abrege de la distribucion des vivres’ and ‘Liste de la journellier delivrances des vivres a frais pour les gens de guerre’.
231 CSPFor., 18:238, 240, 246, nos. 271, 273, 278; BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 122r.
Proud, William (d. 1632)

He was a gentleman volunteer in Sir Francis Vere's company at Ostend and attracted his attention. He was made a captain in Vere's regiment in 1602 and served for the rest of the period. He eventually became sergeant-major of Edward Cecil's regiment, and though that was only after this period, it was he, presumably, who became Cecil's sergeant major when Philip Pakenham replaced Sir Hatton Cheke as lieutenant colonel in 1608. Proud was still in Dutch pay at the siege of Maastricht, where he was killed.232

Reid, or Reade (fl. 1572) [Sir William Reade (d. 1604) of Worcestershire?]

The captain of a company which served around Brill in June and early July 1572 before being merged with the English troops of Jan van Tryer's mixed English and émigré battalion.233 It has been assumed that he was William Reade,234 an experienced officer of the royal establishment who later served in the Netherlands under Leicester (by whom he was knighted). He initially had a mercenary company and was sergeant-major of Norreys's States'-pay regiment, but it was transferred into royal pay. In 1586 he succeeded John Price as Sergeant-Major-General of the foot, but this was not a States'-pay appointment.235 Reade was considered as a successor for Willoughby as Governor of Bergen-op-Zoom but Sir Thomas Morgan was chosen instead.236 There is no certain evidence, however, to support the identification of the two Read[e]s.

Vere, Sir Edward (d. 1629)

He was probably an illegitimate son of John Vere, the elder brother of Sirs Francis and Horace Vere, and he served in the Netherlands at least from 1601, when he was a captain-lieutenant. He became a captain in his own right in the spring of 1605. At the end of the year he was commissioned sergeant-major of Sir Horace Vere's regiment, replacing Adolph Meetkerke

232 Vere Commentaries, 181; ARH, AJO 2946; ARA, CAan 879, ff. 44r, 47v, 52r; RSG, n.s., 1:13; and lists of companies for 1605, 1607-8, 1610; Sellin, 215 n.13; Donagan, 73.
233 Williams, Actions, 108; ARA, CO 73; see in ch. 3, above, pp. 111-12.
235 Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 349n; Shaw, 'Financial and Political Relationships', xxxiii; Tenison, 6:204, 211.
236 ARA, RAGP I:93, n.f. (26 May 1588).
who became lieutenant colonel, and Edward Vere held the office thereafter. He stayed in Dutch employ not only to 1610, but until slain in 1629.  

Watson, Thomas (fl. 1584), of Northamptonshire

Sergeant-Major of Thomas Morgan's regiment at Antwerp, 1584-85. He brought in the initial draft of the regiment in September. Thereafter, though, he disappears from the records and was not present when the regiment was mustered in March 1585, nor is any explanation given for his absence. This suggests he had been evacuated long since, presumably being one of the many soldiers who fell ill during the winter. Morgan's sergeant-major is referred to in a letter of April 1585 but by office, rather than by name, so it may not have been Watson by this time. In any event, for him to have been given the office originally he surely would have served previously as a captain, presumably in 1583, if not also in 1582.

Watson returned to the Netherlands promptly, for he was captain of a States'-pay company at the muster of English troops in September 1585. However, though his company was not transferred into queen's pay later that autumn, it was thenceforth commanded by Robert Shaw. It is likely that he was a relative of Sir Edward Watson of Northamptonshire who served with Leicester in the Netherlands in 1586.

Sergeant-Majors (2), or Wachtmeisters, of Garrisons

Baskerville, Sir Thomas (d.1597)

Having probably served with the first Earl of Essex in Ulster in 1573, he fought under Norreys as a gentleman volunteer in 1580-81 and was captain...
of one of the original queen’s-pay foot bands in the Netherlands in 1585. Baskerville was commissioned wachtmeister (i.e. sergeant-major) of Bergen-op-Zoom by the Council of State on 3 February 1587, but in May his auxiliary band was sent to Ostend. Thereafter, his commands were all in royal service: in Normandy under Willoughby (1588-89) and again under Essex (1591-92), in Brittany under Norreys (1593-94), the West Indies under Sir Francis Drake (1595) and then as Colonel-General of the royal army in Picardy in 1597, where he died.

Levens, Christopher (fl. 1562-98)

Apparently a Frenchman, who eventually took up long-term English service, he was in 1573 or 1574 sergeant-major of St Geertruidenberg.

Lovell, Thomas (fl. c.1565-1600), [of Huntingdonshire?]

Lovell first served as a mercenary sometime in the mid-1560s; he was one of Sir Humphrey Gilbert’s gentleman volunteers in Zeeland in 1572 and, Gilbert reported, ‘served very valiantly’. He probably went home that winter but returned to the Netherlands where he remained thereafter, serving the Dutch in indigenous units and holding local offices. He was an engineer in the pay of the States of Holland by the spring of 1585 but had at various times been a town sergeant-major and a company commander. Lovell also become an active gatherer of news for Walsingham and he actively solicited a command in the queen’s pay when English intervention became likely.

Norreys, who must have known Lovell, appointed him field Sergeant Major of the force Norreys took on campaign against Arnhem in the autumn of 1585, in which Lovell was wounded. Henry Norreys then made him the acting sergeant-major of the cautionary garrison of Brill. He did good service through to 1586 but it was unpaid. He unsuccessfully solicited command of the fort of the Ramekins, outside Flushing, but was commissioned garrison sergeant-major of Bergen-op-Zoom by Leicester on 3 February 1587. This

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245 Longleat, DP 1, f. 52r; Wemham, ENDSP, 71; CSPFor., 20:25.
246 ARA, RvS 15244f, f. 147v; APC, 15:90
247 DNB, 1:1289; Hasler, 1:402.
248 Lans. MS 1218, f. 114r.
249 HMCS, 6:237. Longleat, DP 2, f. 9r.
250 CSPFor., 19:64, 82-83, 85-86, 157, 291, 344, 402, 440, 498.
was confirmed by a States' commission of 14 April 1589.\textsuperscript{251} He returned to England by June 1596.

Perceval, Christopher

In the summer of 1588 Perceval was the town sergeant-major of Harlingen in Friesland.\textsuperscript{252}

Studder, Thomas (fl. 1602-5)

He is referred to in Dutch records as sergeant-major of the English at Sluys in 1605. He had previously commanded a company in Sir Francis Vere's regiment since 1602.\textsuperscript{253} His eventual fate is uncertain.

Wilsford, Sir Thomas (1530?-1604?), of Kent:

He was captain of an auxiliary company in 1585 but it was transferred into States'-pay in 1586 and cassed at the end of the year. Wilsford was also the sergeant-major of Ostend in 1586. The town had an auxiliary garrison, but the post itself was in States' pay.\textsuperscript{254}

Wilsford was made Sergeant-Major-General of the royal army in the Netherlands under Willoughby from 27 June 1587 to 2 December 1588, and, in 1589, High Marshal of Willoughby's army in Normandy; these were, of course, both royal offices. Throughout the 1590s he filled a variety of military offices within England; as Provost Marshal of Middlesex, Surrey, Kent and Essex from July 1595 onwards, he policed deserters from Vere's States'-pay companies. He also assisted in Vere's recruiting for those units, at least in 1599, if not on other occasions.\textsuperscript{255} Wilsford's sister married, as a second wife, Bishop Sandys of London; Sir Thomas's son served as a lieutenant with Sir Francis Vere and is probably the Captain Edward Wilsford who was killed at Ostend.\textsuperscript{256}

\textsuperscript{251}TDH, 74; BL, Cott. MS Titus B.vii, f. 104r; HMC Bath, 5:215; ARA, RvS 1524/i, ff. 73v-74v.
\textsuperscript{252}HMC Bath, 5:212-14, 350.
\textsuperscript{253}RSG, 12:393; ARH, AJO 2946.
\textsuperscript{254}BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r; ARH, AJO 2943 (i), f [3r]; Shaw, 'Financial and Political Relationships', xxxv; information from Paul Hammer's notes on PRO, AO 1/292/1096.
\textsuperscript{255}PRO, SO 3/1, f. 537r; SRO, D593/S/4/10/9.
\textsuperscript{256}See DNB, 17:773, 21:236.
Other Administrative Offices

Chamberlain, Charles

Commissioned as Provost of Bergen-op-Zoom on 26 March 1593, an office he held at least into 1598. In 1596, 1597 and 1598 he served as captain of a company in Vere’s mercenary regiment of foot.\(^{256}\)

Cheston, Thomas

The Raad van State on 17 June 1586 endorsed an appointment by Leicester of Cheston as Provost of the whole army, with twenty-five horse and twenty-five foot, to police deserting soldiers; two weeks later it commissioned him as Scoutmaster (or Captain and Chief of Scouts), again of the whole army (that is, both Dutch and English forces).\(^{257}\)

Crookes, John (fl. 1590s)

He was Provost of Bergen-op-Zoom up to spring 1593 (when Chamberlain replaced him), but the date of his original appointment is unknown. He may well be the same John Crooks that served as a gentleman volunteer with Gilbert in Zeeland in 1572.\(^{258}\)

Dexter, Ralph (fl. 1599-14)

Dexter was an engineer but he was appointed captain of the company of Sir Edward Norreys after his recall from Ostend. Dexter served at Ostend until the city’s surrender in 1603 and was commissioned joint engineer of the city on 15 June 1602.\(^{259}\) He continued in Dutch employ as a company captain until at least 1614.\(^{260}\)

Peyton, Sir John (1544-1630)

Peyton was commissioned by the Council of State as lieutenant-governor of

\(^{256}\) ARA, RvS 1525, f. 52r, SG 8040, SG 8041, SG 8042; PRO, SP 84/54, f. 107r; ARH, AJO 2943 (ii), AJO 2945.

\(^{257}\) ARA, RvS 1524, f. 48, 138v-39r.

\(^{258}\) ARA, RvS 1525, f. 52r, Longleat, DP 2, f. 9r.

\(^{259}\) Vere Commentaries, 197; Orfors, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 184; SL, 2:276, 279; ARH, AJO 2946.

\(^{260}\) SL, 2:159, 162; ARA, RvS 24, pp. 5, 185, and GRK 1232; lists of captains for 1607-8, 1610, in app. 7, below; Peacham, sig. D3r.
Bergen-op-Zoom on 15 October 1586; his initial office at Bergen had been as Willoughby's 'provost general', but this was in the queen's pay. Peyton had earlier served as a royal muster-master, before being appointed to command William Tweedy's States'-pay company of foot in July 1586 (the actual date of his commission from the Council of State was 4 August 1586), on Tweedy's return to England. The company remained in Dutch pay only into 1587, being cassed that spring. Peyton was back in England by July 1588 when he was made colonel of a regiment of foot in the army to defend against the Armada. The rest of his distinguished career was wholly in national service.

Smith (d. 1580?)

The Provost Marshall of Cavendish's regiment at Rijmenam. He may be the 'Maister Smithe' killed at the storming of Mechelen.

Thomas, Samuel (fl. 1586)

The 'Master gooner' of the army, he had a hundred 'canoniers' under his command. Although originally in royal pay, by the summer of 1586 he and his men were in States' pay. They took part in most campaigns of that year and were initially kept in States' service in 1587. However, his band was described as 'very weake' by one English observer in January and disappears from Dutch records soon after.

Whetstone, Bernard (b. 1549), of London

On 4 April 1586 he was appointed Commissioner in Ordinary for Musters by the Council of State, duplicating an office he already held in the queen's pay.
APPENDIX 6

MERCENARY CAPTAINS (ii): COMPANY COMMANDERS

Abarrow, Edward (fl. 1585-89), of Southampton

In April 1586 Abarrow, who probably ‘had previously served in Ireland’ was commissioned by the Privy Council to raise 300 men in Southampton for States’ service. He successfully raised and conducted to the Netherlands a company half that strong by mid-May. He passed command over to Captain Young sometime in the summer, but Abarrow had not died, for he held militia offices in England in the late 1580s.

Acres, George (fl. 1574)

A captain in Morgan’s regiment in 1573, probably replacing Captain Owen (killed in July), since Acres was definitely one of the captains in the regiment on its return and transshipment to Ireland in early 1574, but there is no sign that he held a command in it earlier in the year. Thereafter he served in Ireland but, like others of Morgan’s captains, continued to try to obtain the back-wages owed from his Dutch employment.

Aldridge, George (d. 1600)

He took over the cautionary company of a Captain Salisbury in 1595, having married Salisbury’s widow and he may be the ‘Captain Alderish’ who commanded Essex’s troop of horse in the royal expedition to Cadiz in 1596. His company passed into Dutch pay in 1599; by the beginning of the Nieuwpoort campaign the following year Aldridge had been replaced by Captain Kayes.

\[1\] Adams, ed., Household Accounts of Leicester, 705n. See ibid., 358; APQ 14:55; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 99r; CSPFor., 20:667.

\[2\] BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r; Boynton, Elizabethan Militia, 100; R. C. Anderson, ed., Letters of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries. From the Archives of Southampton, Southampton Record Soc. Publications, 22 (Southampton: 1921), 170.

\[3\] APC 8:177, 179; CSPIr., 2, 8, 48, 50-51; KL, no. 2955, 7:553.

\[4\] APC, 25: 76, 202; L&A, 6:85, no. 52; Birch, 2:15; ARA: SG 5883, no. 231, SG 4891; RvS 1232.
Aleyn, Sir Francis (d. 1595)

A 'Mr Alen' was a captain under Roger Williams in Flanders in 1583. He is probably to be identified with Captain Francis Aleyn, who later served in the royal army in the Netherlands in 1586 -- apart from the obvious geographical and chronological proximity between the two sets of service, Aleyn was a boon companion of Roger Williams and described Francis Vere, whose first service in the Netherlands was as a gentleman volunteer with Williams, as 'my brother'. His longstanding connections with them could well date from service in Norreys's regiment, commanded by Williams as lieutenant colonel in the summer of 1583. Aleyn later served in royal armies in Ireland and the Netherlands.

Allyn (d. 1602)

Captain of a States'-pay company in 1602 -- he died that autumn or in the winter that followed. It is not known if he was related to Sir Francis Aleyn.

Almond, William (d. 1578)

Captain Aumond or Aman commanded a company, probably in Norreys's regiment, at Rijmenam, 1578. He was either killed in action there or died soon afterwards.

Arthur, Sir Robert (or Rowland) (fl. 1599-1606)

Arthur took over command of what had been Sir Robert Sidney's States'-pay cornet of horse on 21 October 1599. He commanded it throughout 1600-5, before he either died or returned home and it passed to John Radcliffe.

Astley, Sir Jacob (fl. 1605-45)

Astley later became famous as a Parliamentary general in the English Civil War. He first became a captain in Dutch service, in 1605. His company was

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5 CSP For., 18:31, no. 38.
7 Hammer, Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics, 133, 291 n.
8 BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 129v; Churchyard's Choice, Siii r.
9 RSG, 12:186; ARH, AJO 2946.
10 SL, 2:125; HMCD, 3:4; RSG, 12:194; ARA, CAan. 879, ff. 33r, 34v; HMCS, 18:155.
retained by the States until 1608, but with the advent of peace negotiations it was cassed. However, he had regained a States'-pay captaincy by 1614 and by 1627 was a regimental commander.11

Barnes, Arthur (fl. 1586)

He was captain of a company raised for States' service in 1586. It arrived in the Netherlands in May and continued in Dutch pay certainly until January 1587 but it was then 'very weake' and may have become defunct soon after, despite having been scheduled to remain in States' employ through 1587.12

Bartlett, Edward (d. 1576?)

His company was newly raised by the States of Holland as part of the Dutch effort to relieve the siege of Zierickzee. It served for much of the summer of 1575, but by the autumn Bartlett was replaced by John Lloyd.13 The Captain Ned Bartelett who engaged in a quarrel on the northern marches in October 1577 is presumably the same man, so he did not die in the Netherlands!14 He may have been a Berwick captain who, having seen a season in the Dutch wars, was satisfied and returned home, but the reasons why Lloyd was commissioned in Bartlett's place are not known.

Baskerville, Nicholas (fl. c1585-1600), of Herefordshire and Berkshire

He was a captain in the royal army from 1587, serving in the Netherlands and France and settling in the cautionary garrison of Flushing. He spent one season in States' pay, however, commanding one of Vere's mercenary companies in 1595.15

Baskerville (fl. 1606-25)

He was captain of a States'-pay company in 1606 -- an English observer called him the brother of a captain in the cautionary garrison of Flushing, but

11 ARA, GRK 1232, SG 8043, SG 8044; Peacham, sig. D3r; FSL, MS F.c.16.
12 CSPFor, 20:667; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r, and Egerton MS 1694, ff. 55f, 85v; Tenison, 6:210; ARH, AJO 2943 (i), f. [2r].
13 BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 118; ARH, RKA 346a/1d, f. 4v, and SvH 281, f. 5Lv.
14 HMCR, 115.
15 Rowe, Expansion, 359; Williams, Discourse, 48-49; BL, Add. MS 14284, f. 66r; Sydney Papers, 2:113. ARA, SG 8040.
Nicholas Baskerville's brother, Sir Thomas Baskerville, had died in 1596. This captain is probably the Baskerville who remained in the Dutch army -- though not a captain again during this period, he was a lieutenant colonel by 1625.  

Baud, William (fl. 1575)

This, together with Baude and Baudt are Dutch spellings and seem like a Dutch name but he is clearly indicated in official documents as English. It is not clear when he first entered Dutch employ; he first appears among a list of officers paid by the Treasurer of the States of Holland for the period 1 June 1573 to 31 July 1574. Given the timeframe, it is probable that he replaced the captain of an existing English company -- several are recorded for 1573 or 1574 but effectively vanish.

Baude was definitely in Holland's pay by September 1574 when he received a barrage of instructions from the States of Holland. His company was mustered at Delft in September 1575 and was paid by the States the following month. This is the last reference to him that has been found.

Bedwell (d. 1572)

One of the captains in Gilbert's regiment in Zeeland in 1572, killed in action near Flushing in August. His name is various spelled Bedes and Bedowe. However, in 1573 'the widow of the late Captain Boddele' was pursuing the magistracy of Ter Veere for sums due her husband. Bedwell might be the original of all these different spellings, and of course a Thomas Bedwell was in States' pay in 1586.

Bell, Robert (fl. 1595)

Captain of a company in Vere's States'-pay regiment in 1595.
Bellingham (fl. 1572)

Captain of a company which landed at Brill with Lumey de La Marck's force in the spring of 1572.\(^{23}\)

Berry, Benjamin (fl. 1599)

A captain in the royal garrison of Flushing, his was one of the companies transferred into Dutch pay after the York House Treaty. However, he only stayed in States' pay up to May 1599 -- from June his place in Sir Horace Vere's foot regiment was taken by Captain Madison.\(^{24}\)

Beyns, J. (d. 1576?)

Captain of an independent company in the pay of the States of Holland in 1576.\(^{25}\) Inasmuch as Baud simply disappears from the records in the autumn of 1575 and suddenly Beyns appears in 1576, with no other change in the personnel of the independent companies, it is probable that Beyns replaced Baud, though for what reason is unclear. Since Beyns himself disappears from the records after 19 September the probability is strong that he died.

Bingham, Roger (d. 1578), of Dorset

The younger brother of Sir Richard Bingham, he served under his brother's command in Cavendish's regiment in 1578. He fought bravely at Rijmenam, where he was killed, along with a third brother.\(^{26}\)

Bishop, Edmund (d. 1581), [of Lincolnshire?]

As a client of the Earl of Rutland's he was possibly from Lincolnshire. Bishop was in the Netherlands in 1575, but not, apparently, as a captain.\(^{27}\) The first reference to him as a captain comes in 1578 when he is described as captain of one of the three 'old bands': companies employed by Holland between 1574-77, but at that point in the pay of the States-General. The

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\(^{23}\) BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 121v.
\(^{24}\) ARA, 5883-II, no. 231; SG 4891, n.f.; and 12503, f. 279r.
\(^{25}\) ARH, SvH 281, ff. 5K2r, 5L -- there four separate references on these two fols.
\(^{26}\) CSPFor., 13:16, 115, nos. 23, 136; Churchyard's Choice, Si ii v; KL, nos. 4048, 4050, 10: 684, 686.
\(^{27}\) KL, no. 2887, 7:409.
context of other evidence about these companies indicates that Bishop had
replaced Captain Beyns at the beginning of 1577, though he was probably
then paid off by the States of Holland, prior to him being commissioned by
(or his company transferred to) the States-General.28

Bishop's company was merged into Norreys's regiment early in 1579. It was one of those chosen by Norreys for the campaign in Groningen in the late summer and autumn of 1580. Bishop distinguished himself as 'sure and steadfast'.29 He was still in Norreys's regiment for most of the 1581 campaign in Friesland but he was killed in action at the battle of Nordhorn.30

Beeston (fl. 1562)
Possibly one of the (otherwise unknown) English captains in Killigrew's force in Normandy in 1562. He cooperated with Montgommery's Huguenot troops in Lower Normandy in the late summer.31

Blount, Sir Charles (1562-1606) (succeeded as eighth Baron Mountjoy 1594 and created Earl of Devonshire 1603)
Blount was a captain in the Netherlands 1585-86. He raised two companies in the summer of 1585, one each in queen's and States' pay. The latter was not converted to royal pay in the autumn but remained in States' pay into 1586, though Blount himself gave up command in the spring to John Ward.32 Thereafter his career (in the Netherlands, France, Spain and, most famously, Ireland) was wholly in royal service.

Blundell
He became a captain in the staatsche leger in 1610, probably of one of the companies specially raised to serve in the first Jülich campaign; he was still in Dutch employ in 1614, during the second Jülich campaign.33

28 CSPFor, 12:571, 589, nos. 737, 759; UBL, MS Vulc. 104/37; KL no. 3918, 10:478; PRO, SP 83/8, f. 39r. 
29 Bandy, 26v. See HMCR, 121.
30 ARA, SG 12576, n.f. (rubric 'Stucken concernende [...] Norijts'); Camden, iii.5; Baudart, 370.
31 Churchyard's Choice, sigs. Lii r-L4r; Trim, 'Normandy Campaign', 78.
32 CSPFor, 20:25, 129; Shaw, 'Financial and Political Relationships', xxxiii, xxxv; ARA, RAGP I: 206 (i); BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r.
33 ARA, RvS 1226; Peacham, sig. D3v.
Bold, Richard (fl. c. 1580-85), from Lancashire (?)  

One Bold, probably a former soldier of Edward Chester, had command of a cornet of seventy horse in the States-General’s pay in 1579-80 -- probably Thomas Cotton’s cavalry unit. By the end of 1580 it had either been effectively destroyed or was then disbanded.  

It is probable that he is the same as the Richard Bold who in 1586 was given a commission to raise a States’-pay company of foot from Lancashire. He definitely recruited the company, and transported it to the Netherlands by the early summer of 1586. However, he then disappears from the records and evidently gave the company up, to an unknown successor.

Borlase, Sir John (fl. 1609-2)  

He was presumably related to Sir William Borlase, the Marshall of Flushing in 1590-91. Sir John Borlase (or Burlacy) obtained a States’-pay captaincy in 1609. His company remained in States’ pay at least to 1621, when he commanded a company in Vere’s force in the Palatinate.

Bostock (d. 1572)  

The captain-lieutenant of Thomas Cotton’s company, killed in action near Flushing in 1572.

Bourchier (d. 1572), [of Devonshire?]  

One of Gilbert’s captains, he was badly wounded near Flushing, then slain at ‘Sutherland’, in 1572. His name is variously spelled as variants of ‘Bowsar’, ‘Bouser’ and Bourcher. Sir George Bourchier, an uncle of the Earl of Bath who served for many years in Ireland had his name variously spelled as ‘Bowser’ and ‘Bousar’. Thus, this officer was probably from the family of the

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34 CSPFor., 14:262, no. 287; SL, 1:55.  
35 APC, 14:55; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 99r; ARA, RAGP I:206 (ii), f. [2r].  
36 Hay, Life of Robert Sidney, 77-78.  
37 Egerton Papers, 443-44; Chamberlain Letters, no. 123, 1:305. PRO, E 101/612/73.  
38 Williams, Actions, 116; Longleat, DP 2, f. 9r.  
39 Longleat, DP 2, f. 9r; Gascoigne, A Hundreth Sundrie Flowers, II. 29--35, no. 68, pr. in notes to Williams, Works, 227; Churchyard’s Choice, sig. K4r; BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 123v; Williams, Actions, 116.  
40 BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 125r; Churchyard’s Choice, sigs. F4r, R4r.
Bourchier, Earls of Bath, who were prominent landowners in Devon, but a precise identification is not possible.

Bowes (fl. 1580)

He commanded a company in Norreys's regiment in 1580; this was his one year as a captain. It is likely he was one of the Bowes family which were clients of the Earl of Leicester and supplied a number of military officers, but nothing is known for certain.

Boyces, Edward (fl. 1595-1606), of Kent

He was captain of a States'-pay company in 1606. He is probably to be identified with the Captain Edward Boys who raised a company of pressed men for service in Picardy in 1595.

Breton, Giles (fl. 1599-1600)

He succeeded to the command of Richard Smith's company in Sir Horace Vere's regiment in the summer of 1599. Breton had brought reinforcements to Flushing and replaced Smith after the latter decided to return to cautionary pay. He was in Horace Vere's regiment again in 1600 including at the battle of Nieuwpoort at which he was killed. His name also appears as Pirton, Purton, Purtene and Breden.

Brinsley (fl. 1605-10)

He was made captain of a States'-pay company in 1605 and continued in that capacity up to and including 1610.

Britgens, Thomas (fl. 1606)

The captain of a States'-pay company in 1606.

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41 Blandy, sig. Hii v.
42 See Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 426; Churchyard's Chippes, 38; BL, Lans. MS 113, f. 148r.
43 ARA, CO 51; SRO, D593/S/4/70/4.
44 ARH, AJO 2950; Oriers, NassauschenLaurencrans, 155; Dalton, 1:56, 60; Chamberlain Letters, no. 31, 1:103.
45 ARA: GRK 1232; SG 8043, SG 8044; RvS 1236.
46 ARA, CO 51.
Brookesby, John (d. 1583), of Leicestershire

He is probably the 'Mr Brokesby' who was one of Gilbert's gentlemen volunteers in 1572 and was wounded near Flushing. He was lieutenant of Gainsford's company in Holland in 1575 before obtaining his own company in 1576. His company was decommissioned by the States of Holland in 1577 along with those of several other captains, but it was not one of those recommissioned in 1578. When he obtained new employment it was from the Union of Utrecht. His company was part of the force which attempted to hold Maastricht in 1579 and Brookesby was wounded in the defeat in which his kinsman, John Brookesby, was killed. The next year, his company transferred into the pay of the States of Brabant, in the service of which he remained until his death in October 1583.

Buck, Sir John (fl. 1586-96)

Buck was a captain first in States', but mostly in queen's, pay. He took over command of Thomas Smith's company in the autumn of 1586; it remained in States' pay in 1587, before finally being converted to a cautionary band in 1588. He spent most of the rest of his career as a cautionary captain in the Netherlands but served at Cadiz in 1596 where he was knighted.

Bucklandshide, Philip (fl. 1568-70), of Devon

A first cousin of Henry Champernowne, Bucklandshide was the lieutenant of his cavalry troop in France in 1569 and probably succeeded to its command after Champernowne's death in May 1570, though he himself had been slain

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47 A gentry family of Brookesby was relatively prominent in Elizabethan and Jacobean Leicestershire: see, e.g., Leicester RO, I/D41/4/281, DG 40/27, DG 40/30-31; John Nichols, The History and Antiquities of the County of Leicester, 4 vols (London: by the author, 1795-1815), 2:769, 3:403, 4:7, 154. The Brookesbys had a long-standing connection with the Digbys, another East Midlands family (Leicester RO, DG 40/283) and were clients of the earls of Huntingdon (Robertson, 'Uneasy Allies'). Their links with the 'Puritan earl' and a family that provided several soldiers in the Netherlands are the basis of this identification.

48 Longleat, DP 2, f. 7r. ARA, CO 37. ARH, RKA 346a/1d, f. 1v.

49 See above, in app. 1, p. 323.

50 CSPFor., 17:524, no. 538; Churchyard's Choice, sigs. T4v-Ui recto.

51 ARA, SG 7, ff. 140v, 149r; CSPFor., 18:148, no. 176.

52 BL, Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r; ARH, AJO 2943 (i), f. [2r]; ARA, SG 12576, n.f. (31 Aug. 1588).

53 Markham, Fighting Veres, 181, 184, 234.
by the end of the war in August.54

Bull (fl. 1606)

Captain of a States'-pay company in 1606.55

Burgh, John (fl. 1606-21)

He had certainly obtained a States'-pay captaincy by 1607 but may have first acted as a captain in 1606, replacing one of the casualties of that year. His company was still employed in 1608 but was then cassed with the onset of peace negotiations. He later commanded a company in Sir Horace Vere’s army, raised mostly from States'-pay companies, in the Palatinate in 1621.56 It is not known if he was related to Sir John Burgh and Lord Burgh.

Butler (d. 1603)

A lieutenant at Ostend in 1601, he raised a new company in 1602, but died of plague at Ostend in 1603.57 His widow was paid his back wages in 1605.58

Caesar (fl. 1602)

Presumably a son of Sir Julius Caesar, he took up command of a company in the States’ army in 1602, which he kept into the following year.59

Carey, Sir Edmund (1558-1637), of East Anglia

The sixth son of Henry, first Lord Hunsdon, he was in Leicester’s service by 1582 and accompanied Leicester to the Netherlands in December 1585. He returned to England in February 1586 to raise a voluntary company and on 8 April was granted a commission to raise a company of three hundred volunteers for the States-General’s pay in Norfolk and Suffolk.60 He had re-

54 Churchyard’s Choice, sig. Kii v; [Henri] Lancelot de Voysin de la Popelinière, La Vraie et Entière histoire des troubles et choses memorables, avenues tant en France qu’en Flandres, & Pays circonvoisins, depuis l’an 1562 (La Rochelle: 1573 [orig. edn]), 363r; Camden, i.224; Rowse, Sir Richard Grenville, 62.
55 ARA, CO 51.
56 ARA, SG 8043, SG 8044, and CO 51. PRO, E 101/612/73.
57 HMCS, 11:291; RSG, 12:186; ARA, CAan. 879, f. 26v; HMCD, 3:45.
58 ARA, CAan. 879, f.63v.
59 RSG, 12:186; ARH, AJO 2946.
60 Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 465, 373; APC, 14:55; and above, ch. 8, p. 264.
cruited and transported just over two hundred men to the Netherlands by June 1586 and his company was in action the rest of the year, fighting well enough that it was scheduled to be kept in States' pay in 1587. It was put in the garrison of Deventer, together with Sir William Stanley's regiment. On the latter's treacherous surrender of the city to the Spanish, 'all English troops who did not wish to follow him were permitted to remain under the English standard and about 300 marched away under Sir Edmund Cary.' He served in States' pay again in 1587, but then all English bands were converted to cautionary status.

Carey, Henry (fl. 1594-99)

A captain in the Netherlands who transferred to Ireland in 1599 to serve in Essex's army. He was possibly related to the family Lord Hunsdon. He is to be distinguished from Sir Henry Carey, who served the Dutch as a gentleman volunteer during James I's reign, according to the History of Parliament Trust's biography of the latter.

Carey, or Carew, Sir Henry (fl. 1602-14 [c. 1576-1633 ?])

A captain in Dutch employ from 1603. His name is variously spelled Carew and Carey and it is impossible to be sure of the correct spelling. He has been identified with his distinguished namesake, the courtier Sir Henry Cary, later Viscount Falkland, who served in the Netherlands as a gentleman volunteer in the middle of the first decade of the new century. But the Carey or Carew who took over John Ridgeway's company in March 1603 is almost certainly the same man who thereafter served until at least 1614. If so, it is hard to correlate his career to that of the courtier Sir Henry Carey, who is usually said to have gone to the Netherlands only in 1605. He possibly went to the Netherlands earlier and kept his company later than has been thought, and after 1606 served only during campaign seasons, spending the winter...
months in England. Equally, however, it is possible that this is a different Sir Henry Carey, or that Carew may be the correct reading of his surname -- in which case the courtier Sir Henry Carey may have never been a captain.\(^{66}\)

Carey, or Carew, Robert (fl. 1608-14)

A captain on the state van oorlog for 1608, he was evidently one of the captains cassed at the end of the year, since he does not appear on the state for 1610. However, by 1614 he had regained a company in Dutch pay.\(^{67}\) He was presumably related to Sir Henry Carew or Carey (above).

Cavendish (fl. 1573)

Captain of a company in the campaign to relieve Haarlem in 1573.\(^{68}\) He may be the Richard Cavendish who, since he received a license to go beyond the seas in July 1576, may have served in Jacob’s wars, but this is speculative.\(^{69}\) What relationship, if any, he was to Henry Cavendish, the colonel of 1578, is also unknown.

Champernowne, Christopher (d. 1581), of Devon

Almost certainly a kinsman of Henry Champernowne, although the exact relationship is uncertain. He was an officer in John Norreys’s cornet of horse in Groningen in 1580, serving with distinction under Roger Williams, who captained the unit for Norreys. When in the winter of 1580/81 Williams was promoted to Norreys’s lieutenant colonel, in Morgan’s absence, Christopher Champernowne was promoted, too, to captain-lieutenant of Norreys’s horse-band. However, it was short-lived: he was killed in action in February 1581.\(^{70}\)

Champernowne, Henry (1538-70), of Devon

Champernowne served with the imperialist army in Hungary against the Turks in 1566-67, but en route back to England in the autumn of 1567 joined

\(^{66}\) See HMCD, 3.59-60, 234; ARH, AJO 2946; BL, Stowe MS 168, f. 158r; ARA, GRK 1232 and RvS 24, p. 201; lists of captains for 1607-10, in app. 7, below; Peacham, sig. D3r.
\(^{67}\) ARA, SG 8044; Peacham, sig. D3r.
\(^{68}\) IDH, 19.
\(^{69}\) PRO, E 157/1, f. 2r.
\(^{70}\) Blandy, 24v; CSPFor, 15:44, no. 42.
the Huguenot army in the initial campaign of the second civil war with a troop of 'xij gentlemen or more'. The war went on into 1568 but Champernowne left France and was back in England by 18 January 1568, when he agreed a land deal with other local gentry.

When hostilities resumed in August 1568 Champernowne immediately prepared to return to France, making a disposition of property in the event of his death and writing his will (on 1 September and 2 October respectively). He was back in France with a cornet of cavalry by mid-November, when he wrote to Leicester and Cecil, having joined a detached force commanded by Montgomery. By February 1569 he had joined the main army and struck up a close personal rapport with the Prince of Condé, shortly terminated by his death at Jarnac (13 March 1569).

Champernowne's company either suffered heavy casualties in the defeat or Champernowne himself lost heart, or both. Certainly in April, the month after Jarnac, he was back in Devon. Over the summer he did recruit his unit and in September, with a full-strength band of a hundred light horse, Champernowne arrived back at La Rochelle in time to pick up the pieces after another great defeat at Moncontour (10 October). He remained in France with his troop, albeit ever dwindling in numbers due to casualties, into the following year; Champernowne was slain on 28 May 1570. He was the subject of immediate eulogies from Huguenots, and great praise was to follow in contemporary histories by French writers, Catholic and Protestant, as well as English chroniclers. They especially praised his role in securing the route for the retreat of the Protestant army after Moncontour, but also lauded his general prowess and chivalry.

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72 Devon RO, 269A/PF7.
73 Bodl., Rawl. MS B.285, ff. 71-74; PRO, PROB 11/52, f. 239.
74 HMC Pepys, 136. CSPFor., 8:578, no. 2647.
75 CSPFor., 9:27, no. 99; HMC Pepys, 148; BN, MS Fr. 5785, f. 17v, MS Fr. 23275, f. 48r; Churchyard's Choice, sig. Kii v.
76 Howard and Stoate, Devon Musters, 216-17.
77 Churchyard's Choice, sig. Kii v; CSPFor., 9:126, nos. 446-48. For Champernowne's modest account of Moncontour, ibid., 131, no. 468.
78 CPR, 5:239, no. 1949.
79 CSPFor., 9:278, 287, nos. 1039, 1073; Churchyard's Choice, sig. Kii v; Popelinière, 284v, 363; [J. de Serres], Memoires de la troisieme guerre civile et des derniers troubles de France (n.p. [Paris]: 1571), 429; d'Aubigné, 1:308; BN, MS Fr. 5785 ['Liste des Seigneurs, Barons, Chevaliers & Gentilshommes envoyez en France par Elizabeth, Royne d'Angleterre ... 8 Juin 1572'], f. 17v; Camden, i.224.
Chatterton, Richard (d. 1581)

He had served alongside Morgan and Norreys as a captain in the royal army in Ireland in the 1570s. Chatterton transferred to the Netherlands in about 1579, initially as a gentleman volunteer, but he was given command of John Lloyd's company by Norreys in August 1580 and he led it in Groningen and Friesland until his death at Nordhorn in September 1581. It is possible that he was related to either or both of two clerical Chattertons (or Chaddertons): Lawrence, a godly divine and leader of Puritanism, and William, Leicester's chaplain and an Elizabethan bishop.  

Chatterton, Thomas (fl. 1586)

Chatterton was presumably related to Richard Chatterton. He had served in Ireland and was one of the horsemen in Leicester's following at The Hague in January 1586. He raised his own company for States' service, but in the autumn of 1586 he gave way to George Kettelbie.  

Clarke, Henry (fl. 1586-87)

Clarke was licensed to raise a volunteer company for States' service from Bedfordshire in the spring of 1586. His States'-pay company then served throughout 1586 and was maintained in service into 1587.  

Clarke, Ralph (fl. 1601-8)

He first served in Ostend in 1601-2 as a captain-lieutenant, commanding an unknown captain's company. He was made captain in his own right in 1605 and thereafter commanded a company until 1608 -- it was presumably one of those cased with the advent of peace negotiations.  

Clifford (d. 1602)

Captain of one of the companies newly-raised in 1602 for the campaigns to

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80 ARA, SG 12576, n.f. (rubric 'Stucken concernende [...] Norijts'); Blandy, 22v; BL, Cott. MS Titus B.vii, f. 38r, and Lans. MS 1218, ff. 118r, 119r, 123v, 129r, 131v. DNB, 3:1340-43.
81 APC, 17:161; Tenison, 6:46; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r.
82 APC, 14:80. Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r; Tenison, 6:204, 210; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r, Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r, and Lans. MS 1218, ff. 121r-22r; ARH, AJO 2943 (i), f. [2r].
83 Vere Commentaries, 197, 204; ARA, GRK 1232, SG 8043, SG 8044.
divert Spanish attention from Ostend, but he died that autumn, around the same time as Captain Ball and hence probably in the same epidemic.  

Clive (fl. 1605-10)

He obtained a States'-pay captaincy in 1606 and was thereafter maintained in Dutch employ at least to 1610.  

Cobham, Edward (fl. 1578-91), of Kent

Captain of the three companies of foot of John Cobham in the regiment of John Norreys in 1578: 174 strong when mustered that summer. The two were surely kin and since John Cobham was also known as Brooke and was from Kent, it is likely that he is the Edward Brooke who in March 1591 was made captain of one hundred men levied in Kent for service in Flushing.  

Cockain (fl. 1602-3)

Captain of a company raised to strengthen the garrison at Ostend in early 1602. His unit was broken or his command suspended that summer though it was only finally cassed by the States-General in March 1603.  

Coningrave (fl. 1602-4)

He was a captain in States' pay from 1602 to 1604. What happened to him then is unknown.  

Constable, Sir William (fl. 1594-1613), of Nottinghamshire and Lincolnshire

He was captain of a company in Sir Francis Vere's mercenary regiment from 1594 to 1598 inclusive. He then left the Netherlands to serve under Essex in Ireland. He later returned to the Netherlands as a captain in the cautionary garrison of Brill.  

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84 ARH, AJO 2946; RSG, 12:186; Chamberlain Letters, no. 54, 1:170.
85 ARA, CAan. 879, f. 123v; lists of captains for 1607-8, 1610, in app. 7, below.
86 ARA, RAGP III:28, f. [7r].
87 SRO, D593/S/4/10/9.
88 RSG, 12:151, 186, 194, 490.
89 ARH, AJO 2946; RSG, 12:186; ARA, CAan. 879, ff. 48r, 52v.
90 Markham, Fighting Veres, 203; ARA, SG 8040, SG 8041; PRO, SP 84/50, f. 103r; ARH, AJO 2943 (ii), AJO 2945. Falls, 245. CSPDom. 1611-18, 212.
Conway (fl. 1606-8)

He obtained a company in Dutch pay in 1606 and remained in their employ up to 1608. This may be the Fulke Conway, who had captained a company in Ireland in 1598, or the Thomas Conway who later commanded a regiment in Swedish service (in which case he died in 1631).\(^1\)

Copeland (fl. 1599)

He is listed in one set of accounts for troops in Dutch pay up to the end of April 1599, but not in any other records for that year. Possibly he was a lieutenant who took acting command but was superseded by another captain.\(^2\)

Connock (fl. 1606-14)

He recruited a new company for States’ service in 1606. It was maintained in Dutch employ up to 1610 and beyond.\(^3\)

Corne (d. 1580)

A captain in Norreys’s regiment in 1580 who won much praise for his valour from contemporaries; he was killed in a skirmish near the city of Groningen in August.\(^4\)

Cosby, Arnold (fl. 1586-87)

Cosby, or Crosby, was captain of a States’-pay voluntary company in 1586 and served at Zutphen. In the autumn his company was one of those scheduled to remain in States’ pay in 1587.\(^5\)

That winter, however, it was garrisoned in Deventer as part of Sir William Stanley’s regiment. When Stanley and his Irish troops went over to the Spanish, Cosby was one of only three captains to stay loyal and march back to the main States’ lines, but with insufficient men to maintain his unit’s

\(^{11}\) ARA, CAan. 879, ff. 110r, and SG 8043, SG 8044; BL, Add. MS 36293, ff. 3v, 10r-11r; Donagan, 71n.  
\(^{12}\) ARA, SG 4891.  
\(^{13}\) ARA: CAan. 879, ff. 112v, 121v; SG 8043, SG 8044; RvS 1226. RSG, n.s., 1:72. Peacham, sig. D3v.  
\(^{14}\) Blandy, 22v-23r.  
\(^{15}\) BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 136r, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r, Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r; Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r; Tenison, 6:204, 210.
independent existence. This ended his time as a captain in Dutch employ.\textsuperscript{96}

Courtney, William (fl. 1596-1620), of Cornwall

On 12 October 1604 he was appointed captain of Sir Charles Fairfax's company after the latter's death.\textsuperscript{97} He had earlier served as a gentleman volunteer from at least 1596, but found promotion difficult due to being associated (in Sir Francis Vere's mind at least) with Captain William Lower, with whom Vere had a feud.\textsuperscript{98} After commissioning, he kept his company in Dutch employ up to the Twelve Years' Truce and for some years thereafter; he was eventually knighted.\textsuperscript{99}

Cox (fl. 1572):

Captain of a company garrisoned at Ter Veere, but most probably of Gilbert's regiment, in 1572.\textsuperscript{100}

Croft (or Craft), Francis (fl. c. 1597-1602)

Croft had served in Ireland in the late 1590s. He was probably not a victim of the demobilisation that followed the English victory at Kinsale (24 December 1601, since he had already left Irish service. He obtained a company in States' pay at the end of 1601 and commanded it in the Netherlands through 1602 and into 1603.\textsuperscript{101}

Croftes, Sir William (d. 1602)

His surname is also spelled Croft and Craft, occasionally leading to confusion with Francis Croft (above). He raised a new company for States' service in 1601, to reinforce the garrison of Ostend. He served there into the autumn of 1602, when he died.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{96} Jennings, I.410. It is neither on the list of units retained in States' pay nor of units cassed, a point in common with Hovenden's company, which was also at Deventer. This suggests they simply folded through lack of men, rather than being disbanded: ARH, AJO 2943 (i).
\textsuperscript{97} RSG, 13:136n.
\textsuperscript{98} See above, in ch. 5, p. 182.
\textsuperscript{99} ARA, GRK 1232, CAan. 879, ff. 110r, 126v, and SG 8043, SG 8044; Tammel, 78; ARH, Collectie Goldberg 297; Holles, Memorials, 79-81.
\textsuperscript{100} Cf. above, app. 1, pp. 314-15.
\textsuperscript{101} HMCS, 7:181. RSG, 12:151, 170, 186, 194.
\textsuperscript{102} APC, 32:145; HMCS, 11:337; Chamberlain Letters, no. 54, 1:170; RSG, 12:151, 186, 194.
Cromwell, Edward (1559?-1607), of Leicestershire and Rutland (succeeded as third Baron Cromwell, 1592)

He served as second captain in the small force commanded by his kinsman, Ralph Cromwell, in the Netherlands in 1584. In 1585 he joined Norreys's expeditionary force, commanding a States'-pay company in September. It was converted into a cautionary company in November; in May 1586 it was reported to be one of the companies that would be returned to States' pay, but is still listed as a queen's-pay band in the autumn of 1586. Thereafter, Edward Cromwell's military career, in France, the Azores and Ireland, was entirely in royal service.

Crompton (fl.1601-5)

He conducted reinforcements over to Ostend in the late summer of 1601 and served as a captain in the Dutch army in 1605.

Daley, Thomas (fl. 1603)

Daley became captain of a States'-pay company in 1603 (whom he replaced is not known). His company was kept in Dutch employ throughout the next seven years.

Dalton (fl. 1578-83)

After serving as a lieutenant in Cavendish's regiment in 1578, Dalton finally obtained his own company in 1582, in Thomas Cotton's regiment. After Cotton's death he appears to have joined Morgan's regiment but was active in the dispute over the organisation of English regiments in July 1583. He successfully conspired to betray Alost to the Spanish that November, ending his Dutch employment.

1 CSPFor., 18:373.
104 Ibid., 20:25, 668; Shaw, 'Financial and Political Relationships', xxxiii; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86v.
105 HMCs, 11:302; ARA, GRK 1232.
106 RSG, 12:507, 522; ARA, CO 51; GRK 1232; and lists of captains for 1607-8, 1610, in app. 7, below.
108 CSPFor., 18:30-31, 246, nos. 38, 278.
Day (fl. 1601)

The captain of a company in Ostend, very possibly one raised for its defence, though this is not certain. He may well have died, since he vanishes from the records, but his fate, too, is uncertain.100

Deacons (d. 1602)

Captain of one of the States'-pay companies newly raised for the campaigns of 1602, he died at the end of the year, probably in the epidemic that claimed other captains' lives.100

Dennis or Denney, Morris (d. 1591), of Hertfordshire

He was probably of the Denney family of Hertfordshire, well-known for its support of Protestantism, for when licensed to raise a voluntary company for States’ service in the spring of 1586 it was to be recruited partly in Hertfordshire.111 He successfully raised the company by June and commanded it in the campaigns of late summer and autumn but in the winter of 1586/87 it was merged with a cautionary company under Denny’s captaincy.112 He was after a captain in the royal forces in the Netherlands until at least 1589 and his company was later one of those transferred to serve in the royal army in Brittany under Norreys; he was killed in action there.113

Dennis (d. 1601)

Another Captain Dennis commanded a company in Sir Francis Vere’s regiment in 1600 and 1601. He then disappears from the records and, since is last heard of at Ostend, he probably died there.114 He was almost certainly related to Morris Dennis, or Denney, but in what way is unknown.

Dewhurst, Sir Bernard (fl. 1608-14)

Dewhurst obtained a contract or commission for a new company in States’

100 Vere Commentaries, 208.
110 ARH, AJO 2946; RSG, 12:186; Chamberlain Letters, no. 54, 1:170.
112 BL, Add. MS 48084, ff. 86r, 99r; Egerton MS 1694, ff. 55r, 85r; Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r; Tenison, 6:204, 210; ARH, AJO 2943 (i), f. [3v].
113 ARA, SG 5881-I, no. 109, SG 5882-I, no. 130. HMCR, 292.
114 Ofters, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 155; KB, HS 132.G.27.
pay in 1608, one of mounted infantry. With the retrenchments consequent upon the advent of serious peace negotiations, it was either dismounted, or cassed, but in the latter case Dewhurst obtained the captaincy of a company of foot. It served throughout the next six years.\footnote{ARA, SG 8044 and RvS 1226; Peacham, sig. D3r.}

Digby, R. (fl. 1573-75)

A captain in Thomas Morgan’s regiment in 1573, he was one of the captains who abandoned Morgan after contractual disputes, but, unlike others he did not ultimately join Edward Chester’s regiment, though Chester wooed him.\footnote{ARA, CO 29, n.f. (‘Articles du Colonel Morgan touchant Capitaines Price et Digbie’); GAL, Archief der Secretarie, 1364.}

In 1574, just before Chester’s disaster at Leiden, Digby’s company took part in a victory over Spanish units in the eastern Netherlands.\footnote{KL, no. 2739, 7:157.} However, it was not enough to save Digby from the taint of Chester’s captains’ pusillanimity, perhaps partly because of being involved in the hard bargaining of 1573 and by October 1574 he had been paid off.\footnote{ARA, Co 29, n.f. (Articles du Colonel Morgan touchant Capitaines Price et Digbie'); GAL, Archief der Secretarie, 1364.} His relationship, if any, to Sir George Digby, is unknown.\footnote{ARA, RAGP III:28.}

Dormer (fl. 1595-98)

He was the captain of a company in Vere’s States’-pay regiment from 1595. In 1598 Dormer probably gave it up in order to serve in Ireland with Essex, or died. He was replaced by Captain Garnet.\footnote{ARH, SvH 281, f. F52r.}

Doyley (fl. 1578-82), of Berkshire

A long-term captain with John Norreys in the Netherlands. His was one of the companies Norreys had raised personally in 1578.\footnote{ARA, RvS 1226; Peacham, sig. D3r.} Doyley served well in Groningen and Friesland in 1580 and 1581 and his company remained in service in 1582 -- his is almost certainly the ‘Daley’ who was being issued bread in July.\footnote{ARA, RAGP III:28.} However, thereafter he disappears and his eventual fate is
unknown. He was probably from the Doyley family, clients of the Norreyses and, like them, also from the Thames Valley.  

Doyley, Michael (fl. 1602-5), of London

He successfully contracted for a company of foot in States' service during the Dutch military expansion of 1602. His company served up to 1605, but it is not known if he then died or retired. His father, later a successful physician in London, had been a commercial agent for John Norreys in the 1580s.  

'Drise' (fl. 1573)

A captain whose company was raised with the assistance of the 'deputies' of Lumey de La Marck and which arrived at Brill during the summer of 1572, as Roger Williams records. He may have been captain of some of the troops which stayed over the winter, but nothing more is known of him. 'Drise' is likely to be phonetic spelling or abbreviation by Williams, or a printer's error.  

Drury, Sir Robert (fl. 1600-2)

He was the son of Sir William Drury, quondam Governor of Bergen-op-Zoom and general on the Scottish marches; his mother remarried into the family of the brothers Scott, captains from Kent. He was a gentleman volunteer in Sir Francis Vere's company at Nieuwpoort, where his brother was killed, and the next spring obtained a captaincy in Vere's regiment. Drury served until late the following year, when his company passed to Captain Waldegrave.  

Dutton, Sir Thomas (fl. 1602-27)

The date of his first service is not known, but he first obtained a captaincy in 1602 (pace my suggestion in an earlier article, when I dated it to 1609), of a company in the regiment of Horace Vere, whose client he was thereafter. He remained in States' employ from then on, until at least 1627.
Duxberry, Joseph (fl. 1598-1600)

In the autumn of 1598 he raised a company for Dutch service and was commissioned by the Council of State the following year. His company was in Sir Horace Vere’s regiment. It served in the Flanders campaign of 1600 and Duxberry was killed at the battle of Nieuwpoort. His widow was paid his outstanding wages the following year.\(^{126}\)

Dyer, Alexander (fl. 1586-87)

He was licensed to raise a company for States’ service in the spring of 1586 and had succeeded in doing so by June.\(^{130}\) There may have been some problems with the unit, however, for it seems only to have served on garrison duties and may have dissolved or been disbanded even before the winter of 1586/7.

In 1587 Leicester commissioned Dyer a colonel in States’ pay, in the force the earl had newly raised for the attempted relief of Sluys. Ultimately, however, the States-General (which, as discussed in chapter 5, refused to take these bands into its pay) would not endorse his colonel’s commission.\(^{130}\)

Edwards (fl. 1578-83)

He was captain-lieutenant of Henry Cavendish’s personal company in 1578 and commanded it in action at Rijmenam.\(^{131}\) He remained in the Netherlands, but evidently as a gentleman volunteer or junior officer. Only in 1581 did he obtain his own captaincy, evidently replacing Fitzwilliam in command of a company in Tournai when Fitzwilliam was transferred to Friesland to captain one of Norreys’s companies there. As he was one of Cavendish’s captains, Edwards may well have been Fitzwilliam’s lieutenant. Edwards remained a captain in Norreys’s regiment into the summer of 1583 when he changed to Morgan’s regiment.\(^{132}\) However, there is no evidence of his presence in the Netherlands in 1584 or afterwards.

\(^{126}\) ARA, RvS 1525, f. 205v, SG 4891, SG 12536, f. 343r; ARH, AJO 2950; Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 155; Dalton, 1:56, 60.

\(^{129}\) ARA, RvS 1525, f. 205v, SG 4891, SG 12536, f. 343r; ARH, AJO 2950; Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 155; Dalton, 1:56, 60.

\(^{130}\) ARA, RvS 1525, f. 205v, SG 4891, SG 12536, f. 343r; ARH, AJO 2950; Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 155; Dalton, 1:56, 60.

\(^{131}\) ARA, RvS 1525, f. 205v, SG 4891, SG 12536, f. 343r; ARH, AJO 2950; Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 155; Dalton, 1:56, 60.

\(^{132}\) ARA, RvS 1525, f. 205v, SG 4891, SG 12536, f. 343r; ARH, AJO 2950; Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 155; Dalton, 1:56, 60.
Ellis, Anthony (d. 1580)

He 'behaved ... verie sufficiently, and with greate valure and courage' as a gentleman volunteer in Norreys's regiment at Rijmenam. He became a captain in the regiment in 1580, serving in the Frisian campaign, and was killed in action in December. His relationship, if any, to Stephen Ellis, is not known.

Ellis, Steven (fl. 1574-85)

This Ellis was captain of a company in Chester's regiment in 1574. He is one of the captains mentioned in the reports of the Spanish agent de Guaras as being willing to betray the Dutch, but the initial dispatch simply records the claims of the treacherous Ralph Haselby. The only direct evidence that Ellis was conspiring with the Spanish is from well after Ellis's return when he was associated with Richard Bingham, who at this stage was certainly an agent provocateur. Ellis was later reported by Spanish intelligence as one of the captains accompanying Bingham and Stafford to the Prince of Condé and John Casimir in 1575. He is probably the Captain Ellis who by 1585 was a servant of Sir Francis Walsingham and had conducted missions for him already in 1578. His relationship, if any, to Anthony Ellis, is unknown.

Eures, Robert [?] (fl. 1572)

'Mr Euors' was a captain who 'served very valiantly' under Gilbert in Zeeland in the summer of 1572. Possibly he is the Captain 'Woore' who commanded a company in Morgan's regiment in 1573 and is otherwise unidentified. The presence of a number of followers of the Earl of Pembroke in the 1572 expedition suggests that Eures may be the 'Robart Euarr' who was one of Pembroke's liveried servants in 1570. Later, a Richard Eures served as a gentleman volunteer in the Netherlands from 1583 to 1589, initially in Dutch
and then in royal service.\textsuperscript{141} Thus, regardless of precise identity, he probably came from a family with strong ties to the mercenaries.

Everett, Michael (fl. 1607-14)

He succeeded in 1607 to the captaincy of a States'-pay company which was kept in Dutch employ at least until 1614, when it served in the second Jülich campaign.\textsuperscript{142}

Fairfax, Sir Thomas (c. 1560-1640), of Yorkshire

He served as a gentleman volunteer in the Netherlands in 1585 and served in the royal army at Rouen in 1591, where Essex knighted him. Sir Thomas was captain of a company in Vere's mercenary regiment in 1594 and 1595.\textsuperscript{143}

Farmer, Sir George (d. 1612), of Northamptonshire

Farmer had a strong connection to the Earl of Leicester.\textsuperscript{144} He raised some three hundred men for States' service in the spring of 1586 but split them into two companies, one commanded by his kinsman, Richard. He thereafter captained his own company throughout the rest of 1586, including service at Zutphen, until it was cassed early in 1587.\textsuperscript{145} Farmer was later Sheriff and a deputy lieutenant of Northamptonshire.\textsuperscript{146}

Farmer, Richard (fl. 1586), of Northamptonshire

Richard commanded a company's worth of the three hundred men raised for States' service by George Farmer. He, too, fought at Zutphen; his company was scheduled in the autumn to continue in Dutch pay in 1587, but in the end it was also cassed.\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{141} BL, Lans. MS 1218, 132r.
\textsuperscript{142} ARA, SG 8043, SG 8044, and RvS 1226; Peacham, sig. D3v.
\textsuperscript{143} History of Parliament Trust, Jacobean House of Commons (forthcoming), draft biography (I am grateful to Simon Healy for providing me with a copy); Markham, Fighting Veres, 203; ARA, SG 8040; KB, HS 133.M.63, f. 134v.
\textsuperscript{144} Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 243n., 301, 322. Leicester knighted him in the Netherlands in 1586: Tenison, 6:218.
\textsuperscript{145} APC, 14:65-66; BL, Add. MS 48084, ff. 86r, 99r and Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r; Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r; Tenison, 6:204, 210; ARH, AJO 2943 (i), f. [2v].
\textsuperscript{146} Wake, Montagu Musters Book, 23, 246.
\textsuperscript{147} Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r; Tenison, 6:204, 210; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r, Egerton MS 1694. f. 55r; ARH, AJO 2943 (i), f. [3r].
Faunte, William (1547-74), of Leicestershire

A William Faunte first served in foreign Protestant employ in France, in Champernowne's troop in Coligny's army during the third civil war. During his service he evidently made firm contacts with the Huguenots and their Dutch allies and he maintained his interest in their affairs. A 'Maister Font' joined Louis of Nassau in 1574 and probably commanded the English troop in his army; he was killed at the battle of Mook (14 April 1574), which is about the time that William Faunte, of Foston, Leicestershire, died. An 'Anthony Fant' had served as a gentleman volunteer in Morgan's regiment in 1573, but transferred from Morgan's regiment to join a Huguenot commander, de Poyet, in Dutch service. It is notable that William Faunte of Foston's heir was Anthony (1552-88). In light of this evidence, I argue that it was the Fauntes of Foston, Leicestershire, who fought in Jacob's wars, and that the head of the family was the Font who died at Mook.

Fenton, Edward (fl. 1574), of Nottinghamshire

A Captain Fenton commanded a company 'under Coronell Chester his first Regiment into Holland' (that is, in 1574). It seems very likely that this was Edward Fenton, who had a taste for 'the life of a soldier of fortune' and had served in Ireland in the late 1560s, as had many of the captains of the early 1570s. He later commanded the troops on several naval expeditions.

Fitzwilliam (d. 1581)

Captain of one of the companies in Henry Cavendish's regiment in 1578. He remained in the Netherlands after Cavendish and most others returned to England the following spring, and joined Norreys's regiment. Other evidence indicates that his was one of the companies garrisoned in Tournai in 1580, though he may have gone with Norreys to Groningen. Certainly in 1581,
presumably because of the high casualty rate of captains in the fighting in the northeast, he was called to Friesland and took command of one of Norreys’s companies there. He was mortally wounded at Nordhorn and died some weeks later.\footnote{ARA, SG 12576, n.f.; Baudart, 370; Camden, iii.5.}

**Foster (d. 1601)**

He replaced Sir Henry Docwra as a company commander in Vere’s States’-pay regiment in 1599. He commanded it in the Nieuwpoort campaign the following year and in 1601, when he was shot dead at Ostend in August.\footnote{ARA, SG 12576, n.f.; Baudart, 370; Camden, iii.5.}

**Friar, Thomas (d. 1605)**

Friar replaced either Honeywood or Tyrrell, both dead, in the aftermath of the battle of Nieuwpoort. He was thereafter a captain in Sir Francis Vere’s regiment, including service at Ostend, until Vere’s departure.\footnote{ARA, SG 12576, n.f.; Baudart, 370; Camden, iii.5.} Friar remained and commanded his company in 1605, when he was killed.\footnote{ARA, SG 12576, n.f.; Baudart, 370; Camden, iii.5.}

**Friar (fl. 1605-14)**

He evidently replaced his kinsman, Thomas Friar, from whose death he was captain of a States’-pay company at least until 1614.\footnote{ARA, SG 12576, n.f.; Baudart, 370; Camden, iii.5.}

**Fretton (fl. 1608)**

Captain of one of the new States’-pay companies in 1608, but it was cassed by the end of that year.\footnote{ARA, SG 12576, n.f.; Baudart, 370; Camden, iii.5.}

**Frost (d. 1603)**

He was captain of a States’-pay company of foot in 1602 and 1603, when he was died of plague contracted while serving in the garrison of Ostend.\footnote{ARA, SG 12576, n.f.; Baudart, 370; Camden, iii.5.}
Fulford, John (d. 1589)

He went to the Netherlands as one of Leicester's horsemen in January 1586 but soon obtained command of a States'-pay company of foot, though it was cassed in the winter of 1586/87. Fulford obtained a cautionary captaincy and served in the royal forces in the Netherlands until his death in 1589.

Gainsford, Giles (fl. 1573-81), of Surrey

He had probably served as a lieutenant in Woore's company of Thomas Morgan's regiment in 1574 and was one of the few who distinguished himself in the fighting around Leiden that spring. As a reward for his good service, although all of Chester's regiment was paid off that summer, Gainsford had a new company commissioned by William of Orange in August 1575, in the pay of the States of Holland, which equipped the new unit. It continued in service until the summer of 1577, when in common with other companies it was paid off. However, by February 1578 he had been employed by the States-General; his band served for the rest of the year as an independent company. It was merged into Norreys's regiment the following year and remained a part of it until late 1581, serving in the campaigns in Groningen and Friesland. He may have been one of Norreys's regimental captains in 1582, but no certain evidence has been found and he simply fades out of the picture. The date of his last service and his final fate (whether died or retired) are alike unknown.

Gainsford, Thomas (d. 1624), of Surrey

Thomas was a kinsman of Giles Gainsford, though the exact relationship is unknown. He went to the Netherlands with Norreys's expedition in 1585, as
captain-lieutenant of John Burgh's States'-pay company. Burgh also had a queen's-pay company and Gainsford quickly became effective captain of the unit. After nearly eighteen months of service, it was cassed in the winter of 1586/7. It is likely that he was the Captain Thomas Gainsford who served in Ireland in the 1590s -- if so, he later became an important anti-Catholic and anti-Spanish propagandist. This would be consistent with having fought in the Netherlands in 1585-86.

Garnet (fl. 1598-1602)

He replaced Captain Dormer in Sir Francis Vere's States'-pay regiment during 1598. He continued as one of Vere's captains through to 1602, but then was replaced by Captain Winter.

Gascoigne, George (1539?-1577), of Bedfordshire

A captain in Morgan's regiment in 1573 and in Chester's regiment in 1574, having probably quarrelled with Morgan and switched his company. He was taken prisoner after the disastrous defeat of Chester's regiment near Leiden in 1574, but was ransomed by the Spanish.

He had earlier served as one of the gentleman volunteers or junior officers of Morgan's force in and around Flushing in 1572. He was in Paris in September 1576, whence he wrote to Burghley of his plans to travel to Antwerp. He arrived in time to be an eyewitness of the 'Spanish Fury', about which he published the first report in English. But it is evident from his letter of September that he had been involved in travel or some campaign. The coincidence of location and date and his evident status as an agent of Burghley suggest he may have been one of the captains that carried messages and money to Henry of Condé and Jean Casimir of the Palatinate and then served with them in the conclusive campaign of the fifth civil war; however, this is partly conjecture.

171 CSPFor., 20:25; Shaw, 'Financial and Political Relationships', xxxv; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r; ARH, AJO 2943 (i), f. [2v]. See S. L. Adams, 'Captain Thomas Gainsford, the 'Vox Spiritus' and the Vox Populi', HR 49 (1976): 141-44.
172 See lists of captains for 1598-99, 1602, app. 7, below; Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 155; Dalton, 1:60; ARA, RvS 1226, f. 132r.
173 See Prouty, 57, 65-77.
174 Longleat, DP 2, f. 7v; Prouty, 50-55.
175 CSPFor., 11: 376, no. 915. Gascoigne, Spoyle of Antwerp.
Gachill, John (fl. 1584-87)

His name is also given, inter alia, as Gatesfield, Gatchfield, Gatchell and Gashefelt, but he himself used Gachill which is used here. He was a captain in Morgan's regiment raised for the defence of Antwerp and served in the Netherlands from October 1584. In February 1585 Gachill, Henry Richards and John Lee were found guilty by a court martial of having secret dealings with the enemy and as being deserving of death. They had actually only sought passports for themselves, rather than trying to betray Antwerp to the Spanish and, they claimed, once they had received their pay, they would have fought on. The other captains sympathised and so Gachill and Lee were publicly degraded, rather than executed. Gachill broke his parole and returned home.176

His side of the story must have been accepted in England for he was one of the captains licensed to raise a company for States'-pay service in the spring of 1586. He raised it by June and commanded it throughout the rest of the year and must have done so with success, for though it was not on the original list, from the autumn of 1586, of companies to be maintained in Dutch pay, it was nevertheless kept by the States' in March 1587.177 It was only at the end of that year or in 1588 that it was finally cassed, ending Gachill's career in foreign Protestant service.

Gates, Sir Thomas (fl. 1606-14)

Gates was made a captain in Dutch pay in 1606. His company was retained in States' service at least until 1614, when it served in the second Jülich campaign.178

Gerald (fl. 1603)

After the death of Captain Deacons in autumn 1602 Gerald commanded his company for the rest of the year and into 1603.179 He was probably Deacon's lieutenant and only a temporary replacement.

176 CSPFor., 19: 101-2, 256, 284, 292, 326, 626.
177 APC, 14:119. BL, Add. MS 48084, ff. 86r, 99r, Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r; Tenison, 6:204, 210; Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r; ARH, AJO 2943 (i), f. [2r].
178 ARA: CAan. 879, ff. 81v, 84r, 89r; SG 8043, SG 8044; RVS 1226. Peacham, sig. D3r.
179 ARH, AJO 2946.
Goodere, Sir Henry (1534-95), of Warwickshire

A key member of Leicester’s affinity, he was captain of the earl’s Guard in the Netherlands in 1586. This was distinct from Leicester’s companies of foot and comets of horse (just as sovereigns’ guards were usually part of their household, not the army) -- no allowance had been made for it on the royal establishment. It was consequently in the States’ pay. It evidently went returned with Leicester to England in November 1586, or simply became defunct, for it ceases to appear thereafter in military accounts. While in the Netherlands, however, it was in Dutch pay.

Green (d. 1573?)

Thomas Morgan’s captain-lieutenant in 1573. However, because Morgan returned to England, apparently to undertake the extra recruiting necessary to bring his regiment nearer its contracted figure, Green seems to have taken on some responsibility for transporting the company to Holland, and he was in sole charge of it there for some time after arrival. His opinion was valued by other soldiers -- that he vanishes during the summer of 1573 and Richard Bingham was later called Morgan’s captain-lieutenant suggests that Green had died, or been wounded sufficiently to be repatriated or captured.

Green, Richard (fl. 1585-86)

He commanded the second company of foot Henry Norreys raised in 1585, which was in States’ pay. Both were then converted into royal service, but in May 1586, the band commanded by Green was transferred back to States’ pay, as part of Leicester’s manoeuvrings against Sir John Norreys. Under Green, it served through that summer and early autumn’s campaigns. In the winter it was recombined with Henry Norreys’s queen’s-pay band.

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180 Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 347n.
181 Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r; Tenison, 6:204.
182 For Leicester’s guard see ch. 5, above, pp. 255-56 and sources cited there.
184 ARA, CO 29; KL, nos. 2597, 2600, 2605, 6:760, 779, 786; Ferguson, Papers, 36.
185 KL, no. 2509, 6:791; Williams, Actions, 125.
186 CSPFor., 20:25, 668; Shaw, ‘Financial and Political Relationships’, xxxiii-xxxiv; Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r; ARH, AJO 2943 (i), f. [2v]; Tenison, 6:212.
Greville (fl. 1602-3)

Captain of a States'-pay company in 1602 and into the spring of 1603. In one Dutch record his name is spelled with an 'n', so he may be the same as Captain Grenville, below.

Grenville (fl. 1608-10)

Captain of a States'-pay company in 1608, 1609 and 1610. If the same as Captain Greville his whereabouts between 1604 and 1607 are a mystery.

Gwynne, Thomas (d. 1592), [of North Wales?]

Captain of an Anglo-Welsh States'-pay company in Sir William Stanley’s regiment in the Netherlands in 1586. Gwynne was complicit in Stanley’s betrayal of Deventer to the Spanish that December and briefly served in the Spanish army in Flanders. But he eventually repented and after much lobbying by his cousin, Sir Roger Williams, was pardoned and obtained a new command in the royal army in France in 1592. He was killed there. In light of his name and the origins of several of Stanley’s captains he is presumed to have been from north Wales.

Gwynne, William (d. 1585), of Wales

Gwynne was a captain in Morgan’s regiment in the States of Brabant’s pay in 1584-85. His company was one of the last to arrive, probably with Morgan himself. Gwynne was killed in the attack on Kouwensteyn Dike. In light of his name and connection with Morgan, Gwynne was surely Welsh.

Hannam, John (fl. 1583-85)

He was a captain in Morgan’s regiment in 1583, but its reduction from five companies to two in the winter of 1583/4 led to his discharge. However, he

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157 ARH, AJO 2946; RSJ, 12:186.
158 ARA: SG 8044; RV 1226, RV 1236.
159 Tenison, 6:204, 210; Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r and Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r.
161 CSP For., 19:256, 292, 326, 481.
162 Ibid., 18:352, no. 419.
remained in the Netherlands into early 1585, possibly in Morgan's regiment in Antwerp but possibly in another company, either as a gentleman volunteer or lieutenant.193

Hammond, George (fl. 1598-1604)

In 1598 he succeeded John Heydon as captain of a company in Sir Francis Vere's mercenary regiment. He remained in command into 1601 but not thereafter. A later reference to a payment from the Dutch in the summer of 1604, is presumably for back wages.194

Handly (fl. 1572)

A captain in Gilbert's regiment in Zeeland, of whom nothing more is known.195

Harcourt, Michael (d. c. 1597), of Berkshire and Oxfordshire

He was authorised in May 1586 to raise two hundred volunteers for States' service and in early June was commissioned captain by the Council of State in the Netherlands.196 His company was on active service by September, but despite having an actual Dutch commission (unlike many of the States'-pay captains of 1586, who had been commissioned by Leicester) and being (no doubt in consequence) actually scheduled to remain in States' service, his company was cassed by the spring.197 He may have served as a volunteer in the Duke of Bouillon's army (composed mostly of German mercenaries) that aided Henry of Navarre in France in the autumn of 1587.198

Harcourt, Sir Walter (d. 1602)

It was probably he, rather than his kinsman, Michael, who was captain of a company on the expedition to Cadiz in 1596.199 Harcourt became a captain in Sir Francis Vere's regiment in 1599. His company was not taken on the

193 Bodl., Tanner MS 169, f. 69v.
194 Lists of captains 1598-1600, in app. 7, below; Dalton, 1:60; ARA, RvS 1226, f. 132r; CAan. 879, f. 51v.
195 Longleat, DP2, f. 9r.
196 APC, 14:115; ARA, RvS 1524/i, f. 126r.
197 BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r, and Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r; Tenison, 6:210; ARH, AJO 2943 (i), f. [3r].
198 BN, MS Fr. 704, f. 69v.
199 Birch, 2:16.
Nieuwpoort campaign and it probably did not see service at Ostend. It was part of the English force in the campaign against Grave, during the siege of which, in September 1602, he was killed in action.\textsuperscript{200}

Haughton (d. 1602)

Haughton was a captain of one of the English companies sent to reinforce Ostend in 1601. He was killed there early in 1602.\textsuperscript{201}

Herbert (fl. 1606-8)

He was probably one of the Herberths of Cherbury, several of whom served in the Netherlands around this time. He was made a captain in States' service in 1606 and retained in Dutch employ up to 1608.\textsuperscript{202}

Herle, Robert (fl. 1606-10)

He obtained a States'-pay captaincy in 1606 and remained thereafter in Dutch employ through to 1610.\textsuperscript{203}

Heydon, John (fl. 1594-1600), of Norfolk

He commanded a company in Sir Francis Vere's mercenary regiment from 1594 to 1598.\textsuperscript{204}

Higman, Walter (fl. c. 1580)

He was one of four captains paid by the Union of Utrecht in 1579. Then in 1580 he was a captain in Norreys's regiment in the north-east Netherlands.\textsuperscript{205}

He does not appear in Blandy's eyewitness account of the regiment in action around Groningen later that year, though all other captains are mentioned. It is not known whether he simply left (unlikely mid-campaign season) or was killed, wounded or captured.

\textsuperscript{200} ARA, RvS 1525, f. 205, SG 4891, n.l. (29 Apr. 1599); Dalton, 1:60; RSG, 12:186; \textit{Copie of a Letter from Grave}, sig. A2v. \textsuperscript{201} Life of Edward Herbert, 4, 8. ARA, RvS 24, p. 185, and SG 8043, SG 8044. \textsuperscript{202} ARA: CO 51; and lists of captains for 1607-8, 1610, in app. 7, below. \textsuperscript{203} Markham, \textit{Fighting Veres}, 203 (wrongly identifying him as his brother Christopher Heydon); ARA, SG 8040, SG 8041; PRO, SP 84/54, f. 107r; ARH, AJO 2943 (ii), AJO 2945. \textsuperscript{204} ARA, RvS 1226, f. [3v]; \textit{SL}, 1:264 n.5.
Hill, John (fl. 1585-90)

Captain of a States'-pay company in Norreys's original expeditionary force in the late summer of 1585. His company was placed into royal pay later that autumn, in the cautionary garrison of Brill, but in the spring of 1586 was one of the companies returned into the States' pay by Leicester because Hill was perceived as pro-Norreys.\textsuperscript{206} It served in States' pay for the rest of 1586, but in the spring of 1587 was not cassed and Hill was instead transferred back to the queen's pay in which he served thereafter.\textsuperscript{207}

Hitchcock, Robert (fl. 1573-91), of Buckinghamshire

He was among the 'Marshall men & captaines ... to be presently imployd' in the mid-1580s.\textsuperscript{208} In 1586 he raised a company of nearly 200 'voluntarie men' from Buckinghamshire for Dutch service.\textsuperscript{209} It remained in States' pay for the next year, until the following spring it was 'cassed' by the States-General.\textsuperscript{210} Hitchcock only received the last £145 owed him by the Dutch on 29 June 1588; he collected the arrears due to three other English captains, so he was probably liked and certainly trusted by his fellow officers.\textsuperscript{211} Between July and October 1587, he commanded a company in the failed relief expedition to Sluys -- he was appointed sergeant-major of Alexander Dyer's regiment, authorised by Leicester for Dutch pay, however the States-General refused both to accept the newly-raised companies into its pay and to endorse the commissioned regimental officers.\textsuperscript{212}

In 1571, Hitchcock had written 'A Discourse for Defence against the threatened Invasion of the Holy League', which John Foxe preserved a copy of.\textsuperscript{213} Given his immediate appointment as captain in 1586 and his interest in national defence it seems virtually certain that he had served as a mercenary -- probably as a gentleman volunteer -- prior to 1585. in 1591, he published The Arte of Warre, by William Garrard, another former mercenary, who had

\textsuperscript{206} CSPFor., 20:25, 86, 668.
\textsuperscript{207} BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r; ARH, AJO 2943 (i), f. [3v].
\textsuperscript{208} BL, Lans. MS 113, f. 148r.
\textsuperscript{209} APC, 14:80; ARA, SG 12536, f. 92r.
\textsuperscript{210} PRO, SP 9/93, f. 53r; ARH, AJO 2943 (i), f. [3r].
\textsuperscript{211} ARA, SG 12536, ff. 92r-94r.
\textsuperscript{212} ARH, AJO 2943 (i); SL, 1:265; above, in ch. 5, p. 169.
\textsuperscript{213} BL, Lans. MS 389, ff. 339r-350v. Strype, 368-70, praised it.
died in 1587. Although he 'corrected, finished and published Garrard’s MS’, Hitchcock appended an original work of his own, *A generall proportion and order for provision*, on logistics: the first treatise published on this subject by an Englishman.214

Holcraft, Geoffrey (fl. 1601-8)

His first known experience in States’ service was in the garrison of Ostend in 1601 and presumably he remained in the Dutch army thereafter, but he first obtained a States'-pay captaincy in 1606. His company served until it was cassed at the end of 1608.215 He was probably related to Henry Holcroft.

Holcroft, Henry (d. 1601)

Holcroft, or Holcroft, raised a company for service in the Netherlands in 1598 and was commissioned by the Council of State the following year. His band was put into Sir Francis Vere’s regiment in which he served until his death at Ostend in 1601.216

Honeywood (d. 1600)

Honeywood replaced Sir Samuel Bagnall as captain of his company in Sir Francis Vere’s States'-pay regiment in 1598 (but not as sergeant-major of the regiment). He served through 1599 and into 1600; he was killed at the battle of Nieuwpoort.217

Hopton (fl. 1575)

He was an English captain who was with Condé and John Casimir in the autumn of 1575. There is no reference to him among the captains said by Spanish spies to have taken Elizabeth’s money to the Palatinate, so he may have been a newly-arrived individual volunteer or may have commanded an

English company in the princes' army. He was possibly kin of the Captain Hopton who was captain of a company of 100 foot on the Cadiz expedition.

Hovenden, Walter (fl. 1586)

Hovenden (and other variants, including Ovington) was captain of a States'-pay company in 1586. It fought in the Zutphen campaign and was brigaded with Sir William Stanley's Irish troops, to form a stronger regiment.

In the autumn of 1586 his company was among those scheduled to remain in States' pay rather than be disbanded. However that winter it was garrisoned in Deventer as part of Stanley's regiment. When Stanley and his Irish went over to the Spanish Hovenden was one of only three captains to stay loyal and march back to the main States' lines, but he had lost men to the conspiracy and so his company did not survive after all.

Huddy, Nicholas (fl. 1584-88)

On the death of Captain Sutton in 1584 he was succeeded by Huddy, whose lieutenant was James Johnson, who had been ensign under Sutton. This probably indicates that Huddy had been Sutton’s lieutenant and there was a simple chain of promotions on the captain’s death. Huddy’s company was evidently one of those disbanded by the States in 1584, but he was one of Leicester’s ‘Howsehould Servants’, 21 Jul. 1587, along with other soldiers such as Bernard Whetstone and Francis Castilion, and by 1588 Huddy had command of a queen’s-pay company in the garrison of Ostend.

Hunckes, Thomas (fl. 1602-6)

He possibly commanded one of the several newly commissioned companies in 1602. He remained in States’ service up to 1606. Since the number of

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218 CSPSp, 2:502, no. 420; Bodl., Add. MS C.193, f. 9r.
219 Birch, 2:16.
220 Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r; BL, Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r; Tenison, 6:204, 210.
221 BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r.
222 Jennings, i.410. It is neither on the list of units retained in States' pay nor of units cassed, a point in common with Cosby's company, which was also at Deventer. This suggests it simply folded through lack of men, rather than being disbanded: see ARH, AJO 2943.
223 BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 121v.
224 Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 431; ARA, SG 12576, n.f. (Gilpin/Willoughby to SG, 31 Aug. 1588).
English foot-bands did not change in 1607 Hunckes obviously retired, if he had not died, at or by the end of 1606. His name is also spelled ‘Hounchte’ and similar variants.

Hunnings, Charles (fl. 1585-86), of Suffolk

Hunnings succeeded as captain of the States'-pay company of his brother, John, after his death in 1585. His band was in Willoughby's States'-pay foot regiment. This may reflect an affinity connection to Willoughby through his cousins, the Wingfields, to whom Charles and John Hunnings were related through the wife of their oldest brother, Edward; their father had also been on friendly terms with members of the Wingfield family. The company was maintained in States' service throughout 1586 and 1587.

Hunnings, John (d. 1585), of Suffolk

The captain of one of John Norreys's original States'-pay companies in the Netherlands in the late summer of 1585, Hunnings was killed in action near Arnhem on 15 November. His death was vividly described by Churchyard. His company passed to his brother, Charles. As noted above, both were related by marriage to the Wingfields, another notable family of mercenaries.

Hunter, Christopher (fl. 1573)

Captain of a company of about two hundred men which was in the garrison of Haarlem in the winter of 1573. His eventual fate is unknown.

Huntley, Edmund (fl. 1580s)

Huntley served as a gentleman volunteer or junior officer with Norreys in the north-east Netherlands in 1581 and took over command of Thomas Cotton’s company in September after the latter was wounded at Nordhorn. He was

225 ARH, AJO 2948; RSG, 12:186; ARA, CO 51; ARA, GRK 1232.
226 HMC Various Collections, 71. BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 133r.
227 See Walter C. Metcalfe, ed. The Visitations of Suffolk (Exeter: privately printed, 1882), 96; CPR, 5:33, nos. 226, 1856.
228 Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r; Tenison, 6:204, 210; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r and Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r; ARH, AJO 2943, f. [2r].
229 In TDH, 71.
230 App. 1, above, p. 316.
231 ARA, SG 12576, n.t. (rubric ‘Stucken concernende […] Norijts’).
still one of Norreys's captains up to October 1582 and probably returned to
serve in the Netherlands the following year. He may have accompanied his
colonel to Ireland in the winter of 1583/4.232

He then commanded two companies in the expedition Norreys took to
the Netherlands in September 1585. One was in queen's pay the other in
States' pay, but the second was transferred into royal service as well, by the
end of 1585.233 He later distinguished himself in the siege of Sluys, before
commanding a regiment in the expedition to Lisbon, in which he invested his
own money. This is presumably why he is referred to as 'Colonell Huntley
by Williams in his narrative of evens in the Netherlands, but Huntley never
held this rank in foreign employ.234

Huntley (fl. 1607-10)

Captain of a States'-pay company from 1607-10.235 His relationship, if any, to
Edmund Huntley is unknown.

Inge, William (fl. 1585-87)

Inge was one of the original captains of a States'-pay company in September
1585, though he was in Morgan's, mostly queen's-pay, regiment. His band
was not transferred into royal service in the autumn of 1585 and remained in
States' pay throughout 1586 and into 1587, being one of the few companies
selected to remain in Dutch employ, which indicates a high level of ability.236
His company was eventually disbanded when all English companies were
made either cautionary or auxiliary in 1587/8.

Jacques, Francis (fl. 1606)

The captain of States'-pay English company in 1606. Other references to an
officer of this name may be to a Dutch, Walloon or Huguenot soldier.237

233 BL, Harl. MSS 168, f. 159v and 287, f. 5r; Shaw, 'Financial and Political Relationships', xxxiii-
xxxv.
234 Wernham, ENDSP, 21, 257, 267; Williams, Discourse, 49.
235 Lists of captains for 1607-10, app. 7, below.
236 CSPFor., 20:25; Shaw, 'Financial and Political Relationships', xxxv; BL, Add. MS 48084, f.
86r, and Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r; Tenison, 6:210; ARH, AJO 2943.
237 ARA, CO 51. E.g., RSG, n.s., 1:13, 589, 680.
James, Thomas (fl. 1585)

James was a captain in States'-pay in the spring of 1585. He had probably succeeded to command of one of the bands of Cotton's or North's regiment (if he had not been a captain earlier), for though he participated in the attack on Kouwensteyn Dike, he was in the army attacking from outside Antwerp, not in Morgan's regiment in the garrison.\(^{28}\)

Johnson, Charles (fl. 1602-7)

He became a States'-pay captain in 1602, perhaps in command of a newly-contracted company, possibly succeeding to command of one of the Ostend companies whose captain had died. He continued in service into 1607, but is not in the records for 1608, though his fate is unknown.\(^{29}\)

Kayes (fl. 1600-2)

He took over as captain of a company in Sir Horace Vere's regiment in 1600, replacing George Aldridge. His name is given as Cains Hartwixen (or Hardwichsen) in Dutch sources; the significance of the second part of the name is not known. Kayes was killed in action during the siege of Rheingrave in the summer of 1602.\(^{30}\)

Kellaway, Thomas (fl. 1573-82)

A Thomas Kellaway served as a gentleman volunteer in the royal army that besieged Edinburgh Castle in 1573.\(^{31}\) He was given a license to go beyond the seas for three years in April 1576 -- just in time for the campaign season, so he may have served as a gentleman volunteer in foreign Protestant pay. He was a captain in the Netherlands in 1582.\(^{32}\) His regiment is uncertain but he may well have been in John North's for members of the Kellaway family were clients of the Lords North.\(^{33}\)

\(^{28}\) CSPFor., 19:414, 431, 437.
\(^{29}\) ARH, AJO 2946. ARA: CAan. 879, ff. 81v, 84r, 89r, 123v; GRK 1232; CO 51; and SG 8044.
\(^{30}\) Orleans, Nassauischen Laurencrans, 155; ARH, RVs 1226, f. 131v, and 1232, n.f.; Copy of a Letter from Grave, sig. A2v.
\(^{31}\) Churchyard's Chippes, 93; Camden, ii.334.
\(^{32}\) PRO, E 1571/1, f. 2r. ARA, CvDorp 986 n.f. (rubric 'Renseignement des pains [...]').
\(^{33}\) E.g., Bodl., Douce MS 393, f. 32r.
Kent (d. 1579)

In 1575 Kent was one of the captains who conducted money to Condé and John Casimir; he may have stayed to serve under the princes' standard but this is uncertain.\footnote{CSPSp., 2.497-98, no. 416.} He commanded a company in the Netherlands in 1579. He was slain at 's-Hertogenbosch that December during the failed attempt by Union of Utrecht troops to seize control of the city from a Catholic faction.\footnote{Ibid., 2:497n., citing Strada, n.f.; see Parker, Dutch Revolt, 196.} It is possible that he is the same as the William Kent who was one of the first earl of Pembroke's liveried retainers in 1570.\footnote{BL, Harl. MS 7186, f. 195r.}

Kettelbie, George (fl. 1580-87)

He succeeded to the command of Richard Chatterton's company after the latter was killed at the battle of Nordhorn (1581). Kettelbie was Chatterton's lieutenant, having previously been the lieutenant of Captain 'Fflude' and the ensign then lieutenant of Captain Edward Bartlett (1575-76). He had earlier served on the Scottish borders and in Ireland and may have been a retainer of the Earl of Lincoln. It is not clear whether he was a short-term replacement or continued as a captain, or, if he did, whether he joined his unit, which had been originally raised by Thomas Morgan in 1578, to Morgan's regiment in 1582 or remained with Norreys. He probably had an affinity connection to the Chatterton family, for in 1586 Kettelbie replaced Thomas Chatterton in command of his States'-pay foot-band, though this Chatterton seems not to have died. The company was cassed by the spring of 1587.\footnote{BL, Lans. MS 1218, ff. 118r, 128r. BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r; ARH, AJO 2943, f. [2v].}

Knappe, Leonard (fl. 1586)

Knappe was captain of a company of States'-pay foot that served in the late summer and autumn of 1586 and had been cassed by March 1587.\footnote{BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r; ARH, AJO 2943, f. [3r].}

Knollys, Sir William (c.1547-1632), of Oxfordshire (later Earl of Banbury)

Having distinguished himself (he was knighted) as a gentleman volunteer Sir William Drury's expedition into Scotland in 1570, in which several other
mercenaries served, Knollys went to the Netherlands in 1582, serving briefly as a gentleman volunteer with Norreys.\textsuperscript{26} He was in the Netherlands in July 1585, again serving briefly with Norreys’s Dutch-pay regiment. By the autumn of 1586 he had command of a queen’s-pay foot-band of the garrison at Ostend, but he commanded Thomas Maria Wingfield’s small cornet of States’-pay horse at Zutphen in September-October. The cornet was paid off later that autumn and Knollys gave up the foot company and left the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{27} He became joint lord lieutenant of Berkshire and Oxfordshire with Lord Norreys and was later appointed to high office at court.\textsuperscript{28}

Lambert, Sir Oliver (d.1618), of Southampton (later Baron Lambert of Cavan)

Lambert served in the Netherlands from 1580 and was badly wounded there in 1584.\textsuperscript{29} He got a States’-pay captaincy in 1585, commanding a company in Norreys’s expedition. It was transferred into the royal army by December 1585, but either it was put back into Dutch pay or Lambert raised a new company.\textsuperscript{30} He was captain of a States’-pay foot-band throughout 1586; it was one of the few English mercenary companies not cassed by the spring of 1587.\textsuperscript{31} By the summer of 1588, however, it had been transferred into royal pay in the garrison of Ostend.\textsuperscript{32} Thereafter Lambert’s career, in the Netherlands and Ireland, was wholly in royal service. He later advanced Sir Francis Vere loans to help in raising his mercenary companies.\textsuperscript{33}

Latham, John (fl. c. 1575-1601), [of Lancashire?]

He raised a company of volunteers from London for States’ service in the spring of 1586. It is possible he was the same John Latham as had served as a private soldier in Giles Gainsford’s company in 1575.\textsuperscript{34} Latham’s own

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} Camden, ii.238; Churchyard’s Chippes, 38r; TDH, 46.
\item \textsuperscript{27} CSPFor., 19:635-36; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 84r, Egerton MS 1694, f. 89r; Tenison, 6:207-8; Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 161r.
\item \textsuperscript{28} GEC, 1:400-1.
\item \textsuperscript{29} J. Rutherford, ed., The Miscellaneous Papers of Captain Thomas Stockwell, 1590-1614, 2 vols, Southampton Record Soc. Publications 32-33 (Southampton: 1932-33), 1:x-xi.
\item \textsuperscript{30} CSPFor., 20:25; Shaw, ‘Financial and Political Relationships’, xxxiii, xxxv.
\item \textsuperscript{31} BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r, and Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r; Tenison, 6:210; ARH, AJO 2943, f. [3r].
\item \textsuperscript{32} ARA, SG 12576, n.f. (31 Aug. 1588).
\item \textsuperscript{33} Hasler, 2:432-34. Rutherford, Miscellaneous Papers of Capt. Stockwell, 2:37-38, 42, 46.
\item \textsuperscript{34} APC, 14:110. ARA, CO 37.
\end{itemize}
company served in the late summer and autumn of 1586 before being cassed. He was later a captain in royal service and was chosen as Muster-Master of Lancashire by the county authorities in preference to the candidate endorsed by the Privy Council.

Lee, John (fl. 1583-89)

Lee, or Ley, was a gentleman volunteer with Norreys in Frisia in 1580 and was already identified as a probable future captain. He did not obtain an appointment, though, until 1584 in Thomas Morgan's regiment in Brabant's pay. Lee's company arrived in October 1584 and served through to the end of the siege. In February 1585 Lee, John Gachill and Henry Richards were found guilty by a court martial of having secret dealings with the enemy and as being deserving of death. They had actually only sought passports for themselves to leave since they had not been paid; they had not attempted to betray Antwerp to the Spanish. The other captains sympathised and there seems to have been a feeling in the Anglo-Welsh mercenary community that Lee was guiltless of any crime other than to defy the cantankerous Morgan.

That Lee was not perceived as a traitor is evident from the fact that he was one of the captains licensed to raise a voluntary company for States' pay in early 1586. He had done so by May and it served for the rest of the year, including in the Zutphen campaign. It was either cased over the winter of 1586-87 or combined with one of the queen's-pay companies. Lee remained in service, though now in royal pay, for another five years; he may have been the Captain John Ley who was a mourner at the Earl of Leicester's funeral.

Liggins (d. 1578), of Ireland

He had an independent company of Irish troops in the pay of the States of Holland in 1574. It apparently took bad casualties for in 1575 Liggins tried to

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258 BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r, and Lans. MS 1218, f. 133v; ARH, AJO 2943, f. [2v].
259 HMC 6:298; McGurk, Elizabethan Conquest, 114.
260 Blandy, 26v. CSPFor., 19:101-2, 256, 284, 292, 326; Bodl., Tanner MS 169, f. 70r; BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 116v.
261 APC, 14:62; CSPFor., 20:667; BL, Add. MS 48084, ff. 86r; Tenison, 6:204; Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r.
262 ARH, AJO 2943, f. [2v]; BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 139r; Adams, ed., Household Accounts of Leicester, 455.
raise a new company this time in England. The Dutch had no problem with his raising a new company (which also suggests he and his Irish had fought well in 1574) but he was unable to raise the men and so he was put into Gainsford’s company as a gentleman volunteer, in which capacity he served for the rest of the year.  

In 1578 he returned to the Netherlands as captain of a company in Thomas Morgan’s battalion -- possibly Liggins had returned to serve in the royal establishment in Ireland, alongside Morgan, in the interim. His band of 200 men entered the main army’s camp at Rijmenam ahead of the rest of Norreys’s regiment. Consequently the unit was engaged in the battle from the very beginning -- Liggins was killed in action.

Lindley, [Lawrence?] (fl. 1598-1614), [of Yorkshire?]

Lindley in 1598 was captain of a company of Yorkshire militia conscripted for service in Ireland. It therefore is probable that he is the Captain Lindley who took over Thomas Ball’s company in Sir Francis Vere’s regiment after Ball’s death in the autumn of 1602 -- the Irish army then being demobilised, following the defeat of Tyrone. Lindley thereafter commanded a company in States’ employ until at least 1614.

L’Isle (d. 1602)

He became captain of a States’-pay company in the Netherlands in 1602 but did not survive his first campaign.

Littleton, Francis (fl. 1584

Littleton was from a gentry family prominent in the West Midlands, which also supplied other men who served in Dutch pay, and he served as a gentleman volunteer or lieutenant in the Netherlands for some time in the 1580s. He was made a captain in Thomas Morgan’s Brabant-paid regiment in 1584-85.

263 ARA, CO 37; Ferguson, Papers, 36.
264 Churchyard’s Choice, Si verso, Si v-Sii r; KL, nos. 4048, 4050, 10: 684, 686.
265 BL, Add. MS 36293, ff. 3v-4r, 11v-12r.
266 ARH, AJO 2946; ARA, CAan. 879, f. 124v; lists for 1605, 1607-10, app. 7; Peacham, sig. D3r.
267 ARH, AJO 2946; RSG, 12:186; Chamberlain Letters, no. 54, 1:170.
268 CSP For., 20:30
He and Sergeant-Major Watson brought the first draft of men into Antwerp in the first week of September 1584. Littleton was one of the members of the court martial of Gachill, Lee and Richards, with whom he sympathised much less than the other captains. His company served until the regiment was withdrawn in the summer, during which time he showed great valour but also came to blows with Morgan.

He was captain of a States'-pay company in Norreys's expeditionary force in September 1585. It remained in Dutch pay into 1586, despite being scheduled in December 1585 to transferred to queen's pay. It served for the rest of 1586 and was on the list of companies to remain in States' employ in 1587 but by March of that year it had in fact been cassed.

Llewellyn (fl. 1580), of Wales

Captain 'ffuellains' commanded one of the companies of the regiment of John Norreys left in the south in 1580 while Norreys and the bulk of the regiment campaigned in Groningen, Overijssel and Friesland in 1580-81. He seems to have taken over command of the company of Anthony Powell. He in turn seems to have been replaced by December 1581: he disappears from the records, but whether due to death or departure home is not known. Given his name, he must have been Welsh.

Lloyd, George (fl. 1607-8), of Wales

'George Flud' was a captain in Dutch pay in 1607 and 1608. His company was one of several cassed in the latter year because of truce negotiations. Given his name, he was almost certainly Welsh.

Lloyd, John (fl. late 1570s)

A 'Captain Fludde' commanded one of Morgan's companies at Rijmenam in

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265 Tonks, 7, 146-47, et passim; CSPFor., 19:54.
270 CSPFor., 19:256, 292, 300.
271 Ibid. 326, 405, 432, 481.
272 Harl. MS 168, f. 159v; CSPFor., 20:25; Shaw, 'Financial and Political Relationships', xxxiii-xxxv.
273 BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r, Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r; Tenison, 6:210; ARH, AJO 2943, n.f.
274 BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 127r.
275 Lists of captains for 1607-8, in app. 7, below.
1578. He was probably the 'Capiteyn Johan Fluyt' commissioned by the States of Holland on 11 November 1576. Since George Kettelby later recalled that, after serving Bartlett as first ensign and then lieutenant, he after succeeded as lieutenant of Captain 'Fflude', it is probable that Lloyd directly replaced Bartlett on the latter's demise. Lloyd's company was merged into Morgan's regiment in 1578 and thus subsumed into Norreys's regiment. By late 1580 it had been taken over by Richard Chatterton. Morgan complained in 1581 that a company of his had 'by Coronel Norris his meanes given to one Chatterton', but Lloyd may have died rather than being dismissed, for Kettelby remained in his position, indicating a simple replacement of captain rather than anything more substantial, as may have been the case if Norreys was trying to win the company over from Morgan.

Lovelace, Sir William, Senior (1561-1629), of Kent

Lovelace had fought in Ireland in 1599 under Essex, who knighted him. By 1602 he was serving in the Netherlands with his son and namesake and had managed to obtain his own company. He remained in command of this company until 1605, thereafter passing it to his son.

Lovelace, Sir William, Junior (b. 1582?), of Kent

The son of Sir William Lovelace, by 1606 he had become captain of his father's company. His first year was marred by a notorious incident in which he accidentally killed a Flushing brothel keeper. Despite this he made a success of his captaincy, was knighted and kept his company even after the reductions in strength following the agreement of the Twelve Years' Truce. He remained in States' pay at least into the middle of the following decade.

278 Churchyard's Choice, sig. Sii.
277 ARA, CO 48.
278 BL: Lans. MS 1218, f. 118r; Cott. MS Titus B. vii, f. 38r.
279 Chamberlain Letters, 1:84. ARH, AJO 2946.
280 ARA, SG 12503, f. 391v; RSG, 12:186; HMCS, 16:78; biography of Lovelace, for History of Parliament, Jacobean House of Commons (I am grateful to Andrew Thrush for a copy of the draft of this article).
Lovell (fl. 1610)

Captain of one of the new companies raised for States' pay in 1610.1

Lower, Sir William (fl. c.1600), of Cornwall

Lower was Sir Francis Vere’s captain-lieutenant in 1600, commanding the general’s own foot company. He fought bravely at Nieuwpoort.2 His affinity connection to Vere’s antagonist, the Earl of Northumberland, later led to a notorious quarrel with Vere, which ended Lower’s career in the Netherlands. His knighthood dates from 1603, after he left Dutch employ.3

Lucar, Emmanuel (fl. 1583-85), of London

He first appears in the records as a captain in 1583. He was almost certainly related to Emmanuel Lucar, merchant tailor and a member of the Common Council of London in 1559-61, but whether son or grandson is uncertain. The councillor Emmanuel Lucar’s son, also Emmanuel, was born in 1536. It is possible that the son could have been serving in the Netherlands aged 47, but he also could well have had a son of about 25 in 1583 who may have been the captain.4

Lucar was captain of a company in Norreys’s regiment in July 1583. After Norreys went home, he switched to Morgan’s regiment in the spring of 1584.5 In consequence Lucar was chosen by Morgan as a captain for the regiment commissioned by the States of Brabant for the defence of Antwerp. He raised a new company in England with which he returned to the Netherlands in October 1584. His company briefly served in Zeeland and Holland, but by the start of 1585 had moved to Antwerp where it served in the garrison until March. He sympathised with Gachill, Lee and Richards and though he voted them guilty at their court martial he opposed Morgan’s handling of the situation in Antwerp.6 Perhaps as a result his company was detached from

1 ARA, RvS 1226; ARH, Collectie Goldberg 297.
2 Vere Commentaries, 163; Orfes, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 157.
4 See Foster, 166; Rawlins, 61.
5 CSPFor., 18:30-31, 390, nos. 38, 470.
6 Ibid., 19:102, 199, 254, 256, 284, 292, 326.
the city but was badly cut up and Lucar was summoned home to report to the English government on the state of the war.\(^7\) In August 1585 he returned to the Netherlands commanding one of the original queen's-pay companies in Norreys's expeditionary force and he did not serve in foreign pay again.\(^8\)

Madison (fl. 1599-1601)

He became captain of a company in Sir Horace Vere's States'-pay regiment in 1599, replacing Benjamin Berry. His company was not taken on the Nieuwpoort campaign but remained in service and was at Ostend in 1601, where Madison was wounded and evidently obliged to retire.\(^9\)

Manners (d. 1605)

He became a captain in States' service in 1605, doubtless reflecting the expansion that year in the Dutch army. He was killed at the battle of Mulheim that October.\(^10\) He may well have been related to the Earl of Rutland, who had served as a gentleman volunteer in the Netherlands, but the relationship is conjectural.

Markham, William (fl. 1578-94), of Nottinghamshire and Lincolnshire\(^11\)

A captain in Cavendish's regiment, he is praised in two contemporary histories for his deeds at Rijmenam (1578).\(^12\) Markham was a follower of the Cavendish family.\(^13\) This may explain why, despite his good performance at Rijmenam, he accompanied Cavendish home. However, he returned to the Netherlands as a captain in the expanded forces of 1582.\(^14\) His kinsman, the soldier-writer Francis Markham, presumably served in William's company when he first did a tour of duty as a gentleman volunteer in 1583.\(^5\) Around 1594 Markham may have served again as a gentleman volunteer, this time in

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\(^7\) ARA, RvS 3, f. 153r; CSPFor., 19:405, 428, 441.
\(^8\) CSPFor., 20:25.
\(^9\) ARH, AJO 2950; HMCS, 11:263, 346.
\(^10\) BL, Stowe MS 168, f. 158r.
\(^11\) TDH, 31; Markham, Fighting Veres, 50; Francis Markham, Genealogy of the Markhams, ed. Clements Markham (London: n.p., 1872), 29.
\(^12\) Churchyard's Choice, sig Sii v; TDH, 31.
\(^13\) See MacCaffrey, 'Talbot and Stanhope', 79-80, 83-84.
\(^14\) ARA, CvDorp 986 n.f. (rubric 'Renseignement des pains [...]').
\(^15\) Markham, Genealogy, 35.
the company of Sir Thomas Fairfax, with whom he signed the album amicorum of Bernard ten Broecke, physician and naturalist of Enkhuizen.16

Martin, William (fl. c.1582-85)

Martin was made a captain during the winter of 1582/83; his company was in the army sent to the relief of Eindhoven in the late spring of 1583. Since he later served in Thomas Morgan’s regiment and Captain William Morris of that regiment disappears from its records in the autumn of 1583 it is probable that Martin replaced Morris.17

Martin, who seems to have been Walsingham’s client, was captain of one of the first bands of Morgan’s States of Brabant-pay regiment to arrive in Antwerp, in the autumn of 1584. Several of Morgan’s captains grew on bad terms with their colonel during the siege and Martin seems to have become an unofficial leader. Having served faithfully, however, up to April he then absconded from Antwerp -- he allegedly took his company’s pay and when arrested in Bergen he was found with ‘false dollars and counterfeit coin of Brabant’, which Martin claimed was planted.18 It is difficult to determine the truth at this distance, but it is worth noting that other English mercenaries did not sympathise with Martin, though they had with Lieutenant Colonel Morris and Captains Lee and Richards who also fell foul of Morgan in Antwerp.19

On the other hand, Martin must have been exculpated by the Dutch authorities for he was back in England by the spring of 1586, when he raised a company of volunteers for the States’ pay. It had arrived in the Netherlands by June and served for the rest of the year -- but by September, Martin had given way as captain to Richard Spencer.20

Mason, Nicholas (fl. 1604-14)

Mason was made a captain in the States’ army in 1604. Since the Dutch had retrenched some of the English companies from 1602-3 he presumably

16 KB, HS 133.M.63, f. 134v.
17 BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 124r; ARA, CvDorp 971, n.f. (rubric ‘Liste et declaration des vivres [...] estre distribuee journelement’).
18 CSPFor., 19:441. See ibid., 64, 284, 326, 405-7, 431-33, 506; ARA, RvS 3, ff. 152v-53r.
20 BL, Add. MS 48084, ff. 89r, 99r; Tenison, 6:204; Bodl., MS Tanner 78, f. 160r.
replaced an existing captain. Despite rumours of his death in 1605, he was a captain in Dutch employ up to 1610 and beyond.  

Meolis, Henry (fl. 1604-8)

He became captain of a company in the garrison of Gorcum in 1604, which served in States’ pay until the end of 1608. With the advent of negotiations for peace either it was cassed, or Meolis returned home.  

Merton (fl. 1583)

A mercenary captain in the Netherlands in 1583--probably the other captain of Ralph Cromwell’s battalion. He was replaced by Edward Cromwell in 1584, so evidently had died or returned home.  

Mewtys, Sir Thomas (fl. 1606-8)

He obtained a Dutch commission for a company in the autumn of 1606 but for some reason did not actually fill the contract until 1608 but his company was then cassed at the end of the year. In common with other captains Mewtys regained a States'-pay company in 1614, for the second Jülich campaign.  

Morgan, Sir Matthew (fl. 1589-1602), of Monmouthshire

He was a captain in the regiment of his kinsman, Thomas Morgan, by 1583. Matthew was also a captain in the new regiment raised by ‘the warrior’ for the defence of Antwerp, served there in 1584-85, and remained with him when the remnants of the regiment withdrew to Holland. He thereafter had a distinguished career in royal pay over the next fifteen years, serving in several naval/amphibious expeditions (he was knighted at Cadiz), in the Netherlands, France and Ireland.

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21 ARA, CAan. 879, ff. 48r, 52r, 123v; ARA, GRK 1232; HMCD, 3:129; lists of captains for 1607-8, 1610, in app. 7, below; Peacham, sig. D3r.
22 ARA, CAan. 879, ff. 46r, 47v, 50r, 52v, 123r; GRK 1232; lists of captains for 1607-8, in app. 7, below.
23 ARA, SG 3110, f. 236r.
25 CSPFor., 18:247, no. 280; see ibid., 26, 30, nos. 32, 38.
26 Ibid., 19:256, 292; ARH, SvH 19, p. 278.
Morgan went bankrupt in 1602 having borrowed heavily to finance his military career. His younger brother was Sir Charles Morgan, who took command of his auxiliary company when it was transferred to Dutch employ in 1599.

Morgan Wolfe, Walter (fl. 1572-1604), of South Wales

The Walter Morgan who served in the Netherlands in 1572-73 has been positively identified with the engineer and cartographer, Walter Morgan Wolf, who served there in the 1580s and after, by Anna Simoni.

It is well-known that Morgan was a captain in the Netherlands in 1572, for he wrote a detailed, illustrated manuscript history of the first two years of the opstand, which has attracted much notice, while his service was also recorded by Roger Williams. Morgan remained in the Netherlands over the winter of 1572/73, taking part in the efforts to save Haarlem, though not as a captain -- in what capacity is unclear. He joined Morgan’s regiment in 1573 as an individual gentleman volunteer, but left it in the late summer and autumn to join William of Orange’s Huguenot general, de Poyet, who was campaigning in Brabant and Zeeland. Morgan went to England by February 1574 and wrote his narrative, which he presented to Burghley.

Morgan returned to the Netherlands in April 1574, leading a company for which he had contracted independently of Chester’s regiment. It served until the autumn, having not been involved in the debacle at Leiden. The following year, 1575, he was one of the captains that took money to Condé in the Palatinate. His ‘brother’ de Poyet was there and Morgan stayed on into

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27 Lloyd, Elizabethan Adventurer, 112; BL, Lans. MS 1218, ff. 132r, 136v; Birch, 2:15; HMCRC, 351-52; Dictionary of Welsh Biography, 640.
28 Dodd, 270; ARA, SG 5883, nos. 230-31.
29 There were branches of the family in Carmarthenshire (Lloyd, Gentry of South-West Wales, 32, 155, 205) and Monmouthshire (CPR, 4:233, no. 1390) -- which branch Walter was from is not certain, though the latter is favoured in the New DNB.
32 Williams, Actions, 116.
33 ASCL, MS 129, ff. 21r-23r.
34 Williams, Actions, 135, 148; ASCL, MS 129, ff. 31r, 1r; Simoni, ‘Walter Morgan Wolff’, 68.
35 KL, 7:102n. (CSPSp., 2: 478, no. 395); Ferguson, Papers, 38.
1576 and served with the princes Henry de Condé and John Casimir in the campaign that won the fifth civil war, before returning to the Netherlands with de Poyet.35

His career thereafter is obscure. He passed into royal pay by 1587 at the latest, when he seems to have been serving as an engineer, and in the 1590s he commanded royal troops in France and the Netherlands.37 In the early years of the seventeenth century he was practising, possibly in States' pay but perhaps privately, as a cartographer.38

Morgan, Sir William (d. 1584), of Glamorgan

Captain of a troop of horse with Louis of Nassau in 1572. He joined William of Orange's army and commanded some of the English and Welsh soldiers who stayed in the Netherlands in the winter of 1572/3 after their companies had gone back to Britain. Morgan returned home in the spring of 1573 and joined the first Earl of Essex's army in Ulster.39

He had probably earlier served as a volunteer in France in the second and third civil wars. He obviously knew Louis of Nassau before 1572, since he was made a member of the prince's household; while the DNB asserts (possibly on the basis of Welsh sources) that he went to France in 1569, shortly after the battle of Jarnac, as a volunteer.40 He could well have served in the second war, since references to judicial proceedings in south Wales reveal that, though he was on the panel of justices at the trial of an outlaw, John David, in 1566 and was a commissioner post mortem in the winter of 1567, he was absent from a further trial of David held some months latter, before what was otherwise the same panel.41 Morgan was thus in Wales in 1566 and early 1567 but not when the second war of religion broke out later that year. After 1573 he served entirely in the queen's pay, mostly in Ireland or at sea, but he did flirt briefly with participating in the sixth war of religion and may have equipped privateers to that end.42

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37 Simoni, 'Walter Morgan Wolff', 64-65; CSPDom., 1591-4, 242; Aubigné, 3:316.
39 See above, in ch. 3, p. 112; see also Gascoigne, Selected Poetry and Prose, 53; Williams, Actions, 97, 121; BN, MS Fr. 20787, f. 5r.
40 DNB, 13:934. Dictionary of Welsh Biography, 656, essentially follows DNB.
41 CPR, 5:77, no. 560; 4:133 no. 865.
Morris, William (fl. 1582)

A captain in the new regiment obtained by Thomas Morgan in early 1582 which served until early 1584. A servant of the Earl of Leicester, he served well at Ghent in August 1582; he is differentiated in contemporary reports from Lieutenant Colonel John Morris, who was also in Morgan's regiment, by the description of him as 'young'. His relationship, if any, to John Morris is not known.

Morton, John (fl. 1602-5)

He commanded one of the newly-contracted States'-pay companies in 1602, and remained in States' service up to and including 1605.

Morton, Walter (fl. 1603)

He took over the companies of Captains Clifford and Norton in 1603, the two then being combined into one. He was presumably related to John Morton, but either his company was cased, or he died or retired, in 1604, for there is no further evidence for its existence in Dutch employ.

Munton, Richard (fl. 1610)

He succeeded to the command of a States'-pay company in 1610: probably one of those raised for the campaign against Jülich.

Mynne, Thomas (fl. 1601-2)

He was captain of one of the companies raised to reinforce Ostend in 1601 and commanded it into the spring of 1602.

Norreys, Sir Henry (1554-1599), of Berkshire

He took over the captain-lieutenancy of his older brother's cornet of horse in early 1581, apparently replacing the deceased Christopher Champernowne.

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44 ARH, AJO 2946; ARA, GRK 1232.
45 ARH, AJO 2946.
46 Egerton Papers, 443; ARA, RvS 1226.
47 HMCS, 11:328; RSG, 12:151n., 170.
Henry Norreys commanded the cornet for the rest of 1581, as well as briefly taking over the captaincy of Edmund Bishop’s company of foot on the latter’s death at Nordhorn in September. However, thereafter he returned to the cavalry, which he commanded through to his brother’s departure for Ireland in early 1584.

In 1585 he served with his brother, commanding two royal companies of foot. In May 1586, however, one was transferred back into States’ pay, but while it served throughout 1586, it was under the command of Richard Green not Norreys. In the winter of 1586/7 it was combined with Norreys’s queen’s-pay band to produce one strong unit. Thereafter Henry Norreys fought only in royal service, distinguishing himself in Portugal, France and Ireland, being mortally wounded in the latter country.

North, George (fl. 1568-69)

He served in and seems to have led a small company of Englishmen which served the Huguenots during the autumn of 1568. He may have been a younger son of Roger, Lord North, but this is speculative.

Norton (fl. 1602)

He was Captain L’Isle’s lieutenant, replacing him in command of a States’-pay company in 1602 on his death.

Orrell, George (fl. 1584-1614)

Orrell served as a gentleman volunteer in a range of private and royal naval and amphibious expeditions in the late 1580s and early 1590s, but included a stint as sergeant in Captain John Latham’s States’-pay company in 1586. By 1595 he was lieutenant of Captain Robert Bell’s company in Sir Francis Vere’s mercenary regiment. He then disappears from view, but given his

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48 ARA, SG 12576, n.f. (rubric ‘Stucken concernende […] Norijts’); Gachard, 4.383.
49 HMC, 2nd Report., 73; ARA, CvDorp 971, n.f. (rubric ‘Liste et declaration des vivres […] estre distnbeue journellement’); BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 131v.
50 CSPFor., 20:25; and see under Green, above.
51 DNB, 14:569.
52 Above, ch. 3, p. 105.
53 ARH, AJO 2946; RSG, 12:186.
54 BL, Lans. MS 1218, f.133v.
55 L & A, 6.77, no. 34.
record of service it was probably he that obtained a captaincy in 1605. He then maintained it through 1606.\textsuperscript{56}

In 1607, reflecting Orrell's rich experience of amphibious expeditions, his company was transferred to serve, effectively as marines, with the fleet sent to attack Spain, which won the celebrated victory at Gibraltar in April. Later that year it was paid off, but Orrell regained a company of his own in 1610 and maintained it at least until 1614.\textsuperscript{57}

Owen (d. 1573), of south Wales

A captain in Morgan's regiment in 1573, he was killed in battle near Haarlem in July.\textsuperscript{58} Given his name and association with Morgan, south Welsh origins are extremely likely.

Palmer, Barnaby (fl. 1572-85?)

Palmer crossed with Norreys's expedition to the Netherlands in September 1585, as commander of Black Jack's own foot company. Norreys appointed Palmer almost immediately to a roving commission, to gather all the various English mercenaries in Friesland and Overijssel into Norreys's newly-arrived brigade. Palmer was described as 'a man well known to these countries'.\textsuperscript{59} Because he was relatively junior, he would not have been the Palmer who was Cavendish's sergeant-major in 1578 -- that would have been Nicholas Palmer. However, if as seems probable, it was Nicholas who commanded a company under Montgomery in 1573, then Barnaby could have been the brother who fought alongside him, and then served in the Netherlands as a gentleman volunteer under his brother. This would explain his knowledge of the Dutch situation. He does not seem to have served into 1586.

Parker, Sir Nicholas (1547-1619), of Sussex and Cornwall

Parker was a distinguished commander of auxiliary cavalry, praised both by Essex and Maurice of Nassau.\textsuperscript{60} In October 1598 his cornet was transferred

\textsuperscript{56} ARA, CAan. 879, ff. 74v, 123v.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., f. 127r; Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 206-12; ARA, RvS 1226; Peacham, sig. D3v.
\textsuperscript{58} KL, no. 2609, 6:792.
\textsuperscript{59} CSP For., 20:10; see ibid., 25; and BL, Harl. MS 168, f. 159v.
\textsuperscript{60} E.g., Cecil MS 47, f. 85r; PRO, SP 84/54, ff. 101r-3r; ARA, Verspreide Collectie 6.
to States’ pay and Parker served some months as a mercenary. But in the summer of 1599 he resigned his cornet to Edward Cecil and returned home, to become Governor of Pendennis Castle, a post he held until his death.\(^6\)

Parkes, Francis (d. 1605)

He was captain of a States'-pay company in 1605, but died by that August. His place was taken by Humfrey Parkes, who was presumably a brother or other kinsman.\(^6\)

Parkes, Humfrey (fl. 1605-10)

He became a States'-pay captain in 1605, evidently filling the gap left by his kinsman, Francis. His company was retained in States’ pay throughout the next five years.\(^6\)

Paston, Charles (fl. 1605)

He was a States'-pay captain in 1605. Nothing more is known about him, though it is natural to speculate that he was of the East Anglian family. Two other Pastons later served as captains in the Dutch army during the Thirty Years’ War.\(^6\)

Paulet, Hamlet (or Hampden) (fl. 1585-1603), of Hampshire

He raised a company of voluntary foot for States’ service in the spring of 1586 -- it was in the Netherlands by mid-May and in the field in June but thereafter seems to have remained in garrison duties. It was cassed over the winter of 1586/87.\(^6\) He later filled offices in domestic military administration.\(^6\)

Pembroke, Henry (fl. 1600-8)

An illegitimate son of Henry, second earl of Pembroke, he accompanied his half-brother, William Herbert, later the third earl, to the Netherlands in 1600.

\(^{61}\) ARA, SG 12503, f. 284r, SG 12536, f. 284; SL 2:125; Dalton, 1:30, 36-37.

\(^{62}\) ARA, GRK 1232.

\(^{63}\) ARA, CAan. 879, f. 79v, 110r; list of captains for 1607-8, 1610, in app. 7, below; RSG, n.s., 1:72.

\(^{64}\) ARA, GRK 1232. RvS 1908, pt 1, English lias.

\(^{65}\) APC, 14:55; CSPFor., 20:667. BL, Add. MS 48084, ff. 86r, 99r; ARH, AJO 2943, f. [2v].

\(^{66}\) HMCS, 12:701; Boynton, Elizabethan Militia, 100.
Pembroke was captain-lieutenant of Sir Francis Vere’s cornet of cuirassiers and, after Vere’s enforced retirement in the winter of 1603/4, he commanded the unit in 1604 and 1605, though still nominally as captain-lieutenant. He was dead by 1609.\(^7\)

Peyton, Sir Henry (d. 1623?), of Devonshire

His mother was a daughter of the second earl of Bath so he was related to Captain Bourchier. He obtained a States’-pay captaincy in 1605 and stayed in Dutch pay until after 1610. He was one of the commanders of an Anglo-Dutch force that aided Venice against the Habsburgs in 1618.\(^8\)

Pietfield (fl. 1600)

The lieutenant of Sir Thomas Knollys’s company; Pietfield commanded it in the battle of Nieuwpoort.\(^9\)

Pigott (fl. 1602-1614)

Following Richard Vavasour’s death in 1602 Pigott took command of his company in Sir Horace Vere’s regiment. He remained a States’-pay captain until after the end of the period.\(^10\)

Petty, George (fl. 1585-87)

Captain of one of the original States’-pay companies in the 1585 expedition, commanding one of John Norreys’s two bands, which suggests a personal relationship, forged possibly in Ireland in 1584 but perhaps as a gentleman volunteer or junior officer in the Netherlands, earlier. This was one of the seven companies not transferred to royal pay in the autumn of 1585.\(^7\) Petty continued in States’ service in 1586 but his company was cassed at the end of the period in 1587. \(^*\)

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\(^{7}\) See Chamberlain Letters, no. 30, 1:100; Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 155, 157; RSG, 13:124; Ferguson, Papers, 74.

\(^{8}\) Trim, ‘Sir Horace Vere’, 345n.

\(^{9}\) Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 155.

\(^{10}\) ARH, AJO 2946; ARA: CAa. 879, ff. 112r, 114r, 123r; and lists of captains for 1605, 1607-8, 1610, in app. 7, below; Peacham, sig. D3v.

\(^{71}\) Shaw, ‘Political and Financial Relationships’, xxxv: his name is transcribed Robert Petty there and in the version pr. CSPFor. of the army’s companies in Sep. 1585. However, in the copy of the latter document in BL, Harl. MS 168, f. 159v, his name is given as George, which is consistent with his appearance in records for 1587 (sources in note following).
of that year.\textsuperscript{72} He was commissioned by Leicester in Dutch pay in June,\textsuperscript{73} but this was part of the Sluys relief expedition and the States-General did not endorse it.

Powell, Anthony (d. 1585), of Glamorgan

The 'Poel' who was a captain in Thomas Morgan's regiment in 1578 was probably Morgan's cousin, Anthony Powell, who served with him at Antwerp in 1584-85.\textsuperscript{74} Contextual evidence suggests he remained in the Netherlands in 1579, before returning home but resuming his Dutch service when Morgan needed to raise his large regiment for the relief of Antwerp. Powell was sent home with dispatches in early January, but returned with replies from Walsingham in February.\textsuperscript{75} He served in Antwerp for the next two months and was killed in the attack on Kouwensteyn Dike in May 1585.\textsuperscript{76}

Powell, Thomas (fl. 1585-88), of north Wales

Having presumably fought as a gentleman volunteer in the Netherlands in the early 1580s, perhaps with his namesake Anthony, Thomas Powell raised a States'-pay company in the autumn of 1585. It crossed slightly later than the rest of Norreys's bands. It was transferred into royal pay in November, but in early 1586 it was either transferred back again, or Powell got a license to recruit another, voluntary, company. He had a company in Dutch pay in 1586, but by the autumn it was under the captaincy of Henry Swanne.\textsuperscript{77} He was a member of the affinity of the Earl of Leicester and carried a bannerol in the funeral of the earl's son in 1584.\textsuperscript{78}

Price, John (fl. c.1580-95)

He first served as a gentleman volunteer with John Norreys in 1580. He was on intimate terms with 'Black Jack' who, in the winter of 1580/81, made Price captain of one of the companies in his regiment in Friesland. He remained

\textsuperscript{72} BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r; ARH, AJO 2943.
\textsuperscript{73} HMC Pepys, 181.
\textsuperscript{74} ARA, RAGP III:28, f. [3r].
\textsuperscript{75} CSPFor., 19:242, 299-300, 325.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 351, 481.
\textsuperscript{77} Shaw, 'Financial and Political Relationships', xxxiii, xxxv; Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 482; Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r.
\textsuperscript{78} Adams, ibid.
with Norreys throughout 1582-83. Indeed, Price was one of Norreys's most trusted officers and was given Black Jack's dispatches on his celebrated rearguard action at Ghent to carry to the Council of State.

He went with Norreys to the Netherlands in 1585. He was appointed Sergeant-Major-General of the English troops, but this was an appointment in royal pay. He also, however, had a company in Dutch pay but because of his duties as Sergeant-Major-General it was commanded in his stead by another officer, though precisely which is uncertain. It was in any event put into royal pay in November 1585. Although Price served in the United Provinces for some years thereafter, it was always as a soldier of the queen. Given his name, he was probably Welsh, but no more is known of his origins.

Price, William (fl. 1573-75)

His name also appears as 'Pers' and 'Pierce' and variants thereof, but all references are clearly to the same man. He raised a company that he led to Brill in the mid-summer of 1572. He returned to England in the autumn of 1572 and it is unclear what happened to his company in Holland.

He raised what was evidently a new company as part of Morgan's new regiment in 1573 and led it back to Brill at the end of March. It served in the fighting that summer and took heavy casualties -- Price made a brief trip to England in August to appeal for royal help in raising reinforcements. He was one of the captains who abandoned Morgan and adhered to Chester in late 1573. Consequently, however, he was caught up in the disaster outside Leiden and was paid off by the autumn of 1574. Thereafter, he served in the royal army in Ireland.

Radcliffe, Sir John (fl. 1606-10)

He replaced Sir Robert Arthur as captain of a cornet of cavalry in 1606 and

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79 *TDH*, 40; *ARA*, SG 12576, n.f. (rubric 'Stucken concernende [...] Norijts') and SG 11095 (11 Oct. 1582); BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 123v.
80 RvS 2, f. 358r.
82 KL, no. 2441, 6:462; Wijn, 'Noordhollands Regiment', 235.
83 KL, nos. 2506-7, 6:596-97.
84 *ARA*, CO 29; KL, nos. 2609, 2620, 6:792, 804.
85 KL, no. 2634, 6:826-27; ARH, SvH 281, f. 5F2r. CSPIr., 343-44.
remained a States'-pay captain of horse until the end of the period. He was praised in verse by Ben Jonson. \(^{86}\)

Randolph [or Randall], Avery [or Alfred] (fl. 1586)

He succeeded Edward Simmes as captain of a company which, originally in States’ pay, was in queen’s pay -- but it was transferred back to States’ pay just after Randolph took over. \(^{87}\) He was chosen as one of the captains to be retained in Dutch employ in November 1586, but his company was ultimately cassed in the early spring of 1587. \(^{88}\)

Raynes, Edmund (fl. 1605-10)

He became a States'-pay captain in 1605 and remained so for the following five years. \(^{89}\) His relationship, if any, to John Raynes remains unknown.

Raynes, John (fl. 1573-89), of Kent

Captain of a company in Holland in 1573, probably originally raised by Edward Chester and shipped over with Chester’s own company. \(^{90}\) Though there they were joined with Thomas Morgan’s regiment, Raynes naturally left Morgan’s control and adhered to Chester, though his company was then caught up in the rout at Valkenburgh, which ended Raynes’s career in Dutch employment -- at least for the time being. \(^{91}\) It is likely that he is the same man as the John Raynes who, twelve years later, in 1586, raised a company, again in Dutch pay, which served till it was cassed in the winter of 1586/7. \(^{92}\) Three years later he was granted lands in recognition of ‘his service in the wars’. \(^{93}\)

Reade, Sir Edward (fl. 1602)

His relationship, if any, to the Reade or Reid who served at Brill in 1573 and

\(^{86}\) SL 2:125; HMCS, 18:155; lists of captains for 1607-8 and 1610, in app. 7, below. Jonson, Epigram xciii.

\(^{87}\) CSPFor., 20:667-68.

\(^{88}\) BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r; Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r; ARH, AJO 2943.

\(^{89}\) ARA: GRK 1232; SG 8043, SG 8044; RvS 1226, 1232.

\(^{90}\) See BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 134r; ARA, CO 29.

\(^{91}\) BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 125v.

\(^{92}\) Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r; Tenison, 6:204, 211; ARH, AJO 2943.

\(^{93}\) DCPR 1588-89, 379-80.
Sir William Reade, sometime Sergeant-Major-General of the royal army in the Netherlands in 1586, is unknown. He raised a company in Dutch pay in 1601, to reinforce the garrison of Ostend. It remained in States’ service into 1603.94

Rich, Barnaby (1542-1617), of Essex

Rich first saw military service under Warwick at Le Havre in 1563, as he recalled later. He commanded a States'-pay company in the Netherlands in 1586.95 He had earlier served there as a gentleman volunteer -- in 1581 he claimed already to have seen a range of Dutch cities and fortresses; later references reveal that this was around 1577.96 There is an indication in one of Churchyard’s works that Rich served at the siege of Haarlem, but Rich does not include Haarlem in his list of Dutch places seen, and in July 1573 he accompanied his kinsman, Lord Rich, to Ireland (where he spent most of his career, in royal service), so he almost certainly could not have served in the campaign around Haarlem.97

A prolific author, his works have been the subject of much scholarly attention, but chiefly by literary critics, focusing on his views on Ireland and gender. Although his military writings are often quoted, there is still very little scholarship on this part of his literary output.98

Richards, Henry (d. 1585)

He was captain-lieutenant of one of the companies with Norreys in the northeastern Netherlands in 1581 and was commended by Blandy when he filled in for his captain: probably Corne, when he was slain. He was not given the captaincy permanently and while he was probably a captain in one of the English regiments in 1582-83 there is definite evidence of him having his own company only in the autumn of 1584, as a captain in Morgan’s regiment raised to defend Antwerp.99

94 HMCS, 11:337; ARA, SG 12503, f. 373v, and CAAan. 879, f. 26v; RSG, 12:151, 170, 186, 194; ARH, AJO 2946.
95 Rich, Path-way to military practise, sig. A4v; Bodl., Tanner MS 79, f. 160r; ARH, AJO 2943 (i).
96 Rich, Farewell to Military Profession, 10; idem, Path-way to Military practise, sig. B4r.
97 TDH, 19. DNB, 16:991-94.
99 Blandy, 26r; Bodl., Tanner MS 169, f. 70r; CSPFor., 19:55, 109.
In January-February 1585 Richards, John Lee and John Gachill were found guilty by a court martial of having secret dealings with the enemy and as being deserving of death. In fact, they had only sought passports for themselves, rather than trying to surrender Antwerp or admit Spanish troops, and, they claimed, once they had received their pay, they would have stayed loyal. The other captains therefore recommended that they only be publicly degraded and banished. Although Gachill and Lee were paroled and allowed to leave, Richards was executed by May 1585, probably because of Morgan’s personal animus -- the other two may have been saved by patrons’ intervention, so possibly Richards was without an important patron.°

Richards (2) (d. 1602)
The captain of a company in Sir Horace Vere’s regiment in 1602, he died on campaign that same year.\(^{101}\)

Ridgeway, John (fl. 1601-3)
He obtained a commission for a new States’-pay company to contribute to the defence of Ostend in 1601. It served in Sir Francis Vere’s regiment until March 1603 when, before the commencement of campaigning, Ridgeway was dismissed from States’ service. This resulted from the bitter personal dispute that had developed between Ridgeway and Vere.\(^{102}\)

Rockwood (fl. 1606-10)
He became captain of a States’-pay company in 1606 and served in that capacity at least until 1610.\(^{103}\)

Rogers (fl. 1581)
He commanded a company that was garrisoned in Sluys in 1581 -- probably one of the bands that was newly arrived from England that year -- and he was possibly commissioned by William of Orange. He may have originally

\(^{106}\) See CSPFor., 19: 203, 256, 284, 292-93, 326, 481, 626.
\(^{101}\) ARH, AJO 2946; RSG, 12:194; Chamberlain Letters, no. 54, 1:170.
\(^{103}\) HMCD, 3:315-16; ARA, RvS 24, p. 145; lists of captains for 1607-8, 1610, app. 7, below.
served as a gentleman volunteer with Norreys in 1580. Rogers was almost certainly one of the captains in 1582, but whether in Cotton's, Morgan's or North's regiments is unknown and there is no evidence of his presence in the Netherlands from about 1583 onwards.

Rogers (fl. 1602-3)

Captain of a States'-pay company in 1602; it was garrisoned at Rotterdam over the winter and served during the campaign of 1603.

Ryder, William (fl. 1602)

Captain of a States'-pay company in 1602.

Salisbury, Ralph (fl. c.1580), [of north Wales?]

He succeeded in command of John Cobham's company on 12 May 1579. He had probably been Cobham's captain-lieutenant: he exercised effective command over the troops of Cobham's battalion that fought at Rijmenam.

He was in Norreys's regiment throughout 1580, but at the end of January 1581 he quit Norreys's regiment for unknown reasons. Blandy's description of him as 'sufficient', which in the context looks like damning with faint praise, may hint at disputes between him and Norreys (and maybe other captains).

He may be the Captain Salisbury who later served in the Netherlands with a queen's-pay commission in which case he died in 1596. It is possible that Ralph was of the Salusburys of Bachymbyd (Denbighshire), several of whom were supported in military careers in the Netherlands and Ireland by Thomas Myddelton.

Sampson, Anthony (d. 1589), of Kent

Captain of one of the three companies of John Cobham in John Norreys's

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104 BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 123v; see SL, 1:64; Blandy, sig. Hiii r.
105 ARH, AJO 2946; RSG, 12:186, 507.
106 RSG, 12:120, 151.
107 ARA, CO 51, n.f. (15 Jul. 1581).
108 Churcyard's Choice, sig. Siii r.
109 Blandy, 22v, 26v; ARA, CO 51.
110 BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 137r; Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 63; APC, 25: 76, 202.
111 Dodd, 270-71.
regiment, 1578, which mustered 191 men in that summer. Since Cobham was from Kent and Anthony Sampson had at least a strong association with that county, he is probably the 'Mr. Sampson of Kent' wounded outside Ter Goes in late July 1572. In April 1586 he was commissioned to raise 150 men in Kent for service in the States’ pay. His company is not on a list of companies that had been raised by June, but it arrived in time to serve in the Zutphen campaign. He evidently returned home that autumn, for when his company was cassed over the winter its captain was one Thomas Sampson. Anthony Sampson commanded a company of foot on the expedition to Portugal, during which he died of disease. (Captain John Samson, also a captain on the Lisbon voyage, who had previously commanded a foot under Drake in the West Indies in 1585 and was sergeant-major of Sidney’s garrison at Flushing during 1590-91, may have been related but he was never in foreign employ.)

Sampson, Thomas (fl. 1587), of Kent

Captain of Anthony Sampson’s company in 1586-87, which was cassed by March 1587. He was presumably a kinsman of Anthony but any kinship to the celebrated Puritan of the same name is conjectural.

Sanders, Walter (fl. 1606-10)

He obtained a States’-pay captaincy in 1605; his company was retained in Dutch employ at least until 1610.

Scott, Charles (d. 1600), of Kent

The brother of an auxiliary captain of 1585-89, Sir John Scott, Charles was captain one of the companies raised in late 1598 and was commissioned by the Council of State in early 1599. His company served throughout 1599 and 1600, including at Nieuwpoort, which Scott survived, only to die in the

112 ARA, RAGP III.28, f. 7r [foliation mine].
113 Longleat, DP 2, f. 7v.
114 APC 14:70.
115 BL, Add. MS 48084, ff. 99r, 86r; Tenison, 6:204; Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r.
116 Wemham, ENDSP, 213.
118 ARH, AJO 2943, f. [3r].
119 ARA, CAan. 879, ff. 98v, 112r, 123v; and lists of captains for 1607-10, in app. 7, below.
autumn of 1600.  

Scott, Edward (fl. 1598-1601), of Kent  

A younger brother of Charles and Sir John Scott, he also raised a company for States' service in late 1598, but his company was one of those cassed (or rather combined with others). On Charles Scott's death, he got the Privy Council's recommendation to Sir Francis Vere that he be given his brother's company in Sir Horace Vere's regiment and served in 1601. However, he evidently proved unsatisfactory to the Veres or to the Dutch for he was not in States' pay in 1602 and subsequently had difficulties obtaining his back-pay -- his pay dispute was only concluded in 1604.  

Selby, Sir John (fl. 1586-1612), of Yorkshire  

Having served as lieutenant of Lord Grey de Wilton's cornet, Sir John Selby succeeded him in command on 22 November 1603. Selby was a captain in each campaign from 1604 to 1606, but that December, his cornet cassed. From 1604 a Scottish captain, Ralph Selby, was in Dutch pay, but as he was a captain of foot there are no occasions when identification is uncertain.  

Shaw, Robert (fl. 1585-86)  

Shaw succeeded Thomas Watson in command of a States'-pay company in the Netherlands sometime between September and December 1585. It was never transferred into royal pay and served until finally cassed in the winter of 1586/7 (and even then its men went to reinforce William Inge's States'-pay band).  

Sheffield (fl. 1574)  

Captain of a company in Chester's regiment in Holland in 1574. He was

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120 SRO, D593/S/4/10/9; ARA, RvS 1525, f. 205, SG 4891; ARH, AJO 2950; Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 155; Dalton, 1:60; APC, 31:54; The Visitation of Kent, Taken in the Years 1619-1621, ed. Robert Hovenden, Hart. Soc. 42 (London, 1898), 128-29.  

121 HMCS, 14:104; above, app. 1, p. 333.  

122 APC, 31:54-55; ARA, CAan. 879, ff. 39r, 57r.  


124 Ferguson, Papers, 65 et seq.  

125 Shaw, 'Financial and Political Relationships', xxxv; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r; ARH, AJO 2943; information from Simon Adams.
taken prisoner, along with George Gascoigne, after the fall of Valkenburgh and though he negotiated good surrender terms it is not known if he, like Gascoigne, was ransomed.\^\textsuperscript{128} It certainly ended his career in Dutch employ.

Shelton, [Ralph?] (fl. 1600-14)

One ‘Ralfe Shelton, a gentleman of knowledge and experyence’ was given a captaincy in the cautionary garrison of Brill by Sir Francis Vere in 1600. He may well be the ‘Schelton’ who replaced Captain Allyn on the latter’s death. He commanded a States’-pay company in the campaign of 1603 and from then up to and beyond 1610.\^\textsuperscript{127} He was probably related to John Shelton, captain of one of the original queen’s-pay foot-bands in 1585 and a captain in royal service, in the Netherlands and France, to 1598, when his company was in the cautionary garrison of Flushing.\^\textsuperscript{128}

Sherley, Sir Anthony (1566-c.1635)

The son of Sir Thomas Sherley, he took command of a company separated out of the men raised by his father for States’ service in the spring of 1586.\^\textsuperscript{129} His band was actually larger than his father’s during the Zutphen campaign, in which Anthony Sherley served bravely. Nevertheless, his company was cassed in the winter.\^\textsuperscript{130} He was knighted by Henry IV in 1591 but for services performed while with Essex’s royal army. Sherley later served in Brittany, on his own amphibious expedition to Spanish colonial possessions and ended up as a mercenary in Spanish pay fighting the Turks and the Moors.\^\textsuperscript{131}

Sibthorpe, John (fl. 1585)

Sibthorpe, whose military background is unknown, had command of one of the States’-pay bands in Norreys’s expedition in 1585, but it was fairly early converted into a queen’s-pay company.\^\textsuperscript{132}

\^\textsuperscript{128} BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 127r. Prouty, 76.
\^\textsuperscript{127} APC, 31:199. See ARH, AJO 2946; and lists of captains for 1605, 1607-8, 1610, in app. 7, below; Peacham, sig. D3v.
\^\textsuperscript{128} CSPF, 20:25; ARA, RAGP 1:206, and SG 5883, no. 230; Lloyd, Rouen Campaign, 85, 87n.
\^\textsuperscript{129} Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r; Tenison, 6:204; Andrews, 62. ARH, AJO 2943, f. [3r].
\^\textsuperscript{130} L&A, 6:148; Andrews, 63-65.
\^\textsuperscript{131} CSPF, 20:25; Shaw, ‘Financial and Political Relationships’, xxxiii.
Some of his financial records are preserved as the first pages of the common-place book of Lady Anne Southwell (in the Folger Shakespeare Library) but I have not had the opportunity to examine them.\textsuperscript{133}

Sidney, Sir Robert (1563-1626), of Kent and south Wales (later created Earl of Leicester)

He first went to the Netherlands in 1583.\textsuperscript{134} A letter from Sidney to Norreys, thanking him for the command of a company of foot, is dated simply 'this Wensday 1583' or '1585'. Sidney's biographer, Hay, along with Adams and Nolan all give the year as 1585.\textsuperscript{135} My instinctive reading was and is 1583, yet obviously the reading is difficult: 1585 is a legitimate possibility, but I believe that there has been a preconception that the date must be 1585 since it has been presumed that it was only in December that year that Robert Sidney went to the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{136} However, according to a Spanish report, 'the brother of Sir Philip Sydney' was serving in the eastern Low Countries by August 1584.\textsuperscript{137} It is thus quite credible that he obtained a captaincy in 1583 -- young, but not impossibly so given his brother's good offices, and in a year when the number of English captains was much higher than in 1578-81.

In any event, Sidney definitely went to the Netherlands in 1585, as a captain of States'-pay foot.\textsuperscript{138} He then served in royal armies and held high rank, including as Governor of Flushing from 1588 until his death. However, his cornet of horse, as an auxiliary unit, was transferred into States' pay in 1599 and it was some time before Sidney allowed command to pass to Sir Robert Arthur.\textsuperscript{139}

Simmes, Edward (d. 1586)

Captain of one of Norreys's companies in the late summer of 1585. Initially in

\textsuperscript{134} Bodl., St Amand MS 8, ff. 69-70; see above, p. 266.
\textsuperscript{135} Hay, Life of Robert Sidney, 44; Adams, 'Puritan Crusade', 30 n.40; Nolan, Norreys, 263 n.9
\textsuperscript{136} As in Hay, Life of Robert Sidney, 44.
\textsuperscript{137} CSPFor., 18:642, no. 780.
\textsuperscript{138} CSPFor., 19:635, 20:25; Hanl. 168, f. 159v.
\textsuperscript{139} ARA, SG 4891, n.f., SG 12536, f. 283.
States' pay, in October his company was converted to cautionary status, as part of the garrison of Flushing. Simmes was killed in action in May 1586 and his company was transferred to Avery Randolph and then returned into Dutch pay.140

Slingsby, Anthony (fl. 1605-14)

A States'-pay captain from 1605 to 1608 inclusive. Like Astley, his band was cased with the retrenchments consequent upon peace negotiations but, also like Astley, he regained his company by 1614, when he served in the second Jülich campaign.141

Smith, John (fl. 1575-85)

Captain of an independent company in the States of Holland's pay in the mid-1570s. Confusingly, a Scottish captain Smith served in this same period, but they are virtually always distinguished, explicitly or implicitly. The English Smith first obtained a company in 1575.142 He maintained it through 1576,143 but in common with the other captains of independent companies Smith was paid off in the early summer of 1577.144

However, unlike Bishop, Gainsford and Cromwell he did not regain his company immediately. He joined John Norreys's regiment in 1578 and fought with Norreys as a gentleman volunteer and perhaps a staff officer for the next few years; as was the custom he was still called Captain Smith. He carried letters for Norreys to the Prince of Orange and the States-General at least once, in January 1582.145 With the expansion of 1582, Smith regained a company of his own, in either John North's or Thomas Cotton's regiment -- more likely the latter since they fought together in the Steenwijk campaign. He is probably the 'Jehan de Smit' who took responsibility for the supplies sent to the (mostly English) garrison of Bergen-op-Zoom in 1582.146

140 CSPFor., 20:25, 81, 668.
141 ARH, AJO 2979; ARA, SG 8043, SG 8044; Peacham, sig. D3v.
142 ARH, RKA 346a/1b; see Ferguson, Papers, 39.
143 ARH, SvH 281, ff. 5K2r, 5Lr.
144 Ibid., f. 5Mr.
145 ARA, SG 3106, f. 25r.
146 ARA, CvDorp 986, n.f. (rubric 'Estat en brief des vivres distribuez [...] pour la garnison de la ville de Berghes', Apr.-Jun. 1582).
Smith, Richard (fl. 1595-99)

Smith was a captain in the Netherlands in the 1590s who served variously in royal and States' pay. He was a captain in Sir Francis Vere's regiment in 1595 and then, after the transfer of 1598/99, in Sir Horace Vere's regiment. Between 18 and 29 June 1599 Smith gave up his company to Giles Breton, who had arrived at Flushing with fifty recruits. Smith returned into queen's pay, commanding a cautionary company at Flushing, while Breton took over his company.\(^{147}\)

Smith, Thomas (fl. c.1586)

Captain of a States'-pay company in the Netherlands in 1586. He brought over a company of 165 men; the affrekening for the transportgeld 'agreed by contract', is still extant.\(^{148}\) He may earlier have been a captain in the royal army in Ireland.\(^{149}\)

Spencer, Richard (fl. 1577-89), of Northamptonshire

Spencer may have fought as a volunteer in the sixth civil war in France in 1577.\(^{150}\) He certainly served as a captain in the Netherlands in 1586, taking over command of William Martin's company, for which he was commissioned by the Council of State on 23 September (new style).\(^{151}\) He served well and his company was maintained in States' service during 1587.\(^{152}\) His brother, John, had served as a gentleman volunteer with Norreys in 1583 -- Richard was one of Norreys's captains on the Portugal expedition in 1589.\(^{153}\)

Spry, Henry (fl. 1605-14)

Captain of a company in States' service beginning in 1605 and at least up to the autumn of 1614.\(^{154}\)

\(^{147}\) ARA, SG 8040. ARH, AJO 2950 (rubric 'Voet volck vuyten Repartitie').
\(^{148}\) BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r; Lans. MS 1218, f. 123r. ARA, SG 12536, f. 89.
\(^{149}\) Churchyard's Choice, sig. H4v.
\(^{150}\) CSPFor., 11:600, no. 1476.
\(^{151}\) BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r; ARA, RS 1524/4, f. 130v.
\(^{152}\) BL, Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r; ARH, AJO 2943, f. [2r].
\(^{153}\) ARA, RvS 2, ff.175-76; BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 120v.
\(^{154}\) ARA, GRK 1232; lists of captains, 1607-8 and 1610, in app. 7, below; Peacham, sig. D3v.
Stafford (fl. 1575)

His Christian name may have been Humphrey or may have started with 'R'. He was with Condé and John Casimir in mid-summer 1575 but returned to England carrying letters for Condé in August. It was only a brief visit: he was back in the Palatinate by September and later served in the princes' army on its invasion of France, at least up until March 1576.155

Stanley, Sir Edward (fl. 1586), of Lancashire

Edward was a popular Christian name with the Stanleys; he or a namesake served as a gentleman volunteer in Henry of Navarre's guard during the sixth civil war in France (1577). He raised a company of English troops in States' pay in 1586 to complement the Irish troops of his brother Sir William Stanley, whose regimental lieutenant colonel he was. Edward Stanley performed deeds of great heroism at the taking of Zutphen in October 1586 and was knighted by Leicester; in the late autumn of 1586 his company was scheduled to be kept in States' service the following year.157 However, in December Sir William betrayed Deventer to the Spanish and Edward Stanley was involved to the hilt. He took his own company into Spanish service, but in May 1591 it was disbanded due to lack of numbers. Unlike some of Sir William's captains he did not seek a pardon and in 1601 was still agitating for a new captaincy in Spanish pay.158

Staunton (fl. 1572)

One of Gilbert's captains in Zeeland in 1572, he was wounded in action in late July. It probably weakened his health, for by early September, or earlier, he was in command of the English garrison in Flushing.159 It seems likely that he is the 'C[aptain] Stantö the elder' listed as one of the 'marshall men to be presently employed' (c. 1586), but details of his later career are not known.160

155 CSPSP, 2:502, no. 420; BL, Cott. MS Titus B vii, f. 403r; CSPFor., 11:35, 360, no. 64, 874.
156 BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 115r.
157 Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r; Tenison, 6:204, 210; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r, Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r; Leycester Corr., 427-28; Rowse, Expansion, 353.
158 See Henry, 55, 119, 150.
159 Longleat, DP 2, f. 7v. KL, no. 2458, 6:506; CSPFor., 10:173-4, no. 550.
160 BL, Lans. MS 113, f. 148r.
Stratford, John (fl. 1586), of Gloucestershire(?)

As discussed below, Sir John Tracy of Gloucestershire raised five hundred men for States' service in the spring of 1586, but did not put them all in one company. Stratford took command of one of the companies -- it had been under Nicholas Tracy, but Stratford took command of a detachment which was sufficiently large to assume its own independent existence. By March 1587 it had been cassed.161

Sutton, Thomas (d. c. 1585)

A captain about whom little is known. He was killed during the siege of Ghent, which lasted from late 1584 until the city's surrender in March 1585; references to his company by veterans who served under him imply he had served earlier, but in what capacity or in which regiment are unknown.162

Swanne, Henry (fl. c. 1585-1600), of Hertfordshire

He had been appointed the Muster Master of Hertfordshire, 31 May 1585.163 This is suggestive of previous military experience. He took over Thomas Powell's company of foot at States' charge by November 1586, but it was cassed by March 1587.164 The fifteen men pressed by the JPs of Hertfordshire for him in June 1587 were for his company in the relief expedition to Sluys.165 He commanded a company raised in Cambridgeshire in Normandy in 1592; he was the subject of claims of financial irregularities by his soldiers, many of whom deserted.166 Despite this, he was probably the Captain Swanne who was captain of a band in Sir Francis Vere's regiment in the Netherlands from 1594 -- doubtless the recipient of the hundred men conscripted from Hertfordshire that year for Vere's regiment.167 He continued in it until 1599, now serving in Sir Horace Vere's regiment; he is not listed as being replaced during the course of the campaign, so he presumably lived to winter, but he did not serve thereafter -- whether due to death or retirement is

161 See BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r; ARH, AJO 2943, f. [3r].
162 BL, Lans. MS 1218, ff. 119r, 121v, 132r; Molley, United Netherlands, 1:23.
163 King, 43-45.
164 BL, Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r; Tenison, 6:210; ARH, AJO 2943.
165 King, 83; ARA, RAGP I:206 (i), f. [3v].
166 CSPDom. 1591-94, 89; Lloyd, Rouen Campaign, 87, 95-96.
167 Lloyd, Rouen Campaign, 95-96.
unknown.  

Symons (d. 1573)

The captain of a company of foot, comprising about one hundred shot, which entered Haarlem in January 1573. There is no subsequent record of him and it is virtually certain that he died during the siege or was killed after in the Spanish massacre of the surrendered garrison.

Tanner, Roger (fl. 1576-87)

He was a captain in Ireland in the 1570s and early 1580s and a client of the Earl of Warwick. In May 1586 Tanner brought a ‘fresh company’ out of England to Netherlands. It was a States’-pay unit which served under his command throughout the campaign season of 1586 and was retained by the Dutch in their pay through 1587 as well.

Tatton, William (fl. 1586-88), of Cheshire

In 1586 was authorised to raise a voluntary company for States’ service in Cheshire and he was reported to have done so by June. His company never served in the Netherlands, however, unless he passed command to another officer and this is uncertain. Tatton was a client of Leicester’s and a mourner at the earl’s funeral.

Taylor, Thomas (fl. 1582-83)

Taylor was a captain in John North’s regiment in 1582. In 1583 his band was detached to the garrison of Alost, where he played a leading part in the notorious conspiracy that betrayed the town to the Spanish. Unlike some

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164 Tables 10.40-43 (1595-99) in app. 7, below; ARA, AJO 2950, n.f. (rubric ‘Voet volck vuyten Repartitie’).
165 Tragicall Historie, 3:85v; Ekama, 124.
170 HMCs, 13:141; CSPPr., 350.
171 APC, 14:55; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 99r.
172 CSPFor., 20:667. Bodl., Tanner MS 79, f. 160r; BL, Add. MS 48048, f. 86r and Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r; ARH, AJO 2943, f. [2r].
173 APC, 14:55; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 99r.
174 Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 455.
175 ARA, CvDorp, 986, n.f (rubric ‘Estat en brief des vivres distribuez [...] pour la garnison de la ville de Berghes’, Apr.-Jun. 1582); BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 121r.
176 CSPFor., 18:238, 240, 246, nos. 271, 273, 278.
of his fellow conspirators he was able to persuade most of his troops to follow him and they served as a unit in Spanish pay at least until 1585.\textsuperscript{177}

Tracy, Giles (fl. 1586), of Gloucestershire

He was a younger son of Sir John Tracy of Toddington, Gloucestershire (d. 1591). His father was a long-standing advocate of godly Protestantism and, in 1586, though of advanced age, raised raised five hundred men from his estates and the vicinity between April and June 1586.\textsuperscript{178} Although a veteran himself,\textsuperscript{179} he did not command them in person, but assigned them to the next generation of the family. One was Giles Tracy, whose company fought at Zutphen and was kept in States’ pay throughout 1587.\textsuperscript{180} He was a servant of Leicester’s.\textsuperscript{181}

Sir John (c.1561-1648), of Gloucestershire

The heir of Sir John Tracy the elder (d. 1591) and himself knighted in 1586, he was the second captain of the Tracy contingent in the Netherlands. His company also fought in the Zutphen campaign but it was cased during the following winter. He, too, was a servant of Leicester’s and both Sir John junior and his father played important parts at his funeral. Sir John was later a successful courtier.\textsuperscript{182} His sister later married Sir Horace Vere.

Tracy, Nicholas (fl. 1586), of Gloucestershire

Nicholas may not have been a brother of Sir John and Giles Tracy, but he was surely related to them. He, too, commanded a company from the contingent, raised by the family, in the Netherlands in 1586. It was eventually split into two and John Stratford commanded the balance. Nicholas Tracy’s band was cased during the winter of 1586/87.\textsuperscript{183}

\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., 19:196.
\textsuperscript{178} Litzenberger, 43, 63, 127, 129, 138; APC, 14:70; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 99r.
\textsuperscript{179} HMCF, 6.
\textsuperscript{180} Bodl., MS Tanner 78, f. 160r; Tenison, 6:204, 210; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r, Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r; ARH, AJO 2943, f. [2r].
\textsuperscript{181} Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 485.
\textsuperscript{182} Bodl., MS Tanner 78, f. 160r; Tenison, 6:204; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r; ARH, AJO 2943, f. [2v]. Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 449-52, 485.
\textsuperscript{183} Tenison, 6:204, 210; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r; ARH, AJO 2943, f. [3r].
Tracy, Thomas (fl. 1603)

He replaced Captain Richards in Sir Horace Vere's regiment over the winter of 1602/3 and served until the end of the year. He was presumably of the Tracy family of Gloucestershire but details are not known.

Turner (fl. 1570s)

He first served in the Netherlands in 1573, though whether he was then a captain or not is unclear; he remained in Dutch service until 1581. This included a spell as lieutenant (and perhaps commander) of one of Norreys's troops of horse in Friesland in 1580. A number of Turners were in the royal military establishment in the 1570s and early '80s, but which one this Turner is to be identified with is uncertain.

Turner, Clement (1604-7)

He became captain of a company in States' service in 1604. It served up to and including 1607, but not thereafter.

Tyrrell (fl. 1583)

He was a captain in Norreys's regiment in the summer of 1583. His previous and later experience are unknown.

Tyrrell (d. 1600)

He became a captain in Sir Francis Vere's regiment in States' pay in the summer of 1599. He commanded the company on the Nieuwpoort campaign and was killed in the battle.

Upsher, John (fl. 1596-99), of Essex

From the same county as the Veres, Upsher became a captain in Sir Francis Vere's mercenary regiment in 1596, though he may well have served in the

184 ARH, AJO 2946; RSG, 12:507.
186 ARA: CAan. 879, ff. 57v, 74r, 123v; GRK 1232; SG 8043.
187 CSPFor., 18:30-31, no. 38.
188 ARH, AJO 2950; Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 155; Dalton, 1:56; Chamberlain Letters, no. 31, 1:103
Netherlands previously. He was appointed in time to command a company in the attack on Cadiz. He continued in service into 1599, remaining in Sir Francis's regiment that year. However, at sometime between 18 June and 9 October 1599 he vanishes from the records and was replaced by Charles Fairfax. It is virtually certain that he died on campaign.

Vaughan (d. 1585), of Wales

A captain in Morgan's regiment in the spring of 1585. From his name and connection to Morgan, he was surely Welsh; he was not one of the original captains and probably had replaced William Martin. Vaughan was slain in the attack on Kouwensteyn Dike.

Vavasour, Richard (d. 1602)

One of the auxiliary companies at Flushing which was transferred into Dutch pay in the autumn of 1598 was commanded by Sir Thomas Vavasour. This company served through the next four years but by the time its captain died on active service in 1602 it was Richard Vavasour. I posit that Sir Thomas, like Sir Matthew Morgan, passed command of his company to a kinsman before himself continuing in royal service, rather than Richard taking over from him at some later date, though this remains a possibility.

Vere, Daniel (fl. 1596-1603)

He was obviously a cousin of Francis, Horace and Robert Vere, but his exact relationship is uncertain. He may have served as a volunteer in Dutch pay some years before he was made a captain in Sir Francis Vere's States'-pay regiment in 1596. He served as a captain until 1603. He may have chosen to go home with Sir Francis, but his actual fate is unknown.

\[158\] Vere Commentaries 115. On Upsher's county of origin and connections see above, chs. 8-9, pp. 275, 304.

\[159\] Lists of captains for 1596-99, in app. 7, below.

\[160\] CSPFor., 19:481.


\[162\] ARA, SG 4891, RvS 1232 and GRK 1232; ARH, AJO 2950, 2946; Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 155; Dalton, 1:60; BSG, 12:194; Chamberlain Letters, no. 54, 1:170.

\[163\] See ARA, CO 73, f. [1v]; RvS 1226, f. 132r; lists of captains for 1596-1600, 1602-3, in app. 7, below; Dalton, 1:60.
Vere, John (fl. 1594-1616)

An illegitimate son of John Vere, elder brother of Francis, Horace and Robert Vere, he was probably conceived in the Netherlands during his father's time as a lieutenant in Dutch pay (c. 1582) and he was educated at the university of Leiden. He obtained a States'-pay captaincy in 1604, possibly succeeding to Daniel Vere's company, and served until the end of 1607. His company was then one of those cassed, for unknown reasons. He served as a gentleman ranker till 1611, when he was made captain of Sir Callisthenes Brooke's company. In 1616 commanded one of two English companies in a force led by John Ernest of Nassau to serve the Dutch Republic's ally, Venice, against the Habsburgs in the War of Gradisca.

Vere, Robert (1564-95), of Essex

A brother of Sir Francis and Sir Horatio Vere, Robert served in the auxiliary forces in the Netherlands before commanding a company in Sir Francis's mercenary regiment in 1594-95. He was taken prisoner and killed by the Spanish in August 1595.

Vincent (d. 1584)

A captain in Dutch pay in 1583. His regimental affiliation is unknown, but his company was garrisoned at Alost and Vincent joined in betraying the town to the Spanish in the autumn of 1583. The following year he was captured by Dutch troops and executed.

Waldegrave (fl. 1603)

He was appointed captain of Sir Robert Drury's company in Sir Francis Vere's regiment after Drury's death in 1602 and remained captain until the end of the campaign season of 1605. He may be the same man as the 'Walgrave' who was a States'-pay captain in 1586-87.

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195 See CSPFor., 16:260, no. 263; Tammel, 350; Carleton to Chamberlain, 221 n.3.
196 Tammel, 251; HMC, 3:316; ARA, CAnn. 879, f. 110r; RSG, n.s., 1:79, 171, 241, 292, 367, 525, 589; HMC Downshire, 3:142; Carleton to Chamberlain, 220.
197 Markham, Fighting Veres., 195; ARA, SG 8040; L&A, 6:72, 75, nos 22-3, 28.
198 CSPFor., 18:240, 641, nos. 273, 779.
199 ARH, AJ0 2946; ARA, GRK 1232.
Walgrave (fl. 1587)

An English captain who was in States' pay in 1587. He had presumably replaced a captain from 1586 in command of his company. (He may well be the son of John Walgrave, a Berwick captain and client of Leicester's, whose christening in May 1560 attracted a gift from the then Robert Dudley.) He may be the same as the Waldegrave who later served from 1603.

Ward, John (fl. 1586)

Ward took over command of Charles Blount's States'-pay company in 1586 (though he may have been Blount's captain-lieutenant and not ever been formally commissioned). The company served on garrison duties and was cassed at the end of the year. His relationship, if any, to Richard Ward who was a captain contemporaneously, is unknown.

Ward, Richard (fl. 1586)

Ward raised a company of volunteers from Berkshire and Oxfordshire in the spring of 1586 and had transported them to the Netherlands by June. His company served in the field throughout the summer and early autumn and was scheduled to be kept in States' pay in 1587. But it had been cassed by March 1587. It is not known if he was related to John Ward or, if so, how.

Wayman, John (fl. 1586-98?)

He was captain of a States'-pay company in the Netherlands in 1586. It was cassed at the end of the year. He is presumably the Captain Wayman or Wainman who made a successful career in royal service during the 1590s, serving mostly in the Netherlands but also at Cadiz.

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200 ARA, RAGP 1:206 (i), f. [3v].
201 Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 166 and 152n.
202 BL, Add. MS 48084, ff. 84r, 86r; ARH, AJO 2943, f. [2v].
203 APC, 14:55; BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r.
204 Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r; Tenison, 6:204, 210; BL, Add. MS 48084, ff. 84r, 86r, and Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r; ARH, AJO 2943, f. [2v].
205 BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r, and Lans. MS 1218, ff. 129v, 138v; Brugmans, 1:287; ARH, AJO 2943, f. [3r].
206 See Birch, 2:16; Rutherford, Miscellaneous Papers of Capt. Stockwell, 1:78; Chamberlain Letters, no. 39, 1:125.
Welch (fl. 1580-83)

A gentleman volunteer named Welch served well with Norreys in the north-eastern Netherlands in 1580. He may be the same as the Captain Welch (or Welsh), who was captain of a company in Flanders by late 1581, evidently replacing Captain Llewellyn. This company had always been one of John Norreys's and returned into his regiment on its return to the southern, but Welch in 1583 was willing to switch to Thomas Morgan's regiment for better conditions. His company was placed in garrison at Alost in the summer of 1583, but Welch was not part of Pigott's conspiracy; he rejoined the States' forces and was still in the Netherlands in 1586 though not as a captain, a post he seems to have lost in the aftermath of Alost.207

West, Robert (fl. 1572)

The captain-lieutenant of Gilbert's personal company in Zeeland; he carried Sir Humphrey's dispatches to Burghley in September 1572.208

Whyte, John (fl. 1603-8)

He first obtained a States'-pay company in 1602 and thereafter was in Dutch employ until 1608, but thereafter there is no record of him. His company was presumably cassed with the peace.209

Wigmore, Sir Richard (fl. 1601-10)

He was captain of one of the companies pressed in England in 1601 for the defence of Ostend. The company served in the Dutch army thereafter until at least 1610, but by then it may well have passed to the brother who was with Richard Wigmore in 1601.210

Williams, William (fl. 1583), of Monmouthshire

He was a cousin german of Roger Williams. In 1582 and the spring of 1583

207 Blandy, Hiii r; CSPFor., 15:401, no. 427, 18:26, 30, nos. 32, 38; SL, 1:178.
208 Longleat, DP 2, ff. 7v, 9r; BL Lans. MS 1218, f. 115r; KL, no. 2476, 6:532.
209 RSG, 12:186; ARA, CO 51, n.f.; KB, HS 132.G.27; and lists of captains for 1605, 1607-8, in app. 7, below.
he commanded Williams's company of lancers in States' pay. In July 1583 he returned to England, seeking royal employment and he seems not to have returned to the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{211}

Wilsford, Edward (d. 1601/2), of Kent

The son of Sergeant-Major Sir Thomas Wilsford, he was the lieutenant of Sir Francis Vere's cautionary company of foot at Brill. He is probably the Captain Wilsford who raised a new company of foot for service at Ostend in 1601 and was killed there.\textsuperscript{212}

Wilson, Thomas (fl. 1580s)

He was a captain in the Netherlands in Thomas Morgan's regiment, initially perhaps in 1582, certainly by 1583. The reduction of Morgan's regiment from five companies to two in the winter of 1583/4 led to his discharge. He was highly regarded in the Netherlands, however, and not just by English officers and he regained a company later in 1584. He was due to be paid off in November, but was retained and his company only 'cassed' at the end of February or beginning of March 1585.\textsuperscript{213} He then immediately obtained a States'-pay company in Norreys's expeditionary force and was wounded in fighting in late 1585. He probably had first served as a gentleman volunteer with Norreys, for he was fiercely loyal to 'Black Jack' and in the spring of 1586 defied the authority of George Digby, newly commissioned colonel by Leicester.\textsuperscript{214}

Wilson was certainly in queen's pay by September 1586, but his band, like several of Norreys's, had probably been transferred in autumn the previous year, when Wilson was appointed one of the Corporals of the Field -- a queen's-pay office.\textsuperscript{215}

Wingfield, Sir Richard (1551?-1634), of Huntingdonshire

Wingfield was the product of a military family and related to Lord Willoughby.

\textsuperscript{211} RSG, 4:53-54. CSPFor., 18:7, no. 9.
\textsuperscript{212} Markham, Fighting Veres, 253n.; Holles, Memorials, 73.
\textsuperscript{213} BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 130r; above, in ch. 4, p. 154; CSPFor., 18:241, 247, nos. 274, 279, 19:407, 413; ARA, RvS 2a, ff. 3r, 16v, 19v.
\textsuperscript{214} TDH 72, 74. CSPFor., 20:25, 667; BL, Harl. MS 168, f. 159v.
\textsuperscript{215} Tenison, 6:204; Shaw, 'Financial and Political Relationships', xxxii.
'Trained up from his youth to the profession of a soldier, Wingfield first saw active service ... in Ireland.'\textsuperscript{216} He was a captain in Norreys's expedition to the Netherlands in the summer of 1585, commanding a States'-pay company. It was converted into queen's pay when put into the cautionary garrison of Flushing that autumn. However, the following spring, it was converted back to States' pay by Leicester, partly because he perceived Wingfield as too pro-Norreys.\textsuperscript{217}

It served as a mercenary company throughout 1586 but though the States did not continue it in their pay in 1587 it was not cassed, instead being transferred (again!) to auxiliary status.\textsuperscript{218} Wingfield's distinguished military career thereafter, in Portugal, France, Ireland and Spain, was in royal service. Although he got a company in the Netherlands once more in December 1604 it was in the cautionary garrison of Flushing.\textsuperscript{219}

Winter, George or Randolph (fl. 1573), of Gloucestershire

One of the two known captains in Montgommery's force of English infantry in 1573 (the other is Nicholas Palmer). Montgommery took Belle Isle as part of his effort to relieve La Rochelle. English troops led by 'one of Sir Willyam Winters brethren' stormed the island.\textsuperscript{220} Sir William Winter, a Vice-Admiral, had escorted convoys of arms and ammunition to La Rochelle in 1569.\textsuperscript{221} His brothers included George, himself an officer in the naval establishment, and Randolph, about whom less is known.\textsuperscript{222}

Winter, John (fl. 1603-10), of Gloucestershire

He took over command of Captain Garnet's company in Sir Francis Vere's regiment in late 1602 or early 1603. Although there were rumours of his death in 1605 he remained a captain in Dutch pay until the end of the period.\textsuperscript{223} There is a good chance that this is the John Winter who had been

\textsuperscript{216} DNB, 21:661.
\textsuperscript{217} CSPFoL, 20:25, 81, 668; BL, Add. MS 5753, f. 212r.
\textsuperscript{218} BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 88r, Egerton MS 1694, f. 55r; Tenison, 6:210; ARH, AJO 2943, n.f.
\textsuperscript{219} DNB, 21:661; HMCR, 291; Birch, 2:16. BL, Add. MS 5753, f. 305r.
\textsuperscript{220} Choice, sig. L4v; BN, MS Fr. 20787, f. 2r.
\textsuperscript{221} Above, ch. 3, p. 103.
\textsuperscript{222} BL, Harl. MS 1041, ff. 49-50.
\textsuperscript{223} ARH, AJO 2946; HMCD, 3:179; ARA, GRK 1232; lists of captains for 1607-8, 1610, in app. 7, below.
the bailiff of Brill. In this case he was a grandson or great-nephew of the Captain Winter of the 1570s, though since there were several John Winters in that family the exact relationship is uncertain.224

Woore, or Woere (fl. 1573)

A captain in Morgan's regiment in 1573.225 He may be the Captain Eure from 1572 (see above), but this is conjecture.

Wolley, Edward (fl. 1585)

He commanded a States'-pay foot-band in Norreys's expeditionary force in 1585, but either did so as a captain-lieutenant or the command passed to his own lieutenant fairly early.226

Woodhouse, Francis (fl. 1605-8), of Norfolk

He joined his kinsman, Sir William Woodhouse, in Dutch pay and obtained a company in the expanded English contingent in 1605. It served throughout the next three years, but in 1608 it was one of the companies disbanded with the advent of peace negotiations.227

Woodhouse, Henry (fl. 1606-16)

He obtained a States'-pay captaincy in 1606, probably replacing Sir William Woodhouse. His company remained in Dutch employ at least to 1610 and it was probably Henry Woodhouse who commanded a company in the expeditionary force led by John Ernest of Nassau to aid the Dutch Republic's new ally, Venice, against the Habsburgs, in the autumn of 1616.228

Wotton, James (fl. 1585)

With his brother, John, Wotton joined Norreys's expedition to the Netherlands in September 1585. John commanded a queen's-pay, James a States'-pay,

224 BL: Add. MS 5753, f. 295r; Harl. MS 1041, ff.49-50.
225 ARA, CO 29.
226 CSPFor., 20:25, 129; BL, Harl. MS 168, f. 159v; Shaw, 'Financial & Political Relationships', xxxii.
227 ARA: GRK 1232; CAan. 879, ff. 81v, 84r, 88v, 123v; RvS 24, p. 192; SG 8043, SG 8044.
228 See above, p. 393; lists of captains for 1605-10, in app. 7, below; Carleton to Chamberlain, 220.
company. His band was never transferred into royal pay, but James himself returned home at some point early in 1586; his successor is not clear.\textsuperscript{229}

Wroth, John (fl. 1602), of Middlesex

Wroth was identified by N. E. McClure as the second son of Sir Robert Wroth the elder of Enfield, Essex and thus related by marriage to the Sidneys and Earls of Pembroke.\textsuperscript{230} Wroth raised one of the several new companies that the States-General contracted for in 1602, commanding it into the following year. It is not known if he then died, or if his company was one of the several cased.\textsuperscript{231}

Wynn, Peter (d. 1609), of Flintshire

Wynn was captain of one of the companies in Sir William Stanley's regiment of Irish troops -- unlike Sir Edward Stanley or Thomas Gwynne, he did not command an Anglo-Welsh unit. He had probably served previously in the royal army in Ireland. In 1587 he was complicit in the betrayal of Deventer and served for for the following two seasons in Spanish pay.\textsuperscript{232}

But like other Welshmen who had joined Stanley in Spanish service, Wynn soon regretted his decision. He put out feelers for forgiveness and was pardoned in December 1589. He acquired the patronage of Sir Francis Walsingham and later the Earl of Essex and served in the royal expeditions to Normandy in 1591-92 and Cadiz in 1596.\textsuperscript{233} After Essex's fall he joined the affinity of Sir Charles Blount, now Lord Mountjoy and Earl of Devonshire, who was able to persuade the Dutch ambassador, Sir Noel Caron, to obtain a States'-pay captaincy for Wynn in July 1605 (quite possibly replacing the recently deceased Henry Sutton). Wynn served in that capacity into the spring of 1608 but by the summer his company had been cased.\textsuperscript{234}

Wynn (fl. 1609-14), of North Wales

Captain of one of the new States'-pay companies in 1610. He was probably

\textsuperscript{229} BL, Harley MS 168, f. 160r; Shaw, 'Financial and Political Relationships', xxxv.
\textsuperscript{230} Chamberlain Letters, 1:146n.
\textsuperscript{231} Ibid., no. 47, 1:146; RSG, 12:186; ARH, AJO 2946.
\textsuperscript{232} Hammer, 'Welshman Abroad', 63-67; Henry, 150.
\textsuperscript{233} DCPR 1588-90. 475; Hammer, 'Welshman Abroad', 67-71, 74-82.
\textsuperscript{234} Hammer, 'Welshman Abroad', 85; ARA, SG 8043, SG 8044.
from a north Welsh family, like his namesake. Certainly a survey of records of the Wynn family of Gwydir revealed a strong interest in the Netherlands in this period, dating back to service by family members with Leicester in 1586, though no basis for a positive identification was found.235

Yorke, Edmund (fl. 1579-92)

A brother of the notorious Lieutenant Colonel Rowland Yorke, Edmund had been a servant of Leicester’s since at least 1579.226 In 1582 he crossed to the Netherlands, probably with Leicester, and during the spring was captain of a cornet of horse in Anjou’s army -- possibly composed of English aristocrats.227 Although this service was short-lived, he later served in an uncertain capacity with Norreys’s expeditionary force in the Netherlands in 1585 and in 1586 became quartermaster-general or forage-master of the royal army commanded by Leicester.228

Young, John (fl. 1570)

He commanded a small naval squadron, but with a force of infantry attached, operating near La Rochelle in 1570.229 He may have been from Devon, as suggested in chapter 8, but he may alternatively be identified with a John Young from Sussex, who was noted for his naval experience and may well have had links with the Huguenots.229

Young (fl. 1586)

He took over command of Edward Abarrow’s company in the summer of 1586, having presumably been Abarrow’s lieutenant. His company was cassed at the end of the year.240 Since Abarrow’s company was raised in and around Southampton, Young may well have been related to the John Young of 1570, but this is speculative.

226 Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 352n.
227 BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 134r; above, ch. 4, p. 150.
228 CSPFor., 19:55, 62-64; Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 352.
229 Above, ch. 3, p. 105.
241 BL, Add. MS 48084, f. 86r; Tenison, 6:204; Bodl., Tanner MS 78, f. 160r; Brugmans, 1:287; ARH, AJO 2943, f. [2v].
Zouche, John (fl. 1560s-70s), of Wiltshire

He distinguished himself in action on Ré in 1577, evidently commanding his own company, though this is not certain -- he may have been purely a naval commander. He had earlier served with distinction in royal armies, at the siege of Leith in 1560, at Le Havre in 1562 and against the northern rebels in 1569. He was an intimate friend of a number of mercenary captains.

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242 His was probably the son of Sir John Zouche of Anstey, Wilts. (d. 1585).
243 CSPFor., 12:201.
244 Churchyard's Challenge. 104; PRO, SP 70/48/88; Tenison, i, i, 42.
245 E.g. Gascoigne, Selected Poetry and Prose, 67; BL, Harl. MS 6992, f. 110r.
APPENDIX 7

COMPANIES AND REGIMENTS IN FOREIGN PROTESTANT SERVICE EACH YEAR

Note: this derives from the information already supplied in appendixes 1, 5 and 6. Footnotes are thus kept to a minimum and relate to particular points, either problematic or of particular interest. The exception is for the period after official intervention in the Netherlands, when complete lists of regiments and/or of English captains in Dutch pay for a given year survive, either as abstracts of musters or in the Dutch Republic's annual military budgets (state van oorlog). Where such documents are the source(s) for a list of captains for a year then they are cited here -- and sometimes are the source(s) for statements in appendixes 6-7.

In the sources, both English and Welsh names are inconsistently and often ambiguously transcribed and Christian names rarely given; whether payments are for the year of recording or for previous years is not always distinguished clearly; and there are sometimes significant lacunæ. Thus, a list of captains for each year can rarely be definitive. Those that follow, however, are relatively authoritative and at least offer a quick, approximate, check-list for who was where when.

Companies are listed divided into regiments where these are known; independent companies are listed separately. Companies in each regiment or group are numbered to allow for easy calculation; they are placed in alphabetical order, save that in regiments, following contemporary practice, the colonel and his two field officers (where known) are listed first. However, though captains replaced in the course of a campaign and their substitutes are all listed in alphabetical order, the replacements are unnumbered so as not to distort the total number of companies.

\[1\] There are complete or near-complete lists from 1595-1603 (though 1601-2 is complicated by the flood of extra troops sent in to Ostend), 1605 and 1607-10.
France 1562-70

Table 10.1: Captains of units
1. Henry Killigrew (battalion strength)
2. Biston
3. Philip Buddockshide
4. Henry Champernowne
5. George North
6. John Young

Netherlands 1572

10.2: Gilbert's regiment
1. Humphrey Gilbert, colonel
2. Thomas Morgan
3. Thomas Cotton, lieutenant colonel
4. Bedwell
5. Bouchier
6. Edward Chester
7. Cox
8. Eures
9. Handly
10. Walter Morgan Wolfe
11. Staunton

10.3: Captains of other units
1. Bellingham
2. 'Drise'
3. William Morgan
4. John Morris
5. William Price
6. Reade [or Reid]

Netherlands and France, 1573

10.4: Morgan's regiment, 1573*
1. Thomas Morgan, colonel

2. Rowland Yorke, lieutenant colonel
3. Edward Chester
   George Acres [vice Owen]
4. R. Digby
5. George Gascoigne
6. John Morris
7. Owen [repl. by Acres]
8. William Price
9. John Raynes
10. Woore

Netherlands and France 1574

10.7: Chester's regiment in Holland
1. Chester, colonel
2. Ralph Haselby, lieutenant colonel
3. Stephen Ellis
4. Edward Fenton
5. Giles Gainsford
6. George Gascoigne
7. William Price
8. John Raynes
9. Sheffield

10.8: Independent companies
1. William Baud
2. Thomas Cotton
3. Ralph Cromwell
4. R. Digby
5. William Faunte
6. Liggins
7. Walter Morgan Wolfe
Netherlands and France 1575-77

10.9: Independent companies in Netherlands, 1575
1. William Baud
2. Edward Chester
3. Ralph Cromwell
4. Giles Gainsford
5. John Smith

2. Richard Bingham, lieut. colonel
3. Palmer, sergeant-major
4. Roger Bingham
5. Fitzwilliam
6. William Markham

10.10: Independent companies in Netherlands, 1576
1. Edward Bartlett [repl. by Lloyd]
2. J. Beyns
3. John Brookesby
4. Edward Chester
5. Ralph Cromwell
6. Giles Gainsford
   John Lloyd [vice Bartlett]
7. John Smith

1. Edward Bartlett [repl. by Lloyd]
2. J. Beyns
3. John Brookesby
4. Edward Chester
5. Ralph Cromwell
6. Giles Gainsford
   John Lloyd [vice Bartlett]
7. John Smith

10.11: Independent companies in Netherlands, 1577
1. Edmund Bishop
2. John Brookesby
3. Edward Chester
4. Ralph Cromwell
5. Giles Gainsford
6. John Lloyd
7. John Smith

1. Edmund Bishop
2. John Brookesby
3. Edward Chester
4. Ralph Cromwell
5. Giles Gainsford
6. John Lloyd
7. John Smith

10.12: Units in France, 1577:
1. Christopher Carleill
2. John Norreys
3. John Zouche

1. Christopher Carleill
2. John Norreys
3. John Zouche

Netherlands, 1578

10.13: Cavendish's regiment
1. Henry Cavendish, colonel

It had six companies, UBL, MS Vulc. 104/37, ff 2v, 4r; RSG 2.201. Liggins's band (of Norreys's regiment) fought with it at Rijmenam, probably simply because it had already arrived at the camp, while the rest of the regiment was still to follow Churchyard's Choice, sigs. Si-Sii.

Netherlands, 1579

10.14: Norreys's regiment
Twelve companies, comprising three originally distinct components: six companies, under Thomas Morgan; three companies, under John Cobham; and three companies raised by Norreys personally.


Cobham's companies: Captains John Cobham, Edward Cobham and Sampson.

1. John Norreys, colonel
2. Morgan, lieutenant colonel
3. William Almond
4. Edward Cobham
5. John Cobham
6. Doyley
7. John Lloyd
8. Liggins
9. John Morris
10. Anthony Powell
11. Anthony Sampson
12. Rowland Yorke

10.15: Captains of other units
1. Edmund Bishop
2. Thomas Cotton (two companies of foot, one of horse)
3. Ralph Cromwell
4. Giles Gainsford

Specified as Norreys's second-in-command ('Lieutenant General'): RAGP III 28, f. 3r.
5. Doyley
6. Fitzwilliam
7. Giles Gainsford
8. John Lloyd
9. John Morris
10. Anthony Powell
11. Ralph Salisbury
12. Rowland Yorke
13. [Company Captain]
14. [Company Captain]

10.17: Captains of other units
1. John Brookesby
2. Ralph Cromwell
3. Thomas Cotton (two of foot, one of horse)
4. Walter Higman
5. Kent

10.18: Norreys's regiment (i), spring and early summer, in Flanders and Tournai
1. John Norreys, colonel
2. Thos. Morgan, lieutenant colonel
3. Edmund Bishop
4. Christopher Carleill
5. Doyley
6. Fitzwilliam
7. Giles Gainsford
8. Walter Higman
9. John Lloyd
10. John Morris
11. Anthony Powell
12. Ralph Salisbury
13. Rowland Yorke
14. [Company Captain -- Bowes?]
15. [Company Captain -- Corne?]
ATTACHED HORSE CORNETS
   Roger Williams
   Rowland Yorke

10.19: Norreys's regiment (ii), summer and autumn, in Groningen and Friesland
1. John Norreys, colonel
2. Thos. Morgan, lieutenant colonel
3. Edmund Bishop
4. Christopher Carleill
5. Bowes
6. Richard Chatterton
7. Corne [repl. -- by Richards?]
8. Anthony Ellis
9. Doyley
10. Giles Gainsford
11. Ralph Salisbury
   Roger Williams (attached horse)

10.20: Norreys's companies in Tournai
1. Fitzwilliam
2. John Morris
3. Llewellyn
4. Rowland Yorke (one of foot, one of horse)

10.21: Captains of other units
1. Bold (horse)
2. John Brookesby
3. Thomas Cotton
4. Ralph Cromwell

10.22: Norreys's regiment
1. John Norreys, colonel and general
2. Thomas Morgan, acting colonel
3. Chris. Carleill, sergeant major
4. Bishop [repl. by Henry Norreys]
5. Ric. Chatterton [repl. by Kettelbie]
6. Thos. Cotton [repl. by Huntley]
7. Doyley
8. Fitzwilliam

* Regimental command effectively devolved onto Morgan because Norreys was commanding the army -- but Morgan did not have his own company
9. Giles Gainsford
   Edmund Huntley [vice Cotton]
   George Kettelbie[vice Chatterton]
   Henry Norreys [vice Bishop]
10. John Price
11. Rowland Yorke
ATTACHED HORSE CORNETS:
   Christopher Champernowne [repl. by H. Norreys]
   Roger Williams [from June]
   Thomas Morgan [from November]

10.23: Captains of other units
1. John Brookesby
2. Ralph Cromwell
3. Edwards
4. Llewellyn [repl. by Welch]
5. John Morris
6. Pigott
7. Rogers
8. Welch [vice Llewellyn]

Netherlands, 1582

10.24: Norreys's regiment
1. John Norreys, colonel
2. Roger Williams, lieutenant colonel
3. Doyley
4. Edwards
5. Edmund Huntley
6. George Kettelbie
7. Pigott
8. John Price
9. Welch
10. [Company Captain]
11. [Company Captain]
ATTACHED HORSE CORNETS:
   Henry Norreys
   William Williams

10.25: North's regiment
1. John North, colonel
2. Ralph Cromwell
3. Thomas Kellaway
4. Thomas Taylor
5. [Company Captain]
6. [Company Captain]
7. [Company Captain]

10.26: Cotton's regiment's captain, 1582
1. Thomas Cotton, colonel
2. Dalton
3. John Smith
4. [Company Captain]
5. [Company Captain]
6. [Company Captain]
7. [Company Captain]
   Thomas Cotton (attached horse)

10.27: Morgan's regiment
1. Thomas Morgan, colonel
2. John Morris
3. William Morris
4. [Company Captain]
5. [Company Captain]
6. [Company Captain]
   Thomas Morgan (attached horse)

10.28: Other known units -- regimental affiliation uncertain
1. Edmund Yorke (horse)
2. Rowland Yorke (horse)
3. William Markham

Netherlands, 1583

10.29: Norreys's regiment
1. John Norreys, colonel
2. Roger Williams, lieutenant colonel
3. Pigott, sergeant-major
4. Francis Aley

A number of captains from previous years may have continued in service in 1582, while it could have been a first year of service for captains of 1583 and after -- but there is no definite evidence placing any of them in the Netherlands in this year.

*Cotton died in Dec. 1582.
*Regiments are listed as they were before the disputes and confusion of Jul. 1583, on which see ch 4, above, p. 152.
5. Edwards
6. Edmund Huntley
7. Emmanuel Lucar
8. John Price
9. Robert Sidney
10. Tyrrell
11. Welch

ATTACHED HORSE CORNETS:
  Henry Norreys

10.30: Morgan's regiment
1. Thomas Morgan, colonel
2. Matthew Morgan
3. John Morris
4. William Martin
5. Thomas Wilson
6. John Hannam
  Thomas Morgan (attached horse)

10.31: North's regiment
1. John North
2. Thomas Taylor
3. [Company Captain]
4. [Company Captain]
5. [Company Captain]
6. [Company Captain]
7. [Company Captain]

10.32: Other known units
1. Rowland Yorke
2. Ralph Cromwell
3. Dalton
4. William Markham
5. Merton
6. John Smith
7. Vincent
8. Watson

Netherlands, 1584 and 1585

10.33: Morgan's regiment
1. Thomas Morgan, colonel
2. John Morris, lieutenant colonel
3. Watson, sergeant-major
4. John Gachill
5. William Gwynne
6. John Lee
7. Francis Littleton
8. Emmanuel Lucar
9. William Martin
10. Matthew Morgan
11. Anthony Powell
12. Henry Richards

  Vaughan (vice Martin?)

10.34 Other known units
1. Edward Cromwell
2. Ralph Cromwell
3. Nicholas Huddy [vice Sutton?]
4. Thomas James
5. John North
6. Robert Sidney
7. Thomas Sutton [repl. by Huddy?]
8. Roger Williams (horse)
9. Thomas Wilson

Netherlands, autumn 1585

10.35: Captains of units
1. John Norreys, colonel (one of foot and one of horse)
2. Roger Williams, lieutenant colonel
3. William Reade, sergeant-major
4. Thos. Bedwell, colonel of pioneers
5. Charles Blount
6. Edward Cromwell
7. Thomas Gainsford
8. Richard Green
9. John Hill
10. John Hunnings
11. Edmund Huntley
12. William Inge
13. Oliver Lambert
14. Francis Littleton

* As listed in the muster of 14 Sep. 1585, CSPFor., 20.25; BL, Harl. MS 168, ff 159v-60r; supplemented by Shaw, 'Financial and Political Relationships', xxxiii, xxxv, for additions and changes after Sept.
15. Barnaby Palmer
16. George Petty
17. Robert Shaw
18. John Sibthorpe
19. Robert Sidney
20. Edward Simmes
21. Thomas Watson
22. Thomas Wilson
23. Richard Wingfield
24. Edward Wolley
25. James Wootton

Netherlands, 1586

Note: From 1586 the survival of records of mercenaries in the Netherlands is much better, partly because the Dutch government was hereafter securely seated in the north, partly because of the involvement of the English government. There are rich sources including several abstracts of the muster returns of the English and Welsh troops in the Netherlands, both royal and mercenary, but individual companies changed their status from queen's pay to states' pay and even sometimes back again. These difficulties must be borne in mind.

Some of the captains in the following list were probably replaced by others on the list but the evidence for transfer of bands does not always survive. In consequence of this, and the fact that there is no attempt here to distinguish regiments, all captains are enumerated in table 10.37, regardless if they were replaced or were themselves replacements.

10.36: Captains of horse cornets:
1. William Knollys
2. Edward Norreys
3. Lord Willoughby

10.37: Captains of other units:
1. Edward Abarrow [repl. by Young]
2. Lord Audley
3. Arthur Barnes
4. Charles Blount [repl. by J. Warde]
5. Richard Bould

E.g., those of Captains Hill, Randolph and Wingfield, see app. 6, above, pp. 436, 461, 481.
At least some of these companies formed parts of regiments, though they may have been ad hoc and operational, rather than permanent and administrative, divisions.

George Digby was commissioned as a colonel by Leicester, while there are contemporary references to the regiments of Sir Thomas Sherley and Lord Audley. The probable division of companies into regiments is as follows:

Audley, Fulford, Gachill, Martin and Rich (Audley, colonel); Clarke, Digby, Lee, Raynes, Sampson, Tanner, Richard Ward, and two queen's-pay companies (Digby, colonel); and Dennis, George Farmer, Richard Farmer, Anthony Sherley, and Thomas Sherley, colonel. In addition, Stanley's Irish regiment was brigaded with four English and Welsh companies: those of Cosby, Gwynne, Hovenden and Edward Stanley. Lord Willoughby was a colonel in States' pay, but his regiment included no English mercenary companies.

See Knight, 25, citing Stowe's Annales; ARA, RAGP 1.206(ii), f. [2r]; and the next note.

* Doyley to [Burgheley], 24 May 1586, CSPFor., 20 668; list of companies at Zutphen, 26 Sep 1586, in Tenison, 6:204.

Tenison, ibid., Henry, 150.

The only captains known to have been in the original regiment are Vere, his brother Robert, Constable, Fairfax, Heydon and Swanne (on whom see in app. 6). It has been assumed that the rest of the line-up was close to that of 1595, below.

ARA, SG 8040.
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Nicholas Baskerville</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Robert Bell</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>William Constable</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Dormer</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Thomas Fairfax</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>John Heydon</td>
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<td>Jaxley</td>
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<td>Richard Smith</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Henry Swanne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Robert Vere [repl. by Horace Vere at the end of the year]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Netherlands, 1596° - 1597°**

10.41: Vere's regiment

1. Francis Vere, colonel
2. Henry Docwra, lieutenant colonel
3. Samuel Bagenal, sergeant-major
4. Henry Carey
5. Charles Chamberlain
6. William Constable
7. Dormer [repl. by Garnet]
8. John Heydon [repl. by Hammond]
9. Jaxley
10. Henry Swanne
11. John Upsher
12. Daniel Vere
13. Horace Vere

**Netherlands, 1598°**

10.42: Vere's regiment

1. Francis Vere, colonel
2. Henry Docwra, lieutenant colonel
3. Samuel Bagenal, sergeant-major [repl. by Honeywood]
4. Henry Carey
5. Charles Chamberlain

**Netherlands, 1599°**

10.43: Sir Francis Vere's regiment

1. Francis Vere, colonel
2. Henry Docwra, lieutenant colonel [repl. by Foster]
3. Yaxley, sergeant major
4. Callisthenes Brooke
5. Garnet
6. George Hammond
7. Walter Harcourt
8. Henry Holcraft
9. Honeywood
10. John Ogle
11. Henry Swanne
12. Tyrrell
13. Daniel Vere

10.44: Sir Horace Vere's regiment

1. Horace Vere, colonel
2. Henry Sutton, lieutenant colonel
3. George Aldridge
4. Benjamin Berry [repl. by Madison]
5. Edward Cecil
6. Joseph Duxberry
7. Thomas Knollys

*PRO, SP 84/54, f. 107r.*

*ibid.; ARA, SG 8041.*

*ARH, AJO 2943, 'Te Velde: Ende reste' (n.d., but winter 1597/88) and AJO 2945, 'Staet' of Vere's regiment (n.d., ascribed to 1585-90, but actually clearly from 1598). NB: the state van oorlog for 1598 (SG 8042) lists only strengths, not captains, of companies.*

*Staet' of military expenses, Apr. 1599, ARA, SG 4891; 'State' of captains of horse and foot, Apr.-Oct. 1599, ARH, AJO 2950.*
Madison [vice Berry]
8. Adolph van Meeterkerke
9. Charles Morgan
10. Charles Scot
11. Richard Smith [repl. by Breton]
12. John Upsher [repl. by Fairfax]
13. Vavasour

10.45: Other units
1. Edward Norreys
2. Nicholas Parker
3. Robert Sidney
4. Francis Vere

Netherlands, 1600

10.46: Sir Francis Vere's regiment
1. Francis Vere, colonel
2. Yaxley, sergeant major
3. Callisthenes Brooke
4. Dennis
5. Charles Fairfax
6. Foster
7. Garnet
8. George Hammond
9. Henry Holcroft
10. Honeywood
11. John Ogle
12. Tyrrell
13. Daniel Vere

10.47: Sir Horace Vere's regiment
1. Horace Vere, colonel
2. Sutton, lieutenant colonel
3. Edward Cecil
4. Joseph Duxberry
5. Kayes
6. Thomas Knollys
7. Adolph van Meeterkerke
8. Charles Morgan
9. Charles Scot
10. Giles Breton
11. Vavasour

10.48: Companies not on the Nieuwpoort campaign
1. Ralph Dexter
2. Walter Harcourt
3. Madison

10.49: Cornets of horse
1. Robert Arthur
2. Edward Cecil
3. Francis Vere

Netherlands, 1601

10.50: Sir Francis Vere's regiment
1. Francis Vere, general and colonel
2. Thomas Ball
3. Dennis
4. Robert Drury
5. Charles Fairfax
6. Foster
7. Thomas Friar
8. Garnet
9. George Hammond
10. Henry Holcraft
11. John Ogle
12. Daniel Vere
13. William Woodhouse

10.51: Sir Horace Vere's regiment
1. Horace Vere, colonel
2. Sutton, lieutenant colonel
3. Edward Cecil
4. Robert Drake
5. Kayes
6. Thomas Knollys
7. Madison
8. Adolph van Meeterkerke
9. Charles Morgan
10. Edward Scot
11. Vavasour

a NB. The division into regiments is speculative; not all the Veres' companies were in Ostend concurrently. Callisthenes Brooke's company was in Sir Francis's regiment up to July but was not transferred into Ostend.
10.52: Companies newly raised for Ostend
   1. John Bingham
   2. William Croftes
   3. Haughton
   4. Thomas Mynne
   5. Edward Reade
   6. John Ridgeway
   7. Richard Wigmore
   8. Edward Wilsford

3. A. van Meetkerke, sergeant major
4. Edward Cecil
5. Robert Drake
6. Thomas Dutton
7. George Holles
8. Thomas Knollys
9. Charles Morgan
10. Richards
11. Thomas Studder
12. Vavasour
13. Edward Vere

10.53: Other companies
   1. Callisthenes Brooke, acting colonel
   2. John Cooke
   3. Day
   4. Ralph Dexter
   5. Walter Harcourt

10.57: Other companies of foot
   1. Allyn
   2. John Bingham
   3. Callisthenes Brooke
   4. Butler
   5. Caesar
   6. Hatton Cheke
   7. Clifford
   8. Cockain
   9. Conigrave
   10. Francis Craft
   11. William Croftes
   12. Deacons
   13. Ralph Dexter
   14. Michael Doyley
   15. Frost
   16. Greville
   17. Walter Harcourt
   18. Thomas Horwell
   19. Thomas Hunokes
   20. Charles Johnson
   21. Kayes
   22. L'Isle
   23. William Lovelace Sr
   24. John Morton
   25. Mynne
   26. Norton
   27. Thomas Panton
   28. Edward Reade

10.54: Cornets of horse:
   1. Robert Arthur
   2. Edward Cecil
   3. Francis Vere

10.55: Sir Francis Vere's regiment
   1. Francis Vere, colonel
   2. John Ogle, lieutenant colonel
   3. Thomas Ball
   4. John Cooke
   5. Robert Drury
   6. Charles Fairfax
   7. Thomas Friar
   8. Garnet
   9. Philip Pakenham
   10. William Proude
   11. John Ridgeway
   12. Daniel Vere
   13. William Woodhouse

Netherlands, 1602

10.56: Sir Horace Vere's regiment
   1. Horace Vere, colonel
   2. Henry Sutton, lieutenant colonel

10.57: Other companies of foot
   1. Allyn
   2. John Bingham
   3. Callisthenes Brooke
   4. Butler
   5. Caesar
   6. Hatton Cheke
   7. Clifford
   8. Cockain
   9. Conigrave
   10. Francis Craft
   11. William Croftes
   12. Deacons
   13. Ralph Dexter
   14. Michael Doyley
   15. Frost
   16. Greville
   17. Walter Harcourt
   18. Thomas Horwell
   19. Thomas Hunokes
   20. Charles Johnson
   21. Kayes
   22. L'Isle
   23. William Lovelace Sr
   24. John Morton
   25. Mynne
   26. Norton
   27. Thomas Panton
   28. Edward Reade

Not all were in service concurrently, a number of captains were replaced by the end of the year, but whether during the campaign or after is not always known.

List of regiments, winter 1602/3, ARH, AJO 2946.
29. Rogers  
30. William Ryder  
31. John Whyte  
32. Wigmore  
33. John Wroth

10.58: Cornets of horse  
1. Robert Arthur  
2. Edward Cecil  
3. Lord Grey de Wilton  
4. Francis Vere

Netherlands, 1603

10.59: Sir Francis Vere’s regiment  
1. Francis Vere, colonel  
2. John Ogle, lieutenant colonel  
3. Henry Carey  
4. John Cooke  
5. Charles Fairfax  
6. Thomas Friar  
7. Lindley  
8. Philip Pakenham  
9. William Proude  
10. Daniel Vere  
11. Waldegrave  
12. Winter  
13. William Woodhouse

10.60: Sir Horace Vere’s regiment  
1. Horace Vere, colonel  
2. Henry Sutton, lieutenant colonel  
3. Edward Cecil  
4. Robert Drake  
5. Thomas Dutton  
6. George Holles  
7. Thomas Knollys  
8. Adolph van Meeterke  
9. Charles Morgan  
10. Pigot  
11. Thomas Studder  
12. Thomas Tracy  
13. Edward Vere

10.61: Other companies of foot  
1. John Bingham  
2. Callisthenes Brooke  
3. Butler  
4. Cæsar  
5. Hatton Cheke  
6. Coningrave  
7. Francis Craft  
8. Ralph Dexter  
9. Thomas Dale  
10. Michael Doyley  
11. Frost  
12. Gerald  
13. Greville  
14. Thomas Horwell  
15. Thomas Hunkes  
16. Charles Johnson  
17. William Lovelace Sr  
18. John Morton  
19. Walter Morton  
20. Thomas Panton  
21. Edward Reade  
22. Rogers  
23. Shelton  
24. John Whyte  
25. Wigmore  
26. John Wroth

10.62: Cornets of horse  
1. Robert Arthur  
2. Lord Grey de Wilton  
3. Edward Cecil  
4. Francis Vere

Netherlands, 1604

10.63: Companies of foot\textsuperscript{a}  
1. John Bingham  
2. Callisthenes Brooke  
3. Henry Carey  
4. Edward Cecil  
5. Hatton Cheke  
6. Coningrave

\textsuperscript{a} Division into regiments is conjectural.
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<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>John Cooke</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Thomas Dale</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Ralph Dexter</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Michael Doyley</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Robert Drake</td>
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<td>Charles Fairfax</td>
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<td>Thomas Friar</td>
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<td>Wigmore</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>Winter</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>William Woodhouse</td>
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10.64: Comets of horse

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Robert Arthur</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Edward Cecil</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Henry Pembroke</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>John Selby</td>
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Netherlands, 1605

10.65: Regimental field officers’ companies

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Horace Vere, general and colonel</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Thos. Knollys, lieutenant colonel</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A. van Meetkerke, sergeant major</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Edward Cecil, colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Hatton Cheke, lieutenant colonel</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Philip Pakenham, sergeant-major</td>
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<td>John Ogle, colonel</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Charles Morgan, lieutenant colonel</td>
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<td>Thomas Panton, sergeant-major</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Henry Sutton, colonel</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Thos. Horwell, lieutenant colonel</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>John Cooke, sergeant-major</td>
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10.66: Other companies of foot

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<td>2</td>
<td>John Bingham</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Brinsley</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Callisthenes Brooke</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Henry Carey</td>
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<td>Ralph Clarke</td>
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<td>Ralph Dexter</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Thomas Dutton</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Thomas Friar</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Gates</td>
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<td>George Holles</td>
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<td>Thomas Hunckes</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Charles Johnson</td>
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<td>Lindley</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>William Lovelace Sr</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Manners</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Nicholas Mason</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Henry Meolis</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>John Morton</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>George Orrell</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Francis Parkes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ARA, GRK 1232. Division of the other captains’ companies into the regiments is not known.
10.67: Captains of comets of horse
1. Robert Arthur
2. Edward Cecil
3. John Selby
4. Henry Pembroke

Netherlands, 1606

10.68: Regimental field officers’ companies
1. Horace Vere, general and colonel
3. Edward Vere, sergeant major
4. Edward Cecil, colonel
5. Hatton Cheke, lieutenant colonel
6. Philip Pakenham, sergeant-major
7. John Ogle, colonel
8. Charles Morgan, lieutenant colonel
9. Thomas Panton, sergeant-major

10.69: Other companies of foot
1. Jacob Astley
2. Baskerville
3. John Bingham

There were casualties, but which captains were replaced and which replacements is not known.
10.70: Comets of horse
1. Robert Arthur [repl by Radcliffe]
2. Edward Cecil
3. John Radcliffe [vice Arthur]
4. John Selby
5. Horace Vere

**Netherlands, 1607**

10.71: Regimental field officers' companies
1. Horace Vere, general and colonel
3. Edward Vere, sergeant major
4. Edward Cecil, colonel
5. Hatton Cheke, lieutenant colonel
6. Philip Pakenham, sergeant-major
7. John Ogle, colonel
8. Charles Morgan, lieutenant colonel
9. Thomas Panton, sergeant-major
10.80: Other companies of foot
1. Jacob Astley
2. John Bingham
3. Brinsley
4. Callisthenes Brooke
5. John Burgh
6. Henry Carey
7. Ralph Clarke
8. Clive
9. Connock
10. Conway
11. John Cooke
12. William Courtney
13. Thomas Dale
14. Ralph Dexter
15. Thomas Dutton
16. Michael Everett
17. Friar
18. Thomas Gates
19. Edward Harwood
20. Herbert
21. Robert Herle
22. Geoffrey Holcraft
23. George Holles
24. Thomas Horwell
25. Huntley
26. Charles Johnson
27. Lindley
28. George Lloyd
29. William Lovelace Jr
30. Nicholas Mason
31. Henry Meolis
32. Humfrey Parkes
33. Henry Peyton
34. Pigott
35. William Proud
36. Edmund Raynes
37. Rockwood
38. Walter Sanders
39. Shelton
40. Anthony Slingsby
41. Henry Sprye
42. Clement Turner
43. John Vere
44. John Whyte
45. Wigmore
46. Winter
47. Francis Woodhouse
48. Henry Woodhouse
49. Peter Wynne
50. Michael Everett

**Netherlands, 1608**

10.73: Comets of horse
1. Edward Cecil
2. John Radcliffe
3. Horace Vere

**ARA, SG 8043, also GRK 1232**
3. Edward Vere, sergeant major
4. Edward Cecil, colonel
5. Philip Pakenham, lieut. col.
6. William Proud, sergeant-major
7. John Ogle, colonel
8. Charles Morgan, lieutenant colonel
9. Thomas Panton, sergeant-major

10.75: Other companies of foot
1. Jacob Astley
2. John Bingam
3. Brinsley
4. Callisthenes Brooke
5. John Burgh
6. Henry Carey
7. Robert Carey
8. Ralph Clarke
9. Clive
10. Connock
11. Conway
12. John Cooke
13. William Courtney
14. Thomas Dale
15. Ralph Dexter
16. Thomas Dutton
17. Michael Everett
18. Fretton
19. Friar
20. Thomas Gates
21. Grenville
22. Edward Harwood
23. Herbert
24. Robert Herle
25. Geoffrey Holcraft
26. George Holles
27. Thomas Horwell
28. Huntley
29. Lindley
30. George Lloyd
31. William Lovelace Jr
32. Nicholas Mason
33. Henry Meols
34. Thomas Mewlys
35. Humfrey Parkes
36. Henry Peyton
37. Pigott
38. Edmund Raynes
39. Rockwood
40. Walter Sanders
41. Shelton
42. Anthony Slingsby
43. Henry Sprye
44. John Whyte
45. Wigmore
46. Winter
47. Francis Woodhouse
48. Henry Woodhouse
49. Peter Wynne

10.76: Comets of horse
1. Bernard Dewhurst
2. Edward Cecil
3. John Radcliffe
4. Horace Vere

Netherlands, 1609

10.77: Regimental field officers' companies
1. Horace Vere, general and colonel
3. Edward Vere, sergeant major
4. Edward Cecil, colonel
5. Philip Pakenham, lieut. col.
6. William Proud, sergeant-major
7. John Ogle, colonel
8. Charles Morgan, lieutenant colonel
9. Thomas Panton, sergeant-major

10.78: Other companies of foot
1. John Bingham
2. John Borlas
3. Brinsley
4. Callisthenes Brooke
5. Henry Carey
6. Clive
7. Connock
8. William Courtney
9. Thomas Dale
10. Ralph Dexter
11. Bernard Dewhurst
12. Thomas Dutton
13. Michael Everett
14. Friar
15. Thomas Gates
16. Edward Harwood
17. Grenville
18. Robert Herle
19. George Holles
20. Thomas Horwell
21. Huntley
22. Lindley
23. William Lovelace Jr
24. Nicholas Mason
25. Humfrey Parkes
26. Henry Peyton
27. Pigott
28. Edmund Raynes
29. Rockwood
30. Walter Sanders
31. Shelton
32. Henry Sprye
33. Wigmore
34. Winter
35. Henry Woodhouse

9. Charles Morgan, lieutenant colonel
10. Thomas Panton, sergeant-major

10.79: Comets of horse
1. Edward Cecil
2. John Radcliffe
3. Horace Vere

10.80: Regimental field officers’ companies
1. Horace Vere, general and colonel
3. Edward Vere, sergeant major
4. Edward Cecil, colonel
5. Philip Pakenham, lieut. col.
6. William Proud, sergeant-major
7. John Ogle, colonel
8. George Holles, acting colonel

9. John Bingham
10. Blundell
11. John Borlas
12. Brinsley
13. Callisthenes Brooke
14. Henry Carey
15. Clive
16. Connock
17. William Courtney
18. Thomas Dale
19. Ralph Dexter
20. Bernard Dewhurst
21. Thomas Horwell
22. Huntley
23. Lindley
24. William Lovelace Jr
25. Lovel
26. Nicholas Mason
27. Richard Munton
28. George Orrell
29. Henry Peyton
30. Pigott
31. Edmund Raynes
32. Rockwood
33. Walter Sanders
34. Shelton
35. Henry Sprye
36. Wigmor
37. Winter
38. Henry Woodhouse
39. Wynne

ARA, RvS 1226, RvS 1236; ARH, Collecte Goldberg 297.
10.82: Comets of horse
1. Edward Cecil
2. John Radcliffe
3. Horace Vere
APPENDIX 8
CAPTAINS AS CASUALTIES

TABLE 11
MERCENARY CAPTAINS DEAD ON ACTIVE SERVICE
(while serving in Huguenot or Dutch pay, 1562-160)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Almond, William</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Allyn</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Ball, Thomas</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Bedwell</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Bingham, Roger</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Bishop, Edmund</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Bostock</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Bourchier</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Breton, Giles</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Brookesby, John</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>Buddockshide, Philip</td>
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<td>12.</td>
<td>Butler</td>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>Champernowne, Christopher</td>
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<td>14.</td>
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<td>Chatterton, Richard</td>
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<td>Chester, Edward</td>
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<td>Clifford</td>
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<td>Cotton, Thomas</td>
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<td>Deacons</td>
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<td>22.</td>
<td>Dennis</td>
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<td>23.</td>
<td>Drake, Robert</td>
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<td>Duxberry, Joseph</td>
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<td>Fairfax, Charles</td>
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<td>Fitzwilliam</td>
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<td>27.</td>
<td>Foster</td>
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<td>28.</td>
<td>Friar, Thomas</td>
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<td>29.</td>
<td>Frost</td>
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<td>30.</td>
<td>Green</td>
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<td>31.</td>
<td>Gwynne, William</td>
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<td>32.</td>
<td>Harcourt, Walter</td>
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<td>33.</td>
<td>Holcroft, Henry</td>
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<td>34.</td>
<td>Haughton</td>
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<td>35.</td>
<td>Honeywood</td>
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<td>36.</td>
<td>Hunning, John</td>
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<td>37.</td>
<td>Kayes</td>
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<td>Liggins</td>
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<td>L'Isle</td>
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<td>Manners</td>
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<td>Owen</td>
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<td>Parkes, Francis</td>
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<td>43.</td>
<td>Richards, Henry</td>
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<td>44.</td>
<td>Richards</td>
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<td>45.</td>
<td>Scott, Charles</td>
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<td>46.</td>
<td>Simmes, Edward*</td>
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<td>47.</td>
<td>Sutton, Henry</td>
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<td>48.</td>
<td>Symons</td>
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<td>49.</td>
<td>Tyrrell [2nd]</td>
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<td>50.</td>
<td>Upsher, John</td>
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<td>51.</td>
<td>Vaughan</td>
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<td>52.</td>
<td>Vavasour, Richard</td>
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<td>53.</td>
<td>Vere, Robert</td>
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<td>54.</td>
<td>Wilsford, Edward</td>
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<td>55.</td>
<td>Yaxley</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Killed commanding a company in royal pay, but which had recently been switched from States' pay and was about to be transferred back thereto.

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APPENDIX 9
ROYAL CAPTAINS WITH EXPERIENCE IN THE RANKS OF MERCENARY COMPANIES

NB: Appendixes 5-6 incorporates those captains and other senior officers in royal pay who had held equivalent rank in French or States’ pay. This is a list of those that had previously served as mercenaries, but in the ranks.

Berkeley, Edward (c.1548-1596):

A gentleman volunteer on his own in the second civil war up to the battle of St Denis (10 November 1567), after which he was in the Prince de Condé’s gendarmerie company.¹ He fought in this during the third civil war until the prince’s death at Jarnac, after which he joined Henry Champernowne’s light horse company.² From 1572 he served with the Earl of Essex in Ulster and spent much of the rest of his career as a captain in Ireland.³ However, he may be the Mr Berkeley who visited the Netherlands in 1576 and certainly was briefly a captain in royal service under the Earl of Leicester.⁴

Finch, Thomas (d. 1589)

He raised a company of 100 foot for the Lisbon expedition on which he died of sickness. He was commissioned by Norreys so he may be the ‘Finche’ who was lieutenant of a company of Cavendish’s regiment at Rijmenam (and thus would have been known to Norreys).⁵

Greville, Fulke (1554-1628), of Warwickshire

In 1587 he briefly served as a gentleman volunteer under Henry of Navarre

¹ Churchyard’s Choice, sigs. K4v, Lii r. No ‘rolle’ for Condé’s company for this period survives, but it is known to have included foreigners: BN, MS Fr. 21490, f. 24r; Neuschel, 177.
² Churchyard’s Choice, sigs. Kii v, Lii r.
³ Ibid., sigs. F4v, K4v; Hasler, 1:429.
⁴ CSPFor., 11: 368, no. 897; Hasler, 1:429.
⁵ SRO, D593/S/4/20/1; Wernham, ENDSP, 213. Churchyard’s Choice, sig. Sii.
in France. Although a 'captain' in royal pay, his service was entirely naval. In 1580 he captained a ship on patrol in Irish waters. In 1599 (having been appointed to the administrative office of Treasurer of the Navy in 1598) he was made rear-admiral of the fleet gathered against the onset of the third armada. Greville had tried to enlist under Norreys in the Netherlands (1578) but was forbidden by the queen. He was sent on a mission to the Prince of Orange and Duke of Anjou in March 1582, along with Edward Norreys, but it was a quick visit and Greville was not among the many English gentlemen who briefly fought for Anjou in the spring of 1582.

Holles, Sir John (1564-1637), of Nottinghamshire

Holles was Muster-Master of Nottinghamshire 1595-96, but while he actively sought military appointments throughout his career and eventually acquired extensive military experience in both royal and foreign pay, this was the only office he was ever to hold. Although he had, as he himself declared, been 'bred up mostly in war', he did so as a gentleman volunteer. This included time in the Netherlands with his kinsman Sir Francis Vere in 1601 (as well as a possible spell in the 1590s). The story that he served in the Imperial army against the Turks derives from a misunderstanding of later recollections by a youthful relative. In 1608 Holles himself described his military career (in a letter seeking military office, in which it was to his advantage to emphasise his experience) and noted that he had served in Ireland, the Low Countries and on several naval expeditions, but not in Hungary.

In 1610, a regiment described only as that of 'Halles' took part in the Jülich campaign. Its commander could not have been Sir John, who had just been appointed Prince Henry's Controller of the Household. It was almost certainly Ogle's regiment, under the temporary command (in Ogle's absence in Utrecht) of Sir John's younger brother, George Holles. However,
while Ogle's lieutenant colonel, Charles Morgan, could well have been with
his colonel, it is unlikely that the regimental sergeant-major, Thomas Panton,
would also have been absent from the regiment on campaign in Cleves-
Jülich since the bulk of its companies were there and would then have been
left without any field officers. Yet it was George Holles, not Panton, who was
acting commander. It seems likely that Sir John Holles was instrumental in
raising the extra companies that reinforced the regiment and used this to
secure his brother's appointment.\textsuperscript{13}

The number of gentlemen volunteers who flocked to serve in the 1610
campaign was remarkable; it owed something to the fact that it was not
directly against Spain (and hence was consistent with Jacobean policy), but
even more to Henry IV's intention to command the French contingent in
person (which only failed to eventuate because of his assassination). Holles
was a confidante of the Prince of Wales, whose support for international
Protestant military action was notable and who was also a great admirer of
his namesake, Henry of France. The prince had made contact with Sir
Horace Vere shortly before the campaign broke out, showing his interest.
Sir John had already spent considerable sums supporting his brothers in
their military careers in the Netherlands and would continue to do so (if not
as much as they felt he ought to have given by the terms of their father's will);
and, as noted in chapter 8, he had maintained military service clauses in his
tenants' leases.\textsuperscript{14} I suggest, therefore, that the extra companies of English
troops (placed by the Dutch in Ogle's regiment as an operational expedient)
were raised for this campaign partly at Prince Henry's initiative, but with his
trusted officer Holles taking the leading part for discretion's sake.\textsuperscript{15} If this
hypothesis is right, it was John Holles's last contribution to the employment
of English troops by foreign Protestants.

\textsuperscript{13} Sir John's later quarrel with his brothers (a Jacobean cause célèbre) may seem to make this
unlikely, but in 1610 he was at odds only with his youngest brother, Thomas; he was on good
terms with George until 1617: see Seddon, 'Introduction', xxvii; BL, Add. MS 32464, ff. 23v-
24r, 31; Holles Letters, 1:154, 163, nos. 244, 256

\textsuperscript{14} See Trim, 'Sir Horace Vere'. Thomson, ibid.; Holles Letters, 1:20, 21, 66, 72, nos. 48, 54,
156, 161, and Seddon, 'Introduction', xxvii; Stone, Crisis, 216.

\textsuperscript{15} Even if Morgan or Panton did command the regiment at Jülich (and in the MS in question all
units are referred to by their commander's name), then the description of it as being Holles's is
even more striking and suggestive of a role in raising it.
Hussey, Roger (fl. 1572-90)

He held a captaincy in Sir James Hall’s regiment on the Lisbon expedition of 1589, during which he was acting regimental sergeant-major. Hussey had earlier been a sergeant, then ensign, in Captain-Lieutenant Robert West’s company at Flushing in 1572; a trooper in Henry of Navarre’s guard during the fifth war of religion in 1577; and the lieutenant of Edward Abarrow’s Dutch-pay foot company in the Netherlands, 1586. He served both in the ranks and as a captain in various companies in the royal armies in Scotland, Ireland, the Netherlands and France in the 1570s and 1580s.8

Johnson, James (fl. 1572-93)

Sergeant-major of Sir Ralph Lane’s regiment on the Lisbon expedition of 1589. He had earlier served as a gentleman volunteer in Capt. Bellingham’s company at the storming of Brill, and as sergeant first in Nicholas Palmer’s company, then in Captain Sutton’s company. He also had varied service as a private and NCO in royal forces from 1569 to 1592, on the Scottish border, in Ireland, the Netherlands, and France.17

Knollys, Henry (c.1542-1582), of Oxfordshire and Warwickshire

The heir of Sir Francis Knollys, he served as a gentleman volunteer with the army sent against the northern rebels in 1569 and as a captain in Ireland in 1573. In 1582 he joined his ‘cousin’, John Norreys, in the Netherlands and distinguished himself in the fighting retreat to Ghent in August. He died in the Netherlands on 21 December 1582, committing his estate to Norreys.8

Norreys, William (1545-1579), of Berkshire

He held offices in royal service in Ireland and on the marches in the 1570s. He first saw action in the second civil war in France (1567), alongside his younger brother, John.19 He was in France again during the early part of the third civil war (1568-69), but this time -- unlike his brother -- he took no part in

8 BL, Lans. MSS 113, f. 148r and 1218, f. 115r; Adams, Household Accounts of Leicester, 358; HMC Finch, 27; APC 17:245.
17 BL, Lans. MS 1218, f. 121v.
18 Hasler, 2:416; TDH, 46.
19 CSPFor., 8:374, no. 1837; and see above, p. 365.
hostilities. He went home to serve in the army sent against the Northern rebellion in 1569-70. This was a prelude to service in Ireland 1573-76, initially with Essex, during which time he became a captain of horse. He returned to England in 1578 and was appointed Marshall of Berwick in 1579, but was recalled to Ireland that October, and died there of a fever in December.

Percy, Henry (1564-1632), Earl of Northumberland

He earlier 'served as a volunteer in Holland' during 1585-86, but whether in Dutch or royal pay is unclear. He served as a volunteer in the Netherlands again in the autumn of 1588. Northumberland was appointed General of the Horse in the army gathered to defend against the anticipated Spanish invasion in 1599.

He went back to the Netherlands in July 1600, following the battle of Nieuwpoort. He served as a volunteer with Maurice during the campaigns of autumn 1600 and summer of 1601; then, in the autumn of 1601, he joined the garrison of Ostend. Northumberland left after a month, having quarrelled with Vere, who, he claimed, showed him insufficient respect. This ended his service with foreign Protestants; his last military office was from May 1603 to 1605, as Captain of the Gentleman Pensioners.

Ralegh, Sir Walter (1552-1617), of Devonshire

A gentleman volunteer under his kinsman, Henry Champernowne, in the third war of religion in France, he continued in service there after Henry's death. In addition, he may have served as a mercenary in the Netherlands.

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See CSPFor., 8:565, 586, nos. 2596, 2687, 9:143, no. 511. The 'fils de ... Maistre Norris', about whose involvement in some difficult matter Elizabeth wrote to Catherine de Médicî on 26 Aug. 1568 (AAE, MDA 98, f. 12r) was probably William, who had a reputation for loose living (CSPFor., 9:96, no. 327) and may have been involved in an affair with a woman (BN, Pièces Originales 2125 [MS Fr. 28609], art. 48274).

CSPFor., 9:150, no. 539; Hasler, 3:140; Churchyard's Choice, sig. R4r; GEC, 9:646. HMCR, 118; GEC, 9:646; Nolan, Norreys, 32.

GEC, 9:732, citing Stowe, 711, and HMC, 6th Report, 221, 227; Orlers, Nassauschen Laurencrans, 69-70; Bodl., St Amand MS 9, f. 54; Batho, 84.

Chamberlain Letters, no. 22. 1:80.

Ibid., nos. 30, 39, 1:100, 127; Sydney Papers, 2:205; Dalton, 1:59n; GEC, 9:733; HMCS, 11:286; Histoire Remarquable, 19r, 28v.

An early biographer's suggestion that he was with Norreys at Rijmenam is unproven; he was with Maurice during the Nieuwpoort campaign, but unlike the peers whom he accompanied (Cobham, Rutland and Northumberland), he was sent as an observer by the queen and stuck to this role, so it is debatable whether this was mercenary service. Ralegh's illustrious career as a sailor and soldier in royal service needs no elucidation here.

Russell, Sir William (1558?-1613) (later Lord Russell of Thornhaugh)

It was said in his funeral sermon that, after his Oxford education, he 'spent divers yeeres in travelling thorow France, Germanie, Italy, Hungarie and other countries', during which time he followed 'the warres in Hungarie, in France, in Ireland, and in the Low Countries'. He was given a license to pass beyond the seas for three years in January 1575, and so this was most probably the time of his 'grand tour'. This would mean that his service in France was in the fifth civil war in 1576. This would fit with his itinerary and the fact that his service in France came before his time in Ireland, where he obtained a company in 1580.

He joined the English army in the Netherlands in 1586 and was made Lieutenant Colonel-General of the English auxiliary horse (under the inexperienced Essex) -- he did not exercise a comparable jurisdiction over the Dutch cavalry. In 1587 he volunteered his services to Henry of Navarre, but nothing came of it and Russell remained in the Netherlands, succeeding Sir Philip Sidney as Governor of Flushing. In the summer of 1589 he gave up this office to Sir Robert Sidney and returned to England. Russell was later Lord Deputy of Ireland at the beginning of Tyrone's rebellion.

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30 Walker, 43-44; PRO, E 157/1, f. 1r. Service in France was presumably with Condé, but possibly with Montgommery or Montmorency-Damville -- see ch. 3, above, pp. 132-33.
31 Tenison, 6:211; Hammer, Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics, 48, 74; GEC, 9:239; ARA, Collectie Hardenbroek 4.
32 GEC, 9:239; DNB, 18:236; Falls, 186-87.
Sutcliffe, Matthew (1550?-1629), of Yorkshire

Sutcliffe was the Judge-Advocate-General for Leicester in the Netherlands -- a queen’s-pay rather than States’-pay office. He had earlier had ‘dangerous experience in France’, evidently as a gentleman volunteer. Since he had been given a license to pass beyond the seas in October 1575, this would have been during the fifth war of religion.\(^{34}\)

Sutcliffe additionally had a successful clerical career: he was installed as archdeacon of Taunton in January 1587 and as Dean of Exeter in October 1588. He was an author, notable chiefly for anti-Catholic polemic, but he also published *The Practice. Proceedings and Lawes of Armes* (dedicated to Essex) in 1593.\(^{35}\) This book was praised by Francis Markham, who referred to its author as the ‘Reverend and learned Doctor Sutcliffe’, settling the issue of whether Leicester’s judge-advocate is to be identified with the dean of Exeter.\(^{36}\)

Uvedale, Edmund, knight (d. 1606), of Dorset:

He was an officer in Morgan’s regiment at Antwerp in 1584-85, but not a captain.\(^{37}\) He had a queen’s-pay company in the Netherlands from 1585-97 and from 1591-97 was the Marshall of Flushing. On his return to England he held important administrative military offices in 1598 and 1599.\(^{38}\)

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\(^{34}\) Sutcliffe, *The Practice. Proceedings and Lawes of Armes* (1593), sig. B4v; PRO, E 157/1, f. 2v.

\(^{35}\) *DNB*, 19:175-77; Sutcliffe, *Practice*, sig. Cr.


\(^{37}\) *CSPFor.*, 19:254, 683.

\(^{38}\) Information from Paul Hammer; Hasler, 3:544-45.
APPENDIX 10

BRITISH MERCENARIES AND THE ENGLISH, DUTCH AND SPANISH ARMIES

This appendix provides troop strengths for the English, Dutch and Spanish armies, providing some context for the numbers provided in appendix 2. The figures for the Spanish army include British mercenaries, but they are not just English and Welsh, but Scottish and Irish as well.

Table 12. Dutch Establishment Strengths, 1575-1610

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Garrisons</th>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Garrisons</th>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1575</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1595</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1576</td>
<td>31,200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1596</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1577</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1597</td>
<td>31,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1578</td>
<td>39,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1598</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1579</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1599</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1580</td>
<td>34,600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>37,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1581</td>
<td>28,600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1601</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1582</td>
<td>11,900</td>
<td>28,600</td>
<td>40,500</td>
<td>1602</td>
<td>47,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1583</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1603</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1584</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1604</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1585</td>
<td>24,400</td>
<td>14,600</td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td>1605</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1586</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>1606</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1587</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1607</td>
<td>27,300</td>
<td>29,700</td>
<td>57,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1588</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1608</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCES: SL, 1:29, 33-44, 55-58, 65-66, 82, 176, 2:346-55, 64-69; KL, 8:60; CSPFor., 12:48-49, no. 61, 21/2:176; Holt, Aniou, 180; ARA, SG 11096, ff. 29-30, SG 8040, SG 8043, RAGP I:207, CAan. 1662, FAB 23, FAB 47, RvS 1226; Bodl., St Amand MS 5, ff. 6-8; Israel, Dutch Republic, 264; and, in addition, English establishment strengths have been added from table 7 (above, p. 344) when not already included in the Dutch figures.

All the troop numbers in table 12 are establishment strengths, rather than figures from musters. This is because there are very few years in which
figures from musters are available for most of, much less the whole, army. Years for which reliable establishment strengths do not exist or cannot be estimated are not listed. The numbers in table 12 total 784,200 men from 22 years, an average of 34,906 men per annum. Figures 17 and 18 allow an easy comparison of these strengths, for the staatsche leger as a whole, to the establishment for its Anglo-Welsh contingent.

Source: Table 7 and figures 8-11 (pp. 344-46) For 1579 and 1584 there are Anglo-Welsh, but not total, establishments, for greater comparative analysis, total figures were estimated by taking the average of 1578/80 and 1583/85 respectively.

To the Orangist rebels-cum-rulers of the United Netherlands, then, the perceived value of the English and Welsh mercenaries became greater over the course of the period since they employed more of them, relative to the Dutch war effort as a whole as time went on; this can be seen more clearly in
figure 18 (which plots the data from figure 17 as a curve). This, then, was the Dutch context. How significant, though, were the mercenaries’ numbers in comparison to the number of English and Welshmen fielded by their own state?

Direct comparison between national and mercenary troop numbers like that between mercenary and Dutch numbers is difficult. England was openly allied to the Huguenots, Henry IV and the United Provinces only from 1585 to 1602 and some of the peak periods of mercenary employment were before the Treaty of Nonsuch and after the Treaty of London.¹ Further, from 1588 to 1593 the mercenaries were almost wholly incorporated into the royal armies. Furthermore, there are only unsatisfactory figures even for establishment strengths of English armies during the Elizabethan war with Spain. The figures in Dr Nolan’s tabulation of ‘English troop levels’ for 1585 to 1602 are problematic and in some cases certainly understated, but even when alternative figures are available correction is difficult, partly because sources for particular years are unclear and partly because, although he implies the numbers are all establishment strengths some seem to reflect actual numbers.² Despite the limitations of his figures, however, they do give a reasonably accurate indication of the orders of magnitude and trends in the

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¹ As already noted in app. 2.
English national war effort and thus permit comparison with the mercenaries' numbers, at least at the level of official establishments.

Table 13. English Establishment Strengths, 1585-1602

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBERS</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1585</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>1594</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1586</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>1595</td>
<td>11,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1587</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>1596</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1588</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>1597</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1589</td>
<td>21,550</td>
<td>1598</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1590</td>
<td>13,050</td>
<td>1599</td>
<td>22,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1591</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1592</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>1601</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1593</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>1602</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The annual strengths recorded in table 13 total 290,000 in eighteen years, an average of just over 16,100 men per annum. These numbers are of course, the annual establishment strengths of troops in Elizabeth’s pay -- troops sent with amphibious expeditions are included, but not the sailors, nor the contingents of gentlemen volunteers raised on their own initiative by some commanders, which in the case of some expeditions (that to Cadiz in 1596, for example) were sizable. It is notable that this is slightly less than half the average planned strength of the Dutch army in this period. It is also notable that the official Elizabethan military establishment was approximately

---

3 Nolan’s stated total of 286,100 is greater than the sum of the figures in his table: they actually total 282,600. The extra sources thus indicate an increase of some 7,400, not 3,900, men.

4 As table 12 reveals, the total for the ten years between 1585-1602 in which establishments are known for the Dutch army is 348,000; the annual average of 34,800 is virtually the same as that for the period as a whole.
the same in all years that hostilities were confined to the Low Countries, as figure 19 (which plots the data in table 13) reveals. The median strength is somewhat higher in years when English troops were additionally deployed in France but it rose most significantly when the theatre of operations expanded to encompass the Iberian peninsula and Ireland.

Bearing in mind these figures (and those in appendix 2) it seems clear that the reason the planned number of English and Welsh mercenaries in the Dutch army rose in 1596 and remained on an upward trajectory thereafter until the Twelve Years' Truce was Dutch military exigencies. There is no real correlation between increases and decreases in English queen's-pay and mercenary establishments. There is certainly no evidence that mercenaries in this period were used instead of royal troops or vice versa -- doubtless there were natural limits to English manpower commitments, but these were never reached. We ought not conclude that there was an optimum figure for the number of English and Welsh soldiers employed (whether as soldiers of the queen or mercenaries) which effectively determined troop levels. Army sizes were a function of the military requirements of the English and United Provinces' governments rather than of demography. It is striking that in 1601 and 1602 there were substantial increases in the official and actual numbers
of both the Dutch army and the royal army in Ireland. Army sizes, then, were set by policy not by population.

Another set of statistics exists that provides context to the commitment of English and Welsh mercenaries abroad. During the eighteen years of the war with Spain, as table 13 shows, over 113,000 men were raised in England and Wales to serve in the queen's pay in armies deployed abroad. The figures in table 14 are largely those of C. G. Cruickshank, drawn from appendix I in his *Elizabeth's Army*, but almost inevitably he overlooked some drafts; where these have been found, they have been added to his figures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1585</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1586</td>
<td>4,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1587</td>
<td>4,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1588</td>
<td>6,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1589</td>
<td>4,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1590</td>
<td>4,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1591</td>
<td>8,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1592</td>
<td>2,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1593</td>
<td>3,025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1594</td>
<td>5,900</td>
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<td>1595</td>
<td>1,781</td>
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<td>1596</td>
<td>11,237</td>
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<td>1597</td>
<td>9,285</td>
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<td>1598</td>
<td>9,564</td>
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<tr>
<td>1599</td>
<td>2,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600</td>
<td>7,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1601</td>
<td>9,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602</td>
<td>4,035</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is, finally, also instructive to compare the Dutch and English national war efforts with that of their chief enemy. The strength of the Spanish army of Flanders (broken down by nationality), in each year for which a muster of the whole army survives, is given in table 15. The numbers of Spanish troops sent abroad each year through the period are recorded in figure 20 (which is thus comparable with table 14). British mercenaries in Spanish pay were not as long-lasting nor as numerous as their compatriots in Dutch employ.
Table 15. Troop Numbers and Nationalities in the Spanish Army of Flanders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Spanish</th>
<th>Italians</th>
<th>'Burgundians'</th>
<th>British Isles</th>
<th>Germans</th>
<th>Netherlandish</th>
<th>Infantry Sub-Total</th>
<th>Cavalry</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1572</td>
<td>9,100</td>
<td></td>
<td>24,440</td>
<td>19,500</td>
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<td></td>
<td>53,040</td>
<td>14,219</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>16,200</td>
<td>33,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>57,500</td>
<td>4,780</td>
<td>62,280</td>
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<td>8,016</td>
<td></td>
<td>27,449</td>
<td>38,110</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>73,575</td>
<td>12,750</td>
<td>86,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>23,600</td>
<td>25,420</td>
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<td></td>
<td>56,650</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>59,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1576</td>
<td>6,125</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>21,226</td>
<td>22,616</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49,967</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>51,457</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8,680</td>
<td>9,692</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24,565</td>
<td>3,038</td>
<td>27,603</td>
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<tr>
<td>1580</td>
<td>384</td>
<td></td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>29,678</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>43,062</td>
<td>2,373</td>
<td>45,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1582</td>
<td>4,636</td>
<td>4,754</td>
<td>26,438</td>
<td>20,295</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>57,623</td>
<td>3,539</td>
<td>61,162</td>
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<td>1588</td>
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<td>1,556</td>
<td>1,722</td>
<td>11,309</td>
<td>30,211</td>
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<tr>
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<td>55,442</td>
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<tr>
<td>1601</td>
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<td>1,204</td>
<td>1,718</td>
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<td>4,678</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,553</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1607</td>
<td>6,545</td>
<td>3,579</td>
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<td>2,442</td>
<td>16,776</td>
<td>14,018</td>
<td>44,605</td>
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<td>48,769</td>
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<tr>
<td>1609</td>
<td>6,528</td>
<td>2,613</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>1,699</td>
<td>3,571</td>
<td></td>
<td>15,259</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>16,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>86,121</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,394</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,986</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,326</strong></td>
<td><strong>219,959</strong></td>
<td><strong>270,060</strong></td>
<td><strong>613,846</strong></td>
<td><strong>60,605</strong></td>
<td><strong>674,451</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 20. Spanish Troops Sent to the Netherlands/Ireland/France Per Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>9,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1568</td>
<td>2,427</td>
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<td>1572</td>
<td>1,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1573</td>
<td>5,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1575</td>
<td>430</td>
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<td>1577</td>
<td>6,231</td>
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<tr>
<td>1578</td>
<td>8,409</td>
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<td>11,159</td>
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<td>5,415</td>
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<td>1586</td>
<td>2,000</td>
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<td>1597</td>
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<td>1598</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1601</td>
<td>13,314</td>
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<tr>
<td>1602</td>
<td>9,759</td>
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<tr>
<td>1603</td>
<td>3,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>1604</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1605</td>
<td>10,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1606</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>136,231</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source (table 15 figure 20): Parker, *Army*, apps A-C, pp. 271-79 (corrected -- some of the printed totals in app. A are incorrect) I am grateful to Professor Parker for permission to utilise his data
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III:32 ‘Estat en brief de ce que convient pour faire une monstre generalle a larmee’ [1578]

IX:8, points discussed between Maurice of Nassau and the Council of State, July 1585.

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12576 Loketkast Engeland

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6, letters, William of Orange and the States-General to the States of Flanders (nineteenth-century copies of documents in the Ghent city archives).
593, Thomas Morgan to Christiaan Huygens, secretaty of the Council of
State, 1589.
879, summary of subsidies received from France and detailed accounts for
their expenditure, 1598-1609.
1662, summary *staat van oorlog*, 1587.

**Verzamelingen**

Verspreide Collectie (1.11.02)
6, Bodley to the States-General, 1592.

Collectie Jacobus Koning (1.13.07)
12, States-General to the Count of Lalaing, 21 Jul. 1578.
16, 'Estat en brief [...] de gaiges et soldes des gens de guerre', [1578].

**Tweede Afdeling**

Collectie Goldberg (2.21.006.51)

Algemeen Rijksarchief, Derde Afdeling: Rijksarchief in Zuid-Holland

Archief van de Staten van Holland (3.01.04.01)
11, 13-15, 19-20, register of resolutions of the States of Holland, 1575, 1577-
80, 1584-85.
281, index of resolutions of the States of Holland, 1524-79.
5848, *staat van oorlog* for 1598.

Archief van Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (3.01.14)
1318, John Ogle's correspondence with Oldenbarnevelt from Utrecht, 1610.
2943 Two documents (numeration supplied):
   (i) 'Liste des Compagnies Angloises' [n.f., foliation supplied].
   (ii) 'Te Velde: Ende reste. Voetvolck' [also a list of companies].
2945, lists of companies of foot and of horse in States' service: the *inventaris*
dates this 1585-90, but in includes a list of English companies which
other documents allows us to date with certainty to 1598.
2946, three MSS, all unnumbered and undated: one is a list of captains, with regimental affiliations, and the garrisons they were to be stationed in over the winter, which information from other documents shows to be the winter of 1602/3.

2950 'State van der namen der hoofden ende Capt. van ruyteren ende Voetvolck soe d'selve respectulen zijn gereparteert over de Provincien, [...] Mitsgaders vande monsteringen [...]', 22 Apr.-23 Oct. 1599

2952 'Lijste vande Comp. de bevonden werden inde leste generale monsteringen nijet gemonstert te zijn, daer van de Rollen noch nijet ter handen zyn gecomenen', [1600].

2971, Sir Ralph Winwood's proposal to the Council of State concerning Sir Francis Vere, 1604.

2976, Dutch and English texts of Elizabeth's commission to Sir Francis Vere as Governor of Brill, 1598 (original).

2977, duplicate of the States-General's commission to Vere, as General of all English troops in States' service, 19 Jan. 1599.

Archief der Rekenkamer ter Auditie 1572-1805 (3.01.28)

338, 'rekening' of Lumey de La Marck's treasurer, for 29 Jul.-22 Sep. 1572

346, 'rekening' of Michiel de Wael, commissaris van de ammunitie, 8 Feb. 1574-31 Jan. 1574; including 346A, appendix, register of issue of ammunition and weapons, covering up to 1576.

All Souls College, Oxford, Codrington Library

MS 104

MS 129, narrative of Walter Morgan, 1572-73.

MS 211

Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris

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22
Mémoires et Documents, Angleterre

16 ‘Discourse sommaire’ by Jehan Bernard on English history
97, 98 nineteenth-century transcriptions of MSS

Mémoires et Documents, France

28, ‘Princes estrangers en France’
242
763

Berkshire Record Office

D/EN O4/1, Neville family papers: documents relating to impressment of men for service in Brittany in the army commanded by Sir John Norreys.

Bibliothèque Mazarine

MS 2085
MS 2592

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704
3159
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3179
3185
3190
3193
3220
5785, description by Charles IX's herald and British languages secretary of the Earl of Lincoln's ambassadorial entourage in 1572.
16106, correspondence of Sieur de Goard (French ambassador in Spain), 1574-1579.
16127, reports of French ambassadors in the Spanish Netherlands, 1571-94.
18587
20787, notes made by Lancelot de Voysin de la Popelinière (c. 1575?) for a history of the *guerres de religion*.
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23275
23335
25801, 'Montres' [collections of musters], 1564-67.
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4709, Claude de la Chatre, 'Relation du voyage du duc d'Anjou au Pays Bas', 1582-83.
8626, 'Montres', 1567.

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MS 754/2, 'Papiers de Coligny'.
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C.193, daybook of John North during his travels on the Continent, 1575-77.
D.109, Fortescue Papers

Carte Manuscripts

56

Douce Manuscripts

393

English Historical Manuscripts

f.8

North Manuscripts

b.25, North family papers

Rawlinson Manuscripts

B.74, pedigrees
B.139, pedigrees
B.146
B.285, papers of Peter Edgecumb

St Amand Manuscripts

5
6 (bound together with MS 7 and 8)
7, mostly letters received by Sir John Norreys.
8, letters received by Norreys.
9
10, mostly Norreys's accounts from his Lord Presidency in Munster, 1585-85.

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78
80
169, Common-place Book of Sir Stephen Powle.

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32502, North Family Miscellaneous Papers 1563-1789.
35831, correspondence of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton.
38033, transcriptions of MSS in the Collection de Gaignières, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.
48023, anonymous notes for a history of England from the death of Henry VIII [possibly by John Hales, c.1563].
48084, Yelverton MSS (papers of Robert Beale).
48116, Yelverton MSS (papers of Robert Beale).

Cotton Manuscripts

Galba C.iii
Galba C.viii
Galba D.v
Titus B.vii
Titus C.vii
Vespasian F.vi
Egerton Manuscripts
1694

Harley Manuscripts
168
253
287
782
1041 Visitations of Gloucestershire, 1583 and 1623.
6992
6993
7186 diverse collections, including the first Earl of Pembroke’s Stewards’ Accompts [I owe my knowledge of the existence of these accounts to W.R.B. Robinson.]

Lansdowne Manuscripts
14, 15, 16, 17, Burghley Papers, 1572-73
42
81
113
1218 ‘Lists of Justices, Sheriffs, etc’ -- but ff. 113-40 comprise ‘The Booke of the Captaines, Liuetenauntes and other officers at the Warres’.

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MS Dd.xi.76, meditations and prayers by Oliver Pigge, 1585-88.
MS Ee.iii.56, private letters of Lord Burghley to Sir Robert Cecil, 1593-98.
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[All examined on microfilm at the British Library.]

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1364, inventory of the possessions of an English soldier, Richard Lazenby.

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